

Stony Brook University



OFFICIAL COPY

The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University.

© All Rights Reserved by Author.

Politics in Black and Brown: The Prospects for Political Alliances between African
Americans and Hispanic Americans

A Dissertation Presented

by

Tony Eugene Carey Jr.

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

Stony Brook University

December 2010

Copyright by
Tony Eugene Carey Jr.
December 2010

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

Tony Eugene Carey Jr.

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the
Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend
acceptance of this dissertation.

Leonie Huddy- Dissertation Advisor
Professor, Department of Political Science

Matthew J. Lebo- Chairperson of Defense
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

Stanley Feldman
Professor, Department of Political Science

Vincent Hutchings- Outside Member
Professor, Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School.

Lawrence Martin
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

Politics in Black and Brown:

by

Tony Eugene Carey Jr.

Doctor of Philosophy

Political Science

Stony Brook University

2010

The similar economic circumstances of blacks and Latinos have led some researchers to argue they should engage in political alliances. Nevertheless, while their economic hardships should serve as a basis for cooperation, they may also lead to conflict, especially within contexts where both groups must compete for scarce material resources. To date, research indicates the influence of economic self-interests on political behavior is circumscribed. Furthermore, recent work shows intergroup attitudes are shaped by economic disparities between blacks and Latinos within their communities; however, the work on this subject has been limited. Using the 1993-4 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), I explore whether economic self-interests and realistic group conflict within neighborhoods heighten blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition and their willingness to exclude each other from the benefits of race-based public policies. Researchers also suggest political elites facilitate political cooperation. By appealing to shared interests, political elites are believed to encourage blacks and Latinos to work together toward common goals. To explore the influence of elite messages, I conduct two experiments that vary the race of hypothetical minority candidates and their political messages. The first experiment uses a 2 (Race: black and Latino) X 3 (Message: Neutral, Ingroup-Specific, Cross-group) factorial design that presents participants with a matchup between a majority (i.e., Anglo) and a minority (i.e., African American or Latino) candidate. The second experiment employs a 3 (Black Message: Neutral, Ingroup-Specific, Cross-group) X 3 (Latino Message: Neutral, Ingroup-Specific, Cross-group) factorial design that offers a contest between a black and Latino candidate. In both experiments, the messages of the minority candidates vary so that they focus on group-specific, cross-group, or group-neutral interests. The analysis contributes to the prevailing literature by showing that conflict between blacks and Latinos is primarily driven by their economic self-interests and perceived group competition. Nevertheless, there is the potential for electoral alliances to occur, particularly when minority candidates avoid messages focused on their own narrow group interests.

Table of Contents

List of Figures	vi
List of Tables	vii
1 Politics in Black and Brown	1
1.1 Political Friends or Foes?	3
1.2 Liberal Coalitions	5
1.3 Recent Demographic Shifts	6
1.4 Similar Objective Circumstances	8
1.5 Changes in the Urban Economy and Social Dislocation	9
2 Theoretical Approaches for Understanding Black-Latino Relations	12
2.1 Collective Action and Black-Latino Electoral Alliances	14
2.2 Realistic Interest Theories	15
2.3 Hypotheses	45
3 Survey Data and Methods	51
3.1 1992-94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality	52
3.2 Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality	55
3.3 Boston Study of Urban Inequality	66
3.4 Key Survey Items	75
4 Perceived Group Competition between Blacks and Latinos	86
4.1 Los Angeles	87
4.1.1 Perceived Group Competition between Blacks and Latinos . .	91
4.1.2 Blacks' Perceived Group Competition with Latinos	94
4.1.3 Latinos' Perceived Group Competition with Blacks	106
4.2 Boston	115
4.2.1 Perceived Group Competition between Blacks and Latinos . .	118
4.2.2 Blacks' Perceived Group Competition with Latinos	120
4.2.3 Latinos' Perceived Group Competition with Blacks	124
5 Group Biases in Race-Based Public Policy Preferences	133
5.1 Policy Implications of Black-Latino Relations in Los Angeles	136
5.1.1 Blacks' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies	137
5.1.2 Latinos' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies	158
5.2 Policy Implications for Black-Latino Relations in Boston	173
5.2.1 Blacks' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies	174

5.2.2	Latinos' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies	188
6	Experimental Data and Methods	203
6.1	Experimental Design	205
6.2	Key Survey Items	216
6.3	Characteristics of Participants in Majority-Minority Experiment . . .	219
6.4	Characteristics of Participants in Minority-Minority Experiment . . .	223
7	Elite Messages and Black-Latino Electoral Alliances	229
7.1	Majority-Minority Elections	232
7.1.1	Black Evaluations of the Latino Candidate	233
7.1.2	Latino Evaluations of the Black Candidate	243
7.2	Minority-Minority Elections	252
7.2.1	Black Evaluations of the Latino Candidate	253
7.2.2	Latino Evaluations of the Black Candidate	265
8	Conclusion	280
	References	298
	Appendices	310
	A Measurement	310
	B Further Analysis	321

List of Figures

4.1	Blacks' and Latinos' Perceived Group Competition in Los Angeles . . .	92
4.2	Predicted Values Across Racial and Economic Contexts	100
4.3	Blacks' and Latinos' Perceived Group Competition in Boston	119
5.1	Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles .	137
5.2	Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles . . .	139
5.3	Bias Across Black Educational Attainment and Latino Populations .	153
5.4	Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles	159
5.5	Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles . . .	160
5.6	Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston . . .	174
5.7	Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston	175
5.8	Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston . . .	188
5.9	Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston	190
6.1	Selected Images of Hypothetical Candidates	209
7.1	Blacks' Evaluations by Latino Messages and Percieved Competition .	240

List of Tables

3.1	Sample Distribution Across Strata in Los Angeles	57
3.2	Demographic Characteristics of Racial Groups in Los Angeles	63
3.3	Sample Distribution Across Strata in Boston	67
3.4	Demographic Characteristics of Racial Groups in Boston	72
4.1	Sample Distribution Across Racial Contexts in LA	89
4.2	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition in Los Angeles	97
4.3	Estimates for Neighborhood and Group Disparities in Los Angeles	102
4.4	OLS Estimates of Latinos' Perceived Competition in Los Angeles	108
4.5	Estimates for Neighborhood and Group Disparities in Los Angeles	110
4.6	Sample Distribution Across Racial Contexts in Boston	117
4.7	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition in Boston	121
4.8	OLS Estimates of Latinos' Perceived Competition in Boston	125
5.1	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles	143
5.2	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles	147
5.3	Ordered Probit Estimates for Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles	151
5.4	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles	157
5.5	Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles	163
5.6	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles	164
5.7	Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles	168
5.8	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles	169
5.9	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston	178
5.10	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston	182
5.11	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston	184
5.12	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston	186

5.13	Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston	192
5.14	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston	193
5.15	Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston	196
5.16	Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston	198
6.1	Demographic Characteristics of Sample for Study 1	220
6.2	Demographic Characteristics of Sample for Study 2	224
7.1	Mean of Blacks' Candidate Evaluations Across Conditions	233
7.2	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Candidate Evaluations	236
7.3	Effect of Perceived Group Competition on Blacks' Evaluation of Latino Candidate	237
7.4	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Differential Voting between the Latino and White Candidate	241
7.5	Means of Latinos' Candidate Evaluations Across Conditions	244
7.6	OLS Estimates of Latinos' Candidate Evaluations	245
7.7	Effect of Perceived Group Competition on Latinos' Evaluation of the Black Candidate	246
7.8	Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Differential Voting between the Black and White Candidate	249
7.9	Means of Blacks' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate Across Conditions	254
7.10	Means of Blacks' Evaluation of the Black Candidate Across Conditions	255
7.11	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Differential Candidate Evaluations	257
7.12	Effect of Perceived Group Competition on Blacks' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate	258
7.13	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Differential Voting for the Latino Candidate	259
7.14	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate	260
7.15	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Likely Vote for the Latino Candidate and Differential Vote for the Black and Latino Candidates	262
7.16	Means of Latinos' Evaluation of the Black Candidate Across Conditions	267
7.17	Means of Latinos' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate Across Conditions	268
7.18	OLS Estimates of Respondents' Differential Candidate Evaluations	269
7.19	OLS Estimates of Latinos' Evaluation of the Black Candidate	270
7.20	Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Differential Voting between the Black and Latino Candidates	272
7.21	OLS Estimates of Latinos' Evaluations of the Black Candidate	273
8.1	National Surveys of African Americans and Latinos	294
B.1	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition over Jobs and Political Influence in Los Angeles	322

B.2	OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition over Jobs and Political Influence in Boston	323
B.3	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles When Using Interaction Terms in Separate Models	324
B.4	Ordered Probit Estimates of Differential Support for Job Training Programs Among Foreign-born and U.S. Born Latinos in Los Angeles	325
B.5	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' General Support of Job Training Programs for Latinos in Boston	326
B.6	Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' General Support of Hiring Preferences for Latinos in Boston	327

Acknowledgments

There are several individuals that offered me either technical or moral support through the process of completing this project. First, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee- Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Matthew Lebo, and Vincent Hutchings- for their helpful feedback. I am especially grateful for the guidance of my dissertation advisor, Leonie Huddy. She offered her keen insight and gentle encouragement at all of the critical stages of this study. I was also privileged to receive a dissertation fellowship from the Africana Studies Department at the University of Notre Dame. The writing time and enlightening exchanges with faculty in both the Department of Africana Studies and the Department of Political Science were immeasurably beneficial. Furthermore, I deeply appreciate the hard work of each of the undergraduate research assistants at Stony Brook who were responsible for data collection and entry. These research assistants include Basir Ahmad, Marissa Averett, Shaun Brown, Charles Chang, John Chau, Ketty Dautruche, Michael Davidson, Matthew Dominick, Ummehani Faizullboy, Ankita Ghandi, Marina Jabsky, Delmira Martinez, Oghenerukevwe Riesa, Vivianna Schwoerer, Melissa Shah, and Ovia Shaw.

My fellow graduate students also offered me a considerable amount of advise and support over the years. These people include Todd Hartman, Chris Weber, Udi Sommer, Chad Westerland, Nadia Khatib, Thomas Craemer, Adam McGlynn, Jacob Sohlberg, Maxwell Mak, and Marie Courtemanche. Their support was invaluable and I consider them not only my colleagues, but also my friends.

Lastly, but certainly not least, I have benefitted from the loving encouragement of family and friends. Chiefly, my mother, Pamela Carey, has been a stable source of wisdom and support. My mother serves as my example of how one can remain strong even in difficult circumstances. That example provided the necessary motivation at several stages of this project. Moreover, she reassured me when I was frustrated and celebrated with me during good times. In addition, my grandmother, Beatrice Brown, and aunt, Doris Perry, were eager cheerleaders at every step and my good friends, Derek Harper and Etu Evans, lended an ear when I needed to voice my frustrations.

I am deeply indebted to all of the people named above; without their support, this process would have been far more difficult.

Chapter 1

Politics in Black and Brown

In 2001, Antonio Villaraigosa, a California state legislator and son of Mexican immigrants, campaigned against James Hahn, a former city attorney, in Los Angeles' runoff mayoral election. Villaraigosa emerged among a crowd of candidates as his message began to resonate in Latino as well as white neighborhoods. On the other hand, Hahn's candidacy was buoyed by a long record and his father's legacy as a public official and civil rights advocate in Los Angeles. Although Villaraigosa won a plurality of the vote in the primary election, Hahn defeated him in the runoff. He secured the white vote by characterizing Villaraigosa as too liberal and soft on crime (Sonenshein and Pinkus, 2002) and the black vote (80%) on the strength of his father's civil rights legacy. Villaraigosa won a large proportion of the Latino vote (82%) and a significant minority of the white population (41%); however, it was simply not enough to bridge the gap with Hahn. There is good reason to believe Villaraiga's election would have been assured with greater support from the African American community.

Both Hahn and Villaraigosa faced one another again in the mayoral election in 2005. Nevertheless, the political environment was decidedly different than it was in 2001. Since 2001, Hahn had drawn harsh criticism from the black community for firing the African-American police chief, Bernard Parks. Furthermore, his opposition to the succession of the San Fernando Valley from Los Angeles along with allegations of fiscal improprieties alienated him from the conservative base that was instrumental

to his victory in 2001 (Sonenshein and Pinkus, 2005). Thus, the coalition Hahn constructed for his 2001 election began to unravel. In the meantime, Villaraigosa cobbled together support from a range of different groups in the city, including overwhelming support within the Latino community in addition to a sizable group of moderate white Republicans. Again, Villaraigosa and Hahn made it to the runoff election, of which Villaraigosa won by a landslide (59% for Villaraigosa and 41% for Hahn). As in 2001, Latinos showed up to the polls in record numbers, with over 80% choosing to vote for Villaraigosa. He also won about half of the white vote and a plurality of Republicans.

However, the most dramatic shift in support came from African Americans who, while voting overwhelmingly for James Hahn in 2001, defected to Villaraigosa in 2005. Whereas 20% of blacks chose Villaraigosa in 2001, his share of the black vote in 2005 reached approximately 50%. Clearly, Villaraigosa made significant headway in his support within the African-American community in Los Angeles. Villaraigosa made more of an effort to mobilize black voters in 2005 than in 2001, securing key endorsements from prominent African-American politicians and businesspeople (Sonenshein and Pinkus, 2005). Yet, questions still linger. For one, why, under the best conditions—with Hahn’s missteps and support from prominent black leaders—was Villaraigosa only able to secure half of the black vote? There are a number of reasonable answers. Perhaps the civil rights legacy of James Hahn’s father was strong enough to convince African Americans to remain loyal to him. Or Villaraigosa may have relied too heavily on his endorsements. Additionally, African Americans may have, despite his stumbles, simply felt more familiar with Hahn.

The intent of the present study is not to focus on any particular election, but, instead, to investigate the origins of black-Latino political conflict and cooperation more generally. Therefore, the project works toward explaining the political relationships between both groups in Los Angeles as well as across the country. Specifically, I explore whether African Americans’ and Hispanic Americans’ willingness to en-

gage in collective actions such as voting for each other's candidates or supporting mutually-beneficial policies is shaped by tensions over escalating economic and political competition between both groups. Although their similar social and economic conditions imply they should be political allies, current demographic and economic trends taking place within urban centers suggest they may be more prone to view one another as rivals (Vaca, 2004).

1.1 Political Friends or Foes?

There have been other examples of electoral tensions between African Americans and Latinos across the country. For instance, the 2001 mayoral election between Lee P. Brown and Orlando Sanchez in Houston, Texas highlights how blacks' and Latinos' political support is often confined to ingroup candidates (Rodriguez, 2001). The population of Houston is split approximately into thirds between the Anglo-American, African-American, and Latino communities. Sanchez, a Cuban-American and Republican, secured a substantial proportion of the largely Mexican-American, Latino vote, while Brown, who is African American and a Democrat, gained overwhelming support from the black population. Ultimately, Brown succeeded because he was able to mobilize the black vote along with a proportion of liberal white voters. The racially-charged nature of the election highlights the challenges facing black-Latino political alliances as both groups become politically-incorporated.

Yet, there have also been clear instances of cooperation between African Americans and Latinos in electoral politics. For instance, Harold Washington, an African American candidate, won his 1983 mayoral election in Chicago based on African American and Latino support; he received very little support from the white population (Munoz and Henry, 1986). This electoral coalition was aided by his inclusion of Latinos as workers in his campaign as well as his production of campaign materials in Spanish. His efforts were mimicked by David Dinkin's 1989 mayoral election in New York City (Thompson, 1990). Although winning a significant plurality from

white New Yorkers, the largest share of votes came from the black and Latino communities (90% and 70% respectively). Dinkins was popular in the Latino community due to alliances he built while serving as the the Manhattan Borough president from 1985 to 1989.

However, even when alliances occur, they are often unstable. The coalitions that were responsible for the election of Harold Washington and David Dinkins were quickly shaken (Munoz and Henry, 1986). The Democratic successors to Washington were far less successful at compelling both African Americans and Hispanic Americans to show up to the polls (Kleppner, 1995). Similarly, while gaining 90 percent of the black vote and almost 60 percent of the Latino vote, Dinkins proved less effective at mobilizing black New Yorkers to support his campaign in 1993 as they had in 1989 (Biles, 2001). The demise of these coalitions shows the importance of strong leaders who can sufficiently mobilize members of both groups to work together toward their common interests (Sonenshein, 1990).

Barack Obama's successful presidential campaign in 2008 is the most recent example of the power of political elites to forge black-Latino alliances. During the Democratic primaries, party leaders and political commentators considered whether Latinos' solid support for Hillary Clinton as the Democratic nominee was due to their negative racial attitudes about African Americans. They feared that in the general election, Latinos would withhold their support for Barack Obama, an African American, by either voting for John McCain or declining to vote altogether. Ultimately, these concerns were misplaced. Obama's inclusive campaign rhetoric held together a multi-racial coalition of liberal whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. In the general election, he received approximately 67 percent of the Latino vote, suggesting their attitudes, either positive or negative, did not prevent them from voting for an African American. Whether this coalition can be sustained is yet to be seen; however, there is good reason to believe that if Obama's governance matches his rhetoric, Latinos will continue to support him.

1.2 Liberal Coalitions

The most effective coalitions have been facilitated by blacks' and Latinos' shared liberal beliefs and policy preferences. Research shows that the pace of minority political incorporation and the recent electoral victories of minority candidates have been a product of liberal coalitions between African Americans, Latinos, and liberal whites (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1986). The most notable example of such an alliance would be the liberal coalition of whites, blacks, and, to a lesser extent, Latinos which elected Tom Bradley, an African American, to hold the office of mayor of Los Angeles for 20 years (Sonenshein, 1986*b*). Each of these groups came together as a consequence of their similar policy objectives. In particular, blacks and Latinos express similar support for issues such as affirmative action and the expansion of government social services.

Yet, critics question the stability of liberal coalitions, particularly when group interests are in jeopardy (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). For instance, some African American leaders have questioned the benefit of joining coalitions with white liberals. According to Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), when blacks pursue political coalitions with white liberals their goals tend to be subordinated to the interests of whites. They argue this is due to the lop-sided power relationship between whites and blacks in the United States. For this reason, it has been argued that African Americans and Latinos would make better coalition partners, due to their similar social position (Henry, 1980). Nevertheless, divisions remain, particularly due to their differing policy priorities. For example, Latinos tend to be much more concerned than African Americans with issues related to language and immigration (Tedin and Murray, 1994). Furthermore, although both groups support affirmative action, African Americans endorse such programs more than Latinos. Thus, while their similar positions on certain policy issues may encourage them to work together, the disparity in African-American and Hispanic-American policy priorities may drive

them further apart.

1.3 Recent Demographic Shifts

Greater attention has been paid to the potential for black-Latino coalitions in recent years given the dramatic increase in the Latino population. Latinos became a fixture in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century after the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which annexed territories from Mexico, ended the Mexican War. The territories acquired by the treaty now comprise the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and southern California. As a consequence, several families who were-at one point-citizens of Mexico immediately became residents of the United States. Thus, the ancestors of many Hispanic Americans had a presence in the United States before that of most Euro Americans, many of whose ancestors did not arrive in the United States until the rapid immigration from Central and Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth century.

However, the size of the Latino community remained stable until the mid-twentieth century; workers from Central and South America began relocating, both legally and illegally, en mass to the United States for jobs and greater opportunities during the 1970s and 1980s. Legal immigration to the United States was due largely to the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which ended immigration quotas on the basis of the country of origin. The elimination of these quotas, which favored immigrants from Northern and Western Europe, led to a significant increase in immigration from Asia; however, there was also an upturn in immigration from the Caribbean and Latin America (Waldinger, 1989). Another major source for the increase in the Latino population was the influx of undocumented workers from Mexico who crossed the border to enter the country. Some studies indicate a lower-bound estimate of 2 million illegal immigrants lived in the United States in 1980. Since then, estimates indicate there

has been an annual growth of between 100,000 to 300,000 undocumented aliens (Passel and Woodrow, 1987). The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provided amnesty to much of the undocumented population who had lived in the United States since the beginning of 1982; however, after the act there has been a significant increase in the annual growth of illegal immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries.

According to the Census Bureau, which began collecting data on Latinos in 1970, the number of Latinos in the United States increased by over 50 percent between 1970 and 1980, from 9.6 million to 14.6 million, respectively (*Hispanics in the United States*, 2006). Latino population growth escalated even further to 22.4 million between 1980 and 1990. Nevertheless, the greatest share of growth occurred between 1990 and 2000 with the Latino population growing by 13 million people to a total of 35.3 million.¹ The magnitude of the population growth meant that the share of the Latino community in the United States now rivaled that of African Americans at approximately 36.4 million. The report by the Census Bureau sparked a considerable amount of attention from both researchers and the media who began to consider the implications of a large and growing Latino community for everything from marketing consumer products to winning elections. Moreover, there was speculation about the impact of Latino population growth on the black community, which intensified in 2005 when Latinos surpassed African Americans as the largest ethnic minority group in the United States.² There is no end in sight to the present growth of the Latino population. In fact, population projections suggest that the Hispanic community will increase by 117 million people between 2005 and 2050, which, given decreasing birthrates among Euro-Americans, means they would comprise approximately 30% of the population (Passel and Cohn, 2008).

¹The period between 1990 and 2000 is what Vaca (2004) recently termed the "Latino tsunami"

²According to a 2008 report from the Pew Hispanic Center, Latinos comprised approximately half of the population growth in the United States between 2000 and 2007 (Fry, 2008)

1.4 Similar Objective Circumstances

The objective conditions of both groups suggest that they share similar economic and political interests; both blacks and Latinos are more prone to live below the poverty line and have lower levels of educational attainment than either Euro Americans or Asian Americans (Farley and Haaga, 2005; Wilson, 1997). Furthermore, the evidence suggests that both groups experience greater housing discrimination and harsher incarceration rates for committing the same crimes as Anglo-Americans (Ross and Turner, 2005; Weich and Angulo, 2000). Other work also finds that African Americans and Latinos are viewed as being at the bottom of the racial hierarchy across racial and ethnic groups (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). Therefore, objectively, both African Americans and Latinos share similar economic conditions that suggest they would be suitable coalition partners (Henry, 1980).

Nevertheless, coalitions between both groups have often proven difficult. The instability of black-Latino alliances, despite their similar objective interests, likely is due to the differences between both groups in how they perceive their economic circumstances. Latinos, particularly first and second generation immigrants, tend to view their economic circumstances more positively than African Americans (Tedin and Murray, 1994). Moreover, they attribute their economic conditions to racial or ethnic discrimination less often than blacks (Uhlener, 1991). Therefore, although African Americans may view themselves as having similar economic interests as Latinos, Latinos may not agree. Also, as noted earlier, while both groups may have common economic interests, blacks and Latinos also differ in their views on other issues. Latinos prioritize language-oriented and immigration issues, while African Americans are stronger supporters of race-based public policies (Tedin and Murray, 1994). These policy differences may overshadow their otherwise common economic concerns.

1.5 Changes in the Urban Economy and Social Dislocation

The recent dramatic demographic shifts hold the potential to disproportionately impact African Americans because Latinos have traditionally gravitated toward urban centers, where they frequently enjoy stronger social networks and greater opportunities for employment (Waldinger, 1996).³ Some of the largest Latino communities in the United States are in major urban centers such as Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and New York City. Nevertheless, these metropolitan centers also comprise deeply-entrenched and politically-cohesive African-American communities (Camarillo, 2004). Therefore, both groups have found themselves increasingly in greater proximity to one another (Glaeser and Vigdor, 2001; Logan, 2001).

Latinos' movement into urban centers has paralleled a transition in the economy of urban centers in the United States. The U.S. economy's transition from an industrial, manufacturing-base to a post-industrial, service-oriented economy has led many manufacturers to relocate their operations to other countries in pursuit of low-wage labor, while knowledge-based industries have increased. These industries have placed themselves in the suburban outskirts of metropolitan areas, where they have greater access to more highly-educated, technologically-savvy workers (Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Wilson, 1997). There have been two major consequences of these economic shifts. First, the absence of manufacturing jobs from the urban centers severely crippled African Americans, who were disproportionately represented in the manufacturing sector.⁴ Even for qualified black residents it is difficult to pursue jobs

³More recently, Census Bureau data suggest this pattern is changing. Between 2000 and 2006, less densely-populated areas have experienced the greatest rate of growth in the Latino population (*Hispanics in the United States*, 2006).

⁴While there is little dispute about the recent trends in the urban economy, there is some debate about how these patterns should be interpreted. Wilson (1997) contends that the intensified levels of black urban poverty can be attributed to the mismatch in the demand for high-skilled labor and the skills many blacks gained in the manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, Waldinger (1996) argues the increase in black poverty is largely due to a lack of social networks among blacks to acquire low-level jobs along with discrimination by employers.

in the suburbs given the long commute involved. Secondly, there is stronger demand among employers of the remaining low-skilled enterprises for low-wage labor (Wilson, 1997). These employers lean toward frequently illegal Latino migrant workers to fill the void; employers tend to perceive them as harder workers and more likely to tolerate exploitative work conditions than blacks (Waters and Eshbach, 1995; Johnson and Oliver, 1989). As a consequence, blacks in urban areas increasingly complain that employers pass them over for jobs in favor of Latinos. Furthermore, Latinos frequently seek housing in predominantly black neighborhoods. Overall, blacks and Latinos have found themselves competing over the same jobs, housing, and, in some cases, political access, which has heightened the level of conflict between both groups (Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Wilson, 2001). Such conflict might work to undermine the potential for an African American and Latino political coalition by making their distinct interests more salient than their shared concerns.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the economic, social and political shifts that may influence the potential for African Americans and Latinos to work together toward their shared political interests. The dramatic increase in the Latino population is having a tremendous impact on American society. Political leaders and commentators have speculated that African Americans and Latinos should work together toward their common goals; both blacks and Latinos experience similar economic hardships in relation to the white non-Hispanic population. These observers are led to believe their similar experiences and increasingly shared economic circumstances will lead blacks and Latinos to realize their common group interests. Furthermore, both groups' liberal tendencies have led them to create alliances not only with one another, but also white liberals in order to speed the process of political incorporation. Nevertheless, the economic transition occurring in many urban areas has created an environment in which both African Americans and Latinos find them-

selves in conflict over jobs, housing, and political influence. These tensions over material resources and privileges hold the potential to undermine the ability for both groups to work together by driving them to view one another as competitors rather than allies.

To date, the literature exploring political relationships between African Americans and Latinos has focused largely on the factors that explain how conflict occurs. There is little work that explores how cooperation between both groups can be facilitated. This project takes a step in advancing the literature to examine the conditions that encourage African Americans and Latinos to engage in collective action. The studies reported in the following chapters utilize survey data from two urban spaces to examine the impact that the economic and social context as well as respondents' personal economic circumstances have on the perceptions that blacks and Latinos hold towards one another and their willingness to work toward seemingly mutually-beneficial policies. Furthermore, an experimental survey is employed to examine the influence of political elites and their campaign messages in mobilizing both groups to work together.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Approaches for Understanding Black-Latino Relations

In recent years, researchers have focused considerable attention on how African Americans and Latinos relate to one another (McClain and Karnig, 1990; Meier et al., 2004; Kaufmann, 2003; McClain et al., 2006). These studies have been conducted to understand the potential for political alliances to be formed between both groups. Scholars of racial and ethnic politics consider political alliances between blacks and Latinos to be an effective strategy for increasing their political representation and gaining access to resources both groups have been traditionally denied (Wilson, 2001; Henry, 1980; Kaufmann, 2003). For instance, it has been argued that whether minorities engage in conflict or cooperation has serious implications on many public policy outcomes (Wilson, 2001; Meier et al., 2004). William Julius Wilson in his book, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide* (2001), argues that cross-racial coalition-building should be utilized to address the problem of income inequality in the United States. Wilson's theory includes poor whites along with people of color as viable partners in the fight for income equity; however, his argument remains based on the premise that each group, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, shares similar economic interests that should provide an incentive for collective action. In similar fashion, Meier et al. (2004) suggests black-Latino coalitions could

wield tremendous influence on educational policy, particularly when the outcomes do not benefit one group at the expense of the other.

While, on the surface, the assumption held by these scholars- that shared interests should motivate groups to work together-is compelling, empirical evidence shows that blacks and Latinos may also hold competing interests that prevent them from working toward mutually-beneficial goals-goals that serve the interests of both groups. Within urban America, blacks and Latinos frequently compete over low-skill jobs, housing, and political influence (Gay, 2006; Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Waldinger, 1996). Such competition fuels out-group bias and racial antagonism. Therefore, while shared interests may persuade racial and ethnic minorities to work together, ingroup-specific interests stand to encourage blacks and Latinos to compete with one another over finite resources and, thus, undermine their prospects for political cooperation. Ultimately, the present research is driven by two primary questions: (1) what factors threaten the potential for African Americans and Latinos to work together to achieve their shared interests and (2) how might members of both groups find common ground to build strong, enduring political alliances?

The conceptual approach taken in this project is chiefly informed by realistic interest theories of intergroup relations. Realistic interest theories are premised on the idea that the attitudes and behavior of group members toward outgroup members stem concerns for their group's well-being. Realistic group conflict theory (RGCT), which is applied in this study, fits within the realistic interest school of thought. RGCT proposes that group competition over scarce resources drives intergroup antagonism. Nevertheless, an often overlooked expectation of RGCT is that goals that require a unified effort by different groups will reduce group tensions and encourage cooperation. This chapter grapples with the benefits and shortcomings of realistic group conflict theory in explaining relations between African Americans and Latinos.

2.1 Collective Action and Black-Latino Electoral Alliances

Studies show that collective action, regardless of the groups involved, can be difficult. In *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), Mancur Olsen applies rational choice theory as a basis for explaining the barriers to achieving collective action. According to Olsen, rational individuals will choose to abstain from collective activities unless motivated by selective incentives, which are social pressures or material benefits offered by a group. This is the case because it is in an individual's self-interest to free-ride, or to enjoy the benefits of public goods while allowing other people to bear the costs. Olsen defines public goods as any material resource in which a group of individuals think they will benefit and, if provided for, cannot be withheld from any member. Thus, collective action is any action or activity aimed at acquiring a collective, or public good. By his definition, collective action can be performed by a single individual, but traditionally scholars have taken collective action to mean the pursuit of a collective good by a group of people (i.e., two or more individuals).

Notably, underlying his hypothesis is the presumption that self-interests, or the relative gains and losses to an individual or his or her immediate family, motivate decisions to engage in collective action (Citrin and Green, 1990; Sears and Funk, 1990). Yet, as further discussed below, previous research in political behavior indicates the political consequences of self-interests tend to be small and circumscribed (Citrin and Green, 1990; Sears and Funk, 1990). Furthermore, although Olsen's emphasis on self-interests offers a compelling explanation for why individuals *do not* engage in collective activities, he fails to explain why they *do* participate.

Other theorists imply group interests are more consequential for collective action, particularly within racial and ethnic minority groups. The evidence suggests minorities tend to mobilize around their perceived common interests. Particularly, African Americans' consideration of their group concerns increases their cohesion which, in turn, influences their electoral choices and public policy attitudes (Dawson, 1994;

Tate, 1993). Less work examines how Latinos' concern for their shared interests drive their willingness to engage in collective action. However, recent studies imply Latinos' group consciousness, which reflects a sense of commonality and shared circumstances, motivate their voting behavior and support for group-related policies (Sanchez, 2006*a*; Stokes, 2003).

Similarly, some researchers argue that group concerns play a central role in achieving collective action across groups. For example, Carmichael and Hamilton's book, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (1967) proposes that four factors determine the effectiveness of coalition-building: (1) the parties recognize each others' respective interests, (2) each party has their own power base that can make decisions independent of the collective group (3) the coalition pursues mutually-beneficial goals, which must be (4) specific and identifiable. Their work reflects a belief that coalitions are fundamentally facilitated by the pursuit of congruent realistic interests between equally powerful groups.

By Carmichael and Hamilton's (1967) criteria, blacks and Latinos in the United States would be ideal political partners; however, efforts at collective action between both groups has proven difficult. Many of these difficulties emerge as a consequence of how they *perceive* their respective group interests. For instance, recent studies suggest that while African Americans believe themselves to have something in common with Hispanic Americans, Latinos are less likely to think they have any commonalities with African Americans (Kaufmann, 2003; McClain et al., 2006). These results imply that although they share similar material concerns, blacks and Latinos may not believe their interests converge.

2.2 Realistic Interest Theories

Realistic interest approaches propose that group conflict and cooperation is contingent upon group members' pursuit of realistic group interests, or specific, goal-oriented objectives aimed at improving the general condition of the ingroup. Real-

istic group interests can be material or symbolic in nature; however, they must be clearly defined and tangible (Bobo, 1988). Material interests concern the accumulation of physical resources such as money, shelter, and other goods, while symbolic interests involve benefits to group status as well as the meaning underlying group membership. This study applies realistic group conflict theory, which is included in the realistic interest school of thought, to understand the origins of both conflict as well as cooperation between African Americans and Hispanic Americans.

The development of realistic group conflict theory began with a series of experiments conducted by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues, which gathered a group of pre-adolescent boys for a camping trip to examine the process of group formation and outgroup bias (Sherif and Sherif, 1953). After allowing the boys to interact for a short period of time, they were separated into two groups. From this point on, the boys interacted almost exclusively within their ingroup, thus, facilitating friendships and a group status hierarchy. The researchers discovered that when the groups were placed in competition the relationship between members of both groups grew hostile and antagonistic. Nevertheless, the resentment subsided when both groups worked together to achieve superordinate goals, or objectives that they wanted to achieve but that neither could accomplish independently of the other. Based on their findings, Sherif and his colleagues conclude that intergroup competition fuels outgroup hostility, but that friction between groups can be reduced when working towards interdependent goals.

Since the work of Sherif and his colleagues, several studies have sought to translate their findings to non-experimental settings. Additionally, they include groups with varied social backgrounds.¹ These studies suggest greater attention should be paid to distinguishing personal from group interests (Sears and Funk, 1990; Sears and Kinder, 1985); real, tangible threats to the group's well-being versus individuals'

¹In an effort to avoid differences in personal background and physical appearance from confounding the results, the boys selected for the Robbers' Cave experiment were exclusively white, middle-class, and Protestant.

mere perception of a threat (Bobo, 1983); and, lastly, concerns about the distribution of material resources, rather than group status and esteem (Huddy, 2003). Each of these distinctions are addressed in the following discussion.

Self-Interests vs. Group Interests

While realistic group conflict theory is concerned with the relationship between group material concerns and individual attitudes and behaviors, group interests are frequently difficult to discern from personal concerns. Empirical research demonstrates the limited effect of self-interests on political attitudes and behavior (Sears and Funk, 1990). Sears and Funk (1990) define pure self-interests as the short-term material well-being of an individual or his or her immediate family. Evidence shows personal interests fail to drive greater support for a range of public policies including bilingual education and school busing (Huddy and Sears, 1995; Sears, Hensler and Speer, 1979). In contrast, group interests are defined by Sears and Funk (1990) as a concern for the ingroup's well-being, regardless of the consequences on one's personal circumstances. Group interests often motivate people to adopt certain issue-positions and behavior that are beneficial to the group even when they do not benefit themselves personally. For example, affluent African Americans tend to support race-based redistributive policies that are in direct conflict with their economic self-interests (Dawson, 1994; Huddy, 2003). In this instance, collective gains clearly trump whatever negative personal economic consequences might occur.

More frequently, group interests serve as a proxy for self-interests. Sears and Funk (1990) define the interdependent relationship between the self and the ingroup as self-oriented group interests. Fundamentally, self-oriented group concerns reflect a belief that improved material circumstances for the group translates into a better livelihood for individual group members. There is evidence to suggest self-oriented group interests deeply influence African-American public opinion. Dawson (1994) argues that since African Americans often perceive their life chances as being chiefly

determined by their race, they often substitute their self-interests with their racial group concerns. Therefore, public policies perceived to benefit blacks as a group are also believed to benefit them personally.

There is reason to believe self-interest plays a greater political role among Latinos than African Americans. Latino immigrants and their families, who frequently relocate to the United States in the pursuit of better jobs and greater opportunities, tend to prioritize their economic self-interests. Yet, these economic self-interests, like those of many African Americans, are inextricably tied to their broader group concerns. Latinos' concentration in particular industries and occupations, residential spaces, as well as their limited employment and educational opportunities has led to the development of perceived common interests (Garcia, 2003). Clearly, many of their perceived commonalities are economic in nature; however, their interests also center around language-oriented issues (e.g. bilingual education) and immigration. The relationship between self-interests and group interests is clear when considering Latinos' attitudes about immigration. Latinos express less support for flexible immigration policies than many people may expect. Generally, Mexican-Americans and other Latinos support greater restrictions on illegal immigration, much like the rest of the American population (de la Garza, 1998). Yet, they support amnesty for undocumented aliens who are residents of the United States. While seemingly contradictory, taken together these opinions prioritize both legal and illegal Latino residents' group concerns in service of their self-interests. Similar to other Americans, Latinos seem concerned about the influence of immigration on their economic opportunities. At the same time, exchanges between Hispanic Americans and undocumented residents in the United States are commonplace; Latino citizens often have spouses and other members of their immediate families that are undocumented (de la Garza, 1998). Both opposition to flexible immigration policies and support for amnesty serve the interests of Hispanic residents as a group in ways that are also beneficial to the individual, by protecting their access to economic opportunities and

excluding undocumented family members from having to bear the consequences of a more draconian immigration policy.

Ultimately, both self-interests and group interests stand to impact relations between African Americans and Hispanic Americans. Increased job and housing competition jeopardize group members' economic self-interests by threatening their access to income and quality housing opportunities. Consequently, group competition and conflict is likely to emerge. This study relies upon respondents' reported family income, education, home ownership and employment status as indicators of their economic self-interests. Other studies have used these measures, or variations of them, to test the claim of economic self-interest (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Fetzer, 2000). Demographic measures of family income and educational attainment are often employed to capture a person's access not only to material resources, but also personal status (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Other work introduces homeownership to account for significant racial disparities in wealth that are not captured by either income or education (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). For this analysis, this concern is particularly valid given the closer proximity of blacks and Latinos within residential spaces and their reported competition over affordable housing (Johnson and Oliver, 1989). Lastly, individuals' interactions with outgroups may be shaped by the in-group and outgroups' relationship to the economy. Those who enjoy a stable place within the labor market will be less likely to view outgroups in threatening terms and potentially will be more amenable to intergroup cooperation. People who stand in a precarious place within the market may view outgroups as potential competitors for gainful employment. For this reason, a measure of respondents' work status is also included in the analysis.

Objective vs. Perceived Group Interests

Group interests can be conveyed by both the objective and perceived condition of the group. Objective group interests concern actual, immediate threats to the

group's status or economic, political, and social position, while subjective group interests consist of an individual's perception that the outgroup jeopardizes one's personal or group well-being (Bobo, 1983,9). This distinction suggests, for instance, that African Americans' attitudes toward Latinos may not only be impacted by an increase in Latino residents in their neighborhoods, which could increase job competition, but also whether they *perceive* greater numbers of Latinos as a threat to jobs for African Americans. Yet, perceived group threats do not always accurately reflect actual objective conditions; group conflict can occur not because group members are truly threatened by an outgroup but because they *feel* threatened (Bobo, 1983). For example, African Americans may believe Latinos jeopardize their access to job opportunities even when evidence of such a threat is not present in their actual environment. Alternatively, they may not view Latinos as rivals, even within apparently competitive environments. According to realistic group conflict theory, both objective and subjective, or perceived, group interests can, in some instances, heighten intergroup tensions and, at other times, reduce group hostility and, thus, facilitate intergroup cooperation (Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Bobo, 1983; Giles, 1977; Giles and Evans, 1986).

This study employs measures of the neighborhood racial composition and economic conditions to capture the objective group interests present within residential contexts. Previous studies show these measures influence intergroup attitudes and behavior; however, they have rarely been employed to explain relations between racial and ethnic minority groups (but see Oliver and Wong, 2003). Given demographic shifts that have led blacks and Latinos to live in closer proximity to one another, there is good reason to believe residential conditions also shape their decision to engage in either political conflict or cooperation. On the other hand, perceived group interests are measured by items that assess whether residents believe the outgroup poses a threat to the welfare of their own group. By including both objective and subjective measures in the analysis, this study contributes to the

prevailing literature by showing their comparative impact on interracial attitudes and behavior.

Racial Context

One way that researchers have assessed objective group concerns is by a neighborhood's racial composition. This approach is best reflected by literature exploring the racial threat hypothesis, a variation of the realistic group conflict approach (Key Jr., 1949; Allport, 1954). The racial threat hypothesis proposes that negative interracial behavior is a function of an individual's proximity to large numbers of outgroup members. Generally, there is overwhelming evidence in support of the racial threat hypothesis. First, the analysis has consistently demonstrated the concentration of black residents living in whites' neighborhoods drives their negative racial attitudes toward blacks (Giles, 1977; Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989). Other work shows these effects map onto their political attitudes and behavior. Higher black concentrations have been associated with stronger support among whites for anti-black candidates (Giles and Buckner, 1993) and defections among white Southerners from the Democratic to the Republican party (Giles and Hertz, 1994). Overall, the work shows that higher black concentrations are related to stronger white racial hostility. Unfortunately, little work shows how concentrations of outgroup members impact relations between racial and ethnic minorities. This study is intended to fill that void.

Nevertheless, recent studies have proposed that the effects of racial threat are weaker than proposed (Voss, 1996; Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000). For instance, Voss (1996) discovers that the racial context did not predict white Louisianians' support for David Duke, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan, during his 1990 campaign for the U.S. Senate or his 1991 bid for governor. He found no evidence that white residents that lived near large proportions of African Americans were more likely to support Duke; instead, he shows that whites living in predominantly white suburban areas largely endorsed Duke. Other studies propose alternative indicators, such as

the neighborhood's socioeconomic status, are stronger predictors of black animus than racial composition (Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000). Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) demonstrate that living among greater numbers of uneducated whites was a stronger predictor of whites' anti-black attitudes than the racial context. Yet, even these studies do not offer conclusive evidence against the racial threat hypothesis; the evidence either does not evaluate the impact of racial proximity across a range of racial attitudes and behaviors, or does not entirely disconfirm the threat hypothesis (Giles and Buckner, 1996; Hutchings and Valentino, 2004). For instance, Voss (1996) bases his conclusion on the results for only one dependent variable, attitudes toward David Duke. Yet, as Hutchings and Valentino (2004) point out, the racial threat hypothesis applies not only to candidate selection, but also to racial attitudes and positions on race-based policies. In addition, although Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) show little evidence that the racial composition of neighborhoods influences whites' traditionally stable racial predispositions, their evidence supports the racial threat hypothesis as it relates to whites' attitudes about race-based public policies. Overall, while the recent work suggests qualifications to the racial threat hypothesis must be considered, the evidence fails to conclusively displace the theory as an explanation of interracial conflict.

However, there is reason to suspect blacks' and Latinos' greater proximity to one another may encourage them to work together toward their common goals. In contrast to the racial threat hypothesis, there has been an enduring research agenda, advanced by Allport (1954), that proposes greater contact with outgroup members reduces racial animosity and facilitates intergroup cooperation. Allport argues that the impact of group contact is contingent upon four factors: (1) the group must be of equal status, (2) both groups must be engaged in a common, or superordinate goal, (3) the task must be something that both groups can not achieve independently, and (4) authorities must define the social norms and legitimize group interactions. Ultimately, empirical evidence suggests many of Allport's conditions

are not necessary for contact to have a positive impact on racial attitudes (Forbes, 1996). Instead, these studies imply a reduction in racial hostility merely requires sustained, non-negative interactions between groups.

Although the racial threat and racial contact theories have been overwhelmingly applied to explain whites' attitudes toward blacks, group proximity is also likely to influence feelings between African Americans and Latinos. As mentioned above, blacks and Hispanics increasingly live in the same or adjacent neighborhoods (Johnson and Oliver, 1989). While their proximity to one another stands to heighten their sense of group competition (Johnson and Oliver, 1989), there is also the possibility that it may reduce hostility and facilitate cooperation by offering opportunities for meaningful social contact between both groups. To date, little work has explored the relationship between the concentration of black and Latino residents to their attitudes toward one another (but see Cummings and Lambert, 1997; Bobo and Johnson, 2000). Consequently, the association between blacks' and Latinos' proximity to one another and their prospects for group conflict or cooperation is considered in the analysis.

The racial threat literature has traditionally utilized measures of the proportion of outgroup members at particular geographic units (e.g., county, standard metropolitan statistical area, and census block) (Blalock, 1967; Key Jr., 1949; Quillian, 1996). Large concentrations of outgroup members are believed to reflect underlying intergroup competition over resources and group status. In contrast, studies of interracial contact tend to employ subjective measures of racial interactions (Jackman and Crane, 1986; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Ellison and Powers, 1994). The different approaches likely explain the literatures' often contradictory conclusions. Subjective indicators are optimal for measuring the quality of intergroup interactions, but less effective at representing the actual objective conditions within the environment (Forbes, 1996). With this in mind, this study relies upon aggregate measures of the racial composition to capture objective group interests.

Neighborhood and Group Material Conditions

Beyond the racial composition, the economic context also serves as an indicator of their objective group interests. Neighborhood material conditions often hint at residents' access to resources and relative social position. Furthermore, recent studies reveal the economic environment shapes intergroup attitudes (Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995; Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000). In fact, these studies conclude that economic conditions, regardless of the racial context, are better predictors of outgroup antipathy. For instance, Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) contend that white racial attitudes are a product of a psychological response to living within economically difficult environments, rather than the racial composition. The potency of economic conditions, as opposed to the racial context, in explaining relations between blacks and Latinos is buttressed by the fact that little evidence shows a consistent and significant relationship between blacks' and Latinos' proximity to one another and their cross-group attitudes and behavior (Cummings and Lambert, 1997; Bobo and Johnson, 2000).

African Americans' attitudes and behavior are particularly shaped by the economic status of their neighborhoods. African Americans tend to live in communities with higher rates of poverty than other racial and ethnic groups (Wilson, 1997). Researchers disagree about the reason for this phenomenon; nevertheless, there is a general consensus about its consequences.² Wilson (1997) argues that areas with high concentrations of poverty tend to lack the ingredients for stable, cohesive communities. The limited opportunities in these areas often leave residents economically, socially, and *politically* isolated. Their isolation deprives them of conventional role models and vital social networks as well as facilitates debilitating behaviors (e.g., crime, illegitimate childbirths,) that perpetuate their poverty. The relationship be-

²As mentioned above, Wilson (1997) attributes the growth of black urban poverty to a mismatch between the high concentration of blacks in low-skilled manufacturing jobs and the increasing demand for knowledge-based laborers caused by the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. On the other hand, Massey and Denton (1993) argue that the increase is due to extreme levels of racial segregation.

tween dire economic conditions and political isolation is demonstrated by Cohen and Dawson (1993), who show that, although black residents in impoverished areas view political involvement as an effective means of achieving particular objectives, they do not see political action as a viable option for themselves. This result is consistent with Wilson's (1997) argument that living in areas with high rates of poverty and joblessness lowers feelings of self-efficacy among residents. Ultimately, Cohen and Dawson (1993) contend that there are constraints in the opportunity structure within economically-deprived communities that cause black residents to become less engaged with the political system than their counterparts in less impoverished environments. To date, there has been little research that examines the relationship between Latinos' economic context and their levels of economic, social, and political isolation in the United States. Nevertheless, there is evidence that low-income Latinos, unlike African Americans, enjoy stronger social networks that allow them to be more economically connected than their black counterparts (Waldinger, 1996). Yet, there is little to suggest these networks help them become more politically engaged.

Additionally, there is good reason to distinguish between the material conditions of neighborhoods from that of different groups within residential spaces. Resources tend to be distributed unequally across neighborhoods, resulting in residential disparities in the quality of education, access to affordable housing, and social services. In areas with limited access to resources, black and Latino residents are expected to compete with one another to gain a share of the limited resources available, thus, heightening group antagonism. On the other hand, competition between group members is expected to be less pronounced within economically stable communities. At the same time, within neighborhoods, resources tend to be distributed among groups disproportionately. Those groups with better economic circumstances tend to enjoy greater social, economic and political power within their communities. Businesses and other institutions within a neighborhood tend to reflect the tastes and interests of the most economically secure group (Gay, 2006). Likewise, elected officials

are often more responsive to groups that are engaged in the political process, particularly through voting or campaign contributions. Given the prevalence of racial segregation, group members are likely more aware of their economic circumstances within their neighborhoods, especially if their group is economically disadvantaged (Gay, 2006). The expectation is that economically-vulnerable groups will be more sensitive to the presence of potential competitors within their communities.

In many instances, economic conditions are difficult to separate from the racial environment, particularly since neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of poverty also have high minority populations (Wilson, 1997). Thus, intergroup relations may be a function of the *combined* influence of the racial and economic environment. In fact, some work demonstrates this to be the case. Branton and Jones (2005) illustrate that white Americans' racial attitudes and race-based policy preferences (e.g., educational quotas, preferential hiring, and increased spending on welfare) are influenced not by either the racial or economic context independently, but by their interaction. Anglo-Americans living in neighborhoods with greater diversity as well as larger numbers of college-educated people expressed more liberalized racial attitudes and greater support for race-based policies than either those in diverse, but lowly-educated environments or those in highly-educated, homogeneous areas. With this in mind, the present analysis tests whether the size of the outgroup generates stronger group tensions among economically vulnerable blacks and Latinos. Absent an outgroup presence, it is unclear whether their feelings would be directed toward any particular group. Moreover, given more favorable economic circumstances, competition is likely to be less intense and, consequently, antagonism less pronounced.

Previous evidence suggests the combined influences of the racial and economic context explains African Americans' negative attitudes toward Latinos. Specifically, Gay (2006) examines whether blacks' relative economic status vis-a-vis Hispanics influences their anti-Latino attitudes. Her focus on the relationship between relative

economic disparities between blacks and Latinos to their cross-group antagonisms is similar to the approach taken by students of relative deprivation theory, which is in the family of realistic interest theories. Yet, the study differs from relative deprivation approaches by its concentration on disparities in actual, objective economic conditions between groups. Relative deprivation theory proposes that group antagonisms and social protests are not due to absolute, objective impoverished conditions, but, instead, on whether individuals or groups *feel* deprived as compared to other people or groups (Crosby, 1976; Dube and Guimond, 1986). In this respect, Gay (2006) is more consistent with the realistic group conflict approach. The study uses the 1992-94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), which is unique for its breadth and depth of items that measure intergroup attitudes. Furthermore, the study allows the survey responses to be linked to 1990 Census Bureau data measured at the census block level. The findings reveal that African Americans living within areas where blacks' material conditions are worse than their Latino neighbors tend to exhibit stronger negative racial attitudes toward Latinos as well as greater support for preferences in hiring and promotion for blacks than Latinos. Ultimately, Gay (2006) demonstrates that the influence of the outgroup population size on black's anti-Latino attitudes is conditional upon group members' material conditions within their respective neighborhoods. Given Gay's (2006) findings, the project tests both the influence of absolute and relative group conditions on the prospects for black-Latino conflict and cooperation. To the author's knowledge, a similar analysis has not been done to explore how group material conditions and the racial context impact Latinos' attitudes toward blacks. This project stands to advance the literature in that regard.

Researchers have tended to use aggregate measures of the proportion of residents who live below the poverty line and have attained at least a bachelor's degree at particular geographic units as indicators of a neighborhood's economic status (Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Gay, 2006). Several scholars have

employed measures of the neighborhood educational composition to capture residential economic status. However, while many of these earlier studies rely upon a measure of the proportion of college graduates to gauge the economic status of the neighborhood, this study captures neighborhood educational attainment by measuring the percentage of residents with less than a high school degree. This measure is considered to be a better indicator of the economic stress prevalent within a community. Indeed, studies show failing to complete high school is associated with a number of negative consequences such as higher rates of unemployment and lower earnings over a lifespan (Rumberger, 1987; *Lifetime Earnings Estimates for Men and Women in the United States:1979*, 1983). These problems are particularly pervasive within predominantly minority, inner-city neighborhoods (Rumberger, 1987). Nevertheless, the educational makeup of a community is hardly a sufficient measure of neighborhood material conditions. In fact, there is evidence that, due to racial segregation, education is not as easily translated into improved residential conditions for racial and ethnic minorities as it is among the majority population (Alba and Logan, 1991). As a consequence, better-educated blacks and Latinos are more likely to live in neighborhoods with higher levels of crime, fewer social services, and limited economic activity than comparably-educated white Americans. Accordingly, an indicator of the proportion of residents who live below the poverty line is employed to complement the measure of neighborhood educational composition. Furthermore, the distinction between neighborhood and group material conditions informed the decision to employ aggregate, objective measures of the proportions of blacks and Latinos both living in poverty and with less than a high school degree. Lastly, in an effort to compare the results from this analysis to Gay (2006), indicators of relative group economic disparities are calculated by taking the difference between the proportion of blacks and Latinos who live below the poverty rate and have earned less than a high school degree within each respective residential context.

In spite of the advantages to using aggregate measures of the residential context

to capture objective group interests, there are reasons to employ such measures with caution. First, there are inconsistencies that emerge depending on the geographic unit at which the indicators are measured. With respect to the racial threat hypothesis, studies utilizing indicators from larger geographic units (e.g., counties and states) tend to discover evidence of interracial conflict, while measures for smaller areas (e.g., census tracts and census blocks) tend to reveal no relationship to intergroup attitudes and behavior (Oliver and Wong, 2003). These disparities suggest different geographic levels capture distinct elements of the social environment. Forbes (1996) argues that larger areas reflect “broad national and historic forces”, while smaller areas more closely approximate “proximity” and, thus, “interaction” (Forbes, 1996, page 107). At best, contextual measures seem to represent the *potential* for economic, political, and social exchanges between groups, rather than *actual* group competition or threat (Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995). Yet, while caution should be taken with the inferences drawn from such measures, aggregate, contextual indicators of the racial context and economic conditions still offer the most accurate approximation of the objective group interests present within the residential environment.

Perceived Group Interests

At the same time, objective conditions do not necessarily map onto individuals’ perception of the environment (Crosby, 1976). For this reason, some researchers argue group interests should not be determined solely by objective circumstances, but also by group members’ subjective assessment of their collective interests (Bobo, 1983). Accordingly, the evidence shows that subjective group interests shape intergroup attitudes and behavior. For instance, perceived group threat can heighten group tensions. Bobo (1983) demonstrates whites threatened by blacks’ push for civil rights expressed greater opposition to school busing. His findings are revealing because they show a perceived threat to a group’s welfare may outweigh the impact

of their objective conditions. Unfortunately, Bobo (1983) is one of the few to assess the political implications of subjective group threat. This project advances the present work on subjective group threat by determining its relationship to public policies and candidate evaluations.

As it relates to the present analysis, subjective group interests have been found to facilitate collective action. Within groups, the perception that one's personal well-being is linked to the fate of the group effectively mobilizes group members to pursue their common goals. The connection an individual makes between their personal and group interests is what Dawson (1994) calls linked fate. Outside of racial politics, work shows perceived common fate among group members who view their group status as deteriorating leads them to vote on the basis of their group interests (Kinder, Adams and Gronke, 1989). However, perceived common fate has also been shown to influence racial and ethnic politics, particularly among minorities. For example, African Americans' subjective assessment of their common fate drove their support for Jesse Jackson, an African-American presidential candidate, during the 1984 and 1988 Democratic primaries (Dawson, 1994). Furthermore, blacks' perceived linked fate also leads them to favor public policies deemed favorable to African Americans (e.g., affirmative action, busing, and government aid) and, in some cases, increases their political participation (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1993; Chong and Rogers, 2005). Dawson (1994) argues that blacks' personal circumstances have historically been tied to the treatment of the group as a whole. Consequently, black group interests have served as an efficient proxy for self-interests. Recent evidence suggests a similar relationship may exist for Latinos. While there are no studies on Latinos' linked fate specifically; there is evidence that perceived commonalities among Latinos increase their levels of Latino-specific participation such as working for and contributing money to a Latino candidate as well as attending a demonstration on Latino issues (Sanchez, 2006a). Overall, the evidence shows that subjective assessments of group interests facilitate intragroup cohesion.

Yet, subjective assessments of group concerns can also reduce outgroup hostility and potentially facilitate intergroup cooperation. For instance, in addition to causing greater intragroup cohesion, perceived linked fate is associated with reduced hostility toward outgroups. Recent studies reveal that the perceived linked fate of Latinos influenced their perceived commonalities with African Americans. Latinos who viewed their personal circumstances as a function of their group fate tended to believe they had more things in common with African Americans than Latinos with a weaker sense of linked fate (McClain et al., 2006; Kaufmann, 2003). Likewise, McClain and her associates (2006) show that perceived linked fate is associated with fewer anti-black attitudes. Little evidence reveals how African Americans' perceived common fate drive blacks attitudes toward Latinos. Nevertheless, evidence suggests blacks' sense of interdependence with other group members is not associated with outgroup antipathy (Herring, Jankowski and Brown, 1999). While not ensuring cooperation, the results imply perceived common fate among group members stands to reduce intergroup hostility and, thus, encourage greater intergroup cooperation. Ultimately, the relationship between perceived linked fate and intergroup cooperation is viewed as a consequence of group members being politically socialized to link their circumstances to the fate of other oppressed, marginalized groups (Kaufmann, 2003).

Measures of subjective group interests tend to capture either respondents' perceived common fate with other group members or their perceived competition with outgroups. Given realistic group conflict theory's focus on group threat, subjective measures of zero-sum competition are used in the present analysis. These measures reflect most of the criteria offered by Sears and Kinder (1985) for reliable measures of realistic group competition. They argue reliable realistic group conflict items must distinguish between: (1) threats to the self and to the group, (2) objective conditions and subjective perceptions, (3) threats to a group's material well-being and their group status, and, lastly, (4) group interests and group conflict. Each of these

criterion inform the structure of the items used to capture respondents' subjective perceptions of group competition. First, they tap threats posed to the group by directly referencing both the ingroup and outgroup. Secondly, the survey items clearly ask respondents whether they *perceive* advances for one group to be at the expense of their group. Furthermore, while, as discussed below, distinguishing between material and symbolic interests is extremely difficult, the survey measures explicitly refer to the source of conflict (e.g., jobs, political influence, economic opportunities). Lastly, the items clearly reflect intergroup conflict, rather than simple group interests, which is the focus of this study. Accordingly, recent studies of RGCT rely upon these measures to capture respondents' perceptions of group competition (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Oliver and Wong, 2003). Generally, these studies have employed perceived group competition as a dependent variable, precluding an exploration of its political implications. The present study not only explores the determinants of respondents' perceived group competition, but also whether it influences their public policy attitudes and candidate evaluations. Furthermore, the analysis is, to the author's knowledge, the first to compare the effects of perceived group competition and objective group residential conditions.

Realistic vs. Symbolic Interests

Lastly, group conflict and cooperation may occur as a consequence of concerns over realistic, material interests or symbolic interests. Realistic interests include tangible material gains or losses for either individuals or groups. For example, realistic concerns may center around unemployment, low wages, or access to affordable housing. As discussed above, perceived shared material concerns frequently fuel greater cohesion within groups (Huddy, 2003; Dawson, 1994). Yet, groups are also driven by their symbolic concerns, which involve the status and respect the group receives from certain outgroup members and society-at-large. Researchers have found psychological and symbolic factors may play an even more significant role than cost-

benefit considerations on intra and intergroup relations (Horowitz, 1985; Sidanius and Pratto, 2001; Simon et al., 1998). Yet, in many instances, it is difficult to separate realistic from symbolic concerns, since oftentimes greater access to material resources hints to an improvement in group status.

Realistic interests, either actual or perceived, appear to motivate stronger intergroup conflict and intragroup cohesion. As mentioned in the previous section, research suggests that, outside of racial politics, individuals who perceive their welfare is aligned with other group members tend to share similar political attitudes and behavior (Kinder, Adams and Gronke, 1989). For instance, Kinder, Adams and Gronke (1989) discover that certain groups such as teachers, labor unions, blacks and the elderly, were less inclined to vote for Ronald Reagan in the 1984 presidential election. Their mobilization was a function of their perception of the group's economic circumstances under the Reagan administration as well as the strength of their group identification.³ Huddy (2003) points out that fraternal deprivation, or group members' perception that the group is fairing worse economically than other groups, and group consciousness also motivate intergroup and intragroup behavior. For example, there is evidence that feelings of group deprivation encourage intergroup cohesion and intergroup conflict. Dube and Guimond (1986) demonstrate that Quebecois' feelings of fraternal deprivation relative to Anglophones in Montreal drove their intragroup solidarity, which heightened their more militant nationalistic attitudes. Similarly, Tripathi and Srivastava (1981) reveal that Indian Muslims who feel deprived relative to Indian Hindus express more positive ingroup attitudes than those who feel less deprived. In addition, they find that relative deprivation fuels outgroup antipathy. Their findings reveal Indian Muslims' feelings of relative group deprivation also drove more intensely negative attitudes about Hindus. Taken together, the findings suggest that group comparisons of economic circumstances in-

³Yet, it should be noted that Kinder, Adams and Gronke (1989) find that the relationship narrowly misses conventional levels of statistical significance.

fluence both intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behavior.

Group consciousness entails not only feelings of linked fate with other group members and perceptions of group deprivation, but also an awareness that group disparities are a consequence of unequal treatment (Miller et al., 1981). Feelings of unequal treatment are rooted in suspicions that group disparities are illegitimate. Empirical work demonstrates group consciousness mobilizes political participation and certain public policy attitudes among group members. The most consistent effect has shown group consciousness drives higher levels of political participation. Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk (1981) show that members of different groups (e.g., businessmen, women, the elderly, etc.) reported higher levels of voter turnout when they identified strongly with the group, felt the group was deprived relative to other groups, and blamed the system for the group condition, all components of group consciousness. In particular, they find this relationship exists among African Americans. Their results are supported by later evidence showing group consciousness drives blacks' vote choices and public policy attitudes (Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson, 1989). Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) show that group consciousness predicted blacks' support of Jesse Jackson in the 1984 Democratic presidential primaries and race-based public policies. In similar fashion, recent studies reveal group consciousness sparks stronger levels of political participation among Latinos (Stokes, 2003; Sanchez, 2006*b*,0). For instance, Sanchez (2006*b*) finds that Latino group consciousness increases Latino-specific political activities (e.g., working for a Latino candidate and engaging in demonstrations on Latino issues). In another study, Sanchez (2006*a*) discovers that group consciousness among Latinos also shapes their attitudes about Latino-specific issues such as immigration and bilingual education. Ultimately, these studies show that concerns over group material conditions can fundamentally shape whether group members decide to work toward common goals. There is little work to show how group consciousness influences intergroup relations; however, there is evidence that group consciousness does not necessarily lead

to antagonisms toward outgroups. For instance, Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) discover that while group consciousness influences group-relevant policies, it did not drive outgroup antipathy, particularly negative attitudes toward whites. Their findings suggest that while it may lead to intergroup cooperation, group consciousness will, at least, not lead to conflict.

Yet, although group members' perceived group interdependence, fraternal deprivation, and group consciousness reflect concerns over their collective realistic interests, they can not be entirely separated from their non-material or symbolic concerns. In particular, each assessment of realistic group interests is deeply tied to group identity. Evidence that group identity intensifies perceived group grievances and the perceived deprivation of the group begs questions about whether perceived common realistic fate, fraternal deprivation, and group consciousness accurately reflect objective realistic group interests.

Symbolic interests involve concerns about group status and esteem. Present examples of symbolic concerns involve the introduction of bilingual education, the acknowledgement of a federal holiday for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and gay marriage. There are no economic resources at stake for any of these issues; instead, they concern the respect afforded different groups in society. Oftentimes, symbolic interests are at play even when the group is not engaged in economic competition (Horowitz, 1985).

Symbolic concerns are inextricably tied to social identities. Social identities are rooted in the psychological pursuit of personal and group esteem. Since group identities are inextricably linked to personal identities, improving the group's status necessarily lifts self-esteem. Tajfel and his associates (1979; 1981) highlight the cognitive, evaluative and affective components of social identities. First, the researchers show that individuals are hard-wired to make group distinctions. Their minimal group experiment, which serves as the foundation for social identity theory, shows that people categorize others into groups even when the method of differentiating

between group members is apparently arbitrary.

Yet, the evaluative and affective components of social identity are central to pursuits among group members to improve their status. The evaluative element of one's group attachment concerns the value that one places on group membership (Tajfel, 1981). An individual may assess the value of the group as either positive or negative. Furthermore, the perceived value of group membership motivates a positive or negative affective response to the group label, driving the person to pursue strategies to either maintain or improve their group's status. These strategies may involve exiting from group membership, changing the reference point for making intergroup comparisons or inciting social competition. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue efforts to improve group status also depend on whether group members perceived group differences in social status and if they perceive such differences as legitimate. Recent work corroborates their conclusions by showing that low status groups express more group grievances and stronger group identification when their low status is viewed as the consequence of an arbitrary, illegitimate process (Ellemers, H. and A., 1993).

Symbolic interests, due to their relationship to social identity, may drive either intergroup cooperation or conflict, depending on the inclusiveness of individuals' group attachments. Recent studies reveal shared identities are critical for overcoming collective action problems (Klandermans, 2000). Ultimately, the more individuals identify with other members of the group, the more likely they will work toward common goals (Klandermans, 2003). Therefore, a shared, minority identity among blacks and Hispanics may motivate them to pursue objectives that improve the condition of both groups. Yet, their specific racial or ethnic group attachments present major obstacles to collective action. In order for cooperation to occur, group members must, first, identify themselves with their respective racial and ethnic groups and then acknowledge their common interests and collective identity with each other. Traditionally, African Americans have been a cohesive group in spite of their increasing social and economic heterogeneity; however, pan-ethnic identities

among Latinos tend to be more tenuous (DeSipio, 1996). Several factors contribute to the difficulties involved in creating a shared identity among Latinos such as racial and socioeconomic stratification as well as the the tendency of Latino subgroups to gravitate toward different geographic locations (DeSipio, 1996).

In addition, research reveals an asymmetry in the perceived commonality between African Americans and Latinos. Kaufmann (2003) discovers that while African Americans perceive themselves to have much in common with Latinos, Hispanics tend to think they have little in common with African Americans (see also McClain et al., 2006). These findings suggest Latinos would work to improve their group's condition without regard to African Americans' group status. However, Hispanics with a pan-ethnic Latino identity are more likely to have an affinity toward blacks (Kaufmann, 2003). Ultimately, the findings suggest that Latinos play a critical role in facilitating black-Latino alliances since their sense of pan-Latino identity encourages greater perceived commonalities between both groups. Such commonalities are vital for creating a collective identity between group members. Kaufmann argues that the results speak to the importance of Latino political elites and organizations in generating stronger pan-ethnic identities among Latinos and suggests that a mobilized Latino community could lead to the establishment of mass political alliances with black Americans. Nevertheless, while Kaufmann (2003) provides suggestive evidence that common goals may facilitate greater intergroup cooperation, the study does not explore the sources of the perceived commonality between the groups, nor does it reveal the political consequences.

Although symbolic interests are related to non-material concerns, that is not to suggest that they are divorced from how resources are distributed in society. Group status is often associated with the distribution of scarce resources between groups. As such, concerns over group material interests are inextricably linked to social identity and strategies to either improve or maintain group status (Mummendey

et al., 1999).⁴ Thus, among minorities, battles over, for example, affirmative action not only reflect efforts to gain greater access to better opportunities and resources, but also signals America's commitment to improving the status of minorities and other disadvantaged groups.

Nevertheless, there is work to suggest realistic and symbolic interests differ in their political consequences. For instance, Tate (1993) discovers that the strength of blacks' racial identity, which is associated with symbolic concerns, predicted their support for Jesse Jackson, an African-American candidate, in the 1984 and 1988 Democratic presidential primaries. However, when looking at the support for the eventual presidential candidates, blacks' perceived economic common fate influenced their support for the Democratic candidate more than their racial identity. Tate (1993) suggests that symbolic interests are likely to have a stronger influence on issues that signal an improvement in blacks' status (e.g., the election of a black president, recognition of the Martin Luther King holiday) in society, while realistic group interests shape preferences concerning group material conditions, regardless of the symbolic implications.

To date, few studies have sufficiently disentangled the effect of realistic interests from symbolic concerns (Huddy, 2003). The intention of this study is to assess the influence of realistic group interests on the propensity for blacks and Latinos to engage in political alliances; the focus is less on the impact of symbolic interests. The project differs from previous work on intergroup relations by offering both measures of subjective perceptions of competition and objective group material conditions. The subjective measure of zero-sum competition is believed to accurately capture participants' assessment of their realistic group interests; nevertheless, given the subjective nature of the item, they may still capture underlying symbolic concerns as well. Accordingly, the study uses indicators of the racial and economic contexts

⁴The role of perceived realistic group interests and relative deprivation do not diminish the impact of other sociostructural variables such as (1) the perceived legitimacy of group status and (2) the permeability of group boundaries.

within respondents' neighborhoods to judge their realistic group interests in a way that is detached from their symbolic concerns. The use of both survey items and indicators of the residential context to capture realistic group interests separates this project from previous studies.

In summation, interests, either actual or perceived, clearly shape whether groups chose to either engage in conflict or cooperation. In particular, I expect both personal and group interests to impact the prospects for black-Latino political alliances. While the literature suggests that economic self-interests have a limited impact on political attitudes and behavior, these studies have primarily focused on relations between whites and blacks. Yet, recent studies have suggested that personal economic considerations are more important for inter-minority relations. In particular, concerns about an individual's economic well-being and that of their immediate family are expected to ignite intergroup conflict between blacks and Latinos, especially since they are increasingly placed in circumstances where they must compete over scarce resources. However, self-interests are often tied to group interests, which prove even more consequential for intergroup behavior. As discussed above, these interests can be real or perceived, material or symbolic, but they have been shown to encourage intragroup cohesion and, at times, intergroup conflict. There is less work to suggest how these interests would impact intergroup cooperation.

Perceived Threat from Immigration

When assessing the determinants and implications of blacks' perceived threat from Latinos, it is frequently difficult to separate feelings about the group from broader social phenomena. In particular, African Americans' perceived competition with Latinos may be driven less by their concerns about Latinos per se, than the consequences of immigration often associated with Latinos. The major criticism of immigration policies in the United States centers around the concern that immigrants take jobs away from native-born workers and drain the resources for social

services from local governments and municipalities. Accordingly, recent work shows that zero-sum beliefs about the impact of immigration motivate more negative attitudes about immigration and immigrants. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong (2001) explore the relationship between whites' perceived threat from immigration and ethnic prejudice to their overall attitudes toward immigration. They discover that perceived competition from immigrants mediated the relationship between respondents' social dominance orientation and their attitudes toward immigration. Moreover, they demonstrate attitudes toward immigration are driven less by ethnic prejudices about the immigrant group, than underlying beliefs about competition with the group. Yet, the perceived threat from immigration may not be as influential for all groups. Indeed, the researchers discover the relationship was more negative when applied to Asian than black immigrants. Given the strong association with immigration and Latinos in addition to the increasingly shared circumstances of blacks and Hispanics in the United States, a measure of black respondents' perceived threat from immigration was included as a control variable in the analysis to determine whether their attitudes and perceptions are directed at immigration or Latinos specifically.

Racial Prejudice

A final complication to understanding the prospects for political alliances between African Americans and Latinos involves the role of racial prejudice. The realistic approach presumes that, barring the existence of conflicting group material interests, there would be no basis for intergroup conflict. However, a preponderance of evidence shows that intergroup conflict also occurs as a consequence of racial prejudices felt towards another group. As such, group conflicts over interests may merely serve as a proxy for blacks' and Latinos' underlying racial attitudes about one another. Yet, some research suggests that racial prejudice and realistic group conflict are related, suggesting racial prejudice is motivated by underlying competition

between groups over their relative position in society (Blumer, 1958). Given these considerations, the analysis for this project compares the influence of racial prejudice and realistic group conflict on the prospects for black-Latino political alliances.

The classical prejudice model proposes that racial prejudice is negative affect caused by an individual's psychological predisposition for categorization (Allport, 1954). According to Allport (1954), the content of such stereotypes is informed by cultural ideas acquired through socialization. Studies of classical racial prejudice typically utilize measures that assess participants' agreement with a series of questions that ask them to evaluate groups along a number of positive and negative group traits (e.g., intelligence, laziness, and self-sufficiency). These measures have been shown to reduce whites' support for policies perceived to benefit blacks such as affirmative action and school busing plans (Carmines and Layman, 1998; Gilens, 1995). However, declining levels of agreement to racial stereotype items-in spite of persistent discriminatory practices-have led to concerns that white prejudice has become less overt in nature. ⁵

As a consequence, researchers have developed a number of variations to the classical prejudice model, each proposing that racial prejudice has taken on a new form. Although these alternative versions have been given different labels such as symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears, 1981), modern racism (McConahay, 1986) and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders, 1996), they share similar assumptions about the nature of modern expressions of racial prejudice. These approaches suggest whites' negative feelings toward blacks are due to a belief among white Americans that blacks receive advantages for which they are not entitled. Although factorially distinct (McConahay, 1986), the political implications of modern forms of racism are similar to the classical version in that they result in opposition to black candidates (Kinder and Sears, 1981) and race-based policies (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Critics

⁵Notwithstanding, moderate portions of respondents continue to agree with the racial stereotype items

of the new racism theory argue that modern racism offers unique conceptual and measurement problems-chief among them being disentangling the political effects of racial prejudice from political ideology (Bobo, 1983; Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; Feldman and Huddy, 2005). Yet, recent work confirms modern racism as a valid measure of traditional racial attitudes and behavior (Feldman and Huddy, 2005).

Although the literature on racial prejudice has tended to focus on white racial attitudes of African Americans, recent work has started to explore the racial attitudes that minorities hold towards one another. There is some evidence that blacks' racial prejudice toward Latinos tends to be lower than that expressed by Anglo-Americans (Cummings and Lambert, 1997). The result is corroborated by work showing that blacks tend to perceive commonalities with Hispanic Americans (Kaufmann, 2003). In contrast, McClain and her colleagues (2006) discover that racial attitudes among Latinos toward African Americans are more negative than the attitudes of whites. Accordingly, Latinos believe they have more in common with whites and the least in common with blacks. Taken together, the findings reveal an asymmetry in the racial attitudes of both groups that suggests Latinos may impede black-Latino political cooperation.

Overall, the concern is that blacks and Latinos may be reluctant to engage in political alliances more due to their underlying prejudices towards one another rather than their concerns over economic and political competition. Accordingly, the present analysis observes the influence of personal and group interests when controlling for racial prejudice.

Elite Messages and Group Interests

Lastly, the present project contributes to the existing literature by exploring the effect of elite appeals to group interests on blacks' and Latinos' political attitudes and behavior. Throughout this chapter, the focus has been largely on the group interests conveyed by group material conditions and the racial context. However,

the political environment also influences intergroup relations. In particular, political elites shape the discourse surrounding the distribution of resources among groups and, consequently, either fuel intergroup competition or encourage intra-group cohesion and intergroup cooperation (Huddy, 2003; Kaufmann, 2003). In this respect, political elites are critical for overcoming collective action problems between African Americans and Latinos. The early literature on political persuasion concentrates on how citizens utilize the information provided by candidates to make their vote decisions (Campbell et al., 1960; Lazerfeld and Gaudet, 1944). Campbell and his colleagues (1960) argue that citizens' vote choices are rooted in their party affiliations, personal issue orientations, and the issue positions of the candidates.⁶

Nevertheless, other studies show that, rather than basing their judgments on the issue positions of the candidates, citizens utilize information shortcuts, or heuristics, to reduce the costs of acquiring information. In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), Downs argues that due to the high costs and the limited personal returns to becoming politically informed, rational citizens rely upon the guidance of elites who share their political values in order to make their decisions. The reliance on heuristics as a basis for political evaluation is particularly prevalent when elites are divided on an issue (Zaller, 1992). Under these circumstances, citizens follow leaders that share their ideological and partisan beliefs. Likewise, one would expect people from different racial and ethnic minority groups to use a politician's racial and ethnic identity as an indication of whether they represent their group interests, particularly within political environments where they are presented with diverse and often conflicting messages. This expectation is corroborated by evidence that members of racial and ethnic minority groups participate more when ingroup members

⁶The Michigan researchers utilized a decidedly memory-based model of political decision-making in which voters conjure up information from which to base their judgments. Other researchers contend that analysts' use of memory-based models is responsible for the evidence of citizens' seemingly limited political knowledge (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995; Lodge, McGraw and Stroh, 1989). Instead, these analysts favor an on-line model of information processing that attends to the affective components of each message, which is eventually tallied to make an overall evaluation.

are political officeholders (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Gilliam, 1996). In fact, previous research suggests the racial identification of political candidates may be such a powerful cue that ingroup members disregard the ideological predisposition of the candidate (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994). The race of the candidate could serve as a cue of his or her concern for either realistic or symbolic group interests. First, group members may believe a co-ethnic candidate will pursue issues that will improve their access to material resources. On the other hand, the election of a co-ethnic candidate may signal the improved standing of the group in society.

Similarly, group-based messages should shape the political evaluations of group identifiers. Prior work indicates citizens base their judgments of political candidates and public policies on personal assessments of which group the candidate or policy will benefit (Converse, 1964; Nelson and Kinder, 1996). Nelson and Kinder (1996) show that public opinion about social policies is strongly influenced by the groups depicted as the primary beneficiaries. For example, the researchers discover that prejudiced whites oppose affirmative action more strongly when it is described as providing blacks undeserved preferences. These assessments are often relayed to citizens through the messages of political elites. Alternatively, rather than serving as a heuristic, group-based messages may, as mentioned above, merely increase the political salience of group concerns. Unfortunately, little work has investigated the influence of elite group-based messages on the political attitudes and behavior of African Americans and Hispanics. In one exception, White (2007) shows that explicit racial cues trigger racial thinking among blacks by making their ingroup identity more salient; the results show this is the case even for non-racial issues. The present study breaks new ground by not only exploring the impact of group messages on preferences for ingroup candidates, but also whether appeals to the shared interests of African Americans and Latinos can encourage them to engage in electoral alliances.

2.3 Hypotheses

The theoretical discussion leads to a number of hypotheses. Clearly, the hypotheses explore the independent influence of each theoretical explanation. However, I am also concerned with the influence of each theory compared to the others.

Economic Self-Interest Hypothesis

The first hypothesis deals with the impact of economic self-interests on relationships between African Americans and Latinos. While economic self-interests have not been found to have a significant influence on white Americans' attitudes toward minorities, my expectation is that self-interests are more consequential in relations between racial and ethnic minorities because they are often placed within contexts where they experience limited access to material resources. While previous studies suggest the impact of economic self-interests on inter-minority attitudes is also limited, they are not focused on relationships between particular groups (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Given the similar social position of blacks and Latinos, there is good reason to expect economic self-interests to influence the dynamics of their relationship more between other groups. These conclusions lead to the following hypothesis:

H1: Economically-deprived group members are more likely to view their group as being engaged in realistic group competition with the outgroup and exhibit an ingroup bias in their political attitudes and behavior than better-off group members.

For the present purposes, economic self-interests are captured by respondents' reported employment status, occupation, family income, education, and homeownership. The effect of each indicator may vary across metropolitan contexts, but their influence uniformly reflects individuals' fundamental concern about the material gains and losses that either they or their immediate family experience.

Residential Group Conflict Hypothesis

Another expectation is that relationships between blacks and Latinos are shaped by their residential context. Specifically, their group material conditions *in combination* with the racial compositions within their environments are likely to shape their views about the outgroup. In particular, I expect tensions between both groups will be at their strongest in areas where the ingroup has limited access to material resources *and* where there are high concentrations of outgroup members. It is believed such environments most accurately convey realistic group interests. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Blacks and Latinos living in environments where ingroup members have limited access to material resources *as well as* where there is a high concentration of outgroup members are more likely to perceive group competition with the outgroup and hold an ingroup bias in their attitudes toward race-based public policies.

To test this hypothesis, measures of the percentage of the ingroup living below the poverty line and with less than a high school diploma are used as indicators of group material conditions. These measures are interacted with the percentage of outgroup members to capture conditions that could potentially fuel realistic group conflict. All of the contextual indicators were measured at the census block level.

Perceived Group Conflict Hypothesis

In addition to objective group conditions, perceived group conditions are also expected to impact intergroup attitudes between African Americans and Latinos. Specifically, the perception that gains for one group come at the expense of the other is likely to heighten intergroup tensions. Accordingly, the third hypothesis is as follows:

H3: Blacks and Latinos who perceive gains in material resources and group status for another group at the expense of their own group will favor policies that benefit their group more than the other and oppose the outgroup minority candidate than those with weaker perceptions of zero-sum competition.

Mediated Conflict Hypothesis

As an extension of the economic self-interest and perceived group conflict hypotheses, there is the expectation that both objective and perceived group conditions are related to one another. Specifically, the relationship between participants' economic self-interests and the objective context to their political attitudes should occur as a consequence of group members' subjective assessment of their environment. Consequently,:

H4: The relationship between economic self-interests and unfavorable racial and economic conditions on political attitudes is mediated by group members' perceived group competition with the outgroup.

Elite Messages

The remaining hypotheses specifically relate to the survey experiment reported in Chapter 7. There is an expectation that messages from political elites convey group interests. These messages may speak either to the interests of a particular group or common group concerns. Accordingly, the following hypotheses work toward explaining how these elite messages are expected to impact participants' evaluation of outgroup candidates.

Ingroup Bias Hypothesis

First, blacks and Latinos are expected to exhibit a consistent ingroup bias in their candidate evaluations. Specifically, black participants should prefer black candidates to Latino candidates and Latinos should favor Latino candidates to black candidates. I expect these results regardless of the messages expressed by either candidate. Therefore, the hypothesis is as follows:

H5: Group members will prefer co-ethnic candidates over outgroup candidates regardless of the messages each candidate endorses.

Cross-Group Message Hypothesis

Yet, elite messages should matter. In particular, elite messages that speak to the shared interests between groups are less likely to increase tensions and, instead, according to the tenets of realistic group conflict theory, will encourage intergroup cooperation. Therefore, I expect:

H6: Elite messages that emphasize superordinate interests between blacks and Latinos will increase group members' evaluations of outgroup candidates.

Moderated Cross-Group Message Hypothesis

Alternatively, participants' perceived group competition with the outgroup is likely to make them more sensitive to the group interests conveyed by the messages of outgroup candidates. In this case, I suspect highly-threatened group members will be more likely to prefer cross-group messages from outgroup candidates. These messages would effectively mollify their concerns that the candidate will not address their group interests. The hypothesis is as follows:

H7: Highly-threatened group members will express more positive evaluations of the outgroup candidates when they speak to shared, superordinate interests.

Ingroup Message Hypothesis

With respect to group-centric appeals, it is expected that they will work to fuel group tensions between blacks and Latinos. Ingroup messages by outgroup candidates offer a cue that the candidate will neglect group members' collective concerns. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:

H8: Elite messages that exclusively speak to the interests of outgroups without reference to ingroup concerns will decrease group members' evaluations of outgroup candidates.

Moderated Ingroup Message Hypothesis

Again, participants' reaction to the ingroup message is expected to vary depending on how threatened they feel from the outgroup. Specifically, highly-threatened group members are likely to exhibit strong opposition to candidates that speak only to their sectarian group interests. Such narrow, group-specific appeals offer no cues that the candidate will address their group concerns. Therefore, I expect:

H9: Highly-threatened group members will express more negative evaluations of the outgroup candidates when they speak to narrow, group-specific interests.

The empirical chapters utilize survey data as well as an experiment to judge the validity of these hypotheses.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this chapter explored how economic, social, and political conditions can drive blacks and Latinos to view one another as competitors as well as partners in the pursuit of their mutual group interests. Realistic interest theories serve as the primary theoretical framework for the forthcoming analysis. Concerns of tangible, defined personal and group interests are expected to either dissuade or encourage African Americans and Latinos from working together toward common goals. When economic competition exists between blacks and Latinos and, consequently, their conflicting interests are more salient, the more proximate realistic interests of their racial and ethnic group are more likely to undermine their openness to political cooperation. The present study promotes African Americans' and Latinos' racial and economic contexts as good approximations of objective realistic group interests. Environmental conditions can capture, as realistic group conflict theory proposes, how one group makes the other more economically-vulnerable. Of course, subjective assessments of group interests can be equally or more consequential. Nevertheless, whether perceived or objective, realistic group interests can either heighten group

tensions or facilitate intergroup cohesion and, consequently, cooperation. Yet, in spite of the fact that increasing competition over access to scarce resources may fuel tensions between African Americans and Latinos, political elites may be able to facilitate political cooperation by communicating the mutual interests of both groups.

The remaining chapters report the data and results from an empirical analysis of the theoretical propositions advanced in this chapter. Chapter 3 explains the survey data to be used in the first portion of the analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the determinants of blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition as well as their ingroup policy favoritism for race-based public policies. Chapter 6 describes the methods utilized in the experimental study and is followed by chapter 7, which explores the impact of elite group-based messages on the potential for black-Latino political cooperation. Ultimately, the project sheds light on whether shared realistic group interests, in spite of competitive environments, can encourage African Americans and Latinos to overcome their collective action problems.

Chapter 3

Survey Data and Methods

This chapter describes the data utilized in chapters 4 and 5 to test the key hypotheses regarding the role of economic self-interests and group interests, either objective or perceived, on the potential for African Americans and Hispanics to work together toward common goals. The selection of data for the project was motivated by four criteria. First, the data needed to comprise samples of African Americans and Latinos large enough to perform multivariate analysis. Given the dearth of such oversamples, the range of available datasets was limited. Secondly, the survey data needed to include questions measuring respondents' relevant individual characteristics and attitudes such as their personal economic standing (e.g., employment status, income, education, and home ownership), perceived competition with other groups, and, also, the intensity of their racial prejudices toward other groups. Thirdly, the survey data needed to be gathered across different metropolitan contexts. Indeed, different urban areas may vary considerably with respect to the distribution of blacks and Latinos within the population as well as the residential and economic patterns that influence their relationships. Therefore, data collected from more than one metropolitan area was sought to ensure the hypotheses were not context-dependent. Fourth, it was important that the data utilized for the study captured the economic conditions and racial composition of respondents' neighborhoods. Such indicators

are vital for understanding whether objective conditions reflected the potential for group competition. Ultimately, each of these criteria are reflected in the data utilized to test the hypotheses. A thorough discussion of the survey data is offered below.

3.1 1992-94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality

The analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 relies upon the 1992-94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), which was originally designed to investigate how changing labor markets, racial attitudes, and racial residential conditions work independently or in combination to foster inequality in urban spaces. The MCSUI is composed of data from two surveys: (1) a survey of households and (2) a survey of employers. The household surveys were conducted via in-person interviews with residents 21 years of age and older. Multi-staged probability sampling covered four major metropolitan areas in the United States including Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. While similar, the sampling methods employed in each city varied and will be discussed in detail below. Overall, the household survey consists of 8,947 respondents. Due to oversampling within particular areas, there was considerable racial and ethnic diversity; among those not reporting a Latino ethnic identity, there were 2,792 whites, 3,099 African Americans, 1,129 Asians, 23 American Indians, and 75 respondents who identified themselves as "Other". Additionally, there were 1,790 respondents who self-identified as having Spanish or Hispanic origin. The response rates were quite high, ranging from .68 (Los Angeles) to .78 (Detroit) across subsamples.¹ The second survey targeted business establishments in each metropolitan area. Due to its limited relevancy to the project, the sample of employers is not utilized.

For the purposes of this study, the household samples from Atlanta and Detroit

¹The response rates reflect the ratio of completed interviews to eligible households.

were excluded due to the homogeneity of their populations.² Therefore, Los Angeles and Boston are the primary focus of the analyses. Each of these urban centers vary substantially with respect to their racial and ethnic makeup as well as their political, social, and economic conditions. Los Angeles presents an ideal location for investigating relationships between African Americans and Latinos; the city comprises a vibrant and rapidly growing Latino community along with a smaller, but entrenched population of African Americans. Assuming the projected growth of the Latino community is correct, Los Angeles resembles what many urban spaces in the United States will look like in the future. By comparison, Boston's black and Latino populations are much smaller, although having grown since the data was collected. Furthermore, the national origins of the Latino populations in Boston and Los Angeles differ; while the Hispanic community in Los Angeles descends predominantly from Mexico, the national origin of Latinos from Boston is overwhelmingly from Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. However, despite these differences, the economic and political forces that shape relationships between blacks and Latinos are believed to be similar in both places. Ultimately, the MCSUI offers one of the earliest and largest multi-racial samples to assess respondents' attitudes and perceptions of other racial and ethnic groups.

Lastly, the MCSUI allows for aggregate, contextual data of respondents' residential context to be linked to their survey responses. A randomly-generated geocode was assigned to each respondents' census block, which then could be merged to corresponding geocodes included within a separate data file compiled by the principal investigators from 1990 Census Bureau sample data. The contextual data offer measures that are central to the key hypotheses such as the racial composition of respondents' neighborhoods as well as their group material conditions.

²The samples from Atlanta and Detroit are overwhelmingly African American.

Sample Design

Each household in the sample was drawn using a multi-staged stratified, clustered area probability design. Responses were collected through face-to-face interviews. In each city, there were certain populations that were oversampled in order to perform more sophisticated analyses within subgroups. In almost all cases, African-American and low-income households were drawn disproportionately from the population. In Los Angeles, there was an effort to not only draw a larger sample of African-American and poor households, but also to gain a larger and more diverse sample of Asian Americans who identified as being of Korean, Japanese, or Chinese descent. Given the larger size of the Anglo-American and Hispanic-American populations in Los Angeles, there was no effort to acquire oversamples. Their responses were taken by sampling within predominantly white, Latino, and mixed census tracts. In contrast, a larger Latino sample was desired in Boston. The stratified cluster design was employed as a strategy for acquiring oversamples of the preferred populations. This method involved drawing households located within areas with concentrated minority and poor populations.

Generally, the first stage of the sampling design grouped different geographically-defined units (e.g., tracts or blocks) according to their racial/ethnic compositions and income brackets. Afterwards, the stratified units were ordered according to the proportional size of the targeted group within each geographic unit and were selected based on probability proportional to size estimation within strata. To acquire the oversamples, disproportionate sampling rates were utilized within selected strata. At the final stage, adults 21 years of age and older were randomly selected within households from the selected areas, with equal probability of selection. Since the stratification procedures varied slightly across subsamples, the sampling designs for both Los Angeles and Boston are discussed below.

Survey Weights

Given the stratification procedures and disproportionate sampling rates, sampling weights are required for proper analysis. Accordingly, two weights are included in the data file. First, the data includes a post-stratified, nonresponse adjusted household weight. Based on the race/ethnicity of the respondent, the weight adjusts responses in accordance with the relative distribution of households by race/ethnicity reported in the 1990 Census. The second weight compensates for variances in household size. It is calculated by multiplying the household weight by the number of eligible persons per household. Therefore, it adjusts for the strata-specific sampling weights as well as differences in household size. The weight adjusts the sample so that it reflects the proportionate distribution of age, race, and gender within the adult population. Again, the population distributions are based on estimates reported in the 1990 Census. Since it adjusts for both the distribution of households and household size, the person weight is employed in the analysis reported in chapters 4 and 5.

3.2 Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality

The Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality (LASUI) is the largest subsample of the MCSUI. In-person interviews were conducted between September 9, 1993 and August 15, 1994. Each individual household was recruited by, first, selecting among census tracts, then, blocks within tracts, and, lastly, households located on selected blocks. The first two stages utilized a probability proportional to size selection and the third stage employed equal probability sampling. The sampling methodology is discussed in greater detail below.

Overall, the LASUI drew a sample of 4,023 participants, which included 835 whites and an oversample of African Americans and Asian Americans with 1,104

blacks and 1,058 Asians.³ There were also two respondents that classified themselves as Native American and ten as "Other". In addition to their racial identification, there were 1,025 respondents who identified themselves as being of Hispanic or Spanish descent.

Sample Design

To be more specific about the sampling strategy, after eliminating census tracts without households, the remaining 1,632 tracts were stratified by race-ethnicity and by poverty status. The three-stage sampling process began by creating strata based on the racial/ethnic composition and poverty status of residents within census tracts in Los Angeles. Six race/ethnicity strata were initially created. The first three strata were assigned to tracts where the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese populations were above 10 percent of the residents. Furthermore, there was a strata established for areas where the non-Hispanic black populations were greater than 50 percent. Then, a stratum was created where Latino residents comprised more than 50 percent of the population. The final stratum comprised tracts that consisted of racially-mixed populations (i.e., areas where no racial/ethnic group comprised a majority). Nested within the racial/ethnic strata were three strata that accounted for differences in poverty status: low poverty, medium poverty, and high poverty. The low poverty stratum includes areas where less than 20% of the residents live below the poverty line. The medium poverty stratum includes areas where 20-30% of residents live in poverty. Lastly, the high poverty stratum captures areas where the percentage of residents living below the poverty line is greater than 40%. Since there were few high poverty census tracts for neighborhoods heavily populated by Asian Americans, the high and medium poverty strata were collapsed. Considering the nested strata, there

³The Anglo, African-American, and Asian participants represent individuals who did not identify as Latinos

Table 3.1: Sample Distribution Across Strata in Los Angeles

Racial Strata	Low Poverty	Medium Poverty	High Poverty
Black Respondents			
Majority Black	280 (26.2%)	297 (27.8%)	179 (16.8%)
Majority Latino	—	6 (.5%)	47 (4.4%)
At least 10% Japanese	2 (.2%)	—	—
At least 10% Korean	1 (.1%)	54 (5.0%)	—
At least 10% Chinese	3 (2.8%)	2 (.2%)	—
Racially-mixed	29 (2.7%)	81 (7.6%)	86 (8.0%)
Latino Respondents			
Majority Black	37 (3.9%)	46 (4.8%)	10 (1.0%)
Majority Latino	72 (7.5%)	224 (23.6%)	252 (26.5%)
At least 10% Japanese	29 (3.0%)	—	—
At least 10% Korean	1 (.1%)	48 (5.0%)	—
At least 10% Chinese	64 (6.7%)	17 (1.8%)	—
Racially-mixed	101 (10.6%)	42 (4.4%)	7 (.7%)

Note: The numbers in each category reflect the raw number of respondents collected within each strata. Numbers within parentheses reflect the approximate proportion of the sample within each stratum.

was a total of 15 stratum created within the sampling design.⁴ Sampling rates varied from stratum to stratum as a means of acquiring the desired sample, particularly to facilitate oversampling from African-American and Asian households as well as households within high poverty areas.

In the second stage, blocks within each tract were ordered with respect to the

⁴These strata include areas where: (1) residents are predominantly non-Hispanic black and less than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (2) residents are predominantly non-Hispanic black and 20-30% of residents live in poverty, (3) there is a majority of non-Hispanic black residents and greater than 40% of the resident live in poverty, (4) at least 10% of the residents are Japanese and less than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (5) at least 10% of the residents are Japanese and more than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (6) Korean residents comprise more than 10% of the residents and less than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (7) Korean residents comprise more than 10% of the population and greater than 20% of the residents live in poverty, (8) at least 10% of residents are Chinese and less than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (9) at least 10% of residents are Chinese and more than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (10) Latino residents comprise more than 50% of the residents and less than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (11) Latino residents comprise more than 50% of the residents and 20-30% of the population lives in poverty, (12) Latino residents comprise more than 50% of the residents and greater than 40% of the population live in poverty, (13) the population is racially-mixed and less than 20% of the population lives in poverty, (14) the population is racially-mixed and 20-30% of the residents live in poverty, and (15) the population is racially-mixed and more than 40% of the residents live in poverty.

concentration of the targeted racial or ethnic group. As an example, this means that blocks within the stratum for blacks were ordered according to the proportion of blacks in the population and so forth for the other racial/ethnic strata. For the mixed stratum, blocks were ordered by the percentage of the African-American population. This strategy increased the probability of recruiting more African Americans, which was a serious concern of the principal investigators. A systematic process of random sampling was then applied according to the cumulative size of the targeted population within each stratum. Across strata, 567 block selections were made.

In the final stage, households within census blocks were selected through an equal probability of selection sampling method. The UCLA Survey Research Center (SRC) employed block listers to identify and list all housing units within the selected blocks. Based on the lists of housing units, systematic random sampling was applied to select households.

Table 3.1 reports the distribution of the sample for both black and Latino respondents across each of the strata. A plurality of African American respondents were sampled from medium or high poverty census tracts (26.2% and 16.8%, respectively). These numbers are a function of the principal investigators' efforts to gain an oversample of African Americans. Beyond predominantly black census tracts, many African Americans were sampled from mixed census tracts (18.3%). Across economic strata, most of the black respondents were drawn from medium poverty areas followed respectively by high and low poverty neighborhoods. Among Latinos, a majority of the respondents were selected within areas with high proportions of Latino residents. The next larger proportion were drawn from mixed census tracts. Yet, similar to African Americans, most Hispanic Angelenos were sampled from medium poverty census tracts.

Survey Weights

As a consequence of the oversample of poor blacks and Latinos, analysis weights were applied to approximate the racial/ethnic mix that resembles their proportions in Los Angeles County. For this analysis, a person sampling weight was employed, which multiplied a housing weight supplied in the data set by the number of eligible persons in the household. Ultimately, the person weight corrects for the strata-specific sampling weights utilized for each of the three stages of sample selections as well as differences in household size. The weighted sample is distributed approximately as the eligible population (i.e., adults who identify as white, black, Hispanic, or Asian of Japanese, Korean, or Chinese descent) in Los Angeles County.

Questionnaire Translation

The English version of the questionnaire was translated into five languages: Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, and Korean. Professional translators with prior experience in translating questionnaires were hired for each translation. Each foreign language version was back-translated into English to confirm the integrity of the questionnaire was maintained. Discrepancies in interpretation between the original translators and back-translators were resolved by both translators discussing their differences and making a final decision. Bilingual interviewers also reviewed the questionnaire since they often can detect language that is either too formal or sophisticated for the average respondent.

Response Rates

Since 4,025 interviews were completed out of 5,885 eligible households, the raw response rate was 68 percent. An adjusted response rate, which assumes the non-response categories (i.e., nobody home, no access, and screen refusal) would have been ineligible, climbed to 73 percent. Furthermore, the response rates varied across

strata, ranging from a low of 55 percent for Japanese low-poverty blocks to a high of 87 percent in mixed-race, high poverty blocks. Interestingly, on average, the response rates were higher in high-poverty areas than in low-poverty areas.

Sociodemographic Characteristics

Lastly, the sociodemographic characteristics of African Americans, Hispanics, and Anglos in the sample are reported. Affected early by the immigration patterns now being felt across the country, Los Angeles offers a glimpse of the future demographic makeup of urban centers. Table 3.2 reports some of the individual-level characteristics of black, Latino, and white respondents in the Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality (LASUI).⁵ While this research is primarily concerned about relationships between blacks and Latinos, the sociodemographic characteristics of Anglo Americans are also offered on the basis of making comparisons. On the whole, these comparisons corroborate evidence that blacks and Hispanics experience dramatically disparate economic outcomes than their white counterparts.

First, consider the age of each group. The marginals reveal that a majority of black respondents in the LASUI are below 50 years of age (74.2%), approximately 11 percent (11.2%) below 25 years old and 63 percent between the age of 25 and 50 years old. This proportion is on par with the Latino population (81.1%). Over 16 percent (16.4%) of Latinos are below 25 years old and approximately 65 percent (64.9%) are between 25 and 50 years old. The young Latino population likely reflects the fact that young, able-bodied individuals are more inclined to immigrate for economic opportunities. By comparison, only approximately 64 percent (64.2%) of white Angelenos were younger than 50 years old, with approximately 7 percent (7.3%) below 25 years old and roughly 57 percent (56.9%) between 25 and 50 years old. In contrast, the Anglo sample tends to be an older population, with approximately 36

⁵The frequencies for each sociodemographic variables reflect the relative percentages after accounting for differential sampling within each strata.

percent over 50 years old (33% between 50 and 75 years old and 2.8% above the age of 75 years old). Only a little over 26 percent (21.5% between 50 and 75 years old and 4.9% over 75 years of age) of blacks and almost 19 percent (17.6% between 50 and 75 years old and 1.1% above 75 years old) of Latinos were over 50 years old.

On the other hand, the table reveals the gender distribution of each group is virtually identical. In all three groups, women and men split the sample almost evenly. Among African Americans and Anglos, females comprise a little over a majority of the sample (50.5% and 50.9%, respectively), while they are exactly half of the sample for Latinos.

With respect to party identification, the data show clear differences in party attachments between each group. As expected, the analysis reveals that black Angelenos affiliate themselves overwhelmingly with the Democratic Party (69.5%). This is a significant proportion of Democratic party identifiers as compared to the proportion of Democrats among the Latino and Anglo populations (31.5% and 37.9%, respectively). In contrast, a large percentage of Latinos in the sample reported themselves as being independents (59.8%), which according to the present coding includes independents (11.4%) as well as participants who expressed no preference either for religious reasons or otherwise (1.2% and 46.2%, respectively), preferred other options (.7%), or reported not knowing (.3%).⁶ African Americans and white Americans tend to have far fewer independents (25% and 30.6%, respectively) than Latinos. Yet, when looking at attachments to the Republican party, it is clear that most blacks and Hispanics in Los Angeles do not perceive the Republican party as representing their political preferences. Less than ten percent of both communities identified themselves as Republicans (5.5% for blacks and 8.7% for Latinos) as compared to approximately one-third of white Angelenos (31.5%).

⁶The propensity for Latinos to not express a preference for a particular political party is likely a function of their population being comprised of large proportions of first and second generation immigrants, who tend to be less socialized to the political system than their Latino counterparts who have greater experiences with the American political environment.

As expected, the sample varies across groups with respect to their country of birth. A large segment of the Latino community was foreign born as compared to either Anglos or African Americans. A little over 70 percent of Latino respondents reported their place of birth as being outside the United States (72.0%), while 28 percent of Latinos in the sample were born in the United States. These proportions vary significantly from both blacks and whites. Almost 90 percent (89.9%) of African Americans report having been born in the United States, with the remaining 10 percent claiming foreign birth (10.1%). Similarly, approximately 85 percent (84.9%) of white Angelenos were born in the United States, while about 15 percent were foreign-born (15.1%).

For Latinos, the estimates uncover their national descent. Over 70 percent (71.6%) of the Latino sample in Los Angeles is comprised of respondents that identify as either Mexican or Mexican American. By comparison, only 3 percent of respondents report themselves as Puerto Rican (1.3%) or Cuban (1.7%). Moreover, only a fraction of 1 percent identify themselves as Dominican (.01%). The remainder hail from a variety of other Central and South American countries as well as Spain (25.4%). This finding is consistent with previous evidence that Mexican immigrants have historically gravitated toward the southwestern region of the United States as compared to Latinos that descend from other nations (DeSipio, 1996).

Since concerns about group material resources are central to the project, consider the socioeconomic status of each group in Los Angeles. First, the evidence indicates most blacks attained at least a high school diploma. For slightly more than half the sample a high school diploma was their highest degree (52.6%). This was followed by those who had earned an associate's degree (18.9%), a bachelor's degree (9.3%), and a graduate degree (7.6%). Taken together, over 88 percent of the African American sample holds at least a high school diploma. When compared to Anglos, the estimates reveal a disparity of over 7 percent in educational attainment (95.6% for whites and 88.4% for blacks). Moreover, whites have a clear advantage in higher

Table 3.2: Demographic Characteristics of Racial Groups in Los Angeles

Items	Whites	Blacks	Latinos
Age			
Below 25 years old	7.3	11.2	16.4
25-49 years old	56.9	63.0	64.9
50-74 years old	33.0	21.5	17.6
75 years old and above	2.8	4.9	1.1
Sex			
Female	50.9	50.5	50.0
Male	49.1	49.5	50.0
U.S. Born			
Yes	84.9	89.9	28.0
No	15.1	10.1	72.0
National Origin			
Mexico	—	—	71.6
Puerto Rico	—	—	1.3
Dominican Republic	—	—	0.01
Cuba	—	—	1.7
Other	—	—	25.4
Party ID			
Democrat	37.9	69.5	31.5
Independent	30.6	25.0	59.8
Republican	31.5	5.5	8.7
Highest Degree Earned			
None	4.4	11.6	48.2
High School or GED	38.4	52.6	32.4
Associate's	19.9	18.9	9.9
Bachelor's	26.2	9.3	7.5
Above Bachelor's	11.1	7.6	2.0
Income			
Below \$30K	24.8	42.5	59.4
\$30K-\$59,999	43.5	32.8	32.5
Above \$60,000	31.7	24.7	8.1
Work Status			
Employed	61.0	60.0	62.5
Unemployed	9.9	13.7	17.0
Out of Workforce	26.5	27.3	20.5
N	835	1104	1025

Note: The estimates reflect the frequencies when the person weight is applied.

educational attainment, with more than half of all Anglos in Los Angeles earning more than a high school diploma (57.2%). This disparity reinforces the argument that many blacks lack the requisite education and technical skills to secure gainful employment within the primarily knowledge-based, postindustrial urban economy (Wilson, 2001). Nevertheless, the estimates reveal that most African Americans receive at least a rudimentary formal education; only approximately 12 percent of black Angelenos have not earned a high school diploma. Yet, the disparities become even more stark when examining the educational attainment of Latinos in Los Angeles. Only approximately half of the Latino sample holds at least a high school diploma, leaving almost half of the sample with no formal degree (48.2%). These estimates reveal that, despite the disparity with Anglo Americans, African Americans' educational attainment is more on par with white Americans than Latinos.

The differences in educational attainment between blacks and Hispanics translate onto the incomes each group earns as well. For instance, almost 43 percent (42.5%) of blacks in Los Angeles reported a family income below \$30,000. The next largest proportion earns between \$30,000 and below \$60,000 (32.8%) and the last makes \$60,000 or more (24.7%). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests Latinos are more economically-deprived than their African American counterparts; almost 60 percent (59.4%) of the Latino sample earns less than \$30,000. The proportion of Latinos earning incomes between \$30,000 and \$60,000 a year (32.5%) is virtually identical to the proportion of blacks making the same income (32.8%). Nevertheless, a relatively small segment of the Latino sample earns more than \$60,000; the proportion of African Americans earning more than \$60,000 is approximately three times the proportion of Latinos making the same income (24.7% and 8.1%, respectively). Therefore, the disparities in educational attainment between African Americans and Latinos is mirrored by substantial differences in their family incomes. However, the incomes of both groups lag behind Anglo Americans. Only approximately 25 percent of Anglo-American households earn less than \$30,000 a year, which is significantly

lower than low-income blacks and Latinos (again, 42.5% and 59.4%, respectively). Roughly 44 percent (43.5%) earn incomes between \$30,000 and \$60,000, followed by approximately 32 percent (31.7%) acquiring more than \$60,000 a year. Thus, when compared to both African Americans and Latinos, Anglo Americans in Los Angeles tend to enjoy higher incomes. On face value, these findings imply that alliances between African Americans and Latinos could work toward alleviating the racial disparities in earned income ⁷

Additionally, Table 3.2 reveals blacks and Latinos experience similar outcomes in the labor market. Ultimately, virtually the same proportion of residents within each group are employed. Over 60 percent of African American and Latino respondents were employed (60.0% and 62.5%, respectively); these rates were on par with the proportion of employed white respondents (61.0%). Nevertheless, the results also indicate both blacks and Hispanics experience higher rates of unemployment than their white counterparts; approximately 14 percent of the African-American sample (13.7%) and 17 percent of the Latino sample reported being either unemployed or laid-off. A glance at the estimates for white Angelenos reveals that almost 10 percent (9.9%) of whites reported being unemployed. The disparity in unemployment between whites and blacks is substantial. However, a greater gulf exists between the percentage of unemployed Latino and Anglo respondents (17% and 9.9%, respectively).⁸ Lastly, similar proportions of each group report being out of the workforce.⁹ In Los Angeles, the Anglo sample has the largest proportion out of the work force (29.2%), followed by African Americans (26.5%) and then Latinos

⁷This result does not address the even greater disparities in wealth accumulation between majority and minority populations in the United States. For instance, Oliver and Shapiro (2006) show that although black wealth has grown over the last half century, the racial gap in wealth accumulation between whites and blacks has grown.

⁸The marginals were also observed for respondents below the age of 65. It was suspected disparities in work status may be larger among younger workers. Results show an increase in unemployed respondents occurred for each group: 10.9% for whites, 15.1% for blacks, and 17.7% for Latinos. Despite the increase in unemployed respondents, the gaps between Anglos and both blacks and Latinos remain approximately the same.

⁹Again, those respondents who were out of the workforce included students, homemakers, the permanently disabled, the retired, and mothers on maternity leave.

(20.5%). Taken together, blacks and Latinos appear to experience different outcomes from the labor market than their white peers; these disparities further demonstrate both groups have sufficient reasons to engage in political alliances to pursue their shared material interests.

3.3 Boston Study of Urban Inequality

Interviewing for the Boston Study of Urban Inequality (BSUI) took place between May 1993 and November 1994. Again, the principal investigators applied a stratified random selection of households; however, instead of using seven racial strata, the BSUI simply utilized four strata. These strata include neighborhoods that are predominantly: (1) white, (2) black, (3) Hispanic, and (4) mixed-race. Strata for white, black, and Hispanic census blocks reflect areas where each group comprises more than half of the population. Non-white areas were oversampled in an effort to acquire large enough samples of minority populations. The BSUI also differs from the LASUI because there are only two nested strata for the neighborhood poverty status, namely high and low income. The principal investigators define high poverty areas as census blocks where more than 20 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and low poverty census blocks as areas where fewer than 20 percent of the residents are in poverty. Ultimately, the nested income strata for black, Latino, and racially-mixed strata were collapsed given their disproportionate percentage of low-income residents, leaving only five major strata: (1) white, high-income, (2) white, low-income, (3) black, (4) Hispanic, and (5) mixed-race.

The BSUI drew responses from 1,842 participants, of which 595 were white, 446 black, 37 Asian, and 705 Latino.¹⁰ Despite differences in selection methodology, the similarities between the BSUI and LASUI allow for judgments of the validity of the hypotheses to be made across urban contexts. A more thorough discussion of the

¹⁰In addition, there were 11 Native Americans and 40 people who identified themselves as "Other" along with two individuals that did not answer the question.

Table 3.3: Sample Distribution Across Strata in Boston

Racial Strata	
Black Respondents	
Majority White, Low Poverty	2 (.4%)
Majority White, High Poverty	12 (2.7%)
Majority Black	349 (78.3%)
Majority Latino	68 (15.2%)
Racially-mixed	15 (3.4%)
Latino Respondents	
Majority White, Low Poverty	6 (.8%)
Majority White, High Poverty	26 (3.7%)
Majority Black	93 (13.2%)
Majority Latino	565 (80.1%)
Racially-mixed	15 (2.1%)

Note: The numbers in each category reflect the raw number of respondents collected within each strata. Numbers within parentheses reflect the proportion of the sample within each stratum.

sampling methodology is discussed below.

Sample Design

Like the LASUI, the BSUI employed a multi-stage probability sample. Nevertheless, the BSUI differs from the LASUI in that it did not begin by stratifying along census tracts; instead, the principal investigators stratified the sample at the census block-level. Their sample area consisted of housing units in eastern Massachusetts (Boston-Lawrence-Salem, Massachusetts-New Hampshire Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area). Census blocks were selected according to the probability proportional to estimated size based on its racial/ethnic composition and level of poverty.

Households were selected within census blocks by using an equal probability of selection method within strata. The number of households within the sampling area was assessed by, first, referencing computer drawn maps obtained from the UMass Computing Services to local street atlases.¹¹ Afterwards, a team of trained

¹¹The UMass Computing Services rely upon Census TIGER files.

listers visited the selected census blocks and made complete listings of the residential addresses. From this point, the principal investigators applied an equal probability of selection method for households within strata. This method accommodated the principal investigators' efforts to acquire oversamples of minority and low-income groups.¹²

Table 3.3 shows the distribution of African American and Latino respondents across the racial and economic strata. Among blacks, a majority of African Americans were sampled within areas that comprised a majority of black residents (72.2%), followed by areas with large Latino populations (21.4%). Likewise, most of the Latinos in the sample were drawn within census tracts with a majority of Latino residents (80.1%). The second largest proportion were selected within majority black areas (13.2%). Ultimately, the black and Latino subsamples far outweigh their proportion of the Boston population as reflected in the 1990 U.S. Census.¹³

Survey Weights

Also, given the oversampling among blacks and Latinos, post-stratification weights are employed for the analysis. Like the LASUI, the BSUI utilizes a person weight that is a function of multiplying the weight for the population distribution of each racial and ethnic group in the Boston area to participants' household size. Overall, the weight adjusts the distribution of respondents by race and ethnicity according to the relative distribution of the eligible population in the greater Boston area as reflected in the 1990 Census.

¹²The number of Latino respondents was higher than expected due to significant changes in residential patterns that occurred since the 1990 Census was conducted. Particularly, the proportion of the Latino community was larger than what was reflected by the 1990 Census, which meant that fewer non-hispanic interviews were conducted. Nevertheless, the results are representative of the overall population and the white, black, and Hispanic populations of the Greater Boston area.

¹³According to the 1990 Census, blacks and Latinos comprised approximately 24% and 10% of the population, respectively. The proportion of blacks in the sample is on par with the general population (24.2%); however, the proportion of Latinos in the sample is overwhelmingly disproportionate (38.3%).

Questionnaire Translation

The questionnaire for the BSUI was only translated into Spanish. The process for creating the Spanish version of the questionnaire was similar to that of the LASUI. A translator was employed to translate the English version of the questionnaire into Spanish. Afterwards, two other translators, one who was bi-lingual in English, back-translated the Spanish version back to English. Discrepancies between their English versions were resolved by a meeting between one of the principal investigators and all three translators.

Response Rates

The raw response rate for the sample was approximately 58 percent. Nevertheless, the adjusted response rate climbs to 71 percent. The report on the BSUI does not explain the calculation used to determine the response rate. However, given the substantial jump from the raw rate to the reported response rate, the principal investigators appear to have calculated the response rate assuming that there were no eligible households among those cases where the eligibility was unknown (for Public Opinion Research, 2008). As with the LASUI, response rates across the racial strata in the BSUI vary from a low of 66 percent within predominantly white census blocks to a high of 74 percent for highly Latino areas. Again, the response rates in high poverty areas were somewhat higher than in low poverty areas.

Sociodemographic Characteristics

As with Los Angeles, the sociodemographic characteristics between white, black, and Latino residents are examined. These differences are reported in Table 3.4. Many of the demographic patterns in Los Angeles are also reflected in Boston. For instance, the age distributions of the groups is similar in both cities. Like Los Angeles, the black and Hispanic samples are substantially younger than their

white counterparts. Among African Americans, approximately 75 percent of the population is below the age of 50 years old, with 11 percent below the age of 25 and roughly 64 percent (64.3%) who are between 25 and 50 years old. An even larger proportion of the Latino sample is younger than 50 years old, with approximately 84 percent (84.1%) of Latinos placing themselves within this age range. By comparison, the proportion of Anglos within the same age range was at roughly 60 percent (59.6%).

In addition, the distribution of women to men across each group is approximately the same. Across groups, the samples can be roughly split in half between women and men. Among African-Americans, women comprise 52 percent, while men are 48 percent of the sample. Similarly, about 53 percent (52.8%) of the Anglos in the sample are women and approximately 47 percent (47.2%) were men. For Latinos, there are slightly more men than women (51.5% and 48.5%, respectively). Nevertheless, on the whole, the gender distribution is roughly the same for each racial group.

On the other hand, the African-American population in Boston clearly differs from that of Los Angeles in the proportion of foreign-born blacks within the sample. Compared to Los Angeles, where foreign-born blacks only comprise approximately 10 percent of the African-American population, Boston's foreign-born black population is roughly 39 percent (38.6%). As mentioned above, this is consistent with evidence that foreign-born blacks from the Caribbean and Africa tend to gravitate toward cities in the northeastern region of the United States. While there have been clear tensions between native-born and foreign-born blacks in these cities, they also tend to share similar socioeconomic circumstances that make them more amenable to shared group objectives (Rogers, 2006). Nevertheless, the Hispanic community in Boston clearly has a much larger foreign-born population, with approximately 86 percent (85.8%) reporting that they had not been born in the United States. On the other hand, the population of foreign-born whites was even smaller in Boston than in Los Angeles (5.5% and 15.1%, respectively). Taken together, the estimates

suggest that blacks and Latinos in Boston not only share similarities in being racial and ethnic minorities, but may also be linked by their immigrant status.

A glance at the national descent of Latinos in the sample reveals that the composition of the Hispanic community in Boston is different than in Los Angeles. Unlike Los Angeles, whose Latino community is disproportionately Mexican, most of the Hispanic population in Boston was Puerto Rican (46.4%). The next largest nationality represented in the sample was from the Dominican Republic (12%), followed by Cubans (3.5%). In fact, Mexicans, in contrast to Los Angeles, account for only a marginal portion of the sample (0.7%). Overall, the composition of the Latino population in Boston appears to contrast starkly with Hispanics in Los Angeles. These differences may portend qualitative differences in the relationship between blacks and Hispanics in both cities. For instance, since Puerto Ricans and native-born blacks have long lived in similar neighborhoods in many northeastern cities, they may be more inclined to view one another as political allies. This expectation is supported by evidence suggesting that Puerto Ricans, more than other nationalities, tend to feel greater commonalities with African-Americans (Kaufmann, 2003).

The partisan makeup in Boston is similar to Los Angeles. However, one substantial difference between the two samples is the atypical party identification of blacks in Boston. A smaller proportion of African Americans in Boston (46.8%) report themselves as Democrats than in Los Angeles (69.5%). Nevertheless, the lower percentage of black Democrats in Boston does not translate to a significantly larger proportion of black Republicans (8.5% in Boston and 5.5% in Los Angeles). Instead, many African Americans in Boston choose to identify as independents (44.7%). On the other hand, Latinos and Anglos display similar patterns of partisanship in both Boston and Los Angeles. A larger proportion of Latinos report identifying with the Democratic Party (27.3%) than the Republican Party (18.2%). However, a majority of Latinos are actually independents (54.5%). This pattern among Latinos in Boston is consistent with the patterns reflected in Los Angeles. Also, white Amer-

Table 3.4: Demographic Characteristics of Racial Groups in Boston

Items	Whites	Blacks	Latinos
Age			
Below 25 years old	9.1	11.0	15.7
25-49 years old	50.5	64.3	68.4
50-74 years old	33.4	20.6	13.9
75 years old and above	7.0	4.1	2.0
Sex			
Female	52.8	52.0	48.5
Male	47.2	48.0	51.5
U.S. Born			
Yes	94.5	61.4	14.2
No	5.5	38.6	85.8
National Origin			
Mexico	—	—	0.7
Puerto Rico	—	—	46.4
Dominican Republic	—	—	12.0
Cuba	—	—	3.5
Other	—	—	37.4
Party ID			
Democrat	32.2	46.8	27.3
Independent	47.5	44.7	54.5
Republican	20.3	8.5	18.2
Highest Degree Earned			
None	7.1	22.8	48.4
High School or GED	44.2	53.3	38.0
Associate's	12.9	11.8	8.2
Bachelor's	22.8	7.1	1.8
Above Bachelor's	13.0	5.0	3.6
Income			
Below \$30K	26.5	63.1	55.3
\$30K-\$59,999	39.9	29.8	31.2
\$60K and Above	33.6	7.1	13.5
Work Status			
Employed	66.4	63.2	66.8
Unemployed	4.8	9.1	12.2
Out of Workforce	28.8	27.7	21.0
N	595	446	705

Note: The estimates reflect the frequencies when the person weight is applied.

icans in Boston are more evenly split between the two parties than either blacks or Hispanics, with approximately 32 percent (32.2%) reporting as Democrats and roughly 20 percent (20.3%) as Republicans. While their allegiances to both major parties is split fairly evenly, Anglos in Boston still largely view themselves as independents (47.5%). Although more lopsided in favor of Democrats than in Los Angeles, white Bostonians are still more evenly distributed politically than either African Americans or Latinos.

There appear to be national forces that shape the resources and status afforded to blacks and Latinos; the patterns in educational attainment, family income, and work status for each racial group in Boston are consistent with those revealed in Los Angeles. For instance, the results for educational attainment show that both blacks and Latinos achieve lower levels of educational attainment than their white counterparts. Latinos, by far, have the lowest levels of education between each group. Almost one-half (48.4%) of Latinos in the Boston sample report having not received a high school diploma. By comparison, a little over 20 percent (22.8%) of African Americans failed to receive a high school degree; however, the rates for both blacks and Hispanics are significantly higher than Anglos (7.1%). Comparing each group, it is clear that white Americans are more successful at acquiring higher education than either blacks or Latinos. While approximately 36 percent (35.8%) of the white sample had earned a bachelor's degree or above, only about 12 percent (12.1%) of blacks and a little over 5 percent (5.4%) of Latinos had done so. These disparities in educational attainment foreshadow significant group differences in access to material resources.

Similarly, white Americans enjoy higher incomes than blacks and Hispanics as well. Yet, contrary to Los Angeles, African American families earn lower incomes than Latinos. Among blacks, an overwhelming majority of the sample earn less than \$30,000 a year (63.1%). In fact, blacks appear to be worse off in Boston than in Los Angeles; a larger proportion of black Bostonians report being in the lowest

income bracket than black Angelenos (63.1% and 42.5%, respectively). The level of low-income blacks far outpaces the proportion of Latinos making less than \$30,000 a year (55.3%). By comparison, the proportion of Anglos within the same income category is approximately 27 percent (26.5%). The second largest proportion of African American and Latino respondents make between \$30,000 and \$60,000 (29.8% and 31.2%, respectively). For whites, this income range comprises a plurality of the sample (39.9%). Lastly, the findings reveal that relatively few African American and Latino families reported making \$60,000 or above; only approximately 7 percent (7.1%) of blacks reported earning within this income bracket while almost 14 percent (13.5%) of Latinos were earning the highest incomes in Boston. Yet, over 30 percent (33.6%) of whites in the sample report earning within this income bracket. The disparities between blacks and Latinos corroborate the evidence from Los Angeles as well as national reports detailing the significant income disparities that exist between blacks and Latinos and the majority white population.

On the whole, unemployment rates across groups are lower in Boston than in Los Angeles. Nevertheless, racial disparities remain. The percentage of unemployment among blacks in the Boston sample is approximately 9 percent (9.1%) and among Latinos it is even higher at roughly 12 percent (12.2%). Yet, although these proportions are lower than in Los Angeles, compared to the significantly lower percentage of whites who are unemployed (4.8%), it is clear that a racial disparity exists with respect to unemployment rates. In fact, the disparity corresponds with the fairly consistent finding that black unemployment tends to be double the rate for whites. Even worse, Latinos' unemployment rate approaches three times the rate for whites. On the other hand, there are generally high rates of employment across the board. By a slight margin, a greater proportion of the Latino sample reported being employed (66.8%), followed by white Americans (66.4%) and then blacks (63.2%). Lastly, each group approaches parity when comparing the percent of each group who were out of the workforce. The proportion of members outside of

the workforce is approximately the same for Anglos and blacks (28.8% and 27.7%, respectively). Yet, the Latino sample was comprised of slightly fewer respondents reporting they were out of the workforce (21%). Since a disproportionate percentage of the Latino population are immigrants, when compared to either Anglos or blacks, it is understandable that they would have fewer members outside of the workforce.

3.4 Key Survey Items

As mentioned before, the MCSUI not only offers a large multi-racial sample, but also several survey items that assess respondents' perceptions and attitudes toward other racial/ethnic groups. More importantly, the questions offer the opportunity to better understand how these attitudes map onto African Americans' and Latinos' ingroup policy bias for race-based public policies. Furthermore, since the MCSUI allows contextual data to be linked to survey responses, indicators of the economic and racial conditions within respondents' neighborhoods can also be included in the analysis. The following sections discuss the key exploratory and explanatory variables employed in the analysis, including each of the contextual indicators.¹⁴

Perceived Zero-Sum Group Competition

There are three key dependent variables that are central to the analysis in chapters 4 and 5. The first dependent variable consists of a composite scale of two items that assess African Americans' and Hispanics' perceived zero-sum competition with one another. The first survey item asks how threatening the other group is to the job opportunities afforded to the respondents' racial/ethnic group. It asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the following statement: "More good jobs for [outgroup] means fewer good jobs for [respondents' group]." Similarly, the second item evaluates how strong of a threat respondents feel the other group poses

¹⁴The question wording and response options are provided in Appendix A.

to their political influence. The question asks to what extent participants agree or disagree that, "The more influence [GROUP] have in local politics the less influence [respondents' group] will have in local politics."

Both measures were chosen because they met standards for content and construct validity as well as scale reliability. There are three primary forms of scale validity: content validity, construct validity, and criterion-related validity (Allen and Yen, 1979). With respect to content validity, the items meet the author's standards for face validity. In both cases, the groups presented refer to either the racial/ethnic group of the respondent and an outgroup. For the overall sample, participants are asked their feelings about a range of racial and ethnic groups (i.e., whites, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics or Latinos). However, the questions utilized in the analysis ask African Americans and Latinos how they feel towards one another. For example, the statement posed to an African American about the threat of Latinos to their job prospects would read: "More jobs for Latinos means fewer good jobs for Blacks" and vice versa for Latino respondents. The values for the response options range from zero to one, with the lowest value reflecting strong disagreement and the highest value indicating strong agreement with the statements. Furthermore, the measures appear to meet the standards of logical validity. Specifically, the items meet the criteria offered in previous studies for creating accurate measures of group threat (Sears and Kinder, 1985). With respect to construct validity, the correlation between the two items is high ($r=.65$). Given that there are only two items, a factor analytic technique was not utilized. Ultimately, there were few items that allowed for an examination of criterion-related validity other than the measure used later in this study for differential policy support. However, as will be shown, the relationship between perceived group competition and differential policy attitudes moves in the expected direction. Lastly, the scale is quite reliable ($\alpha=.79$).¹⁵

¹⁵Both the Pearson correlation and alpha coefficients reflect the relationships between the items among African Americans and Latinos in Boston and Los Angeles. The alpha coefficients within each group for both Los Angeles and Boston are reported in Chapter 4.

Differential Group Policy Preferences

The other two dependent variables address disparities in support for public policies depending on whether blacks or Latinos are presented as the prime beneficiaries. Two questions were asked concerning how strongly respondents favor job training programs and hiring preferences for both African Americans and Latinos. For example, the introduction for the questions concerning job training programs states: "Some people feel that because of past disadvantages there are some groups in society that should receive special job training and educational assistance. What about you? Do you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose special job training and educational assistance for [Group]." Afterwards, a series of questions ask how respondents feel about such programs for particular groups. Participants answered questions referencing their ingroup as well as other racial and ethnic groups. The response options range from those that strongly oppose to those that strongly favor job training programs for each group. A similar format exists for the two questions regarding support for hiring preferences. The introduction to the series of questions for each group states, "Some people feel that because of past disadvantages, there are some groups in society that should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special preferences. What about you? Do you strongly favor, favor, neither favor or oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose special preferences in hiring and promotion to [Group]?" Like the job training items, each item is recoded to range from 0-1, with the low value indicating those respondents that strongly opposed and the high value for those that strongly favor the policies for each group.

While participants' absolute support for such programs for particular groups is certainly important, the focus of the present study is on their differential support for such policies depending on whether African Americans or Latinos are viewed as the primary beneficiaries. Ultimately, these measures are believed to more accurately reflect the potential for members of both groups to work toward mutually-beneficial

policies. Accordingly, the dependent variable employed in the analysis consists of a difference score between policy preferences for African Americans vis-a-vis Hispanics. First, each item is recoded from 0-1, ranging from those that strongly oppose at the lowest value to those that strongly favor at the highest value. Afterwards, I take the difference between support for such policies for Latinos from preferences for African Americans. Consequently, the final coding of the dependent variables ranges from -1 to 1, with zero reflecting equal support for job training programs and hiring preferences regardless of the primary beneficiaries (i.e., either African Americans or Latinos).

The indicators of group bias are important for two reasons. First, they allow for a better understanding of how the underlying socio-psychological and structural dynamics map onto political attitudes. Secondly, the items are theoretically relevant because they capture support for policies that are mutually-beneficial for blacks and Latinos. Job training programs have traditionally targeted predominantly minority, urban populations that have become isolated from employment opportunities. These programs tend to teach job skills, assist with placement, and expose workers to workplace etiquette. Given the economic vulnerability of both African Americans and Latinos such programs would ostensibly benefit both groups. Similarly, affirmative action policies for employment have been credited with dramatically shifting the racial and ethnic composition of the American workforce. African Americans and increasingly Hispanics are some of the primary beneficiaries of these programs. Consequently, if blacks and Latinos express differential support for these policies when applied to each other, it would suggest the prospects for black-Latino coalitions are bleak.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Beyond the dependent variables, there are several measures of respondents' sociodemographic characteristics that serve as crucial independent variables in the

analysis. Most of these items capture participants' socioeconomic circumstances. The explanatory variables that are central to the theoretical concerns of the project include respondents' reported employment status, occupational sector, educational attainment, income, and homeownership. The measure for employment status asks participants what describes their present work status. They are supplied with a number of options including working now, part-time; working now, full-time; only temporarily laid-off; sick or maternity leave; retired; unemployed; permanently disabled; homemaker; student; and those participants with a combination of statuses. From this item, I constructed two dichotomous variables, one for unemployed respondents and the other for participants outside of the workforce. For the item determining unemployment, unemployed and temporarily laid-off participants are coded at the highest value while all other participants are placed at the lowest value. Similarly, another item for participants outside of the workforce places them at the high value, while other respondents are placed at the lowest value. Those categories deemed to be outside of the workforce include participants who are retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, student, and those either sick or on maternity leave. The baseline category for both items include participants that report having either full-time or part-time employment. Nonresponses were excluded from the analysis.

The analysis employs dichotomous measures for respondents with either executive/professional or service-oriented jobs. The baseline category included respondents involved in technical and administrative support as well as military occupations. Each occupational category was determined based upon the 1990 Census Occupational Codes.

Educational attainment was determined by a question that asks, "What is the highest degree you have earned." Eight response options were offered, ranging from those with "none" to participants with a "Ph.D. or professional degree." Those participants choosing "Other" or to not respond were excluded.

For income, participants are asked for "the income group that includes your total

family income before taxes in 1991.” Starting with ”none or less than \$ 4,999, the response options increase by increments of \$ 4,999 until reaching \$69,999 (e.g.,\$5,000-\$9,999,\$10,000-\$14,999, etc.). At \$70,000, the increments increase by \$9,999 until they reach the \$100,000 mark (e.g., \$70,000-\$79,999, \$80,000- \$89,999, etc.), where it increases by \$24,999 until it reaches \$149,999 (e.g., \$100,000-\$124,999,\$125,000-\$149,999). In an effort to better understand the effects at different income levels as well as prevent a significant reduction in sample size due to nonresponse, three dichotomous variables were constructed with the variable. The first item places respondents making less than \$35,000 at the high value (1) and all other participants at 0, the lowest value. A similar measure was created for respondents reporting income at or above \$70,000, with high earners at 1 and all other participants at 0. Lastly, a measure for participants that refused to report their income was created, with respondents with missing values placed at the highest value and all other respondents at the lowest value. Respondents earning between \$35,000 and \$69,999 are the baseline category.

The last variable used to measure participants’ socioeconomic characteristics determined their homeownership. The item employed to capture respondents’ housing arrangements asks whether they ”own [their] house/apartment], are [they] renting, or do [they] have some other arrangement.” Afterwards, they are offered five response options including, ”own or buying”, ”rent”, ”cooperative”, ”relative owns house/apt”, and ”other” in which they were probed to further explain their housing situation. For the analysis, this item was reconstructed into a dichotomous variable so that homeowners were coded as the highest value and all other respondents as the lowest value.

Other Sociodemographic Characteristics

Beyond the socioeconomic variables, there are several other measures of sociodemographic characteristics that are employed in the analysis including age, gender,

party identification, political ideology, and length of residence. The variable for age simply asks respondents to report their age, which range between 21 to 96 for the overall sample. For gender, the interviewer was responsible for noting whether the respondent was male or female. Conventional measures of party identification and political ideology were offered. For party identification, respondents were asked, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something else." Afterwards, they were provided a seven-point scale where, in ascending order, they could choose Republican, Democrat, Independent, no preference, no preference for religious reasons, and other. The scale was recoded so that Republicans retained the lowest value, but those respondents reporting as Independents, having no preference for any reason, and other were placed in the second category. Lastly, Democrats were assigned the highest value on the scale. To determine respondents' political ideology, they were posed with the following question: "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale." The lowest value on the scale is for those who report being extremely liberal and increases in ascending order to liberal, slightly liberal, moderate; middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative and extremely conservative. A separate category for those who had not given it much consideration was placed among the moderates. For the analysis, the variable was reverse-coded so that the lowest value reflected participants that were "extremely conservative" and the highest value indicated the respondent was "extremely liberal". Finally, participants were asked, "How long have you lived in [this area]. In Los Angeles, the reference in the question is to "Los Angeles County", while in Boston it is for the "greater Boston area". The number of years ranges from respondents who had lived in the area for one year or less to those who were lifelong residents.

For Los Angeles in particular, a measure for the years the study was conducted,

1992 and 1993, is used in order to determine whether the intensity of attitudes toward the outgroup changes as respondents become further removed from the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The year the interview was completed was recorded by the investigators outside of the interview. The 1992 Los Angeles riot emerged largely as a consequence of the heightened racial tensions ignited by the acquittal of four Los Angeles Police Department officers who were videotaped brutally beating an African American motorist by the name of Rodney King. Although it was widely believed the violence was perpetrated predominantly by blacks and was directed toward the white community, the assailants were largely black and Latino and the victims were diverse. In fact, much of the violence and looting was targeted toward Korean-American storeowners who owned businesses in the predominantly black and Latino South Central area of Los Angeles. Given the intense racial tensions in Los Angeles around the time the survey was conducted, the item for the years interviews were conducted serves as a basis, although crude, for understanding whether the riots impacted intergroup attitudes.

For Latinos, measures of their national descent, place of birth, and number of years living in the United States are also introduced. The national descent measure asks respondents to identify themselves with a particular national origin such as Mexican, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, and Cuban. Several national identities were offered along with a category for those in which none of the offered categories fit. Out of this measure, three dichotomous measures were created for respondents whose families descend from either Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, respectively; all other countries were assigned to the baseline category. In similar fashion, the question concerning participants' place of birth stemmed from an item asking participants where their mother was living when she gave birth to them. From this item, interviewers were directed to report separately whether the respondents were born in the United States; this is the item that is utilized in the analysis. Participants born in the United States were assigned the highest value (1) and foreign-born res-

idents were given the lowest value (0). The measure of respondents' place of birth consists of a dichotomous item where Latinos born in the United States are placed at the highest value and the remaining respondents are given the lowest value. Lastly, a measure of Latinos' years living in the United States was created. The number of years participants' had lived in the United States was calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference of the year of the completed interview, which was discussed above, from the year they arrived in the United States. The measure of the year respondents arrived in the United States relied upon self-report, while the record of the year of the completed interview is discussed above. The values for the number of years participants lived in the United States ranges from a low value of zero for those who arrived in the United States within the year of the interview to the highest value for those participants who had been in the United States for 88 years. For each of the socioeconomic and sociodemographic items, nonresponses were excluded from the analysis.

The Racial and Economic Context

The greatest benefit of using the MCSUI is that it allows block-level data from the 1990 Census to be linked to survey responses. For the present purposes, data on the racial and material conditions within respondents' neighborhoods was crucial, largely because it allows for an examination of how such conditions shape political attitudes and behavior. In order to capture these conditions, several measures are constructed from the contextual indicators. The key measures of the residential context capture the proportion of African-Americans and Latino residents, the proportion of *residents* living below the poverty line and with a high school diploma or less, as well as the proportion of blacks and Latinos, respectively, living in poverty or with a high school diploma or less. The denominator for the measures of racial conditions and general material conditions is the absolute number of residents in the area. On the other hand, the measures of group material conditions utilize the

absolute number of blacks and Hispanics, respectively, living on the block as the denominator.

Mediational Analysis

The final methodological matter concerns the use of a mediational analysis to test the mediated conflict hypothesis. As discussed in Chapter 2, the mediated conflict hypothesis proposes that the relationship between black and Latinos' economic self-interests and residential material conditions to their group policy preferences is facilitated by their perceived zero-sum competition with one another. An item mediates the relationship between two variables when: (1) the key explanatory variable explains the mediating variable, which, in this case, is African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos, (2) the key independent variable explains the variance in the dependent variable, and (3) when the mediating variable is placed in the analysis, its impact is statistically significant and the magnitude of the key independent variable reduces in size, usually below conventional levels of statistical significance (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The independent variables in the mediational analyses include the indicators of economic self-interests and residential group conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter describes the survey data utilized for chapters 4 and 5. Both chapters concentrate on the influence of personal economic circumstances and competitive social environments on black-Latino relations. As such, the data needed to possess several characteristics: (1) an oversample of African Americans and Latinos, (2) survey questions that capture respondents' personal economic status as well as their perceptions and attitudes towards other groups, (3) a sampling area in several metropolitan areas, and (4) contextual data of the racial and economic conditions of

respondents' neighborhoods. The Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) fits each of these criteria, which is the reason it is utilized in the forthcoming analyses. Specifically, the analysis reported in chapters 4 and 5 focus on two subsamples within the MCSUI, namely the Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality (LASUI) and Boston Study of Urban Inequality (BSUI). Both the LASUI and BSUI were drawn from cities with sizable African American and Latino populations. Furthermore, the sampling method for both datasets included a multi-staged process that accommodated the need for an oversample from both groups. Although Los Angeles and Boston differ in significant ways, the expectation is that both economic self-interests and the social environment will similarly impact African Americans and Latinos in both cities.

Chapter 4

Perceived Group Competition between Blacks and Latinos

Due to recent shifts in the urban economy and changing residential patterns, the economic position of African Americans and Latinos in metropolitan areas has become increasingly vulnerable (Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Wilson, 1997). African Americans, who have been overrepresented within the low-skilled manufacturing sector, have experienced a significant increase in joblessness and poverty as industries have moved out of the inner-city. For the remaining jobs, employers have sought to supply their need for cheap labor within the emerging Latino immigrant population, who may be undocumented and, thus, more tolerant of exploitative treatment (Johnson and Oliver, 1989). Sensing employers' bias for immigrant labor, blacks report that they are often passed over for jobs in favor of Latino workers. Furthermore, evidence reveals large Latino populations in what were once predominantly black neighborhoods has increased; Consequently, both groups frequently find themselves competing for the same political offices and public resources (McClain and Karnig, 1990). Justifiably, this has led to concerns that heightened competition between African Americans and Latinos over material resources and status may spark group tensions and undermine efforts at political cooperation (Johnson and Oliver, 1989).

This chapter explores whether underlying economic self-interests and realistic group concerns fuel perceptions of group competition between black and Hispanic residents in metropolitan areas. The analysis begins in Los Angeles, which boasts

large and vibrant African American and Latino populations. Afterwards, the focus shifts toward Boston, which has significantly smaller black and Latino communities than Los Angeles. Despite their differences, the economic and social trends in both cities are quite similar. For both cities, the sociodemographic characteristics as well as the racial and material conditions experienced by black and Hispanic residents is examined. This exploratory analysis is followed by a more systematic investigation of how the individual characteristics and residential contexts of participants in the study influenced whether they perceive themselves to be engaged in zero-sum competition. In the final analysis, African Americans and Latinos, to a lesser extent, appear motivated by their economic self-interests. On the other hand, racial and group economic conditions have a limited influence on the perceived group competition felt by both groups.

4.1 Los Angeles

Los Angeles is an ideal location to begin the analysis. African Americans have been a fixture in the city since the Great Migration from the southeastern states during and after World War II. While blacks comprise a small proportion of the Los Angeles population, their presence has dramatically shaped the city's racial composition, economic growth and spatial arrangement (Sides, 2003). Similarly, Latinos, but particularly Mexican Americans, have had a long history in the region, residing in southern California before it was annexed to the United States after the Mexican-American War in the mid-nineteenth century. Initially, the Latino community in Los Angeles was small, but has grown to become a majority of the population. Los Angeles' history is inextricably tied to both groups. Furthermore, Los Angeles' future will, in part, be determined by their ability to work together toward common goals.

The analysis begins by examining the degree of propinquity between blacks and

Latinos in Los Angeles. Absent each other's presence within their communities, there is little reason to suspect that either group poses a serious threat to the realistic interests of the other. As mentioned in chapter 2, most of the racial threat literature measures characteristics of the residential area at larger geographic units (i.e., counties or metropolitan areas). However, in understanding black-Latino relations, geographic units at the census block level is also appropriate. The distribution of economic resources at the neighborhood level can significantly impact residents' economic well-being and quality of life (Gay, 2006). Previous work shows that the salience of race among blacks declines as the quality of their neighborhoods (i.e., census block) improve (Gay, 2004). There is little reason to not expect a similar relationship among Latinos. Given the link between neighborhood material resources and group relations, neighborhood conditions may also motivate feelings of competition between groups and, thus, group antagonisms. More importantly, it is likely that residents would be more aware and impacted by racial economic disparities that exist within their neighborhoods than at larger geographic units (Gay, 2004).

Table 4.1 reports the proportion of black and Hispanic residents living within respondents' census blocks. African American and Latino respondents were categorized depending on whether the proportion of black or Latino residents living within their areas was either (1) below 25 percent, (2) between 25 percent and 50 percent, or (3) at or above 50 percent. As reflected in the lower half of the second column, a majority of blacks in Los Angeles live in areas where there are relatively few Latinos (56.3%). It is this group of African Americans that should have little reason to view Latinos as competitors for resources and status. Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of African Americans live on census blocks in which Latinos comprise at least 25 percent of the population (43.7%), with approximately 32 percent (31.5%) living in areas with 25 to 50 percent of Latino residents and roughly 12 percent (12.2%) in which Latinos comprise over 50 percent of the population. With these estimates, it is clear many blacks in Los Angeles live within contexts in which they

Table 4.1: Sample Distribution Across Racial Contexts in LA

Percentage of Population	Black	Latino
% Black Residents		
Below 25%	45.1	90.9
25-50%	10.1	5.8
50% and above	44.8	3.3
% Latino Residents		
Below 25%	56.3	17.4
25-50%	31.5	26.7
50% and above	12.2	55.9

Note: The estimates reflect the frequencies when the person weight is applied.

can potentially interact and find themselves competing with Latinos over their realistic group concerns. Ultimately, the results corroborate evidence by Johnson and Oliver (1989) that Latinos in Los Angeles have gravitated toward predominantly black neighborhoods, where they are more likely to find affordable housing.

On the other hand, the estimates indicate relatively few Latinos sampled live among African Americans. The upper half of the third column reports the proportion of African Americans that live within Latinos' census blocks. These percentages reveal an overwhelming majority of the Latino sample live within neighborhoods where blacks comprise less than 25 percent of the residents (90.9%), leaving a relatively small proportion of Latinos within the sample who live in areas where blacks comprise either 25 to 50 percent (5.8%) or at least 50 percent of the residents (3.3%). This evidence suggests that Latino participants largely live within areas where they would interact fairly infrequently with African Americans. However, there is little to guide inferences about the proportion of an outgroup necessary to elicit feelings of group threat; therefore, populations less than 25 percent may sufficiently motivate outgroup antipathy.

African Americans and Latinos live in highly segregated areas as well. Almost half of the black sample live in areas where African Americans comprise more than 50 percent of the residents (44.8%). This finding further corroborates evidence that

many blacks live in areas where there is an extraordinary degree of segregation (Massey and Denton, 1993). Yet, the marginals for Latinos reveal even greater segregation within their neighborhoods. Approximately 56 percent (55.9%) of Latinos live within residential contexts in which they comprise at least half of the population, thus, suggesting hypersegregation is not exclusively experienced by blacks.

The remaining frequencies may explain the lower levels of segregation among blacks than Latinos in the sample; the results indicate a greater proportion of African Americans in the sample (45.1%) reside in areas where, in fact, blacks comprise less than 25 percent of the residents. This finding hints that efforts to reduce housing discrimination may have been successful, at least for certain segments of the African American community. The remaining segment (10.1%) of blacks appears relegated to areas with moderate levels of segregation. In the end, the findings reveal a bimodal distribution in which blacks live in either extremely segregated neighborhoods or are free to select from less segregated, diverse communities. In accordance with previous research, these disparities can likely be attributed to greater economic heterogeneity (Wilson, 1997); poor blacks would not be afforded the opportunity of pursuing less segregated housing alternatives while African Americans in the middle and upper-middle class would be better able to select from a wider array of neighborhoods. In contrast, only a small proportion of the Latino community live within neighborhoods where they comprise less than 25 percent of residents (17.4%) and a somewhat larger proportion live in areas where the Latino population is between 25 and 50 percent (26.7%), indicating the overwhelming proportion of Latinos live in areas that have moderate to high levels of racial segregation.

The measures of racial and economic conditions within respondents' residential contexts are critical for understanding how the social environment may facilitate group competition. Neighborhood conditions are likely to capture many of the sources of group conflict over material resources. According to the racial threat literature, the percentage of outgroup members reflects underlying group competition.


The asymmetry present in the racial composition of black and Latino neighborhoods implies blacks may be more prone to view Latinos as potential competitors than Latinos view blacks.

4.1.1 Perceived Group Competition between Blacks and Latinos

One of the primary concerns of the present research is the role that economic self-interests and objectively competitive environments play in influencing whether blacks and Latinos perceive one another as competitors over material resources and influence. In particular, this section tests two key hypotheses: (1) that economic self-interests heighten the perception among blacks and Latinos that they are engaged in zero-sum competition and (2) areas where group members experience dire economic conditions and blacks and Latinos live in close proximity to one another spark group tensions. Group members' perceived group competition is believed to undermine any prospects for black-Latino political alliances.

Before examining the results from the multivariate analysis, consider how strongly blacks and Latinos believe they are engaged in group competition. Figure 4.1 illustrates the intensity of competition that black and Hispanic Angelenos feel the other poses to their ability to secure employment and maintain their political influence. The bars on the left side of the chart show the percentage of African Americans in the sample that either agreed or strongly agreed that Latinos are their competitors for jobs and political influence. Over half of the African-American sample viewed Latinos as a threat to blacks' access to gainful employment (51.5%), with a majority of supporters strongly agreeing with the proposition. That ultimately leaves over 48 percent (48.5%) of respondents who either strongly disagreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. The high level of agreement with the statement signals that relations between both groups within the labor market in Los Angeles play a critical role in African Americans' attitudes toward Latinos. With

Figure 4.1: Blacks' and Latinos' Perceived Group Competition in Los Angeles



regard to political influence, the second bar from the left shows that a somewhat lower percentage of African Americans believed that Latinos jeopardized blacks' power within the political system (44%). The results indicate blacks believe themselves to be in greater competition with Latinos over jobs than for political influence. Ultimately, the evidence demonstrates that African Americans in Los Angeles are keenly aware of the heightened presence of Latinos and their increasing influence within the labor market and the political system.

In contrast, Latinos perceive far less competition between themselves and African Americans over material resources and status. The two bars on the right of Figure 4.1 illustrate how strongly Latinos believe the economic and political advancement of blacks comes at the expense of Hispanics' well-being. First, consider how strongly they believe there to be competition with blacks for jobs. Over 30 percent (30.2%) of Latino respondents in Los Angeles either somewhat or strongly agreed with the idea that blacks posed a threat to their access to gainful employment. The first thing to note is that the degree of agreement with this item among Latinos is over 20

percentage points lower than African Americans (30.5% and 51.5%, respectively). This disparity indicates job opportunities and security are far more salient issues among blacks than Latinos; a t-test of the means for blacks and Latinos shows the difference is statistically significant ($t=8.68$, $p=.00$). Given similar proportions of both groups report being unemployed (62.5% and 60%, respectively) and a larger segment of the Latino participants were unemployed than the black participants, the differences in the perceived threat of both groups seems unrelated to their actual experiences in the job market. Instead, the disparity may reflect that Latinos tend to think more optimistically of their economic condition than their black counterparts (Tedin and Murray, 1994).

Interestingly, a greater proportion of Hispanics perceived African Americans as a threat to their political advancement.¹ Approximately 37 percent of Latinos in Los Angeles agreed that the more political influence blacks acquire, the less political influence available to Latinos. This result is unsurprising given that, despite the current size of the Hispanic population, African Americans' political incorporation in Los Angeles is far more advanced than Latinos. Blacks have enjoyed a stable presence on the city council in Los Angeles since 1963. Moreover, the political strength of the black community was made clear by their role in electing Tom Bradley, an African American, as mayor of Los Angeles (Sonenshein, 1986*a*). On the other hand, the political incorporation of Latinos has come much more slowly. They have traditionally played a small part in electoral politics given the size of their young and undocumented population. However, since 1993 there has been a steady increase in the number of Latino voters, which culminated into the election of Antonio Villaraigosa as mayor in 2005 (Sonenshein and Pinkus, 2002). Thus, Latinos may perceive blacks to be a greater threat politically because while African Americans have enjoyed political access for years, they are still in the process of becoming fully incorporated. Ultimately, Latinos' perceived threat from African

¹Although, a t-test reveals the mean differences are not statistically significant.

Americans over political influence suggests that blacks are in a better position to pursue their political interests than the Latino community and, consequently, may secure resources for the black community at Latinos' expense.

The descriptive statistics above reveal that each group varies in their perception that the other threatens its economic and political well-being. Clearly, with the influx of Latinos moving to Los Angeles in the last quarter of a century, many African Americans have become increasingly sensitive about their emerging prominence within the urban metropolis, with a majority viewing them as a threat to African Americans' access to jobs and, to a lesser extent, political influence. In comparison, Latinos feel much less threatened by African Americans over material resources, although clearly concerned about their political influence in the city. Latinos' weaker sense of perceived threat from African Americans may be explained, at least partially, by evidence showing they tend to live in communities with relatively few black residents. Their virtual isolation from African Americans within their communities may not lead many Latinos to believe blacks block their access to material resources or status.

Next, the focus of the analysis shifts to understand what drives both African Americans' and Latinos' perceptions of group competition. While the descriptive data is informative, to test the proposed hypotheses, a more rigorous, systematic approach is required. For this reason, a multivariate analysis is conducted to test the strength of particular items while controlling for respondents' other sociodemographic characteristics and residential conditions. Most importantly, the analysis below explores whether respondents' personal and group material resources affect how strongly blacks and Latinos perceive one another as competitors over scarce resources.

4.1.2 Blacks' Perceived Group Competition with Latinos

We begin by exploring the factors that drive blacks' perceived competition with Latinos. The dependent variable consists of a composite scale of the two items

illustrated in Figure 4.1-blacks believe that gains in employment and political influence for Latinos will be at their own expense ($\alpha=.81$). The independent variables consist of measures of respondents' sociodemographic characteristics, with indicators of both their personal economic status along with other social traits. For the purpose of this analysis, measures of respondents' educational attainment, occupational sector, family income, employment status, and homeownership serve as critical indicators of whether economic self-interests influence African Americans' feelings of zero-sum competition with Hispanics. Beyond economic self-interests, measures of the racial context and group material conditions of respondents' neighborhoods are employed as indicators of realistic group concerns. In particular, two interaction terms are utilized to represent areas where there are dire group material conditions as well as large proportions of Latinos; it is in these areas that I propose realistic group conflict is more likely to occur.

While the data's ability to link respondents' contexts to their individual responses certainly is relevant to the theoretical concerns of the study, such a data structure also presents its own share of problems. Notably, since respondents are nested within their respective geographic areas, their responses may be similarly influenced by their environment. Therefore, lower-level units, or subjects in this case, would be nested within a higher-level unit, which in this analysis would be census blocks. Depending on the intensity of the clustering, ignoring variance at higher levels may be problematic (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Accounting for the hierarchical nature of the data allows researchers to avoid model misspecification, explore cross-level interactions between lower-level and higher-level units, and test for generalizability across contexts. Furthermore, multi-level modeling corrects the low standard errors brought about by naive pooling and, as a consequence, Type I errors. However, preliminary diagnostics suggest there would be no particular advantage to using multi-level modeling rather than ordinary least squares regression. For one, the intraclass correlation, which reflects the similarity of responses among

subjects living within the same context relative to subjects living across contexts, reaches a coefficient of approximately .09, which means that only roughly nine percent of the variance can be explained by respondents' living within the same context. Furthermore, the magnitude and inferences drawn from the coefficients do not vary significantly between standard ordinary least squares regression and multi-level modeling. For these reasons and to offer a more parsimonious presentation, the model in Table 4.2 employs ordinary least squared estimation. The following sections discuss whether the empirical analysis confirms the proposed hypotheses.

Economic Self-Interests

Contrary to previous work revealing a weak relationship between economic self-interests and outgroup attitudes, the estimates in Table 4.2 indicate blacks' feelings toward Latinos are shaped, to some extent, by their material concerns. In accordance with earlier studies, the estimates suggest the source for blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos chiefly centers around their access to gainful employment. The positive and significant coefficient for the unemployed indicates black Angelenos without jobs are more likely to believe Latinos pose a threat to their group interests and status ($\beta=.14$). To be sure, the predicted values reveal that even employed blacks tend to view Latinos in zero-sum terms; approximately 54 percent of employed blacks in Los Angeles believed Latinos pose a threat to blacks' access to jobs and political influence. However, the probability for unemployed blacks that hold similar views increases to roughly 68 percent. These findings further corroborate evidence indicating African Americans often find themselves at a competitive disadvantage with Latinos in the labor market.²

²Further analysis shows that the perceived threat unemployed blacks feel from Latinos did not differ depending on the size of the Latino population. This finding appears to suggest unemployed blacks may feel threatened from all potential competitors; however, a model of blacks' perceive threat from Asians shows no evidence that unemployed blacks believed themselves to be engaged in group competition with Asians. While testing such a hypothesis is beyond the capacity of the MCSUI, there is the possibility that the effects of unemployment would vary based on the size of the Latino population at larger geographic units, which would more likely capture broader regional and national forces.

Table 4.2: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	LASUI	
	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	.72	1.38
% Black Below Poverty X % Latino	-1.45	.60
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma	.40	.67
% Black Below Poverty Level	.58	.22
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>		
% w/o HS Diploma	-.59	.61
% Below Poverty Level	.08	.16
<i>Racial Context</i>		
% Black	.17	.11
% Latino	.75	.36
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>		
Age	.13	.13
Male	-.08	.04
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.02	.08
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.21	.08
Educational Attainment	-.04	.12
Below \$35K	-.06	.06
Above \$70K	-.07	.07
Missing Income	-.10	.07
Executives and Professionals	.11	.06
Service and Labor	.12	.06
Unemployed	.14	.06
Out of Workforce	.09	.07
Homeowner	.01	.05
Years of Residency	.12	.06
Year (1994=1)	-.12	.04
Constant	.45	.19
N	537	
R^2	.28	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 545 African Americans were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Moreover, the analysis corroborates evidence from previous studies that competition is greatest among black and Latino Angelenos over low-skilled jobs. The item for blacks working within service and labor industries is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.12$). This finding indicates blacks working within service and labor occupations are more inclined to believe gains in resources for Latinos will come at their expense. Their feelings are likely informed by their experiences competing with the growing Latino population over jobs within their occupational sector. Yet, the finding for blacks in executive and professional positions narrowly misses the conventional level of statistical significance. Furthermore, the coefficient was positive, indicating black executives and professionals were also inclined to view Latinos as a threat ($\beta=.11$). The initial expectation was that black executives and professionals may feel more threatened by Latinos politically rather than economically, while blacks in service and labor occupations would perceive greater group competition over jobs. However, when separate models were run using each item in the perceived group competition scale as dependent variables, blacks in both occupational sectors viewed Latinos as competitors primarily for jobs.³ Ultimately, the findings indicate blacks at both ends of the labor market feel their opportunities for gainful employment are jeopardized by the Latino population in Los Angeles.⁴

Beyond respondents' employment status and occupations, there is little evidence that African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos stems from either their educational attainment, family income, or access to affordable housing. For all three of these measures, the coefficients fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, it appears all other sources of economic self-interests for blacks are subordinate to their concerns over employment, particularly for service and labor occupations.⁵

³The results from this model are reported in Appendix B.

⁴Similarly, there is no evidence that the group threat felt by blacks working within service and labor occupations varied by the percentage of Latino residents in their communities. Nor is there evidence showing they felt threatened by Asians.

⁵In further analyses, adults above the age of 65 were excluded since they are not likely to


Residential Group Conflict

In addition to their economic self-interests, I expect African Americans' relationships with Latinos are also fundamentally shaped by their residential conditions. In this section, the key indicators of potentially conflictual residential conditions are reflected by indicators of the percentage of blacks living below the poverty level and the percentage of blacks with less than a high school diploma interacted with the percentage of Latinos living within their neighborhoods. These interaction terms were offered to represent neighborhoods with the greatest potential for intergroup conflict between African Americans and Latinos. In considering the effect of the residential conditions, it is important to note that the impact of the individual components of the interactive terms reflect the conditional effect of the item when the other components of the interaction term are held at the lowest value. For example, the independent effect of the percentage of blacks living below the poverty line reflects its influence on blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos when the percentage of Latinos living within the respondents' neighborhoods is at zero.

The effect of the interactions indicate the expectations were misguided. Rather than increasing blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos, the results show that, in fact, such contexts lead African Americans to view Latinos as less threatening; the signs for the coefficients of each interaction term are in the negative direction. Nevertheless, only one interaction term reaches above the level of statistical significance—the multiplicative term between the percentage of blacks below the poverty level and the percentage of Latinos ($\beta=-1.45$). By comparison, the perceived threat felt by many African Americans is greater in areas where the proportion of African Americans living below the poverty line is high, but have few Latino residents; the estimate within such areas is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.58$). Finally, the estimate for the percentage of Latinos, which reflects its influ-

be engaged in work competition. Nevertheless, excluding elderly participants had no noticeable impact on the results; the magnitude and significance of the effects reported in Table 4.3 remained approximately the same.

Figure 4.2: Predicted Values Across Racial and Economic Contexts



ence when both the percentage of black poverty and educational attainment is held at zero, increases how threatened African Americans feel toward Hispanics. The coefficient for the percentage of Latinos is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.75$). Taken together, each of these estimates suggests that African Americans' perceived group competition decreases within areas where they have greater proximity with Latinos and where blacks experience dire economic conditions. Contrary to expectations, it is actually in areas with unfavorable group material conditions and few Latinos where blacks are more likely to view their relationship with Latinos in zero-sum terms.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the influence of the percentage of blacks below the poverty level in areas where the proportion of Latinos is set at the lowest value (solid line), the average (dashed line), and the highest value (dotted line). The figure shows that in areas where there are small Latino populations African Americans' perceived competition with Latinos heightens as the proportion of black poverty increases. The predicted values across the range of black poverty move from .36 to .94. At the

average proportion of Latino residents, the slope fell slightly, ranging from a value of .55 for respondents who live among few poor blacks to .70 for those living among large percentages of poor black residents. However, there is a steep negative slope for blacks living within areas with large Latino populations as the percentage of black poverty increases. Point estimates show that as the proportion of black poverty increases, the predicted values reduce roughly 77 percentage points, from .96 to a low of .19.

Ultimately, the results do not support the proposed hypothesis that blacks living in areas where blacks experience dire economic circumstances *and* are exposed to larger Latino populations will be more likely to feel Latinos threaten their realistic group interests. In fact, the results suggest that African Americans under such conditions are less likely to feel threatened by Latinos. By contrast, blacks experiencing dire economic conditions, but with limited access to Latinos, are more likely to view them as threatening. In considering the estimates, it is important to note that for African Americans living in neighborhoods with low and average levels of black poverty the slopes move in a clearly positive direction with increasing percentages of Latino residents. Furthermore, the steep negative slope must be qualified given prior evidence that a small proportion of the black community actually live in areas where Latinos comprise more than 50 percent of the population (12.2%), much less greater than 75 percent of the population (1.8%).

Yet, what explains the effects found in the analysis? Rather than confirming the presence of realistic group conflict, the analysis, at least at the census block level, appears to support the contact hypothesis, which proposes that meaningful contact between groups reduces group antagonisms. Yet, there are some questions about the role of economic conditions within this dynamic. As shown in Table 4.2, the strongest impact of proximity to Latino populations was felt by blacks living in areas with high concentrations of black poverty. However, this result begs the question as to whether these are the effects of group conditions or broader

Table 4.3: Estimates for Neighborhood and Group Disparities in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Latino Education Advantage X % Latino	—		7.03	1.60
Latino Poverty Advantage X % Latino	—		.22	.38
% w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	-3.33	1.40	—	
% Below Poverty X% Latino	-.29	.93	—	
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	.12	.32	—	
% Black Below Poverty Level	.07	.10	—	
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	.32	.64	.00	.45
% Below Poverty Level	.25	.31	.27	.15
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	.17	.10	.04	.10
% Latino	1.16	.40	-.05	.23
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.16	.13	.04	.13
Male	-.08	.04	-.06	.04
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.01	.08	.07	.08
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.21	.08	-.18	.09
Educational Attainment	-.04	.11	-.19	.11
Below \$35K	-.04	.06	-.08	.07
Above \$70K	-.06	.07	-.11	.08
Missing Income	-.09	.07	-.08	.07
Executives and Professionals	.11	.05	.13	.06
Service and Labor	.12	.06	.11	.06
Unemployed	.14	.06	.13	.08
Out of Workforce	.07	.07	.08	.08
Homeowner	.01	.05	-.03	.05
Years of Residency	.11	.06	.12	.06
Year (1994=1)	-.11	.04	-.11	.05
Constant	.34	.19	.60	.17
N	537		525	
R^2	.28		.29	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 545 African Americans were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

neighborhood conditions. If general neighborhood conditions are at play, then it would suggest black and Latino residents living in such neighborhoods are likely to have relatively equal economic status. Furthermore, given previous evidence showing relative economic disparities between blacks and Latinos heighten blacks' anti-Latino attitudes, there is a question about whether the investigation should be more concerned with absolute group deprivation or economic disparities between blacks and Latinos.

Table 4.3 reports the estimates from two models. The first model is similar to the specification reported in Table 4.2, except that the interaction terms between the group economic conditions and the size of the Latino population are excluded. Instead, an interaction term is included that consists of the general neighborhood conditions multiplied by the percentage of the Latino population. By comparing the effects between Model 1 and Table 4.2, we can judge whether the influence of group conditions on blacks' perceived threat from Latinos is decidedly different from the impact of their neighborhood's economic status. The model in Table 4.2 revealed a negative and statistically significant result between the percentage of blacks living below the poverty line and the size of the Latino population. The estimate for the interaction between neighborhood poverty and the percentage of Latinos in Model 1 of Table 4.3 is negative, but fails to approach conventional levels of statistical significance ($\beta=-.29$). This finding would seem to suggest that the effect of group conditions can be distinguished from neighborhood status. However, the negative and statistically significant effect ($\beta=-3.33$) for the interaction between the percentage of residents without a high school diploma and the proportion of Latinos mirrors the results found between the racial and economic context in Table 4.2. Ultimately, the findings suggest blacks living in areas with high proportions of less educated residents and large Latino populations tend to view Hispanics in less threatening terms. The shift in the effects from group poverty to neighborhood educational attainment likely shows that blacks have different considerations depending on whether

they focus on the conditions of the group as compared to the general neighborhood. As explained earlier, black educational attainment does not correlate as strongly to income as for other groups, which explains why blacks' poverty status is more important in Table 4.2. Yet, when broadening the considerations to neighborhood conditions, differences in educational attainment tend to be a stronger predictor of intergroup attitudes. Ultimately, the results signal support for the contact hypothesis considering that one of the conditions for contact to improve intergroup relations was that both groups have approximately equal status.

In contrast, Model 2 in Table 4.3 offers a different picture of the role of blacks' residential conditions. Rather than an interaction term between neighborhood conditions and the proportion of the Latino population, a multiplicative term was employed that combines a measure of areas where Latinos hold a material advantage over blacks in both income and educational attainment and the size of the Hispanic population. The indicators of Latino educational advantage and Latino poverty advantage are calculated identically to those employed in Gay (2006). To take relative poverty disparities as an example, the difference between the proportion of Latinos' living below the poverty line was taken from the proportion of black poverty. Consequently, positive values reflect areas in which black poverty was greater than Latino poverty, while negative values indicate contexts in which the proportion of Latinos living below the poverty line was greater than the percentage of blacks living below the poverty line. The zero values reflect areas where black and Latino poverty was at parity. To reflect the Latino poverty advantage, the negative values were also set at zero. In contrast, the Latino educational advantage measure was calculated by taking the difference between the proportion of Latinos who graduated with at least a high school diploma from the percentage of blacks with at least a high school diploma. Consequently, the positive values reflect areas where blacks enjoy higher levels of educational attainment. Negative values reflect census blocks where a greater percentage of Latinos had acquired at least a high school degree.

Subsequently, the positive values are set at zero and the absolute values of the negative values are taken. The specification for model 2 mimics the model specification in Gay (2006). Interestingly, Gay (2006) excludes the independent components for Latino' material advantages from the model, leaving them only in the interaction terms. She reasons that intergroup disparities would only be present within contexts where the proportion of Latinos was greater than zero. While theoretically her reasoning is sound, previous research stresses that even when theoretically-valid, the exclusion of the individual components of interaction terms can lead to severe inferential errors (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2005). Nevertheless, for the sake of comparing her results to model 1, model 2 reflects Gay's (2006) specification.⁶

The results indicate that relative economic disparities impact blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos differently than their absolute group or neighborhood conditions. In particular, the estimates show that in areas where Latinos attained higher levels of education than blacks *and* there were sizeable proportions of Latinos, blacks were more likely to perceive Hispanics as a threat. The coefficient for the interaction term between the Latino education advantage item and indicator for the size of the Latino population was both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=7.03$).

The evidence demonstrates that the influence of living among large Latino populations on blacks' perceived threat from Latinos depends on whether there are economic disparities between both groups. The presence of Latinos in areas where all residents are economically-deprived does not necessarily facilitate black-Latino conflict. In fact, the evidence suggests such conditions can reduce group tensions. This finding likely emerges because black and Latino residents living in areas with high concentrations of black poverty will tend to have approximately equal economic status, which is necessary for contact to reduce intergroup hostilities. On the other

⁶When the independent components are included, both interaction terms fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

hand, economic disparities spark group competition between African Americans and Hispanics. In areas where Latinos hold greater resources and status than their black neighbors, African Americans are more likely to believe they pose a threat to their access to material resources; this finding corroborates the conclusions from Gay (2006). In the final analysis, the results support the claim from contact theorists that group exchanges are a necessary, but insufficient condition for group harmony. In addition to contact, groups must have equal standing-in this case, economically. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that group contact is most effective at reducing group tensions when there are opportunities for meaningful exchanges between groups, which has been argued is more likely within smaller geographic units (Forbes, 1996).

4.1.3 Latinos' Perceived Group Competition with Blacks

At this point, the analysis moves on to explore the determinants of Latinos' perceived group competition with African Americans. Again, the expectation is that economic self-interests will motivate feelings of group competition with blacks among Latinos. Additionally, I expect Latinos' perceived threat from African Americans is largely a function of the racial and economic conditions within their neighborhoods. Like the model presented above, the dependent variables for the multivariate analysis consist of a composite scale of the two items presented in figure 4.2.⁷ The questions ask Latino participants whether gains for blacks either for jobs or political influence mean less access to jobs and political influence for Latinos ($\alpha = .81$). Again, ordinary least squared estimation is utilized for the analysis. Multi-level modeling revealed, as for African Americans, that clustering did not have a significant influence on the final results. The intraclass correlation was negligible (.009) and the estimates from both models were similar. The results reported in Table 4.4 provide few coefficients

⁷The logic of the scale construction was discussed in detail in Chapter 3

that reach the conventional levels of statistical significance when a two-tailed test is applied. Nevertheless, for the explanatory variables for which one might expect directional hypotheses, there are some coefficients that are statistically significant using a one-tailed test. The sections below include a discussion of how the estimates either confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses initially offered.

Economic Self-Interests

The evidence concerning the relationship between Latinos' economic self-interests and their perceived competition with African Americans is, on a whole, weak. Table 4.4 reports the coefficients from the model of Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks. None of the measures offered as indicators of economic self-interests reached conventional levels of statistical significance when applying a two-tailed test. Nevertheless, given the directional nature of the hypotheses, a one-tailed test is informative. When applying a one-tailed test, one indicator clearly stands out—employment status. As expected, the coefficient for unemployed Latinos moves in the positive direction and reaches statistical significance using a one-tailed test ($\beta=.07$). Yet, although the coefficient is statistically significant, the magnitude of the estimate is small in comparison to other estimates in the model. For instance, when comparing the coefficients, the results suggest being of Mexican descent had a stronger impact than being unemployed ($\beta=.09$ and $.07$, respectively). Thus, while influential, the impact of economic self-interests on Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks is not overwhelming. Furthermore, none of the other indicators of economic self-interests (i.e., educational attainment, occupation, family income, or homeownership) were found to be significant when using either a one or two-tailed test. This finding in combination with the results for African Americans implies that while relationships between blacks and Latinos are shaped by the labor market, it seems to influence blacks' threat from Latinos more strongly than Latinos' perceived competition from blacks.

Table 4.4: OLS Estimates of Latinos' Perceived Competition in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	LASUI	
	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>		
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X % Black	-.44	.71
% Latino Below Poverty X % Black	-1.05	.60
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>		
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.07	.56
% Latino Below Poverty Level	.42	.29
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>		
% w/o HS Diploma	.07	.56
% Below Poverty Level	-.38	.33
<i>Racial Context</i>		
% Black	.65	.39
% Latino	.13	.13
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>		
Age	.04	.12
Male	-.01	.03
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.03	.07
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.06	.08
Educational Attainment	-.08	.08
Below \$35K	.05	.05
Above \$70K	-.13	.16
Missing Income	.05	.07
Executives and Professionals	.05	.05
Service and Labor	.05	.05
Unemployed	.07†	.04
Out of Workforce	-.05	.05
Homeowner	.06	.05
Years of Residency	-.02	.10
Year (1994=1)	.00	.06
Mexican	.09	.04
Puerto Rican	.19	.23
Cuban	.12	.14
US Born	-.06	.19
Years in US	-.02	.24
Constant	.29	.12
N	448	
R^2	.12	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. The † signifies estimates that move in the hypothesized direction and are statistically significant when a one-tailed test is applied. Due to the split-sample design, only 476 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Residential Group Conflict

There is also little evidence to suggest that racial and economic conditions, either generally or for the group, influence Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks. At best, the results provide suggestive evidence, consistent with the findings for African Americans, that dire group conditions and living in close proximity to large black populations actually decreases how threatening Latinos view African Americans. For instance, the estimate for the interaction between neighborhoods with high concentrations of Latino poverty and larger populations of black residents implies such conditions actually temper how threatened Latinos feel from blacks ($\beta=-1.05$). Yet, the negative coefficient for the estimate fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The same can be said of the estimate for the percentage of black residents; the coefficient narrowly misses statistical significance ($\beta=.65$). Nevertheless, these measures seem to imply that the perceived group competition among Latinos living in areas with large numbers of African-American residents *decreases* with increasing levels of Latino poverty.

The analysis also explores the impact of the general economic condition of the neighborhood as well as the relative economic disparities between blacks and Latinos. Table 4.5 shows the OLS estimates from two model specification. Model 1 employs interaction terms between the percentage of residents who live below the poverty line as well as the proportion of residents without a high school diploma with a measure of the percentage of black residents within respondents' neighborhoods. Again, these interactions were created as a way of distinguishing between the effect of group material conditions from the broader neighborhood's economic status.

The results from model 1 were as disappointing as the estimates reported in Table 4.4. The interaction between neighborhood conditions and the size of the Latino population moved in the negative direction, which is contrary from what was initially hypothesized. Although there is no confirmation of the proposed hypotheses, the evidence suggests blacks living in neighborhoods with dire economic conditions and

Table 4.5: Estimates for Neighborhood and Group Disparities in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Black Education Advantage X % Black	—		.63	.92
Black Poverty Advantage X % Black	—		-.31	.38
% w/o HS Diploma X % Black	-2.28	1.33	—	
% Below Poverty X % Black	-.41	.75	—	
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.31	.57	—	
% Latino Below Poverty Level	.24	.25	—	
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	.31	.57	-.11	.34
% Below Poverty Level	-.23	.36	.01	.17
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	.86	.36	.02	.29
% Latino	.10	.13	.12	.12
N	448		448	
R^2	.12		.11	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. The sociodemographic items specified in the model reported in Table 4.4 were also included in both models; the magnitude of the coefficients as well as the inferences drawn from the estimates were consistent with the results found in Table 4.4. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 476 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

sizable Latino populations were actually *less* inclined to view them as competitors than those living under better circumstances. On the other hand, the coefficient for the percentage of blacks within respondents' neighborhoods ($\beta = .86$) indicates residents of more economically-viable communities and larger African American populations were more likely to perceive blacks as a threat. This result confirms that proximity to large numbers of outgroup members does not necessarily translate into group conflict or cooperation. In this case, the size of the black population is consequential when Latinos live in higher status neighborhoods.

On the other hand, model 2 explores whether relative economic disparities between blacks and Latinos fuel Latinos' perceived threat from blacks. The model

includes measures of areas where blacks have higher levels of educational attainment and family income than their Latino neighbors. The indicators for areas where blacks enjoy economic advantages is calculated similarly to the measures of Latino material advantages used in the analysis for African American respondents. For example, the black poverty advantage measure was calculated by, again, taking the difference between the proportion of Latinos below the poverty line from the percentage of black poverty. The positive values reflect areas where black poverty is greater than Latino poverty and negative values indicate the contrary. Zero values represent areas where there is economic parity between the two groups. Yet, unlike the measure of Latino poverty advantage, the black poverty advantage score is constructed by setting the positive values at zero and taking the absolute value of the negative scores. On the other hand, the indicator of a black educational advantage is constructed by taking the difference between the proportion of Latinos with less than a high school degree from the percentage of blacks without a high school diploma. Yet, in this instance, the only step taken is for the negative values to be placed at zero since they reflect areas where Latinos' educational attainment is less than African Americans.

Ultimately, the results offer little to suggest group economic disparities influence how strongly Latinos perceive blacks to be economic competitors. The coefficients for the interaction terms fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Considering all of the evidence, there is little support for the residential group conflict hypothesis when applied to Hispanic Angelenos. Under no circumstance did the interaction terms indicate that Latinos living in areas with dire economic conditions and sizable black populations viewed blacks as a threat more than those living in areas with higher economic status. In fact, there is little to suggest Latinos' social context has an influence on their attitudes toward blacks altogether.

Discussion

Overall, the findings revealed that African Americans in Los Angeles hold stronger feelings of group competition with Latinos than Latinos feel toward them. In addition, both groups' perception of intergroup competition is shaped by their personal economic circumstances. The evidence shows that blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition is influenced, to some extent, by a concern for their economic self-interests, particularly their employment status. However, economic-self-interests were shown to influence blacks' perceived competition with Latinos more than Latinos' perceived threat from blacks more than Latinos' perceived threat from African Americans. Furthermore, the analysis corroborates the evidence in previous studies that blacks in occupations that are service-oriented or require manual labor were more inclined to believe Latinos posed a threat to their group interests. Latinos in service and labor occupations did not tend to see greater competition. While little evidence suggests other sources of economic self-interests were consequential, the findings confirm the economic self-interest hypothesis. The results are further confirmation that the labor market in Los Angeles forces blacks and Latinos to increasingly compete for similar employment opportunities.

On the other hand, the evidence for the residential group conflict hypothesis is mixed. For one, rather than increasing their perceived group competition, black residents in areas with poor group and neighborhood conditions as well as sizeable Latino populations perceived less competition with Latinos; these findings were revealed when utilizing measures of the absolute economic conditions of the group and respondents' neighborhoods. Yet, while absolute conditions did not heighten blacks' perceived threat from Latinos, residential economic disparities between both groups did. In particular, areas where Latinos held greater status than blacks and where there were large Latino populations motivated blacks to think of their relationship with Latinos in zero-sum terms. Taken together, the evidence shows the tenor of blacks' feelings toward Latinos is shaped by a delicate balance between the rela-

tive condition of both groups as well as group members' proximity to large Latino populations. Under conditions where blacks and Latinos have approximately equal status, blacks are less likely to view Latinos as threatening. This result is consistent with what has been proposed by the contact hypothesis. Yet, when Latinos enjoy greater status, blacks are more likely to believe they are economic competitors. This finding corroborates evidence from previous work (Gay, 2006) and offers qualified support of the residential group conflict hypothesis.

In contrast, there is little evidence to suggest residential conditions influenced Latinos' perceived group competition with African Americans. Estimates for both Latinos' absolute and relative group conditions did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance; their perceived competition with blacks was primarily led by their personal economic circumstances rather than their residential conditions. Assuming a large proportion of the Hispanic community in Los Angeles is undocumented, there is good reason to believe this result is valid. Immigrating to pursue greater economic opportunities and freedom, illegal immigrants are more likely to live in less favorable residential areas as they seek improvements in their personal economic circumstances.

In addition to the hypothesized effects, there were other indicators that shaped respondents' perceived group competition. First, among black Angelenos the coefficient for political ideology was consistently negative and statistically significant, indicating liberal blacks in Los Angeles felt less group competition with Latinos than their conservative counterparts. The relationship between ideology and perceived group competition is understandable given that the political incorporation of blacks and Hispanics has largely occurred as a consequence of liberal coalitions that advocated for minority interests (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1986). Such coalitions signal the potential for similarly-minded members of both groups to work toward their common goals. Furthermore, city elections in Los Angeles are non-partisan,

which means that groups are forced to rally around issues rather than party labels.⁸ Yet, again, Latinos were not impacted greatly by their political ideology; the coefficient for ideology was not statistically significant in any of the models reported in Table 4.4 and 4.5.

Furthermore, the year the interviews were conducted with blacks had a significant influence on their perceptions as well. An indicator for the year was employed chiefly to determine whether responses conducted further away from the 1992 Los Angeles riots resulted in significantly different answers. Accordingly, the estimate for the year of the interview is both negative and significant in each model for African Americans, which hints that blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos reduced after 1992. While the coefficient may be linked to an event other than the Los Angeles riots in 1992, there are few events that would influence intergroup conflicts as intensely.

Lastly, the analysis reveals that Latinos' national descent determines whether they view African Americans as a threat. In particular, Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans tended to view African Americans as more of a threat than Latinos that descend from other central and south American countries. This finding has serious implications on relationships between blacks and Hispanics in Los Angeles since Mexicans comprise an overwhelming majority of the Latino population. Previous studies of Mexican racial attitudes have proposed that the racial order in Mexico, like the United States, was initially structured to benefit its white population. To sustain this racial order, anti-black attitudes-as well as attitudes toward other racial/ethnic segments of the population-developed (Menchaca, 2001; Seed, 1982). Furthermore, it is likely that a predominant proportion of the Mexican population in Los Angeles are first or second generation immigrants who have translated the anti-black prejudice from their homeland to the United States. Taken together, there is reason to suspect efforts at cooperation between blacks and Latinos-but

⁸Nevertheless, most candidates in Los Angeles tend to make their party affiliations public before elections.

specifically Mexicans-in Los Angeles are particularly difficult.

4.2 Boston

The results from Los Angeles certainly provide some insight into what factors influence relationships between blacks and Latinos; however, group dynamics in Los Angeles may merely reflect its unique racial history and sociodemographic composition. Consequently, the analysis now turns to examine how the results from Los Angeles translate to another context-Boston, Massachusetts. Boston and Los Angeles are similar in that they are both major metropolitan areas in the United States. Moreover, both cities have sordid racial pasts. In the case of Boston, despite being considered a liberal northeastern city, white Bostonians gained notoriety for their vehement and, ultimately, violent opposition to bus desegregation plans in the 1970s and 1980s. Even before the opposition to desegregation, the African-American and Irish-American communities in Boston had very tense relations (Hornburger, 1976).

On the other hand, there are some differences between both cities as well. For one, Los Angeles has a larger landmass and population than Boston.⁹ Furthermore, while both cities are diverse, Los Angeles and Boston have different types of black and Latino communities. For instance, the black community in Los Angeles is predominantly native-born, while a significant proportion of the black community in Boston are foreign-born, coming primarily from the Caribbean and parts of Africa. The size of the foreign-born black population is typical of many metropolitan cities in the northeastern region of the United States. With respect to Latinos, a large proportion of the Latino community in Los Angeles is of Mexican descent, while in Boston the Latino population hails predominantly from Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. Lastly, but most importantly, Los Angeles has experienced a

⁹According to the 1990 Census, Los Angeles had a population of 8,863,164 residents, while the metropolitan statistical area comprising Boston, Lawrence, and Salem, Massachusetts as well as parts of New Hampshire was comprised of 3,871,968 residents.

greater increase in the Latino population over the last several years than Boston. In the early 1990s, when the data for the MCSUI was collected, Latinos comprised approximately 40 percent and blacks 10 percent of the Los Angeles County population (1990 Census Bureau Summary File). However, the size of both groups was much smaller in Boston in 1990. African Americans comprised 5.5% percent of the population in Boston and the Latino community was only approximately 5 percent (4.7%) of the population.¹⁰ These differences may have some bearing on the inferences to be drawn from the analysis. Overall, the analysis offers a more conservative test of the hypotheses than what was offered in Los Angeles. Given their small size, the presence of one group may not be salient among the other; if they live in the same neighborhoods, their presence is likely to be limited and, given their numbers, both groups are unlikely to enjoy much political influence.

At this point, I explore the racial context in Boston to consider whether it presents an environment that holds the potential for both African Americans and Latinos to compete over material resources. Overall, the data suggests that African Americans and Latinos may be in fewer circumstances that would lead them to conflict.

For instance, Table 4.6 shows that few blacks live in neighborhoods where there are sizable proportions of Latino residents. In fact, only approximately 7 percent (7.3%) of African-Americans live in environments where Latinos comprise more than 25 percent of the population, as compared to roughly 93 percent (92.7%) that live in neighborhoods where the proportion of Latinos is less than 25 percent. Furthermore, the evidence indicates an overwhelming proportion of black Bostonians live in neighborhoods where African Americans are the majority of the residents; almost 60 percent (59.1%) of blacks live in areas where they comprise more than half of the population. Another roughly 15 percent of African Americans reside in communities

¹⁰The 1990 Census reports the size of the non-Hispanic black population as 215,050 and the Latino population as 180,835.

Table 4.6: Sample Distribution Across Racial Contexts in Boston

Percentage of Population	Black	Latino
% Black Residents		
Below 25%	26.4	69.5
25-50%	14.5	19.1
50% and above	59.1	11.4
% Latino Residents		
Below 25%	92.7	62.3
25-50%	5.8	20.7
50% and above	1.5	17.0

Note: The estimates reflect the frequencies when the person weight is applied.

where there are between 25 and 50 percent of African Americans in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, there appear to be a considerable number of blacks in Boston who are able to live outside of such segregated circumstances. Over a quarter of the black sample (26.4%) live in areas where blacks comprise less than 25 percent of the population.

In contrast to Los Angeles, the Latino sample has a larger proportion of black residents in their neighborhoods than blacks have Latinos in their neighborhoods. Approximately 31 percent (30.5%) of Latinos live in neighborhoods where African Americans comprise 25 percent or more of the residents. In comparison, only roughly 9 percent (9.1%) of Latinos in Los Angeles lived in areas with a similar composition of blacks. Yet, the remaining Latino community live within areas where the proportions of black residents are low (i.e., 69.5% live in areas where blacks are less than 25 percent of the residents). Most surprisingly, there appears to be fewer Latinos living in solely Latino communities in Boston. Approximately 62 percent (62.3%) of Latinos live in neighborhoods where the proportion of Latino residents is less than 25 percent. Accordingly, the remaining proportion of the sample (37.7%) live in areas where Latinos comprise at least 25 percent of the residents. This is a significant change from the residential pattern of Latinos in Los Angeles. Ultimately, the fact that Latinos in Boston tend to live in neighborhoods that have neither a majority of

black or Latino residents suggests that they are more racially-integrated in Boston than in Los Angeles. Nevertheless, there is evidence to show that a large enough proportion of Latinos in Boston live among African Americans to warrant further investigation into whether competitive environments influence their attitudes toward blacks.


4.2.1 Perceived Group Competition between Blacks and Latinos

At this point, we further explore the degree to which both groups view one another as competitors over scarce resources. Although the evidence suggests that they are more isolated from one another than in Los Angeles, both blacks and Latinos experience less favorable socioeconomic circumstances than their white counterparts, which can serve as either a basis for greater political conflict or, perhaps, cooperation. We begin by examining the degree to which both groups perceive one another as competitors over material resources and status.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the proportion of black and Latino respondents that agree the other group poses a threat to their access to jobs and political influence. Overall, it is clear that blacks and Latinos are less threatened by one another in Boston than in Los Angeles. The percentage of respondents that perceived the other group as a threat was substantially higher in Los Angeles than in Boston for both groups.

Only roughly one-third of African Americans agreed that Latinos pose a threat to their access to jobs as compared to nearly half of black Angelenos (33.5% and 51.5%, respectively). A similar gap exists in how strongly they view Latinos as competitors over political influence; while about 44 percent of blacks saw Latinos as competitors in Los Angeles, only a little over 20 percent of blacks in Boston held the same perception (43.9% and 22.0%, respectively). These disparities between both cities likely reflect different economic and political dynamics between the two cities. Given the smaller Latino population, there would be fewer available Latino workers

Figure 4.3: Blacks' and Latinos' Perceived Group Competition in Boston



to compete for jobs that African Americans would pursue. Furthermore, Los Angeles was likely experiencing stronger Latino population growth than Boston. The analysis in Los Angeles suggests this may not be consequential at smaller geographic levels, but there is good reason to believe shifts in the broader metropolitan context would certainly influence how strongly blacks perceived Latinos as a threat. Nonetheless, it is still the case that blacks in both cities perceive Latinos as less of a threat to their political influence than their job opportunities. This pattern provides further evidence that the key source of tensions between both groups within urban areas is their competition over jobs. This finding is significant because most of the prevailing literature revealing job competition between African Americans and Latinos has focused, with good reason, on Los Angeles; this analysis demonstrates job competition between both groups exists even outside of Los Angeles, although less pronounced.

A similar pattern emerges for Latinos' perceived competition with blacks in Boston as in Los Angeles. In Boston, the proportion of Latinos that view African

Americans as competitors for jobs is almost half that of Hispanics in Los Angeles (16.9% and 30.2%, respectively). The same can be said for their perceived political competition with blacks; while approximately 37 percent of Latinos viewed blacks as political competitors in Los Angeles, only roughly 17 percent of Latinos in Boston view their political relationship with blacks in zero-sum terms (37.4% and 15.3%, respectively). Overall, Latinos felt less intensely about the presence of realistic competition with blacks in Boston than in Los Angeles. Furthermore, they are equally threatened by blacks for jobs and political influence, unlike their Los Angeles counterparts who are more concerned with the threat blacks pose to their political influence.

4.2.2 Blacks' Perceived Group Competition with Latinos

For the final section of this chapter, I investigate the factors that influence whether blacks and Latinos perceive each other as competitors. Similar to the analysis in Los Angeles, the key dependent variable consists of a composite scale of the two measures of perceived group competition for jobs and political influence (for blacks, $\alpha=.71$ and, for Latinos, $\alpha=.70$). The model specification for blacks mimics the equation used in Los Angeles with few exceptions.¹¹ Table 4.7 reports the ordinary least squared estimates from a regression analysis of African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos in Boston. Again, the key independent variables include measures of respondents' socioeconomic characteristics as well as their residential conditions, both for their group and generally. Like the Los Angeles analysis, the interaction terms between the respondents' group material conditions and size of the outgroup are taken as signals of the realistic group concerns present in the local environment. The only deviation from the Los Angeles specification is that the measure for the year the interview was completed is excluded from the

Table 4.7: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition in Boston

Independent Variables	BSUI	
	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	-.79	1.15
% Black Below Poverty Level X % Latino	1.08	.91
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma	.17	.53
% Black Below Poverty Level	-.72	.41
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>		
% w/o HS Diploma	.77	.65
% Below Poverty Level	.35	.38
<i>Racial Context</i>		
% Black	.03	.07
% Latino	-.27	.45
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>		
Age	.18	.14
Male	-.03	.05
Party Identification (Democrat)	.14	.08
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.10	.10
Educational Attainment	-.05	.11
Below \$35K	.00	.07
Above \$70K	-.09	.10
Missing Income	.18	.10
Executives and Professionals	.09	.07
Service and Labor	.04	.07
Unemployed	-.04	.08
Out of Workforce	-.04	.07
Homeowner	-.09†	.05
Years of Residency	-.03	.07
Constant	.17	.19
N	201	
R^2	.29	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. The † signifies estimates that move in the hypothesized direction and are statistically significant when a one-tailed test is applied. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

analysis. Evidence for the hypotheses is discussed in detail below.

Economic Self-Interests

On the whole, the evidence that economic self-interests drive African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos in Boston is weak. While several of the indicators move in the expected direction, most do not approach conventional levels of statistical significance.¹² The only exception in this case is the coefficient for homeownership ($\beta = -.09$); the negative coefficient implies black Bostonian homeowners viewed Latinos as less of a threat than those who did not own a home. The coefficient is not statistically significant when a two-tailed test is applied; however, the estimate reaches conventional levels of statistical significance when employing a one-tailed test. Given the estimate is consistent with the proposed hypotheses, the one-tailed test is appropriate.¹³ Overall, the results suggest black Bostonians' perceived threat from Latinos is driven more by housing competition than concerns over access to jobs.¹⁴

¹¹The analysis, again, relies upon ordinary least squares estimation due to the infinitesimal interclass correlation (9.43e-236) and similar results between the estimates generated from OLS and a multi-level model.

¹²Even when excluding elderly respondents, there is no substantive change in the results. The coefficient for homeownership increases to statistical significance even when using a two-tailed test. Nevertheless, there were no other indicators of economic self-interests that influenced blacks' perceived threat from Latinos.

¹³The effect of homeownership on the composite scale is primarily driven by its influence on blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos over jobs. When the two items used to create the scale of zero-sum competition are employed in two separate models, the coefficient for homeownership was both negative and statistically significant for the model of job competition. However, there is no effect for homeownership in the model for political competition. The estimates are reported in Appendix B.

¹⁴Granted, homeownership may also reflect an respondents' overall financial well-being. One could speculate that homeownership may signal respondents' wealth, in contrast to their income. Clearly, their income and wealth would be highly-correlated; nevertheless, homeownership in a major metropolitan area such as Boston tends to require a considerable amount of capital above and beyond one's income. Unfortunately, the survey offers no measure of personal wealth, eliminating the possibility that it can serve as a control in the model.

Residential Group Conflict

The evidence for residential group conflict was even less compelling. None of the contextual indicators in the analysis reached conventional levels of statistical significance. Some of the estimates went in the expected direction, but there is little to demonstrate either their economic or racial context makes a significant impact on black Bostonians' perceived realistic threat from Latinos. Further analysis of the general neighborhood conditions as well as the relative group economic disparities between blacks and Latinos also offered null findings for the contextual effects. Ultimately, residential conditions appear to have less influence on blacks' perceived threat from Latinos in Boston than Los Angeles. One reason for the different effects of residential conditions on blacks perceived threat from Latinos in both cities likely relates to the overall proportion of Latinos present in both cities. In Los Angeles, where Latinos comprised almost 40 percent (37.3%) of the population in 1990, black respondents would likely be well aware of Hispanics' presence even if one's community did not have a large number of Latino residents. This finding explains why poor blacks living in areas with few Latinos were more likely to view Hispanics as a threat than those living among large numbers of Latinos. In contrast, Boston's overall Latino population is small (4.5%), which is likely to make them less of a salient threat to blacks no matter the economic and racial composition of their neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the MCSUI does not offer measures that would allow for such an analysis.

Overall, the analysis provides little evidence for either the economic self-interest or residential group conflict hypotheses. Yet, there are a few conclusions that can be drawn from the results. First, among black Bostonians, homeownership rather than one's employment status was more likely to drive group competition with Latinos. This finding may be due to the fact that unemployment was less of a problem among Black Bostonians than blacks in Los Angeles. Given the smaller unemployment rate for blacks in Boston, homeownership may serve as a stronger cue of their overall

economic well-being.

Secondly, residential material conditions, either for the group or for the neighborhood generally, had no influence on blacks' feelings toward Latinos. I suspect the generally small Latino population in Boston may cause black Bostonians to view Latinos as less of a threat regardless of the size of the Latino population in their neighborhoods. Considering the limited influence of economic self-interests and residential group conditions on their perceived group competition, there is good reason to believe blacks in Boston may be more amenable to political alliances with Latinos than in Los Angeles. If blacks do not tie Latinos to their personal or group economic circumstances, they would likely be less willing to view their interests in conflictual terms. On the other hand, the absence of realistic group competition does not necessarily presage cooperative intergroup relationships if other motivating factors are triggered.

4.2.3 Latinos' Perceived Group Competition with Blacks

The final section of the chapter concentrates on the determinants that predict Latinos' perceived competition with African Americans. Again, the model specification is similar to the model presented for Los Angeles, except that it excludes the predictor for the year the interview was completed.¹⁵ The estimates from the analysis are reported in Table 4.8.

Economic Self-Interests

The evidence that economic self-interests impact Latinos' perceived realistic group competition with African Americans in Boston is mixed. As confirmation of the economic self-interest hypothesis, Latino respondents' work status, educa-

¹⁵Like the other specifications, the clustering did not present a significant problem to either the analysis or interpretation of the results to necessitate a multi-level approach. The interclass correlation is .035 and there was no change in the inferences that could be drawn between either ordinary least squares or multi-level estimation. Therefore, like the other models, I relied upon ordinary least squares analysis.

Table 4.8: OLS Estimates of Latinos' Perceived Competition in Boston

Independent Variables	BSUI	
	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>		
% Latino HS Diploma or Less X % Black	-.49	.38
% Latino Below Poverty X % Black	-.27	.17
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>		
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	-.05	.19
% Latino Below Poverty Level	.14	.09
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>		
% w/o HS Diploma	-.05	.39
% Below Poverty Level	.11	.17
<i>Racial Context</i>		
% Black	.30	.12
% Latino	-.09	.08
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>		
Age	.04	.09
Male	.00	.03
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.05	.06
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.14	.06
Educational Attainment	-.50	.07
Below \$35K	-.06	.05
Above \$70K	-.07	.07
Missing Income	-.18	.09
Executives and Professionals	-.05	.04
Service and Labor	-.05	.04
Unemployed	.08†	.05
Out of Workforce	-.04	.04
Homeowner	-.18	.04
Years of Residency	.10	.08
Mexican	-.05	.14
Puerto Rican	-.07	.03
Cuban	-.12	.06
US Born	-.08	.11
Years in U.S.	-.22	.13
Constant	.69	.10
N	301	
R^2	.59	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. The † signifies estimates that move in the hypothesized direction and are statistically significant when a one-tailed test is applied. Due to the split-sample design, only 338 Latinos were asked the questions for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

tional attainment, and homeownership all significantly influenced their perceived competition with blacks. The coefficient for the measure of unemployment actually fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance using a two-tailed test ($\beta=.08$); however, the estimate has the expected sign and is statistically significant when a one-tailed test is applied. Ultimately, the results show unemployed Latinos believed blacks posed more of a threat to their group well-being than their counterparts who were either employed or out of the workforce. When holding all other variables constant, the predicted values range from .49 for employed Latinos to .58 for unemployed Latinos. Furthermore, the results reveal that better-educated Latinos tend to perceive less group competition with African Americans than less educated Latinos, which is indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient for educational attainment ($\beta=-.50$). When estimating the predicted values for Latinos' perceived competition with blacks, the point estimates range from .58 for less-educated Latinos to .10 for highly-educated Latinos. Given the low levels of educational attainment in the Latino community, the findings suggest that greater access to a quality education would facilitate more cooperative relationships with African Americans. Finally, the model reveals a negative and significant estimate for homeownership ($\beta=-.18$), indicating Latinos who owned homes were less likely to view blacks in threatening terms than those Hispanics who either rented or had other housing arrangements. The predicted values, when holding the other variables constant declines from .52 for those that do not own homes to .34 for Latino homeowners. Overall, the estimates for homeownership imply housing competition between both groups is more prevalent in Boston than in Los Angeles. Despite these findings, there is no evidence to suggest African Americans' labor market status or family income shaped their attitudes toward Latinos. Both coefficients failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Taken together, the results hint that economic self-interests tend to shape Hispanic Bostonians' views of group competition with African Americans.

Residential Group Conflict

In contrast, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that group competition is driven by residential group conditions. The negative direction of the interaction terms seem to suggest areas with dire group conditions and large proportions of African Americans decreases how threatened Latinos' feel towards blacks. Nonetheless, both interactions failed to approach statistical significance. At best, the estimate for the proportion of blacks within Latinos' neighborhoods is both positive and significant ($\beta=.30$), indicating Latinos living among larger proportions of African Americans in more economically-favorable conditions were more likely to perceive them as competitors. In comparison to some of the other significant coefficients in the model, the magnitude of the estimate is trumped only by the effect of educational attainment ($\beta=-.50$). This finding reveals that economic circumstances—at least at the census block level—shape Latinos' views of blacks as competitors differently than expected. Latinos living in more favorable economic circumstances are likely to have a greater pool of resources to compete over than their counterparts in more economically-deprived areas. As such, large black populations in such neighborhoods would serve as a cue that Latinos may acquire a smaller share of the economic pie. In neighborhoods with concentrated poverty, there may be fewer resources to fight over, limiting the ability of Latinos to blame their circumstances on African Americans.¹⁶

Discussion

Overall, the analysis in Boston offers mixed results. For one, homeownership reduces blacks' perceived threat from Latinos, likely because black homeowners are more affluent and, thus, in fewer situations where they would need to compete with

¹⁶Nevertheless, group conflict may still center around issues of territory and respect. This concern appears to be at the heart of intensified gang violence between blacks and Latinos in some inner-city communities in the United States, where black and Latino gangs have sought to drive each other out of their respective neighborhoods.

Latinos over resources. On the other hand, black Bostonians' residential conditions have no impact on how threatening they perceive Latinos. This is likely due to the fact that Latinos did not comprise a threatening enough proportion of the overall Boston population in the 1990s. With a Latino population of only approximately 5 percent (4.5%), blacks may not be convinced Latinos pose a serious threat to their economic well-being regardless of Hispanics' composition within their neighborhoods. In contrast, Latinos perceived threat from African Americans is certainly impacted by their concerns over their personal economic interests. Nevertheless, the evidence for residential group conflict is not compelling for Latinos either. As in Los Angeles, the findings may merely reflect that the Latino population has a large immigrant population that is more concerned with improving its immediate, personal economic circumstances than engaging in group competition with blacks.¹⁷

Aside from the major hypotheses, the evidence also reveals that Latinos' national descent impacts their perceptions of the threat African Americans pose to their material resources. In particular, the results show that Puerto Rican respondents tended to express fewer feelings of group competition with African Americans than Latinos with other national origins ($\beta=-.07$ in Table 4.8). This result is not entirely surprising since Puerto Ricans have historically intermixed with African Americans in economically-deprived neighborhoods in northeastern cities like New York and Boston.

Additionally, the results show that more liberal Latinos felt more threatened by blacks than conservative Latinos. The coefficient for political ideology reported in Table 4.8 is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.14$). I suspect the importance of ideology rather than party reflects that Boston, like Los Angeles, utilizes nonpartisan elections to selected public officials. Therefore, party serves as a less relevant cue in city politics for Boston residents than areas where candidates

¹⁷As shown in Table 3.4, approximately 86% of the Latino population was foreign-born. While not a perfect measure of immigrant status, the estimate is a strong indicator that the size of the immigrant population among Latinos in Boston was quite large.

run under party labels. Absent party cues, residents may be more likely to rely on the ideology of candidates and the issues they support. Since African Americans and Latinos tend to be liberal, the finding that liberal Hispanics feel threatened by blacks may be a sign of heightened political competition between both groups.¹⁸

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored whether economic self-interests and residential group conflict motivated African Americans and Latinos to view each other as competitors over scarce resources. Overall, while the evidence for the economic self-interest hypothesis is consistent, few of the findings support the residential group conflict hypothesis. These results are consistent across groups and urban contexts.

The evidence that economic self-interests influenced perceived group competition between both groups was mixed. Personal economic concerns appeared more prevalent among the most numerically-vulnerable group in each city, African Americans in Los Angeles and Latinos in Boston. In Los Angeles, relations between African Americans and Latinos clearly hinge around job opportunities; unemployed blacks and Latinos were more likely to perceive each other as competitors than their counterparts who were employed or out of the workforce. However, the effect was stronger for unemployed blacks than unemployed Latinos. This evidence corroborates the recent reports of job discrimination against African Americans, often by employers who favor Latinos because they perceive them as more amiable workers (Johnson and Oliver, 1989). On the other hand, blacks in Boston, where the Latino population was quite small, were not driven by their concern over acquiring gainful employment. Instead, their perceived threat from Latinos is driven more by whether they were homeowners. Black homeowners were less likely to perceive

¹⁸Approximately 42 percent (42.9%) of African Americans and 44 percent (43.5%) of Latinos self-reported as liberals in Boston. These numbers far exceeded the proportion of conservatives (25.2% of blacks and 33.1% of Latinos) and independents (32.9% of blacks and 23.5% of Latinos) in both groups.

Latinos as a threat than their counterparts who either rented or had other housing accommodations. Like blacks, Latinos in Boston felt less threatened by blacks if they were homeowners. The impact of homeownership for both groups offers a strong indication that their feelings toward one another were driven by underlying housing competition. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that their perceptions were driven by their educational attainment. Highly-educated Latinos were less inclined to perceive blacks as competitors than less-educated group members. Overall, the results suggest black and Latino concerns over their economic self-interests jeopardize efforts at bi-racial cooperation. Furthermore, contrary to previous evidence concerning majority-minority relations, there is good reason to believe personal economic concerns can potentially fuel greater intergroup conflict among racial and ethnic minorities in the the United States.

Yet, while the results clearly suggest economic self-interests shape blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition, there is room for caution. For one, the findings were often inconsistent across groups and contexts. Indicators that were statistically significant in one model were often insignificant in others. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients were often small compared to other indicators in the model. More importantly, there is a concern that the results may overstate the impact of economic self-interests on black-Latino relations. The chief concern is that the attitudinal predispositions of blacks and Latinos may temper the impact of their economic self-interests on their attitudes toward one another. Previous evidence has shown that Americans' adherence to economic individualism tends to limit the influence of economic self-interests on political behavior (Feldman, 1982). The same study reveals that whites and blacks do not tend to differ in the strength of their individualistic values. There is little reason to suspect Latinos would be less inclined to subscribe to the same beliefs; in fact, previous evidence has shown that Latinos tend to evaluate their personal economic circumstances more positively than blacks (Tedin and Murray, 1994). Given these considerations, both groups'

economic self-interests may play less of a role on their perceived threat from one another than revealed in the analysis. Unfortunately, the MCSUI does not include variables that measure individualistic attitudes; their absence limits the degree to which the results can be generalized.

Similarly, the evidence for the impact of residential group conditions is mixed. In Los Angeles, blacks were less likely to view Latinos as a threat when both groups held approximately equal economic status within their neighborhoods. It was only in neighborhoods where Latinos enjoyed a material advantage over blacks that African American expressed stronger feelings of group competition. While a variation of the residential group conflict hypothesis, the findings are confirmation that the distribution of economic resources between both groups may critically shape whether blacks view Latinos as potential partners or competitors. However, the effects for black Angelenos was the exception rather than the rule; residential conditions had a negligible influence in the remainder of the analysis. Black Bostonians were not as impacted by their residential context as blacks in Los Angeles. I suspect that despite the size of the Latino community in their respective neighborhoods, the overall paucity of the Latino population may have dissuade blacks in Boston from viewing them as viable economic competitors.¹⁹ In addition, group and neighborhood material conditions did not influence Latinos' perceived competition with blacks in either metropolitan area. The findings for Latinos likely signals that the Latino population comprises a significant share of immigrants whose attitudes are shaped more by their personal

¹⁹Although the data does not allow for further investigation, I suspect black Bostonians may feel stronger competition with whites in Boston than with other racial and ethnic minorities. Much has been written of the historically contentious relationship between blacks and the Irish, who have a significant population in Boston. In the mid-nineteenth century, free blacks were the chief competitors of new Irish immigrants for low-skilled jobs (Roediger, 1991). Although the Irish American population has since become assimilated into American society, there are still enclaves of working-class Irish-American communities that seek low-skilled jobs. Historically, the Irish-American community in Boston have instituted racial bars for receiving certain jobs, systematically excluding African Americans from certain employment opportunities. Furthermore, the data does not suggest blacks feel threatened by Asians. A look at blacks' perceived threat from Asians shows that approximately the same proportion of blacks perceived job competition with Asians as they did with Latinos (33.5% for Latinos and 35% for Asians). Also, a similar proportion of blacks in Boston perceived political competition with Asians vis-a-vis Latinos (25.1% and 22%, respectively).

economic circumstances than their residential material conditions.

With these findings, the next chapter explores whether these underlying feelings of group competition influence African Americans' and Latinos' willingness to support minority job training programs and hiring preferences. These policies are believed to reflect policies that are mutually-beneficial for both groups. Therefore, differential support for such policies would suggest there were barriers to black-Latino political alliances.

Chapter 5

Group Biases in Race-Based Public Policy Preferences

In addition to understanding what motivates blacks' and Latinos' perceived realistic group competition with one another, this project also explores whether both groups' perceptions translate onto their attitudes toward race-based public policies. Previous evidence demonstrates the perceived threat from another group may increase opposition toward policies believed to benefit that group (Bobo, 1983). However, these studies have tended to focus on majority-minority relations, particularly whites and blacks. The research question is more compelling when applied to relationships between African Americans and Latinos because, unlike blacks and whites, their group interests appear better-aligned. As mentioned before, both blacks and Latinos tend to confront similar barriers to gaining access to both economic resources and political power. Therefore, many public policies intended to address economic and political inequality for minorities would appear to benefit blacks and Hispanics alike.

There are a number of public policies that focus on improving minorities' access to economic and political resources. Many of these programs were fueled by the efforts of African Americans during the civil rights movement to end de jure racial segregation in the southeastern region of the United States and secure blacks' access to economic resources and political influence. For instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity in government,

employment, and in public and private accommodations. Initially, the Civil Rights Act was chiefly applied to end Jim Crow policies in the South; however, the act has increasingly been more broadly applied to prevent discrimination against Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups. Moreover, new provisions such as Title 9 restrict federal funding for institutions that discriminate on the basis of gender. Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act has grown to benefit blacks and Latinos equally by offering a legal basis from which to communicate grievances over discriminatory practices. Consequently, the Civil Rights Act could be viewed as a mutually-beneficial policy for both groups.

Affirmative action policies were initiated under the presidential administrations of John F. Kennedy, Jr. and Lyndon B. Johnson to force institutions to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, they were meant to increase the representation of minority groups by encouraging educational institutions and employers to consider an applicants' race, gender, or national origin in hiring and admissions. Affirmative action policies have since been credited with the dramatic increase in the black middle-class (Collins, 1983). Latinos have also benefited from affirmative action programs, although less than African Americans, and there is good reason to believe that as their numbers continue to increase the policy will contribute to Latinos' future economic progress. Similarly, federal funding for programs that focus on job training and worker dislocation also stand to disproportionately benefit both black and Latino citizens, which one may conclude would encourage them to overwhelmingly support them.

Yet, conflicts occasionally emerge depending on which group is perceived to benefit most from the policy. For example, tensions have surfaced between blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles over access to public jobs and resources. In one instance, there was conflict surrounding hiring practices at Martin Luther King Jr. Medical Center located in South Central Los Angeles (Fletcher, 1998). The King hospital was built after blacks protested against what they saw as neglect from the county's white-run

health care system. Operated predominantly by African Americans, several Latinos filed lawsuits against the King hospital for alleged job discrimination. In part, the resistance by black administrators to hiring Latinos, despite the exorbitant growth of the Latino community in South Central, was rooted in the belief that Latinos were trying to take jobs that existed as a consequence of the gains blacks had fought for during the civil rights movement. Similar conflicts have emerged in Los Angeles over jobs in public schools and city government. In similar fashion, there is evidence from places like Miami, where there is a dominant Cuban-American population, that Latinos can be just as guilty of blocking blacks' access to economic resources and political empowerment (Vaca, 2004). These examples show that blacks' and Latinos' attitudes about programs that seemingly benefit both groups may differ depending on which group they perceive to be the primary beneficiary. By implication, efforts to form alliances around particular issues may be jeopardized when one group believes they will have less to gain from a particular policy than the other.

Accordingly, this chapter explores the determinants of blacks' and Latinos' support of both hiring preferences and job training programs for minorities. On face value, one would expect strong support for such policies; however, there is good reason to believe attitudes toward both programs will be shaped more by whether the ingroup benefits rather than whether there is some shared benefit for both groups. I expect that underlying feelings of group competition between both groups will heighten their ingroup biases when considering public policies that would seemingly benefit both blacks and Latinos alike. For instance, Latinos who view blacks as economic competitors may be likely to believe affirmative action benefits blacks more than Latinos and, consequently, would express lukewarm support for the program. The expectation is consistent with studies of racial differences in public opinion about affirmative action that indicate while both blacks and Latinos tend to support affirmative action more than whites and Asians, Latinos express weaker levels of support for affirmative action when they are framed as benefiting blacks (Bobo, 1998). The

threat they perceive from blacks may drive them to adopt positions on affirmative action that are at odds with black interests, thus, undermining the potential for black-Latino political alliances to occur. Like chapter 4, the analysis employs data from the 1992-94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality collected from African Americans and Hispanics in both Los Angeles and Boston. Our discussion begins with the findings from Los Angeles and then shifts to examine the results from Boston.


5.1 Policy Implications of Black-Latino Relations in Los Angeles

The analysis begins by examining the differential support that blacks and Latinos express toward both job training programs and hiring preferences. As discussed in chapter 3, respondents' differential support for each policy is captured by taking the difference between two measures of support for the policies when targeted toward blacks and separately when targeted for Latinos. The difference scores were calculated by subtracting support for job training programs and hiring preferences for Latinos from support for such policies for blacks. Ultimately, the values for the differential support measures were recoded so that they range between -1 and 1.¹ Positive values reflect a bias for policies that benefit blacks rather than Latinos, while negative values reflect favoritism for policies that favor Latinos at the expense of blacks. Scores of zero indicate equal support for policies when targeted for either blacks or Latinos, which one would suspect reflect the attitudes of respondents who are more amenable to political alliances between both groups.

The model specification for the multivariate analysis is identical to the equations offered for perceived group competition in chapter 4. First, the models include measures of economic self-interests, in this case, indicators of respondents' work status, occupation, family income, educational attainment, and homeownership. Furthermore, there are contextual indicators of respondents' economic and racial conditions.

¹Chapter 2 includes a more exhaustive discussion of how the dependent variables were calculated.

Figure 5.1: Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles



The contextual variables are meant to capture whether areas with deprived group material conditions and greater proximity to outgroup members actually heighten the group favoritism reflected in respondents' public policy preferences. In addition to these measures, there are a number of other sociodemographic variables included in the analysis as controls.

5.1.1 Blacks' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies


Our analysis begins by looking at African Americans' support for job training programs in Los Angeles. Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of their differential support. By far, the modal category for the differential measure is zero, which indicates most black Angelenos evaluate job training programs for blacks and Latinos equally. This would suggest that most African Americans believe that Latinos are equally deserving of the benefits of affirmative action. Nevertheless, there was also a minority of black respondents that favored job training programs for blacks over

Latinos.

Hiring preferences for minorities is another policy that would appear to be equally appealing to both African Americans and Latinos. Although having its fair share of critics, minority hiring preferences have been credited with expanding the black middle-class, greatly increasing their presence in managerial and professional jobs (Collins, 1983). The dependent variable in this case is based on questions that ask about respondents' support for hiring preferences for both African Americans and Latinos separately. Respondents' scores were calculated by taking the difference in their support of hiring preferences for Latinos from the support they expressed for African Americans. Therefore, like the job training item, after differencing the scores, positive values indicate black favoritism, while negative values indicate a bias for Latinos. The distribution for blacks' differential support for hiring preferences in Figure 5.2 mirrors the distribution of their support for job training programs. Again, most African Americans support hiring preferences for blacks and Latinos alike. Nevertheless, the distribution is clearly skewed in favor of supporting policies when they benefit blacks rather than Latinos.

Taken together, the pattern of the distributions for black Angelenos' differential support for both job training programs and hiring preferences suggests that, on average, African Americans evaluate the benefit of such policies in an even-handed manner, supporting both policies for blacks and Latinos equally. This finding bodes well for the willingness of blacks to join Latinos in the pursuit of their shared group interests. However, there is still a sizable portion of African Americans that prefer both policies when they apply to their group exclusively. There are virtually no respondents whose support for job training programs is stronger for the outgroup than the ingroup. This finding is consistent with results from the social identity literature, which demonstrates people exhibit ingroup biases in their preferred distribution of resources, even when the basis of such favoritism is obviously arbitrary (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981).

Figure 5.2: Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles



Determinants of Blacks' Differential Support for Job Training Programs

While the distributions adeptly illustrate blacks' differential support for race-based public policies, the analysis is particularly concerned with the determinants that drive their ingroup biases in policy preferences. The analysis of blacks' and Latinos' race-based public policy preferences is an effort to offer further tests of the economic self-interest and residential group conflict theories. The expectation is that economic self-interests will motivate group members to promote policy positions that benefit the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup. Secondly, ingroup biases in race-based public policy preferences should increase as a function of living in residential conditions that facilitate competition between blacks and Latinos. Nevertheless, beyond these hypotheses, blacks' and Latinos' differential support for race-based policies should also be shaped by whether group members perceive members of the outgroup as competitors over economic resources and political influence. Lastly, it is believed group members' perceived group competition with the outgroup

mediates the relationship between group members' economic self-interests and residential group condition and the extent of their group favoritism on public policy. The mediational analysis is important because little research has explored the direct relationship between personal economic circumstances and perceived group competition.

First, consider African Americans' group preferences with respect to job training programs. In order to test all of the hypotheses, five iterations of the models were performed. The first and second models include the variables for respondents' sociodemographic characteristics and residential material conditions; these iterations are identical to the specification offered in Chapter 4 for models of perceived group competition. Both specifications are important because they offer direct tests of the economic self-interest and residential group conflict hypotheses when applied to policy positions. The first and second iterations only differ in that model 1 includes the entire sample of either blacks or Latinos, while model 2 only utilizes respondents that were asked questions about their perceived group competition with Latinos, which were only asked of select participants in the survey. By using the split-half sample, one can judge whether using the smaller pool dramatically changes the inferences that can be drawn from the analysis. The remaining three iterations only use the split-half sample since the measure of zero-sum group competition was included in each specification. The third model uses the same specification as model 2, but includes the zero-sum competition scale. In doing so, it offers a test of the perceived group conflict hypothesis by determining whether it motivates stronger ingroup biases among group members. Also it allows for a determination of whether group members' perceived group threat from the outgroup mediates the relationship between their economic self-interests and residential group conditions on their policy positions.

The fourth iteration is created specifically for blacks; it includes all of the measures specified in the previous model, but also adds an indicator of the threat blacks

feel immigration poses to their access to jobs and political influence. Its inclusion is important because it allows one to determine whether the reported threat blacks feel from Latinos is attributed to the group itself or general immigration patterns. Respondents perceived threat from immigration is captured by a composite scale of two items that ask respondents the extent to which they believe recent immigration patterns are taking place at the expense of blacks' economic and political standing ($\alpha=.80$). With respect to economic opportunities, the question asks, "If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, do you believe people like you, that is [respondent's race] people will probably have much more economic opportunity than now, some not a lot more, no more or less than now, less than now, or a lot less influence than now." Similarly, the question concerning political influence asks respondents, "if immigration to this country continues at the present rate, how much political influence do you believe people like you, that is [respondent's race] people will have." The response options offered include "much more than you do now", "some but not a lot more", "no more or less than now", "less than now", and "a lot less than now".

Finally, the last iteration includes a measure of racial prejudice into the model to account for the possibility that perceptions of zero-sum competition stand as a proxy for underlying racial prejudices. The measure of racial prejudice consists of an index of items asking participants to rate how likely outgroup members are to be rich, intelligent, welfare dependent, easy to get along with, proficient with English, involved in drugs or gang activities, and discriminate against other groups ($\alpha=.47$). The item states, "I'm going to show you a 7-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated....a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are [positive trait]. A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is [negative trait]. A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or the other and, of course, you may choose any number in

between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.”²

By including indicators of respondents’ perceived threat from immigration and racial prejudice, the influence of participants’ perceived group competition can be observed even when accounting for the other possible explanations for the relationship. Given the ordered nature of the dependent variable, an ordinal probit analysis using maximum likelihood estimation is employed.

Table 5.1 reports the estimates for two models of blacks’ differential support for job training programs without the attitudinal variables. Since the method of estimation is non-linear, the coefficients can not be interpreted as linear and additive. Nevertheless, the direction and significance of the coefficients suggest some interesting conclusions, which are discussed in detail below.

Economic Self-Interests

The evidence indicates economic self-interests increase black Angelenos’ group favoritism for job training programs that target blacks over Latinos. First, the model using the full sample indicates blacks’ group biases are driven by their work status. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for unemployed African Americans indicates unemployed blacks are more likely to express favoritism for policies that benefit blacks vis-a-vis Latinos, thus, providing further confirming evidence that tensions between African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles are primarily rooted in concerns about employment opportunities ($\beta=.36$). When comparing the predicted probabilities of blacks’ ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs between employed and unemployed respondents, the values increase substantially from .61 for employed blacks to .76 for unemployed blacks.³ The coefficient fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the split-half sample ($\beta=.39$, p-value=.11). However, it is important to note that although not reaching statisti-

²The question wording and response options for each item used in the composite scales are reported in Appendix A.

³The predicted probabilities are taken with the remaining independent variables in the model held at their means.

Table 5.1: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	1.36	3.17	4.86	4.35
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	.51	1.73	-2.25	2.14
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	.63	1.53	-2.40	2.49
% Black Below Poverty Level	-.12	.83	-.08	.92
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-2.52	1.56	1.05	2.30
% Below Poverty Level	.69	.66	1.29	.81
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	.78	.29	1.06	.39
% Latino	-1.02	.90	-1.16	1.21
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.51	.35	.86	.48
Male	-.16	.11	-.16	.17
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.28	.20	-.18	.29
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.17	.20	.03	.33
Educational Attainment	.05	.24	.34	.39
Below \$35K	.12	.16	.50	.20
Above \$70K	-.48	.19	-.49	.23
Missing Income	-.06	.22	.30	.32
Executives and Professionals	.06	.14	.17	.21
Service and Labor	.01	.15	-.06	.22
Unemployed	.36	.15	.39	.24
Out of Workforce	.09	.17	-.12	.21
Homeowner	-.34	.13	-.39	.19
Years of Residency	.03	.15	.02	.20
Year (1994=1)	.04	.11	.04	.15
N	1093		542	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

cal significance, the magnitude of the coefficient actually *increases*, suggesting the reason it missed statistical significance is due to the increase in the standard error caused by reducing the sample size. Consequently, the results lead one to conclude that not only do unemployed blacks tend to view Latinos as competitors, they also are more likely to prefer job training programs that favor blacks at Latinos' expense.

Additionally, the estimate for income in the full sample shows that more affluent African Americans were less likely to hold an ingroup bias in policy preferences ($\beta = -.48$). These findings confirm that blacks with higher incomes do not view Latinos as a threat to their economic well-being. Indeed, affluent blacks would not be as likely as low-income blacks to pursue the same jobs or live in the same residential areas with Latinos. The predicted probabilities for blacks' ingroup policy favoritism between low and high-income blacks reveal an almost 40 point drop in the probability of ingroup bias from African Americans making less than \$35,000 to those making above \$70,000 (.72 to .35, respectively). The coefficient remains statistically significant in the split-half sample, indicating high-income blacks tended to feel that blacks and Latinos were equally deserving of access to job training programs. The coefficient for low-income African Americans is statistically significant in the split sample ($\beta = .50$); however, given that the estimate for lower-income blacks is not statistically significant in the full sample, which should supply greater statistical power, caution must be taken in drawing inferences from the results in model 2. The significant coefficient may merely be an artifact of reducing half of the sample.

Finally, the estimate for homeownership signals that black homeowners were less likely to express an ingroup policy bias than those black Angelenos that either rented or had other housing accommodations. The coefficients remain statistically significant from the full sample to the split sample ($\beta = -.34$ to $-.39$, respectively). The results hint that there may be some degree of housing competition between African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles. These findings are consistent with studies discussed earlier that reveal the increasing movement of Latinos into predominantly

black neighborhoods (Johnson and Oliver, 1989). Yet, given that homeownership did not impact blacks' feelings of group competition with Latinos, there is the possibility that it may stand as a proxy for some other indicator of financial well-being such as blacks' personal wealth. In any event, the analysis provides consistent evidence that there should be greater consideration of the impact of economic self-interests on black Angelenos' intergroup attitudes and suggests that such considerations may have a considerable influence on blacks' attitudes about engaging in political coalitions with Latinos.

Residential Group Conflict

In addition to economic self-interests, there is the expectation that environments where blacks and Latinos are forced to engage in economic competition will motivate blacks to express ingroup biases in their policy positions. As with the models for perceived group competition in Chapter 4, threatening residential conditions are represented by communities with large percentages of African Americans that are either below the poverty line or who have earned less than a high school diploma *in combination with* sizable Latino populations. It is in these communities that blacks are more likely to be waged in economic competition with Latinos over scarce resources. Nevertheless, the estimates in Table 5.1 offer little evidence to suggest that such conditions shape blacks' differential support for job training programs. None of the interaction terms in the analysis reach statistical significance in either the full or split sample. At best, the interaction between residential areas where black residents have a low level of educational attainment and where there are large proportions of Latinos moves in the right direction; however, the estimate fails to reach statistical significance.⁴ These findings offer evidence that battles between blacks and Latinos over scarce resources is related more to how they are perceived to impact their own

⁴Moreover, models using interaction terms between neighborhood material conditions or relative group economic disparities and the percentage of the Latino population move in the wrong direction and fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

welfare or that of their immediate family, rather than by conflictual interactions between group members.

The only residential conditions that generated a statistically significant result were neighborhoods with large black populations. The coefficients in both the full and split-half sample were both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.78$ and $.91$), indicating African Americans living in areas with large black populations exhibited stronger ingroup policy preferences than those with smaller percentages of African Americans. Ultimately, this finding contradicts the residential group conflict hypothesis by suggesting that it is in neighborhoods with high concentrations of black segregation that African Americans tend to exhibit stronger ingroup biases. This finding is consistent with Oliver and Wong (2003), who also use the MCSUI to demonstrate more homogenous communities motivate stronger negative racial attitudes than racially-diverse areas. Highly-segregated communities reflect something other than realistic group competition, which was shown by its consistently null effect on blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos. Instead, predominantly African American communities may simply make black interests more salient to their residents.

Perceived Group Conflict

Next, the analysis examines the relationship between blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos and their group policy preferences. The expectation is that blacks who view their relationship with Latinos in zero-sum terms will be more likely to exhibit ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs. Accordingly, across every iteration of the model in Table 5.2, the scale for zero-sum competition with Latinos was both positive and statistically significant, indicating blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos motivated stronger ingroup biases in their policy preferences. This finding confirms that concerns over realistic group interests may discourage African Americans from engaging in political alliances with Hispanics.

Table 5.2: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	5.74	4.76	5.50	4.76	6.62	4.71
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	-1.11	2.44	-.95	2.41	-1.34	2.43
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-2.85	2.62	-2.93	2.64	-4.64	2.48
% Black Below Poverty Level	-.59	1.05	-.67	1.04	-.75	1.09
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>						
% w/o HS Diploma	1.74	2.37	1.84	2.38	3.01	2.38
% Below Poverty Level	1.19	.86	1.20	.86	1.50	.92
<i>Racial Context</i>						
% Black	.86	.41	.87	.41	.99	.43
% Latino	-2.01	1.23	-1.98	1.23	-2.10	1.25
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>						
Competition with Latinos	.89	.30	.85	.30	.71	.31
Threat of Immigration	—	—	.17	.27	.10	.27
Anti-Latino Prejudice	—	—	—	—	1.36	.64
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>						
Age	.74	.51	.73	.50	.41	.47
Male	-.10	.18	-.10	.18	-.06	.17
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.18	.31	-.18	.32	.00	.29
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.13	.37	.10	.37	.14	.38
Educational Attainment	.30	.41	.32	.42	.47	.42
Below \$35K	.56	.21	.56	.21	.56	.21
Above \$70K	-.48	.23	-.47	.23	-.44	.24
Missing Income	.35	.33	.35	.34	.41	.33
Executives and Professionals	.09	.22	.09	.22	.07	.22
Service and Labor	-.16	.22	-.16	.22	-.18	.22
Unemployed	.30	.26	.30	.26	.19	.24
Out of Workforce	-.20	.20	-.18	.20	-.17	.20
Homeowner	-.43	.18	-.46	.18	-.43	.18
Years of Residency	-.07	.21	-.06	.21	.03	.21
Year (1994=1)	.14	.16	.14	.16	.17	.16
N	541		541		538	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 545 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Additionally, the expectation was that blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos mediated the relationship between their underlying economic self-interests and residential material conditions and group policy positions. Specifically, personal economic concerns and competitive residential conditions should increase blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos, which should, in turn, heighten their in-group policy favoritism. However, there is little evidence to support the existence of a mediated relationship.⁵ First, comparing the coefficients for the determinants of African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos, none of the significant coefficients for African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos in chapter 4 (Table 4.2) reaches conventional levels of statistical significance in the model for group biases in public policy preferences. To review, the estimates for unemployed blacks, blacks with occupations in the service sector, and those living in areas with competitive group environments were statistically significant in Table 4.2. Their null effects alone disconfirm the mediated conflict hypothesis. In the end, the results show that although blacks' economic self-interests influence their perceived group competition with Latinos and ingroup favoritism for job training programs, the three factors are not linked. African Americans' economic self-interests and perceived threat from Latinos had independent influences on their policy attitudes.

Nonetheless, these findings beg the question: what explains the influence of African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos if it is not related to their underlying economic self-interests or group material conditions? One answer may be that the model fails to account for a critical source of respondents' economic self-interests or the group's residential condition. This answer seems unlikely since most items measuring respondents' economic self-interests and residential group conditions are included in the analysis. Furthermore, given many socioeconomic items and contextual indicators tend to be, at least, moderately correlated with one another I would suspect that, if absent, a variable currently in the analysis would serve

⁵The discussion in Chapter 3 explains the strategy of mediational analysis in greater detail.

as a proxy for the omitted variable. On the other hand, respondents' perceived group competition may merely serve as a proxy for their other attitudinal predispositions, particularly how threatened they generally feel from immigration as well as their negative racial attitudes towards Latinos.

To test the latter possibility, the two measures for blacks' threat from immigration and racial prejudice were included in the analysis. Model 2 in Table 5.2 includes a scale for the perceived threat that immigration poses to blacks' economic status and political influence. The estimates for the threat of immigration is statistically insignificant ($\beta=.17$, p-value=.52), while the perceived group competition scale remains both positive and significant ($\beta=.85$). The disparity provides convincing evidence that the group favoritism reflected in blacks' policy preferences is, in fact, rooted fundamentally in the threat they feel from Latinos as a group and not by general immigration patterns.

There are also concerns that perceptions of group competition may merely reflect underlying racial prejudices. Model 3 in Table 5.2 includes an index for anti-Latino prejudice. If group competition serves as a proxy for blacks' racial animus toward Latinos, the coefficient for perceived group competition in model 3 should be insignificant and the measure of racial prejudice should be positive and statistically significant. However, if they are distinct constructs, the coefficient for perceived group competition should remain positive and statistically significant. The estimates of both indicators are positive and significant, indicating blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos ($\beta=.71$) can, indeed, be distinguished from their racial prejudice toward Latinos ($\beta=1.36$). While both have a similar impact on blacks' policy preferences, they appear to be different constructs.

In the end, the question remains as to what blacks' perceived group conflict conveys if it neither reflects their underlying economic self-interests nor serves as a proxy for other attitudinal predispositions. Ultimately, black's perceived group competition still signals concerns over their group interests; however, these group

interests do not appear to be material in nature. Instead, black Angelenos' subjective threat from Latinos may convey their concern over differences in group status and respect.

Determinants of Blacks' Differential Support for Hiring Preferences

The model specification for blacks' differential support for hiring preferences mirrors the equations utilized to ascertain their support for job training programs. Table 5.3 reports the estimates for the models excluding respondents' attitudinal predispositions, while Table 5.4 includes a measure of black Angelenos' perceived group competition while controlling for both their perceived threat from immigration as well as their negative racial attitudes toward Latinos. Again, the ordinal nature of the dependent variables necessitate ordered probit estimation.

Economic Self-Interests

Again, the expectation is that economic self-interests will drive African Americans to prefer hiring preferences for blacks over Latinos. When exploring the impact of economic self-interests on blacks' policy preferences, the most compelling evidence lies in the estimate for unemployed blacks. Using the full sample, the model reported in Table 5.3 shows that unemployed blacks exhibit a stronger sense of ingroup favoritism than other blacks ($\beta=.64$). Moreover, the estimate remains statistically significant using the half sample despite the expected increase in the standard error ($\beta=.62$, $p=.01$). Therefore, as was shown in the model for job training programs, African Americans' support of hiring preferences for blacks vis-a-vis Latinos reflects an underlying concern for their own access to gainful employment.

Nevertheless, the influence of the other indicators of economic self-interests were negligible. Unlike the model of job training programs in Table 5.1, there is no significant difference between the support of affluent and lower-income blacks. The

Table 5.3: Ordered Probit Estimates for Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	7.12	3.48	5.48	4.43
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	-5.80	2.59	-7.40	2.88
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-3.16	1.56	-2.64	2.58
% Black Below Poverty Level	2.79	.85	3.23	.94
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	.23	1.61	-.18	2.40
% Below Poverty Level	-1.55	.55	-2.19	.80
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	1.06	.29	1.58	.39
% Latino	.49	1.14	1.92	1.61
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.40	.39	.96	.52
Male	-.06	.12	.01	.16
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.10	.23	-.45	.30
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.46	.21	.78	.32
Educational Attainment	.39	.29	.66	.36
Below \$35K	.10	.18	.10	.20
Above \$70K	-.30	.22	-.52	.30
Missing Income	.33	.23	.10	.29
Executives and Professionals	.06	.14	.05	.21
Service and Labor	.01	.15	.06	.21
Unemployed	.64	.16	.62	.25
Out of Workforce	.07	.16	-.16	.21
Homeowner	-.24	.15	-.23	.19
Years of Residency	-.30	.13	-.32	.19
Year (1994=1)	.09	.11	.02	.15
N	1092		537	


Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

null finding for income is likely due to the fact that both affluent and lower-income blacks benefit from race-based hiring preferences.

Residential Group Conflict

Again, the proposed effect of residential conditions is in areas where the ingroup is economically-deprived and in close proximity to Latinos, blacks will exhibit a stronger tendency for ingroup policy favoritism. However, the support for this hypothesis is mixed. Some estimates suggest support for the residential group conflict hypothesis. For instance, the results imply tensions are greatest in areas where the educational attainment among black residents is low and where there is a sizable proportion of Latinos. The model using the full sample shows that the interaction term is both positive and significant ($\beta=7.12$), indicating blacks living in such conditions were more likely to support hiring preferences for blacks over Latinos. Furthermore, the model demonstrates that within areas with low black educational attainment and smaller Latino populations, African Americans were more likely to support hiring preferences for blacks and Latinos equally; this effect is indicated by the coefficient for the indicator of the percentage of blacks without a high school diploma ($\beta=3.16$). When the sample is split in half the magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction wanes to statistical insignificance. Nevertheless, the change is likely a random artifact of truncating half of the sample. Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship of the interaction term to the dependent variable. These estimates show that group favoritism among blacks living in areas where educational attainment is low among black residents increases as the percentage of Latino residents increases. The predicted probabilities for blacks' ingroup policy favoritism ranges from .12 in areas with no Latinos to .99 in areas with large proportions of Latino residents. This finding corroborates the residential group conflict hypothesis by indicating those blacks living in areas where their group experiences more dire material conditions and greater interactions with Latinos were more likely to prefer hiring

Figure 5.3: Bias Across Black Educational Attainment and Latino Populations



preferences that favor blacks vis-a-vis Latinos.

Yet, there is also evidence that contradicts the residential group conflict hypothesis. The results suggest that for blacks living among large Latino populations, their group favoritism is actually lower in neighborhoods with high levels of black poverty; the coefficient for the interaction term is both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-5.80$). Conversely, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for blacks living in communities with high rates of black poverty and relatively few Latinos ($\beta=2.79$) indicates they were more likely to express an ingroup bias in their support for hiring preferences than those living in areas with larger proportions of Latino residents. In neighborhoods with relatively few Latino residents, there is a modest difference in the predicted probabilities of differential support across the levels of black poverty, ranging from .56 for those areas with low concentrations of black poverty to .99 for areas with a large proportion of blacks living below the poverty line. In contrast, areas with large concentrations of Latino residents experienced an almost 80 point decline moving from low to high rates of black poverty (.99 to .19, re-

spectively). Moreover, the coefficient remains significant when the split-half sample is utilized ($\beta=-7.40$). This finding appears to disconfirm the residential group conflict hypothesis; blacks exhibited an ingroup bias in areas that lacked opportunities for group competition to occur.

In combination, the model offers surprisingly opposing findings for seemingly related material conditions. The contradictory results may reflect the presence of multicollinearity in the model due to the relationship between the measures of black educational attainment and black poverty. When examining the correspondence between living in high poverty areas and neighborhoods with low black educational attainment, the relationship appears strong. Cross tabulations reveal more than half of black Angelenos (525 out of 837 respondents) living in areas with high black educational attainment lived in low black poverty neighborhoods. In contrast, approximately 60 percent of blacks living in neighborhoods with low black educational attainment resided in high black poverty areas (183 out of 267). Therefore, approximately 65 percent of the black sample in Los Angeles lived in areas where the black educational attainment and poverty levels seemed to correspond.⁶ Furthermore, the indicators for the percentage of blacks below the poverty line and blacks without a high school diploma are moderately correlated ($r=.36$).

Given the apparent relationship between both indicators, further analyses were performed so that the interaction terms as well as their components were run sepa-

⁶To explore the relationship, alternative dichotomous measures of the black poverty and black low educational attainment items were created. Both measures are dichotomous indicators used to separate areas with low black educational attainment from those with high educational attainment as well as neighborhoods with low black poverty from those with high black poverty. The measures employed in the multivariate analyses were continuous ranging from areas with no black poverty of high educational attainment to those with high poverty and little educational attainment among black residents. Areas with high rates of black poverty were captured by assigning the highest value of 1 to neighborhoods where greater than 25 percent of the black population lives below the poverty line. The remaining values were set at zero and represent neighborhoods where the percentage of blacks below the poverty line was less than 25 percent. Similarly, a measure of low black educational attainment was created so that neighborhoods with low educational attainment were classified as areas where more than 25 percent of the black population had less than a high school diploma; again, these neighborhoods were assigned a value of 1. Areas with high black educational attainment were set at zero and capture areas where the proportion of black high school dropouts is less than 25 percent.

rately in different models.⁷ In a model using just the interaction for black educational attainment and the size of the Latino population, the effect of the interaction continues to run in a positive direction, but fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($\beta=1.42$, $p=.65$). Similarly, the effect for the interaction between black poverty and the Latino population runs in the same negative direction as the original model and was also statistically insignificant ($\beta=-3.93$, $p=.09$). Alternatively, there was a positive and significant effect for the sole measure of black poverty ($\beta=2.08$, $p=.01$), suggesting blacks living in areas with high black poverty and few Latinos were more likely to favor blacks as the primary beneficiaries of hiring preferences. In the final analysis, the weight of the evidence offers little to support the residential group conflict hypothesis. Blacks' support for hiring preferences that benefit blacks over Latinos appears to be unrelated to the potential threat Latinos pose to blacks within their communities.

Perceived Group Conflict

As before, rather than concentrating on the influence of blacks' *actual* personal and group economic circumstances, the expectation was that their *perceived* group conflict with Latinos would heighten their ingroup favoritism for hiring preferences. A model that includes the perceived group competition scale is reported in Table 5.4 along with two separate models that control for blacks' perceived threat from immigration and anti-Latino prejudice. Like the earlier model of support for job training programs, Table 5.4 reports several iterations of the models in order to judge the relative impact of each item on the dependent variable. Model 1 shows that African Americans' perceived group competition is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.84$), which again shows that their perceived threat over scarce resources has serious implications on their policy attitudes. African Americans in Los Angeles that view themselves as being in zero-sum competition were less likely to believe

⁷The estimates are reported in Appendix B3.

Latinos deserved similar access to hiring preferences as blacks.

Some evidence emerges in support of the mediated conflict hypothesis. First, unemployed blacks were found to express strong levels of perceived group competition towards Latinos in chapter 4 (Table 4.2). Furthermore, the beta coefficients for unemployed blacks when moving from the model using the split sample, which excludes the group competition scale in Table 5.3, to Model 1 in Table 5.4, which includes the measure, reduce in size ($\beta=.62$ to $.56$, respectively). Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient does not reduce below the level of statistical significance.⁸ At best, the results indicate blacks' perceived group competition only partially mediates the relationship between their employment status and their differential support for hiring preferences. A Sobel test of mediation shows this to be the case. In addition to determining whether the key independent variable significantly diminishes in the presence of the mediator, the Sobel test assesses the proportion of the total effect that is mediated. The Sobel test was statistically significant, confirming that blacks' perceived group competition mediates the relationship between their unemployment status and their ingroup policy favoritism ($p=.02$). Furthermore, the results show that approximately 15 percent of the total effect was mediated, further demonstrating that the relationship between blacks' personal economic concerns and their endorsement of hiring preferences that favor blacks over Latinos was partially mediated by their perceived group competition.

When a measure of African Americans' subjective threat from immigration is included, their perceived group competition remains positive and significant ($\beta=.80$), indicating blacks' resistance to support policies for African Americans and Latinos equally truly reflects the group dynamics between blacks and Latinos. Moreover, when the anti-Latino prejudice scale is placed in the model, the effect of the coefficient for blacks' perceived group competition remains positive and statistically

⁸The reduction of the coefficient below the level of statistical significance is the strongest evidence of a mediated effect; nevertheless, if there is a substantial reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient, there is still suggestive evidence of a mediated effect (Baron and Kenny, 1986).

Table 5.4: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	5.07	4.46	4.93	4.54	6.23	4.55
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	-6.30	2.77	-6.20	2.84	-6.30	2.89
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-2.39	2.56	-2.49	2.58	-4.36	2.45
% Black Below Poverty Level	2.80	.92	2.73	.94	2.57	.95
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>						
% w/o HS Diploma	-.15	2.35	.06	2.35	1.38	2.42
% Below Poverty Level	-2.39	.79	-2.39	.79	-2.15	.81
<i>Racial Context</i>						
% Black	1.54	.38	1.57	.37	1.70	.37
% Latino	1.71	1.49	1.76	1.49	1.49	1.60
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>						
Competition with Latinos	.84	.28	.80	.29	.71	.29
Threat from Immigration	—	—	.19	.30	.13	.30
Anti-Latino Prejudice	—	—	—	—	1.03	.59
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>						
Age	.98	.52	.97	.52	.64	.47
Male	.09	.16	.09	.16	.14	.16
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.47	.30	-.47	.30	-.30	.28
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.94	.31	.92	.31	1.00	.31
Educational Attainment	.78	.35	.80	.35	.98	.35
Below \$35K	.12	.20	.13	.20	.14	.20
Above \$70K	-.46	.30	-.45	.30	-.44	.31
Executives and Professionals	-.07	.22	-.07	.22	-.10	.22
Service and Labor	-.03	.21	-.03	.21	-.04	.22
Missing Income	.16	.29	.18	.29	.25	.29
Unemployed	.57	.25	.57	.25	.48	.25
Out of Workforce	-.19	.20	-.17	.20	-.18	.20
Homeowner	-.31	.19	-.34	.20	-.30	.19
Years of Residency	-.39	.19	-.39	.19	-.33	.19
Year (1994=1)	.11	.16	.10	.16	.13	.15
N	540		540		537	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 545 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.


significant ($\beta=.71$). The measures for perceived threat from immigration and anti-Latino prejudice measure are also positive, but fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, in the final analysis, the results confirm the initial hypothesis that blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos would cause them to view public policies in zero-sum terms, favoring policies that benefit blacks more than Latinos.

Ultimately, the results for blacks' ingroup policy favoritism offers more mixed evidence in favor of the economic self-interest hypothesis, but particularly that blacks' employment status shapes their willingness to support policies that benefit blacks and Latinos equally. On the other hand, African Americans' residential conditions do not appear to fuel black-Latino conflict. None of the indicators of residential group conflict moved in the expected directions. This finding is consistent with the results from Chapter 4 and, in combination, suggests that greater consideration should be made of the relationship between blacks' residential context and their intergroup attitudes. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence in favor of the perceived group conflict hypothesis. Whether considering job training programs or hiring preferences, highly-threatened African Americans were less likely to believe Latinos were equally deserving to be beneficiaries of such programs as less-threatened blacks. Furthermore, the relationship between blacks' economic self-interests and ingroup policy favoritism, at least when considering hiring preferences, is facilitated by their perceived threat from Latinos. The mediated effect is only partial, but shows that black Angelenos perceived zero-sum competition reflects, to some extent, underlying personal economic concerns.

5.1.2 Latinos' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies

Next, we consider the nature of Latinos' support for each race-based public policy. Figure 5.4 illustrates the distribution of Latinos' differential support for job training


Figure 5.4: Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles



programs for Latinos and African Americans. Similar to African Americans, the figure reveals that the overriding majority of Latinos support job training programs for blacks and Latinos equally. This result in combination with the distribution for African Americans provides encouraging evidence that there is potential for both groups to work together toward their shared goals. Nevertheless, the distribution is slightly skewed in the negative direction, indicating some Latinos support job training programs that favor Latinos over African Americans.

Similarly, Latinos are open-minded about who should benefit from hiring preferences. Figure 5.5 reveals the distribution for Latinos' differential support for hiring preferences, which mirrors the variance in Latinos' support for job training programs. The majority of Latinos in Los Angeles endorse hiring preferences that benefit both Latinos and blacks alike. Nevertheless, like for job training programs, Latinos tend to express a slight ingroup bias. Again, this is good news for those who argue for the benefit of black-Latino political alliances. However, as before, this analysis is

Figure 5.5: Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles



concerned with the factors that undermine the willingness of both groups to work together. In particular, the analysis tests whether economic self-interests and realistic group conflict within Latinos' neighborhoods influences whether they believe blacks are equally deserving of the benefits of race-based public policies. Another expectation is that Hispanics' perceived group competition with African Americans will spike their ingroup policy biases and, further, will mediate the relationship between their underlying personal and group material concerns and policy preferences. The analysis below explores each of these hypotheses in detail.

Determinants of Latinos' Differential Support for Job Training Programs

First, consider the determinants that influence Latinos' ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs. The model specification is identical to the equation for Hispanic Angelenos' perceived group competition with blacks in chapter 4. Like African Americans, I expect personal economic concerns as well as group material

conditions to impact Latinos' support for job training programs that benefit themselves and blacks equally. However, since negative values reflect an ingroup bias for Latinos the coefficients must be interpreted differently to evaluate the validity of the proposed hypotheses. Contrary to the analysis for African Americans, economic self-interests stemming from unemployment, blue-collar occupations, and low incomes are established when their coefficients are negative, rather than positive. In contrast, the economic self-interest hypothesis is confirmed for Latinos who earn high incomes, work in professional and managerial occupations, and own homes when their estimates move in the positive direction. As support for the residential group conflict hypothesis, the interaction terms between Latinos' group material conditions and the size of the African American population should also produce negative coefficients. Similar to the analysis for blacks, several iterations of the model are run. The first model specification includes measures of Latinos' residential conditions as well as their sociodemographic characteristics, allowing for a test of the relationship of Latinos' economic self-interests and residential group conflict to their ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs. Two iterations are run—the first with the total Latino sample in Los Angeles and the latter with the subsample, which was asked about their perceived zero-sum competition with African Americans. Afterwards, two additional models are estimated to assess the relative impact of blacks' perceived group competition and anti-black prejudice on their policy positions. In addition, they test whether Latinos' perceived threat from blacks mediated the relationship between their economic self-interests and residential group material conditions and their ingroup policy favoritism. Table 5.5 reports the maximum likelihood estimates from the ordered probit model. Each of the significant coefficients is explained in detail below in relation to how they either confirm or disconfirm the proposed hypotheses. Overall, the estimates offer little support in favor of economic self-interests or residential group conflict. Given earlier results showing African Americans' perceived competition with Latinos and ingroup

policy biases are fundamentally shaped by their economic self-interests, the results seem to confirm evidence from previous work (Johnson and Oliver, 1989) showing Latinos serve as more threatening economic competitors to blacks than blacks are to Latinos.

Economic Self-Interests

On the whole, there is scant evidence that economic self-interests motivate stronger ingroup biases among Latinos. Consider the model with the full Latino sample. Only one of the indicators of economic self-interests reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The variable for respondents' occupations reveals that Latinos in executive and professional jobs expressed more neutral policy preferences than the rest of the Latino sample ($\beta=.52$). This finding supports the economic self-interest hypothesis since African Americans and Latinos tend to be more highly represented within the service and labor industries, thus, limiting the potential for group conflict. The limited effects appear to indicate Latinos' economic self-interests do not shape their ingroup policy biases. Nevertheless, given the significant representation of foreign-born Latinos in the Los Angeles sample, the estimates may largely reflect the views of foreign-born respondents. Further analysis offers suggestive evidence that economic self-interests play more of a role on foreign-born Hispanics' group biases when considering job training programs.⁹ This is particularly the case for high-income earners. High income, U.S.-born Latinos were more likely to believe blacks and Hispanics deserved to benefit from job training programs equally. Nevertheless, there was no evidence that low-income, U.S. born Latinos held stronger ingroup policy biases. Beyond income, none of the other indicators of economic self-interests were found to be statistically significant among U.S.-born Latinos. Taken together, support for the economic self-interest hypothesis when applied to Latinos in Los Angeles is weak. However, there is suggestive evidence that U.S.-born Latinos' policy positions were influenced more by their economic self-interests than their

⁹The results are reported in Appendix B4.

Table 5.5: Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	-1.50	2.33	-4.01	2.64
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	.44	1.58	1.78	2.34
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.59	1.27	1.14	2.14
% Latino Below Poverty Level	.69	.86	-1.04	1.24
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-.22	1.66	-1.14	2.14
% Below Poverty Level	-1.52	.99	-.04	1.45
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	1.10	.95	1.82	1.52
% Latino	.26	.43	.23	.54
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.09	.47	-.14	.84
Male	-.22	.12	-.49	.18
Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.36	.28	.05	.41
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.15	.19	-.15	.30
Educational Attainment	.32	.27	.10	.39
Below \$35K	-.20	.19	-.36	.29
Above \$70K	.29	.30	.64	.35
Missing Income	-.36	.23	-.97	.34
Executives and Professionals	.52	.21	.63	.29
Service and Labor	.28	.15	.44	.20
Unemployed	.27	.17	.21	.24
Out of Workforce	-.35	.19	-.18	.25
Homeowner	.10	.17	.08	.27
Years of Residency	-.69	.27	-.39	.38
Year (1994=1)	-.01	.21	.18	.32
Mexican	.03	.14	.05	.20
Puerto Rican	-.58	.53	.55	.57
Cuban	.47	.26	.06	.55
US Born	-.45	.73	-1.15	1.54
Years in US	.91	.87	1.37	1.81
N	944		448	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 476 Latinos were included in the second iteration. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table 5.6: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	-4.01	2.64	-4.39	2.68
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	1.78	2.35	1.67	2.32
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	1.17	1.63	1.35	1.61
% Latino Below Poverty Level	-1.04	1.22	-1.07	1.21
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-1.14	2.14	-1.29	2.15
% Below Poverty Level	-.05	1.43	.03	1.43
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	1.82	1.54	1.98	1.53
% Latino	.23	.54	.25	.54
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Blacks	.00	.32	-.01	.32
Anti-Black Prejudice	—		-.67	.55
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	-.14	.84	-.20	.85
Male	-.49	.18	-.50	.18
Ideology (Liberal=1)	.05	.42	.02	.41
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.15	.30	-.20	.31
Educational Attainment	.10	.39	.10	.40
Below \$35K	-.36	.29	-.38	.29
Above \$70K	.64	.34	.59	.34
Missing Income	-.97	.34	-.99	.34
Executives and Professionals	.63	.29	.64	.29
Service and Labor	.44	.20	.46	.20
Unemployed	.21	.24	.23	.23
Out of Workforce	-.18	.25	-.18	.25
Homeowner	.08	.27	.07	.27
Years of Residency	-.39	.38	-.33	.37
Year (1994=1)	.18	.32	.22	.31
Mexican	.05	.19	.05	.19
Puerto Rican	.55	.57	.61	.56
Cuban	.06	.55	.14	.57
US Born	-1.15	1.54	-1.20	1.54
Years in US	1.37	1.80	1.39	1.80
N	448		448	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 476 Latinos were included in the second iteration. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

foreign-born counterparts. This finding is unsurprising given that U.S. born Latinos are more likely to understand the substance of race-based policies as well as their implications for their lives.

Residential Group Conflict

Likewise, there is little evidence that residential conditions impact Latinos public policy attitudes. The estimates for the interaction terms in both models failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The only potentially significant result was reflected in the estimate for census blocks with a high proportion of Latinos without at least a high school degree and with a large black population. The negative coefficient in the split-sample suggests that Latinos living under such conditions favor job training programs when they benefit Latinos vis-a-vis blacks ($\beta=-4.01$). Nevertheless, the estimate misses the conventional level of statistical significance, whether applying a one or two-tailed test; moreover, the null effect of the interaction within the full sample limits the inferences that can be drawn from the estimate. Since the larger sample should provide greater statistical power than the split sample, it seems unlikely that the truncated model would detect the relationship more accurately than the full sample.¹⁰

Perceived Group Conflict

More surprisingly, when assessing the attitudinal determinants of Latinos' group biases, the research does not suggest their perceived group competition with African Americans has a significant influence on their ingroup policy favoritism. Table 5.6 reports the results of the model when the scale of Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks is included. Overall, the evidence reveals that Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks does not encourage greater support for policies that

¹⁰There was no evidence to suggest the presence of realistic group conflict differed between U.S.-born and foreign-born Latinos. In fact, among Latinos born in the United States, the evidence suggested living in areas where Latinos were materially-deprived and among large black populations *decreased* their ingroup policy favoritism.

exclusively favor Latinos over blacks.¹¹ The magnitude of the coefficient for the perceived group competition scale in Model 1 is negligible and fails to reach statistical significance ($\beta=.00$). Furthermore, the insignificant result for Latinos' perceived group competition bars the possibility of a mediated effect. Lastly, when controlling for their racial attitudes, it is clear that Latinos' racial prejudices about blacks have little impact on their policy attitudes. Instead, the evidence seems to suggest that Latinos in Los Angeles may be less likely to view their relationship with blacks as a zero-sum game, implying that they would be more amenable to political alliances with African Americans.

Determinants of Latinos' Differential Support for Hiring Preferences

Our discussion of Los Angeles ends by examining Latinos' differential attitudes about hiring preferences for both African Americans and Latinos. Latinos' differential support for job training programs was marginally driven by their economic self-interests and not at all by their group material conditions. Nevertheless, hiring preferences tend to be at the heart of many conflicts between blacks and Latinos. Therefore, there is good reason to suspect that Latinos' economic self-interests and group material conditions would lead to stronger ingroup biases in their support for race-based hiring policies. Nevertheless, the estimates below show this to not be the case. Yet, while Latino respondents' policy preferences in minority hiring are not shaped by their personal economic circumstances or by group tensions within their respective neighborhoods, they are influenced by how strongly they *perceive* blacks to pose a threat to their group interests. The findings are discussed in greater detail below with respect to whether they confirm or contradict the expected hypotheses.

¹¹Further analysis reveals that Latinos' perceived competition with blacks does not shape the ingroup policy favoritism of either foreign-born or U.S.-born Latinos.

Economic Self-Interests

The analysis offers no evidence that Latinos' concern for their economic self-interests motivate their attitudes about hiring preferences. Table 5.7 reports the estimates from both the full and split samples. None of the indicators of economic self-interests offered evidence to support the conclusion that personal economic concerns shaped Hispanic Angelenos' ingroup policy favoritism. All of the estimates failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance and often moved in the wrong direction. Additionally, the effects of economic self-interests are insignificant for both U.S. and foreign-born Latinos alike. Overall, Hispanics' economic self-interests have little impact on their positions about who should benefit from hiring preferences.

Residential Group Conflict

Likewise, the results offer little evidence to show Latinos' residential material conditions influence their differential support for hiring preferences. None of the models in Table 5.7 reveal a coefficient for group residential conditions that reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Again, when stratifying the sample for further analysis to examine the differences between U.S. born and foreign-born Latinos, there is no evidence to support the residential group conflict hypothesis. In the end, the influence of group material conditions within Hispanic Angelenos' neighborhoods appears to have a limited influence on their attitudes about race-based public policies.

Perceived Group Competition

Lastly, the analysis examines the relationship between respondents' attitudes toward African Americans and their policy predispositions about hiring preferences for minorities. Table 5.8 reports the estimates for a model that includes an index of Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks and another with both the

Table 5.7: Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	-.83	2.25	-4.43	2.71
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	1.42	1.51	.93	2.49
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	-1.20	1.54	.35	1.72
% Latino Below Poverty Level	.68	.82	.87	1.34
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	2.54	1.86	.51	2.14
% Below Poverty Level	-.68	1.02	-.79	1.53
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	-.22	.95	1.32	1.57
% Latino	-.74	.46	-.45	.56
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	-.02	.41	.09	.64
Male	-.01	.12	.04	.18
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.25	.21	-.10	.31
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.43	.28	-.45	.43
Educational Attainment	.14	.30	-.04	.41
Below \$35K	-.19	.18	-.30	.25
Above \$70K	-.02	.28	.37	.35
Missing Income	-.26	.24	-.47	.35
Executives and Professionals	.22	.19	-.15	.26
Service and Labor	-.11	.18	-.26	.27
Unemployed	.30	.16	.32	.22
Out of Workforce	-.23	.17	.09	.20
Homeowner	.21	.17	.01	.24
Years of Residency	-.95	.41	-.29	.33
Year (1994=1)	.01	.19	.13	.26
Mexican	-.21	.15	.01	.21
Puerto Rican	-.43	.33	-.67	.53
Cuban	-.48	.56	-1.49	.84
US Born	-.37	.70	-.07	1.25
Years in U.S.	1.52	.82	.46	1.42
N	944		448	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 476 Latinos were included in the second iteration. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table 5.8: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X % Black	-4.99	2.66	-5.99	2.69
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	-.24	2.35	-.34	2.35
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.38	1.65	.53	1.67
% Latino Below Poverty Level	1.37	1.26	1.35	1.26
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	.82	2.16	.62	2.17
% Below Poverty Level	-1.38	1.47	-1.26	1.50
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	2.05	1.56	2.20	1.57
% Latino	-.33	.56	-.31	.56
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Blacks	-.95	.36	-.95	.36
Anti-Black Prejudice	—		-.71	.56
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.19	.64	.10	.64
Male	.03	.18	.03	.18
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.10	.31	-.14	.32
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.41	.42	-.44	.41
Educational Attainment	-.07	.40	-.08	.39
Below \$35K	-.23	.27	-.26	.27
Above \$70K	.28	.40	.23	.39
Missing Income	-.40	.38	-.42	.37
Executives and Professionals	-.12	.26	-.10	.26
Service and Labor	-.23	.25	-.21	.25
Unemployed	.41	.22	.43	.22
Out of Workforce	.04	.21	.03	.21
Homeowner	.08	.23	.07	.23
Years of Residency	-.29	.33	-.23	.33
Year (1994=1)	.12	.26	.16	.26
Mexican	.11	.21	.11	.22
Puerto Rican	-.42	.44	-.38	.46
Cuban	-1.36	.86	-1.30	.89
US Born	-.04	1.32	-.12	1.31
Years in U.S.	.30	1.49	.39	1.48
N	448		446	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 476 Latinos were included in the second iteration. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

group competition scale as well as a composite scale of respondents' negative racial stereotypes about African Americans. As has been the case in the previous analyses, both measures are included as a means of ruling out the possibility that one attitudinal component merely stands as a proxy for the other. Model 1 shows that Latinos' perceived zero-sum competition with blacks leads to greater support for hiring preferences when they benefit Latinos vis-a-vis blacks ($\beta = -.95$). Furthermore, when Latinos' anti-black stereotypes are included in the analysis, it clearly has no influence on Latinos' differential support for hiring preferences. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the relationship between Latinos' perceived group competition with African Americans truly reflects their concerns over group interests rather than their underlying negative racial attitudes about Latinos. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a mediated effect. While the group competition scale led to a statistically significant result, none of the determinants of Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks were shown to influence their ingroup policy favoritism for hiring preferences. Ultimately, this finding suggests Latinos' perceived threat from blacks were not strongly tied to their actual personal or group material circumstances. This finding is similar to the results revealed for African Americans. Ultimately, the dissociation between Latinos' personal economic circumstances and their perceived group competition implies their subjective threat from blacks may reflect concerns over differences in group status more than the group's economic status.

Discussion

In the final analysis, the inferences point in some clear directions. First, while economic self-interests appeared to impact black Angelenos' differential support for race-based public policies, there is little to suggest that Latinos' personal economic self-interests play a significant part in their support for such programs. African Americans' preference for blacks to be the primary beneficiaries of both job training programs and hiring preferences were impacted primarily by their employment sta-

tus and, to a lesser extent, homeownership and family income. The most consistent predictor of blacks' ingroup policy favoritism was their employment status. Unemployed blacks were less likely to believe Latinos deserved to benefit from job training programs and hiring preferences as much as African Americans. Similarly, the results in Chapter 4 revealed that unemployed blacks perceived stronger group competition with Latinos than blacks who were unemployed or out of the workforce. Taken together, the evidence offers strong support for previous work suggesting blacks in Los Angeles are disadvantaged by a labor market in Los Angeles that increasingly seeks largely undocumented, Latino workers for jobs that were once predominantly held by blacks (Johnson and Oliver, 1989). In addition, black homeowners and high-income earners were less inclined to hold an ingroup bias in their positions on job training programs. This finding is consistent with the economic self-interest hypothesis because blacks with higher incomes and who own homes will tend to have higher social status and greater access to material resources. However, both high incomes and homeownership had no impact on blacks' differential support for hiring preferences.

For Latinos, the effect of economic self-interests was limited. At best, the results show that Hispanics with managerial or professional occupations tended to be more even-handed in their positions on job training programs (Table 5.5). Such jobs require higher levels of education and technological savvy, thus, limiting the impact that one group in particular has on one's job stability. Ultimately, the results suggest an asymmetry exists in the influence of economic self-interests on the ingroup policy favoritism between both groups. This asymmetry likely reflects that the Latino population in Los Angeles is overwhelmingly composed of immigrants, who came to the United States for economic opportunities and are less inclined to view other groups, but particularly blacks, as barriers to their upward mobility.

On the other hand, there is no evidence that the residential conditions of blacks or Latinos in Los Angeles heightened their ingroup policy favoritism. In one case, African Americans living in areas with low black educational attainment and siz-

able Latino populations were shown to support hiring preferences for blacks more than Latinos. However, further analysis suggested the effect was a function of multicollinearity between the contextual variables. Overall, the evidence indicates residential conditions, at least at the census block level, have little influence on who blacks and Latinos prefer to benefit from race-based public policies. In comparison, the economic self-interests of both groups clearly trump the influence of their residential context.

Finally, there is overwhelming evidence in support of the perceived group conflict hypothesis. Highly-threatened blacks and Latinos tended to express ingroup policy favoritism for both job training programs and hiring preferences. The only exception was Latinos' positions on job training programs. If assuming a larger proportion of Latinos in Los Angeles are immigrants-and in some cases undocumented-there is reason to suspect job training programs are not necessary for the often, low-skill jobs they often pursue. Despite the robust support for the perceived group conflict hypothesis, it is important to note that these perceptions were largely unrelated to either their objective personal economic circumstances or group material conditions. As mentioned earlier, I believe this suggest blacks' and Latinos' perceived threat of one another is rooted more in their relative group status and symbolic concerns rather than their economic position. Ultimately, the findings in Los Angeles confirm evidence from previous studies showing that *perceived* group threats can incite intergroup conflicts as much or more than objective, or actual conditions (Bobo, 1983). Overall, the evidence from Los Angeles offers reasons for dismay at the prospects for electoral alliances to occur between African Americans and Latinos. Their personal economic circumstances, particularly their work status, as well as their perceived group conflict with one another may undermine any positive steps taken toward forging stable political alliances.

Beyond the proposed hypotheses, there is evidence that living in highly-segregated communities influences African Americans' group biases in policy preferences; there


is a consistent positive and significant effect for African Americans living in areas with large percentages of blacks, showing they tend to have stronger ingroup biases in their policy preferences. This finding corroborates prior evidence that African Americans living in areas with high concentrations of black segregation are more likely to become politically-isolated than other blacks (Massey and Denton, 1993).

Yet, residing within areas where there are a substantial number of people, irrespective of their group identification, living below the poverty line has a more neutralizing impact on blacks' ingroup biases for hiring preferences. Each model of blacks' differential support for hiring preferences reveal a negative and statistically significant coefficient for blacks living in areas with high poverty rates across all racial groups. This result suggests that living in similar material circumstances with outgroup members may actually mitigate the tensions between groups. For Latinos, there were no estimates, beyond those previously mentioned, that consistently predicted their positions on race-based policies.

5.2 Policy Implications for Black-Latino Relations in Boston

Next, the analysis shifts its focus to determine whether the group dynamics between African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles translate into a different urban context—in this case, Boston, Massachusetts. As mentioned earlier, Boston is similar to Los Angeles in that it is a diverse, metropolitan area and that it also has a tortured racial legacy. Nevertheless, the African American and Latino populations in Boston are different from their counterparts in Los Angeles. Therefore, the implications of respondents' economic self-interests and residential group conditions may differ across urban areas. The analysis below is an effort to gauge whether the dynamics that shape African Americans' and Latinos' ingroup policy favoritism in Los Angeles also influence their policy positions in Boston. There is good reason to

Figure 5.6: Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston




suspect that, while both cities have their own unique racial history, the economic and demographic patterns that influence black-Latino relations in Los Angeles will also be present in Boston.

5.2.1 Blacks' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies

Similar to Los Angeles, I analyze blacks' differential support for job training programs and hiring preferences. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the distributions for each dependent variable. The dependent variables, as in the models for Los Angeles, take the difference between African Americans' support for job training programs and hiring preferences favoring Latinos from such programs when favoring blacks. Again, the measure is an attempt to determine the factors that might drive ingroup biases and, consequently, undermine the ability of both groups to work toward shared goals. Positive values reflect group favoritism for policies when they apply to African Americans compared to when they are offered for Latinos. Conversely, negative values reflect a bias for policies targeted to Latinos. And, again, a value of zero

Figure 5.7: Histogram of Blacks' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston



connotes equal support for policies as they relate to both blacks and Hispanics.

Figure 5.6 illustrates the distribution of responses for the item measuring differential support for job training programs. It is clear from the histogram that most blacks in Boston believe Latinos deserve to benefit from job training programs equally with blacks; the modal category is a value of zero. Furthermore, while the distribution shows a slight bias in favor of policies applied to African Americans, the distribution is somewhat less skewed than the Los Angeles sample.¹²

A similar pattern emerges for African Americans' differential support for hiring preferences. Figure 5.7 shows a majority of black respondents were willing to support hiring preferences for blacks and Latinos equally. However, there was a slight skew in the direction of favoring policies when they related to blacks as compared to Latinos.¹³ In the end, their support for the equal application of both job training

¹²Nevertheless, there appears to be limited variation in the measure, which may limit the effects observed from estimation.

¹³Yet, like their attitudes about job training programs, blacks' differential support of hiring preferences for blacks and Latinos offers very little variation to be explained by the independent

programs and hiring preferences suggests there is great potential for black-Latino political alliances in Boston.

Determinants of Blacks' Differential Support for Job Training Programs

Now, consider the factors that predict African Americans' differential support for job training programs. The model specifications for African Americans' support for job training programs and hiring preferences in Boston is similar to the models created for black Angelenos. The analysis begins by looking at black Bostonians' differential support for job training programs. Like the analysis for Los Angeles, Table 5.9 reports the estimates for blacks in Boston without the attitudinal variables (i.e., blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos, the threat they feel from immigration, as well as their racial stereotypes about Latinos), whereas the estimates reported in Table 5.10 include these items. In Table 5.9, model 1 includes the entire sample of African Americans from Boston, while model 2 comprises only the black respondents that were asked about their perceived zero-sum competition with Latinos. Again, both the full and split-half samples are used as a basis for understanding the implications of reducing the sample size on the inferences drawn. Overall, the analysis corroborates the results reported for African Americans in Los Angeles that economic self-interests and, to a lesser extent, residential group conditions influence how strongly blacks in Boston favor policies that benefit African Americans' exclusively to those that also include Latinos. The results are discussed with respect to their relationship to each of the key hypotheses below.

Economic Self-Interests

The influence of blacks' economic self-interests on their ingroup favoritism for job training programs is less compelling in Boston than in Los Angeles. Most of the indicators of self-interests do not approach conventional levels of statistical sig-

variables.

nificance. The only exception is for homeownership. The estimates for blacks who owned their home is negative and statistically significant for the full sample in Table 5.9 ($\beta=-.46$). The negative relationship indicates African American homeowners in Boston were less likely to express ingroup biases in their support for job training programs than blacks either renting or living under alternative housing circumstances. This finding implies that the source of group conflict between blacks and Latinos in Boston may be over access to housing, rather than employment opportunities, as it was in Los Angeles. The effect of homeownership also is present in the split sample; the coefficient is both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-.60$).¹⁴ While the indicator of unemployment fails to reach statistical significance, an extended analysis using an interaction term capturing unemployed black residents of areas with large Latino populations led to significantly stronger ingroup favoritism among unemployed than employed blacks. The presence of Latinos triggers the ingroup biases of African Americans in Boston. On the other hand, when the size of the Latino population is small, they tend to believe blacks and Latinos should benefit equally from job training programs.¹⁵

Residential Group Conflict

Furthermore, there is little to suggest that residential group conflict drives their differential support for job training programs. Although moving in the expected direction, the interaction terms for the full sample in Table 5.9 fail to reach statis-

¹⁴Given the small size of the paired sample, further analysis was done to offer more statistical power. In order to offer greater statistical power to test the economic self-interest hypothesis, the contextual indicators were excluded from the analysis. Ultimately, the results revealed in the full model specification held in the reduced model.

¹⁵Given concerns about the limited variance in the measure for ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs, an additional analysis was run using only the absolute measure of support for job training programs for Latinos. A glance at the descriptive statistics for the measure suggest the distribution is skewed in the direction of support for such programs ($r=.81$). When a multivariate analysis was run using the variable in the model for ingroup policy favoritism, the relationships between blacks' sociodemographic characteristics and their support for job training programs for Latinos were consistent with the effect revealed in the model of blacks' differential support. In particular, black homeowners were found to support job training programs for Latinos more than blacks who either rented or had other housing accommodations.

Table 5.9: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	.36	3.04	.52	5.30
% Black Below Poverty Level X % Latino	2.05	2.70	-3.36	3.52
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-2.75	1.39	-4.12	3.33
% Black Below Poverty Level	-3.89	1.13	-4.84	1.60
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	2.30	1.61	.78	3.30
% Below Poverty Level	3.72	1.28	5.62	1.77
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	-.83	.31	-1.26	.58
% Latino	-3.19	1.62	-1.73	2.26
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	-.71	.54	-1.18	.83
Male	-.24	.18	-.28	.25
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.97	.27	.75	.38
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.09	.35	.33	.53
Educational Attainment	-.58	.43	.34	.59
Below \$35K	.34	.24	.00	.26
Above \$70K	.22	.26	-.08	.31
Missing Income	-.04	.46	-.29	.59
Executives and Professionals	.22	.25	-.21	.27
Service and Labor	-.02	.25	.16	.28
Unemployed	.34	.30	.16	.31
Out of Workforce	.23	.27	.49	.40
Homeowner	-.46	.18	-.60	.29
Years of Residency	-.03	.24	-.22	.33
Year (1994=1)	.26	.18	.03	.22
N	466		209	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned

tical significance. Nevertheless, the estimates show that blacks living in areas with high black poverty and small Latino populations are more likely to believe Latinos are equally deserving of the benefits of job training programs as African Americans. The coefficient for the independent indicator of black poverty is both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-3.93$). A similar effect is revealed for black residents in areas where blacks have low levels of educational attainment and few Latinos; the coefficient for the indicator of the percent of blacks without a high school diploma is both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-2.75$). Lastly, the results show that in neighborhoods where blacks are economically-stable and live among sizable Latino populations, they also tend to hold more even-handed policy positions; the coefficient for the indicator of the percentage of Latino residents is negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-3.19$). Taken together, the findings show that while the presence of Latinos does not necessarily heighten blacks' ingroup bias, blacks' policy positions are still influenced by the combined impact of their group material conditions and proximity to Latinos. However, for blacks in Boston their relationship appears to temper their bias against Latinos rather than ignite it. Most of the effects found in the full sample translate onto the split sample. The only exceptions are for the independent indicators of the percentage of blacks with less than a high school diploma and the proportion of Latino residents. However, the inconsistencies are probably largely due to the dangerously small sample size. For instance, the coefficient for the indicator of black educational attainment actually increases in size; however, the standard error also spikes substantially as well. The change in the indicator for the proportion of Latino residents is more difficult to explain; the magnitude of the estimate reduces and the standard error inflates. The significant reduction in the coefficient may signal that the split-half sample excluded the respondents who were impacted most by living in economically-stable neighborhoods with large Latino populations.¹⁶

¹⁶Again, a reduced model was specified for the split sample as a way of determining whether the effects were merely an artifact of the small sample size. In this case, measures of respondents' age,

Given concerns about the limited variance of the dependent variable, further analysis explored whether the effects differed for blacks' general support of job training programs for Latinos, rather than their differential support for such programs.¹⁷ The model specification for blacks' general support was identical to the model of their ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs. Since the dependent variable is still ordinal in nature, ordered probit model was employed. Using the full sample, the results offered support for the residential group conflict hypothesis. The interaction term between respondents living in areas with low black educational attainment and large Latino populations was negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-6.74$), indicating they tended to express less support for job training programs for Latinos. Furthermore, there was evidence that black residents in neighborhoods where blacks are economically-stable and live in close proximity to large populations of Latinos were more inclined to support such programs ($\beta=2.67$). The estimate narrowly misses statistical significance when using a two-tailed test; however, since the sign of the estimate is consistent with the residential group hypothesis, a one-tailed test is justified and, consequently, the coefficient easily reaches conventional levels of statistical significance.

Why would residential group material conditions influence blacks' position on job training programs for Latinos and not their differential support? Interestingly, the evidence shows they also express lower support of job training programs for blacks, which would reduce their score on the measure of differential support. As mentioned by Wilson (1997), low status black neighborhoods have been drained of jobs over the past forty years. Blacks living amid such dire group circumstances may question the effectiveness of such programs to offer them gainful job opportunities. Yet, given Latinos' presence within their neighborhoods, black residents may particularly object

gender, party identification, political ideology, years of residency, and year of the survey interview were excluded from the analysis. In addition to the contextual indicators, all of the items related to blacks' economic status were kept in the model. The relationships produced in the reduced model were consistent with effects in the full model specification.

¹⁷The estimates are reported in Appendix B5.

to them benefiting from such programs.

Perceived Group Conflict

Table 5.10 reports the estimates for the model of blacks' ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs when measures capturing respondents' perceptions and racial attitudes about Latinos and immigration are included in the model. One of the key hypotheses for the analysis proposes that group biases in policy preferences stem from blacks' perceived competition with Latinos over scarce material resources and that, furthermore, the relationship between African Americans' underlying personal and group economic circumstances to their differential support for seemingly mutually-beneficial public policies would be mediated by such perceptions of realistic threat. Model 1 in Table 5.10 suggests this is not the case in Boston. While positive, the coefficient for African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos fails to reach statistical significance ($\beta=.15$), indicating their perceived threat from Latinos had little impact on their ingroup policy bias. By definition, this finding disconfirms the mediated conflict hypothesis, which requires the mediator-in this case, blacks' perceived threat from Latinos- to predict the dependent variable, which is blacks' propensity to exhibit ingroup policy favoritism for job training programs. Yet, neither their perceived threat from immigration nor their anti-Latino prejudice explain differences in support for job training programs either. When both scales for African Americans' perceived threat from immigration and anti-Latino prejudice are included in the models, they fail to approach conventional levels of statistical significance. The weak relationships found in this analysis hint that the presence of Latinos in Boston may not have been very salient for African Americans at the point this sample was collected.¹⁸

¹⁸In further analysis, a reduced model was estimated that included only blacks' sociodemographic characteristics and the measures of their perceived group competition, threat from immigration, and anti-Latino prejudice; the contextual indicators were excluded. None of the measures of blacks' attitudinal predispositions toward Latinos reached conventional levels of statistical significance.

Table 5.10: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	.68	5.31	.05	4.91	.98	5.05
% Black Below Poverty Level X % Latino	-3.40	3.48	-3.65	3.48	-4.22	3.36
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-4.18	3.33	-3.94	3.11	-4.60	3.23
% Black Below Poverty Level	-4.82	1.60	-4.61	1.59	-4.60	1.56
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>						
% w/o HS Diploma	.70	3.31	.77	3.27	1.27	3.30
% Below Poverty Level	5.62	1.78	5.23	1.76	5.57	1.76
<i>Racial Context</i>						
% Black	-1.28	.47	-1.27	.46	-1.25	.45
% Latino	-1.76	2.28	-1.48	2.20	-1.51	2.20
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>						
Competition with Latinos	.15	.41	.14	.42	.11	.41
Threat of Immigration	—	—	.55	.48	.49	.48
Anti-Latino Prejudice	—	—	—	—	-1.00	1.01
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>						
Age	-1.21	.82	-1.30	.81	-1.23	.79
Male	-.28	.25	-.25	.25	-.26	.26
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.72	.37	.55	.38	.54	.38
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.33	.54	.36	.53	.22	.57
Educational Attainment	.37	.60	.34	.59	.31	.58
Below \$35K	.00	.26	.00	.27	-.09	.28
Above \$70K	-.07	.30	-.04	.32	-.08	.32
Missing Income	-.30	.58	-.34	.61	-.42	.62
Executives and Professionals	.20	.27	.18	.26	.19	.27
Service and Labor	.16	.29	.13	.28	.10	.27
Unemployed	.15	.30	.12	.30	.16	.29
Out of Workforce	.49	.39	.46	.39	.48	.37
Homeowner	-.60	.30	-.58	.30	-.63	.31
Years of Residency	-.22	.33	-.19	.32	-.21	.32
Year (1994=1)	.00	.23	.01	.23	.04	.23
N	208		206		205	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Determinants of Blacks' Differential Support for Hiring Preferences

Next, the analysis examines the determinants for black Bostonians' differential support for hiring preferences. Since hiring preferences between minorities tend to be a more conflictual public policy than job training programs, there is good reason to expect economic self-interests and residential group conflict to be more consequential. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 report the estimates for black respondents' differential support for hiring preferences between blacks and Latinos. Ultimately, the findings for all of the hypotheses are weak, suggesting something other than material conditions, either for the individual or group, explains their differential support for hiring preferences.

Economic Self-Interests

Again, the evidence for the economic self-interest hypothesis is weak. In Table 5.11, none of the indicators of economic self-interests are statistically significant. The null findings are consistent between the full and split-half sample.¹⁹ Overall, there is little to suggest blacks' economic self-interests shape their ingroup favoritism for hiring preferences.

Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that personal economic concerns influenced their general support of hiring preferences for Latinos. A separate analysis using only a measure for how strongly blacks believed there should be hiring preferences for Hispanics offered evidence in support of the economic self-interest hypothesis.²⁰ The model specification was identical to the model for blacks' differential support for hiring preferences. Again, given the ordinal nature of the dependent

Furthermore, the attitudinal measures did not predict blacks' general support of job training programs for Latinos.

¹⁹A reduced model was estimated identical to the model for black Bostonians' differential support for job training programs. The reduced model excludes the contextual indicators, leaving only measures that capture respondents' sociodemographic characteristics. Using the split sample, the reduced model offered results that were little different from the full model.

²⁰The estimates are reported in Appendix B6.

Table 5.11: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	-.79	2.90	-5.53	4.75
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	-5.45	2.17	-8.99	3.98
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-1.49	-1.32	-1.29	2.47
% Black Below Poverty Level	-1.66	.87	-1.65	1.53
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-2.55	1.77	-1.98	3.19
% Below Poverty Level	3.76	1.14	4.34	1.74
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	-.55	.31	-.51	.55
% Latino	1.57	1.25	2.98	2.33
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.11	.59	.52	.78
Male	.07	.20	-.18	.27
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.60	.28	.49	.39
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.02	.38	.05	.50
Educational Attainment	-.56	.51	.12	.56
Below \$35K	.45	.28	.13	.37
Above \$70K	-.05	.26	-.32	.36
Missing Income	.77	.43	.81	.51
Executives and Professionals	-.50	.21	-.40	.28
Service and Labor	-.48	.27	-.28	.33
Unemployed	.05	.28	.11	.32
Out of Workforce	-.28	.26	.37	.42
Homeowner	-.06	.19	.03	.26
Years of Residency	-.26	.30	-.79	.38
Year (1994=1)	.51	.20	.34	.21
N	465		197	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

variable, ordered probit estimation was utilized. The estimates revealed a positive and significant result for blacks who were out of the workforce, indicating blacks outside of the workforce were more likely to support hiring preferences for Latinos ($\beta=.43$). This finding is consistent with the economic self-interest hypothesis because nonworkers would likely feel less job competition, which may actually reduce their overall feelings of economic competition with Latinos.²¹ However, there was no evidence that unemployed blacks were less supportive of hiring preferences for Latinos than those that were employed.

Residential Group Conflict

The analysis offers little evidence in support of the residential group conflict hypothesis. In fact, the interaction term between blacks living in areas with high black poverty and large Latino populations is negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-5.37$), indicating such conditions lead to less biased positions on hiring preferences. This finding is consistent with the results of the model for blacks' differential support for hiring preferences in Los Angeles (Table 5.3). The effect also emerges for the model using the split-sample ($\beta=-8.99$).²²

Interestingly, the effect of the interaction on blacks' differential support for hiring preferences is consistent with its influence on their general support of hiring preferences for Hispanics. A separate analysis reveals that black residents in neighborhoods where there is high black poverty and large Latino populations are more supportive of hiring preferences for Latinos; the coefficient for the interaction moves in the positive direction ($\beta=3.36$); however, it narrowly misses the conventional

²¹When utilizing a t-test of blacks outside of the workforce, the results show that the mean difference in their support for hiring preferences between blacks and Latinos was statistically significant. I suspect the null effect for blacks outside of the workforce in the model of their ingroup policy favoritism for hiring preferences may reflect that the variance was explained by the other explanatory variables in the model.

²²The results for blacks' group residential conditions were similar when a separate reduced model was estimated. Like the reduced model for their differential support of job training programs, the model specification excludes measures of respondents' age, gender, party identification, political ideology, years of residency, and year of the survey interview.

Table 5.12: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	-5.13	4.88	-3.60	4.63	-4.40	4.79
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	-9.23	4.11	-8.69	4.06	-8.06	3.99
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>						
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-.45	2.58	-1.09	2.61	-.48	2.74
% Black Below Poverty Level	-.56	1.69	-.98	1.57	-.93	1.58
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>						
% w/o HS Diploma	-3.96	3.23	-3.84	3.19	-4.32	3.26
% Below Poverty Level	3.54	1.75	4.10	1.69	3.73	1.67
<i>Racial Context</i>						
% Black	-.28	.59	-.33	.58	-.35	.58
% Latino	3.57	2.49	2.97	2.31	-2.94	2.32
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>						
Competition with Latinos	.89	.51	.92	.50	.98	.49
Threat of Immigration	—	—	-.82	.51	-.76	.50
Anti-Latino Prejudice	—	—	—	—	1.04	1.01
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>						
Age	.42	.68	.59	.63	.53	.64
Male	-.04	.26	-.10	.26	-.09	.25
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.63	.42	.93	.41	.92	.41
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.11	.51	-.13	.53	.01	.53
Educational Attainment	-.04	.51	-.01	.50	-.01	.50
Below \$35K	.07	.37	.05	.35	.14	.37
Above \$70K	-.19	.37	-.21	.33	-.18	.33
Missing Income	.41	.49	.52	.48	.61	.51
Executives and Professionals	-.54	.28	-.56	.28	-.57	.29
Service and Labor	-.43	.33	-.39	.33	-.36	.32
Unemployed	.27	.32	.38	.34	.34	.33
Out of Workforce	.35	.40	.42	.39	.45	.39
Homeowner	.13	.27	.11	.27	.16	.28
Years of Residency	-.65	.38	-.72	.37	-.69	.37
Year (1994=1)	.22	.22	.22	.22	.18	.22
N	208		206		205	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

level of statistical significance. Nevertheless, the analysis also reveals that areas with high proportions of black high school dropouts and sizable Latino populations led to less support for Latinos benefiting from hiring preferences ($\beta=-7.89$).²³ The competing effects likely stem from the fact that the educational attainment of black residents is a better indicator of their social and economic status than living in high poverty areas. As mentioned earlier, educational attainment does not grant blacks similar access to better neighborhoods as whites. Therefore, areas with low black educational attainment may better reflect circumstances where blacks experience group material deprivation. Nevertheless, similar to their positions of job training programs, blacks living under such conditions are also less likely to support hiring preferences for blacks, which explains why the interaction term does not reveal a statistically significant result. Yet, they are even more certain that Latinos should not benefit from such policies.


Perceived Group Conflict

Table 5.12 reports the estimates for the attitudinal variables when included in the analysis. The estimates from each of the models are solid evidence in favor of the perceived group conflict hypothesis. In model 1, the coefficient moves in the expected direction and narrowly misses the conventional level of statistical significance when a two-tailed test is applied ($\beta=.89$, $p=.08$). Nevertheless, given the estimate moves in the appropriate direction a one-tailed test is justified, which causes the coefficient to reach statistical significance. Again, the estimate is significant when a one-tailed test is applied in model 2 and reaches statistical significance for a two-tailed test in Model 3. Moreover, blacks' perceived threat from immigration and their anti-Latino prejudice had no impact on their differential support for hiring preferences.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence to support the mediated conflict hypothesis. None of the indicators of economic self-interests impacted black Bostonians' per-

²³The estimates are reported in Appendix B6.

Figure 5.8: Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston



ceived group competition with blacks, which precludes the existence of a mediated effect in the present model. Overall, these findings confirm that highly-threatened blacks were more inclined to favor hiring preferences when they benefited blacks. Yet, their perceived competition seems unrelated to their underlying personal and group economic circumstances, suggesting they reflect their concerns over symbolic interests and group status more than their realistic interests.

5.2.2 Latinos' Biases for Race-Based Public Policies


The final section of this chapter explores how economic self-interests and residential economic and racial conditions influence Latinos' differential support for race-based public policies. To begin, consider the distribution of Latinos' differential support for both job training programs and hiring preferences. A histogram for Latinos' attitudes on job training programs is illustrated in figure 5.8. Like the distribution for Latinos in Los Angeles, the predominant proportion of Latino

participants express the same level of support of job training programs for African Americans and Latinos alike; the greatest density of Latinos in Boston have a difference score of zero. Again, this is encouraging evidence that Latinos are amenable to working toward public policies that benefit both blacks and Latinos. Yet, there is a slight bias in the direction of policies that advantage Latinos vis-a-vis African Americans. The density on the left side of the distribution is greater than the right side of the histogram. Thus, while most Latinos express equal support of job training programs for both blacks and Latinos, the remaining proportion of Latinos endorse the policies more when Latinos are the primary beneficiaries.

The distribution for hiring preferences is virtually identical to the variance for support of job training programs. Figure 5.9 shows the variance in Latinos' responses in support of hiring preferences for blacks and Latinos. A substantial proportion of Latino respondents in Boston are equally supportive of hiring preferences for both groups. Yet, like for job training programs, a bias also exists in favor of policies that benefit Latinos over African Americans. Taken together, Latinos' support for both job training programs and hiring preferences speaks well of the potential for cooperative relationships to occur between both blacks and Latinos; a large proportion of Hispanic respondents believe both groups deserve to benefit equally from race-based public policies. Nevertheless, the evidence also shows that a small segment of Latinos in Boston lean toward Latinos benefiting from the policies at the expense of African Americans.

The scores for the measures of differential support have limited variance. Therefore, there are some concerns that the independent variables will have little variance to explain. As a consequence, the analysis also examines Latinos' general support for policies that benefit African Americans when the key explanatory variables fail to impact their differential support for such policies.

Figure 5.9: Histogram of Latinos' Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston



Determinants of Latinos' Differential Support for Job Training Programs

Next, the analysis concentrates on the determinants that explain Latinos' differential support for job training programs. As in the previous analyses, I explore whether personal economic concerns as well as economic and racial conditions influence Latinos' attitudes about job training programs for both groups. Furthermore, I examine whether underlying perceptions of zero-sum competition with African Americans or racial prejudices impact their differential support for such policies. Again, the analysis begins with two iterations of the model, one with the full Latino sample and the other with a split sample. Table 5.13 reports the estimates from the model excluding attitudinal variables and Table 5.14 shows the estimates with Latinos' attitudinal predispositions included in the equations. Overall, the models offer some evidence that economic self-interests play an important part in shaping Latinos' differential support of job training programs for blacks and Latinos.

Nevertheless, there is less evidence that residential conditions are consequential.

Economic Self-Interests

Generally, the models offer mixed results about the strength of the economic self-interest hypothesis. Some of the effects move in the expected directions. For example, the coefficient for low-income Latinos indicates they tend to prefer job training programs that benefit Latinos rather than blacks; the estimate is negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-.60$). However, other estimates run contrary from what one would expect if economic self-interests shaped Latinos' ingroup policy favoritism. The findings for Latinos that either earn high incomes or own homes contradict the economic self-interest hypothesis. High-income Latinos were shown to be more biased toward programs that benefit Hispanics over blacks ($\beta=-1.35$). Yet, the expectation was that since high-income earners are more economically-stable than their low-income counterparts, they would feel less competition with African Americans. Similarly, the coefficient for homeowners implies that they would be *more* likely to hold an ingroup bias in their support for job training programs ($\beta=-.70$). Yet, like high-income earners, they should feel more stable since by virtue of owning their home they are free from competing with blacks over housing. Of course, as mentioned before, homeownership could stand as a proxy for another factor such as personal wealth; however, even a related unobserved variable is likely to reflect greater economic stability and not vulnerability. Furthermore, I would presume that high-income earners and homeowners would likely enjoy greater socioeconomic status and, thus, would not be in as great of need for job training programs. Moreover, the model for the split sample offers little to explain the competing effects; none of the sociodemographic variables approach conventional levels of statistical significance.²⁴

To speculate, higher-status Latinos in Boston may feel a stronger sense of linked

²⁴A reduced model was utilized in further analyses that excluded all the variables for Latinos' residential conditions. Latinos with high levels of educational attainment were shown to have more even-handed views about who should benefit from job training programs; the estimate was both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=1.46$). Yet, none of the other indicators of economic self-interests impacted their policy positions.

Table 5.13: Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	-.83	2.37	3.82	3.62
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	.75	1.38	2.94	1.94
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.82	.95	1.10	2.18
% Latino Below Poverty Level	-.76	.50	-1.38	.75
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-3.06	1.74	-4.91	4.14
% Below Poverty Level	.36	.79	-.38	1.59
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	-.69	.64	-2.97	1.28
% Latino	.38	.54	1.36	.84
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	-.02	.59	.50	.83
Male	-.23	.24	-.19	.32
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.96	.31	-.83	.44
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.07	.33	-.32	.56
Educational Attainment	.50	.54	1.22	.81
Below \$35K	-.60	.30	-.57	.47
Above \$70K	-1.35	.50	-.67	.75
Missing Income	-.15	.31	.13	.52
Executives and Professionals	-.43	.25	-.61	.35
Service and Labor	-.09	.23	-.09	.40
Unemployed	-.33	.28	-.09	.40
Out of Workforce	-.39	.30	-.27	.49
Homeowner	-.70	.26	-.13	.40
Years of Residency	.70	.53	.58	.86
Year (1994=1)	.29	.20	.48	.27
Mexican	-1.63	.53	.26	.47
Puerto Rican	.01	.21	.49	.31
Cuban	-.21	.32	-.58	.53
US Born	-.18	.65	.09	.80
Years in U.S.	.15	.78	-.27	.90
N	610		304	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 344 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table 5.14: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Job Training Programs in Boston

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	5.90	3.63	4.90	3.89
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	2.67	2.06	2.96	2.20
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.11	2.33	.74	2.44
% Latino Below Poverty Level	-1.12	.83	-1.38	.85
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-.15	3.35	-.39	3.58
% Below Poverty Level	-1.70	1.52	-1.80	1.53
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	-3.26	1.43	-3.06	1.47
% Latino	1.34	.89	1.39	.94
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Blacks	-1.03	.73	-1.06	.73
Anti-Black Prejudice	—		-.77	.77
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.54	.84	.60	.83
Male	.09	.32	-.02	.33
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-1.05	.46	-1.11	.48
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.11	.59	-.06	.59
Educational Attainment	1.61	.80	1.70	.80
Below \$35K	-.48	.50	-.52	.50
Above \$70K	-1.46	.71	-1.52	.73
Missing Income	.07	.62	.07	.63
Executives and Professionals	-.51	.36	-.51	.36
Service and Labor	-.04	.42	.03	.41
Unemployed	.13	.39	.16	.40
Out of Workforce	-.12	.50	-.18	.52
Homeowner	-.01	.43	.07	.43
Years of Residency	1.58	.67	1.56	.66
Year (1994=1)	.67	.29	.62	.30
Mexican	.72	.51	.77	.52
Puerto Rican	.44	.33	.48	.34
Cuban	-.44	.52	-.40	.55
US Born	.26	.70	.49	.73
Years in U.S.	-.73	.90	-.98	.91
N	298		288	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 344 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

fate with other Latinos; similar results have been found among better-educated, higher-income African Americans (Dawson, 1994).

The evidence for the residential group conflict hypothesis is weak. None of the estimates using the full sample are statistically significant.²⁵ Ultimately, the results offer little evidence that the economic and racial conditions in which Latinos in Boston live impacted their support for job training programs.

A similarly disappointing result was revealed for the influence of Latinos' perceived group competition on their attitudes toward job training programs. Table 5.14 included the three iterations of the models with respondents' attitudinal predispositions included. In all three models, the coefficients for Latinos' perceived group competition had no impact on their support for job training programs. Furthermore, their negative racial attitudes toward blacks had no impact as well. Ultimately, the evidence suggests that realistic interests, either actual or perceived, play a minimal role on Latinos' support for job training programs. This finding may suggest that things other than access to material resources shape Hispanics' willingness to engage in coalitions with African Americans in Boston.

Determinants of Latinos' Differential Support for Hiring Preferences

Lastly, the analysis focuses on respondents' differential support for hiring preferences. Since Latinos were a very small proportion of Boston at the time the data was collected, African Americans are more likely to have benefited from minority hiring preferences. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect policies regarding minority hiring preferences to reflect group concerns over access to resources. Table 5.15 reports the models for Latinos' support of hiring preferences without account-

²⁵Even a reduced model offers no support for the residential group conflict hypothesis. The reduced model excludes measures for Latinos' age, gender, party identification, political ideology, years of residency, the year of the survey interview, national identity, place of birth, and number of years living in the United States.

ing for their perceived group competition or negative racial attitudes toward blacks. On the other hand, Table 5.16 reports two iterations of the model including both attitudinal measures. The results of the analysis are discussed in detail below.

Economic Self-Interests

The analysis for Hispanic Bostonians offers some evidence that economic self-interests fuel their group biases in race-based policy preferences. Particularly, a look at the model using the full sample in Table 5.15 shows evidence that unemployed Latinos tend to express an ingroup bias ($\beta=-.47$). The estimate fails to reach statistical significance when a two-tailed test is applied. However, since the estimate moves in the expected direction a one-tailed test is justified.²⁶ Interestingly, the findings suggest high-status Latinos hold stronger ingroup policy biases than disadvantaged Latinos. Latinos with executive and managerial occupations ($\beta=-.48$) as well as those with higher incomes ($\beta=-1.24$) were more inclined to support hiring preferences when they favored Latinos over African Americans. This finding contradicts the expectations of the economic self-interest hypothesis. Nevertheless, Latinos of higher economic status are more likely to take advantage of hiring preferences than their lower-income counterparts; therefore, it is reasonable that they would seek to secure and expand access for their own group, particularly since it is frequently blacks who they would compete with for such preferences. While the results using the full sample offer some signs that economic self-interests influence Latinos' differential support for hiring preferences, these estimates dissipate when the sample is split in half. Nevertheless, given the greater statistical power, the estimates using the full sample are more compelling.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that residential group conditions impact Hispanic Bostonians' support for hiring preferences. In every model, the coefficients for the interaction terms fail to reach statistical sig-

²⁶Moreover, the results show that among areas with large proportions of African Americans, ingroup biases were stronger among unemployed rather than employed Latinos.

Table 5.15: Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston

Independent Variables	Full Sample		Split Sample	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X % Black	-3.21	2.52	4.33	3.78
% Latino Below Poverty Level X % Black	-2.11	1.29	-.78	1.62
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.96	1.03	.74	2.17
% Latino Below Poverty Level	-.50	.60	-.70	.81
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-1.84	1.78	-2.95	2.78
% Below Poverty Level	1.75	.91	1.94	1.59
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	1.04	.69	-2.13	1.09
% Latino	-.29	.59	-.80	.95
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	-1.17	.61	-.02	.82
Male	-.07	.24	-.07	.30
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.88	.31	-.12	.36
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.55	.35	-2.04	.56
Educational Attainment	.62	.44	1.77	.71
Below \$35K	-.24	.31	.41	.55
Above \$70K	-1.24	.60	1.20	.80
Missing Income	-.87	.53	.71	.70
Executives and Professionals	-.48	.25	-.86	.38
Service and Labor	-.29	.26	-.39	.41
Unemployed	-.47†	.27	-.02	.38
Out of Workforce	-.18	.27	-.29	.47
Homeowner	-.03	.27	.98	.36
Years of Residency	1.24	.53	.43	.59
Year (1994=1)	.13	.19	.56	.32
Mexican	-.92	.51	.54	.50
Puerto Rican	-.14	.23	.16	.29
Cuban	-.95	.43	-1.62	.76
US Born	-.66	.60	.37	.75
Years in U.S.	.33	.78	-1.15	.92
N	609		305	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 344 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

nificance. Furthermore, in many instances, the coefficients actually change signs as well, offering no suggestive evidence of their potential impact.

Perceived Group Conflict

Nevertheless, the results confirm that Latinos' perceived group competition with African Americans shapes their group-based policy preferences. The results in Table 5.16 report the coefficients for each of the models when Latinos' perceptions and attitudes toward blacks are included in the equation. Overall, there is consistent evidence that Latinos who believe blacks pose a threat to their access to material resources and status are more likely to exhibit group favoritism in their support for hiring preferences. To be specific, both models in Table 5.16 reveal a negative and significant relationship between the perception that blacks pose a threat to Latinos' realistic interests and group favoritism in hiring preferences ($\beta=-3.35$ for model 1 and -3.58 for model 2). Finally, Latinos' perceived group competition with African Americans does not serve as a proxy for their negative racial attitudes toward African Americans. Indeed, the estimate for anti-black prejudice among Latinos in Boston moves in the expected direction and reaches statistical significance ($\beta=-2.65$). Nevertheless, although the anti-black prejudice measure reaches statistical significance, it does not impact the magnitude or significance of the perceived group competition measure in any way; in fact, the coefficient increases in size. These results indicate that while both attitudinal predispositions have a similar influence on Latinos' support for hiring preferences, their impacts can be distinguished from one another.

Discussion

In the final analysis, the results from Boston provide less support for the hypotheses than in Los Angeles. For African Americans, it appears their personal economic circumstances marginally influence their group biases in policy prefer-

Table 5.16: Effect of Attitudinal Predispositions on Latinos' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Boston

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	2.66	3.95	3.36	3.96
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	-.97	1.51	-1.38	1.52
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	3.73	3.93	1.34	2.18
% Latino Below Poverty Level	-1.28	1.61	-.77	.74
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-4.15	2.95	-4.43	3.06
% Below Poverty Level	2.08	1.58	2.32	1.46
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	-1.88	1.20	-1.88	1.23
% Latino	-.93	.92	-1.18	.93
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Blacks	-3.35	.70	-3.58	.71
Anti-Black Prejudice	—		-2.65	1.09
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.24	.77	.53	.82
Male	-.13	.31	-.24	.34
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.38	.38	-.42	.39
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-1.59	.55	-1.57	.51
Educational Attainment	.23	.75	.45	.74
Below \$35K	.33	.54	.33	.48
Above \$70K	1.23	.77	1.33	.82
Missing Income	.12	.79	.07	.79
Executives and Professionals	-.88	.34	-.89	.35
Service and Labor	-.41	.35	-.34	.35
Unemployed	.44	.37	.63	.38
Out of Workforce	-.40	.46	-.45	.47
Homeowner	.34	.41	.57	.44
Years of Residency	.26	.60	.39	.58
Year (1994=1)	.73	.31	.66	.30
Mexican	.93	.67	1.08	.67
Puerto Rican	.12	.31	.07	.31
Cuban	-2.03	.72	-2.22	.67
US Born	-.28	.62	.24	.65
Years in U.S.	-1.42	.82	-2.06	.85
N	299		289	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

ences. Moreover, like blacks in Los Angeles, living in areas where blacks have few resources and live among large populations of Latinos has little impact on their group favoritism for race-based public policies. In fact, in some cases, it actually mitigates such biases. More interestingly, the relationship between black Bostonians perceived conflict with Latinos and their policy support is mixed. Their perceived threat from Latinos is consequential only when they consider their positions on hiring preferences, rather than job training programs. Similarly, there is little evidence that economic self-interests and residential group conditions shape Latinos' differential support for race-based policies. There is some evidence that Latinos' perceived threat has some impact on their ingroup policy favoritism. Yet, like blacks, the effect emerges only for their consideration of hiring preferences. Given the similar effect of perceived threat for blacks and Latinos, hiring preferences appear to be a source of group conflict between both groups in Boston.

Beyond the measures of economic self-interests and residential group conflict, the analysis showed that both blacks and Latinos' party identification shaped their policy preferences. Democrats were actually more inclined to express stronger ingroup biases than either independents or Republicans. Since the Democratic party dominates the political environment in Boston, the effects may merely reflect the conflict that emerges as both groups pursue greater political influence within the Democratic machine in the city.

Conclusion

In closing, the relationship between African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles and Boston appear inextricably shaped by the group dynamics present in both cities. Both cities have their own unique racial history, economic patterns, and demographic shifts. In Los Angeles, the growing Latino population has clearly presented a more complicated relationship between African Americans and Latinos. Given

evidence that employers prefer Latinos for low-skill labor jobs, African Americans increasingly view Latinos as jeopardizing their access to economic opportunities. Nevertheless, Boston is also experiencing significant shifts in its demography that are likely to cause serious shifts in the group dynamics within the city. The underlying tensions between blacks and Latinos in each city was captured in the analysis for this chapter.

The most robust findings support the economic self-interest hypothesis. In Los Angeles, blacks' ingroup policy biases were fundamentally shaped by their employment status, income and homeownership. Unemployed blacks were more likely to support job training programs and hiring preferences for blacks over Latinos. On the other hand, African Americans who were high-income earners or homeowners were more likely to believe Latinos were equally deserving of job training programs. In Boston, blacks' personal economic considerations were based on their homeownership, but also their occupations. As in Los Angeles, black homeowners were less likely to express an ingroup policy bias. However, there was also evidence that blacks in executive and professional occupations were more even-handed about who they believed should benefit from hiring preferences. Taken together, the results suggest economic self-interests influence how blacks view Latinos and whether they perceived shared interests between the groups.

Yet, for Latinos, there is relatively little evidence that their personal economic circumstances motivate their policy preferences. In Los Angeles, the only indicator that seemed to matter was whether Latinos worked in executive or professional occupations. Latinos in managerial and professional jobs were more likely to believe blacks and Latinos should benefit from job training programs equally. On the other hand, Latinos in Boston were impacted more by their family incomes. Low-income Hispanics exhibited stronger ingroup policy favoritism than Latinos who were high-income earners. Overall, the results from Los Angeles and Boston indicate that economic self-interests, to some extent, matter in motivating blacks and Latinos

to work together toward mutually-beneficial public policies; however, these self-interests manifest themselves in different ways depending on the nature of the labor market and the demographic makeup of the metropolitan area.

Again, further work should compare the effect of blacks' and Latinos' actual personal economic well-being to their perceived economic status and values about what influences individuals' economic mobility. Unfortunately, the MCSUI does not provide the adequate measures to make such comparisons; nevertheless, they are necessary in order to determine whether citizens' perception of their economic circumstances and attitudinal predispositions attenuate the impact of their actual economic well-being on their intergroup attitudes.

Furthermore, both groups' perceived group competition with the other certainly shaped the group favoritism reflected in their policy attitudes. Nevertheless, the consistency of such perceptions varied by context. In Los Angeles, where the growing Latino community is acquiring greater economic opportunities and access to political power, African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos consistently increased their ingroup policy favoritism. For Latinos, the perceived threat from blacks heightened their ingroup policy favoritism for hiring preferences, but not for job training programs. Highly-threatened blacks did not voice more biased support in Boston; their perceived group competition had no impact, either on their positions for job training programs or hiring preferences. Furthermore, as in Los Angeles, Latinos who believed blacks posed a threat to their group interests preferred hiring preferences when they exclusively targeted Latinos; however, there was no relationship to their positions on job training programs. Lastly, in every instance the effect was statistically significant, there was no evidence of a mediated effect; perceived group competition for African Americans and Latinos was divorced from their actual personal and group economic circumstances.

The evidence for the residential group conflict hypothesis was weak. African Americans living in areas where blacks were economically-deprived and the percent-

age of Latino residents was high did not express any stronger ingroup biases than blacks living in better conditions. In fact, the results suggested that such circumstances actually mitigate blacks' ingroup policy favoritism. Similarly, residential group conflict had absolutely no impact on Latinos' policy positions in either Los Angeles or Boston. Taken together, the results suggest that residential conditions-or at least at the census block level- may not be the source of group conflict between blacks and Latinos.

Overall, the evidence from the analysis hints to why coalitions between blacks and Latinos are often short-lived, tumultuous affairs. The access that both groups are afforded to economic and political resources clearly impacts how amenable they are to cooperative efforts. In the final analysis, the evidence suggests that in order for coalitions between African Americans and Latinos to be stable, they would have to share virtually similar levels of economic opportunities and political influence. Nevertheless, there is consolation in the fact that, on average, members of both groups support race-based public policies on equal terms.

Chapter 6

Experimental Data and Methods

After exploring the factors that drive greater conflict between African Americans and Latinos, the analysis now transitions to examine what motivates greater political cooperation between both groups. In particular, the final chapters of the project analyze the role of political elites in shaping African Americans' and Latinos' attitudes about engaging in electoral alliances. In accordance with realistic group conflict theory, the remaining analysis tests whether blacks and Latinos are willing to engage in electoral alliances when presented with superordinate goals, which are common objectives that neither group can achieve independently. Within a political environment, such common goals between groups are frequently relayed to citizens by political elites. Yet, the information citizens acquire from political elites can come from different sources. First, citizens may infer the interests of political candidates, but particularly minority candidates, from their personal characteristics. Thus, a minority candidate may be presumed to have a more liberal policy agenda or work toward the interests of their particular ingroup simply due to their racial or ethnic background. Additionally, political elites may choose to speak directly to citizens, imparting messages that speak to varied group interests. As proposed in chapter 2, African Americans' and Latinos' disposition toward cross-group alliances is likely shaped by whether the candidate speaks to either group-specific or more

overarching, shared group interests.

The proposed hypotheses were tested in this project by using two experimental designs that manipulate the racial and ethnic background of hypothetical candidates as well as the messages they communicate. The experimental approach was believed to be the best method for judging both the independent and combined impact of each factor as well as to gain greater leverage over determining causality. Respondents were asked to evaluate Anglo, black, and Latino candidates. Political candidates were used to evaluate cooperation because they are often the most visible of political elites and their messages tend to be heard by a broad cross-section of their respective communities. The content of their messages can encourage groups to work together—as was the case in Barack Obama’s recent candidacy for president of the United States—or can be divisive, sparking group tensions and encouraging racial bloc voting.

In an effort to mirror how citizens judge political candidates, they were asked to assess them in relation to one another, rather than independently. The first experiment focused on campaigns between majority and minority candidates, using a hypothetical Anglo candidate and varying between a hypothetical black or Latino candidate. The message attributed to the Anglo candidate does not speak to the interests of any group and, instead, focuses on more neutral concerns such as creating job training programs and reducing corruption. On the other hand, the messages of the minority candidates communicate either neutral, ingroup-specific, or superordinate group goals. The second experiment assesses support for two minority candidates, one black and the other Latino. Like the first experiment, the messages associated with each minority candidate relay either neutral, ingroup-specific, or cross-group interests. New York City served as an ideal location to conduct research pertaining to relations between African Americans and Latinos since both groups are significant proportions of the population. Furthermore, blacks and Latinos have historically lived in close proximity to one another, either in the same or adjacent neighborhoods. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to providing greater detail

about the experimental designs and procedures.

6.1 Experimental Design

The designs for each experiment are similar; they only differ by the nature of the matchups offered between candidates. Both the first and second experiment present a faux newspaper article describing two candidates running for office in an upcoming Democratic primary in Houston, Texas. The hypothetical matchups were set in Houston due to its large populations of black and Latino residents as well as its distance from New York City. Its distance from New York made it less likely participants' knowledge of local political affairs would contaminate the results. The first experiment utilizes a 2 (Race: Black and Latino) X 3 (Message: Neutral, Ingroup-Specific, Cross-group) factorial design. Respondents are presented with a matchup between a hypothetical majority-or Anglo-political candidate and a hypothetical minority candidate. The Anglo candidate is presented as a foil to assess how respondents judge the minority candidates relative to a white candidate. As such, the white candidate offers a neutral message within each condition. On the other hand, the racial background of the minority candidate is varied so that he is depicted as either African American or Latino. Secondly, the minority candidate expresses either a neutral, in-group-specific, or cross-group message.¹ The neutral message highlights concerns that are general and do not explicitly appeal to the special interests of either group (e.g., cutting taxes and corruption). The ingroup-specific message included direct appeals to group-specific concerns. For example, the African American candidate addresses the need to end black-on-black crime while the Latino candidate speaks to the importance of immigration reform. Finally, the cross-group message speaks to the shared interests of both African Americans and Latinos, such as acquiring an equal wage and improving the similarly dire conditions

¹The full text of the message content is provided in Appendix A.

of their communities. In particular, the manipulation explicitly states that blacks and Latinos should work together to address these issues.

A second experiment is conducted that faced a black and Latino candidate against one another. Campaigns involving non-white candidates have become more common. Furthermore, the experiment offers an opportunity to determine if, when presented with a black and Latino candidate, group members will rely on the message content or the race of the candidate to make their candidate evaluations. The experiment employs a 3 (Black Message: Neutral, Ingroup-specific, Cross-group) X 3 (Latino Message: Neutral, Ingroup-specific, Cross-group) factorial design. Similar to the first experiment, respondents are presented with a faux newspaper article describing a matchup between two hypothetical candidates. However, unlike the first experiment, the candidate matchup consists of an African American and Latino candidate. The messages attributed to each of the candidates is varied so that both the African American and Latino candidates express either a neutral, ingroup-specific, or cross-group message. The content of the messages is similar and in many cases identical to the content used in the first experiment. A more thorough description of the candidate images and message content of the experimental manipulation is provided below.

Procedure

Upper-level undergraduates enrolled as research assistants for this project chiefly to recruit participants and administer the survey. Before gathering surveys, research assistants were trained on how to approach potential participants as well as read literature concerning experimental design, quasi-experimental fieldwork, and survey research. At the end of the course, research assistants were evaluated based on their ability to meet the quota of surveys for the semester, their attendance at weekly meetings, and the quality of their term paper, which required them to consider the theoretical literature on intergroup politics, experimental and survey methods as

well as their experiences in the field.

The target population for the survey included adult black and Latino residents of New York City, which includes the boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and the Bronx. Consequently, before administering the survey, research assistants were responsible for screening the participants by asking them their age, racial and ethnic identification, and place of residence. As an additional check of their eligibility, questions were asked within the survey to ensure the answers they provided were consistent. Research assistants were also provided with quotas for age and gender. Each week, they were handed 5 surveys and encouraged to bring back 2 surveys from people that were below the age of 30, thus, leaving the remaining three for older residents. Furthermore, they were directed to split the surveys equally between women and men. Research assistants were encouraged to recruit participants from a variety of places, including public places such as local coffee shops, hair salons, and barbershops as well as their families, friends, and neighbors. Given the data collection does not employ random sampling, no instruction was given to students about collecting information about response rates. Once it was clear participants fit the target criteria, they were asked to sign a research consent form and, afterward, were handed the survey. The survey was complete after participants answered all the questions on the survey and were debriefed.

Ultimately, the sample for the majority-minority experiment comprised 280 participants, 133 African American and 147 Hispanic. For the second experiment, there were 251 participants in the sample, 109 blacks and 142 Latinos.

Candidate Images

Both the first and second experiment utilize images for each of the political candidates (i.e., Anglo, black, and Latino). Before including the photos in the manipulation, a pretest was conducted using a survey that asked respondents to look at a series of photos and judge the attractiveness and racial identity of the candidates.

Each of the photos were acquired online and show the candidates engaged in public speaking. Photos of men were exclusively employed to control for the gender of the candidates. In each image, the candidates are wearing business attire. Also, they hold neutral facial expressions. Surveys were proctored for 140 undergraduates enrolled in political science courses at Stony Brook University in Stony Brook, New York. In exchange for their participation, extra credit points were applied to their term grade. The survey consisted of 20 photos of state and local elected officials across the country. There were 7 photos of black candidates, 7 of Latino candidates, and 6 of white candidates. Care was taken to only include politicians outside of the northeastern region of the United States in an effort to limit the possibility that respondents would recognize the candidates captured within the photo. Different versions of the survey were generated in which the photos were randomly-ordered; this random ordering was utilized to prevent participants' evaluation of one picture from carrying over to their judgment of the following image. Furthermore, the photos showed a profile of the candidates from either the front, left, or right side. After being presented with the photos, respondents answered three questions asking them to evaluate the candidates' attractiveness, judge their racial identity, and report the likelihood that they would vote for the candidate.

One of the primary objectives of the experiment is to evaluate the candidate; as such, it was critical to separate their assessment according to the primary factors of interest, namely the candidates' racial/ethnic background and their message, from the perceived attractiveness of the candidate. Previous work has shown that attractive individuals tend to be associated with more favorable personality traits and more successful life outcomes than unattractive people (Eagly et al., 1991).² In order to choose images of candidates that respondents perceived to be equally attractive,

²Although, it is important to note that these associations are not without their limitations. While there is a greater tendency to associate attractive people with social competency, the relationship between physical attractiveness and the perception of one's intellectual competence, strength, and psychological stability is moderate. Furthermore, there is a negligible relationship between attractiveness and a person's perceived integrity and concern for others.



(a) Black Candidate



(b) Latino Candidate



(c) White Candidate

Figure 6.1: Selected Images of Hypothetical Candidates

the pretest asks them to rate the extent to which they believed the candidate captured in the photo was physically attractive. To be specific, the question asks, "How would you rate the attractiveness of the individual above; extremely unattractive, somewhat unattractive, neutral, somewhat attractive, extremely attractive". In accordance with the question wording, respondents were offered five response options ranging from extremely unattractive to extremely attractive.

Another important concern was that respondents could accurately place candidates within defined racial and ethnic categories. The general consensus within the academic community is that race is a social construction, or a category created by dominant groups in society that is used to distribute disparate material resources and

social rewards (Ferrante and Browne Jr., 2000). The criterion for judging whether a person is African American has been historically rooted in the "one drop rule", which categorizes a person as black that has any trace of African descent. Consequently, an individual that shares similar physical attributes with white Americans can still be classified as African American. This criterion stands in contrast to many Latin American countries whose criteria for making racial classifications is based more on phenotype such as the shade of the skin tone or whether one has "African" facial features (Telles, 2006). Therefore, an additional pretest was focused on determining which candidates the respondents were more inclined to place within specific racial categories. The question on the survey asks respondents, "What would you judge to be the person's racial or ethnic identity." Participants were provided with six response options: White/Caucasian, Black/African American, Latino/Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and Other.

Three images were selected from the 20 photos to represent the African American, Latino, and Anglo candidates. Figure 6.1 shows the images that were selected from the 20 photos. There were a number of selection criteria for choosing the photo. First, tests were conducted only for images of candidates that shared the same physical profile. Therefore, candidates with a left profile in the pictures were tested against one another; the same applied for candidates with a front and right profile. For each physical profile, there were images of candidates from each of the target racial groups. Subsequently, t-tests were conducted to compare participants' assessment of the candidates' relative physical attractiveness. T-tests were conducted between candidates from different racial groups. Based on the results from three t-tests, the perceived attractiveness of three candidates with a left profile was approximately equal.³ The candidates depicted in the select images each had a left profile. While the black (Figure 6.1a) and white candidate (Figure 6.1c) had

³Paired t-tests reveal no significant difference of the means (white candidate=black candidate, t-statistic=1.09; white candidate=Latino candidate, t-statistic=1.06; black candidate=Latino candidate, t-statistic=0.9).

only a slight left profile, the Latino candidate's (Figure 6.1b) image has a more pronounced left profile. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect the slight difference significantly impacted how the candidates were evaluated.

Afterwards, I explored whether participants were able to accurately place the racial identity of the three candidates. Most people could accurately categorize the white and black candidates; approximately 98 percent of the respondents categorized the white candidate as white or Caucasian and the black candidate as black or African American. Yet, respondents found it more difficult to place Latino candidates. When not judged as Latino, the hypothetical Latino candidate was most frequently categorized as Caucasian. This pattern emerges for all of the photos of Latino candidates. Given the history of racial mixture in many areas of Central and South America as well as the Caribbean, this finding is understandable. Latinos tend to vary considerably with respect to their physical features. The image of the Latino candidate (Figure 6.1b) was judged to be Latino by approximately 38 percent of the sample and white by roughly 58 percent of the sample. Although there was a greater tendency to view the candidate as white, the ability of respondents to accurately place the selected image was greater than most of the other photos of Latino candidates. Nevertheless, the Hispanic candidate was labeled as Latino within the experimental manipulation to help participants associate him with a Hispanic identity. The Anglo and black candidates were also appropriately labeled within the experimental treatment.⁴

The three images of the candidates were employed in both the first and second experiment. For the first experiment, the picture of the Anglo candidate was utilized in every condition. Furthermore, the photo of the African American candidate

⁴Although the Latino candidate selected for the study was racially-ambiguous, I believe there is little reason to suspect it would lead to severe bias in the results. For one, considering most of the respondents identified him as white, there is little reason to believe black respondents would identify with a white candidate more than a Latino candidate. Secondly, the candidate's racial ambiguity serves as a conservative test of the ingroup bias hypothesis if Latino respondents had a difficult time determining whether he was Hispanic. Yet, the results offer strong evidence in favor of the ingroup bias hypothesis among Latinos.

was included in the condition depicting a matchup between the Anglo and African American candidates. Likewise, the Latino candidate's image was utilized for the white vs. Latino candidate condition. On the other hand, the second experiment exclusively used the images of the black and Latino candidates.

Candidate Messages

In addition to the images, each candidate was associated with a neutral, ingroup-specific, and cross-group message. For the first experiment, the characteristics of the minority candidate were varied with respect to their race/ethnicity (i.e., African American or Latino) and the content of their message (i.e., neutral, ingroup-specific, or cross-group message). As an example, the Latino candidate stressed ingroup interests by emphasizing that “with the problems facing the Hispanic community it is important that we elect people that are truly committed to working in our interest” and, further, that Latinos “can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. That responsibility is [Latinos'] and [Latinos'] alone.” In addition, the article describes the candidate as pledging to “work in support of greater access for Hispanic businesses to government contracts as well as introducing reforms to immigration policy that are sensitive to the important role of immigrants in the U.S. economy.” For the black candidate, the description is similar except that blacks are the reference group and the candidate promises to work toward “increasing crime prevention programs to reduce black-on-black crime.” The description for the Latino candidate who stresses minority interests is similar except that it emphasizes the need to pursue such aims for both the “black and Latino community.” Moreover, the candidate works toward policy goals that appeal to both groups such as “greater access for minority businesses to government contracts” and “legislation that increases blacks' and Latinos' access to quality healthcare and educational opportunities.” The description for the black candidate mirrors the Latino candidate. Lastly, for the neutral message the candidates emphasize government responsive-

ness, quality healthcare, and preparing workers for a post-industrial economy. The white candidate is the foil and, consequently, is described the same way in every manipulation. He is depicted as believing “it is time for lawmakers to regain the public’s trust” and advocating for “the creation of job training programs that would prepare workers to meet the changing needs of today’s economy.”⁵

For the second experiment, the campaign messages are virtually identical to the first experiment with only a few exceptions. The neutral message for the black candidate emphasizes the need for fiscal responsibility. The candidate stresses that “government must do what the people want it to do, in the most efficient, economical way.” Furthermore, he pledges to “work to ensure that all Americans have greater access to affordable and quality healthcare as well as technological innovation to create high-wage jobs in the 21st century.” The neutral message for the Latino candidate is identical to the white candidate in the first experiment, emphasizing the need for the “highest ethical standards” and working to “create job training programs that would prepare workers to meet the changing needs of today’s economy” as well as “reduce the tax burden on middle-class families.” Similarly, there were only limited changes made to the ingroup messages between the first and second experiment. The message for the African American candidate is identical to the first experiment. The only change for the Latino candidate is that instead of emphasizing the sole responsibility of Latinos in changing their condition, he argues that Latinos “are on the ground floor of political empowerment, which means it is essential that [Latinos] have people who will push Washington to pay attention to our needs.” Furthermore, he supports “improving Latinos’ access to social services” as well as “introducing reforms to immigration policy.” Lastly, there were slight changes made to the cross-group messages for both the African American and Latino candidates. The cross-group message for the black candidate in the manipulation is similar to the first experiment, citing that “with the problems facing the black and Hispanic

⁵The full text of the faux newspaper articles for both experiments are offered in Appendix A.

community it is important that we elect people that are truly committed to working in the interest of minorities.” Furthermore, he campaigned on “increasing the hourly wage for low-skilled workers, which will disproportionately impact blacks and Latinos, and introduce legislation that improves the enforcement of policies aimed at penalizing employers for discrimination toward racial and ethnic minorities.” Similarly, the Latino candidate points out “blacks and Latinos are being exploited and hurt by the same economic forces” and that “it’s really not to our advantage for one oppressed group to fight the other, while those who control the economy get richer.” He also supports the same policies described in the black cross-group message.

Manipulation Checks

Manipulation checks were conducted to determine whether the campaign messages were capturing the appropriate group interests. In both experiments, a series of questions were offered asking participants whether they believed the candidate would work towards issues of concern for particular groups; these groups included women, the elderly, whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians. For example, after participants assessed their affect towards and likelihood of voting for the black candidate, one of the questions asks, “How likely do you think it is that [the black candidate] will work toward issues of concern to blacks.” Identical questions were asked for each of the other groups.

In the first experiment, cross-tabulations reveal that participants were able to associate the ingroup message with the intention of the candidate to work toward the interests of his own group. For the black candidate, approximately 97 percent (96.8%) of respondents believed he was either somewhat likely or very likely to support the issues of African Americans. Similarly, roughly 85 percent (84.9%) of participants reported they thought the Latino candidate that spoke to his own group’s interests would promote the issues of Hispanics. The marginals offer strong evidence that the ingroup message accurately captures sectarian, group concerns. On

the other hand, the data shows participants exposed to the ingroup message believed the outgroup candidate would support their interests as well. A slightly smaller, but large proportion of participants believed the African American candidate that spoke to black issues would promote issues of concern to Latinos (90.3%). Roughly 70 percent (69.8%) thought the Latino candidate that emphasized Latino issues would support issues important to blacks. While black and Latino participants associated the ingroup message with the candidate's effort to support his own group interests, they did not detach the message from the candidate's willingness to work toward their concerns.

The minority message seems to have persuaded respondents that the candidates intended to work toward the interests of both blacks and Latinos. When the black candidate spoke to the broad, superordinate interests of blacks and Latinos, 93 percent of participants believed he would work toward the interests of Latinos and 88 percent thought he would support black-issues.⁶ Alternatively, 89 percent (89.1%) of participants exposed to the Latino candidate who employed the cross-group message that he was somewhat or very likely to endorse black-oriented issues; eighty-seven percent believed he would support the issues of Latinos.⁷ Overall, the cross-group message seems to illicit the appropriate responses from participants.

The manipulation checks had a similar effect in the second experiment. Participants almost uniformly associated the black ingroup message as a signal that the African American candidate was going to support issues of concern to blacks (95.6%). Yet, unlike the first experiment, fewer respondents viewed the black ingroup message as a cue that the African American candidate would endorse Latinos' interests (59.7%). While the percentage is smaller than the first experiment, the marginal

⁶Despite the smaller proportion who thought the black candidate would support black issues, approximately 47 percent of the sample believed it was very likely that he would do so in comparison to only 37 percent who thought he was very likely to promote issues of concern to Latinos.

⁷Yet, 61 percent of the participants thought it was very likely that the Hispanic candidate would speak to Latinos' interests, while only 26 percent believed he was very likely to support blacks' concerns.

still reveals that a significant proportion of respondents continue to view the more narrow, group-specific appeal of the black candidate as a sign that he would support Latino issues. Similarly, approximately 93 percent (93.4%) of respondents thought the ingroup message from the Latino candidate indicated they would advocate for Latino interests. Nevertheless, again, a smaller, but still significant segment of the sample believed the Latino-oriented message of the Hispanic candidate suggested he might support black issues as well (65.3%).

After exposure to the minority message from the black candidate, roughly 73 percent (73.4%) of participants thought he would support issues of importance to Latinos and approximately 91 percent (91.1%) believed he would support black issues.⁸ A large proportion of the sample believed the Latino candidate that emphasized broad, superordinate interests would address issues of concern to blacks (90.5%). As expected, almost 95 percent (94.7%) of participants thought the Latino candidate who spoke to minority interest would support Latino-oriented issues.⁹ Ultimately, the manipulation checks offer strong evidence that the messages triggering the appropriate responses.¹⁰

6.2 Key Survey Items

Outside of the experimental manipulation, participants are directed to answer a range of survey questions concerning how they evaluated and their likelihood of voting for the candidates. In addition, other items are included to ascertain their perceived group competition with the outgroup. Furthermore, there are questions meant to capture participants' internal political efficacy, racial resentment, and pol-

⁸Participants were more certain that the black candidate would support black rather than Latino concerns. Approximately 67 percent of participants thought it was very likely that the African American candidate would support black issues, while only 30 percent believed he was just as likely to promote Latino-oriented issues.

⁹Almost 70 percent thought it was very likely to be the case.

¹⁰The cross-tabulations are reported in Appendix B

icy attitudes. Lastly, there are measures of respondents' sociodemographic characteristics such as their age, income, educational attainment, political ideology, and party identification. The following sections provide a more detailed explanation of the key survey items employed in the analysis.

Candidate Evaluation

After being exposed to the experimental manipulation, participants are asked a question about their feelings toward each candidate. A question utilized to determine respondents' affect toward the candidates asks, "Generally, how positively or negatively do you feel about [the political candidate], the [racial group] candidate." Respondents are given five response options, very negative, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive, and very positive. In addition, given the nature of the experimental manipulation, the survey also focuses on how likely respondents would be to vote for each candidate. Accordingly, the question asks, "how likely is it that you would be willing to vote for [the political candidate]." Participants were provided with four response options to answer the question: very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, very likely.

In an effort to offer a dependent variable that is more reflective of how people make candidate evaluations as well as to simplify the analysis, both measures were combined into a composite scale. The index reflects that candidate evaluations do not merely involve the act of voting for or against a particular candidate, but also voters' underlying feelings toward the candidate. Therefore, a voter that feels very positively toward a particular candidate will likely vote for that candidate and vice versa for voters that feel very negatively about a candidate. Likewise, voters that feel neutral about a candidate are likely to be ambivalent about their vote choices. Together, voters' affect and decision to vote for or against the candidate comprises their overall candidate evaluation. For the first experiment, the

evidence across groups confirms that the two measures are related and the scale is moderately reliable ($r=.54$, $\alpha=.70$). Scales were also generated for evaluations of the Latino and black candidates separately (α for Latino candidate $=.73$ and α for black candidate $=.67$). Unlike the first experiment, where participants evaluated either the black or Latino candidate, respondents in the second experiment were able to assess both candidates. Consequently, there will be two combined measures, one for the black candidate and the other for the Latino candidate. The measures of participants' affect and likelihood of voting for the black candidate were strongly related ($r=.64$); furthermore, the index was shown to be reliable ($\alpha=.76$). Similarly, the correlation between both items for the Latino candidate were high ($r=.60$) and the scale was dependable ($\alpha=.70$).

Perceived Zero-Sum Group Competition

There were also items employed to gauge respondents' perceived zero-sum competition with the outgroup. For the experiment, I import the measures of their perceived group competition over jobs and political influence from the MCSUI; nevertheless, I also include an item to determine how threatening each group perceives the other to be to their access to quality housing. The question relating to housing opportunities is based on an item originally introduced in the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS). In the experiment, the question wording is as follows: "As more good housing and neighborhoods go to Hispanics/Latinos the fewer good housing and neighborhoods there will be for blacks." The response options offered are strongly disagree, generally disagree, neutral, generally agree, strongly agree. In the analysis, the items are combined into a composite scale. Since the questions explicitly reference each group, there were separate scales created for African American (first experiment, $\alpha=.84$; second experiment, $\alpha=.87$) and Latino respondents (first experiment, $\alpha=.89$; second experiment, $\alpha=.90$). Both of the scales are employed to determine whether the effects found in the survey data translate to

blacks' and Latinos' candidate evaluations.

6.3 Characteristics of Participants in Majority-Minority Experiment

The demographic characteristics of the sample for the experiment involving a majority and minority candidate are reported in Table 6.1. The composition of the sample is consistent with prior evidence concerning the demographic characteristics of blacks and Latinos in New York. From glancing at the frequencies, the first thing to note is that the characteristics of blacks and Latinos in New York are more similar to their populations in Boston than in Los Angeles. This finding is to be expected given that the immigration patterns affecting Boston are very similar to the patterns impacting New York City.

Table 6.1 also reveals that the gender breakdown of each population is lopsided. There was a relatively larger proportion of females than males within each population. Among African Americans, women account for about 57 percent (56.9%), while men are about 43 percent of the sample (43.1%). The gender disparity was even greater among Latinos, where females comprised 62 percent and men were 38 percent of the sample. Nevertheless, these estimates should not have a major impact on the results for two primary reasons. The gender composition of both populations is consistent with the disparity present in the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality before the application of post-stratification weights. There was little evidence in the earlier chapters or in earlier studies that gender should have a significant impact on how blacks and Latinos interact with one another; moreover, the significant results that emerged imply contradictory conclusions.

The greatest disparity present within the sample is clearly the age of the population. Despite the quotas provided to students, the sampling led to an overwhelmingly large young sample. Over half of the African American and Latino participants are

Table 6.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sample for Study 1

Items	Blacks	Latinos	Total
Sex			
Female	56.9	62.0	59.3
Male	43.1	38.0	40.7
Age			
Below 25 years old	57.9	63.9	61.1
25-49 years old	27.8	22.5	24.8
50-69 years old	6.8	6.1	6.7
70 years old and above	7.5	7.5	7.4
U.S. Born			
Yes	71.8	74.7	73.2
No	28.2	25.3	26.8
National Origin			
Mexico	—	5.8	—
Puerto Rico	—	28.5	—
Dominican Republic	—	38.0	—
Cuba	—	4.3	—
Other	—	23.4	—
Highest Degree Earned			
None	3.1	3.6	3.4
High School or GED	39.4	48.2	43.7
Associate's	19.7	17.3	18.7
Bachelor's	29.1	25.9	27.6
Above Bachelor's	8.7	5.0	6.7
Income			
Below \$30K	24.6	31.8	29.3
\$30K-\$59,999	36.8	36.4	36.1
\$60K-\$79,999	19.3	14.4	16.5
Above \$80K	19.3	17.4	18.1
Work Status			
Employed	41.2	51.4	52.9
Unemployed	3.8	6.3	5.0
Out of Workforce	55.0	42.4	42.1
N	133	147	280

Note: The estimates reflect the percentage of respondents that fit within each category.

below the age of 25 years old (57.9% and 63.9%, respectively). The next largest age group among black and Latino participants is between the ages of 25 and 50 years old (27.8% and 22.5%). Therefore, the predominant proportion of the sample comprises respondents below the age of 50 years old. In comparison, only about 14 percent of blacks and Latinos were above the age of 50 years old (14.3% and 13.6%). In some respects, the age disparity may reveal a greater tolerance for outgroup candidates than if the population was more representative. However, as with gender, there is little evidence from the previous analysis and earlier studies to suggest that age would have a tremendous impact on the findings. Further analyses bear this out.

The proportion of U.S. born participants was consistent with what one should expect from the racial and ethnic composition of major urban centers in the northeastern region of the United States. Similar to Boston, the black population in New York City comprises a significant population of foreign-born participants (28.2%), although the vast majority are native-born (71.8%). This finding is to be expected given that the urban centers in the northeastern region of the United States have experienced an influx of immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa (Rogers, 2006; Takougang, 2003). The relative size of the foreign-born population among Latinos is on par with the black foreign-born participants (25.3%). The finding appears somewhat unusual unless one considers there has been a strong Latino population, particularly from Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, for over half a century.

The national identity of Latino participants revealed in the table confirm the expected composition of the Latino population. The largest plurality of Latinos descend from the Dominican Republic (38.0%), followed by Puerto Rico (28.5%). The remaining Latino participants hail from a variety of nationalities, such as Mexico (5.8%), Cuba (4.3%), and a range of other nations from central and South America (23.4%). Again, the composition of the Latino population mimics the presence of Hispanics in Boston, largely because the immigration patterns that influenced

Boston are the same trends that also impacted New York City.

The remaining items in Table 6.1 gauge the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample. In many respects, respondents' reported educational attainment, family income, and work status are consistent with the characteristics of both blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles and Boston. As in both Los Angeles and Boston, blacks in New York City have higher levels of educational attainment than their Latino counterparts. A greater proportion of Latinos reported either having earned no educational degree or only a high school degree than African Americans (51.8% for Latinos and 42.5% for blacks). Moreover, a larger proportion of blacks report having earned advanced degrees than Latinos either for an associate's degree or certification for a trade (19.7% and 17.3%, respectively), a bachelor's degree (29.1% and 25.9%, respectively), or degrees higher than a bachelors such as a master's or doctoral degree (8.7% and 5%, respectively). Nevertheless, although the sampling method did not include Anglos in the sample, it is probably reasonable to suspect the level of educational attainment among both blacks and Latinos in the sample is probably not on par with their Anglo counterparts.¹¹

A similar, but somewhat less pronounced, disparity is revealed with the reported family income of both groups. A slightly larger proportion of African Americans report earning higher incomes than Latinos. Approximately 5 percent more blacks report earning between \$60,000 and \$80,000 than Latinos (19.3% and 14.4%, respectively). Moreover, there is a slightly larger proportion of blacks than Latinos earning greater than \$80,000 (19.3% and 17.4%, respectively). The disparity in income can likely be attributed to the differences in educational attainment.

Nevertheless, these differences do not necessarily translate on to their work status. A larger percentage of Latinos report either having full or part-time employment than African Americans (51.4% and 41.2%, respectively). However, the differences

¹¹Since university students were responsible for the administration of the surveys, the sample likely overrepresents the level of educational attainment in both the black and Latino communities

in the proportion of employed respondents does not necessarily lead to significant differences in their unemployment rate. In fact, despite having a lower percentage of employed participants, the proportion of unemployed blacks is actually lower than the Latinos in the sample (3.8 and 6.3, respectively). The differences in the employment rate are more than made up by the proportion of respondents that report being out of the workforce. A substantially larger proportion of blacks report being out of the workforce than Latinos (55% and 42.4%, respectively).

Overall, most of the characteristics revealed in Table 6.1 are consistent with those of blacks and Latinos in the Multy-City Study of Urban Inequality. The only item that is not consistent with the makeup of the previous samples is the age distribution. However, as mentioned before, there is reason to suspect the impact of age on respondents' attitudes toward the outgroup candidate will be limited.

6.4 Characteristics of Participants in Minority-Minority Experiment

Table 6.2 reports the demographic traits of both groups. The demographic characteristics of the black and Latino respondents in the second experiment are similar to the sample for the first experiment. For example, the ratio of women to men was disproportionate, with women comprising more than two-thirds of the respondents (64.4%). The lopsided nature of the gender composition across groups was also reflected in the breakdown within groups. Among African Americans, women comprised roughly 67 percent (67.3%) and men approximately 33 percent (32.7%) of the sample. Likewise, about 62 percent (62.4%) of Latinos are female and about 38 percent are male (37.6%).¹²

As with the previous sample, the greatest concern focuses around the age dis-

¹²According to the 2000 Census, the male and female population was approximately equal. Out of a total population of roughly 8 million people, there were roughly 3,800,000 men and 4,200,000 women.

Table 6.2: Demographic Characteristics of Sample for Study 2

Items	Blacks	Latinos	Total
Sex			
Female	67.3	62.4	64.4
Male	32.7	37.6	35.6
Age			
Below 25 years old	50.5	47.2	48.0
25-49 years old	21.1	38.0	30.9
50-69 years old	6.4	7.8	7.0
70 years old and above	22.0	7.0	14.1
U.S. Born			
Yes	77.6	64.3	70.0
No	22.4	35.7	30.0
National Origin			
Mexico	—	9.0	
Puerto Rico	—	22.6	
Dominican Republic	—	23.3	
Cuba	—	10.5	
Other	—	34.6	
Highest Degree Earned			
None	1.0	2.9	2.0
High School or GED	52.4	34.5	41.7
Associate's	18.5	18.0	19.0
Bachelor's	19.4	23.7	21.9
Above Bachelor's	8.7	20.9	15.4
Income			
Below \$30K	31.6	40.5	35.7
\$30K-\$59,999	38.8	24.0	32.2
\$60K-\$79,999	11.2	10.7	10.7
Above \$80K	18.4	24.8	21.4
Work Status			
Employed	53.9	54.3	54.2
Unemployed	6.7	5.0	5.6
Out of Workforce	39.4	40.7	40.2
N	109	142	251

Note: The estimates reflect the percentage of respondents that fit within each category.

tribution of the respondents. Among African Americans, approximately half of the sample consists of respondents who are below the age of 25 (50.5%) in comparison to roughly 58 percent in the previous study (57.9%). Similarly, slightly less than half of the Latino sample includes respondents who are younger than 24 years old (47.2%), while roughly 64 percent of the Hispanic respondents were within that category in the first sample (63.9%). These differences certainly suggest that the sample is less skewed and, as a consequence, a closer approximation to the age distribution of both groups in New York City. However, the 2000 U.S. Census suggests the sample would be more representative if the greatest proportion of respondents were between the ages of 25 and 50.¹³

The proportion of U.S. born participants is also consistent with what was revealed in the previous sample. Overall, the estimates reveal that the majority of the black and Latino samples were born in the United States. For blacks, approximately 78 percent of the sample was U.S. born. Again, the proportion of foreign-born blacks in New York is greater than in other areas of the country given significant immigration to New York from the West Indies and Africa. Similarly, a somewhat lower, but still high percentage of Latinos reported being U.S. born, approximately 64 percent (64.3%). As a consequence, both black and Latino participants may be more aware of their similar social positions in the United States and, thus, may be more amenable to cross-group political alliances. As mentioned above, U.S. born Latinos tend to view more commonalities with African Americans than their foreign-born counterparts (Kaufmann, 2003).

Looking exclusively at Latinos, the participants' national origins are more consistent with the New York population than in the first experiment. In the previous sample there was a significantly larger proportion of participants from the Dominican Republic than Puerto Rico, 38% and 28.5% respectively. The proportion of

¹³According to the U.S. Census, black and Latino New Yorkers between the ages of 18 and 25 years old comprised only 10 and 12 percent of the population respectively, while those between the ages of 25 and 50 composed approximately 37 and 39 percent of the population respectively.

Dominicans and Puerto Ricans is virtually even in the present sample (23.3% and 22.6% respectively). Although more representative of the New York Latino population, it still is not entirely representative of the Hispanic population, which has a majority of residents of Puerto Rican descent. Cubans comprise the next largest nationality (10.5%), followed closely by Mexicans (9.0%). The remainder of the Latino sample descends from other nations in Central and South America (34.6%). Ultimately, the distribution of national origins among Latinos would suggest there may be greater cooperation given Dominicans tend to share more phenotypic traits with African Americans. Their similarities may make them predisposed to accept black Americans as political allies. Nevertheless, previous work shows that Puerto Ricans perceive greater commality with blacks than Dominicans (Kaufmann, 2003). As a consequence, the Latino sample may actually be less cooperative than the broader Latino population in New York City.

Now, consider the socioeconomic differences between African American and Latino participants. With respect to the educational attainment between both groups, the evidence is largely consistent with the previous sample. For one, a slightly higher percentage of Latinos have attained less than a high school degree than blacks (2.9% and 1%, respectively). Furthermore, a significantly larger proportion of the black participants report having attained at least a high school diploma than their Latino counterparts (52.4% and 34.5%, respectively). As such, the data appears to corroborate prior evidence that blacks tend to have higher levels of educational attainment than Latinos. Nevertheless, the estimates for higher levels of education go in a different direction than the first sample; a greater proportion of Latino participants reported having acquired higher levels of education than blacks. For instance, while the proportion of blacks and Latinos that acquired an associate's degree was virtually identical (18.5% and 18.0%, respectively), a somewhat larger proportion of Latinos than blacks report having attained a bachelors degree (23.7% and 19.4%, respectively). This disparity is certainly a turn from the previous sample, which

had more highly-educated African Americans than Latinos. Lastly, a significantly larger proportion of Latinos report having received more than a bachelor's degree than African Americans (20.9% and 8.7%, respectively). This proportion far outpaces the educational attainment of Latinos in New York City. At worst, given the propensity for education to encourage greater tolerance, the disparity may lead to results that suggest Latinos are more amenable to cross-group alliances than they may otherwise be; nevertheless, the differences in educational attainment within the Latino sample are not so overwhelmingly disproportionate to suggest such an effect would be significant.

The differences in educational attainment appear to map onto the group differences in income. There is a greater proportion of Latinos than African Americans with incomes below \$30,000 a year (40.5% and 31.6%, respectively). Yet, more blacks report making between \$30,000 and \$60,000 than Hispanics (38.8% and 24%, respectively), suggesting blacks may be better able to secure higher levels of pay than their Latino counterparts. However, Latino participants enjoyed higher incomes than African Americans. Approximately 25 percent (24.8%) of Latinos reported having incomes above \$80,000, while only 18 percent of blacks reported the same (18.4%). The findings suggest that the higher reported educational levels among Latinos maps onto their higher levels of income. Ultimately, this finding implies African Americans may be more inclined to feel Latinos and Latino candidates threaten their access to material resources than Latinos may feel toward blacks.

Yet, both groups have similar levels of employment. Approximately the same proportion of black and Latino participants report being employed (53.9% and 54.3%, respectively). Furthermore, there are similar proportions of unemployed and employed members as well, with approximately 7 percent (6.7%) of blacks and 5% of Latinos reporting being unemployed. Lastly, virtually the same proportion of blacks and Latinos report being out of the workforce (39.4% and 40.7%). Given their similar work status, the findings appear to indicate that employment status may be less

of an explanation for group conflict and, consequently may facilitate greater group cooperation.

Overall, the sample includes Latinos that have higher incomes and levels of educational attainment than is reflected in the population at-large. As a consequence, there is good reason to believe they may not be as likely to view their relationship with African Americans in conflictual terms. On the other hand, black participants may be more sensitive to the economic disparities that exist between themselves and Latinos.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter describes the data utilized to determine the influence of group messages in shaping candidate evaluations among blacks and Latinos. The primary component of the study consists of the experimental manipulation which exposes participants to a faux newspaper article about an election between two hypothetical candidates seeking to win the Democratic primary in Houston, Texas. Both experiments vary with respect to the nature of the candidate matchups. In the first experiment, an Anglo candidate campaigns against a minority candidate. The racial identification of the minority candidate varies to be either African American or Latino. In the second study, the faux newspaper article describes a campaign between black and Latino candidates. In both experiments, the messages of the minority candidates are varied so that they express either a neutral, ingroup-specific, or cross-group message. The message of the Anglo candidate in the first experiment is a neutral message and is used in each of the conditions in the first experiment. Furthermore, participants answered a number of survey questions to determine whether the influence of particular items was consistent from the social survey to the experimental survey. Ultimately, it is believed the experimental survey provided the best means of determining whether elite messages are important for facilitating cooperative relationships between African Americans and Latinos.

Chapter 7

Elite Messages and Black-Latino Electoral Alliances

The previous chapters concentrate on factors that drive conflict between African Americans and Latinos. In this respect, the approach is consistent with existing studies of realistic group conflict theory (RGCT), which focus on how economic self-interests and threatening social environments drive group conflict. Nevertheless, an often overlooked component of RGCT is its influence on intergroup cooperation. RGCT proposes that group conflict can be allayed when groups pursue superordinate goals that they could otherwise not achieve independently. This chapter explores whether elite appeals to superordinate goals motivate greater cooperation between blacks and Latinos, particularly by encouraging greater support for each other's candidates.

In the realm of politics, elites tend to be the most adept at communicating shared goals and priorities to citizens. The capacity of black and Latino political elites to persuade the masses is particularly critical given the shared concerns of both groups tend to involve issues that neither group could adequately address on their own such as educational disparities, joblessness, and political enfranchisement. Frequently, both groups live in cities in which neither of them comprise a majority of the population (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Dallas); consequently, their influence is compounded when they can find ways of working together. Without persuasive elite messages, blacks' and Latinos' underlying economic and socio-political

interests may undermine the potential for collective action. In fact, the few examples of successful electoral alliances between blacks and Latinos have taken place when there was a strong political leader who could effectively articulate the shared interests and commonalities between both groups (e.g., Harold Washington in Chicago and David Dinkins in New York).

Nevertheless, it is clear political candidates appeal to citizens in a variety of ways depending on the dynamics of a political race. In some instances, it is most advantageous for them to appeal directly to their ingroup, particularly when their success relies upon a strong showing from their ingroup. Candidates may deem these messages more politically-advantageous in a city where the ingroup comprises a majority or near majority of the population. However, in more cases, the context does not lend itself to group-specific messages. Therefore, candidates must appeal across racial, ethnic, and class lines. Often, this can be achieved by speaking to shared group interests. While the interests of blacks and Latinos may not be entirely consistent, their shared material concerns serve as a potential basis for making cross-group appeals. As mentioned earlier, both groups tend to earn lower incomes, achieve lower levels of educational attainment, and experience greater joblessness than their Anglo American counterparts.

An experimental approach is utilized in the analysis below as a way of assessing the conditions under which African Americans and Latinos might be more likely to support outgroup candidates. Two experiments were conducted. In the first experiment, respondents are exposed to a hypothetical candidate matchup between a majority and minority politician and the second experiment involves a contest between a black and Latino candidate. For each experiment, the black and Latino candidates express campaign messages that appeal to either their superordinate, group-specific, or group-neutral interests. By presenting respondents with political candidates expressing different group messages, we can judge whether particular messages have a greater influence in potentially facilitating black-Latino alliances

than others. Overall, the experimental approach was ideal for two reasons. First, the experiment provided leverage for determining causality. In the first experiment, the only factors that varied within the experimental manipulation were the minority candidate's race and his message. The remaining components of the manipulation were identical; thus, any differences in variance can only be attributed to the experimental manipulations. In the second experiment, the candidates' messages were the only thing that varied across conditions, making any variance in the dependent variable a function of the variance in the messages. Secondly, the experiment can determine the independent effect of each factor in the experimental design. Therefore, we would be able to judge the relative importance of the candidate's race or messages on respondents' overall evaluations and vote choices.

Both studies were conducted to explore three central hypotheses. First, black and Latino respondents are expected to be more supportive of each others' candidates when they express cross-group messages that appeal to their shared, superordinate interests (Cross-group message hypothesis). Support for the cross-group hypothesis would suggest that there is the potential for elites to forge black-Latino electoral alliances. In contrast, the second hypothesis proposes that group members will oppose outgroup minority candidates that speak to their own narrow, group-specific concerns (Ingroup Message Hypothesis). Nevertheless, group members' attitudinal predispositions are expected to vary the impact of each message. Generally, blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition is expected to reduce their support of each others' candidates (Perceived Group Conflict Hypothesis). This hypothesis is consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 demonstrating the effect of perceived group competition on blacks' and Latinos' ingroup policy favoritism for race-based public policies. However, when presented with a cross-group message, highly-threatened group members should express stronger support for the outgroup minority candidate (Moderate Cross-group message hypothesis); the cross-group message is expected to mollify their concern that the outgroup candidate will neglect their group

interests. Nevertheless, when exposed to an ingroup message from an outgroup candidate, highly-threatened participants are expected to voice stronger opposition than their less-threatened counterparts (Moderated Ingroup Message Hypothesis). The outgroup minority candidates' use of an ingroup message signals that they will be chiefly concerned with their narrow, group-specific concerns, rather than shared superordinate interests. Yet, group members may support the ingroup candidate without regard to the messages express by either candidate in the race (Ingroup Bias Hypothesis). Each of these messages is explored in detail below, first, by examining the influence when minority candidates face majority candidates and, secondly, when black and Latino candidates compete against one another.

7.1 Majority-Minority Elections

Increasingly, elections offer voters a choice between a majority, Anglo candidate and a minority candidate. In these elections, previous studies show that white Americans have tended to support the white candidate and hold negative, racial attitudes about the minority candidate (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Terkildsen, 1993). However, little evidence has explored how racial and ethnic minorities in the United States evaluate minority candidates. Since the assessment of any particular candidate is dependent upon the characteristics of the challenger, group members' evaluation of the minority candidate should depend upon the qualities of his opponent.

As mentioned in chapter 6, the minority candidate expresses either a neutral, group-specific, or cross-group message. The Anglo candidate appeals to group-neutral concerns in every condition; thus, he is a foil used to determine the impact of the race and campaign messages of the minority candidate. Also, the dependent variable consists of a composite scale used to measure respondents' overall evaluation of the Latino candidate. The index, as mentioned in chapter 6, comprises items for respondents' affect toward the minority candidate as well as their likelihood of voting

Table 7.1: Mean of Blacks' Candidate Evaluations Across Conditions

Candidate's Race	Candidate Messages			
	Neutral	Ingroup	Cross-Group	Total
Latino	.65	.63	.65	.64
Black	.69	.75	.71	.72
Total	.68	.68	.68	.68

Note: The cell means reflect participants' average score on their reported evaluations of the political candidates. The dependent variable was recoded to range from 0, which indicates a very negative evaluation of the respective candidate, to a 1, which indicates a very positive evaluation of the candidates.

for the candidate (α for sample=.73).

7.1.1 Black Evaluations of the Latino Candidate

To begin, I test the key hypotheses to determine the factors that shape African Americans' evaluation of Latino candidates when they face white opponents. Before examining each of the hypotheses in detail, consider the general patterns for blacks' evaluations of the black and Latino candidates across experimental conditions.¹ Table 7.1 shows the cell means for each of the conditions offered to black participants in the experiment. A preliminary look at the scores for blacks offers some suggestive evidence of how the campaign messages may shape how black respondents evaluated the Latino candidate.

The first thing to notice is that participants generally evaluated both candidates positively. The scores for the candidates across experimental conditions is well over the midpoint (μ for black candidate=.72, μ for Latino candidate= .64), indicating African Americans felt positively toward both candidates. This finding was expected given the experimental conditions offered a limited amount of information-and no negative information-for both candidates. With such limited information, partici-

pants were given little reason to evaluate the candidates negatively.

However, it is clear that, on average, African Americans viewed the black candidate more positively than they did the Latino candidate ($\mu=.72$ and $.64$, respectively).² In fact, there is no condition in which blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate trumped the African American candidate. This result provides strong evidence in favor of the ingroup bias hypothesis. Ultimately, the cell means offer some preliminary evidence that blacks either feel a sense of group solidarity with those black candidates or, in keeping with the proposed role of group interests, infer that the candidates' race signals whether he is more likely to pursue their group's realistic interests.

The cell means offer mixed results for the cross-group message and ingroup message hypotheses. First, the evidence for the cross-group message hypothesis is weak. Black participants' evaluation of the Latino candidate was the same whether he emphasized a cross-group or group-neutral message ($\mu=.65$ and $.65$, respectively). This finding contradicts the cross-group message hypothesis since the message that communicated shared, superordinate interests should have been the clearest indicator of the Latino candidate's intention to support black interests.

However, there is evidence in favor of the ingroup message hypothesis. As one would expect, black participants evaluated the African American candidate more positively when he spoke to their group-specific interests than when he communicated either group-neutral or cross-group concerns. Furthermore, blacks were slightly less supportive of the Latino candidate when he spoke to his own narrow group concerns. Overall, the cell means suggest that blacks are indeed sensitive to the group interests conveyed in the campaign messages of political elites. Granted, the cell mean for the ingroup message of the Latino candidate is not considerably higher than either the neutral or minority frame. Yet, the results provide, at least,

¹The scale employed as the dependent variable is moderately reliable when assessing blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate ($\alpha=.64$).

²However, the difference in the means was not statistically significant (t -statistic= -1.578).

some preliminary evidence of the importance of elite messages and how they relay group interests.

Below, a more systematic approach is employed to examine each of the proposed hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, a multivariate analysis is utilized. The continuous nature of the scale for respondents' candidate evaluations allows for ordinary least squares regression. Within each model, dichotomous items for experimental manipulations are included in the model specification. An item for the race of the candidate is included, which captures the black candidate with the high value (1) and the Latino candidate at the lowest value (0). Secondly, two measures for their candidate messages were placed in the model. One item is a dichotomous measure for group-specific messages; the high value (1) reflects the ingroup message and the lowest value (0) captures the group-neutral and cross-group messages. The second dichotomous measure captures cross-group messages at the highest value (1) and the other two messages at the lowest value (0). When both message items are included in the analysis, the baseline condition is for the group-neutral message. To test the perceived group conflict hypothesis as well as the moderated ingroup message and moderated cross-group message hypotheses, a scale for respondents' perceived group competition was included in the analysis.

Ingroup Bias

First, we explore the strength of the ingroup bias hypothesis, which simply proposes that group members will prefer a co-ethnic candidate regardless of the campaign message they express. In this case, African American respondents should support the hypothetical black candidate across experimental conditions. Table 7.1 reports the estimates from two models of blacks' overall candidate evaluations. The first model examines the effect of each experimental manipulation across conditions. In order to confirm the ingroup bias hypothesis, the coefficient for the measure of the race of candidate should be positive and statistically significant, which would indicate black respondents were more inclined to support the black candidate regard-

Table 7.2: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Candidate Evaluations

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Candidate's Race (Black=1)	.08	.04	.04	.07
Ingroup Message	.02	.04	-.02	.06
Cross-Group Message	.02	.04	.00	.07
<i>Interactions</i>				
Candidate's Race X Ingroup Message	—		.07	.09
Candidate's Race X Cross-Group Message	—		.02	.09
Constant	.63	.04	.65	.05
N	130		130	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

less of the message they expressed. In the second model, two interactions between the race of the candidate and the ingroup and cross-group messages were included. By including the interaction terms, we can determine whether blacks' support for black candidates was conditional upon the group interests relayed by their campaign messages.

The estimates in model 1 offer strong evidence in support of the ingroup bias hypothesis. The coefficient for the race of the candidate is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .08$), indicating black respondents were inclined to support the black candidate more than the Latino candidate in every condition, regardless of the message they expressed. Moreover, model 2 offers no evidence that the influence of the candidates' race varied depending on their campaign messages. None of the estimates approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Ultimately, the results confirm that blacks tend to prefer black over Latino candidates regardless of the group interests conveyed in either candidate's campaign messages.

However, it is important to point out that while blacks preferred their own candidate over the Latino candidate, they also tended to favor the Latino candidate over the white candidate. T-tests show that, on average, blacks evaluated the Hispanic

Table 7.3: Effect of Perceived Group Competition on Blacks' Evaluation of Latino Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Attitudinal Variable</i>				
Competition with Latinos	-.01	.10	-.34	.22
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Ingroup Message	-.02	.06	-.16	.12
Cross-Group Message	.00	.06	-.18	.12
<i>Interactions</i>				
Group Competition with Latinos X Ingroup Message	—		.37	.26
Group Competition with Latinos X Cross-Group Message	—		.49†	.28
Constant	.66	.06	.75	.09
N	68		68	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 68 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

candidate at much higher levels than the white opponent ($\mu = .64$ and $.52$, respectively; t -statistic = 3.91). Therefore, while there was clearly ingroup bias present in blacks' candidate evaluations, it does not prevent them from supporting a Latino candidate when facing a white challenger. This finding suggests, absent the presence of a co-ethnic candidate, blacks' ingroup biases would not serve as an obstacle to black-Latino electoral alliances.

Perceived Group Conflict

Next, the perceived group conflict hypothesis proposes that highly-threatened blacks will evaluate the Latino candidate negatively across experimental conditions. The perceived group conflict hypothesis implies that blacks who perceive strong competition between blacks and Latinos will feel threatened by the Latino candidate regardless of the message he conveys, thus, making his ethnic identity their sole cue for judging how effectively he will promote their group interests.

Considering the sheer number of interactions necessary to explore each hypoth-

esis using the global scale of candidate evaluations, an index of evaluations of the Latino candidate was used for the analysis ($\alpha=.64$). Model 1 accounts for the main effects of respondents' perceived group competition with Latinos, the ingroup message, and the cross-group message. This model was specified in order to determine if the factors influenced blacks' evaluations of the Latino candidate across experimental conditions. The second model includes two interaction terms between blacks' perceived threat from Latinos and each item for the candidate message. Model 2 was specified to test the moderated cross-group hypothesis and moderated ingroup hypothesis, which will be discussed in the sections below. Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, ordinary least squared estimation was employed.

Table 7.3 reports the coefficients from the analysis. Model 1 offers the evidence for the perceived group conflict hypothesis. The perceived group conflict hypothesis proposes that blacks' perceived threat from Latinos should lessen their support for the Latino candidate across experimental conditions, which means the measure of perceived group competition in model 1 should be negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless, the analysis offers no such results; the coefficient is negative, but fails to approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest highly-threatened blacks were more inclined than less-threatened blacks to reject Latino candidates regardless of the message they expressed.³

Cross-Group Messages

A fundamental concern of the project is driven by concerns about whether appeals to broad, superordinate interests motivate blacks and Latinos to support each other's candidates. When applied to blacks, the cross-group message hypothesis proposes African American respondents evaluate the Latino candidate more positively when he endorses superordinate, shared interests. Model 2 in table 7.2 reveals


³There was no evidence to suggest respondents' perceived group conflict served as a proxy for their underlying racial attitudes. As such, I have reported the estimates of the models with participants' perceived group competition as the only measure of their attitudinal predispositions.

whether this expectation was confirmed. The interaction terms in model 2 test whether the cross-group message was more impactful for candidates of either race. With the interaction terms in the model, the independent items for the ingroup and minority messages represent the conditional impact of each message for the Latino candidate. To confirm the cross-group message hypothesis, the sole item for the minority message should be positive and statistically significant. While the coefficient moves in the positive direction, a statistically significant effect does not emerge. Showing no influence for Latino candidates' use of superordinate campaign messages, the findings offer no evidence for the cross-group message hypothesis. Ultimately, the findings imply that African Americans are not inclined to engage in electoral alliances with Latinos even when they appeal to blacks' shared group interests with Latinos.

Despite the disappointing results for the cross-group message hypothesis, there is good reason to believe the impact of broader appeals to superordinate interests may vary depending on participants' attitudinal predispositions toward Latinos. In particular, highly-threatened blacks may be more sensitive to the messages from Latino candidates than others. Accordingly, the moderated cross-group hypothesis proposes that blacks who perceive strong group competition with Latinos will evaluate Latino candidates that speak to broad, minority interests more positively (Moderated Cross-Group Message Hypothesis). In this case, appeals to shared, superordinate interests are believed to temper the hostility highly-threatened blacks may otherwise direct toward Latino candidates.

The evidence for the moderated cross-group message hypothesis is strong. The test of the moderated cross-group message hypothesis is offered in model 2 of table 7.3. In order for the hypothesis to be confirmed, the interaction between blacks' perceived group competition and the cross-group message should be positive and statistically significant. Accordingly, the coefficient for the interaction term offers strong support for the cross-group message hypothesis ($\beta=.49$). The coefficient for

Figure 7.1: Blacks' Evaluations by Latino Messages and Perceived Competition



the estimate is positive. While the estimate fails to reach statistical significance when a two-tailed test is applied, it reaches statistical significance when using a one-tailed test. Given the estimate moves in the expected direction, a one-tailed is justified. Ultimately, one could ascertain from this finding that the minority message from a Hispanic candidate works to mitigate the opposition of otherwise hostile African Americans who perceive Latinos as a threat to their realistic interests.

Figure 7.1 illustrates the relative effect of each group message across levels of blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos. The predicted values among African Americans with weak perceptions of group competition indicate participants felt more favorably toward candidates that spoke to neutral messages than either ingroup or minority messages. The predicted probability for blacks exposed to the neutral message is .5, but reduced considerably when presented with an ingroup or minority message (.25 and .15, respectively). Nevertheless, as blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos increases, those relationships shifted in the opposite direction. At high levels of perceived group competition, blacks were more attracted

Table 7.4: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Differential Voting between the Latino and White Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1	
	β	s.e.
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>		
Ingroup Message	-.66	.33
Cross-Group Message	-.14	.34
N	69	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. The baseline condition for the message experimental manipulation is for the neutral message condition. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

to the Latino candidate that expressed a broader, minority-based message (.70) than those speaking to ingroup interests (.34) or group-neutral interests (.03). Therefore, the minority message has a positive impact on improving feelings toward Latino candidates among blacks that feel particularly threatened by Latinos.⁴

Ingroup Messages

Table 7.1 also offers evidence to assess the ingroup message hypothesis. The ingroup message hypothesis asserts that Latino candidates that speak to more sectarian group concerns will provoke greater opposition from black participants. The independent item for the ingroup message reflects its influence for the Latino candidate. If the ingroup message hypothesis is accurate, the coefficient for the ingroup message should be negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results show no such effect. The coefficient for the ingroup message item was actually positive and did not approach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Nevertheless, while the ingroup message was not found to impact blacks' overall evaluation of the Latino candidate, further analysis reveals that the ingroup message shaped their likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate vis-a-vis his Anglo

⁴The effect for the ingroup messages was expected to look more like the pattern for group-neutral messages. The only viable explanation for the effect is that blacks may have interpreted the Latino candidate's emphasis on their group's concerns as a cue for determining how sensitive they might be to minority interests broadly. This is supported by the evidence from the manipulation checks.

challenger. Instead of the scale for the overall evaluation of the Latino candidate, a separate measure was created to reflect differential support between the Latino and the white candidate. To create the measure, the difference between participants' reported likelihood of voting for the white candidate was taken from their likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate. Therefore, positive values reflect a respondents' likelihood of supporting the Latino candidate over the white candidate and a negative value reflects the contrary; a value of zero indicates the respondent was equally likely to vote for either candidate.⁵ The measure of the differential likelihood of voting between the candidates is consistent with how participants were presented the information and how citizens determine their vote choices; rather than evaluating candidates in isolation, voters often consider the strengths of political candidates in relation to their opposition. Thus, the differential measure offers a more realistic measure of how citizens make their voting decisions.

Table 7.4 reports the estimates from an ordered probit analysis of blacks' differential support for the Latino and white candidate. The model specification only includes items representing the experimental conditions for the campaign messages. In order for the ingroup message hypothesis to be confirmed, the item for the ingroup message would produce a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Accordingly, there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the ingroup message ($\beta=-.66$), indicating the level of support for the Latino candidate reduced when he emphasized narrow, group-specific interests. Ultimately, this result suggests that blacks' willingness to vote for Latino candidates depends upon their capacity to speak beyond their parochial group concerns. Otherwise, it appears they are willing to judge the white and Latino candidate on roughly equal terms. In this respect, the finding clearly corroborates the ingroup message hypothesis.

⁵In shifting from the global candidate evaluation measure to more group-targeted measures, the sample size was reduced to half its previous size. Given the nature of the experimental design, half of the black participants were asked to evaluate the Latino candidate and the other half assessed the black candidate.

Lastly, the analysis explores whether African Americans who perceive group competition with Latinos will react to the ingroup message differently than less-threatened blacks. Specifically, highly-threatened blacks should be more likely to negatively evaluate Latino candidates that speak to narrow, group-specific issues. When Latino candidates emphasize their own group's interests they merely exaggerate the concerns of highly-threatened blacks that they will pursue Latino interests at their expense. The moderated ingroup message hypothesis can be assessed by observing the interaction term between blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos and the ingroup message in model 2 of table 7.3. If accurate, the coefficient would be negative and statistically significant. However, the coefficient is neither negative nor statistically significant. Instead, the estimate moves in the positive direction and fails to reach statistical significance.

7.1.2 Latino Evaluations of the Black Candidate

Now, consider the conditions under which Latinos may feel more compelled to engage in electoral alliances with African Americans. Again, the expectation is that Latinos' evaluation of the African American political candidate depends on the group interests conveyed by that candidate's campaign messages. Before engaging in a more sophisticated analysis, consider the general patterns in Latinos' evaluation of the black candidate. The patterns should provide some preliminary clues about whether the proposed hypotheses can be applied to Latinos. Table 7.5 reports the cell means for Latinos' candidate evaluations across experimental conditions. At first glance, it is important to note that, contrary to blacks, Latinos' evaluation of the black and Latino candidates was not considerably different. The overall mean scores for the black and Latino candidate were virtually identical ($\mu=.72$ and $.74$, respectively). Given the high evaluations afforded to the African American candidate, the cell means offer little evidence that suggests Latinos' ingroup biases shape their attitudes about forging electoral alliances with African Americans.

Table 7.5: Means of Latinos' Candidate Evaluations Across Conditions

Candidate's Race	Candidate Messages			
	Neutral	Ingroup	Cross-Group	Total
Latino	.74	.74	.73	.74
Black	.75	.71	.70	.72
Total	.75	.73	.72	.73

Note: The cell means reflect participants' average score on for their candidate evaluations. The dependent variable was recoded to range from 0, which indicates a very negative value, to a 1, which indicates a very high evaluation.

Looking at their evaluations across the candidate message manipulations, there is a confusing trend that emerges. Interestingly, Hispanics appear to feel more positively toward the black candidate when he spoke to group-neutral concerns ($\mu=.75$). Surprisingly, the mean within the neutral experimental condition is higher than for any condition for the Latino candidate. Beyond the group-neutral condition, Latinos appear to evaluate black candidates similarly regardless of their candidate messages. The cell means for black candidates who express either an ingroup or cross-group message are approximately equal ($\mu=.71$ and $.70$, respectively). The lower mean for the black candidate within the ingroup message condition is consistent with expectations; Latinos exposed to messages from black candidates that emphasize their own sectarian group interests should choose to evaluate them more negatively. However, the mean for the cross-group message moved in the wrong direction. Rather than reducing their evaluations, Latino participants should have been reassured by the black candidate's effort to address the shared group concerns of blacks and Latinos. Ultimately, these unexpected findings may reflect that Latinos are less likely to view their interests in pan-ethnic terms; their primary group attachment may be elsewhere, such as with members that share their national identity.

Ingroup Bias

As with blacks, the analysis begins by exploring whether Latinos exhibit an ingroup bias across experimental conditions. If the ingroup bias hypothesis is correct,

Table 7.6: OLS Estimates of Latinos' Candidate Evaluations

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
Candidate's Race (Black=1)	-.01	.03	.02	.05
Ingroup Message	-.02	.04	.00	.05
Cross-Group Message	-.03	.04	-.01	.05
<i>Interactions</i>				
Candidate's Race X Ingroup Message	—		-.05	.08
Candidate's Race X Cross-Group Message	—		-.04	.08
Constant	.75	.03	.74	.04
N	146		146	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Latinos would prefer Latino candidates regardless of the campaign messages black candidates express. Table 7.6 reports the estimates from two models of Latinos' candidate evaluations. Similar to the analysis for black respondents, the first model includes independent items for the candidate's race, the ingroup message, and the cross-group message. This model is important because it tests whether any of the manipulations had an influence on Latinos' candidate evaluations across experimental conditions. Consequently, the ingroup bias hypothesis would be confirmed in this case if the estimate for the candidate's race is negative and statistically significant. A negative coefficient would indicate Latino respondents evaluated the Latino candidate more positively than the black candidate regardless of the group interests promoted by either candidate. On the other hand, model 2 includes interaction terms between the candidate's race and his campaign message. Ultimately, model 2 allows for an examination of whether the influence of the campaign message is conditional upon the candidate's race.

Ultimately, the evidence for the ingroup bias hypothesis is weak. The estimate for the candidate's race moved in the expected negative direction ($\beta = -.01$); however, the coefficient was far from approaching the conventional level of statistical significance. In the end, the finding suggests that Latinos did not rely solely upon the candidate's

Table 7.7: Effect of Perceived Group Competition on Latinos' Evaluation of the Black Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Attitudinal Variable</i>				
Competition with Blacks	-.14†	.08	-.36	.15
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Ingroup Message	-.02	.06	-.16	.09
Minority Message	-.04	.06	-.09	.09
<i>Interactions</i>				
Group Competition with Blacks X Ingroup Message	—		.41	.22
Group Competition with Blacks X Minority Message	—		.23	.20
N	54		54	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 54 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

race as a cue for their evaluations. Thus, there is good reason to suspect Latinos may endorse either Latino or black candidates largely based on the interests they promote.

Perceived Group Conflict

Next, the analysis explores whether Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks shaped their attitudes toward the African American candidate. Generally, the expectation is that highly-threatened Latinos will feel less favorably toward the black candidate regardless of the message he communicates. In this instance, there is little that can be said by a black candidate to a Latino participant who believes they are engaged in realistic group competition with African Americans.

In order to test the perceived group conflict hypothesis, a model was specified that simply includes independent measures of participants' perceived group competition with blacks as well as dichotomous indicators for the experimental manipulations. The dependent variable for both models consists of scores on the evaluation scale only for the black candidate ($\alpha = .67$). Model 1 in Table 7.8 reports the esti-

mates that test the effect of Latino participants' perceived threat from blacks across experimental conditions. The model includes only independent measures of participants' perceived group competition with blacks, the ingroup message and the cross-group message. If the hypothesis is correct, the measure of perceived group conflict should be negative and statistically significant, showing that with higher levels of perceived group competition Latinos tended to report lower evaluations of the black candidate. Accordingly, the coefficient for the perceived group competition index was negative ($\beta = -.14$). Although not significant when using a two-tailed test, the estimate is significant for a one-tailed test, which, considering the estimate is going in the expected direction, is acceptable. In the end, highly-threatened Latinos tended to evaluate the black candidate more negatively regardless of the message he expressed.

Cross-Group Messages

To judge the cross-group message hypothesis, we observe the estimates in model 2 of table 7.6. In particular, the interaction term between the candidate's race and the minority message indicates the strength of the cross-group message hypothesis. If the hypothesis is valid, the sign of the coefficient for the interaction term should be positive, which would indicate Latino participants tended to evaluate black candidates that spoke to shared, superordinate group interests positively. Nevertheless, the coefficient reveals no such relationship; the estimate for the interaction is actually negative. Furthermore, the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance. Thus, contrary to expectations, cross-group messages were not effective at rallying greater support from Latino participants for the black candidate. This finding bodes poorly for black-Latino political alliances since cross-group messages seem better-suited for facilitating cooperation between both groups than the other campaign messages.

Of course, as shown for blacks, the influence of the cross-group message on Latinos' evaluation of the African American candidate may depend on how strongly they

perceive blacks as a threat to their group well-being. Thus, the moderated cross-group message hypothesis proposes that highly-threatened Latinos will evaluate the black candidate more positively when he speaks to broad concerns that benefit both blacks and Latinos. In order to explore the moderated cross-group hypothesis, the focus shifts to model 2 of table 7.7. In particular, the strength of the moderated cross-group message hypothesis can be determined by the interaction term between Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks and the cross-group message. To confirm the hypothesis, the coefficient for the interaction terms should move in a positive direction. Indeed, the estimate for the interaction is positive ($\beta=.23$); however, it fails to reach statistical significance. As such, the analysis offers little support for the moderated cross-group message hypothesis.

Ingroup Messages

Next, consider the impact of the ingroup message on Latinos' support for the black candidate. I expect Latinos will be more likely to oppose African American candidates that endorse narrow, group-specific interests. To consider the evidence for this hypothesis, observe the interaction term in model 2 of Table 7.6 between the race of the candidate and the ingroup message. The estimate for the interaction should be negative and statistically significant, indicating Latinos tended to evaluate black candidates that only speak about black-issues more negatively. While moving in the negative direction ($\beta=-.05$), the coefficient does not approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Consequently, the analysis does not support the conclusion that ingroup messages reduce Latinos' evaluation of the black candidate.

Yet, as with blacks, further analysis shows that ingroup messages impact Latinos' likelihood of voting for the black candidate vis-a-vis his white opponent. In this case, a measure was created to capture Latinos' differential likelihood of voting for the black versus the white candidate. Similar to the measure for black participants, the item is calculated by taking the difference between Latinos' reported likelihood of

Table 7.8: Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Differential Voting between the Black and White Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1	
	β	s.e.
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>		
Ingroup Message	-.83	.38
Cross-Group Message	-.47	.37
N	55	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 55 Latinos were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

voting for the white candidate from their likely vote for the black candidate. As a consequence, the positive values reflect when participants were more likely to vote for the black candidate over the white candidate and the negative values indicate when they favored the white candidate over the black candidate. Values of zero indicate instances in which participants were equally likely to vote for either of the candidates.

Table 7.8 shows that when items for the campaign messages are applied, there is a negative and statistically significant result for the ingroup message. The finding indicates that when presented with an ingroup message, Latinos' favoritism toward the black candidate was neutralized ($\beta = -.83$). Ultimately, this finding shows that Latinos were sensitive to messages that appeared to threaten their own group interests, offering strong evidence in support of the ingroup message hypothesis.

Similarly, there is little support for the moderated ingroup message hypothesis. Support for the hypothesis would require the estimate for the interaction in model 2 of table 7.7 between Latinos' perceived group competition and the ingroup message to be negative and statistically significant, suggesting Latinos evaluated black candidates that advocated ingroup interests more negatively. Nevertheless, the relationship moves in the opposite direction; the coefficient for the interaction term is positive ($\beta = .41$). Nevertheless, the estimate fails to reach conventional levels of

statistical significance. While the p-value is below the .10 level, a one-tailed test is not justified given that the estimate moves in the opposite direction than originally hypothesized.

With interactive terms in the model, the independent item for Latinos' perceived group competition reflects a conditional relationship. In this case, the independent item for Latinos' perceived group competition reflects how highly-threatened Latinos evaluated the black candidate in the neutral message condition. Based on the estimate in model 2, Latino participants who perceived blacks as economic competitors tended to evaluate the black candidate more negatively when he emphasized group-neutral interests; the coefficient for the item is negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-.36$). The effect likely reflects highly-threatened Latinos' baseline evaluation of the black candidate. Ultimately, the finding suggests that when lacking information from which to base their decision, Latinos may rely upon a black candidate's race as a cue for the group interests they may endorse.

Discussion

Ultimately, the analysis offers some very interesting results concerning the influence of campaign messages on the potential for black-Latino electoral alliances when candidates from either group oppose an Anglo candidate. First, the analysis reveals that blacks tend to exhibit a strong ingroup bias when evaluating between black and Latino candidates. They were more inclined to support the black candidate when facing a white opponent than the Latino candidate, although they still supported the Latino candidate at much higher levels than the white candidate ($\mu=.64$ and $.52$, respectively; t -statistic= 3.91). On the other hand, Latinos did not exhibit an ingroup bias in the candidate evaluations. The candidate's race did not solely explain their evaluations. Similar to blacks, Latinos evaluated the black candidate much more positively than their white rival ($\mu=.71$ and $.54$, respectively; t -statistic= 3.93). Therefore, the evidence suggests that blacks exhibit a strong ingroup biases for their

own candidates; however, absent a black candidate, they are perfectly willing to support a Latino candidate over a white opponent. Latinos appear to evaluate black and Latino candidates in a more even-handed manner; their overall evaluations of the Latino and black candidates were virtually identical ($\mu=.74$ and $.72$, respectively; t -statistic $=.44$).⁶ Like blacks, they are more likely to support a black candidate over a white rival. Taken together, ingroup bias does not appear to undermine the potential for black-Latino electoral alliances. Even when group members prefer ingroup candidates, they are very willing to support each other's candidates over a white candidate.

Nevertheless, the evidence on the influence of the campaign messages on blacks' and Latinos' candidate evaluations was mixed. There was no evidence that the cross-group message increased participants' general evaluation of the outgroup minority candidate. This finding suggests that group members do not support outgroup minority candidates who promote shared, superordinate group issues. Furthermore, ingroup messages were not found to negatively impact group members' general evaluations of each other's candidates. However, black and Latino respondents were less willing to vote for the outgroup minority candidate over the white candidate when he emphasized narrow, group-centric issues. Ultimately, blacks and Latinos judge outgroup minority candidates on par with white candidates when they give little indication that they will support common, superordinate concerns.

Blacks' and Latinos' evaluation of each other's candidate is also shaped by the degree of group competition they perceive between both groups. For instance, Latino candidates who expressed campaign messages that conveyed a concern for pursuing the mutually-beneficial interests of both blacks and Latinos were effective at shaping

⁶I considered whether Latinos held a weaker pan-ethnic identity; however, further investigation suggests otherwise. A question capturing the importance Latinos place on being Latino suggests they strongly identified with the group label. The question asks, "How important is being Latino/Hispanic to you". They are given the following four response options: (1) not important at all, (2) not very important, (3) somewhat important, (4) very important. The mean for this score was quite high ($\mu=.82$), suggesting a strong group attachment among Latino participants.

how blacks evaluated them as political candidates. However, rather than influencing all blacks, the cross-group message primarily influenced blacks who were sensitive to the threat that Latinos posed to their realistic group interests. In contrast, Latinos who felt threatened by blacks opposed the black candidate regardless of the message he expressed. Therefore, highly-threatened blacks do not tend to voice significantly greater opposition toward Latino candidates than their less-threatened counterparts; however, Latino candidates who endorse cross-group interests are more likely to temper their anxiety. Yet, Latinos who perceive zero-sum competition with blacks are unmoved by cross-group appeals, associating any black candidate with an effort to undermine Latino interests.

7.2 Minority-Minority Elections

The remaining half of this chapter focuses on the factors that influence participants' evaluations of black and Latino candidates when they face one another. Elections between minority candidates have become more prevalent given dramatic changes in the demography of the United States, particularly urban America. As the minority populations within urban centers grow and become politically socialized, there is good reason to expect the political candidates within these areas to become more diverse. While some may regard such political shifts as a reflection of a more open, inclusive political environment, they may also bring underlying group tensions to the fore, causing hostile opposition to outgroup minority candidates. A far more dubious matter is whether group members can be successfully wooed by outgroup candidates. To the author's knowledge, there is no research that signals under what conditions group members might prefer an outgroup minority candidate over a co-ethnic candidate. Ultimately, minority-minority elections offer an opportunity to determine whether group members will judge the outgroup candidate based on the content of their campaign messages when there is the option to select a co-ethnic

candidate.

In the experiment, each of the hypothetical minority candidates expresses either a group-neutral, ingroup, or cross-group message. Furthermore, the dependent variable for the analysis is the same as the previous section, a composite scale combining an item measuring respondents' affect toward the candidates with a variable capturing their likelihood of voting for the candidates. Since the black and Latino candidates were present in every condition, there was no global index of participants' candidate evaluations; instead, two scales were constructed, one for the black candidate ($\alpha=.76$) and the other for the Latino candidate ($\alpha=.70$).

7.2.1 Black Evaluations of the Latino Candidate

To begin, consider the patterns of the cell means for blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate across experimental conditions. The expected impact of the campaign messages for elections with only minority candidates are similar to majority-minority elections. For instance, group members are expected to evaluate the co-ethnic candidate more positively than the outgroup candidate, regardless of the group concerns they promote (Ingroup bias hypothesis). Nevertheless, elite messages are expected to shape their support for the candidates. Blacks and Latinos should evaluate outgroup candidates positively when they speak to shared group concerns (Cross-group message hypothesis) and negatively when they endorse sectarian group interests (Ingroup message hypothesis).

Table 7.9 shows African Americans' evaluation of Latino candidates across the experimental conditions. In large part, the results corroborate the cross-group message hypothesis. A glance at the means for blacks' evaluations of the Latino candidate across the experimental conditions (bottom row) shows that, of all the messages expressed by the Latino candidate, African Americans preferred the superordinate, minority message, followed closely by the group-neutral message ($\mu=.67$ and $.60$,

Table 7.9: Means of Blacks' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate Across Conditions

Black Message	Latino Message			Total
	Latino Neutral	Latino Ingroup	Latino Cross-Group	
Black Neutral	.62	.52	.62	.58
Black Ingroup	.66	.71	.69	.69
Black Cross-Group	.53	.48	.68	.57
Total	.60	.56	.67	.62

Note: The cell means reflect participants' average score on their reported evaluations of the political candidates. The dependent variable was recoded to range from 0, which indicates a very negative evaluation of the respective candidate, to a 1, which indicates a very positive evaluation of the candidates.

respectively). The cross-group message from the Latino candidate is more effective than the other messages when the black opponent expresses a message that promotes shared group interests ($\mu=.68$). On the other hand, the Latino candidate's cross-group and group-neutral message on evaluations equally improves blacks' evaluations when the black candidate speaks to group-neutral interests ($\mu=.62$ for both conditions). The only condition for which the mean is not equal to or greater than the other messages for the Latino candidate is when the black opponent endorses narrow, group-specific concerns ($\mu=.69$). Ultimately, the pattern of the cell means offer suggestive evidence in favor of the cross-group message hypothesis.

Comparatively, blacks were far less supportive of Latino candidates that expressed a group-specific campaign message. The overall mean of the ingroup message for the Latino candidate is lower than the mean for the group-neutral or cross-group message ($\mu=.56$, $.60$, and $.67$, respectively). Nevertheless, the mean for the Latino candidate's ingroup message obscures a considerable amount of variation. While the mean is roughly similar when the Latino candidate faces a black candidate that emphasizes either group-neutral and cross-group interests, they think more positively of the Latino candidate when the black candidate emphasizes pro-black issues ($\mu=.71$). The variation in how blacks evaluate the ingroup message shows that their

Table 7.10: Means of Blacks' Evaluation of the Black Candidate Across Conditions

Black Message	Latino Message			Total
	Latino Neutral	Latino Ingroup	Latino Cross-Group	
Black Neutral	.66	.66	.73	.68
Black Ingroup	.66	.76	.60	.66
Black Cross-Group	.77	.70	.67	.71
Total	.70	.70	.66	.69

Note: The cell means reflect participants' average score on their reported evaluations of the political candidates. The dependent variable was recoded to range from 0, which indicates a very negative evaluation of the respective candidate, to a 1, which indicates a very positive evaluation of the candidates.

views must be judged in relation to blacks' evaluations of the co-ethnic candidate.

Accordingly, Table 7.10 reports the cell means of blacks' evaluation of the black candidate across experimental conditions. The means for the black candidate help to put the means for blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate in perspective. First, the means offer strong support for the ingroup bias hypothesis. When glancing at the means from Table 7.9 to 7.10, it is clear that African Americans tended to think more positively of the African American candidate in most conditions. When the black candidate emphasized group-neutral interests and superordinate minority interests, blacks thought more positively of him than the Latino candidate no matter his campaign message. Interestingly, these patterns change when the Latino candidate endorses broad, superordinate group concerns, particularly when the black candidate advocates for ingroup and cross-group messages. Furthermore, there was a significant difference in the means between blacks' evaluation of the black and Latino candidate ($\mu=.69$ and $.62$).

The remainder of this section introduces a more systematic demonstration of the relationship between the candidate messages and African Americans' evaluation of Latino candidates. The key dependent variable is the scale for blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate. The independent variables include dichotomous items for ingroup and minority messages of both the black and Latino candidate; the neutral

condition is the baseline category. Two models are reported in each of the tables. The first reveals the independent effect of each message on blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate. The second model explores whether their evaluations were conditional upon both the Latino candidate's message *and* the message of the African American candidate.

Ingroup Bias

First, consider whether African Americans support the black candidate more than the Latino candidate, regardless of the message each candidate endorses. Unfortunately, given the experimental design, the hypothesis cannot be tested in a similar way as in the first experiment. Since participants evaluate the black and Latino candidate separately in the same experiment, there is not a global measure of their candidate evaluations. Instead, there are measures that capture their evaluations for each candidate. Ultimately, the cell means offer strong evidence in support of the ingroup bias hypothesis. As mentioned above, the blacks' evaluation of the African American candidate is higher than the Latino candidate in all but three conditions. Furthermore, a t-test for the mean difference between the evaluations for the black and Latino candidate reveals that the difference is statistically significant ($\mu=.69$ and $.62$, respectively; t -statistic= 2.72). Overall, the results offer strong support for the ingroup bias hypothesis, suggesting under most conditions blacks chose to support the black over the Latino candidate.

However, further analysis was done using a differential score of evaluations between the black and Latino candidate. The measure takes the difference of the scores on the evaluation scale for the Latino candidate from the scores for the black candidate. Positive values reflect more favorable evaluations for the black candidate than the Latino candidate, thus, the ingroup bias hypothesis is confirmed if the item for the race of the respondent-whose high value represents black participants-is both positive and statistically significant. Table 7.11 reports the estimates from the analysis. The results reveal that even when controlling for candidate messages,

Table 7.11: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Differential Candidate Evaluations

Independent Variables	Model 1	
	β	s.e.
Race of Respondent (Black=1)	.26	.03
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>		
Latino Ingroup Message	.02	.05
Black Ingroup Message	-.16	.04
Latino Cross-Group Message	-.09	.04
Black Cross-Group Message	-.03	.04
Constant	-.11	.04
N	248	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

black participants were more likely to support the black candidate over the Latino candidate. The coefficient was both positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .26$). In combination with the cell means, there is strong support for the ingroup bias hypothesis.

Perceived Group Conflict

Similar to the other sections of this chapter, the analysis explores whether blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos influenced their evaluation of the Latino candidate. The expectation is that blacks who feel the strongest sense of group competition with Latinos will tend to express more negative evaluations of the Latino candidate. Table 7.12 reports the ordinary least squared estimates from a model of blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate. Similar to the previous analyses, evidence from two models are reported in the table. The first model includes measures of the independent effect of blacks' perceived group competition along with the dichotomous items for the ingroup and cross-group messages. Model 1 offers a test of the perceived group conflict hypothesis by determining whether blacks' feelings of group competition reduce their overall support for the Latino candidate across experimental conditions.

Table 7.12: Effect of Perceived Group Competition on Blacks' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Latinos	-.11	.07	-.19	.14
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Latino Ingroup Message	-.03	.05	-.03	.09
Black Ingroup Message	.10	.05	.09	.05
Latino Cross-Group Message	.07	.05	.01	.09
Black Cross-Group Message	.00	.05	.00	.05
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Competition with Latinos X Latino Ingroup	—	—	.00	.21
Competition with Latinos X Latino Cross-Group	—	—	.16	.18
Constant	.61	.05	.64	.07
N	101		101	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Model 1 offers no evidence in favor of the perceived group conflict hypothesis. Although the coefficient for the perceived group competition scale moves in the expected direction, it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($\beta = -.11$). Therefore, the analysis of blacks' evaluations of the Latino candidate suggest blacks' perceived threat from Latinos continued to have little impact on their feelings toward the Latino candidate.

However, when changing focus from their overall evaluations to their differential vote for either the black or Latino candidate, support for the perceived group conflict hypothesis emerges. Table 7.13 reports the coefficients for the reduced and full model of blacks' differential vote between the black and Latino candidates. The evidence reveals that the perceptions of highly-threatened blacks influenced their differential support for both candidates. Model 1 shows the independent effect of blacks' perceived group competition was both positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .89$), indicating blacks who perceived Latinos as competitors tended to be biased against the Latino candidate. Furthermore, these effects are present across

Table 7.13: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Differential Voting for the Latino Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Latinos	.89	.43	.01	.81
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Latino Ingroup Message	.42	.26	-.13	.53
Black Ingroup Message	-.42	.26	-.43	.27
Latino Cross-Group Message	-.40	.26	-.87	.49
Black Cross-Group Message	.25	.25	.30	.26
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Competition with Latinos X Latino Ingroup	—	—	1.37	1.16
Competition with Latinos X Latino Cross-Group	—	—	1.15	1.04
N	100		100	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

experimental conditions. Therefore, regardless of the message offered by the Latino candidate, highly-threatened blacks tend to vote for the black candidate over the Latino candidate. Model 2 corroborates this conclusion by revealing little evidence that the influence of blacks' perceived group competition with Latinos on their differential support is conditional upon the Latino candidate's campaign messages. Neither the independent nor interactive effects approached conventional levels of statistical significance.

Cross-Group Messages

Next, the analysis explores whether cross-group messages by the Latino candidate led black participants to evaluate him more positively. In order to analyze this further, the scale of black respondents' overall evaluation of the hypothetical Latino candidate is employed as the dependent variable. One model is run with the dichotomous items for the ingroup and cross-group messages of both candidates; the second model includes the independent measures in addition to interaction terms between each of the independent variables. Table 7.14 shows the estimates for both

Table 7.14: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Latino Ingroup Message	-.04	.05	-.10	.08
Black Ingroup Message	.10	.05	.04	.08
Latino Cross-Group Message	.06	.05	.01	.08
Black Cross-Group Message	-.02	.05	-.08	.08
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Latino Ingroup X Black Ingroup	—	—	.15	.12
Latino Ingroup X Black Cross-Group	—	—	.05	.11
Latino Cross-Group X Black Ingroup	—	—	.03	.11
Latino Cross-Group X Black Cross-Group	—	—	.14	.11
Constant	.58	.04	.62	.05
N	102		102	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

models of blacks' candidate evaluations. Ordinary least squared estimation is employed to analyze the data. If the cross-group message hypothesis is confirmed, the independent term for the cross-group message in model 1 should be positive and statistically significant. Model 2 explores whether the impact of the Latino candidate's cross-group message is conditional upon the interests endorsed by the black candidate. Accordingly, interaction terms between the messages of the black and Latino candidates are included in the model.

Now, consider the estimates in Model 1. Ultimately, the findings do not suggest that cross-group messages are particularly successful at attracting blacks to Latino candidates. The coefficient for the item is positive ($\beta = .06$), but does not approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, the impact of the Latino candidate's appeals to shared, superordinate interests did not depend upon the message of the black candidate. None of the estimates in model 2 approach statistical significance.

On face value, the data offers little evidence to suggest cross-group messages improve blacks' overall evaluation of the Latino candidate. However, an analysis

of the independent item for blacks' reported likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate offers some evidence for the cross-group message hypothesis. Table 7.15 shows two models of blacks' general likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate as well as two additional models for their differential vote between the black and Latino candidate. The first model of blacks' likely vote for the Latino candidate only includes independent items for the experimental manipulations. This model tests the main effects of the experimental variables, determining whether they influence blacks' vote choices across the conditions. On the other hand, the second model explores whether the effect of the campaign messages for the Latino candidate were conditional upon the appeal from the black candidate. Similarly, the first model of blacks' differential vote examines the effect of the experimental manipulations across conditions, while the second examines the conditional effect. The measure of differential vote takes the difference of blacks' reported likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate from their likelihood of voting for the black candidate. As such, positive values reflect when black participants favored the black candidate over the Latino candidate; negative values indicate a greater likelihood of voting for the Latino over the black candidate. Zero values indicate respondents did not prefer one candidate over the other. Given the ordered structure of both dependent variables, ordered probit estimation was utilized for the analysis.

First, consider the reduced model for blacks' reported likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate. The estimate for the Latino minority message offers strong support in favor of the cross-group message hypothesis. The coefficient for the Latino minority message item is both positive and statistically significant ($\beta=.55$), indicating blacks' reported likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate increased

Table 7.15: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Likely Vote for the Latino Candidate and Differential Vote for the Black and Latino Candidates

Independent Variables	Likely Voting		Full Likely Vote		Differential Vote		Full Differential Vote	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>								
Latino Ingroup Message	-.16	.27	-.54	.45	.43	.26	1.04	.43
Black Ingroup Message	.40	.28	.07	.49	-.43	.26	.17	.46
Latino Cross-Group Message	.55	.27	.14	.46	-.38	.25	.52	.44
Black Cross-Group Message	-.26	.26	-.74	.46	.31	.25	1.21	.44
<i>Interaction Terms</i>								
Latino Ingroup X Black Ingroup	—	—	.89	.69	—	—	-.97	.65
Latino Ingroup X Black Cross-Group	—	—	.32	.64	—	—	-.87	.62
Latino Cross-Group X Black Ingroup	—	—	.22	.68	—	—	-.94	.64
Latino Cross-Group X Black Cross-Group	—	—	1.03	.65	—	—	-1.75	.62
N	101		101		101		101	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

when he emphasized shared, superordinate group concerns. More importantly, the effects were present across experimental conditions. Furthermore, the estimates for the full model of blacks' likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate suggest the effect of the Latino minority message is not conditional upon the influence of the black candidate's message. Ultimately, the results from this model suggest blacks are open to electoral alliances with Latinos as long as their group interests are addressed.

The models for blacks' differential support between the black and Latino candidate also offers some encouraging evidence concerning the impact of the cross-group message. On one hand, the results show that the minority message did not impact African Americans' attitude toward the Latino candidate across the experimental conditions. The estimate for the Latino minority message in the reduced model of blacks' differential voting failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the evidence from the full model indicates the impact of the Latino cross-group message was conditional upon the message expressed by the black candidate. Most importantly, the interaction between the Latino minority message and the black minority message show that when both the black and Latino candidate emphasize shared superordinate concerns, black participants were less inclined to exhibit an ingroup bias. The coefficient was both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-1.75$). Moreover, the estimate for the independent item of the black minority message provides further evidence in favor of the cross-group message hypothesis. Although a single item, the estimate indicates the conditional effect of the minority message from the black candidate when the Latino candidate emphasizes group-neutral issues. The estimate is positive and statistically significant ($\beta=1.21$), indicating that, when compared to the minority message, the group-neutral message was less effective at reducing blacks' ingroup bias in their reported likely vote. The negative coefficient for the interaction term reveals that only the cross-group message tempered blacks' group biases.

Ingroup Messages

Finally, the analysis offers mixed evidence for the ingroup message hypothesis. Again, according to the ingroup message hypothesis, group members should be averse to outgroup candidates that speak to their own narrow, sectarian interests. Model 1 in Table 7.14 offers no evidence to show that this is the case. If sectarian appeals reduced blacks' evaluation of the Latino candidate, the coefficient for the Latino ingroup message should be negative and statistically significant. Although moving in the expected direction ($\beta = -.04$), the coefficient fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Moreover, the results from Model 2 do not indicate the impact of the ingroup message from the Latino candidate is conditional upon the message of the black candidate. Neither the independent nor interaction terms in the model are statistically significant. Ultimately, the results from both models offer little evidence in support of the ingroup message hypothesis.

However, the results in Table 7.15 suggest that while narrow, group-specific messages may not impact blacks' overall evaluation of the Latino candidate, it does have an impact on the disparity in support between the black and Latino candidates. The models of blacks' differential likelihood of voting between the black and Latino candidate in Table 7.15 provide some evidence that Latino candidates' appeals to the interests of Hispanics reduced support for the Latino candidate among blacks. The reduced model of blacks' differential voting offers no evidence to suggest the ingroup message encouraged blacks to vary their support between the black and Latino candidate. None of the estimates approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Nevertheless, the full model specification provides some qualified support for the hypothesis. Given the nature of the dependent variable, the results indicate an ingroup bias among blacks when the coefficients are both positive and statistically significant, showing blacks favored the African American over the Latino candidate. The estimate for the single dichotomous item for the Latino ingroup message indicates some support for the ingroup message hypothesis. Given the inclusion of interaction

terms in the model specification, the independent term actually reflects the influence of the ingroup message when the black candidate emphasizes group-neutral concerns. The coefficient is both positive and significant ($\beta=1.04$), demonstrating such messages dissuade blacks from supporting Latino candidates when his black opponent spoke to concerns that were not focused on either groups' interests. In the final analysis, the results suggest that blacks may not automatically penalize Latinos for promoting their group-specific interests; the Latino-centric message only reduces blacks' support for the Latino candidate when the black candidate steers clear of group-based appeals.

7.2.2 Latino Evaluations of the Black Candidate

Lastly, the analysis shifts to consider whether campaign appeals by black candidates can be successful at rallying support from Hispanics in New York. The expectations are the same as those from the earlier sections of this chapter. First, Latinos are expected to evaluate Latino candidates more positively without regard to their campaign messages or the messages of their black opponent (Ingroup Bias Hypothesis). Yet, Latinos should gravitate towards black candidates that speak to broad, superordinate interests more than those that endorse either narrow, sectarian or group-neutral concerns (Cross-group Message Hypothesis). On the other hand, black candidates that emphasize group-specific concerns should garner greater opposition from Latinos since the candidate fails to address their group interests (Ingroup Message Hypothesis). Lastly, highly-threatened Latinos are likely to evaluate black candidates more negatively across the board; their view that blacks pose a threat to their group well-being is likely to undercut any effort by a black candidate to garner their support. Alternatively, Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks may illicit certain responses from a black candidates' campaign messages. First, their perceived threat from African Americans may lead them to find black candidates who

speak to broad, shared interests more appealing (Moderated Cross-group Hypothesis). In this instance, cross-group messages should mollify Latinos' perceived threat from the candidate by addressing issues that are also relevant to the Hispanic community. Accordingly, highly-threatened Latinos should find narrow, group-specific messages from black candidates unappealing since such messages offer a cue that the black candidate will address black issues and neglect the interests of the Latino community (Moderated Ingroup Message Hypothesis). Each of these hypotheses is addressed in detail below.

To begin, the general pattern of Latinos' evaluation of the black candidate is examined. Table 7.16 reports the cell means for Latinos' evaluation of the black candidate across experimental conditions. On the whole, the evaluation of the black candidate was generally favorable; the overall mean for the black candidate was .53. Nevertheless, there was considerable variance between experimental conditions. For example, when looking at the influence of the black candidate's message, Latinos clearly evaluated the black candidate differently depending on the group appeals made by the candidate. As expected, when the black candidate spoke to broad, minority messages Latinos evaluated them more positively than if he expressed an ingroup message ($\mu=.49$ and $.42$, respectively). This finding is consistent with the expectations for the cross-group message and ingroup message hypotheses. In particular, the ingroup message drove considerably less support for the black candidate; in fact, a majority of Latinos evaluated the black candidate that utilized the ingroup message negatively. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals that the neutral message was the most popular among the Latino respondents. The relationship may imply that Latino participants did not view black appeals to their interests as plausible and, consequently, were less inclined to support the black candidate.

Interestingly, Latinos appeared to evaluate the black candidate more favorably when his Latino opponent stressed narrow, group-specific concerns ($\mu=.57$). This finding is unexpected since Latinos should perceive an ingroup message by the co-

Table 7.16: Means of Latinos' Evaluation of the Black Candidate Across Conditions

Candidate's Race	Candidate Messages			Total
	Latino Neutral	Latino Ingroup	Latino Cross-Group	
Black Neutral	.66	.66	.61	.64
Black Ingroup	.37	.49	.41	.42
Black Cross-Group	.57	.57	.35	.49
Total	.55	.57	.50	.53

Note: The cell means reflect participants' average score on their reported evaluations of the black political candidates. The dependent variable was recoded to range from 0, which indicates a very negative evaluation of the respective candidate, to 1, which indicates a very positive evaluation of the candidate.

ethnic candidate as a surer sign that their interests will be addressed. Furthermore, Latino participants were less likely to think positively about black candidates when facing a Latino candidate who promoted broad, minority concerns ($\mu=.50$). Overall, the evidence suggests that Latinos were opposed to narrow, sectarian appeals by both candidates.

Next, consider the cell means for Latinos' evaluations of the Latino candidate. Table 7.17 reports the cell means across experimental conditions. The most glaring pattern in the data is that Latinos clearly exhibited an ingroup bias for the Latino candidate. First, when comparing the overall mean evaluation between the black and Latino candidates, Latinos overwhelmingly favored the Latino candidate over the black candidate ($\mu=.75$ and $.53$, respectively). In fact, when comparing the means between Table 7.16 and 7.17, Latino participants evaluated the Latino candidate more positively than the black candidate in every experimental condition. Ultimately, this finding offers strong support for the ingroup bias hypothesis by showing that, generally, Latinos prefer Latino candidates more than black candidates regardless of the messages offered by both candidates.

Furthermore, the mean evaluation for each of the Latino campaign messages were approximately equal, suggesting they had little impact on their view of the Latino candidate. As would be expected, the average score for the Latino ingroup

Table 7.17: Means of Latinos' Evaluation of the Latino Candidate Across Conditions

Candidate's Race	Candidate Messages			Total
	Latino Neutral	Latino Ingroup	Latino Cross-Group	
Black Neutral	.73	.73	.84	.78
Black Ingroup	.65	.79	.80	.74
Black Cross-Group	.82	.79	.58	.72
Total	.73	.77	.76	.75

Note: The cell means reflect participants' average score on their reported evaluations of the political candidates. The dependent variable was recoded to range from 0, which indicates a very negative evaluation of the respective candidate, to 1, which indicates a very positive evaluation of the candidate.

message is the highest ($\mu=.77$), but only one percentage point higher than the Latino minority message ($\mu=.76$). The difference is not large enough to suggest they reflect a systematic relationship.

Moreover, the evidence does not suggest Latinos' evaluation of the Latino candidate differed significantly depending on the message of the black candidate. Again, the means were virtually similar for all the messages from the black candidate. In keeping with the cross-group message hypothesis, Latinos appeared less supportive of the Latino candidate when the black candidate spoke to shared, superordinate interests ($\mu=.72$). One might expect Latinos to favor the Latino candidate more when the African American candidate endorsed exclusively black issues; however, the evidence shows Latinos actually judged the Hispanic candidate more favorably when the black candidate spoke to group-neutral interests ($\mu=.78$). Nevertheless, the marginal differences between each of the experimental conditions suggest the race of the candidate played a more influential role in shaping Latinos' evaluations of the candidates than the campaign messages.

Next, the analysis transitions from looking at the patterns in the data to determining whether there are systematic relationships between the campaign messages and Latinos' evaluation of the black candidate. Again, a multivariate analysis is employed to further investigate the link. As before, two models are specified to

Table 7.18: OLS Estimates of Respondents' Differential Candidate Evaluations

Independent Variables	Differential Evaluations	
	β	s.e.
Race of Respondent (Latino=1)	.26	.03
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>		
Latino Ingroup Message	-.02	.04
Black Ingroup Message	.16	.04
Latino Cross-Group Message	.09	.04
Black Cross-Group Message	.03	.04
Constant	-.16	.04
N	248	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

judge the independent and interactive effects of the messages from both the black and Latino candidate.

Ingroup Bias

First, let us consider whether Latinos simply gravitate towards Latino candidates regardless of the messages they or their black opponents endorse. Glancing at the cell means from the previous section, there is strong evidence that Latinos exhibit an ingroup bias when they evaluate between black and Latino candidates. As mentioned before, the overall mean for Latinos' evaluation of the Latino candidate is much higher than for the black candidate ($\mu = .75$ and $.53$, t -statistic = 7.85). Furthermore, the means of Latinos' evaluations are higher for the Latino candidate in every experimental condition.

Nevertheless, further analysis reveals further evidence of an ingroup bias among Latino respondents. In particular, a model of respondents' differential evaluations between the black and Latino respondents indicates Latino respondents tended to evaluate the Latino candidate more positively than the black candidate across experimental conditions. The dependent variable in the model takes the difference of respondents' score on the black candidate evaluation scale from their score on the Latino candidate evaluation scale. As such, positive values indicate more favorable

Table 7.19: OLS Estimates of Latinos' Evaluation of the Black Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>				
Competition with Blacks	-.09	.07	.06	.12
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Latino Ingroup Message	.06	.05	.06	.05
Black Ingroup Message	-.29	.05	-.11	.09
Latino Cross-Group Message	-.07	.05	-.08	.05
Black Cross-Group Message	-.17	.05	-.10	.09
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Competition with Blacks X Black Ingroup	—	—	-.46	.20
Competition with Blacks X Black Cross-Group	—	—	-.13	.17
N	130		130	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

evaluations of the Latino candidate than the black candidate and, conversely, negative scores reflect more positive evaluations of the black candidate than the Latino candidate. Zero values indicate that respondents evaluated the Latino and black candidates equally. The key independent variable in the model captures whether the respondent is African American or Latino; the highest value (1) represents Latino respondents while the low value (0) captures black participants. In addition, the four measures of the candidate messages are included in the analysis. Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, ordinary least squared estimation was employed in the analysis. Ultimately, the estimate for the race of the respondent confirms the ingroup bias hypothesis. The coefficient for the race of the respondent was both positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .26$), indicating Latino respondents evaluated the Latino candidate much more favorably than the black candidate. In combination, each of these findings offers strong evidence in favor of the ingroup bias hypothesis.

Perceived Group Conflict

Furthermore, the analysis examines whether Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks drove their evaluations of the black candidate. Ultimately, the expectation is that Latino respondents who feel threatened by blacks will be disinclined to vote for African American candidates. The measure of Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks consists of a composite scale of three items measuring how threatening they believe blacks are to their jobs, political influence, and housing opportunities ($\alpha=.86$). Furthermore, as before, the analysis includes two model specifications, one that includes the independent effects of the campaign messages and the other with the interactions between each candidates' campaign messages.

Table 7.19 reports the estimates from both the reduced and full model of Latinos' evaluations of the black candidate. Model 1 shows the coefficients for the independent effects of Latinos' perceived group competition with blacks along with the candidate messages. While the direction of the estimate for blacks' perceived group competition moves in the expected negative direction ($\beta=-.09$), it does not approach conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, Latinos' perceived threat from blacks appears to have a limited impact on their general evaluations of the black candidate. Ultimately, this evidence disconfirms the expectations for the perceived group conflict hypothesis.

As a further test of the perceived group conflict hypothesis, the analysis shifts focus to Latinos' differential voting between the Latino and black candidates. This shift is warranted because rather than impacting Latinos' general evaluation of the black candidate, Latinos' perceived threat from blacks may actually be more consequential on their vote choices between the black and Latino candidate. The analysis finds this to be the case. Table 7.20 reports the estimates from a model using only the independent terms for Latinos' perceived zero-sum competition with blacks and the candidate messages. The estimate for Latinos' perceived threat from African Americans offers evidence in support of the perceived group conflict hypothesis; its

Table 7.20: Ordered Probit Estimates of Latinos' Differential Voting between the Black and Latino Candidates

Independent Variables	Model 1	
	β	s.e.
<i>Attitudinal Characteristics</i>		
Competition with Blacks	-.59†	.35
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>		
Latino Ingroup Message	-.10	.24
Black Ingroup Message	-1.11	.25
Latino Cross-Group Message	-.39	.22
Black Cross-Group Message	-.47	.22
N	130	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

coefficient moves in the negative direction ($\beta = -.59$). While the estimate fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance when using a two-tailed test, since the coefficient moves in the expected direction, a one-tailed test is justified. Using a one-tailed test, the estimate is statistically significant. In the end, highly-threatened Latinos were more likely to vote for the Latino candidate over the black candidate regardless of the messages endorsed by each candidate.

Cross-Group Messages

Next the analysis explores whether cross-group messages were effective at rallying greater support among Latinos for the black candidate. In order to test this theory a model of Latinos' general evaluations of the black candidate was specified. Like the previous analyses, dichotomous items for the black and Latinos' ingroup and cross-group campaign messages were included in the model specification. The continuous nature of the dependent variable necessitates the use of ordinary least squared estimation. The estimates from the model are reported in Table 7.21.

Similar to the previous analysis, two models are specified to test the hypotheses. The first model includes a reduced specification that includes independent variables

Table 7.21: OLS Estimates of Latinos' Evaluations of the Black Candidate

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Experimental Manipulations</i>				
Latino Ingroup Message	.05	.05	.00	.09
Black Ingroup Message	-.24	.05	-.29	.08
Latino Cross-Group Message	-.07	.05	-.04	.07
Black Cross-Group Message	-.16	.05	-.09	.08
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
Black Ingroup X Latino Ingroup	—	—	.12	.13
Black Cross-Group X Latino Ingroup	—	—	.00	.12
Black Ingroup X Latino Cross-Group	—	—	.08	.12
Black Cross-Group X Latino Cross-Group	—	—	-.17	.11
Constant	.66	.04	.66	.05
N	141		141	

Note: Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

for the candidate messages; the specification is able to test whether the effects of the messages are true across experimental conditions. On the other hand, the second model uses the same items, but also includes interaction terms between the candidate messages; this model specification was used to determine whether the effect of the candidate messages was conditional upon the messages of the opposing Latino candidate. In model 1, the cross-group message hypothesis is confirmed if the item for messages that endorse shared superordinate interests is positive and statistically significant. Ultimately, the estimates do not support the cross-group message hypothesis. The item for the minority message of the black candidate was statistically significant, but negative ($\beta = -.16$), which suggests such messages actually led Latinos to view the black candidate more negatively.

Model 2 reports the coefficients when the interactive effects are included. This specification, as before, allows for an examination of whether the impact of the cross-group message from the black candidate depended upon the appeals of the Latino candidate. The first thing to note is that none of the interactive effects reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, the independent term

for the black candidate's superordinate message was both negative and statistically insignificant. Ultimately, these findings offer no support for the cross-group message hypothesis. In fact, they directly contradict expectations by showing Latino participants tended to evaluate the black candidate more negatively when appeals to shared, superordinate interests were employed.

Ingroup Messages

Lastly, there is considerable evidence in favor of the ingroup message hypothesis. For model 1 in Table 7.21, a negative and statistically significant estimate for the ingroup message of the black candidate would confirm expectations. Accordingly, the estimate for the black ingroup message indicates appeals to black issues drove less favorable views of the black candidate; the coefficient was both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-.24$). The independent effect of the black candidate's appeal to narrow, group-specific concerns shows that its influence was present regardless of the messages offered by his Latino opponent.

When shifting focus from model 1 to model 2, the aim is to determine whether the impact of the ingroup message for the black candidate was conditional upon the message of the Latino candidate. However, the evidence from Model 2 allows one to draw similar inferences as those from Model 1. Again, the black ingroup message motivated Latino participants to evaluate the black candidate more negatively. The coefficient for the independent measure of the black ingroup message was both negative and statistically significant ($\beta=-.29$), indicating Hispanics judged black candidates that spoke to narrow, sectarian interests more negatively when the Latino candidate promoted more group-neutral concerns. Nevertheless, none of the other independent and interactive effects reached conventional levels of statistical significance. In the final analysis, Latinos' feelings toward the black candidate were fundamentally shaped by whether black candidates concentrated their messages on concerns that were exclusive to their ingroup.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the influence of the black ingroup message varied depending on Latinos' perceived group competition with African Americans. The interaction term between the group competition scale and the ingroup message in Model 2 of Table 7.19 offers a direct test of the moderated ingroup message hypothesis. The interaction term produces a negative and statistically significant coefficient ($\beta = -.46$). The negative relationship shows that when presented with an ingroup message from a black candidate, highly-threatened Latinos tend to evaluate black candidates negatively. This finding is entirely consistent with what we would expect from the moderated ingroup message hypothesis. Highly-threatened Latinos would be more acutely aware that their group concerns were not being addressed and, consequently, would harbor more negative feelings toward the black candidate.

Discussion

Ultimately, the results offer considerable evidence in support of many of the proposed hypotheses. The most consistent evidence shows that both black and Latino participants preferred co-ethnic candidates to outgroup candidates. These results emerged even when controlling for the candidate messages. Both groups' preference for their own candidates suggest contests involving black and Latino candidates will tend to lead to racial bloc voting rather than electoral alliances formed on the basis of the content of the candidates' messages.

On the other hand, there was limited evidence to suggest appeals to shared, superordinate interests increased the potential support of blacks and Latinos for each other's candidates. Among African Americans, the Latino candidates' appeals to the shared concerns of blacks and Latinos did not impact their overall evaluation, but did increase their likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate. Nevertheless, the minority message did not increase blacks' likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate over the black candidate. Similarly, there was no evidence to suggest black candidates' appeals to shared, superordinate interests are effective at rallying

support from Latinos. Overall, these findings appear to corroborate previous evidence that Latinos may be less willing to acknowledge commonalities with blacks than blacks notice with Latinos (McClain et al., 2006).

The results also indicate black and Latino candidates are best served when they steer clear of messages that speak to their narrow, sectarian concerns. An ingroup message from the Latino candidate reduced blacks' likelihood of voting for the candidate. Similarly, Latinos evaluated black candidates more negatively when they addressed black-oriented issues. Thus, while there is little evidence to suggest black and Latino candidates can effectively garner cross-group support, the results indicate appeals to shared group interests are superior to messages directed exclusively to the interests of the ingroup.

Lastly, the evidence concerning the influence of blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition on their candidate evaluations were mixed. Highly-threatened blacks were more likely to vote for the black candidate over the Latino candidate across experimental conditions; thus, there was no appeal that the Latino candidate could pose to encourage highly-threatened blacks to support them. On the other hand, Latinos who believed they were engaged in group competition with blacks appeared more sensitive to the messages promoted by the black candidate. In particular, the evidence shows that highly-threatened Latinos evaluated the African American candidate more negatively when he endorsed black issues. In both cases, there is no evidence to suggest group members that perceive the outgroup as a threat can be effectively persuaded to support the outgroup candidate.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter focused on blacks and Latinos living in New York City. New York City provided an ideal location to conduct the study because there is a long history of blacks and Latinos living in the same or adjacent neighborhoods. In

many instances, their cohabitation has led to less conflictual relationships between both groups; however, there have also been clear instances of conflict between them. When there has been political cooperation, it has been with the benefit of strong political leaders who forged electoral alliances by making appeals that spoke to the interests of both groups. Accordingly, the evidence presented in this chapter reveals the degree to which the group interests conveyed by the messages of political elites work to draw outgroup members to support their candidacy.

The experimental studies presented in this chapter provide a nuanced picture of how these messages work, first, for elections between majority and minority candidates and, secondly, in elections between two minority candidates (i.e., African American and Latino). Overall, blacks and Latinos tend to evaluate co-ethnic candidates more favorably than outgroup minority candidates. Yet, while one may imply from these findings that the prospects for black-Latino alliances are limited, further examination actually shows the potential for electoral alliances hinges upon the nature of the candidate matchup. Although preferring co-ethnic candidates, both blacks and Latinos evaluate each other's candidates more positively than a white opponent. In the final analysis, this finding suggests that, absent a co-ethnic candidate, electoral alliances between blacks and Latinos are possible. On the other hand, there is less evidence that group members can be effectively persuaded to support each other's candidates when a co-ethnic candidate is one of the contenders.

Furthermore, in some instances, blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition independently influenced their evaluations of each other's candidates. For instance, when facing a white opponent, highly-threatened Latinos evaluated the black candidate negatively regardless of the message he expressed. Furthermore, when a black and Latino candidate faced one another both blacks and Latinos who perceived group competition favored the co-ethnic candidate over the outgroup candidate across the experimental conditions. The fact that both groups' perceived group competition impacted their voting behavior more than their evaluations, sug-

gests highly-threatened group members understand the implications of their vote on their overall group condition are deeper than their candidate evaluations.

The evidence for the impact of the cross-group message is mixed. In majority-minority elections, appeals to shared, superordinate interests were generally ineffective at shaping how both groups' evaluated each other's candidates. The only exception was for highly-threatened blacks, who expressed more positive views of the Latino candidate when he promoted broad, superordinate interests. In this instance, the cross-group message appears to have mollified blacks concern that the Latino candidate would pursue the interests of Hispanics at their expense. In elections between a black and Latino candidate, the Latino candidate's use of the minority message was shown to heighten blacks' reported likelihood of voting for the Latino candidate, while, again, the message had no impact on Latinos' perception of the black candidate. Overall, the findings suggest that while under certain circumstances, appeals to shared group interests may compel blacks to participate in electoral alliances with Latinos, Latinos remain unmoved by such messages. These results appear to corroborate previous evidence suggesting Latinos tend to perceive fewer commonalities with African Americans than blacks believe they have with Hispanics (McClain et al., 2006).

Yet, there is strong evidence that group members dislike outgroup candidates that speak to narrow, group-specific interests. In elections between a majority and minority candidate, both blacks and Latinos were less likely to favor the outgroup minority candidate over the majority candidate when he promoted the exclusive interests of his ingroup. In similar fashion, when black and Latino candidates contend against each other, both groups voice stronger opposition toward the outgroup candidate when he voices the sectarian interests of his own group. In particular, Latinos who perceived group competition with blacks felt more negatively toward the black candidate that used the ingroup message. Taken together, the analysis shows that the potential for black-Latino alliances may be undermined by candidate

appeals to their sectarian group concerns.

On the whole, the results suggest there are several barriers to the formation of electoral alliances between African Americans and Latinos. Even when not considering candidate appeals, blacks and Latinos uniformly prefer their own co-ethnic candidates to outgroup candidates. However, the evidence offers little guidance for what political elites might say to encourage black and Latino citizens to engage in electoral alliances. At best, they can stem opposition by steering clear of messages that communicate narrow, exclusive concerns.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Data shows that, on average, both blacks and Latinos in the United States experience lower levels of economic well-being than white Americans. For instance, whether bull or bear market, the unemployment rate for African Americans and Latinos is typically much higher than for their white counterparts (Farley, 1987). Some quip that "when America catches the cold, black America catches pneumonia", for, in many cases, the unemployment rate for blacks and, to a lesser extent, Latinos can reach almost twice the rate for whites. Additionally, a larger proportion of both groups live below the poverty line. Based on Census data collected in 2007, 25 percent of the black population and approximately 22 percent (21.5%) of the Latino population lived in poverty as compared to only approximately 8 percent (8.2%) of non-Hispanic, white Americans (, ACS). Yet, even these figures do not accurately reflect the concentrated poverty in many inner-city, predominantly minority neighborhoods, where poverty rates can reach as high as 50 percent (Wilson, 2001). Furthermore, there have traditionally been significant differences in educational attainment, with 30 percent of whites earning at least a college degree and only approximately 17 percent (17.3%) of blacks and 11 percent (11.2%) of Latinos doing so (, ACS). Similar disparities exist in other domains as well, from differences in access to affordable housing to inequitable treatment within the healthcare system.

Given their common economic circumstances, it would appear African Americans and Hispanic Americans share similar economic interests and concerns.

Yet, while experiencing similar economic conditions, those very economic considerations often threaten to undermine any prospects for political alliances. Recent studies show that tensions between blacks and Latinos often emerge as a consequence of competition for jobs, housing, and political access (Henry, 1980; Johnson and Oliver, 1989). The economic tensions stem from a fundamental shift in the urban economy from a manufacturing base to more service-oriented industries. As a consequence of this transition, there was a limited pool of jobs for blacks, who worked disproportionately within the manufacturing sector, and a greater demand for cheap labor, which Latino migrant workers were able to provide (Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Wilson, 1997). Politically, both groups frequently pursue a finite number of elected offices and public resources. Within areas with smaller white populations, it has been shown that political competition can emerge (McClain and Karnig, 1990). Also, while their economic interests may push them to work together, their differences over other issues stand to drive them further apart. Latinos tend to value issues surrounding language (e.g., bilingual education) and immigration, which tend to be less of a priority for African Americans. On the other hand, although favored by both groups, African Americans support affirmative action programs at higher rates than Hispanic Americans (Bobo, 1998). Even barring competition over resources and their differences over policy priorities, blacks' and Latinos' prejudices as well as their inability to perceive commonalities with one another stand as barriers to cooperation (McClain et al., 2006; Kaufmann, 2003). Recent studies show that these attitudes are particularly prevalent among Hispanics. Latinos tend to hold negative stereotypical views of African Americans (McClain et al., 2006) and perceive fewer commonalities between themselves and African Americans than many blacks feel toward Latinos (McClain et al., 2006; Kaufmann, 2003). In the end, these factors explain why in the few cases blacks and Latinos have been able to forge political

coalitions, they have been largely unstable.

The direction of this project was informed by realistic group conflict (RGCT) approaches to explaining intergroup behavior. In most cases, the empirical work on realistic group conflict theory has focused on how concerns over economic self-interests or group conditions motivate intergroup tensions (Bobo, 1983; Giles and Hertz, 1994). Yet, there is another component of RGCT that seeks to explain how group conflict can be abated. The early theorists proposed that group conflict can be reduced and cooperation facilitated by presenting groups with superordinate goals that neither could achieve independently. Likewise, this study explored the factors that both trigger and reduce group conflict. The first aim of the study was to, like previous studies, examine whether economic self-interests and group material conditions heighten tensions between African Americans and Latinos. Specifically, I was interested in whether both factors increased both groups' perceptions that they were engaged in zero-sum group competition as well as if they held an ingroup bias in their positions about who should benefit from race-related public policies. While the relationship of economic self-interests and group material conditions have been explored in previous studies, this project separates itself by, first, looking outside of a black-white paradigm. While other work has suggested that economic self-interests play a negligible role on political behavior, there was good reason to believe that personal economic concerns would be even more pronounced in relationships between blacks and Latinos. Moreover, with few exceptions (Gay, 2006), the work examining group material conditions and group attitudes has focused largely on relationships between whites and blacks. Thirdly, rather than focusing exclusively on how these factors influence racial attitudes, this project examined both how they affected each groups' perceived group competition as well as their policy attitudes.

Next, the project explored whether elite messages affect African Americans' and Hispanic Americans' willingness to engage in electoral alliances. Previous work suggests political elites are central to developing and maintaining minority coalitions

(Kaufmann, 2003). They are important for communicating information, values, and goals to citizens. Accordingly, it is argued black and Latino candidates can compel members within their group to realize their economic, political, and cultural commonalities, which can generate ingroup solidarity and intergroup political alliances. Yet, while many have asserted the importance of political elites in shaping mass attitudes among blacks and Latinos, little empirical work has been conducted to confirm the relationship. To the author's knowledge, this project is the first to examine the influence of elite messages on black and Latinos' attitudes toward each other's candidates. Messages appealing to common interests between blacks and Latinos were expected to generate greater support for the outgroup candidate. These cross-group messages offered an opportunity to explore whether an appeal to pursue larger superordinate goals between the groups was successful at facilitating cooperation. In contrast, messages emphasizing group-specific concerns were utilized to determine whether they would draw people away from outgroup minority candidates. These messages were believed to heighten the sense that the candidate would pursue narrow group concerns rather than both groups' mutual interests.

Economic Self-Interests

Ultimately, the project uncovered some interesting results. First, economic self-interests appear to shape the perceptions that blacks and Latinos have of one another as well as their policy attitudes. In Los Angeles, African Americans' perceived group competition with Latinos is influenced-to varying degrees-by their economic self-interests. In particular, job competition appears to be at the root of these feelings. Furthermore, their preference for blacks to benefit from race-based public policies over Latinos was connected to their employment status, income and home ownership. This finding is interesting because it shows that there are not only economic, but political self-interests at play. For Latinos, their perceived competition from blacks

was also shaped by whether they were gainfully employed. However, these economic self-interests had a minimal influence on their public policy attitudes; the limited impact of economic self-interests on Latinos' ingroup policy biases likely reflects they have yet to become politically socialized to a degree that they can understand how the political environment impacts their personal well-being. Overall, these findings corroborate studies and news reports of increasing job competition between African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles (Johnson and Oliver, 1989; Vaca, 2004).

In Boston, blacks and Latinos are less concerned with their job opportunities, than their access to quality housing. Additionally, uneducated Latinos expressed stronger feelings of group competition with African Americans than their better-educated counterparts. Nevertheless, both groups' policy positions on race-related public policies were not significantly influenced by their economic self-interests. This finding suggests political conflicts between African Americans and Latinos in Boston are unrelated to their personal economic circumstances.

Overall, there is reason to believe economic self-interests will continue to play a role in relations between blacks and Latinos in both cities. Increasingly, black Angelenos must compete with Hispanics over low-skilled jobs, which historically have been the reserve of African Americans. Furthermore, Latinos comprised-and continue to comprise-a larger proportion of the population in Los Angeles than African Americans. Latinos were approximately 40 percent of Los Angeles' population in 1990 and grew to become almost half of the population of Los Angeles County in 2008. On the other hand, the black population in 1990 was at approximately 11 percent and has since declined to a little under 10 percent.¹ Such a population advantage would usually translate into a political advantage for Latinos; however, their political power in Los Angeles is neutralized by the fact that many Latinos in Los Angeles are either illegal or unnaturalized immigrants. This disparity explains

¹Estimates for the black and Hispanic populations in Los Angeles County in 1990 are based on 1990 decennial Census data; the 2008 estimates were acquired from the American Community Survey, which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau on a yearly basis.

why blacks in Los Angeles feel Hispanics pose a greater threat to them economically than politically.

Dramatic changes are also taking place in Boston. In 1990, the Latino population amounted to only 11 percent of the population. Since then, based on estimates from 2007, their numbers have shot up to approximately 18 percent. By comparison, African Americans comprised approximately 26 percent of the Boston population in 1990, and have declined to roughly 23 percent in 2007. Given these estimates, there is reason to suspect any advantages blacks felt in the job market or politically are weakening as the growing Latino population seeks better job opportunities. With their larger size, Latinos can now supply a reliable source of cheap labor for low-skilled jobs. Blacks also do not have as strong a grip on public offices and, by consequence, public jobs. Although with considerable opposition from white Bostonians, African Americans have over the years, mobilized themselves into a unified political front, electing black candidates to at-large and district-level city council seats (Nelson Jr., 2000). During the 1990s, there were few analagous movements among Latinos. Nevertheless, with the increasing size of the Latino community in Boston, there have been more successful efforts at mobilization. In 2001, Felix Arroyo became the first and only Latino elected to the city council, aided by a virtually unanimous Latino vote and a significant proportion of blacks. Latinos have also won a number of state elected offices in Boston as well as surrounding suburbs. The burgeoning Latino population may presage greater competition between African Americans and Latinos over government jobs and access to public resources, which often have been the rewards for electoral success among racial and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, since the groups are on more equal footing, they may realize the importance of creating stable electoral alliances.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the evidence in support of the economic self-interest hypothesis should be accepted cautiously, largely because the analysis did not control for participants' perception of the causes of their personal economic prob-

lems. Specifically, previous evidence suggests the influence of economic self-interest on political behavior is mitigated by citizens' belief in economic individualism, or the sense that they are responsible for their personal economic well-being (Feldman, 1982). The analysis would also benefit from measures that ask respondents to subjectively assess whether outgroup members threaten their personal economic circumstances.

Residential Group Conflict

Surprisingly, there was little to suggest either the racial context or group material conditions heightened tensions between blacks and Latinos. At best, the evidence in Los Angeles shows blacks' perceived threat from Latinos is highest in neighborhoods where Latinos enjoy greater material advantages than African Americans. The results from the rest of the analysis were weak. In fact, the findings suggest that when living in close proximity to one another amid dire economic conditions, blacks and Latinos were actually *less* likely to view their interests in conflictual terms. Clearly, the result contradicts what would be expected from studies of racial threat, which suggests that such conditions heighten group antagonisms. What do the results imply about the role of the context in shaping the relationship between both groups? Rather than offering evidence for realistic group conflict, the evidence appears to support the racial contact theory, which proposes that meaningful interactions between groups reduce group tensions and negative racial attitudes. Using measures at the census block level offers conditions in which respondents are more likely to have more substantive interactions with the outgroup (Forbes, 1996). Moreover, when both groups experience the same economic conditions within such small geographic units, it is more likely that they view themselves as having greater commonalities. Using the same data, Oliver and Wong (2003) draw a similar conclusion, finding that individuals living predominantly among ingroup members were more likely to

express negative racial attitudes toward outgroups than those living in communities with fewer ingroup members. The present findings are somewhat different in that they show the presence of both groups within the same communities amid similarly dire economic circumstances reduces their perceived group competition and ingroup policy biases.

A question remains as to whether the results for the residential group conditions would hold when measuring the contextual indicators at larger geographic units. As previously mentioned, supporting studies of the racial threat hypothesis have tended to utilize measures of the social environment at larger geographic units (e.g., county of residence and standard metropolitan statistical areas) (Giles, 1977; Giles and Evans, 1986; Glaser, 1994; Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989). There is a consensus among these studies that larger areas reflect conflict such as job competition. On the other hand, recent work shows proximity to outgroup members reduces outgroup antipathy in smaller geographic areas (Oliver and Wong, 2003). It has been suggested that indicators of racial threat at smaller geographic units are a better approximation of meaningful interactions between group members.² The analysis from this study supports this argument by showing blacks' and Latinos' proximity to each other within neighborhoods may work towards alleviating group tensions rather than heightening them.

Perceived Group Competition

The relationship between blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition and political attitudes was a central part of the study as well. There were consistent results that both groups' perceived group competition motivated them to prefer policies that benefited group members at each other's expense. The effect of both

²One may also argue small areas reflect residential choice or self-selection; however, given concentrated levels of racial segregation among blacks and Latinos, there is little reason to suspect self-selection plays a large role in their residential location (South and Crowder, 1998).

groups' perceived threat on their policy positions was separate from the influence of their economic self-interests and group residential conditions. Furthermore, both groups' perceived group competition did not merely serve as a proxy for their underlying negative racial attitudes; their perceptions appear to truly reflect concerns that the other group is benefiting at their group's expense. Also, blacks' perceived competition with Latinos concentrated on the threat of Latinos as a group rather than general immigration patterns. Of course, these findings beg the question: What exactly does the perceived zero-sum competition between blacks and Latinos reflect if not their underlying economic self-interests, residential group conflict, negative racial attitudes, or, for blacks, their perceived threat from immigration? The results suggest their perceived threat conveys their group interests, but their concerns are likely symbolic, rather than material in nature.

Furthermore, group members' perceived competition impacted their reactions to political elites. In several cases, blacks' and Latinos' perceived group competition caused them to evaluate each other's candidates more negatively. Additionally, highly-threatened group members were inclined to support the ingroup candidate over the other minority candidate regardless of the messages promoted by each candidate. Lastly, as will be discussed below, group members who believed they were engaged in zero-sum competition with the other group, were sensitive to the group interests conveyed by the outgroup minority candidate in his messages. Overall, the work indicates both groups' subjective assessment of competition can have a significant impact on their willingness to engage in electoral alliances. Overall, the findings support arguments that studies of group conflict should not exclusively utilize objective measures of group threat, but also items that capture how strongly group members believe the outgroup poses a threat to their well-being (Bobo, 1983). Under conditions where blacks and Latinos are made to feel anxious about their group well-being, it seems unlikely that political alliances between blacks and Latinos would occur.

Elite Messages

Finally, the experiment revealed that political alliances between blacks and Latinos face some difficult challenges. First, both groups evaluate co-ethnic candidates more positively than outgroup candidates, regardless of the candidates' messages. Their ingroup biases are clearly a hurdle when a black and Latino candidate face one another within an election. Such an election is likely to lead to racial-bloc voting among both groups. However, blacks' and Latinos' ingroup biases do not threaten opportunities for building cross-group alliances when an ingroup candidate is not involved in the contest. Under these circumstances, blacks and Latinos' evaluate each other's candidates more positively than a white challenger. Therefore, barring the presence of a co-ethnic candidate, the prospects for electoral alliances between both groups are substantial.

The evidence for the impact of the elite messages is mixed. In majority-minority elections, cross-group appeals were somewhat successful at encouraging blacks and Latinos to support each other's candidates. At best, Latino candidates that spoke to shared, superordinate interests were more positively evaluated by blacks who perceived group competition with Latinos. Furthermore, when black and Latino candidates face one another, the evidence suggests blacks are willing to vote for Latino candidates that utilized the cross-group message; however, they had no impact on Latinos' views toward the black candidate. Ultimately, the findings suggests that, under some circumstances, blacks are willing to support Latino candidates that appeal to blacks' and Latinos' shared group concerns. However, cross-group messages have no impact on Latinos' attitudes toward the black candidate. Ultimately, the findings appear to support earlier findings that Latinos recognize fewer commonalities with blacks than blacks perceive to have with them (McClain et al., 2006). In majority-minority elections, endorsements by political elites in the Latino community may be more effective at encouraging Hispanics to support black candidates

(Kaufmann, 2003); however, due to ingroup pressures, Latino leaders are less likely to support a black candidate when a co-ethnic candidate is running.

Black and Latino candidates that spoke to their narrow, group-specific interests were particularly unlikely to encourage intergroup alliances. Across elections, blacks and Latinos were less likely to vote for the outgroup minority candidate over the white candidate when he emphasized sectarian group concerns. Furthermore, when a black and Latino candidate faced one another, highly-threatened Latinos tended to feel more negatively toward black candidates that endorsed black-oriented issues. Ultimately, both black and Latino candidates can at least stem opposition by avoiding any appeals to their narrow, group concerns.

On the whole, the results offer mixed results concerning the prospects of electoral alliances between blacks and Latinos. On a positive note, both groups are willing to support each other's candidates when they face white opponents. This result has been born out in many elections across the country; from Harold Washington's 1983 mayoral victory in Chicago, Antonio Villaraigsa's election as mayor of Los Angeles in 2005, and even Barack Obama's successful campaign for the presidency in 2008. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests the potential for cooperation is limited when black and Latino candidates face one another. In these elections, there is likely to be extreme racial polarization in the voting behavior of blacks and Latinos. While this scenario has been limited, the few instances this has occurred-such as the 2001 election between Lee Brown and Mark Sanchez-have led to considerable racial-bloc voting among both groups.

Future Directions

The discussion surrounding political coalitions between blacks and Latinos have tended to focus on the issues of political incorporation (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1986) and conflict (McClain and Karnig, 1990; Vaca, 2004; Gay, 2006). A few studies have concentrated on the perceived commonalities both groups feel towards

one another (Kaufmann, 2003; McClain et al., 2006), which moves somewhat closer to exploring the potential for both groups to work together. This project lays new ground by exploring the elements of the political, economic, and social context that shape each groups' attitudes about forming political alliances. Although the findings offered in this project move in a new direction, there are other avenues of exploration that warrant attention.

First, more work should be done to understand how the relative population size of each group across cities impacts their attitudes about forming electoral alliances. Few coalitions emerge within environments where one group comprises a majority of the population, or registered voters. This reality explains the frustrations voiced by blacks living in cities like Miami and, increasingly, Los Angeles. Similar feelings are likely felt among Latinos living in predominantly African-American urban centers. Under such conditions, both groups can pursue their interests independently, without seeking support from other groups. Consequently, urban areas comprising a majority or strong plurality of members from either group have been able to elect a member of their group as mayor for over a quarter of a century, largely through fairly pronounced racially polarized voting (e.g., Miami, Atlanta, Detroit). Black-Latino coalitions appear more successful within environments where neither group composes a majority of the population, thus, any effort to achieve their shared interests must be done through cooperation. Furthermore, the populations outside of the black or Latino communities must be considered, particularly because their size can determine the capacity of both groups to pursue their own agendas. There is little work indicating at what point the population distribution of urban centers is optimal for biracial-and particularly minority-coalitions to form. Yet, the literature would be well served by further examination.

Furthermore, greater attention should be paid to how white candidates shape the prospects for black-Latino alliances. The first experiment in chapter 7 assigns a group-neutral message to the Anglo candidate in every condition. However, as cities

become increasingly diverse, it will also require white candidates to make appeals to minority voters. More research is needed to determine whether white candidates can successfully rally minority support through their campaign messages, particularly when facing a minority candidate. The present analysis shows that, generally, racial and ethnic minorities will gravitate toward other minorities rather than the majority candidate. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suspect that Anglo candidates who make broad group appeals can win the support of minority voters, particularly when an ingroup candidate is not an option. The 2001 mayoral election in Los Angeles is proof that, within cities where neither Anglos, Latinos, nor blacks hold a commanding proportion of the voting population, Anglo candidates can successfully win elections by gaining the support of one of the minority groups.

Another potentially fruitful area of study moves beyond individual voters and their support for political candidates and looks more closely at coalitions between organizations. As pointed out by other researchers, voting accounts for only one form of political participation (Verba, 1995). There are a variety of other ways for individuals and groups to influence the political process; one of these ways is through the work of interest groups. How often do groups working toward the interests of either blacks or Latinos cooperate to pursue their common interests? Under what conditions is cooperation most likely? What sort of policy concerns do these groups tend to rally around? Answers to these questions may reveal whether there are differences in the willingness of citizens versus political activists and elected officials to engage in political coalitions.

The last issue at hand involves the stability of coalitions between both groups. In many urban areas, support for minority-led electoral alliances waxes and wanes across time and elections. As mentioned previously, even instances in which minority candidates have won elections through biracial coalitions, they have often only lasted for one election cycle. Although difficult to measure, it would be revealing to assess the factors that influence the stability of minority coalitions over time.

Minority Public Opinion

In order for these issues to be addressed, efforts have to be made to increase the amount of available data from minority populations. Understanding the political behavior of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States has become a recent concern of political scientists. Consequently, we are only starting to gain insight into the group concerns and attitudes toward group-relevant policies among minorities. Most of the existing survey datasets have large samples of white Americans, with relatively few members of racial and ethnic minority groups. These data have deeply contributed to our understanding of public opinion and political behavior. However, their contributions are usually presented under the guise of understanding "American" political attitudes and behavior, when in fact these data are primarily capturing one subgroup-albeit a majority-of the population in the United States.

Some of the more prominent national surveys with large samples of either African Americans or Latinos are reported in Table 8.1. Since 1984, there have been a series of studies aimed at capturing the political attitudes and behavior of African Americans. The first comprehensive studies of black public opinion were the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies (NBES), which concentrated primarily on attitudes towards Jesse Jackson as a political candidate (Jackson, 1984 and 1988). If continued, the NBES would have served as a useful way to assess black opinion across time; however, after 1988 there was not another study in the series until 1996 and has not been repeated to this day. Outside of the NBES, another study that gauged the political attitudes and behaviors of African Americans was the 1993-4 National Black Politics Study (NBPS) (Dawson, Brown and Jackson, 1993). The NBPS was unique in the range of items that asked blacks about various issues such as their nationalistic attitudes, gender attitudes, and attendance at politicized black churches. The emergence of Barack Obama as a successful African-American presidential candidate has rejuvenated interest in black political attitudes and, as a

Table 8.1: National Surveys of African Americans and Latinos

Year	Study	N
1984	National Black Election Study	1150
1988	National Black Election Study	473
1989-90	Latino National Political Survey	2000
1996	National Black Election Study	1216
1993-4	National Black Politics Study	1206
2006	Latino National Survey	8634
2008	CAAPS/ABC News Black Politics Study	1032

Note: The sample sizes reflect the number of respondents participating in the pre-election study consequence, survey data of African Americans. More recently, the Center of African American Politics and Society at Columbia University and ABC News conducted the Black Politics Survey in September 2008 to gauge the attitudes of African Americans toward Obama along with their feelings concerning black advancement and their racial and ethnic identities (Harris, 2008).

Large samples of Latinos are also difficult to come by. The most well-known national survey of Latino political attitudes and behavior was the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey, which completed interviews with approximately 2000 Latinos (800 Mexican-Americans, 600 Puerto Ricans, and 600 Cubans) (de la Garza et al., 1989-90). This seminal dataset has largely been responsible for our greater insight into Latino politics in recent years (DeSipio, 1996; de la Garza et al., 1992; de la Garza, Falcon and Garcia, 1996). Additionally, since 2001, the Pew Hispanic Center has gathered data on the public opinion of Latinos on a range of political and social issues. More recently, political researchers conducted the 2006 Latino National Survey, which comprises an unprecedented 8634 Latino respondents (Fraga et al., 2006). The dataset contains a sufficient sample size not only to perform analyses on Latinos as a group, but also within respective Latino nationalities; furthermore, the dataset contains contextual data on respondents' neighborhoods and congressional districts.

However, multiracial samples would be even more beneficial. Within the last two years, researchers have made their samples large enough to do within-group analyses. For instance, the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) included an oversample of blacks and Latinos (527 African American interviews and 507 Latino interviews) (, ANES). The ANES's oversample of blacks and Latinos is an encouraging move since it tends to reflect topics of concern for mainstream political scientists. In the same year, the Collaborative Multiracial Political Survey (CMPS) was conducted, which not only drew oversamples of blacks, Latinos, and Asians, but also offered the survey in a variety of languages. Typically, public opinion surveys provide English or, at best, Spanish versions; the CMPS was available in six different languages. Hopefully, these studies show that political scientists will pay greater attention to the political attitudes and behavior of racial and ethnic minorities in the future.

Continued efforts by political scientists to collect data from racial and ethnic minorities are necessary given the dramatic population shifts taking place in the United States. Unless there is a greater effort to collect data from these often overlooked populations, there will be little information available to help us understand nascent shifts in American political attitudes and behavior.

Broader Implications

The importance of forging biracial coalitions becomes increasingly clear as the population of the United States becomes more diverse. Based on estimates from a Census Bureau report in 2007, approximately one-third of all Americans are non-white. African Americans compose only approximately 13.5 percent and Hispanics comprise roughly 15 percent of the American population. Presuming current immigration and birthrate patterns persist, it is projected Anglo-Americans will become a majority-minority by 2050. Nevertheless, presently, there are four states in the country where the Anglo-American population is less than 50 percent (i.e., Califor-

nia, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas). These statistics illustrate the face of America is changing in dramatic fashion.

These shifts have led to significant changes in American politics and the policy priorities of the American public. The size of minority populations have caused dramatic economic, social, and political changes. Frequently, elected officials disregard the interests of minority communities at their own peril. Another consequence of these changes is that there are a larger pool of minority candidates and a greater variety of policy concerns than there has ever been in American history. As a consequence, politicians must speak to the variegated American populace by making broad appeals to their shared interests. The importance of such appeals is demonstrated by the ascendancy of Barack Obama as president of the United States in 2008. He achieved this feat largely by presenting himself as a politician who could bridge racial, ethnic, class, and ideological divisions to unify Americans around shared national goals. His campaign rhetoric successfully attracted a large cross-section of Americans, including African Americans, liberal whites, young people, and Hispanic Americans. Barack Obama won approximately 67 percent of the Latino vote in 2008. Given consistent increases in the minority population, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a greater demand on presidential candidates to make broader group appeals in order to attract support from an increasingly diverse electorate. At the congressional level, these projections are even more pressing. With Texas being added to three other states whose minority populations comprise a majority of the citizens, candidates for the House, but particularly the Senate, will be forced to appeal to the more diverse concerns of their constituencies. The changes in campaign messages will also have to be combined with similar changes in policy priorities. Policies relevant to minority interests such as equitable education, housing discrimination, immigration reform, and affirmative action will likely increase in importance.

A broader question surrounds what these transformations portend for the future

of American democracy. There are certainly those who argue the increasing diversity of the United States poses a threat to traditional Anglo-Protestant values, or the American creed (Huntington, 2004). This creed consists, in part, of a shared religious commitment, respect for the rule of law, but most importantly, the English language and belief in the values of individualism and a strong work ethic. In particular, they argue Mexicans and other Latinos who immigrate to the United States are unwilling to assimilate to mainstream American culture, choosing instead to create isolated communities, both culturally and linguistically, from the broader American public. In large part, concerns about the "hispanization" of America are an extension of longer-held criticisms of multicultural values (Schlesinger Jr., 1998). Ultimately, these critics fear that ethnic attachment among African Americans and new immigrants threaten a common American identity, undermining the ideals that have traditionally bound immigrants to the nation. Nevertheless, when faced with empirical scrutiny, many of these concerns are without merit. This work shows that from the first to second generation of Latino immigrants, Hispanics tend to acquire the English language and depend less upon Spanish (Citrin et al., 2007). Furthermore, Latinos appear at least as-and often more- committed to the Protestant work ethic as Anglo Americans. Similarly, other evidence shows that many black Americans, but particularly those with limited economic resources, believe deeply in fundamental American values (Hochschild, 1996; Wilson, 1997). Ultimately, as Hochschild (1996) points out, the real threat to American values is not increasing racial and ethnic diversity, but an unwillingness to address racial and class injustices, which may encourage minorities to abandon the American dream. Biracial and multiracial political coalitions present one of the best opportunities for addressing these concerns (Wilson, 2001). Thus, rather than threatening traditional American values, the willingness of Latinos and African Americans to work together toward their common interests may actually invigorate and sustain fundamental American ideals.

References

- (ACS), American Community Survey. 2007. American Community Survey: Summary. Technical report U.S. Bureau of the Census Washington, DC: .
- Alba, Richard D. and John R. Logan. 1991. "Variations on Two Themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburban Residence." *Demography* 28(3):431–53.
- Allen, Mary J. and Wendy M. Yen. 1979. *Introduction to Measurement Theory*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- (ANES), The American National Election Studies. 2008. American National Election Study, 2008: Pre- and Post-Election Survey [Computer file]. Technical Report ICPSR25383-v1 Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] Ann Arbor, MI: .
- Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny. 1986. "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51:1173–82.
- Biles, Roger. 2001. *African American Mayors: Race, Politics, and the American City*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press chapter Mayor David Dinkins and the Politics of Race in New York City, pp. 130–152.
- Blalock, Herbert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Blumer, Herbert M. 1958. "Racial Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1:1–37.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. 1983. "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45:1196–1210.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. 1988. Group Conflict, Prejudice and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes. In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, ed. P. Katz and D. Taylor. New York: Plenum.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. 1998. "Race, Interests, and Beliefs about Affirmative Action." *American Behavioral Scientist* 41(7):985–1003.

- Bobo, Lawrence D. and Devon Johnson. 2000. *Prismatic Metropolis: Analyzing Inequality in Los Angeles*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation chapter Racial Attitudes in a Prismatic Metropolis: Mapping Identity, Stereotypes, Competition, and Views on Affirmative Action, pp. 81–163.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. and Frank D. Gilliam. 1990. “Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment.” *American Political Science Review* 84:377–93.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. and Vincent L. Hutchings. 1996. “Perceptions of Race Group Competition: Extending Blumer’s Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context.” *American Sociological Review* 61:951–72.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2005. “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” *Political Analysis* 13:1–20.
- Branton, Regina P. and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. “Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and the Socioeconomic Environment.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49:359–72.
- Browning, Rufus P., Dale R. Marshall and David H. Tabb. 1986. *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics*. University of California Press.
- Camarillo, Albert M. 2004. *Not Just Black and White*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation chapter Black and Brown in Compton: Demographic Change, Suburban Decline, and Intergroup Relations in a South Central Los Angeles Community, 1950 to 2000, pp. 358–76.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley.
- Carmichael, Stokely and Charles V. Hamilton. 1967. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*. New York: Random House.
- Carmines, Edward G. and Geoffrey C. Layman. 1998. When Prejudice Matters: the Impact of Racial Stereotypes on the Racial Policy Preferences of Democrats and Republicans. In *Perception and Prejudice: Race and Prejudice: Race and Politics in the United States*, ed. John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Chong, Dennis and Reuel Rogers. 2005. “Racial Solidarity and Political Participation.” *Political Behavior* 27:347–74.
- Citrin, Jack, Amy Lerman, Michael Murakami and Kathryn Pearson. 2007. “Testing Huntington: Is Hispanic Immigration a Threat to American Identity?” *Perspectives on Politics* 5(1):31–48.
- Citrin, Jack and Donald Phillip Green. 1990. The Self-Interested Motive in American Public Opinion. In *Research in Micropolitics 3*, ed. S. Long. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

- Cohen, Cathy J. and Michael C. Dawson. 1993. "Neighborhood Poverty and African-American Politics." *American Political Science Review* 87:286–302.
- Collins, Sharon M. 1983. "The Making of the Black Middle Class." *Social Problems* 30(4):369–82.
- Converse, Phillip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press.
- Crosby, Faye. 1976. "A Model of Egoistical Relative Deprivation." *Psychological Review* 83:85–113.
- Cummings, Scott and Thomas Lambert. 1997. "Anti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African American." *Social Science Quarterly* 78:338–53.
- Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Dawson, Michael C., Ronald Brown and James S. Jackson. 1993. National Black Politics Study. Computer file ICPSR02018-v2 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research[distributor] Ann Arbor, MI: . doi:10.3886/ICPSR02018.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo. 1998. "Interests Not Passions: Mexican-American Attitudes toward Mexico, Immigration from Mexico, and Other Issues Shaping U.S.-Mexico Relations." *International Migration Review* 32(2):401–22.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo, Angelo Falcon, F. Chris Garcia and Garcia John. 1989-90. Latino National Political Survey. Computer file ICPSR06841-v3 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research[distributor] Ann Arbor, MI: . doi:10.3886/ICPSR06841.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., Angelo Falcon and F. Chris Garcia. 1996. "Will The Real Americans Please Stand Up: Anglo and Mexican-American Support of Core American Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(2):335–51.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia and Angelo Falcon. 1992. *Latino Voice: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- DeSipio, Louis. 1996. More Than the Sum of Its Parts: The Building Blocks of a Pan-ethnic Identity. In *The Politics of Minority Coalitions: Race, Ethnicity, and Shared Uncertainties*, ed. Wilbur C. Rich. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Dube, Lise and Serge Guimond. 1986. Relative Deprivation and Social Protest: The Personal-Group Issue. In *Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: The Ontario Symposium*, ed. Herman C. Peter Olsen, James M. and Mark P. Zanna. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.

- Eagly, Alice H., Mona G. Makhijani, Richard D. Ashmore and Laura C. Longo. 1991. "What is Beautiful is Good, But....A Meta-Analytic Review of Research on the Physical Attractiveness Stereotype." *Psychological Bulletin* 110(1):109–128.
- Ellemers, N., Wilke H. and Van Knippenberg A. 1993. "Effects of the Legitimacy of Low Group or Individual Status as Individual and Collective Status-Enhancing Strategies." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64:766–78.
- Ellison, Christopher G. and Daniel A. Powers. 1994. "The Contact Hypothesis and Racial Attitudes among Black Americans." *Social Science Quarterly* pp. 387–400.
- Esses, Victoria M., John F. Dovidio, Lynne M. Jackson and Tamara L. Armstrong. 2001. "The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity." *Journal of Social Issues* 57(3):389–412.
- Farley, John E. 1987. "Disproportionate Black and Hispanic Unemployment in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: The Roles of Racial Inequality, Segregation, and Discrimination in the Male Joblessness." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (2):129–50.
- Farley, Reynolds and John Haaga. 2005. *The American People: Census 2000*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Feldman, Stanley. 1982. "Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 26(3):446–66.
- Feldman, Stanley and Leonie Huddy. 2005. "Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race-Conscious Programs: Principles or Prejudice?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1):168–83.
- Ferrante, Joan and Prince Browne Jr. 2000. *The Social Construction of Race and Ethnicity in the United States*. Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. "Economic Self-Interest or Cultural Marginality? Anti-Immigration Sentiment and Nativist Political Movements in France, Germany, and the USA." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26(1):5–23.
- Fletcher, Michael A. 1998. "In L.A., a Sense of Future Conflicts." *Washington Post* A1.
- for Public Opinion Research, American Association. 2008. Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys. Technical Report 5th edition AAPOR Lenexa, Kansas: .
- Forbes, Hughes Donald. 1996. *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fossett, Mark A. and K. Jill Kiecolt. 1989. "The Relative Size of Minority Populations and White Racial Attitudes." *Social Science Quarterly* 70(4):820–35.

- Fraga, Luis R., Garcia John, Rodney Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers and Gary M. Segura. 2006. Latino National Survey. Computer file ICPSR20862-v1 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Ann Arbor, Mi: . doi:10.3886/ICPSR20862.
- Fry, Richard. 2008. Latino Settlement in the New Century. Technical report Pew Research Center.
- Garcia, John A. 2003. *Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Gay, Claudine. 2004. "Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes." *American Political Science Review* (98):547–62.
- Gay, Claudine. 2006. "Seeing Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes toward Latinos." *American Journal of Political Science* 50:982–97.
- Gilens, Martin. 1995. "Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare." *The Journal of Politics* 57(4):994–1014.
- Giles, Michael W. 1977. "Percent Black and Racial Hostility: An Old Assumption Reexamined." *Social Science Quarterly* 58(3):412–17.
- Giles, Michael W. and Arthur Evans. 1986. "The Power Approach to Intergroup Hostility." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30:469–86.
- Giles, Michael W. and Kaenan Hertz. 1994. "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification." *American Political Science Review* 88:317–26.
- Giles, Michael W and Melanie A. Buckner. 1993. "David Duke and Black Threat: An Old Hypothesis Revisited." *The Journal of Politics* pp. 702–13.
- Giles, Michael W and Melanie A. Buckner. 1996. "Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New South: Comment." *The Journal of Politics* 58(4):1171–80.
- Gilliam, Frank D. 1996. "Exploring Minority Empowerment: Symbolic Politics, Governing Coalitions, and Traces of Political Style in Los Angeles." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(1):56–81.
- Glaeser, Edward L. and Jacob L. Vigdor. 2001. Racial Segregation in the 2000 Census: Promising News. Technical report Brookings Institution Washington, D.C.: .
- Glaser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *The Journal of Politics* 56:21–41.
- Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett and James S. Jackson. 1989. *Hope and Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Harris, Fredrick C. 2008. Black Politics Survey. Not yet released ABC and Center for African-American Politics and Society, Columbia University New York, NY: .
- Henry, Charles. 1980. "Black-Chicano Coalitions: Possibilities and Problems." *Western Journal of Black Studies* 4(4):222–32.
- Herring, Mary, Thomas B. Jankowski and Ronald E. Brown. 1999. "Pro-Black Doesn't Mean Anti-White: The Structure of African-American Group Identity." *The Journal of Politics* 61:363–86.
- Hispanics in the United States*. 2006. Technical report Population Division, Census Bureau.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L. 1996. *Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hornburger, Jane M. 1976. "Deep Are the Roots: Busing in Boston." *The Journal of Negro Education* 45(3):235–45.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huddy, Leonie. 2003. Group Identity and Political Cohesion. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 511–58.
- Huddy, Leonie and David O. Sears. 1995. "Opposition to Bilingual Education: Prejudice or the Defense of Realistic Interests?" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 58(2):133–43.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2004. "The Centrality of Race in American Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:383–408.
- Jackman, Mary R. and Marie Crane. 1986. "Some of My Best Friends are Black....: Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50(4):459–86.
- Jackson, James S. 1984 and 1988. National Black Election Study. Computer file ICPSR09954-v1 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research[distributor] Ann Arbor, MI: . doi:10.3886/ICPSR09954.
- Johnson, James H. and Melvin L. Oliver. 1989. "Interethnic Minority Conflict in Urban America: The Effect of Economic and Social Dislocations." *Urban Geography* 10:449–63.
- Kaufmann, Karen M. 2003. "Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions." *Political Research Quarterly* (2):199–210.

- Key Jr., Vladimir Orlando. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Knopf.
- Kinder, Donald R. and David O. Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40(3):414–31.
- Kinder, Donald R., Gordon S. Adams and Paul W. Gronke. 1989. "Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2):491–515.
- Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, Donald R. and Tali Mendelberg. 1995. "Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites." *The Journal of Politics* 57(2):402–24.
- Klandermans, Bert. 2000. Identity and Protest: How Group Identification Helps to Overcome Collective Action Dilemmas. In *Cooperation in Modern Society: Promoting the Welfare of Communities, States, and Organizations*, ed. M. Van Vugt, M. Snyder, T.R. Tyler and A. Biel. London: Routledge pp. 162–83.
- Klandermans, Bert. 2003. Collective Political Action. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. L. Huddy D.O. Sears and R. Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 670–709.
- Kleppner, Paul. 1995. *The Changing Racial Regime*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers chapter Mayoral Politics Chicago Style: The Rise and Fall of a Multiethnic Coalition, 1983-1989, pp. 152–180.
- Kuklinski, James H. and Norman L. Hurley. 1994. "On Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking." *The Journal of Politics* 56(3):729–51.
- Lazerfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet. 1944. *The Peoples Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lifetime Earnings Estimates for Men and Women in the United States:1979*. 1983. Community Population Reports Series P-60 139 U.S. Bureau of the Census Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: .
- Lodge, Milton, Kathleen M. McGraw and Patrick Stroh. 1989. "An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation." *American Political Science Review* 83(2):399–419.
- Lodge, Milton, Marco R. Steenbergen and Shawn Brau. 1995. "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation." *American Political Science Review* 89(2):309–26.

- Logan, John R. 2001. Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind. Technical report Lewis Mumford Center, State University of New York Albany: .
- Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- McClain, Paula D. and Albert K. Karnig. 1990. "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition." *American Political Science Review* 84(2):535–45.
- McClain, Paula D., Niambi M. Carter, Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, Monique L. Lyle, Jeffrey D. Grynviski, Shayla C. Nunnally, Thomas J. Scotto, J. Allan Kendrick, Gerald F. Lackey and Kendra Davenport Cotton. 2006. "Racial Distancing in a Southern City." *The Journal of Politics* 68:571–84.
- McConahay, John B. 1986. Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism. In *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism*, ed. John Dovidio and S. Gaertner. New York: Academic Press pp. 91–126.
- Meier, Kenneth J., Paula D. McClain, J. L. Polinard and Robert D. Wrinkle. 2004. "Divided or Together? Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3):399–409.
- Menchaca, Martha. 2001. *Recovering History, Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and White Roots of Mexican American*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin and Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. "Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 25(3):494–511.
- Mummendey, Amelie, Thomas Kessler, Andreas Klink and Rosemarie Mielke. 1999. "Strategies to Cope with Negative Social Identity: Predictions by Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76(2):229–45.
- Munoz, Jr., Carlos and Charles Henry. 1986. "Rainbow Coalitions in Four Big Cities: San Antonio, Denver, Chicago, and Philadelphia." *Political Science and Politics* 19(3):598–609.
- Nelson Jr., William E. 2000. *Black Atlantic Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston and Liverpool*. State University of New York Press.
- Nelson, Thomas E. and Donald R. Kinder. 1996. "Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion." *The Journal of Politics* 58(4):1055–78.
- Oliver, J. Eric and Janelle Wong. 2003. "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):567–82.

- Oliver, J. Eric and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. "Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3):574–89.
- Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas Shapiro. 2006. *Black Wealth/ White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Olsen, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. and D’Vera Cohn. 2008. U.S. Population Projections:2005-2050. Technical report Pew Research Center.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. and Karen A. Woodrow. 1987. "Change in the Undocumented Alien Population in the United States, 1979-1983." *International Migration Review* 21(4):1304–1334.
- Quillian, Lincoln. 1996. "Group Threat and Regional Change in Attitudes toward African Americans." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(3):816–60.
- Rodriguez, Lori. 2001. "Mayoral Rivals Promote Plans to Hispanics." *Houston Chronicle*.
- Roediger, David R. 1991. *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. New York: Verso.
- Rogers, Reuel Reuben. 2006. *Afro-Caribbean Immigrants and the Politics of Incorporation: Ethnicity, Exception, and Exit*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, Stephan L. and Margery Austin Turner. 2005. "Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes between 1989 and 2000." *Social Problems* 52(2):152–180.
- Rumberger, Russell W. 1987. "High School Dropouts: A Review of Issues and Evidence." *Review of Educational Research* 57(2):10121.
- Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006a. "The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion." *Political Research Quarterly* 59(3):435–446.
- Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006b. "The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation among Latinos in the United States." *American Politics Research* 34(4):427–50.
- Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M. 1998. *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Sears, David O., Carl P. Hensler and Leslie K. Speer. 1979. "Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?" *American Political Science Review* 73(2):369–84.

- Sears, David O. and Carolyn L. Funk. 1990. Self-Interest in American' Political Opinions. In *Beyond Self-Interests*. Chicago: University of Chicago pp. 147–70.
- Sears, David O. and Donald R. Kinder. 1985. "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Group Conflict." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48(5):1141–47.
- Seed, Patricia. 1982. "Social Dimensions of Race: Mexico City, 1753." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62(4):569–606.
- Sherif, Muzafer and Carolyn W. Sherif. 1953. *Groups in Harmony and Tension*. New York: Harpers and Brothers.
- Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 2001. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sides, Josh. 2003. *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Sigelman, Lee and Susan Welch. 1991. *Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality: A Dream Deferred*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Simon, Bernd, Michael Loewy, Stefan Sturmer, Ulrike Weber, Peter Freytag, Corinna Habig, Claudia Kampmeier and Peter Spahlinger. 1998. "Collective Identification and Social Movement Participation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74(3):646–58.
- Sniderman, Paul M. and Philip E. Tetlock. 1986. "Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis." *Journal of Social Issues* 42:129–50.
- Sonenshein, Raphael. 1986a. "Biracial Coalitions in Los Angeles." *PS* 19(3):582–590.
- Sonenshein, Raphael J. 1986b. *Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles*. Princeton University Press.
- Sonenshein, Raphael J. 1990. "Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?" *Political Science Quarterly* 105(2):219–41.
- Sonenshein, Raphael J. and Susan H. Pinkus. 2002. "The Dynamics of Latino Political Incorporation: The 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral Election as Seen in Los Angeles Times Exit Polls." *Political Science and Politics* 35(1):67–74.
- Sonenshein, Raphael and Susan H. Pinkus. 2005. "Latino Incorporation Reaches the Urban Summit: How Antonio Villaraigosa Won the 2005 Los Angeles Mayor's Race." *Political Science and Politics* 38(4):713–21.
- South, Scott J. and Kyle D. Crowder. 1998. "Leaving the 'Hood: Residential Mobility between Black, White, and Integrated Neighborhoods." *American Sociological Review* 63:17–26.

- Steenbergen, Marco R. and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1):218–37.
- Stokes, Atiya Kai. 2003. "Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Politics Research* 31(4):361–378.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. W. G. Austin and S. Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Takougang, Joseph. 2003. "Contemporary African Immigrants to the United States." *Ikinkerindo: A Journal of African Migration* 2.
- Tate, Katherine. 1993. *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tedin, Kent L. and Richard W. Murray. 1994. "Support for Biracial Political Coalitions among Blacks and Hispanics." *Social Science Quarterly* 75(4):772–89.
- Telles, Edward E. 2006. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. "When White Voter Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4):1032–53.
- Thompson, J. Phillip. 1990. "David Dinkins' Victory in New York City: The Decline of the Democratic Party Organization and the Strengthening of Black Politics." *Political Science and Politics* 23(2):145–48.
- Tripathi, Rama Charan and Rashmi Srivastava. 1981. "Relative Deprivation and Intergroup Attitudes." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 11:313–18.
- Uhlaner, Carol Jean. 1991. Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition Prospects of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian American. In *Ethnic and Racial Politics in California*, ed. Byron O. Jackson and Michael B. Preston. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies Press pp. 339–71.
- Vaca, Nicolas C. 2004. *The Presumed Alliance: The Unspoken Conflict between Latinos and Blacks and What It Means for America*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Verba, Sidney; Schlozman, Kay Lehman; Brady Henry E. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Voss, D. Stephen. 1996. "Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New South." *The Journal of Politics* 58(4):1156–70.

- Waldinger, Roger. 1989. "Immigration and Urban Change." *Annual Review of Sociology* 15:211–32.
- Waldinger, Roger. 1996. *Still the Promised City: African Americans and New Immigrants in PostIndustrial New York*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Waters, Mary C. and Karl Eshbach. 1995. "Immigration and Ethnic and Racial Inequality in the the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology* 21:419–446.
- Weich, Ronald H. and Carlos T. Angulo. 2000. Justice on Trail: Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System. Technical report Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
- White, Ishmail K. 2007. "When Race Matters and When It Doesn't: Racial Group Differences in Response to Racial Cues." *American Political Science Review* 101(2):339–54.
- Wilson, William J. 1997. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: First Vintage.
- Wilson, William J. 2001. *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide: Rising Inequality and Coalition Politics*. University of California Press.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix A

Measurement

Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality

For the following items, the outgroup mentioned in the question alternates between Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics depending on the racial or ethnic identity of the respondent. For example, black participants are asked questions that mention Asians or Latinos as the outgroup; the outgroups vary similarly for Asians and Latinos. The values for each response option are the values listed in the original data. For the analysis, the response options are reverse-coded and calculated to range between 0 and 1.

Perceived Zero-Sum Competition

D16a: More good jobs for [Outgroup] means fewer good jobs for [R's racial and ethnic group].

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Generally agree
- 3 Neither
- 4 Generally disagree
- 5 Strongly disagree

D16b: The more influence [Outgroup] have in local politics the less influence [R's Group] will have in local politics.

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Generally agree
- 3 Neither
- 4 disagree
- 5 Strongly disagree

D17: If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, how much political influence do you believe people like you, that is [R's race] people will have?

- 1 Much more than you do now
- 2 Some but not a lot more
- 3 No more or less than now
- 4 Less than now
- 5 A lot less influence than now

D18: What about economic opportunity? If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, do you believe people like you, that is [R's Race] people will probably have much more economic opportunity than now, some but not a lot more, no more or less than now, less than now, or a lot less influence than now?

- 1 Much more than you do now
- 2 Some but not a lot more
- 3 No more or less than now
- 4 Less than now
- 5 A lot less influence than now

Support of Job Training Programs and Educational Assistance

D10a: Some people feel that because of past disadvantages there are some groups in society that should receive special job training and educational assistance. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special job training programs and educational assistance. What about you? Do you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose special job training and educational assistance for [Outgroup]?

- 1 Strongly favor
- 2 Favor
- 3 Neither Favor Nor Oppose
- 4 Oppose
- 5 Strongly oppose

Support of Preferences in Hiring and Promotion

D11: Some people feel that because of past disadvantages there are some groups in society that should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special preferences. What about you? Do you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose special preference in hiring and promotion to [Outgroup]?

- 1 Strongly favor
- 2 Favor
- 3 Neither Favor Nor Oppose
- 4 Oppose
- 5 Strongly oppose

Racial Stereotypes

Rich

D3a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tend to be rich and 7 means tends to be poor?

- 1 Rich
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Poor

Intelligent

D4a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tend to be intelligent and 7 means tends to be unintelligent?

- 1 Intelligent
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Unintelligent

Self-Supporting

D5a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tend to prefer to be self-supporting and 7 means tends to prefer to be on welfare?

- 1 Prefer to be self-supporting
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Prefer to live on welfare

Easy to Get Along With

D6a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tends to be easy to get along with and 7 means tends to be hard to get along with?

- 1 Prefer to be self-supporting
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Prefer to live on welfare

Speaks English Well

D7a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tends to speak English well and 7 means tends to speak English poorly?

- 1 Speak English Well
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Speak English Poorly

Involved in Drugs

D8a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tends not to be involved with drugs and gangs and 7 means tends to be involved with drugs and gangs?

- 1 Not involved with drugs or gangs
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Involved in drugs and gangs

Treat Other Groups Equally

D9a-d: Where would you rate [Outgroup] on this scale, where 1 means tends to treat members of other groups equally and 7 means tends to discriminate against other groups?

- 1 Treat others equally
- 2
- 3
- 4 Neither
- 5
- 6
- 7 Discriminate against others

Experiment Manipulations and Measures

Study 1

The language in italics varied across experimental conditions. The ingroup and minority messages are given after the neutral passages for the black and Latino candidates.

Black versus White Candidate

Candidates Gear Up for '08 Democratic Primaries

By Jeff Henderson

HOUSTON, April 4, 2007- The 2008 Democratic primary in the twenty-eighth congressional district has the potential to be a highly competitive race between Ronald Jackson and John Henry. Both candidates have accumulated substantial war chests and the race has started to gain a considerable amount of media attention.

Mr. Jackson, who is a lawyer by trade, has been involved in local politics as an activist and city councilman for years. He has expressed the desire to bring more

money into the district in order to make environmental changes such as improving the air and water quality.

Additionally, Jackson, an African American, has *emphasized the need for fiscal responsibility in a number of of campaign speeches*. In a recent speech, Jackson stressed that "Government must do what the people want it to do, in the most efficient economical way." Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that, "*The time has come to take a hard look at how we can best use the money we have to accomplish the most for our citizens.*"

Once elected, he promises to work *to ensure that all Americans have greater access to affordable and quality healthcare as well as harnessing innovation to create high-wage jobs in the 21st century*.

Mr. Henry, also a lawyer, ran a private law practice in Houston until winning his race for city council in 1998. He has focused on the need for genuine government reform to protect citizens' rights and ensure that the government and its elected officials act ethically and within the confines of the law. In a speech to the Texas Shamrocks, an Irish-American service organization, Henry an Irish-American, argued that "the citizens of Texas are becoming increasingly disappointed with their government and particularly with how their elected officials conduct themselves. It is time for lawmakers to regain the public's trust." Henry also advocates for the creation of job training programs that would prepare workers to meet the changing needs of today's economy.

The Democratic primary is scheduled to be held on March 6, 2008 in preparation for the general election in November. At present, Jackson and Henry are the only candidates that have filed to place their names on the ballot. The deadline for filing is January 2008.

The language in the third and fourth paragraphs varied so that they would emphasize either the interests of the ingroup or shared interests between blacks and Latinos.

Insertion for Ingroup Message: Additionally, Jackson, an African American, has *made special appeals to the African American community*. In a recent speech, Jackson stressed that "*Government must do what the people want it to do, in the most efficient economical way.*" Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that, "*blacks "can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. That responsibility is ours and ours alone.*"

Once elected, he promises to work *in support of greater access for black businesses to government contracts and increasing crime prevention programs to reduce black-on-black crime*.

Insertion for Minority Message: Additionally, Jackson, an African American, has *made special appeals to both blacks and Latinos in Houston*. In a recent speech, Jackson stressed that "*with the problems facing the black and Hispanic communities, it is important that we elect people that are truly committed to working in the interest of minorities.*" Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that *African Americans and Hispanics "can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. Blacks and Latinos must work together to bring about the changes*

that they need.”

Once elected, he promises to work *in support of greater access for minority businesses to government contracts and introducing legislation that increases blacks’ and Latino’s access to quality healthcare and educational opportunities.*

Latino versus White Candidate

Candidates Gear Up for ’08 Democratic Primaries

By Jeff Henderson

HOUSTON, April 4, 2007- The 2008 Democratic primary in the twenty-eighth congressional district has the potential to be a highly competitive race between Edward Padilla and John Henry. Both candidates have accumulated substantial war chests and the race has started to gain a considerable amount of media attention.

Mr. Padilla, who is a lawyer by trade, has been involved in local politics as an activist and city councilman for years. He has expressed the desire to bring more money into the district in order to make environmental changes such as improving the air and water quality.

Additionally, Padilla, a Hispanic American, has emphasized the need for fiscal responsibility in a number of of campaign speeches. In a recent speech, Padilla stressed that “Government must do what the people want it to do, in the most efficient economical way.” Later, speaking at another event, Padilla said that, “The time has come to take a hard look at how we can best use the money we have to accomplish the most for our citizens.”

Once elected, he promises to work to ensure that all Americans have greater access to affordable and quality healthcare as well as harnessing innovation to create high-wage jobs in the 21st century.

Mr. Henry, also a lawyer, ran a private law practice in Houston until winning his race for city council in 1998. He has focused on the need for genuine government reform to protect citizens’ rights and ensure that the government and its elected officials act ethically and within the confines of the law. In a speech to the Texas Shamrocks, an Irish-American service organization, Henry an Irish-American, argued that “the citizens of Texas are becoming increasingly disappointed with their government and particularly with how their elected officials conduct themselves. It is time for lawmakers to regain the public’s trust.” Henry also advocates for the creation of job training programs that would prepare workers to meet the changing needs of today’s economy.

The Democratic primary is scheduled to be held on March 6, 2008 in preparation for the general election in November. At present, Padilla and Henry are the only candidates that have filed to place their names on the ballot. The deadline for filing is January 2008.

Insertion for Ingroup Message: Additionally, Padilla, a Hispanic American, has *made special appeals to the Hispanic community.* In a recent speech, Padilla stressed that *“with the problems facing the Hispanic community it is important that we elect people that are truly committed to working in our interest.”* Later, speaking

at another event, Padilla said that *Latinos "can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. That responsibility is ours and ours alone."*

Once elected, Padilla promises to work *in support of greater access for Hispanic businesses to government contracts and introducing reforms to immigration policy that are sensitive to the important role of immigrants in the U.S. economy.*

Insertion for Minority Message: Additionally, Padilla, a Hispanic American, has *made special appeals to both blacks and Latinos in Houston.* In a recent speech, Padilla stressed that *"with the problems facing the black and Hispanic communities, it is important that we elect people that are truly committed to working in the interest of minorities."* Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that *African Americans and Hispanics "can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. Blacks and Latinos must work together to bring about the changes that they need."*

Once elected, Padilla promises to work *in support of greater access for minority businesses to government contracts and introducing legislation that increases blacks' and Latinos' access to quality healthcare and educational opportunities.*

Study 2

Black versus Latino Candidate

Candidates Gear Up for '08 Democratic Primaries

By Jeff Henderson

HOUSTON, April 4, 2007- The 2008 Democratic primary in the twenty-eighth congressional district has the potential to be a highly competitive race between Ronald Jackson and Edward Padilla. Both candidates have accumulated substantial war chests and the race has started to gain a considerable amount of media attention.

Mr. Jackson, who is a lawyer by trade, has been involved in local politics as an activist and city councilman for years. He has expressed the desire to bring more money into the district in order to make environmental changes such as improving the air and water quality.

Additionally, Jackson, an African American, has *emphasized the need for fiscal responsibility in a number of of campaign speeches.* In a recent speech, Jackson stressed that *"Government must do what the people want it to do, in the most efficient economical way."* Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that, *"The time has come to take a hard look at how we can best use the money we have to accomplish the most for our citizens."*

Once elected, he promises to work *to ensure that all Americans have greater access to affordable and quality healthcare as well as harnessing innovation to create high-wage jobs in the 21st century.*

Mr. Padilla, also a lawyer, ran a private law practice in Houston until winning his race for city council in 1998. He has focused on the need for genuine government reform to protect citizens rights and ensure that the government and its elected officials act ethically and within the confines of the law.

During a recent speech, Padilla, a Hispanic American, argued that "the citizens of Texas are becoming increasingly disappointed with their government and particularly with how their elected officials conduct themselves. It is time for lawmakers to regain the public's trust." He continued by saying that Americans "need elected officials that are committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards."

If elected as the representative of the twenty-eighth district, Padilla has pledged to create job training programs that would prepare workers to meet the needs of the shifting economy and reduce the tax burden on middle-class families.

The Democratic primary is scheduled to be held on March 6, 2008 in preparation for the general election in November. At present, Jackson and Padilla are the only candidates that have filed to place their names on the ballot. The deadline for filing is January 10, 2008.

Insertion for Black Ingroup Message: Additionally, Jackson, an African American, has *made special appeals to the African American community*. In a recent speech, Jackson stressed that "*Government must do what the people want it to do, in the most efficient economical way.*" Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that, "*blacks 'can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. That responsibility is ours and ours alone.'*"

Once elected, he promises to work *in support of greater access for black businesses to government contracts and increasing crime prevention programs to reduce black-on-black crime.*

Insertion for Black Minority Message: Additionally, Jackson, an African American, has *made special appeals to both blacks and Latinos in Houston*. In a recent speech, Jackson stressed that "*with the problems facing the black and Hispanic communities, it is important that we elect people that are truly committed to working in the interest of minorities.*" Later, speaking at another event, Jackson said that *African Americans and Hispanics 'can't rely on anyone else to improve their condition in this city. Blacks and Latinos must work together to bring about the changes that they need.'*

Once elected, he promises to work *towards increasing the hourly wage for low-skilled workers, which would disproportionately impact blacks and Latinos, and introducing legislation that increases blacks' and Latinos' access to quality healthcare and educational opportunities.*

Insertion for Latino Ingroup Message: *Padilla has primarily tried to mobilize members of his ethnic group by appealing to their political and economic interests.* During a recent speech, Padilla, a Hispanic American, argued that "it is now time for the interests of the Latino community to be heard." He continued by saying that *Latinos 'are on the ground floor of political empowerment, which means it is essential that we have people who will push Washington to pay attention to our needs.'*

If elected as the representative of the twenty-eighth district, Padilla has pledged to *work towards improving Latinos' access to social services as well as introducing reforms to immigration policy that are sensitive to the important role of immigrants*

in the U.S. economy.

Insertion for Latino Minority Message: *Padilla has primarily tried to mobilize members of both the African-American and Latino communities by appealing to their shared political and economic interests. During a recent speech, Padilla, a Hispanic American, argued that "Blacks and Latinos are being exploited and hurt by the same economic forces." He continued by saying that "it's really not to our advantage for one oppressed group to fight the other, while those who control the economy get richer."*

If elected as the representative of the twenty-eighth district, Padilla has pledged to work towards increasing the hourly wage for low-income workers, which should disproportionately impact blacks and Latinos, and introduce legislation that improves the enforcement of policies aimed at penalizing employers for discrimination toward racial and ethnic minorities.

Measures for Study 1 and 2

Affect towards the Minority Candidate

9. Generally, how positively or negatively do you feel about Mr. [Candidate], the [Candidate's Race] candidate? 5 Very Positive
4 Somewhat Positive
3 Neutral
2 Somewhat Negative
1 Very Negative

Likelihood of Voting for the Minority Candidate

10. How likely is it that you would be willing to vote for Mr. [Candidate] as the Democratic candidate?
4 Very Likely
3 Somewhat Likely
2 Somewhat Unlikely
1 Very Unlikely

Perceived Zero-Sum Competition

35. More good jobs for [Outgroup] means fewer good jobs for [R's racial and ethnic group].
1 Strongly agree
2 Generally agree
3 Neither
4 Generally disagree
5 Strongly disagree

36. The more influence [Outgroup] have in local politics the less influence [R's Group] will have in local politics.

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Generally agree
- 3 Neither
- 4 disagree
- 5 Strongly disagree

37. As more good housing and neighborhoods go to [Outgroup] the fewer good housing and neighborhoods there will be for [R's Group].

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Generally agree
- 3 Neither
- 4 disagree
- 5 Strongly disagree

Appendix B

Further Analysis

Table B.1: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition over Jobs and Political Influence in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Jobs		Political Influence	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	.60	1.42	-2.04	1.65
% Black Below Poverty X % Latino	-2.71	.78	-.19	.68
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-.33	.68	1.13	.84
% Black Below Poverty Level	1.20	.28	-.05	.25
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-.66	.66	-.52	.68
% Below Poverty Level	-.26	.21	.42	.18
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	.36	.12	-.03	.11
% Latino	1.18	.45	.33	.40
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.23	.14	.03	.13
Male	-.10	.04	-.07	.04
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.10	.09	.05	.09
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.22	.09	-.20	.09
Educational Attainment	-.01	.12	-.07	.13
Below \$35K	-.05	.07	-.06	.06
Above \$70K	-.08	.08	-.06	.08
Missing Income	-.13	.08	-.07	.07
Executives and Professionals	.12	.06	.10	.06
Service and Labor	.19	.07	.06	.06
Unemployed	.11	.07	.17	.07
Out of Workforce	.07	.07	.10	.07
Homeowner	-.03	.05	.04	.05
Years of Residency	.09	.07	.15	.06
Year (1994=1)	-.12	.05	-.11	.05
Constant	.42	.19	.49	.19
N	537		537	
R^2	.30		.23	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 545 African Americans were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table B.2: OLS Estimates of Blacks' Perceived Competition over Jobs and Political Influence in Boston

Independent Variables	Jobs		Political Influence	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	-1.38	1.31	-.96	1.44
% Black Below Poverty Level X % Latino	1.09	1.07	.76	1.17
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	.28	.57	.73	.84
% Black Below Poverty Level	-.71	.46	-.38	.52
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	.93	.69	-.08	.96
% Below Poverty Level	.33	.42	.00	.51
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	.08	.12	.11	.16
% Latino	-.20	.52	.17	.75
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.27	.16	.16	.16
Male	-.01	.06	-.04	.06
Party Identification (Democrat)	.20	.09	.07	.08
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.02	.11	.20	.13
Educational Attainment	.01	.12	-.07	.11
Below \$35K	-.04	.08	.05	.08
Above \$70K	-.18	.11	.00	.11
Missing Income	.20	.12	.14	.11
Executives and Professionals	.09	.08	.09	.08
Service and Labor	.05	.08	.03	.08
Unemployed	-.01	.10	-.05	.08
Out of Workforce	-.01	.08	-.09	.08
Homeowner	-.15	.06	-.03	.06
Years of Residency	-.09	.08	.05	.08
Constant	.13	.18	.03	.27
N	200		199	
R^2	.32		.19	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table B.3: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' Ingroup Bias for Hiring Preferences in Los Angeles When Using Interaction Terms in Separate Models

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma X% Latino	1.42	3.16	—	
% Black Below Poverty Level X% Latino	—		-7.40	2.88
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Black w/o HS Diploma	-1.20	1.54	—	
% Black Below Poverty Level	—		2.08	.81
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	.18	1.55	-1.31	.99
% Below Poverty Level	-.37	.49	-1.27	.57
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	.80	.27	1.58	.39
% Latino	-.23	.96	1.38	1.08
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.35	.39	.42	.40
Male	-.05	.12	-.05	.12
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	.03	.22	.10	.23
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.37	.21	.44	.20
Educational Attainment	.32	.30	.46	.32
Below \$35K	.11	.17	.10	.18
Above \$70K	-.31	.21	-.34	.23
Missing Income	.33	.24	.35	.23
Executives and Professionals	.15	.17	.11	.17
Service and Labor	.03	.16	.05	.16
Unemployed	.69	.16	.67	.16
Out of Workforce	-.01	.18	.03	.18
Homeowner	-.23	.15	-.20	.15
Years of Residency	-.23	.15	-.27	.13
Year (1994=1)	.09	.12	.12	.12
N	1092		1092	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table B.4: Ordered Probit Estimates of Differential Support for Job Training Programs Among Foreign-born and U.S. Born Latinos in Los Angeles

Independent Variables	Foreign-Born		U.S. Born	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma X% Black	-1.82	2.57	22.60	10.82
% Latino Below Poverty Level X% Black	-.10	1.82	11.98	5.68
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>				
% Latino w/o HS Diploma	.60	1.69	3.16	4.43
% Latino Below Poverty Level	.70	1.13	.17	1.54
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>				
% w/o HS Diploma	-1.00	1.80	3.16	4.43
% Below Poverty Level	-1.56	1.18	-1.40	2.29
<i>Racial Context</i>				
% Black	1.27	1.00	1.82	1.52
% Latino	.43	.483	-.77	1.03
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>				
Age	.65	.56	-1.42	1.07
Male	-.29	.14	-.17	.29
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	-.39	.31	-.25	.67
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.07	.23	-.17	.42
Educational Attainment	.47	.29	-1.16	.91
Below \$35K	-.34	.25	.03	.33
Above \$70K	-.29	.59	1.53	.47
Missing Income	-.29	.30	-.84	.44
Executives and Professionals	.50	.25	.86	.46
Service and Labor	.32	.17	.33	.39
Unemployed	.24	.18	.01	.44
Out of Workforce	-.39	.21	-.10	.58
Homeowner	.16	.20	.39	.37
Years of Residency	-2.34	1.69	-.84	.39
Year (1994=1)	-.04	.25	-.04	.35
Mexican	.01	.14	.92	.45
Puerto Rican	.04	.43	-.28	.76
Cuban	.40	.27	—	
Years in US	1.67	1.57	—	
N	753		191	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Los Angeles as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned.

Table B.5: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' General Support of Job Training Programs for Latinos in Boston

Independent Variables	Full Sample	
	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	-6.99	3.19
% Black Below Poverty Level X % Latino	-1.19	2.29
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma	1.54	1.62
% Black Below Poverty Level	.63	1.06
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>		
% w/o HS Diploma	-.48	1.87
% Below Poverty Level	-1.00	1.19
<i>Racial Context</i>		
% Black	.00	.39
% Latino	2.96	1.60
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>		
Age	-.17	.46
Male	.22	.17
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.44	.25
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.67	.34
Educational Attainment	.24	.39
Below \$35K	.05	.21
Above \$70K	-.37	.31
Missing Income	.27	.36
Executives and Professionals	-.18	.24
Service and Labor	-.01	.22
Unemployed	-.07	.26
Out of Workforce	.04	.24
Homeowner	.64	.20
Years of Residency	-.02	.21
N	466	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. Due to the split-sample design, only 212 blacks were asked the question for the dependent variable. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned

Table B.6: Ordered Probit Estimates of Blacks' General Support of Hiring Preferences for Latinos in Boston

Independent Variables	Full Sample	
	β	s.e.
<i>Interaction Terms</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma X % Latino	-7.89	2.82
% Black Below Poverty Level X % Latino	3.36	2.04
<i>Group Material Conditions</i>		
% Black w/o HS Diploma	2.70	1.51
% Black Below Poverty Level	-2.72	.67
<i>Neighborhood Material Conditions</i>		
% w/o HS Diploma	-.74	1.76
% Below Poverty Level	1.28	.79
<i>Racial Context</i>		
% Black	-.64	.28
% Latino	1.09	1.11
<i>Sociodemographic Characteristics</i>		
Age	.57	.36
Male	.23	.15
Party Identification (Democrat=1)	-.66	.23
Political Ideology (Liberal=1)	.81	.29
Educational Attainment	-.05	.34
Below \$35K	-.07	.19
Above \$70K	.05	.27
Missing Income	.03	.36
Executives and Professionals	-.24	.19
Service and Labor	-.13	.18
Unemployed	.04	.25
Out of Workforce	.44	.23
Homeowner	-.08	.16
Years of Residency	-.01	.16
N	465	

Note: The analysis was performed after applying a survey weight to account for the stratified sampling design as well as to adjust the sample to approximate the distribution of the adult population in Boston as determined by the 1990 Census. Estimates in bold signify coefficients that reached the conventional level of statistical significance, $p < .05$. All items in the models range from 0-1 unless otherwise mentioned