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Culture Wars as Identity Politics

A Dissertation Presented

by

Erin Catherine Cassese

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Stony Brook University

December 2007

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Culture Wars as Identity Politics

by

Erin Catherine Cassese

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science

Stony Brook University

2007

Over the past two decades, religion has emerged as a significant cleavage in American political life. Religious adherence is a strong predictor of partisanship, vote choice, and political participation, and predicts a host of social policy preferences – such as reproductive rights and gay rights – in addition to intolerance towards a variety of social groups. Differences in political preferences across religious groups have become so pronounced that religious voters are often perceived as a cohesive electoral bloc. As a result, many argue religious differences form the basis of “culture wars” or a “values divide” in the United States (Hunter, 1991; White, 2002; Frank, 2004). In these culture wars, debate over issues of morality and social policy has displaced the traditional economic disagreements driving policy conflict and electoral behavior. However, many political scientists claim this notion of culture wars in American politics is vastly overstated. Notably, Fiorina (2006) contests this notion of a nation embroiled in cultural conflict and focused exclusively on moral policy issues. He argues the electorate is largely moderate and deeply ambivalent, even on flashpoint issues such as reproductive rights. For Fiorina (2006), polarization on cultural issues is confined to elites and party activists and this notion of a national deeply divided stems from the media’s dramatization of cultural conflict.

In this project, I argue the culture wars in American politics are more than an artifact of the media’s treatment of cultural conflict. While the citizenry is not polarized as a whole, as Fiorina suggests, there is strong evidence for polarization among significant subsets of the mass public. Namely, Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities are most attuned to this conflict and most responsive to culture wars rhetoric. Drawing on social identity theory, I approach the culture wars from the perspective of intergroup relations – as a conflict between key social groups over the proper moral course for the nation. Using data from three national surveys, I examine the manner in which group identity and identity threat condition attitudes towards highly charged issues like abortion and gay rights. The results firmly situate the culture wars within the mass public and explicate the nature of the social, psychological, and political processes underlying this phenomenon.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee – Stanley Feldman, Leonie Huddy, Howard Lavine, and Bonita London – for their feedback on this project. I am especially indebted to Stanley Feldman and Leonie Huddy who invited me to participate in many interesting projects and provided me with numerous travel opportunities. Thank you for your assistance with this and other projects. I would also like to thank Stanley Feldman, Leonie Huddy, Howard Lavine, and Charles Taber for providing me with funding through work on the journal *Political Psychology*. In addition, I am grateful to the faculty of the political science department at Stony Brook University for providing me with an excellent graduate education and for their collegiality.

I would like to acknowledge the help and support of Teresa Cassese, Christopher Weber, April Weber, and Suzanne Allsopp.

I also owe a special thanks to the bloggers who made the web survey possible and the research assistants – Rob Parker, Zahra Khan, Mark Leftkowitz, Yunnelly Martinez, and Marge Rodriguez – who helped with the administration of the mail survey.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Culture Wars in American Politics

Over the past two decades, religion has emerged as a significant cleavage in American political life. Religious adherence is a strong predictor of partisanship, vote choice, and political participation. It is also related to a host of social policy preferences – in areas such as reproductive rights and gay rights – as well as intolerance towards a variety of social groups. Differences in political preferences across religious groups have become so pronounced that religious voters are often perceived as a cohesive electoral bloc. As a result, many argue religious differences form the basis of "culture wars" or a "values divide" in the United States (Hunter, 1991; White, 2002; Frank, 2004). The development of the culture wars in American politics and the rise of religious cleavages have been linked to changes in the nation's political and religious climate in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, political movements involving civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights had a polarizing effect on the electorate and resulted in the politicization, or counter-mobilization, of conservative religious groups. These developments led to the existence of polarized activist groups centrally concerned with issues of public and private morality.

At the same time, changes were occurring within the nation's major religious traditions. Increasingly, adherents to moderate branches of Christianity were dropping out of religious life. Also, internal debates over proper theological responses to modernity crystallized into major divisions on social issues within key religious groups. These political and religious changes fundamentally altered the nature of religious conflict in the United States and heightened the salience of social policy issues and cultural conflict.

In these culture wars, debate over issues of morality and social policy has displaced the traditional economic disagreements thought to drive most policy conflict. In addition, ideological labels have been redefined in moral terms, due to the growing salience of social policy issues and the close connection between religiosity and political conservatism (Miller and Hoffman, 1999). For Adams (1997) and Carmines and Layman (1997), opinion on culture wars issues - like abortion - reflect an issue evolution on moral grounds, not unlike the changes in party composition stimulated by racial issues in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson, 1990). This perspective suggests cultural issues have become a major cleavage in American public opinion and important determinants of electoral behavior.

This notion of the culture wars in American politics is not without its critics. Notably, Fiorina (2006) contests claims the nation is embroiled in cultural conflict focused exclusively on moral policy issues. He argues the electorate is largely moderate and deeply ambivalent, even on flashpoint issues such as reproductive rights. His analysis of data from the National Election Studies, General Social Surveys, and PEW surveys over the past 30 years reveals little evidence of social issue attitude polarization between partisans, ideologues, or religious Americans of any stripe. Instead, polarization in this domain is confined primarily to elites and activists – the thin stratum of Americans he labels the "political class." From this perspective, polarized elites translate into relatively polarized choices in major electoral contests, which creates the appearance of a polarized electorate absent true opinion polarization at the mass level. In this fashion, mild preferences for progressive or traditional social policies are translated into more

extreme preferences, because only extreme positions are represented in the electoral choice set. The media perpetuates this notion of a nation deeply divided by dramatizing cultural conflict and adopting polarizing metaphors, such as “red states” versus “blue states,” which mask considerable heterogeneity at the sub-state level.

However, it is difficult to reconcile Fiorina’s (2006) findings with anecdotal evidence of cultural conflict at both the elite and mass levels. Bitter strife in the Senate confirmation hearings for judicial nominees in 2006, the importance of referenda on gay marriage in many states for electoral outcomes in the 2004 elections, conflict at both levels regarding the outcome of the Terry Shaivo controversy and right to life (and death) issues more generally all point to increased polarization on issues where value priorities conflict. Some scholars have addressed this apparent discrepancy, contending the entire electorate need not be involved in culture wars politics for it to be an important and consequential political phenomenon. For example, Hunter (2006) recognizes that while cultural conflict does not extend to the entire electorate, there are significant minorities for whom these issues are highly salient and determinative of electoral behavior. The people most involved in culture wars politics are those holding strong political and religious identities. While they may compose only a fraction of the electorate, they are disproportionately active in political life and form critical bases of support for the major political parties.

Following Hunter (2006), I argue the culture wars in American politics are more than an artifact of the media’s treatment of cultural conflict and elite polarization. While the citizenry is not polarized as a whole, as Fiorina suggests, there is strong evidence for polarization among significant subsets of the mass public. Namely, Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities are most attuned to this conflict and most responsive to culture wars rhetoric. Drawing on social identity theory, I approach the culture wars from the perspective of intergroup relations – as a conflict between key social groups over the proper moral course for the nation.

The Group Basis of Cultural Conflict in the United States

To better understand the group basis of the culture wars, and the importance of collective identity for public opinion more generally, I draw on social identity theory. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) was originally developed to understand the psychological determinants of discrimination, but has been extended to explain a variety of phenomenon occurring both within groups and between them and applied to a wide range of group and intergroup contexts (see for example, Brown, 1995; 2000). Social identity theory maintains the self is composed of two distinct parts, the individual identity and the collective or social identity. The social identity is defined as: “that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978). Work on social identity has demonstrated a variety of perceptual, attitudinal, and behavioral biases emerge in intergroup contexts - where one’s

social identity is salient. In these intergroup contexts, in-group favoritism is pervasive (Brown, 2000). There is also evidence collective identities produce a host of negative attitudes and emotions towards oppositional groups – such as prejudice, anger, aggression, and intolerance – though these negative biases tend to emerge only in contexts where intergroup conflict or competition is salient (Brown, 2000; Flippen, Hornstein, Siegal and Weitzman, 1996; Postmes and Branscombe, 2002).

At their core, the culture wars are a symbolic conflict over the moral principles that should guide public policy. Certain social and political groups – such as Feminists, Christian Fundamentalists, Gays, Liberals, and Conservatives – feature prominently in this conflict. As a result, the culture wars rhetoric contains numerous references to symbolic threats posed by key social groups. Social identity research on the conditions under which negative intergroup biases occur should afford further insight into the dynamics underlying this phenomenon – specifically the fashion in which group members respond to threats and opportunities conveyed in culture wars rhetoric.

In addition to the presence of contextual threats, this literature points to a second important moderator of intergroup attitudes and behaviors – individual differences in subjective identity strength and salience. Work on social identity theory has demonstrated the implications of group membership are most pronounced among individuals who possess a strong subjective sense of attachment to the group or have internalized their group membership (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Kinket and Verkuyten, 1997). In the political science literature, differences in identity strength are largely ignored. Scholars typically ascribe a single group identity to respondents based upon their answer to a single survey item. For instance, one might use the common religious denomination item to categorize respondents as Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or some other religious category. For this method of establishing identity, strength of identification is assumed to be relatively homogeneous across group members. This method also implicitly assumes a specific identity is primary or salient to respondents, and thus factors into their social and political attitudes. However, as the social identity theory literature demonstrates, identities vary in salience and strength across individuals with important consequences for attitudes and behavior (Huddy, 2001). While one might indicate they are Roman Catholic, this person may place more importance on his or her identity as, say, a Feminist. For this individual, the Feminist identity could be more closely linked to political attitudes and behaviors. Thus in order to better understand the group basis of the culture wars, I attend to the constellations of group identities held by Americans, the relative salience of these identities, and variation in subjective identity strength. I anticipate the emotional and attitudinal processes characteristic of the culture wars will be most pronounced among individuals who primarily identify with political, religious, and secular groups, and who possess a strong subjective sense of group identification.

Project Overview

By attending carefully to the nature and political consequences of collective identities, and working from a social identity theory point of view, I aim to develop a more nuanced understanding of the culture wars phenomenon and, more generally, obtain insight into the group basis of public opinion. In Chapter 2, I review the developments in American politics and changes in the character of the nation's religious climate which gave rise to the culture wars in American politics. In addition, I introduce social identity theory and explain its applicability to this political phenomenon. My reading of the social identity theory literature points to the ways in which thinking about the culture wars as an intergroup conflict over the proper moral course of the nation furthers our understanding of the conflict. It also supports an emphasis on the constellations of social identities held by Americans and the individual-level variation in identity strength and salience. In addition, this work highlights the social and psychological processes underlying the conflict, by demonstrating the manner in which group-based threats promote emotion, intolerance, and attitude polarization. Ultimately, social identity theory provides us with a strong foundation for understanding how identity structures social and political thinking among members of the mass public in the context of culture wars politics.

In Chapters 3 through 5, I investigate the group basis of the culture wars using data from three samples of adult Americans. In Chapter 3, I examine 30 years of survey data from the National Election Studies to determine the extent of public involvement in the culture wars. My analysis centers on Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities, as these Americans are hypothesized to be the driving force behind the conflict. Beginning with 2004, I examine the magnitude of group differences on issues like abortion, gay rights, and also intergroup attitudes. I then consider whether the differences observed here reflect a pattern of greater polarization originating with the political and religious changes occurring during the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, I look at the stability of group differences from 1972 to 2004 to determine whether this subset of Americans did in fact become more polarized in their social policy attitudes over time. Finally, I conclude with a look at the relationship between identity, attitude extremity, and political participation. My goal is to determine whether Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities are both most polarized and most active in political life – thus driving the continued salience of this conflict over time and exerting disproportionate influence on electoral politics.

While Chapter 3 provides a picture of group differences and the way they change over the period of interest, the analysis is based on ascribed measures of identity. In Chapter 4, I aim to address the limitations of existing methods for measuring social identities. I begin by outlining problems with common methods for ascribing identity, paying particular attention to the current dissensus regarding the proper operationalization of religious identity, which is clearly central to this conflict. Existing work on the culture wars tends to focus on a single religious or political identity in isolation, obscuring whether these social identities co-occur or intersect in meaningful and politically consequential ways. For instance, the culture wars are often framed as a conflict between Secular Liberals and Religious Conservatives – composite rather than singular identities. Typical methods of ascribing identity also assume the identity of interest is equally salient to all respondents, thus exerting the same kind of impact on

political thinking and behavior for all group members. Such methods also ignore individual differences in identity strength, a subjective sense of attachment or belonging to a particular social group.

In this chapter, I develop and evaluate a method of examining social identities which draws on insights from social identity theory and addresses some of the oversights in existing work on the culture wars. I focus on how social identities intersect in the minds of Americans and how to best identify which specific identity is strongest and most salient for each respondent. To understand the relationship between religious and political identities, I administered a checklist of social identities to two samples – a mass sample (containing an oversample of Evangelical Christians) obtained via mail and a sophisticated, activist sample obtained via the web. The data from this identity checklist was analyzed using multidimensional scaling – a technique for representing the similarity of objects in Euclidean space which affords insight into the structure underlying these social identifications. Focusing on the group identity clusters derived from the scaling configurations and respondent self reports of their primary or most important identity, I look at how social and political attitudes covary with group identifications. I also discuss a new measure for gauging individual differences in subjective identity strength and consider how political and social attitudes vary within groups as a function of identity strength.

In Chapter 5, I look more closely at the opinion dynamics of the culture wars in an effort to understand the social and psychological processes accounting for Americans' polarization on these cultural issues. I contend responses to the group based threats characteristic of the culture wars resonate most with strong group identifiers – resulting in heightened emotional response, intolerance, and attitude polarization. Emotional and attitudinal responses to threat are examined with an experiment contained in the web and mail surveys mentioned above. The threat manipulations employed here were designed to mimic threats typical of the culture wars rhetoric. Here, I focus my attention on how group identity and identity strength moderate the effects of threat on reported emotions, attitudes, and political tolerance. The role played by core values – such as moral traditionalism and social conformity – in determining these responses to threat are also considered. Throughout this analysis, I pay attention to differences between the more and less sophisticated samples, which provides further insight into level of public involvement in this conflict – a sticking point in much of the extant empirical work on the culture wars in American politics. The project concludes with Chapter 6, in which I review the findings from the three studies mentioned above and discuss how they speak to the existing culture wars literature. In addition, questions raised by the results of these studies are developed into directions for future research on this subject. Ultimately, this work provides a better understanding of the group basis of this conflict and points to the utility of a social identity theory approach to the culture wars.

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Chapter 2: Culture Wars as Identity Politics

Introduction

The culture wars phenomenon in American politics refers to the notion the electorate is embroiled in conflict over the proper moral course for the nation and the value priorities that should guide public policy. This conflict is often characterized as an intractable, bitter struggle between competing factions who are convinced of their moral rectitude and unwilling to compromise. Conservative Christians and Secular Humanists garner a great deal of attention in this conflict, given their diametrically opposed positions on cultural flashpoint issues like abortion, gay rights, and the proper role of religion in politics and public life more generally. But some argue the culture wars extend beyond these groups, and conflict over these social issues is considerably more widespread. For Adams (1997) and Carmines and Layman (1997), opinion on issues like abortion reflects an issue evolution on moral grounds, not unlike the changes in party composition stimulated by racial issues in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson, 1990). According to this perspective, elites have aligned themselves on these issues, adopting relatively polarized positions, and sending clear signals to their constituents regarding their preferences and policy goals. As a result, partisans in the electorate link their political identities to positions on these highly contested issues, sorting themselves into the appropriate party coalition and altering, in a fundamental way, the link between the public and the parties (Lindaman and Haider-Markel, 2002). Often, sorting in these contexts occurs among key social groups based on gender, class, race, and religious affiliation, thus altering the group basis of the party coalitions (Manza and Brooks, 1999). Clearly this change in emphasis on social issues is evident in the strategy adopted by the Republican Party since the 1980s, which has increasingly distinguished itself from the Democratic Party on issues of morality and family values (Layman and Carsey, 2000). Some have similarly argued that ideological labels have been redefined over the past two or three decades to reflect positions on issues of public and private morality, such that the term liberal carries connotations of social progressivism while conservatism carries connotations of social traditionalism (Miller and Hoffman, 1999). Ultimately, such changes point to the replacement of the traditional economic cleavages dominating American politics since the New Deal with divisions over social policy issues.

This notion of the culture wars in American politics was popularized by Hunter's (1991) study of cultural politics in the United States. The culture wars were invoked in the presidential campaigns the following year and received a great deal of play at the Republican National Convention, though the term is often credited to Pat Buchanan rather than Hunter (Leege et al, 2002). Empirical work on public opinion and electoral behavior also points to the 1992 election as the point at which cultural issues became quite salient and significant religious cleavages emerged in voting behavior. The character of these religious divisions is evident in Fiorina's (2005) work on the culture wars. Fiorina demonstrates the gap between regular church attenders and non-attenders grows from 2 percent in 1988 to over 25 percent in 1992. The size of the gap diminishes only slightly in the following presidential elections, by no means returning to pre-1992 levels. While cultural politics were certainly salient and divisive in the 1992 election, growing dissensus over cultural issues predates this election year. The culture wars are often attributed to reactions to social movements – such as the women's movement and

gay rights movement – and demographic changes within the nation's major religious traditions which began 20 years prior (Hunter, 1991).

Despite the popular acclaim gained by this notion of the culture wars and the indisputable heightened salience of cultural flashpoint issues following the 1992 election, there is considerable debate within the political science literature regarding the scope of the culture wars and the magnitude of its effects on electoral outcomes and public policy. Morris Fiorina has emerged as perhaps the most notable critic of the common characterization of the culture wars. For Fiorina (2006), the conflict is an idea created by the media, which gives disproportionate play to conflict over social issues relative to more long standing conflicts over economic issues. He contends the commonly invoked metaphor of a nation deeply divided into red states and blue states masks a great deal of heterogeneity existing at the sub-state level (see also Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 2006). The media gets it wrong by situating the culture wars within the mass public. Instead, the culture wars are really confined to a thin stratum of elites, delegates, party activists, and infotainers who are both disproportionately polarized on these issues and disproportionately visible by virtue of their more public roles. Such polarization is not mirrored at the mass level.

In fact, there is a significant disconnect between elite and mass opinion on these issues, contrary to the issue evolution perspective discussed above. According to Fiorina (2006), misconceptions about the nature of public polarization and public involvement in the culture wars stem from the nature of the nation's electoral institutions. Specifically, the two-party system creates the illusion of a polarized electorate because the public is forced to choose between polarized opinions in electoral contests. The existence of these polarized choices masks the ambivalence and moderation characterizing public opinion on many cultural flashpoint issues, such as abortion.

But, it is possible Fiorina (2006) systematically understates the scope of the culture wars in American politics. While, as Fiorina claims, the majority of the public does hold relatively moderate positions on issues like abortion and gay rights, a significant and electorally consequential minority are actively involved in this cultural conflict. Hunter (2006) refers to these highly committed partisans and activists as the "white hot core" of cultural politics. Following Hunter (2006), I situate the culture wars within the subset of the general public holding strong political, religious, and secular group identities. This focus on groups and group identity stems from a conceptualization of the culture as an intergroup conflict that plays out among the most intensely committed members of these social and political groups. These groups struggle to codify their core values into public policy and elect representatives who will govern from their point of view. Such actions are viewed as direct threats to the values and political priorities of ideologically opposed groups – who respond with anger, polarization, and growing intolerance. I hypothesize people highly committed to political, religious, and secular groups have become more polarized in response to the political and social developments thought to spark the culture wars phenomenon and respond most strongly to the culture wars rhetoric, which is replete with group-based threats. Thus a critical subset of the mass public, one both highly committed and highly active, drives this conflict.

Below, I develop testable hypotheses about the nature of this intergroup conflict and the processes governing it by drawing on findings from an established social psychology framework - social identity theory. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner,

1979; Tajfel, 1981) is a theory of intergroup attitudes and behavior. A great deal of empirical work from this perspective has documented predictable patterns of group-related biases, emotions, and behavior and specified the conditions under which they are most likely to emerge. Generally, this literature suggests people maintaining a strong subjective sense of identification or attachment to social groups will be more responsive to group conflicts, particularly in contexts where group-based threats are salient. While social identity theory has been somewhat underutilized in political psychology and political science more generally (Huddy, 2001), it affords a solid framework for thinking about the culture wars as a form of intergroup conflict or as an instance of identity politics. By attending to the political implications of identity, variations in subjective identity strength emphasized in social identity theory, and the threatening messages inherent in the culture wars rhetoric, I expect to gain greater traction on the scope and magnitude of the culture wars in American politics. Before turning to specific hypotheses and outlining a strategy for evaluating them, I lend some context to this project by considering the historical development of the culture wars conflict and briefly reviewing the extant empirical work on this subject.

Origins of the Culture Wars in American Politics

The development of the culture wars in American politics is tied to two key factors. The first factor centers on changes in American social and political culture in the 1960s and 1970s which heightened the salience of social policy issues and fundamentally altered the nature of social regulation. During this period, political movements involving civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights had a polarizing effect on the electorate and resulted in the politicization of conservative religious groups. These developments led to the existence of polarized activist groups centrally concerned with moral policy issues. The second contributing factor is changes in the nature of the nation's major religious traditions. Demographic shifts led to a decline of mainline faiths, while more conservative faiths maintained their strongly committed bases and even grew. The result was greater polarization between those adhering to conservative religious faiths and those adopting a progressive or secular perspective. This phenomenon is often referred to as the "collapse of the center" in American religion (Wuthnow, 1988). In addition, the decline of denominational conflict reduced tensions between the nation's major religious traditions and paved the way for ecumenical, or interdenominational, movements based on theological ideology. These ecumenical coalitions were often organized around specific political and social agendas.

Political Origins of the Culture Wars

Typically, the development of the culture wars is framed in terms of liberal political movements and their influence on policy and popular culture. While Conservatives, particularly religious Conservatives, are often heralded as the true "culture warriors" and credited with the development of the culture wars, their involvement in cultural politics was a direct response to mobilization around liberal causes and liberal efforts at policy change. To be sure, political movements tied to liberal causes – expanding rights and opportunities for women in the public sphere, the related push for reproductive freedoms, expanding rights and opportunities for Gays and blacks, efforts to ban religion from the public schools – catalyzed this cultural conflict. In addition, the counterculture movement - with its emphasis on moral progressivism and blatant disregard for social conventions - led to more pervasive and, for social Conservatives, insidious cultural changes.

For religious Conservatives, these movements foretold dramatic social and moral decline and the breakdown of key social institutions. For example, the women's movement struck at the institutions of marriage and the nuclear family with its efforts to redefine gender roles. Several successful conservative women groups – such as the Eagle Forum and Concerned Women for America – organized in direct response to the efforts of the women's movement. These groups have been credited with the widespread political mobilization of conservative women and effectively stalling ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. The push for reproductive freedom, which culminated in the *Roe v. Wade* decision, was similarly viewed as a major blow against the institutions of marriage and family. In fact, the legalization of abortion is often considered the primary factor driving conservative Christians back into political life, following their exodus from politics en mass in response to the Scopes trial (Dionne, 1991).

Indeed, the *Roe v. Wade* decision reflected an important shift in the nature of social regulation in the United States. In Evangelical circles, the decision was viewed as a signal from the Supreme Court that morality could not be divorced from public policy (Wuthnow, 1988). The decision indicated that morality or values were not just private matters but important enough to fall under the purview of government. For Wuthnow (1988), this decision marked the dissolution of the boundary between church and state and opened the door for challenges to the more privatistic notions of morality which dominated the pre-Roe period. To be sure, Evangelicals and religious Conservatives could get behind moral policy issues. Opinion on issues like abortion, pornography, the role of women in society and the proper rights afforded Gays was far more consensual among religious Conservatives than opinion on issues such as race relations and the Vietnam War. As a result, protecting the moral fiber of the nation and its key social institutions by way of promoting the moral code set forth in the Bible became a rallying point for conservative Christians. Church leaders facilitated this movement into politics, adopting a siege mentality which conveyed a sense of urgency about the nation's moral decline and directly linking political action to religious beliefs – sometimes referred to as preaching politics (Leege et al, 2002). In this fashion, political involvement became a natural extension of religious evangelism.

The entry of conservative Christians into the political fray was legitimized by the candidacy and election of Jimmy Carter in 1976. Carter was quite vocal about his evangelism and, as a result, won majorities of votes from both Evangelicals and

Fundamentalists. His electoral success among Southern Baptists was virtually unparalleled at that time. But Carter's evangelism did not extend to his presidential agenda, and for the most part he maintained the wall between church and state (Dionne, 1991). For example, Carter supported the Court's decision in the *Roe* case and opposed efforts to bring religion back into the public schools. As a result, he alienated his most important bases of support. Catholics and Jews, mainstays of the Democratic coalition, were put off by his evangelism while Evangelicals themselves were alienated by his failure to govern in a manner reflecting their core values. Evangelicals and adherents to other conservative faiths responded with greater activism, resulting in the rise of the Christian Right or the New Right - a socially conservative movement within modern conservatism. Evangelicals were again instrumental in the presidential contest of 1980, showing strong support for Reagan. The New Right and their perhaps most vocal interest group - the Moral Majority, then headed by Jerry Falwell – were credited in popular accounts with the victory given Reagan's success among religious Conservatives.

Indeed, the major electoral successes of 1976 and 1980 solidified Christian Conservatives place in American political life. The 1980 election, in particular, firmly situated religious Conservatives in the Republican camp and precipitated an important shift in conservative priorities from limited government and anticommunism to social regulation and family values (Dionne, 1991). The result of these developments was the creation of two competing activist factions oriented around cultural issues. Thus, the battle lines were drawn and a socially conservative, religiously-based cadre of activists emerged to challenge the efforts of liberal activists tied to the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the gay rights movement.

This conflict over social, or moral, policy issues was not confined to liberal and religious-conservative activists, however. Some have suggested social issue attitudes lie at the core of a major party coalition realignment, occurring at the mass level, not unlike the changes in party composition stimulated by racial issues in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson, 1990; Adams, 1997; Carmine and Layman, 1997). For Carmines and Stimson (1990) differences on racial issues gradually became defining characteristics of the major parties. As the parties moved to take distinct positions on racial issues, the public came to identify with one of the parties based primarily on their positions towards this issue, resulting is mass polarization. According to the issue evolution perspective, opinion cleavages cause partisan change slowly, though an incremental process driven for the most part by elite opinion. As an issue persists at the forefront of the political agenda, elite polarization becomes mirrored in the mass public. When this contested issue cuts across party lines, partisan realignment occurs. The public sorts itself into the appropriate party based on their positions on this single issue. As noted prior, partisan sorting on the basis of issues decisive for elites often occurs at the group level and alters the group basis of the party coalitions (Manza and Brooks, 1999). This was certainly the case for Southern Democrats, who defected to the Republican Party based on attitudes towards the civil rights movements.

In the context of culture wars politics, it is likely the very same social and political movements that led to the politicization of Christian Conservatives polarized political elites and eventually the mass public – resulting in a partisan realignment on moral grounds. Much of the work on issue evolution following the civil rights movement has focused on whether the controversy over abortion has served as a fulcrum for partisan

change. A number of studies have demonstrated polarization in abortion attitudes among Congressional partisans and partisan activists in the mass public in the years following the *Roe v Wade* decision (Adams, 1997; Carmines and Woods, 2002). Polarization on this issue also occurs at the mass level, lagging somewhat behind elite and activist polarization. This finding is consistent with the issue evolution framework set forth by Carmines and Stimson (1990). Moral issues, like abortion, readily lend themselves to partisan change as conceptualized in the issue evolution perspective. Abortion can be characterized as a requisite "easy" issue. Easy issues are those requiring little information or expertise to form an opinion. The low information burden allows for the development of strong opinions in the mass public, where levels of political knowledge and sophistication tend to be quite low (Converse, 1964). In addition, abortion has remained a salient political issue in the wake of the *Roe v. Wade* decision, giving public opinion on this issue time to crystallize.

While this work focuses on a single culture wars issue, it is suggestive of partisan realignment on moral grounds. However, there are some dissenting opinions. Notably, Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) find no evidence of polarization among mass partisans on other culture wars issue, like the regulation of pornography or attitudes towards gay rights. Unfortunately, these studies look at simple partisan differences, between self-identified democrats and republicans, without incorporating any notion of identity strength. While partisan polarization is evident in abortion attitudes at the mass level, polarization on pornography and gay rights may be masked by changes among only strongly identified partisans. If the process of issue evolution is incremental and elite driven, as Carmines and Stimson (1990) suggest, it may be the case polarization is only evident among strongly identified and activist partisans during the period examined. Also, the focus on partisan identity obscures the group basis of partisan change. During this period, religious adherence emerged as a strong predictor of partisanship and vote choice (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005; Layman, 1997; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2006; Kellstedt and Green, 1993). In addition, religiosity is strongly linked to a host of social policy preferences and conservative ideology (Gay and Ellison, 1995; Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Hoffman and Miller, 1997). These empirical linkages point to partisan sorting among religious identifiers (see also Fiorina, 2006).

While empirical evidence of a cultural realignment is far from conclusive, anecdotal evidence points to the continued political import of cultural issues. Republican candidates won the presidency in 1984 and 1988 on a platform of family values, supported by a strong Southern base. Cultural issues proved particularly important in the 1992 presidential race. As noted above, the notion of the culture wars in American politics received a great deal of play during the campaign and significant religious cleavages emerged in voting behavior. The difference in the two-party vote between regular church attenders and non-attenders grew by approximately 25 percentage points from 1988 and persisted through the 2004 election (Fiorina, 2006). Of course, the 2004 presidential race is interesting from a culture wars perspective, given the prominence of gay rights issues in the campaign rhetoric and presence of referenda to ban gay marriage on the ballots in 11 states.

While culture wars politics are often discussed in terms of campaign strategy and presidential elections, instances of cultural conflict outside the electoral context are pervasive. Following the election, the culture wars showed through in the importance

placed on abortion attitudes in the Senate conformation hearings in 2006, the Terry Shaivo case, the passage of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban, state level efforts to ban abortion, and the continued debate over stem cell research. Certainly, sufficient anecdotal evidence exists to support the growing importance of cultural issues and the existence of polarized bases of support on either side of these conflicts.

Religious Origins of the Culture Wars

Changes in the nature of the nation's religious climate occurred in concert with these political developments which heightened the salience of moral policy issues. During the 1960s and 1970s, sociologists championed the secularization hypothesis – the notion religiosity was in decline among citizens of all industrialized Western nations. From this perspective, social changes accompanying modernization - urbanization, social and geographic mobility, expanded access to higher education, and the growth of the welfare state - have decreased reliance on religious institutions and religious communities (Hadden, 1987; Roof, 1993; Beito, 2000). In the United States, sociologists did uncover some initial evidence to support this sweeping secularization hypothesis. As Americans have become more geographically mobile, community investment and participation in both religious and civic life has declined dramatically (Putnam, 2000). In fact, the proportion of Americans reporting no religious affiliation increased from 2 percent in the 1960s to 11 percent in the early 1990s. Also, reported involvement in religious organizations diminished by an estimated 25 to 50 percent during this period (Putnam, 2000).

Declining rates of organizational involvement suggests those Americans who did maintain a religious identity became somewhat de-institutionalized. The result was a more lax or personalized form of religiosity, where individuals still adhered to religious beliefs, in spite of their movement away from institutionalized religion (Bellah, 1985; Hammond, 1992; Pargament, 1999). Ultimately, through a process of generational replacement, this nondenominational spirituality is thought to be replaced by a more unapologetic or unambivalent secularism (Roof, 1993). For example, Marler and Hadaway (2002) examined national public opinion polls and found that the baby boomer cohort was more apt to identify themselves as spiritual and not religious than was the previous generational cohort. However, the authors also found the subsequent cohort, the baby busters, were much less likely than other generational cohorts to identify as either spiritual or religious, and more likely to indicate that neither term adequately described them.

It is difficult to reconcile this evidence of secularization with parallel trends in American religious life. While global or general indicators of secularization were rising in the United States, conservative churches were effectively maintaining their memberships, and in some cases even expanded (Perrin, Kennedy, Miller, 1997; Hunter, 1987; Roof and McKinney, 1987). In addition, the emergence of a politicized right wing religious movement, the Christian or New Right, seems at odds with the secularization

thesis. Relative to Western European nations, with the exception of Ireland and perhaps Italy, the United States has remained an outlier in its religiosity (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). These contradictory trends culminated in a phenomenon sociologists refer to as "the collapse of the center" in American religious life (Wuthnow, 1988). While secularization is underway, as sociologists contended in the 1960s and 1970s, it is not a sweeping secularization but seems to occur selectively within the American public. Specifically, members of mainline churches distanced themselves from religious life at rates far greater rates than did members of conservative churches. While Conservative churches reported growth from the 1960s onward, mainline churches reported declining membership during this period (Roozen and Hadaway, 1993). The result was a widening gap between religious Conservatives and more progressive or secular Americans.

In addition to the changes in the nation's religious climate heralded by the collapse of the center in America's religious traditions, particularly Protestantism, changes in the nature of denomininational conflict had consequences for the development and character of cultural politics. Historically, religious cleavages occurred between the nation's major denominations, such as Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. Such interdenominational conflict was clear in the 1960 presidential contest, in which over 80 percent of Catholics voted for John F. Kennedy (the Catholic candidate) while an equal proportion of Protestants voted for Richard Nixon, a Protestant. Clearly, religious Americans voted along denominational lines in this election.

Following the 1960 election, the nature of religious cleavages shifted such that interdenominational conflict was replaced with *intra*denominational conflict. The nation's major religious traditions became internally polarized over appropriate theological responses to social changes inherent in modernization. Wuthnow (1988) attributes this change to increased access to higher education. The rising education level within these religious traditions led to an influx of liberal values which clashed with traditional religious doctrine, promoting internal divisions. Others have pointed to class difference, with progressive movements drawing popular support from the upper middle classes and conservative movements drawing support from the lower middle and working classes (Hunter, 1991; Frank, 2005). Such internal debates were evident in the Baptist Battles over social issues and the ordination of women and the schism that developed in Catholicism over women's and reproductive issues which culminated the Second Vatican Council. Such internal polarization likely accounted for some of the drop off among religious moderates evident during this period.

Ultimately, such conflicts meant that even within the same major religious tradition, adherents developed dramatically different positions on social issues like reproductive rights, women's role in society, and the proper political rights afforded Gays. As a result, denominational distinctions blurred and were replaced by interdenominational coalitions based on religious orthodoxy or progressivism. The rise of these ecumenical coalitions, such as the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the Moral Majority, pitted theological Conservatives drawn from Catholicism, Judaism, and Protestantism against theological progressives from the same religious traditions, resulting in new religious coalitions diametrically opposed on cultural flashpoint issues (Hunter, 1991).

Hunter (1991) draws on these developments in his conceptualization of the culture wars in American politics. He argues that as the moderate center has dropped out

of American religious life, interdenominational changes have given rise to ecumenical coalitions based on theological ideology, and various social and political developments have increased the political salience of various social issues, the public has coalesced into competing factions adopting progressive or orthodox perspectives on social life. These political and religious changes have sharpened the boundaries of these opposing coalitions, heightened the salience of group differences, and led to intergroup conflict over key social and political institutions.

While these orthodox and progressive coalitions do hold opposing positions on social issues - such as the regulation of pornography, the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and school prayer - Hunter (1991) warns against thinking about the culture wars as a constellation of polarized issue attitudes. For Hunter (1991), these polarized social policy attitudes are really symptomatic of fundamentally different worldviews which are tied to membership in various social groups. The worldviews of orthodox, or socially conservative, Americans are grounded in belief that religious doctrine guides the way for proper moral behavior and provides the basis for maintaining the social order. They are also characterized by submission to an external, transcendent authority. Alternatively, progressive worldviews are characterized by moral relativism and an emphasis on personal freedoms and liberties over social or religious conventions. The progressive worldview privileges human rationality in a manner consistent with Enlightenment philosophers. Another key dividing line between progressive and orthodox worldviews is the different conceptions of freedom and justice championed by each side. According to Hunter (1991): "Cultural Conservatives tend to define freedom economically (as individual economic initiative) and justice socially (as righteous living), progressives tend to define freedom socially (as individual rights) and justice economically (as equity)." Thus, while both sides appeal to freedom and justice they are applying the terms in fundamentally different ways consistent with their oppositional perspectives on the principles guiding social life and attitudes towards authority.

The key consequence of these competing and diametrically opposed worldviews linked to political and social identities is intractable conflict. Drawing on Durkheim, Hunter (1991) contends communities cannot and will not tolerate the desecration of the sacred. Cultural conflict occurs because each side of the cultural divide operates with a different notion of the sacred, and the mere existence of the one represents a certain desecration of the other. Because both sides are entirely convinced of their moral rectitude, there can be no fruitful debate on moral policy or cultural issues. As a result, the conflict takes on recalcitrant tone - characterized by hostility, polarization, and intolerance. Thus, at their core, the culture wars are about power and control. Both progressive and orthodox groups collectively strive to control key social and political institutions – government, the media, and the public schools – with the goal of defining public culture in their own image and defining public policy consistent with their core values. This conceptualization of the conflict is akin to Gramsci's (1971) notion of cultural hegemony which links culture and legitimizing ideologies to the procurement and maintenance of political power.

Empirical Studies of Mass Opinion on Culture Wars Issues

Despite Hunter's (1991) warning that the culture wars cannot be reduced to simple issue positions, much of the empirical work on the culture wars has focused on changing issue attitudes over time – relying on public opinion surveys like the General Social Survey and National Election Studies. In part, this analytic strategy is the result of difficulties inherent in the conceptualization of culture and rather amorphous constructs like worldviews. It also makes sense to look at the changing nature of these attitudes in the mass public, since polarized issue attitudes are a proximal consequence of this phenomenon and can be taken as evidence the conflict extends beyond elites and issue activists to the mass public. Most of the extant studies of culture wars politics in political science and sociology attempt to establish the existence of opinion cleavages for political attitudes on issues like abortion, gay rights, and school prayer. They also consider whether opinion on these cultural flashpoint issues among key groups of religious, secular, and political identifiers have become more polarized over time in response to the growing salience of cultural conflict in American politics.

While this literature is reviewed in greater detail in Chapter 3, it is important to note it is essentially plagued with inconsistencies. Some studies demonstrate polarization of abortion attitudes beginning in the early 1990s among partisans, ideologues, and political activists (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Adams, 1997). Others find partisan and ideological polarization extend to other issue areas, such as gay rights and school prayer, during this period (Evans, 2003; Abramowtiz and Saunders, 2005). Fiorina (2006) makes perhaps the most notable contribution to this debate. Based on his analysis of data from the National Election Studies, the General Social Surveys, and a number of studies by the PEW Organization, he reports scant evidence of attitude polarization along partisan, ideological, regional, or religious lines. In fact, the differences between Liberals and conservative, activists and non-activists, Fundamentalists and mainliners on social issues like abortion, gay rights, and school prayer are quite modest - on the order of around 10 percent. The overwhelming majority of the mass public holds centrist positions on these hot-button social issues. Even in 2004, when gay rights and family values featured prominently in the presidential campaign, Fiorina (2006) unearthed little evidence the public placed much importance on social issues when voting. Instead the public placed considerably more emphasis on the Iraq war and terrorism. Hillygus and Shields (2005) similarly concluded social issues did not weigh heavily in the vote calculus of most citizens in the 2004 election.

Studies of opinion change on social issues among religious identifiers are also somewhat inconclusive. DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) find differences between religious and conservative identifiers on issues like the role of women, sexual conduct, and abortion actually declined from the period between 1972 and 1992, contrary to the expectations set out in the culture wars thesis. Evans (2003), extending this earlier analysis out to 2000, finds similar patterns of opinion convergence for these groups. However, using a revised religious classification scheme reflecting the intradenominational nature of religious conflict discussed above, Evans (2002) finds conservative Protestants have in fact become more socially conservative over time, while mainliners have remained relatively stable. Hoffman and Miller (1998) and Jelen (1990) similarly finds Evangelical Protestants have become more conservative in their social issue attitudes. These studies focus on differences between religious groups,

emphasizing central tendencies in opinion, which can obscure internal polarization. Some empirical work in this area has focused on the distribution of opinion within groups and has uncovered evidence of growing dissensus within the Evangelical camp (Hoffman and Miller, 1998; Gay et al, 1996). Such divisions challenge common conceptions of religious Conservatives as monolithically social conservative and perhaps portend diminished conflict over social issues, while some (but not all) of the earlier studies which focus on average differences between Evangelicals and mainliners instead point to an escalation of the conflict.

In part, the inconsistencies observed across these studies are the result of different approaches to ascribing identities to respondents - classifying them into particular political and social groups. For example, the partisan and ideological classifications employed in these studies are typically quite blunt, lumping strong, weak, and sometimes even leaning partisans into a common category. This strategy ignores likely heterogeneity among partisans. It seems entirely plausible strongly committed partisans are more polarized in their social policy preferences than their more weakly identified and leaning counterparts – who are certainly more ambivalent about their partisan and ideological identifications.

A similar criticism applied to work on attitude change among religious Americans, which is problematized by the lack of gold standard for measuring religious identity. Denominational affiliations alone are not terribly meaningful given the rise of ecumenical coalitions than cut across denominational lines. Furthermore, sub-denominational classification approaches face problems of missing data, a lack of meaningful subdivisions for some major religious traditions like Catholicism, and regional variation in the theological ideology of various religious sub-denominations (Kellstedt and Leege, 1993; Alwin et al, 2006; Steensland et al, 2000). Alternate measures of religious identity, focusing on general religiosity rather than religious affiliations are similarly problematic. Church attendance, for instance, tends to be systematically overreported (Hadaway, Marker and Chaves, 1993). A more thorough review of strategies for measuring religious identity and their utility is provided in Chapter 4, but it is important to understand at the outset that problems with the measurement of religious identity obscure important religious differences. It is difficult to determine, for example, whether findings of growing internal polarization among Evangelicals on issues like abortion, uncovered by Gay et al (1996), are real or an artifact resulting from error in classifying religious Americans. If measures fail to cleanly sort religious identifiers into Evangelical and mainline camps, opinion heterogeneity among the resulting groups may be related to differences in theological ideology across groups rather than polarization within groups.

In sum, the literature is inconclusive on whether social issue attitudes among Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities have become more polarized following the political and social developments in the 1960s and 1970s outlined above. Clearly, inconsistencies in the measurement of political and religious identities in the mass public need to be resolved. Among both political and religious identities, greater attention need be granted to gradations in identity strength. Polarization among the most deeply committed group members during the period of interest here may be masked by lumping them with their less committed counterparts. Better accounting of group identities, which are linked to the competing worldviews discussed by Hunter,

should allow for a better test of whether the mass public, or some relevant subset of it, has become increasingly polarized on the moral policy issues at the center of culture wars politics.

Culture Wars as Intergroup Conflict

As is evident from the brief overview of empirical studies on the culture wars and the discussion of its origins, social and political group identifications are thought to play a central role in culture wars politics. While Hunter (1991; 2006) may slightly privilege worldviews over group membership, as common worldviews are thought to underlie the constellation of groups aligned over cultural issues, the strong group basis of the conflict is clear in his writing. Indeed, polarization based on group membership is clear in the political and religious changes which catalyzed the culture wars in American politics. The prominent liberal political movements of the 1960s and 1970s were based in strong racial, feminist, and gay identities, and the rise of the New Right was a direct response of conservative religious groups to the efforts and successes of these liberal groups, which threatened traditional Christian values.

While the majority of the public may very well be moderate, ambivalent or ignorant on matters pertinent to this cultural conflict, as Fiorina (2006) claims, I contend Americans who are strong identified with key social and political groups – such as Liberals, Conservatives, Democrats, Republicans, Feminists, Gays, religious Conservatives, and Seculars – are sensitive to this conflict; mobilized and polarized by it to a larger degree than their more weakly identified counterparts. To be clear, I do not situate the culture wars only among political activists, but among the subset of the mass public maintaining these strong identities. These strong group identities serve as a lens for understanding both the social and political world, lending consistency and stability to political views and behavior. Thus, I argue religious and political identifications form the backbone of culture wars politics. The culture wars can best be understood as a form of intergroup conflict between groups holding diametrically opposed perspectives on social issues. These groups struggle to gain influence over the nation's key political and social institutions, control that would afford them the ability to set moral priorities for the nation.

Culture Wars as Identity Politics

Social identity theory provides a solid framework for understanding intergroup attitudes and behaviors in this culture wars context, by explicating the micro-level basis processes driving intergroup conflict. According to this perspective, the psychological drive to maintain a positive social (or group) identity produces a number of intergroup biases designed to improve or maintain one's social group's economic or symbolic status relative to that of other salient social groups. The self is composed of two distinct parts, the individual identity and the collective, or social, identity. One's social identity is defined as "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the *value* and *emotional significance* attached to that membership (emphasis added, Tajfel, 1978)." People maintain a sense of attachment to their group and derive psychological benefits from group membership - such as a sense of security, importance, and self esteem - to the extent that their group is positively evaluated or enjoys a particular level of social status (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1992; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). The perceptual and motivational biases associated with social group membership and the drive to maintain a positive group identity – notably ingroup favoritism, outgroup denigration and intolerance, sensitivity to group-based threats and conflicts, and collective action based on group interests - are largely consistent with the dynamics of cultural conflict outlined above.

Social identity theory has received a great deal of play in psychology, but tends to be underutilized in political science (Huddy, 2001; Leege et al, 2002). The problem lies, in part, with a general reluctance or difficulty in applying this framework to "real" social groups – political or social groups with complex histories tied to social movements – rather than minimal groups created artificially in laboratory settings (Huddy, 2002). Some problem in applying this framework to political conflicts comes from disagreement among theorists themselves. Specifically, there is tension within the social identity literature on the extent to which context influences the expression of intergroup biases and motivates collective action (Huddy, 2002; 2004; Oakes, 2002). The two major strands of this work, social identity theory (SIT) and social categorization theory (SCT), differ in the emphasis placed on context. SCT maintains a more fluid notion of identity, highly contingent on context. While both perspectives maintain people can hold multiple and even conflicting social identities, SCT contends the salience of a particular identity, and its influence on attitudes and behavior, is largely a function of contextual cues (Oakes, 2002; Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al 1987). Identity stability, or the chronic salience of a particular identity, arises in some cases, such as when one's social context itself is relatively stable (Turner et al, 1994).

On the other hand, SIT places significantly less emphasis on context. For example, Huddy (2002) suggests identities are rendered far more stable than assumed by SCT by factors such as well-established group prototypes (group leadership), group norms and values linked to specific historical movements, reinforcement of these norms and values through common cultural practices, and the presence of common outgroups which serve to sharpen the boundaries of group membership. These factors account for why some identities – particularly political, ethnic, and religious identities – tend to be quite stable and salient across a variety of contexts (Sherkat, 2001; Abrams, 1994; Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb, 1992; Duck, Hogg and Terry, 1995; Duck, Terry and Hogg, 1998).

This notion of identity stability is somewhat more satisfying than the fluidity emphasized by SCT. If there is no real consistency to the more social aspects of one's self concept, an empirical link between social identity, attitudes, and behavior will not likely materialize.

While much of the work on social identity and context has focused on this debate about identity salience, some scholars have considered how contextual cues of group competition or conflict influence the expression of intergroup attitudes and behaviors. One of the most consistent finding in the SIT literature is the expression of ingroup favoritism. Ingroup bias occurs across a variety of contexts and is even present in minimal groups settings, among groups created in the laboratory (for an overview of these studies see Mullen, Brown, and Smith, 1992; Brown, 1995). While expressing favoritism towards one's own group is pervasive, bias towards other groups generally emerges only when intergroup conflict or competition is salient (Flippen, Hornstein, Siegal and Weitzman, 1996; Postmes and Branscombe, 2002; Brown, 2000).

Early efforts to explain group conflict focused on economic threat. This realistic group conflict perspective assumed competition between groups for scarce resources contributed to group related biases (Sherif, 1966; Deutsch, 1973). An offshoot of this approach, fraternal relative depravation theory, considered the importance of the subjective perception of group status relative to that of other salient groups in one's immediate context. Perceptions of fraternal relative depravation were found to be more strongly predictive of intergroup and policy attitudes than egoistic or personal feelings of depravation (Crosby, 1976).

Challenges to the realistic conflict and fraternal relative depravation approaches argue symbolic threats (such as those characterizing cultural politics), rather than realistic or economic threats, are critical determinants of intergroup attitudes. Group members are thought to hold negative attitudes towards other groups to the extent that these groups adhere to different values, norms, or customs. The presence of groups holding opposing values is perceived as threatening to group identity and integrity. Much of the work relating symbolic beliefs to group threat has focused on racial attitudes in the United States. A great deal of this work was stimulated by Rokeach's (1968, 1973) belief-congruence model, which proposed that prejudice towards members of ethnic groups is rooted in perceived dissimilarity of beliefs and core values. Perceived differences in group value hierarchies have been linked to antagonism and negative intergroup attitudes (Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky, 1990; Haddock, Zanna, and Esses, 2000). Also, work on symbolic racism suggests that the animosity whites hold towards blacks is a function primarily of perceptions that blacks violate fundamental American values, particularly those embodied in the Protestant work ethic (Kinder and Sears, 1971, 1981; Biernat, Vescio and Theno, 1996). Alternatively, Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) found when African Americans perceived their group to be devalued by white Americans on either realistic or symbolic grounds, they reported stronger identification with African Americans as a group and expressed more hostile attitudes towards whites. These studies suggest there is symmetry to this racial conflict, based on mutual perceptions of symbolic group threat.

Some of the empirical work on the cultural wars discussed briefly above has illustrated polarizing trends in evaluations of social and political groups salient in the culture wars (see for example Miller and Hoffman, 1999). These polarized group

evaluations, measured by feeling thermometers, are often cast in terms of growing intergroup hostilities or antipathies. However, such measures tap the colder, more cognitive aspects of intergroup attitudes. Social psychologists, working from a social identity theory point of view, are increasingly turning to the more emotional consequences of intergroup conflict which are thought to afford insight into the hotter and more virulent forms of prejudice and discrimination (Smith, 1993; Mackie and Smith, 1998; 2003; Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005). This shift in focus has led to a redefinition of prejudice as a social emotion experienced on behalf of one's group identity in response to threats and opportunities arising in intergroup contexts (Smith, 1993). Discrete intergroup emotions – such as fear, anger, disgust, and enthusiasm – are thought to motivate particular patterns of intergroup attitudes and behaviors. Anger is an emotional reaction thought to characterize nearly all intergroup conflicts, whether the conflicts are on realistic or symbolic in nature (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005). The experience of anger in intergroup contexts has been linked to mobilization, aggression, and intolerance in intergroup settings.

The link between culturally-based threat, emotion, and tolerance is of great interest here. It seems likely the hostility, polarization, and political mobilization resulting from cultural conflict ultimately translates into undemocratic tendencies – specifically the desire to censure or otherwise disenfranchise groups holding uncomplimentary values or political attitudes. If culture wars politics elicit anti-democratic preferences among a significant portion of the electorate, conflict over cultural issues is not merely the reflection of a traditional electoral or public opinion cleavage. Instead, it should be considered a significantly more sinister phenomenon which threatens democratic pluralism, institutions, and processes.

Typically, work on political tolerance linked religiosity and political conservatism to intolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982, McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sniderman et al, 1989; Altemeyer and Hunsberger; 1992; Ellison and Musick, 1993). However, recent studies have pointed to growing intolerance for right wing groups, particularly Fundamentalists, among secular and progressive Americans (Bolche and DeMaio, 1999). A symmetric pattern of intolerance in response to group-based threats would be consistent with predictions derived from social identity theory, which posits prejudice and intolerance arise among groups in conflict regardless of their religious or ideological leanings. Symmetry to the conflict is also evident in the culture wars rhetoric, where both sides tends to demonize the opposition – characterizing competing groups as dogmatic, bigoted, and fanatical (Hunter, 1991; Luker; 1984; Hardisty; 1999).

Thus, I am interested in how the group-based conflict inherent in culture wars rhetoric precipitates attitude polarization - the emphasis of most studies of culture wars politics in political science and sociology - but also emotions and intolerance. However, it is important to note the effects of threat on intergroup attitudes are not uniform across all group members. Instead, the effects of threat on intergroup attitudes are moderated by individual differences in subjective identity strength, which varies along a continuum from weak to strong (Mullin and Hogg, 1998; Noel et al, 1995; Perreault and Bourhis, 1999). Individuals who identify most strongly with their group are thought to adhere most stringently to group values and to react to symbolic threat with greater intensity (Doosje, Ellemers and Spears, 1999). Thus attention to individual differences in group

attachment or subjective sense of group identity is critical for understanding responses to group based threats.

Some work has even shown that people who are weakly identified with minority groups, or groups bearing some social stigma, will elect to disassociate from their group when identity threat is salient. Alternatively, people holding a strong subjective sense of identification with such groups will maintain the identification regardless of real or potential threats (Kinket and Verkuyten, 1997; Ethier and Deaux, 1994). Alternatively, group threat has been shown to mobilize strong identifiers to take collective action on behalf of the group, while weak identifiers are significantly demobilized by such threats (Grant and Brown, 1995; Simon, 1997; Veenstra and Haslam, 2000). This link between identity and activism likely generalizes to the culture wars context, where strongly committed partisans, ideologues, religious and secular Americans are most mobilized by invocation of the culture wars in the political rhetoric.

Based on this work, I expect to find Americans with strong religious, secular, and political identities respond most intensely to the threats inherent in culture wars politics. These strong identifiers will show the greatest evidence of attitude polarization over time in public opinion surveys and also respond most intensely to experimentally induced threat – with anger, attitude polarization, and intolerance. Political mobilization to promote group interests is also a likely reaction to cultural conflict among these committed Americans, though a direct test of this relationship lies beyond the scope of this project.

Core Hypotheses and Method Overview

In the chapters that follow, I aim to answer some of the questions left open by prior work on the culture wars in American politics. The first and perhaps most fundamental question is whether the culture wars are a mass phenomenon. In the subsequent chapter, I follow previous studies which consider both the distributional properties of opinion on hotly contested social issues and the stability of opinion on these issues among key social groups over time, using data from the National Election Studies for the period 1972 to 2004. My work diverges from other treatments of this kind by emphasizing variations in identity strength. Because the social identity literature places great importance on identity strength and highlights its moderating effect on attitudes and behavior in intergroup conflicts, I expect to find Americans who strongly identify with partisan, ideological, secular, and religious social groups will be quite polarized in their social policy positions relative to their more weakly identified counterparts.

Group differences are expected to increase over time. In the early 1970s, differences between ideologically or theologically opposed groups should be relatively muted. Beginning in the late 1970s, group differences should grow in response to the greater salience of cultural conflict in American politics. In addition, I consider the political consequences of polarization among these Americans by comparing rates of political activity among those with strong and weak (or nonexistent) political and

religious identities. I suspect, by virtue of their greater polarization and higher rates of participation in political life, people with social and political identities send stronger and clearer signals about their more polarized social policy preferences to elites than the more moderate, less active, majority.

But existing survey data can only get us so far. As noted prior and developed in Chapter 4, the measures of religious and political identity available in the National Election Studies and other national opinion surveys are quite limited. These measures contain scant information on subjective identity strength relative to measures employed in the social identity theory literature, such as the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992). Of course, the study of identity politics hinges on the appropriate operationalization of identity. The second major question I address here is how to best capture subjective variation in identity strength. To this end, I develop and evaluate a new strategy for measuring collective identity which better incorporates notions of identity salience and subjective identity strength than does existing measures.

Finally, after establishing the nature and magnitude of opinion polarization on social issues in the electorate and delving into the relationship between various key social identities and the appropriate operationalization of identity strength, I turn to the dynamics underlying this cultural conflict by examining responses to experimentally induced threat in Chapter 5. Consistent with the finding from the social identity theory literature outlined above, I expect Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities are most responsive to the symbolic threats characteristic of the culture wars. These highly committed group members will be more sensitive to political messages containing explicit cues of group-based conflict over cultural issues than their more weakly identified counterparts and will respond to them with greater anger, attitude polarization, and intolerance.

Overall, this project points to the utility of social identity theory in the context of cultural conflict in American politics. The results of these three studies situate the culture wars within the mass public and explicate the nature of the social, psychological, and political processes underlying this phenomenon. But, the major findings developed here also raise several important questions about the relationship between identity and values, as well as the connection between national identity and these sub-national political and religious identities, which are discussed at some length in the final chapter.

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Chapter 3: Culture Wars and the Mass Public

Introduction

There is considerable debate over the extent to which the mass public is actively engaged in culture wars politics. The crux of the culture wars thesis is that political and social developments in the 1960s and 1970s – particularly the political successes of liberal movements for civil, women's, reproductive, and gay rights and the mobilization of the Christian Right - heightened the salience of moral issues among the masses and led to the polarization of social policy preferences. Continuing debate over the proper moral course for the nation in the 1990s and 2000s – disagreement over prayer in the public schools, the teaching of evolution, right to life and death, and the proper civil rights afforded Gays -- is understood to have cemented moral policy questions in the forefront of the public's psyche. Despite the glut of anecdotal evidence supporting this notion of culture wars politics, empirical studies are divided on the presence and magnitude of mass opinion polarization. While there is some evidence of polarization among partisans and political activists since the early 1970s, scholars disagree on the extent of this polarization and its electoral consequences. For example, Fiorina's (2006) touchstone work on this topic contends the stratum of polarized Americans is so thin, it exerts a negligible influence on electoral politics. The vast majority of the mass public is far removed from these kinds of conflicts, holding preferences for centrist policies on moral policy issues.

However, it is difficult to reconcile Fiorina's position with recent political developments pointing to the existence of an electorate fundamentally divided on the nature of the values that should guide public policy. Increasingly, anecdotal evidence at both the elite and mass levels – such as bitter strife in Senate confirmation hearings for judicial nominees, the importance of referenda on gay marriage in many states for electoral outcomes in the 2004, conflict regarding the outcome of the Terry Shaivo controversy and right to life (and death) issues more generally – suggests increased polarization on issues where value priorities conflict. In addition, it is difficult to understand why the parties have moved apart on these issues, adopting a base strategy, if the overwhelming majority of the public retains centrist positions, as Fiorina (2006) claims. This change seems inconsistent with the median voter theorem, which would predict centrist parties based on the relatively normal distribution of opinion on these issues. These developments suggest social policy conflict is salient for both significant subsets of the public and the parties and influences both electoral politics and public policy in important and interesting ways.

To better understand opinion polarization at the mass level and its political consequences, I look at the culture wars phenomenon from a social identity perspective. The analysis centers on the subset of Americans who hold strong political, religious, and secular identities. This emphasis on identity stems from conceptualization of the culture wars as a form of intergroup conflict over the moral direction of the nation. Because the rhetoric characterizing culture wars politics is replete with group-based threats and reflects a tendency to demonize specific social groups, people with strong political and religious identities are likely more attuned to the conflict and are expected to demonstrate the most consistent and pronounced attitudinal and affective responses. This polarization occurs because the symbolic threats characteristic of culture wars lead to greater cohesion among group members and exaggerated responses to perceived threats from opposing

groups (Hunter, 1991; Jelen, 1990). Such group-based, symbolic threats are used to cultivate a siege mentality among social groups and party leadership (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2006).

Below, I examine the link between identity and involvement in social policy conflict using data from the 1972 to 2004 National Election Studies. Two symptoms of the culture wars are considered. First, consistent with other work on the culture wars, I look at the distribution of social policy attitudes in the electorate and compare it to the attitudes held by American people with strong social identities. Second, I look for evidence that intergroup attitudes have become increasingly polarized during this time frame. In addition, I take seriously the political consequences of this polarization by comparing rates of political activity among those with strong and weak (or nonexistent) political and religious identities. I suspect, by virtue of their higher rates of participation in political life, people with social and political identities send stronger and clearer signals about their more polarized social policy preferences to elites than does the more moderate, less active majority. This pattern of results could account for movement of the parties away from the center of the opinion distribution on these issues. Ultimately, examination of the relationship between identity, attitude extremity, and political participation should provide insight into the scope of the conflict within the mass public and its political consequences.

Attitude Polarization

For the most part, empirical work on the culture wars has focused on the distributional properties of mass opinion on social policy issues (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Hoffman and Miller, 1997; Gay et al 1996; Gay and Ellison, 1993). Distributional approaches assume attitude polarization is the primary symptom of culture wars politics. As the public becomes more internally polarized on social issues like abortion, the role of women in society, school prayer, and gay rights, the variance of the opinion distribution increases. In extreme cases, where divisions are quite pronounced, the distribution of opinion approaches bimodality – with significant portions of the public holding relatively distinct positions on these issues. The distributional properties of mass opinion provide insight into which social issues reflect major electoral cleavages and thus are likely to become cultural flashpoints. As opinion becomes increasingly dispersed, the likelihood of groups forming at the tails of the opinion distribution for an issue – holding dramatically different and perhaps irreconcilable positions – increases substantially (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996). Opinion polarization therefore militates against political consensus by reducing the likelihood of consensual and stable policy solutions – those supported by the bulk of the public. Alternatively, as the variance in the opinion distribution for an issue declines, mass opinion becomes more consensual and the likelihood of stable political solution increases.

Looking at the distributional properties of opinion lends insight into debate over the locus of the culture wars – whether it is primarily an elite phenomenon or the scope of

the conflict extends to include the mass public. While scholars agree Congressional Democrats and Republicans have become increasingly polarized in their perspectives on these social issues, there is considerable debate over the extent of mass polarization. Some work points to polarization in attitudes towards abortion, school prayer, and gay rights based on partisan and ideological identification beginning in the early 1990s, while other work contends opinion on these issues has been relatively stable over the period from 1970 to 2004.

In his benchmark work on the culture wars, Fiorina (2006) finds attitudes on seemingly contentious social policy attitudes are, for the most part, distributed normally in the mass public. The bulk of the population adheres to moderate positions on these issues. Only the small subset of the public reflected in the tails of the opinion distributions for these issues – which are rather thin – hold extreme positions. Fiorina unearths little evidence of mass polarization based on geography, lending little credence to the notion of a nation cleanly divided into red states and blue states. Differences in the social attitudes reported by members of red states and blue states were quite modest – with the largest differences (10-15 percent) observed for issues like gun control. Fiorina also finds that attitudinal divisions based on social characteristics such as race, age, gender, and religious identification have been declining – a finding inconsistent with the polarization hypothesis.

Even differences between rank and file partisans are relatively muted. Partisan differences on a composite index of social policy attitudes constructed from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press' Values Project Surveys are small and constant over the period from 1987-2003 – on the order of about 10 percentage points. Small differences are even observed for issues like abortion and gay rights. Looking at abortion attitudes in the GSS from 1975-2005, Fiorina (2006) finds minimal differences in support for abortion in a variety of circumstance, though here (and throughout his analysis) "leaning" partisans are lumped together with strong partisans, potentially masking differences between strongly and weakly committed members of the parties. Some evidence of polarization is observed when focusing on only extreme response options to this item – abortion should always be legal or never be legal. In the mid 1990s, partisan differences increased slightly to between 10 and 15 percent for both issue positions. Overall, however, only a small percentage of both Democrats and Republicans chose these all-or-none positions. Beginning in about 1995, only about 30 percent of Democrats reported abortion should be legal in all circumstances, compared to 10-20 percent of Republicans, while less than 20 percent of Democrats reported abortion should never be legal, compared to about 30 percent of Republicans. While the parties differ at the extremes, these figures suggest 70 to 80 percent of rank and file partisans selected a moderate response option, supporting abortion rights with some degree of qualification.

A similar pattern emerges for attitudes towards gay rights. Overall, the general public seems to be growing increasingly tolerant of Gays, as is evident from an increase in average feeling thermometer scores, a decrease in the number of American's supporting the criminalization of gay sex, and an increase in support for legal employment protections for Gays. Modest partisan differences are observed beginning in the early 1990s – widening to a gap of about 10 percent in 2003. Again, these results are far from suggestive of the intense conflict, extremity, and intolerance stressed in common characterizations of culture wars politics.

Based on this analysis, Fiorina (2006) concludes extreme positions on social issues are held only by a thin stratum of activists – what he refers to as the American *political class*. Included in the political class is: "The collection of officeholders, party and issue activists, interest group leaders, and political infotainers who constitute the public face of politics in contemporary America (Fiorina, 2006)." The vast majority of Americans are not included in this category. While elites have clearly polarized on issues like abortion and gay rights, Fiorina (2006) finds no evidence of a relationship between elite or political class and mass opinion on these issues. While Congressional Democrats and Republicans have become increasingly polarized (see also Poole and Rosenthal, 2001), the mass public has remained consistent in its support for centrist policy solutions. Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) report similar findings for a variety of issue areas. Their analysis of GSS and Congressional Roll Call data from 1970-1999 indicates that while elites have polarized on issues like abortion, gay rights, and the regulation of pornography, rank and file partisans have not followed suit. While there is no apparent relationship between elite and mass opinion on these kinds of moral policy issues, elite polarization on gun control and environmental protection does coincide with mass polarization during this period. These findings run counter to other studies of mass and elite abortion attitudes. Notably, Adams (1997) demonstrates elite polarization on the abortion issue catalyzed polarization among partisans in the mass public. He concludes the parties have realigned on the basis of the abortion issue, causing the parties to take distinct positions and move away from each other on this topic, consistent with Carmines' and Stimson's work on issue evolution (1990).

Mass polarization of abortion attitudes has been observed in other work on the culture wars. For instance, DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson's (1996) analysis of NES and GSS data from 1972 to 1992 demonstrates this polarization is most pronounced among partisans. Modest polarization is observed between Americans identifying as liberal and conservative as well during this period. Interestingly, partisans appeared to be the only groups polarizing on a variety of other social issues. Of the 17 issues examined by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) partisans began moving apart on eight. Little evidence of polarization was observed for issues other than abortion in the mass public, and ideologues remained rather consistent in their differences over time. Opinion cleavages based on race, age, gender, education and even religion actually declined during this period, leading the authors to conclude mass opinion was becoming more consensual, despite partisan changes (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996).

Others have noted similar polarizing trends among rank and file partisans, suggesting they have become more attuned to conflict over social issues. For example, Evans (2003) extended the findings reported in DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) to 2000 and found this earlier work had documented the beginning of a trend towards political conflict over matters of social policy. Evans (2003) reported an increase in partisan polarization over social issues after 1992 and reports growing polarization among ideologues - not just for abortion attitudes but also issues such as sex education and school prayer. Similar patterns of polarization between Liberals and Conservatives are observed for other pro-family issues and gay rights in other studies (for example, see Gay et al 1996).

While polarization has occurred among partisans and ideologues since the early 1990s, divisions based on other social and demographic characteristics (such as

education, race, religion, and gender) continue to decline (Evans 2003). There are a few noteworthy exceptions. For instance, some regional differences are observed – namely the south is more conservative on abortion attitudes and gay rights relative to other regions (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005; Fiorina, 2006). Similarly, age cohort effects are evident in attitudes towards Gays (Fiorina, 2006). But, these differences have been relatively consistent since the early 1990s and no polarizing trend is apparent.

To be sure, the literature by no means offers a definitive picture of trends in mass opinion on these hotly contested social issues. Some of this inconsistency may be due to the use of different methods for classifying respondents into partisan or ideological camps. While these political identities are measured on a seven-point scale, researchers often collapse across categories to obtain three groups – Liberals, Conservatives, and moderates or Democrats, independents, and Republicans. This method effectively lumps strong, weak, and even leaning partisans or ideologues into a common category, ignoring heterogeneity within these groups related to the extremity of their identifications. Others exclude partisan or ideological leaners, by virtue of their minimal attachment to these political groups. It seems entirely plausible that strongly committed partisans or ideologues are more polarized in their social policy preferences than their more weakly identified and leaning counterparts. If this is the case, their inclusion in analysis of differences between the parties or major ideological groups should dampen perceived polarization.

A second factor which may lend inconsistency to these results is differences in question wording for social issue attitudes. Comparison of trends in attitude changes across studies like the NES and GSS is difficult, because the question wording varies a great deal between these surveys. This is certainly the case for abortion attitudes, which have been the focus of much of this work on the culture wars. Consider the following survey items regarding abortion attitudes:

> [GSS Abortion Item] Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if:
> (1) The woman's own health is seriously endangered? (Yes or No)
> (2) She became pregnant as a result of rape? (Yes or No)
> (3) There is a serious chance of defect in the baby? (Yes or No)
> (4) The family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children? (Yes or No)
> (5) She is not married and does not want to marry the man? (Yes or No)
> (6) She is married and does not want any more children? (Yes or No)
>
> [NES Abortion Item] There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. I am going to read you a short list of opinions. Please tell me which one of the opinions best agrees with your view:
> (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted.
> (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.

(3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.
(4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

Obviously, the items differ a great deal in their response options. The GSS item raises a greater number of considerations or circumstances under which abortion might occur than the NES item and also requires respondents to weigh in on the legality of each circumstance separately, as if it were independent of the others. Analysis of this item is typically framed in terms of the number of considerations under which one supports abortion, with higher scores indicating greater support for reproductive freedoms. The response options for the NES item are clearly ordered such that high scores correspond to support for greater reproductive freedoms. Based on the differences between these two items, it is clear why differences may be observed across studies which examine these different items. However, when inconsistencies arise among studies examining the same dataset, differences in partisan and ideological classification are more likely at fault.

Activist Polarization

While much of the culture wars literature agrees active partisans and ideologues are more polarized in their social issue attitudes than are inactive partisans and ideologues, the way activism is defined tends to vary. Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) find active partisans in 2004 were quite divided on social issues. Looking at the 2004 National Exit Polls, they find a 37 percent gap in attitudes towards abortion among activist partisans and a 52 percent gap in support for gay marriage. Sharp divisions among active partisans are also evident in the 2004 NES. Differences in reported attitudes towards social, economic, and foreign policy issues range from 37 percent on abortion to 59 percent on the use of force in international conflicts. Active partisans were also significantly more ideologically polarized than their less active counterparts, who have also become ideologically polarized since the 1970s. Evans (2003) also notes this pattern of activist polarization. Using GSS data from 1972-2000, he demonstrates how polarization among activists has outpaced polarization among less active partisans and ideologues on issues like abortion, divorce law, and school prayer.

Of course, evidence of activist polarization is consistent with Fiorina's (2006) conceptualization of the culture wars in American politics, which situates the conflict firmly among activists and the political class. The critical point here is in the definition of activists. While Fiorina compares polarization among Congressional partisans and party delegates (members of the nation's thin political class) to polarization among mass partisans, Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) and Evans (2003) uncover considerable polarization among Americans who report three or more acts of political involvement in the past year – including voting, volunteering for a campaign, attending a meeting,

making a contribution, or displaying a campaign sign or button. This likely represents a somewhat broader subset of the public than true party and issue activists who likely maintain a higher level of activity and commitment than three or more of these relatively modest acts of participation. For example, Abromowitz and Saunders (2005) report that in 2004 22 percent of participants in the NES were considered activists based on this standard. While American's did participate in politics at higher rates in 2004 than in previous years, these results are somewhat instructive in conceptualizing the scope of culture wars politics. They suggest a significant subset of the American public is responsive to this cultural conflict and, to some extent, actively participates in it. Though beliefs about abortion and the proper rights afforded Gays do not divide all Americans, these issues do appear to be a source of conflict among this more active subset of the American public.

This idea is mirrored in Hunter's recent essay "The Enduring Culture War" (2006). Hunter writes:

> No matter how one approaches the question, social dissensus is very much present in public opinion. Forming the grassroots support for competing visions are factions that constitute the white-hot core of difference and dissensus. Disproportionately motivated and active in these issues, they are the most likely to write letters, send checks to the special interest groups and parties that represent them and volunteer on behalf of their cause. Although these highly partisan citizens might make up only 5 percent of the American population on one side of the cultural divide or the other, in actual numbers they account for 10 to 12 million people on each side. Extending out to less committed constituencies, the numbers who align themselves on one side of the cultural divide or the other can range up to 60 million each.

Here, Hunter (2006) posits a relationship between identity strength, political involvement, and attitude polarization. Hunter recognizes that while the conflict does not extend to the entire electorate, there are significant minorities for whom these issues are highly salient and influential for their political behavior. The people most involved in culture wars politics are those holding strong political identities. While they may compose only a fraction of the electorate (10 to 12 million people of either side), they are disproportionately active in political life and form critical bases of support for the parties. Indeed, Hunter's (2006) conceptualization of the activist core of the American public involves considerably more Americans than Fiorina's (2006) "political class." As a result, Fiorina may systematically understate the extent of public involvement in or attention to cultural wars politics. By focusing on the thin stratum of Americans comprising the political class and failing to make finer distinctions among partisans - such as between strong, weak, and leaning partisans or active and inactive partisans - Fiorina (2006) and others may get it wrong when it comes to the scope of the culture wars in American politics.

The idea that key subsets of the public – the politically active and those with strong political identities – have become polarized over the past two decades suggests opinion on social issues like abortion, school prayer, and gay rights reflect important divisions in American politics. Public involvement in the culture wars, even among a small, but significant, subset of Americans, somewhat undercuts the normative problems

stemming from the culture wars conceptualized as an elite phenomenon. For Fiorina (2006), the disconnect between elite and mass opinion suggests extreme opinions are overrepresented in the political system and the vast moderate majority of Americans are underrepresented. He likens the development of culture wars politics to the capture of the political system by fanatics. As a result, elites "indulge" in debate and action over issues far removed from the concerns of the mass public. For others, polarization among activists (more broadly defined) and strong partisans does not point to a normative quandary so much as it signifies the presence of a major electoral cleavage concerning moral policy issues (Hunter, 2006; Evans and Nunn, 2005).

Below, I evaluate the link between strength of partisan and ideological identification, political participation, and attitude polarization using data from the NES cumulative data file. Consistent with Hunter (2006), I contend the subset of the population who is most active in political life and holds the strongest political identities are most polarized on culture wars issues – such as abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and the role of women in society. This idea comports with expectations derived from social identity theory laid out in the previous chapter. Individuals with strong social identities will be most attuned to group conflict, in this case conflict over the moral direction for the nation. And, the siege mentality adopted by elites is most likely to hit home for these Americans, resulting in polarization and intolerance towards ideologically opposed groups. By virtue of their attitude extremity and high rates of participation, these individuals send clear signals to elites about their preferences. The link between attitude polarization and identity among strong partisans and ideologues suggests there is a connection between mass and elite opinion on these issues, though the precise nature of the causal relationship is unclear. At the very least, it may explain why cultural issues are so commonly invoked as an electoral strategy – to mobilize the parties most committed bases.

Religious Identity and Attitude Polarization

Polarization of strong political identifiers and activists is only part of the picture. As noted prior, Hunter's (1991) seminal work on the culture wars outlined how changes within the nation's major religious denominations precipitated culture wars politics. Drawing on sociological studies of the decline of denominationalism and collapse of the center in American religion, Hunter (1991) and others stress how the nation's dominant religious traditions had become internally polarized – fracturing into orthodox and progressive camps (see also Wuthnow, 1988). As a result, denominational affiliations have become less indicative of social and political orientations. Instead, adherents to various religious traditions have coalesced into competing political camps on issues of public and private morality based on their level of religious orthodoxy (Hunter, 1991; Guinness, 1993; Wuthnow, 1988). Some have attributed this pattern of change to a Fundamentalist backlash in response to liberal victories in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the *Roe v. Wade* decision, which highlighted the perceived pervasiveness of social

permissiveness and secular humanism (Miller and Hoffman, 1997). The threat to traditional values posed by these socially progressive movements, coupled with internal debates over appropriate theological and institutional responses to modernity fractured the nation's major religious traditions into orthodox and progressive camps – shifting the locus of religious dissensus from interdenominational conflict to intradenominational conflict.

These trends resulted in a greater political awareness within religious communities, imposed for the most part from the top down by church leadership. Of this, Hunter writes: "In religious organizations, ideology is often elevated over theology to such an extent that the public witness of faith in our day has become a partisan and political witness (Hunter, 2006)." Such developments are thought to have forged a link between political and theological ideology. For decades sociologists have situated religious groups, especially Protestant sub-denominations, along an ideological continuum to indicate relative theological liberalism or conservatism (Roof and McKinney, 1987; Steensland et al 2000; Smith, 1990). Fundamentalist and Evangelical groups anchor one end and liberal or progressive traditions anchor the other. The idea put forth by Hunter (1991) is that as religious identities have become increasingly politicized theological ideology has become more highly correlated with political ideology, such that Evangelicals and Fundamentalists are much more likely to identify as politically conservative and theological Liberals are more inclined to identify as politically liberal.

In fact, there is a great deal of evidence to support this claim. Since the early 1980s, religiosity has emerged as a good indicator of political ideology, partisanship, and electoral behavior (Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Layman, 1997; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2006). Fiorina (2006) finds differences in voting behavior between regular church attendees and infrequent church attendees are rather pronounced. Beginning in 1992, distinctive patterns of voting behavior emerged based on church attendance. Regular church attendees vote Republican at considerably higher rates than those who rarely, if ever, attend religious services (Fiorina, 2006; Ambramowitz and Saunders, 2005). In addition, religiosity became more closely tied to a host of social and political attitudes (Gay and Ellison, 1993; Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Hoffman and Miller, 1997; Smith, 1990) and rates of political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Thus, religion should exert a more pronounced influence on political thinking and electoral behavior in the masses following the politicization of religious experience in the 1970s and 1980s. A likely consequence of this politicization of religious identities is polarization of attitudes on issues pertaining to traditional morality.

Yet, empirical work on religious polarization is somewhat inconclusive, not unlike the work on attitude change among political identifiers. Some of this work points to convergence among religious moderates and religious Conservatives, contrary to expectations based on Hunter's (1991) conceptualization of the culture wars. For example, DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) found attitudinal differences between moderate and conservative religious identifiers towards women's role in society, sexual conduct, sex education, abortion, and divorce declined modestly, but significantly, between 1972 and 1992. Hoffman and Miller (1998) conducted a similar analysis using data from the General Social Survey and found differences between members of

Evangelical and Mainline Protestant subdenominations were relatively stable during this period, controlling for a range of other social and demographic characteristics. In a few areas, such as women's role in society and attitudes towards premarital sex, differences did decline. Evans (2003), using the same religious classification scheme and extending the series to 2000, found a comparable pattern of convergence among religious identifiers. For these authors, polarization on social attitudes is primarily a function of political rather than religious identity.

Fiorina (2006) focused his analysis of religious differences on attitudes towards abortion. Interestingly, religious differences in abortion attitudes are somewhat more pronounced than partisan differences (though partisans here include leaners). Looking at the GSS item on abortion attitudes, Fiorina finds modest but significant differences in support for abortion between Evangelical and Mainline Protestants. On average, Evangelicals support abortion under one fewer circumstance than reported by Mainliners. Fiorina (2006) also finds differences are more pronounced among people who attend church regularly and those who attend rarely, regardless of their denominational affiliation. Regular church attendees approve of abortion in between 1 and 2 fewer circumstances than those who attend infrequently. This difference is fairly consistent from 1972 to 2000, at which point slight polarization is apparent. For Fiorina (2006), observed differences are too modest to support the culture wars thesis. Mean responses on the GSS abortion measure for Evangelicals and Mainliners are nowhere near extreme positions, suggesting majorities of religious Americans maintain qualified support for abortion rights.

But other studies of social attitudes held by religious Americans reach different conclusions. Jelen (1990) has documented how Evangelical Protestants have become more socially conservative over time relative to Mainliners since the 1970s. Hoffman and Miller (1997) find Evangelical and Mainline Protestants have polarized only in their attitudes towards abortion and school prayer. However, they argue much of the action occurs for Mainline and progressive Protestants, who have grown more uniformly liberal on these issues. Interestingly, they find attitudes towards abortion have become more variable among Evangelicals. Evans (2002) examined this relationship between religious identity and abortion attitudes using a revised sub-denominational classification scheme developed by Steensland et al (2000). He observed a different pattern of results. While he too finds Evangelicals and Mainliners have polarized in their attitudes towards abortion, it seems mean reported attitudes for Catholics and Mainline Protestants have stayed relatively consistent, while Evangelical Protestants have grown more conservative overall. In addition, he finds evidence of growing within-group polarization for both Catholics and Mainliners, but *not* for Evangelicals.

In a later study, Miller and Hoffman (1998) suggest polarization both between and within religious groups is probably issue specific, rather than applying generally to all cultural issues. They report that while certain issues do seem to divide Evangelicals, this group is relatively united in their attitudes towards Gays and extramarital sex. These same issues have caused divisions within Mainline camps and among Catholics – particularly the issue of gay rights. In fact, the distribution of attitudes towards gay rights among Mainline Protestants is actually moving towards bimodality. Alternatively, Hoffman and Miller (1998) argue within-group variance on attitudes towards abortion and pre-marital sex is increasing for Catholics, Mainline Protestants, *and* Evangelical

Protestants. The distribution of abortion attitudes among Mainliners is actually approaching bimodality. Similarly, Gay et al (1996) finds evidence of polarization among Baptists, which they attribute to theological disputes such as the "Baptist Battles" over issues such as the ordination of women. However, their results point to greater cohesion among non-Baptist Evangelicals, at least on pro-family issues.

Thus, while there is some evidence of growing mean differences in attitudes towards abortion, gay rights, and school prayer between Evangelical and Mainline Protestants, these changes seem to have been matched by growing divisions within these groups. Evidence of polarization within the nation's major religious traditions indicates these groups are considerably less monolithic in their social and political attitudes than Hunter's (1991) conceptualization of the culture wars would suggest. The political implications of internal polarization are quite important. As attitudes within groups become more divided, the likelihood group members will successfully organize and pursue a unified political agenda diminishes (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996). For example, the rise of the Christian Right was predicated on adherence to Fundamentalist doctrine – particularly Biblical inerrancy – and a desire to see public policy uphold traditional notions of the family and personal morality (Sherkat and Ellison, 1997). Polarization among Catholics' social attitudes is found in a number of studies (Gay et al 1993; Hoffman and Miller, 1998; Evans, 2002). While internal divisions among Catholics are widely recognized (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993), a consistent method of identifying adherents to various theological movements has not materialized. As noted above, the literature is somewhat less conclusive on whether opinion is converging or becoming more disperse within Protestant sub-denominations.

Uncertainty surrounding distributional changes in social attitudes between and within groups, particularly Protestants, may be a function of the different schemes used to classify Protestant sub-denominations. There are multiple classification schemes available, some locate sub-denominations along a continuum of religious orthodoxy (Roof and McKinney, 1987; Smith, 1990; Steensland et al, 2000) and others derive religious orthodoxy from identification with 20th century religious movements (Alwin et al, 2006). For example, Evans' (2003) extension of the earlier analysis performed with DiMaggio and Bryson (1996) relied on Roof and McKinney's classification scheme, consistent with the earlier work. Here, the author found no evidence of polarization on a host of social policy attitudes and even unearthed some trends towards convergence. However, in an article published a year earlier, Evans (2002) employed the sub-denominational classification scheme developed by Steensland and colleagues (2000) and discovered polarization between Evangelical and Mainline Protestants on support for abortion rights. Measures of sub-denominational affiliation are also problematic in that there are high percentages of nonresponse (Alwin et al, 1996). It is also possible the differences across studies reported above are the result of changes in the character of various sub-denominations. Recognition of such changes has led to revised classification schemes, but change may outpace these efforts. Beyond this, several scholars of American religion suggest sub-denominational boundaries have blurred to such an extent they are no longer a terribly useful way to categorize religious adherents (Wuthnow, 1996; Guiness, 1993).

While there is no gold standard for measuring religious identity, lack of consistency across studies has rendered it difficult to conclude whether polarization has

occurred between members of conservative and Mainline religious traditions or whether opinion has become more dispersed within these groups. Religious groups may, in fact, be internally polarizing, or respondents may simply be mistakenly categorized, artificially inflating within-group heterogeneity. As a result, the true distribution of attitudes among people with different theological ideologies is obscured - as is the nature of between group differences. Clearly, further study is required to understand the link between religiosity and attitude polarization.

Intergroup Attitudes and the Culture Wars

While much of the empirical work on the culture wars emphasizes attitude polarization and its consequences, thinking about the culture wars as a form of intergroup conflict – through a lens of social identity theory – suggests a second indicator of this cultural conflict. Work in social identity theory has demonstrated intergroup attitudes become polarized in contexts where group conflict is salient. Clearly, the culture wars rhetoric is replete with group based appeals and threats. Debates over culture wars issues are often framed explicitly in terms of group conflict – with red states pitted against blue states, secular Liberals pitted against religious Conservatives, Gays pitted against the traditional family, and the nation's heartland pitted against the intellectual elite. Hardisty (1999) recognizes the centrality of social group conflict to cultural politics in her book on the politics of the New Right. Her discussion of scapegoating is particularly instructive here. Scapegoating refers to the tendency for groups to blame social problems or perceived social ills on specific outgroups. Perceptions of the damage caused by these groups and the potential they may cause further harm is commonly used to mobilize bases of support and serves as a justification for restricting the rights and privileges of these groups.

Hardisty (1999) highlights the pervasiveness of this scapegoating phenomenon in the politics of the New Right, citing the demonization of Feminists and Gays by Right Wing groups like the Eagle Forum, Focus on the Family, and Concerned Women for America for their impact on the American family and notions of common decency. For example:

> The homosexual movement is nothing less than an attack on our traditional, pro-family values. And now this movement is using the AIDS crisis to pursue its political agenda. This in turn, threatens not only our values but out lives . . . They are loved by God as much as anyone else. This we believe while affirming the disordered nature of their sexual condition and the evil nature of the acts this condition leads to, and while fully committed to the proposition that homosexuals should not be entitled to special treatment under the law. That would be tantamount to rewarding evil (c.f. Hardisty, 1999).

This strategy of demonizing the opposition is also observed in Luker's (1984) study of abortion activists. She finds symmetry in the tendency to derogate opponents among both

pro-choice and pro-life activists. Luker writes: "Adherents to one side of the debate dismiss the other side as being ignorant of the facts or perversely unwilling to admit the truth when confronted with the facts. They see their most committed opponents as bigots – as so deeply committed to a group (the church, Feminists, etc) that they are unable to think on their own about the issue (1984)."

Fiorina makes a similar observation: "Because purists hold their views more intensely than ordinary people do, their operating style differs from that of most people. They are completely certain of their views: they are right and their opponents are wrong. Moreover, their opponents are not just misguided or misinformed, but corrupt, stupid, evil, or all three. . . . angry attacks substitute for reasoned judgment (2006)."
As do Hunter and Bowman: "Majorities of both factions view the other as hypocritical, characterless, self-serving, insensitive to the concerns of most Americans, out of touch with reality and undemocratic (1996)." Generally, such comments imply each competing faction is not only self conscious of the other but openly antagonistic.

These scholars stress the group basis of conflict over moral issues in American politics and highlight the hostile tenor of the associated political discourse. Their work illustrates how the group dynamics characterizing this conflict extend beyond distrust and suspicion to outright hostility, intolerance and, in some extreme cases, aggression. Clearly, the nature of culture wars politics makes group identity and group differences highly salient. And, the rhetoric of cultural conflict is divisive and explicit in its references to friends and foes. While the severity of the group threats observed here may convey the urgency and arouse the ire required to mobilize bases of support, this type of discourse is also likely to result in polarized intergroup attitudes and growing intolerance – a kind of outgroup paranoia (Kramer and Jost, 2003) requiring constant vigilance and action. Such hostility and intolerance is likely to further impede consensus and render centrist political solutions untenable.

The vitriolic tenor of culture wars politics is consistent with the social identity theory literature on intergroup conflict and its consequences. As discussed in the previous chapter, intergroup competition or conflict – whether realistic or symbolic – tends to be characterized by group antipathies, prejudice, and discrimination. Notably, there has been a proliferation of work on intergroup emotions and social conflict, with an emphasis on the affective components of prejudice. Much of this work emphasizes a link between normative group threats – such as threats to group values – and out-group directed anger (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg and Cottrell, 2002). Anger and resentment are quite evident in the culture wars rhetoric, particularly in interest group communications as is reflected in the quotations provided above. Most of this work demonstrates that both intergroup emotions and attitudes become increasingly polarized in contexts where cues of group conflict (or group threat) are salient, particularly among people with strong group identities (for example see Mackie and Smith, 2003). Interestingly, intergroup emotions, while related to intergroup attitudes, are often better predictors of behavior in group setting than are intergroup attitudes (Esses et al, 1993). While much of this work on intergroup emotions looks at the consequences of discrete emotional states – such as anger, fear, disgust, and pride – here were are constrained to simple bipolar measures of feelings towards groups. In Chapter 5, I revisit this notion of intergroup emotions.

Intergroup animosities have received less empirical attention in the political science literature on culture wars politics, which tends to emphasize attitude polarization. A notable exception occurs for feelings towards Liberals and Conservatives and the major political parties. Results across several studies point to polarization in feelings towards these groups, particularly among partisans (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Evans, 2003; Fiorina, 2006). Fiorina (2006) notes how polarization is significantly more pronounced among activists and strong partisans, consistent with the notion of attending to identity strength discussed above.

But competing ideological camps and the parties are only a small subset of the social groups involved in culture wars politics. And, in many ways, these partisan and ideological groups are considerably more politically mainstream than other critical groups and also more heterogeneous. Groups like Feminists, Gays, and Christian Fundamentalists are critical players in this conflict. Fortunately, the National Election Studies measures feelings towards these groups several times between 1972 and 2004. This enables us to investigate whether there is an explicit group basis to culture wars politics. I expect to find that polarization of intergroup attitudes or feelings across a broad range of political, religious, and social groups is symptomatic of the culture wars phenomenon. Polarization will likely be most pronounced for Americans with strong religious or political identities, as they are most attuned to this conflict. Such a finding would fall in line with the anger, resentment and intolerance observed by Hardisty (1999), Luker (1984), and others.

Hypotheses

Three critical questions about the nature of mass involvement in the culture wars emerge from the literature on cultural conflict in American politics. Are Americans holding strong political and religious identities polarized in their political and intergroup attitudes? Are differences between these groups stable over time, or have they grown increasingly polarized since the 1970s in response to cultural and political movements? And finally, are Americans holding strong religious and political identities more inclined to participate in politics?

I expect to find the culture wars do operate within the mass public and are manifest through polarization of policy and inter-group attitudes in response to social and political developments in the 1970s and 1980s. I contend the subset of Americans involved in culture wars politics extends far beyond the thin political class identified by Fiorina (2006) to include millions of Americans. Following Hunter (2006) and expectations derived from social identity theory, I focus on Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities. These identities operate like a lens for understanding social and political phenomenon, as they are linked to shared values and norms which show through in group members' political thinking and behavior. As a result, I expect Americans holding strong religious and political identities are especially attuned to political conflict over issues like abortion, gay rights, the role of women, and

the proper public role for religion. They are also likely to be most sensitive to group-based threats to their particular social and political agendas, and thus have become increasingly polarized over time as the idea of the culture wars gets more play in the mass media.

In addition, I examine the link between these group identities and political action. Though very religious and politically committed Americans represent only a fraction of the electorate, I expect they are disproportionately motivated to participate in political life. In fact, it may be the case that active partisans are *most* polarized in their opinions on these highly contested issues and in their feelings towards their opposition. As a result, strong, active political and religious identifiers on either side of the cultural debate send clear signals to elites about preferences regarding the moral direction of the nation and constitute formidable electoral blocks. The presence of this subset of polarized, active Americans on either side of the ideological divide may explain the importance of position taking on these issues in political campaigns and appointment processes. Similarly, it may explain why the parties have moved apart despite the persistence of a strong center in American politics – the parties are responding to polarization among their most committed bases.

Data and Measures

Data from the 1972 to 2004 National Election Studies is used to evaluate whether the culture wars operate among the subset of the public holding strong religious, secular, and political identities.

Political Identity. Political identities were determined using the standard 7-point ideology and party identification measures included in the NES. These measures range from "Strong Liberal/Democrat" to "Strong Conservative/Republican". The distribution of partisan and ideological identities in the NES samples from 1972-2004 are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Though there is some year-to-year variation, Strong Democrats typically compose 15 to 20 percent of each sample. Strong Republicans are present in somewhat smaller numbers, making up between 9 and 16 percent of each sample during this time period. Extreme ideological identities are much less common than extreme partisan identities. About 2 to 3 percent of the NES sample identified as Very Liberal in each year, while between 2 and 5 percent identified as Very Conservative. The proportion of respondents identifying as Liberal or Conservative are higher – 8 to 14 percent indicated a Liberal identity and 14 to 25 percent reported a Conservative identity. As a result, respondents in the two most extreme categories on either side of the ideology scale are pooled in the subsequent analysis to identify meaningful central tendencies in opinion for ideologues. Much of the analysis presented below focuses on strong partisans and ideologues, given expectations these groups will be most polarized in their social policy attitudes and most responsive to culture wars politics.

Religious Identity. Here I use a composite indicator of religious identity based on theological beliefs and church attendance. Theological beliefs are based on attitudes

towards the Bible. Respondents selected one of the following statements to indicate their orientation towards the religious text. The Bible is: (1) the *word of God, to be taken literally, word for word*, (2) *the word of God, but should not be taken literally*, or (3) *not the word of God*. Literal interpretation of the Bible is used here as a proxy for religious orthodoxy, while middling responses are taken to indicate a Mainline or moderate position, and reports the Bible is not the word of God is taken as an indicator of secular orientation. This item was asked in the NES from 1980 to 2004. As a result, the series for religious and secular Americans are slightly truncated. The distributions of religious identities from 1980 to 2004 are provided in Table 3.3. I further distinguish among Fundamentalists and Moderates using reported church attendance to distinguish among levels of religious commitment. Respondents who report attending church almost weekly or more are considered highly committed religious adherents, while those who attend less frequently are less committed or less strongly identified with the religious group. Church attendance is uniformly low among secular Americans – those reporting the Bible is not the word of God. As a result, no further distinctions are made among secular Americans.

I also considered attitudinal differences between adherents to various Protestant sub-denominations using the Steensland et al (2000) classification scheme. The differences in political and intergroup attitudes observed between conservative and moderate Protestants were roughly comparable to the differences I found between Fundamentalists and Moderates more broadly defined. These results are omitted. The composite measure employed here has several advantages over the sub-denominational approach. Many have noted that sub-denominational classification schemes are error prone due to high rates of nonresponse and the lack of parallel measures for other major religious traditions, such as Catholicism (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993). The measure used here captures differences in theological ideology across religious traditions, consistent with Hunter (1991) and Wuthnow's (1988) recognition of the growth of inter-denominational coalitions based on religious orthodoxy. In addition, it suffers considerably less from missing data problems. Finally, inclusion of a church attendance threshold gives an indication of religious salience or commitment to the religious group. Religion and the associated patterns of belief should be more salient for those who attend church nearly every week than for those who attend infrequently. This measure is also not without its limitations. People do tend to over report church attendance and the item used to measure theological beliefs does seem to operate differently in some populations (see Chapter 4). However, some work suggests Fundamentalist beliefs, such as a literal interpretation of the Bible, are more closely tied to political attitudes and tolerance than denominational measures or church attendance alone (Mason and Feldman, 2007). In addition, several scholars have demonstrated a strong link between reported church attendance, political attitudes, and voting behavior (for example see Fiorina, 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005).

Participation. A composite index of responses to six political participation items was used to distinguish between more and less active partisans, ideologues, and religious identifiers. The items included voting in the November elections, trying to influence the vote of others during the campaign, attending political meetings or rallies during the campaign, working for a party or candidate during the campaign, displaying a candidate button or sticker, and making a campaign contribution to a party or candidate. The index ranges from 0 to 6. Activists were defined as people who reported three or more types of

political involvement during the most recent campaign cycle. The distribution of policy activity over the range of the series is reported in Figure 3.1. It is clear that the distributions in each year are heavily skewed toward inactivity, with most citizens engaging in one or fewer forms of participation. I distinguish between active and inactive citizens with a dummy variable coded 1 if a person reports three or more acts of participation during the election cycle, and coded zero if a person reports fewer than three acts of participation. The percentage of respondents considered activists by this standard ranges from a low of about five percent in 1990 to a high of 22 percent in 2004.

Policy Attitudes. As noted above, attitude polarization on social policy issues is expected to be one of two key symptoms of culture wars policy. Here, I examine attitudes on several key culture wars issues – the role of women in society, abortion rights, gay rights, and school prayer. Following Fiorina (2006), I focus on attitudes towards abortion and gay rights. Abortion attitudes were measured with a single item. Prior to 1980, respondents were asked to chose among the following options: *(1) Abortion should never be permitted, (2) Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in danger, (3) Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for the child, (4) Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want.* Following 1980, the response options were changed to include exceptions in the cases of rape and incest for the second option and the requirement of a clear justification for abortion in the third option: *(1) By law, abortion should never be permitted, (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger, (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established, (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.* In 1980, a split ballot was used where half of the respondents received the first set of response options and half received the second set of response options.

In addition to attitudes towards reproductive rights, the National Election Studies contains three items about gay rights. The issue of gay rights has featured prominently in culture wars politics, particularly in recent years. The 2004 elections provide a prime example of the growing salience of this issue. Eleven states included referenda banning gay marriage on their electoral ballots, all of which passed, and pundits have linked these referenda to voter mobilization and the electoral fortunes of Republican candidates in these states. Gay rights feature so prominently in the culture wars because gay relationships are seen by many on the right as threatening to the traditional family and violating sexual-social norms (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller, 2002). The National Elections Studies included items about military service for Gays, adoption rights for Gays, and preferences for anti-discrimination laws to protect Gays in employment contexts. Responses to the military service item were give on a four-point scale, ranging from (1) strong support for gay military service to (4) strong opposition toward military service for Gays. Adoption by gay parents was measured with a dichotomous item asking whether Gays should be allowed to adopt or not. A final item asked whether anti-discrimination laws should be passed to protect Gays against job discrimination. Responses were given on a four-point scale, again ranging from (1) strong support for anti-discrimination laws to (4) strong opposition to anti-discrimination laws.

In addition, attitudes towards prayer in the public schools and the proper role of women in society are briefly considered. School prayer is an important culture wars issue because it pertains to appropriate degree of overlap between religious preferences and public life. The National Election Studies contained a single item asking those responding which of the following comes closest to their view on school prayer: *(1) By law, prayer should not be allowed in public schools, (2) The law should allow public schools to schedule time when children can pray silently if they want to, (3) The law should allow public schools to schedule time when children as a group can say a general prayer not tied to a particular religious faith or (4) By law, public schools should schedule a time when all children would say a chosen Christian prayer.* Beliefs about the proper role of women in society are measured by a single item asking: "*Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that a women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale?*" Responses were given on a seven-point Likert scale, where low scores corresponded to preferences for gender equality and high scores indicated preferences for inequality.

Missing Data. The policy items of interest here were not asked in every administration of the National Election Studies during the period from 1972 to 2004. In addition, interviews conducted in 2002 were only done for panel respondents, so a number of these policy items were omitted for this year. For instance, abortion attitudes were not measured in 2002. Questions about gay rights were not asked in the National Election Studies until the late 1980s or early 1990s. The item gauging preferences for anti-discrimination laws to protect Gays was asked beginning in 1988, but was omitted from the survey in 1994, 1998, and 2002. The item about adoption rights for Gays was asked only in 1992, 2000, and 2004. Attitudes towards gay military service was asked starting in 1996 but was omitted in 1998 and 2002. In addition, the series for school prayer is rather short, ranging from 1986 to 1998. Attitudes towards women's role in society were asked frequently - in every year but 1986 and 2002. Despite the absence of observations on these items for some years – notably 2002 – there are sufficient time points in the series of these items to get a sense of whether a polarization trend is present for attitudes towards culture wars issues.

Intergroup Attitudes. The second symptom of culture wars politics examined here is the polarization of intergroup attitudes. People holding strong political and religious identities are expected to respond to cultural conflict with increasingly polarized affect towards groups perceived as central to the conflict. Here, the emphasis is on feelings towards salient political, religious, and social groups – including Feminists, Gays and Lesbians, Liberals and Conservatives, and a number of religious groups including Christian Fundamentalists. While many studies of intergroup emotions examine discrete emotional states – such as anger, fear, and disgust, here I am constrained by the available data and consider the valence and extremity of emotional responses towards groups. Feelings towards their groups were measured using 97 point feeling thermometers - where responses around 50 indicate neutral feelings, responses below 50 indicate negative feelings, and responses above 50 indicate positive feelings.

Missing Data. As for the policy items, these indicators of intergroup attitudes were not asked each time the National Election Studies were administered. Only the liberal and conservative thermometer ratings were asked each election year. Feelings

towards Feminists were measured in 1988, 1992, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Prior to 1988, feeling thermometers asked about "women's libbers" rather than Feminists, so these years are excluded. A feeling thermometer for Gays and Lesbians was included in the survey beginning in 1984 but was omitted in 1990. The inclusion of feeling thermometers for religious groups was somewhat more sporadic. Feelings towards Protestants were measured in 1972, 1976, 2000, and 2002. Feelings towards Catholics were measured more frequently, including 1972, 1976, 1984, 1988, 1992, 2000, 2002, and 2004. A Jewish feeling thermometer was included in 1972, 1976, 1988, 1992, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Feelings towards Fundamentalists – a key religious group in culture wars politics – were measured beginning in 1988 but were excluded in 1990 and 1998. Despite some inconsistencies in the use of these items in the National Election Surveys, there are sufficient observations between 1972 and 2004 to get an impression of general trends in intergroup attitudes.

Method Overview

Below, I provide answers to the three key questions about public participation in culture wars raised by the literature in this area. First, are Americans with strong political and religious identities more polarized than their weakly identified counterparts? To address this question, the distribution of policy and intergroup attitudes for the mass public as a whole are compared to the distributions obtained for people with strong political, religious, or secular identities. Following Fiorina (2006), I consider opinion distributions for abortion and gay rights - areas identified as flashpoint issues in culture wars politics. In addition, differences in the distribution of attitudes towards key players in culture wars politics – Gays and Lesbians, Feminists, and Christian Fundamentalists – are evaluated, in keeping with the notion of the culture wars as a form of intergroup conflict. I limit the initial analysis of these differences to the 2004 National Election Study. Opinion is expected to be quite divided for these groups in 2004, given the prominence of cultural issues such as gay rights in the campaign rhetoric. These results will provide a snapshot of opinion on social issues during the most recent presidential election and serve as a baseline for subsequent analysis.

Second, I am interested in the stability of group differences in opinion on these issues over time. Are the differences between partisans, ideologues and religious Americans observed in 2004 indicative of a long-standing cleavage in public opinion, or have they grown in magnitude over time in response to social and political developments in these areas? This question is address by looking at the relative positions of political and religious Americans from 1972-2004 on abortion, gay rights, and the role of women in society. In addition, trends in attitudes towards a variety of social groups – including Feminists, Gays and Lesbians, religious groups, Liberals, and Conservatives – are considered. If the culture wars thesis holds, trends towards polarizing policy and intergroup attitudes should be evident beginning in the late 1980s or early 1990s and persist or grow through 2004.

Third, I examine the link between these identities and political participation. Rates of political participation are examined across different strengths of partisan and ideological identification, as well as by religious identity and commitment. I expect to find Americans holding these identities are disproportionately active in politics. By virtue of this participation bias, more polarized signals are sent to elites about public preferences on these cultural issues. Indeed, it might also be the case that even among strong partisans, ideologues, religious, and secular Americans, those who frequently participate in politics, and thus might be considered activists, are more polarized than their less active but nonetheless strongly identified counterparts.

In addressing these three questions, particular attention is granted to the symmetry of the conflict. I expect to find group members on both sides of the debate over public morality respond to conflict over social policy issues with growing attitude extremity and polarized intergroup attitudes. Similarly, rates of political participation are expected to be highest among strong group members regardless of which side of the ideological spectrum they fall on. A symmetric pattern of polarization among strong political, religious, and secular identifiers would match patterns of elite polarization observed by Fiorina (2006) and Poole and Rosenthal (2001).

Attitude Polarization among Strongly Identified Americans

Do Americans strongly identifying with key political, religious, and secular groups hold polarized social policy attitudes? To address this question, consider two flashpoint issues receiving a great deal of attention in the culture wars literature: abortion and gay rights. Fiorina (2006) has argued abortion attitudes have become more consensual over time, while Americans have become somewhat more polarized on the proper rights afforded Gays. As noted above, other scholars reach different conclusions regarding public opinion on abortion (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, 1996; Evans, 2003; Adams, 1997). This work points to major partisan, ideological, and religious cleavages on this issue. Here, I consider the distribution of opinion on abortion and gay rights among the mass public and the subset of Americans identified as especially attuned to this cultural conflict. I provide a snapshot of opinion in 2004, using the 2004 National Election Study Survey, to give a sense of the current state of group differences on these issues. In the following section, the stability of observed group differences is considered.

Abortion Attitudes. The distribution of abortion attitudes in the mass public is presented in Figure 3.2. The distribution is clearly bimodal – with approximately 30 percent of Americans supporting abortion only when the health of the mother is clearly at stake, and a slightly larger percent supporting abortion under all circumstances. The opinion distributions for Americans holding strong political identities look notably different (see Figure 3.3). Both Strong Democrats and Strong Liberals are quite unified in their support for abortion rights – clear majorities of both groups support legalizing abortion in all circumstances. Support for abortion rights is more unitary among Liberals – three-quarters of whom support abortion under any circumstance. Alternatively, the

distributions of opinion on this issue are notably flatter among Republicans and Conservatives and skewed in the direction of imposing greater restrictions on abortion rights. A majority of Republicans and Conservatives report abortion should never be permitted or only permitted in circumstances where the mother's health is at risk. Interestingly, the percentage of Strong Republicans reporting abortion should always be allowed and those reporting it should never be allowed are virtually equal in 2004. Similarly, there is only about a 5 percent difference in the proportion of strong Conservatives supporting and opposing abortion under all circumstances. This result suggests these groups are significantly more internally polarized than are groups in the opposing progressive camp, who are notably more unified in their attitudes on this issue.

Differences are also evident among religious and secular Americans. The distributions of abortion attitudes for Fundamentalists and Moderates at high and low levels of commitment (indexed by reported church attendance: high versus low) and Seculars are presented in Table 3.4. As one might expect, the distributions of committed Fundamentalists and Seculars differ the most dramatically, given their drastically different views on Biblical authority. About 75 percent of secular Americans support abortion rights in all circumstances, compared to 10 percent of committed Fundamentalists. The distribution of opinion on this issue among committed Fundamentalists is heavily skewed towards restricting abortion rights, with about 70 percent reporting abortion should never be permitted or permitted only to protect the health of the mother. Among less committed Fundamentalists and highly committed Moderates, opinion distributions are bimodal – with approximately 40 percent of each group reporting abortion should only be permitted to protect the health of the mother and approximately 30 percent reporting it should be legal under all circumstances. This distribution is indicative of internal polarization, as was the case for Republicans and Conservatives. Among less committed Moderates, opinion on this issue is skewed towards greater support for unrestricted abortion rights, though less so than observed for secular Americans.

The distributions of abortion attitudes observed here suggest significant differences among Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities. Differences observed between Americans on the left and right are quite pronounced. While strong Democrats, Liberals, and secular Americans are quite unified in their support for abortion rights, greater divisions are observed among Strong Republicans and Conservatives. This internal division may reflect heterogeneity within these groups. The measurement of partisan and ideological identity in the National Election Studies fails to distinguish between social and economic Conservatives. It is probably the case that strongly committed economic Conservatives are significantly more libertarian in their attitudes towards social issues like abortion than are their socially conservative counterparts. Among religious Americans, committed Fundamentalists are most unified in their opposition to abortion. But even within this socially conservative group, a significant proportion reported slightly qualified support for abortion – in the case where the mother's health is in jeopardy. Greater significance within group heterogeneity was observed for other groups of religious Americans – particularly less committed Fundamentalists and highly committed Moderates.

Gay Rights Attitudes. A similar pattern of results is observed for attitudes towards gay rights. The 2004 National Election Study contained four items in this area – one

assessing support for a law to protect Gays from discrimination in employment, one assessing support for allowing Gays to serve in the military, and one assessing support for adoption rights for gay couples, and one assessing attitudes towards gay marriage. First, consider attitudes towards anti-discrimination legislation. As a whole, the American public is largely supportive of anti-discrimination legislation (Figure 3.5). Just over 50 percent report strong support and 25 percent report weak support. Again, differences are observed in the opinion distributions for Americans with strong political identities. As one can see from Figure 3.6, Strong Democrats and Liberals are quite unified in their strong support for employment protections. The opinion distributions for Strong Republicans and Strong Conservatives are notably flatter. Again, the bimodality of these opinion distributions is apparent, as the proportion of group members strongly supporting and strongly opposing anti-discrimination legislation is roughly equivalent. As was the case for abortion, there seems to be significantly more dissensus among Americans with strong Republican and Conservative identities than their strongly identified counterparts on the left.

The distributions of opinion on this issue for both highly committed and less committed Fundamentalists similarly reflect internal dissensus (see Figure 3.7). The distributions for both groups are relatively flat, and bimodality is present among highly committed Fundamentalists – with virtually equal proportions (30 percent) strongly supporting and strongly opposing anti-discrimination laws. For Moderates, opinion is unimodal and skewed towards strong support. This pattern is most pronounced for secular Americans, about 70 percent of whom strongly support anti-discrimination legislation. Interestingly, a comparable pattern is observed in attitudes towards Gays in the military (results not presented here). Liberals, Democrats and Seculars are unified in their support for permitting Gays to serve in the military, while members of the conservative coalition are much more internally divided.

Group differences are also evident in support for extending adoption rights to gay couples. The item measuring adoption attitudes used in the National Election Study is dichotomous and asks respondents: *Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children?* Responses to this item are presented in Table 3.4. As a whole, the mass public is evenly split on this issue with 50 percent supporting adoption rights and 50 percent opposing adoption rights. Differences are evident for strong partisans, with Republicans appearing more polarized on this issue than Democrats. Fifty-nine percent of Democrats support adoption rights while 41 percent oppose them. Alternatively, 29 percent of Republicans support adoption rights while 71 percent oppose such rights. Differences between Liberals and Conservatives are more pronounced. Eighty-seven percent of Liberals support adoption rights and 13 percent are opposed. Only twenty-four percent of Conservatives support adoption rights, compared to 76 percent who oppose adoption by gay couples. Secular Americans and committed Fundamentalists are similarly polarized. Only 18 percent of Fundamentalists support gay adoption (82 percent oppose), compared to 78 percent of secular Americans (22 percent oppose).

An analogous pattern of results is observed for opinion towards gay marriage – an issue some claim was decisive in the 2004 presidential election. Attitudes towards gay marriage were assessed with a dichotomous item, and respondents were permitted to voluntarily report a preference for civil unions though few did. Responses are provided

in Table 3.5. Sixty-two percent of Americans oppose gay marriage. As was the case for adoption rights, strong Democrats are almost equally divided on this issue. Strong Republicans, however, are significantly more uniform in opinion – with 82 percent opposing marriage rights. Liberals and Conservatives were similarly polarized. Seventy-seven percent of Liberals support gay marriage rights compared to opposition by 85 percent of Conservatives. Among religious Americans, opposition to gay marriage is pervasive. Ninety-one percent of committed Fundamentalists, 81 percent of less committed Fundamentalists, and 70 percent of committed Moderates reported opposition to gay marriage rights. Less committed Moderates are evenly split on this issue, while Seculars are fairly consensual in their support for marriage rights (73 percent support).

While group differences are evident in attitudes towards gay rights, the pattern of results obtained here suggest there is some complexity to opinion on this issue. While Liberal and secular Americans are consistent in their support for gay rights across the four issue areas examined here, support among Democrats is significantly more domain specific. While Democrats report strong support for employment protections and rights to military service, they are more divided on extending marriage and adoption rights to gay Americans. Conversely, Republicans, Conservatives, and religious identifiers (particularly highly committed Fundamentalists) are more uniform in their opposition to extending rights to Gays in the domain of the family. Alternatively, they are much more divided on employment and service rights. This pattern of conservative opposition to gay marriage and adoption by gay couples is consistent with the notion that Conservatives view gay lifestyles as a threat to the traditional family and violations of social norms regarding proper moral behavior. One caveat to making comparisons across issue domains – extending employment rights versus marital and parental rights – is that marital and parental rights are measured with dichotomous indicators. Inclusion of more response options may reveal greater nuance to opinion in these areas. Despite this problem, it is evident from this look at group differences in attitudes towards abortion and gay rights that these issues divide Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular alliances.

Intergroup Attitudes. Group differences in social policy attitudes are only part of the story. I expect to find differences in intergroup attitudes as well. Here, I consider the distribution of attitudes towards groups taking clear public positions on issues central to the culture wars conflict. These groups include Feminists, Gays and Lesbians, and Christian Fundamentalists. The expectation is that individuals with strong religious, political, and secular identities are more attuned to culture wars conflict, are self-conscious of their opposition, and perceive this cultural conflict as a threat to their preferred political agenda. Thus evaluations of ideologically similar groups should be quite positive, while evaluations of ideologically dissimilar groups should be quite negative. Here, intergroup attitudes are gauged by feeling thermometer ratings, with zero indicating very negative feelings, 50 indicating neutral feelings, and 100 indicating very positive feelings.

The distribution of Feminist evaluations for the public as a whole is depicted in Figure 3.8. The mode occurs around 50 degrees, but the distribution is skewed towards positive evaluations, with approximately half of the public reporting positive feelings towards Feminists. The opinion distributions for Americans with strong political identities (provided in Figure 3.9) differ somewhat. Among strong Liberals and

Democrats, the distributions of Feminist evaluations are positively skewed, with majorities reporting positive feelings. Very few members of these groups provide ratings below the neutral point. However, Liberals are slightly more uniformly positive in their evaluations than are Democrats. The distributions for strong Republicans and Conservatives are notably flatter, indicating more internal polarization. While the central tendency for both distributions is around the neutral point, substantial minorities of both groups (15-20 percent) report extremely negative feelings – at or below 30 degrees. A similar distribution is evident for committed Fundamentalists and committed Moderates – though overall more members of both groups provided neutral or positive ratings than negative ratings (see Figure 3.10). This observation is surprising, given religious Conservatives' apparent distaste for Feminists observed by Luker (1984) and Hardisty (1999). Among less committed religious Americans, feelings towards Feminists are distributed similar to the mass public, with a neutral central tendency and skew towards positive feelings. For secular Americans, the tendency to positively evaluate Feminists is more pronounced than for the mass public as a whole. Overall, while group differences are evident in attitudes towards Feminists, attitudes among Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities are hardly suggestive of gross intolerance and hatred.

Attitudes towards Gays and Lesbians are critical in the context of culture wars politics, given the salience of conflict over gay rights in recent elections. In the public as a whole, the central tendency of attitudes towards this group falls around 50 percent, indicating neutral feelings (see Figure 3.11). There is a small but significant minority of Americans, approximately 15 percent, who report extremely negative feelings towards Gays and Lesbians. Among partisans and ideologues, evaluations of Gays and Lesbians are uneven (Figure 3.12). For strong Democrats and Liberals, distributions are skewed towards positive feelings. This skew is more pronounced for Liberals, more than 50 percent of which report evaluations at or above 70 degrees. While few Democrats and Liberals responded with negative feelings, there is a blip for the zero to 20 degree range for both groups. The proportion of respondents reporting such negative feelings towards Gays and Lesbians is larger among strong Republicans and Conservatives, exceeding 20 percent in both cases. However, the distributions are not heavily skewed towards negative feelings. Neutral evaluations were also quite common.

As one might expect, negative evaluations of Gays and Lesbians were most prevalent among Fundamentalists (Figure 3.13). Evaluations of these groups are distributed bimodal, with significant proportions reporting extremely negative feelings and neutral feelings. This tendency to report extremely negative feelings was notably less among Moderates, for whom evaluations were slightly skewed in the positive direction. This skew is more pronounced among secular Americans, who generally hold more positive attitudes towards these groups. Overall, there is stronger evidence of polarized group attitudes towards Gays than observed for Feminists; but, again, Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities were far from uniform in their feelings towards Gays and Lesbians. This is particularly true of Americans belonging to conservative groups, for whom evaluations were clearly distributed in a bimodal fashion.

Turning to the other side of the spectrum, I consider intergroup attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists, given their prominence in debates regarding social policy and

public morality. Here I find the most pronounced group differences. The distribution of feelings towards Fundamentalists in the mass public is presented in Figure 3.14. The distribution is clearly skewed towards positive feelings. This positive skew is more pronounced among strong Republicans and especially strong Conservatives, consistent with expectations (Figure 3.15). Alternatively, the distribution of evaluations is relatively flat among strong Democrats. Evaluations are distributed bimodal among Liberals – with about 40 percent reporting very negative feelings and just over 30 reporting more neutral feelings. Evaluations of Fundamentalists by Fundamentalists are strongly skewed in the positive direction, consistent with an ingroup favoritism effect (Figure 3.16). Feelings towards this group are positively valenced among moderate religious Americans, though the skew is more pronounced for highly committed Moderates than for weakly identified Moderates. Evaluations for Seculars are distributed bimodally, as was the case for strong Liberals, with significant portions reporting very negative or nearly neutral feelings.

Summary. Taken as a whole, the results suggest significant differences in both policy and intergroup attitudes between Americans with strong political identities. Differences are also evident among religious and secular identifiers – with the most pronounced divisions observed between committed Fundamentalists and secular Americans. Both Strong Democrats and Strong Liberals are quite unified in their support for abortion rights in all circumstances and employment protections for Gays. While Liberals tend to be slightly more uniform on these issues than Democrats across the board, the gap between strong Liberals and strong Democrats is most pronounced for extending marriage and adoption rights to Gays and Lesbians. While Democrats clearly support employment and service rights, they appear to be considerably more divided on family issues. Similarly, secular Americans are relatively unified in taking progressive positions on these issues. In many cases, their attitudes are comparable to those of strong Liberals.

This pattern of uniformity among strong group identifiers on many cultural issues does not extent to the other side of the divide. The opinion distributions for abortion and gay rights were notably flatter among conservative groups, reflecting internal polarization or dissensus. This result is surprising, as the media commonly portrays Conservatives as monolithic in their social conservatism and Fundamentalists as highly committed and united on these flashpoint cultural issues. Also, most treatments of the rise of the New Right attribute its development to intense concerns over the moral course of the nation, concerns which crystallized around issues of reproductive and gay rights. Importantly, the internal polarization observed here reflects within-group conflict – perhaps between economic and social Conservatives. For DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996), the existence of internal polarization militates against broader social conflict, such as the culture wars, by reducing the likelihood group members will effectively organize to pursue and promote a cogent political agenda. However, in recent years, Conservatives have demonstrated consistent electoral success and have effectively promoted several policies aimed at regulating abortion – such as the South Dakota Abortion Ban and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban. In addition, their efforts placed referenda on gay marriage on the ballot in 11 states in November of 2004. This apparent disjuncture may be explained by the relationship between identity, activism, and attitude extremity, which is explored in a later section.

Clear group differences in evaluations or feelings towards key social wars groups – Feminists, Gays, and Fundamentalists – were apparent, though these differences are a far cry from the intolerance and hatred reflected in work by Luker (1984) and Hardisty (1999). In fact, strong partisans, ideologues, religious and secular Americans were notably less unified in their attitudes towards these groups than in their policy positions on abortion and gay rights. Generally, Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities held more positive feelings towards ideologically similar groups and more negative feelings towards ideologically dissimilar groups. This finding is consistent with expectations derived from social identity theory, which documents consistent patterns of ingroup favoritism and outgroup denigration under conditions of intergroup competition or conflict. However, the extremity of these differences was not consistent across groups. Interestingly, the most modest group differences were observed for Feminists. Differences were much more pronounced for evaluations of Gays and Fundamentalists, though some evidence of within-group polarization was also observed. Distributions of attitudes towards Gays were distributed bimodal for Liberals, Democrats, and secular Americans, with modes indicating neutral and positive feelings. Conversely, neutral and very negative modes were observed for Fundamentalists, Republicans, and Conservatives. Attitudes towards Fundamentalists were overwhelming positive for Fundamentalists and committed Moderates, as well as strong Republicans and Conservatives. However, Liberals, Democrats, are Seculars were more divided in their evaluations of Fundamentalists. Central tendencies indicated both neutral and very negative feelings – particularly for Liberals and secular Americans.

Stability of Differences between Political and Religious Identifiers

Are the divisions observed in 2004 among political, religious, and secular Americans indicative of relatively stable group differences, or are they part of a polarizing trend emerging in the late 1970s and 1980s in response to cultural changes? Here, I consider group differences in attitudes towards key social groups and how they have changed during the period 1972 to 2004. Again, I begin with abortion attitudes. Figure 3.17 depicts the percentage of strong partisans who support abortion under all circumstances and oppose abortion under all circumstances – the most extreme positions on these issues. A liberalizing trend is quite evident over the entire range of the series for strong Democrats. The percentage of strong Democrats favoring abortion rights nearly tripled during this period, while the proportion opposing abortion in all circumstances drops modestly beginning in the mid 1980s. Interestingly, prior to 1980, strong Republicans supported abortion at higher rates than strong Democrats. While support falls gradually over time, the proportion of strong Republicans who support abortion under all circumstances exceeds the proportion opposing abortion in all circumstances until 2004 – the point at which strong support and opposition are evenly matched. Consistent changes in Republican opinion on this issue begin in the mid 1980s, the same point at which the rate of progressive change among Democrats changes dramatically.

A similar pattern of attitude change is observed for Americans with strong ideological identifications (Figure 3.18). Support for abortion grows more uniform over the range of the series for strong Liberals and opposition is nearly nonexistent. Liberals are more polarized on this issue than Democrats – with almost 80 percent reporting strong support by 2004 compared to just over 50 percent of strong Democrats. Again, the rate of change for Liberals increased dramatically in the late 1980s beginning in 1982. As was the case for Republicans, more Conservatives support abortion in all circumstances than oppose it for virtually the entire range of the series. And, 2004 is the first year in which opposition exceeds support. Attitudes towards abortion are considerably more stable for Conservatives than for other groups examined. Conservative support for abortion eroded only a few percentage points and was matched by a very gradual increase in opposition. Overall, only 30 to 40 percent of strong Conservatives and Republicans took extreme positions on these issues over the range of the series. The majority reported qualified support for abortion rights – in cases where the mother's health is at stake or a clear need other than the mother's health is present. While a liberalizing trend is evident for strong Democrats and Liberals, Conservatives and Republicans are again much more internally divided on this issue.

Among religious and secular Americans, support for abortion is relatively stable. The percentage of group members supporting abortion under all circumstances is presented in Figure 3.19 and the percentage opposing abortion in all circumstances is presented in Figure 3.20. Seculars and highly committed Fundamentalists are most polarized on this issue. Secular support for abortion increased after 1988, to a high of over 80 percent, and then leveled off around 75 percent. Support among less committed Moderates is also fairly high, relative to the other religious groups, but begins to erode significantly after 1992. Opinions among highly committed Moderates and less committed Fundamentalists are relatively stable, though support declines from almost 40 percent in 1992 to less than 30 percent in 2004. Support among highly committed Fundamentalists is, as anticipated, uniformly low – hovering between 10 and 20 percent. Fundamentalist opposition to abortion grew steadily since 1988, to a high of about 32 percent in 2004 – reflecting the highest degree of opposition among the religious groups examined here. Even among highly committed Fundamentalists, a majority took middling positions on this issue. Opposition was significantly lower among less committed Fundamentalists and Moderates. Generally, these results do not provide strong support for the notion Fundamentalists constitute the solid core of the pro-life movement. Considerable diversity is evident even among committed Fundamentalists. It may be the case that Fundamentalists with highly political identities – who view political participation as a natural extension of their evangelism – are most unified in their opposition to abortion. This possibility will be examined in the next section.

In the realm of gay rights, a general liberalizing trend is apparent among the groups of interest here. A question about employment discrimination was asked in the National Election Studies every four years, beginning in 1988. Attitudes towards adoption rights for gay couples were measured at three time points – in 1992, 2000, and 2004. Unfortunately, attitudes towards gay marriage are not included in the NES cumulative data file, so trends over time cannot be investigated here. Since 1988, strong Democrats have become increasingly unified in their support for anti-discrimination legislation to protect employment opportunities for Gays (Figure 3.21). In the 16 years

following 1988, strong support for this law among strong Democrats has increased a total of 40 percent, from a low of 30 percent in 1988 to 70 percent in 2004. The percentage of committed Republicans strongly supporting such legislation also increased but at a much slower rate. In 1992, only about 15 percent of Republicans strongly supported anti-discrimination measures, compared to 35 percent in 2004. While strong support doubled for Republicans during this period, a substantial majority of this group reported either qualified support or opposition to such legislation.

Similar patterns are observed for ideologues (see Figure 3.22). Overall, Liberals become increasingly supportive of employment protections during this period, though there is a significant drop in support in 2000. By 2004, 80 percent of Liberals report strong support for this policy – an increase of 30 percent since 1988. Strong opposition among Conservatives diminishes during this period – from 47 percent in 1988 to 30 percent in 2004. Support also increases from about 17 percent to 31 percent. Again, these findings point to greater unity of opinion over time for Liberals and Democrats and greater dissensus among Conservatives and Republicans.

Evidence of greater support for anti-discrimination laws is also apparent among religious and secular Americans (see Figure 3.23). Strong support has increased among Seculars from about 36 percent in 1988 to 70 percent in 2004. A similar, but less dramatic increase is observed for religious Moderates. Both strongly and weakly identified Fundamentalists showed evidence of increased support from 1988 to 1996, but opinion plateaus after this point. In 2004, the gap between committed Fundamentalists reaches 40 points – the largest gap for the time period under consideration. Strong opposition to this measure has also diminished over time (see Figure 3.24). Even among committed Fundamentalists, strong opposition dropped by almost 30 percent between 1988 and 2004 – at a rate comparable to Seculars. Attitude change follows a similar course for attitudes towards military service opportunities for Gays (results not presented here).

Recall in the previous section, the global liberalizing trend in attitudes towards gay rights was observed for employment and service rights but was significantly less evident for issues pertaining to the family - specifically the extension of marital and adoption rights. This again seems to be the case for attitudes towards adoption rights. While a liberalizing trend is apparent for strong Liberals and Democrats across all three time points, change occurs at a notably slower rate for Conservatives and Republicans (Figure 3.25). Support for adoption rights increases 30 percent among Liberals and Democrats from 1992 to 2004 and 25 percent among secular Americans (Figure 3.26). Support increases at about half this rate for Republicans and Conservatives. The smallest opinion change is observed for committed Fundamentalists, for whom support increases only by about 10 percent. Again, it is clear that Liberals are much more polarized on this issue than are Democrats. Ninety percent of Liberals and almost 80 percent of Seculars support adoption rights for gay couples, compared to just under 60 percent of Democrats. Differences between Republicans and Conservatives on this issue are much more muted.

Based on the opinion series presented above, it seems clear that opinion on these highly charged social issues became significantly more polarized in the early 1990s. However, the nature of opinion change varied by issue area. For abortion, the gap between ideologues, between strong partisans, and between committed Fundamentalists and Seculars increased dramatically after 1988. This finding runs counter to Fiorina’s

(2006) claims that opinion on this issue has grown more consensual over time. Changes in attitudes towards gay rights looked somewhat different. While a global shift towards extending greater rights to Gays was observed, even among these highly religious and conservative groups of Americans, change among Liberals, Seculars, and Democrats far outpaced change among Conservatives, Republicans, and Fundamentalists. As a result, the gap between these opposing groups does widen in the early 1990s and persists through 2004. This gap is more pronounced for attitudes towards adoption rights than for service and employment rights.

In fact, it is clear for all issues examined that strong Democrats, strong Liberals, and secular Americans have becoming increasingly polarized. Liberals have moved in the progressive direction at a much higher rate than Democrats across the issues examined here. Indeed, Liberals overwhelmingly take extreme positions on abortion and gay rights, while certain issues – such as adoption rights for Gays – seem to divide Democrats more. Attitude change among secular Americans closely parallels liberal change. Surprisingly, this pattern of change is not symmetrical. Americans who identify with the political and religious right have moved in a more conservative direction on abortion, but are quite divided internally by this issue. Alternatively, these groups have actually moved in a slightly more progressive direction on gay rights, though again considerable dissensus is still evident. Though both conservative and liberal groups are moving in a more tolerant direction, the rates of change differ so greatly that the opinion gap has actually increased for many of these issues. This asymmetry is also observed in attitudes towards the role of women in society and attitudes towards prayer in the public schools (results not presented here).

Intergroup Attitudes

Have intergroup attitudes similarly changed in response to the growing salience of social policy conflict and the proliferation of culture wars rhetoric, which contains explicit group cues? Below, I present group mean scores on feeling thermometers for Liberals, Conservatives, Feminists, Gays, and Christian Fundamentalists.[1] First, consider attitudes towards Liberals and Conservatives. Miller and Hoffman (1999) argue the terms have been redefined in recent years to reflect moral progressivism and moral traditionalism. Thus, one would expect to see polarization in evaluations towards these groups given the conflict between them on moral policy issues. Evaluations of Liberals by Americans with strong political identities are presented in Figure 3.27. As expected, large group differences are apparent, but they are relatively stable over the range of the series. Differences are most pronounced in 1994 but decline slightly in subsequent years. Self-identified strong Liberals hold the most favorable evaluations of Liberals, consistent

[1] This presentation of results emphasizes differences between groups. Internal divisions are obscured by presenting only the mean thermometer score. In a prevision section, it was clear that distributions in attitudes towards Gays and Fundamentalists are bimodal for some groups. Presentation of mean scores will obscure internal divisions but will give a sense of the average relative positions of groups.

with an ingroup favoritism effect. Liberals' self evaluations are typically 5 to 10 points higher on average than Democrats evaluations of Liberals, though the gap shrinks in 2000. Liberal self-evaluations are 30 to 40 percent higher than evaluations made by strong Republicans and Conservatives, who tend to evaluate this group more negatively. Evaluations of Liberals are also quite stable for religious and secular Americans but smaller between group differences are observed (Figure 3.27). The largest difference occurs between committed Fundamentalists and Seculars, which ranges from about 5 degrees in 1984 to a high of 15 degrees in 1994.

Evaluations of Conservatives are also relatively stable for Americans holding strong political identities (Figure 3.29). Republicans and Conservatives consistently report positive feelings towards Conservatives (on average 70 to 80 degrees), while evaluations for Democrats and Liberals are significantly more negative. In fact, their average feeling thermometer scores decline slightly over the range of the series. Though there are year-to-year fluctuations, thermometer scores decline about 10 percent for both groups during this period. Liberals are significantly more negative in their evaluations than are Democrats in most years and seem to further polarize between 2000 and 2004. As was the case for evaluations of Liberals, evaluations of Conservatives by religious and secular Americans are less divided (Figure 3.30). However, while opinion is relatively stable for Moderates and less committed Fundamentalists, there is evidence of polarization between committed Fundamentalists and Seculars. While the gap between these groups averages approximately 10 percent from 1980 to 1992, it nearly doubles in 1994 and increases again slightly in 2004. Secular change, though small, was nearly double that for committed Fundamentalists and followed a more consistent trend.

While political and religious groups differ in their average evaluations of Liberals and Conservatives, these differences are relatively stable. There is modest evidence of polarization, but it is confined to evaluations of Conservatives by Liberals, Democrats, and secular Americans. It is possible that culture wars considerations – such as liberal and conservative positions on issues like abortion and gay rights – are not salient when making evaluations of these groups. In any given year, differences on economic, defense, or a host of other issues may trump cultural considerations. This should not be the case for groups like Feminists, Gays, and Christian Fundamentalists for whom cultural issues, such as the role of women and the proper definition of the family, are central aspects of their political agendas.

First, consider evaluations of Feminists, presented in Figure 3.31 and Figure 3.32. Evaluations were measured every four years in the National Election Studies, beginning in 1988. This is one area in which I find Liberals are not more polarized than Democrats. The two groups are uniform in their average levels of support for Feminists. Conversely, Republicans and Conservatives report comparable levels of opposition to Feminists. Surprisingly, average evaluations for these groups are not as negative as one might expect, falling just slightly below the neutral point in most years. These groups were most polarized in 1992, which is referred to as the "Year of the Women" given their heightened electoral success. There is also evidence of divergence in 2004, though it is not clear whether this is merely an anomaly or the beginning of a trend towards greater polarization. The picture for religious and secular Americans is quite different (see Figure 3.32). Feminist evaluations among these groups are quite muted and actually converge in 2004, contrary to expectations.

Intergroup attitudes towards Gays have followed a liberalizing trend among strongly identified Americans (Figures 3.33 and 3.34), consistent with findings of greater support for employment and service rights for Gays discussed above. A large gap between Liberals and Conservatives opens up in 1990, but declines beginning in 1996. At this time, liberal evaluations plateau while conservative opinion continues, on average, to become more positive – exceeding an average of 40 degrees in 2004. Recall from the previous section on intergroup attitudes that evaluations of Gays are distributed bimodal among strong Conservatives in 2004. There is still a substantial percentage of this group that reports extremely negative feelings towards Gays. While differences between Liberals and Conservatives range from 20 to 40 percent over the range of the series, difference between strong Democrats and strong Republicans are smaller – around 10 to 15 percent. By 2002, the magnitude of mean group differences in evaluations of Gays is virtually identical to those observed at the beginning of the series, in 1984. Among religious and secular Americans, evaluations of Gays become more positive at approximately the same rate during this period. Mean thermometer scores increased 15 to 20 degrees for each group, thought only secular and less committed Moderates mean evaluations exceeded 50 degrees during this period.

Finally, consider evaluations of Fundamentalists, presented in Figures 3.35 and 3.36. Americans with strong political identities differ in their feelings towards this group. While evaluations of Fundamentalists by Republicans and Conservatives are quite positive, Liberals and Democrats, on average, report less positive feelings. This is particularly true for Liberals, whose average thermometer scores are typically 20 to 30 points cooler than Republicans and Conservatives and about 10 degrees cooler than strong Democrats. Liberals do become modestly more negative over the course of the series, but the greatest evidence of polarization occurs in 2004 – when Republicans and Conservatives become more positive in their evaluations of Fundamentalists while Liberals become more negative. Evaluations of Fundamentalists are relatively stable over time for religious and secular Americans (Figure 3.36). The gap between Seculars and committed Fundamentalists is quite large – between 30 and 40 percent. Seculars consistently report negative feelings towards Fundamentalists – around 35 degrees from 1988 to 2004. As expected, Fundamentalists' self evaluations are quite high – between 65 and 75 degrees.

Polarized attitudes towards religious groups in America seem to be confined to Christian Fundamentalists. Americans with strong religious, political, and secular identities are notably more divided in their opinion towards Fundamentalists than towards other religious groups – including Jews, Catholics, and Protestants. Mean Catholic thermometer scores are presented in Figures 3.37 and 3.38 for comparison purposes. As one can clearly see, there is little difference in average opinion among political and religious groups. Similar results are observed in evaluations of Jews and Protestants. Divisions in evaluations of Fundamentalists are likely a consequence of perceptions of this group as more uniformly conservative than other religious groups and, perhaps, more politically motivated.

Summary. The results of this analysis suggest the culture wars do extend to the mass public and operate mainly among Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities. Attitude change in the late 1980s and early 1990s on issues like abortion and gay rights resulted in greater polarization between these groups of

Americans, which has persisted through 2004. Attitude change occurred in an asymmetrical fashion with much of the action in the opinion series transpiring among Liberals, Seculars, and to a lesser extent Democrats. For these groups, change occurred at a much faster rate than for their counterparts on the political and theological right. In addition, progressive groups are fairly uniform in their attitudes on these issues, while internal divisions are evident for the more traditional groups. A notable exception occurs for opinion regarding the extension of family rights and privileges to gay couples. Democrats are considerably more divided on this issue than for other issues in this domain, such as extending service and employment protections to Gays. As a result, the emphasis on gay marriage in the 2004 election makes a great deal of sense. Gay marriage is the only cultural issue examined above likely to evenly split the democratic base.

While differences in intergroup attitudes exist, they are significantly more stable that policy attitudes, contrary to the expectations set out above. While ideologically similar groups did rate each other more favorably than ideologically dissimilar groups, the magnitude of differences were relatively muted. Divisions between Americans with strong political identities were typically much larger than for religious and secular Americans. Among politicized Americans, there was some evidence that intergroup attitudes polarized slightly in 1994, but in most cases polarization declines in the late 1990s. The most consistent pattern of polarization emerged for evaluations of conservative groups by Liberals, though the changes amounted to only about 10 degrees in each case. This is further evidence that strongly-identified Liberals are most responsive to culture wars politics.

How then, can one explain the recent electoral success of socially conservative Republicans and their persistent emphasis on cultural issues? It is possible that the subset of strong Republicans, Conservatives, and Fundamentalists who frequently participate in political life are most polarized on these issues. As a result, they send clear signals about preferences on these issues to elites. Or, more generally, it may be the case that politically active Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities are generally most polarized on these cultural issues. This link between identity and attitude extremity could explain why the major parties have shifted from a median voter to base strategy over the past 20 years – the parties are responding to their most committed bases of support.

Political Activism and Attitude Polarization

Rates of political participation are not uniform among partisan and ideological identifiers. Figures 3.39 and 3.40 present the percentage of activists Americans in each category of partisanship and ideology. Here I take a loose definition of activism, counting Americans who report three or more acts of political participation in the last year as activists. Acts of participation are broadly defined to include voting, trying to influence the vote of others during the campaign, attending political meetings or rallies

during the campaign, working for a party or candidate during the campaign, displaying a candidate button or sticker, and making a campaign contribution to a party or candidate. Clearly, activism is more common among Americans with strong partisan and ideological identities. Looking at Figure 3.39, it is clear that activism is most common among Strong Republicans, followed by strong Democrats. Even among the strongly identified, rates of activism are not very high. With the exception of 1976 and 2004, less than one-third of strong partisans can be considered activists in any given presidential election year. Rates of participation are significantly lower for all groups in mid-term elections, though strong partisans are still disproportionately active relative to leaning partisans and independents (not presented here). The percentage of partisan and ideologue activists increased considerably in 2004. This increase was greatest among strong partisans who were particularly mobilized by this election.

The same relationship between ideological identity strength and activism are observed (see Figure 3.40). Again, rates of activism are highest among committed Liberals and Conservatives, but a slightly higher percentage of strong Liberals are activists, contrary to the pattern observed for partisans. Though activism is more common among strong ideologues, the percentage of activists in these groups is still quite small – less than 30 percent in most years, though ideologues were also unusually mobilized in 2004. Rates of activism are fairly low among religious and secular Americans (Figure 3.41). With the exception of 2004, 20 percent or fewer Fundamentalists, Moderates, and Seculars report three or more acts of participation in the election years considered. Activism is least common among less committed Fundamentalists – 10 percent or less, even in 2004.

Is the activist stratum more polarized in social and intergroup attitudes than Americans with strong identities but lower levels of political participation? Because activism is somewhat uncommon, even among strong identifiers, it is necessary to pool data into 2 to 4 survey-year intervals to compare attitudes of strongly identified activists with non-activists. The intervals vary across policy items, based on when they were asked, and are provided on the x-axis of the related figures. First, consider differences in abortion attitudes. Differences between activist and non-activist strong partisans in support for unregulated abortion rights are presented in Figure 3.42. The results demonstrate significance within group heterogeneity, even among highly committed partisans. Support for abortion rises among both active and inactive Democrats over the range of the series, though the rate of change is greater among active Democrats. Differences between active and inactive Republicans are notably smaller. For the time period considered, support for abortion is more polarized among activists, particularly for Democrats. Active Democrats support abortion at rates 10 to 20 percent higher than inactive Democrats, and this gap widens near the end of the series as activist change outpaces non-activist change. A similar pattern emerges for active and inactive ideologues (Figure 3.44) with small differences between active and inactive Conservatives and larger differences between active and inactive Liberals, though the difference here is small than observed for active and inactive Democrats.

Trends in reports of opposition to abortion in all circumstances among partisans and ideologues are presented in Figure 3.43 and 3.45. Opposition declines significantly for activist and non-active Democrats over the range of the series. Opposition increases among active Republicans, though for most years opposition is slightly higher among

non-activist Republicans than for activists. Regardless of the level of political activity, preferences for completely eliminating abortion rights are uncommon among Republicans. In any give time period, less than 20 percent of committed Republicans reported complete opposition to abortion rights. Though a minority of committed Republicans take extreme positions on these issues, the majority of both activist and non-activist Republicans support abortion rights only in the case where the mother's health is at stake, compared to the majority of Democrats who support abortion rights under all circumstances. As a result, the groups are still quite divided on the nature of social regulation on this issue. Overall, differences between activists and non-activists are marginal compared to the differences between committed partisans. The same is true of committed Conservatives.

These results reflect general patterns of polarization in abortion attitudes. Activist polarization is generally confined to the political left. Republicans and Conservatives are more consensual in their lack of support for unregulated abortion, regardless of their levels of participation. While general polarizing trends are not present for religious and secular Americans, secular activists are also significantly more polarized in their support for abortion than are secular non-activists (Figure 3.46 and Figure 3.47). Again, differences between active committed Fundamentalists and inactive committed Fundamentalists are marginal – very small percentages of both groups support unrestricted abortion rights. This figure does demonstrate the magnitude of the Fundamentalist-secular divide, as the gap between these groups is stark over the range of the series. Strong opposition to abortion is higher among Fundamentalists than Conservatives and Republicans. Over the course of the series, 25 to 35 percent of committed Fundamentalists oppose abortion in all circumstances. Again, these figures do suggest considerable diversity of opinion among Fundamentalists, as was the case for Conservatives and Republicans.

Figures 3.48 - 3.53 show differences between partisan, ideological, religious, and secular activists and non-activists in attitudes towards anti-discrimination legislation. Small percentages of both strong Republicans and strong Conservatives indicate strong support for antidiscrimination laws. Active Republicans, and to a lesser extent Conservatives, indicate support at slightly lower rates than their less active counterparts. Among strong Democrats and Liberals, the gap between activists and non-activists is greater, on the order of 10 to 20 percent. Though pooling results in only two time points for this series, the gap between both activist and non-activist Democrats and Liberals clearly grows as a result of activists liberalizing at a slightly faster rate than for non-activists. Little difference exists between the attitudes of activist and non-activist committed Fundamentalists, who report strong support for anti-discrimination laws at low rates. Looking at rates of strong opposition among these groups, its clear activists are somewhat more polarized than non-activists, though an overall trend towards diminished opposition is apparent for all groups. This general pattern of results is also observed for attitudes towards service rights. Unfortunately, attitudes towards adoption and marriage rights were asked too infrequently to pool the results and consider differences based on activism.

Intergroup attitudes among activist strong partisans, ideologues, secular and Fundamentalists are also modestly polarized. Active Democrats and Republicans hold slightly more polarized feelings towards Feminists than their less active counterparts

(Figure 3.54). Differences range between five and 10 degrees. The same is true for active Liberals and Conservatives (Figure 3.55). Among Fundamentalists and Seculars (Figure 3.56), the gap between activists and non activists is quite small in 1988 and 1992 but grows significantly following 2000. While the gap between non-activist Seculars and Fundamentalists shrinks during this period, the gap between activists grows significantly larger. Mean evaluations of Gays are comparably low for Republicans, Conservatives, and committed Fundamentalists, regardless of political activity (Figures 3.57 – 3.59), while activists in the progressive groups are significantly more positive in their evaluations of Gays than those who are less active. This asymmetry is also apparent in evaluations of Christian Fundamentalists (Figures 3.60 - 3.62). Activists in the more progressive groups are significantly more polarized than non-activists over the range of the series. The gap between activist and non-activist partisans is most pronounced. The activist gap is more than double the gap between partisan non-activists. In this case, evaluations of Fundamentalists actually become more extreme over time among partisan, religious, and secular activists. Activists with strong political, religious, and secular identities are also polarized in their evaluations of Liberals and Conservatives, though the magnitude of these differences is modest, on average 10 to 15 percent (see Figures 3.63 – Figure 3.68.

In sum, I find small but significant differences between activists and non-activists holding strong political, religious, and secular identities. Generally, more pronounced differences are observed among groups on the left than for groups on the political and religious right. It is also clear that activists on the right are much more diverse in their attitudes towards social policy issues than are Liberals, Democrats, and secular Americans. Thus, the asymmetry observed is the previous section holds even among the most politically active.

Conclusions

The results presented above supports the notion the culture wars operate among a significant and electorally consequential subset of the American public. Strong and committed partisans, ideologues, Fundamentalists and Seculars are quite divided in their attitudes towards social policy and social groups participating in culture wars politics. Group differences were large and significant in 2004. These differences reflected a growing trend towards polarization that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and persisted through 2004. But an interesting asymmetry was present in attitudes towards social issues like abortion and gay rights. Generally, groups in the liberal or progressive coalition moved towards greater unity of opinion at significantly higher rates during this period. Conservative groups were considerably more internally polarized in their reported attitudes.

Even though general trends towards polarization were observed, patterns of polarization were somewhat dependent on the policy issue or group being evaluated. For instance, on gay rights issues, a general liberalizing trend was apparent for all groups,

suggesting that even committed Conservatives are becoming increasingly tolerant of this group. An important subdivision was observed for gay rights attitudes. Opinion was much more favorable over all on affording Gays employment and service rights than for affording this group with marriage and adoption rights. Committed Democrats actually diverged from the general pattern of progressive unity on these issues and were quite divided in their preferences.

Thus, I reach conclusions somewhat different from Fiorina (2006), who contends abortion attitudes are becoming more consensual while gay rights have become increasingly controversial. Based on the results presented above, it seems that abortion is still a controversial social policy issue for significant minorities of Americans – namely committed partisans, ideologues, Fundamentalists, and Seculars. Indeed, even the distribution of mass opinion in 2004 reveals a bimodal distribution of attitudes. However, I need to be cautious when making comparisons between Fiorina's results and my own. Fiorina (2006) uses the GSS item on abortion attitudes in his analysis, which differs from the item used by the NES. The GSS item raises a larger number of specific considerations under which abortion should be permitted. This item likely brings to mind different considerations than does the NES item. For gay rights, I see the nature of the right is an important determinant of support. I find the extension of marital and adoption rights are significantly more controversial than employment and service rights.

While differences in intergroup attitudes exist, suggesting intergroup conflict is salient, they were significantly more stable than policy attitudes. As a general rule, ideologically similar groups did rate each other more favorably than ideologically dissimilar groups. However, the magnitude of group differences were, for the most part, small. The most consistent pattern of polarization emerged for evaluations of conservative groups by Liberals, though the magnitude of these changes was relatively small.

Finally, I considered the link between political and religious identity and political participation. I found strong partisans and ideologues were significantly more likely to report 3 or more acts of participation in the past year. Differences among religious and secular Americans at various levels of commitment were more muted. Still focusing on Americans with strong group identities, I compared the attitudes of activists and non-activists and found the activist subset is slightly more polarized than those who are less active. Again, there was a bit of an asymmetry observed here, as the differences between activists and non-activists tended to be more pronounced among progressive groups than for conservative groups. Ultimately, it seems that committed partisans and ideologues are notably more polarized and politically active than their less committed and moderate counterparts. By virtue of their greater polarization and participation, they send clear signals to the parties about their preferences. This may explain why the parties adopted a base strategy in the early 1990s. But the direction of the causal relationship is not clear. It could be the case that elites are responding to attitude changes among their most committed bases of support. Conversely, strongly committed partisans and ideologues may be more responsive to changes in elite opinion than their more weakly committed counterparts. While testing this relationship is beyond the scope of this project, the political implications of this uneven pattern of participation are clear. Committed partisans and ideologues, who hold more extreme positions on social issues than are found on average in the mass public, garner attention from elites disproportionate to their

size but perhaps consistent with their greater level of political activity. Unlike Fiorina (2006), I do not liken this result to the capture of the political system by fanatics. Instead, I merely claim the most active Americans are most polarized on social issues such as abortion and gay rights. This likely explains the continued salience of cultural conflict in American politics.

These findings are consistent with Hunter's conceptualization of the conflict (2006). Contrary to Fiorina's (2006) notion of the culture wars as an elite conflict - confined primarily to the small political class of elites, issue activists (more narrowly defined), and infotainers - Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities are attuned to the conflict and have responded with attitude polarization over time. Also, as Hunter (2006) suggests, these Americans who strongly identify with political, religious, and secular groups participate in politics at higher rates than their less committed and more moderate counterparts. As a result, they play a disproportionate role in the political process. I am left then with the somewhat confusing finding of considerable diversity of opinion within the conservative coalition. If Conservatives, Republicans, and Fundamentalists are so internally polarized, why have social issues became the focus of such intense debate and electoral import? Earlier, I opined this result may reflect significant ideological divisions with the conservative coalition. Social and economic conservatism may not neatly coincide and, as a result, committed Conservatives and Republicans may hold very divergent attitudes on these social issues. For example, one could expect committed Conservatives taking a libertarian perspective to strongly oppose any federally imposed social regulation in keeping with a preference for limited government and local determinism. Unfortunately, the measures of political ideology and partisanship in the National Election Studies do not allow for fine grained distinctions among Conservatives.

It is also possible the intersection of religious and political identities is critical for reconciling the apparent disconnect between polarization within the conservative camp and the emphasis placed on social and cultural issues by Republican elites and strategists in recent years. Hunter (1991) attributes the rise of the culture wars to a backlash among theological Conservatives against the moral permissiveness promoted by the counter-culture movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Prior this movement, Evangelicals and other theologically conservative groups were uniformly inactive in politics. The social changes that ensued drove conservative Christians into the political fray – political participation aimed at promoting traditional morality became a natural extension of their evangelism. As politics moved into these churches, Americans with conservative religious identities increasingly took on conservative political identities. Thus, it may be the case that the intersection of religious and political identity is critical here for locating the stratum of committed social Conservatives. While there is diversity among committed Fundamentalists, Conservatives and Republicans, those Americans who identify strongly with both religious Conservatives and political Conservatives are likely more uniformly socially conservative than political Conservatives who are religious Moderates or secular. That is, people with strong, politicized religious identities are likely monolithic in their social policy attitudes.

A cursory look at the National Election Studies data suggests this is the case. However, the paucity of committed Fundamentalists who hold strong partisan or ideological identities in the NES samples lend these results tentative at best. In the

subsequent chapters, I carefully consider whether political and religious identities co-occur in meaningful ways and examine the political consequences of these identities. Some have argued the partisan polarization observed by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) and Evans (2003) is the result of partisan sorting (Fiorina, 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005). As partisans become more ideologically consistent, they appear more polarized. While partisan sorting has certainly had this effect, it cannot explain why ideologues have also polarized. If this partisan polarization is the result of sorting, one would expect to find the partisan series converging on the ideology series – but in fact both are changing in parallel. Some scholars have made an analogous argument for religious polarization. They argue religious Americans are sorting more accurately into ideological camps due to the growing salience of political controversies over social issues in religious communities. This work on sorting suggests political and religious identities intersect in important and consequential ways among members of the mass public.

In addition to the partisan and religious sorting arguments, cultural conflict is often framed in the political discourse as a conflict between composite groups. For example, the media often portrays the conflict as a war between secular Liberals and religious Conservatives. It is entirely possible that these groups are more polarized in their attitudes towards morality and public policy than are less religious Conservatives and more religious Liberals.

In the next chapter, I look more closely at partisan, ideological, and religious identification among members of the mass public. I begin with a discussion of the limitations of ascribing or assigning people with group identities based on their responses to existing survey questions, which is the strategy I employed in this chapter. Drawing on social identity theory, I develop an alternative method for assessing collective identities. This strategy focuses on the multiple group identities held by Americans and the subjective importance placed on each. The results indicate religious and political identities do co-occur in meaningful ways and have non-trivial consequences for political and intergroup attitudes in the context of culture wars politics.

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Tables

Table 3.1: Distribution of Partisans Identities in the National Election Study Surveys, 1972-2004

Year	N	Strong Dem	Dem	Leaning Dem	Independ.	Leaning Rep	Rep	Strong Rep
1972	2656	14.95	26.05	11.26	13.33	10.62	13.33	10.47
1974	1533	18.92	21.00	12.92	14.02	9.39	14.29	9.46
1976	2213	15.27	24.72	11.75	14.23	9.85	14.78	9.40
1978	2224	15.29	25.04	14.75	14.03	9.76	13.13	8.00
1980	1577	18.14	23.59	11.67	13.19	10.46	14.27	9.69
1982	1383	20.54	24.51	11.21	11.28	8.10	14.61	9.76
1984	2198	17.24	20.43	11.01	11.15	12.60	14.97	12.60
1986	2120	18.35	22.59	10.66	11.79	11.04	14.86	10.71
1988	1999	17.76	17.96	12.01	10.76	13.51	14.06	13.96
1990	1935	20.31	19.48	12.66	10.59	12.04	15.14	9.77
1992	2445	18.16	17.67	14.44	11.74	12.47	14.27	11.25
1994	1772	15.52	19.02	12.87	10.10	11.79	14.67	16.03
1996	1695	19.41	19.71	13.75	8.55	10.80	15.16	12.63
1998	1255	19.04	19.04	14.42	10.12	10.60	15.86	10.92
2000	1776	19.48	15.43	15.15	11.60	12.95	12.11	13.29
2002	1497	16.77	17.17	13.79	6.90	13.32	15.96	16.09
2004	1195	16.99	14.98	17.57	9.87	11.55	12.89	16.15

Table 3.2: Distribution of Ideological Identification in the National Election Study Surveys, 1972-2004

Year	None	Very Liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Mode-rate	Slightly Conserv	Conserv	Very Conserv
1972	28.17	1.48	7.24	9.84	26.87	14.94	10.21	1.25
1974	25.87	1.55	9.87	7.87	28.00	13.29	11.94	1.61
1976	32.31	1.30	6.61	7.96	25.26	12.72	11.55	2.29
1978	26.75	1.66	7.84	9.85	26.76	13.53	11.34	2.28
1980	35.85	1.60	5.94	8.69	19.62	13.48	12.72	2.11
1982	35.93	1.36	5.79	7.50	22.36	12.71	12.14	2.21
1984	30.24	1.62	7.22	9.02	23.33	14.04	12.92	1.62
1986	24.75	1.11	5.99	10.69	27.79	15.16	13.00	1.52
1988	29.98	1.72	5.50	9.14	21.92	15.18	13.66	2.90
1990	33.05	1.37	7.22	8.08	24.45	13.93	9.81	2.08
1992	26.45	2.02	8.47	9.84	23.06	14.96	12.62	2.58
1994	21.52	1.40	6.45	7.85	26.79	14.69	18.16	3.14
1996	22.37	1.40	7.59	10.86	23.48	15.48	16.24	2.57
1998	20.47	2.34	7.11	9.92	28.98	15.70	12.89	2.58
2000	16.05	4.54	8.74	12.62	15.83	19.59	13.84	8.80
2002	16.83	1.54	12.09	9.02	22.71	12.42	21.04	4.34
2004	18.52	1.88	9.68	11.75	26.22	13.44	15.60	2.91

Table 3.3: Distribution of Theological Ideology in the National Election Study Surveys, 1972-2004

Year	Fundamentalist (High Attend)	Fundamentalist (Low Attend)	Moderate (High Attend)	Moderate (Low Attend)	Secular
1980	22.68	24.54	14.53	29.21	9.04
1984	23.11	27.14	13.19	28.66	7.90
1986	24.89	26.09	13.17	27.10	8.75
1988	24.21	25.68	11.87	29.85	8.40
1990	24.22	23.80	12.79	27.71	11.48
1992	20.71	18.98	16.49	31.11	12.71
1994	21.90	17.23	16.53	30.90	13.43
1996	20.00	16.78	16.54	32.06	14.63
1998	17.73	17.08	18.78	31.18	15.23
2000	19.81	15.15	17.60	33.04	14.39
2004	20.27	16.62	14.93	32.32	15.86

Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Table 3.4: Group Attitudes towards Adoption Rights for Gay Couples

	Percent Supportive	Percent Opposed
Mass Public	49.65	50.35
Strong Democrats	58.82	41.18
Strong Republicans	28.65	71.35
Strong Liberals	87.18	12.82
Strong Conservatives	23.81	76.19
Fundamentalists: High	17.65	82.35
Fundamentalists: Low	35.44	64.56
Moderates: High	49.02	50.98
Moderates: Low	62.23	36.77
Secular	77.64	22.36

Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Table 3.5: Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

	Support	Oppose	Civil Union (Voluntary)
Mass Public	34.90	61.52	3.58
Strong Democrats	48.95	46.84	4.21
Strong Republicans	14.36	81.91	3.72
Strong Liberals	76.69	20.30	3.01
Strong Conservatives	10.34	85.34	4.31
Fundamentalists: High	6.90	90.95	2.16
Fundamentalists: Low	16.94	80.87	2.19
Moderates: High	25.00	70.12	4.88
Moderates: Low	46.89	48.59	4.52
Secular	72.53	25.27	2.20

Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Figures

Figure 3.1: Rates of Political Participation, 1972-2004



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File

Figure 3.2: Abortion Attitudes in the Mass Public



Source: 2004 National Election Study

Figure 3.3: Abortion Attitudes among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Figure 3.4: Abortion Attitudes among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Figure 3.5: Gay Rights Attitudes in the Mass Public



Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Figure 3.6: Gay Rights Attitudes among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Figure 3.7: Gay Rights Attitudes among Religious Americans



Source: 2004 National Election Study.

Figure 3.8: Feelings toward Feminists in the Mass Public



Source: 2004 National Election Study.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.9: Attitudes towards Feminists among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: 2004 National Election Study.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.10: Attitudes towards Feminists among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: 2004 National Election Study.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.11: Feelings towards Gays and Lesbians in the Mass Public



Source: 2004 National Election Study.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.12: Feelings towards Gays and Lesbians among Strong Political Identifiers



Y axis should read “Mean Thermometer Score.”

Figure 3.13: Feelings towards Gays and Lesbians among Religious and Secular Americans



Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.14: Feelings towards Christian Fundamentalists in the Mass Public



Source: 2004 National Election Study.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.15: Attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists among Strong Political Identifiers



Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.16: Attitudes towards Fundamentalists among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: 2004 National Election Study.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.17: Abortion Attitudes among Strong Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.18: Abortion Attitudes among Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.19: Support for Abortion in All Circumstances among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.20: Opposition to Abortion in All Circumstances among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.21: Attitudes towards Anti-Discrimination Laws among Strong Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.22: Attitudes towards Anti-Discrimination Laws among Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.23: Strong Support for Anti-Discrimination Laws among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.24: Strong Opposition to Anti-Discrimination Laws among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.25: Support for Adoption Rights among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.26: Support for Adoption Rights among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.27: Attitudes towards Liberals among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.28: Attitudes towards Liberals among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.29: Attitudes towards Conservatives among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.30: Attitudes towards Conservatives among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.31: Attitudes towards Feminists among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.32: Attitudes towards Feminists among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.33: Attitudes towards Gays and Lesbians among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.34: Attitudes towards Gays and Lesbians among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.35: Attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists among Strong Political Identifiers



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.36: Attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.37: Attitudes towards Catholics among Strong Political Identifiers



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Figure 3.38: Attitudes towards Catholics among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.39: Political Activism among Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.40: Political Activism by Ideological Identification



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.41: Political Activism among Religious and Secular Americans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.42: Support for Abortion in All Circumstances among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.43: Opposition to Abortion in All Circumstances among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.44: Support for Abortion in All Circumstances among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.45: Opposition to Abortion in All Circumstances among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.46: Support for Abortion in all Circumstances among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.47: Opposition to Abortion in All Circumstances among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.48: Strong Support for Anti-Discrimination Laws among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.49: Strong Opposition to Anti-Discrimination Laws among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.50: Strong Support for Anti-Discrimination Laws among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.51: Strong Opposition to Anti-Discrimination Laws among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.52: Strong Support for Anti-Discrimination Laws among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.53: Strong Opposition to Anti-Discrimination Laws among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.54: Attitudes towards Feminists among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Figure 3.55: Attitudes towards Feminists among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.56: Attitudes towards Feminists among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.57: Attitudes towards Gays and Lesbians among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Y axis should read “Mean Thermometer Score.”
Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Figure 3.58: Attitudes towards Gays and Lesbians among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.59: Attitudes towards Gays and Lesbians among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.60: Attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.61: Attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.62: Attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.63: Attitudes towards Liberals among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.64: Attitudes towards Liberals among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.65: Attitudes towards Liberals among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.66: Attitudes towards Conservatives among Activist and Non-Activist Partisans



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.67: Attitudes towards Conservatives among Activist and Non-Activist Ideologues



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Figure 3.68: Attitudes towards Conservatives among Activist and Non-Activist Fundamentalists and Seculars



Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.
Y axis should read "Mean Thermometer Score."

Chapter 4: Measurement Issues in Identity Research

Introduction

The study of identity politics hinges on the appropriate operationalization of identity. There is far from a consensus on this matter, particularly in scholarship on religious identity. Despite these disagreements, much of the work on the implications of social, political, and religious identity has employed a common strategy – researchers ascribe or impose identity based upon responses to one or more survey item. In this approach, researchers infer identity based upon respondents' religious or political affiliations, their race or gender, or in some cases their reported attitudes. Ascriptive methods suffer from several significant limitations. Different methods of ascribing the same type of identity are often employed, rendering comparisons across studies difficult. Often, these measures also confound group identity with specific patterns of belief – obscuring efforts to understand the link between identity and attitudes.

Perhaps most critically, these methods ignore the subjective aspects of social identity. The ascribed identity is assumed to be personally salient to the respondent – that is, the respondent is thought to be aware they belong to this particular group or category. The ascribed identity is also assumed to be primary. This method tends to ignore the influence of other potentially competing social identities that may impact each respondent's attitudes or behavior. In addition, ascribed identities are assumed to be uniform across respondents, such that all respondents attributed to a particular social category have comparable levels of psychological attachment to the group, or have internalized group membership to the same degree. As a result, traditional methods for ascribing respondent identity are rather blunt and fail to capture the inherent complexities of collective life.

In this chapter, I develop and evaluate a method of measuring identification with the social and political groups centrally involved in the culture wars. This method allows respondents to identify with multiple social groups and provides an indication of the most salient, or primary, group identity. In addition, heterogeneity within groups is accounted for by attending to respondents' subjective sense of attachment or belonging to their primary group identity. This strategy should better capture nuances in group identification and allow for empirical tests of two critical tenets of the culture wars thesis: (1) that religious and secular identities are closely linked to political identities, and (2) that these groups have coalesced into competing camps on issues of public and private morality.

Ascribed Measures of Social Identity

Interest in the political implications of group membership has a long history in political science. Early work on public opinion and American political ideology investigated whether members of the same religious, occupational, and racial groups voted along similar lines and shared common political beliefs (Berelson et al 1954, Campell et al 1960, Lazarsfeld, et al). Since its inception, the study of identity politics

has expanded considerably, with racial, ethnic and gender identity receiving a great deal of attention (Shildkraut, 2005; Huddy, 2001). Work in this vein has also focused on a host of explicitly political identities based on party identification and ideology (Feldman, 1988; Abrams, 1994; Duck, Hogg and Terry, 1995; Duck, Terry and Hogg, 1998), feminist identity (Huddy, 1998; Rhodebeck, 1996) and national identity (Huddy and Khatib, 2007).

While this body of work suggests collective identities play an important role in structuring Americans' political thinking and political behavior, research in this area is somewhat confounded both by inconsistencies in the operationalization of different types of identities and the use of ascribed identities. Many scholars use different strategies for measuring the same social identity. Some have characterized group identity as a combination of group identification, power discontent, and system blaming (see for example Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1980). Others rely on polarized group affect as an indicator of group identity (for example, see Conover and Sapiro, 1992). Phinney (1990) has noted the many differences in the measurement of ethnic identity and attitudes towards one's ethnic group, and how these differences make comparisons across studies difficult. This is also the case for feminist identities, which have been measured in various ways – including feeling thermometers, perceived closeness to feminists, and beliefs about gender equality (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahren, 2004). The case of feminism raises a second problem. Often, these measures of identity are confounded with specific beliefs and attitudes, which obscure the relationships between identity, attitudes, and behaviors.

This is also commonly the case with the measurement of religious identity, which tends to combine aspects of religious identity (such as religious affiliation) with religious belief (such as doctrinal interpretation) (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993). In fact, a careful look at various common methods of ascribing religious identities is particularly instructive in demonstrating the limitations of ascriptive methods. Measurement of religious identities is critical in this context, as religious identities are an important part of the culture wars phenomenon. Traditional or orthodox religious identities have been intimately tied to the politics of the New Right (Hunter, 1991; Dionne, 1991). As you will see, developing a method for measuring religious identities is anything but straightforward. A number of strategies have been adopted for this purpose, and comparisons of these strategies suggest the classification of respondents by religious identity is highly contingent on the nature of the options provided or survey questions utilized.

Ascribing Religious Identity

Denominational Affiliation. Two approaches have dominated the study of religious identity. The first and most commonly employed method is to categorize respondents based on their affiliation with specific religious denominations (Roof, 1999; Smith, 1987; Steensland et al, 2000). Increasingly, emphasis has been placed on

distinguishing among sub-denominations rather than major religious denominations. This change is the result of developments in the nature of American religious life, most notably schisms within the nation's major religious traditions. Until the mid 1970s, political differences among religious Americans were best captured by their major denominational affiliation. In fact, religious traditions were thought to be the primary building blocks in party coalitions (Green and Guth, 1991). The impact of religious affiliation on political behavior was quite noticeable in the 1960 presidential election, in which approximately 80 percent of Catholics voted for Kennedy (a Catholic) and 80 percent of Protestants voted for the Republican candidate, Nixon (Wald, 2004). In response to the counterculture movement, political developments such as the Roe *v. Wade* Supreme Court ruling, and patterns of denominational attrition (i.e. "the collapse of the center in American religion" noted by Roof and McKinney, 1987), the political differences between major religious denominations were muted in comparison to the differences emerging among factions within each denomination (Woodbury and Smith, 1998). This phenomenon is often referred to as the decline of denomination (Wuthnow, 1988; Hunter, 1991).

The result of this intra-denominational change is predictable differences in political orientations based on sub-denominational affiliation. Adherents to more traditional or orthodox religious sub-denominations have moved to the right in terms of political ideology, while members of mainline and theologically liberal sub-denominations have moved left (Hunter, 1991). These developments indicate approaches measuring only major denominations fail to provide sufficient information to evaluate the link between religious identity and political orientations. Recognition of these changes has spurred efforts to classify respondents based on religious sub-denominations. The logic behind this revised approach is that sub-denominational affiliations capture important religious subcultures related to specific patterns of religious, social, and political beliefs (Gay and Ellison, 1993; Gay, Ellison, and Powers, 1996).

This strategy for assessing religious identity asks respondents to identify with a major religious denomination and then prompts them for a specific sub-denomination, typically using an open-ended response format. These responses are then coded into categories that reflect the religious differences of interest, such as religious traditionalism or conservatism. However, a consensus on how to classify these sub-denominations has failed to emerge, even within Protestantism which is thought to have the most consistent schismatic properties. Two common classification schemes for distinguishing among Protestants combine sub-denominations into fundamentalist and non- fundamentalist categories (Smith, 1990) or evangelical and mainline sub-denominations (Steensland et al, 2000), with the goal of distinguishing between the theologically conservative and theologically liberal, moderate, or progressive respondents. This distinction is thought to be sufficient for understanding the social and political implications of religious identity (see also Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Green and Guth; 1991), as mainline or progressive and evangelical identifiers of different denominations are understood to form coalitions or alliances for political purposes (Hunter, 1991). But even these widely used methods differ in the classification of respondents from the same sample. In a recent study comparing these methods by Alwin et al (2006), the authors found the two methods differed markedly in their classification of respondents into traditional and progressive

camps. Kellstedt and Green (1993) have also pointed out the potential for these methods to miscategorize respondents.

A second problem with sub-denominational approaches is heterogeneity within sub-denominations. Woodbury and Smith (1998) have noted this heterogeneity within Protestant sects – particularly Baptists, Lutherans, and Methodists – which complicates classification of these groups in terms of their theological ideology. Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege (1993) have also noted regional variation in the theological ideology of major Protestant sub-denominations. Many southern border state churches identified with theologically moderate sub-denominations have been found to promote very conservative religious doctrine, and are probably better classified as evangelical or fundamentalist. Beyond problems of miscategorization and sub-denominational heterogeneity, many respondents do not report a religious denomination, rendering them unclassifiable. This is particularly true of the non-Protestant religious identifiers. While scholars have recognized schisms within for example, Catholicism, Catholics tend not to be readily classifiable by sub-denominational approaches as they do not provide sub-denominational information when prompted (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993).

Movement Identification. A second major approach to measuring religious identities arose in response to these difficulties with sub-denominational methods. The movement approach establishes religious identities based on identification with major 20th century religious movements, particularly the schismatic movements in Protestantism catalyzed by modernization (Mardsen, 1980). This method is sometimes referred to as the "subjective" approach because its measures are non-denominational. It will be referred to as the movement method here to distinguish between the subjective measures derived from social identity described below. The religious movements of interest typically include Fundamentalist, Evangelical, Charismatic, Pentecostal, Mainline, and Liberal (see for example Green et al, 1996; Kellstedt and Smidt, 1991; Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993; Smith and Sikkink, 2003). This classification scheme sorts religious adherents into different categories than the aforementioned sub-denominational classification schemes. Alwin et al (2006) did not find a close correspondence between this method and the sub-denominational approaches. Both denominational and movement based measures show a relationship between religious identity, religious beliefs, and behaviors, but movement affiliation and religious sub-denomination seemed to make somewhat unique contributions to these aspects of religiosity when examined concurrently.

Unfortunately, this movement-based approach also suffers from several significant limitations. Perhaps the most problematic is the amount of missing data typically obtained when using this method. Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege (1993) investigated the use of this measure in the 1989 NES pilot study, and found the total missing data for the movement measure exceeded 60 percent. Alwin et al (2006) similarly found that upwards of 60 percent of respondents in the 1996-2000 GSS could not or would not identify themselves according to these movement categories. Their results suggest the measure has limited utility outside of Protestantism. Rates of nonresponse among Protestants were about half that of the total sample - though 30 percent nonresponse is still quite high. This method of determining religious identity suffers from the same criticism as the sub-denominational approaches in that is fails to distinguish between traditional and progressive members of non-Protestant faiths, such as Catholics. Beyond

this apparent unwillingness or inability to apply these movement labels to describing one's personal religious identity, scholars have noted that people generally have a difficult time using these labels to describe their local church or parish (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993).

Another problem with the movement method for ascribing religious identity is the apparent disconnect between scholarly understandings of these labels and the meanings held by respondents. To begin with, there is some debate among scholars about how to best define these movements. Some favor defining evangelicalism based on doctrinal interpretations, while others favor private religious practices, and still others argue that membership in an evangelical church is critical. These disagreements have raised questions about attempts to validate self-identification measures like the movement method. For instance, (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993) examined data from both the 1989 NES pilot and the 1990 NES and found that about one third of respondents who claim fundamentalist, evangelical and charismatic identities lack the theological beliefs and practices typically associated with these labels. Also, a substantial minority of respondents who chose liberal or mainline movement identifications reported a literal interpretation of the bible or a born again experience. This is inconsistent with how these movements are characterized by experts. Others have noted that many self-identified fundamentalists do not fit the pattern of doctrinal separatists – they are not especially likely to take a literal interpretation of the Bible. In addition, it seems that when given the chance to select multiple movement labels, some respondents will select more than one – even though the labels seem logically incompatible (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993; Smidt and Penning, 1991)

These results suggest imperfect correspondence between self-identifications and specific patterns of beliefs and practices. Ultimately, the use of these terms may indicate high levels of religiosity among respondents rather than specific patterns of religious identity or religious belief. While religious doctrine is generally understood to be the basis of religious identifications, these studies suggest many Americans are not sure whether their beliefs qualify them as evangelical, fundamentalist, Pentecostal, charismatic, mainline or liberal. The large quantities of missing data on these measures further support this argument. The apparent error involved in this measurement strategy calls into question its general utility for effectively distinguishing between respondents' religious identities.

Nonspecific Religiosity. Other methods of ascribing religious identity have emphasized nonspecific or global religiosity over particular denominational or movement-based religious identities. Much of this work arose from the recognition that denominational differences may not be as important as other aspects of religious life and practice (Alwin, 1986). Church attendance is commonly employed as a proxy for religiosity. But this measure has been widely criticized for failing to capture important aspects of religiosity – such as variations in strength of psychological attachment to the religious tradition, differences in religious knowledge, and private devotional practices (Wilcox, Jelen, Leege, 1993). In addition, reported church attendance is thought to be biased by social desirability effects stemming from pro-religious norms. Some scholars have estimated that upwards of 50 percent of survey respondents overreport their frequency of church attendance (Hawaway, Marler, and Chavez, 1993). As a result, most

studies using this measure likely underestimate the link between attendance and social and political attitudes.

Increasingly work on religion has looked beyond church attendance, noting that religiosity is a multidimensional construct. Several scholars have pointed out the need to distinguish between two key aspects of religiosity – a believing dimension (religion as a mental phenomenon) and a belonging dimension (religion as a social phenomenon) (for example, see Roof, 1979). This believing aspect of religiosity emphasizes substantive doctrinal beliefs (such as Biblical interpretation) and private religious practices (such as Bible study). As noted above, differences in these beliefs and practices are thought by many scholars to underlie responses to the sub-denominational and movement based measures. On the other hand, the social aspect of religiosity is concerned more with shared collective identity or a sense of belonging to one's religious community. From this perspective, the impact of personal religiosity is thought to be mediated by a sense of identification with the religious group (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993).

There is some debate over whether these two aspects of religiosity are independent or interrelated (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege, 1993). Some of this confusion lies in the growing popularity of uninstitutionalized religion, which is evident in increased identification with the term spiritual in favor of a major religious denomination and increases in private devotionalism (Marler and Hadaway, 2002). However, empirical researchers rarely distinguish between aspects of belief and belonging. Rather, they employ composite measures that capture various aspects of religiosity and religious identity (Wilcox, Jelen, Leege, 1993; Wilcox, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993). A few efforts have been made to understand the unique contributions of these two facets of religiosity. Most have emphasized doctrinal interpretation by examining the impact of Biblical literalism on social and political attitudes. Others have considered the impact of private devotionalism, which is a good predictor of Republican Party identification and social conservatism (Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt, 1993). The belonging aspect of religiosity has received less empirical attention. Wilcox, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993 have used a church involvement index – combining church attendance, religious identification, and involvement in church activities outside of regular services - to investigate the more social aspect of religiosity. They found this measure to be modestly correlated with measures of religious beliefs and strongly related to moral traditionalism and many social policy attitudes. These findings also indicate the religiously involved hold attitudes strikingly different from the uninvolved (see also Wald, Owen, and Hill, 1990). Beyond, this few direct and uncontaminated measures of the belonging or social aspect of religiosity have been explored.

Summary. This literature points to the difficulties in developing objective ascribed measures of identity even when respondents provide a significant amount of information about their religious affiliations, beliefs, and practices. Clearly, no gold standard for measuring religious identity has emerged from this work. Classification schemes based on sub-denominational affiliations or religious movements seem particularly error prone and do not relate well to religious identities outside of Protestantism. While experts expect these identities to coincide with specific patters of religious belief and practice, many have noted a mismatch between reported identity and reported beliefs – particularly in the case of doctrinal interpretation. Strategies based on global or nonspecific religiosity are similarly problematic, in that they fail to effectively

distinguish between the personal and social aspects of religious identity. Few measures of religious identity are uncontaminated by specific patters of substantive religious beliefs.

This is particularly troubling in the context of this project, as the culture wars is conceptualized here as a form of intergroup conflict. As a result, the belonging aspect of religious identity – in addition to secular and political identities – is critical here. For religious identities, focusing on this social component of identity is important because people may maintain a strong social identification with their religious group while at the same time holding liberal or progressive religious beliefs. The impact of these identities on social and political attitudes would not be the same as for those who have strong social ties to religious groups and adhere to strict doctrinal interpretations. Thus, the use of measures that confound the social aspect of religiosity with orthodox religious beliefs is inappropriate for understanding the group basis of the culture wars phenomenon.
It is also worth noting that these methods of ascribing religious identities are also used to ascribe secular identities. Respondents are usually identified as secular based on the absence of religious beliefs and practices rather than a subjective sense of attachment to secularists as a social group. Below, I draw on social identity theory to develop a strategy for measuring collective identity purged of specific patterns of belief that can be applied to all of the social groups considered central to culture wars politics. This strategy will also capture the subjective aspects of social identity critical to understanding intergroup phenomenon.

Subjective Aspects of Social Identity

Social identity theories define social or collective identity as (1) knowledge of group membership combined with (2) a sense of attachment to the group or internalized sense of identity (Tajfel, 1978). This second aspect of identity is often unobserved. Rarely are people asked explicitly about their group membership and their personal sense of belonging to a particular group. Instead, these studies ascribe or infer respondents' identities based on their responses to one or more survey items. This ascriptive method assigns respondents into one "objective" category. This is an indirect method of assessing identity that obscures important individual differences both within and across groups by assuming (1) ascribed identities are equally **salient** for all "objective" group members, (2) ascribed identities are **primary** – they exert a direct influence on attitudes and behaviors independent of (and dominating) other group identifications, and (3) all "objective" group members have **internalized** this identity to the same degree, or share a common level of psychological attachment to the group. Yet this is rarely found to be the case. In fact, work in social identity has linked these more subjective aspects of identity (identity salience, identity primacy, and identity strength) to predictable patters of intergroup attitudes and behaviors (see for example Aberson, Healy, Romero, 2000; Branscombe and Wann, 1994).

Identity Salience and Multiple Social Identities. Typically, work on identity politics focuses on one particular type of identity - feminist identity, Hispanic identity, national identity, or partisan identity for example - to the exclusion of other identity types (Conover 1984; 1988; Huddy, 2001). This narrow focus is problematic because people hold multiple social identities, each of which may vary in their salience over time and across contexts. Work in social categorization theory has demonstrated this facet of social identities. For example, studies of stereotype threat show how context can shape the salience of gender and racial identities and impact performance behavior (Steele and Aronson, 1995; Spencer, Steele and Quinn, 1999). Ascribed identities, assigned by interviewers, assume the identity of interest is of equal salience to all "objective" group members.

Though social categorization theory posits instability in social identities, certain identities do appear to be quite stable for individuals over time and across contexts. For example, studies of religious switching suggest once established, there is very little change in religious identities (Sherkat, 2001; Roof, 1989). Most change seems to be among mainliners who drop out of religious life all together – a phenomenon referred to as the "collapse of the center" in American religious life (Wuthnow, 1988). Also, many have noted the stability of political identifications – based on party labels and ideological terms (Abrams, 1994; Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb, 1990; Duck, Hogg and Terry, 1995; Duck, Terry and Hogg, 1998). However, it is difficult to discern from ascriptive measures which objective group members maintain strong and stable ties to the group and which are more incidental members – influenced by some element of the survey context.

Given the mutable nature of identities, we need to think more carefully about the multiple identities people hold and the relationship between them. Respondents' survey answers may suggest a variety of political, religious, and ethnic identities but most researchers do not ask respondents to provide an explicit rank order of their relative importance. As a result, differences in the subjective importance placed on these identities are unobserved. Multiple identities of varying salience and strength can cause cross-pressures that obscure the true relationship between group identity and political orientations. For example, studies of religious identity might lump together all respondents who report a Catholic identity on a religious identification measure. In this case, Catholics might include respondents who also have a strong feminist identity and respondents who have a strong conservative political identity. In addition, it likely includes people who hold a traditional Catholic identity and people who consider themselves "cafeteria Catholics" – those who pick and choose beliefs and practices, as if off a buffet line. While all group members can be considered Catholic by objective standards, there is tremendous diversity within the group - both in terms of the other social identities at play and the relative salience of each. The influence of these identities on political attitudes would really depend upon which is the dominant or primary identity. Sidanius and colleagues' (1997) study of the relationship between national identity and sub-national ethnic identities is instructive. They found strong ethnic identities subverted the effect of national identity on political attitudes and behaviors. These sub-national identities were found to undercut national unity and were related to domestic intergroup conflict. Thus, identifying one's primary identity is critical for understanding the link between identity and attitudes. Primary identities are thought to be strong and stable; and

as a result, they will exert the strongest and most consistent influence on social and political attitudes.

Ignoring multiple group affiliations also assumes that social identities are not related in meaningful ways. Conceptualization of the culture wars as a religious and political phenomenon posits a meaningful relationship between religious, secular, and political identities. Hunter (1991) contends that culture wars politics is characterized by two competing coalitions. The progressive coalition consists of political liberals, seculars, and members in theologically moderate or liberal churches. These group members share a common orientation towards moral progressivism. On the other side of the conflict are political conservatives, members of evangelical or fundamentalist churches, and people who adhere to traditional or orthodox interpretations of theology – all of whom share a traditional or orthodox moral perspective. Based on this understanding of the culture wars as coalition politics, I focus on a subset of religious, secular, and political identities. Rather than looking at the identities of interest here in isolation, I consider the constellations of social identities Americans hold (all salient identities) and isolate the primary identities with the goal of better understanding the culture wars as a kind of identity politics.

Subjective Identity Strength. In addition to subjective differences in identity salience and primary, I am interested in subjective identity strength. Identity strength is related to stability and primacy – as strong identities are thought to be impervious to contextual factors and are more likely to influence attitudes and behaviors (Kinket and Verkuyten, 1997). A final criticism of ascribed identities is their failure to capture the extent to which people have internalized group membership or maintain a psychological attachment to the group. Instead, ascriptive measures implicitly assume all group members share the same level of identity strength. But even when dealing with a salient and primary social identity, there is probably still evidence of heterogeneity among group members because people vary in their subjective identity strength. It is important to consider this within-group heterogeneity because strong group identifiers are probably more "typical" of their group. They adhere more strongly to group norms and values, and demonstrate predictable intergroup biases (Terry, Hogg, and White, 1999; Terry, Hogg and Duck, 1999). As a result, I expect the culture wars to primarily operate among individuals who are strongly identified with key religious, secular and political groups.

Variation in identity strength has been largely ignored by political scientists (Huddy, 2001), but psychologists have attended to these differences. Some have attributed variations in identity strength to personality characteristics like authoritarianism, which shapes people's proclivities to identify with dominant social groups (Duckitt, 1989). Others argue there are stable individual differences in whether people possess positive collective or social identities, just like differences in positive personal identity, or self esteem. Crocker and Luthanen (1990) have developed the collective self esteem scale (CSES) to measure differences in subjective identity strength. The scale captures four dimensions of collective self esteem: (1) private collective esteem (the extent to which the person evaluates their own groups positively), (2) membership esteem (evaluations of ones self as a good member of the group one belongs to), (3) public collective self esteem (how others evaluate one's social groups), and (4) importance to identity (how important memberships in these groups are to one's self concept). The consequences of the private collective esteem dimension of the CSES have

received the most attention. Private collective esteem has been linked to biased intergroup attitudes and behavior in a number of studies (Aberson, Healy, and Romero, 2000).

The Collective Self Esteem Scale provides a useful way of measuring identity strength without reference to specific attitudes or patterns of belief. As a result, the measure lends itself to application across a wide range of groups. The original scale was intended to capture global esteem for all group identities. The original instructions for the task read: "We are all members of different social groups or categories. Some of these social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and social class. We would like you to consider your membership in these particular groups or categories, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about these groups and your memberships in them (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990, p62)." Though the measure isn't intended to be group specific, it has been modified successfully to investigate a single identity, such as Hispanic identity (see for example, Ethier and Deaux, 1994).

This measure does have one caveat; it focuses exclusively on group affect or positive evaluations of one's social groups (Aberson, Healy and Romero, 2000). For example, the scale includes items such as "I am proud to be a member of these groups." While valence is an important aspect of group identity (Huddy, 2001), people can evaluate groups positively or feel close to groups without objectively belonging to them (see for example Conover, 1984). Work by Esses and colleagues (1993) indicates valence is only one of many determinants of intergroup attitudes. Positive group evaluations alone do not necessarily capture other relevant aspects of social identity – such as a sense of common fate or the perception of shared values. Below, I discuss how this scale was modified to include incorporate these elements. This measure should afford insight into how variations in subjective identity strength among group members moderate the impact of group identity on political attitudes and behaviors.

In addition to differences in identity strength within groups, average differences in identity strength may be observed across groups. Hewitt (1989) argues people with strong traditional religious identities tend to view their community as an enclave from larger society. Membership in the religious community buffers its members from the dangers of outsiders and they hold tight to it for protection. Similarly, Stark and Finke (2000) report people with conservative religious identities have more commitment to their faith because they are at greater tension with their surroundings. To be sure, the social aspect of identity is quite salient for very religious Americans, who likely interact with other group members more frequently and in a more structured fashion than members of more diffuse political and secular groups. It may be the case that religious Americans, particularly those with more conservative faiths, have a stronger sense of group identity than their more secular or mainline counterparts.

To address the problems with ascribed identities outlined here, I developed a task in which respondents select all group memberships pertaining to them and indicate the identity most important to them – their primary social identity. Respondents then complete a modified version of the collective self esteem scale to gauge their subjective identity strength. This procedure, outlined below, should allow us to investigate the inter-relationship between people's multiple social identities to determine whether religious and political identities go together in meaningful ways, as Hunter (1991)

suggests. This strategy for assessing the subjective aspects of group identity should also afford a better understanding of the link identity and Americans' political attitudes and behaviors in the following chapters.

Data and Method[2]

Unlike other scholars who argue the culture wars are confined to elites and party activists, I contend the culture wars operate among Americans who identify strongly with salient social groups. These individuals share politicized group identities that exert substantial influence on their political attitudes and behavior particularly on moral policy issues. In order to assess the new strategy for measuring social identity outlined below and examine the implications of identity for political attitudes and tolerance, I developed and administered the Religion and Politics in American Life Survey. Due to the emphasis on identification with the religious, secular, and political groups central to culture wars politics, the survey was administered to two targeted samples each of which recruited Americans who identified strongly with these groups. The survey was conducted by mail and via the web in the summer of 2006.

Mail Survey. To obtain an oversample of American adults who identify with key political, religious, and secular groups, I identified 36 U.S. counties that were either very "red" or very "blue" in both their electoral behavior and religious climate. Counties were selected based on the proportion of the presidential votes cast for Bush in the 2004 election. County level election return data was obtained from Charles Stewart's election data archive (http://web.mit.edu/~cstewart/www/election2004.html). Selection was determined by the skew of the electoral returns in favor of one of the major candidates. In "red" counties, an average of 69 percent of the presidential vote went to Bush, compared to 33 percent in the "blue" counties selected.

Efforts to obtain this oversample also focused on evangelical and fundamentalist Christians. Because of their theological conservatism and the primacy of this group in the politics of the New Right, the inclusion of conservative Christians in the sample is critical for understanding the nature of the culture wars phenomenon. Counties were selected based on the number of evangelical adherents per 1000 population. County level data on evangelical adherents was obtained from the Glenmary Corporation's 2001 Religious Identification Survey, which was accessed from the American Data Religion Archive. The average number of evangelical adherents in the "red" counties was 604/1000, compared to 47/1000 in the "blue" counties. While evangelicals are a minority in the "blue" counties, theologically liberal and secular Americans are thought to be well represented. The 36 "red" and "blue" counties comprising the sampling frame are depicted in Figure 4.1. One can see the Bible Belt is well represented among the "red"

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[2] For more information about the sampling frame, response rates, and sample characteristics, please see Section B of the Appendix.

counties. This is due to the regional concentration of evangelicals in the United States. The distribution of evangelical adherents in the mass public is depicted in Figure 4.2.

Three thousand addresses were selected randomly from the 36 counties. The records were drawn from the U.S. Post Office Delivery Service File to ensure households were included in the sampling frame even if they were not listed in the white pages. The survey was administered in accordance with the guidelines established by Dillman (2006) for maximizing response rates in mail surveys. A pre-notice letter was sent to each address, to notify respondents the survey was coming. This mailing was followed by the survey with a stamped envelope for its return. The survey included instructions for randomization at the household level. Reminders were sent the first and second week following the survey. The third week after the survey was initially sent, a second copy of the survey was mailed to respondents who had not yet returned their completed survey. This was followed by two more reminders at week long intervals. Participants who completed and returned the survey were sent a 60 minute pre-paid phone card as a token of appreciation.

There was a great deal of variation in county level response rates – ranging from 7.41 percent in New Jersey's Hudson County to 36 percent in Washington's Jefferson County. Overall, 181 addresses were determined undeliverable and 536 respondents completed the survey, for a total response rate of 19.01 percent (AAPOR RR5). While this may seem low, a recent meta-analysis by Krosnick, Holbrook and Pfent (in press) reports typical response rates for media polling firms range from 5 to 51 percent, with a mean response rate of 17 percent. The response rate obtained here is not too bad in this context.

Web Survey. The web survey was administered to a targeted sample of political sophisticates who are very active in politics. The sample was obtained to evaluate claims made by Fiorina (2006) and others that the culture wars is confined to elites, activists, and sophisticates. Comparison of data from the mail and web survey in subsequent analysis should afford insight into whether the mass public and political sophisticates are engaged in culture wars politics to different extents. The use of web-based survey methods for social science research has increased dramatically in the past several years. There are a number of advantages to the use of web surveys. This technique has a low marginal cost of administration, the ability to provide respondents with audio-visual information, affords rapid data collection, and is thought to minimize social desirability bias and interviewer effects (Berrens et al, 2003). There are a number of drawbacks to this survey method as well. Noncoverage error can be problematic, as the digital divide precludes a nontrivial portion of the electorate from participation (Alvarez et al, 2003). On average, web users are younger, more educated and have higher incomes than nonusers (Lenhart et al, 2003). They are also disproportionately white and regionally concentrated (Couper, 2000). Another problem is that response rates tend to be lower than for other common survey modes - such as personal interviews, mail surveys, and phone surveys – introducing potential non-response error (Berrens et al, 2003).

These problems loom especially large for projects aiming for a probability sample of the adult population. However, web surveys can be particularly useful for targeted sampling. This survey mode provides an economical means of reaching special groups that tend to be underrepresented in probability samples of the general population. Researchers have successfully reached a diverse set of groups, including hate group

members, anabolic steroid users, people with hearing loss, and pet owners via web surveys (see Skitka and Sargis, 2006 for review). This mode of administration can circumvent the "needle in the haystack" problem, as a quick search on www.Google.com brings one directly to the group of interest. Use of this type of sample does have implications for statistical inference. The sampling frame for special populations is often unknown. When this is the case, nonresponse error cannot be meaningfully evaluated because members of the target population do not have known probabilities of selection into the sample. As a result, one must be quite cautious in making generalizations from the target sample to the target population (Couper, 2000).

For this project, it was necessary to obtain a sample of political sophisticates who identify with religious and secular social groups. Respondents were recruited from a number of weblogs. The blogs were selected based on their content, the frequency of postings, and traffic. The blogs used for this project contained digested political content with a clear ideological orientation. Many also reflected a clear religious or secular orientation, such as Neural Gourmet (a blog written from an atheist perspective) and Jesus Creed (a blog written from a Christian perspective). The selected sites were updated frequently, at least every 3 days. In addition, the sites were frequently trafficked – as evident by a hit counter or the volume of posted comments. A total of 23 of the 100 bloggers contacted agreed to post the survey. In these cases, the blogger endorsed the survey and asked their readers to participate. Unfortunately, willingness to post the survey was not uniform across blogs. The survey was better received among sites visited by respondents describing themselves as secular liberals. In an effort to increase the diversity of respondents, banner ads were purchased on 14 websites posting religious or conservative content. A list of participating blogs can be found in Section B of the Appendix. Three-thousand, one hundred and twenty-six people viewed the survey (they clicked on the link to read the introduction) and 2,248 completed it – yielding a rough cooperation rate of 72 percent.

Sample Characteristics – Mail and Web Surveys. The key demographic, religious, and political characteristics of the two samples are presented in Table 4.1. Information from the 2004 National Election Study (NES) is also provided as a rough benchmark for evaluating the nature of the samples. It is important to note however that the NES is a random general population sample, while the data collected here contains oversamples of particular groups of respondents. As a result, the samples are not expected to very closely approximate a general population survey.

Women were oversampled in both the mail and web survey. 63 percent of respondents in the mail sample and 61 percent of respondents in the web sample were female, compared to 52 percent in the National Election Study sample. Both surveys were also disproportionately Caucasian – over 85 percent of both samples selected this racial category. To some extent, the racial bias in the web survey can be attributed to the digital divide. Work on new media consumption suggests African Americans and Hispanics on average are much less likely to have internet access in their homes than Caucasians (Couper, 2000). Interestingly, the average age for the web survey – 38 years – was considerably lower than for the mail survey (51 years) and the NES sample (47 years). While young respondents tend to be underrepresented in phone and mail surveys - due to the proliferation of cell phones and busy lifestyles – the web survey did seem to capture considerably more young respondents than the other survey modalities. The

median household income of respondents in the mail sample was slightly lower than the other two samples (40-50k compared to 50-60 k for the web sample and NES sample). This difference may be an artifact of county selection in this survey – the "red" counties tended to be significantly less urban than the "blue" counties and probably have a lower cost of living. Both the mail and web samples reflected above average levels of educational attainment. Twenty-one percent of mail sample respondents and 33 percent of web respondents reported holding a bachelor's degree, compared to 18 percent of respondents in the NES sample. This difference is even more pronounced for graduate level education – 21 percent of mail survey respondents and 43 percent of web survey respondents reported holding a graduate degree compared with approximately 12 percent of the NES sample.

The religious character of the mail and web surveys also deviated somewhat from the NES general population survey. These differences are, to some extent, a reflection of the strategies used to recruit respondents with strong political, religious, and secular identities. The web sample was significantly more secular than the other two samples described in Table 4.1. Forty-four percent of respondents chose no religious affiliation, compared to only 14 percent in the mail survey and 15 percent in the NES sample. The most common religious affiliation was Christian. Fifty-three percent of mail survey respondents and 20 percent of web survey respondents identified as Christian. The religious identification question used in the NES did not distinguish between Christians and Protestants – both groups combined comprised 56 percent of the sample.

Church attendance is commonly employed as a proxy for religiosity, or intensity of religious commitment. Again the secular character of the web sample is evident - only 13 percent of web respondents attended church weekly or more, a figure significantly lower that the mail sample (37 percent) and the NES sample (24 percent). Web respondents were also very unlikely to report a literal interpretation of the Bible. Less than 5 percent held this perspective, compared to 37 percent of both the mail and NES samples. This difference may be confounded by a quirk in the interpretation of this question by the more sophisticated web respondents. A number of participants indicated their dislike for this question in the comments section of the survey. The comments suggested religious sophisticates distinguish between Biblical literalism and Biblical inerrancy – the notion that the Bible is the perfect word of God but contains parables and metaphors. As a result, responses to item probably do not reflect true levels of religious conservatism among either the higher educated or religious sophisticates.

In addition to its rather secular cast, the web survey respondents are disproportionately liberal. Severty-nine percent of respondents identified as liberal (78 percent as Democratic) and 14 percent identified as conservative (and 14 percent Republican). The mail sample and NES sample are considerably more balanced ideologically. Thirty-five percent of the mail sample identified as liberal and 51 reported Democratic Party identification. Alternatively, 39 percent identified as conservative and 44 percent gave a Republican identification – figures that more closely approximate the general population NES sample. While secular and liberal respondents were better represented, religious and conservative respondents were captured in sufficient numbers to examine the impact of religious and conservative identities and identity strength on political attitudes in subsequent analysis. The group identification task, discussed in the next section, gives a better indication of the prevalence of these group members.

Approximately 450 respondents identified as politically conservative or as belonging to a conservative religious group in this task. This should afford enough statistical power for the proposed analysis, although the nature of the sample will likely lend greater confidence to the relationships established between identity and attitudes for liberal, secular sophisticates.

As noted above, the purpose of the web survey was to obtain a sample of politically sophisticated, politically active Americans. Respondents in the web sample did have significantly higher levels of political knowledge than respondents in the mail survey or the NES sample. About 78 percent of respondents answered all of the knowledge questions correctly, compared to 44 percent of the mail sample, and 9 percent of the NES sample. The web sample was also considerably more engaged in American political life. Over 94 percent of respondents reported voting in the 2004 election, compared to just under 70 percent of the NES sample. In addition, almost 40 percent reported attending a political meeting, rally, speech or dinner in support of a particular candidate in the past year, compared to 8 percent of NES respondents. Also, more than twice as many respondents reported displaying a campaign button or sign - 49 percent compared to 21 percent. They also contributed to candidates and political parties at much higher rates than the NES survey respondents. Political participation items were not asked of mail respondents due to space constraints, and unfortunately no direct comparisons can be made.

The targeted sampling strategy used for the web survey was certainly successful in obtaining a sophisticated, activist sample. However, it was more effective in reaching liberal and secular respondents than their religious and conservative counterparts. The character of this sample certainly reflects some form of self-selection bias. Politically conservative and religious bloggers were less willing to post the survey on their blog and endorse it, and the readership of these blogs was much less likely to participate in the survey or even click on the post to view the survey information. Ultimately, some respondents were probably suspicious of a survey conducted by an ostensibly liberal institution of higher education. Such suspicions were evident in the comments of many respondents who did elect to participate in the survey.

Procedure for Measuring Social Identities

Social Identity Checklist. The survey contained a task designed to gauge the constellation of social identities held by respondents, the relative importance placed on these identifications, and respondents' subjective sense of attachment or belonging to their most salient group identity. First, respondents were given a check list of 24 group labels and asked to select all of the terms they would use to describe themselves. The list of terms is provided in the first column of Table 4.2. It does not contain an exhaustive set of possible religious, secular, and political identities. Notably, most religious sub-denominational affiliations were omitted, as were eastern religions. Instead, emphasis is placed on major religious denominations and their relation to ideological groups. This

checklist data should demonstrate whether religious, secular, and ideological identifications co-occur in meaningful ways. This procedure for measuring social identities should be an improvement over existing measures which emphasize a single identity or identity-type to the exclusion of other potentially meaningful identities brought to bear on the political attitudes and behaviors of respondents.

Consistent with this notion that people hold multiple social identities, the overwhelming majority of both samples selected more than one group identification - 98 percent of web survey respondents and 88 percent of mail survey respondents chose two or more group identifications. The number of social identities ranged from one to 11. Mail survey respondents selected an average of 3.89 (standard deviation = 2.07) and web survey respondents chose an average of 5.30 (standard deviation = 1.84). These results bolster claims that people hold multiple identities. They also suggest the set of group labels included on the checklist, though far from exhaustive, did capture an important subset of social identities. Frequencies for social identifications are presented in the second and forth column of Table 4.2.

Primary Social Identity. After respondents indicated all of the groups they identify with, they were asked to select the social identity that describes them best. This identity is assumed to be primary, or most salient, in subsequent analyses. A number of respondents in both surveys (17 in mail survey and 28 in the web survey) did not follow instructions and either did not specify a most salient identity, entered an identity that was not on the list (i.e. Wiccan), or entered more than one identity (i.e. libertarian-feminist-humanist). These respondents were excluded from the remaining analysis. The group identification frequencies for both surveys are provided in Table 4.2.

Christian identity was most common among mail survey respondents. Seventy percent of respondents identified as Christian and 38 percent indicated Christian was their primary identity. The second most common identification was Spiritual (47 percent), although only 9 percent of the sample selected this group as their most salient social identity. Protestant was also a very common identification, though it accounted for only 3 percent of primary social identities. Interestingly, only 10 percent of the mail sample identified as Evangelical, despite the targeted sampling strategy employed here. The evangelical adherence data used to selected counties – the 2000 Religious Identification Survey – is based on sub-denominations of Christianity identified by scholars as Evangelical. The apparent disconnect between sub-denomination data and self-reported religious affiliation highlights the limitations of sub-denominational measures of religious identity or even specific theological movements like evangelism. While many of the Christian respondents may hold values may reflect core evangelical beliefs – such as biblical inerrancy – most of them did not explicitly characterize themselves as evangelical. As expected, religious identities were considerably less common among web survey respondents. Only 31 percent of the sample identified as Christian, and 7 percent indicated Christian was their primary or most salient identity. Thirty-four percent of respondents identified as Spiritual and 19 percent as Protestant. These identities were most salient for about 7 percent of the sample.

Secular identities were more prevalent among the web sample respondents. Fifty-one percent of the web sample identified as Secular, compared to only 11 percent of mail respondents. Twenty-three percent of the mail sample and 38 percent of the web sample identified as humanist. The difference was also pronounced for agnostic and atheist

identities. While 39 percent of the web sample reported an agnostic identity and 28 percent reported an atheist identity, only 8 and 5 percent of the mail survey identified with these groups. Though respondents did seem to hold these secular types of identities, they were rarely the most salient identity reported for the mail respondents. Secular, humanist, agnostic, and atheist identities accounted for only about 10 percent of primary identities among mail respondents, compared to about a quarter of the more sophisticated, politically active web sample.

Political identities were fairly common in both surveys. Twenty-four percent of the mail sample identified as liberal and 29 percent as conservative, with 8 and 6 percent respectively composing respondents' primary identities. Alternatively, 67 percent of web respondents chose a liberal identity and 12 percent chose a conservative identity, accounting for 18 and 5 percent of primary identities respectively. In addition to these common ideological labels, the checklist included two other liberal political identifications – feminist and progressive – both of which were fairly common. Eighteen percent of mail respondents and 62 percent of web respondents reported a feminist identity. Progressive identities were slightly more common. Twenty-four percent of mail respondents and 67 percent of web respondents reported a progressive identity. Overall, these groups accounted for 8 percent of primary identities for mail respondents and 31 percent of web respondents.

A number of groups were also included on the checklist to distinguish between social and economic conservatism. Approximately one quarter of the sample identified as libertarian or economic conservatives, but these identities were salient only for about 4 percent of respondents in both samples. Respondents also had the option to report identification with the Religious Right, the Christian Coalition, the Moral Majority, Religious Conservatives or Christian Conservatives. Identification with these groups ranged from 3 percent of the mail sample (Christian Coalition) to 15 percent (Christian Conservative) and accounted for a total of 7 percent of respondents' most salient identities. These identities were much less common in the web sample. They ranged from 1 percent of respondents (Christian Coalition) to 6 percent (Christian Conservative) and accounted for the primary identities of about one percent of respondents. Overall, respondents in the mail survey tended to hold primary identities that were religious in character conventional ideological labels like liberal and conservative. Secular and liberal identities were more common among web respondents – particularly politically liberal labels like progressive and feminist.

Subjective Identity Strength. Following the checklist task, respondents were asked to answer a battery of ten items adapted from the Collective Self Esteem Scale (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) to gauge subjective strength of identification with their primary social identity. The items were modified to include aspects of identification beyond positive evaluation. Item wording is provided in Table 4.3. Responses were measured on a 4 point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. These items scaled together well. Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the scale is .86 for both samples. The average inter-item correlation was .42 for the mail survey and .41 for the web survey. Items were combined and recoded to scale from zero to one. The central tendencies of the scale suggest the bulk of respondents did subjectively identify or feel a sense of belonging to their primary group identification. The mean level of identity strength was .70 (standard deviation = .17) for web survey respondents and .73 (standard

deviation = .19) for mail survey respondents. There is also sufficient variance on this measure to get a sense of how identity strength moderates the effect of group membership on political attitudes and tolerance.

Results

It is clear from the checklist task that Americans hold multiple social identities which are religious, secular, and political in character. In this section, the relationship between these identities - their *intersectionality* - is considered. Specifically, I am interested in empirical regularities in the co-occurrence of these identities and the political implications of common constellations of social and politicalidentities. This emphasis on a set of multiple religious, secular, and political identities – rather than examining any subset in isolation – is motivated in part by social categorization theory, as noted above. However, this approach is also consistent with Hunter's (1992) original conceptualization of culture wars politics as coalition politics. According to Hunter (1991), a number of religious, social, and political groups have coalesced into opposing camps on issues of public and private morality. The progressive camp or coalition is comprised of liberals, progressives, feminists, secular humanists. Also included are adherents of theologically moderate and liberal religious groups – regardless of major religious denomination. Alternatively, the orthodox coalition is comprised of political conservatives (particularly social conservatives) and members of theologically conservative faiths – including evangelical and fundamentalist Christians, evangelical Protestants, theologically conservative Catholics, and Orthodox Jews. This conceptualization mirrors the idea that divisions within major religious denominations – between modernists and traditionalists – are often more significant than divisions between the nation's major religious denominations (see for example, Wuthnow, 1988).

This coalition politics perspective suggests political and religious identities are related to each other in meaningful ways. Part of the reason these groups hang together is because people see themselves as belonging simultaneously to multiple social groups that are in some way similar or mutually compatible. This compatibility may lie in a set of shared values or worldviews, which contribute to common orientations towards the social and political world. As a result, it is likely group identities within these culture wars coalitions co-occur with greater frequency that those across coalitions. Some group identifications are more exclusive and unlikely to co-occur. For example, one would not expect most people to categorize themselves as both Christian and Jewish. However, given the rise of ecumenical coalitions, there is a chance Christian and Jewish Americans are more likely to identify as Religious Conservative and are linked by both political and theological conservatism. Thus, one can think of mutual identification or regularities in intersectionality as the glue holding these coalitions together. The probable consequence of this intersectionality is commonality across sets of groups in political attitudes and behavior.

Within the social identity literature, there is a tendency to view group identities as relatively discrete categories with unique consequences for attitudes and behavior.
A great deal of this work focuses on the consequences of a particular kind of identity – racial identity gender identity, or national identity – in isolation. More recently, social identity theorists have recognized that the intersection of social identities creates cross pressures that can explain some heterogeneity in the attitudes and behaviors of various group members. For example, an intersectionality approach to gender identity has been used to explain variability in the social and political attitudes observed among women (Crenshaw, 1991; Brah and Phoenix; 2004). While political scientists have long recognized the group basis of public opinion and political behavior (see for example Feldman, 1988), the intersectionality of these identities has received scant attention. This is particularly true of empirical work on the culture wars, which considers religious and political identities in isolation. An intersectionality approach to the identity basis of the culture wars should afford insight into the macro level characteristics of this conflict, by illustrating the manner in which social groups coalesce into larger alliances based on shared membership and shared characteristics.

To assess whether the constellations of social identities held by respondents are consistent with the perspective on the culture wars outlined above - or if religious, political, and secular identities are relatively distinct categories with unique perspectives on social and political issues - classic multidimensional scaling was performed on the group identification checklist data for both samples. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a technique that represents the similarity (or dissimilarity) among object or stimulus pairs as distances in Euclidian space. Items perceived as similar are depicted close together, while items perceived as dissimilar are depicted further apart. Items also may cluster together, reflecting strong similarity among objects within clusters and dissimilarity across separate clusters. MDS can be used as an exploratory technique to determine the psychological or substantive dimensions that underlie respondent judgments of similarity. The dimensions evident in the spatial configurations are thought to reflect the factors that explain perceived similarity between items.

For example, MDS performed on a matrix of ratings of candidate characteristics can be used to spatially represent the similarity of these candidates. The resulting configuration could be used to identify the major factors distinguishing candidates in the eyes of the public. For instance, candidates may cluster together in space based on public perceptions of their partisan and ideological identifications, their perceived competence, or positions on a key issue such as the Iraq war. MDS techniques also allow for tests of the relationship between the spatial configurations based on similarity judgments and external criteria or external information about the relationships between object pairs. This capability is important because like factor analysis, the placement of the axes or dimensions underlying perceptions of similarity is arbitrary and requires subjective interpretation. For the example above, years spent in political office could be regressed on coordinates of a competence dimension derived from MDS, to validate whether this dimension was in fact related to perceived political experience.

In this context, similarity between groups is not based on public perceptions of candidates or even perceptions of the social groups of interest to us here. Instead, I take similarity to mean simultaneous membership in multiple social groups. Data obtained from the identity checklist is nominal – indicating only whether one identifies with the

group or not. Thus, similarity here refers to the frequency of co-occurrence or co-identification for each pair of social groups on the checklist. Groups more similar (closer together in space) contain greater overlap in their memberships, while groups that are dissimilar (further apart in space) contain minimal overlap in their memberships. Looking at the constellations of groups represented in Euclidean space should provide information about the linkages between religious and political identities based on overlapping group membership thus revealing the ways in which they are meaningfully related to each other. Because these identities are unlikely to intersect in a random fashion, in completely unrelated ways among respondents in our sample and members of the mass public more generally, empirical regularities in intersectionality will provide useful information about the coalition nature of culture wars politics.

Multidimensional Scaling Results – Identity Checklist Data (Mail Survey). The data from the checklist task described in the preceding section was aggregated across respondents for each dataset. Because the checklist data is really co-occurrence data, measured at the nominal level, the tetrachoric correlation between each group pair was employed as an indicator of similarity. Metric[3] MDS was performed on the resulting matrix of tetrachoric correlations. The spatial configuration obtained from MDS of the checklist data is presented in Figure 4.3. Inspection of the configuration reveals two moderately correlated dimensions. The majority of the social groups are grouped near the poles of these dimensions, forming 4 related but apparently distinct clusters. The first dimension reflects respondents' religious and secular identities, and is anchored by Atheist, Secular, and Agnostic identities in the lower right quadrant and by Christian, Protestant, and Spiritual identities in the upper left quadrant. The second dimension represents' respondents ideological orientations and is anchored by Christian Conservative and Religious Conservative in the lower left quadrant and by Liberal, Feminist and Progressive identities in the upper right quadrant. Conservative and Libertarian fall off the main ideological dimension, which suggests this dimension may better capture the social aspects of ideology, though Economic Conservatives do seem to fall closer to the main dimension.

There are a number of criteria available for assessing the quality of the MDS solution obtained here. Perhaps the most commonly employed standard is Kruskal's Stress Formula 1. Kruskal's Stress gives an indication of the correspondence between the distances between object pairs in the MDS spatial configuration and the similarity data on which the solution is based. Higher stress values correspond to greater distortion in the representation of groups in Euclidean space. The standard cut-off point for assessing solution quality is .15, though there is a great deal of contention about the utility of solutions with higher stress (Borg and Groenen, 2005), particularly when substantively meaningful results are evident. The solution presented in Figure 4.3 exceeds the .15 criteria, with a global stress value of .2491. This suggests the presence of nontrivial distortions between the input similarity data and the obtained Euclidean distances between objects. These distortions are evident from inspection of the Shepard diagram (Figure 4.4), which graphically depicts stress as the distance between transformed similarity data (the tetrachoric correlations) and distanced obtained from the MDS solution. Deviations from a 1:1 relationship (the 45 degree line) between transformed

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[3] Nonmetric analysis of this data was also conducted. The results were quite similar, though they did reflect greater similarity among liberal and secular groups than observed in the metric solutions.

similarities and distances reflect distortions in the data – or stress. There is a great deal of dispersion around the 45 degree line, consistent with the high indicator of global stress.

High stress can result from one or more odd object pairs or outliers, or it can be distributed across all objects. Per-point stress decomposition (not presented here) suggests stress is pretty well distributed across groups, with the exception of Catholic (stress=.5628). While identities such as Libertarian, Gay, and Religious Right seem to be outliers based on visual inspection of the MDS configuration, they are represented here with less stress than are Catholics. High stress can also result from either insufficient dimensionality, random measurement error, or a combination of the two. Here, stress is not appreciably reduced by the addition of a third dimension, and groups do not vary much in their placement on a third dimension which suggests it is not picking up a significant criterion related to perceived group similarity or intersectionality. However, random measurement error may be a significant problem. Idiosyncrasies in the personal meaning attached to these group labels, or ignorance of their meaning, may have introduced error. For example, the term Evangelical might not mean the same thing to all Christians.

While the solution cannot be considered ideal by conventional standards, it does yield an apparently substantively meaningful solution. The notion that religiosity and political ideology explain the perceived similarity between groups – or the frequency with which they co-occur - is intuitively satisfying. Also, the correlation between these dimensions suggests political and religious identities are related in meaningful ways in the minds of the American public – that simultaneous membership in these various clusters of groups is based on commonality of religious and political views.

MDS Configurations – Identity Checklist (Web Data). The spatial configuration for the politically sophisticated and activist web sample (Figure 4.5) is a modest improvement in terms of fit. The global stress measure is .1955, lower than mail sample solution, but still suboptimal. The Shepard diagram for this solution (Figure 4.6) shows less dispersion around the 45 degree line, suggesting less distortion between input data and the resulting distances. The spatial configuration is roughly comparable to the mail data solution in the sense that two correlated dimensions – one religious and one ideological – seem to explain the similarity between objects. The web and mail solutions are roughly mirror images of each other, because the placement of the dimensions in MDS solutions is arbitrary. True mirror-image solutions can be considered equivalent, but comparison of the mail and web data configurations reveal some important differences. Fewer identities are represented far from the main dimensions. Gay identity is clustered with the liberal ideological labels, while Libertarian identity is clustered with the conservative ideological labels. This difference may be due to the presence of more group identifiers in the web sample. Three times the proportion of respondents identified as Gay in the web sample relative to the mail sample, and nearly twice as many selected a Libertarian identity. In addition, five social identities were represented on different dimensions in the two solutions. Jewish identity was represented on the religious-secular dimension, as a secular identity, in the web configuration and on the liberal end of the ideological dimension in the mail configuration. Evangelical and Religious Conservative identities fall on the conservative end of ideological dimension for the mail configuration, but are represented in the religious end of religious-secular dimension; while Moral

Majority and Religious Right identifications moved from the religious-secular in mail to the ideology dimension in the web configuration.

These differences probably resulted from the paucity of these group identifiers represented in both samples. Fewer than 10 percent of respondents in the two samples identified with each these groups and they comprised about only seven percent of mail sample primary identities, and less than three and a half percent of the primary identities held by web respondents. The instability in the placement of these groups for the two configurations may be a result of this overlap. With only a few identifiers for these groups, any personal idiosyncrasies or measurement error would exert an undue influence on the spatial representation of these identities. Alternatively, the differences in the configurations could result from the different connotations these identities take on in the mass and sophisticate samples. For example, the political connotations of the terms Moral Majority and Religious Right may be more salient for a sophisticated sample, while the religious or moral aspects of these identities may loom larger in the minds of the mass sample respondents. Given the nature of the samples, it is impossible to discern which explanation accounts for these differences. However, in spite of these few differences, it is important to note that two-thirds of the groups are represented comparably in both configurations. Though the solutions are a perfect match, the replicability of the majority of groups suggests the scaling result is moderately reliable.

Multidimensional Scaling Results – External Criteria. As mentioned above, one advantage of MDS is the ability to compare the spatial configuration obtained from respondents' similarity judgments to external criteria. This allows one to determine whether the obtained cognitive dimensions explaining similarity between objects in the minds of respondents are related in a systematic fashion to external substantive criteria. These external criteria are derived from a priori assumptions about the way groups are relate to one another. The literature on the culture wars points to a number of substantive criteria that might explain the relationship between these group identities. Hunter's (1992) conceptualization of culture wars politics and work on the American religious climate (Wuthnow, 1988) suggests theological ideology – or religious orthodoxy - plays a central role in this conflict. Mainliners of the nation's major religious denominations take a moderate or liberal theological perspective and are thought to have moved left in terms of their political ideology over the past 20 years. Alternatively, evangelists and fundamentalists take a more orthodox or conservative theological stance. They are thought to have formed the basis of the New Right (Conover, 1983) and moved right politically in response to the counter-culture movement of the 1970s. Thus, a combination of theological and political ideology accounts for the constellations of groups on either side of this cultural conflict. However, Hunter also contends different perspectives on morality (or different worldviews) really lie at the core of this conflict. Placement along this traditional morality dimension forms the basis of the "progressive" and "orthodox" coalitions central to culture wars politics.

Do political ideology, religious orthodoxy, and moral traditionalism constitute shared social and political orientations accounting for the intersectionality among social groups observed here? There are two ways to answer this question. First, MDS can be performed on the group means for each of these three variables. If the resulting configuration is similar to the one obtained from the checklist data, one can assume these criteria underlie the sets of identities held by respondents (or their similarity judgments,

based on simultaneous membership). If the configurations differ, these external variables may still be related in some way to respondents' similarity judgments, but do not fully account for the constellations of identities observed in the checklist data. If this is the case and these variables partially explain the relationships between the external criteria, the configuration obtained from the group checklist data can be evaluated by external variables regression. The external variables – group mean values of ideology, religious orthodoxy, and moral traditionalism – are regressed on the coordinates for the two dimensions evident in the MDS configuration based on the identification checklist data. Significant coefficients indicate a relationship between these external variables and the obtained dimensions of similarity. The explained variance for each model also provides an indication of the percentage of variance in group placement along each dimension is accounted for by these variables. This method should provide an indication of whether the two similarity dimensions observed in Figures 4.3 and 4.5 reflect political ideology, religiosity, or moral traditionalism or some combination of these factors.

Measures. The standard 7-point ideology measure is employed to assess political ideology. High scores on this item correspond to political conservatism. Religious orthodoxy is measured with a single item that asks respondents about their interpretation of the Bible. Low scores indicate a literal interpretation, while higher scores indicate a more relativist interpretation. Moral traditionalism is measured by the 4 item scale used in the National Election Studies. The items were combined and rescaled to range from 0 to 1. The items scaled together well ($alpha_{mail}$=.85, $alpha_{web}$=.82). High scores indicate moral traditionalism and low scores indicate progressivism. As one might expect, these three variables are highly correlated. Individual level correlations are presented in Table 4.4. The mean scores for all respondents who selected each group identity were calculated and used in the following analysis.

Scaling Results. First, consider the results obtained when the group identities are scaled based on the mean levels of political ideology, religious orthodoxy and moral traditionalism reported by group members. The MDS spatial configurations are presented in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. The structure obtained from this analysis differs notably from the scaling results based on the group identity checklist. Both solutions are very flat – comprised of either 1 dimension or 2 very highly correlated dimensions. The configuration based on the mail sample contains two rather compact clusters, one containing the liberal and secular identities and the other containing the religious and conservative identities. The configuration is similar for the mail data, though there is a bit more horizontal dispersion among the conservative and religious identities. The global stress for these solutions is quite low – .0076 for the mail survey and .0004 for the web survey – suggesting the spatial configuration is a good fit. Despite the absence of stress, these solutions do not lend much insight into the subjective constellations of identities held by respondents. Though cognitive representations of these identities may be related to these variables, there is not a perfect correspondence between them. The observed differences between the solutions suggest the checklist data contains more information about the intersectionality of these identities than is accounted for by political ideology, religious ideology, and moral traditionalism alone.

External variables regression was employed to determine the relative contributions of ideology, religiosity, and traditionalism to the checklist-based MDS solution. Mean values of ideology, religious orthodoxy and moral traditionalism for

respondents with each group identity were regressed on the coordinates obtained from the two dimensions evident in the MDS configurations based on the identification checklist data. The results of the external variables regressions are presented in Table 4.5. The placement of group identities on the first dimension is determined primarily by theological orientation or religious orthodoxy. There is also a small but significant effect of political ideology on group identity location. Together, these variables account for 98 percent of the variance in identity location along this dimension. The second dimension is determined by a combination of religious orthodoxy and moral traditionalism. These factors account for 76 percent of the explained variance on this dimension. The influence of religious orthodoxy on both dimensions is likely due to the correlation between them. While much of intersectionality between identities can be accounted for by shared political and religious ideology and moral values, there is a nontrivial proportion of the variance in group placement – about 25 percent - which cannot be accounted for by these factors. Some of this variance is no doubt measurement error, but a good portion of it likely reflects some meaningful differentiation among group identifiers in the liberal and conservative coalitions, particularly as similar results are obtained for both samples.

It is somewhat curious that political ideology does not play a more pivotal role in the way these identities are structured – particularly because many of the identities included on the checklist are expressly political in nature. It is possible that the effect of political ideology is funneled through moral traditionalism due to the high correlation between these variables. Or, it might be the case that moral traditionalism is capturing the social dimension of ideology. This would explain why the Libertarian identity tends to fall a bit outside the main conservative cluster in the checklist-based MDS configurations (Fig 4.3 and 4.5). Many of these group identities explicitly suggest moral conservatism rather than fiscal conservatism – such as Religious Conservative, Christian Conservative, Moral Majority, and Religious Right. When moral traditionalism is excluded from the regression models, ideology does exert a large and significant effect on the second dimension (results not presented here).

Interestingly, the results for the sophisticated, activist web sample are quite similar though, as noted above, the dimensions are reversed due to arbitrary placement. For this configuration, the first dimension is determined by a combination of ideology, religious orthodoxy and moral traditionalism. Ideology seems to have a larger impact on the placement of identities in this configuration – most likely due to the nature of the sample. It seems reasonable that sophisticates and activists are more attuned to the ideological characteristics of these social groups. Together, these variables explain 96 percent of the variance in group identity placement along this dimension. The second dimension is explained primarily by religious orthodoxy, which accounts for 60 percent of the variance in group placement. As was the case for mail sample respondents, the intersectionality of these social identities is strongly related to ideology, religious orthodoxy, and moral traditionalism, but does not perfectly explain the pattern of results obtained from MDS analysis of the identity checklist data. Here, these three factors account for significantly less total variance in group similarity than for mail respondents. About 40 percent of this variance (relative to 25 percent in the mail sample) is unexplained. Because the two solutions are so similar, it is unlikely all of this variance reflects measurement error. Instead, these results suggest the differentiation observed in

the liberal and progressive coalitions is meaningful and may reflect important divisions within these camps.

The results of the external variables regression analysis suggest religious orthodoxy, moral traditionalism, and to a lesser extent political ideology, are related to the constellations of identities reflected in the checklist data. These variables account for much of the variance on the dimensions of similarity obtained via MDS. What really stands out is the importance of moral traditionalism in accounting for the relationship between these identities. These results lend some credence to Hunter's (1992) assertion that an orthodox-progressive morality dimension underlies American religious and political identity. However, it is unclear whether this dimension reflects a pure value orientation, or merely the social dimension of political ideology. It is difficult to parse out the unique contribution of ideology and traditionalism due to the nature of the measures and the correlations between them. Religious orthodoxy also underlies these constellations of social identities, consistent with work on trends in American religious life.

Although the identity constellations based on external variables presented above (Figures 4.7 and 4.8) are technically superior to the checklist solutions in terms of fit, they do not in and of themselves lend much insight into the cognitive representations of these identities held by Americans. Though the external variables regression results indicate consistent relationships between identity, ideology, religious orthodoxy and moral traditionalism for both samples, these variables do not explain all of the variance in group placement for the more subjective constellations of group identities. The MDS analysis performed on the identity checklist data yields considerably more disperse solutions than the solutions based on external variables. The results suggest there may be some important differentiation within the liberal and conservative coalitions. Because the emphasis here is to understand the political implications of identity by attending to the subjective aspects of group identification, the substantive implications of this apparent differentiation requires serious consideration, despite the possibility these solutions are to some extent tainted by measurement error.

Subjective Identity Strength and Culture Wars Politics

The scaling results presented above reveal social identities are arranged along two correlated dimensions – one reflecting political ideology and another reflecting religiosity. Most social identities are located near the poles of these two dimensions, forming four distinct clusters. The identities within clusters tend to be held simultaneously by respondents. Previously, I discussed the relationship between the scaling results and the coalition politics characteristic of the culture wars. While Hunter (1991) and others have conceptualized culture wars politics as conflict between orthodox and progressive coalitions, our scaling results suggest the presence of differentiation within these coalitions. Within the progressive coalition, there seems to be a distinction between secular and liberal social identities. Within the orthodox coalition, one can

distinguish between religious and conservative social identities. While one might readily expect to observe differences in social and political orientations between groups on the left and groups on the right, it is less clear whether this differentiation within the major group coalitions are also related to meaningful attitudinal differences.

To better understand the link between these identities and social or political orientations, I consider the more subjective aspects of social identity. To this point, I have emphasized the structure of relationships between religious and political identities, or intersectionality, while assuming salience is constant across these identities – that the identities carried equal weight in the minds of respondents. However, it is clear from work on social identity theory and social categorization theory that identities vary in their strength and salience across individuals. Strong and primary identities tend to be stable over time, and exert disproportionate influence on attitudes and behavior – particularly in contexts where intergroup conflict or competition is salient. I expect people with strong identities to be most polarized in their political and intergroup attitudes. To get a sense of how these social identities are related to social and political orientations, I investigate whether the four social identity clusters obtained from the MDS analysis differ in meaningful ways by focusing on each respondent's primary identity. I also consider within-group heterogeneity by looking at the moderating role played by subjective identity strength.

This approach gives greater weight to respondents' primary, or most salient, identity and collapses across discrete identities based on the frequency with which they co-occur, or their intersectionality, as suggested by the MDS results. This is a bit of a departure from typical work in social identity theory, which tends to treat identities as discrete categories with unique perspectives and consequences for intergroup relations. Below, I will demonstrate that the use of this strategy is justified because the religious and political identities of interest here tend to be held concurrently by Americans and identities within the clusters observed in the MDS configurations have similar consequences for political attitudes and behaviors. To summarize, the goals in this section are to investigate (1) whether collapsing across identities that tend to co-occur is an appropriate strategy, (2) whether examination of differences across group clusters reveals something about the nature of culture wars politics, and (3) determine whether subjective strength of identification explains heterogeneity within groups and reveals polarization among individuals with strong social identities. This analysis will provide a starting point for understanding the attitudinal correlates of religious and political identities and serve as the foundation for exploring the impact of identity on policy attitudes and political tolerance in subsequent chapters.

Classifying Respondents by Primary Identity

Respondents were classified into four identity types based on the MDS cluster in which their self-reported primary identity was located. This method gives greater weight to primary identities, as they are expected to have the greatest influence on political and

social attitudes. What really distinguishes between these four social identity types is their ideological cast. Identities falling on the liberal to conservative dimension are politicized, while those falling on the secular to religious dimension are not. As a result, I expect to find people with politicized identities to be more polarized in terms of partisanship and ideology. This polarization likely has consequences for the extremity of social and political attitudes as well. For example consider two respondents, both of which identify as both Christian and Conservative but either chose Christian or Conservative as their primary identification. One might expect the person with a Conservative identity to be more polarized ideologically than the person who primarily identifies as Christian. Starker differences would probably be present between individuals who shared the same set of identities but held primary identities in opposing coalitions – such as a Catholic identity and a Feminist identity. One would expect a person to be much more politically liberal and socially progressive if a Feminist identity is dominant than if a Catholic identity dominated.

The list of identities falling into each social identity type (liberal identities, conservative identities, secular identities, and religious identities) and the number of respondents in each category is presented in Table 4.6. A common classification scheme is applied to respondents from both samples, despite the minor differences in cluster composition from the MDS results. This should not influence results dramatically because only 17 respondents in the mail survey chose primary identities that varied in their location across the mail and web based MDS configurations. As noted previously, the differences in the MDS solutions were confined to groups that were poorly represented in the samples.

Categorization based on primary identity type is predicted on the tendency for the social identities located within each of the liberal, conservative, secular and religious identity clusters to co-occur. Table 4.7 shows the percentage of respondents from each of the four group identity clusters who hold each discrete identity provided on the checklist. It is easier to get a sense of the global overlap or intersectionality between these identities by looking at Table 4.8, which collapses across identities within each cluster. Entries in this table are the average proportion of identities selected that fall in the same cluster as the respondent's primary identity. One can see that approximately half of total reported social identities are located in the same cluster as the respondent's primary identity. However, there is a great deal of variation at the individual level. For any particular cluster of social identities, anywhere from 20 to 100 percent of each respondent's reported social identities are located in the same cluster.

Inspection of Table 4.8 also indicates many respondents hold identities in the cluster closest to, but not containing, their primary identity. In both samples, many people who primarily identified with a liberal group also identified with one or more secular groups. People who held a primary conservative identity were commonly held one or more religious identifications as well. Some of this overlap is due to the ideological compatibility of these groups, as evident from the correlated similarity dimensions observed in the MDS configurations. However, it is less common for respondents to hold many identities at opposite poles of the religiosity and ideology dimensions. That is, people may hold identities within what we might think of as the orthodox coalition (religious and conservative social identities) or progressive coalition (liberal and secular collective identities), but rarely hold countervailing social identities.

For example, respondents with primary conservative social identities rarely reported liberal collective identities (on average, 3 percent in the mail sample and 0 percent in the web sample) or secular identities (on average, 5 percent for the mail sample and 3 percent for the web sample).

These results further suggest identities within the clusters observed in the MDS configurations are often held simultaneously. There seems to be much greater intersectionality within clusters than across them. While these identities do tend to go together, the important question is whether they reflect similar orientations towards the social and political world. To address this question, I look at political affiliations, religious indicators, and a number of beliefs and values - moral traditionalism, sexual traditionalism, social conformity, theocratic orientations – to determine whether social identities falling within the liberal, conservative, religious, and secular clusters have unique perspectives. I am interested both in general differences between what we might think of as the orthodox and progressive coalitions – characterized by liberal and secular identities and by conservative and religious identities respectively – as well as differences within subsets of these major coalitions. I am also in differences between the mass and sophisticate samples, which may afford insight into the broader debate over the locus of this conflict.

Primary Identity Group Differences – Mail Data. Group differences on these religious and political variables are presented in Table 4.9. First, consider the political orientations of these primary identity groups for the mail sample. Relatively straightforward differences are observed between progressive and orthodox coalition groups. People holding primary liberal and secular group identities report political liberalism and Democratic Party identification at much higher rates than people with primary religious and conservative collective identifications. Religious and conservative group identifiers are more likely to report Republican Party identification and conservative political ideology. But important distinctions are also evident within the progressive and orthodox group coalitions. People with primary political identities are much more polarized politically than their religious and secular counterparts. For example, 87 percent of respondents with primary liberal collective identities reported Democratic Party identity compared to 74 percent of secular respondents. 74 percent of respondents with conservative collective identities reported Republican identification compared to 45 of percent religious identifiers. Similarly, 86 percent of participants with liberal collective identities reported political liberalism, while only 63 percent of their secular counterparts made the same claim. Alternatively, 76 of people with conservative primary identities reported being conservative, compared to only 45 percent of religious identifiers.

It is also clear that people with religious and secular primary identities were more likely to choose a moderate or middle of the road response to the ideology question. Thirty-three percent of secular identifiers and 30 percent of religious identifiers chose moderate responses relative to only eight percent of liberal identifiers and 19 percent of conservative identifiers. Interestingly, the politicized identities are also distinguished from their more liberal and conservative counterparts by higher levels of political sophistication. Over 50 percent of both liberal and conservative group identifiers answered all five sophistication questions correctly. Rates of perfect scores were 10 to 20 percent lower among people with primary religious and secular identities.

Religious differences were also apparent across these group identities. People who identify primarily with religious or conservative groups scored significantly higher on indicators of global religiosity than their liberal and secular counterparts. While liberal and secular respondents have comparably low levels of religiosity, important differences are evident between people with primary conservative and religious social identities. Religious identifiers score considerably higher on the three indicators of global religiosity reported here. Over 50 percent report weekly church attendance, literal interpretation of the bible, and report religion provides a great deal of guidance their daily lives - compared to only about a third of conservative identifiers

Further primary group distinctions are evident in beliefs and values. Group-level mean values social conformity, moral traditionalism, sexual morality, and theocratic orientations are reported in Table 4.9. High scores on these measures indicate more conservative or traditional responses. The groups differ significantly, with liberal and secular identifiers scoring considerably lower than religious and conservative collective ids on all four measures – consistent with the theoretical placement of these groups into two opposing coalitions (Hunter, 1991). Interestingly, there are no within-coalition differences on these measures. Liberals and seculars reported comparable levels of these beliefs and values, as did religious and conservative identifiers. This latter finding is somewhat unexpected, given the higher levels of observed religiosity among religious identifiers.

Primary Identity Group Differences – Web Data. The patterns of group differences in political and religiosity orientations are similar, but not identical, for the more sophisticated, activist web sample (see Table 4.9). As anticipated, liberal and secular group identifiers report political liberalism and Democratic Party identification at greater rates than conservative respondents. However, people with religious social identities were more evenly split between the parties and ideological poles. In fact, these respondents were slightly more likely to give liberal and democratic responses than conservative or Republican responses.

Again, I find evidence of differential within the major group coalitions – though here it is less pronounced for the progressive coalition and more pronounced for the orthodox coalition than observed for the mail sample. People holding political primary identities are much more polarized than religious and secular identifiers. Ninety-four percent of liberal identifiers reported Democratic Party identification, compared to 87 percent of secular respondents. Similarly, 96 percent of liberals reported political liberalism on the standard NES measure, compared to 90 percent of secular respondents. This pattern was also found for religious and conservative identifiers, but the differences are more striking. Ninety-five percent of people with a primary conservative group identity indicated a Republican Party identification, compared to only 42 percent of religious identifiers. In addition, 96 percent of people with conservative identities gave a conservative response on the NES ideology item, compared to only 40 percent of religious respondents. In fact, religious respondents in this sample were slightly more likely to choose a Democratic or liberal moniker. This suggests considerable heterogeneity within the set of religious identifiers. The results here also diverge from the mail survey results in that political sophistication is fairly uniform across groups, though it seems likely this is an artifact of the sampling strategy.

Observed differences in religiosity across groups are largely consistent with the mail survey results. Virtually no liberal or secular respondents attend church weekly, take a literal interpretation of the bible, or rely on religion for guidance in daily life. People with a conserve or religious social identity are much more likely do so, though there are important differences between these two groups; namely, people with a religious identity are somewhat more religious than conservative identifiers. About 50 percent of these religious respondents attend church weekly or more and report religion provides a great deal of guidance in their daily lives, compared to about 40 percent of people with primary conservative identities. Oddly, religious identifiers were much less likely to report a literal interpretation of the bible than conservative identifiers - 17 percent compared to 32 percent. It is not clear whether this suggests these respondents are more liberal in their theological ideology or the item functions differently for a sophisticated sample. As noted in a previous section, there is some evidence to suggest religious sophisticates distinguish between Biblical Literalism and Biblical Inerrancy. As a result this measure might underestimate theological conservatism for these respondents.

These social identity groups also differed in their mean levels of moral traditionalism, sexual traditionalism, social conformity, and theocratic orientations On average, people with liberal and secular social identities scored lower on these measures than their conservative and religious counterparts. Unlike the mail survey, there seems to be some differentiation within the orthodox group identity coalition on these beliefs and values. Specifically, people with conservative collective identities gave considerably more conservative responses on these measures than religious identifiers, despite scoring significantly lower on two of three global religiosity measures. This finding suggests that conservative sophisticates are more polarized than their religious counterparts both politically and in terms of their social beliefs and values. But, religious identifiers did score significantly higher on these measures than liberal and progressive respondents – suggesting they are probably not, on average, theologically liberal.

Group Differences on Culture Wars Issues. To further understand group differences in opinion, consider the distribution of opinion on two key culture wars issues. The mail and web surveys contained two NES questions also examined in Chapter 3 – questions about attitudes towards abortion rights and adoption rights for gay couples (see previous chapter for item wording). As was observed in Chapter 3, liberal and conservative identifiers demonstrate strong and unified support for abortion rights in all circumstances (Figures 4.9 and 4.10). Opinion is considerably more dispersed among conservative and particularly religious identifiers. While majorities of conservative respondents oppose abortion in all circumstances or when the health of the mother is jeopardized, the distribution of support among religious identifiers is quite flat. This result suggests conservatives are more polarized than religious Americans in their opinion on this issue. These patterns are comparable across surveys. Similar differences are observed in support for extending adoption rights to gay couples (Figures 4.11 and 4.12). Support for adoption rights is virtually unanimous among liberal and secular identifiers in the web sample. A majority of conservatives oppose these rights, while a slight majority of religious respondents favor them. Among mail survey respondents, support is similarly quite high among liberals and seculars, though they are not as polarized as their counterparts in the web survey. Majorities of both conservative and religious identifiers oppose these rights among mail survey respondents. Differences are

not really evident across these groups, perhaps due to the limited response options used in this survey question. Group differences in opinion on culture wars policy issues and political tolerance will be further fleshed out in Chapter 5.

Summary. These results are consistent with the differences across major coalitions one would expect from a careful reading of Hunter's conceptualization of the culture wars. For both the mass and sophisticated samples, people with salient liberal and secular identities have progressive orientations toward political and social life – in both their political affiliations, religious behavior, and moral values. Alternatively, people who identify primarily with conservative and religious groups are more conservative in their political and social orientations. But the results also suggested some relevant differentiation within these coalitions. In both samples, people with primary political identities were much more polarized in their political affiliations than their counterparts. In the mass sample, group differences in political sophistication were also evident. Religious differences were also observed within the more orthodox coalition for both samples, though the meaning of these differences is somewhat less clear in the sophisticated sample. Interestingly, significant differences between religious and conservative identifiers also emerge in moral and sexual traditionalism, social conformity, and theocratic orientations. This suggests a strong relationship between conservative identity and attitudes towards issues of public and private morality. It also supports the argument made above that this MDS based classification scheme is capturing the social dimension of political ideology. There was less evidence for differentiation between liberal and secular identifiers. While people with liberal identities are somewhat more polarized politically, the differences are slight and do not seem to correspondent to significant differences in social orientations or values.

Subjective Identity Strength and Within-Group Heterogeneity

In addition to differences across groups, I am interested in how identity strength is related to heterogeneity within groups. Our focus stems from recognition that identity strength is an important moderator of intergroup attitudes and behaviors. People with strong social identities are thought to adhere more strongly to group norms and values and to demonstrate predictable patterns of ingroup and outgroup biases in intergroup settings. While the extent to which identity strength moderates attitudes will be examined in greater detail in the subsequent chapters, here I provide preliminary evidence of this relationship by looking at within-group differences in political ideology and moral traditionalism.

To get a sense of these differences, I regressed identity strength on ideology and moral traditionalism for each of the four identity types and generated predicted values for individuals with high and low identity strength.[4] The predicted values are presented in figures 4.13 and 4.14 for the mail data and figures 4.15 and 4.16 for the web data. For all

[4] High and low identity strength is defined as two standard deviations above and below the group mean for identity strength.

four groups of identifiers in both samples, significant differences in ideology and traditionalism are evident between people with weak and strong collective identities. People with liberal and secular group identities are much more liberal at high levels of identity strength than at low levels of identity strength. Strong identifiers also report lower levels of moral traditionalism than their more weakly identified counterparts. Alternatively, people with strong conservative group identities are considerably more conservative and report higher levels of moral traditionalism than those who are weakly identified. This is also true of religious identities – as identity strength increases, so does conservatism and moral traditionalism.

The figures also make explicit the differences in ideology and traditionalism across groups. It is clear that people with strong political identities – whether liberal or conservative – are most polarized ideologically and in terms of moral traditionalism. This difference is more pronounced in the web data than the mail data – lending some credence to the idea that culture wars is confined to political sophisticates and political activists. Differences within both the liberal and conservative coalitions are more muted. People with primary secular identities do not differ much from liberal identifiers on these measures. Secular group members at high and low levels of identification are slightly more conservative and report slightly higher levels of moral traditionalism than those with liberal identities, but in some cases these differences are only marginally significant. People with primary religious and conservative identities tend to differ more. Weakly identified religious respondents are considerably more liberal and less traditional than are weakly identified conservatives. As identity strength increases, these respondents become increasingly conservative – almost as conservative as those with a primary conservative collective identity. The difference between weak and strong identifiers is more pronounced for people with a religious primary identity, suggesting greater heterogeneity within this group relative to the others. These differences are particularly pronounced in the web data.

Conclusions

In this chapter I discussed the limitations of ascribing identities to survey respondents and the implications of these problems for understanding the political implications of identity. I developed a method for capturing the more subjective aspects of social identity informed by work in social identity theory and social categorization theory. This method was evaluated using new data from mass and sophisticated opinion surveys. Multidimensional scaling was used to evaluate the structure of respondents' social identities – or their intersectionality. The results indicate two correlated dimensions explained the relationship between political and religious social identities. Interestingly, the configurations obtained here suggest some differentiation within the orthodox and progressive group coalitions characterizing culture wars politics. Specifically, there is a distinction between secular and liberal political identities within

the progressive coalition and between religious and conservatives identities within the orthodox coalition.

Further analysis of these identity clusters, based on respondents' primary identities, revealed substantive differences between these four groups. For both the mass and sophisticate sample, people who identified primarily with liberal and secular groups were significantly more liberal and Democratic than their religious and conservative counterparts. They were also notably less religious, and reported lower levels of moral traditionalism, sexual traditionalism, social conformity, and theocratic beliefs. Differences were also evident within the progressive (liberal and secular identities) and orthodox (conservative and religious identities) coalitions, though the differences between seculars and liberals were relatively muted. Liberal identifiers tended to be slightly more ideological and Democratic than secular identifiers, but these differences did not translate into differences in attitudes and beliefs. The distinction between conservative and religious respondents was considerably more pronounced. For both samples, people who identified primarily with conservative groups were more likely to select conservative and republican monikers. Religious respondents reported higher levels of general or nonspecific religiosity. Despite this, religious and conservative identifiers in the mass sample reported comparable levels of moral traditionalism and other forms of moral conservatism. This was not the case for the sophisticate sample. Here conservative respondents were significantly more morally traditional than religious identifiers. To be sure, conservative identities seem to strongly reflect the social dimension of American political ideology.

I also uncovered some evidence of heterogeneity within each identity cluster in terms of political ideology and moral traditionalism. Some of this within-group variance is clearly explained by subjective identity strength. Strong identifiers within all groups were clearly more polarized on these measures than weakly identifiers group members. Across groups, people with strong liberal and conservative identities were most polarized in their reported ideology and moral traditionalism. These results suggest those with politicized identities might be most attuned to culture wars politics. This possibility will be explored at greater length in the following chapter.

This analysis provides a starting point for understanding the attitudinal correlates of religious and political identities and lends a foundation for exploring the impact of identity on policy attitudes and political tolerance in subsequent chapters. In the next chapter, I will further explore how identity shapes public opinion on social policy issues and intergroup attitudes – with attention to the polarization and intolerance thought to characterize the culture wars in American politics.

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Tables

Table 4.1: Sample Characteristics

	Mail Survey	Web Survey	2004 NES
N	536	2248	1212
Female	63.4%	60.6	52.0
Caucasian	85.3	89.4	72.3
Married/Partnered	58.8	52.8	53.5
Mean Age	51 years	38 years	47 years
Median Income	40-50k	50-60k	50-59,999k
Bachelor's Degree	21.2	33.0	18.4
Graduate Degree	21.2	42.9	11.5
Weekly Church	37.1	12.5	23.6
Bible	37.3	4.6	36.9
Conserv Theology	13.3	4.4	---
Not Religious	13.6	44.2	15.1
Christian	52.6	19.6	---
Jewish	2.3	5.7	2.9
Protestant	11.3	7.4	56.1*
Catholic	10.9	8.4	24.4
Democratic ID	51	77.9	49.5
Republican ID	35.9	14.0	40.6
Liberal	34.6	78.8	26.2
Conservative	39.2	13.7	41.5
Sophistication (5/5)	43.7	77.5	9.1+
Voted in 2004	---	91.6	69.1
Attended Meeting	---	37.7	7.6
Display Button/Sign	---	49.3	20.6
Contributed – Cand	---	40.2	9.6
Contributed – Party	---	33.3	9.5

Notes: Liberal, Conservative, Democrat and Republican includes leaners. Religious identification is taken from a standard religious affiliation item. Church attendance is the percent of the sample who attends once a week or more. Bible is literal interpretation of the Bible. Political participation items were not asked of mail sample due to space constraints. *NES combined Christian and Protestant in the religious affiliation item. +The NES included a 4 item office recognition scale.

Table 4.2: Respondent Social Identities

	Mail Survey		Web Survey	
Social Identity	Described R	Described R Best	Described R	Described R Best
Christian	69.9%	37.9%	30.6	6.9
Orthodox	.9	0	1.3	.2
Feminist	17.5	2.3	61.9	10.5
Spiritual	46.8	8.7	33.7	3.6
Religious Right	9.4	0	3.4	.1
Atheist	5.1	1.4	28.0	3.6
Agnostic	7.9	.8	28.9	2.2
Humanist	23.3	6.6	48.4	13.8
Jewish	2.4	.6	8.5	.8
Evangelical Christ.	9.6	2.5	6.3	1.1
Protestant	29.5	2.7	18.8	.6
Conservative	29.3	6.2	11.8	5.2
Christian Coal.	3.2	0	1.3	0
Libertarian	6.4	1.9	11.2	3.3
Liberal	23.5	8.0	66.7	17.6
Progressive	23.9	6.4	67.2	19.9
Roman Catholic	13.4	4.3	10.7	1.9
Economic Conserv	18.4	1.9	13.9	.6
Moral Majority	6.8	.8	2.3	.1
Christian Conserv	15.2	4.5	6.2	.1
Muslim	.8	.2	.4	0
Gay	3.6	.2	9.5	1.6
Religious Conserv	9.9	.8	5.4	.2
Secular	11.1	1.4	51.1	6.2
N	532	515	2248	2220

Notes: As the table suggests, the terms Orthodox and Muslim were selected infrequently, and respondents selecting theses labels were excluded from subsequent analyses. Also, several respondents indicated they were both liberal and conservative (18 web 8 mail). These respondents were dropped from further analysis.

Table 4.3: Subjective Identity Strength Scale Items

1	How well does this term describe you?
2	I feel like a member of the group of people who label themselves this way.
3	When I am talking about this group, I usually say ***we*** rather than ***they.***
4	When I hear people criticizing this group or its members, I feel like I am personally being criticized.
5	I am proud to be a member of this group.
6	I rarely think about this group and its members.
7	I feel a sense of belonging with the group of people who label themselves this way.
8	I feel good about belonging to this group.
9	I hold values and beliefs that are similar to those held by this group.
10	My thoughts about the way life should be in this country are similar to this group's thoughts about the way life should be in this country.

Table 4.4: Correlations between External Variables

	Political Ideology	Moral Traditionalism	Religious Orthodoxy
Mail Survey			
Political Ideology	1.00		
Moral Traditionalism	.69	1.00	
Religious Orthodoxy	-.55	-.62	1.00
Web Survey			
Political Ideology	1.00		
Moral Traditionalism	.68	1.00	
Religious Orthodoxy	-.69	-.62	1.00

Notes: Entries are polychoric and polyserial correlations

Table 4.5: External Variables Regression Models

	Group Identification Checklist Mail Data		Group Identification Checklist Web Data	
	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Dimension 1	Dimension 2
Political Ideology	-.09 (.04)	-.01 (.08)	.42 (.11)	-.21 (.14)
Religious Orthodoxy	.37 (.06)	-.88 (.12)	-1.12 (.18)	-1.00 (.24)
Moral Traditionalism	-.26 (.27)	-2.42 (.52)	-3.91 (.93)	-.64 (1.26)
R^2	.98	.76	.96	.60
N	22	22	22	22

Entries are standard OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4.6: Respondent Classification Scheme

Liberal	***Conservative***	***Secular***	***Religious***
Liberal	Conservative	Humanist	Christian
Feminist	Economic Conserv.	Secular	Spiritual
Progressive	Christian Conserv.	Atheist	Evangelical
	Religious conserve.	Agnostic	Protestant
	Religious Right	Jewish	Catholic
	Christian Coalition	Gay	
	Moral Majority		
N (mail) 86	72	56	285
N (web) 1,060	133	620	312

Note: Libertarians are excluded.

Table 4.7: Group Identifications by Cluster

Mail Survey	*Liberal*	*Conserv.*	*Secular*	*Relig.*
Liberal	74.42	2.78	42.86	9.12
Feminist	47.67	2.78	32.14	10.18
Progressive	56.98	8.33	46.43	12.98
Conservative	2.33	79.17	7.14	28.77
Economic Conserv	8.14	48.61	8.93	14.04
Christian Conserv	2.33	40.28	1.79	16.14
Religious Conserv	0	27.78	1.79	10.53
Religious Right	4.65	9.72	0	13.33
Christian Coalition	0	2.78	0	4.56
Moral Majority	2.33	13.89	1.79	7.37
Humanist	37.21	5.56	75.00	13.33
Secular	24.42	8.33	33.93	2.11
Atheist	8.14	1.39	25.00	0
Agnostic	17.44	8.33	25.00	1.05
Jewish	4.65	1.39	8.93	1.05
Gay	9.30	0	10.71	1.40
Christian	34.88	80.56	30.36	88.77
Protestant	25.58	51.39	10.71	30.53
Catholic	11.63	11.11	7.14	14.39
Spiritual	46.51	37.50	28.57	54.74
Evangelical	1.16	11.11	0	14.39
Web Survey				
Liberal	86.13	0	71.77	33.01
Feminist	79.81	3.01	64.35	32.69
Progressive	83.40	0	74.52	37.18
Conservative	.38	88.72	1.77	30.13
Economic Conserv	7.83	64.66	6.94	20.83
Christian Conserv	0	61.65	0	17.31
Religious Conserv	.09	47.37	.16	16.67
Religious Right	0	36.09	.32	7.37
Christian Coalition	0	12.78	0	3.21
Moral Majority	.57	19.55	.48	4.17
Humanist	50.09	1.50	75.97	15.71
Secular	56.42	3.76	77.10	7.05
Atheist	29.25	1.50	47.10	.32
Agnostic	31.42	3.01	42.26	4.17
Jewish	9.91	3.01	11.61	1.28
Gay	9.81	.75	13.39	6.73
Christian	21.13	88.72	9.52	79.81
Protestant	14.34	42.86	6.61	46.47
Catholic	10.00	13.53	7.10	18.27
Spiritual	32.26	35.34	22.90	61.22
Evangelical	.75	36.09	0	25.32

Table 4.8: Identities by Cluster

	Mail Survey – Primary Identity			
	Liberal	*Conserv.*	*Secular*	*Relig.*
Liberal IDs	44%	3	27	7
Conservative IDs	4	49	6	19
Secular IDs	22	5	49	4
Religious IDs	28	41	17	69
	Web Survey – Primary Identity			
	Liberal	*Conserv.*	*Secular*	*Religious*
Liberal IDs	49	0	37	20
Conservative IDs	02	55	2	17
Secular IDs	33	3	51	7
Religious IDs	15	39	8	54

Table 4.9: Political and Religious Characteristics of Identity Clusters

	Mail Survey Clusters				Web Survey Clusters			
	Liberal IDs	Conserv IDs	Sec. IDs	Relig. IDs	Liberal IDs	Conserv IDs	Sec. IDs	Relig. IDs
Party ID								
Republican	3.61%	74.29	11.11	41.48	.82%	95.00	2.30	41.79
Democrat	86.75	24.29	72.22	45.19	94.39	1.67	86.88	50.00
Ideology								
Conservative	5.88	76.39	3.57	48.00	.29	96.09	2.98	39.93
Liberal	85.88	4.17	62.50	21.82	96.36	0	89.74	46.20
Sophistication (5/5)	51.81	58.33	43.64	36.70	76.76	83.46	78.06	74.74
Weekly Church Attendance	5.95	35.71	7.14	55.68	4.79	37.01	2.18	49.15
Biblical Literalism	8.24	32.29	9.26	54.71	.29	32.38	.50	17.01
Guidance in Daily Life (great deal)	11.63	38.89	7.27	58.01	5.54	46.09	1.84	54.92
Mean Values								
Identity Strength	.71	.69	.60	.78	.74	.77	.66	.66
Identity Inclusiv.	4.30	4.61	4.05	3.51	5.29	5.81	5.47	4.79
Social Conformity	.53	.70	.51	.70	.38	.62	.38	.51
Moral Trad~ism	.35	.76	.40	.72	.21	.83	.23	.53
Sexual Morality	.42	.81	.45	.82	.28	.84	.25	.67
Theocratic Orientations	.22	.64	.19	.75	.13	.88	.10	.59

Note: Ideology and party identification includes leaners.

Figures

Figure 4.1: Counties Sampled in Mail Survey



Figure 4.2: Evangelical Adherents per 1000 Population



Source: The Glenmary Corporation's Religious Identification Survey (2000). The data was accessed from the American Religion Data Archive (www.thearda.org).

Figure 4.3: MDS Configuration of Checklist Data from the Mail Survey



Figure 4.4: Shepard Diagram from Mail Data MDS Configuration



Figure 4.5: MDS Configuration of Checklist Data from the Web Survey



Figure 4.6: Shepard Diagram from Web Data MDS Configuration



Figure 4.7: MDS Configuration – External Variables Solution for Mail Survey Data



Figure 4.8: MDS Configuration – External Variables Solution for Mail Survey Data



Figure 4.9: Abortion Attitudes by Identity Type (Web Survey)



Figure 4.10: Abortion Attitudes by Identity Type (Mail Survey)



Figure 4.11: Adoption Attitudes by Identity Type (Web Survey)



Figure 4.12: Adoption Attitudes by Identity Type (Mail Survey)



Figure 4.13: Predicted Ideology by Group Type and Identity Strength (Mail Survey)



Note: Low scores indicate political liberalism and high scores indicate political conservatism.

Figure 4.14: Predicted Moral Traditionalism by Group Type and Identity Strength (Mail Survey)



Note: High scores correspond to high levels of moral traditionalism.

Figure 4.15: Predicted Moral Traditionalism by Group Type and Identity Strength (Web Survey)



Figure 4.16: Predicted Ideology by Group Type and Identity Strength (Web Survey)



Chapter 5: Culture Wars and Identity Threat

Introduction

In previous chapters, I established the existence of large group differences in attitudes towards social issues like abortion and gay rights and demonstrated how opinion has become more polarized over time, such that these issues now constitute major cleavages in American public opinion. This work suggests the culture wars play out among the mass public, particularly among Americans who hold strong political, religious, and secular identities. Having documented the nature of these differences and trends over time, I now turn to the opinion dynamics underlying this intergroup conflict over the proper moral direction for the nation. The social identity literature points to two key moderators of intergroup attitudes and behavior. The first is the presence of intergroup threat. A growing body of work on intergroup attitudes suggests various forms of outgroup antipathy emerge consistently only under conditions of group threat - whether threat is realistic or symbolic (Brown, 2000; Flippen, Hornstein, Siegal and Weitzman, 1996; Postmes and Branscombe, 2002). Culture wars rhetoric is replete with group-based symbolic threats. Groups struggle to see their values recognized in American political life – by appealing to the courts or Congress, through conventional electoral politics, or through the efforts of special interest groups and issue activists. These actions are perceived as threatening to ideologically opposed groups. Beyond legitimate political activity, the rhetoric surrounding these cultural issues abounds with group based threats. Hardisty (1999) has documented the pervasiveness of scapegoating in cultural politics – the strategy of demonizing social and politics groups, such as Gays and Feminists, to both polarize and mobilize committed bases of conservative support. I contend Americans on both sides of the ideological or cultural divide respond to conflict over cultural issues - and the symbolic threats characteristic of this conflict – in a symmetrical fashion with anger, intolerance, and attitude polarization. These dynamic responses to symbolic threat lie at the core of the culture wars in American politics.

Yet the nature and magnitude of responses to symbolic, group-based threats are not likely to be uniform across the mass public. Previously, I demonstrated Americans with strong religious, secular, and political identities are both most polarized on culture wars issues and most active in politics. This finding is consistent with Hunter's (2006) contention that politically active and highly committed partisans form the "white-hot core" of cultural politics in the United States. This emphasis on commitment and identity speaks to the second important moderator of intergroup attitudes identified by social identity theorists – individual differences in subjective identity strength. Numerous studies of social or collective identity demonstrate group biases are most pronounced among individuals who possess a strong subjective sense of attachment to the group or have internalized their group membership (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Kinket and Verkuyten, 1997). People who strongly identify with key social or political groups adhere most intensely to group norms and values, are most likely to take action on behalf of group interests and, critically, are most attuned and responsive to intergroup conflict. Consistent with this work, I contend American's strongly identified with the key political and social groups examined earlier will respond most intensely to the symbolic threats characteristic of culture wars politics.

I evaluate the effects of symbolic threat and subjective identity strength on emotion, attitudes, and tolerance with an experiment. Both the mail and web surveys

discussed in Chapter 4 contained threat manipulations which allowed for direct tests of responses to the type of threats inherent in the culture wars rhetoric. Respondents were randomly assigned to read one of five essays on the subject of emergency contraception. The content of these essays varied such that two pose a threat to people taking progressive positions on moral policy issues and two threaten those holding more traditional positions on these issues. Within these essay pairs, one was written in a personal tone (as one woman's personal choice) and the other was written in an editorial tone (as a conflict between competing religious and political groups). The remaining essay served as a baseline for comparing responses to these threats and provided only a brief description of emergency contraception. If group identity and group based threats are critical components of the culture wars phenomenon, as I have argued here, the strongest emotional and attitudinal responses should be observed for people maintaining a strong sense of collective identity. Threats cast in a political tone – with explicit group cues – should elicit the most intense responses. While threats cast in a personal tone may convey a violation of group values, the absence of group cues should result in more modest emotional and attitudinal reactions. Ultimately, this emphasis on threat and identity strength should afford insight into the psychological processes at the core of the culture wars in American politics.

Identity Threat and Emotion

The study of intergroup conflict has typically focused on prejudice – a positive or negative evaluation of a group and its members (Allport, 1954; Zanna, 1994; Mackie and Smith, 2003). Much of the work on intergroup emotions is born of efforts to better understand various forms of prejudice. While early models of prejudice emphasized its cognitive or evaluate elements, attention to emotions is thought to afford insight into the hotter and more virulent forms of prejudice and discrimination (Smith, 1993; Mackie and Smith, 1998; 2003). Smith's (1993) seminal work on this topic defines prejudice as a social emotion experienced on behalf of one's group in reference to another group. To the extent group membership is an important part of the self concept, it acquires emotional significance. Emotion – whether experienced on behalf of the self or one's group - is more strongly linked to behavior than are cognitive evaluations (Roseman, Weist, and Schwartz, 1994; Esses and Dovidio, 2000; Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2003). Also, emotions are stronger and more consistent predictors of group attitudes and social distance than are more cognitive elements of intergroup attitudes, such as stereotypical beliefs (Stangor et al 1991; see also Zanna et al, 1990; Dijker, 1987).

Much of this work on intergroup emotions extends existing individual level theories of human emotion to group contexts. Most build on cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. Unlike valence theories of emotion, which contend all emotions of the same valence (positive or negative) similarly influence judgment and behavior (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995), cognitive appraisal theories account for a broader spectrum of emotional experience (anger, fear, disgust, joy, hope) by specifying a link between emotion and

cognition. From this perspective, emotions arise from cognitive appraisals of an object or situation along several key evaluative dimensions (for example see Roseman and Smith, 2001). Most appraisal theories of emotion agree that perceptions of valence (e.g., whether the event is intrinsically positive or negative), certainty (e.g., the probability of an event occurring), legitimacy (e.g., whether an outcome is fair and just), control/efficacy (e.g., whether one can affect an outcome), relevance (e.g., how important the event is to the individual and how much attention should the situation be given), and agency (e.g., is the event caused by individuals or is it an inevitable, situational occurrence) influence the character of emotional experience in systematic ways (Ellsworth and Sherer 2003; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Scherer 2001; Roseman 2001).

Negatively valenced emotions such as fear, anger, and sadness are distinguished from one another by different patterns of appraisals along these evaluative dimensions. For example, anger is caused by appraisals of certainty, illegitimate action by an external agent, and personal control. Fear, alternatively, is caused by appraisals of uncertainty, lack of personal control, and may involve appraisals of agency (in the case of fearing another person), while sadness results from appraisals of certainty and lack of personal control. These discrete, qualitatively distinct, emotional experiences are functionally specific. They provide information critical for goal seeking processes by signaling the presence of threats and opportunities in the immediate environment and by stimulating appropriate behavioral tendencies (Carver and Scheier, 1990; Eckman, 1999). For example, anger is commonly associated with tendencies towards aggression, while fear is associated with avoidance or withdrawal behavior. Work on the political implications of emotion has also observed a link between emotion and various forms of political behavior. For instance, work in the affective intelligence framework developed by Marcus and MacKuen (1993) demonstrated anxiety promotes information search and political learning, while enthusiasm has a mobilizing effect and promotes campaign involvement.

Emotions modulate social behavior much in the same way they modulate personal behavior (Smith, 1993). When one's social identity is salient, people think of themselves as a group member and view themselves in terms of group attributes. People appraise their context in terms of group goals and group obstacles, and experience emotions in a manner consistent with cognitive appraisal theory. These assumptions underlie Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET), developed by Devos, Silver, Mackie, and Smith (2002). The authors find both physical and symbolic threats predict the experience of specific emotional states and behavioral tendencies. Symbolic threats produced anger and a desire to take action against the opposing group, while physical threats elicited fear and a desire to withdraw or avoid contact with the opposing group. In their study of reactions to symbolic threat, the authors divided subjects into two groups based on their support or opposition for gay marriage and manipulated threat to each position. Interestingly, the effects of emotion on action tendencies were quite strong, despite the use of artificial groups. However, it is likely attitudes on these issues are related to identification with real social groups, which go unmeasured in this study. Such a relationship would be consistent with the analysis presented in Chapter 3, linking strong social identities to support for gay rights and attitudes on other cultural issues.

A second framework for understanding intergroup emotions – the sociofunctional approach – has looked more carefully at actual social groups based on race, religion, or political orientations (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005). The authors approach intergroup or social emotions from an evolutionary psychology perspective. They argue because humans have always been ultra-social, emotions and the associated behavioral tendencies developed to allow people to protect valuable shared resources and maintain critical group structures and processes. Like Intergroup Emotions Theory, this perspective considers discrete emotional states and their unique effects on attitudes and behavior. However, rather than focusing on a single emotional state in isolation, they focus on patterns of emotional responses. From this perspective, specific types of threat elicit distinct patterns of emotions. For example, consider expectations about emotional reactions to symbolic threat. The authors expect group members to experience anger when confronting obstacles to group goals – such as interference with group norms, the promotion of values opposed to those of their group, and threats to the moral standing of one's group. In fact, anger is expected to accompany all perceptions of group threat to some degree (Neuberg and Cottrell, 2002). In addition, disgust is likely to be experienced in response to another group's promotion of contrary values. This emotion is particularly likely when an external group is viewed as a moral contaminant – which is often how Gays are portrayed in Christian Conservative rhetoric, for example.

Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) study of group emotions and threat perceptions considered some of the social groups salient in culture wars politics – notably Christian Fundamentalists, Activist Feminists, and Gays. Caucasian, non-fundamentalist Christians were surveyed about their attitudes and perceptions of a wide range of social groups, including the three of interest to us here. The authors find reports of anger and disgust towards these groups are significantly higher than for European Americans, the baseline group, though only Christian Fundamentalists elicited significant amounts of fear. Participants in this study were also significantly more likely to see these groups as threatening to their basic values. The perceived threat to values posed by these groups was nearly 14 times greater than for European Americans; and in fact, significantly greater than all other target groups utilized in the study. As one might expect, perceptions these groups posed economic or health threats were negligible, with the exception of Gays who were perceived as a significant health threat. However, the authors did not control for the social identities of respondents beyond restricting the sample based on race and religiosity. One might expect to find, for instance, that Feminist participants would not view activist Feminists as a threat to their values or experience anger towards this group. Despite this oversight, this work does demonstrate threat perceptions are closely linked to feelings about social groups.

Like Intergroup Emotions Theory, the results point to anger and disgust as the dominant reactions to group-based symbolic threat. This is consistent with the hostile tenor of culture wars rhetoric outlined by Hardisty (1999), Luker (1984), and others (see Chapter 3). Here, I similarly expect to find anger and disgust are the dominant reactions to the culture wars threats contained in the experimental manipulation employed here. These political threats contain group references likely to heighten the salience of respondents' social identities and provide cues of group-based threats to core values. Perceptions that other groups challenge the values promoted by one's own group should result in heightened anger and disgust, particularly among people maintaining a strong

subjective sense of attachment to their social group. I expect these emotions will moderate the effects of threat on both political and intergroup attitudes.

Identity Threat and Tolerance

As noted prior, a few studies of the culture wars phenomenon have illustrated polarizing trends in intergroup feelings or attitudes (see for example Miller and Hoffman, 1999) and I present modest evidence to this effect in Chapter 3. While polarized group evaluations, measured by feeling thermometers, are often cast in terms of growing intergroup hostilities or antipathies, there has been little systematic study of the link between discrete emotional states, such as anger or disgust, and attitudes towards groups central to the culture wars conflict. Here I am interested in political tolerance towards these salient culture wars groups – Feminists, Fundamentalists, Liberals, and Conservatives – and the relationship between threat, emotion, and reported tolerance. I suspect the hostility, polarization, and political mobilization resulting from cultural conflict ultimately translates into undemocratic tendencies – specifically the desire to censure opposition groups. If culture wars politics elicit anti-democratic preferences among a significant portion of the electorate, cultural conflict is not merely the reflection of a traditional electoral or public opinion cleavage. Instead, it should be considered a significantly more sinister phenomenon which threatens democratic pluralism, institutions, and processes.

Much of the literature on political tolerance has emphasized the link between religiosity, conservatism, and intolerance. Sullivan, Pearson, and Marcus (1982) and McClosky and Brill (1983) have shown political conservatism is linked to intolerance of various "deviant" or non-mainstream groups on both the right and left ends of the ideological spectrum (see also Sniderman et al, 1989). As one might expect, given the discussion of the difficulties inherent in measuring religiosity in the previous chapter, there has been some debate regarding which aspects of religiosity are most closely linked to intolerance. Allport and Ross' (1967) early work on this subject found specific patterns of religious belief and private religious practice were not directly linked to intolerance, while the more social aspect of religiosity – the idea of belonging to a religious group or community - was linked to intolerance. Later studies reached a different conclusion. For example, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) contend religious fundamentalism – defined by specific patterns of belief, such as a literal interpretation of the Bible – is the best predictor of intolerance. Similarly, Ellison and Musick (1993) demonstrated theological conservatism is a better predictor of intolerant beliefs than church attendance or denominational affiliation. Karpov (2002) and Mason and Feldman (2007) reach a similar conclusion, reporting political intolerance stems from adherence to evangelical doctrine, while frequency of worship and religious salience are rather poor indicators of intolerance. However, recent work again favors a more social explanation for the relationship between religiosity and intolerance. For example, Eisenstein (2006)

reports religious involvement, captured by frequency of worship rather than specific religious beliefs, is a strongly related to tolerance for various social groups.

But some of the work on religiosity, values, and tolerance raises a potential confound for study of the link between identity strength and tolerance. Many argue it is authoritarianism or preferences for social conformity rather than religiosity per se that are linked to intolerance (Laythe et al 2002; Hunsberger, 1995; Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman, 2003). Religious fundamentalism is related to authoritarianism, which is considered by some to be a constellation of personality characteristics (such as dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and conventionalism) which produce potential for undemocratic preferences and behaviors (for an overview see Martin, 2001). More recent work on this topic conceptualizes authoritarianism as the tendency to value social conformity over personal autonomy (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). People who hold a strong preference for social conformity favor adherence to dominant social norms and tend to "dislike" deviant groups, or groups whose values and behavior violate social conventions thus creating potential for social disorder. This value orientation is also related to preferences for government actions to restrict the rights of deviant groups and impose particular moral codes through policy (Feldman, 2003). A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that when authoritarianism goes unmeasured, religious fundamentalism and political conservatism convey its effects on intergroup attitudes. When controlling for authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism or theological conservatism exerts a negligible influence on attitudes towards non-mainstream, or deviant, groups (Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Canetti-Nisim, 2004). Feldman and Weber (2006) similarly find authoritarianism, rather than moral traditionalism or conventional measures of religiosity, determines tolerance towards a number of social groups. But unlike previous work, they find the effect of authoritarianism on intergroup attitudes is qualified by threat. Cues of threat to group norms or values seem to activate these pre-existing authoritarian tendencies. This further speaks to the earlier discussion of the link between contextual threats, attitudes, and behaviors.

While there is some debate in this literature regarding whether religiosity, authoritarian values, or some combination of the two precipitates intolerance, it seems obvious there is an important relationship between religiosity and intergroup attitudes. But this literature is somewhat asymmetric in its focus on ideologically and theologically conservative groups. Social identity theory predicts outgroup bias and antipathy will emerge on *both* sides of a group based conflict. Strongly identified group members should respond to cues of group-based threat in a comparable fashion, regardless of their political or theological orientations. If values like traditionalism and social conformity are the root cause of intolerance, and these values are linked to group identity on the political and theological right, but not the left, one would expect an asymmetric pattern of intolerance to emerge. However, some recent work on attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists suggests the intolerance and polarization characteristic of culture wars politics operates on the both sides of the conflict. For example, Bolche and DeMaio (1999, 1999a) demonstrate considerable polarization in attitudes towards Fundamentalists over the period from 1988 to 1997 in the National Election Study Surveys. They find a significant portion of the electorate – about 20 percent of white non-Fundamentalists - report intense dislike for Fundamentalists beginning in 1992. This group, which the

authors label anti-Fundamentalists, perceives Fundamentalists as militantly intolerant and ideologically extreme. These anti-Fundamentalists are themselves almost monolithically progressive, taking liberal positions on the role of women in society, gay rights, abortion, and the separation of church and state. They are also overwhelmingly liberal, educated, and secular (Bolche and DeMaio, 1999). Interestingly, feelings towards Fundamentalists and positions on these culture wars issues are stronger predictors of electoral behavior among this group than are attitudes in other domains, such as government aid, suggesting the centrality of cultural issues for antifundamentalist political thinking (Bolche and DeMaio, 1999a).

The prevalence of antifundamentalist sentiment suggests the intolerance and polarization characteristic of the culture wars is a two-way street. While this work speaks to the symmetry of the conflict, it does not do much to assuage concerns over the link between identity and values. The authors contend these anti-Fundamentalists are overwhelmingly culturally progressive and tend to hold a relativist perspective on the Bible. Thus, it remains possible that progressive values, rather than subjective strength of identification with key social groups, drive the antipathy observed by Bolche and De Maio (1999, 1999a). Indeed, it is likely social identity and values are closely intertwined for the groups of interest to us. Hunter's (1992) notion the culture wars are best defined as a contest between groups holding competing, irreconcilable worldviews over the proper moral course for the nation is as consistent with a values based argument as it is with a social identity argument. Also, some work on social identity argues shared core values are critical components for the development and maintenance of collective identities (Huddy, 2001; Barth, 1981).

While subjective identity strength is likely linked to the endorsement of particular constellations of values, I cannot make any causal claims about the nature of the relationship between these two constructs given the nature of my data. I do expect subjective identity strength –the sense of internalized group membership, the idea that the group is an integral part of one's identity, the sense of attachment to the group – is related to, but conceptually distinct from, value orientations and conditions both emotional and attitudinal responses to threat. I also suspect symbolic threats heighten the salience of group values, particularly for those maintaining a strong subjective sense of attachment to the group.

Hypotheses

Based on this literature, I expect Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities are most responsive to the symbolic threats characteristic of the culture wars. These highly committed group members will be more sensitive to political messages containing explicit cues of group-based conflict over cultural issues than their more weakly identified counterparts and will respond to them with greater anger, attitude polarization, and intolerance. Though identity strength is likely related to core values such as moral traditionalism and social conformity, I expect it will exert an independent

moderating effect on responses to threat when controlling for the effects of these value orientations. While I do consider the impact of moral traditionalism and social conformity on responses to threat, I am truly working from a social identity point of view. Thus, my emphasis is on isolating the consequences of subjective identity strength on responses to the symbolic threats characterizing culture wars politics.

Interesting differences will likely be observed across samples in reactions to symbolic threat. Of course, such comparisons need to be made with caution. Given the nature of these samples, I cannot be certain my analysis yields unbiased population estimates. In addition, because the survey was administered to these two samples using different methods, through the mail and via the web, it is impossible to distinguish mode effects from true sample differences. However, based upon the greater political sophistication and activism of the web sample, I expect to observe more pronounced emotional and attitudinal responses to threat among these respondents. Examining the ways in which contextual indicators of group threat shape public opinion and intergroup attitudes in this manner should afford insight into the opinion dynamics underlying the culture wars phenomenon. It should also shed light on the effectiveness of the culture wars as an electoral strategy.

Data and Method

To examine responses to threat and their determinants I use data from the Religion and Politics in American Life Survey. This survey was administered by mail and via the web in the Summer of 2006. The mail survey was administered to a sample of "average" Americans with an oversample of Evangelical Christians. The web survey was administered to a sample of politically sophisticated Americans who are disproportionately active in political life. A more detailed discussion of the sampling frame is provided in Chapter 4 and supplemental information is available in the Appendix.

Experimental Design. As previously noted, the culture wars are characterized by hostile and inflammatory rhetoric. Hardisty (1999) argues that the type of communications relayed by political elites and interest group leaders – replete with group based threats, emotional appeals, scapegoating, and divisive language – are intended both to polarize and mobilize adherents. To better understand the public's reactions to such threats and their political consequences, I embedded a threat manipulation in our survey. Respondents in the experimental conditions were asked to read one of four essays about emergency contraception (EC), also known as Plan B or the morning after pill. This topic was selected due to the importance placed on reproductive issues in culture wars politics. At the time the survey was administered, the FDA was considering a proposal to allow EC to be administered over the counter, without a prescription. This change would increase women's access to the drug, affording women greater reproductive choice. The FDA approved a measure to allow over-the-counter sales of EC in late August of 2006, after data collection was completed.

The content of these essays was varied so that two essays threatened people holding morally progressive positions on reproductive issues and two threatened those holding more traditional positions on reproductive issues. The essays also differed in whether they were written in a personal tone – from the perspective of a college-aged woman describing her own decision to use emergency contraception or not to use it – or a political tone – as a debate between key elites and interest group leaders on policies regarding the use and availability of the drug. A control condition was also included in which respondents simply read a short neutral description of emergency contraception – yielding a 2(progressive, traditional) X 2 (personal, political) + control between-subjects design. The stimulus materials are provided in the Appendix. Respondents were randomly assigned to each experimental condition.

To get a sense of this distinction between essays, considering the following two excerpts designed to threaten those individuals holding more progressive positions on this issue and reproductive rights more generally.

> ***[EXCEPT 1: Threat to Progressive Position, Personal Tone]*** "I talked to my mom about the morning after pill, and she thought that it was a mistake to try to interfere with what could possibly be a human life. She said that she would love and support me no matter what happened – but just because I had made one mistake was no reason to make another. . . . During the next three weeks I prayed to God to give me the strength to deal with the consequences of my actions. It turned out that I did not get pregnant. This experience was a wake up call, and really reaffirmed my personal commitment to wait until marriage to have sex."
>
> ***[EXCERPT 2: Threat to Progressive Position, Political Tone]*** "Catholic healthcare systems and other hospital networks also try to avoid providing EC in their hospitals, even to sexual assault survivors who seek treatment in their emergency rooms. Many supporters of emergency contraception are outraged. "This practice is irresponsible, and only serves to further traumatize victims of sex crimes," says Sykes. "As Catholic healthcare providers increasingly merge with their secular counterparts, the restrictions on access to the fullest range of reproductive health services are likely to become increasingly widespread."

The distinction in the tenor of these essays is clear. The essay written in a personal tone conveys one woman's choice and the reasoning underlying it. The essay written in a more editorial tone makes explicit group references – to Planned Parenthood (a group commonly associated with Feminists) and Catholics. The implications of group actions are also clear – if the Catholic healthcare system is successful in blocking access to emergency contraception, women's reproductive choices will be limited. As noted prior, I expect the political, group-based threats to elicit the most pronounced emotional and attitudinal responses among Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities, based on our notion of the culture wars as a form of intergroup conflict. While people may disagree with the choice or reasoning of the woman in the personal-tone essay, it will likely arouse less ire than the editorial-style essay. Comparison of responses to the personal and political threat conditions should provide some indication of the extent to which the communication of group based cues and threat promote the anger, polarization, and intolerance characteristic of the culture wars.

Key Measures

Group Identities and Identity Strength. Group identities were measured using the procedure discussed in Chapter 4. Respondents were assigned to one of four group clusters obtained from the MDS analysis based on their primary collective identity – as Liberals, Conservatives, Seculars, or Religious Americans. The 10-item measure of subjective identity strength discussed in Chapter 4 is also used here to determine whether Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities are most polarized in their social and intergroup attitudes and most responsive to culture wars rhetoric.

Emotion. Emotional responses to the threat manipulations were gauged using a modified version of the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark, 1994). The post-manipulation emotion check included 11 items tapping anxiety, anger, disgust, and enthusiasm. The items were examined using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. The results revealed a clear 3 factor solution (Mail Survey: RMSEA=.10, TLI=.984, CFI=.995; Web Survey: RMSEA=.10, CFI=.995, TLI=.998), with enthusiasm items (enthusiastic, proud) loading on one factor, fear or anxiety items (nervous, scared, afraid) loading on a second factor, and both anger and disgust items (revolted, angry, hostile, disgusted, repulsed, and irritated) loading on a third factor. The correlations between these emotions were quite high (Mail Survey: $r_{fear,\ anger}$=.796, $r_{enthusiasm,anger}$=-.437, $r_{enthusiasm,\ fear}$=-..229; Web Survey: $r_{fear,\ anger}$=.869, $r_{enthusiasm,anger}$=-.715, $r_{enthusiasm,\ fear}$=-.521). Given the high correlations between factors, particularly fear and anger in both samples, I considered alternative specifications, such as a two factor model with all negative emotion items constrained to load on one factor and all positive emotions constrained to load on a second factor. The RMSEA for these solutions were much higher ($RMSEA_{mail}$=.228, $RMSEA_{web}$=.218), indicating inferior model fit. Similarly, a single factor solution proved to be a poor fit for the data ($RMSEA_{mail}$=.277, $RMEA_{web}$=.226). As a result, I took the three factor solution as evidence these indicators reflect three distinct emotional states. The items loading on each factor were combined to form three emotion measures (anxiety, anger, and enthusiasm) and rescaled to range from zero to one, with higher scores indicating higher levels of felt emotion. The three scales are reliable, and the scale items are highly correlated. For more information on scale properties for the mail and web sample, see Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

Attitudes towards Emergency Contraception. Following the manipulation and post-manipulation emotions check, respondents were asked six questions about their attitudes towards emergency contraception. The items asked about support or opposition to women's right to use emergency contraception, physician refusals, allowing emergency contraception to be sold over the counter, and government subsidy of emergency contraception costs. The items were combined and rescaled from zero to one, with higher scores corresponding to greater support for the right to use emergency contraception. The complete wording of the scale items is provided in Appendix A. The scale items were moderately inter-correlated and resulting scale is reliable ($alpha_{mail}$=.88, $alpha_{web}$=.93).

Political Tolerance. Following attitudes towards emergency contraception, I assess tolerance towards four key social and political groups – Feminists, Fundamentalists, Liberals, and Conservatives. Unlike, the NES which includes only feeling thermometer scores for these groups, I included seven-item scales of tolerance towards Feminists and Fundamentalists. The items asked about the influence these

groups have in American politics, the attention they receive in the media, and the perceived aggressiveness with which they promote their political agendas. Respondents were also asked whether they would support a Feminist or Fundamentalist candidate for political office. The remaining three items were geared towards interpersonal rather than political tolerance. They asked how respondents felt about welcoming a Feminist or Fundamentalist into their home, how they would feel if such a person married into their family, and how they would feel about working under a member of these groups. Though I attempted to distinguish between interpersonal and political tolerance here, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis revealed responses were generated by a single underlying factor. As a result, I combined all items into a single measure, recoded to range from zero to one. High scores on these measures reflect tolerance for Feminists and Fundamentalists, while low scores indicate intolerance. The items scaled together well and are quite reliable (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

Tolerance for Liberals and Conservatives were measured using four-item scales. Respondents indicated whether they felt the views of most Liberals and Conservatives are close to mainstream or far from mainstream, whether the positions held by these groups are good or bad for society, whether these groups support worthy or unworthy causes, and whether the programs these groups support are like to improve society. These items were combined and rescaled to range from zero to one, with high scores indicating tolerance for these groups. The items scaled together well. Item wordings for these measures are provided in Appendix A and scale properties in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

Values. I also consider the impact of values on political and intergroup attitudes. Controlling for these value orientations allows one to isolate the unique effects of identity strength, as discussed above. Because many of the social policy issues central to the culture wars rest on notions of traditional morality, I include the four-item measure of moral traditionalism used in the National Election Studies. These items were combined and rescaled to range from zero to one, with higher scores indicating greater traditionalism and lower scores reflecting moral progressivism. The scales are reliable ($alpha_{mail}$=.85, $alpha_{web}$=.82). In addition, I consider the impact of social conformity on political and intergroup attitudes. A number of studies have demonstrated individuals with a strong preference for social conformity are less tolerant of minority groups and more likely to value adherence to traditional social norms and mainstream behavior. Social conformity was measured with an 8-items subset of Feldman's (2003) social conformity scale (alpha=.78; alpha=.70).

Social and Demographic Controls. In the analysis presented below, I included controls for a number of social and demographic characteristics. Dummy variables were used to control for whether respondents were married or unmarried, female or male, Caucasian or another racial category. Two dummy variables were also included to indicate educational attainment. One designated whether respondents hold a college degree, and a second designated whether respondents hold an advanced or graduate degree. The excluded category is less than a college education. I also included an indicator of age, measured in 10 year increments. Seven-point indicators of party identification and ideology, taken from the National Election Studies, were also employed. Finally, I controlled for religious salience with a dummy variable coded one if respondents reported attending church almost weekly or more and zero otherwise. I also use the standard NES item tapping attitudes towards the Bible. High scores on this

trichotomous measure correspond to a more progressive interpretation of the bible, while low scores connote a literal interpretation consistent with theological conservatism.

Group Differences on Key Measures

Before delving into the effects of experimentally-induced threat on emotions and attitudes and examine the moderating influence of identity strength on threat, consider the nature of simple group differences in support for emergency contraception and tolerance towards the political groups of interest here. Our expectation is that our method of classifying respondents as liberal, conservative, religious, or secular based on their primary social identifications captures important differences in orientations towards the political and social world. A series of ANOVA tests (Table 5.3) confirm the presence of significant differences in policy attitudes and political tolerance across the social identity types derived from MDS analysis in the previous chapter. As one can see from Figure 5.1, clear differences in mean support for emergency contraception are evident in both the mail and web samples. While liberal and secular Americans report very high levels of average support for emergency contraception, support among conservatives is significantly lower. While liberal and secular Americans report comparable mean levels of support for emergency contraception, a significantly difference between conservative and religious identifiers is apparent here. Among web sample respondents, conservatives are relatively unified in their opposition to emergency contraception, while religious identifiers take a more middling position. This difference is due to greater polarization within the group of religious identifiers relative to conservative identifiers. This result is not mirrored in the mail sample, in which both groups seem to be internally polarized by this issue.

Group differences in political tolerance for various salient social groups are provided in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. As expected, group members demonstrate significantly higher tolerance for ideologically and religiously similar groups than more dissimilar groups. That is, respondents with primary liberal or progressive political identities are very tolerant of liberals and feminists, and significantly less tolerant of Conservatives and Fundamentalists. As was the case for attitudes towards emergency contraception, Americans maintaining primary political identities are more polarized in their tolerance for these groups than are those who maintain secular or religious primary identifications. The mean difference in reported tolerance between conservative and liberal identifiers is larger than the mean difference between religious and secular identifiers. This pattern is evident in both the web sample (Figure 5.2) and the mail sample (Figure 5.3), though differences are more pronounced for the more sophisticated web sample.

These simple mean differences suggest the social identity classification scheme derived from the MDS analysis in Chapter 4 does capture some important differences in political and intergroup attitudes related to group membership. The results suggest Americans who reported a political primary identity are most polarized in their support for emergency contraception and their attitudes towards the social and political groups of

interest here. As one would expect, political tolerance for ideologically similar groups was significantly higher than was tolerance for ideologically dissimilar groups – consistent with the patterns of group evaluations observed in Chapter 3. However, much of the differences between political and the more apolitical identities are driven by religious Americans. On all measures of interest here, Liberals and Seculars differ only slightly in their mean reported attitudes. In many cases, these differences do not attain conventional levels of significance. Alternatively, Americans holding religious identities differ markedly from all other groups, even Conservatives. This difference is particularly distinct among the more sophisticated and politically active web sample respondents. As noted in Chapter 4, the group of respondents with a religious primary identification is internally polarized on a number of these issues, indicating they may be a relatively more heterogeneous group than Liberals, Seculars, and to a lesser extent Conservatives.

This result points to a potential problem in the classification of religious respondents employed here. Given our earlier discussion of the difficulties involved in measuring religious identity, it seems plausible this group is not uniform in various aspects of religiosity. For example, 56 percent of religious identifiers in the mail survey and 51 percent in the web survey report attending church almost weekly or more, and attendance is notably lower among the remaining half of the group. In the mail sample, 55 percent of respondents who chose a primary religious identity also reported taking a literal interpretation of the bible, compared to only 17 percent of web respondents falling into this religious cluster (as noted in a previous section, this item seems to function differently in a sophisticate sample, which distinguishes between Biblical literalism and inerrancy). Thus, while some conservative religious identifiers selected primary identities reflecting both religious and political conservatism (such as Christian Conservative or Religious Conservative) and were located in the Conservative cluster of the MDS solution based on their primary identification, others identified primarily with their religious group. As a result, the classification of respondents based on their primary identity may obscure meaningful differentiation within the cluster of religious identities. This group of religious Americans likely contains people who strongly identify with either relatively progressive or relatively conservative religious traditions, which could account for the observed attitudinal heterogeneity.

Manipulation Checks - Emotional Responses to Threat

To determine whether the manipulations had the intended effects – namely, whether the progressive threats elicited fear and anger among people with strong liberal and secular identities, whether the traditional threats elicited fear and anger among conservative and religious identifiers, and whether the effect of threat was greatest when conveyed in a political, rather than personal tone – I conducted a series of ANOVAs. The main effects of threat were examined using a four-category variable indicating the threat treatment received by respondents. I also used a four-category variable indicating the cluster of respondents' primary identity determined in the previous chapter to

examine the effects of social identity on emotions. The interaction between threat and the group identity is significant for all emotion models in both samples (Table 5.4). To get a better sense of the direction and magnitude of group differences in responses to threat, group means in reported emotions are presented by threat condition in Figures 5.4 through 5.9.

Fear. Group differences in reported fear across experimental conditions are presented in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. In both the web and mail samples, the personal progressive threat elicits only modest and fairly uniform amounts of fear across groups. Fearful responses to the progressive threat cast in a political tone are larger and more variable – particularly in the web sample. For liberal and secular identifiers in this sample, this political progressive threat evoked significantly greater amounts of fear. It also elicited greater fear among religious respondents, but the effects were modest relative to liberal and secular group identifiers. As anticipated, conservatives reported little fear in this condition. The effects of this threat were more uniform across mail sample respondents. It elicited greater fear in liberal identifiers relative to the other three groups, who reported fairly similar levels of fear. Reported fear in response to the traditional threats was more comparable across samples. These threats had little effect on reports of fear among liberals and seculars, though they did have a small but significant effect on fear reported by religious and conservative identifiers. In the web sample, conservatives were more responsive than religious identifiers, while the reverse was true for the mail sample. Both the personal and traditional threat manipulation elicited similar levels of threat across groups in the mail sample, though the personal threat was much less effective in the web sample compared to the political threat.

Anger. Group mean differences in reported anger by experimental condition are presented in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. Among web sample respondents, progressive threats elicited comparable levels of anger among liberals and seculars – levels significantly higher than those reported by conservative and religious identifiers. Here there is a difference in the magnitude of effects for each manipulation. Reported anger among liberals and seculars in the political progressive condition is nearly double that for the personal progressive threat. Again, differences between conservative and religious identifiers are more pronounced than for liberals and seculars, who respond to these threats in essentially the same fashion. Religious Americans report significantly greater anger in response to both threats than do conservative Americans. However, this pattern of results is not observed among mail sample respondents. Instead, the progressive threats have more uniform effects across groups, though again the political progressive threat elicits significantly greater anger than the personal progressive threat (Figure 5.7). A similar pattern of results is evident across samples for the traditional threats. Both traditional threats heighten anger among religious respondents, and especially conservatives. In both samples, it is clear conservative identifiers are more sensitive to these threats than religious identifiers. Unlike the progressive threat conditions, the effect of traditional threat does not vary in magnitude depending on the tone of the manipulation in either sample.

Enthusiasm. Because the experimental conditions were randomly assigned, some respondents received “threat” manipulations which were actually consistent with their positions on reproductive issues such as emergency contraception. Enthusiasm should be the dominant reaction when this matching occurs. Alternatively, enthusiasm should be

significantly diminished when respondents are assigned to a truly threatening condition. Group means for reported enthusiasm by experimental condition are presented in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. The progressive threat cast in a personal tone evoked greater enthusiasm among conservative and religious identifiers relative to liberal and secular identifiers as expected. The pattern is clearer among web respondents, while in the mail sample this threat condition elicited greater enthusiasm among liberals than was anticipated – levels comparable to conservatives. A similar pattern is observed for the progressive threat condition cast in a political tone. Conservative and religious identifiers reported significantly greater enthusiasm than did liberal and secular identifiers. As was the case for the other emotions examined here, these "threats" had a greater emotional impact on Americans with conservative identities relative to religious identities, while considerably more modest differences were apparent between liberal and secular Americans. As anticipated, the traditional threats had the reverse effect on reported enthusiasm for respondents identified with these political, religious, and secular groups. Liberals and seculars reported significantly greater enthusiasm in response to these manipulations than did their religious and conservative counterparts. Again, a distinction emerges between conservative and religious groups, with enthusiasm being depressed to a greater extent among conservative identifiers. No real differences are observed for threats conveyed in a personal versus a political tone. Both elicited similar patterns of enthusiasm across groups.

Overall, the results suggest the threat manipulations employed here were somewhat uneven in provoking emotional responses. The political progressive threat was clearly the most effective in arousing both fear and anger, but it did not discriminate well across groups in the mail sample. This may reflect a problem with stimulus design. For instance, neither side of the conflict may have been perceived to be in a stronger or dominant position. Or, it may signal selective attention to particular aspects of the message members of each group found most threatening. Given this pattern of results, it is difficult to say conclusively whether threats conveyed in a political tone – with explicit group based cues – had greater emotional consequences than those conveyed in a personal tone. While the political progressive threat did elicit more pronounced negative emotional responses than the personal progressive threat, conservative and religious identifiers' reactions to the personal and political threats directed at them were essentially equal in magnitude. Of course, the different effects of personal and political threat may be clarified in the subsequent analysis, which attends to individuals differences in subjective identity strength. It may be the case the political, group-based threats resonate most with people who hold a strong internalized sense of collective identity.

Manipulation Checks – Attitudinal Responses to Threat

Next, consider whether threat produced differentiated patterns of support for emergency contraception and political tolerance among Americans identified with political, religious, and secular groups. Recall, progressive threats should heighten

support for emergency contraception among liberal and secular identifiers and should heighten tolerance towards ideologically similar groups (liberals and feminists) while depressing tolerance for ideologically dissimilar groups (conservatives and fundamentalists). The traditional threats, alternatively, should depress support for emergency contraception among religious and conservative identifiers, while bolstering tolerance for fundamentalists and conservatives and depressive tolerance for liberals and feminists. Such a pattern of results would point to polarization of policy and intergroup attitudes in response to threat. As discussed prior, threats cast is a political tone are expected to have a larger effect than those case in a personal tone.

A series of ANOVAS conducted following the procedure outlined above revealed significant main effects of social identity type on these attitudinal measures, but no direct effect of threat or qualifying interaction between group identity type and threat – with the exception of tolerance for fundamentalists among web survey respondents (results omitted). However, it is difficult to conclude the threat manipulations had no effect on support for emergency contraception or tolerance based on these results, as there are multiple degrees of freedom in the numerator for these significance tests. To better understand the effects on threat on these attitudes, a series of dummy variables indicating group membership and threat conditions, as well as the interactions between identity and threat type were regressed on the measures of support for emergency contraception and tolerance towards four social groups using ordinary least squares regression. Unlike the emotion measures, these scales were asked of respondents in the experimental and control conditions. Here, the control condition serves as the baseline category. Secular identification is the baseline condition for the social identification dummy variables.

Support for Emergency Contraception. The results are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The first column of coefficients in both tables gives the effects of identity and threat on support for emergency contraception. The coefficients for the group identification dummies show the effect of identity type on support in the control condition. A significant effect of group membership is apparent for all groups relative to the secular baseline among both web and mail respondents. Support for emergency contraception is modestly but significantly greater among liberal identifiers relative to secular identifiers. Support is significantly lower among religious and conservatives identifiers. These results again suggest Americans holding politicized identities are significantly more polarized in their attitudes towards this issue than are those who primarily identify with secular or religious groups. The coefficients for the threat condition dummy variables give the effect of threat on secular respondents relative to the control condition. Among secular web respondents, the personal and political threat conditions and the political traditional threat modestly but significantly bolster support for emergency contraception, consistent with hypotheses about the polarizing effects of cultural threat.

The effects of threat on the remaining three groups of identifiers are given by the coefficients for the interaction between group identity dummy variables and the threat condition dummy variables. Still looking at web respondents, it is clear the manipulations influence support among liberal and conservative identifiers. Among conservatives, all four threat manipulations – regardless of target or tone – drive down support for emergency contraception relative to the secular baseline. The largest effect is evident for the personal progressive threat condition, rather than the traditional threat

conditions which were aimed at this group. Among liberals, the progressive and political traditional threat conditions also modestly but significantly reduce support for emergency contraception. This result is inconsistent with expectations, in that threat seems to slightly depolarize attitudes among this group. Unlike the political identifiers, support for emergency contraception among religious identifiers was not significantly influenced by any of the threat conditions relative to the secular baseline.

Interestingly, the experiment seemed to have little systematic effect on mail respondents, regardless of group identification. The only exception occurs for conservative identifiers in the political progressive threat condition, who reported significantly less support than the secular baseline. Among these more "typical" Americans, identity alone seems to drive attitudes.

Group differences in support by condition for web respondents are also depicted graphically in Figure 5.10. Each plot within this figure reflects differences across conditions for each group. Within groups, support is rather uniform across conditions. While some of the differences observed here are significant, they are quite small in magnitude relative to the differences observed for the emotion measures in the preceding section. Differences across groups are considerably more pronounced. As noted for other measures, conservatives are significantly more polarized in their opposition to emergency contraception than are religious Americans.

Political Tolerance. Looking first at the web survey results (Table 5.5), one can see effects of group identity type in the control condition. Liberals are modestly but significantly more tolerant of ideologically similar groups (feminists and liberals) than their secular counterparts. This finding that liberals are more tolerant of liberals as a group reflects a kind of ingroup favoritism effect and is also observed for conservative identifiers. Liberals are also significantly less tolerant of fundamentalists and conservatives than are seculars in the baseline conditions. The reverse pattern is observed for religious and conservative identifiers – who are significantly more tolerant of fundamentalists and conservatives and significantly less tolerant of liberals and feminists. The effect sizes are nearly double for conservative identifiers, suggesting their intergroup attitudes are significantly more polarized.

Turning to effects of threat on tolerance, one can see that among seculars all threats slightly bolstered tolerance for feminists and diminished tolerance for fundamentalists - expect for the political traditional threat which had no effect on tolerance for fundamentalists. Less consistent effects are observed for tolerance towards the more mainstream political groups (liberals and conservatives). A comparable pattern of experimental effects is observed for religious identifiers. Again, there is not much effect of threat on reported tolerance among religious identifiers with the exception of the personal traditional threat, which increased tolerance only for fundamentalists and not for the other social and political groups. For conservative identifiers, effects are apparent across threat conditions. All threats depressed tolerance for ideologically dissimilar groups, bolstered tolerance for similar groups. The effect sizes did not differ much across threat conditions however, contrary to expectations the political traditional threat would have the largest impact on tolerance. The effects of threat on tolerance for political, religious, and secular identifiers in the web sample are also presented graphically in Figures 5.11 through 5.14. It is clear from these figures that group differences in political

tolerance for feminists, fundamentalists, liberals, and conservatives are quite pronounced, while experimental effects are quite modest.

As was the case for emergency contraception, few experimental effects were evident among mail survey respondents (Table 5.6). Many of the observed effects were sporadic. For example, personal progressive threat depressed tolerance for Fundamentalists only among Secular identifiers. And political progressive threat heightened tolerance for feminists only among liberals. The only consistent experimental effect observed here is for the political progressive threat, which heightened reported tolerance among conservative identifiers for fundamentalists and conservatives, while depressing tolerance towards liberals and feminists. Some basic group differences are evident however, putting aside the threat manipulations. While, liberals did not differ from seculars in reported tolerance in the control condition, religious and conservative identifiers were significantly less tolerant of feminists and liberals and significantly more tolerant of fundamentalists and conservatives.

In sum, threat did impact policy support and tolerance but only among the more sophisticated, activist web sample. Here, threat influenced support for emergency contraception among secular, liberal, and political identifiers, but not religious identifiers. For seculars and conservatives threat resulted in attitude polarization – heightening support among seculars and depressing support among conservatives. However, this polarizing effect was observed across threat types, suggesting respondents were not necessarily sensitive to variations in the tone and content of the manipulations. This result is contrary to expectations about differences in the effects of political and personal tone. Threat actually depressed support for emergency contraception among liberals, contrary to the polarization hypothesis. Threat also seemed to have significant consequences for political tolerance among web respondents maintaining secular, liberal, and conservative identifications. Again, no effect was observed for religious identifiers. Generally, threat bolstered tolerance for ideologically similar groups while depressing tolerance for dissimilar groups. This was particularly true for reported tolerance towards the more ideologically extreme groups – feminists and fundamentalists. As for policy support, the effect of the manipulations was fairly uniform, and not differentiated according to the position taken in the essay or the tone in which it was written. This result suggests the manipulations may not have been sufficiently clear, or respondents may have attending selectively to particular aspects of the manipulations.

The results for the mail sample were quite different. Threat had negligible effects on reported policy and intergroup attitudes, contrary to the polarization hypothesis. Instead, the bulk of the variation in policy and intergroup attitudes was explained simply by social identity type. As a result, I consider the moderating effects of identity strength on threat on emotion for both samples in the following section, but confine the analysis of attitudinal responses to threat to web respondents only.

Moderating Effects of Identity Strength on Responses to Threat

Emotional Responses to Threat. Subjective strength of group identification is expected to moderate the effects of threat, such that people maintaining strong social identities will response most strongly to threat. To determine whether identity strength moderates the effects of threat on reported emotion fear, anger, and enthusiasm, I ran a series of OLS regressions. Group identity is measured by a series of three dummy variables, with secular respondents serving as the baseline category. As noted prior, emotional reactions were only gauged in the threat conditions and not in the control condition. As a result, I include three dummy variables to connote threat conditions. The personal political threat condition serves as a baseline, as it did not elicit significant differences in fear ($F_{MAIL}(3,88)=.11$; $F_{WEB}(3,431)=.31$) or anger in the mail sample ($F_{MAIL}(3,89)=.32$). However, this condition did elicit significant differences in anger across groups in the web sample ($F_{WEB}(3,431)=14.60$). These effects are quite small and are driven by secular respondents, who reported slightly more anger than did the other groups on average. In both samples, significant differences in reported enthusiasm were observed across groups in this condition ($F_{MAIL}(3,89)=2.61$; $F_{WEB}(3,431)=30.07$). In the mail sample, these differences are driven by people who primarily identify as secular. Secular identifiers reported very little enthusiasm in this condition, significantly less than did Americans maintaining primary liberal, conservative, or religious primary identities. For the web survey, Liberals reported significantly more enthusiasm than did the other groups who reported comparable levels of enthusiasm. Because the personal progressive threat operated differently across groups in eliciting anger and enthusiasm, it will be more difficult to interpret the regression coefficients obtained here. As a result, I also present graphs of predicted probabilities for group members reporting high and low identity strength in the various threat conditions to clarify these relationships. Generally, the results suggest identity strength moderates the effects of threat on emotion, but does so in a relatively inconsistent fashion across the types of threat and emotional responses of interest.

Fear. First, consider fearful responses to threat. Among web respondents (Table 5.7), neither threat nor identity strength influences reported fear among either liberal or secular identifiers relative to the baseline of secular identifiers in the personal progressive threat condition. However, among secular and liberal identifiers in the mail survey, some effects of threat and identity strength are apparent (Table 5.8). For instance, identity strength moderates the effect of threat on fear in the baseline condition among seculars. In this case, fear increases an estimated 43 percent of the range of the scale as identity strength goes from its minimum value (zero) to its maximum value (one). Surprisingly, the remaining threats depress fear among seculars at high levels of subjective identification. These effects are given by the coefficients on the interaction terms between identity strength and threat dummy variables. While this result was expected for the traditional threats, the political progressive threat should have had the opposite effect. Counterintuitive findings are also observed for liberal mail respondents. At maximum levels of identity strength, liberals reported significantly less fear in the baseline condition than their secular counterparts. In addition, traditional threats significantly heightened reported fear among strongly identified liberals. These effects are given by the three-way interactions between liberal identification, identity strength, and threat.

Differences in the estimated effects of threat and identity strength on fear across samples are also observed for conservative and religious identifiers. Among religious and conservative identifiers in the mail sample, virtually no effect of threat or identity strength was observed. It is important to note the null results observed in the mail sample may be due to an efficiency problem. Standard errors, though robust, are still very large. To some extent this inefficiency may be the result of the cluster sampling method employed here. Alternatively, reported fear among conservatives in the web sample was influenced by threat and identity strength. At low levels of identity strength, both political threats depressed fear for this group. The effect of the political traditional threat was qualified by an interaction between threat and identity strength, such that reported fear increased significantly with increasing identity strength – consistent with expectations. Among religious identifiers, identity strength moderated the effect of personal traditional threat, such that strongly identified religious Americans reported to the threat with greater fear.

The results of this analysis suggest much of the action for fearful reactions to threat occurs among people holding religious and conservative identities. However, it is hard to get a sense of relative positions of groups on these issues and the magnitude of group differences given the coefficients of the interaction terms cannot be understood as effect sizes in isolation. A visual presentation of these group differences in response to threat and the moderating effects of identity strength clarifies these relationships. Predicted values for emotional responses to threat were generated using Clarify. Values were generated for each group and in each condition at high and low identity strength – two standard deviations above and below the sample mean. Predicted values based on the mail survey data are presented in Figures 5.15 – 5.18.

From these figures it is clear both progressive and traditional threats conveyed in a personal tone elicited very modest amounts of fear at both high and low levels of identity strength across groups. The political threats, on the other hand, had a larger effect on reported fear. Political progressive threat (Fig 5.16) has a considerable effect on fear for both secular and liberal identifiers. This effect was moderated by identity strength, such that Americans strongly identified with liberal and secular groups responded to this threat with the greatest fear. This political progressive threat elicited only small amounts of fear among Conservatives, though fear was slightly more pronounced for strongly identified Conservatives. Among religious identifiers, this effect was reversed and in the expected direction. At low levels of identity strength religious respondents reported fear at levels comparable to weakly identified Liberals or Seculars. However, fear was significantly lower among those reporting a strong subjective sense of attachment to a religious group. The effect of the political traditional threat was really confined to Conservatives (Figure 5.18). At low levels of identity strength, Conservatives reported virtually no fear in response to this threat. Highly identified Conservatives reported significantly more anger in response to threat

Predicted fear for each group at high and low levels of subjective identification in each threat condition among mail survey respondents is presented in Figures 5.19 through 5.22. Personal progressive threat actually drives down fear among strongly identified Liberals, while heightening predicted fear among strongly identified Conservatives, Seculars, and Religious Americans (Figure 5.19). However, Liberals responded to the political progressive threat with considerable greater fear than did the other groups

(Figure 5.20). The moderating effect of identity strength is apparent - strong identifiers reported the greatest fear. Reactions among Seculars are comparatively more muted. Seculars reported levels of fear similar to conservative and religious identifiers. Also, no moderating effect of identity strength was evident. Strongly identified Seculars actually reported somewhat less fear than did the weakly identified. Among religious and conservative identifiers, the expected influence of identity strength is observed. Fear is notably lower among strongly identified members of these groups relative to their more weakly identified counterparts. Finally, both traditional threats had little effect on fear for Liberals and Seculars, regardless of identity strength. However, these threats did influence reported fear among strongly identified religious and conservative Americans, exerting a somewhat greater effect on strong religious identifiers.

Anger. In the case of anger, much of the action among web sample respondents is confined to religious and conservative identifiers. Among conservatives, identity strength moderated the effect of the personal progressive threat, reducing experienced anger (β=-.59, s.e.=.15). Similarly, identity strength moderated the effects of the personal traditional (β=1.41, s.e.=.36) and political traditional (β=1,49, s.e.=.36) threats on reported anger among conservatives – heightening anger in a manner consistent with expectations. Identity strength moderated the effect of these traditional threats on anger among religious respondents in a comparable fashion, such that anger increased with increasing strength of identification. A comparable effect is observed for religious, but not conservative, mail sample respondents (Table 5.8). Unlike the web sample, there is some evidence that angry reactions to threat among seculars are moderated by identity strength. At minimum levels of identity strength, the political progressive and personal traditional threats elicited more anger than the baseline personal progressive threat condition. However, the effects of these threats are qualified by identity strength - such that at maximum levels of identification, secular respondents reported significantly less anger in response to these threats. This result for the political progressive threat runs counter to expectations. Minimal effects of threat or identity strength on reported anger are observed for liberal or conservative identifiers here.

Predicted values of reported anger for web respondents based on this model are presented in Figures 5.23 - 5.26. Values are given for each group at both high and low identity strength (two standard deviations above and below the sample mean). The progressive threat cast in a personal tone elicited modest amounts of anger across all groups at low identity strength (Figure 5.23). Moving from low to high identity strength modestly increased reported anger among Liberals and Seculars, while it depressed reported anger among religious and especially conservative identifiers. Political progressive threat provokes a great deal of anger among Liberals and Seculars (Figure 5.24). Highly identified members of these groups are clearly most responsive. Religious Americans respond to this threat with more anger than do Conservatives at both high and low levels of identification. For both groups, reported anger is modest in response to these threats at high levels of identification.

Both traditional threats have their greatest impact among highly identified Conservatives and Religious Americans (Figures 5.25 – 5.26). In both cases, it is clear traditional threats elicit quite minimal amounts of anger among Liberals and Seculars. In addition, these threats have much of an effect on Conservatives and Religious Americans at low levels of identification. Traditional threat had a greater effect on highly identified

Conservatives than for religious identifiers. Also, the political threat seemed to have a slightly larger effect on this group than did the personal threat. In total, these results largely conform to expectations – progressive threat elicits anger in highly identified Liberals and Seculars, while traditional threats evoked significant amounts of anger among highly identified Conservatives and Religious Americans. While Liberals and Seculars do not differ much in reported anger, I again find Conservatives are much more polarized than religious identifiers.

Predicted values of anger for mail respondents are provided in Figures 5.27 through 5.30 to further illustrate these relationships. The personal progressive threat produced modest amounts of anger for religious identifiers and Conservatives (Figure 5.27). It is clear that predicted anger is notably higher among Liberals and Seculars at high identity strength, while it is virtually zero at minimum levels of identity strength. As noted prior, anger in response to the political progressive threat does not conform to expectations (Figure 5.28). This threat produced significant among of anger for all groups. Also, it appears high identity strength actually reduces anger for liberal and Seculars (the intended targets of this threat). As anticipated, threat does significantly depress anger among strongly identified Conservatives and Religious Americans. Anger in response to both traditional threats was largely confined to religious and conservative identifiers (Figures 5.29 - 5.30). Reported anger was significantly higher among people reporting a strong sense of identification with their social group. As was the case for fear, I find strong religious identifiers are more responsive to these traditional threats, such that highly identified religious Americans report levels of anger comparable to conservative identifiers. Responses to the political traditional threat were not appreciably different from the personal traditional threat, contrary to expectations. There is one slightly odd relationship apparent here. Strongly identified Liberals report more anger in response to the political traditional threat than do weakly identified Liberals or Seculars, though this effect is not significant.

Enthusiasm. In both samples, effects of threat and moderating effects of identity strength are most pronounced among religious and conservative identifiers. Among web sample respondents, identity strength moderates the effect of personal progressive threat on enthusiasm for both groups, such that reported enthusiasm increases significantly with increasing identity strength. Both traditional threats bolster enthusiasm for religious respondents at minimum identification, but significantly depress enthusiasm at maximum levels of identification. Among conservatives, no effect of threat is observed at minimum identity strength, though both traditional threats significantly depress tolerance at maximum levels of identity strength. A similar pattern of response to traditional threats for these groups is evident in the mail survey data. While there is no effect of these threats on religious or conservative identifiers at minimum identity strength, enthusiasm is significantly diminished at maximum identity strength. While occasional effects of threat and identity strength are observed for secular identifiers in both samples, they are sporadic and do not amount to a consistent validation of the hypotheses examined here. As observed for negative emotions, liberals do not seem to differ significantly in most cases from secular Americans.

Predicted values for enthusiasm in these four threat conditions better illustrate the nature of group differences and the impact of identity strength. As one can see from Figure 5.31 and Figure 5.32, both progressive threats evoked little enthusiasm among

Liberals and Seculars in the web survey at both high and low levels of subjective identity strength. These conditions also elicited very little enthusiasm among weekly identified Conservatives and Religious Americans, though predicted enthusiasm is 3 to 4 times greater for these groups at high levels of identification. For these highly identified group members, both threats have essentially the same effect. Contrary to expectations, there is little evidence the political threat had a greater effect on reported enthusiasm – despite the presence of explicit group-based cues. The traditional threats elicit comparable levels of predicted enthusiasm for Liberals and Seculars at low levels of subjective identity strength (Figure 5.33 and Figure 5.34). Enthusiasm is notably higher among more strongly identified Liberals and Seculars. Interestingly, weakly identified Religious Americans reported comparable levels of enthusiasm to Liberals and Seculars, though this effect was significantly reduced at high levels of identity strength. As anticipated, both traditional threats evoked very little enthusiasm among Conservatives. Again, I find Conservatives are more polarized in their emotional responses to threat than are their religious counterparts. However, at high levels of identity strength, religious identifiers report emotional responses to threat roughly comparable to those reported by Conservatives.

Predicted values of enthusiasm for mail survey respondents are presented in Figures 5.35 – 5.38. The personal progressive threat elicited the greatest enthusiasm among strongly identified conservative and religious respondents, which makes sense because these experimental treatments are generally consistent with their position on reproductive issues (Figure 5.35). Surprisingly, this condition evokes almost the same amount of reported enthusiasm among weakly identified Liberals, though reported enthusiasm decreased sharply with increasing identity strength for this group. Overall, personal progressive threat produced only modest amounts of enthusiasm across all groups. The effects of political progressive threat on reported enthusiasm run counter to expectations (Figure 5.36). At high levels of identity strength, this threat condition actually slightly increased reported enthusiasm for liberal and secular identifiers. Conservative and religious identifiers were significantly more enthusiastic than their liberal and secular counterparts, though identity strength seemed to have opposite effects on reported enthusiasm for this threat condition. High levels of identity strength seem to reduce enthusiasm among Conservatives (though this effect is not significant), while heightening enthusiasm among religious identifiers. For personal traditional threat (Figure 5.37), enthusiasm is high among Liberals and Seculars. While identity strength does not appreciably impact predicted enthusiasm for Liberals, a large and significant effect of identity strength is apparent for Seculars. The same pattern emerges for Liberals and Seculars in response to political traditional threat, while both traditional threats drive down predicted enthusiasm for both religious and especially conservative identifiers (Figure 5.38).

Overall, the emotional responses to traditional threat reported by religious and conservative identifiers – especially anger and enthusiasm – largely conform to expectations across both samples. Fearful responses are more inconsistent. While conservative identifiers are often clearly more polarized in their emotional responses than are religious identifiers, it is not clear that liberals and seculars differ in meaningful ways in response to threat.

Support for Emergency Contraception. The effects of threat and identity strength on support for emergency contraception are provided in Table 5.9. Recall, results for the attitudinal measures are only presented for the mail data because threat did not have an appreciable impact on the key attitudinal measures among mail survey respondents. For these measures, observations were taken for respondents in the control and experimental conditions, and respondents in the control condition serve as a baseline here. Again, secular respondents serve as the group baseline category. The coefficient for identity strength gives the effect of identity strength on secular respondents in the baseline condition. Reported support is qualified by identity strength for this group, such that support is significantly higher at maximum identity strength. The remaining threat conditions did not significantly affect reported support among this group. Liberal support does not differ from secular support in most cases. Notably, the effect of the personal progressive threat condition differed from the secular baseline. At minimum levels of identity strength, liberals reported significantly lower support (β=-.26 (.09), though this effect goes to zero at high levels of identity strength (β=.30, s.e.=.13). While this result is consistent with the polarization hypothesis, it does not support expectations that the effect of threat would be greatest when conveyed in a political tone.

Effects of identity strength on reported support among conservative and religious Americans were evident, though the threat manipulation seemed to have little effect on their attitudes. In the baseline condition, religious Americans with minimum identity strength reported significantly greater support relative to the baseline (β=.33, s.e.=.16), though this effect is reversed at maximum levels of identity strength (β=-1.04, s.e.=.25). It is worth noting here that one should interpret the effects of social identity type at minimum identity strength with caution. The distribution of identity strength has a strong negative skew, and no respondents actually reported having no subjective identification with their primary group. Among conservatives, no effect of group identity type is observed on reported support at minimum levels of identification, though support drops significantly moving from weak to strong identification (β=-.57, s.e.=.27). Ultimately, social identity type and identity strength along account for much of the variance in reported policy support. Attention to threat offers little more explanatory power.

Political Tolerance. Next, consider the effects of threat and identity strength on tolerance for feminists, fundamentalists, liberals, and conservatives (Table 5.10). Neither threat nor identity strength exert very consistent effects on reported tolerance. The only consistent effects observed are for religious identifiers. In the control condition, identity strength influences expressed tolerance from religious identifiers across target groups. Increases in identity strength correspond to increased tolerance for ideologically similar groups and decreased tolerance for ideologically dissimilar groups. Political traditional threat also influences reported tolerance across groups (with the exception of funds) and these effects are conditioned by identity strength. The remaining observed effects are seemingly random. Threat and identity strength impacts reported tolerance among conservatives, but these effects are confined to tolerance for feminists. Reported tolerance for this group in the control condition is low relative to the secular baseline, and is not qualified by identity strength. However, both political threats heighten tolerance for feminists at minimum identity strength, though this effect is reversed at maximum identity strength. Neither threat not identity strength has an effect on conservative reports

of tolerance for the remaining target groups. Beyond this, there is not much evidence here to support an identity threat account of political tolerance.

Alternative Moderators of Threat – Moral Traditionalism and Social Conformity

To determine whether subjective identity strength exerts an independent effect on emotional reactions to threat, rather than simply acting as a proxy for values like traditionalism or social conformity, I look at the extent to which these value orientations condition responses to threat. Certainly, strength of identification with the political, religious, and secular identities of interest here is related to endorsement of these values. Correlations between identity strength and these values are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12. Traditionalism and social conformity are moderately to highly correlated with identity strength for Americans holding primary religious and conservative identities in both samples, though these orientations are only weakly related to identity strength among secular and liberal identifiers. Working from a values point of view, one would expect individuals with high scores on the measure of moral traditionalism to respond to traditional threats with fear and anger. Alternatively, individuals with low scores on this measure, indicating moral progressivism, should respond to progressive threats with fear and anger. Also, it seems plausible the traditional threats would elicit anger among respondents high in social conformity. One of the defining characteristics of authoritarianism is authoritarian aggression. The literature on emotions has established a firm link between anger and aggressive action tendencies (Berkowitz, 1993). Also, authoritarianism is often thought to be "activated" by threat, such that its effects are most pronounced when threats to the social order or traditional social norms are salient (Feldman and Weber, 2006).

To test these claims, moral traditionalism, social conformity, and the threat condition dummy variables were regressed on the three emotion measures. The interactions between these value orientations and the threat dummy variables give the effect of threat at maximum values of these indicators, while the constituent terms yield the effects of threat while these variables are at their minimum value. In addition, a number of political and demographic controls were included in these models. Again, the personal progressive threat condition serves as a baseline condition. The results are presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. In both samples, traditionalism accounts for much of the variance in emotional responses to threat. Interestingly, these models explain a comparable proportion of variance in emotional response to the identity-based models of emotion examined earlier.

Fear. Looking first at the determinants of fear, it is clear traditionalism significantly moderates the effects of threat among respondents in both samples. While no effect of traditionalism on fear is observed in either sample for the personal progressive threat condition, the effects of the remaining threat conditions are moderated by traditionalism. At minimum levels of traditionalism, the personal progressive threat condition elicits significantly greater fear than the personal progressive threat

(web:β=.64, s.e.=.05; mail:β=.53, s.e.=.15). This effect is reversed or goes to zero at maximum levels of traditionalism (web:-.74, s.e.=.08; mail:β=-.40, s.e.=.19). Both traditional threats depress fear at minimum levels of traditionalism (though this effect is not significant for the personal traditional threat in the web sample), and again this effect is reversed as moral traditionalism goes to its maximum values, such that individuals high in traditionalism reported greater fear in response to these conditions. These findings suggest the threat manipulations operated as intended – with progressive threats arousing fear in progressive respondents and traditional threats arousing fear in morally traditionally respondents. Surprisingly, individual differences in social conformity only moderated the effect of the personal threats on fear and only among web respondents. The directions of these effects run counter to expectations. Recall, the personal political threat heightened fear for individuals at maximum levels of social conformity (β=.30, s.e.=.09), while personal traditional threat diminished reported fear at high levels of social conformity (β=-.28, s.e.=.11).

Anger. A similar pattern of results emerges for anger. In both samples, political progressive threat heightens anger at low levels of traditionalism (web:β=.54, s.e.=.05; mail:β=.44, s.e.=.13), and this effect is reduced at high levels of traditionalism, but only among web respondents (β=-.38, s.e.=.08). Both traditional threats correspond to decreased anger among respondents at minimum levels of traditionalism, while this effect is reversed at maximum levels of traditionalism. Again, this pattern of results conforms to expectations. However, the personal progressive threat does seem to bolster anger among individuals high in moral traditionalism in the web sample results, which is not an expected result. Social conformity does not moderate angry responses to threat among mail sample respondents. Though, among web respondents, high levels of social conformity heighten anger in the personal progressive threat condition, and depress anger in the personal traditional threat condition, contrary to expectations.

Enthusiasm. Among web respondents, traditionalism moderates the effects of threat on enthusiasm. At minimum levels of traditionalism, respondents reported slightly less enthusiasm in response to the political progressive threat than the baseline, but significantly more enthusiasm in response to the traditional threats. Again, this effect is reversed at maximum levels of traditionalism, such that those individuals adhering to a very traditional worldview reported significantly less tolerance when exposed to a traditional threat. In the mail sample, moderating effects of traditionalism are only observed for the traditional threats. In both cases, respondents with minimum levels of traditionalism report heightened enthusiasm, while this effect is reversed at maximum levels of traditionalism. Again, social conformity does not seem to be a major determinant of emotional responses to threat. Endorsement of this value does not appear to moderate the effects of threat on enthusiasm in either sample.

Predicted Values. Predicted values based on these emotion models are presented in Figures 5.39 through 5.44. Given the effects of threat were mainly moderated by moral traditionalism, predicted values were generated at high and low levels of traditionalism (two standard deviations above and below the sample mean), holding social conformity at its mean value and the control variables at their modal categories. One can see that in both samples, individuals scoring low on moral traditionalism reported considerably greater anger and fear than their more traditional counterparts in response to the political progressive threat. Alternatively, morally traditional individuals

reported significantly greater anger and fear in response to the traditional threats than did their progressive counterparts. Predicted enthusiasm was significantly higher for low traditionalism respondents than for more traditional respondents in the traditional threat conditions, while the reverse was true for the progressive threat conditions.

Support for Emergency Contraception. Similar analyses were conducted on the measure of support for emergency contraception. Results for both samples are presented in Table 5.15. In both samples, respondents at maximum levels of traditionalism are significantly less likely to support emergency contraception (web: β=-.24, s.e.=.04; mail;β=-.31, s.e.=.10) in the baseline condition. Social conformity similarly depresses support in this condition, but only among web respondents (β=-.12, s.e.=.04). Overall, the effects of threat on policy support are quite modest here. Interestingly, threat has no effect on respondents at minimum levels of traditionalism in either sample, though both progressive threats depressed support among those high in traditionalism in the web survey. This runs counter to expectations the traditional threats would have this effect, though they do not seem to have an appreciable impact on support in either sample.
In the mail sample, there is no evidence of threat on policy support, merely a direct effect of traditionalism. This is also clear from inspection of predicted values (Figures 5.45 and 5.46).

*Values-Based Explanation for Tolerance***.** Finally, consider the effects of threat and values on political tolerance (Tables 5.16 and 5.17). Looking first at the web data, I find no evidence social conformity moderates the effect of threat on reported political tolerance for Feminists, Fundamentalists, Liberals, or Conservatives, contrary to other work demonstrating a link between preferences for social conformity and political tolerance. Social conformity does have a direct effect on group tolerance. In the control condition, high levels of social conformity corresponds to significantly lower tolerance for Feminists (β=-.13, s.e.=.05), as one might expect given their liberal orientation. However, social conformity also depressed tolerance for Fundamentalists (β=-.12, s.e.=.05) and Conservatives (β=-.13, s.e.=.06), despite these groups taking more traditional positions on social issues.

Traditionalism directly influences reported tolerance in the control condition and also moderates the effect of threat on tolerance. At maximum levels of traditionalism, respondents are significantly less tolerant of both Feminists (β=-.12, s.e.=.04) and Liberals (β=-.21, s.e.=.03), relative to those individuals scoring at minimum levels of traditionalism in the control condition. Conversely, at maximum levels of traditionalism respondents are significantly more tolerant of Fundamentalists (β=.30, s.e.=.04) and Conservatives (β=.19, s.e.=.04). Traditionalism moderates the effect of the political threats on tolerance, but has no influence on responses to threats cast in a personal tone. Among respondents reporting high levels of moral traditionalism, political progressive threat likewise reduces tolerance for Feminists (β=-.12, s.e.=.05) and Liberals (β=-.10, s.e.=.05) relative to the baseline, but has no effect on tolerance for Fundamentalists and Conservatives. Similarly, political traditional threat also reduces tolerance for Feminists (β=-.12, s.e.=.05) and Liberals (-.10, s.e.=.04), though it seems to also bolster tolerance for Conservatives (β=.10, s.e.=.05).

Partisanship and ideology also have modest but significant effects on tolerance. High scores on measures of partisanship and ideology, corresponding to more conservative and republican identification, are related to decreased tolerance for Liberals

and Feminists. In addition, an effect of Bible beliefs, a proxy for theological ideology, is evident. High scores, indicating a relativist interpretation of the Bible, slightly depress tolerance for Fundamentalists and Conservatives, all else being equal. Progressive bible beliefs also correspond to slightly greater tolerance for Liberals and Feminists, though the effect is quite modest.

The results obtained from the mail sample differ markedly from the web results. Whereas social conformity had a direct impact on tolerance towards groups but did not moderate the effects of threat on tolerance among web respondents, here there is a relationship between social conformity and threat. In the baseline condition, social conformity has a direct effect on political tolerance such that respondents reporting high levels of traditionalism report significantly less tolerance for Feminists (β=-.48, s.e.=.15) and Liberals (β=-.26, s.e.=.12), but also Conservatives (β=-.19, s.e.=.09). The effects of social conformity on threat run counter to the hypothesized directions. I anticipated social conformity would depress tolerance for Liberals and Conservatives due to prevailing perceptions of these groups as morally permissive particularly in the traditional threat conditions. Alternatively, threat should bolster tolerance for groups understood to take more traditional perspectives on social issues. In spite of expectations, I find here that the political progressive threat and both traditional threats actually significantly increase tolerance for Feminists at high levels of social conformity. The political progressive threat also significantly depresses tolerance for Fundamentalists among respondents high in social conformity (β=-.41, s.e.=.17).

The effects of traditionalism are much less pronounced here than for web sample respondents. Modest effects of progressive threat on tolerance for Fundamentalists and Conservatives are observed. At minimum levels of traditionalism, political progressive threat elicits significantly less tolerance for Feminists than observed in the baseline condition (β=-.18, s.e.=.09). And, at maximum levels of traditionalism, political progressive threat significantly heightens tolerance for Fundamentalists (β=.20, s.e.=.10). Oddly, at high levels of traditionalism the personal progressive threat significantly reduces tolerance for Conservatives (β=-.21, s.e.=.09). In addition to these somewhat counterintuitive findings for traditionalism and social conformity, I also observe effects of political orientations and religiosity on political tolerance. Partisanship and ideology affect tolerance in ways one would expect. Increasing scores on indicators of partisanship and ideology, which correspond to more conservative political orientations, modestly but significantly decreased tolerance for Feminists and Liberals while increasing reported tolerance for Conservatives and Fundamentalists. Progressive attitudes towards the Bible also depressed tolerance for Fundamentalists (β=-.09, s.e.=.02), while attending church almost weekly or more increased tolerance for Fundamentalists (β=.08, s.e.=.02) and decreased tolerance for Feminists (β=-.07, s.e.=.02).

Predicted Values. To clarify the relationship between traditionalism, threat, and reported political tolerance, I again present predicted values based on the regression analysis discussed above. Because much of the variance in tolerance is explained by traditionalism rather than social conformity, I present predicted tolerance at high and low levels of moral traditionalism (two standard deviations above and below each sample mean). Social conformity is held constant at its mean value, while the control variables are held constant at their modal categories. The results are presented in Figures 5.47

through 5.47. Examination of these figures reflects clear differences between morally traditional and morally progressive respondents across the experimental conditions. In terms of tolerance for Feminists, little effect of threat is apparent among web respondents (Figure 5.47). Generally, predicted tolerance for Feminists is significantly lower among very traditional respondents relative to the more progressive respondents. Among the mail respondents (Figure 5.48), predicted tolerance for Feminists is across all groups that observed among web respondents. Differences based on moral traditionalism are quite evident and the relationship between tolerance and traditionalism is moderated by threat. This effect is really confined to the political progressive threat condition, where observed differences are nearly twice as large as in the other conditions.

Turning to tolerance for Fundamentalists, somewhat larger differences are found between people high and low in traditionalism (Figures 5.49 and 5.50). In the web survey, these differences are quite large, but do not seem to be influenced at all by threat. Among mail respondents, differences in predicted tolerance among very traditional and more progressive respondents are less pronounced. An exception occurs for the political progressive threat condition – which significantly boosts tolerance for Fundamentalists among traditionalists. In terms of tolerance for Liberals and Conservatives, a significant effect of traditionalism but not threat is evident among web respondents (Figures 5.51 and 5.53). The results are similar for the mail survey (Figures 5.52 and 5.54), in that a significant effect of traditionalism on tolerance is observed. However, I do see a greater effect of threat on tolerance for Conservatives. Specifically, the personal progressive and political traditional threats seem to drive down tolerance for Conservatives among individuals high in traditionalism.

Relative Utility of Identity and Values-Based Approaches to the Culture Wars

As was the case for the identity models in the previous section, it seems much of the variance in policy support and tolerance is accounted for by factors other than threat. However, it is difficult to evaluate the relative utility of these approaches from the analysis presented thus far, which consider social identity and values in relative isolation. While both approaches explain virtually identical portions of the variance in emotion, the values approach explains significantly more variance in policy attitudes and tolerance – despite inclusion of fewer predictor variables. In addition, the effects of traditionalism seem to make a great deal of sense. For the most part, the effects of traditionalism and its moderating effects on threat are consistent with the hypotheses developed above. It may be that differences underlying group membership and identity strength are strongly tied to moral traditionalism or particular worldviews related to traditionalism, as Hunter (2006) suggests. In this respect, group membership and identity strength may merely be proxies for the more central political and social orientations driving this conflict.

Perhaps the best way to compare the relative influence of identity strength, moral traditionalism, and social conformity on responses to threat is to estimate a model that simultaneously accounts for the moderating effect of these variables on threat. Using the

web data (given its larger sample size), I conducted this analysis and found this more complex model explains exactly the same proportion of the variance in fear, anger, and enthusiasm as do the identity-based and value-based models individually, despite the inclusion of additional variables (results omitted). Generally, the results suggest traditionalism drives most of the variance in emotional responses to threat. Identity strength does exert a modest effect on emotional responses to threat. However, this effect is largely confined to liberal identifiers. Given the collinearity between traditionalism, social conformity, and identity strength, it is difficult to parse out the unique effects of these variables even when their effects are estimated simultaneously. Endorsement of specific values and social identities are determined endogenously, and likely serve to reinforce each other, particularly for groups such as these – where group boundaries are demarcated by specific patterns of belief and orientations towards the social world.

Ultimately, the results seem to favor an explanation for emotional reactions to threat grounded in values rather than subjective identity strength. The models examining the influence of traditionalism and conformity on responses to threat are more parsimonious, explaining a comparable proportion of the variance in reported emotion with a single construct, traditionalism, rather than multiple indicators for collective identity type and subjective identity strength. Also, the direction of moderating effects of traditionalism on threat conform to expectations in all cases and for both samples, while the effects of group identity and identity strength are less consistent and at times run counter to expectations, especially in the mail sample.

Parallel analysis was conducted to explore the determinants of support for emergency contraception and political tolerance using data from the web survey (the mail sample again could not support such as analysis). I found modest evidence that traditionalism moderates the effects of threat on policy support. For the most part, traditionalism seemed to have a direct effect on attitudes towards this issue. Subjective identity strength did exert a significant effect on attitudes, but the effect was only present for people holding a primary religious identity (results omitted). No clear pattern of relationships emerged from similar analysis of the tolerance data. The effects of identity strength, traditionalism, and social conformity were sporadic and inconsistent (results omitted). Because no consistent relationships between threat and tolerance were observed for the identity-based, values-based or combined approaches employed here, I did not investigate whether emotional responses to threat mediated the effects of threat on tolerance, as I had intended to do. Ultimately, accounting for religiosity and political orientations in a manner typical of political science analysis and looking at the effects of traditionalism explains more of the variance in attitudes towards emergency contraception and political tolerance than does the social identity perspective.

Discussion

In this chapter, I have examined the ways in which identity strength and threat moderate the expression of political and intergroup attitudes among the four primary

identity types derived from the MDS analysis in Chapter 4. Consistent with expectations, I find progressive threats elicit fear and anger among people who report a salient liberal or secular identity. Fearful and angry responses to these threats are most pronounced among Liberals and Seculars who report a strong subjective sense of identification with their primary social groups. Alternatively, these progressive threats induced enthusiasm among conservative and religious identifiers, particularly at high levels of subjective identity strength. Conversely, traditional threat evoked fear and anger among conservative and religious identifiers, particularly at high levels of identity strength. Traditional threat evoked enthusiasm among strongly identified Liberals and Seculars. In the more politically savvy web sample, it was clear Conservatives were more polarized in their emotional responses to threat than were religious identifiers. However, identity strength seemed to operate more strongly for religious identifiers. At low levels of identity strength, religious identifiers were often indistinguishable from Liberals and Seculars. However, at high levels of identification, the emotional responses of religious identifiers converge on conservative levels. This result may be a consequence of greater heterogeneity among religious identifiers - some of whom are more progressive and others more orthodox in their theological orientations.

While threat and identity strength influence reported emotions, attitudes towards emergency contraception and political tolerance were not appreciably polarized or depolarized by threat – whether cast in a personal or political tone. Instead, these attitudes appear to be largely determined by primary social group identification and subjective identity strength. In fact, across the emotional and attitudinal responses to threat, I do not uncover clear support for hypothesis that political or group-based threats elicit more extreme reactions than do threats cast in a personal tone. The political progressive threat manipulation seemed to elicit the strongest emotional reactions across all groups. Its effects were not confined to progressive groups as I anticipated. As noted prior, this could reflect a problem with the stimulus design or selective attention to particular aspects of the threatening message. The political traditional threat seemed to operate more selectively among religious and conservative identifiers – though emotional responses to it were quite muted overall. Conservative web survey respondents were significantly more emotionally polarized by these conditions, though differences are not as apparent for mail survey respondents. In both cases, polarization is confined to individuals reporting strong subjective identity strength.

I also consider an alternative explanation for these effects – whether our measure of subjective identity strength merely conveys the effects of values like moral traditionalism or social conformity. I find strong and relatively consistent evidence that American's endorsement of moral traditionalism or progressivism drives the emotional and attitudinal polarization characteristic of the culture wars phenomenon. Such a finding is consistent with the idea, promulgated by Hunter (1992; 2006) and others, that impulses towards orthodoxy and progressivism result in competing and irreconcilable worldviews which drive the culture wars phenomenon. While consistent differences in opinion and expressed emotion based on moral traditionalism are observed across a variety of domains, I see only very modest effects of threat. The effects of threat are really confined to emotional responses to threat and have quite modest effects on reported attitudes. I also controlled for political and religious orientations in this analysis conducted from a values point of view in an effort to capture some of the variance

explained by the social identity classifications developed in Chapter 4. The results point to small but significant effects of political identity and religiosity on support for emergency contraception and political tolerance.

Contrary to many extant studies on authoritarianism, I do not uncover much evidence that preferences for social conformity are activated by threat. Social conformity does not have much influence on emotion or attitudes in the more sophisticated web sample, which is overwhelmingly liberal. Among mail survey respondents, the effects of threat are moderated by social conformity, but the results run counter to expectations. While I anticipated individuals high in social conformity would report diminished tolerance for socially progressive groups (Feminists and Liberals) in the presence of threats to the moral order and bolster tolerance towards socially traditional groups (Fundamentalists and Conservatives), these effects were not observed. In the mail sample, strong preferences for social conformity actually increased tolerance for Feminists while having no significant influence on tolerance for other groups.

Analysis of the influence of values on emotion and attitudes suggests traditionalism plays a major role, explaining an equal proportion of variance in emotions and attitudes as does social identity type and subjective identity strength. But one key difference does jump out from comparison of the predicted values obtained from the social identity and value-based models. Predicted values of emergency contraception attitudes and tolerance based on differences in moral traditionalism show more muted attitudinal differences which are consistent in magnitude across threat conditions and attitude domains. Predicted values based on primary group identity and subjective identity strength show greater indications of dissensus among groups thought to characterize the conservative coalition – namely that Conservatives are much more polarized than religious identifiers. Also, the effects of identity strength are not constant across groups. Differences between strong and weak identifiers vary as a function of primary identity. Thus, the identity perspective seems to reveal a bit more information than the values perspective, which only points to gross differences between morally progressive and morally traditional Americans. Of course, political and religious orientations were held constant at their modal categories when generating these predicted probabilities, so perhaps a more nuanced perspective on these attitudes could be gained by generating predicted values for strong partisans or ideologues, religious, and secular Americans at high and low traditionalism.

Unfortunately, determination of the relative contributions of values and identity on emotion and attitudes was problematic. Identity and identity strength are correlated with both traditionalism and social conformity. The resulting multicollinearity made it difficult to parse out the unique contributions of each construct on attitudes. An endogeneity problem further complicated these relationships. People maintaining strong group identities are more likely to adhere to group values, particularly for the groups of interest to us here which are largely demarcated by beliefs about the social and political world. Thus, the relationship between identity and values is complex and the constructs likely reinforce each other. Of course, it is also possible the measure of subjective identity strength utilized here did a poor job of capturing the psychological sense of belonging to a particular social group.

Attitudes towards emergency contraception and political tolerance are determined mainly by identity and values but not threat, suggesting they are relatively crystallized.

On the other hand, emotions appeared arise as a function of threat, identity, and values. No link between emotional responses to threat and attitudes was present, counter to what I had expected. It is possible these emotional reactions do not result in attitude change or promote intolerance, but have some other important political consequences which go unmeasured here. Recall from our earlier discussion of intergroup emotions that many studies have linked discrete intergroup emotions to tendencies to behave in particular ways. Notably, Devos, Silver, Mackie, and Smith (2002) demonstrate how anger is liked to tendencies to aggress towards opposition groups while fear results in withdrawal from intergroup conflict. Here, the mobilizing effects of anger may result in the motivation to participate in politics – acting out against opposing groups through mostly legitimate political channels. Enthusiasm is likely to have a comparable mobilizing effect. Such a relationship would be consistent with findings by Marcus and MacKuen (1993) which linked enthusiasm to greater involvement in political campaigns. Unfortunately, this desire to take political action on behalf of group interests goes unmeasured here. Such relationships may explain why the culture wars are so frequently invoked as an electoral strategy.

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Tables

Table 5.1: Scale Properties of Key Measures (Web Survey)

	Alpha	Average Inter-Item Correlations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Identity Strength	.86	.40	.70	.17	.07	1
Anger/Disgust	.96	.80	.32	.34	0	1
Anxiety	.93	.83	.27	.33	0	1
Enthusiasm	.85	.74	.31	.32	0	1
Support for Plan B	.93	.71	.80	.26	0	1
Feminist Tolerance	.94	.71	.76	.21	0	1
Fundamentalist Tolerance	.90	.57	.29	.21	0	1
Liberal Tolerance	.91	.73	.73	.25	0	1
Conservative Tolerance	.87	.65	.38	.22	0	1
Moral Traditionalism	.82	.54	.30	.25	0	1
Social Conformity	.70	.23	.41	.17	0	1

Table 5.2: Scale Properties of Key Measures (Mail Survey)

	Alpha	Average Inter-Item Correlations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Identity Strength	.89	.48	.73	.19	.1	1
Anger/Disgust	.94	.73	.29	.30	0	1
Anxiety	.89	.72	.28	.30	0	1
Enthusiasm	.66	.50	.34	.29	0	1
Support for Plan B	.88	.54	.55	.30	0	1
Feminist Tolerance	.93	.66	.54	.24	0	1
Fundamentalist Tolerance	.91	.61	.49	.25	0	1
Liberal Tolerance	.90	.70	.53	.25	0	1
Conservative Tolerance	.90	.70	.56	.22	0	1
Moral Traditionalism	.85	.58	.62	.28	0	1
Social Conformity	.78	.31	.65	.20	.04	1

Table 5.3: ANOVA Results – Group Differences on Key Measures

WEB SURVEY	Partial SS	Df	MS	F	Prob>F
Support for Em. Contraception					
Group Identity	81.49	3	27.16	896.48	.0001
Residual	64.27	2121	.03	---	---
Feminist Tolerance					
Group Identity	42.96	3	14.32	624.73	.0001
Residual	47.95	2095	.02	---	---
Fundamentalist Tolerance					
Group Identity	38.99	3	13.00	490.78	.0001
Residual	55.80	2110	.03	---	---
Liberal Tolerance					
Group Identity	59.34	3	19.78	753.36	.0001
Residual	54.66	2082	.03	---	---
Conservative Tolerance					
Group Identity	38.08	3	12.69	426.08	.0001
Residual	61.75	2073	.03	---	---
MAIL SURVEY	**Partial SS**	**Df**	**MS**	**F**	**Prob>F**
Support for Em. Contraception					
Group Identity	11.13	3	3.71	57.00	.0001
Residual	31.83	489	.07	---	---
Feminist Tolerance					
Group Identity	7.54	3	2.95	63.85	.0001
Residual	20.12	491	.05	---	---
Fundamentalist Tolerance					
Group Identity	8.84	3	2.95	63.85	.0001
Residual	22.43	486	.05	---	---
Liberal Tolerance					
Group Identity	8.97	3	2.99	67.29	.0001
Residual	21.24	480	.04	---	---
Conservative Tolerance					
Group Identity	5.82	3	1.94	50.16	.0001
Residual	24.41	481	.04	---	---

Table 5.4: ANOVA Results – Emotion Manipulation Checks

WEB SURVEY	Partial SS	Df	MS	F	Prob>F
FEAR					
Model	89.86	15	5.99	113.34	.0001
Group Identity	1.59	3	.53	10.03	.0001
Threat	18.68	3	6.23	117.79	.0001
Group Identity * Threat	12.31	12	1.37	25.87	.0001
Residual	85.68	1621	.05	---	---
ANGER					
Model	109.38	15	7.29	145.84	.0001
Group Identity	.53	3	.18	3.51	.0147
Threat	18.64	3	6.21	124.27	.0001
Group Identity * Threat	21.37	12	2.37	47.48	.0001
Residual	81.10	1622	.05	---	---
ENTHUSIASM					
Model	72.67	15	4.94	84.76	.0001
Group Identity	.88	3	.29	5.13	.0016
Threat	6.02	3	2.01	35.08	.0001
Group Identity * Threat	22.40	12	2.49	43.55	.0001
Residual	92.65	1621	.06	---	---
MAIL SURVEY	**Partial SS**	**Df**	**MS**	**F**	**Prob>F**
FEAR					
Model	5.43	15	.36	4.57	.0001
Group Identity	.72	3	.24	3.01	.0302
Threat	2.88	3	.96	12.11	.0001
Group Identity * Threat	2.41	9	.27	3.38	.0005
Residual	29.24	369	.08	---	---
ANGER					
Model	6.78	15	.45	5.82	.0001
Group Identity	.88	3	.29	3.79	.0106
Threat	3.52	3	1.17	15.14	.0001
Group Identity * Threat	2.53	9	.28	3.62	.0002
Residual	28.79	371	.08	---	---
ENTHUSIASM					
Model	5.21	15	.35	4.64	.0001
Group Identity	.66	3	.22	2.93	.0338
Threat	1.67	3	.56	7.45	.0001
Group Identity * Threat	3.73	0	.41	5.54	.0001
Residual	27.53	368	.07	---	---

Table 5.5: Attitudinal Responses to Threat (Web Survey)

	Em. Cont. Support	Feminist Tolerance	Fund~ist Tolerance	Liberal Tolerance	Conserv. Tolerance
Liberal ID	**0.06 (.02)**	**0.08 (.02)**	**-0.05 (.02)**	**0.06 (.02)**	**-0.05 (.02)**
Conserv. ID	**-0.45 (.04)**	**-0.36 (.04)**	**0.37 (.03)**	**-0.42 (.04)**	**0.39 (.03)**
Religious ID	**-0.34 (.05)**	**-0.17 (.03)**	**0.17 (.03)**	**-0.19 (.04)**	**0.18 (.03)**
Pers. Progressive Threat	**0.09 (.02)**	**0.06 (.02)**	**-0.06 (.02)**	**0.04 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)
Pol. Progressive Threat	**0.06 (.02)**	**0.05 (.02)**	**-0.07 (.02)**	0.02 (.02)	**-0.05 (.02)**
Pers. Traditional Threat	0.01 (.02)	**0.04 (.02)**	**-0.04 (.02)**	0.02 (.02)	-0.02 (.02)
Pol. Traditional Threat	**0.04 (.02)**	**0.05 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)	0.03 (.02)	-0.02 (.02)
Liberal ID * Pers. Progressive Threat	**-0.10 (.02)**	**-0.07 (.02)**	**0.08 (.02)**	**-0.06 (.02)**	0.04 (.03)
Liberal ID * Pol. Progressive Threat	**-0.06 (.02)**	**-0.06 (.02)**	**0.09 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)	**0.07 (.03)**
Liberal ID * Pers. Traditional Threat	-0.03 (.02)	**-0.05 (.02)**	**0.07 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)	0.05 (.03)
Liberal ID * Pol. Traditional Threat	**-0.05 (.02)**	**-0.06 (.02)**	**0.04 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)	0.01 (.03)
Conserv. ID * Pers. Prog. Threat	**-0.33 (.04)**	**-0.21 (.04)**	**0.17 (.03)**	**-0.27 (.04)**	**0.13 (.03)**
Conserv. ID * Pol. Progressive Threat	**-0.22 (.05)**	**-0.16 (.06)**	**0.17 (.05)**	**-0.24 (.06)**	**0.19 (.04)**
Conserv. ID * Pers. Trad. Threat	**-0.18 (.06)**	**-0.12 (.05)**	**0.17 (.04)**	**-0.20 (.05)**	**0.12 (.05)**
Conserv. ID * Pol. Traditional Threat	**-0.21 (.05)**	**-0.17 (.05)**	**0.10 (.05)**	**-0.19 (.05)**	**0.10 (.04)**
Religious ID * Pers. Prog. Threat	0.01 (.06)	0.02 (.04)	0.04 (.04)	0.02 (.05)	-0.02 (.04)
Religious ID * Pol. Progressive Threat	-0.03 (.07)	-0.03 (.05)	0.06 (.05)	-0.04 (.06)	0.03 (.05)
Religious ID * Pers. Trad. Threat	-0.04 (.07)	-0.05 (.05)	**0.11 (.05)**	-0.08 (.06)	0.05 (.05)
Religious ID * Pol. Trad. Threat	-0.03 (.06)	-0.09 (.05)	0.02 (.05)	-0.08 (.06)	0.01 (.05)
Constant	**0.86 (.01)**	**0.77 (.01)**	**0.26 (.01)**	**0.77 (.01)**	**0.34 (.02)**
R Squared	.58	.49	.42	2077	2065
N	2078	2075	2074	.55	.39

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.6: Attitudinal Responses to Threat (Mail Survey)

	Em. Cont. Support	Feminist Tolerance	Fund~ist Tolerance	Liberal Tolerance	Conserv. Tolerance
Liberal ID	**0.07 (.06)**	-0.04 (.05)	-0.05 (.06)	0.06 (.06)	-0.03 (.08)
Conserv. ID	**-0.30 (.08)**	**-0.27 (.07)**	**0.24 (.07)**	**-0.27 (.07)**	**0.29 (.06)**
Religious ID	**-0.26 (.07)**	**-0.23 (.05)**	**0.22 (.06)**	**-0.23 (.06)**	**0.23 (.07)**
Pers. Progressive Threat	0.10 (.07)	0.06 (.06)	**-0.17 (.06)**	0.09 (.06)	-0.06 (.06)
Pol. Progressive Threat	-0.06 (.08)	-0.08 (.05)	-0.03 (.08)	-0.04 (.05)	0.08 (.08)
Pers. Traditional Threat	0.04 (.13)	-0.06 (.12)	-0.08 (.07)	0.06 (.05)	0.11 (.08)
Pol. Traditional Threat	0.11 (.06)	-0.05 (.05)	-0.03 (.07)	-0.03 (.05)	0.08 (.07)
Liberal ID * Pers. Progressive Threat	-0.10 (.09)	-0.02 (.08)	0.08 (.08)	-0.06 (.08)	0.12 (.08)
Liberal ID * Pol. Progressive Threat	0.12 (.09)	**0.19 (.08)**	0.01 (.10)	-0.01 (.09)	-0.07 (.10)
Liberal ID * Pers. Traditional Threat	0.00 (.14)	0.18 (.13)	0.05 (.09)	-0.05 (.08)	-0.11 (.10)
Liberal ID * Pol. Traditional Threat	-0.08 (.08)	0.15 (.07)	-0.09 (.09)	0.04 (.07)	-0.08 (.10)
Conserv. ID * Pers. Prog. Threat	**-0.19 (.07)**	**-0.22 (.05)**	**0.15 (.05)**	**-0.24 (.05)**	**0.21 (.04)**
Conserv. ID * Pol. Progressive Threat	0.16 (.11)	0.06 (.09)	-0.03 (.10)	-0.10 (.09)	-0.08 (.09)
Conserv. ID * Pers. Trad. Threat	0.05 (.17)	0.06 (.15)	0.00 (.10)	-0.14 (.09)	-0.04 (.09)
Conserv. ID * Pol. Traditional Threat	-0.04 (.10)	-0.05 (.09)	-0.02 (.10)	-0.02 (.09)	-0.08 (.08)
Religious ID * Pers. Prog. Threat	-0.07 (.09)	0.06 (.08)	0.11 (.07)	0.03 (.07)	-0.03 (.07)
Religious ID * Pol. Prog. Threat	0.13 (.09)	0.08 (.07)	0.01 (.10)	0.09 (.07)	-0.12 (.09)
Religious ID * Pers. Trad. Threat	-0.04 (.14)	0.04 (.13)	0.05 (.09)	-0.08 (.07)	-0.13 (.09)
Religious ID * Pol. Trad. Threat	-0.10 (.08)	0.06 (.06)	0.05 (.08)	0.02 (.07)	-0.06 (.08)
Constant	**0.71 (.05)**	**0.72 (.04)**	**0.37 (.05)**	**0.70 (.04)**	**0.39 (.06)**
R Squared	.30	.33	.31	.36	.31
N	481	484	480	475	476

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.7: Identity Strength and Emotional Responses to Threat (Web Survey)

	FEAR	ANGER	ENTHUSIASM
Identity Strength	0.02 (.14)	0.15 (.14)	0.06 (.09)
Liberal Id	0.02 (.09)	0.05 (.09)	0.07 (.13)
Conservative Id	0.08 (.17)	0.14 (.11)	-0.10 (.21)
Religious Id	-0.04 (.15)	0.08 (.15)	**-0.31 (.12)**
Political Progressive Threat	0.19 (.13)	**0.27 (.14)**	0.04 (.09)
Personal Traditional Threat	-0.16 (.10)	-0.20 (.11)	0.25 (.14)
Political Traditional Threat	-0.11 (.11)	-0.16 (.11)	0.14 (.11)
Identity Strength*Liberal Id	0.03 (.18)	0.07 (.18)	-0.03 (.11)
Identity Strength*Conserv Id	-0.15 (.25)	**-0.59 (.15)**	**0.56 (.28)**
Identity Strength*Religious Id	0.04 (.21)	-0.38 (.21)	**0.68 (.18)**
Liberal Id* Political Progressive Threat	-0.14 (.16)	-0.20 (.15)	0.00 (.15)
Liberal Id* Personal Traditional Threat	0.04 (.11)	-0.10 (.11)	-0.23 (.20)
Liberal Id* Political Traditional Threat	-0.03 (.15)	-0.17 (.15)	-0.04 (.15)
Conserv Id* Political Progressive Threat	**-0.82 (.33)**	-0.20 (.59)	-0.19 (.46)
Conserv Id* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.04 (.25)	-0.44 (.26)	-0.02 (.27)
Conserv Id* Political Traditional Threat	**-0.51 (.26)**	-0.44 (.28)	-0.08 (.26)
Religious Id* Political Progressive Threat	**0.48 (.24)**	0.11 (.24)	0.18 (.19)
Religious Id* Personal Traditional Threat	0.08 (.18)	-0.32 (.20)	**0.68 (.23)**
Religious Id* Political Traditional Threat	0.13 (.21)	-0.17 (.22)	**0.72 (.20)**
Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	**0.43 (.19)**	0.18 (.19)	-0.10 (.13)
Identity Strength* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.02 (.15)	-0.21 (.17)	0.28 (.21)
Identity Strength*Political Traditional Threat	-0.07 (.16)	-0.17 (.16)	**0.46 (.16)**
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog Th.	0.08 (.25)	0.06 (.24)	-0.04 (.16)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad Th.	-0.09 (.20)	-0.01 (.21)	0.29 (.26)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad Th.	-0.01 (.21)	-0.10 (.22)	-0.12 (.21)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog Th.	0.21 (.46)	-0.13 (.74)	0.25 (.60)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad Th.	0.17 (.35)	**1.41 (.36)**	**-1.08 (.36)**
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad Th.	**1.00 (.37)**	**1.49 (.36)**	**-0.94 (.35)**
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	**-1.19 (.34)**	-0.42 (.35)	-0.16 (.29)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	-0.04 (.26)	**0.98 (.29)**	**-1.60 (.34)**
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	-0.04 (.31)	**0.76 (.34)**	**-1.65 (.30)**
Constant	**0.23 (.09)**	**0.29 (.09)**	0.08 (.06)
N	1637	1638	1637
Adjusted R^2	.54	.60	.48

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.8: Identity Strength and Emotional Responses to Threat (Mail Survey)

	FEAR	ANGER	ENTHUSIASM
Identity Strength	**0.50 (.18)**	0.51 (.29)	0.07 (.27)
Liberal Id	-0.15 (.27)	-0.22 (.24)	0.31 (.33)
Conservative Id	-0.32 (.18)	0.35 (.37)	-0.14 (.46)
Religious Id	0.10 (.27)	0.34 (.31)	-0.05 (.24)
Political. Progressive Threat	0.45 (.25)	**0.56 (.25)**	-0.02 (.28)
Personal Traditional Threat	0.24 (.16)	**0.39 (.17)**	-0.07 (.21)
Political Traditional Threat	0.04 (.14)	0.07 (.16)	-0.05 (.27)
Identity Strength*Liberal Id	**-0.92 (.42)**	0.03 (.53)	-0.53 (.54)
Identity Strength*Conserv Id	0.38 (.25)	-0.60 (.52)	0.48 (.59)
Identity Strength*Religious Id	-0.24 (.34)	-0.58 (.43)	0.35 (.35)
Liberal Id* Political Progressive Threat	0.62 (.49)	0.60 (.39)	-0.40 (.47)
Liberal Id* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.03 (.31)	0.13 (.34)	0.28 (.50)
Liberal Id* Political Traditional Threat	0.71 (.41)	0.07 (.41)	0.21 (.51)
Conserv Id* Political Progressive Threat	0.47 (.55)	0.10 (.57)	0.41 (.55)
Conserv Id* Personal Traditional Threat	0.12 (.37)	-0.61 (.52)	0.02 (.52)
Conserv Id* Political Traditional Threat	0.40 (.26)	-0.44 (.42)	0.91 (.53)
Religious Id* Political Progressive Threat	0.21 (.41)	0.13 (.40)	-0.22 (.37)
Religious Id* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.43 (.35)	**-0.83 (.37)**	0.34 (.32)
Religious Id* Political Traditional Threat	-0.15 (.31)	-0.58 (.33)	0.57 (.38)
Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	**-0.61 (.25)**	**-0.64 (.32)**	-0.03 (.45)
Identity Strength* Personal Traditional Threat	**-0.77 (.21)**	**-0.92 (.29)**	**0.75 (.33)**
Identity Strength*Political Traditional Threat	**-0.49 (.18)**	-0.52(.29)	0.63 (.41)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	0.62 (.70)	-0.30 (.66)	0.71 (.75)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	**1.21 (.47)**	0.10 (.59)	-0.38 (.75)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	**1.22 (.60)**	0.42 (.66)	0.12 (.70)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	-0.58 (.79)	-0.03 (.82)	-0.67 (.76)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	0.20 (.54)	1.33 (.75)	-0.96 (.70)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	-0.21 (.39)	1.08 (.62)	**-1.98 (.71)**
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	-0.13 (.47)	-0.03 (.51)	0.17 (.55)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	**1.06 (.44)**	**1.60 (.51)**	**-1.29 (.45)**
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	0.64 (.39)	**1.31 (.47)**	**-1.44 (.52)**
Constant	-0.03 (.14)	-0.06 (.16)	.14 (.16)
N	384	386	383
Adjusted R^2	.21	.28	.24

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.9: Effects of Identity Strength and Threat on Policy Support (Web Survey)

	Web Survey
Identity Strength	**0.16 (.08)**
Liberal Id	0.08 (.07)
Conservative Id	-0.15 (.22)
Religious Id	**0.33 (16)**
Personal Progressive Threat	0.11 (.08)
Political. Progressive Threat	0.03 (.10)
Personal Traditional Threat	-0.03 (.07)
Political Traditional Threat	0.05 (.07)
Identity Strength*Liberal Id	-0.08 (.10)
Identity Strength*Conservative Id	**-0.57 (.27)**
Identity Strength*Religious Id	**-1.04 (.25)**
Liberal Id*Personal Progressive Threat	**-0.26 (.09)**
Liberal Id* Political Progressive Threat	-0.14 (.12)
Liberal Id* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.07 (.09)
Liberal Id* Political Traditional Threat	-0.15 (.09)
Conservative Id*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.43 (.27)
Conservative Id* Political Progressive Threat	0.13 (.30)
Conservative Id* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.05 (.28)
Conservative Id* Political Traditional Threat	-0.03 (.28)
Religious Id*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.04 (.21)
Religious Id* Political Progressive Threat	-0.05 (.23)
Religious Id* Personal Traditional Threat	0.03 (.23)
Religious Id* Political Traditional Threat	0.09 (.19)
Identity Strength*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.11 (.11)
Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	0.00 (.14)
Identity Strength* Personal Traditional Threat	0.05 (.10)
Identity Strength*Political Traditional Threat	-0.04 (.10)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Personal Progressive Threat	**0.30 (.13)**
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	0.15 (.16)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad Threat	0.07 (.13)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad Threat	0.17 (.12)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Personal Progressive Threat	0.44 (.35)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	-0.26 (.37)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Personal Traditional Threat	-0.04 (.34)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Traditional Threat	-0.07 (.34)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.02 (.32)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	0.04 (.35)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Personal Traditional Threat	-0.08 (.34)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Traditional Threat	-0.15 (.29)
Constant	**0.77 (.06)**
N	2124
Adjusted R^2	.65

Table 5.10: Effects of Identity Strength and Threat on Political Tolerance (Web Survey)

	Feminists	**Funds.**	**Liberals**	**Conservs.**
Identity Strength	0.13 (.08)	-0.11(.09)	0.12 (.10)	-0.01 (.11)
Liberal Id	0.05 (.07)	-0.04(.08)	0.02 (.08)	0.11 (.09)
Conservative Id	**-0.51(.22)**	0.24 (.16)	-0.42(.25)	0.27 (.22)
Religious Id	0.25 (.14)	**-0.28(.12)**	0.25 (.15)	-0.10 (.13)
Personal Progressive Threat	0.00 (.08)	0.05 (.09)	-0.10(.09)	0.14 (.10)
Political. Progressive Threat	-0.08(.10)	-0.03(.09)	-0.11(.12)	0.17 (.11)
Personal Traditional Threat	0.02 (.07)	-0.03(.09)	-0.02(.09)	0.06 (.10)
Political Traditional Threat	-0.01(.07)	0.13 (.08)	-0.10(.08)	0.15 (.10)
Identity Strength*Liberal Id	0.01 (.10)	0.01 (.11)	0.01 (.11)	-0.19 (.13)
Identity Strength*Conservative Id	0.08 (.30)	0.29 (.21)	-0.21(.30)	0.26 (.28)
Identity Strength*Religious Id	**-0.66(.22)**	**0.70 (.19)**	**-0.70(.23)**	**0.44 (.19)**
Liberal Id*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.04(.10)	0.10 (.11)	-0.06(.11)	-0.02 (.12)
Liberal Id* Political Progressive Threat	0.01 (.12)	0.14 (.12)	-0.06(.13)	-0.17 (.13)
Liberal Id* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.14(.09)	0.10 (.12)	-0.08(.10)	-0.14 (.13)
Liberal Id* Political Traditional Threat	-0.04(.09)	0.01 (.11)	-0.02(.10)	-0.03 (.12)
Conservative Id*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.01(.25)	-0.02(.20)	0.19 (.28)	-0.10 (.24)
Conservative Id* Political Progressive Threat	**0.62 (.31)**	-0.25(.33)	0.32 (.40)	-0.15 (.29)
Conservative Id* Personal Traditional Threat	0.39 (.25)	-0.05(.20)	0.20 (.29)	-0.25 (.26)
Conservative Id* Political Traditional Threat	**0.61 (.27)**	-0.29(.21)	0.38 (.28)	-0.30 (.25)
Religious Id*Personal Traditional Threat	-0.04(.18)	-0.09(.16)	0.23 (.20)	-0.28 (.17)
Religious Id* Political Progressive Threat	0.12 (.21)	0.04 (.16)	0.03 (.23)	-0.22 (.19)
Religious Id* Personal Traditional Threat	0.01 (.17)	-0.06(.16)	0.14 (.18)	-0.16 (.18)
Religious Id* Political Traditional Threat	0.28 (.17)	-0.28(.18)	0.32 (.19)	**-0.41 (.17)**
Identity Strength*Personal Progressive Threat	0.04 (.12)	-0.13(.13)	0.12 (.13)	-0.20 (.14)
Identity Strength*Political Progressive Threat	0.17 (.14)	-0.03(.13)	0.16 (.17)	**-0.30 (.15)**
Identity Strength* Personal Traditional Threat	0.01 (.10)	-0.01(.14)	0.03 (.12)	-0.11 (.15)
Identity Strength*Political Traditional Threat	0.07 (.10)	**-0.23(.12)**	0.16 (.11)	-0.23 (.14)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Personal Prog.	0.00 (.14)	-0.05(.16)	0.06 (.15)	0.07 (.18)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	-0.08(.16)	-0.09(.16)	0.05 (.18)	0.33 (.18)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	0.13 (.12)	-0.06(.17)	0.09 (.14)	0.25 (.18)
Liberal Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	0.00 (.12)	0.04 (.15)	0.00 (.13)	0.05 (.17)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Personal Prog	-0.08(.34)	0.08 (.27)	-0.24(.34)	0.13 (.31)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	**-0.89(.40)**	0.41 (.41)	-0.53(.48)	0.35 (.36)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	-0.59(.33)	0.19 (.27)	-0.33(.35)	0.39 (.32)
Conserv Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	**-0.93(.35)**	0.42 (.28)	-0.56(.34)	0.44 (.31)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	0.04 (.27)	0.23 (.24)	-0.37(.30)	0.41 (.24)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Prog	-0.22(.31)	0.04 (.24)	-0.08(.34)	0.36 (.27)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Personal Trad	-0.09(.26)	0.24 (.24)	-0.33(.27)	0.31 (.26)
Religious Id*Identity Strength*Political Trad	**-0.54(.26)**	0.43 (.27)	**-0.58(.29)**	**0.60 (.25)**
Constant	**0.70 (.06)**	**0.32 (.06)**	**0.72 (.07)**	**0.34 (.08)**
N	2095	2110	2085	2076
R^2	.55	.50	.61	.46

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.11: Correlation Matrix for Key Variables by Group (Web Survey)

LIBERALS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1)Identity Strength	1						
(2)Traditionalism	-.19	1					
(3)Social Conformity	.02	.20	1				
(4)Party ID	-.34	.15	.08	1			
(5) Ideology	-.25	.27	.06	.31	1		
(6)Bible Beliefs	.04	-.17	-.05	.00	-.24	1	
(7)Church Attendance	-.04	.14	-.03	-.10	.11	-.45	1
CONSERVATIVES							
Identity Strength	1						
Traditionalism	.39	1					
Social Conformity	.20	.46	1				
Party ID	.32	.38	.29	1			
Ideology	.34	.37	.10	.48	1		
Bible Beliefs	-.21	-.23	-.18	-.17	-.21	1	
Church Attendance	.09	.22	.02	.04	.15	-.42	1
SECULARS							
Identity Strength	1						
Traditionalism	-.19	1					
Social Conformity	.03	.23	1				
Party ID	-.19	.17	.17	1			
Ideology	-.20	.31	.16	.46	1		
Bible Beliefs	-.05	-.20	-.13	-.15	-.26	1	
Church Attendance	.09	.16	.01	.01	.15	-.39	1
RELIGIOUS							
Identity Strength	1						
Traditionalism	.56	1					
Social Conformity	.40	.64	1				
Party ID	.50	.74	.54	1			
Ideology	.50	.80	.60	.87	1		
Bible Beliefs	-.35	-.54	-.41	-.43	-.51	1	
Church Attendance	.28	.40	.21	.32	.35	-.43	1

Table 5.12: Correlation Matrix for Key Variables by Group (Mail Survey)

LIBERALS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1)Identity Strength	1						
(2)Traditionalism	-.17	1					
(3)Social Conformity	-.17	.42	1				
(4)Party ID	-.24	.10	.23	1			
(5) Ideology	-.14	.42	.27	.34	1		
(6)Bible Beliefs	-.02	-.34	-.37	-.12	-.34	1	
(7)Church Attendance	-.01	.37	.31	.00	.30	-.57	1
CONSERVATIVES							
Identity Strength	1						
Traditionalism	.30	1					
Social Conformity	.32	.64	1				
Party ID	.22	.34	.07	1			
Ideology	.46	.35	.25	.60	1		
Bible Beliefs	-.49	-.28	-.23	-.22	-.31	1	
Church Attendance	.35	.40	.28	.19	.25	-.49	1
SECULARS							
Identity Strength	1						
Traditionalism	-.10	1					
Social Conformity	.08	.39	1				
Party ID	-.23	.21	.03	1			
Ideology	-.35	.48	.28	.32	1		
Bible Beliefs	.15	-.45	-.38	-.24	-.47	1	
Church Attendance	-.02	.29	-.05	.21	.20	-.33	1
RELIGIOUS							
Identity Strength	1						
Traditionalism	.47	1					
Social Conformity	.23	.48	1				
Party ID	.22	.27	.09	1			
Ideology	.28	.61	.34	.48	1		
Bible Beliefs	-.32	-.48	-.38	-.07	-.32	1	
Church Attendance	.44	.39	.23	.08	.25	-.40	1

Table 5.13: Values and Emotional Responses to Threat (Web Survey)

	Fear	Anger	Enthusiasm
Traditionalism	-0.06 (.06)	**-0.42 (.06)**	**0.42 (.06)**
Social Conformity	**0.30 (.09)**	**0.33 (.09)**	0.00 (.08)
Political Progressive Threat	**0.64 (.05)**	**0.54 (.05)**	**-0.08 (.04)**
Personal Traditional Threat	**-0.13 (.04)**	**-0.39 (.04)**	**0.67 (.05)**
Political Traditional Threat	**-0.18 (.05)**	**-0.33 (.05)**	**0.64 (.05)**
Trad*Political Progressive Threat	**-0.74 (.08)**	**-0.38 (.08)**	0.06 (.09)
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	**0.30 (.07)**	**0.89 (.07)**	**-1.12 (.08)**
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	**0.25 (.08)**	**0.70 (.08)**	**-0.97 (.09)**
S.Conform*Political Progressive Threat	-0.10 (.13)	-0.14 (.12)	0.11 (.11)
S.Conform* Personal Traditional Threat	**-0.28 (.11)**	**-0.24 (.10)**	0.00 (.13)
S.Conform*Political Traditional Threat	-0.01 (.12)	-0.02 (.12)	-0.04 (.14)
Partisanship	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Ideology	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)
Bible Beliefs	-0.02 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.02)
Church Attendance	**-0.05 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)	**0.04 (.02)**
Female	**0.05 (.01)**	**0.03 (.01)**	**0.03 (.01)**
White	-0.01 (.02)	0.00 (.02)	0.04 (.02)
College	0.00 (.02)	-0.02 (.02)	0.01 (.02)
Postgraduate Degree	0.01 (.02)	-0.01 (.02)	-0.02 (.02)
Married	0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.01 (.01)
Children	-0.01 (.01)	**-0.04 (.01)**	0.00 (.02)
Age	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Constant	**0.27 (.07)**	**0.33 (.07)**	0.06 (.07)
N	1455	1455	1455
R^2	.55	.61	.49

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.14: Values and Emotional Responses to Threat (Mail Survey)

	Fear	Anger	Enthusiasm
Traditionalism	0.12 (.13)	0.11 (.13)	0.16 (.15)
Social Conformity	0.18 (.18)	-0.13 (.18)	0.21 (.21)
Political Progressive Threat	**0.53 (.14)**	**0.44 (.13)**	-0.06 (.12)
Personal Traditional Threat	-0.23 (.14)	**-0.36 (.13)**	**0.47 (.15)**
Political Traditional Threat	**-0.23 (.11)**	**-0.29 (.12)**	**0.77 (.16)**
Trad*Political Progressive Threat	**-0.40 (.19)**	-0.28 (.19)	-0.06 (.19)
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	**0.36 (.18)**	**0.40 (.17)**	**-0.87 (.21)**
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	**0.30 (.14)**	**0.38 (.15)**	**-0.59 (.17)**
S.Conform*Political Progressive Threat	-0.23 (.25)	-0.05 (.24)	-0.03 (.27)
S.Conform* Personal Traditional Threat	-0.08 (.28)	0.21 (.26)	0.12 (.29)
S.Conform*Political Traditional Threat	-0.10 (.22)	0.09 (.22)	-0.58 (.30)
Partisanship	**-0.02 (.01)**	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Ideology	-0.02 (.03)	0.01 (.03)	**-0.07 (.03)**
Bible Beliefs	-0.02 (.03)	-0.04 (.03)	**-0.06 (.03)**
Church Attendance	0.06 (.04)	0.03 (.04)	0.01 (.04)
Female	0.04 (.03)	-0.02 (.03)	0.05 (.03)
White	0.06 (.04)	-0.01 (.05)	0.01 (.05)
College	0.04 (04)	0.05 (.04)	-0.04 (.04)
Postgraduate Degree	-0.02 (.04)	-0.03 (.04)	-0.03 (.04)
Married	0.04 (.03)	0.04 (.03)	**-0.07 (.03)**
Children	**-0.08 (.04)**	-0.02 (.04)	0.03 (.04)
Age	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Constant	0.17 (.15)	**0.38 (.14)**	**0.38 (.16)**
N	340	341	339
R^2	.25	.31	.25

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.15: Values, Threat, and Support for Emergency Contraception

	Web	Mail
Traditionalism	**-0.24 (.04)**	**-0.31 (.10)**
Social Conformity	**-0.12 (.04)**	0.02 (.15)
Personal Progressive Threat	-0.02 (.02)	0.00 (.09)
Political Progressive Threat	0.02 (.02)	-0.06 (.09)
Personal Traditional Threat	-0.03 (.02)	-0.06 (.11)
Political Traditional Threat	0.02 (.02)	0.15 (.11)
Trad*Personal Progressive Threat	**-0.14 (.05)**	0.11 (.13)
Trad*Political Progressive Threat	**-0.13 (.05)**	0.08 (.13)
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	-0.06 (.05)	-0.01 (.13)
Trad*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.06 (.05)	0.06 (.11)
S.Conform*Personal Progressive Threat	**0.17 (.07)**	-0.16 (.19)
S.Conform*Political Progressive Threat	0.05 (.06)	0.07 (.19)
S.Conform* Personal Traditional Threat	0.09 (.06)	0.17 (.21)
S.Conform*Political Traditional Threat	-0.02 (.06)	-0.17 (.21)
Partisanship	-0.02 (.00)	**-0.03 (.01)**
Ideology	**-0.06 (.00)**	**-0.07 (.02)**
Bible Beliefs	**0.06 (.01)**	**0.05 (.02)**
Church Attendance	**-0.06 (.01)**	**-0.17 (.03)**
Female	**0.02 (.01)**	-0.02 (.02)
White	0.00 (.01)	-0.04 (.03)
College	0.01 (.01)	**-0.04 (.02)**
Postgraduate Degree	0.00 (.01)	-0.02 (.03)
Married	0.00 (.01)	-0.03 (.02)
Children	0.00 (.01)	0.02 (.02)
Age	**0.01 (.00)**	0.01 (.01)
Constant	**0.89 (.03)**	**0.94 (.10)**
N	1878	435
R^2	.80	.58

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.16: Values, Threat, and Political Tolerance (Web Survey)

	Feminists	Fundam-entalists	Liberals	Conserv-atives
Traditionalism	**-0.12 (.04)**	**0.30 (.04)**	**-0.21 (.03)**	**0.19 (.04)**
Social Conformity	**-0.13 (.05)**	**-0.12 (.05)**	-0.05 (.04)	**-0.13 (.06)**
Personal Progressive Threat	-0.01 (.03)	-0.02 (.03)	-0.01 (.02)	-0.02 (.03)
Political Progressive Threat	0.01 (.03)	0.01 (.03)	0.03 (.02)	-0.05 (.03)
Personal Traditional Threat	-0.02 (.02)	-0.01 (.03)	0.00 (.02)	-0.01 (.03)
Political Traditional Threat	0.02 (.02)	0.01 (.03)	0.03 (.02)	-0.03 (.03)
Trad*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.06 (.05)	-0.01 (.05)	-0.02 (.04)	0.00 (.05)
Trad*Political Progressive Threat	**-0.12 (.05)**	0.04 (.05)	**-0.10 (.05)**	0.04 (.05)
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	-0.08 (.05)	0.05 (.05)	-0.03 (.04)	0.05 (.05)
Trad*Political Traditional Threat	**-0.12 (.05)**	0.04 (.05)	**-0.10 (.04)**	**0.10 (.05)**
S.Conform*Personal Progressive	0.08 (.07)	0.03 (.07)	0.04 (.06)	0.05 (.08)
S.Conform*Political Progressive	0.06 (.07)	-0.05 (.07)	-0.03 (.06)	0.11 (.08)
S.Conform* Personal Traditional	0.10 (.06)	-0.01 (.07)	-0.01 (.06)	0.03 (07)
S.Conform*Political Traditional	0.02 (.07)	-0.06 (.07)	-0.03 (.06)	-0.01 (.08)
Partisanship	**-0.05 (.00)**	**0.04 (.00)**	**-0.04 (.00)**	**0.02 (.00)**
Ideology	**-0.02 (.00)**	**0.01 (.00)**	**-0.06 (.00)**	**0.06 (.00)**
Bible Beliefs	**0.02 (.01)**	**-0.05 (.01)**	**0.02 (.01)**	**-0.02 (.01)**
Church Attendance	-0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)
Female	**0.06 (.01)**	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	**0.04 (.01)**
White	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	**0.02 (.01)**
College	**0.03 (.01)**	0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	**0.02 (.01)**
Postgraduate Degree	**0.02 (.01)**	**0.02 (.01)**	-0.01 (.01)	**0.03 (.01)**
Married	0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Children	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Age	0.00 (.00)	**-0.01 (.00)**	**0.02 (.00)**	**-0.02 (.00)**
Constant	**0.90 (.03)**	**0.29 (.04)**	**0.98 (.03)**	**0.22 (.04)**
N	1876	1876	1877	1877
R^2	.70	.58	.79	.57

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Table 5.17: Values, Threat, and Political Tolerance (Mail Survey)

	Feminists	Fundam-entalists	Liberals	Conserv-atives
Traditionalism	-0.07 (.07)	0.13 (.08)	**-0.17 (.08)**	**0.35 (.07)**
Social Conformity	**-0.48 (.15)**	0.18 (.14)	**-0.26 (.12)**	**-0.19 (.09)**
Personal Progressive Threat	-0.06 (.09)	0.00 (.09)	-0.09 (.07)	0.02 (.07)
Political Progressive Threat	**-0.18 (.09)**	0.14 (.09)	-0.02 (.08)	-0.01 (.07)
Personal Traditional Threat	-0.17 (.10)	0.10 (.10)	0.00 (.07)	0.10 (.08)
Political Traditional Threat	-0.15 (.09)	0.07 (.10)	-0.14 (.08)	-0.01 (.08)
Trad*Personal Progressive Threat	-0.02 (.10)	-0.01 (.10)	0.05 (.10)	**-0.21 (.09)**
Trad*Political Progressive Threat	-0.15 (.12)	**0.20 (.10)**	0.18 (.11)	-0.03 (.10)
Trad*Personal Traditional Threat	-0.17 (.11)	-0.05 (.13)	-0.01 (.11)	-0.04 (.10)
Trad*Political Traditional Threat	-0.15 (.09)	0.05 (.11)	-0.03 (.10)	-0.16 (.10)
S.Conform*Personal Progressive	0.10 (.18)	0.03 (.17)	0.11 (.15)	0.18 (.14)
S.Conform*Political Progressive	**0.41 (.21)**	**-0.41 (.17)**	-0.19 (.17)	0.03 (.13)
S.Conform* Personal Traditional	**0.44 (.21)**	-0.17 (.20)	0.03 (.16)	-0.15 (.16)
S.Conform*Political Traditional	**0.36 (.17)**	-0.21 (.19)	0.23 (.15)	0.18 (.15)
Partisanship	-0.01 (.01)	**0.02 (.01)**	**-0.02 (.00)**	**0.03 (.00)**
Ideology	**-0.07 (.02)**	**0.06 (.02)**	**-0.14 (.01)**	**0.10 (.02)**
Bible Beliefs	0.01 (.01)	**-0.09 (.02)**	0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.02)
Church Attendance	**-0.07 (.02)**	**0.08 (.02)**	-0.01 (.02)	0.01 (.02)
Female	**0.06 (.02)**	0.00 (.02)	0.03 (.02)	0.01 (.02)
White	**-0.07 (.03)**	**-0.06 (.02)**	0.01 (.02)	0.02 (.02)
College	**0.04 (.02)**	0.00 (.02)	0.01 (.02)	0.02 (.02)
Postgraduate Degree	**0.05 (.02)**	-0.01 (.02)	0.01 (.02)	0.01 (.02)
Married	-0.03 (.02)	**0.04 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)	-0.01 (.02)
Children	0.02 (.02)	-0.02 (.02)	**0.04 (.02)**	-0.03 (.02)
Age	-0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)
Constant	**1.15 (.10)**	**0.33 (.09)**	**1.17 (.08)**	**0.15 (.07)**
N	435	432	429	428
R^2	.55	.57	.67	.57

Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients at least twice as large as the standard errors are bolded.

Figures

Figure 5.1: Mean Support for Emergency Contraception by Group



Figure 5.2: Political Tolerance by Group (Web Survey)



Figure 5.3: Political Tolerance by Group (Mail Survey)



5.4: Group Difference in Reported Fear (Web Survey)



5.5: Group Differences in Reported Fear (Mail Survey)



5.6: Group Differences in Reported Anger (Web Survey)



5.7: Group Difference in Reported Anger (Mail Survey)



5.8: Group Difference in Reported Enthusiasm (Web Survey)



5.9: Group Difference in Reported Enthusiasm (Mail Survey)



5.10: Effects of Manipulation on Emergency Contraception Support (Web Survey)



5.11: Effects of Threat on Tolerance for Feminists



5.12: Effects of Threat on Tolerance for Fundamentalists



5.13: Effects of Threat on Tolerance for Liberals



5.14: Effects of Threat on Tolerance for Conservatives



5.15: Fearful Responses to Personal Progressive Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.16: Fearful Responses to Political Progressive Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.17: Fearful Responses to Personal Traditional Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.18: Fearful Responses to Political Traditional Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.19: Fearful Responses to Personal Progressive Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.20: Fearful Responses to Political Progressive Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.21: Fearful Responses to Personal Traditional Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.22: Fearful Responses to Political Traditional Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.23: Angry Responses to Personal Progressive Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.24: Angry Responses to Political Progressive Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.25: Angry Responses to Personal Traditional Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.26: Angry Responses to Political Traditional Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.27: Angry Responses to Personal Progressive Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.28: Angry Responses to Political Progressive Threat (Mail Survey)



Note: Y axis should read "Predicted Anger".

Figure 5.29: Angry Responses to Personal Traditional Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.30: Angry Responses to Political Traditional Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.31: Enthusiastic Responses to Personal Progressive Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.32: Enthusiastic Responses to Political Progressive Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.33: Enthusiastic Responses to Personal Traditional Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.34: Enthusiastic Responses to Political Traditional Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.35: Enthusiastic Responses to Personal Progressive Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.36: Enthusiastic Responses to Political Progressive Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.37: Enthusiastic Responses to Personal Traditional Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.38: Enthusiastic Responses to Political Traditional Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.39: Traditionalism and Fearful Responses to Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.40: Traditionalism and Fearful Responses to Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.41: Traditionalism and Angry Responses to Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.42: Traditionalism and Angry Responses to Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.43: Traditionalism and Enthusiastic Responses to Threat (Web Survey)



Figure 5.44: Traditionalism and Enthusiastic Responses to Threat (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.45: Traditionalism, Threat, and Support for Emergency Contraception (Web Survey)



Figure 5.46: Traditionalism, Threat, and Support for Emergency Contraception (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.47: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Feminists (Web Survey)



Figure 5.48: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Feminists (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.49: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Fundamentalists (Web Survey)



Figure 5.50: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Fundamentalists (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.51: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Liberals (Web Survey)



Figure 5.52: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Liberals (Mail Survey)



Figure 5.53: Traditionalism, Threat, and Tolerance for Conservatives (Web Survey)



Figure 5.54: Threat, Traditionalism, and Tolerance for Conservatives (Mail Survey)



Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks

Introduction

In this project, I sought to gain a better understanding of the culture wars phenomenon by investigating it from a social identity point of view. Specifically, I considered whether identification with key political, religious, and secular groups was related in a systematic fashion to political attitudes and behavior. Given the debate regarding whether the culture wars is an elite or mass phenomenon, I focused considerable attention on the scope of the conflict. Looking at over thirty years of data from the National Election Studies, I found strongly committed partisans, ideologues, religious, and secular Americans became more polarized in their attitudes towards issues like abortion and gay rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The magnitude of differences between these groups stayed consistent, and in some cases grew, through 2004. I also uncovered a link between strong identification with these groups and political behavior. Committed members of these groups participated in politics at significantly higher rates than did their less committed and more moderate counterparts. A likely consequence of this unevenness in political participation is that elites receive signals suggesting polarization among their key bases of support.

Next, I investigated whether alternative strategies for measuring identity would prove more useful than the ascribed methods typically employed in empirical work on the culture wars. I developed and evaluated a method for measuring social identities which takes into account the relationship among identities (or their intersectionality), identity salience, and subjective strength of identification with one's primary social group. Finally, I attempted to gain some traction on the emotional and attitudinal processes underlying this conflict by looking at responses to experimentally induced threat and the way these responses were moderated by identity strength. I found threat influenced the expression of anger and fear, particularly, among strong group identifiers. Large group differences were observed for reported attitudes and political tolerance, and these differences were moderated by identity strength. However, threat had only modest and inconsistent effects. Generally, the results support this notion of the culture wars as a form of identity politics. However, this support is qualified by an inability to effectively disentangle identity strength from core values. Below, I review the key findings from the three studies presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 and discuss several avenues for future research likely to afford further insight into the culture wars phenomenon in American politics.

Public Involvement in the Culture Wars

The results of this analysis of opinion polarization in the mass public presented in Chapter 3 are somewhat at odds with the findings outlined by Fiorina (2006). Consistent with work by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) and Evans (2003) there is strong evidence of polarization on social issue attitudes among strong partisans and ideologues in the mass public. Looking at the distribution of opinion on issues like abortion and gay

rights in 2004, using data from the 2004 National Election Study, I find large and significant partisan and ideological differences. These differences reflect a recent point in a trend towards greater polarization which began in the late 1980s and early 1990s and persisted through 2004. An interesting asymmetry is also observed here which goes unmentioned in other studies of the culture wars in the mass public. Looking at trends in opinion on these social issues over the past 30 years, one can see strong Liberals and Democrats rapidly become more unified in the endorsement of socially progressive positions on these issues. Generally, opinion on these issues for these groups has become increasingly more consensual. Conversely, Republicans and Conservatives have become internally polarized during this same time period. This finding seems at odds with Republicans recent electoral and policy success, and is also inconsistent with the notion Republicans have moved en masse towards greater social conservatism during this period. Ultimately, such internal polarization may reflect growing dissensus between the more libertarian economic conservatives and social conservatives.

While these general trends towards greater unity among Liberals and Democrats and greater disunity among republicans and conservatives hold, some variation is observed across issue areas. For example, attitudes towards abortion have become increasingly polarized, though the rate of change was significantly greater among Liberal and Democrat identifiers. Reported attitudes towards gay rights became increasingly liberal for all groups beginning in 1992. Again, Liberals and Democrats moved towards greater support for gay rights at a much faster rate than did Republicans and Conservatives, resulting in a widening gap between these groups over time. However, attitudes towards gay rights varied by domain. Support for extending employment and service rights grows uniformly high for both Democrats and Liberals during this period. However, Liberals are significantly more univalent in their support for extending marriage and adoption rights to gays. These issues more evenly divide strong Democrats, which may explain why they were invoked in the 2004 presidential campaign – as an effort to divide the Democratic base and ensure a Republican victory.

While these findings of partisan and ideological polarization are consistent with work by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) and Evans (2003), my findings on the nature of religious differences differ. There is modest evidence of polarization – rather than convergence – based on religiosity, most notably among secular Americans and committed Fundamentalists. In some cases, polarization among committed Mainliners is evident, though this group reports less extreme social policy attitudes, on average, than do committed Fundamentalists. In fact, their attitudes are typically more comparable to those reported by weakly committed Fundamentalists. I may observe polarization where others fail to, because I employ a different strategy for classifying respondents into religious camps. Work in this area, notably work by Evans (2002; 2003), has shown how observed differences among sub-sets of religious Americans are highly contingent on the methods used to identify religious subdivisions. This question of how to appropriately classify Americans also bears on these finding of internal polarization among committed fundamentalists. While this group is typically perceived as monolithic in their social conservatism and highly politicized, the internal polarization observed here points to divided opinion and diminished capacity for promoting a unified political agenda. Given the available data, it is had to determine whether these differences of opinion are the result of classification errors, variations in the extent to which fundamentalist identity is

politicized, or true internal divisions within the fundamentalist camp. Of course, the same criticism can be made of other studies pointing to internal divisions among religious Americans (see for example Gay et al, 1996).

Similar patterns of results are found for intergroup attitudes. Generally, ideologically similar groups make significantly more favorable evaluations of one another than do ideologically dissimilar groups. However, considerably less polarization is observed in intergroup attitudes than for policy attitudes during this period. While Christian Fundamentalists, Liberals, Conservatives, Democrats, and Republicans differ significantly in their mean evaluations of each other, these differences are mostly stable over time.

Finally, I find a relationship between strong identities, political participation, and attitude polarization. Americans holding strong political, religious, and secular identities are generally more active in political life. A significantly higher percent of these strong identifiers reported engaging in three or more forms of political participation each year than do their more weakly identified counterparts. Also, when confining analysis to the most active, most committed partisans, ideologues, religious, and secular identifiers, greater attitude polarization is observed among politically active Americans than less active Americans, consistent with earlier work on the culture wars by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) and Evans (2003). Again, activists drawn from socially progressive groups are significantly more uniform in their positions on these highly charged issues than are activists who identify with more socially conservative groups.

Unlike Fiorina (2006), I do not view greater participation among more polarized activists as a normative problem or as capture of the political system by fanatics who are out of touch with mainstream opinion. The broader definition of activism on which I rely here merely points to a subset of Americans who are highly polarized on these issues and strongly motivated to participate in public life. This relationship between activism and polarized attitudes on social policy issues likely accounts for the continued salience of cultural conflict in American politics. Elites are appealing to their most committed bases of support. Because there is a relationship between elite and mass opinion on these issues – though it does not encompass the entire electorate – I cannot characterize the culture wars as a conflict disconnected or far removed from the mass public. On the whole, this relationship between activism, strong identities, and social policy attitudes may point to a relationship between elite and mass opinion. However, the nature of this relationship cannot be fleshed out much here. It could be that elites have become increasingly polarized on these issues, causing a shift in partisan alignments and polarization among partisan activists, consistent with the issue evolution framework (Carmines and Stimson, 1990; Adams, 1997). Or, shifts in public opinion among party bases could have precipitated elite change. However, changes in mass opinion seem to lag behind elite change in these studies, suggesting the issue evolution perspective may prove more accurate and more readily stand up to empirical scrutiny.

Generally, the trends in public opinion outlined here suggest social policy issues have become an important cleavage in American public opinion. While much of the public holds middling positions on these issues, as Fiorina (2006) claims, significant subsets of the public increasingly endorse more extreme positions on these hotly contested social issues – namely Americans maintaining strong political, religious, and secular identities. By virtue of their greater involvement in politics, these committed

Americans exert disproportionate influence on electoral politics. These results are largely consistent with Hunter's (2006) contention that highly committed partisans, religious, and secular (or progressive) Americans form the "white hot core" of cultural conflict in the United States. However, the trends in opinion observed here for strong Liberals, Seculars, and to a lesser extent Democrats seem to more closely support Hunter's (2006) position than do the trends observed for committed Fundamentalists, Conservatives, and Republicans who are much more divided on these key culture wars issues.

This asymmetry raises a bit of a quandary. Fundamentalists and religious conservatives are often credited with the onset of culture wars politics and are thought to be the driving force behind the continued salience of cultural conflict on the national political scene. In recent years cultural issues have been invoked with great regularity in presidential campaigns, and many pundits and political scientists alike have credited the electoral fortunes of republican candidates to successful appeals to conservative positions on these contested social issues or family values. How then can we reconcile evidence of internal polarization among Conservatives, Republicans, and Fundamentalists with these electoral successes? These results may point to significant ideological divisions with the conservative coalition. Social and economic conservatism, or libertarianism, may be rather distinct political ideologies, such that committed Conservatives and Republicans may hold very divergent attitudes on these social issues. Libertarians may oppose any federally imposed social regulation in keeping with a preference for limited government and local determinism. Unfortunately, the available data does not allow us to effectively pinpoint these differences among Conservatives. This split may in fact be symptomatic of the culture wars. As religious and social conservatives have increasingly moved into the conservative camp, these competing factions may have become increasingly self conscious of one another resulting in internal polarization.

Social Identity and Culture Wars Politics

I also considered the possibility this dissensus in the conservative coalition can be explained by the ways in which political and religious identities intersect. The culture wars are often framed as a conflict between secular or progressive liberals and religious conservatives. It naturally follows that Americans holding strong conservative political *and* religious affiliations or strong liberal political *and* secular affiliations are most sensitive to these cultural issues and most polarized by cultural conflict. This subset of the liberal and conservative coalitions may lend considerable weight to these cultural issues in their political thinking and behavior. Because people simultaneously hold multiple group identifications, it may be the intersection of these identities – or specific constellations of identities – which matters most. Extant work on the culture wars has considered the impact of single political or religious identities in isolation. Such an approach ignores the multiple identities held by Americans and individual differences in the relative importance or salience of particular group identifications.

In Chapter 4, I considered whether these political, religious, and secular identities co-occur in politically meaningful ways. To examine the intersectionality of these identities an identity checklist was administered to two samples of American adults. One sample of "average" Americans was obtained by mail and a sample of more politically sophisticated, politically active Americans was obtained via the web. The data obtained from this group identity checklist was analyzed using multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) – a technique for representing objects (here social groups) in Euclidean space based on their degree of perceived similarity. For both the samples, I observed a similar configuration of group identities. Americans reported membership in these groups was structured by two underlying dimensions of similarity. The first dimension seems to reflect political orientations - anchored on one end by Liberal, Feminist, and Progressive identities and by Conservative identities on the other, including politicized religious identities like Christian Conservative, Religious Conservative, and Moral Majority. The second dimension seemed to reflect orientations towards religion and was anchored by secular identities (Secular, Humanist, Atheist) on one end and by religious identities on the other (Christian, Evangelical, Protestant). External variables regression revealed the observed pattern of relationships between identities could not be fully reduced to political or theological ideology, or to value orientations like moral traditionalism. Thus, the spatial configuration obtained from the checklist data contains more information about the relationship between these social identities than one can garner from merely looking at respondents levels of political ideology, beliefs about the bible, or moral traditionalism. These patterns of results were essentially comparable for both samples, suggesting the structure underlying these identities is somewhat reliable and also that the relationship between these social identities are comparable across various levels of political sophistication.

Interestingly, the two similarity dimensions obtained from this analysis were correlated, but not so correlated that the groups split cleanly into conservative and progressive coalitions. Instead, four clusters of group identities were apparent in the scaling analysis for both samples. The results suggest the distinction between purely religious identifications (i.e. Christian) and politicized religious identifications (i.e. Christian Conservative) is meaningful – clearly a large portion of respondents reporting a religious identity did not also report a Conservative political identity or politicized Religious identity. The same is true for the distinction between Liberal and Secular identities. While these identifications are held simultaneously by many respondents, the correspondence between Liberal and Secular identities is imperfect. This makes sense given the tendency for religious progressives to maintain Liberal political identities and suggests religious identifications may cut across party lines, consistent with notions of interdenominational conflict outlined by Hunter (1991) and Wuthnow (1988). If Liberal and Secular identities co-occurred with greater frequency - and conservative and religious identities co-occurred with greater frequency – these two similarity dimensions would converge on a single dimension. But this is not the case. Instead, the four identity clusters observed here seem relatively distinct, such that political conservatism and religious identity or political liberalism and secular identity do not necessarily go hand in hand. Instead, the link between religious and political identity is more complex. This pattern of results may also be due to people endorsing political identities but not religious or secular identities, or vice versa. Ultimately, these divisions within the conservative

and liberal coalitions – between more and less politicized identities - may in fact reflect internal dissensus or an important cleavage within both coalitions. To some extent, the divisions found between religious Americans and Conservative Americans may in fact account for some of the variance in opinion on issues like abortion and in intergroup attitudes observed in Chapter 3.

I suspected these identity clusters were related in meaningful ways to social and political orientations and to some extent reflected important divisions within the conservative and liberal coalitions. To investigate the nature of these differences, I classified respondents based on the MDS configurations obtained here. Respondents were placed into one of four categories based on the cluster in which their primary or most salient identity was located. Primary identities were gauged by respondent self-reports. The focus on primary identities stemmed from findings from the social identity theory literature about how social identities vary in salience across contexts. Though there is some debate on this point (Huddy, 2001; Oakes, 2001), work in social identity theory suggests strong identities tend to be more stable, more readily accessible or salient, and likely exert greater influence on political attitudes and behavior. The resulting classification scheme yielded four categories of respondents – those maintaining strong liberal, conservative, secular, or religious social identities.

To investigate the nature of group differences, and the group basis of public opinion more generally, I first considered the distributions of opinion on political attitudes and tolerance for the four groups obtained from the MDS configurations. The results revealed patterns similar to those observed in our analysis of the 2004 National Election Study data. For both the mail sample and sophisticated, activist web sample, uniformly progressive opinions were reported on issues such as abortion and gay rights. Similar patterns were observed for the new measures of interest – attitudes towards emergency contraception, moral traditionalism, and political tolerance for several key culture wars groups. Opinion was much more dispersed among conservatives and especially religious identifiers, again pointing to significantly greater internal polarization.

I also looked at mean differences across groups to get a sense of their central tendencies in political orientations and attitudes. Generally, Americans whose primary identity was political in nature were expected to be more polarized in their political and religious orientations and attitudes towards salient culture wars issues than those primarily identifying with a religious or secular group. However, I did not uncover consistent evidence to this effect. Differences between Americans holding primary Liberal and Secular identifications were rather muted. On average, Liberals reported somewhat more polarized partisan and ideological identification than did seculars, but these differences did not translate into divergent political attitudes or beliefs. The distinction between religious and conservative identifiers is considerably more pronounced, particularly among web sample respondents. Americans maintaining a primary conservative identification were more partisan and ideological than their religious counterparts. Religious identifiers, on the other hand, reported higher levels of general or nonspecific religiosity than did conservatives. In spite of these differences, Americans primarily identification with conservative or religious groups reported comparable levels of moral traditionalism and held similarly conservative positions on a number of social issues – such as support for emergency contraception. Significant

attitudinal differences were observed among the more sophisticated web sample respondents. On average, conservative identifiers were significantly more polarized in their social policy attitudes than were religious identifiers, suggesting social conservatism was quite prevalent among conservative identifiers in this sample. One would have expected more modest differences if these conservatives took a more libertarian perspective. Essentially, the differences observed here across groups point to greater divisions within the conservative camp than within the liberal camp. Americans maintaining liberal or secular identifications held fairly consensual opinions and political orientations in both samples. While conservatives appeared more polarized on average than their religious counterparts, significant internal divisions were apparent for members drawn from both identity clusters. These results are consistent with the patterns observed in the National Election Studies data.

In addition to looking at the effect of salient or primary identities on political attitudes, I considered individual differences in subjective identity strength. This approach stems from work in social identity theory, which contends individuals vary in their sense of attachment to social groups and this variation has implications for intergroup attitudes and behavior. In the context of culture wars politics, I anticipated Americans who most strongly identified with political, religious, and social groups would be most attuned to culture wars politics. To understand the political implications of subjective identity strength, I evaluated the extent to which it moderated ideological extremity and moral traditionalism. A significant amount of variance on these measures was due to identity strength and, as expected, Americans with strong identities were significantly more polarized in their ideological identification and reported traditionalism than were weak identifiers. In addition, Americans holding primary political identities – liberal or conservative - were somewhat more polarized than those identifying primarily with secular or religious groups. This result suggests Americans with strong political identities are more attuned to this conflict.

Again, important differences were observed between groups thought to compose the conservative coalition. The effect of identity strength on ideology and traditionalism were significantly more pronounced for religious identifiers. At low levels of identification, religious identifiers were much closer to weakly identified liberals than weakly identified conservatives on these measures. However, identity strength had a large effect for religious identifiers, such that they more closely resemble conservatives at high levels of identification. The significant within-group differences observed here point to identity strength as an important moderator of political attitudes and behaviors.

The Opinion Dynamics of the Culture Wars

In Chapter 5, I considered the effects of threat on political and intergroup attitudes and the extent to which the effects of threat were moderated by subjective identity strength using an experiment embedded in the two surveys mentioned above. My emphasis on threat stemmed from expectations that the threats to group values and beliefs

inherent in culture wars rhetoric cause the polarization observed in longitudinal studies of social issue attitudes. The experimental threat manipulations employed here did elicit emotions in ways consistent with expectations. Progressive threats evoked anger and fear among liberal and secular identifiers, while Americans identifying with conservative or religious groups responded to these treatments with enthusiasm. Conversely, conservative and religious identifiers reported anger and fear in response to traditional threats, while these treatments elicited enthusiasm among liberal and secular identifiers.

Few differences were observed, at any level of identity strength, between secular and liberal identifiers in their emotional reactions to threat. Differences in the intensity of emotional responses to threat were evident between conservative and religious identifiers. At high and low levels of subjective identity strength, conservatives were more polarized in their emotional responses to threat. At minimum levels of identity strength, religious identifiers reported emotions not unlike those of liberals and seculars. However as identification increased to its maximum value, the levels of fear, anger, and enthusiasm reported by religious identifiers converged on levels observed for Americans holding conservative identities. This result may be a consequence of greater heterogeneity among religious identifiers than conservative identifiers. While religious Americans with conservative political identities were classified in the conservative identity cluster in the MDS results, the religious identifiers who did not identify primarily with a conservative group may include both relatively orthodox religious Americans who do not think of themselves in political terms and adherents to more progressive religious traditions.

Beyond the emotions considered here, I observed little effect of threat on support for emergency contraception (the topic of the threat manipulations) or tolerance for Liberals, Conservatives, Feminist, or Christian Fundamentalists. I did observe group differences and an effect of identity strength. For the most part, the relationships between identity, identity strength, and attitudes uncovered here conformed to expectations. Liberal and secular identifiers reported comparably high levels of support for emergency contraception, significantly more than for their conservative and religious counterparts. Liberals and seculars also reported high levels of tolerance for feminists and liberals, and low levels of tolerance for the ideologically dissimilar groups – Fundamentalists and Conservatives. These effects were more pronounced among respondents reporting a greater subjective sense of identification with these groups, suggesting strong identifiers hold more polarized intergroup attitudes than do weak identifiers. The reverse pattern was observed for conservative and religious identifiers, who reported notably less support for emergency contraception, less support for liberals and Feminists, and greater support for Conservatives and Fundamentalists. Again, these differences were most pronounced at high levels of subjective identity strength. The effect of identity strength on reported attitudes was greater among religious identifiers, who as before appeared rather progressive at low levels of identity strength and significantly more conservative at high levels of identity strength. Also, the threat manipulations did appear to more consistently influence attitudes reported by religious identifiers, though comparable patterns were not observed across the other identity clusters.

Recall, I also considered whether the nature of the threat influenced reported emotions, attitudes, and tolerance. The tone of our threat manipulations varied such that two were provided in a political (or editorial) tone and two were given in a personal tone.

I anticipated the threats conveyed in a political tone – making reference to competing social and political groups – would produce more intense emotional and attitudinal responses than the personal threats. Not much evidence emerged to support this hypothesis. The progressive political threat did have a greater impact on reported emotions than did the personal progressive threat, however this was really only the case among the more sophisticated web samples respondents. Among the more "typical" mail survey respondents, this threat seemed to have virtually the same effects across the four groups considered here, regardless their ideological or theological orientation. Alternatively, traditional threat in both a personal and political tone seemed to operate differently across groups, as anticipated, but responses to the two types of threat did not differ significantly. None of the threats exerted consistent effects on reported attitudes or tolerance.

As a result, I cannot really distinguish between the effects of political, group based threats and simple value violations conveyed in the personal threats. It is not clear whether this finding undermines my argument for a group basis to this conflict. It could easily reflect poor stimulus design. Or, it could be the case that political and intergroup attitudes are relatively crystallized – not readily pushed around by contextual threat. Threat did produce emotional responses in the fashion anticipated, but they did not appear to mediate the effects of threat on attitudes or tolerance. Of course, there may be important political consequences of these emotions which go unmeasured here. One likely candidate is these emotions serve to mobilize Americans – heightening their rates of political participation. This idea will be discussed further below, as a potential direction for future research.

I also considered an alternative explanation for the effects of identity strength observed here – whether subjective identity strength simply conveys the effects of value orientations on emotions, and political and intergroup attitudes. In fact, models predicting emotion, support for emergency contraception, and political tolerance as a function of moral traditionalism and social conformity (controlling for political and religious orientations) accounted for the same amount of variance in these measures as did the identity-based models. Most notably, this analysis indicates moral traditionalism exerts a significant moderating influence on emotional and attitudinal responses to threat. Such a result suggests traditionalism could be strongly related to the diametrically opposed worldviews thought by Hunter (1991) to drive this conflict. And, it indicates references to the culture wars as a "values divide" are probably appropriate.

Contrary to expectations, I did not observe much of an effect of social conformity on responses to threat. Ultimately, much of the variance in emotion, attitudes, and political tolerance was instead explained by moral traditionalism. Indeed, even the effects of political and religious orientations on these measures were quite muted when controlling for traditionalism. Comparison of the predicted values generated by the identity-based and values-based approaches to the opinion dynamics of the culture wars does reveal one important distinction. Predicted values on all key dependent measures derived from the values-based models show more muted differences between individuals high and low in moral traditionalism compared to the group differences observed for the identity-based models. Predicted values based on primary social identifications and subjective identity strength reveal greater group differences. In addition, they point to considerably greater polarization among conservative identifiers than religious identifiers

– a finding which may explain some of the internal divisions in opinion on social issues discussed prior. Also, the effects of identity strength on reported attitudes vary in magnitude across groups, while differences based on traditionalism are pretty consistent in size across the variables of interest here.

Unfortunately, I was not able to effectively parse out the unique contributions of identity, identity strength, and values on emotional and attitudinal responses to threat. The size of the mail sample did not support such analysis and collinearity proved to be a significant problem for analysis of the web data. The strong relationships observed between group identity, identity strength and values raises an important question which bears directly on intergroup conflicts like the culture wars in American politics. Namely, what is the relationship between social identity and values? While core values are thought to be "prototypic markers of group identity" (Hogg et al, 2004), the causal relationship between value orientations and social or cultural identifications has not received much attention (for notable exception, see Wan, Chiu, Tam, Lee, Lau, Peng, 2007).

The lack of theoretical and empirical clarity regarding the relationship between identity and values stems from several sources. First, much of the work on social identity involves the use of artificial groups, created in the lab. These groups obviously lack a sense of shared history, culture, or norms held by real-world social groups. Also, this work tends to focus on conflicts over economic resources, relying primarily on resource allocation tasks. Such studies do not provide much insight into the dynamics underlying symbolic group conflicts, like the culture wars. In some cases, group membership is even assigned on the basis of a particular political attitude. For example, Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2002) create artificial groups in the lab based on attitudes towards gay marriage and the legalization of drugs. Clearly, this method of group classification does not lend itself to understanding the link between identity, values, and attitudes, as attitudes are the explicit basis for group membership. In part, these problems arise from this literature's failure to address identity development and identity choice (Huddy, 2002). Whether individual differences in the endorsement of particular values or even personality characteristics drive some people towards particular groups has been largely ignored in this framework. Understanding the factors promoting the adoption and development of identities related to feminism, environmentalism, religiosity, conservatism, and liberalism should afford insight into the link between identity and values (Huddy, 2002).

Directions for Future Research

Clearly, further study is required to flesh out the relationship between social identity and values. But this project raises some additional questions about the nature of the culture wars in American politics. The first is whether the culture wars phenomenon is best understood as an electoral strategy which plays on divisions among the parties most committed bases. While I found scant evidence culture wars rhetoric influences reported attitudes or tolerance, it may have significant effects on political participation.

This also may be an area where the consequences of intergroup emotions are clearer. The link between emotion and action tendencies outlined in the key theories of intergroup emotions in Chapter 5 could explain mobilization among strong political, religious, and secular identifiers. In addition, this project raises some questions about the relationship between culture wars politics and national identity. It seems plausible the competition to define public culture results in competing notions of what it means to be an American. These disparate notions of American identity likely influence the endorsement and application of core democratic principles such as religious tolerance, justice, and freedom. Finally, I step back from my focus on political and religious identities and consider how other social identities operate in the culture wars conflict. Some social groups, notably women and African-Americans, report higher levels of social conservatism than do white males, but at the same time are significantly more likely to maintain liberal ideological orientations. This pattern suggests tension among women and blacks regarding these hotly contested social issues. I am interested in the political consequences of this discrepancy in the context of the culture wars politics, specifically whether appeals to these issues split these committed bases of Democratic Party support. Ultimately, research in these areas should afford a greater understanding of the nature of this conflict in American politics.

Culture Wars and Political Mobilization

This project has focused on the emotional and attitudinal implications of identity and threat in the context of the culture wars. However, political participation is an important aspect of this phenomenon. For Fiorina (2006), the culture wars is merely an electoral strategy employed by elites, designed to mobilize the most committed party bases. The parties' shift from a centrist to base strategy in the mid 1990s, due to the declining proportion of swing voters in the electorate, has moved this notion of the culture wars into common parlance. At the same time, rates of political participation among key groups have changed – dramatically in some cases. For example, evangelicals are participating in politics at ever increasing rates – rates apparently outpacing their progressive counterparts. Some argue this asymmetry in mobilization has occurred in part from greater pre-existing organization among these groups and is also due to successful appeals to shared values. The 2004 election readily comes to mind in this culture wars context. Many have linked high turnout among religious voters, as well as the outcome of the presidential election, to referenda on gay marriage in key states and the salience of this issue during the election cycle. The legalization of gay marriage poses a threat to traditional values and produced a clarion call for a leader who would realize an appropriate moral vision for the nation.

However, Fiorina warns more moderate and centrist Americans are demobilized by the culture wars electoral strategy. If this is in fact the case, one would expect biased patterns of participation to keep these cultural issues on the public agenda and perhaps perpetuate the conflict. The implications of this relationship between social identity and

participation are clear – group interests are better represented when group members participate at higher rates. Based on social identity theory, one would expect individuals with strong group identity to be more responsive to the group based threats and appeals to shared values characteristic of culture wars politics. These individuals should also prove more willing to bear the costs of participation and, perhaps, possess a heightened sense of civic obligation (Grant and Brown, 1995; Simon, 1997; Veenstra and Haslam, 2000).

Political mobilization is also a subject to which work on intergroup emotion may be fruitfully applied. As noted prior, work in political science has demonstrated a link between emotion and political participation. This work shows enthusiastic responses to candidates promotes campaign involvement (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000). In addition, anxious responses to threat have been shown to increase participation, but only among individuals high in political efficacy (Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens, 2000). Also, the theories of intergroup emotions discussed in Chapter 5 are inherently functional – linking discrete emotional states to distinct patterns of behavior. From this perspective, anger is key. The experience of anger in intergroup contexts is consistently related the desire to aggress against opposing groups (Devos, Silver, Mackie, and Smith, 2003). On the other hand, fear and disgust are related to a desire to withdraw from intergroup conflicts - though it is not clear this relationship would hold for the more non-confrontational forms of political participation, such as voting or contributing to a campaign. Based on this work, it seems likely there is a link between the highly charged emotional tenor of culture wars politics and political mobilization.

Culture Wars and National Identity

As observed in Chapter 4, Americans hold multiple, and even conflicting, social identities. In this project, I considered how religious, secular, and political identities intersect in the minds of the American public. Of course, the set of identities considered here was not exhaustive. A number of religious traditions were excluded, namely Eastern and pagan religions, due to the greater prominence of Christians and Jews in the American public and the greater involvement of these groups in culture wars politics. In addition, I set aside a number of other social identities that likely have political consequences – such as racial or ethnic identity, class identity, gender identity, and national identity. I expect there is an interesting and politically relevant relationship between the culture wars phenomenon and national identity. Studies of national identity and patriotism have uncovered significant variance in the meaning of American identity and what constitutes patriotic behavior (Huddy, 2001). Some of the more contested aspects of national identity – for example competing notions of the United States as a "Christian Commonwealth" or a "Secular Democratic Experiment" – bear directly on this culture wars phenomenon. For Hunter (1991), the culture wars in American politics are, at their core, a struggle to define a unified national culture and national identity. Both

sides of this conflict seek to modify some aspect of American identity so it aligns more closely with their core values.

These competing notions of American identity are also associated with distinct normative standards for political deliberation and behavior. Belief the United States is a Christian nation implies a link between religion and politics that conflicts with democratic principles promoting freedom of (and from) religion, as well as the notion of strict separation between church and state. Competing definitions of national identity are also tied to endorsement of either blind or critical patriotism (Huddy and Khatib, 2007). These differences are even related to the definition and application of core democratic values like freedom and justice. As noted prior, a main distinction between social conservatives and social progressives is grounded in these concepts (Hunter, 1991). Social conservatives tend to define freedom in economic terms and justice in social terms, while the reverse is true for social progressives. Thus, when these groups invoke justice and freedom in political rhetoric, they are speaking of fundamentally different things. Further study on this link between the political, religious, and secular identities examined here, national identity, and the endorsement of democratic principles is an important step towards gaining a broader understanding this conflict.

Gender, Feminism, and the Culture Wars

The analysis presented in the pervious chapters emphasizes differences among Americans holding strong partisan, religious, and secular identities. In Chapter 3, I focused on partisan, ideological, religious, and secular identities ascribed based on questions to standard survey items. A different strategy was employed in Chapter 4. Here, I considered whether these identities co-occur or intersect in meaningful ways and whether the subjective importance Americans place on these identities factor in to the influence they exert on social and political attitudes. Rather than looking at these identities in isolation, I examined the four key clusters of identities which seemed to co-occur with greatest frequency. For example, liberal, progressive, and feminists identities were tightly clustered in the Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis indicating they are simultaneously endorsed by a high percentage of respondents. That is, many of the respondents in both samples reported identification as feminist, liberal, and progressive at the same time. As noted prior, this approach deviates somewhat from the common operationalization of identity in the social identity theory literature, which tends to treat each identity as discrete and unique. While the approach employed her makes sense given the coalitional nature of culture wars politics and interest in the intersectionality of these identities, it is possible this approach obscures some of the unique characteristics and consequences of specific social identities.

For example, feminist identity may have unique consequences in this context, particularly for attitudes on gender issues like the proper role of women in society and reproductive rights, as these issues are central components of liberal feminist ideology. Feminists were actually overrepresented in the web survey. Approximately half of the

sample identified as feminist, a total of 1,291 respondents. Of this group, 218 indicated feminist was their primary identity or strongest identification. For the remaining 1,073 respondents, feminist was a secondary identification. The number of female respondents reporting no feminist identity was small, however. Only 240 of the women sampled did not identify as feminist. It may be worth examining this dataset further, with the intent of parsing out the effects of feminist identity on responses to the culture wars threats contained in the experiment. It is likely the experiment had a stronger effect on feminists relative to the other political and religious groups of interest here, due to its focus on reproductive freedoms and references to both feminists and feminist organizations. Comparison of emotional and attitudinal responses reported by Americans maintaining a primary, secondary or non-feminist identity may afford insight into the processes underlying the culture wars phenomenon, at least for this group.

Thinking about the relationship between feminist identity and the culture wars raises a broader question about gender differences in sensitivity to or involvement in culture wars politics. Work on gender and public opinion suggests women are significantly more likely than men to endorse conservative positions on these social policy matters, though there is some non-trivial variation in this pattern across issue areas. For example, Eagley and colleagues (2004) find women are less supportive of behaviors violating conventional moral norms such as casual sex, drug use, and suicide. Using data from the GSS and a community sample, the authors find attitudes in traditional morality are tied to gender differences in family responsibilities or social roles. Marital status and parenthood are strong predictors of these attitudes. The authors contend that married women with children are more likely to endorse morally traditional behavior because it protects children and the family unit (see also Iannocone 1991). Women are also more supportive than men of school prayer (Clark and Clark, 1993).

Evidence of gender differences in tolerance for gays and support for gay rights is more mixed. While women report significantly higher levels of tolerance towards gays than do men (Davies, 2004; Herek, 1987; LaMar & Kite, 1998; Whitley, 2001), the evidence for gender differences in support for extending civil liberties to gays is inconclusive. Several studies have shown men and women report comparable levels of support for extending civil rights to gays (Kite and Whitley, 1998; Davies, 2004), while others find women are more supportive of gay rights than are men (Eagley et al, 2004; Herek, 2002; Swim et al., 1995; Twenge, 1997; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999). Women's greater favorability towards gays seems at odds with both their greater levels of moral traditionalism and greater reluctance to extend civil liberties to other unpopular or non-mainstream social groups (Gibson, 1992; Marcus et al, 1995; Golebiowska, 1999). One area where gender differences fail to emerge is in support for reproductive rights, which tends to comparable for men and women (Clark & Clark 1996; Cook & Wilcox 1995; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

The greater social conservatism observed for women in these studies may be linked to gender differences in religiosity. Women typically report higher levels of religiosity than men (Kelley and DeGraaf, 1997; Walter and Davie, 1998) and stronger commitment to religion and religious institutions (Tolleson -Rinehart and Perkins, 1989; Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis, 1993). In addition, women tend to engage in private religious behaviors more frequently - such as prayer and reading the bible (Davis and Smith, 1991).

Women's greater religiosity and moral traditionalism is difficult to reconcile with gender differences in partisanship and ideology. Women consistently report greater identification with the Democratic Party and more liberal ideological leanings than their male counterparts. They also tend to vote for Democratic candidates at higher rates than men. These gender gaps persist even when controlling for a variety of social and demographic factors – such as race, income, marital status, parental status, and occupational prestige (Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte, in press a). Because religiosity and moral traditionalism are strongly associated with political conservatism, one would expect to find a gender gap in reverse of what is commonly observed. However, there is evidence these gender gaps exist even among the highly devout. Even in statistical models of vote choice that control for religiosity, there is no evidence religiosity eliminates the independent effect of gender (Kaufmann, 2004; Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte, in press b).

This work suggests there is tension among women between their greater religiosity and moral conservatism on one hand and their greater political liberalism on the other. Women are generally more likely than men to endorse socially conservative positions on many of these "culture wars" issues, but these attitudes do not seem to have much influence on their overarching political affiliations or their electoral behavior. Given this tension, it is unclear whether cultural conflict should further divide men and women. In part expectations stem from the sources of these social outlooks - whether the gender differences described above are based in some intrinsic difference between men and women or whether than can be accounted for by differences in social roles related to marriage and motherhood, as Eagly and colleagues (2004) suggest. If social role differences do in fact account for much of this gap in social policy attitudes, one might expect the culture wars to resonate more with women – attenuating the gender gap between men and women in public opinion and voting behavior. Ultimately, further study is required to determine the factors driving these gender differences in public opinion and whether they are linked in any meaningful way to culture wars politics.

Concluding Remarks

While this project may raise more questions than it answers about the nature of the culture wars in American politics, the analysis presented here does point to cultural issues as an important cleavage in American public opinion. Unlike Fiorina (2006), I situate the culture wars firmly within the mass public. I recognize the conflict does not extend to the entire electorate, but polarizes significant subsets of the public. This work points to a group basis for cultural conflict, in that Americans with strong political, religious, and secular identities have become most polarized in their social issue attitudes over time. They are also disproportionately active in public life, and exert considerable influence on electoral politics.

Thinking about the culture wars as identity politics, from the standpoint of social identity theory, does afford some insight into the nature of this conflict. At the macro

level, this identity-based approach points to meaningful and interesting empirical regularities in the intersectionality of religious and political identities in the mass public. It also reveals important divisions within the conservative coalition among Americans who identify primarily as politically conservative and Americans who identify with religious groups. Divisions are also evident within these subsets of the conservative coalition. Divisions observed among religious identifiers are consistent with work on the changing nature of the American political climate outlined by Wuthnow (1988) and others. There is also evidence of growing dissensus among conservative Americans, as economic and social conservative diverge on these cultural flashpoint issues. These divisions reveal an important asymmetry in public opinion on culture wars issues. Overwhelmingly, opinion on issues like abortion and gay rights is notably more uniform among Americans maintaining strong liberal and Democratic Party identifications relative to religious and conservative Americans. This difference may portend an important shift in the consequences of invoking cultural issues in political campaigns.

At the micro level, the emphasis on subjective identity strength and salience also affords some insight into the nature of the conflict. Subjective identity strength accounts for a great deal of within-group variance in social and political attitudes, showing strong identifiers are most polarized in their social policy and intergroup attitudes. Identity strength also provides some insight into the psychologically processes underlying responses to cultural politics. Americans maintaining strong political, religious, and secular identities responded to the symbolic threats characterizing culture wars politics with greater emotional intensity than their more weakly identified counterparts.

In this respect, the utility of a social identity theory approach to the culture wars shows through here. However, the empirical support for this approach developed here is by no means unequivocal. Core values, particularly moral traditionalism, seem to play a key role in this conflict. But group identity and group values are inherently related, particularly for the political and religious groups of interest here, which are defined primarily by distinct patterns of beliefs and values. Essentially, it is the divergent ways of thinking about politics and the social world stemming from these social identities which sets these groups in conflict. Whatever the relationship between the two, both group identities and values afford some stability and consistency to Americans political thinking and behavior, suggesting this conflict over issues of public and private morality may have staying power.

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Section A: Survey Instrument

THE RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICAN LIFE SURVEY

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WHO SHOULD COMPLETE THIS SURVEY?

The survey should be completed by an adult in your household who is over the age of 18.

If there is more than one adult over 18 years of age living in your household, please ask the adult who most recently celebrated a birthday to complete the survey.

Thank you.

You will start off by reading several statements about how things are going in this country. Please place a CHECK or X in the box below each statement to show how much you agree or disagree with it.

A1. The core values in this country are every bit as solid as they have ever been.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A2. The foundations of this country are strong and we really shouldn't worry about recent changes in society.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A3.Politics has gotten too conflictual in the last few years and it is bad for the U.S.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A4. There have been too many things changing in this country, and it is taking a toll on our basic values.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A5. One of our major problems is that there are too many different opinions being expressed about the way this country should be run.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A6. It seems as if people in this country have less in common than they used to.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A7. One the whole, the increasing diversity in the US has been good for the country.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

A8. Most children in this country are being raised to have good values.

Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

Please turn the page to begin the next section of the survey.

B1. The list below includes a number of terms that people commonly use to describe themselves. Place an X next to ALL of the terms that you would use to label or describe yourself. Leave the terms that do not describe you blank.

_____ Christian	_____ Jewish	_____ Roman Catholic
_____ Orthodox	_____ Evangelical Christian	_____ Economic Conservative
_____ Feminist	_____ Protestant	_____ Moral Majority
_____ Spiritual	_____ Conservative	_____ Christian Conservative
_____ Religious Right	_____ Christian Coalition	_____ Muslim
_____ Atheist	_____ Libertarian	_____ Gay or Lesbian
_____ Agnostic	_____ Liberal	_____ Religious Conservative
_____ Humanist	_____ Progressive	_____ Secular

B2. Looking only at the terms you marked with an X, think about the term that BEST describes you and write it in the blank below:

The term ___________________________ describes me best.
(write the name of the term)

B3. How well does the term you wrote in the blank describe you?

Not well, but better than the other terms.	Somewhat Well	Well	Extremely Well
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

Now, think of all the people in this country who describe themselves using this term . For example, if you labeled yourself as a Roman Catholic – think now about the group Roman Catholics. The next set of questions asks about how you feel towards the group of people who label themselves using the label you picked above.

How much do you agree or disagree with each statement?

B4. I feel like a member of the group of people who label themselves this way.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

B5. When I am talking about this group, I usually say *we* rather than *they*.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

B6. When I hear people criticizing this group or its members, I feel like I am personally being criticized.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

B7. I am proud to be a member of this group.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐$_1$	☐$_2$	☐$_3$	☐$_4$

B8. I rarely think about this group and its members.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐$_1$	☐$_2$	☐$_3$	☐$_4$

B9. I feel a sense of belonging with the group of people who label themselves this way.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐$_1$	☐$_2$	☐$_3$	☐$_4$

B10. I feel good about belonging to this group.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐$_1$	☐$_2$	☐$_3$	☐$_4$

B11. I hold values and beliefs that are similar to those held by this group.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐$_1$	☐$_2$	☐$_3$	☐$_4$

B12. My thoughts about the way life should be in this country are similar to this group's thoughts about the way life should be in this country.

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
☐$_1$	☐$_2$	☐$_3$	☐$_4$

Next, you will read an essay that represents one position on an important moral issue that is debated within American politics. After you read the essay, you will be asked about your reactions to it.

Personal Progressive Threat

This essay is about emergency contraception. Emergency contraception, also known as Plan B and the Morning After Pill, is a method of birth control that can be taken within three days of unprotected sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy. Please read the essay and then answer the questions that come after it.

I had been dating my boyfriend since I was 17, and we went away to college together. After a few months of living away from home, he started to pressure me to have sex. That night I finally gave in. Afterwards I couldn't stop crying, so I went back to my dorm to think about things. I confided in my roommate that I had had sex, and that I hadn't used protection. My roommate suggested that I go to the student health clinic and get emergency contraception, or the morning after pill, to make sure I didn't get pregnant.

I wanted to cry even more. What had I done? Did I just ruin my life? Being Catholic, I knew that I had committed a sin against God; however, I also knew that it was a much greater sin to try to try to interfere with a pregnancy. I honestly just did not know how to respond.

The next morning, instead of going to the clinic, I called my mother at work. Breathing heavy and sobbing, she just kept telling me that I needed to calm down, she couldn't understand what I was saying. Finally after a few minutes of mumbling the words, I just straightened my voice and said, "Mom, please don't hate me. . . " and explained what had happened. As soon as the words came out, the tears started flowing again. All I could hear my mom say is that everything would be okay and that she was my mom and she was here to support me.

I talked to my mom about the morning after pill, and she thought that it was a mistake to try to interfere with what could possibly be a human life. She said that she would love and support me no matter what happened – but just because I had made one mistake was no reason to make another.

During the next three weeks I prayed to God to give me the strength to deal with the consequences of my actions. It turned out that I did not get pregnant. This experience was a wake up call, and really reaffirmed my personal commitment to waiting until marriage to have sex.

****Please answer the following questions about how the essay made you feel.****

Political Progressive Threat

This essay is about emergency contraception. Emergency contraception, also known as Plan B and the Morning After Pill, is a method of birth control that can be taken within three days of unprotected sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy. Please read the essay and then answer the questions that come after it.

Over the past several years, a series of incidents have been reported where pharmacists refuse to fill women's prescriptions for emergency contraception, also known as the morning-after pill or "EC." Some pharmacists have also refused to dispense regular oral contraceptives. In the overwhelming majority of these cases, no formal actions were taken against these pharmacists. As a result, some patients have left their pharmacies empty-handed – upset and confused about what to do next. Amy Sykes of Planned Parenthood finds this trend troubling. "I am alarmed by this trend towards refusing to provide medically necessary care to women. It sets a dangerous precedent."

Catholic healthcare systems and other hospital networks also try to avoid providing EC in their hospitals, even to sexual assault survivors who seek treatment in their emergency rooms. Many supporters of emergency contraception are outraged. "This practice is irresponsible, and only serves to further traumatize victims of sex crimes," says Sykes. "As Catholic healthcare providers increasingly merge with their secular counterparts, the restrictions on access to the fullest range of reproductive health services are likely to become increasingly widespread."

Forty-six states have enacted refusal clauses that allow health care providers to refuse to provide drugs and perform medical procedures on the grounds that they conflict with the provider's religious beliefs. Refusal clauses limiting access to reproductive health care were initially established in the weeks following the January 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision, which legalized abortion nationwide, by groups who strongly opposed the decision. Over time, refusal clauses have been extended to include regular daily contraceptive and emergency contraception.

There has been considerable effort to pass a nation-wide refusal law, and this effort has recently met with some success. The Weldon Federal Refusal Clause, a component of the FY 2005 omnibus spending bill currently under consideration in the Senate, allows any federally funded hospital to refuse to provide reproductive health services or referrals, including emergency contraception. Under this law, states that attempt to enforce their own laws in favor of reproductive rights could be accused of discrimination and lose hundreds of millions of dollars in federal health, education and labor funding. According to Sykes, "This bill has teeth - it is a serious obstacle to women's reproductive choices."

Personal Traditional Threat

This essay is about emergency contraception. Emergency contraception, also known as Plan B and the Morning After Pill, is a method of birth control that can be taken within three days of unprotected sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy. Please read the essay and then answer the questions that come after it.

This is a simple story, but I think it is important. I have been in a loving committed relationship with the same guy for the last 3 years, since I was 18. After we had been together for six months we decided to become sexually active. We both have loving families who supported us in making this choice for ourselves because they knew we knew how to be safe and that we have a good, mature relationship.

About a month after we first had sex we had a condom break. At first, I was completely panicked, and couldn't stop crying. I was able to go to my mother and ask for her advice. We talked about whether I was really ready to have a child. I decided that I wasn't ready to have children, and didn't want to take any chances. My mom took me to get Emergency Contraception, also known as the morning after pill, at Planned Parenthood. Now, who knows if I would have become pregnant or not, but I can't imagine what my life would be like if I had.

I am currently going to college, playing music, involved in campus pro-choice clubs like the Feminist Majority. My boyfriend is studying to be a mechanical engineer. What would we be doing now with a baby? I just want to say that it is possible for teenagers to be in loving sexual relationships if they are given the tools to do so, like supportive communities and good sex education, like I had. I also want to say that sex education doesn't make people more likely to be sexually active, it makes it less likely that they have unwanted or crisis pregnancies. Where might I be without it?

I know this isn't an abortion story, but I think it shows how important good sex ed and access to EC are. This is why I stay involved with women's groups: to support a woman's right to choose what is right for her body, her right to access the tools (EC, contraceptives, and abortion clinics) that make it possible to implement these decisions, and the education to make these decisions in an informed ways.

Political Traditional Threat

This essay is about emergency contraception. Emergency contraception, also known as Plan B and the Morning After Pill, is a method of birth control that can be taken within three days of unprotected sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy. Please read the essay and then answer the questions that come after it.

It is estimated that over three million American women have unplanned pregnancies each year and over half of these end in abortion. Emergency contraception (EC), sometimes called the "morning-after pill," is an effective method of preventing unwanted pregnancy. Some anti-choice groups are alarmed by the widespread use of this new product and oppose EC by equating it with abortion, which they also oppose. According to Amy Sykes of Planned Parenthood, an advocate for emergency contraception, “The attacks against EC are unwarranted and are part of an alarming and narrow-minded agenda to ban all contraceptives. (These groups) are out of step with the mainstream medical community, and their views have very little support in laws and policies at the state and federal level.”

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has deemed the use of EC safe and effective in the prevention of pregnancy. The Center for Reproductive Rights petitioned the FDA in 1994 on behalf of medical associations to improve women’s access to EC. In response to the petition and other advocacy efforts, in 1997, the FDA announced that six brands of oral contraceptive pills were safe and effective for use as EC. This announcement put the FDA's explicit "stamp of approval" on agency reviewed EC regimens. “FDA approval,” says Sykes “is a major victory for those who support reproductive choice.”

On February 14, 2001, the Center for Reproductive Rights had petitioned the FDA, on behalf of more than 70 medical, public health, and pro-choice organizations, to change the status of EC from prescription to over-the-counter, based on the fact that EC is safe and effective for use without a prescription. Both the American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists approve of a change to over-the-counter status, recognizing that over-the-counter availability may be the only way for some women to obtain EC in time to prevent a pregnancy. Sykes feels over-the-counter sales of EC is a step in the right direction. “Fortunately, public awareness of emergency contraception has increased,” she says, “And hopefully this policy will enable more women to benefit from important backup birth control method in the future.”

Control

People often have very different attitudes about political issues. The next set of questions asks for your attitudes towards emergency contraception. Emergency contraception, also known as Plan B and the Morning After Pill, is a method of birth control that can be taken within three days of unprotected sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy.

Now, we would like to know about your opinions regarding emergency contraception.

C1. How nervous did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Nervous	Not Very Nervous	Somewhat Nervous	Very Nervous
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C2. How enthusiastic did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Enthusiastic	Not Very Enthusiastic	Somewhat Enthusiastic	Very Enthusiastic
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C3. How scared did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Scared	Not Very Scared	Somewhat Scared	Very Scared
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C4. How revolted did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Revolted	Not Very Revolted	Somewhat Revolted	Very Revolted
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C5. How angry did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Angry	Not Very Angry	Somewhat Angry	Very Angry
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C6. How hostile did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Hostile	Not Very Hostile	Somewhat Hostile	Very Hostile
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C7. How proud did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Proud	Not Very Proud	Somewhat Proud	Very Proud
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C8. How disgusted did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Disgusted	Not Very Disgusted	Somewhat Disgusted	Very Disgusted
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C9. How afraid did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Afraid	Not Very Afraid	Somewhat Afraid	Very Afraid
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C10. How repulsed did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Repulsed	Not Very Repulsed	Somewhat Repulsed	Very Repulsed
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

C11. How irritated did the essay make you feel?

Not at all Irritated	Not Very Irritated	Somewhat Irritated	Very Irritated
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

Now, we would like to know about your opinions regarding emergency contraception.

D1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Deciding to use emergency contraception is a woman's private choice"?

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

D2. Would you support or oppose a law that would allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception because it violated their personal beliefs and values?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

D3. Do you support or oppose government action to make emergency contraception available over the counter (without a prescription) so that women would have greater access to it?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

D4. Would you support or oppose more restrictions on the use of emergency contraception?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

D5. Would you support or oppose government subsidizing the cost of emergency contraception?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

D6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Ensuring every woman has access to emergency contraception should be a top priority for the current administration."

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

In the next section of the survey, you will answer a series of questions about your attitudes towards Christian Fundamentalists.

E1. Would you say that Christian Fundamentalists have too much or too little influence in politics?

Far too little	Too little	Slightly too little	Slightly too much	Too much	Far too much
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E2. Would you feel comfortable or uncomfortable in welcoming a Christian Fundamentalist into your home?

Very uncomfortable	Uncomfortable	Somewhat Uncomfortable	Somewhat Comfortable	Comfortable	Very Comfortable
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E3. Do you think that Christian Fundamentalists get too much or too little attention in the media?

Far too little	Too little	Slightly too little	Slightly too much	Too much	Far too much
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E4. How would you feel if a Christian Fundamentalist married into your family?

Very uncomfortable	Uncomfortable	Somewhat Uncomfortable	Somewhat Comfortable	Comfortable	Very Comfortable
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E5. Do you think Christian Fundamentalists are too timid or too aggressive in publicly promoting their ideas?

Far too timid	Too timid	Slightly too timid	Slightly too aggressive	Too aggressive	Far too aggressive
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E6. Do you support or oppose the election of more Christian Fundamentalists to public office?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E7. Would you feel comfortable or uncomfortable if a <u>Christian Fundamentalist</u> became your boss?

Very uncomfortable	Uncomfortable	Somewhat Uncomfortable	Somewhat Comfortable	Comfortable	Very Comfortable
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

Now you will answer a series of questions about your attitudes towards Feminists.*

E8. Would you say that <u>Feminists</u> have too much or too little influence in politics?

Far too little	Too little	Slightly too little	Slightly too much	Too much	Far too much
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E9. Would you feel comfortable or uncomfortable in welcoming a <u>Feminist</u> into your home?

Very uncomfortable	Uncomfortable	Somewhat Uncomfortable	Somewhat Comfortable	Comfortable	Very Comfortable
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E10. Do you think that <u>Feminists</u> get too much or too little attention in the media?

Far too little	Too little	Slightly too little	Slightly too much	Too much	Far too much
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E11. How would you feel if a <u>Feminist</u> married into your family?

Very uncomfortable	Uncomfortable	Somewhat Uncomfortable	Somewhat Comfortable	Comfortable	Very Comfortable
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E12. Do you think <u>Feminists</u> are too timid or too aggressive in publicly promoting their ideas?

Far too timid	Too timid	Slightly too timid	Slightly too aggressive	Too aggressive	Far too aggressive
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E13. Do you support or oppose the election of more <u>Feminists</u> to public office?

Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

E14. Would you feel comfortable or uncomfortable if a <u>Feminist</u> became your boss?

Very uncomfortable	Uncomfortable	Somewhat Uncomfortable	Somewhat Comfortable	Comfortable	Very Comfortable
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

Please answer the following questions about your political affiliations and attitudes towards political groups.

F1. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as (*please choose one*):

Strong Democrat..............................	☐ 1	Strong Republican	☐ 5
Weak Democrat................................	☐ 2	Weak Republican...............................	☐ 6
Independent Leaning Democrat	☐ 3	Independent Leaning Republican....	☐ 7
Independent.......................................	☐ 4	Other party..	☐ 8

F2. In general, when it comes to politics, do you think of yourself as (*please choose one*):

Extremely Liberal..............................	☐ 1	Extremely Conservative......................	☐ 5
Liberal	☐ 2	Conservative.....................................	☐ 6
Slightly Liberal	☐ 3	Slightly Conservative	☐ 7
Moderate, Middle of the Road...........	☐ 4		

F3. Would you say that the views of most liberals are close to the mainstream or far from the mainstream?

Very Far from Mainstream	Far from Mainstream	Somewhat Far from Mainstream	Somewhat Close to Mainstream	Close to Mainstream	Very Close to Mainstream
☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6

F4. Would you say that the views of liberals are good or bad for society?

Very Bad for Society	Bad for Society	Somewhat Bad for Society	Somewhat Good for Society	Good for Society	Very Good for Society
☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6

F5. Would you say that the causes liberals support are worthy or unworthy causes?

Very Unworthy	Unworthy	Somewhat Unworthy	Somewhat Worthy	Worthy	Very Worthy
☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6

F6. Do you think the programs liberals support are likely to improve society or not likely to improve society?

Not at all likely	Not Very likely	Somewhat Likely	Very likely
☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4

What about Conservatives?

F7. Would you say that the views of most <u>conservatives</u> are close to the mainstream or far from the mainstream?

Very Far from Mainstream	Far from Mainstream	Somewhat Far from Mainstream	Somewhat Close to Mainstream	Close to Mainstream	Very Close to Mainstream
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

F8. Would you say that the views of <u>conservatives</u> are good or bad for society?

Very Bad for Society	Bad for Society	Somewhat Bad for Society	Somewhat Good for Society	Good for Society	Very Good for Society
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

F9. Would you say that the causes <u>conservatives</u> support are worthy or unworthy causes?

Very Unworthy	Unworthy	Somewhat Unworthy	Somewhat Worthy	Worthy	Very Worthy
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

F10. Do you think the programs <u>conservatives</u> support are likely to improve society or not likely to improve society?

Not at all likely	Not Very likely	Somewhat Likely	Very likely
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

Next, you will answer questions about your personal attitudes on a number of political issues.

G1. Which statement best represents your position on abortion?

☐1	By law, abortion should never be permitted.
☐2	The law should permit abortion only in the case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.
☐3	The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for abortion has been clearly established.
☐4	By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

G2. Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion on the issue of school prayer?

☐1	By law, prayers should not be allowed in the public schools.
☐2	The law should allow public schools to schedule a time when children can pray silently if they want to.
☐3	The law should allow public schools to schedule time when children, as a group, can say a general prayer not tied to a particular religious faith.
☐4	By law, public schools should schedule a time when all children would say a chosen Christian prayer.

G3. Do you think there should be laws against the distribution of pornography?

☐1	There should be laws against the distribution of pornography whatever the age
☐2	There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under the age of 18.
☐3	There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography

G4. Do you think marijuana should be made legal or not?

Yes	No
☐1	☐2

G5. Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children?

Yes	No
☐1	☐2

Next, we would like to ask a few more questions about your thoughts on the way things are going in this country.

G6. The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to these changes.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

G7. We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are different from our own.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

G8. The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

G9. This country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4	☐5	☐6

G10. What is your opinion about a married person having sex relations with someone other than the marriage partner – is it:

Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Wrong Only Sometimes	Not Wrong at All
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

G11. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is:

Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Wrong Only Sometimes	Not Wrong at All
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

G12. What if they are in their early teens, say 14 to 16 years old? In that case, do you think sexual relations before marriage is:

Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Wrong Only Sometimes	Not Wrong at All
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

G13. What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it:

Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Wrong Only Sometimes	Not Wrong at All
☐1	☐2	☐3	☐4

G14. Which statement comes closer to your view?

Organized religious groups of all types should stay out of politics.	It is important for religious groups of all types to stand up for their beliefs in politics.
☐1	☐2

G15. Which statement comes closer to your view?

The government should take special steps to protect America's religious heritage.	There should be a high degree of separation between church and state.
☐1	☐2

G16. Which statement comes closer to your view?

The influence of religion on American politics threatens to divide us as a country.	Religious people must take political action in order to protect their rights.
☐1	☐2

G17. Do you consider religion to be an important part of your political thinking, or not?

Important	Not Important
☐1	☐2

G18. How much guidance would you say religion provides in your daily life?

A great deal .... ☐1
Quite a bit .... ☐2
Some.................................. ☐3
None .... ☐4

G19. Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion regarding the Bible?

☐1	The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
☐2	The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
☐3	The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God.

Now we have a set of questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how much information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like. If you do not know the answer to any of these questions, it's okay. You can select the "Don't Know" option and move on to the next question

H1. What job or political office does Dick Cheney currently hold?

Secretary of State .... ☐1
President .... ☐2
Attorney General .... ☐3
Vice President .... ☐4
Don't Know .... ☐5

H2. What job or political office does Tony Blair hold?

British Prime Minister......... ☐1
Israeli Prime Minister.......... ☐2
Supreme Court Justice......... ☐3
Attorney General .... ☐4
Don't Know .... ☐5

H3. What are the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution called?

Bill of Rights .... ☐1
Articles of Confederation .... ☐2
States Rights .... ☐3
Declaration of Independence ☐4
Don't Know .... ☐5

H4. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not . . . is it the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?

President .... ☐1
Congress .... ☐2
Supreme Court.................... ☐3
Don't Know........................ ☐4

H5. How long is the term of a United States Senator?

2 years .... ☐1
4 years .... ☐2
6 years .... ☐3
8 years .... ☐4
Don't Know........................ ☐5

Finally, we would like to get a little more information about you.

I1.. Are you:

Female ☐1   Male ☐2

I2. What year were you born in? _____________________ (year born)

I3. Do you consider yourself:

White .... ☐1   Asian .... ☐4
Black/African-American ..... ☐2   Pacific Islander................... ☐5
Hispanic/Latino .... ☐3   Native American .... ☐6
Other................................... ☐7 Please specify: ________________ ______

I4. What is the highest grade of school, year of college or highest degree that you have received?

No grades............................☐1 High school graduate..............................☐8
1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th grade......☐2 Some college, no degree.........................☐9
5th, 6th, 7th or 8th grade ......☐3 Associate degree....................................☐10
9th grade..............................☐4 Bachelor's degree (BA, AB, BS) ....☐11
10th grade............................☐5 Master's degree ....☐12
11th grade............................☐6 Professional school degree (J.D.,M.D.)...☐13
12th grade, no diploma.........☐7 Doctorate (Ph.D., Ed.D., Sc.D.) ....☐14

I5. Which of the following income categories best describes the total 2005 household income of all members of your family living there before taxes?

Less than $10,000 .... ☐1
$10,000 - $20,000 .... ☐2
$20,000 - $30,000 .... ☐3
$30,000 - $40,000 .... ☐4
$40,000 - $50,000 .... ☐5
$50,000 - $70,000 .... ☐6
$70,000 - $90,000 .... ☐7
$90,000 - $110,000 .... ☐8
$110,000 - $130,000 .... ☐9
$130,000 and up .... ☐10

I6. Are you a citizen of the United States?

Yes	No
☐1	☐2

I7. Were you born in the United States?

Yes	No
☐1	☐2

I8. How many years have you been living in the United States?

____________ (Number of years)

I9. Which of the following describes your employment status? Please check all that apply to you.

Working Now .... ☐1
Temporarily Laid Off .... ☐2
Unemployed .... ☐3
Retired .... ☐4
Disabled .... ☐5
Homemaker .... ☐6
Student .... ☐7

I10. Are you married now and living with your partner – or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never married?

Married .... ☐1
Widowed .... ☐2
Divorced .... ☐3
Separated .... ☐4
Single, Never Married .... ☐5

I11. How many children do you have?

None .... ☐1
1 .... ☐2
2 .... ☐3
3 .... ☐4
4 .... ☐5
5 or more .... ☐6

I12. In the matter of religion, you are:

- Not religious .... ☐1
- Liberal .... ☐2
- Moderate... ☐3
- Fundamentalist .... ☐4

I13. In the matter of religion, you are:

- Not Religious.. ☐1
- Christian .... ☐2
- Jewish .... ☐3
- Protestant... ☐4
- Roman Catholic... ☐5
- Muslim .... ☐6
- Hindu... ☐7
- Spiritual .... ☐8

I14. How often do you attend religious services?

- Never .... ☐1
- Once or twice a year....................................... ☐2
- Once or twice a month .... ☐3
- Almost once a week .... ☐4
- Once a week .... ☐5
- More than once a week .... ☐6

I15. How often do you attend meetings, other than religious services, at your church or involving your religious community?

- Never .... ☐1
- Once or twice a year....................................... ☐2
- Once or twice a month .... ☐3
- Almost once a week .... ☐4
- Once a week .... ☐5
- More than once a week .... ☐6

Thank you for your cooperation! After we receive this completed survey, you will be sent an AT&T 60 MINUTE PRE-PAID PHONE CARD WORTH $6.95 as a token of our gratitude. If you have any questions or need further information, please feel free to contact us via the address provided on the cover sheet of this questionnaire. If you have any comments about the study, you may write them below:

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Thank you for your cooperation!

Section B: Response Rate and Sample Information

Table A.1: County Level Characteristics – Red Counties

FIPS	County	State	Evangelical /1000	Proportion Bush Vote	Urban Pop.	Total Pop.	Median Inc
01055	Etowah	AL	565.8666	0.637867	62225	103459	31170
01039	Covington	AL	619.5159	0.764613	10550	37631	26336
05145	White	AR	533.0009	0.650632	29880	67165	32203
05053	Grant	AR	725.4617	0.624907	3719	16464	37182
21199	Pulaski	KY	603.2695	0.770186	22211	56217	27370
21075	Fulton	KY	656.7338	0.532613	2805	7752	24382
22117	Washington	LA	533.7615	0.626765	16662	43926	24264
22111	Union	LA	639.9158	0.707093	3244	22803	29061
28115	Pontotoc	MS	596.5727	0.761221	4281	26726	32055
28085	Lincoln	MS	648.3447	0.693747	11937	33166	27279
37193	Wilkes	NC	500.1219	0.70945	17248	65632	34258
37161	Rutherford	NC	578.8644	0.666327	23242	62899	31122
40009	Beckham	OK	603.8689	0.738524	13879	19799	27402
40137	Stephens	OK	633.9678	0.712176	24488	43182	30709
47019	Carter	TN	521.9238	0.711552	34081	56742	27371
47107	McMinn	TN	595.0628	0.630315	20333	49015	31919
48375	Potter	TX	553.6171	0.740775	103352	113546	29492
48023	Baylor	TX	755.6805	0.714548	2741	4093	24627

Table A.2: County Level Characteristics - Blue Counties

FIPS	County	State	Evangelicals /1000	Proportion Bush Vote	Urban	Total	Median Inc
06075	San Fran.	CA	33.4311	0.154802	776733	776733	55221
06045	Mendocino	CA	57.0915	0.346947	46616	86265	35996
09007	Middlesex	CT	14.7223	0.427069	111621	155071	59175
09003	Hartford	CT	28.7675	0.402574	810317	857183	50756
25003	Berkshire	MA	14.5458	0.26036	94243	134953	39047
25025	Suffolk	MA	43.8529	0.23124	689807	689807	39355
26161	Washtenaw	MI	64.8973	0.358531	266463	322895	51990
26103	Marquette	MI	73.3979	0.457604	37526	64634	35548
27075	Lake	MN	64.3878	0.396648	3422	11058	40402
27047	Freeborn	MN	76.6327	0.441082	18226	32584	36964
34017	Hudson	NJ	20.1535	0.322426	608975	608975	40293
36061	New York	NY	20.9108	0.169363	1537195	1537195	47030
36109	Tompkins	NY	35.8546	0.339471	55898	96501	37272
42101	Philadelphia	PA	39.7331	0.193512	1517550	1517550	30746
42049	Erie	PA	68.508	0.457903	225835	280843	36627
53031	Jefferson	WA	49.2814	0.364184	11627	25953	37869
41003	Benton	OR	78.5894	0.410450			
08097	Pitkin	CO	7.26200	0.305297			
29510	St. Lois Cty	MO	99.5379	0.192156			

Table A.3: County Level Response Rates

FIPS	County	State	Records Sent	Undeliv.	Surveys Received	RR*
25025	Suffolk	MA	84	2	7	8.54
09003	Hartford	CT	84	3	15	18.52
09007	Middlesex	CT	83	4	19	24.05
34017	Hudson	NJ	83	2	6	7.41
36061	New York	NY	83	4	9	11.39
36109	Tompkins	NY	83	8	27	36.00
42049	Erie	PA	83	1	22	26.83
42101	Philadelphia	PA	83	4	8	10.13
37161	Rutherford	NC	83	10	14	19.18
37193	Wilkes	NC	84	5	18	22.78
01055	Etowah	AL	83	6	13	16.88
01039	Covington	AL	83	10	12	16.44
47107	McMinn	TN	83	14	6	8.7
47019	Carter	TN	84	6	19	24.36
28115	Pontotoc	MS	83	4	10	12.66
28085	Lincoln	MS	84	4	14	17.5
21075	Fulton	KY	83	2	14	17.28
21199	Pulaski	KY	83	1	11	13.41
26161	Washtenaw	MI	84	7	16	20.78
26103	Marquette	MI	84	3	21	25.93
27075	Lake	MN	84	4	21	26.25
27047	Freeborn	MN	83	4	19	24.05
29510	St. Louis	MO	83	8	16	21.33
22117	Washington	LA	83	5	15	19.23
22111	Union	LA	83	1	16	19.51
05145	White	AR	83	2	19	23.46
05053	Grant	AR	84	8	12	15.79
40137	Stephens	OK	84	4	14	17.5
40009	Beckham	OK	84	1	7	8.43
48023	Baylor	TX	83	5	12	15.84
48375	Potter	TX	83	2	13	16.05
08097	Pitkin	CO	83	13	12	17.14
06075	San Francis.	CA	83	12	12	16.90
06045	Mendocino	CA	84	2	13	15.85
41003	Benton	OR	83	3	22	27.5
53031	Jefferson	WA	83	7	26	34.31
	TOTAL		3000	181	530 (+ 6 no address)	19.01

Response rate is calculated using AAPOR-RR5. Overall, 6 percent of records were undeliverable.

Table A.4: Participating Weblogs

Bitch Ph.D.	Alternate Brain	Phantom Professor
BlondSense	Neural Gourmet	Mockingbird’s Medley
B12 Partners Solipsism	Jesus Creed	Ankle Biting Pundits
Café Apocalypse	Stingray	Skippy the Bush Kangaroo
Radar Active	Wittenberg Gate	Martian Chronicles
WorthyBoards	American Rocks	Democratic Underground
Liberty News Forum	Hannity Forums	Conservative Underground
Free Conservatives	Citizens Forums	

Table A.5: Websites Posting Banner Ads

Evangelical Outpost	Tim Blair	PoliPundit
Anti-Ideolitarian Rottweiler	Blogs for Bush	Betsy's Page
Sister Toldja	Mrs. Happy Housewife	Iowa Voice
PoliBlog	Smart Christian	The American Mind
Pro-Life Blog	MOOREWATCH	