Stony Brook University

OFFICIAL COPY

The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University.

© All Rights Reserved by Author.

Transgenic Crops, Environmental Contamination, and Peasant (De)Mobilization in Argentina

A Dissertation Presented

by

Pablo Lapegna

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

Stony Brook University

May 2011

Copyright by

Pablo Lapegna
2011

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

Pablo Lapegna

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the

Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend

acceptance of this dissertation.

Michael Schwartz – Dissertation Co-Advisor
Professor, Department of Sociology

Javier Auyero – Dissertation Co-Advisor
Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Professor of Latin American Sociology
Department of Sociology
University of Texas at Austin

Ian Roxborough – Chairperson of Defense
Professor, Department of Sociology

Marc Edelman – Professor
Department of Anthropology
Hunter College and The Graduate Center
City University of New York

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Lawrence Martin
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

Transgenic Crops, Environmental Contamination, and Peasant (De)Mobilization in Argentina

by

Pablo Lapegna

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

Stony Brook University

2011

Based on archival research and ethnographic fieldwork in northeast Argentine province of Formosa, this dissertation examines the dynamics of popular mobilization and demobilization in cases of environmental contamination. Drawing on the sweeping advance of genetically modified (GM) soybeans in Argentina I reconstruct and compare different responses of peasants to agrochemical exposures to address the following question: Why, when facing an environmental onslaught, do people from the same community sometimes react by organizing transgressive protests while at other times failing to engage in disruptive action? The analytic goal is to explain the ways in which people think, feel, and act (or *fail* to act) when affected by environmental problems. I argue that this variation in responses to environmental damage is explained by the certification and/or decertification of authorities, the evaluation of collective action's effectiveness, and people's perceptions of politics and environmental contamination. By exploring how people address their grievances through patronage politics and/or social movements, the study shows the continuities and interpenetrations between these two political phenomena which are usually understood as distinct and opposing spheres. The dissertation's Introduction elaborates the overarching argument, presents definitions of key concepts, and details the methods used for the analyses. Chapter Two discusses the relevant literatures relating to social movements, patronage politics, and biotechnology in agriculture. Chapter Three provides the background on neoliberalization processes in Argentina, the expansion of GM crops, the history of Formosa and its peasant organizations, and the communities of Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon. Chapter Four presents a diachronic comparison of transgressive mobilization and demobilization in Monte Azul. Chapter Five presents a synchronic comparison of transgressive mobilization in Moreno and contained mobilization in Bermellon. Chapter Six presents an ethnography of the everyday life of a peasant organization, showing the interconnections between social movements and patronage politics. The Conclusion

summarizes the dissertation's main arguments and findings, and proposes avenues for future research.

Dedication Page

To the memory of my grandparents, Elda Durí de Calógero and Eduardo H. Lapegna.

Table of Contents

List of Figures …… x
List of Tables …… xi
List of Illustrations …… xii
List of Abbreviations …… xiii
Preface …… xiv
Acknowledgements …… xv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION …… 1

THE CASES …… 1

DEFINITIONS …… 3

Actors …… 3
Actions …… 4

METHODS AND SOURCES …… 6

Data Collection and Analysis …… 7

WHAT LIES AHEAD? …… 9

CHAPTER 2: (DE)MOBILIZATION, PATRONAGE POLITICS, AND TRANSGENIC-BASED AGRICULTURE …… 12

DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION …… 13

The Social Movements Field: Refining the Gaze at the Cost of Losing Sight … 13
Framings, Political Opportunities, Culture, and Demobilization …… 17
Methods' Advantages and Shortcomings …… 23
The Limits of Theoretical Definitions: Social Movements, The Polity, and the State …… 26

PATRONAGE AND POOR PEOPLE'S POLITICS …… 34

The Connected Lives of Patronage Politics and Collective Action …… 35
Clientelism, Politics, and Social Movements in Latin America …… 38

TRANSGENIC AGRICULTURE AND AGROCHEMICAL USE …………………….. 42

From Green Revolution to "Gene Revolution" ……………………………….. 42
Debates on the Consequences of Transgenic Agriculture
and Agrochemical Use ……………………………………………………… 45
From the "Bottom-Up" ….……………………….………………………….…. 48

CHAPTER 3: NEOLIBERALIZATION AND THE DARK
SIDE OF THE BOOM ……………………………………………………………….. 49

AGRARIAN NEOLIBERALIZATION IN ARGENTINA …………………………… 50

The "Dark Side of the Boom" …………………………………………….... 59
Neoliberalization Processes: Between State Retrenchment
and Reregulation ……………………………………………………………….. 62

A BRIEF SOCIAL HISTORY OF FORMOSA ……………………………………….. 65

Cotton, Cattle, and Concentration ……………………..……………………. 66
Politics and Peasant Organizations during Democratization ……………..... 70
An Overview of Neoliberalization in Formosa ………………….………….. 74
The Rural Communities of Monte Azul, Bermellon, and Moreno …………….. 78

CHAPTER 4: CONTAMINATION AND (DE)MOBILIZATION
IN MONTE AZUL ……………………………………………………………………. 81

GM SOY PRODUCTION IN MONTE AZUL: SOY RUSH
AND SKIN RASHES ……………………………………………………..……… 82

CONTAMINATION AND MOBILIZATION ………………..…………………….. 85

Contamination and Transgressive Collective Action ………………………….. 91
Health Problems and Misrecognition ……………..……………………………. 95
Controversy, Reason-Giving, and Counter-Framings …………………………. 98
Misrecognition and Contention ……………………..……………………… 102
Outcomes and Consequences ……………………..……………………….... 108

CONTAMINATION AND DEMOBILIZATION …………………….………….. 110

Peasant Complaints and Authorities: Reaction and Recognition …………….. 112
Social Movements' Alliances and the State ……………………………….. 116
Contentious Identity, Collective Action, and Contamination ……………….. 121

CONCLUSIONS …………………..…………………..…………………... 126

CHAPTER 5: TRANSGRESSIVE AND CONTAINED CONTENTION IN MORENO AND BERMELLON …………………………………………... 128

CONTAMINATION AND TRANSGRESSIVE CONTENTION IN MORENO …… 130

GM Soy Production in Moreno ……………………..……………………… 132
The Lead-Up to Contention …………………………………………….... 134
From Requests to Transgressive Contention ……………………………..... 136
Environmental Problems and Poor People's Perspective …………………….. 141

CONTAMINATION AND CONTAINED CONTENTION IN BERMELLON …….. 145

GM Soy Production and Agrochemicals in Bermellon ………………………. 146
From Individual Problems to A Public Issue …………………………………. 149
The Public Audience ……………………..……………………………...... 154
Contention, Organizations, and Authorities ………………………………..… 157

CONCLUSIONS ……………………..……………………..…………………... 160

CHAPTER 6: PATRONAGE, EVERYDAY POLITICS, AND "DOUBLE PRESSURE" ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS …………………… 165

PATRONAGE POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ……………………..….... 167

Patronage Pervasiveness: Language, Ambivalence, and Informal Connections ……………………………………………………. 168
Resource Distribution and Problem-Solving within MoCaFor ………………. 172
Pressures "From Above" ……………………..……………………………. 177
Resemblances and Differences ……………..………………………………… 180

DISCUSSION ……………………...…………………………………………….. 183

CONCLUSIONS ……………………..…………………………………………… 187

Future Research ……………..……………………..………………………. 189

BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………….……………………..………………………..... 192

APPENDIX 1– PICTURES AND MAPS ……………………..………………..... 220

APPENDIX 2 – DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS …………….……… 238

List of Figures

Figure 1. Soybean Production in Argentina 1969-2009, in metric tons ……………….. 55

Figure 2. Area harvested with soybeans in Argentina 1969-2009, in hectares …..……. 57

Figure 3. Area harvested with cotton (in hectares), Formosa, 1969-2009 …………..… 80

Figure 4. Cotton Production, Formosa (in metric tons), 1969-2009 …………………. 80

List of Tables

Table 1. Argentina. Soy exports by country and region, 2006……………………………. 53

Table 2. Formosa, % of rural properties according to extreme sizes…………………… 66

Table 3. Formosa, % of area occupied by extreme sizes of properties………………..... 66

Table 4. Timeline of Contentious Actions in Monte Azul, 2003……………………… 87

List of Illustrations

Map 1 – Pampa Region, Argentina ………………………..…..……………..…….... 220

Map 2 – Formosa Province, Northeast Argentina ……………………………………. 221

Map 3 – Location of three communities: Monte Azul, Bermellon, and Moreno …….. 222

Picture 1 – Entrance to Monte Azul seen from the paved road ………………………. 223

Picture 2 – Local family farm 1 ………………………………………………………. 224

Picture 3 – Local family farm 2 ………………………………………………………. 225

Picture 4 – Soybean field next to local school …………………..…………………….. 226

Picture 5 – Soybean field next to local school ……………………………..…..... 227

Picture 6 – Mosquito …………………………....……………………………….. 228

Picture 7 – Normal cotton leaves ……………………………………………………... 229

Picture 8 – Cotton leaves affected by agrochemicals ………………………………… 229

Picture 9 – Affected cassava plant …………………………………………………… 230

Picture 10 – Withered leaves in cassava plant ……………………………….….... 230

Picture 11 – Rotten cassava stem ……………………………………………………... 231

Picture 12 – Defoliated cassava plant ………………………………………………… 232

Picture 13 – Normal and affected sweet potatoes ……………………………………. 232

Picture 14 – Assembly in Monte Azul ………………………………………..…. 233

Picture 15 – Entrance to soybean plot ……………………………………………..... 234

Picture 16 – Official shield of the province of Formosa …………………………… 235

Picture 17 – Dead chickens, February 2009 ………………………………………….. 236

Picture 18 – Skin rashes, February 2009 ……………………………………………... 237

List of Abbreviations

INTA: *Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria*; National Institute of Agricultural Technology.

FTV: *Federacion de Tierra y Vivienda*; Land and Households Federation.

MAF: *Movimiento Agrario de Formosa*; Agrarian Movement of Formosa.

MoCaFor: *Movimiento Campesino de Formosa*; Peasant Movement of Formosa.

PAIPPA: *Programa de Asistencia Integral al Pequeño Productor Agropecuario*; Program of Integral Assistance to Small Farmers.

PJ: *Partido Justicialista*, political party (also known as Peronist Party).

PSA: *Programa Social Agropecuario*; Social Agricultural Program.

SAGPyA: *Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación de la Nación*; Federal Secretary of Agriculture, Stockbreeding, Fishery, and Food.

SSDRAF: *Sub-Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural y Agricultura Familiar*; Sub-Secretary of Rural Development and Family Agriculture.

Preface

What is at stake in the struggles about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization.

Pierre Bourdieu*, Distinction*

Peasant life is a life committed completely to survival. Perhaps this is the only characteristic fully shared by peasants everywhere.

John Berger, *Into their Labours*

I was not there when they met, – or, not in the usual Way. I later heard from them how they remember'd meeting. I tried to record, in what I then projected as a sort of Spiritual Day-Book, what I could remember of what they said,– tho' 'twas too often abridg'd by the Day's Fatigue.

Rev[d] Wicks Cherrycoke, narrator in Thomas Pynchon's *Mason & Dixon*

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without all the people in Formosa who generously volunteered their scarce and valuable time to have conversations about events that often were not pleasurable to talk about. I am thus indebted to the members and leaders of MoCaFor, especially those from the place I call Monte Azul, for opening their organization, their houses, and their lives, allowing me to complete this dissertation. *Muchas gracias cumpas!*

It is hard to find the words to thank my advisor, Javier Auyero. First in Stony Brook and also later on, when he joined the University of Texas, Javier has always been there to generously support me –academically and otherwise. It is not easy to summarize in just a few sentences the gratitude for his going above and beyond the call of duty, for commenting on my writings and dissertation chapters at shocking speed, and for being the kind of advisor that any graduate student dreams of. Let me just say his abilities as scholar are only matched by his grandeur as person. *Gracias O'Sheer!* Thanks also to Gabriela Polit, for always welcoming me and lending an ear in crucial moments.

I would like to express my gratitude to the exceptional members of my dissertation committee: to Michael Schwartz, because every meeting with him guarantees insightful ideas and unparalleled enthusiasm; to Ian Roxborough, for constantly pushing me to make my arguments precise and clear; and to Marc Edelman, for offering generous support and always providing a different and interesting viewpoint. I am also grateful to Eileen Otis, who encouraged me during the initial years of the PhD program.

At the Department of Sociology, I always knew I could count on the knowledge and warmth of Wanda Vega to solve any issue, as well as with the help of Pat Bremer and Sharon Worksman. Thanks! I am also very thankful to Pamela Neumann, for her unmatched qualities as an editor and her extremely useful comments on this dissertation.

Norma Giarracca and the members of the *Grupo de Estudios Rurales* of the *Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani* at the University of Buenos Aires deserve recognition for enriching the early stages of my journey to becoming a sociologist. I especially would like to mention Diego Domínguez and Pablo Sabatino for the many

hours spent writing, discussing, doing fieldwork, participating in demonstrations, or just enjoying time together as friends.

I am thankful to those who I met as colleagues in Stony Brook and became dear friends: Lauren Joseph, Diana Baldermann, and Can Ersoy; and to my fellow graduate students that created an environment of mutual support and encouragement in the PhD's long and winding road. During these years in the U.S., I was lucky to have friends who gave joy to the expatriate life and were there through thick and thin: Bahar Aykan, José Aznarez, Gaston Beltrán, Tania Carol-Lugones, Natalia Chanfreau, Jorge Derpic, Consuelo Figueroa, Matt Gildner, Juan A. Gómez, Angelo Guanazzi, Alberto Harambour, Barbara Orelli, Victoria Prieto, Alexis Stern, and Emilio Teubal.

My parents, Víctor Lapegna and Rita Calógero, my sister Alejandra Lapegna, and my brother in law Claudio Meschini always offered unconditional love and support. My niece, Malena Meschini, was a baby when I left Argentina in 2005; hopefully some day she will reconcile my ghostly presence with her flesh and blood uncle.

And, last but surely not least, I am thankful to Roberta Salmi. Paraphrasing Tom Robbins, we couldn't figure out how to make love stay –but we certainly had our salad days. *Tante grazie* Rob, for bringing unexpected experiences to my life and for teaching me how to see things differently.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

THE CASES

In February 2003, agrochemicals used in soybean fields rented by entrepreneurs in the Argentine northeastern province of Formosa ravaged nearby crops grown by small-farmers and peasant families in Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon.[1] In Monte Azul and Moreno, women, men and especially children felt feverish, experienced headaches and muscular pains and had frequent episodes of nausea and vomiting. In Bermellon, hundreds of dead fish floating on nearby streams indicated that the water had been polluted as well. Victims of this toxic exposure reacted through transgressive collective action in Monte Azul and Moreno, organized by members of the Peasant Movement of Formosa (*Movimiento Campesino de Formosa*, MoCaFor). In the rural area of Monte Azul, rural workers, peasants, and small farmers organized several roadblocks, and collectively sued the entrepreneurs demanding reparation for damages to their farms. In Moreno, demonstrators took over a fumigating airplane and occupied the local airport for a week. In both cases, provincial authorities downplayed the effects of contamination and depicted demonstrators as troublemakers. In Bermellon, concerned farmers organized public hearings to tackle the problem, with the support of the local mayor (events of "contained collective action"). Six years later, on February 2009, a very similar environmental problem occurred in Monte Azul. Several families suffered the sudden death of animals on their farms, and people exhibited a series of ailments akin to those seen in 2003. Peasant leaders from Monte Azul distributed leaflets in a nearby town, but no protest took place. This contamination did not even appear in the provincial media, but national and provincial authorities "assisted" the affected people.

Based on archival research and ethnographic fieldwork, this dissertation examines the dynamics of popular mobilization and demobilization in cases of environmental contamination in the context of the sweeping advance of genetically modified (GM) soybeans in Argentina. I

[1] The names of specific localities and people have been modified following IRB regulations.

reconstruct, compare, and contrast different responses of peasants to agrochemical exposures to address the following questions: Why, when facing an environmental onslaught, do people from the same community sometimes react by organizing transgressive protests while at other times failing to engage in disruptive action? And why did similar situations of agrochemical exposure generate transgressive contentions in some communities and contained contention in others? The analytic goal is thus to examine the ways in which people think, feel, and act (or *fail* to act) when affected by environmental problems.

The different reactions observed in 2003 and 2009 in Monte Azul can be accounted for by observing three dimensions: the denial/acknowledgement of authorities; activists' participation in political networks; and poor people's perspectives on environmental damage and on collective action's effectiveness. First, the *denial/acknowledgement of authorities*: after the environmental damage of 2003 in Monte Azul and Moreno, peasants' outrage was fueled by the lack of recognition to their pleas and the denial of the contamination by officials of the provincial administration. Receiving no answer to their demands, peasants turned their indignation into transgressive contention. In 2009, in turn, the acknowledgement of environmental problems in Monte Azul on the part of provincial and mainly by national authorities lessened people's willingness to engage in transgressive collective actions.

Second, *activists' participation in political networks*: as poor people's movements, peasant organizations have to solve the pressing subsistence needs of their members, who join the social movement to defend their rights but also to achieve material benefits. To address constituents' needs, between 2003 and 2009 MoCaFor established alliances with a national social movement and the federal state. These political networks, while providing resources for the organization's continuity and people's survival, posed obstacles for the emergence of transgressive collective action in 2009.

Third, *people's views on environmental damage and the effectiveness of collective action*: protests sprouting from the use of agrochemicals were less inspired by the environmental problems per se than from how contamination threatened people's daily survival (i.e. the destruction of peasants' cash crops and the ones used for daily consumption). In 2003, the protests of peasants in Monte Azul showed people in Moreno and Bermellon that contention was an effective method to draw attention to their pleas. Conversely, in 2009 people in Monte Azul evaluated that transgressive collective action was not an effective means to solve the problems

created by environmental damage. When authorities became responsive, potential collective actions were deemed too risky or costly and there was less room to argue for pursuing transgressive contention. In that context, negotiations with and requests to authorities were seen as more effective ways to solve the problems created by the environmental damage.

The differences between the responses in Monte Azul and Moreno (transgressive contention) and people's reactions in Bermellon (contained contention) in 2003 can be ascribed to the absence of a local social movement organization in the latter community.

DEFINITIONS

Throughout the chapters of this dissertation, I will repeatedly refer to a series of actors and actions. In this section, I present a set of definitions of the main actors appearing in the ensuing chapters (peasant, small farmers, agro-businessman, and entrepreneurs) and their actions (contained contention, transgressive contention, and demobilization).

Actors

I will interchangeably use the terms "peasant" and "small farmer" following the way people in Formosa refer to themselves, both as *campesino* and *pequeño productor/pequeño agricultor*. I will use these categories to refer to rural cultivators who produce both for subsistence and the market, in relatively small plots of land, employing mainly family labor, very limited capital, and for whom significant non-market considerations affect production decisions, returns to labor, and use of land. I also include rural workers in this category since many peasants combine their farming activities with seasonal work, hourly wage labor, and/or informal employment. This definition circumvents a lengthy debate (marking the heyday of Latin American rural sociology between "*campesinistas*" and "*proletaristas*") regarding the inherent instability of peasant production and processes of social differentiation among the peasantry –also referred in the literature as the "Lenin-Chayanov" debate.[2] The expansion of GM crops and its impact on the

[2] The classic authors are Lenin (1967 [1899]) and Chayanov (1966 [1927]), and the debate was periodically revisited in the *Journal of Peasant Studies* (and, more recently, in the *Journal of Agrarian Change*). For recent discussions, see Otero 1999; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009; Bernstein 2009; Shanin 2009. For the pertinence of the debate to the Argentine case, see Archetti and Stolen 1974; Posada 1993; and Giarracca and Teubal 2006.

peasantry might be relevant to this discussion, but addressing it would merit a separate dissertation. Since this dissertation's main concern is questions of mobilization and demobilization in cases of environmental contamination, here I acknowledge the aforementioned debate but do not enter in it.[3]

I reserve the term "farmer" for rural cultivators with capital investments (mainly in agrochemicals, seeds, and machinery), who hire workers, and obtain their main income from agriculture. In Argentina, they usually call themselves *chacareros*, and are concentrated in the *Pampas* region. I will use "entrepreneurs" or "agro-businessmen" to talk about those who invest in rural cultivation, but obtain their income from different sources, and manage their rural activities mainly as short-term investments. I will also refer to these actors as *empresarios* (literally, businessmen) because this is the term locals use to talk about them.

Four caveats are in order. First, although I define each actor individually, it should be noted that they are not groups in and of themselves but agents constituted in relationship with one another. Second, I emphasize economic aspects in defining these actors (i.e. their situation in terms of factors of production: land, capital, and labor) but their "material" characteristics are inextricably linked to "symbolic" aspects (i.e. identification processes vis-à-vis one another).Third, and closely related to the previous point, the characteristics defining each actor are not "objective" or "given" but a product of the practices of the actors themselves; that is, they are "in the making." Fourth, the emphasis on economic aspects and class relationships implied in these definitions present the limitation of not paying deserved attention to gender relationships and differentiation in terms of ethnicity. In the conclusions, I will return to some of these limitations and propose future lines of research to address them.

Actions

In chapters four and five I describe and analyze events of contained and transgressive contention. These definitions are based on McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's *Dynamics of Contention* (2001: 7-8). These authors define contained contention as cases

[3] Accordingly, I neither address the literature on "pluriactivity" (i.e. a strategy of rural households to sustain a farm via income from non-agrarian activities) that flourished mostly in European rural sociology with influences in Latin American scholarship (see, for instance, the journals *Sociologia Ruralis* and *Journal of Rural Studies*).

> in which all parties are previously established actors employing well established means of claim making. It consists of episodic, public, collective interactions among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, and object of claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, and (c) all parties to the conflict were previously established as constituted political actors.

Transgressive contention is understood as situations of

> episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interest of at least one of the claimants, (c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collective action.[4]

Although the authors assert that there is an "incessant interplay between contained and transgressive modes of contention" (McAdam et al 2001: 305) they also admit that their analyses concentrate on episodes of transgressive contention. Furthermore, "for further simplification" and "practical concerns," their examples come from events in which governments are national states (McAdam et al 2001: 8). In this dissertation I address cases of both transgressive and contained contention, and analyze the relationships between mobilization and national, provincial, and local levels of the state, in an attempt to contribute to an extension and refinement of these concepts (O'Brien 2003).

Within the chapters of this dissertation, I will also refer repeatedly to processes of demobilization. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly understand mobilization and demobilization in the following terms: "With respect to mobilization we must explain how people who at a given point in time are not making contentious claims start doing so –and, for that matter, how people who are making claims stop doing so. (We can call that reverse process *de*mobilization)" (2001: 34, original emphasis). In the specific cases of this dissertation, I understand demobilization as the process by which a group of people protesting over an environmental contamination at one point in time (in 2003) do not react in the same way later on (in 2009). In doing so, I follow the minimal definition of McAdam et al 2001, although extending it to encompass what the literature refers to as the "movement career model" (McAdam et al 2001: 65). However, I do not assume a

---

[4] "Action qualifies as innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-representations, and /or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question" (McAdam et al 2001: 8)

linear and invariant model positing demobilization as a necessary result of participation in institutional politics, i.e. I problematize the "iron law" of oligarchization (Michels 1962). In doing so, I am taking heed of existing research showing that social movements' involvement in political institutions does not necessarily translate into bureaucratization (Aminzade 1995; Rucht 1999; Clemens and Minkoff 2004; Joseph 2010). In the next chapter, I further discuss the relationship between (de)mobilization, organizations, and political processes.

METHODS AND SOURCES

My first contact with the people of Monte Azul took place in April 2003 when I traveled to Formosa with two colleagues to investigate the environmental problems created by the production of GM soybeans. We worked as researchers at the School of Social Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires and at the same time participated in a network of academic groups and NGOs aimed at bringing agrarian and ecological issues into the public arena. During our visit, we conducted interviews and recorded some of them on digital video. Back in Buenos Aires, we transformed those images into a documentary that we presented in the capital of Formosa in 2004 and in Buenos Aires (Digilio et al 2004), and published a chapter on the case of Monte Azul in an edited book (Dominguez et al 2005).

As a graduate student in the PhD program of Stony Brook University, I made subsequent trips to Formosa in the summer of 2007, fall 2008, spring and summer 2009, and summer 2010, totaling eleven months of fieldwork. The fieldwork involved data collection through: a) interviews; b) participant observation; and c) archival research. In the provincial capital I interviewed the lawyers involved in the legal demands, public officials, and representatives of landowners' associations; and I did archival work in the Ministry of Production, Judiciary offices, and provincial newspapers. In Monte Azul (2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010), Moreno (2008 and 2009), and Bermellon (2009) I interviewed people involved in the conflict: mainly peasants and rural workers, but also political leaders, public officials, and employees of soybean companies. In Monte Azul and Moreno I spent many days in the locales of peasant organizations, and I recorded field notes about my informal conversations with activists and their constituents, as well as the observed interactions between them, and activities taking place in these settings. In summary, the sources from which I reconstructed the events and draw my

analyses are comprised of 41 formal interviews, field notes based on my participant observations, documents from peasant organizations, 73 newspaper accounts (culled from three provincial newspapers for the 2003-2006 period), and the legal documents associated with the lawsuit filed by the peasants in Monte Azul and the prosecution against demonstrators in Moreno.

Data Collection and Analysis

When I initiated this study, I was interested in the consequences of the rapid expansion of GM crops in Argentina, and wanted to further investigate the peasants' protests of 2003 in Formosa. In 2007, I started exploratory fieldwork in Monte Azul, since I had already established contact with the people in the community. In addition, the documentary we produced in 2004 reflecting the environmental and social problems in Monte Azul provided me a good starting point to "gain entrance." I began conducting semi-structured interviews with key informants with the goal of reconstructing the protest events of 2003, since I considered the events of contention the units of analysis of the project (these events are presented in chapters four and five; see guidelines and list of interviews in Appendix 2). At the same time that I was carrying out interviews, I participated in the activities held in MoCaFor offices in Curuzú and lived in the houses/farms of peasant families in Monte Azul. While taking part of the everyday life of peasants and the organization, I took daily notes on interactions and dialogues. My first goal with the interviews was to reconstruct the events and the meanings attributed to them, so I held interviews with the people affected by the agrochemical exposure. The lawyer representing the peasants suing the soybeans growers for the damage to their crops had given me access to the lawsuit, so the list of the people that took part in the lawsuit was the first group I interviewed.

Later on, to obtain a broader perspective of the community, I also interviewed people who were affected by the agrochemical exposure but did not participate in the lawsuit, and other relevant community actors (for instance, a local political broker). In doing my interviews, I relied on both "snowballing" by asking people to refer me to others for interviewing, and I also interviewed peasants living on nearby soybean plots by simply approaching their farms and asking them if they were willing to talk to me about their experiences. Nevertheless, I never aimed to obtain a "representative sample," simply because the use of qualitative methods is not

suitable for achieving this goal (Small 2009a, 2009b). Instead, I concentrated on the strengths of qualitative research, that is, to provide insights into meaning, human agency, and processes. Using qualitative methods to study social movements gives the researcher the advantage of accessing non-participants and seeing interactions that take place when people *are not* engaged in open contention (I further discuss this point in chapter two, section "Method's advantages and shortcomings"). Such participant observation also allows for in-depth analysis of the interactions between leaders and members of a social movement, relationships which previous research (Schwartz et al 1981) suggests are an important dimension to understand processes of demobilization.

My goal in collecting data about the activities of both participants and non-participants in the social movement was to understand processes of mobilization *and* demobilization, and to answer why some people affected by agrochemicals did not mobilize. From my previous research experience in Argentina, I knew that there were cases of agrochemical drifts throughout the country but, with some exceptions, there were few protests about it. I also knew, from fieldwork done in 2003, that there were other cases of agrochemical drifts in Formosa that did not result in collective actions.

By 2008 my research project had taken on a "theory-driven" focus, informed by ethnographic research emphasizing the explanatory and analytical capacities of this method and qualitative research in general (e.g. Lofland 1995; Katz 2001, 2002; Snow, Morril and Anderson 2003; Ragin et al 2004). In my research design, I thus followed the principles of the extended case method (Burawoy 1998), understanding that the objective of research is to strengthen and extend theory by accommodating "observed lacunae or anomalies." As stated by Burawoy, "We try to constitute the field as a challenge to some theory we want to improve. What makes the field 'interesting' is its violation of some expectation and an expectation is nothing other than some theory waiting to be explicated" (Burawoy 2000: 28). In my case, the anomaly to be explained was the lack of collective action following agrochemical drifts: why, when affected by an environmental onslaught, did people not react contentiously?

In 2008, I transcribed the interviews I had conducted so far and began the analysis by coding them. The codes mainly aimed to: reconstruct the events of 2003 and how people thought, felt, and acted about them; identify people's views about other actors (the provincial and federal states, soybean growers, other social movements); and understand peasants' experiences

in a context of neoliberalization processes (see list of codes in Appendix 2). While coding the interviews, I noticed particularities in the language used when talking about the contamination (for example, women expressing their worries as "mothers") and how peasants saw the interaction with authorities and soy growers (for instance, using terms like "shameless" ["*sinvergüenza*"] and highlighting the "lack of respect" they felt). These observations guided subsequent rounds of data collection I conducted in 2008 and 2009, during which time I returned to Monte Azul and also initiated fieldwork in Moreno and Bermellon. In doing so, I followed an established strategy of qualitative research of making preliminary interpretations and return to the field to gather data suggested by them (Becker 1998: 151-7).

In early 2009 I received an email from members of MoCaFor telling me there had been another incident of agrochemical drift in Monte Azul. When I traveled to Formosa some months later and found out that no protest had taken place following this environmental problem, I decided to consider this instance as a "negative case" (Emigh 1997). By doing so, I could make the most of my data by a) profiting from my previous fieldwork in the area, and b) capturing the *processes* of mobilization and demobilization that were at the center of my research questions. Put another way, the cases in Monte Azul (in 2003 and 2009) allowed for a diachronic comparison, while I could also make a synchronic comparison drawing on the 2003 cases of Moreno and Bermellon.

WHAT LIES AHEAD?

This dissertation is divided in six chapters and a conclusion. In chapter two, I discuss the literatures on social movements, patronage politics, and biotechnology in agriculture focusing on how they relate to my main research question. I argue that the literature on social movements has not paid enough attention to processes of demobilization and the lack of mobilization, and I concentrate on the specific problems of the framing perspective and political opportunities on this matter. In addition, I claim that to understand demobilization and the lack of mobilization it is necessary to observe the relationships between social movements and the state. This leads to a discussion of patronage politics in Latin America, since the relation between popular social movements and the state in this region is permeated by patronage politics. The discussion on

agriculture based on transgenic seeds serves to inform the processes presented in chapter two, and reviews environmental problems associated with GM crops.

Chapter three provides the background on neoliberalization processes and the expansion of GM crops in Argentina, the history of Formosa and its peasant organizations, and introduces the communities of Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon. It argues that processes of neoliberalization involve both a "roll back" and a "roll out" of the state. In other words, the chapter shows how a phase of "state retrenchment" of economic activities is followed by a "state reregulation" via welfare programs.

Chapter four presents a *diachronic comparison* of two instances of environmental onslaught, in 2003 and 2009, and how people in the same community (Monte Azul) responded in each instance. In 2003, peasants responded with widespread contention, escalating from petitions to fairly spontaneous roadblocks on local roads, to roadblocks of a paved provincial road for several days (i.e. transgressive collective actions). By contrast, in 2009, no contentious events were organized. This chapter is the core of the dissertation. As stated above, the lack of protests in 2009 can be accounted for by: a) authorities' recognition of the environmental problem; b) the alliances and political networks established by MoCaFor in intervening years that posed obstacles to collective action; and c) the evaluation by peasants that petitions and negotiations with authorities would be more effective in solving the problems created by environmental damage than transgressive collective actions.

Chapter five presents a *synchronic comparison* of the reactions to an environmental onslaught, showing peasants' responses in Moreno and Bermellon, two other rural communities affected by environmental damages created by agrochemical drifts in 2003. This chapter elaborates on the points of the previous one by: a) showing that the argument that explains the reactions of Monte Azul peasants also applies to other rural communities (Moreno); and b) presenting the case of Bermellon, where contamination prompted contained collective actions. In Moreno, provincial authorities' denial of the environmental problem and peasants' direct witnessing of the environmental onslaught in Monte Azul prompted direct, transgressive collective action (the takeover of a fumigating airplane). In Bermellon, the reaction to the environmental contamination of 2003 led to several public meetings, but no transgressive action took place. The events of contained collective action in Bermellon can be attributed to the support of local politicians and the absence of a social movement organization in the area.

Chapter six presents an ethnography of the everyday life of a peasant organization, showing the interconnections between social movements and patronage politics. In this chapter, I argue that MoCaFor acts in a context dominated by patronage politics and thus must respond to a "double pressure": a) delivering concrete benefits to its constituents; and b) maintaining external alliances with national social movements and the federal state, to obtain resources and maintain autonomy from the provincial government. I present my ethnographic data to show that, in spite of the oppositional politics that MoCaFor maintains vis-à-vis the provincial government, the practices and the language of both MoCaFor activists and constituents became nevertheless immersed in the logic of patronage politics. In other words, participation in MoCaFor is a way of defending rights but also of achieving concrete benefits, which members receive through the organization's connections to national social movements and the national government. By exploring how people address their grievances through patronage politics and/or social movements, this chapter shows the continuities and interpenetrations between these two political phenomena which are usually understood as distinct and opposing spheres. The Conclusion summarizes the dissertation's main arguments and proposes avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2

(DE)MOBILIZATION, PATRONAGE POLITICS, AND TRANSGENIC-BASED AGRICULTURE

How have the social sciences tackle processes of mobilization and demobilization? How can we characterize the relationships between the state, social movements, and political parties and their patronage networks? How did agriculture based on genetically modified seeds transform crop production and how has this process affected the lives of peasants and the environment? The primary goal of this dissertation is to investigate the connections between processes of mobilization and demobilization in cases of environmental damage. More specifically, my primary aim is to scrutinize different reactions of peasants and the rural poor (transgressive and contained contention) when affected by agrochemical drifts and to understand why, later in time, the same aggrieved people do not protest when facing a similar situation. To identify the causes of agrochemical drifts and environmental damage, it is necessary to detail the expansion of agriculture based on transgenic seeds –a process that, in turn, is connected to the demise of peasants' subsistence economy. The literature on social movements provides the framework to understand processes of mobilization. However, as I argue below, this literature has not paid enough attention to processes of demobilization. As it will become clearer through the cases I present in chapters four and five, processes of mobilization and demobilization are crucially shaped by the political context in which they take place. Thus, examining the relationships between social movement leaders, their constituents, and authorities is essential to gaining a better understanding of processes of mobilization and demobilization. At the same time, this political context –particularly in Formosa, but for poor people politics in Latin America in general- is molded by clientelism and patronage politics. In summary, to answer the questions that opened this chapter we need to review the literatures on social movements, patronage politics, and biotechnology applied to agriculture, a task I turn to next.

DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION

The relationship between collective action and inaction among subordinate classes has preoccupied social theory since its origins. Concepts like Karl Marx's "false consciousness" (differentiating a "class in itself" from a "class for itself"), and Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony points us toward a comprehension of the situations in which subordinated actors reproduce their positions, eschewing rebellion or resistance. In the 1980s, different authors have interrogated dynamics of compliance and contention. Basing his analysis on an array of historical cases, Barrington Moore posed the question in the following terms: Why do people so often put up with being victims of their society and why do at other times they become angry and try ... to do something about their situation? (1978). John Gaventa posed a similar inquiry: "Why, in an oppressed community where one might intuitively expect upheaval, does one instead find, or appear to find, quiescence? Under what conditions and against what obstacles does rebellion begin to emerge?" (1980: 3). James C. Scott (1985) gave an interesting twist to the question of why open confrontation does not erupt: the absence of contention may not necessarily mean conformity but, rather, that resistance is sometimes a subtle process, more difficult to grasp than scholars have traditionally thought. In what follows, I review the literature on social movements zooming in on how scholars in this field have addressed the dynamic relationship between mobilization and demobilization.

The Social Movements Field: Refining the Gaze at the Cost of Losing Sight

Questions of why and when people mobilize are the cornerstone of studies on collective action; yet responses to this question have radically changed through the development of this field of study. Social movement studies emerged borrowing theoretical frameworks from two well-established fields of social inquiry: social psychology ("collective behavior" theories) and political sociology ("political process theory"). The collective behavior perspective, as originally formulated by Robert Park (1955), resonated with classical works on psychology (i.e. Freud's *Group Psychology* 1989 [1921]) and, seeing massive upheavals as "crowds" (Le Bon 1897), it understood protest as a subset of irrational behaviors and fads spread by contagion and akin to

riots and crowd's actions.[5] Theories of collective behavior were later on elaborated upon by Neil Smelser and Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957), focusing on norms and values held by individuals but also positing strain and breakdown as catalysts of collective action (Buechler 2004).[6] In contrast to this view, theories on the mobilization of resources and on organizations viewed demonstrators as rational actors (Zald and Ash 1966; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Assuming that grievances were fairly constant among populations (in contrast with explanation based on "strain" or "breakdown"), what became known as "resource mobilization theory" explained the emergence and development of social movements as a result of the resources that organizations could mobilize to put forth their claims. In the late 1970s also emerged research that shared with resource mobilization the idea of protestors as rational actors, but paying closer attention to political and economic structures (rather than to organizations and their professionalization) and long-term change –most clearly exposed in the work of Charles Tilly (e.g. 1978). In the 1980s, this perspective was labeled either "political opportunities" or "political process" theory, extended and refined in influential research on the U.S. civil rights movement (e.g. McAdam 1982, 1988; Morris 1981, 1984).[7]

With political process becoming the "dominant paradigm" in social movement research (Goodwin and Jasper 2004), other perspectives emerged drawing attention to constructivist, subjective, and "ideational" elements, mostly absent in the research on "political opportunity structures." In the mid- to late 1980s, two new bodies of research began to ease out the "structural bias" of social movement research: framing analysis and "new social movements" (NSM). On one hand, the NSM perspective (mostly sprouting from the decline of the labor movement and the emergence of environmental protests in Europe) centered on the "reflexivity" of late modernity (Touraine, 1981) and the role of identity construction in social movements (Melucci 1989, 1991).[8] On the other hand, framing analysis –harking back to the influence of

[5] Herbert Blumer (1946) can also be seen as one of the pioneers in the collective behavior tradition, although his point of view was rooted in symbolic interactionism rather than in psychology.
[6] On collective behavior and social movements, see also Evans 1975; Genevie 1978; Perry and Pugh 1978; Rose 1982 (especially chapter 3); Lofland 1985; McPhail 1991; Curtis and Aguirre 1993; Gusfield 1994; Marx and McAdam 1994; and Turner 1996. The work of Moscovici (1985) and McClelland (2010 [1989]) elaborate on the topic of crowds.
[7] Other influential works within this perspective include Oberschall 1973; Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tarrow 1988, 1991; and Tilly 1986.
[8] These authors began to be recognized in the United States in the late 1980s, although they were previously influential in Europe and Latin America, based on their earlier works (e.g. Touraine 1965; Melucci 1982). For reviews of the NSM perspective and comparisons with resource mobilization, see Cohen 1985 and Klandermans

social psychology- applied the framework of Erving Goffman's *Frame Analysis* (1974) to the study of social movements. David Snow, Robert Benford and his colleagues argued that prevalent perspectives on social movements presented three shortcomings: "They neglect the process of grievance interpretation; they suggest a static view of participation; and they tend to over-generalize participation-related processes" (Snow et al 1986: 465). In further research, they elaborated their perspective defining "framing alignment" and its components: "diagnosis," "prognosis," and "motivation" (Snow and Benford 1988).[9] The framing perspective was incorporated into the dominant paradigm of social movement research and integrated with the mobilization of resources and political opportunities, becoming one of the central factors explaining collective mobilization (see McAdam 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996). This incorporation, however, was not without its problems. By conceiving language, discourses, and rituals as "symbolic resources," the convergence of the framing perspective with resource mobilization and political opportunities theories glossed over the problematic assumption that, as public and contextual processes emerging from mobilization and action, narratives and accounts can hardly be seen as resources that can be controlled and distributed (Steinberg 1998: 851). As Mark Steinberg points out, the rationality and instrumentality implied in framing analyses are at odds with a constructionist perspective (Steinberg 1998).

A new turn in social movement studies was represented by the "contentious politics" program, aimed at synthesizing different perspectives in the field and integrating research on social movements with that on strikes, interest groups, political parties, war, and democratization (McAdam et al 2001). Although McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly admonish scholars against searching for universal laws of collective action (2001: 13-14, 37, 74, 340), their program could be seen as a "paradigm shift" in social movement studies (Tindall 2003). Instead of looking for general models that would explain different types of mobilization, the authors argue for the identification of mechanisms and processes that would explain contentious events. Mechanisms are defined as "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (McAdam et al 2001: 24). The

---

1991. See Calhoun 1993 for a critique of the "newness" of NSM, and Hellman 1995 for the pertinence of a NSM perspective in Latin America.

[9] See also Gamson 1975 for pioneering work on "injustice frames" and Tarrow 1992 for the connection between frames and political culture. For a review and assessment of the perspective see Benford and Snow 2000; and for connections with ideology and dialogic analysis see Snow 2004. A recent edited volume by Noakes and Johnston (2005) discusses the main tenets of this perspective.

authors differentiate between cognitive, environmental, and relational mechanisms that, in turn, combine to produce processes, "regular sequences" of such mechanisms that explain the emergence, development and decline of episodes of contention. This new perspective offers advantages over the previous dominant paradigm of social movement research in that it stresses "the necessity of taking strategic interaction, consciousness, and historically accumulated culture into account" (McAdam et al 2001: 22), advancing a relational viewpoint that moves from static analyses to more dynamic explanations, and focuses on fields of contention rather than on one social movement at a time.[10] I borrow from McAdam et al 2001 the concepts of transgressive and contained contention (see introduction), and use their terminology referring to mechanisms of certification (the validation of a social actor by a powerful outsider), brokerage ("the linking of two previously disconnected social actors by a third party"), and processes of diffusion – besides taking heed of their recommendation to focus not only on the emergence but also later phases of contention.

The development of the social movements field, in summary, promoted the convergence of various perspectives and stimulated a vast array of research. Along these lines, the introduction to a recent edited volume asserts that "so rich and varied has been the development of this field since the 1960s that one would be hard-pressed to find subjects that have not been studied by some scholar somewhere or themes that have not been broached in doing so" (Tarrow 2001: 5). However, this development has increasingly zoomed in on patterns of *mobilization*, leaving questions about the *lack of mobilization* as an afterthought or glossing over processes connecting collective action and *demobilization*. In other words, with the development of a research field on social movements, scholars concentrated on factors (resources, political opportunities, frames, sets of mechanisms) mediating between grievances and mobilization, paying much less attention to explaining why social movements cease to mobilize, or why people choose collective action (or not) among a set of tactics when addressing their grievances. As John Walder put it when inspecting the relationship between social movements and political

[10] McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly responded to criticism to *Dynamics of contention* about the vagueness and proliferation of "mechanism talk" with a methodological article (McAdam et al 2008) that was commented on and criticized in a symposium organized by the journal *Qualitative Sociology* (2008, Vol 31). The "DOC program," inspired a series of scholarly pieces building on and critically examining this approach (e.g. Wolford 2003; Martin and Miller 2003; Johnston 2006; Biggs 2005; O'Brien 2003; Sherman 2008; Braun and Vliegenthart 2009; Ondetti 2006; Boykoff 2007; Auyero 2007; Mische 2008). Also see an evaluation of the book ten year after its publication in McAdam and Tarrow 2010, and a special issue of the journal *Mobilization* presenting several articles applying the "DOC perspective" (2011, Vol. 16, number 1).

sociology: “The increasing variety of ideas about mobilization and the perennial controversies within the subfield has created a false sense of intellectual breadth, obscuring the enduring narrowness of the focus on mobilization (…) All of this breadth and vitality, however, has remained within the narrowed boundaries of the defining question—how groups mobilize, or why social movements emerge” (Walder 2009: 394, 399).

The literature on social movements thus increased its explanatory power about dynamics of mobilization, yet this came at the expense of disregarding research about the *lack* of collective action in situations when protests might be expected, and about processes of *demobilization*. This lacuna did not pass unnoticed by some influential scholars in the field. For instance, Robert Benford (one of the creators of the “framing perspective”) asserted that “We lack studies of negative cases, as when framings fail to stimulate collective action” (1997: 412). Similarly, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (the leading figures of the “contentious politics” program) pinpointed that “In searching for causal mechanisms that produce collective action, we should be as interested in cases where nothing much happens as in those in which widespread action ensues” (2008: 325).

Framings, Political Opportunities, Culture, and Demobilization

The initial answers that come to mind when asking why people do not mobilize or why social movements demobilize are simple ones: resources were not available, framings failed, political opportunities were not open. However, I believe this is a very narrow way of viewing the matter insofar as it conceives framings as “things” to be manipulated and tried until one frame is successful; likewise, it sees political opportunities as something “out there,” independent and isolated from social movements. In what follows, I critically evaluate these limited ways of seeing framings and political opportunities, and suggest connections between these critiques and the cases presented in this dissertation.

In an article outlining a “friendly critique” to the framing perspective, Robert Benford enumerates a series of shortcomings of the framing perspective. A number of these critiques are valuable points of departure to avoid categorizing processes of demobilization as framing “failures.” Consider, for instance, what Benford calls an “elite bias” in the framing literature. A “shortcoming prevalent in much of the movement framing literature is the tendency to focus on

the framings of movement elites to the neglect of rank-and-file participants, potential recruits, bystanders, and others" (Benford 1997: 421). Benford sees this bias as stemming from the methodological strategies of framing research, i.e. producing accounts that rely on leaders, media accounts, or movements' documents. In so doing, the resulting analyses usually portray a top-down view on how frames are constructed. In the cases I present in this dissertation, I paid attention to both leaders and the rank-and-file, finding dissonance between their views on GM crops (see chapter five, section on Moreno case). Accordingly, I also listened to bystanders and people who do not participate in the movement to better understand changing perceptions on agrochemical exposure, blame assignment, and transgressive collective action (see chapter four, section on demobilization in 2009). Researchers using a framing perspective have been drawing attention to this "elite bias" and to the problems of conceiving frames as "resources." In a piece on mobilization around antinuclear opposition, Stephen Adair asserts that "Although activists unquestionably think about and work at defining themselves, a collective action frame operates at a sociocultural level, and therefore it ought not be regarded as simply an achievement of activists or as a resource for collective action. (…) Thus, people outside of a movement and members of countermovements in particular can critically influence a collective action frame (1996: 371-2; see also Ellingson 1995).

Another problem of the framing perspective, related to its "elite bias," is the tendency to focus on framing at a given point and overlook its changes through time. In this regard, Benford suggests an expansion beyond "the temporal focus of movement framing studies. The bulk of framing studies are either synchronic or encompass a relatively brief slice of time. We need studies which examine continuities and changes in framing strategies, their forms, and the content of frames" (Benford 1997: 417). I followed this suggestion by observing cases of mobilization and demobilization through synchronic and diachronic comparisons of cases of agrochemical exposure. Inspecting processes of demobilization offer the possibility of observing framings when they effectively mobilize a constituency *but also* when those framings are ineffective at doing so. In other words, since framing involves "schemas of interpretation," those ideational elements at times can serve to produce collective action yet also preclude mobilization at others.

In making this point I am taking heed of an insightful review of the framing perspective advanced by Marc Steinberg, who underlines that framing is inextricably linked to discourse and,

as such, entails a "social production of meaning that is essentially dialectic, dynamic, and riven with contradictions" (Steinberg 1998; 851-2). Drawing on the work of the Bakhtin Circle of literary theorists and sociocultural psychologists, Steinberg points out that "the discourse used in framing is taken to be a generally straight-forward bearer of meanings"; however, "discourse is dialogic, the interindividual product of streams of speech communication within specific historical situations" (Steinberg 1998: 845, 852). Although Benford's ideas come from a different theoretical tradition, his remarks resonate with Steinberg when he states that "meaning is negotiated, contested, modified, articulated, and rearticulated" (Benford 1997: 410). The cases of mobilization and demobilization that I present in the ensuing chapters illustrate these points by showing, for instance, that the meaning assigned to agrochemical exposure changed over time: whereas in 2003 the blame for the environmental problems created by agrochemical drifts was located in soybean growers, by 2009 processes of blame assignment had become less straightforward. Or, taking another example from the cases on this dissertation, you will read in chapter four how the meaning assigned to roadblocks ("pickets," *piquetes*) was initially unknown to the peasants of Monte Azul in 2003 and how, by 2009, the term had gained negative connotations, delegitimizing this form of transgressive contention. Furthermore, the identity attached to those participating in roadblocks ("*piqueteros*") became a derogative expression even among social movement leaders, reproducing its use by elite members who equated the term with "troublemakers." This examples hearken back to what Steinberg calls "the multivocal nature of discourse" and how "actors over time within a movement or actors from different movements can create distinctive meanings from the same words and phrases, meanings that might indeed stand in some tension to one another" (Steinberg 1999b: 750).[11]

Simply put, the idea I am proposing is that processes of demobilization should not be narrowly understood as failures (for instance, of leaders to carve out a successful frame) or absences (for example, of propitious political opportunities). Instead, I believe it is more productive to inspect the causes behind apparent "failures" or "lacks": for instance, to answer why potential constituents are not reached by a social movement organization, or interrogate the obstacles posed to mobilization. John Burdick (1995), in his research among grassroots Catholic groups in Brazil, argued that the long list of motives that movement leaders usually present when

[11] For an elaboration on these points on the dialogic nature of framing, see also Steinberg 1995 and 2002. For an application of this perspective, see Steinberg 1999b.

making sense of a lack of mobilization (indifference, fear, inertia, ignorance, false consciousness, alienation, failure to participate in local civic life) are only partial answers. Instead, Burdick observed that "For each item on the list one may still reasonably ask: *who* tends to be more fearful, more indifferent, more peripheral to organizational networks?" (1995: 367). In a similar vein, I claim that seeing the lack of mobilization as "failures," especially when it comes to processes of demobilization, closes the interrogation at precisely the point where it ought to begin. For instance, if a certain "mobilizing frame" is successful in bringing about collective action, why does a very similar frame not produce the same results later in time? To draw on the example of Monte Azul presented in this dissertation: why did the assignment of blame on soybean growers make sense in 2003 but not in 2009? Or why was transgressive action seen as an effective means to address an environmental problem in 2003 (what we may call a "prognosis frame") but not in 2009?

A similar argument can be made regarding the relationship between political opportunities and the lack of collective action. To explain this relation as a mere "absence" (i.e. explaining processes of demobilization simply arguing that political opportunities were not available) dismisses the problem too easily and without posing further questions. In certain circumstances, the opening of political opportunities stimulating collective action might be a straightforward matter –say, when an authoritarian government steps down from power or, to take a concrete example from the U.S context, we might consider the civil rights movement during early 1960s (McAdam 1982). But the opening of political opportunities is not necessarily something external to social movements; opportunities might also be created by social movements themselves (Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). And, in certain circumstances, collective action may emerge even in the absence of factors that political process theory deems conducive to social protest (Kurzman 1996).

The almost exclusive focus of political process theory on opportunities created at the national level also underplayed the complexities associated with the different levels and branches of the state (cf. Tarrow 1998; O'Brien 2003). Consider the multiple political arenas of federal nations (like, for instance, the U.S., Mexico, Brazil, or Argentina), where social movements interact with authorities at the national, provincial/state, and municipal levels. In those scenarios, it is not infrequent for political opportunities to be opened at one level but closed at another. Furthermore, the state involves different branches and social movements may have allies and/or

opponents within the executive, the congress, and/or the judiciary; and, again, different situations may be faced at different levels (national congress, provincial legislatures, municipal councils, etc.).[12] I illustrate the complexities of some of these variegated scenarios in later chapters of this dissertation. In chapter four, for instance, I describe how in 2003 a local social movement confronted the provincial executive but found allies in members of the provincial legislature and how, in 2009, experienced confrontation with the provincial government while maintaining an alliance with the national executive. In addition, this latter situation was fraught with contradictions for social movement leaders: they opposed the provincial government yet were supported by the national government, but both governments were allies at the national level (both belong to the Peronist Party). This thorny situation, as I argue in chapter four, is one of the factors explaining the lack of mobilizations in Formosa in 2009.

Political opportunities are not, therefore, "something out there" that can be unmistakably recognized. Moreover, the complexities of political opportunities structures that I briefly summarized above have been taken to another level by the latest debate within the social movement literature revolving around the role of culture in collective action. In this regard, Goodwin and Jasper discuss the "structural bias" of political process theory arguing that "There may be no such thing as objective political opportunities before or beneath interpretation –or at least none that matter; they are all interpreted through cultural filters. (…) Incentives and expectations necessarily involve interpretation" (2004: 9).

A thorough reconstruction of the debate on social movements and culture is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in essence, the debate contrasts two distinct perspectives on the role of culture. One position (closer to the political process tradition and the "dynamics of contention" program of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) sees culture as a "super-structural" phenomena, a "mediator." In this perspective, culture is mainly expressed in norms, values, and symbols that play an important yet delimited role in interactions and contention.[13] From this point of view, culture mediates between political structures and action, usually in the form of "frames." The other position is represented by the critique of political process articulated by Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (2004) emphasizing the ubiquity of culture. They argue that it is

[12] See Kitschelt 1986 for a discussion on how these various levels interact with anti-nuclear mobilization in France, Sweden, West Germany and United States.

[13] Consider, for instance, the following statement: "The kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are most defensibly conceived of as political opportunities should not be confused with the collective processes by which these changes are interpreted and framed" (McAdam 1996: 25-26).

impossible to define something as "outside" culture, since every aspect of social life is apprehended through cultural lenses. Drawing on Geertz (1983), Swidler (1986), Bakhtin (1986), Sewell (1992), and Steinberg (1995), Goodwin and Jasper see culture as enabling *and* constraining collective action "in ways that are not always or even usually intentional or instrumental" (Goodwin and Jasper 2004: 24).[14] This understanding of culture as a double-edged phenomenon, facilitating but also constraining protests, sheds light on how meaning-making can foster mobilization but also be at the root of processes of demobilization.

Elaborating on this duality of culture, Francesca Polletta (2008) makes three important points to better understand its relation to mobilization arguing that culture must be seen a) as objective, rather than only subjective; b) as constitutive of interests, rather than only expressive of them; and c) as setting the terms of strategic action rather than only used strategically. Culture limits not only what people think, but also what people can say, and the content of what people can say in certain circumstances. Therefore, institutional conventions of cultural expression and evaluation shape the claims that can be made (Polletta 2008: 90). In one sentence, culture sets the terms of strategic action; and we may be better equipped by "an approach to culture that focuses more on people's beliefs about appropriate means than on their beliefs about appropriate ends, more on institutional schemas than on cultural values" (Polletta 2008: 93). These considerations shed light on the cases of mobilization and demobilization presented in the empirical chapters of this dissertation: movements immersed in a culture permeated by patronage politics and clientelist practices may, under certain circumstances, privilege negotiation over contention (see chapter four), or reproduce relationships based on patronage within social movement organizations (see chapter six).

[14] What it is barely inspected in this perspective is how power inequalities –especially those rooted in class relationships- are constitutive of culture as well. To wit: the authors completely gloss over the long tradition of British Marxism inspecting the connections between culture and class (e.g. Hoggart 1957; Thompson 1968, 1993; Hall 1973; Williams 1977; Willis 1977). The lack of discussion of this tradition is especially surprising in two specific instances: the work of E.P. Thompson, explicitly aimed to understand the relationship between culture and mobilization (1971, 1993b); and Raymond Williams' concept of "structures of feeling" (1977: 132) that may serve as an interesting counterpoint to the discussion of "structures vs. culture." See Steinberg 1997 for an attempt to bridge E.P. Thompson's perspective with post-modern theories of language and discourse.

Methods' Advantages and Shortcomings

The little attention paid to the lack of collective action and to processes of demobilization in the literature on social movements can be explained by reasonable methodological strategies prevailing in the field. Research on social movements has mainly concentrated on discontinuous, public, and collective claim-making; i.e. on episodes of contention when people "break with daily routines to concert their energies in publicly visible demands, complaints, attacks, or expressions of support before returning to their private lives" (Tilly 2006: 49). This point of view is nothing but logical when aiming to cover a large time-span (several decades or even centuries) or relatively vast geographical areas (nations or continents). Allow me to inspect this methodological strategy keeping an eye on how it relates to the cases under analysis in this dissertation.

Many studies of protest use newspaper data to characterize waves of protest in a given country, assembling databases that can be used to inspect relationships between demonstrators, claims, objects of claims, forms of protest, the location and diffusion of protests, and so on (e.g. Paige 1975; McAdam 1982; Walsh and Warland 1983; Franzosi 1987; Olzak 1989; Everett 1991; Tilly 1992, 2002; Francisco et al 1994; Mueller 1997; Myers 1997, 2000; Rucht et al 1999; Koopmans and Rucht 1999, 2002; Earl et al 2004).[15] The problem with this strategy is that the results may reproduce sources' biases (e.g. over-representation of events that take place in large cities or that gather the largest number of people), and that certain correlations –for instance, sudden rise or decline of protests- may be hard to explain without access to processes that are not reported in the media (Gamson et al 1992; McCarthy et al 1996; Rucht and Neidhardt 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000; Strawn 2008; Amenta et al 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010). In this dissertation, I pay attention to how the media plays out in moments of open contention –the emergence of protests in 2003 following agrochemical exposure- and its role in the diffusion of contention. But I also explain why similar situations (agrochemical exposures in 2009) did not result in events of open contention, a question that I never could have formulated had I relied

[15] A recent book by Christian Davenport (2010) uses event catalogues to analyze authorities' repression to the Black Panther Party and demonstrates that, depending on the source used to build the catalogues, very different narratives of this relationship and of the Black Panther movement in California are obtained. Also see Koopmans and Statham 1999, on the integration of quantitative data of event analysis and qualitative discursive data of claims-making.

only on newspaper sources, since the agrochemical exposures of 2009 never appeared in the media.

Let me elaborate the point taking as an example Tilly's work on contention in Europe and his seminal concept of collective action repertoires (1978, 1986, 1995). The hypothesis that forms of protest became routinized and "modular" with the expansion of capitalist relationships and state centralization spanning centuries was observed by coding and examining the "paper trail" (Tilly 2002) left behind by events of contention. This strategy consciously left aside, for practical and methodological reasons, other types of interactions: "Such an angle of vision obscures some important aspects of contentious politics: backroom deals, patron-client relations, organizing efforts that precede claim-making, official responses to claims, and interpretations by third parties." (Tilly 2006: 49). By setting these aspects aside, a vast array of data useful for advancing and testing theoretical claims can be collected. However, and as Tilly points out, this approach omits from the researcher's gaze other phenomena that are key to understanding dynamics of demobilization. Attention to relationships between claimants and authorities before and after contentious events are germane to explain, for instance, why claims and claimants might not be recognized by authorities; and also to understand variations in types of collective action (i.e. between transgressive and contained contention), the different tactics adopted by movements (protests vis-à-vis negotiation), and the ebb and flow of protest (when, for example, a social movement is highly contentious at a point in time and disappears from the public scene later on). In the cases analyze in this dissertation I touch on these points to contribute to an understanding of social movements that goes beyond their moments of public visibility.

Prominent scholars of the social movement field have noticed the problems inherent in certain methodological strategies and begun to theorize about the advantages of using other, less utilized methods in the field, to address dynamics of mobilization. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, in a piece that serves as a methodological follow up to their *Dynamics of Contention* (a book that can be seen as the program of the "contentious politics" perspective), highlight the contribution that ethnography can make to specify the mechanisms and processes explaining contentious events (McAdam et al 2008). Accordingly, ethnography is probably the most suitable method to tap into dynamics of demobilization among social movements. Considering that demobilization entails processes that, by definition, do not involve events of open confrontation with authorities or of collective action (and thus do not leave "public records" like newspaper accounts or

authorities' reports), those processes would be hardly captured by other means than an up-close and in situ observation of practices. The same logic applies to events of contained contention: unlike transgressive events that leave behind a series of registries (newspaper accounts, movements' documents, legal demands, etc.), events of contained contention fall, so to speak, "under the radar" –unless we reconstruct those events through a direct contact with the people participating in them.

Ethnography can also tackle some of the theoretical-methodological problems of studying demobilization by examining the dynamics of less visible cases in order to avoid a reasoning that deems them as mere "failures." For instance, by paying attention to the discourses of leaders *but also* to those of constituencies, we can avoid the pitfalls of the "elite bias" of framing analyses – discussed in the previous section. A case in point is presented in chapters four and five of this dissertation: you will find how attention paid to the views of the movement's rank-and-file and to potential constituents that *do not* participate in the movement help to explain the lack of collective actions following agrochemical exposure in 2009. Similarly, attention paid to discourses *but also* to practices can unveil meanings and cultural processes that otherwise remain invisible if we only rely, for instance, on interviews of leaders and spokespersons or on documents produced by social movement organizations. In chapter six of this dissertation you will read an illustration of cultural dynamics that both enable and constrain the social movement. The fact that the social movement organization is immersed in a context dominated by patronage politics puts the movement under a "double pressure." On one hand, the movement has to build national alliances in order to maintain autonomy from the provincial government and to ensure a flow of resources that guarantee the organization's survival. On the other hand, the movement also faces the pressure of its constituents that need to solve everyday problems of survival –a pressure addressed, in turn, by the resources accessed via the national alliances of the movement. This double pressure, I argue, constrained the tactical options of the social movement and posed obstacles to the organization of transgressive contention in 2009 to protest the effects of agrochemical exposures.

When it comes to explaining processes of mobilization *and* demobilization, ethnography can be a suitable method for exploring local patterns of social heterogeneity that, in turn, explain why potential constituents are not mobilized or why the definitions of a situation can change over time – to take an example presented in chapter four of this dissertation, ethnography can

provide access to the discourses of non-participants in the local social movement that help explain why blame assignment in cases of agrochemical contamination varied between 2003 and 2009. Along these lines, "By exploring heterogeneity in the social composition, cultural practices, and political positions of both mobilized and unmobilized social movement constituencies, ethnography has the potential to illuminate the process of the growth, shrinkage, rupture, and disintegration of social movements" (Burdick 1995: 362). Ethnography, thus, is especially well equipped to delve into what Melucci (1985) calls the "submerged networks" of social movements that, I argue, are key to explaining variations in contention (transgressive and contained contention) and patterns of mobilization and demobilization.[16] In summary, scholars of social movements "could benefit from a greater sensitivity to the historical and cultural processes through which some of their main analytical categories (frames, submerged networks, movement culture) are constructed, as well as a more genuine appreciation of the lived experience of movement participants and nonparticipants, something that is accessible primarily through ethnography, oral narratives, or documentary history" (Edelman 2001: 309).

The Limits of Theoretical Definitions: Social Movements, the Polity, and the State

Most accepted understandings of social movements usually characterize them as "challengers," social actors located outside the polity or the "political system" and involved in sustained efforts targeting the state and institutional politics by means of collective action and disruptive tactics. Although a series of definitions can be found in the literature (e.g. Tarrow 1998: 2; Della Porta and Diani 1999: 16), most of them conceptualize the relationship between state and social movements as one of confrontation and emphasize the use of protest as the main strategy of social movements. A recent edited volume aimed at providing "in-depth, synthetic examinations of a comprehensive set of movement-related topics and issues" specifies that collective actions of social movements fall outside institutional channels and social movements "are defined *in part* by their use of noninstitutional means of action" (Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2004: 7). The original emphasis of "in part" in this definition underlines social movement scholars' reluctance

[16] Ethnographers "may have privileged access to the lived experience of activists and nonactivists, as well as a window onto the 'submerged' organizing, informal networks, protest activities, ideological differences, public claim-making, fear and repression, and internal tensions, which are almost everywhere features of social movements" (Edelman 2001: 309).

to leave aside the institutional actions in which social movements take part. Nonetheless, and as the ensuing review of the literature will demonstrate, the relationships of cooperation (and not only of confrontation) between social movements and the state are still under-theorized –a topic that deserves more attention than it has been granted so far. In this last sub-section reviewing the social movement literature, I first review classical works of social movement scholars that paid attention to the interface between social movements and the polity. Then, I discuss recent research challenging the canonical conceptualization of social movements as mostly involved in non-institutional activities and as actors located outside the polity. In doing so, I lay out the theoretical background for the main claim advanced in the next section, that is, that we can hardly understand and explain the dynamics of mobilization and demobilization of Latin American social movements if we fail to pay attention to *their strong connections and relations of cooperation with the state*. Specifically, my main contention (which I substantiate in the next section) is that *connections between social movements and the state in Latin America are chiefly permeated by practices based on patronage politics*.

Classic works of the social movement literature paid attention to patterns of collective action and inaction with a keen eye toward its relation to the state. Two of the seminal and most influential books by Charles Tilly can be seen as an argument in this direction: *The Vendée* (1964) and *The Contentious French* (1985). The first book examined the rebellions opposing the French Revolution that emerged in west central France, providing a compelling explanation of why certain regions mobilized but not others. The second book examined four centuries of popular contention, explaining the changes from a parochial to a national repertoire of contention as a result of the combined forces of state centralization and the expansion of capitalist relationships. Taken together, both books can be seen as explanations of dynamics of mobilization and inaction and how the state influences the pace and forms of contention. Other pieces of early scholarship on social movements also paid attention to the relationship between collective action, institutional politics, and the state. However, whereas the quoted books of Tilly concentrated on how mobilization was affected by changes in the state, the books of Lipset (1950) and Schwartz (1976) analyzed the effects that participation in electoral politics had for social movements, and the classic works of Gamson (1975) and Piven and Cloward (1979) on how state formations reacted to the challenges posed by protests.

Lipset's book showed how farmers in the Canadian region of Saskatchewan initially responded to economic hardship in the 1930s through the organization of cooperatives and massive protests and, later on, through participation in electoral politics. This ultimately resulted in the installation of a socialist-leaning government that served the interests of the farmers participating in the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation. Beyond the specificities of the case analyzed by Lipset, the book (with the telling subtitle of "A Study in Political Sociology") shows the early scholarship's interest in connecting collective action and its direct intervention in the polity. By contrast, the development of social movement studies as a field of research in its own right increasingly focused on the state as a target or third party of claims, and less interest was paid to the possibility of seeing the electoral arena as another, alternative strategy, of social movements.

The study of Schwartz (1976) serves as an interesting counterpoint to Lipset, in that it also analyzes how cotton growers in the U.S. South first organized collectively to deal with economic hardships through initiatives based on agrarian production and commercialization (creating trade agreements, cooperative stores, and "exchanges") and then moved into the political arena. Nonetheless, what stands out from the comparison is the opposing results of these efforts: whereas in Canada the move from protest to politics resulted in relatively successful strategy for farmers, in the U.S. South ultimately meant the demise of the movement in terms of bringing about social change. The demise of the Farmers' Alliance in the late 1800s is mostly explained by Schwartz as a result of the tendencies towards oligarchization stemming from the growing opposing interests between the leadership and the members of the organization –an opposition, in turn, rooted in their diverse class positions. Although "the shift into politics was the final step in a long and twisted oligarchization process," Schwartz argues, it was "the entry into politics [that] destroyed the Farmer's Alliance as a protest group" (1976: 277, 269). The point I would like to stress here it that, examined in tandem, Lipset's and Schwartz's analyses suggest that it is not uncommon for social movements to resort to electoral politics as one of their strategies, and that this can be an alternative means for social movements to address the grievances of their constituents or advance the goals of the organization. The point is relevant for this dissertation since, as I show in chapter six, the peasant social movement in Formosa moved from reluctance to participate in electoral politics in the early stages of the organization to direct participation in electoral politics in recent years.

Two other pieces published in the early stages of the social movement field of research stand out for their addressing of the connections between social movements and the political system: William Gamson's *The Strategy of Social Protest* (1975) and Piven and Cloward's *Poor People's Movements* (1979). Gamson studied the features of "challenging groups" (organizational resources, structures, claims, and tactics) that correlated with "success," as evaluated by two dimensions: the formal recognition as a legitimate actor in politics ("acceptance"), and whether the group was able to translate its demands into policies ("new advantages"). With his book, Gamson pioneered investigation on the consequences and outcomes of social movements, a line of research that was only picked up more than twenty years later (Giugni 1998; Tilly 1999; Cress and Snow 2000; Amenta et al 2002; Amenta and Caren 2004; Amenta et al 2010). Gamson's research stimulated a series of critiques, mostly pointing to his methodology in regards to how define and measure "success" (chiefly Goldstone 1980; but also see Zelditch 1978; Webb et al 1983).

For the purposes of this dissertation, two points should be noted. First, Gamson drew attention to the importance of "challenger groups" being recognized as legitimate actors by authorities. However, he only focused on this dimension as long as it affected the chances of obtaining advantages for the challenging group. In this dissertation, in turn, I observe these connections but focus on the inverse relationship. In other words, if Gamson observed how challenger's tactics influenced recognition by authorities, I pay attention to how the recognition of authorities influenced movement's tactics. In chapters four and five I offer a dense description of protests (and lack thereof) by inspecting how the recognition of authorities of challenging groups (to follow Gamson's language) influenced different local social movements' tactics (transgressive contention, contained contention, and no contention). Specifically, I show how the lack of recognition of claims and claimants on the part of provincial authorities raised discontent among peasants and, in turn, how the support of other authorities constituted the "tipping point" between discontent and open confrontation. My study is modest in that focus on a relatively short time-period and a very limited number of cases (unlike Gamson's, which covered a period of 145 years researching the trajectories of 53 groups). Nevertheless, given criticisms of Gamson's research that "the policy process appears as a black box, described without nuance and contingency" (Meyer 2005: 6), my research aims to show how relational and micro-level interactions underpin the processes of social movements' recognition.

The last piece I will discuss before moving on to the current literature on the relationship between social movements and the state is the widely commented book by Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements, Why they Succeed How they Fail* (1979). Succinctly put, the authors argued that the only way poor people could extract concessions from elites is via disruptive actions. In their view, any concession obtained from elites will be withdrawn as soon as protests' "moments of madness" gives way to organization-building efforts, when "organization-building activities tended to draw people away from the streets and into the meeting rooms" (Piven and Cloward, 1979: xxii). The creation of large organizations, the argument goes, will necessarily lead to oligarchization; massive organizations will serve the interests of leaders instead of constituents, and will contribute to maintaining the quiescence that elites need to keep doing "business as usual." The other part of argument, complementing their points regarding the effects of organization, is the role played by political institutions in bringing about the demise of protest. When concessions are given, Piven and Cloward argue, they are "usually part and parcel of measures to reintegrate the movement into normal political channels and to absorb its leaders into stable institutional roles" (1979: 32). The corollary of government's actions is that concessions "work to create a powerful image of a benevolent and responsive government that answers grievances and solves problems. As a result, whatever support might have existed among the larger population dwindles" (Piven and Cloward 1979: 34).

Poor People's Movements received a series of criticisms, many of them aiming to challenge their data as it applied to specific movements (Roach and Roach 1978; Albritton 1979; Hicks and Swank 1983; Valocchi 1990; Bennett 1990)[17]. What deserves close attention here is the thesis that organizational efforts ultimately result in people's compliance. In this regard, Gamson and Schmeidler (1984) argued that the equation of organization with demobilization or failure brushes aside a more complex question: what kind of organizations determined what kind of results. In their words "One must specify the conditions under which one type of organization is better than another, rather than search for a universal form" (Gamson and Schmeidler 1984: 568-69; see also Rosenthal and Schwartz 1990). Jenkins (1979) made a similar point, claiming that it is not sound to dismiss organizational efforts *tout court*. For Jenkins, Piven and Cloward

[17] See the responses to these critiques in Piven and Cloward 1978; 1980; 1990, 1984. For recent appraisals of *Poor People's Movements*, see the symposium on the journal *Perspectives on Politics*, 2003, 1(4). See also Hall 1995 for a critique of the book and an analysis of poor people's organizations; and see Schram 2002 for an edited book building on Piven and Cloward's perspective. See also Clemens and Minkoff 2004 for a current discussion on the role of organizations in social movements.

propose an "oversimple equation: bureaucracy = acquiescence," since "the conversion of movements into lobby organizations and the subsequent abandonment of insurgent goals is clearly a hazard of formal structure, it is a decision, not an inevitability" (Jenkins 1979: 226).[18]

I would like to follow up these criticisms by pointing out what I see as two limitations of the theses advanced by Piven and Cloward. The first is their teleological view; the second is the lack of attention to relationality. The argument of Piven and Cloward is teleological in the ways identified by the aforementioned reviewers, in that the connection between organization and quiescence is not necessary but contingent on the type of organizations and the historical circumstances in which they develop. I believe the critique could be taken a step forward to scrutinize the assumption that disruptive collective actions will necessarily lead to profound social change. Piven and Cloward's idea that organization-building leads to demobilization (or, for that matter, the involvement of movements in institutional politics, a point less discussed in the appraisals of the book) assumes a problematic line of thought. In the absence of organizations built by leaders, so the argument goes, poor people's mobilization would ultimately bring about broad social change; such processes are directly hampered by the construction of organizations. This leads to my second point, the assumption that a movement's de-radicalization is a result of the leaders' "cooptation." My study is much more modest and restricted than Piven and Cloward's, but my data indicates that the moderation of leaders is actually less inspired by their cooptation or the movement's institutionalization than by the pressures put on leaders by their constituents. For instance, in chapter five I show how the view of leaders about GM crops is actually much more radical than the one prevalent among their constituents, who are not much bothered by the production of GM crops as long as they do not affect their subsistence. I think the point, simply stated, is that we need to focus on the *relationships* between leaders and constituents, and between both these groups and different authorities. In chapter six, for example, I show how the MoCaFor moved from contention against the provincial government to negotiation with national authorities as a result of the pressures of constituents in need of concrete solutions to their everyday problems. In this, I take heed of Piven and Cloward's notion that when analyzing poor people's movements we need to take into account the institutional conditions in which they act and thus the limited lines of action afforded to these movements; i.e.

[18] In a previous work, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) showed that the absence of organizational resources was what constrained the mobilization of the powerless; they argued that insurgency could only emerge when external leaders created a permanent membership organization mobilizing farm workers.

we should not assume "that people are free to act without regard to the constraints imposed by their social context" (Piven and Cloward 1979: xii). In the context of contemporary Formosa, Argentina, the option that poor people have to address their grievances, besides participation in a social movement, is integration into the patronage networks of the provincial government –an option that certainly feeds acquiescence and forecloses any involvement in disruptive contention (I outline this social context in chapter three and discuss its implications for the social movement in chapter six).

With the establishment of social movements as a separate field of research, the dialogue between studies on mobilization and political sociology dwindled. The interest in the link between social movements and the state increasingly focused on the latter as a target of claims or a third party, as the broader political dimensions of social movements were overshadowed by the focus on political opportunities as an explanatory factor in the emergence of protests. The involvement of social movements in electoral politics or its direct participation in policy, for the most part, disappeared from the research agenda. Since the mid-1990s, however, scholars have recovered the initial interest in the interfaces between social movements, politics, and the state (e.g. Flam 1994; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Banaszak 1996; Santoro and McGuire 1997; Andrews 1997; Tarrow 1998; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1998; Alvarez, Dagnigno and Escobar 1998; Burstein 1999; Santoro 1999; Burstein and Linton 2003;Giugni 2004; Goldstone 2003; Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram 2005) and there are attempts to re-establish a dialogue between social movement studies and political sociology (Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta et al 2002; Walder 2009). This recent body of literature has been challenging the accepted definition of social movements as actors involved in non-institutional action and located outside the polity; showing that the state is "simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory" (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 3). What is at stake in this development of the field is a cross-fertilization between theories of the state and theories of social movements, insofar as the former "have largely focused on those who hold and wield power rather than studying their challengers" and the latter "have primarily focused on those who are contesting power rather than their relationships with the powerful" (Jenkins 1995: 15). In his research on nineteenth century republicanism in France, for instance, Ron Aminzade (1995) observed the relationship between formal organization and institutionalization, adding nuance to the thesis advanced by Piven and Cloward that

organization-building inevitably leads to participation in institutions that, in turn, moderate challenger groups. Aminzade shows that the emphasis on electoral tactics (i.e. institutionalization) did not lead to an increased bureaucratization or formal organization. In doing so, he demonstrated that institutionalization and formalization are contingent: "In the long run, institutionalization and formalization did go hand in hand, but this connection was not the inevitable product of a developmental logic" but rather a result of the establishment of a liberal-democratic political culture and a specific institutional setting (Aminzade 1995: 61).

The "contentious politics" perspective, arguably the most influential line of research of recent years in the social movements field, has been pushing forward a re-engagement of different strands of analysis about political action, encouraging the dialogue between the literatures on revolutions, strikes, interest groups, political parties, war, democratization, and social movements (McAdam et al 2001). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly have called into question the clear-cut division between institutionalized and non institutionalized politics, arguing that "the study of politics has too long reified the boundary between official, prescribed politics and politics by other means. As an unfortunate consequence, analysts have neglected or misunderstood the parallels and the interactions between the two" (2001: 6; see also Goldstone 2003).

Nevertheless, in my view three shortcomings still limit a thorough understanding of the relationship between the polity and social movements and beg for more research and theoretical elaboration. First, many times "the state" is referred to without taking notice of its internal variation, that is, the different (and sometimes contrasting) projects put forward by state actors and the different levels of the state that social movements may get involved with (cf. Kitschelt 1986; Goldstone 2003). Failure to see the multiple points of conflict and support faced by social movements leads, I believe, to a limited understanding of dynamics of mobilization and demobilization (I analyze this issue in chapters four and five).

Second, most research focuses on how social movements might influence policy (e.g. Giugni 1998, 2004; Meyer 2005), but not enough recent research has picked up the polemic theses of Piven and Cloward (1979) and inspected the impact of public policies on social movements. The relationship between states and social movements is best conceptualized as a recursive process (Amenta et al 2002; Soule et al 1999). Yet in this area it is not uncommon to find the label of "cooptation" when activists move from the social movement field to participate

in state programs. "Cooptation" is a concept of little sociological depth, in that eschews a relational explanation in favor of a flawed individualistic view: the demobilization of a whole group or social movement is explained by the individual decision of leaders, assuming too direct of a connection between leaders' "cooptation" and demobilization. We may gain more insight into the relationship between states and social movements if we loosen our normative views of seeing leaders' participation in the state bureaucracy as a symptom of being "sell outs" and interrogate if and how gaining access to the administration may advance the goals of a social movement or better address the grievances of a movement's constituency. Promising leads have been offered in this regard. For instance, Banaszak (2005) inspects the overlap between movements and states as sets of institutions proposing the concept of "state-movement interaction." In her analysis of the role of the women's movement in pushing for reform by assuming positions within state structures, Banaszak challenges the idea that participation in state bureaucracies automatically translates in a moderation of the movement by "tempering their goals and moderating their tactics" (2005: 169). She shows that "The women's movement presence within the state also provided additional opportunities, which might have been absent if the movement had existed solely outside the state" (Banaszak 2005: 169).

Third, more research is needed investigating the relationships between social movements and the polity in a diversity of social contexts. So far, research on this subject has been overwhelmingly concentrated in the United States and Europe. In making this point, I take heed of the idea that we "need to ground our theories in time and place and to be more explicit about the dependence of regularities on historical contexts" (Aminzade 1995: 61). The historical legacies and the particular composition of the polity in Latin America underscore this need. Specifically, the interfaces between the state, political parties, and social movements (especially poor people's movements) are crucially shaped by patronage politics, a point I develop next.

PATRONAGE AND POOR PEOPLE'S POLITICS

The literatures on social movements and on patronage politics rarely establish a dialogue and, in most views, both political phenomena are seen as antithetical to one another. In contrast, I argue that only by inspecting this relationship can we understand popular politics in Latin America and the dynamics of mobilization and demobilization among poor people. My study shows that the

practices permeating patronage politics and social movements are not isolated from one another or stand in opposition but, in contrast, both present continuities and interpenetrations. I show that more than two opposed spheres of action or two different forms of sociability, patronage politics and social movements are mutually imbricated in the strategies deployed by poor people when addressing their grievances.

The literature on patronage politics is vast, covering more than three decades and inspecting its iterations in a variety of social contexts.[19] A thorough examination of this literature is therefore beyond the scope of this chapter. In what follows, I concentrate on showing the interconnections between clientelism, patronage politics, and collective action by making two main points.[20] First, I briefly explain the reasons behind the neglect of the connections between patronage and contention, and present a series of scenarios in which clientelism and patronage networks are at the root of collective action. Then, I describe the concomitant growth of clientelism and protest in Latin America and draw on recent political ethnographies to show that both phenomena are key to understanding popular politics.

The Connected Lives of Patronage Politics and Collective Action

Extant research has demonstrated that contentious collective action is usually based on indigenous organizations or associational networks (e.g. McAdam 1982; Morris 1984), showing that "prior social ties operate as a basis for movement recruitment and that established social settings are the locus of movement emergence" (Diani and McAdam 2003: 7). These networks and ties that are assumed as a pre-condition for both episodic and more sustained forms of collective action (i.e. social movements) are usually understood as autonomous spaces, at odds with the relationships of dependence that define clientelism. Clientelism, as the distribution (or promise) of resources by public office holders or political candidates in exchange for political support, has been recently defined as a "transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2). Clientelist exchanges are usually seen as hierarchical networks built on asymmetrical

[19] For examples of classic works on clientelism, see Bodeman 1982; Boissevain 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Guterbock 1980; Schmidt et al 1977; Scott 1969, 1972, 1977; and Silverman 1965.
[20] For the purposes of this dissertation, and following most of the recent literature on the subject, I here use clientelist and patronage politics as interchangeable terms (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Way and Levitsky 2007; Wilkinson 2004).

and face-to-face relationships that create bonds of dependence and control and reproduce power differences and inequalities.[21] Most research on collective action sustains that embeddedness in patronage networks is thus antagonistic to the involvement in the ties of cooperation that are at the root of collective action and in opposition to the transformative goals of social movements. Far from being a realm of possible cooperation, patronage networks are, to the contrary, considered a (de)mobilizing structure (e.g. Rock 1972, 1975; O'Donnell 1992; Holzner 2007). Clientelist and mobilizing networks are thus usually assumed to be mutually exclusive and opposed spheres of political action that seldom overlap. The conventional wisdom in social movement studies is that the atomization of citizens promoted by patronage politics frustrates collective claims-making and prevents the organizational and relational work at the basis of collective action.

However, although most of the scholarship understands patronage politics as antagonistic to contentious collective action, the literature does identify one particular case in which protest can emerge from patronage: the breakdown of clientelist arrangements. When a well-oiled system of patron-client relationships, crucial for the survival of a local population, fails to deliver or suddenly collapses, "reciprocity [can] change to rivalry" (Lemarchand 1981: 10). Political scientist James Scott (1972), for instance, examined the "network breakdown" scenario when writing about the collective revolts caused by the swift changes in the "balance of reciprocity" between landlords and tenants in Southeast Asia. Historian E. P. Thompson (1971, 1993) also uncovered analogous cases when dissecting the 18th century English food riots as manifestations of the rupture in the "moral economy of the poor." Contemporary cases in Argentina and Mexico present iterations of the breakdown scenario as well (Auyero 2003; Tosoni 2007).

Existent scholarship, then, points to the potential malfunctioning of patronage networks as a generator of sudden grievances ultimately resulting in episodes of collective action.[22] Yet studies have also demonstrated that well-functioning clientelist networks may act as key relational supports of collective action. Historical research has shown several instances of mobilizations and upheavals in which patronage relationships have played a key role. For instance, Roger Gould (1996) analyzed how the cooptation of local elites by the U.S. federal government promoted rebellions of marginalized patrons and brokers during the Whiskey

[21] Examples of recent work include Auyero 2007; Hilgers 2008, 2009; Holzner 2004, 2007; Lazar 2008; Schedler 2004; and Shefner 2001.
[22] On the variable nature of grievances as an important factor in mobilization, see Walsh (1981). On the connections between breakdown and the emergence of collective action see Snow et al 1998.

Rebellion of 1794. Mobilization in the midst of seventeenth century Europe also followed patronage lines: conflicts in England stemmed from the replacement of local kinship-based systems with nationally-structured patronage links (Bearman 1993). In France, patronage cleavages explain "the extent to which the Fronde spread and the direction it took in the provinces once it had erupted" (Kettering 1986: 412). Research on Western India under British colonial rule also reveals that clients may become mobilizers and mobilizers can become patrons; in fact, patronage and group mobilization can become "interdependent processes, for the successful use of one process tends to create opportunities for the other" (Attwood 1974: 231, 238).[23]

But we do not need to return to centuries past to find evidence of a close connection between mobilization and patronage. Indeed, research on contemporary environmental movements in modern societies provides insight into the role of patronage in explaining the ebb and flow of contention. For example, Norris and Cable (1994) analyze the dynamics of opposition and quiescence towards a paper mill in Tennessee arguing that elites' initially spurred mobilization with the aim of control it. However, by legitimizing protest and claim-making, elites' intervention provided the conditions for the emergence of grassroots, non-elite social movement organizations. Jeffrey Broadbent (1999, 2003), in his research of environmental conflicts in Japan, shows that the "triple control machine" of political party, government, and big business was able to suppress social protest. Yet when the pleas of local leaders were not heard they led their followers into a protest movement. Broadbent's study unveils that patronage networks may pose "a formidable barrier to mobilization in village context," but if a boss breaks free he may "carry much of his subordinate networks 'automatically' (structurally) into the protest movement" (Broadbent 2003: 223, 221). Recent research on environmental conflicts in Taiwan (Ho 2010) also shows how patronage arrangements can either maintain quiescence or mobilize their constituents, depending on the inclusion or exclusion of local elites in national politics.

Close relationships between patronage politics and mobilization have also been identified as crucial factors to explain contemporary violent conflicts. Episodes of collective violence in Jamaica, for instance, have been explained by the conflicts between the two main political parties

[23] Risa Goluboff also shows that in the context of urban South of the United States during World War II, "patronage and rights consciousness can not only coexist but that patron-client relationships can facilitate the emergence of rights consciousness" (1999: 781).

(Sives 2002, see also Patterson 2001 and Gunst 1996), and studies of the long-standing violence in Colombia also found partisan divides at the root of deadly confrontations (Schmidt 1974, see also Roldan 2002, cf. Pécaut 1987 and Ortiz Sarmiento 1985.) Similarly, Stathis Kalyvas' study of mass killings in Indonesia in the mid-1960s reveals that conflicts were organized around a communism/anti-communism division but a "sustained examination of regional massacres unearthed all kinds of local conflicts…. (…) associated with long-standing rivalries between patronage groups" (2003: 478.) Historical accounts of "race riots" in the United States also point to the participation of members of established political parties and/or public officials in the support and perpetration of violent actions: Janet Abu-Lughod (2007) shows how machine politics in Chicago might act as a key support of violent contentious politics.

Clientelism, Politics, and Social Movements in Latin America

Institutional politics is intertwined with patronage networks and clientelism across Latin America. Clientelism is a key element to understand popular politics and democratic processes in the region, given the legacy of "populist" parties (Levitsky 2003) and how citizenship in Latin America is historically intertwined with clientelist arrangements (Taylor 2004). Patronage and clientelism are at the core of popular politics in the new democracies of Latin America, as demonstrated by a wide array of cases, including Mexico (Holzner 2007, Tosoni 2007, Hilgers 2009), Brazil (Arias 2006), Argentina (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004, Stokes 2005), Bolivia (Lazar 2008), Venezuela (Smilde 2008), and Peru (Schneider and Zúniga-Hamlin 2005).[24] At the same time, democracy in Latin America is also closely connected to mobilization, from processes of democratization in the 1980s (Hipsher 1998) to the wave of protests of the 1990s and early 2000s that exposed the consequences of neoliberal policies and state retrenchment. Although presented from varied and sometimes contrasting perspectives, scholars concur on the vitality of social movements and contentious collective action in Latin America (Almeida and Johnston 2006; Almeida 2007; Shefner 2004; Eckstein 1989; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003; Slater 1994; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Revilla Blanco 2010; Stahler-Sholk and Vanden 2011; Yashar 2005; Lievesley 1999; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Teubal 2009; Harris 2002). In short, in recent decades Latin

[24] For general surveys see Roniger and Günes-Ayata 1994, and Helmke and Levitsky 2006.

America has witnessed a concomitant expansion of both contention and clientelism, a fact that is hard to explain if we assume their mutual opposition.

Although most research deems clientelism and protest as mutually exclusive phenomena, research conducted in urban poverty enclaves (shantytowns, *favelas*, squatter settlements, *colonias*, etc.) and on poor people's movements in Latin America shows how patronage networks and collective mobilization can flourish in the same setting. This coexistence is only paradoxical or contradictory if we fail to see clientelism and protest as alternative means that poor people have to address their grievances and solve pressing survival needs. On the one hand, the particularized favors of patrons and brokers offer alternative channels for "getting things done," while avoiding bureaucratic indifference. As it is shown by Robert Gay in his studies of two *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro (1990, 1994) and Gerrit Burgwald in his research on a squatter settlement in Quito (1996), clientelist mediation is an effective way of obtaining urban services otherwise unavailable for those without access to proper contacts or channels. A clientelist network also may offer informal rules of promotion and reward and low-cost access to state jobs, providing a rare opportunity for upward social mobility. In a context of dwindling economic opportunities, sustained and loyal engagement in the party machinery can assure participants access to jobs and influence in the distribution of public resources. Patronage arrangements may thus become a "problem solving network" (Auyero 2001) and can open channels of participation for excluded groups (Nelson 2006). On the other hand, a series of studies have demonstrated how popular sectors have responded with contention to policies that negatively impacted their livelihoods in a series of countries.[25]

Two recent ethnographies –by Julieta Quirós (2006) in a poor neighborhood of Greater Buenos Aires and by Sian Lazar (2008) in the city of El Alto, Bolivia- illuminate the ways in which patronage networks and social movements can be seen as alternative means poor people's find to address their survival needs –rather than two opposed spheres of interaction or mutually exclusive social spaces. Julieta Quirós (2006) carried out fieldwork about a social movement of

[25] In Argentina see Auyero 2007; Domínguez et al 2006; Giarracca 2001, 2007; Giarracca and Teubal 2005; Giraudy 2007; Villalon 2007; Svampa and Pereyra 2003; in Mexico and Argentina see Shefner, Pasdirtz, and Blad 2006; in Venezuela see López Maya and Lander 2006; Motta 2010; Smilde and Hellinger 2011; Spanakos 2011; in Brazil see de Medeiros 2007; Foweraker 2001; Rothman and Oliver 1999; Vergara-Camus 2009; Wright and Wolford 2003; Reiter 2010; Sigaud 2004; in Chile see Foweraker 2001; Hipsher 1998; Richards 2004, 2010; in Ecuador see Becker 2010; Jameson 2010; Laurie et al. 2005; Ramírez Gallegos 2010; in Costa Rica see Edelman 1999; in Bolivia see Albro 2005; Arce and Rice 2009; Assies 2004; García Linera 2004; Gill 2000; Lazar 2008; Mamani Ramírez 2005; Nash 1992; Rivero 2006; Shultz and Draper 2009; Spronk and Webber 2007; Svampa and Stefanoni 2007.

"*piqueteros*," picketers, as the organized unemployed are called in Argentina in reference to the group's main form of protest, i.e. pickets blocking roads and streets to demand work. Running contrary to most analyses of *piqueteros* in Argentina that stress their oppositional stance vis-à-vis the patronage networks of the Peronist Party, Quirós shows that in fact poor people switch back and forth between the two, and that some families develop creative strategies to obtain welfare benefits from both. Delving into the multifarious world of welfare in a poor neighborhood, Quirós found out that people obtained benefits through a series of alternative means: by links to a politician, by signing up in the local municipality, or by joining a *piquetero* movement (2006: 26). By way of up-close and *in situ* observations, Quirós disputes the dichotomy opposing the figure of the picketer –defined by the participation in horizontal, participative, and autonomous spaces- with that of the political broker ("*puntero*"), understood as taking part in vertical, apolitical, and clientelistic arrangements (2006: 28).

In Bolivia, the city of El Alto has been a stronghold of "populist" movements in the 1990s and early 2000s (Saravia and Sandoval 1991; Lazar 2002, 2004) as well as a site of massive contention opposing neoliberal policies (Gómez 2004; Mamani Ramírez 2005; Perreault 2006; Arbona 2007). The ethnography of Sian Lazar shows that in El Alto (a burgeoning Aymara metropolis neighboring Bolivia's capital, La Paz), clientelism "appears as a means by which the clients seek to overcome the depersonalization of electoral politics to create a more direct and less delegative local democracy" (Lazar 2008: 92). Lazar observed "the operation of clientelism from the perspective of clients" exploring "the ways clients exercise their political agency according to both individual and collective interests" (2008: 94). Lazar shows that clientelism in El Alto is exercised before and after political campaigns, and rather than atomizing people, stimulates discussions on how to define the collective political allegiances of entire neighborhoods; in this way, clientelism encourages the exercise of accountability, and nurtures emotional and affective ties between candidates and electors. Popular sectors in El Alto "are using clientelism to temporarily redress the normal balance of unrepresentative politics" (Lazar 2008: 114), and leaders participate in both unions and political parties (Lazar 2008: 198-203).

Scholars writing from a rational-institutional perspective usually concur in the assessment of clientelism as a mechanism that tends to degrade citizenship and erode democracy (e.g. Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Nevertheless, examples from recent research illustrate novel ways of seeing the

relationship between clientelism, politics, and social change. Eduardo Canel's study on urban decentralization in Uruguay (2010) belies the established wisdom that participation in institutional politics necessarily results in maintaining the status-quo; and Tina Hilgers' research in Mexico (2009) shows that clientelism, far from eroding civic practices, may enhance democratic participation.

Canel's research in Montevideo investigated the following question: "why were some communities better able than others to seize the opportunities offered by participatory decentralization?" (2010: xv). Counter intuitively, he demonstrates that the communities whose leaders had the most entrenched histories of activism were the ones that encountered greater difficulties in taking advantage of the decentralizing policies of the Left-wing municipal government. Through a comparison of three communities during a long-term period, Canel demonstrates that communities with class-based "oppositional mobilization capacities" (useful during the years of factory strikes) became immersed in factionalism and internal power struggles. Conversely, communities with moderate leaders benefited most from decentralized participatory policies and were able to improve the living conditions of their neighborhoods. In communities where participation was historically low, leaders were able to work with public officials, engage local associations and neighbors, and bring about tangible changes to their areas.

Based on a series of interviews with members of a patronage network, the study of Tina Hilgers in Mexico (2009) suggests –counter to the conventional wisdom that clientelism erodes democracy- that some clients learned important citizenship practices through their interactions with patrons. In the context of democratic transition in Mexico and after the decline of PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, Institutional Revolutionary Party, the ruling party for more than seventy years) "patrons must compete vigorously for clients who can now choose among candidates from various parties" (Hilgers 2009: 70). By participating in the networks of the PRD (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, Democratic Revolutionary Party) people gained access to goods and services, but also engaged in politics, learning "the participatory skills and values that are the building blocks of democracy" (Hilgers 2009: 70).

In summary, what these studies indicate is that patronage politics and social movements are not necessarily antithetical or counter-posed, that institutional politics may contribute to

produce concrete changes, and that clientelism may enhance participation and democracy –rather than just atomize people and erode democratic practices.

TRANSGENIC AGRICULTURE AND AGROCHEMICAL USE

What is a transgenic crop? Basically, it is a crop obtained with a seed that has been modified by genetic engineering which enables the crop, for instance, to tolerate an herbicide or provide resistance to certain insects. In this dissertation, I use the term GM (genetically modified) and transgenic seeds interchangeably. This is one of the applications of biotechnology, which is also used to produce medicines (insulin) and genetically modified animals (for instance, salmons). Agricultural biotechnology is only one part of the nascent biotechnology industry, but it is reshaping agro food production, especially in the Americas.

From Green Revolution to "Gene Revolution"

The process known as the "Green Revolution" has its origins in the 1940s, but was greatly accelerated in the 1960s when its main productive techniques for crop production expanded throughout the world. It can be briefly characterized by the incorporation of hybrid seeds into agricultural production in the form of a "technological package," since the use of those seeds demanded the concomitant use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, together with the use of heavy machinery for sowing, fumigating, and harvesting crops (mainly wheat and corn). From a sociological standpoint, these changes in food production cannot be disentangled from their ideological and geopolitical dimensions. As Eric Ross points out, the expansion of the Green Revolution took place in the context of the Cold War and the menace of "peasant revolutions", and was "predicated on views that denied the yield-raising potential of land redistribution and of indigenous innovation and that substituted for both the commitment to a more entrepreneurial mode of production, oriented to the world market rather than to local subsistence needs" (Ross 2003: 439). In its expansion to the "Third World" (especially in Mexico and India) the Green Revolution was "less about enhancing the food security of the poor in developing countries than

about securing the economic prosperity of the U.S. power elite" (Ross 2003: 440) and was heralded without serious examination of its simpleminded Malthusian assumptions.[26]

The Green Revolution structured the post World War II food regime that begun to change in the 1970s.[27] The oil crisis of 1973, the global disposition of financial capital, and changes in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union represented a reconfiguration of the global food regime (Friedmann 1993: 31). This new stage in world food production is characterized by the control exerted by global corporations (McMichael and Myhre 1991), whose interests have become increasingly detached from the national states where they are based (Friedmann 1993: 52) and that manage most of the global trade via intra-firm transactions (Goodman and Watts 1997: 4). As delineated by McMichael (2009), this emerging food regime has incorporated new regions into animal protein chains (e.g. China, Brazil), has expanded differentiated supply chains to ensure access to fish, fruit and vegetables for privileged consumers in affluent countries, and has displaced smallfarmers from their lands throughout the world. At the center of this new phase of global food production are GM seeds and transgenic crops (Fitting 2006; Pechlaner and Otero 2008; Otero 2008).

The intersection between molecular biology and agri-bio-business can be summarized by pointing to a series of scientific landmarks. The research of Watson and Crick on DNA "double helix" and the publication of their findings in the journal *Nature* (1953) opened a wide range of technological applications for molecular biology. One of these applications was the technological process of "gene splicing" developed by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer in 1973, which involves inserting one or more genes from one species into the genome of another, i.e. recombinant DNA technology (or rDNA). In 1975, a conference gathering scientist and scholars was held in Asilomar, California to discuss potential risks of biotechnology. The conference set the regulatory and safety guidelines for laboratory experiments on molecular biology, banning certain uses of biotechnology for its potential dangers. This precautionary approach changed in the 1980s after the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ananda Chakrabarty, a scientist working for the General Electric Corporation who wanted to patent a living bacteria created in a laboratory. The "Diamond v. Chakrabarty" case opened the possibility for patenting

[26] For the negative consequences of the Green Revolution see Glaeser 1987; Frankel 1971; Pearse 1980; Bayliss-Smith and Wanmali 1984.
[27] A food regime is defined as a "rule governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale" (Friedmann 1993: 30-1). On the concept of food regime, see McMichael 2009.

life forms, and in 1987 the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) ruled that genetically engineered animals, as well as human genes, cells, and organs can also be patented (Yount 2000).

From then on, science, technology and business came together to create a "university industrial complex" (Kenney 1988). In the context of the "gene revolution" fostered by agricultural biotechnology "a global and largely private agricultural research system is creating improved agricultural technologies that are flowing to developing countries primarily through market transactions. Asymmetries between developed and developing countries in research capacity, market institutions and the commercial viability of technologies raise doubts regarding the potential of the Gene Revolution to generate benefits for poor farmers in poor countries." (Pingali and Raney 2005: 3). Agricultural biotechnology, i.e. the creation and commercialization of transgenic seeds, has been one of the most salient applications of molecular biology and gene splicing. In United States –the world leader in transgenic production– the initial caution evident in the regulations of the mid-1970s governing biotechnology research gave way to looser regulation by the mid-1990s. The premise of current regulation has been that transgenic seeds should be covered under previous legislation and agencies. In 1993, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) agreed to require only the notification of the agency, not a permit, to test transgenic seeds and plants in open-field. Today, "regulatory agencies in the United States seem to agree with the claims of the agricultural biotechnology companies that genetically engineered plants are not substantially different from those changed by traditional breeding techniques and therefore require no additional regulation" (Yount 2000: 13). Under the regulations issued in the 1990s (or rather lack thereof) the USDA should intervene only in cases where biotechnological products can be shown to injure plants or plant parts. This poses a serious limitation considering that "Such a finding may be difficult to make since the ecological effects of engineered organisms cannot be ascertained in the absence of widespread ecological baseline studies" (Peritore 1995: 175). The regulatory frame involves several agencies and "creates a conflict of interest in that the NIH [National Institutes of Health] and USDA are both promoters and regulators of biotechnology" (Peritore 1995: 176).

Debates on the Consequences of Transgenic Agriculture and Agrochemical Use

The production of GM crops has generated a series of debates and contrasting conclusions. On the one hand, some have argued that GM crops hold enormous economic potential for both developed and underdeveloped countries (Cooper et al 2005; Herring 2007; Paarlberg 2008) and assessment of these new technologies emphasizes that no-till practices associated with transgenic crops can reduce both soil erosion and the use of dangerous agrochemicals (National Research Council 2004). On the other hand, critics have argued that transgenic crops have negative social impacts such as the economic marginalization of peasants and small-holders, and an increase in the concentration of agro-food systems in the hands of a few powerful actors (McMichael 2006). Still others have criticized the privatization of genetic material through patents and enhanced intellectual property rights (Kloppenburg 2005; Lappe 1984; Pistorius and van Wijk 1999) and the uncertain environmental impacts of GM crops (Snow et al 2005; Wolfenbarger and Phifer 2000). Doubts have also been raised about potential hazards of transgenic food to human health, and about environmental risks such as gene flow to "natural" species, the appearance of "superweeds" that may resist herbicides, biodiversity loss, and the effects of agrochemicals on animal/vegetal life and human health (Altieri and Rosset 1999; Cerdeira and Duke 2006).

An important area of research in terms of the cases presented in this dissertation is the effect of the agrochemicals associated with the production of GM crops. The initial optimism with which GM were received in terms of reducing the use of pesticides and/or the use of less pesticides in comparison to hybrid crops was soon brought into question. A study analyzing the amount of pesticides used in the production of GM crops in the United States after thirteen years of its commercial approval showed that herbicide-tolerant crops (chiefly GM soybeans) "increased herbicide use by a total of 382.6 million pounds" over 13 years and that GM soybeans "increased herbicide use by 351 pounds (about 0.55 pound per acre), accounting for 92% of the total increase in herbicide use" (Benbrook 2009: 3). In what follows, I review the recent literature on the effects of pesticides, focusing on the research on glyphosate, the herbicide that GM soybeans are designed to endure. In the remainder of this section, I present the findings of recent research divided into four groups: effects on flora, effects on fauna, effects of GM feed on mammals, and effects on human health.

Regarding the impact of glyphosate use on flora, studies have shown a series of negative effects: “glyphosate application at the recommended dosage can exert negative side-effects on plant growth and micronutrient status” (Bott et al 2008); “the accumulation in soils of one glyphosate metabolite questions the sustainability of glyphosate-tolerant systems” (Mamy et al 2010); the current regulatory protocol for glyphosate use underestimates inhibitory consequences to the growth of non-targeted plants and its poisonous effects (White and Boutin 2007); and studies testing the exposure of six woodland plants to herbicide drifts showed that “herbicide treatments at drift concentrations caused increased mortality, reduced biomass and reduced fecundity in all species” (Gove et al 2007). The extant research also draws attention to the obstacles to fully assessing the effects of Roundup (the commercial formulation of glyphosate) because the company producing it (Monsanto Co.) does not reveal its complete composition. Several studies mention that more research is needed to evaluate the effects of herbicides in the environment, since Roundup is composed of glyphosate combined with surfactants and adjuvants. Scientists assert that “glyphosate is much less toxic to the species tested than the formulated product Round-Up Original” (White and Boutin 2007). A study using diluted Roundup “far below agricultural recommendations” showing low levels of residues in food or feed concluded that “the proprietary mixtures available on the market could cause cell damage and even death” of cells confirming “that the adjuvants in Roundup formulations are not inert” (Benachour and Séralini 2009). Research demonstrating that Roundup decreased steroid production whereas glyphosate did not, concluded that “Because the formulation of Roundup is proprietary, further studies are needed to identify the components in Roundup and their ability to disrupt steroidogenesis” (Walsh et al 2000).

Other studies investigated the effects of glyphosate and Roundup on fauna, proving that when using “realistic exposure times and the frequently occurring stress of predators found in natural ecologic communities, one of our most widely applied herbicides (Roundup) has the potential to kill many species of amphibians” (Relyea 2005a; see also Relyea 2004, 2005b; Rohr and Crumrine 2005). Other studies also investigated the negative effects on the life of aquatic plants (Perez et al 2007). When it comes to the effects of glyphosate exposure on mammals, deleterious effects have been shown among rats in terms of their reproductive capacities (Dallegrave et al 2007) and neural defects and craniofacial malformations in vertebrate embryos (Paganelli et al 2010; cf. Williams et al 2000). Several studies also demonstrate the damaged

caused by the ingestion of GM foods in experiments: rats fed with three different varieties of GM maize experienced problems with kidney and liver development, as well as other effects in the heart, adrenal glands, spleen and haematopoietic system (de Vendômois 2009); and rats fed with GM soybeans determined that intake can influence some liver features during aging (Malatesta et al. 2008).[28] A recent study (Séralini, Mesnage, et al 2011) reviewed the available research on the chronic toxicity of GM food ingestion, concluding that "The 90-day-long tests are insufficient to evaluate chronic toxicity" and that "no minimal length for the tests is yet obligatory for any of the GMOs cultivated on a large scale, and this is socially unacceptable in terms of consumer health protection" (Séralini et al 2011).

In addition, studies have focused on the effects on glyphosate human health. Benachour et al 2007 used human embryonic and placental-derived cells to test "the toxicity and endocrine disruption potential of Roundup" finding that "Roundup exposure may affect human reproduction and fetal development in case of contamination", and adding that "chemical mixtures in formulations appear to be underestimated regarding their toxic or hormonal impact."

A study in Ontario, Canada, observed the exposure of male farmers to glyphosate-based herbicides and found that it "was associated with an increase in miscarriage and premature birth in farm families" (Bonn 2005). Noticing that agricultural workers using glyphosate had pregnancy problems, Richard et al 2005 carried out a study showing that glyphosate is toxic to human placental cells in concentrations lower than those found in actual agricultural use, and also found that "this effect increases with concentration and time or in the presence of Roundup adjuvants. Surprisingly, Roundup is always more toxic than its active ingredient." Experiments also point out a potential carcinogenic effect of Roundup; researchers noted that "The most consistent finding in our study was a suggested association between multiple myeloma and glyphosate exposure" (De Roos et al 2005). Studies also have shown an association between the use of 2,4D and Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (Zahm et al 1990; McDuffie et al 2001). As I present in chapters four and five, 2,4D is widely used in the *actual production* of GM soybeans.

[28] For studies on rats fed on GM crops, see also Ewen and Pusztai 1999; Malatesta et al. 2009; Vecchio, Cisterna et al. 2004; Tudisco, Mastellone, et al. 2006; Trabalza-Marinucci, Brandi, et al. 2008.

From the "Bottom-Up"

The review of the effects of agrochemicals used in the production of herbicide resistant crops (chiefly, GM soybeans) calls for the need to pay close attention to how transgenic crops are *actually produced* rather than just taking at face value the "recipes" provided by the companies promoting and commercializing seeds and agrochemicals. A similar argument should be made regarding the political aspects of the expansion of GM crops. For the most part, social research on biotechnology in agriculture has concentrated on the public discourses and the strategies of global corporations, transnational social movements, and national states. Valuable research has been offered in this respect, showing the opposition to GM crops on the part of national and transnational organizations in Latin America (e.g. Otero 2008; Newell 2008) and elsewhere (e.g. Scoones 2008; Schurman and Munro 2010). Nevertheless, much less attention has been paid to how policies have been adopted, transformed, supported, or contested at the local level. How do the actions of farmers, peasants, provincial officials, and local political brokers transform large-scale trends into concrete realities? How are global discourses and strategies enacted in the nitty-gritty realities of local agricultural production? In short, how has the process of GM crops expansion been lived and negotiated, supported and resisted, in specific rural areas? In chapters four and five of this dissertation, processes of mobilization and demobilization take center stage, but I also show the concrete realities of GM crop production, a "bottom-up" perspective that, I believe, is necessary to complement the structural and global research on the topic.

CHAPTER 3

NEOLIBERALIZATION AND THE DARK SIDE OF THE BOOM

In chapters four and five, the next two chapters of this dissertation, I present cases of agrochemical exposure and describe what people did about it (mobilization), why the same people that did something at one point in time did not do the same later on (lack of mobilization), and why people in different places did different things (transgressive and contained contention). In so doing, I focus on events that took place in 2003 and in 2009 –and, naturally, make references to what transpired in between. The ensuing chapters present a thick description that pays attention to meanings and interactions, while keeping an eye on how the cases inform theory-building (i.e. analytic ethnography). Yet in between the concreteness of the events and the abstraction of theory, sits the historical background that sets the terms of action. Paraphrasing a famous statement, people do the things they do but not in circumstances of their own choosing. This chapter thus presents the circumstances that led to the agrochemical exposures at the root of what people did (or failed to do), and the historical setting that shaped the experiences and the available options for action of the people involved in the events. In other words, this chapter presents the backdrop for the ensuing chapters.

In the first section of this chapter, I describe the main characteristics of processes of neoliberalization in Argentina, focusing on the agrarian sector. Then, I zoom in on the negative consequences of GM soybeans' expansion. The description of this "dark side" of the soybean boom shows that the cases of agrochemical exposure I present in chapters four and five are not rare instances but a common occurrence in contemporary agricultural Argentina. Moreover, this raises the question as to why there are not *more* protests caused by environmental damages –a conundrum I unravel in the analyses of the cases. The rest of the chapter presents the background of the province of Formosa, the site of the cases I present in the next chapters.

AGRARIAN NEOLIBERALIZATION IN ARGENTINA

Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade, where the role of the state is to guarantee the conditions for the implementation of such policies and practices (Harvey 2007: 2). Neoliberalism is oftentimes historicized referring to the policies pushed forward by Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. during the 1980s. However, policies of unfettered trade and reduced state intervention in the economy can be traced back to the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile during the 1970s (Bondi and Laurie 2005).[29] Political geographers have been attentive to the protean features of neoliberalism (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a; Larner 2000, 2003; Martin 2005), suggesting instead the use of the term "neoliberalization" (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010b; Perreault and Martin 2005; Peck 2004, 2010; Peck and Tickell 2002).[30] Neoliberalization highlights the fact that "neoliberalism" is not monolithic: more than the opening of a new era brought on by neoliberal policies, a *process of neoliberalization* stresses its heterogeneity and the frictions produced by the intended imposition of policies, and remind us that neoliberalism is an ongoing project. When characterizing processes of neoliberalization we need to be wary, since we are "walking a line of sorts between producing, on the one hand, overgeneralized accounts of a monolithic and omnipresent neoliberalism (…) and one the other hand, excessively concrete and contingent analyses of (local) neoliberal strategies, which are inadequately attentive to the substantial connections and necessary characteristics of neoliberalism as an extralocal project" (Peck and Tickell 2002: 381-2).

To avoid a monolithic description of processes of neoliberalization, we thus need to pay attention to "actually existing neoliberalism" (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 349). To do so, here I take heed of James C. Scott's assertion that "no abstract force, collectivity, or system, ever arrives at the door of human experience, except as it is mediated by concrete, particular human 'carriers'" (2005: 398; see also Lyon-Callo and Hyatt 2003). I therefore proceed in two steps: first I delineate structural trends in Latin America and Argentina, and then I describe some of its concrete manifestations in Formosa, a province of Northern Argentina. This chapter therefore

[29] "To take a specific example, the introduction of Chilean-style pension reform in the UK under a 'New Labour' government in the late 1990s bears testimony to the longevity and de-contextualised global reach of neoliberal thinking" (Bondi and Laurie 2005: 395).
[30] For a review of this literature, see Springer 2010.

serves to identify the hinges between large scale forces and their tangible effects in determined social spaces.

Beginning in the 1970s but especially during the 1990s, Latin American governments followed neoliberal principles in the application of policies of structural adjustment, reducing state expenditures on education, health, housing, and social security services, and/or privatizing these services (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Smith et al 1994; Williamson 1994; Teichman 2001; Murillo 2000). Latin America's class structure was thus radically changed: income inequalities increased, wealth became increasingly concentrated, and labor insecurity and unemployment expanded (Portes and Hoffman 2003). Democratic regimes were also substantially modified by the weakening of political parties and unions, the discouragement of political participation, and the erosion of governmental accountability (Weyland 2004). Although each country of the region adopted neoliberal policies at different paces and with varying results, governments "demolished tariff barriers, privatized hundred of state-owned enterprises, deregulated product, capital, and labor markets, and slashed state employment" (Stokes 2001: 1; also see Burdick and Oxhorn 2009; Hershberg and Rosen 2006; Margheritis and Pereira 2007; cf. Walton 2004).

Within Latin America's agricultural sector, neoliberalization processes translated into a particular set of measures: the end of subsidies to agrarian production and of government regulations; "outward looking" policies aimed to increase primary exports; foreign investment and local incorporation of capital goods (mainly machinery and technology); and an overall "climate" fostering large agribusiness. An assessment conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture summarizes these processes as follows: "The reforms contributed to greater market orientation and a more stable macroeconomic environment for investment and decision making. (…) With liberalized trade and strengthened market signals, imports and use of agricultural inputs and technology increased markedly throughout the 1990s. The improved investment climate and reduced border controls also ushered in foreign direct investment, which increased competitiveness and efficiency in the agricultural sectors" (USDA 2001: V-VI.)

These policies paved the way for the incorporation of genetically modified (GM) crops into agriculture: they favored the importation of foreign seeds, agrochemicals and agricultural machinery needed to produce these crops; and attracted global agribusiness corporations marketing GM seeds (Teubal and Rodriguez 2001). The expansion of agribusiness, mainly

through GM soy production, grew rapidly in Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay. To wit: in 1996, transgenic soybeans were sowed in only 37 *thousand* hectares (about 91,500 acres) in Latin America. A decade later, the area cultivated with GM soybeans skyrocketed to almost 32 *million* hectares (more than 78 million acres) (James 2006).

Argentina has been at the forefront of both the implementation of neoliberal policies and the expansion of agribusiness through the adoption of GM crops. In the early 1990s, the federal government applied all the policies recommended by international lending institutions (i.e. the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank): the privatization of state-owned companies, elimination of trade barriers, and the reduction of state expenditures and employment. The adoption of parity between the Argentine peso and the American dollar (known locally as *convertibilidad*) provided macroeconomic stability and curbed inflation. However, this policy favored the import of foreign goods, destroying national industry and thus producing an enormous negative impact on the employed population (unemployment during the 1990s reached 20 percent). These policy orientations were applied in the agricultural sector through the elimination of regulatory organisms (controlling the prices and the commercialization of grains, meat, sugar, etc.), and an elimination of barriers for both the importation of agricultural supplies (seeds, agrochemicals, machinery) and the export of commodities (mostly soybeans but also corn, wheat, and meat) (Teubal 2008).

In that context, GM soybean production was introduced into Argentina in 1996 and rapidly expanded in the *Pampa* region, an export-oriented area characterized by its commercial agriculture, comprised of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba, and La Pampa (see image of *Pampa* region in Appendix 1). Farmers quickly adopted GM herbicide-resistant soybeans due to a set of factors. First, the liberalization of markets reduced the prices of imported herbicides and the agricultural machinery needed for GM soybean production.[31] Second, high international prices and external demand stimulated the soybeans exports that, coupled with the elimination of export taxes, made soybean production highly profitable (see table of exports below).[32] Third, Argentine farmers were accustomed to reproducing their own seeds, a practice that allowed them to circumvent the payment of royalties to the owners of seeds' patents (this reduced the costs of acquisition), and rapidly expanded the availability of

---

[31] In 1993, the fees for the importation of capital goods were reduced to zero (Trigo et al 2002).

[32] The average international prices of wheat, corn, and soybeans in the period 1992-2001 were, respectively, 290, 228, and 461 dollars/metric ton (at constant prices of 2005) (SAGPyA 2005).

GM seeds.[33] Fourth, the growth of GM soybeans requires less labor than other crops.[34] Fifth, GM soybeans allow two harvests (instead of one) in one agricultural cycle, thereby increasing profit margins for producers (Bisang 2003). In short, lower costs of production, increased margins of profitability, and favorable external demand (in a context of "free market" policies) quickly expanded the planting of GM soybeans both geographically and in terms of quantity.

Table 1. Argentina. Soy exports (beans, oil, and pellets) by country and region. 2006

Country	Metric Tons	Thousands of Dollars	% of exports to country
TOTAL ARGENTINE EXPORTS	**99,199,610**	**46,546,203**	**///**
Chile	498,482	104,623	2.4
Venezuela	89,450	45,466	5.6
Peru	264,051	130,648	17.9
Colombia	283,066	53,416	9.7
Ecuador	359,983	68,099	22.5
Guatemala	40,422	21,015	12.2
Dominican Republic	87,820	42,385	28.4
LATIN AMERICA	**1,623,274**	**465,652**	

[33] Later on, Monsanto Co. implemented a system called "extended royalties": this company signed contracts through which farmers and seed companies agreed to not reproduce their own seeds –a mandate that contradicts Argentine law 20247, which allows farmers to reproduce the seeds obtained in their own farms (see Rodríguez 2010:184).

[34] According to Hillcoat and Guibert (2003) the margin of profit using GM soybeans increases in 15% when compared to other traditional crops (see also Hernandez 2007)

Table 1. Argentina. Soy exports (beans, oil, and pellets) by country and region. 2006 (continued)

Country	Metric Tons	Thousands of Dollars	% of exports to country
Spain	3,502,399	621,777	34.1
Netherlands	3,002,816	536,189	37.1
Italy	2,315,144	414,038	37.8
Denmark	1,365,867	234,955	80.4
France	821,309	152,155	27.5
United Kingdom	551,416	102,156	20.8
Belgium	435,448	77,431	26.0
EUROPE	**11,994,399**	**2,138,701**	
South Africa	806,145	151,182	16.5
Algeria	267,387	127,038	23.6
Egypt	728,317	197,969	61.1
Morocco	311,207	148,832	64.0
United Arab Emirates	82,490	17,924	11.2
Turkey	259,782	87,803	36.1
Angola	31,247	23,328	16.8
Tunisia	405,065	108,883	82.2
AFRICA and MIDDLE EAST	**2,891,640**	**862,959**	
China	6,316,658	1,422,096	40.9
India	1,387,085	656,685	72.3
Malaysia	853,389	160,228	30.1
Korean Republic	531,988	96,950	22.6
Indonesia	951,675	175,807	55.5
Philippines	1,012,119	190,699	66.4
Thailand	1,077,622	215,298	75.5
Vietnam	654229	139,885	68.4
Bangladesh	182,215	90,493	64.6
ASIA	**12,966,980**	**3,148,141**	
Australia	40,219	8,143	6.0

Source: Based on table "Exportación por principales países y productos. Año 2006" available at the webpage of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, http://www.indec.mecon.ar/principal.asp?id_tema=1007

Figure 1. Soybean Production in Argentina 1969-2009, in metric tons



Source: Ministry of Agriculture, http://www.minagri.gob.ar/site/index.php

As seen in the table above, the bulk of soy exports (combining soybeans, oil, and pellets) in 2006 were exported to Asia and Europe. China and India concentrated 2 billion of the 3.1 billion dollars of soybean products exported to Asia; soybean products also represented almost 41% of Argentine exports to China and 72% to India. For other Asian countries (like Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Bangladesh) the total values were lower, but soybean product exports represented between two-thirds and three-fourths of the total Argentine exports to those countries. Argentine soy products exported to Europe in 2006 amounted to 2.1 billion dollars, and it is notable that these products represented more than one-third of the total exports to several countries (e.g. Spain, Netherlands, and Italy). The soybean exports to Africa are lower than to Asia and Europe, but higher than soybean exports to Latin America, and are the majority of total exports to several countries in Northern Africa: Egypt (61%), Morocco (64%), and Tunisia (82%).

In 1990 eight companies controlled 67% of the soy flour market and by 2002 those companies dominated 92% of it; similar trends took place in the market of soy oil: between 1990

and 2002 the first eight companies increased their market share from 72% to 92%. The economic concentration occurring during the years of neoliberalization is reflected in the reduced number of firms controlling the export markets. Currently, seven transnational companies (Cargill, Bunge, Nidera, Vicentin, Dreyfus, Pecom-Agra and AGD) control 60% of the agricultural exports. (Teubal, Domínguez and Sabatino 2005: 46-7).

"Successful" farmers (those who did not go bankrupt during the liberalization process), "sowing pools," and mega-agricultural firms led the expansive GM soybean production. Sowing pools consisted of associated investors (agrarian and non-agrarian) who contribute capital in order to rent land for two or three harvests through joint ventures, typically managed by an agronomist. The soybean producers responsible for the agrochemical drifts described in chapters four and five are an example of this type of scheme. Some economic groups reach a scale of "mega-agricultural firms" *renting* hundred of thousand of hectares –instead of *buying* lands, which would immobilize their capital (De Martinelli 2008; Posada and Martinez de Ibarreta 1998).[35] A series of variegated forms of contracts to rent land and create companies dedicated to short-term investments flourished in the *Pampa* region (see Bisang et al 2008). The accelerated and aggressive expansion of GM soybeans is also explained by a kind of "entrepreneurial activism" on the part of companies (for instance, Monsanto) that hired local community leaders, organized meetings with local farmers, and distributed publications and videos promoting GM crop production (see Gras and Hernández 2009: 20). Global companies like Nidera, Dekalb, and Cargill also took market shares of seeds and agrochemicals by closing deals of exclusivity with providers of these supplies in rural towns of the Pampa (Gras and Hernández 2009: 20). By the mid-2000s the area of GM soybean soared, covering nearly 50% of the arable land, more than 18 million hectares (almost 44.5 million acres). In 1997-1998, 18.7 million tons of soybeans were produced in Argentina; by 2006-2007 that production rose to 47.5 million tons (SAGPyA, 2007). In 2007, it was estimated that more than 90% of the soybeans produced in Argentina were genetically modified (SAGPyA, 2007). As a USDA report declares: "No other Latin American country embraced Genetically Modified Crops (GMO) as wholeheartedly as Argentina" (Yankelevich 2006: 3).

---

[35] One of the most emblematic examples of these "mega-firms" is "*Los Grobo*," a company that cultivates more than 150,000 hectares but only owns a very small percentage of it, leasing most land under temporary contracts for a percentage of the harvest (Gras 2009).

By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, GM soybean production in the *Pampa* region had reached its limit in terms of land availability and began to expand to other regions of Argentina.[36] Farmers and investors bought and/or rented (cheaper) land in the northwest and northeast regions of the country (mainly in the provinces of Santiago del Estero, Salta, Jujuy, Chaco, and Formosa), deforesting and advancing into areas occupied by peasant families and indigenous communities. Soybean production mushroomed in every province in a "Soy Rush" of sorts, with cultivation reaching road shoulders and plants being sowed on the outskirts of rural and semi-rural towns.

Figure 2. Area harvested with soybeans in Argentina 1969-2009, in hectares



Source: Ministry of Agriculture, http://www.siia.gov.ar/index.php/series-por-tema/agricultura

After the financial crisis of December 2001 and the devaluation of the Argentine peso, the federal government established taxes on agricultural exports, to appropriate part of the extraordinary rent stemming from the difference between national prices (in pesos) and

[36] An official report from the National Institute of Agrarian Technology stated that "Mostly as an effect of soybeans, land prices [in the Pampa region] reach historical values of increases of up to 50% in a year" (INTA 2004).

international export revenues (in dollars).[37] By 2009, the exports of the soybean agro-industrial complex (soybeans, oil, and flour) accrued to nearly one-fourth of the total exports from Argentina, worth close to 14 billion dollars[38]. The importance of soybean production and exports in Argentina has led to a "bio-hegemony" structuring the political and economic landscape of the country (Newell 2009). This "bio-hegemony" can be defined by the alliance of interests between agribusiness producers and traders (such as Cargill), "export oriented elements of national Argentine capital," biotechnology corporations (such as Syngenta, Dow, and Monsanto), big commercial banks, "and supportive elements within the state itself" creating an "alignment of material, institutional, and discursive power in a way which sustains a coalition of forces which benefit from the prevailing model of agricultural development" (Newell 2009: 35, 38). Two essential pillars of this bio-hegemony are, first, the "influence that business exercise through formal channels and systems of representation as well as informally through social networks" and, second, a hegemonic discourse that represents agricultural biotechnology as "an important, economically significant, socially beneficial, safe, and environmentally benign technology" (Newell 2009: 47, 53). This "bio-hegemony," in turn, has engendered an "export-oriented populism" (Richardson 2009), stemming from the policies implemented during the governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner (2003-2007 and 2007-2011). These two consecutive and aligned administrations have used the export tax revenue to fund redistributive polices and welfare programs.[39] In chapters four and five, I expose the capillarity of this "bio-hegemony," showing that it is not restricted to the national alliances delineated by Newell, but also reaches the provincial and local level. At the same time, the ensuing chapters of this dissertation also describe the resistances by organized peasants to this model based on soybean production. This resistance, although sporadic and confined to the local level, can be seen as a reaction to the negative consequences of the sweeping expansion of GM soybeans. In the next section, I characterize these negative consequences focusing on their socio-economic and environmental dimensions.

[37] Export taxes, eliminated during the 1990s, were reinstated in 2002 under the interim government of President Eduardo Duhalde. Starting in 2002 at a rate of 10%, taxes were increased later that year to 20%. During the Kirchner's government (2003-2007) export taxes for soybeans reached 24% and then were raised to 35%.

[38] See tables "Exportaciones y participación porcentual según complejos exportadores. Año 2009" and "Exportaciones del complejo soja, por zonas económicas, según componentes. Años 2005-2009" at http://www.indec.mecon.ar/principal.asp?id_tema=5187

[39] "Export taxes comprised 8 to 11% of the Kirchner government's total tax receipts, and around two-thirds of this—nearly US$2 billion in 2006—came from soy exports." (Richardson 2009: 242).

The "Dark Side of the Boom"

The expansion of GM soybeans boosted primary exports, creating an agricultural boom of sorts; yet it also spurred a chaotic and uncontrolled process of environmental change. Some studies on these agricultural changes have stressed the economic benefits brought by the expansion of agribusiness in Argentina or see it as a natural process of integration into global agriculture (e.g. Trigo and Cap 2003). However, critical perspectives have drawn attention to the *dark side of this boom*, stressing its negative consequences. These can be summarized in three main problems: first, economic concentration; second, the eviction of peasant families; and third, environmental damage.

First, the rapid and extensive expansion of agribusiness prompted an economic concentration of agro-food systems, i.e. the wealth created was appropriated by a smaller number of people and companies (Teubal and Rodríguez 2001; Teubal, Domínguez and Sabatino 2005; Teubal 2008; Rodríguez 2010). This concentration is reflected in a comparison of the agricultural censuses of 1988 and 2002, focusing on the number of farms and amount of the arable land. In 1988, there were roughly 421 thousand farms, occupying 30.8 million hectares with agrarian activities (76 million acres), whereas in 2002, 333 thousand farms occupied 33.5 million hectares with agrarian activities (82.8 million acres) (CNA 1988 and 2002).[40] Hence nearly 88 thousand farms, or one-fifth, (20.8%), were pushed out of business in the 1990s (see further analyses of these figures in Teubal, Domínguez and Sabatino 2005).

Other negative consequences at the socio-economic level include the loss of agricultural jobs and the decreased diversity of food production in Argentina. Regarding the first, a comparison of the censuses of 1988 and 2002 shows a 25% reduction in the proportion of agrarian workers; and between 1996 and 2006 "rural workers received 497 million dollars less as a consequence of the diffusion of GM soybeans" (Rodríguez 2010: 232). The claim that the expansion of GM soybeans has created jobs (e.g Trigo et al 2002) must not be considered in isolation but rather in comparison with the crops displaced by GM soybeans. Rodríguez (2010: 233-5) demonstrates that the increase in rural work stimulated by GM soybean production goes

[40] The exact figures for 1988 are: 421,221 farms, 378,357 with established limits; with a cultivated area of 30,766,460.5 hectares (CNA 1988); for 2002: 333,533 farms, 297,425 with established limits; with a cultivated area of 33,491,480.2 hectares (CNA 2002).

hand in hand with the elimination of jobs in the production of rice, corn, sunflower, cotton, sorghum, milk, and cattle. As hinted above, the expansion of soybeans also implied the dislocation of other agricultural products. A document from the federal Secretary of Agriculture states, "Given the behavior of the crop in both regions (Pampean and extra-Pampean), it can be concluded that soy has displaced other crops (substitution effect), and, at the same time, has spread to areas once considered marginal from an agro-ecological point of view" (SAGPyA 2002; quoted in Domínguez and Sabatino 2006). It is calculated that the diversity of crops in Argentina has been reduced in 20% because of the expansion of GM soybeans (Aizen et al 2009).

A second consequence of the expansion of the agricultural frontier, a process derived primarily from increased GM soybean production, has been the eviction of peasant and indigenous families (REDAF 2010; Barbetta 2005, 2009; UPC-UNESCO et al 2009). A report of the federal Ministry of Human Rights investigating the presence of armed groups forcing the eviction of peasant families in the Northern province of Santiago del Estero concluded that "The problem of land ownership and possession is one of the main human rights issues on the in the Santiago del Estero agenda, since the indiscriminate advance of the agricultural frontier via soybean production is a threat not only to real possession rights but also the environmental assets of rural communities" (Ministry of Justice, Security, and Human Rights 2004, quoted in Giarracca and Teubal 2006).

Third, the expansion of GM soybean production has created a series of environmental problems in the countryside and semi-rural areas. With the diffusion of GM soybean production from the *Pampa* to other regions of the country, problems of deforestation increased dramatically. In certain eco-regions, like the Mesopotamian Forest in the Northeast and the jungle of Yungas in the Northwest, the advance of the agricultural frontier has been done at the cost of destroying the natural forests (Pengue 2005). Between 1998 and 2002, thousands of hectares of native forests were destroyed: nearly 118 thousand hectares in the province of Chaco, 160 thousand hectares in the province of Salta, and 223 thousand hectares in Santiago del Estero –291 thousand, 395 thousand, and 551thousand acres, respectively (Montenegro et al 2004, quoted in Pengue 2005). In the province of Entre Ríos –the province where GM soybean production grew more rapidly– research by the National University of Entre Ríos reported in 2003 that 1.2 million hectares (almost 3 million acres) of native forest were lost in the recent

years (Fiorotto 2003). The environmentalist organization Greenpeace exposed a series of companies and governors for extensive and uncontrolled deforestation in several Argentine provinces, detailing specific cases and denouncing the annual deforestation of 250 thousand hectares (more than 617 thousand acres) in Argentina (Greenpeace 2006). In light of this dramatic effect of agricultural expansion, in 2007 the national Congress passed a law (known as "Bonasso law," named for the representative promoting the bill) mandating the provinces to promote mechanisms of "territorial organization," creating different areas: red (prohibiting deforestation), yellow (authorizing deforestation under certain conditions), and green areas (allowing deforestation). The law has been slowly implemented in a handful of provinces, though with the fierce opposition of the agricultural lobby.

At the agronomic level, the increased and constant use of pesticides has created serious complications in terms of weed management, such as the appearance of herbicide-resistant weeds (Pengue et al 2009), the depletion of soil nutrients (Pengue 2005) and the degradation of soils (Casabe et al 2007).[41] The use of pesticides has been skyrocketing in recent years. It is estimated that by the end of the 1990s, 42% of the pesticides used in Argentina were utilized for the production of GM soybeans (Pengue 2004a). On average, soybean growers in Argentina make 2.3 applications/year of glyphosate (the herbicide used in GM soybean production), whereas farmers in the United States make 1.3 applications/year (Benbrook 2002). The application of glyphosate in 2003/04 reached 100 million liters (Benbrook 2005); in 1997-98, 28 million liters of glyphosate were used, whereas in 1998-99 this quantity increased to 56 million liters (Pengue 2004b). A whole set of weeds that resist glyphosate have sprouted in Argentina's countryside, prompting farmers to apply even more toxic agrochemicals (see Papa 2002; Vitta et al 2004; Puricelli and Tuesca 2005; Faccini 2000; cf. Qaim and Traxler 2005).[42] The massive and uncontrolled use of herbicides has also caused contamination in water streams (Jergentz et al 2004). A recent study nicely summarizes this problem: "the substitution of traditional crops by GR [glyphosate-resistant] soy within the last couple of decades represents a large-scale, unplanned, ecological experiment, whose consequences for natural ecosystems, and aquatic environments in particular, are poorly understood" (Perez, Torremorell, et al 2007).

[41] According to an investigation "If the natural depletion were compensated with mineral fertilizers, Argentina would need around 1,100,000 metric tons of phosphorous fertilizers at a cost of US$330,000,000 in the international market" (Pengue 2005: 317).

[42] In Argentina, the volume of Dicamba increased 157%, of Imazethapyr 50%, and of 2-4D 10% (Benbrook 2005).

In the midst of an accelerated expansion, soybean production has reached areas near villages and towns. NGOs and journalists have reported a number of cases in which agrochemicals drifted from agricultural plots to people's houses and/or to farms. As a consequence, the crops of small-farmers and peasants have been destroyed, and the health of local inhabitants is being affected throughout the country (GRR 2009, Joensen et al 2005). Journalists have been reporting about cases of agrochemicals drifts affecting the health of local populations in the provinces of La Pampa, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero, Córdoba and Chaco (Aranda 2008, 2009; Giardinelli 2010; Diario Junio 2009).[43] A recent study documented thirty-two cases of agrochemical drifts affecting animals, plants, and inhabitants' health in different provinces of Argentina (see Domínguez and Sabatino 2010: 70-1 and 103-113).

In summary, the events presented in the ensuing chapters of this dissertation are not isolated incidents but a common experience of rural populations increasingly affected by the uncontrolled expansion of GM soybeans and its associated agrochemical use. In the next two chapters I show how the structural trends that I delineated here using national aggregated data are lived and experienced by concrete rural populations. Furthermore, in those chapters I provide answers as to why rural populations facing environmental onslaughts are more quiescent than we might normally expect. In the last part of this chapter I present the background of the province of Formosa, to better understand the actions and reactions of peasants in Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon. Yet before moving to that section, it is important to briefly reconsider the idea of "state retrenchment" associated with neoliberalization processes.

Neoliberalization Processes: between State Retrenchment and Reregulation

In their analysis of the theoretical and political status of neoliberalism, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell make the distinction "between the destructive and creative moments of the process of neoliberalism –which are characterized in terms of 'roll-back' and 'roll-out' neoliberalism, respectively" (2002: 380). In the previous pages, I mostly concentrated on the "roll back" phase of neoliberalization. An overview of the welfare programs implemented by the federal state since

[43] See also http://www.cepronat-santafe.com.ar/index.html for other cases in the province of Santa Fe and http://darioaranda.wordpress.com/ for several reports on agrochemical use in Argentina.

the 1990s will provide a good illustration on how the state also "rolls out" in the midst of neoliberal policies. A detailed description and analysis of the welfare programs in Argentina exceeds the scope of this chapter. Nonetheless, it is important to take notice of its expansion because not only does it provide a more nuanced picture of neoliberalization: this expansion also constitutes a key dimension in understanding the dynamics of mobilization and demobilization among popular sectors in Argentina. As I discuss in chapter four, the alliances that MoCaFor establishes with national social movements and the federal state both provide resources for the organization's survival and pose obstacles to mobilization.

The deregulation of the economy in the 1990s in Argentina is frequently referred to as "state retrenchment" (e.g. Lo Vuolo 1997), but this concept needs to be problematized. As the state relinquished its regulatory role in the economy, it also maintained its intervention in society through welfare policies. In a recent insightful article about the welfare state in Argentina, sociologist Ernesto Isuani concludes that "at the same time that Argentine Keynesianism was drastically dismantled with privatisation, deregulation and labour market flexibility, the welfare state experienced significant growth, measured by the proportion of resources assigned to it." (2010: 106). The point brings us back to the literature of political geographers on neoliberalization. Processes of neoliberalization, as Peck and Tickell assert, imply a dynamic process in which the state "rolls-back" and also "rolls-out" insofar as "neoliberalism is increasingly associated with the political foregrounding of new models of 'social' and penal policy-making, concerned specifically with the aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed" (2002: 389). Neoliberalization processes can thus be seen as a "twin process of financialization in the realm of economic policy and activation in the field of social policy" (Peck and Tickell 2002: 391).

The rural sector in Argentina is a good case in point of the reregulation mentioned by Peck and Tickell. In the 1990s, agriculture in Argentina underwent a profound deregulation with the stimulation of "free market" policies. At the same time, several "social programs" were created by the federal state targeting the rural poor through "focalized" policies. The federal state, through its Secretary of Agriculture and INTA (National Institute of Agricultural Technology), implemented a series of programs and projects: PROINDER, Development Project for Small Farmers (*Proyecto de Desarrollo de Pequeños Productores Agropecuarios*)[44];

[44] PROINDER was initiated in 1998 and implemented in Formosa in 2001. (DDA-PROINDER 2003: 6)

PRODERNEA, Project of Rural Development of Northeast Provinces (*Proyecto de Desarrollo Rural de las Provincias del Noreste Argentino*); Small Farm Program (*Programa Minifundio*); and PSA, Social Agricultural Program (*Programa Social Agropecuario*). PROINDER and PRODERNEA were funded by the World Bank. Besides the significance of this fact at the structural level (i.e. the bitter irony that welfare for the poor increased Argentina's external debt), what it is notable is how the Argentine offices in charge of these programs adopted the language and views of the international funding agencies. For instance, in reports and documents one often finds references to the "assistance" given to "vulnerable groups" targeted by the programs. The following statement in a document celebrating the 10th anniversary of PSA is, I believe, eloquent in terms of exposing the underlying aims of these welfare programs: launched to "soften" the impact of neoliberalization and stimulate in farmers a disposition towards efficiency, competitiveness, and profitability:

> Since the 1990s, the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Fishing, and Food [SAGPyA] resolved to launch a series of actions and programs as a result of the assessment by the authorities, regarding the difficulties that small-farmers in particular were going to face in integrating themselves as active protagonists in the new socio-economic context created by the profound structural changes implemented by the National Government. With the deliberate aim of minimizing the cost of adjustment, the SAGPyA adopted a compensatory and differentiated policy, so that any producer willing to do whatever it takes to recover (or achieve) *efficiency*, *competitiveness*, and *profitability*, could count on the support of the State. (DDA-PROINDER 2003: 9, emphasis added).

The PSA funds projects to families or groups and pays for supplies and equipment oriented to towards improving food production. Subsidies are paid back by donating eventual surpluses to community organizations (schools, hospitals, etc.). The "targeted population" of PSA was calculated to be more than 159 thousand families, representing 40% of Argentine farmers (DDA-PROINDER 2003). In 2005 in Formosa, PSA reached more than 1600 families, comprising 8600 people (PSA 2005).

Another important source of welfare targeting the poor in Argentina was a massive program for the unemployed launched in 2002, in the aftermath of the widespread crisis that the country was immersed following the financial crisis of December 2001. The "Unemployed Head of Households Plan," PJyJHD (*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados*) paid 150 pesos (50

dollars) to jobless people that were head of a household with children, with the conditionality that they had to be enrolled in a community project –for instance, making reparations to a school, cleaning the shoulders of a road, organizing a community bakery, etc. By 2003, the plan reached almost two million people (CELS 2003). During the interim government of President Duhalde (2002-2003), the Plan was administered by municipalities, and was both praised as a much needed "safety net" for the poor[45] and criticized on the grounds that "Far from its supposed consecration of a right, the plan limits itself to distributing precarious welfare benefits that do not meet the basic needs of the indigent population" (CELS 2003: 3).[46] During the government of Néstor Kirchner, social movement organizations were also allowed to administer their own PJyJHDs, a decision that reconfigured the functioning of social movements (see Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Delamata 2004; Fernández Álvarez and Manzano 2007; Gaitán and Maneiro 2009).[47]

A BRIEF SOCIAL HISTORY OF FORMOSA

In this section, I briefly review the social history of Formosa, the province that is the setting of the protests analyzed in the ensuing chapters, closing this section of the review with the 1976-1982 dictatorship in Argentina. Next, I concentrate on the democratization initiated in 1983 focusing on the peasant organizations created in the province and their relationships with the provincial government. Then, I briefly overview how the years of neoliberalization were seen by peasants participating in MoCaFor and present the main features of the welfare programs implemented during those years. The chapter closes with a brief presentation of the three communities that are the scenario of the events I describe in the ensuing chapters.

[45] See, for instance, "Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar. Pro y contra de un seguro" newspaper Página 12, May 12 2002.

[46] For analyses of the "Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados" also see CELS 2003, Kostzer 2008; Repetto et al n/d; Alperin 2009.

[47] To wit, see this conclusion about the "*piquetero* movement" in Argentina: "more and more unemployed organisations concluded that a measure of co-operation with the [Kirchner] government was the most efficient way to assert at least some of their interests and values. This led much of the more 'radical' groups to retreat further to their particular local projects –a retreat generally supported by the government which –via subsidies for small 'productive enterprises' – supports 'the communitarian-style, collective self-organisation' in which virtually all piqueteros engage." (Wolff 2007: 24). Also see Wolff 2007: 21-23, and Gaitán and Maneiro 2009: 151-3.

Cotton, Cattle, and Concentration

Formosa, a northeast province of Argentina, comprises most of the Argentine border with Paraguay (see map of Formosa in Appendix 1). It was originally occupied by indigenous hunter-gatherer populations but Spanish colonizers never settled in the region –although some Jesuit missions were established in the area in the late 1700s. What is today the province of Formosa was "colonized" by the Argentine federal state in the late 1800s through the creation of a National Territory in 1872, shared with what it is today the province of Chaco. The institutions of the federal state were established in Formosa following the "Paraguay War" of 1865-1870 and an ensuing military campaign against indigenous populations during 1884 (Maeder 1979). With the effective occupation of the territory by the federal state, the land was distributed among a small group of families with strong ties to public officials. Nearly 937 thousand hectares (more than 2.3 million acres) were adjudicated to only 14 owners, receiving around 66 thousand hectares each (more than 163 thousand acres) (Slutzky 1973: 7). This "original sin" of land concentration continued throughout the province's history. The following two tables show the land concentration of the province comparing small farms (less than 100 hectares) and large farms (more than 1000 hectares).

Table 2. Formosa, % of rural properties according to extreme sizes

	1914	**1947**	**1960**	**1969**	**1974**	**1988**
Less than 100 has.*	42.4	59.0	72.3	72.7	71.7	71.1
+ 1000 has.**	33.6	28.0	12.6	13.3	14.7	10.9

*100 hectares equals almost 250 acres
**1000 hectares equals almost 2500 acres
(Adapted from Valenzuela 1988: 49; information based in National Agrarian Censuses)

Table 3. Formosa, % of area occupied by extreme sizes of properties

	1914	**1947**	**1960**	**1969**	**1974**	**1988**
Less than 100 has.*	2.0	1.6	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.9
+ 1000 has.**	79.7	91.9	87.8	82.2	84.3	80.4

*100 hectares equals almost 250 acres
**1000 hectares equals almost 2500 acres
(Adapted from Valenzuela 1988: 49; information based in National Agrarian Censuses)

As it can be inferred from these figures, an overwhelming quantity of small farms (around 70% in the last decades) occupy a much reduced portion of land, whereas a small number of large properties control around 80% of the productive lands. This "social dualism" still persists in the province. According to the 2002 National Census, 57% of the farms are represented by land plots of 100 hectares or less, only occupying 3% of the cultivated land. Conversely, plots of 1000 hectares or more represented 15% of the number of farms, but occupying 76% of the cultivated land.[48]

To understand this unequal distribution of land, we must take a look at the main economic activities of the province and the main social actors associated to them. In the early decades of the 1900s, the area was integrated into national markets through the exploitation of forests on large properties and the breeding of cattle in extensive ranches (Brodershon and Slutzky 1975). During the world economic crisis of the 1930s, the federal state begins to promote the production of cotton by distributing seeds and facilitating the access to credit (Girbal Blacha 2004). In 1935, the federal state also created the National Board of Cotton (*Junta Nacional del Algodón*) to regulate its production and commercialization (Girbal Blacha 2004). An expansive population of the area by small farmers ensued. The occupation of the territory by small farmers during those decades was characterized by some analysts as "interstitial," in that small family farmers settled "in the reduced free spaces enclosed by large cattle properties" (Brodershon and Slutzky 1975: 103). This results in "Structural conditions of agricultural employment which create a peasant sector [*una capa campesina*] that occupies small areas of land using family labor, animal traction, that do not capitalize, and only reproduce their living conditions" (Brodershon and Slutzky 1975: 104). Many of these small farmers were migrant families from Paraguay, fleeing from the "Chaco War" waged by Paraguay and Bolivia between 1932 and 1935 (the father of Nélida and Horacio, two of the main leaders of MoCaFor in Monte Azul, was one of these migrants). This migrant population was hired as harvesters and many of them settle in fiscal lands to grow food for self-consumption.

The intervention of the state in cotton production (and economic activity in general) intensified during 1945 and 1960. During the governments of Juan D. Perón (1946-1952 and 1952-1955) the production of cotton was further stimulated by the installation and

[48] Census data may under-represent and over-represent large properties and small farms (see Edelman and Seligson 1994). Nonetheless, these figures give an indication of the unequal distribution of land in the province.

nationalization of factories that bought the cotton produced in the region, and several cooperatives were created in Formosa, Corrientes, and Chaco (cotton production was also developed in these two neighboring provinces, especially in the latter). In 1955, Formosa was "upgraded" from National Territory to province; the official shield created for the occasion reflects the importance of cotton production: a cotton plant stands above two shaking hands (see picture 16 in Appendix 2). The equalizing effects of the policies of the federal state during this phase were reversed after the coup d'état against Perón in 1955.

In summary, a polarized social and economic structure developed in the province during the first half of the 20th century, as a large group of poor peasants produced crops for self-consumption and cotton and a small group of large landowners bred cattle on large properties. The decades of 1960 and 1970s constituted economic and political landmarks for cotton production: the 1960s as the beginning of a decline and increased crisis of cotton production, and the 1970s in terms of the political organization of peasants and small farmers and by the heightened level of social conflict.

The introduction of synthetic fibers in the world market towards the end of the 1950s began the crisis of cotton production. The decline in the prices of natural fibers directly impacted the economy of small farmers, who responded to the drop in prices by increasing the cultivated area –to maintain their income by producing more (Brodershon and Slutzky 1975) (see graphic of cotton production and area harvested with cotton between 1969 and 2009 at the end of this chapter). At the same time, this increased pressure for land clashed with the interests of large landowners breeding cattle. During the military governments ruling Argentina between 1966 and 1972, the provincial administrations gave large areas of fiscal lands to middle and large cattle producers (Brodershon and Slutzky 1975: 104). By the end of the 1960s, cattle production in Formosa became increasingly complementary with this activity in the *Pampa* region: calves bred in Formosa were "exported" to the *Pampa* region for their final fattening. The acquisition of agricultural land in Formosa thus became increasingly appealing for cattle breeders interested in using this land to grow fodder and calves. In short, by the end of the 1960s the social actors behind cotton and cattle production –rural economic activities that once run relatively independent from each other- began to have conflicting interests (Roze 1992: 92-3).

In the 1970s, peasants and small-farmers created collective organizations and organized contentious actions through ULiCaF, Union of Peasant Leagues of Formosa (*Union de Ligas*

Campesinas de Formosa). Peasant Leagues were created in the 1970s in Paraguay, southern Brazil and several Argentine provinces (like Misiones, Chaco, and Corrientes) and, supported by the most progressive sections of the Catholic Church, aimed to transform the highly unequal relationships between rural classes (Ferrara 1973, Roze 1992). In Formosa, the ULiCaF attempted to address the unequal distribution of land and improve the terms of negotiation between cotton growers and the cotton industry. ULiCaF organized land seizures and mobilized extensively to demand better prices for cotton and to create cooperatives. ULiCaF was characterized by a high level of grassroots organization: in the 1970s, local committees in several areas of the province took over fiscal land plots that had been previously transferred to private owners in the 1960s (Roze 1992). Along with its counterparts in other provinces of Argentina, ULiCaF was severely repressed by the military dictatorship of 1976-1982 and many of its leaders and activists were killed, tortured, and imprisoned (Galafassi 2006).

The dictatorship of 1976-1982 in Argentina was not only about repressing radical movements, but also a project of elites to redefine society and destroy the economic base of popular sectors (Jozami et al 1985; Azpiazu et al 1986; Taylor 1997; Arditti 1999). Formosa also followed this pattern, especially in the rural sector. Coronel Colombo was appointed as Formosa's governor by the military and was strongly supported by the provincial Rural Society (*Sociedad Rural*), the organization of large landowners. Prominent members of the Rural Society became minister of Economy and minister of Agriculture (Rofman et al 1987: 239). During the Colombo administration of 1976-1981, several publicly-owned companies were privatized: the cotton-processing plants[49], a textile factory, and a meat processing plant (the latter was acquired by the Rural Society). In addition, the provincial Cotton Board (*Junta Provincial del Algodón*) was transformed and its regulatory functions were curtailed.[50] The consequences of these actions were that "in three years the structure of the cotton industry took a decisive turn, coming under private sector control with a total absence of the State in the regulation of market policies and prices" (Rofman et al 1987: 241). All of these policies, combined with the repression of the Peasant Leagues, translated into a further concentration of the agrarian economy and greatly reduced the power of negotiation of small cotton farmers vis-à-vis the commercializing and

[49] Public-owned cotton plants paid to farmers between 15 and 20% more for their cotton than private merchants (Rofman et al 1987: 241).

[50] Before the military government dissolved it, the function of the Board was to buy the cotton from farmers at a regulated price and provide them with credit to buy seeds and agrochemicals (Rofman et al 1987: 240).

industrializing chains of the sector. In terms of land distribution, the public organisms were transformed and fiscal land was transferred to medium to large proprietors; furthermore, a special commission was created to evict peasants occupying lands without legal titles (Rofman et al 1987: 242-3).

The military government thus destroyed the grassroots organizations of peasants and undermined the bases of their economic reproduction. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the experience of peasant organizations left a legacy: several leaders of MoCaFor were former leaders of ULiCaF. In chapter five, I describe how this "memory of struggle" still reverberates: Rafael, the main organizer of a protest in Bermellon was an activist of the ULiCaF.

Politics and Peasant Organizations during Democratization

During the democratization that began in 1983, small-farmers reorganized by creating the Agrarian Movement of Formosa, MAF (*Movimiento Agrario de Formosa*.) However, the MAF lost the confrontational character that inspired the ULiCaF and mostly resorted to negotiation with the government, eschewing mobilization and radical tactics. In the mid-1990s, MAF figures struck a pact with the province's governor Gildo Insfrán –who has held his position, uninterruptedly, since 1995 and will run again for governor (and most likely win) in 2011. Several MAF leaders negotiated with the provincial government to obtain resources, engaged in the party politics of the Peronist Party, the *Partido Justicialista* (which has governed the province from 1983 until today), and were elected as councilmen and mayors of small towns. I visited the offices of MAF and talked with the organization's leaders during my fieldwork in 2009. In the following two paragraphs, I present a narrative based on my fieldnotes to, first, provide the reader an idea of the patronage politics dominating the organizational landscape of Formosa and, second, give a glimpse of how provincial authorities and MAF (a close ally of the provincial government) see MoCaFor.

> I arrive at the office of MAF in the city of Formosa for an appointment with Miriam. Carlos Arroyo, the provincial head of MAF, is the mayor of a town in the countryside (many leaders of MAF are also mayors in small towns), so Miriam is the one that takes care of managing the organization's tasks in the capital of the province. I am welcomed by a man in this fifties, who tells me that Miriam is not

there yet and explains to me that delegates come to that office "to do paperwork or bring concerns" ("*para hacer trámites o traer inquietudes*"). While I wait for Miriam, I look at the pictures hanging on the wall. In one of them, Arroyo is smiling next to a minister of the province of Buenos Aires and Gildo Insfrán, Formosa's governor. Next to the picture, a bronze plaque reads: "From the government of the province of Formosa to the Agrarian Movement of Formosa recognizing its permanent struggle in defense of the countryside. Formosa 1993." Three other framed pictures hang next to the plaque: in one of them, Arroyo is talking into a microphone next to a table where governor Insfrán and other men in suit and tie look on attentively; the caption reads: "Don Carlos Arroyo Mayor of [town], November 2006, 6th floor of the Government Building" (that floor is where official ceremonies take place). In another picture, the governor and Arroyo are walking on a street and the caption reads: "Don Gildo Insfrán and Don Carlos Arroyo, Formosa's boardwalk, March 1997." In the last picture, Arroyo, the governor and other men smile while eating at a table under a gazebo.
I receive a message from Miriam telling me to come to the building of PAIPPA, the "Program of Integral Assistance to Small Farmers" (*Programa de Asistencia Integral al Pequeño Productor Agropecuario*), a provincial welfare program that many interviewees told me works as an extension of the patronage networks of the Peronist Party. I meet Miriam inside the building and she tells me she is "running all over the place" to obtain the subsidies the government is distributing among cotton growers. She introduces me to several people, and I notice everyone address to each other as "compañero," companion, the way people from of the Peronist Party refer to their fellow party members. We enter an office to meet Fabio Casone, the secretary of rural development, and we sit with Miriam and three other people in front of his desk (the following year, Casone became minister of production and environment). Casone gives me a long speech mentioning the governor in every other sentence, saying things like "Gildo is a man of dialogue," or "the message of Gildo is that we always have to have hope." According to Casone, the PAIPPA only covers basic needs "but we have organizations like MAF that give us a hand." He contrasts MAF with MoCaFor saying the latter "do not look for dialogue, they only confront." He mentions representatives of the Radical Party (the main party of the opposition) who are also landowners, and highlights that "we gave them credits, we supported them, we work with everybody, we don't care if they are in the opposition." We leave the building with Miriam and go back to the MAF office, where she had to take care of the paperwork for credits of two thousand pesos (five hundred dollars) from the national ministry of human development. She praises Arroyo saying that he knows how to maneuver politically ("*tiene cintura política*") and that he

> became mayor because "we realized that we lacked a political branch" ("*nos dimos cuenta que nos faltaba la pata política*"). [Field notes from June 8, 2009]

The excerpt from my field notes hint at the reasons behind the creation of MoCaFor. In the early 1990s, when MAF begin to establish strong ties with the provincial government and its leaders engaged in party politics and became mayors of rural towns, nearly a dozen leaders broke away unsatisfied with what they saw as a cooptation, a subordination of MAF to the provincial government. This group of leaders and their followers then created the Peasant Movement of Formosa, MoCaFor (*Movimiento Campesino de Formosa*), a process which developed between 1997 and 1999. An important part of this disgruntled group creating the MoCaFor was the "Team of Peasant Women" (*Equipo de Mujeres Campesinas*). One of the leading members of this group was Estela, who during the 1970s was a young activist of the Peasant Leagues. Estela met Nélida through Nélida's husband, Pedro, who was one of the leaders of MAF. Nélida was involved in community work in Monte Azul and, invited by Estela, began to participate in the Team of Peasant Women. In the ensuing years, Nélida became one of the leaders of MoCaFor.

In a series of interviews I held with Nélida at her farm in Monte Azul, she offered me insights into the reasons behind the creation of MoCaFor and the meanings she attributed to her participation in this peasant organization. In what follows, I present some excerpts of my interviews with her, since they provide a glimpse of the obstacles peasants face when aiming to voice claims –a germane factor to understanding processes of mobilization and demobilization. Nélida described in these terms the process by which MAF lost legitimacy from its involvement with the provincial government, prompting the creation of MoCaFor:

> Government people always have their brokers everywhere. So the government formed PAIPPA [a welfare program for the rural poor]. They came with a spreadsheet and the *punteros* [political brokers] began to visit all the farms and were telling people to register there to be a beneficiary of PAIPPA. But it turns out it wasn't about that. The spreadsheet was to be a member of the MAF. And they told people that lie and made them sign. (…) When they held the assembly thousands of people showed up who were supposed to be those of PAIPPA but was people… who are in the government. There were councilmen of Curuzú, from the entire province. (…) In other words, they destroyed, scattered the association of small farmers. And to this day the general secretary is a mayor. A mayor! [in an outraged tone] (…) The mayor, the councilmen, the *diputado*, got together and did all that, scattered the people of MAF.

In her narrative, Nélida constantly talked about her participation in MoCaFor as a learning process. In the following excerpt from an interview, she connected this process with knowing how to voice rights and, in turn, how this helped to "wrench" resources form the government:

> They [Team of Peasant Women] taught us not to be afraid of anyone, to bang on the doors of officials. That we demand of the government that they do what they ought to do. And…and [they taught us] to claim our rights (…) And I learned there [in MoCaFor] being a part of these things. Many things I learned. And with Proinder [a welfare program], we were already fighting in the province because we did the projects here and we didn't get any. They all went to other places. Later we went to Buenos Aires and there they told us that they could get projects for our area. And we came to fight with the government people, the people in the ministry in charge of all of this. And they didn't take us into account. I mean, all the people who are in the government don't like the organization. They don't like that people realize things, only they want to know, and the people shouldn't know anything. When they feel like it, they give you a crumb.

In the next and last excerpt, Nélida elaborates on the obstacles she had to overcome to articulate her claims. The process described by Nélida bears a close resemblance to the Rutten's (2007) analysis of the emergence of activism among Filipino plantation workers. Rutten talks about a "clientelist habitus," a complex combination of "ideology, behavior, and (expected) emotions" that "shape and legitimize relations of subordination and control" and hindered a "collective form of claim-making in face-to-face encounters with planters" (Rutten 2007: 47). In face-to-face encounters, landowners and patrons were able to shame workers and thus avoid the articulation of claims. Rutten shows how activists were able to instill in workers a sense of pride that allowed a management of emotions enabling face-to-face claims-making. This is how Nélida lived this very similar process:

> You feel yourself valued when you go to a meeting and you can argue with a minister, and show him he's lying, that what he's saying is not true. And we didn't have that *capability* to confront them, to argue with a minister, for instance, before. But not today, thanks to the organizations, thanks to a lot of women who taught us that in the conferences [women's conferences she attended to as MoCaFor representative]. Well, I learned there. Before that I didn't want to speak; in Buenos Aires when a journalist came, I used to tell them "don't interview me, I don't want to do it because I don't speak well –everything will go wrong, and the only thing that will happen is that I will be laughed at". And the

> other women from other organizations used to tell us, "It's not true that you don't know how to talk; you should talk the way you know how."

In this section, I described how during the early years of democratization small farmers re-organized after the years of brutal military repression creating the MAF. The cooptation of this organization prompted peasants to create MoCaFor which, in turn, allowed peasants to learn how to voice their claims –exemplified by the case of Nélida. This brief genealogy of peasant organizations in the province and what it means for peasants, at this point, needs to be complemented with a description of the consequences of neoliberalization processes in the 1990s in Formosa. These processes provide the background for the dynamics of mobilization and demobilization that I analyze in chapters four and five.

An Overview of Neoliberalization in Formosa

In the ensuing chapters, I detail recent changes in the communities of Monte Azul, Moreno and Bermellon due to the expansion of GM soybeans to those areas. Thus in this section I will only present an overview of other processes connected to neoliberalization in Formosa. Basic demographic information about the province in general and small farmers in particular provides a useful starting point. According to the National Census of 2001, the province had approximately 485 thousand inhabitants, 375 thousand living in urban centers and nearly 110 thousand in rural areas. In other words, nearly 20% of the Formosan population was rural, a much higher proportion than the national level of nearly 10%. In the early 2000s, 51% of the province's rural population lived with unsatisfied basic needs, i.e. was poor, a figure well over the national level of rural poverty (32%).[51] The province presents the worst level of infant mortality in Argentina: almost 29‰, much higher than the 16‰ of the country as a whole. A high proportion of people in Formosa make a living from agriculture (almost 68%) although primary activities only represent 9% of the gross provincial product, according to data for the year 2000 (PRODERNEA-FLACSO 2003).[52] In contrast, 73% of the gross provincial product is

[51] In general terms, that is, including both rural and urban areas, 28% of Formosan households had unsatisfied basic needs, double the national level of 14% (2001 Census).
[52] The gross provincial product (the equivalent concept in the U.S. is "gross domestic product by state") takes into account the value generated by units that reside in a given province, therefore, companies that have their fiscal

represented by tertiary activities (i.e. services), within which 45% is composed of public services –reflecting the weight of public employment in Formosa, intertwined with the patronage networks of the provincial government. A survey done by a national welfare program (PRODERNEA-FLACSO 2003), although without the coverage of a census, provides an overview of the small farmers of Formosa.[53] Only one fourth of the sample hired temporary workers and a very small proportion (less than 4%) had permanent workers. Reflecting the low level of capitalization among small farmers, the survey shows that 84% of this population still uses animals to work the land –instead of tractors. Regarding the channels of commercialization for its products, the survey states that almost 60% sells their vegetables in bulk to a wholesaler. These percentages are even higher when it comes to selling their cotton: 92% do so through a wholesaler. An inspection of the living conditions of small farmers casts a bleak picture. Only 38% of their houses have concrete floors; in other words, 62% of their houses are precarious constructions with dirt floors. A meager 11% have running water in their houses, and only 30% have health insurance. Finally, 95% of the people included in the survey did not finish high school.

During the mid to late 1990s, the province's economic landscape underwent profound changes, with an overall negative effect on peasants. In contrast, the economic transformations of the 1990s had quite different effects for medium and large landowners of Formosa. Many provincial landowners switched from cattle to crop production, usually renting their lands to agricultural businessmen from other provinces or creating short-term joint ventures with them. According to provincial data, the area cultivated with soybeans in Formosa grew from 250 hectares in 1999/2000 to 9,000 hectares in 2002/2003 (Sapkus 2002). Many soy producers rented medium to large properties that are surrounded by small plots owned by peasants. In that context, fumigations required for the production of soybeans drifted to those neighboring small plots where peasant families live –a scenario I detail in chapters four and five.

The policies of neoliberalization and structural adjustment of the 1990s eliminated state subsidies for cotton production, causing prices to plummet and therefore negatively affecting peasant families relying on cotton-growing as their main income source. This worsened the situation of small cotton farmers, who in the early 1980s already received a payment 20% lower

---

residence in provinces other than Formosa (for instance, most soybean growers) are not computed in the gross provincial product.

[53] The survey was a representative sample of farms of up to 100 hectares (almost 250 acres).

than the one received by medium farmers (Manzanal and Rofman 1989: 85) –a situation that reflects how small farmers lost capacity for negotiation after the military dictatorship described in the previous section. According to data from the Agricultural Censuses, in 1988 there were 58,500 hectares in Formosa planted with cotton, whereas in 2002 this area was reduced to 11,500 hectares (nearly 144,500 and 28,400 acres respectively). In spite of the low prices they receive, some peasant families continue to grow cotton; as a Formosan agronomist told me "here, for most small farmers, if you don't grow cotton, you're not a farmer." A "survival strategy" deployed by peasant families and small farmers in Formosa was to look for alternative sources of income by selling cassava, vegetables, dairy products, chickens, eggs, beans, and pig meat in local farmers' markets, adopting a practice that has proved successful in nearby provinces (Golsberg 1999; Schvorer 2003; Lapegna 2005). Yet peasants mostly see the recent decades as years of decay and tend to view the future in bleak terms, saying things like "we barely survive," "we don't have anywhere to sell our produce at a fair price," or "we the poor don't have any opportunities." Often times, peasants compare their current situation with better times lived in the past, as Eduardo (a man in his thirties and rank-and-file member of MoCaFor) expressed during a meeting:

> The State had a cotton-processing plant [*desmotadora*], now all of sudden it's private. That's what we've lost now. We don't have our own bank, just private and foreign banks, we can't access credit easily (…) And before it was easier, this has been lost.

A comment by Nélida, a local leader of MoCaFor, encapsulated the dilemmas and concerns faced by peasants: "I remember in the [19]90s, Formosa had lots of bananas, and we ate the bananas that were brought from Ecuador. And where is our government?" This last point, the reference to government's intervention, was a common trope in the discourse of peasants. The deregulation of the economy was a hard hit for small cotton growers, and they resent the government's lack of oversight in agricultural production.

To make ends meet, many a small farmer relies on welfare programs for the rural poor and unemployment subsidies provided by the provincial and the national governments. The expansion of welfare and its increasing role as means of survival nurtured the patronage networks of the provincial government, a common process taking place in Argentina as a whole (e.g. Auyero 2001). The provincial government deploys a vast array of welfare and "social

programs," including pensions and food assistance managed by the Minister of Human Development, programs for the unemployed managed by the Minister of Economy, and a much publicized program called "*Por Nuestra Gente, Todo*" ("For Our People, Everything") that receives funds from a series of ministries (Government, Human Development, Education, Production, and Public Works) (Iñigo Carrera 2008). In the main provincial newspapers, it is common to find reports of the governor delivering benefits to the population as part of this program in almost every daily edition. In 2004, Formosa also received more than 51 thousand unemployed subsidies "*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados*" that covered 18% of the Formosan population over 18 years old (Iñigo Carrera 2008: 149). Many of these subsidies were administered by the municipalities, nurturing the patronage networks of the provincial government. According to an investigation published in a national newspaper, 72.3% of the people receiving "Unemployment Plans" in Formosa were affiliated with a political party (at the national level, this proportion was 51.6%).[54]

MoCaFor received many of these unemployed subsidies, although not from the provincial government or the local municipalities, but through its connections with a national social movement, the FTV (*Federacion de Tierra y Vivienda*, Land and Households Federation). In this section I will not specify the implications that obtaining and distributing these resources have for a social movement like MoCaFor, since I take on that task on chapter six. Yet, to foreshadow: I argue that the pervasiveness of patronage politics in Formosa generates a "double pressure" for leaders of MoCaFor. On one hand, their constituents express the expectation that participation in the movement will bring them concrete benefits. On the other hand, to fulfill these expectations, leaders have the pressure of obtaining resources. As a result (as I hint at in chapter four and detail in chapter six), the alliances created with the national government poses obstacles for transgressive mobilization. During the Kirchner's administrations (2003-2011) there were also several national programs mostly distributed by the Ministry of Social Development that delivered resources in Formosa. MoCaFor receives resources from many of these programs but, again, not from the ones managed at the provincial level.[55]

[54] See "Planes sociales; más de la mitad son para afiliados a los partidos" newspaper *Clarín*, September 11, 2005.
[55] The benefits received by MoCaFor from the federal state include pensions to the elderly, the disabled, and mothers with more than seven children; and resources from a wide plan called "National Plan of Local Development and Social Economy" ("Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Local y Economía Social *Manos a la Obra*") to stimulate the creation of a variety of "social projects." MoCaFor also receives other resources from the national state in the form

The Rural Communities of Monte Azul, Bermellon, and Moreno

To close this chapter, I will present a brief overview of the common features connecting the three communities that were the scenario of the events described and analyzed in the ensuing chapters: Monte Azul, Bermellon, and Moreno. These three communities are located in the same area of the province, the Center-West region (see map "Location of three communities" in Appendix 1). The center of the province is a semi-arid plateau sharing ecological features with the center of the province of Chaco, located south of Formosa, also characterized by extensive cotton production (Girbal Blacha 2004: 185). This area was the last of the province to be "colonized," in the early twentieth century, since Formosa was initially populated in its eastern region (near the capital located on the banks of the Paraguay River) and the western region (by migrants from the bordering province of Salta) (Borrini 1991).

Monte Azul and Bermellon are in the same department (i.e. "county"), and are located 80 kilometers (50 miles) from each other, in the south of the Center-West region. The department has a population of 64 thousand, with 36.6% of its population with "unsatisfied basic needs," i.e. living in poverty.[56] The infant mortality in the department is of 23‰, slightly lower than the provincial average of 28.5‰. The main means of communication between the Monte Azul and Bermellon is a national paved road; buses travelling to the South of the country depart from Curuzú (near Monte Azul) and stop in Bermellon.

Moreno, in turn, is located in the northern part of the region, near the border with Paraguay. Although Moreno is located in the same ecological region as Monte Azul and Bermellon, it belongs to another department. The department where Moreno is located also has 64 thousand inhabitants, with 41.2% of its population experiencing "unsatisfied basic needs" and an infant mortality of 30.1‰. Moreno is roughly on the same parallels than Monte Azul and Bermellon, but there is only a dirt road running North-South which is impossible to use during most of the year. Therefore, to travel from Moreno to Curuzú, near Monte Azul, it is necessary to

---

of student scholarships (delivered by the Ministry of Education) and unemployment programs from the Ministry of Labor (a subsidy called "*Programa de Empleo Comunitario*," Program of Community Work).

[56] Demographic data in this section is based on the 2001 Census, www.indec.gov.ar and http://www.formosa.gov.ar/.The provincial data is aggregated at the department level, thus not necessarily reflecting the specific conditions in the rural communities of this study. Nonetheless, the figures provide an approximation of living conditions in those areas.

first reach Formosa. Moreno is at 270 kilometers (almost 170 miles) from the province's capital, Monte Azul at 110 (68 miles), and Bermellon at 190 kilometers (118 miles).

Figure 3. Area harvested with cotton (in hectares), province of Formosa, 1969-2009



Figure 4. Cotton Production, province of Formosa (in metric tons), 1969-2009



Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, http://www.siia.gov.ar/index.php/series-por-tema/agricultura

CHAPTER 4
CONTAMINATION AND (DE)MOBILIZATION IN MONTE AZUL

In this chapter, you will find a description and analysis of how agrochemical drift in Monte Azul (the airborne displacement of agrochemicals away from their intended target, soy plants) prompted a series of mobilizations in 2003 but did not produce the same outcome in 2009. On February 1, 2003, fumigations in soybean plots drifted into neighboring small farms, destroying peasants' crops and impairing the health of peasant families. The affected peasants organized a series of roadblocks to put a stop to the fumigations and obtain compensation for the damages. In response, authorities and provincial landowners denied the contamination. Public officials and the managers of soybean plots attempted to make a deal with some of the families affected by agrochemicals, but they could not reach an agreement. A judge ordered soy growers to cease fumigations, and soy growers left Monte Azul after harvesting soybeans (a timeline below presents key dates and events).

Exactly six years after the events of 2003, small farmers of Monte Azul experienced, yet again, skin rashes, vomiting, and respiratory problems. In addition, nearly seven hundred chickens suddenly died within just a few days. Soybean fields had been fumigated a few days earlier and, given the events of 2003, the sloppiness with which agrochemicals were used was an open secret in the community. Some of the affected peasants went to the local hospital, but they were diagnosed with scabies and told there were no experts in the province to prove that the ailments were caused by agrochemicals. Local activists distributed leaflets in a nearby town, but they could not organize a rally, let alone a road blockade.

This chapter offers a *diachronic comparison* of the reactions to an environmental onslaught, focusing on how the same community (Monte Azul) responded to it at two points in time, 2003 and 2009. Based on a close examination of the events and people's interpretations, I argue that the events of transgressive contention in 2003 are explained by the provincial authorities' denial of the contamination and the support of less influential authorities (a representative of the political opposition and the mayor of Curuzú) that prompted the roadblocks.

Conversely, the lack of protests in 2009 is explained by authorities' recognition of the environmental problem; people's assumption that transgressive actions would alienate the movement's national allies; and the evaluation that transgressive actions would not be effective. The chapter is organized as follows: first, I describe the advance of GM soybean production in the area and its consequences in terms of environmental damages and health problems created among small farmers. Second, I present a thick description of the lead-up to and events of transgressive contention of 2003, paying attention to the creation of grievances, opportunities, frames, counter-frames, and moral disputes. Third, I describe the contamination of 2009 and explain why it did not prompt any collective actions by focusing on the relationships established between MoCaFor and authorities since 2003, the reactions of authorities to the contamination of 2009, and people's evaluations of past collective actions.

GM SOY PRODUCTION IN MONTE AZUL: SOY RUSH AND SKIN RASHES

Colonia Monte Azul is a rural area located almost 70 miles from the province's capital and 14 miles from the nearest town, Curuzú (an urban center with a population of more than thirty five thousand.) Monte Azul has a population of around 150 families (approximately 800 people), mainly peasants and small-farmers. An unpaved vicinal road is the main artery within the colony, which people use to travel between farms and to attend the elementary school, the church, and a small health care center. To commute to Curuzú, they travel by a paved national road (see picture 1). Most families settled in Monte Azul during the 1930s, when a state-owned company was installed in the area to produce wood and coal. Migrants from nearby Paraguay, many of them fleeing the Paraguayan-Bolivian War of 1932-35, were hired as loggers. While working as woodcutters for companies "exporting" quebracho logs to Buenos Aires, families occupied vacant lands in the area to grow corn and cassava and maintained small farms to feed their families. The town of Curuzú was founded around the same time, evidenced by the creation of a neighbors' commission in 1936, the antecedent of the municipal government (Lugo n/d: 15).

From the 1950s on, cotton production became the main source of income for small-farmers. The economic reforms of the 1990s, however, transformed this scenario: many a local small-farmer abandoned cotton-growing since the money they earned for it barely covered the cost of seeds, agrochemicals, and harvesters' wages. In the early 2000s, MoCaFor leaders

organized peasants searching for an alternative source of income and created a weekly farmer's market in the nearby town of Curuzú. The organization also obtained unemployment subsidies helping families to make ends meet through its connections to a national social movement organization, the FTV (*Federacion de Tierra y Vivienda*, Land and Households Federation).

By 2002 peasants found themselves increasingly surrounded by plots of genetically modified (GM) soybeans, grown next to their farms and the local elementary school (see pictures 2 to 5). Soybeans were produced by well-to-do farmers from the province of Santa Fe and by agribusiness' entrepreneurs from the province of Salta. Although both were producing GM soybeans, locals speak very differently about them. They refer to *santafecinos* (farmers from Santa Fe) with the utmost respect, describing how they lend machinery, give rides to Curuzú, pull over when crossing paths with locals riding their horses, and generally behave as good neighbors. In contrast, peasants repeatedly remark how *salteños* (agro-businessmen from Salta) drive SUVs at high speed on local roads, sometimes running over their chickens, and show little interest in interacting with locals. I pinpoint the differentiation between the two, because (as you will see below) a feeling of disrespect plays an important role in prompting the peasants' protests.

Salteños arrived in Formosa after creating a joint venture company in April 2002 (which I will call CEFA) with the aim of growing soybeans. Joint venture companies to produce soybeans have become a common practice in contemporary agricultural Argentina: entrepreneurs obtain capital; rent land for two or three years; hire machinery and agrarian engineers to take care of the production; and redistribute the profits among investors (themselves included) after the harvest is sold. CEFA rented almost 6 thousand hectares in Formosa (more than 14800 acres) divided in several plots –the largest plot had an area of 700 hectares (almost 1730 acres.) They were attracted by the low prices of land in the province and the chance to produce soybeans during winter-spring, due to the sub-tropical weather (thus increasing the yearly profits of their agricultural business.) In Monte Azul CEFA rented around 350 hectares (more than 860 acres), divided in several plots ranging from 11 to 90 hectares (27-222 acres), all of them located close to farms of peasant families. CEFA paid, in advance, 10 pesos/hectare (around 3 dollars/2.5 acres) offering a deal locals found hard to refuse: local landowners would be paid less money than they could get from a hectare of cotton, yet without having to farm the land by themselves.

Ironically, some of the families renting their plots to soy growers were later on affected by agrochemicals.

CEFA arrived in Monte Azul and hired an agrarian engineer, Julio Cortello, to provide on-the-ground information about the best plots to rent and to take care of striking deals with locals. Cortello had a good knowledge of Monte Azul and its farmers, since he worked for the provincial Ministry of Production administering programs targeted to small-farmers. The company employed local youngsters for the preparation and fumigation of agrochemicals, under the directions of Cortello. These employees worked between ten and eighteen hours a day, and although they were paid not much more than the legal minimum wage, they say they received "good money" (*nos pagaban buena plata!*). Interviewed years later, they say glyphosate (the herbicide GM soybeans endure) was frequently mixed with 2,4D –a more toxic agrochemical.[57] CEFA employees, following Cortello's orders, cleaned the tanks used for fumigations in water reservoirs of the area, where they also poured remaining agrochemicals. One of the local youngsters working for CEFA told me that

> Sometimes there were left over bags of Round Up [commercial name of the herbicide glyphosate] and even one day… there was a lot of left over poison; a thousand liters. So we went, we had to spill it over, and we spilled it over there in the corner, in the entrance where the school is, and we spilled everything over there, the thousand liters. (…) And it may have done something… I don't know what it may have done, but the water was contaminated, for sure. We spilled more than a thousand liters. It was an order of Cortello: [he told us] "go there, and spill it".

The workers' main tasks were to "prepare" the seeds with fungicides; mix concentrated agrochemicals with water; and to stand on the borders of plots waving flags, guiding the tractor driver making fumigations. On one occasion, the tractor driver and one of the workers waving a flag fell sleep, exhausted by overwork. The "flagger" almost got run over by the tractor and received a shower of agrochemicals.

[57] According to the World Health Organization (WHO) glyphosate is considered "Unlikely to be Hazardous." It is listed as "Unlikely" in the U.S. EPA Carcinogens list; and as "Not Acutely Toxic to Slightly Toxic" for the U.S. NTP Acute Toxicity Studies. The 2,4D in turn, is evaluated as "Moderately Hazardous" by the WHO, presents "Unclassifiable, ambiguous data" in the U.S. EPA Carcinogens list; and it is considered "Slightly to Moderately Toxic" in U.S. NTP Acute Toxicity Studies. (Source: PAN Pesticide Database at http://www.pesticideinfo.org/)

The sloppiness with which agrochemicals were managed soon brought negative consequences for small-farmers' farms. Peasants claim that after soybean production started, they noticed their tomatoes and lettuces begin to wither, their cassava grew smaller roots, and the fruit trees did not flourish as they used to do. At the time, they were unsure how to explain these unusual effects and leaned towards weather as an explanation. Retrospectively, they attribute those problems to agrochemicals. Fumigations were making them uneasy, since they were conducted during lunch hours, forcing them to seclude themselves within their houses –in a province where temperatures easily reach 100 Fº during summertime. Some, like Augusto, were nonetheless certain about what caused his corn, pumpkin, and bean plants to wither, since he was one of the workers to CEFA. He asked the company to provide him with new seeds, but his request was denied. Similarly, a small-farmer (whose farm is located next to a soybean plot) went to the local police station on November 2nd, 2002, to denounce the destruction of his fruit trees, and the death of several chickens.

Emilia also tackled the situation individually. At the time, one of her sons was suffering from respiratory problems. During one of the fumigations on the soy field next to her house/farm she went to the field and screamed at the tractor driver, demanding that he stop the fumigation. When she got back home, her daughter was in shock: "Mom! How did you do that?! Don't you see he's just working?" When I interviewed her years later, she stills sounds apologetic: "I looked like a crazy person, but I didn't know what else to do, I was seeing my son who couldn't breathe and I just did it, without thinking about it." It was not until a small scale disaster simultaneously affected several farms that individual complaints were transformed into collective claim-making.

CONTAMINATION AND MOBILIZATION

On February 2003, agrarian engineers working for CEFA needed to prepare the soil and plant new soybean seeds as soon as possible if they wanted to achieve three harvests –instead of two- during the 2002/2003 agricultural campaign. On Saturday, February 1, employees received orders to mix herbicides and fumigate the plots with it, to get rid of unwanted weeds.[58]

[58] The conventional process of producing a crop goes as follows: first, the soil must be tilled; that is, cleared of weeds by raking it with a tractor fitted with an implement that cuts the roots of unwanted weeds. Only then are the

Fumigations were done using a “mosquito,” an agricultural machine similar to a tractor with faucets on the sides to spread agrochemicals (see picture 6). Workers were fumigating from early evening until nightfall. In virtually every recollection of this evening, people mention the intensely hot weather and the strong winds. In short, the high temperatures made the powerful agrochemicals vaporize quickly and the wind caused it to drift towards the neighboring plots. This produced what peasants experienced as a sort of “environmental onslaught” on their small farms. When locals woke up the next day, they found all their cotton and staples (cassava, beans, pumpkins, lettuce, tomato, etc.) totally withered (see pictures 7 to 13). Instead of the gradual withering seen on previous occasions, herbicides had a powerful negative effect overnight. As Emilia, one of the affected peasants, told me: “Because they went too far… maybe otherwise we wouldn’t have noticed. Maybe we hadn’t seen it yet [other effects of agrochemicals]. But that day was such a disaster…” Locals say plants looked “as if someone had put a flame next to them” or “as if someone had doused them with chlorine” (see pictures 8to 10). The cotton “bolls” they were expecting to harvest a month later, and from which they receive their main income, had fallen to the soil; the staples they rely on a daily basis to feed their families and to sell in the farmer’s market were destroyed, their leaves completely withered.

By affecting a group on neighboring farms at the same time, the situation clustered the contamination spatially and temporally, thus creating “suddenly imposed grievances” (Walsh 1981:18.) This destruction affected the food they use for both daily personal consumption and as produce to sell at the weekly farmers’ market. A sense of infringement also grew from the havoc caused by agrochemical exposure in their farms/houses, done by entrepreneurs who neither belong to Monte Azul nor to the province.

---

crop’s seeds sowed. Genetically modified soybeans are grown differently, using a method called “no tillage.” GM seeds are planted directly, because weeds are eliminated with an herbicide (glyphosate) which GM soybeans are designed to resist. However, farmers sowing soybeans after a previous harvest of soybeans often face a problem: soy plants can grow from the beans of the previous harvest, and they cannot be eliminated with glyphosate because soy plants endure it. Thus, they usually employ other (more toxic) herbicides to eliminate those plants. In this case, they used 2,4D. In conversations I had with agrarian engineers of Formosa, they told me that in some areas of the province another agrochemical used is the acutely toxic endosulfan, an agrochemical banned in 63 countries.

TIMELINE

February 1, 2003

Soybean growers fumigate their plots and agrochemicals drift to peasants' farms

February 2, 2003

Peasants file a police report in Curuzú

February 6, 2003

An agrarian engineer visits Monte Azul to assess the damages in peasants' crops

Mid-February

Women blockade the entrance of a soybean land plot

March 2-4, 2003

Road blockade in Monte Azul

Mid-March, 2003

Public officials from the Ministry of Human Development visit Monte Azul

March 18, 2003

Summit in the Government House to discuss the use of agrochemicals in the province

March 26, 2003

Road blockade in Monte Azul

Judge orders the cessation of fumigations

End of March – early April, 2003

Public officials attempt to make a deal with peasants

Early August, 2003

Soybean growers fumigate in spite of the judge's order

August 12, 2003

The judge extends the order prohibiting fumigations

November 11, 2003

Audience in the Court of Appeals between peasants and the lawyer of soybean growers

Nélida's farm is located between Horacio's and Luisa's, two of her siblings, and she and Horacio represent MoCaFor in the area. As soon as Nélida saw the destruction of her plants, she went to Horacio's farm where she encountered a similar situation. They decided to see if other farms were also affected and went to their sister's farm, finding a similarly poignant landscape. Joined by Luisa's husband, Facundo, Nélida and Horacio went to Monte Azul's police station to file a report. The policemen, however, refused to file the report or to go to their farms and see the damage. Peasants were told they should file a report at the police station in Curuzú. In Curuzú, the Partido Justicialista (the seemingly permanent governing party in Formosa) was divided in two main factions: one supporting Mayor Pimentel and the other led by Valencia, a powerful political broker in the province. MoCaFor had a longstanding confrontation with Valencia, because this peasants' organization had represented, since mid 1990s, one of the main oppositional forces against the provincial government, which Valencia supports. Under the logic of "the enemies of my enemies are my friends," Pimentel thus became an ally to the movement.

When Nélida and Horacio arrived in Curuzú, they decided to pay a visit to the mayor, seeking support for their pleas. Pimentel told them to file a police report and that he somehow would back them up. At Curuzú's police station, Horacio –speaking on behalf of Nélida and Facundo- filed a formal statement declaring that their plants of cotton, cassava, corn, beans, melon, and yam "have been affected by the poison spread by the manager of the soy field (…) recording that the poison is used to eliminate useless grass" (as it was machine-typed in the police report). The policeman writing the report told them "you won't get anywhere; there have been many reports but nothing has ever come of them." "You take our report and we'll see how far we can go" replied Nélida, undeterred. The next day, she received a visit from a policeman on her farm, asking her to sign a paper. Nélida replied to the policeman that she would not sign anything without consulting her lawyer (while in Curuzú, she got in touch with an attorney). The policeman insisted, but she still refused to sign. Years later she told me she was convinced the policeman wanted to play a trick on her, obtaining her signature on some sort of statement that could be used against her in court.

Nélida and Horacio then visited the farms of the neighbors affected by the agrochemicals calling a meeting to discuss what they should do to tackle the situation. The next day, more than two dozen peasants affected by the agrochemical drift met at Nélida's farm, and agreed to hire a notary and bring an agrarian engineer to document the damages to their crops. After their first

attempt, they realized it was not going to be so easy to get an agrarian engineer to visit Monte Azul and write a technical report. Nélida and Horacio's first choice was an agrarian engineer from La Corona, a town in southern Formosa. At the time, he had been in touch with them as an employee of a state program assisting small-farmers. The agrarian engineer confirmed that the plants appeared to be affected by the herbicides used in soy production, but he refused to write – let alone sign- a report making such a statement, fearful of losing his job. Then Nélida and Horacio got in touch with Mario Hispano, an agrarian engineer working for the Social Agricultural Program, PSA (*Programa Social Agropecuario*), a federal assistance program for poor rural families. Hispano agreed to collaborate with the peasant families but only as a private consultant, wary about the provincial minister talking with the federal secretary of agriculture (which administers the PSA), and thus being fired –as a matter of fact, later on he learned that the minister had complained to the national coordinator of PSA about his report.

Hispano and a notary visited Monte Azul on February 6, and his observations confirmed the peasants' suspicions. Hispano assured them that the deformed leaves showed the typical effects of 2,4D: curled and withered leaves, and unusual growth in some plants caused by hormonal changes. Days later Hispano had a conversation with Cortello, the agrarian engineer working for soybean growers, who confirmed that they had been using a combination of glyphosate and 2,4D. During the meeting with peasant families Hispano recommended that they cease consumption of the crops affected, stop selling them in the farmer's market, and destroy all the plants. He also conducted an evaluation of the quantities of crops affected and their commercial value. Questioned by the peasants about the unusual and simultaneous ailments they were experiencing (vomiting, permanent headaches, soreness in throat and face, and skin rashes), he answered he could not say conclusively if the ailments were caused by agrochemicals, and claimed that such a diagnosis was beyond his capabilites. However, he clearly stated that those symptoms are typical of people affected by herbicides. Hispano also told them that the rain probably transported remnants of pesticides to the reservoirs where they obtained water on a daily basis. A professor of ecology from the University of Formosa also visited Monte Azul during those days and elaborated a report confirming the environmental wreckage caused by agrochemicals and the conclusions advanced by Hispano (see picture 14 showing the meeting between Hispano and peasant families.)

Peasant leaders, bolstered by the two reports confirming the effect of herbicides on their plots, wrote a petition to the Municipal Council of Curuzú requesting its intervention in the case, arguing that "the State has to assume its responsibilities to the affected people in order to have access to the rights recognized in juridical norms." Peasants demanded the councilmen's intervention to stop fumigations, and also a report on the environmental and health damage. The request included demands for health attention, the provision of seeds for the following agricultural campaign, subsidies, and food for the affected families. The note, in short, framed the demands as rights to be guaranteed by the state but also deployed terms frequently used in patronage politics: "It is requested… help with merchandise" ("*Se solicita… ayuda con mercaderias*"). Noteworthy here is the contrast between the language of this note –written as a request for support- and that which is contained in the certified letter that Horacio (on behalf of the farmer's market association) sent to the provincial ministry of production. Horacio demanded "to stop fumigations immediately and a study of environmental impact" and, using far more contentious terms than the note to the municipal council, addressed the minister saying "I DEMAND [original capital letters] that [they] be held responsible for the damages, without foregoing penal responsibilities that may correspond" ("*INTIMO se haga responsable de los daños ocasionados, sin perjuicio de las responsabilidades penales que les correspondiesen*.") I take notice of the language used when addressing local and provincial authorities because, as I argue, the relationships between different authorities explain the pace of contention.

The meetings among affected families and the studies of environmental impact brought the incident under a new light. First, peasants confirmed that the damages to their crops were a result of agrochemicals used in soybean fields and therefore it was attributable to concrete actors, soybean growers. Second, Hispano's recommendation to destroy the crops exposed the impingement upon their economic reproduction, since they could not eat their produce or sell it in the farmers' market. Similarly to the peasants studied by James Scott, who questioned economic exploitation only when it affected resources needed for subsistence (Scott 1976), Formosan small-farmers were not troubled by GM crop production until it threatened their daily survival. Neither deprivation nor environmental damage per se will automatically generate collective action; relational work is necessary to transform an "objective" situation into a collective problem, and a framing of the situation is necessary to show *how* that collective

problem might be tackled.[59] Attention to the connections between social movements and other political actors facilitate understanding of how a prognosis/diagnosis was transformed into disruptive collective action. Specifically, the support of local authorities and political actors, paired with a sense of disrespect and a lack of recognition (of both the environmental problem and peasants) by provincial authorities explain the shift from discontent to transgressive contention.

Contamination and Transgressive Collective Action

A few days after the massive contamination of February 1st, a group of women of Monte Azul met in the local school. They came together to complete paperwork for a welfare program provided by the federal state and brokered by local MoCaFor leaders, but they could not avoid talking about the damages to their farms. Nélida –whose son was working for CEFA- provides a glimpse of how people, especially women, felt about what was going on:

> I got very enraged when we learned that [agrochemicals] were very poisonous, very dangerous, and these people [the managers] didn't even tell the kids "use gloves and be careful." Only after everything happened, when the animals and plants had died and the kids got sick, did we talk to other people who told us [agrochemicals] were very poisonous (…) They had not even told the kids "wash your hands" [after working]. And they drank water from the same place where they cleaned the tanks. The kids didn't know about the danger either. And all that got me so enraged, when people told me that you may not notice it now but in the long term… that they may not be able to have kids, or their sons could be deformed… I learn that afterwards, and I was so pissed off… I couldn't talk to anybody, let alone them [the managers]. Because the plants and the soil may get sick and you can recover from that, but recover a son… you don't know. If I had known, I would never have let my son do that for miserable ten pesos [for a day of work]. But I used to teach him to work, no matter for how much; ten, five pesos. Anything but stealing or getting into drugs. I always used to teach that to my son, work and not to steal even a chicken; and for those ten pesos he might be sick for all of his life.

[59] On framing, see Snow et al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow 2004; and Johnston and Noakes 2005. On framing and political opportunity see Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996; Suh 2001. On framing and outcomes see Cress and Snow 2000. For insightful critiques, see Benford 1997 and Steinberg 1998. For a review of the wide literature on this perspective, see Benford and Snow 2000.

While in the meeting, the women got word that the "mosquito" (the machine to fumigate) was working in one of the soybean plots (After soy plants begin to grow, a second application of herbicides is required). The group of women went to the entrance of the soy plot to be fumigated next, determined to not allow the mosquito to get in. "Armed" with rolling pins and pieces of wood, more than a dozen women attending the meeting gathered at the entrance to a soybean plot, and waited for the "mosquito" to come. Juana (one of Nélida's sisters) says in the meeting they thought

> We had to do something. Because if [one round of herbicides] once killed everything around, what do we have to wait for next? To be killed ourselves? (…) So, little by little, we gathered courage, and we did something to defend what is ours. And then, the decision [to block the entrance of the soy plot] was made by us, the mothers. Several of us; Nélida and other *compañeras* (…) So we, the women –because we were mainly women there [at the entrance of the soy plot]-, we said "send word to the husbands, the kids, the neighbors, tell them to come."

The entrepreneurs, after fumigating with the "mosquito" one of their fields, arrived with the machine to continue the fumigations in another of the soybean plots, but they found the group of women obstructing the entrance to the plot (see picture 15). In a menacing tone, the *empresarios* told the women they should let them in, or else face the consequences of criminal charges. The women, however, were undeterred and replied that they would not move. With the argument escalating, entrepreneurs said they would run into them with the tractor, to which Nélida replied they would rather die there and now than being killed little by little. Juana recalls that they "didn't run into her, which gave us courage." The *empresarios* left the field and went to Monte Azul's police station. In less than half an hour, they arrived at another of their soybean plots, accompanied by two police officers. Once there, they found an even larger group obstructing this entrance (men from the colony joined the women); the peasants were adamant in their resolve to not let in the mosquito. Outnumbered by the peasants, the entrepreneurs asked if they could take the mosquito with them and leave the area, to which the peasants agreed.

Peasants, determined to put a definitive stop to agrochemical exposure and obtain legal protections, requested that their lawyer file an injunction in court, based on two provincial laws

protecting environmental rights.[60] By then, the MoCaFor had brought publicity to the incident by issuing a press release "informing the public opinion" (through newspapers) in which they declared themselves to be in a state of "alert and mobilization." News of the conflict reached radios and local TV networks, granting the issue of fumigations high public visibility, partially aided by the political context at the time.

The February contamination occurred in the midst of a campaigning year, with two important events scheduled for the ensuing months. The provincial Constitution was being reformed in April and constituents were to be elected; and general elections for governor, legislators, mayors, and municipal councils were scheduled for October. This context can be seen as opening a window of political opportunity (McAdam 1996[61]) created by *both* Monte Azul peasants and provincial politicians: the former demanded support for their pleas and the latter needed to promote their candidates. Here we see a relational aspect of political opportunities: how they are "used" not only by social movement organization, *but also* by elites searching for legitimacy and/or followers. Marcelino Trillo (a legislator and leader of the main party of the political opposition, the UCR), paid a visit to Monte Azul accompanied by councilmen of Curuzú and other members of his party. The politicos walked through the affected farms, and afterwards Trillo made public statements supporting the pleas of peasant families. Soon after, he presented a bill to further enforce provincial environmental laws. All these actions drew media attention to both the contamination *and* to UCR's candidates.

Following the political and media attention, peasants held meetings in the colony and decided to block the paved road at the entrance of Monte Azul. In Juana's words,

> Some people, I think lawyers, came and when we blockaded the paved road, they were coming to tell us 'don't let them do that to you' [referring to the fumigations]. They gave us some advice, but without taking the initiative… like saying: do what you can do and defend yourselves that way. At least, they told us 'Do that'; it was better than nothing.

---

[60] The "injunction" was a measure of protection against an action which is effective immediately. The Spanish term, *recurso de amparo*, has no exact translation into English

[61] For a conceptualization of political opportunities, see McAdam et al 1996; for the relationship between political opportunities and frames, see Diani 1996; Suh 2001; Stanbridge 2002; and McCammon et al 2007; for applications to specific cases see, among other work, Kitschelt 1986; Brockett 1991; Almeida and Stearns 1998. A review of this wide literature can be consulted in Meyer 2004.

This certification of authorities (a process of "validation of actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities" [McAdam et al 2001: 121]) proved to be an important factor bolstering transgressive collective action. Peasants obtained the support of a provincial representative but also (as I detail below) of Curuzú's mayor –the certification of elite allies, ironically, turned out to be a mixed blessing later, when the presence of figures from the political opposition was used by opponents of the protest to vilify it. Besides the alliance with authorities, the other factor prompting transgressive contention was the backing of activists of MoCaFor. I highlight this support because it shows the importance of organizational strength to bring about an event of transgressive contention –contrasting with the creation of a contained protest, as I show in the next chapter for the case of Bermellon.[62]

The presence of a group of MoCaFor leaders and activists, who traveled from the nearby town of Moreno to support their counterparts in Monte Azul at that crucial moment, also encouraged the staging of the road blockade. The MoCaFor group from Moreno, with previous experience in roadblocks, provided critical "know-how" for organizing and maintaining the protest once locals decided to engage in disruptive action. MoCaFor members of Moreno showed Monte Azul peasants how to effectively obstruct the road and prevent vehicles from "breaking it," designated a person to handle media relations, and, importantly, gave Monte Azul residents a sense that the problem was reaching the provincial scale, moving beyond the local arena. For locals, the external support was crucial since it was the first time they were taking part in a roadblock in their area.

Besides the support from UCR's politicos and activists, peasant families also received resources from the mayor of Curuzú. Demonstrators partially relied on food donated by Pimentel to sustain the people camped out on the road for three days and nights. Although the donations were done almost secretly, this fact shows an often overlooked dimension in the study of social movements: how political factionalism may lay at the root of collective action (Auyero et al 2009), and the "fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics" (Goldstone 2003: 2.) The blockade obstructed the communication between Curuzú and the rest of the province, greatly upsetting Valencia, the most important political broker of Curuzú. He lost both face in the eyes of the governor, and money because his businesses were economically damaged. While manning the road blockade, peasants showed passersby the

[62] On social movement and organizations see Davis et al 2005; Zald 1992; and McCarthy and Zald 1987.

cassavas and sweet potatoes visibly affected by agrochemicals. Peasants reported that people from other provinces showed support, telling them what they were doing was right; yet Formosans drivers mostly reacted with disdain, shouting insults and saying they were lazy people who did not want to work. The protest brought the agrochemical drift under public scrutiny; nonetheless, it also set the stage for the emergence of counter-definitions among powerful actors.[63]

Health Problems and Misrecognition

Some days after this direct action took place, it seemed to produce concrete results when the provincial government agreed to peasants' demands for health attention and an assessment of the environmental problems in Monte Azul. A "whole army" ("*un ejército*") of public officials and medical doctors arrived at the colony, unexpectedly. They settled into the health care center and summoned locals, from whom they obtained blood samples to be tested for the presence of agrochemicals. Likewise, they took water samples from reservoirs and obtained cassavas, sweet potatoes, and grapefruit to be tested as well. Some days later, public officials released the results: there was no presence of organochloride or organophosphate agrochemicals, neither in the blood samples nor in the water. The studies revealed, however, that the water was contaminated with pernicious bacteria, and was thus not potable, but officials gave no indication of whether they were going to take action to address this sanitary problem. The results raised skepticism among locals, for a series of reasons. First, the samples were tested for agrochemicals *different* from the ones Hispano's report identified as responsible for the environmental damage. Second (as Hispano explained to peasants in a follow-up meeting), several agrochemicals are rarely detected when analyses are performed more than fifteen days after the exposure. And third, right after the initial contamination there was intense precipitation, which could have washed away the presence of herbicides in the plants.

These subtleties of chemical analysis were noticeable to the experts involved and recognized by more knowledgeable peasant leaders. However, what unmistakably clung to everybody's memory were the diagnosis and proposed cure offered by the public officials from

[63] On disputes *within* movements about the definition of frames, see Benford 1993. On the dynamics of movements and countermovements, see Andrews 2002; see Meyer and Staggenborg 1996 for its relation to political opportunities; and see Heaney and Rojas 2006 for its relation to the politics of place.

the Ministry of Human Development, publicized on provincial radio. Officials claimed that skin rashes and soreness in eyes and throat should be cured by washing themselves with water and lye soap, arguing that these symptoms were due to contact with dirt and the use of winter clothes during summertime. They also distributed antiparasitic drugs to everybody in the health care center, saying the pills would solve their problems of diarrhea and other ailments. In each and every interview I conducted with small-farmers, the answer given to locals about their health problems was brought to the surface –often times spontaneously. "Our skin problems were a matter of lack of hygiene," they all said in an ironic tone; or "officials said it was the dirt and the clothes we used; as if we wouldn't have been born and raised here and in permanent contact with dirt, or as if we didn't know how to dress ourselves." These were the most common reactions I heard among peasants. An interview I conducted with Juana and her husband on their farm nicely captures people's feelings about the incident:

> Don Cura: And those people from the Ministry of Human Development… they called us dirty.
>
> Juana: Ah, that too, those from Human Development who should have come to see what was really going on with the people, they called us dirty. (…) I remember we started itching, we had pimples, and they say it was because of dirtiness. They say it's because we didn't know how to dress; that we used winter clothes during summer and summer clothes in winter… They treated us badly. And that puts you down –besides all the loss, that someone is telling you that you don't know how to dress yourself, that you don't know how to take a bath, that you don't know how to be tidy… It's like they were crushing us, worse than we had been before.
>
> Pablo: And what did you feel when you were told that–
>
> Juana: [cutting me short, angry] To me, I wanted to hit them in the mouth. Because I think that an educated person, supposedly more intelligent than us, should learn how to respect people, no matter how dirty we may be. But they treated us like we were dirty… They said the kids had pimples because they didn't wash with soap, that they had to use soap… And they thought "We'll tell them anything, so they just go away." That was the feeling I had. That they were telling us "Go away, stay at home and if you have to die, die." That's mistreatment, according to me. And there are things… things that made us feel worse than we were. We were feeling bad, but they made us feel worse, instead of making us feel better.

Emilia expressed similar thoughts, but focuses on the distribution of medicine:

> We were in a meeting and we asked each other: "what did they give to you?" And then we realized that everyone had the same pills. And Horacio took a look at them –since he had been to school, he studied medicine- and he read it and told us all the pills are anti-parasitic medicines… And one was there for a diarrhea, another one for headaches, another for nose bleeding… And we got all the same thing! Some symptoms were repeated, but how is it possible that all received the same pills? (…) They were making fun of us… We all took the anti-parasitic pills, for everything… for vomits, for hemorrhaging… [Long pause, she remains pensive] And I think that people were making fun of us; they treated us as if we didn't have any culture, since we're peasants, and most of us are illiterate…

When rumors about a new visit from the Ministry of Human Development reached Monte Azul, Horacio prepared a basin with water and lye soap with the idea of asking public officials to show them how to take a proper bath. However, the officials did not show up again and peasants could not enact their sarcastic performance. The incident with the Ministry of Human Development was an instance of what I see as a process of decertification, that is, authorities denying actors the right to organize, act, and make claims (McAdam et al 2001). Moreover, the events pitting peasants and authorities against each other constitute a conflict of recognition and misrecognition. Nancy Fraser defines misrecognition and status subordination as those situations where "institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actor as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction" (2003 :27). Claims for recognition are "aimed not at valorizing group identity, but rather at overcoming subordination" and "seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact with others as peer" (Fraser 2003: 28). Considering Fraser's rather abstract treatment of (mis)recognition processes, I believe that observing those processes in concrete situations can shed light on how "institutionalized patterns of cultural value" tangibly operate in social life. Claims for recognition rarely emerge spontaneously: by definition, a subordinate group encounters obstacles in its attempts to articulate its demands and in its quest for recognition. Open conflicts –for instance, a case of agrochemical exposure- thus offer an opportunity to observe concrete processes of (mis)recognition. Furthermore, a conflict between peasants, authorities, and agri-businessmen also offer a "strategic research site" to connect

demands for recognition with struggles for redistribution.[64] The public controversies raised by the peasants' roadblock further illustrate these points.

Controversy, Reason-Giving, and Counter-Framings

The escalation of conflict brought on by the road blockade also prompted counterframing efforts and a firmer resistance to peasants' claims –a common situation when social movements become a threat to targets and begin to achieve some of their goals (Jasper and Poulsen 1993). The denial of the contamination by the Ministry of Human Development was thus taken a step further by important provincial figures through the publication of a series of statements in newspapers of wide circulation. On March 1st, a month after the fumigation, a press conference was convened by the Minister of Production along with other members of his staff and the president of the provincial association of agrarian engineers. The main province's newspaper quoted the minister in its headlines, asserting there were "interests beyond agricultural production" in the events of Monte Azul. The minister, quoted at length in the article, reported that

> The accident [he refers to the agrochemical drift] with the treatment of products in a specific crop (…) was used to misinform and create concern in the community, since [the agrochemicals] are products that passed strict controls and do not affect human health, neither animals nor the soil, as some want us to believe (…) That is not truth, given the innocuity of the products (…) There are people interested in creating discord and a confrontation that does not benefit society nor the agrarian sector, but instead terribly damages the province's image[65].

Similarly, CEFA issued a public statement shortly after (published in the main province's newspaper) which accused "unscrupulous politicos" for the "alleged effects on human health, animals or soil deterioration" and admonished those making such evaluations:

---

[64] In the "status model" proposed by Fraser "The distributive dimension concerns the allocation by economy systems of disposable resources to social actors (…) [and] corresponds to the *economic structure* of society. (…) The recognition dimension corresponds, as we saw, to *status subordination* rooted in institutionalized patterns of cultural value. The distribute dimension, in contrast, corresponds to *economic subordination* rooted in structural features of the economic system (…) the two dimensions are imbricated and interact causally with each other." (Fraser 2003: 30-31, original emphasis). The cases presented in this dissertation offer, I believe, an opportunity to probe Fraser's ideas in concrete situations.

[65] Newspaper *La Mañana*, March 2 2003, p. 27. A source mentioned the minister was getting daily calls from the entrepreneurs pushing him to "do something" about the allegations of contamination.

> [They should] refuse to make such accusations, because we retain the right to sue for the felony of libel and slander and for civil damages caused[66].

Reinforcing these points of view, the representative of one of the landowner's associations qualified the actions of peasants as "dangerous," stating that "as lay citizens we cannot act outside the law, as if trying to take justice into our own hands"[67] because the protests "put us in a very hard situation, as producers and as a province."[68] Along similar lines, the president of the Rural Society of Formosa (a powerful and traditional organization of landowners) declared that "some people, journalists, and even a legislator" were "adding an element of disintegration," stating that

> to see this accident as a conflict between small-farmers and landowners; to make imputations as to growers being contaminating, without any proof and showing the utmost ignorance on the matter, are distortions of the facts, that do not seek to solve any problem but rather to bring chaos and confusion.[69]

Taken together, these statements show the reverse of the validation obtained with the support of elite allies, i.e. a process of decertification through which authorities deny actors the right to organize, act, and make claims (McAdam et al 2001). The content of the decertification here was done by vilification, "a rhetorical strategy that discredits adversaries by characterizing them as ungenuine and malevolent advocates" (Vanderford, 1989: 166[70]). By connecting protests with "dangerous attitudes creating discord and confrontation" seeking to "damage the province," and pointing to demonstrations as contributors to "disintegration" and "chaos," these discourses perform two of the functions that define vilification: to cast opponents under an exclusively negative light and to magnify an opponent's power (Vanderford, 1989: 167). In doing so, landowners and political figures were not creating a completely new depiction: the equation "dissent = social disintegration" was a common trope in the discourse of Argentina's military dictatorship of 1976-1982. Unsurprisingly, provincial elites were among the stronger supporters of military rule in Formosa.

---

[66] Newspaper *La Mañana*, March 6 2003, p. 20.
[67] Newspaper *La Mañana*, March 4 2003, p. 19.
[68] Newspaper *Opinion Ciudadana*, March 6 2003, p. 11. His statements were published in two of the main provincial newspapers.
[69] Newspaper *Opinion Ciudadana*, March 7 2003, p. 8.
[70] See also McCaffrey and Keys 2000 for an elaboration on vilification in processes of framing.

The denial of the contamination by elites did not pass unnoticed by peasants, who disputed this vilifying frame, although without the publicity achieved by elite members. Emilia interpreted the situation in very different terms and, in an interview conducted on her farm, concisely expressed the combination of disrespect, disparage, and dismissal peasants felt during the controversy:

> They say we were being treated [medically] by them, that we were *well* treated by them, that we received medicines, that we got all we needed… They said that in the media, and they said that we were… against the government, that that was the reason why were complaining… And I really don't know, Pablo, if that… A movement, an organization, always makes its claims about rights to the government, isn't that so? That's why we get organized. Well, then they see us as belonging to the opposition. And it's not true! So I say that… maybe they said we were demanding ridiculous things; that we were just making things up. Maybe they took it that way. Because… it wasn't like that. It was the moment to make claims through the movement, through the organization… But they surely treated us like that, as dirty, as scum, anything.

What this dispute shows is that a definition of a given situation goes well beyond a simple depiction; by understanding the same events in different ways and disputing its meanings actors do relational work. In a constructive critique of framing theory, Mark Steinberg rightly observes that "discourse never neutrally conveys meanings (…) as an ideological process, discourse therefore is a terrain of conflict, and not simply the medium or messenger" (1998: 853). Drawing on Bakhtinian theories of discourse, he argues that hegemony is achieved when monologic discourse becomes authoritative, i.e. when "its meanings become enforced convention while simultaneously suppressing alternatives" (Steinberg 1998: 855).[71]

In a short but compelling book, Charles Tilly (2006) scrutinized the social processes involved in reason-giving and the power of conventions. When people provide organized answers to the question "Why did X do Y?" they give rationales for behavior, all the while offering statements about the social relationships at stake. Two of the categories of reason-giving analyzed by Tilly clarify the relational work involved in this "battle of words": conventions and technical accounts. Conventions are formulas, accepted reasons for dereliction and deviation that

[71] See Gillan 2008 for a recent work paying attention to the relation between frames and ideologies from a hermeneutic point of view. See also Ellingson 1995 for the dynamics of collective action and discursive frames; and Steinberg 1999a and 1999b for an extension and application of the points mentioned here.

can be recognized "by their stylized simplicity, and by the absence of further discussion" (Tilly 2006: 40). By defining the contamination as a mere accident, elite members were attempting to discourage further debate on the matter and adjudicate the events to fate rather than human action. As Jill Harrison argues "As long as the problem of pesticide drift is conceived as a series of accidents, the everyday exposures to pesticides remain invisible and naturalized." (2004: 296). The contamination resulting from the careless management of agrochemicals could be seen as a foreseeable consequence or a "normal accident," rather than a fortuitous event.[72] By using a convention along the lines of "it was just bad luck", elite members not only offer an explanation of the events but also define their relation vis-à-vis peasants. "To the extent that giver and receiver are distant and/or giver occupies a superior rank," Tilly explains, "giver provides formulas rather than cause-effect accounts (…) Givers who offer formulas thereby claim superiority and/or distance" (2006: 25).[73]

Another kind of reason-giving genre explored by Tilly is a "technical account," whereby experts provide cause-effect explanations based on specialized knowledge. Unlike conventions, accessible to lay understanding, technical accounts require belonging to a group of experts. Some of the discourses of elite members bundled vilification and demands to address the situation by the production of technical accounts. Probably reacting to an earlier newspaper's headline stating that "Hemorrhagic diseases were denounced in Monte Azul,"[74] the president of the provincial association of agrarian engineers declared that

> We are hearing really dangerous opinions, like people saying that some neighbors may have hemorrhagic fever; to make such a big claim is to show that you don't know anything.[75]

The president of the Rural Society similarly expressed that the issue should be treated only by "trained technicians" to avoid "biased opinions and the search of spurious profits"; whereas the aforementioned representative of a landowner's association stressed that the agrochemicals were authorized by the SENASA (the Argentine equivalent of the FDA.) Providing a strong

[72] "Normal accidents" is the title of an influential book on technological hazards by Charles Perrow (1999). I just borrow the telling expression, since his research is devoted to large-scale nuclear accidents and the management of risk, matters tangentially related to the cases analyzed here.

[73] For comments and critiques on Tilly's *Why?* see the symposium discussing the book in *Qualitative Sociology*, Volume 29, Number 4.

[74] Newspaper *Opinión Ciudadana*, February 6 2003, p. 16.

[75] Newspaper *La Mañana*, March 2 2003, p. 27.

institutional endorsement to these perspectives, the ministry of production organized a meeting in the Government House with the presence of SENASA representatives on March 18th of that year (2003). The official policy, expressed by the Minister, was

> To put the matter on a technological level, which is the level where it should be, with institutions related to those issues (…) The idea was to redirect the matter to the areas where it should have always been.[76]

What do these cries referring the matter to technical accounts do? The appeals to "keep the discussion on a technical level" imply that peasants and their organizations should not have a say in matters of agrochemical use and contamination; only people invested with the proper knowledge should opine on the issue. Furthermore, even when demonstrators in Monte Azul were not protesting against the *use* of agrochemicals *per se* but against its effects on their health, animals, and crops, the issue veered to a discussion of its lawfulness –an argument I heard repeatedly even four and five years after the events. In this context, the focus of the discussion moved from the negative effects of agrochemicals on peasants' farms to questions about its innocuity and the authorization of its use by the federal administration.

Misrecognition and Contention

A week after the meeting in the Government House (which was the summit of a public battle to define the events) and still recovering from the blow of the Ministry of Human Development visit, peasants received the news that the legal injunction had been granted. On March 26th, a judge from the town of La Corona determined that fumigations ought to be suspended for six months and a study of environmental impact carried out[77]. The order to stop fumigations brought relief to locals, but they still could not sell their produce in the farmer's market (because it was contaminated), and the cotton they were planning to sell was either destroyed or severely damaged. Furthermore, vilification of the protest in the provincial media had stirred small-farmers' feelings about the situation.

[76] Newspaper *La Mañana*, March 19, 2003, p. 13.
[77] The judge granting the injunction was later removed from her position. Several sources pointed as causes for her removal her decisions on the case of agrochemicals in Monte Azul, and other decisions she made contradicting the goals of the provincial government.

In late March, three weeks after the first road blockade, peasants organized another road blockade to address not only their "material" demands but also their demands for recognition: they needed a solution for the damages to their source of income, but they also wanted to make clear that the contamination they were suffering was *real* and not due to their "deviant behavior" (i.e., being "dirty.") To put it another way, the protests became a "quest for recognition" (Auyero 2003), intertwining demands for both recognition and redistribution: at that point, the neglect of the contamination also signified the neglect of peasants' ability to intervene in social life –recall, for instance, the declarations of the president of the Rural Society: insinuating that soy growers were contaminating only exposes "the utmost ignorance;" and the assertions of the ministry of production that the discussion should remain "at the technical level."

The new blockade pitted Monte Azul's small-farmers and *empresarios* of CEFA (the soybean company) against each other, exposing the institutional power wielded by the latter. Peasants of MoCaFor were obstructing the entrance to Monte Azul and therefore to the soybean plots, at a moment when entrepreneurs needed to apply more herbicides to their rented fields. Soybean growers looked for legal backing before bringing in the "mosquito" to the area (it was employed in a nearby locality.) The entrepreneurs met a judge in Formosa, the province's capital, to file a claim ordering peasants to vacate the road. The judge told them he could not make a decision, so the entrepreneurs resorted to their contacts with the provincial Minister of Government. The minister told them he would look into the matter. The *empresarios* went back to the judge's office and witnessed how the judge received a telephone call from the Minister, telling him to grant the petition and "liberate the road."[78] With the written order in their hands they showed up in the road with more than sixty policemen[79]. The massive presence of policemen seemed to enrage rather than deter peasants: "When we asked the police to come and see the contamination, they wouldn't, but when they [the soy growers] need them they surely show up," as a peasant woman told me. A police officer served as mediator, and Horacio showed him the judiciary decision ordering a suspension of fumigations. Horacio argued convincingly that the judge of La Corona (and not the judge from Formosa) held jurisdiction in the area. Without being able to refute this argument and to avoid a situation of open violence ("There

[78] This chain of events was described to me by a direct participant. Since the remarks were made after our interview concluded ("off the record"), I do not quote the name of the source to err on the side of anonymity.
[79] The judge's decision seemed tailored to meet the needs of soy growers: it commanded the police "to guarantee free circulation… especially the entrance and exit of agricultural machinery, and to evacuate any person obstructing the normal transit."

were women and kids, it was going to be a disaster," a representative of the entrepreneurs told me), soybean growers withdrew from the scene.

Some days after the road blockade, representatives of CEFA and the provincial government arrived in Monte Azul, attempting to make individual deals with some of the affected peasants. The company's representatives offered to pay compensation for the destroyed cotton –at a rate far below the market price- but refused to pay for the losses on the produce peasant families sold in the farmer's market. The entrepreneurs' offer – by only recognizing the value of products sold in large-scale, commodity markets- denied recognition to peasants' strategies for survival and to their alternative channels of commercialization. Moreover, the way in which the offers were made also exposes this lack of recognition. Augusto, one of the affected peasants, emphasized in our interview that people from the company were very sharp during the negotiation; he summarized their attitude in a statement they told him "Okay, I'll give you 100 pesos for each hectare and that's it; shut up; that is that; sign here" ("*Bueno, te doy 100 pesos por hectárea y arreglate, callate la boca, termina todo ahí, firmame acá*").

Representatives of CEFA tried a different strategy to overcome peasants' resistance to accept the low compensations offered. They tried to make a deal with the most active members from the protests (Horacio, Nélida, and Facundo), but they remained firm saying the company must compensate all of the affected families, not only them. The last attempt was made by the Minister of Production acting on behalf of soy growers. He convened a meeting in Monte Azul, requesting the presence of all of the affected families but under the condition that no journalists be invited. The meeting was tense, and, quoting the words of the peasants' lawyer, the Minister was very defensive:

> Rather than acting like a public servant in charge of taking care of inhabitants' security regarding the use of agrochemicals, he [the Minister] acted like the manager of the company causing the damages.

The minister recognized that the company should compensate the families for their loss, but he also expressed that the claims were "a little exaggerated." His attitude triggered a furious reaction from Nélida, who still gets agitated four years later, when recalling the scene during our interview:

> They said it was a lie what we were saying, that everything was burned, that it wasn't like that! So in that meeting, the Minister was there and I told Cortello, "Why you don't say the truth?" [I told them] that if they said the truth maybe we could get an agreement, but because they were such *liars* we wouldn't make any deal. We are not the liars, you are! And I said to Cortello, "you know perfectly well what I'm saying and what you're doing." And they surely wanted to play a trick on us, and to mistreat us; because we are farmers [*agricultores*] they think we are *so dumb*, that we'll accept anything they say. "Because the Minister used to work with you, and you know exactly what the poisons were that you used to mix. How can you dare to say we are liars?" I told them. Not even like parents, for instance, I told him, "You didn't tell my son to use gloves when getting inside the tank to clean it up. Are you not a father? Why don't you tell the truth? Did you mix [the agrochemicals] or not?" "Yes," he told me, in front of everybody. "And *why* are you telling everywhere we're lying? We're not lying." It *was* mixed; you put the 2.4D, because it was their order. (…) First he stayed quiet, but then he accepted it. What could he say? He cannot tell me something like that. My son was working with them that night, and also another kid. And that day he accepted it, but in front of a judge he will never do it. He will always be lying… (…) And they were always saying that nobody would get affected, that it wasn't true, that they work everywhere and nothing happens… They kept saying things like that. How come nothing happens?! All our chickens, our ducks got killed; the horses got sick, the plants all withered…

As Nélida's narration exposes –and especially the emotional involvement she displayed while telling it- the conflict at that point was *as much* a matter of recognition as it was about economic loss: peasants were furious over being treated as liars and being blamed for the ailments they attributed to agrochemical exposure (rather than a lack of hygiene or a unfortunate accident of nature, as the authorities claimed).[80] Nélida's reactions show that, unlike the way people see a so-called natural disaster, "When humans can be blamed for causing a threat, outrage is a more common response" (Jasper 1997: 119). Peasants' reactions during the encounter illustrate that the conflict went beyond the narrow demands of fumigation cessation and payment of compensations for lost crops. Granted, peasants wanted to recover their sources of food and income, but at the same time they strived to reverse the mistreatment they felt and what they sensed as disrespect by public officials, moved by the anger created by the public denial of the contamination and the attempts to cast blame on affected families[81]. In doing so, they also were redefining their relationship with powerful authorities and expressing their right

[80] For the relationship between redistribution and recognition see Fraser and Honneth 2003, and see ramifications of this debate in Swanson 2005, Lovell 2007, and Fowler 2009.

[81] Research on psychology has analyzed how disrespect and injustice may trigger anger and demand reparation (Miller 2001) and the feelings of moral outrage prompted by the transgression of laws (Darley 2009).

to speak up ("A movement, an organization, always makes its claims about rights to the government, isn't that so? That's why we get organized… maybe they said we were demanding ridiculous things; that we were just making things up," as Emilia said.) As Tilly points out, the attribution of blame for a loss creates boundaries between "us and them", and "separates two moral settings from each other: "As I engage in 'the act of censuring,' I justify my own distinction from the culprit's world" (Tilly 2008: 6).

Taken together, the social acts involved in the discourses of public officials and the emotional reactions of the affected peasants show how different attributions of blame implied the definition of moral boundaries in the identification of wrong-doing. In accounts from the perspective of elites, the moral boundary singles out peasants as those to blame for the ailments, pointing to their lack of hygiene and education. Peasants adamantly react against these moral accusations ("they treated us like that, as dirty, as scum, anything"; "they think we are *so dumb*") and re-draw the moral boundary by emphasizing that authorities and the agrarian engineer in charge of the agrochemicals are the ones to blame, that *they* are the culprits and liars. Peasants, in their dispute with public officials, were thus practicing what James Jaspers calls a remedial form of blame, when causality differs from the responsibility for fixing the problem: "If people believe that their government should have foreseen or prevented a catastrophe, or should have done more to help afterwards, they may become indignant even without believing that the government actually caused the calamity" (Jasper 1997: 118). Requests for justice not only invoke reparation for a loss; they also demand recognition for the endured sufferings.[82]

The battle pivoting on issues of recognition, denial, and blame had a last round some months later, during a judiciary audience on November 11 2003. In August, soy growers fumigated their fields again, motivating the peasants' lawyer to file another injunction. The judge who prohibited further fumigations in March granted the petition, and extended the mandate for additional six months. When this decision was appealed by the soy growers' lawyer, the Court of Appeals convened an audience to hear the involved parties. During the audience, the lawyer of CEFA continuously interrupted the testimonies to deny that the contamination took place, enraging peasants for what they saw as a blatant lie. One of them, a man more than seventy years old, could not contain the tears brought on by the indignation while he was testifying. The

[82] "When people go to court," Tilly observes, "they seek to fix blame on the authors of their hardships, and to punish them appropriately. Yet they also seek recognition of their own merit (…) They ask for vindication" (2008: 33).

CEFA's lawyer, when his turn came, declared that the company was authorized by the Ministry of Production, that acted according to the law, and that there was no damage caused by agrochemicals in any neighboring farm. Peasants reacted with indignation and began to raise their voices in the midst of the audience, to the point that Nélida could not be restrained and shouted, completely out of order, "You better shut up or I'll smash your face! You are a liar! A liar!" (*¡Callate la boca, porque te voy a romper la cara! ¡Sos un mentiroso! ¡Vos sos un mentiroso!*) The scandal prompted the judges to suspend the audience. Once on the streets after the audience was suspended, peasants tried to beat up CEFA's lawyer.

During an interview with Juana I was able to grasp the importance peasants gave to setting the record straight, understanding that their demands for economic compensation are intermingled with a moral need to make the point that the soy growers were the liars and not them.

> Pablo: *So then you went to Formosa?*
>
> Juana: Then we went to Formosa again… there was the injunction, I don't remember which month, we went to… to the Chamber of I don't know what… I barely remember. What I do remember is the entrepreneurs' lawyer that argued with us, he mistreated us. He call us liars, he told us all kind of things. I remember he said… I think it was the judge who said that there could be one liar, but not 23 liars, because we were 23 people there. That there might be one, two liars, but not 23 saying the same thing, besides the lawyer; everyone had to be a liar. But I remember, the lawyer of the company, he said all kind of things. (…)
>
> Pablo: *And what would be the aim of all that happened? What would you have liked to achieve?*
>
> Juana: I would have liked to see the company compensating all the losses we had. Many things… Because they mistreated us; the lawyer was basically saying "you're a bunch of liars, nothing got damaged."

Juana's testimony condenses the moral dimensions of the protest by showing that outrage persists even when memories about the events may be fading, and that demands for monetary reparations are intermingled with a quest for vindication. As scholars analyzing the relationship between moral and protest have argued, cognitive beliefs, emotional responses, and moral evaluations of the world "are inseparable and together these motivate, rationalize and channel political action" (Jasper 1997: 12). Protests are not only a way to put forward economic or

political interests; they also may open a window to "express allegiance to moral visions through our actions" and provide "the opportunity to articulate, elaborate, alter, or affirm one's moral sensibilities, principles, and allegiances" (Jasper 1997: 14-15). The case scrutinized here shows that poor people's protests may intertwine the defense of their economic survival with their need to vent their moral indignation and denounce those they see as wrong-doers. In a specific conflict about agrochemical exposure poor people may simultaneously put forward their material interests, define and defend their identity, and assert their worthiness when facing powerful actors denying them due recognition. Elites' rebuttal prompted a morally charged protest because peasants sought not only to recover their material losses but to restore a sense of justice, to demonstrate that not them but elites were the liars to be blamed, and to demand recognition of their right to speak up. Two crucial building blocks of protest, threat and blame, came together fusing emotion, morals, and cognition (Jasper 1997: 127.)

Outcomes and Consequences

Shortly after entrepreneurs fumigated in August (disobeying the judge's order), they harvested soybeans, left Monte Azul, and did not return. In early 2004, the peasants' lawyer presented a demand for damages against CEFA and the Ministry of Production. The case has been sitting in courts for years now and there is no agreement or decision in sight, even eight years later, in 2011.[83] The aftermath of the protest shows the difficulties of defining the results of contentious events in terms of "success" or "failure." Although soy growers eventually abandoned the area, the contamination left scars on the economies of peasant families, modified their agricultural practices, and drove potential movement members away. A view of the messy realities of meaning-making showed that "frames" are not neat and definite belief systems, and that counter-definitions can make their way to the points of view of those negatively depicted by them.

[83] Adding to the customary slowness of Argentine courts, the case presents a series of elements that have delayed its resolution. First, two important points have been very hard to prove, especially when many years have passed: on the one hand, the causal relationship between herbicide use and environmental and health problems; on the other hand, the demonstration that the agrochemical drift to peasants' land was caused by CEFA. Second, a series of bureaucratic barriers have slowed the process: CEFA's lawyer has questioned every single document presented by the peasants' lawyer; the company's representatives have legal addresses in other provinces; and the original judge was removed.

The analysis of collective action's outcomes shows the importance of paying attention to its unintended consequences. The consequences of contention are a relatively underdeveloped area of study, reflecting a problem partially due to the inherent difficulties in attributing causality to the actions of social movements (cf. Andrews 1997 and 2002, Burstein et al 1995, McAdam et al 1988, Tarrow 1993). The bulk of research has focused on the "success" or "failure" of collective action –in spite of the difficulties in defining what counts as either- and has usually observed its effects on the political realm, public policy, and social movement organizations (Giugni 1998).

The events of early 2003 in Formosa had a series of consequences at both the environmental/agricultural and organizational/mobilization levels. First, the conflict ultimately drove CEFA soy growers out of Monte Azul. Second, the agrochemical exposure induced changes in peasants' agricultural practices. Third, it affected the "mobilizing base" of MoCaFor. I scrutinize a fourth consequence in the next section –i.e. how the blockades of 2003 affected potential collective actions later in time, in 2009.

First, soy growers of CEFA left the area, in what at first may be seen as a success for the movement. However, the conflict did not discourage other farmers who rent plots in Monte Azul from producing GM soybeans –although they did so using other type of machines and techniques to apply herbicides. In other words, collective actions had a "reactive effect", i.e. the prevention of "new disadvantages" by exercising a sort of power of veto (Kriesi 1995: 172). In the case of Monte Azul, the protests discouraged –at least for a time- the careless use of agrochemicals by the remaining soy growers in the area.

Second, the destruction caused by the agrochemicals negatively impinged upon the peasants' economic production and modified their agricultural practices. Many peasants abandoned the farmers' market and did not grow staples again, afraid of investing monies and work in crops that could be destroyed by another agrochemical drift. Others, in an ironic twist, began to grow genetically modified (GM) cotton, since the province's Ministry of Production was promoting it by giving away glyphosate-resistant seeds to small-farmers. Some of them say they adopted GM cotton as a sort of "insurance policy": since the variety of GM cotton promoted by the government endures the same herbicide as GM soybeans, a potential agrochemical drift would not affect their plants. As Nélida said:

> It may be that the government wants all the poor people out of here. Maybe they want to buy all the land, to get people tired, and to see everybody leave. Sooner or later you have to do something. Because if you can't work, if they fumigate and burn all your plants, you can't do anything, you have to leave. Or you have to fight again to make them leave. (…) And if you don't do anything you have to grow the same things they grow if you want to keep living here. So they are getting us used to what they produce.

Third, the loss of production during the 2002-2003 agricultural campaign had a deep negative impact on the domestic economy of the affected peasant families, and many a head of household had to migrate in search for work, reducing the mobilization base of MoCaFor. As Augusto told me:

> We used to go to meetings with organizations that were with us… But then I got out, because I went to work in Las Lomitas, I had to leave everything… I needed work, and all my produce was destroyed. I didn't have anything, and I had to feed my family. They [MoCaFor members] kept dealing with the issue but I left. Then I totally lost touch with them. (…) Because if one year you lost, excuse me, but you fucked the whole year. Then the next year you grow everything again… I don't know. Or you get lost, like we did, we went to work, to somehow get by. Leave our families, our homes, so you don't starve; [you need to] get a job.

The contamination thus drove constituents away from the movement, a deleterious effect for the mobilization of the rural poor. A fourth consequence of the protests of 2003 was the re-evaluation of transgressive contention as a method of claims-making. In the next section, I turn to this and other points explaining processes of demobilization.

CONTAMINATION AND DEMOBILIZATION

Six years after the contentious events of 2003, on February 2009, peasant families of Monte Azul felt a sense of dejá-vu. Nélida says she felt "like a burning in my neck," had blisters on her skin and her lips felt dried and hurt; a neighbor got blisters all over her back. Hundreds of chickens, which small farmers of Monte Azul let roam freely, suddenly appeared dead (see pictures 17 and 18). Nélida went to the hospital in Curuzú, where she told the sub director that they were having the same problems as in 2003; "he told me that that was possible but no doctor in Curuzú was prepared [to diagnose it]." People of Monte Azul took their children to the hospital to cure the

sudden eruption of pimples on kids' skin. Both the children and a woman with a skin rash covering her back were told they had scabies. Nélida and her brother Isidoro went to the hospital (an institution they see as the turf of political brokers) and talked to "the guy that runs the whole hospital, he's like the hospital's dog, guarding it." Nélida told him that the tanks with "poisons" (agrochemicals) were being cleaned near people's houses and the community health center, to which he replied that the hospital was not in charge of agricultural matters.

Contaminated water, skin rashes, sudden death of farm animals, and neglect from authorities: the situation in 2009 seemed so similar to the 2003 events that one might expect that people would have protested again to address the problems they attributed to agrochemical exposure. However, changes in national politics between 2003 and 2009 affected local institutions and the national alliances of MoCaFor, modifying the way small farmers interpreted agrochemical exposure and possible courses of action to deal with it. Meaning-making processes (threat and blame assignment, claims-making, process of identification) interplayed with political conditions transforming the evaluation of potential contentious events in 2009. However, to fully understand the connection between changes in the political landscape and the lack of collective action in 2009, attention must be paid to how these changes were understood, felt, and acted by local actors. The "reading" of the situation in 2009 varied according to the organizational network of the MoCaFor and was informed by their previous experiences of contention. In this section, I argue that three factors explain the lack of contention in 2009. First, the authorities' acknowledgement of the problems created by agrochemical exposure and the recognition of peasants as valid social actors curtailed local leaders' abilities to frame the situation as "not being heard." Second, the alliances established between MoCaFor and national allies, i.e. the federal government and a national social movement (FTV), confronted the local social movement with a complex scenario. These alliances enabled the channeling of resources to MoCaFor, ensuring the survival of the organization. Yet these alliances also put the local social movement in a cumbersome position: MoCaFor still opposed the provincial government, but the latter also became a political ally of the national government. As we will see below, this situation posed constraints to open contention. Third, the lack of concrete results obtained through the transgressive contentions of 2003 (in terms of not obtaining compensation for the lost crops) eschewed open confrontation as a means to address grievances. In addition, the "counter-frames"

put forward by authorities and rich landowners in 2003 were also reproduced by some local smallfarmers. I elaborate on each of these points next.

Peasant Complaints and Authorities: Reaction and Recognition

Néstor Kirchner, one of the candidates of the (Peronist) Justicialist Party, became president of Argentina in 2003, after the profound crisis of December 2001 in Argentina and following an interim government during 2002. Both Kirchner and his wife and successor, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (who became president in 2007, and will hold office until 2011) maintained taxes on soybean exports that were implemented in 2002 after the Argentine peso was devalued. In 2008, President Fernández sent a bill to Congress to modify this export tax, but the bill was overturned in Congress. Several organizations of medium to large landowners created a coalition and demanded a total elimination of export taxes with roadblocks and rallies throughout the country between March and July of 2008 (see Giarracca and Teubal 2010). In the context of this conflict, President Fernández de Kirchner launched two initiatives. First, the PSA (*Programa Social Agropecuario*; Social Agricultural Program) was given permanent status and renamed Sub-Secretary of Rural Development and Family Agriculture, SSDRAF (*Sub-secretaría de Desarrollo Rural y Agricultura Familiar*).[84] Second, the federal Ministry of Health created a National Commission of Research on Agrochemicals, CNIA (*Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Agroquímicos*.)[85] Both the SSDRAF and the CNIA had a direct intervention in the aftermath of the 2009 contamination in Monte Azul. Yet, to narrate the events chronologically, allow me first to present the initial reaction of the provincial authorities to peasants' complaints.

Shortly after small farmers visited Curuzú's hospital and complained about the effects of agrochemical exposure, provincial authorities unexpectedly arrived in Monte Azul. Unlike 2003, when doctors showed up after small farmers blockaded a road, in 2009 there was no need of a protest to make them come –showing that relational learning goes both ways, that is, both

[84] PSA was a federal welfare program for the rural poor, whose continuity was determined annually. Upgrading PSA to SSDRAF meant that the program would be automatically included in the overall federal budget and given a permanent office within the government.

[85] Upon the creation of this commission, the national minister of health delivered a subsidy to the municipality of Cordoba to carry a study on a nationally renowned case of agrochemical exposure in a neighbor located in the outskirts of the city (Barrio Ituzaingó). The commission also launched research projects in the province of Chaco, were rural families have been also greatly affected by the use of agrochemicals.

challengers and authorities learn from their mutual interactions. Dozens (estimations vary between 60 and 150) of doctors, employees, and authorities from the provincial ministry of human development convoked Monte Azul's inhabitants in the local community health center. Authorities told the people there was no reason to be alarmed, that they would take blood samples to determine if they had traces of agrochemicals in their bodies, and proceeded to distribute antiparasitic drugs for everybody. Authorities did not allow people to ask questions, but Nélida and Horacio spoke up to say that the reason for their ailments was not parasites but the agrochemicals used in the soybean fields. A heated debated ensued, with authorities saying that soybeans were grown around the world and that agrochemicals were authorized by the government; to this Nélida and Horacio replied that soybeans also created problems around the world and that the "poisons" may be harmless, but the problem was that the government did not control the way agrochemicals were being used. The employees from the ministry made surveys, took blood from 140 people, and sent the samples to be analyzed in Buenos Aires. The people in Monte Azul never received the results of the samples.

After the contamination, people in Monte Azul "were growing *very* anxious," as Mario Hispano told me. Hispano did an environmental assessment for peasants in 2003, while he was working as field technician for the PSA. By 2009, he had three years of experience as head of the PSA in Formosa, and was re-appointed as provincial representative when this federal program was promoted to the Sub-Secretary of Rural Development and Family Agriculture (SSDRAF, *Sub-Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural y Agricultura Familiar*; more on this "upgrading" below). The newly created SSDRAF received a note from small farmers of Monte Azul, where they listed how many chickens each small farmer had lost (totaling seven hundred chickens.) Hispano organized meetings with the affected peasants and told them the Sub-Secretary was going to compensate peasants for their losses. The SSDRAF also brought small farmers from Curuzú to the city of Formosa to be tested for the presence of specific agrochemicals, although Hispano was skeptical about the results: "I knew the tests would turn out negative… and they did. But the people of Monte Azul were very, very anxious… We needed to do something… They told me, 'we are tired of seeing people coming, taking blood samples and then nothing happens'." The SSDR offered to pay the lawyer representing small farmers in the lawsuit initiated in 2004 against soy growers. The SSDR also organized meetings to discuss the provincial environmental laws because according to Hispano, "a lawyer needs to train them on what to do in cases of

contamination; because peasants always take the wrong path: they go to the police, or to the mayor, or they want to burn the fumigating machine."

On February 2009, peasants did not do any of those things. Instead, Horacio sent a note to the Ministry of Health asking for the intervention of the National Commission of Research on Agrochemicals (CNIA, *Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Agroquímicos*). In the note, Horacio detailed the ailments people was suffering (skin rashes, headaches, lost of appetite, and eye soreness), the problems in their plants (deformations in cotton and cassava leaves) and the death of chickens and ducks. He also stated that the director of the local hospital told them there were no doctors to treat problems caused by agrochemicals, and highlighted that two affected women were prescribed with antibiotics and a lotion to treat lice and nit. He closed the note saying he was "confident in the prompt response of the Minister." Peasant leaders also sent a note to the national Secretary of Environment requesting a study of environmental impact on the community. In March, Monte Azul families received a visit from a representative of the CNIA. The representative wrote a report that clearly backed up peasants complaints about the contamination. The report mentioned that provincial authorities did not do a study of environmental impact and pinpointed a series of hazards affecting local families: the soybean fields were located next to the local elementary school where fruit trees showed the negative effects of herbicides, machinery used for fumigations passed in front of the school and it was cleaned in the water reservoirs of the area, there was no correct treatment of the containers with agrochemicals, and employees working in soybean fields did not have the required garments to avoid health problems when handling agrochemicals. The report stated that locals "manifested their expectations of the response of the Commission, since they consider it is the last resort to solve their problems." The conclusions and recommendations of the report closely followed the demands repeatedly made by peasant leaders: there were "enough elements to assert the existence of problems of environmental contamination due to the use of pesticides resulting in a risk for the local population," the "damages on plants and crops are notorious," and stated that "local inhabitants should not demonstrate the intoxications but instead the State should create proper and impartial institutional procedures to assess health damages, to prove there is no environmental contamination, and to demonstrate that the local habitat does not pose a health risk." Also recommended were the suspension of pesticide use, a closer control of the soybean companies, and the creation of "instances of participation for the control of pesticide

management.” The report even recognized the clash between peasants’ mode of production and that fostered by soybean growers, saying that “the coexistence between a productive model for self-consumption and an extensive industrial agriculture is very hard” and asserting that the introduction of soybean production had disrupted the lifestyle of peasant families that had been developed in “close connection to the environment.”

The reactions of the provincial authorities, the support of the SSDRAF, and the report of the CNIA recognized the health problems of the local population and the environmental hazards created by soybean production and the use of agrochemicals. Combined, these reactions showed that the environmental problems created by soybean production in the area were real (as peasants claimed since 2003), and installed among locals the idea that something was being done to address health problems and the negative effects on crops and farm animals. However, the responses of authorities amounted to what I would call “performative policies.” The actions of provincial and national authorities showed peasants that “something was being done” about the health and environmental problems affecting them, but the root of the problems were never addressed.

First, the result of the analyses of blood samples taken by the provincial ministry of human development were never shared with local inhabitants. Provincial authorities never attempted to regulate soybean production or created a more systematic or efficient control of the use of agrochemicals. Second, the report of the national ministry of health never translated into concrete actions to stop fumigations or enforce the correct use of agrochemicals. Furthermore, some months after the report was issued the national minister was replaced (due to political disputes within the national government), and thus the public official in charge of the Commission on Agrochemicals was replaced as well. The new appointed official continued with the Commission’s meetings, but the language used to refer to the use of agrochemicals was less contentious towards the industry and no concrete actions were taken to curb the nation-wide indiscriminate use of agrochemicals.

Third, the creation of the SSDRAF was a powerful sign coming from the national government, in terms of supporting and recognizing peasant families as a valid actor in food production and rural life. Moreover, shortly after Néstor Kirchner became president in 2003 the control of PSA (*Programa Social Agropecuario*, Social Agricultural Program), the direct antecedent of the SSDRAF, was given to a federation of peasant social movements, the MNCI

(*Movimiento Nacional Campesino Indígena*, Peasant and Indigenous National Movement). The creation of the SSDRAF was seen as a further cue signaling the support of the national government toward peasant organizations. Nevertheless, the necessary funds and the infrastructure to develop the program (monies to organize meetings between organizations, national and provincial offices, etc.) and a key instrument to implement its programs (a national registry of small farmers) were, as of 2010, still absent. In the next section, I elaborate on the national government's "symbolic recognition" of peasants.

Social Movements' Alliances and the State

I attended a rally organized by the recently created SSDRAF in the sports center of a union in Greater Buenos Aires in October 2008 –some months after the protracted and intense conflict involving the national government and soybean growers over export taxes on soybeans, between March and July of that year. The place is called "*17 de Octubre*" (October 17), in reference to the day in 1945 when a massive mobilization in Buenos Aires reclaimed the freedom of then Secretary of Labor, Juan Perón. The day (and the many places named after it throughout Argentina) thus has a clear political and symbolic resonance. The streets around the area were filled with the buses that brought people from all over Argentina to attend the event. MoCaFor members came from Formosa in two buses paid for by the Forum of Family Agriculture (*Foro de Agricultura Familiar*), a coalition of organizations created in several Argentine provinces to underpin the work of the SSDRAF. In a large gazebo outside the stadium people were preparing food for the attendees.

I found the people from Formosa inside the stadium, which was packed with hundreds of people, and stood next to Isidoro and other people from Monte Azul during the speeches of public officials. We first hear the head of the SSDRAF, who repeatedly mentions the "smallfarmers and indigenous peoples" (*"pequeños productores y pueblos originarios"*) and prompts spontaneous applauses when mentioning slogans popularized by Perón ("our aim is to achieve social justice, political independence, and economic sovereignty"). When he makes several announcements about programs to be developed by the SSDRAF, Isidoro whispers in my ear "If only half of that will come true…" The national anthem is sung and many people's gesture of raising their arms with their fingers doing a "V" brings a flashback from my

childhood, when my dad used to take me to the acts organized by the Peronist party. When the anthem is over, we hear the discourse of President Fernandez de Kirchner closing the event. She begins her speech naming the governors of different provinces on the stage, and addressing the "rural workers, peasants, and the rural family" ("*trabajadores y trabajadoras rurales, campesinos, y la familia rural*"), which prompts the first of a series of enthusiastic applauses and ovations from the crowd. She immediately continues saying: "I feel a *great* honor being here today, with those who work the land from sunrise to sunset, *from sunrise to sunset!* [She emphasized the phrase in the midst of the applauses] And with the men and women that, throughout the country, contribute every day to build food sovereignty for the Argentine people." She mentioned the importance of creating the SSDRAF in terms of having "an institutional area within the state that takes into account the small producers of our country," since they "produce more than half of the food consumed by Argentines." She closed her speech with a remembrance of her grandfather, "who had a dairy farm, and worked from sunrise to sunset."[86] For anyone reading between the lines, the celebratory reference to people "working the land from sunrise to sunset" was a not-that-subtle critique to soybean growers, which during the conflict with the government were depicted by public officials as absentee proprietors who did not wanted to contribute (via taxes) to the rest of the Nation.[87] Furthermore, the concept of "food sovereignty" –mentioned several times during the speech- was also a cue to peasant organizations: the concept has been pushed forward worldwide by Via Campesina, an international organization of smallfarmers to which some peasant organizations in Argentine are affiliated.[88]

After the rally, we sip mate with a group of MoCaFor members sitting in the park around the stadium and watch the people coming and going. Isidoro tells an anecdote from the day before when he found Luis D'Elía in a hallway and was having a chat. D'Elía is the head of FTV (*Federacion de Tierra y Vivienda*, Land and Households Federation), a grassroots organization

[86] Some weeks after this act, I traveled to Formosa. While dwelling in Nélida's farm/house, we listened my recording of the speech. She told me: "What she [the President] is saying is very nice… we'll see if she delivers what she promises." Nélida then told me that she and other MoCaFor members traveled to Buenos Aires a year before to attend an act in Plaza de Mayo (Buenos Aires' central square) where Cristina Kirchner closed her political campaign running for President.

[87] Along these lines, the President also said: "If we don't think of our Nation as our fatherland, we have no purpose. Societies without aims, with just profits as an aim, don't go too far" ("*Si no concebimos a nuestra Nación como una Patria, no tenemos objetivos. Y las sociedades sin objetivos, únicamente con fines de lucro, no llegan demasiado lejos*.") She also received a standing ovation when mentioning that "it cannot be possible that the few gain a lot and the many have nothing!"

[88] For a discursive analysis of President Fernández de Kirchner's speeches, see Couso 2008.

based in the province of Buenos Aires that through "pickets" (road blockades), and massive popular mobilizations, obtained unemployment subsidies since 1999.[89] Some of these subsidies were passed on to MoCaFor, as one of the founding organizations of the FTV. While Isidoro was chatting with D'Elía, Gildo Insfrán, Formosa's governor, passed by "and he was looking at the floor so he didn't have to say hello", says Isidoro with a smile. "And Gildo was surprised when Luis grabbed his arm [and said] 'What's up *compañero*?!' Gildo's bodyguards almost punched him; but Gildo had no option, he had to say hello. When Gildo left Luis told me 'with these guys you have to be on good terms, because later on you need them'."

I described this rally and reconstructed the anecdote told by Isidoro for three reasons. First, the launching of the SSDRAF and the discourse of President Cristina Kirchner during the event shows how peasant organizations and rural workers were recognized by authorities as a valid actor –a contrast with the situation of 2003, described in the first part of this chapter. Second, the characteristics of the act –people's mobilization in buses paid by the state, the presence of mayors and governors, a speech mixing the announcement of policies with political campaigning- provide an example of how since 2003 (during the administrations of Néstor Kirchner on 2003-2007 and then Cristina Kirchner on 2007-2011) MoCaFor members have become increasingly embedded in the practices of patronage politics (I elaborate on this point in chapter six). Third (and the point I develop next) the actors present at the rally and the anecdote connecting a MoCaFor leader (Isidoro), the head of FTV (Luis D'Elía), and Formosa's governor (Gildo Insfrán) draws attention to the complex system of alliances MoCaFor has become involved in since 2003. Kirchner's government and D'Elía's FTV had had an alliance dating back to the 2003 election, when Néstor Kirchner ran (and won) for president.[90] On the other hand, during both Kirchner's administrations, Gildo Insfrán has been a consistent ally of the federal government in Congress and within the internal struggles of the Peronist Party. These various political alliances ultimately put MoCaFor in a difficult position: MoCaFor opposes a provincial government that, at the same time, is an ally of the national government that MoCaFor also supports. How have these multiple points of opposition and support affected the actions of

[89] For a history of this organization, see Svampa and Pereyra 2003.

[90] In 2003, while still living in Argentina, I was part of a group doing ethnographic research in different areas of Greater Buenos Aires. A colleague of mine was doing his fieldwork on the FTV and he narrated a telling event to me. During the presidential electoral campaign of 2003, a conference of FTV delegates was held. During the meeting, D'Elía arrived carrying huge plastic bags filled with Kirchner's ballots. He addressed to FTV delegates saying: "*Compañeros*, this guy is our candidate," showing Kirchner's ballot. Before becoming president, Kirchner was fairly unknown outside the province where he was governor.

MoCaFor at the local level? I argue that these alliances provided important resources to MoCaFor yet, at the same time, discouraged the organization of transgressive contentious actions.

A series of events taking place in 2004 sheds light on how processes of demobilization take place, as explained by the allegiances and alliances in which MoCaFor became embedded during the Kirchners' administration. On June 15 2004, MoCaFor had planned a march from a locality near Moreno to Formosa's capital reclaiming lands, subsidies, minimum prices for cotton, and scholarships for students, among other demands, to the provincial government. The day of the scheduled march, Luis D'Elía arrived in Formosa and arranged a meeting between Benito García (the head of MoCaFor), governor Insfrán, and himself. During the meeting, it was agreed that the provincial administration and MoCaFor would create a commission to negotiate peasants' demands. As a result of the meeting, MoCaFor's mobilization to Formosa was suspended. D'Elía was quoted in the main provincial newspaper saying that the policies of the provincial government "strongly support the province's development through projects sustaining production and that have the countrymen as main protagonist" and noted that "there was a good amount of dialogue and willingness from both sides, to initiate a new phase based on work, the recreation of trust, and trying to support the project put forward by President Néstor Kirchner." The newspaper stated that "the leader highlighted that the national project of President Néstor Kirchner is absolutely identified with the Formosan governor." Benito expressed that the meeting "was an opportunity to begin a new phase between the province's government and a sector of the organized society. It has been fruitful in terms of reaching an agreement to work together and begin to look for effective solutions."[91] Although the march was suspended, MoCaFor still held a meeting with delegates to inform them about the results of the agreement. The signature of the agreement was programmed for a month later, on July 16 2004. MoCaFor peasants massively mobilized to the capital of Formosa to make sure their demands were addressed. However, at the moment of signing the agreement the minister of production declared that the peasants' demands were exaggerated, that they will consume a large portion of the province's budget, and blamed the peasant organization for not reaching an agreement: "they want to impose the signature of the document… We always try to solve the conflicts through consensus and not by confronting… Maybe they [MoCaFor and FTV] are not used to dialogue

[91] Newspaper *La Mañana*, June 15 2004.

and consensus, something we were able to reach with other organizations," and put forth MAF (Agrarian Movement of Formosa) as an example –an organization that has been a close ally of the provincial government, as seen in chapter three. MoCaFor mobilized to Formosa to demand the signature of the agreement, but the official response was that the governor was negotiating with D'Elía in Buenos Aires. MoCaFor rank-and-file then blockaded a road on the outskirts of Formosa's capital, demanding that the governor receive them and accept the agreement reached in June. Benito was desperate to reach D'Elía on the phone, but he was not returning his calls. "But as soon as we blocked the road, I got a call from D'Elía, telling me we will be repressed, that we should stop the blockade…" Benito told me. In spite of the pressure of mobilizations, the provincial government never fulfilled the promises reached in the agreement. MoCaFor leaders see these events as the moment when they broke any possible bridges with the provincial government. Some months later, in September 2004, MoCaFor organized a march when President Kirchner visited Formosa. The movement was considering blocking a road, but D'Elía got in touch with them to ask them to reconsider the blockade and offered his support to negotiate MoCaFor demands. MoCaFor leaders then held a meeting with the President's secretary, and from then on they established a direct connection with the national government.

Telma is a member of MoCaFor who actively participates at the provincial level. She is one of the members of the movement that holds a position as "promoter" of a program administered by the national Ministry of Social Development. What she told me during our interview illustrates the complexity of MoCaFor alliances and the strategic actions of social movements, showing that collective action is not the only mean people have to address their grievances.

> Pablo – *The MoCaFor was more active in 2004 and 2005, wasn't it?*
>
> Telma – The thing is we sometimes confront the government and we don't obtain anything, but we just make our people suffer... We will try other means, for example, in this case presenting projects to the ministry, or working more at a national level than at the provincial level... Gildo [Formosa's governor] won't change his system, thus... I don't want to tell you with this that we've been defeated or that we've dropped our guard either... I think we should avoid confronting the governor and try to find alternative means to get what we want, which is what we are negotiating with the national government. They are allowing more participation from the organizations, so…

The tensions between D’Elía and Benito left scars within MoCaFor. Benito, in spite of formally being the vice-president of FTV, withdraw his active participation in the organization and, tacitly, detached MoCaFor from FTV. However, other leaders were not convinced of the convenience of losing FTV’s support. The leaders of MoCaFor in Monte Azul administered welfare programs from the national Minister of Social Development brokered by the FTV. These leaders decided to invite D’Elía to Formosa to show they were still affiliated with FTV. As Horacio told me, “We were there when the FTV was created; Benito was the vice-president, so we decided to maintain that national umbrella.” The different points of view regarding the alliance with FTV confronted MoCaFor leaders from Monte Azul with Benito –whose stronghold is based on Moreno. Ultimately, I believe, these frictions diminished the organizational strength and unity of MoCaFor, a factor that played a role in the lack of mobilizations in 2009.

In summary, the alliance between FTV and MoCaFor provided the latter with resources (welfare plans) and networks with the national administration. These resources and connections were germane to ensuring the organizations’ survival (as I detail in chapter six). However (and besides the tensions I just outlined) this affiliation with FTV also affected how MoCaFor was perceived among constituents. During my fieldwork I noticed that people’s discourses in Monte Azul suggested a negative connotation of blockades (“*piquetes*”) and *piqueteros* (as are known members of FTV and other organizations that, mostly in 1999-2003, used blockades as their main form of collective action). I argue that these perceptions and the evaluation that transgressive action would not be effective explain the lack of mobilizations in 2009. I turn to this problem next.

Contentious Identity, Collective Action, and Contamination

When peasants blocked roads in 2003 protesting the environmental contamination, they were participating in a form of action that, although not completely new for them, was not as familiar as other forms of contention. MoCaFor leaders who had been active in MAF, for instance, took part in roadblocks in the early 1990s. However, for other leaders and some members of MoCaFor this form of action was relatively new –something that confirms its transgressive features. Even the term with which road blockades are popularly dubbed in the activist discourse

and in the media ("*piquetes,*" pickets) were unfamiliar to them. During an extensive interview, Nélida narrated how she learned what a picket was:

> Nélida: Once I went to a meeting of women in La Plata [near Buenos Aires city]. And I remember that a woman went [to the stage] and said [mimicking a person screaming] "For the next year, more women at the picket!" And I didn't know what a picket was. Here we call picket a place where we take the animals. I didn't know what a picket was.
>
> Pablo: *You had never held a road blockade before.*
>
> Nélida: No, we knew nothing about roadblocks. For us, that's what we thought a picket was.

During my fieldwork, I noticed that the words "picket" or "picketer" were used with an apologetic tone –when uttered by activists- or referred to with despising undertones. A peasant woman told me that she heard a manager of a soybean plot say "I'm going to make those picketers cry" when he was making the preparations to fumigate a soybean field in 2007. But not only those opposing MoCaFor used the terms "picket" and "picketer" with scorn. For instance, while staying at the MoCaFor offices in Curuzú, I participated in several meetings of the organization. In one of them, Julio said to three youngsters and prospective members of MoCaFor that "some call us picketers, and some call the [unemployed welfare] subsidy 'the picketer subsidy' [Smiles]. It's not that we *like* to blockade a road, but we do that so people from other provinces, or from Buenos Aires, get to know what's going on, to make ourselves heard." When the meeting was over and we were sipping mate with Julio, he told me that one of the more talkative girls of the meeting once told him: "I agree with you [the MoCaFor], but I don't like when you block the road," to which Julio replied "No, I understand, we don't like it either!" On another occasion I was doing an interview on a farm, when Julio dropped by to give me a ride back to Curuzú. When the interview was coming to an end, he began to intervene to justify the roadblock of 2003:

> It wasn't that people just thought 'we won't let the mosquito in', from the top of their heads. No. All the legal steps were taken, but we didn't get response. So people were *pushed* to blockade the road.

When recalling the roadblock, people several times remarked how they did it because "nobody was hearing us." The legal demand peasants presented against soy growers in 2004 also reflected these feelings: "Facing the government's utmost indifference to the sufferings of inhabitants affected by indiscriminate fumigations, they were *forced* to blockade the road" (emphasis added). During an interview with Nélida and Isidoro he told me: "this [welfare] programs are called 'the picketer program,' mind you [laughing]" ("*estos planes los llaman plan piquetero, para que vos te enteres*").

Several activists of MoCaFor conveyed an apologetic tone when talking about the road blockades, saying "we looked like picketers," echoing the public statements of officials saying they were "troublemakers." Others in Monte Azul also provided glimpses of the perception of locals as *piqueteros* equaling "troublemakers." The principal at the local elementary school told me that "Even when people say that in the Colony they are troublemakers, that they are *piqueteros*, I'm proud of my Colony." During an interview, Nelida's daughter spontaneously gave me her view on the topic:

> And here, this colony is criticized. It is criticized because the people from here always, always protest; they say what they don't like. So they have it marked. And the peasant movement as well. And you notice it, for instance, when the fumigation started, there was Mom, Horacio, all of them, and even in my work, they told me 'the son of so-and-so, of Nélida, the picketer'.

In short, attention to what it is said about transgressive actions and the identities associated with them suggest that, by 2009, roadblocks were delegitimized as a form of protest.

Among the constituents of MoCaFor, the blockades of 2003 are recalled with bittersweet undertones: several interviewees mentioned how they had to endure high temperatures during the day and chilling cold at night, but without getting any concrete compensation for their loss. And among those loosely associated with MoCaFor, the lack of concrete solutions inspired suspicions: some, expressing mistrust, suggested the leaders may have reached a deal for self-benefit. Others, especially those living in dire poverty, hinted that *any* compensation would have been better than ending up empty handed. During my fieldwork in 2009, several people expressed despair for what implicitly evaluated as a battle with high costs and little benefits. Six years after the incident the trial was still unsolved, and waiting for a solution that never arrives instilled discouragement and seemed to eschew open confrontation to address grievances. These

discourses call attention to a key problem among social movement organizations, the complex relationship between leaders and constituents (Schwartz 1976; Schwartz et al 1981). In another vein, it connects to an old topic of sociological inquiry: the unintended consequences of purposive action (Merton 1936; Tilly 1996); a problem that has been noted but little explored empirically in the social movement's literature (cf. Deng 1997). Taking a longer-term perspective, we can conclude that one of the factors constraining mobilization in 2009 was the mobilization of 2003. A transgressive contention at one point in time might, paradoxically, preclude mobilization years later, even when grievances may be very similar.

These changes in processes of identification were also matched with changes in processes of blame-assignment. In 2003, blame was clearly directed at soy growers and the provincial government, but some years later blaming processes were not that clear. In 2003, elite members attributed peasants' ailments to their "lack of hygiene", in an attempt to "blame the victim" that caused further contention. In 2009, in turn, some small farmers reproduced this point of view, showing that some elites' evaluations were becoming common sense, at least among some of the people in Monte Azul and Curuzú. Two instances during my fieldwork exemplify this change in blaming assignment: an informal chat that turned into a heated discussion between Nélida and Nina (one of her sisters who does not participate in MoCaFor); and a conversation with smallholders participating in a farmers market in Curuzú.

It is a Sunday mid-morning and Nina and her husband Mariano pay a visit to Nélida's in her farm and house, where I am dwelling. We bring some chairs and gather to chat and drink mate. Mariano says that a neighbor rented his field, adding that they "surely will grow soybeans" and he says soy growers brought a mosquito (the fumigating machine) that is taller than the one used before. Mariano says that with that machine they are going to "fill the grass with poison" ("*van a llenar de veneno los pastos*") and the animals would not be able to feed themselves. Nina says that is *their* fault, because neighbors rent their fields to grow soybeans "and if you invite a thief into your home, then you cannot complain if you are robbed" ("*Y si vos dejás entrar un ladrón a tu casa después no te vas a quejar de que te roban*"). Nélida intervenes, eagerly arguing that *the government* is to blame and not the people; the government allows businessmen to go there and produce soy, "without controlling the use of poisons". Nélida nonetheless was cautious about the rights of soy growers, "You can't go there and tell them how they should work, that's their right", but "the government should control them." Nina keeps annoying Nélida, adding that

“now people are not willing to work, they just want money, a little wage” (“*un sueldito*”); in the past people was more willing to work, “everybody had their corn, their manioc, their vegetables, but not now, no, they don’t work the land.” Nélida gets aroused again: “but people have no tools to work, the government does not give anything!” Nina stands her ground, remarking that “them”, emphasizing the word, are guilty (the neighbors), because if everybody gets together and would not let soy growers be there, they would not have problems. “But people prefer to rent the land rather than work it themselves, so *they* have to be blamed”. “No, that’s not true, the *government* has the blame,” says Nélida shaking her head, walking to the kitchen to bring more water for the mate.

In 2008 I approached smallholders from Monte Azul participating in a weekly farmers’ market in Curuzú, different from the one organized by MoCaFor. When I bring up the 2003 protest in our conversation, they say many people “saw the opportunity and joined, expecting to get some money out if it.” One of them comments that the agrochemicals are harmless, “that’s why the government approved them” and that

> If you are in your plot and you use something affecting me, I have to reclaim to *you*. Why should you ask the government to pay if the damage was done by someone else?

One of them is a former policeman and told me that in the protests “everything was politics, all politics.” He went on to say, while the other two smallholders nodded, that the skin rashes attributed to agrochemical exposure were

> because of a lack of hygiene. The doctors went to the community and they did the analyses, they took blood samples, and turned out everyone is healthy. I have a lump in my back, but I don’t pay attention to it, you have to die from something, right?

When I visited Monte Azul and Curuzú in 2010, I attended a public talk organized by MoCaFor to raise awareness about the dangers of agrochemicals, which shows that the issue is still important for MoCaFor. They are still worried about the hazards posed by agrochemical use because even when the company growing soybeans in 2003 left the area, other agro-businessmen rented fields and continue to produce GM soybeans. Furthermore, an enormous feed-lot (where livestock is fattened with soybeans instead of being grass-fed) was being built in the area,

spurring worries among locals. A generalized feeling, mixing despair and resignation, seemed to permeate small farmers living in Monte Azul regarding their future and the effects of contamination. Emilia, one of the peasants affected by agrochemicals in 2003, encapsulates people's feelings in a telling metaphor: "they are killing us with a wooden knife; they don't kill you at once but little by little" ("*nos están matando con un cuchillo de madera; como que no te matan de una vez, sino de a poco*").

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I explained both the emergence of events of transgressive contention and its absence by paying attention to the (mis)recognition of contamination and peasants; the alliances in which social movements become embedded; and took into account people's views on the effectiveness of transgressive collective action and environmental damage. I examined people's "frames" of the situation while avoiding "the tendency to focus on frames as 'things' rather than on the dynamic processes associated with their social construction, negotiation, contestation, and transformation" (Benford 1997: 415). As Robert Benford, one of the creators of the "framing perspective," rightly asserts: "Movement scholars have been more inclined to attend to frames rather than to framing" (ibidem).

In 2003, peasants constructed a mobilizing frame by blaming the provincial government for the contamination, claiming that authorities failed to oversee soy production and to provide protection for the affected peasants. In 2009, by contrast, the articulation of an oppositional framing was constrained by the state's recognition of the agrochemical exposure. Furthermore, as a result of new alliances in which peasant organizations became involved, the delegitimization of road blockades as form of collective action, and the meager results of the 2003 mobilizations, peasants privileged negotiation and collaboration as forms of problem solving over transgressive contention. When contamination was lived as suddenly imposed, political actors were unresponsive, and the social movement was united and strong, oppositional elements gained "resonance" and transgressive contention followed. In turn, when contamination became routinized, political actors were sensitive to people's demands, and transgressive contention was

seen as ineffective and tainted with suspicion, negotiation and collaboration were privileged over collective action.

In 2003, blame for the contamination was assigned to provincial authorities because of their lack of oversight of soy production and a lack of adequate "help" to protect peasants from a threat and compensate them for their losses. In 2009, a very different state response at the national and provincial levels combined with local changes in processes of blame- and threat-assignment, precluding collective actions. This shows that "As challengers seek to transform existing meaning in discursive practices to articulate senses of injustice, make claims, and establish alternative visions, they also remain bounded by the field and the genres within which they struggle" (Steinberg 1999a: 213). In the cases analyzed in this chapter, making the state the responsible agent for problem solving mobilized peasants in 2003 but it became increasingly unsuccessful as a "mobilizing frame" when state officials acted differently in 2009. In order to appeal to bystanders and supporters, social movement members use the idiom and a problem-solving approach, achieving a "cultural resonance" (Kubal 1998). However, and by the same token, this strategy posed problems for successful mobilizing processes later in time.

In the next chapter, I present two other cases of agrochemical exposure and contention taking place in 2003. By doing so, I substantiate the argument of this chapter by showing that the factors explaining the transgressive contention in Monte Azul in 2003 (and its absence in 2009) also explain events of transgressive and contained contention in other rural communities of the province.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSGRESSIVE AND CONTAINED CONTENTION IN MORENO AND BERMELLON

In this chapter you will read about the taking over of a crop duster airplane in the town of Moreno and the reactions of inhabitants of Bermellon to agrochemical drifts in their area. A group of leaders and activists of Moreno traveled to Monte Azul in February 2003 to support fellow MoCaFor members. Upon their return to their town, they promoted a series of meetings to tackle the use of agrochemicals in their area: there were a number of complaints among MoCaFor constituents about the effects of air fumigations in soy fields on their farms, children's health problems, and the appearance of dead animals. After experiencing first-hand the problems engendered by an environmental onslaught in Monte Azul, activists in Moreno decided to do something about the situation in their area. The neglect of the problems brought about by the environmental contamination, publicized by a local radio station, further enraged MoCaFor members. They sought support from the mayor, but she refused to respond to their pleas. When the mayor left the town for a trip, peasants garnered support from the interim mayor, a recently elected councilwoman. A multitude of peasants marched to the local airport, seized the airplane soy growers were using to fumigate fields, and stayed there for a week refusing to return the aircraft. After tense negotiations, soy growers promised to change their methods of fumigation, the airplane was returned, and demonstrators vacated the airport.

In Bermellon, also in 2003, agrochemical drifts and the sudden appearance of dead fish in a nearby lake prompted public meetings of concerned small-farmers and municipal authorities; yet no transgressive contention took place. Soy growers in Bermellon were using an aircraft to fumigate their fields; they also washed their agricultural machinery in a nearby lake, causing the sudden and massive death of fish. The houses of local small farmers were also sprayed with agrochemicals causing respiratory and skin ailments, especially in children. When public officials downplayed the effects of agrochemical drifts, a former leader of a peasant movement

went to a local radio station and called for a public meeting on the air. Cognizant of the situation in Monte Azul and Moreno, he demanded the municipal council take action and obtained the support of the mayor to organize a public audience. He and other locals organized public meetings, but no transgressive contention took place.

This chapter presents a *synchronic comparison* of the reactions to agrochemical drifts, analyzing the responses of two other rural communities, Moreno and Bermellon, also affected by environmental disasters created by agrochemical drifts in 2003. In doing so, I substantiate the arguments presented in chapter four. Specifically, the cases of Moreno and Bermellon further elaborate the three points presented in the preceding chapter regarding the relationships between demonstrators and authorities, the effectiveness of collective action, and the importance of taking poor people's perspective into account. First, the cases expose that contention was prompted by the lack of recognition by *provincial* authorities and *federal* public officials, and their denial of the environmental damage. Furthermore, these cases show that the support of *local* authorities constituted the "tipping point" transforming outrage and a sense of disrespect into contention. Second, the cases presented here show that the protests of Monte Azul fostered a diffusion process and signaled the effectiveness of collective action –in terms of raising awareness and reasserting the problems created by the contamination. The case of Bermellon demonstrates that when local authorities recognized the problems created by an agrochemical drift people organized events of *contained* contention. This case also illustrates the constraints to collective action posed by the lack of a social movement organization.[92]

Seen together, both cases also enhance the argument presented in the previous chapter regarding the importance of taking into account poor people's perspectives when considering cases of environmental damage. Specifically, these cases (especially in Moreno) show that grievances surrounding contamination affecting poor people are less inspired by an articulated environmental discourse than by the quest to solve pressing survival needs. The ways in which people in Moreno talked about GM soybean production and environmental contamination highlights that, like in Monte Azul, the rank-and-file of the movement were more concerned about the threats to their survival than the production of transgenic crops *per se*.

---

[92] Contained contention refers to cases "in which all parties are previously established actors employing well established means of claim making;" whereas transgressive contention "consist of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects (…) and at least some parties employ innovative collective action (…) [i.e.] means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 7-8). For a detailed description and the discussion of these concepts, see Chapter One.

CONTAMINATION AND TRANSGRESSIVE CONTENTION IN MORENO

Moreno is a small town of nearly 5,000 inhabitants, located in the center-north region of the province of Formosa. The town grew around a national route that connects it to the province's capital (at 160 miles), and it is located 16 miles from Pilcomayo river, the border between Argentina and Paraguay (see maps 2 and 3). Eight "colonies" (rural communities) surround Moreno; its unpaved streets reflect the town's relatively recent urbanization. The first elementary school in the area opened in 1961 in one of the nearby colonies, and Moreno's first elementary school was built two years later. The local police station was also created in 1963, the year that marks the official birth of the town. The national route connecting Moreno to the west of the province was paved in 1964 –yet paved eastward in 1997. Between 1965 and 1968 a federal office of the civil registry (office of vital records) and a community health center were created; the neighbor's commission organized in 1970 became a municipality in 1982. Two other institutional landmarks took place in the 1970s: the opening of a branch of the provincial bank in 1975 and the creation of a high school in 1977.

Most economic activity in the region revolves around agricultural and livestock production. The area reproduces the economic structure of the province (see section on Formosa in chapter three): large ranches breeding cattle to be "exported" to the Pampas region, companies exploiting the local forests, and small farms of peasant families growing cotton as cash-crop. The area, however, presents some particularities: small farmers grow vegetables for self consumption (as in the rest of the province), but they also grow sweet potatoes, watermelons, and pumpkins to be sold as "novelty" –that is, to reach the market before the production from other, southern provinces. In 1975, the opening of a state-owned local facility to process cotton fiber reflected the efforts of the Peronist administration of 1973-1976 to improve the prices paid to small farmers selling their cotton in an oligopsonistic market (one with many sellers and few buyers)[93]. This facility was privatized in 1979, during the military government (Rofman et al 1987: 20) and in the midst of the first phase of neoliberalization in Argentina. It was transformed into a

[93] A document issued in 1974 by the national government and significantly entitled "First Agreement of the Triennial Plan for the National Reconstruction and Liberation with the Province of Formosa," declared among its objectives that "it is considered a priority the solution to the problems deriving from a trading system that does not guarantee the producer a fair retribution and consequently limits the possibilities for reinvestment, channeling out of the province the wealth generated in it."

cooperative in 1982 but in 1994 the cooperative was sold to private investors, during the years of neoliberalization (see chapter three).

During the 1970s, the area was the site of a high level of organization and contention: grassroots and local organizations affiliated to the ULiCaf (the Formosan Peasant Leagues) took over lands in a large *latifundio*, provoking unease between the provincial leaders of the Leagues and the provincial government (see Roze 1992: 105-6). As in the rest of Formosa and the country, popular and contentious organizations were harshly repressed by the military government of 1976-1983. Since the years of democratization initiated in 1983, the institutional-political sphere in Moreno has reflected the provincial dynamics. When walking the streets of the town, the strong presence of patronage is represented by significant symbols. For each and every public work (school, hospitals, roads) big signboards remind the passerby that those improvements are made by the governor. For instance, when arriving to the main square of the town, a gigantic signboard with the title "A commitment with the people" ("*Un compromiso con la gente*") is signed "Gildo Insfrán government," with the first name of the governor in big capital letters. In the same square, a bust shows no reference to the represented historical figure yet a bronze plate reads: "Construction work [of the] municipal square. Governor Dr. Gildo Insfrán, Vice-governor Dr. Floro Bogado." Like the province as a whole, Moreno has been a stronghold of the Peronist Party. Since the democratization process begun in 1983, the municipal government has been controlled by the Peronist Party, alternating between different factions; the same politicians (and their family members) appear time and again as mayors and municipal council members. The first elected mayor for the period 1983-1987, Armando Espinillo, was elected again in 1999 –although he stepped down from his position in 2001, in favor of his wife and councilwoman Violeta Paloza. Espinillo regained his position as mayor for the period 2007-2011. Between 1987 and 1999 the municipality was controlled by the leader of the other Peronist faction, Caldera. In Moreno and its area of influence, political power is also intertwined with economic power. Cabral, another political boss of the area, is a large landowner whose father acquired lands during the military dictatorship by evicting peasant families with precarious land titles. As I detail below, the expansion of GM soybeans production in the area exposed the interpenetration between economic and political power.

GM Soy Production in Moreno

GM soybeans production arrived in Moreno around the same time as in Monte Azul, in the early 2000s. Like in Monte Azul, farmers and agri-businessmen from the *Pampas* region rented plots of land in the area, but in Moreno Formosan landowners also begun to plant soybeans. Many of these local landowners were (and still are) local politicians. One of them is Cabral, a provincial representative (*diputado*) that lives in Moreno. During my fieldwork I interviewed Omar, a middle-aged man of strong complexion and callous hands, working in one of Cabral's land plots of 140 hectares (346 acres). He explained to me the way that weeds are managed in the fields, providing insights as to why soybean production in the area uses not only glyphosate (the active ingredient in Round-Up Ready, Monsanto's Co. widely used agrochemical) but also 2.4D, a more toxic and harmful agrochemical. Omar explained to me that the climate in Formosa promotes the growth of weeds that are uncommon in the temperate climate of the *Pampas* region (Formosa has a sub-tropical climate). Soybean growers in the area use 2.4D because they would have to use large quantities of glyphosate to destroy persistent weeds: Omar explained to me that a quart of 2.4D will do the work of 20 liters of glyphosate. To fumigate the fields, workers used a tank of 3 thousand liters in which they mixed 60 liters of glyphosate, 25 liters of 2.4D, plus sulphosate and other chemicals to regulate the water's ph level. After the fumigations, he found several dead foxes and armadillos. Omar said that "I told the agronomists and the owner to plow the land instead of using so many chemicals, but they didn't pay attention to me… The agronomists want to sell their products."

This intensive use of agrochemicals is not necessarily a secret, as it is openly declared to the media by agrarian engineers working for soybean companies in the area. Very recently, a consortium of farmers and agri-businessmen rented 3,500 hectares in the surroundings of Moreno (more than 8,600 acres), to grow soybeans during winter. In Formosa, soy growers can take advantage of the sub-tropical climate of the province, extending their annual period of operation from six to nine months. In a story published in a newspaper of national circulation, the agrarian engineer in charge of the production said that the treatment of "diseases" in soy plants grown in Formosa was "more demanding."[94] Therefore, he continued, they had to apply two extra agrochemicals: strobilurin and triazole. The strobilurin pesticides are regarded as "a

[94] See newspaper *La Nación*, January 16 2010.

family of relatively safe pesticides in terms of acute, chronic, and long-term effects" yet they are "toxic to fish and aquatic invertebrates."[95] Triazole, in turn, is considered by the EPA to be a carcinogen chemical, and a suspected endocrine disruptor.[96] It is a potential water contaminant and raises serious concerns regarding its negative effects on fish and other aquatic organisms.[97]

Like in Monte Azul, agri-businessmen in Moreno rented several plots of land placed in between small farms of peasant families. One of these agri-businessmen rented nearly 2,000 hectares (almost 5,000 acres) divided in plots of 80-100 hectares each (200-250 acres). In 2003 soybean growers used a fumigation plane to spray herbicides for weed control. Aerial fumigations are prone to produce agrochemical drifts: "under normal circumstances in developed countries, 20 to 80 percent of sprays applied land outside the targeted field and may injure non-target crops twenty miles downward (…) under specially adverse conditions, investigators have shown that 95 percent can miss the field" (Wright 2005: 20). Isaías and his family suffered the effects of herbicide drifts first hand. I interviewed him on his farm, in one of the colonies nearby Moreno. He is in his fifties, and has the hardened and wrinkled skin of a man who has worked the land his whole life under the ruthless Formosan sun. He proudly tells me that he was "born and raised" in the area; his parents had a farm nearby and he managed to buy his own plot of land. Isaías still gets agitated when recalling how the aerial fumigations reached his farm, saying "This is not an area to use an airplane, they're crazy!" His farm is located in between two of the plots soybean growers rented and each time the plots were sprayed the herbicides reached his house and crops. His daughter was seven years old at the time; she fainted on several occasions and had sudden episodes of nausea after the fumigations. Isaías also begun to notice that his cotton plants were losing their cotton balls and new sprouts were not growing, and his manioc plants presented many withered leaves. He went to the police station in Moreno to file a complaint and three days later a policeman arrived at his farm accompanied by a public official from the ministry of production. They observed his crops but did not tell him what (or if) they would take any action. Isaías did not harbor many expectations about any sanctions or warnings that would reach soy growers, since "The people from the ministry were with them," as he told me.

[95] Electronic Data Information Source, University of Florida, at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pi104
[96] See http://www.pesticideinfo.org/Summary_Chemical.jsp?Rec_Id=PC34917
[97] Electronic Data Information Source, University of Florida, at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pi105

The suspicions Isaías articulated were well founded for several reasons. One of the neighboring soy growers is the nephew of the provincial minister of production; moreover, the water tank and the tractor that belonged to the municipality were used by soy growers to carry water from Moreno to their private fields. Soy growers hired a company from Buenos Aires to perform the aerial fumigations, but the municipality gave them permission to use the local airstrip to land and refill the airplane with agrochemicals. This site was the scenario of a transgressive contention, which I take up in turn.

The Lead-Up to Contention

As you read in the previous chapter, a group of MoCaFor members from Moreno travelled to Monte Azul to support their fellow smallfarmers in their conflict with soy growers. Moreno activists provided crucial support to organize blockades there, and then returned to their town when the conflict subsided. The contamination in Moreno differed somewhat from that which occurred in Monte Azul: in the latter the sudden agrochemical drift damaged the crops of a group of families at the same time –although, retrospectively, they realized they had been affected by herbicide exposure before they were able to see its effects simultaneously. The experience of seeing the deleterious consequences of agrochemical exposure first hand and the controversies aired in the media had a crucial role in agglutinating the grievances of peasant families of Moreno.

During an interview I held with members of MoCaFor in the storehouse that functions as the office of the organization, they told me that "the members of the movement asked about the situation and said we had to do something." When I asked them to elaborate on how these requests were made, they told me that they received comments asking what could be done,

> *Kiko* – …and then the news reaching the region through the papers. Other comments were transmitted on the radio. People thus listen, know, and find out. People ignoring what fumigation was bringing about didn't approach us. But those who knew, they did come.
>
> *Pablo* – And they were approaching you [the MoCaFor].

> *Kiko* – To find out how it was, [to see] what could be done and what the consequences were.

The worries created in Moreno by the first-hand witnessing of herbicide exposure in Monte Azul were also reflected in a police report:

> Legal proceedings were instituted demanding fumigation be stopped until the kind of 'poison' utilized in soy field fumigation could be determined since they feared the same consequences that other towns had to face, where the utilization of this kind (of soybeans) supposedly brought about different kinds of damage (to plants and animals).[98]

The point was stated in similar terms by Benito García (the leader of MoCaFor in Moreno), in a judiciary report:

> They took notice that in other towns of the province these kind of fumigations had damaged the agricultural production in various ways, affecting the inhabitants' health and the environment; this is the reason why concern prevails and it is feared that that same damage could be caused in our jurisdiction since people in charge of the fumigations are using the same agrochemicals that had already brought harm elsewhere.[99]

Nelson is a skinny yet strong-looking man, with pronounced wrinkles on the sides of his vivacious eyes, who speaks with a thick country accent and interjects Guaraní words. When I asked him if his farm was fumigated he replied that he was not affected, but that in Monte Azul

> In some cotton fields leaves fell off because of the glyphosate and other... agrochemicals were too strong. A devastating substance... And what do we know; we know nothing about agrotoxics or agrochemicals... Yet according to the chemical analysis it was a fulminant thrown into the soil so that they could sow soy again. And that was the battle we had to fight.

He nicely summarized the connection between the support for the conflict in Monte Azul and the lead-up to the conflict in Moreno:

[98] Police note in the judiciary demand folio 01, sheet 06.

[99] Deposition of Benito García in the police station of Moreno, as recorded in the judiciary demand, folio 4, sheet 13.

> I remember page after page, since we withstood cold, heat, hunger, exhaustion, all. At first the conflict originated in Monte Azul. The soybean growers would come to fumigate glyphosate and some other substances. They would sprinkle herbicides onto the soil to destroy weeds, and then they would sow soybean seeds. (...) And we had the opportunity to go [to Monte Azul] to fight alongside with them, to strive, to block roads, to make demands. And between protest and protest we came back on a Thursday, we got here very tired and realized that the plane was also fumigating nearby.

Kiko Martínez is a stocky man always wearing a cap, a sort of "mandatory accessory" for the people working in the sunny fields of Formosa. Many people I talked to regarded him as a hard working man, knowledgeable about agricultural production and always on top of his farm. The following excerpt from our interview nicely ties the influence of witnessing the effects of contamination in other areas with the evaluation of the agrochemical exposure as a threat to peasants' survival:

> Pablo – I'd like you to tell me how the plane was seized... How was the day to day…? How did the idea of doing something first come to mind?
>
> Kiko – It was due to the need for stopping the harm that all this was bringing about, the kind of fumigation that was carried out. We realized we needed to bring this to a halt at all costs. We had seen in other colonies, in other areas of the province, that there were bad consequences to the fumigation. So in our area we decided to seize the plane as a means to defend the people and the production a bit, that is, the families' subsistence. Because if we didn't act and let everything go on as it was happening, people may have not been able to subsist. In general poor people live on from what they produce in their farms. Those fumigations would make a waste of everything. People wouldn't be able to subsist.

From Requests to Transgressive Contention

The anxieties spurred by media accounts of the contamination in Monte Azul and MoCaFor members witnessing first-hand the effects of herbicide exposure motivated the organization of meetings to address the situation. After the first meeting between MoCaFor members and some of the affected peasants, they decided to present a request to the mayor of Moreno, Violeta Paloza. Paloza was a councilwoman who took office as mayor in 2001, when her husband resigned from his position as elected mayor. MoCaFor members presented a formal note in the municipality, demanding a stop to the fumigations. Nelson described the attitude of Paloza in the

following terms: "she told us she didn't know what soybean growers were doing (…) So, she was erasing with one hand what she was writing with the other" ("*ella nos decía que se le escapa del conocimiento de ella, que ella no conocía lo que estaban haciendo los sojeros. (...) O sea, que quería borrar con el codo lo que hacía con la mano*"). Dismissed by the mayor, peasants decided to file a complaint with the police, yet to no avail. As Kiko explained to me:

> We went there and they told us "you have to decide on what to do, as you like. We cannot do anything. We have sent the message to the people at the top, but nothing happened. You will have to make your own decisions." And we've always sought no bad conflict, not doing anything wrong. We've only tried to solve that problem.

The mayor knew peasants were uneasy and that a direct action could take place (the events of transgressive contention organized by MoCaFor in Monte Azul were, by then, common knowledge). To avoid losing face with provincial authorities if a contentious event erupted, the mayor left the town, leaving the president of the city council, Nancy Valente, in charge. Valente did not belong to the Peronist party and was more receptive towards the peasants' claims. She received the complaints of MoCaFor members and decided to issue a municipal note, through the police, ordering a suspension of fumigations until further notice –using a respectful and measured language.[100] Soy growers, however, continued with the aerial fumigations. I interviewed Valente in 2008, in the bodega she opened in Moreno after she retired from politics. It is worthwhile to quote her at length, since her description of the situation highlights the sense of disrespect and misrecognition that, I argue, prompted peasants to turn to transgressive contention:

> They didn't respect the note, or the police or anything. Because for sure they thought "she's not from the Party [Justicialista], we are fine with the government" and they went on doing their thing. That enraged the peasants. They told me "*Señora*, they keep fumigating, we already listened to the radio, and we saw the note you signed." Because I had given them a copy of what I had submitted to the police, asking for the fumigation to be suspended until the misunderstanding was clarified, if it was a misunderstanding at all, so that at least they explained what they were using, what poison they were spreading. Then the soy growers said 'no'

[100] The note reads: "In my capacity as acting mayor of the Municipality of Moreno, I am pleased to inform you that the aerial fumigation will be momentarily suspended in our town and its surrounding areas. I request you to communicate this decision to those who are carrying out the tasks through the personnel under your supervision."

> and kept doing it, they said they couldn't stop... The peasants took the plane because fumigations never stopped, not caring if somebody else was concerned or if the authorities allowed them, nothing... Besides, they went to the local radio station and they were aggressive, treated us as ignorant and all. We were told to modernize, to leave the Old Age in which we were stuck, that things were currently done this way, and that the extensions would reach thousands of hectares, not just a few hectares…

Isaías, whose farm and family were repeatedly sprayed with agrochemicals, connected the sense of disrespect and being dismissed with the feelings of anger motivating peasants' actions:

> Isaías – The police and the mayor were notified, everyone was, so that they wouldn't go on, but the soy growers replied they couldn't do anything. Then, since they didn't respect; we knocked down...
>
> Pablo – How did you participate in the seizing of the plane?
>
> Isaías – We held a meeting to figure out how to stop the plane. They had told us they couldn't stop it, since they had received orders from the Ministry. So would the mayor said and none would respond. The engineer said he had come to work and that none would stop him. And this made the people angry.
>
> Pablo – What was the meeting like?
>
> Isaías – Well…we didn't want the plane to work on the area, because it was causing damage. They wouldn't, so to speak, respect us willingly. We talked nicely: to the police, to the mayor, and they kept fumigating, kept doing what they wanted. So we decided to seize the plane.

A police note also expressed the disregard of soy growers towards the order of putting a halt to fumigations and the anger felt by peasants: "The representatives of the company were notified of the request for such suspension. However, the fumigation went on, enraged by this the people decided to occupy the place in question, demanding the presence of the Minister of Production and a qualified person in the matter."[101]

These excerpts summarize what peasants were thinking and feeling at the time: dismissed by authorities, disrespected by soy growers fumigating indiscriminately, and only recognized as a vestige from the past doomed to disappear, they decided to act collectively and address the

[101] Police note in the judiciary demand, folio 02, sheet 07.

problem on their own. After a meeting where a representative of the soybean growers told peasants that fumigations would not stop, peasants attempted to organize a new meeting with soy growers. When the latter did not show up, and another representative of soy growers appeared on the local radio denying that herbicides were harmful and acting "with arrogance" (as it was put by several interviewees), peasants decided to march to the local airstrip and stop the fumigating airplane. On the evening of February 28, members of MoCaFor and a group of peasant families affected by agrochemical exposure gathered to discuss what to do about the problem. Determined to do something, they walked from Moreno to the airstrip used by the fumigating airplane, located on the outskirts of the town. Once there, they found one of the employees of the soybean growers seated in a pick-up truck. An activist from MoCaFor got into the truck and told the employee to stay calm, while other activists secured the entrance to the airstrip with a chain and a lock. Shortly after, the airplane landed in the airstrip and the crowd swooped over it. They removed the pilot out from the cockpit, escorted him to the truck, and locked both employees inside it, while others slashed the airplane's tires. Peasants created a bonfire and improvised tents preparing to spend the night there. At nightfall, a group of policemen showed up on the scene. The protestors received them with a firm and adamant attitude, saying that if the police attempted to break into the place to evict them, they would set the airplane on fire. Some hours later, demonstrators got in touch with their lawyer, who recommended letting the employees go. They followed the advice but remained camped on the site, demanding the presence of provincial authorities and representatives from the soybean growers.

During that same night, councilwoman (and interim mayor) Valente paid a visit to the airport escorted by the police and her aids. She wanted to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict and, interestingly, framed her intervention in terms of reciprocity: "I went to talk to the people… to ask them to stop the airplane but not to do anything else. To ask them, personally, because I took the risk of stopping the fumigations." ("*Me fui… a hablar con la gente de que demoren el avión, o que atajen, pero que no hagan otra cosa. A pedirles personalmente, como yo con ellos me jugué a suspender la fumigación*"). Members of MoCaFor and supporters remained in the airport for a week, waiting for a confirmation that fumigations would cease if they returned the airplane. They organized a soup kitchen with food donated by supporters, and entire families, including women and children, stopped by the place to get a plate of food. Valente contributed by organizing a breakfast with *mate cocido* (a kind of tea made of *yerba mate*).

Indicative of the importance of food provision during poor people's demonstrations, Valente explained to me that she provided food

> so they can eat breakfast, so that they are appeased, so that dialogue is restored... I cannot go add more fuel to the fire or anything like that. And because of that they said I supported the peasants. No one can dialogue with an emboldened group or person if you confront them. So they calmed down, understood, people talked, and the fumigation was over.

I asked MoCaFor members why they decided to camp in the airport, instead of just organizing a protest. This is what they told me:

> Otherwise they would have loaded the chemicals again and they would have started all over. That is another reason why the guys decided to stay. Until the plane takes off and leaves for good; because the plane could go back to the fields to fumigate if it didn't leave. That's why we decided to camp.

When visited by councilwoman Valente, demonstrators clearly stated their commitment by saying they "won't give up, even if we get killed, because what's the point? We will have to suffer throughout the whole year [because of the lost crops]. We will die on our feet" ("*No vamos a aflojar así nos tengan que matar a todos… total, ¿de qué nos sirve? Que nos queda vivir si ya todo el año vamos a pasar mal. Vamos a morir parados*"). Upon the return of the mayor, representatives of the provincial government and the soy growers approached the airport to negotiate with the peasants. Under the agreement reached, the peasants would vacate the airport and return the airplane, while soy growers signed a document reassuring demonstrators that they would suspend the aerial fumigations. The owner of the airplane verified the state of the machine, under the attentive vigilance of MoCaFor members who pushed the airplane outside the airport and left it there ("We surrounded him, he was being watched; we made sure he checked his airplane, and went away, that's it. So we pushed the airplane to the route and just left it there.") After these events, peasant leaders and activists were accused of kidnapping and destruction of private property. Although later on they were acquitted, the judiciary demand confirms the transgressive character of the direct action.

Environmental Problems and Poor People's Perspective

Before moving to the next case (contained collective action in Bermellon) allow me to briefly analyze how peasants evaluate the environmental problems they faced in 2003. A close examination of fieldnotes and interviews reveals a contrast between how the process is seen by leaders and the movement's rank-and-file. Whereas the former frame the cases of contamination and the production of genetically modified crops as an advance of agribusiness over natural resources, the latter tend to see the situation in slightly (but significant) different terms. Most poor peasants do not object to the production of GM soybeans or the use of agrochemicals in and of themselves, but instead are troubled when both affect their own crops and thus pose a threat to their daily survival. Furthermore, in several interviews and everyday conversations I repeatedly heard the phrase "I reckon they're working," referring to soybean growers and their use of agrochemicals. In so doing, peasants recognized the right of soybean growers to work their lands as they please, and seemed to express certain empathy for people (like them) earning their income by working the land –an always uncertain activity highly dependent on the weather, where timing (for plowing the land, sowing, and harvesting) is key to ensure a proper yielding.

It took me some time to gain an interview with Benito García, the main leader of MoCaFor. He is a man in his early thirties, who speaks softly but firmly, rarely smiles, and conveys a certain sense of mistrust. Everyone who I spoke to (even his political enemies) regard him as a skillful leader, savvy in the construction of alliances yet permanently "looking over his shoulder" –which should not come as a surprise, in a province where the patronage networks of the governor maintain a permanent surveillance on every political and social organization that may defy their preeminence. Benito spends most of the year travelling to Buenos Aires and other provinces, obtaining resources from the national state and attending meetings with other social movements. In one of my visits to Moreno, I finally met him but it was still hard to find time to talk privately: he is constantly taking care of paperwork for the organization, talking on his cell phone to coordinate visits to other parts of the province, and giving directions to MoCaFor members on how to solve problems or take care of specific issues. When we were finally able to sit down for a conversation, he gave me his view on the problems faced by the organization: "the struggle is very hard; the agribusiness model is being imposed at any price… Soybean

production is the imposition of the agribusiness and the appropriation of natural resources." As the spokesperson of MoCaFor, he presented similar ideas to journalists:

> We see transgenics as the invader displacing us, taking the soil from us, poisoning the environment, producing the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.[102]

In that and other interviews, he linked the advance of genetically modified crops to a broader agricultural system dominated by transnational corporations. For instance, in another interview he said:

> We are against this system of concentration, genetic manipulation, this way of production, the transnationalization of companies that commercialize the supplies for agricultural production.[103]

Benito's articulated discourse contrasts with the ideas about the production of genetically modified crops that I noticed in poor peasants, the rank-and-file of MoCaFor. Whereas in Benito's view the focus is on the dangers of economic concentration and the expansion of agribusiness, lay peasants regard transgenic crops as a menace *only as long as it threatens their daily survival*. For instance, when I asked Isaías at what moment he filed a complaint for the damage in his crops he replied that he did so "when the flowers began to fall, and the cotton balls withered. Just then. Why should I do it before that? If it wasn't affected, I wouldn't make the complaint. ("*cuando empezó a caer la floración y empezó a secarse la bochita. Ahí recién. ¿Antes para qué? Si no se hubiera perjudicado yo no hacia la denuncia"*). He went on comparing the situation with previous years, when fumigations were done using a "mosquito," a tractor-drawn sprayed rig (the fumigation method used in Monte Azul):

> In the previous years a mosquito [fumigator] arrived in the area. No one bothered it. We did not bother a single farmer. The job was done correctly and it left. Soybeans are being sowed there, behind those woods: the owner goes with his tractor and he bothers no one. I am not against farming, but the fumigation cannot be done in the fields with an airplane in a colony.

[102] Interviewed by the Agencia Periodística del Mercosur.
[103] Interviewed by María Inés Aiuto for Indymedia.

Furthermore, I asked Isaías what happened with soy growers in his area after the fumigating airplane left Moreno, and this is what he said:

> They harvested their soy. No one interfered with his work. The only problem was the plane. It is said that soy ruins this, or that it has ruined that one, but that, at least personally, has not happened to me. If someone rents his soil, he's the owner; he ought to know what he's doing.

Similar views were expressed by other members of MoCaFor. For example, in the following excerpt Nelson nicely connects his views on how fumigations should be done with the subordinate position of peasants:

> It was verified that the fumigation affected the animals, the humans, and the plantations, and that was the problem. The thing is the soy growers *did* stop. We could stop them in this area. *We let them work, as long as they use a [fumigating] backpack, correctly, not too much; but they weren't respecting anything*. The loads in the plane would sprinkle everywhere, a workmate would have his cistern, his house all sprayed with poison. We also denounced this but... *you see, we are peasants, we are useless, and they are the ones in charge,* the one in power is the one who controls, the one at the wheel, who does whatever he wants. The one working the soil only screams. That's how it happened.

Nelson clearly stated the point of not being bothered by GM crops *per se* by saying: "What we are asking them is to sow in the country, far from the populated areas. But they came to spray the town, the farmhouses. That was the battle we had to fight." He went on saying that "I don't care if they grow soybeans, but I'm bothered when they contaminate."

This comparison and contrast between the discourse of a social movement leader and the rank-and-file sheds light on important points about social movements, patronage politics, and environmental conflicts –the three main bodies of literatures I engage in this dissertation. First, and regarding social movements, it draws attention to the importance of taking into account the discourses of *both* leaders and the rank-and file. Often times, social movements are reified by either being treated as unitary entities or "things," or by attributing anthropomorphic characteristics to them (when we read that a social movement "thinks *a*" or "does *b*"). Naturally, that language is useful as shorthand, but it should not obscure the internal variations within a movement, or mislead us into taking the discourses of leaders or spokespersons at face value. An attentive ear to these interfaces help to avoid the perils of a "romantic view" of social movements

or the idealization of "resistance" (see Abu-Lughod 1990).[104] Second, as I further explore in the next chapter (on the pressures faced by a social movement in a context dominated by patronage politics), attention to the relationships between leaders and constituents contributes to a better understanding of poor people's movements and their collective actions (or lack thereof). The comparison between discourses of leaders and constituents exposes how poor people's movements intertwine the defense of rights with the struggle to address material needs. The negative effects of agrochemical exposure –the loss of crops used for self-consumption- posed a pressure for leaders, who needed to provide and solve the problems of their constituent's daily survival (as Kiko said when talking about why they took over the airplane: "we decided to seize the plane [because] poor people live on from what they produce in their farms… People wouldn't be able to subsist.")

Third, and regarding GM crop production, it is important to stress that even when peasants said they were mostly bothered by the damage caused to their crops by agrochemicals (and not by the production of genetically modified soybeans *per se*) that does not mean their collective actions are not environmental conflicts. I here take heed of authors that sustain that environmental conflicts can be defined as "any conflict which has at its center the dispute for resources or the externalities derived from its use" (Soto Fernández et. al. 2007: 64, my translation). What this case shows is an instance of the "environmentalism of the poor," that is, an environmentalism that does not respond to "post-materialist values" (Inglehart 1977) but rather "grows out of distribution conflicts over the use of ecological resources needed for livelihood" (Martinez Alier 1995: 70; see also Guha 2000[105]). It is also important, however, to be wary about essentialisms that may be implied in this view. To wit: the "environmentalism of the poor" thesis sustains that peasants "have often coevolved sustainably with Nature" and "ensured the conservation of biodiversity" (Martinez Alier 2002: 11). Formosan peasants have been constructed as a class or group hand in hand with the production of cotton, an activity that demands the use of a myriad of agrochemicals, often times highly toxic. In other words, their ingrained practices are hardly compatible with an idealized version of a "good peasant" in "harmony with nature." And this is not an idiosyncratic characteristic of Formosan peasants: see, for instance, the problems faced by activists of the Landless Movement in Brazil in promoting

[104] I develop this point in chapter six, taking heed of Sherry Ortner's ideas on "ethnographic refusal" (Ortner 2006).
[105] See also the literature on livelihoods research, e.g. Friedmann and Rangan 1993; de Haan and Zoomers 2005; Scoones 2009.

agro-ecological production among peasants historically connected to sugarcane production (Wolford 2003a; 2003b). This argument should not be overstated to the point of cynicism, but I discuss the matter to avoid the perils of idealization (for a critique of romantic views on environmental struggles, see Rangan 2000 and Mawdsley 1998). This argument also reflects, I believe, an ethnographic stance: we need to pay attention not only to public discourses but also to the undercurrents of a social movement and the practices of its members.

CONTAMINATION AND CONTAINED CONTENTION IN BERMELLON

Bermellon is a small town in the center-south of Formosa, with a little more than 4,500 inhabitants and located more than 100 miles from the province's capital. It is surrounded by several "colonies" (rural communities), and closely connected to La Corona –a small city of 15,000 people and 10 miles away, providing access to services not available in Bermellon (for instance, banks and offices of the provincial administration). The area was populated by settlers since the 1930s, following a pattern similar to the one described for Moreno and Monte Azul: a polarized land structure and economic activity dominated by a handful of large cattle ranches and forestry companies, and a large group of small farms occupied by peasant families (Schaller 2008). The distribution of fiscal land among smallholders contributed to a diversified production. Peasant families combined the province's ubiquitous production of cotton with the cultivation of vegetables, not only for self-consumption but also for selling to traders (who re-sold the vegetables in large cities, at around ten times the prices paid to small farmers). The inauguration of a bridge in 1958, over the river that divides Formosa and the neighboring province of Chaco, further connected the area with the rest of the country. In the 1970s, the opening of a local office of INTA, the National Institute of Agrarian Technology (*Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria*) in La Corona contributed to the development of small to medium scale farmers in the region.[106]

The early years of the 1970s also represented a moment of heightened organization among peasants and rural contention in the province and the region. The Peasant Leagues created in several Argentine northeastern provinces (see chapter three) were mirrored in the province by the creation of the Union of Peasant Leagues of Formosa (ULiCaF, *Union de Ligas Campesinas*

[106] On the creation of INTA in the context of the developmentalist state in Argentina, see Sikkink 1991.

de Formosa). Representatives from Bermellon were present in the assemblies organized in 1971 and preceding the creation of ULiCaF (Ferrara 1973: 225). As a matter of fact, the second of these meetings, in May 1971, took place in a locality nearby Bermellon (Ferrara 1973: 228). During the first provincial congress that brought together representatives of the whole province and officially launched the ULiCaF, La Corona was designated as one of the organization's regional centers. As in the rest of the province, local grassroots committees were persecuted during the military dictatorship of 1976-1983.

Since 1983 and with the return of democratically elected authorities in Argentina, local institutional politics followed some of the provincial patterns. Although some elected mayors belonged to the opposition party UCR (in the early years of democratization), the current mayor reproduced the provincial practice of perpetuation in positions of power. Lautaro Schneider has served as a representative in the provincial legislature and has occupied the position of mayor of Bermellon since 1995. He has strong links with the governor –who also has held his position, uninterruptedly, since 1995. Some of the people I interviewed criticized him for being the local link in the machine politics of the governor, yet also highlighted that in recent years he begun to support smallholders' initiatives and, as we will see later, he supported the local complaints against agrochemical drifts.

GM Soy Production and Agrochemicals in Bermellon

As described in chapter three, cotton production began to decline in Formosa in the 1960s, with a sharp expulsion of smallholders from the activity following the deregulation of markets in the 1990s. The data collected by INTA in the rural areas nearby La Corona shows the sharp decline in cotton production. In 1976/77, more than 16,000 hectares (39,500 acres) of cotton were harvested; by the agricultural campaign of 1985/86, that number was reduced to 6,000 hectares (14,800 acres). In 2001/02, only 900 hectares (2,200 acres) were harvested (Schaller 2008). The expansion of Argentina's agricultural frontier in the early 2000s brought the production of GM soybeans to Formosa and the area of La Corona and its surroundings. The availability of relatively cheap land in the province attracted agri-businessmen, since companies producing soybeans in the provinces of the *Pampas* region could extend their cycle of production. By renting land in Formosa (usually for a three-year period and leaving the plot "cleared" for the

owner, i.e. ready to be used again), sowing pools and agro-companies can produce "winter-spring" soybeans. In other words, while soybeans sowed in the *Pampas* are still growing, they can harvest the soybeans in Formosa and thus extend the creation of profits from a six- to a nine-month period.

An interview with a qualified informant offers an account on how this process takes place "on the ground." Norberto Kasper is a tall and loquacious man in his late sixties, who talks about rural life and agricultural production with an unmatched enthusiasm, and has been working in INTA for more than three decades advising farmers on plague management. In June 2009 he received me in his office in the "Experimental Station" of INTA, a handful of chalets on the outskirts of La Corona. He is one of those interviewees you always want to find: a short question about recent changes in agricultural activity in the area gives way to a narrative jumping from food globalization to soybean production to anecdotes of his long-life experience as an extension agent. His amusing manner changes to a serious expression when he describes the recent rampant deforestation of the area.

> There was a property of seven thousand hectares of woodland, they could use it for fifty years of sawmill productivity. What they did instead was to fence and burn. The children had to quit school because of cases of conjunctivitis from the smoke. A livestock auction was put off because of the smoke, too. And here our nature reserve was suddenly full of pumas escaping from the fire. Without the woods the rain takes all the soil…

Norberto provided more details on the agri-businessmen who come to Formosa by reproducing dialogues he had with people getting in touch with him to ask about the availability and quality of lands.

> I ask everyone arriving here what they will be growing and they all say "Soybeans." "Mind you, the soil of Formosa is not good for soy. A 1,000 hectares land is for cattle and woodland." "Can the trees be cut down?" "Well, there are regulations, and it's better to leave the trees because it is wealth, there are animals, there are fence posts." "No, we just want to cut down." So they come here to "Pampeanize" Formosa [to transform it like the *Pampas* region]. And the model from the *Pampas*... should never have been implemented here. Because the soil is rapidly depleted... And they started coming. And they do so with the knowledge from the South [the *Pampas* region]. They do not come with the knowledge from the local producers and technicians. They just ignore it all. They

> arrive with the arrogance of productivism: cut down, clean, and sow soy. The thing is soybeans can be grown by email [in jest], since it's a very easy crop.

Soy growers in the area, like in Moreno, also used an airplane to fumigate their fields. Some of the plots rented by soy growers were located on the border of Bermellon, and when they fumigated their fields they sprayed agrochemicals not only over small farms, but also over people and houses on the outskirts of the town. Norberto gave me details on how agrochemicals affected the reservoirs in the area. Soybean growers emptied a tank used for fumigant pesticides in a lake or in the soil, and rainwater carried the agrochemicals to water streams. As a result, four hundred tons of fish suddenly died in a lake in the area. He explained to me that fish are "markers": since they are highly sensitive to contamination, the sudden appearance of dead fish usually indicates the misuse of agrochemicals. Other animals (for instance, cows) may drink contaminated water and still survive. He went on to tell me that it was common to find dead birds in the area, also due to the contamination in water streams. Norberto presumes (based on his experience and the manner in which fish died) that the agrochemical contaminating the water was Furadan, the trade name of the agrochemical Carbofuran. Carbofuran was banned by the US Environmental Protection Agency in 2009, citing a report issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service asserting carbofuran's negative impact on fish.[107] This agrochemical is soluble in water and has high potential for groundwater contamination (Venkateswarlu and Sethunathan 1984). Granulated carbofuran resembles grain seeds, and is highly toxic for birds and wildlife;[108] extensive research in Canada has shown its negative impact on birds' population (see Mineau 1993; Mineau et al 2005). Carbofuran made international news in 2009, when the program *60 minutes* reported that in Kenya seventy-five lions died from eating baits (placed by poachers) contaminated with this agrochemical.

Norberto did not make any reference to the international fame of Furadan, but instead he shared a telling anecdote reflecting the appropriateness of the term "environmental onslaught" for the use of agrochemicals in Formosa.

---

[107] The National Marine Fisheries Service "concluded that the continued used of carbaryl and carbofuran is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 22 listed pacific salmonids and destroy or adversely modified habitat for 20 of 26 listed salmonids if additional limitations are not imposed on their used." See the report on http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/wtc/biop-ltr-to-jhlecky-may-2010.pdf

[108] "One granule [of carbofuran] is sufficient to kill a small bird. Bird kills have occurred when birds ingested carbofuran granules, which resemble grain seeds in size and shape, or when predatory or scavenging birds have ingested small birds or mammals which had eaten carbofuran pellets" (EPA 1989).

> Here they use Furadan [pesticide] to exterminate parrots, and the fox [after eating one] also dies. A grower, who is a friend of mine, was having problems with a squash pest. He comes to see me and I prescribe a pesticide. The problem is that anyone sells poisons [pesticides]. When the grower leaves, I follow him, because I had been told that a guy was selling everyone Furadan. The grower went there and he asked for the pesticide I had recommended him. [The agrochemical seller tells him] "No, I don't have that one... but use Furadan anyway." I went in and told him "who are you to tell him so? You are wasting away your own future, your family's. Come to INTA [National Agricultural Technology Institute] and I'll tell you what to do." Furadan kills everything. The guy blushed…

Indiscriminate fumigations were creating concerns among some smallholders in the area, mostly those who produced vegetables and fruits using agro-ecological techniques and with a past history of involvement in peasant organizations. It was not until the case of Monte Azul gained public notoriety that they begun to see the individual problems created by fumigations as a public issue.[109] I turn to this process next.

From Individual Problems to a Public Issue

I met Rafael Pevorski in June 2009 on a visit to his farm, located in one of the colonies nearby Bermellon. I got there with the help of Julio, a local leader of MoCaFor in Monte Azul. There is no way to get to the farms in the surroundings of Bermellon without a vehicle, so I was happy to accept Julio's offer to take me there on his motorcycle and help me with my fieldwork. Pedro, Julio's father, was a respected figure in Monte Azul, who befriended several local politicians and contributed to the creation of the local chapter of MoCaFor. Rafael had met Julio's father when Rafael was an active member of MAF, the smallholder's organization preceding MoCaFor (see chapter three). We visited Rafael at his farm on three occasions while staying in the area. I considered the presence of Julio during the interviews with Rafael not as an obstacle but rather as an opportunity. During the conversations, Rafael was not only talking to a sociologist interested in cases of contamination, but I felt that he was also passing along the history of smallholders' struggles to Julio. They had never met before, and Julio heard from Rafael several stories about the MAF's protests of the early 1990s, its enemies and its allies, which offered Julio (who began

[109] On the process of turning private troubles into public issues, see Wright Mills' renowned "The Sociological Imagination" (1959).

to participate in MoCaFor in the early 2000s) useful information about the provincial politics and its organizational field.[110] Furthermore, Julio's interventions during the interviews (when Rafael talked about the role of Bermellon's mayor) also helped me to gain insights on what MoCaFor activists from Monte Azul think and feel about the role of authorities during environmental conflicts.

Taking a walk on Rafael's farm is a learning experience. He has kept several acres with the original areas' woods; the trees are identified with a special number for monitoring by a provincial research group. He produces organic honey, fruits, and vegetables, and his farm is visited by the students of local elementary and high schools to learn about the environment and the importance of conservation.[111] While we walk he describes the names of different trees and their origins, different techniques for growing food without using agrochemicals, and his past, present, and future agro-ecological projects. Rafael's passion for environmentally friendly agriculture and his past history of involvement as a MAF leader help to better understand his actions to organize local citizens counteracting the negative effects of agrochemical exposure.

By the time fumigation began to affect people in and around Bermellon, Rafael had heard about the problems created by the use of agrochemicals in soybean production. As an active agro-ecological farmer, he constantly participates in conferences and meetings throughout the country and receives information from environmental groups. In one of these meetings, he heard a presentation about the negative effects of GM soy production and agrochemicals in a small town in the North of Santa Fe province. In this and other meetings he also received pamphlets on the problems of GM crop production in Argentina and began to be more attentive to the issue (*"Y de ahí yo empecé a parar la oreja*"). A neighbor told him that in Campo Arde, a nearby colony, the use of herbicides had destroyed the cotton field of a smallholder (more on this case below). Some days later, he gave a ride to a relative to the bus station at Bermellon. While there, he told me, "I hear a noise, brrr, brrr… I ask a neighbor, and he tells me it's the fumigating airplane". Rafael visited the soybeans fields on the outskirts of the town, and to his surprise, he found a large group of poor kids watching the airplane's maneuvers. "People went there to see

[110] In what follows, I focus on the cases on environmental contamination and the reactions that followed. Thus, I will not present the stretches of conversation where Rafael elaborated at length on how since the 1990s the Catholic Church and its affiliated NGOs since the 1990s contributed to the demobilization of peasants' social movements, or on how they withdraw their support in key conflicts between peasant movements and the government. However, it was quite telling to see Julio reproducing this discourse in subsequent internal meetings of Mocafor that I witnessed.
[111] On September 2010, a university of the nearby province of Corrientes conferred on Rafael a medal for being "the best conservationist farmer of the Northeast."

the airplane because it was the ‘new thing’… And some kids were soaked, sprayed with chemicals!” During ensuing visits to Bermellon, he was outraged by the sight of a fumigating tractor, with faucets leaking agrochemicals, roaming the streets of the town (for an image of this type of fumigating tractor, see picture 6).

Three instances stirred Rafael’s feelings about the problem and prompted him to turn to concrete action: another case of agrochemical exposure in the area, the news about the conflicts in Monte Azul, and two contentious interactions with locals. In Cabo Noroña, a colony of the area, the sudden appearance of dead fish in a stream motivated the presentation of a complaint by local inhabitants to the representative of the provincial Wildlife Office, located in La Corona. This official got in touch with the local TV network, which covered the incident and sent the report to the provincial network in the city of Formosa. However, the provincial network did not air the report because the minister of production intervened to prevent its diffusion. The Wildlife Office employee was admonished by the minister and he almost lost his job. Around the same time, the news about the conflict in Monte Azul gained public visibility, contributing to increased everyday conversations on the negative effects of soybean production and the use of agrochemicals. These experiences put Rafael on guard; in particular, two conversations with people from the area, showing what he deemed to be a lack of awareness of the problems created by soybean production, made him feel something needed to be done. In the first of these exchanges, Rafael was riding a car service, shared with two other people. Suddenly, the car was passed by a fumigating tractor driving at a high speed. Rafael said he wanted to hit one of the ladies in the car when she said “That’s so nice, so modern… These fumigating machines are so good!” He could not refrain from asking her: “Ma’am, do you know what that is?” “Yes, a fumigating machine”. “No ma’am, that’s death ma’am… But you don’t know what’s happening here, I won’t argue with you,” Rafael replied. A second exchange with a former colleague solidified his ideas about doing something about the situation. One afternoon, Rafael was hoeing his cotton plot when an acquaintance paid him a visit. The visitor wanted to engage Rafael in a national campaign organized by the Argentine association of soybean growers, by which the latter donated GM soybeans to soup kitchens. The campaign was being criticized by environmental NGOs for feeding the poor with transgenic soybeans, which (the NGOs argued) should not be considered food. Allow me to quote Rafael at length, since the way he retold us the story conveys the intense feelings and controversies aroused by the issue:

> He tells me, "I came to invite you to come with me tomorrow to the school; we are going to give a workshop on soy." I knew what it was all about, and what had happened to them [at Monte Azul] and he says "we are going to teach to make meals, soy milk..." "Don't tell me you are involved in that," I said. "Yes," he says; that it was the great solution. "What the fuck!" "Are you serious?" I said. "How could you!? That's the death of the small farmers, this is for the big fish, they are going to screw us, here we have to teach them to grow beans, vegetables, and you propose this!?" And he says, "Are you one of these assholes who are against soybeans?" And we started arguing. "Do you know you can go to hell? I am not going to. You go, I am not. You have to know, who can guarantee that the transgenic soy is harmless?" And he says, "Are you also telling that story these assholes against all keep talking about?" "Yes, I have my doubts. Did you do research? Are the poor going to eat soy?" I told him. "As they are stealing the earth's riches, and this is part of the system, of the model, you go to fuck yourself," I said, "you are about to retire, you have no need to do this, and I'm telling you, this is a tough thing. The AAPRESID guys [Soy Growers Association] are using the state institutions, and you should work for the small farmers. Defending the poor. I always knew you had this intention, now you've changed sides, surely they've given you money." And then he got mad. But what I said was right, his wife was being paid. And he left without saying goodbye.

Still mad about the discussion, Rafael went to the local radio station and made a speech criticizing the initiative, saying things like "While people are starving, they want to donate soybeans, which we don't know if they are suitable for human consumption." Back in his house, Rafael jotted a contentious note to the municipal council ("*Bien, bien picante la hice*", as he told us). In the note, he asked who was going to be responsible for the health problems created by the fumigations and said the local authorities should sue the people causing health problems among the local population. After leaving the note in the municipal council, he went to see the director of the local hospital. He asked the doctor if he recently had received cases of skin rashes, and the doctor replied he had noticed that many kids had recently arrived to the hospital with problems in their eyes, throats, and hands. "That is caused by the fumigations" Rafael told him. "Are you sure?" replied the doctor, and Rafael told him about the cases he heard about in different parts of the country, the situation in Monte Azul, and showed him the documents and pamphlets he received from environmental NGOs. Both went to see the president of the municipal council, who told them that he would talk to the people at INTA.

A few days later, a popular radio host dedicated several hours to talk about the problems created by fumigations and spoke at length about the conflict in Monte Azul. Cognizant of the

cases taking place in Bermellon and the area, the radio host called the director of INTA in La Corona to hear his position on the issue. Rafael was listening to the program, and he was outraged when he heard the interview:

> The guy from the radio asks him “Well, what’s going on, engineer? We know very serious incidents have been taking place at Bermellon.” And the other replies “Why, we don’t know anything about that.” Son of a bitch! I was listening to the radio. “And what do you think?” “Look, the only thing we can do as INTA technicians is to offer advice on the correct use of agrochemicals.” Go fuck yourself, motherfucker! [Rafael gets agitated] He had been in Incupo [an NGO supporting peasant movements], he had met the poor, he knew about misery, poverty... He arrived at INTA because of all the arrangements they have made, notice the position he holds, he must be earning... That's the director; he washed his hands of the whole business! He didn't say anything! What the fuck!!

Similarly to the peasants of Monte Azul, Rafael was enraged by the denial of the contamination and the lack of support authorities paid to the pleas of people affected by agrochemical exposure. The next day, he went to the local radio, read the note presented in the municipal council, and summoned all the smallholders of the area affected by the fumigations “to begin to do something.” He demanded the councilmen and the mayor to step forward, “to see what side they are on,” and asked “Who is going to take care of the health problems? Who is going to respond for the lost crops of smallholders? They lost everything; this is the same situation as in Monte Azul.” When he came out of the radio studio, a small crowd was gathered in the street. A producer of honey, linked to local politicians, approached Rafael:

> “Hey, Pevorski, what you said was nice, pity you didn’t recall that they had ruined my son’s fifty [honey] boxes.” “Know what?” I said, “Go to the radio, go to curse. I am not that affected yet, but go to swear and make noise, *chamigo*, at least to try to stir up the politicians and other forces in the community because something serious is coming up.”

Shortly after his radio appearance, Rafael received a phone call from Lautaro Schneider, Bermellon’s mayor. Rafael told him that the he should support their claims, among other things, because the circulation of the fumigating tractor was prohibited within the town. The mayor was well disposed to Rafael’s discourse, and Schneider told him he would back up the summoning of a public audience to discuss the problem of agrochemical exposures in the area. In our interview,

Rafael enumerated for us the reasons why the mayor gave his support. First, Schneider was himself a honeybee producer and fumigations were also affecting his apiaries. Second, as Rafael told us

> the guys from the company came here and ignored him. They didn't even tell him "we're coming to do some work here," they just went straight past. Because they had made arrangements with the government of Formosa, with Nicora, with the minister [of Production]. So we egged on this one [the mayor]

The point shows both the role of disrespect feeding authorities' support to the protests and also the importance people gave to this. As Rafael elaborated: "Nothing would have happened if we didn't have the mayor's support. Our strategy was to get the mayor involved, otherwise. Because Nicora [the minister of production] was saying that
everything was legal, that [the fumigations] were harmless."

The Public Audience

The people of Bermellon, supported by the mayor, organized a public hearing in the warehouse of the local cooperative that provides running water to the town. The managers of the cooperative were also worried about the threat of agrochemicals contaminating the water sources in the area. The place was packed with people from several nearby colonies, some of them mobilized by the mayor. The ministry of production had promised to attend the meeting yet, adding insult to injury, he did not show up. Neither did the invited representative of SENASA, the national office that oversees the use of agrochemicals (the Argentine equivalent of the FDA). People felt that provincial authorities were not recognizing the seriousness of the matter; these feelings were further confirmed by the representative sent by the soybean company, a low-ranking employee.

A week later, a second hearing was convened and finally the mayor and the people from the area had their chance to air their indignation and display their reactions to authorities' and company's disrespect. The meeting opened with the reading of the notes presented to the municipal council and the complaints of smallholders affected by agrochemical drifts. It followed by the reading of a note presented by the agrarian engineer working for soybean

growers, threatening to initiate a judiciary demand. The threat spurred a reaction from the attendees: first Rafael said that that agrarian engineer was also a public official working for the ministry of production. The agrarian engineer took advantage of his public position to advise soybean growers on which were the best plots to rent, in terms of quality of land and the financial needs of the farmers renting the lands to the company. "They even prepared the contracts and made the farmers sign them, without giving information on what they were going to plant and in what state they would leave the plots," Rafael denounced. The mayor backed Rafael up, saying that the agrarian engineer working for the company "is an employee of the ministry, so we pay his salary, and they're working for the companies and screwing the farmers. They will hear from me; I won't allow them to come to town again." The representative of the company intervened, saying they were investing in the province and creating jobs; to which Rafael replied

> What kind of work will they generate if they come with all the machines! We are not against the investors. But they have to *respect* the farmers a bit. As a farmer I am affected, this affects us all. What kind of *respect* do we receive? Who knows you?

Rafael's questions condense two themes recurrently emerging in this conflict, as well as in Monte Azul and Moreno: disrespect and anonymity. The agrochemical drifts were seen by locals as a sign of disrespect, and they also felt troubled by not knowing who those soybean growers were –in communities where, as I heard repeatedly, "everybody knows each other."

The company's representative replied arguing that the company was authorized by the provincial government to work in Formosa. Unconvinced and rather annoyed by this argument, Rafael's response delineated the allegiances drawn by the conflict and restated the point on anonymity:

> They might be authorized by everyone, but around here who knows they are actually authorized? Unfortunately the minister didn't show up, neither the INTA nor the SENASA representatives did, yet we all know who they back up. We are the ones living here, and surely the ones dying here too, none of these assholes live here, like you. And I know you, your dad was a great person, but you are a piece of shit. You are given a salary these days but when the company leaves…

The mayor intervened to reinforce Rafael's statement, wielding his direct connection to the governor and asserting his prerogative in the area, denied by soybean growers' disrespect when the latter bypassed him and did not look for his approval:

> You know what? They are not going to last more than three years, if they do. And we are going to see you bumming around here. And you, instead of defending your own people, you back up these guys whom we don't know anything about. But don't worry: people here will be supported by the mayor; they won't do whatever they want. They won't enter the town with whatever piece of junk and they won't throw a single chemical substance within 25 kilometers around. Because we are the ones that will sue them. And tell your employer, your boss, that he will have to face the consequences. I am going to meet the governor and if they are backing this up, I don't know, but they are harming the people. Besides, we drink water from the tap and here you are polluting the lagoon's water.

The director of the hospital took the floor and addressed the audience, a strategy that the organizers devised as the "punch line" of the meeting. He explained the negative effects of agrochemicals, saying that now they only had skin rashes but if the water was being contaminated women might develop fertility problems and babies could be born with health problems. The doctor closed his speech with a direct appeal to the company's representative:

> You know what? You don't drink tap water from here. You might not have any problem in the future. But our kids, our grandchildren, we are all going to face very serious problems with the crap you are adding to the water.

The doctor's speech had an immediate effect, beyond the expectations of the organizers. The company's representative was shaken by the speech, he begun to mumble a reply but soon he broke into tears, saying one of his daughters lived in Bermellon and that he was worried about her health as well. The audience was moved by the reaction, and the meeting was overtaken by a heavy silence. Suddenly, the company's representative left the room which was soon filled by the muttering crowd. The murmurs were interrupted by the reentrance of the company's representative who informed the audience that he talked with the company's owners on the phone and announced they will stop the aerial fumigations. The meeting closed with the assertion of the mayor that the company also will not fumigate with a tractor and that the next day he will travel to Formosa "to take care of the issue."

The emotional dimensions of the conflict are highlighted by both the background and the developments within the contentious meeting itself, the outrage motivating Rafael's actions as organizer, the indignation raised among locals by the authorities' denial of the environmental problem, and the visceral reaction of the representative of the company. A phrase uttered by Rafael during our interview further stresses the point: "I'm sorry [about getting agitated when retelling the events], but I'm mad with all these sons of bitches."

In the following weeks, the collective actions of people in Bermellon bore fruit. Soybean growers refrained from driving the fumigating tractor within the town and ceased fumigations in their plots nearby Bermellon –although they kept doing it in the larger plots they managed in the area. After the conflict, soybean growers also paid compensation to smallfarmers in Campo Arde and Rasero, other nearby colonies, whose grapefruit trees and cotton plants had been affected by agrochemical drifts. Other farmers in the area who were renting their plots to soy growers attempted to revoke their three-year contracts after hearing about the conflict in Bermellon. However, the representatives of the soybean company did not allow it, enforcing their contracted rights.

Contention, Organizations, and Authorities

How does the conflict in Bermellon relate to the ones on Monte Azul and Moreno? I develop a comparison in the conclusion of this chapter, but before moving to that section, allow me to make two brief points on the role of indigenous organizations and local authorities.

One of the central theses of resource mobilization theory is that preexisting organizations are a precondition for contentious collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Aldon Morris extended this claim by showing how "indigenous organizations" are the mobilizing structures that contribute to the emergence of collective action and, ultimately, to bring social change (Morris 1984; see also Freeman 1973, Oberschall 1989, Tilly 1978). The case of Bermellon serves as a good example for connecting two of Morris' contributions to the social movement literature: the importance of indigenous organizations and the role of oppositional consciousness (Morris and Braine 2001).[112] The lack of a peasant social movement in Bermellon in part

[112] "An oppositional consciousness is an empowering mental state that prepares members of an oppressed group to act to undermine, reform, or overthrow a system of human domination" (Morris and Braine 2001: 25).

explains why the agrochemicals drifts there did not result in events of transgressive contention. Yet the emergence of contained collective actions are explained by the role of Rafael, his past histories of struggle and his connections to environmental social movements.

The second point that deserves attention is the role played by the mayor in Bermellon. As we have seen for the case of Moreno, the fact that the local mayor supported soybean growers and not peasants contributed to the organization of an event of transgressive contention (the take over of the fumigating airplane). Conversely, the support of the mayor in Bermellon contributed to contain the protests. People there could sense that their authorities were equally concerned by the environmental problems and that the mayor was taking concrete actions to address the issue. Before moving to the conclusions of the chapter, I would like to present three key moments that took place during our interviews with Rafael regarding authorities' support. The reactions of Julio (a local leader of MoCaFor in Monte Azul) during the conversation shed light on why peasants in Monte Azul granted such importance to the role of authorities.

When one of our interviews was coming to an end, Julio intervened to ask Rafael about the mayor. Specifically, he asked "Is this guy [the mayor] one of the good guys remaining in the Peronist Party?" (*¿Este es uno de los buenos que queda del PJ?*). Allow me to quote at length Rafael's response and the ensuing exchange between him and Julio (which I witnessed silently), since I think it clearly shows how local leaders think about the role of authorities and politicians:

> Rafael – [replying Julio's question] I don't know, lately he has improved, because he used to be a very narrow-minded guy. He used to be one of Gildo's [the governor] favorites. Then he started doing many things in the town. But he surrounded himself with incompetent people. He only has one guy who's worth, a town councilman who's not with them [the Peronist Party].
>
> Julio – Though he risked it and he supported you when he defined his position on the soy issue...
>
> Rafael – That's true, I appreciated that. I criticize many mistakes he has made, but that time [during the public hearings] he put himself on the line.
>
> Julio – It's not easy for him to support you, he knows he's going against the government.
>
> Rafael – Yeah, when he told Nicora [minister of the Production] "stop bullshitting, I am the one responsible here and you are bullshitting from the governor's house," I heard very clearly when he said that.

> Julio – That's what I mean, he was going against the government, the government structure.

In a second interview we held in Rafael's farm, our conversation veered away from the topic of agrochemical contamination when he digressed by narrating a community project he is developing: the construction of a small factory to produce juice from the grapefruits and oranges grown by smallholders from the area. While Rafael was explaining the project to us, Julio intervened, saying "What's good is that the mayor… is there" (*Lo que es bueno es que el intendente… esté*). Rafael elaborated about the mayor's support, saying he contributed money to develop the project, made arrangements to obtain a truck and also paid for the fuel to travel in the area. Rafael did not wanted to overstate the point, saying "At least he allows us to do something, because it's different if they don't allow you to do it" ("*Pero por lo menos te deja hacer. Porque otra cosa es que no te deje hacer"*); Julio eagerly jumped in saying "Of course!"

A last quote from Rafael shows, I believe, the importance smallholders attribute to the role of authorities in both open conflicts and the opportunities grassroots organizations have to advance the well-being of their members:

> [The relationship with politicians] is a strategy one has to think about. Because if they open the door a bit... Let's talk seriously, there are many things you cannot do as an organization. Because you depend on many other things. On policy. I think that here provincial policy is scary. *But if you are able to work with the mayor you may allow for certain little things*. Things that take place close to you, you bother the mayor with your concerns, and if you manage to get his attention that's a different story. Persuading him [at the provincial level] is very hard. First you need to convince here. For example, the question of soybeans, we stopped it.

These excerpts contribute to an understanding of both the situation in Bermellon and the different reactions of Monte Azul peasants in 2003 and 2009. In 2003, when authorities where unresponsive, peasants reacted through transgressive contention (as they said, "we were *forced* to blockade the road" –see chapter four.) Conversely, when authorities responded to peasant pleas in 2009 –by taking blood samples, writing a report on the contamination, and paying compensations- contentious collective actions did not emerged. The reasoning of Rafael in the last excerpt presented above also explains in part why peasants may choose negotiation over contention when aiming to address their grievances. To fully address these points, I turn now to

conclusions, where I will compare and contrast the conflicts of Moreno and Bermellon and the case of Monte Azul.

CONCLUSIONS

Taken together, the cases of Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon delineate three provisional conclusions: first, on GM crops production and agrochemical exposure; second, on the diffusion of contention; and third, on the factors explaining dynamics of mobilization and demobilization.

First, the cases suggest a pattern showing a disjuncture between the "official script" of GM production and its realities. The sowing method associated with herbicide-resistant soybeans (i.e. "no tillage" techniques) is, at first sight, more environmentally friendly than the ones used for conventional crops. When beginning to investigate the issue of GM crops, you soon get used to hearing the spokespersons of agribusiness and the mass-media making this point by citing two main reasons. First, soils are not plowed and therefore soil erosion is avoided; second, glyphosate is arguable a less harmful agrochemical than many of those traditionally used. However, as the cases presented here demonstrate, the realities of agricultural production belie these arguable environmental advantages. Faced with the pressures of obtaining the same results in less time, soybean growers customarily resort to highly toxic agrochemicals (for instance, 2,4-D), severely affecting the health of plants, animals, and people. Furthermore, the expansion of GM production (usually relying on renting plots of land rather than ownership) encourages renters to produce soybeans in three consecutive seasons. If farming companies do not have an interest in how soils are treated, then it is easier to produce the same crop over and over (using the same machinery, seeds, agrochemicals, and know-how) than to become knowledgeable about a new crop –as Norberto jokingly said: "you can produce soybeans by email" (*"la soja la podes hacer por correo electrónico"*). When we pay close attention to how GM crops are produced on the ground, we see that the discourses and propaganda of the agro-industry are at odds with the realities of agricultural production. What the cases presented here (and agricultural production in Argentina at large) show is that potential environmental advantages of GM crops are countered by its actual environmental impacts. It should not come as a surprise that crops developed with

the aim of yielding profits through the use of patented seeds (i.e. Monsanto's Round-up Ready soybeans), which are dependent on specific agrochemicals (Round-Up Ready, i.e. glyphosate and coadjuvant chemicals), most likely would not contribute to an environmentally friendly agriculture.[113]

Second, the cases of Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon, when analyzed in tandem, present a good example of the micro-mobilization processes informing the diffusion of contention. Doug McAdam proposed the distinction between "initiator" and "spin-off" movements to explain diffusion processes within cycles of contention. Movements can be differentiated between those that "signal or otherwise set in motion an identifiable protest cycle," and those that "draw their impetus and inspiration from the original initiator" (McAdam 1995: 219). The main mechanism underpinning the emergence of spin-off movements, McAdam argues, is a cognitive/cultural one: the realization that a certain aspect of social life is illegitimate and it may be changed through collective action. The connection between initiator and spin-off movements is thus a process of diffusion. Two elements contribute to that process: network ties and the "attribution of similarity" –i.e. a context where the adopters define the situation and themselves as similar to that of innovators (Strang and Meyer 1993). The cases presented here illuminate the ways in which this characterization, developed for protest cycles spanning relatively large stretches of time, take place at the micro-mobilization level and during a short time span.

Seen together, the cases of Moreno and Monte Azul show the ways in which close and direct ties contribute to the diffusion of protest through face-to-face interaction and direct witnessing of the negative consequences of agrochemical drifts. As McAdam argues, "[the] confluence of strong internal ties and weak bridging ties is, thus, one of the conditions that facilitates the development of a protest cycle" (1995: 232). As we have seen, scattered complaints turned into direct action in Moreno when activists witnessed first-hand the negative consequences of agrochemical exposure of Monte Azul. The direct experience of activists, combined with the information provided by the media to their followers in Moreno (who were not present in Monte Azul), resulted in an episode of transgressive contention. The case of Bermellon, in turn, shows how weak bridging ties (information spread through the media) and

[113] It is also important to notice that glyphosate is the *active ingredient* of Monsanto's Round-Up Ready, making up around 40% of the herbicide. The combination with adjuvants may increase Round-Up's toxicity (see Bonn 2005).

processes of attribution of similarity influence the diffusion of protest, but not necessarily through the adoption of the same tactical repertoire (contained instead of transgressive contention). These cases can be seen as an iteration of what Michael Biggs (2003) calls "positive feedback" in the spread of collective mobilization. Explaining the wave of strikes in American cities in 1886, one of the mechanisms proposed by Biggs to specify the "positive feedback" is "inspiration" (2003: 224-228). Put simply, in a situation where collective action is fraught with uncertain results, inspiration drives mobilization: "Before the outcome is clear, the simple fact that others have acted implies that they expect success" (Biggs 2003: 226). As a close observation of the influence of the Monte Azul conflict on Moreno and Bermellon shows, "people may act simply because others have recently done so, thus creating (for a short time) a dynamic process that is self-reinforcing." (Biggs 2003: 244; see also Biggs 2005).

The cases of Monte Azul and Moreno also provide detailed examples of processes of scale shift, which combine diffusion with brokerage.[114] Lastly but notably, a close-up observation of these processes shed light on how these mechanisms are informed by strong emotions that go hand-in-hand with cognitive elements. In the cases analyzed, emotional and moral elements underpinned both transgressive and contained contentions, marking the passage from negotiations to the buildup of contention (in Monte Azul and Moreno), and motivating individual responses that later on turned into collective action (in Bermellon).[115]

Third, comparing and contrasting the cases of Monte Azul, Moreno, and Bermellon refines and substantiates the argument on processes of mobilization and demobilization I presented in the previous chapter. Although I distinguished between transgressive (Monte Azul and Moreno) and contained contention (Bermellon), usually transgressive episodes are fully developed contained conflicts. As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly argue, most cases of transgressive contention are actually episodes of contained contention escalating into broader conflicts.[116]

[114] "We see scale shift as a robust process consisting of two sometimes linked pathways: what we call the diffusion/emulation pathway and a brokerage/coalition formation pathway. The two pathways lead to scale shift through a common mechanism that we call attribution of similarity… *Diffusion* involves the transfer of information along established lines of interaction while *brokerage* entails the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 332-333, original emphasis).

[115] On protest diffusion see also Givens et al 2010; Andrews and Biggs 2006; Strang and Soule 1998; Soule 1997; Bohstedt 1994; Hedström 1994; Meyer and Whittier 1994; McAdam and Rucht 1993; Strang and Meyer 1993; Gould 1991; Oberschall 1989.

[116] "Most of our cases began with episodes of contained contention that eventually evolved into broader transgressive episodes" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 341). On the problem of defining what counts as transgressive or contained contention, see also O'Brien 2003.

Recall the argument I made in the previous chapter on processes of mobilization and demobilization in Monte Azul. First, the lack of protests in Monte Azul in 2009 was explained by the evaluation that transgressive contention would not yield the expected results. The case of Moreno in 2003 confirms this point by way of contrast: the effectiveness of collective actions in Monte Azul (in terms of gaining recognition to the problem) showed people in Moreno "what was to be done." A similar reasoning applies to the situation in Bermellon: the events in Monte Azul and Moreno signaled that collective action was an effective means to address the problems created by agrochemical drifts. The lack of a peasant organization in Bermellon resulted in an event of contained contention, combined with the support of local authorities.

This latter observation (concerning the mayor's support) leads to a second point: the role of authorities in explaining dynamics of mobilization and demobilization. In Monte Azul in 2003, authorities' denial of the contamination and the lack of recognition of peasants and their claims resulted in episodes of transgressive contention (the roadblocks). Conversely, authorities' recognition of the problem in 2009 was one of the factors explaining the lack of mobilizations in 2009. As we have seen in this chapter, a similar situation took place in Moreno in 2003: the unresponsiveness of authorities to peasants' requests leaded to a transgressive episode (the taking over of the fumigating airplane). This comparison shows that the explanation of the events in Monte Azul is not unique or limited to a specific community, which further substantiates the argument. If we compare the lack of mobilizations in Monte Azul in 2009 (explained by authorities' recognition) with the lack of transgressive contention in Bermellon, the argument comes full circle: the support of authorities in Bermellon contributed to the lack of transgressive contention in this town.

The argument explaining the dynamics of mobilization and demobilization in Monte Azul, besides the role of authorities and the evaluation of the effectiveness of collective action, also included the role of alliances between MoCaFor and the national state, and the relations of reciprocity implied in those alliances. As you recall, I argued that these alliances were the third factor explaining the lack of contention in 2009. This importance granted to the role of authorities was further exemplified by presenting the cases of Moreno and Bermellon. In Moreno, the denial of the problem by local and provincial authorities enraged peasants and convinced them that something needed to be done. When they were supported by a local councilwoman, this conviction turned into direct action. Similarly, the people in Bermellon were

outraged by the denial of the contamination expressed by INTA officials and by the support of provincial authorities to soybean growers. When small farmers were supported by the mayor, the individual problems created by agrochemical exposures turned into an episode of contained contention (the public hearing). Now, why is the role of authorities so central to explaining the emergence of collective action (or the lack thereof)? Where did that quest for support and recognition come from and how did it become so ingrained in local leaders? (Remember, for instance, the remarks of Julio during the conversation with Rafael in Bermellon). And why do relations of reciprocity gain such weight among social movements and play a key role in explaining the lack of mobilization? In the next chapter, I present my ethnographic data on the quotidian life of social movements to answer these questions.

CHAPTER 6

PATRONAGE, EVERYDAY POLITICS, AND "DOUBLE PRESSURE" ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

I am doing fieldwork in Monte Azul and staying in the house of Nélida, a local leader of MoCaFor. The radio is usually turned on, alternating between local news, announcements, and music. In between two songs, the following message is read: "Please, those people who requested a new pension, come get your certificates from the ANSeS [Social Security] at the headquarters of the Justicialista [Peronist] Party! Congratulations to the newly retired people!" (Fieldnotes; July 12, 2007)

We are seated with Armando [a member of MoCaFor] on a bench by the door of the cooperative that MoCaFor runs in Moreno. Several people arrive and ask if they are going to give out mercadería *[merchandise, food]: first, two young girls, later a woman, later two other girls, and afterwards a girl, barefoot, with worn, strained clothing. Armando says that the next day they will. [The next day] I ask if a lot of people came to ask for* mercadería*, and they say, no, but last time it was a ton. Armando says, "It was like a political rally!"While some were smiling over the joke, a woman arrives on a bike wearing a cap and tattered clothes to ask for* mercadería (Fieldnotes; November 6 and 7, 2008)

[I arrived in Curuzú that morning] That night I went to eat and as I was finishing, Julio showed up. We hug and start to catch up. He tells me that all the government's rural social programs will be dissolved; that the PSA 'was a patch, but really didn't solve anything, it never worked.' (...) That the Pro-Huerta [Pro-Garden program] was worse, "they gave you these seeds that weren't even enough for a 1 by 1 garden." They are participating in a provincial roundtable organized of the REAF (Family Agriculture Network), because "even though we aren't kirchneristas [supporters of President Kirchner], it's better to change things from within." That [the representative of PSA in Formosa, a rural welfare program] invited some organizations to the provincial roundtable "but they are a rubber stamp...like the MAF, totally coopted by the government." (Fieldnotes, October 19 2008)

I began this chapter with these excerpts from my fieldnotes to exemplify three dimensions of the relationships between patronage politics and social movements I will discuss in this chapter: pervasiveness, resemblance, and opposition. In other words, I want to show a) how patronage politics dominates the political environment in Formosa; and b) how MoCaFor opposes the

provincial government and its patronage networks but at the same time mimics certain clientelist practices. Research on the relationship between social movements, culture, and the state suggested that the nature of social movements' connections to the state is central in molding movements' internal organizational composition, and that "Movement organizations may adopt structures that mirror those of their targets" (Whittier 2002: 293). The ways in which the pervasiveness of patronage politics in Formosa makes its way into the interactions between MoCaFor leaders, members, and constituents, shows that "the specific meanings that the state and dominant culture support can shape the discourses and collective identities that dominate within a movement," and that "Movements draw on hegemonic discourses and categories to construct discourses that are both transformative yet constrained by the hegemonic meanings they wish to challenge." (Whittier 2002: 305-6).

The point of inspecting the pervasiveness of patronage in Formosa and showing how MoCaFor practices both resemble and oppose clientelist arrangements is to elaborate on the instances of demobilization presented in chapter four. In the previous two chapters, I presented the reactions (or lack thereof) of peasants affected by agrochemical exposures. In doing so, I focused on the "public moments" of a social movement, that is, the instances in which people gathered publicly and visibly to make demands to authorities that, if realized, would affect the interests of other parties. In this chapter I change the angle of vision to draw attention to the quotidian interactions that take place within a social movement organization. The aim is to show that in the Formosan political context, dominated by patronage politics, MoCaFor faces what I call a "double pressure." As a poor people's movement, MoCaFor is a means of defending rights and ultimately bringing about social change but, at the same time, it must deliver concrete benefits to its members to ensure their participation. In order to obtain and distribute resources among their constituents, leaders establish alliances with the federal government and a national social movement. These alliances or political networks put MoCaFor in a difficult and complex situation. The federal government and the provincial government belong to the same political party (the Peronist Party) and are allies in institutional politics. MoCaFor opposes the politics of the provincial government but needs the support of the national government. Thus, the alliances established by MoCaFor to allow the organization's continuity ultimately pose obstacles for protests and transgressive collective actions because MoCaFor members are wary of alienating the support of their national allies.

The chapter thus scrutinizes what MoCaFor does when it disappears from the public eye and the movement is “held in abeyance” (Taylor 1989). In so doing, I complement the analysis presented in chapter four that focused on two points in time, 2003 and 2009, and the different reactions of peasants in those two instances. Here, in turn, I concentrate on the relationships established in “everyday politics,” taking heed of the point that in peasant societies, politics is mostly comprised of quotidian interactions that may involve resistance but also support, compliance, modifications, and evasions (Kerkvliet 2009). In order to do so, I present abundant excerpts from interviews and ethnographic data, since participant-observation “is especially suited for asking questions about everyday, often taken-for-granted meanings of activism” (Lichterman 1998: 402).

PATRONAGE POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In what follows, I closely follow my ethnographic data to illuminate four aspects of the connections between patronage politics and social movements, breaking down the process of “double pressure” into different components. First, I present a close reading of my interviews showing how the language people use to refer to welfare resources reveals how they tend to understand those resources as “help” or favors rather than as acquired rights. Then, I show the ambivalent views of MoCaFor members about politicians and patronage; and I close this first section with examples of the informal connections and links between participants in a social movement and patronage networks. Second, I present a series of excerpts from my fieldnotes unveiling how a poor people’s movement like MoCaFor mimics the practices of patronage networks in the distribution of resources. These two sections suggest the “pressure from below” on MoCaFor leaders. Third, I inspect how that pressure “from below” also translates into a pressure “from above” exerted on leaders, when they change their role from givers/distributors to receivers of resources obtained from their national political networks. As the distribution of resources creates implicit reciprocities between MoCaFor leaders and their constituents, similar relations of obligation are created between MoCaFor leaders and their national allies. In the fourth and last section, I make the point that although certain practices and interactions between members and leaders of MoCaFor resemble those more commonly found among members of a

patronage network, there are important distinctions that differentiate the peasants' social movement from the clientelist networks of the provincial government.

Patronage Pervasiveness: Language, Ambivalence, and Informal Connections

The excerpts of interviews and fieldnotes I present in this section aim to show that patronage politics makes its way into the language and practices of MoCaFor leaders and members. The way that both leaders and the rank-and-file of MoCaFor talk about the welfare resources they obtain from the federal government are couched in a language that reflects that pervasiveness. I repeatedly heard peasants referring to welfare resources as "help" ("*ayuda*"), conveying the idea that these resources are given as a favor rather than a right. For instance, when I asked Telma, a middle-range leader of MoCaFor in Moreno, what happened after the protests of 2003 subsided, she told me that

> What we wanted the most is that they would give them some *help*, or something, to those families who were affected. More than what the organization already gave them. Because there are people who lost everything. The cassava, which is like their bread, was dried up. And it took a long time to grow back, because the soil is bad. That's what I wished would have happened.

Nélida is one of the leaders of MoCaFor in Monte Azul. She identifies herself as Peronist, is still affiliated with the Peronist Party, but repeatedly says she does not like the way Peronist politicians behave today. In one of our many conversations, I asked Nélida how they manage to survive in a context of dwindling economic opportunities. She answered me that they obtained some things from the PSA, the Social Agricultural program of the federal state, and contrasted the "help" they receive from the PSA with the relationship with the provincial government:

> The Ministry of Agriculture in Formosa didn't even give us a gram of anything. It's all talk, nothing else. When they come, I always participate in the meetings, but to fight with them, because you get nothing else out of it. They come and say they are going to do trainings, trainings, trainings, but we do thousands of trainings, and *if they don't help you in something else, you can't do anything*. And this is what we fight with them about, that the trainings are good, but *along with the training, they need to give us credit or subsidies so we can work*. Because

> with the training, the poor people who is already desperate, without tools, and we've been bad off for many years, with this we're not going to get ahead. This is what we always fight with them about.

On several occasions, I heard the rank-and-file of MoCaFor using the term "help" to talk about welfare resources. In one of my interviews I talked to Ignacio, who lives with his mother on a small plot of land where they built a house with wood and mud bricks. When I asked him who he thinks helps the community, he answered me:

> The one who *helped* us was Julio, to get the plan [for unemployed heads of household]. Julio, Isidoro [local leaders of MoCaFor] *helped* us a lot. Through them we get the plan. Me and my mom at least.

I then asked him what community project he was involved in (a condition to be a "beneficiary" of an unemployment subsidy):

> We're cleaning up to build a plaza. That's the idea. I don't know if it's for the school or what. But *help is still needed* to put up hammocks for the kids.

Ignacio is quite reserved, and most of his answers during our interview were laconic. After a long silence, I asked him if he participated in any activity of MoCaFor; he told me that he barely did, and when I asked him why he said that

> You have to have time to go, to be in the meeting, you have to have time. And we do day jobs just to live. And instead of going to a meeting or something, we go work a short gig to buy *mercadería* or something. Now I participate, because we get the plan, which helps us to get *mercadería*.[117]

During our interview, Ignacio was wearing a cap with the name of a councilman of Curuzú. I asked him if he voted for him, and he said "No, I only took the cap." I took the chance to ask him about his vote, and he said he voted for Pimentel, the current mayor of Curuzú because "he's better, he helps you more" ("*es más bueno, te* ayuda *más*"), unlike Valencia "who only helped the people that were with him." When our talk was coming to a close, I asked Ignacio what he thought about the fumigations, the roadblocks and the lawsuit against soy growers. His answer

[117] Literally, "*mercadería*" translates as "merchandising"; I keep the Spanish word because, in the jargon of popular sectors, the term refers to the food distributed by political brokers usually during electoral campaigns.

illustrates the idea that by participating in MoCaFor and in protests, people also aim to obtain concrete benefits:

> There has to be a solution. If not, we're doing all of this for nothing. We've suffered so much, and we're not going to get any benefit…We have to get something out of the government. Whatever crumb, we have to get it. I mean, what they came to do… the company; we suffered a lot; hunger, cold, we got wet…some kind of benefit we have to get out of them.

Other interviewees in Monte Azul also referred to MoCaFor as the ones who "help" people in the community. I asked Germán and Cintia (Nélida's daughter and her husband) who supported the community. Cintia replied "No one," but Germán readily said "MoCaFor. And they bring plans…and these things; MoCaFor is the one who does more things." Later on, Cintia used the ubiquitous term of "help" when talking about cotton production, saying that "There was no sowing, because the price was no good, because *the government never helped again with a credit* to sow, and if you sowed, you lost."

While witnessing conversations among peasants in Monte Azul, I also noted the ambivalent views they expressed about politicians and patronage politics. Most peasant leaders repeatedly complained about politicians distributing food ("*mercadería*") before elections, but at the same time they criticized the current mayor for not distributing enough. This excerpt from my fieldnotes, recorded while I was living in the house/farm of Nélida, is an illustration of this ambivalence expressed by Eduardo, an active member of MoCaFor:

> There's talk about the elections, and one candidate says he's the change, and it's pure lies, later they're elected and they sell themselves, the only thing that changes is their car. "The town is ugly," says Nélida, and "it's the politicians' blame." Eduardo says no, that the people are to blame too, that people in Curuzú don't even take care of their sidewalk, it's dirty, "a woman changes the baby's diaper and won't even put it in a bag and throw it away, she looks both ways and if no one's around she throws it onto the neighbor's property." Eduardo says "they are all corrupt, the one who cuts the grass takes the gas of the machine and puts it in his motorcycle; the guy takes gas-oil from the municipal truck and puts it in his car. And if I were a politician, I would do the same, if I have 100, I would take 30, but with the rest I would do things." Eduardo continued, saying "Valencia stole, but he did things, if you went to ask for medicine, or if you needed to travel to Formosa at least he gave it to you, if you go to [the current mayor] Pimentel he'll say come back tomorrow but you need it today…that's why

> I get angry when they say that it's just the politicians' blame; if we go and vote for them, if the people get their bag of *mercaderia* and go and vote, even though they know that after the elections they're not going to give them anything." Eduardo says to Julio: "Your mom makes me angry, because it's not the politicians' blame, it's ours too for voting for them."

Others in Monte Azul and Curuzú expressed similar views to Eduardo, both constituents and leaders. For instance, Adela, a woman in her sixties who participates in the activities of MoCaFor, told me that "Gildo [the governor] steals but he does things, he builds, because it looks like he's already robbed enough…the guy is smart to talk, he talks to you about God, hope, humility, but at least he leaves you something. In Ibarreta, he left a beautiful school, but the kids are going to ruin it, because they don't take care of it." Isidoro is a local leader of MoCaFor and Curuzú, and the brother of Nélida and Horacio. He used to be a political broker for the Peronist Party, so he has first-hand knowledge of how patronage politics works. After breaking away from the political network of Valencia, a powerful broker aligned with the governor, Isidoro became a leader of MoCaFor. During a conversation at his house in Curuzú, he told me: "Even though Valencia is a son of a bitch, the guy solved problems for you; when someone's family member died, he took care of everything, he paid for trips to Buenos Aires; the old guy [Valencia] gave you things. The ones who are in now [in the mayor's office], no, they don't give anything."

Before moving to the next section on how MoCaFor functions as a problem-solving network and mimics clientelist practices in the distribution of resources, allow me to quote an excerpt from my fieldwork in Moreno. I quote these notes because they show that, within a day of fieldwork, I stumbled upon a series of indications of the connections between a social movement and patronage politics.

> I arrive at the cooperative at 9.30, and I meet Tito and Nilda, who are seated in the doorway sipping mate. Soon Marcelo arrives and they begin to talk about the candidates [a few months later there were legislative elections]. Marcelo says that people came to his house to campaign, and he told them that the candidate should come convince him, not them. That he could vote for someone he knew, that he could get medicine from, but why would he vote for someone he didn't know (…) I see inside the warehouse there is a giant Argentine flag; they tell me they took it to Buenos Aires when they went to a march in support of Cristina [Kirchner, the president] during the conflict between the national government and soy growers [for information on this conflict, see section "Peasant Complaints and Authorities:

> reaction and recognition" on chapter four] (…) I go from the cooperative to Orlando's house [MoCaFor leader in Moreno]. He isn't there, but his daughter welcomes me, and we talk for a while. She takes care of the son of a local political couple, Calderón and his wife, he is a provincial deputy and she is a councilwoman. She says Calderón is a thief. She tells me that they are going to buy her a house, 4,000 pesos [more than a thousand dollars], and to pay for it, they are going to take out of her babysitting salary. (…) I go to see Juan Améndola [he participated in MoCaFor but had a fight with the local leader and left the movement]; they tell me he's not there but will be back soon. They say he's in the house across the street, Calderón's house. I talk to the woman who was there, and she tells me that Calderón is going to hire Juan to do some jobs, to design some signs for the campaign. (June 13, 2009)

So far, I have identified certain tropes in the discourse of MoCaFor members that suggest the pervasiveness of patronage politics in Formosa, and explored the informal connections between social movement members and local politicians. In the next section, I focus on practices and interactions (rather than language, perceptions, and informal connections) to further illustrate the overlap between patronage politics and social movements.

Resource Distribution and Problem-Solving within MoCaFor

In 2003, MoCaFor began to receive resources from the federal government: unemployment benefits ("planes" in the jargon of poor people's movements), scholarships for youngsters attending high school, food, and agricultural machinery for the cooperative created by MoCaFor in Moreno. In the administration and distribution of these resources, the relationships between MoCaFor leaders and constituents began to resemble those of political brokers and "clients" of patronage networks. However, this does not mean MoCaFor practices are the same as those found in patronage networks (I elaborate this point below, in the last section "Resemblances and Differences."). In this section, first I briefly show how the administration and distribution of "*planes*" (unemployment subsidies) in Monte Azul made MoCaFor akin to a "problem-solving network." Second, I present fieldnotes recorded in Moreno, where the resemblance between the practices of the social movement and the ones of patronage networks were even clearer.

In the management of *planes*, MoCaFor not only distributes these benefits among their constituents, they also help people to solve problems they encounter while being "beneficiaries"

of the *planes* (payments in arrear, paperwork, etc.). The following excerpt exemplifies the kind of interactions between leaders and constituents created by the expansion of welfare benefits.

> In the morning we are in the Nélida's house sipping mate with her and Julio [her son, also a MoCaFor leader]. An older man arrives in the attire and hat of a farmer. He asks about his son's plan, he says he got paid but they hadn't paid his son yet. Julio tells him that he might be paid in a few days, that sometimes they get behind, and asks for his plan number, he replies three, and Julio says, that's why. The elder man also asks about his widowhood pension and the one for having a large family. He shows them a paper and Julio tells him that it says that just presenting his children's certificates is enough, that he doesn't have to show marriage papers, that showing children in common is enough, and he explains how to fill out the paperwork. Julio says that for some people the paperwork goes through quickly, because of politics. The man thanks them deferentially, says, "Sorry to bother you", to which Julio replies, "Nooo, no problem," as if to say, "It's not necessary to thank so much." They tell him to keep a look out in a couple days and if they haven't paid to his son, that he should come back. The man says thanks again, and leaves. Julio tells me that everything depends on "if you are the same 'political color' they fast track your file." (June 19, 2009)

The next excerpt elaborates on the topic of MoCaFor as problem solving network; in this case, with a group of prospective MoCaFor members. On a Sunday afternoon, a meeting was held in the locale of MoCaFor in Curuzú. A dozen women were gathered there with two MoCaFor leaders, Julio and Isidoro, to discuss how to solve a problem: a series of products of "popular consumption" that the federal government was subsidizing nationally to bring prices down were not available in Curuzú. After the meeting, four women in their twenties stayed to talk with Julio and Isidoro about the possibility of joining MoCaFor.

> Several of the women leave, and a small group of four younger women remains to talk to Julio. Isidoro comes over and tells me "come here, sit down." The women want to join the organization, so Julio begins to explain what MoCaFor is all about. He tells them that the organization began by demanding cotton subsidies, that some people did not receive them, and so they began to organize. He shares that they acquire *planes* and distribute them "according to the needs of the people." That they don't write anyone's name down "because that's what they do in the municipality and later the plan doesn't come to anyone but they promise that's going to come." The difference is, they [MoCaFor] tell the people to have a folder ready with a copy of the first two pages of the document [ID copies] and the CUIL number [Social Security number]. They talk about how to get a CUIL, they give a couple of options, Isidoro says "also it's possible to put 4 or 5 together

> and someone goes to Formosa to do the paperwork for everyone" (…) They say they privilege those who participate more, "because sometimes you get a plan for the people, and then they don't come anymore, or they only appear when their plan gets cut, or their plan gets cut and they don't even show up then." They ask for a contribution of 10 pesos for those who get the plan, because that's how they pay for the computer, Internet, and the "costs of the paperwork, supplies, trips that have to be made, if we need to go to Formosa for something, if we need to go Buenos Aires, for the gas for the vehicle when we have to go to the rural communities to talk to people or have meetings." (…) That they give priority to the people that participate, who come to the meetings. That they "instead of asking people to work half a day every day, that they come once a week, do the work, and sign the paperwork. Because they also control us, there could be an inspection and we have to have all the papers in order, there could be a monthly or a yearly check, or not, but the papers have to be in order." Julio asks one of the women when her plan was cut. "In April," she answers. Julio: "and now you can't do anything, because when you get cut, you have to ask for a renewal within 15 days." Julio says that he doesn't think there will be any more plans given out this year because if they don't come the 15th of December "I don't think they'll come until March…because without being biased [he looks at me and laughs] porteños [people from Buenos Aires] have problems to release the money" [everyone smiles]. One of the women says, "*We want to participate, and if later there's some plan, great, I hope you will keep us in mind*." Isidoro tells them to come to the meeting Tuesday and Wednesday [there is a two-day meeting with peasant organizations of the northeast]. Isidoro adds that their faces look familiar, and one of them replies, yes, she "used to work with [name]." Isidoro responds, "oh yeah, I remember, that guy did a lot for Peronism…and you were a kid then." She smiles, and says she will be there Tuesday after dropping her son at daycare. (October 26, 2008)

I quoted this passage of my fieldnotes at length because it encapsulates several dimensions I am discussing in this chapter: first, that people join the movement to "participate" but also to eventually obtain something in return ("*We want to participate, and if later there's some plan, great, I hope you will keep us in mind*."); second, that the distribution of "planes" contributes to the organization's survival (through the collection of "dues") and to recruit people for the movement's activities ("come to the meeting Tuesday and Wednesday"); third, how MoCaFor leaders differentiate the way the manage the "*planes*" from the way the municipality does; and fourth, the porous boundaries between participation in patronage networks and in a social movement (when Isidoro recognized one of the girls from his years as political broker of the Peronist Party).

Yet the instances where the practices of the peasant social movement even more closely resembled the workings of a patronage network unmistakably were the distribution of

"*mercadería*" (food) I witnessed in the locale of MoCaFor in Moreno. In Moreno, MoCaFor is led by Benito García, surrounded by a group of people that closely follows his orders. The following excerpt from my fieldnotes is a case in point. For the purposes of brevity, I only quote this passage and do not reproduce the many instances during my fieldwork in Moreno when I witnessed similar situations of continuous peregrination of people asking for "*mercadería*."

> I go to the cooperative, and when I arrive there are several women waiting for "*mercadería*" and Nilda [a kind of "secretary" for Benito] seated at a table, noting who receives something, while Vicente [member of MoCaFor since before 2003] gives out bags of milk, cacao, and peas. Benito is in an office in the barn of the cooperative (…) After a little while, Benito comes out and greets those of us outside with his typically serious and somewhat rueful face. He orders Nilda to "find Reina because I want to finish with the scholarships today" and right away says to the man seated in front of me, "Romero, come here." Nilda gets on the phone to try to find Reina, she's not there, so she calls another place and says to get up (she was probably sleeping), that Benito wants to finish *today* with the scholarships (emphasizing "today"). "Yes, right away," I hear her say. A few minutes later she calls again to make sure she is coming. Shortly thereafter, a man with a gaucho [cowboy] hat arrives and asks "Is Benito García here?" and they tell him yes, but he is busy, take a seat and wait. Afterwards, another man with hat and work clothes arrives, also asking for Benito, and then tell him to have a seat and wait. The situation appears more and more like the office of a mayor. A woman emerges from Benito's office, showing how he gave her a paper from the Ministry of Education to cover a scholarship for her son. She talks to a woman who just arrived about how to arrange to go together to Clorinda to collect the scholarship; they exchange phone numbers on a piece of paper I give them. The woman who arrived second goes into Benito's office and soon comes out with the same paper. Meanwhile, two girls wearing old and slightly tattered clothing arrive to ask for *mercadería*. The girl tells Nilda that she doesn't have the document and doesn't remember the number, but she can find out and come back. Without further explanation, Nilda tells Vicente to fill the bags they brought. Two other women arrive, also to ask for *mercadería*, and go through the typical process: information to Nilda, Vicente fills their bags. Yiya [member of MoCaFor] leaves with the bag of *mercadería* that everyone is taking, plus a transparent bag with three bottles of oil. They aren't giving oil to everyone, so when Nilda sees that a group of seven women is arriving, with a boy and a girl, she says "Oh no, they're kind of thugs [patoteras], and are going to want the same thing." All of them come from Malvinas, the poor neighborhood in Moreno, with old, dirty clothes with holes in it, they're all in sandals with muddy feet and one is barefoot. (November 10, 2008)

The next day I went back to the locale of MoCaFor (the cooperative) for an interview with Benito. The following excerpt shows how the role of MoCaFor does not end with the distribution

of welfare benefits, but requires ongoing monitoring as MoCaFor leaders are called upon to solve the day-to-day problems their constituents face while being "beneficiaries" of welfare. We were seated with Benito inside his office towards the end of the interview, when I witnessed the following situation:

> Someone knocks on the door, it's Nelson [MoCaFor member]. He recounts a problem he had in the mayor's office (he's presenting some projects there), and that he wants to present another note. Benito tells him, "Bring what you've written tomorrow and we'll look at it." Two women enter the office and say that they went to Clorinda to get paid the scholarship from the ministry of education but couldn't, they were told that the school wasn't registered. Benito says, that's not it, that they get paid through MoCaFor and not through the school. They spent 44 pesos in bus fare roundtrip and were waiting from 6am until 3pm "in the sun". Romero and Dionisio enter and recount how they were not able to get paid either. Benito says, "I'm sorry", several shake their heads, as if to say, "no it's not your fault." Benito: "The papers are all in order, you should have been able to get paid …I don't know why you took the paper I gave you yesterday, that's for you, to be notified about the scholarship, you should not have taken the paper. What we are going to do is to fix this and send ONE person to get paid, to make sure that everything is okay, and ensure that you don't go back in vain." He knocks on the window glass and asks Nilda to come in. Benito to Nilda: "Give them five pesos to buy bread…and the Spam in the kitchen. Because you didn't eat anything today, right? Go and make breakfast…" While we leave the office, one of them tells me there were more than 200 people in line to get the scholarship payment. (November 11, 2008)

During our interview, Benito periodically looked outside through the window glass. While contemplating the people in a line waiting for the distribution of food, Benito said in a despairing tone, "This is so sad… so much misery here." He told me that he does not come to the locale very often, because "People think you are the priest, the police captain… You end up in a personalized situation, when the matter should be collective" ("*Te confunden con el cura, el comisario… Se cae en la cuestión personalizada, cuando la cuestión tiene que ser colectiva*"). Tito is Benito's brother, and since he dwells in the locale of MoCaFor in Moreno, he has to deal with people coming to the locale every day. One night, while we are having dinner at a nearby eatery, he tells me in a complaining tone: "I always have to deal with people coming and asking for anything; to get them medicines, to help them with legal problems, to get them food… they even ask you for money" ("*siempre tengo que atender a la gente que viene y pide de todo, que*

les den remedios, que los ayuden con un problema legal, que les consigan comida… hasta te piden plata.”)

So far I have presented my ethnographic data illustrating the pervasiveness of patronage in Formosa and how the distribution of resources obtained by MoCaFor mimics certain clientelist practices. MoCaFor fulfills the expectations arising from the ubiquity of patronage in Formosa and addresses the needs of its constituents while, at the same time, the interactions between leaders, members, and constituents also tend to reproduce the pervasiveness of patronage politics in the province. In other words, the actions of MoCaFor are guided, implicitly, by the “structure of patronage” and in so doing those structures are perpetuated.

The data presented so far showing what people do, think, and say depicts the pressure that leaders of MoCaFor receive “from below”. Leaders feel pressured to address people’s survival needs and in interactions with them they take the role of “givers.” In the next section, I look at the other side of the coin, that is, the implications of MoCaFor *receiving* resources from the federal government and a national social movement.

Pressures “From Above”

In order to obtain resources to be distributed among their members and constituents, MoCaFor leaders also become “receivers”: they negotiate and request those resources from the federal government and a national social movement (i.e. FTV). Accordingly, the reception of those resources creates certain (unspoken) obligations for MoCaFor leaders. For instance, MoCaFor is invited to mobilize people for rallies in Buenos Aires supporting the President. They are not *forced* to do so, but rather feel the *obligation to reciprocate* the support of the federal government by taking part in activities organized by the latter (very much like MoCaFor members receiving “planes” are expected to participate in the activities organized by MoCaFor in Formosa). In short, obtaining and distributing resources creates a relational field of reciprocity with multiple points of reference, influencing processes of mobilization and demobilization. In the section “Social Movements’ Alliances and the State” of chapter four, I illustrated these processes by describing how MoCaFor leaders and members participated in a rally organized by the national government, and how the leader of FTV, Luis D’Elía, intervened in conflicts

between MoCaFor and the provincial government, resulting in a demobilization or deactivation of contentious actions in Formosa in 2004.

During my fieldwork in Moreno I interviewed Oscar, a middle-range leader of MoCaFor. I asked him about the roadblocks of 2004 and the intermediation of Luis D'Elía, and why they decided to suspend the mobilizations against the provincial government. Oscar's answer clearly connects the mobilization of people with the access to resources, in that instance and in MoCaFor actions in general:

> Our concern was always to maintain the economic part. To sustain the people. So this was one of the factors affecting why we had to suspend the roadblocks. Because to mobilize the people from here to Formosa it's 300 km [186 miles], from San Martin it's 800 km [497 miles], and if you don't have resources, how can you mobilize the people? We also had the issue of food. This was always a factor for our organization. Not just that time [in 2004], in many roadblocks that we did it was hard to sustain them, because of the economic part. Because most of us are poor, and when we were going to Formosa we covered our transportation, roundtrip; there were groups that made empanadas, sold raffle tickets, got some pesos together, and if there were peasants who wanted to go, in that way we covered the cost of the trip. That was our system. But we couldn't sustain this for very long, we didn't have the resources. This was always the problem, resources. Not because we don't work, but because of where we live, scarce resources, the crops we have aren't worth much, there are large families…There is a series of factors, that if you say "let's go, x days, on the road" it's very difficult to sustain it.

In an interview with Nélida and Isidoro in Curuzú, they elaborated on the relationship between the association with FTV and restrictions posed to MoCaFor.

> Lately we came closer to a politician that helped us, but also conditioned us; not directly, but we knew that that was their intention. We had to join the people from Buenos Aires so that our mates [*nuestros compañeros*] could have a bit more help. If no one gives us anything, the organization will crumble, it will fall down; people are not doing fine, and if they don't get some help... We realized that through the organization we could negotiate and obtain welfare plans for our *compañeros*... Lately I've seen that if we don't do anything and if we cannot give anything to our people...nothing at all can be done. They are all poor and with some help, we are joined together; it's not that much, but we are keeping up and growing. Lately many people have become [MoCaFor] members, now we are even more.

In the same interview, Isidoro nicely connected the need for external resources in a context of economic crisis and how welfare benefits contribute to the organization's survival:

> If the provincial or national government had given us the help that every small farmer deserves, we would have been in better shape and the people of the organization wouldn't have needed even one peso from anyone. Because the people need certain things to live (…) We knew as leaders that the *planes* were not the solution, they weren't what we were looking for. We were searching for something else. But somehow we took these things to maintain the organization.

A last interview excerpt from a conversation with Telma, a middle-range leader in Moreno, brings the process full circle, showing how MoCaFor leaders navigate the complex field of alliances in which they are embedded, and how they might privilege negotiations over contentious action, given the constraints the organization and poor people face:

> The thing is we sometimes confront the government and we don't obtain anything, but we just make our people suffer… I think we should avoid confronting the governor and try to find alternative means to get what we want, which is what we are negotiating with the national government. They are allowing more participation from the organizations, so…

In this section, I provided an account of the "pressures from above" stemming from the alliances MoCaFor creates with the federal government and a national social movement. I borrow the spatial metaphor from the discourse of peasants: it is common to hear that resources "come down" ("*bajaron recursos*"); that information or negotiations they had with authorities need to be "brought down" to their members ("*bajamos la información a la gente*"); or that the state is "up there" –like, for instance, this comment I heard in Moreno when MoCaFor members obtained scholarships from the federal state: "If there is political will, things come; if they want up there, things come" ("*Si hay voluntad política las cosas salen, si allá arriba quieren, las cosas salen*").[118] In summary, this "pressure from above" combines with a "pressure from below" exerted on leaders by the need to deliver to their constituents, creating what I call a "double pressure" on MoCaFor.

---

[118] As anthropologists Gupta and Ferguson pinpoint, states are "spatialized" usually in vertical terms: *"Verticality* refers to the central and pervasive idea of the state as an institution somehow 'above' civil society, community, and family. Thus, state planning is inherently 'top down' and state actions are efforts to manipulate and plan 'from above,' while 'the grassroots' contrasts with the state precisely in that it is 'below,' closer to the ground, more authentic, and more 'rooted.'" (2002: 982).

Resemblances and Differences

In the previous sections I explored the connections between patronage politics in Formosa and how its logic influences what people participating in MoCaFor think, say, and do. Before moving to the discussion of the chapter, in this section I present excerpts of interviews and quotes from my fieldnotes to stress that the practices and interactions of MoCaFor *resemble* the works of a patronage network but also maintain key differences. The main point is to show that MoCaFor reproduces certain patronage practices in the distribution of resources; yet receiving those resources also allow MoCaFor's continuity. The organization's survival thus keeps alive a force for social change that encourages collective claims-making in the province.

MoCaFor members see themselves as a group that, in the eyes of most people in the province, is "weird" or "bothersome." As they told me in Moreno: "We are like a piece of meat in between the teeth (*somos como carne en el diente*)… they don't like us. Many people depend on pubic employment, the school, the municipality, the police, and they all respond to the government that doesn't want us to exist." Benito García, the leader of MoCaFor in Moreno, told me that many people in Formosa agree with what they say but cannot support them openly, so the majority reproduces the discourse of the provincial government:

> Some 60% repeat what they hear…they call you terrorist, subversive, but if you ask them why, they don't know what to answer, they just repeat what they hear in the media, what they hear from the mouth of the provincial government…The people here are very uninformed, VERY uninformed, without any capacity for analysis, the level is very low, very low…the radio misinforms, the TV channels misinform. There's no information. There's no debate in the province, there's only one discourse (*hay un discurso único*)."

Being an oppositional group in the province also creates a delicate situation for MoCaFor, because the provincial government complains to national authorities about it, and the latter are key allies of MoCaFor. As Benito told me:

> It bothers Gildo [the governor] that the national government supports us; for the provincial government, 'Benito and his group are crazy,' just like that, directly, 'they're crazy'. The provincial government always tells the national government that they got 75% of the votes, and that all those votes went to Cristina [Kirchner,

> the president and ally of the governor]. So they [the provincial government] tells them [the national government] 'don't tell us what we ought to do in our province.'

In interviews I conducted with MoCaFor leaders in Monte Azul/Curuzú, they underlined the differences between the way they manage welfare benefits and the way the municipality (a branch of the patronage networks of the provincial government) does it.

> Nélida: When they began to manage the plans, the politicians treated the people like garbage. They did the paperwork, went to the municipality and tossed everything. When Horacio [MoCaFor leader] began to manage the plans for the people and lots came for the organization, the people realized that the people from the municipality trampled on the poorest people. So the people came and Horacio did everything for them. So the people realized that we did not treat them badly, but we tried to look for something for the people, and not play with them that way.
>
> Pablo: In the municipality they took the people's information and then…
>
> Nélida: And then they threw it away, there in the trash they found many applications for plans (…) This gave more standing to the organization when it began to arrange things and the people got them.
>
> Isidoro: In every election they said that the plans were going to come. So they used the plans playing with people's desperation. And everybody followed them [the people from the municipality], the election passed, but the plans never came.

Besides the discourse of leaders, however, it is important to access how the rank-and-file see the differences between the provincial government's and MoCaFor's management of resources. To avoid taking what leaders told me at face value, in what follows I present an excerpt from my fieldnotes to show: a) how prospective members of MoCaFor see participation in a social movement as a *collective* enterprise; b) how MoCaFor acts as a problem-solving network that, nonetheless, encourages the voicing of rights and *collective organization* (rather than reproducing the atomization that usually results from the integration into the patronage networks of the provincial government and the Peronist Party); and c) how MoCaFor leaders help people to solve everyday subsistence problems and, at the same time, ask them to volunteer in other activities of the movement.

In the morning a girl arrives at the locale of MoCaFor in Curuzú and she sits down to talk to Isidoro at a table in the front of the office. I'm in the back writing fieldnotes from yesterday and downloading recordings to the computer. When I finish, I join the conversation. The girl was working with Paippa [a social program of the provincial government for small farmers], but she says she got tired of working with them "and I came here to see if I might work with MoCaFor." She says that *"they [Paippa] wanted to work with two, three people at the most, and I want a project that can benefit all the small farmers, not just two or three."* Julio joins the table and says, "*Individually you're not going to achieve anything, if you go, he goes, the other goes, and complains, you're not going to achieve anything. But, if you organize, there's where you will get something*." The girl says that she wants to join and work with them, Isidoro tells her to come to the meeting Tuesday and Wednesday [a meeting of peasant organizations of the northeast] so she can see how they work. (…) After lunch, women start to arrive, little by little. The group is gathered to make community purchases, and to complain about the price increases. There are 15 women and a guy, plus Julio, Isidoro, and me. We are seated in a semi-circle, with Julio in front, and Isidoro coming and going, almost always standing. One woman says, "when you go the municipality to complain about why they don't have the prices the government says, they treat you like a ping pong ball; that it's here, no it's there; there they say it's somewhere else, and that's how it goes, passing the ball around." Julio says that *the idea of the meeting is to learn their rights so they can defend them. That if everyone goes and complains alone, nothing will happen, but if they do something together, they can achieve something.* Julio says the municipality should control the prices, but they don't do anything, "I don't have anything against the mayor, but they don't control the prices." (…) One of the women says that they would have to buy a product in bulk and divide it among them, to start with something. Several nod their heads. One of the women insists that they don't know who to complain to, because they don't know who is responsible for controlling prices (…) [After a long stretch of conversation] an agreement is reached to present a note to the municipality requesting price controls (…) Isidoro asks if someone can come lend a hand with the cooking for the assembly Tuesday and Wednesday. One woman says she can come, "if I don't have work now, I am doing nothing (*estoy al pedo*)". Later Julio tells me that he loves this woman, because she doesn't receive a plan, but she always participates, "and when she doesn't like something, she tells you to your face." (October 26, 2008)

In summary, what this ethnographic data exemplifies is that the distribution of resources by MoCaFor (and the system of reciprocation that generates), besides its actions as problem-solving network, convert this social movement organization into a group that takes elements from patronage politics. However, it would be mistaken to equate MoCaFor to a patronage network –like the one of the provincial government and the Peronist Party. MoCaFor maintains certain distinctive features, most notably, the encouragement of collective claims-making. Taken

together, this section and the previous ones suggest that patronage politics and social movements, usually seen in the literature as totally separated and contrasting phenomena, may present interpenetrations and hybridizations.

DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I presented the problem of "double pressure" that MoCaFor has to deal with. This "double pressure" stems from two components: a pressure "from below" and a pressure "from above." The former is built by the expectations of constituents that, in a context dominated by patronage, join the movement with the goal of defending their rights and voicing discontent but also to obtain concrete material benefits they need for the subsistence of their families. The latter is created when MoCaFor leaders move from the role of "distributors" of resources to that of "clients" vis-à-vis the federal state and a national social movement. The federal government and the provincial government belong to the same party and are allies in institutional politics. Thus, the system of reciprocity which MoCaFor leaders become involved in by receiving resources from its national allies poses obstacles to initiating confrontations with the provincial administration. MoCaFor needs resources to ensure the organization's continuity and the participation of constituents. At the same time, this translates into informal barriers for collective action; as Nélida said, the alliances with people from Buenos Aires "conditioned" the movement.

Although my data pertains to Formosa and MoCaFor, the idea of "double pressure" might be applicable to other instances of popular politics, at least in Argentina. The idea of "double pressure" aims to capture the complexities of a *relational political field* in which popular social movements are embedded, and advance a better understanding of processes of mobilization and demobilization. Adopting a relational point of view based on ethnography may help prevent a normative view of social movements or avoid qualifying the participation of social movement leaders in institutional politics with the judgmental label of "cooptation." For instance, an article inspecting processes of demobilization among the *piqueteros* in Argentina argues that

> The features enabling mobilisation and collective action in the first place [rejection of the political system] implied important *internal* dynamics and enabled strategies of *external* manipulation that in the end inhibited the

> movements from realising the macro-political role many observers expected (in hope or fear) that they might play (…) With increasing opportunities to get 'some ideas heard' and 'some things done', the balance between the conflicting goals of 'global rejection' and 'concrete claims' and the corresponding strategies had to be continuously adjusted. (…) Negotiation and dialogue as well as concrete governmental offers –social plans and support for local projects and micro enterprises- could hardly be rejected even if the risks of co-optation and instrumentalisation were well known. (Wolff 2007: 22-23; original emphasis)

According to the analyst, movements "fail" because they do not achieve the "macro-political role" they are supposed to fulfill. Accordingly, the "global rejection" of the system and the addressing of "concrete claims" are seen as two opposed and conflicting tendencies that generate "maladjustments." And negotiation and dialogue with authorities, coupled with obtaining resources, results in cooptation. Besides the role of "instrumentalization," the author explains demobilization by arguing that "the initial public resonance to the protests gave way to a growing demand for 'normalisation' especially among urban middle classes and the media." Even when the *piqueteros* contributed to changes in the democratic regime, he concludes, those changes have been "piecemeal only": "The formal-democratic order has not broken down, nor is there a profound process of 'democratic deepening' to be detected" (Wolff 2007: 27).

Similar views are expressed in another study of *piqueteros* in Argentina. Delamata (2004) found that the two unemployed organizations she studied

> share the same difficult relationship between, on the one hand, the broader political goals of their founders and, on the other, the struggle for jobs and food, which is the principal activity that the movement carries out. Whereas the political leaders found their identities on the ideological field, rank and file members tend to identify the organization's action either through the absent state responsibilities or self help. [One of the organizations of the study] never solved the tension between the development of a mass political movement and the struggle for jobs and food, and continues to function in practice as two overlapping organizations. Strategic political confrontation, which is the terrain of

> political activists, and social organization around basic needs and collective work, which is the everyday activity of the movement, co-exist as differentiated constructions. (Delamata 2004: 18)

I believe the problem with these views is that they see the larger goals of social change that inspire social movements and the need to address concrete material problems among its constituents as opposing forces, the first as the "political" aspect of the movement and the second as an spurious interference that ultimately leads the movement down the path of cooptation. In turn, in this chapter I kept my analysis close to the ethnographic data and the meanings and views of people participating in a movement to suggest that both goals, that of social change and of addressing subsistence needs, are two intertwined sides of the life of poor people's movements. In other words, as Rosanne Rutten argues, "On the local level, 'traditional politics' based on clientelism, and leftwing 'new politics' (…) may not consist of such separate political camps as is often implied" (1994: 4).

The ideas of anthropologist Sherry Ortner in her discussion of studies of "resistance" might contribute to shed light on the processes of popular politics I am tackling in this chapter. In an essay on "Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal" Ortner argues that studies of "resistance" that limit themselves to only observe the relationships between the dominant and the subordinate do not pay enough attention to the "ongoing politics *among* subalterns," and fail to problematize the "conflicted, internally contradictory, and affectively ambivalent" aspects of resistance (2006: 48-9, original emphasis). In this chapter, I explored the ambivalences within a social movement by showing how members and leaders of MoCaFor reject the clientelist practices of the provincial government but at the same time reproduce similar practices within their organization, while at the same time criticizing patronage networks for not "giving enough." In the distribution of resources that might solve people's subsistence needs, leaders of MoCaFor (more clearly in the case of Moreno) also reveal the politics *among* subalterns pinpointed by Ortner, reproducing asymmetries and unveiling authoritarian or patronizing strokes (for instance, in the way Benito addressed members and constituents). Ortner claims that "The impulse to sanitize the internal politics of the dominated must be understood as fundamentally romantic" and that "an understanding of political authenticity, of the people's own forms of inequality and asymmetry, is not only not incompatible with an understanding of

resistance but is in fact indispensable to such an understanding" (2006 :49). To view the demands for food and access to welfare as necessarily conducive to manipulation or as goals that create "noise" in the pursuit of broad social change is, I believe, to succumb to this impulse of "sanitizing politics" and a failure to see the situated agency of popular sectors. With this idea I take heed of Ortner's conceptualization of agency, seen not as an "entity that exists apart from cultural construction" but rather considering that "Every culture, every subculture, every historical moment, constructs its own forms of agency" (2006: 57). In the case of Formosa, peasants manifest their agency but, as it could not be otherwise, in a context that is imbued with the logic of patronage politics. Furthermore, in their views about clientelism and patronage politics, peasant leaders and constituents expressed the "ambivalences and ambiguities" that, in turn, "emerge from the intricate webs of articulation and disarticulations that always exist between dominant and dominated" (Ortner 2006: 62).[119] In short, by inspecting the nitty-gritty realities of the everyday life of social movements we can, I believe, contribute to a better understanding of popular politics, one that is less normative and closer to the experience of the subjects we study.

[119] For ramifications of the debate on "resistance" among subalterns see also, among a vast literature, Scott 1985, 1990, 2008; Kerkvliet 1990, 2005, 2009; Abu-Lughod 1990; Reed-Danahay 1993; Brown 1996; Mills 2003; Hollander and Einwohner 2004.

CONCLUSIONS

In a recent article, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly problematize the conventional wisdom of studies on social movements that see established social settings as necessarily conducive to contentious collective action. The authors assert that the concept of "mobilizing structure" has frequently "been treated as an objective structural facilitator of protest, rather than a contested site of interaction that can give rise to different lines of action" (2008: 325), and argue that existing groups and networks can facilitate action as well as present obstacles to it. They conclude that

> By starting from the accomplished fact of contentious action, and then working back in time to note that movements tend to arise in established social settings, structural analysts exaggerated the link between organization and action. And by selecting on the dependent variable –in this case, successful collective action– analysts inevitably focus on the exceptional cases in which existing groups produce movements, and elide the more numerous examples in which groups constrain action. (McAdam et al 2008: 325)

In this dissertation –based on data from interviews, participant observations, and archival sources- I have focused on cases in which environmental damage was followed by contentious actions and also on instances where similar environmental problems did not lead to protests. In accounting for these different responses, this dissertation considered three factors: authorities' denial/acknowledgement of environmental problems; activists' involvement in political networks; and the perspectives of the affected people regarding environmental damage and collective action's effectiveness. In 2003, the denial of the agrochemical exposure by provincial authorities fed the outrage of peasants, who saw the environmental damage and the destruction of their crops as a threat to their daily survival. Peasants thus engaged in collective actions, convinced that only protests could bring attention to their pleas. In 2009, in turn, the organization of collective actions were precluded by the authorities' acknowledgement of contamination, the

embeddedness of MoCaFor in national political networks allied to the provincial government, and the belief that negotiations and requests would be more effective to address their claims than contention.

In investigating dynamics of action and inaction I aimed to contribute towards a broadening of the field of social movement research, which has developed analytical concepts to explain processes of mobilization while giving less attention to situations in which people do not mobilize. In doing so, I reviewed recent developments and critiques to central concepts within social movement research, namely, framing activities and political opportunities. Recent discussions among social movement scholars over the role of culture lend important insights into understanding dynamics of mobilization, demobilization, and inaction. Particularly illuminating are the perspectives of those who argue for a dual conception of culture as both enabling and constraining phenomena in processes of mobilization. In an edited volume contributing to this debate, Nancy Whittier analyzes the relationship between meaning and structure arguing that "there has been relatively little complex analysis of how, exactly, movements' particular internal processes interact with external political opportunities, and even less analysis of the interaction with dominant cultural contexts. (…) Taking such an approach means serious consideration of *structure* (movement organizations, communities, and fields), *strategies and collective action* (challenges, protest events), and *meaning* (collective identities and discourse)" (2002:290, original emphasis).

The analysis presented in this dissertation weaves together, step by step, these three aforementioned dimensions. Thus, I first outlined the broader context in which contentious actions take place by delineating the recent structural changes in agrarian Argentina, mostly driven by the expansion of genetically modified crops which has created a host of environmental and social problems. The negative consequences of that expansion, which I dubbed "the dark side of the boom," are at the root of the transgressive and contained protests I presented in chapters four and five. In these chapters, where I analyzed a series of protest events in Formosa, I adopted a twofold strategy of a diachronic and a synchronic comparison of contentious events. Through a diachronic comparison of peasants' reactions to two similar instances of environmental damages in Monte Azul in 2003 and 2009, I tapped into processes of mobilization and demobilization paying attention to the dimensions Whittier identified. Different reactions in these cases were accounted for by observing the relationship between claimants and authorities,

the political networks in which activists became embedded, and the meanings attributed to contamination and the effectiveness of collective action vis-à-vis less confrontational means of addressing grievances. The ensuing chapter tackled the variation in responses to agrochemical exposure (transgressive and contained contention) through a synchronic comparison of the events in Monte Azul with those taking place in Moreno and Bermellon. This comparison highlighted the importance of mobilizing structures in making sense of different reactions to environmental damage, while also making the conclusions derived from the Monte Azul case more robust by attending to their pertinence in other settings. In chapter six, I further considered the implications of a social movement's "dominant cultural context" by investigating the role of patronage politics in MoCaFor's political networks, meanings, and strategies. With this chapter, the dissertation's main ideas come full circle by integrating the everyday meanings of politics and participation in a social movement with the analyses of open confrontations offered in previous chapters. The full-fledged presentation of my ethnographic data provides additional evidence to better understand processes of demobilization by developing the concept of "double pressure." The pervasiveness of patronage politics in Formosa creates a twofold pressure for MoCaFor activists. On one hand, constituents expect, by their participation in the movement, to receive material benefits for their subsistence needs. On the other hand, obtaining resources to meet these expectations through alliances with national political actors ensures the organization's continuity yet generates obstacles for transgressive collective actions.

Future Research

I see at least three lines of future research spinning-off from this dissertation, aiming to address some of its limitations and extending its central ideas. First, I would like to refine the concept of "double pressure" that I presented in chapter six of this dissertation. While the conventional wisdom sees social movements and patronage politics as two different and opposing phenomena, I expect to have shown that these two spheres present a series of interpenetrations when it comes to popular movements and politics in Latin America. I believe putting the literatures on social movements and patronage in dialogue can contribute to the refinement of the idea of "double pressure" through a further inspection of the relationships between movement's members, leaders, and authorities. In this dissertation, I mostly focused on these relationships by observing

them as political networks. The idea of "double pressure" could be refined, I think, by exploring the analytical value of the relational identities constructed through those political networks. Specifically, leaders of MoCaFor play a twofold role in the acquisition and distribution of resources. They play the role of "givers" among their members, while acting as "receivers" when they relate to authorities of the federal state and leaders of a national social movement. By inspecting these multiple points of connection, scantly analyzed in both the literature on social movements and patronage, I can make the concept of "double pressure" more robust in order to shed greater light on processes of mobilization and demobilization among popular sectors.

Second, and related to the previous line of research, I would like to probe the question of what politics means for Formosan peasants. What are the meanings of participating in a social movement? How do peasants understand institutional and patronage politics? How is the state constructed by everyday interactions between officials, activists of popular movements, and poor people? As hinted upon in chapter six, I have a substantial amount of ethnographic data on how people in Formosa talk about and understands politics. In advancing this line of research, I can establish a dialogue with anthropological research on everyday politics among peasants (e.g. Kerkvliet 1990, 2005, 2009) and the meanings of activism and political engagement (Eliasoph 1998; Lichterman 1996, 1998; Gamson 1992). I can also benefit from the burgeoning field of political ethnography (e.g. Joseph 2007; Baiocchi and Connor 2008) and from a long-standing line of research of Brazilian political anthropology inspecting the relationships between peasant activism, patronage, and electoral politics (e.g Goldman 2001, 2006; Comerford 1999, 2004; Bezerra 1999).

Third, to continue the project put forward in this dissertation, a limitation of this study needs to be addressed. Throughout this dissertation, I used the terms "peasant" and "small farmer" interchangeably. In so doing, I circumvented the question of why people refer to themselves as "peasants" in public discourses (e.g. *Peasant* Movement of Formosa, MoCaFor), but tend to talk about themselves as "small farmers" (*pequeños productores*) or "poor people" ("*nosotros los pobres…*") in everyday interactions and many of my interviews. I thus would like to scrutinize the polysemy surrounding the definition of poor people working the land in rural Argentina. I will put different definitions in historical perspective (*minifundista*, *pequeño productor*, *campesino, agricultor familiar*) to investigate: a) why and how those definitions are shaped in a constant complicity and struggle with the state; b) its implications for relationships

between rural classes; c) how people currently *use* those categories. In chapter three, I used secondary literature to reconstruct the background of Argentina and Formosa using the work produced by state agencies and social scientists involved in the designed of rural public policy between the 1970s and the early 2000s. I will revisit this literature with a critical eye to trace the discourses and policies for the rural poor zooming in on “naming”: *minifundista* and *campesino* in the 1970s-1980s, *pequeño productor* in the 1990s, and the recent category of *agricultor familiar*. Then, using my ethnographic data, I will inspect how people in Formosa use different categories in different contexts: when talking about and between themselves in everyday settings; in social movement meetings, events of collective action, and public discourses; and in negotiations with state officials.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abu-Lughod, J. L. (2007). Race, Space, and Riots in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, New York, Oxford University Press.

Abu Lughod, J. L. (1990). "The romance of resistance: tracing transformations of power through Bedouin women." American Ethnologist **17**(1): 41-55.

Adair, S. (1996). "Overcoming a collective action frame in the remaking of an antinuclear opposition." Sociological Forum **11**(2): 347-375.

Aizen, M. A., L. A. Garibaldi, M. Dondo. (2009). "Expansión de la soja y diversidad de la agricultura argentina." Ecología Austral **19**(1): 45-54.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. and C. Kay, Eds. (2009). Peasants and globalization: political economy, rural transformation and the agrarian question. London, Routledge.

Albritton, R. B. (1979). "Social amelioration through mass insurgency? A reexamination of the Piven and Cloward thesis." The American Political Science Review **73**(4): 1003-1011.

Albro, R. (2005). "The Indigenous in the Plural in Bolivian Oppositional Politics." Bulletin of Latin American Research **24**(4): 433-453.

Almeida, P. and H. Johnston (2006). "Neoliberal Globalization and Popular Movements in Latin America." Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield.

Almeida, P. and L. B. Stearns (1998). "Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata." Social Problems **45**(1): 37-60.

Almeida, P. D. (2007). "Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements against Economic Adjustment Policies in Latin America." Latin American Perspectives **34**(3): 123.

Alperin, M. N. P. (2009). "The impact of Argentina's social assistance program plan jefes y jefas de hogar on structural poverty." Estudios Económicos(1): 49-81.

Altieri, M. A. and P. Rosset (1999). "Ten reasons why biotechnology will not ensure food security, protect the environment and reduce poverty in the developing world." AgBioForum **2**(3&4): 155-162.

Alvarez, S. E., Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar (1998). Cultures of politics/politics of cultures: re-visioning Latin American social movements. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.

Amenta, E. and N. Caren (2004). "The legislative, organizational, and beneficiary consequences of state-oriented challengers." D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements Malden, MA, Blackwell.

Amenta, E., N. Caren, et al. (2010). "The Political Consequences of Social Movements." Annual Review of Sociology **36**(1): 287-307.

Amenta, E., N. Caren, T. Fetner, and M.P. Young (2002). "Challengers and states: Toward a political sociology of social movements." Research in Political Sociology **10**: 47-83.

Amenta, E., N. Caren, S.J. Olasky and J.E.Stobaugh (2009). "All the movements fit to print: Who, what, when, where, and why SMO families appeared in the New York Times in the twentieth century." American Sociological Review **74**(4): 636.

Amenta, E. and M. P. Young (1999). "Democratic states and social movements: Theoretical arguments and hypotheses." Social Problems **46**: 153-168.

Aminzade, R. (1995). Between Movement and Party: The Transformation of Mid-Nineteenth-Century French Republicanism. The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives

on states and social movements. J. C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, Univ of Minnesota Press.
Andrews, K. (1997). "The impacts of social movements on the political process: The civil rights movement and black electoral politics in Mississippi." American Sociological Review **62**(5): 800-819.
Andrews, K. T. (2002). "Movement-Countermovement Dynamics and the Emergence of New Institutions: The Case of White Flight Schools in Mississippi." Social Forces **80**(3): 911-936.
Andrews, K. T. and M. Biggs (2006). "The dynamics of protest diffusion: Movement organizations, social networks, and news media in the 1960 sit-ins." American Sociological Review **71**(5): 752.
Andrews, K. T. and N. Caren (2010). "Making the News: Movement Organizations, Media Attention, and the Public Agenda " American Sociological Review **75** (6): 841-866.
Aranda, D. 2008a. "El lado oscuro del boom de la soja." Pagina 12 March 31 2008. In http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/101594-32004-2008-03-31.html
Aranda, D. 2008b. "'Varias generaciones están comprometidas'. Seis pueblos de la Pampa Húmeda, con niveles de cáncer superiores al normal por el uso de los agrotóxicos." Pagina 12 May 14 2008 In http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/104144-32760-2008-05-14.html
Aranda, D. 2009. "Un tema prohibido. Hay denuncias en todo el país por el uso del glifosato." Pagina 12, January 12 2009. In http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/118075-37629-2009-01-12.html
Arbona, J. (2007). "Neo-liberal ruptures: Local political entities and neighbourhood networks in El Alto, Bolivia." Geoforum **38**(1): 127-137.
Arce, M. and R. Rice (2009). "Societal Protest in Post-Stabilization Bolivia." Latin American Research Review **44**(1): 88-101.
Archetti, E. P. and K. Stolen (1974). "Tipos de economía, obstáculos al desarrollo capitalista y orientaciones generales de los colonos del norte de Santa Fe." Desarrollo Económico **14**(53): 151-179.
Arditti, R. (1999). Searching for life: The grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the disappeared children of Argentina. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Arias, E. D. (2006). "Trouble en Route: Drug Trafficking and Clientelism in Rio de Janeiro Shantytowns." Qualitative Sociology **29**(4): 427-445.
Assies, W. (2004). "Bolivia: A gasified democracy." Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe **76**: 25-43.
Attwood, D. (1974). "Patrons and mobilizers: Political entrepreneurs in an agrarian state." Journal of Anthropological Research **30**(4): 225-241.
Auyero, J. (2001). Poor people's politics: Peronist survival networks and the legacy of Evita, Durham, Duke Univ Pr.
Auyero, J. (2003). Contentious lives: two Argentine women, two protests, and the quest for recognition. Durham, Duke Univ Press.
Auyero, J. (2007). Routine politics and violence in Argentina: the gray zone of state power, New York, Cambridge Univ Pr.
Azpiazu, D., E. M. Basualdo, et al. (1986). El nuevo poder económico en la Argentina de los años 80. Buenos Aires, Hyspamérica.

Baiocchi, G. and B. T. Connor (2008). "The Ethnos in the Polis: Political Ethnography as a Mode of Inquiry." Sociology Compass **2**(1): 139-155.
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986). Speech genres and other late essays. Austin, University of Texas Press.
Banaszak, L. A. (1996). Why movements succeed or fail: Opportunity, culture, and the struggle for woman suffrage. Princeton, Princeton Univ Pr.
Banaszak, L. A. (2005). "Inside and outside the state: Movement insider status, tactics, and public policy achievements." D.S. Meyer, V. Jenness, and H. Ingram Routing the opposition: Social movements, public policy, and democracy. Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press.
Barbetta, P. (2005). El Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero: luchas y sentidos en torno a la problemática de la tierra. El campo argentino en la encrucijada. N. Giarracca and M. Teubal. Buenos Aires, Alianza.
Barbetta, P. (2009). El derecho distorsionado: una interpretación de los desalojos campesinos desde un análisis del campo jurídico. La Argentina rural: De la agricultura familiar a los agronegocios. C. Gras and V. A. Hernández. Buenos Aires, Editorial Biblos.
Bayliss-Smith, T. and S. Wanmali (1984). Understanding Green Revolution: Agrarian Change and Developemnt Planning in South Asia. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
Bearman, P. S. (1993). Relations into rhetorics: local elite social structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press.
Becker, H. S. (1998). Tricks of the Trade: How to Think about Your Research While You're Doing It. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Becker, M. (2010). "Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador." Latin American Perspectives **38**(47): 47-62.
Benachour, N. and G.-E. Séralini (2009). "Glyphosate Formulations Induce Apoptosis and Necrosis in Human Umbilical, Embryonic, and Placental Cells." Chemical Research in Toxicology **22**(1): 97-105.
Benbrook, C. (2002). Economic and Environemental Impacts of First Generation Genetically Modified Crops: Lessons from the United States. Transgenics in Argentine Agriculture: Towards Defining a Natinoal Policy. Buenos Aires; December 2002.
Benbrook, C. (2005). Rust, resistance, run down soils, and rising costs–Problems facing soybean producers in Argentina. Technical Paper, AgBioTech. **8**.
Benbrook, C. (2009). Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the United States: The first thirteen years. Critical Issue Report, The Organic Center.
Benford, R. and D. Snow (2000). "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment." Annual Review of Sociology **26**(1): 611-639.
Benford, R. D. (1993). "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." Social Forces **71**(3): 677-701.
Benford, R. D. (1997). "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective." Sociological Inquiry **67**: 409-430.
Bennett, S. E. (1990). "The Uses and Abuses of Registration and Turnout Data: An Analysis of Piven and Cloward's Studies of Nonvoting in America." PS: Political Science and Politics **23**(2): 166-171.
Berger, J. (1992). Into Their Labours: Pig Earth, Once in Europa, Lilac and Flag. A Trilogy. London, Penguin Books.
Bernstein, H. (2009). "VI Lenin and AV Chayanov: looking back, looking forward." Journal of Peasant Studies **36**(1): 55-81.

Bezerra, M. O. (1999). "Em nome das bases": política, favor e dependência pessoal. Rio de Janeiro, Relume Dumará, Núcleo de Antropologia da Política.
Biggs, M. (2003). "Positive Feedback in Collective Mobilization: The American Strike Wave of 1886." Theory and Society **32**(2): 217-254.
Biggs, M. (2005). "Strikes as Forest Fires: Chicago and Paris in the Late Nineteenth Century." American Journal of Sociology **110**(6): 1684-1714.
Bisang, R. (2003). "Apertura económica, innovación y estructura productiva: La aplicación de biotecnología en la producción agrícola pampeana argentina." Desarrollo Económico **43**(171): 413-442.
Bisang, R., G. Anlló, et al. (2008). "Una revolución (no tan) silenciosa. Claves para repensar el agro en Argentina." Desarrollo Económico **48**(190/191): 165-207.
Blumer, H. (1946). Collective Behavior. A New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. A. McClung Lee. New York, Barnes and Noble.
Bodemann, Y. M. (1982). "Class rule as patronage: Kinship, local ruling cliques and the state in rural sardinia." Journal of Peasant Studies **9**(2): 147-175.
Bohstedt, J. (1994). The dynamics of riots: Escalation and diffusion/contagion. The dynamics of aggression: Biological and social processes in dyads and groups. M. Potegal and J. F. Knutson. Hillsdale, NJ, Laurence Erlbaum.
Boissevain, J. (1977). "When the saints go marching out: reflections on the decline of patronage in Malta." Patrons and clients in Mediterranean societies: 81–96.
Bondi, L. and N. Laurie (2005). "Introduction." Antipode **37**(3): 393-401.
Bonn, D. (2005). "Roundup Revelation." Environmental Health Perspectives **113**(6): A403-A404.
Borrini, H. R. (1991). Ocupación y organización del espacio en el territorio de Formosa, 1880-1980. Resistencia, Chaco, Instituto de Investigaciones Geohistóricas.
Bott, S., T. Tesfamariam, et al. (2008). "Glyphosate-induced impairment of plant growth and micronutrient status in glyphosate-resistant soybean (Glycine max L.)." Plant and soil **312**(1): 185-194.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Boykoff, J. (2007). "Limiting dissent: the mechanisms of state repression in the USA." Social Movement Studies **6**(3): 281-310.
Braun, R. and R. Vliegenthart (2009). "Violent Fan Fluctuations: A Diffusion Perspective to Explain Supporters' Violence." Mobilization**14**(1): 23-44.
Brenner, N., J. Peck, et al. (2010a). "Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, pathways." Global Networks **10**(2): 182-222.
Brenner, N., J. Peck, et al. (2010b). "After neoliberalization?" Globalizations **7**(3): 327-345.
Brenner, N. and N. Theodore (2002). "Cities and the geographies of 'actually existing neoliberalism'." Antipode **34**(3): 349-379.
Broadbent, J. (1999). Environmental politics in Japan: networks of power and protest, Cambridge Univ Pr.
Broadbent, J. (2003). "Movement in Context: Thick Networks and Japanese Environmental Protest." Social Movements and Networks **1**(9): 204-231.
Brockett, C. D. (1991). "The structure of political opportunities and peasant mobilization in Central America." Comparative politics **23**(3): 253-274.

Brodherson, V. and D. Slutzky (1975). Formación y Desarrollo de las Estructuras Agrarias Regionales: Misiones y Formosa. Diagnóstico de la estructura social de la región NEA. V. Brodherson, D. Slutzky and G. Tesoriero. Buenos Aires, Consejo Federal de Inversiones.
Brown, M. F. (1996). "On resisting resistance." American Anthropologist **98**(4): 729-735.
Brusco, V., M. Nazareno, et al. (2004). "Vote Buying in Argentina." Latin American Research Review **39**(2): 66-88.
Buechler, S. (2004). "The strange career of strain and breakdown theories of collective action." The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, MA, Blackwell.
Burawoy, M. (1998). "The Extended Case Method." Sociological Theory **16**(1): 4-33.
Burawoy, M. (2000). Grounding globalization. Global ethnography: forces, connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Burdick, J. (1995). "Uniting theory and practice in the ethnography of social movements: Notes toward a hopeful realism." Dialectical Anthropology **20**(3): 361-385.
Burdick, J., P. Oxhorn, K.M. Roberts (2009). Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?: Societies and Politics at the Crossroads, Palgrave MacMillan.
Burgwald, G. (1996). Struggle of the Poor: Neighborhood Organization and Clientelist Practice in a Quito Squatter Settlement. Amsterdam, CEDLA.
Burstein, P. (1999). Social movements and public policy. How social movements matter. M. Giugni, D. McAdam and C. Tilly. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Burstein, P., R. L. Einwohner, et al. (1995). The success of political movements: A bargaining perspective. The politics of social protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. C. J. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, Univ of Minnesota Press.
Burstein, P. and A. Linton (2003). "The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns." Social Forces **81**(2): 381-408.
Calhoun, C. (1993). "'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century." Social Science History **17**(3): 385-427.
Canel, E. (2010). Barrio Democracy in Latin America: Participatory Decentralization and Community Activism in Montevideo, Pennsylvania State Univ Pr.
Casabe, N., L. Piola, et al. (2007). "Ecotoxicological assessment of the effects of glyphosate and chlorpyrifos in an Argentine soya field." Journal of Soils and Sediments **7**(4): 232-239.
CELS (2003). Plan Jefes y Jefas: ¿Derecho social o beneficio sin derechos? Buenos Aires, CELS.
Cerdeira, A. L. and S. O. Duke (2006). "The current status and environmental impacts of glyphosate-resistant crops: A review." Journal of Environmental Quality **35**(5): 1633-1658.
Chayanov, A. V., D. Thorner, et al. (1966). On the theory of peasant economy, Irwin.
Clemens, E. S. and D. C. Minkoff (2004). Beyond the iron law: Rethinking the place of organizations in social movement research, Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing.
Cohen, J. L. (1985). "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements." Social research **52**(4): 663-716.
Comerford, J. C. (1999). Fazendo a luta: sociabilidade, falas e rituais na construção de organizações camponesas. Rio de Janeiro, Relume-Dumará.

Comerford, J. C. (2004). Como uma família: sociabilidade, territórios de parentesco e sindicalismo rural. Rio de Janeiro, Relume Dumará.

Cooper, J., L. Lipper, et al., Eds. (2005). Agricultural Biodiversity and Biotechnology in Economic Development. New York, Springer.

Couso, C. (2008). "La conformación de un imaginario de "Modelo de País" en el discurso presidencial de CFK." Lavboratorio **10**(22): 45-50.

Cress, D. M. and D. A. Snow (2000). "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing." The American Journal of Sociology **105**(4): 1063-1104.

Curtis, R. L. and B. E. Aguirre (1993). Collective behavior and social movements. Needham Heights, MA, Allyn & Bacon.

Dallegrave, E., F. D. Mantese, et al. (2007). "Pre- and postnatal toxicity of the commercial glyphosate formulation in Wistar rats." Archives of Toxicology **81**(9): 665-673.

Darley, J. M. (2009). "Morality in the Law: The Psychological Foundations of Citizens' Desires to Punish Transgressions." Annual Review of Law and Social Science **5**: 1-23.

Davenport, C. (2010). Media Bias, Perspective, and State Repression: the Black Panther Party. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Davis, G. F., D. McAdam, W. R. Scott and M.N. Zald, Eds. (2005). Social Movements and Organization Theory. New York, Cambridge Univ Pr.

DDA-PROINDER. (2003). Los programas de desarrollo rural ejecutados en el ámbito de la SAGPyA, Serie Estudios e Investigaciones, Dirección de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Buenos Aires.

de Haan, L. and A. Zoomers (2005). "Exploring the frontier of livelihood research." Development and Change **36**(1): 27–47.

de Martinelli, G. (2008). Pools de siembra y contratistas de labores. Nuevos y viejos actores sociales en la expansión productiva pampeana reciente. Pasado y Presente en el Agro Argentino. J. Balsa, G. Mateo and M. Ospital. Buenos Aires, Luminere.

de Medeiros, L. S. (2007). "Social movements and the experience of market-led agrarian reform in Brazil." Third World Quarterly **28**(8): 1501-1518.

de Roos, A. J., A. Blair, et al. (2005). "Cancer Incidence among Glyphosate-Exposed Pesticide Applicators in the Agricultural Health Study." Environmental Health Perspectives **113**(1): 49-54.

de Vendômois, J. S., F. Roullier, et al. (2009). "A comparison of the effects of three GM corn varieties on mammalian health." International Journal of Biological Sciences **5**(7): 706-726.

Delamata, G. (2004). The Organizations of Unemployed Workers in Greater Buenos Aires. CLAS Working Papers, Center for Latin American Studies, UC Berkeley.

Della Porta, D. and M. Diani (1999). Social movements: An introduction, Malden MA, Blackwell Pub.

Deng, F. (1997). "Information gaps and unintended outcomes of social movements: the 1989 Chinese student movement." American Journal of Sociology **102**(4): 1085-1112.

Diani, M. (1996). "Linking mobilization frames and political opportunities: Insights from regional populism in Italy." American Sociological Review **61**(6): 1053-1069.

Diani, M. and D. McAdam (2003). Social movements and networks: relational approaches to collective action, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.

Diario Junio (2009) "Marcada preocupación por el uso de agrotóxicos en Entre Ríos" *Diario Junio*, September 29 de 2009 http://www.diariojunio.com.ar/noticias.php?ed=1&di=0&no=35661
Digilio, P., D. Domínguez, P. Lapegna and P. Sabatino (2004). "Como una llamarada". Argentina. Documentary.
Domínguez, D., P. Lapegna, P. Sabatino (2005). Agriculturas en tensión en Colonia Loma Senés, provincia de Formosa. El campo argentino en la encrucijada. Estrategias y resistencia social, ecos en la ciudad. N. Giarracca and M. Teubal. Buenos Aires, Alianza.
Domínguez, D., P. Lapegna, and P. Sabatino (2006). "Un futuro presente: las luchas territoriales." Nómadas **24**: 239-246.
Domínguez, D. and P. Sabatino (2006). Con la soja al cuello: crónica de un país hambriento productor de divisas. Los tormentos de la materia. Aportes para una ecología política latinoamericana. H. Alimonda. Buenos Aires, CLACSO.
Domínguez, D. and P. Sabatino (2010). La muerte que viene en el viento. Los problemática de la contaminación por efecto de la agricultura transgénica en Argentina y Paraguay. Los señores de la soja. La agricultura transgénica en América Latina. Buenos Aires, CLACSO.
Earl, J., A. Martin, et al. (2004). "The use of newspaper data in the study of collective action." Annual Review of Sociology **30**: 65-80.
Eckstein, S. (1989). Power and popular protest: Latin American social movements. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Eckstein, S. and T. Wickham-Crowley (2003). Struggles for social rights in Latin America. New York, Routledge.
Edelman, M. (1999). Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.
Edelman, M. (2001). "Social Movements: Changing Paradigms and Forms of Politics." Annual Reviews in Anthropology **30**(1): 285-317.
Edelman, M. and M. A. Seligson (1994). "Land Inequality: A Comparison of Census Data and Property Records in Twentieth-Century Southern Costa Rica." The Hispanic American Historical Review **74**(3): 445-491.
Eisenstadt, S. N. and L. Roniger (1984). Patrons, clients and friends. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Eliasoph, N. (1998). Avoiding politics: How Americans produce apathy in everyday life. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Ellingson, S. (1995). "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action: Public Debate and Rioting in Antebellum Cincinnati." The American Journal of Sociology **101**(1): 100-144.
Emigh, R. J. (1997). "The power of negative thinking: The use of negative case methodology in the development of sociological theory." Theory and Society **26**(5): 649-684.
Escobar, A. and S. E. Alvarez (1992). The making of social movements in Latin America: Identity, strategy, and democracy, Westview Pr.
Evans, R. R. (1975). Readings in collective behavior. Chicago, Rand McNally & Company.
Everett, K. D. (1991). "Professionalization and Protest: Changes in the Social Movement Sector, 1961-1983." Social Forces **70**(4): 957-975.

Ewen, S. W. B. and A. Pusztai (1999). "Effect of diets containing genetically modified potatoes expressing Galanthus nivalis lectin on rat small intestine." The Lancet **354**(9187): 1353-1354.
Faccini, D. (2000). "Los cambios tecnológicos y las nuevas especies de malezas en soja." AgroMensajes (Universidad de Rosario) **4**(5).
Fernández Álvarez, M. I. and V. Manzano (2007). "Desempleo, acción estatal y movilización social en Argentina." Política y Cultura **27**: 143-166.
Fernández, D. S., A. H. G. de Molina, et al. (2007). "La protesta campesina como protesta ambiental, siglos XVIII-XX." Historia Agraria: 277-301.
Ferrara, F. (1973). Qué son las ligas agrarias: historia y documentos de las organizaciones campesinas del Nordeste argentino. Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno.
Fiorotto, D. T. (2003). "Prohíben la tala de los bosques en Entre Ríos. Tras conocer un informe universitario sobre el desmonte" *La Nación*, October 1 2003 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/532043-prohiben-la-tala-de-los-bosques-en-entre-rios
Fitting, E. (2006). "Importing corn, exporting labor: The neoliberal corn regime, GMOs, and the erosion of Mexican biodiversity." Agriculture and human values **23**(1): 15-26.
Flam, H. (1994). States and anti-nuclear movements. Edinburgh, Edinburgh Univ Pr.
Foweraker, J. (2001). "Grassroots movements and political activism in Latin America: a critical comparison of Chile and Brazil." Journal of Latin American Studies **33**(04): 839-865.
Fowler, B. (2009). "The Recognition/Redistribution Debate and Bourdieu's Theory of Practice: Problems of Interpretation." Theory, Culture & Society **26**(1): 144.
Francisco, R.A., D. Gerner, P. Schrodt, and J. Weddle. (1994). "The Analysis of Political Events Using Machine Coded Data. " International Studies Quarterly **38**:91-119.
Frankel, F. R. (1971). India's green revolution. Economic gains and political costs. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Franzosi, R. (1987). "The press as a source of socio-historical data." Historical Methods **20**(1): 5-16.
Fraser, N. (2003). Rethinking recognition: overcoming displacement and reification in cultural politics. Recognition struggles and social movements: contested identities, agency and power. B. Hobson. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ Pr.
Fraser, N. and A. Honneth (2003). Redistribution or recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange. London; New York, Verso Books.
Freeman, J. (1973). "The origins of the women's liberation movement." American Journal of Sociology **78**(4): 792-811.
Freud, S. (1989) [1921]. Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. New York, Norton.
Friedmann, H. (1993). "The political economy of food: a global crisis." New Left Review: I/197: 29-57
Friedmann, J. and H. Rangan (1993). In Defense of Livelihood: Comparative studies on environmental action, West Hartford, Kumarian Pr.
Gaitán, F. A. and M. Maneiro (2009). "El plan jefes y jefas de hogar desocupados: sus efectos en la protesta de los movimientos de trabajadores desocupados." Barbarói(30): 139-158.
Galafassi, G. (2006). "Conflictos agrarios del Nordeste argentino en la década de los setenta." Perfiles latinoamericanos **28**: 159-183.
Gamson, W., D. Croteau, et al. (1992). "Media images and the social construction of reality." Annual Review of Sociology **18**(1): 373-393.
Gamson, W. A. (1975). The strategy of social protest, Homewood, IL, Dorsey Press.

Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Gamson, W. A. and D. S. Meyer (1996). Framing political opportunity. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. N. Zald. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Gamson, W. A. and E. Schmeidler (1984). "Review: Organizing the Poor." Theory and Society **13**(4): 567-585.
García Linera, A., Ed. (2004). Sociología de los Movimientos Sociales en Bolivia. La Paz., Diakonia-Oxfam.
Gaventa, J. (1980). Power and Powerlessness. Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. Urbana, IL University of Illinois Press.
Gay, R. (1990). "Community Organization and Clientelist Politics in Contemporary Brazil: a case study from suburban Rio de Janeiro." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research **14**(4): 648-666.
Gay, R. (1994). Popular organization and democracy in Rio de Janeiro: a tale of two favelas. Philadelphia, Temple Univ Pr.
Geertz, C. (1983). Common sense as a cultural system. Local Knowledge. C. Geertz. New York, Basic Books.
Genevie, L. E., Ed. (1978). Collective behavior and social movements. Ithaca, Peacock Publishers.
Giardinelli, M. (2010). "Soja, ambiente, intereses" *Pagina 12* September 26 2010 http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-153810-2010-09-26.html
Giarracca, N., Ed. (2001) La protesta social en la Argentina. Transformaciones económicas y crisis social en el interior del país. Buenos Aires, Alianza.
Giarracca, N. (2007). "The tragedy of development: disputes over natural resources in Argentina." Sociedad (Buenos Aires) **3**(26): 1-14.
Giarracca, N. and M. Teubal, Eds. (2005). El campo argentino en la encrucijada. Estrategias y resistencias sociales, ecos en la ciudad. Buenos Aires, Alianza.
Giarracca, N. and M. Teubal (2006). Democracia y neoliberalismo en el campo Argentino. Una convivencia difícil. La Construcción de la Democracia en el Campo Latinoamericano. H. C. de Grammont. Buenos Aires, CLACSO.
Giarracca, N. and M. Teubal, Eds. (2010). Del paro agrario a las elecciones de 2009: tramas, reflexiones y debates. Buenos Aires, Antropofagia.
Gill, L. (2000). Teetering on the rim: global restructuring, daily life, and the armed retreat of the Bolivian state. New York, Columbia Univ Pr.
Gillan, K. (2008). "Understanding meaning in movements: a hermeneutic approach to frames and ideologies." Social Movement Studies **7**(3): 247-263.
Giraudy, A. (2007). "The distributive politics of emergency employment programs in Argentina (1993-2002)." Latin American Research Review **42**(2): 33-55.
Girbal-Blacha, N. M. (2004). Opciones para la economía agraria del Gran Chaco Argentino. El algodón en tiempos del Estado intervencionista. El campo diverso: enfoques y perspectivas de la Argentina agraria del siglo XX. G. Galafassi. Bernal, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes: 185-215.
Giugni, M. (2004). Social protest and policy change: Ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements in comparative perspective. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.
Giugni, M., D. McAdam, et al., Eds. (1998). From contention to democracy. Boston, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield.

Giugni, M. G. (1998). "Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements." Annual Review of Sociology **24**(1): 371-393.

Givens, R., K. Roberts, et al., Eds. (2010). Dynamics of Diffusion in Social Movements. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Glaeser, B., Ed. (1987). The Green Revolution revisited. Critique and alternatives. London and Boston, Allen & Unwin.

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience, Cambirdge, MA, Harvard University Press.

Goldman, M. (2001). "An Ethnographic Theory of Democracy. Politics from the Viewpoint of Ilhéus's Black Movement (Bahia, Brazil)." Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology **66**(2): 157-180.

Goldman, M. (2006). Como funciona a democracia: uma teoria etnográfica da política. Rio de Janeiro, 7 Letras.

Goldstone, J. (1980). "The weakness of organization: a new look at Gamson's the strategy of social protest." The American Journal of Sociology **85**(5): 1017-1042.

Goldstone, J. (2003). Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Politics. States, Parties, and Social Movements J. A. Goldstone. New York, Cambridge University Press**:** 1-26.

Golsberg, C. (1999). *El Movimiento Agrario de Misiones*. Facultad de Agronomía, UBA. Unpublished.

Goluboff, R. L. (1999). "“Won't You Please Help Me Get My Son Home”: Peonage, Patronage, and Protest in the World War II Urban South." Law & Social Inquiry **24**(4): 777-806.

Gómez, L. A. (2004). El Alto de pie: Una insurrección aymara en Bolivia. La Paz, Comuna.

Goodman, D. and M. J. Watts, Eds. (1997). Globalising food: agrarian questions and global restructuring. London, Routledge.

Goodwin, J. and J. M. Jasper (2004). Introduction. Rethinking social movements: Structure, meaning, and emotion. J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.

Gould, R. V. (1991). "Multiple networks and mobilization in the Paris commune, 1871." American Sociological Review **56**(6): 716-729.

Gould, R. V. (1996). "Patron-client ties, state centralization, and the whiskey rebellion." American Journal of Sociology **102**(2): 400-429.

Gove, B., S. A. Power, et al. (2007). "Effects of herbicide spray drift and fertilizer overspread on selected species of woodland ground flora: comparison between short-term and long-term impact assessments and field surveys." Journal of Applied Ecology **44**(2): 374-384.

Gras, C. (2009). "Changing Patterns in Family Farming: The Case of the Pampa Region, Argentina." Journal of Agrarian Change **9**(3): 345-364.

Gras, C. and V. A. Hernández, Eds. (2009). La Argentina rural: De la agricultura familiar a los agronegocios. Buenos Aires, Editorial Biblos.

Greenpeace. (2006) Desmontes S.A. Quiénes están detrás de la destrucción de los últimos bosques nativos de la Argentina. Buenos Aires, Greenpeace.

Guha, R. (2000). The unquiet woods: ecological change and peasant resistance in the Himalaya. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ of California Pr.

Gupta, A. and J. Ferguson (2002). "Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality." American Ethnologist **29**(4): 981-1002.

GRR (Grupo de Reflexión Rural). (2009). "Pueblos Fumigados. Informe sobre la problemática del uso de plaguicidas en las principales provincias sojeras de la Argentina." In www.grr.org.ar

Gunst, L. (1996). Born fi'dead: a journey through the Jamaican posse underworld, Holt Paperbacks.

Gusfield, J. R. (1994). The reflexivity of social movements: Collective behavior and mass society theory revisited. New social movements: From ideology to identity. E. Laraña, H. Johnston and J. R. Gusfield. Philadelphia, Temple University Press: 58-78.

Guterbock, T. M. (1980). Machine Politics in Transition: Party and Community in Chicago. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Haggard, S. and R. R. Kaufman (1992). The politics of economic adjustment: international constraints, distributive conflicts, and the State. Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univ Pr.

Harris, R. L. (2002). "Resistance and alternatives to globalization in Latin America and the Caribbean." Latin American Perspectives **29**(6): 136-151.

Harrison, J. (2004). Invisible people, invisible places: connecting air pollution and pesticide drift in California. Smoke and Mirrors: The Politics and Culture of Air Pollution. New York, NYU Press.

Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism. New York, Oxford University Press, USA.

Heaney, M. and F. Rojas (2006). "The place of framing: Multiple audiences and antiwar protests near Fort Bragg." Qualitative Sociology **29**(4): 485-505.

Hedström, P. (1994). "Contagious collectivities: On the spatial diffusion of Swedish trade unions, 1890-1940." American Journal of Sociology **99**(5): 1157-1179.

Hellman, J. (1995). "The riddle of new social movements: who they are and what they do." Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America S. Halebsky and R. L. Harris. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, Westview Press.

Helmke, G. and S. Levitsky, Eds. (2006). Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from Latin America, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins Univ Pr.

Hernandez, V. A. (2007). "El fenómeno económico y cultural del boom de la soja y el empresariado innovador." Desarrollo Económico **47**(187): 331-365.

Herring, R. J., Ed. (2007). Transgenics and the poor: Biotechnology in development studies. New York, Routledge.

Hershberg, E. and F. Rosen (2006). Latin America after neoliberalism: turning the tide in the 21st century?, New Press.

Hicks, A. and D. H. Swank (1983). "Civil disorder, relief mobilization, and AFDC caseloads: A reexamination of the Piven and Cloward thesis." American Journal of Political Science **27**(4): 695-716.

Hilgers, T. (2008). "Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective." Latin American Politics and Society **50**(4): 123-153.

Hilgers, T. (2009). "'Who is Using Whom?'Clientelism from the Client's Perspective." Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research **15**(1): 51-75.

Hillcoat, G. and M. Guibert (2003). "Compétitivité acquise et capacité d'adaptation: l'agriculture pampéenne face à la crise." Cahiers des Amériques Latines **41**: 91-106.

Hipsher, P. L. (1998). Democratic transitions as protest cycles: social movement dynamics in democratizing Latin America. The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century. M. Gugni, D. McAdam and C. Tilly. New York, Rowman and Littlefield.

Ho, M.-s. (2010). "Co-Opting Social Ties: How the Taiwanese Petrochemical Industry Neutralized Environmental Opposition." Mobilization **15**(4): 447-463.
Hoggart, R. (1957). The uses of literacy: changing patterns in English mass culture. Fair Lawn, N.J., Essential Books.
Hollander, J. A. and R. L. Einwohner (2004). "Conceptualizing resistance." Sociological Forum **19**(4): 533-554.
Holzner, C. A. (2004). "The End of Clientelism? Strong and Weak Networks in a Mexican Squatter Movement." Mobilization **9**(3): 223-240.
Holzner, C. A. (2007). "The poverty of democracy: neoliberal reforms and political participation of the poor in Mexico." Latin American Politics and Society **49**(2): 87-122.
INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos) (1988) CNA-Censo Nacional Agropecuario. In www.indec.gov.ar
INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos) (2002). CNA-Censo Nacional Agropecuario). In www.indec.gov.ar
INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos). Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2001. In www.indec.gov.ar
Inglehart, R. (1977). The silent revolution. Changing values and political styles among Western Publics. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Iñigo Carrera, V. (2008). Sujetos Productivos, Sujetos Políticos, Sujetos Indígenas: Las Formas de su Objetivación Mercantil entre los Tobas del Este de Formosa. School of Philosophy and Literature. Buenos Aires, University of Buenos Aires. Doctor in Anthropology.
Isuani, E. A. (2010). "The Argentine welfare state: enduring and resisting change." International Journal of Social Welfare **19**(1): 104-114.
INTA (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria) (2004). El avance de la soja en la Argentina y la sostenibilidad de los sistemas agrícolas. Rafaela, Santa Fe, Consejo del Centro Regional Santa Fe-INTA.
James, C. (2006) "Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2006." ISAAA Briefs No. 35.
Jameson, K. P. (2010). "The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador: The Struggle for a Plurinational State." Latin American Perspectives **38**(63): 63-73.
Jasper, J. and J. Poulsen (1993). "Fighting back: Vulnerabilities, blunders, and countermobilization by the targets in three animal rights campaigns." Sociological Forum **8**(4): 639-657.
Jasper, J. M. (1997). The art of moral protest: Culture, biography, and creativity in social movements. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Jenkins, C. J. and C. Perrow (1977). "Insurgency of the powerless: Farm worker movements (1946-1972)." American Sociological Review **42**(2): 249-268.
Jenkins, J. C. (1979). "What Is To Be Done: Movement or Organization?" Contemporary Sociology **8**(2): 222-228.
Jenkins, J. C. (1995). Social movements, political representation, and the state: An agenda and comparative framework. The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements. J. C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Jenkins, J. C. and B. Klandermans, Eds. (1995). The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Jergentz, S., H. Mugni, et al. (2004). "Runoff-related endosulfan contamination and aquatic macroinvertebrate response in rural basins near Buenos Aires, Argentina." Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology **46**(3): 345-352.

Joensen, L., S. Semino, and H. Paul (2005). Argentina: A Case Study on the Impact of Genetically Engineered Soya. London, Gaia Foundation.

Johnston, H. (2006). "" Let's Get Small": The Dynamics of (Small) Contention in Repressive States." Mobilization: An International Quarterly **11**(2): 195-212.

Joseph, L., M. Mahler, and J. Auyero (2007). New Perspectives in Political Ethnography. New York, Springer.

Joseph, L. (2010). The Production of Pride: Institutionalization and LGTB Pride Organizations. Department of Sociology. New York, SUNY-Stony Brook. Doctor of Philosophy.

Jozami, E., P. Paz, et al. (1985). Crisis de la dictadura argentina: Política económica y cambio social, 1976-1983. Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2003). "The ontology of "political violence": action and identity in civil wars." Perspective on Politics **1**(03): 475-494.

Katz, J. (2001). "From How to Why: On Luminous Description and Causal Inference in Ethnography (Part I)." Ethnography **2**(4): 443-473.

Katz, J. (2002). "From How to Why: On Luminous Description and Causal Inference in Ethnography (Part II)." Ethnography **3**(1): 63-90.

Kenney, M. (1988). Biotechnology: The university industrial complex, Princeton, Yale Univ Pr.

Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (1990). Everyday politics in the Philippines: class and status relations in a Central Luzon village. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press.

Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (2005). The power of everyday politics: how Vietnamese peasants transformed national policy. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (2009). "Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours)." Journal of Peasant Studies **36**(1): 227-243.

Kettering, S. (1986). "Patronage and Politics during the Fronde." French Historical Studies **14**(3): 409-441.

Kitschelt, H. (2000). "Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities." Comparative Political Studies **33**(6-7): 845.

Kitschelt, H. and S. Wilkinson (2007). Patrons, clients, and policies: patterns of democratic accountability and political competition, Cambridge Univ Pr.

Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). "Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies." British Journal of Political Science **16**(1): 57-85.

Kloppenburg, J. R. (2005). First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492–2000. Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press.

Koopmans, R. and D. Rucht (1999). "Protest event analysis-where to now?" Mobilization **4**: 123-130.

Koopmans, R. and D. Rucht (2002). Protest event analysis. Methods of social movement research. B. Klandermans and S. Staggenborg. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press**:** 231-259.

Koopmans, R. and P. Statham (1999). "Political claims analysis: Integrating protest event and political discourse approaches." Mobilization **4**(2): 203-221.

Kostzer, D. (2008). "Argentina: A Case Study on the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, or the Employment Road to Economic Recovery." Economics Working Paper Archive.

Kriesi, H. (1995). The political opportunity structure of new social movements: its impact on their mobilization. The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements. J. C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press**:** 167-198.
Kurzman, C. (1996). "Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in social-movement theory: the Iranian revolution of 1979." American Sociological Review **61**(1): 153-170.
Lapegna, P. (2005). Transformaciones y nuevas articulaciones agroalimentarias. Las Ferias Fancas de la provincia de Misiones. El campo argentino en la encrucijada. N. Giarracca and M. Teubal. Buenos Aires, Alianza Editorial.
Lappe, M. (1984). Broken code: the exploitation of DNA. San Francisco, Sierra Club Books.
Larner, W. (2000). "Neo-liberalism: policy, ideology, governmentality." Studies in Political Economy **63**: 5-25.
Larner, W. (2003). "Neoliberalism?" Environment and Planning D: Society and Space **21**(5): 509-512.
Laurie, N., R. Andolina, et al. (2005). "Ethnodevelopment: Social Movements, Creating Experts and Professionalising Indigenous Knowledge in Ecuador." Antipode **37**(3): 470-496.
Lazar, S. (2002). The 'politics of the everyday': populism, gender and the media in La Paz and El Alto, Bolivia. London, Goldsmiths Anthropology Research Papers.
Lazar, S. (2004). "Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Elections in El Alto, Bolivia." Bulletin of Latin American Research **23**(2): 228-243.
Lazar, S. (2008). El Alto, rebel city: self and citizenship in Andean Bolivia, Durham, Duke Univ Pr.
Le Bon, G. (1897). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. New York, Macmillian.
Lemarchand, R. (1981). Comparative political clientelism: structure, process and optic. Political clientelism, patronage and development. S. N. Eisentadt and R. Lemarchand. London, Sage.
Lenin, V. I. (1967). The development of capitalism in Russia. Moscow, Progress Publishers
Levitsky, S. (2003). Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press.
Lichterman, P. (1996). The search for political community: American activists reinventing commitment. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Lichterman, P. (1998). "What do movements mean? The value of participant-observation." Qualitative Sociology **21**(4): 401-418.
Lievesley, G. (1999). Democracy in Latin America: mobilization, power, and the search for a new politics, Manchester, Manchester Univ Pr.
Lipset, S. M. (1950). Agrarian Socialism: the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan: A Study in Political Sociology. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ of California Pr.
Lo Vuolo, R. M. (1997). "The Retrenchment of the Welfare State in Latin America: The Case of Argentina." Social Policy & Administration **31**(4): 390-409.
Lofland, J. (1985). Protest: Studies of collective behavior and social movements. New Brunswick N.J., Transaction Books.
Lofland, J. (1995). "Analytic ethnography." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography **24**(1): 30.
López-Maya, M. and L. Lander (2006). Popular protest in Venezuela: novelties and continuities. Latin American social movements: globalization, democratization, and transnational

networks. P. D. Almeida and H. Johnston. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc**:** 43.
Lovell, T. (2007). (Mis) recognition, social inequality and social justice: Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu. New York, Routledge.
Lugo, E.R. (n/d). Introducción Histórica a la Provincia de Formosa. Desde el Ferrocarril a la Provincia, 1930-1962. Formosa, Editorial Gualamba.
Lyon-Callo, V. and S. B. Hyatt (2003). "The Neoliberal State and The Depoliticization of Poverty: Activist Anthropology and "Ethnography From Below"." Urban Anthropology **32**(2): 175.
Maeder, E.J.A. (1979). Introducción. Memoria de los Gobernadores del Territorio Nacional de Formosa (1885-1899). Instituto de Historia, Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Nordeste, Resistencia Corrientes.
Malatesta, M., B. Baldelli, et al. (2009). "Reversibility of hepatocyte nuclear modifications in mice fed on genetically modified soybean." European Journal of Histochemistry **49**(3): 237-242.
Malatesta, M., F. Boraldi, et al. (2008). "A long-term study on female mice fed on a genetically modified soybean: effects on liver ageing." Histochemistry and cell biology **130**(5): 967-977.
Mamani Ramírez, P. (2005). Microgobiernos Barriales: Levantamiento de la Ciudad de El Alto (Octubre 2003). El Alto, Cades/Idis-UMSA.
Mamy, L., B. Gabrielle, et al. (2010). "Comparative environmental impacts of glyphosate and conventional herbicides when used with glyphosate-tolerant and non-tolerant crops." Environmental Pollution **158**: 3172-3178.
Manzanal, M. and A. Rofman (1989). Las Economías Regionales de la Argentina. Crisis y Políticas de Desarrollo. Buenos Aires, CEAL-CEUR.
Margheritis, A. and A. W. Pereira (2007). "The Neoliberal Turn in Latin America: The Cycle of Ideas and the Search for an Alternative." Latin American Perspectives **34**(3): 25-48.
Martin, D. G. and B. Miller (2003). "Space and contentious politics." Mobilization **8**(2): 143-156.
Martin, P. M. (2005). "Comparative topographies of neoliberalism in Mexico." Environment and Planning A **37**(2): 203-220.
Martinez-Alier, J. (1995). "Political ecology, distributional conflicts, and economic incomensurability." New Left Review **I/211**.
Martinez-Alier, J. (2002). The environmentalism of the poor: a study of ecological conflicts and valuation, Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Marx, G. T. and D. McAdam (1994). Collective behavior and social movements: Process and structure. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall.
Mawdsley, E. (1998). "After Chipko: From environment to region in Uttaranchal." Journal of Peasant Studies **25**(4): 36-54.
McAdam, D. (1982). Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
McAdam, D. (1988). Freedom summer. New York, Oxford University Press.
McAdam, D. (1995). ‘Initiator’and ‘Spin-off’Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles. Repertoires and cycles of collective action. M. Traugott. Durham and London, Duke University Press.

McAdam, D. (1996). Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes—toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements. Comparative perspectives on social movements. D. McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D., J. D. McCarthy, et al. (1988). Social movements. Handbook of Sociology. N. J. Smelser. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage.

McAdam, D. and D. Rucht (1993). "The cross-national diffusion of movement ideas." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science **528**(1): 56.

McAdam, D., S. Tarrow and C. Tilly (2001). Dynamics of Contention. New York, Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D., S. Tarrow and C. Tilly (2008). "Methods for Measuring Mechanisms of Contention." Qualitative Sociology **31**: 307-331.

McAdam, D. and S. Tarrow (2010). "Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship between Elections and Social Movements." Perspectives on Politics **8**(2): 529-542.

McCaffrey, D. and J. Keys (2000). "Competitive framing processes in the abortion debate: Polarization-vilification, frame saving, and frame debunking." The Sociological Quarterly **41**(1): 41-61.

McCammon, H., C. Muse, et al. (2007). "Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The Political Successes of the US Women's Jury Movements." American Sociological Review **72**(5): 725-749.

McCarthy, J. D., C. McPhail, et al. (1996). "Images of protest: dimensions of selection bias in media coverage of Washington demonstrations, 1982 and 1991." American Sociological Review **61**(3): 478-499.

McCarthy, J. D. and M. N. Zald (1977). "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." American Journal of Sociology **82**(6): 1212-1241.

McCarthy, J. D. and M. N. Zald, Eds. (1987). Social movements in an organizational society. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers.

McClelland, J. S. (2010 [1989]). The crowd and the mob: From Plato to Canetti. London, Routledge.

McDuffie, H. H., P. Pahwa, et al. (2001). "Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and specific pesticide exposures in men." Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers & Prevention **10**(11): 1155.

McMichael, P. (2009). "Contemporary Contradictions of the Global Development Project: geopolitics, global ecology and the 'development climate'." Third World Quarterly **30**(1): 247-262.

McMichael, P. and D. Myhre (1991). "Global regulation vs. the nation-state: agro-food systems and the new politics of capital." Capital & Class **15**(1): 83.

McPhail, C. (1991). The myth of the madding crowd. New York, Aldine De Gruyter.

Melucci, A. (1982). L'invenzione del presente. Movimenti, identità, bisogni individuali. Bologna, Il Mulino.

Melucci, A. (1985). "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements." Social research **52**(4): 789-816.

Melucci, A. (1989). Nomads of the present: Social movements and individual needs in contemporary society. London, Hutchinson Radius.

Melucci, A. (1991). Il gioco dell'io. Cambiamento di sé in una società globale. Milano, Feltrinelli.

Merton, R. K. (1936). "The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action." American Sociological Review **1**(6): 894-904.

Meyer, D., V. Jenness, et al., Eds. (2005). Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy. Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press.

Meyer, D. and S. Staggenborg (1996). "Movements, countermovements, and the structure of political opportunity." American Journal of Sociology: 1628-1660.

Meyer, D. S. (2004). "Protest and political opportunities." Annual Review of Sociology **30**: 125-145.

Meyer, D. S. and N. Whittier (1994). "Social Movement Spillover." Social Problems **41**(2): 277-298.

Michels, R. (1962). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. Glencoe, IL, Free Press.

Miller, D. T. (2001). "Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice." Annual Review of Psychology **52**(1): 527-553.

Mills, C. W. (1959). The sociological imagination, London, Oxford University Press.

Mills, C. (2003). "Contesting the Political: Butler and Foucault on Power and Resistance." Journal of Political Philosophy **11**(3): 253-272.

Mineau, P. (1993). The hazard of carbofuran to birds and other vertebrate wildlife, Canadian Wildlife Service Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Mineau, P., C. M. Downes, et al. (2005). "Patterns of bird species abundance in relation to granular insecticide use in the Canadian prairies." Ecoscience **12**(2): 267-278.

Mische, A. (2008). Partisan publics: Communication and contention across Brazilian youth activist networks, New Haven, Princeton Univ Pr.

Moore, B. (1978). Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt. New York, Macmillan.

Morris, A. D. (1981). "Black Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization." American Sociological Review **46**(6): 744-767.

Morris, A. D. (1984). The origins of the civil rights movement: Black communities organizing for change. New York, Free Press.

Morris, A. D. and N. Braine (2001). Social movements and oppositional consciousness. Oppositional consciousness: The subjective roots of social protest. J. J. Mansbridge and A. D. Morris. Chicago, University Of Chicago Press.

Moscovici, S. (1985). The age of the crowd: A historical treatise on mass psychology. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Motta, S. C. (2010). "Populism's Achilles' Heel: Popular Democracy beyond the Liberal State and the Market Economy in Venezuela." Latin American Perspectives **38**(1): 28-46.

Mueller, C. (1997). "International press coverage of East German protest events, 1989." American Sociological Review **62**(5): 820-832.

Murillo, M. V. (2000). "From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America." World Politics **52**(2): 135-174.

Myers, D., J. (1997). "Racial rioting in the 1960s: An event history analysis of local conditions." American Sociological Review **62**(1): 94-112.

Myers, D., J. (2000). "The Diffusion of Collective Violence: Infectiousness, Susceptibility, and Mass Media Networks1." American Journal of Sociology **106**(1): 173-208.

Nash, J. (1992). "Interpreting social movements: Bolivian resistance to economic conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund." American Ethnologist **19**(2): 275-293.

National Research Council (2004) Safety of Genetically Engineered Foods: Approaches to Assessing Unintended Health Effects. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Nelson, L. K. (2006). "Geographies of state power, protest, and women's political identity formation in Michoacán, Mexico." Annals of the Association of American Geographers **96**(2): 366-389.
Newell, P. (2008). "Trade and Biotechnology in Latin America: Democratization, Contestation and the Politics of Mobilization." Journal of Agrarian Change **8**(2-3): 345-376.
Newell, P. (2009). "Bio-Hegemony: The Political Economy of Agricultural Biotechnology in Argentina." Journal of Latin American Studies **41**(1): 27-57.
Noakes, J. A. and H. Johnston (2005). Frames of protest: A road map to a perspective. Frames of Protest. Social Movements and the Framing Perspective. H. Johnston and J. A. Noakes. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield.
Norris, G. L. and S. Cable (1994). "The seeds of protest: From elite initiation to grassroots mobilization." Sociological Perspectives **37**(2): 247-268.
O'Brien, K. J. (2003). "Neither transgressive nor contained: Boundary-spanning contention in China." Mobilization **8**(1): 51-64.
Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.
Oberschall, A. (1989). "The 1960 sit-ins: Protest diffusion and movement take-off." Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change **11**(1): 31-53.
O'Donnell, G. (1992). Transitions, continuities, and paradoxes. Issues in democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective. S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell and S. Valenzuela. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press: 17–56.
Oliver, P. and H. Johnston (2000). "What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social movement research." Mobilization **5**(1): 37-54.
Olzak, S. (1989). "Analysis of events in the study of collective action." Annual Review of Sociology **15**: 119-141.
Ondetti, G. (2006). "Repression, Opportunity, and Protest: Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil's Landless Movement." Latin American Politics and Society **48**(2): 61-94.
Ortner, S. B. (2006). Resistance and the problem of ethnographic refusal. Anthropology and Social Theory. Culture, Power and the Acting Subject. Durham and London, Duke University Press.
Otero, G. (1999). Farewell to the peasantry?: political class formation in rural Mexico, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Otero, G., Ed. (2008). Food for the few: neoliberal globalism and biotechnology in Latin America. Austin, TX, University of Texas Press.
Paarlberg, R. L. (2008). Starved for science: How biotechnology is being kept out of Africa. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Paganelli, A., V. Gnazzo, et al. (2010). "Glyphosate-based herbicides produce teratogenic effects on vertebrates by impairing retinoic acid signaling." Chemical research in toxicology.
Paige, J. M. (1975). Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World. New York, Free Press.
Papa, J. C. (2002). Malezas tolerantes y resistentes a herbicidas. Actas del Seminario Sustentabilidad de la Producción Agrícola. . Rafaela, Santa Fe, INTA, Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria.

Park, R. E. (1955). Society: collective behavior, news and opinion, sociology and modern society. Glencoe, Free Press.
Patterson, O. (2001). The Roots of Conflict in Jamaica. New York Times.
Pearse, A. (1980). Seeds of plenty, seeds of want. Social and economic implications of the Green Revolution. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
Pécaut, D. (1987). Orden y violencia: Colombia 1930-1954, Bogota, CEREC.
Pechlaner, G. and G. Otero (2008). "The third food regime: neoliberal globalism and agricultural biotechnology in North America." Sociologia Ruralis **48**(4): 351-371.
Peck, J. (2004). "Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism." Progress in Human Geography. **28**(3): 392-406.
Peck, J. (2010). Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. New York, Oxford Univ Pr.
Peck, J. and A. Tickell (2002). "Neoliberalizing space." Antipode **34**(3): 380–404.
Pengue, W. (2004a). La ingeniería genética y la intensificación de la agricultura argentina: algunos comentarios críticos. Los transgénicos en América Latina y el Caribe: un debate abierto. A. Bárcena, J. Katz, C. Morales and M. Schaper. Santiago de Chile, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
Pengue, W. A. (2004b). "El modelo de agricultura industrial intensivo." Revista Saber Cómo(16).
Pengue, W. A. (2005). "Transgenic Crops in Argentina: The Ecological and Social Debt." Bulletin of Science Technology Society **25**(4): 314-322.
Pengue, W. A., I. Monterroso, et al. (2009). Bioinvasiones y Bioeconomia: El caso del sorgo del alepo resistente al glifosato en la agricultura argentina. ICTA-FLACSO-GEPAMA.
Perez, G., A. Torremorell, et al. (2007). "Effects of the herbicide roundup on freshwater microbial communities: a mesocosm study." Ecological Applications **17**(8): 2310-2322.
Peritore, N. P. (1995). National, Regional, and lnter-national Regimes and the Regulation of Biotechnology. Biotechnology in Latin America: politics, impacts, and risks. N. P. Peritore and A. K. Galve-Peritore. Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources Inc.
Perreault, T. (2006). "From the Guerra Del Agua to the Guerra Del Gas: resource governance, neoliberalism and popular protest in Bolivia." Antipode **38**(1): 150-172.
Perreault, T. and P. Martin (2005). "Geographies of neoliberalism in Latin America." Environment and Planning A **37**(2): 191-201.
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents. Living with High-Risk Technologies. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Perry, J. B. and M. D. Pugh (1978). Collective behavior: response to social stress. Eagan, Minnesota, West Pub. Co.
Petras, J. F. and H. Veltmeyer (2005). Social movements and state power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador. London, Pluto Press.
Pingali, P. and T. Raney (2005). From the Green Revolution to the Gene Revolution: how will the poor fare? Working Papers, Agricultural and Development Economics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO-ESA).
Pistorius, R. and J. van Wijk (1999). The exploitation of plant genetic material: political strategies in crop development Wallingford, CABI Publishing.
Piven, F. F. and R. A. Cloward (1979). Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York, Vintage Books.
Polletta, F. (2008). "Culture and Movements." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science **619**(1): 78.

Portes, A. and K. Hoffman (2003). "Latin American class structures: their composition and change during the neoliberal era." Latin American Research Review **38**(1): 41-82.
Posada, M. and M. Martínez de Ibarreta (1998). "Capital financiero y producción agrícola: Los “pools” de siembra en la región pampeana." Realidad Económica **153**: 112-135.
Posada, M. G. (1993). Sociología rural argentina: Estudios en torno al campesinado. Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de América latina.
PRODERNEA – FLACSO. (2003). "Estudio estadístico del ingreso de los productores agropecuarios en la provincia de Formosa." In http://www.sagpya.gov.ar/new/0-0/programas/prodernea/pdf/Publicaciones11.pdf
Puricelli, E. and D. Tuesca (2005). "Weed density and diversity under glyphosate-resistant crop sequences." Crop Protection **24**(6): 533-542.
Pynchon, T. (2004). Mason & Dixon. New York, Picador.
Qaim, M. and G. Traxler (2005). "Roundup Ready soybeans in Argentina: farm level and aggregate welfare effects." Agricultural economics **32**(1): 73-86.
Quirós, J. (2006). Cruzando la Sarmiento: Una etnografía sobre piqueteros en la trama social del sur del Gran Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Antropofagia.
Ragin, C., J. Nagel, et al. (2004). Workshop on Scientific Foundations of Qualitative Research, Washington, National Science Foundation.
Ramírez Gallegos, F. (2010). "Desencuentros, convergencias, polarización (y viceversa): El gobierno ecuatoriano y los movimientos sociales." Nueva Sociedad **227**: 83-101.
Rangan, H. (2000). Of myths and movements: rewriting Chipko into Himalayan history, London, Verso Books.
REDAF (Red Agroforestal Chaco Argentina). (2010). Conflictos sobre Tenencia de Tierra y Ambientales en la Región del Chaco Argentino. Reconquista, Chaco, REDAF.
Reed-Danahay, D. (1993). "Talking about resistance: Ethnography and theory in rural France." Anthropological Quarterly **66**(4): 221-229.
Reiter, B. (2010). "What’s New in Brazil’s “New Social Movements”?" Latin American Perspectives **38**(1): 153-168.
Relyea, R. A. (2004). "Growth and survival of five amphibian species exposed to combinations of pesticides." Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry **23**(7): 1737-1742.
Relyea, R. A. (2005a). "The impact of insecticides and herbicides on the biodiversity and productivity of aquatic communities." Ecological Applications **15**(2): 618-627.
Relyea, R. A. (2005b). "The lethal impacts of Roundup and predatory stress on six species of North American tadpoles." Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology **48**(3): 351-357.
Repetto, F., F. Potenza Dal Masetto, et al. (n/d). Plan “Jefes y Jefas de hogar desocupados en Argentina”: Un estudio de caso sobre la forma en que la política social se vincula a la emergencia política y socio-económica. Washington, D.C. , Instituto Interamericano para el Desarrollo Social (INDES).
Revilla Blanco, M. (2010). "América Latina y los movimientos sociales: el presente de la «rebelión del coro»." Nueva Sociedad **227**: 51-67.
Richards, P. (2004). Pobladoras, indígenas, and the state: conflicts over women's rights in Chile. New Jersey, Rutgers Univ Pr.
Richards, P. (2010). "Of Indians and Terrorists : How the State and Local Elites Construct the Mapuche in Neoliberal Multicultural Chile." Journal of Latin American Studies(42): 59-90.

Richardson, N. P. (2009). "Export-Oriented Populism: Commodities and Coalitions in Argentina." Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID) **44**(3): 228-255.
Rivero, M. d. C. (2006). El poder de las luchas sociales. 2003: quiebre del discurso neoliberal. La Paz, Bolivia, CEDLA: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario.
Roach, J. L. and J. K. Roach (1978). "Mobilizing the poor: road to a dead end." Social Problems **26**(2): 160-171.
Rock, D. (1972). "Machine Politics in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Radical Party, 1912–1930." Journal of Latin American Studies **4**(2): 233-256.
Rock, D. (1975). Politics in Argentina, 1890-1930: the rise and fall of radicalism, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
Rodríguez, J. L. (2010). Consecuencias económicas de la difusión de la soja genéticamente modificada en Argentina, 1996-2006. Los señores de la soja. La agricultura transgénica en América Latina. Buenos Aires, CLACSO.
Rofman, A., A. Quintar, et al. (1987). Políticas estatales y desarrollo regional. La experiencia del Gobierno Militar en la región del NEA (1976-1981). Buenos Aires, CEUR.
Rohr, J. R. and P. W. Crumrine (2005). "Effects of an herbicide and an insecticide on pond community structure and processes." Ecological Applications **15**(4): 1135-1147.
Roldán, M. (2002). Blood and fire: la violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953, Durham, Duke Univ Pr.
Roniger, L. and A. Günes-Ayata (1994). Democracy, clientelism, and civil society. Boulder, L. Rienner Publishers.
Rose, J. D. (1982). Outbreaks, the sociology of collective behavior. New York, Free Press.
Rosenthal, N. and M. Schwartz (1990). Spontaneity and democracy in social movements. Organizing for Change: social movement organizations in Europe and the United States. B. Klandermans. Greenwhich, CT, JAI.
Ross, E. B. (2003). "Malthusianism, capitalist agriculture, and the fate of peasants in the making of the modern world food system." Review of Radical Political Economics **35**(4): 437.
Rothman, F. D. and P. E. Oliver (1999). "From local to global: The anti-dam movement in southern Brazil, 1979-1992." Mobilization **4**(1): 41-57.
Roze, J. (1992). Conflictos agrarios en la Argentina: el proceso liguista, Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de América Latina.
Rucht, D. (1999). "Linking organization and mobilization: Michels's Iron law of oligarchy reconsidered." Mobilization **4**(2): 151-169.
Rucht, D., R. Koopmans, et al. (1999). Acts of dissent: new developments in the study of protest. New York, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.
Rucht, D. and F. Neidhardt (1999). Methodological issues in collecting protest event data: Units of analysis, sources and sampling, coding problems. Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest. D. Rucht. Berlin, Edition Sigmas.
Rutten, R. (1994). "Courting the Workers' Vote in a Hacienda Region: Rhetoric and Response in the 1992 Philippine Elections." Pilipinas: A Journal of Philippine Studies **22**: 1-34.
Rutten, R. (2007). Losing Face in Philippine Labor Confrontations: How Shame May Inhibit Worker Activism. New Perspectives in Political Ethnography. L. M. Joseph, Matthew and Auyero Javier. New York, Springer.
SAGPyA (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación de la Nación). (2007). Estimaciones agrícolas mensuales. Buenos Aires, Ministerio de Economía.

Santoro, W. A. (1999). "Conventional politics takes center stage: the Latino struggle against English-only laws." Social Forces **77**(3): 887-909.
Santoro, W. A. and G. M. McGuire (1997). "Social movement insiders: The impact of institutional activists on affirmative action and comparable worth policies." Social Problems **44**(4): 503-519.
Saravia, J. and G. Sandoval (1991). Jach'a Uru, la esperanza de un pueblo?: Carlos Palenque, RTP y los sectores populares urbanos en La Paz. La Paz, ILDIS-CEP.
Sarmiento, C. (1985). Estado y subversión en Colombia: la violencia en el Quindío, años 50, Bogota, CIDER, UNIANDES.
Schaller, N.A. (2008). "Pirané Sur-Formosa. Ensayo: Un análisis del pasado para poder edificar el futuro." El Colorado, Estación Experimental Agropecuaria, INTA.
Schedler, A. and L. Manríquez (2004). "" El voto es nuestro". Cómo los ciudadanos mexicanos perciben el clientelismo electoral." Revista Mexicana de Sociología **66**(1): 57-97.
Schmidt, S. W. (1974). "La Violencia Revisited: The Clientelist Bases of Political Violence in Colombia." Journal of Latin American Studies **6**: 97-111.
Schmidt, S. W., L. Guasti, et al. (1977). Friends, followers, and factions: a reader in political clientelism. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Schneider, A. and R. Zúniga-Hamlin (2005). "A strategic approach to rights: lessons from clientelism in Rural Peru." Development Policy Review **23**(5): 567-584.
Schurman, R. and W. A. Munro (2010). Fighting for the Future of Food: Activists Versus Agribusiness in the Struggle Over Biotechnology, Minneapolis, Univ Of Minnesota Press.
Schvorer, L.E. (2003). Etnografía de una Feria Franca. Estudio de un proyecto de desarrollo rural con productores familiars. Departamento Eldorado, Misiones, Argentina. MA Thesis in Social Anthropology. National University of Misiones, Argentina.
Schwartz, M. (1976). Radical protest and social structure: the Southern Farmers' Alliance and cotton tenancy, 1880-1890. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Schwartz, M., N. Rosenthal, and L. Schwartz. (1981). "Leader-Member Conflict in Protest Organizations: The Case of the Southern Farmers' Alliance." Social Problems **29**(1): 22-36.
Scoones, I. (2008). "Mobilizing Against GM Crops in India, South Africa and Brazil." Journal of Agrarian Change **8**(2-3): 315-344.
Scoones, I. (2009). "Livelihoods perspectives and rural development." Journal of Peasant Studies **36**(1): 171-196.
Scott, J. C. (1969). "Corruption, machine politics, and political change." The American Political Science Review **63**(4): 1142-1158.
Scott, J. C. (1972). "The erosion of patron-client bonds and social change in rural Southeast Asia." The Journal of Asian Studies: 5-37.
Scott, J. C. (1977). Patronage or exploitation? Patrons and clients in Mediterranean societies. E. Gellner and J. Waterbury. London, Duckworth.
Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Scott, J. C. (2005). "Afterword to "Moral Economies, State Spaces, and Categorical Violence"." American Anthropologist **107**(3): 395-402.

Scott, J. C. (2008). "Everyday forms of resistance." The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies **4**(1): 33.
Seralini, G. E., R. Mesnage, et al. (2011). "Genetically modified crops safety assessments: present limits and possible improvements." Environ. Sci. Europe **23**: 10-20.
Sewell, W. H. (1992). "A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation." The American Journal of Sociology **98**(1): 1-29.
Shanin, T. (2009). "Chayanov's treble death and tenuous resurrection: an essay about understanding, about roots of plausibility and about rural Russia." Journal of Peasant Studies **36**(1): 83-101.
Shefner, J. (2001). "Coalitions and clientelism in Mexico." Theory and Society **30**(5): 593-628.
Shefner, J. (2004). "Introduction: current trends in Latin American social movements." Mobilization **9**(3): 219-222.
Shefner, J., G. Pasdirtz, et al. (2006). Austerity protests and immiserating growth in Mexico and Argentina. Latin American Social Movements. Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. H. Johnston and P. D. Almeida. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield.
Sherman, D. J. (2008). "Disruption or convention? A process-based explanation of divergent repertoires of contention among opponents to low-level radioactive waste disposal sites." Social Movement Studies **7**(3): 265-280.
Shultz, J. and M. Draper (2009). Dignity and defiance: stories from Bolivia's challenge to globalization, Los Angeles and Berkeley, Univ of California Pr.
Sigaud, L. (2004). "Ocupações de terra, Estado e movimentos sociais no Brasil." Cuadernos de Antropología Social **20**: 11-23.
Sikkink, K. (1991). Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Silverman, S. (1965). "Patronage and community-nation relationships in Central Italy." Ethnology **4**(2): 172-189.
Sives, A. (2002). "Changing patrons, from politician to drug don: clientelism in downtown Kingston, Jamaica." Latin American Perspectives **29**(5): 66-89.
Slater, D. (1994). "Power and social movements in the other Occident." Latin American Perspectives **21**(2): 11–37.
Slutzky, D. (1973). Tenencia y Distribución de la Tierra en la Región NEA. Buenos Aires, Consejo Federal de Inversiones.
Small, M. L. (2009a). Lost in translation: How not to make qualitative research more scientific. Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research, Washington, National Science Foundation.
Small, M. L. (2009b). "'How many cases do I need?' On science and the logic of case selection in field-based research." Ethnography **10**(1): 5-38.
Smith, W., C. Acuña and E. Gamarra, eds. (1994). Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction.
Smelser, N. J. (1962). Theory of collective behavior. New York, Free Press of Glencoe.
Smilde, D. (2008). "the social structure of hugo chávez." Contexts **7**(1): 38-43.
Smilde, D. and D. Hellinger, Eds. (2011). Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy: Participation, Politics, and Culture under Chávez. Durham and London, Duke University Press.
Snow, A., D. Andow, et al. (2005). "Genetically Engineered Organisms and the Environment: Current Status And Recommendations." Ecological Applications **15**(2): 377–404.

Snow, D., D. Cress, et al. (1998). "Disrupting the" Quotidian": Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action." Mobilization **3**(1): 1-22.
Snow, D. A. (2004). Framing processes, ideology, and discursive fields. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. D. A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA, Blackwell.
Snow, D. A. and R. D. Benford (1988). "Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization." International Social Movement Research **1**(1): 197-217.
Snow, D. A., C. Morrill, and L. Anderson (2003). "Elaborating Analytic Ethnography: Linking Fieldwork and Theory." Ethnography **4**(2): 181-200.
Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford, Jr., et al. (1986). "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." American Sociological Review **51**(4): 464-481.
Snow, D. A., Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, Ed. (2004). The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Malden, MA, Blackwell.
Soule, S. A., D. McAdam, et al. (1999). "Protest events: cause or consequence of state action? The US women's movement and federal Congressional activities, 1956-1979." Mobilization **4**(2): 239-256.
Spanakos, A. P. (2011). "Citizen Chávez: The State, Social Movements, and Publics." Latin American Perspectives **38**(1): 14-27.
Springer, S. (2010). "Neoliberalism and Geography: Expansions, Variegations, Formations." Geography Compass **4**(8): 1025-1038.
Spronk, S. and J. R. Webber (2007). "Struggles against Accumulation by Dispossession in Bolivia: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Contention." Latin American Perspectives **34**(2): 31-47.
Stahler-Sholk, R. and H. E. Vanden (2011). "A Second Look at Latin American Social Movements : Globalizing Resistance to the Neoliberal Paradigm." Latin American Perspectives **38**(1): 5-13.
Stanbridge, K. (2002). "Master Frames, Political Opportunities, and Self-Determination: The Åland Islands in the Post-WWI Period." Sociological Quarterly **43**(4): 527-552.
Steinberg, M. W. (1995). The roar of the crowd: Repertoires of discourse and collective action among the Spitalfields silk weavers in nineteenth-century London. Repertoires and cycles of collective action. M. Traugott. Durham and London, Duke University Press.
Steinberg, M. W. (1997). "'A Way of Struggle': Reformations and Affirmations of EP Thompson's Class Analysis in the Light of Postmodern Theories of Language." The British journal of sociology **48**(3): 471-492.
Steinberg, M. W. (1998). "Tilting the frame: Considerations on collective action framing from a discursive turn." Theory and Society **27**(6): 845-872.
Steinberg, M. W. (1999a). Fighting words: Working-class formation, collective action, and discourse in early nineteenth-century England. Ithaca, Cornell Univ Pr.
Steinberg, M. W. (1999b). "The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners." The American Journal of Sociology **105**(3): 736-780.
Stokes, S. C. (2001). Public support for market reforms in new democracies. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge Univ Pr.
Stokes, S. C. (2005). "Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina." American Political Science Review **99**(03): 315-325.

Strang, D. and J. Meyer (1993). "Institutional conditions for diffusion." Theory and Society **22**(4): 487-511.
Strang, D. and S. Soule (1998). "Diffusion in organizations and social movements: From hybrid corn to poison pills." Annual Review of Sociology **24**(1): 265-290.
Strawn, K. D. (2008). "Validity and Media-Derived Protest Event Data: Examining Relative Coverage Tendencies in Mexican News Media." Mobilization **13**(2): 147-164.
Suh, D. (2001). "How Do Political Opportunities Matter for Social Movements?: Political Opportunity, Misframing, Pseudosuccess, and Pseudofailure." Sociological Quarterly **42**(3): 437-460.
Svampa, M. and S. Pereyra (2003). Entre la ruta y el barrio: La experiencia de las organizaciones piqueteras. Buenos Aires, Biblos.
Svampa, M. and P. Stefanoni (2007). Bolivia: memoria, insurgencia y movimientos sociales, Clacso Libros.
Swanson, J. (2005). "Recognition and redistribution: Rethinking culture and the economic." Theory, Culture and Society **22**(4): 87.
Swidler, A. (1986). "Culture in action: Symbols and strategies." American Sociological Review **51**(2): 273-286.
Tarrow, S. (1988). "National politics and collective action: Recent theory and research in Western Europe and the United States." Annual Review of Sociology **14**: 421-440.
Tarrow, S. (1992). Mentalities, political cultures, and collective action frames. Frontiers in social movement theory. A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. Bimghamton, NY, Yale University Press**:** 174-202.
Tarrow, S. (1993). "Social Protest and Policy Reform: May 1968 and the Loi d'Orientation in France." Comparative Political Studies **25**(4): 579.
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, S. (2001). "Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics: Introduction." Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics: 1-13.
Taylor, D. (1997). Disappearing acts: spectacles of gender and nationalism in Argentina's "dirty war". Durham, Duke University Press.
Taylor, L. (2004). "Client-ship and Citizenship in Latin America." Bulletin of Latin American Research **23**(2): 213-227.
Taylor, V. (1989). "Social movement continuity: The women's movement in abeyance." American Sociological Review **54**(5): 761-775.
Teichman, J. 2001. The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Teubal, M. (2008). Genetically modified soybeans and the crisis of Argentina's agriculture model. Food for the few: neoliberal globalism and biotechnology in Latin America. G. Otero. Austin, University of Texas Press.
Teubal, M. (2009). "Agrarian Reform and Social Movements in the Age of Globalization: Latin America at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century." Latin American Perspectives **36**(4): 9.
Teubal, M., D. Domínguez, P. Sabatino. (2005). Transformaciones agrarias en la argentina. Agricultura industrial y sistema agroalimentario. El campo argentino en la encrucijada. Estrategias y resistencias sociales, ecos en la ciudad. N. Giarracca and M. Teubal. Buenos Aires, Alianza Editorial.

Teubal, M. and J. Rodríguez (2001). Agro y alimentos en la globalización: una perspectiva crítica. Buenos Aires, La Colmena.
Thompson, E. P. (1968). The making of the English working class, New York, Pantheon Books.
Thompson, E. P. (1971). "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century." Past and Present **50**: 76-136.
Thompson, E. P. (1993). The moral economy reviewed. Customs in Common. New York, The New Press.
Tilly, C. (1964). The Vendée. A Sociological Analysis of the Counterrevolution of 1793. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press.
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley.
Tilly, C. (1985). "Models and Realities of Popular Collective Action." Social Research **52**(4): 717-747.
Tilly, C. (1986). The Contentious French. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Tilly, C. (1992). How to detect, describe, and explain repertoires of contention. Working Paper Series, Center for Studies of Social Change. **150**.
Tilly, C. (1995). Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834, Cambridge, Harvard Univ Pr.
Tilly, C. (1996). "Invisible elbow." Sociological Forum **11**(4): 589-601.
Tilly, C. (1999). From interactions to outcomes in social movements. How social movements matter. M. Giugni, D. McAdam and C. Tilly. Minneapolis, Univ of Minnesota Pr.
Tilly, C. (2002). "Event catalogs as theories." Sociological Theory **20**(2): 248-254.
Tilly, C. (2006). Why? What happens when people give reasons... and why. Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univ. Press.
Tilly, C. (2008). Credit and Blame, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Tindall, D. B. (2003). "From structure to dynamics: a paradigm shift in social movements research?" Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie **40**(4): 481-487.
Tosoni, M. M. (2007). "Notas sobre el clientelismo político en la ciudad de México." Perfiles latinoamericanos(29): 47-69.
Touraine, A. (1965). Sociologie de l'action. Paris, Editions du Seuil.
Touraine, A. (1981). The voice and the eye: An analysis of social movements. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Trabalza-Marinucci, M., G. Brandi, et al. (2008). "A three-year longitudinal study on the effects of a diet containing genetically modified Bt176 maize on the health status and performance of sheep." Livestock Science **113**(2-3): 178-190.
Trigo, E., D. Chudnovsky, et al. (2002). Los transgénicos en la agricultura argentina: una historia con final abierto, Buenos Aires, Editorial Libros del Zorzal.
Trigo, E. J. (2003). "The Impact of the Introduction of Transgenic Crops in Argentinean Agriculture." AgBioForum **6**(3): 87-94.
Tudisco, R., V. Mastellone, et al. (2006). "Fate of transgenic DNA and evaluation of metabolic effects in goats fed genetically modified soybean and in their offsprings." Animal **1**(1): 1-10.
Turner, R. (1996). "The moral issue in collective behavior and collective action." Mobilization **1**(1): 1-15.
Turner, R. H. and L. M. Killian (1957). Collective behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

UPC- UNESCO (Cátedra UNESCO de Sostenibilidad de la Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña), EdPAC (Educación para la Acción Crítica), GCCT (Grupo de Cooperación del Campus de Terrassa), GIDHS (Grupo de Investigación en Derechos Humanos y Sostenibilidad). (2009). Situación de los derechos humanos en el Noroeste argentino en 2008. Barcelona, Càtedra Unesco en Sostenibilitat.

Valocchi, S. (1990). "The Unemployed Workers Movement of the 1930s: A Reexamination of the Piven and Cloward Thesis." Social Problems **37**(2): 191-205.

Vanderford, M. L. (1989). "Vilification and Social Movements: A Case Study of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech **75**(2): 166-182.

Vecchio, L., B. Cisterna, et al. (2009). "Ultrastructural analysis of testes from mice fed on genetically modified soybean." European Journal of Histochemistry **48**(4): 449-454.

Venkateswarlu, K. and N. Sethunathan (1984). "Fate of C-Carbofuran in a Flooded Acid Sulphate Saline Soil " Current Science **53**(17): 925-927.

Vergara-Camus, L. (2009). "The Politics of the MST: Autonomous Rural Communities, the State, and Electoral Politics." Latin American Perspectives **36**(4): 178-191.

Villalon, R. (2007). "Neoliberalism, Corruption, and Legacies of Contention: Argentina's Social Movements, 1993-2006." Latin American Perspectives **34**(2): 139-156.

Vitta, J., D. Tuesca, et al. (2004). "Widespread use of glyphosate tolerant soybean and weed community richness in Argentina." Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment **103**(3): 621-624.

Walder, A. G. (2009). "Political Sociology and Social Movements." Annual Review of Sociology **35**(1): 393-412.

Walsh, E. J. (1981). "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island." Social Problems **29**(1): 1-21.

Walsh, E. J. and R. H. Warland (1983). "Social movement involvement in the wake of a nuclear accident: Activists and free riders in the TMI area." American Sociological Review **48**(6): 764-780.

Walsh, L. P., C. McCormick, et al. (2000). "Roundup Inhibits Steroidogenesis by Disrupting Steroidogenic Acute Regulatory (StAR) Protein Expression." Environmental Health Perspectives **108**(8): 769-776.

Walton, M. (2004). "Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, bad, or incomplete?" Latin American Research Review **39**(3): 165-183.

Watson, J. D. and F. H. C. Crick (1953). "Molecular structure of nucleic acids." Nature **171**(4356): 737-738.

Way, L. A. and S. Levitsky (2007). "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide." East European Politics & Societies **21**(1): 48.

Webb, K., E. Zimmermann, et al. (1983). "Etiology and Outcomes of Protest: new European perspectives." American Behavioral Scientist **26**(3): 311-331.

Weyland, K. (2004). "Neoliberalism and democracy in Latin America: A mixed record." Latin American Politics and Society **46**(1): 135-157.

White, A. L. a. C. B. (2007). "Herbicidal effects on nontarget vegetation: Investigating the limitations of current pesticide registration guidelines." Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry **26**(12): 2634-2643.

Whittier, N. (2002). Meaning and structure in social movements. Social movements: Identity, culture, and the state. D. S. Meyer, N. Whittier and B. Robnett. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press**:** 289–307.

Wilkinson, S. (2004). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India, Cambridge University Press.

Williams, G. M., R. Kroes, et al. (2000). "Safety Evaluation and Risk Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup and Its Active Ingredient, Glyphosate, for Humans." Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology **31**(2): 117-165.

Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and literature, Oxford University Press Oxford.

Williamson, J., Ed. (1994). The political economy of policy reform. Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics.

Willis, P. E. (1977). Learning to labor: How working class kids get working class jobs, Columbia Univ Pr.

Wolfenbarger, L. L. and P. R. Phifer (2000). "Biotechnology and ecology - The ecological risks and benefits of genetically engineered plants." Science **290**(5499): 2088-2093.

Wolff, J. (2007). "(De-) Mobilising the Marginalised: A Comparison of the Argentine Piqueteros and Ecuador's Indigenous Movement." Journal of Latin American Studies **39**(01): 1-29.

Wolford, W. (2003). "Families, fields, and fighting for land: the spatial dynamics of contention in rural Brazil." Mobilization **8**(2): 157-172.

Wolford, W. (2003). "Producing community: the MST and land reform settlements in Brazil." Journal of Agrarian Change **3**(4): 500-520.

Wright, A. (2005). The Death of Ramón González. The Modern Agricultural Dilemma. Austin, TX, University of Texas Press.

Wright, A. L. and W. Wolford (2003). To inherit the earth: the Landless Movement and the struggle for a new Brazil, Food First Books.

Yankelevich, A. (2006). GAIN Report. Argentina Biotechnology Annual 2005 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. In http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200510/146131302.pdf, retrieved on October 5, 2009.

Yashar, D. J. (2005). Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Yount, L. (2000). *Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering*. New York, Facts on File.

Zahm, S. H., D. D. Weisenburger, et al. (1990). "A case-control study of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and the herbicide 2, 4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2, 4-D) in eastern Nebraska." Epidemiology **1**(5): 349.

Zald, M. N. (1992). Looking backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program. Frontiers in social movement theory. A. D. Morris and C. Mueller. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

Zald, M. N. and R. Ash (1966). "Social movement organizations: growth, decay and change." Social Forces **44**(3): 327-341.

Zelditch, M. (1978). "Review essay: outsiders' politics." American Journal of Sociology **83**: 1514-1520.

APPENDIX 1 – PICTURES AND MAPS

MAP 1. Pampa Region, Argentina. (from Gras 2009).



MAP 2. Formosa Province, Northeast Argentina

MAP 3. Location of three communities: Monte Azul, Bermellon, and Moreno

PICTURE 1 - Entrance to Monte Azul seen from the paved road

PICTURE 2 – Local family farm 1

Vicinity between local houses and soybean’s plots: the field that can be seen behind the tree on the right is a soybean land plot.

PICTURE 3 – Local family farm 2

The green field behind the houses is a soybean plot.

PICTURE 4 – Soybean field next to local school

The area between the horizon line (with trees) and the two parallel trees is a soybean field. The building in the left is the local elementary school.

PICTURE 5 – Soybean field next to local school

Students playing in front of a soybean field in Monte Azul (as seen from the local elementary school, the building on the right). The area occupied by the soybean plot extends from the trees on the horizon to the tree on the left.

PICTURE 6 – Mosquito

Example of “mosquito,” a machine that soybean farmers use for fumigations. The “arms” on the side are folded in the picture, but they are extended when spreading agrochemicals.

PICTURE 7 – Normal cotton leaves



(Castellan, 2003)

PICTURE 8 – Cotton leaves affected by agrochemicals

(Castellan, 2003)

PICTURE 9 – Affected cassava plant

Detail of cassava plant affected by agrochemicals. Compare the new leaves (front left) with the affected ones (curled leaves at the top of the plant) (Castellan, 2003)

PICTURE 10 – Withered leaves in cassava plant

(Castellan 2003)

PICTURE 11 – Rotten cassava stem

(Castellan 2003)

PICTURE 12 – Defoliated cassava plant

PICTURE 13 – Normal and affected sweet potatoes

The sweet potato at the center is a normal root; the sweet potatoes at the sides show the effects of agrochemicals.

PICTURE 14 – “First assembly for herbicides in [Monte Azul] with technicians”. From Horacio’s photo album. The actual name has been erased to protect anonymity.

PICTURE 15 – Entrance to soybean plot (the soybean field is located at the end of the road). This intersection was blocked by a group of women in 2003.

PICTURE 16 – Official shield of the province of Formosa. The center stage occupied by a cotton plant denotes the importance of this activity in the province.

PICTURE 17 – Dead chickens after the agrochemical exposure of February 2009.

PICTURE 18 – Skin rashes after the agrochemical exposure of February 2009.

APPENDIX 2 – DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

1. INTERVIEWS

2007

Pseudonym	Who – Where
Nélida (Interview 1)	MoCaFor leader – Monte Azul
Nélida (Interview 2)	MoCaFor leader – Monte Azul
Nélida (Interview 3)	MoCaFor leader – Monte Azul
Juana and husband	Peasants – Monte Azul
Sensini	Farmer, broker – Monte Azul
Adela and husband	Peasants – Monte Azul
Buryaile	Businessman – Formosa
Mariela	Teacher – Monte Azul
Augusto	Rural worker – Monte Azul
Antonio	Peasant – Monte Azul
Cortello	Company's agronomist – Curuzú
Emilia (Interview 1)	Peasant – Monte Azul
Emilia (Interview 2)	Peasant – Monte Azul
Estela (Interview 1)	MoCaFor leader – Formosa
Estela (Interview 2)	MoCaFor leader – Formosa
Nina (Interview 1)	Peasant – Monte Azul
Nina (Interview 2)	Peasant – Monte Azul
Lalo	Peasant – Monte Azul
Mario Hispano	Agronomist PSA – Formosa

2008

A. Recordings

1. Rally in Buenos Aires 10/09/08, launching of the Sub-Secretary of Rural Development and Family Agriculture. Speeches of: Cristina Kirchner; Carlos Cheppi (SAGPyA); Guillermo Martinez (Sub-secretary)

2. Peasant Assembly of the North – Octuber 28/29, 2008

B. Interviews

In Formosa

Name	Who – Where
R. S.	Peasants' Lawyer – Formosa

Monte Azul – Curuzú

Pseudonym	Who
Cintia and Germán	Peasants
Isidoro (Interview 1)	MoCaFor leader
Nélida and Isidoro	MoCaFor leaders
Isidoro (Interview 2)	MoCaFor leader
Paula and brother	Peasants
Isidro	Peasant

Moreno

Pseudonym	Who
Kiko Martínez	Mocafor leader
Nancy Valente	Former councilwoman
Don Polo	Former MoCaFor member
Nancy Valente (2)	Former councilwoman
Nelson	MoCaFor member
Nelson, Alberto	MoCaFor members
Oscar	MoCaFor leader
Isaías	MoCaFor member
Arturo	MoCaFor leader
Andrés and Juan	Former MoCaFor members

2009

Pseudonym	Who - where
Mario Hispano	Agronomist PSA – Formosa
Miriam	MAF leader – Formosa
H K	Company's Lawyer – Formosa
Néstor	Priest – Moreno
Telma	MoCaFor member – Moreno
Rafael Pevorski	Activist – Bermellon
Norberto Kasper	Agronomist – Bermellon
Group Discussion – Day 1	MoCaFor members – Curuzú
Group Discussion – Day 2	MoCaFor members – Curuzú
A., I., and E.	MoCaFor members – Curuzú

2. OTHER MATERIALS

Fieldnotes

2007: 46 pages
2008: 124 pages
2009: 42 pages
2010: 20 pages

Newspapers

Newspapers years 2003, 2004, 2005 y 2006. Newspapers *La Mañana*, *Opinión Ciudadana* and *El Comercial*. Total of 78 news.

Judiciary demands

Lawsuit for airplane take-over in Moreno. 474 pages.

Lawsuit for agrochemical exposures in Monte Azul. 178 pages.

3. CODIFICATION

1. The 2003 situation: how they found the contamination
1.2 Effects of contamination

2. The 2003 situation: actions taken / conflict
2.1 Actions taken individually (act, no act, back to work)

3. How they see / Relations with soy producers
3.2 Santafecinos
3.3 Salteños
3.3 Negotiations after the incident

4. How soy production is done

5. Connections with the provincial state (programs, acquaintances)
5.1 What they expect from the government / (no) negotiations

6. Connections with the federal state (programs, acquaintances)

7. Connections with other organizations

8. How they talk about politics

9. How they talk about contamination
9.1 Worries as mothers

10. Contrast between “before” and “now”

11. The MoCaFor / La organizacion

12. Internal conflicts

13. La feria (Their farmer’s market)
13.1 How it was affected by the contamination

14. What they do / are / how they produce

15. How is life in the countryside? / what do you do?

16. Recognition / (Mis)recognition / Shame – Subordination

17. Other cases of contamination they know

18. Suffering / Material constraints