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Party Identification through Social Identity:
The Formation of Partisanship among Latino Immigrants

A Dissertation Presented

by

Angel Saavedra Cisneros

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

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in

Political Science

(Political Psychology/Behavior)

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Party Identification through Social Identity:

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Latinos are now the largest minority in the United States and continue to grow through immigration. I explore the process of partisanship acquisition in Latino immigrants. Because Latinos are often construed as “being up for grabs” they present an optimal population to study how both parties actively attempt to attract more followers. I argue that in order to better understand the acquisition of partisanship, it is necessary to focus on group identities along with the social and political conditions that make an identity politically relevant. I argue that issues and political appeals affect partisanship mostly by achieving the activation of group memberships that are linked to each party.

I first test the conventional wisdom that Latinos are an issue public driven by concerns about immigration policy. Using the Latino Policy Coalition 2006 and the Latino National Surveys (LNS 2006) I show that a) immigration is not the most important issue for Latinos, b) that immigration policy preferences do not drive partisanship and that c) partisanship heavily affects the perception of party competence.

Using the LNS 2006 I establish that even though social group identities have direct effects on political partisanship, these effects are moderated by political socialization and an individual’s cognitive representation of political parties. This last component refers to Latino’s

perceptions of political parties, not necessarily political knowledge. Interacting strength of Latino and religious identities with socialization and cognitive representation of political parties I find that with low socialization and little understanding of American political parties, strong identities have no effect on partisanship. On the other hand, for those highly socialized and with clear ideas about the parties, group identities play a crucial role in predicting partisanship. I also show that Latino identity has important effects on issue positions.

This project contributes to the literature by showing that a religious group identity might pull Latinos toward the Republican Party and away from Democrats. The findings presented here challenge the existing literature that asserts Latinos mostly base their partisanship on issue positions by showing that pan-ethnic and religious identities play a crucial role in Latino politics.

A los que siempre nos han amado y apoyado.

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Contents:

List of Tables	ix
List of Figures	xi
Acknowledgments.....	xiii
Introduction: Latinos, Ethnicity and Partisanship.....	1
Partisanship.....	5
Why Latinos and Why Immigrants?.....	6
Explanations	7
Group Identity and Politics	8
Outline of Chapters	10
1. Origins of Latino Partisanship: Issue and Group Identity-Based Explanations.....	13
The Puzzle of Latino Partisanship	14
Origins of Party Identification	16
Issues and Partisanship	20
Latinos as an Immigration Issue-public.....	23
Social Identity Explanations:	26
The Multiple Social Identities of Latinos	30
Latino Identity: a Panethnic Group Approach.....	33
Religious Identity among Latinos.....	34
2. Latino Partisanship: All About Immigration?	37
Salience of Immigration.....	37
Issue Importance and Partisanship.....	42
Issue Competence and Partisanship.....	46
Testing for Endogeneity.....	49
Policy Preferences and Partisanship:	51
A Natural Experiment.....	52
Predictors of Partisanship with Contextual Changes	55
Discussion.....	56
3. Measuring Latino Group Identity	58
Operationalization of Latino Identity	59
Subscales of Latino Identity.....	67
Latino Identity and Assimilation	71

Does the Scale Vary across Latino Subgroups?	73
Republican-linked Identities	73
Religious Identity	75
Contextual Effects on Latino Identity and Other Political Variables	78
Summary	79
4. Latino Identity and Partisanship	81
Theory	81
Moderators of the Impact of Identity on Partisanship	83
Political Socialization	84
Time in the United States	84
Cognitive Representation of Political Parties	89
Predicting Partisanship with Both Moderators	93
Time in United States Model for Immigrants	97
Distinct Effects of Latino Solidarity and Strength of Identity	102
Summary and Conclusions	107
5. Direct and Indirect Effects of Identity	110
Identity and Issue Preferences	111
Dependent Variables	112
Independent Variables	113
Results	113
Political Attitudes	113
First Generation Immigrant Policy Preferences	116
Partisanship as a Function of Identities and Issue Positions	118
A Fully Moderated Relationship between Identities, Issues and Partisanship	120
Mediational Model of Social Identities on Partisanship Through Issue Positions	123
A Mediated and Moderated Relationship	127
A Saturated Mediated Moderation of Identity on Partisanship Through Issues	130
Summary	132
Conclusion: Latinos, Identity and a Grim Forecast for Republican Hopes	135
Republican Prospects	137
Why are Latinos Democrats?	139
Rethinking the Definition of Partisanship for Latinos	141

Contextual Determinants of Identity Strength	141
Looking Forward	143
References.....	145
Appendix Chapter 1	155
Appendix Chapter 3	161
Appendix Chapter 4.....	163
Appendix Chapter 5	173

List of Tables

Table 1.1: Attitudes about political issues .in Latino National Survey 2006 (Percent)	15
Table 2.1: Most Important Problem Facing the Country and the Latino Community	42
Table 2.2: OLS Estimation of Party Identification by Most Important National Issue Cited.....	43
Table 2.3: OLS Estimation of Party Identification by Most Important Issue Facing the Latino/Hispanic Community	45
Table 2.4: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Perceived Party Competence on the Issue of Immigration and Party Identification (Latino National Coalition 2006)	50
Table 2.5: Regressions Estimating Effect of Party ID on Immigration Preferences (OLS) and of Immigration Preferences on Party ID (ordered logit).	51
Table 2.6: Regression and Ordered Logit for Different Dependent Variables, Using Time 1 as a Baseline (before April 25)	54
Table 2.7: Issue Priming Due to Environmental Effects, OLS regression. (LNS 2006, Fraga et. al).....	56
Table 3.1: Correlations of Identity Measures.....	62
Table 3.2: Correlations of Group Commonality Items (“Latino Solidarity” Scale J. Garcia 2010)	64
Table 3.3: Covariance Structure Model of Latino Identity Scale Items.....	70
Table 3.4: Acculturation and incorporation variables on Latino Identity	72
Table 3.5: Reliability Estimates and Descriptive Statistics of Latino Identity Scale across Latino Subgroup	74
Table 3.6: Responses to Questions about Religiosity and Evangelical/Charismatic Catholic Identification.	77
Table 3.7: OLS Regression and Logistical Regression for Dependent Variables, Using Time 1 (before April 25) as the Baseline Category.	79
Table 4.1: Partisanship as a Function of Cognitive Representation of Parties and Place of Birth.....	94
Table 4.2: Partisanship as a function of Cog Rep and time in the US for foreign-born Latinos	98
Table 4.3: Partisanship Regressed on Social Identities interacted with Cog Rep and Socialization Separating Latino Identity into Two Main Constructs.....	104
Table 5.1: Effect of Identities on Issue Attitudes for Full Sample.....	114
Table 5.2: Effect of Identities on Issue Attitudes for Foreign-Born Latinos. Time in United States is Used as Socialization Variable.....	117
Table 5.3: Partisanship Predicted by Social Identities and Issue Preferences.	119
Table 5.4: Moderated model of partisanship with issues with both sets of moderating variables.	121
Table 5.5: Direct, Indirect and Total Effects of Mediation: Regressing Partisanship on Group Identities through Issue attitudes. Structural Equation Modeling.....	126

Table 5.6: Results from Structural Mediated Moderational Model of Partisanship. Identities through Economic, Social, and Immigration Issues, Moderated by Cogrep and Socialization.	131
Table 1.A: OLS of Partisan Ambivalence Using Hispanic/Latino Ethnicity as a Predictor using the 2008 ANES Time Series.....	155
Table 3.A: Reliability Coefficients for Latino Identity Scales	160
Table 4.A: Partisanship including group identities and control variables. OLS with robust standard errors.	162
Table 4.D: OLS Regression of Partisanship on Main Identities Interacted with Socialization Variables, Generational Status, Place of Birth, and Time Lived in the United States.	166
Table 4.E: OLS Regression of Partisanship on Main Identities Interacted with Cognitive Representation of Parties.	167
Table 4.F: Partisanship regressed on Latino Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination. Socialization: a) place of birth, b) time in US (foreign-born only) and c) proportion of life spent in the US.	168
Table 4.G: Predictors of Correctly identifying Republicans as Conservative party (Logistical Regression)	170
Table 4.H: Partisanship Separated by Country of Origin/Heritage:	171
Table 5.A: Principal Components Analysis (loadings > .3) after Promax Rotation.	172
Table 5.B: Moderated Model of Partisanship on Identities and Issues using Cognitive Representation and Socialization as Separate Moderators.	172

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Relative Frequency Timeline for <i>Google News</i> Search: “Latino“ and “Immigration” (January 1990- July 2010)	39
Figure 2.2: Percent of Mentions for "Most Important Issue" Amongst Latinos	40
Figure 2.3: Percent Mentions for "Most Important Issue" (Nationally Representative).....	40
Figure 2.4: Responses to "Which Political Party Has a Better Approach to Address this Problem." (for Most Important Problem Facing the Country)	47
Figure 2.5: Responses to "Which Political Party Has a Better Approach to Address this Problem." (Most Important Problem Facing the Latino Community).....	48
Figure 2.6a: Four Most Important Issues Facing the Nation for Three Different Survey Periods	53
Figure 2.6b: Four Most Important Issues Facing the Latino Community Three Different Survey Periods	53
Figure 3.1: American and Home Country Identification across Generations	61
Figure 4.1: Party Identification Formation Process	81
Figure 4.2: Effect of Latino Identity on Partisanship over Time in the United States.....	87
Figure 4.3: Effect of Religiosity and Born Again/Charismatic Identity on Partisanship by Time in the United States	88
Figure 4.4: Effect of Latino Identity on Partisanship by Cognitive Representation of Parties	91
Figure 4.5: Effect of Religious Identities on Partisanship by Cognitive Representation of Parties.....	92
Figure 4.6A: Effects of Latino Identity moderated by Place of Birth (Mainland US or Abroad) and Cognitive Representation.....	96
Figure 4.6B: Marginal Effects of Born Again or Charismatic Catholic Identity Moderated by Place of Birth (Mainland US or Abroad) and Cognitive Representation.....	97
Figure 4.7A: Effects of Latino Identity Moderated by Time in the US and Cog Rep.	99
Figure 4.7B: Effects of Religiosity Moderated by Time in the US and Cog Rep.	100
Figure 4.7C: Effects of Born Again or Charismatic Catholic Identity Moderated by Time in the US and Cog Rep	101
Figure 4.8A: Marginal Effect of <i>Latino Solidarity</i> by Levels of Cogrep on Partisanship across Time in United States	105
Figure 4.8B: Effect of <i>Strength of Latino Identity</i> by Levels of Cogrep on Partisanship across Time in United States	106
Figure 5.1: Immigration Views across Generation and Citizenship Status. (LNS 2006)	116
Figure 5.2: Graphical Representation of Mediational Effects of Identity on Partisanship Through Issue Preferences.....	124
Figure 5.3: Representation of Results from Mediated Model.....	125

Figure 5.4: Diagram of Moderated Mediation of Identities on Partisanship through Issue Preferences..	127
Figure 5.5: Results from Moderated Mediation of Identities on Partisanship through Issue Preferences	128
Figure 5.6: Diagram of Fully Moderated Mediation of Identities on Partisanship through Issue Preferences.....	129
Figure 3.B: Screeplot of Eigen Values for Latino Identity Items after Principal Components Analysis	161
Figure 4.B: Distribution of Latinoness across Time in United States, Grouped by Tens of Years	163
Figures 4.C: (1-4) Marginal Effect of Predictors of Partisanship across Time in the United States	164
Figure 4.G: Knowledge of Republicans as More Conservative (Cognitive Representation) across Time in the United States	170

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Introduction:
Latinos, Ethnicity and Partisanship

Did Gerald Ford's bite into an tamal(e) husk help or hurt? Was G.W. Bush's Spanish good enough? Were his efforts to reform immigration genuine? Were Bush and Karl Rove successful at courting Latinos? Or is Harry Reid ultimately right in saying: "I don't know how anyone of Hispanic heritage can be a Republican..."

These are the questions that surround the political world Latinos in the United States live in. These questions motivate this dissertation. Specifically, I seek to understand why it is that Latinos, even those newcomers to the American political system and despite Republican efforts to appeal to Latinos, reject the Republican Party so often. In essence: What draws Latinos to the Democratic Party?

Latinos continue to grow and have become the largest minority in the United States and their allegiance to a specific political party is often questioned. Come election time, pundits and students of politics wonder how much more important Latinos will be. Latinos continue to grow in numbers through high fertility rates but also through immigration. Of about 40 million foreign-born people living in America, roughly 50% of them are of Hispanic origin. While many of these Latinos do not have proper immigration documentation a large percentage are naturalized citizens (most recent estimates put the unauthorized immigrant population at over 11 million, Pew Hispanic 2011). While most of the traditional Latino population was of Mexican origin, new waves have brought migrants from all regions of the American continent. This has generated a new definition of Latino, which is rooted in the Spanish language, and involves the syncretism of cultures, religions, ideologies, and social classes.

Latinos play an increasingly visible role in politics. Despite assurances in the media and political commentaries that argue Latinos act as swing voters who are willing to be courted by whomever offers them the best deal, Latinos, as culturally heterogeneous as they are, consistently identify more Democratic than they do Republican. Latinos also consistently vote for Democratic candidates. It is well known that President Bush reached out to Latinos during his campaigns and presidency. Nonetheless, he was ineffective at generating a large shift in electoral and partisan preferences among most Latinos. Why the Republican Party continues to be so unappealing to Latinos when over 90% of the Latino population identifies with some Christian

religion and over 40% feels part of a charismatic Christian movement, has yet to be fully explained.

Recent evaluations of the claim that Latinos and immigrants are “up for grabs” find that Democrats continue to enjoy a stronghold on these groups while Republicans continue to alienate the Latino vote. Nonetheless, Latinos (and many immigrant groups) overall are socially conservative and religious. Social conservatism has long defined the Republican Party. In theory, conservatism should alienate Latinos from the Democrats and deliver them to the Republican Party. Rather than ask whether or not Latinos are up for grabs, it seems more important to ask why Latinos are so Democratic. Latinos, like all voters, can either choose to align with a party based on different considerations, such as minority status, social status, ethnic identity, or positions on social, economic and moral issues. Clearly these forces might constitute different dimensions of political and social life, and when coupled seem to predict contradictory partisan alignments.

This research project thus fits into two large literatures, ethnic politics and partisanship. The theory and evidence presented here will reveal why Latinos – including those born abroad – have not become more Republican. I argue that issues may matter, but they matter in conjunction with group identities which align with the perceptions of each Party. I specifically propose that Latino identity, a feeling of being part of the same group as millions of people who come from south of the border, is crucial to Latinos’ attachment to the Democratic Party. Religious identities are proposed to pull Latinos away from Democrats. This link however is not a straightforward one, as some researchers have pointed out (see Lee 2008). For a group identity to matter on the political arena, Latinos must be able to consciously link these social groups to the political parties. Without links between identities and parties, partisanship will not be impacted by social identities.

There are several aspects of Latinos’ heritage that make explaining their partisanship too complex for soundbytes. First, while Latinos share a common historical language (many latter generations are no longer fluent in Spanish) and culture, Latinos as a group are not always on the same page. Latinos share the same colonial heritage, and are able to trace their ethnic history to south of the USA-Mexico border, yet Latinos are very distinct on many social and even physical characteristics. Latinos in the US run the gamut of skin tones.

Latinos also have different historical experiences in the United States, most of the immigration from Latin America has occurred in the last decades of the XX century; yet many Latinos are not immigrants. More than half of Latinos in this country were born on the mainland United States and many can trace their United States of America roots beyond their grandparents. Nonetheless, all this heterogeneity speaks little to the political behavior of Latinos. Even among immigrants who came to this country as adults, their experience with democracy or authoritarianism growing up varies greatly. It is impossible to infer across the board what democratic and political attitudes any given Latino espouses. Despite this diversity, Latinos overwhelmingly continue to identify with and vote for the Democratic Party.

Second, when compared to American Blacks, another very visible minority in the US, Latinos are much less cohesive and do not behave very distinctively as a political group. That is, Latinos do not have a long history of party allegiance and appear willing to cross party lines to vote for candidates that woo them. This is not the case with African Americans. Furthermore, while immigration issues seem to motivate Latinos, research has failed to find a strong link between Latino immigration attitudes and partisanship.

Third, Latinos are quite religious. Between two thirds and three fourths of Latinos in the US identify as Catholics while 15% identify as Protestant Christians. This leaves about 10% of Latinos without some type of Christian religion identification. Fourth, Hispanics are generally socially conservative, espousing traditionalist values and rejecting progressive ideals such as abortion rights and gay marriage. These values exist alongside their underprivileged and minority status, which might lead Latinos to perceive their historical role in society as one marked by unequal opportunities and oppression. These sets of values and attitudes held by Latinos exemplify why thinking of Latinos as a political bloc oversimplifies such a diverse population.

Latinos have traditionally and consistently identified with the Democratic Party. While Latinos do in fact sometimes support a Republican candidate (about 40% supported G.W. Bush in 2004; see Leal, Barreto, Lee & de la Garza 2005) their partisanship is not significantly affected by defecting to an appealing candidate. The major question that remains largely unanswered is why. Overall, Latinos do not conform to our general understanding of politics: they are socially conservative and economically liberal. They do not seem to fit the unidimensional distribution of party preferences, attitudes, issue positions and ideology that is

the simplified norm for American political parties; characterized by a morally conservative right and the progressive liberal left. In fact, Latinos might fit well with a European Christian Democratic party, which traditionally is economically progressive on issues of welfare and health care while conservative on social and religious issues. Ethnic identity and immigration preferences appear to cross-cut the traditional social and economic dimensions.

The United States however has two main parties, which have been slow to change since the civil rights realignment era. A more modern distinction between parties is that of the morally conservative right and the progressive liberal left. It should be hard to predict how a poor immigrant who signs herself with the cross when driving past a church would fit into one of these major political categories.

What is it then that makes Latinos reliably Democratic? Is it that Latinos are poor? Is it that Latinos believe in providing government aid to those who need it? Or is it because they are a minority? All of these explanations might seem plausible yet do not capture the complexity of the Latino experience in the U.S. Latinos as a whole cannot be expected to behave like the African American community, with centuries of history within the American democracy (and yet very little voice until recently). The majority of Latinos are fairly new to the United States, and maybe even to democracy. The Black-White dichotomy that is prevalent in the race literature does not work well for understanding how a group that is neither fully White nor Black. Yet Latinos continue to consistently identify as Democrats by a three to one ratio.

This previous question inevitably leads to the next logical one, why is it that Latinos are not Republicans? Republicans have attempted to court the Latino vote and have even proposed fairly liberal immigration reforms. G.W. Bush spoke some Spanish, was from Texas and pushed to try to get immigration reform on the congressional table. Furthermore, Latinos were supporters of efforts to ban gay marriage such as Prop. 8 in California, where they voted and worked with Republicans. Thinking about the new divide between religious conservatives and liberals (Layman 2001) leads us to expect that Latinos would not have a hard time identifying with the Republican Party. But why don't they?

Partisanship is stubborn, and even when there are shocks to the political system, political realignment occurs slowly over time. This is not only because people hold on to their partisanship like an identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2001; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008) but also because Americans are socialized by their families into parties as well

as into a general understanding of how parties are arranged across the many political topics (Niemi & Jennings 1981). Latinos are also different in how they are socialized politically.

Latinos continue to grow largely through immigration. Every year there is a large influx of people who come to the United States as immigrants and who most likely do not have much exposure to American ideology and politics. This is why Latinos are considered a prime market for politicians; because it is believed that as a group, their preferences are not yet set in stone. Looking at Latino immigrants provides a great opportunity to explore the formation and possible change of partisanship among ethnic and social groups in the United States. This dissertation also hopes to extrapolate the theory developed here to other democracies with large groups of immigrants as well as to young democracies with new or weak party systems.

Partisanship

While studies of Latinos and politics have focused on a myriad of political phenomena (De la Garza 2004; Espino, Leal & Meier 2007) partisanship is a concept that proves time and again to be extremely important in political behavior. Partisans are not only more likely to vote and to be engaged in politics, but are also influenced by their partisanship on issue preferences. Understanding the party attachment (or non-attachment) process is central to the study of political behavior. Partisans are those who adhere to a political party in a systematic way; in fact, partisanship is considered to be a psychologically relevant identity for individuals (Green et al. 2002; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Partisanship is the major driving force of the vote (Campbell et al. 1960) and can affect government approval, values and policy preferences and can even bias political perceptions (Bartels 2000; 2002; Basinger & Lavine 2005; Goren et al. 2009; Green & Palmquist 1990) as well as change attitudes (Carsey & Layman 2006). Learning about partisanship allows researchers to uncover an indispensable component of political thought and behavior that is relevant not only to immigrants or minorities, but to the whole American population.

While partisanship can be construed as many different political preferences such as strength of identification with a political party, voter registration with a party, or simply a preference for one party over another, the main crux of partisanship is that it is an important political identity that is psychologically relevant. Identifying where partisanship comes from and how it changes is not simple and has been the subject of many research efforts (Achen 2002;

Campbell et al. 1960; Carsey & Layman 2006; Johnston 2006; Kinder 2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). The idea of pre-adult socialization into political parties by families (Niemi & Jennings 1968, 1981, 1991) and childhood experiences is well accepted. Because of the importance of parental influence, simple models can't disentangle which political attitudes are inherited and which ones are developed by an individual's experiences. But, how does partisanship form when early socialization is either irrelevant or non-existent? Such is the case with first and even second-generation Latinos.

Why Latinos and Why Immigrants?

Latinos, growing annually over 20% in the US, continue to increase in their political relevance. Traditional theories of partisanship acquisition include strong roles for parental socialization (Achen 2002; Fiorina 1981), yet parental political influence is greatly diminished in first and second generation immigrants (40% of Hispanics were foreign-born in 2006) to the United States, requiring more research to understand how other variables affect partisanship.

The idea that Latinos are "up for grabs" (see De la Garza & Cortina 2007; Leal et al. 2008) and have a non-traditional alignment of social and economic issue preferences provides an excellent scenario to study the factors affecting the acquisition of partisanship among immigrants. Studies of Latinos (Cain et al. 1991, Latino National Survey, LNS 2000 and 2006; Pew Hispanic Center) show that even immigrants who can't vote (non-citizens), report feeling closer and even attached to political parties. In 2001, Gimpel and Kaufmann showed that partisanship intensifies with length of stay (and generational cohort) and that Latinos largely identify as Democrats.

Immigrants arrive at a country either knowing little or not caring much about the political system of the host country, except for the regulations that directly affect them (immigration and labor laws). As such, immigrants provide an optimal¹ sample to study how factors such as issue preferences and social identities drive partisanship. In a sense, by studying Latino partisanship, it is possible to explore how partisanship is developed while removing early partisan socialization.

¹ Immigrants from different nations bring different attitudes, ideologies, values, etc. The heterogeneity of immigrants may be seen as problematic for many studies of immigrant political behavior, yet it helps provide a more diverse testing ground for the theory laid out here.

Explanations

Research has shown that Latinos are much less cohesive in their culture and political attitudes than are Blacks. The heterogeneity of Latinos has not stopped mentions of a bloc vote of unity (see however, Beltrán 2010). In order to behave as a voting bloc, a unifying factor must exist. It has been argued that Latinos vote based on political issues and that immigration reform is the most important issue for Latinos as a whole. This line of thinking further argues that immigration concerns pull Latinos closer to the Democratic Party and further away from the Republican. When marches were organized on May 1, 2006, the massive amounts of Latino support for immigration reform made clear the size of the immigrant and Latino electorate.

Nonetheless, the perception that Latinos care about immigration and thus are Democrats seems ill-informed. First of all, it is important to remember that not all Latinos are immigrants and many are more concerned with the state of the economy or their job prospects (chapter 2). The fact that recent Republican presidential candidates have had a moderate to liberal stance on immigration, guest worker programs and paths to legalization strikingly contradicts the idea that Latinos are Democrats because they only care about immigration. The immigration issue hypothesis has not been supported by empirical evidence. In fact, research looking at issues and attitudes finds that other issues tend to be more important for Latinos and the immigration preferences aren't fixed and change across generations (Nicholson, Pantoja & Segura 2006; Branton 2007). The immigration-issue hypothesis is explored in Chapter 2 of this research project but the lack of scholarly support for this idea suggests that an alternative explanation should be presented.

Latinos are not a bloc group despite being a minority. African Americans are mostly Democratic and seldom vote Republican; White Evangelicals and Born-again Christians almost never choose a Democratic candidate over a Republican opponent. Yet these social groups often overlap for individuals: a Latina might be businesswoman with a micro or macro corporation, identify as a member of the born-again Catholic (charismatic) movement, and not be able to vote. Nonetheless, it is clear that not all racial and ethnic groups vote cohesively (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth & Weisberg 2008). Those racial groups that vote as blocs are defined as secondary (political) groups with close ties to the parties. Despite not being issue-centered, these groups show a clear group-to-party link – as in the case of African Americans. Latinos, on the other hand, do not seem to fit the profile of a primary

group that is closely linked to a political party even though they identify largely as Democrats and are influenced by immigration more often than the rest of the American public (Campbell et al. 1960). Why is it then that Latinos are Democrats?

While issue-publics can be thought of as groups who are interested in a single political issue, such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) it is also possible to think of issue groups as those that are affected symbolically by certain political issues. In fact, thinking of Latinos as a group that is linked together symbolically through the issue of immigration seems a more plausible explanation of how the issue of immigration affects Latino political cohesiveness and partisanship. Latinos seem to be mobilized by immigration issues, as we have seen after SB 1070 in 2010 or by the nation-wide marches organized in the spring of 2006. In order to test the idea that immigration issues might bring Latinos together and could wake “the sleeping giant” I make use of a natural experiment that occurred during the collection of data for the Latino National Survey. In the final section of chapter 2 I explore how increases in the importance of immigration affect the way Latinos conceive of their partisanship. There is a simpler alternative to understanding the development of partisanship among Latino immigrants. This theory also requires little cognitive effort, fulfilling the least-effort principle of political thinking.

Group Identity and Politics

Social groups are inherent in people’s lives. Groups help simplify our environment and serve as heuristics in decision-making. I propose looking at social groups and group identity as an explanation for Latino partisanship. This dissertation proposes a psychological process in which salient social (non political) group identities generate and affect attachments to parties. If a social group identity is clearly linked to one of the political parties, feeling part of a group that is not inherently political (such as Catholics) should activate the political group membership when politics are evoked. In other words, if an individual feels identified as Latina, and she knows that Latinos and Latinas are Democrats, when facing political choices, she will be more likely to feel like a Democrat than any of the other relevant political alternatives. The stronger both links, hers to the group and from her group to the party, the stronger her identification.

Because any individual has more than a single identity, the possibility that political issues play a role in determining partisanship exists. Namely, different issue agendas or political themes can activate different identities in immigrants and voters in general. A dark-skinned Pentecostal

farm worker born in El Salvador who is a member of the Latino soccer club in his community embodies three identities available to Latino individuals. However, these identities aren't inherently political and must be linked to parties or candidates for them to result in political ramifications.

These accessible group-based identities, such as pan-ethnic identity or religion-based groups, will then activate cognitive group-party links² about the political parties and change the affective tag attached to each party. This clearly is a process and not a one-shot game, it continues throughout the political life of an individual (c.f. Gerber & Green, 1998). Partisanship may be much more fluid for immigrants than it is for later generations. Furthermore, I also propose that the strength and direction of partisan identification can be manipulated by political messages as well as issue and campaign agendas. The process through which issue appeals affect partisanship is by activating specific group identities.

In summary, I propose that Latinos, as everyone else, identify with different social groups at any given point in time. Some of these groups are more distinctively political (such as Blacks) (Lewis Beck et al. 2008) and some are irrelevant to parties (being a football soccer fan instead of a baseball fan). The closer a political group is tied to a political party, the more politically relevant it is. The more a person identifies with a politically relevant social group, the more they identify with the respective Party.

This identification however occurs at the individual level and is affected by political events, such as Senator Harry Reid's promises on immigration while courting the Latino vote or Jan Brewer's signing of immigration enforcement measures with ethnic and racial undertones. Another important factor included in this theory is that of political socialization, and how length of residence in the United States affects immigrants' political involvement and understanding as well as their partisan decisions.

This dissertation explores how social groups are tied to political ones and furthers our understanding of how identities inform political behavior. It also contributes to the growing literature on Latino and immigrant political phenomena. By proposing a generalizable theory that can explain social group partisan realignment, this dissertation furthers our understanding of why Latinos are still Democrats and what, if any, prospects there are for this to change.

² It is also possible to think of these cognitive links as political schemas. However, party-group links are not necessarily schemas, they can rather be thought of as established links that can serve as heuristics.

Outline of Chapters

This introduction has briefly outlined the main theoretical contribution of this research project. The following chapters look at Latino partisanship based on the theory presented here and tests it against an alternative hypothesis of partisanship: the issue-public approach. The main hypothesis to be tested in this dissertation is that the linkages of a social group (social identity) directly affects an individual's partisanship. Before being able to test this hypothesis, several empirical steps must be taken to build up the theory.

The next chapter will more specifically place this dissertation within the partisanship, Latino, and immigrant political socialization literatures. Chapter 1 will explore the literature relevant to partisanship, political socialization, and Latino politics. In doing so, the rationale behind the social identity-based theory of partisanship will become clearer to the reader. Chapter 1 also provides some insights about the political behavior of Latinos as a whole, showing why this strong Democratic attachment is puzzling. Despite not being able to vote, it is highly possible that immigrants do in fact care about different areas of politics and are engaged in politics and have clear political preferences. Basic statistics using the ANES 2008 as well as the Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al. 2006) are used to determine the extent to which immigrants are interested in politics, have policy positions, and are engaged in politics.

It is important to also establish the plausibility that immigrants are “up-for-grabs.” If there is a possibility that a person feels drawn toward both parties, an individual must perceive both to have a similar valence. It is necessary to establish higher levels of ambivalence among Latinos than the rest of the population to further the idea of Latinos being pulled toward both parties. This chapter proposes two hypotheses for explaining Latino immigrant partisanship.

Chapter 2 tests the proposition that Latinos behave as an issue-public focused on immigration. In this chapter many different specifications are explored in order to thoroughly explore the effect that the issue of immigration has on partisanship. The importance of immigration as a national or Latino issue is tested as a predictor of partisanship using the LNS 2006. Latino Policy Coalition 2006 data is used to explore how partisan issue competence is related to partisanship. The latter part of the chapter looks at the effects of a naturally occurring experiment in mid 2006, where the importance of partisanship increased greatly among the Latino as well as the general population. The LNS2006 was in the field between November 2005

and August 2006, providing a test of whether the immigration issue could be primed among Latinos. The chapter shows that immigration can affect partisanship in some, but not most situations. The chapter also finds that the extent to which a person identifies as a Latino affects immigration policy preferences, thus suggesting yet another role for identities. These relevant socio-political identities are the focus of Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 proposes two different identities that are relevant to Latino immigrant political behavior. The first important one is that of Latino panethnicity. That is, how much people think of themselves as Hispanics or Latinos. While this idea of a shared ethnicity among such a diverse set of groups has been explored in some research, in Chapter 3 I explore Latino Identity using the Latino National Survey 2006 (LNS 2006, Fraga et al. 2006) and show that the scale created to measure this construct is reliable and composed of two subscales, one that measures Latino commonality or solidarity, and another one that measures strength of Latino identity. The second part of the chapter explores the important religious variables that are expected to play a role on partisanship: religiosity and identity as a Born Again Christian or Charismatic Catholic. The final part of this chapter makes use of a natural experiment captured by LNS 2006 and evaluates how contextual effects can change how these identities are reported among Latinos.

Chapter 4 is the core analysis of this dissertation. The LNS2006 is used to test the major hypotheses. It first explains the theoretical model in extensive detail. Then it focuses on the operationalization of the individual components of the theory. After exploring how these variables are described, I show how predictors of partisanship depend on the length of residence in the US of the individual. Multivariate models are used to explore whether the theory is capable of explaining simultaneous pull towards both parties. While the results show that identities matter, Latino identity plays a much more important role in Latino partisanship than do religious identities. Furthermore, political socialization and an individual's view of political parties are both crucial in helping Latinos link their group identities to parties. The empirical results support the theory and suggest the need to explore how context-based variables might interact with social identities and political attitudes.

Chapter 5 tests the theory developed throughout this dissertation against claims that Latino partisanship is very much political and driven by issue preferences. In this chapter, the effect of identities on issue positions is shown to be important and consistent across issue areas. The latter part of this chapter shows how identities affect partisanship both directly and indirectly

with the use of a mediational model. It concludes by showing that the effect of Latino identity on partisanship is both mediated (slightly through issue preferences) and moderated (through the socialization and understanding of political parties) and that these relationships can be affected by changes in the salience of identities.

The last chapter offers conclusions and possible future explorations of the theory developed here. It also seeks to understand why the theory presented here does not work empirically with Cuban immigrants and propose the necessary steps to make the theory more generalizable to other immigrant groups and democracies.

Chapter 1
Origins of Latino Partisanship:
Issue and Group Identity-Based Explanations

Recent evaluations of the claim that immigrants and specially Latinos are “up for grabs” when it comes to party affiliation find that Democrats continue to enjoy a stronghold on these groups and that Republicans continue to alienate the Latino vote. Why then are these arguments present in political commentary? The main reason is that Latinos (and many immigrant groups) are socially conservative and religious. Social conservatism has long been a stronghold for Republicans; this conservatism should be able to push Latinos away from the Democrats and toward the Republican Party. In this logic, Latinos can either choose to align with a party based on many different considerations, such as minority status, social status, ethnic identity, or positions on social and moral issues. In this chapter I show argue that there are two competing proposals for Latinos’ partisan allegiance, one based on considerations of immigration, and one based on a panethnic Latino identity.

Parties play a prominent role in American politics and as Latinos continue to increase in their size and political importance it is important to understand the conduits through which they acquire a political partisanship. This chapter lays out the framework from which the main theory of this dissertation is drawn. The next sections explore political socialization, Latino politics, establishing why the study of Latinos immigrants is informative for broader theories of partisanship. The final section of this chapter explains the main theoretical contribution of this dissertation, a model of Latino partisanship which focuses on group identities.

Most of the research on political behavior supports the idea that parties matter and that partisanship is crucial to politics (Kinder 2006; Stokes 1999). Since *The American Voter* (Campbell et al.1960) introduced the idea of a psychological attachment to a political party many have tried to explain where partisanship comes from (Jennings & Niemi 1981; Niemi & Jennings 1968, 1991; Sears 2003), how it changes (Achen 1975; Fiorina 1981), how it serves as a heuristic (Conover & Feldman 1982; Lau & Redlawsk 2001) that affects information processing (Cohen 2003; Rahn 1993), and how it can change the way people construe their own attitudes (Carsey & Layman 2006). Partisanship has many important implications for politics and political behavior; thus, understanding where it comes from is essential to our understanding of political behavior.

In this dissertation, partisanship is constructed as a semi-continues scale where people can identify as strongly Democratic, to purely independent, to a strongly Republican. While partisanship can be modeled as a series of steps (Fiorina 1981, Hajnal & Lee 2010, 2011), seeing partisanship as a continuum allows researchers to look at how Latinos are pulled from one extreme, through a middle non-partisan point to the other political extreme.

The Puzzle of Latino Partisanship

De Leal and colleagues would argue that the statements about the opportunities for Republican gains among Latinos are at best wishful thinking, and at worse gross misrepresentations of reality. Yet the question remains as to what underlies the Democratic advantage among Latinos. Latinos do not conform in their issue positions to the normal left-right dichotomy present in American political life. Interestingly, when asked about their ideology, more Latinos identify as conservative (22.9%) than as liberal (12.7%) or “middle of the road” (16.9%). However, it is important to note that a large majority of respondents chose neither of these terms 16.5% state they do not know how they would consider themselves in ideological terms, while 31% state that they do not think of themselves in those terms.

One of the largest surveys on Latinos to date was the Latino National Survey (LNS 2006), conducted by Fraga and his colleagues. This survey was conducted on 8634 self-identified Latinos or Hispanics, over half of these did not perceive any differences between the term Hispanic or Latino. Furthermore, 66% of the sample was born abroad; this over represents the foreign-born Latino population in the United States, yet allows researchers to explore the great diversity among Latinos in this country. While 66% of Latinos in the sample trace their roots to Mexico, there are over 19 countries represented by respondents. A common characteristic among Latinos involves their religious background.

Latinos are quite involved in religion, 71.3% of those surveyed by the LNS 2006 are Catholic; another 16% identify with some sort of Christian tradition and only about 6% do not identify with any religious tradition. More interesting is the finding that 42.5% of respondents say they are members of some born-again tradition. This will be explored more in chapter 3, but the growing numbers of Catholics engaging in the *Charismatic* movements, along with over half of the sample stating they attend church at least once week, suggests that religion and religiosity are important aspects of Latino life. If Christian values play a relevant role on political decision-

making, Latinos should be pulled toward the Republican party, cross-pressuring them towards both parties.

Table 1.1 Attitudes about political issues .in Latino National Survey 2006 (Percent)					
Issue	Agree		Disagree		Number of observations
People are entitled to equal rights regardless of political opinions	87.8		6.2		8120
People who don't get ahead should blame themselves and not the system	67.8		24.9		7999
Spending policies: The government ...	Oppose 11.9		Support 79.3		7972
...should provide income to those who need it	11.8		75.9		3754
... should provide income support for those to try but can't adequately provide*	8.3		82.4		7833
...needs to intervene to improve health care	7.1		83.4		4256
...should fund public education for school equality*					
Social/moral policies: Gay couples should be allowed to:*	Legally Marry 18.2		Civil Unions 7.3		No legal recognition 34.4 2588
Abortion should be: *	Legal in		Only life-saving, rape, incest		Illegal in all cases 20.3 3735
	All cases 11.9	Most cases 9	47.9		
Immigration views: Undocumented Immigrants should pay higher tuition at state colleges and universities	Oppose 78		Support 14.5		7976
Immigrants...	Strengthen the US 90.8		Are a burden to the US 9.2		8634
Preferred policy on undocumented immigrants:	Close borders 4.9		Guest worker programs 43.4		Immediate Legalization 42.0 7796

* These questions were asked to only asked to half of the sample.
The percentages do not add up to 100% because don't knows and refusals are not shown.

Among African Americans, religiosity does not seem to reduce Democratic partisanship, but as argued above, Latinos face a different reality than do Black Americans. Latinos are

socially conservative and fiscally liberal with middle of the road ideological preferences. Table 1.1 presents the frequencies for ideological questions asked to Latinos in the LNS 2006. It is clear why some students of Latino partisan identification hypothesize that the possible gains that the Republican Party may have on immigrants and Latinos are far from being consummated³. Latinos are socially conservative (at least on religious matters), they are liberal on spending policy issues, and without doubt, very welcoming of immigrants. In fact, contrasting with statements about complete Democratic dominance among Latinos, Latinos are more ambivalent than is the general population. This suggests Latinos are pulled towards both parties and pushed away from both more than the average American, suggesting there is no clear cut affinity toward Democratic Party despite the levels of identification.⁴

Origins of Party Identification

The main theory that attempts to explain how partisan attachments are created is based on the socialization hypothesis (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Niemi & Jennings 1968; Sears 1975). An alternative argues that partisanship is a rational choice taken by individuals based on both prospective and retrospective evaluations of parties and their experience with them (Downs 1957; Achen 2002; Fiorina 1981; Gerber & Green 1998)⁵. Both currents wish to predict partisanship among the electorate and do so based on the idea that there is some form of socialization that takes place somewhat beyond the control of the individual, creating a baseline from which partisanship begins to be formed.

³ Another important feature necessary to contemplate in the study partisanship and political behavior is that of the mass media and political campaigns (Fraga N.D.; Iyengar & Simon 2001; Kinder & Iyengar 1989). Campaigns, as well as news media (Kinder & Iyengar 1989), leaders, or social networks (Mutz 2004) may solidify previous beliefs, establish new group identifications, or create issues that drive voters to prefer a political option over another. Latinos are often spoken of as a homogenous pan-ethnic group and mentioned when talk about immigration reform is present. Yet it is less clear how these portrayals inform Latinos about which party they should identify with or which issues or group-considerations should drive political behavior.

⁴ I use the ANES 2008 and include education and campaign interest to test whether or not Latinos are more ambivalent – feelings of both positivity and negativity toward the parties – than the rest of the ANES sample. Appendix 1.A Table 1.2 presents the results for an OLS regression using the ambivalence scale developed by Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen (2011).

⁵ Downs 1957 presented a rational choice utilitarian account of how people choose their party and decide their vote in terms of their self interest and that continually respond to pressures in the political environment.

⁶ There is also a growing research program exploring how political beliefs are transmitted through instruction, socialization experience and genetic material, see Kinder 2006 for a brief review.

The socialization school focuses on the determinants of a long-standing psychological attachment to a given party. The main role is carried out by the family as well as the social context in which an individual is brought up. Partisan agreement between parents – present in over half of the sample of the 1992 NES – leads to high levels of offspring partisan consistency⁷ (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). The amount of political involvement and engagement of the household has a strong effect on the transmission of partisan preferences (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Parental and household influences on political preferences of young voters are viewed as crucial for political socialization. In fact, the socialization literature had at one time emphasized the role of pre-adult socialization to such an extent that in a review piece, Johnston states that: “Using the logic of immunization, if no stimulus comes from the family of origin (Converse & Dupeux 1966, Converse 1969)⁸ or from the system at large in the critical early adult years (Converse 1969), the likeliest outcome for the individual is no party identification at all, or only a weak one” (2006, p. 331). This is clearly an extreme outcome based on the predictions of the theories of political immunization, yet it emphasizes the importance of the role played by pre-adult socialization processes.

A more modern view of the generational transmission of partisanship shows that even though parental effects continue to be significant, they do decline over time (Achen 2002; Jennings & Niemi 1991). Even proponents of socialization find that individuals’ political attitudes also affect their party identification (Niemi & Jennings 1991). It is hard to predict the effect that parental attitudes and partisanship have on their offspring’s future political attitudes from Niemi and Jennings 1991; nonetheless, with a conservative test, they find that parental partisanship continues to be related to their children’s even more than twenty years after the initial survey. Lewis-Beck and his colleagues also point out that “the initial socialization imprint” (p. 143) might help explain why some people identify with a party at one wave of the Youth-parental socialization panel (1965-1997) then change and ultimately revert back to their initial preference.

The revisionist view (cited above already) , proposes that citizens – with enough interest and cognitive abilities – will choose to align with the party that more closely resembles the

⁷ Less is known about single-parent households from the analyses carried out by the authors of the American Voter revisited using the 1992 NES.

⁸ As cited by Johnston (2006).

citizen's preferences and views; these can be driven by ideology, issues, or retrospective evaluations of government performance. This camp sees partisanship as a more rational attachment that functions as a running tally. When people encounter new information, they adjust their evaluation of the target according to the value and novelty of the data. This is the model adopted by Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner (1991) in attempting to explain how immigrants form their party attachments.

While these two conceptions have often been portrayed as antagonistic this is not necessarily true (Lavine et al. 2009). Among hybrid theories, Sears and Valentino's political crystallization theories (1997, 1998) appear as a plausible mix between both currents. They argue that political predispositions exist in pre-adult individuals and that because of the low relevance and importance of politics to these individuals these predispositions are unstable. They argue that "true attitudes" are only achieved if individuals' predispositions are crystallized through political events that create the necessary amounts of information to make predispositions relevant and important (1998, 130-131). This allows a role for parental socialization, political communications, and the environment in determine political preferences. This conceptualization is a better starting point for studying the emergence of partisanship among Latinos.

One of the major shortcomings of all currents of thought about partisanship is that all are somewhat ambiguous as to what are the factors that create, or socialize partisanship. Even beyond the quite demanding threshold proposed by revisionist model, these models fail to inform us about where the initial feelings and attitudes toward the parties come from and how their impact is determined. Revisionists also accept that partisanship has some degree of heritability (Achen 2002; Fiorina 1981). It is passed from parents to children through socialization (and possibly genetic) processes. The relative importance of this parental influence is greatest for younger voters, the same set of individuals with less interest and less likely to participate (Achen 2002, Niemi & Jennings 1991). While immigrants are not necessarily young they do resemble young American voters in that their partisanship appears to be more in flux than older voters (Converse 1974), they are less knowledgeable about politics, and are less engaged in it. Since immigrants do not experience parental socialization into the US political party system, the role of other factors that help establish psychological attachments to the parties becomes more relevant. It is important to explore how existing theories of socialization explain the process through which partisanship is acquired.

Existing models of partisanship acquisition are largely unable to predict where initial political preferences would come from without effective socialization early in the life of a homopoliticus, such as with the immigrant case. While cultural and even political attitudes may transfer back and forth between home and host countries (Jimenez 2009), especially with the rise in transnationalism among Latino immigrants, ideas about American political parties and feelings towards them are much less likely to be influenced from the home country. Even with a complex understanding of parties, institutions, and ideologies, knowledge about the social definitions and partisanship will not be of much use given the differences not only in party platforms, but also in ideological dimensions and orientations across countries (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan & ShROUT 2007; Zechmeister 2005; also see cross cultural psychological work by S.H. Schwartz). Furthermore, given the correlates between political knowledge, participation, education, and migration found across many countries, it is more likely that immigrants are not highly knowledgeable about their own country's system, political debates, or party ideologies, much less so about the American scene (see however Finifter & Finifter 1989).

A common response to the question of what would happen to people that are not effectively socialized when young is that they would be "apolitical." (Johnston 2006; see also Nicholson et al. 2006). Some research has argued that most immigrants are "a-political." That means that they are unengaged, unknowledgeable, and uninterested in politics⁹. Similar research has also shown that second and third generations are more involved in politics than are earlier generations; arguing that political behavior is learned and only comes after people are socialized into the political environment (e.g. DeSipio 1996; Leal 2002). Other research however has shown that immigrants do in fact become involved in politics through non-voting participation (Leal 2002 see also De la Garza, Falcón & Garcia 1996).

In fact, partisanship is less of a political activity and more of a psychological phenomenon. Thus Latinos are capable of identifying, that is, feeling a psychological attachment to a particular party even if they are unable to vote. Time of socialization in an immigrant's home country seems to affect the extent to which they identify with parties in their host country (Wong 2000; White et al. 2008). Partisanship also increases with political experience. The longer Latinos are in this country, the more they identify with a political party (Wong 2000; Cain,

⁹ This observation in fact would show why Cain and his colleagues' model does not appear to be the best for explaining immigrant partisanship. See Leal (2002) footnote 17.

Kiewiet & Uhlaner 1991). Interestingly, even among immigrants with little time in this country, there is evidence of partisanship. It is mostly Democratic (Gimpel & Kaufman 2001), but there appear to be glimpses of hope for Republicanism beyond their Cuban strongholds (but see de la Garza & Cortina 2007). Clearly not all Latinos are Democrats. Even among non-Cuban Latino immigrants, identification with the Democratic Party is not near 100%. How then are social and political identities acquired and why do some immigrants choose to align or not with the dominant party of the group?

Recent research has focused on the importance of ethnic and partisan group identities in political decisions and find that both matter (e.g. Barreto 2007; DeFrancesco Soto 2007). I seek to understand how the links between immigrants, identities, and parties are established without parental influence in order to help enrich the theory of partisanship formation among Latinos. Using immigrants thus provides a fertile ground to test theories of partisanship that are able to detect what ideological, issue, identity, or group-based factors are most important in determining how these attachments to the different parties are formed and evolve.

Issues and Partisanship

Issues are central to partisanship according to the revisionist view, as well as to spatial and utilitarian models of voting and party identification (Downs 1957). Latinos have often been construed to be single-issue voting blocks, or at least issue-driven when it comes to party preferences (Nicholson et al. 2006). While this dissertation does not claim a direct link between issues and partisanship; the role played by issues merits discussion because of scholarly evidence that issues are important in understanding Latino partisanship (Alvarez & Garcia Bedolla 2003; Nicholson, Pantoja & Segura 2006).

In the psychological literature, attitudes are generally construed to be stable across time, yet we know this is not always the case (Ledgerwood & Chaiken 2007; Wilson & Hodges 1992). Attitudes can be influenced by persuasive messages, interpersonal and group contexts, and reference points (Carsey & Layman 2006; Feldman & Zaller 1992; Jacoby 2000; Ledgerwood & Chaiken 2007). The psychological literature has developed theories that match attitudes to both underlying psychological traits as well as to individual level motivations (Bizer et al. 2004; Katz 1960; Lavine & Snyder 2000). However, less is known about the political attitudes of immigrant populations. If surveys only measure those attitudes and issues that are relevant to the general

American public we may be missing the real driving force behind not only vote choices but also partisanship (Hajnal & Lee 2010) and the process through which it is created. Parties generally do not position themselves according to one or two issues, but rather must be able to provide potential voters with some type of position on a variable number of issues. When arriving at a new country, immigrants may not have a packaging of issues in mind that conforms to the standard in the new country (Left-Democrats, Right- Republicans), making a broad issue-based partisanship explanation less plausible. This revisionist view of partisanship, argues that individuals (somewhat) consciously choose the party they identify with based on the policy positions, issue agenda, and retrospective evaluations of each of the parties (see Nicholson & Segura 2005).

Cain et al. (1991) propose party stances on discrimination and foreign policy proposals¹⁰ are a driving force for party identification among immigrants. They argue that immigrants with anti-communist backgrounds as well as those feeling discriminated as minorities are able to link their experience to a particular party and thus align accordingly. Interestingly, they do not test whether immigrants are aware of the discrimination-Republican or communist-Democrat links assumed by their hypotheses.

Nicholson et al. (2006) also present the Latino public as driven by issues, interested (and knowledgeable) on Gun control, abortion and school vouchers. They study issue voting among Latinos based on the premise that Latinos as interested in 3 major areas of policy, which might be quite true for their sample (Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 2000 survey focusing mostly on urban centers), but does not seem to fit the overall conventional wisdom of Latino voters. Nicholson and his colleagues attribute their choice of the three issues, gun control, abortion, and school vouchers, to being “regularly identified as among Latinos most important issues” (p.261), citing a book chapter from Nicholson and Segura in Segura and Bowler’s (2005) “Diversity in Democracy” as their source for this claim. Meticulous reading of the chapter cited however fails to find support for their statement. In fact, on page 58 the authors of the chapter state: “Using the frequency of responses across the three states, we identified the *nine* most frequency mentioned issues. [...] The issues [...] are: *Economy, Jobs, Education, Crime, Drugs, Social Security,*

¹⁰ While attempting to extrapolate beyond Latinos, Cain and his colleagues propose that foreign affairs with respect to the immigrant’s home country should have an important effect on partisan choice. While this hypothesis seems plausible, it appears to only work for migrants from communist regimes (China, Cuba, Vietnam, etc.).

Immigration, Race, and Affirmative action” (Nicholson & Segura, 2005, p. 58). There is no data about the frequency of responses regarding the importance of issues. With such a large number of available issues, it would seem that narrowing it down to one or two major issues and ignoring others, such as the issue of immigration is mostly arbitrary.

In exploring Latino partisanship, Alvarez and García Bedolla (2003) incorporate a large number of social, political, and demographic variables. They find abortion, affirmative action, government-funded health insurance, gun control, school vouchers, tax cuts, and domestic spending to be significant for at least one of the levels of their multinomial model (pp. 39-40). Immigration positions and budget deficit are not significant in their model. One problem with existing findings of Latinos as basing their partisanship on issues is that when asked about which party can do a better job at handling a wide range of issues Latino respondents (both immigrants and further generations) choose neither party between one fourth and one third of the time; furthermore, they choose Democrats over the Republicans by almost a two to one margin, with over a 10% margin (Latino Policy Coalition survey 2006; Leal et al. 2008). This seems to be the case with all of the issues as reported by different survey efforts (Leal et al. 2008, Nicholson & Segura 2005).

Nicholson, Pantoja and Segura (2006) find that issue positions are important for individuals high in political knowledge and can even have a significant effect on vote choice when controlling for Partisanship. However it is possible that those with a higher understanding of politics may be more likely to justify their political choices (Goren 2000, Sniderman, Brady and Tetlock 1991). That is, they are better able to realize the connection between specific issue positions and the political alternatives. Research in political psychology has shown that individuals might be able to deduct their reported issue preferences based on their political choices. This suggests that it is possible that political preferences are the cause and not the consequence of issue preferences among highly knowledgeable and sophisticated voters.

Abrajano also studies issues and presidential evaluations among the Latino public and finds that symbolic politics are more important than issues in Latino voting (2005). The main distinction between her work and that of Nicholson and his colleagues is the way knowledge is defined. Regardless of the definition of knowledge, a much simpler way to conceptualize issue-based voting and partisanship amongst Latinos might be to focus on a single, highly symbolic issue, rather than a set of issues that might cross traditional party lines.

Previous research has established that some individuals might be more inclined to support one or another major party if there is a clear partisan divide on an issue. If Latinos in general care about a small set of issues, there could be tremendous political consequences for shifts in party positions on these issues as the voting Latino population continues to grow. In fact, Alvarez and García Bedolla (2003) state that: “unless the parties fundamentally change their issue positions, these Latinos’ identifications with those parties should remain fairly stable” (p. 45). This highlights the importance of determining which issues Latinos are more interested in to further the understanding of how Latinos as a group are more likely to attach to a particular party.

Latinos as an Immigration Issue-public

Immigration and Latinos go hand-in-hand. In fact, when thinking about immigration policy, most Americans think of Latinos (Branton, Dillingham, Dunaway & Miller 2007; Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong 1997; Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2009). A recent New York Times story explored the political use of immigration in campaigns by Republicans. The story focused on Tennessee, where a resident of Fremon was quoted saying: “ ‘We’re just getting too many Hispanic people in town,” said Gerry Boller, 78, who works at the counter at New Beginnings Thrift Store on Main Avenue. “It seems like they come in and take over”” (Sulzberger 2010, A16). This inconspicuous substitution of the word: “illegal immigrant” by the word “Hispanic” is but one example of how interconnected illegal immigration and Latinos are in the political sphere. Furthermore, since immigration affects education, economic, and social areas, it is possible that the issue of immigration affects other policy domains.

Attitudes on immigration do not fit either a social or economic liberal-conservative dimension (Feldman & Johnston 2009), another interpretation of the role of immigration is that Latinos use this third dimension of issue space to guide their political behavior as it is able to resolve the ambivalence created by Latinos’ conservative social and liberal economic views. The belief that Latinos are an issue-public concerned with immigration appears to be a very valid understanding of Latino politics as it is an issue area that cuts orthogonally against the two main issue areas in American politics.

Latinos from different origins and immigration statuses appear to join forces and coalesce when immigration becomes salient. Challenges to tough immigration laws such as AZ 1070 argue that these policies discriminate against Latinos as a whole and do not really focus on

illegal immigration, which also come non-Latin American countries. When nation-wide marches were organized to advocate for immigration reform, Latin American flag colors could be seen all around. Research has also shown that anti-immigrant bills in California had a significant effect over time on Latino partisanship (Bowler, Nicholson & Segura 2006). Nonetheless it is uncertain whether or not Latinos are solely driven by this unifying issue.

Sometimes, even the same political commentators and journalists seem to be undecided about the importance of immigration considerations. In 2004, Mercedes Olivera from the Dallas Morning News put it very directly: “When political candidates want to appear sensitive to Latino issues, more than likely they talk about immigration. Here's a news flash: Not all Latinos are immigrants, and immigration is not their top concern” (2004). However, in speaking about the drivers for the Latino vote in the 2008 election, the same journalist stated that: “there is no difference of opinion as to what will be Latinos' strongest motivator in making their decision: immigration” (2008). This is exactly the problem with the understanding of Latino politics. Immigration plays an important role in Latino politics only when it plays an important role; when it doesn't, the consensus is that other issues drive the Latino vote (obviously).

Both research and journalism often show that Latinos are not only concerned with immigration but rather share the same concerns as most Americans (Aizenman 2009; Gimpel & Kaufmann 2001; Nicholson & Segura 2005; Olivera 2004). In a 2009 Washington Post article, Aizenman used the Pew Hispanic poll to state: “Only 31 percent of Latinos surveyed cited immigration as an "extremely important" priority for the government, ranking the issue behind not only the economy but also education, health care, national security and the environment” (Aizenman, “Economy, not immigration, a top worry of Latinos”, 2009). This however does not mean that immigration is unimportant, but rather that Latinos are also interested in other issues.

Scholarly works are also not immune to this lack of consensus. While there is often an assumption that Latinos are most concerned about issues of immigration there is little empirical work exploring whether Latino are driven by immigration related policies in their political behavior, and even less on partisanship (Nicholson & Segura 2005).

Bowler, Nicholson and Segura (2006) find that immigration-related propositions in California have an effect on Latino partisanship. They show that individual props are not very important in changing macro partisanship among Latinos, but that the additive effect of the three propositions (187, 209, and 227) is highly significant for Latinos in California. Bowler and his

colleagues argue that this is evidence of issue-based appeals by parties and that immigration-related issues are inherently racially-charged. Bowler, Nicholson and Segura identify specific California propositions as “earthquakes” which are capable of shaking the foundations of partisanship amongst Latinos. They show that the cumulative effect of the propositions on Latino partisanship in California increased the probability of Democratic identification while decreasing the probability of identifying as Republican.¹¹ Their results do not really tell us why all Latinos should care about these immigration propositions or why Latinos should choose the Democratic Party as a sign of disapproval.¹²

Some papers assume that immigration issues matter the most for Latinos without much rationale behind it. Branton (2007) looks at how assimilation affects Latinos’ issues attitudes and states that the research on Latino public opinion focuses mostly on the realm of immigration-related issues (p. 294). Sanchez (2006) also asserts that immigration and bilingual education are more salient to the Latino community than would be other areas such as abortion or the death penalty. He also argues that these are policy areas where Latinos diverge the most from the rest of the US population (p. 436). These assertions of issue importance are crucial to understanding Latino political behavior, yet seem to run against other papers explicitly looking at issue voting and partisanship (Alvarez & Garcia Bedolla 2003; Nicholson & Segura 2005).

The lack of agreement for this process of Latino partisan identification does not mean it is incorrect, but that it merits a thorough investigation as well as the development of an alternative explanation. While it is possible that issues, political knowledge and experience with parties drive partisanship, a utilitarian issue-based approach requires voters to know much about politics and about the individual parties, or at least to have some sort of experience (either direct or by proxy, Cain et al. 1991) with the relevant parties. If the idea of a tightly knit group is correct, issue-importance and partisanship among Latino immigrants should move in unison (see however Abrajano & Alvarez 2010 chapters 1 and 2), and immigration should be at the center of

¹¹ The change for the predicted probability of identifying as Democratic was from .38 to .63. While the effect on Republican identification was a decrease from .34 to .12.

¹² It is important to acknowledge that Bowler and his colleagues do state that anti-immigrant policies alienate Latinos and that because Republicans endorsed these policies, the link between Republicanism and anti-Latino/immigrant sentiment was cognitively drawn, see also Lupia (1994) for an explanation of how peripheral political information and cognitive shortcuts provides systematic-like behavior among voters.

issue considerations. This is the focus of the first empirical chapter. Chapter 2 explores the many ways in which the policy issue of immigration might affect Latino partisanship.

Issues can also play the role of eliciting specific group feelings, I propose that group identities are a major player in Latino political partisanship. During the 2000 campaign, Bush appealed to evangelicals by using hymn phrases in his messages. He also attempted to appeal to Latinos by showing his knowledge and decent use of Spanish. However, he did not attempt to elicit an identity that would tip the balance in favor of the Republican Party. In 2008, Olivera argued that when choosing between McCain and Obama, Latinos would use immigration predominantly in their voting calculations. She however argued that McCain's support for comprehensive immigration would not play as important a role in Latino voting decisions as much as "Obama's personal story as the son of immigrants" (Olivera 2008). Her assertion provides a segway into the next section that proposes social groups as the bases for partisan identification among Latinos.

Social Identity Explanations:

An alternative way to look at how Latinos identify with a political party allows individuals to rely less on knowledge about party's stances on specific issues and to rely more on their social groups. This less cognitively demanding process which seems a very plausible explanation for how most immigrants come to identify with their party of choice also includes room for heterogeneity among the diverse Latino immigrant population. While it is clear that Latinos as a group are quite distinct in their backgrounds, values, and political preferences, the growing sense of Latino panethnicity seems like a perfect group that can translate individual preferences to group partisanship. This approach of party identification requires citizens to possess knowledge of the social meanings of parties, and the social identities associated with them. In essence, once social identities are attached to partisan labels, individuals will be able to determine when and which party to feel closer to.

The authors of the American Voter Revisited (Lewis-Beck, et al. 2008) argue that social groups can affect the political behavior of individuals because of the group's issue positions which lead to issue-based links between the groups and candidates. However, issues should more likely be linked to parties rather than individual candidates. Since candidates change from election to election, these group loyalties are seen most clearly in the case of group-party links.

In exploring issue-voting and political conceptualization, Lewis-Beck and his colleagues define people who look at political phenomena from a group-outcome perspective as “ideological by proxy” (pp. 267-268). “[People] in the second-highest level of conceptualization are similar to [ideologues and near ideologues] in that they employ a particular evaluative standard when they think about political parties and candidates” (p. 267). They proceed to argue that these voters look at politics from a group-based point of view. Furthermore, these people appear to be particularly receptive to group-leaders and framing effects. However, there is currently no consensus as to how these identities are created, maintained, and ultimately affect politics.

Social identity theory argues that individuals define their in-group and out-group and from then on prefer their in-group and its characteristics over the out-group (Tajfel & Turner 1979). The simplest application of the theory would suggest that once an immigrant finds his place in the society and begins to identify with a social group, they would be socialized by different aspects of the group, including political preferences as well as values. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) argue that for people in the 2nd category of political concept formation are very likely to have a direct link between their identity and their understanding of politics. Nicholson et al. in fact study what they believe are the important issues for the Latino public. Yet my suspicion – as noted above – is that their study is based more on the convenience of those issues than on the likelihood that Latinos are homogenous in their views about the importance of issues. Clearly people differ on what is important to them in their daily life and weigh issues differently; extrapolating to all members of a group based on non-representative data is a dangerous route to studying the socialization of immigrants (McClain et al. 2009, Lee 2008). Group membership and identity is not always “a factual manner” as the authors of the *American Voter Revisited* state (p. 307). They are defined by the individual and may appear “incorrect” even among clear groups. A working-class person may be promoted to a managerial position and still consider him or herself as working class. The effect of the psychological link an individual has to a given group on their partisan attachments is the process studied in this project.

The *American Voter Revisited* (chapters 11 and 12) explores the relationship between groups and political life. Early on, the authors create a distinction between groups that are inherently political and those that are indirectly linked to politics but that might have a political effect (secondary). This distinction is helpful because some of these groups do not initially seem relevant to politics and yet have significant predictive effects on the vote (Lewis-Beck et al.

2009, Lee 2008). Green and his coauthors also argue that for groups to have a direct effect on politics they must be clearly linked to the political parties associated with them. This is the link that makes these political groups important to politics within the American political landscape.

Which groups are important for politics? This natural question is tackled directly by the *American Voter Revisited*. Politicized groups are definitely important to politics, because they are political in nature (political parties, issue-based advocacy groups, etc.). Other groups are also relevant to political behavior even though there is no obvious link to politics. These groups, they argue, must “have a distinctive political norm,” yet individuals differ in their adherence to the group and “in following the group norm” (p. 307).

In exploring social, economic, and group conditions, Lewis-Beck and colleagues argue that the reason why some of these variables aren’t always relevant to politics is that a) they are subsumed by group-party links and b) the groups aren’t well defined and there is not clear link between them and politics, “they don’t see the political connection” (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 344). To put it clearer I quote an example in the *American Voter Revisited*: “a skilled laborer may identify as working class but not see how a Democratic vote might decrease his or her chances of escaping unemployment” (p. 344). However, if well defined groups aren’t tangibly linked to politics, the effect that they might have is minuscule. Furthermore, the capacity of an identity to lead either partisanship or the vote depends on there being clear differences between the available political alternatives.

The *American Voter Revisited* explores the “distinctiveness” – the difference in vote patterns between in and out-group members – of different groups.¹³ The group most closely related to the focus of this dissertation is Hispanics.¹⁴ They find that Hispanics are distinctive to non-Hispanics by about 12 points (percent democratic vote) in 2000 and 18 points in the 2004 presidential election. However, one of the concerns the authors have is directly relevant to my hypotheses as they control for what they call “life situations.” These variables might also describe political behavior if the groups have a coherent way of voting, such as the elderly. When using multiple regression to control for these life situations, they find a small decrease in Hispanics’ distinctiveness in the 2000 election but a sizeable increase in 2004 (from 18 to 22

¹³ The five groups they study are unions, Catholics, Jews, Blacks, Hispanics, and Women.

¹⁴ Although it is highly plausible that Jews are also immigrants and face very strong identity conflicts (Democratic tradition while support of Republicans on Israel).

points). However, when looking at strength of identification (high or low identifiers), Lewis-Beck et al. show that Hispanics' distinctiveness score would drop to 7 points for the 2000 election, furthermore, Catholics (a large majority of Latinos identify as Catholics too) who are high identifiers show a slight preference for the Republican party. Even though these findings are directly related to the vote and not partisanship, it is clear that the effects of an ethnic or any group identity on political behavior are not always constant.

The update to the American Voter explores the effect that group cohesiveness – defined as the percent of identifiers within the group that are strong (as opposed to weak) identifiers – can have on political behavior (pp. 313-314). Their data shows that group cohesiveness is not a good predictor of group electoral distinctiveness. There is however a problem in this interpretation as it relies on aggregating individual answers to identification questions, and not necessarily gets at the group composition. Furthermore, Barreto & Pedraza (2009) show that the small number and unrepresentativeness of Latino respondents in the 2000 and 2004 ANES as well as other previous studies of group cohesiveness have grossly underestimated the extent to which Latinos are cohesive. A corollary which is also developed from chapter 11 of the American Voter Revisited is that strong group identifiers may also be able to recognize group opinion leaders and go with their group's leaderships and thus be more cohesive ideologically and more likely to identify non-ethnic groups as salient identities.

Latino immigrants in the United States have a multitude of possible identities (Fraga et al. 2010); they can be Christian, atheists, software entrepreneurs or factory workers, educated, rich, poor, and come from any of over a dozen Latin American countries. Latinos identify with these groups to a varying extent and while some groups tend to be more solid in their voting the individual identifies with the labels to a varying extent even though most of these are a matter of fact (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 307). Latinos do however share common ethnic heritage with as well as a similar language. And Latino panethnicity has been proposed as a term that encompasses a multitude of sociodemographic characteristic (Jones-Correa & Leal 1996). Immigrants might find themselves in a position where there are several relevant groups. However, not all groups are equally important at a given point in time as the relevance of these identities seems to be highly context dependent (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009), which suggests some identities might become relevant if the right conditions are present in the political environment.

The accessibility of these identities will drive their connections to politics but only if a cognitive link between the relevant group and a party's relationship to that group exists.

The Multiple Social Identities of Latinos

Even though ethnicity it is most often studied as the driving force of immigrant groups' political behavior, ethnicity is not always relevant. Paula McClain and her coauthors (2009) show that ethnic-based sentiments and in-group favoritism is not constant across different income levels (also see Gay, 2004). Race-based identities continue to be important, but only if no other group identity becomes more politically salient to the individual. Latinos are expected to vote as Latinos while Born Again Christians are expected to vote as Born Again. Clearly these two groups are not mutually exclusive and thus could produce overlap for individuals.

Social networks play an important role on how immigrants self-categorize politically (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009). In fact, it seems most plausible that once an immigrant is able to define his in-group (one of the first steps as described by Lee's 2008 identity-to-politics process), this in-group then socializes him or her into parties. Furthermore, the authors of the American Voter Revisited also argue that groups that are seen as polarized – such as rich and poor or working class and business people – may be most relevant to politics if there is also a clear distinction in how partisan platforms and reputations directly relate to this conflict (p. 338) (see also Hajnal & Lee 2010, 2011). All of this can be based on how ideologically homogenous the group is, which would related to how cohesive it is.

Building upon Green et al. (2002), I argue that immigrants do not have strong schemas organizing parties and partisans and do not have a clear picture of the group-based definitions accorded to each party. These social definitions of partisanship thus are acquired through direct and indirect experiences that help create partisan schemas (Conover & Feldman 1984) that might in turn be reinforced by feelings of commonality and solidarity among Latinos (Garcia 2003, 2010). Cain et al. (1991) explore the relationship between experiences with party and partisanship in immigrants using a rational model of party attachment. However, they do not directly model the effect of different experiences and rather infer that belonging to a minority and being discriminated as one is the driving force. While this is a plausible determinant of partisanship, it does not provide an explanation for why Latino immigrants might be “up for grabs” politically speaking. Given the historical record of the Democratic Party since the end of

Jim Crowe politics, if minority status is the only salient identity, Republicans would not have any opportunity of appealing to immigrants.¹⁵ This in fact is what Lee (2004) finds among Asians; those reporter higher levels of linked fate are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. Furthermore, for people who are not clearly categorized as minorities (Anglos, Northern Europeans, and very light skinned South Americans) the process through which they socialize remains out of the scope of the authors' theory. Interestingly, while not originally proposed, they find that Latinos who identified as union members were more likely to identify as democrats than those who didn't. While this is a logical relationship, it nevertheless lends more confidence to the idea that only relevant identities should drive partisan identification.

One of the questions that remain from this review of the group-based determinants of partisanship is why one identity, say ethnicity, should be more important than religion. While the environment helps immigrants learn which identities are relevant, campaigns, opinion leaders, and political communication can also play an important role. Given the high frequency of church attendance among Latinos, it is feasible to see how messages received within their religious communities might impact the importance that identities or issues have on their political preferences.

In fact, issues might also be tightly related to specific social groups. As stated above, different groups are linked to different issues ex. discrimination to minority status and gay marriage to Christian conservatives. Latinos are the poster child for issues of immigration. From ethnically-based profiling to reform promises helping Harry Reid receive Latino support, Latinos are constantly associated with Immigration issues. Even if incorporating a large set of issues might be complicated for voters, there is evidence that groups can become "issue-publics" and rely on one issue to guide their partisanship and other political behavior. While issues are important to Latinos, their effect might be most obvious in eliciting feelings of group cohesiveness and not necessarily on partisanship.

Nonetheless, the preceding evidence has suggested it is important to derive a theory that precedes partisanship-tinged responses to issue positions and attitudinal preferences (see Carsey & Layman 2006; Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009). In order to do so, it is necessary to show

¹⁵ Although some immigrants are clearly not categorized as minorities (Anglo-speaking immigrants, and probably western and northern Europeans), it is important to generate a theoretical account for why they would prefer one party over another.

that identities matter, that different identities are related to parties in varying manners, and that these identities help create attachments toward the parties.

Latinos are mostly Democratic, yet they do not look like other cohesive groups of Democrats (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Partisanship is not a fixed predetermination but rather a mix of allegiances, identity, and evaluations (Campbell et al. 1960; Carsey & Layman 2006; Fiorina, Green & Gerber 2002; Green Palmquist & Shickler 2001; Lewis Beck et al. 2008) As such, one of the main reasons for people identifying with a party is based on other types of group identification (Huddy 2001; Lee 2008; Lewis Beck et al. 2008). One of the major questions that students of Latino politics attempt to resolve is whether or not Latinos as a whole identify as a group and if this group has a close link to politics (Barreto & Pedraza 2009; Beltrán 2010; Fraga et al. 2010; García 2003; Jones-Correa & Leal 1996). The extent to which Latino group identification affects voting and partisanship behavior is still uncertain (Beltrán 2010).

The descriptive statistics shown above present a somewhat vexing picture of Latino politics which suggests that there may be more than one important social group at play among Latinos in pushing them towards each party. Because individuals hold a large number of group identities at any given point and these identities can change in their salience, it is possible to further a theory that explains why, despite high levels of social conservativeness, Latinos (with the exception of Cubans) are consistently Democratic. The political literature on Latinos seems to show that Latinos are consistently Democratic (Gimpell & Kauffman 2001; De la Garza & Cortina 2007). What hasn't been established is the link between Latino identity and the Democratic Party. The American Voter revisited shows that, the more a group identifies with a political party, the more the identity of the group is tied to that of the party. While seemingly tautological, this argument does make sense if we think of reinforcing mechanisms. That is, although little is done at any given time to bring in Latinos to the Democratic Party ranks, enough is done so that there are small changes in overall partisanship even despite G.W. Bush's efforts to attract Latinos to his Party (De la Garza & Cortina).

Since Republicans are the most vocal at pushing anti-immigrant politics; they might signal a willingness to alienate Latinos in order to further their own electoral prospects. If Republicans are willing to use anti-immigration rhetoric and policy positions to motivate their political base they might in fact be pushing the Hispanic vote away from themselves even when Democrats do not seem to stand up for Latinos (Barreto 2010). This logic seems to fit given the

findings by Bowler and his colleagues (2006), who find that no single proposition or election leads to stronger Democratic ties, but rather the accumulation of these events.

Latino Identity: a Panethnic Group Approach

The concept of Latino panethnicity has been studied for several decades (Espiritu 1992; García 2003, 2010; Jones-Correa & Leal 1996, Lopez & Espiritu 1990). It is somewhat of a super identity that spans across the different nationalities subsumed within the Latino label. Ethnic identification has consistently been found to increase mobilization in Asians and Latinos, both groups with very high levels of internal heterogeneity (DeFrancesco Soto & Merolla 2006; Junn & Masuoka 2008; Shaw et al. 2000). However, less is known about how Latino Identity affects partisanship. Barreto and Pedraza (2009) find that increases in identifying as a Latino or Hispanic does not have a direct effect on partisanship when modeled as a multinomial logit. They however find that latter generations of Latinos are more likely to translate their Latino identity into Democratic partisanship. This effect is not found when comparing identifying as an independent to Republican identification (table 4, p603, 2009). They however use a single measure of Latino identification (reported strength of identity) and do not fully explore other important parts of ethnic and social identity (c.f. Fraga et al. 2010, García 2004, Huddy 2001; McClain et al 2009).

The research on ethnic identity among Latinos has found contradictory evidence on the role played by this pan-ethnic identity. On one hand: Alvez-Rodriguez and Segura state: “Can a pan-ethnic identity serve as a political resource for Latinos to the same degree that racial identity and solidarity do for African-Americans? For now, we [think] the answer is no.” (p. 383, 2006). Similarly, Beltrán states: “I am uninterested in [...] imposing yet another meta-narrative, one based on the dubious presumption that Latinos are a political demographic with shared interests and a common policy agenda.” (p. 9, 2010). But on the other hand, Barreto and Pedraza state: “A strong sense of ethnic identity generates [...] a much more cohesive political group” (p. 604, 2009). Further stating: “Data from the LNS demonstrate the Latinos maintain a higher degree of Democratic partisanship across generation because of the effect of ethnic identity.”¹⁶

Panethnic identity has nonetheless emerged as a strong predictor of political behavior and preferences among Latinos (García 2003, 2010; Sanchez 2006). In fact, in a similar vein to

¹⁶ This is Shown in Barreto and Pedraza (2009) Figure 2 (p. 604)

studies of linked fate among African Americans (Dawson 1994) it is possible that as Latinos come to see themselves as members of an important group, they are more likely to think about furthering the group's power as a whole. In fact, García argues that this identity is both individually and socially constructed, and that as a social construction, it provides Latinos with a distinct role in American politics and helps the creation of a large group (also see Marquez 2007). In his 2003 book Garcia argues that commonality among Latinos plays a pivotal role in Latino collective action and political power. Espíritu (1992) also proposes that a panethnic label helps gel the diverse Hispanic population and provides them with more institutional leverage. Less has been established regarding panethnic identity and partisanship when considering other important identities such as religion or social conservatism.

Religious Identity among Latinos

While researchers have often argued that immigrants, specifically Latinos (?) are cross-pressured by their attitude structure – socially conservative and economically liberal, there is little evidence that supports this claim (Leal, Nuño, Lee & de la Garza 2008; Segura & Bowler 2006). Despite the lack of importance of moral issues when compared to economic and other social ones for Latinos (see Barreto et al. 2002, Segura et al. 2006), these issues might matter as an identity building force. The theory developed here argues that it is not the issue positions of individuals, or even the perceptions of which party is better able to handle a given issue that matters for partisan identification, but rather the positively valenced association between an issue area, its group identity, and a political party.

In their study of how social groups affect political identification, Barreto and Pedraza find a strong relationship between identification as a Catholic and Democratic partisanship. Identifying as a Catholic may be construed as an identity with political relevance. Religious identities have played a prominent role in the study of changes in partisanship in the American electorate (Layman 2001). Barreto and Pedraza's study however ignored two important variables that play an important role in religion and politics, Born Again or Evangelical identification and Religiosity (Pantoja 2010). Pantoja in fact shows that religiosity is a much better predictor of Republicanism and support for conservative policies among Latinos than is identification as a born again. To focus on denomination and the distinction between born-again Christians and Catholics is similar to the standard practices in the politics of religion; nevertheless, it would

show some degree of cluelessness about Latino identity if we only focused on protestant identification as “Born-again” or “new covenant” groups.

Charismatic Catholicism has experienced a great increase in Latin America and Latino communities in the US. In fact, it shares many of the conservative and identity bases of Pentecostalism and Born-Again identification. Stoll states: “One increasingly visible phenomena disrupting the Catholic-Protestant distinction is the Catholic charismatic movement” (p. 9, 1993). In fact, the LNS 2006 does not ask a separate question for Born Again Christians. Among Catholics, 37.53% answer affirmatively to this question. This finding is puzzling given the general work on religion and politics (Pantoja 2010), nevertheless, the question wording fits very well with the social identity explanation I present and with the research that argues categorizations might not be as important as religiosity, a more intense sense of belonging, is to political behavior. In fact Pantoja’s findings suggest that both identifying as Born-Again and religiosity have a strong effect on partisanship. It seems that both variables might be tapping into an identity variable that is important to Republican identification among Latinos.

Furthermore, the Catholic Church has often taken important political stances and these may be best received through a membership that is active and engaged in the non-political group. While Catholicism has traditionally been linked to Democratic behavior, this is less true now than it was fifty years ago (Lewis-Beck et al 2008). In fact, during the 2004 election, the Catholic Bishop’s stated that voting for Kerry was to be considered a sin. In 2010, the Catholic Bishops of New York issued a statement urging Catholic citizens to carefully consider their vote choice, however, make a clear statement about which issues should be most determining of voters’ choices:¹⁷

“But as the U.S. Bishops’ most recent document Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship (www.faithfulcitizenship.org) makes clear, not every issue is of equal moral gravity. The inalienable right to life of every innocent human person outweighs other concerns where Catholics may use prudential judgment, such as how best to meet the needs of the poor or to increase access to health care for all.”
(http://www.nyscatholic.org/pages/news/show_newsDetails.asp?id=523)

This statement provides support for the hypothesis that identities are activated through political communications and reflect issues on which a party enjoys a clear comparative advantage over the other one. Issue areas such as minority-support, welfare, foreign policy,

¹⁷ The Full statement can be found in Appendix 1.B.

abortion, and gays rights might have clearer partisan tones. These issues are expected to be activated by and in turn activate a group identity (religious, Central American, conservative, Chinese, poor, etc.). The activation of these identities and the affective tags associated with parties will modify respondents' feelings of attachment toward the available parties.

According to the results from the LNS 2006, more Latinos thought of themselves as conservatives then either middle of the road or liberal¹⁸. This raises the possibility that if immigrants are able to make a connection between their "conservative" identity and the Republican Party, the GOP might be able to make affective gains among these immigrants. On similar lines, most Latinos consider themselves religious to a certain extent, and socially conservative. If the political rhetoric is able to elicit group-identities such as "Christian, church going, anti-abortion, traditional, anti-gay" then the group identity can also lead to increased affinity for the Republican party. Thus we have not only competing identities but also explanations as to why Latinos overwhelmingly identify as Democrats when they share so many characteristics with Republicans.

This important relationship between issues, identities and partisanship is clearly not a direct one (see Huddy 2001; Lee 2008). In this dissertation I propose that group identities are linked to parties, yet the link between the social group and the political one (party identity) is not a direct one but rather must be interpreted by the individual depending on his or her knowledge of political parties, social groups, and political socialization. Chapter 3 explores the major social identities for Latinos: panethnic identity, and religious identity and operationally defines them.

¹⁸ While thinking of unidimensional ideology might be an over-simplification of ideology, it is nonetheless a widely-used and stable construct that gauges respondent's political ideology on broad terms.

Chapter 2

Latino Partisanship: All About Immigration?

While waiting in the local laundromat, I overheard some people speaking in Spanish. They were talking about some issues that they were interested in: what part of their country (Honduras) they liked and missed the most, whether the Mexican lady still worked at the food shop, whether they should change jobs, and about last weekend's soccer game. My nonscientific convenience one-shot sample of Honduran interests curiously reflects the interests of many Latinos in the United States. They never talked about immigration or how they could or couldn't be affected by changes in it. Yet immigration seems to be an issue that unifies Latinos, who come from many different backgrounds.

With about 40% of Latinos in the United States born in a foreign country it is easy to see why Latino politics is consistently linked to immigration politics. Latinos are the poster child for the immigration debate as Latinos are oft evoked in connection with legal or illegal immigration. Latinos as a whole also are highly sensitive to matters related to immigration reform. Politicians like Harry Reid seem able to secure the Latino vote by promising to put the Dream Act up for a congressional vote. Marches in the spring of 2006 unified millions of immigrants and Latinos in an effort to push for comprehensive immigration reform. However, there have been very few attempts to systematically explore the effect of immigration on partisanship and other attitudes.

In this chapter I seek to establish whether the issue of immigration affects Latino partisanship. The first part of the chapter focuses on the importance of the issue of immigration. I then turn my attention to issue competence, that is, the perception of which party is better than the other at handling the issue of immigration. The next step is to look at preferences on immigration policies and partisanship. The last section in the chapter uses a natural experiment to test whether the immigration issue can be primed among Latinos.

Salience of Immigration

If Latinos' issue concerns focus mostly around immigration, immigration-based appeals from Bush and to a lesser extent McCain might have been able to persuade some Latinos to feel more favorable toward the Republican Party. If the issue concerns of Latinos, however, resemble

those of the general public, then it becomes important to reconsider the conceptualization of Latinos as an issue-public.


It is important to note that issue salience is very dynamic, even for issue-publics. Campaigns and external shocks make some issues more salient than others, and political candidates and parties attempt to push the electoral agenda that is most favorable for their cause. Thus it is likely that even for Latinos issues will vary in their importance and intensity over time. Nonetheless, surveys find that immigration issues consistently rank high in importance among Latinos, but also that there are other issues which matter for Latinos (Leal et al. 2008; Nicholson & Segura 2005).

In the midst of the 2007-2009 recession, Aizenman cited a Pew poll that showed that most Latinos thought that the economy was the most important issue (2008). He also pointed out that immigration ranked 5th on a list of six possible issues asked during the December 2007 poll; immigration was chosen as very important by 38% of respondents. This shows that that Latinos care about several issues, which vary in their importance depending on the context of the survey.

Latino politics become most relevant when there are public events that highlight the role of that group. For example, when immigration debate or reform occurs, an interest on Latino politics should be activated. I use a simple method to show how this might be true. In searching for news using *news.google.com* archive, one can see that stories that have the terms: Latino and immigration naturally spike during times of immigration-related turmoil. Figure 2.1 shows the results from a googlenews timeline using those search terms between 1990 and 2010.¹⁹ The spikes in the frequency graphs closely mirror 3 major events relevant to immigration and Latinos: California proposition 187 in 1994, the nation-wide marches on May 1st 2006, and most recently, Arizona's law SB1070. In fact, Bowler et al (2006) study the effects of California propositions 187, 209 and 227, for which surveys were taken in Oct, 1994; Oct-Nov, 1996, and May 1998. This could help explain the large spike in news coverage on Latino and immigration issues that occurred late in 1996 seen in figure 2.1.

¹⁹ While a more updated timeline was sought, "googlenews timeline" became unavailable in early 2011.

Figure 2.1 Relative Frequency Timeline for *Google News* Search: “Latino” and “Immigration” (January 1990- July 2010)



Source: Googlenews timeline. Archived timeline search for terms: “latino immigration” Accessed July 1, 2010 on news.google.com

While the coverage in news (figure 2.1), is clearly fueled by the increased importance of immigration issues, it seems less likely that all surveys that show immigration as an important issue are driven completely by these events. In fact, surveys conducted exclusively with Latinos in 1996, 2002, 2004 (low salience years), and 2006, show that immigration is at least the 4th most important issue for them.

Figure 2.2 shows that the most important issue across all surveys was on average the economy. However, right after the 2004 election we see a very large spike in the number of mentions for Iraq and War as the most important issue facing the country. The line tracking the number of mentions for foreign policy and terrorism also peaks right after the attacks on the WTC on September 11, 2001 (2002 survey). Interestingly, the percentage of respondents choosing immigration (or illegal immigration) as the most important problem facing the country follows first a downward trend which peaks at around 20% in the 2006 Pew Hispanic poll.

Figure 2.2. Percent of Mentions for "Most Important Issue" Amongst Latinos





Figure 2.3 Percent Mentions for "Most Important Issue" (Nationally Representative).



In order to understand the dynamics of these lines it is important to refer back to the temporal context in which these surveys were answered. The first was asked during 1996, when immigration was not a salient national concern. The percentage of Latinos choosing immigration

as the most important issue, it ranks 3rd and is closely followed by mentions of race and discrimination. The next survey was taken just after the attacks on the twin towers. The Latino public reacts as expected, focusing on issues that are more trying to the nation than immigration. Interestingly, the next years present an increase in the importance of immigration for Latinos. The last survey was taken in 2006. On May 1st, 2006 millions of Latinos and immigrants marched across different cities in the United States in favor of immigration reform. Immigration, in this context is the second most important issue in the minds of Latinos. Interestingly, the Iraq war seems most important in Latino minds, relegating the economy to a third place.

These figures show that the Latino public is responsive to the major issues that affect the nation and but also that immigrant issues consistently rank among the top 3 issues²⁰. In order to see whether Latinos are systematically different than the general population, I look at other surveys asked during the same timeframe to a nationally representative sample of Americans. Figure 2.3 presents the frequencies of mentions for the top 8 issues mentioned by Americans asked the question “What is the most important problem/issue facing the country?”

While figure 2.3 is clearly different than figure 2.2, the trends of the major issues roughly track in the same manner that they did for Latinos. Foreign affairs and the Iraq war trump the Economy and welfare issues after 2001. Interestingly, immigration shows up as a major issue in 2001 and 2004, but then disappears off the chart until March 2006, this is when the immigration reform once again lead the Bush agenda, and in the dawn of the idea of massive marches around the country. In fact, in May of that year, immigration issues become the 4th most important for the American population. However, this fourth place only captures 5% of the population surveyed. Throughout the following year immigration continued to be one of the top 5 issues mentioned, yet never surpassed the 5% threshold. This paints a picture of a general public that is concerned mostly with economic and war issues for the timeframe shown. The general public also recognizes the importance of immigration issues, yet does not choose immigration over the major ones even in times of great political activism on the subject.

Although the evidence shows that Latinos may not rank the issue of immigration as the top national concern, they may feel that immigration is an issue that related to their community. The Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al.) includes a question that asks respondents to state

²⁰ This contradicts what Nicholson and his colleagues have argued (2005, 2008)

the “most important problem facing the Latino or Hispanic (depending on the respondent’s initial preference) community.”

Table 2.1 shows that the importance of issues changes dramatically once Latinos focus on their community. Illegal immigration jumps from 10.5% to 29.49%, the top issue for this ethnic group. The Iraq war is no longer perceived as the most important problem. The economy also drops in importance, from 14.15 to 6.73%. However, unemployment, education and race relations are all seen as more serious problems for the Latino community than for the nation. (Also Nicholson et al 2006). The difference in choices between national and community-level issues seems to show that when thinking about their own community and group Latinos have different priorities. The percentages shown in table 2.1 emphasize that when asked to think about their community, Latinos think more about immigration than any other issue. This provides more evidence for the belief that the issue of immigration is at the core of Latinos’ political concerns.

Table 2.1. Most Important Problem Facing the Country and the Latino Community.		
	The Country	The Latino Community
Iraq War	32.22%	1.59%
The Economy	14.15%	6.73%
Illegal Immigration	10.50%	29.49%
Unemployment	4.37%	12.15%
Education	2.90%	9.86%
Race relations	2.47%	4.57%
Something else	18.72%	17.36%
(N= 8634)		
Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al. 2006).		

Issue Importance and Partisanship

I explore the importance of issues on partisanship using the most recently available (and largest) data set, the Latino National Survey 2006. I model partisanship as a 7 point scale ranging

from strongly Democrat (-1) to pure independent (0) to strong Republican (1).²¹ Table 2.2 relates the importance of issues to party identification while holding demographic control variables constant.

Most Important Issue Facing the Nation						
The economy	-0.201** (0.091)					-0.370*** (0.105)
Immigration		0.483*** (0.111)				0.235* (0.123)
Jobs			-0.020 (0.153)			-0.218 (0.161)
Education				-0.232 (0.167)		-0.416** (0.175)
Iraq War					-0.272*** (0.068)	-0.377*** (0.084)
Crime						-0.107 (0.250)
Foreign Policy						0.243 (0.202)
Racial relations						-0.617*** (0.218)
Demographic variables						
Age	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Income	0.049*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.0452*** (0.016)	0.047*** (0.016)
Ideology	0.242*** (0.016)	0.241*** (0.016)	0.243*** (0.016)	0.243*** (0.016)	0.243*** (0.016)	0.240*** (0.016)
Female	-0.192*** (0.065)	-0.209*** (0.065)	-0.194*** (0.065)	-0.189*** (0.065)	-0.194*** (0.065)	-0.187*** (0.065)
Constant	-0.372** (0.150)	-0.454*** (0.149)	-0.399*** (0.150)	-0.403*** (0.149)	-0.303** (0.151)	-0.207 (0.159)
Observations	3,554	3,554	3,554	3,554	3,554	3,554
R-squared	0.070	0.073	0.068	0.069	0.072	0.082

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Partisanship is a 7- point scale coded from -1 (strong Democrat) to 1 (Strong Republican)

²¹ I also modeled partisanship as a trichotomous model using an ordered logistical regression and found that perceiving jobs, crime, education, war, foreign policy, but not the economy or immigration as the most important problems facing the nation were significant in predicting partisanship.

Choosing immigration as the most important problem facing the country has a significant, but unexpected effect. It pulls Latinos away from the Democratic Party and closer to the Republicans. This effect is still significant, although less so and weaker, when all other issues are included. This could be due to one of two factors. The first is that Latinos might be aware of Bush's immigration positions. Because of the pro-reform efforts of the Bush presidency, Latinos might feel closer to the Republican Party.

The second explanation is less optimistic for the Republican Party and speaks to the nature of the interest in this issue when asked with this specific wording. Because the question asks about the "most important problem" it is possible that those who choose this option are those that might in fact be opposed to immigration, in fact 4.9% of Latinos in this survey state that efforts should be made to seal or close the border and stop illegal immigration. This is a tiny percentage of those who say immigration is the most important problem (10.5%). A closer look at this explanation with a simple correlation of those respondents who choose immigration as the most important problem with a question asking about the preferred approach to immigration ($r = -0.0495$) tells us that this second explanation is not very plausible.

While the immigration coefficient is positive and significant, other issues are more statistically significant and have a stronger effect on partisanship. Even so, this evidence counters the assumption that Latinos are driven to the Democratic Party because of their interest in immigration. It also provides some credence for the argument that G.W. Bush's Latino and immigrant friendly campaigns were only able to reap marginal earnings for the Republican Party. Overall, the important message here is that when compared to other important issues, immigration does not drive Latinos toward the Democratic Party.

In order to further explore the effect of issue importance, I now use the issues named as most important for the Latino community to predict partisanship. Maybe partisanship is better predicted by issues which directly relate to their sense of Latino identity and less to national considerations of abstract concepts. Table 2.3 shows the result for an OLS estimation which mimics the previous one, except this time the independent variables for issue importance are the answers to the question: "...important problem facing the Latino/Hispanic community?"

The results from these regressions provide even more puzzles. The importance of immigration for the Latino community has no significant effect on Latino partisanship. This is so

even though immigration was the top issue cited by Latinos facing their community. It does not matter whether the issue is used alone or with controls for all issues.

Table 2.3 OLS Estimation of Party Identification by Most Important Issue Facing the Latino/Hispanic Community

Most Important Issue Facing the Latino Community:						
The economy	0.005 (0.121)					-0.075 (0.132)
Immigration		0.096 (0.072)				-0.014 (0.087)
Jobs			0.055 (0.100)			-0.032 (0.112)
Education				-0.279*** (0.096)		-0.324*** (0.108)
Iraq War						0.063 (0.257)
Racial relations					-0.227* (0.125)	-0.291** (0.135)
Crime						-0.144 (0.263)
Foreign Policy						-0.865 (0.613)
<u>Demographic variables</u>						
Age	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Income	0.049*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.045*** (0.016)	0.058*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.016)	0.059*** (0.016)
Ideology	0.243*** (0.016)	0.243*** (0.016)	0.243*** (0.016)	0.242*** (0.016)	0.244*** (0.016)	0.242*** (0.016)
Female	-0.194*** (0.065)	-0.196*** (0.065)	-0.194*** (0.065)	-0.198*** (0.065)	-0.196*** (0.065)	-0.202*** (0.065)
Constant	-0.401*** (0.149)	-0.436*** (0.152)	-0.409*** (0.150)	-0.404*** (0.149)	-0.369** (0.150)	-0.351** (0.159)
Observations	3,554	3,554	3,554	3,554	3,554	3,554
R-squared	0.068	0.069	0.068	0.070	0.069	0.072

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Partisanship is a 7- point scale coded from -1 (strong Democrat) to 1 (Strong Republican)

Overall, the results are not more informative than using the more nationwide definition of issues, the R-squared for each column in the table is smaller than the similar models run using the question about the most important problem facing the country. When looking at the full

model (last column), all the demographic variables continue to be significant and only the issues of education and racial relations have a significant effect on partisanship.²² Most of the issues chosen as important to the Latino community do not seem to correlate with partisanship preferences. This provides some credence to the possibility that respondents perceived this second question as a “something else” follow up question to the one about the most important problem for the country. This might also provide some insight into understanding why when interviewed, Latinos choose immigration more often than the general population and how choosing immigration does not necessarily have political implications. These analyses fail to provide support for the idea that Latinos are Democrats because of their idiosyncratic issue preferences.


Issue Competence and Partisanship

The previous exploration has shown that issue importance does not provide a consistent way to explain the foundations of partisanship. Perceiving immigration as the most important national problem leads Latinos to be more Republican, yet when asked about their community, the salience of this same issue has no significant effect on partisanship. Moreover, another problem is that the direction of issue and party preferences on each issue is unaccounted for. This means that while some of those who perceive unemployment as the most important problem might think the Democrats have a better solution than the Republicans, others might perceive both parties as equally competent. The available data set also asks respondents to choose which political party they perceive as better able to solve the problem mentioned as the most important.

Understanding the perceptions of competence on diverse issues is important to be able to better understand how partisan preferences are formed among Latinos (Nicholson & Segura 2005). As has been shown in the political behavior and public opinion literature, issue ownership plays an important role not only in partisanship, but also in party realignment (Carmines & Stimson 1989; Petrocik 1996). Learning more about how Latinos and immigrants perceive parties to be able to handle different areas of public policy will help us learn about why issue preferences should lead to long-term stable partisan attachments.

²² I manually recoded the variable for racial relations as a problem for the Latino community to include mentions coded as “other” which had the words ‘racism’ and ‘discrimination’ in the open ended responses (n=213)

The Latino National Survey asks this question only for the top issue named. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 present the percentages of perceived issue competence for the six most important problems facing the nation and the five most important for Latino community respectively. The results show that respondents overwhelmingly perceive parties as equally (in) competent at solving the problem. The results show a large degree of skepticism about political parties. The modal category for any given issue is that “neither” party is better able to handle the specific issue. It is also clear that among those choosing one of the two parties as more competent in handling an issue, the Democratic Party is always preferred over the Republican one, even on the Iraq War.



Interestingly, the gap between party issue competences is smallest for respondents who chose immigration as the most important problem for the country as a whole (Republicans 11.58% and Democrats 19.63%). Not even the Iraq war has such a close margin, despite Republicans being perceived at better handling issues of national security than Democrats in general.²³ This further supports the possibility that Latinos in fact were aware of Bush's

²³ It is however important to remember that support for the Bush led invasion of Iraq continued to decrease throughout the time when the Latino National Survey was in the field.

approach to immigration reform. While the average Democratic advantage across issues is around 12%, the gap is 16% on average for the six most important issues. The gaps between the parties are largest among respondents choosing the economy (19.31%), unemployment (19.10%), education (20.4%), and racial relations (16.9%) as the most important problem facing the country. In general, Latinos perceive Democrats at better solving everything.




Figure 2.5 presents a bleaker picture for Republican gains among Latinos. When looking at the top five issues mentioned as the most important problems for the Latino community (which account for 65% of the total responses), the average advantage for the Democratic Party is 21.6%, larger than for national issues. Interestingly, the gap between parties for solving the illegal immigration problem is once again the smallest (14.5%). It is important to keep in mind that this could be due to a diverse set of people choosing this issue, such as those who strongly oppose illegal immigration as well as those whose family has been separated due to migration. Since Republicans have taken much stronger stances on closing down borders, someone who perceives immigration to be a problem may recognize Republicans have a more forceful solution to solving the problem of immigration. It could also be that Bush's pro-immigration stances resonated strongly with the Latino community. This makes responses to the question about party

competence less biased in the Democratic direction. When looking at the distribution of partisanship among those who choose illegal immigration as the most important problem facing the Latino community is very similar to that of the sample the previous explanation seems less plausible. Democrats account for 35.73% of the sample, and 32.8% of those who select illegal immigration as the most important problem (Republicans are 11.23% and 10.45% respectively while Independents are 16.62% and of the sample and 17.4% of those mentioning illegal immigration).

These findings raise the question of whether issue competence is driving partisanship or if issue competence is a mere reflection of party preferences. In order to be sure that issues affect partisanship, we need to determine that there is no reciprocal causality.

Testing for Endogeneity

The Latino National Survey 2006 is not useful for such test because not all respondents were asked about all issues. Luckily, another available dataset, the 2006 pre-election Latino Policy Coalition survey²⁴ includes a battery of questions asking all respondents such questions.

I focus on the issue seen as most important for the Latino Community: immigration. The reciprocal relationships between immigration competence and party identification are specified as follows:

$$Party\ ID = \beta_0 + \beta_{1\ 2}immigration\ issue\ competence + \gamma_{2\ 7}gender + \gamma_{2\ 8}Catholicism + \gamma_{1\ 3}Income + \gamma_{1\ 4}Age + \varepsilon$$

$$Party\ immigration\ issues\ competence = \beta_0 + \beta_{2\ 1}Party\ ID + \gamma_{1\ 5}percieved\ purpose\ of\ immigration\ plan + \beta_{1\ 6}Spanish\ TV\ viewing + \gamma_{2\ 3}Income + \gamma_{2\ 4}Age + \varepsilon$$

The results for the 3SLS estimation are shown in table 2.4.^{25 26}. Both pairs of instruments are significant and have direct effects on their independent variable. However, when looking at

²⁴ Unfortunately, this survey did not include respondents who were ineligible to vote (non-citizens) or who did not express a more than 50/50 chance they would vote in the 2006 general election.

²⁵ Because both equations are overidentified, it is possible to conduct tests to evaluate the instruments used. The individual Sargan tests show that in both models the variables are properly excluded (p=.46 in the Party ID model and p=.94 for the Immigration model)

²⁶ Because of the strong relationship between both independent variables estimated, it is possible to argue that the instruments themselves aren't theoretically useful. However, statistical tests show that the instruments are relevant and properly excluded. While this does not in itself theoretically justify their use, it allows for proper estimation.

the endogenous regressors, we see that in both equations the endogenous regressors are significant and in the correct direction. This means that the equation isn't properly specified because the instruments aren't only affecting the independent variable of their individual equation. Rather, they are both affecting the other variable through the endogenous regressor. As such, both variables are found to statistically cause each other, further supporting the reciprocal causation argument.

Table 2.4. Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Perceived Party Competence on the Issue of Immigration and Party Identification (Latino National Coalition 2006).

	Immigration party Competence	Party ID
Party ID	0.150 (0.069) **	
Perceived Purpose Of immigration Policy	0.134 (0.048) ***	
Spanish TV Viewership	-0.030 (0.016) *	
Immigration Party Competence		1.307 (0.623) **
Female		-0.467 (0.197) **
Catholicism		-0.786 (0.243) ***
Education	-0.010 (0.026)	0.128 (0.068) *
Income	0.028(0.020)	0.064 (0.057)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.006)
Constant	-0.458 (0.173) ***	2.011 (0.490)***
Observations	337	337
R-squared	0.304	0.325

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The most important lesson from table 2.4 is that there is no statistical one-way causation, from party competence on immigration to party identification. The argument that Latinos prefer the Democratic Party because they perceive them to be better at handling immigration issues is flawed, because it is equally likely that Latinos prefer the Democratic Party on immigration

issues because they are Democrats. One cannot deny that both attitudinal variables affect each other.²⁷

Policy Preferences and Partisanship:

The previous results have painted an inconclusive picture of whether the salience of immigration or party competence on this issue shapes Latino party identification. In this section I turn to Latinos' preferences on immigration policy (2006 Latino National Coalition pre-election survey). I estimate party ID as a function of policy preferences on immigration. The variable offers a choice between "Make illegal immigrant workers felons and send back" and "amnesty." The results, shown in table 2.5, indicate that views on immigration policy do not have a significant effect on partisanship.

Table 2.5 Regressions Estimating Effect of Party ID on Immigration Preferences (OLS) and of Immigration Preferences on Party ID (ordered logit).

	Party ID	Immigration position (Baseline = deport all illegals)
Immigration policy preference	0.132 (0.108)	
Perceived purpose of policy	0.340 (0.102)***	0.137 (0.054)**
Female	-0.475 (0.168)***	-0.031 (0.090)
Catholic	-0.441 (0.182)**	-0.162 (0.097)*
Education	0.089 (0.060)	-0.002 (0.032)
Income	0.119 (0.040)***	0.029 (0.021)
Age	0.001 (0.005)	0.005* (0.003)
Spanish tv viewership	-0.066 (0.040)*	-0.027 (0.022)
Partisanship		0.019 (0.021)
Generational Cohort (0,1,2)		0.112 (0.059)*
Constant	1.509 (0.433)***	
Cutoff 1 (guestworkers) (N= 508)		-0.918 (0.233)***
Cutoff 2 (citizens) (N=207)		0.819 (0.232)***
Cutoff 3 (amnesty) (N=102)		1.707 (0.239)***
Observations	648	633
R-squared	0.087	

²⁷ Individual 2SLS estimations produced the same result: partisanship was a significant predictor of issue competence and vice-versa.

On the other hand, the perceived purpose of immigration policy (keeping immigrants out or keeping terrorists out) does have a strong effect on partisanship.²⁸ Note that the two immigration variables are not strongly correlated with each other ($r=0.11$). At the same time, partisanship does not have a significant effect on policy preferences toward illegal immigrants (Table 2.5).²⁹

A Natural Experiment

The previous sections have failed to provide unambiguous support for the proposition that the immigration issue is exogenous to partisanship among Latinos. Earlier figures and tables (figures 2.4 and 2.5, table 2.1) showing the percentages of respondents choosing one issue as the most important demonstrated the variability in issue importance across time. Nonetheless, the spike in the importance of immigration in 2006 presents another interesting opportunity to study the effect of immigration views on partisanship. This heightened importance in immigration might provide a test of issue-priming among Latinos. In particular, the Latino National Survey 2006 provides an unintended natural experiment where the overall importance of immigration is increased for a subset of respondents.


The LNS surveys were conducted between November 17, 2005 and August 4, 2006. The nationwide marches calling for comprehensive immigration reform occurred on May 1st 2006. This coincidence may allow researchers to explore how contextual effects on issue salience might change the impact of these issues on other political variables. Before explaining the models and expectations, it is important to show that the issue of immigration did in fact become more important for a period of time. Figures 2.6a and 2.6b show the percentage of respondents choosing each issue as the most important facing a) the nation and b) the Latino community at three different time intervals of surveying for the LNS 2006.³⁰

²⁸ This variable however, has been shown to be endogenous to partisanship as well as perceived party competence.

²⁹ Generation has an interesting significant effect. Later generations are more likely to support liberal immigration policies than are newer generations. This could be due to the belief that: "if I was able to become a citizen, others should not have an easier path." Crosstabulations of the responses to the question on what their preferred policy position is and generation (0 =immigrants, 1 = parents immigrants, 2 = native born, parents not immigrants), show that the percentage of immigrants that support an amnesty approach is only 6.87 for first generation, 13.19 for second and 11.39 for third generation respondents.

³⁰ These dates were chosen arbitrarily as the importance of immigration gradually increased to reach its highest levels of importance in early May 2006. They however seem to capture the major shifts in importance while

Figures 2.6. Four Most Important Issues Facing a) the Nation and b) the Latino Community for Three Different Survey Periods (LNS 2006, Fraga et. al)



The results support the expectation that the May 2006 marches dramatically increased the importance of immigration among the Latino population.³¹ In order to test whether these marches had effects on other political variables I first analyze how time changes the mean values for several important variables among Latinos surveyed in the three main time periods (before, during, and after). In order to do this I run a series of simple regressions using the time period as predictors in changes in the dependent variables of interest. The results shown in Table 2.6 demonstrate that there is in fact a change in the values of each variable across the created time groups. Furthermore, the result of several of these variables exactly mirrors the expectation, that is, that the second period should be different then the first period but that the third period should not necessarily differ.

Interestingly, the increase in immigration salience among Latinos also matches a large and significant change in preferences on the immigration issue. In fact, there is a 0.2 (out of 1)

keeping a large enough N to conduct the multivariate analyses required to test the hypotheses. N T1= 4037, N T2= 1463, N T3= 3134

³¹ Figure 2.4 also provides some tentative evidence that immigration might have become salient to the general population as well in mid 2006.

switch towards more liberal policies among the population. This means that about one fourth of the population changes their position by one level (from say, 2 to 1) towards a more liberal position. Furthermore, once the period of heightened importance is over, preferences revert back closer to their original point and the variance in responses increases during the third time period. Another interesting finding is that while the other two issues (abortion and welfare) change their survey population means, they do not change as drastically as immigration preferences does.

Table 2.6 Regression and Ordered Logit for Different Dependent Variables, Using Time 1 as a Baseline (before April 25)				Mean values
Dependent Variable (N)	Constant	Time 2 (April 25-June 06)	Time 3 (After June 08)	(T1, T2, T3)
Immigration Preferences (N = 8634)	.8761 *** (.0134)	-.2200 *** (.0259)	.0102 (.0202)	T1= .8761 T2= .6562 T3= .8863
Abortion (N = 4321)	1.8817 *** (.0186)	.0606 † (.0361)	-.1152 *** (.0282)	T1= 1.8817 T2= 1.9423 T3= 1.7665
Welfare (N = 8634)	.7486 *** (.0130)	.0593 * (.0251)	.0311 (.0195)	T1= .7486 T2= .8079 T3= .7797
Interest in Politics (N = 8255)	.4274 *** (.0058)	.0343 *** (.0113)	.0536 *** (.0088)	T1= .4274 T2= .4617 T3= .4809
G.W. Bush Evaluation (N = 7745)	1.9696 *** (.0212)	.0987 * (.0425)	-.0581 † (.0321)	T1= 1.9696 T2= 2.0683 T3= 1.9114
Partisanship (N = 6189)	-.8940 *** (.0352)	-.0167 (.0724)	-.1055 * (.0532)	T1= -.8940 T2= -.9108 T3= -.9996
Standard Errors in parenthesis Statistical significance: † p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005				

A variable that is also increased across both time frames is interest in politics. Here the relationship is quite linear and it is hard to state whether the increase in political interest is due to the marches or to the proximity of the 2006 elections (campaigns taking off and increasing in coverage). Presidential evaluation increases in the second time frame. This might signal that as immigration policy preferences becomes more relevant and increase their mean value, President Bush is rewarded for his pro-immigration reform efforts. It is hard to tell whether or not this is the case. Partisanship does not change in time two but overall shows a trend of become increasingly Democratic (by .1 out of 7) over the course of the survey.

Predictors of Partisanship with Contextual Changes

I now explore the effects that the heightened importance of immigration has on partisanship, which should be a stable variable that reacts weakly to environmental shocks.

The basic hypothesis tested is:

H1. As immigration becomes more important to the Latino public (by % of measures) its role on predicting partisanship will increase.

This expectation is in line with the research showing the effect of issue priming (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Miller & Krosnick 2000). In priming, the increased accessibility of the issue of immigration does not mean that the dependent variable changes, but rather that the effect of the independent variables (immigration policy preferences) on the dependent variable will be affected by the changes in issue salience. The traditional interpretation of environmental priming with increased issue coverage has recently been challenged by Lenz. In his 2009 piece he shows that when an issue becomes more salient, the effect is more akin to that of political learning, and less to assigning more weight to a specific issue. That is, that the increase in importance of one issue makes people more knowledgeable about the issue, and then they align their issue preferences along with those of the party or preferred candidate.

In this priming regression, partisanship is not modeled as a function of the choice of one issue as being most important than all the other options, but rather an increase in the general (environmental) importance of immigration while allowing all other variables to remain independent at the individual level.

In order to explore whether immigration was in fact primed during the period of the highest percentage of respondents choosing immigration as the most important issue (between late April and early June) I model partisanship as a function of the predictors used above (table 2.5) and include an interaction term for immigration preferences at each time point (the first period is the baseline). The second column in Table 2.7 shows that immigration preferences do not predict partisanship in any of the time frames; all the coefficients that include immigration are insignificant. The main predictors continue to be stable and significant: ideology, Catholicism, and Cuban all predict partisanship in the expected direction. Interestingly, neither the time variables alone or the interaction between immigration and the time are significant in predicting partisanship in this restricted model. Table 2.7 shows that the heightened importance of Immigration and Latino Identity do not seem to change the basis of Latino partisanship.

Table 2.7. Issue Priming Due to Environmental Effects, OLS regression. (LNS 2006, Fraga et. al)	
	Robust Regression Partisanship
Immigration preferences	0.092 (.059)
Immigration X Time 2	0.019 (.118)
Immigration X Time 3	-0.028 (.090)
Ideology	0.848 (.076)***
Catholic	-0.309 (.077)***
Cuban	1.414 (.186)***
Border State	-0.163 (.073)*
Time 2 (April 25 to June 6)	0.024 (.139)
Time 3 (After June 6)	-0.018 (.110)
Constant	-0.539 (.324)†
Observations	2853
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis Statistical significance: † p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005	

The results of the empirical explorations using the natural experiment provide evidence that is in line with Lenz’s (2009) findings that increases in the importance of an issue do not necessarily lead to priming, but rather learning and persuasion.

Discussion

This chapter has shown that Latinos in general are highly reactive to the issue of immigration. However, the data shown here also demonstrates that immigration is not the only or even the main issue that matters for Latinos. Latinos and Latinas in 2006 were just as worried about terrorism, a bad economy, and the war in Iraq as other Americans were. The last set of analyses also showed that Latino party identification is not solely driven by immigration concerns, even with environmental shocks that double the mentions of immigration as the most important issue facing both the nation and the Latino community. These findings on the lack of influence of immigration issues on partisanship open up the question of “what does?”

In the spring of 2006, G.W. Bush’s approval increased along with interest in politics. However, even with the increase in the importance of immigration as a political issue, it did not

appear to play a substantial role in predicting partisanship. The theory presented in the following chapters posits that Latinos are torn between both parties and that through group-based identities parties might be able to bring in this seemingly elusive cohort. This dissertation on Latino and immigrant politics explores how identities help inform political decisions, how these identities can be primed, and how a cohesive partisan bloc can emerge from a group of heterogeneous people who share little more than a recent immigrant past, language, and religion.

In the next chapter I propose that Latino identity, a sense of shared panethnicity among people with heritage from Latin America is a salient social and political identity for Latinos. After establishing a measure of Latino Identity and showing how it reacts to changes in the environment (natural experiment), I empirically study whether or not social identities affect partisanship in a more predictable and sustainable way than does the issue of immigration.

Chapter 3

Measuring Latino Group Identity

Marisa Abrajano and Michael Alvarez state that "...the salience of a political identity based on Hispanic ethnicity may remain strong for years to come – and that analyzing the shape of that political identity is a matter of some practical urgency" (2010, p.7). The ease with which people identify with groups and attach a significant meaning to group membership (Tajfel 1970, Tajfel 1981, Tajfel & Turner 1979) suggests that a simple cognitive mechanism, such as group identification is closely related to partisanship, even among newcomers to America. This dissertation focuses on the important role of ethnic identity (Márquez 2007, Sanchez 2006) and how Latinos use a sense of pan-ethnicity to guide their attitudes and party preferences.

While a consensus about what Latino identity means and how it is developed has yet to emerge, the work on ethnic and racial identity and its effect on political behavior has exploded in recent decades (García Bedolla 2003, 2005; see also Beltrán 2010). Benjamin Márquez argues that while institutions and organizations attempt to muster support through identity appeals, it is unclear how these appeals generate or elicit increases in identity among the whole range of Latinos (2007). However, John García argues that because of the institutional combination of similarities among the heterogeneity in Latinos, it IS possible for a panethnic Latino identity to emerge (2003). In his chapter in Espino, Leal and Meier's edited volume, Benjamin Márquez argues that panethnic identity is confounded with transnationalism, however, recent literature has shown that panethnic identity, feelings of Americanism, incorporation, and transnationalism all seem to act independently of each other (Portes, Escobar & Arana 2008). Márquez recognizes the role that attachment to cultural heritages plays in Latinos and their organizations, but is unable to distinctively describe the political effects of this identity. In fact, he concludes his chapter by saying that ethnic identities matter, but that it is yet to be shown how.

In looking at the possibility of the creation of a broader political identity, Fraga et al. (2010) argue that the California immigration ballot initiatives were at least partly responsible for the politization of Latino identity (p. 4). However, while the effects of anti-immigration initiatives on partisanship have been explored by researchers (Bowler et al. 2006), less is known about how immigration-related events have changed macro levels of panethnic identity. Moreover, when looking at the idea of a common Latino culture and monolithic group behavior,

it is important to look at the diversity in Latinos in this country and avoid any broad generalizations (Beltrán 2010, Fraga et al. 2010).

In order to try to define Latino identity it is first necessary to define a concept from which a construct can then be operationalized. While it is possible to look at whether people accept the label of Latino or not to study panethnicity, it is important to re-emphasize that an identity is not necessarily a yes or no membership question but rather one that varies in strength. It is this identity and its varying strength that is central to this research project. The concept of a panethnic identity can be coined in many different ways: Hispanic identity, Latino identity, pan-ethnic consciousness, etc. It is thus important to state what is meant by these terms.

As stated earlier, I use these terms interchangeably. While the different words most likely carry different meanings, for purposes of this research project I choose to define the group identity in as broad a term as possible, reflecting a sense of belonging to a group that spans all Spanish speaking countries in Latin America. In fact, the LNS 2006 seems to find no consistent pattern of identifying as either Latino or Hispanic. Furthermore, 50% of the sample says that either one works for their identification, or that they don't care about which label (Latino or Hispanic) is used.³² The idea of group consciousness is important for an identity to have an effect on political behavior. Group consciousness attempts to go a step further than group membership. Group consciousness and identity thus is introduced be a more precise measure of what people actually mean when talking about their Latino or Hispanic group feelings. Having warned about monolithic assumptions of Hispanics, a scale of Latino identity rather than a dichotomous or nominal variable seems best suited to address the question of how Latino identity and its strength affects the way Latinos feel about political parties.

Operationalization of Latino Identity

While Latino ethnic identity has an effect on political behavior, less is known about what contributes to this construct and how to measure it. There is still no consensus as to the precise way to operationalize ethnic identity for the purpose of politics (Beltrán 2010; García 2010). However, there are several ways one might conceive of how this identity can be construed.

Ethnic identity goes beyond the simple choice of whether or not to check a box that says: "*Hispanic, Latino or Latina.*" In fact, while the development of a pan-ethnic label was important

³² In fact, this trend holds across generation groups, English proficiency, and age.


in the creation of an ethnic identity, ethnic identity is much more nuanced and multi-dimensional than a dichotomous choice (Garcia 1982). The variables established to play an important role on African American's political behavior – ethnic consciousness, linked fate, and perceptions of discrimination (McClain et al. 2009) – have also been used to operationalize Latino identity (Lien 1994, Sanchez 2006). The Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al. 2006) includes several questions that can be directly linked to Latino and ethnic identity.

Before explaining each of these variables it is important to note that, contrary to some assumptions by existing research, I argue and show that panethnic and Latino identities are not mutually exclusive of national or American identities. The non zero-sum idea of Latino and American identities has received more attention in scholarly research in political science recently (see Abrajano & Alvarez 2010, Monsivais 2004, as well as the work by John Garcia and Michael Jones-Correa). In fact, some of these researchers argue that this panethnic identity does not exist outside the context of immigrant America. As such, it is only as immigrants become part of the American polity that they develop a sense of panethnic Latino identity.

Research on national identities that takes into account the social-identity nature of identifying with one's country of origin has found it hard to distinguish what leads Latino immigrants shed their national origin identity in favor of the identity of the host country (Monsivais 2004). While there is a negative correlation between strength of identification with one's country of origin and strength of American identity (pearson's $R = -.046$) in the 2006 LNS, this relationship is extremely small. Figure 1 graphs the average strength of identification as American and with people from a respondent's home country. While the graph shows the average identification as an American among foreign-born Latinos is just above the midpoint of the scale, this identification increases to .84 in second generation Latinos and then drops to .75. More important is the relationship that it has with identifying with one's country of origin. Even among third generation Latinos, strength of identification with one's country of origin is .74 on a 0 to 1 scale.

Furthermore, beyond looking at the effect that generational status has on American and home country identity in a macro sense as presented in Figure 3.1, recent research has used both quantitative and qualitative methods to find that the choice of identifying as with either the US or with their country of origin is not a tradeoff (Fraga et al. 2010). In their chapter 6, the authors find that among foreign-born Latinos time in the US increases the likelihood of choosing an

American identity when forced to choose among other identities. They however also show that most immigrants hold strong home country and host country (United States) feelings and that there is no obvious tradeoff between both identities.



Using the author’s data (LNS 2006) it is possible to map the correlation among different variables aimed at tapping identity among the respondents. The questions that ask about identity provide respondents with four possible answers ordered by strength of identity. The four possible answers are: *Not at all*, *Not very strongly*, *Somewhat strongly*, and *Very strongly* as available responses. A polychoric correlation analysis – the proper method for ordinal variables – among three identities, American, Panethnic (Hispanic/Latino), and country of origin (national heritage) shows that the relationship between American and Panethnic identity is in fact positive, but not very substantial. The results for this correlation are shown in Table 3.1.

While American and Panethnic identity aren’t strongly correlated, their relationship is positive. This is also true when looking at identification as an American and with one’s country of origin. Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show that the relationship between both variables is not very strong and that they are not mutually exclusive. There is however a negative relationship between these two variables, this suggests that American identity is the identity least related to the other two.

	American Identity	Latino/Hispanic Identity	National Heritage/ Country of origin ID
American Identity	1		
Panethnic Identity	.11	1	
National heritage/ Country of origin	-.07	.52	1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al. 2006)

Using this correlation as a starting point to the development of a measure of panethnic identity I now explore the individual components of the scale. The first item I use to build up the scale of the construct of Latino identity is composed of a variable measuring the strength of Latino identity. This variable is constructed using respondents' answers to the question of how they would like to be identified in panethnic terms (either Hispanic or Latino). The question reads "how strongly or not do you think of yourself as Hispanic/Latino." Interestingly, 87% of those interviewed responded *Somewhat* or *Very strongly* to this question. While the very high percentage of strong Latino identifiers might be surprising, it makes sense given that those who chose to participate in this survey had already identified as Latinos during the screening questions of the survey. Furthermore, by asking questions related to ethnicity earlier in the survey, this identity might have been primed in many of the respondents. Discussion of this possible mechanism will be continued in the concluding chapter of this project, it is however important to keep in mind these proportions and the possible causes when looking at the items that compose the Latino Identity scale.

The second item I include is the strength of identification with one's home country. It is understandable to expect someone to assume that in order for one's panethnic identity to become important for an individual, this person should experience a tradeoff between their national and their Latin American identification. However, as social identity theory states, identities do not have to be mutually exclusive and one identity might be subsumed by another (Tajfel 1981). This appears to be the case with national and continental identities. In order for someone to be Hispanic or Latino, they most surely have to trace their heritage to a Latin American country, by doing so one cannot separate one identity from the other. This understanding of identities is not without challenge, in fact Lien (2001) and Masuoka (2006) argue that being born in the US

creates a stronger sense of panethnicity and thus that a panethnic identity evolves as immigrants care less about their country of origin identity.

Once again social identity theory is able to help guide the theoretical understanding. While about 13% of the American population can be classified as Hispanic, there is much heterogeneity within this group, just as among any racial category defined by the US census. Fraga et al. (2010) point out that a large proportion of those surveyed in the 1990 LNPS state that national identities are in fact subsumed by panethnic identities. They find in a 2002 Pew Hispanic/Kaiser family foundation survey that respondents do not see the categories are mutually exclusive or as interchangeable yet they choose both labels a majority of the time (p. 154, 156). Furthermore, it seems plausible that with over twenty million Latinos, having a nested identity helps ingroup members identify as distinctive, giving them a sense of being different from the rest. This in fact was what Huddy and Virtanen (1994) found in their study of Latino identities and perceptions of other Latinos.

Huddy and Virtanen (1994) find that Latinos overall are more likely to identify as members of their national group than they are as members of the panethnic group. However, even Cubans identify as Hispanic or Latino 53% of the time. They show that Latinos perceive a large amount of homogeneity among other Latino subgroups yet assert their distinctiveness when compared to other groups (table 1. p. 101). More striking is that while distancing themselves from other subgroups, Latinos rate themselves as more similar with the term “Hispanic or Latino” than they do with specific subgroups. This suggests that a panethnic identity might in fact provide a way for Latinos to find commonality with people that share little more than a common language and continental history. In the LNS 2006, the variable measuring strength of Latino/Hispanic (panethnic) identity and the one measuring country of origin identity are significantly correlated. The rho (correlation) coefficient is 0.522 (see Table 3.1). While not extremely high, the correlation is significant, positive, and quite strong, providing more credence for the idea that national identities might in fact be subsumed by a panethnic identity.

The next set of variables included in the scale of Latino identity are those that John García calls a “Latino solidarity scale” (2010). García’s scale has six components. Three of the questions are asked for both shared pan-ethnic or Latino beliefs and for country of origin beliefs. The first item addresses linked fate. It asks respondents how much their “doing well” depends on other Latinos/Hispanics (for the panethnic question) or other people with the same national

origin (for the ethnic/nationality question) also doing well (for complete wording, see appendix 3.A). The next set of questions asks about the commonality of experiences with other in-group members. The first one asks respondents how much in common they have with other in-group members when it comes to employment and educational opportunities as well as income. The second question asking about commonality asks respondents about government services, political power and representation. The correlations among the six items (three asking respondents about their country of origin and three asking about Latinos/Hispanics) are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Correlations of Group Commonality Items (“Latino Solidarity” Scale J. Garcia 2010).					
	Linked Fate		Socioeconomic commonality		Political Commonality
	Latinos	National Origin	Latinos	National Origin	Latinos
Common and Linked Fate					
Latinos/Hispanics	1				
National origin	.62	1			
Social and Economic Commonality					
Latinos/Hispanics	.37	.33	1		
National origin	.31	.40	.40	1	
Political Commonality					
Latinos/Hispanics	.29	.22	.56	.34	1
National origin	.23	.36	.36	.59	.41

The highest inter-item in table 3.2 correlation occurs for the linked fate items³³. The relationship between the linked fate items and political commonality are the least strong of the six items included in the solidarity subscale, although the correlation between linked fate for co-nationals and political commonality for the same group is a bit higher than the other three correlations. Among the other items that also correlate strongly are the commonality items; each group of commonality items correlates highly when asked about panethnic group as well as when asked about national origin group, but not as well when comparing across groups. All six items

³³ This will be used below to help inform the correlation between items that is not due to the common factor but rather due to their shared variance.

are included as part of my Latino Identity scale, but it should be kept in mind that these items can also be seen as a subscale and as such will be used in later models.

One of the least conventional items that I include in my scale has to do with language. García Bedolla (2003) finds that Spanish language is an important part of Latino identity, but that it also plays a role in group feelings of inferiority. Specifically, she finds that being able to speak Spanish (in two L.A. counties) is an important part of being a member of the Latino or Mexican community. However, she also finds that not being able to speak English is directly related to in-group discrimination and a source of shame. While other studies of Latino identity and acculturation have looked at the adoption of English over an immigrant's native tongue (Branton 2007) it is possible that this variable does not capture identity or assimilation but rather a simple learning or socialization variable. In fact, assuming that English proficiency measures someone's attachment to their ethnic culture would lead us to classify 2nd and 3rd generation activists from the Chicano movements of the 70s as having a low value on Latino identity on that measure.

In order to be able to identify the role that Spanish language plays on Latino identity, it is necessary to understand its symbolic value. One curious anecdote about the LNS 2006 is that there were many people who chose to take the survey in either Spanish or English who later had to switch languages because their proficiency wasn't high enough. 8.39% of those choosing to answer the survey in English switched to Spanish during the interview. More important is that 22.23%, almost a quarter of the respondents who chose to answer in Spanish, needed to use English during the interview. This in fact lends some credence to the idea that language may be more symbolic than it is objective. As such, I use a variable that asks respondents the importance of keeping Spanish in their family. Unfortunately, this variable is very highly skewed with 85% of respondents saying "very important" and another 12% stating it is somewhat important, on a 4 point scale. The nature of the frequency distribution may affect the usefulness of the variable but it nevertheless seems a relevant variable to include in a measure of Latino identity. The full information on each item included in the scale is shown in Appendix A after the question wording.

Last, it is important to acknowledge one variable that is excluded from my scale which could be perceived as missing: perceptions of or experience with discrimination. While some studies continue to use perceptions of discrimination as an indicator of ethnic identity (i.e.

Sanchez 2007, but see also Beltrán 2010, p.127), the main justification behind it is the traditional black-white dichotomy in American politics, where the African-American experience has been molded by centuries of discrimination and structural inequalities. The inclusion of this variable as a predictor of this identity is based on the notion of Latinos being an oppressed minority. The research presented above finds that in fact, in the study of racial politics, perceptions of and experience with discrimination lead Blacks to feel more cohesive as a socio-political group. Extrapolating this to Latino politics may not be as simple as one would expect because of the high numbers of recent immigrants as well as of different cultural histories in the United States. The long history of Black and White dichotomies in the United States does not seem to fit well with the experience of Latinos, 40% of which were born in a foreign country.

Rumbaut (1994) finds that discrimination may play a role in the creation of an ethnic identity for only some immigrants, for others, it does not. In fact, the experiences of discrimination have a molding effect on what a Latino identity means to individuals. A Latino panethnicity might represent a common heritage and a shared cultural pride. It can also be reflected as a class struggle which leads immigrants and their offspring to feel oppressed and underprivileged, leading to what Portes and Zhou coined “downward assimilation” (1994).

When looking at traditional patterns of identification among Mexican Americans, discrimination does play an important role for those who think of themselves as Chicanos or even “cholos” (Rumbaut 1994). This group however is characterized by their assimilation into an inner city sub-culture that does not believe in upward social mobility and that is lower achieving than other Mexican Americans (Portes & Zhou 1993). In fact, given the increase in visibility of the Latino population in the US, it is possible that perceptions of discrimination do not shape ethnic identities but rather ideological positions. Perhaps perceptions of discrimination in fact signal an acceptance of a class structure within American group politics, rather than the understanding that ethnic groups are distinct.

Natalie Masuoka (2006) in fact finds that experiences with discrimination decrease feelings of panethnicity among Latinos, further suggesting that discrimination does not play an important role in Latino identity. Furthermore, Junn and Masuoka (2008) find that pride might elicit feelings of group consciousness among Asians and less importantly for Latinos. In studying how identity maintenance occurs in changing contexts Ethier and Deaux (1994) found that Latino students often associated positive words such as proud, aware, and loyal with their ethnic

identity (p. 247). Furthermore, across their panel study, they find that negative mentions of ethnic identity decrease in the second and third waves of their study. Another important insight from Ethier and Deaux's work is that Latinos with high levels of identity remove their identity and switch from a cultural consciousness to a more behavioral-based definition of their identity throughout the course of their higher education (1994, p. 247). Thus, it seems pertinent to reconceptualize the definition of ethnic or panethnic identities from the traditional sense of deprivation to a more visible and possibly even pride-inducing idea.

Subscales of Latino Identity

While Latino identity scale is quite reliable (Gutman's $\lambda = .80$, see appendix at the end of chapter 3), it is possible that this scale includes multiple dimensions of Latino identity. In order to evaluate this possibility I estimate a principle components analysis with all the variables in the scale.³⁴ By looking at the eigen values of the principal components analysis we can try to gain an idea of how many principal components there are to this scale. Eigen values give the sum of the variance in the variables accounted for by that component. For this measure there are three components that have an eigen value greater than 1.0. The first one has an eigen value of 2.75, the second 1.38, and the third 1.05. Being that the third component is very close to 1.0 it might be helpful to look at a plot of how these eigen values change in order to learn when the change in eigen value seems to be negligible. The scree plot that shows the changes in eigen values for the different components that make up the scale can be found in Appendix 3.B. Looking at the points on the chart it is unclear whether or not the third component adds much to the reduction of variance.

In order to try to gain more traction as to how the items form one or two or three factors, I estimate a principal factors analysis. This method uses a reduced correlation matrix that only includes the variance due to the shared commonality among the indicators. This analysis, which uses the common factor model to estimate the underlying dimensions in a set of variables finds only one principal factor. I then estimate the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) for each of the component solutions. The BIC is lowest (best fit) for a four factor solution, nevertheless, the

³⁴ I also ran principal components analysis as well as exploratory factor analyses including the variable measuring perceptions of discrimination. This variable did fit with any of the other components or factors in the analyses and was consistently a unique element in the latent variable analyses.

three and four factor solutions are Heywood cases, which suggests that too many factors might have been extracted because the commonality might be equal to 1 (all of the variance); it also suggests that one of the factors extracted might have a negative variance, which is nonsensical.³⁵

While looking at factor loadings for both principal components and principal factors analyses does not allow us to conclude how many factors there are, we can get a sense of how variables relate to each other. When running an oblique rotation (promax) on the principal components analysis, we see that both two and three factor models align quite well with the data. The factors do not fully rotate to simple structure and as such suggest that there might be a measurement component to this scale. The rotation does however show a clear loading onto a solidarity factor, which is composed by the commonality and linked fate items for both pan-ethnic and national identities. The second factor that appears after the oblique rotations is what I call the strength of identity factor. This factor includes the measures of strength of identification as Latino or Hispanic, as well as the strength of identification with one's country of origin. The factor also includes the question asking respondents about the importance of keeping Spanish. While this variable seems to be the least related of the three used for this identity strength component, it still plays an important part that fits with the expectations.

When looking at the third (and possibly more) factor we see that it is based on the wording of the question asked. What would appear to be a 3rd factor might in fact be a measurement instrument that can be explained by question wording. In fact, there are two items that seem to be extremely similar and that should be expected to be correlated by something else than by their relationship to the underlying measures. In a three factor solution they create their own factor but this might be due to their wording and not necessarily because they represent a distinct latent construct. These items are the linked fate questions that are asked in both pan-ethnic and regional (country based) terms. The question is identical except for the change in the target of the question, the exact wording is:

L3/L6. How much does your 'doing well' depend on other **[people from your country of heritage]/[Hispanics or Latinos]** also doing well? A lot, some, a little, or not at all?

³⁵ It is possible that the two constructs are nested within a major one. While it is impossible to estimate a nested factor model, it makes sense that both Latino solidarity and identity strength are related (the rho coefficient is: .224 and statistically significant).

In order to incorporate the possibility that these two variables are interrelated based on a shared variance independent of the Latino identity construct, it is important to allow for them to be correlated in a confirmatory factor analysis. Furthermore, if we look at the wording of more of the items that compose this scale we see that the commonality items are practically the same with a slight change on the focus. Question L1. Reads:

Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do you have in common with other [people from your country of origin/heritage]? Would you say you have a lot in common, some in common, little in common, or nothing at all in common?

If we compare this to Question L2, we see that the only difference is on the things respondents are asked to focus on. The actual wording for question L2 is:

L2. Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power, and representation, how much do you have in common with other [people from your country of origin/heritage]? Would you say you have a lot in common, some in common, little in common, or nothing at all in common?

The underlined text is the only part that changes. It is possible that these items are correlated because of their similarity. This also occurs when asking Latinos about their perceived commonality with other Latinos (panethnic) as well as when asking them about other people from their same country of origin (regional or country based). In order to correctly estimate the effect that the underlying factors have on these variables it is important to also estimate the correlation between these two almost identical items for each subgroup.

Having established that the reason we may see three or more factors in the principal components or principal factors analyses (as well as in exploratory factor analysis) is due to the nature of the questions asked, I seek to estimate a 1 and 2 factor solution using confirmatory analyses to understand how the measures included in the scale load on the different factors. The results of this analysis confirm that a two factor solution has a better model fit (CFI: 0.975, RMSE: 0.051) than a one factor model (CFI: 0.884, RMSE: 0.114). The results for the two factor confirmatory analysis (covariance structure model) are shown in Table 3.3.

There are no standard errors estimated for the baseline items; they help us understand how much each item loads on the underlying factor by providing a baseline effect (1.0). The factor loadings of the commonality and linked fate items on the first underlying construct

(solidarity) range from .805 to .987. All of the loadings are statistically significant and as such provide support for the idea that Latino Identity as a whole is comprised of two different things.

Turning our attention to the second underlying construct: strength of identity; we see that all of the loadings are significant and load strongly on the underlying factor. One thing to note however is that the importance of keeping Spanish is used as a baseline and that the effects of the other two items – strength of identity – is stronger than the baseline specified.

TABLE 3.3. Covariance Structure Model of Latino Identity Scale Items.			
Item	Latino Solidarity/ Commonality	Strength of Latino Identity	
Common and Linked Fate			
Latinos/Hispanics	0.805 (.026)		
National origin	0.856 (.026)		
Social and Economic Commonality			
Latinos/Hispanics	0.987 (.030)		
National origin	1.000 (-----)		
Political Commonality			
Latinos/Hispanics	0.860 (.028)		
National origin	0.941 (.019)		
Strength of Identity			
Strength of pan-ethnic identity		1.570 (.085)	
Strength of home country identity		1.591 (.085)	
Importance of keeping Spanish		1.000 (-----)	
Inter-item correlations		Correlations (s.e)	
National origin commonality	Social/economic with political	0.204	(0.013)
Panethnic commonality items	Social/economic with political	0.227	(0.013)
Linked Fate	National origin with Pan-ethnic	0.335	(0.012)
(N = 8634)			
Model Fit: CFI: .975 TLI: .975 RMSE: .051			
Unstandardized Factor Loadings (Standard Errors) for 2-Factor Confirmatory Analysis on Latino Identity Scale			

The second factor is also significant and the three items used to estimate this factor are well defined. Last, we see that the correlations between individual items are, although small, significant, and as such important to include in the two-factor modeling of Latino identity. Thus we see that although Latino identity can be construed as one thing, it is comprised of two factors,

one that measures feelings of solidarity among Latinos and one that measures strength of identity. It is important to remember that some researchers have found acculturation and political incorporation to be important predictors of political behavior among Latinos. Thus in order to understand whether this construct of panethnic identity is a function of acculturation and socialization we must look at the effect of incorporation variables on the developed measures of Latino identity.

Latino Identity and Assimilation

Panethnic identity is proposed to be unaffected by changes in Latinos' incorporation into the American polity. The effects of generation and two language variables on the two Latino identity constructs are shown in Table 3.4. Two language variables are included: one is the choice of language in which to respond to the survey (0 for English and 1 for Spanish). The other language variable is a measure of self-reported conversational English proficiency for those respondents choosing to answer in Spanish.³⁶

As seen in Table 3.4 neither second nor third generation Latinos differ from foreign-born Latinos. For the language variables, those respondents choosing to answer the questionnaire in Spanish were significantly more likely to have a stronger sense of Latino commonality. More interesting however is the finding that, for Latinos who chose to respond to the survey in Spanish, reporting high English proficiency had an 8.5% increase in their Latino solidarity scores. This suggests that as English proficiency increases, Latinos who choose to answer the survey in Spanish show higher levels of Latino solidarity. In estimating the model for the Latino Identification dependent variable, this effect is less strong yet still significant. Answering the survey in Spanish is still highly significant and has a 4.3% impact on identity strength. Second generation is not significant while third generation is and results in a decrease in Latino identity. It is important to note however that the constant for this model is .843, and that the variable is

³⁶ The interaction between language of choice and generational status is significant in predicting both Latino identity variables. The results, not presented here, show that 2nd and 3rd generation Latinos who choose to be interviewed in Spanish and have high English proficiency might showing their identity by choosing to speak in Spanish for an interview on Latino politics. This is corroborated by an analysis on the language choice variables. A logistical regression shows a decrease of choosing Spanish among 2nd and 3rd+ generations, yet significant positive increases for the identity variables as well as for the interaction of these variables for each generation. This means that 2nd and 3rd generation Latinos with high levels of Latino identity are significantly more likely to choose to answer the survey in Spanish than those with low levels of Latino group identity.

coded 0 to 1. Thus if a respondent is a 3rd generation Latino, who chose to answer the survey in English, he or she would report a strength of Latino identity of 0.79 (see footnote 3). This effect is not very substantively meaningful.

Table 3.4. Acculturation and incorporation variables on Latino Identity

	<u>Full sample</u> (by generations)		<u>Foreign Born Latinos (time</u> <u>in US)</u>	
	Latino Solidarity	Identity Strength	Latino Solidarity	Identity Strength
2 nd Generation	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.006)		
3 rd + Generation	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.049** (0.005)		
Time in US (10 years)			-0.009** (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)
US Citizen			0.010 (0.007)	0.015** (0.005)
Surveyed in Spanish	0.016* (0.007)	0.043** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.007 (0.006)
Surveyed in Spanish* English Proficiency	0.085** (0.010)	0.020* (0.008)	0.091** (0.012)	0.027** (0.008)
Constant	0.637** (0.006)	0.843** (0.004)	0.670** (0.009)	0.876** (0.006)
Observations	7988	8139	5,654	5,750
Adjusted R-squared	.022	0.041	0.015	0.005

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Surveyed in English is the baseline for the language and proficiency items and interactions

A similar model is estimated for Latinos who are born outside the US, using time in the US (by ten years) and naturalization status as measures of political incorporation. For the Latino solidarity variable, time in the US has a significant negative effect on this variable. However, once again it is important to focus on the magnitude of the impact of this variable. For every 10 years in this country, the effect on Latino solidarity is about 1%. Thus, in order for this variable to exert an impact of 10% on the dependent variable, an immigrant would have live in this country for 100 years. Citizenship status and language of interview are not significant. Once again the interaction of English proficiency and choosing to be interviewed in Spanish is significant and positive, reaffirming the previous findings. Being a naturalized citizen exerts a positive and significant effect on Latino identification. While some of these variables are significant, it is not difficult to find significance using OLS with samples of 8000 or 6000

respondents. The magnitude of the effects of acculturation and language proficiency on measures of Latino group identification is quite small and shows that there is no inherent shedding of one's ethnic identity as one lives in this country for longer or acquires higher English proficiency.

While these results are quite convincing, we know little about how this scale works with subgroups of Latinos. Since Latinos as a group are quite heterogeneous it is important to establish that the Latino identity scale can be used to understand political phenomena across the subgroups that exist in US Latino politics.

Does the Scale Vary across Latino Subgroups?

The previous sections have shown how the scale as a whole is reliable and internally consistent, supporting recent work that uses many of these items in constructed scales related to Latino identity (Garcia 2010). However, it is important to make sure the scale is consistent across different groups of respondents. In Table 3.5 I report the best lower bound estimate using Guttman's 6 Lambdas for the scale when measured among Latino subgroups.

While there are some changes in the reliability coefficients across the subgroups examined, the lambda coefficient never drops below .75. This suggests that this scale is fairly stable across groups of Latinos. Furthermore, while some subgroups vary in the strength of their Latino identity, the changes in the mean value for this scale across Latinos are not very stark and never statistically significant. This section has shown how this constructed scale of Latino identity is quite constant across groups and has a high level of reliability. Based on this scale, we can now begin to explore the effects that this panethnic identity has on partisanship. However, it is important to first talk about a possible identity that is also salient for Latinos and that might exert the opposite influence on partisanship as does the Latino identity.

Republican-linked Identities

Gimpel & Kauffman's (2001) exploration of partisanship among Latinos predicted a very bleak image of Republican's chances of bringing in a large proportion of the non-Cuban population. However, the Bush years proved to be a time of hope-generating efforts and successes in the Republican Party's relationship with Latinos. However, de la Garza & Cortina (2007) found that the Bush effect was quite short-lived and that despite the efforts and electoral gains, and the pro-immigration stances of his government, Latino partisanship did not react to the

Rove and G.W. push. Nicholson & Segura (2005) argue that in order for Republicans to make partisan gains, they must change their positions on core issues.

Table 3.5. Reliability Estimates and Descriptive Statistics of Latino Identity Scale across Latino Subgroups		
	Guttman's Lambda	Scale Mean (0 to 1) (Std. Dev)
Gender		
Female (N=4738)	.80	.743 (.164)
Male (N=3896)	.80	.731 (.172)
Generation		
Foreign Born (1 st) (N=4938)	.78	.751 (.161)
2 nd Generation (US born) (N=1465)	.81	.716 (.172)
3 ^{rd+} Generation (Parents US born) (N=1736)	.81	.713 (.179)
Country of Origin		
Mexico (N=5704)	.80	.737 (.164)
Cuba (N=420)	.75 (lambda 6, smc=.77)	.736 (.190)
Puerto Rico (N=822)	.83	.742 (.175)
All others (N=1688)	.80	.738 (.173)
Region		
Border State (N=2815)	.79	.736 (.167)
Non-Border State (N=5819)	.80	.738 (.168)
California (N=1204)	.78	.749 (.161)
New York (N=800)	.80	.747 (.167)
Texas (N=811)	.75	.732 (.170)
Age of Respondent		
< 18-25 (N=1483)	.78	.737 (.158)
26-35 (N=2092)	.77	.748 (.155)
36-45 (N=1828)	.79	.743 (.165)
46-55 (N=1268)	.81	.735 (.172)
56-65 (N=831)	.82	.725 (.175)
Over 65 (N= 639)	.75 (lambda 6, smc=.77)	.718 (.191)

However, since the issues which should matter for Latinos are a subject of much debate, it is doubtful that specific issues or policy areas might be well suited to pull Latinos away from Democrats and closer to Republicans, there is thus a need to find an social identity capable of linking Latinos to the Republican Party. A consistent finding in American politics is the link between White evangelical Christianity and Republicanism. The group-based theory of partisanship developed in this dissertation is also applicable to religious identities.

Religious Identity

The literature on polarization and realignment in recent years has found that religion has increasingly played a role on political behavior (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, pp. 327-331). In fact, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) find that the religious divide is much more pronounced than the class divide among white voters (p. 550). Layman argues that it is religiosity, not necessarily denomination that has a strong effect on voters (Layman 1997, 2001). Abramowitz and Saunders also find that religiosity (attending religious services at least weekly) in 2004 affects not only ideology, but also partisanship, issue preferences, and support for the president and the Iraq war. Another interesting finding from their 2008 study is that both Church attendance and evangelical or born-again identification lead to increased correlations with partisanship and voting Republican. They also show that the gap between religiously observant and non-observant respondents to the ANES 2004 has increased greatly since 1972. While the impact of Catholic denomination on Democratic identification continues to decline (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), Abramowitz and Saunderson's findings provide strong support for the increasing role of religiosity and of a born again identity on party identification. These studies however say nothing about how the impact of religiosity on minorities might be similar or different to the one found in their sample of white respondents.

Religious identities have played a prominent role in the study of changes in partisanship in the American electorate (Layman 2001). In the realm of race and politics from a group-based approach, Tate (1994) found that church membership mobilized Black voters. In their study of how social groups affect political identification, Barreto and Pedraza find a strong relationship between identification as a Catholic and Democratic partisanship. Identifying as a Catholic may be construed as an identity with political relevance. Kelly and Kelly (2005) also find evidence that being Catholic leads Latinos to identify more with the Democratic Party. However, they also

suggest that with the decrease in Catholicism among Latinos in the US (71.3% of the LNS 2006) and with the rise of Protestantism (between 16 and 20% of the LNS 2006), the simple Catholic vs. non-Catholic dichotomy used traditionally in studying Latino politics may no longer be as informative for studies of partisanship.

Barreto and Pedraza however ignore two important variables that play an important role in religion and politics, Born Again or Evangelical identification and Religiosity (Pantoja 2010). Pantoja in fact shows that religiosity is a much better predictor of Republicanism and support for conservative policies among Latinos than is identification as a born again. On the other hand, Kelly and Kelly use a combined sample from the 1990-2000 ANES and find that Evangelical and mainstream protestants are more likely to be Republicans and that more committed Catholics are closer to the Democratic Party. Their effects for commitment (religiosity) among protestant groups are non-significant. To focus on denomination and the distinction between born-again Christians and Catholics is similar to the standard practices in the politics of religion; nevertheless, it would show some degree of cluelessness about Latino identity if we only focused on protestant identification as “Born-again” or “new covenant” groups as these born-again practices have also been adopted by some Catholic groups.

In their study of the effects of biblical literalism and race on partisanship in the Houston, TX area, McDaniel and Ellison (2008) find that the effect of biblical literalism on Latinos is not as strong as it is among Whites but much stronger than it is among Blacks. Interestingly, Biblical literalism has a very limited effect on policy attitudes, even those that are directly tied to religious ideals, for Latinos as well as Blacks. This suggests that biblical literalism might have a limited effect on issue attitudes while being a strong predictor of partisanship. This supports the empirical reasons for looking at the effects of religion and religious identity among Latinos even when religion does not seem to play an important political role on the other large minority (Blacks) in the United States.

As discussed in Chapter 1, an increasingly relevant religious identity among Latin Americans is that of evangelical or Pentecostal Christianity. This form of extreme religious identification among Protestants has also been mirrored within the Catholic Church as the charismatic movement increases (Stoll 1991, 1993). While there are clear theological distinctions between the different religions, it is unclear that these groups are distinct in their relationship to

politics. Stoll also argues that many of the leaders of the Charismatic movement in Guatemala have strong ties to religious right-wing groups in North America (p. 10, 1993).

	Born Again Christian or Charismatic Catholic		Church Attendance				
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Never	Only holidays	Once a month	Once a week	> once a week
Full Sample (N= 8634)	3,665 (42.5%)	3,898 (45.2%)	1,066 (12.4%)	1,133 (13.1%)	1,546 (17.9%)	3,332 (38.6%)	1,434 (16.6%)
Gender							
Female (N=4738)	2,133 (45.0%)	2,001 (42.2%)	433 (9.1%)	541 (11.4%)	790 (16.7%)	1,995 (42.1%)	916 (19.3%)
Male (N=3896)	1,532 (39.3%)	1,897 (48.7%)	633 (16.3%)	592 (15.2%)	756 (19.4%)	1,337 (34.3%)	518 (13.3%)
Generation							
Foreign Born (1 st) (N=4938)	2,109 (42.7%)	2,078 (42.1%)	559 (11.3%)	548 (11.1%)	983 (19.9%)	1,971 (39.9%)	799 (16.2%)
2 nd Generation (US born) (N=1465)	546 (37.3%)	804 (54.9%)	197 (13.5%)	262 (17.9%)	230 (15.7%)	546 (37.3%)	218 (14.9%)
3 rd + Generation (Parents US born) (N=1736)	769 (44.3%)	793 (45.7%)	225 (13.0%)	258 (14.9%)	280 (16.1%)	649 (37.4%)	297 (17.1%)
Country of Origin/Heritage							
Mexico (N=5704)	2,396 (42.0%)	2,519 (44.2%)	602 (10.6%)	721 (12.6%)	1,118 (19.6%)	2,313 (40.6%)	883 (13.5%)
Cuba (N=420)	132 (31.4%)	238 (56.7%)	110 (26.2%)	63 (15.0%)	58 (13.8%)	121 (28.8%)	55 (13.1%)
Puerto Rico (N=822)	375 (45.6%)	392 (47.7%)	134 (16.3%)	135 (16.4%)	95 (11.6%)	270 (32.9%)	175 (21.3%)
All others (N=1688)	762 (45.1%)	749 (44.4%)	220 (13.0%)	214 (12.7%)	275 (16.3%)	628 (37.3%)	321 (19.0%)
Region							
Border State (N=2815)	1,211 (43.0%)	1,300 (46.2%)	293 (10.4%)	360 (12.8%)	514 (18.3%)	1,134 (40.3%)	482 (17.1%)
Non-Border State (N=5819)	3,665 (42.5%)	3,898 (45.2%)	1,066 (12.4%)	1,133 (13.1%)	1,546 (17.9%)	3,332 (38.6%)	1,434 (16.6%)
Age							
Under 30 (N=2299)	930 (40.5%)	1,020 (44.4%)	329 (14.3%)	334 (14.5%)	501 (21.8%)	817 (35.5%)	285 (12.4%)
30 – 50 (N=3652)	1,606 (44.0%)	1,607 (44.0%)	408 (11.2%)	478 (13.1%)	668 (18.3%)	1,427 (39.1%)	628 (17.2%)
Over 50	914 (41.7%)	1,096 (50.1%)	283 (12.9%)	272 (12.4%)	289 (13.2%)	870 (39.7%)	446 (20.4%)
Note: percentages do not add to 100 because Don't Knows and Refusals are not included in this matrix. In the multivariate analyses, these uninformative cases are omitted.							

Table 3.6 shows the distributions of responses to the questions regarding religion among different Latino subgroups. One of the most important things to note in Table 3.6 is that born

again or charismatic identification is lowest among Cubans. The proportion of Latinos identifying as either Born Again or charismatic varies from about 30% for Cubans to a high of 45.6% for Puerto Ricans. Despite being the lowest, one in every three Cubans identify as born again or charismatic. The other columns in Table 3.6 show that although not uniform across Hispanic subgroups, religiosity seems to follow a similar pattern across all Latinos surveyed in the LNS2006. This suggests that these identities are present in every subgroup of Hispanics and as such it is possible to explore the role that these religious identities play on political partisanship. It also seems important to explore both ways to think of religious identity as well as to see how they might interact with each other.

Contextual Effects on Latino Identity and Other Political Variables

In the previous chapter, the relationship between the issue of immigration and partisanship was examined. The findings seem to paint a bleak picture for those who argue that Latinos are a single issue-public, whose liberal preferences on immigration lead them to identify with the Democratic Party. However, the issue of immigration does seem to be tied to Latino politics, Latino marches are most closely related to immigration issues. The sit-in on the Texas capitol staged by Mexican-Americans in late 2010 in favor of the DREAM act is yet another example of how immigration-related issues seem to be strongly tied to Latino politics.

As shown in the last section of Chapter 2, the LNS 2006 allows researchers to look at the environmental effects of the priming of immigration through the nation-wide marches advocating immigration reform that occurred in the spring of 2006. Here I focus on the changes on Latino Identity, religiosity, identification as Born Again or Charismatic, and partisanship. Table 3.7 shows the results for a simple model that uses interview time earlier than April 25th as the baseline, and two dummy variables as predictors of the variable, the first is coded 1 if the interview was conducted between April 25th and June 6th 2006, 0 otherwise. The second dummy is for respondents surveyed after June 8th, (no interviews were conducted on June 7th).

Table 3.7 shows that in fact Latino Identity can be primed through environmental effects. While the spring 2006 marches were extraordinary, they were not the only show of solidarity among Latinos in response to immigration reform. While the effects of the marches on Latino Identity are not very large, they are significant and in the expected direction. The large scale immigration rallies of 2006 increased the average Latino identity score among those surveyed by

1.5%. Interestingly, religiosity seems to be negatively affected after the decline in importance of immigration, average religiosity drops about 2% for those surveyed after June 08, 2006.

Interestingly, Republican partisanship increases marginally during the period of heightened interest in immigration and then drops (significantly from this period but only marginally from the baseline) afterwards. It is unclear why this happens, but these results suggest that Latino identity is in fact a fluid construct that depends to a certain extent on the context in which Latinos find themselves in. Furthermore, it provides credence to the theory that identities can be primed and that the changes in identities can have important political effects.

Table 3.7. Regression and Logistical Regression for Dependent Variables, Using Time 1 (before April 25) as the Baseline Category.				Mean Values for Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable (N)	Constant	Time 2 (April 25 -June 06)	Time 3 (After June 08)	(T1, T2, T3)
Latino Identity (8634)	.7276 *** (.0027)	.0148 ** (.0054)	-.0068 (.00412)	T1= .7276 T2= .7424 T3= .7208
Religiosity (8511)	.5929 *** (.0050)	.0035 (.0096)	-.0201 ** (.0075)	T1= .5929 T2= .5964 T3= .5728
Born Again or Charismatic (8634)	-.2743 *** (.0318)	-.0051 (.0616)	-.0810 † (.0482)	T1= 43.19% T2= 43.06% T3= 41.21%
Partisanship (0 Democratic to 1 Republican) (6189)	.3902 *** (.0352)	.0144 † (.0085)	-.0123 † (.0067)	T1= .3902 T2= .4046 T3= .3779
Standard Errors in parenthesis Statistical significance: † p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005				

Summary

This chapter has ratified the idea that such a thing as Latino identity (a panethnic identity) exists and is relevant for Latinos. The constructed scale used to measure this construct is quite reliable and also can be construed as being a one, or two-construct scale. While we can think of Latino identity as an overarching construct encompassing such variables as linked fate, solidarity, commonality, identity strength, and importance of keeping Spanish, it is also possible to break it down into two main constructs (as shown in the confirmatory factor analysis). The two constructs are: Latino solidarity (see García 2010) and strength of identity. While the existing literature on Latino politics makes it hard to determine if one or the other plays a more prominent role on partisanship attachments, the theory proposed here would suggest that strength

of identity is a more important political construct than solidarity. Solidarity might lead to non-political behavior as well as group cohesiveness, but strength of identity might be directly related to the 7-point partisanship measure used throughout the modern partisanship literature.

This chapter also explored another important identity, one tied to conservative beliefs. For this identity, both religiosity (measured by self-reported church attendance) and identifying as a born again Christian or Charismatic Catholic were explored. It is clear that Latinos espouse both strong Latino identities as well as religious ones. The next chapter explores the relationship between each of these identities and partisanship.

Chapter 4:


Latino Identity and Partisanship

Latino identity is a reliable construct that is consistent across groups of Latinos and includes in-group feelings, strength of attachment to the group and feelings of common experiences with other Latinos. This identity, strongly linked to an ethnic minority group, is expected to pull Latinos toward the Democratic Party. On the other hand, religious devotion, common among Latinos, links them to the Republican Party.

Theory

Earlier I outlined the rationale for an identity-based conceptualization of partisanship. However, the link between a psychological attachment to a social group and partisanship is manifested only in the presence of political socialization and a cognitive representation of the link between social groups and parties. Figure 4.1 presents a graphic representation of the theory advanced in this dissertation. The term “Salient Social Identity” is used to refer to one of multiple relevant social groups that an individual might identify with at any given time. That is, a Jewish Argentinean who is member of a labor union might feel more Jewish or Argentinean in different contexts. By coining the identity as “salient” the theory infers that one of the identities becomes more relevant than the others (Tajfel & Turner 1981).

Figure 4.1. Party Identification Formation Process



While there is a direct arrow from social identity to partisanship in figure 4.1, the effects of this identity will translate into political partisanship contingent on several other factors. The first is political socialization, in this dissertation, place of birth and time the individual has spent in the United States (for Latinos born abroad) are used as measure of the socialization process of immigrants. The second factor is called *cognitive representation of political parties*, or knowing the relationship between the social group and the political parties; and also some politically relevant phenomena (i.e. political marches or changes in issue salience).

Recently arrived immigrants are less likely to understand the political relevance of social groups. The longer they live in the US, the more belonging to a social group becomes relevant to their partisan identity. Importantly, time in the United States also affects the personal relevance and knowledge about politics. Not all new immigrants are apolitical, but the more they are socialized into the American sociopolitical environment, the more the care about politics and know about the political parties. Socialization moderates the effect that a social group identity will have on political partisanship. Latinos who have been in the US for longer are expected to not only be more likely to understand how parties are aligned on issues and ideology, but also to make the connection between a salient group identity and the political parties.

Cognitive Representation of Political Parties is a catchall phrase referring to an individual's understanding of how political parties are organized based on ideological, attitudinal, and issue preferences. This is important in order for a group identity to be translated into political behavior. If someone has a very strong attachment to a group, say an environmentalist group, and they do not know which party is more in favor of protecting the environment and which party prefers market forces to work on natural resources, they will be unable to make a link between their group membership and a specific political party. On the other hand if someone is aware of Jim Crow politics and the Democratic support for civil rights for African Americans, then they can use their identification as an equal rights activist to identify with the Democratic Party.

The theory presented here argues that both identities, panethnic and religious, will have significant effects on partisanship. A strong sense of Latino or Hispanic identity is expected to lead to a stronger identification with the Democratic Party (Barreto & Pedraza 2009; Sanchez 2006). Alternatively, religiosity and religious conservatism is expected to pull Latinos away from the Democrats and closer to the Republicans. The theory also proposes that the effects of

identities on partisanship are moderated by political socialization and the individual's cognitive representation of political parties. I thus expect a positive relationship to exist between a Latino pan-ethnic identity and the Democratic Party as well as one between religious identities and the Republican Party. Moreover, I expect these relationships to be strengthened as a function of the individual's socialization and understanding of political parties in a social context.

While the theory presented here argues for the pivotal role of social identities which are interacted with an individual's socialization American politics as well as their perceptions of political parties, it would be naïve to believe that other traditional predictors of partisanship are not relevant for Latino immigrants. One of the most important variables in political behavior is ideology. In fact, more Latinos are able to report their ideology on a 7-point measure than those reporting a partisan affiliation. Ideology is highly related to partisanship and it appears to be relevant across political systems.³⁷ Other socio-economic variables controlled for are taken from Alvarez and García-Bedolla's study of predictors of partisanship (2003). The major socio-economic predictors in their model are: age, income, education, gender, religion, and dummy variables people of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican origin.³⁸

Moderators of the Impact of Identity on Partisanship

I purport that in order for the social identity to partisanship link to be consistently significant in predicting partisanship immigrants must be socialized into American politics as well as have some idea of how the political parties relate to their relevant social identities. These two concepts are crucial to help bridge the gap between non-political groups and partisan identification. I now operationally define these concepts in order to incorporate them into a model of partisanship that helps explain Latino immigrants' partisan attachments.³⁹

³⁷ Ideology is asked as part of the World Values Survey, and is translated into many different languages. Bobbio (1997) argues for the importance egalitarianism across political contexts. Thorisdottir et al. (2007) find that traditionalism and other psychological variables predict right-wing conservatism in both Eastern and Western Europe. While it is impossible to ascertain what considerations respondents use when decided how to place themselves on an ideological scale, people nevertheless do, and this position has important political implications.

³⁸ I also ran a kitchen sink model with Bayesian model averaging. This technique selects the best model by sampling hypotheses from the universe of available hypotheses as specified in the model. The BMA results show that a model with less controls than the ones included in Alvarez and García-Bedolla has a better fit than does a more complex model. However, the loss of fit from including all of the above mentioned controls is negligible.

³⁹ Appendix 4.A in this chapter presents a linear model using separate specifications of the religious identities.

Political Socialization

In order for people to be able to translate their beliefs, attitudes, and socio-economic characteristics into political elements, they must first find a political meaning in these dimensions of their daily life. However, there is no consensus as to how to measure, or in some cases define, political socialization.

In order to have a useful definition of socialization the context of the variable should be explored. That is, to reduce the amount of disagreement among researchers as to what constitutes socialization, acculturation, or other term introduced in a research program it is useful to keep in mind the political phenomena that is being explored; in this case: partisanship. Research on political socialization of immigrants has used different understandings and operationalizations of this construct. While some studies use terms such as acculturation, assimilation, or socialization, the theory tested in this chapter argues that it is a general political socialization, broadly defined, that should lead to increased effects of the group identities on partisanship. As explored in Chapter 3, using assimilation measures which require respondents to lose some of their cultural identity and to shed themselves of the use of Spanish will inevitably lead to a reduction in the strength of group identity if this identity is defined in non-Anglo mainstream terms.

Generational cohort has been used by various existing studies to explore how acculturation and political socialization occurs among immigrants (Barreto & Muñoz 2003, Branton 2007, Portes & Rambaut 2001; Sánchez 2006; Stokes-Brown 2006; Tam Cho 1999). Some of these same authors as well as others have shown that in fact, generational status not only has important effects on political behavior, but that it interacts with other types of predictors (see Cain et al. 1991; Wong 2000). The concept of political socialization used here is more closely related to experiences with the American political system. As such, Latinos born on the continental United States will all have at least 18 years of political socialization. This leads me to use a dichotomous variable of place of birth to explore socialization differences between those Latinos born abroad, and those born on the continental United States. Nonetheless, this measure seems to ignore the heterogeneity in socialization among foreign-Latinos.

Time in the United States

In studying the acquisition of partisanship among Asian and Latino immigrants, Cain et al. (1991) find that the time spent living in the US as well as experiences of discrimination help

socialize these immigrant groups into identifying the Democratic Party. Wong (2000) finds that time in the United States has a significant effect on the decision of Latinos to choose any party. However, a recent study of immigrant political attitudes in Germany and the United Kingdom finds little differences between immigrants and those who are native-born as well as no significant effects for length of residence in the host country (Dancygier & Saunders 2006). In discussing their results the authors argue that the fact that their survey was in the native tongue and not in the immigrants' first language could account for the lack of significance of time in the host country on aligning immigrant political attitudes to those of natives. Wong (2000) also finds a significant effect of English proficiency (but not dominance) on the acquisition of partisanship among immigrants. Moreover, she finds that English dominance does not have a significant effect on the acquisition of partisanship, further suggesting that English dominance may in fact measure a cultural preference and not the degree of socialization among immigrants. Thus, time in the United States can be argued to capture many environmental phenomena which immigrants are exposed to.

As immigrants are in this country for longer, they become more integrated into American culture and lifestyle while not necessarily shedding their cultural identities (see chapter 3); they are also more exposed to politics. While there is recent evidence (Cheung et al. 2010) that the age of immigration to a host country is more important than the time spent in the host country in determining the degree of acculturation, using time in the US to study political socialization (not general acculturation or assimilation) appears to have many advantages. First of all it measures exposure, which has been found to be important in the political (re)socialization of immigrants (White, Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil & Furnier 2008). Additionally, using time in the US as a proxy of socialization is not prescriptive as to what type of behavior should be observed before an immigrant can be said to be socialized. Furthermore, it does not lump all first generation immigrants into a single category.

As shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5, both identity variables are quite stable across time in the US. In fact, the distribution of this variable changes very little over respondents' time in the United States.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, socialization changes the way Latinos organize their political

⁴⁰ The distribution of the "Latineness" variable across the different groups divided by time in the United States is presented in Appendix 4.B. The results show that there are very small changes in the distribution of frequencies of responses across time in the US. This supports the idea that the concept of Latino identity does not depend on political socialization and that it is a stable construct across the time Immigrants spend in this country.

beliefs and how they use them in predicting partisanship. Time in the United States seems to be a good proxy for studying how Latinos are socialized into the American political system.

However, there are two important issues with this variable, the first is that time in the US is necessarily correlated with age as nobody can be in this country for 40 years if they are under the age of 40. This problem can be tackled by including an interactive term between time in the US and age⁴¹. Another problem however due to cohorts, defined by the context surrounding migrating, is not fully solved by this measure. The interactive term also helps understand socialization and how the effect varies depending on both age and time in the United States, that is, a 20 year-old who has lived in the US since 1990 might have been socialized differently than a 50 year-old arrived the same year (see footnote 5).

The second and possibly more problematic issue at hand is that this measure of political socialization can only be used for foreign-born Latinos. It is hard to come up with a valid value for this measure for Latinos who have lived in this country since birth. I thus estimate socialization as separate models, one using place of birth for the whole sample, and one using time in the United States for foreign-born Latinos.⁴² Appendix 4.D shows the results for a model regressing partisanship on the identity predictors interacted with the measures of socialization (place of birth and time in the United States). While the theory presented in this dissertation proposes that both socialization and cognitive representation of parties moderate the impact of group identities on party identification, I briefly show that socialization is a significant moderator of the impact of identities on partisanship. While the results are quite consistent across the different measures of socialization, I use time in the United States to graph the effects of socialization on the marginal impact of each variable.


⁴¹ Regressions not shown find an insignificant interactive term and the results remain almost identical with models including only linear socialization and age variables.

⁴² The issue of political socialization is complex. Cain and his colleagues use time in the US as the measure for exposure of foreign-born immigrants and age for US born Latinos and Asians (1991). However, this measure is also problematic because it is unable to capture age effects among foreign-born Latinos. This leads us to be unable to look at the effects of political socialization across age groups. Another way in which political socialization has operationalized is as the percentage of life spent in the US (Barreto & Muñoz 2003; Subervi-Vélez 2008). While this measure also assumes constant affects across age, it is worth studying because it would place all native-born Americans toward the highest values of this variable (1), while placing older recently arrived immigrants at the bottom. The results using this specification of socialization were highly similar to those using time in the US and generational cohort. The results using this proxy for socialization are presented on the last column of Appendix 4.G

Figure 4.2 plots the marginal effect of Latino identity along with its 95% confidence intervals at different levels of the socialization variable. At the low end of the socialization scale, Latino identity is not significant, while at the high ends it is extremely influential on Latino's partisanship. The effect of Latino identity is highly moderated by the socialization variable. The interaction is significant and exacerbates the impact that Latino identity has on predicting identification with the Democratic Party.

Also important is the moderation that occurs on religious identities. Figure 4.3 plots the marginal effects of both religiosity and Born Again/Charismatic identity on partisanship across time in the United States with 95% confidence intervals. Religiosity pulls Latinos towards the Republican Party. This effect becomes most significant around 15 to 20 years in the United States and then becomes less reliable.


Figure 4.2 Effect of Latino Identity on Partisanship over Time in the United States.



Looking at the born again or charismatic variable we see more evidence for the hypothesis that in order for identities to matter politically they must be put through a process that links the relevant identity to political groups. Among newcomers to America, being born again or a charismatic Catholic marginally predicts Democratic identification. However, after ten years of being in the US, the effect of this variable is reduced to 0. After another 10 years the effect of

the variable switches and now is a marginally significant predictor of Republicanism.⁴³ The fact that the marginal effect of evangelical identity crosses the 0 point means that the effects of this variable on partisanship are in fact inverted as we move from low to high levels of socialization.

Figure 4.3. Effect of Religiosity and Born Again/Charismatic Identity on Partisanship by Time in the United States



These findings help provide support for the idea that social groups do not automatically translate into political interests and rather that the effect is contingent on socialization. The effect of identifying as Born Again or Charismatic, albeit only marginally significant, is puzzling shows how lack of socialization may lead immigrants to “incorrectly” associate their social group to a political party that might not have the same interests as those embodied by the primary, non-political groups.

Political socialization however is only one part of the full model proposed in my main theory. Political socialization is strongly related to the second moderating variable. I now explore

⁴³ Also important to note is that it is possible to hypothesize decreasing returns of socialization and include a quadratic term to model the effect of time in the US on partisanship. I included a quadratic variable in other models and the results for the quadratic term were not significant and did not change the effects of the other variables on partisanship.

the other major variable predicted to be a moderator of identities: an individuals' cognitive representation of political parties.

Cognitive Representation of Political Parties

The idea that exposure will inevitably lead to socialization is not without problems. Immigrants who have lived in the US for the same amount of time might be exposed to different amounts of political information. If politics never crosses the mind or the interests of a person, it seems unrealistic to assume that living in a country for any amount of time will make this person more capable of establishing a link between their relevant social identities and political groups. Because of this plausible scenario, I propose a second concept necessary to establish the link between social identities and party identification.

The *cognitive representation of political parties* represents the ideas people have about political parties. This concept is explicitly not “accurate political knowledge” but rather the beliefs people hold about political parties and how they relate to non-political aspects of life in the United States since people might hold erroneous beliefs yet be confident about their accuracy. The purpose of this concept is to allow people to link their salient group identities to partisanship, thus factual knowledge might in fact not be as powerful as the belief that a group is closely related to one of the parties.

A related concept to the idea of the cognitive representation of parties is political sophistication. While political sophistication relies heavily on knowledge, it seems to encompass more elements than just knowledge; it relates to individual's ability to make inferences about politics based on cues that might not be considered relevant or significant information. Research on the concept of “schemas” showed that political sophisticates, operationally defined as those who know more and are more interested in politics, are more likely to link statements to the accurate party of the candidate making those statements (Lodge & Hamill 1986). These “partisan schematics” were also more prone to recall party consistent information and disregard party inconsistent statements. Schemas appear to closely mirror the idea of a cognitive representation of a political party. Individuals who have a strong partisan schema, that is, who quickly relate the political party to social groups (see chapters 7 and 11 in the American Voter Revisited) will be more likely to make link social identities to partisanship.

Using both knowledge and political interest I construct a measure of the cognitive representation of parties that resembles political sophistication, or the partisan schema concept (Lodge & Hamil 1986). The knowledge question asks respondents to state which of the two parties is more conservative. Responses that correctly state Republicans are more conservative than Democrats are coded 1 while all other responses are 0. Only 36% of those surveyed are able to state that Republicans are the more conservative of the parties. While this is less than 50% (chance), this actually captures the essence of the measure, since anyone who answers incorrectly or is unable to provide an answer does not see Republicans as being more conservative, meaning they are incapable of making the link between a conservative ideology and the party⁴⁴.

However, some respondents might be incapable of answering the Party ideology question yet might still be interested in politics and might have other relevant representations of how political parties align with other groups or policy issues. I thus incorporate an individual's self-reported interest in politics. This variable is justifiable if we think about the process of political socialization among immigrants. An immigrant who has just arrived to this country and is highly interested in politics might not know a lot about American politics, yet will quickly develop a broader understanding as he or she is socialized into the American political system.⁴⁵ Because socialization affects political knowledge, it is important to use a variable that is not solely based on knowledge to better understand how ideas about politics and parties interact with group identities in predicting one's psychological attachment to parties.


Cognitive representation of parties variable (from here on: *cogrep*) is constructed by using the mean value across the two variables, knowledge of conservative Party (0 and 1) and interest in politics (0,1,2), it ignores values missing for one of the two variables and uses the

⁴⁴ Another way to think about this variable is to think about projection effects of individuals. While a projection hypothesis is beyond the scope of the dissertation, it is possible that Latinos who might be cross-pressured between religious and social issues may apply an arbitrary ideological label that they like to their preferred party. Since ideology seems to be a strong predictor of partisanship across all the models estimated in this dissertation, it might be important in future studies to explore how Latinos (and possibly other groups) adjust their self-reported ideology as a function of their strength of party identification.

⁴⁵ A bivariate logistical regression is estimated to predict the correct choice of Republicans as being more Conservative party. The predictors in my model are Time in the US, place of birth, and political interest. These variables are interacted in order to show how the effect of time in the US on this knowledge variable is moderated by political interest. The results from this model are shown in Appendix 4.G

value for the other one to construct the measure. The variable has 4 levels and a quasi-normal discrete distribution. This variable is also an important moderator of different political beliefs.⁴⁶

Figure 4.4. Effect of Latino Identity on Partisanship by Cognitive Representation of Parties




The regression results for the OLS estimation are presented in appendix 4.E and show that cogrep is in fact an important moderator of the impact of identities on party identification. I now graph the moderating effect of cogrep on predictors of partisanship. Figure 4.4 plots the marginal effect of Latino identity on partisanship along with 95% confidence intervals. For Latinos who score lowest on the cognitive representation variable Latino identity has a very small and insignificant effect. On the other hand, as values on the cogrep variable increase, Latino Identity starts to have a larger impact on partisanship. At the highest level of the variable, Latino identity has a .3 effect on the 0 to 1 dependent variable (partisanship).

The interactions of cogrep and religious identities are also significant (or marginally significant). Figure 4.5 plots the marginal effect of religiosity (light line) and Born Again or Charismatic identification (dark line) on partisanship (dash and dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals).

⁴⁶ Similarly to time in the US, this variable is a strong moderator of the impact that ideology has on partisanship.

While some of the interactions are significant, their impact on partisanship is miniscule. Religiosity (lighter line) is only significant at the highest levels of cogrep, and that the impact of religiosity on partisanship even at the high levels of cogrep is less than a 5%. Latinos who are Evangelical, Born Again, or members of the Charismatic movement show much more interesting and striking effects.

Figure 4.5. Effect of Religious Identities on Partisanship by Cognitive Representation of Parties



At the lowest levels of cogrep, identifying with evangelical traditions leads Latinos to identify slightly more Democratic. This seems irrational given the relationship between fundamentalist Christians and the Republican Party. However, as stated above, people with low levels of cognitive representation of political parties may not only be incapable of matching each party with their positions, but also might project their beliefs onto the parties. This makes sense for someone who knows he or she is a Democrat and a member of the Charismatic movement in his or her local parish, but does not know what Democrats stand for. As we make our way up the cogrep scale we see that the effect of Evangelical identity crosses the 0 point and shifts signs. Half-way along the cogrep scale Born Again or Charismatic identification has a positive and slightly significant effect on partisanship, pulling respondents towards the Republican Party.

While nowhere nearly as impactful as Latino Identity, a religious identity does have an effect on partisanship and that this effect is largely conditional on the moderating variable.

Having shown the effects of each of the two moderating variables on their own, the next task is to explore the role of both moderators when included in the same model. Although not originally hypothesized, exploring the triple interaction of these variables might shed some light on the conditional effects of the identity variables.

Predicting Partisanship with Both Moderators

I first show the results of a regression that uses place of birth as a measure of socialization.⁴⁷ The second column of Table 4.1 presents the results including the three sets of interactions (with both place of birth and cogrep). I focus on the top half of the table as the control variables are not central to the understanding of how social identities affect partisanship and are quite consistent across model specifications.

The effect of Latino identity is not significant when the value of both place of birth and cogrep is 0 (coefficient $-.024$; s.e. 0.026). However, both interactions are significant, as expected. The interaction between cogrep and Latino Identity is significant ($-.213$, s.e. 0.059). This effect is quite large. The effect of Latino Identity is also conditional on whether the respondent is US or foreign-born. We see that Latino identity has a $-.134$ (s.e. 0.043) effect on partisanship when the respondent is born in the US. This proxy for socialization moderates the impact of Latino identity on partisanship by about 13%, even when lumping all foreign-born respondents – barely and highly socialized alike – together.

Religiosity is a weak and insignificant (despite all coefficients being positive) predictor of partisanship even when interacted with cogrep and socialization. An evangelical identity at the low end of cogrep for Latinos born abroad has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant ($-.038$, s.e. 0.009). This means that foreign-born Latinos with low cogrep scores incorrectly link their religious identity to the Democratic Party. However, the interaction with cogrep is quite large ($.089$ s.e. $.021$) suggesting that this evangelical identity now pulls respondents toward the Republican Party (coefficient becomes positive). Being born on the

⁴⁷ I assume that Latinos born in the United States have at least 18 years of early experience with the political system and are more likely to be socialized into American politics than are foreign-born Latinos.

mainland US (.026, s.e. .015) however does not fully reverse the trend of Born Again or Charismatic predicting Democratic partisanship but does help bring the effect closer to zero.

Table 4.1. Partisanship as a Function of Cognitive Representation of Parties and Place of Birth

Latino Identity	-0.024	(0.027)	-0.055	(0.029) *
Latino Identity * Cog Rep	-0.213	(0.059) ***	-0.126	(0.070) *
Latino Identity * Born Mainland US	-0.134	(0.043) ***	-0.009	(0.069)
Latino ID* Cog Rep * Born Mainland US			-0.258	(0.126) **
Religiosity	0.008	(0.015)	0.005	(0.016)
Religiosity * Cog Rep	0.051	(0.031)	0.057	(0.038)
Religiosity * Born Mainland US	0.013	(0.023)	0.019	(0.035)
Religiosity * Cog Rep * Born Mainland US			-0.014	(0.068)
BA/Charismatic	-0.038	(0.009) ***	-0.035	(0.010) ***
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep	0.089	(0.021) ***	0.080	(0.024) ***
BA/Charismatic * Born Mainland	0.026	(0.016) *	0.011	(0.026)
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep * Born Mainland			0.0308	(0.048)
Cognitive Representation of Parties	0.067	(0.048)	0.001	(0.057)
Cog Rep * Born Mainland	0.068	(0.022) ***	.249	(0.098) **
Born Mainland United States	-0.014	(0.034)	-0.100	(0.051) *
Ideology	0.245	(0.015) ***	0.244	(0.015) ***
Catholic	-0.044	(0.007) ***	-0.044	(0.007) **
Income	0.016	(0.012)	0.016	(0.012)
Cuban	0.223	(0.019) ***	0.223	(0.019) ***
Mexican	0.025	(0.008) ***	0.025	(0.008) ***
Puerto Rican	0.003	(0.013)	0.003	(0.013)
Female	-0.013	(0.006) **	-0.013	(0.006) **
High School	-0.028	(0.007) ***	-0.028	(0.007) ***
Some College	-0.019	(0.009) **	-0.019	(0.009) **
College Grad	-0.036	(0.013) ***	-0.035	(0.013) ***
Grad education	-0.032	(0.015) **	-0.031	(0.015) **
Age (years)	-0.003	(0.0002) ***	-0.003	(0.0002) ***
Constant	0.450	(0.026) ***	0.474	(0.028) ***
Observations	8,035		8,035	
R-squared	0.122		0.123	

(Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis)

*** p < .01 ** p < .05 *p < .1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et. al)

Other coefficients to pay attention to are the constituent variables from the interaction. At the lowest levels of religiosity and Latino identity, and when respondents are foreign-born, cognitive representation does not have a significant effect on partisanship (.067, s.e. .048). The same weak effect is present for place of birth (-.014, s.e. .033). Cogrep has a significant, albeit small, effect on partisanship for those born in the US. The effect of .068 (s.e. .022) suggests that non religious Latinos who are at the lowest level of Latino identity (a very small group) and have a high level of cogrep are slightly more Republican.

These results show that both variables, being born in the US and one's level of cognitive representation of parties, are important moderators of the impact of group identity on partisanship. These models have also shown that religiosity does not seem to play an important part in pulling Latinos toward the Republican Party if we include a Born again or Charismatic Catholic identity the regression.


However, these results leave open the possibility of a three way interaction between social identities, political socialization and cogrep. The last column in Table 4.1 explores these triple interactions. One way to think of what could be occurring is to imagine a scenario where somebody was born in this country but has never paid attention to politics and as such does not have a clear idea of how the parties relate to social groups. The empirical evidence that shows how little Americans know about politics supports the idea that being socialized from birth into the American polity might not be enough to be able to link social identities to political parties.

Among Latino identity very few coefficients are significant despite the negative sign of all coefficients. Interestingly, the three way interaction is significant and has a large coefficient; this suggests both moderating variables exacerbate the impact of Latino identity on partisanship. In order to be better able to understand what the impact of Latino identity is on partisanship I graphically represent the marginal effect of this variable on partisanship across the levels of cogrep while showing the different effects occurring from place of birth. Figure 4.6A shows that Latino Identity has an increasing effect on partisanship as we move along the cogrep scale.

All the coefficients for religiosity are insignificant. The evangelical identity baseline (born abroad and cogrep = 0) is significantly different from zero and leads foreign-born Latinos to identify more with the Democratic Party. However, the interaction with cogrep is significant and positive. This coefficient predicts a change in the direction of the effect of identifying as born again or charismatic as a function of respondents' cogrep. Figure 4.6B graphs the marginal


effects of how these religious identities affect partisanship. Both lines increase in their impact on partisanship across the x axis, pulling Latinos toward the Republican Party with more force as cogrep increases. While both lines follow a similar trace, the impact of being a born again Christian or a Charismatic Catholic is stronger for Latinos born in the US.

4.6A Effects of Latino Identity moderated by Place of Birth (Mainland US or Abroad) and Cognitive Representation.



The results show that both cognitive representation of parties and place of birth interact with a salient group identity in predicting partisanship; there is however scant evidence for a three way interaction across all identity variables. Only Latino identity seems to be significantly affected by the three way interaction, where US born Latinos are more likely to use this identity at higher levels of cogrep. Interestingly, for the religious identity variable cogrep seems to matter more than does place of birth or the three way interaction. These regressions however lump all immigrants together and are incapable of looking at different levels of socialization among foreign-born Latinos.

4.6B Marginal Effects of Born Again or Charismatic Catholic Identity Moderated by Place of Birth (Mainland US or Abroad) and Cognitive Representation.



Time in United States Model for Immigrants

Table 4.2 shows the results from OLS regressions measuring socialization as time in the United States. The first column of Table 4.2 looks at the interactions including both moderators with no triple interactions. The first three rows show the effect of Latino Identity as a constituent term as well as its interaction with political socialization (time in the US) and cogrep. While all coefficients are negative only the interaction with time in the US is significant. This means that socialization, measured by time in the US is necessary for foreign-born Latinos to translate their Latino identity into partisanship. Neither religiosity nor its interactions are significant.

A respondent’s identification as a born again Christian or Charismatic Catholic once again has the curious negative sign on the constituent term of this variable, suggesting that a born again or charismatic identity pulls respondents low in cogrep who have just arrived into the US towards the Democratic Party (-.047, s.e. .013). This effect inverts as cogrep increases. The interaction term for BA/Charismatic of .085 (s.e. .025) is twice as large as the constituent term and positive, meaning those who have a better understanding of the relationship between parties

and groups use their evangelical identity to feel more Republican. The cogrep constituent coefficient is marginally significant and negative (-.106, s.e. .064), suggesting that even at low levels of Latino identity and socialization, Latino immigrants with a higher understanding of parties are more Democratic than those who have a less clear picture of how these parties relate to groups and issues. However, as Latinos high on cogrep are in this country for longer, they are slightly pulled toward the Republican Party, as is shown by the cogrep and time in United States interaction (.004, s.e. .001). Time in the US does not individually affect partisanship.

Table 4.2 Partisanship as a function of Cog Rep and time in the US for foreign-born Latinos.

Latino Identity	-0.002	(0.038)	-0.054	(0.049)
Latino Identity * Cog Rep	-0.080	(0.073)	0.065	(0.124)
Latino Identity * Time in US	-0.003	(0.002) *	-0.001	(0.003)
Latino ID* Cog Rep * Time in US			-0.006	(0.005)
Religiosity	0.019	(0.021)	0.043	(0.026)*
Religiosity * Cog Rep	0.057	(0.040)	-0.005	(0.065)
Religiosity * Time in US	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.002	(0.001)
Religiosity * Cog Rep * Time in US			0.003	(0.003)
BA/Charismatic	-0.047	(0.013) ***	-0.053	(0.016) ***
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep	0.085	(0.025) ***	0.100	(0.040) **
BA/Charismatic * Time in US	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep * Time in			-0.001	(0.002)
Cognitive Representation of Parties	-0.106	(0.063) *	-0.185	(0.103) *
Cog Rep * Time in US	0.004	(0.001) ***	0.007	(0.004) *
Time in United States	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.003	(0.002)
Ideology	0.166	(0.018) ***	0.165	(0.018) ***
Constant	0.424	(0.036) ***	0.452	(0.043) ***
Observations		5,371		5,371
R-squared		0.099		0.100

(Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis)

*** p < .01 ** p < .05 *p < .1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et. al)

Note: Social and Demographic control variables were included in estimation but are not shown.

The last column of coefficients in Table 4.2 shows a similar model that now includes the three-way interactions for the identity variables and the moderators. There are no significant

effects for the Latino identity variable, yet many of the coefficients are negative and might in fact lead to strong effects of this variable on partisanship. Religiosity is only significant (.043, s.e. .026) when both cognitive representation and time in the US are low. The effect of Born Again or Charismatic identity is consistent with the findings so far. For newcomers with low cogrep, an evangelical identity pulls Latinos toward the Democratic Party (-.053, s.e. .016). However, as cogrep increases, the effect of this religious identity inverts signs and predicts Republican identification (.100, s.e. .040). None of the other interactions are significant.

I plot these effects in Figures 4.7A, 4.7B and 4.7C. Figure 4.7A plots the marginal effect of Latino identity on partisanship. The four lines represent the 4 categories created for the Cog Rep variable, ranging from very low (darkest line with dots) to very high (lightest line). The X axis represents time in the United States.⁴⁸




Figure 4.7A shows a strong interaction that is less clear in Table 4.2. At low levels of cognitive representation, the effect of Latino identity is quite consistent across the levels of

⁴⁸ While the full range is included in the plots, it is important to realize that there are very few immigrants who have lived in this country for more than 60 years and thus looking at the far end of the X axis might provide an unrealistic picture of the marginal effect of Latino identity at different levels of socialization.

political socialization. As cogrep increases, the effect of socialization on the impact of Latino identity becomes much starker. Newcomers to America with lower levels of cogrep are less likely to use their strength of feelings as a Latino or Latina to identify with the Democratic Party. Latinos who have been in this country for about 10 years, cogrep does not affect the marginal impact of Latino identity on partisanship. However, after 20 years in the United States the difference between levels of cogrep increases. Immigrants living in this country for thirty or more years with high levels of cogrep show at least a doubling of the marginal effect of Latino identity compared to those with low levels of cogrep. This effect is very strong as the marginal effect of Latinoness surpasses .40 (on a 0 to 1 scale) for highly socialized individuals at the highest level of the Cog Rep variable.

This finding is crucial to the central premise of this dissertation, that Latino identity matters, but only if people are socialized into American politics and only if they have a mental representation of how parties align with social groups and ideologies. While a sense of panethnic identity clearly matters for Latino politics, the identity is not automatically translated into political parties.

Figure 4.7B. Effects of Religiosity Moderated by Time in the US and Cog Rep.




Figure 4.7B plots the marginal effects of religiosity with the three way interaction. As we can see, socialization interacted with cog rep results in very different marginal effects of religiosity.⁴⁹ At the lower levels of socialization the effect of religiosity is on party ID is positive and all the levels of cogrep are indistinguishable from each other. However, as immigrants are more socialized we see that the impact of Religiosity changes in interesting ways. Once again it is important to be cautious about looking too far along the scale of time in United States. Nonetheless, the results show that those who are socialized into American politics use their religiosity differently depending on the understanding they have of political parties.

Figure 4.7C. Effects of Born Again or Charismatic Catholic Identity Moderated by Time in the US and Cog Rep.




Figure 4.7C plots how the impact of identifying as Born Again Christian or Charismatic Catholic changes across levels of cogrep and socialization. At lower levels of socialization cognitive representation has an important impact on the marginal effect of this identity. Latinos

⁴⁹ It is important to be a bit cautious with these graphs because of the effect that several individuals at the highest levels of time in the US might have on the model. However, given the very large sample size used to evaluate my model, it is doubtful that influential observations are driving these findings. I also ran a similar model using a robust regression (using the STATA command rreg) and found very little differences between the results. Interestingly, the three way interaction for Latino identity becomes significant (-.010, s.e. .004).

with very low cogrep who are newcomers to the US use their evangelical identity to identify with the Democratic Party; however, as Latinos are more socialized, they slowly start to use this identity to identify as more Republican. Socialization appears to help evangelical immigrants to link their conservative identity with the correct party, even when they don't have a clear idea of how parties stand on issues. Nonetheless, it is important to remember how long it takes for these effects to reach 0 (about 40 years) and that for most foreign-born Latinos that are very unengaged in politics, their Born Again or Charismatic identity will never have a significant impact on partisanship. Furthermore, even for those who are high on both socialization and cogrep, the effect of this identity is just above .05, a very small pull in the Republican direction.

While the three way interactions do not always follow the same pattern, the empirical evidence suggests that Latinos must be somewhat socialized and have a clear mental picture of how parties relate to other political and non-political elements of American life in order to be able to use their group identity to inform their choice of partisanship.

Distinct Effects of Latino Solidarity and Strength of Identity

The evidence presented so far has shown that the effect of a pan-ethnic Latino identity (strongly related to Democratic identification) is exacerbated by increased cogrep and socialization into American politics. However, all of the previous models have relied on a single scale measure of Latino identity to predict partisanship. While the Latino identity scale used above is very reliable and consistent across different Latino subgroups, chapter 3 showed that two nested latent variables can be found within the Latino Identity scale. The first latent construct was measured by the commonality and linked fate items; the second one by strength of identity and the perceived importance of keeping Spanish. I test whether the effects for each construct are distinct by splitting up Latino identity. The first subscale represents what John Garcia coined "solidarity." The second subscale measures strength of Latino identity.

The first regression estimates the effects of pan-ethnic identities on partisanship when moderated by cogrep and socialization. Table 4.3 shows the results of this model. The first two columns use place of birth as a measure of socialization, the next two use time in the US. The first column of each group of coefficients (first and third) shows two interactions with a moderator for each identity while the last column presents the same interactions along with the

three way interactions⁵⁰. The major focus of this table how the two different measures of Pan-ethnicity affect partisanship when they are estimated as separate predictors.

The first three rows show the linear and moderated effects of the Latino solidarity variable. All of the coefficients related Latino solidarity (feelings of commonality and linked fate) are negative. The baseline is significantly different from zero (-.043, s.e. .020). Both interactions are negative, which shows that at all levels of the moderating variables, the effect of Latino solidarity on partisanship is significant in pulling Latinos away from the Republican Party.

The interaction with cogrep is not significant but being born in the continental USA marginally increases the pull toward the Democratic Party when compared to Latinos born abroad (-.061, s.e. .035). The strength of identity constituent term represents the effect of strength of identity for foreign-born Latinos who are at the lowest level of cogrep, it is insignificant. The interaction with cogrep shows the impact of the strength of identification for respondents who have the highest level of cognitive representation of parties, this effect is significant and quite large (-.174, s.e. .038). There is no significant difference between US born and foreign-born Latinos on the impact of Latino identity strength.

Both religious identities show patterns similar to those found above and the religiosity coefficients are not shown. The second column of coefficients shows the three way interactions of the identity variables and the measures of place of birth and cognitive representation of parties. None of the three-way interactions are significant, suggesting small differences between foreign-born Latinos and those born on the mainland across the different levels of cogrep.

Once again, these effects might obscure the diversity among foreign-born Latino immigrants. In order to understand socialization among Latino immigrants, the last two columns substitute place of birth for years lived in the US (only foreign-born Latinos). The only significant coefficient among the Latino identity sets of variables (first eight rows of the table) is the interaction between identity strength and cogrep. This suggests a strong moderating effect of this variable on partisanship. None of the variables that include Latino identity have a significant effect on partisanship in the model with three way interactions.

⁵⁰ Other models were estimated including only one of the two moderators. The moderators were consistently significant across the identities. Nonetheless, it is theoretically more interesting to look at the full model where the identities are interacted with both, and not just one, of the moderating variables.

Table 4.3. Partisanship Regressed on Social Identities interacted with Cog Rep and Socialization Separating Latino Identity into Two Main Constructs.

	Full sample		Foreign-born	
Latino Solidarity	-0.043** (0.020)	-0.050** (0.021)	-0.030 (0.030)	-0.053 (0.037)
Lat Solidarity * Cog Rep	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.0036 (0.053)	0.023 (0.055)	0.084 (0.091)
Lat Solidarity * Socialization	-0.061* (0.035)	-0.028 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.002)
Lat Solidarity * Cog Rep * Socialization		-0.066 (0.103)		-0.003 (0.0038)
Strength of Latino Identity	0.012 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.029)	0.036 (0.039)	0.017 (0.049)
Lat ID Strength* Cog Rep	-0.174*** (0.038)	-0.129*** (0.047)	-0.12** (0.051)	-0.089 (0.084)
Lat ID strength * Socialization	-0.055 (0.041)	0.024 (0.063)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Lat ID strength * Cog Rep * Socialization		-0.106 (0.078)		-0.001 (0.003)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.039*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.010)	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.054*** (0.016)
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep	0.088*** (0.021)	0.080*** (0.024)	0.082*** (0.025)	0.099** (0.041)
BA/Charismatic * Socialization	0.027* (0.016)	0.012 (0.026)	0.0008 (0.0006)	0.001 (0.0009)
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep * Socialization		0.028 (0.049)		-0.0008 (0.002)
Cognitive Representation of Parties	0.154*** (0.057)	0.084 (0.070)	-0.0150 (0.079)	-0.074 (0.127)
Cog Rep * Socialization	0.054** (0.022)	0.219** (0.111)	0.004*** (0.0009)	0.006 (0.005)
Socialization	Born Mainland US		Time in US	
	-0.024 (0.039)	-0.104* (0.060)	-0.0009 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Ideology	0.243*** (0.015)	0.242*** (0.015)	0.166*** (0.018)	0.166*** (0.018)
Constant	0.452*** (0.030)	0.479*** (0.03)	0.410*** (0.042)	0.433*** (0.051)
Observations	7,912	7,912	5,296	5,296
R-squared	0.125	0.126	0.099	0.100

(Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis)

*** p < .01 ** p < .05 *p < .1

Note: Religiosity and Demographic control variables were included in estimation but are not shown.

The only significant identity effects occur for the Born Again or Charismatic variable. Here we see that the trend shown throughout this chapter continues, newcomers with low levels

of cogrep use their evangelical identity to identify with the Democratic Party. As levels of cogrep increase, this identity pulls them toward the Republican Party and away from Democrats.

Figure 4.8A shows the marginal effect of Latino solidarity on partisanship. The flat line represents the marginal effect of Latino solidarity for respondents with very low cogrep across different levels of political socialization. The effect is small and not statistically significant even at higher levels of socialization. As we increase in levels of cogrep however we see that time in the US has an increasingly important effect on the impact that Latino solidarity has on partisanship. In fact, for those with the highest cogrep, time in the US determines the direction of the effect of solidarity on partisanship. The effect goes from an insignificant positive effect to a negative effect of $-.059$ for Latinos who have lived in this country for 30 years. For Latinos with very high cogrep who have lived in the US for 50 years, the effect of Latino solidarity is of $-.119$. These results suggest that Latino solidarity plays a small role on Latino's party preferences, even at very high levels of both cogrep and socialization.

Figure 4.8 A. Marginal Effect of *Latino Solidarity* by Levels of Cogrep on Partisanship across Time in United States





Figure 4.8B plots the conditional effects of the strength of Latino identity. The lines do not cross each other yet both moderators play an important role in how Latinos use the strength of their identity to inform their choice of political party. For Latinos with low cogrep, time in the US changes the effect of strength of identity. After 10 years the effect of strength of identity is just above 0. For a similar respondent who has been in this country for 20 years the effect is now negative but still extremely small (-.007). However, we can see that after 50 years of socialization there is a much stronger pull toward the Democratic Party. While small, this effect shows that for strength of Latino identity, time in the US has an important moderating effect.

Figure 4.8 B. Effect of *Strength of Latino Identity* by Levels of Cogrep on Partisanship across Time in United States



As cogrep increases so does the effect of strength of identity on partisanship. For recently arrived Latinos with a score of .5 (out of 1) on the cogrep scale, the effect of strength of identity is -.028; for those at the highest level of cogrep it is -.072. As cogrep and socialization increase, so does the impact of strength of identity in making Latinos feel more democratic. Latinos at the highest level of cogrep who have been in this country for 40 years experience a 20% pull toward the Democratic Party as a function of their strength of identity as Latino. This demonstrates that

the effect of strength of identity also increases with cogrep and socialization among foreign-born Latinos.

Overall, we see that the full Latino Identity scale is a stronger predictor of partisanship than are its separate components. However, when separating the components into different parts we see that the effect of solidarity is not as strong as the effect of strength of identity at increasing levels of the moderating variables. This suggests that strength of identity does in fact play an important role in determining how Latinos identify with a political party. Furthermore, the findings, although mostly statistically insignificant support the idea that for either solidarity or strength of Latino identity to have an effect on partisanship, they must be catalyzed by political socialization and the cognitive representation of parties.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has examined the effect of social and group identities on partisanship in many distinct ways. The basic model looked at the linear effects of these identities on partisanship and while sometimes significant, they weren't always substantive.

The main model proposed in this dissertation asserts that in order for social groups to be related to partisanship, Latinos must be socialized into American politics and have a mental representation of how parties are related to non-political groups and ideas. This was tested by interacting the relevant identities with proxies for political socialization and the cognitive representation of political parties.

Political socialization was operationalized mainly as either place of birth (Mainland vs. US) or time lived in the US (for foreign-born Latinos). The proportion of their life a person has spent in the United States has also been proposed as an alternative measure of political socialization. The last column in appendix 4.F shows the results of using this variable. The effects of all identity variables are consistent with the other results. This measure of socialization also finds the proposed relationship between born again or charismatic membership and partisanship. Cognitive representation of political parties was measured by a variable akin to political sophistication (partisan schema according to Lodge and Hamill, 1986). Both variables were found to be important moderators of the impact of identities. However, three way interactions did not provide any significant effects yet confirmed the trends shown by the two-way interactions.

One of the consistent findings in this chapter is that Latino identity matters more than religious identity. This was clear in all the distinct models tested above. It is possible that this signifies that a religious approach to pulling Latinos toward the Republican Party might be effective yet insufficient.

The preceding chapter (Chapter 3) showed that Latino Identity can be construed as consisting of two underlying constructs, one that measures commonality, consciousness (Sanchez 2006) or solidarity (Garcia 2010) and another one that measures strength of identification as a Latino. When we estimate partisanship with separate measures for each of these constructs the strength of identity is stronger than is the solidarity measure. This provides some tentative evidence for the claim that identities matter significantly for Latinos. It also provides further evidence that the conceptualization of linked fate and group consciousness as developed in the race and politics literature might be inadequate to help explain Latino partisanship and political behavior.

In this chapter I have to a large extent ignored the role played by perceptions of discrimination. The previous chapter showed how perceptions of discrimination against Latinos are not a good measure of Latino identity; however, perceptions of discrimination seem to play a role that leads Latinos to think more like minorities (Portes & Zhou 1994). Including discrimination in a regression (Appendix 4.F) does not affect the main results and discrimination does not play an important (whether moderated or not) role on partisanship. These findings seem to contradict the findings of nearly two decades ago that found a strong link between discrimination and Democratic partisanship (Cain et al. 1991). This could signify that as Latinos gain more visibility and acceptance as a relevant group in American politics, the bases of their identification have shifted from those of experiencing less opportunities and less access to resources to a new base that reinforces a strong ethnic and cultural identity that unites Latinos in collective action.

Another set of regressions was run on each Latino subgroup separately. The results suggest that the identity theory works well for all non-Cuban groups. Interestingly, Cubans appear to be simply driven by ideology in their partisanship, however, it is important to remember that it might be the strong Republican partisanship of Cubans that is driving their ideology and that the regression coefficient simply tells us that both variables are very highly related for Cubans.

While the theory present here is quite robust for Mexican, Latino, and other non-Cuban Latinos, it does not work for Cubans (see appendix 4.H). Cubans seem to be the outliers on many different factors. Cubans are strongly socialized into linking Democrats with the failure to stop the Castro regime. Also, because of the slightly lighter complexion of many Cuban immigrants, they might reject a relationship between the minority-supporting Democrats and their own group identity. While an in-depth study of Cubans is beyond this research endeavor, it is clear that they raise a theoretical challenge in thinking about how to extend this theory beyond non-Cuban Latinos.

While this chapter has shown the importance of identity-based explanations of partisanship among Latinos, it has neglected the impact of issues on partisanship. Research has asserted that Latinos are heavily political in their partisanship (Alvarez & García Bedolla 2003; Nicholson & Segura 2005) In order to establish that Latino identity is the primary driver of partisanship; it must be tested against a competing explanation that seems to be well established in Latino politics research. The next chapter explores the relationship between Latino identity, issue preferences and partisanship.

Chapter 5

Direct and Indirect Effects of Identity on Party Identification

The theory tested in the previous chapter is robust to many different specifications. However, the specifications ignore an important component of political partisanship, issue preferences. While chapter two thoroughly explored the role of the issue of immigration on partisanship, other issue preferences have been shown to be very important in determining partisanship among Latinos (Alvarez & García Bedolla 2003; Barreto & Woods 2005). In his review piece, de la Garza states that issues are central to political partisanship among Latinos and that issue positions are surprisingly more important than Socio-Economic Status for Latinos when choosing which party they will feel closer to (2004, p. 103). However, it still remains unclear which issues are (or should be) central to Latino political behavior and partisanship.

Issues are undoubtedly related to partisanship, nevertheless, the chapter examining the role of immigration attitudes – considered to be a naturally relevant issue for Latinos – on partisanship showed that this issue alone cannot predict partisanship. Interestingly, research on Latino policy positions (Branton 2007; Polinard et al. 1984, Sanchez 2006) has often contradicted research on partisanship (Alvarez & García Bedolla 2003; Nicholson & Segura 2004) in stating which issues are the most important for Latinos. More problematic might be the tightly knit relationship between partisanship and many other areas of political behavior (Bartels 2002, Basinger & Lavine 2005). Arguing that the causal arrow points in only one direction might be both empirically implausible (see chapter 2), and theoretically incorrect (Carsey & Layman 2006).

Clearly partisanship serves as a heuristic that guides Latinos' policy preferences for issues they might not have thought about, but on the other hand, in the case of Cubans, it is a historical issue legacy which continues to dictate Cubans' rejection of Democrats. The analysis in chapter 2 using the Latino Policy Coalition 2006 survey showed that attitudes on immigration were not related to partisanship. Also, in the same section it was shown that partisanship also has a non-significant effect on preferences toward immigration policy. One problem with that data however was that it was a survey of registered voters and as such might not be representative of the whole Latino population, much of which is more closely related to immigration than most

registered voters are. It is important to reanalyze the question of partisanship using a more comprehensive model that includes issue attitudes as well as a prominent role for social identities.

There is no reason why the political impacts of Latino identity should be confined to partisanship. In fact, García (1993, 2011) and Sanchez (2006) have separately argued that Latino identity matters to political behavior and issue attitudes. If panethnic identity in fact is an important component of political behavior among Latinos, then it should also have an important role in determining policy positions. This chapter first explores the role that Latino identity has on issue positions and then explores a full model of partisanship incorporating Latino identity as well as issue positions as predictors of partisanship. Finally, the direct and indirect effects of Latino identity on partisanship through issue positions are estimated and explained.

Identity and Issue Preferences

In one of the few studies linking Latino identity to public opinion Sanchez (2006) explores the role of ethnic commonality among Latino subgroups. A major part of the constructed variable called commonality asks respondents how close they feel to different subsets of Latino groups (national origin). However, as Huddy and Virtanen (1995) find, it is possible that Latinos at the same time identify strongly as a Latino and yet feel quite distinct from Latinos of other national origins. This in fact was shown using the LNS 2006 in chapter 3. Another important component of Sanchez' (2006) measure of group consciousness is the belief that discrimination against Latinos is an important problem. This dissertation has shown this construct to not be the best for the study of Latinos (Segura et al. 2006). Interestingly, when the survey asks those who report feeling being treated unfairly (45% of sample) the reason for this discrimination, less than 30% report that their Latino heritage was the cause of the discrimination. This evidence further opposes the idea of discrimination as a precursor of group consciousness (Garcia 2010, Jones-Correa 2007, Masuoka 2006; see also Garcia 2003).

In explaining the dynamics of Latinos as a political group I propose prominent roles of Latino Identity and group consciousness in determining political behavior in general as well as partisanship. Furthermore, I contend that group identities are the driving force behind both issue attitudes and partisanship. The specific hypotheses for this chapter are:

Hypothesis 1. Latino identity is closely related to liberal policy views, which in turn predict stronger Democratic attachment.

The corollaries of this first hypothesis are in turn:

Hypothesis 2: A positive effect of Latino identity on economic, education, and welfare variables is expected.

Hypothesis 3: Pro-immigration attitudes are closely tied to Latino identity and as such should have a strong positive relation.

Hypothesis 4: a stronger Latino identity will be linked to more conservative social policies⁵¹. Nevertheless, as shown in the previous sections, religious identities play an important role on Latino partisanship and because they are directly linked to social issues, it is expected that (*Hypothesis 4a*). Religious variables play a prominent role on social issue preferences.

Using the LNS 2006, and the developed Latino Identity scales I explore these hypotheses.

Dependent Variables

I rely on 8 questions related to policy preferences in the 2006 LNS. Three questions address government spending, asking respondents their approval or disapproval of government spending on welfare, health care, and education. The two social items ask about respondents views on abortion (4 point) and gay marriage (3 point). The items related to immigration policy include attitudes on the DREAM act, immigration policy and their perception of the impact of new immigrants on the US.

I create three scales for each issue area⁵²: Government spending ($\alpha = .52$), social policies ($\alpha = .51$), and immigration issues ($\alpha = .50$).^{53,54} All scales are coded 0 to 1. 0 Represents the most liberal (pro-spending, abortion, gay marriage, immigration). 1 represents the most conservative opinions.

⁵¹ In evaluating this hypothesis it is important to keep in mind the finding that religiosity and religious denomination in fact have a very strong effect on opposition to abortion (Ellison, Echevarría, Smith 2005). Furthermore, contrary to Sánchez (2006) they however find that foreign-born are less likely to support abortion than are US-born, they do not include a measure for Latino identity in their model.

⁵² A principal components analysis supports a three-component solution. A screeplot confirms the drop in the impact of the components further reaffirming the 3-component solution. An oblique rotation of the items shows that the issue positions conform to simple structure and that each item loads correctly onto the theoretically expected component. Exploratory factor analyses confirm these findings. The component loadings are shown in Appendix 5.A and show that the issues included in this exploration conform to expectations.

⁵⁴ The government spending or economic issues scale is a 13 point scale; social issues 11 point scale, and the immigration issues scale is composed of 13 points. Making the analyses somewhat continues and allowing for OLS estimation instead of a form of ordered maximum likelihood.

Independent Variables

Each dependent variable is estimated with the same set of predictors and controls, all variables are coded 0 to 1. Table 5.1 presents the results for the models estimated for the whole sample. The predictors are the same as in the previous chapter. I use the full Latino identity scale in these explorations. I include both measures of religious identification as they have been shown to not have identical effects on partisanship, as such we are able to look at the effects of both religiosity (church attendance) and identification with a born again Christian tradition (born again or charismatic Catholic).

I control for two political variables, partisanship⁵⁵ and ideology. I also include a group of variables to test whether incorporation or acculturation has an independent effect on policy preferences once political and identity factors have been controlled for. I include dummy variables for US born Latinos (2nd generation) and one for those whose parents were also born in the US (3rd generation and beyond). The models exploring the determinants of policy opinions among foreign born Latinos (table 3) substitute the generational variables for a variable measuring the length of time the respondent has resided in the US. Controls as well as a variable determining whether or not the respondent is a citizen (in the case of those foreign-born this might be an important variable) are also included.

Results

Political Attitudes

Using the constructed scales as the dependent variables, I now explore the effect that each of these constructs has on different policy attitudes. The results mostly confirm hypotheses 2 and 3. Latino Identity is significant in predicting more liberal economic and immigration policy preferences. The effects of Latino identity on economic and immigration issue preferences are in fact much larger than those of partisanship and ideology – both highly significant, suggesting a prominence of Latinoness in policy positions. Interestingly, for social policies, the

⁵⁵ This is done because of the highly interrelated nature of issues and partisanship. While Identities are the driving force behind both political preferences – issues and party ID – it is important to include partisanship as a control when proposing alternate variables as the driving force behind issue preferences.

identity constructs are not significant. Across all columns, partisanship and ideology are also significant and consistent with expectations.

Table 5.1 Effect of Identities on Issue Attitudes for Full Sample.

	Economic/ Spending	Social issues	Immigration issues
Latino Identity	-0.132*** (0.015)	0.016 (0.030)	-0.187*** (0.017)
Religiosity	-0.004 (0.008)	0.165*** (0.017)	-0.014* (0.008)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.013*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.005)
Partisanship	0.033*** (0.009)	0.088*** (0.018)	0.041*** (0.010)
Ideology	0.038*** (0.010)	0.143*** (0.021)	0.024** (0.010)
Income	0.066*** (0.009)	-0.067*** (0.019)	0.033*** (0.009)
Cuban origin	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.070*** (0.023)	-0.025** (0.012)
Mexican origin	0.012** (0.006)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.006 (0.006)
Puerto Rican origin	-0.037*** (0.012)	-0.081*** (0.030)	0.032** (0.015)
Female	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.010)	-0.019*** (0.005)
Some College	0.007 (0.006)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.007 (0.007)
College Graduate	0.018** (0.009)	-0.081*** (0.019)	0.015 (0.009)
Graduate Education	0.009 (0.010)	-0.088*** (0.020)	-0.009 (0.011)
Citizen	0.014** (0.006)	-0.042*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.006)
Second Generation	0.027*** (0.008)	-0.061*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.008)
Third + generation	0.025*** (0.006)	-0.027** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.006)
Age	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.003*** (0.0004)	0.001*** (0.0001)
Constant	0.263*** (0.016)	0.432*** (0.033)	0.191*** (0.017)
Observations	7,432	3,446	7,567
R-squared	0.052	0.157	0.128

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al.)

On economic issues, generational status has a significant positive effect, meaning second and third generation Latinos are less likely to support federal spending on welfare, health care, and education. However, the magnitude of the effect of generational status is less than 3% change on economic policy preferences; much less than the effect of the Latino identity variables. Being a citizen only has a marginally significant, and quite miniscule, effect on economic policy preferences.


The middle column of coefficients in table 5.1 presents the model regressed on social policies (abortion and gay marriage scale). Second generation Latinos are in fact more liberal than are immigrants. As expected, the strongest variables in this model are those related to religion. The most religious are almost 17% more likely to prefer conservative social policies than the least religious while holding all other variables constant. Born Again identification is also highly significant but exerts only about a 4% impact on social policy preferences.

The last column of table 5.1 shows the result for the regression on immigration preferences. Once again, 0 is the most liberal stance (pro-DREAM act, pro-immigration, and positive opinions about immigrants). It must be noted that each of the individual variables are heavily skewed toward the pro-immigration attitudes. 77% of respondents oppose or strongly oppose higher tuition rates for immigrants without proper documentation (DREAM act). In regards to immigration policy a whopping 42% support immediate legalization (amnesty) while another 32% support a guest worker program that eventually leads to naturalization. Only 5% support efforts to stop immigration and seal the borders. When Latinos are asked about whether immigrants help or hinder the United States, over 90% believe immigrants strengthen the country. However, there are clear generational effects as immigrants and non-citizens are most likely to believe immigrants improve the US. The differences across generation and citizenship status are all significant ($p < .001$). Figure 5.1 plots the frequencies of responses to this question for across generations and citizenship status.

Despite the small levels of variation in the dependent variables the results in Table 5.2 portray a trend similar to that found with economic policies. Both measures of Latino identity are negative and significant in predicting immigration attitudes. The measures of incorporation however now are stronger than in the previous models. Generational status has a significant effect on attitudes toward immigration preferences (.03 for second generation and .044 for third+ generations). It is important to note that the constant is .36 (on a 0 to 1 scale).

These results appear to support both Hypothesis 2 and 3. However, it is possible that the effects of political socialization and incorporation are muted when lumping all 1st generation Latinos into one category. The effects of socialization might be most visible among immigrants. I now replicate these models with only those respondents in the LNS 2006 who are foreign born.

Figure 5.1. Immigration Views across Generation and Citizenship Status. (LNS 2006)



First Generation Immigrant Policy Preferences

The models exploring the effects of the identity and integration variables for Latinos who were not born in the US (table 5.2) vary only in one aspect. The generational variable is substituted with a variable measuring the respondent's time in the US. The discussion of the results will focus on the identity variables and will not discuss the controls variables.

The first column shows the effect on government spending preferences. The effect of Latino panethnic identification is both significant and substantive. A Latino with the highest value on the Latino identity scale is 12% closer to the most liberal point of the scale. Interestingly, neither partisanship nor ideology has an effect on these preferences. This is probably due to the high numbers of first generation Latinos who lack an understanding of the relationship between the parties, ideology, and issue positions (see Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1993; Delli-Carpini & Keeter 1997).

The second column models social preferences. As with the full sample, Latino group identity has a negligible effect on social policy preferences. For these social issues, ideology and partisanship are both significant and in the expected direction. Religiosity is once again the most important variable in this model (.148, s.e. .020). Born Again or Charismatic identification is also significant but much smaller in impact (.025, s.e. .012).

Table 5.2 Effect of Identities on Issue Attitudes for Foreign-Born Latinos. Time in United States is Used as Socialization Variable.

VARIABLES	Economic/ Spending	Social	Immigration
Latino Identity	-0.123*** (0.019)	0.004 (0.036)	-0.116*** (0.017)
Religiosity	-0.006 (0.009)	0.148*** (0.020)	-0.0004 (0.009)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.012** (0.006)	0.025** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.005)
Partisanship	0.006 (0.011)	0.057*** (0.021)	0.051*** (0.010)
Ideology	0.018 (0.011)	0.126*** (0.024)	0.006 (0.010)
Income	0.055*** (0.011)	-0.103*** (0.023)	0.027** (0.011)
Time living in US	0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0006)	0.001*** (0.0003)
Constant	0.303*** (0.020)	0.493*** (0.040)	0.193*** (0.019)
Observations	5,266	2,430	5,371
R-squared	0.027	0.101	0.064

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Control variables are included but not shown as the mostly mirror table 5.1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et al.)

In the last column we can see that Latino identity has a strong and significant effect on attitudes toward immigration policies. This provides some support for hypothesis 4 yet not as strong as with the model including mainland-born Latinos. This supports the idea that a strong sense of Latino identity pushes immigrants, regardless of citizenship status and time in the country to be more willing to support increases in immigration. Religiosity, evangelical identity and income don't impact either of the immigration related variables;

Once again, the results appear to provide some support for the hypotheses laid out above. In fact, length of residence and citizenship status, variables found to be quite strongly related to concepts of acculturation, assimilation, and political incorporation, are only significant for the immigration policy positions. Even when they are significant, their effect on policy positions is almost negligible. Partisanship is also related with non-economic preferences while ideology only affects social preferences, the social issues model is where Latino solidarity and identity strength are least influential.

The effect of the group identity scales on policy preferences is almost always significant and has substantive effects on most realms of policy. Latinos, regardless of where they were born and how long they've lived in this country, incorporate their feelings of solidarity with other Latinos as well as the strength of their identification into their attitudes toward government spending and immigration. These effects are even stronger than the effects of ideology and partisanship, reaffirming the prominent role of group identity in Latino politics. Since Latino partisanship has been argued to be heavily influenced by issue positions, it is imperative to estimate the impact of both Latino identity and issue positions in a model predicting partisanship.

Partisanship as a Function of Identities and Issue Positions

I now turn my attention to a more complete understanding of partisanship that incorporates identity variables as well as issue preferences. Issue preferences are coded as in the previous analyses, with zero representing the most liberal position and one representing the most conservative one. Table 5.3 estimates partisanship as a linear function of the predictors. The second column shows the results for a model that includes all respondents in the sample while the last column estimates partisanship for foreign born Latinos. One of the first things to notice in these models is that Latino identity plays a significant and substantive role in determining partisanship. The effects of Latino identity however are attenuated among foreign born Latinos, once again suggesting that political socialization may play an important role in how social identities are translated into political ones. Interestingly, religiosity plays a significant role only for the foreign-born respondents and not for the whole sample. Born again or Charismatic identification is non-significant. As expected, ideology plays an important role on partisanship and, similarly to the effect of Latino identity, is much more important for the whole sample (.242, s.e. .024) than it is for the foreign born sample (.156, s.e. .027).

Table 5.3. Partisanship Predicted by Social Identities and Issue Preferences.

	(Socialization = Generation)		Foreign Born (Socialization = Time in US)	
Identities				
Latino Identity	-0.136	(0.029)***	-0.067	(0.035)*
Religiosity	0.030	(0.016)*	0.040	(0.019)**
Born Again/Charismatic	0.011	(0.010)	-0.010	(0.011)
Ideology	0.242	(0.024)***	0.156	(0.027)***
Issue preferences				
Economic/spending issues	0.085	(0.024)***	0.018	(0.029)
Social issues	0.080	(0.017)***	0.053	(0.020)***
Immigration issues	0.034	(0.026)	0.055	(0.034)
Socialization				
2 nd generation	-0.033	(0.016)**	Years in the United States	
3 rd + generation	-0.034	(0.013)***	-0.003	(0.001)***
Controls				
Cuban	0.247	(0.027)***	0.251	(0.032)***
Mexican	0.016	(0.012)	0.040	(0.014)***
Puerto Rican	0.057	(0.027)**	0.010	(0.028)
Income	-0.008	(0.018)	0.005	(0.023)
Female	-0.004	(0.010)	0.019	(0.011)*
Some College	-0.001	(0.013)	0.002	(0.016)
College Graduate	-0.020	(0.019)	0.002	(0.024)
Graduate Education	-0.017	(0.020)	-0.032	(0.026)
Citizen	-0.035	(0.012)***	0.013	(0.015)
Age	-0.002	(0.0003)***	-0.0004	(0.0005)
Constant	0.370	(0.033)***	0.330	(0.041)***
Observations	3,412		2,407	
R-squared	0.120		0.089	
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Immigration preferences have no effect on partisanship, further reinforcing the findings from chapter 2. Social issues are significant and exert about an 8% effect on partisanship for both the full sample and the foreign born respondents alike. Last, economic issue preferences are only significant using the full sample but not for the model estimated with the foreign born

population. On the full sample, a change from the most liberal to the most conservative issue position creates about an 8.5% change on the partisan measure.⁵⁶

These results show that both issue positions and group identities are strongly related to partisanship. While most models of partisanship assume a direct relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable, the theory developed in this dissertation proposes that predictors are moderated by political socialization and by the cognitive representation of political parties. While it is interesting to look at the effects of the important variables on partisanship interacted with each moderator (socialization and cognitive representation of parties) separately,⁵⁷ the model proposed both are important in translating beliefs and attitudes into political partisanship.

A Fully Moderated Relationship between Identities, Issues and Partisanship

Table 5.4 shows the results for an OLS regression including each important predictor interacted with both cogrep and socialization in order to test whether the theory developed in this dissertation holds in a fully specified model. The second column estimates partisanship for the full sample using place of birth (born abroad is the omitted category) as a measure of political socialization. The last column operationalizes political socialization as time spent in the US. I will discuss the columns together as they should mirror each other to a large extent.

One of the first things to notice from these models is that the goodness of fit measures are increased, suggesting a better model than one using only one of the two moderators (Appendix 5.B). When looking at the constituent terms of the important predictors of partisanship (first several rows) we see that only a Born Again or Charismatic identity is significant in predicting partisanship. However, the effect of this identity is opposite to what we would expect and of what other models of religious identity and partisanship consistently show. Thus it is important to look at how the moderators change the impact that these identities have on partisanship.

⁵⁶ While issue positions and partisanship have been shown to be interrelated, the causal arrow in this specification is hypothesized to move from Identity (a basic driving force) to issue preferences and then partisanship. Other prominent studies on Latino partisanship use this specification assuming away the interconnectedness of issue preferences and party identification.

⁵⁷ Appendix 5.B shows the results for regressions predicting partisanship interacted with each moderating variable at a time. The results suggest cogrep and place of birth play an important role in helping Latinos link their social identities and political attitudes to partisanship.

Among the issue policy variables, Immigration preferences are marginally significant for both models as are economic considerations for the full sample model but are in the incorrect direction. With such a large sample, it does not make much sense to look at these marginal effects in much detail. None of the other issue policy variables are significant, reaffirming the need to look at how cogrep and socialization moderate the effects that these variables have on party identity.

Table 5.4. Moderated model of partisanship with issues with both sets of moderating variables.

	(Socialization = Born mainland United States)		(Socialization = Time in United States)	
Constituent terms of major predictors				
Latino Identity	-0.048	(0.039)	-0.055	(0.062)
Religiosity	0.032	(0.023)	0.050	(0.033)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.048	(0.014)***	-0.057	(0.021)***
Economic/spending Issues	-0.056	(0.034)*	-0.008	(0.050)
Social Issues	-0.020	(0.024)	-0.033	(0.035)
Immigration Issues	-0.101	(0.040)**	-0.109	(0.065)*
Socialization interactions				
Latino Identity * Socialization	-0.169	(0.067)**	-0.001	(0.003)
Religiosity * Socialization	-0.019	(0.034)	-0.001	(0.001)
BA/Charismatic * Socialization	0.046	(0.024)*	0.001	(0.001)
Economic/spending * Socialization	0.151	(0.053)***	0.001	(0.002)
Social * Socialization	0.047	(0.034)	0.0004	(0.001)
Immigration * Socialization	-0.043	(0.052)	-0.001	(0.002)
Cognitive Representation of Parties Interactions				
Latino Identity * Cog Rep	-0.072	(0.087)	0.034	(0.111)
Religiosity * Cog Rep	0.003	(0.012)	0.001	(0.015)
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep	0.106	(0.031)***	0.085	(0.037)**
Economic/spending * Cog Rep	0.175	(0.072)**	0.025	(0.093)
Social * Cog Rep	0.172	(0.047)***	0.176	(0.064)***
Immigration * Cog Rep	0.297	(0.072)***	0.407	(0.110)***
Cognitive Representation of parties	-0.203	(0.080)**	-0.258	(0.104)**
Socialization	(Born Mainland US)		(Time in US)	
	0.011	(0.060)	-0.003	(0.003)
Constant	0.464	(0.043)***	0.435	(0.064)***
Observations	3,627		2,407	
R-squared	0.146		0.104	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Controls are included in the estimation but are not shown.

Looking at the moderating impact of socialization, one notices that for foreign born Latinos (last column), time in the United States does not moderate the impact of any of the predictors, suggesting that this variable might not be as important in determining how group identities and issue positions are translated into political partisanship. The second column (full sample model) is much more interesting. Here we see that Latinos who were born on the mainland US are much more likely to translate a strong sense of Latino identity into Democratic Party attachments.

Also, the effect of born again or charismatic Catholic identification is marginally significant and pulls those born in the US who identify with these evangelical traditions toward the Republican Party. These effects though are not very impressive given the large sample used to estimate the model. Among the issue preferences variables only preferences on government spending are moderated by socialization. These economic preferences exert a strong effect on partisanship (.151, s.e. .053) and are in the correct direction.

I now focus on the second set of moderated effects; here the moderating variable is an individual's cognitive representation of political parties. Neither Latino identity nor religiosity is significantly moderated by cogrep. Born Again identification however is strongly moderated, showing that those high on cogrep use their religious identity to identify more with the Republican Party.

The findings here resonate well with Converse's 1964 argument that only those who have a clear representation of political parties and their relationship to groups and issues are able to translate their policy preferences into political choices, in this case, partisanship. The effect of cogrep on the impact of economic issues is only significant for the model estimated with the full sample. The moderating effect on social issues however is consistent across both models and highly significant. Resulting in a strong pull in the correct direction (more conservative social policy preferences leads to a stronger Republican identity).

Most interesting however is the impact that immigration policy preferences play on partisanship for those at the highest levels of cogrep. For the full sample, a change from the most liberal to the most conservative view on immigration exerts an almost 30% effect on party identification. For the foreign-born population, this impact is even larger, at the highest level of cogrep, immigration preferences have a .41 (s.e. .11) effect on party identification. It is important

to look at this coefficient with caution though as the constituent term for cogrep has a $-.26$ effect (s.e. = $.10$) on partisanship in the opposite direction.

Interestingly, only about 10% of the whole sample is past the midpoint of the immigration attitudes scale. This could suggest that there are influential observations that are pulling the effects found in the previous regression. In order to minimize the effect of these influential observations I run a robust regression that uses iterated Huber and biweight regression to reduce the effects of these outliers on the model. The effects for most of the model are identical and the interactive term of immigration preferences and cogrep is even more shocking. While the constituent term of immigration preferences is $-.15$ (s.e. $.07$), this effect is dwarfed by the interactive term, which has a coefficient of 0.54 (s.e. $.10$). Also, the effect of the constituent cogrep is slightly reduced ($.22$, s.e. $.11$). The results from this robust regression suggest that for foreign born Latinos with high cogrep, immigration issues play an extremely important role in their partisan choices.

One of the peculiar findings that has emerged from these results is that the impact of social group identities on partisanship appears to be attenuated by the inclusion of issue preferences. As shown earlier in this chapter, social identities also predict issue positions. This is a classic case of what appears to be a mediation of social identities through issue positions, suggesting that these group identities might affect partisanship both directly and indirectly. This is the focus of the next model.


Mediational Model of Social Identities on Partisanship Through Issue Positions

Mediational models seek to establish the structural relationship between variables that are interrelated through a path model. In the case of panethnic and religious identities, their effects on partisanship are slightly lessened by the inclusion of issue position variables. Furthermore, these identities affect respondent's economic, social, and immigration policy preferences, which in turn affect partisanship. In order to be able to determine the total effects, direct and indirect of each identity on partisanship, it is necessary to model the relationship between these predictors as a mediational one.

The logic of the mediation is simple. Group identities affect both partisanship and issue preferences. Issue preferences in turn affect partisanship, which leads group identities having both direct and indirect effects on partisanship. While theoretically all of the group identities

might be mediated by every issue area, we have generated empirical predictions of which relationships should be important and which ones shouldn't. Tables 5.1 through 5.4 shown above, help give us a good idea of what relationships will be important in a mediational model of partisanship and social groups. Figure 5.2 presents the theorized mediational relationship between the important predictors of partisanship.

Figure 5.2 Graphical Representation of Mediational Effects of Identity on Partisanship Through Issue Preferences.




The light gray lines represent the expected significant effects of Latino Identity on each of the issue areas. As we can see, the expectation is that Latino identity affects economic and immigration policy positions but not social ones. The expectations for the religious identities are less clear as far as non-social issues goes. Clearly, religious identities should affect positions on social issues. However, the results presented earlier in this chapter show that religiosity (represented by the dashed line) is marginally significant in predicting more liberal immigration positions for the full sample, but not for foreign born Latinos. A born again or charismatic identity (shown as a dashed and dotted line) is on the other hand strongly linked to liberal economic positions. All the solid lines represent the direct effects of each predictor on partisanship.

I estimate the mediated model structurally in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen). The significant results of this estimation are shown in Figure 5.3. All of the expected relationships are significant except for religiosity affecting immigration views. Latino Identity exerts a very strong effect on economic (-.157, s.e. .013) and immigration (-.188, s.e. .013) policy preferences. Both religiosity and a Born Again or Charismatic Catholic identity have significant effects on social issue

preferences but only those of religiosity seem to be substantively important (.168, s.e. .015). A Born again identity also exerts a small but significant effect on economic and spending preferences (-.013, s.e. .005).

Figure 5.3. Representation of Results from Mediated Model.



The effects of issue preferences on partisanship are also all significant and in the expected direction, more conservative beliefs lead to more Republican identification. The effects are however not very strong, the coefficients for each of these are presented in table 5.5. A change from the most liberal to the most conservative economic issue positions exerts about a 5% change on the partisanship scale, social and immigration issues have a 9% and 7% effect on the dependent variable respectively.

The lower part of Table 5.5 shows the indirect and total effects of the three identity variables. As can be seen, the indirect effects of the group identity variables on partisanship is quite small yet significant. The total effects are however larger and statistically significant for both religiosity and Latino identity, the effects of identifying as a born again Christian or charismatic Catholic are only marginally significant and quite small. One of the consistent predictors of partisanship and issue positions throughout these analyses is ideology. Ideology appears to play a constant significant role in Latinos' policy positions and partisan preferences.

This mediational model provides evidence that panethnic and religious identities have important direct effects on partisanship as well as on issues. Because issue positions are also influenced by social identities, the relationship between these identities and partisanship is also indirect. However, the indirect effects are quite small. Ultimately, it is possible to conclude that partisanship is affected by both issue positions and group identities, and that a possible reason for seeing decreases in the predictive power of ethnic and religious identities on partisanship in models containing issue preferences as predictors.

Variables	Economic Issue positions	Social Issue positions	Immigration positions	Partisanship
Direct Effects				
Latino Identity	-0.157 *** (.013)	-0.009 (.028)	-0.188 *** (.013)	-0.129 *** (.017)
Religiosity	-0.001 (.008)	0.168 *** (.015)	-0.009 (.008)	0.023* (.010)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.013 ** (.005)	0.039 (.010)	.000 (.005)	0.009 (.006)
Economic Issues				0.055 *** (.014)
Social Issues				0.086 *** (.014)
Immigration views				0.069 *** (.014)
Indirect Effects			Partisanship	
Latino Identity			-0.022 ***	(0.004)
Religiosity			0.014 ***	(0.003)
Born Again/Charismatic			0.003 *	(0.001)
Total Effects				
Latino Identity			-0.151 ***	(0.017)
Religiosity			0.037 ***	(0.010)
Born Again/Charismatic			0.012 *	(0.006)
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005				


Despite these solid findings, an empirical analysis of the relationship between the predictor variables and partisanship would be incomplete if not testing at least a part of the main theory laid out in this dissertation.

A Mediated and Moderated Relationship

Chapter 4 estimated many different models of partisanship and found that the impact of social identities on partisanship is strongly moderated by both socialization and cogrep. This chapter has shown that the impact of social identities on partisanship is at least somewhat mediated by the influence that these identities have on issue positions. The next step is to evaluate if a mediated moderation exists. That is, to explore whether or not the mediated effects of identities by issue preferences on partisanship are moderated by either socialization or cogrep.


The first step to establish this link is to generate a clear prediction as to which moderators should be important at which steps of the mediation. As laid out in the theory chapter and in the subsequent analyses, cogrep is a very important variable that helps link a person's identity to political parties. Even though the variable is operationalized as a scale that includes knowledge and interest in politics (basically political sophistication), its role as theorized should be in linking identities and attitudes to the political parties. As such, the moderation that is expected is between group identities and partisanship as well as between issue positions and partisanship. The effect of group identities on issue positions is estimated as a linear multivariate model. Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of the model to be estimated.

Figure 5.4. Diagram of Moderated Mediation of Identities on Partisanship through Issue Preferences.



I model the relationship between the variables using a simultaneous equation in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen). The results of the model are shown in Figure 5.5. The left hand side of the diagram shows the effects of the 3 explored group identities (Latino Identity, Religiosity, Born Again/Charismatic) on issue preferences. The results are similar to those of previous models, suggesting the existence of indirect effects in the group variables. I turn my attention to the moderated variables. Here, for each predictor I show two lines, a dotted line which represents the interacted effect of the variable (coefficient bolded), and a solid line that represents the effect of that variable when $cogrep = 0$.

Figure 5.5 Results from Moderated Mediation of Identities on Partisanship through Issue Preferences. Dotted Lines Represent Interaction Coefficient, Solid Lines Represent the Baseline (Constituent Effect).




These results reaffirm the findings from the previous explorations. A Born Again or Charismatic Catholic identity does not have a significant direct effect on partisanship, while it does impact economic and social issue preferences the effects are in opposite directions, suggesting that its overall effect might also be insignificant, even at high levels of cogrep. The other variable related to Republican partisanship, religiosity, strongly affects social issues but also has direct effects on partisanship. At the lowest levels of cogrep, religiosity pulls respondents towards the Democratic Party. However, at the highest levels of cogrep the effect of

Religiosity changes direction and pulls Latinos toward the Republican Party, creating an overall direct effect of (.061), a small, yet significant effect.

Looking at Latino identity it is clear that Latino identity pulls Latinos toward the Democratic Party. At the lowest levels of cogrep, it exerts a significant .059 effect in the direction of Democrats, this effect is exacerbated as cogrep increases, with the interaction effect increasing the effect of Latino identity by -.151 (s.e. 0.051). Furthermore, Latino identity affects both economic and immigration policy preferences and thus also has indirect effects on partisanship. The indirect effect of Latino identity through economic preferences is .029 for those high on cogrep. The indirect effect through immigration preferences for those low on cogrep is .014 while for those high on cogrep is -.04. Once again this suggests that the moderating effect of cogrep is important in determining both direct and indirect effects of important group identities.

Figure 5.6. Diagram of Fully Moderated Mediation of Identities on Partisanship through Issue Preferences.



Lastly, if we look at the right hand side of the diagram it is clear that cogrep plays an important moderating role on the impact of issue preferences on partisanship. While the effects of issues at the lowest level of cognitive representation are either negative (economic and immigration) or nonsignificant (social), the effects of all issue areas at the highest level of cogrep are in the correct direction and are all significant.

A saturated Mediated Moderation of Identity on Partisanship Through Issues

One last way of estimating a full mediated moderation is to include both moderating variables (political socialization and cogrep) in the analysis. Figure 5.6 presents one possible way of modeling the fully mediated moderation. While it is possible to hypothesize that socialization affects the links between group identities and partisanship, group identities and issue preferences, and issue preferences and partisanship; estimation and interpretation of results makes it less feasible than the model presented in figure 6. Using Mplus I estimate a model that includes moderations and mediations for all relevant variables. In order to maximize the N, I model socialization as a dichotomous variable indicating the place of birth of the respondent.

The results from this model reaffirm those found above. Relevant results are shown in Table 5.6. The first column of coefficients shows the effect of the predictors on Economic attitudes, the second on social issues and the third on immigration preferences. The last column of coefficients shows the effects of all the variables on partisanship. As expected, the effect of Latino identity on Partisanship is both moderated and mediated. Latino Identity is significant in predicting more liberal economic policy preferences. However, the effect of Latino identity on social issues for foreign born Latinos is insignificant while there is a negative effect (liberal) for Latinos born on the mainland United States.

The effect on immigration preferences is also quite interesting. Latino identity predicts more liberal views on immigration for those Latinos born outside of the mainland US. The interaction term however shows that for mainland born Latinos, the effect of Latino identity on partisanship is diminished, the effect of Latino identity on partisanship for foreign born Latinos is a 13% pull in the liberal direction, an almost 8% decrease from the 20% effect on the dependent variable for Latinos born outside the US. Partisanship also has direct linear and moderated effects on partisanship. Latinos at the lowest level of cogrep and those born outside the use are marginally more liberal on their spending preferences based on their Latino identity.

Table 5.6. Results from Structural Mediated Moderational Model of Partisanship. Identities through Economic, Social, and Immigration Issues, Moderated by Cogrep and Socialization. (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

Variables	Economic Issue positions	Social Issue positions	Immigration positions	Partisanship
Identity variables				
Latino Identity (foreign born)	- 0.150 (0.014)***	0.041 (0.029)	-0.202 (0.014)***	-0.049 (0.027)†
Latino Identity * Socialization (US Born)	-0.030 (0.017)†	-0.160 (0.034)***	0.076 (0.017)***	-0.104 (0.022)***
Latino Identity * Cog Rep				-0.117 (0.052)*
Religiosity (foreign born)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.150 (0.018)***	-0.022 (0.009)**	0.019 (0.016)
Religiosity * Socialization (US Born)	0.010 (0.016)	0.057 (0.031)†	0.045 (0.015)***	0.005 (0.020)
Religiosity * Cog Rep				0.001 (0.030)
BA/Charismatic (Foreign born)	-0.013 (0.005)*	0.026 (0.011)*	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.033 (0.010)***
BA/Charismatic * Socialization (US Born)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.055 (0.021)**	0.011 (0.010)	0.026 (0.014)†
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep				0.083 (0.019)***
Ideology	0.039 (0.009)***	0.171 (0.019)***	0.035 (0.009)***	0.210 (0.012)***
Issue attitudes				
Economic/Spending				-0.049 (0.022)*
Economic * Cog Rep				0.232 (0.041)***
Social				0.006 (0.022)
Social * Cog Rep				(0.160) 0.039***
Immigration				-0.069 (0.023)***
Immigration * Cog Rep				0.288 (0.039)***
Constants	0.266 (0.015)***	0.473 (0.031)***	0.224 (0.015)***	0.453 (0.029)***
† p < .1 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005				

Those high on cogrep and born in the US show an interaction that exacerbates the effect of Latino identity. The effects of the religious variables are less obvious. Religiosity does not significantly affect economic policy preferences. Religiosity however has a strong impact on social issues preferences (.15, s.e. .018) for foreign born Latinos, the effect on US born Latinos is increased by .045 (s.e. .015). Interestingly, the effect of religiosity on attitudes toward

immigration are strongly defined by the respondent's birthplace. Foreign-born Latinos translate their Latino identity into a significant but small preference for more liberal policies while mainland US born Latinos use their religiosity to predict a more conservative policy. Religiosity however has no direct effects, either linear or moderated, on partisanship (last column). A Born Again or Catholic Charismatic identity only has a marginally significant effect on government spending preferences (-.013, s.e. .005). This variable has no effect on immigration policy preferences. On social issues, a born again identity is strongly related to more conservative positions for both US and Mainland born Latinos.

When looking at the direct effects on partisanship (last column), we see that Latinos at the lowest level of cogrep translate their born again identity into a slightly more Democratic identification (-.033, s.e. .010). However, socialization appears to counteract this effect even though the effect of being born on the Mainland US is only marginally significant. The effect of cogrep however is strongly significant and pulls respondents clearly into the other direction. This finding suggests that those Latinos who have a clear conceptualization of parties translate a born again or charismatic identity into Republican partisanship.

The last column shows the effect of the full model. Using the previous findings we can see whether or not identities are mediated through the issue preferences variables. Here we have findings similar to those shown in previous figures. At low levels of cogrep issue preferences have a negligible or even negative (incorrect) effect on partisanship. At high levels of cogrep however we see that all issue areas are significant in predicting partisanship in the correct manner, more conservative views on issues are strongly and significantly related to Republican partisanship. While the indirect effects of the identity variables on partisanship are small, they clearly exist and reaffirm the finding that social identities matter for Latinos. Furthermore, these results also suggest that Latino identity matters a lot for all issue areas as well as for partisanship. Interestingly, the effect of Latino identity is moderated by cogrep and socialization and then mediated by issue preferences. The structural modeling of this relationship has allowed us to see that the importance of Latino identity is consistent and robust to different estimations.

Summary

The main goal of this chapter was to establish Panethnic Latino identity as the driving force behind two of the most important political variables: partisanship and issue preferences.

This chapter tested the theory that Latino identity and religious identities are important in determining partisanship while taking into account issue preferences. This chapter first established that Latino identity is strongly related economic and spending preferences as well as immigration attitudes. As expected, Latino identity is however not strongly related to the social issues explored in this chapter. These social issues, gay marriage and abortion, are clearly linked to conservative religious attitudes. Religiosity and Born Again or Charismatic identification are significantly related to more conservative views on these issues.

The chapter then used structural equations to estimate the direct and indirect effects of group identities on partisanship. The results suggest a mild mediation of group identities through economic and immigration issue preferences. The indirect effects of religious identities in the mediated model are a bit less important. This model help establish that one of the reasons why panethnic identity might not have been found to be significant by previous studies of Latino partisanship is the failure to acknowledge the indirect relationship that identities have on partisanship through their effect on issue preferences.

The last explorations of this chapter established the mediated relationship using the theoretical model of this dissertation (empirically evaluated in chapter 4). The last tables and figures in this chapter show that the effect of Latino Identity on partisanship is both moderated and mediated. The moderation of the effect of identities on issue preferences is based on political socialization, Latinos born on the mainland United States show a stronger relationship between their identities and their social and economic issue preferences than Latinos born abroad. On the other side of the mediation, Latinos higher on cogrep show a stronger relationship between their issue preferences and partisanship. In the case of spending and immigration preferences, the effect of these preferences is in the incorrect direction for Latinos at the lowest levels of cogrep. This means that when studying the overall effects of issues on partisanship, it is important to include this knowledge and interest related variable. Exclusion of it would lead us to incorrectly conclude that issues do not matter for Latino politics. However, it is also clear the group identities have both direct and indirect effects on partisanship when estimated in this manner.

One interesting finding that has emerged in these last analyses is the effect of place of birth mediating the effect of Latino identity on immigration preferences. This finding provides evidence for the hypothesis that self-interest might be more important than pan-ethnicity for immigration issue preferences. Latinos who are born outside the United States translate their

strength of Latino Identity into more liberal views on immigration. Latinos born in the US on the other hand use their identity to a significantly lesser extent, the interaction between place of birth and Latino identity is negative and while it does not cancel out the constituent effect entirely, it shows that in fact US Born Latinos are less likely to link their Latino identity to a pro-immigration attitude.

Overall, this chapter has helped solidify the hypothesis that identities, panethnic and religious, are at the core of Latino political behavior. By incorporating issue attitudes I have shown that even when including a variable so intrinsically tied to partisanship, panethnic and religious identities continue to exert significant and substantive political effects.

Conclusion:

Latinos, Identity and a Grim Forecast for Republican Hopes

While working on this dissertation and immersing myself into the growing Latino politics literature I learned that the word *Latino* is not pronounced in the traditional American way but rather with a Spanish accent, a Spanish sounding ‘L’ a flat ‘a’, a strong ‘t’ and no ‘oh’ at the end, rather a simple ‘o’. Even among researchers, saying *Latino* in a non-American English way meant something. These researchers are in their majority American citizens, with perfect English and yet, they pronounce this word in Spanish. I was also surprised when many emails, all in English were signed with the word “saludos,” a cordial way of saying *greetings* as a closing statement to a conversation. A sense of Latino identity and cultural understanding is conveyed through this subtle but distinguishable socio-linguistic act among students of Latino politics.

As the Latino population grows it draws more attention from politicians, mainstream media, and students of political phenomena. The more we learn about Latinos and their political proclivities, the more we realize that the group is far more complex and diverse than is expected of traditional political groups. Some Latinos are less easy to identify by name than others, such as former New Mexico governor Bill Richardson. His successor, Susana Martinez has darker skin and a very Hispanic name; yet she won the governor’s seat by campaigning on a hard anti-immigration stance that included rescinding drivers’ licenses for undocumented migrants. Both are Latinos in the state with the highest Latino population, one Democrat, one Republican, with very different views on policies, and yet both elected by the voters of New Mexico. What is it that makes these two people similar? What do they share? How about the immigrant who took trains, buses and ran through the wilderness all the way from Ecuador to be able to work a minimum wage job in New York? How can he relate to the Mexican student getting her PhD in Economics from Yale? These are the questions that make understanding Latino politics challenging. This dissertation has attempted to explain one major aspect of political behavior: partisanship.

Latinos share several important commonalities. First, Latinos are culturally tied to countries south of the US border, which share a history of Spanish conquista and about 300 years of Spanish colonization. This cultural similarity allows for the sharing of two important aspects

of life: language and genes. To a greater or lesser extent, Latinos share a common genetic ancestry, the mix of Native American and European (mostly Spanish) and African. This creates, in the case of some, a phenotypic marker that creates a visible group that is different from White Anglosaxons, Asians, and people with African ancestry. Spanish however is a common thread across all Latinos – except for Brazilians if we consider them Latinos. A third linking factor among Latinos is the somewhat recent immigrant experience of the large majority of those living in this country. These shared cultural aspects come to conform what has been called a panethnic identity. Research on the topic has called this shared culture Latino identity, Latinoneness, and *latinidad* among others.

Latinos, however, are not inherently tied to these shared cultural traits. As assimilationists would prefer, Latinos could shed their non-American culture and value systems and incorporate into the American mainstream. The structural development of a class called: “Latinos” however makes it more likely that Latinos understand this identity as an important one in the organic landscape of American Politics. Latinoness is still a choice; it is about self-identification and not just about membership (Hochschild & Weaver 2010). One important finding of this dissertation mirrors the insightful work of Christina Beltrán, Latinos might check “Hispanic or Latino” when surveyed, but this does not mean all of them feel linked to a common group with monolithic political behavior. Nonetheless, many of the Latinos surveyed by the LNS 2006 do see many links and commonalities between themselves and other Latinos. The purpose of this dissertation was not to quantify how much Latinos feel as part of a group but rather to understand the effects of this social identity on partisanship.

The social group model of partisanship proposed here argues that social groups that are not overtly political might still have strong partisanship consequences if the individual is able to link the group to one of the political parties. This is clearly the case with Latino identity. Stronger feelings of Latino identity lead to a stronger identification as a Democrat. This expands the findings that Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have aligned with the Democratic Party (see Cain et al. 1991; Alvarez & García Bedolla 2003). These effects are enhanced by cognitive representation of political parties as well as by their political socialization. That is, people who know more about the American system and have a clear idea of how parties relate to groups are those who are better able to link their Latino identity to the Democratic Party. On the other hand, religious identity seems to be pulling Latinos toward the Republican Party. Nonetheless, the

effect of religious identity is quite small. While there might be other social identities that are important to Latino partisanship, the two explained here appear to be some of the most prevalent and important ones. While not exhaustive, the evidence presented in the previous chapters suggests that these social identities have an important political impact.

This dissertation also probed another theory of Latinos as an interest group focused on immigration. The research showed no evidence of a direct causal effect of the immigration issue on Democratic partisanship among Latinos. The last chapter incorporated the mainstream view that Latinos are heavily influenced by issue positions in their partisanship and showed that social identities are the driving force behind both issue preferences and partisanship. This final chapter further supports a social identity interpretation of partisanship that is capable of incorporating the findings that show that issue preferences and partisanship are interrelated.

Republican Prospects

One practical concern motivating this dissertation was to try to find out what it would take for Republican success in bringing in Latinos to their party ranks. The two most promising ways in which Republicans could attract Latinos stem from the partisan literature. The first is that the religious nature of Latinos as a whole would be able to pull them closer to the Republican Party. The growth of Born Again Christians and Charismatic Catholics among Latinos would also signal that fervent Latinos might follow the political paths of other religious Americans. California prop 8 showed that Latinos, religious groups, and Republicans can come together to fight against liberal social policies. The second way would require Republicans to continue to rhetorical and policy tactics of G.W. Bush and John McCain, although McCain appears to have forgotten about his pro-reform immigration speeches. If Republicans were in fact more pro-immigration, a clearly capitalism-driven policy that supports the free flow of labor and capital, they might be able to appeal to more Latinos, similar to G.W. Bush's electoral success with this group.

The prospects for Republicans being able to bring in Latinos through progressive immigration policies, or even rhetoric, seem to be fading with every campaign cycle. Nonetheless, while Republicans have mostly used anti-immigration rhetoric to mobilize their conservative base, the issue of immigration does not alone push Latinos away from the Republican Party. Furthermore, Latino identity is positively related to Democratic partisanship

as well as progressive immigration reform. Thus it seems that the growing panethnic identification among Latinos holds very little promise for an increase in Republicanism among Latinos.

Religion among Latinos continues to play an important role. Furthermore, Catholic leaders have taken very explicit stances on politics, refusing to give Kerry communion, calling voting for a pro-choice Catholic a sin, and sending out newsletters to the dioceses stating that among all political concerns, the right to life (for infants and the infirm) should be the number one policy area Catholic voters should consider. Anti-gay marriage movements were also indicators that Latinos might abandon the Democrats when social and religious issues are at the forefront of politics. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in the previous chapters showed a very weak effect of religious identities on partisanship. While the context of the LNS 2006 might have attenuated the effects of these identities (given the salience of the issues of immigration and the Iraq war), it is highly unlikely that Latinos will experience an exodus to the Republican Party in the near future based on marriage-defining, abortion blocking policies. The effect of anti-Latino and immigrant rhetoric from many of the Republican frontrunners seems to largely overshadow the significant yet small success that social conservatism has on Latino partisans.

It seems that even if Republicans were to shift their issue stances on immigration, the effects of what appear to be Latino-discriminatory policies should linger long enough to lead Latinos to socialize newcomers into understanding that the GOP is not “their” party. It is hard to see how Republicans could change their stances on either economic or immigration issues to better attract Latinos. For now, it seems that the existence of a third policy-issue dimension – such as foreign-policy and Cubans – among all Latinos is not leading Republicans to attract more Latinos, but rather to scare them away. The prominence of new socially conservative policies might be able to dictate a change among Latinos, but as long as Republicans keep eliciting Latinos as a political group through their anti-immigrant rhetoric, there appears to be little hope for capturing the Democratic or even independent Latino vote.

While issues have been considered to be one of the most important forces in Latino partisanship, chapter 2 showed the very limited impact of the issue of immigration on partisanship. Chapter 5 furthered the idea that social groups are the driving force behind both issues and partisanship. Earlier studies have ignored the increasing role of Latino social groups on partisanship. By showing how issues mediate the impact of identity on partisanship, I have

incorporated a fuller understanding of the drivers behind Latino partisanship that is not affected by reciprocal causation that is well-known in the relationship between partisanship and issue preferences. This is one of the main problems with existing research on Latino partisanship, that the arrow of causality between issue preferences and partisanship remains unclear. By focusing on identity as the primordial driver of political attitudes, I have presented a theory that occurs before and independent of the strong correlation between issues and partisanship.

Nonetheless, chapter 5 also shows that the issue of immigration is a distinct dimension than the other traditional dimensions of ideology, social and economic issues. As such, immigration might play a more symbolic than a policy-relevant role in Latinos. If the rise of prominent Latinos among the Republican ranks is accompanied by pro-immigrant rhetoric and symbolism, it may be possible for Republicans to attract Latinos based on this feeling of unity as an important social and political group. Unfortunately for the Republican Party, Democrats are also incorporating more Latinos as representatives, and the anti-immigrant rhetoric continues to lead the way among Republicans, even among candidates of Latino heritage.

Why are Latinos Democrats?

This dissertation has established the mechanism through which specific social identities are translated into political partisanship. Latino identity is strongly related to Democratic partisanship. One of the most prominent works on immigrant partisanship (Cain et al. 1991) argues that as Latinos are marginalized politically through experiences of discrimination, they are more likely to adopt Democratic partisanship. While it is possible that discrimination is a force that brings Latinos together and closer to the Democratic Party the evidence presented throughout this dissertation suggests that another process might be at play. This process is based more on the sense of group identity and less on a sense of deprivation. Another major proposition has been that as an ethnic or racial minority, just like African Americans, Latinos naturally lean toward Democrats because of the Democratic Party being “pro-minority” (Hajnal & Lee 2010). Nonetheless, the experiences of Blacks and Latinos with racism and the civil rights movement share little commonality. While minorities can be brought together by perceptions of – or experiences with - discrimination this explanation is not the sole reason why Latinos identify as a common panethnic group or why they identify with the Democratic Party. There appears to be a large deal of hand-waving when it comes to identifying why identity strength,

group consciousness, and linked fate should inexorably link these feelings among non-whites to the Democratic Party, yet in this study and others (Hajnal & Lee 2010; Sanchez 2007), this relationship emerges consistently.

Latinos varyingly feel as members of a larger panethnic group. It could be that Bowler et al.'s (2006) insight into the partisanship effect of anti-immigrant propositions is correct and that over the last several decades, Republicans have effectively been able to alienate Latinos and immigrants alike. Latinos are the poster child for immigration and yet they do not appear to be driven by this issue. However, the issue of immigration may be important not because it is directly related to Latinos' political attitudes but rather because it is linked to the concept of Latino identity. Progressive immigration policies do not attract Latinos because of Latinos' self-interest in more lax immigration policies but rather because it speaks to the willingness of a party to consider Latinos as a political force.

Latinos are no longer as anonymous as the braceros once were. As Latinos increase in number and in the ability to organize, they are expected to gain more political power. However, it is impossible to gain political power as a set of fractionalized groups with diverse interests. If Latinos can be considered political capital and parties care about this growing set of voters, Democrats appear to be much more willing (at least recently) to entertain the symbolic and wedge issues that drive Latino leadership. Latinos however do not seem as responsive to lower taxes or conservative social policies as the average WASP voter. If Republicans care about Latino voters beyond the Cuban base,⁵⁸ a broader group appeal is necessary. Yet with the reinforcing mechanisms in place, Democrats seem poised to continue to capture Latino voters simply because that is "how Latinos vote." If there is little appeal from Republicans, as feelings of Latinoness and panethnicity continue to gain political significance, the group label will continue to be strongly related to Democratic partisanship.

While Latino newcomers to the United States are not socialized into their party by through their families living abroad, socialization continues to occur at the group level. This socialization process appears to mimic what happens in family-based socialization. Latinos who identify very strongly with other Latinos continue the Latino tradition of aligning with the Democratic Party. Those who feel less connected to this panethnic groups are more likely to

⁵⁸ Interestingly, latter generations of Cubans appear to identify more with the panethnic Latino category and are slightly less Republican holding all else equal.

“rebel” and to move away from Democrats. It is important to keep in mind that this is only possible IF the individual has experienced this socialization and is aware of how parties and their Latino identity relate to each other.

Rethinking the Definition of Partisanship for Latinos

By focusing on the choice between two parties, this research project might have overlooked the importance of a third option that seems to be very strategically savvy for a group with wedge issues and no inherent commitment to any of the two parties: independence or non-partisanship. If Latinos are not Republican, they could also not be Democrats, but rather play upon the belief that they are still “up for grabs” and that, as a group, they might respond to the best political option rather than always voting based on a partisan heuristic.

Many immigrants do not choose a party when asked to do so, a good amount also refuse to choose a party they lean towards when prompted to do so. More interesting however, is the fact that calling oneself an independent is in and of itself a political choice. Thus, it is possible that partisanship must be rethought to be a series of steps, rather than a sliding on a continuum.

Thinking about the steps it takes to think of oneself as a partisan, we can split the choices into two or three steps, depending on what the specific aim of the research project is. The first step is quite simple, that is, distinguishing among those immigrants who choose neither of the standard responses for partisanship (Republican, Democrat, Independent, or another minor party). Political socialization seems to play an important role in immigrants ability to choose a political category when asked by researchers, thus socializing variables should be most important for this first step. The next steps involve the choice of one partisan label against several others. This alternate manner of thinking about partisanship among immigrants is still evolving (see Hajnal & Lee 2010, 2011), yet nonetheless seems an important place to think about the multiple roles for socialization, cognitive representation of political parties and group identities.

Contextual Determinants of Identity Strength

One of the questions only briefly addressed in this dissertation was one concerning the contextual salience of identities. Classic social identity theory tells us that individuals have multiple identities and that the salience of these identities is determined by the context in which the individual finds him or herself in. While the final sections in chapter 2 explored how the

salience of immigration affects Latino pan-ethnicity, it is not a systematic approach to understanding under what conditions identities might be primed and what the political effects of these primes might be.

In order to best understand to what extent the two proposed identities, Latino panethnicity and religiosity, can be primed an experimental endeavor is required. While studies of issue priming and politics have found that over the course of campaigns citizens, learn, and are better able to align their preferences to issue positions (see work by Lenz, Goren, and colleagues). Priming social identities which are not intrinsically political might be able to provide better support for the idea that these identities matter to politics if heightened and made politically salient. This future project is expected to solidify the findings established throughout this dissertation by experimental showing the causal path that predicts the acquisition of partisanship among Latinos. Furthermore, the moderators proposed as crucial to the understanding of the social identity to politics link could be better operationalized with an experiment.

The concept of cognitive representation of political parties was measured as a mix between interest in politics and knowledge about which of the two parties was more conservative. Ideally, this construct would be measured as a series of questions that ask how Latinos link political parties to specific social groups and policy areas. These questions could help understand why it is that, as shown in chapter 4, some Latinos translate their religious beliefs into a more Democratic partisanship.

Socialization remains a tricky concept to define and measure. While by now it is quite clear that in order for someone to be American they need not forget their country of origin, mother tongue or their cultural customs, it is still unclear what makes someone an American. How do people learn more about this country? When can we say that someone is fully incorporated into the American polity? Must one become a citizen to be able to participate in a Democracy where less than 60% of the people vote? Research on Latino politics shows that Latinos, just like other groups vary in their involvement in politics, yet there are some issues that seem to prompt action as a group, even motivating other marginalized and immigrant groups to join. In order to better understand how immigrants are incorporated into American politics and what this means for the group as a whole, it is important to expand the important work on socialization, incorporation and integration that has been developed in sociology into political science. The work by Jones-Correa continues to explore what it means to be socialized and what

the behavioral and attitudinal changes involved in this process are. While this dissertation used the place of birth and the time an immigrant has spent in the US as a measure of political socialization, these are only two possible measures of socialization. I briefly explored how the proportion of life spent in the US worked as a measure and the results were very similar to those found with the other specification.

Looking Forward

This project has stretched my understanding of what it means to be a Latino and what it means to be a partisan in this country. As an immigrant with very little emotional roots in the USA, despite having lived in this country for almost half of my life, it was hard to understand why Latino politics as a subdiscipline should be considered mainstream. As this project progressed it became clear that this subdiscipline is not only about understanding the 40 million of Latinos in this country. The subdiscipline seeks to understand new ethnic groups that are not covered by the traditional race and politics literature. As Asians, south-east Asians, Middle-Easterners, Eastern-Europeans, etc. become more prominent in this country, there is a need to understand the political implications of new diversity.

Political parties help people organize sets of beliefs and ideas into the country's way of doing politics. Across new democracies, new immigrant groups are arriving with different sets of concerns, from citizenship policy reform, to welfare, taxes, religious freedom, etc. Political parties help interests aggregate and have a political voice regardless of the institutional system. The theory developed here is guided by Latinos, by their interests, panethnic cohesiveness and their emerging political power. But it is not restricted by it. People all over the globe attach to different social groups, people identify in terms of the groups that are both individually and institutionally defined. As we learn more about new groups in old Democracies, the challenge remains to understand how their political capital can be capitalized upon by parties.

This dissertation has attempted to look at one part of this puzzle and finds that groups matter, identity matters, but that the relationship is not a completely smooth one. For Latinos to be able to translate their social identities into partisanship, they must be socialized into American politics, and they must also have a somewhat clear picture of how political parties relate to other aspects of life in this country. These simple processes lead to a stronger partisan identification which is translated into political voice and representation. Partisanship is but one of the many

ways through which immigrants engage in politics, yet it is a costless way to aggregate preferences and push for legally recognized changes. Parties legitimize undocumented heterogeneous voices; as parties gain vigor through newcomers, they will continue to play the important role that has been established for many decades now.

The Democratic Party does not have a firm grip on Latino allegiance, nonetheless, as time goes by and the reinforcing mechanisms of political socialization are left unaltered by the opposition, it appears more likely that Latinos' voices, as diverse as they might be, will continue to be heard through the Democrats they support and elect.

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APPENDIX 1.A

Table 1.A OLS of partisan ambivalence using Hispanic/Latino ethnicity as a predictor for the 2008 ANES time series.

VARIABLES	Ambivalence (0 to 8)
Latino	0.297 (0.097) ***
Education	-0.802 (0.274) ***
Interest in campaign	-0.172 (0.036) ***

Standard Errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX 1.B

Bishops Statement on Upcoming Election

Posted: 10/8/2010

Our Cherished Right, Our Solemn Duty

By the Catholic Bishops of New York State

We Catholics are called to look at politics as we are called to look at everything – through the lens of our faith. While we are free to join any political party that we choose or none at all, we must be cautious when we vote not to be guided solely by party loyalty or by self interest. Rather, we should be guided in evaluating the important issues facing our state and nation by the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the teachings of His Church. Our national and state elected officials have profound influence on countless matters of great importance, such as the right to life, issues of war and peace, the education of children and how we treat the poor and vulnerable. We must look at all of these issues as we form our consciences in preparation for Election Day.

Unfortunately, it is the rare candidate who will agree with the Church on every issue. But as the U.S. Bishops' most recent document *Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship* (www.faithfulcitizenship.org) makes clear, not every issue is of equal moral gravity. The inalienable right to life of every innocent human person outweighs other concerns where Catholics may use prudential judgment, such as how best to meet the needs of the poor or to increase access to health care for all.

The right to life is the right through which all others flow. To the extent candidates reject this fundamental right by supporting an objective evil, such as legal abortion, euthanasia or embryonic stem cell research, Catholics should consider them less acceptable for public office. As *Faithful Citizenship* teaches, "Those who knowingly, willingly, and directly support public policies or legislation that undermine fundamental moral principles cooperate with evil."

These are complex times, so our task is not light. It is often difficult to get a good grasp on the positions of incumbent congressional representatives and state legislators, not to mention their challengers. News accounts of positions are hard to come by, and voting records on important issues are often lacking. So the task of doing due diligence can be truly challenging. Yet our state is facing many critical issues which are of vital concern to faithful Catholics. Thus it is absolutely necessary for good citizens to take a careful look at every candidate and to vote accordingly for the better candidates. You can find all of the candidates for elected office at the New York State Catholic Conference Web site (www.nyscatholic.org).

Many of the most compelling moral issues of the day play out at the state level. Commonsense restrictions on abortion, whether or not to employ the death penalty, issues related to same-sex "marriage" and civil unions, parental rights in education, programs to serve the poor, access to health insurance – all of these debates occur in the halls of our state Capitol in Albany.

We set forth below potential questions for candidates on a variety of critical issues, and we urge you to learn where all the candidates for every office stand with each critical issue. This list is by no means exhaustive, but our hope is that it serves as a valuable tool in forming your consciences as you make your decisions in the voting booth as Catholic faithful citizens.

While we as the Bishops of New York State cannot and do not endorse candidates for office, we encourage you to properly form your conscience by reflecting on the moral and social teachings of our Church and we strongly urge you to vote on Election Day. For when you vote, you are exercising your cherished right and your solemn duty as Americans and as Catholics.

Important Questions for Political Candidates

The Right to Life

Do you agree with the need to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade*, which struck down all state laws criminalizing abortion and established a woman's "right" to abort her unborn child in the womb?

Do you oppose the state's "Reproductive Health Act" or the federal "Freedom of Choice Act" which both go beyond *Roe v. Wade*, guaranteeing a fundamental right to abortion with no restrictions or regulations?

Do you support a ban on physician-assisted suicide?

Do you oppose government funding for human embryonic stem cell research?

Do you oppose the death penalty?

Do you oppose using taxpayer money to fund abortions?

Parental Rights in Education

Do you support the right of all parents – especially poor parents – to be provided with the means (such as education tax credits) to choose the most appropriate school for their child, including a religious or independent school?

Do you support restoring full state reimbursement on mandates in religious and independent schools?

Protecting Marriage

Do you support maintaining the historic understanding of marriage as only between a man and a woman?

Immigration Reform

Do you support immigration reform that regularizes the situation for undocumented immigrants already in this country?

Do you oppose punishing charitable organizations that provide social services to undocumented persons?

Access to Health Care

Do you support legislative action to provide access to health care for needy New Yorkers?

Protecting the Poor

Do you support the Farmworkers Fair Labor Practices Act that would grant farm workers certain rights available to all other New York workers, such as the right to overtime pay, collective bargaining and a day of rest?

Do you support an increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit, available as refunds to families with the greatest need?

Religious Liberty

Do you support the right of faith-based health and human service providers to offer services to the community in accord with their religious beliefs?

Do you support the right of faith-based health and human service providers to make employment and employee benefits decisions in accord with their religious beliefs?

A Time to Act

As religious leaders, we urge you to exercise your right and solemn duty to vote on Election Day.

+ Timothy M. Dolan

Archbishop of New York

+Howard J. Hubbard

Bishop of Albany

+Nicholas DiMarzio

Bishop of Brooklyn

+Edward U. Kmiec

Bishop of Buffalo

+ Terry R. LaValley

Bishop of Ogdensburg

+Robert J. Cunningham

Bishop of Syracuse

+Matthew H. Clark

Bishop of Rochester

+William F. Murphy

Bishop of Rockville Centre



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Nuestro Derecho Valorado, Nuestra Obligación Solemne Por los Obispos Católicos de Nueva York

Nosotros los Católicos estamos llamados a ver la política así como estamos llamados a ver todo a través de la perspectiva de la fe. Aunque somos libres para unirnos a cualquier partido político de nuestra elección, o a ninguno, debemos tener cautela cuando votemos, de no ser guiados solamente por una lealtad al partido ni a nuestros intereses personales. Al contrario, debemos evaluar los temas relevantes que enfrenta nuestro Estado y Nación guiados por el Evangelio de Jesucristo y las enseñanzas de Su Iglesia.

Nuestros oficiales electos a nivel nacional y estatal tienen una profunda influencia sobre incontables asuntos de gran importancia, como el derecho a la vida, los asuntos de la guerra y la paz, la educación de la niñez y el cómo se trata a los pobres y a los vulnerables. Debemos contemplar todos estos asuntos al formar nuestra conciencia en preparación del Día de Elecciones, el 4 de noviembre.

Desafortunadamente es raro el candidato que va a estar de acuerdo con la Iglesia en todo. Pero como los Obispos de los Estados Unidos pusieron en claro en su más reciente documento Formando la Conciencia para ser Ciudadanos Fieles no todo asunto tiene la misma gravedad moral. El derecho inalienable a la vida de toda persona humana inocente tiene mucho mayor peso sobre otras preocupaciones en las que los Católicos pueden usar un juicio prudente, como en cómo mejor responder a las necesidades de los pobre o en incrementar el acceso a los servicios de salud para todos.

El derecho a la vida es el derecho a través del cual todos los otros derechos surgen. En la medida en la que los candidatos rechazan este derecho fundamental apoyando un mal objetivo, como el aborto legal, la eutanasia o la investigación científica con células madre de embriones humanos (stem cell), los Católicos deben considerar a esos candidatos menos aceptables para ejercer un oficio público. Como nos enseña Ciudadanía con Fé, “Quienes consciente, deliberada y directamente apoyan políticas públicas o legislaciones que operan en contra de los principios morales fundamentales están cooperando con el mal.”

Estos son tiempos complejos, así que nuestra tarea no es ligera. A menudo es más difícil comprender claramente las posiciones de representantes titulares del

congreso y los legisladores estatales, y mucho menos las de sus contrincantes. Es más escasa la noticia informativa de sus posiciones y su historial de votos sobre temas importantes a menudo no existe. Así que nuestra tarea de hacer una debida investigación puede ser un verdadero reto. Sin embargo, nuestro Estado está enfrentando muchos temas críticos de importancia vital para los fieles Católicos. Así, que por eso es absolutamente necesario para el buen ciudadano el poner atención a cada candidato y votar por los mejores candidatos. Puede usted encontrar información sobre todos los candidatos para oficios públicos en el sitio de internet de la Conferencia Católica del Estado de Nueva York.

Muchos de los temas morales de mayor peso en nuestros días aparecen a nivel estatal.

Restricciones al aborto de razonamiento común, si se empleará o no la pena de muerte, asuntos relacionados con las uniones civiles y ‘matrimonio’ de personas del mismo sexo, los derechos de la familia (padre/madre) en la educación, programas para servir a los pobres, el acceso a seguros médicos — todos estos debates ocurren en los pasillos de nuestro Capitolio estatal en Albany. Su voto personal por un Senador estatal y un Miembro de la Asamblea Legislativa puede ser tan crítico como su voto por un Presidente de los Estados Unidos.

Aquí presentamos preguntas potenciales para los candidatos en una variedad de temas críticos, y nosotros le urgimos que aprenda en qué posición están todos los candidatos para cada oficio público en relación con estos temas. Esta lista no es exhaustiva, de ninguna manera, pero nuestra esperanza es que sirva como una herramienta valiosa en formar sus conciencias al tomar decisiones en la urna de votación como ciudadanos Católicos fieles.

Mientras nosotros como oficiales de la Iglesia no podemos y no endosamos a ningún candidato para un oficio público, le alentamos a que forme su conciencia propiamente reflexionando sobre las enseñanzas morales y sociales de nuestra Iglesia y le urgimos fuertemente que vote el Día de la Elección. Porque cuando tú votas, ejerces tu derecho valorado y tu obligación solemne como Americano y como Católico.

Preguntas Importantes para Candidatos Políticos

El Derecho a la Vida

¿Está usted de acuerdo con la necesidad de cancelar la decisión de la Suprema Corte de Justicia en el caso Roe vs. Wade, que terminó todas las leyes estatales criminalizando al aborto y estableció el “derecho” de la mujer a abortar a sus hijos no nacidos en el vientre?

¿Se opone usted a los proyectos de ley llamados Ley de la Protección a la Privacidad y la Salud Reproductiva al nivel estatal (Reproductive Health & Privacy Protection Act) o a la Ley de la Libertad de Elección a nivel federal (Freedom of Choice Act), ambos garantizando un derecho fundamental a abortar sin restricciones ni regulación?

¿Apoya usted la prohibición del suicidio asistido médicamente?

¿Se opone usted al financiamiento gubernamental de investigaciones científicas con células madre de embriones humanos (stem cell)?

¿Se opone usted a la pena de muerte?

¿Se opone usted como contribuyente al uso de su dinero como fondos para el aborto?

Derechos de la familia (padre/madre) en la Educación de sus Hijos

¿Apoya usted el derecho de todo padre y madre de familia – especialmente de familias pobres – a que se les otorguen recursos (como son los créditos en impuestos educativos) para que puedan elegir la escuela más apropiada para sus hijos, incluyendo escuelas religiosas e independientes?

¿Apoya usted que las escuelas religiosas e independientes sean reembolsadas de manera completa por realizar los mandatos que el Estado le pide anualmente?

Protegiendo el Matrimonio

¿Apoya usted el que se mantenga la definición histórica del matrimonio entre un hombre y una mujer?

+ **Timothy M. Dolan**
El Arzobispo de Nueva York

+**Howard J. Hubbard**
El Obispo de Albany

+**Nicholas DiMarzio**
El Obispo de Brooklyn

+**Edward U. Kmiec**
El Obispo de Buffalo

Reformas de Inmigración

¿Apoya usted la reforma migratoria que regularizaría la situación de los inmigrantes indocumentados que ya están en el país?

¿Se opone usted a que se castigue a las organizaciones caritativas que dan servicios sociales a personas indocumentadas?

Acceso a Servicios de Salud

¿Apoya usted la acción legislativa para dar acceso universal al seguro médico?

Protegiendo a los Pobres

¿Apoya usted el proyecto de ley “Acto de Prácticas Laborales Justas para trabajadores Agrícolas”, la cual establece para los trabajadores del campo la concesión de ciertos derechos disponibles para todos los otros trabajadores de Nueva York, tales como derecho para la paga por tiempo de trabajo extra, la negociación colectiva, prestaciones por desempleo y un día de descanso?

¿Apoya usted el aumentar el Crédito al Impuesto a los Ingresos y el Crédito Tributario por Hijo, como reembolso a familias con mayores necesidades?

Libertad Religiosa

¿Apoya usted el derecho a que las organizaciones basadas en la fe y los proveedores de servicios humanitarios ofrezcan servicios a la comunidad de acuerdo a sus creencias religiosas?

¿Apoya usted el derecho de las organizaciones basadas en la fe y los proveedores de servicios humanitarios a tomar decisiones sobre sus políticas de empleo y beneficios al empleado de acuerdo con sus creencias religiosas?

Una Hora de Actuar

Como líderes religiosos, le instamos a ejercer su derecho y el deber solemne de votación el Día de Elecciones.

+ **Terry R. LaValley**
El Obispo de Ogdensburg

+**Robert J. Cunningham**
El Obispo de Syracuse

+**Matthew H. Clark**
El Obispo de Rochester

+**William F. Murphy**
El Obispo de Rockville Centre

APPENDIX 3


Reliability of Latino Identity Scale

In order to justify the use of the scale it is important to show explore its internal consistency. Table A shows the reliability coefficients for the full scale as well as with a scale adding an item tapping perceptions of discrimination and also a scale without the importance of keeping Spanish item. The second column shows the alpha reliability coefficient for the scales constructed. While alpha is a ubiquitous measure of reliability, it is in fact a lower-bound estimate for reliability that assumes continuous variables (items) in the scale, thus underestimating the true reliability in a scale. In order to get a better sense of the actual reliability, I also calculate two of Guttman's lambdas. Alpha coefficients are thus not the best lower-bound estimates for scales constructed from non-continuous items. While Table A presents three different lower-bound estimates of reliability, all subsequent tables in this dissertation will only report the highest lambda coefficient since it does not make sense to report lower-bound estimates that are lower than the correct lower-bound estimates for non-continuous variables.

	Cronbach's alpha	Guttman's Lambda 6 (Squared Multiple Correlation)	Guttman's Lambda 4
Full Scale with importance of keeping Spanish item (k=9)	.707	.72	.80
Full Scale without Spanish item (k=8)	.711	.72	.81
Full Scale adding perceived discrimination item (k=10)	.696	.70	.78

One of the important things to note from these reliability estimates is that removing the item asking about the importance of Spanish results in a slight increase in the reliability of the scale (.004) while adding the item asking about discrimination reduces reliability by .015 in alpha and .02 in Guttman's Lambda. In general, as the number of items in a scale increases, so does the reliability of the scale, thus a decrease of .02 in reliability when adding an extra measure suggests an important loss in reliability. While not entirely conclusive, these findings support the idea that adding the discrimination to the scale only makes it unreliable and that while the item about Spanish may be important theoretically, it does not play a positive role in the scale's internal consistency. As discussed above, the problem with this variable might be due to its heavy skew toward the higher values of the variable. Nevertheless, it remains an important variable to include given the value of Spanish in Latino immigrant communities and as a symbolic issue related to politics, relating to positions on bilingual education, services in Spanish among other policy areas.

APPENDIX 3.B




APPENDIX 4.A.

TABLE 4.A Partisanship including group identities and control variables. OLS with robust standard errors.

VARIABLES	Partisanship			
	Only religiosity	Only Born Again/Charismatic	Religiosity and BA/Charismatic	Interaction of Religiosity and Born Again/Charismatic
Latino Identity Scale	-0.146*** (0.0191)	-0.143*** (0.0189)	-0.147*** (0.0191)	-0.147*** (0.0191)
Religiosity	0.0360*** (0.0100)		0.0329*** (0.0102)	0.0299** (0.0128)
Born Again or Charismatic		0.0129** (0.00626)	0.00774 (0.00643)	0.00288 (0.0143)
Religiosity*B/A or Charismatic Ideology	0.256*** (0.0156)	0.256*** (0.0155)	0.255*** (0.0156)	0.00198 (0.00525)
Catholic	-0.0454*** (0.00700)	-0.0449*** (0.00697)	-0.0441*** (0.00704)	-0.0436*** (0.00711)
Income	0.000752 (0.0120)	0.00149 (0.0119)	0.00149 (0.0120)	0.00148 (0.0120)
Cuban origin	0.216*** (0.0190)	0.211*** (0.0188)	0.217*** (0.0190)	0.217*** (0.0191)
Mexican origin	0.0193** (0.00806)	0.0208*** (0.00798)	0.0195** (0.00806)	0.0195** (0.00806)
Puerto Rican origin	0.0141 (0.0177)	0.0120 (0.0176)	0.0141 (0.0177)	0.0141 (0.0177)
Female	-0.0137** (0.00624)	-0.0116* (0.00612)	-0.0137** (0.00624)	-0.0137** (0.00624)
Education variables				
High School completed	-0.0322*** (0.00751)	-0.0324*** (0.00745)	-0.0321*** (0.00751)	-0.0321*** (0.00751)
Some College	-0.0312*** (0.00928)	-0.0314*** (0.00920)	-0.0310*** (0.00928)	-0.0311*** (0.00929)
College Graduate	-0.0492*** (0.0128)	-0.0502*** (0.0127)	-0.0489*** (0.0128)	-0.0490*** (0.0128)
Graduate Education	-0.0455*** (0.0153)	-0.0472*** (0.0152)	-0.0451*** (0.0153)	-0.0452*** (0.0153)
Age	-0.00274*** (0.000223)	-0.00268*** (0.000221)	-0.00274*** (0.000223)	-0.00274*** (0.000223)
Generation (1, 2, 3+)	-0.0238*** (0.00390)	-0.0244*** (0.00386)	-0.0239*** (0.00390)	-0.0239*** (0.00390)
Constant	0.503*** (0.0209)	0.511*** (0.0205)	0.501*** (0.0210)	0.502*** (0.0212)
Observations	7,567	7,667	7,567	7,567
R-squared	0.110	0.108	0.110	0.110

APPENDIX 4.B.

Distribution of Latinoness across Time in United States, Grouped by Tens of Years



APPENDIX 4.C

Figure 4.C.1 shows the marginal effect and with confidence intervals of the effect of ideology (coded -1 to 1) on partisanship. Figure 4.C.2 shows the coefficients for the gender variable, 0 is male and 1 is female. The effect of education is shown in Figure 4.C.3. Figure 4.C.4 plots the marginal effect of identifying as a Born-Again or Charismatic Christian.




Figure 4.C.3 Marginal effect of High School education on partisanship (and 95% C.I.)





Figure 4.C.4 Marginal effect of identification as Born again or Charismatic Christian (and 95% C.I.)



APPENDIX 4.D

Table 4.D. OLS Regression of Partisanship on Main Identities Interacted with Socialization Variables, Generational Status, Place of Birth, and Time Lived in the United States.

	Partisanship Moderated by Socialization		
	Place of Birth (0 foreign-born, 1 born Mainland)	Generational Status (0 foreign-born, 1 US born to foreign parents, 2 US parents)	Time in the US in years (foreign-born)
Latino Identity	-0.101*** (0.021)	-0.119*** (0.023)	-0.036 (0.036)
Latino Identity* Socialization	-0.177*** (0.042)	-0.041* (0.023)	-0.003* (0.002)
Religiosity	0.028** (0.012)	0.040*** (0.012)	0.041** (0.019)
Religiosity * Socialization	0.020 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.001)
Born Again or Charismatic	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.020* (0.011)
BA/Charismatic * Socialization	0.044*** (0.015)	0.020** (0.008)	0.001* (0.001)
Ideology	0.250*** (0.015)	0.254*** (0.016)	0.171*** (0.018)
Catholic	-0.045*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.007)	-0.029*** (0.008)
Income	0.016 (0.012)	0.001 (0.012)	0.011 (0.015)
Cuban	0.219*** (0.019)	0.217*** (0.019)	0.250*** (0.022)
Mexican	0.025*** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.009)
Puerto Rican	0.001 (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.018)
Female	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)
High School	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.021** (0.008)
Some College	-0.021** (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.014 (0.011)
College Grad	-0.036*** (0.012)	-0.049*** (0.013)	-0.016 (0.016)
Grad education	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.036* (0.019)
Age (years)	-0.003*** (0.0002)	-0.003*** (0.0002)	-0.001*** (0.0004)
Socialization	(Born US)	(Generation)	(Time in US)
	0.040 (0.032)	0.003 (0.018)	0.0001 (0.001)
Constant	0.473*** (0.022)	0.482*** (0.023)	0.391*** (0.034)
Observations	8,035	7,567	5,371
R-squared	0.116	0.111	0.090

(Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis)
 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 *p < .1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et. al)

APPENDIX 4.E

Table 4.E. OLS Regression of Partisanship on Main Identities Interacted with Cognitive Representation of Parties.

	Partisanship moderated by Cogrep	
Latino Identity	-0.041	(0.027)
Latino Identity* Cog Rep	-0.253	(0.058) ***
Religiosity	0.007	(0.014)
Religiosity * Cog Rep	0.015	(0.008) *
Born Again or Charismatic	-0.030	(0.009) ***
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep	0.091	(0.021) ***
Cognitive Representation of Political Parties	0.102	(0.047) **
Ideology	0.250	(0.016) ***
Catholic	-0.043	(0.007) ***
Income	0.004	(0.012)
Cuban	0.221	(0.019) ***
Mexican	0.020	(0.008) **
Puerto Rican	0.015	(0.018)
Female	-0.013	(0.006) **
High School	-0.032	(0.008) ***
Some College	-0.029	(0.009) ***
College Grad	-0.048	(0.013) ***
Grad education	-0.039	(0.016) **
Age (years)	-0.003	(0.0002) ***
Generation (1,2,3+)	-0.024	(0.004) ***
Constant	0.457	(0.026) ***
Observations		7,567
R-squared		0.116

(Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis)

*** p < .01 ** p < .05 *p < .1

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et. al)

APPENDIX 4.F

TABLE 4.F. Partisanship regressed on Latino Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination. Socialization is modeled in as: a) place of birth, b) time in US (foreign-born only) and c) proportion of life spent in the US.


	Place of Birth	TIME in US	Proportion of life spent in US
Latino Solidarity	-0.0358* (0.0201)	-0.0242 (0.0303)	0.00979 (0.0298)
Lat Solidarity * Cog Rep	-0.0299 (0.0461)	0.0299 (0.0556)	-0.0371 (0.0455)
Lat Solidarity * Socialization	-0.0704** (0.0350)	-0.00156 (0.00133)	-0.0937** (0.0439)
Strength of Latino Identity	0.00333 (0.0276)	0.0295 (0.0396)	0.0829** (0.0395)
Lat ID Strength * Cog Rep	-0.170*** (0.0384)	-0.118** (0.0512)	-0.163*** (0.0385)
Lat ID Strength * Socialization	-0.0704** (0.0350)	-0.00219 (0.00172)	-0.144*** (0.0558)
Perceptions of Discrimination	0.0211 (0.0153)	0.0187 (0.0246)	0.0136 (0.0258)
Discrimination * Cog Rep	-0.00739 (0.0279)	-0.0361 (0.0401)	-0.00733 (0.0279)
Discrimination * Socialization	0.00471 (0.0199)	0.000535 (0.000781)	0.0127 (0.0323)
Religiosity	0.0114 (0.0151)	0.0181 (0.0219)	0.0114 (0.0214)
Religiosity * Cog Rep	0.0485 (0.0321)	0.0559 (0.0405)	0.0549* (0.0316)
Religiosity * Socialization	0.0138 (0.0233)	-0.000390 (0.000938)	0.00496 (0.0297)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.0396*** (0.00936)	-0.0484*** (0.0133)	-0.0592*** (0.0131)
BA/Charismatic * Cog Rep	0.0865*** (0.0212)	0.0813*** (0.0252)	0.0838*** (0.0210)
BA/Charismatic * Socialization	0.0293* (0.0158)	0.000856 (0.000586)	0.0446** (0.0193)
Cognitive Representation of Parties	0.173** (0.0761)	0.0499 (0.111)	0.142* (0.0811)
Cog Rep * Socialization	0.0532** (0.0227)	0.00394*** (0.000861)	0.0590* (0.0303)
Ideology	0.248*** (0.0151)	0.169*** (0.0180)	0.252*** (0.0151)
Catholic	-0.0428*** (0.00703)	-0.0282*** (0.00844)	-0.0423*** (0.00703)
Income	0.0186 (0.0121)	0.0144 (0.0155)	0.0266** (0.0124)
Cuban	0.227*** (0.0194)	0.245*** (0.0221)	0.222*** (0.0195)
Mexican	0.0265*** (0.00811)	0.0436*** (0.00892)	0.0310*** (0.00817)
Puerto Rican	0.0137 (0.0135)	0.0100 (0.0181)	0.0239* (0.0136)
Female	-0.0101 (0.00624)	0.0111 (0.00726)	-0.0106* (0.00623)

High School	-0.0290*** (0.00760)	-0.0222*** (0.00853)	-0.0289*** (0.00757)
Some College	-0.0180* (0.00941)	-0.0131 (0.0113)	-0.0210** (0.00931)
College Grad	-0.0376*** (0.0130)	-0.0185 (0.0167)	-0.0423*** (0.0130)
Grad education	-0.0314** (0.0153)	-0.0370* (0.0193)	-0.0363** (0.0153)
Age (years)	-0.00304*** (0.000217)	-0.00117*** (0.000380)	-0.000816 (0.000504)
Socialization (Place of Birth or Time in US)	-0.0292 (0.0526)	-0.00181 (0.00219)	
Proportion of Life in the US			0.134 (0.0858)
Age* Proportion of Life in the US			-0.00289*** (0.000657)
Constant	0.408*** (0.0418)	0.374*** (0.0635)	0.288*** (0.0672)
Observations	7,735	5,179	7,735
R-squared	0.128	0.100	0.129

APPENDIX 4.G

Table 4.G Predictors of Correctly identifying Republicans as Conservative party (Logistical Regression)	
Time in US (Foreign-born)	.010 *** (.004)
Interest in Politics (US born)	1.55 *** (.113)
Interest in Politics (Foreign-born, timeUS=0)	-.452 ** (.186)
Interest in Politics* Time in US (Foreign-born)	.016 *** (.006)
Foreign-born (constituent term)	-.737*** (.112)
Constant	-.891 *** (.074)
N = 8255 LR Chi square = 866.39	
Note: Time in the US is a linear variable in years, All other variables are coded 0 to 1. *p< .1 **p<.05 *** p < .01	

Figure 4.G. Knowledge of Republicans as More Conservative (Cognitive Representation) across Time in the United States



APPENDIX 4.H

TABLE 4.H. Partisanship Separated by Country of Origin/Heritage. OLS with robust standard errors.

	Cuban	Mexican	Puerto Rican	All Others
Latino Identity	-0.104 (0.159)	-0.0270 (0.0301)	0.128 (0.108)	-0.0520 (0.0613)
Latino Identity * Cog Rep	0.0137 (0.232)	-0.158** (0.0740)	-0.513*** (0.180)	-0.251* (0.130)
Latino Identity * Born Mainland	-0.0361 (0.206)	-0.127** (0.0499)	-0.141 (0.127)	-0.309*** (0.118)
Religiosity	-0.0308 (0.0744)	-0.0183 (0.0171)	0.0412 (0.0582)	0.0357 (0.0302)
Religiosity * Cog Rep	0.0564 (0.123)	0.0785** (0.0391)	0.0218 (0.106)	0.0474 (0.0659)
Religiosity * Born Mainland	0.0608 (0.127)	0.00141 (0.0266)	0.0915 (0.0708)	0.0818 (0.0702)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.0193 (0.0621)	-0.0253** (0.0104)	-0.0790** (0.0398)	-0.0557*** (0.0203)
BA/Charismatic* Cog Rep	0.110 (0.102)	0.0618** (0.0250)	0.136* (0.0753)	0.139*** (0.0465)
BA/Charismatic * Born Mainland US	0.0457 (0.116)	0.0307* (0.0175)	0.00729 (0.0503)	-0.0510 (0.0534)
Cognitive Representation	0.0609 (0.173)	-0.0178 (0.0622)	0.343** (0.148)	0.0513 (0.106)
Ideology	0.552*** (0.0656)	0.211*** (0.0186)	0.274*** (0.0458)	0.228*** (0.0318)
Catholic	0.0348 (0.0334)	-0.0636*** (0.00845)	-0.0581** (0.0240)	-0.0166 (0.0143)
Income	0.0986 (0.0666)	0.00893 (0.0145)	0.0521 (0.0401)	0.0138 (0.0257)
Female	-0.0116 (0.0355)	-0.0108 (0.00705)	-0.0449* (0.0231)	-0.00553 (0.0143)
High School	-0.0712 (0.0497)	-0.0277*** (0.00836)	-0.00460 (0.0322)	-0.0223 (0.0191)
Some College	-0.0699 (0.0549)	-0.0243** (0.0112)	0.0430 (0.0336)	-0.0195 (0.0201)
College Grad	-0.106* (0.0620)	-0.0572*** (0.0163)	0.000854 (0.0404)	0.0185 (0.0267)
Grad education	-0.0835 (0.0654)	-0.0530*** (0.0198)	0.00904 (0.0491)	0.0153 (0.0292)
Age (years)	0.00250** (0.00113)	-0.00342*** (0.000256)	-0.00246*** (0.000765)	-0.00258*** (0.000496)
Born Mainland United States	0.0519 (0.192)	-0.0359 (0.0390)	0.0313 (0.107)	0.0939 (0.0938)
Cog Rep * Born Mainland US	-0.150 (0.143)	0.107*** (0.0262)	0.0275 (0.0715)	0.150** (0.0638)
Constant	0.131 (0.142)	0.562*** (0.0298)	0.233** (0.108)	0.427*** (0.0541)
Observations	392	5,328	778	1,537
R-squared	0.263	0.123	0.140	0.103

APPENDIX 5.A.

Factor Loadings for Issue Items.

Table 5.1 Principal Components Analysis (loadings > .3) after Promax Rotation.

Items	Immigration issues	Economic Issues	Social Issues	Item Uniqueness
Economic Issues				
Welfare		0.703		0.477
Health Care		0.745		0.440
Education		0.634		0.576
Social Issues				
Abortion			0.806	0.332
Gay Marriage			0.823	0.316
Immigration Issues				
Immigration preferences	0.690			0.465
Views on immigration	0.738			0.440
Dream Act	0.669			0.546

N=1091

Source: Latino National Survey 2006 (Fraga et. al)

APPENDIX 5.B.

Table 5.B Moderated Model of Partisanship on Identities and Issues using Cognitive Representation and Socialization as Separate Moderators.

	Cognitive Representation of Political Parties		Socialization: Place of Birth or Time in US	
	Full sample	Foreign Born	Full Sample	Foreign Born
Latino Identity	-0.0764* (0.0393)	-0.0796* (0.0440)	-0.0743** (0.0330)	-0.0544 (0.0572)
Latino Identity*Cog Rep	-0.125 (0.0848)	0.0293 (0.111)		
Latino Identity * Socialization			-0.193*** (0.0643)	-0.000681 (0.00280)
Religiosity	0.0261 (0.0223)	0.0369 (0.0259)	0.0398** (0.0182)	0.0557* (0.0293)
Religiosity*Cog Rep	0.00271 (0.0457)	-0.00214 (0.0599)		
Religiosity * Socialization			-0.0222 (0.0327)	-0.000823 (0.00142)
Born Again/Charismatic	-0.0436*** (0.0141)	-0.0436*** (0.0155)	-0.00938 (0.0109)	-0.0311* (0.0181)
BA/Charismatic*Cog Rep	0.125*** (0.0307)	0.0907** (0.0373)		
BA/Charismatic * Socialization			0.0708*** (0.0229)	0.00117 (0.000913)

Issue preferences				
Economic and spending	-0.0219 (0.0343)	0.00820 (0.0380)	0.00637 (0.0279)	-0.00956 (0.0442)
Economic issues*Cog Rep	0.238*** (0.0720)	0.0411 (0.0933)		
Economic preferences* Socialization			0.200*** (0.0510)	0.00149 (0.00216)
Social preferences	-0.0153 (0.0239)	-0.0273 (0.0287)	0.0536*** (0.0192)	0.0239 (0.0311)
Social*Cog Rep	0.190*** (0.0470)	0.181*** (0.0626)		
Social preferences * Socialization			0.0778** (0.0334)	0.00143 (0.00142)
Immigration preferences	-0.109*** (0.0382)	-0.122** (0.0491)	0.0293 (0.0336)	0.0255 (0.0547)
Immigration*Cog Rep	0.271*** (0.0708)	0.398*** (0.110)		
Immigration preferences * Socialization			-0.00132 (0.0501)	0.00143 (0.00223)
Cognitive Representation	-0.191** (0.0789)	-0.260** (0.103)	0.00260 (0.0158)	-0.00544 (0.0194)
2 nd Generation	-0.0327** (0.0160)	Born in US -0.00331*** (0.000663)	Born in US -0.0180 (0.0576)	Time in United States -0.00445* (0.00255)
3 rd + Generation	-0.0360*** (0.0127)			
Constant	0.474*** (0.0437)	0.449*** (0.0504)	0.370*** (0.0361)	0.354*** (0.0581)
Observations	3,412	2,407	3,627	2,407
R-squared	0.139	0.103	0.131	0.090

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1