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Besieged:
British-American Forts, Families, and Communities in the Seven Years' War, 1755-1763

A Dissertation Presented

by

Elizabeth Bartlett Hornor

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Stony Brook University

August 2011

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Stony Brook University
The Graduate School

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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This dissertation examines interactions between civilians and the military during the Seven Years' War in the British North American colonies. The settings of those interactions were seven forts located along three corridors that encompassed British, French, and Native American territory. The corridors include the region between Philadelphia/Alexandria and the Ohio River, the territory between Albany and the Great Lakes, and the area between Albany and Quebec/Montreal. This project traverses the divide between histories of colonial society and histories of the war by using letters, personal journals, newspapers, memoirs, wills, and colonial and military records to explore backcountry communities and their interactions with the military at and near forts. Rather than interpreting interactions between the army and civilians simply as conflicts, the project argues that forts became sites of negotiation as civilians and military authorities made requests of one another. By examining the varying ways in which people responded to the war, the dissertation illuminates how the experience of living on the periphery influenced residents' perceptions of the army and imperial administration. In exploring the civilian experience of the war on the periphery, the project connects the events of the Seven Years' War to existing problems and circumstances, thereby integrating the war more seamlessly into the history of colonial America and facilitating a more nuanced understanding of how the war affected its civilian participants.

Dedication

To:
The Elizabeths: Elizabeth Sloan and Elizabeth O'Connell Gennari
and
The ELM girls: Emily Hickey and Melissa Stroud

Life with you is half as hard and twice as good.

Frontispiece



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Acknowledgements

Rarely in life do we have the opportunity to publicly thank all the people who have helped us along. I am, therefore, grateful for this chance to acknowledge all of the help and support I have received in my education and through the dissertation process.

I have heard that teachers have to tell students something seven times before they really understand it. I am afraid that Ned Landsman has had to exceed that number in advising me through this process. I began giving him earnestly-written but half-baked chapter drafts in 2007, and he has shown remarkable patience as I have steadily pestered him with draft after draft over the past four years. His responses and criticism have been thorough and incisive even as I found new ways to make the same mistakes. His ability to guide without simply telling me what to do has shaped my own approach to teaching, and his understanding of colonial America has influenced my own profoundly. If this dissertation says anything useful, he deserves the credit, and if it persists in reifying empire despite his seven-fold warning, I'll take the blame.

Donna Rilling read several chapter drafts throughout the process and has an ability to ask questions that helped me see what was missing and what needed to happen. She has an eye for detail while also keeping the big picture in mind, which was very helpful as I struggled to find that balance. She has also been very encouraging to me since the first day of grad school, both in my own teaching, my work, and my professional development. I am very grateful to have her on my committee. Kathleen Wilson has also been very encouraging to me throughout the dissertation writing process. She gave me good advice about finding larger themes back when the dissertation was still a pile of stories. She is one of the few people who have written about women in the Seven Years' War, and that work has been critical to my own understanding. I am thankful to have her on my committee. I am also grateful to have Drew Newman on my committee. I had a chance to work with him on the short-lived Atlantic Studies Working Group, of which I was perhaps the greatest beneficiary. He was also helpful to me as I formulated a conference paper for the McNeil Center that was the earliest iteration of this project.

I have benefitted from funding from several sources. At Stony Brook, the Gardiner Fellowship funded the beginning stage of my graduate education. In 2008, a Robert L. Middlekauf Fellowship at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California allowed me to research the Loudoun Papers and afforded me the opportunity of participating in that community and studying at a beautiful and inspirational institution. In particular, Olga Tsapina, the curator of American Historical Manuscripts was helpful both at the library and with later requests. In 2009, a David Library Fellowship allowed me unlimited access to the David Library in Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania where the librarians and staff fostered an atmosphere conducive to studying. In addition, the librarians and staff at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the New Hampshire Historical Association's Library (where I met a relative of a very obscure person from chapter four, Thomas Tash) and the Melville Library and interlibrary

loan department at Stony Brook University were all very important and helpful in the research process.

I am aware of the great privilege it is to pursue a doctorate in the humanities, and I recognize that it was only possible through the support and assistance of many people. At Stony Brook, many professors, in addition to those on my committee, taught and encouraged me. I am especially grateful to Young-Sun Hong, Sara Lipton, April Masten, and Ian Roxborough in addition to Ashli White and Kathleen Banks Nutter, who have since moved on. Particular thanks is due to Michael Barnhart whose influence in two moments in my education, several years apart, affected me profoundly. During my one undergraduate year at Stony Brook, one of the books he assigned in his World War II class was *Miss You: The World War II Letters of Barbara Woodall Taylor and Charles E. Taylor*, which sparked my interest in the intersection of war and civilian society. Several years later, in his Biography research seminar, he made us keep a journal of our research and writing process. I used this same strategy for this project, and my dissertation journal is almost as long as the actual dissertation. More than almost anything else, the journal has kept me sane and organized.

Also at Stony Brook, Susan Grumet has been very generous and helpful to me and keeps the department lively. Roxanne Fernandez has reinstituted order and stability to the administrative side of the graduate program, and I have benefitted from her kindness and patience. Outside of Stony Brook, Elizabeth Mancke took time out of her enjoyment of the Seven Years' War conference at Fort Niagara to talk with me about my project, which helped jolt me out of the rut I had fallen into. At the Huntington, Mary Beth Norton talked to me about female petitioners and gave me some critical references.

I've been very fortunate to make a number of wonderful friends at Stony Brook who have journeyed with me through the ups and downs of grad school and made the whole experience more fun than it is probably supposed to be. I am grateful to be named Elizabeth and therefore numbered among the Elizabeths of S312. When Elizabeth "Sloanie" Sloan arrived at Stony Brook, we both recognized the same wide-eyed, bewildered look on each other's face and became fast friends (we are cool and confident *now*, of course). Elizabeth "O'Connell" Gennari's arrival unleashed the full power of our combined ability to turn anything into an opportunity for a pop culture reference, and between the three of us, our pop culture savvy borders on the encyclopedic. Their friendship and support continues to be invaluable to me.

In addition to the Elizabeths, several other members of the mysterious Turtle Group deserve mention. Chris Mauceri stole my pen in Core and helped break me out of my shell. He is one of the funniest people I know, and he is also very generous in sharing resources and ideas. Tristan Tomlinson lent his insight to several drafts and had several key conversations with me as I struggled to figure out what the project is about. Tim Nicholson has proven to be a good friend and very annoyingly asked, "But don't we know that already?" when I tried to reinvent things that we already know. Many other friends at Stony Brook have been encouraging along the way

including Tara Rider Zeiss, Christina Bosco Langert, Seth Offenbach, Jeff Hall, Christopher Gennari, Soroya Baselious, Annette Ricciardi, Christobal Zuniga-Espinoza, and Marisa Balsamo.

Outside of school, so many people have helped and encouraged me. My mother taught me to read in first grade and introduced me to the serious study of history in high school. My grandfather, Dr. Donald Thomas, has always been a strong advocate for excellence and education. At Houghton College, Peter Meilaender was very generous with his time in directing my honors project, and Cameron Airhart and Charles "good writing is rewriting" Bressler were the kinds of professors I want to be. Coach Robert Smalley encouraged me early on to pursue a Ph.D. and taught me to run hard even when no one is watching (a lesson that is very applicable to dissertation writing).

On Long Island, my roommates and oldest friends, Monique Parmentier and Colleen Heinze helped me to remember there is more to life than school and were understanding when I had to say no and spend Saturdays in the office. In addition, Mr. and Mrs. Parmentier have taken me into their family and gone beyond any rational definition of generosity in their kindness toward me. Mr. and Mrs. Heinze have also treated me like a daughter, and I think of their house as home. So many others have been the right person at the right time including Vicki Radonovitch, Barbara Maurelis, Karen Grimm, Connie Kendall, Lisa Anderson, Sara Groves, and Jorge Cham.

In California, I had the joy of living with Joan Alexander, who continues to cheer me on, and I also benefitted from the kindness of Sandy Biery. In Pennsylvania, Meg McSweeney was always very kind and interested and helped make life at the farmhouse less lonely. In addition, my sisters, Annie, Katie, and Virginia, my new friends in Maine, and my old friends from Houghton, especially Minori Nagahara and the cross country girls, have cheered me on even as they had little idea of what I was doing or why it was taking so long.

Two other friends have been there through the vicissitudes of life and have been stalwart companions. Melissa Stroud has listened, laughed, and consoled and is always up for deep discussion about life and ideas. Emily Hickey has let me be part of her family and has run, swam, biked, laughed, talked, eaten, and goofed off with me. She has also been interested in and encouraged me through the daily grind of dissertation writing.

My dad, Jon Henry Gladwish, was the first man I knew to champion women's stories, has been there through thick and thin, listened to convoluted chapter descriptions, and cheerfully paid for more car repairs than a Nascar owner.

Finally, through not only the last seven years but also the past thirty, as I have been besieged by life, it has been an inestimable grace to discover that there is, in the words of Martin Luther, a Mighty Fortress, who has always been to me "a bulwark never failing."

Introduction

In January, 1756, William Johnson summed up the Seven Years' War in North America this way: "the objects of his Majesty's Service in this Country [are] either to Erect Forts, or to demolish those erected by the French."[1] Behind that statement lies a world of complexity. Erecting and demolishing forts had ramifications that extended beyond military tactics and strategies. This project employs the British military's use of forts in the Seven Years' War as a lens through which to explore life on the peripheries of British America. By examining forts and the families and communities associated with them, one can see how the pressures of war, emanating from activities at forts, besieged the daily lives of a variety of British subjects and Britain's Native American allies and how people responded to those pressures.

The Seven Years' War started as a conflict between French and British settlers in North America over the building of Fort Duquesne near the Ohio River, and the first real battle was at George Washington's hastily constructed Fort Necessity. The building and defending of forts by both sides proceeded apace. In 1755, the initial British strategy called for a four-pronged attack on French forts. General Edward Braddock would capture Fort Duquesne; William Shirley would take Fort Niagara on the New York/New France border. William Johnson would lead forces against Fort St. Frédéric at Crown Point, New York, and British and provincial forces would target the French Forts Beausejour and Gaspareau in Nova Scotia. This ambitious plan proved impossible to successfully execute, but even its failure and the failure of subsequent plans led to the building of more forts.

[1] William Johnson, Letter to Sir Thomas Robinson, January 17, 1756, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (Albany: State University of New York, 1962 [1921]), 2: 421; Frontispiece: William Shepherd, "The British Colonies in North America, 1763-1775," *Historical Atlas* (Leipzig: Koerner and Dietrich, 1911), 194.

As the fighting grew into a global conflict, the North American front became only one theater of the war. The French were victorious for the first several years; they rebuffed Braddock's attack on Fort Duquesne in 1755 and forced Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry in New York to capitulate in 1756 and 1757. The British and provincials won at Louisbourg, Nova Scotia in 1758, but were defeated in their attempt on Fort Carillon in New York later that year. They succeeded in finally taking Fort Duquesne in 1758, which they rebuilt as Fort Pitt. The British won at Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario in 1758 and at Fort Niagara, Fort Ticonderoga, and Crown Point in New York in 1759 and finished the year with the stunning success at the Battle of Quebec. After that victory, the war centered on the European, Asian, and Caribbean theaters, but the British in North America still had to confront troubled Native American relations in the southern colonies which led to the Cherokee War of 1761-1763.

The Seven Years' War created situations in which civilians who were all different from one another in ethnicity, religion, social standing, wealth, their perception of Britain, and many other factors had to interact with the army and imperial authorities. These civilians who experienced war most directly lived on the peripheries of British America, where the war was fought. Their responses to their interactions with the army were based on the history and development of their communities and the specific ways that the war affected their lives, and because of that, their responses varied widely. Merely experiencing the same war or interacting with the same army or imperial officials did not create a unified response to the war. Therefore, instead of interpreting provincial responses to the Seven Years' War as a referendum on the British empire (which is useful but outside the purview of the evidence gathered here), this project reads civilian responses to the war as reflections of what it meant to live on the periphery of British America. Furthermore, the ways individuals and communities responded to the war

betray diverse conceptions of their relationship and obligation to outside forces, particularly army authorities and imperial administrators.

As the eighteenth century progressed, the population of the North American colonies was becoming increasingly non-English; nowhere was this more apparent than in borderland regions that saw the influx of recent immigrants seeking land. The prospect of land also attracted settlers whose families had been living in the colonies for generations but who ventured onto British frontiers in pursuit of a better life. These borderlands settlers were likely to be in contact with Native Americans in their vicinity through the pursuit of the fur trade and trade in other goods as well as in conflicts over land. In many instances, borderlands settlers had closer connections (both peaceful and hostile) to their western neighbors than to British communities on the east coast. All of these factors—recent migration, ethnic diversity, western trade, and a desire for a better life—helped create a unique borderlands culture. In waging the Seven Years' War on the periphery of British America, army leaders had to contend with this culture and the challenges to their authority that it fostered.

Perhaps as an outgrowth of borderlands culture, many residents of the periphery perceived British army leaders' demands for resources and participation as negotiable. Some scholars have seen this desire to negotiate as evidence of colonial resistance to arbitrary authority and as a foundational act in the American Revolution. It is true that some provincials did criticize army leaders for trying to interpret the ambiguities of the law in their favor, but, at least at the most intensely involved locations, a unified ideological movement against army leaders' exercise of power did not emerge. Instead, one can see individuals and communities attempting to bargain with the army to turn specific situations to their favor or ease the weight of the burden that the army and the circumstances of the war were forcing them to bear.

This project as a whole seeks to traverse the divide between histories of colonial society and histories of the war. Military histories that focus on battles and tactics provide detailed pictures of how the war was fought and how politics dictated military action. That history is very necessary, but since battles were singular events, it can be difficult to connect them to the everyday life of civilians. A problem with the military-centered approach is that war appears as a disruption of "normal" life or as disconnected from the rest of life, instead of as simply another part of life. In addition, military histories often focus exclusively on men, because men were the only ones who fought. But that approach shortchanges the history because men, even separated from women in battles, lived lives that were fully integrated with the other half of the population. This project connects the events of the Seven Years' War to problems and circumstances that already existed; this helps to integrate the war more seamlessly into the history of colonial America and facilitates a more nuanced understanding of how the war affected its civilian participants. Attempting to tread a line between social and military histories is beneficial, therefore, because it helps to create a more holistic story.

The historiography of the Seven Years' War shows that many aspects of the military side of the war have been thoroughly discussed. One tendency, exemplified by Alan Rogers, is to use the war to show that "Americans" were developing the ideology that would drive the American Revolution by resisting the British army in the Seven Years' War.[2] Similarly, Douglas Edward Leach emphasizes the differences and conflicts between British regulars and colonists.[3] Stephen Brumwell takes a contrasting approach by seeking to repair the prevailing image of British soldiers in America as unadaptable and inept; instead, he emphasizes that the British army won

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[2] Alan Rogers, *Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763* (Berkely: University of California Press, 1974).

[3] Douglas Edward Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

the war and argues that the war became an incubator for Britishness for the army's ethnically diverse soldiers.[4] The prime counterpart to Brumwell is Fred Anderson's early work which emphasizes differences between provincial and regular soldiers and explores how Massachusetts soldiers in particular functioned as part of the British army.[5] All of these scholars emphasize some degree of conflict between provincials and regulars and between civilians and soldiers.

Beyond discussions of the army, military histories that survey battles and tactics have been the primary interpreters and presenters of the war. This trend began with Francis Parkman and Lawrence Henry Gipson.[6] More recently, the emphasis on the military story has continued with another entry from Douglas Edward Leach's who sees colonial history as fighting its way (literally) toward the American Revolution.[7] Other scholars have chosen to focus on specific battles. Paul Kopperman provides a multi-faceted account of Braddock's march to the Monongahela River and the French victory over the British near Fort Duquesne.[8] Ian Steele challenges the long-held thesis that the capitulation of Fort William Henry devolved into a massacre.[9]

Fred Anderson's *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of the Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (2000) combines military and political history to provide an

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[4] Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[5] Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

[6] Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, vol. 7 in *France and England in North America: A Series of Historical Narratives* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1884); Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757* and *The Victorious Years, 1758-1760* vols. vi, vii of *The Great War for the Empire* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946, 1949).

[7] Douglas Edward Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

[8] Paul Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
[9] Ian Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre"* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

in-depth examination of imperial competition and the construction of empire. Anderson is careful to avoid the trap of seeing the American Revolution as the natural outcome of the Seven Years' War. Instead, he argues that the war and its aftermath "set in motion the forces that created a hollow British empire."[10] He is most interested in the imperial relationship, not its breakdown. In that, his approach is similar to that of Brendon McConville, who sees allegiance to the king lasting up until almost the very moment of revolution and argues that the imperial relationship was based on this allegiance to the monarch.[11] Like Anderson, McConville is not looking deep into the colonial past for the roots of revolutionary ideology.

The chapters that follow build on the work of Anderson, McConville, and the scholars discussed below to argue that people on the periphery of British America had a variety of responses to and conceptions of the imperial relationship. While the circumstances differed from place to place, the waging of the war became defined by negotiations between individuals, families, communities, and military authorities. In that sense, this project is not looking for the development of the American Revolution in the Seven Years' War. The result of the intersection of war and civilian society relates much more closely to what had already happened than to what would happen in the future. In these instances, there is very little evidence for proto-American revolutionary ideology. That is not to say that the roots of the American Revolution did not stretch back into the colonial past; rather, it is to assert that colonial history is more complex than simply a prologue to the Revolution.

[10] Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), xxi.

[11] Brendon McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

This perspective has been well-developed in the historiography. Jack Greene traces the tension between local and imperial control. This problem had a long history, and Greene traces how colonists and imperial authorities struggled to develop an effective balance between power and liberty in the relationship between the peripheries and the center.[12] Ned Landsman shows how American colonists slowly began to see themselves as provincial Britons, an identity derived from a specifically provincial interpretation of several aspects of British culture as well as an assertion that citizenship on the periphery carried the same rights and privileges as citizenship at the center.[13] Both Landsman and Greene explore the relationship between the periphery and the metropole; this perspective is complemented by the study of the borderlands.

While the concept of the borderland encompasses a wide range of study, several scholars explore it from the perspective of colonial life on the periphery of British America, which is the focus of the chapters that follow. This project defines the backcountry in mid-eighteenth century British North America as a contested place undergoing settlement and separate from more developed coastal regions but also recognizes that the line demarcating the backcountry was constantly shifting.[14] For example, Albany still had characteristics of a backcountry town despite its Atlantic connections and early-seventeenth century settlement. Keeping this definition in mind, it is useful to note several other scholars who explore similar territory. Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall's geographic and chronological survey of the North American

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[12] Jack Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986).

[13] Ned Landsman, *From Colonials to Provincials: American Thought and Culture, 1680-1760* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[14] This project also occasionally employs the term "frontier" when denoting the backcountry from a specifically British perspective. The problem with using "frontier" exclusively is that regions that Britons considered beyond the pale of their settlement and therefore free to be claimed were actually being used by Native Americans, who would not have thought of the place as a "frontier." "Backcountry," as used below, denotes regions that British, French, and North Americans would all consider contested (to varying degrees).

backcountry shows the possibilities and challenges of life on the edge of empire.[15] Focusing more specifically on the mid-eighteenth century, Matthew Ward emphasizes the changes that came to the southern mid-Atlantic backcountry through the Seven Years' War.[16] Peter Silver discusses how the life in the backcountry profoundly affected the provincial American experience in that constant Indian warfare was critical to shaping a uniquely American identity.[17] The backcountry should also be understood from the perspective of Native Americans. Many scholars have discussed the Native American experience of British imperial expansion including Daniel Richter in and Francis Jennings who emphasize the Native American perspective on the events that transformed their world.[18] In addition, studies of specific tribes and locations, such as Colin Calloway's examination of the western Abenaki in the region that became Vermont, illuminate the Native American perception of the backcountry.[19]

This project, therefore, situates itself in the discussion of provincial Britons' experience of living on the periphery. Studying the periphery as distinct from the coastal centers focuses the project on the locations where the war was actually fought. The element of danger that characterized life at and near forts during the war gave negotiations between civilians and military officials an urgency and importance that more abstract disputes did not have. Failure to

[15] Eric Hindraker and Peter Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

[16] Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003).

[17] Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008).

[18] Daniel Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984); Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, colonies, and tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1988).

[19] Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990).

find workable solutions could be deadly. Studying negotiations at these locations, therefore, brings the imperial relationship from abstraction into sharp relief. While the importance of the American Revolution can lead to vague assumptions about how individuals thought of their relationship to Britain, studying specific interactions between imperial authorities and communities shows the nuances of the relationship. In particular, studying the peripheries in the war shows that army leaders' initial approach of command and control rarely worked. Instead, the balance of power between military authorities and civilian individuals, families, and communities shifted according to circumstances. The relationship, therefore, was characterized by negotiation, which meant that individual and communal perceptions of British imperialism were dependent on local, specific conversations about power and authority. Because these conversations occurred against the backdrop of war, there was no room for indecisiveness. These circumstances made it difficult for people who lived through it but are a boon to historians looking to characterize aspects of a notoriously ambiguous relationship. In order to keep the emphasis on the most potent effects of the war on civilians, this examination is limited to the flash points of activity in the war, namely seven specific forts located in the backcountry.

Forts were places where civilians and the military came together and experienced the war collectively. Still, limiting the study to forts also limits who is included in the project. While, of course, everyone in colonial America was at least distantly affected by the unfolding of the war at forts, a specific subset of people bore an additional economic and emotional burden due to their proximity to the places where the experience of war was most profound. These people at and near forts were personally, emotionally, and physically affected by the proceedings of warfare and battle; they also encountered the war through interactions with the military and military authorities. The members of this subset include: women who followed the army or were

directly affected by their husbands' and sons' activity at forts; civilians who were already living at a site before a fort was built; civilians who lived at or near an existing fort; frontier settlers who fled to a fort for refuge; Native Americans who came to forts for supplies, protection, and to build alliances; and residents of a fort's surrounding community who contributed supplies to the army. Even with this multiple category in mind, the study is driven by the problems that war aggravated or illuminated at forts, so people from every category are not necessarily fully examined in each chapter.

The following discussion is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one provides the setting for the rest of the project by exploring three critical corridors of the war and seven British forts that punctuated these corridors. Chapter two explores a set of problems that affected the civilian populations at and near Fort Cumberland, Maryland and Fort Herkimer, New York in similar ways. The British and provincial armies taxed the regions of those forts for supplies, but the peculiarities of each region's history and development interfered with the ability and desire of the residents to effectively cooperate. British authorities at Fort Cumberland sought supplies, wagons, and horses from southern Pennsylvania, especially York, Lancaster, and Cumberland counties. The region had only recently been settled as part of the expansion across Pennsylvania and the army's requests (especially for wagons and horses) called for supplies that were critical to the effective functioning of the "crossroads" towns.

At Fort Herkimer on the Mohawk River in New York, army authorities expected the German residents to quickly comply with their demands for assistance, but the residents resisted. Their resistance can be understood by recognizing the history behind their settlement. After being tricked into coming to the colonies and used for their labor once they arrived, the German settlers had finally been sent out to the frontier to form a buffer between the British and the

French. Army authorities were surprised and frustrated when the German settlers at Herkimer were unwilling to play this role or contribute to frontier defense during the Seven Years' War, when it really mattered. At both forts, army leaders questioned the loyalty of the residents when they did not comply with the army's demands.

Chapter three explores the army's use of Albany's Fort Frederick, which was too small to properly accommodate its needs. Since Albany was palisaded, the whole city ended up functioning as a fort. This meant that (especially in the fall and winter) the army and civilians had to live together. At the start of the war, Albany was in the midst of a transition from a backcountry outpost to a provincial city. The war and the presence of the army put pressure on points of tension that already existed because of the changes the city was undergoing. Albany residents, the chapter shows, attempted to mitigate this pressure and control their participation by negotiating with army authorities and, occasionally, forcefully resisting army demands. Furthermore, the chapter provides a portrait of the city at war by offering a detailed examination of Albany's society and culture.

Chapter four shows that the residents of Fort Number Four on the western border of New Hampshire were able to negotiate protection for their settlement by presenting it to imperial authorities as a strategic post. The residents of the Connecticut River valley (home to Fort Number Four) had a long history of conflict and disputes over land with the Abenakis of the Connecticut River valley and the Green Mountains. By petitioning the British government, the river valley residents were able to garner the attention of Lord Loudoun, and by maintaining constant communication with him, they were able to transform their obscure settlement into a place of strategic importance and therefore use the army's presence to solve their safety problems. The chapter shows a different way in which the experience of war was negotiated. In

contrast to the situation at Albany and Fort Herkimer, the settlers of Fort Number Four were eager for Loudoun to send troops to them. However, the chapter shows that becoming a strategic post also created a situation that was more difficult for the community to control than had been the case before the war.

Chapter five explores some of the stories of women who traveled with the army. Women, of course, did not fight in combat, but some women were part of the army as non-combatants. These women lived at forts when the army went out to fight and when the forts were besieged by the enemy. But women who traveled with the army faced gender-related restrictions from both civilian society and army authorities. First, women who traveled with the army risked being ostracized as prostitutes (whether they were or not) and were suspected whenever they traveled without socially-acceptable male companionship. British matron Charlotte Browne walked a fine line between military and civilian life and was constantly scrutinized despite her high position in the army and her contributions to its successful operation. Second, army authorities co-opted women's participation in the war (willing and unwilling) to make an argument for the barbarity of their French enemies and advance the moral justification of the Seven Years' War. This can be seen in particular in the aftermath of Fort William Henry's capitulation to the French. The "massacre" after the battle resulted in the death of ten women and capture of many more. Army authorities had been uneasy about having women with the army, but they were able to use the women's presence at the "massacre" to galvanize support for the war at a time when Britain had lost every battle but one. In both of these cases, women who were with the army presented a problem to army authorities and members of civilian society because the necessities of eighteenth-century warfare demanded that even respectable women participate in dangerous and unusual situations.

Participation in the war was open to negotiation, which chapter six shows by investigating men and women who sent petitions to Lord Loudoun for a wide variety of reasons. These petitions reveal that ordinary people who were affected by the army, sometimes in very negative ways, held Loudoun in high esteem but also felt comfortable in approaching him with very personal requests that occasionally had very little to do with the army. Even though the act of petitioning recognized that the petitioner was powerless, women who petitioned had very little power to begin with, so their efforts can be viewed as an attempt to assert their place as British subjects. Regardless of how the petitions were resolved, the very act of petitioning shows that people believed they had certain rights as national subjects and participants in the war.

Chapter seven explores the New York borderland from the perspective of the Iroquois and the centrality of Fort Johnson and William Johnson in that borderland. Provincial and imperial authorities had struggled to build effective alliances with Native Americans, partially because they wanted to find a duplication of their own political structures within Native American tribes. The war put unprecedented power in the hands of the superintendents of Indian affairs, and one of them, William Johnson, was able to use the seeming problem of Iroquois emphasis on webs of power (as opposed to hierarchies) to his advantage in his diplomacy at Fort Johnson. One way Johnson did this was through diligent maintenance of the Covenant Chain, which can be thought of as a long series of small-scale negotiations. The chapter explores how Johnson used Fort Johnson as a strategic tool in Iroquois relations and how this work benefitted the British at the end of the war.

The experience of the Seven Years' War on the periphery of British America, therefore, was about much more than demolishing and erecting forts. As the British and provincial army interacted with settlers on the borderland, the experience of war became defined by a variety of

negotiations as settlers and army authorities tried to balance demands and resistance, requests for help and the exercise of arbitrary power, and battles and the reality of living on the periphery. The following chapters echo this balancing process by attempting to combine military and social history in recounting the civilian experience of war on the periphery.

Chapter One

Corridors of War: Forts and the Geography of the Seven Years' War

This project explores seven forts that provided the setting for interactions between civilians and the military. These seven forts were located along three corridors or zones that stretched between British and French territory (and included Native American territory). The corridors, as defined below, have rather loose geographic boundaries and are mainly characterized and unified by the action that occurred within each territory. Within the zones, the seven forts served as critical anchors where activity was concentrated. The chapters that follow focus on the forts, but having an understanding of the place of the forts in a wider region will help to contextualize the discussions that follow. The three corridors are: Philadelphia/Alexandria to the Ohio River, Albany to the Great Lakes, and Albany to Montreal/St. Lawrence River.

Three significant factors about these corridors helped to define them and insured that they would see most of the activity in the Seven Years' War in North America. First, they developed a certain cohesiveness as a result of the fur trade. By the mid-eighteenth century, the fur trade was declining in importance in colonial economies, but the pursuit of furs left a lasting legacy on settlement patterns. Throughout the eighteenth century, British, German, Dutch, and Scots-Irish settlers progressed deeper and deeper into Native American territory in the pursuit of furs and the trade opportunities that the fur trade engendered. Many of the towns that were established in these backcountry regions served as transit points between the interior and the coast, and the settlers of these regions made a living moving goods between the coast and the frontier.

A second factor in the development of these regions was a demand for land. After the initial settlement of the coastal region in the seventeenth century, newer European arrivals had to

move further inland to find land for farming and to give them the independence they sought in leaving Europe. Many eighteenth-century backcountry settlers were non-English Europeans seeking the opportunities that North America offered and descendents of early coastal settlers who had to constantly push west, south, and north as population grew. Furthermore, British and French land speculators recognized that they needed to act quickly to claim the large tracts of land that were still seen as available (though occupied by Native Americans) between French and British territories. The fur trade and land speculation were the driving forces behind the initial dispute over the building of Fort Duquesne on the Ohio River in 1754, a dispute that started the war.

A third factor in defining these regions was the significance of waterways. Roads were costly to build and developed piecemeal in tandem with small settlements, but waterways were critical both to the fur trade and to generating the initial interest in settling a region. Major waterways in these regions include the Potomac, Monongahela, Youghiogheny, Allegheny, and Ohio Rivers in Maryland and Pennsylvania, the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers and the Great Lakes in New York, and Lake George, Lake Champlain, and the Connecticut River in the New York/New England/New France border region. These waterways made it relatively fast and efficient to transport furs and goods between New France and the *pays d'en haut* or Native American villages in New York and Pennsylvania and riverside settlements in British territory. Waterways also facilitated the exploration and settlement of new territory. As the war developed, waterways were the preferred method of travel. The British army learned how difficult it could be to build a road when General Braddock attempted it in 1755 and when General Forbes had to do it again in 1758, both in order to attack Fort Duquesne. All of the seven forts in this study were located on waterways.

When the war began in 1755, British settlement was still centered on the coast. While settlement of the interiors had increased rapidly during the first half of the eighteenth century, the further frontiers were still large and lightly settled. In Maryland, Fort Cumberland was located at the furthest western edge of British settlement. In Pennsylvania, much of the territory west of Harrisburg was only lightly settled, with Cumberland County only recently established and ill-defined on its western border. In New York, Burnetsfield (just east of present-day Utica) represented the western edge of British-controlled settlement, except for a few traders and soldiers at Fort Oswego. To the north, Schaghticoke (southeast of Saratoga Springs), an Indian mission town, represented British incursions above Albany. In New England, settlements were creeping up from Massachusetts and Connecticut into New Hampshire, but Vermont was still twenty years from being settled established. To give some perspective, the Proclamation of 1763, which cut off the western third of most colonies, did not take away any territory with any sort of significant British settlement and, in addition, claimed territory from Native Americans that the British had not even touched before the Seven Years' War.

During the Seven Years' War, the French and British and their allies were battling over these lightly settled borderlands in order to determine who would control the North American interior. The primary way that these battles developed was through building and besieging forts. Battles based on the capture of a structure such as a fort appealed to European leaders because they were very controllable. Ideally, the process of capturing a fort could be (and was) outlined in manuals; the protocols for capitulation could be clearly established and followed by both sides, thus minimizing bloodshed and civilian casualties. The main alternative to siege warfare was the set piece battle which involved orderly lines of troops maneuvering toward each other in an open field with a bloody clash at the climax. In the Seven Years' War, this type of battle

occurred most famously at the Battle of Quebec in 1759, but that tactic did not easily lend itself to the terrain of the New World. Siege warfare was a better option, but it provided a challenge to both French and British military leaders who sought to use their Native American allies effectively. Siege warfare did not cater to the traditional strengths of Native American warriors (wilderness fighting), nor did it provide benefits (captives and plunder) to Native Americans who assisted the victors. Native American ideas about the culture of honor were different from those of Europeans, and ending a battle by allowing potential captives to walk away did nothing to enhance Indian honor. A war based largely on siege warfare, therefore, had the potential to frustrate Native American allies and added another uncertain and uncontrollable facet to the waging of the war.[1]

Despite the problems with siege warfare, forts were critical to the waging of the war, and both the French and British spent significant resources building forts, transforming houses and trading posts into forts, and repairing existing forts. All of the forts in this study were true forts in that they were walled structures with several buildings inside the walls. These forts were different from blockhouses, which were fortified buildings (usually with no walls surrounding them). Forts, of course, were strictly defensive tools, meaning they were designed, in part, to draw attacks. Civilians living near a fort benefitted from the safety that a fort could provide but also could suffer by living near a target. Forts also functioned as offensive staging points and therefore were most effective when they were located on the borderland. Of the seven forts considered in this study, Fort Cumberland, Fort Oswego, Fort William Henry, For Herkimer, and

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[1] See chapter 2 "The Military Enlightenment" and chapter 3 "A Culture of Honor" in Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700-1789* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003) and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); See "Introduction" and chapter one "Situating the Story: Armies, Communities, and Women" in John A. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Fort Number Four were located on contested borderlands. Only Fort Johnson and Fort Albany were located in more settled areas, but both of these places became threatened as the war progressed.

It is useful to examine the three corridors more closely to see how forts and populations were connected. The corridor that saw the earliest action in the war was the area from Philadelphia and Alexandria to the Ohio River. Philadelphia and Alexandria were both population centers that were connected to the Atlantic trade, with Philadelphia being the larger and more prominent. In addition, settlers in the interior of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania needed to be connected to these centers (and Baltimore) to maintain trade. When the British army arrived in 1755, it landed at Alexandria, which was fitting in that the land speculators who had formed the Ohio Company and started the dispute with the French on the Ohio River were from Virginia. As the army marched westward through Virginia and Maryland, the settler population steadily decreased, which made it very difficult for the army to draw supplies from civilian settlers. Instead, the army had to look to southern Pennsylvania to supply many of its needs.

The population of southern Pennsylvania was growing rapidly in the mid-eighteenth century. Lancaster, York, and Cumberland counties were newly formed and populated by English Quakers, Scots-Irish, and Germans, many of them recent immigrants. These settlers were interested in farming and trade and therefore were diligent about building roads that connected their towns to each other and to Philadelphia. In 1755, the British army used these roads (and commissioned new ones) to draw supplies from southern Pennsylvania to Fort Cumberland. The fort was located at the current site of the town of Cumberland, Maryland, at the confluence of Will’s Creek and the Potomac River. Members of the Ohio Company built the

original structure in 1749.[2] By 1752 the location had become a trading post, and the Company built an additional storehouse. This activity drew the attention of the French and they began to establish their own forts and storehouses along the Ohio River, which soon led to conflict.

The storehouses at Will's Creek played a role in the war's earliest conflict as Major George Washington used the site as a starting point for his expeditions to the Ohio River and as a storehouse for goods.[3] When Washington's small army retreated from Fort Necessity, they pulled back to Will's Creek.[4] Washington did not stay there long, but soon Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia sent Colonel James Innes to Will's Creek to transform the storehouses into a fort. During the fall and early winter of 1754 Innes oversaw the construction of Fort Mount Pleasant.[5] When Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland visited the fort, he complained to Governor Dinwiddie that it was too small ("its Exterior Side not exceeding 120 feet"), and he recommended that another, larger fort be built on an adjacent hill. Fort Mount Pleasant could then be used as a storehouse. Sharpe envisioned a fort that could hold and sustain a force of 3,000 men.[6] In 1754 Governor Dinwiddie received instructions from King George II to build the

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[2] William H. Lowdermilk, *A History of Cumberland, (Maryland) from the Time of the Indian Town, Caiuctucuc, in 1728, up to the Present Day, Embracing an Account of Washington's First Campaign, and Battle of Fort Necessity, Together with a History of Braddock's Expedition, etc.*(Baltimore: Regional Publishing Company, 1921 [1878]), 18-21.

[3] George Washington, Letter to Thomas Cresap, April 18, 1754 and Letter to James Hamilton, April 1754, W.W. Abbot, ed., *The Papers of George Washington* Colonial Series, vol. 1 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983), 82, n. 1, 83.

[4] "George Washington's Account of the Capitulation of Fort Necessity," (1786), Abbot, ed., *The Papers of George Washington*, 173 and n. 1.

[5] Robert Dinwiddie, Letter to Horatio Sharpe, September 5, 1754, William Hand Browne, ed., *Archives of Maryland* vol. 6, *Correspondence of Governor Sharpe, 1753-1757* (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1888), 97.

[6] Horatio Sharpe, Letter to Robert Dinwiddie, December 10, 1754, Browne, ed., *Archives of Maryland,* 6: 136-142.

larger fort at Will's Creek, and Colonel Innes oversaw its construction that winter.[7] The new fort was named Fort Cumberland in honor of the Duke of Cumberland.

In late 1754, Governor Dinwiddie chose the fort as the rendezvous location for the gathering of provincial forces in preparation for General Edward Braddock's arrival.[8] By early 1755, Fort Cumberland was ready for the arrival of Braddock and his troops from Britain. The army arrived at Fort Cumberland in the spring and marched for Fort Duquesne in the early summer. The distance to Fort Duquesne was over one hundred miles, much of it treacherous terrain due to the Appalachian Mountains. The army traveled along the northern border of Maryland, crossing into Pennsylvania near the abandoned site of Fort Necessity. The army then headed north, leaving the support train on the southwest bank of the Youghiogheny River while a faster "flying column" attempted to make up for the long delays accrued in building the road. Fort Duquesne was located at the confluence of the Ohio, Allegheny, and Monongahela Rivers, but the British army did not make it that far. Soon after crossing the Monongahela River, heading northwest, the army was ambushed by French and Indian troops, and the war began in earnest. After General Braddock was killed, the British troops retreated back down the road they had built, making painstaking progress all the way back to Fort Cumberland. While Braddock's road was not the best (General Forbes would later build a new road through Pennsylvania rather

[7] Lowdermilk, *History of Cumberland*, 88-91; fort sketch on page between 92 and 93; Horatio Sharpe, Letter to Sir Thomas Robinson, January 12, 1755, Brown, ed., *Archives of Maryland*, 6:164. The fort consisted of a stockade and the fort proper. The stockade held "barracks sufficient to furnish quarters for two hundred men, and the company officers." The stockade also had a parade ground. At the western end of the stockade was the fort. Inside the fort were four storehouses for provisions. The fort also held the commanding officer's house, the centinel's guard room and the officer's guard room. At the four corners, the fort had four magazines. Outside the fort were log cabins used as barracks when the assembled force was too large to be housed in the fort. The whole fort was "400 feet in length, and 160 in width."

[8] J. Hall Pleasants, ed., *Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland 1755-1756 (24).* vol 52 of *Archives of Maryland* (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1935), 608; J. Hall Pleasants, ed. *Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland 1752-1754 (23)* vol. 50 *of Archives of Maryland* (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1933), 408.

than using Braddock's road in his siege of Fort Duquesne in 1758), it was the first step in connecting the Ohio country to the Atlantic coast. It also opened a way for Ohio Indians to attack settlers in Maryland and Pennsylvania, especially after the army retreated to Philadelphia from Fort Cumberland.

With the disastrous defeat in Pennsylvania, the strategy of war turned to New York and New England. The Albany-Montreal corridor was the next to see action. Before the war started, Albany already had a thriving connection to Montreal through the fur trade. Northern Canadian furs and Dutch and English goods (from Albany) passed through the hands of French middlemen in Montreal and traveled up and down the St. Lawrence River, Lake Champlain, Lake George, and the Hudson River (with brief portages to connecting the waterways). While Albany was the largest British settlement on the middle Hudson River, there were also significant and growing settlements at Rensselaer, south of Albany, and some traders, such as John Henry Lydius, had settled north of Albany near Saratoga. Partially because of the convenient waterways, this region would be hotly contested during the war. The British had Fort Frederick at Albany and built Fort Edward and Fort William Henry near Lake George in 1755. The French built Fort Carillon (later Fort Ticonderoga) and Fort St. Frédéric (Crown Point) between Lake George and Lake Champlain in 1755.

For the British, Albany became critical as a supply point and staging area for the Lake George region as well as for points west. In 1755 there were about 329 households in Albany, and the majority of residents were Dutch. Fort Frederick was built on the original structure that had been Fort Orange, which dated back to earliest Dutch settlement. The fort was made of stone and could house about 300 soldiers. Since the army used Albany to keep troops in readiness, the number of soldiers at Albany often far exceeded the space available at Fort

Frederick. The city of Albany, which was already enclosed by a palisade, became a sort of fort-city. Throughout the war, soldiers were quartered in the homes of private citizens, and nowhere else in British North America were the army and civilians in such close quarters for such a long time as at Albany.

North of Albany, the British army was concentrated at Lake George, where there were very few civilian settlements (making the forts difficult to supply). General William Johnson first led troops to the site of Fort William Henry in September, 1755, with the intention of building a fort from which to attack Fort St. Frédéric. Soon after his arrival, an engineer, Captain William Eyre, who had been sent by Braddock, came to oversee the building of the fort.[9] Before the fort was even half built, however, it was used defensively during the indecisive Battle of Lake George on September 8, 1755. In that battle the British and their allies lost 331 and the French and their allies lost 339.[10] After the battle, construction on the fort continued. Initially, the New England council of war that was working with William Johnson only wanted to build a picketed log fort. Although it was easier to build, a picketed fort could not support cannon on its walls, and it could be easily burned. Later, Johnson and Eyre convinced the council to support the building of an earthen fort capable of housing 500 men. There was also a well-placed camp nearby that could house more men.[11]

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[9] William Johnson, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (hereafter, *Johnson Papers*) (Albany: State University of New York, 1962 [1921]), 1: 547, 557; 2:362.

[10] Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre,"* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 50-53.

[11] *Johnson Papers* 2: 117-118, 221. The fort itself was built by digging a thirty foot wide trench in the shape of a fort. The resulting fort-shaped pile of sand was then encased in ten foot high wooden walls. Cannon could then be mounted on the walls. One side of the fort had the added advantage of overlooking Lake George and being protected by the steep embankment that led to the lake. The fort was finished in early November, around the same time that the French completed Fort Carillon (later Fort Ticonderoga). William Johnson wrote to Governor Shirley on November 7 informing him that he had named the fort William Henry "after Two of the Royal Family." Steele,

Fort William Henry was most intensely involved in the war during the summer of 1757 when it was besieged by a force of French soldiers and *pays d'en haut* Indians. The British garrison at Fort William Henry did not get the support it needed from nearby Fort Edward and was forced to capitulate. Despite being granted a parole of honor, the retreating garrison (including women and children) was attacked by disgruntled Indians who had fought in order to gain captives, not watch them peacefully leave the fort. With the defeat of Fort William Henry and the ensuing chaos, the British feared that Albany itself would see a French attack. While the attack did not come (the French were too busy trying to save face after the botched capitulation), 1757 marked a low point for the British army in the war.

Parallel to the waterways that connected Albany and Montreal was another north-south zone that should be considered in conjunction with and as a part of the Albany-Montreal corridor. East of Lake George and Lake Champlain, in the Connecticut-Massachusetts-New Hampshire borderland, settlers from New England were beginning to encroach on western Abenaki territory in the region that would become Vermont. The northernmost of these settlements was called Number Four (later Charlestown), but the people who settled Number Four were part of a larger movement of settlers from Massachusetts and Connecticut up the Connecticut River in the late 1730s. The Connecticut River begins at the Connecticut Lakes in northern New Hampshire and runs down along the border between New Hampshire and Vermont, eventually flowing through Massachusetts and Connecticut and into Long Island

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59; "Remarks on Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, by Harry Gordon," Stanley Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1969), 177-178. *Johnson Papers* 2:201, 226, 279, 301.

Sound.[12] The river connected the settlers to the more established areas of Massachusetts and Connecticut.[13]

While Connecticut and Massachusetts settlers were populating the area, the region's diplomatic, political, and social history was closely tied to the Albany-Montreal corridor. Number Four was the northernmost British settlement in the Albany-Montreal corridor until the construction of Fort William Henry in 1755. During the war there were about thirty families (150 people) at Number Four. This made the location one of the smallest of the northern Connecticut River valley settlements which included Walpole, Westmoreland, Putney, Keene, Fort Drummer, Hinsdale, Vernon, and Northfield; these settlements were home to about 1,000 British settlers in all. Their nearest British neighbors to the south were the small Massachusetts towns of Deerfield, Hatfield, Hadley, and Northampton.[14] The small, scattered nature of the settlements made it difficult to house and supply troops that came to protect the region. In 1757 Colonel Nathan Whiting estimated that about 450 soldiers, or one regiment, could be quartered in the Connecticut River valley settlements.

Number Four and its small fort became the protector of the backdoor to New England. The town of Number Four was first established by British settlers in 1740, and the residents built a fort in 1743 to protect themselves from western Abenaki attacks. On July 4, 1746—in the midst of King George's war—a soldier named John Maynard drew a plan of the fort. The fort's construction was very different from that of other forts because it was built by moving existing

[12] Even though "Vermont" was never a British colony and did not exist as a political entity until 1776, the name is used in this project to designate the area that is presently Vermont.

[13] Colin Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 8-9.

[14] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 147.

houses into a rectangular shape and connecting them with lean-tos. There were six houses and six lean-tos. The lean-tos were used by families who had dwellings outside of the fort. In case of an attack, the family would stay in their one room lean-to inside the fort. The other six buildings were more permanent homes in which families lived year round. By 1753, the population of Number Four had doubled to twenty-three families, and some families were starting to move out of the fort onto their own property. In times of attack, the residents would crowd together in the small fort.

In addition to the twelve buildings, the fort also had a "Great Chamber" that formed most of the southern wall. A watchtower was attached to the Great Chamber and provided a lookout onto the main street leading into the fort as well as the great meadow and swamp to the southwest of the fort. The fort was surrounded by a palisade of 724 posts at 5 inch intervals surrounding the west, north, and east sides. Maynard's drawing also shows some outbuildings (for example, James Johnson's barn) that were outside of the fort and a street leading "to the great meadows."[15] Notably absent from the drawing is a depiction of the sawmill and gristmill which Indians burned down in August, 1746.[16] The settlers rebuilt both of these before the Seven Years' War, just in time for western Abenakis set fire to the sawmill again in 1757.[17]

North of Fort Number Four, the French were also making incursions into the region, not to gain land, but to encourage trade and relationships with the eastern and western Algonquins of the Albany-Montreal corridor. In the mid-seventeenth century, St. Francis and Trois-Riviéres

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[15] John Maynard, "The Plan of No. 4 Drawn by John Maynard July 4, 1746," Yale University Map Collection, digitized by The Fort at No. 4 Living History Museum, http://www.fortat4.org/images/maynmap.jpg , accessed April 21, 2009.

[16] Benjamin Doolittle, *A Short Narrative of the Mischief done by the French and Indian Enemy, on the Western Frontiers of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay* (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1750), 11.

[17] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 173.

were originally established as mission towns where priests, traders, and Algonquins intermingled. Both of these towns were located on or near the St. Lawrence River, between Montreal and Quebec, which connected them to much of the trade in New France and gave them a good outlet for captives. During the Seven Years' War, Abenakis would use St. Francis as a base for attacks and would bring captives back to St. Francis before trading them to Montreal or Quebec. In 1759, the British raided and all but destroyed St. Francis.

The third corridor extended from Albany to the Great Lakes. This area encompassed the Mohawk River valley, Iroquois Six Nations territory, and the Great Lakes region. Before the war started, the most important British fort in the corridor was Fort Oswego, which was a critical outpost of the New York fur trade. The distance between Fort Oswego and Albany (170 miles) meant that settlers along the Mohawk River could profit from the trade between the two points and from Fort Oswego's need for supplies. One of the earliest settlements that arose to take advantage of the shift in the fur trade's focus away from Albany was Schenectady, located about sixteen miles northwest of Albany. Settlement continued along the Mohawk River as the eighteenth century progressed; Irish, Dutch, German, and English settlers moved along the Mohawk River and down Schoharie Creek, which ran parallel to the Hudson River. By the mid-eighteenth century there were towns at and near Mount Johnson, Fort Hunter, Schoharie, Stone Arabia, Cherry Valley, and Burnetsfield. These settlers were most interested in farming and trade and moved to the region for the prospect of owning large pieces of land. By 1755 there were approximately 500 families living along the Mohawk River.

Fort Johnson was located on the Mohawk River about 35 miles northwest of Albany, 30 miles east of German Flats, and about 50 miles southwest of Lake George. The fort's main purpose was to provide a welcoming place for Indians, mainly Iroquois, to stay and meet with

British officials, mainly William Johnson. It also served as a gathering point for British-allied Indians who were willing to fight on behalf of the British. This alternate purpose for a fort—using it primarily as a meeting place—fits in well with the strategies Johnson was attempting to use to win back Iroquois allies after the breaking of the Covenant Chain in 1753 and Braddock's mishandling of Native American affairs in 1755. Fort Johnson was uniquely situated for this purpose in that it was firmly located in Mohawk territory but also close enough to the British center at Albany.

William Johnson built the original structures that became Fort Johnson in 1742 or 1743, but he expanded and added to them during the course of the next decade.[18] In 1755 William Shirley considered the location as part of the New York defense system, and the site became known as Fort Johnson. The layout of the structures reflected Johnson's position both as a military leader and as an Indian trader and go-between. In addition to the fortified house, the property also featured an Indian council house and semi-permanent Indian encampment capable of housing a large number of guests. In 1755 Johnson held a conference at Fort Johnson that included 1,100 Indian men, women, and children. The real defect of the property, from a military point of view, was that it was completely commanded by Mount Johnson, a steep hill overlooking Fort Johnson and the Mohawk River. If the enemy had control of the hill, they could do real damage to the buildings below.[19] Fortunately for Johnson, the French never attacked the fort.

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[18] *Johnson Papers*,1:xvii.

[19] The drawing, entitled, "A North View of Fort Johnson drawn on the spot by Mr. Guy Johnson, Sir Wm. Johnson's Son" is available in the New York Public Library and is reproduced in James Thomas Flexner, *Mohawk Baronet: Sir William Johnson of New York* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1959), 5th page after 214.

Portions of the British and provincial armies were occasionally stationed at Fort Johnson, but the army was more likely to be located at the westernmost British-controlled settlement, Burnetsfield. Burnetsfield actually consisted of two towns that straddled the Mohawk River: German Flats on the north bank and Herkimer or the Palatine village on the south bank. There were several blockhouses in German Flats, but the army took over a large house and storehouse in the Palatine village and turned it into a fort. The house and storehouse belonged to John Jost Herkimer, who protested the takeover and enclosure of his buildings. The settlers of Burnetsfield could muster about eighty fighting men if they needed to, but the German settlers there really would have preferred to have nothing to do with Britain's war. Burnetsfield was drawn into the war because of its proximity to Fort Oswego. Although the settlers of Burnetsfield had benefitted from the trade between Fort Oswego and Albany, their location as the closest British-controlled settlement to Fort Oswego forced them to participate in the war and suffer attacks.

Fort Oswego was about 100 miles west of Burnetsfield on Lake Ontario. It was connected to the other British settlements in New York through waterways. The fort was situated at the confluence of Lake Ontario and the Onondaga River, which connected to Oneida Lake through to the Mohawk River, with some portages. The British built Fort Stanwix and Fort Bull on the eastern shore of Oneida Lake, to act as staging points for Fort Oswego. In 1755, as General William Shirley (temporarily Commander in Chief after Braddock's death) tried to begin his campaign against Fort Niagara, he moved his troops up to Fort Oswego from Albany in order to use that location as a staging point for the attack on the French fort. But when he arrived at Fort Oswego he was dismayed to discover that the fort was virtually useless. Like Fort Cumberland, Fort Oswego began as a storehouse and trading post, originally constructed in

1727. The government of New York had stationed a small garrison at the post to protect the traders and to keep an eye on the French who had built a fort at Niagara and another fort northward on Lake Ontario, Fort Cataraqui (later Fort Frontenac).[20] At the start of the war Fort Oswego was actually a compound of three blockhouses: Old Fort Oswego, Fort Ontario, and new Fort Oswego (barely more than a plan). By 1755 the original fort, Old Fort Oswego, was little more than a crumbling blockhouse partially surrounded by a poorly built wall.[21] General Shirley was forced to abandon his attack on Fort Niagara, in part because of the decrepit condition of Fort Oswego. He left instructions for the fort to be rebuilt.

When Engineer Patrick Mackellar visited Fort Oswego in May 1756, he wrote to Chief Engineer James Montressor that the guns at Old Fort Oswego "must not be fired for fear of bringing down the Wall."[22] In an attempt to make the blockhouse more defensible, the army had added a hornwork and a raveline on the west side in 1755, but Engineer Mackellar noted that they were "badly laid out."[23] To the west of this fort was the proposed location for the new Fort Oswego, but in May 1756 only some of the trenches were partially dug. Mackellar thought that "the Work is by no means tenable," but the project would continue and half of the palisaded fort would be surrounded by earth works before the battle in August, 1756. To the east and across

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[20]" Gov. Burnet to the Board of Trade," May 9, 1727, E. B. O'Callaghan,ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New-York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1850), 1: 447.

[21] Gov. Clarke to the Board of Trade, August 20, 1742, O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1:463-464.

[22] "Journal of the Transactions at Oswego from the 16th of May to the 14th of August 1756. By Patrick Mackellar Eng'r Second to the Expedition," Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 190.

[23] A hornwork is "a single-fronted outwork, the head of which consists of two demi-bastions connected by a curtain and joined to the main body of the work by two parallel wings. It is thrown out to occupy advantageous ground which it would have been inconvenient to include in the original enceinte (enclosure). A raveline is a detached outwork, constructed beyond the main ditch and in front of the curtain, and consisting of two faces forming a salient angle (OED); "Journal of the Transactions at Oswego from the 16th of May to the 14th of August 1756. By Patrick Mackellar Eng'r Second to the Expedition," Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 190.

the Onondaga River from Old Fort Oswego was Fort Ontario which was in the best shape of the three.[24] It was a star-shaped fort, but Mackellar noted that "the Plan is bad."[25] Part of the bad planning consisted of building the fort near a ridge that would give the enemy a foothold should they attack.[26]

Braddock's replacement, Lieutenant General John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, arrived in New York City in late July, 1756. The new commander in chief had not even settled to his task before the French attacked Fort Oswego in early August. At the time of the attack on Fort Oswego there were 1,135 British and provincial soldiers stationed at the three forts. During the battle the British were forced to abandon Fort Ontario and the French used it to assail Old Fort Oswego, thereby attacking the fort on its exposed side.[27] In an instance of bitter irony for the British, the French used the artillery they had captured from General Braddock's train at the Monongahela River to bombard Old Fort Oswego.[28]

After the British lost Fort Oswego, they also lost their main foothold in western Iroquois territory. For most of the war, the three western nations (also known as the "upper nations") of Onondagas, Cayugas, and Sencas would trade with the French at Fort Cataraqui and Fort Niagara. It was not until 1759 that British and Iroquois interests came together to the point that

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[24] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, map page facing 1: 494.

[25] "Journal of the Transactions at Oswego from the 16th of May to the 14th of August 1756. By Patrick Mackellar Eng'r Second to the Expedition," Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 191.

[26] "Journal of the Transactions at Oswego from the 16th of May to the 14th of August 1756. By Patrick Mackellar Eng'r Second to the Expedition," Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 208.

[27] "Journal of the Transactions at Oswego from the 16th of May to the 14th of August 1756. By Patrick Mackellar Eng'r Second to the Expedition," Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 211; numbers: "An Account of the Strength of the Garrison, & State of the Works at Oswego, at the Time of Its Being Invested, Together with an Account of the Naval Force at That Time, & the Seige of the Place, in August, 1756," Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 218.

[28] "The Examination of Monsr Belestre," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1:498.

the three upper nations (and the Seneca in particular) agreed to support the British attack on Fort Niagara. With that victory and the defeat of Fort Cataraqui in 1758, the British had a clear path to the Great Lakes and beyond into the Ohio country.

Throughout these three corridors, the people who lived in or near forts were affected by their construction and the violence in their vicinity. The presence of the British army with its large numbers of people and demands for supplies, the authority that the army and its leaders represented, and the threat and realization of battles upset the daily rhythm of life for families and individuals, especially in the vicinity of forts. The presence of forts in the midst of colonial communities also offered the opportunity and the obligation for colonists to cooperate with the army and its leaders. Members of fort and frontier communities had to decide how the army's needs and demands related to those of their own communities and families, and they attempted to act accordingly. For provincials and British-allied Native Americans, living in the shadow of a fort gave added weight to military leaders' demands because if the fort fell then the surrounding region would be thrown into chaos. Military authorities could therefore attempt to use the threat of future violence to coerce nearby populations into participating more directly in the war by contributing their goods and assistance.

The involvement of these three corridors in the war reflects the settlement patterns of colonists in North America, to some extent, and the economic forces driving their decisions of where to settle. While several forts had very little settlement in their immediate vicinity, the location of the forts on the far periphery indicated the trajectory of future settlements, which was one of the key arguments at the heart of the war. The civilians at and near forts represented the leading edge of British settlement and the varied ways they responded to the army's presence and demands suggests the complexity of life on the periphery.

Chapter Two

"Good and loyal Subjects:"
Demands and Supplies at Fort Cumberland and Fort Herkimer

The arrival of the British army in Virginia in 1755 introduced one of the most significant challenges that colonists would face in the Seven Years' War. The army would need to be fed, housed, supplied and transported over the course of the war, and military and imperial authorities were counting on the colonists to fill many of those needs. This chapter examines two frontier communities that were forced to participate in the war because of their locations near forts; both communities were reluctant to respond to the army's demands. In both instances, army and imperial authorities demanded that the colonists act like "good and loyal subjects," and evaluated the communities' responses as evidence of their loyalty or disloyalty. Despite this insistence by authorities, the communities' responses had very little to do with loyalty but much more to do with their development as borderland communities. As events progressed, members of both communities attempted to negotiate with army authorities because of the significant burden that the army's demands were placing on their communities and resources.

The chapter also explores the participation of two provincial leaders: Benjamin Franklin and John Jost Herkimer. Both of these men managed to direct, at least in part, the tone of their respective communities' responses to army leaders' demands. In the end, Franklin was commended for his loyalty, and Herkimer was berated as a troublemaker. Both of the men engaged with army leaders in an attempt to control how the army's demands affected their communities. In responding to the army's demands, however, the men had very different goals. Franklin was interested in improving his reputation with General Braddock and Governor Morris and furthering the British cause, but John Herkimer had very little interest in British concerns

and wanted to be left alone. These different goals had an effect on the general tenor of their community's responses.

As European communities on the periphery, there were many similarities between the towns in the vicinities of Fort Cumberland and Fort Herkimer. They were all recently settled, primarily by non-English immigrants, located on frontiers, and were acting as buffers between Native American territory and more settled regions. The settlers of both regions were farmers and traders connected to Native Americans and to coastal centers. Furthermore, the settlers near Fort Cumberland and Fort Herkimer did not ask for the presence of the army, and they were both drawn into the war by the accident of location, which, to some extent, increased their resentment of the army's demands. But the regions were also unique in their development and their particular history. Examining the prior histories of these regions leads to an understanding of how the army's demands put pressure on existing challenges and how their development as a community on the periphery shaped their responses to the army's demands.

The vicinity of Fort Cumberland was the first location to be taxed with large-scale demands in the war. In the spring of 1755 General Edward Braddock and most of the British army arrived at the fort and began preparing for an attack on the French Fort Duquesne, one hundred miles away. Having come from Great Britain, the army was not able to bring many necessary supplies across the ocean. Additionally, the long trek to Fort Duquesne—though simple enough to plot out on a map in Whitehall—was over mountains and through dense woods and presented a serious logistical problem regarding supplies. Braddock had been instructed to contract supplies and transportation from local residents. After landing in Virginia, he began working with colonial governors and assemblies, but it was not until the army was assembling at Fort Cumberland that Braddock was able to fully assess his supply needs. Since time was a

factor in a short campaign season, supplies, wagons, and horses needed to be gathered at Fort Cumberland quickly. Therefore, the people living closest to Fort Cumberland in Maryland and Pennsylvania found themselves called upon to invest financially, physically, and emotionally in the war effort. This call had very little to do with their ability to provide; rather it was solely derived from their geographic proximity to the fort.

In order to contextualize the demands, it is important to understand the history and development of southern Pennsylvania. Understanding the region's development helps to contextualize the demands that army leaders were placing on the residents and signifies how their prior history influenced their response. The counties of southern Pennsylvania had only recently been settled and officially established. Lancaster County was established in 1729, and subsequently York (1749) and Cumberland (1750) counties were formed out of Lancaster.[1] The settlers of these counties belonged primarily to three groups: English Quakers, Scots-Irish, and Germans.[2] Of these settlers, many were recent migrants, who arrived after 1720. Matthew Ward notes that the differences in language, political affiliation, religion, and culture, as well as economic competition among immigrant groups, "made the formation of any sense of community identity difficult."[3]

The most intense period of European migration to southeastern Pennsylvania was from 1725 to 1755. The predominantly German and Scots-Irish migrants who chose to move to Pennsylvania were of the middling sort, but many spent all their savings to get to Pennsylvania

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[1] John Gibson, ed., *History of York County, Pennsylvania* (Chicago: F.A. Battey Publishing Co., 1886), 299-300.

[2] Gibson, ed., *York County*, 302; Ned Landsman, *Crossroads of Empire: The Middle Colonies in British North America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 96-99.

[3] Matthew Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 14.

and were poor when they began their new life. These people moved because they wanted a better life and they believed "that hard work would bring success." In choosing where to settle, immigrants were looking for good land and a connection to Philadelphia. When they arrived in the Susquehanna River Valley, there were already some Delawares and Iroquois-allied tribes living in the vicinity; these Native Americans connected new settlers to the fur trade. However, their presence also influenced how and where settlement occurred, particularly early on when the Penns were trying to keep their promises to Native Americans and prevent white settlement on their lands. In short, the Germans, Scots-Irish, and English Quakers who settled in Lancaster, York, and Cumberland counties aspired to work hard and better their lives and were connected to the fur trade and to Philadelphia. They traded with and lived near Native Americans, but probably had very little contact with the French until the disputes at the Ohio River began in 1754.[4]

The European settlers of these counties were mainly interested in farming and commerce. Therefore, grain cultivation and the fur trade were the backbone of the economy. While the borderland offered plenty of land for cultivation and access to Native Americans with furs, the settlers of Lancaster, York, and especially Cumberland were far from centers of commerce, particularly Philadelphia. In order to connect to markets, therefore, the settlers built roads in the 1740s and 1750s, and the towns of York, Lancaster, and Carlisle (in Cumberland County) became crossroads towns, connecting the frontiers to the coast. With the need to transport goods between the backcountry and Philadelphia and Baltimore, wagoning (moving goods with a Conestoga wagon and teams of four, six, or eight horses) became an important industry.

[4] James T. Lemon, *The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), 5, 7, 10, 31, 43, quote from 13.

Historian Judith Ridner, in her study of Carlisle, notes that the challenge for settlers of Pennsylvania crossroads towns was to "form exchange networks that would connect them to Atlantic markets and consumer economies."[5] These networks were able to develop in relative peace as Pennsylvania largely avoided the imperial wars of the first half of the eighteenth century, and Ohio Indians were more interested in trade than in conflict over land.[6]

When the British army arrived in 1755, the primary target was French activity on the Ohio River. Beginning in 1754, the government of Maryland had been preparing Fort Cumberland to serve as a staging point for the army's trek to Fort Duqeusne. But Fort Cumberland was on the edge of British settlement in Maryland, so if the army needed supplies, leaders had to make requests of points east of the fort. On June 5, 1755, General Braddock wrote to Sir Thomas Robinson, the secretary of state for the southern department, from Fort Cumberland to report on his progress in preparing for battle. He began by attributing his delay in traveling from Alexandria to Fort Cumberland to "the bad roads,…the want of forage, and indeed, the want of zeal in the people for the success of our expedition." The "want of zeal" among provincials would be one of the general's recurring complaints, and his continued use of the phrase betrays his underlying expectation that colonists would do everything they could to eagerly assist the army. When this assistance was not forthcoming, Braddock was puzzled and frustrated.

Braddock specified that his main problem was that "the difficulty of getting waggons and horses to cross the mountains has detained me a whole month." Braddock noted that the first

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[5] Judith Ridner, *A Town In-Between: Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Early Mid-Atlantic Interior* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 64-65; Gibson, ed., *York County*, 323-325, 351; Lemon, *Best Poor Man's Country*, 28.

[6] Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 22.

plan when he arrived in Virginia, as told to him by Robert Napier, the Quarter-Master General, was that Virginia and Maryland would supply 2,500 horses and 200 wagons. These horses and wagons failed to materialize, however, which simply served to confirm Braddock's skepticism about the colonists' reliability. He noted, "I had great reason to mistrust it; from the experience which I have had of the deceit of all the persons of this country with whom I have had any dealings."[7] In addition to ordering wagons and horses from Maryland and Virginia, Braddock also expected Pennsylvanians to contribute, but Governor Robert Hunter Morris' request to the assembly on Braddock's behalf was quickly subsumed into the long-running dispute between the governor and the assembly about who was responsible to supply the army.

Braddock's difficulty was not a surprise to colonial governors. As early as February, 1755, Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland foresaw the problems that could occur due to the army's needs and the proximity of some communities to Fort Cumberland. In a speech to the General Assembly on February 22 he remarked, "Gentlemen, I take this occasion of recommending to you, to regulate the Hire of Waggons and Horses, in Case the Service should require us, at any Time, to impress either in this Government." This regulation was necessary, Sharpe asserted, because "a short Experience has shown, that many of the Inhabitants have raised the Price of Carriages since the Beginning of these unhappy Disturbances, in Proportion as they found we stood in Need of their Assistance."[8] The problem, therefore, was not that colonists were unwilling to rent their wagons and horses; the problem was the price that colonists were seeking as compensation for losing the use of their wagons and horses.

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[7] Edward Braddock, Letter to Thomas Robinson, June 5, 1755 in William Livingston, *A Review of Military Operations in North America from the French hostilities on the frontier of Virginia in 1753 to the surrender of Oswego 1756* (Dublin: P. Wilson and J. Exshaw, 1757), 250-252.

[8] The speech is reprinted in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 4, 1755, No. 1367.

The main reason that Braddock got caught up in negotiations for supplies and disputes over prices is that army authorities were expressly forbidden from simply taking what they needed. This provision was the outcome of a debate concerning the appropriate role of the army among civilians. This debate had a long history dating back to King William III and the standing army controversy in 1688-1689. Because the outcome of this controversy was that parliament, not the king, had control over the army, laws and practices had developed to ensure the subordination of the military to the civil authority, even to the point of detracting from the military's successful operations. As far as military power was concerned, Parliament's highest priority was the preservation of liberty among the civilian population, and this included restricting troop movements and subjecting them to civil authorities. If, therefore, the army needed to move from one place to another it was the task of a civil magistrate to arrange for the rental of conveyances from civilians. The prices and terms of service would be set before the task was undertaken. If civilians felt that they were abused in this service, they could appeal to a civil magistrate (usually a Justice of the Peace). Historian John Brewer suggests that the legislation's, "intent … was to ensure that the armed forces in England caused as little inconvenience and inflicted as little damage as possible upon the civilian population."[9]

In the colonial context, the laws were just powerful enough to make it necessary for army leaders to negotiate with civilians for supplies and defend their actions if they took what they needed against the owner's will. Still, conflicts arose because both British authorities and colonial civilians could both make convincing arguments for giving or withholding supplies. The problem was that army leaders did not have the time, patience, or authority to work through colonial legalities, so their demands could often come across as a display of arbitrary authority.

[9] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 48-49.

In addition, both Braddock and later Loudoun were convinced that the colonists were hiding their horses and wagons when army officers came around to collect them. Generals such as Braddock saw their unanswered demands as evidence that provincials were intent on hindering the service and therefore disloyal. After his initial orders for wagons went unfilled, Braddock fumed to Robinson, "I should never finish, were I to enter into a detail of the innumerable instances which I could give of the want of honesty, which I found both in general, and in particular; and the most absolute contempt of truth, which I have met with in the course of this service."[10]

Despite Governor Sharpe's attempt to insure the supply of wagons from Maryland, Braddock's initial orders produced only a few wagons. Harry Gordon, a 48th artillery engineer, reflected this scarcity in his journal entry for April 18 noting, "orders came for us to buy horses to carry our baggage, as there will be no more wagons allowed us."[11] Braddock's entire expedition would be compromised if he had to spend all of his money to buy wagons or horses. Instead, he needed the colonists to rent their wagons to the army. When wagons were not forthcoming, Braddock grew frustrated and threatened to send soldiers to seize them. However, before Braddock instituted his threats, Benjamin Franklin stepped in and offered to gather wagons from the Pennsylvania communities nearest Fort Cumberland—in York, Lancaster, and Cumberland counties. In 1755, Franklin was a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly. Despite the Assembly's official position that it was not their responsibility to fund the war, Franklin took it upon himself to persuade residents of southern Pennsylvania to rent their wagons. To accomplish this task, Franklin printed up and distributed an advertisement on April 26. The

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[10] Edward Braddock, Letter to Thomas Robinson, June 5, 1755, Qtd. in Livingston, *Military Operations in North America*, 250-252.

[11] Harry Gordon, "The Morris Journal," in Winthrop Sargent, ed., *A History of an Expedition Against Fort Duquesne; Under Major-General Edward Braddock* (New York: Arno Press, 1971 [1855]), 368.

advertisement called for “150 Wagoons, with 4 Horses to each Waggon, and 1500 Saddle or Pack-Horse.” The army also needed drivers for each wagon and people to take care of the pack horses, at least for the journey to Fort Cumberland.

Franklin was careful to spell out the terms of the contract in the lengthy advertisement. He and his son William Franklin were in charge of contracting the deals and paying the initial fees. Benjamin Franklin went to the towns of York and Lancaster, and William Franklin went to Carlisle in Cumberland County.[12] Once the wagons arrived at Fort Cumberland, Braddock would pay the balance of the fees. Franklin was careful to note in the advertisement that “No Drivers of Waggons, or Persons taking care of the hired Horses, are on any Account to be called upon to do the Duty of Soldiers, or be otherwise employ’d than in conducting or taking Care of their Carriages and Horses.” While the people would not have to fight, Franklin did not mention that the wagoners could face danger, loss of property, or death.

In the second half of the advertisement, Franklin evoked Braddock’s condemnation of the colonists for a lack of loyalty, telling the Pennsylvanians that, “If you are really, as I believe you are, good and loyal Subjects to His Majesty, you may now do a most acceptable Service.” Franklin added to this statement by warning the Pennsylvanians, “if you do not do this Service to your King and Country voluntarily, when such good Pay and reasonable Terms are offered you, your Loyalty will be strongly suspected.” Rather than discussing whether or not the army had a right to demand or take wagons, Franklin avoided a debate about the army’s actions and motivations by focusing on how the colonists’ response would be perceived.

[12] Lancaster was about 75 miles from Philadelphia and 170 miles from Fort Cumberland; York was 100 miles from Philadelphia and 140 miles from Fort Cumberland; Carlisle was 125 miles from Philadelphia and 110 miles from Fort Cumberland.

By interpreting colonists' participation as evidence of their loyalty or disloyalty to King George II and Great Britain, Franklin and Braddock heightened the wagon contracts from economic transactions to patriotic displays. Yet not every colonist had his or her loyalty tested in this expensive and potentially dangerous way; only those people who lived in the vicinity of Fort Cumberland were called upon to show their patriotism. Braddock and Franklin were implying that being a British citizen, whether in London, Philadelphia, or a distant frontier, had the same meaning and obligation, even if in practice the circumstances and claims upon their resources could vary widely. Furthermore, Franklin and Braddock were not afraid to threaten violence, even though it was technically illegal, and, if it had been employed, might have caused an uproar. Franklin justified his high-handed measures by explaining the political situation to his fellow citizens. In the advertisement he informed them that he had been at the army camp and "found the General and Officers of the Army extremely exasperated," at the lack of wagons. Franklin explained that wagons and horses "had been expected from this Province, as most able to furnish them;" however, the dispute between Governor Morris and the Assembly had stalled any action. Therefore, it was necessary to circumvent the normal political process.

Braddock's plan, with the assistance of Franklin, was to try to force the issue rather than wait for it to be resolved in the Assembly. Franklin included in the advertisement Braddock's threat to send "an armed Force immediately into these Counties, to seize as many of the Carriages and Horses as should be wanted, and compel as many Persons into the Service as would be necessary to drive and take care of them." It was an interesting threat that, if carried out, would have given the war a very different start. The British had already fought three imperial wars against France based, in part, on a resistance to French arbitrary power, both in the pope and the king, and an elevation of English liberty as an ideal worth fighting for. But

Braddock and the generals that came after him would implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) insist that colonists needed to show their loyalty to Britain by subordinating their liberty to the necessities of war. While it was not surprising that the generals made demands on the colonists, the threats that the generals used to support their demands seemed antithetical to the overall purpose of the war. Furthermore, the threats and exercise of arbitrary power were consistently ineffective and only served to irritate colonists.

Whether Braddock would have even been able to carry out his threat to impress wagons, horses, and drivers was conveniently excluded from the advertisement. Instead, Franklin explained that he had looked out for the best interests of the colonists when, "I apprehended that the Progress of a Body of Soldiers thro' these Counties on such an Occasion, especially considering the Temper they are in, and their Resentment against us would be attended with many and great Inconveniences to the Inhabitants." Therefore he had convinced Braddock to give the colonists one more chance to prove their loyalty. At the end of the advertisement, Franklin again presented the threat of violence noting, "the King's Business must be done; so many brave Troops, come so far for your Defence, must not stand idle, thro' your backwardness to do what may be reasonably expected from you; Waggons and Horses must be had; violent measures will probably be used and you will be to seek [*sic*] for a Recompence where you can find it, and your Case perhaps be little pitied or regarded." The idea that the army had come in order to defend the colonists was a theme that army and imperial authorities would take up many times in trying to persuade the colonists to participate in the war. But even from the start, it was clear that the war was about land and trade (the war started with a French claim to land, not an attack on provincials), and colonists soon discovered that the army would not be very effective at

defending settlers from Indian attacks on the frontiers. Furthermore, the wagons that Franklin was gathering would be used for offensive, not defensive, purposes.[13]

Franklin printed the advertisement as a broadside and posted it in York, Lancaster, and Carlisle on April 26. He also convinced the chief justices in York and Lancaster to present the army's deed to the residents and order the town constables to assist in gathering wagons.[14] Since Franklin only allotted Saturday, April 26 through Wednesday, April 30, to gather wagons at Lancaster and only May 1 and 2 at York, he was probably drawing from settlers at or near those towns and not the more remote settlers of those counties. One of the last contracts was made with Harbanus Ashebriner on May 2, in Paradise, Pennsylvania, which was east of Lancaster and on Franklin's way back to Philadelphia.

Considering that Franklin was able to fill Braddock's request in a matter of weeks, it is important to consider what sort of demand Braddock was placing on Pennsylvanians' resources. In 1755 the population of the town of Lancaster was about 2,000 people (approximately 20,000 in the county); in York there were about 1,500 people (about 12,000 countywide); and in Carlisle there were about 1,250 people (about 7,000 in Cumberland County).[15] The average number of horses in Lancaster in 1760 was 2.44 per farm, and between the three towns there were at least 1,500 horses.[16] As for wagons, in 1759 there was an estimated one wagon per twenty people,

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[13] The advertisement is printed in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 26, 1755.

[14] "Letter to Susanna Wright" April 28, 1755 in Benjamin Franklin, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* (hereafter, *Franklin Papers*), Leonard W. Labaree, ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) 6: 23 and note 8.

[15] Lemon, *Best Poor Man's Country*, 48, figure 11; 126, figure 36.

[16] If the average family size was five persons (Lemon, 165) then out of the 4,750 people in the three towns there were around 950 families. Lemon estimates that in the second half of the 18th century, farm families comprised two-thirds of all rural families in Pennsylvania. If two-thirds of the 950 families in York, Lancaster, and Carlisle had 2.44 horses each then there were 632 farm families with 1, 542 horses. Of course, non-farm families could still have had horses that they were willing to rent.

which means that the combined population of the towns of York, Lancaster, and Carlisle (about 4,750 people) had about 237 wagons.[17] Braddock and Franklin were asking for 150 wagons, 600 horses to draw the wagons, and an additional 1,500 horses. They received the 150 wagons and teams and perhaps an additional 500 horses.[18] Even if the pool they were drawing from was expanded outward slightly to the people nearest the town, the request was still placing a significant burden on the residents of southern Pennsylvania. The fact that the army was never able to get all of the horses it wanted helps to show the degree of the burden.

In the end, Braddock and Franklin filled the need by making an organized effort and paying a fair wage. Both Braddock and Franklin cast civilian's initial disinterest in supplying the army as evidence of disloyalty and ungratefulness and later characterized their participation as evidence of loyalty and zeal. In reality, however, the impetus behind individuals' participation was much more prosaic: for the right price, they were willing to disrupt their lives and sacrifice the wagons and horses that were critical to the effective functioning of their farms and commerce.

From Franklin's partial accounts, it is clear that he contracted with many individuals who offered one wagon or one or two horses. That means that more people were affected than if large numbers of wagons had come from a few individuals. Most people probably offered their wagon with their own team, and many people probably chose to offer themselves as the drivers of their own wagons, which was a valuable piece of property, of which they would want to keep

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[17] Lemon, *Best Poor Man's Country*, 165, 275 n. 162. Unfortunately, these numbers reflect the situation after the army had already come through, but they are several years removed, which perhaps means that the levels had again normalized.

[18] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 93.

track. In addition, the time invested would be significant.[19] Drivers contracted at the end of April did not make it home until the end of July, which meant the loss of an important period of the agricultural calendar. Still, the cash payment (cash was scarce in the backcountry) could have been adequate compensation, assuming nothing went wrong. On May 15, the *Gazette* printed the initial results of Franklin's advertising campaign: "great Numbers were immediately offered, and 150 Waggons, laden with Oats, Indian-corn, and other Forage, were dispatched to the Camp in a few Days, and as many more might have been had if wanted, the People offering with Readiness and Cheerfulness, from a Zeal for his Majesty's Service."[20]

On June 5, 1755 the *Gazette* again picked up the wagoners' story by relating their safe arrival at Fort Cumberland and their reception by Braddock: "[the wagons] gave great satisfaction to the General, and the other Officers, being, for the most Part, by far the best of any that have been engag'd in the Service of the Army since their Arrival." The *Gazette* went on to address more practical concerns by informing interested readers that "for several Miles round the Camp … there is a great Deal of good Grass and other Food for the Horses."[21] Franklin's assistance did not go unnoticed by Braddock. The General wrote to Thomas Robinson that Franklin acted "with equal quickness and probity." Furthermore, Franklin's ability to promise and provide wagons from Pennsylvania was "the only instance of capacity and honesty that I have seen in all these provinces," regardless of his methods.[22] The arrival of the Pennsylvanians at Fort Cumberland was certainly an event. On May 20 Harry Gordon wrote in his journal

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[19] An example is Charlotte Browne's driver, Mr. Gore. See chapter five.

[20] The news item is printed in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 15, 1755, No. 1377.

[21] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 5, 1755, No. 1380.

[22] Edward Braddock, Letter to Thomas Robinson, June 5, 1755, Livingston, 251.

"Arrived here 80 waggons from Pennsylvania, to assist in the expedition, and eleven wagons from Philadelphia, with presents for the officers of the Army."[23]

What motivated Franklin to get involved? There are a few hints in Benjamin and Deborah Franklin's letters. On April 30, 1755, Deborah Franklin wrote to Peter Collinson explaining that her husband was away from home contracting for wagons and supplies. She told Collinson that Franklin had undertaken the project in order to "prevent[…] some Inconveniencies that might have attended so many raw Hands sent us from Europe, who are not accustomed to necessary Affairs." This makes it seem like Franklin was doing the army a favor because the leaders were inept, a sentiment that was not evident in the advertisement. Similarly, on May 22, 1755, Franklin himself wrote to Governor William Shirley explaining, "I have had the good Fortune to do an acceptable Piece of Service to the Forces under General Braddock. I found them stuck fast, and unable to move for want of Horses and Carriages." He did not mention being motivated by zeal or loyalty.[24]

Nevertheless, Franklin was interested in promoting cooperation among the colonies and between Britain and the colonies. He believed that fighting the war effectively depended on cooperation and interconnectedness. He had already proposed the Albany Plan of Union in 1754 and, even though colonial assemblies had rejected the plan, Franklin still warned Peter Collinson on June 26, 1755 that until the Plan or something like it was adopted, Collinson should "never expect to see an American War carried on as it ought to be." Therefore, while Franklin was certainly more aware of and invested in intercolonial and imperial issues than most settlers of

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[23] Harry Gordon, "The Morris Journal," in Winthrop Sargent, ed., *A History of an Expedition Against Fort Duquesne; Under Major-General Edward Braddock* (New York: Arno Press, 1971 [1855]), 379.

[24] Deborah Franklin to Peter Collinson, April 30, 1755; Franklin to William Shirley, May 22, 1755, *Franklin Papers*, 6:24, 57.

southern Pennsylvania, he also recognized that a little organization and cooperation would solve Braddock's problem. Still, in his advertisement, he emphasized Braddock's threats in order to convince the colonists to comply and not hold out for a higher price. By posting the broadsides and going to the towns himself, Franklin turned the transaction into an event and the momentum he created helped him secure the wagons and horses quickly.[25]

In the end, Franklin was not able to keep his whole promise about the safety of the wagoners and horses. When the army was caught by surprise on the banks of the Monongahela River in July, some of the wagons and horses were with the "flying column" that faced the French and Indians. Nevertheless, on August 21, 1755 the *Gazette* noted, "What seems remarkable is, that all the Waggoners from Lancaster and York Counties, in this Province, who engaged in the Service of the Army, have returned safe but two; one of which died by Sickness."[26] While it is true that the wagoners returned home safely, many of them had abandoned their wagons and fled with their horses during the battle. Zeal for his majesty's service, in this instance, led to consequences that Braddock and Franklin had not anticipated or emphasized. The colonists had proven their loyalty according to Braddock's criteria but also suffered the consequences. In fact, the frontier settlers, now without their wagons, had to stand by and watch as the army retreated to Philadelphia in August.

In this first instance of civilians responding to the authority of army and imperial authorities, several patterns were initiated that would carry on throughout the war. Army leaders would continue to make demands that expected colonists to eagerly assist them. They would often assume that colonists were, or should be, uniformly invested in the war, though they were

[25] Franklin to Peter Collinson, June 26, 1755, *Franklin Papers*, 6:83.

[26] *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 21, 1755, No. 1391.

not unified by geography, ethnicity or culture. Provincials would continue to respond poorly to threats or when authorities seemed to presume unlimited power in the name of war. A trend emerged in which British settlers and residents of non-British communities living in British territory were most active in the war when they could control or negotiate their participation, which was an idea that was endlessly frustrating to army leaders. Another example of this trend and of the tensions inherent in the intersection of war and civilian society can be seen at Fort Herkimer, New York.

After Braddock's death at the Monongahela River, Lord Loudoun was dispatched to the North American colonies to assume the position of Commander in Chief. Following the defeat in Pennsylvania, the central activity in the war moved to the New York frontier.[27] British-controlled settlements in central New York extended northward up the Hudson River and westward on the Mohawk River. The westernmost of these settlements was Burnetsfield, which encompassed land on the northern and southern banks of the Mohawk River. The southern village was called Herkimer and the northern village was called German Flats.[28] Burnetsfield was located about 75 miles west of Albany and about 90 miles west of Fort Oswego. Beginning in 1756, increased activity at Fort Oswego drew attention to Burnetsfield since it was the closest British-controlled settlement to Fort Oswego. From the beginning, the residents of Burnetsfield resisted the army's demands for assistance and protested the building and occupation of Fort Herkimer. The reasons for the residents' resistance were derived directly from the history of the settlement. The story of Burnetsfield in the Seven Years' War shows how a community that

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[27] The next significant battle in Pennsylvania was the successful campaign against Fort Duquesne in 1758.

[28] Towards the end of the century, a surveying error switched the names of the towns and the northern village became Herkimer. Walter A. Knittle, *Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration: A British Government Redemptioner Project to Manufacture Naval Stores* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1965), 209.

really did not want to be involved in the war navigated the challenges that the inescapable reality of war presented.

The region was settled by German Palatines whose migration from the Holy Roman Empire to the banks of the Mohawk River was marked by a series of rather bizarre circumstances.[29] Their journey began in the late seventeenth century when a number of factors about life in the vicinity of the Rhine River in the Holy Roman Empire made emigration attractive to a large portion of the population. The land had been destroyed by the War of the Spanish Succession; the people had grown weary of high taxes and religious quarrels. In 1708, a particularly hard winter spurred poor people to look for a fresh start. Indeed, most people cited hunger and poverty as their chief motivations to move elsewhere. These "push" factors combined with a number of "pull" factors to make the British North American colonies one attractive choice.[30]

Foremost among these pull factors was a piece of propaganda called the "Golden Book." It was written by a Lutheran pastor, Joshua Kocherthal, and distributed through the southwest of the Holy Roman Empire between 1706 and 1709. In 1704, Kocherthal had been in London, met some Carolina proprietors, and agreed to write a promotional tract to encourage immigration to North Carolina. The book "extolled the life of ease awaiting those who moved to America," but, most importantly, it included a picture of Queen Anne and hinted that she would provide transportation and free land to anyone who wanted to move to British North America. The gold

[29] Even the title "German Palatines" has its own peculiar history as most of the immigrants were not Palatines and "Germany" was the Holy Roman Empire. However, as Philip Otterness recounts in *Becoming German: The 1709 Palatine Migration to New York*, the migrants began referring to themselves as Palatines in order to seem more Protestant and anti-French to their British sympathizers. Philip Otterness, *Becoming German: The 1709 Palatine Migration to New York* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 59.

[30] Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 11; Otterness, *Becoming German*, 22-23.

lettering on the title page coupled with the queen's picture and the pleasing descriptions of life in the colonies proved to be irresistible to thousands of impoverished residents in the Holy Roman Empire. The book was widely circulated and three editions were printed in 1709 alone.[31]

The problem was that the book and the promises were not authorized (or even known) by the British crown, but that is not to say the British government was opposed to a large-scale German migration. The migrants benefitted from a political climate in London that encouraged population growth in Britain and the colonies. Whig and mercantilist theory posited that a high population was a key component of a nation's strength and that, as Philip Otterness notes, "increasing a country's population would increase its wealth." Encouraging immigration was therefore a fast way to build wealth. Toward that end, and before the large-scale German migrations even began, British lawmakers passed the General Naturalization Act in March, 1709. One of the main benefits of this law was that it allowed non-English Protestants to acquire land within British domains and pass it on to their children.[32]

The Golden Book, combined with the other reasons to leave, led to a huge emigration from the Holy Roman Empire to England, and eventually to the colonies. The first emigration of about 60 people occurred in 1708; this was followed by a much larger group of 13,000 people in 1709. Most of the 1709 migrants traveled as families; 80% of adults were married, and family size averaged 4.7 people. However, the migrants quickly discovered that the path to America was not as golden and easy as the book suggested. Most spent all they had in traveling to England, and many relied on the charity of strangers at Rotterdam just to get there. British authorities were faced with an overwhelming influx of peasant farmers with no funding or plan

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[31] Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 14-15; Otterness, *Becoming German*, 25-30, quote from 29.

[32] Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 28; Otterness, *Becoming German*, 39 (quote), 42.

for traveling to North America. The first official solution was to keep them in Britain in order to increase the national wealth. However, Otterness notes that among British authorities the feeling soon became widespread that the migrants were "too poor, too unskilled, too Catholic, and too unenlightened to be British subjects." So the plan developed to send them to the colonies, possibly to serve as a buffer between the French and British zones of settlement, especially if they intermarried with Native Americans. There were a variety of plans for funding and implementing the migration, including one plan proposing to send some Palatines to the frontier of New York in order to produce tar and pitch for the navy, basically working as servants indentured to the crown.[33]

Therefore, in April, 1710, about a year after arriving in England, 3,300 Palatines boarded ships for New York. The original agreement was that the profits from the production of tar and pitch would pay for the costs of initial settlement and subsistence. Once the debt was paid, each individual would get forty acres of land. The major problems that everyone conveniently overlooked were that the farmers and vignerons from the Rhine did not know anything about making tar and pitch, the process would take several years (in the best of circumstances) to become profitable, and it would be difficult to motivate people who were seeking an escape from poverty to work hard for the benefit of an overlord. Furthermore, land that produced good pitch pine trees was sandy and not good for farming, ensuring at least one more move in the Palatines' future if they wanted their forty acres to be farm land. The governor of New York, Robert Hunter, had drafted the naval stores plan, and he took charge of the Germans when they arrived in New York City. During the fall of 1711, he transported them up the Hudson River, about

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[33] There were other plans as well: some people went to North Carolina, some went to Ireland, several other Catholics and others were sent back to the Holy Roman Empire. Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 52-66; Otterness, *Becoming German*, 19, 66, 69-74, quote from 66.

forty miles south of Albany. About 2,500 of the original 3,300 made it to the settlements on the Hudson River (about 500 people had died on the ocean voyage and others initially stayed in New York City).[34]

Life on the Hudson River did not go according to plan. The Germans resented having to work in gangs, but when they tried to rebel, soldiers were sent to keep them at their work. Hunter and the British authorities treated them like servants, but the Germans still thought of themselves as land-seeking peasants. The whole point of the naval stores project was to reduce British dependence on Swedish tar and pitch. British economic theory, based on mercantilism, dictated that colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country. If the colonies could produce naval stores, wealth would be kept within the British empire instead of benefitting Sweden. But the Germans had no interest in British mercantilism or imperialism. Instead, once they arrived in New York, they were very intrigued by the Iroquois, who were a separate nation living near but not part of the British empire.[35]

The Germans thought their best way of achieving independence was by finding land far enough away from British settlements to avoid British oversight but close enough to benefit from British trade networks. The place they looked to in order to fulfill those hopes was Schoharie, New York. Schoharie Creek was about thirty miles west of and ran parallel to the Hudson River, connecting to the Mohawk River at the mission town of Fort Hunter (established 1711).[36] In 1712, the naval stores project became financially unsustainable (never having produced much);

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[34] Otterness, *Becoming German*, 88, 97; Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 133-134; 141-142.

[35] Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 111-117; Otterness, 106-108; "State of the British Plantations in America, in 1721," John R. Brodhead and E.B. O'Callaghan, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co, 1855), 5: 601.

[36] Presently, Fort Hunter is a hamlet of the town of Florida, New York in Montgomery County.

Governor Hunter had expended a large amount of his own money and refused to continue unless he was repaid or the British government took up the cost (he never did get his money back). Without the project, there was no reason to stay at the settlements on the Hudson. Hunter made the Germans sign contracts pledging to return if and when the tar and pitch production was resumed. Many of the Germans moved south, settling in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, but a significant number remained in New York and sought the fulfillment of their dreams at Schoharie. By 1713, there were about 1,000 Palatines living along Schoharie Creek.[37]

The only problem with the German's promised land at Schoharie was that it was already claimed by land speculators who succeeded in taking back their land from the Germans in 1720. By that point, the 1710 migrants had moved four times, and they were eager to find a permanent home far away from British influence. Fortunately for them, Governor Hunter had been replaced by Governor William Burnet who had been tasked by the Board of Trade to solve the Germans' settlement problem once and for all by giving them land to establish permanent homes. While Governor Hunter had been financially invested in the tar and pitch scheme, Burnet was not. For his part, Burnet was very interested in creating a buffer between the French and the British and decided to revive the old idea of using Germans for that purpose. Both the Germans and Burnet were looking to the Mohawk River as a suitable place to settle. It would protect the entryway to British settlements on the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers, and it was far enough away from other British settlements to ensure that the Germans would not be disrupted, while also being located on a major trade route. In 1722 Governor Burnet purchased land from the Mohawks on the

[37] Otterness, *Becoming German*, 108, 114, 137-138; Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 188-189. William Burnet, Letter to the Board of Trade, October 16, 1721, Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 5: 634.

Mohawk River about 75 miles west of Albany, 60 miles west of Schenectady, and about 45 miles west of Fort Hunter.[38]

When he told the Palatines about it, however, they argued that it was not enough land to settle all of them, and they announced that they had split into two factions who refused to settle with one another. Burnet suspected that they made up the quarrel just to get more land, but he allowed sixty families, "who had all along been most hearty for the Government," to purchase a separate tract of land east of his purchase. In 1722, these families settled a town called Stone Arabia, five miles north (across the river) of the Mohawk town of Canajoharie and twenty-five miles east of Burnet's initial purchase. The other more fractious thirty families (consisting of ninety-two adults) settled at the original location, which was called the Burnetsfield Patent. Forty-six patentees settled on the north side of the river, and their village became known as German Flats; the other forty-six patentees settled on the south side of the river, and their village was first called Palatine village and later Herkimer.[39]

The eventual name change to Herkimer reflects the prominence of John Jost Herkimer and his son Nicholas Herkimer, who fought in the Revolutionary War, but the Herkimers were not part of the 1709 Palatine emigration. While the rest of the settlers of Burnetsfield had originally traveled to New York in 1710, it appears that John Herkimer, his wife Catherine, and his parents Jurgh and Madaline Herkimer arrived in New York in 1722. He may have left the Rhine River region around 1710, but seems to have been waylaid in Holland for several years

[38] Fort Johnson (William Johnson's house) was about 5 miles east of Fort Hunter (50 miles west of Burnetsfield). Otterness, *Becoming German*, 141; Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 204-205.

[39] Otterness, *Becoming German*, 142; Knittle *Palatine Emigration*, 209; William Burnet, Letter to the Board of Trade, November 21, 1722, Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 5: 656; W.N.P. Dailey, *History of the Old Fort Herkimer Church: German Flatts Reformed Church, 1723* (St. Johnsonville, NY: St. Johnsonville Enterprise and News, nd), 2-3. Every adult qualified as a patentee.

before finally traveling to England and arriving in New York in 1722 in the company of a number of other German immigrants. It seems likely that he knew some of the 1710 immigrants and joined them at their final destination at Burnetsfield. Herkimer arrived in plenty of time to make it onto the first list of patent holders; he is listed as number 36 and received 100 acres of land along with the other 91 patentees. Even though the Germans moved to Burnetsfield in 1722, the final patent was not issued until April 13, 1725. The Germans began farming as soon as they arrived and quickly became profitable wheat sellers. The settlers built their homes near each other in the village and divided up the rest of the land into strips so that everyone had at least one piece of land near the river. They also began a vibrant rum trade with their Iroquois neighbors. The Germans were content to cultivate close ties with their Native American neighbors, benefit from exchange networks connected to Albany, and retain their German Palatine identity.[40]

By the time the Seven Years' War began, the first generation had given way to the second and third, and those Palatines were the ones who were most affected by the war. Many of the members of the second generation had been teenagers when their families left Germany, and they remembered the camps in England, the treacherous journey across the Atlantic, the miserable life on the Hudson, the dashed hopes of Schoharie, and the reasons for moving to Burnetsfield. Otterness notes that "The 1710 immigrants whom William Johnson dealt with in 1757 did not differ much from the German immigrants Hunter had dealt with forty-five years

[40] Otterness, *Becoming German*, 145; Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 209; Dailey, *Herkimer Church*, 11; George A. Hardin, ed., *History of Herkimer County New York* (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1893), 11; Phoebe Strong Cowen, *The Herkimers and Schuylers: An Historical Sketch of the Two Families* (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1903), 12.

earlier." The Germans' ambivalence toward British authority would be an important factor in how they responded to the war and the demands of the army and imperial authorities.[41]

The felicitous position of Burnetsfield as a support station for Fort Oswego was recognized early on in the war. Throughout the summer of 1756, the army invaded the isolation of the Germans by passing through and staying at Burnetsfield on its way up the Mohawk River to Fort Oswego. Fort Oswego grew in importance, and William Johnson wrote to John Jost Herkimer and Johan Jost Petrie in July, 1756, informing them that "His Majestys service requires there should be A good Road opened by Land to Oswegoe." Johnson asked that the men find someone to mark out the road and begin building it, with the assistance of the Oneida and Onondaga Indians. He hoped that one of them would undertake it as it "will be a very Considerable Piece of Work" that needed to begin quickly. Johnson was authorized to pay whoever took up the project.[42]

John Herkimer, Johan Petrie, and another neighbor John Franck took Johnson's request as an opportunity to convey their annoyance and frustration about the presence of the army. Since the army wanted their participation, they recognized that they were in a position to make some demands themselves. Johan Petrie explained he could not undertake the project because, "I am oald, and lame in one of my jips, and It's not in my power to Undertake any Such fatigue." John Jost Herkimer noted, "I dare not leave my house upon account, of the Military." He began to launch into a longer complaint about the military's abuses but stopped himself and summarized, "In short they take a prerogative power in their own hand, Not only by Infesting my house, and taking up my Rooms at pleasure, but takes what they think Nesserarie of my Effects

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[41] Otterness, *Becoming German*, 154-155.

[42] William Johnson, Letter to Johan Jost Petrie and Jost Herkimer," July 22, 1756, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (hereafter, *Johnson Papers*) (Albany: State University of New York, 1962 [1921]), 2: 513-514.

for theire own use with out asking." He warned, "if shuch doings Is allowed to go on not only I and my familie must suffer but also all my Niebours."

The other man that they had asked to consider the project, John Conrad Franck, took the opportunity to explain why the project was out of the question for him too. He explained, "It is not possible for me to undertake it upon account of Soldiers, Battoee men & Saillors &c. for My house every day is full Either of one sort or another." In addition to damaging his house, the sailors and soldiers had helped themselves to his cattle, "without either asking liberty or paying me for their Vallue." If he left his house to work on the road, "I must Immagine never to See Either my wife or Chieldreen again." The men concluded the letter by informing Johnson that they were "willing to do any thing that wou'd tend to his Magiesteies Service or the good of our Country, yet as matters Stand now we must be Excused." This exchange set up a confrontation between the residents of Burnetsfield (and especially John Herkimer) and army authorities, with the constant tension between the possibility of attack and the demands of the army as the backdrop.[43]

John Jost Herkimer had become a leader among the second generation of the Burnetsfield settlers, finding success as a trader and a supplier for western posts, especially Fort Oswego. In 1740 he built a large house and separate storehouse for his goods. His house and his storehouse / trading post were located on a hill overlooking the river. The storehouse was "a large three story stone house with port holes… at each story, and likewise in the basement for the purpose of cross firing."[44] Herkimer's house was one of several homes in Burnetsfield that doubled as

[43] *Johnson Papers* 2:526-527.

[44] E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, & Co.), 1:527.

blockhouses in case of attack.[45] During the summer of 1756, the army began using Herkimer's storehouse as a fort and quartering soldiers in his house and in other houses in the village.

Soon enough, living in close quarters began to increase the tension further. On August 8, Captain Horatio Gates wrote to William Johnson exclaiming, "I can no longer avoid acquainting you of the extreme ill behavior of Justice Herkimer, his family & relations." The Herkimers, he claimed, "are not only perpetually making the Indians drunk with Rum, which they sell in most unreasonable quantities but are taking all opportunities to create an animosity between the Officers, Soldiers & the Indians." The rum trade had long been a feature of the Burnetsfield economy, but army officials knew that it hindered successful negotiations with Native Americans. Effective negotiations could also be hindered if it seemed that the British (including the German settlers) were not unified, an impression Gates feared the Herkimers were instigating by pitting the soldiers and Indians against each other. Gates was reticent about handling the situation himself and instead asked Johnson to "exert your magisterial authority to stop this growing ill, which will save me the disagreeable office of doing that by force of arms which ought to be done by the powers of governments." Once again, as at Fort Cumberland, British military leaders threatened to use force to carry out their goals.

As answer to Gates' accusation about the residents causing trouble and selling rum, Johnson noted, "Those are Evils which should be prevented by all Means, and in order to put a Stop to them I shall send for Harkemer, & his Son in Law." But in order to handle the situation effectively, Johnson asked Gates to "send me all the Proof you Can to make good those Allegations against them." The Herkimers could not be manhandled because their cooperation

[45] Jost Herkimer, Letter to Loudoun, October 1756, LO 2443.

and leadership in German Flats was still necessary in maintaining effective relations between the army and the residents.[46]

After Fort Oswego was defeated in August 1756, General Webb, spooked by the French advance, destroyed and abandoned Fort Bull and pulled his troops back to Fort Herkimer, thus making it the westernmost British post. The increased activity at and new importance of German Flats and Fort Herkimer placed a strain on residents who were already ambivalent (at best) about the presence of the army. In September, 1756, General Loudoun ordered General Webb to return with the 44th regiment to Albany, but he ordered Webb to leave the 50th and 51st regiments at Herkimer to hold the post. Since the 50th and 51st were not up to full strength (many of their number had been captured at Oswego), there was certainly plenty of space around the village for the men to camp in the fields, but as the weather grew colder, quartering became an issue again. Loudoun advised Webb that the men left at Herkimer "can Encamp; and if any parties should attack them, they have the Fort, and Herkermer's House, which I look on as the best of the two to defend." Furthermore, to increase the defensibility of their position, Loudoun advised, "if the House can be Strengthened by any works, that ought to be done."[47]

Considering his earlier complaints and the quality of his house, it is not surprising that Herkimer protested this latest encroachment. Herkimer addressed Loudoun in a formal petition in October, 1756. He began by telling Loudoun that he had cooperated with the army. Referring to himself in the third person, Herkimer explained, "The Kings Fort [his storehouse] is built within sixty yards of his house, he has always accommodated the officers with several Rooms in his house, in general without charging them any thing." In return, "He has suffered much by the

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[46] *Johnson Papers* 2:539.

[47] Loudoun to Daniel Webb, September 16, 1756, LO 1819.

officers and others in the servise puting their horses into his stables, and making use of his hea [hay], and Provinder, without paying for it." Despite this generosity, he noted, "the soldiers have destroyed his gardens, and orchard, and burnt his Fences, so that the Cattle for the use of the Army have done him great Damage." But through all of this, Herkimer asserted, "he never complained."

Still, the purpose of the petition was not to protest these encroachments, rather the breaking point for Herkimer was that his house was to be turned into "a Kings Fort." Herkimer claimed that the inevitable result of this action was that "he is to be turned out, he knows not where from his house, his Corn, and Cattle; to the ruin of himself, his Family, and all his worldly substance." In addition to creating problems for the Herkimer family, the army's takeover of his house would lead to problems for the whole community. Herkimer explained, "Your petitioner and his next neighbours have stocaded [*sic*] his house for their defence, and preservation, and if they are now to be deprived of their refuge, and be obliged to go they know not where, they are sure to meet with the greatest distress." Apparently Herkimer did not think that the British army would provide better protection than if he and his neighbors were left to their own defenses.

Furthermore, Herkimer argued that his house was not fit to be turned into a fort because "his barn and several Barracks are full of wheat, straw and other combustables, and so close to his house as renders it altogether unfit for a fort." He concluded the petition by requesting that "your Lordship will please to order that he and his family may remain unmolested in his house," and he reminded Loudoun that, "he is, and always was willing to lodge as many officers in his house as he could."[48] Despite this protest, the army enclosed Herkimer's house, the storehouse,

[48] John Jost Herkimer, Petition to Loudoun, October 1756, LO 2443.

a guard house, and a well with a ditch and a palisade with four angles or bastions; they named it Fort Herkimer. The one gate in the wall was on the north side leading to the river.[49]

Herkimer resented being forced out of his house and tried to reclaim it shortly thereafter, apparently by confronting a Captain Jocelyn. In a November 1756 letter to Captain Jocelyn of the 50th regiment (provincials) Loudoun explained that he had spoken to John Jost Herkimer (when Herkimer came to Albany to present his petition) and explained that "no Part of his Family could inhabit any Part of that House this Winter; and gave him very early Notice of this, that he might Supply himself in a house for the Winter, as he has Several just by." It is unclear if Herkimer himself had another house (perhaps he had inherited his parents' house after they died) or if the other houses belonged to his children. Either way, Herkimer failed to mention his other houses to Loudoun in the petition, but for Loudoun, the availability of the other houses was a key point in his justification for taking the main house. Loudoun brusquely asserted that if Herkimer had not taken steps to move to a different house, "'tis no fault of mine." He further commanded Jocelyn, "in the new Fort, he shall not be, acquaint him with this, and turn him and his People out, whenever you have Occasion for the place."[50]

After a few months of living with the British military, the Germans began to investigate other options for their defense. British military authorities suspected the loyalty of the Germans to the British cause, but did not let that suspicion temper their actions. If they had known how actively the Germans were seeking out a change in their allegiance, they might have acted differently. In December, 1756 there was a conference in Montreal between Pierre Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the Governor-General of New France and a group of one hundred Cayugas,

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[49] "Plan and Profile of Retrenched Work round Harkemeis house at ye German Flats, 1756," [probably drawn by William Eyre], John Roque, comp., *A Set of Plans and Forts in America* (London: J. Roque, 1763), no. 27.

[50] Loudoun, Letter to Captain Jocelyn, November 3, 1756, LO 2140.

Onondagas, Oneidas, Tuscaroras, Senecas, Algonquins, and Hurons. Kouee, an Oneida headman told Vaudreuil that the German Palatines, "a Nation that is neither French nor English, nor Indian," had approached some Iroquois headmen with a complaint and a request. The Palatines said they "would no longer support the continual vexations of the English, who not only ravage their lands and destroy their animals, but also incessantly maltreat them." In light of this mistreatment, the Palatines proposed "to annex us to itself in order to afford each other mutual help and defence against the English." The Germans were ready to give up their connection to the British, which had always been fraught with difficulty, and join up with the Iroquois, whom they had always admired for their ability to be independent of but still benefit from the British.[51]

Vaudreuil's reply reflected that his primary concern was securing a strong alliance between the French and the Iroquois. Vaudreuil knew that this would be accomplished most effectively by undermining any trust or relationship that existed between the Iroquois and the British, so he used the Palatine's request to his advantage. He told the Iroquois headmen that he knew this nation that was "neither French, nor English, nor Indians…There is reason to believe they are the Palatines." He explained that the Palatines were "a branch of a Nation belonging to the other side of the Great Lake, at present in alliance with the great Onontio." The German states, in fact, had signed the Convention of Westminster with Britain in January 1756 and were not allied with France; although Vaudreuil probably knew that, his hearers did not. Vaudreuil told the Iroquois that he was "not surprised" that the Germans wanted to escape British authority and speculated "that there are many malcontents in New England who would desire a favorable occasion of coming over to the French." He cautioned the Iroquois to make sure that the Germans were serious in their offer and not just trying to avoid French attacks. Above all, he

[51] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 10:513.

wanted the Iroquois to realize it was "time for you to declare against them and drive him [the English] from the territory inhabited by you and that Nation [the Germans]." Vaudreuil may not have realistically believed that Burnetsfield would turn against the British, but he used the conversation to present the British as weak and bolster the idea that New France was a welcoming refuge for all opponents of the British.[52]

In March, 1757, an Onondaga Indian, known as Corn-Milk, relayed intelligence to William Johnson concerning a letter purportedly sent by the Burnetsfield Germans to the French Governor. The "letter" was actually the wampum belt that Kouee had discussed with Vaudreuil. The belt, as discussed above "let him [Vaudreuil] know the Hardships they labour under, and the ill Treatmen they receive from the English, meaning the Troops." It also "begged the protection of the French." Corn-Milk reported that the French decided they would not act without confirmation. When Johnson told some Oneidas to go to German Flats to try to get confirmation, they talked to Jost Petrie and the Herkimers, but the residents all said that they "knew nothing of any such Thing."[53] Whether they did or not, it was unlikely that they would admit it to Johnson's envoys.

Johnson noted his concerns about the loyalty of the Germans in a letter to Major General Abercromby in April, 1757. Johnson's proximity to the fort afforded him opportunities to observe the residents' actions and words. He wrote, "The Germans living at Burnetsfield I plainly see do not like to have Troops there for their Defence and Security, which together with some Words they now and then drop gives me some Reason to doubt their Fidelity." In a letter

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[52] In this instance, Onontio refers to the king of France, Louis XV. "Conferences between M. de Vaudreuil and the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 10: 514-515; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 15, 128.

[53] *Johnson Papers* 2: 679-680.

to Loudoun, Johnson explained this point further. One of the reasons that the Germans were wary of the British troops was that "it tended to draw Scalping Parties upon them." Indeed, this was a persistent problem for anyone living near an occupied fort.[54]

There were also fears that the Germans would not only trade with the Indians but with the French as well. In April, 1757, Johnson wrote to Loudoun explaining that Fort William Henry and Fort Edward now blocked the road that French traders were accustomed to use to secure goods from Albany, in particular "Wampum and Silverworks … the one essential for carrying on all Indian Negotiations, and the other an article much required amongst Indians." Since these items were essential and Albany was blocked and swarming with soldiers, Johnson feared that the French would attempt "to open a Supply for their necessities by the Way of this River." Since Fort Johnson and Fort Herkimer were both on the Mohawk River, Johnson promised to do his best to prevent this trade, but he was skeptical of his abilities because of the ambiguous loyalty of the residents of German Flats. He complained to Loudoun "I am convinced, neither my Diligence or Authority will be sufficient to curb the Lust of Profit amongst the general Inhabitants of this County."

But whereas Braddock and Franklin had goaded the colonists about their loyalty in an attempt to force them to cooperate, Loudoun and Johnson feared the real effects of the ambiguous loyalty of the German population. The Germans played a critical role in the protection of the New York frontier; if they peacefully turned to the French for economic gain, they would be setting a dangerous precedent in the struggle to control the borderland. In addition, while the rum trade was profitable and did not have any immediate negative consequences for the Germans, it could lead to widespread problems if the British were not able

[54] William Johnson, Letter to Loudoun, April 20, 1757, LO 3405.

to negotiate effectively. The main problem was that since Fort Herkimer was the westernmost post on the New York frontier, danger was always imminent, and a long-term defensive strategy was a necessity.

In September, 1757 Johnson wrote to both Thomas Pownall and James Abercromby about scalping parties that were continually attacking the scattered homes at Burnetsfield. Even though New York provincial troops were posted at Fort Herkimer, the soldiers tended to "keep within the Bounds of their Garrison [and] are no cover or protection to [the residents]." In fact, a strong garrison ensconced in a strong fort was little help to German Flats. Instead, the community needed "a suff[icien]t Number of Men qualified for Ranging kept out in constant and well directed Scouts" in order to be protected effectively.[55] But by that point in 1757, the main force of the army was trying to handle the aftermath of the fall of Fort William Henry to the northeast of Fort Herkimer. The real problem was that the garrison at Fort Herkimer was not there only to protect the residents of Burnetsfield. The garrison was more interested in monitoring French activity to the west. However, the presence of the army made Burnetsfield a target, even if residents did not support the war. Living on the periphery meant that issues like safety were often out of the control of the residents.

The result of the struggles over defending Fort Herkimer culminated in November, 1757. By that point the British had lost Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry, and British territory was shrinking. Fort Herkimer and German Flats, which had already been out on the western frontier, were now quite remote. On November 12, a force of three hundred French and Indians attacked the 300 residents of German Flats. At the first sign of the attackers, the residents ran into the five blockhouses scattered throughout the village. Each blockhouse attempted to put up a fight

[55] *Johnson Papers* 2: 739-740.

but gave up quickly and surrendered. One hundred and fifty men, women, and children were taken into captivity. Forty people, who either did not make it into the shelters or who tried to escape, were killed; some of them drowned while trying to swim across the Mohawk River to Herkimer. Sixty houses, as well as barns, outbuildings, and a water mill were burnt. The French and Indians made off with large numbers of hogs, sheep, cattle, and 500 horses (many of which were actually killed or wounded in the chaos) as well as a large amount of goods worth £20,000. The plundering went on for several days, despite some weak counterattacks from across the river.[56]

A few days after the battle, William Johnson sent his deputy, George Croghan, to German Flats to meet with some Oneidas and Tuscaroras and find out if they had known about the attack and, if so, why they had not alerted the Germans. An Oneida spokesman informed Croghan that they had known about the attack and had warned German Flats three times: fifteen days before the attack, six days before the attack, and the day before the attack. The spokesman told Croghan that after the second warning, which he personally delivered, "they paid not the least regard to what I told them; and laughed at me, slapping their hands on their buttocks, saying they did not value the Enemy." When Croghan asked the Germans if this was true, they admitted that it was.[57] Whether or not the Germans felt confident because of their earlier overtures to the western Iroquois (and thereby the French) is difficult to determine because the Germans never admitted that they had been exploring other options.

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[56] Nathaniel Soley Benton, *A History of Herkimer County, Including the Upper Mohawk River Valley, from the Earliest Period to the Present Time*. (Albany:J. Munsell, 1856), 51-52; "French Descent on the German Flatts," "Mr. DeLancy to the Board of Trade," "M. de Vaudreuil to the Minister," "Description of the Country between Oswego and Albany," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1:515-520, 531.

[57] "A Summary Narrative," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1:520-521.

The devastation of German Flats, according to William Johnson, "had Struck such a Pannick in the remainder of the Inhabitants of the River[,] Stoneraby [Stone Arabia], & Cherry Valley, that they before I knew it Sent away all their Effects, or moveables, and were ready to follow." This abandonment of the frontier would not have been prevented, Johnson wrote to Abercromby, "if I had not by Example, perswasion & threats prevented them Stirring until I wrote you, & had an answer whether you would please to cover, or protect their Settlements soon." Johnson also acknowledged that the attack on German Flats showed the vulnerability of the frontier and the inertness of frontier fortifications. He told Abercromby, "as to the garrisons along the River they are, or can be little or nor protection to them, as the Enemy can burn & destroy them…as they did lately at the German Flatts."[58]

Fort Herkimer and German Flats suffered another French attack on April 30, 1758. Eighty Indians and four French soldiers attacked Fort Herkimer. This time, the Germans listened to the warning that came a few hours before the attack. Only four families did not make it to the fort and attempted to defend themselves in a house. Thirty-three people were killed before some rangers came from the fort and rescued the people in the house. Several Germans were wounded, including one woman who struggled into Fort Herkimer the morning after the attack, "having her Nose almost cut off, with a Wound in her Breast, and another in her side." She had also been partially scalped, and apparently fainted, but not before recognizing that there were some Onondagas among the attackers.[59]

It was not until the British defeated Fort Niagara in 1759 that the settlement was again safe. By that point, however, the war had interrupted daily life for over three years. The

[58] *Johnson Papers* 2:758-759.

[59] "Extract of a Letter from Albany," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1:522-523. See chapter seven for more on British-Iroquois relations, but at this point the Onondagas were supposedly neutral.

residents of Herkimer and German Flats not only suffered enemy attacks, which many similarly-placed frontier settlements also suffered, but also had to manage the demands and constant presence of the army living on their land and using their supplies. Furthermore, the residents of Burnetsfield were ambivalent at best about their enforced participation in the war. While their first decade in the colonies had been marked by intense oversight, the following thirty years had been free of imperial intervention. This period of obscurity ended with the battles on the New York frontier. The residents, led by John Herkimer's strenuous resistance, believed that the presence of the army created more problems than it solved. In the end, one could perhaps argue that the presence of the army probably kept Burnetsfield from quietly drifting farther from British alliance, despite the inclination of its residents.

Communities in the vicinity of Fort Cumberland and Fort Herkimer experienced significant supply demands from the army, and army authorities evaluated the loyalty of the residents based on how enthusiastic their responses were. In southern Pennsylvania, there is little evidence that the residents were disloyal; instead they were trying to balance the pressure to participate with the pressure to maintain their livelihoods. Toward that end, residents of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania only wanted to contribute their supplies if they could be adequately compensated for significant losses in supplies, manpower, and time. However, Braddock and other colonial officials refused to pay the high prices colonists sought and a stand-off ensued. Benjamin Franklin saw a way to get people to participate while also avoiding a fractious discussion about prices. He turned the hiring of wagons, horses, and drivers into an event and a patriotic display. By emphasizing Braddock's threats and questioning the Pennsylvanians' loyalty, Franklin was able to circumvent the central issue and get enough supplies to satisfy Braddock.

The situation was different at Fort Herkimer in that the loyalty of the residents was more ambiguous. Their early history in New York and the circumstances that led to the move to Burnetsfield made their connections to Britain tenuous. The westward focus of their trade made them loathe to accept disruptions, even when there were threats to their safety. Unlike the situation in southern Pennsylvania, the British generals did not find a way to work with the Burnetsfield residents in a mutually beneficial way.

The experience of the Burnetsfield and southern Pennsylvania residents begins to show the degree to which negotiation defined the interactions between the army and civilians. In the vicinity of Fort Cumberland, Braddock (complain as he might) had to acknowledge that command and control did not work, especially for large-scale supply demands. By allowing Benjamin Franklin to negotiate for supplies, Braddock abdicated some of his power in order to gain supplies. At Fort Herkimer, residents and army officials struggled to find a blance of power that would insure cooperation. Loudoun and Johnson's attempts to demand cooperation were met with resistance, and the residents' attempts to seek elsewhere for protection (whether real or not) were viewed with suspicion. The inability to find an effective solution led to complaints and perhaps increased the settlement's vulnerability in the face of attack.

The negotiations in Pennsylvania and Burnetsfield took place against a backdrop of conditions specific to the borderland. Recent migration, ethnic diversity, a westward focus of trade and a desire for a better life defined the experience of the periphery and shaped the residents' response to the army. While the relatively recent settlement of the regions was a key factor in the Burnetsfield and southern Pennsylvania residents' willingness and ability to supply the army, the non-English ethnicity of some of the settlers also played a role. The next chapter

will explore this latter concept further and continue to explore how the distinct features of the borderlands shaped colonists' negotiations with the army.

Chapter Three

"A Frontier Place:" The Fort-City of Albany and the British Military

As the North American theater of war expanded, New York began to play an important part. The long border that it shared with New France and the waterways that connected the two regions determined that New York would see conflict. At the start of the war, New York had two major cities: New York City and Albany. While both of them hosted the army, were taxed for supplies, and experienced disruptions due to war, Albany had the more sustained and intense experience of war. This was in large part due to its location. As noted in chapter one, waterways connected Albany to interior places north and west. While Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were designed, in part, to guard the entrance to the Hudson River, and therefore Albany, if those forts fell, it was up to Albany to protect the entryway to the coast.

Because of its location, Albany was very convenient for the army as a staging point for preparations to move west or north. It was somewhat protected while the other forts were standing, and it had a large enough (almost) population and infrastructure to sustain the army. Albany's location and convenience meant that the residents of the city experienced war and the military as a matter of daily life for several years. However, a number of factors made the military's long-term presence in Albany particularly challenging for the residents. A large army descending on a population for years would cause problems in the best of circumstances, but exacerbating the problem in Albany was that the army's arrival coincided with Albany's period of transition from a borderland town to a provincial city. Albany was distinctive in that its experience of the war was shaped both by its foundation as a Dutch fort on the periphery and its ongoing development into a larger city.

In that sense, it is useful to think of Albany as a fort-city. The city itself was surrounded by a palisade and was prepared to withstand an attack. It also had a fort (Fort Frederick) within the city limits, adding to its military character. As a fort and a borderland town, it was concerned with borderland things: trade, Indian relations, connections to the interior, and danger from attack. It was a strong point on a besieged frontier and served as a refuge for frontier inhabitants. In these characteristics, it was similar to other borderland outposts. But it was also a city. There was a large population within the city limits. The residents had a well-developed economy with Atlantic connections and strong ties to New York City. It had a city charter and the governmental organization and infrastructure of a city, not a remote frontier outpost. Seeing Albany as a fort-city is critical to understanding why and how the war affected the place so intensely.[1]

In order to understand Albany's dual identity, it is necessary to approach the Seven Years War in Albany from a longer chronological distance than the start of the war. This chapter will briefly address Albany's foundation and then look more closely at several influential factors in its development as a fort-city. From there, the chapter will focus in on Albany in the 1750s to understand what the city looked like when the war started. In order to explore the effect of the military presence on civilians, the chapter will look most intensively at Albany during the war and explore how accommodating a large army challenged Albany politically, economically, and

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[1] It is perhaps surprising that there are so few monographs about colonial Albany. Its homogeneity and geographic location (near New York City but also on the frontier) would seem to lend itself well to a community study. Its connections to New France and the West Indies mean that it was an Atlantic city and could be studied as such (especially for the years of English/British rule). Albany is addressed in studies of the colony of New York, but often falls into the shadow of New York City. The starting point in researching colonial Albany is George Howell and Jonathan Tenney, eds., *Bicentennial History of Albany: History of the County of Albany, N.Y. from 1609-1886* and Joel Munsell's ten volume *Annals of Albany*. An interesting offshoot of these two foundational works is the Colonial Albany Social History Project overseen by Stefan Bielinski under the auspices of the New York State Museum. The main focus of the project is a website which serves as a platform for the project's goal of providing interlinked biographies of every person who lived in Albany before 1800 (approximately 16,000 people). When used in conjunction with Howell and Tenney, Munsell, and other primary sources, the website can be a helpful resource. It is located at: http://www.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/.

socially. Finally, the chapter will briefly address post-war Albany to understand how war and the military presence changed the city.

Albany, Donna Merwick remarks, "had no founding moment."[2] There was no *Mayflower*, no starving time; instead, Albany's founding was predicated on economics and diplomacy, two themes that would define its place in colonial America. The Hudson River corridor was home to Mohawks, Mahicans, and River Indians. By the time Henry Hudson sailed up the river that would bear his name and noted the future location of Albany in 1609, the Native Americans in the region had already been in contact with French traders, Samuel de Champlain in particular. Trade, particularly in furs, was the driving force spurring Dutch, English, and French settlers into the northern interior of the continent. Dutch traders began exchanging goods for furs with the Mohawks and Mahicans on the upper Hudson River in 1610. In 1623, the Dutch West India Company established Fort Orange as a trading post and defensible position on the site that became colonial Albany, but the site was not yet occupied year round.[3]

Permanent settlement began in 1630 when a Dutch jewel merchant, Kiliaen Van Rensselaer, acquired a patroonship encompassing 700,000 acres along the Hudson River, which included Fort Orange. Tenants began arriving at the newly christened Rensselaerswyck in the spring; Van Rensselaer had recruited Dutch families to set up farms with the hope of producing a cash crop. All of the patroonships in New Netherland were originally established to exploit the available agricultural opportunities, but the wealthy merchants who became patroons were more interested in cutting into the Dutch West India Company's monopoly of the fur trade. Van

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[2] Donna Merwick, *Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7.

[3] Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 51-56; Joel Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany* (Albany: J. Munsell, 1850), 1:139.

Rensselaer and his partners set up their own monopoly in Rensselaerswyck. They were the sole importers of European goods to Fort Orange, and settlers of the patroonship were forbidden from purchasing furs from any Indians unless the settlers had been granted a license. Even with a license, the traders still had to send their furs to Van Rensselaer in Amsterdam, and he retained a share of the profits.[4]

By the end of the 1630s, the Dutch West India Company opened up its monopoly (which had become increasingly difficult to enforce anyway) and began charging a duty on imports and exports to anyone who wished to engage in the fur trade. Meanwhile, the Iroquois had worked to set up a sort of monopoly of their own. In the 1620s the Mohawks succeeded in pushing the Mahicans off of the west bank of the Hudson River, and the Mahicans subsequently became more associated with trade in Connecticut. Northern furs were more valuable than those found south of the Great Lakes, but Fort Orange offered better goods than Montreal. Therefore, the Five Nations worked to intercept northern furs as they were headed down the St. Lawrence River toward Fort Orange. Daniel Richter notes that, especially before 1670, "Many if not most of the pelts that Iroquois sold at Fort Orange were probably hijacked."[5]

However, the benefits of the fur trade were slowly outweighed by two powerful disadvantages. First, contact with Europeans led to virgin soil epidemics that decimated the Five Nations. By the 1640s, the population of the Iroquois tribes had been cut in half, down to 10,000 people, and some groups, such as the Mohawks who lived closest to the Europeans, lost as much as 75% of their population. Second, dependence on European goods combined with the dramatic loss of life and made old ways of living virtually irrecoverable. Therefore, although the fur trade

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[4] Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany*, 1:139, 194; Thomas Elliot Norton, *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 4-5.

[5] Richter, *Longhouse*, 57.

made the Five Nations politically and economically powerful throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the significant challenges it introduced would not be easily overcome.[6]

Returning to the Dutch, by the 1640s settlement in the vicinity of Fort Orange had not yet coalesced into a single political or social entity. In 1644 the Dutch West India Company abandoned the trading post at Fort Orange, leaving the fur trade to the competition between the Van Rensselaers and the settlers of Rensselaerswyck. The settlers asserted themselves in 1652 through the leadership of Peter Stuyvesant, who established Beverwyck (which included Fort Orange) as a town separate from Rensselaerswyck in order to better the settlers' trade opportunities. The society of Beverwyck (about one hundred people at most) was expanding beyond the original farmers to include traders, merchants, artisans and soldiers. Black slaves had been living in the area since at least 1628. With the separation from Rensselaerswyck, the town that became Albany began to take shape.[7]

In 1642, as one of his last significant acts regarding his tenants, Van Rensselaer sent over a Dutch Reformed minister, the Rev. Johannes Megapolensis. Understanding how religious life developed in the settlement leads to some important clues about the development of Albany's society. The First Reformed church was established in 1642. In 1645 a Jesuit missionary, Isaac Jogues, who had been captured by Iroquois, visited Beverwyck and noted that a small church had been recently built behind Fort Orange (which he described as "a miserable structure of logs"). Services at the church were conducted exclusively in Dutch until 1782, and the community was reluctant to permit the establishment of any non-Dutch Reformed churches. A Lutheran congregation was finally allowed to build a church in the late 1660s, but their children still had to

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[6] Richter, *Longhouse*, 55-59, 87; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 4-5.

[7] Michael Kammen, *Colonial New York—A History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), 46-47; Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany*, 1:140; Merwick, *Possessing Albany*, 7; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 4-5; Richter, *Longhouse*, 93, 95.

be baptized at the First Reformed church. In 1727 St. Peter's Episcopal Church developed out of the small English worship services that were being held at the fort. Nevertheless, the great majority of the population attended the First Reformed Church, reflecting the homogeneity of the town for its first century and a half of existence.[8]

Following Albany's early settlement, the city's development was profoundly affected politically, economically, and socially by English conquest. In 1664, at the beginning of the third Anglo-Dutch War, New Netherland fell to English control and was promptly renamed New York. Beverwyck and Fort Orange were renamed Albany. Still, English dominance did not change the predominantly Dutch culture of the city and would not for a remarkably long time. One result of English takeover was an intensified and somewhat centralized focus, on the part of colonial authorities, on Indian relations. English authorities saw the need to cultivate good relationships with the Iroquois in New York, specifically through the relational alliance known as the Covenant Chain. Albany was the natural center for the increased focus on Iroquois relations, but the Dutch merchants and traders would clash with English leaders whose economic, military, and political focus increasingly extended beyond Albany.[9]

First and foremost, maintaining the Covenant Chain was essential for the fur trade.[10] One of the more important years in the political, economic, and social development of colonial Albany was 1686, when there were about 1,000 people living in the town of Albany. In that

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[8] George Howell and Jonathan Tenney, eds., *Bicentennial History of Albany: History of the County of Albany, N.Y. from 1609-1886* (New York: W.W. Munsell & Co., 1886), 758-759, 768, 770; Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 46-47.

[9] Richter, *Longhouse*, 102; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 7.

[10] The Covenant Chain refers to the understanding between the English and the Iroquois Five Nations that they would be partners and brothers in trade and war, but there was a great deal of ambiguity in how each side interpreted the alliance. The Iroquois tended to emphasize trade and the English tended to emphasize the military alliance. Significantly, the Iroquois did not see agreeing to the Covenant Chain as precluding them from entering into similar alliances with the French.

year, Governor Thomas Dongan granted a city charter to Albany; along with the charter, Dongan also gave Albany an exclusive monopoly over the fur trade. The monopoly quelled Albany's most potent competition from the nearby town of Schenectady, which had the advantage of being sixteen miles northwest of Albany on the Mohawk River. Formalizing the monopoly in the charter gave recognition to what had already become an important reality: the fur trade was critical to the success of Albany's merchants and protecting it benefitted the city. Protecting the fur trade therefore defined the political and diplomatic relationships with the French to the north and the Iroquois to the west. Politics and economics were inextricably linked and even when the fur trade was proportionally less vital to Albany's economy in the 18th century, the patterns and strategies that had developed to protect the trade would continue to define politics and diplomacy throughout the Seven Years' War.[11]

The Covenant Chain was also important because it asserted English leadership, even though the majority of fur traders in Albany were Dutch. Whereas Dutch homogeneity was not directly challenged by the English takeover in 1664, the Iroquois did experience changes as a result of the power shift. English control led to more oversight of the fur trade, which made trading more tightly regulated but also safer. Richter notes that "the improvement over the kidnappings, beatings, and thefts of earlier years was plain."[12] Within the Five Nations there were several factions that disagreed about how to best relate to the European colonizers. The most obvious split was between so-called Francophiles and Anglophiles, but there were also traditionalists (who wanted the Five Nations to reassert their traditional spiritual power and saw French Catholicism as an insidious force) as well as converts to Catholicism who were attracted

[11] Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 91, 106-107; Richter, *Longhouse*, 138; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 7; Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany*, 8:206.

[12] Richter, *Longhouse* ,137.

to French religious offerings (such as the Caughnawagas, Mohawk converts who moved to New France). In short, individual headmen, families, clans, and tribes had diverse reasons for wanting to work with or against the French and English.

In Albany, an important step that built on Anglophile Iroquois' desire to benefit from English connections was the establishment of the positions of Commissioners of Indian Affairs. These posts were held by a succession of high-ranking Albany citizens, including Robert Livingston. These commissioners struggled to balance the claims of Albany merchants with the effective functioning of Indian affairs. The establishment of these positions points to how critical Indian relations were to the effective functioning of the fur trade and Albany's economy. With more stability in relations with the English and Dutch and a secure and valuable market for furs available to them at Albany, the Iroquois used English weapons to re-institute mourning wars that replenished spiritual power and population numbers and plundered northern furs from French-allied Indians. While Albany fur traders benefitted from Iroquois mourning wars, they were not in direct competition with New France. Instead, Albany, Montreal, Quebec, the Iroquois and the Northern Indians were all linked together in the fur trade.[13]

In his study of the fur trade in New York, Thomas Norton notes, "Economically, politically, and diplomatically, the trade with Canada constituted one of the most important aspects of life in Albany."[14] The trade developed out of the natural dictates of supply and

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[13] Richter, *Longhouse*, 137-138, 161, 164; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 7.

[14] Norton, *Fur Trade*, 121. Norton ultimately attempts to redeem the reputation of the Albany Dutch by arguing that they used the trade with New France and the fur trade in general to maintain good relations with the Iroquois and preserve Albany from military attack. He argues that "the desire of Albany to remain neutral was based primarily on its recognition that the inadequate defenses of New York were extremely vulnerable to attacks from Canada." The book takes an important and neglected perspective, but it is difficult to prove that "Albany" acted so single-mindedly and presciently across multiple generations. The argument that individuals acted for their best economic interest, by contrast, is the more obvious interpretation that he does not fully disprove. Nevertheless, the importance of the fur trade cannot be overstated, and the book makes a valuable and needed contribution to the field.

demand. Dutch, and later English, rum and goods were cheaper and more desired by Indians; in particular, a heavy wool cloth that the Dutch called "duffels" and the English called "strouds" or "stroudwaters" became a staple item among the northern Indians. French cloth could not compete in price or quality, but, as mentioned above, northern furs were superior and worth more than southern furs. Therefore, French merchants wanted goods from Albany; Albany merchants wanted furs from the north; and northern Indians did not want to have to travel all the way to Albany (and risk their goods being highjacked along the way). The obvious solution—and the one that worked for quite a long time—was for French traders in Montreal to serve as the middlemen between Albany and the northern Indians. English authorities, however, saw two major disadvantages to this system. First, regardless of whether the goods were French or English, the French were the sole beneficiaries of the relationships that grew from trade. Second, the Albany economy was supporting and increasing the economy of Montreal, even as England and France were beginning to fight over territory. These perceived disadvantages would lead to confrontations between English/British authorities and the Dutch residents of Albany.[15]

The first of these confrontations occurred in 1688-89 when the leaders of Albany (especially Mayor Peter Schuyler) opposed Jacob Leisler and attempted to maintain neutrality during the developing war (King William's War) in order to protect the smooth functioning of the fur trade. The realities of war (including the burning of Schenectady) led Albany to acquiesce to Leisler, but the conflicts were not over. Imperial war created other challenges; Albany's location on the frontier led many people to fear for their safety and flee to the coast. In 1697 the population of Albany stood at 1,449, down from 2,016 in 1689. The population would not begin to grow again until after Queen Anne's War ended in 1713. Imperial war also took its

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[15] Richter, *Longhouse*, 83-84; Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 112, 193; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 7.

toll on the Five Nations. Scholars estimate that the Iroquois population decreased from 8,600 in 1689 to about 6,600 in 1700.[16]

With the peace after Queen Anne's War, several new economic opportunities developed. An expanding population in both Albany and the western frontier of New York stimulated the real estate market. The importance of grain and lumber in the upper Hudson River economy expanded due to increased farming. In 1730, Fort Oswego was built in order to connect more directly to the Great Lakes/Midwest fur trade. This meant that the center of the fur trade began to move away from Albany and that Albany merchants had to expand their operations. Now they had to assume responsibility for transporting furs from Oswego to Albany, moving trade goods to Oswego, and hiring traders to go to Oswego on their behalf. The construction of Fort Oswego did not go unnoticed by the French. It was a direct attempt to cut into their trade with the *pays d'en haut* Indians and to cut Montreal out of the trade. The French responded by building a post at Niagara. Oswego was so important to the economy and politics of New York that the colony took on the expense of garrisoning the post and paying the salaries of a doctor and commissary.[17]

However, Albany merchants' ties to the lucrative Montreal trade did not disappear with the establishment of Fort Oswego. The French, even at Niagara, still needed the English goods that were most desired by Indians. Therefore, a brisk trade between Niagara, Albany, and Montreal developed in tandem with the Oswego-Albany trade. Iroquois and Caughnawaga participation was critical to making both of these trade corridors run smoothly; however, increased economic activity along the western frontier of New York stimulated settlement further

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[16] Richter, *Longhouse*, 164, 166, 188; Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany*, 9: 89; Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 124, 145.

[17] Richter, *Longhouse*, 269; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 94, 121, 170, 173; Kammen, *Colonial New* York, 193-194.

into Iroquois territory. Among these settlers were several large traders who began to dominate and consolidate the fur trade, gradually cutting Albany merchants out of the business. These large traders included William Johnson at his estate west of Albany on the Mohawk River and John Henry Lydius north of Albany on the Hudson River.

In addition to the geographic shifting, the decline of the fur trade can be linked to a variety of economic and political factors. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, New York governors worked to eliminate Albany's support of the Montreal trade and to encourage direct trade with Native Americans at Oswego and along the Mohawk River in western New York. Although, fur traders in Albany continued their illicit trade with Montreal and their trading partners in England successfully lobbied George II to remove the restrictions on the Albany-Montreal trade, the trade still continued to decline in economic importance. Trading continued through the 1750s but the direct involvement of traders based in Albany was curtailed by the rise of more powerful northern and western traders and the interruptions of imperial war.

With the decline of the fur trade, Albany traders turned to the Dutch West Indies where they exchanged wheat and butter for bills of exchange that they could use in Amsterdam, where they purchased goods for importation to Albany. Timber and masts for ships also played an increasing role in the Albany economy. From 1700 to 1755, the economy continued to diversify as businessmen in Albany became more connected to New York City and the Atlantic trade. Entrepreneurs built a cocoa processing mill in 1726, a brick firing kiln in 1727, a sawmill (within the city limits) in 1729, and shipping to New York City began to steadily increase. By 1749, flour made from wheat grown around Albany was considered among the best in North America.

Albany was turning from a town of fur traders and farmers into a city of merchants and artisans. The Seven Years' War arrived in the midst of this transition.[18]

The fur trade, even in decline, still had lasting political ramifications. First, the trade was a critical tool in keeping the alliances with the Iroquois alive and functioning. Trade patterns (even if they included French involvement) tied the two groups together.[19] Second, the trade with the French gave Albany residents a reputation of not being completely loyal to the British cause. In 1749, a Scandanavian naturalist, Peter Kalm, visited Albany as part of his tour of North America. While in the colonies, Kalm learned how Albany residents were perceived by their neighbors due to their actions during King George's War (lately concluded). During the war, French-allied Indians had attacked and plundered homes in New England and then brought those stolen goods to Albany for trade. New Englanders resented that Albany merchants gave the Indians a market for these goods, "though the names of the owners were engraved on many of them," and accused them of encouraging the Indians to bring more.

The New Englanders interpreted the Albany merchants' actions as contributing to the destruction of the British colonies, even though they were the "subjects of the same crown." Kalm seemed to come down on the side of the New Englanders, noting "The hatred which the English bear against the people at Albany is very great, but that of the Albanians against the English is carried to a ten times higher degree." He traced the animosity back to the English takeover in 1664, but certainly the persistent homogeneity of the city was a factor in setting the residents of Albany off from their neighbors. Even as New York City and other provincial cities were becoming more diverse, Albany was predominantly populated by people of Dutch ancestry.

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[18] Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 176, 193-196; Norton, *Fur Trade*, 120; Peter Kalm, *Travels in North America*, ed. and trans. Adolf B. Benson (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), 335.

[19] See chapter 7, below for additional discussion of trade and Indian relations.

Most of the people who lived in Albany were descendents of people who had migrated from the Netherlands before 1664. Newer immigrants often chose to settle in the communities that were being established outside the city limits. [20] The incident also illustrates the degree to which the patterns of the fur trade continued to define trade patterns through the middle of the eighteenth century. Albany's connection to northern and western markets and close contact with Native Americans demonstrates how it retained characteristics of a frontier trading post even as it was developing into a city with Atlantic connections. Yet, the lack of connection between the residents of Albany and New England betrays the level of isolation that Albany still experienced on the eve of the Seven Years' War.

Before exploring Albany in the Seven Years' War, it is useful to trace the history of the fort at Albany in order to understand why the city had to take on some of the functions of a fort. Fort Orange was one of the original structures of Rensselaerswyck, functioning as a trading post and defensible position. As the Dutch West India Company was pulling out of the fur trade in Resselaerswyck, the structure was abandoned and became "a hangout for soldiers."[21] During the winter of 1687-88, Fort Orange was filled to overflowing with soldiers and Indians as word spread that the French were planning to attack the Mohawks. Governor Dongan recommended that the Mohawks bring their families into Albany, which was surrounded with a palisade. Four hundred soldiers, 50 cavalrymen, and 800 Indians crowded into the fort and the palisaded city and had to be quartered in private homes. Not only did this place a burdensome expense on the residents of Albany, it also damaged the fur trade that year as "only nine thousand skins instead

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[20] Kalm, *Travels*, 345-346. While Thomas Norton does try to redeem the reputation of the Albany residents, he does note that Kalm was trying to be objective and had no ulterior motive in reporting the rumors he heard about the Dutch. Norton, 64; Stefan Bielinski, "Newcomers," last modified 11/5/10, http://www.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/newcomers.html.

[21] Merwick, *Possessing Albany*, 105-106.

of the usual forty thousand" were sent to Albany because the hunters were distracted by the war.[22]

Fort Orange's decrepitude continued until about 1731 when a new fort, Fort Frederick, was built around the old structure. It was not exactly the most defensible position, however, because it was commanded by the rising hill of State Street and "people at the top of the hill could look down into its drill-yard." In 1749, Peter Kalm observed the fort, noting it "is a great building of stone surrounded with high and thick walls," capable of housing "an officer and a number of soldiers." In 1754, French-allied Indians invaded Schaghticoke (an English-Indian town north of Albany on the Hudson River) and took all the inhabitants to Canada. Governor DeLancey ordered Fort Frederick to be repaired and the palisades surrounding Albany to be strengthened, and he sent a militia company from Fort George in New York City to garrison Fort Frederick. Therefore, at the start of the Seven Year's War, Fort Frederick was in repair, but small (it was often referred to as a "blockhouse," basically just a building) and not capable of housing many soldiers.[23]

In order to get a sense of what the British soldiers found upon approaching Albany, it is useful to delve a little more deeply into what Peter Kalm saw when he visited Albany about five years before the war started. In June, 1749, Kalm noted that the city had two churches. Both were built of stone, but the Dutch church also had a steeple and a bell and, more importantly, a minister. While English services had been suspended as they waited for a minister, Kalm noted that everyone in the city (except for the fort's garrison) understood Dutch and could attend services at the Dutch Reformed church. South of the First Reformed Church and closer to the

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[22] Codman Hislop, *Albany: Dutch, English, and American* (New York: Argus Press, 1936), 119.

[23] Hislop, *Albany*, 142-143; Kalm, *Travels*, 342; Howell and Tenney, eds., *Bicentennial History*, 388; Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany*, 8:52.

river was the town hall, “a fine building of stone, three stories high.” Kalm also noted other elements that showed how the city was growing and evolving from a backcountry town to an urban center. He noted that the street with the two churches (State Street) was “five time broader than the others” in order to accommodate a marketplace. Houses were located on long streets that ran parallel to the river and were bisected by cross streets, some of which had been paved. But, there were still elements that betrayed Albany’s frontier outpost roots. The streets tended to be dirty because “the people leave their cattle in them during the summer nights,” and the city had no formal entrance or gates; instead, there were just holes in the palisades that people would pass through (which could be closed up if needed).[24]

Kalm observed that the community seemed to be close-knit. In the evenings, residents gathered on the porches that adorned every house; however, “this is rather troublesome because a gentleman has to keep his hat in constant motion… It is considered very impolite not to lift your hat and greet everyone.” In addition, even almost a century after English conquest, the inhabitants “speak Dutch, have Dutch preachers,… Their manners are likewise quite Dutch; their dress is however like that of the English.” Still, he also observed that, “The children are taught both Dutch and English.” He noted that the merchants of Albany seemed to be very wealthy, each having “extensive estates in the country and a large property in forests.” The inhabitants also profited by making wampum and carrying on a vibrant trade with the Indians, but they retained their wealth by “their sparing manner of living, in the Dutch way.”[25]

The residents of Albany had a reputation for being stingy and almost inhospitable. Kalm reported that outsiders viewed Albany residents as characterized by “avarice, selfishness and

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[24] Kalm, *Travels*, 340-341.

[25] Kalm, *Travels*, 341-343.

immeasurable love of money." Nevertheless, Kalm approached Albany with an open mind and seemed more struck by its homogeneity than its stinginess. Still, Kalm was surprised that such an isolated place—"they seldom see any strangers, (except those who go from the British colonies to Canada and back again)"—would be so expensive to visit. He observed that many Albany merchants "either fixed exorbitant prices for their services or were very reluctant to assist me." He accorded this spirit to his understanding that the original settlers of Albany were "a pack of vagabonds" from the Netherlands, but he asserted that Dutch settlers elsewhere in New York were more refined. In visiting Albany residents' homes, Kalm perceived that the houses were fastidiously ("almost superstitiously") clean, but sparse, and that the women worked hard to maintain neat homes and children. In addition, he was not overly impressed with Albany hospitality, noting "Generally what they serve is just enough for the meal and sometimes hardly that." In summation, the Albany that Peter Kalm visited was still very Dutch but had English influences, growing into a city but still showing signs of its rural past, reputed to be stingy but showing signs of wealth, and almost unnaturally isolated but connected to the French and their allied Indians. It was into this city that the British and provincial armies marched in 1755.[26]

The arrival of the army and the demands of army authorities challenged many aspects of life in the fort-city. Some of the challenges grew out of conflicts over shared space. The army decided to quarter a large number of soldiers on the residents of Albany and this took an economic and psychological toll on the residents. In addition, the residents of Albany had to share public spaces in the city with the army, and allotting these spaces led to conflicts. Furthermore, residents of Albany attempted to exercise some measure of control in how they responded to army leaders' demands for supplies and that led to conflicts over power. Finally,

[26] Kalm, *Travels*, 344-346.

the presence of a large number of foreign men challenged the isolated culture and society of the Dutch residents of Albany which led to distress on several levels. In short, the presence of the army was both invasive and pervasive, and Albany's isolation and backcountry culture contributed to how the residents perceived the challenges that the army presented.

In 1756 there was a total population of 17,424 people in Albany county (14,805 whites and 2,619 blacks).[27] When soldiers arrived, they encamped in and around the most populated areas for ease of supply, transportation, and organization. Troops were concentrated along both sides of the Hudson River at Albany, Port Schuyler, and Bethlehem. At one point in 1756, there were 10,000 troops encamped in the middle Hudson River region of Albany county. Soldiers encamped out in the countryside were an expense and possibly an annoyance, but they were not really a problem in the summer. It was only in the fall and winter when soldiers had to be quartered in Fort Frederick and in private homes that they became a serious problem for the residents of the city of Albany especially, as well as the surrounding towns.[28]

At the start of the war, there were about 1,800 people living within the limits of the city of Albany. As the war progressed, the population swelled to 3,000 people, bolstered by refugees from the frontier.[29] During the fall and winter of any given year, only a small portion of the total British-provincial army had to be housed among civilians. Some regiments spent the winter holding a fort, and many provincial soldiers went home for the winter. The big problem was that British soldiers could not go home, there were not adequate barracks to house them (especially

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[27] The county of Albany was still somewhat vaguely defined until the 1770s, but in the 1750s it basically encompassed all of upstate New York north of Dutchess county.

[28] Howell and Tenney, ed., *Bicentennial History*, 275, 389.

[29] Most likely, these people were able to stay with friends and relatives. Most people who would be living on the frontier were related to the original settlers of Albany. As families became established and grew, they had to move out of the city to take advantage of farming and lumber opportunities.

early on), and there simply were not enough taverns and public houses to accommodate everyone. Furthermore, Albany was so conveniently located to the major theaters of the war that it made sense to hold some soldiers in readiness there. However, Albany only had 329 houses within its seventy-five acres. In 1756 Lord Loudoun needed to quarter the 35th and the 42nd regiments (1,850 men at full strength, but probably around 1,400 men at that point) and in 1757 he needed to quarter three battalions (3,000 men at full strength, but probably around 2,300 men at that point) in Albany. Equally divided (which was not necessarily the case) that meant 4 men to each house in 1756 and 6 men to each house in 1757.[30]

In 1756, when army officials were determining how many men they could quarter in Albany, they conducted a house-to-house survey of the town. The census includes the name of 329 householders, their occupations (with twenty seven exceptions that list no occupation), the number of officers and soldiers that could be quartered there (separate numbers for "comfortably" or "in a pinch"), the number of rooms with and without fireplaces in each house, and the number of rooms the family occupied. The one major detail that the survey neglects is the address (or at least, the street) of each house.[31]

Studying the list of occupations can reveal much about colonial Albany but also raise many questions. There are 57 separate professions listed (including 28 "widows"). It is clear that Albany was a town of merchants and artisans. It is also clear that the fur trade was still a vibrant force. Out of the 329 householders, 52 are listed as merchants, 10 are listed as Indian traders, 14 are listed as shippers, and 5 are listed as businessmen. While all of these people may

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[30] Stanley Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 195-197, 109 notes 8 and 9; David G. Hackett, *The Rude Hand of Innovation: Religion and Social Order in Albany, New York, 1652-1836* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 33.

[31] "A List of the Inhabitants of the City of Albany," November, 1756, LO 3515.

not have been directly involved in the fur trade, the existence of the occupations shows that the apparatus of the fur trade was well-established. In addition, the census lists a variety of artisans including 21 shoemakers, 21 carpenters, 12 coopers, 10 smiths, 9 tailors and 8 bakers. There are many more single entries for occupations such as sadler, waggoner, tobacconist, glazier, wheelmaker, and carter.

In attempting to determine the status and lifestyle of the residents of Albany, the census gives some clues. Twenty-three houses are designated on the list with a "GH," signifying a good house, and one is listed as a "VGH," very good house. In addition, two are noted as "Rich." It is difficult to determine precisely what these notes signified. In looking at the number of men that the census takers thought could fit into a house "at a pinch" (which is what ended up happening for most people), 83 houses could quarter 1 officer, 36 could house 2 officers, 9 could lodge 3 officers, and the great majority, 193 houses, could not offer quarters to any officers. But the story was different when it came to soldiers. Only three houses were deemed unfit to house any soldiers. The census takers decided that most houses could house 4, 6, or 8 soldiers; 52 could house a group of 4, 111 houses could house up to 6 men, and the majority, 140 houses, were assessed as able to house up to 8 men.[32] At least on paper, therefore, Albany could house all of the men that Loudoun brought, but the reality of having eight men share a home with a family for six months seemed to invite trouble. The houses labeled GH or VGH did not seem to be much different from the rest of the houses in terms of how many men they could lodge. Of the 24 houses in these categories most were deemed capable of housing 6 or 8 men.

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[32] The census takers were not absolutely precise in their evaluations. Some houses did not have any numbers associated with the name, others did not have a total evaluation. The numbers for housing soldiers "comfortably" were, in most cases, two less than the numbers for "at a pinch." So, the 140 houses that could quarter 8 soldiers at a pinch, could house 6 soldiers comfortably.

There were several families in Albany that might be denoted as prominent, if prominent means both well-established and prolific. Early residents of Albany who managed to have large, thriving, expanding families naturally became prominent in the relatively compact community. In looking at the list, four family surnames are especially well-represented: the Lansings (13 householders), Roseboorns (12), Wendells (10), and Ten Eycks (9).[33] These four combined had forty-four householders (male and female) on the list, not counting people related by marriage. In addition, these four families owned a third of the Good Houses on the list; two belonged to Roseboorns, one belonged to a Wendell, two belonged to Lansings, and three belonged to Ten Eycks.

Loudoun began trying to get quarters in Albany for his troops in mid-August, 1756. He related his course of action in a letter to the Duke of Cumberland. First, he had tried working with the colonists to persuade them to allow soldiers to be housed in private homes, but they refused. The mayor of Albany, Sybrant G. Van Schaick, met with the general in order to, according to Loudoun, "inform me, that he understood the Law; that I had no right to Quarters, or Store Houses, or anything else from them, and that he would give me none." In his letter, Loudoun scoffed "The Mayor is a fool" and, by way of a slight, mentioned that Van Schaick had made his fortune from trading with the French. Loudoun's next step was to send for the Recorder, John G. Roseboom, and inform him of "the custom, in time of War, in all Countries, even in England itself, and the necessity there was, of Troops been lodged, and having all necessary things found for them here, in a Frontier Place." The distinction that Loudoun failed to mention was that, even in England, troops were only quartered in public houses. If soldiers were going to be billeted in private homes, it could only be with the explicit consent of the

[33] In addition to these four, there were 11 families with between 5 and 7 names on the list including Yates, Fisher, Vandenburgh, Fonda, Bratt, Williams, Bogert, Schuyler, Van Schaick, Hilton, and Van Zandt.

owner. If the homeowner refused to house troops, the army had to accept his or her decision. As noted in chapter two, the point of the law was to subject the military to the civil authority so as to control military power.[34]

The residents of Albany also had the misfortune of living near a fort—and in a city—that was too small to adequately accommodate the army. To the residents of the city and county of Albany, therefore, the arrival of the army felt like an invasion, which Loudoun's demands only accentuated. While not condoned by the spirit of the law, Loudoun could (and did) take measures to encourage or force consent by home owners. He informed Cumberland that he had attempted to work with the civil authority by inviting the magistrate to come along with him as he quartered the troops, but he had warned the city authorities that, "if [the civil magistrate] would not [assist], I must follow the Custom of Armies, and help myself, for that I could not sit still, and see the Country undone, for the Obstinacy of a few Men." In the end, Loudoun "Quartered the Men, by my own Quarter-Masters," until finally the magistrate issued the billets for quartering in private homes. Even with the billets, some home owners were reluctant to take in their assigned men. There had not been any outright trouble until one man, whom Loudoun typified as "another Cannadian Trader," refused to accept his assigned officer, threw the officer's baggage into the street, and barricaded the door of the house. Loudoun's answer to this was to send over "a file of Men" to get the officer back into the house. Loudoun warned that if other

[34] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 48-49; Munsell, ed., *Annals of Albany*, 5:102.

leading men of the city refused to fill their billets, he would to "take the whole House for an Hospital, or a Store House, and let him Shift for himself."[35]

Though he was loath to admit it publicly, Loudoun did acknowledge privately that quartering was placing a strain on the people of Albany. In a private letter to the Duke of Cumberland in December, 1756, Loudoun wrote, "In this place [Albany], they realy have hardly any more beds, than they lye on themselves; I am forced to give the Men Palliasses." He also confided in the Duke that "I am obliged to Quarter more Troops than the People can support, or reasonably ought."[36] The army needed to be close to Fort William Henry and Fort Edward in 1757, and Albany was the only place that they could comfortably do so. Because Loudoun was over-filling the houses in Albany with troops, he included material for starting fires, which he did not provide in other cities where he quartered fewer men.

The insular nature of Albany also meant that quartering affected the residents in ways that may not have been true of more open, diverse cities. Because many families had been established in Albany for between 100 and 130 years, quartering hit many members of the third and fourth generations of Albany families. In fact, the mid-eighteenth century was a transitional period for many Albany families as the third generation was growing older and passing on their homes and wealth to the fourth generation. In addition, many members of the fourth generation of Albany residents were enjoying or just coming into the peak of their earning potential. For the

[35] Loudoun, Letter to the Duke of Cumberland, August 29, 1756, Stanley Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1969), 231.

[36] Loudoun, Letters to the Duke of Cumberland, November 22, 1756 and December 26, 1756, Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs,* 273.

younger members of the fourth generation especially, quartering and the disruption of trade could be a significant burden.[37]

This point can be illustrated by looking more closely at the two of the most prominent families. For the Lansings, three members of the third generation had to quarter troops: Isaac G. Lansing was seventy-nine years old and his cousin Abraham Lansing Jr. was fifty-two; their more distantly-related relative, Johannes G. Lansing was sixty years old. Seven members of the fourth generation of Lansings had to quarter troops. All of these Lansings were born between 1707 and 1727. Robert (age 49) and Sander (32) were brothers; their cousins, the brothers John J. (41) and Gerrit J. (45) and their other cousin Peter (35) as well as their more distant relatives, the cousins Thomas (29) and Gerrit G. (37) all had to quarter troops.[38] For members of this generation, the addition of soldiers could make their homes extremely crowded since they were more likely to have children at home. Of the fourth generation Lansings who quartered troops, Robert (the oldest), had two living children in 1756 and the oldest of these was Maria, who was just 21 (and did not move out of the house until she married in 1757). The youngest Lansing, Thomas, was not yet married and probably had only recently moved out on his own. Two of the Lansings were merchants, one was an Indian trader and the rest were artisans.

The third generation of the Rosebooms was especially hard hit by the demands for quarters. The only member of the second generation who had to house soldiers was Maria Vinhagen Roseboom, who was 76 and widowed. In the third generation, eight cousins all had to house soldiers. This generation was slightly older than the fourth generation Lansings who bore

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[37] New York City and Philadelphia (the other cities that had to quarter soldiers) had been experiencing continual immigration since their founding. Albany was somewhat unique since newer immigrants tended to settle in the growing towns around Albany rather than inside the city.

[38] There are four Lansings on the list that are difficult to trace. Two are named John (the most popular Lansing name), one is only noted as “Widow Lansing” and another is “Mr. Lansing.”

the brunt of the quartering; these Roseboom were born between 1693 and 1707. Hendrick M. (age 49), his cousin Gerrit J. (58), Gerrit's widowed sister-in-law Elsie Cuyler Roseboom (61), their cousins, the siblings Robert (63), Ahasuerus (56), and Johannes G. (54), and their cousins, brothers Abraham (41) and Jacob (61). In addition, one fourth generation Roseboom, Ahasuerus' son Gerrit A. (24, unmarried and working as an Indian trader) had to provide quarters.[39] Four of the Roseboom were listed as merchants, another was a shopkeeper, one an apothecary and another a shoemaker.

The Ten Eycks and Wendells also experienced the pattern of the third and fourth generations bearing the brunt of the quartering. In sum, from looking at these families it is clear that there were a few older members of the second or third generation of Albany residents who had to quarter troops, but most people who had to share their homes with soldiers were between the ages of 40 and 60 and if they had families, they were likely to have children still in the house. Possibly, they were also housing an aging parent. Quartering, therefore, placed a significant burden on Albany householders.[40]

It is possible to see firsthand the effect of quartering on the population in Albany by examining a petition from a woman, Janniete Ten Eyck, whose house was taken over by soldiers. As noted above, the Ten Eycks were a prominent Albany family.[41] Janniete was a member of the fourth generation of Ten Eycks. At least five of her cousins also had to quarter soldiers. Janniete had five siblings; their father, Barent Ten Eyck, died in 1710. In 1736, their paternal

[39] Two additional Roseboom are difficult to trace: "Widow K. Roseboom" and Hendrick Roseboom.

[40] Stefan Bielinski, "Colonial Albany Social History Project," http://www.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/; Howell and Tenney, eds., *Bicentennial History of Albany*, 931-932; Jonathan Pearson, *Contributions for the Geneologies of the First Settlers of the Ancient County of Albany from 1630-1800* (Albany: J. Munsell, 1872), 70-73, 92-93, 109-110, 148-150.

[41] Stefan Bielinski, "Ten Eyck," Accessed November 12, 2008, http://www.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/bios/t/teneyck.html.

grandmother Geertruy Coeymans Ten Eyck died and left the children of her deceased son a 1/5th share in her estate. In addition, her will explained that Barent's children "when they come of age are to give a deed to Jacob, Ten Eyck, of New York, bolter, for all their right to two certain houses in New York, which did formerly belong to their [great] grand-father, Coenraedt Ten Eyck." There were, therefore, three houses in question: the two houses in New York City that had belonged to Janniete's great-grandfather Coenradt Ten Eyck, the patriarch of the family who made the initial move to New York from the Netherlands, and the house in Albany built by Janniete's grandfather (Geertruy Coeyman's husband) Jacob Ten Eyck. The six siblings had a 1/5th share in the Albany house and outright ownership of the New York houses when they came of age.[42]

Janniete never married but worked as a seamstress. At some point between 1736 and 1756, she used her savings "to purchase of the Joint-Heirs a House which was built by her Grand-Father." This was the Albany house built by Jacob Ten Eyck, and she was able to buy out her siblings and aunts and uncles. Apparently, she lived there by herself. With the arrival of the army in Albany in 1756, her house began to be used for storage and to house both soldiers and officers. On the census, the house is noted as a Good House capable of housing one officer and four soldiers at a pinch.[43] In 1757, Ten Eyck had "a Serjeant & three men of Coll: Perry's Reg:t billeted at her House." These soldiers were causing problems for Ten Eyck, so she petitioned Lord Loudoun for some sort of relief from the burden of quartering. Ten Eyck's petition gives a

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[42] William S. Pelletreau, "Abstracts of Wills," in *Collections of the New-York Historical Society* (New York: New York Historical Society, 1894) 27:204.

[43] Stefan Bielinski asserts that the "Mrs. Janke Tynack" on the census refers to Gerritje Van Schiack Ten Eyck, Janniete's aunt, but the woman who wrote the petition could not have been Gerritje because she mentions that she is "upwards of fifty years of age." Gerritje was born in 1687, and was about 69 in 1756. Janniete was born in about 1706, which would make her 50 or 51 in 1757. I contend that the census refers to Janniete instead of Gerritje, but the dispute points to the care with which the "Colonial Albany Social History Project" must be used.

glimpse into how quartering was perceived and experienced. One rather mundane question that caused a lot of aggravation for everyone at Ten Eyck's house concerned bedding. Apparently, sleeping on the hard floor was quickly eschewed by the soldiers, and they started prowling around the house looking for something else to sleep on. Ten Eyck had already surrendered "the Straw Bed from under her," which she asserted was "in Conformity to your Lordships Orders." But the insomniac men threatened "to take the Bed whereon she lays, or come to Bed to her." To stave off these advances, Ten Eyck offered "to unlock all to shew them that she has no more Beding," but that did not quiet their complaints.

An additional problem was firewood. The census indicates that the house had three rooms with fireplaces, two rooms without fireplaces and that Ten Eyck occupied one room. Since Ten Eyck was accustomed to living by herself, she probably did not stockpile enough wood to keep all three fireplaces going all winter. Therefore, by November 17 (probably only a month or two into this second season of quartering), her firewood stores had already been used up. The soldiers threatened "to Cut the Doors & Windows off the House, if she does not find them Fire Wood." Even though Loudoun was supplying the soldiers with material for starting fires, they had to find firewood on their own or rely on their hosts. This presented a quandary for Ten Eyck as "she is obliged to the Charity of her Neighbours" for firewood. She asserted that she was "Weak & sickly, incapable of working for her maintainance, and in but low circumstance, and no Man to Assist her."

Ten Eyck's insistence that she had no man to assist her is puzzling because she was part of a large, prominent family. Her cousin Jacob C. Ten Eyck had been mayor of Albany in 1748; her brother-in-law, Hendrick M. Roseboom, was a prominent Albany merchant. Even if her three brothers were not living in Albany or available to help her, she had eight male first cousins,

at least five of whom lived in Albany and were also quartering soldiers, in addition to her elderly uncle Hendrick Ten Eyck who was also housing soldiers. Still, none of these men lived in the house with Janniete Ten Eyck, and they were perhaps too caught up with their own quartering problems to help her. Certainly they could not stop the soldiers from physically threatening Janniete; for that she had to apply to Loudoun. She closed her petition by imploring Loudoun to "Ease the oppression, and Curb the Insolence on Virtue."

The picture that emerges from Janniete's petition is that of people frustrating one another due to limited resources, close contact, and disruption of normal routines. This description can also apply to the presence of the army in Albany overall. Certainly one component of having so many soldiers in such a small space was the sexual threat they presented to the women of the city. As will be discussed below, this became a serious concern that had a significant effect on the people of Albany.[44]

Even though he did not use his house in Albany full time, William Johnson also had to contend with quartering in the city. In December 1757 he wrote to Major General Abercromby complaining that his house in Albany had been used to quarter soldiers. This was done despite the fact that during the previous year, when soldiers had been quartered in his Albany house, he had applied to Lord Loudoun and the soldiers had been removed. He had received Loudoun's promise that no more soldiers would be billeted there in the future. Nevertheless, in December

[44] Jannitie Ten Eyck, Petition to Loudoun, LO 4851. In addition to the firsthand accounts of people who experienced quartering, many other stories and rumors flew around the colonies (especially New York) about Loudoun's quartering practices. For example, William Corry, an Albany attorney who was subjected to Loudoun's quartering in Albany, wrote to his friend Sir William Johnson in January 1757, relating the latest news from New York. Apparently when 2,400 troops arrived in the city, Loudoun quartered six of them at the home of Oliver DeLancey—an alderman, assemblyman, and the acting governor's brother. Oliver DeLancey, according to Corry, "zounzed and blood and Owz[d] at the Soldiers." In response, Loudoun sent "half a dousen more." DeLancey exclaimed that "if matters was to go so he would leave the Country." Loudoun replied that "he would be glad of it, then the troops would have the whole house." This story spread through New York City, to Albany, and westward. William Johnson, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (hereafter, *Johnson Papers*) (Albany: State University of New York, 1962 [1921]), 2:666.

he heard that "there are Some Men Billetted there now, and in the best Room I have." He had planned to use this room himself the next time he went to Albany. Furthermore, Johnson explained, "I have always a good many Stores in that House which may not be Safe with Soldiers in it, there being but an old Woman to take care of them."[45]

The presence of the army also affected the everyday life of residents through conflicts over shared and public space. In November, 1756 Loudoun was renting a house in Albany from Henry Van Driessen.[46] His neighbors were George and Caterina Couthy, refugees from the frontier who had fled to Albany probably sometime in 1756 when Indian attacks and perhaps the fall of Fort Oswego in August frightened them from their home. November 15 started out normally enough for the Couthy family. They had just finished breakfast, and George Couthy was inspecting his gun to see "if i[t] were in order." Then, "to his Surprise" the gun fired. The gun was not loaded, but the sound was enough to alarm Loudoun's guards.[47]

George Couthy put his gun away and grabbed his ax "To work in ye woods," and as he was leaving, Loudoun's guards found him and hauled him off to the guard house. They told him he had to pay six shillings to be released, but then "they took from Him Eight Shillings—Took his Tobacco Box & Knife--& Beat him--& Then Brought him to Goal." They still wanted six shillings, and George Couthy was kept there overnight. The next day, Caterina Couthy, "the

[45] *Johnson Papers*, 2:761.

[46] Henry Van Driessen, Letter/Petition to the Earl of Loudoun for rent, June 2, 1757, LO 3774.

[47] Couthy notes "the Said George Took Hold of his Gun—would Try it if if were in order—opened ye pan as no prime was on the Same; He Snapt it--& to his Surprise it went of."

Helpmeet of the poor Distressed prisoner" got someone to write a breathless petition to Loudoun explaining the situation and asking him "to grant Releaf—and to Bestow money."[48]

The Couthys were in the wrong place at the wrong time. The war on the frontiers had forced them to flee to Albany where they ended up right next door to Loudoun, so their neighborhood was full of soldiers. George Couthy's accidental firing of the gun was a mistake that might have gone unnoticed in the country or even in Albany if it had not been wartime, but in a city already worried about spies and forced to house the most important representative of the British empire in North America, such a mishap could not go unnoticed or unpunished. Additionally, George Couthy probably did not know that back in August, 1756, Loudoun had issued an order stating that, "Any person who presumes to fire a Musquet in the Streets, or near the Stockades of Albany, immediately to be made prisoners, & reported."[49] It is ironic that even though Loudoun was the nemesis in the Couthys' case, he was still the only one to whom Caterina Couthy could appeal for assistance.

Having everyone crowded together in a small space had other consequences as well. In March, 1757 (after the first winter of housing the troops), the Albany corporation wrote a memorial to Colonel Gage who was in charge of the garrison at Albany. The issue over which they were "Humbly Complaining" concerned the building of a storehouse on Yonker Street (also known as State Street). As noted above, the street was very broad to accommodate a marketplace and it had two churches in the center of the street; the Dutch Reformed Church was at the corner of State and Market Street, near the river, and St. Peter's Episcopal Church was three blocks west on State Street. The fort stood at the western end of State Street, west of the

[48] The petition is full of dashes and is crowded together in a single paragraph. She must have gotten someone else to draft it because her signature is just her mark. Caterina Couthy, Petition to Loudoun, November 16, 1756, LO 2226.

[49] Loudoun, "General Orders," August 21-November 30, 1756, LO 1538.

Episcopal church. The army wanted to build the storehouse in the middle of State Street, between the two churches. This would give the storehouse easy access to the river and the fort and a wide thoroughfare over which to move supplies. But State Street was very important to the civilian commerce of the city, so the corporation tried to convince Captain Gabriel Christie (who was in charge of the project) to build the storehouse elsewhere. They even went so far as to procure an alternate plot of land from "the elders & deacons of the Dutch Church." Nevertheless, Captain Christie refused to move the storehouse to the alternate location despite the corporation's complaints about the great inconvenience the storehouse would pose "whilst they are Busy in making of it as well as after it is completed." The corporation therefore appealed to Colonel Gage.[50]

Gage passed the memorial on to his superior, Major General Abercromby, and informed him that Captain Christie had examined the proposed new location but maintained that it was far too narrow for his purposes. The petitioners insisted that he had measured in the wrong place. While they worked to clear up the matter (it was decided in favor of the corporation), Gage sent the memorial to Abercromby. At the end of his introductory letter he noted, "Building on the main street makes great grumbling."[51]

Even though the corporation's location was correctly measured, when Abercromby informed Loudoun of the situation, he noted that the original location on the main street was still going to be used. He wrote to Loudoun, "I went to view the ground they proposed & afterwards send Major Eyre & Mr. Leake, who all agree that the place first pitched upon is the only proper one." The corporation finally gave in and the storehouse was built on State Street. But, in order

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[50] Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty of Albany, Memorial to Colonel Gage, March 19, 1757, LO 3100.

[51] Thomas Gage, Letter to James Abercromby, March 29, 1757, LO 3204.

to avoid lengthy negotiations in the future, Abercromby advised Loudoun to build relationships with the leaders in Albany. He informed Loudoun, "I have had several Conversations with the Mayor whom I have always found very well disposed to promote the publick service; but in order that he may cooperate heartily with us; I must beg your Lo[rdshi]p will approach his Son Lieutenant in room of Roseboom; for which end you have inclosed Roseboom's resignation." Having Mayor Van Schaick on their side was an important step for the British military authorities. They had already seen his ability to create delays with the quartering controversy. If giving his son a commission in the army would lead the mayor to support army policies, then the unfortunate Roseboom could not be dismissed quickly enough.

Even though the younger Van Schiack was not necessarily fully qualified for a position in the British army, Abercromby thought he was "a genteel, alert young fellow, at present a Lieut in the N. York regiment, & under Lieut Collins [?] tuition he will make a good officer to an independent company." So, it was all arranged. But, if Loudoun did not agree with the plan, Abercromby asked him to "signify the same to Capt Christie with such assurances as you shall think proper for doing something for the Mayor's Son, that the Capt may have the Father's assistance in the publick works."[52] The war necessitated a stronger connection between the Dutch residents and imperial authorities than naturally existed. In order to facilitate cooperation, both army leaders and Albany residents had to be willing to work together. However, Loudoun's primary focus was waging the war, not facilitating colonists' acceptance of the military presence.

Meanwhile, many Dutch residents were primarily interested in finding ways to profit from the presence of the army, especially since the trade with France had been curtailed. While connecting the two groups economically might have been beneficial for both sides, army

[52] James Abercromby, Letter to Loudoun, April 11, 1757, LO 3337.

authorities were primarily concerned with getting the job done while managing a tight budget. The residents of Albany did not have this same focus or zeal to assist the waging of the war. In the end, the difference in priorities led army leaders (as demonstrated with Braddock in chapter two) to use power instead of money, if at all possible, to accomplish their goals.

An incident in 1756 exemplified this tension. Loudoun needed twenty wagons to transport supplies to Schenectady and then on to Fort Oswego. In order to get the wagons, Loudoun had to apply to the governor and the chief justice for press warrants. Even with the warrants, however, Loudoun was only able to get five wagons, so he changed his tactic. In a letter to the Duke of Cumberland he explained "as the Service was urgent, I immediately pressed what I wanted." His secretary, Thomas Pownall (former lieutenant governor of New Jersey and future governor of Massachusetts) was appalled by Loudoun's heavy-handed measures. According to Loudoun, Pownall approached him and "represented to me the terrible Infringement this was on the Liberty of the Subject and that I should be undone by it immediately." Loudoun refused to change his tactic or wait for the people of Albany to fulfill the request voluntarily. Pownall marched off in protest and stayed away for ten days. When Pownall's expectation of a widespread protest was not fulfilled, he eventually came back to work for Loudoun. Nevertheless, Pownall continued, according to Loudoun, "to resist what he calls Military Power," and Loudoun continued to disagree with him by insisting that in time of war, military authority was preeminent to civil power.[53]

The problem with Loudoun's method of using arbitrary power to achieve the army's goals was that when it could not be used, the army had no relationship with the colonists to rely on in order to accomplish their tasks. In the spring of 1757 Major General James Abercromby

[53] Loudoun, Letter to Cumberland, October 17, 1757, Stanley Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs*, 405-406.

was trying to find horses and drivers to help start up the supply service along the Hudson River leading into Albany. When he tried to recruit men and horses, he found the residents guilty of "sculking and sending their horses into the woods" in order to avoid contributing.[54] Also that spring, a British officer, Gordon Wells, was trying to move cattle to Albany. However, in April he was stuck in Stratford, Connecticut because, as he wrote to Loudoun, "The Inhabitants in the Countys of Dutchess and Albany absolutely refused to sell or let us have Hay for our Cattle in our late March." Even though Abercromby and Wells were offering payment for their requests, they still struggled to find colonists who would cooperate. Perhaps the pay they were offering was too low to be appealing, or perhaps the settlers needed the supplies themselves. Abercromby mentioned to Loudoun that he thought the problem would be resolved when the transportation service was more developed and residents realized how they could benefit from it economically. Wells, on the other hand, urged Loudoun to "compel those People to furnish us with what is absolutely necessary for subsisting our Cattle on the Road."[55]

Part of the problem that Loudoun and Abercromby encountered was that the Albany residents saw an opportunity to profit from the presence of the army. They did not want to give up their wagons or supplies for free, especially if demand would raise the price they could charge. Albany was the only place in the New York frontier that could adequately provision the army, and Albany merchants and businesses took advantage of the profit opportunity by raising their prices. Furthermore, the residents of Albany were suffering financially from the presence of the army and therefore were looking for ways to profit off of the army. In addition to the expense of quartering and having the British army centered in Albany (in addition to the waging

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[54] James Abercromby, Letter to Loudoun, April 11, 1757, LO 3337.

[55] Gordon Wells, Letter to Loudoun, Loudoun Papers Box 73.

of the war itself) significantly cut down on the fur trade and the trade to New France despite the fact that Native Americans and Albany merchants tried to surreptitiously keep it going.

For example, during the summer of 1755, William Johnson, following the Battle of Lake George, was continuing to work to maintain Iroquois support of the British effort. The Iroquois who had fought with him at Lake George suggested that he could help the British cause by preventing any Caughnawagas from trading in Albany. To prevent this illicit trade, Johnson wrote to the Board of Trade (rather than the mayor of Albany or the governor of New York, interestingly) advising them to prohibit French traders and Caughnawagas from trading in the region, "but more particularly at Albany." Johnson noted that the Albany trade was contributing to French influence over the Indians, and if the Albany-Montreal trade was prohibited, the Iroquois believed the Caughnawagas would return to their Mohawk relatives and the Covenant Chain. Johnson observed that he would approach Governor Charles Hardy with the advice, but he had sought the support of the imperial board first to strengthen his position. He feared that Hardy would be swayed by the economic interests of the Dutch traders in Albany, "who by their cabals & weight in the Assembly may perhaps Distress or at least vex him." Johnson shared the stereotypical opinion of the Dutch at Albany as "So devoted to their Own private Profit that every other public Principle has ever been sacrificed to it."

The desire to profit from the army, therefore, grew out of the economic challenges that the presence of the army created as well as the opportunity they presented. By December, 1756, selling alcohol (especially rum) to soldiers had gotten so out of control that the soldiers were continually drunk and presented a public nuisance. In the interest of public order and at the insistence of army authorities, therefore, the Albany corporation prohibited the selling of liquor to soldiers and levied a fine on anyone who broke the law. Still, the presence of the army was

costly for individual residents and for the city as a whole. In 1759, the Albany Common Council authorized a lottery to make up for some of the expenses that the city had incurred by hosting the troops. The city gained £1,000 by this venture. [56]

A final area of contention concerned the challenges to Albany's culture and society that the presence of a large group of foreign men presented. One of the major complaints of Albany citizens about the presence of soldiers concerned the attack on virtue that the soldiers presented, not only to the women but to the city as a whole. Before the soldiers arrived, Albany was isolated, homogenous, and religious; the presence of soldiers challenged those dominant descriptors.

Anne Grant's *Memoirs of An American Lady* depicts a city shocked by a sudden influx of outsiders and residents struggling to navigate the challenges to their isolation and way of life. Grant was a friend of Margarita and Phillipus Schuyler and visited Schuyler Flats, just south of Albany in the 1760s.[57]Two main stories emerge from the memoir: one, a challenge to the morals and religion of Albany and another, a challenge to Dutch homogeneity. As British soldiers spent more years in Albany, they became more comfortable with their temporary home. Gradually, they began to influence their Dutch hosts, especially the younger members of society. Grant notes that the elder Dutch residents and especially the Dutch Reformed minister Dominie Theodorus Frelinghuysen, Jr. became alarmed that the lax morals of the English were admired and emulated by some members of Albany society. Moral decline began with the adoption of "a lighter style of dress and manners," and continued with a disregard for the Dominie's calls for

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[56] Anne McVickar Grant, *Memoirs of an American Lady* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846), 150-151; Howell and Tenney, eds., *Bicentennial History*, 309; Hislop, *Albany*, 166.

[57] Grant wrote the book in 1808. The book must be used carefully since she was recalling stories that she heard as a girl while living at the Flats, but the general points and overall sense of the changes that happened at Albany are substantiated through other sources.

reform. Soon enough, "balls began to be concerted, and a degree of flutter and frivolity to take place, which was … far from… the honest, artless cheerfulness of the meetings usual among them." The Dominie redoubled his efforts, but the events that followed challenged his patience—and theology—to the breaking point.[58]

Theodorus Frelinghuysen, Jr., was the son of the New Jersey Dutch Reformed minister, Theodorus Frelinghuysen, who was influential in starting the spiritual revivals that became known as the Great Awakening. The elder Frelinghuysen was German, but trained as a Dutch Reformed minister. He arrived in New Jersey in 1720 and challenged his congregants with his adherence to Pietism, a doctrine that emphasized inward transformation, a deep sense of sin, and a resulting outward manifestation of a changed heart. Frelinghuysen attacked hollow demonstrations of piety and emphasized that a lax attitude toward sin was a reflection of an unchanged soul. In one sermon he criticized his congregants who "not only with delight reflect upon the wanton extravagances of our youth, but also speak of them with such satisfaction that it is manifest you have never repented of them." Concerning their casual acceptance of sin, he declared, "Oh! were you truly penitent, you would be unable to think of them except with grief, or to speak of them but with tears." The elder Frelinghuysen had five sons who all became ministers and two daughters who married ministers. The younger Frelinghuysen certainly seemed to adhere to the Pietism of his father.[59]

During the winter of 1757, the officers in and around Albany decided to put on a play, despite the fact that the Dutch residents were unfamiliar with the form. The town was both

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[58] Grant, *Memoirs*, 156.

[59] F.J. Schrag, "Theodorus Jacobus Frelinghuysen: The Father of American Pietism," *Church History* 14:3 (1945), 203, 205, 207, 208; Randall Balmer. "Frelinghuysen, Theodorus Jacobus." Accessed June 22, 2011. http://www.anb.org.libproxy.cc.stonybrook.edu/articles/01/01-00303.html; *American National Biography Online*.

scandalized and entertained, as well as sharply divided in opinion, after watching a performance of George Farquhar's *The Beaux' Stratagem*. The play, with its plot of two impoverished strangers seducing rich women in a country town, was certainly relatable to the audience but not in a way that would quell the disapproval of Frelinghuysen and others. Aside from the plot, a large part of the play's salaciousness came from the cross-dressing ensigns acting the ladies' roles. For people unfamiliar with the concept of fictional dramatic performance, the presentation was grotesque. Grant records the general feeling that "the officers… had not only spent a whole night in telling lies in a counterfeited place, the reality of which never existed, but that they were themselves a lie, and had degraded manhood, and broken through an express prohibition in Scripture, by assuming female habits." The makeup that the men wore was "looked upon as a most flagrant abomination."[60]

No one was more scandalized than the Dominie himself. Aside from Frelinghuysen's personal Pietism, there was a long history of unease between Protestantism and the theater. Some saw plays, even religious plays, as being too popish and reminiscent of the theatricality of the Catholic Church. Others thought that hearing and seeing a play, especially a secular play, was a form of idolatry in that it was a celebration of a false reality. Protestants, with their emphasis on and elevation of the word, were very wary of visual representations of many kinds, in art, architecture, and worship, and some believed that enjoyment of licentiousness portrayed on stage was evidence of an untransformed heart.[61]

For the soldiers, however, putting on the plays was an act of imperialism. Historian Gillian Russell explains several reasons for the popularity of plays in military camps and army-

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[60] Grant, *Memoirs*, 157-158.

[61] Michael O'Connell, "The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm, Anti-theatricalism, and the Image of the Elizabethan Theater," *ELH* 52:2 (1985), 289, 299.

occupied cities. First, "the performance of plays by the military was a means of rehearsing the ideological and political differences between the antagonists." In the case of Albany, the conflicts between the army and Albany residents, especially Freylinghuysen, culminated with the dramatic performances. The plays illustrated the differences between British culture at home and the conservative Dutch-English hybrid culture of Albany. Second, Russell emphasizes the performative aspects of imperialism that were literally acted out in putting on plays. The enacting of British culture far from home was part of a larger performance of Britishness that was essential to establishing the connection to Britain and the transformation of local culture that defined imperial efforts. In Albany, the soldiers' method of introducing the citizens of Albany to British culture was an essential step in integrating Albany, culturally and socially, into the British empire.[62]

When the soldiers announced that they would next perform Farquhar's *The Recruiting Officer* (which told a story even closer to home, of soldiers seducing young women), Frelinghuysen "invoked heaven and earth to witness and avenge this contempt, not only of his authority, but… of the source from whence it was derived." This led to conflicts between parents and youths over the challenges to traditional Dutch Reformed theology. Soon after, Frelinghuysen could not handle the opposition to his authority and the moral decline of Albany and decided to take a trip to Holland. He never returned.[63]

In the wake of the Dominie's departure, scandal rocked the town when a young colonel, one of the ringleaders of the entertaining officers, impregnated the daughter of the "very wealthy

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[62] Gillian Russell, *The Theaters of War: Performance, Politics, and Society, 1793-1815* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 159-160.

[63] He insisted it was just for a visit, but the rumor was that he had been lost at sea on his way to Holland. Whether he had jumped or had been swept overboard was a topic of some debate. Grant, 159-162.

citizen" with whom he was quartered. The colonel received orders to march and left without marrying the girl. The girl believed he would return and marry her, and she apparently showed no shame about the affair. When the colonel eventually refused to marry the daughter, her father "offered to divest himself of all but a mere subsistence, and give him such a fortune as was never heard of in that country" if he would marry the girl. The colonel still refused, and the town was in an uproar because "Of such a circumstance there was no existing precedent; half the city were related to the fair culprit, for penitent she could hardly be called." Grant noted "One would have thought there had been an earthquake" at the reaction the city had to the scandal.[64]

In addition to the moral upheaval caused by the presence of the army, the cultural milieu of Albany was challenged and changed by the large influx of foreigners. One way this happened was through the presence of the army train. These sutlers, suppliers, contractors, storekeepers, women, and children spent long periods in Albany with the rest of the army, and "began to mingle more frequently with the inhabitants." Some of these people were able to establish themselves permanently in the city and "intermarry[ied] with the daughters of the citizens" and became part of Albany society. Another way that society became diversified was through intermarriage between soldiers and civilians and by soldiers bringing their wives to settle in Albany. Michael Kammen calculates that "that the proportion of voters with Dutch surnames in Albany County declined from 82 percent in 1720 to 57 percent in 1763."[65]

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[64] The parallels to Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* (the officer, George Wickham [who meets the Bennets while quartered in their town] and Lydia Bennet scandalously elope with no thought of marriage, Mr. Bennet is convinced he will have to spend his entire fortune to right the affair until Darcy saves the day) must at least be noted. It is known that Jane Austen read *Memoirs of an American Lady,* and *Pride and Prejudice* was published in 1813, five years after Grant's book. But, certainly, stories of scandals from the intermixing of the military and civilians were widespread. Isobel Grundy, "Jane Austen and Literary Traditions," in Edward Copeland and Juliet McMaster, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Jane Austen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 200.
[65] Grant, *Memoirs*, 150-151, 154; Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 294.

After the Seven Years' War, Albany's transition from fort to city sped up due to several factors. With British conquest of Canada, the northern fur trade was opened up directly to trade with Britain. That change, coupled with the diminishing importance of the fur trade in general, meant that Albany's status as a center of northern, Canadian, and Indian trade decreased substantially. In addition, the waging of the Seven Years' War altered the nature of British-Iroquois alliances. The individual relationships of traders and Indians were no longer the keys to maintaining the Covenant Chain. Instead, the superintendents of Indian affairs became the most important negotiators. Also, with an increased British presence and the influence of British culture, Albany became more diverse. Finally, with the end of the contest over the New York frontier, Albany was no longer a frontier town. Settlers poured past Albany into northern and western New York as well as into Albany itself.[66]

Albany began the Seven Years' War still connected to and influenced by its past as an outpost on the periphery. The diplomatic and economic patterns created by the fur trade had lasting legacies, particularly in directing where Albany residents looked for economic growth. Albany's Dutch majority contributed to its comparative cultural isolation, making it similar in some ways to more recently settled backcountry areas such as Burnetsfield. The city ended the war more influenced by its contact with the military and the political and social changes that war engendered. Struggles for power in conflicts over shared space were shaped by the realities of war; Albany was in a position of danger and overwhelmed by the military, leaving its leadership with few ways to effectively bargain with the military. Some individuals had some success in resisting the army initially, but the pervasive presence of the military ultimately challenged

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[66] Norton, *Fur Trade*, ch. 11; Daniel Richter and James Merrell, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003 [1987]), 56.

Albany's society and culture, leaving it changed. While Albany never experienced a French attack, it was nevertheless besieged by forces beyond its control.

Chapter Four

"A very material post:" Fort Number Four and the New England Frontier

In the fall of 1754, twenty-four year old Susannah Johnson was living as a captive in St. Francis, a French mission town populated by western Abenakis. St. Francis was located on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River near Quebec. Her original Abenaki captors traded her to the sachem's son-in-law, and his family formally adopted her. Susannah Johnson was distressed to be separated from her husband and three of her four children and unsure about her future and safety. One bright spot in Johnson's misery came in the form of her adopted Abenaki brother, Sabatis. Susannah Johnson was keenly aware of her status as an outsider and struggled with loneliness. Young Sabatis befriended her, probably reminding her of her own captured son, Sylvanus. In her captivity narrative, Johnson remembered how her adopted brother would bring in the cows for her and play with her infant daughter, Captive, who had been born on the journey to St. Francis. She also recalled that he "often amused me with feats performed with his bow and arrow."[1]

Five years later, in 1759, Susannah Johnson had survived her captivity, negotiated her freedom, reunited with part of her family, and returned to her hometown of Number Four or Charlestown, New Hampshire. During the Seven Years' War the town had struggled to protect itself from French-allied Abenaki attacks, and the climax of that defensive struggle occurred in 1759, shortly after Susannah Johnson's return. Robert Rogers and his rangers carried out an attack on St. Francis that succeeded in reducing the threat to British settlements on the New Hampshire frontier. During their raid on St. Francis, the rangers took some Abenakis captive, including Sabatis. Rogers brought him along with the others to Number Four. They stopped at

[1] Susannah Johnson, *A Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. Johnson*, 3rd edition (Windsor, VT: Thomas M. Pomrot, 1814), 62.

Susannah Johnson's house and upon seeing her, Sabatis cried out, "My God, my God, here is my sister." Johnson recalled that Sabatis was "transported to see me, and declared that he was still my brother, and I must be his sister."

Despite her long years of captivity and the significant toll that Abenaki attacks had taken on her family, Johnson responded to Sabatis with joy and kindness. She remarked, "The fortune of war had left him without a single relation, but with his country's enemies, he could find one who too sensibly felt his miseries."[2] The anomalous bond between Susannah Johnson and Sabatis reflects the complexities of the situation that encompassed the Connecticut River valley and Green Mountain region in the mid-eighteenth century. That two people could be simultaneously friends and enemies, winners and losers, family but unrelated shows how European expansion engendered ambiguity that the Seven Years' War magnified, even as it clarified boundary lines and borders.

This chapter explores how the residents of Fort Number Four navigated the problems that resulted from their location on the New England periphery, particularly as the Seven Years' War developed. At first glance, Fort Number Four seems like dozens of other places on the North American frontier: a small fortification protecting a small population. But, by studying the development of the community at Fort Number Four, one can uncover a more complex story. Because of its ambiguous connections to colonial governments, the community at Fort Number Four struggled to find anyone outside of their settlement who cared about their protection. Long-term settlement of the region was dependent on keeping the residents safe from Abenaki attacks, particularly during wartime, but the settlement was so distant from the rest of the colonial population that military protection consistently fell short and provincial authorities refused to

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[2] Johnson, *Captivity*, 117.

take responsibility for the town. By positioning their settlement as critical to British success in the Seven Years' War, the settlers of Fort Number Four were able to get the protection that they desperately needed, yet integration into British strategy created new challenges and uncertainties for both the community and individuals.

In order to understand the larger context of the story of Fort Number Four in the Seven Years' War one must go back to the earliest incursions of white settlers on western Abenaki territory. Western Abenaki is the name given to several tribes that lived in and around the Green Mountains of New Hampshire and Vermont. They are distinguished from the eastern Abenakis of Maine. Beneath this umbrella title were many smaller tribal affiliations including the Sokokis (located in the Connecticut River valley), the Missisquois (located near Lake Champlain), the Cowasucks (located in the Green Mountains between the Connecticut River and Lake Champlain) and the Pennacooks (located east of the Connecticut River, along the Pemigewaset River). Another force in the region was the Mohawks. Though historians generally recognize Lake Champlain as the border of Mohawk territory, there was certainly contact between the Mohawks and western Abenaki groups, especially the Missisquoi and the Sokokis. The strong allegiance that the Iroquois in general and the Mohawks in particular had toward the British (manifesting itself at its weakest in neutrality and at its strongest in armed defense of British interests) challenged the western Abenaki's inclination toward the French.[3]

Colin Calloway estimates that there were 10,000 western Abenakis in Vermont and New Hampshire in 1600. This number may have sunk to as low as 250 by the mid-1600s after

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[3] Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 59, 75; William A. Haviland and Marjory Power, *The Original Vermonters: Native Inhabitants, Past and Present*, revised and expanded (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 181.

epidemic diseases swept through the region.[4] By 1700 there were an estimated 6,000 Abenakis in the region that is now Vermont. Western Abenaki villages tended to be spread out as they encompassed fields and river banks, but they also had central palisaded enclosures for protection. A notable example of this was the Sokoki village of Fort Hill, which the Sokokis used to protect themselves from Mohawk attacks.[5]

The western Abenaki of the Connecticut River valley were already in contact with French traders when English fur traders first approached them in 1636. Contact with French Catholic missionaries followed before the century was out. The English, eager for land, may not have noticed or understood that the Abenaki's subsistence was based on seasonal migrations. In the winter, life centered on hunting; in the spring, fowling, fishing, and sugaring; in the summer, planting and harvesting. Each of these activities happened in different places. Every family band controlled a specific tract of hunting territory, which was defined, not by peripheral boundaries, but by interior trail systems connected to waterways. The family band had to grant permission for anyone else to hunt or even enter their territory. The land could not be bought or sold, and the family was closely associated with its territory. From the perspective of Europeans who lived and worked on one plot of land all year, the Abenakis would have been using a large amount of land over the course of a year, and Europeans would have been confused by their seasonal movements.[6]

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[4] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 39; Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 157; Calloway notes that the 250 estimate is probably low, but he affirms that a 90% casualty rate for the era of epidemic diseases is probable and consistent with other areas.

[5] Haviland and Power estimate an average population of 1,000 people per village with six recognized villages in the region. Villages were made up of several smaller communities. The village proper was a central location on a navigable waterway. Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 158-159. The rebound from 250 to 6,000 people can be explained by captivity raids and migration in addition to natural increase.

[6] Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 161-162.

Contact with Europeans led to significant, though initially subtle, changes for the Abenaki. The most dramatic change was the transformation of their economic focus from subsistence to trade, mainly based on furs; these furs came from family-controlled hunting territories. This emphasis on furs led to conflict over hunting territory and a necessity to identify territory based on well-defined boundaries, thus changing the concept of ownership. Another change was that trade with the French also led to contact with Jesuit missionaries as part of the French emphasis on relationships and connections along with trade.[7] Jesuit missionaries established mission towns at Sillery in Quebec on the St. Lawrence River and at St. Francis, also on the St. Lawrence River, halfway between Quebec and Montreal, about 200 miles north of Number Four. Both of these towns drew converts from the eastern and western Abenakis.[8]

By the last quarter of the 17th century, English settlers had established the western Massachusetts towns of Deerfield, Hartfield, Hadley, and Northampton, and other Massachusetts and Connecticut residents began eyeing the fertile land of the middle Connecticut River valley. A key factor that led settlers to believe they could settle on Sokoki lands along the Connecticut River was that, as noted above, the Sokoki had adapted to the geography and climate by moving seasonally. Therefore, even when English settlers came upon cleared Sokoki fields, they refused to believe the land was occupied. Aside from the northward progress of English settlers, the Abenakis were also drawn into contact with the English in King Philip's War. The war affected the western Abenaki in at least two significant ways. The first was a disruption of their seasonal mobility, leading many to flee (at least temporarily) to Canada. The second was the creation of a multi-tribal community called Schaghticoke on the Hudson River, north of Albany.

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[7] Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 216.

[8] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 42, 46, 51.

Schaghticoke served as the English answer to St. Francis as its founder, Governor Edmund Andros, sought to draw western Abenakis to its vicinity and to English allegiance. Nevertheless, for Native Americans, Schaghticoke often functioned as a stepping stone from New York to St. Francis over the course of the next century.[9]

Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the western Abenaki and the English settlers were only at peace for one seventeen-year stretch between 1727 and 1744. Sometimes the French convinced the Abenaki to fight with them, sometimes French and Abenaki goals coincided, and sometimes the Abenaki fought the British at their own initiative and apart from the motivations of the French. In 1704 Abenakis joined Caughnawagas and French soldiers in the infamous raid on Deerfield, Massachusetts that led to the captivity of John Williams and his daughter, Eunice. Raids continued through the end of Queen Anne's War in the Schaghticoke-St. Francis corridor. The two towns served as meeting points for Abenakis and Mahicans, giving them a strong point (Schaghticoke) within English territory. By the end of Queen Anne's War, Cowasucks returned to the upper Connecticut River valley and some eastern Abenakis from Maine, pushed out by increasing British settlement, settled on the St. Francis River and at Missisquoi on Lake Champlain.[10]

Following Queen Anne's War, the western Abenakis became involved in the western phase of Drummer's War, which some historians call Grey Lock's War. This war lasted from 1723-1727 and pitted British frontier settlers in New Hampshire and Massachusetts against the Missisquoi and disgruntled Schaghticoke Indians, who resented the British incursions onto their

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[9] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 53, 83, 88; Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 226-227.

[10] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 103, 106; Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 228, 230. Caughnawagas were Mohawks who had separated from the main group of Mohawks in New York, converted to Catholicism, and moved to French territory. They were French allies. Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 229.

lands. It was during Grey Lock's War that colonists from Massachusetts built Fort Drummer. A few years later (1731), the French built Fort St. Frederic at Crown Point, one hundred miles northwest of Fort Drummer. Seventeen years of peace followed Grey Lock's War before King George's War broke out, and it was during these peaceful years that settlers from Massachusetts and Connecticut began moving into lightly settled Sokoki territory in the middle Connecticut River valley.[11]

Fort Number Four was the northernmost of these outposts. Due to cartographical errors and overlapping charters, the original settlers of the northern Connecticut River valley believed their settlements were part of Massachusetts Bay.[12] It was not until 1738-1739 that the Privy Council and King George II determined the boundaries of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. In 1740, the inhabitants of Number Four—now located in New Hampshire—petitioned the king to be annexed to their home colony of Massachusetts, but he did not grant their request.[13] The town was renamed Charlestown in 1753, but many people continued to refer to it as Number Four.[14] It was almost exactly due east of Fort Edward in New York and about one hundred miles from both Albany, New York and Portsmouth, New Hampshire—the closest seats of government. The distance to Fort Edward was slightly shorter, but over mountainous terrain.

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[11] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 113, 116, 130, 140-141; Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 205, 230.

[12] Henry H. Saunderson, *History of Charlestown, New Hampshire, The Old Number Four, Embracing the part borne by its inhabitants in the Indian, French and Revolutionary Wars, and the Vermont Controversy, also genealogies and sketches of families, from its settlement to 1876* (Claremont, NH: The Claremont Manufacturing Company, 1876), 1.

[13] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 2, 13. Edwin M. Beacon, *The Connecticut River and the Valley of the Connecticut* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), 208.

[14] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 58; the fort, in particular, was still called Fort Number Four, never Fort Charlestown.

The first settlers of Number Four were three brothers who arrived there in 1740: Samuel, David, and Stephen Farnsworth. Following them were Isaac Parker, Obadiah Sartwell, John Hastings, Moses Willard, and Phineas Stevens, all important players in the defense of Charlestown during the Seven Years' War.[15] The settlers constantly worried about safety from the nearby Abenakis, and by 1744 there were only about ten families living at Number Four.[16] Because of the need for defense, the inhabitants of the settlement met together in November, 1743 and decided to build a fort for their own protection, which they would have to finance themselves since the New Hampshire government had no interest in protecting a distant settlement that was populated by people from Massachusetts.[17] They built a small fort made of houses and lean-tos so that all of the town's residents either lived in the fort or stayed there in times of danger (with the long-term plan of establishing farms outside of the fort).

King George's War began in 1744, and in April, 1746, about forty French soldiers and Missisquoi and St. Francis Indians attacked Fort Number Four. They captured John Spafford, Isaac Parker, and Stephen Farnsworth. The captives eventually made it back to Number Four in 1747. The attackers also burned down the sawmill and the gristmill. Indeed, the sawmill became a constant target because it was a key tool in the settlers' ability to build homes and towns on the frontier. Massachusetts sent troops to Number Four over the course of the next few months, even though the settlement was part of New Hampshire.

In early May, Abenakis attacked again and killed Seth Putnam, a member of a small group of men that was protecting the townswomen as they went out for the evening milking. At

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[15] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 14.

[16] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 15.

[17] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 17, 20.

the end of May, 1746, Abenakis ambushed some men who went out to see the place where Seth Putnam was killed; Obadiah Sartwell was captured (he returned to Number Four in 1747), and Samuel Farnsworth was killed (shot accidentally by another defender of the fort). In August, Abenakis killed most of the livestock and again burned the partially reconstructed mill. After the deadly summer of 1746, Massachusetts refused to allow its garrison to remain, and New Hampshire refused to supply others in its place. The inhabitants of Number Four abandoned their settlement in 1746 and returned to Massachusetts. A small contingent of men was left to guard the fort until the winter, at which point they figured it would be snowed in and safe from arsonists. Fort Number Four's ambiguous position relative to Massachusetts and New Hampshire meant that no one with strong enough authority to protect the settlement was motivated to act on the settlers' behalf. It was only when the more settled regions felt threatened that leaders thought about protecting the frontier. [18]

By April, 1747, the government of Massachusetts decided that holding the Connecticut River valley settlements was critical to the defense of the colony, despite the dispute over who had jurisdiction in the Connecticut River valley. To that end, Governor William Shirley sent troops to defend Fort Number Four (newly repopulated after the assurance of protection). A few days after the troops arrived, French and Abenaki forces attacked Fort Number Four, but the Massachusetts troops were able to withstand the attack and hold the fort.[19] There were a few more attacks in 1748 and even in 1749, after the peace was official. For example, in 1749 Obadiah Sartwell, (lately returned from captivity), was "harrowing his corn" when Abenakis raided again. This time he was killed and a ten-year-old boy that was with him, Enos Stevens,

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[18] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 26-28, 30-32; Emma Lewis Coleman, *New England Captives Carried to Canada Between 1677 and 1760 During the French and Indian Wars*, vol. 2 (Portland, ME: The Southworth Press, 1925), 183.

[19] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 34-36.

was captured. Stevens was redeemed by the French, who sent him back to Albany since peace had been declared.[20] Despite proclamations of peace from distant governments, the settlers of Number Four still did not feel safe from Abenaki attacks. A garrison authorized by Massachusetts remained at the settlement through the end of 1749, but when it withdrew, the community was left to defend itself as best it could. Accordingly, in 1750 a company of twenty-nine men from Number Four was formed for defensive purposes. Half of them would take on garrison duties for six months; then the remaining men would take a turn. From 1750-1753, the threat of an attack was a constant concern, and it was difficult for the settlers to leave the fort with confidence to work in the fields or at the mill or travel to other settlements.

Conflict between the Abenakis and the Connecticut River valley settlers over territory continued through the 1750s. Since the establishment of Fort Number Four, settlers had been eyeing the fertile region further north on the Connecticut River, known as the Cowas Intervales. This territory was controlled and settled by Cowasucks. In 1752, several new British settlements had been proposed for the region, and a surveying party travelled north to evaluate where the townships should be located. Their actions did not go unnoticed, and in January, 1753, six St. Francis Indians appeared at Fort Number Four requesting a meeting with Captain Phineas Stevens. They stated that "for the English to settle Cowass was what they could not agree to, as the English had no need of that Land, but had eno' without it." If the British insisted on exploring and settling the northern region then "They must think the English had a mind for War." The Abenakis promised that "you shall have a Strong War…that there was four hundred Indians now a hunting in this Side St. Francis River, and that the owners of the Land at Cowass would be all there this Spring." They left with the threat that "they at No. 4 might expect that if

[20] Coleman, *New England Captives*, 183.

the affair of settling Cowass went forward, to have all their houses burnt."[21] Captain Stevens took the meeting very seriously and reported it to Governor Shirley of Massachusetts and Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire. The plan to establish the towns north of Number Four was abandoned, but the Abenaki were on the alert for any signs of English movement further into their territory.[22]

Later in 1753, Massachusetts had improved relations with the Abenaki, and the settlers of Number Four were able to work their fields and engage in trade with the Indians. In July 1753, Number Four was officially and legally incorporated into New Hampshire and received the name Charlestown. The only problem with this new arrangement was that the twenty-five or thirty families living at Charlestown could no longer hope for military aid from Massachusetts (which had always been more interested than New Hampshire in protecting the northwestern frontier). Still, the settlers of Number Four began looking toward establishing homes and farms outside the fort. Among these settlers were James and Susanna Johnson who moved out of the fort in 1752 and established their farm about five hundred meters north of the fort.[23] From the Abenaki perspective, the Johnson farm was the beginning of a slow creep northward of British settlement. Considering their strong words to Phineas Stevens soon after the Johnson's moved out of the fort, it should come as no surprise that the Abenaki later targeted the Johnson farm. Susannah Johnson's own narrative of the events illuminates what happened.

Susannah Willard Johnson records that she was born in 1730 to Moses and Susanna Willard in Lunenburg, Massachusetts. Her great-great-grandfather was Major (Simon?) Willard,

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[21] Qtd. in Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 236.

[22] Haviland and Power, *Original Vermonters*, 233; Beacon, *Connecticut River*, 223-224.

[23] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 57-58.

who fought for Massachusetts in King Philip's War in 1675. His son, Simon Willard, had nine sons, the oldest of whom was Susannah Johnson's grandfather, Simon Willard. When that Simon Willard died, his widow (Susannah Johnson's Grandmother Willard) married a Mr. Farnsworth. Their three sons (Susannah's half-uncles) were the Samuel, David, and Stephen Farnsworth who were the original settlers of Number Four. Stephen Farnsworth would later be killed in May, 1746, as described above.[24]

Susannah Willard first visited Number Four in 1744 as a fourteen-year-old when there were about ten families living there and her parents had moved there from Massachusetts.[25] In *A Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. Johnson*, she recalls that during her early visit, "The Indians were numerous, and associated in a friendly manner with the whites."[26] While she was there she witnessed the construction of the fort and the ill-fated sawmill. Three years later in 1747, when she was about seventeen, Susannah Willard married James Johnson. In 1730, James had been an orphan whose servant contract Susannah's great uncle Josiah Willard had purchased, and Willard had raised James as part of his household.[27] In 1749, James, Susannah, and their baby Sylvanus moved to Number Four (newly repopulated after the ending of King George's War), where they joined five other families, including Susannah's father and some of her brothers. Soon after the Johnsons' arrival, the Massachusetts troops who had been guarding the fort during the war returned home. The next day Abenakis from St. Francis attacked the men working in the fields, which included all of the Willard/Johnson men at Number Four. Susannah Johnson spent several

[24]Johnson, *Captivity*, 4-5.

[25] For some reason, Susannah seems to have stayed in Massachusetts when her parents moved to Number Four.

[26] Johnson, *Captivity*, 8.

[27] James Johnson had been at sea with his uncle, the ship's commander. His uncle died, and James was sold to a passing convict transport to help pay his uncle's debts. When James came ashore in Boston, Josiah Willard purchased him from the convict ship.

tense days holed up in the fort waiting to find out if her father, brothers, and husband were dead, alive, or captured (this was the attack that killed Obadiah Sartwell and captured young Enos Stevens). All of Susannah Johnson's relatives returned safely to the fort.[28]

From her narrative, it is evident that Susannah Johnson did not particularly enjoy living at Number Four during those early years. She writes of "the gloominess of the rude forest, the distance from friends and competent defense, and the daily inroads and nocturnal yells of hostile Indians." Looking back on that tense time, Johnson reflected, "Had there been an organized government to stretch forth its protecting arm, in any case of danger, the misery might have been in a degree alleviated."[29] Since Massachusetts no longer had a claim to Charlestown and since New Hampshire was ambivalent, at best, about its new frontier settlements, the settlers could either give up and go back to Massachusetts or rely on themselves and their neighbors for protection. James Johnson chose the latter course and proved it by moving his family (which by then included a daughter, Susan) out of the fort and onto his own land in 1752.

James Johnson worked as a farmer and Indian trader, occasionally making trips to Connecticut to replenish his supply of goods. During one of those trips in the summer of 1754, Susannah Johnson was left at home alone with the children for three months as rumors flew of impending western Abenaki attacks. In her narrative, she remembers this period as terrifying and full of anxiety. She recalled, "I never went round my own house, without first looking with trembling caution by each corner, to see if a tomahawk was raised for my destruction." When James Johnson finally returned in late August, his wife's fears were little relieved by the news he brought of the coming of war. The family made plans to move down river to Northfield,

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[28] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 157; Johnson, *Captivity*, 16-17.

[29] Johnson, *Captivity*, 17, 18.

Massachusetts the following spring before the danger increased.[30] However, they would not get that opportunity.

A few days after James Johnson's return, on the morning of August 30, Abenaki warriors raided the Johnson farm. They captured James (34 years old), Susannah (24 years old and 9 months pregnant), Sylvanus (6), Susan (4), and Polly (2). The Abenakis also captured Susannah's sister, Miriam Willard, Ebenezer Farnsworth who had spent the night at the Johnson's, and the Johnsons' neighbor, Peter Labarree, who had called at their house to work for James just before the warriors arrived. The Abenakis dragged the group about 200 meters from the house until they were secreted behind a hill and could stop to regroup for the journey. Some Indians went back to the house, perhaps intending to set it on fire or get more plunder. Ebenezer Farnsworth and James Johnson, realizing they were to be led on a long journey into captivity, debated going back to the house to gather food for the journey. But James argued that leading the Abenakis to the cellar would lead them to the rum, and the intoxicated Abenakis would be more likely to kill their prisoners. Meanwhile, the Abenakis arrived back at the house just as Aaron Hosmer (who lived in the upstairs room) had come out of hiding and was making a run for the fort. The Abenakis gave chase, but Hosmer made it to the fort and sounded the alarm. The Abenakis, seeing Hosmer escape, ran back to their captives and hustled the group away. Back at the fort, Moses Willard, Susannah's father and second in command to Captain Phineas Stevens, begged the captain to call off the search party as it would likely result in the deaths of the captives. Thus, the Johnson household was taken captive even as their family and neighbors helplessly watched them go.[31]

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[30] Johnson, *Captivity*, 23.

[31] Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 61; Johnson, *Captivity*, 26.

Susannah Johnson had a particularly difficult time in the quick escape to the woods since she was only one day away from giving birth. After traveling about three miles, the group came upon a stray horse belonging to Captain Phineas Stevens. James Johnson convinced the Abenakis to allow Susannah to ride. The next day when they were about fifteen miles away from the fort, Susannah went into labor. Her husband and fourteen-year-old sister Miriam assisted as best they could in the delivery on a cold, rainy day (though, Susannah Johnson noted that her captors built a little booth for her and allowed her to rest for the remainder of the day). They named the baby Elizabeth Captive Johnson and called her Captive. The Johnsons were taken to St. Francis then eventually traded to Canada. The group was scattered over the course of their captivity. [32]

The residents of Charlestown were deeply affected by the capture of the Johnson household. The town's inability to effectively cope with attacks and the threat of attacks highlighted the settlement's tenuous relationship with its provincial government. Since the location had been settled by the residents' own initiative and without authorization or assistance from New Hampshire, the government was reluctant to send troops to the far western periphery. Since they were unsuccessful in gaining protection from New Hampshire and since the commencement of the Seven Years War (in 1755) would only increase the threat to the frontiers, the settlers decided to appeal to a higher authority. Accordingly, in 1755 and again in 1756 the inhabitants of Charlestown and neighboring Hinsdale petitioned King George II himself.

In the petitions, the settlers described how their settlement's foundation and development had been plagued by war and conflict and how the start of the Seven Years' War had imperiled

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[32] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 171; Coleman, *New England Captives*, 313, for the rest of the story of the Johnsons, see below. In 1757, Peter Labarree escaped from Montreal and returned to Charlestown; later he took up land north of the fort, becoming the northernmost settler. Ebenezer Farnsworth was released from Montreal shortly before the end of the war.

them once again. They described their vulnerability in three ways. First they were "the most northerly of any of your Maty's Plantations in New England." Second, because they were "the nearest Crown Point, & the French Settlements adjacent thereto," they found themselves living on a battleground. Finally, their position on the river that led to Massachusetts and Connecticut meant that they were "lying in the very Road the Indains [*sic*] & French usually make their descent on the Frontiers of this Province, & many of the Frontiers of the Province of the Massachusetts."[33] The residents of the river valley settlements—and Charlestown in particular—needed to convince the king that their fort was strategically important to the British imperial cause in order to get assistance from the British army.

In their correspondence with imperial authorities, the inhabitants of Charlestown emphasized their role as the protectors of the entryway to New England. In their 1756 petition to the king they explained that if they were forced to leave their settlement, their departure "would greatly encourage the Enemy to proceed in their murderous hostilities & Invasions of the more in frontiers of Your Maty's Governments in America."[34] They explained the hardships they endured while living under constant fear of attack, especially without any assistance from New Hampshire or Massachusetts. The danger of living at Number Four had led them to abandon the post once before. The people who had returned explained, "many of our Inhabitants have left us, & withdrawn to places of more Security, (but would return to Us again in Case we could be protected sufficiently) so that we are left but few in Number."

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[33] Inhabitants of Fort Number Four and Hinsdale, Petition (May 27, 1756) with a letter from the Board of Trade (March 30, 1757), LO 1184A.

[34] Inhabitants of Fort Number Four and Hinsdale, Petition (May 27, 1756) with a letter from the Board of Trade (March 30, 1757), LO 1184A.

This lack of people created problems for the rest of the community as "near one third part of our Number are obliged to keep at home to defend our garrisons & Families left in them, & a considerable part of those who go into the Field are obliged to leave their Work & guard those who labour." The few people who were able to work were constantly on edge as any stray sound made everyone jump; therefore, "what little Improvements we have been capable of making has been in fear & peril of our Lives, & we are very apprehensive & fearful we shall not be able to reap & gather in what little we have adventured to sow." If they were not able to gather the harvest they "must unavoidably (tho' unwillingly) leave & abandon our Settlements & Substance, (not only thro' fear of the Enemy, but also for want of Sufficiency of Provisions to subsist & support ourselves & Families)." The residents argued that without adequate defense of the river valley communities, there was no hope for the continuation of the settlement or the protection of the New England frontier.

To this point, Charlestown's complaints sound similar to the situation of dozens of other settlements in the backcountry. The essence of being on the borderland meant that potential threats menaced from across the border. What set Fort Number Four apart was its separation from any local government. The inhabitants explained to the king "we are altogether neglected as to any Protection either from this or any other of your Majesty's Goverments." The inhabitants further emphasized their allegiance to the king by praising his royal governor, Benning Wentworth, saying "His Excy [Wentworth] did recommend to the said Assembly the Protection & defence of the frontier Settlements of said Province." The settlers had joined their voices to the governor's and "once & again applied to the said Government, & have earnestly addrest them for Succour & Protection." But, according to the residents of Charlestown, the

Assembly had turned a deaf ear to their supplication, and there was "not so much as one Man sent in for our Protection & Defence."[35]

If the reiteration of their daily troubles was not enough to convince the king that Charlestown deserved protection, the petitioners also argued that they had suffered for years. Attempts to make a life at Number Four had left them "much impoverished by the Incursions, & depredations of the Enemy in the last War." In the present conflict, enemies had "renewed their Attacks upon Us, & have carried into Captivity Eight of our small Number, who are still retained prisoners in Canada." This referred to Susannah Johnson and her family. The Abenakis had not been content to capture people; they had also "killed a great Number of our Cattle the Summer past, which has put us under great Inconvenience & hindred us from ploughing & sowing seasonably as otherwise we might have done." The settlers had invested significant resources in trying to conquer the frontier, and their entire investment would be lost without adequate protection.[36] Through their petitions, the settlers tried to convince the king that their small, isolated settlement was strategically important to both the Seven Years' War and the expansion of British territory.

The Board of Trade read the petitions and passed them on to the king's Privy Council for Plantation Affairs. The Board included a note recommending that the council give the petitions to Lord Loudoun and informed the council that "the Assembly of New Hampshire whose Duty it is to provide for the Defence & Security of these & all other …frontier Settlements of that Province, have neglected or refused to make such provision although it was particularly

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[35] Inhabitants of Fort Number Four and Hinsdale, Petition (May 27, 1756) with a letter from the Board of Trade (March 30, 1757), LO 1184A.

[36] Inhabitants of Fort Number Four and Hinsdale, Petition (May 27, 1756) with a letter from the Board of Trade (March 30, 1757), LO 1184A

recommended to them by his Majesty's Instructions to Mr. Wentworth in August 1755."[37] The Board hoped that Loudoun would be able to remedy the precarious situation of the settlers on the New England frontier. Meanwhile, before anything could be done, in the summer of 1756, Abenakis attacked Number Four again, killing Susanna Johnson's father, Moses Willard, and wounding Moses Willard, Jr., her brother.[38]

In January or February, 1757 Isaac Parker went to Boston with the intention of presenting a petition directly to Loudoun from the residents of Charlestown. While in Boston, Parker met with Colonel Theodore Atkinson, brother-in-law of Governor Wentworth and secretary of New Hampshire. Atkinson, perhaps because of his relationship to Governor Wentworth, advised Parker not to deliver the petition to Loudoun, but Parker seems to have met with Loudoun anyway and explained the situation although he did not actually present the petition. At that meeting Loudoun made a very important decision that would affect the fate of Number Four for the rest of the war. Loudoun told Parker that if anything further happened at Number Four, the inhabitants should write directly to Loudoun himself, not to Governor Wentworth or the New Hampshire assembly. This special arrangement cemented in the minds of the inhabitants of Number Four their strategic importance and increased their expectations of future assistance.[39] In addition, Loudoun ordered two hundred men from the New Hampshire forces to garrison the fort at Number Four and provide protection for the town. It also marked a new development in the history of the Connecticut River valley; not since Edmund Andros had established Schaghticoke had imperial officials taken such a personal interest in the region.

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[37] Letter from the Board of Trade to the Privy Council, March 30, 1757, LO 1184A.

[38] Beacon, *Connecticut River*, 244-245; Johnson, *Captivity*, 91.

[39] Thomas Hutchinson, Letter to Loudoun, March 16, 1757, LO 3070; Loudoun, Letter to Fox, February 8, 1757, LO 2802 A; Isaac Parker, Letter to Loudoun, March 24, 1757, LO 3161; Ebenezer Hinsdale, Letter to Loudoun, April 21, 1757, LO 3417.

This action began a cycle that lasted through 1757 and into 1758 in which Loudoun would send troops and they would either not arrive, or only partially arrive, or they would arrive and promptly leave. After each problem, the people of Number Four and the governors of the neighboring colonies would send new petitions and letters to Loudoun requesting aid, excusing problems, and offering solutions. In March 1757, after none of the promised New Hampshire soldiers had arrived at Fort Number Four, another group from Charlestown resolved to present their petition to Loudoun after Parker's failed attempt. They decided to use an old friend of their community, Thomas Hutchinson, to introduce their petition to Loudoun. Thomas Hutchinson's connection to Number Four went back to 1753 when the settlement officially became part of New Hampshire. The inhabitants had sought his help in their quest to rejoin Massachusetts. He had been unsuccessful, but the people of Number Four had not forgotten his interest, and the contingent that came to Boston in March 1757 to present a petition to Loudoun sought his help. Hutchinson was wary of appearing to waste Loudoun's time, so he took a somewhat condescending tone towards the people of Number Four in his letter to Loudoun introducing the petition.

Hutchinson began his letter by explaining his connection to Number Four. He then introduced the petition while also distancing himself from it, informing Loudoun "The petition, my Lord, was entirely formed among themselves, & it was brought to me just as it now is." He went on to inform Loudoun that "I enquired the number of the families settled there. Which I find to be only twenty three & about one hundred & twenty souls, settled compact, all the houses within the compass of half a mile." He further downplayed the potential threat to the settlement that the petitioners took so much care to emphasize, stating "They seem under no apprehensions of danger from an army, a form they always give to any number of the enemy considerable

enough to make an open attack, but are afraid of small parties destroying them at their labour." Hutchinson attempted to assist Loudoun by giving him a sense of the scale of the situation and summed up by reporting "what they desire is thirty or forty men to serve as guards to prevent" an attack.[40]

The petition itself reiterated many of the same concerns and even used many of the same phrases as the 1756 petition (sent to the king) in presenting the case. One factor that made the residents' desire for protection more urgent was that the winter had brought snow to New England and it being "Deep and Solid… makes it good Traveling on Rackets." This easy access to Number Four made an attack "Very Feasible and it Looks very Probable that the French will Improve such an Opportunity to make a Desent upon us." If they were attacked, the petitioners assured Loudoun that "we can Expect nothing but cruel usage and Barbarous Treatment if they Shall be so good as to Spare our Lives."[41] The petition then turned to the ongoing problem that the residents had in getting someone to pay attention to their plight. In the months before the petition, the residents noted, the extent of New Hampshire's involvement with the defense of Charlestown had been that in June 1756 the Assembly had sent "Twenty men to guard us and Ten men near the Same time we had those from New hampshire which are still continued with us." However, these men had not been particularly useful since they "came so late in the Spring that it was quite out of Season for plowing & sowing & doing our Spring work… So that we were obliged to Let a Considerable part of our fruitful Fields lye uncultivated and unimproved to our great Detriment and Disadvantage." This would be the chronic problem with military aid

[40] Thomas Hutchinson, Letter to Loudoun, March 16, 1757, LO 3070.

[41] Petition of the Inhabitants of No.4 (Charlestown N.H.) near Crown Point to the Earl of Loudoun, January 1757[?], LO 5307.

from New Hampshire: it would arrive late, if at all, and would not supply enough men to provide adequate protection.[42]

Without the protection of the New Hampshire troops, the residents of Charlestown had to rely on themselves and their nearest neighbors. One of the closest settlements to Number Four was the town of Hinsdale, a settlement and fort similar to Number Four but with a larger population. Hinsdale had been the northernmost settlement along the Connecticut River until 1723 when Fort Drummer was established.[43] Hinsdale was home to one hundred seventy people in 1753, the year it was incorporated into New Hampshire.[44] The settlement faced many of the same challenges as Number Four because, although it was theoretically protected by the presence of Number Four and Fort Drummer to the north, it was still far enough away from those places to attract attacks of its own without anyone close by to come to its assistance (Number Four was thirty miles away).[45] The leader of the settlement at Hinsdale and the commander of its small fort was Ebenezer Hinsdale. Unlike the inhabitants of Charlestown who often petitioned collectively, the people of Hinsdale generally relied on Ebenezer Hinsdale to speak for them to the relevant authorities.[46] The settlements at Hinsdale and Number Four were forced to rely on each other for help and protection, but their relationship could still be tense as they competed for

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[42] Petition of the Inhabitants of No.4 (Charlestown N.H.) near Crown Point to the Earl of Loudoun, January 1757[?], LO 5307.

[43] Horace W. Bailey, "Introduction" in Susannah Johnson, *A Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. Johnson*, 3rd edition reprint (Springfield, MA: H.R. Huntting Co., 1814), x; Fort Drummer is now located in Vermont.

[44] Inhabitants of Fort Number Four and Hinsdale, Petition (May 27, 1756) with a letter from the Board of Trade (March 30, 1757), LO 1184A.

[45] Inhabitants of Fort Number Four and Hinsdale, Petition (May 27, 1756) with a letter from the Board of Trade (March 30, 1757), LO 1184A.

[46] The only instance of a collective petition is the 1756 petition to the Board of Trade, which 23 settlers signed along with Ebenezer Hinsdale and his wife Abigail; LO 1184A.

limited aid. Ebenezer Hinsdale highlighted this trouble in a letter to Loudoun dated September 1, 1757, when protection was once again an issue.

The problem, Hinsdale wrote to Loudoun, was that if Number Four was better protected than Hinsdale, the enemy would simply attack the lower settlement. In his letter he noted, "the Protection of Number Four only Can be but of Little Service to us below if we are not in Some measure Strengthned." He further explained the importance of Hinsdale to the British war effort by telling Loudoun that without protection "we must all of us quit our Substance Fortifications & [abandon] the four Cannon we have Lodged in Severall of our Garrisons to the use of the Enemy & the Disadvantage of his Majestys Frontiers if they Should be pleased to make use of them." Because Hinsdale had been protected in the past, they naturally expected that they would continue to be protected. Besides, if Hinsdale fell, Charlestown would be almost completely isolated.[47]

This ongoing problem on the New Hampshire frontier created continuous difficulty between Governor Wentworth and Loudoun. When Loudoun would hear from Isaac Parker and Ebenezer Hinsdale that the New Hampshire protection was inadequate or not forthcoming, he would write to Wentworth to discover why his orders were not being followed. One such misunderstanding occurred in April, 1757. Even though Loudoun had given orders to Colonel Atkinson to send New Hampshire troops to Number Four, the inhabitants kept sending letters (in addition to the petition they presented in person) to Loudoun complaining about a lack of protection. Soon, Loudoun discovered the problem, and he wrote to Wentworth on April 11, saying "By Letters from Number 4, of the 24th of March, I find your Men were not arrived there, which I expected they would have been before that time." Loudoun assumed that his orders

[47] Ebenezer Hinsdale, Letter to Loudoun, September 1, 1757, LO 4554.

would be promptly followed; he therefore directed Wentworth, "in case they are not marched, when you receive this; I must beg you will send them there directly."[48] New Hampshire's apathy led to dire consequences for Number Four.[49]

On April 20, 1757, Abenakis again attacked Fort Number Four. Since the New Hampshire Assembly had been so slow in following Loudoun's orders from February, the settlement did not have a garrison at the time, and did not have any advance warning of the raid. On the day of the attack, a few men were holding the fort and the rest of the men had separated into three work parties. One group was heading for the mill, another was traveling to a maple sugar camp in the woods, and a third was going hunting.[50] The Abenakis first attacked the mill party, which included Isaac Parker and his son Isaac, Jr. In a breathless letter to Loudoun, written as the attack was still happening, Isaac Parker related his experience. First, the men at the mill heard the sound of several guns being fired. The men went to investigate and discovered "near 20 Indians" running towards them. Next, "we heard near one hundred guns & saw Severall Indians & heard a Shouting." The men bolted for the fort, scurrying their families into its protection, and leaving the Indians to burn the mill and kill or capture "Ens^{n} Farnworth, Broadstreet Spafford & Sampson Coalfax."

This was not all, as Parker related to Loudoun, "We have Severall other persons that are out & although we have fired Severall alarms yet they do not Come in So y't we are fearfull that the Indians have got them." The Abenaki attack was the realization of the inhabitants' worst

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[48] Loudoun, Letter to Benning Wentworth, April 11, 1757, LO 3343.

[49] New Hampshire had sent "two four pounders and four six pounders" under the care of Colonel Meserve to Number Four in March, 1757, but did not send soldiers at that time and Number Four did not have the ammunition to use the artillery effectively. Nathaniel Bouton, comp. and ed., *Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire, from 1749 to 1763*, vol. vi (Manchester: James M. Campbell, 1872), 567ff; Isaac Parker, Letter to Loudoun, March 24, 1757, LO 3161.

[50] Beacon, *Connecticut River*, 245.

fears. They were without adequate protection and had been taken by surprise. Furthermore, their mill was destroyed, and they recognized that now the Indians knew that they did not have any soldiers with them. Another attack could come at any time, and their remoteness insured that it would be several days before anyone beyond the Connecticut River valley even knew what had happened to them. Isaac Parker summarized the mood at Charlestown in one sentence: "We are In Distress."[51] As news spread about the attack, the accusations began. Loudoun's frustration was evident in a letter written on April 25, five days after the attack.[52] He fumed, "I am very sorry to find the People at Number Four are so destitute of Help; but that is no Fault of mine." He insisted he had already done his part: "in Consequence of what I promised to [Number Four], I applied to Colo Atkinson of New Hampshire, to march 200 of their Troops to take possession of it." The men should have been there in March.[53]

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[51] Isaac Parker, Letter to Loudoun, April 20, 1757, LO 3410.

[52] Successful communication was critical to the protection of Number Four, but due to the remoteness of the settlement, communication took a long time and letters very often were lost. When Indians attacked Number Four in the spring of 1757, Isaac Parker finished writing his call for help to Ebenezer Hinsdale just as the news came in that the attackers had burned the mill. The letter is dated April 20, and in it Parker begged, "I hope you will be as Speedy as possible In Sending this along." Hinsdale received the letter on April 21 and took time to make several copies and write his own letter to Loudoun, Governor Wentworth and Colonel Israel Williams in Hatfield, Massachusetts. On April 22, Colonel Williams had his Lieutenant Colonel, Oliver Partridge, write a letter relaying the news to Loudoun in New York. Loudoun received the letter on April 25. Benning Wentworth probably heard about the attack on April 24, but did not write to Loudoun about the attack until May 6. The five days that it took for Loudoun to hear about the attack on Number Four was actually remarkably fast compared to how long it sometimes took for news to travel from Number Four. In the fall, when Whiting and Loudoun were discussing quartering troops at Number Four, communication took much longer. On October 18, Loudoun wrote, "Yesterday I received your Letter of the 5th by the officer you sent, I had writ to you soon after my arrival here, which I am surprised never came to your hands." Loudoun alluded to the additional problems of lost mail or mail that crossed in transit that led to further misunderstanding. Whiting had relied on one man to make the 235 mile journey to New York, so it is understandable that it took twelve days for the letter to arrive. It was perhaps in part because of this communication problem that Loudoun had set up the agreement with Isaac Parker that letters from Number Four should go directly to him. Isaac Parker, Copy of a Letter to Ebenezer Hinsdale, April 20, 1757, LO 3410; Ebenezer Hinsdale, Letter to Loudoun, April 21, 1757, LO 3417; Oliver Partridge, Letter to Loudoun, April 22, 1757, LO 3425; Loudoun, Letter to Oliver Partridge, LO 3471. Loudoun, Letter to Nathan Whiting, October 18, 1757, LO 4664.

[53] Loudoun asserts in his letter to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Partridge on April 25, 1757 that he had ordered Colonel Atkinson to raise the troops "in the Beginning of February" and that Atkinson had promised that the men "shoud march in ten days after he got home." But the New Hampshire provincial records indicate that Benning Wentworth

News of the attack became widespread in New Hampshire on April 29, when a short paragraph in the *New Hampshire Gazette* related the facts, which closely corresponded to Parker's letter to Loudoun.[54] The paper announced that the following Friday, May 6, "is appointed by Authority to be observed and kept as a Day of public Fasting, Humiliation and Prayer thro'out this Province."[55] Governor Wentworth found time amidst the humiliation and prayer to write to Loudoun on May 6. He noted in his letter that, "It gave me great Concern that none of the New Hampshire troops were then Arrived, as was at first intended." But Wentworth's power extended only so far. He explained to Loudoun, "there have been Unforeseen impediments of many kinds Ariseing in this Service, and out of my Power to remove, that occasioned the delay of the troops marching."

The main "impediment" had been that the Assembly had insisted upon forming a committee to oversee the supplying of the men, and the committee had been painfully slow to act. To Loudoun, Wentworth conceded, "I am truly sensible how dangerous Delays are of any kind in His Majesties Service, and that unless your Lordship Could certainly depend on your orders Being duly Executed the Service cannot be carried on with Success."[56] In fact, 350 New Hampshire troops did reach Fort Number Four on April 25, a few days after the raid, but they were not the troops designated to garrison the fort. Colonel John Goffe's regiment assembled at Number Four on their way to Fort William Henry. While their brief presence was most likely

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did not hear about the order until March 12 and he did not bring it before the assembly until March 21. Loudoun, Letter to Oliver Partridge, April 25, 1757, LO 3471; Bouton, comp. and ed., *New Hampshire Documents*, 584.

[54] Either Parker or Hinsdale may have sent the "Express" that delivered the news to Portsmouth. The newspaper reports that the news came in on Sunday, April 24, but the news was only printed on Fridays. This is the only mention of Number Four in the *Gazette* during the years relevant to this study.

[55] *New Hampshire Gazette*, April 29, 1757.

[56] Benning Wentworth, Letter to Loudoun, May 6, 1757, LO 3572.

noticed by the Abenaki, the residents of Number Four needed more than a regiment that was merely passing through.[57] Despite Wentworth's conciliatory attempts, the problems with the New Hampshire provincial troops would continue.

Loudoun had assumed that the New Hampshire troops were protecting Number Four in February and March. Therefore, in April, even before the attack, he ordered five hundred Connecticut men, commanded by Colonel Nathan Whiting, to go to Number Four and relieve the New Hampshire troops that were supposedly holding the fort.[58] Nathan Whiting already had experience garrisoning a fort; during the winter of 1755-1756 William Johnson had left him in command of 300 men at Fort Edward.[59] Colonel Whiting left New Haven, Connecticut on April 19, 1757 with two hundred men, three hundred others to follow shortly thereafter. In his letter to Loudoun informing him of his departure, Whiting took a moment to declare that he would fulfill Loudoun's expectations. He proclaimed, "I shall be Carefull to follow your Lordship's directions, … and shall at all time use my best endeavours to promote his Majesty Service [*sic*] & the good of my Country."[60] With the arrival of Whiting and the Connecticut troops, things began to change for Charlestown. Connecticut's provincial government had no responsibility for towns in New Hampshire; the only connection between Number Four and Connecticut was the Connecticut River. But the important thing to note is that Loudoun deployed provincial troops as part of a larger strategy. Charlestown was no longer a remote town in New Hampshire

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[57] Beacon, *Connecticut River*, 245-246; Benning Wentworth, Letter of Loudoun, May 6, 1757, LO 3572.

[58] Loudoun, Letter to Oliver Partridge, April 25, 1757, LO 3471.

[59] William Johnson, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* [hereafter, *Johnson Papers*] (Albany: State University of New York, 1962), 2: 355-358.

[60] Nathan Whiting, Letter to Loudoun, April 19, 1757, LO 3391.

dependent on its provincial assembly. With Loudoun's attention, Fort Number Four had become a strategic post.

With this new privilege came new responsibilities. Loudoun began thinking of Fort Number Four as part of the New England-New York frontier defense system which included Fort Edward and Fort William Henry at Lake George. Colonel Nathan Whiting did not think of himself as only providing protection for the residents of Charlestown; he knew that he was responsible for the entire middle Connecticut River valley. Whiting's correspondence with Loudoun reflects his understanding that he was involved in something larger than protecting a few families from an Indian raid. From April 19 to November 2, 1757 Whiting wrote nine letters to General Loudoun and General Webb.[61] In a letter to Loudoun dated September 19, 1757, Whiting informed Loudoun, "I have not lost one of my Command here by the enemy or by Sickness have lost one by the accidental firing of a gun, not one person on this River has been taken this Summer." Again on October 5, 1757 he wrote to Loudoun, "I have lost none of my Command by the Enemy, nor any of the Inhabitants on this frontier Who have Lived on their farms at Swanzey, Keen, & the Ashuelots [Connecticut River valley towns] more than they have done this Several years." Loudoun replied to this information on October 18, 1757 stating, "I am very well satisfied with your diligen'ce in your Command, and with the order & discipline you have kept among your People, and with the Constant Scouts you have kept out, by which you have secured the Inhabitants and made many new discoverys of the Country."[62]

[61] When Loudoun was leading the soon-to-be abandoned 1757 attack on Louisbourg, Webb had authority in the colonies, but he later forwarded the letters to Loudoun.

[62] Nathan Whiting, Letters to Loudoun, September 19, 1757, LO 4497, October 5, 1757, LO 4592; Lord Loudoun, Letter to Whiting, October 18, 1757, LO 4664.

Charlestown and Hinsdale were no longer competing for limited aid; instead, they had been merged into a larger community with the rest of the river valley settlements as the New England frontier took on strategic importance. Toward these ends, Whiting began several projects for the purpose of connecting the settlements to each other and to the New York-New England theater of war. Whiting recruited the river valley inhabitants to help his men build a road from Charlestown to Northfield, Massachusetts, a distance of about fifty miles. He noted that the only existing connection between the river valley settlements (other than the river) was a footpath that stopped abruptly at a "mountain [that] was thought impassible," but Whiting found a way over it. In his letter to Loudoun about the project, Whiting hinted that the settlers were not very enthusiastic about helping with the road, noting "[I] am sure it will be greatly Serviceable to the Inhabitants, whether they will acknowledge it or not."

Another responsibility associated with being strategically important was quartering soldiers. In his October 5, 1757 letter to Loudoun, Whiting explained "the State of this Town is such that not many Soldiers Could be quartered on the people without Inconvenience to the Soldiers as well as Inhabitants." He also noted, "their Houses are Small." Further, there were no barracks at Number Four, and, until the sawmill was rebuilt, there would not be any. In conveying this information to Loudoun, Whiting was inadvertently pressing one of the issues that annoyed Loudoun most: provincials' resistance to quartering troops. Loudoun fired back at Whiting, "when the People of Number Four applied to me for Protection they undertook to Provide quarters for the men I sent and as they are there Intirely for their Protection it would be unreasonable in me to put the Crown to any Expence for Barracks." Loudoun expected that the settlers would "make proper accomadation for the men that are necessary for their own protection."

Loudoun's caustic reply had more to do with the problems he had encountered in Albany and Philadelphia than with Whiting's rather neutral statement of fact. Loudoun certainly believed that if Fort Number Four wanted to be part of British strategy, the residents would need to do their part for war.[63] Nevertheless, since the entire settlement of Charlestown encompassed only half a mile, housing several hundred troops in the town was impossible. Loudoun ordered Whiting to send him a list of how many men could be quartered in the Connecticut River valley, including the distances between each place. On November 2, 1757, Whiting sent a list stating that 459 men could be quartered in an area stretching 44 miles along the Connecticut River.[64]

Still, there were advantages to having official oversight. As soon as Whiting arrived, he realized that the "fort" was really "only a parcel of Log Houses which form An oblong Square without any Bastion or Flank." The structure was not even capable of supporting a canon. He began working to make the structure more defensible, and billed Loudoun for his expenses. Loudoun balked at paying for what he described as "Inhabitans [*sic*] throw[ing] up Works for their own Security" until Whiting described the indefensible nature of the original structure.

[63] Nathan Whiting, Letter to Loudoun, October 5, 1757, LO 4592; Lord Loudoun, Letter to Whiting, October 18, 1757, LO 4664. Interestingly, in 1755 the government of New Hampshire has been more lenient than Loudoun on this issue. Ebenezer Hinsdale had written the assembly to ask for money to cover quartering expenses even over and above the money they had been allotted. Hinsdale argued "Its true our Necessity was such y't we could not live here without men to protect us, neither could we get away with safety, but yet we would hope no Gent'n would take this advantage of our necessity to oblige us to subsist the men for vastly less than the provisions cost us (which we are oblig'd mainly to buy for that end.) Thus to do would be to starve us and destroy what little subsistence we have under a pretext of guarding us against our enemy who are seeking the destruction of both." After some debate, the Assembly granted Hinsdale's request. Ebenezer Hinsdale, Letter to Benning Wentworth and the Committee of War for the Province of New Hampshire, December 23, 1755 and "Journal of the House," January 10, 1756, Bouton, comp. and ed., *New Hampshire Documents*, 458-459.

[64] Loudoun, Letter to Nathan Whiting, October 18, 1757, LO 4664; Nathan Whiting, Letter to Loudoun, November 2, 1757, LO 4762.

Whiting also commissioned the building of a boat "for transporting provisions for the Use of his Majestys forces," also paid for by the British government, not the residents of Charlestown.[65]

In addition, Fort Number Four had Loudoun's special attention, and he was diligent to make sure it was taken care of. When he was onboard the HMS *Winchester* en route to attack Louisbourg in August 1757 (the attack was abandoned when the French captured Fort William Henry), Loudoun wrote to Governor Thomas Fitch of Connecticut and told him "I must depend on your having a watchfull Eye on No. 4 and of throwing in any Aid or supplies it may want." Two days later he wrote to Thomas Pownall, "I have mentioned the Support of No. 4 to the Gov'r of Connecticut… as the 500 Men in it, are of that Province; but I must beg you will have an Eye to it." Loudoun was right to be wary of the New England frontier's security during the summer of 1757 when the French and their Indian allies were controlling the Lake George region only 100 miles away.[66]

In the early fall of 1757, New Hampshire troops were supposed to relieve Whiting and the Connecticut troops. However, the New Hampshire troops began deserting even before they arrived at the fort. In response to this new crisis, Isaac Parker, a group of twenty-one other Charlestown inhabitants, and Ebenezer Hinsdale sent three separate letters/petitions to Loudoun and Webb on September 1, 1757 begging for Whiting to stay. Parker's letter is representative as he gushes over Whiting's achievements: "[his] excellent Conduct seems to have gain'd the Esteem & merited the Applause of all his Aquaintance. By him we have been well protected, by him all things have been kept under the best Regulations; Centries been obliged to the greatest

[65] Nathan Whiting, Fort Number Four—Four Bills for work done at the Garrison, May 1757, LO 3748; Loudoun, Letter to Whiting, October 18, 1757, LO 4664.

[66] Loudoun, Letter to Thomas Fitch, August 18, 1757, LO 4256; Loudoun, Letter to Thomas Pownall, August 20, 1757, LO 4270.

Fidelity People well guarded at their Works; Scouting Parties constantly reconnoitering the Woods." To this list Parker added Whiting's work on the fort which previously had been "but a slender Fortification, very much decay'd."[67] Ebenezer Hinsdale concurred, calling the situation under Whiting's command, "The best protection we have Ever yet had."[68]

The inhabitants of Number Four echoed this sentiment in their petition to General Webb and added their own prediction concerning the effect of Whiting's departure without adequate reinforcement. Of Whiting they said, "While this worthy gentleman was with us at this garrioson [*sic*], all things were kept under the best Regulation, and managed with much more Wisdom, Prudence, Diligence & Fidelity than we are capable of expressing." But abandoning Fort Number Four to the reluctant protection of a few New Hampshire men would certainly mean that "the Inhabitants of this Frontier must be obliged with our Families to withdraw …with Ill Consequence to our Country." They characterized Whiting's departure as a threat not only to Charlestown but to the safety of the frontier and the colonies.[69]

Whiting also showed his allegiance to the people of the Connecticut River valley. When a partial reinforcement of New Hampshire men arrived—and then began "Running Away in Companys" —Whiting refused to follow his order to march. He claimed that he had not been relieved and his orders were to march when relieved. But Whiting was still the king's man, and he joined the letter writing on September 1, 1757, explaining his predicament to General Webb: "I am Concerned for the Garison & people & at The same time Solicitous to obey punctually my

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[67] Isaac Parker, Letter to Loudoun, September 1, 1757, LO 4377.

[68] Ebenezer Hinsdale, Letter to Loudoun, September 1, 1757, LO 4554.

[69] Number Four New Hampshire Inhabitants—Petition to General Webb, September 1, 1757, LO 4373.

orders & do my duty in every Respect as far as I know it."[70] In the end, Whiting did not leave. The morning of September 2 revealed that only 120 New Hampshire men remained, out of the 500 which were supposed to have marched and the 250 which actually did march to Number Four.[71] Later, General Webb affirmed Whiting's decision by countermanding his order for the Connecticut men to march.[72]

The desertion of the New Hampshire troops in September 1757 can be traced to something other than mere laziness. These troops had an interesting connection to the events at Fort William Henry a few weeks earlier; New Hampshire soldiers under Colonel John Goffe had been at the rear of the troops retreating from Fort William Henry after the capitulation. These men, along with the women and children, were hit the hardest when the Indian attack began.[73] The members of Goffe's regiment who survived the attack and evaded captivity regrouped at Fort Edward and then left for New Hampshire. Goffe's regiment was bound by the terms of the capitulation not to serve for eighteen months. Therefore, when Loudoun ordered Wentworth to send New Hampshire troops to relieve Colonel Whiting, Wentworth was forced to send new recruits, fresh with the most horrifying versions of the story of Fort William Henry's capitulation ringing in their ears. It is no wonder that these men took one look at the exposed position of

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[70] Nathan Whiting, Letter to Daniel Webb, September 1, 1757, LO 4375.

[71] Nathan Whiting, Letter to Daniel Webb, September 2, 1757, LO 4383.

[72] Daniel Webb, Letter to Loudoun, September 12, 1757, LO 4454. Whiting was imperially-minded throughout the remainder of his life. He later served as a captain in a South Carolina independent company and later tried to get a post as an imperial customs collector. Harold Selesky notes that he "devoted all but his last two years to seeking imperial favor." Harold E. Selesky, *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 211-212.

[73] Louis de Bougainville, General Montcalm's aide-de-camp noted that "the disorder commenced by the Abenakis of Panaouamské in Acadia, who have pretended to have experienced some ill treatment at the hands of the English." These eastern Abenakis were Penobscots (also called Panaouamske) who were from central and coastal Maine, near present-day Bar Harbor. John R. Brodhead, Berthold Fernow, and E. B. O'Callaghan, eds, *Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1853-1857) 10: 616. For more on the attack on the garrison of Fort William Henry, see chapter five, below.

Number Four and hightailed it for home. In his letter, Whiting noted "most of them were new in the Service & undisciplined."[74]

Of all of the letters going out from the Connecticut River valley in the wake of the New Hampshire troops' desertion, not one of them was addressed to Governor Wentworth or the New Hampshire Assembly. It was not until November 15, two and a half months later, that Wentworth raised the subject with Loudoun, and he only knew about it from the reports of the groups of deserters coming back.[75] The commander of the deserting New Hampshire forces was Major Thomas Tash. When he wrote to his superior officer, Colonel Nathaniel Meserve, he explained that the troops had deserted because the men "are in bad Circumstances, by reason the Government has not allowed them any thing, except the King's Allowance, saving a few Kettles, and the Weather now grows cold, & the Men has not got Blankets, nor any Thing comfortable for them."[76] Whiting agreed with Tash's assessment of the situation in a letter to Loudoun on November 2, 1757 stating, "they were sent up without Necessary blankets & Cloathing & were Some of them barefoot."[77]

Governor Wentworth, however, disagreed with this explanation. In two separate letters to Loudoun he contended that the troops deserted "from the ill Treatment they met with from the Inhabitants, or to some other Cause to me at present unknown." He further argued that "had the people met with due [?] encouragement Scarse a man would have deserted." He noted that the

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[74] Benning Wentworth, Letter to Loudoun, November 15, 1757, LO 4843; Nathan Whiting, Letter to Loudoun, November 2, 1757, LO 4741.

[75] Nathan Whiting, Letter to Daniel Webb, September 1, 1757, LO 4375; Isaac Parker, Letter to Loudoun, September 1, 1757, LO 4377; Number Four New Hampshire Inhabitants—Petition to General Webb, September 1, 1757, LO 4373; Ebenezer Hinsdale, Letter to Loudoun, September 1, 1757, LO 4554; Nathan Whiting, Letter to Daniel Webb, September 2, 1757, LO 4383.

[76] Thomas Tash, Letter to Nathaniel Meserve, October 3, 1757, LO 4571.

[77] Nathan Whiting, Letter to Loudoun, November 2, 1757, LO 4741.

troops that arrived back in Portsmouth were "pretending the want of blankets and kettles, which they were Supplyed with."[78] Major Tash asked Wentworth to recall the remaining New Hampshire troops, but since Loudoun had taken responsibility for Number Four, Wentworth told Tash to apply to Loudoun for orders. Since the New Hampshire government had not taken responsibility for the frontier earlier in the war, they were ineffective later on. They did not have any connection to the frontier posts; further, the power of the governor and the assembly was curtailed because Fort Number Four was under Loudoun's direct supervision.

In the spring of 1758, after Loudoun had been recalled to England and after the Connecticut forces that had stayed at Number Four all winter had been recalled, twenty-five Charlestown inhabitants signed a petition directed to the new Commander in Chief, General Abercromby, once again requesting protection. Even without Loudoun, they still did not appeal to the New Hampshire government. In the petition, they once again tied their fate to British strategy noting, "we are not In A Condition to Defend our Forts and ye Kings Stores and Ordinance that are Left in Them." Number Four was now part of a larger strategy of war, and it was up to the king to defend his property.[79] The New Hampshire government's failure to adequately protect the frontiers convinced the residents of Hinsdale and Number Four that they needed the security that only British authorities could provide. In the spring of 1758, Ebenezer Hinsdale first applied to Governor Wentworth for protection after the Connecticut forces left.

[78] Benning Wentworth, Letter to Loudoun, November 15, 1757, LO 4843 and December 1, 1757, LO 4927.

[79] Inhabitants of Number Four, Petition to James Abercromby, May 13, 1758, AB 243.

But Wentworth recommended that the inhabitants of the frontier petition Abercromby for protection, although he later informed Abercromby that he was sending troops to Number Four.[80]

Despite the benefits of official notice, connection to other posts and the larger strategy of war presented different challenges, including that the settlers had comparatively less control over their participation. The affects of these challenges can be seen in particular by examining the experiences of the Johnson family who were captured from Number Four as part of the Abenaki's desire to reclaim their land. The Johnson household was captured when France and Britain were at peace. The whole group was first taken to St. Francis where they were divided among several families; at that point, it was up to the individual families to do what they wanted with their captives. Initially, everyone except for James was adopted into separate families. Aside from adoption, the other main option was to be sold to Montreal. During peacetime, the French seemed to be diligent about returning captives quickly (as they did with young Enos Stevens in 1749), but during wartime, captives became prisoners of war and were involved in a complex, costly prisoner exchange system.[81]

The St. Francis Indians traded James to Montreal, and Miriam, Susan, and Polly followed him within the next few months. Sylvanus was adopted into a family and was soon separated from his mother when he was taken on a hunting trip away from St. Francis. Susannah and Captive alone of the group remained at St. Francis. But even in her loneliness, Susannah was not disconnected. She referred to the members of her adopted family as her brothers and sisters and

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[80] Benning Wentworth, Letter to Abercromby, May 15, 1758, Abercromby Papers (Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) AB 256.

[81] The French government benefitted from purchasing captives from their Indian allies during peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, they could save face with the British by returning captives quickly, and in wartime they could exchange captives for French prisoners of war. In both situations, the French government was able to use the purchasing of captives as a way to strengthen their relationship with their Indian allies by always offering them a market for captives.

seemed content with being part of their family. In addition, she visited a French family, "some friends of my [adopted] brother's family, where I was entertained politely a week." On the whole, Johnson's account is equivocal concerning her overall impression of her captivity. She was grateful to be treated well and curious about her captors' lifestyle, but she was also disdainful about aspects of their community that were different from what she was accustomed to. Apart from the separation from family, Johnson's life at St. Francis was not too different from her life at Fort Number Four, except there was no fear of Indian attacks. She had tasks to do, people to visit, and a family to be a part of. The real transition occurred when she was traded to Montreal and was not adopted into a community but instead forced to navigate the bureaucracy of the prisoner exchange system.[82]

In Montreal, Susannah, James, Polly, and Captive were reunited (Miriam and Susan remained with the French families that had taken them in as servants) and became part of a large and growing prisoner exchange system that was developing in tandem with war. In order to gain their freedom, the Johnsons needed to pay a ransom. James was allowed to travel to New England for two months to gather money to redeem his family; however, when he did not come back in time, the remaining family members were treated poorly. When he finally returned without money or credit, he was imprisoned. Later, the four Johnsons were moved to Quebec where they were put into the criminal jail for six months followed by a year-long stay in the civil jail. During this time, Susannah gave birth to a son who only lived for a few hours and soon after, she heard about the death of her father at Charlestown earlier that year (1756).[83] The Johnsons discovered that, even though they had been captured during peace, they became mired

[82] Johnson, *Captivity*, 56-63.

[83] Johnson, *Captivity*, 62-90.

in the logistics of the Seven Years' War and had to negotiate their new position as British prisoners of the French. While the residents of Fort Number Four were benefiting from having their community's protection subsumed into the war, the Johnsons were suffering from the de-emphasis on the local circumstances that led to their captivity.

Finally, in June 1757, after three years of captivity, Susannah, Miriam, Polly, and Captive were permitted to sail for England as part of the prisoner exchange. James Johnson was forced to remain behind in prison until the rest of the money for the family's redemption came through. Susan was left with the three nuns who had purchased her, and Sylvanus was still with the St. Francis Indians. Susannah and the girls made it safely to Plymouth, England, and they finally arrived in New York City in December, 1757. They traveled through Connecticut on their way to Charlestown, and in New Haven Susannah met Colonel Whiting, who was able to satisfy her curiosity about the state of Number Four. They arrived in Charlestown in late December, 1757.

James Johnson secured his freedom and was reunited with his wife in Charlestown in January, 1758. However, a few weeks later he had to go to New York to finalize the payment of the redemption fees, and while he was there, Governor Pownall convinced him to join the army as a captain in the siege of Fort Ticonderoga. Johnson agreed and was killed in battle on July 8, never having seen his family again. In October, 1758, Susannah was finally reunited with Sylvanus in Northampton, although he could speak very little English and only vaguely remembered his mother. In 1759, Susannah began permanently living at Charlestown again. She had inherited joint ownership of a house with her brother, Moses Willard, where she ran a

small store. In 1762 Susannah Johnson married John Hastings, one of the early settlers of Charlestown and had seven more children.[84]

Despite their partial recovery, the Johnsons' experience in the war had been transformative. Their long captivity and imprisonment destroyed their finances, pulled apart their family, and caused emotional distress. At the same time, Susannah Johnson, for one, became less clear about who her enemies were. Before her captivity, she was tremulously peering around the corners of her house looking for tomahawks, but after her captivity she experienced a joyful reunion with her adopted brother Sabatis. Experience of a wider world beyond the small community, therefore, was enlightening but also unsettling.

In the late summer of 1758, Abenakis attacked Fort Number Four again, killed Asahel Stebbins, and captured his wife Lydia, Isaac Parker (captured for the second time), David Hill, and Mrs. Robbins.[85] In 1759 two important events tempered the threat to the New England frontier. General Jeffery Amherst successfully defeated the French garrison at Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and Robert Rogers led his successful raid on St. Francis that resulted in the capture of Sabatis. Some prisoners from New England were released by Rogers during the raid.[86] Many others most likely had been traded to Canada and were probably freed, at least by the end of the war. Others did not survive long enough to be traded. Rogers estimated that there were 400 British settlers killed and captured by Abenakis over the course of the war (in New York and

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[84] Johnson, *Captivity*, 90-117.

[85] Lydia Stebbins was redeemed a few months later, moved to Northfield, remarried and had seven more children. Isaac Parker was among the militiamen who were freed in a prisoner exchange in 1759. Coleman, *New England Captives*, 326-327; Saunderson, *History of Charlestown*, 79; Jazaniah Crosby, *History of Charlestown, in New Hampshire ,From Its First Grant by the Province of Massachusetts in 1735, to the Year 1833* (Concord, NH: March, Capen & Lyon, 1833), 22.

[86] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 175, 179.

New England). He noted that when he raided St. Francis he found "about 600 scalps, mostly English."[87]

Still, the threat to the Connecticut River valley was not completely eliminated until late in 1760 when the British takeover of French possessions in Canada decimated the Abenaki support system. Before that happened, Joseph Willard (Susanna Johnson's brother-in-law), his wife, and their five children were captured near Charlestown. One of the children died during the two-week journey to Montreal. A few days after the Willards were captured, the French surrendered Montreal to the British. Four months later, the Willards (except for another child who died on the return journey) arrived back at home, and brought with them their niece, Susan Johnson, who had been separated from her family for five years.[88]

After the war ended, many Abenakis continued to live in small family bands in and around the Green Mountains, but they had lost their powerful French allies and had the choice to adapt or leave as British/American settlers continued to move into the region.[89] The ability of the members of Charlestown and the other Connecticut valley towns to hold onto the territory led to dramatically increased settlement after the war ended. One result of this settlement was the establishment of the independent state of Vermont in 1776.

A variety of factors came together to create a unique situation at Fort Number Four. The original settlement of the site by Massachusetts residents left it with a tenuous connection to New Hampshire when the boundaries were redrawn. The investment of time, resources, and the

[87] Robert Rogers, *Journals of Major Robert Rogers* (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1883), 147. Obviously there would be no way for Rogers to tell which scalps belonged to soldiers or civilians and which were from outside New Hampshire/Vermont.

[88] Beacon, *Connecticut River*, 329; Johnson, *Captivity*, 119.

[89] Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, 182.

building of the fort insured that the residents would want to stay at Number Four rather than retreat to safety. The capture of the entire Johnson household including children and a pregnant woman alarmed the inhabitants of Fort Number Four to the point that they were willing to petition the king himself for aid. The loss of Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry in subsequent years under Loudoun's command made the New England frontier particularly vulnerable and made Loudoun intensely aware of the precariousness of the situation. Warfare in general and the Seven Years' War in particular also forced the residents of the Connecticut River valley to look further and further east for protection, even as their inclination was to move further west and become more connected to western trade.

Exploring the intersection of war and society at Fort Number Four reveals several things about the relationship between civilians and the army. First, it shows the extent to which the activity in the war was driven by events at the periphery. Fort Number Four initially played little role in British strategy, but, partly through the insistence of the Connecticut River valley residents, army leaders soon recognized the importance of the New England backcountry to the safety of New York and New England. Still, activity at Fort Number Four was about more than protecting the back door to the coast. The interactions between Loudoun and the residents of Charlestown and Hinsdale also show the degree to which colonists were able to negotiate with army leaders. The preceding chapters emphasized how civilians managed army leaders' demands, but this chapter shows how civilians made demands of army leaders and continued to negotiate for their protection through the vicissitudes of war. At Fort Number Four, this process

had difficulties of its own which reflect the fort's transition from an obscure frontier outpost to, as Loudoun put it, a "Post which is a very material one."[90]

[90] Loudoun, Letter to Mr. Fox, February 8, 1757, LO 2802.

Chapter Five

"The innocent blood of Women:" Gender and the military in the Seven Years' War

The following two chapters continue the process of traversing the boundaries between the military and society by discussing some of the ways that women participated in the Seven Years' War. While this chapter examines the participation of some women who traveled with the army and lived with the army at forts, chapter six, below, explores how some women negotiated situations that left them without husbands and sons,. In the eighteenth century, women held a somewhat ambiguous position in European armies. They were not soldiers, but they were sometimes paid for their military service. They did not carry weapons or fight, but they risked capture and death in battle. Military authorities and members of civil society thought of army women as closer to civilians than soldiers, which made women's participation problematic on several levels. As this chapter will show, women attempted, to some degree, to manage and control their participation in the war, but adherence to eighteenth-century gender norms restricted the degree to which their participation was negotiable.

The participation of women in the army was not new; it had been a widespread practice in Europe for centuries, but it was introduced to the North American colonies on a large scale for the first time during the Seven Years' War. Before that point, North American colonial wars had not employed extensive siege warfare or large armies moving from place to place. The large-scale nature of the Seven Years' War dictated the use of larger armies than had been used previously. Troops from Britain brought women with them as support personnel and the gathering of large provincial armies led to an increase in the participation of provincial women. Even though the use of large armies prompted changes in the relationship of women to war in the North American colonies, the ways that army authorities and members of civil society

interpreted women's participation was based on a longer history of understanding the role of women in the nation-state and in society. Women's participation was viewed through the lens of eighteenth-century gender norms first and the realities of war, second.

In discussing the role and use of women in imperial war, Kathleen Wilson notes that "war…underlined the subordinate place of women in social life and the national imaginary, and the double consciousness that eighteenth-century women had to take on, as 'women' and national subjects."[1] As national subjects who played a critical role in the effective functioning of the army, women who were attached to the military constantly had to navigate their primary role as "women," meaning subordinate, dependent, and needing protection, even when army service sometimes required the opposite of them. In addition, Wilson notes that "Women's bodies and minds functioned symbolically and literally as the beacons of national values and ideas."[2] The ideological impetus behind British geographic and imperial expansion rested on the belief in the superiority of British Protestantism to French Catholicism and the belief that Protestant Britons was more civilized than Catholics in general and the French in particular. The advance of women onto the "savage" frontiers of North America was a marker of the progress of British civility. As will be shown, British and provincial observers characterized attacks on army women's bodies as attacks on British ideologies of civility and evidence of the attackers' barbarity.

Complicating women's direct participation in war was the fact that women in North America had long been affected by war, even without being part of an army. Since the earliest conflicts between settlers and Native Americans, women (on both sides) had not been immune to

[1] Kathleen Wilson, *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 94.

[2] Wilson, *Island Race*, 93.

death and capture from martial enemies. Nevertheless, British observers interpreted an enemy's murder of a white woman as evidence of savagery. Peter Silver notes that the European laws of war declared that "it was forbidden to kill people who could not fight, which meant, above all, children and women."[3] Warfare that broke this law (Indian warfare in particular) became the focus of a literary device that Silver calls "the anti-Indian sublime," which was designed to "overwhelm the reader with emotion at the sight of [Indian-induced] suffering." A central focus of this type of writing was "an obsession with the helplessness before attack of mothers and infants, especially when twinned in pregnant women."[4] The result of this trend was that the real and imagined suffering of women was co-opted to serve a larger purpose: condemnation of Indian savagery and the barbarity of their allies, specifically the French.

As bearers of the national image and ideas, therefore, women's direct participation in battles was fraught with complexity in that the killing of a woman in a battle had both real and symbolic ramifications. At the same time, women who traveled with the army (especially those who did not have a husband or other suitable male companion) threatened traditional interpretations of gender roles. Women in this position were seen as suspect, to some extent within the army and to a greater extent by the members of civilian society with whom they came in contact. Female participation in a very masculine sphere made a woman's own personal civility and respectability suspect. Women who forged ahead in this new (to North America) role had to contend with restrictions, suspicions, and hardships. At the same time, women in the army were subject to the absolute authority of military leaders. If army authorities decided that women were superfluous or a hindrance, they could force them to leave the army. But some

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[3] Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008), 58.

[4] Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 83-84.

women who were able to stay with the army were able to take control of their own participation, to some extent, because they were oftentimes an anomaly in an overwhelmingly male sphere.

Thus the real participation of women in the army was fraught with difficulties because even the most indispensible women were still outsiders; however, women were useful to the army in that they performed necessary services and their death and capture in battle could be used for rhetorical purposes. To examine this concept, the chapter explores several examples of women's participation in war and examines how observers of women's participation used and interpreted it. This chapter and the one that follows do not attempt to provide a complete picture of all women in the Seven Years' War. Instead, both chapters focus on some of the most intense ways that women participated in and experienced the Seven Years' War. The specific category of women discussed in this chapter had to directly confront the problems that resulted from the restrictions that gender norms placed on their war-related activities.

Before exploring the examples, it is useful to provide some context for British and provincial women's participation in war in order to understand women's place in the army and their role as national subjects. In Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, women participated in wars by being members of "campaign communities"—the large crowds of soldiers, women, children, sutlers (peddlers of goods and food), and support personnel that traveled and fought for pay and plunder. In these communities, non-combatants often outnumbered soldiers. Women chose to join campaign communities for a variety of reasons: to follow a husband, escape a bad family situation, seek employment or a living (often through prostitution or a long-term relationship), or even to experience adventure. During these centuries, women and non-combatants were seen as essential for a successful campaign; the idea of going out to battle without a large train was unimaginable.

At the end of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, women's roles in the army became increasingly subject to army and governmental authorities. This was a result of the turn to a more limited war, the ability of monarchs to consolidate their power and field their own armies, the professionalization of the military, and the shift towards using patriotism and monarchical allegiance, rather than the lure of plunder, to motivate men to fight. In this new system, military leaders sought to avoid civilian involvement in battles, and this applied both to locating battles and restricting the army train. In the British army, the number of women permitted to travel with the army was slowly reduced to six per company (one hundred men).[5]

This number was not always strictly enforced (for example, at Fort William Henry in 1757 there were twelve women per hundred men), but army officers did make an effort to limit the number of women following the army. For example, at Fort Cumberland, General Braddock had to divest the army of some extraneous women by sending them to Philadelphia to await the outcome of the campaign against Fort Duquesne. On June 9, 1755—eleven days before the army left Fort Cumberland—General Braddock wrote to Governor Morris stating that he had "found it necessary to discharge a number of women who are wives to soldiers belonging to the forces under my command, and must beg of you to give orders that they be subsisted in your government." It appears that these women were not officer's wives so they did not have the privilege of remaining close to their husbands or in the fort. Braddock noted, "I have taken care to order stoppages to be made of one-third Part of their Husband's Pay to defray the expence of their maintenance," so they would have something to live on.[6] Morris replied to Braddock on

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[5] The best book about women in early modern armies is John A. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See especially Introduction and chapters 1, 2, and Conclusion.

[6] William H. Lowdermilk, *A History of Cumberland, (Maryland) from the Time of the Indian Town, Caiuctucuc, in 1728, up to the Present Day, Embracing an Account of Washington's First Campaign, and Battle of Fort Necessity,*

June 16 and cautiously promised, "The Women You have discharged shall be taken Care of as soon as they arrive, If I can prevail on my Assembly to contribute any thing to it."[7] True to his word, Morris wrote to the Assembly on June 17 informing them of the coming of the soldiers' wives and recommending that the Assembly, "take Compassion of these poor People, and add as much to it [their husbands' pay] as will enable them to provide a Subsistence."[8]

Women who wanted to stay with the army had little recourse if they were counted as extraneous, and they had little power to resist if called upon to do something that they did not want to do. For example, in April, 1755, as the army was sorting itself out at Alexandria in preparation for the move to Fort Cumberland, Sir Peter Halkett ordered that since "A greater number of Women … [had been] brought Over Then those Alowd by the Government sufficient for washing," these extra women would have to start working in the hospital. They would be paid six pence per day. However, in response to this order the women organized and attempted to demand higher wages. Halkett ordered that "A return will be Calld for of those who Refuse to serve for six pence per day And Provisions that they may be turned out of the Camp And others got in their places."[9] Women in the army tended to be expendable and powerless if they did not have powerful men to assist them. They were absolutely subject to military authority, which is not surprising since they were part of the army, but other aspects of their participation were not regulated (beyond the whims of army leaders), which could lead to experiences that were difficult for women to manage.

Together with a History of Braddock's Expedition, etc.(Baltimore: Regional Publishing Company, 1921 [1878]), 135-136.

[7] *Pennsylvania Archives* 4th Series, vol. 2, *Papers of the Governors, 1747-1759*, ed George Edward Reed (Harrisburg, PA: State of Pa., Wm. Stanley Ray, State Printer, 1900-1902), 413-414.

[8] *PA Archives*, 4th series, vol. 2, 410.

[9] Charles Hamilton, ed. *Braddock's Defeat: The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley's Batman, The Journal of a British Officer, Halkett's Orderly Book* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 76-77.

Waiting at the fort as their husbands marched out to battle was a difficult task for the anxious women, but it was usually safer than traveling with the army. Captain Cholmley's batman (the military servant of a cavalry officer), in his eyewitness account of the battle at the Monongahela, reported that as the army was retreating back across the river, "an Indien Shot one of our Wimen and began to Scalp her. Her Husband being a little before her Shot the Indien dead." In reply to the husband's quick response, "another Indien Immediately Shot him through the Arm, but he [the husband] made his Escape from them."[10] The army could be a difficult place for family loyalties, but it was also a difficult place for women who could face battle but did not carry weapons.

Most women had very little control over their participation. Even though they were providing necessary services, their presence was tolerated rather than encouraged. A partial exemption from this trend applied to women who were hospital matrons. The matron was the highest paid and "most respected woman in the army."[11] While nurses were paid about six pence per day, matrons received at least two shillings per day.[12] The matron's responsibilities included supervising nurses and taking general responsibility for patients' care. A British army physician, Donald Monro, described matrons' responsibilities this way: "Every matron, or head nurse, is to go round all the wards of the hospital at least twice a day, morning and evening; to see that the nurses keep their wards clean; that they behave themselves soberly and regularly, and

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[10] Hamilton, ed., "Journal of Cholmley's Batman," 31.

[11] Paul Kopperman, "Medical Services in the British Army, 1742-1783," *Journal of the History of Medicine* 34 (Oct. 1979), 437.

[12] Kopperman, "Medical Services," 436-437. There are several documents in the Loudoun Papers and the Abercromby Papers containing accounts of pay for hospital staff, including Charlotte Browne. On May 7, 1757 Browne was paid £4 for six months of work (LO 6071). On December 9, 1757 she was paid £2.6 but the document does not mention a time period (LO 4975). In a damaged document from the Abercromby Papers dated April 5, 1758 there is record of a "matron" being paid £4 (The Papers of James Abercromby (AB), The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, AB 119 [1]).

give due attention to their patients; and to examine the diet of their patients, and see that it was good and well dressed; and if she finds anything amiss, to report the same to the physician, surgeon, or apothecary, of the hospital."[13]

During the Seven Years' War, one woman who held this post (through at least 1758) was Charlotte Browne.[14] The main source for the details of Charlotte Browne's life and experience is her journal. She began keeping it on November 17, 1754 in England aboard the ship *London* headed for Virginia and ended it on August 4, 1757 in Albany, New York. She lived in Alexandria, Fort Cumberland, Philadelphia, New York City, and Albany and marched and sailed among those places. Browne recorded where she went, how she felt, conversations she had, comings and goings at forts and cities, the different types of people she encountered, and gave a general picture of army life, particularly for women. The journal also seems to indicate that Charlotte Browne had some education (shown by her high position in the army and the quality of the writing in the journal), was accustomed to a higher standard of living than she found in America, and that she was resourceful and able to take care of herself but also relied on male friends to help and protect her. She also had served during King George's War, so she had experience in traveling with the army.

As a matron, Browne was accorded certain privileges, but her unique position in the army also created certain hardships. She did not have to fear being abruptly sent away from the army, as other women did, and she was guaranteed steady employment. But as one of the few women permanently attached to the army, she encountered a host of problems that served as a constant

[13] Kopperman, "Medical Services," 437.

[14] The best published work on Charlotte Browne is chapter three, "Britannia into Battle: Women, war, and identities in England and America," of Kathleen Wilson's *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century*.

reminder that she was an anomaly. Browne had to navigate a variety of situations that developed from being a woman in a professional setting (the army) designed for men. The problems that Browne encountered can be roughly organized into four main categories: needing male assistance, experiencing difficulties with travel and lodging, fitting into civilian society, and balancing work and family. All of the problems grew out of her unique position as a woman employed by the army. Of all women attached to the army, Charlotte Browne had the best chance of avoiding difficulty because she was respected and her job placed her above the rest of the women (except for the wives of high ranking officers). In reality, however, Charlotte Browne experienced many difficulties because of her anomalous position and the fact that her respectability was often questioned. Some of the problems she encountered were normal enough, but because she was in the army and a woman, managing the problems became more difficult than they otherwise would have been.

Browne's first problem was that she entered army service without a husband. Her husband had died on May 6, 1753, about a year and a half before she embarked for North America. [15] Browne had several children, whom she left in England under the care of family. The problem with traveling in the army without a male protector was that there were many situations where having the assistance of a man made life easier, simply because army life (and, to some extent, civilian life away from home) was not constructed with single women in mind. Even though Browne was fairly independent and self-sufficient, she often confided in her journal that she wished she had a man to help her work through some of the difficult situations she encountered. Browne's solution to this first problem came in the form of her brother, Robert

[15] It is possible to pinpoint the date because she notes in her journal on May 6, 1755: "This Unhappy Day 2 Years depriv'd me of my dear Husband." Charlotte Browne, "The Journal of Charlotte Browne, Matron of the General Hospital with the English Forces in America, 1754-1756," printed in Isabel M. Calder's edited collection *Colonial Captivities, Marches and Journeys* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1967), 169.

Bristowe, an apothecary who was also traveling with the army. [16] Bristowe helped Browne navigate some of the logistics of living and traveling with the army and served as a mediator between Browne and the masculine army culture.

Another solution to the problem of traveling without a husband came in the person of Browne and Bristowe's friend, John Cherrington. Browne first mentioned Cherrington in her journal's second entry on November 24, 1754, noting that he boarded at Gravesend. They may have been acquainted before the voyage because already by December 5, Browne wrote that Cherrington had entrusted his money with her for safe keeping.[17] It is a little unclear exactly what Cherrington's marital status was, but he was probably a widower. Aboard the ship from England, Cherrington had quarreled with a Mr. Bass over a woman named Miss Davis, whom Browne described as "a friendly fair of Mr. Cherringtons." Later, Browne noted that among the luggage that Cherrington was taking to Philadelphia was "his Wife's Dressing Box."[18]

At her arrival in the colonies, Browne benefitted from the presence and assistance of her brother. When they disembarked at Alexandria, Browne and Bristowe soon went looking for lodging with a Mr. Lake. Browne was disappointed when, after a long search, she was "Obliged to take a Room but little larger than to hold my Bed and not so much as a Chair in it." Bristowe took a room next door at a "Dutch mans." They called those small rooms home from March 23 to May 5. On April 22 she noted that most of the army left for Fort Cumberland while she and

[16] Paul Kopperman identifies Charlotte Browne's brother as the apothecary Robert Bristowe. Kopperman, "Medical Services," 437, 439 n. 29. Charlotte Browne mentions "my dear children" on April 29, 1755. Browne, "Journal," 176.

[17] Browne, "Journal," 169.

[18] Browne, "Journal," 170.

Bristowe stayed behind with one officer, forty guards, fifty sick men, and several women acting as nurses. The hospital train eventually followed the army on June 1.[19]

Browne consistently encountered problems relating to getting from one place to another. She sometimes had to travel with the hospital; at other times she seems to have been left to find her own way to travel to the next location. The journey from Alexandria to Fort Cumberland was one of her more organized trips, but it was not without excitement. While Browne still benefitted from her brother's presence on this trip, she traveled separately from him with her own wagon and driver. The drivers were civilian contractors from Pennsylvania, and Browne's driver, Mr. Gore, became her defender during the journey to Fort Cumberland. They left Alexandria on June 1 and arrived at Fort Cumberland on June 13. On the first day of their journey, Gore had barely driven three miles before he decided to take a better road but was stopped by the army sentries. Unused to army discipline, Gore complained to Browne that "it was very hard" and "if the Other Waggons drove to the Old Boy [the devil] he must follow them."[20] The next day Gore continued to flout army discipline by insisting that Browne should not have to ride at the end of the train and threatened to whip any who disagreed. Gore almost started a riot the next day when he again insisted on driving in front. He shouted down the crowd by exclaiming that "he had but one Officer to Obey and she was in his Waggon and it was not right that she should be blinded with Dust."[21] Despite the ruckus Gore was causing, Browne seemed to enjoy his protection, and the two developed a friendship.

[19] Browne, "Journal," 176.

[20] Browne, "Journal," 178.

[21] Browne, "Journal," 179.

On June 6, five days into the journey, the hospital train stopped at a plantation belonging to a Mr. Keys. That night the soldiers begged Robert Bristowe to advance them some whiskey or else, "he had better kill them at once than to let them dye by Inches for without [whiskey] they could not live." Faced with this dire situation, Bristowe provided the whiskey and as it took effect, the soldiers began to dance and to "bid Defiance to the French." Mr. Gore soon got up with them to, as Charlotte Browne records it, "shake a Leg." Upon seeing this behavior, Browne remarked that she was surprised that Mr. Gore, a Quaker, would dance. However, Gore explained that "he was not at all united with them" and proceeded to inform her that "there were some of this People who call'd themselves Quakers and stood up for their Church but had no more Religion in them than his Mare." To this jest, Browne replied with her own—that she should "set him down as a Ranter."[22]

By mid-June the army and support personnel had assembled at Fort Cumberland. When Charlotte Browne arrived at the fort, she wrote in her journal, "at 6 we came to Fort Cumberland the most desolate Place I ever saw went to Mr. Cherrington who receiv'd me kindly drank Tea."[23] Browne and Bristowe settled into the fort on June 13, although Browne was not particularly impressed with her living situation. She remarked, "I was put into a Hold that I could see day light through every Log and 1 port Hole for a Window which was as good a Room as any in the Fort."[24] At Fort Cumberland, Charlotte Browne's problems would only increase. Her primary difficulty was how to balance work and family after her brother became ill. She wanted to take care of him, but the army needed her to work.

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[22] Browne, "Journal," 180. Ranters were antinomians who were believed to disregard Protestant morals and convention.

[23] Browne, "Journal," 182-183.

[24] Browne, "Journal," 183.

On June 20, the British and provincial forces set out for Fort Duquesne near the Ohio River, building the road as they went. Browne and Bristowe stayed at the fort and cared for the sick when the army went out to besiege Fort Duquesne. On July 1, Browne recorded in her journal, "My Brother was taken ill with a Fever and Flux and Fits." Charlotte Browne herself had been ill on and off since mid-June, and her maid also came down with a fever on July 1. Browne tended to her maid and her brother and anxiously mapped Bristowe's progress in her journal. While Browne and the residents of the fort had no idea what was happening with the army on the march to Fort Duquesne, the events in Browne's personal and professional life would soon collide. On July 7, Browne noted, "My brother extremely ill he was blistered." Also on that day, she wrote in her journal that "Several who call'd themselves friendly Indians came to the Fort but the Gates were order'd to be shut they stay'd 4 Hours and then went to the Camp." Keeping these Indians out of the fort was a high enough priority that the residents of the fort had to go without water while the Indians waited at the gate. Browne noted, "we had not a drop of Water there being no Well in the Fort."[25] The lack of water would be a concern for the feverish Bristowe.

The next day, July 8, she recorded "My brother still the same." Her maid was also still sick, and she noted, "I can get no Nurse so that I am very much fatigued." Although there were other women at the fort serving as nurses, they must have been busy with sick soldiers and wounded frontier refugees, which left Browne to nurse her brother and maid and probably assist in the hospital as best she could. Browne did not write in her journal for the next two days, but in the meantime, the army began encountering trouble almost one hundred miles away. After toiling over mountains and through woods, the army was only a few miles from Fort Duquesne

[25] Browne, "Journal," 183.

on July 9. That morning, the British troops were ambushed by a French and Indian force which succeeded in routing the British army. To make matters worse, General Braddock was shot, fatally. He lingered for a few days as the army began an unorganized retreat back to Fort Cumberland, carrying their dying general with them.

Back at the fort on July 11, while the army was still retreating, Browne noted, "My Brother much better." Also on that date, the first news of the army's defeat reached the fort, which led to a panic. Browne noted, "It is not possible to describe the Distraction of the poor Women for their Husbands." Browne herself was still distracted with her brother's illness and what to do in case Fort Cumberland was attacked. She wrote, "I pack'd up my Things to send for we expected the Indians every Hour my Brother desired me to leave the Fort but I am resolv'd not to go but share my Fate with him." On July 12 she noted, "My brother better," but sometime after writing that, Bristowe took a turn for the worse. On the 13th, he confided to his sister that "if he was not better he could not live but a few Days." In distress, Browne turned to the army medical staff, and Bristowe "submitted to have Mr. Tuton one of the Dr. attend him he gave him 2 Draughts which had a surpprizing effect and I hope that he is better." However, that night his condition continued to deteriorate and Browne wrote, "I set up with my Brother and was much surppriz'd in the Night he was so convuls'd I thought he was dying he dos'd and I hope that he is better." At the same time, Fort Cumberland had received confirmation of Braddock's defeat and was alerted that the remains of the army, including the wounded, would be returning to the fort.[26]

Meanwhile, back with the army, General Braddock died of his wounds on July 13 and on the 14th he was buried in the road he had worked so hard to build. The rest of the army

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[26] Browne, "Journal," 183-184.

continued on to the fort. Because there were so many wounded, the army was stretched out in a long line. A force of seventy men escorted the first group of wounded officers into the fort on the night of July 15. Browne noted that on the 15th Bristowe was "much Better" and that several wagons had arrived carrying the first wounded soldiers, "some at the Point of Death." They were the first of 328 wounded men who would struggle into the fort between July 15 and 26. These men needed urgent medical care and the limited hospital staff was fully taxed.

Finding a way to balance her personal and professional problems would not be any easier for Browne on July 17. On that day, Charlotte Browne wailed in her journal, "Oh, how shall I express my Distraction this unhappy day at 2 in the After Noon deprived me of my dear Brother in whom I have lost my kind Guardian and Protector and am now left a friendless Exile from all that is dear to me." There is no journal entry for the next day, but Browne explained on July 19, "I am in so much grief I can think of nothing." Browne was faced with a very difficult situation. The death of her brother threw her into the depths of grief, but each day during that trying time saw the return of more and more wounded soldiers to Fort Cumberland. Browne, in the midst of her grief and distraction, turned to the friend of both her and her brother, John Cherrington, for assistance. On July 19 he helped her arrange Bristowe's funeral and they buried him that day.[27] The next day, July 20, as wounded men continued to stream into Fort Cumberland, Browne recorded that the illness she had been fighting since mid-June again made her ill. On the 22nd she wrote that she was "Very Ill and in the greatest Pain." It does not seem likely that Browne assisted in the hospital at all during this time, especially since she did not get out of bed until August 12, and even then, "could not set, I was so faint."[28]

[27] Browne, "Journal," 184-185.

[28] Browne, "Journal," 185.

From July 17 to August 16, Browne only wrote in her journal eight times, and she never mentioned the army. She focused instead on her grief and her own illness. However, it is evident from other sources that the hospital at Fort Cumberland was very busy during that month. Captain Robert Cholmley's batman recorded in his journal that on July 17—the day Bristowe died—"We Marched to Fort Cumberland" from the battle at the Monongahela. Between July 18 and July 26, his reports recounted the arrival of 328 wounded officers and soldiers who had been slowly following the main army train back to the fort. As they came in, "all the Wounded men was put in the Hospital and dressed," most likely by hospital staff other than Charlotte Browne.[29] While being distracted from professional duty by family concerns was not restricted to Charlotte Browne or women in the army, Bristowe's death was more than simply a distraction. Browne's tenure in the army changed significantly as a result of her brother's death. Bristowe had mitigated the restrictions that Browne faced as a result of her gender; without him, Charlotte Browne would have to confront these challenges on her own while also performing her job.

One important result of Bristowe's death (as far as Browne was concerned) was that it also affected his friend, John Cherrington. Perhaps because of the strain on the medical staff coupled with the death of his friend, John Cherrington began refusing to follow any orders soon after the army arrived back at the fort. Hospital Director James Napier informed Henry Fox that "Mr. Cherrington one of the Surgeons here has declared he'll receive no Order from me nor from any body but the commander in chief." Napier noted that Cherrington's rebellion had thrown the medical department into chaos as a refusal to follow orders meant "any one of them may stay or

[29] Hamilton, ed. "Journal of Cholmley's Batman," 33-34, 58; On July 22, the hospital director, James Napier, wrote to Henry Fox and stated, "On my return to this place, from the Battle near the Monongahela, last Thursday the 17th current, I found Mr. Bristowe, one of the Master Apothecarys of the Hospital, dead." He asked for a replacement to be sent. James Napier, Letter to Henry Fox, July 22, 1755, LO 611.

go from the place allotted them when they please and the commander be daily teezed with complaints."[30] Napier dismissed Cherrington on July 18 for "Neglect of Duty or Disobedience of Orders."[31] Looking at the dates and keeping in mind the close friendship between Browne, Bristowe, and Cherrington, it is tempting to attribute Cherrington's rebellion at least in part to his grief at Bristowe's death. What is clear is that on July 19, at the height of activity at the Fort Cumberland hospital, Cherrington and Browne were burying Bristowe, and the medical staff was functioning without its surgeon, apothecary, and matron, which might help explain why Robert Cholmley's batman noted on July 25 that, "The men dying so fast daily that they [the survivors] digg holes and throw them in without reading any service Over them, Although we having two Ministers with us."[32]

Cherrington's rebellion and dismissal had further consequences for Charlotte Browne because without her brother or her closest friend, she was left to fend for herself when the army left the fort for Frederick's Town, Maryland on August 18. In her journal on August 18 she wrote, "Mr. Cherrington is gone so that I shall not be so happy as to go in his Party He is the only one I can call my friend." By August 16 Browne was feeling "Much better" but was worried because "the Director [Napier] says we must march very soon to Frederick's Town…which is 150 Miles God only knows how I shall get there." Her options were limited because her brother had "made me promise him on his Death Bed not to travel in a Carriage as he said it would soon kill me." Indeed, Browne was still very weak; on August 17 she wrote, "I went out of my Room supported by 2."

[30] James Napier, Letter to Henry Fox, July 22, 1755, LO 611. Henry Fox was the secretary of state for the southern department.

[31] John Cherrington, Memorial to Loudoun, LO 2464; Loudoun, Letter to Viscount Barrington, August 27, 1757, LO 4283.

[32] Hamilton, ed. "Journal of Cholmley's Batman," 34.

When she finally began the journey, she had a horse and a nurse but "all the Gentlemen were gone before." Her horse eventually laid down and refused to move. The next day she had a different horse, but it threw her as they were going down a hill. On the following day, the horse threw her as she was crossing the Potomac River, and she had to be rescued by "one of the men with one Arm." On August 24 the army halted and she spent the day "mending my Saddle which I was at a loss to do." She had to sleep on the ground, and on August 29 she became separated from the army and got lost in the woods, where she "expected to be scalp'd every minute."[33] She was ill for the whole trip and often had to stop and rest, sometimes right on the side of the road. However, the ordeal ended happily enough when Browne, coming out of the woods, "let my Horse go which way he chose and he carried me to a House where was Mr. Cherrington who had heard I was coming and provided a good Bed for me."[34] Still, in the chaotic retreat from Fort Cumberland, Charlotte Browne had to take care of herself even though she was sick, did not know where she was going, and was not particularly adept at riding a horse. The account of the journey gives the impression that no one particularly cared how Charlotte Browne got from Fort Cumberland to Fredericks Town, and there were not any protocols or standards in place for her.

At the time of his reunion with Charlotte Browne in August, John Cherrington's position in the army was unsettled. Soon after arriving in Frederick's Town, he tried writing to Lord Loudoun to be reinstated, but Loudoun refused the request because Cherrington's dismissal had come from the king before Loudoun arrived in the colonies. Later, Cherrington wrote to Loudoun again asking to be paid through September 1 and explaining that he had spent August

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[33] Browne, "Journal," 186.

[34] Browne, "Journal," 186.

assuming that his dismissal would receive "an Enquiry by a Courth Martiall." Although this court martial did not happen and Cherrington was not reinstated, he still wanted to be paid and stayed close to the army for the next few months.[35]

While she was with Cherrington, Browne encountered new problems relating to travel and lodging. On October 10, Browne wrote in her journal, "5 Waggons with sick are marched for Philadelphia Mr. Cherrington desired me not to go with them but to favour him with my Company." As noted above, no one seemed to care how Browne traveled from one place to another, even if it meant not traveling with the army hospital. Browne and Cherrington set off together on October 12 completely separated from the rest of the army and anyone else except for "his man Tim."[36] On the evening of their first day of travel, Browne and Cherrington "came to Mr. Trucks we supt and desired to have 2 Beds." However the proprietress told Browne "she presumed we were Man and Wife and that one would do." Cherrington jokingly replied, "it was true I was his wife but it was very seldom that he was favoured with part of my Bed." The proprietress answered that "she was sorry for it" and accommodated them with two beds. Charlotte Browne seems to have found the situation immensely entertaining.

Browne and Cherrington flirted and quarreled all the way to Philadelphia. When they arrived there, which she described as "London in miniature," Browne and Cherrington stayed at an inn called the Indian King. Browne noted uncomfortably that, "the People of the House star'd at me and some said I was Mr. Cherr'n Whife and others his Miss but he soon convinced them that I was neither and then they treated me with much more respect."[37] The puzzled reactions

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[35] John Cherrington, Memorial to Loudoun, LO 2464.

[36] Browne, "Journal," 188.

[37] Browne, "Journal," 190.

that Browne and Cherrington received show how unconventional their choice to travel alone together was and how vulnerable Browne's reputation was without her brother.

Even though Cherrington had been dismissed from the service in 1755, he stayed close to the army for a year and a half as it moved from Philadelphia to New York City to Albany, and he was able to assist Browne at various points. On December 1, 1755, in Philadelphia, Browne recorded that she went to church "and to my great Surprize saw Mr. Cherr'n there."[38] In February 1756, Cherrington was on board the ship that Browne took to New York City. In March, when the sloop carrying all of her luggage capsized, it was Cherrington who went to see if anything could be retrieved. A few days later she was "agreeable supprized with a sight of all my Things but very wet with the salt Water" brought by Cherrington.[39] When she traveled to Albany, Mr. Cherrington was the commanding officer of the ship, and Browne noted that he "gave me the best Cabbin in the Sloop."[40] Perhaps Cherrington continued to ferry people between New York City and Albany, although he appears less frequently in Browne's journal for 1757. He was probably among the friends who visited her in August when she received word that her daughter Charlotte had died. Despite his dismissal from the army, Cherrington had been a helpful friend to Browne, so it is understandable that she would remark on December 1, 1756 "Mr Cherrington left Albany for England in whom I have lost all my friends in one."[41]

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[38] Browne, "Journal," 191.

[39] Browne, "Journal," 193.

[40] Browne, "Journal," 194. Browne refers to him as the commanding officer, but it is unclear if it was a navy ship or a private vessel.

[41] Browne, "Journal," 196-197. Cherrington remained in the colonies for so long because he was fighting his dismissal. In August 1757, Loudoun replied to a letter from the Secretary of War, Viscount Barrington. Barrington had mentioned Cherrington to Loudoun as one of two people, "that seem to have had great Injustice done to them, and who seem to have been superseded very hastily, to say the least." In reply to this, Loudoun went on the defensive and declared, "I wash my hands of it." He maintained that Cherrington had been dismissed by the King's

Another problem that Browne encountered was fitting into civilian society. Since the army was quartered in cities for about half of any given year, Browne had many opportunities to experience colonial social life. Browne's ability to participate in society was dependent on her being accepted by the other ladies of the town. This was usually not a problem in places where other military wives lived (such as Alexandria) or where the whole army was just passing through (as at Frederickstown), but it could be a problem in larger cities such as Philadelphia and Albany where Browne was more likely to be on her own. The main reasons that people were reluctant to accept her were because she was traveling without a husband, or because she was with John Cherrington who was not her husband and people suspected she was his mistress, or simply because she was a foreigner. Browne's status as an outsider and an anomaly continued to give her trouble.

Browne might have encountered more trouble at Philadelphia if she had not been befriended by Deborah Franklin. On November 17, the day she was awakened early by "a Shock of an Earth quake," Browne received a visit from "Miss Franklin and several other Ladies." Benjamin Franklin's prominence in the colony meant that Deborah Franklin was one of the first ladies of the city. After their first meeting, Charlotte Browne and Deborah Franklin often enjoyed one another's company. On November 27, Browne recorded, "Mrs. Franklin sent her Chaise for me and I was received with great politeness. I return'd at Night and she did me the favour to drive me home herself." On January 24 she again noted, "Mrs. Franklin came to see

command due to complaints about Cherrington's rebellion and failure to complete his duties. Of these accusations, Loudoun declared, "the contents of it are true." Loudoun, Letter to Viscount Barrington, August 27, 1757, LO 4283, emphasis his.

me." Later on February 12 she "went with Mrs. Franklin to the Academy and was agreeably entertain'd by hearing the Boys speak."[42]

In February, 1757 when Browne moved with the army to New York, she took with her a letter of introduction from Deborah Franklin. She delivered that letter to Dr. John Bard, and later he gave her a letter to give to Colonel Hubert Marshall at Fort Frederick in Albany. This was helpful in establishing her reputation, which again became an issue at Albany. On April 16 she noted in her journal that "The Dutch had a very bad Opinion of me saying I could not be good to come so far without a Husband." The rumors persisted until an old friend of Browne's from King George's War, Miss Miller, visited her and "told me that the Dutch said I was Gen'l Braddock's Miss but she had convinced them that I was not for that her Father had known me Maid, Wife and Widow and that nobody could say anything bad of me." Miss Miller's testimony and possibly the letter of introduction seemed to quell the rumors and on April 28 "Several of the Dutch Ladies" visited Brown and invited her to their homes. Despite being accepted, Browne still had reminders that she was an outsider. On August 10, 1757 she heard the news that her daughter Charlotte had died back in England. Two days later she wrote, "All my Friends come to see me; but at present I have no Comfort in any thing."[43]

The problems that Browne encountered were not unusual, but the situation she was in was unusual. As a member of the army staff, Browne had specific obligations that other army women did not have. She also had opportunities, such as traveling separately from the army, that other women did not have. These obligations and opportunities created challenges that were

[42] Browne, "Journal," 192 and n. 42; the Academy was the future University of Pennsylvania.

[43] Browne, "Journal," 193 n. 46, 194, 195, 196.

unique to Charlotte Browne, but studying them provides a glimpse into the challenges that occurred when women participated in a highly masculine sphere.

Browne's journal ends in August, 1757, right before the most infamous involvement of some women in the Seven Years' War, namely, their death and capture after the capitulation of Fort William Henry. While Browne's story helps to illuminate the challenges women in the army faced as a result of their gender, the story of the women at Fort William Henry shows one way that women functioned as national subjects and how some army and civilian leaders used the women's (unintentional) participation in the war to further their own goals. The siege of Fort William Henry began in August, 1757, when a combined force of about 6,000 French, Canadian, and *pays d'en haut* Indians attacked the 2,300 British and provincial soldiers at Fort William Henry and an adjoining camp.[44] On August 3 the French settled in for a siege. The commander of the British forces was Colonel George Munro; his superior was General Daniel Webb at Fort Edward, sixteen miles away. At that point, Webb was the final authority in military matters for the region because Lord Loudoun was at sea on his way to attack Louisbourg.

Over the course of the next week, French and Indian forces crept closer and closer to the fort. Munro desperately hoped for reinforcements from Webb, but cautious Webb was under the impression that the French had a force of 11,000 men, so he was gathering forces from near and far to meet the enemy with equal numbers. On August 7, French General Montcalm showed Munro an intercepted letter from Webb stating that he would not be coming to Fort William Henry's assistance. On August 9, Munro decided to capitulate. Because of their valiant defense, Montcalm offered the garrison a parole of honor. This meant that "the whole garrison was to

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[44] Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre,"* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 92-99.

march to Fort Edward the next morning, with drums beating, with colors flying, and with soldiers and officers retaining their arms and luggage." They could also bring one symbolic cannon. They were to be escorted by a detachment of French regulars. For their part, the soldiers of Fort William Henry had to agree not to fight against the French for eighteen months, and the British had to give up all French and Canadian prisoners taken up to that point in the war.[45]

At about five o'clock on the morning of August 10, the British troops and camp followers began moving out. Similarly to what had happened at Fort Oswego in 1756, some Indians moved into the fort and killed the seventeen sick and wounded soldiers who were unable to leave. As the garrison began to march, Indians took black servants and British-allied Indians as prisoners and began stripping soldiers of their clothes and packs. This scene of confusion soon devolved into chaos as more Indians came running up to get their share. The camp followers and the New Hampshire troops at the end of the line were hit first, but soon the melee encompassed the whole line. The killing lasted for only a short time before the Indians began hauling prisoners away. The French escort and General Montcalm (running in from his camp a mile away) tried to restore order. Any British troops that could get away took off at a dead run for Fort Edward. The Indians quickly set out by canoe on Lake George with as many prisoners as they could retain.[46]

Ian Steele notes that out of the 2,372 men and about 80 women in the retreating garrison when it was attacked, at most 185 people were killed in the "massacre," 175 of whom were men and 10 were women. He also posits that as many as 500 people were captured, most were taken

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[45] Steele, *Betrayals,* 98-111; quote, 110; George Munro, Letter to Daniel Webb, August 8, 1757, LO 4041.

[46] Steele, *Betrayals*, 115-125.

to Canada, and most eventually made it back to Britain or the colonies.[47] The redemption of the prisoners would go on for months and even years, and August, 1757, would be the last time that the French offered a British garrison the honors of war in North America.[48] No one at the time of the event had as clear an understanding of the facts as modern historians are capable of achieving, which led to a profusion of rumors. However, a paucity of information did not stop the story, especially the death and danger of the women, from being discussed and used to its full rhetorical potential.

Army officials and civilians wrote about the death and capture of the Fort William Henry women in lurid detail in order to elicit a response. They sought to use the peril of the women to help prove that the French were barbaric and were not following the rules of war. If this could be proven then the army could disregard the terms of the capitulation and increase civilian support for the war. The discussion that follows is not about the actual experiences of the women; rather, it focuses on how observers used the incongruity of women dying in battle to advance the British cause. Therefore, women, however unknowingly, leant themselves to the development of rhetoric about the war. While having women travel with the army was often a problem for army authorities and a cause for suspicion among civilians, after the fall of Fort William Henry, there was no question (on the British side) about whether the women should have been there or not. Instead, the women were seen as the bearers of national ideals, especially civility. Even though women had no control over the rhetoric that developed out of the battle, in the writings about the capitulation of Fort William Henry women were implicitly accepted as both women *and* national subjects.

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[47] Steele, *Betrayals*, 98, 142-144.

[48] Steele, *Betrayals*, 110.

The first way that news about the capitulation and subsequent attack circulated was through private correspondence. Because Loudoun was at sea when the capitulation occurred, many people rushed to give him the news of the capitulation, and he in turn discussed it with several others. Most of the correspondence occurred between August 11 and August 31, when fury over the garrison's ill-treatment was at its height. These first private reports became the basis for the public versions of the story. They are significant for how they connect the massacre of the garrison, and especially women and children, to French barbarity.

The first letters went out on August 11 from Fort Edward. General Webb was quick to make his report to Loudoun and he was careful to emphasize the cruelty towards women and children and the complicity of the French. Webb relied for this early report upon the hundreds of breathless men that came running into the fort throughout the day on the 10th and the 11th. He reported to Loudoun that the troops, "on leaving the Camp yesterday morning, … were Strip'd by the Indians of every thing they had both Officers & men, the women and Children dragged from among them and most Inhumanly Butcherd before their faces." In painting a word picture of the scene of carnage, Webb emphasized the brutality toward the non-combatants. He did not even directly say that soldiers were killed, even though time would show that many more men were killed than women (although proportionally, more women were killed than men). He explained that "after having destroyed the Women and Children, they fell upon the rear of our men, who running in upon the Front soon Put the whole to a most Precipitate flight." The women were "destroyed," and the men were sent running.

Although Webb charged the Indians with committing the deeds, he did not hold them responsible. He explained to Loudoun that, "the Party of about three hundred [French] men

which was given them as an Escort, were during this time quietly Looking on." This French passivity had led Webb to conclude "from this and other Circumstances we are too well convinced there Barbarites must have been connived at by the French."[49] Accusing the French of orchestrating the attacks was much more powerful than blaming the Indians. Native Americans had been attacking the frontiers for years, seemingly without much French oversight. But to be able to link Indian atrocities to French authority meant that France was no longer holding to European standards of warfare. Emphasizing the barbarous murdering of women and children exemplified the turn toward savagery of the French.

Webb's interpretation of the events was shared by other correspondents and generally persisted even after more information came out. Another of the first letters to be sent was written by George Bartman, Webb's aide-de-camp. On August 11 he wrote to Gabriel Christie, the assistant deputy quartermaster in Albany.[50] Bartman had been in charge of communication with Fort William Henry during the siege, and his close communication with Webb is reflected in his letter to Christie. Echoing Webb's letter to Loudoun, Bartman described the attack thus, "The Indians of the Enemy, (you may imagine not without the Connivance of the French) fell upon [the troops] at setting out yesterday morning with their spears &c and after having strip'd both officers and Men, murder'd the Women and Children."[51] In this letter, as in Webb's, the deaths of the soldiers are not mentioned. The men were "strip'd," but the women and children were "murder'd."

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[49] Daniel Webb, Letter to Loudoun, August 11, 1757, LO 4198.

[50] George Bartman and John A. Schurtz, "The Siege of Fort William Henry: Letters of George Bartman," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 12:4 (August, 1949), 417.

[51] George Bartman, Letter to Gabriel Christie, August 11, 1757, LO 4203.

As a few days passed and the initial shock and adrenaline wore off and more stories were heard, the tone changed slightly in some accounts to put equal blame on both Indians and French. The governor of New York, James DeLancey, described the incident to the New York Council on August 14 by explaining that "The Indians of the Enemy (notwithstanding the Capitulation, which were that they should march out with all the Honors of War) having fallen on them at their leaving the Camp with Spears and Hatchets, murdered the women and Children & numbers of the men."[52] DeLancey adds the murdering of soldiers to the account, but mentions women and children first and implies that all of the women and children were murdered. He also adds "Hatchets" to Bartman's account that only mentioned "spears." Although DeLancey only names the Indians as committing the deeds, he is also careful to note that the actions went contrary to the capitulation, which was a European convention and therefore the responsibility of the French.

The New York Council wrote to Loudoun with the news on August 19 and informed him that the fort was "invested by the Enemy." The council waited a few days after receiving DeLancey's letter, so they may have gathered a little more information before writing to Loudoun. Like DeLancey, the Council emphasized the breach of the capitulation. They wrote, "We now beg Leave to inform you of its [the fort] having surrendered after a Siege of six Days and a half upon honourable Terms, which were no sooner agreed to than broke, by striping and massacring Men, Women and Children, in a most horrid and cruel Manner." They named "the Enemy" as the one responsible.[53] In this account, they included the murder of the men, but they did not directly indict either the French or the Indians.

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[52] James DeLancey, Letter to the New York Council, August 14, 1757, LO 4220.

[53] New York Council, Letter to Loudoun, August 19, 1757, LO 4264.

By August 17, even Daniel Webb had tempered his account. In his letter to the Secretary of War, Viscount Barrington, Webb stated: "every man [was] striped of the cloaths he had on his back, Several men women & children murdered, scalped and carried Prisoners besides others who must have perished in the woods, to which they ran for shelter from these barbarities."[54] Webb added the men's deaths to his earlier account and substituted "several" for "all" in his calculations of casualties. He also added the woods as another scene of death. In this account to Barrington, Webb was not as adamant as he had been to Loudoun in placing responsibility on the French.

By this point, however, the earliest and most vivid accounts of the event were being accepted and incorporated into characterizations of the French. Loudoun's first written assessment of the event was in a letter to Thomas Pownall, the new governor of Massachusetts. On August 20, he wrote from the HMS *Winchelsea* as he was making his way back to New York from his abandoned attempt on Louisbourg. He thanked Pownall for forwarding along Webb's letter of the 11th, which, according to Loudoun, contained, "an Account of the Capitulation, and the inhuman Breach of it by the French."[55] Even as more subdued reports came in, Loudoun persisted in placing responsibility on the French, not the Indians, and characterizing the terms of the capitulation as broken.[56]

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[54] Daniel Webb, Letter to Viscount Barrington, August 17, 1757, LO 4245A.

[55] Loudoun, Letter to Thomas Pownall, August, 20, 1757, LO 4270A.

[56] Letters for Loudoun continued to come in. On August 20, James Pitcher wrote to Loudoun from New York City and conveyed the general opinion that was forming about the attacks. "By all Accounts," according to Pitcher, "there has been a most cruel & unhuman Carnage of the Garrison, in the sight of the French Army." Further, it "appears to Us, as if their intention was to have made a Sacrifice of the whole Garrison." Pitcher does not mention women or children. He does, however, convey the latest rumor—that the French army planned to let the Indians kill all of the British troops. The French would vehemently deny this accusation, but Loudoun and others would not abandon its rhetorical value. For example, on August 24 Governor James De Lancey wrote to the Board of Trade showing the impact of this latest interpretation of the event. He informed them that "the Garrison obtained an

On August 20, Loudoun crafted a lengthy reply to Webb. Because of the difficulties of communication, compounded by the fact that he was at sea, Loudoun did not really know what was happening at Lake George. In his mind, the worst possible scenario was that the French had taken Fort Edward and pushed the border back to Albany. Even if that had not happened yet, Loudoun had to rely on Webb to prepare for such a situation. In this letter he also gave a complete statement regarding where he placed the responsibility for the attacks and what that assessment meant for the future of the war. He began by calling the breach of the capitulation "villainous and inhuman." Loudoun continued by informing Webb that he was on his way "with a Force sufficient to turn the Scale of Affairs." This was not his only goal, however. He also hoped to "teach them [the French] the Necessity, to comply with the Laws of Nations and Humanity." Despite his outrage, the perfidy of the French was not a surprise to Loudoun. He explained to Webb that he was aware of "[French commander in chief] Mr. Vaudreuil's Behaviour in Time of Peace, (when in Louisiana) from His own Letters, in my Possession; and the Murders committed at Oswego, and now at Fort William Henry." This knowledge encouraged him to "make those Gentlemen sick of such inhuman Villainy, whenever it is in my Power."[57]

The French, of course, were not silent on the events following the capitulation of Fort William Henry. Because most of the British witnesses to the event ran straight to Fort Edward with the story, Montcalm knew that he would need to publicize a counter-narrative. The terms of

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honourable Capitulation but notwithstanding that the French General Mont calm [*sic*] under his own eyes and in the face of about three thousand of his regular troops suffer'd his Indians to rob and strip them, officers as well as men, of all they had, and left most of them naked." In this retelling, De Lancey left out the women and children in favor of condemning the French. De Lancey, like many others, would tailor the story to fit the concerns of his audience. James Pitcher, Letter to Loudoun, August 20, 1757, LO 4268; John R. Brodhead and E.B. O'Callaghan, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co, 1856), 7: 274.

[57] Loudoun, Letter to Daniel Webb, August 20, 1757, LO 4271A.

the capitulation were at stake and the freedom of hundreds of French prisoners hung in the balance. Therefore, Montcalm was quick to offer his own perspective on the events to the war department in France and to the British.

On August 15 he wrote to the minister of war Marc-Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy from his "Camp on the ruins of Fort William Henry, called, by the French, Fort George." His first approach was to downplay what had happened. He admitted that "that the capitulation has unfortunately suffered some infraction on the part of the Indians." However, he continued, "what would be an infraction in Europe, cannot be so regarded in America, and I have written with firmness to General Webb and to Lord Loudoun, on the subject, so as to deprive them of all excuse for not observing the terms on a slight pretence."[58] Montcalm reiterated the arguments he had made after the problems at Fort Oswego by stating that war was significantly different in North America, and the standards of European warfare could not be made to fully apply.

Other French explanations for the massacre wavered between discounting it, blaming the British for bringing it on themselves, emphasizing French efforts to restore order, and pointing to unruly and drunk Indians as the perpetrators. An anonymous French "Journal of the Expedition against Fort William Henry" emphasized the taking of prisoners rather than the murders. The author noted that after they left the fort, the British, "did not proceed half a league when the Indians pursued them; killed some of them; took several, plundered almost all, killed one soldier and wounded three who endeavored to oppose their cruelty." Later the author amended his earlier statement and admitted "200 have been carried off by the Indians."[59]

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[58] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York* , 10: 598.

[59] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York* , 10: 605.

Soon enough General Montcalm and Governor Vaudreuil constructed a cohesive narrative of the events which they stuck to and retold each time they had to explain what had happened. In a letter from Montcalm's aide-de-camp, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, to de Paulmy, two letters from Montcalm to Webb and Loudoun respectively, and a letter from Vaudreuil to the Secretary of State for the Marine, M. de Moras (Montcalm actually wrote the letter), the French argument was laid out. The French authorities needed to prove that they had not broken the rules of war. First, they blamed the British for priming the Indians to attack.

In his letter to Loudoun, Montcalm explained, "[The capitulation] would not have experienced the slightest alteration had not your soldiers furnished rum; had that troop been willing to march out with more order and not taken fright at our Indians, which emboldened the latter; in a word, had they been willing to put into execution what I had proposed to them for their own benefit." Vaudreuil concurred, stating that the English "entertain an inconceivable terror" of the Indians. In addition, Montcalm argued that one group of Indians had a specific grievance against the British. He explained to Loudoun, "I regard as a real misfortune, the having with me the Abenakis of Panaouské in Acadia." These Indians, according to Vaudreuil, "pretend to have experienced, this very year, some ill treatment on the part of the English," and these Abenakis started the attack.[60]

Next, Montcalm tried to strike a conciliatory tone with Loudoun, attempting to relate to him as two European-trained generals forced to fight in an uncivilized land. He wrote, "You know what it is to restrain 3,000 Indians of 33 different Nations, and I had but too much apprehension of them, which I did not conceal from the Commandant of the fort in my

[60] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York* , 10: 619, 633.

summons."[61] Loudoun actually did not know what this was like, since the British certainly did not have a comparable number of Indian allies. Nevertheless, Loudoun jumped on this concession in his November 18 letter to Vaudreuil in which he icily informed the Governor, "if a General Serves at the head of Troops he cannot Command, He is not in a Capacity to make a Capitulation."[62] Loudoun was not about to excuse Montcalm for not being able to control his army, regardless of who was part of it or where they came from.

Further, Montcalm attempted to separate the French army from the Indian attacks and to show that the French army understood what an honorable capitulation meant and they were fighting the war according to European norms. He informed Loudoun, "I am pleased with myself for having exposed my person as well as my officers in the defence of yours, who render justice to everything that I have done on that occasion." Vaudreuil's letter provided more details on who was to blame noting that "The great number of women this garrison was bringing back, contributed not a little to increase its terror." The women, far from being victims in French eyes, made the situation worse. While the British were very diligent to present the murdered women as national subjects and their deaths as a breach of the rules of war, the French downplayed the women's importance and emphasized that they contributed to the trouble.

Vaudreuil continued, "The Indians, emboldened to excess by this very panic of the English, set about plundering them, and I know not what would have been the result, had it not been for the promptness with which all the officers ran forward. The escort, which commenced

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[61] The letters from Bougainville and Vaudreuil say 2,000 Indians while the letters from Montcalm say 3,000. Anderson notes that there were 2,000 Indians assembled by the end of July. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of the Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 187; Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 10: 619, 632.

[62] Loudoun, Letter to Vaudreuil, November 18, 1757, LO 4788.

collecting, opposed the outrage; we even had some grenadiers wounded on the occasion."[63] Loudoun did not join in the praise of the French. Nor did he blame the women for making things worse. Instead, in his November 18 letter to Vaudreuil he maintained that "Your Troops" carried out, "the most unhuman Murders not only of the Sick, but of many others, and likewise by the great Numbers of Both Sexes, that were carried off Prisoners in direct Violation of the Capitulation." Loudoun contended that he "attribute[d] these breaches of the Capitulation to the Army in General" and to Montcalm in particular.[64]

Montcalm concluded his letter to Loudoun with the following statement, "Therefore, my Lord, I request you to cause the capitulation to be executed in every particular. The least omission in its execution, on the slightest pretext, would be of still more fatal consequence for you than for us." Vaudreuil's letter again gives more insight into Montcalm's thinking. Towards the end of that long letter he wrote, "The English, far from complaining, ought to feel the more grateful for what we have done on that occasion, inasmuch as all belonging to that garrison, whom the Indians had taken, are restored to them, and as, thanks to the activity of the Marquis de Montcalm and of all his officers, the disorder has been promptly arrested and only 6 or 7 English soldiers killed."[65] This was a gross miscalculation on the part of Montcalm and Vaudreuil, but they were doing their best to make their point that the British were overreacting to say that the capitulation was broken.

Whether the capitulation had been breached or not was the subject of much conversation, and on November 18 Loudoun laid out his conditions for following the terms of the capitulation.

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[63] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York* , 10: 619, 633.

[64] Loudoun, Letter to Vaudreuil, November 8, 1757, LO 4788.

[65] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 10: 619, 634.

He told Vaudreuil, "I have hitherto adhered strictly to the Capitulation, in Expectation that you would have Instantly return'd to me here, …all the Prisoners of both Sexes." In addition, Loudoun requested, "The King my Masters Arms, and the Cloaths and Baggage, of the Officers and Soldiers, with all those Concerned in the Robereys & Murders, to be Punished at my discretion."[66] Vaudreuil, of course, was not about to fulfill these requests, beyond the return of the prisoners. In the end, Loudoun was recalled to England before the next battle season began and it was left to his successor, General James Abercromby to synthesize the rumors, accusations, and reports and decide what to do.

Before examining Abercromby's decisions in 1758, it is important to see how the incident was discussed in civilian society in 1757. In both news reports and opinion pieces, writers used the deaths of the women in particular as a rallying point for condemnation of French barbarity and as a call to arms. France's ability to cultivate Indian allies and to use them heavily in warfare exposed the French army and leadership to accusations that they had abandoned civilized behavior. In a war over which empire could most effectively rule the North American continent, British leaders exploited the opportunity to show that France was devolving, uncivilized, immoral, and out of control.

The earliest newspaper reports of the event were in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* and the *Pennsylvania Journal*, both of August 18. The reports were publications of letters sent by people who had witnessed the event or at least part of it. The earliest letters/reports were dated August 15 from Albany. One of the early letters stated: "not a Soul was suffered to reach Fort Edward but in a naked Condition, and many cruelly murdered, especially the Women and Children, who were reduced from about 80 to 10." Certainly a large number of women were captured, and it is

[66] Loudoun, Letter to Vaudreuil, November 8, 1757, LO 4788.

possible that only ten women made it to Fort Edward, which would have given the impression that the rest were murdered.

Another letter from the 15th did not mention women. It stated in part, "they began to massacre all the Sick and Wounded within the Lines, and before both Armies; next they hawled all the Negroes, Mulattoes and Indian Soldiers, out of the Ranks, butchering and scalping them; when our Men began to march, they then began without Distinction, stripped and tomahawk'd both Officers and Men." A third letter from August 15 informed the public that "the Escort soon left them, and the Indians murdered many of our People, strip'd them all; the most of them stark naked, killed the Women and Children, and this they began immediately after the Capitulation."[67] All of these letters contain elements of the "anti-Indian sublime"—nakedness, butchering and tomahawking, killing women and children, but there was one letter that had truly mastered the rhetoric. It was also the most widely printed letter, appearing in newspapers in Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Hampshire.

This letter was dated August 15 and related "That the French immediately after the Capitulation, most perfidiously, let their Indian Blood-Hounds loose upon our People." At that, "a few ran off with their Arms, and light Cloathing that they had upon their Backs… and were pursued by the Indians six or seven Miles on their Way to Fort Edward." These were the lucky ones as "The most were stripped stark-naked; many were killed and scalped, Officers not excepted." The author then really warmed to his task, continuing, "The Throats of most, if not all the Women, were cut, their Bellies ripped open, their Bowels torn out, and thrown upon the Faces of their dead or dying Bodies; and 'tis said, that all the Women are murdered one Way or other." The author adds, "the Children were taken by the Heels, and their Brains beat out against

[67] *Pennsylvania Journal*, August 18, 1757.

the Trees or Stones, and not one of them saved."[68] With both the images of the pregnant women being mutilated after death and children being brutally killed, the account horrifies the reader and names the French as the guilty party while the Indians were "Blood-Hounds" manipulated by the French. None of the other letters offered their readers such a chance to share in the pathos and emotion of the moment, which perhaps explains why it was so widely reprinted and persisted for many years.

At the end of this account, the writer of the report included his own opinion of what the attack meant for the future of the war. He began by indicting French cruelty in their quest for empire, noting, "'Tis certain that the Growth of the British Colonies has long been the grand Object of *French Envy*; and 'tis said that their Officers have Orders from their Superiors, to check it at all Events, and to that End, to make the present War as bloody and destructive as possible!" The author went on to conflate Indian frontier attacks with French activity by asking, "And is not every News-paper still stained with the innocent Blood of Women and Children, and of unarmed Sufferers, who were plowing their Land, or gathering in their Harvest, on our Frontiers?" The implication was that the French broke the laws of war by killing defenseless people.

The author then turned to the event at Fort William Henry and wondered "To what a Pitch of Perfidy and Cruelty is the French Nation arrived! Would not an ancient *Heathen* shudder with Horror, on hearing so hideous a Tale!" The author asked his readers, "Is it the *Most Christian King* that could give such Orders? Or could the most savage Nations ever exceed such French Barbarities! Besides this, was it ever known in the Pagan World, That Terms of

[68] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 25, 1757 (also printed in *The New York Mercury*, August 22, 1757; *The Boston Weekly Advertiser*, August 29, 1757; *Pennsylvania Journal*, August 18, 1757; *The Maryland Gazette*, September 1, 1757; *The New Hampshire Gazette*, September 2, 1757), emphasis original.

Capitulation were not held inviolably sacred." The real horror was not that women were being killed in war-related deaths; that had been happening since 1755 along the frontiers. The terrifying aspect of the situation was that the French were acting like heathen barbarians. How could they claim to be Christians, Britons wondered, and sanction the breaking of the rules of war? If the French would not hold to the rules of war, their very civility was questionable. The easy conclusion from these points was that French civilization should not be spread in North America and Christian Britons should do whatever possible to prevent the expansion of French domination. Yet, this could not be done peacefully. The author concluded by calling on the provincials to overcome their own reservations in war-making and "make some severe Examples of our inhuman Enemies when they fall into our Hands."[69]

The only attempt to address some of the factual errors in this report was another letter dated August 29 that four newspapers published around September 1. This letter noted that "Seven Deserters are also come to Town, and give different Accounts, which cannot be depended on; though we hear that the French have burnt down Fort William Henry… and that the Massacre among the Women was not so great as it was generally believed at first; but that the Indians destroyed all the Sick and Wounded is beyond Dispute."[70] This report was followed by a printing of the terms of the capitulation in their entirety.

Another opinion piece printed soon after the news came out about Fort William Henry focused on the danger threatening women and children by French "Insolence." This author called on his countrymen to take up arms. He asked his readers, "Can we… remain in a

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[69] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 15, 1757.

[70] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 1, 1757 (also in *The New York Mercury*, August 29, 1757; *The Pennsylvania Journal*, September 1, 1757, *The Maryland Gazette,* September 1, 1757 (?)).

scandalous Inaction, while we see our Country ransacked, Wives killed, innocent Children murdered, and aged Parents destroyed; as we evidently must do, if we refuse to exert our Utmost, for the Defence of our Country?" In characterizing the latest incident as an incident of "our Country ransacked," the author drew parallels between the attacks on the frontiers and the attack on the garrison. Like others, he summoned women's voices to prod men to action by asking, "can we refuse our Assistance when our Country, our Wives and Children so loudly demand it?" Further, he took up the theme of French savagery, exclaiming, "May those who are gone into the Field, be incensed at the Barbarity of the Enemy, and take the Field with an undaunted Resolution, to conquer or die."[71]

In *The American Magazine or Monthly Chronicle for the British Colonies* of October 1, 1757, an unnamed author (the editor was Rev. William Smith), printed a long piece titled "Account of the North American Indians." The article focused on its proposed subject for much of the piece, but for the last few pages, the author strayed to the topic of the war and the enemy. In fact, the last several pages were a transcription of a section of a long letter attributed to William Livingston, the future governor of New Jersey. That letter was titled "A Review of the Military Operations in North America, from the Commencement of the French hostilities on the frontiers of Virginia in 1753, to the Surrender of Oswego, on the 14th of August, 1756; in a Letter to a Nobleman."[72] Livingston's letter was reprinted in several publications including the *Universal Magazine* in May 1757. The writer of the piece in *The American Magazine* apparently thought that Livingston's words regarding the fall of Fort Oswego were again relevant after the fall of Fort William Henry. Referring to the French, Livingston told his readers, "We have a

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[71] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 25, 1757.

[72] Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society for the year 1800*, vol. 8 (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1846 [1801]), 67.

subtile, enterprising enemy to contend with; an enemy rapacious, martial, and bloody; committing murders rather than waging war." Livingston called on the colonies to unite against their common enemy and "exert our whole force for the preservation of these colonies from bloody carnage and total ruin, by extirpating this brood of French savages from the face of the continent." French cruelty and savagery invited a vigorous offense.[73]

It is perhaps not surprising that, when faced with the decision in 1758, General Abercromby chose not to uphold the capitulation. Several hundred of the captives from Fort William Henry had returned or were on their way home, so Abercromby felt safe in ignoring some of the terms, particularly those relating to British soldiers not serving for eighteen months. On March 26, 1758, Governor Benning Wentworth of New Hampshire wrote to General Abercromby on behalf of Colonel Nathaniel Meserve's regiment of 300 men. These men had been present at the capitulation of Fort William Henry, so they were subject to its restriction on their participation in the war for eighteen months. However, only seven months later they wanted to get back into the action. Wentworth wrote to Abercromby and conveyed the regiment's argument that "the French in many Instances have Violated the Articles of capitulation on their par[t]." Therefore, "they Esteem themselves disengaged from Complying with their Obligation, & futher, that they are willing to run any risqué provided they Can have the Liberty to proceed in the Regiment now raisieing." Wentworth added his own argument stating, "Your Excellency can want no proof that the French have in too many Instances broke their Articles, & the breaking of one, must of Consequence make void the rest."

[73] *The American Magazine or Monthly Chronicle for the British Colonies,* "An Account of the North American Indians," William Smith, ed. 1:1 (Oct. 1757), 22-23.

Abercromby agreed. On April 5, 1758 he wrote to Governor Thomas Pownall of Massachusetts whose troops had also petitioned him to be allowed to continue fighting. He explained to the governor, "I am so much of opinion, that the French have been guilty of a Breach of the Capitulation of Fort William Henry, that upon application from Governor Wentworth to me … I immediately Concurr'd therein, and added, that I should be highly pleased to have them with me; you may be assured, I shall not be less so, with having yours." Because of the passionate and widely spread arguments about French perfidy immediately after the capitulation, it was easy for Abercromby to decide that the capitulation was officially broken.[74]

Meanwhile, the real people who had been captured after the fall of Fort William Henry were beginning to make their way back to British territory. On October 18, 1757, the first shipload of British and provincial soldiers, women, and children arrived in Nova Scotia. There were 143 people on board, including 6 women and 3 children, but 4 soldiers had died on the passage. These people were fortunate in that they had been redeemed from their Indian captors soon after the capitulation; they boarded a ship for Halifax on September 1. Vaudreuil sent Loudoun a list of the passengers on the day they boarded the ship, as part of his effort to prove to Loudoun that the French were trying to make the situation right.[75] But many more people experienced longer captivity and a longer time in the prisoner exchange system. Of the 80 women at Fort William Henry, if 10 were killed, 10 made it to Fort Edward, and 6 returned to Halifax in October, that still left 56 women in captivity in late 1757.

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[74] Benning Wentworth, Letter to James Abercromby, March 26, 1758, AB79; James Abercromby, Letter to Thomas Pownall, April 5, 1758, AB 117.

[75] "Return of the Men's Names under the Capitulation," October 18, 1757, LO 6795; Marquis de Vaudreuil, "Role of the English Officers and Soldiers," September 1, 1757, LO 6678.

Thanks to James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826), the "massacre" of the retreating garrison was quickly romanticized and this imagery persists to our own day, despite the availability of more sober minded accounts.[76] The imagery of unspecific Indians tearing babies from their screaming mothers and brutally killing both mother and child[77] endures because it illuminates the gendered interpretation of women and war as being incongruous, despite their well-documented connection. When women died battle-related deaths, it was characterized as murder and evidence of incivility, especially if it seemed to be officially sanctioned by a civilized nation. The women's murdered bodies were co-opted for rhetorical purposes in order to prove that one nation was more civilized than the other.

As easy as it was to construct rhetoric about the death of women in battle, the real participation of women in the army was difficult for both the women involved and for army officials. Charlotte Browne had no clear place in the army, even though her position was the most well-defined occupation available to women. As a result of her ambiguous situation, she experienced several hardships relating to travel, male protection, and fitting into civilian society. She struggled to be fully comfortable in the army and in civilian society and faced challenges from both spheres. While Charlotte Browne's experience should not be taken as representative

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[76] Who can resist Daniel Day-Lewis' Hawkeye racing across the field of battle, hair flying, to rescue his lady love from a Huron tomahawk in the 1992 film version of *The Last of the Mohicans*?

[77] From *The Last of the Mohicans*: " 'Here -- here -- there -- all -- any -- everything!' exclaimed the breathless woman, tearing the lighter articles of dress from her person with ill-directed and trembling fingers; 'take all, but give me my babe!' The savage spurned the worthless rags, and perceiving that the shawl had already become a prize to another, his bantering but sullen smile changing to a gleam of ferocity, he dashed the head of the infant against a rock, and cast its quivering remains to her very feet. For an instant the mother stood, like a statue of despair, looking wildly down at the unseemly object, which had so lately nestled in her bosom and smiled in her face; and then she raised her eyes and countenance toward heaven, as if calling on God to curse the perpetrator of the foul deed. She was spared the sin of such a prayer for, maddened at his disappointment, and excited at the sight of blood, the Huron mercifully drove his tomahawk into her own brain. The mother sank under the blow, and fell, grasping at her child, in death, with the same engrossing love that had caused her to cherish it when living. James Fenimore Cooper, *The Last of the Mohicans: A Narrative of 1757* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 215.

of all army women's experiences, her history does provide a perspective on how gender norms played a role in women's participation in the army.

Taking Charlotte Browne's story together with the history of the rhetoric surrounding the women at Fort William Henry again emphasizes the ambiguous and difficult position of women in the army. Women's place in the army was always tenuous and not fully regulated, and by joining the army, women opened themselves up to having their actions interpreted and evaluated by others. After the fall of Fort William Henry, the women who were killed and captured were portrayed as both innocent civilians and national subjects whose deaths illuminated the barbarism of the enemies and the civility of the British nation. But behind all this rhetoric and interpretation were real women. The women who were captured after the fall of Fort William Henry entered the prisoner exchange system and spent months or years getting back home. But the use of the women's suffering was immediate and quickly paid dividends both in shaping public perception of the French and forming military strategy regarding the terms of the capitulation. The difficulties associated with interpreting women's presence in the army points to the ambiguities and challenges of their position.

Chapter Six

"To Beg some relief from your Lordship:" Petitioners and Lord Loudoun

In the early fall of 1755, the remainder of Braddock's defeated army was retreating from Fort Cumberland to Philadelphia. Following the withdrawal of the British army, provincials in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia had to step in to provide defense for their colonies. At this time, a young man named John Whipple joined a ranging company to help defend the frontier against Indian attacks. For about a year, Whipple did his part to protect the backcountry, but after the Virginia assembly recalled the rangers, he was ready to go home. Eagerly anticipating his return was his mother, Elizabeth Forrester, a widow. Whipple's homecoming was thwarted by the captains of the ranging company who turned all of their men over to the captain of a regiment that was forming up to continue fighting the war. Whipple explained to his new captain that he wanted to go home, and in the early days of winter, 1756, the captain signed a "Furlough" and allowed him to leave. As Whipple was making his way through Virginia, a recruiting officer of the Second Battalion of the Royal American Regiment stopped him in Yorktown and tried to convince him to enlist. Whipple refused and presented his furlough. The recruiting officer threw Whipple in jail, assuring the young man that he would write to the author of the furlough to find out if it was authentic. John Whipple sat in a frigid jail for two weeks before the cold and hunger convinced him to agree to enlist, if only to get out of prison.

Two days later, two of Whipple's friends arrived with the intent of helping him out of his predicament. They had heard about his plight by chance, but to Whipple's dismay, they arrived too late to help him. The recruiting officer absolutely refused to release John Whipple. Soon after that, Whipple marched with the army to Philadelphia (where he may have seen his mother briefly) and then on to New York. Elizabeth Forrester refused to abandon her son to his fate.

She appealed to friends and local authorities (including Benjamin Franklin), but, although they pitied her, there was nothing they could do to help. Elizabeth Forrester would not give up, however, and she decided to appeal to the highest authority (under the king) that she could think of, Lord Loudoun.

Elizabeth Forrester sent her petition to Loudoun in February, 1757 and followed it up with a second petition on March 28, 1757. In the first petition she began by apologizing for taking so much of the great man's time and assured him that she had tried other avenues for relief first. She then told her son's story with as many details as she knew. Forrester concluded the petition with a rush of words throwing herself on Loudoun's mercy and offering him heavenly rewards. She wrote, "My only hope is in thy Justice and humanity; pity a Mother whom anguish of heart makes importunate & restore a Son unjustly detained, so may Almighty God pour Blessings on thy Heart."[1]

Elizabeth Forrester's petition is one of about twenty that Lord Loudoun received and preserved in his papers. The petitions show how the war affected families and individuals in a variety of ways. Although there are a few petitions from men, women sent most of the petitions found in Loudoun's papers.[2] While the petitions cannot be considered representative of a "typical" experience of the war, the petitions are nevertheless useful for several reasons. First, they provide a glimpse into how women and families managed when fathers and sons left for war. Second, they convey how some people thought about army service, the army presence, and army authorities, to some extent. Third, they provide a perspective onto how people experienced the war indirectly, in that petitioners connected to the army had their attention turned to the

[1] Elizabeth Forrester, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, February 1757, LO 2945.

[2] There are a large number of memorials (slightly different in form from a petition) written by men, mainly soldiers asking for an assignment in the army.

fighting on the periphery even though they did not experience fighting themselves. Fourth, they show the extent to which and the manner in which civilians connected to the army sought to negotiate, manage, or change a wide variety of situations involving their families and family members. Fifth, the petitions provide an additional perspective on the variety of ways that people could be part of the army: long term, short term, soldier, carpenter, tradesman, pioneer, bateaux service and more. All of the petitions do not illuminate all of these areas, but, taken together, the petitions can provide an understanding of the indirect experience of war.

This chapter is somewhat of a departure in that it is not as much about individuals or communities on the borderland as it is about people who were connected to and affected by the battles on the borderland. Therefore, while it does not contribute as much to the discussion of life on the periphery, it does provide an additional perspective on the idea that negotiation was a significant feature of the relationship between army authorities and civilians. Thus far, the chapters have emphasized army leaders' demands and civilian resistance or communities' requests for protection and leaders' responses. This chapter complicates the discussion of negotiation by demonstrating the degree to which individuals felt comfortable making requests of army leaders and by expanding the discussion of what aspects of the relationship between war and society were open to negotiation.

While many of the people who sent petitions were not on the borderland, their attention was on the borderland and their lives were directly affected by what happened there. The variety of ways that the activity at forts affected families led to petitions relating to a variety of problems. It is also important to note that many of the problems in the petitions were related to the fact that men in the army were serving on the frontier far from home with little or no way to communicate with their families. While provincials had been fighting (especially on the

frontiers) for decades, the Seven Years' War was the first time that large numbers of provincials served outside their home colony. This separation created new problems that had not appeared when men served for shorter periods of time closer to home.

The results of the petitions, while conveying interesting information about the relationship of war and society, are not the sole focus of the discussion that follows. Rather, greater significance is accorded to the act of petitioning (including the content of the petitions themselves) and what it says concerning how people felt about the army and imperial administrators. Toward that end, the petitions can be considered as part of the larger imperial culture and the "cult of monarchy." Through petitions, women and men placed themselves in a position of dependence on British authority and, in particular, on the representative of the king, Lord Loudoun. As Brendon McConville notes, many Britons in North America had grown accustomed to viewing the king as a benevolent father. While Loudoun was not the king, the petitioners addressed him in obsequious language and requested favors as they would of a paternalistic figure. The culture of devotion to the monarchy in early America could prove useful to Loudoun, but also made him, as the king's representative, the target of people's requests.[3]

Aside from his elevated position, Loudoun was the focal point for a variety of reasons. Some of the petitioners had previous contact with Loudoun. In her petition, Ann Moore reminded Loudoun of "the kind reception thou gave me in the City of Albany when I came to visit thee in the pure Love of the Lord of Heaven & of the whole Earth."[4] Elizabeth Faesch and her son John Rudolf Faesch had written to Loudoun previously and took time in their petition to

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[3] Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 63-70.

[4] Ann Moore, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, March 12, 1757, LO 3024.

note “That your Petitioners are for ever obligated to your Lordship for the Favour your Lordship was pleased to shew to your Petitioners in Promising to assist your Petitioners.”[5] Other people sought Loudoun out as the one with the most authority to handle their cases. Twelve tradesmen’s wives whose husbands were taken prisoner at the capitulation of Fort Oswego indicated in their joint petition that they were “Truly Sensible we have none other under God to look to for redress but from Your Lordship only.”[6] Sophia Beckers’ husband was also taken at Fort Oswego, and she was in danger of losing his pay, which was dependent on the legislature of New Jersey. She therefore appealed to Loudoun as one with at least equal power to the provincial government.[7]

For still others, Loudoun was not the first person to whom they appealed. As mentioned above, Elizabeth Forrester’s petition was endorsed by Benjamin Franklin.[8] Reverend John Moorehead wrote a petition on behalf of men and women in his congregation who were seeking back pay for the men’s efforts as “Pioneers” in Massachusetts.[9] Jane Williams wrote that her husband’s pay had been held up because “Majr Craven does not think himself warranted to allow, and discharge” her husband’s account. After their attempts to work with other people failed, petitioners appealed to Loudoun, making sure, as Jane Williams did, to beg that “Your Lordship will be pleased kindly to excuse this Trouble.”[10]

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[5] Elizabeth Faesch and John Rudolf Faesch, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, May 30, 1757, LO 3739.

[6] The Petition of Twelve Trandesmen’s Wives whose husbands were taken at Oswego, March 1757, LO 3239.

[7] Sophia Beckers, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, July 1756, LO 1382.

[8] In his note on the petition, Franklin calls her Mary Forrester.

[9] John Moorehead, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, January 31, 1757, LO 2740.

[10] Jane Williams, Petition to Loudoun, February 1757, LO 2950.

Because of Loudoun's high status and because an appeal to him was probably a final effort to accomplish their goals, petitioners addressed Loudoun in very obsequious language, elevating him from an earl to a position just below God. Indeed, some of the petitions employed almost Biblical language to address Loudoun. Catarina Couthy referred to him as "your Lordships worthy Self—who is Clothed with power."[11] Elizabeth and John Faesch noted that they were "convinced of your Lordships Benevolence and Protection and putting their Confedence, next to God, in your Lordship."[12] Ann Moore, a Quaker, almost apologized that her religious beliefs keep her from exalting Loudoun in her address. She begged, "Excuse my simple address to thee my Friend, for I can say truly that I bear as due a regard to thee as if I had given thee all the Highest Titles that could be set forth by the Tongue of man."[13] These rhetorical flourishes betray the high expectations the petitioners had of Loudoun and of the petitioning process.

Although the very nature of a petition precluded much power on the part of the petitioners, the authors often offered Loudoun spiritual benefits. Jane Williams insisted that, should Loudoun retrieve the money due her husband, she and her spouse would be "under the greatest Obligations, ever to pray for your Lordships Prosperity, and Success."[14] Jemima Farrar indicated that if Loudoun fulfilled her request he would then enjoy the "blessings of her that is

[11] Caterina Couthy, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, November 16, 1756, LO 2226.

[12] Elizabeth Faesch and John Rudolf Faesch, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, May 30, 1757, LO 3739.

[13] Ann Moore, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, March 12, 1757, LO 3024.

[14] Jane Williams, Petition to Loudoun, February, 1757, LO 2950.

ready to perish."[15] Most simply closed their petition with a line which promised that, if their petition was attended to, they would feel "duty bound" to pray for their benefactor.

In addition to understanding how the petitioners approached Loudoun, it is useful to try to determine how Loudoun approached the petitions and the petitioners. In the basic narrative of the war and in his own papers, Loudoun generally comes across as frustrated with non-cooperative colonists and, like Braddock, suspicious of their loyalty. He was also famous for brushing aside colonial resistance and taking what he needed when he needed it. Despite this reputation, people felt comfortable petitioning him, even when their requests had little to do with the army. The difficulties in determining the result of many of the petitions must temper any judgment of Loudoun; however, if Loudoun had addressed the wide variety of problems with which petitioners confronted him, he would have taken on an almost monarchical degree of authority. There is no evidence that he pursued that path, but, in considering the relationship between civilians and army authorities, it should be noted that the petitioners were willing to give Loudoun unprecedented authority if he would intervene in their favor.

While both men and women petitioned Loudoun, it is necessary to pay female petitioners special attention for several reasons. First, women who participated in the war in any way did not leave many records behind, so what is available should be studied closely in pursuit of a holistic picture of the intersection of war and society. Second, petitioning was a rare act in which men and women were equal in their submission to a higher authority but also in their ability to confront a high authority or seek a redress of grievances. Third, female petitioners during the Seven Years' War were making use of an act with a longer history. The women who sent petitions to Lord Loudoun were expressing themselves in a standard form that had been

[15] Jemima Farrar, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, February 5, 1757, LO 2789.

widely accepted in Britain for centuries. Historian Elaine Hobby designates petitions written by women as falling into two broad categories: "those concerning individual grievances or needs; and those addressing more general social issues." The petitions in the Loudoun papers all fall into the first category. Linda Kerber notes that petitions were a "prepolitical" form of expression. Petitions placed the needs of the powerless at the feet of the powerful and essentially begged for redress. Most petitions followed a specific rhetorical and written form. Kerber notes some common elements of petitions: the petition often began with "the acknowledgement of subordination; by definition the petitioner poses no threat" and also included the "rhetoric of humility… whether or not humility is felt in fact." Hobby concurs, noting that the "assertion of the women's helplessness, distress and need for protection" were characteristics of specifically female-authored petitions.[16]

Examining the petitions, therefore, provides another entryway into seeing how women performed their dual roles as "women" and national subjects. Their language and use of the form fit in with their role as subordinate, dependent women, and the act of petitioning allowed them to assume the rights of national subjects and engage in a discussion with various authorities (or protest their actions). Women could not draft or vote on laws regulating army service or become army officers and make the decisions that affected women and families, but they were able to write petitions that would receive an equal hearing from the commanding general, without challenging gender norms. With this option open to them, it is not surprising that women took advantage of it. As noted in the previous chapter, women were not excluded from participating in the war and having their (even unwilling) participation interpreted for

[16] Elaine Hobby, *Virtue of Necessity: English Women's Writing 1649-88* (London: Virago Press, 1988), 13-14. Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 85.

nationalistic purposes. Petitioning gave women an opportunity to attempt to exercise some measure of control over how the war affected them. In their subordinate position as women, females were subject to men, but in the absence of men, women were able to express their opinion (through this accepted form) and be heard. The petitions, therefore, present a rare opportunity to try to determine from their own words what women thought of the war, the army, and the British authorities in their midst. While several aspects of the petitions were standard, the rest of the content, and the variations between them, reveal, at least in part, how women perceived their situations.

Nowhere is this opportunity to glean insights more evident than in Elizabeth Forrester's second petition. By March 28, 1757, Elizabeth Forrester still did not have any word regarding the return of her son, John Whipple, or the result of her petition. Therefore, she decided to get a little more creative with her second petition by inclosing two "Small presents whether thou grant me my petition or not." These presents, though regrettably not extant, were drawings, most likely produced by Elizabeth Forrester herself. Rather than simply sending the drawings and leaving them for Loudoun to decipher, Forrester "thought it proper to acquaint thee with the meaning of the figure and the versis that is on them." The detailed description of the pictures is noteworthy not only for what it says about the nature of petitions and the relationship between petitioner and benefactor, but also for what they say about how Elizabeth Forrester viewed the British monarchy and politics. It is important to remember that her son had been jailed, forced to enlist, and put into a position of extreme danger fighting a war. One might think that Forrester would resent the British authorities and the war especially since she was petitioning to have her son released from any association with them. However, the descriptions of the drawings do not reflect that attitude.

Elizabeth Forrester titled the first drawing "the picture of our king." It featured George II, probably enthroned, with "the king of frans on his knees beging for peace at his Right hand." King George's response was to hold "his Sword against Lewises Lips as much as to Say here kiss the rod." Louis XV in turn is pictured casting his crown down "at our kings feet" in adoration and submission. Forrester realized that imagining King Louis in this position went against her Protestant ideals noting that "it is against my principle for one man to worship another." But, she was quickly able to justify her artistic license because Louis was Catholic "and if he Can go on his knees to the pope I think our king more worthy." Forrester, in her drawings, betrays her optimism about the ultimate victory of Britain, despite Braddock's defeat, the ravaging of the frontiers, the ignominious defeat of Fort Oswego, and even though she was petitioning for her son to be released from service to the king.

The second picture was more detailed than the first. This one she titled "the picture of the Earl of Loudon." From the somewhat confused description it seems to have portrayed Loudoun and King George II standing in front of the king's coat of arms. Written on "the kings glove" were words of benediction for the king proclaiming, "May blesings attend our noble king his heart be fild with grase [?] [grant] him Long Life free from all Strife his days to end in peace." Wishes for Loudoun were inscribed on the king's other glove: "Likewise the Lord his honoured Earl may he shine Like the Stars by the Light of that pearl grace in his heart."

Forrester included more kind words for the earl as she instructed Loudoun to "Look up on the fore finger and thou wilt find John and then at the roots of the fingers over the unicorns head: begins Earl of Loudoun: if the honour of god is not our owne in all we do we are to

blame."[17] The French king was not forgotten in this drawing either. In Loudoun's other hand was a "vers for the king of frans." The verse starts as an address to Louis XV which directs "beg Lewis and do not fear thou disturber of our peace," but seems to devolve into Forrester's own hopes and prayers for Loudoun, George II, and the conduct of the war. Speaking for herself she declared "I desire that all that is done may be done to the honour and glory of the great Lord of Lords and king of kings." Her desires turned into a prayer as she asked "that if it be Consistent with his blessed Will and for the honour of his grate name that he may for his Sons Sake and for his Elects Sake be with you protect you and preserve you both from Sheding of Blood or having your blood Shed." She concluded with a final hope directed toward Loudoun, "that thou mayst have the blessed title of peasmaker and that thou mays have to Say as our blessed Lord Said: i was Sent not to destroy mens Lives but to Save them."

Forrester's plea for peace in the second drawing is contrary to the image of George II punishing Louis XV in the first drawing. But calling for peace and looking to Loudoun as a savior is perhaps more in keeping with Elizabeth Forrester's reason for petitioning. As it happened, in her excitement about describing the drawings, she nearly forgot her main point concerning her son. She closed the petition/description with "So all at present from thy Sincearly Well wisher Elizebeth Forrister [*sic*]." It was as a postscript that she added, "I do beseech thee to Send me my Son if thou canst any ways or by any means Spare him but if i cannot by any means obtain him my Life is no Longer Dear unto me." Thus rather dramatically, Forrester closed her second attempt to have her son released.[18]

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[17] The unicorn was part of the Hanoverian coat of arms.

[18] Elizabeth Forrester, Letter to the Earl of Loudoun, March 28, 1757, LO 3193.

In most cases, it is difficult to determine exactly what Loudoun thought of the petitions. Loudoun labeled all of the papers he received with a short description—usually just the name, date, and location of the sender but occasionally he included a brief summary of the contents. He simply marked Elizabeth Forrester's long letter describing the two drawings as "Memorial from Elizabeth Forrester March 28th 1757 Desiring to have her Son discharged." Even though Loudoun seemingly kept every scrap of paper anyone handed him, he does not appear to have kept the drawings, nor did he seem to take any notice of their description which constitutes most of the letter and reveals Elizabeth Forrester's high opinion of him. And, as shall be seen, the drawings did not help Forrester win her petition; John Whipple remained in the army. Despite her lavish praise of Loudoun, Forrester's assumption of his mercy and grace was not met.

While no other petitioners chose to include visual representations in support of their petitions, most did include many details in support of their requests, and some of the petitions reveal several layers of complexity. For purposes of analysis, the petitions can be grouped into three categories: petitions to get sons into or out of the army, petitions relating to the battle and capitulation of Fort Oswego, and petitions from people seeking redress for an army-related grievance. From the first category, a complicated situation involving a mother and son can be found in the petition of Ann Moore, a famous Quaker preacher. Her first preaching journey led her from her home in Maryland to Pennsylvania, Albany, and New England in 1756 and 1757. She had married a widower, Walter Moore, in 1738. Walter Moore already had two children—Sarah and Thomas—by his late wife when he and Ann married. The couple then had five more children. However, in 1753 Walter Moore was disowned by the Quaker meeting. It is not difficult to speculate that this event would have been embarrassing to Ann Moore.

Her trials were compounded when the oldest son Thomas decided to join the British army. Although she spent many years preaching to soldiers, Ann Moore was solidly opposed to violence.[19] She attempted to persuade Thomas to leave the army, but he refused. Next, she attempted to have him discharged and sent home by appealing to Loudoun. She had first met the Loudoun on November 16, 1756, and the meeting went so well that she decided to petition him for the release of her son on March 12, 1757. At that time Moore was back in Maryland caring for her children and reprobate husband and planning her next preaching journey which would begin in December.

Understanding this background information makes her petition particularly interesting. Her case for her son's discharge was difficult to make since she could not point to any benefits that the army would receive for discharging Thomas. In crafting her petition, therefore, Moore did not focus on the religious convictions that led her to make her request. Moore began her petition by informing Loudoun that her forthcoming request was "Just and Equal." She explained to Loudoun that God "Call[s] me often from Home [in] his Work which he Commands me to do." Her absence left her husband, an "old man of about sixty four or five years of Age," alone (she did not mention the presence of her five other children who were most likely at home with their father).[20] She informed Loudoun that "thou hath both our Son, and Servant too," but she was willing to forgo the servant, noting, "I only Crave my Son that He may be a help to his aged Parent in my absence." In one further effort to bolster her case, Moore told Loudoun "I

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[19] Margaret Hope Bacon, ed., *"Wilt Thou Go On My Errand?" Journals of Three 18th Century Quaker Women Ministers* (Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill Publications, 1994), 285-287.

[20] Loudoun himself was fifty-two years old in 1757 and may not have thought that a sixty-four year old was particularly old. Moore's stepdaughter Sarah had married in 1748 but her other five children, Elizabeth, Rachel, Ann Jr., John, and Mary were probably at home since Mary was born in 1754 and the oldest could only have been about 19. Bacon, ed., *Quaker Women Ministers*, 285, 286, 377 n.3.

may let thee know that I have seen my Son & that he hath lain sick most part of this Winter."[21] Moore's argument was that Thomas was not helping the army at all by being sick, his life was in danger in the cold winter, and he was needed at home.

Despite Moore's notoriety and her personal connection to Loudoun, he did not fulfill her request. In 1763 Thomas Moore was still in the army, and Ann Moore was still trying to convince him to leave. She worried about her reputation as a preacher since her husband was disowned and her son was engaged in violence.[22] However, as much as Loudoun tolerated and even welcomed Quaker preachers into the army camps, Ann Moore's request was not beneficial to the army and could not be granted. In this situation, it certainly appears that Thomas wanted to remain in the army and that Moore was using her husband's "infirmity" as an excuse to try to convince Loudoun to act on her behalf. Perhaps if she did not already have a personal connection to him she would not have asked for his intervention in what seemed to be a family quarrel. That she chose to petition him says as much about her assertiveness as it does about the wide variety of motives that would drive people to petition.

A very different situation regarding a son's army service can be found in the petition of Margaret MckMacken. Far from a family argument, MckMacken found herself right in the middle of an argument between two powerful army authorities. Margaret MckMacken's son was an indentured servant in Chester County, Pennsylvania at the time of his enlistment, and his mother's attempt to un-enlist him was part of a larger quarrel in the colonies concerning the enlistment of indentured servants. Technically, servants were allowed to *voluntarily* enlist in the army. When William Shirley was acting as commanding general in 1756, he attempted to

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[21] Ann Moore, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, March 12, 1757, LO 3024.

[22] Bacon, ed., *Quaker Women Ministers*, 286.

discourage the recruiting of indentured servants because it angered the colonists. However, as the war progressed and more men were needed, Shirley was not able to afford the provincials this luxury, and servants were permitted to enlist but not by the efforts of a recruiting officer.[23] One of the factors that led to the provincials' discontent concerned questions about whether servants were listed voluntarily or not. Recruiting officers were notorious for getting young men drunk and convincing them to enlist "voluntarily" before they sobered up.

Margaret MckMacken, for one, certainly believed the reports about nefarious recruiting officers. Her son, Samuel Henry, was indentured to Robert Powell, a "Cordswainer" or shoemaker of Chester County, Pennsylvania. In August 1755, the remnant of Braddock's army, now under the command of Colonel Thomas Dunbar, was marching from Fort Cumberland to go into very early winter quarters in Philadelphia. Along the way they came across Samuel Henry, and "by the unwarrantable Artificer of a Serjeant and Party of Soldiers belonging to Capt Dobson's Company," Henry was "Taken into his Majesties Service." Samuel Henry was one of many servants enlisted during the fall of 1755 until the general outcry of the provincials to General Shirley led him to strike a deal with the colonists. Shirley decided that if any servant wanted to return to his indentureship, his master could redeem him by providing another man in the servant's place.[24] Further, Shirley reiterated his suggestion to the recruiting officers to desist

[23] In a letter to Henry Fox, Shirley explains, "The Officers have been arrested for entertaining these Servants, Violences us'd by the populace in [Pennsylvania and Maryland] for recovering them from the Officers, and the Servants imprison'd for inlisiting…" William Shirley to Henry Fox, March 8, 1756. William Shirley, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, vol. 2, Charles Henry Lincoln, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 413.

[24] Shirley, *Correspondence*, 386-387.

from enlisting servants if possible.[25] That was the official position, but as it filtered down through the ranks of society it seems to have been misunderstood.

Margaret MckMacken and Samuel Henry, among others, thought that Shirley had contacted Dunbar and "strictly require[ed] him not to inlist either Servants or Apprentices." According to MckMacken, this gave Henry the freedom to leave the army since he "Conceiv[ed] that under the aforesaid prohibition & without an express Provision in the act of Parliament to authorize the inlisting such Servants & Apprentices he could not be justly detain'd." Acting on this basis, Samuel Henry did not contact his master Robert Powell to arrange a replacement. The situation was made more confusing because Henry's commanding officer neglected to include Samuel Henry's name on the general list of deserters, so Henry thought that his actions were "tacitly assented to by the then commanding Officer." Further, no one from the army attempted to find Henry, "notwithstanding the Army continued several weeks in this City after his Supposed desertion." In the meantime, Henry returned to his master Robert Powell and started making shoes again.

Suddenly, on December 7, 1756, "a Party of Soldiers with a Serjeant" burst into Robert Powell's house and hauled Samuel Henry away, claiming he was a deserter. This action, according to Margaret MckMacken, had a threefold result: "the Damage of his Said master, the Great dissatisfaction of the said Saml. Henry & … the Inexpressible Grief and distress of your Petitioner." To rectify this situation, Margaret MckMacken did not directly say that she wanted her son returned to her. Rather, she asked "that your Excellency will be Pleased to take her deplorable Case into your Serious Consideration" and appealed to Loudoun's "Strict regard to justice."

[25] Shirley, *Correspondence*, 392.

In her petition, MckMacken used two strategies to make her case. One strategy was to make an argument using law and politics. She saw her son's treatment as a breach of the legal system that she believed Loudoun, following in the footsteps of Shirley, would not tolerate. However, she probably did not realize that Loudoun held Shirley and his actions as commanding general in contempt, and that he probably viewed his predecessor's attempt to placate provincials as further evidence of Shirley's weak command.[26] In case the first argument failed, MckMacken's second strategy was to present herself as a woman worthy of pity. She introduced herself at the beginning of the petition as a "poor disconsolate Woman, now unfortunately married to a Person unworthy of her Affection."[27] Interestingly, this line caught Loudoun's eye.

In March and April of 1757, the time when he would have received MckMacken's petition, Loudoun was in Philadelphia.[28] In his efforts to work with the provincial governments that he felt were forever undermining him, Loudoun attempted to understand the expectations of one group of citizens: the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures. This group of Quakers would be key players in the Easton conference of the summer of 1757. Loudoun was uneasy with citizens taking a diplomatic role, and the minutes of the Friendly Association indicate that he met with some of their leaders including Israel Pemberton, the president of the Association. In an attempt to understand their peace-seeking ideology he apparently also showed them Margaret MckMacken's petition and

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[26] Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 143-145.

[27] Margaret MckMacken, Petition to Loudoun, March, 1757, LO 2538.

[28] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 184.

asked how they would advise a woman who was "married to a Person unworthy of her Affection."[29]

Later in April, the Association sent him "The Sentiments of the President, Vice President, Secretary & all the Honorable Members of the Friendly Association, on the Case Refer'd to their determination by The Right Honourable John Earl of Loudoun." According to their peaceful ideology "this unfortunate woman" should first use "Every method that Prudence, & Reason, could suggest to Reclaim" her wicked husband. If those methods failed, "she then ought to mortify, & subdue those affections By Reason, & Religion, that she thro' Indiscretion, or want of Judgment had missplac'd." The solution was, in essence, to refuse to cast the pearls of her affection before her husband's swinish behavior. Preserving her own integrity, therefore, "will afford her more Real Satisfaction than all the Sensual Injoyments of Life." [30]

It is not clear exactly how Loudoun acted on this insight into the Association's ideology. He did not hinder their efforts to negotiate with the Indians, and the favorable results of the Easton Conference in July and August would later prove to be critical to Britain's success in North America.[31] Nor is it obvious how their insight helped MckMacken's petition since her relationship with her husband was not the central concern of her plea. However, it seems that, of the two tactics MckMacken took in her petition, the human side of her case affected Loudoun more than her appeal to justice. In the end, Samuel Henry did eventually make it back to Pennsylvania, but he very well may have served his full term in the army. He married Margaret

[29] Samuel Parrish, *Some Chapters in the History of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures* (Philadelphia: Friends Historical Association, 1877), 60. The minutes from April 17, excerpted in *Some Chapters*, reflect two meetings with Loudoun. On the Association's reply to Loudoun's question about the petition, Loudoun wrote "Re April 9."

[30] Friendly Association, "The Sentiments of the President…" LO 2491.

[31] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 207. Anderson calls the outcome of the conference "a ray of hope."

Barnhill on December 22, 1770. Even if he was a very young man when he was taken into the army (for example, fifteen), he seems to have waited some time before getting married. An interrupted apprenticeship and service in the army could explain the delay.[32]

Another case involving the enlistment of an indentured servant was that of Jacob Spengler from New York City. This case was different from Samuel Henry's in that Jacob Spengler may have seen army service as a way to get out of his indenture. His father, Balthaser Spengler, petitioned on his son's behalf and explained to Loudoun that he had signed Jacob up for a five-year indentureship, but "your Petitioner and Son not understanding English," the master, Israel Horsefield of Long Island, had taken advantage of the Spenglers and increased the indenture from five to seven years. Balthaser had offered to pay Horsefield £20 on several occasions in exchange for his son, but Horsefield refused. Apparently, sometime around the five year mark, Jacob "was enlisted in the King's Service" in Captain Gates' company. Balthaser Spengler then approached Captain Gates, asked for Jacob to be released, and in return, "proposed to enlist two able Bodied men to serve in his Place." This proposition was accepted, even though it cost Balthaser "upwards of twenty Pounds Currency," and Jacob was released from service.

There was still a problem, however, because his old master Israel Horsefield believed Jacob still owed two years on his indenture. Therefore, Jacob, free from the army, had to "conceal himself for Fear of being apprehended." All of Balthaser's expense had been for nothing if Jacob had to stay in hiding. Balthaser Spengler claimed he was "an poor old and infirm man and having a large Family to provide for," which was why he had worked so hard to get Jacob free from his indentureship and service in the army. He asked Loudoun to make some

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[32] *Pennsylvania Archives*, ser. 2 vol. 2, 117. There are other possibilities for Samuel Henry's delay in marrying, of course, or Margaret Barnhill may have been his second wife.

sort of provision "as will protect the said Jacob against the said Master from any further Servidute." It was a rather odd request to make of Loudoun, since Jacob was only in the army very briefly, but the request demonstrates that Balthaser Spengler, like Elizabeth Forrester and others, saw Loudoun as having significant, almost monarchical power.[33]

Petitions to release sons from army service were joined by petitions for sons to be enlisted. Loudoun often received letters from people who knew him and wanted to introduce a young man for a position in the army. But sometimes the situation was too complicated for a simple introduction. Such was the case of John Rudolf Faesch whose father, a Captain Faesch, died or was killed some time before May 1757. According to John Faesch and his mother, Elizabeth Faesch, the loss of Captain Faesch's income left them "quite destitute." They therefore sought a commission for John in the British army. They had initially approached Loudoun some months prior, and at that time he had "Promised to assist your Petitioners and accordingly recommended your Petitioner John Rudolph to the Care of Colonel Buquet." Colonel Henry Bouquet, a Swiss "soldier of fortune," commanded the first battalion of the Royal American Regiment and spent the winter of 1756-57 recruiting in Pennsylvania.[34] When the Faeschs approached Bouquet under Loudoun's recommendation, Bouquet "signified to your Petitioners that the first Ensigncey that should be vacant should be for your Petitioner John Rudolph." However, winter turned to spring, and Bouquet marched his battalion to Charleston, South Carolina—without John Faesch.[35]

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[33] Balthaser Spengler, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, March 21, 1757, LO 3114.

[34] Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The Great War for the Empire: The Victorious Years, 1758-1760* , vol 7 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 258-259.

[35] Gipson, *Victorious Years*, 31.

The Faeschs were confused as to what their next step should be. They decided to turn to Loudoun again by way of a petition, explaining that "your Petitioners are entire Strangers to the Ways & Cusdoms of this Country and not knowing who to draw upon for the Supsistence [*sic*] appointed for the Relief of your Petitioners." They concluded their petition by asking Loudoun to "take the Premisses in Consideration and grant your Petitioners such Releaf …[as] your Lordship in your great Wisdom shall seem mete." It is interesting that Elizabeth Faesch was involved in the petition at all. Her participation in the initial request to Loudoun is understandable if she was the representative of her late husband. The second request seems to have been necessitated by the type of miscommunication that elsewhere in the Loudoun papers is taken care of with a memorial by the soldier himself. Perhaps the most obvious possible reason for Elizabeth Faesch's involvement would be if John Faesch was quite young. He was hoping to get a commission as an ensign, or standard bearer, which was the lowest possible rank, and he could easily have been sixteen or younger which might explain why they had to ask Loudoun for assistance in getting him into the army.[36] His father's death may have forced him to start providing for the family, and his mother's dependence upon his income would explain her involvement in the petitioning process.

The four preceding petitions (including Elizabeth Forrester's) were all concerned with getting sons into or out of the army. Taken together, the petitions reveal a number of things about the petitioners and their relationship to the army and Loudoun. First, they saw Loudoun as someone who could help them, even when their situation had little to do with the army. Jacob Spengler's situation really was not in Loudoun's purview, and Ann Moore's problem was more about her own religious views than her son's army service. The petitions also show how people

[36] Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-63* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

perceived the laws that applied to them. Samuel Henry and Margaret MckMacken had tried to be very diligent about the laws regarding the enlistment of indentured servants, but their understanding of the laws was incomplete (though perhaps understandable considering the changes in command and Shirley's indecisiveness). On the other hand, it seems that Balthaser Spengler had a good understanding of the laws regarding indentured servants and tried to use army service as a way to get his son out of his indenture. When the plan fell apart, he hoped that Loudoun's authority (which superseded Israel Horsefield's) would provide the extra influence that he and his son needed. The petitions also demonstrate that Loudoun was relatively accessible; both Ann Moore and Elizabeth Faesch had been in contact with him previously.

The second group of petitions was related to the battles leading up to the fall of Fort Oswego and the confusion following the capitulation. In mid-August of 1756, not even a month after Loudoun's arrival in America, combined French, Indian, and Canadian forces successfully defeated the garrison at Fort Oswego in New York. The British and provincial soldiers, sailors, carpenters, skilled workers, settlers, traders, women, children and their allied Indians who survived the post-surrender Indian attack were forced to become prisoners and marched to Montreal.[37] It would be months and even years before many of them regained their freedom, and the women who waited at home for their husbands to return were forced to survive on their own. It is almost possible to trace all of the activity at Fort Oswego, from early skirmishes to the prisoner exchange afterward, through the petitions that Loudoun received.

One petition concerning the early skirmishes was submitted by Sophia Beckers. Her husband, Henry Beckers, was serving in Colonel Peter Schuyler's New Jersey provincial

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[37] Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War* 150-157; list of types of people taken prisoner, Sarah Mulliken, ed., "Journal of Stephen Cross of Newburyport, Entitled 'Up to Ontario,' the Activities of Newburyport Shipbuilders in Canada in 1756," *Essex Institute Historical Collections* 76 (1940): 15.

regiment. Although the Beckers probably lived in New Jersey, Sophia Beckers wrote her petition in New York, possibly because she went there to try to meet Loudoun. Henry Beckers had joined the New Jersey regiment in March, 1755 as a lieutenant, and soon afterward, they marched to Fort Oswego. He was among the troops who worked to construct better defenses at Fort Oswego during the first year of the war. Another one of his jobs, according to his wife, was to go out with scouting parties to reconnoiter the French encampments and defenses at Cataraqui—the French post directly northwards across Lake Ontario from Fort Oswego (near present-day Kingston, Ontario). During the winter of 1755, Henry Beckers probably was back home in New Jersey because Sophia Beckers reported that he went to Fort Oswego again in April, 1756.

According to his wife, on June 22, 1756, Henry Beckers went "with a Detached party in Whale Boats to Reconiter Cudargue [Cataraqui] & discover the Strength of the French in that Garrison." Unfortunately, he "was in that Service attacked by a Supperiour party, wounded & Tacken a Prisoner. Where he now Remains."[38] Sophia Beckers may have gotten her information confused, or as the information passed down from Fort Oswego to New Jersey, it may have gotten scrambled. The *New York Mercury* reported on June 28, 1756 that some whale boats did go out from Fort Ontario on June 16 to "make Discoveries on the French Shore." The detachment was fired on by "1000 French and Indians" who appeared on the beach when the whale boats drew near. The shots did not reach the boats, however, and the boats fired a few parting shots, gave "three Huzza's & row'd off, and returned to Oswego about 5 o'Clock." There were no reports of casualties or captives during that mission. But, on June 27, the *Mercury* reported that there had been a skirmish on June 21 (closer to the date Beckers reported) and "a

[38] Sophia Beckers, Petition to Loudoun, July, 1756, LO 1382.

thousand French and Indians had attacked the Fort, but were beat off by Colonel Schuyler, and those that were in Garrison there." This would most likely have included Henry Beckers. It was reported that Colonel Schuyler lost twenty-six men. Although it makes more sense that Beckers would have been wounded and captured on a scouting mission outside the fort, it is possible that he was outside of the fort and was taken when the attack came on the 21st. [39]

Whatever way her husband was captured, Sophia Beckers had a problem because he could be held prisoner for a long time, and the New Jersey forces, enlisted for only one fighting season, would be disbanded before then. Once the troops returned to New Jersey in the fall, the legislature would stop her husband's pay. She had already thought of a solution to this problem and asked Loudoun, "to Provide for the said Henry Beckers. in the Royal American Regiment. Or give him such other Commission on the Establishment, as your Lordship shall think best." [40] While the provincial regiments usually disbanded during the winter, the British army provided constant employment. Sophia Beckers, of course, did not know that in a few short weeks the rest of the New Jersey regiment would also be taken prisoner after Fort Oswego capitulated. It is unclear if Loudoun granted Sophia Beckers' request, but she did eventually get her husband back. He and about three hundred Oswego prisoners sailed from Quebec to England on July 18, 1757. He may not have given up his military life, however. A Henry Becker is listed as a quartermaster for the New Jersey forces that fought in the Revolutionary War.[41]

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[39] O'Callaghan, E.B., ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, & Co., 1849), 1:478-479.

[40] Sophia Beckers, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, July, 1756, LO 1382.

[41] "Extract of a Letter from Portsmouth, dated Feb. 13, 1757," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1: 505; William S. Stryker, ed. *Official Register of the Officers and Men of New Jersey in the Revolutionary War* (Trenton: W.T. Nicholson & Co., 1872), 835.

A second petition regarding the pre-battle skirmishes was written by Captain John Bradstreet in November, 1756 from Albany. Bradstreet would gain fame in 1758 for defeating the French garrison at Fort Frontenac and for being part of the turn towards victory that the British army experienced beginning in 1758. In 1756, however, Bradstreet was busy with the activity surrounding Fort Oswego. Under General Shirley's command, Bradstreet was in charge of building boats and leading bateau supply convoys. In July 1756, on his way to Schenectady, New York after provisioning the forces at Fort Oswego, Bradstreet's bateaux were ambushed by French and Indian forces concealed on the north bank of the Oswego River. In the fighting that followed, Bradstreet managed to lead part of his force onto an island, which the French proceeded to attack while the rest of the bateau force safely reached the southern bank. Bradstreet then led his men against French troops that were attempting to cross the river a mile away. The enemies met, with Bradstreet leading a charge that eventually sent the French back over the river. The battle was not without its casualties on both sides, however. The British lost 20 men killed and 24 wounded while the French claimed to have lost 9 killed.[42]

Back in Albany, the wives of the men who were killed or who later died of their wounds in this battle had not adequately prepared for the possibility that their husbands would not return from the relatively safe bateau service. Legally, they needed a letter of administration to prove their relationship to the deceased. Procuring this letter was an expense the women had not anticipated. Therefore, they appealed to Captain Bradstreet in order to be paid their deceased husbands' outstanding salaries without the letter. Bradstreet in turn submitted a memorial to Loudoun explaining the situation and presenting the women's request that "you will be pleas'd to allow that they may receive the ballance due to their Husbands on their making an affidavit

[42] "Action between the French and the English" (NY Mercury, July 19, August 2, 1756), O'Callaghan, *Documentary History of New York*, 1:482--485.

before the Mayor of this or any other City of their being the lawful wife of the Person whose wages they claim." It is possible to know the outcome of this case because Loudoun's clerk transcribed the general's response onto the back of the memorial. Loudoun decided to "permit and Impower the said Captain John Bradstreet to Pay them the Wages due to their Husbands at the time of their decease, without obliging them to take out Letters of Administration." Bradstreet was further ordered to collect the affidavits as a receipt. Unlike other petitioners, these women were able to resolve their situation quickly (both the memorial and the reply are marked November 22, 1756) due to the support and assistance of Captain Bradstreet.[43]

Another case that was able to be resolved quickly because of the assistance of the right army authority was the petition of Martha Gudgeon. She was a camp follower, and her well-organized petition reflects that she knew something of the procedure necessary for filing claims with the army. Martha Gudgeon, her husband Henry, and their children had apparently come over together from Britain when the 51st Regiment was assigned to the colonies. Lieutenant and Adjutant Henry Gudgeon had previously served in the 8th Regiment "in Ireland, Germany, Flanders, Scotland & Gibralter, & was present in all Engagements, in the Late Warr & Rebellion wherein said Regiment was Employed." The Gudgeons had probably arrived with the rest of the 51st Regiment in 1755 and spent the next year in New York. Henry Gudgeon was stationed near Fort Oswego at the Oneida Carrying Place in the spring of 1756. Under Major Charles Craven, a small portion of the 51st regiment (about 200 men) was assigned to guard the magazine and stores at the Oneida Carrying Place and help with conveying provisions to Fort Oswego.

[43] John Bradstreet, Memorial to Loudoun, November 22, 1756, LO 2267.

Gudgeon likely did not see much fighting at the Carrying Place and he died on May 15, probably of natural causes.[44]

Martha Gudgeon and the children were most likely with him when he died since, as an officer's family, they would have travelled with the army. They were actually quite fortunate in some ways because Gudgeon's company was part of a small contingent of the 51st Regiment that was not at Fort Oswego when it capitulated to the French; thus Martha and the children were not taken prisoner or sent to Montreal. Martha Gudgeon and her children stayed with the remnant of the 51st Regiment (briefly at Burnetsfield) through the rest of the year and returned with them to winter quarters in New York City. Her petition is dated December 10, 1756 from New York.[45]

Henry Gudgeon's death left Martha Gudgeon "his Widow with a Family in Distressed Circumstances." In this situation, Martha Gudgeon requested that Loudoun "Commiserate the distressed Condition of you [*sic*] Petitioner" by "order[ing] her to be put on the list of Officers Widows for the Pension of the Widow of a Lieu't & Adjut't to enable her to Maintain herself & Family." Barring that, she asked for "Such other Reliefe as to Your Lordship may seem Meet." With this she closed the petition. It was not overly humble; she was direct, succinct and confident in her knowledge of the accepted procedure for her circumstance. Gudgeon also expedited her request by submitting it to the proper authorities. The bottom of the petition shows that it was certified by Major Charles Craven, Gudgeon's superior officer. Craven attested that "the above petitioner is Widow of the Late Lieu't & Adju't Gudgeon who died as is above sett

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[44] Fred Anderson notes that the 51st Regiment at Oswego was starving during the spring of 1756: "Weak and sick, dying at an appalling rate, the men of Mercer's garrison held on, but only barely." The detachments along the supply line probably did not fare much better. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 137. There were two forts (really storehouses) at the Oneida Carrying Place: Fort Williams and Fort Bull.

[45] On location of Major Craven's Company, William Shirley, "At a Council of War held at the Camp at Albany" May 25, 1756, Colonial Office America and West Indies Military Dispatches CO 5/47, 43-44; Earl of Loudoun to Henry Fox, August 21, 1756, CO 5/47, 153; on winter quarters, Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 181.

forth; and do Recommend her for the Pension." The certification has the same date as the petition, December 10. The petition and the certification are both in Charles Craven's handwriting with Martha Gudgeon's signature at the bottom; he probably helped her draft the petition.

Craven was not the only authority whose approval Martha Gudgeon needed. Eight days later on December 18, a second page was added to the petition signifying that it was presented to the Mayor of New York, John Cruger, by Captain James Delancey and Lieutenant John Foxon, both from the 51st Regiment. These two men "Declared upon Oath that Mrs. Martha Gudgeon Widow of Henry Gudgeon late Lieutenant and Adjutant in the said Regiment is still living and now residing in this said City." Further they attested that "That they are Personally acquainted with her, and know fore certain that she is still a Widow and no [*sic*] otherwise Provided for." Mayor John Cruger certified their statement, and they sent the two page petition on to Loudoun.[46] Whether Loudoun granted her request or not, it is evident that she was well-connected and seemed to follow the proper protocol. Many provincial women did not share in that knowledge or those connections.

Obtaining money from the army after the capitulation of Fort Oswego was a struggle shared by many wives. This was particularly true for wives of men who were being paid by the army for services rendered. After the capitulation, the French took everyone who was at Fort Oswego to Canada, including tradesmen and carpenters. Twelve tradesmen's wives who lived in Philadelphia joined together in 1757 to request assistance from Lord Loudoun. Their husbands were no longer able to send a portion of their pay back to their wives, the women were therefore

[46] Martha Gudgeon, Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, December 10, 1756, LO 2329.

"reduc'd to extremity & want." The reduction in pay had not only affected the women; they also had children who were dependent on their father's income.

The women did not have any real strategy about what should be done. They simply asked Loudoun "to find some relief for us, Otherwise we shall become a Burden to our fellow Citizens as well as ourselves being Truly Sensible we have none other under God to look to for redress but from Your Lordship only."[47] Unfortunately, none of the women signed her name to the petition, so it is impossible to try to track down their husbands except to note that they may have been among the "Carpenters, Sailors, and other Artificers" that were "to be sent home by the first opportunity" as early as February, 1757.[48] Of course, it took several months to be transported from Canada to France or England and then back to North America, but the women may have been reunited with their husbands during the fall of 1757.

A separate petition from a tradesman's wife was written by Martha Taylor in March, 1757. Her husband, William Taylor had been a carpenter at Fort Oswego and contracted to receive "Eleven pounds ten Shillings [per] month." He and a "Boy" (probably a servant) went to Fort Oswego in the spring of 1756, and he was captured in the capitulation. From his departure in 1756 until March 17, 1757 neither William Taylor nor his wife in Philadelphia had received any of his pay. Martha Taylor explained to Loudoun that she and her husband had tried to calculate how long he would be gone, but they never expected that he, a carpenter, would be taken prisoner and sent to Canada. The money the Taylors had set aside to subsist the family in William Taylor's absence "being long since Exhausted, she is now left in malancholly Circumstances with four Children." Part of the problem was that William Taylor had "Agree'd

[47] Twelve Tradesmen's Wives, Petition to Loudoun, March, 1757, LO 3239.

[48] "Extract of a Letter from Portsmouth, Dated Feb. 13, 1757," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 1:505.

for his Wages in Philadelphia," but then, not thinking that he would be gone longer than a few months, he had "Settled the pay in N.York." Now that he was gone, it was up to Martha Taylor to figure out how to get the money from New York. She therefore asked Loudoun, "to allow her, her Husbands Wages or Vouchsafe to Inform her where she must apply for them."[49] Martha Taylor may have been able to figure it out, but her husband may have gotten back home before things got too desperate. He was listed as being in England already by February, 1757, in good health and on the list of the first to be sent home.[50]

In addition to losing their husbands' pay, some women lost track of their husbands; one of these was Jemima Farrar. She most likely lived in New Hampshire, but she was forced to leave her seven children and travel for a week to Boston in order to try to get some help. Her husband, Timothy Farrar, had been gone for two years, and Jemima Farrar had never gotten any money from his army wages. Furthermore, she did not even know where her husband was, other than that he had joined Shirley's regiment in 1755. She suspected that Timothy Farrar was "still in the army or gone to Canada." Her only hope for getting his money was that she had arrived at Boston with "power of Attorney from my husband, & would gladly give a receipt for such payt of his wages as your Lordship shall order me to receive."[51] Part of Jemima Farrar's problem was a lack of information; however, she trusted that Loudoun knew where her husband was.

Jemima Farrar's problems may have gone even deeper than she suspected. Farrar mentions that her husband was a member of William Shirley's regiment. These men had been part of a planned attack on Fort Niagara in 1755, but they had only made it as far as Fort Oswego

[49] Martha Taylor, Petition to Loudoun, March 17, 1757, LO 3088.

[50] "Extract of a Letter from Portsmouth, Dated, Feb. 13, 1757," O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York,* 1:505-506.

[51] Jemima Farrar, Petition to Loudoun, February 5, 1757, LO 2789.

before lack of adequate supplies and defenses forced them to stop. This regiment had lingered at Fort Oswego through the spring of 1756, but disease, starvation, and Indian raids were taking a toll. If Timothy Farrar had survived that and stayed at the fort, he would have been there for the siege of Fort Oswego. If he was not among the killed, he would have been among the 1500 men who were captured and taken to Canada and would not have made it back to North America before February, 1757. If he had been captured, it seems odd that Jemima Farrar had not heard about it, but she lived in a remote location, and it is possible the news did not reach her.

It is possible that Jemima Farrrar's situation ended happily enough. Out of the hundreds of Farrars who lived in New Hampshire, there appear to have been only two Timothy Farrars who fit into the prescribed dates. Both of these Timothys served in the Revolutionary War. A nineteen year old Timothy enlisted as a private in April, 1775 and rose to the rank of Sergeant by September, 1778. This Timothy could have been the youngest of Jemima Farrar's seven children. Another Timothy Farrar is listed as a Justice of the Peace who seems to have assisted with recruiting and enlistment; this was probably Jemima Farrar's missing husband. Both Timothy Farrar's are listed as from Dunstable, New Hampshire. Dunstable is now Nashua, New Hampshire, about sixty miles from Boston, consistent with what Jemima Farrar states in her petition.[52]

In another case, it was the son who went missing after the fall of Fort Oswego. In March, 1757, Michael Diehl, a cooper from Philadelphia, petitioned Loudoun seeking information about his son Johann Philip Daniel Diehl. Johann Diehl was fifteen when he enlisted in Shirley's regiment in 1755. He marched to Fort Oswego and seems to have been among those who stayed

[52] For lists of Farrars in New Hampshire, see Samuel Lee, *The Memoir of Timothy Farrar, LL.D.* (Boston, 1875); For the Timothy Farrars see Isaac W. Hammond, ed., *Rolls of the Soldiers in the Revolutionary War 1775 to May 1777* (Concord, NH: Parsons B. Cogswell, 1885) 15: 79, 82, 84, 105, 470.

to work on the fort when Shirley had to abandon his planned attack on Fort Niagara. Michael Diehl reported that he had not seen his son in two years, so it is likely that he was at Fort Oswego when it capitulated and was taken to Montreal. However, the information had come down to Michael Diehl that his son "was missed or lossed." In addition, two of Diehl's servants had also enlisted and disappeared. Diehl wanted to "obtain a regular Discharge for his said Son," and Loudoun was the only person he could think of to appeal to. If Johann Diehl had been taken prisoner after the fall of Fort Oswego, there was little that Loudoun could do except to tell Michael Diehl to wait. Johann Diehl probably made it back to Philadelphia by 1759, but his father died in 1760. Johann Diehl seems to have lived until about 1829.[53]

These petitions demonstrate that the capitulation of Fort Oswego had long-reaching ramifications. With the unexpected capture of the entire garrison, the people waiting at home were thrown into chaos. Some of the captured were carpenters and other tradesmen who never expected that they would be captured and taken to New France. Their families had not prepared for the financial burden that a lengthy separation would create. Other people either had not heard about the capitulation or had no idea what had happened to their husbands or sons. Whether looking for relatives or financial relief, some of these people turned to Lord Loudoun. These petitioners, unlike the ones trying to get sons into or out of the army, all had army service-related requests, but it seems clear that knowing the right people and the right procedure was the best way to petition successfully. While Loudoun was the main target of the petitions, it helped to rely on lesser authorities, as Martha Gudgeon and the bateaux service wives did, as the

[53] Michael Diehl, Petition to Loudoun, March 21, 1757, LO 3115; Annette Kunselman Burgert, *Eighteenth Century Emigrants from German-Speaking Lands to North America*, vol. 2 (Birdsboro, PA: The Pennsylvania German Society, 1985), 91; "Notice of the Estate of Michael Diehl," *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, February 7, 1760; "Descendents of Johannes Hans Diehl," Accessed June 21,2011. http://familytreemaker.genealogy.com/users/d/i/e/William-A-Diehl/GENE3-0004.html.

petition made its way to Loudoun. That many people did not know or take advantage of this procedure demonstrates the extent to which people accorded Loudoun absolute power, but also saw him as receptive to their requests, however haphazard.

A third category of petitions was written by people seeking redress of an army-related grievance. Some of these grievances were perpetrated by the army, and others were connected to problems deriving from army service. Included in this second variety is the petition of Jane Williams, probably from New Hampshire. Her husband, Lieutenant Nathaniel Williams was one of the New England men who had served in the army for years, dating back to the successful Louisbourg expedition of 1745. In 1747 he also worked to raise men for an expedition against Canada and, according to his wife, "spent his Fortune in doing of it." The end of King George's War made all his work for naught, but he did get a lieutenancy out of it. However, during the Seven Years' War he was accused of misconduct and dismissed from the army.

Williams began her petition by noting her husband's previous accomplishments, and she explained his present misfortune by arguing that "His misconduct perhaps was chiefly occasioned by his unacquaintedness with the strict Rules of the Army and the Examples of the Provincial Officers." Whether she knew it or not, Jane Williams had tapped into one of Loudoun's ongoing complaints: the unprofessionalism of the provincial army, especially in comparison to the British army. Another problem was that Nathaniel Williams was in debt, but he was unable to get his backpay from the army to pay his debts and therefore had been "confined by the civil Officers in common Goal, until said Accounts are passed." He was in jail in New York, and Major Charles Craven (who had earlier been so helpful to Martha Gudgeon) had refused to pay Williams or his wife the "considerable Sum due to him." Jane Williams seems to have received all of this information—about the dismissal, the arrest, and the debt—by

mail and was struggling to figure it out on her own. Her only hope was in Loudoun's "compassionate Consideration."[54]

Jane Williams' petition suffered from both lack of information and lack of support from other army authorities. The petitioners from the Church of the Presbyterian Strangers in Boston tried to improve their case by using an intermediary to help them. Their pastor of twenty-eight years was the Reverend John Moorehead.[55] During the summer of 1756, several men from Moorehead's congregation had served the British army as pioneers.[56] While the men were working, some of their wives and children struggled to provide for themselves and looked to their church to help and "preven[t] their begging in ye Absence of their Husbands who cou'd not obtain one farthing to be transmitted in their absence." This was only the beginning of their troubles. Upon the men's return, the pay was still not forthcoming, so the men and women approached Moorehead to petition Loudoun on their behalf.

Moorehead chose to approach Loudoun from the position of a fellow community leader. He informed Loudoun "I am well apprised of ye vast Concerns of infinitly greater importance lying before yr Lordship," but he tried to convince Loudoun that addressing these types of small matters was essential if he wanted to be able to rely on future provincial support. Ignoring these small claims, Moorehead warned, "must be an imbarrassment to any new undertakings of this Nature." Moorehead further appealed to Loudoun's pity by informing him "we are a handful of

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[54] Jane Williams, Petition to Loudoun, February, 1757, LO 2950.

[55] Alexander Blaikie, *A History of Presbyterianism in New England: It's Introduction, Growth, Decay, Revival and Present Mission* (Boston: Alexander Moore, 1881), 64-65; Gene Navias, Arlington Street Church Historical Highlights, Accessed November 6, 2008, http://www.serve.com/~mfelipe/about/history.html .

[56] Pioneers (in this context): A member of an infantry group going with or ahead of an army or regiment to dig trenches, repair roads, and clear terrain in readiness for the main body of troops. (OED)

strangers ill able to bear any discouragement of this nature."[57] One of Loudoun's main challenges was finding ways to work with the provincials and to convince the provincials to work with him. Moorehead was perceptive in linking the troubles Loudoun had in fostering cooperation to small-scale complaints similar to that of Moorehead's congregants.

Perhaps the smallest complaint from the petitions is seen in Mary Davis's request to Loudoun dated March 21, 1757. It has the conventional form of a petition, but, unlike other petitions, Davis did not include a long story of what had happened to her. In her opening she informed Loudoun that her "Husband is enlisted in his majety's Service in the third Battalion of the Royal Americans." Loudoun had brought the orders to form the Royal American Regiment (originally the 62nd but in late 1756 renumbered the 60th) with him when he arrived in North America to take command. It was to consist of four battalions to be filled with provincials.[58]

The Royal Americans were mainly Germans from Pennsylvania, but Mary Davis noted in her petition that she "came from Williamsburg with her said Husband." The 60th was formed in New York, and she and her husband had probably gone there in the late summer of 1756. The third battalion of the Royal Americans was eventually assigned to Fort Edward, but Mary Davis may not have made it that far with her husband.[59] Her petition was written from Philadelphia and she explained to Loudoun that she had decided to discontinue traveling with her husband and instead return to Williamsburg. On the return journey from New York she seems to have made it as far as Philadelphia before becoming "Extreamly reduc'd." Therefore she decided to petition

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[57] John Moorehead, Letter/Petition to the Earl of Loudoun, January 31, 1757, LO 2740.

[58] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 143.

[59] Loudoun's nearly illegible scrawl on the back of the petition seems to indicate that he thought her husband was at Fort Oswego. This may be understandable if he read the petition quickly since all the other petitions he received from women asking for money came from people connected to that fort. However, the 60th regiment was not at Fort Oswego, and if Davis' husband had been killed or captured, she probably would have mentioned it because it would have helped her case.

Loudoun "hop[ing] out of the Humanity so apparent in your Lorship you would be pleased to bestow on her some Small Sum to bear her Expences home."[60]

Mary Davis did not indicate why she decided to stop traveling with her husband. She did not mention any children, nor did she write that her husband was injured or killed. It is also difficult to know if Loudoun granted her request. However, time would soon reveal that Mary Davis was fortunate to be away from her husband in the summer of 1757, because in August the third battalion of the Royal Americans was sent from Fort Edward to Fort William Henry and those soldiers were there for the capitulation. If she had been there, Davis would have been at risk in the melee following the capitulation. If her husband was there, he most likely experienced the danger.

These petitions all show situations in which the petitioners had some sort of grievance more or less connected to army service. Jane Williams and John Moorehead's congregants were both in confusing situations that they did not know how to navigate. Mary Davis, also, was in a difficult situation in that she was stuck in Pennsylvania until she could get enough money to travel to Virginia. However, in all of these situations, it seems like there must have been some intermediary authorities that the petitioners could have appealed to more effectively. Moorehead's congregants had performed their pioneering work before Loudoun arrived in the colonies; someone else must have hired them. Jane Williams mentioned that she had already appealed to Major Craven, but Nathaniel Williams had been a member of Pepperell's Regiment (the 51st), not the regular army, so there were certainly many people (including William Pepperell, commander of the 51st Regiment) that Jane Williams could have appealed to before Loudoun. The point is not that Loudoun did not have the authority; rather, the point is that,

[60] Mary Davis, Petition to Loudoun, March 21, 1757, LO 3116.

especially for cases like Jane Williams and Mary Davis, the situations were too small and specific to garner Loudoun's notice. Nevertheless, all of these people put a lot of work into petitioning Loudoun and getting their petitions to him, which seems to indicate that they really believed he would take an interest and help them.

Finally, two other petitions were not about the indirect effect of the army on family members; rather, they addressed the direct effects of the army on two families and their property. While different from the petitions in the three categories explored above, these two petitions are useful as an additional perspective on how petitioners viewed Lord Loudoun and the presence of the army. John Kirkpatrick and William Wethered both owned houses in Charlestown, Maryland. Both of their houses were taken over by soldiers when troops were quartered in the town during the winter of 1756-1757. By February, 1757 William Wethered had had enough. He wrote a petition to Loudoun describing the good condition of his two story house before the soldiers' arrival, taking care to note the planked floors, brick chimney, and sash windows.

On January 17, according to Wethered, "by [the soldiers'] Carelessness the House took fire from a Candle being left in one of the Upper Chambers of said House & utterly Consumed the Dwelling House af[orementioned] together with the Store houses & Stable & a considerable part of Pailing that Inclosed a Garden Adjoining the said Houses." Since Wethered's future plans depended on the use of the house, he asked Loudoun to "grant him such Relief herein as to your Lordship may seem Just & Reasonable." He also went on to argue that "as the Soldiers are for the Publick Service, your Lordship will think this Burthen too heavy to be born by one

Individual." To support his claim he attached a voucher from Kent County proving the value of the house, with the signatures of nineteen people attesting to the truth of his claim.[61]

John Kirkpatrick's situation was similar. He had a three year old, three story, brick house that soldiers had taken over for their winter quarters. Kirkpatrick claimed that the soldiers had virtually destroyed the house in their quest for firewood, which led them to tear up floorboards and remove doors from their hinges in order to burn them. In short, Kirkpatrick stated that the soldiers had "Left it wourth Nothing Except the Roofe." Then the soldiers moved on to destroying the outbuildings. Kirkpatrick had attempted to appeal to their commanding officers but, he claimed, "all the anser I hade from them wass in dirision they Expected they woulld burn them all befo they Left them." Kirkpatrick maintained that the house had cost him £570 to build, and, furthermore, "the French hase taken all my Intrest at sea." He was depending on the house to sustain him and his family, so he asked Loudoun for restitution. He equated Loudoun with the king, stating "Now [I] am left without any visible thing to support me without his sacred majesty or your Excellency according to his and your known Justice and goodness will be pleased to Grant…satisfaction for my Damages."[62] He ended his petition very obsequiously by praying that Loudoun "may be made ane Instrument in the hand of God to propel our barbrus inimes and preserver the prodaston [Protestant] interest." But he also included a postscript exclaiming, "Lord I haeve sene ma[n]y officers and soallders in Great and North Briton and Iarland and I Neiver saw any sutch [as these] for badness."[63]

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[61] William Wethered, Petition to Loudoun, February 26, 1757, LO 2928.

[62] For the purpose of clarity, spelling errors have been fixed in this sentence. This is the actual sentence: "Now ame Left whout aney visabill thing to support me whout his secrat majesty or your Exclenesy according to his and your knowne Justice and goodness will be plased to Grant and satisfaction for my Damige"

[63] John Kirkpatrick, Petition to Loudoun, April 2, 1757, Loudoun Papers Box 72.

Both Wethered and Kirkpatrick were disappointed in the treatment their houses and property received at the hand of the soldiers. Both of them betrayed an expectation that the soldiers were in the colonies "for the Publick Service," and, as they understood it, they had lent their houses to the army as a favor. In that, they were similar to many other petitioners who thought of Loudoun as being there for the public service and therefore open to requests and petitions. Many petitioners asserted their support of the war and the king, but by their actions they betrayed an expectation that their participation merited a hearing when they had a problem related in any way to the army.

While the petitions are a unique resource, they leave unanswered questions, even those that conveyed as much information as Elizabeth Forrester's two petitions. To complete what can be known about her, despite the two petitions, the drawings, and the elaborate description, Forrester's expectations for her son's release were never realized. Yet, John Whipple seems to have made the most of his time in the army. By 1762 he was in New York and probably had been there for some time. On April 21, 1762 he married Jane Morrell. Between then and 1770 they had at least one child, Joseph Whipple. The Whipples must have maintained contact with Elizabeth Forrester, because Joseph Whipple and Elizabeth Forrester were both named as beneficiaries in the 1770 will of Joseph Cloud-Concord, Elizabeth Forrester's uncle.[64] Elizabeth Forrester remained in Chester County, Pennsylvania, but she was not done with the intrusion of the army on her personal life. In 1775 she married David Lyons who fought in the Revolutionary War as part of the Chester County militia.[65]

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[64] New York State, *Names of Persons for Whom Marriage Licenses were issued by the Secretary of the Province of New York, previous to 1784* (Albany: Weed Parsons & Co., 1860 [1984 reprint]), 455; *Abstract of Willis of Chester County, Pennsylvania*, vol. 2, 1758-1777, prepared by Jacob Martin (Marshallton, PA: 1900), 371.

[65] *Pennsylvania Archives* ser. 2 vol. 2, 102 (marriage record) and 677 (militia record).

As has been shown, civilians connected to the army sent petitions for a wide variety of reasons. Some petitions were more transactional, such as Martha Gudgeon's orderly request for her deceased husband's pay. Other petitions were seeking information about husbands and sons who had seemingly disappeared. Still other petitions complained about a variety of abuses relating to enlistment or the army's presence or were written in search of a handout or intervention in a personal problem. All of the people who petitioned wanted to change their circumstances or some aspect of their situation, and they all thought of Loudoun as the person most able to help them and freely approached him. Women in particular took advantage of the opportunity to seek redress of grievances, and in that they were participating in the war in a way that encompassed their positions as both dependent women and national subjects with rights. Taken together, the petitions show that the relationship between the army and society was more than army leaders making demands and colonists resisting or cooperating. Rather, understanding the extent to which the experience of war was negotiated involves recognizing that the negotiations were nuanced and took many forms.

Chapter Seven

"A Tree of Shelter:" British-Iroquois relations at Fort Johnson

The Seven Years' War began at an inauspicious time for British-Iroquois relations. In the mid-eighteenth century, Iroquois influence extended across western New York, into the Great Lakes region, and south into Pennsylvania, all areas that would see most of the war's activity. The role that the Iroquois would play in the war was a critical concern for both French and British authorities. The safety of provincial families on the New York frontier depended on maintaining some sort of alliance between the British and the Iroquois; otherwise, the New York borderland could possibly have experienced the widespread captivity raids that occurred in Pennsylvania. For the British at the start of the war, the prospect of benefitting from Iroquois military power was weak. The most important bond between the British and the Iroquois was the relational alliance known as the Covenant Chain, but as recently as 1753, the Iroquois had declared that the Covenant Chain was broken. Although the Albany Congress of 1754 made important steps toward repairing it, when the war began in 1755 the alliance was far from strong.

Of critical importance to the development of an Iroquois-British alliance was how the Iroquois viewed the potential of the British to share in their concerns, listen to their complaints, and treat them as equals. The primary ways that the Iroquois saw and judged the British were through dealing with traders, fighting alongside the army, and negotiating with imperial authorities. During the Seven Years' War, the latter two ways took precedence and became very important in determining how the Iroquois wanted to participate in the war. At war's end the Iroquois Six Nations were allied with the British, made a significant contribution to the siege of Fort Niagara, and were optimistic about their ability to dominate the Ohio Country by means of the British alliance, but those developments were only possible because of a long history of

negotiation between the British and the Iroquois, both before and during the war. While the Iroquois were not British or provincials, it is impossible to study the intersection of war with people's lives on the periphery of British America without including the Iroquois. Additionally, in Iroquois society, the division between civilians and the military was very different from the European model, and studying how the Iroquois approached the war provides another perspective on how British provincial civilians experienced the war.

During the Seven Years' War, the process of bringing the Iroquois into an effective alliance with Britain became centered at Fort Johnson. The primary British agent responsible for diplomacy with the Iroquois was William Johnson. By showing the Iroquois that they had a place at his house—a Tree of Shelter under which to feel safe, protected, in control, and at home—Johnson sought to foster in them a sense of belonging in regard to British military and diplomatic endeavors. By engaging the Iroquois on their own terms, Johnson was eventually able to garner the kind of Iroquois support that his superiors expected but the Iroquois had been reluctant to give. Through setting up his home as a Tree of Shelter, Johnson was able to influence and, to some extent, manage how the Iroquois thought about Britain's military goals and how they regarded Britain's diplomatic efforts. While the Seven Years' War was only one moment in a long history of diplomacy, by the time the war ended, the Iroquois had attached their fate to that of Britain's North American empire.

The term "Iroquois" can be deceptive in that the people referred to as Iroquois were primarily concerned with kinship ties, not geographic boundaries or political allegiance. Therefore, even defining them as the Five or Six Nations does not account for the numerous people outside of New York who, through migration, war, adoption, and intermarriage, became connected to the Iroquois. In addition, by the mid-eighteenth century, Iroquois political structure

was moving away from the longstanding League of Peace and Power and towards a confederacy, reflecting the newest connections and links involving groups in Pennsylvania, New England, and the west.[1] The term "Iroquois," therefore, refers to the scattered people of the Confederacy, but the center of that confederacy was the Six Nations. The original Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy were the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas. The Tuscaroras from North Carolina joined the confederacy as the sixth nation in the early 1720s. The Six Nations were located in central and western New York, ranging from the Mohawks between the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, to the Oneidas and Tuscaroras southeast of Lake Ontario, the Onondagas and Cayugas further to the west, and the Senecas near Niagara and in territory that was considered part of the *pays d'en haut*. In 1748, the total population of the Six Nations was perhaps around 3,300 people.[2]

The confederacy's political structure, while having centralized elements, was largely decentralized. Daniel Richter describes the relationships between leaders and followers in the confederacy as "democratic near-anarchy," but another way to describe the political structure is heterarchy. Archaeologist Carole Crumley describes the concept thus: "Societies in which heterarchical values and institutions are dominant are richly networked structures where multiple scales and dimensions are in communication with one another." She notes several "advantages" of a heterarchical structure, namely, "fair decisions reflect popular consensus, [a] variety of solutions to problems [are] presented, [and the] contributions of disparate segments [are]

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[1] Timothy Shannon, "War, Diplomacy, and Culture: The Iroquois Experience in the Seven Years' War," in Warren Hofstra, ed., *Cultures in Conflict: The Seven Years' War in North America* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 88; Timothy Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier* (New York: Viking, 2008), 72.

[2] Numbers are scarce and movement was constant. For Francis Jennings' defense of his estimates see Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988), 31-32 and n. 28.

valued." There are also several "disadvantages" to the structure in that "consensus is slow, dialogue requires constant maintenance, [and there are] cacophonous voices and choices." Scholars who use the concept of heterarchy in a variety of disciplines contrast it with hierarchy and use words such as network, fishnet, meshwork, and polycentric to describe the structure.[3]

As a heterarchy, the Iroquois confederacy employed a large number of people in making decisions. The Grand Council consisted of fifty sachems who represented the clans of the largest villages of the Confederacy, but the Grand Council did not have sole decision-making authority. Village councils met frequently in the home of a leading woman and were attended by "League Sachems, male rotiyanehr [nobles], 'Pine Tree Chiefs' (those who owed their office to merit rather than to hereditary titles), war leaders, wise old men, and others who spoke for significant numbers of followers within the village."[4] Therefore, there were many nodes of influence within networks of power. Iroquois leaders referred to their diplomatic process as "linking arms together," but Europeans who interacted with the Iroquois often had little understanding of the degree of influence a leader exercised. They used the title "chief" in order to invoke European hierarchies, but as Richter points out, a term that better encapsulates the realities of the power structure is "headman."[5]

Furthermore, the main concern of the councils and the confederacy was the preservation of peace, but peace was not a negotiated agreement. Rather, peace was "a matter of 'good

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[3] Crumley is careful to note that "Heterarchy does not stand alone but is in a dialectical relationship with hierarchy (where elements are ranked)." Further, "heterarchy is the more general category and subsumes hierarchy as a special case." So, hierarchies exist within a heterarchy, but their power is variable and subject to change when values are re-ranked (which is constant feature of heterarchies). Carole L. Crumley, "Remember How to Organize: Heterarchy Across Disciplines," chapter three in Christopher S. Beekman and William W. Baden, eds., *Nonlinear Models for Archaeology and Anthropology: Continuing the Revolution* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 40, 43, 44.

[4] Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 43.

[5] Richter, *Longhouse*, 44. Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy*, 43.

thoughts' between two nations, a feeling as much as a reality." While European observers may have considered this type of peace as weaker than a binding agreement, the members of the confederacy were autonomous and free to act how they chose, so establishing the right feelings and attitude was actually the best way to ensure peace. Establishing good thoughts and feelings was a process that needed constant tending. Europeans found this system exasperating because they failed to recognize that the confederacy did not have the type of hierarchy they were accustomed to seeing in European nations. They would negotiate peace or participation with one set of leaders but it would not be binding on other sets of leaders or factions. The only way to get results was to engage in the painstaking process of cultivating good thoughts and building up relationships throughout the many strands of the confederacy's network of power. For Europeans who were part of rigid, vertical structures of power, the heterarchy of the confederacy was confusing and frustrating.[6]

Throughout the polycentric network of the confederacy, an important way to maintain relationships was through gift giving and reciprocity. There were several components to Native American systems of reciprocity. Perhaps most importantly, power was exercised not by accumulating wealth but by distributing gifts. Accepting a gift put the receiver under an obligation to repay the giver, usually through some form of service but also possibly through another gift. Still, the system should not be understood as merely transactional or as a *quid pro quo* arrangement; rather, the system was fundamentally relational and familial. Individuals gave gifts in order to bind two people together, and out of that relationship would come a response of gifts or service. As Europeans became involved in gift-giving, they became frustrated when giving gifts to one group of leaders did not ensure the support of the entire nation. But, Daniel

[6] Richter, *Longhouse*, 40, 44-45.

Richter notes, "It was precisely the *lack* of centralized political unity that made the modern Indian policies work." Disparate groups of leaders could receive gifts and make agreements with both the French and the British concurrently, ensuring that the Iroquois were never fully tied to either European power.[7]

The British tried to formalize their relationship with the Iroquois through the Covenant Chain, which began as an agreement between leaders in New York and various members of the Iroquois confederacy. The exact nature of the Covenant Chain relationship is still debated and not fully known. Some historians, Francis Jennings chief among them, hold to a description of the Covenant Chain as a single (though still ambiguous) alliance that, beginning in the seventeenth century, bound several English colonial governments and the Iroquois Five Nations (and the Mahicans and Indians living at Schaghticoke) together. Other historians emphasize plurality in their approach to understanding the Five Nations, and this emphasis shapes their interpretation of the Covenant Chain. These scholars now argue that it is difficult to describe the Iroquois as acting in political unity. Webs of leadership were maintained by constant discussion, and an agreement with one leader in no way implied that all of the members of the Five Nations agreed to or were aware of an arrangement. This is not to deny the existence of the Covenant Chain. Rather, as Richard Haan argues, it is perhaps better understood as a series of constantly changing relationships, or Covenant *Chains*.[8]

Still, the Covenant Chain began the process of centralizing British authority in their relationship to the Iroquois. The Mohawks in particular looked to Edmund Andros, who had

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[7] Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 170-171.

[8] The debate over the Covenant Chain is elegantly addressed in Daniel K. Richter and James Merrell, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003 [1987]), chapters 1,2,3, 5. Richter, *Longhouse*, 137.

forged the chain on the British side, as the central authority in control of economic, military, and political resources. The British would increasingly see the benefits of coalescing Indian relations under one person, even as they were frustrated by the Iroquois heterarchy. As the eighteenth century progressed, Indian affairs in New York were the responsibility of the Albany commissioners of Indian affairs, positions held by several leading Albany citizens concurrently. When the center of the fur trade began to move toward Oswego, the traders to the north and west of Albany began to play a more important role. Among these was William Johnson.[9]

William Johnson emigrated from Ireland in about 1738 at the age of 23, settling on land that belonged to his uncle, Peter Warren, about forty miles northwest of Albany (near Amsterdam, New York). He traveled with twelve Irish families that were to be his tenants, and when they arrived they found some Irish families, the German Palatines at Stone Arabia, and the Dutch at Schenectady already settled nearby. At that point, the center of the fur trade was moving away from Albany after the establishment of the trading post at Oswego. Johnson was fortunate in both his location and timing and was able to find success as a supplier for Oswego and a trader with the Six Nations, especially his neighbors the Mohawks. Johnson was one of a number of new frontiersmen (including George Croghan and John Henry Lydius) who lived on the edge of settled British territory and became wealthy through successful relations with Native Americans in New York and Pennsylvania. But all of these men were infamous for a variety of scandals that separated them from polite society in Philadelphia or Albany. Croghan was deeply in debt and hiding from his creditors by living on the Pennsylvania frontier. Lydius was at one

[9] Richter, *Facing East*, 149.

time an associate of Johnson's, but he became notorious for his shady trading practices and for swindling a large number of Iroquois chiefs out of land in Pennsylvania in 1754.[10]

For his part, Johnson had a series of questionable relationships with women.[11] The first was with Catherine Weisenberg, a German woman whom Johnson most likely brought into his house as an indentured servant (she may originally have been a runaway). Within a year she was pregnant, and she went on to bear three children for Johnson. While evidence is sparse, it seems that Johnson only married her as she was dying, but the liaison and the lack of a proper Lady Johnson kept Johnson from participating in Albany society. Instead, he was active and popular in Mohawk society. In 1746, after Weisenberg's death, Johnson took as his new consort Caroline, a Mohawk woman who was the niece of Hendrick, a Mohawk sachem and friend of Johnson. Caroline had one son, known as William of Canajoharie, and in 1752 she either died or ran away. Johnson waited six years before beginning his next relationship.[12]

Despite his relationships, Johnson was well-connected to the business and political community at Albany and had a house there. Governor George Clinton appointed Johnson as

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[10] Milton W. Hamilton, *Sir William Johnson and the Indians of New York* (Albany: University of the State of New York, State Education Department, Office of State History, 1975), 7-8; Albert T. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1926), 47-48; Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 78; Thomas Elliot Norton, *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974),190.

[11] In characterizing his relationships as "questionable," I am arguing that they were socially unacceptable for the white society with which Johnson was associated. While it was common for traders to take Indian mistresses (since the traders often lived far from white society and could not convince white women to join them), Johnson was treading a line between white and Indian society, and his choices regarding his female companions would not be viewed equally by the two groups. It is true that he was living on the frontier, but he was still close to Albany and highly involved in networks that extended to New York City and Pennsylvania and across the Atlantic. Johnson's decision to not marry Catherine Weisenberg and later take Iroquois mistresses certainly helped him to be influential in Mohawk diplomacy, but it set him at odds with the conservative society at Albany. For parallels see Sylvia Van Kirk, "The Role of Native American Women in the Fur Trade Society of Western Canada, 1670-1830," *Frontiers* 7: 3 (1984), 9-13.

[12] Arthur Pound, *Johnson of the Mohawks* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 94, 137; Hamilton, *Johnson and the Indians,* 10. For his third relationship, with Molly Brant, see below.

one of the Albany commissioners in 1746, particularly because Clinton thought Johnson would be able to keep the critical trading post at Oswego supplied. By that point, Johnson was becoming a wealthy trader. He had moved to the north bank of the Mohawk River in about 1744 and built a new house, Mount Johnson. With this move and his increasing wealth and prominence, Johnson assumed a powerful position on the New York frontier. He was far enough away from Albany to have his own sphere of influence, and by the 1740s there were about five hundred provincial families living north and west of Albany at the Schoharie villages, Schenectady, Fort Hunter, Stone Arabia, Burnetsfield, and the region surrounding Fort Johnson.[13]

In 1753, the Iroquois declared that the Covenant Chain, which had first been established in the 1670s, was broken, and in 1754 the Albany Congress was called, in part, to repair it. One outcome of the Albany Congress was the establishment of the positions of Superintendents of Indian Affairs for the northern and southern regions. Support for the positions had been building for some time among those who saw Albany in general and the Albany commissioners in particular as too closely allied with New France and too closely focused on using the fur trade to benefit Albany merchants. Political allies of Governor Clinton, including Cadwallader Colden and Archibald Kennedy, were interested in using the fur trade to promote western expansion, rather than the interests of Albany alone. In a pamphlet titled *The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest, Considered* (1751) Kennedy expressed his support for a central superintendent of Indian affairs who would be appointed by the king and not answerable to Albany. The Board of Trade agreed with this idea and divided

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[13] Hamilton, *Johnson and the Indians*, 11-12; Pound, *Johnson of the Mohawks,* 86; "Description of the Country between Oswego and Albany," E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New York*, vol. 2, (Albany: Weed Parsons, 1849) 1:532.

the colonies into northern and southern departments, appointing separate superintendents for the regions. In April, 1755, Johnson met with General Braddock and several colonial governors at Alexandria, Virginia, and Braddock gave Johnson two commissions: Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the northern department and Commanding General of an expedition against Fort St. Frederic at Crown Point.[14]

Johnson was expecting the first commission, but the second was a surprise. In his correspondence in May and June of 1755, Johnson often expressed his discomfort with the role of commanding general, mainly because he had no experience and was worried he did not know what to do. On May 24, he copied into his personal papers, "Some Hints for a Commanding Officer," including helpful tips such as, "Do not encamp but where the water is good" and "At no time shew any diffidence or fear in your Countenance."[15] He was much more comfortable in his role as superintendent and knew that the Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, approved of his appointment. In May, 1755 he wrote to Goldsbrow Banyar from Mount Johnson, "I have had a Meeting of Both Mohawk Castles at my House, at which they Signified the greatest Satisfaction on my being appointed Sole Manager, and Director of their affairs."[16] As the war progressed, Johnson's home and property became a critical tool in his role as superintendant. After Johnson

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[14] Shannon, *Indians and Colonists*, 74-75. The superintendent of the southern department was Edmond Atkin, a South Carolina merchant and councilman, who wrote a report and plan regarding Indian affairs in the southern colonies in 1755. This document led to his appointment. However, he was delayed in traveling from England back to South Carolina and did not become active in the war until late 1757. His tenure was very contentious, as he apparently lacked key diplomatic skills. Several governors of the southern colonies, therefore, remained involved in Indian affairs throughout the war. See "Introduction," in Wilbur R. Jacobs, ed., *The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 1755* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1967).

[15] William Johnson, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (hereafter, *Johnson Papers*) (Albany: State University of New York, 1962 [1921]), 1:539-540.

[16] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 524.

returned from the Battle of Lake George in late 1755, he changed the name of his home from Mount Johnson to Fort Johnson.[17]

The shift in the center of Indian affairs from Albany to Fort Johnson reflected, first, the power shift away from the Albany commissioners to the crown-appointed superintendent. As the Seven Years' War progressed, Johnson would hold treaty conferences at his house, but he also expanded his diplomatic efforts beyond New York as towns in Pennsylvania (such as Easton and Lancaster) and points west became critical locations for negotiations. The first step toward a more broadly focused inter-colonial Indian policy was moving the center of power away from Albany.[18] Second, the move reflected the importance of Iroquois treaty-making customs and forms in diplomacy. Fort Johnson was better able to accommodate the large, long-term gatherings that were essential to effective diplomacy. As Albany became a site for the army to gather, moving Indian affairs out of the city was a practical step.

Johnson quickly developed a system for maintaining and building alliances that picked up where he had left off in 1750. However, a problem that Johnson would continually encounter was that the other generals, especially Braddock, Shirley, and Loudoun, consistently interfered in Indian affairs and with Johnson's methods. Particularly at the beginning of the war, Johnson thought he could be most successful in Indian affairs when he could orchestrate meetings at his house and use Fort Johnson as the center of Indian diplomacy, but the waging of the war on far-flung frontiers meant that diplomacy happened at locations beyond Fort Johnson. The most damaging of these problems happened right at the beginning of the war with General Braddock at Fort Cumberland. Braddock knew or had been told that Indian scouts and warriors would be

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[17] For the first reference to his home as Fort Johnson see William Johnson, "Letter to Sir Charles Hardy," December 7, 1755, *Johnson Papers*, 2:387.

[18] Shannon, "War, Diplomacy, and Culture," 91; Shannon, *Indians and Colonists*, 101-103, 220-221.

critical to his march on Fort Duquesne, and he ordered Johnson to send some Indians to Fort Cumberland. Since Johnson was busy planning his own campaign against Fort St. Frederic, he had to rely on the assistance of another go-between, George Croghan.

As noted above, George Croghan and Johnson had many similarities: they both lived on frontiers and outside of elite white society, they both were experienced Indian traders, and they both had homes that served as meeting places for Native Americans. Later in the war, Johnson would appoint Croghan deputy superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern region. Beginning in 1753, Croghan, trying to avoid his creditors, was living among Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos at his new house/trading post on Aughwick Creek.[19] After George Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity in 1754, most of the Ohio Indians allied themselves with the French, but about 200 Ohio Indians decided to maintain their alliances with the British. These 200 took refuge at Croghan's house. He had already enclosed his house and outbuildings with a stockade, and the Indians built twenty cabins near his enclosure.[20]

On April 23, 1755 Johnson wrote to Croghan, whom he had not yet met, and asked him to speak to "Scarooyady," a Delaware chieftain also known as a "Half-King," and present him with a wampum belt at Johnson's expense. Croghan was to inform Scarouady of Johnson's appointment as superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern region and, according to Johnson, "tell him my desire is that he goes with as many Indians as he can procure & Join the general wherever he is & serve him in the best Manner he can." Through Croghan, Johnson

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[19] Near present-day Shirleysburg, about 80 miles west of Harrisburg. In the 1750s it was part of Cumberland County.

[20] Volwiler, *George Croghan*, 48-49, 88-89

promised the Delawares generous rewards from Braddock, "beyond all doubt." Johnson also told Croghan to "Send Some of the Six Nations there … to Serve as Outscouts &ca." [21]

Croghan's reply to Johnson hinted at difficulties that would only become more acute as time went on. He noted that Scarouady and "the Indians which were under my care" were pleased with the news that Johnson was the superintendent. But Croghan went on to explain his difficulty in carrying out Johnson's injunction to send Indians to Braddock. He had "forty odd fighting Men & Lads" ready to go, but the Shawnees and Delawares were slower to respond. The reason for their absence reveals the complex state of Indian alliances at the war's start. Croghan informed Johnson that a few months previously, "at the instigation of the French," the Shawnees and the Delaware "fell upon our Settlements in North Carolina where they killed and took Prisoners Twenty odd People." This event made them understandably fearful of joining up with the British and provincial force, which included men from North Carolina. To solve this problem, Johnson assured Croghan that General Braddock "promised upon their joining him that he will forget everything of that sort."[22]

When fifty of Croghan's warriors arrived at Fort Cumberland, Braddock was disappointed with the small number. He noted to Thomas Robinson (secretary of state for the southern department) that, "When I arrived in America, they assured me that I might depend on a very great number of the southern Indians; but they have been totally alienated from us by the bad conduct of the government of Virginia." Governor Dinwiddie had promised 400 Cherokee and Catawba warriors, but he may never have intended to fill that promise. Savvy diplomats knew that Cherokees and Catawbas would never fight alongside the Iroquois that Johnson had

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[21] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 475-476.

[22] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 496-497.

also promised to provide. Furthermore, Croghan, Johnson and others had to first convince potential Native American allies that the British were not intending to settle on their land, even though they were encroaching on that land to fight the French. Braddock recognized that colonial governments had made Native American relations difficult before he even arrived in that "these people have behaved towards them [the Indians] with so little regard, and so much *dishonesty*, that a very large expence would be now necessary to gain back their confidence, and none is to be had even in those who have embraced our interests."[23] Braddock himself contributed to the trouble with Indian alliances by refusing to understand the nuances involved. When Croghan's warriors arrived, they insisted on bringing their families with them to stay at Fort Cumberland while they went out to fight. Braddock was somewhat perplexed as to how to treat the Indians and decided to keep them and the army separated as much as possible.

The results of this plan are reflected in the journal of Harry Gordon, a British engineer attached to the 48th artillery. As he was traveling with the army to Fort Cumberland, he recorded that the soldiers were told "that as there were a number of Indians at Will's Creek [Fort Cumberland], our Friends, it was the General's positive orders that they [the army] do not molest them, or have anything to say to them, directly or indirectly, for fear of affronting them."[24] Braddock did not attempt to integrate Indians into his force or build a personal relationship with Indian leaders. This lack of a personal bond would contribute to the dissolution of the alliance as the campaign began. Still, this segregation did not stop the army and the Indians from being

[23] Qtd. in William Livingston, *A Review of the Military Operations in North America from the French Hostilities on the Frontier of Virginia in 1753 to the Surrender of Oswego 1756* (Dublin: P. Wilson and J. Exshaw, 1757), 252-253; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 96.

[24] Harry Gordon, "The Morris Journal," in Winthrop Sargent, ed., *A History of an Expedition Against Fort Duquesne; Under Major-General Edward Braddock* (New York: Arno Press, 1971 [1855]), 373. Archer Hulbert identifies the author of "The Morris Journal" (named for the person who possessed it in 1827) as Harry Gordon, an artillery engineer. Archer Butler Hulbert, ed., *Braddock's Road and Three Relative Papers* (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903), 80.

curious about each other. Harry Gordon wrote in his journal that when the army arrived at Fort Cumberland, "We found here Indian men, women and children, to the number of about 100." These Indians "were greatly surprised at the regular way of our soldiers marching, and the numbers." Gordon himself was very curious about the Indians. He wrote in his journal that they were "hardly to be described." He was most interested in the nightly Indian dances, explaining, "In the day they were in our Camp, and in the night they go into their own, where they dance and make a most horrible noise." Later, he ventured to the Indian camp to watch the dances.[25]

Gordon's journal also shows the difficulties of Indian relations for the inexperienced British army leaders. On May 20 he observed that "An Indian arrived from the French fort [Fort Duquesne] in 6 days, and said they have only 50 men in the fort, but expect 900 more; and when our Army appears they will blow it up." But the army was wary of this report. Gordon wrote, "I believe this fellow is a villain, as he is a Delaware, who never were our friends."[26] But a week later he noted the arrival of more Delawares, recording on May 28, "At 11, the Delawares met at the General's tent, and told him that they were come to know his intentions that they might assist the Army." Braddock told them "he should march in a few days towards Fort Duquesne." At this, the Delawares replied that they "would return home and collect their warriors together, and meet him on his march." Gordon did not comment on Braddock thus handing intelligence to tenuous allies, but he did state his opinion that "These people are villains, and always side with the strongest."[27]

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[25] Gordon, "The Morris Journal," 374, 378.

[26] Gordon, "The Morris Journal," 378.

[27] Gordon, "The Morris Journal," 380.

As preparations at Fort Cumberland continued, Braddock became annoyed about the distraction the Indians were causing and apprehensive about the prospect of leaving the Indian women and children at the fort. He turned to the governor of Fort Cumberland, Colonel James Innes, for advice. According to Croghan, Colonel Innes "told the General that the women and children of the Indians which was to remain at Fort Cumberland would be very troublesome, and that the General need not take above ten men with him, for if he took more, he would find them very troublesome on the march, and of no service." Braddock took Innes' advice, even though it was contrary to Croghan's counsel, and ordered Croghan to send the women and children back to Aughwick. Almost all of the Indian men chose to escort their families back to Croghan's house, and none of them returned to the British army. [28]

In the end, Braddock never fully understood the importance of Indian allies or how to effectively manage Native American relations. The British force left Fort Cumberland with only eight Ohio Indians, and one of those was killed by friendly fire along the way. This unpromising beginning to the relationship between the British army and their potential Ohio Indian allies might have been repaired if the British had defeated the French on the Monongahela, but the British army's defeat struck a blow against any constructive relationship between the two groups for several years.

At the same time that Braddock was shedding his force of Indian allies, William Johnson was reintroducing himself and his house to the Iroquois as the central focus in Indian affairs. Johnson began by inviting the Iroquois to a large conference at Mount Johnson. By mid-May, 1755, "1100 Indians Men Women and Children of 9 different Nations" had arrived at

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[28] J. Hall Pleasants, ed. *Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland 1752-1754 (23) vol. 50 of Archives of Maryland* (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1933), 408; Volwiler, *George Croghan,* 90-96.

Johnson's house. Unlike Braddock, Johnson was realistic in his goals for the conference. He wrote to Stephen Hopkins, "I hope at least to keep them in general Neuteral & to get several of their Warriors to join our Arms against the French & their Indians."[29]

One of Johnson's most effective tools as a diplomat was his ability to use language that his Iroquois listeners could relate to and would use themselves. Seventy-five years of Covenant Chain diplomacy had made British negotiators aware of and somewhat adept at using Iroquois forms and customs in their negotiations. Daniel Richter notes nine stages of treaty protocol that included ceremonial invitations, processions, rites designed to cultivate good thoughts, and the reiteration of past shared history and negotiations. The liberal use of wampum symbolized the factional or tribal unity that the speaker represented, and allowing the treaty process to take a long time ensured that all opinions were considered. This elaborate protocol was made more complex by Europeans who sought to use treaty meetings to make sure that the Indians understood the terms of the agreement and to convince them to enter into binding agreements by verbally stating their intentions and signing a document. The final stages involved gift-giving and feasting. A successful treaty conference, therefore, could last several weeks and the most effective conferences included the largest attendance and participation possible.[30]

While some European leaders (such as Lord Loudoun) were impatient with the elaborate process of treaty-making and viewed it as a time-wasting precursor to the all-important signing of a document, for the Iroquois, the process *was* the treaty. Following all of the steps, putting a lot of time in, and bringing large numbers of people together ensured consensus, clarity, and unity. The different perspectives on diplomacy usually benefitted the Iroquois as they were

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[29] *Johnson Papers* 1: 659. There were many smaller nations that were subsumed into the main Six Nations, which explains why occasionally different numbers than "six" are used to describe the Iroquois nations.

[30] Richter, *Facing East*, 135-137, 139.

able to acquire large numbers of gifts during the almost continuous treaty conferences that were necessary during a time of war.[31]

Johnson was particularly adept at using Iroquois cosmology to explain the British-Iroquois relationship to the Iroquois. One powerful metaphor that he co-opted for his own purposes was that of the Tree of Shelter. Trees served several symbolic purposes in Iroquois cosmology and social organization. According to William Fenton, Iroquois envisioned that an "ever-growing tree stands for life, status, and authority—for society itself." A great white pine tree was the symbol of the Iroquois confederacy. Peace was symbolized by the metaphor of a giant pit into which enemies threw the weapons of war; then, the former enemies would plant a Tree of Peace in the pit, burying former animosity. A council was shaded by a Tree of Shelter that symbolized safety, protection, and peace. There was a Tree of Peace at Onondaga where the council fire burned, and when Europeans came, Iroquois set up another Tree of Peace at Albany and Montreal to foster trade and friendship. The Tree of Peace was one of many Iroquois metaphors that Europeans adopted to foster clarity in communication. The Tree of Shelter was another.[32]

By the time the Seven Years' War started, Johnson was well-accustomed to using the metaphor of the Tree of Shelter. In the early 1750s, when the Covenant Chain was all but broken, Johnson had made an attempt to repair relations between the Iroquois and Albany. In a meeting in September 1753, Johnson told some Six Nations' headmen "I am sorry to find in my Arrival among you, that the fine Shady Tree, which was Planted by Our Forefathers for your Ease, and Shelter [at Albany], should now be leaning, being almost blown down by Northerly

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[31] Richter, *Facing East*, 139; Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy*, 81, 100-101.

[32] William Nelson Fenton, *The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 49, 103, 122, 201, 308, 322, 476. Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy*, 61-63, 95-96.

Winds." The Tree of Shelter was necessary for insuring peaceful interactions, and, like the Covenant Chain, it needed to be constantly tended to keep it upright and strong (insuring peace and security). Toward that end, Johnson promised to "endeavor to set it upright, that it may flourish as formerly, while the Roots spread abroad." But Johnson did not have the power to fulfill that promise until two years later. In 1755, with his new position as superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern region, Johnson revived this language by informing the assembled Iroquois that he had moved the Tree of Shelter from Albany to Mount Johnson.[33]

At the initial conference with 1100 Iroquois at Mount Johnson from May 17-June 27, 1755, Johnson made a defining statement that would become the basis for how he conducted Indian relations for the duration of the war. Johnson introduced his appointment as Superintendent of Indian affairs by declaring to the assembled Mohawks, "The Tree which You & the rest of the Six Nations have so often & so earnestly desired might be again set up is now raised, and fixt in the Earth by so powerful a hand, that Its Roots will take a firm & deep Footing & Its Branches be a refreshing & extensive Shade for You & all Your Allies to take Shelter under it." Johnson used the metaphor of the tree to refer to himself and the strength of his commissioned authority.[34] Johnson further invited "all our Brethren of the Six United Nations & your Allies to come & sit under this Tree, where you may freely open your Hearts & get all your Wounds healed." He emphasized the strength and centrality of himself as the person the Mohawks, and all the Iroquois, should come to for help. [35]

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[33] *Johnson Papers* 9:112.

[34] If there was ambiguity about the meaning of the tree, Johnson's secretary Peter Wraxell, noted that the tree meant "Col. Johnson." *Johnson Papers* 1: 628.

[35] *Johnson Papers* 1: 626.

In addition, he established Mount Johnson as the specific location where they could always expect a welcoming reception and fair treatment. His speech continued, "And I do at the same time remove the Embers which remained at Albany & rekindle the Fire of Council & Friendship at this Place, And I shall make it of such Wood as will give the clearest Light & greatest Warmth; I hope it will prove comfortable & useful to all such as will come & light their Pipes at it, & dazzle & scortch all those who are or may be Enemies to it."[36] Johnson thus used well-known metaphors to move the central meeting place for the Iroquois from Albany to Mount Johnson, establishing his home as the critical location for Iroquois affairs during the war. Johnson reemphasized this point by urging the Mohawks "to extinguish all other deceitful & unnatural Fires which are made up to mislead & in the end destroy both you & yours." For their part, the Mohawks selected Abraham, a sachem, to respond to Johnson's speech. He told Johnson, "It gives us the highest Satisfaction to hear what you have now told us concerning this Tree." On relocating the council fire to Mount Johnson, Abraham declared, "Our Forefathers kindled the first Fire at Onondaga from whence they carried Fuel & made another at the Habitation of Quider (meaning Albany) this Fire never burnt Clear & it was just expiring, We are therefore much rejoiced to hear you have rekindled the Fire here."[37] While the Mohawks initially had the closest relationship to Johnson among the Iroquois and benefitted the most from the location of Fort Johnson close to their territory, as the war progressed Johnson began extending his influence further into Iroquois territory through the large conferences at Fort Johnson that included participants from all the Iroquois nations.[38]

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[36] *Johnsons Papers* 1: 626.

[37] *Johnson Papers*, 2: 627-629.

[38] Shannon, "War, Diplomacy, and Culture," 91.

On June 27, Johnson wrote to Braddock (who was already on his way to the Monongahela River) to inform him of his initial steps as superintendent of Indian affairs. He told Braddock about the speech he had made and the response he had received and then noted the toll the assembled Iroquois were taking on his property. He explained, "I am put to great Difficulties for their Maintenance which amounts to a great Expence every day." In particular, "Numbers of them came a Horse back & as they must not at this critical time be controlled, they have spoiled my Meadows & destroy every Green thing about my Estate." After the spring conference ended, Johnson used £45.15s of the money allotted to him for Indian affairs to repair the damage done to "Hay Land, Pasture, Grain Fences &ca," to build "Hutts" and buy "Timber for Seats [,] Council House &ca" at Mount Johnson. Since Johnson was offering Mount Johnson to the Iroquois as a safe and welcoming meeting place, he decided that he should not try to control how they conducted themselves—a point Braddock would have disputed. Further, Johnson believed that it was all for a good cause. He wrote to Braddock, "If they [the meetings] turn out good, I will not repine."[39]

Paying money upfront before results were assured was part of maintaining the Covenant Chain. This was partly because the Covenant Chain was more than an agreement or a transaction; it was a living relationship that had to be constantly tended to and was constantly changing. This can be more clearly seen by examining how the Covenant Chain relationship was lived out. It is possible to get a sense of the day-to-day workings of the Covenant Chain relationship by examining Johnson's "Account of Indian Expenses" from 1755-1756. Aside from a few months when he was at Lake George, Johnson spent much of that time at Mount/Fort Johnson keeping up a lively exchange with many individual Iroquois. It is evident from the accounts that Fort Johnson became a place where Indians could come and stay, make requests,

[39] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 663.

receive goods, build personal relationships with Johnson, and meet with others. All of these factors were critical in maintaining and building the Covenant Chain, and Fort Johnson was the critical piece, along with William Johnson himself, that kept the system going.

The accounts paint a colorful picture of daily life at Fort Johnson. There are several types of payments in the records. One type shows Johnson using hospitality and influence to direct Iroquois actions. For example, during the conference at Johnson's house in May and June, 1755, Johnson recorded £13.19s as paying for the meeting, but during that time there were over one hundred additional exchanges that supported Johnson's overall goal. These transactions ranged from £1.18s.10d to convince an Indian and his family "to stay among the Mohawks, he having lived 16 years among the French & quite hearty in their Interest" to £3.12s.6d for "Powder Saluteing all the Indians as they came." The payments encompassed strictly diplomatic concerns, such as the £34 spent on "11 New fine Belts some verry large all for the Speeches," and very individualized wants, such as £4 "to the Chief Tuscarora Sachem to buy a Cow for his family" and 12s for "a pair of Pumps and Buckles to the Chief Onondaga." The accounts reveal that Johnson was intensely aware of individual needs and desires, and customized the gifts accordingly. Johnson's home continued to be a site of hospitality and the location for more meetings. On June 29 he spent £5.17s.6d to purchase "Tea & Sugar &ca for some of the Chief Familys 14 days, & for making Punch for the many meetings of the different Nations."

It is also clear from the records that Mount Johnson served as a stopping point for Indian families moving between Albany and western New York. On July 3, Johnson paid £16 "to sundry Families on their return homewards to maintain them," and again on July 5 he spent £2.5s for "a Hog &ca for a Meal for the Conajoharees who stayed a day." One can also see that most of the interactions that Johnson was part of each day were bolstered by exchanges of goods

or money, even if it was just a matter of talking to one person to convince him or her to join the British. Most days have at least three payments demonstrating the mix of personal relationships and Indian diplomacy that happened concurrently at Fort Johnson. On April 20, 1756, for example, one of Johnson's four expenses was the payment of £5 "To Nichus Brants son for a Cow for his Family being a Brave Fellow," but another payment that day was £18.6d to buy beer, rum, oxen, corn, and peas to provide "a Treat to the Conajoharees & Mohawks on their Joining me…for their Signal Services at Lake George."

One other type of exchange evidenced in the accounts is the money Johnson paid for goods of all sorts to be used as presents for the Indians. In July, 1756, he spent almost £1500 on a variety of goods ranging from "Jews Harps" to "4 Doz. Knives" to "Womens Yarn Hose" to "Snuff Boxes gilt & raised" and "210 Indian Guns." Some of these goods he brought with him to a meeting at Onondaga, but he did seem to keep a large store of goods at his house, which he would hand out to the people who came through. The stores also seemed to need replenishing often; later in July 1756 he spent another £1000 to buy more goods such as "31 Ruffled Shirts," "Cut Tobacco," and "brass Bullet Molds." The accounts give a good picture of daily life at Fort Johnson and how personal and diplomatic relationships were closely tied together. In the end, from March 30, 1755-October 12, 1756 Johnson spent £19,619. 9s. 1½d of the king's money on Indian affairs. [40]

While Johnson wanted to avoid being seen as controlling, there was one aspect of Indian affairs that he was eager to regulate: the sale of alcohol to Indians. Johnson did give away alcohol as a gift or to be used in celebrations at his house, but he also tried to carefully control how much drinking was happening at Fort Johnson. In June, 1755, Johnson issued a proclamation to British-American traders concerning the sale of alcohol to Native Americans

[40] Johnson's accounts for 1755-1756 can be found in *Johnson Papers* 2: 566-645

near Fort Johnson and threatened that anyone found selling alcohol to Indians anywhere in the vicinity of Fort Johnson "shall be prosecuted by His Majesty's Attorney General as Enemies to the public Welfare of their Country."[41]

Despite Johnson's threats, the alcohol trade continued to be lucrative and out of his control.[42] In July 1758, Johnson wrote to James Abercromby from a camp in the woods near Fort Edward. He had arrived there with 200 Indians, but had expected to bring many more. When he had left his house, however, he was only able to leave with "as Many as I could then get Sober to move with me, which were but verry few, for liquor was as plenty among them as Ditch Water." The liquor had been brought up to Fort Johnson from Schenectady by "their, and other Squaws as well as white." While Johnson tried to control what happened on his own grounds, the alcohol was "Sold to them at Night in spight of all I could do." Johnson closed with an interesting insight into the delicate balance he was continually trying to strike, noting the extreme difficulty he had encountered in trying to get the Indians away from the liquor and that, "if the Fate of the whole Country depended on my moveing a Day Sooner, I could not do it without leaving them behind, and disgusting all the Nations." [43] He was not in a position to issue orders; the basis of the alliance was a relationship of equality.

Beyond the sale of alcohol, Johnson tried to control any interactions between army or imperial representatives, provincials, and Indians at his house. This is evident, for example, in instructions Johnson gave to Alexander Turnbull, who commanded the 42nd Regiment. In August, 1756, the regiment would be at Fort Johnson, and in preparation, William Johnson wrote

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[41] *Johnson Papers* 1: 580-581.

[42] See chapter two, above for how the Germans along the Mohawk River carried on a lucrative alcohol trade with the Iroquois.

[43] *Johnson Papers* 2:871.

to Turnbull to inform him how to regulate his troops at the fort. The instructions are a mix of military orders and advice for living in close quarters with members of the Six Nations. Johnson's first rule to Trumbull was "You are to keep your Party Sober, & in good order & prevent their haveing any unnecessary Intercourse with the Indians, least any difference might arise between them from too much familiarity." If trouble did arise between the soldiers and the Indians, Johnson ordered Trumbull not to try to handle it himself but instead to alert Johnson immediately.

A conflict over leadership could arise if Fort Johnson was attacked. In that event, Johnson ordered Trumbull to make sure that "the 2 Bastions [are] properly manned the Curtains also, there mixing Some of my People with Yours." Further, whatever Iroquois were there were to "Man the Dwelling House & fight from thence, makeing Use of the four Wall Peices, & Musquetoons out of the Window fitted for them." Johnson's instructions also show how his fort functioned as a stronghold for the surrounding Mohawk inhabitants. In case of an alarm, Johnson had established a signal of "three Pattereroes to be immediately fired." Then, when Mohawks came to the fort for protection, the sentry would challenge them and wait for them "to Answer George as Distinct as they Can" before letting them in. Finally, Johnson also informed Trumbull that when Indians were not present at the fort, the "Gates to be Locked at 8 o Clock in the evening and opened at Six In the Morning."[44] If Indians were present, Johnson did not want to seem to be controlling them, so he did not necessarily lock the gates.

Indian affairs were a delicate balance, and Johnson saw the ability to conduct them at his own home and arrange everyday life at the fort in a way that was hospitable and welcoming to the Iroquois as critical to his success. But in doing so, Johnson was attempting to be the primary representative of the British army and imperial administration. This could be

[44] *Johnson Papers*, 2: 537-538.

problematic when part of the army was stationed at Fort Johnson (as noted above) or when other imperial or military authorities tried to get involved in Indian affairs. For example, Governor/General William Shirley resented that Fort Johnson seemed to be outside the purview of any British authority other than William Johnson. In July, 1755, Shirley was attempting to begin his attack on Fort Niagara. Indian scouts were critical to this endeavor, and Shirley applied to Johnson to send some. The two men had been on uneasy footing since the disputes about Indian affairs before the war. Johnson did not fulfill the request to Shirley's satisfaction, and Joseph Kellog, Colonel John Henry Lydius, and Isaac Staats went to Mount Johnson to enlist some Indians on Shirley's behalf. When William Johnson found out what they were doing, he ordered them "not to Speak to the Indians." Colonel Lydius showed Johnson a commission he had from General Shirley empowering him to recruit Indian fighters. Johnson replied that "Neither he [Lydius] nor any body Else nor General Shirley had any power or authority to go to them Speak to them or Transact any thing with them, but only himself alone [by] virtue of a Commission from his Majesty."[45]

Johnson was referring to the commission he had received from General Braddock appointing him superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern region. In reply to this, Shirley argued, "I dont understand your Commission in the same manner you seem to do; I cant think General Braddock intended to forbid me by it to take any Steps for procuring Indians to go with me from Schenectady to Niagara; or that you should assume to yourself a Power to engage all the Indians to go with yourself to Crown Point." Johnson had the upper hand in directing Indian alliances because Fort Johnson was the established gathering point for the Iroquois as well as his base of operations. Therefore, people like Kellog, Lydius, and Staats who wanted to engage the services of Indian fighters had to go to Fort Johnson, where William Johnson was clearly in

[45] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 737.

charge. Shirley objected that Johnson's commission did not empower him to determine where and when Indians would be used; Johnson thought it did. Johnson and his secretary Peter Wraxell were in the midst of constructing a heated reply to Shirley when the news came about the failure of Braddock's expedition, which tempered Johnson's response.[46] When Johnson finally did reply to Shirley, he simply stated, "In the present Sittuation of Affairs, it appears to me of the last Importance that the Management of our Affairs with the Indians should be conducted with the utmost harmony & in the most uniform manner."[47]

Johnson's desire to fully manage the relationship between the British and the Iroquois can be put into greater context by noting his competition on the French side. The chief French negotiator with Native Americans was Pierre Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the Governor-General of New France. Vaudreuil was just as adept as Johnson in using language that Indians would be familiar with and use themselves, and Vaudreuil also had an advantage in that he had inherited the position from his father and was able to build on the elder Vaudreuil's strong relationships with various Native American groups. In addition, the French had long cultivated a relationship based on the metaphor of a family with Native Americans in New France and the *pays d'en haut*; therefore Vaudreuil was able to approach the Iroquois as a father gently reprimanding his children, which created a way for European hierarchies to interact with Iroquois heterarchies. Furthermore, French victories at Fort Duquesne in 1755 and Fort Oswego in 1756 were very powerful displays of French superiority. In a conference in Montreal in December, 1756 (directly following the year that Johnson spent £20,000 on Indian diplomacy), Vaudreuil met with one hundred headmen from every Iroquois nation except the Mohawks, along with some Algonquin and Huron headmen.

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[46] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 756-757.

[47] *Johnson Papers*, 1: 790.

The meeting began with Chinoniata, an Onondaga headman, reviving and replanting a Tree of Peace at Montreal. Concerning the present conflict, Chinoniata explained "we could not take any side," but he noted that the French "always hold fast to your end of the Belt of peace; we have done likewise." He asked that the French reopen Fort Cataraqui[48] for the Indian trade, noting "the English will not furnish us the smallest article." Of course, William Johnson, with his assortment of large and small articles, would have disagreed.[49] In his reply, Vaudreuil affirmed the revival of the Tree of Peace, stating, "The leaves of the Tree of Peace could not but be dry; you had neglected it too much." Vaudreuil then recited the French victories and the evidence that the British were encroaching on Indian land, and he asked his hearers "Do not these instances convince you that the English are your enemies?" In their reply, the Iroquois, through Chinoniata, affirmed, "we will not permit the English to come among us, and…we will always be faithful to our Father." Furthermore, they declared "we are well disposed to assist, by all means in our power, your warriors and children…whenever they will pass through the country we inhabit on their way to strike the English." They also agreed to try to persuade the Mohawks to abandon the British and join the French cause.[50]

The Iroquois at the meeting were essentially agreeing to a neutrality that tilted toward the French. They did not agree to fight for the French cause, but they did offer to assist the French by helping them in their travels and not fighting for the British. The lack of a central authority meant that the Iroquois could treat with both the French and the British and, in doing so, maintain their autonomy. This ability to hold contradictory alliances simultaneously was one

[48] Fort Cataraqui was located at the confluence of Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. It was directly north of Fort Oswego. The British would refer to it as Fort Frontenac and successfully conquer it in 1758.

[49] "Conferences between M. de Vaudreuil and the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 10: 502-503.

[50] "Conferences between M. de Vaudreuil and the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 10: 509, 515.

of the key factors in Iroquois survival and prosperity through the first half of the eighteenth century.[51]

Having this context provides greater nuance to British-Iroquois affairs in 1757 when Johnson had to find a way to convince the Iroquois to remain allied with the British or at least be neutral, even after the British had suffered several damaging defeats. He spent the year at his house at Fort Johnson, managing Indian alliances and coordinating support for Fort Herkimer and the Lake George forts. He also occasionally went to his house in Albany or visited German Flats. Information that Johnson received in February 1757 reflects the challenges he faced that year in Indian negotiations. Johnson spoke to Silver Heels, a Seneca, and Peter, an Oneida. He asked them "why the Indians in General seemed to Incline more of late to the French than usual." They had several answers for him. First, it was widely believed that "the English by extending their Settlements so far back, intended to dispossess them [the Indians] of all their Lands." The French had been quick to encourage this opinion. Furthermore, the French had informed the Iroquois that British encroachment was the reason that "led them to build Forts in their Country on the Ohio and elsewhere, to stop the English from overrunning them." Next, the Iroquois had seen "the French so successful against the English, and little or no Resistance made." The French successes had led to "a strong Alliance of all the Western and Northern Indians, and hath intimidated them."[52] This was the first Johnson heard about the conference between the Iroquois and Vaudreuil from December.

The necessity of repairing the alliance with the Iroquois was particularly urgent in the spring of 1757 because the French were planning attacks in New York and trying to get the support of the three most western nations (Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas). In April, 1757,

[51] Richter, *Facing East*, 164, 167.

[52] William Johnson, Intelligence, February 18, 1757, LO 2853A.

Captain Thomas Butler, a British army officer, relayed information he had gathered from his Iroquois contacts. The French, according to Butler's sources, were arguing that the English were so numerous that, if the British won the war, the Iroquois would be completely overrun. This argument seemed to be resonating with the Iroquois, and Butler heard murmurings from the Iroquois that the English, "were not the ancient people they made the Covenant with."

In order to realign British and Iroquois interests, Johnson took the opportunity at a meeting in June 1757 to discuss the Covenant Chain. The conference was attended by an assembly of Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga and Mohawk headmen.[53] It is important to note that the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas who participated in the meeting with Vaudreuil six months before may or may not have been among those who met with Johnson. In analyzing the meeting, there are two things to consider: what was said and the circumstances surrounding what was said. Johnson was attempting to negotiate military assistance from the reluctant Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas, but the meeting actually became defined by competing understandings of the Covenant Chain. Studying the subtle differences between Johnson and the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas can lead to a more nuanced understanding of the Covenant Chain and reveal what Johnson and the Iroquois expected of each other.[54]

On June 14, the fifth day of the conference, an Onondaga sachem spoke on behalf of the assembled headmen of the three upper nations, and informed Johnson of the results of an earlier Grand Council at Onondaga during which Johnson's appeal for active involvement had been laid before the council. The resulting consensus was that "the old Covenant Chain was for

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[53] The Mohawk headmen were not part of the negotiations since the Mohawks were already assisting the British (and, specifically, Johnson) militarily.

[54] "Journal of Sir William Johnson's Proceedings with the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of the State of New York*, 7: 254-266. It is not possible to know who attended both meetings because French records do not include many names and even Johnson's records do not list each participant's name.

the common safety of you & us; for were we to leave our country unguarded, it would bring on our destruction." Furthermore, the headman informed Johnson "You told us you were strong in people and able to fight the French and we hope you will exert yourselves against them for the common safety of yours and our Country." Two points are revealed from this statement: first, the three upper nations believed they were participating in the Covenant Chain by protecting their own homes and families from French attack. This allowed the British army to tend to other concerns. Second, they supported the British desire to fight the French and hoped that the British would prevail, leading to the security of their common—"yours and our"—country.[55]

William Johnson and the British authorities he represented had a different understanding of the Covenant Chain, which he attempted to communicate on the seventh day, June 16. He explained that the Covenant Chain meant "That the English and the Six Nations shall consider themselves as one flesh and one blood, and that whenever any enemy shall hurt the one the other is to feel it and avenge it, as if done to himself." He continued by explaining that this meant that the British would come to the assistance of the Iroquois if they were attacked. He asserted, "Let us know do you want our assistance; if you are in danger we know the Covenant Chain and will be ready to defend or die with you." But, the inverse of this understanding was that the Iroquois needed to avenge French attacks on British forts. Johnson then tried to make the military aspects of the Covenant Chain the defining feature of the relationship. He declared, "I must tell you that my orders from the King your father are, to take care of and supply with necessaries such good & faithful Indians as will go out and fight for him

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[55] "Journal of Sir William Johnson's Proceedings with the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*. 7:258.

and his people." To confirm this point, he clarified, "such and their families, only, has he empowered me to arm clothe and provide for."[56]

This assertion that only Indians who participated militarily would receive goods also differed from the three upper nations' interpretation of the Covenant Chain. They had told Johnson two days earlier that "The ancient Covenant Chain was made for our mutual advantage, of which trade is a considerable part," and they asked Johnson to send a trader closer to their territory.[57] The headmen thought of the Covenant Chain as mutually beneficial in both war and trade; the British thought of it as an arrangement whereby they would exchange goods for military help. To these Iroquois, it did not seem incongruous to ask for increased trade even as they refused to be more active in the war, but to the British military, trade was only a means to an end. Further, British traders, even Johnson, who directly benefitted from trade with the Iroquois were not making military decisions, but Iroquois traders and headmen were much more interconnected. The line between the military and civil society was much more permeable in Iroquois society.

The upper three nations' headmen and Johnson continued to differ in their interpretations for the duration of the meeting and concluded with neither side being fully appeased. Yet, studying the non-verbal and background components to the meeting can yield additional information about how Johnson and the Iroquois interpreted the Covenant Chain relationship. First it is important to note who participated in the meeting. From the Senecas, 2 sachems, 2 headmen, 1 head warrior, and "40 others" came. There were 5 Onondaga sachems, 2 head warriors, 24 "young warriors," and 5 women. For the Cayugas there were 2 "head

[56] "Journal of Sir William Johnson's Proceedings with the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 7:261.

[57] "Journal of Sir William Johnson's Proceedings with the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 7:258.

Sachems," 7 warriors, and 2 women.[58] These 92 people certainly were not all of the members of the three upper nations, nor were they clearly serving as representatives for all of the people. The Grand Council of the Iroquois Confederacy consisted of 50 sachems, so even if the 9 sachems who attended the meeting were members of the Grand Council, there were many more sachems who were not present.[59] The point is that the Covenant Chain was not an agreement between British and Iroquois authorities; it was a series of agreements between British authorities and every member of the Iroquois confederacy.

This point about differing authority structures is reinforced by noting who participated in the meeting on the British side. William Johnson was the only real British authority present. The other British attendees included Guy Johnson, nephew and personal secretary of William Johnson (and his future son-in-law); Peter Wraxall, the secretary that transcribed the minutes of the meeting; Arent Stevens, an interpreter; Lieutenant Daniel Claus, another secretary and interpreter who would later become a deputy secretary of Indian affairs for the northern region (and Johnson's future son-in-law); and Robert Adems, a storekeeper and friend of Johnsons (later mentioned in Johnson's will). Johnson was the only one who spoke for the British side during the meetings because he was the only one who had any real power.[60]

The difference in power structures can be further seen by the three upper nations' final response to Johnson's articulation of the Covenant Chain. They responded both verbally and non-verbally. The Onondaga spokesman told Johnson, "You have told us that you have your end of the Covenant Chain fast in your hands…and you have exhorted us to take care of and look

[58] "Journal of Sir William Johnson's Proceedings with the Indians," Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York* 7: 254.

[59] Richter, *Longhouse*, 39.

[60] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 7:257.

well after it…The furthest Castle of the Senecas have the extream end fast in their hands, and the rest of the Six Nations have also hold on it, and we assure you we will not quit it." To demonstrate this, the speaker took the Covenant Chain wampum belt and handed it to the headman "of the Chinosia [Geneseo] or farthest Seneca Castle."[61] This belt was the representation of the diplomatic, political, and economic relationship between the British and the Iroquois, but it was not kept in the possession of a leader of the Grand Council or preserved near the council fire and meeting place at Onondaga. Instead, it was given to the man holding the end of the line, not because he was particularly powerful, but in order to allow all of the Iroquois Six Nations the opportunity to symbolically grab onto it as it stretched back to Mount Johnson.

Another point to consider is that this was not the first time that Johnson and the Iroquois had discussed the Covenant Chain. The alliance dated back to the 1670s, and Johnson had been an active participant in it since 1746.[62] Despite this, the exact meaning could be endlessly discussed. While discussing it and exchanging gifts based on it kept the Covenant Chain "bright," it was difficult for British military authorities to adjust their expectations regarding Iroquois assistance based on the nuances of the Covenant Chain. British leaders like Braddock and Loudoun wanted to use Indian warriors in the same way that they used their own regiments; they wanted Indian participation to be reliable and pliable, with goods given in exchange for service. Johnson, Croghan, and others had to navigate these contrasting viewpoints, and it could be an arduous process without any guarantees. The June 1757 meeting was part of this long-term goal of bringing the two groups together, but the realities of war made the discussions much more urgent.

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[61] Brodhead and O'Callaghan, eds., *Colonial History of New York*, 7:264.

[62] Richter, *Longhouse*, 137.

After the meeting, Johnson felt that he had failed, despite the promise of neutrality. Obviously, he was not privy to the meeting between the Iroquois (excluding the Mohawks) and Vaudreuil the previous December and could not know the exact nature of their agreement. Still, he was very disappointed to end the meeting with no participation from the Tuscaroras and Oneidas and a position of neutrality from the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas. Once again, the Mohawks were the only Iroquoian nation to fully support the British. Johnson pointed to a number of factors that led to his failure to gain the full support of the Six Nations. In a letter to the Board of Trade, Johnson explained that many of the problems he had in securing firm Indian allegiance stemmed from the fall of Fort Oswego in 1756. He called Fort Oswego's capitulation "a Mortal Wound" because "that Post was both a Curb upon the upper Nations to retain them in our Interest & a Security for them against the Enemy should they act in our Favour." Johnson believed that losing Fort Oswego and destroying the defenses at the Oneida Carrying Place (Fort Stanwix and Fort Bull) in the British flight to German Flats had weakened the bonds between the British and the Six Nations that Fort Oswego had fostered. Without a trading post at that western fort, the best the British could hope for from the Iroquois was neutrality.[63]

Johnson, however, was disappointed with this result, in part because he was not convinced that the Iroquois understood what the British meant by neutrality. When he was concluding the meeting with the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas, Johnson informed them that their neutrality declaration was "contrary to the many Promises and Engagements you have bound your selves by, at the several public Meetings & Treaties you have held with me since the King your Father was pleased to appoint me to the Mannagement of his Indian Service in this part of America." Johnson explained to them in detail what was expected of them as neutrals,

[63] O'Callaghan, eds., *Documentary History of New York*, 2:746.

including "That none of your People … commit any Hostilities upon the Persons or Properties of any of His Majestys Subjects, … That you do not permit either the French or their Indians, to pass thro your Settlements in order to come & make War upon the English;" and "you do not directly or indirectly give our Enemies or their Indians any Intelligence to our Prejudice."[64]

Despite their neutrality, the three upper nations asserted that they would still hold to the Covenant Chain. Johnson reminded the Indians that if they wanted to maintain the Covenant Chain, they were obligated to "give us without Delay all such Intelligence as may be in your Power which anyways relates to our Welfare." If the Indians violated either the neutrality agreement or the Covenant Chain, Johnson assured them that the British would consider them enemies. For the British, maintaining the Covenant Chain meant that they still had to spend money on the neutral nations to prevent them from wholly going over to the French side. This was frustrating to Johnson because the budget for Indian affairs was already stretched thin and using that money to secure the affections of people who were not even actively working for the British cause was difficult to justify. He apologized to the Board of Trade for not using the money effectively and even offered to resign.[65]

While the Board of Trade did not accept Johnson's resignation, Lord Loudoun did address the financial and diplomatic situation in a letter to Johnson in June, 1757. Loudoun wrote from on board the HMS *Sutherland* on his way to attack Louisbourg. This attack would be called off when Fort William Henry was besieged, but the long sea voyage gave Loudoun abundant time to address the Indian situation in a lengthy letter. The problems in Indian affairs, according to Loudoun, had arisen because negotiations had become disorganized. In his view,

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[64] William Johnson, "Extract from Indian Records," LO 3863.

[65] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York,* 2: 747-748; William Johnson, "Extract from Indian Records," LO 3863.

presents were given out haphazardly, meetings were held without principle men in attendance, and promises were given out and never kept. Loudoun's solution, which he conveyed to Johnson, was to "treat them like men."

Loudoun explained what he intended by this phrase. It meant that the British would give up on ambiguous speech and instead "talk Truth to them." This included demonstrating "that we were sensible of the manner in which they had behaved to us" and demanding "that now they must declare themselves, for if they were not friends, we shou'd Look on them as Enemy's, and be on our guard accordingly." Economically, this meant being much less generous with gifts, especially weapons, which the Iroquois could potentially use against the British. Loudoun, furthermore, was frustrated that the Iroquois seemed to be constantly switching sides and providing the French with sensitive information. Loudoun declared that "whilst things continue on this footing they are the most dangerous of all Spies, acting with impunity, and that as we had no Intelligence of that sort by the Enemys Indians, it was giving the French an Advantage I could not submit to."[66] Loudoun's insistence on clarity in the Indian situation and determination that Johnson force the Iroquois into taking one side and sticking to it reflected his frustration at having to work with allies that he could not control, but it did not take into account the complexities of Indian affairs. For one thing, Johnson would be hard pressed to find the "Principal Men" Loudoun was referring to. In addition, what Loudoun saw as indecisiveness and disorganization was really the difference between decision-making systems in a hierarchy and a heterarchy. Loudoun explained to Johnson that in suggesting he "Treat them like men," he meant that Johnson should hold to "the Treaties with them Religiously and Strictly." The

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[66] Loudoun, Letter to William Johnson, June 9, 1757, LO 3809.

problem was that the Covenant Chain was a relationship, not a treaty, and for the Iroquois, treaties were processes, not rules.

Johnson had a different perspective on the complexity of the situation, which he relayed to the Board of Trade. Johnson pointed to hostilities—particularly on the Susquehanna River but also elsewhere in Pennsylvania and along the western frontier—between Native Americans and colonists arising from long-running disputes over the payment and possession of land. In several instances, Indians claimed that they had not been paid for land, and, more distressing, the Iroquois declared to William Johnson, "your People, when they buy, a Small Piece of Land of us, by stealing they make it large." Between provincials encroaching onto land and buying land from Indians who did not own it, the Iroquois declared themselves to be "Constantly uneasie in our Minds, and we desire you will take care that we may keep, our lands for ourselves."[67] This complaint dated back to the Albany Congress of 1754 during which John Henry Lydius and other speculators from Connecticut and Pennsylvania had tricked Iroquois headmen into signing away deeds to their land in Pennsylvania.[68]

With Indian affairs in New York in such a ragged state at the end of 1757, Johnson needed to reestablish his position among the northern Indians. In September, 1757, after the fall of Fort William Henry, Johnson reported the status of northern Indian affairs to General Abercromby. The Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas were technically still abiding by their neutrality agreements of 1756, but Johnson was doubtful that it would hold against French offers. The Tuscaroras and Oneidas had not declared for one side or the other, but Johnson thought the

[67] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of New York*, 2: 750-751.

[68] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 78-79. This land (west of the Allegheny Mountains only) would be returned to the Iroquois at the Easton conference of 1758. Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 278. The Iroquois may have also been referring to the Walking Purchase of 1737, but that was really a crime against the Delawares.

Tuscaroras were "by no Means warm in our Interest" and the Oneidas were "divided amongst themselves, and the Majority…, in Favour of the French." The Mohawk alliance he characterized as "staunch, but very expensive and troublesome." And finally, the Oquaga, Susquehanna region, Stockbridge, and New England Indians he thought were on the British side.[69]

It is interesting that Johnson would characterize the Mohawk alliance as "troublesome," since it had always been the strongest of his Indian relationships due to the close proximity of Mohawk settlements to Fort Johnson. At around that time (late 1757), Johnson began taking steps to reaffirm the Mohawk alliance and reassert the importance of his house as a safe and hospitable meeting place. One major way that he accomplished this was by taking a young Mohawk woman, Molly Brant, into his house to be his housekeeper and consort. In 1758 Molly Brant was pregnant with Johnson's son, and she moved into Fort Johnson in early 1759. Johnson's choice of Molly Brant grew out of another relationship: his friendship with her stepfather Brant Canagaraduncka, a Mohawk sachem with a fair amount of European education.[70] From Johnson's relationship with her stepfather and the fact that Molly Brant lived with Johnson for the rest of his life, one can conjecture that while the relationship was politically beneficial, it was also based on some sort of attachment. Johnson's strong alliance with the Brant family—and by extension the Mohawks and the Iroquois—translated into benefits for the British cause. There were, of course, a variety of factors at work in the Iroquois' decisions regarding alliances beyond Johnson's personal relationships. Yet the timing of Molly Brant's

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[69] *Johnson Papers*, 2: 736.

[70] Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant 1743-1807: Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 51-52.

removal to his house fits in nicely with other factors that were pushing the Iroquois toward the British.[71]

Other changes to the British-Iroquois relationship began in late 1758. The Easton conference in October 1758 brought peace to the Pennsylvania frontier and strengthened Iroquois claims to the Ohio Country. Since the Easton treaty was made between the Ohio and Pennsylvania Indians and the British, the Iroquois became more invested in seeing the British win the war and defeat French power in the Ohio Country so that they (the Iroquois) could pursue their goal of dominating the Ohio interior.[72] In addition, the British conquered Fort Frontenac (Cataraqui) during the summer of 1758, meaning that the western New York Indians were left without trading posts either at Oswego or Cataraqui. The only remaining trading post was French-controlled Fort Niagara, which the British were determined to attack in 1759.

With all of these conditions established, the circumstances were certainly in Johnson's favor when he called the Iroquois to a meeting in April, 1759. The meeting was held at the Mohawk town of Canajoharie, near Fort Johnson. He reported to the new commanding general, Jefferey Amherst, that 500 Iroquois had attended the conference and "declared their unanimous Resolution of Joining in the present War against the French." In particular, the Geneseo Senecas, who lived closest to Fort Niagara and had been important to French maintenance of that post declared their decision to "Commence Hostilities against the French." Even more importantly, the assembled Iroquois informed Johnson that "those Indians…who did not attend this Meeting, had Engaged themselves to Abide by whatever Determinations should be here taken." Johnson noted that one of the chief motivators, especially for the Senecas and other

[71] Earle Thomas, *The Three Faces of Molly Brant: A Biography* (Kingston, Ontario: Quarry Press, 1996), 37.

[72] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 278.

western Indians, was their desire that "a Trade may be Established between them and the English…which was formerly carried on at Oswego." It had long been the case that British goods were better and cheaper than French goods, but after the destruction of Fort Oswego in 1756 it had been several years since the western Indians had convenient access to a British trading post (the eastern Iroquois, of course, had Fort Johnson). With such unanimous support, Johnson was able to march to Fort Niagara with 1,000 Iroquois warriors, which was at the high end of the total number of Iroquois warriors available.[73]

The siege of Fort Niagara took place in July, 1759. In studying the battle, some interesting comparisons can be made to Braddock's disastrous attempt on Fort Duquesne four years earlier. As discussed above, Braddock was inept at managing Indian affairs, did not want British/provincial soldiers and Indians to intermingle, and ended up with only eight Indian warriors. At Fort Niagara, William Johnson became the commanding general about ten days into the siege after the accidental death of General John Prideaux. Johnson had spent years cultivating Iroquois relationships and was able to both integrate his Indian allies into the British force and manage their contributions while not seeming overly controlling. After Fort Niagara fell, Johnson was able to avoid a Fort William Henry-type massacre by allowing the Iroquois to plunder all they wanted from the Niagara storehouses but not attack the garrison. Still, insuring this result took work on Johnson's part. In his letter to General Amherst reporting the victory, Johnson explained, "all my attention at present is taken up with the Indians, that the Capitulation I have agreed to may be Observed."[74]

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[73] *Johnson Papers*, 3: 27-29; For Iroquois numbers, Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 31-32; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 787 n. 4

[74] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 330-339; *Johnson Papers*, 3:109.

Johnson knew that how he handled the aftermath of the battle would be critical to the continued success of the Iroquois-British alliance. He had to find a way to uphold the European rules of war while also pleasing the Iroquois. On July 27 he noted in his personal record of the battle's aftermath that "I divided among the several nations, the prisoners and scalps amounting to two hundred and forty-six, of which ninety-six were prisoners." Of these prisoners, however, "the officers I with difficulty released from them, by ransom, good words, &c."[75] Johnson's Iroquois' relationships and intricate knowledge of how Iroquois systems of reciprocity worked allowed him to please both Europeans and Iroquois.

The success of the British-Iroquois alliance at Fort Niagara was a result of a long process. Even negotiations that seemed like failures and money that seemed like it went toward nothing paid off in the end. Johnson saw this firsthand after the battle when some Senecas and Onondagas met with him on September 7. They presented him with "a black belt I gave them some time ago, to unite and strengthen our alliance with them, which they now only produced to show me it was fresh in their memory, and to assure me that it had full effect with the Confederacy,--as they had since shown by their actions." This belt was most likely the Covenant Chain belt that Johnson had presented at the failed negotiations in 1757 and which the assembled Iroquois had placed in the care of the Geneseo Senecas, the same village whose decision to abandon the French had been critical to the success of the Niagara campaign.[76]

Johnson's final command in the war was at Fort Niagara. After the British victory, he returned to Fort Johnson to focus on Indian affairs. He lived there until 1763 when he moved to

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[75] William Johnson, "Private Manuscript Diary, Kept by Sir William Johnson at Niagara and Oswego, 1759," Appendix III in William L. Stone, *The Life and Times of Sir William Johnson, Bart.*, volume 2 (Albany: J. Munsell, 1865), 395.

[76] Stone, *Sir William Johnson*, 2:413.

Johnson Hall in Johnstown, New York. His son John Johnson then moved into the house at Fort Johnson.[77] As hostilities began winding down, the Iroquois firmly believed that aligning their interests with the British cause would be advantageous to their ultimate survival and the pursuit of their claims in the Ohio Country. This sentiment can be traced, in part, to Johnson's ability to be the sole representative of the British army and imperial administration in Iroquois affairs. From the Iroquois perspective, the British were intimately aware of their needs and desires, were willing to listen to their complaints, and saw them as brothers, not as subordinate or dependent. To a great extent, however, this was an illusion. In reality, it was only Johnson himself who was intimately connected to them and willing to treat them as equals, but even he was answerable to higher authorities who had different priorities. The problem with having the Tree of Shelter at Fort Johnson was that its branches did not extend beyond that place. Johnson's great triumph was that he convinced the Iroquois that they could find shelter and peace with the British. As events transpired, however, the Iroquois would see their hopes for the Ohio Country disregarded. The British would not consider them as equals but instead as dependent and subordinate. The Iroquois would eventually be caught up in the struggle between Britain and America, and many of them, including Molly Brant and several of her children, would pay the price of their British allegiance by losing their land in New York and having to move to Canada.

The negotiations between Johnson and the Iroquois present another view of the borderland. The Iroquois lived among Dutch, British, and German settlers as well as New England and *pays d'en haut* Indians. They looked both eastward and northwestward in their negotiations for alliances and they, like the British, were looking to the west for new land and opportunities. They also shared in the borderlands culture that involved negotiations, as they

[77] William Max Reid, *The Story of Old Fort Johnson* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), 14.

spent most of the war negotiating with the British in New York and Pennsylvania and the French near the Great Lakes. They were also besieged in that they had to balance French and British threats to treat them as enemies if they did not fight for one side or the other.

As much as the chapter illuminates the Iroquois experience of living on the periphery of British America, it also shows how William Johnson managed his place in the borderland. Johnson was comfortable with the diversity of the frontier and moved easily among Dutch, British, German, and Iroquois society. He was adept at negotiations, or at least at exerting almost total control, and was willing to maintain relationships over a long period of time. But Johnson also had to balance the intricacies of Iroquois diplomacy with the demands of his superiors. While Fort Johnson never suffered a siege, Johnson himself was attacked for being overly controlling, for giving in too much to Iroquois demands, and for not maintaining trade in western New York. At the center of it all was Fort Johnson, which, with its European and Iroquois connections, symbolic and real importance, and position of strength on a fragile frontier, exemplifies the tensions intrinsic to life on the periphery.

Conclusion

The preceding chapters explored some of the most intense experiences of the Seven Years' War on the North American periphery. They demonstrated that civilians who experienced the war most directly were besieged by a variety of problems including threats to their safety from French and Native American enemies, demands on their resources from the army, and demands for their personal participation from army and imperial authorities. The ways they interpreted and responded to those problems were closely connected to their prior history, particularly their efforts to build a life on a contested frontier. While all of the situations differed from one another, two factors consistently defined each situation: the distinctiveness of borderlands culture and the degree to which participation in the war was negotiated.

Studying the periphery through wartime activity at forts reveals a borderland culture forged out of the experience of living on a contested frontier. Life on the borderland involved several factors that, while not unique to the frontier in themselves, when taken together provide a picture of how individuals, families, and communities navigated life on the periphery. These factors describe borderland life as diverse, besieged, westward focused, and built by people seeking a better life. In pursuit of a new life on the borderland, settlers came into contact and conflict with French and Native American settlers who also claimed the land. These conflicts had simmered since European invasion and routinely exploded into official wars, but the Seven Years' War was the largest and most decisive. During the war, borderland settlers had to manage threats to their own safety from enemies, but at and near forts, the presence of the British army was of equal concern and disrupted daily life in a variety of ways. The British army, in turn, was challenged by having to rely on borderlands settlements for supplies, housing, and transportation.

Rather than seeing the interactions between the army and civilians as a conflict, this project has argued that forts became sights of negotiation as civilians and army members made requests of each other. These negotiations often were not friendly and did not always end in compromise, but they did not end in unified resistance on either side. The experience of the war at forts was intense and dangerous, so it is not surprising that negotiations for supplies, participation, and assistance were filled with frustration, resentment, and misunderstandings. Still, studying these intense negotiations is beneficial because it illuminates the variety of ways that borderland settlers and the people most directly affected by the activity at forts felt about forces outside their communities. There is no way to summarize the responses succinctly, other than to say they were complex and dependent on local factors, but understanding the role of borderlands culture and negotiations helps to disentangle the complexity to some extent.

Foundational to this idea that participation was negotiable was a subtle divergence in the understanding of the civilian-army relationship. While army authorities acted as if the colonists were obligated to assist them and should respond in a spirit of gratitude to the army, provincials acted as if they were doing the army a favor by hosting them and providing for their needs. This divergence in understanding and the desire to negotiate is evident throughout the preceding chapters. Chapter two examined General Braddock's frustration with the colonists in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia when they would not eagerly offer their wagons, horses and supplies to the army that had traveled so far to defend them. It took Benjamin Franklin, working as a broker, to convince the colonists to provide for and profit from the army. At Fort Herkimer, the Germans barely tolerated having to host the army and tried to avoid participating by refusing to build roads or quarter soldiers. Loudoun and Johnson noticed that the Germans did not want the army there, despite their exposed position and need for defense. Beyond seeing

their participation as open to discussion, the Germans saw their inclusion in the British empire as negotiable and tried to join with the Iroquois and the French.

Similarly, the residents of Albany were called upon to host the army for such an extended period of time that they had to navigate a new reality of living with English settlers permanently. Individuals and the city corporation tried to mitigate the long-term burden that the army was placing on them by petitioning Loudoun over issues such as quartering and sharing city space, but Loudoun often responded with annoyance at the residents' resistance to the army's presence. Furthermore, Albany was in a potentially dangerous location, and at least some army presence was a necessity, even aside from its proximity to the frontlines of battle. Because of their location and the overwhelming presence of the army, the residents of Albany did not have much leverage in their negotiations with the army and were only partially successful in their attempt to avoid participating by refusing to engage with army leaders' demands.

At Fort Number Four also, the provincials looked to the army to protect them from the enemies that had plagued them for years. By persuading Loudoun of the strategic importance of their fort on the New England frontier, the residents were able to present their own persistence on the periphery as an act to promote the army's overall goal, not simply an attempt to claim land from Abenakis. Through their determined requests, the residents were able to negotiate for adequate protection. However, once provincial forces did arrive, there are signs that the residents resisted becoming part of a larger strategy.

Charlotte Browne also experienced the resentment provincials felt toward the army as few people welcomed her. Instead, she was initially viewed with suspicion in each city she visited despite the legitimacy of her role in the army. While women's service to the army was

largely out of their control, other women and men who were closely connected to the army through the service of a family member did have a way to seek to change the terms of their participation. The number of petitions Loudoun received for a wide variety of reasons shows that the relationship between army authorities and individuals, while seemingly unequally divided in terms of power, did have a certain element of reciprocity or back and forth.

A final example of differing interpretations of the army's purpose and the terms of civilian participation is seen in the relationship between the Iroquois and British imperial administrators. While the Iroquois were independent from Britain, army leaders, especially Loudoun, were eager to treat them as subordinate to the army because of the gifts they had received. Meanwhile, the Iroquois saw their ambiguous neutrality as enough of a concession to British demands and viewed their relationship as a partnership, not a hierarchy. Johnson's diligent maintenance of the Covenant Chain and almost total control over Indian affairs allowed him to present the British army as committed to the mutual benefit of the British and the Iroquois, even though later events would disprove him.

For all the similarities in the ways that the army related to residents of the peripheries, there were still divergences. One point that the preceding chapters attempted to make was that the situations that arose between the army and civilians were nuanced and civilian response was linked to the history and development of their communities. In some ways, studying how the war affected frontier communities tells us a lot more about what had already happened and about the experience of living on the periphery of British America than it does about what was going to happen next. The colonies were populated by many different types and groups of people whose prior history directly affected how they responded to the war. The study began by introducing

three corridors that witnessed significant fighting during the war. These three corridors had unique development patterns that contributed to the affect of the war in each region.

In southern Pennsylvania, the army arrived before anyone had really had much chance to begin preparing for war. Braddock's problems with getting the wagons and supplies he needed demonstrate the lack of organization. When Franklin stepped in to organize the rental of conveyances and horses, he might have encountered arguments about prices. Wagons and horses were at a premium since the army and the residents of southern Pennsylvania both needed transportation. Franklin was able to sidestep the issue by emphasizing loyalty and threats, but the residents of York, Lancaster, and Carlisle still had to make do without their wagons after the army's defeat. It is difficult to gauge the affect of this loss on the population because, as soon as the army retreated to Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania-Maryland-Virginia borderland was thrown open to Native American raiders. Thereafter, and until the finalizing of a peace in 1758, the dominant experience of those borderlands was captivity. Houses were destroyed and hundreds of people were taken captive. Settlers who were not killed or captured fled to Philadelphia and other coastal cities.

In the Albany-Great Lakes corridor, British leaders' perception of the Mohawk River valley as a buffer between French and British settlement came under siege when they attempted to use it as such. The vicinity of the Mohawk River had been settled by Germans, Irish, and Dutch who were interested in profiting from the trade with Oswego (and the illegal trade with Niagara). The river valley and western New York were also predominantly settled by Iroquois who maintained a loose neutrality throughout much of the war. While British leaders would have preferred that the Iroquois fight the French on their behalf, neutrality was at least better than the raids that were occurring to the south. While raids did occur in New York, they never

were as extensive as those in Pennsylvania, mainly because William Johnson was working to control the alliance with the Iroquois. However, after the fall of Fort Oswego, the line of British control was pushed east to Burnetsfield, to be held by soldiers and by residents who resented the army's presence. In the end, Fort Herkimer did not hold the line very well, and it was only the increased attention to the Lake George region that staved off a larger attack. In fact, some of the best descriptions of Fort Herkimer and Burnetsfield come from French spies who were traveling freely up and down the Mohawk River after the successful French attack in 1757.

In the Albany-St. Lawrence River corridor the French advance southward was curtailed by British victories at Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point in 1759. Until then, Albany was constantly in danger. Because of its convenience to points north and west and its own perilous location, Albany acted as a fort-city for much of the war. The fall of Fort William Henry and its chaotic aftermath increased tensions at Albany. Relief only really came after the decisive British victory at the Battle of Quebec, which effectively ended the North American phase of the war. Still, the effects of the army presence lingered as the city became less Dutch through intermingling and new settlement. North of Albany in the New England backcountry, the settlements along the Connecticut River valley were no longer isolated from colonial governments. Furthermore, with the successful raid on St. Francis and the defeat of Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point in 1759, British settlers, free from Abenaki and French raids, began moving north and west. Enough people moved to the Green Mountain region to create the independent state of Vermont only twenty-two years after Susanna Johnson had given birth in the Vermont woods.

While French settlers remained in Montreal and Quebec and the rest of New France after the war, the British victory in the Seven Years' War ended the French-British competition for

land, goods, and Native American allegiance. The victory also re-opened the backcountry to settlement, despite the attempt to implement the Proclamation of 1763. Provincials disregarded this borderline and began conflicts with Native Americans that would culminate in the 1830s with the contentious removal programs. Many of the promises and structures that had become useful to the effective functioning of Native American relations in the backcountry under British rule were the result of the Seven Years' War. However, with the founding of the United States, the settlement patterns in the backcountry and the tenor of Native American-European relations were once again disrupted and challenged. In the end, the westward movement of European settlers would become one of the defining themes in the history of the United States.

This project has attempted to traverse the divide between social and military history by focusing on the war's effects on society. While exploring the battles and military developments is necessary to provide a complete picture of the era, it was ultimately civilians (and soldiers who returned to civilian life) who would have to live with the consequences of the war, win or lose. In studying the Seven Years' War, a focus on the story of the periphery helps to forge connections to earlier and later developments that directly affected the people who lived with the consequences of the war. While the details of the battles are important, ultimately the war was about securing a future for civilians. Finding connections, therefore, between battles and civilians leads to a more nuanced understanding of both the war and the societies that lived with its outcome.

In conclusion, studying the peripheries of British America in the Seven Years' War leads to a study of how the military and civil society affected one another and the course of the war. The varying ways that people responded to the war illuminate how the experience of living and developing a community on the periphery influenced borderland residents' perceptions of the

army and imperial administration. War created pressures that civilians and the military had to work out together, but their varying perspectives and goals made cooperation challenging. It could be argued that Britain won in North America despite the challenges from its own populace and that communities in the backcountry persisted despite being besieged.

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