

INTERVIEW WITH T. ALEXANDER POND
FORMER EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
December 18, 1987

Dr. Hartzell: An interview with T. Alexander Pond, Executive Vice President and Chief Academic Office, State University of New Jersey, Rutgers in New Brunswick, in his office, on Friday, December 18, 1987, in his office and at his home.

Dr. Pond: This is Thomas Alexander Pond. I came to Stony Brook, I'll recite my appointment after this, I came to Stony Brook in late July of 1962, except it was then Old Westbury, not Old Westbury, Long Island Center at Oyster Bay, and you can supply the exact date because it was about two or three working days before you arrived at Oyster Bay.

Dr. Hartzell: I arrived September 4.

Dr. Pond: Well, then I misremember, because I thought it was the day before me. Gee, are you sure, I thought it was before that.

Dr. Hartzell: I was probably

Dr. Pond: Did you visit there before you took on

Dr. Hartzell: I think I may have.

Dr. Pond: Because I remember being summoned over while I was literally unpacking my briefcase with Bob Merriam to meet you and you asked me why I had come. First you asked Bob Merriam, the senior person present, and Bob said he came, I think it's Bob, I hope I'm not, it was a biologist, Bob or something like that. He said he came because he didn't have to do a lot of teaching around here. I thought that was a rather stupid answer, so when you asked me, I told you that I hadn't been here long enough to decide.

Dr. Hartzell: I remember going out of that meeting with you, and asking you when you had come. It turned out we both came the same

Dr. Pond: I came at any rate into an appointment as Professor of Physics and Chairman of the Department.

Dr. Hartzell: Let me stop you just a second. I have never known how much you people knew about me before I came, whether you had had any voice at all or say in my coming.

Dr. Pond: I think, I certainly hadn't, but that would be understandable because I had so recently arrived; but there was, saving your presence, a good deal of indignation floating around and I am quite sure I recall that part of that was some measure of absence of consultation. For example, had there been consultation, I expect I would have heard about it because I was in closest touch with the Department of Physics and with Fran Bonner in Chemistry, and there was a name prior to yours, and I am sure you know who that was, and he was gunned down, which I guess taught someone not to consult with the faculty. Not that it would have happened to you, but

Dr. Hartzell: I don't know who it was. I know that there was a man from Pennsylvania who was considered, and as I understood, did not take the job. That was Loren Eisley.

Dr. Pond: I didn't hear about that. Of course his name, he was nominated for every job everywhere in that period. Some months prior to that while I was still very much in St. Louis, but I guess I had decided to come, Oscar Lanford was brought forward as

Dr. Hartzell: That was after I was there.

Dr. Pond: No, Karl, it happened at least the first time before you were there.

Dr. Hartzell: Was he brought in twice?

Dr. Pond: If he came in after you were there, he came in twice. And I didn't hear about it the second time around.

Dr. Hartzell: He came in after I had been there, was brought in by Harry Porter, and was shot down by the faculty.

Dr. Pond: That happened before I got there. The crucial observation to be made is there would have been a dreadful stink if that had been pressed, as you may have guessed. There's quite a serious statement of concern.

Dr. Hartzell: Well, I don't know anything about that.

Dr. Pond: Ask Francis Bonner about it if you need first

Dr. Hartzell: All right, good.

Dr. Pond: Cause I never met the man until years later. In fact I may well have met his now famous son before I met him. Happy day! I consider him to be one of the major disasters which overtook, major detailed disasters which overtook SUNY.

Dr. Hartzell: I'm glad it wasn't at Stony Brook.

Dr. Pond: Oh, Stony Brook was very much part of the disaster. As a matter of fact let me, I was down there last week, up there,

Dr. Hartzell: I know you were, and I was at it earlier and I had to go out after the meeting.

Dr. Pond: And I, at 7:30 Saturday morning in a driving rain, I took a quick trip around the campus -- enormously depressing. But it struck me as I drove on, as it always does, at how perfect Oscar's revenge on John Toll was; the, as you know, you may have noted, the campus, of course in our view, was very far from finished. I had in particular two structures that opted into the campus were denied for expansion -- the Math Building and the Administration Building. They were concrete block walls that were to come out eventually Shortly after I was back, the Construction Fund came along and bricked up those walls, finished brick and then

Dr. Hartzell: Just the drive on the east side of the Administration Building?

Dr. Pond: The Nicoll Road side, yeah, east side. Then shortly after that, just to drive a silver spike through the shade of John Toll, Oscar put that appalling parking structure on the intended site; and he even did it with non-matching brick. An absolute statement; and I can just see him cackling over the perfection of that revenge on those people he surely must have hated as much as anyone in the world. The thing about it that bothered me though, we had done all the politicking to get the money for the building and but it was his shot by that time; and he sure fixed us, fixed that campus forever, irreparable piece of work. So, I came to Stony Brook, and I was Professor of Physics and Chairman of the Department, and that persisted for some time.

Dr. Hartzell: Do you want to go into that now? You had been at Washington University previously.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, I was 37 years old at that time; I had come from Associate Professor of Physics at Washington University. It's hard to say who, well, that was my initial appointment, and persisted until '68.

Dr. Hartzell: Who brought you in?

Dr. Pond: I knew a number of people, the most direct connection was that Ed Lambe and I were in the same department at Washington University, and he went away from St. Louis mad the year before, it turned out, I left St. Louis. I was pretty sure, well, the reason I didn't tell you why I came to Stony Brook, nor did you ask me why I left Washington University, I was quite concerned that Washington University, while it is a wonderful little university and always has been, just a splendid place, it was pretty clear to me that the world of physics was going to pass Washington University by, and it did. It's done some wonderful things since then, but relative to the stature that it

Dr. Hartzell: Arthur Compton.

Dr. Pond: Under Arthur Compton and Arthur Hughes it has, well, that's neither here nor there. But, at any rate, I had been worrying a number of, for several years I had been something of a leader in the junior faculty there worrying about the future of the University and that put me in the frame of mind of thinking about the university that made me, it turns out, somewhat susceptible to the invitation from the people at Stony Brook to come and take the chairmanship of this very young, this non-department. Some of the people who played a role in that were virtually everybody in the Department. I had long contact, not intimate, but known of him and known him a bit was Leonard Eisenbud, the first Chairman, since I was a student. Arnie Feingold was a graduate student ahead of me; Bob De Zafra was an undergraduate while I was a graduate student. And it was, I must say, from the very instant that I sat down with them, it was, the whole group attracted me. It was really quite an extraordinary bunch; and I think that's still clear in the character of the Department.

Dr. Hartzell: I think so.

Dr. Pond: They were a Nelsonian band of brothers, I hesitate to pinpoint with anyone with Nelson, but it was a very collegial place that cared intensely about what was happening. And let me record what was said several times last weekend, certainly by me too, that I think the most important days work in all of Stony Brook was done before either of us was there, was done so far as I can tell by Sidney and by, critically, Arnie Feingold, who as you know was Dean of the Graduate School for a while before they, I guess he quit when the dust-up with Jerry. But in the aftermath of that trauma, when both sides were trying to figure out who had won, Arnie and Sid and perhaps Fran, I don't know, got a hold of Porter or someone like that and said, what you must do to stabilize things is to authorize doctoral programs instantly; and Physics got one, so that at the time I was talking with them, they were recruiting their first group of students. The reason that that was absolutely critical was that it put the key arguments into our hands in the formative years about the nature of what it was we needed, and it turned out, of course, that the people we were talking to, while they, for at least a period, could not prevail against those arguments, had no earthly intention of their being a research university on Long Island.

Dr. Hartzell: I believe you're talking about the Central Office.

Dr. Pond: Yup, and a succession of Chancellors. The difference between the Heald Report and the first Master Plan was intended. The question that I bet you never pressed, I certainly never pressed, cause I didn't want to hear the answer. But the fact that they, to quiet the yattering of half the faculty at Stony Brook, they authorized that doctoral program, that was the ball game. And I think the history of the place, when it's written, should find out when that was; it was during the immediate aftermath of the sacking of Lee, and it was a delegation. I think those were the three people, maybe there was someone else along, maybe Tom Irvine went along, I don't know. That was the day the State of New York got put on the, put at serious risk of acquiring a major University on Long Island, even though it did not really feel that

Dr. Hartzell: That was either very late '61 or early '62.

Dr. Pond: Well, it would have been the very earliest '62, because much into '62 would not have been possible to recruit a graduate class. I have the flyer at home, I have about 8 copies of the flyer at home, which I think is a historic document.

Dr. Hartzell: Do you want to send me one?

Dr. Pond: I was looking for it just last week; I have a folder, my house is packed with debris, they are not organized; I will continue to look and send you; they are very handsome, light gray and pink ink, very classy looking. You would have thought the place was something, some serious university, rather than this fraudulent group in a dormitory. So, all those people were responsible. They got no help from anyone, there being no one there to help.

Dr. Hartzell: Porter came in just about that time.

Dr. Pond: Well, he was sort of commuting. And I remember, vaguely remember meeting with him. He, of course, at least in my dealing with him, was very inscrutable. Of course, he had a lot to be inscrutable about. I gather that, as you I am sure have heard, I got to be somewhat comfortable with him later, and we had some very nice discussions. But apparently his assignment to Stony Brook was torture to him; he just had a terrible time, and my heart really does go out. I'm sure everybody was very mean to him.

Dr. Hartzell: I don't think that he and Tom Hamilton saw eye to eye very closely, and Harry was an historian by background. And really a very gentle kind of chap.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, I think of him often. I'm a gentle type of chap, even despite what I do from day to day.

Dr. Hartzell: Okay. To interview for the position here, let me

Dr. Pond: Meaning Stony Brook?

Dr. Hartzell: Stony Brook, yeah. Oh, you covered that.

Dr. Pond: I came to the New York meeting in January 1962 and met with everybody in the Department, and we came back out to Long Island, and I looked around and I, the weather was miserable is what I mainly remember, but we began to develop plans at that point. Why did you come, what factors were most important in your decision? At that

point in time, SUNY was a joke, you may remember. It was pretty much a joke in the circles that I moved in. As, for example, believe it or not, one of the few people, few colleagues in St. Louis that I sought to talk about it was Barry Commoner, who believe it or not I'm one of the few people who really likes Barry Commoner, few people you'll ever meet; I admire his sense of systems and potential. I don't scientifically, we're on different wave lengths, but he wouldn't even talk to me about it, he said it was a contemptible notion. It amuses me that Barry wound up in Queens; he is now retired from Queens. But at any rate, the, I imagine one aspect that conditioned my thinking, it seemed to me that Physics, which is the only thing I was interested in at that point, was at a crossroads, academic Physics was at a crossroads that, with the clear recognition now of the need to double the size of the higher education establishment, which had started in '58 with, it was in the latter part of the Eisenhower administration, and received very clear enunciation from Kennedy at the very beginning of his administration, that those states that had the biggest problem had a serious possibility of writing something new and very exciting, research university business, and obviously New York was at that point was a spectacular example of a rich, sophisticated needful State that had incredibly delayed its decision making on how it was going to address the imperatives of public higher education. It seemed to me, in fact I remember saying it

Dr. Hartzell: Dewey had already done it, taken the first step in '48.

Dr. Pond: But it was a non-step. By agreement of everybody nothing could be done for ten years. As I understand it, there was a secret codicil that nothing serious would be undertaken. The risks were obvious. The State had no record of accomplishment. Such institutions as it had were either, when they were good, they were trivial; when they were bad, they were very bad. And at least in Physics, in the sciences, the pretensions of the Master Plan, the 1960 Master Plan were read as a joke. For example, the first public speeches that I gave on Long Island was our summon to the meeting of the New York Physical Society, the New York Chapter of the American Physical Society, at Farmingdale, at that high-flying academic institution that operated a little storefront down

there, to give my plans for the department. And I gave them a very serious talk about how there were going to be fifty faculty and three hundred graduate students, and the University was going to have between ten and twenty thousand students, that I was pressing for twenty thousand. And we were going to do the following things, and we were going to be big in high energy, and we were going to do nuclear physics, we were going to have major strength in theoretical physics to complement Brookhaven, and they laughed. They laughed at me. Now, that was quite embarrassing, that really wasn't my fault, but I must say I laughed next because every word of it came true, every damn word of it came true, and it came true in five years, except for the three hundred, we never got over 130. But, that's another story, we could have. It seemed to me, and I may have said to you, that when it became clear, was beginning to be clear by 1962 that Rockefeller was seriously intending to do this thing and also had solutions for the obvious problems, namely, the physical limitations, I then concluded it was going to happen. The plan was going to happen, and an enterprise of that magnitude serious people burrowing away over in the corner, even as the whole organization could probably get something done. I said that in those years as a joke; there was a little bit of prophecy in that though. But the attractions of Stony Brook, of course, are the, at that point, were that it was in the downstate part of this wonderful state. It is in the, under the full supervision of a very sophisticated region, which knows what quality is, hasn't previously been interested in investing in it, but they damn well know what it is. That there would not be any risk of not being noticed.

Dr. Hartzell: You were within hailing distance of Manhattan.

Dr. Pond: *The New York Times* was a very important object, and *The New York Times* doesn't give a rap what's happening in Buffalo, but they sure care what's happening around now. I wish they cared a little more about that in New Jersey, but where we have good news for them. But, at any rate, it seemed to me that the State was indubitably going to move, that Rockefeller showed the direction in which the money could come from. It was not a matter of ten sequential gambles on the Legislature. He

hocked the students so that he could build the place. Clever, clever idea, just brilliant. Do you know who's idea that was, did you ever hear? John Mitchell. Isn't that

Dr. Hartzell: The Attorney General.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, his credits were in bond counseling, and he thought up the notion of the moral obligation bond and the political device of securing them with tuition; the Legislature would not fail to appropriate tuition assistance, but they might fail to appropriate buildings. Very clever. We're doing a bit of that down here, very quiet. Not nearly as grandiose. But, at any rate, it was obviously a wild gamble; the other resources beyond the metropolitan region, having the metropolitan mandate outside City University, the proximity of Brookhaven, as you recognized instantly, and so it turned out, which makes me feel especially badly that the University could not have been of more assistance to Brookhaven in their time of terminal grief, they deserved better from us than they got, more smarts. That to me is acutely embarrassing because they blast and launched

Dr. Hartzell: You mean the Isabel problem?

Dr. Pond: Yes, I think that's just a scandal, and

Dr. Hartzell: Did that happen after Johnny left or while he was still there?

Dr. Pond: It was beginning to happen while he was there. In fact I remember Frank mentioning some concerns about it, the need for political intervention couldn't be reasonably identified until 1980 or so, I think. I know I was worrying in '79 and of course nothing was done at that time. It has to be said that the initiation of the problem certainly was squarely attributable to Brookhaven, but greater shortcomings than that have been forgiven in this country, when people insist that it happen. But that I am afraid was a pretty profound signal to you all out there and having enjoyed so many benefits from the support of Brookhaven, the University and SUNY and the State owed them a lot and they never got it. And we over here when the, I was over here by the time it probably got really rough, and I was signaling frantically, I can deliver you two Senators, I can do

lots of things for you, no one asked. There was just no effort. The Northeast deserves everything that happened to it in that decade, most annoying.

Dr. Hartzell: I didn't know really much about what was going on.

Dr. Pond: Well, that's a symptom of the problem, you should have known all about it, you should have been writing your Congressman, but no one told anyone that. But, at any rate, let's see, oh yes, why did one go there? That was one reason, also I thought the location, quite beyond the proximity of Brookhaven, was an extraordinary advantage. It is a very beautiful area; it was clear it was then just beyond the reach of suburbia. It was clear that was going to break at about the same time the University went in and that one could envision a shockingly middle class sort of environment for attracting faculty to, and that's terribly important. One could see some reminiscences of Palo Alto, Pasadena, and San Remo and that sort of business, which I think in the case of Stamford, for example, was quite crucial to their success. It was not the only reason they prospered so mightily, but they grew in exactly the period when, they grew in quality in exactly the period when that sort of extension of the conventional '50's notion of the good life was very important to faculty, and it was important to the people that we attracted, I think. You recall how worried you were about everybody living in New York, well very gradually the faculty thought this was the place to be, by and large.

Dr. Hartzell: Prices have gone sky high.

Dr. Pond: It was not that especially, I think, we sold out; fortunately, our investment here has appreciated too.

Dr. Hartzell: Well, that's good.

Dr. Pond: Let's see, so what other reasons, uh, well, as I say I was taken, Arnie Feingold had a library of the key documents of the system from the late '50's and early '60's, and I was very greatly taken by the Heald Report. I thought that was an extraordinary document. I figured one could fake the differences between it and the 1960 Master Plan for as long as they didn't really raise the question up there.

Dr. Hartzell: New York has so many resources, New York City in particular, in terms of highly intelligent, experienced individuals, but the University, until Wharton got his last Commission going, the University didn't seem to be tapping them the way they should have.

Dr. Pond: I would say I haven't seen any change in that. The city resources have been understandably, continue to be aloof as Stony Brook developed, simply because it was at that, in those same years, very late in the game that they decided that City University had to become more of a public charge; but particular, that of course, those, in any case, an enormous resource, the people. But the particular version of opportunity that I saw in the simultaneous development of a university, of an ambitious research university in the midst of a developing region, I'm talking now about Nassau-Suffolk, was that that's really very rare. You do not often see an opportunity for institution to put its stamp on a region. Stamford came along a little bit behind the development of the peninsula; although they certainly managed to put a stamp on what happened afterward. I thought that was an especially interesting opportunity; it was clear that there was going to be a complex and quasi-independent, not independent interactive, but a discrete region was growing up at the same time that Stony Brook was to be built. And it was our conceit that Stony Brook had a very leading role to play in that.

Dr. Hartzell: I know you mentioned that. I've got some specific questions for you. This is the general set, but

Dr. Pond: Oh, well, let me go on and knock off the general set. My understanding of my purpose behind the creation of Stony Brook, I've already indicated some understanding of the documents and what I made of them. What was the vision being transformed into reality? Our vision to create an extraordinarily powerful, singularly powerful State University, that was the Department's vision. And that was our purpose. Impressions of Stony Brook when you first came, campus, people, leadership and spirit? Well, of course, it was a tiny, tiny place. Everybody seemed unaccountably cheerful considering what had happened the year before. And don't know whether you agree but

the shock seemed to expire fairly rapidly, at least among the people that I hung around with.

Dr. Hartzell: You were with a group that wanted to get on with the job of building the University. There was a group that felt, I think, somewhat out in the cold, and had been anti-Lee, pro-Austill and Olsen.

Dr. Pond: Why were they not happy since they succeeded in getting rid of Lee? Why did not have, I think their agenda, why didn't we hear more about their agenda?

Dr. Hartzell: I think they were, now this is purely my reaction after the fact. I think that the Chicago group was divisionally minded, and there were no scientists among them, I don't think.

Dr. Pond: There were a couple of biologists, I think. Mainly, there were no scientists.

Dr. Hartzell: And somehow there was enough bitterness left over when I came, and I hadn't been in the office more than a couple of weeks when a man came in and said, this place is going to go to the dogs unless you fire that person and that person. And there was enough friction in, so that in committees if one, a representative of one group made a statement, it was almost sure to be a counter for every statement from a representative of another group, quite irrespective of the value of the two statements.

Dr. Pond: I don't really remember; I guess my committee service was, well, I served fairly steadily on the Faculty Executive Committee, or whatever they called it then, but I wasn't on a lot of task-oriented committees.

Dr. Hartzell: I had to preside at one or two of them, and for a while it held us up, but I think people became more and more exasperated at one or two individuals, Nelson in particular. I appreciated the statement that was signed by a group of the faculty, about 70, who started that, do you know.

Dr. Pond: I couldn't tell you; I think I remember it,

Dr. Hartzell: You remember it?

Dr. Pond: In fact I think I have a copy of it in my papers.

Dr. Hartzell: I had to deal with representatives of the press, who were looking for controversy.

Dr. Pond: Oh, yeah.

Dr. Hartzell: But I think I gradually got Martin Buskin turned around.

Dr. Pond: Marty became quite a good friend of ours, yours, excuse me. Okay, well, the [interruption]

Dr. Hartzell: You were both the Executive Vice President, and what's the other title?

Dr. Pond: Chief Academic Officer.

Dr. Hartzell: Chief Academic Officer, good.

Dr. Pond: The reason that's not called Provost is that, like we did at Stony Brook, we use Provost differently here, the three campus principal people are called Provosts at the University, so I'm a central figure, and they are campus figures. Actually, it's a very poor arrangement because our campus leaders are not recognized appropriately; they should be called Presidents. And the reason they're not called President is that Blaustein can't be called Chancellor because Ken Oliver is Chancellor. The minute Ken Oliver I'm going to advocate seizing the Chancellorship and I will become a Vice Chancellor.

Now, or maybe even a Provost, who knows. I should live so long. Well, as to events and persons and experiences that stand out in my mind, maybe that should be the bulk of our discussion.

Dr. Hartzell: All right, let's, why don't we take over this group of questions from there.

Dr. Pond: My role in the planning and organization in the Department of Physics, well, I was the second Chairman; Leonard, it was a Department, I think, actually only for a year or two prior to my coming there. Leonard had no desire to continue in that, he couldn't get out of it fast enough. So they were recruiting for a Chairman and that turned out to be me. There was no plan, nor could there have been one. There was just enough written down to support a proposal for a Ph. D. There was a very good undergraduate program with some quite good students, but there had been no thinking about the, what

reach we should be planning for the Department, nor had there been any opportunity to provide for the Department's needs either in terms of physical resources or supporting personnel. You recall how much worry we shared on that issue. Nor was there, was the Department very well plugged into the national research science, national physics.

Dr. Hartzell: This is when you came, this is as you found it?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, there was a little bit of grant support; Nandor Balazs and Jim Ras, but there was an enormous amount of work to do. So we planned and planned and planned, and I must say by and large it almost, well, at about the 80% level it worked out the way it intended. There was, of course, as there was in all departments, an intense amount of recruiting. The Department went to meetings in a platoon and every week we had at least a couple of people in, and we studied them intensely and the main physical planning we had some, I had some medium-range, shortish-range plans that could largely be accommodated in the Physics Building, the Old Physics Building, Metaphysics as it's lately called. I gather it may be called Harriman now. That's a terrible name for it and an insult to the great man. But the, that was clearly temporizing, that kept us busy through the, it was possible to believe that the Department could develop satisfactorily and be contained in the Physics Building until 1965 or '67 or so without really suffering from disaster. You must remember we didn't get that building until '63. We spent the whole first year with no facilities whatsoever. My graduate student had to work in Oyster Bay, which was, I have felt guilty about ever since, I was not very good for him, although he did get his Ph. D. Uh,

Dr. Hartzell: Was Les Paldy in Physics?

Dr. Pond: Not at that time, no, he had just graduated. He was an undergraduate. But the first thing we did was, well, along the way to temporizing and getting up and going, you may recall having to swat me away on various occasions on the importance of finishing the basement and then finishing the attic. Actually Nelson Rockefeller's bomb shelter was also an historic investment. You recall he hit the panic button in '60. Edward Teller apparently scared the whey out of him and he ordered that bomb shelters be put in

all public buildings when they were being built. Physics got one and Chemistry didn't. By the time '64 or so rolled around, no one was worrying about bomb shelters any more. And the cookies had all rotted. For example, Bob De Zafra, I think, found a barrel in the basement that was a big industrial sized barrel that was full of pressed meat, absolutely full up to the top of bad pressed meat to give to the troops in case they were worrying about nuclear disaster. But at any rate, that space, which was some ten or twelve thousand square feet, occurred singularly in the Physics Building because Chemistry was planned before Physics and that, and our ability to finish off the attic, which was the other project that I then came around and beat your chops, those were absolutely key, because each of them we managed to make sure brought in equipment budgets on the order of a quarter million dollars or so, so that long after, well, the first year we were there, we spent happily planning the expenditure of the order of a million dollars for equipment of the Old Physics Building before we moved into it. And that really got us going pretty well. But then the steam runs out of that, so those other little projects kept us perking until the big money began to come. The big, the first big piece of the plan, you may recall, was the notion that we should have a major research facility, and we did an analysis and concluded that there should be a tandem Van der Graff, and you may recall that kept growing.

Dr. Hartzell: I remember that one.

Dr. Pond: It finally got quite big and it's still running. It's a howling success. Peter Paul, the current Chairman of the Department, came in as a pup on that machine and then run it for several years and at the crucial time when that generation of machines was being to lose its clout with the funding agencies, he came up with a modernization of it, the super conducting accelerator, heavy ion accelerator that is now in place. Let me tell you why that worked right now, because I'll forget if I don't. That was about 1974, and when the competition to upgrade your FM tandem came in the middle '70's, the only way to win it was not have to ask for a building. The NSF didn't have enough money to fool around with that

Dr. Hartzell: And you had the space.

Dr. Pond: Tapped the whole of the wall in, boom. I must say I am as proud of that piece of planning as any that I've been involved in.

Dr. Hartzell: Well, I remember your asking me to write a letter to Harry Porter about the Van de Graff, which I did; and then you went down to Princeton and saw something that made you want to get then

Dr. Pond: A bigger one.

Dr. Hartzell: The bigger one, the next generation.

Dr. Pond: Actually, it was down here, it was Rutgers.

Dr. Hartzell: Was it?

Dr. Pond: This is exactly the same machine and it costs \$600,000 more. A little ridiculous, but that was, incidentally, a very, very wise investment. On the building, the Construction Fund, that was the most complicated project the Construction Fund had ever had to do. That was the first really proper research facility they'd ever touched. A lot of grief over that, but it came out just a splendid building. It cost 50% more than they made provision for because we didn't tell them it was a three-story building, and they never figured it out.

Dr. Hartzell: So, you got a grant from the NSF.

Dr. Pond: The NSF gave us an absolutely key grant, the first big grant we got. Well, the serious planning of the Department began shortly before Toll came. As you may recall, he called for ten year plans, in fact he called for them before he arrived.

Dr. Hartzell: Before he arrived, right.

Dr. Pond: And I spent most of that summer in '65 working for the committee you appointed that was chaired by Sheldon. Have you talked to Sheldon Ackley?

Dr. Hartzell: I haven't. I don't know where he is.

Dr. Pond: I believe he's a Unitarian minister in New York City.

Dr. Hartzell: Is he really? I think I should.

Dr. Pond: I think he's in charge of the Unitarian Fellowship or some such thing. Talk about rumors, there was one that whistled around the campus when he turned up, that he was going to be the President.

Dr. Hartzell: No, Gould suggested that he be my Assistant.

Dr. Pond: I remember that, I remember now. But in any case, those plans then became really big, we were, that was serious planning there, not mid-range satisfied thing which is what we had done prior to that. That was a lot of fun, we nailed it together by '66 or '67, and the basic features of the Department that we plotted out then, like the ITP and the Stony Brook Radiation Lab and the major expansion of the new facilities, the big lab, and we were all pretty clearly derived from that period when we were talking a fifty-five member faculty at least, we had arguments that it could get bigger. And the main problem in sustaining the growth of the Department was keeping capital coming in in some sort of tiered way. The State had this habit of feast or famine, but we worked out satisfactory arrangements to stretch those funds, so I think that those capital investments were as productive of quality results as one could find anywhere. But that was a lot of fun and it kept me busy.

Dr. Hartzell: You and Johnny worked well together.

Dr. Pond: He was generally critical of my plans if they were not sufficiently ambitious, so I would take them back and speed them up a bit. But I quickly got over that. He did not have much criticism of our plans, but many features of course, the spectacular features were the ITP and the Stony Brook Radiation Lab, which

Dr. Hartzell: IT, the Institute for Theoretical Physics.

Dr. Pond: Correct. The decision of Frank to come to Stony Brook was, had a major impact on our plans. That made certain, although let me assure you, that was planned, long before Frank ever heard about it. We had that one in the sights; it was clear that the place should always have an extraordinary investment in theoretical physics as long as Brookhaven was there; and that just worked very, very well. The hard job, harder job was getting things like high energy going in an institutional environment that had not

experienced supporting high level research. But that went pretty well. But it was good, it was good. Now, the Council of Department Chairman, that didn't exist so far as I know in any formal way. It was never authorized by Toll, and as a matter of fact, we spent a good deal of time worrying that it was a vehicle for diverting the responsibility and the authority of Deans and some of the Vice Presidents. I was, as I mentioned, quite active in the governance body, the Executive Committee I think it was called then, the Faculty Executive Committee. But the Council of Chairmen didn't, if my recollection is correct, didn't emerge as an *ad hoc* body until somewhat into Toll's administration; it was an anti-Toll rallying point. And for that reason we gave it no aid or comfort; by that time I was in the administration. It was, that was Norm and that gang.

Dr. Hartzell: Goodman?

Dr. Pond: Yeah.

Dr. Hartzell: Oh, uh, huh.

Dr. Pond: Well, it was a varying group, and we may have been mistaken in thinking that it was going to cause more mischief than help, but the quality of department chairs at Stony Brook, of course, was, as I suppose at most big places, very uneven. And it certainly didn't seem to me that they were contributing what they ought to to the management of the place. It's really the most important office there is, and what you can get done is determined by the sum of the qualities of those people; but it seemed to me that the clustering there had to be between the Deans and their Chairmen, and it's not a university-wide club, because they had a job to do, different here than it is from there, and the notion that the problems of the College of Engineering could be solved by a Council of Chairmen, for example, always struck me as bizarre. Is that there for some reason or?

Dr. Hartzell: It's there because I think Sidney thought that you had had a hand in its formation?

Dr. Pond: Well, I had, it's quite the opposite, what I did do in the early years while you were in charge was systematically get myself elected to every faculty office -- the

Executive Committee, the accessible one being the Executive Committee in the Senate, so that there was no way that Sam Gould could approach that campus without encountering me. That, Sidney, I think, was aware of that. He was away part of that time.

Dr. Hartzell: Yes, he was at Mannes.

Dr. Pond: But that was what I did. As a matter of fact, that was a clearly important tactic. Gould was, I know you wouldn't approve of the fact that I was trying to monitor what Gould was up to. Give you a little help in that. But the membership in the Senate, the University Senate, this is the University-Wide Senate, the SUNY Senate was reasonably useful

Dr. Hartzell: To keep a check.

Dr. Pond: In that regard, it may have had something to do with forcing attention to Toll. In fact, I know it did. That may have been what he had in mind.

Dr. Hartzell: I don't know. Well, that would, I don't remember you as being in any way a burr under my saddle, so to speak, as were

Dr. Pond: Well, I enjoyed working with you. I didn't, I thought you had an extraordinarily difficult task, and I really honestly tried to help.

Dr. Hartzell: Yeah, I think you did. And you did, you were helpful.

Dr. Pond: Toll's name first cropped up at Stony Brook in connection with the Dean of the Graduate School search. I recall that

Dr. Hartzell: We had a vacant line, and I felt that

[end of tape 1]

Dr. Pond: To pick up at the key point following John's consideration for the Graduate Deanship, this was about some time in '63 the Executive Committee was charged as a Search Committee, and that's when he emerged as, first, one of several candidates, none of whom was Oscar Lanford, as far as we were concerned, and then fairly quickly it boiled down to a determination in that body that Toll was the guy for us, and then it was a waiting game, not a waiting game but a stalking game with Gould and company.

Dr. Hartzell: Did you know that Sullivan asked me to go down and interview Johnny?

Dr. Pond: No, Johnny never told me that.

Dr. Hartzell: Sullivan asked me if I thought that John Toll would make a good President, and I said yes. "Would you go down and interview him, see if he was interested in the job?" And I said, yes. So I went down, stayed overnight with him, had breakfast with him, and talked about what our plans were and he already knew

Dr. Pond: I had sent him every document that he could

Dr. Hartzell: And he asked me, why aren't you interested in the job. And I told him that I wasn't, that I was interested in the academic side, faculty, curriculum, students, but not in the top administrative position. And then we made arrangements for him to come up to Coe Hall, actually to the cottage. I briefed him for about eight hours on what he was going to face in Albany. And that's when he went up and saw Larry Murray and Harry Porter.

Dr. Pond: A very significant figure in that search was George Collins, who succeeded Justice Sullivan sort of halfway through that process, didn't he? When did Collins

Dr. Hartzell: Collins was on the Board, he was on the Council.

Dr. Pond: He was, I think, Chair or Acting Chair at the time of Johnny's appointment, because I always dealt pretty carefully with George Collins, you better believe. It was perfectly appropriate, he never told me anything of what was going on inside the Council, but my policy was to hang close nearby everybody that had anything

to do with it and make sure that they didn't want for information or editorial opinion, if that was welcome.

Dr. Hartzell: You did a good job.

Dr. Pond: I wrote, I still treasure a stream of letters from John, incredibly cheerful and optimistic, utterly belying everybody's temper, and which I fed him sedulously every development, how splendid Sam Gould looked as he came aboard. John, of course, I don't really feel guilty about that because John is a pretty acute guy, pretty hard to lead along. But the most vivid recollection I have of the closing part of that was that following, probably the visit you mention, to Albany he came back, I thought directly, but almost immediately, in any case, to our house to prepare a letter, typical Johnny style, he wanted to commit a minute on his discussions with the people in Albany. And he wrote, you probably saw it, simply extraordinary document, 39 single spaced typewritten pages on reflections on the future of Stony Brook, and he wrote that in my study, with me getting data and phoning questions to Sid and other people. He was not, at that point, he was not allowed on the campus. He had been told to stay off the campus. And

Dr. Hartzell: Do you have a copy of that?

Dr. Pond: I'm pretty sure I do, yeah.

Dr. Hartzell: Because that ought to go into the Archives.

Dr. Pond: I'm not sure I should give it to you, perhaps Johnny would be the person to give it to you. Let me know if he won't. It's absolutely pure Johnny. You would just laugh and laugh, but it's superb and absolutely, comprehensive, prescriptive set of steps to achieve the goal that he said I'm going to now describe how we will achieve a university of absolute first-class dimensions in a novel and thrifty way. As I recall that letter was followed by a long period of silence is what I can see those guys up in Thurlow Terrace looking at this thing and saying, what have we got here.

Dr. Hartzell: The only one chap up there that I felt was really on our side and that was Dave Price.

Dr. Pond: Yes, what a splendid fellow Dave was. And a good soldier too, he never broke ranks with his buddies up there. But plainly they were very, very, very reluctant over John and that would be an interesting history. I don't think you would be able to find that out.

Dr. Hartzell: I know that Sullivan wrote a letter to Gould saying that, when he came on board, the first person that the Council wanted him to interview was John Toll, they shouldn't start looking beyond Toll. Toll was the first person that he should look at.

Dr. Pond: Sullivan didn't replace George Collins, did he? No, but he did. Justice Sullivan replaced George Collins when George Collins retired, is that right?

Dr. Hartzell: No, George and Ward Melville and I were the three incorporators of the Foundation.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, I knew that.

Dr. Hartzell: And George was on the Council.

Dr. Pond: But the Chairmanship. George wasn't around too much longer after he retired and went to Virginia.

Dr. Hartzell: Yeah, then Andy became the Chairman of the Council, but I don't know when. He was Chairman for nine years, and I think has been on the Council a couple of years prior to that time. I don't know, I'd have to look it up.

Dr. Pond: Well, but that was, we were getting lots done during those years, '63 to '65, and things were really going awfully well, but I was obsessed with the problem, it was so plain that we were being held up for a determination on the presidency, and I must say I was convinced that Toll was singularly suited to the problems immediately ahead. And I really did get quite obsessed by, so did others I think, I think Harry; I see you talked to him, I don't whether you went over this period, but, and Sidney, and Stan.

Dr. Hartzell: And Ross.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, there's a hero that needs some singing, I think. He did a good job for you.

Dr. Hartzell: I want you to say more about Ross.

Dr. Pond: I see you've got some names down there and he's among them.

Dr. Hartzell: Now look, my experience is you can only take so much at a sitting, so to speak.

Dr. Pond: Should we go on a little while and then head home and relax for a bit and have some dinner, because Barbara's not worrying about anything.

Dr. Hartzell: She isn't, all right, okay.

Dr. Pond: The formulation of the first Master Plan, Sheldon wrote the fluff, and I did the operational plan in the Appendix, which I think was a fairly important document; I'm really quite, I did all the calculating by hand, by oil light. The

Dr. Hartzell: Was that before Johnny came on board?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, it had to be done in the summer, that's what you had the Committee doing, and the problem, of course, was how to write something that set out some reasonable initial parameters without pre-empting an appropriate academic planning process, and that's where the 5 university model came from, which as I have now got probably more experience than anyone I know in this line of work, is probably about where the process should stop.

Dr. Hartzell: What do you mean?

Dr. Pond: I don't have high regard for what you can do in terms of generalizing about the future of the University beyond describing its dimensions and attempting to characterize its standards.

Dr. Hartzell: So much depends on the character and quality of the individuals, you can't do that.

Dr. Pond: I remember too the Route 128 business, the success of that was absolutely minimal, although there was a very brilliant possibility towards the end there that it could succeed mightily. That, I think, is a very long story. I'd like to talk a bit about that, let's pull it out and come back to it, because a principal failure of the University has been the absence of coupled impact, and that's something that I think some, why did that happen, merits some attention, and I have

Dr. Hartzell: I remember talking with you, knowing that you had that same concept. In coming from Boston myself, I could understand what you had in mind.

Dr. Pond: Well, Karl, that is the largest missed opportunity. Well, I mentioned earlier the attractiveness of the Long Island situation, the simultaneous growth of a high quality comprehensive University and the region around it; this would be the principal mechanism to carry that out. Not a literal Route 128; I had in mind a vast generalization of that, but generally speaking, the economic impact. Well, I'm very fortunate to have had an opportunity to play that scenario again here, and it works. Let me tell you, it works.

Dr. Hartzell: That's fine.

Dr. Pond: Big, big amount of energy there. It's going to make this University something that you wouldn't believe based on its history. The budget formulas for SUSB, we did not really develop budget formulas, we interpreted, there was a State process that originated actually from the XDB. There was a basic funding rationale, except it wasn't very rational, and they changed it from year to year. But we played vigorous games with them to try to beat them at that game. We never used it, though, never used the budgeting, strictly the budgeting formula, to allocate for the campus, because it was inadequate. It did not take, in fact our constant criticism was that it did not take adequate attention, care to reflect the social University practices and differences by level of instruction, by discipline, and we made a lot of money by that game. But we never used their formula from year to year to allocate the campus, what we did do starting with, in the very late '60's with Bill Moran and followed by Carl Carlucci -- incidentally, both very significant names.

Dr. Hartzell: I have interviewed Bill Moran, but not Carl Carlucci.

Dr. Pond: Carlucci is the Vice President for Finance at Brooklyn College, and he is the senior staff member for the Assembly Committee on Ways and Means. Did you know that? Did you know you had a man there?

Dr. Hartzell: No.

Dr. Pond: What shame, what a shame. I doubt that Marburger knows.

Dr. Hartzell: I don't think so. Incidentally, if you want to look at that. Let's see, Carlucci's first name.

Dr. Pond: Carl, C-A-R-L C-A-R-L-U-C-C-I.

Dr. Hartzell: His title at Brooklyn College.

Dr. Pond: Vice President for Finance and Administration, or something like that.

Dr. Hartzell: What was the title that you gave me?

Dr. Pond: He was for a long time Director of Long Range Planning, which was Bill Moran's first title, and then in the last years he was there,

Dr. Hartzell: Long Range Planning, where?

Dr. Pond: At Stony Brook.

Dr. Hartzell: At Stony Brook?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, and at the end of the time he was also a Special Assistant to the President for all sorts of things.

Dr. Hartzell: To Johnny?

Dr. Pond: No, to me.

Dr. Hartzell: To you.

Dr. Pond: I guess he served Johnny too. For a time John Burness went off to get a Ph. D. at Maryland, and Carl took over Albany. He's not listed here as at Brooklyn, which is a little bit strange. I guess maybe he went there after this came out.

Dr. Pond: What is that?

Dr. Pond: The Administrative Directory.

Dr. Hartzell: I see.

Dr. Pond: He spent part of the time in Albany, obviously, and the other thing he does every so often is re-district the State for the Democrats; he's a whiz at that. So, that's maybe, since they're doing it now. He's a very well connected young man. His uncle is the Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Hartzell: Is that right.

Dr. Pond: He's one of the students that I'm prouder of.

Dr. Hartzell: He's a graduate of Stony Brook?

Dr. Pond: No, no, he worked for me for years and years. And we made a lot of money together.

Dr. Hartzell: Good, all right.

Dr. Pond: For the University, not for ourselves, let me hasten to add. I mention him because he was a key inside figure, it was as you know, from year to year, a rather small number of people with John who bound and loosed, and he was one of them, so was Bill Moran, although less so. We were more structured then. The other enormously significant figure was

Dr. Hartzell: Was Carlucci connected at all with the Legislature in Albany?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, he worked for them there.

Dr. Hartzell: He worked for them there.

Dr. Pond: Well, he is Mel Miller's, he's essentially Mel Miller's chief of staff, and then he's also head of the Legislative, the Assembly Committee on Staff, Committee Staff on Re-Districting. And he was just an acute analyst and with his work. He's a graduate of Harriman School, and we took him on as the first of the student assistants. He wound up as Director of the Office.

Dr. Hartzell: Graduate of Harriman School.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, actually, I think a Syracuse undergraduate, but another, while I'm on names, is John Burness on your list?

Dr. Hartzell: Yeah, but I haven't interviewed him; I'll do that.

Dr. Pond: He worked from 1970 on, absolutely key figure in the University, really nice things happened. Let's see, we got onto this from budget formulae. What we did do in the Long Range Planning Office, was begin, and let me say this was at Bill Moran's insistence that we started very early. I'm proud only that I didn't discourage him. I should have realized as quickly as he did that we needed an actual data base in practice, and we were very far forward in State University urging them to do the CASA studies

and to measure the workloads of their people. It was very successful, obviously so that we could get at the question of what are the actual practices instruction by level and by discipline, so that those pink books that I still keep a deck of here, probably the best research ever done in higher education on the subject, be in, proved in, and it took three or four years of very hard work to get the data squeezed out so that it was truly consistent and honestly, reasonably honestly reported. Binghamton and Buffalo are probably still gypping, we never gypped a bit, hardly. But those number began to take on, began to show tribal wisdom, you can see there the difference, not only by level and by discipline, you can see systematic differences between the University Centers and the Four-Year Colleges. And by the time the data got good, times had gotten fairly bad, and we were able to prove year after year a wonderful result off of those reports issued by the Central Administration, namely that Stony Brook was cost-effective in everything it did in comparison to the other University Centers and in comparison to the College of Arts and Sciences, where there was comparable activity. And that was an enormously powerful lever at a period when they were really laying for us, year after year after year. We made a little bit of money even though they set out to screw us every time.

Dr. Hartzell: Why did they do that?

Dr. Pond: Because they didn't like us, and besides Long Island was not in their thinking. They did not want to see Stony Brook prosper. So, the budgeting formulae, the eclectic judgmental budgeting that we did through the '70's, Sidney a little bit, Sidney then too, and I'm glad for Sidney, was far more closer to an appropriate allocating mechanism than anything that the Division of the Budget

Dr. Hartzell: Did you have any help in the Division of the Budget, did Veillette understand what you were doing?

Dr. Pond: I think Veillette understood everything that we were doing, and I think, he was a very complex man, I think he was somewhat sympathetic, but he, of course, he's a bureaucrat. He had instructions, and I don't think that his instructions ever included anything except get them wherever you can for Stony Brook. And it may very well be, it

would be interesting to know, it may very may be that he quietly did us a lot of good. Because, in other words, it might have been a lot worse.

Dr. Hartzell: I'm going to see him on the 24th..

Dr. Pond: Well, I always thought he was one of the interesting gentlemen up there, him and Mort Gassman; about the only two with one grain to rub against the other that I ever met there, possibly excluding Boyer. Boyer's clever, he's really smart. Well, I see his name further on. Well, we did some, I think, extraordinarily important things in formulizing budgets but not what the question suggests. I think if the question is transposed to the development of the campus system, the campus system is this reporting system, it's not a budgeting system, it's a matter of taking your faculty energy, your faculty FTE, and support dollars and reporting what did you do with them, how many students did you

Dr. Hartzell: All right, shall I take out budget and how do you spell CASA?

Dr. Pond: It's CASA, Course and Section Analysis, it stands for

Dr. Hartzell: I see, okay.

Dr. Pond: I put away in this box very many years ago, but presently if more and intelligent use had been made in recent years, Ray doesn't complain but I don't get the impression that

Dr. Hartzell: Ray is a bright guy.

Dr. Pond: Ah, he's a treasure. He worked with Carl, in fact he was Carl's successor. In his quiet way one of the heroes of the University, both in, we had a wonderful analytical capability, not only in connection with our operating numbers, like the CASA system, but also in the physical planning. That was a constant battle with them. And we were so good at it, I'm afraid it may have damaged our credibility. They simply couldn't corner us. And it just infuriated Lanford. Of course, it wasn't very smart in quantitative matters or any matters, but the latter, that latter CASA system was critical to the defense and, from time to time, improvement of the operating budget, the capital planning formulizing budgeting, if you will, was critical to the defense of the, was critical in the

master planning process. I had this insistent feeling that we had to know what we good for physically before we could do anything sensible, and that was an absolutely unending struggle. The key issue in it being what will be the size of the enrollment; and that's where one sees most clearly the level of commitment to Stony Brook in Albany. Because they were constantly trying to chop the size of it back. And I did a good deal of calculating, some of it in a legitimately scholarly fashion rather than in an institutionally self-serving fashion, to try to figure what would be the least size at New York State prices that one could have ambitions for the highest quality, and we never advertised it as such, but it was a constant fight that we lost promptly, so that it was not pressed any more, to keep the target up at a level that we could be confident gave us enough scope to talk about a nationally distinguished University, and the place is a few hundred or five thousand below that now and there's no sign that anyone is going to do anything about it. So, formulae, that's one you didn't ask. Now, I've gone on, the wonderful result of that work, that tool that Bill, Carl and Ray gave us, was this ability to demonstrate that had we been funded, had we created the State University of New York at Stony Brook at Buffalo and Binghamton and Albany, that our workload would have been more highly funded than it was in fact. And you know it's pretty damn hard to get around that, especially if you are pointing to bare data. And I think it used to make people awfully angry, and I noticed that one of the first things that Wharton did when he came in was fire the guy that we had been working with, close that office and instruct everybody to operate their campuses according to the Michigan State formulae, which were as fatuous as the State of New York's formulae. But I expect that I have to bear some part of the responsibility for that decision because I'm sure Cliff got early advice that he really didn't want to hear any more of that shit out of Stony Brook. However that may be, it stopped and that was, in a curious way, that was enjoyable, the very hard work over a number of years to get those data flowing and then begin to invoke them as we challenged the Division of the Budget's formulizing for profit. The major problems in facility planning: well, that was the constant nightmare. You can deal with ups and downs from year to year, but the

awful truth is that there was never any, there was just the briefest period when there was an apparently stable commitment from SUNY Central to a sufficient, the campus of sufficient size to support the scope of the things that we thought were minimally necessary, and that was under Boyer, it turned out at the very end of his chancellorship. In fact, the irony, we had an enormous fight, months and years with Jim Kelly; Jim Kelly hated our guts.

Dr. Hartzell: Now, his position?

Dr. Pond: He was Executive Vice Chancellor under Boyer, he was previously a big shot in the NIH. I guess he was the fiscal officer of the NIH, he was a tough cookie, and had played in the big league, but only in the medical big league and didn't know from squat about universities. And he didn't like John Toll worth nothing, and that's not to the exclusion of me, I know he didn't have any use for me either. He was determined to squash these ambitions. We were constantly after them for capital. We had to fight for every dollar. Buffalo was guaranteed a figure instantly, and we had to fight for every damn dollar. So that number, the student number was absolutely crucial because it had to be known in order to rationally design the campus, and it had to be known so that we could offer a clear justification for what we needed and every step of the way had to be fought three or four times annually through, and it got to be quite unpleasant. We got to be quite good at it though, and we began to build a party, there were people who were interested in us.

Dr. Hartzell: In Albany.

Dr. Pond: Yup, and that, of course, was a no-no. Except Boyer at the end of his time did reverse that, said I can't do it alone, I've got to have help. But at any rate,

Dr. Hartzell: What do you mean, he can't do it alone?

Dr. Pond: That he can't handle the Legislature and the Governor alone, has to have regional help.

Dr. Hartzell: I see.

Dr. Pond: Whereupon we promptly gave him a lot. Well, at any rate, there was a bruising struggle, not that the earlier ones were pleasant, but there was a particularly sustained and intense and focused struggle in the latter '70's with Kelly for several years. Those were the years when we were trying to beat the Fine Arts of him, as I recall. I forget what was in the pipeline then, yeah, I think it was the Fine Arts; a very important statement, if Stony Brook couldn't get Fine Arts, it's not going to be comprehensive. But, at any rate, Kelly, we finally, Kelly was assisted in these arguments by Irv Friedman, whom I've always rather liked though I don't have much respect for, and Oscar Lanford, for whom I have nothing but contempt. We finally fought them to a standstill on the numbers, and in January of '78 Boyer came down and signed a treaty. It wasn't a treaty, it was just a very grateful statement in which he affirmed the Stony Brook Master Plan -- first time ever. Nicolas Moon was a significant figure in that, and the Council was reasonably helpful.

Dr. Hartzell: Nicolas Moon was?

Dr. Pond: Nick Moon was head of the construction, lobbying body for the construction industry. Not someone felt very able but obviously very interested in the business. But, at any rate, Nick is now, I think, he's gone on to a bigger job in New York City In any case, virtually the following morning, Ernie came down to Stony Brook to make this announcement in the presence of all sorts of dignitaries from Long Island, that was the period when we had the Long Island future development fire burning. I mentioned there was a period when it looked like we might be able to ignite the thing, that was it. Even Bill Casey, you must remember at that time the leader of Long Island, the respected elder statesman; that tells you a lot about your home, Carl. Although I liked him, did you know him at all?

Dr. Hartzell: No, I didn't.

Dr. Pond: Very interesting guy. I wouldn't trust him. But, at any rate, Ernie made the announcement, and we breathed an enormous sigh of relief, and now we can get on with it. We have a stable planning base, we have a platform to justify an orderly

capitalization of the campus. And the following, I noticed, I took him to the airport, and I noticed that he got on a plane to Washington. And I thought, well. And the next day he announced his acceptance of the. Sad story. Cause then the trouble really started. And incidentally, it was on that morning, I think, that John Toll's attention span came to an end. It was not manifest in his work one bit, but I think that's when he began to be vulnerable to another institution, and by that May, he was gone. And there is where it all ended. A glorious adventure. So, how much about master planning. Facilities planning, with whom did we deal in Albany constructively? Morton C. Gassman. Politically, I think until the statute of limitations has expired, I shouldn't go into that, but there were some legislators who were very helpful. Carl Carlucci and John Burness were extremely effective, respectively, well, with most Legislature and Executive, but I think it is fair to say that Burness was the person who got us most deeply into the Governor's Office, and Carl was the person who, we had sent him off to do task force work in Albany for years. He was the Chief of Staff to the predecessor to that study you mentioned, the, I forget which commission that was, another one that came to naught.

Dr. Hartzell: Wharton's commission, it was the Friday Commission, I think.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, the one before that. There was one in the early '70's that, another anguished look at higher education that came to naught, and Carl helped the Director of that, then we sent him off to do this work to do this work

Dr. Hartzell: The Governor, was this Carey?

Dr. Pond: These were during the Carey years, yeah. So, that, the people that we contested with were virtually everybody else. I give Ernie, I identify Ernie as the sole supporter of, at any point, of our plan who was prepared to say, among the Chancellors certainly, was prepared to say it in public; and in the staff there, I think Tony Adinolfi supported us, but hell, he'd support anybody; and Mort Gassman, the guy who could, and I had a lot of respect for him, also liked him.

Dr. Hartzell: I'll have to find him, find out where he is.

Dr. Pond: He is a guy whose contributions will never really be praised and that's a shame. What can you say about relations with its different communities, local geographical community? Well, that, of course, was pretty uneven.

Dr. Hartzell: Do you want to break at this point, it's a different.

Dr. Pond: Okay, why don't we go on home.

Dr. Hartzell: Okay. This is great, I got. Do you want to keep this?

Dr. Pond: I have, as a matter of fact, several copies in my papers. It's just that this guy brought it back, and he was on the Middle States

Dr. Hartzell: I see; let me take this, if you don't mind.

Dr. Pond: Sure. That got us into a lot of trouble.

Dr. Hartzell: It did?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, that's a rather powerful document.

Dr. Hartzell: Trouble up in Albany?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, trouble with members of the faculty at Stony Brook who didn't exactly like the University heard being urged on there.

Dr. Hartzell: It sounds in some ways, sounds a little superficial. At the, uh, I didn't finish it

[muffled conversation - end of tape]

Dr. Hartzell: This is the second cassette of the interview with T. Alexander Pond. All right, here's your list of questions. You can have that as long as I have them back.

Dr. Pond: Right. We were talking about Stony Brook's relations with its different communities - local geographical communities. The close relation certainly did not warm very rapidly. The University was not popular, as you well know, at the outset, and as we mentioned earlier, I think you're about the only person that anyone would speak to.

Dr. Hartzell: I think there were people who were glad the university had come.

Dr. Pond: But the paper and the

Dr. Hartzell: Oh, yes, *The Three Village Herald*.

Dr. Pond: The spokesman, we were a political issue, a local political issue, we certainly were clearly about to become a very drastic perturbation in the region. However, with little success we had in selling the economic impact argument, we certainly hit that aspect of it as very hard and very disadvantageously. The most dramatic instance of what I would take to be a local geographical difficulty was on the 17th of January 1967, The Great Bust, which

Dr. Hartzell: '67, '68.

Dr. Pond: 1967, excuse me, '68. Manny was born in Christmas '67, so it was '68, and that had the most unattractive sort of political origins in the sense of a county politician that there was a lot of mileage in that. Little did he know how much mileage there was in that, and that of course was the catastrophic event which set the university back at least several years in its development. It consumed Johnny for at least a year and many of the rest of us as well. I don't know whether Johnny talked at any length about that but that was the time that tried him very severely, because he was all alone dealing with a massive political assault, which indeed didn't end, as I understand it, until Nelson Rockefeller picked up the phone and told the sayshakers to lay off. But they were hounding him pretty good, and it was a time of very near total preoccupation with trying to respond to those problems on the

campus and at large. It was when the administration was in the Library, and I remember that we were - I don't know whether you remember the arrangements there, that we had these open offices; Johnny's office had holes in the ceiling, you could see right through from the floor above; so did mine. And there was a little maintenance closet on the second floor of the library with a xerox in it, and when he had something confidential to talk about, we would go in and turn the xerox on and talk over it, because we figured that they wouldn't think to bug that. We were reasonably sure we were being bugged, but there was no proof. But as I say, as a symptom of a really quite hostile locale, that's a gem. As the community grew older with us, and more and more of their children began to be caught sniffing dope or whatever, there was a good deal more understanding of our problems. But that was a long time coming. Well into the 70's. And there were problems even then, cause we began to be a rather spectacular target for local politicians in relationship to various environmental impacts, like the sewage system. Classic ill-considered sewage system, which we were left swinging in the wind for. Well I just noticed last weekend they are finally putting in a treatment plan, in fact it's the only significant new construction I can see on the campus since the day I left. That was a long time coming. I don't know why it took so long but that was a constant irritant.

Dr. Hartzell: Conflict of jurisdictions between the local village of Port Jefferson, Brookhaven County, Brookhaven Town, the County and the Federal government.

Dr. Pond: In my years it seemed clear that the Village of Port Jefferson would be in terrible trouble if we were to secede one way or another - I think that's what kept us in; that didn't buy us any good press at all. As a matter of fact, I had seen a lot of that, of course, since; and it is unattractive, the kinds of political interests that come to feast on the body of a university are quite unattractive, local interests. I'm sure you've seen a lot of that. So it was certainly part of the problem. The local Council

Dr. Hartzell: There were people who were on the side of the University.

Dr. Pond: Oh yeah, Lee Dennison, strongly -

Dr. Hartzell: Yes, Lee Dennison, the County Executive.

Dr. Pond: Wonderful guy. Not able to do a hell of a lot for us though.

Dr. Hartzell: He was local

Dr. Pond: Well, he was a Democrat in a Republican county. The local Council -- The Stony Brook Council -- if your interest is up to 1971, that's through the chairmanship, into the chairmanship of George Toper. That was just the beginning of the period, the very beginning of the period, where the Council began to welded into a powerful source. George was the first person who did that, but I certainly would not say that it had happened by 1971. We were still very much at work on trying to make it happen. That was in detail an accomplishment of John Burness, who began working on it in 1970. Johnny was pretty much too busy to do much part of that. Johnny constantly spread himself to thin, as you know; but when Burness came along, he was able to multiply the President's efforts and begin to force that into a body that could really be supportive of the University, as it was in constantly increasing measure until '78, it played really quite a key role in the development of the strategy, the Long Island strategy. The Trustees: the Trustees were remote, indifferent and ignorant. They obviously had a, for better or for worse, an enormous influence on the development of the place, but part of SUNY's problem, and I think I would know if it weren't still part of its problem, is that that governance body is ineffective and always has been. It may be an impossible task. I could propose models whereby it could become effective, but that's another story, principally through an effective use of the Council. There is no way that a voluntary body of that size and of those necessarily, I gather, very limited capabilities, personal capabilities, can govern a great university. No way.

Dr. Hartzell: It seems to me the quality of the Trustees went down hill slowly.

Dr. Pond: I would agree but stipulate from a very low level. They were bush league people. They still are. There are one or two exceptions of people who brought some personal accomplishment and standing to the body, but their names escape me. The Chancellor in the Central Office. The Chancellorship may very well be an impossible task. I hope that's not the case, but no one as yet demonstrated that it is not an impossible task. I think Sam in a mysterious way was extraordinarily effective, but everybody always writes

that off as being when Rockefeller was in full bay, and there were no problems. That's unjust. There were lots of problems, as you know.

Dr. Hartzell: But Sam, I think, had a good relationship with Rocky.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, and of course he had the good sense to quit just as the tide turned, and poor Ernie came in to staunch the flow. I think Ernie is by a great deal the pick of the litter, for we call the rest of them the working Chancellors. He had style, he had some capability to listen and had, in a quiet way, had a personality which supported the leadership role, and he didn't have too large a sense of himself.

Dr. Hartzell: Is he down in Philadelphia now.

Dr. Pond: No, he's in Princeton.

Dr. Hartzell: He's in Princeton. Carnegie

Dr. Pond: Carnegie Commission, I forget what it's called now, for Higher Education. We invited him to come to Stony Brook. He turns around and is at Princeton. I wish them well. I'll not, since I had earlier shared my assessment of Wharton with you, I will not do that on the record. I decided that is much more recent than you are interested in. The other SUNY campuses. We put an appreciable amount of effort into being collegial, although I guess a large part of that was actually after the time you are interested in. Certainly in Physics we did ourselves a lot of good in the system by being very attentive to the community colleges. If the whole university had followed that, that could have been developed into a considerable strategic alliance.

Dr. Hartzell: You mean Suffolk and Nassau.

Dr. Pond: Well, Suffolk and Nassau because they were close, but statewide. We got NSF money to do that. The nuclear structure lab was the first that is enormously important that campuses cooperate with each other, not be seen crudely competing. Competition is fine, but it shouldn't be crude and obvious. One of the certainly congenital weaknesses of SUNY was, and continues to be, its inability to project a system image. A lot of talk about that, but very little substance to it; and also the tendency in New York State for the public sector and the private sector too

Dr. Hartzell: Never the twain shall meet.

Dr. Pond: to continue to scrap. To be sure, not the serious private sector, but just the marginal private sector. But they make noise, and they spoil the broth. Then City University came into the picture, and of course, without even having to be good at politics, they could run circles around any Chancellor that SUNY ever had. I think the State is getting the worst out of that enormously over-invested State system. It was very early, astonishingly early, clear that whatever its limitations were, that within the system Stony Brook was the class act, and that's a tough cross to bear. People didn't like that. And they didn't like it in Albany either. Part of the weaknesses of the Chancellory, mitigated only for moments in Boyer's time, was an utter inability to support qualitative difference, a despised difference.

Dr. Hartzell: That's what I meant by relativism.

Dr. Pond: Well, that's what has caused is an enormous amount of waste in that system. Very, very strong internal strings in that system to pull everything to the same position

Dr. Hartzell: Yeah, to the same level.

Dr. Pond: And they never have had leadership that could persuasively define and defend different excellences for different campuses. Great shame, very great shame. For example, Johnny could have done that. I think he is doing it in Maryland, where he has a pretty mixed bag too. So that was a very serious problem for Stony Brook. It made us unloved everywhere, and they're still unloved. The Governor's, of the Division of the Budget --I never had much dealing with Hurd -- he was actually at the super level in the cabinet, well the secret cabinet of Rockefeller -- I forget the title, Secretary was it, yes, I think he was the Governor's Secretary. When I first encountered him, he had been promoted out of the Division of the Budget long ago; and I recall him in very early days dispensing justice favorably to us in one or two instances, I don't remember the particulars. Axelrod and Veillette were our more steady companions, when we turn this thing off, I'll tell you a funny story about Axelrod. Veillette I rather liked, as I have said. But as I also said that that division, the Executive Division of the Budget, was the mortal nemesis of the State

University, and so far as I know, it still is. They are, were, are and will ever be determined to run that University, and that problem has never been effectively dealt with; although as I mentioned, there was a significant period under Gould when Ray Kettler was the Vice President, whose name I was trying to remember, took that job on and almost got a memorandum of agreement out of them, for a very considerable degree of autonomy, but it didn't come. It was just strangled by, presumably by Axelrod. The Governor's office, well, I don't, let me not dwell on the Division of the Budget, but that was an enormous problem, continuous problem.

Dr. Hartzell: I remember going before them and thinking to myself, these guys don't really understand what a university is all about.

Dr. Pond: They sure don't, and as fast as one of them would learn, they would transfer him to prisons of something like that. Really doleful and the subject of any number of preachments; on the day Kennedy was shot, we were being visited, do you remember, by the Legislative Task Force -- what was that guy's name -- led to a report a year later?

Dr. Hartzell: Legislative Task Force?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, it was the consultant -- that famous, famous man from Indiana -- Elvis, not Elvis Starr, the other famous guy

Dr. Hartzell: Wells.

Dr. Pond: Wells, Herman Wells, his staff guy, his name was Ticton, Sidney Ticton, was talking to you and me when we heard that Kennedy had been killed, that Kennedy had been shot. That's, incidentally, sort of the day that everything began going downhill everywhere it seems. Loss of innocence.

Dr. Hartzell: You don't know where Ticton is, do you?

Dr. Pond: No

Dr. Hartzell: I haven't been able to locate him, but I would like to. He was the fact man for the Heald Report.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, he was working out of AED, the Academy for Educational Development, but that's of course that's 20 years ago, maybe-22 years ago. But, all of those

preachments that said you cannot build a university, starting with Heald, that you can't build a university this way, have had virtually no effect at all, and I can report to you, in case you ever doubted it, that reasonable economy in a state university is an asset of the greatest value. It makes the overhead on initiative at Stony Brook. Put simply, you know it is, and inevitably that would have to wear people down. I can do things here with the stroke of a pen, that would have taken years of negotiation. Our board can do things that the Board of Trustees at SUNY would never summon the purpose or the courage to do. So don't ever doubt that it was as important as we thought it was when we were complaining. The Governor's office, I had virtually no contact, only trivial contact with Rockefeller - Johnny had some, but I never dealt with him except at state occasions. Carey, as I mentioned, came on very strong thanks to some rather effective representation by Johnny, by Burness, perhaps a little bit by me, turned into an enormous resource of which, of course, in the result nothing much came.

Dr. Hartzell: He was a Long Island man, wasn't he?

Dr. Pond: Brooklyn, that's not really Long Island but he did have

Dr. Hartzell: Wasn't his brother in the oil business?

Dr. Pond: His brother was in the oil business. Cuomo I had no dealings with. I was unemployed by the time he came along. In fact, he wasn't elected until I was here. The Legislature, he worked very hard on the Legislature, once again Burness doing most of the coordinating after 1970. Jerry Kremer, he, of course, was very significant then; he very, very occasionally sought audience to brief the Honorable Joseph Margiotta, he always listened very attentively, never committed himself to anything, but there were signs that he was helpful to us. He never made any demands, since there was a lot cheap crap around about that, I want that on the record. Joe Margiotta never asked the University for a dip and our contact with him was not even on an average of once a year. Miller, because of his chairmanship, we briefed more regular. He was Ways and Means, and I was busily getting to know a very attractive young legislator who I thought was a real comer, when I lost interest, and that was Mel Miller. It turned out all right.

Dr. Hartzell: Mel Miller?

Dr. Pond: He is now the Speaker.

Dr. Hartzell: Oh, he is.

Dr. Pond: Yeah, and Carl Carlucci is an intimate of his.

Dr. Hartzell: Secretary?

Dr. Pond: Sally Steed, a staff person, a great senior staff person. I always wanted to have one zone speaker. We had on the county scene, Dennison, of course, was marvelous. Although it was under his County Executive shift that the blow fell from Jack Barry, the Commissioner of Police.

Dr. Hartzell: Did you ever see that TV publication that they got out with a night in the suburbs on the front?

Dr. Pond: Oh, the briefing book. I own a copy of that. Got a copy downstairs. Famous, famous book. In the aftermath of that, I was told on to re-establish liaison with the Suffolk County Police. In the aftermath of the drug bust, cause there were some other incidents you may remember after that, and the sensitivity was such that the Commissioner only met with a representative of the DA's office and the representative of the DA's office was the Deputy Maurice Najari, subsequently famous for his demise in New York City for over-aggressive prosecution. Maury was an extraordinary person. He was the guy who directed the bust, and boy, he was a true believer. But I'll tell you a funny thing, over the years working with him, and we finally did work out a very good liaison arrangements with the Suffolk County Police, and it is an excellent police department. Very professional and they ought to be, they're paid a ridiculous sum. But I got to be quite friendly with Maury, who was the blackest devil I could imagine when I first met him. He was

Dr. Hartzell: Wasn't that corrective of the bad press that Republicans had over the sewer district.

Dr. Pond: I don't think it was the sewer district, but there were scandals. The sewer district was later. That was what unhorsed John Klein. He beat Dennison. He beat him, or Dennison retired, I guess, but Klein was very friendly to the University, but not very

effective; but he would come when you asked him, and he would sign things when you asked him, a decent fellow, certainly relative to this snake they have now, not the one they have now, but the one before Peter, what's his face?

Dr. Hartzell: Cohalan.

Dr. Pond: Enormous disappointment. I thought he was a most attractive young figure. He turned out to be a tintype. But to hell with him. Then there was Ferd Giese, but that was much later, that's not in your time frame. Boy, he was a pain.

Dr. Hartzell: I got \$20,000 out of him for the Suffolk Symphony.

Dr. Pond: Ferd Giese?

Dr. Hartzell: Yeah.

Dr. Pond: I'll be damned

Dr. Hartzell: To help us pay off our bills.

Dr. Pond: Of his money?

Dr. Hartzell: Yeah, I think it was County money

Dr. Pond: Oh, County money.

Dr. Hartzell: County money.

Dr. Pond: How important in the development of the university is the relationship with Brookhaven?. Well, absolutely critical. The key moment in the University's qualitative development was Frank's decision, and that was certainly conditioned by two things: John Toll and Brookhaven. In the survey of the graduate departments by the Education Department, how did SUSB make out? Well, like bandits. We were the only vocal unit, vocally supported unit, in the system. Those things didn't particularly endear us to our friends. That was, of course the best thing that could happen to Stony Brook. Its instant validation of some sort of program quality, and we desperately needed that. It wasn't that we wanted everybody else shut down, but we needed

Dr. Hartzell: Who actually did that?

Dr. Pond: The Education Department?

Dr. Hartzell: Yea h, did they bring in people from the outside or not?

Dr. Pond: Yeah, they had out of the state panel. The person that set that up was T. Edward Hollander, the present Chancellor of Higher Education here. They modeled the procedure, as you know, very largely after Stony Brook's methods of some five or six year standing. The smartest thing Stony Brook ever did, and I think this is something that Dave Fox laid on and probably Arnie in the beginning, was the insistence on external evaluation.

Dr. Hartzell: I had a hand in doing that.

Dr. Pond: You did. That was a good day's work.

Dr. Hartzell: I got in the first two.

Dr. Pond: We do that at Rutgers too, although the situation here is somewhat different. That has kept the Education Department at bay. You do it and they stay away. The Middle States visitations, the '63 one went down, as you will visibly recall, virtually the week after we got there.

Dr. Hartzell: I know, at Rochester I just finished the Middle States examination of Bucknell, which he was chairman. So I knew him from there.

Dr. Pond: I have it downstairs, I haven't looked at it in a dog's age, probably not since '73. As I recall, it was fairly forgiving, and sort of not now, let's keep up the good work sort of thing. It was really very little they could get a hold of.

Dr. Hartzell: Well, they also made a point that we didn't have a President.

Dr. Pond: True. We were discussing the '73, actually it was '74 I think it was filed in. That one was, I think, pretty damn key, because by that time we had gotten far enough along to be really quite an object of concern of one sort of another throughout the State and on the campus; that was, of course, after the terrible periods of stress and disruption and so on. There was a lot of self-doubt on the campus, I think, at that time, a very uncertain time. Sid did a master, conducted a masterful self-study. Sid is marvelous at getting everybody on committees and doing analysis and self-criticisms, and that's an exceptional document. It made me absolutely furious, which is what it was suppose to do.

Dr. Hartzell: Why

Dr. Pond: I really do try to look at things, look at our shortcomings in affirmative terms, and out of the early drafts of that document there was an inversion of, it was simply wanton in self-destruction. Danner was pretty bad, but it was a marvelous job. That was the period when that was sort of stylish to do; and they came, and the chairman was Ernest Linton, as I recall, that's another funny story. And he, I'm sure he largely wrote the thing, put in a couple of paragraphs that were absolutely priceless. You'll remember them. Johnny and I quoted them several times a couple of years after everything. Those days worked for you, you can't even abstract “The initial mission of Stony Brook was to become an institution of national stature in the time honored and traditional terms of the outstanding, valued universities of such public institutions as Berkeley, Michigan and Illinois. In this it has succeeded outstandingly well. It is remarkable in what a short of time Stony Brook has come to be thought of as being among that distinguished company. In less than a decade it has assembled a faculty which ranges from good to outstanding. Several departments rank among the top in the country, and most are of a very high level of quality as measured in terms of professional reputation and scholarly activities.”

Dr. Hartzell: Is the date on this thing at all?

Dr. Pond: December 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 1973. “Higher education today faces challenges and opportunities during the coming decade which are far more difficult, but also far more promising than the enormous growth of the past twenty years. One of the major public universities, Stony Brook stands out in terms of its potential to accomplish the multi-purpose mission which lies ahead and deserves high praise for its efforts to date.” Not bad, Harry Rosen must have hated every moment there, now that I've come to know what he was doing here but I take my hat off to him, he looked objectively.

Dr. Hartzell: Where'd he come from?

Dr. Pond: Rutgers. He was the head of the Livingston College here, which was our mouse, our unstructured, contemporary, innovative college. We'll turn that off sometime, and I will tell you about the utter disasters which ensued. So that was a pretty good deal and it was a very valuable report.

Dr. Hartzell: As the Middle States Association thought.

Dr. Pond: How would you estimate the value of Yang's presence at Stony Brook? Incalculable, absolutely incalculable, the most fortuitous, conceivable result. You ask about the stature of Stony Brook at the time of John Toll's leaving. Beginning to be moderately promising. I doubt, in fact, that these guys said some years earlier that the foundation had been laid for truly extraordinary achievement. But the achievement by and large was as yet unrealized. For the reasons that I mentioned at the beginning of our talk, about the unusual promise that the situation held, I think all of us at Stony Brook should be held to highest levels of accountability for what that place accomplishes. It really did have a singular opportunity, and, I think, as Toll left he had every reason to be intensely pleased with what he had done. I talked with him most earnestly about the importance of recognizing that the job was not done and that it was still in an extremely formative and delicate condition relative to the accomplishment of the most exciting and original part of the possibilities. And I was right. I was absolutely right about the consequences of his leaving.

Would you care to give your estimate of some of the leaders of the University? Ed Pellegrino, an extraordinary man, one of the most intensely imaginative folk that one could ever meet. Enormous energy, coupled with enormous impatience, the latter is not an attribute to bring lightly into state service anywhere. And it cost him heavily. And that's too bad, really a shame, because the designs were elegant; they ignited the imagination of people. Turn it off a minute. Stan Ross -- Bravo -- that was a shrewd choice on your part.

Dr. Hartzell: I'm glad you think so, there were times when I had doubts about it.

Dr. Pond: He's a little bit hard to take occasionally, but he was good.

Dr. Hartzell: I picked him primarily because I liked the way he went at the business of selecting his own staff in History, and since we were both historians by background, I could assess that; and I was looking for somebody who wanted to get top flight individuals and had a way of assessing them.

Dr. Pond: Well, he also made the trains run on time, and he got his work turned around rapidly at a time when we really didn't have a moment to spare. In dealing with him as a

chairman, he gave quite firm guidance, but boy, he dealt it. It was a great pleasure to work with him. We wound up shouting at each other occasionally, but I think it was a good show. I think it did him a lot of good. I don't think it would have been good for him to work for Johnny, but he came out of that very well. He got a very good job, one that he wanted. Bentley, Bentley was an enormous coup for John. He brought instant credibility when we desperately needed it.

Dr. Hartzell: Did Johnny realize it?

Dr. Pond: Can you imagine Johnny speaking ill of anyone? Turn it off a minute more. Johnny deserved better than that. Sidney -- the long distance heroism award holder of Stony Brook from the time of Lee and before to this very day. To this very recently -- the philosopher king, served with much of the class of the administration -- an enormous source of comfort to the faculty, just his being there, and at the same time a very, very tough minded administrator. An ideologue, there were many dreadful moments at Stony Brook. I think everybody might agree that the most difficult was the financial crisis of '75, which led to the retrenchments. Sidney was a full partner in that and did a very careful, very thoughtful series of analyses, with a lot of advice from all sorts of people that had to have due to get credibility that led to the design that persuaded people that that's what we had to do.

Dr. Hartzell: Is that when the Education Department was given up

Dr. Pond: Uh, huh. That was tough, but that was also the major break moment, a make or break moment for Stony Brook. That was probably the decision over all the years that I was watching that if it had gone the other way, we would have had the most catastrophic result.

Dr. Hartzell: Had gone the other way, what do you mean?

Dr. Pond: If we had tried to fake it.

Dr. Hartzell: If we had tried to save it?

Dr. Pond: No, if we had tried to meet that precipitous reduction by further uniform compression or by firing more groundsman, that was a tough one but it made the University.

Dr. Hartzell: The responsibility for that, this was a State budgetary crisis?

Dr. Pond: It was the time of the imminent collapse of UDC, followed by the functional bankruptcy of the City. Terrible time.

Dr. Hartzell: Collapse of what?

Dr. Pond: The Urban Development Corporation. That's what started the great collapse of '75 in New York State. This was another one of John Mitchell's ideas, but they didn't have an income string from to support that. But there was what seemed to be an infinite aftermath to that that took a good part of the next year out of my life; but the State didn't cut our budget again for a while, and I must say that was a time when Ernie Boyer prepped me. That was a very sudden crisis, it was really an inversion that the whole world view of the State of New York. And Ernie saw it was for real, and he called everybody up there, and I went, for some reason Johnny couldn't go, and he laid it out. He said this is for real, you're going to have to do this, and I want you to make hard decisions, I want you to preserve quality, I want you to know that the Trustees and I will back you on the necessary hard decisions. There was only one campus that came in with a single hard decision, and it was us. And Ernie, I'm sure, regretted those words because he was in the courts with us every inch of the way.

Dr. Hartzell: He was in the what?

Dr. Pond: He was in the courts with us.

Dr. Hartzell: In accordance with you now.

Dr. Pond: No, he was also sued along with us.

Dr. Hartzell: Oh, I see.,

Dr. Pond: That's what kept us busy for a while, had an awful lot of people acted out very badly after that, a number of long-time esteemed faculty colleagues of mine dropped very seriously in my estimation.

Dr. Hartzell: Did they know why it happened?

Dr. Pond: Oh, it was manifest. Yes, the State was dissolving around us. Anyone that couldn't see that that one was for real -- that was at the time of the speech about the days of

wine and roses, you remember -- poor Hugh Carey. The Republicans played the biggest joke on him of all times. They let him beat the, -- poor, what's his name, that wonderful guy, couldn't win -- but literally from the day Carey sat down at that desk they dropped what they had been hiding from the public for years and years. He handled that very well, and so did Ernie, and that didn't make it any less difficult. Incidentally, I have a marvelous set of documentation on all of that downstairs in case anyone ever gets started on what actually happened, partly prepared for Lofton to defend lawsuits. I have comprehensive information on that in every document. Let's see, oh I got into that by noting that Gelber and his folks did a very, very high quality job of analyzing options. Well we've talked much about old times, I think that you provided historic service to the University in those early years. You had very steady nerves, it seems to me. It was a harem-scarem time, and there wasn't a lot to give people confidence around, you certainly seemed to manage to persuade people that this was, in fact, the University that was going to go somewhere in spite of all of the evidence to the contrary.

Dr. Hartzell: Well, I think that already on board there was a core, and a fairly large core, of people that wanted to see the thing succeed and knew where they wanted to go. You were one of them. You were one of the leaders actually.

Dr. Pond: Well, I think it was a remarkable period, and you should be enormously proud of what you built there in just a very brief time. Tom Irvine, he was certainly a very significant figure.

Dr. Hartzell: He had a good head, I think, good judgment.

Dr. Pond: Gould, I've already commented a bit on Gould and on Boyer; Harry, I really got very fond of him by the end of the time.

Dr. Hartzell: A very descent decent guy.

Dr. Pond: And wounded by the place, really wounded -- what a shame.

Dr. Hartzell: Charlie Foster?

Dr. Pond: Never really had all that much working contact with Charlie Foster. I sat in rooms with him a lot and his young henchman, of course, now are at the top of the tree there.

It's amazing how changeless that gang is. Not so amazing actually, where would they go? Larry Martin -- what a piece of work - I never really knew him very well. I sat in rooms with him too, but he probably, he should be very proud. SUNY hasn't amounted to much, but whatever its amounted to, it was really he who kicked it along and made it happen. Elwood Stevens, I got very fairly fond of Steve at the end of the line too. He was an outrageous bully. He had just the most terrible manners. I'm sure that cost him very heavily and his dealings with Johnny, of course, were famous.

Dr. Hartzell: He was aggressive, opinionated.

Dr. Pond: I must say Johnny, in his quest for sainthood, I could admire a lot of it - I did not admire his patience with Stevens. I thought he actually allowed his Office to be demeaned, and I did not think he should do that. But Steve got his comeuppance and became a very nice man after that. And he certainly got a lot of work done. He was in a certain way of the sort of Mark Gassman, except that Mark Gassman was good at it. Mark Gassman did intelligent things. What is my estimate of Stony Brook's progress since I left? I am afraid it is not a very favorable one with respect to initiatives. I gather there has been very little running room for such. I've been quite disappointed. As I say, I think Stony Brook has to be held to very, very high standards. I think the saddest thing that's happened, in my estimate, from my perspective, is the failure of Stony Brook to make enormous yardage out of the concern over economic development that began as we came out of the recession in '81 and '82. That was the great promise, the great possibility for Stony Brook to exercise leadership in the region and the stage had been very thoroughly set for that ----

[End of Tape 3]

Dr. Hartzell: Where is that on your outline because it was one of the things that you brought up.

Dr. Pond: Oh - well I just wanted to mention that a rather significant event although it is later than your time scale was the 1974 evaluation of the president and I believe the proceedings of that are in the Melville Library.

Dr. Hartzell: That was a significant evaluation of Johnny.

Dr. Pond: Ya - because I think in '78 when Maryland came after him I think that - I think he found that process so offensive that he sublimely decided that he was gonna sit still for that again.

Dr. Hartzell: Who came after him, was that Boyer?

Dr. Pond: The Central Administration - a member of that committee was Jim Kelly. So I think he would have been quite pleased to see it come out otherwise but it was a Boyer innovation, those periodic evaluations, and they were a catastrophically a bad idea. Prescription for frustrating the presidency. Kelly of course was no help at all as witnessed that, I suspect any number of people in Albany would have been delighted, but they couldn't bring it off.

Dr. Hartzell: Who did the evaluating

Dr. Pond: There was a committee. There was all sorts of inputs to them. There was a committee that Jim Kelly was the Central Administration representative, I was the representative of the university administration, whoever named Estelle James, was the representative for the faculty - an economist - and there was a student - Sherry Haskin, she was the president of Polity that year. It is a rather interesting background at the time. Stony Brook at its worst. But in terms of the history of the place, it is something that people should look at because it very likely had significant consequences down stream when we were in the position of trying to keep in there and I've already commented on the importance I attach to that event. That's it for me.

Dr. Hartzell: Thank s ever so much.

[end of Tape 4 and interview]