

# THE LONG ISLAND HISTORICAL JOURNAL



*"Starting from fish-shape Paumanok where I was born..."*

*Walt Whitman*

**Spring 1989**  
Volume 1 • Number 2

**The Long Island  
Historical  
Journal**



**Spring 1989**  
Volume 1 • Number 2

**PUBLISHED BY  
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK**

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**ISSN 0898-7084**  
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*The editors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Office of the Provost, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York, The Long Island Community Foundation, Old Westbury, New York, and the Long Island Savings Bank, Syosset, New York. We also thank Dr. Joel T. Rosenthal, Department of History, SUNY at Stony Brook, for his help in launching the Journal.*

The *Long Island Historical Journal* is published twice a year, in October and April. Yearly subscriptions are \$15.00, single copies \$8.00. Address articles, correspondence, books for review, and subscriptions to:

The Editor, LIHJ  
Dept. of History  
SUNY at Stony Brook  
Stony Brook, NY 11794-4348

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# THE LONG ISLAND HISTORICAL JOURNAL

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## EDITORIAL COMMENT

1

### AIDS ON LONG ISLAND:

The Regional History Of An Epidemic 1981-1988

*By Emily H. Thomas and Daniel M. Fox — 93*

### GRUMMAN VERSUS REPUBLIC:

Success And Failure In The Aviation Industry On Long Island

*By Joshua Stoff — 113*

### BROOKLYN: THE ELUSIVE IMAGE

*By Joseph Dorinson — 128*

### “WHATEVER THE COST,

### WE WILL SET THE NATION STRAIGHT”:

The Ministers’ Committee and the Downstate Center Campaign

*By Clarence Taylor — 136*

### ELLA SMITH’S RECIPE COLLECTION, SMITHTOWN, 1889-1910

*By Alice Ross — 147*

### LAND WHERE MY FATHERS DIED

*By William A. Fahey — 158*

### LONG ISLAND AS AMERICA:

A New Look at the First Inhabitants

*By Gaynell Stone — 159*

### THE CREATION OF NASSAU COUNTY

*By Edward J. Smits — 170*

### Reviews of books:

THE MUSEUMS AT STONY BROOK. *Nineteenth-Century American Carriages:*

*Their Manufacture, Decorations, and Use.* By Peter G. Buckley — 183

GAYNELL STONE AND DONNA OTTUSCH-KIANKA. *The Historical Archaeology of Long Island, Volume VII, Part I—The Sites.* By Linda E. Barber — 186

RICHARD F. WELCH. *Memento Mori: The Gravestones of Early Long Island, 1680-1810.* By Susan Battley — 188

BOOK NOTES—189

## COMMUNICATIONS

191

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# EDITORIAL COMMENT

We must subscribe my darlings, we must bear the brunt of  
supporting the *Journal*,  
We, the youthful sinewy races, all the rest on us depend.  
Pioneers! O Pioneers!

—after Walter Whitman

Here we are, two issues into the mission, and many more in the planning stages. We have expanded the number of pages to cover such basic topics as AIDS on Long Island, the aerospace industry, a new look at Native American culture, the creation of Nassau County, recipes as historical tools, two compelling interpretations of Brooklyn, one significant poem, and selected book reviews and communications.

No reader of our first two issues will want to miss Fall 1989 (Number 1 of Volume 2), devoted entirely to the theme of Long Island as an island. There will be articles on the Sound, Bay, and bridges; steamboats, warships, and sailing vessels; fishermen, mariners, and whalers; Lion Gardiner and Gardiner's Island on its 350th anniversary; comment from the Connecticut side; and a study of the Supreme Court's curious ruling (1985) that Long Island is a peninsula and therefore not an island at all.

Succeeding issues will feature landmark pieces on the history of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory; the social and artistic import of the paintings of Shepard Alonzo Mount; woman suffrage; "Gold Coast" estates; the Quaker program of manumission; Walt Whitman's boyhood; the libertarian village of Modern Times (1851-1864); *Engel v. Vitale* (1962), the case involving prayer in the school that originated in Herricks; and many others of equal interest.

It can not happen without your support. I remind each subscriber to Volume 1 that your subscription expired upon receipt of the current issue, Spring 1989. To insure the continuity of our new and needed publication, please send your renewal check for \$15, payable to *LIHJ*, Department of History, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4348. And if each of you stout-hearted charter subscribers not only renews your own subscription but solicits a friend to subscribe as well, you will give our fledgling journal the wings without which it can not fly.

We invite you to send us articles. If reviewing books is among your skills, let us know your field of interest. Would you like to help organize conferences? Do you have ideas for future editions? Your comments are always welcome.

Thank you for your enthusiastic support of Volume 1; now is the time for all good readers to come to the aid of Volume 2.

- Roger Wunderlich, editor





# **AIDS On Long Island:**

## **The Regional History Of An Epidemic 1981-1988**

*By Emily H. Thomas and Daniel M. Fox*

Cases of AIDS on Long Island were first reported in 1981. In 1988, the cumulative total number of cases had reached 900, and the Nassau-Suffolk standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) ranked 17th among SMSAs in AIDS incidence. By then the major components of a service system for persons with HIV infection or at risk of infection were in place on Long Island, largely as a result of New York State policy. Service gaps had been systematically identified through a regional planning process, and some were beginning to be filled with state and federal funds. The suburban environment shaped both the course of the epidemic itself and efforts to address its consequences, and Long Island's experience may foreshadow events in suburban areas farther removed from a major center of the epidemic like New York City.

To place the story of AIDS on Long Island in context, we first summarize the clinical manifestations of the disease, review its history, describe Long Island's population and health-service delivery system and summarize the regional epidemiology of AIDS. We then present the history of the epidemic using data collected mainly through our own participation in the events we describe and from interviews with key actors. Finally, we interpret this history in the framework one of us (Fox) devised to explain the response to the epidemic in the United States and Western Europe.

### **HIV INFECTION AND RELATED DISEASES**

AIDS—acquired immunodeficiency syndrome—is the result of a breakdown of the immune system caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). HIV is transmitted through sexual intercourse, exposure to blood—most often through intravenous drug use and rarely by other exposures—and from an infected mother to a newborn. An infected person may remain well, or nearly well, for several years, but current epidemiological evidence suggests that most people who have been infected will eventually develop AIDS. Asymptomatic persons can transmit the virus.

AIDS is the end stage of a spectrum of clinical manifestations of HIV infection, which results when an infected person becomes acutely ill with diseases that occur when the immune system deteriorates. Many persons with AIDS also suffer neurological impairment ranging from minor disfunction to acute dementia. Up to 1988, persons with AIDS survived an average of one to one and a half years. Prior to developing AIDS, persons with HIV infection often suffer from a variety of debilitating

conditions including persistent fevers, diarrhea and loss of appetite and weight.

By the end of 1988, 81,000 cases of AIDS had been reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC); 45,500 had died, including 83 percent of all patients diagnosed before 1986.<sup>1</sup> According to a projection model developed by the CDC, 39,000 cases were diagnosed during 1988, the annual incidence will increase to 60,000 in 1990 and the cumulative case count will reach 365,000 by the end of 1992.<sup>2</sup> The World Health Organization estimates that between 5 and 10 million people are infected with HIV, that worldwide there have been over 250,000 cases of AIDS, and that one million new cases can be expected in the next five years.<sup>3</sup>

Persons with HIV infection require the full spectrum of health and social services, because they range from asymptomatic to terminally ill and because the disease manifests itself and progresses differently in different individuals. The role of outpatient care has increased as physicians gain experience and new treatments are found, but persons with AIDS still require extensive hospitalization. They also need practical and social support, and long-term medical care in their own homes or in residential facilities, because HIV infection is debilitating, stigmatizing, and terminal.

#### THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TO AIDS

Biomedical researchers have had substantial success in understanding HIV infection, but a cure or vaccine cannot be expected soon. The syndrome was first identified in 1981 when epidemiological anomalies were observed in several groups of gay men. Just three years later, the virus causing the disease was identified by French and American researchers, and by 1985 a test to screen individuals and blood products for its presence was widely available. One drug—AZT—has been proven effective in combatting HIV. After initial hesitation, the federal government made the search for new drugs to control the virus and treat its clinical manifestations a research priority in 1987.

The adequacy of the public health response to AIDS is disputed. Some observers cite as evidence of success the rapid development of screening programs and innovative care models, the response of gay men to safe-sex education programs, the absence of evidence that persons with AIDS have been denied treatment for financial reasons, and the preservation of confidentiality in testing and surveillance programs. Others cite as evidence of failure the continuing spread of the epidemic, the Reagan administration's initial reluctance to request federal funds for research and service, the fragmentation of health services for infected individuals, and the lack of aggressive programs to control the spread of the epidemic among drug users.<sup>4</sup> The history of Long Island's response was far from complete at the end of 1988. AIDS was receiving, in an unusually coordinated service system, more attention than several more prevalent diseases, but it was unclear how the disease was spreading and how the remaining gaps in service for infected persons would be filled.

## THE LONG ISLAND REGION

Long Island contains two New York City boroughs—Brooklyn and Queens—and Nassau and Suffolk Counties, but in this article we identify Long Island with the Nassau-Suffolk region and describe the history of AIDS in this bicounty area. The two counties comprise a separate SMSA because of their large population of 2.6 million,<sup>5</sup> and their health-care delivery system is distinct from though related to that of New York City.

The bicounty area is a large but not atypical geographic region. If Nassau and Suffolk Counties were a state it would rank 31st in population, between Oregon and Mississippi. With an area of about 1,200 square miles it would be larger than Rhode Island but smaller than Delaware. Suffolk County alone is 911 square miles, spreading more than 80 miles from east to west. Ninety-eight percent of the population lives in urban areas, but 9 percent of Suffolk County is agricultural, about the same as in the states of Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. The counties are relatively wealthy, with per capita personal income of \$13,700 compared to the national average of \$10,500, and 4.4 percent of families below the poverty level compared to 9.6 percent nationwide. Local government is active, spending \$1,300 per person compared to the national average of \$800. The region is politically fragmented into 13 towns, and within them two cities, 61 villages and 131 school districts. The counties are well-supplied with physicians, with a total of about 6,000. This amounts to 229 per 100,000 population, compared to a national average of 174.

Hospital care is provided by 28 community hospitals operating at over 90 percent capacity. There are three principal referral centers: Nassau County Medical Center, North Shore University Hospital and University Hospital at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. There is no public hospital in Suffolk County.

Long Island has a severe shortage of nursing home beds as a result of the cost-containment policies of the New York State Department of Health. With long waiting lists, nursing home administrators can select their patients carefully, mainly on the basis of their relative ease of management and ability to pay. At the end of 1988, the selection had not included a single person with HIV infection.

Home health care is also in short supply, particularly for persons, like many with HIV infection, who need an extended number of hours of care each day or whose health-care costs are paid by Medicaid. Limits on the amounts third-party payers will reimburse providers constrain wage rates, which makes staffing difficult in an affluent community with a high employment rate. The inevitable inefficiencies caused by the geographic dispersion of the suburban population further inhibits service delivery.

## THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AIDS ON LONG ISLAND

The AIDS epidemic came relatively early to Nassau and Suffolk Counties because of their proximity to New York City, which had reported 22 percent of all cases at the end of 1988.<sup>6</sup> Reported incidence in the bicounty area rose from 11 cases in 1982 to 127 in 1985 and 256 in 1987. A total

of 909 cases had been reported by the end of 1988. Only 16 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia had a higher cumulative incidence. According to projections by the New York State Department of Health there will be 600 new cases in 1991, and the cumulative caseload will have risen to 2,700. There will be 500 deaths from AIDS. About 9,000 people died from heart disease and 5,700 from cancer in 1986, but only 1,200 persons died in the 25-44 age-group in which AIDS is concentrated.<sup>7</sup>

Because AIDS is the final phase of HIV infection and generally follows several years after infection, the magnitude of the HIV epidemic far exceeds the number of reported cases of AIDS. There may already be as many as 20,000 persons infected with HIV on Long Island. Nationally and on Long Island, the epidemic's true magnitude is unknown because no survey of the prevalence of HIV infection in the general population has been conducted. From the data available on limited populations, the Public Health Service has estimated that between 1 and 1.5 million people are infected nationwide.<sup>8</sup> This estimate suggests that there are 11,000 to 16,500 infected persons in the bicounty region if HIV prevalence is proportional to reported caseload; the Nassau-Suffolk SMSA has had 1.1 percent of all reported cases to date. The director of the AIDS Program at the CDC suggested that the national 1986 AIDS caseload represented 1 to 2 percent of infected individuals,<sup>9</sup> which implies that there were 10,600 to 21,100 infected individuals in Nassau and Suffolk Counties.

AIDS already affects persons of every community, ethnic group and income level on Long Island. Of the 666 cases reported by early 1988, 41 percent were homosexual or bisexual, 35 percent were intravenous drug users, 5 percent were both, and 19 percent were neither. Most of those in the latter group were infected by blood products (4 percent), heterosexual contact (4 percent), or by undetermined means (9 percent).<sup>10</sup> Nationwide 61 percent of all persons with AIDS have been homosexual or bisexual men, 19 percent have been intravenous drug users, 7 percent have been both and 13 percent have been neither. The higher national proportion of gay men reflects the initial concentration of the AIDS epidemic in gay communities. The risk behaviors of persons with AIDS on Long Island anticipates the national shift toward IV drug use as the principal source of transmission: nationally, 23 percent of the cases in the year ending December 19, 1988 were intravenous drug users compared to 17 percent the previous year. There is no evidence of a comparable local shift. Of the persons with AIDS alive in March 1988, 35.1 percent were intravenous drug users, compared to 34.5 percent since surveillance began.

The bigger number of intravenous drug users in the Nassau-Suffolk case mix appears to correspond to a relatively large number of women and children. In the bicounty area 2.4 percent of all cases have been children and 15.3 percent women, compared to 1.6 percent and 9.1 percent nationwide.

The demography of persons with AIDS on Long Island also reflects the nature of suburban IV drug use. Almost 50 percent of IV drug users with AIDS on Long Island have been white, compared with 20 percent

nationwide and 13 percent in New York City.<sup>11</sup> According to health-care providers, many of these drug users are middle class. A number have families, homes and jobs. Some became infected through youthful experimentation.

As in the nation as a whole, however, a disproportionate number of blacks and Hispanics have contracted AIDS. Twenty-seven percent of all reported cases in Nassau and Suffolk Counties have been black and 7 percent Hispanic, while these groups comprise 6 and 4 percent of the total population, respectively.<sup>12</sup>

The suburban ethnic and gay populations affected by AIDS differ from their urban counterparts. The black and Hispanic population is geographically dispersed, culturally diverse, and largely lacking in political organizations. There is no gay community comparable to what exists in large cities. While there is a concentration of gays in certain areas, notably Fire Island and the East End, these are to a considerable extent seasonal populations. Homosexuality is less open than in urban areas that contain a significant gay population, and our interview informants suggest that suburban norms and disincentives to open homosexuality probably increase the number of bisexuals. In 1988, health-care providers were reporting anecdotal evidence of an increased number of bisexuals with HIV infection.

The HIV epidemic challenged Long Island policymakers to assemble from a fragmented health-care delivery system the resources necessary to serve these diverse patients and to curtail the epidemic's spread in the population groups from which they come. The process began in 1983.

### 1983 AND 1984: BEGINNINGS OF A LOCAL RESPONSE

At the beginning of 1983, the cumulative national caseload was less than 1,400, and AIDS was still perceived as a disease confined to distinct population groups and of little significance to the general public. There was no organized AIDS-related activity on Long Island. The East End Gay Organization was concerned about AIDS, but the relatively few persons already ill were generally seeking care in New York City.

North Shore University Hospital organized an AIDS program in 1983, becoming the first Long Island hospital to do so. It was, and has remained, the highest volume provider. It draws about one-third of its patients from neighboring Queens.

On June 16, the School of Allied Health Professions at the State University of New York at Stony Brook (SUNY) presented a continuing education program entitled "AIDS: The New Epidemic?". The program was organized by two members of the school's faculty, Rose Walton and Robert Hawkins, both health educators with a commitment to representing the interests of the gay community. They were concerned about the absence of health care services for persons with AIDS on Long Island, and stories about the ignorance of health-care providers like a policeman who told the members of a helicopter crew transporting a patient with AIDS to burn their clothes. In response, Walton and Hawkins planned a five-hour session to provide basic information about AIDS and a forum

on psychosocial issues for providers and patients. Thirty people were expected; 200 came and the response to AIDS on Long Island was launched.

A few months later the AIDS Institute in the New York State Department of Health initiated an ongoing education and service program. The State Legislature created the AIDS Institute in 1983 to guide development of a comprehensive statewide AIDS program. Its first director was Mel Rosen, previously executive director of the Gay Men's Health Crisis (GMHC) in New York City. Thus the Institute's first initiative was the development of local agencies throughout New York State to provide public education and support services for persons with AIDS and their associates following the GMHC model. GMHC was founded in 1981 by a group of New York City gays prominent in business, the professions and the arts. With its roots in the gay liberation movement, the agency's initial orientation was toward organizing advocacy and self-help in a stigmatized community. It was rapidly professionalized into a successful social service agency, soliciting substantial funding and delivering a variety of services.

To promote action on Long Island, the AIDS Institute convened two meetings on October 27, 1983, one with health-care providers and the second with leaders of the gay community. The two groups met together the next day to form the Long Island AIDS Task Force, convened by Dr. Walton.

On behalf of the Task Force, Walton and Hawkins and their dean—Edmund McTernan—prepared a proposal to establish a Long Island AIDS Project in the School of Allied Health. The school saw the project as an opportunity to bring its faculty's expertise to bear on an urgent community problem. AIDS Institute staff were uneasy about placing the project in the university rather than creating an agency under the control of a broad-based community board, more akin to the GMHC. However, they were also very eager to establish programs and recognized the credentials of the School of Allied Health faculty in health education.

In February 1984, the Long Island AIDS Project found an office, hired a staff person, opened its hotline, started work on a resource guide for persons with AIDS, extended the ongoing community education efforts of Walton and Hawkins, and began to create a service organization. The difference between the New York City and suburban AIDS epidemics became apparent immediately, when the GMHC—under contract with the AIDS Institute—sent one of its staff to train the hotline volunteers. Accustomed to working within the New York City gay community, he had difficulty establishing rapport with the more heterogeneous group who from the beginning volunteered their services on Long Island. Finding means of reaching the Project's scattered clientele was also an immediate and ongoing issue. A year later staff members were posting the AIDS hotline number on the telephones in Long Island Expressway rest areas frequently used for gay liaisons.

Although the initiatives of New York State and the School of Allied Health addressed AIDS as a public-health problem, it was still largely a

gay-community issue in 1984. The Long Island community took action that summer, when the East End Gay Organization organized the first of several major AIDS fundraisers: a gala at the East Hampton home of Craig Claiborne, food editor of the *New York Times*, which raised \$100,000. Part of the proceeds augmented state funding to the Long Island AIDS Project. Part went to the GMHC, reflecting the strong links to New York City of Long Island's gay population. A few thousand dollars were donated to the School of Medicine at Stony Brook for the purchase of biomedical equipment needed for AIDS research. Just four years later AIDS research had become a national priority, and the federal government was providing \$9 million for the program that equipment helped promote.

### 1985: IMPACTS OF NEW YORK STATE POLICY

In 1985, New York State initiated two more AIDS programs: anonymous testing for HIV infection coupled with pre- and post-test counselling, and the coordination of medical care for persons with AIDS in designated treatment center hospitals. Together with the community-service agencies, the local components of these programs became cornerstones of the service system for persons with HIV infection on Long Island. When a test for HIV infection first became available in 1985, it was largely administered by blood services in order to protect the blood supply. Infected blood donors were notified, however, motivating at-risk individuals to donate blood in order to learn whether they were infected. The "alternate test site" program was established by New York and several other states, in cooperative agreements with the CDC, to reduce this demand, to insure that testing was coupled with counselling, and to provide anonymity to persons who feared the health-care system. New York State established seven test sites, all outside New York City which had its own anonymous testing program. There were two main test sites on Long Island, in Farmingville in Suffolk County and Mineola in Nassau.<sup>13</sup>

New York State's decision to organize medical services for persons with AIDS by designating selected hospitals as AIDS treatment centers was motivated in large part by the success of San Francisco's response to the AIDS epidemic. In San Francisco, county government, voluntary associations and the University of California medical school cooperated to provide and coordinate a full range of in- and outpatient services to persons with AIDS. The New York State Health Department imported and institutionalized this model by using financial incentives to motivate the establishment of AIDS treatment centers. These hospitals would cluster persons with AIDS in discrete units and take responsibility for organizing ambulatory and long-term care services on their behalf, coordinated by hospital-based case managers. The AIDS Institute quickly identified a key role for case management as a means of building, from fragmented resources, a comprehensive service system to meet the multiple health and social service needs of persons with AIDS. The hospitals would receive enhanced reimbursement to finance these services, and close scrutiny to



monitor their quality.

On Long Island two hospitals, Nassau County Medical Center and University Hospital at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, began preparing applications to become designated treatment center hospitals. Their designation would formalize a centralized service system in 1987. Proponents of the designated treatment center program praise the benefits of specialized staff and facilities and state funding for case management. Critics complain that the program segregates persons with AIDS and permitted other hospitals to abdicate their responsibility.

### 1986: EVOLUTION OF SUPPORT SERVICES

In 1986, two new actors entered the AIDS arena on Long Island. The Long Island AIDS Project left the School of Allied Health Professions to become a separate agency, and a philanthropic foundation began funding patient services. For the Long Island AIDS Project the issue of governance—sensitive from the beginning—was never resolved, and its importance grew as the project expanded into case management and the provision of patient-support services as well as education programs. The faculty and leadership of the School of Allied Health Professions viewed this work as the delivery of health services, over which health-care professionals should have control because of their specialized knowledge. The AIDS Institute, and subsequently key members of the project's staff, saw themselves entering uncharted waters in response to an extraordinary community need, in which innovation was essential and a combination of the various talents available in the gay community had proven effective. The value of professional knowledge and experience in other realms was therefore limited and could be enhanced by mechanisms—including a community board of directors—to insure responsiveness as well as the ongoing recruitment of committed volunteers and staff members. The conflict was irreconcilable, in spite of mediation efforts arranged by the AIDS Institute.

In the spring of 1986 the project became an incorporated community-based agency called the Long Island Association for AIDS Care (LIAAC). The School of Allied Health continued an active AIDS education program under the direction of Dr. Walton. Their estrangement diminished over the next few years as staff of the school and LIAAC collaborated to plan and mount education programs.

The regional response to AIDS received new funding when the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, one of the largest philanthropic endowments in the country, became the first agency, public or private, to initiate a national program to address service gaps for persons with AIDS. Like New York State, the foundation sought to export the San Francisco model and to promote the development of innovative responses to the AIDS epidemic utilizing community organizations as well as health and social service providers. The foundation allotted \$17.2 million to fund demonstration projects in 10 of the 21 SMSAs with the most cases of AIDS. A consortium of Nassau County agencies organized by Nassau County Medical

Center and LIAAC received one of these grants to develop a model of AIDS care in suburban areas. The grant provided a home-care coordinator at Nassau County Medical Center and funding for transportation services. At LIAAC it funded a volunteer director, and a housing coordinator to address the difficulties persons with AIDS experience as a result of their debilitation and stigmatization. Early in the year a house accommodating six persons with AIDS had been established by the Interfaith Nutrition Network, a non-profit agency whose services previously had expanded from soup kitchens to shelters for the homeless. The auspice and location of this house were well-kept secrets.

### 1987: FURTHER SERVICE DEVELOPMENT

In May 1987, University Hospital at the State University of New York at Stony Brook opened a fifteen-bed AIDS unit. The unit at Albany Medical Center opened simultaneously, making them the second and third approved centers in the state. The first was St. Clare's Hospital in New York City, which had made caring for persons with AIDS an institutional priority. Many of the other hospitals, particularly those in New York City, delayed opening while their administrations sought to negotiate for reimbursement higher than the enhanced level the state planned. University Hospital did not join this effort because a hospital cost study conducted by the authors of this paper had shown that AIDS was not as exceptionally expensive as previously believed.<sup>14</sup> Nassau County Medical Center became a designated treatment center shortly thereafter, having established a 20-bed AIDS unit in 1986. North Shore University Hospital would subsequently become a third state-designated center hospital, but the service system established by New York State policy was in place in 1987.

The alternative test site program was already changing in response to changing demand. Between 1985 and 1987 the number of persons tested statewide (excluding New York City) more than doubled, but the percent of seropositive persons identified fell by a factor of three, from 12 percent at the end of 1985 to 4.2 percent at the end of 1987.<sup>15</sup> The proportion of persons reporting no risk behavior other than heterosexual contact rose from 40 to 60 percent. In response, the AIDS Institute sought to attract individuals at higher risk by adding test sites in locations readily accessible to them, particularly in Westchester County and on Long Island where the incidence of AIDS was higher than in Upstate New York. By the end of 1988, seven sites, some open only part time, had been added in Nassau and Suffolk Counties, in Babylon, Hauppauge, Bayshore, Huntington, Amityville, Riverhead and Hempstead.<sup>16</sup>

The alternate test sites remained an important source of HIV testing and counselling, but private physicians requested more tests. In 1988 the Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency described a sample of 4,015 specimens tested in the Nassau County Laboratory, which provides HIV-antibody testing for the bicounty area. Thirty-two percent were clients of the alternative test sites, 28 percent patients of private practitioners for

whom testing was performed as a condition of immigration, 23 percent other patients of private practitioners, and 15 percent hospital patients. The remainder came from correction facilities and clinics for sexually-transmitted diseases, family planning or tuberculosis.<sup>17</sup>

Significant federal funding for AIDS-related programs also began in 1987. For example, Congress almost doubled the AIDS budget of the National Institutes of Health at the end of the year, from \$253 million to \$448 million. Nassau-Suffolk agencies received several grants.

Two went to Stony Brook. In November 1986, the AIDS Education and Resource Center in the School of Allied Health Professions was awarded a three-year contract from the National Institute of Mental Health to educate health professionals about AIDS, focusing on psychosocial and ethical issues. In 1987 the School of Medicine became one of 16 "National Cooperative Drug Discovery Groups" and one of 17 "AIDS Clinical Studies Groups" funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

Physicians at North Shore University Hospital are also active in research on AIDS, particularly on the viral agent. North Shore patients were included in the sample in which HIV was first identified in 1985 by investigators at the National Cancer Institute. The research at North Shore is primarily funded by a local private foundation, the Jane and Dayton Brown, Jr. Fund. The hospital has funding from the National Institute of Drug Abuse for its drug-abuse program and from the NIH for its pediatric AIDS program.

Nassau County received two federal grants. The Department of Health obtained funding from the CDC for a demonstration project to identify HIV-infected women and women at high risk of infection to reduce their risk of becoming infected and/or bearing infected children. The Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction received money from the National Institute of Drug Abuse for a demonstration project using ex-addicts as outreach workers "on the street" to educate intravenous drug users not in treatment about HIV infection, and to encourage them to be tested for HIV and to enter drug treatment.

The bicounty area had an opportunity to begin a coordinated bicounty response to HIV infection in July 1987, when the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency of the Public Health Service, called for proposals for AIDS demonstration projects in high-incidence SMSAs. A bicounty application was required, forcing the question of who would coordinate the application and manage the project. LIAAC initially assumed that this role was part of its mandate as Long Island's AIDS agency, but the two county health departments also began their own planning. The health commissioners and the leadership of the AIDS treatment center hospitals requested the Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency to convene the various parties. A proposal was submitted by an eight-member "Long Island AIDS Grant Consortium," in which LIAAC was the lead agency and the county health departments did not participate.<sup>18</sup> The proposed projects were designed to build on the Robert Wood Johnson Foun-

dation project and included establishing two residential programs for persons with AIDS, improving access to home care by expanding LIAAC's case management capability, supplementing recruitment, training, and funding in two home care agencies, and augmenting several of LIAAC's support and outreach services. The proposal was not funded.

#### 1988: SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

In 1988, county government increased its leadership role in the response to the AIDS epidemic, in part because of coincidental changes in local politics but also because of the increasing acceptance of AIDS as a multifaceted public-health program of widespread community significance. A new county executive—Patrick Halpin—took office in Suffolk County and with the executive in Nassau County—Thomas Gulotta—made a commitment to bicounty cooperation. Encouraged by their health commissioners—John Dowling in Nassau County and David Harris in Suffolk—they made the development of a bicounty response to the AIDS epidemic a cornerstone of this initiative and requested the commissioners to study AIDS on Long Island and develop an action plan. The project was coordinated by the Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency, one of 205 local health planning agencies established to guide health care facilities development under the federal Health Planning and Development Act of 1974 (PL 93-641). The planning process included a broad array of community leaders, health care professionals, officials of hospitals and other facilities and utilized the research capacity of the State University of New York at Stony Brook. The report,<sup>19</sup> issued in December 1988, identified three principal goals for policy development and future action: current education programs should be enhanced and augmented; alternatives to hospital care should be developed; a variety of public and private health and social service providers should collaborate to meet the multiple needs of persons with AIDS, particularly as the caseload grows. Research conducted by the medical advisory panel suggested that hospital utilization by persons with HIV infection could be reduced by 35 percent if adequate long-term care, in institutions and at home, were available. Because of this substitution, the service mix deemed ideal by the panel could be provided at no more than the current cost and probably for less.<sup>20</sup>

While this planning effort was underway, HRSA issued a second solicitation for demonstration projects. With encouragement and considerable substantive contributions from the county health departments, the Health Systems Agency prepared and submitted a bicounty proposal. The priorities defined in this proposal were different from the previous application, because LIAAC was less involved and the health departments more, and because development of an innovative program was an explicit goal. The new proposal included support for community-based support services, but its principal objective was increasing the role of private physicians in the care of persons with HIV infection. Four activities were proposed: public health nurses would provide case-management and counselling services to patients with AIDS receiving their care from community

physicians; a videotape would be developed to extend community physicians' knowledge of HIV infection and its management; a manual describing the local resources available to persons with AIDS would be prepared; and one of LIAAC's volunteer programs which provides companions to terminally ill patients would be expanded. The videotape would be sent to physicians when HIV test results were reported to them. The project was funded and implementation began early in 1989.

The need for community hospitals and physicians to share responsibility for persons with HIV infection with the treatment centers had emerged as a theme of the regional planning process. Care was centralized in 1988, following New York State policy, but treatment center physicians were beginning to express concern about their ability to meet the rising demand, and hospital-bed need projections indicated that demand would soon exceed supply. In 1987, 72 percent of almost 900 hospital admissions for AIDS and other conditions related to HIV infection in the bicounty area were to the three treatment-center hospitals, which had a total of 65 designated AIDS beds.<sup>21</sup> The medical panel projected the need for 100 hospital beds in 1991 if adequate long-term care becomes available, or 150 beds if the 1988 service pattern continues.<sup>22</sup> Finding these hospital resources may be difficult, since the hospital system is close to capacity and has no public hospitals.<sup>23</sup> The need for shared responsibility was viewed as particularly acute by Suffolk County participants in the planning process. University Hospital has only 15 designated AIDS beds compared to 50 in Nassau County, and the county covers a far larger geographic area.<sup>24</sup>

The call for community physicians to play a greater role was similarly motivated by the caseload statistics, but also by improved understanding of HIV infection and the diseases related to it. The infectious disease specialists contributing to the bicounty plan described much of the care required as fairly routine and well within the capabilities of community physicians. They have significant disincentives to providing care, however, including stigma, the inadequacy of Medicaid payment — on which many persons with HIV infection rely — and the effort required to address their multiple medical and psychosocial needs. The projects funded by the HRSA grant were designed to overcome resistance due to ignorance, to alleviate physicians' service burden, and to provide the patients of community practitioners access to the range of services available to treatment-center patients.

The perhaps more difficult issue of providing adequate dental services to persons with HIV infection had not yet been addressed, but the problem was defined in the bicounty planning process. An expert panel described the substantial unmet needs of persons with HIV infection for dental care and concluded that it is unrealistic to assume that private practitioners will meet this need. Currently, hospital dental departments are the principal source of dental care for infected persons.<sup>25</sup>

Anecdotal evidence indicated that community physicians were gradually beginning to care for more HIV-infected patients by 1988. In Suffolk

County, AIDS treatment center physicians had begun discussing means of accelerating this trend with the county medical society. The county health department was working to increase its health centers' ability to provide primary care for persons with HIV infection, but was anxious that these centers remain resources of last resort to avoid additional drain on its resources. In other areas—in case management and in education—the HRSA demonstration project further increased the role of the county health departments in the response to AIDS.

The Health Systems Agency was the lead agency for the HRSA demonstration and for development of the bicounty plan, but its future role was unclear. It was a planning agency, not a service provider, and its continued existence was uncertain. The federal funding for HSAs was discontinued in 1987. New York State made the unusual decision to substitute state funds, but the Legislature declined to appropriate them until late in the fiscal year of 1988-89, leaving the agencies fully dependent on local government, grants, and contracts.

There were three other events of note in 1988. North Shore University Hospital became a state-designated AIDS treatment center in September. The hospital had initiated an organized AIDS program in 1983 which remained the largest in the bicounty area and was in 1988 the only one serving a significant number of pediatric patients. However, it had not become a designated center, in part because its extremely high occupancy rate precluded establishment of a segregated AIDS unit. To establish a discrete unit, North Shore obtained approval to add 30 new beds in a hospital wing under construction at the end of 1988.

The Suffolk County Legislature entered the AIDS arena with two AIDS bills. It was continuing an activist tradition and responding to demands from certain segments of its constituency, including the public employees' union, for some kind of legislative action on AIDS. The first bill made it a crime for anyone with HIV infection to knowingly donate blood. The second sought to protect county health workers by requiring that all county clinics offer voluntary HIV antibody tests to all patients, that spouses be notified of the test results, that CDC guidelines for the protection of health workers be followed, and that Hepatitis B vaccine to be offered without charge to all county workers. The Commissioner of Health and other health professionals opposed both measures. They argued that the bills would be counterproductive and that better public health approaches could be identified with the help of health professionals, who had not been consulted when the bills were drafted. The county already adhered to the CDC guidelines and offered Hepatitis B vaccine to those workers who were at risk as defined by CDC regulations.

Nevertheless, after some revision, both bills were passed by the Legislature in October. They were vetoed by County Executive Michael LoGrande, but after his defeat in the November election the veto of the testing and notification bill was overridden in December. Suffolk County had a law requiring that HIV antibody testing be offered to all clinic patients, with mandatory spousal notification of the test results.

However, state legislation enacted at the end of 1988 and motivated in part by the Suffolk County initiative preempted the local law. The state law gives physicians the right, not the obligation, to notify the spouses and sexual partners of infected persons if, in the physician's judgment, the infected person will not notify his/her partner and there is a clear danger to the uninformed individual.

The third event of 1988 was closure of the community residence for persons with AIDS run by the Interfaith Nutrition Network with assistance from LIAAC since 1986. The immediate cause was a breach of the confidentiality with which the house operated. A dissatisfied resident reported the auspice and location to *Newsday*, the regional newspaper, which published the auspice though not the location. The board of the Interfaith Nutrition Network then closed the house to avoid violation of residents' privacy, and to conserve the agency's ability to rent housing for the homeless. In 1988, community opposition made the open provision of housing for persons with AIDS as difficult as it has been for other stigmatized groups, including the mentally retarded and persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction.

The closure decision was also influenced by operational difficulties within the residence. It was unclear how best to organize and train the staff, and whether their job was supervision or rehabilitation. The house was begun by persons who were, in their own words, so far outside the system that they could not benefit from the lessons to be learned from other arenas, such as mental retardation. Before attempting a replacement, LIAAC sought to learn these lessons.

In two years LIAAC had grown substantially, with funding from the AIDS Institute, grants and private donations. Moreover, like GMHC, it was maturing into a professional social-service agency and participating in the planning and delivery of services with established providers both public and private. Questions remained, however, about the precise roles of LIAAC, the county health departments and the treatment center hospitals in case management and in public and professional education.

## THE FUTURE

Although New York State was innovative in developing services for persons with HIV infection, its programs left several service gaps, and it appeared unlikely in 1988 that it would undertake a major new policy initiative to fill them. The State was already spending a good deal on AIDS, in the midst of a revenue shortfall. In Nassau and Suffolk Counties alone the total enhanced reimbursement for hospital care exceeded what would have been paid under standard rates by \$3 million in 1987,<sup>26</sup> in addition to which the AIDS Institute provided funding for LIAAC and several other projects.

The principal service gaps were long-term care, dental care, social services—like transportation and practical assistance with daily living—and housing. These gaps will become increasingly serious as improved treatment prolongs the lives of persons with AIDS. However, they large-

ly reflect general shortcomings in the American health-care system: inadequate social services and long-term care.

Social services are everywhere limited and fragmented. Moreover, in contrast to health care there has as yet been little innovation in the delivery of social services to persons with AIDS by public sector providers. Reliance on voluntary agencies like LIAAC to provide these services is not, however, an unusual aspect of the response to AIDS. Since the 1950's and even earlier, the standard remedy for inadequate social services has been creation of community-based agencies to meet the needs of people who "fall between the cracks."

Health-care financing has given priority to services required for treatment of acute illness, largely in hospitals, to the detriment of long-term care for the disabled and chronically ill. New York State established the same priority in developing services for persons with AIDS, acting on the initial conception of the disease as a plague—an acute disease requiring extraordinary medical care over a brief period. This conception is being gradually replaced by the view that HIV infection is a chronic disease. The cost of unnecessary hospital utilization further motivates the development of alternatives.

New York moved incrementally in 1988 to address the shortage of long-term care—both at home and in institutions—for patients with HIV infection, by increasing third-party reimbursement. The AIDS Institute was already providing grants to augment the funding of home care providers, including the Suffolk County Department of Health and the Huntington Visiting Nurse Service. It was unclear, however, whether the increased funding would be sufficient for the provision of adequate services.

For institutional long-term care cost was not the only issue. Nursing home administrators also cite as reasons for not admitting persons with AIDS a variety of disincentives, including the risk posed by limited infection control procedures, concerns about their lack of social congruence with elderly nursing home patients, and the expectation that other patients and their families would object.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, little was known about the precise long-term care needs of persons with AIDS in 1988, and service delivery models were just beginning to emerge. However, the local dearth of institutional long-term care was about to be alleviated by the inclusion of six beds for persons with AIDS in a nursing home under construction at North Shore University Hospital.

The AIDS epidemic has also highlighted the limitations in the national response to intravenous drug use, and Long Island is no exception. Nassau and Suffolk drug programs have incorporated AIDS education into the counselling they provide their clients, but questions remain about how to design effective education and how to reach persons not in treatment. As in most locations, the demand for treatment exceeds supply. Residential treatment is in particularly short supply, and the directors believe their programs will soon become hospices for persons with AIDS if long-term care alternatives are not developed.

Because the service gaps reflect systemic problems, completing a com-



prehensive response to HIV infection poses an exceptional challenge to Long Island institutions. It is unclear whether they will find the necessary political will, technical expertise and fiscal resources. Some of the principal policy questions they must address are as follows:

- What priority should be given to health-care for persons with AIDS, which as yet kills relatively few people but kills them young?
- Who will be responsible for planning a local response to HIV infection, spearheading education programs and delivering services?
- How can a response be organized in minority communities?
- How can professional or community-based health educators control the spread of HIV infection, particularly among intravenous drug users and into the heterosexual population?
- Will a centralized service system be incompatible with growing caseload?
- What are the best means of organizing long-term care and housing for persons with AIDS and how can they be funded?
- What, if anything, will motivate public-sector social service providers to address the needs of persons with AIDS?
- When, and after what course of events, will communities begin to allow housing for persons with HIV infection to be openly established?

The answers to these questions will be influenced to an unpredictable degree by characteristics of the suburban environment. The population of the Nassau-Suffolk region is geographically dispersed, culturally heterogeneous, and relatively affluent. The black and Hispanic population is small compared to many urban areas, and homosexuality appears to be more frequently hidden. Services, particularly those provided by county and local government, are fragmented by political subdivision. Moreover, the suburban environment may alter service needs. There may be greater effective demand for home health care, as opposed to institutional long-term care, because more persons with HIV infection have the health insurance coverage and support systems that make home care feasible. Providers may, however, have particular difficulty in recruiting home care staff in an area with little unemployment and high wage rates. Affluence also is associated with effective political resistance to the establishment of community housing for stigmatized groups.

#### THE LONG ISLAND EPIDEMIC IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Although the suburban environment has helped to shape the course of the epidemic and the response to it by public officials and health professionals, the history of AIDS on Long Island has more similarities with than differences from responses in cities in North America and Western Europe. This generalization is based on research undertaken by one of us (Fox) in Britain, Sweden and the United States (in collaboration with Patricia Day and Rudolf Klein in Britain).<sup>28</sup>

Three themes emerged from this research. First, the initial response of public officials and health professionals to AIDS in all three counties was slow and cautious; dilatory in the view of some people. Second, once

government decided to take strong initiative, it quickly established the terms of debate. Third, policy in all three countries has, in the main, been based on consensus, both political and professional, a consensus which has ruled out certain options (like widespread mandated screening for infection) but has also generated considerable support for the course pursued. Since 1985 and 1986, policy in most Western countries has been made on the advice of experts after political leaders in central government (and in several American states) decided to take the initiative. In most countries, existing interest groups in health affairs used the epidemic as an opportunity to press for additional resources for research, prevention and especially for treating drug addiction. In most, though with considerably more acrimony in the United States, the institutions that finance health services have accepted the obligation to pay the unanticipated costs of caring for persons with AIDS.

There are also important differences in the politics of the epidemic and therefore the policy responses to it in different countries and, in the United States, in different states and regions. In the United States, alone of industrial countries, the epidemic is strongly linked to poverty and race, because of the importance of intravenous drug use as a means of transmission. Other countries have given different degrees of priority to education and innovative drug programs and have different levels of concern about confidentiality in testing and reporting. Americans, as they have for half a century, find it easier to reach consensus about policy for research than about financing health care.

Overall, however, the policies of Western countries are evidence of the authority that medical, scientific and public health professionals have acquired during this century. Most countries have defined AIDS as a classic public health crisis: a temporary threat requiring social policies selected from the repertoire of professionals. As AIDS becomes a chronic problem, however—as it comes to resemble tuberculosis in the 19th century or any one of many chronic diseases today—the classic public health policy model may no longer be appropriate.

The history of the epidemic on Long Island conforms to this international pattern among industrial countries and their subunits. The seriousness of the epidemic was fully realized by health professionals and public officials several years after the emergence of the disease in the region. The first concerted action was stimulated by community organizations that were led by people linked to or active in gay organizations. Very quickly, however, professionals and public officials, supported by policies of the New York State and the federal government, took charge of the response to the epidemic. By 1988, the community activists, working mainly through LIAAC, were partners in planning and service delivery with established public and voluntary providers.

On Long Island, as elsewhere in North America and Western Europe, the response to AIDS offers many examples of the triumph of the ethic of professionalism over the confused and conflicting claims of morality and ideology. The geography, demography, and organizational diversity

of Long Island have helped to shape the response to the epidemic, but not in ways that make it fundamentally different from the response in urban areas. It is, however, unwise to assume that the future will resemble the past, on Long Island or anywhere else.


### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to Bruce Agins, Marvin Burton, John Dowling, John Grabau, John Haigney, David Harris, Robert Hawkins, Mark Kaplan, Lawrence Lessner, Edmund McTernan, Oliver Schepers, Roy Steigbigel, and Rose Walton for their contributions to the preparation of this article.

### NOTES

1. Centers for Disease Control, *AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report*, 19 December 1988.
2. William L. Heyward and James W. Curran, "The Epidemiology of AIDS in the U.S.," *Scientific American* 259 (October 1988): 72-81. Reported caseload lags significantly behind diagnosis.
3. Jonathan M. Mann et al, "The International Epidemiology of AIDS," *Ibid.*: 82-89.
4. Daniel M. Fox, "AIDS and the American Health Polity: the History and Prospects of a Crisis of Authority," in Elizabeth Fee and Daniel M. Fox, eds. *AIDS: The Burdens of History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 316-343.
5. The demographic statistics in this section are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1983* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
6. National data in this section are from Centers for Disease Control, *AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report*, 19 December 1988. Long Island data and projections are from the AIDS Epidemiology Program, New York State Department of Health, cited in Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency, *Plan for a Comprehensive Response to HIV Infection and Related Diseases in Nassau and Suffolk Counties* [hereafter referred to as *Plan*], Part I (December 1988), Exhibits 1-3, 7.2. The analysis of Nassau-Suffolk caseload by risk behavior and race is as of March 31, 1988.
7. New York State Department of Health, *Vital Statistics of New York State*, 1986.
8. William Booth, "CDC Paints a Picture of HIV Infection in U.S.," *Science* 239 (15 January 1988): 253.
9. James W. Curran, "The Epidemiology and Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome," *Annals of Internal Medicine* 103 (November 1985): 657-662.
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12. Nationally, 27 percent of all persons with AIDS have been black and 15 percent Hispanic, compared to the respective 12 and 6 percent of these groups in the total population. In New York City, the respective numbers are 34 and 27 percent of all cases, compared with 25 and 20 percent shares of the population.

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14. Emily H. Thomas and Daniel M Fox, "The Cost of Treating Persons with AIDS in Four Hospitals in Metropolitan New York in 1985," in Daniel M. Fox and Emily H. Thomas, eds, *Financing Care for Persons with AIDS: The First Studies, 1985-1988* (Frederick, MD: University Publishing Group, forthcoming).
15. John C. Grabau and Dale L. Morse, "Seropositivity for HIV at Alternative Sites", *Journal of the American Medical Association* 260:21 (December 2, 1988): 3128.
16. Personal communication from Dr. John Grabau.
17. Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency, *Plan*, (December 1988), Exhibit 11.
18. The consortium included LIAAC, the Interfaith Nutrition Network, Nassau County Medical Center, University Hospital at Stony Brook, Nursing Sisters Home Visiting Service, Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Home Health Agency, Nassau County Department of Social Services, and Suffolk County Department of Social Services.
19. Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency, *Plan*.
20. Report of the medical panel to the Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency: "Projected Utilization and Cost of Acute Care, Long-term Care and Outpatient Services by Persons with Diseases Related to HIV Infection in Nassau and Suffolk Counties," September 1988.
21. Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency, *Plan*, Part I, Exhibit 10.
22. Report of the medical panel to the Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency.
23. Nationwide, public hospitals care for a disproportionate number of persons with AIDS. For example, in a 1985 survey of public and private teaching hospitals almost three-quarters of all AIDS admissions were to public institutions. DP Andrus et al, "The provision and financing of medical care for AIDS patients in US public and private teaching hospitals," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 258:10 (11 September 1987): 1343-1346.
24. The AIDS caseload is equally distributed between the two counties. In March 31, 1988 there were 173 persons living with AIDS in Suffolk County and 169 in Nassau County according to the AIDS Epidemiology Program, New York State Department of Health.
25. Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency, *Plan*, Part I (August 1988), Attachment 2.
26. We estimate the cost of the enhanced reimbursement to be \$3.2 million in 1987. Hospitals receive reimbursement up to 30 percent above average for patients in their AIDS treatment centers; average per diem cost is about \$600 per day, average length of stay for persons with AIDS is about 20 days, and there were about 900 admissions to the treatment center hospitals in 1987.
27. These concerns were reported in a survey conducted by the Nassau-Suffolk Health Systems Agency.
28. Daniel M. Fox, Patricia Day, and Rudolph Klein, "The Power of Professionalism: AIDS in Britain, Sweden and the United States," *Daedalus*, (April, 1989).



*Grumman F-14 Tomcat Fighters and E-2C Hawkeye*

*photo courtesy Grumman Corporation*

# Grumman Versus Republic:

## Success And Failure In The Aviation Industry On Long Island

By Joshua Stoff

Long Island, site of historic flights and base of early aircraft makers, well deserves its reputation as the "Cradle of Aviation." Of the many firms that have come and gone, two major aerospace manufacturers were born on the Island, survived the Depression, made some of the country's fastest and most famous aircraft, and lasted well into the Space Age. They are the Grumman Aerospace Corporation of Bethpage, and the Republic Aviation Corporation of Farmingdale. But from there on, all similarity ends.

Grumman remains in business, producing high-quality military aircraft, spacecraft, and defense electronics, as well as branching out successfully into allied manufacturing fields. Republic, however, ceased operations in 1987 after a long and painful decline. How did this come about? Both firms started at the same time in the same place, were among the largest aircraft makers in World War II, and successfully entered the Jet Age and the burgeoning Space Program. This article examines Republic's failure and Grumman's success, and suggests what Grumman must do to survive in the current tight budget environment confronting the defense industry.

### REPUBLIC

The Depression year of 1931, when thousands of firms were failing all over the country, was not the best year to start a business, but this was when Major Alexander P. deSeversky, a Soviet emigre, founded Sever-sky Aircraft Corporation. Its first product was a highly streamlined amphibian plane, initially sold to foreign governments; the basic design, later modified as a trainer, was sold to the Army Air Corps in 1935.

This early success attracted one thousand stockholders by 1936, the year the firm made its most profitable sale when the Air Corps bought seventy-seven fast, handsomely streamlined P-35 fighters. Encouraged by the new orders, the company soon moved into larger facilities in Farmingdale. President deSeversky continued to woo the Air Corps with such publicity stunts as setting speed records in experimental fighters. His promotional schemes in the prewar years yielded few additional orders, however, and the firm sold no more than 140 aircraft. Each year the company's inept management piled up large deficits.

Seversky Aircraft encountered considerable difficulty filling the P-35

contract, especially in meeting the rigid rules governing Army contracts. The first planes delivered in 1937 cost \$225,543 to build, but the firm received payments of only \$110,002.<sup>1</sup> Management performed financial gymnastics to finish its Army orders while simultaneously researching and developing new designs for future orders, a predicament that continued until the company's final day.

The last P-35 model was modified into the XP-41, an experimental design which attracted Air Corps interest, but the cost of development plunged the company deeper into the red.<sup>2</sup> While deSeversky was seeking orders in England, the board of directors, angered by bleak financial prospects, relieved him as president and reorganized the company as the Republic Aviation Corporation.

Rising tension in Europe and world-wide rearmament greatly benefited the firm. Sweden bought several P-35's, and the sale of more than one million shares of new stock provided added working capital. With \$10-million worth of orders on its books, Republic posted its first profit in 1939. The great American defense build-up initiated in 1940 spurred additional purchases. Employment rose to 10,000 after the Air Corps placed a \$56-million order for P-43 Lancer fighters.<sup>3</sup> Following the outbreak of war, the Air Corps placed large orders for Republic's P-47 Thunderbolt, an advanced craft with more speed, power, range, and capacity than any other U.S. fighter. The Farmingdale firm became the Army's second-largest supplier of fighter aircraft.

On the strength of its war-time contracts, Republic in 1943 retired its outstanding debt, generated a net profit of more than \$1 million, and paid a dividend on its common stock. Employment soared to 24,450 by 1944, when sales totalled \$370 million and the firm became the world's largest maker of fighter planes.<sup>4</sup> More than nine thousand P-47's rolled off its Long Island assembly lines at a rate of twenty-eight a day at one point—more than one an hour!

The surrender of Germany and Japan led to rapid demobilization in the United States, and when World War II ended, all remaining P-47 contracts were canceled. Republic's workforce plummeted from 24,000 to 3,400.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the Air Force lost interest in the firm's experimental photo reconnaissance aircraft, the high-speed, long-range XR-12 Rainbow; production was halted after only two prototypes were built. Republic then attempted to transform the Rainbow into a luxurious civil airliner, only to lose more money when the glut of cheap, ex-military transports precluded the airlines from any need for expensive new planes.

At the end of the war, Alfred Marchev, the company's president, recognized Republic's need to make products other than military planes. He launched the "Seabee" project for a civilian amphibious aircraft aimed at the predicted demand for postwar civil aircraft. By designing a cheap and quickly built product, Republic hoped to exploit the market for private aircraft the way the market for automobiles was exploited after World War I.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, the postwar civil aircraft market never materialized, and Republic lost money on the one thousand Seabees it built.

The transition from propeller-driven to jet powered aircraft saved the company. As early as 1944, Republic began developing the F-84 Thunderjet, a fighter which later set several speed records. But research and start-up costs for three new aircraft were steep; in spite of sizeable Air Force orders for F-84's, the company lost \$4 million in 1946, mostly on the Seabee and Rainbow programs. The gamble to free Republic from complete reliance on military contracts cost President Marchev his job.<sup>7</sup> Disturbed by corporate losses, the directors replaced him with Mundy Peale.

When Seabee and Rainbow work ceased in 1947, the gap was filled with additional orders for F-84's. Though the firm lost \$2 million that year, it also piled up \$57 million in backlog orders. Cold War era rearmament led to even greater sales. Faster versions of the F-84 were bought by the Air Force and several NATO allies. After the outbreak of the Korean War, employment rose quickly, reaching 15,000 in 1951. That same year Republic won an Air Force contract for the F-105 Thunderchief, a new fighter/bomber aircraft. The following year, with three F-84 models in production and work begun on F-105's, the firm became Long Island's largest employer,<sup>8</sup> its twenty-two thousand workers the highest-paid in the airframe industry, partly because of their union's tough negotiating tactics and willingness to go on strike.<sup>9</sup> The F-105's were consistent money-makers; more than eight hundred of them were built until 1964, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara terminated production.

Correctly targeting space flight as the next developing aerospace field, Republic invested \$14 million in its Paul Moore Research Center in Farmingdale, and during the early 1960s received federal contracts for an Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory, the Project Fire Spacecraft (prototype Apollo Command Module), and the first Lunar Spacesuit. Because these new ventures could not compensate for the cancellation of F-105 orders, Republic lost \$3 million in 1964. Not only did it lack a large airframe contract to pick up the slack, it also lost money on its major sub-contract to fabricate the aft fuselage for the McDonnell F-4 "Phantom" fighter. Employment rapidly dropped to 8,000 and the future looked bleak.

At this juncture, in 1965, the Fairchild Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, bought the operating assets of Republic Aviation. Fairchild installed its own president, pared costs, and consolidated facilities. Although it was not a hostile takeover — Fairchild apparently hoped to revive the failing aerospace manufacturer before it was forced to cease operations — Republic's long-term R & D effectively ended when the Moore Research Center was closed and much of its equipment and staff was sent to Maryland. From then on, all high-tech research and resulting production was done in Maryland, leaving Long Island to fend for itself. Many Republic engineers resigned, preferring to travel the well-worn Hempstead Turnpike to Grumman. Employment fell further to 3,700.

Hopes were raised in 1966, when the firm won an unusual contract to design and build a "Safety Car" for the State of New York. Excitement ran high, as this seemed to be its first successful non-aerospace venture,



but Republic's reverses continued when New York canceled the contract after the design stage. The Federal Department of Transportation had Republic build two of the cars. They were received enthusiastically but generated no further orders. Hoped-for profits from patent rights failed to materialize and once again Republic lost money.

The years 1968-1969 marked a critical juncture in the company's fortunes. With no new aircraft production underway, the engineering staff formulated proposals to build the F-15, an air superiority fighter and clearly the Air Force's last new fighter contract for a long time to come. Republic was buoyed by its selection as one of three finalists for the project, along with Rockwell and McDonnell-Douglas. But late in 1969, in a controversial and politicized decision, the Pentagon chose McDonnell-Douglas, in spite of Republic's intensive effort and outstanding design. To date, McDonnell-Douglas has produced more than one thousand F-15's, a remarkably long-lived fighter plane.

There were several reasons for Fairchild-Republic's failure to obtain this valuable contract. First, McDonnell possessed a stronger political lobby. Second, a few months before the award the FBI tracked a leak of information from Republic's F-15 program to the Israeli consulate in New York, causing several ranking Air Force generals to doubt the company's security. Finally, just weeks before the announcement, Grumman won the contract to build the Navy's Air Superiority F-14, inhibiting the Pentagon, for geo-political reasons, from placing two such important aircraft contracts with companies located only nine miles apart.

Chastened, Republic focused its remaining engineering efforts on an impending \$1.5-billion Air Force contract for a new close air support aircraft. In January, 1973, after intense competition, Republic's ten-year quest for a major aircraft prime contract culminated in victory when the Air Force selected its powerful, heavily-armed A-10 as the new Close Air Support plane. At the same time, the Farmingdale-based firm received a contract to build the vertical tail for the Space Shuttle Orbiters.

Unfortunately, the impetus provided by the A-10 contract was short-lived. Production peaked at 144 aircraft in 1980 and then began to decline. Observers at Republic saw ominous signs that the absentee management cared more for profits than for jobs on Long Island, especially after Fairchild moved half of the A-10 work to Maryland. This program, one of the firm's rare winners, had earned \$3 billion until declining production affected profits, initiating large scale layoffs. The 713th and last A-10 was completed in 1984.

There also was unexpected resistance to the A-10 from the Air Force, which defined its mission as high-altitude defense and disdained close air support of ground troops. Together with many members of Congress, the Air Force felt that the A-10 should have gone to the Army. Republic's belated search for foreign sales failed. With A-10 production dwindling, few buyers were willing to order a plane that obviously was going out of production.

In 1980, in an effort to revive corporate finances, Republic initiated

a joint venture with the Swedish company, SAAB, to produce a thirty-four-seat turbo-prop plane. Planners envisioned a world-wide market for more than four hundred aircraft. Republic would produce the wing sets starting in 1982. Almost immediately, however, major production problems arose and the Long Island firm suffered losses of \$85 million before work was halted in 1987.

Republic's last major contract, to produce the Air Force's new T-46 trainer aircraft, also encountered severe problems. By 1985, engineering changes, schedule slippage, and soaring start-up costs necessitated adding millions to corporate reserves.<sup>10</sup> The fixed-price contract forced Republic to cover all costs above the agreed upon ceiling.<sup>11</sup>

To prove its reliability, the company desperately wanted to meet the contractual date of February, 1985, for the long-awaited "rollout" of the first T-46.<sup>12</sup> Unable to meet the deadline, it committed a serious blunder by faking completion. At a large official ceremony, it presented a beautiful and seemingly finished plane. Horrified Air Force Generals discovered, however, that the aircraft lacked twelve hundred internal components and that some of its skin sections were fabricated from fiberglass dummied up to resemble sheet metal.<sup>13</sup> It would be another eight months until a genuine T-46 left the ground.

Relations between the Pentagon and Fairchild-Republic quickly soured. Secretary of the Air Force Aldridge, angry over the missing parts fiasco, complained to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who ordered a seldom-invoked contractor review of the firm. When serious deficiencies were found in eight important areas, including manufacturing, engineering, and product integrity, the Air Force suspended 50% of the company's progress payments.

Reeling under the attack, Fairchild installed a new president, John Sandford, who launched a last-ditch effort to overcome manufacturing shortcomings. In May 1986, the General Accounting Office reported that many problems had been corrected and that the T-46 performed well in six months of flight tests at Edwards Air Force Base. These improvements came too late to save the program. With the end of the Reagan-era defense build-up in sight, the Air Force determined that the T-46 was too low on its list of priorities to be continued.<sup>14</sup> The Pentagon neither released the 1986 money appropriated by Congress for thirty-three T-46's, nor requested these planes in the next fiscal year. Congress then delivered a lethal blow by cutting \$321 million from the Defense Department budget for T-46's. In March, 1987, Republic and the Air Force agreed to terminate the T-46. Production ground to a halt in the midst of a coffee break; only four planes were built, and Fairchild lost \$120 million on the project.

Fairchild-Republic's managerial, tactical, political, and production mistakes badly damaged the T-46 project, but there were other reasons for Republic's failure on Long Island. Lack of stability among top management played an important part; Republic had four presidents in its last four years. Lack of support from its parent proved equally damaging. In October, 1985, during the midst of a Congressional fight to restore

the T-46 program, Fairchild's chairman, Emanuel Fthenakis, told a roomful of reporters that his firm no longer wanted to be in the aircraft manufacturing business.<sup>15</sup> Fairchild was moving into communications and Fthenakis wanted to keep it that way. Once this attitude prevailed at the top, the Long Island Division was doomed. Fairchild did nothing to locate new work for Republic, whose president tried (on his own time) without success to find a partner or buyer for the T-46.

With contraction in the military aircraft industry and limitations on new programs, Fairchild saw no near or long-term opportunities for Republic as a military airframe builder. With no new business coming in, the company wound down its Long Island operations in 1987 and disposed of them entirely in 1988.<sup>16</sup> The last thirty-five hundred employees were laid off as Fairchild withdrew from aircraft production. Some two hundred ex-Republic employees remained in aerospace by finding work at Grumman; the rest obtained related jobs with local manufacturing plants, or moved away from the Island. In 1988, the Republic Aviation property was sold, slated to become a shopping mall. After production of 27,173 aircraft, an era was over.

From its inception in the 1930s, Republic lived tenuously from year to year and contract to contract, never on solid financial footing. It was always building one plane while sinking funds into a new design, its long-term failure made all the surer because it never succeeded in diversifying out of aerospace. In today's tight defense budget climate, no company can survive solely as a military airframe producer.

## **GRUMMAN**

Grumman Corporation, founded by aircraft designer Leroy Grumman at the same general time and place as Republic, avoided most of the latter's mistakes and flourishes today as a principle aerospace firm. As Republic long was associated with the Air Force, Grumman for more than fifty years has been mainly a builder of Navy aircraft, producing 33,000 to date.

On January 2, 1930, two months into the Great Depression, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation opened for business in a garage in Baldwin. Its first contract (for \$33,700) was to design and build two prototype floats with retractable landing gear, to be tested on one of the Navy's Vought Corsair biplanes. The Navy liked the design enough to order additional copies. Although many aircraft companies failed that year, Grumman finished 1930 more than \$5000 in the black. While its engineers worked on plans for a new Navy fighter, the company met its payroll by making aluminum truck bodies that were as strong as conventional steel and wood bodies but lighter and more durable. Thus from the beginning, Grumman diversified its aircraft making with the truck manufacturing that has remained one of its most successful divisions.

In 1931, the Navy's approval of the early floats led to a contract for 27 FF-1's,<sup>17</sup> a two-seater plane with retractable landing gear, faster than contemporary single-seaters. In need of more space to make floats and

planes, the company moved into an abandoned Navy hangar at Curtiss Field (Valley Stream) and then to a “real” factory in Farmingdale. The FF-1 was the first of a series of fighters that also included the F2F and the mass-produced F3F, the Navy’s last biplane fighter, a contract for 160 aircraft that earned well over \$2 million. In 1937 Grumman moved from Farmingdale to Bethpage, issuing 100,000 shares of stock to the public at \$7.50 a share to raise capital for development of the G-21 Goose for the commercial market.

Instead of manufacturing only one type of plane, as Republic did with fighters, Grumman wisely broadened its product line. In the mid-1930s, it entered the amphibian field with the well-received Duck, the Navy’s flying workhorse, followed by the Goose for airline or executive use, and the Widgeon, Mallard, and Albatross for the Coast Guard, Navy, and Air Force.

As war approached in 1940, the firm employed approximately two thousand workers. Their ranks swelled when Congress, in May 1941, ordered a build-up of ten thousand aircraft. Grumman’s workforce more than tripled, with around-the-clock shifts a way of life. Following Pearl Harbor, new F6F Hellcats, the Navy’s best fighter of World War II, began rolling off assembly lines in record numbers, along with TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. During the war, Grumman’s 24,000 workers delivered 17,013 aircraft, more than any other American manufacturer. Sales in 1944 reached \$320 million. At one point in 1945 the firm completed more than one plane an hour, or 664 in a single month, a record never equaled. Grumman planes accounted for two of every three enemy aircraft destroyed in the Pacific Theater—almost six thousand Japanese planes<sup>18</sup>

As the war wound down, however, so did aircraft production. The firm’s \$380-million backlog fell a whopping 80 percent as the paucity of postwar orders reduced employment to 5,400.<sup>19</sup> Alert to the need to change from military to civil production, the company adapted its aluminum stretch presses—once used for forming aircraft skins—to the making of metal canoes that became surprisingly popular. This was the genesis of a profitable boat division that now makes canoes, powerboats, sailboats, and pontoon boats; Grumman, known as an aircraft company, holds the lion’s share of the world’s aluminum canoe market. At the same time, the firm revived the production of aluminum truck bodies, an ongoing product line that fits Grumman’s pattern of avoiding complete reliance on aircraft production. Something the company did not do was emulate Republic’s mistake of producing personal civil planes for a market that did not exist.

As orders for prop-driven Navy fighters were terminated after the war, Grumman recognized the need for special-mission aircraft by creating one of the first of the Navy’s electronic aircraft, the Guardian series of anti-submarine hunter-killer teams with electronic search and detection systems, still a specialty of the firm. In 1947, the company entered the jet age with its small, sleek F9F Panther, the first carrier-based jet fighter to see combat in Korea. Over three thousand Panthers and related swept-wing Cougars were built during the Cold War and Korean re-armament

programs.

Grumman learned several important lessons from its World War II experience. During the Korean Conflict, instead of rapidly adding workers to meet increased demand, it hired only essential employees (5000) and subcontracted the rest of the work. At the end of the war it canceled the subcontracts, thus keeping most of its own personnel on the payroll. Later in the 1950s, the company combined the capability of the Guardian hunter-killer team into a single aircraft, the S-2 Tracker that carried both the detection equipment and armament necessary to perform anti-submarine missions. Grumman also enhanced its position in avionics (aircraft electronics) with the WF-2/E-1B Tracer, a plane that carried a huge radome atop its fuselage for warning a task force of aircraft, ship, or missile threats, and to direct interception by fighter planes. The firm's F-11 Tiger was the Navy's first supersonic aircraft, although only two hundred were made because of, among other reasons, its short operational range.

In the mid-1950s, demand for the company's jet fighters slackened. Grumman's hasty search for other projects resembled Republic's later on, but unlike Republic, Grumman sought alternative kinds of aircraft to build so that when business picked up the firm would have more than one plane in production. Rather than lay off workers, it shifted them to other projects, showing a flexibility that carried it through lean times.

Management proved its acumen by producing a low-cost, low-maintenance crop duster to replace aging government surplus trainers crudely adapted for spraying. The resulting Ag-Cat, simple and maneuverable, is flown worldwide in greater numbers than any of its competitors. The company also entered the aircraft transport field with its Gulfstream I, sold to corporations, government agencies, and foreign customers until succeeded in the late '60s by the jet Gulfstream II. A surveillance plane, the OV Mohawk, the first Grumman product sold to the Army, became the "airborne eyes" of field commanders in Vietnam, and remains in operation today. By the end of the 1950s, Grumman's varied product line generated sales of \$325 million, the highest since 1944.

Orders continued to pile up and the 1960s were good for Grumman. Sales rose to a record \$1.2 billion in 1969,<sup>20</sup> when Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation became Grumman Corporation, a holding company with four main subsidiaries: Aerospace, Allied (trucks, boats) Data Systems (computers, electronics), and International. The firm opened new plants in Georgia and Florida, where there was room for expansion and operating costs were lower.

The rise in orders was paced by NASA's drive to reach for the moon and beyond. Early in the decade, Grumman entered the burgeoning space program with an Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, a satellite for observing the stars from a position outside the distortion of the earth's atmosphere.<sup>21</sup> The investment of \$10 million on a building with a vast "clean room" for spacecraft construction<sup>22</sup> proved its worth in 1962 when Grumman won NASA's contract to build the Project Apollo Lunar Module that touched safely down on the Sea of Tranquility on July 20, 1969. Five

more LM's made round trips to the Moon, one of them serving as the "lifeboat" that rescued the crew of Apollo 13. The LM was a brilliant technological project that grossed \$2 billion for Grumman.

Within two weeks of winning the LM contract, the company also was chosen to work on the new swing-wing F-111, a bi-service fighter. General Dynamics was chosen to build the plane and assemble the Air Force version, while Grumman would fabricate the aft sections, tail components, and landing gear for all the planes, and assemble the Navy version. The Air Force F-111 remained in production until late in the decade, but the Navy model proved inoperable from a carrier and never went into production. This was the fate of McNamara's commonality plan that also doomed Republic's F-105. Fortunately for Grumman, it was later able to utilize its new expertise in swing-wing design to acquire the important F-14 Tomcat contract.<sup>23</sup>

When the Lunar Module and F-111 programs were phased out early in the 1970s, Grumman was forced into sweeping and traumatic layoffs. By 1972, 10,000 workers were lopped from the payroll of 37,000, a level never reached again. Simultaneously, in 1969 Grumman bested four other firms competing to fill the gap in the Navy's planned inventory when it won the contract to build the F-14 Tomcat, a new air superiority fighter. After fourteen years, the firm was back in the fighter business. Today's swing-wing F-14 flies at more than twice the speed of sound and carries the most potent combination of weapons of any fighter in the air. More than six hundred have been built, at a cost that, over the years, rose from \$20-plus million to \$40 million each, with production expected to run at least through 1994. This plane also accounted for Grumman's largest foreign sale, with eighty bought by the Shah of Iran in 1978.<sup>24</sup>

Despite this important contract, the company faced its first serious crisis in the summer of 1972. With the end of Project Apollo and a precipitate rise in inflation, bankruptcy threatened. In 1971, when it lost \$18 million, Grumman informed the Navy that further production of F-14's would be commercially impracticable; after a loss of \$70 million in 1972, President Towl stated that any more such disasters would force the company out of business.<sup>25</sup> In response, the Navy ordered more F-14's which Grumman simply refused to build on grounds that it could not produce them and stay solvent—the company threatened to sue when the Navy insisted it build the planes at original cost. Eventually, a new contract enabled Grumman to stay in business but only after absorbing a massive loss of \$220 million on the early F-14's.<sup>26</sup> The new arrangement added \$1.5 million to the price of each plane and allowed for annual inflation adjustments.

Also in 1972, Grumman apparently won the technical competition to build Space Shuttle Orbiters, but lost the \$2.6-billion contract because of Pentagon misgivings concerning the turmoil surrounding the F-14. The firm continued to develop a variety of military aircraft, however, and by the mid-1970s had produced the advanced airborne early-warning E-2C Hawkeye and A-6 attack bomber), and the EA-6B Prowler, a jamming plane containing the most advanced countermeasure equipment ever

fitted to a tactical aircraft. The Navy EA-6B and the Air Force EF-111 enable Grumman to play either side of the electronics warfare game; it manufactures both radar surveillance aircraft and radar jamming equipment. The firm has made over \$200 million by upgrading old F-111's.<sup>27</sup>

After the F-14 fiasco, Grumman embarked on several far-sighted but unsuccessful stabs at diversification, in its effort to extricate itself from dependence on military contracts. Having forecast the need for cheaper energy sources in the wake of the 1973-1974 oil embargo, the company experimented with windmills, solar panels, and the burning of garbage to furnish steam. When the oil shortage ended, these systems proved economically unfeasible, even if a community could have been found that wanted sludge burned in its midst; Grumman's Ecosystems venture lost \$50 million. Another imaginative venture was Dormovac, a method of keeping perishables fresh without freezing and shipping them by cheaper means than air freight. A main objective was to ship Australian lamb to Moslem countries disdainful of frozen meat, but hopes were dashed when eager Iranians opened the first shipment and were greeted by the stench of rotting meat. In all, Dormovac lost \$45.6 million.<sup>28</sup>

Grumman also targeted energy-efficient mass transportation as another likely diversification venture. In 1978 the firm acquired the Flexible Bus Corporation and began to make a new kind of bus. Unfortunately, the bus was not given enough rigorous, long-term testing and met with disaster when subjected to the lunar-like surface of New York City streets. Grumman sold the company five years later, but not before cracked bus frames caused a loss of \$200 million.<sup>29</sup> On the plus side, demand for fuel efficient transport increased the market for aluminum truck bodies, and Grumman enlarged its production to include fire trucks and other special vehicles. This phase of its business has been extremely successful; in 1986 the firm received its largest order—a government contract for mail trucks.<sup>30</sup>

Grumman's involvement in the Space Program has also continued, with the building of six sets of massive wings for the Space Shuttle and the interior components for the future Space Station Habitat Module. A \$1.5-billion award to manage NASA's Space Station Program and oversee integration of the various contractors' elements has been of particular value in that Grumman, relieved of making hardware, can calculate contract costs and deadlines more accurately and without having to do a great deal of work before the contract becomes profitable.

Grumman won a 1981 award to develop, build, and test two of the X-29, its most recent aircraft design, with forward-swept wings for greater maneuverability and such state of the art features as computerized controls and composite construction. The firm invested \$40 million of its own money on top of the \$80 million award in hopes that this aircraft would make it the leader in certain advanced technologies and result in future contract awards.<sup>31</sup> Both these planes have undergone successful flight-test programs, but unhappily for Grumman, no new contracts have been granted.

In 1987 the firm also was a finalist for the multi-billion Advanced Tac-

tical Aircraft (ATA) contract—the last new Navy contract for the foreseeable future—but lost to McDonnell-Douglas. Grumman could not afford to stay in the contest, which would have required the investment of another \$300 million. Thus the X-29, Grumman's only new aircraft, may also be its last.

The drop in 1987 earnings caused by fewer aircraft deliveries was reversed in 1988, the first full year of producing mail trucks under a contract that calls for 100,000 units with a value of \$1.1 billion. Production of aircraft should continue into the mid-1990s, but beyond that is unknown territory. Grumman will have to compete with larger, richer companies for increasingly rare contracts, as it bids for the Air Force's next airborne early warning system and a proposed multi-mission electronics-systems aircraft. Grumman also is a finalist to build the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System Satellite for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Should it win, and the program be funded, it would be a major success for the firm, creating brand new future business worth \$20 billion.

Today's aerospace industry is shrinking. Tighter federal budgets and the end of the Reagan military build-up dominate the fiscal landscape. Many companies have deeper pockets than Grumman's. Faced with rising taxes, wages, and utility rates, Grumman no longer can manufacture a complete aircraft at a bid-winning price on Long Island. Instead, it is building its new plants in states where costs are lower, thus making operations more competitive and also gaining political advantage by distributing the work base. Its headquarters, research, and electronics divisions will most likely stay on the Island, but probably much of its manufacturing gradually will move away.

Although aerospace still accounts for 75 percent of Grumman's sales, the firm is shifting from its traditional emphasis on combat planes into the fields of military space, defense electronics, and truck building. It has won an Army and Air Force contract under which it hopes to build ten JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems) for \$4 billion.<sup>32</sup> Grumman presently can be summed up by the word "diversification." In 1987, when it completed only 43 aircraft, it built 13,000 trucks and 19,000 boats, although dollar value of planes far outweighed that of other products.<sup>33</sup>

Grumman's 1988 debt of \$643 million ranks among the industry's highest. Short of cash but long in talent, with a record \$7.9 billion backlog, it is a prime target for takeover by a bigger, richer company that wants to get into avionics and gain from Grumman's military experience.<sup>34</sup> The backlog is not a true indicator of financial health, however, and Grumman's SDI and other defense electronics programs are vulnerable to cuts by the new administration.

Electronics superiority is the key to air superiority. Looking beyond the mid-1990s, when its present planes will be phased out, Grumman increasingly will be making and integrating electronic systems and putting them into planes, perhaps their own, but more likely someone else's. Making black boxes is far less risky and more rewarding than making entire



aircraft that may or may not be sold.

In conclusion, Grumman can be considered a success. Though it *appears* to be going out of airframe manufacturing, it is not going *out of business*, as did Republic once the “tin-bending” stopped. Grumman is simply too diversified to go broke, although this makes it all the more alluring as a candidate for takeover. Unlike Republic, which consistently relied on one major program to support the whole operation, Grumman makes several types of aircraft along with all its other lines, too many projects ever to be terminated at once. Another striking difference is the manner of choosing the leadership. Republic’s presidents came and went like New York Yankee managers, while Grumman tends to promote from within in friendly and productive rotation: in 1960, for example, when President Leon “Jake” Swirbul died thirty years after helping to found the company, he was succeeded by Clint Towl, another Grumman founder.

Yet one still wonders if the loss of the ATA contract could have the same long-term effect on Grumman as Republic’s loss of the F-15. The answer is almost surely not, since Grumman has developed alternative routes to survival, something Republic never did.

#### NOTES

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13. The last of three *Newsday* reports of Republic's "roll-out" of an uncompleted, dummied-up aircraft was 14 March 1987, p.15.
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18. Richard Thruelson, *The Grumman Story* (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 238.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
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23. Hardy, *Sea, Sky, and Stars*, p. 90.
24. *Forty-Ninth Annual Report*, Grumman Corp., 1978, p. 9.
25. Thruelson, *Grumman*, p. 362.
26. Myron Magnet, "Grumman's Comeback," *Fortune* 20 September 1982, p. 72.
27. *Grumman-Profile for the Seventies*, Grumman Corp, 1975, p. 14.
28. Magnet, "Grumman's Comeback," p. 79.
29. *Newsday*, 22 January 1988, p. 47.
30. *Grumman Horizons* 23 (1987) 1:4
31. Dubashi Jagannath, "Grumman's New Flight Plan," *Financial World*, 10 March 1987, p. 27.
32. *Newsday*, 22 January 1988, p. 47.
33. *Newsday*, 29 February 1988, part II, p. 7.
34. According to *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 5 December 1988, p. 11, Grumman has filed a \$200-million debt offering "with a provision known as a 'poison put,' designed to protect bondholders from losses in the event of a takeover."

**COMMENTARY**

*By John C. Bierwirth*

*Chairman of the Board, retired*

*Grumman Corporation*

Disraeli's cynical aphorism that "what we learn from history is that we do not learn from history" is simply wrong. History is our cultural memory, and just as we learn from life, so can we learn from history. I was a history major in college and have remained a history buff ever since, and I believe the study of history informed the decisions I have had to make both in business and in my personal life.

Most published history is political: the study of wars and governments, generals and kings. But most of life is economic: the business of making a living, which for most of us is today is the business of business.

Joshua Stoff has added an important economic dimension to the history of Long Island with this study of two corporation that have focused the working lives of many thousands of Long Islanders. I found that his article not only informed me but it also quickened and confirmed my recollection of many of the events in which I played a role. I disagree with him occasionally, but usually only in nuance and detail.

For example, it is not true that the bus Grumman introduced to the market "was not given enough rigorous, long-term testing." Actually, the bus was well enough tested by the company that developed it to discover that the undercarriage was inadequately designed, but those results were withheld from Grumman when we bought the bus business. To me that is an important distinction, but I understand that to the historian it is a detail.

I have only one disagreement of substance with Mr. Stoff. As Yogi Berra put it, "forecasting is difficult, especially about the future," and I believe Mr. Stoff's view of Grumman's future will prove to be fundamentally wrong. He sees Grumman surviving in the late 1990's as a diversified developer and manufacturer of military and space systems, trucks and other products (among which I'm sure he would include Grumman's growing data systems business) but phasing out of aircraft production.

I disagree. Grumman will continue to be a major aircraft company. The aircraft business will continue to be the central core of manufacturing operations and engineering excellence from which its other business derive and on which they will continue to depend.

In the past year there have been two competitions for new tactical aircraft, each intended to serve the needs of both the U.S. Air Force and the Navy. Grumman chose not to make the potentially ruinous "investments"—today's euphemism for bidding below cost—required to win either of them. Some observers, including Mr. Stoff, have jumped to the conclusion that this means Grumman is going out of the aircraft business.

Here we can learn from history. During the 1960's Grumman was displaced by McDonnell Douglas in the fighter aircraft business. Observers and analysts jumped to the conclusion that this marked the end of the

proud history of Grumman Navy fighters, but in the early 1970's Grumman introduced the F-14 Tomcat, which has proved to be the longest-running fighter aircraft program in its history and promises to remain in production, in its improved version, right through the end of the century and beyond.

History tells us that the U.S. Air Force and Navy have never been able to develop a common aircraft design. The missions are too dissimilar and the requirements of an airplane that must spend its service life slamming onto a miniature floating airfield are so specialized that the two services cannot be expected to agree on the same set of specifications. I believe Grumman people will be building yet another version of the F-14 as well as another version of the A6 all-weather attack aircraft.

Grumman has four proven tactical aircraft in production. Each is a sophisticated flying electronics system that can be further updated and improved without spending the billions of dollars required to develop a new airframe. It seems to me that this is the ideal business position for Grumman at a time when defense budgets will be under the greatest pressure we've seen in ten years or more.

At the same time, Grumman has won contracts for the preliminary design study of the next generation of early warning aircraft and for updating aircraft for the People's Republic of China (who could have imagined that just a few years ago?) as well as for other foreign customers, and, in combination with Agusta of Italy, is competing for the U.S. Air Force primary trainer program.

Grumman will not only be building aircraft in the years ahead, but will also be building them here on Long Island. It is true that the costs of living and other costs of doing business here are forcing Grumman to locate some operations off the Island, but the company has a huge investment in aircraft production facilities and equipment here. Between 1980 and 1987 Grumman invested over \$600 million—an amount equal to the total net worth of the company as recently as 1985—in renewing and modernizing that production base here. That has tripled Grumman's net asset value on Long Island, which is an accountant's way of saying that, while people were reading about Grumman leaving Long Island, the company was actually rebuilding itself here threefold.

But there is an even more important reason that Grumman will continue to make aircraft on Long Island: the Grumman people. With an average of twelve year's experience, the people who make Grumman planes are the most productive in the industry. They own about half of the outstanding stock of the company, which makes Grumman perhaps the only large U.S. corporation in which the major stockholders are the employees.

Grumman people think of the company as "ours," and they're right. They have a different attitude about their work, an attitude that visitors never fail to notice and to remark. It is that attitude and those people that will keep Grumman independent and keep Grumman making aircraft history here on Long Island.

# Brooklyn: The Elusive Image

By Joseph Dorinson

If Paris represents the City of Light, New York the Big Apple and Boston the Hub, what is Brooklyn? Our town? Another time, another place? A landscape of cemeteries? A rotten borough? Although the image of Brooklyn continues to elude even the most critical “walker in the city,” no one denies that it has elicited derisive jokes often rooted in historic stereotypes. That equation of Brooklyn with comedy is the principal theme of what follows.

As a point of departure, consider George Washington Plunkitt’s sneer that “... a Brooklynite is a natural born hayseed, and can never become a real New Yorker.”<sup>1</sup> Placing this derogation in the context of ethnic slur, Professor Geoffrey D. Needler relates a series of anecdotal put-downs. For example, tourist to cabbie: “Where are we?” Cabbie: “Nowhere, this is Brooklyn.” A doctor examines a young soldier: “Son, where were you born?” Soldier: “Brooklyn.” Doctor: “Any other defects?” Question: “Why was a subway built to Brooklyn?” Answer: “So the people who live there could get home without being seen.”<sup>2</sup>

Rural Brooklyn in Plunkitt’s era provided fair game for Manhattan’s city slickers. All societies look for deviants to reinforce dominant norms and values; in the United States, the scapegoat tends to be the latest group to arrive.<sup>3</sup> To “nativist” observers, the arrival of swarms of immigrants—Germans to Williamsburg, Irish to the water front, Italians to Bushwick, Ridgewood, and Bensonhurst, and Norwegians to Bay Ridge—provoked ridicule mixed with anxiety.

One source of outsiders’ mirth was the putative Brooklyn accent, but Needler contends that this allegedly indigenous diction can be charted on no linguistic map because it does not exist. John Manbeck attributes the source to immigrant dialects, pointing out that the Dutch and Germans changed “t” and “th” sounds to “d,” just as Irish and Cockneys converted “er” to “oi,” and southern blacks tended to drop the “r” at the end of a word. Other scholars have blamed Brooklynese on a “glottal goulash” of old Dutch, Yiddish, Irish, Italian, and Mohawk Indian speech patterns.<sup>4</sup> H. L. Mencken, having made it clear that “dialect is mainly a function of the lower orders of the population,” traced “the vulgar speech of the New York City area ... now known as Brooklynese” to Manhattan, where it was “once known as Bowereyese.”<sup>5</sup> Finally, Robert Hendrickson, a current scholar, concludes that Brooklynese is a misnomer for a dialect of obscure origin, native to the Bronx, Manhattan, Staten Island, and Long Island, even extending into “Joisey’s Hudson, Bergen,

and Essex counties.” Although “the dialect that grew in Brooklyn was observed and joked about fifty years earlier... the word *Brooklynese* doesn’t seem to have been coined until the late 1920s.”<sup>6</sup> Whatever its class, geographic, and ethnic roots, the accent is perceived as a comic manner of speech related to Brooklyn.

In 1883 the completion of the Great Bridge betrothed Brooklyn and New York. Once the two major cities were legally married in 1898, the residents of Brooklyn suffered an identity crisis which still grows like the tree in the famous novel.<sup>7</sup> A checkerboard of diverse neighborhoods, a *pastiche* of ethnic groups, a patchwork quilt of races and religions yielded plenty of *pluribus*, little *unum*. The center did not seem to hold; economic conditions deteriorated. In a five-year span, 1895-1900, Brooklyn was transformed from “a great city of churches and homes” to one of squalid tenements, shanty towns, and retreating wilderness.<sup>8</sup>

The image, in transition, took still another shape as electrification brought trolley and subway lines to Brooklyn and put an end to its isolation.<sup>9</sup> Coney Island, an enclave of gamblers, hustlers, and prostitutes known as “Sodom By the Sea,” was sanitized into a people’s playground, a spectacle blurring the boundaries of work and play. The place was alive with the sound of music and clinking of beer mugs, the cries of sideshow barkers, and a brilliantly lit succession of Ferris wheels, roller coasters, and shoot-the-chutes. For a five-cent trip on the subway, Coney offered a welcome respite from the iron grip of industrialization. It was, wrote John Kasson, “a case study of the growing cultural revolt against genteel standards of taste and conduct that would swell to a climax in the 1920s.”<sup>10</sup> A boardwalk, completed in 1921, added another magnet to joy rides, hot dogs, fresh air, and ocean bathing. Over sixteen million people visited Coney during the depressed 1930s. In the uplifted 1940s (after World War II was over) attendance sky-rocketed, culminating on 3 July 1947 when two and one-half million people jammed the beach.<sup>11</sup>

As Coney was a place to have fun in, the Dodgers were a team to make fun of. Before the 1940s the “Bums” were a study in futility, radiant with local color in the grandstand and on the field. With players whose antics included doubling into a double play, taking a fly ball on the head, and losing a grounder “in the sun,” the inept Dodgers added to the denigration of Brooklyn in the eyes of all but their faithful fans. Up to 32,000 of these loyalists habitually squeezed into their secular shrine of Ebbets Field, where they rooted and prayed for occasional victory, egged on by clarion-voiced Hilda Chester, a cowbell-ringing superfan, and the Dodger Sym-phoney, a musically illiterate brass and percussion group that played “Three Blind Mice” for the umpires and “The Worms Crawl In, the Worms Crawl Out” for opponents who struck out.<sup>12</sup>

Dodger prospects improved with the advent of Larry MacPhail as General Manager in 1938. This hard-drinking, irascible tycoon introduced night baseball, radio broadcasts of every game, a productive farm system, financial solvency, star players, an organist, and finally, a winning team.<sup>13</sup> The Dodgers fared even better under MacPhail’s successor,

Branch Rickey, called "the Mahatma" for his wisdom and "El Cheapo" for his parsimony. Rickey consistently mined the Dodger farm system and extracted baseball gold. His most glittering prize, Jackie Robinson, revolutionized major league baseball in 1947 by breaking the color barrier heretofore rampant in professional sports.<sup>14</sup>

Win or lose, the Dodgers played a crucial role in the development of Brooklyn, which by 1940 eclipsed Manhattan as the city's most populous borough. Half of Brooklyn's adults were foreign born;<sup>15</sup> as a microcosm of America, an ethnic, religious, and cultural mixture, Brooklyn lacked homogeneity. Clearly, the beloved Dodgers provided a unifying force for the Jews, Blacks, Irish, Italians, Poles, Norwegians, and native-born Americans who flocked to the games, debated strategy, second-guessed managers, derided umpires, and passionately championed their team, especially against its arch rivals, the Giants (of Manhattan) during the pennant race and the (Bronx-based) Yankees in the World Series. The Dodgers celebrated the ideals of community, equality, and careers at last open to talent.

If Coney Island imparted a meretricious image, and the Dodgers a positive portrait, where else was the mixed reputation derived? What happened to Brooklyn's innocence? To paraphrase the title of a book by the film critic, Pauline Kael, Brooklyn lost it at the movies. To Hollywood, Brooklyn was irresistibly droll. A *New Yorker* film critic wrote that its "denizens are invariably represented in the movies as quixotic, warmhearted and hilarious ... the actors portraying them ... speak an argot that sounds as outlandish as the chatter of Eskimos."<sup>16</sup>

The moguls of Celluloid City favor stock characters.<sup>17</sup> From the 1930s through the 1950s, especially, they magnified recognizable traits to offer an endless succession of dumb blondes, laconic cowboys, precocious children, refined Englishmen, and a host of other caricatures. In the case of Brooklyn they served up lovable diamonds-in-the-rough, personified by Jimmy Durante in many roles, the young Frank Sinatra in *On the Town* and *Anchors Aweigh*, and Jack Carson as the dull-witted cop in *Arsenic and Old Lace* - in which the poison-dispensing Brewster sisters fostered the notion that lunacy dominated the Brooklyn scene. Other actresses who portrayed Brooklyn women enjoyed wider parameters. Mae West, all libido, evaded the censors with cleverly crafted invitations to "Come up'n see me sometime." Ann Sothern played a brassy Maisie; Judy Holiday a dizzy Billie Dawn; Lana Turner a vulnerable "Flatbush"; Rosalind Russell a *Yiddishe mame*; and Olympia Dukakis a neglected but worldly-wise wife. Moonstruck indeed, the Brooklyn woman demands fulfillment within her zany environment.

The Hollywood Brooklynite as working-class stiff began with Victor McClaglen as a sandhog in *Under Pressure*. Of the many who were typecast as comic proletarians, William Bendix remains the quintessential figure. Before leading *The Life of Reilly*, Bendix played McGuerin, the hero of a series about an upwardly mobile but earthy taxi driver, whose attempts at gentility dismally fail after he strikes it rich. In one scene, while

Sterling, his valet, is trying to dress him in style, he stares at himself in the mirror and mutters: "Stoiling, I feel like a joik."<sup>18</sup> In *Don Juan Quilligan*, Bendix is a barge captain with two wives, one at either end of his New York to Utica run. Is he the first modern "macho man" or merely another Brooklyn bigamist? Even as knight at King Arthur's court, he emerged as a blustering Brooklynite. Bendix polished his rough-hewn but golden-hearted persona in such World War II propaganda films as *Wake Island*, *Guadalcanal Diary*, and *Lifeboat* in which, as a mortally-wounded G.I., he dies with a happy smile on his lips after hearing on the radio that his beloved Dodgers have won a critical game.

As the winds of war swept Washington, what were Joe and Ethel Turp fighting for? Why, their mailman, who has lost his job and his girl. In *Joe and Ethel Turp Visit the President*, William Gargan and Ann Sothorn are Brooklyn romantics who triumph over the red-tape bureaucrats, restoring the mailman's job and girl. No less inane was Dick Powell's role as a *Cowboy From Brooklyn*, in which his agent books him as the star of a Madison Square Garden rodeo. The "cowboy's" fear of animals and the consequent exposure of his Brooklyn origins threaten his career, but fortunately a hypnotist empowers him both to throw the bull and catch the girl, with only the audience privy to his deep, dark secret.

As unsung hero, the Brooklyn soldier in World War II surfaced as a vital force in America's melting pot. In the movies *A Walk in the Sun* and *The Purple Heart*, the Brooklyn character is brave, colorful, and a compulsive wise-cracker. During crises he meets every challenge. Battle-tough and street-smart, he becomes a sergeant, never an officer - a tribute to his egalitarian spirit combined with a lack of ambition. Though a loyal member of his microcosmic war-team, his aspirations never match his courage. In 1945 he sang complacently about "Goin' back to Brooklyn—to be a bum for the rest of my life." No wonder that Norman Rosten, the "poet-laureate" of Brooklyn, complained: "The Brooklyn boy became the village idiot of show biz. All over the world wherever our cinema culture surfaced, gullible foreigners learned to laugh at the slob from Brooklyn, and pretty soon we are all slobs."<sup>19</sup>

The flip side of Hollywood's comic coin was the prevalence of crime in Brooklyn. In *Out of the Fog*, John Garfield played a thug who preyed on Sheepshead Bay fishermen; a murderous gang chased Red Skelton all over the borough in *Whistling in Brooklyn*; in *Wonder Man*, Danny Kaye played twin brothers, one murdered by gangsters in Prospect Park, the other the unlikely hero who avenges his sibling's death - the dual role nicely capturing the schizoid qualities of the Brooklyn type. Darren McGavin, as a rookie cop, stalked mean streets in pursuit of a gambling syndicate in *The Case Against Brooklyn*. Translated to the silver screen, Irving Schulman's novel, *The Amboy Dukes*, down-played ethnicity but visually accented garbage, ramshackle housing, and pervasive punk violence; *City Across the River* featured Steve McNally as a two-fisted hero who helped to clean up Schulman's sombre Brownsville. Do contract killers thrive in Brooklyn? Hollywood answered affirmatively. Witness *The En-*



forcer, with Humphrey Bogart as the ultimate tough guy, or *Murder, Inc* in which Peter Falk played Abe Reles, the psychopathic killer whose weapon of choice was an ice-pick. After turning informer to the police, Reles fell (or was pushed) to his death from a window in Coney Island's Half Moon Hotel, upon which a former associate quipped: "That boid could sure sing but he couldn't fly."<sup>20</sup>

Much more recently, Jack Nicholson affected a Brooklyn accent as the enforcer of *Prizzi's Honor*, a 1985 movie in which John Huston, the director, played the world of organized crime for laughs mixed with cold authenticity. In the climactic scene, the Nicholson character kills his wife, who is also a hit-man (hit-person?), before she could fulfill her contract to murder him. They could have patched up their differences, had he been willing to leave his "family." It is a far, far better thing to do, the movie suggests, to honor your father than cherish your wife. In this award-winning film, men come out on top and the comic-opera tradition of Brooklyn continues.

*A Tree Grows in Brooklyn* (1945) captured Betty Smith's poignant novel of a sensitive Irish-American girl's quest for personal identity. Francie Nolan triumphs over squalor and tragedy. The film sympathetically portrays her adoring, charming, but alcoholic father; her lovely, strong, patient mother; her sensuous aunt; and the tough, warm-hearted Irish cop who becomes her step-father. The movie ends on the roof of their Brooklyn tenement with Francie and Neelie, her brother, sharing secrets and voicing dreams. Francie wants to know if her looks are good enough. "You'll pass." The dirt below recedes from view as the camera pans on New York's magnificent skyline signalling a bright future. The Nolans will pass to success in Queens, where their step-father owns property.

Television capitalized on the Brooklyn type. In *The Honeymooners*, Jackie Gleason and Audrey Meadows offered a slice of working-class life in America. To be sure, the Kramdens are upwardly mobile but Ralph drives a bus, his wife scrimps, and his neighbor, played in hilarious Brooklynese by the consummate actor, Art Carney, works in a sewer. While the slob syndrome persisted with the "sweathogs" in *Welcome Back Kotter*, Gabe Kaplan projected a positive image as a creative, comical, and caring teacher at New Utrecht High School in Bensonhurst.

Once World War II was over, media fantasies often collided with Brooklyn realities. Parks Commissioner Robert Moses made Long Island east of Brooklyn, as well as Staten Island, more accessible through a vast network of bridges, tunnels, and parkways, to the detriment and frequent destruction of large segments of Brooklyn. Many local residents joined the exodus to suburbia; consequently, the tax base eroded, the schools declined, and urban rot spread. Brooklyn lost its only major newspaper, the *Eagle*, in 1955. The unkindest cut of all was when Walter O'Malley, the money-hungry owner of the Dodgers, moved the "Flatbush Flock" to Los Angeles in 1958. After the Dodgers were gone and the *Eagle* had folded, a newspaper writer lamented that "Brooklyn is the only city of two million people that doesn't have an airport, a newspaper, or a

ballclub.”<sup>21</sup>

The closing of the Navy Yard in 1966 was a signal that industry was leaving the borough. The economy shifted into low gear as such Brooklyn-based, national companies as Ex-Lax and Ebbingers left or collapsed. Containerization eliminated many port jobs and manufacturing firms relocated to secure lower labor costs. In 1967 Brooklyn's factories employed 220,000 workers; in 1972, 165,000; in 1976, 112,000.<sup>22</sup> New immigrants, including many “illegals” who lacked technological skills, put excessive pressure on already overtaxed social services. By 1970 entire neighborhoods, among them once-thriving Brownsville where Alfred Kazin walked to glory, had become urban wastelands. Observers of empty stores and abandoned buildings predicted a gloomy future.<sup>23</sup>

Perhaps it is premature to announce the demise of Brooklyn. Although the vast problems of crime, drugs, drop-outs, housing, and unemployment persist without imminent resolution, encouraging signs are evident. Some neighborhoods—Sheepshead Bay and Bay Ridge, for instance—withstood the ravages of the lean years. Others, plagued with poverty and pathology, received funds from private as well as public sources. Communities started to organize. Block associations sprouted. Gentrification of blighted neighborhoods has achieved better racial balance along with a higher tax base. Some banks, led by Greenpoint Savings, increased local mortgage allocations, while others switched from redlining to greenlining. The high cost of housing in Manhattan and suburban Long Island has brought many prospective homeowners to Brooklyn. Dramatic reversals are apparent in Ditmas Park, Greenpoint, and Fort Greene. Is Brooklyn the proverbial phoenix, rising from real ashes?<sup>24</sup>

One clue to the borough's resiliency is its bumper crop of comedians. Many of the nation's premier humorists—Woody Allen, Mel Brooks, Buddy Hackett, Dom DeLuise, Joan Rivers, Alan King, Abe Burrows, Phil Silvers - mined their Brooklyn past for comedic nuggets. Native wits, whether street performers or stand-up professionals, use humor to deflate the pompous and bring the “high and mighty” down to a common humanity. Lenny Bruce blitzed the hustlers of religion as well as the brokers of power; Mel Brooks challenged all the conventional pieties in his movie, *History of the World—Part I*; Woody Allen even boxed with God whom he judged a “chronic under-achiever.” For these children of lower-middle class Brooklyn, laughter no doubt was a coping technique. Once they reached the far side of paradise, somewhere East of Eden and West of Brooklyn, the funny boys and girls kept returning to their roots for spurts of comic inspiration. Several months before he died, Danny Kaye came back. Though he was terminally ill, he continued to crack jokes as he was showered with affection and honor by Borough President Howard Golden on a warm day in June 1987. Laughter for Danny Kaye, indeed for us all, is a way to keep the *Moloch-hamoves* (Angel of Death) at bay.<sup>25</sup>

The survival of Brooklyn seems assured but the borough's essential image continues to elude a conceptual fix. 78.5 square miles packed with two and a half million people defy facile definition. How, after all, do

we draw the *unum* out of *de pluribus*? Facing a proliferation of neighborhoods, each with a unique ethnic mix, one turns to Thomas Wolfe's realization, long before the vanities succumbed to bonfires, that "Only the Dead Know Brooklyn." As Wolfe's stock character concludes: "Maybe he's found out by now dat he'll neveh live long enough to know duh whole of Brooklyn. It'd take a guy a lifetime to know Brooklyn t'roo and t'roo. An' even den, yuh wouldn't know it all."<sup>26</sup>

## NOTES

1. William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E.P.Dutton, 1963), p. 41.
2. Geoffrey D. Needler, "Kings English: Facts and Folklore of Brooklyn Speech," in Rita S. Miller, ed., *Brooklyn USA: The Fourth Largest City in America* (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), p. 173.
3. Kai Ericson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 3-29.
4. Needler, "King's English," pp. 174-178. John Manbeck, "The Illusion and Reality of Brooklyn as Reflected in Popular Culture," in Joseph Dorinson and Jerrold Atlas, eds., *The Many Faces of Psychohistory* (New York: LIU Press, 1984), p. 106.
5. H.L.Mencken, *The American Language: An Inquiry Into the Development of English in the United States*, Supplement Two (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 107, 187-188.
6. Robert Hendrickson, *American Talk: The Words and Ways of American Dialects* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1986), pp. 68-71.
7. Robert Smith, "Brooklyn At Play: The Illusion and the Reality" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1973), p. 13; Ron Miller, Rita Seiden Miller, and Stephen J. Karp, "The Fourth Largest City in the World," in Miller, ed., *Brooklyn USA*, pp. 22-24.
8. Betty Smith, *A Tree Grows in Brooklyn* (New York: Harper & Row, 1947).
9. In the 1890s, Brooklyn's baseball team was called the "Trolley Dodgers," later shortened to "Dodgers," referring to the need to get out of the way of advancing trolleys.
10. John Kasson, *Amusing the Million: Coney Island at the Turn of the Century* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978), p. 9.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50, 94, 105-106; Mario Puzo, "Meet Me Tonight in Dreamland," *New York*, 3 September 1979, p. 30.
12. John Durant, *The Dodgers: An Illustrated History of Those Unpredictable Bums* (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1948), pp. 139-142.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 118. For more on the Dodgers, see, among many others, Peter Golenbock, *Bums: An Oral History of the Brooklyn Dodgers* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1984), featuring unflattering appraisals of MacPhail and O'Malley.
14. For a useful study of this pivotal period in baseball history see Jules Tygiel, *Baseball's Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy* (New York: Random House, 1985).
15. For the demographics, see Miller, *Brooklyn, U.S.A.*, pp. 26-29.
16. Quoted by John Manbeck, *Brooklyn on Film* (New York: Brooklyn Rediscovery, 1979), p. 14.

17. For much of the movie material, not only did I withdraw treasures from my own memory bank, I also relied heavily on Manbeck, *Brooklyn on Film*, and Mike Olshan, "Brooklyn in the Movies," *New Brooklyn* 5 (Spring 1983):58-62.

18. *Brooklyn Orchid*. Others in the series were *The McGuerins of Brooklyn*, and *Taxi, Mister*.

19. Quoted by Manbeck, "The Illusion," in *Many Faces*, p. 109.

20. One version of this quip can be found in Albert Fried, *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980), p. 222.

21. Tommy Holmes, quoted in Golenbock, *Bums*, p. 449.

22. David Ment, *The Shaping of a City: A Brief History of Brooklyn* (New York: Brooklyn Rediscovery, 1979), pp. 91-93; Raymond Schroth, *The Eagle and Brooklyn: A Community Newspaper* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 4.

23. See Harold X. Connolly, "The Future? Look Over your City and Weep, For It Is Dying," in Miller, ed., *Brooklyn, U.S.A.*, pp. 349-360; Ment, *Shaping*, pp. 92-94.

24. Ment, *Shaping*, pp. 94-99, offers an up-beat scenario while Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 302-303 points to "unmistakable signs" of suburban decay and predicts a "comeback by central cities and rural areas" as the nation enters "a post-suburban age."

25. For humor as a coping device, especially in Brooklyn, see previous articles by the present author, to wit: "The Jew as Comic: Lenny Bruce, Mel Brooks, and Woody Allen," in Avner Ziv, ed., *Jewish Humor* (Tel Aviv: Papyrus Press, 1986), pp. 29-43; "Danny Kaye: Hollywood Toomler," *Genesis II* (Spring 1988):37-38; and more broadly in "Ethnic Humor: Subversion and Survival," co-authored with Joseph Boskin, in Arthur P. Dudden, ed., *American Humor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 97-117.

26. Thomas Wolfe, "Only the Dead Know Brooklyn," *From Death To Morning* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), p. 97.

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# **“Whatever the Cost, We Will Set the Nation Straight”:**

## **The Ministers’ Committee and the Downstate Center Campaign**

*By Clarence Taylor*

*I dedicate this work to the memory of Catherine Low (1955-1988), my fellow student and research mentor whose untimely death I deeply regret.*

In the summer of 1963 an organization known as the Ministers’ Committee for Job Opportunities for Brooklyn conducted a protest campaign at the construction site of the Downstate Medical Center. Led by black ministers from Bedford-Stuyvesant, the Committee demanded that one of every four jobs at the \$25-million project be assigned to blacks and Puerto Ricans. The Downstate site at Clarkson and New York Avenues was chosen because of its proximity to Bedford-Stuyvesant, in hopes of generating jobs for this underprivileged community. From July 15 until August 6 the committee helped to organize hundreds of people, led protests that resulted in the arrest of over seven hundred demonstrators, and received extensive media coverage before reaching a less than satisfactory settlement with Governor Nelson Rockefeller.

Although one of the largest campaigns in the North, it has failed to elicit attention by scholars. Most studies of the 1960s’ civil rights movement and role of African American clergy and churches within it have focused on the South.<sup>1</sup> This article attempts partially to fill the gap by examining the effort of fourteen black pastors to build a broadly-based movement in Brooklyn aimed at ending racial bias in New York City’s construction industry.

A principal goal of the Downstate campaign was to increase job opportunities in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the large, overwhelmingly black community situated in north-central Brooklyn.<sup>2</sup> Before the nineteenth century this area was rural, but as New York City and Brooklyn grew into metropolitan centers, farms were converted to building lots for expensive brownstones and mansions. The adjacent communities of Bedford and Stuyvesant offered havens to people of means who wanted to escape from the growing industrial centers. In the 1840s and 1850s, the opening of major avenues and streets, with horsecar routes to serve them, transformed the neighborhood into an affluent suburb.<sup>3</sup> Toward the end of the century, almost all of this Twenty-Third Ward’s bread-winners were professionals, businessmen, and skilled or white-collar workers. Only 22 percent of residents were foreign-born, fewer than in any other ward in Brooklyn.<sup>4</sup> Black people in the area were concentrated in Weeksville and Carrville, two settlements of their own creation during the 1830s. Although

they numbered 650 by 1875, African Americans accounted for only 6 percent of the area's population.<sup>5</sup>

At the beginning of the twentieth century, improvements in transportation spurred wealthier residents to move to more distant suburbs or elsewhere in the city. The resulting fall in real estate prices encouraged people of more modest incomes to make their homes in the area. Soon Jewish, Italian, Irish, and other ethnic groups made up 30 percent of the population.<sup>6</sup> The black population also grew, as realtors converted brownstones into apartments that poorer folk could afford, and the new Independent subway line made the area more accessible. In the early 1930s, with the names of its components fused as Bedford-Stuyvesant (often shortened to Bed-Stuy), African American families found the area to be an attractive alternative to overcrowded Harlem and Fort Greene. By the 1940s, the existence of an established community acted as a magnet for southern and Caribbean migrants.<sup>7</sup>

Reflecting the national trend of white movement away from densely populated urban areas into the suburbs, increasing numbers of whites left Bed-Stuy during the 1940s and 1950s. New single-family houses in Queens, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties attracted those who wanted to own their own homes and escape from inner city problems. Between 1935 and 1960 the population of Nassau County doubled while the white population of Bed-Stuy fell by over 40 percent, leaving a neighborhood inhabited mainly by working-class blacks.<sup>8</sup> By 1957, its 166,213 blacks comprised two-thirds of the population; today they number 90 percent.<sup>9</sup>

The increase in black population was not the only drastic change in the period after World War II. Between 1945 and 1960, the once affluent community became one of the nation's largest ghettos. Median income in 1950 was well below the borough-wide figure of \$3,447; in southwestern Bed-Stuy it was \$2,288, the lowest in Brooklyn. By the late 1950s Bed-Stuy accounted for nearly 23 percent of cases on public assistance and 30 percent of home relief cases in Brooklyn. By 1970, although the number of people earning over \$10,000 had risen to more than 25 percent, 36 percent—84,000 people—received welfare payments.<sup>10</sup>

During the early 1960s, the organization most intent on improving the quality of life of Bed-Stuy's poor was the Brooklyn branch of CORE (the Congress of Racial Equality), an interracial, non-violent civil rights group founded in 1943. CORE was active in Philadelphia, New Haven, Boston, New York, and other northern cities, staging sit-ins and marches at apartment developments, factories, banks, and construction projects to demand fair housing and employment for blacks. In 1962 Brooklyn CORE, an extremely militant chapter, teamed up with the Rev. Milton Galamison's Parents' Workshop for Equality in New York Public Schools. Together, they launched a sit-in and boycott at the city's Board of Education office, demanding and eventually winning relief for children attending overcrowded schools in Bedford-Stuyvesant. That September, Brooklyn CORE also started "Operation Clean-up," during which its members dumped garbage on the steps of Brooklyn Borough Hall to influence city officials

to improve sanitation services for Bed-Stuy and other ghettos. Brooklyn CORE also encouraged tenants to fight slum conditions by helping them file complaints with the Building Department and initiate rent strikes if this did not work.<sup>11</sup>

Brooklyn CORE was a mixture of workers and intellectuals, a collection of young black and white adults, together with middle-aged radicals who had been active in protest politics since the 1930s and 1940s. At first, half or more of the members were white but once the Downstate campaign began the number of blacks increased dramatically. Yet in spite of its dynamic role in Bed-Stuy and elsewhere, Brooklyn CORE remained small, with only thirty-five members as late as April 1963.<sup>12</sup>

In July 1963 the chapter engaged in a dual attack on bias in the construction industry and unemployment in the ghetto by demonstrating for jobs for blacks and Puerto Ricans at the Downstate Medical Center project. Downstate was an appropriate target because it was not only close to Bed-Stuy but was also a flagrant example of discriminatory hiring practices by the building-trades unions involved.<sup>13</sup> Despite claims that race was not a factor, people of African descent were excluded from jobs by the "Catch-22" stipulation that eligibility for work depended on training in an apprentice program, admission to which required the recommendation of two union members. Since scarcely any blacks belonged to the unions, they were effectively shut out of training programs, much less jobs, thus making a mockery of the State's anti-discrimination laws.

Although power to select apprentices rested with the local unions, New York's Building Construction Trade Council officials made little effort to change the rules. In 1960 black folk accounted for 22 percent of the city's population, but only 2 percent of apprentices in the building trades. Three years later, the New York State Advisory Committee of the United States Commission on Civil Rights reported that at the same time that residents of African descent were denied employment, a good many of New York's white construction workers were "blue collar commuters," traveling as much as one hundred miles a day to and from their jobs. Of the nineteen craft unions engaged in the Downstate project, only the Carpenters' had black members.<sup>14</sup>

Negotiations failed to convince State officials or the Building and Construction Trade Council to take action to raise the number of working blacks and Puerto Ricans. Brooklyn CORE then announced it would stop construction of Downstate by demonstrating at the site until the State, City, and unions guaranteed that blacks and Puerto Ricans make up 25 percent of the work force, and the unions' rolls were opened to people of color.<sup>15</sup>

Although Brooklyn CORE was joined by the Joint Committee on Equal Opportunity, a coalition of civil rights and labor groups including the NAACP and the Urban League, success depended on mustering large numbers of protesters. Acknowledging that the coalition alone could not do this, its leaders appealed to the black clergy of Bedford-Stuyvesant, pastors of some of the city's largest black churches, in hopes these leaders

would mobilize thousands from their congregations to magnify the protest.

The ministers were men of status and power in the city at large as well as Bed-Stuy, politically-influential moderates who worked for civil rights by supporting the NAACP and the Urban League. Yet fourteen of them, on July 15, responded to the plea of CORE and the Joint Committee to take part in civil disobedience. Some white ministers also came forward, but black clergy led the campaign. On that day, after hours of picketing at the site, all fourteen joined Oliver "Ollie" Leeds, chairperson of Brooklyn CORE, and sat down at the entrance to Downstate to deny access to oncoming trucks. Leeds, the fourteen clergymen, and twenty-seven others were arrested for attempting to stop construction. In a scene resembling a southern civil rights protest, the demonstrators sang freedom songs as they were carried into police vans.<sup>17</sup>

The arrest and prompt release of the ministers gave the campaign a needed boost. That evening two thousand supporters gathered at Cornerstone Baptist Church, heard speeches by the clergymen, and voted to join the effort to end job discrimination at Downstate.<sup>18</sup> That night marked the formation of the Ministers' Committee for Job Opportunities for Brooklyn, with the Reverend Sandy F. Ray selected as chairman, perhaps because of his close ties to Governor Rockefeller.<sup>19</sup>

The Committee chose the Reverend William A. Jones to direct the campaign. At the age of twenty-nine years, in only his tenth month as pastor of Bethany Baptist, this pastor of a forty-five-hundred-member church was an experienced civil rights protestor. A few years later he led the New York branch of Operation Breadbasket,

the economic arm of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, [which] reached agreement with Taystee Bread, Continental Bakeries, Robert Hall, Coca Cola, and Pepsi Cola to hire more Blacks and deposit some of their funds in black financial institutions.<sup>20</sup>

The unofficial spokesman was Gardner C. Taylor, pastor of Bed-Stuy's ten-thousand-member Concord Baptist Church and one of city's most influential clerics. Taylor was an ally of Mayor Robert F. Wagner, who appointed him to the Board of Education in 1958 and four years later named him one of a three-man team to replace Joseph T. Sharkey as Democratic leader of Brooklyn. As Ray was picked for his influence with the Republicans, so Taylor's Democratic connections gave the Committee political balance.<sup>21</sup> Another skillful organizer on the Committee's executive council was the Reverend Milton Galamison, pastor of Siloam Presbyterian, a large church with two thousand members, and a leader in the campaign for the integration of schools in New York.<sup>22</sup> Except for the Reverend Carl McCall of the New York City Mission Society, all members of the Committee were Bedford-Stuyvesant pastors whose congregations consisted of one thousand people or more.<sup>23</sup>

What motivated these clerics to risk their reputations by involving themselves in a militant civil disobedience protest? One overriding reason was the inspiration of Martin Luther King in particular and the civil rights movement in general. During the middle 1950s and early 1960s, King raised



the consciousness of clerics all over the country by moving to the forefront of black protest in the South. The success of King and the civil rights movement to smash Jim Crow by means of massive, sustained, and non-violent demonstrations, boycotts, and sit-ins forged a new image of black ministers as militant agents for social change. In Bed-Stuy, ministers raised money for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and kindred civil rights organizations, and used their churches as forums for King and other southern campaigners. They also addressed themselves to expansion of civil rights in New York City. In March and April of 1962, Galamison, Sandy F. Ray, and George Lawrence of Antioch Baptist Church had led a successful but short-lived Ministers' Movement that won jobs for residents of Bed-Stuy by boycotting and picketing merchants on Fulton Street. The Downstate campaign appealed to them as another opportunity to fight Jim Crow in their own backyard.<sup>24</sup>

The Ministers' Committee for Jobs held nightly rallies in their churches, recruiting "jailbirds for freedom" to picket the construction site. Relying on ministerial networking, they urged pastors throughout the city to get their congregations involved at Downstate. Large numbers of demonstrators, they reckoned, would force the suspension of work until Governor Rockefeller, Mayor Wagner, and President Peter Brennan of the Building Trade Council of 122 unions accepted their demand for a 25 percent quota.<sup>25</sup>

The Committee appealed for public support by linking Downstate to the larger campaign to abolish Jim Crow in America. At a rally in Tomkins Square Park, six thousand people gathered to hear the ministers explain the significance of the movement. "We are here in response to the call of history," proclaimed Sandy Ray. "There will be no turning back until people in high places correct the wrongs of the nation." Gardner Taylor referred to a demonstration planned for 22 July, declaring that "Revolution has come to Brooklyn...whatever the cost, we will set the nation straight." The protest will be peaceful, he said, but "if the ruling white power structure brings it about, our blood will fill the streets."<sup>26</sup>

More than twelve hundred people took part in that demonstration, of whom 211 were arrested, the largest number in the city since the Harlem Riots of 1943. Protesters sat in front of entrances to the hospital grounds to keep trucks away from the work site. Many were arrested and carried away singing freedom songs. As one group was removed another moved in, darting under the barricades the police set up to block them. Although it did not stop construction, this mobilization of protestors showed that the ministers were a major civil rights force in the city. Moreover, they had gained the support of many whites, who made up an estimated 25 percent of the demonstrators.<sup>27</sup>

But in spite of July 22's large turnout, the ministers learned how hard it was to sustain a protest movement. They never reached the total of that high-water mark again; by July 26, the number of picketers dwindled to an estimated one hundred and fifty. The campaign showed signs of financial strain; it became increasingly difficult for the Committee to keep its

promise to to put up bail and pay legal fees for arrested pickets.<sup>28</sup>

One reason for fading attendance was the scheduling of demonstrations between 7:00 A.M. and late afternoon, to coincide with construction hours. Because most demonstrators were working people who could not afford to sacrifice more than one or two days' pay at most, their involvement was restricted. To compensate for reduced numbers, the dedicated activists who continued to picket employed more militant tactics for denying access to trucks. One tactic was to create a human chain by locking arms and lying down in the path of construction equipment. When arrested, demonstrators went limp so that the arresting officers had to carry them to the paddy wagons. Some tied their arms together with wire, forcing police to use wire cutters to break the chain. By 29 July, over six hundred pickets had been arrested.<sup>29</sup>

For all the effort of the Committee and its supporters, there was little progress in moving state, city and union officials to meet their demands unequivocally. Governor Rockefeller and Mayor Wagner responded to the demonstrations by pledging to enforce existing anti-discrimination procedure that so far had been ineffectual in breaking down the color line on state and city building projects. Peter Brennan refused to meet with the ministers and denounced their demands as "blackmail"; the day after the July 22 demonstration, he announced vaguely that he would ask his member unions for permission to establish a six-man panel for screening applicants for jobs in place of the old system of nomination by union members.<sup>30</sup>

Not one official promised a finite number of jobs. Both Rockefeller and Wagner favored increased employment of blacks in construction, but neither accepted the quota system. The Mayor begged the question by pointing out his lack of jurisdiction in state programs like Downstate, while the Governor condemned the premise as "unlawful and counter to American principles."<sup>31</sup> Brennan's proposed six-man board board, and Rockefeller's and Wagner's pledges to investigate discrimination in the building trades were dismissed by the protest leaders as inadequate. The ministers and the Joint Committee decided to keep on demonstrating until the state, city, and unions accepted the 25 percent quota.

As the protest continued, violence increased. On July 31, after the arrest of twelve demonstrators, including six ministers, a near riot erupted when pickets in a crowd of one hundred taunted the police by calling them "stormtroopers," and teen-agers locked hands and stood in front of the trucks. A double line of police used night sticks to push protesters away from the entrance and then arrest them. As demonstrators were carried away, they reacted by striking and kicking the police; two officers and two women protesters were injured. The next day a policeman was struck by four young men when he tried to confiscate their cache of rotten eggs. Twenty officers came to his rescue and carried the four men away. Fearing bloodshed, Jones urged the crowd to leave the site and come to a rally at Berean Baptist Church to discuss further action. The same day Taylor sent messages to the Governor and the Mayor, warning of the difficulty

of restraining violence at Downstate.<sup>32</sup>

It is unclear why violence increased, but arrest records suggest that participation of younger demonstrators contributed to the growing militancy. On July 15 only 6 of 28 pickets were younger than 35. By July 23, this group accounted for more than half. On July 24, 42 of 50 people arrested were under the age of 35, and the number of young people kept increasing. Another factor prompting more aggressive behavior was that after July 23, half or more of younger demonstrators resided outside of Bed-Stuy and were less inclined to follow the clergy's direction.<sup>33</sup>

The Ministers feared they were losing control of the pickets. One pastor warned the Governor and the Mayor that violence no longer could be restrained; the Committee discussed the question of cancelling demonstrations. Violence was not on its agenda. Moreover, the strain of continued demonstrations was becoming a burden that many were unwilling to bear—some complained that their churches were being neglected by their involvement in the long campaign. Finally, the declining number of demonstrators was a portent that the protest could not go on much longer without suffering complete loss of support, a defeat that would reduce or end the Committee's power to gain at least some concessions.

Mindful of mounting problems, the ministers began to back off from the quota demand as early as 28 July, when Gardner Taylor stated that "Some of us are not particularly wedded to the quota idea."<sup>34</sup> It was a negotiating item, he suggested; the civil rights leaders were open to other ideas. The Committee asked the Governor for a meeting at which to work out a compromise solution. After refusing their first request, he consented to see them on August 6.

Rockefeller met for three hours with the Reverends Gardner Taylor, Milton Galamison, William Jones, Walter Offutt, Benjamin Lowery, and W.G. Henson Jacobs, along with Ramon Rivera of the Urban League. The resulting agreement provided that laws against bias would be enforced and funds withdrawn from state projects at which discrimination was practiced. The Governor would name a representative to oversee the construction industry and report cases of job discrimination to the State Commission on Human Rights, which, in turn, would sponsor a public hearing on August 15 to investigate charges of racial discrimination against Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local Union 28. Finally, a recruitment program would be created for finding qualified blacks and Puerto Ricans for apprenticeship and membership in eighteen building trades unions. In return, the ministers agreed to call off the demonstration at once.<sup>35</sup>

Except for the recruitment provision, the accord was no more than a duplication of proposals made previously by the Governor. There was no assurance that the Trade Council would comply, or any enforceable ruling that specific numbers of black and Puerto Rican workers would get either construction jobs or union cards. At a press conference, Rockefeller made it clear that the 25 percent quota was never considered at the meeting.<sup>36</sup>

Brooklyn CORE reacted unfavorably. Although Ollie Leeds endorsed the agreement, the membership voted to reject it and keep on picketing. Chairman Leeds voiced his disappointment:

It was my judgement that while the accord was less than satisfactory, it was nevertheless, a good beginning. However, neither the membership of CORE nor the Joint Committee of New York City, composed of the civil rights groups, felt this way.<sup>37</sup>

Brooklyn CORE and the Joint Committee condemned the settlement as inadequate because the ministers gained only "a simple reaffirmation of a promise to enforce state laws against discrimination." Criticizing the document as a public relations device and a substitute for "meaningful" action, the Joint Committee called for demonstrations at the Downstate site and other parts of the city until half the apprentices entering the Building Trade Unions were Negro or Puerto Rican; until a committee of six be established to guard against further discrimination; and until a job training program in construction be established for blacks and Puerto Ricans.<sup>38</sup>

The Ministers condemned the call for renewed demonstrations and announced complete withdrawal of their financial and legal assistance. Jones and Galamison accused Brooklyn CORE of bad faith, not only for calling for more demonstrations but also for telling arrested protestors not to follow the legal advice of counsel hired by the ministers. The Ministers' Committee announced its disassociation with the organization for protest at Downstate.<sup>39</sup>

Members of CORE complained that the accusation of "bad faith" was unfounded. Campaign decisions supposedly were made by the coalition, but the settlement with the Governor was reached at a meeting attended by not a single member of CORE. To this, the NAACP retorted that CORE was too unsophisticated to know when to stop demonstrating and start negotiating. The call for more demonstrations failed; "Deprived of mass support CORE gave up after a few more days of desultory picketing."<sup>40</sup> Unquestionably, the ministers' withdrawal effectively ended the Downstate campaign.

The Downstate movement gained widespread media coverage but failed to rally substantial support for its goal of jobs for blacks and Puerto Ricans in New York's construction industry. The ministers never were able to enlist large numbers of the African American and Hispanic communities, or mobilize even their own congregations on any lasting basis. Hundreds of blacks and Hispanics were interviewed in compliance with the Committee's pact with the Governor, but "only a handful were accepted, all the unions having violated the agreement."<sup>41</sup>

Many reasons account for the failure. The time spent protesting, often followed by going to jail, meant absence from work and loss of wages, a price that few could afford to pay. Moreover, the Ministers' Committee did not convince New Yorkers that the civil rights problem in the North was a replica of the South's. Although racial discrimination was a fact of life in New York City, most residents did not perceive it in terms of

Alabama or Mississippi. Television newscasts did not expose the public to overt racism. There were instances of police brutality, but New Yorkers were not bombarded with images of Freedom Riders beaten by mobs, of demonstrators swept off their feet by fire hoses, and police dogs turned on children. Rhetorical support expressed by state and city officials for the ends (if not the means) of the protest diminished public sympathy for Downstate. Conversely, those Northern militants eager to form a movement similar to the South's might have turned to more appropriate methods for Downstate and the struggle against racism in New York City.

Yet for all its shortcomings, the Ministers' Committee helped to focus attention on the construction industry, one of the most discriminatory in the country. They lost their demand for a quota but succeeded in moving the State, City and unions to take at least some action against racial discrimination in that industry. Despite accusations that they had "sold out," the clergymen were perceptive in knowing when to end the protest. To have insisted on continuing a campaign that was petering out would have reduced their leverage for a settlement.

By leading the Downstate struggle, the black clergymen helped to convince New Yorkers of the need for a movement to eliminate discrimination in the North as well as the South. Downstate afforded many people their first opportunity to take direct action against institutionalized racism.

Most importantly, the role black clergy played in the Downstate campaign for equality calls into question the "Black Theology, Black Power" advocates' argument that urban black ministers, as a group, were lukewarm at best about equal rights.<sup>42</sup> In spite of their position as part of the black elite, the Ministers' Committee for Jobs went into the streets to campaign for equal rights in hiring. They were willing to risk their reputations as mainstream "responsible leaders" and their support from politicians, their congregations, and the community at large, by leading a grass root movement to end racism in their own backyard. By doing so, they helped define a new role for the churches of their community. To deepen understanding of the northern struggle for civil rights, much more attention must be paid to the role of urban African American ministers during the crucial 1960s.

## NOTES

An important source for study of the Downstate campaign is the Milton Galamison Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin. The collection includes the correspondence of Milton Galamison and correspondence and documents of the Ministers' Committee for Job Opportunities in Brooklyn.

1. Recommended works that cover the northern as well as the southern movement are: David Garrow, *Bearing The Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference* (New York: William Morrow and Co. Inc., 1986); August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *CORE: A Study of the Civil Rights Movement 1942-1968* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering, *Confronting The Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986).

2. For the boundaries of Bedford-Stuyvesant (named for former New York governors), see *Brooklyn Communities, Population Characteristics and Neighborhood Social Resources*, 2 vols. (New York: Bureau of Community Statistical Services, the Community Council of Greater New York, 1959), 1:98.
3. Harold X. Connolly, *A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn* (New York: New York University Press, 1977) pp. 43-44, 55, 58.
4. David Ment and Mary Donovan, *The People of Brooklyn: A History of Two Neighborhoods* (Brooklyn: 1980), pp. 24-25.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-23; see also Connolly, *Ghetto*, pp. 8, 41-42; Rae Banks "Weeksville-Microcosm in Black," *Freedomways*, 4th Quarter (1972), pp. 288-298.
6. Ment and Donovan, *People of Brooklyn*, pp. 32-34.
7. Ernest Quimby, "Bedford-Stuyvesant: The Making of a Ghetto," in *Brooklyn USA: The Fourth Largest City In America*, Rita Seiden Miller, ed. (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1977) pp. 230-233.
8. Connolly, *Ghetto*, pp. 131-132; see also Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 238-240; Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975) pp. 942-943.
9. Community Council, *Brooklyn Communities*, pp. 99-101.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106; Quimby, "Bedford-Stuyvesant," pp. 230-235.
11. Meier and Rudwick, *CORE*, pp. 193-200.
12. Interview with the late Oliver Leeds, and Marjorie Leeds, 11 August 1988; Meier and Rudwick, *CORE*, pp. 151, 196.
13. Interview with Oliver and Marjorie Leeds.
14. *New York Times* and *Amsterdam News*, 16 July 1963.
15. Interview with Oliver and Marjorie Leeds; *Amsterdam News*, 13 July 1963.
16. Interview with Gardner C. Taylor, 11 August 1988; interview with Oliver and Marjorie Leeds; Meier and Rudwick, *CORE*, p. 231.
17. *New York Times*, 16 July 1963; *Amsterdam News*, 20 July 1963.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Interview with William A. Jones, 22 December 1987; *New York Times*, 24 July 1963.
20. Harold X. Connolly, "The Future? Look Over Your City And Weep, For It Is Dying," in Miller, ed., *Brooklyn U.S.A.*, p. 350. Also see William A. Jones, *God In The Ghetto* (Elgin: Progressive Baptist Publishing House, 1979) pp. 96-101. 21. *Amsterdam News*, 15 February 1958, 27 January 1962.
22. Diane Ravich, *The Great School Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 261-62.
23. Other members were Albert Smith of St. Paul Community, Saul S. Williams of Pilgrim Baptist, W. J. Hall of Bethel Baptist, Benjamin J. Lowery of Zion Baptist, Edward Holmes

of John Wesley Methodist, Hinson Jacobs of St. Augustine Protestant Episcopal, Richard Saunders of Stuyvesant Heights, F. D. Washington of Washington Temple, A. W. Wilson of Morningstar Baptist, and Melvin Williams of Bethany Baptist.

24. Interview with Taylor. *Amsterdam News*, series on the Ministers' Movement, 24 July - 10 August 1962.

25. Interview with Gwendolyn Timmons, 18 April 1988. Ms. Timmons, a member of Siloam Presbyterian, participated at Downstate.

26. *New York Times*, 22 July 1963; *Amsterdam News*, 27 July 1963.

27. *New York Times*, 23 July 1963; *Amsterdam News*, *ibid.*

28. Interviews with Jones and Taylor; *New York Times*, 23-27 July 1963.

29. *New York Times*, 23-26 July 1963; *Amsterdam News*, 27 July, 1 August 1963.

30. *New York Times*, 24 July 1963.

31. *New York Times*, 26 July 1963; interview with Taylor.

32. *New York Times*, 1 August 1963. Interview with Oliver Leeds.

33. Arrest Docket Part 1B—*Kings County Book 1*, 1963

34. *New York Times*, 29 July 1963.

35. *New York Times*, 7 August 1963; interviews with Taylor, Leeds, and Jones; interview with Milton A. Galamison, 21 October 1987; "Job Opportunities for Brooklyn" letter to pastors, 7 August 1963.

36. *Amsterdam News*, 10 August 1963.

37. Interview with Oliver Leeds; Oliver Leeds to Milton Galamison, 12 August 1963.

38. Interview with Leeds; interview with Arnold Goldwag, Brooklyn CORE's public relations director, 1962-67, 27 July 1988;

39. Ministers' Committee For Job Opportunities statement to clarify its position, 9 August 1863; *New York Times*, 9 August 1963.

40. Meier and Rudwick, *CORE*, p. 231.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

42. See James H. Cone, *Black Theology and Black Power* (New York: Seabury Press, 1969), chap. IV, "The Black Church and Black Power," pp. 91-115.

# **Ella Smith's Recipe Collection, Smithtown, 1889-1910**

*By Alice Ross*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Old recipes are not simply cooking instructions. Their culinary vocabulary adds the useful dimension of material culture to the study of any society, food being a basic comparative. The historical use of cuisine covers many levels, ranging from technology progressions to social and cultural attitudes, and has especial value in traditional historiographic approaches to ethnicity, women, work, and leisure. Thus local cookbooks and private family recipes can be plumbed for more than culinary insights; they express overt or covert attitudes toward country, community, family, culture, class, tradition, and change.

In this context, the late-Victorian recipe collection of Ella Mathilda Smith (Mrs. Theodore Smith) of Smithtown, New York, may be viewed as an important data source, one which promises a reconstruction of some aspects of historical Long Island.<sup>1</sup> The collection consists of hundreds of often-signed, hand-written recipes, a hand-written manuscript, and a typed manuscript, suggesting a selection process and some attempts toward publication. Whether chosen or rejected, a large assortment of recipes have survived as they were originally given to Mrs. Smith, some donated on formal stationery and imbedded in messages, others on scraps of paper or notebook leaves, still others clipped from contemporary printed matter. Most are in the original hand of the donor, and are signed with the writer's married name. Judging by occasional notes and postmarks accompanying the recipes, Mrs. Smith's efforts at soliciting, collecting, and editing spanned the twenty-one years between 1889 and 1910, an extraordinarily long time for such a project. Despite the manuscripts, there is no evidence that it was completed or published.<sup>2</sup>

The Long Island historian inherits both the mystery behind Smith's failure to publish, and the clues to social and cultural life contained in its recipes. The aggregate of foods, recipes, and donors leads to an analysis of culture through diet, the nature of the microcosm of participating local women, and the interface between society and cuisine—or put more simply, who the recipe writers were, which recipes they chose, and what it meant.

## **CHARITABLE COOKBOOKS**

The form of the manuscript gives every reason to believe that Ella Smith intended to compile a charitable, or fund-raising, cookbook. Like others of this genre of cookbooks, the recipes were submitted by women of the



same social group, usually church- or community- related, and each recipe cites the donor by her married name. The individual or committee responsible for compiling, editing, and occasionally testing made no changes for the sake of consistency of recipe form; the measurements and cooking instructions, when used, therefore followed variable and personal styles.

Charitable cookbooks are a particularly American genre, dating from the Civil War and the need of non-professional, community-minded women to raise money for widows and orphans. Many Long Island women worked in this fashion through their local churches - of the six Nassau and Suffolk County charitable cookbooks published before 1915, four were church projects (when Brooklyn is included, the ratio jumps to 14 of 20). Statistically, it is probable that Mrs. Smith's project was intended to benefit her family's hereditary congregation, the First Presbyterian Church of Smithtown.<sup>3</sup>

Mrs. Smith's social and religious position within the group suggests that she was an appropriate person to exercise leadership in the project. She and her husband Theodore were descended from Richard Smythe, the founder of Smithtown, and were heirs to a position of wealth and social prominence.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, both Ella's obituary and her lasting reputation describe her as dedicated to church work, although her name did not appear on lists of church officers or public posts.<sup>5</sup> The family commitment to religious service is exemplified by her father's naming. Lyman Beecher Smith was, in fact, named for and baptized by the Reverend Lyman Beecher, a leading revivalist of the Second Awakening who began his career on Long Island.<sup>6</sup> Very likely Ella found in the project the subtle leadership suitable for a Smith female, properly working in domestic channels according to the contemporary Doctrine of Separate Spheres, which stressed example and sacrifice over bold public action. Her cookbook effort parallels those of writer-reformers Catharine Beecher, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Julia Beecher (Mrs. Henry Ward Beecher), the Reverend's famous daughters and daughter-in-law, who also wrote cookbooks.<sup>7</sup>

The likelihood that Mrs. Smith's was to have been a charitable cookbook is strengthened by the identification of her donors, their interrelationship, and their shared culture. The recipe notes and signatures, genealogies, and maps establish strong personal connections between and among the donors and Ella Smith.<sup>8</sup> A sample of 100 recipes was found to have been donated by 67 people. Of these, 25 were family, 17 were congregants of Smithtown's First Presbyterian Church and/or neighbors, and the remaining 25 were apparently business connections, celebrities, or unidentified. Considering that Smithtown was peopled largely by Smiths and their relatives, and that this group traditionally attended the First Presbyterian Church, substantial overlap would not be surprising. Within the sample, most were from Smithtown (46%) and elsewhere on Long Island (30%).<sup>9</sup>

Charitable cookbooks are also important as cultural expressions in both women's and ethnic groups. The genre has continued central to American women's community projects for over one hundred years, and is still actively used. For many decades the books reflected the English-American

culinary adaptations of the East coast which symbolized the native-born establishment; in the period under discussion only a few other ethnic groups had published their own recipes, and none of them were from Long Island. New immigrants needed time to organize and achieve leisure enough for such projects. An early example, *The First Dutch Reformed Church Cookbook*, 1883, represented an old Dutch community in Newark, New Jersey. One would believe it to be an English-American recipe book, but for the occasional and rather self-conscious inclusion of a few traditional Dutch dishes—Waffles, *Roliches*, *Appel Koek*, and *Buhling*.<sup>10</sup> Later charitable cookbooks with ethnic orientations would follow the pattern, an unwitting measure of acculturation. Some were written to raise money for a local cause (mostly religious); some clearly stated their desire to record old-world food traditions for their daughters (the traditional woman's task of transmitting culture to the next generation);<sup>11</sup> some must have spanned the two. Whatever their original reasons, these ethnic cookbooks now serve to identify the shared-group culture of their authors. By comparison, they clarify the decided Anglo-American character, dominance, and exclusivity among Long Island cookbook writers of the Smith period.

To judge from their names alone, the donors comprised a homogeneous group of white, Anglo-Saxon, native-born people with a long history of residence in Suffolk County.<sup>12</sup> Although during the period of Smith's collecting, numbers of foreign- and native-born people of other than Anglo-Saxon lineage were moving into Suffolk County, such ethnic cultures were unrepresented in the population of Smithtown writers. It is reasonable to expect that the Smiths' friends and neighbors who participated in this project were a homogeneous group by choice and custom, and that the cuisine of native-born English-American culture would be its food preference.<sup>13</sup> The social dynamics of a charitable cookbook are in themselves fascinating. Presumably, the enterprise tapped the cooking skills and personal specialties of a particular community, perhaps adding a few notable outside names for sales appeal. The participants usually knew each other, the Smithtown group based in a semi-rural small town in a somewhat sparsely populated countryside. The same community often provided both authorship and intended market, along with whatever sales individuals could manage outside the area, the cooks both producing and buying their own culture-product. Presumably local people bought the book to see themselves and their friends in print, perhaps to have everyone's specialties at hand, and to support the cause. One also senses the desire of the group to appear well publicly, with its best foot forward. Both Ella Smith and her contributors, each in their own recipe choices, may have sought the balance between the desire for personal status and un-Christian vanity, along with a more socially acceptable pride in the regional character and traditional nature of the community and its foodways. The cookbook, in reflecting local food fashion and custom, remains as good a standard as any in print of what people in a small locality ate, or aspired to eat, and in fact, how they wished to be seen; but one must thus be cautious in concluding that such cookbooks defined either daily eating or pure

fashion.<sup>14</sup>

Charitable cookbooks, in reflecting the desire of private housewives for status as up-to-date cooks, highlighted new and fashionable products and the recipes for using them. This explains the presence of so many Smith recipes that today might seem mundane; the new mayonnaise, for example, appears abundantly in the then-faddish chicken and potato salads. Puddings using cornstarch, the new thickener, exemplified the transition from an earlier pudding style. Use of commercialized gelatin likewise updated molded fruits and juices, and there was an entirely new emphasis on candying, especially using the recently-improved chocolate. The Smith recipes abounded with contemporary symbols of new and modern food. Smithtown housewives apparently had the means for following the fashion in foods, notably through subscriptions to newspapers and the new, nationwide, home magazines from which Ella Smith clipped and saved; and they had access to the products in the local general stores.<sup>15</sup>

The social aspects of cuisine mesh with the geographical in representative regional foodways. Charitable cookbooks expressing local pride may be expected to include a carefully selected array of local products. Indeed one does find seafood in abundance in Ella's collection, for example, in Mrs. Selleck's Clam Chowder (one of many), or the many oyster dishes which pack an entire manuscript chapter. Numerous vegetable recipes, expected in an area involved in truck and kitchen gardens, suggest overcooking to modern taste; Mrs. Smith's own sentiments show her experienced understanding:

It is impossible to give the exact time for cooking vegetables, much depends upon the age - of peas & corn - and whether they are fresh or have been picked a day or two - and beets & turnips much depends upon whether they have grown quickly or have been a long time in the ground.

Some recipes, such as F.M.D.'s Asparagus on Toast, called for drenched drawn butter or faddish white sauce, served modishly on toast. There are numbers of potatoes in croquettes, fritters, omelets, cakes, scallops, glazes, and sauces, as well as baked corn, succotash, and early peas. Niceties such as differential cooking times of beets, winter or summer, are reminders of Smithtown's closeness to the soil, as are the canning and pickling. Famous Long Island duckling seems mysterious in its absence, until one remembers that duck farms were just beginning in her time. On the whole, the range of foods could be said to reflect the parameters of period, regional cuisine.<sup>16</sup>

## **THE PEOPLE AND THEIR RECIPE TRANSACTIONS**

Having made the case for a charitable cookbook, the next question involves the nature of the group that produced it. Apparently Ella tapped her kinship and friendship networks well. "Dear Cousin Ella," wrote Helen Lawton, from Saint James, "I fear I cannot give you any receipts that you have not already had, however I send one for doughnuts which

we all think Mama makes to perfection..."<sup>17</sup> Wrote "Belle," "My dear Ella, I have tried in a way to comply with your request..." and then included a number of medical recipes and home remedies.<sup>18</sup> In a family as old as the Smiths, patterns of intermarriages with other old Long Island families are to be expected, and thus the large numbers of recipes sent by related Stronges, Blydenburghs, and Hallocks, for example, is not surprising. In addition to local family, the accompanying notes and envelope postmarks suggest that family ties and friendships were actively maintained despite distance and the passage of time. News was sent and sought by those who knew the Long Island family but had apparently married and moved as far away as Massachusetts, New Orleans, and Oregon.<sup>19</sup>

The second-largest group included an assortment of non-family local people. These were generally middle- to upper-class neighbors who ranged from wealthy peers (the Handleys of Hauppauge, for example, who contributed Potato Cakes), to one identified in Ella's handwriting simply as "the young schoolteacher." The United States Census rolls suggest that this group was characterized by a long history of local residence and economic stability; in the memory of former Smithtown Historian Nick Michichi they were "religious, good solid folk."<sup>20</sup> The third group of contributors was comprised of notable outsiders, a substantial number difficult to identify but not clearly family or neighbor. This was the most diverse group and often the most dramatic. The people in this group tended to live further from Smithtown. The most prominent was Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, who sent her card and a recipe for baking powder spice cake on White House stationery, reproduced here in its entirety:

#### Spice Cake.

- 1 Cup butter.
- 2 " sugar.
- 1 " milk.
- 4 eggs.
- 4 cups flour.
- 2 Teaspoonfuls Royal Baking Powder.
- 1 Tablespoonful ground cinnamon.
- 1/2 teaspoonful nutmeg.<sup>21</sup>

The relationship between the Smiths and the Roosevelts is unclear; according to former Town Historian Norman O'Berry, the Smiths were regularly invited to summer cotillions at Sagamore Hill, as were other members of Long Island's landed society.<sup>22</sup> Another luminary, Maria Parloa, editor of the *Ladies Home Journal* and co-founder of the Boston Cooking School, submitted two recipes for "simple puddings."<sup>23</sup> One must remember that the new ingredient, cornstarch (like Mrs. Roosevelt's baking powder), implied newness and fashion. Perhaps Miss Parloa met the Smiths through Amy Kohlstatt, a Smithtown resident and recipe donor who owned considerable stock in *The Ladies Home Journal*. Mrs. Smith was not averse to soliciting recipes from strangers, in any case, according to a note accompanying prize-winning cake recipes. Mrs. Florence Smith

almost certainly was a stranger, from the formal tone of her note. Ella noted that the Minnehaha Cake “took first Premium at Mineola Fair, Fall of 1901.” Perhaps she met Florence at the fair or through newspaper coverage, or perhaps she solicited the recipe by mail. Still another group of recipes came from The Long Island House, a restaurant in Riverhead, with a chatty note from Mrs. Frank Corwin, wife of the proprietor. Here too, the relationship is unclear:

[beginning missing] ...if you think they are not worth putting in the book I hope you and your family are all well and that you will take a trip to Riverhead to see me. I should enjoy haveing [*sic*] you very much. Yours...Respy  
 ....Will you please let me know if it is to [*sic*] late and if not if they will do.

Ella thought enough of her Broiled Oysters to include them.

An unusually large packet of typed candy recipes was sent from James B. Taylor, manager of the Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine Company in New York City, along with a formal letter on his office stationery:

Mrs. Thecdore W. Smith  
 Smithtown Branch, N. Y.

Dear Madam:- Agreeable to your request and the writer's promise herewith enclosed I hand you several recipes for making cakes, candies, etc...<sup>24</sup>

The recipes included in the manuscript were credited to Mrs. James Taylor. The formal tone of the note suggests no evidence of a personal relationship, but perhaps one in which the husbands had business dealings and served as go-betweens for their wives.

## THE FOOD

English-American food was the core of almost every American cookbook used in Ella's time, as it was in her collection. Throughout the nineteenth century, established white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant culture promulgated social norms for all regions and groups and their foodways were included.<sup>25</sup>

Rifling through the hundreds of recipes collected, one is struck by the degree of repetition. Every one cooked the same cuisine, used the same culinary styles, ate the same idiom. While one accompanying note responds to Ella's special request (“Dear Ella, I do remember you asking me for the recipes for the Book...”),<sup>26</sup> it is apparent that most donors chose the recipes they wished to contribute; their choices were consistently establishment English-American.

The parameters of English-American cuisine have been set by a number of food historians defining American cuisine. The English, like everyone else, brought their own traditional foodways to the New World. Apparently the Beefeater was appropriately named—beef was the meat of choice

over pork (fresh or smoked), mutton, poultry, or game, and eaten in quantities limited only by availability, economic, and geographical limitations. The island nation favored fish and seafood salmon and oysters in particular, and later in the New World, clams and lobsters. Dairy products were used abundantly—milk, cream, butter, and aged cheeses; barnyards produced eggs and poultry of all kinds for the table. In England gardening followed Belgian and Dutch leads; those who had kitchen gardens wrote passionately about new peas, lettuces, root vegetables, cabbages, in short, the kinds of vegetables possible in a northern, temperate climate.

Apples were their most prevalent fruit, and were used in drink and assorted dishes throughout the cuisine; other orchard fruits and berries were gathered from wild or cultivated stands. Grapes were more difficult to grow; fruit wine (dandelion or currant, for example) were more common than grape, which the English imported from Spain or Portugal, and ales predominated. The English grains—wheat, rye, oats and barley—were prepared in yeasted breads. Use of animal fat prevailed over vegetable oils. Garden herbs supplemented spices imported from the far reaches of the empire.

Even on the grand scale, English recipes were simpler and of a style less rich than those of the French, for whom there was a long tradition of competitive scorn. Roasts, boiled side dishes and complex puddings, spiced drinks, fruit sauces and pastry—these typified the hearty and unsophisticated cuisine. The cuisine was, for one who could afford the ingredients, rich in the luxuries of farm and fishing, domesticated or wild. Constraints on the more modest were imposed by growing cities and the distance from food production, marketing systems, and fuel scarcity.<sup>27</sup> The English in the New World maintained their preferences whenever possible, and their cooking style remains the backbone of our diet even today. Not all of their ingredients adapted immediately—wheat, for one, did not always grow well nor produce large enough yield for early needs, and was supplanted in practice, if not always in preference, by combinations with American corn and coarser European grains such as rye and oats. Other native New World foods such as beans, pumpkins, and eventually potatoes took their place in the English food frame. Pork consumption increased with land availability, as pigs managed to be self-sufficient when allowed to roam wild. Native corn and Caribbean molasses combined naturally into a new combination, one of America's chief contributions to world flavors.<sup>28</sup>

American industrialization of food production in the nineteenth century brought few basic changes, but expedited many trends. Refined flour was newly available at far lower prices, enabling the development and consumption of white breads for most people; inexpensive white sugar, the new cornstarch, and chemical baking powder spurred a rash of adapted traditional puddings, pastries, and new iced layer cakes; the ice industry triggered ice creams as the wood stove did canning. Some of Ella's recipes actually specified the use of a canned product, the first of the convenience foods. The French influence, emerging through such models as

Delmonico's New York City restaurant, stimulated mayonnaise-dressed salads, especially those of potato or chicken.<sup>28</sup> Growing awareness of scientific nutrition encouraged a number of whole-grain breads, all named for the leading nutritionist of the century, Sylvester Graham.<sup>30</sup> Temperance curbed the use of spirits in most cookery.

These dishes are found repeatedly in the recipes Ella's people sent. Lemon pies, chicken and potato salads in mayonnnaise, fudge and chocolate creams, iced cakes and Graham gems (rolls) and biscuits, pickles and canning tips—these fashion plates do in fact appear side by side with those redolent of patriotism, and traditionalism—Boston Brown Bread, Johnny Cakes, Baked Beans with Tomato Sauce, Succotash, Whortleberry Pudding. Mrs. Henry P. Carll testifies that her Pumpkin Bread is "An old recipe"; Mother's Mince Meat and Mother Lewis's Corn Cob Syrup respectfully salute the past, along with an entire envelope of contributions Ella labeled "Old Recipes." With an eye to temperance, the collection also includes recipes for both fermented dandelion and grape wines, and Unfermented Grape Juice.<sup>31</sup> A section on sick-room cookery and occasional recipes for stain removal follows the old form of cookbook cum encyclopedic household guide, and religious sayings and homilies find a place therein.

The occasional, new ethnic dishes do not diverge qualitatively from the English pattern, nor was the Smithtown palate as eager for the exotic as is ours tcday. Smith's ethnic dishes were often labeled as such—Dutch Apple Cake, German Coffee Cake, or Scotch Short Bread, but their foreignness was nore titular than culinary. The Macaroni dish which had the nominal possibility of being Italian was instead creamed on toast; and quoted from a popular Anglo-American cookbook of the day (*Mrs. Rorer's Receipts for Macaroni*). The word "Italian" in a contemporary recipe title referred only to the use of tonatoes, for example Mrs. Drant's Italian Stew, a recipe for roast beef leftovers.<sup>32</sup> Italians on Long Island were not yet integrated into Long Island society, either in food or in social acceptability; the Smith foods prove consistent in their Anglo-American, nativist solidarity.

## CONCLUSION

Ella Smith's recipe collection and manuscript indicate a charitable cookbook in progress, in that it followed the form, style, and content of nineteenth-century charitable cookbooks. Equally telling, it was the joint work of a body of women connected through family and the local church and under the direction of an established social leader. As such it lends itself as a tool for understanding the culture and dynamics of its group of contributors.

The collection and manuscripts demonstrated the centrality of food, personally, socially and culturally, for turn-of-the-century Smithtown. The people and their cuisine were still fixed in the small town niche, but responding to the early effects of the printed word and increasing market technology. The Smithtown of this period had not embraced the great

diversity of culture that was to characterize the twentieth century. Despite accelerating industrialization and social mobility, this project shows only a few indications of qualitative change, and those related to the influence of the new media - magazines, newspaper columns, and advertisements.

Ella's attempt at a charitable cookbook has left a picture of the town—a strong, traditional culture with firm boundaries, stable for those in it and somewhat impenetrable for those who were not. For those within there were strong and elastic ties which could stretch geographically, and networks of interactions in which women used recipe transactions to keep current with each other. In a world which held few public opportunities for women, such projects as charitable cookbooks were a means to public fulfillment and an exercise in peer group power. They may clarify the changing routes to women's status, either in their own eyes or those of their peers. Skills and taste in foodways still brought a basic reward, although the call for commercial canned tomatoes as an ingredient, for example, signals the early stages of the decline of domestic cookery and an eventual loss to women of one of their essential contributions and meaningful status within family and community. Of course this is a double-sided coin—when women were relieved of some home food production they had time for another route to status, that of community service through charitable cookbooks. Ella Smith's persistence, the magnitude of her circle's response, and its degree of cultural consistency underscore the importance of their daily contributions and satisfactions through food, a daily channel now almost entirely lost.

Mrs. Smith stands between her mother's Smithtown and her daughter's. From the viewpoint of the earlier generation, Ella's era was liberated by a plethora of material conveniences, new opportunities for women, and the increased social boldness implied by the cookbook. Ella's daughter Faith, who chose a career in her father's insurance office over marriage and epitomized the successful, single, career woman, was planted firmly in the twentieth century.<sup>33</sup> The cookbook project illuminates this pivotal moment in the history of women.

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7. Janice B. Longone and Daniel T. Longone, *American Cookbooks and Wine Books, 1797-1950* (Ann Arbor: The Clements Library & The Wine and Food Library, 1984), p. 3.
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5. Obituary, Ella Mathilda Smith, *Smithtown Messenger* (Smithtown Branch), 3 November 1922, p. 1.



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16. Vegetable chapter, Smith hand-written manuscript. For Long Island agricultural products, see Richard A. Wines, "The Nineteenth-Century Agricultural Transition in an Eastern Long Island Community," *Agricultural History* 155 (January 1981).
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18. Written on stationery from Presbyterian Hospital, New York City, where she or her husband worked.
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20. *Tenth Census of the United States, 1880*; interview with Nick Michichi, former Smithtown Town Historian, 25 October 1984.
21. Postmark Washington, D.C., 7 May 1902.

22. Interview, Norman "Bud" O'Berry, former Smithtown Town Historian, 24 October 1984.
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30. See Sylvester Graham, *Graham's Lectures on the Science of Human Life* (Boston: Marsh, Capen, Lyon, and Webb, 1839); Stephen Nissenbaum, *Sex, Diet, and Debility in Jacksonian America: Sylvester Graham and Health Reform* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980).
31. "Unfermented Grape Juice" was clipped from ...cks *Family Magazine* (page torn, name illegible).
32. This is an old pattern in recipes; "Florentine" in a recipe title, for example, always signified spinach in the dish.
33. She became a senior partner of the Crafts, Smith, Nowick and Goodwin Insurance Agency. See Faith Smith's obituary, *Smithtown Messenger*, 23 December 1976.

# Land Where My Fathers Died

By William A. Fahey

Ketewomoke  
Natchaguetack  
Opcahouthycke

flashing scales of the  
beautiful fish-shaped island  
Pammanake  
or by the English called  
Long Island

Massapeag's land  
and Meantaquit  
land of Keossechok  
Sachem of Secontok

And Takapousha  
who grieved his heart  
to make this deed  
of three whole necks of  
meadow Land  
for

twenty duch knives  
ten shirts  
five paire of handsom stockings  
one good duch hat  
and a great fine Loking glos

As witness the mark of  
Ambrus Sutton X  
the mark of  
Richrad Brush X

In the presence of  
Lion Gardiner  
and  
Benjamin Price X

Reprinted by permission of William A. Fahey from *Paumanok Rising, An Anthology of Eastern Long Island Aesthetics*, Vince Clemente and Graham Everett, eds. (Port Jefferson: Street Press, 1981).

# Long Island As America: A New Look at the First Inhabitants

By Gaynell Stone

## THE PERCEPTION OF NATIVE AMERICANS

The record in print of Long Island's Native population usually reflects one of several historical stereotypes: the heathen savage not to be trusted; the dupes who sold their land cheaply (Manhattan was bought for only \$24.00!); the peaceful folk who were friends of the settlers because the settlers were good to them; or, later, the disappearing Noble Savage. This sequence of perceptions of a people is politically and chronologically related to their numbers, and these views primarily are based on the colonists' ethnocentric need to justify the involuntary taking of Native lands. While local Native-European relations are frequently characterized as "peaceable," the time period is not specified and evidence contrary to the statement is often ignored. It is necessary to understand the chronology and the causes of Native subjugation in order to understand the stereotypes which shape our thinking about the people preceding us on Long Island.

The "heathen savage" image is the one reported in some early accounts of explorers and settlers. Many of these depict the aboriginals to be vengeful, and there were enough incidents of European traders or sailors being killed by them to reinforce that view. It is likely that these incidents often were in response to the killing or kidnapping of Amerinds by the explorers.<sup>1</sup>

Most early settlers regarded with wariness the aboriginal peoples whose lands they had invaded, at the same time viewing them as objects to be exploited. Underpinning this was the English belief that the Natives, as non-Christians, were subject to the terms of Queen Elizabeth's patent to Sir Humphrey Gilbert empowering him to claim any non-Christian territory, regardless of indigenous occupancy. Francis Jennings further develops the perceptive view that the Europeans invaded a populated, not an empty, land, and outlines the techniques they used to subjugate the Native population.<sup>2</sup>

Early records of New Netherland, the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies, and the Long Island settlements leave no doubt of plotting, violence, and double-dealing by the Dutch and English against the Native people. These reports belie the concept that there was little friction from the early 1600s to King Philip's War in 1675-76. David DeVries describes in

chilling detail the massacre of Native men, women, and children near New Amsterdam, thoughtlessly ordered by Governor William Kieft in 1643. This barbaric act plunged the region into full-scale hostilities, during which Mespat (Newtown) was burned, Gravesend besieged, Hempstead threatened, and outlying settlements sacked and the settlers killed. Silas Wood, the first historian of Long Island, described the continuing threat of danger to the first three generations of European settlers. A current scholar, Marion Ales, provides a gripping overview of this in her history of the Montauk.<sup>3</sup>

Often violence began—a Native woman killed for picking European peaches, then revenged—because of the difference in lifeways that led to mutual misunderstanding. There was no concept of theft by the Natives, who shared the resources of nature because they felt that no one could own them. In his 1867 translation, the eminent scholar Henry C. Murphy did not see fit to include fifteen pages of observations of local Natives in 1679 by Labadist missionary Jasper Danckaerts. A recent translation by Charles Gehring reveals that Danckaerts presciently tried to prove that theft, dishonesty, cursing, greed, and drunkenness could not have existed in aboriginal societies prior to European contact because there were no words for them in their vocabulary. Danckaerts also refuted the general European view that the natives were especially vengeful; he witnessed their willingness to accept punishment if convinced they had done wrong.<sup>4</sup>

Other evidence of the early settlers' fear of the Natives is that the early Long Island towns of Hempstead, Flatlands, Flatbush, Gravesend, and New Utrecht were palisaded for protection, and that a blockhouse was built at Wallabout. In fact, the early Flatlands village layout replicated the compact, palisaded "bawne" form recommended for protection in a "kit" for Scots colonists going to Ulster.<sup>5</sup>

The major Long Island example of violence between Europeans and Native Americans is the report of Captain John Underhill's leading a band of armed men against a group of Natives at Fort Marsapeague (Fort Neck at Massapequa), and killing 120 before marching north to kill another 300 in Connecticut. This is usually described as occurring in 1653, but the dates vary; the document noting the massacre was written in 1647, so the battle, if any, had to predate that. A new evaluation of this hoary tale casts doubt that a massacre ever took place there, the local historical plaque notwithstanding.<sup>6</sup>

Early town records also reflect the colonists' fears of the Natives surrounding them. At various times all men were ordered to carry or keep arms nearby in case of an alarm. All towns enacted laws against selling arms and liquor to the Natives; Southampton forbade men to enter the village (only women and old men with a "ticket" from the magistrates could come to trade). Some Southampton houses were burned and a number of cattle driven into the bay to drown by the Natives, in protest of the loss of their land and subsistence. Hempstead settlers were ordered not to assist the Natives with plowing; men were sent to drive away those they felt did not belong at Rockaway. In 1665, one year after ousting the Dutch

from New York, the English Governor Richard Nicolls, acting under the terms of the Duke's Laws, forbade the Natives to *powaw* (correct word for pow-wow). All Native canoes and arms on Long Island were seized during a period of unrest in 1675 before King Philip's War. Natives constantly were punished for breaking Colonial rules they did not understand. Long Island became a sweatshop for producing the wampum required to pay the exorbitant fines imposed on the Natives for their "crimes"; there are many more such actions in each town's records.<sup>7</sup>

Obviously influenced by these early fears is a local legend—Kate Strong's tale of the kidnapping of Zopher Hawkins of Setauket by "hostile Indians" near Lake Ronkonkoma, in the 1770s. Since no such Native groups existed at that time, the incident could not have happened. Far from being hostile, some Montauk and Shinnecock served in the French and Indian Wars and in the American Revolution.<sup>8</sup>

### PEACEFUL OR PACIFIED?

Was it fear of the Natives or greed for their land which led to the bloodiest acts against them by Europeans? Governor Kieft of New Netherland stands as a butcher for that area, just as Capt. John Mason does for the massacre of Pequot men, women, and children at Mystic, Connecticut, in 1637, and as Mason and Capt. John Underhill do for the slaughter of Natives at Block Island one year before. It is likely that the Pequot War (1637) and others were fomented by early settlers so that they could clear the land and turn a profit by selling it to the rapidly growing number of newcomers. Edward Randolph, sent from England to investigate the causes of King Philip's War (1675-76), reported that some observers

impute the cause to some injuries offered to the Sachim Philip; for he being possessed of a tract of land called Mount Hope, a very fertile, pleasant, and rich soyle...some English had a mind to dispossesse him thereof, who never wanting one pretence or other to attain their end, complained of injuries done by Philip and his Indians to their stock and cattle, whereupon Philip was often summoned before the magistrate, sometimes imprisoned, and never released but upon parting with a considerable part of his land.<sup>9</sup>

This was also the experience of the Long Island Natives.

Many interpreters of Long Island history state that the Indians were peaceable, that here there were no Indian wars and very little friction. The Natives are seen as less troublesome because of the settlers' uniform justice and kindness, assuring fair and equitable treatment. This perception is self-serving, underpinning the colonialism which enabled early settlers to "buy" huge tracts of land for small amounts of trade goods, and then to coerce the Native people into their labor pool and economic control. Silas Wood acknowledged that by denial of arms, and other repressive measures, the colonists made waging war by the Natives hopeless. The historian, Benjamin F. Thompson, also recognized that the settlers, "by forming distinct settlements in different parts of the Island, probably

prevented any such [Native] combination being formed, if it were ever intended."<sup>10</sup> By the 1870s, the ethnocentric and racist view of East Hamptoners was baldly printed: "... the two hundred descendants of the original purchasers are waiting for the time when the tribe will be extinct, and there shall be no lien upon the land."<sup>11</sup>

There are several reasons for the statement repeated in so many histories of Long Island that the Natives here were more peaceable than they were elsewhere. One reason why local peoples were not more aggressive toward Europeans in the beginning may have been their tradition, or belief, of a great Mannitto (Supreme Being or Spirit) arriving from the East. When Henry Hudson appeared, clothed splendidly in red velvet and lace, the Native people were awed; they accepted the perceived Mannitto with obeisance and friendliness. The Natives of Central and South America reacted in the same way to invading Spanish conquistadors, probably because of a similar legend in their societies.<sup>12</sup>

Estimates of the Island's aboriginal population have ranged from 3,000 to about 6,000 (James Mooney's 1928 figure) to 7,500, making it the second-most densely populated area in the country.<sup>13</sup> This Native population on Long Island - and throughout the Northeast - died in large numbers from diseases unwittingly brought by European explorers, beginning with Giovanni Da Verrazano (1524), to which they had no resistance. Early observers noted depletion on a scale of one hundred to one, which allowed the first colonists easily to enter a sparsely populated landscape. So depleted a Native population would probably not have been able to repulse the European invaders, even if it had wanted to - another major reason for lack of friction.<sup>14</sup>

Recurrent epidemics of smallpox and other diseases among the settlers continued to thin Native ranks so drastically that by the late 1600s, their lands passed more easily into European hands. Since the aboriginal people had no concept of land ownership, they thought that the gifts they received from European newcomers were in return for sharing the resources of the land. This accounts for Tackapousha and other leaders returning so often to ask for more payment or gifts; it is the basis of the term "Indian giver." William Fitzhugh suggests that some Native leaders (Wyandanch and Tackapousha?) were no less guilty than the English of self-aggrandizement at the expense of other members of their society; many Native Americans were active, not passive, participants in shaping their destiny—although it must be remembered their choices were extremely limited. It has been argued that the Natives were not dupes, but followed a policy of relinquishing their land as slowly as possible. Tracing the trail of Suscaneman and other Native leaders through the Oyster Bay Town records appears to support this, revealing numerous "sales" of small 40 to 200 acre plots over many years, a regular source of income at 5 to 20 pounds-worth of silver for each transaction.<sup>15</sup>

The introduction of liquor to the Natives, who could not tolerate it and rapidly became addicted, was also a weapon used against them. John Strong and Marion Ales have documented its use against the Shinnecock

and Montauk, to befuddle them while buying their land and signing deeds, and as a bribe to secure their labor on whaling crews. As they were simultaneously deprived of their hunting and gathering areas (now fenced as European farms), malnutrition accelerated the deleterious effects of alcohol. This, plus continuing susceptibility to European diseases, further reduced them. Other oppressive acts against Natives included tearing down or burning their wigwams, scarcely giving the occupants time to escape; confiscating their wandering stock; shooting their dogs, used both for hunting and food; and forbidding them to cut wood, which caused some to freeze to death in winter.<sup>16</sup>

Extracting land from the Natives (dealing in real estate was a prime activity on Long Island then as now) was time-consuming due to Native settlement patterns. Many bands (extended families) lived on the banks of rivers, creeks, ponds, and estuaries throughout the Island; each group was identified by the word in the Algonkian language that geographically described that spot, such as Corchaug, Nessaquake, etc. Charles Wolley, in 1678, listed the Long Island groups as the Rockoway, Sequataeg, Unckah-chaug, Setauck, Ocquabaug, Shinnecock (the greatest), and Montauk. Silas Wood, in 1828, was the first to proclaim the "thirteen tribes" of Long Island; it is not certain how he arrived at that number, perhaps by taking names from deeds, but there never were thirteen tribes.<sup>17</sup>

There is no foundation for considering as "separate tribes" a mobile, largely acephalous people, with similar culture and environment. The only division on the Island was between the two linguistic groups of the Algonkian language family, the Lenni Lenape speakers of western Long Island and the Southern New England language-variant speakers of eastern Long Island. John Morice noted the schism, but erroneously labeled them as two different racial groups; they are all Algonkians, with only a linguistic variation. There is no way to tell exactly where the linguistic boundary was, but there was a cultural boundary—an overlap of East River and Windsor ceramic designs at roughly the Dutch-English international boundary drawn up in 1650 as a line due south from the western border of Oyster Bay. Perhaps the line coincided with a Native linguistic boundary, or perhaps this was farther west, with the Canarsie.<sup>18</sup>

Local Native social and political custom militated against head-on confrontation. Leaders ruled through consent; the social glue was cooperation and sharing, and warfare was a small-scale, guerrilla-type action in which few were killed. Human life, and the necessity for survival, was so appreciated that those captured in a skirmish often ended up replacing a slain father or brother in the enemy camp. This type of amorphous social organization, not hierarchical as the Europeans were accustomed to, made land deals time-consuming and difficult since so many headmen were involved. Evidence that the pre-Contact band headmen (sachems) ruled through ability, not heredity, is given by William Smith, who wrote that a son imitated a respected father's exploits and thus attained the same influence, so accounting for the belief that title and power were hereditary. Added proof that Long Island had no Native "Kings" was found by John



Strong in the unpublished papers of Col. John Scott.<sup>19</sup>

The colonists, to meet their needs, promoted the myth of larger groupings—"tribes"—who supposedly supported their Sachems as leaders in the Western sense. Morton H. Fried has analyzed the social and political ramifications of this Western "invention" on the Native groups upon which it has been imposed, mostly through European colonialism. It is manipulation of relatively unstructured populations by more complexly organized societies. The concept has been used against the Montauk, who were declared 'extinct' as a tribe by a court in 1879 when they stood in the way of real estate development on Montauk. One observer has noted that Stephen Taukus (a Native name bowdlerized as "Talkhouse") Pharaoh, a prodigious walker of robust constitution, would not have been likely to die walking home at the age of 60 in August, 1879; is it coincidental that "Steve" was out of the way by the time the land was partitioned and sold in October, 1879?<sup>20</sup>

Another factor in the rapid melting away of Long Island's Native Americans was that they had no hinterland into which to retreat, as did the other Northeastern Native groups. This is a major reason why so little is known about the culture of the Island's original inhabitants. For example, not one word of the language of the Natives of West End Long Island was recorded before they retreated to Staten Island and soon were pushed to New Jersey in the mid 1600s. The main reason scholars have more extensive information on the Lenni Lenape (Delaware) of New Jersey is because those groups fled to Canada and Oklahoma, where they still live.<sup>21</sup>

Another factor in the creation of a docile Native population was missionary activity, from the beginning of settlement, by, among others, the Reverends John Youngs of Southold, Thomas James of East Hampton, Abraham Pierson of Southampton, and William Leverich of Oyster Bay and Huntington. The task of civilizing and Christianizing the "barbarians, heathens, and savages" was a constant challenge to clerics, who were paid extra fees to minister to their local Native populations. One of them—Thomas James—appears to have supported Natives in times of danger and famine, although he also profited by getting some of their land. The Rev. Azariah Horton was the first full-time missionary; he served a mobile pastorate, traveling a circuit from Jamaica to Montauk in the early 1740s. Aided by an interpreter, he stayed with his charges in their wigwams, teaching and ministering to the sick as well as preaching. The Natives were caught in a double bind: the more successfully they became Europeanized, as bidden, the more they were judged as "not being Indians," and the more they lost their land or were penalized in other ways. A recent study concludes that the Natives were Christianized as well as "civilized" because the discipline of conversion made them reliable and productive members of society.<sup>22</sup>

Other actions that knit the Natives into the sphere of colonial culture—thus maintaining order—involved drawing them into economic dependency for food and trade goods. A gun sold to a Native made him dependent

for powder and shot. Buying game from Natives, or hiring them to tend the cattle at Montauk or man the boats for shore whaling tied them to the colonial economy. Since whaling was the Natives' most lucrative (and dangerous) occupation, it was tightly regulated by the whaling companies to their own benefit. There was little profit for the Natives, no competition was allowed by law, a cap was put on their wages, they had to post bond that they would work and were fined if they did not, and alcohol was used as a bribe for performance. However, such occupations became increasingly necessary for Native survival, since the East Hamptoners prevented the Montauk from making a profit from their land by pasturing cattle or selling hay, and Natives often were fined or horsewhipped for gathering cranberries, groundnuts, or shellfish as they always had.<sup>23</sup>

To fill the insatiable need for labor, Capt. John Youngs of Southold was rewarded by the New England Commissioners for procuring Indian youths to be bound out. Although Native slavery was prohibited by Governor Edmund Andros in 1679 (thus presumably restricting it to Africans), it did continue here. At the same time, large rewards were regularly offered to the Natives to return runaway blacks; apparently they did not, as their settlements became rare safe havens for fugitive slaves, leading to intermarriage between the groups. In the aftermath of King Philip's War, thousands of Natives were sold into slavery in the Caribbean and New England. Cockenoe, a Montauk captured during the Pequot War while visiting in Connecticut, was acquired by a Massachusetts family. His linguistic ability enabled him to become the Rev. John Eliot's translator for the latter's religious writings. Cockenoe returned to Long Island *ca.* 1648 to become a surveyor and interpreter for Native-European land transactions.<sup>24</sup>

Samson Occum, the Mohegan educated at Eleazar Wheelock's Indian School and sent to Long Island to teach the Montauk, became an ordained Presbyterian minister. Occum eventually recognized that the goal of the East Hamptoners was the demise of the Montauk. On pain of banishment, members were not permitted to marry anyone but another Montauk; if they left Montauk land, for any reason, they were not allowed to return. In the 1780s, Occum led the exodus of Montauk and Shinnecock from Long Island to Brothertown, in the Oneida Territory of up-state New York. There was another side to this migration. Ezra L'Hommedieu, the respected legislator from Southold, acting on behalf of East Hampton interests, offered the Montauk a new reservation near Southold. It was when they refused that he encouraged their move to Brothertown. For services rendered in setting Native-white boundaries within the Brothertown reserve (the Natives got 9,390 acres, the settler-trespassers 14,662), the Legislature awarded L'Hommedieu and two other officials £1000 for expenses, exclusive of personal allowances, in 1795. Occum also benefited, in that he was granted land as well as rental fees as official minister of the group. The remnants of the Long Island and other Native groups, who thought they finally had a home safe from white depredations, were wrong; they were pushed off their farms within a generation by the land-hungry

children of the New England settlers heading West.<sup>25</sup>

### LATER VIEWS OF THE REMAINING NATIVES

The story taught every fourth grader of the Cape Cod Wampanoag Native, Squanto, who enabled the survival of the Pilgrims that first winter, epitomizes the canonization of friendly (powerless?) Native helpers. His aid is the more remarkable considering that he had been kidnaped and sold into slavery by earlier English explorers before making his way back to Cape Cod.

To return to the changing stereotypes of Native Americans through time, one local version of the "friendly native" is Wyandanch's much touted friendship with Lion Gardiner. The relationship was probably pragmatic, of political benefit for both of them. Wyandanch was a figurehead supported by the English to make it easier to consummate their continuing land purchases; some deeds do not even have his sign (mark). Obviously he was rewarded with the many fees paid for land sales (which he shared with headmen of local bands), becoming more powerful because he was backed by the threat of English force. Perhaps he had no choice, caught as he was between two aggressive forces, the Narragansetts and the English. Tackapousha followed a similar course for western Long Island. It is interesting that he was made a Sachem over West End Native groups at the time the Dutch and English divided Long Island in 1650; evidently the West End Dutch and English wanted to emulate the East End English in making land transactions simpler. In 1674, when the Dutch briefly retook New York, Tackapousha and other Native leaders petitioned Governor Anthony Colve that Wyandanch had no authority over their lands, for the sale of which they had never been paid.<sup>26</sup> Several generations later, in the mid-1700s when the Natives were living in small, dispersed groups, they no longer were a threat. They had melted further into the rapidly increasing European population through marriage, were serving in the nation's armed forces, and were becoming wage earners in addition to their "cash crops" of making baskets and scrubs, rushing and caning chairs, and selling shellfish and berries. As the 19th century unfolded, they were perceived as providing color and service to country life and thus became the next stereotype, the friend of the settlers.

Nostalgia for the Native lifestyle and abilities developed in proportion to their disappearance. With the American Centennial proclaiming the ascendancy of the European settlers, hand-in-hand with the rise of industrialism, the view of the Native as Noble Savage flowered, exemplified by Longfellow's *Song of Hiawatha*. Such works as Gean Finch Barnes' *Tales of the High Hills* are of a similar genre, as well as Elizabeth Champney's novel, *Witch Winnie at Shinnecock*, a picaresque view of the Shinnecock. It became fashionable to visit Native "Kings," and every obituary of a Native proclaimed the deceased to have been the "last pure-blood of the tribe." Most popular myths and legends of Long Island Natives (such as that of the Native princess who takes a life in Lake Ronkonkoma each year by drowning) are 19th century romantic inventions.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the endless oppressions visited upon Long Island Natives, they have endured in force at Shinnecock, at Poosapatuck (whose lands, because of incursions by whites, have eroded from over 175 acres in 1700 to 120 acres in 1902 to even fewer today), in small communities at Eastville (Sag Harbor), Freetown (East Hampton), and Lakeville (Lake Success), and scattered throughout Long Island's population. Thompson felt in 1836 that the story of griefs and wrongs endured can never be known; Nathaniel Prime stated in 1845 that Indians deserved the universal respect and gratitude of the settlers, as a people not only deeply injured but also grossly misrepresented; and Peter Ross verified in 1902 that the Natives have been cheated, wronged, and cozened at every turn. Even a cursory look at the record attests to monumental injustice. The Suffolk County Archaeological Association series, *Readings in Long Island Archaeology & Ethnohistory*, provides much of that story in seven volumes to date, with more forthcoming.<sup>28</sup>

A certain unease now is felt by those in government or real estate, as today's Native descendents have become educated, are knowledgeable about political action, protest the destruction of ancestral sites, and might sue for return of lands taken from their forebears, not always within the law. Perhaps the evolving stereotypical views outlined above will turn full circle, back to the perception of the Native as a force to be reckoned with.

Long Island has not benefited from a body of interpretative studies of the depth that exists in the New England and Middle Atlantic areas. This lack of new scholarly perspectives has resulted in a lingering use of outdated, inaccurate materials, a factor in continuing misperceptions about the Island's Native Americans. The growing number of scholars of this region, as well as the instigation of this *Journal*, herald a renaissance of productive new insights about Long Island.

#### NOTES

1. See Adriaen Van der Donck, "Wilden, or wild men...because they seemed to be wild and strangers to the Christian religion," in Henry C. Murphy, ed., *Collections, New-York Historical Society*, 2nd Series, Vol. II, (New York: Van Norden, 1849); p. 191; Rev. John Miller, "A Description of the Province and City of New York ... in 1695," in Cornell Jaray, ed., *Historical Chronicles of New Amsterdam, Colonial New York, and Early Long Island* (Port Washington: Ira J. Friedman, 1968), p. 52; Robert Juet (one of Hudson's band), "Voyage of the Half Moon from 4 April to 7 November 1609," in Robert Lunny, ed. (Newark: New Jersey Historical Society, 1959), pp. 25-35; for Jacques Cartier's kidnapping Natives in 1534 at Gaspe Bay, see Robert Hecht, ed., *Continents in Collision: Documents* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 10.

2. See Douglas McManis, "European Impressions of the New England Coast, 1497-1620," Univ. of Chicago, Dept. of Geography, Research paper No. 139, 1972, p. 67; Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).

3. David DeVries, "Voyages from Holland to America." in Murphy, *Collections*, pp. 268-70; Silas Wood, *A Sketch of the Several Towns on Long Island* (Brooklyn: Alden Spooner, 1828), pp 70-80; Marion Ales, *The History and Archaeology of the Montauk*, Vol. III *Readings in Long Island Archaeology & Ethnohistory* (hereafter cited as *Readings*), Gaynell Stone, ed., (Stony Brook: Suffolk County Archaeological Assoc., 1979): pp. 13-125.

4. Henry C. Murphy, ed., "Journal of a Voyage to New York and a Tour in Several of the American Colonies in 1679-80 by Jasper Dankers and Peter Sluyter," in *Memoirs I* (Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society, 1867); Charles T. Gehring and Robert S. Grumet, "Observations of the Indians from Jasper Danckaerts's Journal, 1679-1680," in *William and Mary Quarterly* XLIX (1 January 1987): 104-120.
5. See Ivor Noel-Hume, *Martin's Hundred*, (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 231-239.
6. John H. Morice, "The Indians of Long Island," in Paul Bailey, ed., *A History of Two Great Counties: Nassau and Suffolk* (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1949), p. 115; Robert Grumet, personal communication, regarding Ralph Solecki, "Seventeenth Century Indian Fort Marsapeague, New York," *British Archaeological Reports*, International Series 000, 1988. Grumet is suspicious of the editor's interpretation of this document (which reads "Matsepe" rather than Marsapeague) by Anonymous (possibly Augustine Heermann); "Journal of New Netherlands, 1647," in J. Franklin Jameson, ed., *The Narratives of New Netherlands, 1609-1664* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 282.
7. John Strong, "From Hunter to Servant: Patterns of Accommodation to Colonial Authority in Eastern Long Island Indian Communities," in Joann Krieg, ed., *To Know the Place* (Hempstead: L.I. Studies Institute, Hofstra University, 1986), p. 19. For Southampton Town acts, see Gaynell Stone, *The Shinnecock: A Culture History*, Vol. VI, *Readings* (1983) 1; Benjamin T. Hicks, ed., *Records of the Towns of North and South Hempstead*, Vol. I (Jamaica: Long Island Farmer Printers, 1897) p. 276; Morice, "Indians," pp. 119-125.
8. Kate W. Strong, "Zopher Hawkins, Indian Captive," *Long Island Forum* 39 (February 1940): 39-40. Morice, "Indians," p. 121.
9. Robert Hecht, ed., *Continents in Collision*, p. 10.
10. Wood, *Long Island*, p. 73; Benjamin Thompson, *History of Long Island*, 3 Vols. (first pub. 1849, reprint ed. Port Washington: Ira J. Friedman, 1962), I: 99, and repeated in many succeeding works, as recently as Richard P. Harmond, "Long Island as America: From Colonial Times through the 19th Century," *Long Island Historical Journal* 1 (Fall 1988): 4.
11. *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, 18 September 1871, p. 493, cited in Stone, *Readings*, Vol. III: 2.
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13. Charles Lodwick, "New York in 1692," in Murphy, *Collections*, p. 249; James Mooney, "The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico," *Miscellaneous Collections* Vol. 80, N. 7, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1928); the 7,500 estimate is in Robert Trent, "Coastal Algonkian Culture, 1500-1680; Conquest and Resistance," in Jonathan Fairbanks and Robert Trent, eds., *New England Begins: The Seventeenth Century*, Vol. I (Boston: Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 1982), p. 69.
14. Henry Dobyns, *Native American Historical Demography* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); Phil C. Weigand, "The Great Frontier' on Long Island: Verazzano and Epidemic Diseases," MS., Department of Anthropology, SUNY at Stony Brook, 1986.
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16. Petition to the New York Assembly from Benjamin and Stephen Pharaoh, February

25, 1800, in Stone, *Readings*, Vol. III, p. 139; Strong, *Readings*, 1983, Vol. VI, p. 61, Hicks, *Records*, Vol. I, p. 66, Ales, *Readings*, Vol. III, pp. 138, 143-145.

17. The Rev. Charles Wolley, *A Two Years' Journal in New York* (1701: reprint ed., Harrison, NY: Harbor Hill Books, 1973), p. 64; Wood, *Long Island*, p. 61.

18. See Levine and Bonvillain, *Readings*, Vol. IV, pp. 160-168. In "Indians," Morice confused linguistic with racial group boundaries, but understood the loose, migratory nature of the Native communities. Unfortunately, he called them "tribes" for convenience, with the time-worn listing of thirteen (p. 107).

19. William Smith, Jr., *The History of the Province of New York From the First Discovery to the Year 1732*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 46; John Strong, personal communication, MS 3662, Sloane Manuscripts, British Museum, London.

20. Morton H. Fried, *The Notion of Tribe*, (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing Company, 1975); Ales, *Readings*, Vol. III, p. 118; Robert Giffen, personal communication.

21. Levine and Bonvillain, *Readings*, Vol. III, pp. 137, 208.

22. Azariah Horton, "Second Journal of Mr. Azariah Horton, 1742," in *Christian Monthly History*, 4 (1744); Silas Wood, *Thoughts on the State of the American Indians* (New York: T. & J. Sword, 1794), typescript ed. pp. 7-15, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA., wrote that the Natives would never properly be civilized because of the lack of effort to educate them.

23. See Ales, *Readings*, Vol. III, pp. 77, 96; Strong, *Readings*, Vol. VI, 1983, p. 231.

24. See Hicks, *Records*, Vol. III, p. 51; Strong, "Hunter," p. 20; Stone, *Readings*, Vol. IV, p. 176; Edgar J. McManus, *A History of Negro Slavery in New York* (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 24, 102.

25. "Brothertown Indian Record Book, 1788-1810," MS., SC 11082, Archives, New York State Library, Albany, NY. For "Ezra L'Hommedieu receipt" for 1000 pounds, see "Brothertown Indians, 17125, same archives.

26. See Strong, *Readings*, Vol. VI, (1983), p. 55; Ales, *Readings*, Vol. III, p. 48, 62-70, John Cox, Jr., *Records*, II, p. 680.

27. See Levine and Bonvillain, *Readings*, Vol. IV, 1980, for materials which appear to be of Native origin. Gean Finch Barnes, *Tales of the High Hills* (East Hampton: East Hampton Town, 1975) purportedly recounts the life of her family with their neighbors, the Montauk; Elizabeth Champney, *Witch Winnie at Shinnecock, or the King's Daughters in a Summer Art School* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1894); "A Visit to David Pharoah, King of the Montauket Indians at East Hampton," in *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, 45 (1 December 1877), p. 208; Verne Dyson, *Heather Flower and Other Indian Stories of Long Island* (Port Washington: Ira J. Friedman, 1967).

28. Thompson, *History*, I:99; Nathaniel S. Prime, *A History of Long Island...* (New York: Robert Carter, 1845) p. 95; Peter Ross, *A History of Long Island*, 3 Vols. (New York: Lewis Pub. Co., 1902) I:2.

Vol. VII of *Readings*, *The Historical Archaeology of Long Island: The Sites*, is reviewed in this issue of the *Long Island Historical Journal*; Vol. III, 2nd ed., *The History & Archaeology of the Montauk*, and Vol. VIII, *The Natives of Western Long Island*, are forthcoming.

# The Creation of Nassau County

By Edward J. Smits

During the nineteenth century, major American cities including Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, and New York augmented their populations by absorbing surrounding towns. Easily the most impressive of these municipal consolidations was the merging of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island, the Bronx, and Queens to form Greater New York. When this was accomplished in 1898, the three eastern towns of Queens County — Hempstead, North Hempstead, and Oyster Bay—remained outside the Great City in a state of administrative limbo. Although the formation of New York City was the imminent cause of Nassau's creation, the desire for political independence can be traced as far back as colonial times.

The original counties of New York State were established in 1683, including Queens County which “conteyne the severall towns of New Towne, Jamaica, Flushing, Hempstead and Oysterbay with the Severall out farmes, Settlements and Plantacons adjacent.”<sup>1</sup> Due to the political antagonism between residents of the northern and southern portions of Hempstead caused by the Revolutionary War, the town divided into North and South Hempstead in 1784; Hempstead dropped the “South” in 1801.

During the Revolution, the Queens County Court House in Jamaica had been torn down by British troops for its lumber. The court house and its judicial activities was then the focal point of county government, while the towns provided more direct local public services. As soon as peace was concluded, both the eastern and western towns petitioned the State Legislature for a new county court house to be erected in their respective areas. Since a preponderance of the population was in the eastern towns, the Legislature passed an act on March 1, 1785 allowing \$2,000 to be raised to erect a new building on a site in the county's geographical center. A court house and jail were constructed on the southern edge of the town of North Hempstead, some five miles northwest of the village of Hempstead.

Located in the midst of the Hempstead Plains, a rather desolate area with only scattered farmstands nearby, the court house site led to dissatisfaction, as noted by an observer:

... the village called North Hempstead where the courts were held...hardly deserves a local name or notice but that the courts are held there. The location of this public building...upon an almost naked and barren heath, remote from the conveniences of more populous districts, furnished an admirable comment on blind adherence to geographical centers.<sup>2</sup>

The court's operations were severely criticized by Cadwallader D. Colden, Assistant Attorney General, who complained in January 1799 that the court of Queens County is at all times the least orderly of any court I ever was in. The entry of the court house is lined on court days with the stalls of dram sellers and filled with drunken people, so as to be almost impassable.<sup>3</sup>

The isolated location and unsatisfactory conditions led to demands by lawyers and politicians to relocate the court house. Their efforts became more persistent after 1833, when the county clerk and the surrogate, who had conducted business from their homes, obtained offices at Jamaica. Other nineteenth-century county officials were the county judge, district attorney, sheriff, coroners, treasurer, school commissioner, superintendent of poor, and Plank Road inspectors. Administration was centered in the judicial function, with supervision of schools and the poor more regulatory than administrative. Before the Civil War, public works were very limited and what there was of a network of roads was constructed and maintained primarily by the towns.

Until the mid-1800s the population of Queens increased very slowly. Little effort was made to induce settlement and since transportation was extremely poor, contact even with neighboring Brooklyn was difficult.<sup>4</sup> In 1855 the town of Hempstead remained the county's most populous area, with 10,477 residents out of a total of 46,266.

Industrial growth spilling out from New York City began to change this drastically. By 1865 the western towns of Flushing, Jamaica, and Newtown surpassed the three eastern towns by five thousand people, and continued growing rapidly.<sup>5</sup> During this period the eastern towns remained practically the same in size, although as North Hempstead commenced to sell its common lands some settlement occurred. In Hempstead, the disposal of common lands was once a campaign issue between the Whigs and Democrats; at the annual sheep-parting celebration of 1845 the Whigs displayed a large poster, "Opposed to Selling the Marshes and Plains."<sup>6</sup> Not until 1869 did Hempstead offer common lands for sale, when a great piece of the Plains (used until then as the town's common pasture) was sold to the merchant, Alexander T. Stewart, who developed Garden City on a portion of it.

The Democratic Party was usually in the majority during the decades before the Civil War, but many citizens of Queens showed interest in the national political movement that became the Republican Party. At a meeting at Queens County Court House on August 9, 1854, with John A. King as chairman and leader, two hundred people expressed their strong disapproval of Congress's repudiation of the Missouri Compromise. A Republican County Committee was formed with William T. McCoun of Oyster Bay, Warren Mitchell of North Hempstead, and John W. DeMott of Hempstead representing the three eastern towns, whose residents most readily adopted the new party.<sup>(N.7)</sup> In the election of 1860 the Republicans carried the towns of Hempstead and North Hempstead, though the county as a whole went Democratic.



Just as the remote location of the court house irritated the western leaders, so spokesmen of the eastern towns showed concern for the rising population and political power of the western towns. In 1859 an editorial in the *Queens County Sentinel* expressed Hempstead's attitude, suggesting that the people of Long Island consider forming a new county " ...by adding Huntington to the Towns of Hempstead, North Hempstead and Oyster Bay; leaving Flushing, Newton and Jamaica to fraternize together under the old title or perhaps join with Kings." After pointing out that Huntingtonians had to travel too far to the Suffolk County court house in Riverhead, it went on to charge that the "western towns are closely united in their sympathies with the office of New York and Brooklyn and a great portion of the crime which fills our jail...comes from this direction." The editorial concluded that such a division would also settle the question of the location of the court house.<sup>8</sup>

During the decade of the Civil War, the Republican Party became most strongly entrenched in the eastern towns. However, the increasing population of the westerly towns threw the balance in their favor; the farmers of eastern Queens lost political control of the county. Their strong sense of independence, nurtured since their ancestors obtained self-government from the Dutch, was aggravated by the encroaching dominance of the developing urban areas of New York. The years after the Civil War were marked by conflict, politically based but geographically oriented, between the three eastern towns and the western portion of the county.

No sooner had the echoes of the Civil War died down than discontent among residents of the western towns over location of the county court house flared into the open again. Their agitation resulted in a bill, introduced in the Legislature in February 1869, for a new court house on condition that \$200,000 could be raised to build it. The bill named a board of six appointed commissioners, one representing each town, with complete authority regarding location and construction of the buildings.

The eastern towns at once counterattacked on February 9, 1869, at a meeting at Searing's Hotel in Mineola. William T. McCoun of Oyster Bay, a past president of the Queens County Agricultural Society and a leading Republican, was appointed chairman and Samuel Jones of Oyster Bay and George H. Shepard of Huntington were chosen as secretaries. Excited discussion took place on the formation of a new county named Nassau to be comprised of Hempstead, North Hempstead, Oyster Bay, and Huntington. A proposal by George S. Downing that the Suffolk County towns of Islip and Smithtown be asked to join the plan provoked considerable discussion, with much uncertainty over the wisdom of including towns outside of Queens.<sup>9</sup> McCoun and James A. Searing of North Hempstead were appointed to draft a bill to create the new county.

Queens Assemblyman James B. Pearsall introduced the bill in the Legislature for creation of a new county from the three eastern towns of Queens and the three western towns of Suffolk—Smithtown, Islip, and Huntington. Supporters meeting in Mineola were cautioned by Gideon Frost of Glen Cove that inclusion of the Suffolk towns could result in

defeat of the measure. Committees were organized in each school district to obtain signatures on a petition to the Legislature. Through February and early March many meetings were held in the Suffolk towns. Proponents pointed out that the towns of western Suffolk would enjoy lower taxes and not have to travel to distant Riverhead, the seat of Suffolk County. Cold Spring Harbor, Huntington, and Northport held meetings that favored the project, while opponents seemed to prevail in Islip, Smithtown, and Babylon (the Town of Babylon was split off from Huntington in 1872).<sup>10</sup> Supporters from Hempstead pointed out that:

The County of Nassau will contain more than a sufficient population to entitle it to one Assemblyman. It is eminently proper that the Bill for the erection of the New County should be enacted at this session of the Legislature.<sup>11</sup>

A correspondent to the *New York Times*, contending that the "outside world" did not know what kind of area Long Island was, urged creation of a new county.<sup>12</sup>

At the assembly committee hearing, Mr. Hinsdale of Flushing attacked the proposed bill with vigor in a point by point refutation, climaxed by the charge that it violated the State constitution's provision against dividing assembly districts. On the other side, Benjamin D. Hicks and James Searing spoke in favor, contending that residents of the area affected desired the change. The bill also was strongly supported by Democrat Carman Cornelius, the Supervisor of Hempstead. In early April it was ordered to a third hearing without opposition, but this was a meaningless move by the assembly; the senate committee handling the bill dealt it the death blow by approving Hinsdale's argument that the proposal was unconstitutional.<sup>13</sup>

Thwarted in their efforts to create a new county, the eastern county leaders succeeded in defeating the measure for a new court house, which also died in committee. To counteract Democratic pressure for moving the county seat westward, North Hempstead Republicans introduced a controversial bill to make Mineola the county seat, appoint seven commissioners to erect a court house and jail, and name the present Board of County Supervisors as the commissioners.<sup>14</sup>

Since the board already had spent \$8,000 to renovate the old court house in the fall of 1871, many residents were disturbed over possible costs. The designation as board members of commissioners not seeking re-election led to the feeling that this was a means of retaining office on their part.<sup>15</sup> The Hempstead and Jamaica Democratic organizations strongly protested, and a nonpartisan petition of one thousand names from Oyster Bay was presented against the bill.

At the assembly hearings, Issac Cocks, Henry Eastman, and John H. Searing, all Republicans from North Hempstead, supported the bill. District Attorney Benjamin Downing spoke of the necessity for a new building. However, due to the vociferous opposition, a clause was inserted stating that the Board of Supervisors could designate another site within three months after the bill was passed.

The outgoing Board of Supervisors had selected a site in 1871 but had not acquired title to it. The new Board, unanimously Democratic, defeated a motion to fix the location at Hempstead by a vote of six to one. Several attempts to reconcile the interests of the different areas were made by the majority party, but it could not change prevailing attitudes. The eastern towns were bent on retaining the county seat, and even obtained an offer of several free sites from citizens of Hempstead. Finally, on August 2, the day before the deadline, the Board met in all-day session at Mineola. In the morning four ballots produced no change, with another four needed after lunch before Supervisor Remsen of North Hempstead broke ranks to vote with his three western colleagues for Long Island City.<sup>16</sup>

During construction of the new court house, a great deal of friction occurred between the Commissioners and the Board of Supervisors, which felt that its powers were being usurped. In 1874 the Supervisors vainly tried to have the act repealed, but the next year they succeeded in ousting the Commissioners. After the Supervisors took over, it was found that the Commissioners had spent \$18,000 above their original appropriation and that \$100,000 more would be needed to finish the work. The citizens of Hempstead, Oyster Bay, and North Hempstead thought of such large-scale spending as scandalous. Their Supervisors repeatedly refused to approve the extra money, but finally, at a meeting lasting until midnight on March 18, 1876, the Jamaica Supervisor switched from his economy stand and voted for the measure.<sup>17</sup> The Long Island City court house was opened on March 28, 1877, final proof of the power of the urban western towns over their rural eastern counterparts.

After winning the supervisorship of North Hempstead and an assembly seat in 1876, the Republicans resumed the campaign for local autonomy; Benjamin D. Hicks and members of a citizens' committee urged the erection of a new county. On January 22 Hicks informed a fellow-leader: "I say to you privately that I do not feel at all sanguine as to the success of Division. There are a few figures that stand in our way."<sup>18</sup> A bill was proposed providing for the erection of "Ocean" County from the three eastern towns of Queens. However, after a meeting on February 10 it was decided to include the towns of Huntington and Babylon, and Assemblyman Townsend D. Cock of Oyster Bay introduced the amended bill on February 23. The line of battle was drawn immediately, with the opposition organized in the western towns—both Newtown and Jamaica passed resolutions denouncing the act. Hempstead again led the fight for separation, renewing its resolution of 1875 with the support of the Supervisors of Huntington and Babylon.<sup>19</sup>

Opponents requested further consideration at the March 17 hearing of the Assembly Committee on Civil Divisions. Supporters urged approval, pointing out the disparity of interests in Queens, with the eastern towns based on agriculture, the western towns on manufacturing. The committee reported 4 to 3 against the bill; it was referred to the Committee of the Whole, where it died when the Legislature adjourned.

Proponents of a new county were undaunted. At the next session, in

February 1877, a similar bill was proposed by Assemblyman Elbert Floyd Jones. Supporters obtained a letter from the prominent Roslyn resident, William Cullen Bryant, who wrote to Jones that "The people in Roslyn and its neighborhood are strongly in favor of the project...I, for my part, am one of the numerous class who are in favor of the new county."<sup>20</sup> Losing no time, a special meeting of the Queens Board of Supervisors was held on February 13, 1877, attended only by those from western towns. The group resolved:

Whereas, no good or sufficient reason has been presented... why Queens County should be dismembered, but, on the Contrary every reason exist why no such action should be taken by the present legislature; now therefore

Resolved, that this Board do most emphatically protest against the Division of Queens County, and earnestly urge our members of the Assembly...to prevent the passage of said bill.<sup>21</sup>

At the next County Board meeting, the Supervisors of Hempstead, Oyster Bay, and North Hempstead entered a strong protest against the proceedings of some members of the Board of Supervisors purporting to be a meeting of said board...as being illegal and...that the same being held in a different place from the place named in the minutes of clerk of February 5."<sup>22</sup>

Supervisor Samuel Willets, the lone Republican on the Board, was fully supported by popular opinion in Hempstead. At a special meeting on February 14, former Assemblyman Stephen Taber offered a resolution, seconded by Benjamin Hicks, stating that "...the people of this town have on various occasions heretofore expressed their almost unanimous approval of the erection of said new county, both by petition and by resolution when in town meeting."<sup>23</sup>

Supporters in the town of Oyster Bay pointed out the financial injustice of the present county structure, by which eastern towns were over-assessed for personal property, paid more county taxes than western towns, and yet received fewer expenditures. It was emphasized, as in past efforts, that two-thirds of paupers and criminals were to be found in the western towns.<sup>24</sup>

At the first committee hearing on the bill, former Assemblyman Cock presented the resolution adopted at the last Hempstead town meeting, together with a petition from Huntington in favor of the proposed county. Support also came from George S. Downing, the Democratic Supervisor of Oyster Bay. Opponents from Suffolk, however, led by Elbert Carll, Supervisor of Babylon, contended they had insufficient notice and asked for a second hearing, which was held on 15 March. The opposition was fully aroused for this meeting, at which representatives from Suffolk County thoroughly berated the plan. John M. Crane of Jamaica also attacked the proposal, complaining that "It is a subject, Sir, that has irritated and agitated...our people for more than a quarter of a century."<sup>25</sup>

The bill was favorably reported out of committee, but met vigorous opposition on the floor. Assemblyman George E. Bulmer, of Jamaica,

addressing the chamber on 15 May, maintained that the division not only would cost too much for meals, lodging, and travel expense, but would destroy one of the finest Agricultural Societies in the state.<sup>26</sup>

Although Assemblyman Jones made a strenuous effort for passage, the bill was defeated on third reading, 56 to 42. The combination of opposition by the powerful Democratic forces of western Queens and the continued inclusion of Suffolk towns had spelled the doom of another attempt to create a new county. The eastern towns were thoroughly demoralized, having lost the county seat's location and failed to establish a new county.

While creation of a new county dominated the local political scene, far-reaching events were occurring in New York City. As early as 1848 it had been suggested that parts of Queens, Westchester, Kings, and Richmond should be combined with New York into one big city. Little was done until 1857, when the Metropolitan District was formed to provide unified police and limited health protection for the area. Although later repealed, this act was the first step toward consolidation. Soon the movement gained a leader in Andrew Haswell Green, who led thirty years of civic agitation for the establishment of Greater New York.

In 1890 the Legislature authorized a committee to investigate the problem. Under Green's chairmanship, it recommended consolidation but the Legislature refused to act until 1894, when it passed a law providing a referendum by the people affected. Except for Long Island City, which convincingly approved, Queens County cast a narrow 51 percent of its votes in favor of the merger. The eastern towns were not included and did not vote.<sup>27</sup>

Influenced by the approval of the people and the support of Republican "Boss" Thomas C. Platt, the legislature passed the law in March 1896 creating Greater New York. Queens County consisted of Long Island City, the old towns of Newtown, Jamaica, and Flushing, and that part of the town of Hempstead west of a straight line drawn from the southeasterly point of the towns of Flushing and Hempstead boundary through the middle of the channel between Rockaway Beach and Shelter Island (present-day Atlantic Beach) to the Atlantic Ocean. Most of the territory taken from Hempstead was quickly restored, except for the area extending west of the village of Far Rockaway. According to the current historian, David C. Hammack, the decision to include

so much of Queens County that both the Little Neck Bay and Jamaica Bay were in the greater city reflected the influence of the Chamber of Commerce and its desire for the control and development of the harbor.<sup>28</sup>

The three eastern towns of Queens were left out of Greater New York. These rural sections apparently had few assets to offer the city - they were thought of as a burden that would require excessive public spending. A Long Island historian, writing in 1903, reflected this feeling with the comment that "Chapters might be written of the cowpaths that were paved by granite blocks, of the turnip and potato patches that were lighted by

electric lamps...’’<sup>29</sup> Seth Low and other City Club members petitioned the Legislature, protested that the consolidation bill would force annexation of territory “that has...been deprived for a long time of local improvements.”<sup>30</sup>

On January 1, 1898, the western towns of Queens became a borough of New York City. The three eastern towns were left in a strangely anomalous position, still part of Queens County but not within the reorganized city. Immediately, the citizens of these towns united to find a remedy for this intolerable situation. On January 22 a county-wide meeting was held at Allen’s Hotel in Mineola, with Benjamin D. Hicks of North Hempstead elected chairman once again. In recognition of his long years of leadership in striving for an independent county for the three towns of Hempstead, Oyster Bay and North Hempstead, Hicks well deserves to be called the “Father of Nassau County.” A popular and successful Quaker banker, he was an intelligent and active participant in all types of community improvements. As secretary, the meeting chose Archer B. Wallace, son of another leading adherent of independence, Assemblyman George Wallace, and proceeded to discuss the situation. J.B. Coles Tappen of Oyster Bay moved ...that it is the sense of this meeting that the towns of Hempstead, North Hempstead and Oyster Bay withdraw from the county of Queens, and that a new county to include the said towns be formed.’’<sup>31</sup>

A few dissidents offered alternative actions. W.W. Cock of North Hempstead favored annexation to Suffolk County, while John H. Carll wanted to join New York City. The old question of inclusion of Huntington and Babylon was brought up by Fred Herzog, Sr., of Oyster Bay, but Tappen and Pearsall declared that it would be impossible to get such a measure through the Legislature. D.N. Munger closed the subject appropriately by stating that they should consider not what should be taken in, but what “barnacles” should be taken off. James Ludlum, of Oyster Bay, then offered a motion which was unanimously adopted:

Whereas, it is for the best interests of the citizens of the town of Hempstead, North Hempstead and Oyster Bay to withdraw from the county of Queens. Resolved that...Supervisors Underhill, Smith and Denton be requested to obtain authority...to expend a sum, not exceeding \$250 for each town in defraying any expenses...in drafting and preparation of such bills as may be necessary to carry into effect the desire of the people to have a county free from entangling alliance with the great city of New York.<sup>32</sup>

To pursue the action, a committee was appointed composed of Lott Vanderwater and William G. Miller of Hempstead, Joseph H. Bogert and Wilbur Lewis of North Hempstead, and P. Halstead Scudder (the chairman), James Pearsall, and James H. Ludlum of Oyster Bay. The meeting closed with proposals of names for the county: Matinecock by Edward N. Townsend of Hempstead, Norfolk by J.B. Coles Tappen of Oyster Bay, Nassau by Archer B. Wallace of Hempstead, and Bryant by William G. Miller of Hempstead.<sup>33</sup>

The committee met in Jamaica, at Pettit's Hotel, on February 5 to adopt the draft of a bill. After spirited discussion, the name Nassau was adopted and the bill given to Assemblyman George Wallace. The Queens Democratic leadership, unwilling to reconcile itself to the loss of control over so large an area, moved to oppose the measure. Headlines in the *Long Island Farmer*, a newspaper representing Democratic thought in Jamaica, protested "NEW COUNTY NONSENSE" and "SOME MORE FOOL BILLS." The story under the headlines claimed that a number of prominent eastern men had asked that their towns be taken into Greater New York, and that Queens District Attorney William J. Youngs, an Oyster Bay Republican, had expressed himself as opposed to creation of a new county.<sup>34</sup> Assemblyman Wallace submitted the bill to the Statutory Revision Committee to rule on its constitutionality and then introduced it in the assembly on February 17. It was referred to the Internal Affairs Committee, which held a hearing on March 4 at which only supporters appeared. Although Assemblyman Cyrus B. Gale of Jamaica fought the bill bitterly when it was reported to the floor on March 30, during the last week of the session, it passed both houses and was sent to Governor Frank S. Black.

On 26 April, the Supervisors of Queens appeared before the governor to oppose his signing the measure, at a meeting also attended by a delegation representing the eastern towns. Townsend Scudder, counsel to the Board of Supervisors, urged defeat of the bill because it would be too expensive. Not only would Nassau County have no public property, he argued, but the timing was wrong because of the ongoing war with Spain. He used up all the allotted time despite an agreement to share it with Benjamin Hicks, who briefly assured the Governor that this was a wise proposal, desired by the taxpayers of the territory included within the new county.<sup>35</sup>

Governor Black did not have to be persuaded. He signed the bill that authorized Nassau County to be erected as of January 1, 1899. Since its organization came under previous county laws, the bill specified only the three elective offices of Supervisors, and provided that all of the new county's records would be retained by Queens, except those of the County Engineer concerning the Nassau area.

When Nassau voters went to the polls in the spring of 1898, Republicans Smith Cox and Augustus Denton were elected Supervisors of Hempstead and North Hempstead respectively, while Oyster Bay elected William H. Jones, a Democrat. These men comprised the first Board of Supervisors, with the remaining county officers chosen at the general election in November. On October 4, both parties held nominating conventions at Mineola. The Democrats harmoniously chose candidates for the two most important offices, Robert Seabury for County Judge and James P. Niemann for District Attorney. In contrast, the Republican convention, held in Fireman's Hall at Mineola, was the scene of a fierce intraparty battle. Ex-Senator John Lewis Childs, chairman of the County Committee, controlled the convention. His slate of nominees was vigorously

opposed by William J. Youngs, who was a Republican State Committeeman as well as the District Attorney of Queens. Childs' candidate for County Judge, George Wallace, defeated Youngs' on the first formal ballot, 39 to 33. Edward Cromwell, Childs' choice for District Attorney, also won. Although badly defeated, Youngs moved to make the nominations unanimous and noted to the delegates that he had urged the Governor to approve the new county.<sup>36</sup>

Theodore Roosevelt, foremost resident of Nassau County, had taken no direct part in this battle, but after his election as governor of New York State he appointed Youngs to be his confidential secretary. This undoubtedly indicated which faction he supported, but it helped to unite the Nassau Republicans by removing one of the sources of friction. Yet this intraparty strife was the beginning of trouble for the Republicans. Queens County Clerk John Sutphin would not accept the Republican slate until court proceedings were undertaken, and Justice Wilmot Smith decided favorably on Nassau's constitutionality.

The election was tightly fought, with the Republicans harassed by the split within their party as well as by a scandal that erupted over the administration of the justice of peace courts.<sup>37</sup> In spite of these handicaps, the G.O.P. carried four of the six county offices. They lost the most critical two, however. Democratic victories were scored by James P. Niemann, who captured the office of District Attorney by only seventeen votes, 4,749 to 4,732, and Robert Seabury, who won as County Judge by almost as small a margin, 4,818 to 4,702. Republican winners were Thomas Patterson as County Clerk, Henry N.W. Eastman as County Treasurer, William Wood as Sheriff, and George D. Smith as Superintendent of the Poor.

In this election the voters also decided where the county buildings would be, with the choice restricted to a location no more than one mile from the Long Island Railroad station in Hempstead, Hicksville, or Mineola. With the support of the voters of Oyster Bay and North Hempstead, Mineola was chosen over Hempstead, 5,280 to 3,396.<sup>38</sup>

Nassau County came into existence on New Year's Day, 1899. It encompassed 274 square miles and some 55,448 residents.<sup>39</sup> At the first Board of Supervisors meeting, the truck house of the Mineola Hook and Ladder Company was chosen as the temporary home of the County Court. The Board also adopted the county's seal and coat of arms - a crest with the golden rampant lion of the House of Nassau on an azure blue field, encircled by seven gold bars. County colors of orange and blue were chosen and used in the flag.

The Garden City Company, which owned the extensive areas acquired by A. T. Stewart, offered the county a large site for county buildings. Although this site was in Garden City, at the northern rim of the town of Hempstead, it was adjacent to Mineola railroad station and therefore was accepted.<sup>40</sup> With this auspicious gift, the new County of Nassau began to cope with the problems of separation from Queens and development of services for its rural townships.

The culmination of over forty years of action by civic and political



leaders, Nassau County's creation was not consummated until the incorporation of the neighboring metropolis, New York City, required resolution of the eastern towns' future status. The growing differences during those years between the eastern towns composed of small rural villages, and the urbanizing western towns adjacent to the burgeoning cities of Brooklyn and New York, kept the issue of separation alive. It was an event that could not be denied, in spite of the western towns' numerical superiority and consequent political control.

The issue was not only geographical and demographical; it also was related to the evolution of the Republican Party in the eastern towns of Queens. This was the catalytic agent of victory in the struggle to create Nassau County, fostering the issue as a means of striking back at Democratic control of Queens. In addition, the critical deciding factor stemmed from the formation of New York City, and the determination made by the urban political leadership that there was no useful reason to include this rural hinterland within the Great City.

During the years of strife, the consistent negativism expressed by the eastern towns toward the western towns and New York City established a bias against the urban areas that continued to permeate Nassau's politics and government in the twentieth century. The separation of the rural towns of Hempstead, North Hempstead, and Oyster Bay from the growing metropolis provided the physical and governmental basis for Nassau County's expansion into one of the nation's leading suburban communities, with a developmental pattern quite different from the adjacent sections of New York City.

#### NOTES

All original documents cited are in the collections of the Long Island Studies Institute, Hofstra University, Hempstead, N.Y.

For further study, see David C. Hammack, *Power in Society; Greater New York At the Turn of the Century* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1982), pp. 185-229; Edward J. Smits, *Nassau Suburbia, U.S.A.: the First Seventy-Five Years of Nassau County, New York, 1899 to 1974* (Syosset: Friends of the Nassau Museum, 1974); Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp 138-156; and Paul E. Kerson, "Union of Queens with New York City: What was Gained and What Was Lost," Long Island Collection, Queens Borough Public Library, Jamaica, NY (1988).

1. Benjamin Hicks, ed., *Records of the Towns of North and South Hempstead* (Jamaica, 1904), VIII: 204.
2. Horatio G. Spafford, *Gazetteer of State of New York* (Albany, 1813), p. 255.
3. W.W.Munsell, *History of Queens County* (New York, 1882), p. 52.
4. Peter Ross, *A History of Long Island*, 3 vols. (New York, 1903) I: 522.
5. *Census For State of New York* (Albany, 1857, 1867), pp. 18, 20.
6. Daniel M. Tredwell, *Personal Reminiscences of Men and Things on Long Island, Part One* (Brooklyn, 1912), p. 89. Sheep-parting day was a major social event on the Hempstead

Plains from colonial times to the mid-1800s. The sheep were pastured in common until October, when they were coralled by the keepers for each farmer to collect his own and drive them home to house them for the winter.

7. *Long Island (Jamaica) Democrat*, 17 August 1854.
8. *Queens County (Hempstead) Sentinel*, 3 November 1859.
9. *Long Island Democrat*, 9 February 1869.
10. *Ibid.*, 25 February 1869.
11. *Ibid.*, 18 February 1869.
12. *New York Times*, 14 April 1869.
13. *Long Island Democrat*, 19 April 1869.
14. *Laws of New York State (Albany, 1872) II*, Chapter 804.
15. *Long Island Democrat*, February and March, 1872, *passim*.
16. *Proceedings of Board of Supervisors of County of Queens (Jamaica, 1876)*, p. 269.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
18. Benjamin D. Hicks letter to Henry Onderdonk, 22 January 1876.
19. *South Side (Rockville Centre) Observer*, 10 March 1876.
20. *New York Times*, 16 March 1877.
21. *Queens Proceedings (1877)*, p. 186.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 188. 23. *Hempstead Records*, VIII, p. 56.
24. *South Side Observer*, 9 March 1877.
25. George L. Weeks, Jr., "The Birth of Nassau County," *Long Island Forum* 3 (November 1940) :229.
26. George E. Bulmer, Address in Assembly "Against the Creation of the New County of Nassau," 15 May 1877, p. 2. The Agricultural Society of Queens County, established in 1841, had built a permanent fairgrounds at Mineola in 1866. Its fair was a major public event each fall.
27. Herbert Richard, "A Short History of Queens," *Long Island Daily Press (Jamaica)* 2 January 1949, p. 40.
28. David C. Hammack, *Power in Society; Greater New York At the Turn of the Century* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1982), p. 196. Immediately after creation of Nassau, a bill sponsored by local leaders was passed by the Legislature, transferring to Nassau most of the southeastern portion of the Town of Hempstead that Queens had kept in the 1898 merger, except for the Rockaways west of the village of Far Rockaway. There was no change in the border with Suffolk.
29. Ross, *Long Island* I:527.

30. Allan Nevins and John A. Krout, eds., *The Greater City, New York, 1898-1948* (New York, 1948), p. 58.
31. Minutes of citizens' meeting taken by Archer B. Wallace, 22 January 1898.
32. Ibid.
33. The term "Nassau" originated in 1693 when a colonial law changed the name of Long Island to Island of Nassau in honor of William III of the House of Orange and Nassau. Although a general law repealed this in 1828, the name remained in use during the 1800s in various ways, such as the Presbytery of Nassau.
34. *Long Island (Jamaica) Farmer*, 11 February 1898.
35. *South Side Observer*, 28 April 1898.
36. Weeks, Jr., *Long Island Forum* 3 (December 1940) :255.
37. Elvin Edwards, "Letters to Editor," *Long Island Forum* 4 (January 1941) :2.
38. Election records, Nassau County Board of Elections, Mineola.
39. The wards comprising Queens County had a population of 152, 999.
40. Although the site of the court house and later county buildings is physically and legally within the boundaries of the incorporated Village of Garden City, the county government has retained its official address as Mineola.

## REVIEWS

THE MUSEUMS AT STONY BROOK. *Nineteenth-Century American Carriages: Their Manufacture, Decorations, and Use*. Stony Brook: The Museums at Stony Brook, 1988. Illustrations, notes, appendices. 174 pp. \$27.00 (paper). Available at Museum Store, or from Museums at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11790 (N.Y. State residents please add \$2.50 for postage and handling, and 7 1/2% sales tax).

During the 1820s, the ownership of a private carriage in Manhattan was considered such a mark of luxury and aristocratic pretension that the gout-suffering actor, Tom Hilson, placed an emblem of crossed crutches on his coach with the motto "This or These." The five essays in this volume confirm that Hilson was right in being so self-mocking. Ownership of private carriages was the province of the wealthy. Yet this book also uncovers the worlds of work, design, and technology that produced carriages, and thus goes some way to correct an interesting bias in transportation history. As Doris Halowitch observes, most histories of transportation focus on the development of canals and railroads, projects that required innovative legal forms as well as new arrangements of capital and management. Indeed canals and railroads have been so central to the narrative of industrialization and urbanization that "ages" have been named after them. The making of roads and the expansion of the carriage industry are, perhaps, less glamorous and dramatic developments, yet, as this volume adequately shows, they are no less significant in the wider history of what were once called "internal improvements."

The opening essay, "From Carriage Shop to Carriage Factory," focuses appropriately on production. Joanne Abel Goldman shows that in the early nineteenth century carriages of all kinds were manufactured in small shops, by craftsmen. By the 1870s, however, the national industry had been transformed through the introduction of machine tooling and specialty factories. Yet Goldman, examining the "fine texture" of industrial change at three very different companies, finds that this is more than a simple story of craft declension. For complicated goods, such as carriages, "price" has always had to compete with "service" for customers' attention, and many new skills—decorating, customization, and repair—were spun off from the sundry division of labor. Though the shop system of production suffered a decline, there was still room for small companies that assembled, finished, and sold carriages made from component parts.

Merri McIntyre Ferrell's "A Harmony of Parts: The Aesthetics of

Carriages in Nineteenth-Century America” shows just how complicated an object a private carriage could be, requiring workers skilled in textiles, paint, wood, and metal. After seeing such work, one is left in little doubt that these private vehicles were stages in a performative sense—that they were meant to display the gentility, elegance, and wealth of their occupants. The essay is framed, however, with claims that American carriages were designed for “use,” and “that vehicular design should respond to the requirements established by a diverse, independently-minded, and increasingly mobile population.” Here “use,” like beauty, is very much in the eye of the beholder.

The dominant ideology of design, after Philadelphia’s Centennial Exhibit in 1876, was that beautiful objects would lead to an elevation in national taste. Walt Whitman felt a strange chill, however, when he saw that “oceanic tide of gentility” roll around The Central Park Drive. Ferrell adopts the arguments of the contemporary trade press when she states that “The most exclusive vehicles, manifestations of elite taste and purchasing power, became democratic on the streets...” Not so for those “democratic” members of the crowd who chose to throw stones at private carriages during the Astor Place and Draft Riots.

In “A Ride into History,” Doris Halowitch canters through selected New York counties between 1800 and 1920, showing the differences between rural and urban patterns of private carriage ownership, as well as offering glimpses of demographic and transportation change. The ride is primarily statistical. She uses abstracts for State tax assessments in 1799 and 1800 to show the patterns and forms of vehicle ownership during the opening years in the mania for internal improvement. The “emergency” congressional tax on income and certain personal property provides a window on mid-century. In the final years, 1870 to 1920, the attention shifts, rather abruptly, to public transportation, the introduction of electromotive power, and the eventual demise of the carriage trade with the advent of the automobile. The selection of counties is appropriate: New York for her metropolitan case, Richmond and Westchester for suburban districts, Albany as a “developing economic crossroad,” while Clinton and Ontario serve as rural examples.

Analysis of the data yields clear and unsurprising results. First, it seems that throughout the nineteenth century only the wealthy could afford private carriages for noncommercial use. Second, more carriages were owned “per capita” in non-urban areas than in the central cities, if for no other reason than the high cost of stabling and maintenance. Third, few women owned carriages despite their legal right to do so after the passing of the Married Woman’s Property Acts. Overall, the essay proves that carriage ownership does indeed provide a telling index to the personal wealth of New York’s commercial, financial, and later manufacturing elite. Private carriages always remained a “luxury” and a mark of social exclusivity. During the Civil War, less than one-quarter of one percent of Manhattan’s population owned such vehicles. Though the numbers remained small, the kinds of carriages changed, becoming more elaborate

and showy, with coats of arms displayed more than crutches. The wealthy appeared to be sloughing off their earlier worries about the display of riches in a republic, and standing—or riding—tall. Private luxury gave way to class embellishment.

Though the findings are clear, the ride is often bumpy. A surfeit of enumerations slows the reading. Counts of doctors, street lamps, clergymen, and newspapers are one way to characterize social change and status in the localities covered, though probably not the most efficient. In addition, it would have been useful to warn the reader about the partial nature of tax assessments. The Civil War levies especially were circumvented, and later declared illegal. Even that model of republican virtue, Peter Cooper, chose to hide two of his pleasure vehicles from the eyes of the State, if one can trust his own inventory. The essay would have been stronger if more attention had been given to the different uses to which private vehicles were put, and to the changing notions of pleasure that informed such uses. Reliance on statistical data reveals little about the innovative “pleasure” uses of commercial vehicles (such as butchers and cartmen racing down Manhattan’s Third Avenue after considerable cash prizes), or the reasons why Manhattan’s wealthy took to their carriages when once they had promenaded on foot.

M. Hunt Hessler’s “Spirit of Progress” does, however, deal with all forms of horse-drawn transportation, commercial or otherwise, within the compass of 19th-century Long Island. This is good regional history from the ground up. The essay covers, among other matters, the history of road building, from trackway to turnpike, and the interesting relation between railroad and coach transportation, including the clustering of liverys and carriage manufactories around train stations. The author also considers ownership patterns, citing similar sources to Halowitch’s (with the useful addition of probate records) and finding similar results. His last section focuses on carriage building in Suffolk County, where smaller producers sustained their trade by offering customized products and personal service.

Hessler sensitively makes this essay part of the larger study of Long Island’s incorporation into a regional economy. Many aspects of general economic and social change are glimpsed in the narrative of the Island’s horse transportation; the replacement of barter, then cash, by credit; the increasing social stratification; and the coming of mass-produced components. Long Island appeared never to lag behind, and was certainly not immune from, the spread of market relations and the geographical or social division of labor.

The final essay, “Before the Cart,” again by Merri McIntyre Ferrell, explores “the relationship between horses and carriages.” Much ground is covered, though a more accurate subtitle would have been “the relationship between horses and humans.” There is material on the way horses have been viewed as draft animals over time, on selective breeding, and on treatment. It would have been interesting to include more about the various preventive and reform societies, such as the ASPCA, which appeared after the Civil War to police the care of horses.

As with other publications from the Museums at Stony Brook, these essays are handsomely produced with many illustrations. *19th Century American Carriages* serves as a companion volume to *The Carriage Collection*, a book that provides the history of the Museums collection including full descriptions of eighty vehicles and a listing of major works on carriage history. Carriage enthusiasts might well buy both —the Museums offer them as a set for the price of \$40; for those concerned only with the volume under review, it is unfortunate that the bibliography of standard works is not reprinted here.

PETER G. BUCKLEY

*Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, The Cooper Union*

GAYNELL STONE AND DONNA OTTUSCH-KIANKA, eds. *The Historical Archaeology of Long Island, Volume VII, Part I—The Sites*. Stony Brook: Suffolk County Archaeological Association, 1985. Pp. ix, 352. Illustrations, maps, bibliography. \$34.00 (paper). Available at Weathervane Shop, Suffolk County Historical Society, Riverhead; Museum Gift Shop, Old Bethpage Village Restoration; or (postpaid) from SCAA, Drawer A-R, Stony Brook, NY 11790.

Those familiar with the previous volume in this series, *Readings in Long Island Archaeology and Ethnohistory*, will be pleased to welcome a volume that deals exclusively with historical archaeology on Long Island. Although the new work can be read independently of the earlier collection, in tandem they provide a unique resource for Long Island studies.

This is not a book conceived as, and directed to, the explication of a theme, but rather is a collection of articles loosely grouped around a general concept involving the conjunction of history and archaeology. The topics covered reflect the diversity and wide-ranging nature of historical archaeology. The volume is intended only as an initial effort to penetrate an as yet untapped area, and in that respect it is unique. As in any collection, quality, methodology, and focus vary.

The diversity of the articles is striking, including studies from municipal agencies, museums, private funding, university field schools, restoration projects, and contract agencies. As the preface notes, rapid growth in the volume of historical archaeology on Long Island is predominantly due to legislation requiring evaluation of the impact of development upon cultural resources. This has led to an increased awareness of the importance of archaeological remains.

A bibliographic listing of Long Island sites includes historical and recorded archaeological sites, investigations, and artifacts in museums; although incomplete, it stands as the most comprehensive and up-to-date listing available.

Salwen points out in the "Commentary" that individual archaeological sites can not often reveal very much about broader patterns. It is the accumulation of comparative information, or the building up of a data base that allows theory to be formulated. This collection reflects the progress

in this direction. Although there appears to be a noticeable lack of theory in many articles, the amount of archaeological fieldwork represented is impressive, and will increasingly contribute to assessment of patterns of behavior and how and why they change over time.

Theory does play a central role in DeBoer and Mahler's analysis of the excavation of the Joseph Lloyd Manor House. They focus on transformational processes, or how the archaeological record is formed and how it is subsequently altered by natural and cultural agencies. Using standard categories of artifact classification and provenience, the authors examine anew the problems of ambiguous and misleading archaeological data, a charge that often is made against the written record as well.

An important point made by the Ceci article is the importance of depositional analysis in historical archaeology. The need to distinguish and interpret the processes that affect artifacts and features, after original deposition, become increasingly important as more sites fall victim to modern development before they can be studied.

Baughner raises an on-going concern, reformulated and updated, about the relationship of history and archaeology. Unfortunately, the criticism of archaeology as merely an adjunct to history is still evident in the discipline. She comments that a perfunctory search of the standard documentary sources such as maps, records, and deeds is often not enough to accurately interpret a site. Many studies in this volume support the fact that the interdisciplinary connection of history and archaeology has yet to be exploited to its fullest potential.

One of the most interesting examples of a synthesis of historical and archaeological work is Rippel-Erikson's study of faunal remains at the Brewster-Mount site. Integrating archaeological, zoological and historical documentation, she explores the natural and cultural links of humans and animals as they relate to subsistence patterns. The holistic approach leads to an in-depth understanding of the interconnection between man and animal in the economic, social, and cultural spheres.

In Johannemann and Schroeder's "Archaeological Survey at Blydenburgh County Park"—part of an archaeological site inventory of twenty-six county parks—in-depth archival research played an important role in recording sites and extant structures.

An aspect of critical importance, but lacking in much of the current research, is a strategy that includes formulation and testing of hypotheses, as well as specification of a methodology for obtaining needed data. A notable exception is Ceci's "Historical Archaeology at the 1661 John Bowne House," describing hypotheses as tests for identification of significant cultural resources, as well as methods of gathering data to test these hypotheses in the field and lab.

Use of modern artifact classification systems is evident in many articles. Fine's conclusion that the Connetquot grist mill was constructed in the 1820s, some seventy years after it was thought to have been built, was based on a combination of documentary and archaeological evidence, including an analysis of glass thickness and South's (1974) classification of



ceramics.

Schakel's study of the Nicoll site successfully employs Miller's (1980) ceramic price index to measure the status and wealth of an historic household. The advantages of combining archival research with rigorous subsurface testing as part of the research methodology, is evident in the Lightfoot, Grzybowski, Turano study of the impact of plowed fields on the information-gathering process about historical activities. The findings have important implications for other studies. Human and agricultural practices, while destructive of archaeological remains, still reveal a broad spatial patterning of historical artifacts and hence can reflect past activities.

Research-oriented excavation has both the potential to contribute to architectural and cultural interpretations as well as fully to employ the discipline of history. The beginnings of a transition from simple description to explanation of cultural change is evident. This volume does an outstanding job of accumulating, condensing, and presenting current research in historical archaeology in a comprehensive, manageable format.

LINDA E. BARBER

*Institute for Long Island Regional Archaeology*

**RICHARD F. WELCH. *Memento Mori: The Gravestones of Early Long Island, 1680-1810*.** Syosset: Friends for Long Island's Heritage, 1983. Illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index. Pp. ix, 94. \$10.00 (paper).

Gravestones are important to the historian both as artifacts and written records of past societies. They are helpful in studying family history and demographic patterns as well as cultural and artistic trends. In his informative study of gravestones, Richard F. Welch focuses on the latter and in so doing presents a well-researched guide to Long Island's early gravestones and gravestone carvers. His approach is straightforward and chronological and, when possible, nicely interlaced with biographical observations about the carvers and the people their monuments commemorated.

In colonial times Long Island gravestones reflected the religious and artistic concerns of the Puritan New Englanders, whose preoccupation with mortality and salvation was translated into two recurring funerary motifs, the winged death's head and the winged soul effigy. From the seventeenth century onward New England supplied most of Long Island's grave markers. Indeed the first resident stonemason, a Connecticut man named Ithuel Hill, did not set up shop in Sag Harbor until 1789. Yet given the very strong cultural and economic links Long Island settlers had with New England, Welch notes that the pre-Revolutionary period also saw an influx of gravestones from the New York City-New Jersey area. The post-Revolutionary period saw the influence of this second center of Long Island gravestone design diminish to insignificance. For roughly half a century, from the 1770s to ca. 1820, Connecticut and local Suffolk County carvers held sway over the Long Island market.

Until 1800 the winged soul effigy, rendered in a variety of styles rang-

ing from the primitive to the ornate, predominated as the most common funerary motif. Thereafter religious symbolism based on traditional Puritan themes lost ground to plain memorial markers and neo-classical designs such as the urn and willow. The new fashions came from Europe and, not surprisingly, first gained a foothold here in cosmopolitan centers like New York. But as the old Puritan ethos waned among the residents of Long Island, which invariably it did as a result of many secularizing trends, so funerary art—even in eastern Suffolk—ultimately embraced the new aesthetic.

Although modest in length, Welch's book is to be commended for its thorough treatment of the subject, including historical antecedents, symbolism, materials, and religious and stylistic developments. The author makes good use of photographs for illustrative purposes, and his appendices identify and enumerate known gravestone carvers and early Long Island burial grounds. Anyone seriously interested in the Island's distant past is certain to find *Memento Mori* a useful reference.

SUSAN BATTLEY  
SUNY at Stony Brook

**BOOK NOTES:** *books mentioned in book notes may be reviewed in subsequent issues.*

RUFUS B. LANGHANS and LEN STARK, eds. *Place-Names in the Town of Huntington: Their Location, Origin, and Meaning*. Huntington: Town of Huntington, 1988. Explanations of more than three hundred historic place-names (many no longer in use, most real estate developments omitted) that have occurred in Huntington from its founding date of 1653, from Abbot's Mountain to Yorkers Line. Maps, bibliography. 31 pp. \$4.00 (paper, 8 1/2" x 11"), at local bookstores or from the Huntington Town Historian, 228 Main St., Huntington, NY 11743 (add 25¢ for postage).

RONALD G. PISANO. *Long Island Landscape Painting 1820 - 1920*. New York: Little Brown, 1988—"A New York Graphic Society book." Well-selected collection of paintings, with an informative introduction. Illustrations (chiefly in color), bibliography, index. Pp. iii, 167. \$24.95 (paper [first pub. 1985, \$45.00, cloth]). To be reviewed, Fall 1989.

GRANIA BOLTON MARCUS. *A Forgotten People: Discovering the Black Experience in Suffolk County*. Setauket: Society for the Preservation of Long Island Antiquities, 1988. A documentary work book on the nature and effects of slavery, intended to bring to life those early Long Islanders who lived, worked, and struggled here, and about whom we know so little. Illustrations, glossary, bibliography. Pp. vi, 152, \$10.00 (paper, 8 1/2' x 11''), plus \$1.00 postage and handling, from the Society for the Preservation of L.I. Antiquities, 93 North Country Road, Setauket, NY 11733. To be reviewed, Fall 1989.

SALVATORE J. LAGUMINA. *From Steerage to Suburb: Long Island Italians*. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies, 1988. An effective analysis of suburbia from the neglected dimension of ethnicity, especially Italian Americans. Illustrations, index. Pp. 285. \$17.50 (cloth), \$12.95 (paper). To be reviewed, Fall 1989.

## COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

My congratulations on a classy job: very attractive production and impressive contents... Let me make a few suggestions. On the endnotes/footnotes issue, I vote for footnotes, especially when tough-minded editors keep them short. I also like to see a footer on the first page of every article that identifies the journal, issue, and pages - a modest convenience for which I am always grateful. Finally, the inclusion of poetry raised some questions in my mind about the journal's long-run identity as an "historical" journal (especially since the two poems in question were reprinted from other contemporary journals). Not that it's a bad idea, necessarily - it just changes the overall picture of your intentions. If non-historical writing will be a regular part of the journal, would it perhaps be worth saying so explicitly?... All the best for the future.

Edwin G. Burrows

Professor of History, Brooklyn College

*Response: - We run endnotes for technical reasons related to our printing equipment. Footers make sense, we will print them. Poems can be historically relevant (previous publication is our one exception to the rule that submissions be original); we invite readers' comments on this.*

To the Editor:

Congratulations on your first issue... Since the Journal is still in the process of growing, may I make several suggestions that may add to your success. Although your Advisory Board seems to contain some high school history teachers, this is not the case for your Editorial Board. Having one or two teachers on your Board may give you greater depth and breadth in your choice of articles... (and) enhance your readership in high schools... As your readership increases, you may wish to consider a Conference with Stony Brook University acting as host... It could take the form of an historical survey of transportation, farming, land settlements, etc... Good luck to you and your staff.

Stan Rubenstein  
Cutchogue, NY

*Response: - The LIHJ is open to high school teachers in every phase of its work; all who want to participate are urged to make their interest known (Dr. Geoffrey L. Rossano, a leading Long Island historian and valued member of our Editorial Board, is a secondary school teacher). We hope more and more high schools become subscribers. We agree on the usefulness of Conferences and request that readers who want to help in the arduous task of organization will promptly volunteer.*

Dear Dr. Wunderlich:

I extend my congratulations on a distinguished and informative initial issue of the *Long Island Historical Journal*... I wish you well in this promising venture.

Wendell Tripp  
Editor, *New York History*

The editors thanks Mr. Roy Douglas, Coordinator of the Long Island Republic Airport Historical Society, for pointing out discrepancies between Geoffrey Rossano's article, "Long Island As America: The Twentieth Century," which appeared in Volume 1, pp. 9-15, and Edward J. Smits' chapter, "Aviation on the Hempstead Plains," in his *Nassau Suburbia, U.S.A.* (Garden City, 1974). We submit that Republic Aviation Corporation manufactured 9,087 aircraft at Farmingdale during World War II with a labor force that peaked at 24,450 in 1944 (Fairchild-Republic Corporation, "Notes on the History of Fairchild-Republic", 1977, p.56). Mr. Douglas correctly notes that Jimmy Doolittle's pioneering instrument-only flight in September 1929 occurred at Mitchel Field, not Roosevelt Field. We thank Mr. Douglas and his fellow Research Committee members Jim Boss, Gary Hammond, and Lynn McDonald for their interest in the LIHJ's "success in illuminating Long Island's complex history" and for the information "that most of the other 6,000 P-47's [in addition to those made on Long Island] were built by Republic at its Evansville, Indiana, plant. A few P-47s were also constructed by the Curtiss company, in Buffalo, NY." *Mitchel Field is spelled with one 'l,' not two, a proof-reading error of the kind we will guard against in the future. We call the attention of Mr. Douglas and other concerned readers to the articles on aviation by Joshua Stoff and John C. Bierwirth in the present issue of LIHJ.*

To the Editor

...I am confident that this publication will express the interesting historical past, present and future of Long Island to our residents and friends...I know that the *Long Island Historical Journal* will fulfill that desire to properly represent Long Island in the pages of American history. I wish you great success on your endeavor.

Thomas S. Gulotta  
Nassau County Executive

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## **READERS' REMARKS**

*We welcome your comments and suggestions. Please let us know if 1) you have ideas for articles 2) you want to be a book-reviewer - if so, state your main fields of knowledge 3) you would like to help in whatever phase of our work you select.*





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