Stony Brook University

The Environmentality of Da-sein's Individuation

A Thesis Presented by

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To The Graduate School
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in
Philosophy

Stony Brook University

May 2011

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

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Abstract of the Thesis

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2011

This thesis pursues the question of how the authentic possibility of being constant can arise for Da-sein out of its lost inauthenticity by investigating what will provisionally be termed the "environmentality" of Da-sein. In creating a space for interpretive leeway, the term "environmentality" will remain distinct from the existential structure of worldliness, and from any particular factor of being-in-the-world specified in Division One of *Being and Time*. In assuming this direction, environmentality has its sight set on, or is awaiting, the *way in which* its proper potentiality for being-its-self returns to Da-sein after its interminable period of exile. Da-sein's authentic possibility will inevitably be presented to it in terms of its world, hence the preeminent fore-having guiding the term "environmentality" is how one "world" gets traded for another. For, the difference between constancy and non-self-constancy is categorical, and the modification of world entailed by individuation must itself be categorical: the world will change *as a whole*.

The circumspection of attunement will be shown to grant environmentality its peculiar responsivity to possibility. The concept of *ēthos,* afforded in a reading of a passage in the Iliad, is specified as the character of authentic implacement from which the environmentality of Da-sein

derives. The problem of individuation finds resolution in how *ēthos* is the authentic existentiell

inflection of the structure of environmentality; by way of this specific affectivity (*Befindlichkeit*) Da-

sein's ownmost potentiality-for-being-as-a-whole can be disclosed. The advent of the phenomenon

of *ēthos* is disclosed in a reading of Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony, which lends the advantage of

musical bracketing to draw out the heuristic indirection of Da-sein's shift in affectivity. The distinct

possibility of affectivity named by *ēthos* has a tropological character which opens a space (*aporregnumi*)

in which one is attracted in such a way that being attracted is accompanied by self-trust (resolve).

to Tom

Table of Contents

Preface

The provocation issued by the relentlessly deployed notion of the everyday averageness and the inauthenticity of Da-sein and *das Man* is surpassed in *Being and Time* only by the radical analysis of death, that is, by the very notion used to *counter* the tyranny of the *they*, and to attest the possibility of authentic Da-sein. These two notions sketch a site of strife in *Being and Time*: the strife, the question, and the problem of individuation. More provocative still is how the very individuality of this problem nearly vanishes in Heidegger's subsequent writing, which favors the more impersonal urgencies of truth, the thing, and of place as such. Da-sein ceases to be the protagonist in the faceless ambitions of the "preservers" of *The Origin of the Work of Art*, or in Heidegger's later essays such as *What is Called Thinking?* or *Time and Being*.

Being-toward-death poses a peculiar interpretive problem: its role in *Being and Time* is to attest the existentiell possibility of authentic Da-sein, but it itself precisely does not indicate how Da-sein steps forward out of its anxiety but in such a way as to remain self-constant. *Angst* is a *Grundstimmung*, a so-called fundamental attunement, in which Da-sein is confronted with that specific possibility of its own which is not-to-be-bypassed. But the cost of such a confrontation is nothing less than the collapse of its world—its world *of possibility*. The lack of any "indication" therein is the structural lack of any afforded possibility.

If *Angst* is not suited to affording any authentic existentiell possibility other than impossibility (death), where do readers of Heidegger turn to find the room this possibility? An easy path is initially available in Heidegger's turn toward art and poetry and place. But, as indicated above, Heidegger's thought in these matters is not evidently concerned with the specific stakes of individuation as presented in *Being and Time*. Good Heideggerians who take his Ancient influences seriously are apt to locate another potential *Grundstimmung* in the awe (*thaumazein*) inspired by art, or

in the unique existential affordances of language and its "way." If, however, one wishes to conserve the rigorous limits of *Being and Time*, these paths are really just trailheads, leading back into the unarticulated margins of *Being and Time* and its concern for Da-sein.

This thesis pursues the question of how the authentic possibility of being constant can arise for Da-sein out of its lost inauthenticity by investigating what will provisionally be termed the "environmentality" of Da-sein. In creating a space for interpretive leeway, the term "environmentality" will remain distinct from the existential structure of worldliness, and from any particular factor of being-in-the-world specified in Division One of *Being and Time*. In assuming this direction, environmentality has its sight set on, or is awaiting, the *way in which* its proper potentiality for being-its-self returns to Da-sein after its interminable period of exile. Da-sein's authentic possibility will inevitably be presented to it in terms of its world, hence the preeminent fore-having guiding the term "environmentality" is how one "world" gets traded for another. For, the difference between constancy and non-self-constancy is categorical, and the modification of world entailed by individuation must itself be categorical: the world will change *as a whole*.

The task of this thesis is to investigate the character of this turn. But significant ontological clarification is necessary before the question itself can be framed adequately. Thus the thesis proceeds in two parts. Part One works through the pertinent components of *Being and Time*, laying a foundation both conceptually and terminologically for the purpose of adequately framing the question at hand. Part One starts with an exegesis of Heidegger's analysis of world, and then frames the question of the existential reach of environmentality by adapting Heidegger's analysis of being-toward-death in its context of "attesting" the possibility of authentic Da-sein. In keeping with Heidegger's later attractions to art, Part Two turns to a passage from the Iliad and then to the Pastoral symphony in order to approach the problem indirectly and with the phenomenological resources that have the concretion and specificity suited to the peculiar difficulty of the problem.

Part One

The environmentality of Da-sein poses two initial problems for any attempt to think it. Firstly, it is the nature of its phenomenal precipitation to constantly elude thematic attention. One cannot "point" to environment, and if one could then by that intentionality it would immediately loose its environmental character. To make matters worse, the common concept of environment is so far from ontological adequacy (and so distorted by cultural valuations that one hardly knows "what" one is ever discussing under its name) that it cannot assist in leading the investigation to proper phenomenological access. Hence the attempt to secure the phenomenon lacks even a basic starting point. Secondly, the very attempt to isolate environmentality *theoretically* requires extreme caution due to the constant threat of losing sight of the whole to which it belongs, and from which it "is" essentially inseparable. This latter problem is already an active concern in *Being and Time*'s analysis of the phenomenon of world, throughout which Heidegger routinely cautions against taking its structural "factors" as independent from one another, for example as though they were discrete psychological processes, or logical moments of a schematism. In order to find the proper point of departure for addressing environmentality, one which especially does not distort the phenomenon through isolation, we will attempt to get our bearings by working through the constitutive factors of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time*. World is not environmentality. When we speak searchingly of environmentality—a term which itself merely holds the place of yet unknown and more suited word—we mean something more specific than "world," or at least more specific than the general phenomenon analyzed in Division One. Nevertheless environmentality arises out of being-in-the-world as a "consequence" of it, or perhaps as an emergent structural property.

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1. Exegesis of "World"

According to Heidegger's analysis, *Befindlichkeit* (attunement), understanding, fallenness, and care are equiprimordial for Da-sein; they are existentials, structures of its being. Asking how they are ordered with respect to each other, and whether and how there is some priority between them within equiprimordiality, means asking what each is that for Heidegger they *must* be equiprimordial. Care is the comprehensive "interpretation" of Da-sein's being[1] as constituted by these structures. Care thus describes their unity, and thereby describes the 'sense' of their equiprimordiality. To begin, here are the basic formulations of each of these structures.

Attunement is an *affective* capacity of Da-sein, and constitutes one aspect of the disclosure of Da-sein's "there" (understanding is the other). In being attuned, Da-sein has always already disclosed its "there" to itself, specifically by way of circumspect disclosure of the world as a whole and in the totality of significance. Circumspection means that the type of disclosure is non-thematic: what it discloses is not the theme of attention, but the totality of significance in which any particular thing gains its own significance. Circumspection is required to be directed toward any innerworldly thing or thought, but it does not itself contain that direction. The phenomenological difficulty of environmentality is owing to this constitutive factor of being-in-the-world. Attunement thereby permits what is within the world to be encountered and it is what first lets Da-sein be responsive to things understandingly. Responsivity is another aspect of the *affective* nature of attunement.

Inseparable from the disclosure of its world is the disclosure of itself as "being-in." Self-disclosure is so constitutive of disclosure as such that Da-sein is disclosed to itself even when its mode of being (its attunement) is its "evading" itself. The essential nature of *Befindlichkeit* as *affection* speaks to the inevitability[2] of this disclosure; "Only an entity which…sich befindet [finds itself]…can

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[1] *Being and Time*, 180 (all citations refer to the Heidegger pagination, since multiple English translations were consulted)
[2] in-evitable as the impossibility of evading (as of an a priori), not as the evasion of an impending event.

become affected."[3] Attunement is the affective state in which one *finds* oneself affected. Thus the nature of the disclosure particular to attunement is how Da-sein is *thrown* being-in-the-world. "Having a mood brings Da-sein *face to face* with its thrownness in such a manner that this thrownness is not known as such but disclosed far more primordially in 'how one is.' Existentially, '*Being-thrown*' means finding oneself in some mood or another."[4] But, "The way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn towards or away."[5] Even in turning away from oneself, one's being (as being-in) is disclosed, and this is possible because being-attuned as turning-away *presupposes* that thrown-being from which it turns—but this disclosure which attunement prepares gets essentially exposed by understanding.

It must also be specified that attunement is not a "psychical condition," nor an "apprehending," or a "reflecting." These all presuppose the disclosure afforded by attunement. "The world, Mitsein, and existence are *equiprimordially disclosed*; and attunement is a basic existential species of their disclosedness…"[6] Thus we may summarize the character of this species of disclosure as "tropological"; in being attuned one is always "turned" in a twofold sense: one's affective-responsive surface is always already turned in terms of the mode of circumspection particular to each mood, and one is turned in terms of the toward-or-away from itself of the self-finding disclosure belonging primordially to *Befindlichkeit*. It is not enough to say that attunement is directed, or is directional (c.f. de-severing or de-distancing), because every directionality is only possible by turns; in being turned toward things according to everyday existence (being absorbed by *pragmata*) Da-sein is also turned away from itself. This tropological characterization of attunement will also become important for Da-sein's environmentality.

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[3] *Being and Time*, 346
[4] *Being and Time*, 340
[5] *Being and Time*, 135
[6] *Being and Time*, 137

Understanding is Da-sein's "sight."[7] A particular sight always accompanies each particular attunement. Just as attunement is not a psychical process, understanding is not one type cognizing "among others," but a constitution of the *there* which the other kinds presuppose; it is an existential structure always existentielly inflected in one way or another. Understanding's contribution to the constitution of the *there* is its disclosure of the "for-the-sake-of-which" that Da-sein at any time is. This is not contained "inside" the circumspection of attunement, but is rather coextensive with it. The phrase "for-the-sake-of-which" expresses a potentiality, and in the case of understanding that potentiality is nothing other than the way Da-sein is; "it is its possibility." Just so, in disclosing the for-the-sake-of-which, understanding discloses Da-sein as its possibility. Existentially this disclosure is "projection." Understanding projects its own potentialities. Or cap*ability*. It is on this basis that a thing within the world is discovered in terms of that thing's "service*ability*, its us*ability*, and its detriment*ality*."[8] (But projection is also the possibility condition for encountering non-useful things (i.e. nature). The very possibility of such an encounter must be priorly disclosed.) Understanding thus "press[es] forward into [its] possibilities"[9]; such a formulation also serves as an illustration of understanding's *pro*jective character. Furthermore, that understanding must project itself prior to factical encounters is another expression of its existential status, and a reminder that it "does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects"[10] It is not reducible to "the given contents which we have in mind." As its own possibility Da-sein is understandingly (thrown) ahead of itself. This basic feature of being-ahead-of-itself is coextensive with being-in, and is thereby conserved in Da-sein's environmentality; as the projection of its own possibilities and as being ahead of itself, Da-sein's surroundings are always saturated understandingly with the projection of its possibility. Once more: the *reason* Da-sein's "surroundings" are saturated with possibility is because existentially the two are

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[7] *Being and Time*, 336
[8] *Being and Time*, 144
[9] *Being and Time*, 145
[10] *Being and Time*, 145

not distinct; Da-sein does not project possibilities as some value-added "on top" of the objectively present innerworldly things. Rather things only appear and are afforded to Da-sein by virtue of this disclosure *called* projection. This apparent paradox is dealt with in the chapter treating the existential of "care."

Falling, or fallenness, comes to light as an existential within the analysis of everyday being-in-the-world-with-others. The phenomena of ambiguity, idle talk, curiosity, and the "they," all expose this existential mode in which Da-sein has "fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality."[11] These phenomena expose how Da-sein *evades* itself, and lets itself (that is, lets its possibility) be guided and determined by the leveled-down averageness of others. Existentially fallenness has placed (a priori perfect) Da-sein as "alongside"[12] the world as "absorbed" in the world and "lost" in it. These designations do not describe ways Da-sein is present among things, but the ways Da-sein understands itself. In the inauthenticity of fallenness, Da-sein's own possibility, which the understanding projects, have been rerouted through the interpretation of others, so that the possibilities which Da-sein understandingly projects for itself are no longer its own. Not only is Da-sein's projection taken over, but its commensurate circumspection as well. The emphasis this places on environmentality is that the *phenomenon* of falling shows itself not only in part but *primarily* in terms of the innerworldly affordance of possibility.

(Any discussion of possibility is dogged by the decision to use the plural "possibilities" or the singular "possibility." The plural may emphasize how the fate of all factical possibilities, from high to low, are always already bound up in these structures, and can thereby serve to prepare a proper sense of what is at stake in the two fundamental existential possibilities: inauthenticity and authenticity. On the other hand, the singular, in its bluntness, emphasizes how possibility is constitutive—indeed is the very meaning of—Da-sein. It is thus synoptically more appropriate.)

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[11] *Being and Time*, 175
[12] *Being and Time*, 175

How is **Care** the unity of these structures? The treatment of Care in Chapter 6 retrieves the initial methodological determination of *Jemeinigkeit* (mineness) that opens Chapter 1, and which had, in designating the being of Da-sein as always an issue for itself, initiated the kind of being of Da-sein as an opposition of two categorical possibilities: to exist as losing itself, or in choosing itself resolutely. Da-sein exists either inauthentically, or authentically. This opposition is only possible because ontologically Da-sein is its possibilities. Care retrieves this initial designation of *self-relation*, and re-invests it in the very structures of *disclosure* which constitute Da-sein's "there." Because Da-sein *is* its possibilities, and because it *is* the disclosure of its world, the fact, the way, and the content of disclosure is always essentially an issue for it. The way in which Da-sein's world is disclosed to it in its attunement or mood is essentially *caring* for its possibilities *in letting them appear* within a frame of significance (i.e., within an attunement). The way in which Da-sein's understanding projects, *throws*, its possibilities equiprimordially with attunement, is, in its disclosure, caring for its possibilities. This is not a "selfish act," but a possibility condition (or rather *the meaning* of all possibility conditions) to any psychical event or even any encounter with innerworldly things—that is, for either of these factical events to take place Da-sein must already "understand" itself as essentially possible of them, and must understand itself to be in a world which supports such possibilities. This is the basic sense of the term "projection."

The way in which care retrieves mineness can be seen in how the bulk of the chapter on care deals with the ontological meaning of truth. Truth is only possible in terms of disclosure which has a circular structure in which the Da-sein is always at stake, hence also the structure of care, and the structure of *being ahead of itself.*[13]

> In the phenomenon of willing, the underlying totality of care shows through…. If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it: (1) the prior disclosedness of

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[13] "[O]ntologically, Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Da-sein is already ahead of itself in its Being. Da-sein is always 'beyond-itself,' not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself." (*Being and Time*, 191-192)

the 'for-the-sake-of-which' in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the 'wherein' of Being-already); (3) Da-sein's projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility of the entity 'willed.' [14]

The first factor, the disclosure of the for-the-sake-of-which, falls to the understanding, as outlined above. The second factor, disclosedness as such, which becomes a matter of disclosure of world as such, is attunement. The third factor, the projection of possibility, is the understanding's disclosure of the for-the-sake-of-which in terms of Care. The duplication of the role of understanding traces the difference between the requirement of understanding in general and the *implication* that such disclosure is factical and particular. The meaning of being-ahead-of-oneself is not an empty generality, but the constitution of everyday experience. Consider the following passage:

> This structure [being-ahead-of-oneself] pertains to the whole of Da-sein's constitution [thus, to care]. […] To Being-in-the-world…belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself— that it has in each case already been thrown *into a world.* […] 'Being-ahead-of-itself' means…'*ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world.*' [And 'world' means that] the referential totality of significance (which as such is constitutive for worldhood) has been 'tied up' with a 'for-the-sake-of-which.' […] [Thus] existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.[15]

That world is "tied up" with a for-the-sake-of-which shows the power of understanding. Understanding projects itself into "reality" (facticity). The difficulty here, and the beauty, is reconciling the very figure of projection—of throwing (*not* alluding here to *Geworfenheit*), or casting something forth (so that what is projected has the basic character of its originator)—and the *uncovering* disclosure that it constitutes. If Heidegger is correct in thinking that disclosure uncovers things as they are, then reconciling *projection* as the constitution of genuine disclosure would seem to be an excessive demand. It would seem to entail covering over whatever it is projected "onto," or entail installing something within the fore-field in order to encounter it (which would be an encounter of the Same). In fact, Heidegger's claim is the opposite. The only way to grasp

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[14] *Being and Time*, 194
[15] *Being and Time*, 192

Heidegger's line of thought here is to take-to-heart the distinction between actuality and potentiality. The average figure of projection as described above presumes that something actual has been projected, or that the act of projection produces something actual, like an image onto a screen. But projection, as the throwing-ahead-of-itself of Da-sein, is always the projection and the first forming of its own potentiality. Keeping in view projection's "medium" or "dimension" concordantly explains why projection has the character of *letting* something appear, or letting something be encountered, rather than "making" to appear. To let is to enable; to make signifies the opposite agency, which would entail "actually" creating the thing encountered. The same distinction must be kept in mind for any concept of environmentality, which has nothing to do with actual "nature."

As Da-sein's "sight," understanding *ties up* the world in definite possibilities, hence with the notion of possibility we are in no way restricted to an empty generality either. The two constituents to truth not yet mentioned with respect to care are *Geworfenheit* (*thrownness*) and *falling*, which characterizes the evasive way in which Da-sein as care has initially abandoned itself to the world. These two constituents flesh out what *tying up* means structurally and phenomenally. Thrownness characterizes how Da-sein's own "there" is concealed in its origins. Da-sein can never "get behind" its having-been-thrown into existence. *That,* or rather *how* it has been thrown, however, is eminently disclosed to Da-sein in its affective attunement. The very *affectivity* of attunement is congruent with its always suffering its thrownness. On the other hand, *falling,* indicates how Da-sein initially and for the most part does not understand (project) itself (its possibilities) authentically, but understand itself (projects its possibilities) in the interpretive terms of the *they* (*das Man*). Consequently, Da-sein has initially lost itself and become undifferentiated from others by diffusing itself into the averageness of the public world. The very fact that Da-sein can fall away from itself is a possibility which owes itself to its basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself in care. Falling is not a privation of care (as though care were taking care of something), but an existentiell inflection of the existential structure

called care. In fallenness, when Da-sein loses "mastery"[16] of itself, this structure of world always

being *tied up* factically ends up mastering Da-sein; this is termed *entanglement*. Thrownness and

fallenness are outlined together here:

> Da-sein exists as a potentiality-for-Being which has, in each case, already abandoned itself to
> definite possibilities. And it has abandoned itself to these possibilities because it is an entity
> which has been thrown, and an entity whose thrownness gets disclosed more or less plainly and
> impressively by its having a mood. To any attunement or mood, understanding belongs
> equiprimordially. In this way Da-sein 'knows' what it is itself capable of, inasmuch as it has
> either projected itself upon possibilities of its own or has been so absorbed in the "they" that it
> has let such possibilities be presented to it by the way in which the "they" has publically
> interpreted things.[17]

On Heidegger's account each of the existential structures named above are equiprimordial, and

each presupposes the others in constituting the "there" of Da-sein. The veiling of the "whence" of

thrownness would not constitute Da-sein at all unless Da-sein was essentially its disclosure by way

of affectability (attunement) and the projection of its possibility (understanding). Understanding

could not project itself unless the world is circumspectly disclosed (by attunement); but attunement

cannot disclose its being-in-the-world without having been given (by understanding) the factical for-

the-sake-of-which that it tunes itself to. It is tempting to understand each of these structures as

"accomplishing" some part of the whole of Da-sein, but nothing could be farther from Heidegger's

intention.

If no ordering is possible within a sense of time, or within a sense of space, or in a functional

sense of accomplishment, then perhaps order can be discerned in *how* each structure is open to

existentiell modification. Mood, for example, can only be taken hold of by way of a counter mood.

This must mean something like Da-sein letting itself become affected otherwise, as opposed to

"managing" a present mood. Moods disclose the world as a whole and circumspectly. They cannot

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[16] *Being and Time*, 136: "Factically, Da-sein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its
moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition."
[17] *Being and Time*, 270

be engineered[18]. When Da-sein lets itself be affected otherwise, when it deploys a counter mood, it chooses for itself a whole other world. In contrast to mood, with understanding Da-sein may factically inflect this possibility of sight in different ways, through "grasping" something, through knowing, interpreting, etc. Heidegger says that understanding exerts its counter thrust upon Da-sein. Whatever understanding discloses as the for-the-sake-of-which is not incidental, but binds Da-sein and all its world to it; it *weighs* upon Da-sein; Da-sein is, as a whole, given over to the care of it. This tension (Nietzsche called man a rope) opens the possibility of *developing* Da-sein's understanding of its own possibilities, of developing itself as its disclosure. It is already doing this in a diminutive way when it tries to minimize its concerns, and when it evades its responsibility for its own existence.

Thus these structures show themselves to constitute, in their unity, the *thrown affective projection* of possibility belonging to Da-sein. Da-sein's possibilities always "belong" to it in one sense because Da-sein *is* its possibilities and is given to care for them, even when Da-sein's possibilities are inauthentic. The environmentality of Da-sein is also emerging. Environmentality is not based on "nature." It is not a "property" of "actual" things in one's surroundings, but takes its character from the peripheral way that possibility saturates one's environs as a whole. Environmentality is athematic, borrowing the circumspect character from attunement, and hence is also tropological: the saturation of possibility in one's environment has always turned Da-sein towards de-severed fields of possibility. This turning appears in terms of the traction of care: one is attracted to or averted from fields of possibility. Attraction itself is *for the most part* unheeded, but it can precipitate in a peculiar way from the circumspect and athematic surroundings. We have not yet grasped this phenomenon of attraction, but it is already clear that it is founded on the structures already outlined. Environmentality also bespeaks the already-being-ahead of itself of Da-sein commensurate with its

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[18] The example, *par excellence,* of this impossibility is *Angst.*

already being "in" and surrounded by its environs, by its possibility-field. Being this projection, Da-sein understands itself in terms of its environmentality, its being implaced[19] by the affordances of its environs. The phenomenon of affordance too gets organized in terms of the attractions and aversions of care. The way Da-sein gathers its possibilities is through these dynamics of environmentality.

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[19] c.f. Casey 276

2. The Tyranny of the They

But for the most part the possibilities by which Da-sein understands itself, projects for itself, and gathers to itself, are inauthentic and governed by inauthenticity. This means that Da-sein's surroundings, their affordances, are as a whole inauthentic. Da-sein is trapped by the very room it makes for itself. Understanding how this is the case requires understanding Heidegger's methodological problem of securing a concept of the whole of Da-sein, that is, of the possibility of it being a whole.

Why is the inauthenticity of Da-sein so difficult a predicament that *attesting* to the very possibility of existing otherwise, that is, the very possibility of existing in a way in which one is not lost to oneself, is tantamount to a "fantastical undertaking?"[20] In *Being and Time* the most prominent analysis of inauthenticity is presented in terms of *das Man*, or the they. What is the inauthenticity of the they and who is Da-sein that he admits this possibility into his everyday Being. As outlined above, the structure of care initiates an opposition of two general kinds of existence for Da-sein, namely an existence of constancy versus an existence of non-self-constancy, or, in more illustrative terms, an existence in which it takes its stand as opposed to irresolutely falling away from itself. Da-sein can "lose" itself by "falling" into the world. This is an *existential* modification of Da-sein's understanding. Da-sein *is* its possibilities, but its possibilities are not always its *own;* hence it is not always *its* self. In fact for the most part the possibilities which Da-sein has taken for itself are not its own. In this inauthentic possibility the *they* resurfaces for (or rather submerges) Da-sein in facilely handing to Da-sein the average and public (undifferentiated and anonymous) way of interpreting itself and its world. Heidegger gives an unsettling description of this usurpation:

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[20] "…if, in the end, Da-sein is never authentically related to its end…Is not the project of the existential possibility of such a questionable existentiell potentiality-of-being a fantastical undertaking?" (*Being and Time*, 260)

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Da-sein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others,' in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking. The "they," which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.[21]

The designation of being "lost" acquires its full significance here: Da-sein's *understanding* has been diverted from the outset and as a whole, from the level of projection all the way down to particular factical possibilities. The primordiality of such understanding, and the power of this description, may be seen in how even Da-sein's very relation *to* the they ("we shrink back from the 'great mass' [say: the ubiquity of the they] as they shrink back") *is trapped within the mode of the they.* While it is not explicit, part of the honed edge of this description seems to be how it names intellectual class (those who shrink back from the masses) as not only susceptible to but already determined by this averageness through and through: for example, even in developing the very concepts needed to grasp inauthenticity. This frames the basic problem of whether and how it is ever possible to extract oneself from this "dictatorship" of average interpretation which has arrogated the very way in which one's possibilities appear. The possibility of extraction either never appears as a possibility, or if it does it is perverted from the outset in the same way that whatever is disclosed in inauthentic discourse ("idle talk"), however profound, immediately loses its autochthony, is uprooted and passed around as leveled down and infinitely exchangeable for average intelligibility.

The methodological problem Heidegger understands from the outset of Division Two is that the phenomenon of average everydayness is only a partial disclosure of the being of Da-sein and hence the analyses of the first division only accomplish partial ontological designation of Da-sein. In order to secure a complete grasp, the very possibility of being-a-whole must be grounded with an

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[21] Being and Time, 126-7

existentiell possibility, and not merely a structural indication of it. It seems clear that Heidegger has

his sights set more keenly on the project of fundamental ontology than he does on the problem of a

possible retrieve of constancy as outlined above. It is just such a concern which is the proper

context for interpreting the way in which Heidegger attests the existentiell possibility of being-a-

whole for Da-sein, namely as answering a methodological concern.

The existentiell possibility Heidegger offers as this attestation is Da-sein's being-toward-death in

the fundamental attunement of *Angst* (anxiety). The affectivity of attunement circumspectly

discloses the world in a totality of significance; in anxiety significance totally collapses; all things lose

their meaning. The world "breaks" and obtrudes. Da-sein's projective possibility is likewise

collapsed to the nullity of impossibility: it projects its death, which is both measureless and certain

(though not, to be sure, as a "fact"). Heidegger's cause for calling this state non-relational is that

death is irreducibly Da-sein's own in each case, and so death becomes birth by way of individuating

Da-sein, or, alternatively, delivering it over to the one possibility which is its own and no mistake.

How does being-toward death activate this possibility of being constant, being authentic? When

Heidegger returns to the phenomenon of everydayness as interpreted through the temporality and

historicity of Da-sein he ties Da-sein's ability to become attuned, that is its condition of affectability

(in which one finds oneself affected) to the condition of repeatability. To be affected, in this

existentiell sense, is to experience repetition. Dasein is a "being that *is* as already having been,"[22]

which forms the possibility condition of becoming affected. It is by way of this dimension of

historicity that the notion of affectivity as repetition becomes one of *possibility*: the possibility of

being the self it has been, thus becoming constant.

But does the confrontation with one's own impossibility truly activate authenticity, or does it

merely attest it—or (perhaps worse still) does *Angst* activate authenticity but limit it to that

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[22] Being and Time, 346 emphasis added

potentiality-of-being which *is* toward its impossibility? This is not an idle concern, for in §51

("Being-toward-Death and the Everydayness of Da-sein") Heidegger specifically claims that

everydayness is unknowingly and yet somehow "knowingly" in flight from death and thereby

determined by it, an insight suggesting that authenticity's ceasing to flee would turn Da-sein toward

its death with similar invariance. But in that being-toward Da-sein's world is broken, and precisely

without possibility. The primordial attunement of anxiety itself is one in which Dasein specifically

finds itself "powerless as regards the conditions determining the fact that it is and that it has to be"[23]

(in other words it is the experience of *finding* oneself *as* having been thrown into being). In finding

itself thrown within anxiety Dasein experiences its "nullity," which is characterized as existential

"guilt," or impotence. The question, and the circular paradox is how, in this "radical passivity,"

Dasein "gets the impetus" to emerge from this capture (Heidegger calls it "benommen": be-numb-

ment, or vertigo), that is, how does Dasein get the impetus to "project itself" onto its own

thrownness in order to "become free for it"?[24] In *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity* Christopher Fynsk

expresses the paradox thus: "In Befindlichkeit, Dasein finds that it has already chosen what it is now

given to choose."[25]

What is Da-sein choosing? The answer: itself, as its own possibility and as a whole. The "own"

and the "whole" are what Heidegger "had" to secure, but the success seems hollow. This

fundamental attunement presents Da-sein to itself in ineluctable terms, but the very terms of such

presentation require the structural collapse of the world through which Da-sein is afforded its

possibilities. How is Da-sein "in" its world when it finds itself? The circular character of being-in-

the-world has collapsed into such a limited figure that the projection of understanding has no

accompanying circumspection; this is what "vertigo" *means*. When facing death there is no

"peripheral vision." There is no periphery, no surroundings, in the existential sense. In accordance

[23] Fynsk, 37
[24] Fynsk, 39
[25] Fynsk, 39

with the structure of its being, Da-sein cannot *not* be attuned, but being-toward-death is singular among all attunements in this crucial respect: understanding becomes both anchorless without its circumspection, and trapped or bound to the one possibility afforded by *Angst:* impossibility. We characterize this as a *fissure* between the two most basic structural factors of being-in-the-world: understanding and attunement. Without attunement's circumspection, without a totality of significance, Da-sein cannot be "led" along lines of significance to any other factical possibility. This is what the loss of world means. Da-sein may choose (or have chosen) itself in *Angst*, it may have become constant, but this so-far solely-attested authentic possibility does not give birth to any other authentic existentiell possibility. It does not afford Da-sein an understanding of itself except in terms of its termination.

If this is the case, then what *Angst* does *not* attest is the possibility of extracting oneself from the they in any significant way, where the sense of "significant" is both colloquial *and* ontological. Heidegger's emphasis that being-toward-death is the possibility which is "not to be bypassed" is more confirmation that angst has strict *methodological* priority. Da-sein's death is its own, and its death cannot be taken away from it. When Heidegger writes "anticipation includes the possibility of taking the *whole* of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the possibility of existing as a *whole potentiality-of-being*"[26] he is speaking from an understanding better expressed by the reverse formulation: Da-sein *belongs* to its death. In this figuration the ability to grasp the whole of its possibility in anticipation of its death becomes understandable: all its possibilities become organized in their belonging to their own impossibility,--but this organizing force is the unmistakability (the "not to be bypassed") that its death is its own. In such an understanding of ownership of possibility, say of appropriation, the possibility of owning all one's other possibilities precipitates against the disowning falling-away from them.

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[26] Being and Time, 264

Heidegger has shown a remarkable leap of insight, but in understanding what grants death its strictly methodological prowess we are *also* confronted with the possibility of alternative ontological modifications deploying the same precipitation of belonging-as-a-whole to its possibility. Death *appears* to be unique in that its extremity has been presented as crucial in its ability to expose the whole of potentiality of Da-sein. But its extremity merely serves to expose the *belonging* of Da-sein to the whole of its possibility. Where would we turn to pursue the possibility of other existentiell attunement which offer both the attestation of the whole *and* the possibility of becoming resolute in a way which opens up a field of possibility (as opposed to constricting it to impossibility)?

Heidegger has elsewhere characterized being-toward-death as the jeopardization of Da-sein's "there," that is, of no longer being able to be "there." The there is not a reference to a place, but to its implacement in its world *as such*; circumspectly, understandingly, caringly thrown. The überhaupt is added here because its affective-projective implacement in its world is the very way in which Da-sein's possibilities are freed for it, afforded to it. They are "there." But because the belonging of Da-sein to its there always takes shape in terms of world (even angst is termed by world, it is the very termination of world), this means that the existentiell attestation of its belonging as a whole to its possibility is also shaped in terms of world, and not incidentally but essentially. Da-sein's possibility (itself) is always implaced in its world, even when it does its best to evade itself by shrinking its world to a manageable size (manage: L. *manus,* "hand": handle: V*orhandensein*).

These indications anticipate an attunement in which the world shows itself as the whole of possibility to which Da-sein belongs, and on which Da-sein may resolve and become constant. In other words, Da-sein is to come into its own through its environmentality. The task of the next part is to investigate how such an attunement would be possible.

Part II

In order to provide an attestation of a different type we need to turn to suitable phenomena that will ground analysis. Or rather: a phenomenon or phenomena that will guide thinking through the problem by loosening the possibility of this hitherto undiscovered *Grundstimmung* which is, on the one hand not to be found in *Being and Time,* but on the other whose possibility seems to be encrypted in Heidegger's project of an ontologically adequate analysis of Da-sein. And yet the possibility of such a mood, such a mode of being, is also heavily suggested by Heidegger's reputed "*kehre*," his "turn" after *Being and Time*; a turn away from Da-sein as the basis of the investigation of being, and towards comparatively *indirect* paths: language, thought, the Open, the earth, to name a few. For a sense of this turn, note that the rising prominence of language is precisely a turn away from the Da-sein of *Being and Time*, who shows itself therein as largely a pragmatic being; the language of his later writing is no longer the *Zuhandensein*[27] of *Being and Time*. At a certain level of abstraction the task of this thesis is to locate where in *Being and Time* the room for his later indirections is encrypted. The path we are pursuing is the environmentality of Da-sein, whose indirection has been indicated in part by the athematic character it gets from the circumspection of attunement; particularly circumspection *as* the possibility-saturated implacement of Da-sein in the surround of its world. The promise of environmentality is as the bearer of possibility for Da-sein. In the present case of the problem of attesting belonging-to-possibility-as-a-whole we are seeking a phenomenon or phenomena which show the birth of authentic possibility in terms of environmentality. Initially we anticipate a categorical, which is to say *exclusive* shift in the constitution of Da-sein's *there,* its *world*. It must be categorical and exclusive if it is to mark the shift from inauthenticity to authenticity.

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[27] The "totality of words in which discourse has its own 'worldly' being can thus be found as an innerworldly being, like something at hand." (Being and Time, 161)

The primary examples we will adopt in pursuit of environmentality are two. First, an extended metaphor in the Iliad describing Paris' sudden and exalting run down to the battlefield at the end of Book VI. This passage serves to outline several basic factors of the phenomenon of the spontaneous re-figuration of possibility, and will bring more specificity to what is cleared by the terms environmentality. Second, Beethoven's Pastoral symphony, which is given to the expression of rustic life. While using a piece of music for phenomenological access is unconventional, it has a very particular advantage when investigating a phenomenon determined by circumspect disclosure, namely, music is free of objects. One might say that music has its own phenomenological bracketing built into its art. The turn enacted in the symphony is one, on my reading, of individuation, and will expose the peculiar nature of the coming-to-pass of such turns in terms of environmentality.

3. Paris

To "secure the phenomenal content" pertinent to environmentality we need neither to draw a strict analogy between this scene and Da-sein's scene of birth, nor to calibrate our interpretation with any cultural anthropology of the Greeks (or Trojans). In accordance with poetry's particular ambition, the metaphor stands on its own as an expressive presentation of its phenomenon *even* in interpreting it; in other words it is not trading off an assumed world, but rather erecting one, or providing all the materials necessary for such building. Here they are:

οὐδὲ Πάρις δήθυνεν ἐν ὑψηλοῖσι δόμοισιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γ᾽, ἐπεὶ κατέδυ κλυτὰ τεύχεα ποικίλα χαλκῷ, σεύατ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἀνὰ ἄστυ ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι πεποιθώς. ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε τις στατὸς ἵππος ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτνῃ δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας θείῃ πεδίοιο κροαίνων εἰωθὼς λούεσθαι ἐϋρρεῖος ποταμοῖο κυδιόων· ὑψοῦ δὲ κάρη ἔχει, ἀμφὶ δὲ χαῖται ὤμοις ἀΐσσονται· ὃ δ᾽ ἀγλαΐηφι πεποιθὼς ῥίμφά ἑ γοῦνα φέρει μετά τ᾽ ἤθεα καὶ νομὸν ἵππων· ὣς υἱὸς Πριάμοιο Πάρις κατὰ Περγάμου ἄκρης τεύχεσι παμφαίνων ὥς τ᾽ ἠλέκτωρ ἐβεβήκει καγχαλόων, ταχέες δὲ πόδες φέρον· αἶψα δ᾽ ἔπειτα Ἕκτορα δῖον ἔτετμεν ἀδελφεὸν εὖτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔμελλε στρέψεσθ᾽ ἐκ χώρης ὅθι ᾗ ὀάριζε γυναικί.τὸν πρότερος προσέειπεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής· ἠθεῖ᾽ ᾖ μάλα δή σε καὶ ἐσσύμενον κατερύκω δηθύνων, οὐδ᾽ ἦλθον ἐναίσιμον ὡς ἐκέλευες;[28]

Paris is going to battle. The battlefield is where heroes show themselves as heroes. The first phrase, "nor did Paris tarry long" in the hall (i.e., with Helen) is telling because Paris *is* wont to linger. The occasion for the metaphor is the surprise that Paris is suddenly eager to go to battle, that he is suddenly acting the hero. When he meets with his brother Hector on the way down Hector specifically mentions that Paris usually hangs back in battle and refuses to fight[29] giving himself a bad name. The horse of the metaphor stands in to confound that expectation, as though Paris' usual indolence is not the true expression of his character: like a seemingly-domesticated horse whose nature and impulse can never be entirely subdued, Paris is suddenly showing his true colors.

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[28] Iliad VI.511: "Nor did Paris tarry long in his lofty house, but did on his glorious armour, dight with bronze, and hastened through the city, trusting in his fleetness of foot. Even as when a stalled horse that has fed his fill at the manger breaketh his halter and runneth stamping over the plain—being wont to bathe him in the fair-flowing river—and exulteth; on high doth he hold his head, and about his shoulders his mane floateth streaming, and as he glorieth in his splendour, his knees nimbly bear him to the haunts and pastures of mares; even so Paris, son of Priam, strode down from high Pergamus, all gleaming in his armour like the shining sun, laughing for glee, and his swift feet bare him on." (Iliad, Translation by A.T. Murray)
[29] Iliad, VI.620-624

Indeed Paris is described as "trusting in his fleetness of foot," which is a rather overt dramatization of self-trust[30]. It has become a figure of *return*; and, as we will see, this return in the rise of self-trust from domesticity is also one's individuation.

What does self-trust mean? In terms of the metaphor, the prior state (way of being) was one of domestication (the horse haltered in the manger; Paris' wont to tarry in the house). Domestication means a constitutional adaptation to a non-native context whose possibilities are governed by belonging to a community, a culture—that is, to others. The sense of domestication is not exclusive to animals; it is used also of people; we may say of someone (typically jestingly) that he was "housebroken." In this passage, self-trust is placed in first contrast to domestication. The implication is plain: domestication interposes itself in one's relation with oneself. The image of difference between these two states consists in the stagnancy of the one and the swift movement of the other. Stagnancy is the "feel" of one who is subdued, who is under the control of others, whose possibilities are limited, leveled, and predictable. Movement, the "fleetness" of foot, is the "feel" of the advent of a new field of possibility (in this case gathered by the *battle*field). Self-trust is accompanied by the sense that something is underway, becoming. This sense is intensified with the figure of exaltation: "on high doth he hold his head, and about his shoulders his mane floateth streaming, and he glorieth in his splendour…." The picture of nobility consists in coming into one's own. There is nothing inherently noble in a horse as opposed to anything else, but *truly* and *fully* being a horse *is* noble—especially in contrast with the not-being-a-horse of a horse that has been domesticated, reined in. Likewise, there is nothing inherently special in running quickly. One could direct another to run so, but it would not have the trusting character that "fleetness" suggests. The difference is ontological, and thus also existential. On the ontological view it is a matter of how one *is* when one runs, not that one runs. On the existential view it is a matter of *who* is running. The

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[30] This term was used by Emerson in his address and essay titled "The American Scholar"

"who" who runs when directed is not "who" who "breaks into" a run spontaneously and for her own exaltation and glory. The modification of "who" is nothing other than the moment of individuation.

One could direct another to run, but trusting fleetness flows from a spontaneity that cannot come by way of any instigation by another. In the metaphor a specific, twofold emphasis is placed on this spontaneity: the horse is initially harnessed, or tethered; and the horse *breaks* the halter and runs free. The verb describing this break is *aporregnumi*, which means to snap or break asunder. After Homer, Aeschylus[31] used it to describe the sudden halt of breath as "snapping" the thread of life. Something akin to death is indeed at work in this metaphor, for the existential modification marked by breaking the halter is the advent, or birth, of new self-trusting possibility which excludes and leaves behind the old domesticated one; the birth of one requires the death of the other. The mutual exclusion marked by the spontaneity which is the turning point of the metaphor is remarkably similar to the opposition of constancy and non-self-constancy in *Being and Time*.

But *what* has seized upon the horse, upon Paris, in this spontaneous rupture? The spontaneity of the reversal of mood shares its perplexing lack of antecedent—causal or otherwise—with *Angst*, which can "strike" Da-sein at any time. Why did the horse suddenly run free? One might be tempted to say that this is "natural," or that, as the poet writes, the horse had "eaten his fill" and going into the field habitually follows. Not only would such an interpretation level-down what is said in the metaphor, it would be quite simply wrong. The whole purpose of the metaphor is to describe Paris, this indolent and recalcitrant man, for whom not even the interdiction of his brother or being shamed before his fellow Trojans has been sufficient to turn his mind or heart. He is just the sort of person for whom spontaneously running into battle *cannot* follow "naturally." Or rather, when we speak of the horse we speak of its "nature," but when we speak of Paris we speak of his

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[31] Liddell & Scott

"character." It is not in Paris' "character" to do this. It is not a possibility afforded to him within

his usual moods. The Iliad has reintroduced the same paradox: namely the problem of whether and

how authentic possibility can ever be seized up when initially and for the most part inauthenticity

governs the very way in which all possibility appears. The ineffectuality of the interdiction of others

to break this tyranny exposes the ontological roots of the problem. The paradox is not

psychological or behavioral; it is structural.

How then can we account for the sudden advent of possibility described exultingly in this

metaphor? Instead of fixing on the "fact" of the advent of possibility, let us look again to how this

new possibility is ordered and what its character is. We have already noted its spontaneous advent

without antecedent; we have already noted the character of self-trust and the sense of movement, or

of something being underway. The sense of movement evinces in both the exalting mood and in

the bodily movement of the horse. In seeking an appropriate account we are asking why the horse

is running. The initial form of answer this question takes, however, is in terms of the "whereto" of

its running. We "access" the "why" through the "where." The horse runs stamping across the field;

through the fair-flowing river; into the haunts and pastures of mares, the place of his kin.

Wherefore these haunts? The first point of clarification must be to distinguish between these open

plains and the gated yard we imagine adjacent to the manger. The horse is not running out into the

yard, but "beyond" the confines of that world. The second point is to emphasize the belonging-

together of each of these concatenated descriptors: the field, the river, the haunts and pastures.

They belong within the same circumspect relevance which "cleared" this path for the horse.

Consider the pertinence of Heidegger's explanation in *Building Dwelling Thinking*: "When I go toward

the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I

am there."[32] These concatenated places along the way were gathered into the initial de-severance

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[32] Poetry Language Thought, 155

that allowed the halter to be broken. They were already "there" and had to be as a whole. The "as a whole" is attested by how they are ordered: the series culminates and is governed by the final "haunts and pastures" descriptor.

The word "haunts" especially bears scrutiny. It is the only abstract term in the series, and the only term which specifically takes its character from that-which-it-harbors, namely the horses. The field, river, and pasture can all be conceived on their own terms. Not so the haunts. On the large view, a haunt is a place which is frequented by someone or something, but the phenomenological significance is more specific. A haunt is a place which takes on a particular character of its own in accordance with its being frequented. The very way in which it affords possibility, is saturated by possibility, is different. A haunt not just is a place one is used to and with which one is familiar; the reverse claim holds as well: just as the haunt belongs to the "who," so the "who" belongs to it. Their characters are bound together. This stands in accordance with the determination that the series of places was governed by a whole, a region. Because one may belong to a region, the region constitutes itself correspondingly, becoming a haunt as a whole.

Indeed the Greek term which "haunt" translates is *ēthos*. *Liddell & Scott*[33] gives *ēthos* to mean "an accustomed place" which, when in the plural, specifically means "the haunts or abodes of animals" (although this specification is probably looking at this very passage in the Iliad for guidance). In the second type of usage *ēthos* means "custom or usage" but when speaking of a human being it designates one's "disposition, character." The split use of the term is not accidental, but actually preserves the ontological relatedness of the character of place and the character of the one habituated to it, in-habiting it. The text of the Iliad is very careful (it seems to me) not to attribute the character of the haunt to this particular horse, but to his kin in general, the "mares." This is consistent with (and perhaps conforms to) the purpose of the metaphor with respect to Paris, as

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[33] (Liddell, Scott, Jones, & McKenzie, p. 349)

discussed above, but it also exposes something extremely peculiar about the "kind" of "habit" at work here, not only with respect to the term *ēthos* but also with respect to the ontological modification traced by the metaphor as a whole. The kind of habit which belongs to this haunt and shapes it gets its fitness, its appropriateness, not from—or not exclusively from—past action, but from a kind of character (which is to say a frame of possibility) which belongs to his kin.

One might simply say "haunt" designates an ecological niche which belongs to the species as a whole (a "habit" of their very nature) but such a way of looking would both abandon the phenomenological vantage of the metaphor and thereby miss the work of the metaphor. If one wished to treat the "nature" of something within a phenomenological frame, it would be apt to suspend the typical sense of nature as "what" something is (the *ti estin*), and instead allow it to show itself from itself in "how" it is. This restriction corresponds to the difference between the Greek term *physis* and the Latin term which it antecedes: *natura. Physis* is the original first growth of something from itself and into itself. The categorical notion of the nature of something is, by contrast, the attempt to identify, in advance, what something is *that* it springs forth into being of its own accord in such and such a way.

These distinctions pertain to the attempt to locate how the horse belongs to its *ēthos*. This belonging stands somewhere between that of the categorical notion of its nature and the historicity of habituation. The "between" we seek is already preserved in the phenomenon of the ontological modification underway from the moment of the *aporregnumi*, and which brings the term *ēthos* into its full meaning. What is the full sense of *ēthos?*

The ontological modification is a change in the way of being of the horse, a change which occurs on the whole. The spontaneity without antecedent indicates the mutual exclusion of the prior and posterior states, per the paradox of extracting oneself from inconstancy: the paradox which first drew us to this passage of the Iliad. The sudden change in how the horse is attuned has been shown

in terms of its environmentality, that is, in terms of how it is toward its world. But the environmentality exposed in the metaphor has been specified as *ēthos*. The *ēthos* of the horse was already "there" at the *aporregnumi*, and had to be, just as the circumspect responsivity of attunement is required for any particular innerworldly encounter to "take" place. Accordingly, *ēthos* is not a place, it names the athematic environmentality of those places which afford constancy. The belonging of the horse to its *ēthos* is its belonging to the "where" that affords its ownmost potentiality of being. In being inconstant, one's implacement lacks the character of *ēthos*. The possibility of *ēthos* invading the inconstant implacement of the horse (the environmentality of domestication) is owed to the fact that *ēthos* belongs to the ownmost potential of the horse. The *aporregnumi* was possible only because the horse *belongs to* its *ēthos* as a whole. As being-toward-death is able to expose how possibility is ordered as a whole in all belonging to impossibility, *ēthos* is also able to order all possibility, but in the specifically *implaced* terms. The disruption of domesticity by *ēthos* was accompanied, in the first contrast, by the return of self-trust. Self-trust corresponds to the "resolve" of *Being and Time*, but unlike the placeless vertigo of the resolve possible in being-toward one's ownmost possibility of death, the resolve evinced in Paris' self-trust and in the horse's "nimble" exaltation is possible within and along with one's being-on-the-way, that is, one's being resolved upon the whereto of one's horizon. In no way does *ēthos* unnecessarily mediate one's relation to one's own possibility; it enables its rise.

4. The Pastoral

The unique ability of *ēthos* to bring Da-sein into its possibility as a whole follows from how it grants the character of the possibility of place to the being-there that belongs to it. As much as *ēthos* affords Da-sein, it receives from Da-sein. It exhibits the plasticity of the "there" for Da-sein, responsive to the way of being of the one belonging to it. Just as the battlefield is where heroes are able to show themselves as heroes, the haunts and pastures of mares is where horses may *be* horses. The battlefield was the *ēthos* of the hero; it took its character from the ownmost possibility of the hero, and accordingly it is where the hero comes into his own. To each Da-sein belongs her *ēthos,* as unique as her death. Like death, the *aporregnumi* of the advent of *ēthos* was a moment of individuation. But in contrast to death, the break of the *aporregnumi* was a turn toward *ēthos* (exhibiting the tropological nature of attunement) as the opening of a field of implaced authentic possibility (which opening has the character of being underway, a figure both of attraction and of resolve), rather than the constriction and transfixion of impossibility (a tropological so extreme as almost to be tropologically privative).

But if we have developed the notion of environmentality into this specific figure of *ēthos* it remains unclear how one sense of place (and the possibility belonging to it) can "invade" another. The one phenomenological oversight of the Paris metaphor is how the ethical (via *ēthos*) turn of attraction and its resolve do not show themselves as separate moments or factors in individuation, as though mere anxiety ensured self-constancy. This difference required Heidegger to investigate the call of conscience within anxiety. Heidegger writes in *Being and Time* that *Angst* can arise in even the most innocuous and banal situations, but his assertion was not burdened with the unique problem of having to account for one sense of place arising within another *in addition* to accounting for the possibility of extracting oneself from the they (or: not falling back into the they) through the call of

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conscience and the resolve it constitutes. We strove to clarify the difference between implaced

individuation and anxious individuation in showing the methodological priority of being-toward-

death and its shortcomings with respect to attesting an adequate sense of world for authentic Da-

sein. It remains to secure an adequate phenomenological account of how, in the moment of

individuation, the authentic "familiarity" of one's *ēthos* invades the inauthentic "familiarity"[34] of

everyday being-in-the-world which is lost.

To do so we turn to Beethoven's 6th symphony, the Pastoral, which is programmatically given to

the expression of rustic (pastoral) life. Pastoral life has long been romanticized as having a unique

(idyllic) priority for human dwelling, and if this historical fact is unimportant for ontology, it still

gives credence to the sort of belonging-to-place that Beethoven sought to express with this piece of

music. Employing music to gain phenomenological access may remain incredible, but as indicated

earlier, music has the unique advantage of having its own phenomenological bracketing built into its

very way of expression. Music is uniquely undistracted by objects while expressing and exposing the

attuned affection (via affectivity) belonging to the phenomenon. In pursuing the character of *ēthos,*

music proves to be useful because it corresponds to the circumspect quality of attunement's

disclosure. The invasion of one sense of place by another entails a dramatic reconfiguration of

circumspection (which allows for the reconfiguration of responsivity; it "creates" a new surface of

affectivity), but it is a reconfiguration which comes to pass *surreptitiously* and indirectly. The

symphony enacts the change in circumspect implacement, and shows how the world can change

before our very eyes without violating its character of worldliness. We begin with careful

description of each movement of the symphony.

The first movement is bright, elastic, and energetic. It has the feel of a broad but indistinct

possibility just now in its inception. The movement is famous for its imitation of birdsong. It is

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[34] This figure of two familiars is taken from Stanley Cavell's essay "Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome" in
Emerson's Transcendental Etudes

well suited to express the welcoming freshness of a sunny morning and to express the delight and ebullience of discovering and being sustained by the "beauty" of nature and nature's aesthetic bounty. So far it cleaves to the romantic ideal of belonging to "nature."

The second movement is slow and serene and indeed this movement is said to express moving water. It recalls the lazy contentment of sun-coaxed nap and daydream, as though having gorged on the morning's aesthetic feast. If the first movement is the initial welcome of nature, the second movement is man's dwelling-in with nature, for the serenity speaks to a confidence in nature's genial accommodation of human "spirit." In such a mood, man is swept by nature… he is *absorbed* in into it, drunk on its "beauty." The mood expressed here strongly exhibits a carefree quality, corresponding to being-absorbed. But absorption in the world is precisely what determines everyday Da-sein and what allows Da-sein to be determined by the average possibilities shaped by public opinion. This danger is necessarily *absent* from the expressed mood because it is not relevant to the circumspection belonging to it. Here we have another confirmation of the difficulty of extracting oneself form such a world when the world itself works against affording the possibility of extraction; in this case it does so with its carefree serenity, and the pleasure of "natural" "beauty."

The third movement further extends and confirms the serene settling-in of the second in the orderliness of a dance, as though celebrating the supposed geniality between man and nature. The carefree rollick elicits an image of carouselling partners, dizzy with amusement. But the dizzy exuberance of the mood is, for our analysis, playing directly into the inauthentic potentiality of being determined by others and lost in them.

These first three movements are cut from the same cloth, and sketch a relation to the natural world which is carefree and pleasurable; so far it is representative of the way that romantic art tends to mythologize or say "edenize" the pastoral. The "edenization" may be seen in the subduing ease of the pleasure of nature's "beauty." But a remarkable break from this mood rears itself in the

fourth movement's famous scherzo, a shocking and uncannily real expression of a thunderstorm, replete with lightning and fists of rain. Its mood is nothing short of terror. (And yet, one can be terrified as *they* are terrified.)

The fifth movement restores pastoral calm and builds in strength and confidence, as though man's successful weathering of the storm were a further confirmation of the providence, the bounty, and the genial accommodation of the natural world: further confirmation that the possibility Da-sein sees for itself in associating pleasurably with nature is genial. Yet, along the entire reach of the rising action, while the movement builds in confidence, a sense of anticipation grows along with it. The climax—which ought to confirm the resolution of the storm's inclemency—introduces a *new* element into circumspection that is essentially alien to all the pastoral expressions that preceded it: namely, a trace of sorrow.

The mere presence of this new element decidedly disrupts the attempt to cover-over the thunderstorm by taking it as a mere inclemency *within* the average belonging-to-nature which the pleasured ease of the first three movements established. In other words, such an interpretation baldly denies that the world has undergone a change; it denies that any new possibility was exposed or afforded by the thunderstorm when in fact sorrow is already an "internal" attestation of such a change: sorrow is not found "out" in the world, but in the environmental, or rather ethical responsivity one who belongs to it. Covering-over possibility by down-leveling and averaging it out is how the *they* does not permit the courage required to face and appropriate one's death. The rising action of the fifth movement seems to be heading toward such a prohibition in preventing the courage to abandon oneself to the advent of new possibility; the fifth movement *seems* to be sinking back into the pleasured ease of the first three. Instead we find a (re)appropriation of the beauty of the natural world which differs from the pleasured ease of the pastoral mode; the difference is attested by the sorrow that accompanies the resolved revision of the world in the crescendo.

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Instead of being absorbed into nature, its real beauty (no longer in scare quotes) surfaces in a moment which countervails the average (and romantic) interpretation of the first three movements.

The two interpretive possibilities active in the rising action of the fifth movement attest the endless danger that Da-sein will fail to understandingly resolve upon its ownmost possibility, even when confronted by it, as in *Angst*. Heidegger is careful to say that everyday Da-sein is already in flight from the possibility of its death; the *they* does indeed have its average interpretations of death—but they are down-leveled expropriations. However, the sorrow which supervenes on the very moment of climax in the fifth and final movement, returns or reaches back to the crisis of the "thunderstorm" and carries out its promise, its possibility, as though the storm had already opened up the gap of the *aporregnumi* that interrupted Da-sein's absorption in the world, even though the absorption had not yet been resolvedly shaken off (as attested in the lace of sorrow); the climax returns to the storm as though it were indeed an expression of inclemency, but *not of natural* inclemency (as of weather) but of interpretive inclemency, an inclemency of understanding (of being-in-the-world itself). The resolve of the climax is a palinode, and the palinodian rereading of the crisis exposes the *aporregnumi* that is only carried out in (and *resolved* by) the very palinode that discloses it. It is a circularity befitting the affective projection of Da-sein.

So exposed, the *aporregnumi* not only indicates the diremption of Da-sein from his absorption in nature generally, but it enacts the break from the collective belonging-with-others: it enacts one's individuation. The first three movements of the *Pastoral* express contentment and an "at-homedness" in the world, specifically the natural world. Thus the contentment stands for the belonging of the individual subject—*not* to an *other*—but to a whole as part (and as partial). The individuality of the subject is absorbed *through* this belonging into the collect, into the congregation. The individual is absorbed by this common relation, this publically established relation to the world. Indeed, we hear in the first two movements an affinity precisely with the praising hymnals of church

music. The individuation which pulls itself out of this condition is attested by the same palinodian sorrow that *carries out* the thunderstorm's rupturing by acknowledging, *resolving* upon, the advent of an individual belonging to the world. The bizarre character of the palinodian sorrow consists in how it recants a *lack*; it recants the not-yet-de-severedness (say the self-concealment) of the partial implacement of being lost and absorbed in the world. Sorrow is not pain. It comes from understanding, not from lack or loss (of pleasure; say, pastoral pleasantness). Sorrow marks the distance that has opened up (in de-severing) in being toward pastoral beauty.[35] Without distance there is no "toward," there is only the dizzying absorption in pleasure.[36] With the opening of distance comes the (tropological) pull-toward of attraction. Distance allows Da-sein to be free *for* (toward) that beauty as a possibility, but along with its disclosure as a freed possibility comes the disclosure of the tropological precariousness of its "there," and hence its possible *impossibility*. The bald fear of the storm has matured into sorrow. Sorrow affirms (resolves upon) the possibility of injury which is internal to pastoral beauty, and this affirmation is exactly what could not have happened—could not even make sense—in a disposition governed by absorbing pleasure. The risk of injury must be Da-sein's own because it has been freed for it and so chooses it. In this individuation Da-sein's own implacement precipitates along with the beauty which it is freed for; thus Da-sein's authentic "there" (*ēthos*) is not implaced in terms of a point in space, but in terms of being turned.

The heuristic (disclosive) peculiarity of the symphony rests in how, on first pass, the thunderstorm is readily heard as a natural storm, and that it takes the appearance of sorrow afterwards to recognize that the *apporegnumi* of individuation was *already* at work, that it must have been already at work in the storm, to arrive in such a place. This underhanded movement of

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[35] Note that "being-toward" retains its athematic, circumspect character. The being-toward expressed here is toward the regionally gathered (implaced) affordance of the possibility of pastoral beauty.

[36] This distinction between absorbing pleasure and free beauty is why beauty always appears in scare quotes in the initial description so pastoral "beauty" in the first three movements of the symphony.

individuation took place by means of the indirect invasion of one sense of place into another. *Ēthos* was already "there" to let the *aporregnumi* to come to pass: one finds oneself already "on the way." The analysis of being-toward-death with respect to being-in-the-world showed that in the collapse of the totality of relevance a *fissure* opened up between understanding and attunement. The palinodian disclosure-upon-return suggests that in the spontaneity of such *apporegnumi* circumspection has gone ahead of understanding. The difference that pertains here is that while transfixed anxiety shows this gap as a fissure, *ēthos* shows it as the leading-on, being-ahead-of-itself of attraction.

5. Conclusion

We set out to determine the environmentality of Da-sein's ownmost possibility of individuation. From the outset the circumspection of attunement was identified as granting environmentality its peculiar responsivity to possibility. The problem of attesting authentic existentiell possibility led to specifying *ēthos* as the character of authentic implacement from which the environmentality of Da-sein derives. Thus the paradox has one resolution by way of *ēthos* as the authentic existentiell inflection of the structure of environmentality, in which affectivity (*Befindlichkeit*) Da-sein's ownmost potentiality-for-being-as-a-whole can be disclosed. The musical bracketing of individuation revealed the heuristic indirection of this shift in affectivity. The possibility of affectivity named by *ēthos* was also shown to have a tropological character which opens a space (*aporregnumi*) in which one is moving toward… in being attracted…. The being attracted in this authentic and implaced sense is accompanied by self-trust, or resolve.

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