Stony Brook University

OFFICIAL COPY

The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University.

© All Rights Reserved by Author.

The Dynamics and Origins of the Gender Gap in Support for Military Interventions

A Dissertation Presented

by

Mary-Kate Lizotte

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

For the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

Stony Brook University

August 2009

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

Mary-Kate Lizotte

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the

Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend

acceptance of this dissertation.

Leonie Huddy – Dissertation Advisor
Professor, Political Science

Stanley Feldman – Chairperson of Defense
Professor, Political Science

Howard Lavine
Associate Professor, Political Science

Kira Sanbonmatsu
Political Science, Rutgers University

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Lawrence Martin
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

The Dynamics and Origins of the Gender Gap in Support for Military Interventions

by

Mary-Kate Lizotte

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

Stony Brook University

2009

Much of the existing literature on the gender gap in support for war has focused on average differences between men and women. There is little or no research that has focused on variations in men's and women's support due to differing aspects of the international situation. I find using National Election Study data, a student sample, and a non-random adult sample that the gender gap is dynamic meaning it fluctuates in size depending on the context of the military intervention and that values help to explain this dynamism and the origins of the gap. Specifically, I find that the gap is largest in response to interventions involving terrorism and that women are most supportive of intervention for humanitarian reasons. Values, beliefs about how individuals and society should behave, are central to understanding these gender differences. I show that specific values serve to mediate the gender gap in certain circumstances. For example, militaristic values mediate the gender gap in response to intervention involving terrorism. Moreover, men and women differentially rely on certain values when evaluating military interventions. For instance, women rely more than men on pro-social values when evaluating humanitarian interventions. Overall, this dissertation illustrates the need to conceptualize the gender gap in support for military interventions as dynamic and the importance of values in understanding men's and women's differing propensity for support.

Table of Contents

List of Figures v
List of Tables vi
I. Chapter 1 1
II. Chapter 2 15
III. Chapter 3 55
IV. Chapter 4 86
V. Chapter 5 134
VI. Chapter 6 186
Works Cited 198
Appendix 209

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 50
Figure 2.2 51
Figure 2.3 52
Figure 2.4 53
Figure 3.1 77
Figure 4.1 110
Figure 4.2 111
Figure 4.3 112
Figure 4.4 113
Figure 4.5 114
Figure 4.6 1115
Figure 4.7 116

List of Tables

Table 2.1 54
Table 3.1 78
Table 3.2 79
Table 3.3 80
Table 3.4 81
Table 3.5 82
Table 3.6 83
Table 3.7 84
Table 3.8 85
Table 4.1 117
Table 4.2 118
Table 4.3 120
Table 4.4 121
Table 4.5 122
Table 4.6 123
Table 4.7 124
Table 4.8 125
Table 4.9 126
Table 4.10 127
Table 4.11 128
Table 4.12 129
Table 4.13 130
Table 4.14 131
Table 4.15 132
Table 4.16 133
Table 5.1 165

List of Tables (continued)

Table 5.2 167
Table 5.3 168
Table 5.4 169
Table 5.5 170
Table 5.6 171
Table 5.7 172
Table 5.8 173
Table 5.9 174
Table 5.10 175
Table 5.11 176
Table 5.12 177
Table 5.13 178
Table 5.14 179
Table 5.15 180
Table 5.16 181
Table 5.17 182
Table 5.18 183
Table 5.19 184
Table 5.20 185

Chapter 1: The Gender Gap on Support for the Use of Force

Gender is an important source of influence on foreign policy attitudes, but has received less research attention than it deserves. Average gender differences on support for the use of force average around 8 percent, with women less likely than men to support military interventions. This gap has surfaced in military conflicts ranging from World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, through to the current conflict in Iraq (Brandes, 1992; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Bendyna et al, 1996; Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Huddy et al, 2005). Less is known, however, about the origins and dynamics of this gap. The existence of a modest though persistent gender difference in support of the use of military force thus arouses considerable interest among political researchers.

In this dissertation, I examine the origins and dynamics of the gender gap on foreign policy. In a series of experiments, I examine whether various foreign policy contexts resonate differently with males and females. I examine the extent to which gender differences in values provide an overarching explanation for the observed gender differences in support of the use of military force. Specifically, I test a theoretical model in which economic/political marginalization, feminist consciousness, and personality act as competing explanations for value differences between men and women, and values account for the gender gap and its dynamic nature in turn. These explanations for values differences are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 as are the values.

The Political Importance of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

Public opinion on foreign policy matters. A number of researchers have demonstrated that shifting public opinion influences the decisions of policy makers on war and other foreign policy issues (Hill, 1993; Holsti, 1992; Powlick, 1991; 1995; Zaller, 1992, 1994) as well as with respect to other realms of public policy (Page & Shapiro, 1983; Stimson et al., 1995). As a consequence, the factors that influence foreign policy attitudes are of considerable interest to researchers of political behavior. Gender is a significant basis of influence on these attitudes. Public opinion research shows that gender differences on support for the use of force average around 8 percent and are twice the size of differences on non-force issues (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). Evidence shows that the gap has hovered around seven to nine percentage points in response to World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War (Brandes, 1992; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). Similar findings have also emerged in public opinion on recent conflicts such as the Gulf War (Bendyna et al, 1996; Conover and Sapiro, 1993), the military campaign in Afghanistan (Huddy et al, 2005) and the Iraq War (Huddy et al 2009). Less is known about the origins of this gap and whether it is more or less prevalent among different groups of women and men.

A gender gap in foreign policy opinions also holds interest for political behavior researchers because it may contribute to the gender gap in voting via support for candidates who emphasize military issues. Previous work on wartime elections has largely ignored the possibility that women and men may evaluate wartime presidential incumbents differently. In other words, the predictors of vote choice during wartime elections may differ for men and women. Previous non-gender work on foreign policy attitudes supports the notion that such attitudes can influence presidential approval

(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Krosnick & Brannon, 1993) and vote choice (Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida, 1989). Overall, gender differences in support of the use of force are consistent and sizeable and deserve close research scrutiny.

Moreover, some scholars have argued and found supporting evidence that a gender gap on the use of force may affect foreign policy. The public has the ability to hold elites accountable for their actions including their foreign policy strategies. Therefore the gender gap in public opinion on military intervention should cause countries with greater gender equity to be less likely to engage in the use of force. Specifically, in countries with high levels of gender equity the public opinion of women should be more influential than in countries lacking gender equity. Therefore more pressure against military interventions should exist in such countries because women are less likely to support military interventions and are more likely to have their voices heard in these countries that rank higher on measures of gender equity. In other words, if public opinion matters to policy makers and influences foreign policy, then countries where women and men have an equal voice should be less likely to use force in dealing with international disputes. Overall the findings bear this out.

Caprioli (2000; with Boyer, 2001; 2003) finds that countries with greater levels of gender equality are less likely to use aggressive, violent strategies in dealing with international disputes and crises. Marshall and Marshall (1999) similarly found that countries with higher levels of gender empowerment are more likely to use non-military strategies when dealing with interstate conflicts. In another cross national analysis, Regan and Paskevisciute (2003) find a correlation between higher levels of gender equality and lower levels of interstate military disputes. Such differences may arise

because there are more women involved in foreign policy decision making in such countries although Caprioli and Boyer (2001) find female leadership significantly increases the likelihood of the use of violence during a crisis. Therefore it is equally plausible that the abovementioned differences among countries of varied levels of gender equity may arise because of the gender gap on foreign policy within the general public.

Hence, it is important to gain a further understanding of the causes of the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. Presidential administrations and politicians, in general, must make appeals to the public in order to gain support for their foreign policy agendas. Powlick (1991) finds that public officials take into account public opinion but also attempt to move public opinion if they find opposition to their policy pursuits. Women make up more than half of the population. This lesser support for the use of military force holds important electoral implications because they turn out to vote at higher rates than men (CAWP, 2004; 2005). Understanding the kinds of women who drive this gap will add to our understanding of how different appeals to the public may impact public support of governmental use of force.

For example if the gender gap in support of United States military intervention is driven by women being lower on militaristic values then women should be less likely to support wars involving regime change and/or terrorism. In contrast, if the gap is driven by highly humanitarian women who are concerned that military intervention will have a negative impact on the standard of living of foreign individuals then the gap should diminish for military interventions that will stop further human rights abuses. On the whole, public support is vital to successful policy ventures and therefore the ability to effectively appeal to women is an essential component for such public approval.

Gender Gap on Foreign Policy:

Use of Force

Gender differences exist on a broad range of issues linked to the governmental use of force, including general issues on how to solve international disputes, opposition to the use of nuclear armament/war, and enhanced defense spending (Cook & Wilcox, 1991; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Smith 1984). In the 1990s, the National Election Study asked respondents about their attitudes toward the use of force in solving international problems, and found that women were less likely to favor the use of force (Norrander, 2008). During the cold war era, women were less supportive of the development and existence of nuclear armament and war, and more fearful at the prospect of nuclear war (Bendyna, 1996; Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, 1991). In addition, the gender gap in public support for defense spending fluctuated between 1980 and 2000 (Norrander, 2008) with women being less likely to support increased defense spending.

Gender differences in foreign policy attitudes are not limited to support for imminent or existing military intervention, but also extend to preferences for different foreign policy strategies. Women are more likely to favor military action such as air strikes that do not necessitate large numbers of ground troops (Eichenberg, 2003). In general, women are more likely to favor strategies that will peacefully resolve conflict while men are more likely to support tactics which would escalate the conflict; these differences exist during conflicts such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Shield, and Operation Desert Storm (Nincic and Nincic, 2002). Nincic and Nincic (2002), for example, use NES data to assess mid-conflict attitudes find that women

endorse goals of peace and reconciliation at greater rates than men. In addition, their findings suggest that men favor strategies that escalate the conflicts.

Gender differences in the use of military force have persisted after 9/11 and the Iraq war. Research in the aftermath of 9/11 has shown that women respond differently to terrorist attacks and that their policy preferences are in turn different. Specifically, women express greater levels of anxiety about possible terrorist retaliation and an escalation of conflict in response to the use of force. Past research has shown that anxiety leads to less aggressive foreign policy preferences; in particular, anxious individuals tend to be risk averse (Huddy et al. 2005). It is important to note, that Huddy et al. (2005) found women were still more likely to oppose the use of force with respect to Afghanistan even when controlling for anxiety levels about terrorism. Eichenberg (2003) also found substantial gender differences with respect to the Afghanistan War, Iraq War and the War on Terrorism.

Stage of Conflict

A gender gap in foreign policy attitudes and war support is pervasive but does not always occur. The size of the gender gap varies, for example, as a function of the stage of the conflict. Specifically, surveys of mid-conflict attitudes have found gender differences in strategy and goals but not necessarily a gap in war support (Wilcox et al., 1996). The existing evidence shows that the gap lessens, although is not eliminated, once troops have been committed and as the conflict continues (Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Bendyna et al; 1996). This may be the result of an overall rallying effect that is often observed during wartime (Mueller, 1973) or during a national crisis (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003).

Casualties

In addition, to gender differences on support for the use of force, defense spending, and strategies, some evidence suggests there are gender differences in sensitivity to casualties. Specifically, women are more sensitive than men to casualties (Eichenberg, 2003). This work suggests that women are more sensitive to actual casualties experienced during the conflict and not merely the threat of casualties (Eichenberg, 2003). Bendyna et al. (1996) found gender differences in pessimism with respect to military and civilian casualties for the Gulf War. Specifically, they found that women were significantly more negative about the chances of experiencing military and civilian casualties. Moreover, women consistently judge loss of life to be unacceptable. Their findings showed that the gender gap in justified loss of life was actually larger than the war support gap for the duration of the conflict; the gap in war support diminished as victory became increasingly likely but the gap in attitudes towards acceptable loss of life remained relatively constant.

International Evidence

Evidence of a gender gap on foreign policy attitudes is not limited to the United States. During the now dissolved U.S.S.R., research indicated a gender gap on defense spending with women being more supportive of a cut in spending as well as a gap on the use of force, specifically regarding past military conflicts, among some subsets of women but not women in general (Carnaghan, & Bahry, 1990). Canadian women are more sensitive to potential soldier casualties then Canadian men (Gidengil et al. 2002). Togeby (1994) finds that Danish women are more likely to favor reducing the defense budget. In addition, with respect to humanitarian issues, Danish women were more likely to favor a boycott of South Africa as well as favoring increased assistance to developing

countries (Togeby, 1994). Furthermore, research outside the United States has found gender differences in reaction to terrorism including women expressing greater perceived personal threat (Solomon, Gelkopf, and Bleich, 2005) and national risk (Goodwin et al. 2005) There has been some work, however, that concludes that the gender gap on the use of force does not extend to the Middle East but it is unclear why (Tessler & Warriner, 1997; Tessler et al. 1999, Wilcox et al., 1996).

Overall, we know that the gender gap has emerged with respect to foreign policy attitudes including in response to the use of force and defense spending. We also know that the gap is more consistently found, and is more pronounced, when attitudes are measured immediately prior to and at the initial stages of a conflict. Once intervention has begun the gap is not as likely to emerge. Prior work indicates that even if differential support of an ongoing intervention is not found gender differences still emerge with respect to goals and strategy preferences. Finally, some work indicates that the gender gap materializes outside of the United States (Gidengil et al. 2002; Togeby, 1994). Based on prior research, it is clear that men and women differ in their support for a variety of foreign policy goals. The reason for these differences, however, remains elusive. The first major goal of this dissertation is to investigate values as a potential comprehensive explanation for the gender gap and to examine the origins of values differences between men and women. The next section discusses the second major goal of this dissertation, to show that the gap is dynamic.

Fluctuations in the Gender Gap

As the above literature review suggests, the gender gap in war support is persistent, but does not always materialize. The size of the gap has frequently fluctuated

depending on the situational context of the intervention. Eichenberg (2003) finds strong evidence of this fluctuation in his overview of public opinion polls. For instance, the gap is generally smaller when military force is used in response to a humanitarian crisis, but is larger when the intervention is designed to effect regime change (Eichenberg, 2003). Polling shows a one point gender difference for humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and an almost fifteen point difference for regime change intervention in North Korea (Eichenberg, 2003). The gap's size is smaller for interventions with the purpose of dealing with terrorism than regime change, so instead of the fifteen point difference in response to North Korea the gap ranges from nine to eleven points in response to the War against Terror and the most recent military campaign in Iraq (Eichenberg, 2003). The gender gap tends to be smaller for interventions involving humanitarian concerns such as the one point difference for Bosnia, the 4.6% difference for Rwanda, and 7.4% difference for Kosovo. Understanding the dynamics of the gap will further our understanding of how different reasons for military intervention influence public support of governmental use of force. The second goal of my dissertation is to examine the dynamics of the gender gap through experimental manipulation of the situational context and rationale for intervention.

Political behavior research has largely ignored fluctuations in the gender gap. Eichenberg (2003) shows that survey questions mentioning humanitarian intervention decrease the gender gap by almost 8 percentage points from a baseline of 12 points to an only four point difference. Polls also reveal that the gap jumps to 14 points for questions regarding North Korea and were at a recent high of 17 points in response to the Persian Gulf War both of which involve the issue of regime change. These real world examples

are complex because they often draw upon more than one justification for military intervention. This is why an experiment using a fictional intervention can best isolate how the situational context alters the size of the gap.

The idea that the gender gap oscillates with respect to situational context is compatible with prior work on public support for military intervention. This work has focused on what makes military conflicts popular or unpopular with the public. This non-gender focused work has largely disregarded individual-level assessments and explanations for support or opposition. Instead, it has concentrated on identifying general situations under which a majority of the public supports or opposes military interventions. With respect to my second goal, I analyze situational factors that affect the size of the gender gap in support of military intervention.

Research on foreign policy attitudes provides one critical hurdle for explanations of the gender gap – their ability to account for the powerful influence of situations on public attitudes toward military intervention. Previous work on public support of military intervention has focused on what makes military conflicts popular or unpopular with the public. This non-gender focused work has largely disregarded individual level assessments and explanations for support of intervention. Instead, this research has concentrated on identifying general situations under which a majority of the public supports or opposes military interventions.

Much of the research on foreign policy attitudes has found that the public is sensitive to the reasoning behind military involvement. This work concludes that the rationale for the use of force is a key component of public war approval. Jentleson (1992; 1998) finds support for his hypothesis that the public is more supportive of

military conflict that is designed to protect United States' interests and further humanitarian goals than to institute internal change in another country. In other words, Americans are highly supportive of committing troops to defend allies, protect the country against aggressive acts, and for humanitarian reasons but they are less supportive of intervention to effect regime change (Jentleson, 1992; 1998). Presumably, international consensus also gives such actions perceived legitimacy while interfering with another nation's internal structure such as regime change perceived illegitimacy (Jentleson, 1992).

Other situational factors such as casualties do not play as clear a role in driving public support. The influence of casualties appears to be significantly mediated by perceptions of a military intervention's success (Jentleson, 1992; Larson, 1996). In other words, high casualty counts do not reduce public support if the conflict is perceived as successful, but they do result in less support if the intervention is seen as a failure (Jentleson, 1992; Larson, 1996).

Some work has found that casualties do matter in that they have a significant impact on public opinion. Early work claimed that growing casualties equals growing opposition (Mueller, 1973); this work was based on public opinion towards Vietnam, which was seen as an increasing failure during the early 1970s. Moreover, with respect to casualties, small numbers of casualties can also result in decreasing support levels if the public perceives the military actions to be a failure and/or the intervention as insufficiently important to warrant the loss of American lives (Eichenberg, 2003). Larson (1996) and Jentleson (1998) have argued for an elite driven phenomenon to partially

explain public support in the face of casualties. They have found evidence that public approval of ongoing conflicts largely tracks elite levels of consensus.

This work on the impact of casualties, however, has largely ignored the findings that women may in fact be sensitive to mounting casualties (Eichenberg, 2003). The work of Eichenberg (2003) and Bendyna et al. (1996) appear to indicate that casualty counts do influence women's assessments of success and their approval of ongoing interventions. Their work indicates a trend that even for successful and/or justified military interventions, women are less casualty tolerant than men.

This research underscores the relevance of context to an understanding of foreign policy opinion. I believe it also helps to shed light on fluctuations in the size of the gender gap across situations. One of the key contributions of this project is to examine the extent to which gender differences may interact with specific situations to enhance the gap within some situations and minimize it in others. It is important to explore how dispositional and situational factors interact to produce varying levels of public support as well as varying degrees of gender differences. Work on the impact of situational factors on public support of foreign policy has yet to be incorporated into the gender gap literature on the governmental use of force in any meaningful way. In my opinion, these two separate literatures are closely related and therefore this project discusses both as well as allows both to inform the hypotheses and analysis. Furthermore gaining insight into the interaction of situational and dispositional factors is also important to the issue of public support of military interventions and what appeals to the public are more likely to sway opinion.

Chapter Plan

The following chapter discusses several explanations for the gender gap. Moreover, chapter 2 discusses how gender differences in values is a promising and comprehensive theory of why the gender gap exists and why it fluctuates in size as well as direction. The next chapter will also discuss how other extant explanations act as pre-determinants to the value differences that account for the dynamic gap. Finally, chapter 2 includes my hypotheses.

Chapter 3 is a methods chapter which introduces my primary data sets, two experimental studies: one with a non-random adult sample and the other with a student sample, and its measures. Moreover, this chapter establishes the existence of value differences between men and women and discusses their pre-determinants. Men and women differ significantly in their value endorsements with women higher on pro-social values and men higher on militaristic values. The origins of gender differences in values are less clear, however. I find that the pro-social personality trait of altruism predicts the pro-social values of humanitarianism and universalism. This lends support to my theoretical model that personality explains gender differences in values, but I do not find that marginalization or feminist identity explain these differences.

Chapter 4 includes data analysis for my student and adult samples. This analysis establishes evidence for the dynamic nature of the gap. In addition, I test how values act as an all-encompassing explanation for the gap. I find that the gender gap does indeed vary in size and even direction across my experimental conditions with women more likely than men to support intervention for humanitarian reasons. I find mixed evidence for my hypotheses regarding mediation of the gender gap. Pro-social values fail to mediate the gender gap on Humanitarian intervention indicating that women's greater

support is not just due to values. Militaristic values mediate the gender gap on support for intervention to prevent Terrorism, with men holding more militaristic values than women. I do find consistent evidence that men and women differentially rely on values when evaluating military interventions. Men rely on militaristic values when evaluating terrorism intervention but women do not. Pro-social values are a significant predictor of women's evaluations of humanitarian interventions but not of men's evaluations.

Chapter 5 focuses on secondary data analysis. I use the National Election Study data from 2004 and the panel data from 2000-02-04 to test pre-determinants of values and to what extent values mediate the gender gap on the current interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. I find limited support for values as a mediator of the gender gap in support for these two ongoing conflicts. By and large I find that values are predictive of war support, but they fail to fully mediate the gender gap.

Chapter 6 includes a discussion of the overall findings as well as the implications of those findings. Finally, I discuss possible future directions for gender gap research in light of my findings and the questions they raise.

Chapter 2: Competing Explanations for the Gender Gap in Support of Military Interventions

The focus of this chapter is to discuss several extant theories concerning gender differences in support of war that might account for the persistence of the gap and its variation across situations. Scholars have put forward and tested several theoretical explanations for the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. Examining the different theories put forth in the literature is integral to understanding the stability and the consequences of the gap. The following sections will discuss the competing explanations for gender differences on the use of force. I discuss three theories below, economic and political marginalization, feminist consciousness and an untested explanation based on personality. I discuss the latter at some length to make a case for why it should be considered a potential explanation for the gap. Finally, I offer a more comprehensive explanation, value differences between men and women, which has the potential to explain both the dynamic nature of the gap discussed in Chapter 1 and provide insight into its origins. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, I expressly regard the values explanation as compatible with each of the three other theories and will test among them as determinants of values in subsequent chapters.

Each theory discussed in the following sections needs to explain the existence of the gender gap on foreign policy attitudes. The best theories will indicate why women are less supportive than men of the use of force, why women appear to prefer non-force strategies to the use of force, and account for the circumstances under which women are

most and least like men in their opposition to the use of force. I begin with an evaluation of the empirical research in support of each theory, consider the weight of evidence in favor of each, and highlight possible deficiencies with each approach.

When exploring gender differences as well as when studying gender and politics more generally, one can take an essentialist or a non-essentialist approach to gender. For the purposes of this project I do not conceptualize gender differences on support for military intervention as the result of fundamental, foundational, or essential differences between men and women. Instead, I take a non-essentialist approach meaning that gender differences in values are not the result of women being inherently different than men in their opinions toward war. An essentialist approach might argue that women are born pacifist. Rather I argue that certain small differences in value endorsements give rise to a moderately sized gender gap in which women are less likely to support military interventions.

In the discussion that follows of the various explanations, I do not argue that women are simply more dovish than men. Instead, I discuss how differences between men and women in circumstances such as income, differences in political identity such as feminist identity, and differences in personality, such as anxiety, altruism, and assertiveness/dominance lead to differences in particular value endorsements such as pro-social and militaristic values which account for fluctuations in the size of the gender gap. As discussed earlier, the gender gap on military support is sizeable but is too small to suggest that all women oppose the use of force whereas all men support it. Therefore a non-essentialist approach is consistent with past findings regarding the size of the gap.

Economic and Political Marginalization

Some scholars have argued that economic and/or political marginalization may cause women to be more likely than men to oppose the use of force. Women's economic and political marginalization is historically related in terms of how patriarchal societies traditionally limit women's access to both economic resources and to political power. Moreover, it is possible that the two go hand in hand in many circumstances meaning that economically marginalized women also feel alienated from the political system. I discuss these explanations together as well as the findings on both because work on one has often investigated the other.

One explanation offered in the literature for the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes is based on women's economic marginalization and greater self interest in minimizing the cost of war. This theory is based on the fact that even in western, industrialized societies (Pressman 1988) women tend to make up a larger proportion of the economically disadvantaged. Specifically, the economic hardship of unmarried women with children has caused what many scholars refer to as the "feminization of poverty" (Kimenyi & Mbaku, 1995; Pressman, 1988). Therefore their economic marginalization may result in the view that military interventions and the use of force could siphon disproportionate national economic resources away from domestic social programs that assist women. This line of thinking is not unfounded, increased military spending has been shown to correlate with increased income inequality at the macro level (Abell, 1994).

Other scholars have argued that women may oppose the use of force because of their historically limited access to power leading to political alienation. Some research has contended that overall women value less competition and are more egalitarian than

men due to this historical differential in access to power (Gidengil, 1995; Welch & Hibbing, 1992). In other words, the patriarchal structure has limited women's access to traditional forms of power which has resulted in women being less competitive and more egalitarian. This work has focused on domestic issue areas but might extend to attitudes toward the use of force in foreign policy matters. From an international relations perspective, Tickner (1992) contends that women's marginalization in terms of political power may lead to different perspectives on international disputes; she also points out that historically women have not taken part in the protection of national security through military service. Therefore this power relation explanation contends that women's marginalization with respect to power may be a factor leading to the gap.

Empirical work testing this explanation is mixed. Specifically, Nincic and Nincic (2002) find a positive relationship between income and support for Desert Storm controlling for party identification meaning that war support increases as income level increases. Overall alienation and income do not fully explain the gap and gender remains significant with these factors in the model. Similarly, Bendyna et al. (1996) find income to be a significant predictor of attitudes toward the gulf war but that its inclusion does not eliminate a significant gender effect. Wilcox et al. (1996) conclude with their cross national data that economic self-interest is not an explanation for the gap. For general attitudes toward defense spending from a non-gender approach, the relationship between economic indicators and alienation indicators is not strong (Kriesberg & Klein, 1980). In other areas of public opinion, specifically social attitudes, empirical evidence has given weak support to the connection between self-interest and attitudes showing consistently small effects of self-interest (Sears & Funk, 1990; 1991).

Overall, prior work does not provide overwhelming evidence for the economic and political marginalization explanation as mediator of the gender gap. It does appear to be predictive of war attitudes but fails to remove the gender effect. Perhaps these mixed results are due to differences in the context of the interventions being studied and the values that those interventions evoke. This is discussed in more specificity in the values section.

Feminist/Gender Consciousness

Researchers who explain the gender gap on the basis of feminist and/or gender consciousness leading to opposition to war seem to disagree as to why this would occur. Feminist consciousness and gender consciousness are not usually used interchangeably. Feminist consciousness most often refers to the adoption of a feminist belief system including but not limited to believing that men and women are equal, that women's historically disadvantaged position is not natural or ordained by God, and that recognition of women's linked fate will spur mobilization for change (Cott, 1987). On the other hand, gender consciousness simply refers to a sense of linked fate with other women. They are related in that linked fate may be a precursor to feminist identity but they are distinct concepts.

Generally, the feminist consciousness explanation contends that women possessing a feminist consciousness are less supportive of governmental use of force. Some supporters of this explanation have argued for a link between pacifist orientations and feminism. Traditionally, the women's movement has supported principles of nonviolence (Beckwith, 2002; Costain, 2000) and feminism has embodied a commitment to democratic values while simultaneously opposing hierarchy and other traditional forms

of power relations (according to Conover & Sapiro's (1993) synopsis of Brock-Utne (1985)).

Others argue that feminist consciousness or gender consciousness goes beyond merely a sense of linked fate and overall group identity, but leads women to embrace and possess particular values. Conover (1988) appears to purport this idea of such consciousness leading to a distinct way of looking at the world including a set of distinct values. She argues that women with a feminist consciousness will be higher on egalitarianism, lower on individualism, and exhibit attitudes reflecting greater empathy/sympathy for the disadvantaged. One can imagine why such a composite of values may generate opposition to the use of force. This configuration of values reflects a less competitive, more inclusive view of others, but it is also difficult to distinguish the view that feminists oppose war because they hold a configuration of attitudes that is synonymous with liberal ideology.

In support of this view, Conover (1988) documents a link between feminist consciousness and various gender gaps including the gap in foreign policy attitudes. Conover divides her sample into men, non-feminist women, and feminist women. She finds that men and non-feminist women do not differ in their attitudes towards most foreign policy issues – with the exception of nonintervention in Central America. Conover (1988) argues that more marked differences are found between feminists and non-feminists; specifically she finds that feminist women express a greater fear of war and a lesser commitment to building a strong national defense.

In this early work on the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes, Conover's operationalization of feminism implies that men do not hold feminist values. In her later

work, however, she measures feminism among men and women, others do likewise. For example, Cook and Wilcox (1991) find feminists of both sexes express similar attitudes towards foreign conflicts. They argue that male and female feminists are less militaristic than non-feminists. Conover and Sapiro (1993) also find evidence for a link between feminism and pacifism. Moreover, the authors provide evidence of a feminist gap in support for the Gulf War and opposition to civilian bombing, but they do not find a gender gap with respect to these attitudes. This inclusion of male along with female feminists may point more toward a left-wing ideology rather than a connection with traditional female values. Any empirical investigation of the feminist consciousness explanation should always include a control for ideology.

Other evidence suggests that feminist orientation does not fully explain the gender gap on foreign policy attitudes. Although Cook and Wilcox (1991) find evidence that feminists are less militaristic, they still note that this does not fully mediate the gap. Togeby (1994) found that feminist attitudes only partially explained the gender gap in foreign policy positions in Denmark and actually did not reduce the gap as much as controlling for left-right attitudes. One piece of research using data from the U.S.S.R. actually found that feminists were less likely than non-feminist women to oppose increasing defense spending (Carnaghan & Bahry, 1990). It is possible that the mixed results with respect to the feminist consciousness explanation are due to different methods of testing it. Testing an indirect effect of feminist identity through high pro-social or low militaristic values, may be a better and more appropriate test of this explanation. As Conover (1988) suggests, feminist identity may not directly lead to

policy preferences but rather lead to certain value endorsements that lead to particular policy preferences.

By and large, prior findings suggest that feminist consciousness is a promising explanation of the gender gap in support of military intervention. It does not always fully mediate the gender gap but there is evidence that feminists are generally less support of the use of force and its funding. Again, it is possible that feminist consciousness leads to the adherence to specific values that vary in their importance depending upon the context. In the values section, I discuss in more specific detail which values feminist consciousness is likely to be a pre-cursor of and in which situations those values might be evoked.

Personality

Personality is currently an untested theory of why individuals may be more likely to adopt certain values and therefore espouse particular policy positions. The personality explanation provides a promising alternative to prior theories regarding the foreign policy attitudes. Because as of yet, personality remains an untested explanation for the gender gap, I will provide a thorough discussion of the particular personality framework I intend to test along with a discussion of the stability and validity of personality measures.

The study of personality has been a productive field within psychology and also within political science. Personality research in psychology and the social sciences has included studies of political leaders (such as George & George, 1964; Winter, 1987). One of the most well known personality explorations in terms of political science is that of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer,1988; Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 2003; as well as Lavine and colleagues 1999, 2002).

Many in the field of psychology made an effort to develop a coherent structure of the most basic personality traits. This eventually led to the establishment of the Big Five Personality Traits which include Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Repeated factor analysis has supported the Costa and McCrae work finding that the data best fits with their particular five factors listed above. Generally, the five factor model is widely accepted (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1993), which could be attributed to its parsimony as well as robust findings across different measures and languages (see Eysenck, 1991; 1992 for a dissenting opinion).

Studies of the Big Five Personality Traits have found significant, though small, average, gender differences in self-reported traits. Recent meta-analysis found gender differences across cultures on four of the five traits (Costa et al., 2001). Gender differences appear to exist on subcomponents of neuroticism, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness to experience (Costa et al., 2001; Eagly, 1987). Specifically, women are higher on anxiety a subcomponent of neuroticism, higher on altruism a subcomponent of agreeableness, lower on assertiveness/dominance a subcomponent of extraversion, and higher on the feelings subcomponent of openness to experience (Costa et al., 2001). These differences could be the driving force behind observed gender differences in public opinion on military intervention as well as humanitarian intervention.

To date, studies of Big Five have found significant gender differences. Of particular interest, for the purposes of this study are differences on Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Extraversion. Certain subcomponents of these three larger dimensions are of the most interest with respect to the study of the gender gap on the use

of force. These subcomponents include the anxiety and vulnerability components of Neuroticism, the altruism dimension of Agreeableness, and the assertiveness/dominance component of Extraversion. The particular subcomponents are of interest in the study of foreign policy attitudes with respect to the types of individuals most likely to endorse the use of force. For example, anxious individuals will be less inclined to hold militaristic values because of a fear of retaliation, while altruistic individuals will be more inclined to endorse pro-social values because of a propensity to support helping others, and finally low assertiveness individuals should have a general tendency to be low on militaristic values. If personality factors are the explanation for gender differences in values that lead to gender differences in foreign policy attitudes, then previous studies should uncover specific directional differences in personality between men and women. Specifically, women should be found to be higher on anxiety, vulnerability, and altruism as well as lower on assertiveness/dominance. In other words, the gender gap on foreign policy attitudes emerges with respect to conventional wars and recently toward terrorism, which may be driven by low assertiveness/dominance and high anxiety individuals, respectively. Furthermore, women are more likely to support intervention for humanitarian reasons, which may be driven by altruistic women.

Previous work has found gender differences in these three components and specifically with respect to the abovementioned subcomponents. Feingold (1994) performed a meta-analysis, using data from several countries such as the United States, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Russia. The results showed that women are consistently more agreeable and less antagonistic than men; specifically the results show a one standard deviation difference between men and women with about 84% of

women scoring higher than the average man (Feingold, 1994). Also, Feingold found that women reported higher anxiety. Although differences on extraversion were mixed, Feingold found men to be higher on assertiveness/dominance. In addition, Jang, Livesley, and Vernon (1996) found small and significant gender effects for a sizeable majority of the scales including significant gender differences on the anxiety and vulnerability dimensions of neuroticism as well as on the altruism dimension of agreeableness, which are of particular interest for this dissertation.

Costa et al. (2001) found similar evidence of cross cultural gender differences using meta-analyses. Specifically, they find that women report higher levels of anxiety and vulnerability, subcomponents of neuroticism, and lower levels of assertiveness/dominance, a sub-dimension of extraversion. Generally, Costa et al. also find small differences in self-reports with respect to compassion, altruism, and emotionality (2001). Finally, no changes in these differences are observed over a 40 year period (1952-1992), and there is no evidence of significant differences between the United States and other countries (Feingold, 1994).

These results are consistent with gender stereotypes that purport women are more nurturing and cooperative while men are more aggressive and competitive. This has led some to argue that socialization into gender roles explains these personality trait differences and accounts for gender differences in foreign policy attitudes. In particular, Eagly and colleagues (2004) argue that gender role socialization is behind gender differences in the use of force as well as differences in other issues areas.

Regardless of the source of these gender differences in personality, the results are consistent with findings regarding gender differences in public opinion towards military

intervention, humanitarian intercession, and recent findings on reactions to terrorism. According to the personality findings, women are less antagonistic, assertive, and dominant, which could presumably lead to differences in support for aggressive foreign policies and escalating conflict strategies (Eichenberg, 2003; Nincic and Nincic, 2002). The women, who rate as less assertive and less dominant on the subcomponents of Extraversion, could be the same women who prefer international problems to be solved without the use of force.

Cross cultural gender differences in personality could also explain public opinion gaps involving humanitarian situations as well as differences in sensitivity to casualties. Women's higher average reports on compassion and altruism are presumably related to women's greater support of interceding for humanitarian reasons (Eichenberg, 2003). Furthermore higher levels of compassion and altruism may explain women's greater sensitivity to casualties and general loss of life connected with the use of force (Eichenberg, 2003). The women, who rate higher on Agreeableness, in particular on altruism, could be those more likely to support humanitarian intervention and be increasingly less supportive of the use of force when confronted with mounting casualties.

Finally, gender differences on Neuroticism, could explain differences in reactions to terrorism, risk assessment, and fear of consequences. Higher anxiety and vulnerability reports could likely explain the gender differences in risk aversion and anxiety levels in reaction to terrorist attacks (Huddy et. al. 2005) as well as account for women's higher risk assessments of nuclear armament leading to nuclear war (Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, 1991). In addition, gender differences on Neuroticism could explain women's higher

casualty assessments (Bendyna et al., 1996) and fear of the consequences associated with military interventions and their escalation (Bendyna et al., 1996). In general, the personality explanation may provide the most basic explanation for gender differences in values while the other explanations may prove to be more proximate.

Aggression

Another theory also relies on stable behavioral differences in order to explain the gap. Some theorists have argued that the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes is due to gender differences in aggression. Aggression as conceptualized in the following cited works most likely maps onto the Big Five Personality Traits as a behavioral equivalent to a combination of the assertiveness/dominance and forceful subcomponents of Extraversion and the quarrelsome subcomponent of Agreeableness. In terms of aggression, feminist theorists have argued that women are less aggressive than men for several different reasons, and this translates into lower support for the use of force. Some have claimed that the difference in aggression is a result of basic physiological differences mainly that women differ in aggression because of their role in reproduction (Elshtain, 1986). Studies concerned with ascertaining the degree to which aggression differences exist between the sexes have found mixed results. Archer (2004), in a meta-analysis, found no sex differences in indirect aggression or in circumstances of provocation; he did find that females are more likely to display displaced aggression and that males are more likely to engage in direct, physical aggression. Other work has also found that under provocation, women and men do not differ in terms of aggression (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). The assertiveness/dominance dimension of Extraversion is distinct from aggression in that aggression is not a trait but a behavior. In general, this

theory should predict a larger gap between men and women than what has been found in the past. If women on the average are innately less aggressive, then this theory really seems to predict that the majority of women should be against the use of the force. As detailed earlier, the gap is significant and sizeable but not as large as one might expect according to this particular theory. Perhaps, previous renditions of this theory have exaggerated the gender difference in aggression, which is why previous studies have such mixed findings. It is possible that like other personality traits, the gender differences are non-trivial but not as large as previously theorized. As mentioned in the above discussion of assertiveness/dominance, there are gender differences in that women are more likely to be low on assertiveness/dominance. Therefore, for the purposes of this study the trait aggression approach will be folded in with the personality approach.

Personality provides a promising and relatively new approach to the study of values and policy positions. Moreover, because of the gender differences on anxiety, altruism, and assertiveness it is a potential explanation for fluctuations in the gender gap that arise in response to the different values evoked by different situations. The specifics of which personality traits are likely to predict particular values and the situations that are likely to evoke these values are discussed in detail in the values section.

General Stability and Validity of the Big Five

One concern about personality, because it is a rather new approach in political science research, might be its stability over one's lifetime, across different situations, and using different measures. The following discusses the stability, reliability, universality, and possible heritability of the Costa and McCrae (1992) model. Studies of the Big Five

Personality Traits have revealed their stability, both over time and across different measures, as well as point to the validity of the measures.

Costa and McCrae (1994) found that personality traits are stable over long periods of time; self-reports separated by thirty to forty years of time are characterized by high correlations of between .5 and .7. According to one longitudinal study, adolescence appears to be an important stage of personality development. McCrae, Costa, Terracciano, Parker, Mills, Fruyt, and Mervielde (2002) use the NEO Personality Inventory to determine to what extent personality traits change during adolescence. The NEO Personality Inventory simply refers to the questionnaire that measures all five factors of personality, Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Neuroticism and Agreeableness have the lowest stability scores with a general increase in neuroticism among girls. Overall the big five have significant stability over the adolescent time period. Again, most studies seem to indicate high levels of stability over time for the Big Five. Infant studies have even shown the predictability of observational assessments for later behavior (Kagan, 1994).

Mussen et al. (1980) found that self-reports are highly correlated with assessments made by other individuals; in addition these findings point to the validity of the measures because self-reports are consistent with others' observations. The literature on the Big Five has shown consistency between self-reports and behavior which speaks to the validity of the measures (Friedman et al., 1995; McCrae & Costa, 1985).

If the five factor model is truly the best account of the most basic personality traits then it should also be universal in a cross cultural sense. Some evidence has emerged to suggest that the Big Five replicates universally; the NEO PI-R, the Costa and

McCrae revised measure of the Big Five, cross culturally produces almost identical results. McCrae and Costa (1997) compared factor loadings for several different samples from various countries including United States, Germany, Portugal, Korea, China, and Japan. They found that the primary and much of the secondary factor loadings were replicated across the data sets. Again, this appears to show that the Big Five Personality Traits are universal, which is interesting in light of the cross cultural similarities found regarding the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes.

The evidence on the origins of these personality traits is mixed; some of the evidence suggests that personality traits are heritable while others argue that they are the result of socialization. Twin studies have put forth evidence to support the heritability claim showing that about 50% of personality traits are genetic (Bouchard, 1994; Loehlin, 1992; Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, and Livesley, 1998). Jang, Livesley, and Vernon (1996) performed a study using the self-report NEO Personality inventory comparing identical and fraternal twins to determine the genetic heritability of the five factors. They found that each of the factors has the following heritability: Neuroticism 41%, Extraversion 53%, Openness 61%, Agreeableness 41%, and Conscientiousness 44%.

The debate over the origins of personality traits, however, is beyond the scope of the proposed study. This dissertation's investigates the explanatory power of personality trait differences between men and women to account for differences in values relevant to foreign policy attitude differences. It is likely that personality traits are the result of both genetics and environmental factors. Most important for this project is that these personality traits are reliable and stable individual differences. In particular, the big five

personality traits have been used a great deal in psychology and are beginning to be used in political science (Mondak and Halperin, 2008).

Values as Key Moderating Influence on Gender Gap

The three explanations discussed earlier are key to prior theories and findings regarding the gender gap but variation in situational factors is difficult to explain with a personality, marginalization, or feminist identity approach suggesting a key role for values. What accounts for the variations in support of the use of military force in differing contexts discussed in Chapter 1? When evaluating whether or not to support the use of force under various contexts, I believe it is very likely that individuals draw on relevant values. Values are evaluative, preferable end states or actions (Feldman, 2003). Researchers purport that values are fewer than attitudes and are more abstract so that they are applicable across different attitude objects. Much prior work has focused on developing an understanding of value types, which are a set of conceptually closely linked values. These value types represent basic human goals and motivations (Feldman, 2003). In general, values are beliefs individuals have about how people should act and what society should do.

For example, in response to regime change individuals may draw on values involving national assertiveness/dominance over other countries, whereas when faced with an instance of human rights violations individuals should draw on values involving a concern for universal human welfare. With respect to terrorism, individuals are likely to draw on security values. Finally, when evaluating intervention to protect national interests, individuals should draw on values concerning the well-being of close others. Thus, in order to more fully understand the dynamics of the gender gap, I will investigate

how value differences between men and women mediate the gender gap and how gender differences in reliance on values moderates the gender gap.

Specific Values Included in the Subsequent Analysis

Gender differences in value endorsement and value reliance may account for observed gender differences in support for military interventions. Values are seen as the criteria people use to select, evaluate, and justify actions, events, and people. Prior work in political science has shown a relationship between values and attitudes, including values and policy preferences (Feldman, 1988; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Pollock, Lilie, & Vittes, 1993; Zaller, 1992).

Although I use different value scales throughout the subsequent analysis, the values converge on testing two overarching categories of values: Pro-Social Values and Militaristic-Security Values. First, Pro-Social Values encompass values that measure support for pro-social behaviors such as helping others, promoting human rights, ensuring equality for all people, and guaranteeing the welfare of others. Examples of Pro-Social Values include Feldman and Steenbergen's (2001) humanitarian values scale and Schwartz's universalism and benevolence value type, which I discuss in greater detail in the following section. In the adult study I measure Pro-Social Values with Schwartz' Universalism and Benevolence[1] value types. The Schwartz Value types are discussed in detail in the following section. Overall, I expect that the humanitarian values will mediate the gender gap when the call for war is to stop a Humanitarian atrocity. Moreover, I expect a decrease in the size of the gap because I expect women to be higher on these Pro-Social Values.

[1] The Benevolence value type is not included in all of the analysis; it is often significant in the opposite direction than expected.

Second, the Militaristic-Security Values include measures of support for a strong army, for using the C.I.A. to undermine hostile governments, a preference for military intervention over diplomacy, and a desire for respect and security for one's nation. Examples of Militaristic-Security Values include Schwartz' Power[2] and Security value types as well as Holsti's measure of Militant Values. I adapted the Militant and Cooperative[3] values from the Hosti scales to reflect support for modern international dynamics rather than the Cold War, which were the focus of the original measures. Specifically, I expect that the Militaristic-Security Values will mediate the gender gap in response to interventions involving terrorism, national interests, and regime change. I also expect a larger gap in response to these types of intervention. I expect the Militaristic-Security Values will mediate the traditional gender gap that emerges in response to terrorism, national interests, and regime change interventions.

Schwartz's Value Types: Relevance to Gender Gap and Correlations with Behaviors

Schwartz has developed the study of values through his examination of value types in diverse countries. A value type is a set of values that are closely linked conceptually. These value types represent basic human goals and motivations (Feldman, 2003). For example, according to Schwartz, values such as social justice, equality, tolerance, and peace belong to one of ten key value types known as universalism.

In a seminal paper, Schwartz (1992) collected data from 40 samples in 20 countries. He derived a total of 10 distinct value types--power, achievement, hedonism,

[2] I do not provide analysis on the Power value type because it is unrelated to the dependent variable of intervention support, there is no gender gap, and the two items fail to scale together.

[3] I do not have specific expectations regarding the cooperative values but explore their explanatory power in the student analysis.

stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security. I closely examine four of these value types as the most relevant to the study of foreign policy attitudes: power, universalism, benevolence, and security. Values located in the 'power' value type indicate an individual that values social status and prestige through control and assertiveness/dominance over people and resources. The 'universalism' value type represents a preference for social justice and tolerance. The 'benevolence' value contains values promoting the welfare of close others. Lastly, the 'security' value type contains values relating to the safety and welfare of society and of oneself.

Much of the work on values has been concerned with ranking values, as Rokeach studied, or the relationships between different values as Schwartz has studied. Schwartz (1992, 1996) has argued that values and their relationship to one another should be universal because they originate from basic human needs. He has found evidence to support this in that his basic structure has fairly consistently replicated cross-nationally with seemingly broad consensus on the hierarchy of values (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001). With colleagues, he has also found that alternate forms of measurement beget similar results (Schwartz et al., 2001).

With respect to the values literature, there has been considerable debate over whether or not values directly guide behavior. Concerning Schwartz's value types, evidence suggests that values do correlate with expected behavior, but differences exist between value types in their level of correlation with behavior (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003). Specifically, Bardi and Schwartz find that power and universalism moderately correlate with expected behavior while benevolence and security only marginally relate to behavior. They find that the values types significantly correlate with self-reported

behaviors. Power significantly correlates with self-reports of coercing others to follow one's preferences. Universalism significantly correlates with self-reports of treating others equally. Security significantly correlates with self-reports of not opening one's door to strangers. Benevolence significantly correlates with self-reports of helping one's neighbors. Moreover, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) find that Power and Universalism significantly correlate with peer-rated behavior but Security and Benevolence do not.

As Figure 2.1 depicts, the four value types of Power, Security, Benevolence, and Universalism should be linked to support for four key types of military intervention. Specifically, the power value type, which measures the endorsement of status through assertiveness/dominance over others, should be linked to support for regime change interventions. This type of intervention assumes the higher status of the intervening country which displays, in turn, its assertiveness/dominance over the other country by an attempt to change its internal power structure. The security value type, which includes the endorsement of safety and stability at the societal level through national security, should be linked to support for interventions that will deal with terrorist threats. Clearly, there has been much made of the connection between terrorism and national security in recent years. The benevolence value type, which concerns the welfare of others but in this instance close others not humanity as a whole, should be linked to support for an intervention for the purpose of protecting national interests. This type of intervention involves protecting the interests of the nation which in a broad sense includes the well-being of others close to oneself. The universalism value type, which measures the endorsement of protecting the welfare of all people, should be linked to support for

humanitarian intervention. This type of intervention involves concern for the welfare of others facing a humanitarian crisis.

Figure 2.1 About Here

Regarding different value orientations, men and women likely differ in their degree of support for each value, rather than valuing very different types of values. Indeed, large gender differences in support of a specific value are not necessary in order to account for the gender gap in foreign policy support and variations in its size. The gender gap is significant and sizeable, but by no means large enough to indicate that men and women's value orientations do not overlap. It is important to note, however, that gender is likely an influential component of an individual's psychological perspective and experience in the over-arching political culture. Although men and women experience the same political culture, their experiences within that culture may significantly differ due to their gender. This presumably could lead to differences in men and women's beliefs, attitudes, and values. It is worth stressing that in no way does this mean that women are homogeneous in their value orientations. In terms of their value orientations, men and women just sort slightly differently but their distributions substantially overlap. Because the gender gap on foreign policy attitudes is also moderate in size, this is one reason why values is a promising explanation.

Research on values, in particular Schwartz's ten value types, offer evidence of modest gender differences in value orientations. Overall, Prince-Gibson and Schwartz (1998) find modest correlations between gender and values. In a later study, Schwartz, et al. (2001) find small gender differences on benevolence, which measures individuals' concern for the welfare of others, with women rating this as more important. Lyons et al.

(2005) find gender differences on power, which encompasses a desire for prestige and control of others through assertiveness/dominance over those others, and universalism, which includes a desire of social justice and tolerance through peace and equality. Men score more highly on the power value and women more highly on universalism. Beutel and Marini (1995) find differences between male and female adolescents on compassion meaning concern for the well being of others. In a later study, Beutel and Johnson (2004) found female adolescents to be higher on pro-social values, defined as a concern for the interests of others. Rokeach (1973) found women to be lower on interpersonal conflict. Schwartz (1992) found women to be higher on benevolence and universalism. These findings are promising for my theory on the gender gap because men's higher endorsement of the power value type and women's higher endorsement of the universalism value type is consistent with my expectations that regime change will be the largest gender gap and humanitarian intervention will be the smallest.

It may be that men and women endorse these value types differently as the above findings suggest. This would mean that gender differences on values mediate the gender gap. It also may be that men and women rely on different values when evaluating military interventions. This would result in moderating effects rather than mediating effects. Sapiro and Conover (1997) investigate the mediator versus moderator possibility with respect to electoral decisions. For example, men may support a military intervention involving regime change based on the degree to which they value power whereas women are somewhat more inclined to oppose it based on a humanitarian concern for those affected by possible violence. This would result in a gender gap based on men's and women's reliance on differing values.

Theoretical Determinants of Gender Differences in Values

The competing theories, as discussed earlier in this chapter, may act as pre-determinants of gender differences in value endorsement. Little work has investigated this possibility and thus little empirical evidence exists that the competing theories outlined earlier act as pre-determinants to values differences between men and women. One notable exception is Conover (1988) who claims and provides evidence that the gender gap on various policy preferences is really a feminist gap and that feminists' policy preferences are the result of values differences.

Therefore, I test several explanations for what may cause different value orientations to emerge including economic and political marginalization, feminist consciousness, and personality traits. With respect to these theories, I try to explain two things. First, these explanations need to explain why some women might possess different values than men. Second, these explanations need to provide a link between different values and opposition to the use of force.

Refer to Figure 2.2 for a depiction of the causal chain for the Economic and Political Marginalization explanation. In order to test this explanation, I measure income, receipt of government aid, and political efficacy to determine whether these cause the gap to disappear assuming that women would be more likely to rate higher on these measures. Because of self-interest, economically marginalized individuals should score low on the Benevolence value type. The Benevolence Value type is all about helping others but I believe that economically marginalized individuals act out of self-interest because of their economic status. Because of political alienation, politically marginalized individuals should score low on the Power value type. Individuals who are politically

marginalized, particularly women, should be less likely to endorse more traditional forms of power and control. Therefore they will be low on the power value type.

Figure 2.2 About Here

Overall, feminist identity likely has an indirect influence on foreign policy attitudes through the Power and Universalism value types. In other words, individuals with a feminist identity should be likely to score low on Militaristic-Security values like the Power value type and high on Pro-Social Values like the Universalism value type and humanitarian values. I suspect this because of their pacifist orientation, sympathy for the disadvantaged, and egalitarianism. Prior work (Conover, 1988) shows that feminists are more egalitarian and should therefore be likely to endorse the Universalism value type which measures support for equality of all people. In light of evidence that feminists (Conover, 1988) are higher on sympathy for the disadvantaged, they should be more likely to endorse humanitarian values that measure support for helping others and ensuring the welfare of all people. Figure 2.3 depicts the causal link between Feminist Consciousness and general opposition to the use of force.

Figure 2.3 About Here

Personality and Values

With respect to foreign policy attitudes, it is possible that these personality traits lead to the adoption of particular values that then lead to support or opposition to the use of force. In other words, it is possible that personality traits have an indirect effect on policy preferences through the adoption of particular values. Figure 2.4 provides a visual representation of the proposed indirect relationship personality has through values. Prior work on prejudice has shown this to be the case; specifically, this work found that the Big

Five Personality traits had an indirect effect on generalized prejudiced through Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Ekehammar et al., 2004).

In addition to the literature concerned with contextual factors, another literature studying foreign policy attitudes from a non-gender perspective has emerged which is concerned with dispositional factors. In particular, this work has attempted to demonstrate how individuals may have relatively stable preferences toward intervention or isolationism. For example, Wittkopf (1981; 1986; 1987; & Maggiotto, 1983) have developed a typology of four dispositions regarding interventionism and isolationism capturing variation on the type of intervention supported, specifically cooperative versus militant. Other scholars have also sought to find stable foreign policy dispositions based on similar conceptions to that of Wittkopf (Holsti & Rosenau, 1993; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1987).

Another study investigated the correlations between Schwartz's values and the Big Five Personality traits. Roccas and colleagues (2002) found that the assertiveness/dominance component of extraversion significantly and positively correlated with achievement and more importantly power. Schwartz's power value type includes the goals and motivations of dominance and control (Feldman, 2003). The altruism component of agreeableness correlates positively with benevolence. Schwartz's benevolence value type includes concern for others' welfare along with motivations of helpfulness, loyalty, and responsibility (Feldman, 2003). The anxiety component of neuroticism failed to significantly correlate with any of Schwartz's ten values. In the realm of foreign policy, two scholars have found links between personality and foreign policy attitudes. Christiansen (1959) found that latent personality aggression and

interpersonal aggression was linked to aggressive foreign policy attitudes. Scott (1960) finds that individuals concerned with personal status are likely to be concerned with military status. This prior work on personality and values acknowledges that the causal direction and/or mechanism through which personality traits and values correlate with one another is unknown. Because of the evidence suggesting the heritability of personality traits, I argue that it is likely that personality traits come first in the causal chain.

Research on anxiety, assertiveness/dominance, and altruism also point to certain attitudinal and behavioral expectations. Anxiety research shows a preference for isolationist attitudes, specifically with respect to foreign policy (Huddy et al., 2005). Specifically, those reporting high levels of anxiety were more likely to oppose intervention in Afghanistan as well as being less supportive of the United States involvement overseas. At the chronic dispositional level, it would make sense to expect anxious individuals to prefer isolationist foreign policy goals. Those high on anxiety should be more likely to possess a high value for security which would coincide with an isolationist set of values. Dominance research has shown a correlation between dominance ratings and authoritarianism (Ray, 1981) and it appears that assertiveness/dominance is closely related to aggression but includes a more general desire to implement one's will (Ray, 1981). With this in mind, one would expect that those high in assertiveness/dominance would adopt an individualistic or self-interested set of values, which should coincide with a more interventionist set of values particularly with respect to intervening on behalf of national interests. Finally, empathy/altruism research shows a link between empathy and altruistic or helping behavior (Batson et al.,

1981; Toi & Batson, 1982). In light of these findings, it makes sense to expect that individuals higher on dispositional altruism should be more likely to adopt humanitarian values[4] which would then lead them to support humanitarian interventions. Figure 2.4 provides a visual representation of the abovementioned relationship between personality traits, values, and foreign policy attitudes.

Figure 2.4 About Here

With respect to the competing explanations for the gender gap on foreign policy attitudes discussed earlier, it is possible to derive from these explanations different hypotheses that account for the influence of situational factors. Each of the previously discussed explanations provide distinct expectations for particular individuals to oppose the use of force under specific circumstances as well as prefer specific strategies for dealing with international problems. For example, because of low endorsement of the Power value type, feminist identifiers should be more likely to prefer non-forceful diplomatic strategies; because of their high endorsement of the Universalism value type, they should be more likely to support intervention for humanitarian reasons over the other possible situations. Intervening for humanitarian reasons will promote social justice which is an important component of Universalism; Conover (1988) also found evidence that feminists exhibit sympathy for disadvantaged groups which would presumably extend to the victims of a humanitarian crisis. Feminists should oppose military use of force for terrorism, regime change, and national interests because such intervention involves control and assertiveness/dominance over others which is in conflict with their low endorsement of Power.

[4] It is important to note that humanitarian values are distinct from egalitarian values (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001).

Economically marginalized individuals out of self-interest should oppose the use of force because of their low endorsement of the Benevolence value type. Overall economically marginalized individuals should behave in a way that reflects their self-interests; therefore they will not support expensive and/or unnecessary military interventions or strategies for dealing with foreign policy problems. Politically marginalized individuals, who are low on the Power value type, should oppose the use of force on the grounds that they do not value control and assertiveness/dominance over others. In addition, marginalized individuals, particularly the economically marginalized, should prefer strategies that they believe to be less costly because expensive strategies could result in the lowering of domestic funding for programs of interest to them.

Individuals high on anxiety, adopting security values, should also prefer non-confrontational strategies presumably because of fear of retaliation; these same individuals should oppose intervention for national interests and terrorism again because of a fear of escalation and/or retaliation. Although I make no specific prediction regarding their support/opposition of intervention for this reason, they may support intervention for humanitarian reasons because they might not fear retaliation under such circumstances. Individuals high on assertiveness/dominance should value control over others and therefore be high on the Power value type; this should lead to support for interventions for national interests, terrorism, and regime change. I have no specific prediction regarding support/opposition for humanitarian intervention with respect to individuals high on assertiveness/dominance. Individuals high on altruism should adopt Universalism values, and therefore they should support intervention for humanitarian reasons similarly to that of feminist identifiers. They will not support intervention for

other reasons because they will not believe that other types of intervention will help others or promote social justice and in fact they may believe that it will be to the detriment of others. Moreover, although I predict similar outcomes for altruism and feminist consciousness, these two explanations are distinguished in that they constitute different determinants with different values mediating them. Distinguishing between different determinants even if they have the same political outcome is essential to any further understanding of which persuasive appeals would be successful in closing the gap in opinion. Each of the above explanations can provide insight into how certain individuals with certain characteristics and/or values will be likely to prefer particular strategies and be likely to oppose/support intervention under specific circumstances.

Overall, foreign policy attitudes may be the result of stable dispositions or beliefs interacting with the specific context of each individual situation. Wittkopf's (1981; 1986; 1987; & Maggiotto, 1983) work developing typologies of foreign policy dispositions begins to get at this idea. This prior work, however, does not thoroughly theorize why certain people may have relatively consistent isolationist attitudes while others have militant interventionist attitudes or how situational context may interact with such dispositions. In addition, this work has failed to be incorporated into our understanding of gender differences with respect to foreign policy attitudes. This dissertation will begin to merge these literatures and build upon this prior work.

Using an experiment, I am able to thoroughly investigate and account for the importance of situational factors as well as individual level factors. Moreover, an experimental method through random assignment and the use of fictional justifications for military interventions, will allow for a cleaner test of the hypotheses. Recently

support for the use of force has become partisan in nature with respect to the Iraq War in particular (Jacobson, 2007) and this should not be the case with the proposed experiment. The main goal of this work will be to investigate these competing explanations for the gender gap while at the same time account for differences in support that may arise due to situational factors.

Hypotheses

My research will investigate the effects of several situational contexts on the size of the gender gap as well as the explanatory power of values in accounting for the fluctuations in the size of the gap. I will rely on a multi-method approach using both experimental and survey methodology. Specifically, four situational contexts of military interventions will be analyzed- regime change, national interests, terrorism, and humanitarian- in terms of their distinct impact on the size of the gap in support for military intervention. Based on prior public opinion polls, the gender gap should be largest for regime change and smallest for humanitarian interventions. Value differences between men and women as well as differential value reliance should account for the dynamics of the gap and provide a broad explanation for the origins of the gap. Economic and Political Marginalization, Feminist Consciousness, and Personality should provide insight into the pre-determinants of the value differences and differential value reliance. Thus, the following broad hypotheses also depicted in Table 2.1 will be tested, with specific discussions of expectations given in each subsequent chapter for specific analyses:

Table 2.1 About Here

H1-Gender Gap and Context Hypothesis: The gender gap will vary in size depending upon the situational context surrounding the call for military intervention.

A-Humanitarian Intervention: The gender gap in war support should be minimized when intervention is for humanitarian purposes; women should be equally as supportive as men when it is a humanitarian intervention.

B-Regime Change Intervention: The gender gap in war support should be maximized when intervention is for regime change. Women should be least likely to support this because of Jentleson's (1992) prior findings that this type of intervention is the least popular among the public.

C-Terrorism Intervention: The gender gap in war support should be quite large when intervention involves terrorism; women should be less likely to support terrorism interventions than men.

D-National Interests Intervention: The gender gap should be in the traditional direction for interventions involving national interests. Women should be less likely than men to support but the gap should be smaller relative to regime change and terrorism because of Jentleson's (1992) work showing that national interests is the most popular reason among the general public.

H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis: Men and women will differ in their value endorsements, meaning values will mediate the gap, or men and women will differ in their reliance on values, meaning gender will moderate the effect of values

A-Pro-Social Values: Women should be higher on Pro-Social Values and more likely to rely on these values. Pro-Social values should explain women's greater support for interventions for Humanitarian purposes. Individuals high on these values should be

more supportive of actions that would provide for the wellbeing of others; thus women should score more highly on such values as humanitarian values and the universalism value type. This should explain women's greater support for military interventions for humanitarian purposes.

B-Militaristic-Security Values: Men should be higher on Militaristic-Security Values and more likely than women to rely on these values. Militaristic-Security values should therefore mediate the gender gap on interventions for Regime Change, Terrorism, and National Interests purposes.

1-Regime Change: The gender gap in the Regime Change condition should be mediated by Militaristic-Security Values; individuals high on these values, such as the Holsti's militant values and Schwartz' security value type, should be more supportive of ousting an undemocratic leader.

2-Terrorism Intervention: The gender gap in the Terrorism condition should be mediated by the Militaristic-Security Values. Individuals high on these values, such as the Pro-force values and Schwartz' power value type, should be more supportive of the use of military to stop terrorists.

3-National Interests Intervention: The gender gap in the National Interests condition should also be mediated by the Militaristic-Security values. Individuals high on these values should be more likely to support actions to protect the nation and its interests.

H3-Gender Gap and Value Determinants Hypothesis: Economic and Political Marginalization, Feminist Consciousness, and Personality act as pre-determinants of these value differences between men and women.

A-Economic and Political Marginalization: This acts as a pre-determinant for the benevolence value type and power value type. Specifically, economic and political marginalization leads to low endorsement of the benevolence value type because of a self-interest motivation and low endorsement of the power value type because of political alienation.

B-Feminist consciousness: This leads to low endorsement of the power value type as well as high endorsement of the universalism value type.

C-Personality: Different sub-components of personality lead to the adoption of different values.

1-Anxiety: Women are higher on anxiety and this leads to the adoption of security values.

2-Assertiveness: Women are lower on assertiveness and this leads to the adoption of Militaristic values such as Holsti's militant values and Schwartz' power values.

3-Altrusim: Women are higher on altruism and this leads to the adoption of Pro-Social values, such as humanitarian and universalism values.

The goal of this research is to test among these competing hypotheses. Simultaneously, testing multiple hypotheses allows for the comparison of competing explanations. In Chapter 3, I test H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis and H3-The Gender Gap and Values Determinants Hypothesis. Specifically, in Chapter 3 I test whether there are gender differences on the values included in my two studies and to what extent economic marginalization, feminist consciousness, and personality subcomponents mediate these gender differences. In Chapter 4, I test H1-The Gender

Gap and Context Hypothesis with experimental data that varies the situational context surrounding the call for war. Also in Chapter 4, I test H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis by testing the mediation of the gender gap in the various conditions using my measures of Pro-Social and Militaristic-Security Values. Chapter 5 tests H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis more generally in a national representative sample to see if values mediate the gender gap in response to the ongoing interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lastly, I also test, in Chapter 5, H3-The Gender Gap and Values Determinants Hypothesis; specifically I test whether the economic and political marginalization or the feminist consciousness explanation account for gender differences in values in a national representative sample.

Chapter 2 Figures and Tables

Figure 2.1: Schwartz Values and Situational Contexts



Figure 2.2


Economic and Political Marginalization
Low on Benevolence & Low on Power
Opposition to Intervention

Figure 2.3


Feminist Consciousness
Low on Power & High on Universalism
General Opposition to Intervention Support for Humanitarian Intervention

Figure 2.4: Path Model of Personality, Values, and Foreign Policy Attitudes



Table 2.1: Hypotheses and Sub-Hypotheses

H1-Gender Gap and Context	**H2-Gender Gap and Values**	**H3-Gender Gap and Value Determinants**		
Gender Gap varies in size	Men & Women Differ on Values; Values Mediate Gender Gap	Pre-Determinants to Gender Gap in Values		
A-Humanitarian Intervention	**A-Pro-Social Values**	**A-Economic and Political Marginalization**		
Gender Gap Smallest; Men and Women equal support	Women higher on & explain women's greater support for Humanitarian	Economic leads to low Benevolence	Political Mediates Gap on Power	
B-Regime Change Intervention	**B-Militaristic-Security Values**	**B-Feminist consciousness**		
Gender Gap Largest	Women lower on & Mediate Gender Gap in Regime, Terror, and National Interests	Mediates Gap on Militaristic-Security and Pro-Social Values		
C-Terrorism Intervention	**1-Regime Change** Militaristic-Security Values mediate gender gap	**C-Personality**		
Gender Gap Large	**2-Terrorism** Militaristic-Security Values mediate gender gap	Subcomponents Predict Values Differences		
D-National Interests Intervention	**3-National Interests**	**1-Anxiety**	**2-Assertiveness**	**3-Altrusim**
Gender Gap Moderate Size	Militaristic-Security Values mediate gender gap	Adopt Security Value	Adopt Militaristic Values	Adopt Pro-Social Values

Chapter 3: Student and Adult Primary Data: The Gender Gap on Values

This chapter tests H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that men and women differ on their value endorsements. In particular, I hypothesize that men and women differ slightly in their endorsement of particular values relevant to their evaluations of military interventions. I test H2A that women are higher on Pro-Social Values and H2B that men are higher on Militaristic-Security Values. According to H2A, I expect that women will be higher on Humanitarian Values as well as on Schwartz' Universalism, Benevolence, and Security Value Types. According to H2B that men will be higher on Militant Values as well as Schwartz' Power Value Type.

I also test in this chapter H3-The Gender Gap and Value Determinants Hypothesis that economic and political marginalization, feminist consciousness, and personality are pre-determinants of the value differences between men and women. In particular, I test H3B that feminist consciousness mediates the gender gap on Militaristic-Security Values and Pro-Social Values with feminists, who are more likely to be women, scoring lower on the Militaristic-Security Values and higher on the Pro-Social Values. I also test H3C that personality differences between men and women lead to the adoption of different values with those high on anxiety scoring more highly on security values, those high on assertiveness more likely to adopt Militaristic values, and those high on altruism more

likely to adopt Pro-Social values.[5] Please refer back to Table 2 of Chapter 2 for all these hypotheses.

In order to investigate and account for the importance of situational factors as well as individual level factors, I conducted an experiment which varied the situational factors. Moreover, an experimental method through random assignment and the use of fictional justifications for military interventions, will allow for a cleaner test of the hypotheses. Chapter 4 includes a more detailed discussion of the experiment and the stimulus materials. As will be seen in Chapter 5, support for the use of force has recently become very partisan in nature with respect to the Iraq War in particular and this should not be the case with the proposed experiment. In addition, conducting my own data collection allowed for the inclusion of measures of personality as well as better measures of the values and feminist identity. The main goal of this work will be to investigate the competing explanations for the gender gap while at the same time accounting for differences in support that may arise due to situational factors. The stimulus materials and experimental analysis will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

This chapter introduces the student and adult data sets and discusses the demographics of the samples and the measures included in the studies. Students constitute a convenient sample and are willing to entertain a questionnaire that takes up to one hour to complete. Therefore I was able to test all of my hypotheses using the same sample simultaneously. Using measures of economic and political marginalization, this study will test the Marginalization Explanation. Using indicators of feminist identity, this

[5] I do not include results for test of H3A that Economic and Political Marginalization acts as a pre-determinant to values differences. Income and efficacy failed to be significant predictors of any of the values.

study will test the Feminist Consciousness Explanation. Finally, using personality measures of Anxiety, Altruism, and Assertiveness it will provide the first test of the Personality Explanation. Finally, the Student Study also includes measures of values, specifically militant values, cooperative values, and humanitarian values, to test the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis. This study will tackle the issue of conditional gender effects depending upon the situation. In other words, this study will investigate how different women may be more likely to support or oppose the use of force depending upon the reasons for intervention.

The goal of the Adult Study is to extend the Student Study findings to a diverse sample of adult respondents. An adult sample should provide more variance on the economic marginalization indicators such as low income and government assistance in order to provide a better test of the Marginalization Hypothesis. Because the H3-Gender Gap and Values Determinants Hypothesis involves the indirect effect of feminist identity, marginalization, and personality traits through values, it will be helpful to have an adult sample. This is particularly true for the personality explanation because some findings have indicated that individual's personality traits become more stable post-adolescence (McCrae et al., 2002). Adults will presumably have more stable personality traits which will allow them to be more likely to adopt particular value orientations that correspond with their personality traits.

Because the values are such an important part of the war support analyses, this chapter explores in depth the values measures used in the Student and Adult Studies. Because, I designed both the Student and Adult studies, I included the measures of values I believe will have the most explanatory power. Unlike the NES data discussed in

Chapter 5, I had more control over which measures were included and so these two studies constitute a better test of my hypothesis. Specifically, I run several models to investigate the gender gap on these values as well as to determine to what extent the personality traits, feminist identity, party identification, and ideology predict the endorsement of the various values included in subsequent analyses as mediators of the gender gap on the Afghanistan war, Iraq war, and fictional intervention from the experimental analyses for the student and adult data sets.

Student Study Sample

In exchange for course credit, 317 students enrolled in a political science class in the Fall 2007 and Spring 2008 semesters participated in the study. This constitutes the total number of students that took the survey because there were no compelling reasons to drop any of the participants from the sample. Table 3.1 lists much of the pertinent characteristics of the student and adult samples. Of the 317, 49% are female. The partisan and ideological make-up leans toward Democratic and Liberal identification which is indicative of a predominantly liberal student body. Specifically, 57% identify as Democrats, only 19% identify as Republicans, and the remaining 24% identify as Independents. Similarly, 42% identify as Liberals,only 14% identify as Conservatives, and 44% identify as Moderates. The mean age of the student sample is 20.38. The students are distributed rather evenly across years of college with 25% freshmen, 18% sophomores, 26% juniors, and 31% seniors. The sample has the following racial/ethnic makeup: 44% white, 12% black, 35% Asian, 8% Hispanic and the rest other.

Table 3.1 About Here

Adult Study Sample

Using trained undergraduate research assistants, I gathered a non-random adult sample of 237 New York state residents. In addition to training the research assistants in research and survey methods, I gave them strict instructions regarding who was eligible and quotas. Specifically, I instructed the research assistants to go outside of the Stony Brook community and their family members to get respondents. In terms of quotas, their targets were half male, three quarters white, and half between the ages of 30 and 60 with the other half split between younger and older. Of the 237 respondents, 53% are female. The partisan make-up again leans toward Democratic identification which is unsurprising given the sample is of New York state residents, mostly from New York city and Long Island. Specifically, 45% identify as Democrats, only 21% identify as Republicans, and 34% as Independents. The ideological composition is more balanced among the adults in comparison to the students with 29% identify as Liberals, 24% identify as Conservatives, and 47% identifying as Moderates. The mean age is 40.12. On average male respondents were slightly younger than female respondents (39 vs. 41), although this difference is not statistically significant. In all 34% of the sample is under 30 years of age, 54% is between 30 and 59 and 12% is 60 and over. The sample has the following racial/ethnic makeup 72% white, 6% black, 9% Asian, 12% Hispanic and the rest other. In terms of income, 11% reported making less than $20,000, 8% between $21k and $29k, 18% $30-49k, 19% $50-74k, 17% $75-100k, and 27% over $100k.

Measures of Values

The important variables and examples of their measures are listed in Table 3.2 with all the items for the values scales listed in the Appendix. The values questions differed for the Student and Adult Studies. Specifically, students were asked the

Humanitarian, Militant, and Cooperative values. The scale measuring humanitarian values is listed in the appendix. These questions come from the 1995 NES Pilot Study (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001). There are eight questions in total and half of them are reversed worded. Those with humanitarian values would agree with the following statement: "One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself" but disagree with the following reversed worded item: "It is better not to be too kind to people because kindness will only be abused".

Table 3.2 About Here

Cooperative values, absent from the table, measure support for diplomacy and the United Nations. Militant Values measure support for the use of force to solve international problems. I use the Militant and Cooperative Internationalism scale to measure militant and cooperative values (Holsti & Rosenau, 1990). A modified version of this scale can be found in the appendix and it includes five militant and eight cooperative values questions. The scale has been modified because originally the target of intervention was communism and the Soviet Union. Individuals high on Militant Values would agree with the following statement: "There is nothing wrong with using the C.I.A. to try to undermine hostile governments" but disagree with the following statement: "It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes". Those high on Cooperative Values would disagree with the first statement above and agree with the latter.

In the adult sample, I measure Schwartz value types including the Universalism, Benevolence, Security, and Power value types. The Universalism value type measures support for equality for all people. The Benevolence value type measures a desire to help

others close to oneself. The Security value type measures support for protection of the nation from its enemies. The Power value type measures a desire for respect from others and control over one's decisions. All of the values questions are listed in the Appendix for Chapter 3.

Measures of Pre-Determinants of Values

I measure the Big Five Personality subcomponents of Anxiety, Altruism, and Assertiveness to test the Personality Hypothesis. The copyright on the Big Five does not allow me to include the items in the appendix. Generally, the Anxiety component asks individuals if they would describe themselves as jittery, fearful, and often worrying about future events. The Altruism component asks individuals to describe themselves as thoughtful, generous, and well liked. The Assertiveness component asks individuals if they are dominant, forceful, and the type to occupy a leadership position.

I include a self-report measure of Feminist Identity which asks whether the participants considers themselves a Feminist or opposed to Feminism with five response options as follows: a Strong Feminist, Somewhat a Feminist, Neither, Somewhat opposed to Feminism, and Strongly opposed to Feminism. I measured economic marginalization with questions on income as well as receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (welfare) and food stamps. Finally, I include measures of party identification and ideology in the analysis. I only included five response options for both party identification and ideology, eliminating the "lean" options.[6]

Analysis Plan

[6] I do not include income, my indicator for the marginalization explanation, in this chapter because it fails to reach significance in any of the analysis predicting the values.

Here I explore H2 and H3 hypotheses that there are significant gender differences on the values and that the other explanations are predictors of the values, respectively. In order for the values to explain the gender gap, gender differences on the value endorsement must exist. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2 the values explanation is a more comprehensive explanation than the marginalization and feminist consciousness explanations. I posit that the value differences are at least partially explained by the other explanations. Specifically, men and women differ in their values because of their differences on the personality traits, and feminist consciousness. The next section first discusses whether or not a gender gap exists on the values in both the student and adult data. I briefly demonstrate using confirmatory factor analysis that the separate values scales in each study are distinct constructs. Second, whether or not feminist consciousness or personality traits explain these differences and/or are predictive of the values is also discussed.

Throughout this chapter and the other empirical chapters I test mediaitonal hypotheses. First for mediational analyses, I will ascertain whether a relationship exists between the initial variable, gender, and the dependent variable, in this chapter value endorsement. Moreover, I then establish whether a relationship between the initial variable of gender and the meditational variable, for example personality, exists. In this example, this means showing that women differ on the personality component. Then, in order to have meditation the meditational variable must be a significant predictor of the dependent variable, value endorsement, without the initial variable, gender, in the model. Finally, for mediation to exist the effect of gender should reduce to zero with the inclusion of the meditational variable. It is also possible with respect to this final step

that complete mediation may not exist but that the initial variable reduces in size/significance indicating partial mediation.

Values in the Student Study

First, I discuss the overall endorsement of the three values and then note the gender differences in means on the three values scales. The latter is extremely important because in order for values to explain the gender gap in support for military intervention, there must be a significant gender gap which these means indicate.

In the student study, the Pro-Social Values I include are Humanitarian Values, which are rather highly endorsed by the majority of the students. Only 12% of the students score below the midpoint of the scale, another 56% scoring between 0.5 and 0.75, and the last 32% scoring between 0.75 and 1.00 on the scale. Men and women do significantly differ ($p=0.004$) in their mean level of endorsement of Humanitarian values with men's mean 0.64 (0.16) and women's mean 0.69 (0.16).

In the student study, the Militaristic-Security Values I include are Militant Values, which are not as highly endorsed but the majority of students still score above the midpoint of the scale. A total of 37% of the students score below the midpoint of the scale, 49% score between 0.5 and 0.75, and only 14% score between 0.75 and 1.00 on the scale. The means for men and women significantly differ ($p=0.04$) with the men's mean 0.57 (0.02) and the women's mean 0.54 (0.01).

Endorsement of the Cooperative Values is rather low with the vast majority of students, 95%, scoring at or below the midpoint of the scale. There are significant ($p=0.03$) gender differences in the means, 0.26 (0.01) versus 0.23 (0.01), with men more

likely to endorse the cooperative values. I did not have strong expectations or specific hypotheses regarding the cooperative values.

Next I discuss the structure of the values to demonstrate the scales are measuring distinct values and then I discuss the pre-determinants of the values.

Student Data: Factor Analysis

For the values in the Student data, I decided to perform a confirmatory factor analysis to briefly demonstrate that the values scales are distinctive. Because the scales are correlated with one another, the factor analysis provides evidence that they may be related but are measuring distinct sets of values. The Humanitarian values scale is correlated with the Militant values at -0.37 and with the Cooperative Values at -0.56. The Militant and Cooperative values are correlated at 0.30.

With the confirmatory factor analysis, I find three factors is a good fit to the data but only after specifying cross loadings and correlated errors between items. For the model without cross loadings or correlated errors, the CFI is 0.85, the TLI is 0.89, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation is 0.12. Three cooperative values items that loaded highly on the humanitarian values factor in an exploratory analysis are allowed to cross load on both factors. Two humanitarian values items that loaded on the militant values factor in the exploratory analysis are also allowed to cross load. Finally, a number of the humanitarian and cooperative items are specified as having correlated errors. Similar question wording is probably causing the need to specify correlated errors. The following are specified with correlated errors: helping others less fortunate with dignity and welfare top priority, taking care of other people's needs with kindness to all, enlisting U.N. to settle disputes with strengthening the U.N., cooperation to solve common

problems with cooperation to solve international crises, economic aid to poorer countries with improve standard of living globally, and combating world hunger with improve standard of living globally. These specifications of correlated errors made the most sense of those included in the modification indices.

The final confirmatory model fit is a Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation of 0.09, a CFI of 0.92 and a TLI 0.94. The RMSEA is a good index to use because it is relatively unaffected by sample size, however, it is affected by adding parameters. The baseline for the CFI and TLI is that none of the items are related; these range from 0 to 1.0. Therefore a good fitting model should produce values on these indices that are close to 1.0. The loadings for the confirmatory factor analysis are in Table 3.3. Again, these results suggest that the values scales are measuring different values. Therefore it makes sense to treat them as distinct, separate scales in the rest of the analyses. Moreover, I include them in the war support analysis as separate scales.

Table 3.3 About Here

I am unable to replicate the above analysis for the Schwartz values included in the Adult Study. Unfortunately, MPLUS would not provide output for the confirmatory factor analysis. This is probably because of two reasons: having only two items per value type/scale and the fact that the distribution on the values items is heavily skewed. The confirmatory factor analysis is technically identified but there is too little information with only two items. Future work should be sure to include more items per value type to avoid this problem.

Pro-Social Values: Humanitarian Values

First in the student data I run OLS models predicting the humanitarian, militant, and cooperative values with higher values indicating stronger value endorsement. In this section, I test H2A that women are higher on the Pro-Social Value of Humanitarianism. I also test H3B that feminist consciousness leads to greater support of Pro-Social Values. Finally, I test H3C that personality specifically altruism leads to greater support of Pro-Social Values. Table 3.4 shows the results for the humanitarianism. As noted earlier in the discussion of mean differences, there is a significant gender gap on humanitarian values (B=0.5 s.e. 0.02, p<.01) with women being more likely than men to endorse humanitarianism. Why are women more likely to endorse these values? Is it because of their greater likelihood to identify as feminist? The second column shows the results for feminist identity which is almost marginally significant (B=0.3 s.e. 0.02, p=.11) and gender remains marginally significant (B=0.3 s.e. 0.02, p<.10). So, this indicates that feminists are more likely than non-feminists to hold pro-social values meaning that it is a pre-determinant to pro-social values. In the NES analysis in Chapter 5, I also find that feeling warmly toward feminists increased one's likelihood of endorsing pro-humanitarian values. Feminist identity, however, does not mediate the gender gap on humanitarianism meaning that not only feminist women are producing a significant gender difference on the humanitarian values.

Perhaps, women are more likely to endorse humanitarian values because of personality differences as I hypothesized earlier. Specifically, I expect to find that altruistic individuals should be more likely to endorse humanitarianism. The third column includes the personality scales with altruism highly predicting endorsement of humanitarian values (B=0.40 s.e. 0.06, p<.01) but its inclusion does not entirely mediate

the gender difference on these values (B=0.04 s.e. 0.02, p<.05).[7] Anxiety and assertiveness are not significant predictors of humanitarian values. So, this lends support to my expectation that personality is a pre-determinant of values and specifically that altruistic individuals are more likely to endorse humanitarian values. Similarly to the Feminist Identity findings, personality does not eliminate the gender differences on humanitarianism.

Finally, I include the political control variables of party identification and ideology as predictors of humanitarianism. Party identification and ideology are also significant predictors of humanitarian values and the inclusion of both mediates the gender gap. In particular, Republican identifiers are less likely to hold humanitarian values (B=-0.8 s.e. 0.04, p<.05) and the same is true for conservative identifiers (B=-0.13 s.e. 0.04, p<.01). The gender gap is no longer significant (B=0.3 s.e. 0.02). The final model includes all these possible predictors together. Here we see that the gender gap is no longer significant (B=0.01 s.e. 0.02). Altruism continues to be significant (B=0.41 s.e. 0.05, p<.01) with those high on altruism more likely to hold humanitarian values and anxiety is also significant in this model (B=-0.11 s.e. 0.05, p<.05) with those high on anxiety less likely to endorse humanitarian values. Party identification and ideology also continue to be significant with Republican identifiers and conservative identifiers less likely to endorse humanitarian values. The political variables appear to mediate the gender difference on humanitarianism. Similarly to findings in Chapter 5, Feminist Identity is no longer significant with the inclusion of party identification and ideology.

[7] The items for the humanitarian values and the altruism component of the Big Five Personality traits are quite similar with humanitarianism measuring support for helping others and altruism measuring to what degree one considers themselves a helpful, charitable individual.

Table 3.4 About Here

Militaristic-Security Values: Militant Values

Here I test H2B that men are higher on Militaristic-Security Values. I also test H3B and H3C that feminist consciousness and personality act as pre-determinants to this gender difference in the endorsement of Militaristic-Security Values. H3B states that feminists should be less likely to endorse Militaristic-Security Values. H3C states that individuals high on assertiveness should be more likely to hold Militaristic-Security Values. Table 3.5 depicts the findings for the militant values. Again, there is a gender gap on militant values which is marginally significant (B=-0.4 s.e. 0.02, p=.08) with women being less likely to hold militant values. Does women's greater propensity to endorse feminism explain this lesser likelihood to hold these values? Although much has been written about feminists and their pacifistic beliefs, feminist identity is not significantly related to militant values. In the NES analysis in Chapter 5, I find that the feminist feeling thermometer is a predictor of pro-force values so this lack of a relationship is unexpected.

The gender gap continues to be marginally significant with the personality traits included (B=-0.04 s.e. 0.02, p<.10) and none of the personality scales are significant predictors of militant values. I hypothesized that Assertiveness would predict high militant values but it is not significant. Personality does not appear to be a pre-determinant of Militant values which is contrary to my H3C Hypothesis.

Again, I also include political controls. Party identification and ideology are significantly related to the values with Republican identifiers (B=0.15 s.e. 0.04, p<.01) and conservative identifiers (B=0.14 s.e. 0.05, p<.01) being more likely to endorse

militant values. The gender gap is no longer significant with the inclusion of party identification and ideology (B=-0.00 s.e. 0.02). Finally, I include all of these predictors in the same model and find that partisanship and ideology are the only significant variables and that the gender gap is again non-significant. Overall my findings regarding the militant values are not in line with my expectations. Militant values appear more closely related to party identification and ideology than to personality or feminist consciousness. Much prior works finds evidence of a gender gap in party identification (Huddy et al., 2008) and ideology (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). This could possibly account for why these political controls are mediating the gender differences in value endorsements.

Table 3.5 About Here

Cooperative Values

Finally, I look at the Cooperative Values. In the first column of Table 3.6 the gender gap on cooperative values is marginally significant with women being less likely to hold these values (B=-0.3 s.e. 0.02, $p<.10$). Feminist identity is not a predictor of cooperative values. In general, I did not have strong expectations regarding the cooperative values. In chapter 5, however, I find that increased warmth toward feminists increased the likelihood of endorsing the strengthen United Nations value which is one of the cooperative values items. Therefore this non-relationship is unexpected.

For the personality traits, only altruism predicts cooperative values with those high on altruism being less likely to endorse cooperative values (B=-0.32 s.e. 0.05, $p<.01$). The inclusion of altruism reduces the gender gap to non-significance (B=0.02 s.e. 0.02). This relationship does not entirely make sense because I expected to find that

altruism, being a helpful and charitable individual, would be predictive of wanting to cooperate with others to resolve international crises.

Republicans and conservatives are significantly more likely to endorse cooperative values and their inclusion appears to mediate the gender gap. These findings remain when all the variables are included in the same model except that assertiveness emerges as marginally significant as well with assertive individuals less likely to endorse cooperative values (B=-0.11 s.e. 0.06, $p<.10$). Overall, the findings on the cooperative values do not make a lot of intuitive sense. I did not have particularly strong expectations regarding these values but these findings are somewhat illogical.

Table 3.6 About Here

Summary: Student Study

I find support for my H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that men and women significant differ in their endorsement of values. Specifically, I find support for H2A that women are higher on Pro-Social Values. I show that women are more likely than men to agree that society should ensure the welfare and dignity of people and that one should help others. I also find support for H2B that men are higher on Militaristic-Security Values. I provide evidence that men are more likely to believe the C.I.A. should intervene in hostile governments and that the U.S. should do all that it can to prevent the spread of terrorism. These findings represent strong support for my H2 hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses: H2A and H2B.

By and large, personality emerges as a rather consistent predictor of the measures of values included in the Student Study. Specifically, altruism is a significant predictor of two of the values scales. Altruism predicts the Pro-Social Value of Humanitarianism

and is negatively associated with Cooperative Values. Personality is not a mediator of the gender differences on these values, so they fail to fully explain why women are more likely to endorse humanitarianism and less likely to endorse militarism and cooperation. Feminist identity is predictive of the Pro-Social Value of humanitarianism but is also not a mediator of the gender differences on humanitarianism. Party identification and ideology emerge as important predictors of the values as well as mediators of the gender differences in value endorsements. There is a documented gender gap in party identification (Huddy et al., 2008) and ideology (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008) which could explain why these political controls are mediators of the gender differences in value endorsements. These findings provide moderate support for my H3-C3 hypothesis that the personality subcomponent of Altruism predicts Pro-Social Values although it does not mediate the gap.

Adult Data

For the adult data, I look at the universalism value type and the one security value type item.[8] The universalism value type, the Pro-Social Value in this study, measures support for universal equality and social justice and the two items scale together fairly well with an alpha of 0.70 and inter-item covariance of 0.02. The first universalism item asks "how important to you is equal opportunity for all?" All of the Schwarz values have the same four response options: very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, and not at all important. The second item measuring universalism is as follows: "how important to you is having everyone in the world treated equally?" This value type is highly endorsed with 82% of the adults scoring higher than the midpoint on

[8] These are the Schwartz values included in the multivariate analyses in the adult data for Chapter 4.

the scale. There are significant (p=0.03) gender differences in the means for universalism value type with women 0.78 (0.02) having a higher mean than men 0.73 (0.02).

The security value type, which is a component of Militaristic-Security Values, measures support for protection of oneself and one's nation.[9] The security item is highly endorse with 75% of adults stating that protection of their nation from its enemies is very important to them. There is no significant (p=0.12) gender difference in the means on this item but women 0.94 (0.01) are slightly more likely to endorse it than men 0.92 (0.02). Endorsement of the Schwartz values is in general skewed with the majority of people agreeing that they are important, and the security items are the most skewed.

The benevolence value type and the power value type are not further analyzed in this chapter. The benevolence value type measures support for the wellness of people close to oneself. The benevolence value type is included in some of the analyses in the next chapter but the results are in the unexpected direction. The alpha for the benevolence value items is 0.74 with an inter item covariance of 0.02. It is highly endorsed by the adults with 55% stating that both items were very or somewhat important to them. A significant (p=0.01) gender difference in the means exists with women 0.83 (0.01) more likely to endorse the value type than men 0.76 (0.02).

The two items for the power value type failed to scale together (alpha 0.002 inter item covariance 0.00), neither was significantly related to any of the war support dependent variables, and there was surprisingly no gender gap on either item. The two

[9] The security item measuring support for protection of one's nation is slightly related to support for war with a 0.15 correlation. But the other security value type was unrelated with a 0.05 correlation to any of the war support dependent variables and therefore is not included in any of the analysis. The security value type items only moderately scaled together with an alpha of 0.51 and an inter item covariance of 0.01.

items measured how important "getting respect from others" and "not depending on others" were to the respondents. Therefore the power value type is not included in any of these analyses in this or the next chapter.

Pro-Social Values: Universalism Value Type

In this section, I test H2A that women are higher on Pro-Social Values, in this case universalism. I also investigate H3B that feminists are higher on Pro-Social Values and H3C that individuals high on altruism are more likely to hold Pro-Social Values. For the universalism value type as shown in Table 3.7, there is a marginally significant gender gap (B=0.05 s.e. 0.03, p<.10) with women being more likely to endorse the universalism value type. Feminist identifiers are more likely than non-feminists to endorse the universalism value type (B=0.16 s.e. 0.07, p<.05). The gender gap is no longer significant (B=0.03 s.e. 0.03) suggesting that feminist identity mediates the gap. Those high on altruism are more likely to agree with the universalism items (B=0.55 s.e. 0.10, p<.01) and again the gender gap appears to be mediated (B=0.01 s.e. 0.03). Conservatives are significantly less likely to be high on the universalism value type and the gender gap is no longer significant. When all of these are included, only altruism remains significant (B=0.50 s.e. 0.10, p<.01). The findings on altruism are in line with my expectations and lend support to my hypothesis that personality is a pre-determinant of values differences between men and women.

Table 3.7 About Here

Militaristic-Security Values: Security Value Type

Here I test H2B that men are higher on Militaristic-Security Values, in this case the Security Value Type. I also test H3C1 that individuals high on the personality

subcomponent of anxiety will be higher on the security value type. As can be seen in Table 3.8, there is no gender gap on the security value type item which means that it cannot be a mediator of the gender gap in war support but as shown in the next chapter it is sometimes predictive of military intervention. Overall, Republicans, Conservatives, and altruistic individuals are more likely to endorse this value. Somewhat surprisingly, personality level anxiety is not a significant predictor.

Table 3.8 About Here

Summary: Adult Study

I find moderate support for H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that men and women differ in their value endorsements in the adult study. Specifically, I find support for H2A that women are higher on the Pro-Social Value of universalism. I do not find support for H2B that men are higher on Militaristic-Security Values; I find that men and women do not significantly differ on the security value type or power value type.

I find moderate support for H3-Gender Gap and Values Determinants Hypothesis that feminist consciousness and personality act as pre-determinants of the value differences between men and women, although they are not significant in all final analyses with all independent variables. With respect to H3B, feminist identity is predictive of a greater likelihood to endorse Pro-Social values but not a mediator. Concerning H3C3, altruism appears to actually mediate the gender gap on the Pro-Social Value of universalism.

Chapter 3 Summary and Support for Hypotheses

In general, there are at least moderately sized gender gaps on most of the values supporting my H2 hypothesis. There are significant or marginally significant gender

differences on the humanitarian values, militant values, cooperative values, and the universalism value type. Some of the values appear to be somewhat related to the personality traits supporting my H3C hypothesis. Anxiety and Altruism are significant predictors of humanitarian values. Altruism is negatively related to cooperative values and positively related to the universalism value type and security value type. Lastly, altruism appears to actually mediate the gender gap on universalism values. Feminist identity is predictive of greater likelihood to endorse humanitarian and universalism values. Finally, party identification and ideology are predictive of the various values. It is possible that holding a certain constellation of values leads one to identify as either a Democrat or Republican; so although the analysis is done in such a way to suggest that party identification comes first it is possible that the causal arrow goes in the opposite direction.

Overall I find that there are gender gaps on several of the values included in the analysis. In particular, I find that women are higher on humanitarian values, lower on militant values, lower on cooperative values, and higher on the universalism value type. This suggests that these values could possibly mediate the gender gap in support for war since women differ from men on these values. I will investigate this in the following chapter. I also find that the personality traits are somewhat related to these values. In particular, in line with my expectations individuals high on altruism are more likely to be high on humanitarian values and the universalism value type. I did not find that militant values are predicted by personality level assertiveness, but I do find that it is significantly and negatively related to altruism.

Finally, I find that party identification and ideology are important predictors in my analysis of the values. Specifically, being Republican or Conservative leads to a lower likelihood that one would hold strong humanitarian or universalism values. The party identification and ideology variables, coded so Republican and Conservative are high, are also positively related to militant values, cooperative values, and the security value type.

Taken as a whole the strongest findings in this chapter across both studies involve pro-social values, in particular humanitarianism and universalism, and the pro-social personality sub-component, specifically altruism. By pro-social, I mean behaviors that result in benefiting others and attitudes that support such behaviors. These findings suggest that women are more likely to endorse pro-social behaviors and attitudes as well as being more likely to describe themselves as pro-social individuals. Findings are less consistent for the Militaristic-Security values mainly because assertiveness does not predict the militant values and there is no significant gender difference in endorsement of the power value type.

Chapter 3 Figures and Tables

Figure 3.1: Values Means by Gender



Table 3.1 Participant Demographics

	Students	Adults
Female	49%	53%
Race		
White	44%	72%
Black	12%	6%
Asian	35%	9%
Hispanic	8%	12%
Party ID		
Democrat	57%	45%
Independent	24%	34%
Republican	19%	21%
Ideology		
Liberal	42%	29%
Moderate	44%	47%
Conservative	14%	24%
Mean Age	20.38 (0.17)	40.12 (1.01)
N	317	237

Table 3.2: Experiment Items

DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
If the United States government decides to take military action in Gabon, would you favor or oppose it?		
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES		
Humanitarian Values 6 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.80**	**Interitem Covar: 0.19**
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society		
Universalism Values 2 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.70**	**Interitem Covar: 0.02**
How important to you is equal opportunity for all?		
Militant Values 5 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.64**	**Interitem Covar: 0.20**
How much do you agree or disagree with the following: It is not in our interests to have better relations with Middle Eastern countries because we are getting less than we are giving to them.		
Benevolence Values 2 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.74**	**Interitem Covar: 0.02**
How important to you is helping people around you?.		
Security Value: How important to you is protection of your nation from enemies?		
Altruism 8 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.77/0.77**	**Interitem Covar: 0.17/0.14**
How well does the following describe you: I go out of my way to help others if I can?		
Anxiety 8 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.75/0.78**	**Interitem Covar: 0.20/0.22**
How well does the following describe you: I often worry about things that might go wrong?		
Dominance 8 items	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.79/0.80**	**Interitem Covar: 0.23/0.23**
How well does the following describe you: I am dominant, forceful, and assertive?		
Feminist Identity: Do you consider yourself a Feminist or opposed to Feminism?		
Manipulation Check: How engaging/interesting/compelling/credible did you find the description of Gabon?		

Table 3.3: Values in Student Data-Confirmatory Factor Loadings

	Militant	Humanitarian	Cooperative
Variances	0.23 (0.05)	0.47 (0.05)	0.24 (0.06)
Terrorist victory(restricted to load @ 1.0)	1.00		
Al Qaeda is generally expansionist	0.77 (0.14)		
C.I.A. to undermine hostile governments.	1.21 (0.15)		
Use of force to prevent terrorism.	1.21 (0.20)		
Not better relations with Middle Eastern	1.67 (0.22)		
Help others less fortunate(restricted @ 1.0)		1.00	
Be kind to people	-0.63 (0.15)	0.41 (0.10)	
Dignity and welfare top priority		1.19 (0.06)	
Well-being of others		0.96 (0.08)	
Help others have basic needs met		1.00 (0.07)	
Kindness to all	-1.02 (0.16)	0.26 (0.10)	
Concerned with well being of others		1.05 (0.07)	
Taking care of other people's needs		0.89 (0.07)	
Enlist U.N. to settle disputes (@ 1.0)			1.00
Economic aid to poorer countries		0.72 (0.13)	0.11 (0.22)
Improve standard of living globally		0.62 (0.12)	0.69 (0.21)
Worldwide arms control			0.94 (0.17)
Combating world hunger		0.59 (0.13)	0.90 (0.23)
Strengthen United Nations			1.47 (0.18)
Cooperation to solve common problems			1.51 (0.23)
Cooperation to solve international crises			1.39 (0.23)

Note: Data is from Student Study. Entries are confirmatory factor loadings with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3.4: Determinants of Humanitarian Values in the Student Sample

	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**0.05***	**0.02**	**0.03+**	**0.02**	**0.04***	**0.02**	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02
Feminist Identity			0.03	0.02					0.01	0.02
Altruistic					**0.40****	**0.06**			**0.41****	**0.05**
Anxious					-0.04	0.05			**-0.11***	**0.05**
Assertive					0.05	0.06			0.08	0.06
Party ID 1=St Rep							**-0.08***	**0.04**	**-0.07***	**0.03**
Ideology							**-0.13****	**0.04**	**-0.14****	**0.04**
Constant	**0.64****	**0.01**	**0.64****	**0.01**	**0.33***	**0.06**	**0.74****	**0.02**	**0.44****	**0.07**
N	317		317		317		317		317	
R^2	0.02		0.02		0.18		0.10		0.29	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the humanitarian values.

Table 3.5: Determinants of Militant Values in the Student Sample

	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**-0.04+**	**0.02**	-0.03	0.02	**-0.04+**	**0.02**	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02
Feminist Identity			-0.01	0.02					0.00	0.02
Altruistic					-0.07	0.07			-0.05	0.07
Anxious					0.08	0.06			0.10	0.07
Assertive					-0.05	0.08			-0.11	0.08
Party ID 1=St Rep							**0.15****	**0.04**	**0.15****	**0.04**
Ideology							**0.14****	**0.05**	**0.14****	**0.05**
Constant	**0.57****	**0.01**	**0.58****	**0.02**	**0.61****	**0.08**	**0.45****	**0.02**	**0.50****	**0.08**
N	317		317		317		317		317	
R^2	0.01		0.00		0.01		0.13		0.14	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the militant values.

Table 3.6: Determinants of Cooperative Values in Student Sample

	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**-0.03+**	**0.02**	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02
Feminist Identity			-0.02	0.02					0.00	0.02
Altruistic					**-0.32****	**0.05**			**-0.31****	**0.05**
Anxious					0.02	0.05			0.03	0.05
Assertive					-0.08	0.06			**-0.11+**	**0.06**
Party ID 1=St Rep							**0.09****	**0.03**	**0.08***	**0.03**
Ideology							**0.14****	**0.04**	**0.14****	**0.04**
Constant	**0.26****	**0.01**	**0.26****	**0.01**	**0.53****	**0.06**	**0.16****	**0.02**	**0.44****	**0.06**
N	317		317		317		317		317	
R^2	0.01		0.01		0.12		0.12		0.23	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the cooperative values.

Table 3.7: Determinants of Universalism Value Type in Adult Sample

	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**0.05+**	**0.03**	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.03
Feminist Identity			**0.16***	**0.07**					0.04	0.07
Altruistic					**0.55****	**0.10**			**0.50****	**0.10**
Anxious					0.05	0.08			0.03	0.08
Assertive					-0.03	0.10			-0.04	0.10
Party ID 1=St Rep							-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.07
Ideology							**-0.15***	**0.08**	-0.11	0.08
Constant	**0.73****	**0.02**	**0.64****	**0.04**	**0.31****	**0.11**	**0.85****	**0.04**	**0.45****	**0.12**
N	317		317		317		317		317	
R^2	0.01		0.03		0.12		0.06		0.15	

Note: Data is from Adult Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the universalism value type

Table 3.8: Determinants of Security Value Type in Adult Sample

	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	0.28	0.30	0.51	0.33	-0.03	0.32	0.43	0.31	0.26	0.36
Feminist Identity			**-1.53+**	**0.82**					-0.79	0.94
Altruistic					**3.74****	**1.08**			**4.50***	**1.16**
Anxious					0.15	0.95			0.66	1.06
Assertive					0.01	1.09			0.50	1.15
Party ID 1=St Rep							**1.93***	**0.82**	**2.08***	**0.89**
Ideology							**1.45+**	**0.83**	**1.63+**	**0.90**
Constant	**0.76**	**0.49**	**0.76**	**0.52**	**0.77**	**0.52**	**0.79**	**0.54**	**0.80**	**0.53**
N	317		317		317		317		317	
R^2	0.00		0.01		0.04		0.06		0.12	

Note: Data is from Adult Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the security value type.

Chapter 4: Analysis of Student and Adult Experiment: Support for Military Intervention in Gabon

This chapter tests the H1-The Gender Gap and Context Hypothesis that the gender gap in support of military intervention will vary in size depending upon the situation. According to H1A, I expect to find that the gender gap is minimized when intervention is for humanitarian purposes and that women are equally supportive as men in this situation. In keeping with H1B, I expect to find the gender gap is maximized when intervention is for regime change. According to H1C and H1D, I expect to find that the gender gap is large and in the traditional direction with women being less supportive when intervention involves terrorism and comparatively smaller when intervention involves national interest, respectively.

Also in this chapter, I test the H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that the gender differences in values shown in Chapter 3 lead to mediation of the gender gap across the various types of intervention. Consistent with H2A, I expect to find that Pro-Social Values explain women's greater support for Humanitarian interventions. Moreover, I expect to find that women rely more heavily on Pro-Social values than men when assessing humanitarian interventions. Finally, in accordance with H2B, I expect to find that Militaristic-Security Values mediate the gender gap in the other types of interventions with women's lower endorsement of these values leading to their lesser support for intervention involving regime change, terrorism, and national interests.

Furthermore, I expect that men will rely more than women on Militaristic Values when evaluating non-humanitarian interventions.

The prior chapter discussed the data sets, the demographics of the participants, and the gender gap on the key explanatory variables, the values, included in the following analysis. Overall, I find evidence in support of H1-The Gender Gap and Context Hypothesis that the gender gap is dynamic meaning that it varies in size depending upon the reason for intervention. Most interestingly I find a reversal of the traditional gender gap in response to Humanitarian Intervention in the Student Study. I find modest support for H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that the values are an important predictor of support for military intervention in Gabon and that the values serve to at least partially mediate the gender gap in war support. Moreover, this chapter explores how the measures of values included in the Student and Adult Studies serve to mediate the gender gap in support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Student Study Method and Manipulation Check

The student study consists of 317 participants as discussed in Chapter 3. The survey experiment was administered via computer using Media Lab software. Students answered various questions about their political attitudes, values, and personality traits. They then read about a need for military intervention in the West African country of Gabon. There were four conditions, the full text of each condition can be found in the appendix: Terrorism, Humanitarian, Regime Change, and National Interests. Each treatment consisted of a fictional press release from the Department of Homeland Security's website concerning a need to militarily intervene in Gabon. In the Terrorism condition, Gabon's then Muslim President Ondimba is described as having ties to

international Islamic organizations aiding terrorists. The Humanitarian condition calls for military intervention to stop genocide within Gabon. In the Regime Change condition, Gabon's President is described as a dictator. The National Interests condition calls for intervention to prevent further destruction to the United States' interests in Gabon's oil fields and refineries. I chose Gabon because I wanted the majority of information in the conditions to be true. For example, Gabon's then President was Muslim and was tied to non-terrorist Islamic organizations, he was a President in name-only having changed the constitution to allow for his continual holding of office, and Gabon does have sizeable amounts of oil and oil refineries. Finally, the respondents answered questions concerning the support for such intervention.

Immediately after reading the description of Gabon, respondents answered four questions measuring how compelling, interesting, engaging, and credible the description was to them. This serves as a manipulation check with scores on the scale ranging from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating greater interest, engagement, etc. The items scale well together with an alpha of 0.82 and an inter-item covariance of 0.37. Table 4.1 depicts the means for each condition and for men and women separately for each condition. Overall, women with a mean of 0.65 (0.23) find the descriptions more engaging, credible, etc. than men, who had a mean of 0.61 (0.21), (t=1.62). Much of this overall difference is likely driven by the large difference in the means for the Humanitarian Condition which women find extremely more compelling, interesting, etc., a mean of 0.76 (0.24)

compared to 0.62 (0.24), (t=2.55).[10] The Humanitarian Condition and Terrorism Condition are considered the most credible according to the total means.

Table 4.1 About Here

Adult Study Method and Manipulation Check

The Adult Study consists of 234 participants as discussed in Chapter 3. Research assistants administered the survey experiment using a pen and paper survey. As in the student survey, participants answered various questions about their political attitudes, values, and personality traits. Adult participants then read about a need for military intervention in the West African country of Gabon. The survey consisted of the same four conditions as the Student Study the text of which can be found in the appendix: Terrorism, Humanitarian, Regime Change, and National Interests. Instead of a press release from the Homeland Security website, the press release was attributed to the non-partisan Council on Foreign Affairs' website. Pre-testing revealed that Liberal/Democratic adult participants were skeptical about the credibility of the story when it was from Homeland Security. The pre-test was a non-representative sample of adults on the Stony Brook University campus and the focus of the pre-test was to gauge adult perceptions of the credibility of the stimulus materials. Overall the pre-test showed that adults viewed the description as less credible than students, particularly Liberal adult participants. I assumed that their skepticism resulted from their distrust of the Department of Homeland Security, which they presumably viewed as highly influenced by the Bush Administration. Therefore it made sense to make the source a truly non-

[10] There are not significant changes to the findings discussed later in this chapter when I include the manipulation check as a control; it is a significant predictor of overall support for intervention in Gabon with increases in ratings of credibility, interest, etc. leading to an increase in support for intervention.

partisan and low-salience organization. Furthermore, the descriptions of Gabon are more similar across conditions for the adult study, which is depicted in Table 4.2. Finally, the adult participants answered questions concerning their support for such intervention.

Table 4.2 About Here

As in the Student Study, I asked the adult respondents to gauge how compelling, interesting, engaging, and credible the description was to them. Again the items scale well together with an alpha of 0.89 and an inter-item covariance of 0.40. Table 4.3 displays the condition means and men's and women's means for each condition. Similar to the Student Study, women are more likely to find the description to be credible and compelling than men (t=2.06). Furthermore, the largest difference between men and women is again with respect to the Humanitarian Condition where women rate the description higher (t=2.19). Finally, the Humanitarian and Terrorism conditions are considered the overall most interesting and engaging.[11]

Table 4.3 About Here

Analysis Plan

Throughout this chapter, I sequentially discuss findings for the Student and Adult Studies separately. I discuss the experimental results according to data set comparing the Student Study and Adult Study. For both data sets I focus in detail on the Humanitarian Condition and the Terrorism Condition (the other conditions do not produce a significant gender gap). Within each study and condition, I test my hypotheses concerning mediation of the gender gap. In particular, I test the values as potential mediators of the

[11] As in the Student Study, the findings discussed in the rest of the chapter do not change with the inclusion of the manipulation check as a control and higher ratings lead to greater support for intervention.

gender gap in the various conditions. Finally, results from the student and adult data on attitudes toward the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and possible interventions in Iran and North Korea are discussed.

Through out the analysis I investigate two ways that values may provide insight into the gender gap: mediation and moderation. For the most part my hypotheses are mediational meaning I expect that the inclusion of values will eliminate the gender gap. For example, the inclusion of militaristic values should mediate the gender gap in the traditional direction. I also investigate moderation meaning that men and women rely on different factors when evaluating military interventions. For example, women rely on pro-social values when evaluating humanitarian interventions while men do not.

H1-Gender Gap and Context Hypothesis

First consider the gender gap in terms of percent support for intervention. As can be seen for the student sample in Table 4.4 overall student support is highest for the Humanitarian intervention condition for men and women. Remarkably, in the student sample the gender gap actually reverses in direction from the traditional gender gap with women 10 percentage points more likely to support intervention than men. The gender gap for the other three conditions is in the traditional direction. For the National Interests and Regime Change conditions the gap is modest in size, with 4.5% and 5% greater male than female support respectively, which is in line with previously found gaps. The gap in support for intervention in the Terrorism Condition is quite large with a 21 percentage point difference between men and women. All told, almost 47% of women supported intervention in the humanitarian condition compared to 11% in the Terrorism condition.

The difference in support for intervention among men does not vary as dramatically across conditions (22%-37%).

Table 4.4 About Here

The findings are similar for the adults with one notable exception. These are also displayed in Table 4.4 for the Adult Study. Here again we see that Humanitarian intervention is the most popular among both men and women. Unfortunately, I do not replicate the reversal gap for the Humanitarian condition. In this data set, women remain less supportive of humanitarian intervention than men. The smallest gap in the adult sample is for the National Interests condition in which women are 2 percentage points more likely to support intervention. The gap for the Terrorism condition is again the largest in size with a gap of 15 percentage points in the traditional direction. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also show the gender gap across conditions for the Student and Adult Studies.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 About Here

In summary, in support of H1-Gender Gap and Context Hypothesis, I find the gender gap is dynamic as expected meaning that it varies in size depending upon the reason for intervention. The gender gap is consistently large in the student and adult data sets in response to intervention to prevent terrorism. The gender gaps are consistently smaller across both data sets for intervention involving national interests and regime change. The only inconsistent finding between the data sets is the reversal of the gender gap in the student sample in the humanitarian condition versus the gap in the traditional direction in the humanitarian condition in the adult sample.

Throughout the experimental analysis that follows, I use logistic regression because my dependent variable is equal to 1 if respondents support intervention in Gabon

and 0 if they oppose for the student data. For the adult data, the dependent variable is coded 1-4 with 1=Strongly Oppose intervention and 4=Strongly Favor intervention; therefore I use ordered logistic regression. In these multivariate analyses, an interaction between the condition and gender, coded 1 for female, is the variable of interest as the indicator of the gender gap within that condition. Below I note the significant gender gaps that arise in the Student and Adult Studies.

Table 4.5 shows the multivariate results for the gender gap in the student data with a focus on the statistically significant gaps in the Humanitarian and Terrorism Conditions. The analysis is depicted with the Terrorism condition as the baseline in the first model to show the significant gender gap in the Humanitarian Condition when compared to terrorism. The gender gap in the Humanitarian Condition is significant (B=1.33 s.e. 0.73, p<.10). In the second model, the Humanitarian condition is the baseline to show the significant gender gap in the Terrorism Condition. The gender gap is also marginally significant in the Terror condition when Humanitarian is the baseline (B=-1.33 s.e. 0.73, p<.10) as shown in the second set of columns in Table 4.5. Later analyses will investigate both of these models further in an effort to test various meditational variables for gender gaps in both of these conditions.

Table 4.5 About Here

For the adult data also in Table 4.5, the National Interests condition is the baseline. I chose this as the baseline because the gender gap is -2% in the National Interests condition in the Adult Study. Here the gender gap is only marginally significant in the Terror condition (B=-1.16 s.e. 0.68, p<.10). It is worth noting that traditionally the gender gap in support for war has ranged from 6-14 percentage points. In a large sample

of about 1000 respondents, such a gap is highly significant. This is not the case in my data because my sample sizes are much smaller leaving only a marginally significant gender gap in only some of the conditions. This is why the 12% gap in the traditional direction for the Humanitarian condition is also not significant in multivariate analyses.

Student Study

H2A Pro-Social Values Hypothesis: Humanitarian Values

The most novel finding thus far is the reversal of the gender gap in the student sample for the Humanitarian condition. Why is that women are more likely than men to support intervention in the Humanitarian condition? This might arise because of women's stronger support for pro-social values such as humanitarianism. Men and women differ in their endorsement of humanitarian values as discussed in Chapter 3, the mean for women on the 0-1 scale is 0.69 while for men it is 0.64. Figure 4.3 shows the predicted level of support for humanitarian intervention for women versus men at their existing means of humanitarian values, with men's probability at 0.38 and women's probability at 0.46. If we adjust women's mean on humanitarian values to be equal to that of men shown on the right of Figure 4.3, their probability of support for humanitarian intervention goes down to 0.44. This reduction in probability of support indicates that the gender gap on humanitarian values may partially mediate the gender gap but is unlikely to fully mediate the gap in the humanitarian condition.

Figure 4.3 About Here

In Table 4.6, I investigate the extent to which Humanitarian Values mediate the gender gap in the Humanitarian condition. The inclusion of Humanitarian values does not reduce the gender gap (B=1.44s.e. 0.73, $p<.10$) in the Humanitarian condition. The

appropriate test of the H2A hypothesis is an interaction between humanitarian values and the humanitarian condition to see whether this interaction mediates the gender gap in the humanitarian condition. The reason why an interaction is necessary is because the humanitarian values predict support for war only in the humanitarian condition and instead predict opposition for war in the other conditions. This makes intuitive sense that the values would perform differently in the other conditions because to support helping others and protecting the welfare of all people means to oppose traditional reasons for military intervention. The gender gap (B=1.59s.e. 2.19) is no longer significant but this is because the standard error has inflated quite a bit. This might be because of the multicollinearity introduced by the inclusion of the interaction along with the small sample size. I performed a sobel-goodman mediation test in STATA and the percent of the gender gap in the humanitarian condition mediated by humanitarian values is 23.94%.[12]

Overall Humanitarian values work differently depending on the reason for intervention. Generally, those high on humanitarian values are less likely to support intervention in Gabon except in the humanitarian condition where those high on humanitarian values are more likely to support intervention. Also in Table 4.6: neither a gender-values interaction mediates the gender gap nor does the inclusion of the values-condition and gender-values interactions. Finally, the gender gap is no longer significant

[12] The sobel-goodman mediation test in STATA uses regression which is inappropriate given the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable. Therefore the percent mediated is not completely accurate.

due to an inflated error when a three way interaction between gender-values-condition (not shown) is included.[13]

Table 4.6 About Here

Now I examine the moderating relationship between values and gender on support for intervention. Instead of including a three way interaction, I perform separate models for men and women depicted in Table 4.7. The interaction between Humanitarian Values and the Humanitarian Condition, which is the test of H2A, is only significant in the women only model (B=5.53 s.e. 2.60, $p<.05$) and the humanitarian condition dummy variable reduces to non-significance but unfortunately the standard error also increases in size for this dummy variable. Mediation may be going on here but given the increase in the standard error it is difficult to tell. It is extremely interesting, however, that this interaction is not significant for men. The Humanitarian Values do not appear to be a significant predictor of their support for intervention in the Humanitarian Condition. This indicates that men and women do differ in their reliance on values when evaluating military interventions. Women rely on humanitarian values when evaluating intervention for humanitarian reasons while men do not rely on these values.[14]

Table 4.7 About Here

Because humanitarian values appear to at least partially mediate the gender gap in the humanitarian condition, I calculated the predicted probabilities for men and women at

[13] When party identification is controlled for the female X humanitarian condition interaction reduces to non-significance, but the humanitarian values and values X condition interaction remain significant. If models are run separately for Democrat identifiers, the gender gap in the humanitarian condition is still significant meaning that female Democrat identifiers are more likely to support humanitarian intervention than male Democrat identifiers.

[14] When party identification is controlled for there are no changes to the findings in Table 4.7.

the maximum and minimum of the humanitarian value scale. These predicted probabilities are displayed in Figure 4.4. Both men and women are more likely to support military intervention in the humanitarian condition if they strongly endorse humanitarian values. Women are slightly more likely than men to support intervention in the humanitarian condition at the minimum and maximum of the humanitarian values scale. Specifically, at the maximum of humanitarian values women have a probability of 0.563 of supporting intervention in comparison to men who at the same level on the humanitarian values have a 0.500 probability of support for intervention.

Figure 4.4 About Here

In summary, there is modest support for the H2A Pro-Social Values Hypothesis that values explain gender differences in support for intervention. Specifically, humanitarian values are an important predictor of support for humanitarian intervention but it is unclear whether they mediate the gender gap. It is evident that gender moderates the influence of humanitarian values on evaluations of humanitarian intervention with women relying more on these values.

H2B Militaristic-Security Values Hypothesis: Militant Values

The gender gap in the Terror condition is also large and significant in multivariate analyses for both the Student and Adult data. Going back to Table 4.6, the right hand side of the table shows the logistic regression results with the Humanitarian Condition as the baseline. Here we see that the gender gap in the Terror condition is marginally significant (B=-1.33 s.e. 0.73, $p<.10$) with women being less likely than men to support military intervention in Gabon.

To test the H2B Militaristic-Security Values Hypothesis, I first test whether militant values mediate the gender gap in the Terrorism Condition. To test H2B, I test the mediation of militant values. Militant values positively predict overall support for military intervention in Gabon (B=0.76 s.e. 0.25, p<.01). Moreover, the inclusion of militant values reduces the gender gap in the Terrorism condition to non-significance (B=-1.16 s.e. 0.74). As can be seen in Table 4.6, the size of the coefficient is smaller and the standard error has only increased by 0.01. Therefore this suggests that militant values are mediating the gender gap in the Terrorism condition and not merely inflating the standard error on the gender coefficient.[15] The interaction between militant values and the terror condition is not significant, this might be because the militant values lead to an increase in support for intervention in all four conditions. The predicted probabilities in Figure 4.5 show that men are again overall more supportive of intervention at both the high and low level of militant values. Moreover, the probability that men will support intervention in the Terrorism condition at the maximum on the militant values scale is 0.539 while for women at the maximum it is only 0.341 and for men at the minimum it is only 0.108.

Figure 4.5 About Here

[15] The militant values scale references the current global situation. The original Holsti scale asked support for aggressive policies toward the Soviet Union and for the prevention of the spread of Communism. My modified version measures support for aggressive policies toward Al Qaeda and for the prevention of the spread of terrorism. Therefore Table 4.8 displays the mediation results for a single item from the militant values scale which is furthest removed from the dependent variables. Specifically, the CIA item measures support for the central intelligence agency using force against our enemies. This item alone mediates the gender gap without the inclusion of the terrorism and Al Qaeda items.

I also test whether men and women differ in their reliance on militant values as depicted on the right of Table 4.7. Militant values are not a significant predictor of support for intervention for women indicating that women do not appear to rely on these values. These values are highly significant for men indicating that these values explain support for intervention among men who rely upon them.[16]

In summary, I find strong support for my H2B Hypothesis that women's lower endorsement of Militaristic-Security Values, in this case Holsti's Militant Values, explains their lower support for intervention in the Terrorism Condition.

Adult Study

H2A Pro-Social Values Hypothesis

For the adult data, the same analysis cannot be performed because the value measures differ. Unfortunately, extensive analysis of why adult females are less supportive than student females of humanitarian intervention as well as why adult males are more supportive than student males has not provided an explanation.[17] But the gender gap in the Humanitarian condition is not significant in the multivariate analyses. In a larger sample the12% difference in Table 4.4 would be significant and therefore meditational analyses could be done. The sobel-goodman test in STATA reports that 7.38% is mediated by the universalism value type. The universalism value type is a

[16] The inclusion of party identification in the mediation and moderation models does not change the results.

[17] One possibility is that the descriptions differ between the Student Study and Adult Study. In particular, in the Student Study the description includes reference to the brutal killing of children while the Adult Study description omits any reference to the death of children. Perhaps, female students are more likely than their adult counterparts to support intervention because of the explicit reference to the inclusion of children in the genocide.

significant predictor of support for intervention in the Humanitarian condition. The predicted probabilities in Figure 4.6 show that the Universalism value type helps to explain why men and women are more supportive of intervention in this condition compared to the other conditions. Men and women at the maximum on the Universalism value type are more likely than at the minimum to support intervention in this condition. The universalism value type, however, appears to greater explain why women would support humanitarian intervention and less why men are so supportive because the probability of support among women at the maximum is 0.662 and for men it is only 0.440. Women are higher on the Universalism Value type so it would not make sense as a mediator of the gap in the adult sample which is in the traditional direction.

Figure 4.6 About Here

In addition to Figure 4.6, I also display separate models for women and men in Table 4.9. Because meditational analysis was unsuccessful, I decided, as I did in the Student Study, to investigate the possibility that men and women rely on values differently. Table 4.9 shows that women rely on Universal Values across conditions while men do not. As in the Student Study, the true test of the hypothesis is an interaction between values and condition because Pro-Social Values are negatively related to war support for non-humanitarian reasons and positively related when intervention is for humanitarian purposes. In terms of the interaction, it is highly significant in the woman only model but only marginally significant for the men only model. This appears to indicate that women rely more heavily on Pro-Social Values when evaluating military interventions. It is puzzling that men are more supportive of intervention for humanitarian purposes. It is also confusing that universalism cannot

fully explain this greater support. Men do rely on universal values but not as strongly as women. Perhaps, this finding is due to demand characteristics on behalf of men while for women their support of humanitarian intervention seems more grounded in their values and therefore not the result of social desirability. Or, it could simply be that women are especially sensitive regarding Pro-social values and men just rely less heavily on them.[18]

Table 4.9 About Here

H2B Militaristic-Security Values Hypothesis

As shown in Table 4.10, the gender gap in the Terrorism condition in the adult sample is also marginally significant (B=-1.16 s.e. 0.68, p<.10). The single item test of the Militaristic-Security Values Hypothesis is a measure of Schwartz' Security value type which asks respondents how important having one's nation protected from enemies is to them positively predicts support for intervention (B=1.86 s.e. 0.92, p<.05). The inclusion of the security value type does not mediate the gender gap which is still marginally significant in the Terror condition (B=1.11 s.e. 0.68, p<.10). Perhaps if I had the militant values scale, I would find that among the adults the militant values mediate the gender gap in the Terrorism condition as they do in the student analysis.

Table 4.10 About Here

Going back to Table 4.9, I also tested whether women and men rely differently on the security value. The Security value type is marginally significant in the women only model and associated with a lower likelihood of supporting intervention (B=-2.35 s.e. 1.30, p=0.07). It is not significant in the men only model. In the full model in Table 4.10, the security value predicted support for intervention but among only women. This

[18] The inclusion of party identification does not change these results.

indicates that men and women do differ in their reliance on the security value. But, I have been unable thus far to mediate the gender gap.[19]

Because values do not mediate the gender gap, I also test in post hoc analysis whether the other explanations have a direct influence on the gap. Altruism, Anxiety, and Assertiveness are not significant predictors of support for intervention in Gabon and do not mediate the gender gap. Feminist identity although not a significant predictor of support for intervention, its inclusion does reduce the gender gap's coefficient causing it to lose significance (B=-1.06 s.e. 0.68, p=0.12). Perhaps this is occurring because of multicollinearity, but female and feminist are only correlated at 0.4 which should not result in multicollinearity being a problem. I include the manipulation check and political knowledge neither of which mediate the gender gap.

Finally, I also test ideology and party identification since as Chapter 5 shows these are important predictors of support for the Iraq war. Both are significant predictors of support for intervention with conservatives and Republican identifiers being more likely to support intervention. Ideology (B=1.55 s.e. 0.56, p<.05) also appears to mediate the gender gap which is no longer significant with ideology in the model (B=-1.01 s.e. 0.68). Figure 4.7 depicts the predicted probabilities of support for intervention in the Terrorism condition for Strong Liberals and Strong Conservatives. In general, the probabilities are low but remember that only 31% of men and 16% of women support intervention in the Terrorism condition. The probability of support for strong conservative males is 0.135 while for strong conservative females it is only 0.070. This

[19] The inclusion of party identification in the mediation does not mediate the gender gap. Controlling for party identification, however, reduces the influence of the security value type to non-significance.

suggests that ideological identification explains why adult women are less likely than adult men to support military intervention in Gabon in the Terror condition.

Figure 4.7 About Here

In summary, the findings in the Adult Study do not support my hypotheses as strongly as the Student Study Results. I find support for my H2A hypothesis in that the Pro-Social Values do explain support for intervention for humanitarian purposes for women as they did in the Student Study. These findings provide greater support, given their replication across data sets, that women rely more than men on Pro-Social values when assessing humanitarian interventions. This is a rather strong and consistent finding across the Student and Adult studies that women's support for humanitarian intervention is more likely to be influenced by their pro-social values than men's support.

Unfortunately, I am unable to explain why the gender gap for humanitarian intervention is in the traditional direction in the Adult Study or why men are so supportive of intervention in this condition. In terms of the terrorism condition, perhaps better measures of the Militaristic-Security Values would mediate the gap as in the Student Study. I do find in Chapter 3 that ideology is a significant predictor of Holsti's Militant Values and here I find that ideology mediates the gender gap in the Terrorism Condition. This suggests that if I had Holsti's Militant Values I would find that they mediate the gender gap in the Terrorism condition in the Adult study like they did in the Student Study.

Application to Current Military Intervention: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran Attitudes

Next, I discuss an extension of the above findings to attitudes toward the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the potential conflicts in Iraq and Iran using the Student

and Adult Studies data. In Chapter 5, I provide an imperfect test of my hypotheses using secondary data from the National Election Study. The values included in the NES are not same ones that I chose to use in my own data collection. Therefore I perform the analysis below to test my hypotheses regarding the mediators of the gender gap on Afghanistan and Iraq war attitudes. I also briefly discuss gender differences on potential future military interventions in North Korea and Iran.

Student Study: Afghanistan War Support

First for the Student Data the results for Afghanistan War support are displayed in Table 4.11. The gender gap is highly significant (B=-0.69 s.e. 0.23, $p<.01$). For the values variables, Militant values is a significant predictor of support for the war (B=0.84 s.e. 0.24, $p<.05$), with those high on militant values more likely to support the war. This does not mediate the gender gap to a significant degree although it is slightly smaller in size from -0.69 (0.23) to -0.66 (0.24). Militant values remain significant with the inclusion of party identification in the final model but the gender gap remains significant. Also in Table 4.11, I have depicted separate models for women and men to test whether different values serve to structure their preferences for intervention. This appears to be the case with Militant and Cooperative values as significant predictors of attitudes toward the Afghanistan War among men but not among women.

Table 4.11 About Here

In summary, I find moderate support for H2B that Militaristic-Security Values explain the gender gap in support for war. But, the values fail to fully mediate the gap. I find more evidence that women and men rely on different criteria when assessing military interventions.

Adult Study: Afghanistan War Support

Now for the Adult Data the results for Afghanistan War support are displayed in Table 4.12. The gender gap is significant (B=-0.77 s.e. 0.28, $p<.05$). I test the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis. For the values variables, the Universalism value is a significant predictor leading to a lower likelihood of support. The Security value is a significant predictor of support for the war with those desiring security more likely to support the war. This indicator for the Militaristic-Security Values fails to mediate the gender gap. Again, I also depict separate models for women and men. Both women and men rely on security values which increase their likelihood of supporting the war. Women, however, also rely on universalism values which lowers their likelihood of support.

Table 4.12 About Here

In summary, I do not find strong support for my H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis. The security value type is a significant predictor of war support and reduces the gender coefficient, but does not mediate the gender gap. I find that women and men do slightly differ in the values they rely on with women, more than men, relying on universalism values.

Student Study: Iraq War Support

For Iraq war support in the Student Data, the results are in Table 4.13. The Iraq war, as is also shown in Chapter 5, does not produce a sizeable gender gap and the gap is fully mediated by partisanship. In addition to party identification, Humanitarian and Militant values are significant predictors of Iraq war support in the expected direction but neither mediates the gender gap. There are differences between women and men in terms

of the factors that predict their support of the Iraq war. Specifically, militant values predict male support but not female support.

Table 4.13 About Here

Adult Study: Iraq War Support

In terms of the Adult Data, the Iraq war findings are displayed in Table 4.14. There is no significant gender gap on the Iraq war among the adults. Schwartz' Security Value Type, the measure of Militaristic-Security Values in this study, is significant. There are no substantial differences between the women only and men only models.

Table 4.14 About Here

Student Study: Iran and North Korea

In the student data I also measure support for military intervention in Iran and North Korea. The means, not shown in table format, for both are in the expected direction with men more likely to favor military intervention than women. Only the mean gender difference on support for military intervention in Iran, however, is marginally statistically significant (p=-0.07). Perhaps in a larger sample, both mean differences would be significant.

Table 4.15 depicts the logistic regression for support of military intervention in Iran. The gender gap is marginally significant (B=-0.47 s.e. 0.26, p<.10). The inclusion of the values fully mediates the gender gap (B=-0.21 s.e. 0.29) with all three values significant predictors in the model. Individuals high on humanitarian values are less likely to support intervention (B=-2.04 s.e. 1.14, p<.10). Individuals high on militant values (B=4.29 s.e. 0.93, p<.01) and high on cooperative values (B=2.53 s.e. 1.12, p<.05) are more likely to support intervention. In addition, each of the values alone mediate the

gender gap when included separately in the model and each remains significant with the inclusion of party identification and ideology (not shown). Sobel-goodman tests, which uses regression and is therefore not entirely appropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable, reveal that the percent mediated for the humanitarian values is 42.49%, for militant values is 34.63%, for cooperative values is 30.55%, and for altruism is 17.76%. Ideology and party identification mediate the gender gap (B=-0.24 s.e. 0.30) and are significant predictors of support for intervention with conservatives and Republican identifiers more likely to support intervention.

Table 4.15 About Here

Although there is no gender gap to explain, Table 4.16 depicts the results for support for military intervention in North Korea. Again humanitarian values and militant values are significant with those high on humanitarian values less likely to support intervention (B=-1.73 s.e. 1.06, $p<.10$) and those high on militant values are more likely to support intervention (B=3.38 s.e. 0.86, $p<.01$). Party identification is also significant with Republican more likely to support intervention (B=1.30 s.e. 0.57, $p<.05$).

Table 4.16 About Here

Overall, I find some support for the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis with respect to the gender gap on current and/or potential future interventions. Unfortunately, my results are not consistent across the two studies or with respect to the different interventions. Sometimes values are significant and mediate the gap. I also find with these real world interventions that the gender gap does not always materialize or is not large enough to be impervious to the inclusion of party identification. This lends support to the dynamic nature of the gender gap in support of interventions.

Summary of Support for Hypotheses

First, there is strong support for the H1-Gender Gap and Context Hypothesis that the gender gap is dynamic in nature depending upon the reasons for the military intervention. Specifically, the gender gap varies in size from 4.5% to 21% in the traditional direction. Moreover, I find that in some instances the gap may even reverse in direction as it did among the student sample for the Humanitarian Condition and the adult sample for the National Interests condition.

I also find modest support for the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that different values help to explain why these different gender gaps emerge in response to different calls for military intervention. I find moderate support for H2A that Pro-Social Values explain women's support for Humanitarian Interventions. Specifically, humanitarian values in the student sample and the universalism value type in the adult sample provide insight into why women and men are more or less likely to support intervention in the different conditions, but do not appear to fully mediate the gender gap. I also find strong support for H2B that Militaristic- Security Values mediate the gender gap in the Terrorism Condition but only in the Student Study. As mentioned earlier, different measures of Militaristic-Security Values in the Adult Study may have also mediated the gender gap in the Terrorism Condition.

With respect to H2, I find consistent evidence that men and women structure their attitudes toward intervention differently. Specifically, when thinking about humanitarian intervention women rely more than men on Pro-Social values. Moreover, when thinking about terrorism intervention men are more likely than women to rely on Militaristic values. This means that men and women are using different criteria to make their

evaluations of military interventions. In other words, different values are more or less predictive of their assessments of these different types of interventions. This means that not only do women often differ in their endorsement of values but they actually rely on different values for their foreign policy preferences.

Similarly to the analysis in the next chapter, I only find a significant gender gap on support for the Afghanistan war and not for the Iraq war. Again, this is likely because of the highly partisan nature of public support/opposition for this particular war which is unique in comparison to public support for past military interventions (Jacobson, 2007). I find that values are important predictors of war support but that they do not completely mediate the gender gap in all instances. Militaristic-Security Values in all of the analysis of war support in the Student Study and fully mediates the gender gap on support for military intervention in Iran.

Chapter 4 Tables and Figures

Figure 4.1: Gender Gap Among Students by Condition



Graph was generated from percentages of support for intervention among students depicted in Table 4.4.

Figure 4.2: Gender Gap Among Adults by Condition



Graph was generated from percentages of support for intervention among adults depicted in Table 4.4.

Figure 4.3: Means of Support for Intervention in Humanitarian Condition for Student Study



Bars represent the predicted probability of support for intervention in Gabon in the Humanitarian condition at mean level of Humanitarian Values. The bars on the left are the predicted probabilities of support for intervention at the actual means of Humanitarian Values. The bars on the right are the predicted probability of support with women's mean Humanitarian Values adjust to that of men's actual mean.

Figure 4.4: Predicted Probability of Support in Humanitarian Condition Among Students



Note: Data is from Student Study; predicted probabilities from findings in Table 6. The Terrorism condition is the baseline. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention.

Figure 4.5: Predicted Probability of Support for Intervention in Terrorism Condition Among Students



Note: Data is from Student Study; predicted probabilities from findings in Table 6. The Humanitarian condition is the baseline. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention.

Figure 4.6: Predicted Probability of Support in Humanitarian Condition Among Adults



Predicted Probabilities generated from ordered logit model with the National Interests condition as the baseline.

Figure 4.7: Predicted Probability of Support in Terrorism Condition Among Adults



Note: Data is from Adult Study; predicted probabilities from findings in Table 9. The National Interests condition is the baseline. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention.

Table 4.1: Manipulation Check for Student Study

		Men	Women	Total
Humanitarian Condition	**Mean**	0.62	0.76	0.68
	Std Dev	0.24	0.24	0.25
	Freq	42	35	77
National Interests Condition	**Mean**	0.61	0.61	0.61
	Std Dev	0.20	0.24	0.22
	Freq	39	43	82
Regime Change Condition	**Mean**	0.56	0.61	0.58
	Std Dev	0.20	0.21	0.21
	Freq	41	39	80
Terrorism Condition	**Mean**	0.66	0.64	0.65
	Std Dev	0.20	0.20	0.20
	Freq	39	39	78
Total	**Mean**	0.61	0.65	0.63
	Std Dev	0.21	0.23	0.22
	Freq	161	156	317

Manipulation check consists of a scale of four items asking participants how engaging, compelling, interesting, and credible they found the description of Gabon. The scale is coded 0-1 with higher values indicating greater engagement, interest, etc.

Table 4.2 Adult Study: Description of Gabon as Varied by Condition

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a serious threat to democracy/of terrorism/to United States' interests/of a humanitarian catastrophe. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.</td></tr>
<tr><th>Regime Change</th><th>Terrorism</th><th>National Interests</th><th>Humanitarian</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">The current situation has spiraled out of control.</td></tr>
<tr><td>With the help of his party President Ondimba was able to change Gabon's Constitution to extend presidential terms to seven years and to eliminate the term limits previously in place. In addition, he has violently squashed all opposition to his rule resulting in what is now equivalent to a dictatorship in many experts' opinions.</td><td>Gabon's harboring and aiding to terrorist groups has been escalating and is often accomplished by "behind-the scenes" financing and arming various known international terrorists and their associates. Concerns have also been raised, within the past two months, about the strong possibility that terrorist organizations are operating terrorist training camps in the country.</td><td>Gabon is the richest oil producing and refining African country, but recent attempts to assassinate the President have led to the destruction of the country's oil industry. President Ondimba began a policy of setting oil fields on fire along with destroying nearby refineries. He has threatened to continue this policy until his political rivals leave the country.</td><td>Ethnic conflict has emerged as a major threat to the people of Gabon. Evidence of mass genocide has surfaced. In addition, attacks have also been repeatedly made on humanitarian workers trying to meet the food and health needs of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Many argue for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon:</td></tr>
</table>

Table 4.2 Adult Study: Description of Gabon as Varied by Condition (continued)

"Every day we surveyed evidence of the breaking down of democratic institutions. There are no checks on President Ondimba's power and clearly that is undemocratic. Incarcerating your political competitors and the use of military weapons against peaceful protesters is obviously unacceptable."	**"Every day we surveyed evidence of aid to terrorist groups. Gabon has become one of the primary swamps for terrorism, harboring terrorists from the region and around the world. This shift is one of the most important recent trends we have identified in terrorism..."**	**"Every day we surveyed evidence of the threat to worldwide economic interests: the fires in the oil fields, the abandoned oil refineries, and the halt of oil exportations."**	**"Every day we surveyed evidence of genocide: huts set on fire with people locked inside, children with their faces smashed in, men with their ears cut off and eyes plucked out, and mass graves with the corpses of people who had been executed with gunshots to the head."**
Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is **in need of a regime change.** The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to **institute a regime change.**	Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is **harboring terrorists.** The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to **prevent further aid to terrorists.**	Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is **an emerging threat to national interests including the oil industry.** The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to **prevent further damage to the oil industry.**	Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is **experiencing a humanitarian crisis.** The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to **stop the genocide and prevent further ethnic cleansing.**
As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.			

Table 4.3: Manipulation Check for Adult Study

		Men	Women	Total
Humanitarian Condition	**Mean**	0.59	0.72	0.66
	Std Dev	0.30	0.14	0.23
	Freq	24	33	57
National Interests Condition	**Mean**	0.56	0.59	0.58
	Std Dev	0.22	0.17	0.19
	Freq	25	37	62
Regime Change Condition	**Mean**	0.52	0.56	0.54
	Std Dev	0.28	0.23	0.26
	Freq	28	25	53
Terrorism Condition	**Mean**	0.60	0.64	0.62
	Std Dev	0.19	0.21	0.20
	Freq	35	32	67
Total	**Mean**	0.57	0.63	0.60
	Std Dev	0.25	0.20	0.22
	Freq	112	127	239

Manipulation check consists of a scale of four items asking participants how engaging, compelling, interesting, and credible they found the description of Gabon. The scale is coded 0-1 with higher values indicating greater engagement, interest, etc.

Table 4.4: Percent Difference in Support for Intervention in Gabon by Condition: Student Data

Condition:	**Humanitarian**		**National Interests**		**Regime Change**		**Terrorism**	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Student Study								
Oppose Military Intervention	63%	53%	78%	82.5%	77%	82%	68%	89%
Support Military Intervention	37%	47%	22%	17.5%	23%	18%	32%	11%
Gender Gap: M-F	**-10%**		**4.5%**		**5%**		**21%**	
Adult Study								
Oppose Military Intervention	58%	70%	79%	77%	75%	83%	69%	84%
Support Military Intervention	42%	30%	21%	23%	25%	17%	31%	16%
Gender Gap: M-F	**12%**		**-2%**		**8%**		**15%**	

Table 4.5: Support for Intervention in Gabon

Student Study						Adult Study		
	β	se		β	se		β	se
Female	**-1.01+**	**0.56**	Female	0.31	0.46	Female	0.28	0.49
Human	0.21	0.47	Terror	-0.21	0.47	Terror	0.50	0.49
Regime	-0.44	0.50	Regime	-0.65	0.48	Human	0.80	0.54
National	-0.37	0.50	National	-0.58	0.49	Regime	0.21	0.53
Female X Human	**1.33+**	**0.73**	Female X Terror	**-1.33+**	**0.73**	Female X Terror	**-1.19+**	**0.68**
Female X Regime	0.62	0.79	Female X Regime	-0.70	0.72	Female X Human	-0.35	0.70
Female X National	0.88	0.76	Female X National	-0.44	0.69	Female X Regime	-0.24	0.71
cons	**-0.69+**	**0.34**	cons	-0.49	0.32			
Number	317		Number	317		Number	234	
R-squared	0.04		R-squared	0.04		R-squared	0.02	

Note: +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries for Student Study are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. Entries for Adult Study are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.6: Support for Intervention in Gabon
Mediation of Values in Student Study

	β	se	β	se		β	se	β	se
Female	**-1.02+**	**0.56**	**-1.04+**	**0.57**	Female	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.47
Human	0.18	0.47	-2.76	1.73	Terror	-0.37	0.48	-0.45	1.24
Regime Change	-0.50	0.50	-0.55	0.51	Regime Change	-0.66	0.49	-0.66	0.49
National Interests	-0.46	0.51	-0.55	0.52	National Interests	-0.74	0.50	-0.74	0.50
Female X Human	**1.41+**	**0.73**	1.59	2.19	Female X Terror	-1.16	0.74	-1.16	0.74
Female X Regime	1.02	0.77	1.16	0.78	Female X Regime	-0.74	0.73	-0.74	0.73
Female X National	0.73	0.79	0.81	0.80	Female X National	-0.36	0.71	-0.36	0.71
Human Values	**-1.57+**	**0.82**	**-2.87***	**1.02**	Militant Values	**0.76****	**0.25**	**2.24****	**0.84**
Human Condition X Human Values			**4.53+**	**2.54**	Terror X Militant Values			0.14	1.82
Constant	0.35	0.64	1.19	0.75	Constant	**-2.50****	**0.74**	**-1.72****	**0.57**
N	317		317		N	317.00		317.00	
Rsquared	0.05		0.06		Rsquared	0.06		0.06	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The Terrorism condition is the baseline in the first three models and the Humanitarian Condition is the baseline in the last two models. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.7: Support for Intervention in Gabon
Differing Reliance on Values Among Women and Men in Student Study

	Women		Men			Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se		β	se	β	se
Human	-2.07	1.82	-2.13	1.81	Terror	-0.80	1.61	-0.97	1.66
Regime	0.27	0.63	-0.51	0.50	Regime	**-1.37***	**0.54**	-0.67	0.50
National	0.65	0.59	-0.48	0.51	National	**-1.06***	**0.50**	-0.79	0.51
Humanitarian Values	**-4.32****	**1.68**	-1.91	1.30	Militant Values	1.52	1.23	**2.84****	**1.15**
Human X Humanitarian Values	**5.53***	**2.60**	3.56	2.66	Terror X Militant Values	-1.35	2.88	0.84	2.48
Constant	1.06	1.13	0.56	0.92	Constant	-0.99	0.75	**-2.05****	**0.73**
N	156		161		N	156		161	
R^2	0.10		0.03		R^2	0.07		0.06	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The Terrorism condition is the baseline for the first two models and the Humanitarian Condition is the baseline for the last two models. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.8 Students

	β	se
Female	0.31	0.47
Terror	-0.39	0.48
Regime	-0.71	0.49
National	-0.72	0.49
Female X Terror	-1.08	0.74
Female X Regime	-0.72	0.73
Female X National	-0.38	0.70
CIA Item	**0.99***	**0.49**
constant	-1.05	0.43
Number	317.00	
R^2	0.05	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The Humanitarian condition is the baseline. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.9: Support for Intervention in Gabon
Differing Reliance on Values Among Women and Men in Adult Study

	Women		Men		Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Human	**-4.10***	**1.81**	-1.34	1.34	0.49	0.45	0.83	0.53
Regime	-0.05	0.49	0.24	0.52	-0.04	0.48	0.19	0.52
Terror	**-0.79+**	**0.48**	0.48	0.48	**-2.28+**	**2.87**	1.05	2.74
Universal Values	**-2.19***	**0.99**	-1.10	0.84				
Human X Universal Values	**5.61****	**2.13**	**3.01+**	**1.77**				
Security					**3.12+**	**1.73**	1.79	1.32
Terror X Security					-3.22	3.07	-0.66	2.92
N	123		111		123		111	
R^2	0.05		0.02		0.04		0.02	

Note: Data is from Adult Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The National Interests condition is the baseline. The dependent variable is coded 1-4 with 4=strongly favor intervention and 1=strongly oppose intervention. All other variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.10: Support for Intervention in Gabon Among Adults

	β	se
Female	0.22	0.49
Terror	0.49	0.49
Human	**0.91+**	**0.54**
Regime	0.20	0.53
Female X Terror	**-1.11#**	**0.68**
Female X Human	-0.47	0.69
Female X Regime	-0.23	0.71
Security	**-1.40***	**0.70**
Number	234	
R	0.02	

Note: Data is from Adult Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 and #p=.10Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The National Interests condition is the baseline. The dependent variable is coded 1-4 with 4=strongly favor intervention and 1=strongly oppose intervention. All other variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.11: Support for Afghanistan War in Student Study

							Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**-0.69****	**0.23**	**-0.66***	**0.24**	**-0.66***	**0.25**				
Human Values			0.36	0.91	0.49	0.97	1.16	1.36	-0.37	1.41
Militant Values			**0.84***	**0.24**	**2.24****	**0.77**	1.26	1.12	**3.21****	**1.09**
Coop Values			-0.52	0.95	-1.30	1.03	0.10	1.49	**-2.76+**	**1.45**
Party ID 1=Rep					**1.07***	**0.47**	**1.47***	**0.73**	0.72	0.64
_cons	0.11	0.16	**-2.28***	**1.06**	-1.50	0.97	**-2.55+**	**1.42**	-0.98	1.36
Number	317		317		317		146		143	
Rsquared	0.02		0.05		0.08		0.04		0.08	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.12: Support for Afghanistan War Among Adults

					Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**-0.77***	**0.28**	**-0.61***	**0.29**				
Universalism			**-1.31***	**0.65**	**-2.04***	**0.98**	-0.71	0.86
Security			**5.51**	**1.33**	**5.75****	**2.10**	**5.25****	**1.71**
_cons	**-0.76***	**0.35**	**-4.05***	**1.26**	**-4.33***	**2.06**	**-4.25***	**1.62**
N	234		234		127		112	
R-squared	0.09		0.09		0.08		0.08	

Note: Data is from Adult Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.13: Support for Iraq War Among Students

							Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**-0.51***	**0.23**	**-0.51***	**0.24**	-0.39	0.29				
Human Values			**1.63+**	**0.91**	**2.38***	**1.04**	1.69	1.35	2.04	1.49
Militant Values			**0.79****	**0.23**	**0.69***	**0.27**	0.03	1.10	**3.89****	**1.15**
Coop Values			0.33	0.94	-0.70	1.06	-0.98	1.51	-0.12	1.48
Party ID 1=Rep					**2.00****	**0.51**	**1.84***	**0.74**	**2.05****	**0.69**
_cons	0.01	0.16	**-3.26****	**1.07**	**-3.65***	**1.47**	-2.05	1.40	**-4.35****	**1.51**
Number	317		317		317		146		143	
R	0.01		0.04		0.09		0.05		0.15	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.14: Support for Iraq War Among Adults

			Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	0.03	0.33				
Universalism	**-2.58****	**0.76**	**-2.43***	**1.01**	**-2.73***	**1.05**
Security	**8.45****	**2.46**	**6.69***	**3.07**	**10.65***	**4.18**
_cons	**-7.48***	**2.39**	**-5.83+**	**3.00**	**-9.53***	**4.09**
N	234		127		112	
R-squared	0.09		0.09		0.16	

Note: Data is from Adult Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.15: **Support for Military Intervention in Iran Among Students**

							Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	**-0.47+**	**0.26**	-0.21	0.29	-0.24	0.30				
Human Values			**-2.04+**	**1.14**			-1.20	1.23	**-3.06***	**1.30**
Militant Values			**4.29****	**0.93**			**4.41****	**1.10**	**4.78****	**1.06**
Coop Values			**2.53***	**1.12**			1.22	1.33	**2.60***	**1.33**
Ideology 1=St Con					**1.91***	**0.68**				
Party ID 1=St Rep					**1.39***	**0.58**	0.74	0.69	**0.95+**	**0.57**
Constant	**-0.89****	**0.17**	**-2.95***	**1.14**	-2.37	0.38	-2.25	1.34	-2.32	1.44
N	317		317		317		146		143	
R^2	0.01		0.18		0.10		0.11		0.19	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Table 4.16: Support for Military Intervention in North Korea

							Women		Men	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	-0.13	0.26	0.03	0.28	-0.00	0.29				
Human Values			**-1.73+**	**1.06**			**-2.52***	**1.26**	0.60	1.31
Militant Values			**3.38****	**0.86**			1.34	1.00	**5.46***	**1.08**
Coop Values			-1.21	1.11			-1.72	1.35	0.98	1.39
Ideology 1=St Con					0.58	0.64				
Party ID 1=St Rep					**1.30***	**0.57**	0.79	0.64	0.93	0.58
_cons	**-1.11***	**0.17**	**-1.74+**	**1.07**	**-1.92***	**0.35**	**-1.83***	**0.57**	**-1.69**	**0.78**
N	317		317		317		146		143	
R^2	0.00		0.07		0.04		0.03		0.00	

Note: Data is from Student Study; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the right. The dependent variable is coded 1=support intervention and 0=oppose intervention. All variables are coded 0-1.

Chapter 5: Extending Findings to National Representative Sample

This chapter focuses on extending the findings from the Student and Adult Studies to a national representative sample of U.S. residents. In this chapter, I test H2-The Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that men and women differ in their value endorsements and that values mediate the gender gap in support for intervention. I also test H3-The Gender Gap and Values Determinants Hypothesis that economic and political marginalization as well as feminist consciousness act as pre-determinants to the values and mediate the gender differences on the values.[20] In post hoc analysis, I test the marginalization and feminist explanations as possibly having a direct effect on the gender gap.

The following are post hoc expectations for the marginalization and feminist consciousness. According to the marginalization explanation, I expect that economically and politically marginalized women are causing the gender gap in support of military interventions. Specifically, I expect to find that low income individuals, who are disproportionately women, and individuals low on political efficacy, also disproportionately women, oppose the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Low income individuals are against military interventions because these individuals perceive such military involvements are expensive and will draw funding away from domestic programs upon which low income individuals rely. Politically alienated individuals

[20] Personality is not included in the national survey and so cannot be tested in this chapter.

scoring low on political efficacy are against military interventions because they generally lack faith in government. According to the Feminist Consciousness explanation, I expect that feminists, predominantly women, are against military interventions because of a pacifist orientation and a distinct value orientation.

I utilize the National Election Study data from 2004 and the panel data from 2000-2002-2004. With this secondary data analysis, I examine these explanations with respect to the gender gap in support of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. There is reason to believe that these conflicts are quite anomalous in comparison to past wars. This is particularly true of the Iraq war, for which evaluations have become increasingly partisan in nature (Jacobson, 2007). As Jacobson notes using polling data, support for the Iraq war was rather partisan before it even began and the partisan divide over Iraq widened considerably over time. Specifically the partisan gap in 2004 was an average of 63 points; the largest gap in that year documented that 90% of Republicans supported the war compared to only 10% of Democrats (Jacobson, 2007). This has not been the case for other conflicts, making the Iraq war atypical. For example, the partisan gap on Vietnam average at 5 points while Korea and Kosovo had an average gap of 11-12 points (Jacobson, 2007). Therefore it is not surprising that in the analysis below, I find that the influence of ideology and party identification on Iraq War evaluations swamp the gender gap and all explanatory variables of interest.

NES Panel 2000-2002-2004

The Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan conducts the National Election Study. The study population for the National Election Study is typically defined to include all United States citizens

eligible to vote in the election of that year and residing in the forty-eight coterminous states meaning that residents of Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.

The 2000-2002-2004 Full Panel file includes data for 1,807 cases in the first wave. Respondents were first interviewed in the 2000 National Election Study. The second wave of the panel includes 1,187 re-interviewed respondents of the initial 1,807 respondents. In 2004, 840 of the original 1,187 respondents who were interviewed in 2000 and 2002 were re-interviewed for the final wave of the study. It is worth noting that the 2004 NES Panel Study is different from the 2004 NES time-series study. The 2000 NES included two different modes of the survey; some respondents were interviewed face to face while others were interviewed over the phone. This constitutes a dual frame sample with both an area sample and a random digit dial (RDD) sample. The face to face or area sample is based on a multi-stage area probability sample. The RDD telephone component is a stratified equal probability sample of telephone numbers. The sample is not clustered. The response rate is the number of completed interviews over the total number of potential respondents; the pre-election response rate in 2000 was 61.2%. The overall re-interview response rate in the post election interviewing in 2000 was 86%. The re-interview rate for the 2002 wave is 65.7% and the re-interview rate of the 2004 wave is 46.5%.

NES 2004

The 2004 NES sample constitutes a completely new cross-section sample meaning that it does not include respondents from the NES Panel Study 2000-2002-2004. This sample is based on a stratified multi-stage area probability sample of United States households. The cross-section of 2,374 cases consisted of only 1,833 eligible cases. The

pre-election sample consists of 1,212 interviews with 622 non-response cases making the response rate 66.1%. For the post-elections, 1,066 of the pre-election respondents were re-interviewed yielding a re-interview rate of 88.0%. The response rate is calculated as the total number of Post-Election Interviews over the total number of Pre-Election Interviews.

Variables

Pro-Social and Militaristic-Security Values

Table 5.1 displays the key variables for the analysis in this chapter and the full list of items can be found in the Appendix. The values items are listed in the chapter appendix. The data sets include a set of items measuring support for more abstract foreign policy goals. The 2004 NES asked respondents to assess the importance of ten foreign policy goals. I am only interested in seven of these. The three left out of the analyses measure attitudes toward illegal immigration, foreign economic markets, and protecting jobs in the global market; these have been excluded because they do not tap attitudes on military intervention, directly or indirectly while the other questions more closely measure attitudes relating to military and foreign policy. The seven of interest measure the importance of the following foreign policy goals: combating terrorism, strengthening the U.S. army, strengthening the United Nations, prevention of nuclear proliferation, promoting democracy, combating world hunger, and promoting human rights. In addition to these foreign policy goals, the data set also includes a question regarding preference for diplomacy versus military action to deal with international problems. Respondents are asked to place themselves on a seven point scale with preference for diplomacy coded as 7 and military as 1. The foreign policy goals and

diplomacy versus military question make up the values scales I use to test the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis in this chapter. I create two scales with strengthening the U.S. army and the diplomacy versus military self-placement questions as the Militaristic-Security Values scale and the combating world hunger and promoting human rights questions as the Pro-Social Values scale. The final three foreign policy goal questions, combating terrorism, strengthening the United Nations, and promoting democracy are included in the analyses as separate indicators of distinct values. I include these values as potential mediators of the gender gap on support for the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. I also investigate to what extent the marginalization and feminist consciousness indicators act as pre-determinants to these values.

Table 5.1 About Here

Marginalization Explanation

I use several indicators for economic marginalization. For economic indicators, I use income and occupation variables. Specifically, I use self-reports of income to construct a low income variable, coded as 1 for self-reports of less than $25,000 household income and 0 otherwise. For occupation variables, there is a dummy variable for homemaker, coded 1 if self-reported occupation is homemaker only and 0 otherwise. Also, I have included dummy variables for Pink Collar Ghetto occupational status and Professional occupational status, created from the census occupational codes provided by the NES.[21] The Pink Collar Ghetto includes individuals whose occupations include any

[21] The pink collar ghetto refers to occupations in which the majority of workers are female. Research suggests that women in the pink collar ghetto are not paid equivalently to men in blue collar fields with equivalent skills and educational attainment (Mastracci, 2004). This segregation in employment and lower pay for comparable work could be a contributor to the economic marginalization of women.

of the following: social workers, primary and secondary school teachers, librarians, nurses, dental assistants, office assistants/clerks, etc. The professional occupation variable is coded 1 if the respondent indicated that him/her occupation included one of the following: legal, engineering, management, financial specialist, architecture, etc. The excluded category includes mostly skilled laborers such as mechanics, construction workers, etc. With respect to gender, 74% of those coded 1 for the Pink Collar Ghetto variable are female and only 39% of those coded 1 for the Professional variable are female.

For political marginalization, I use a scale measuring political efficacy.

Feminist Consciousness Explanation

The feeling thermometer items require respondents to indicate how warmly or coolly he/she feels towards the group or individual in question on a one hundred point scale. This is not the ideal measure of Feminist Identity; a better measure would be if respondents were asked whether or not they self-identify as feminists.[22] Self-identification in the NES is only asked of women which is why I choose to instead utilize the feeling thermometer measure as a proximate indicator of feminist identity or of being a feminist sympathizer.

Analysis Plan

I will discuss the analysis for the NES 2004 data in depth. The tables for the NES Panel analysis are included in the appendix and to the extent to which the findings are

[22] The National Election Study does have a battery of questions that are better measures of feminist identity but these questions were only asked of women. In order to include male feminists in the analysis, who prior work shows behave like their female counterparts (Cook and Wilcox, 1991), I have chosen to use the feeling thermometer instead.

similar or differ will be noted but otherwise this analysis will not be discussed in as much detail. Because my hypotheses involve factors that mediate the gender gap, I perform meditational analyses. First, I look at the pre-determinants to values and test whether feminist consciousness or marginalization mediates the gender differences on endorsement of the values scales. Next, I test whether these values mediate the gender gap in support of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Finally, I briefly discuss some post hoc analysis looking at the possible direct effect of marginalization and feminist consciousness on support for these interventions.

Gender Differences on Values and Pre-Determinants of Values

First, I test the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis that there are gender differences on the values. According to my sub-hypotheses H2A and H2B, I expect to find that women are higher on Pro-Social Values, which I measure with Pro-Humanitarian Values in this analysis, and lower on Militaristic-Security Values, which I measure with Pro-Force Values in this analysis. Next, I test H3A and H3B that marginalization and feminist consciousness mediate the gender differences on values. There is only modest evidence that values mediate the gender gap.

I investigated whether a gender gap exists on the values included in the NES 2004 data set and the results are in Table 5.2. Then I ran models with each of the values as the dependent variables and these results are in Table 5.3. No gender gap emerges for the Pro-humanitarian values scale or for the promote democracy value. There is a gender gap for the pro-force values scale ($B=-0.26$ s.e. 0.11, $p<.05$) with women being less likely to hold pro-force values. There is a gender gap on the strong United Nations value ($B=0.60$ s.e. 0.12, $p<.01$) with women being more likely to believe in having a strong

United Nations. Finally, there is a gender gap on the combat terrorism value, but it is only marginally significant (B=-0.32 s.e. 0.17, p<.10). This indicates that women are less likely to hold a strong value for combating terrorism.

Table 5.2 About Here

In the first column of Table 5.3, the married, ideology, pink collar occupation, feminist feeling thermometer, education, and low income variables are all significant predictors of the humanitarian values scale. Being married makes one more likely to be pro-humanitarian (B=0.27 s.e. 0.13, p<.05). Being conservative makes one less likely to hold pro-humanitarian values (B=-0.48 s.e. 0.15, p<.01). The pink collar occupation leads to greater support of pro-humanitarian values (B=0.36 s.e. 0.15, p<.05) as does the feminist feeling thermometer (B=0.24 s.e. 0.12, p<.05). Finally, education (B=0.05 s.e. 0.03, p<.05) and low income (B=0.33 s.e. 0.16, p<.05) also increase the likelihood of endorsing the pro-humanitarian values. Gender, race, having a child, party identification, and age are not significant predictors in this model.

Table 5.3 About Here

In the second model for pro-force values, having a child in the house, party identification, ideology, feminist feeling thermometer, education, and age are significant predictors. Gender is no longer significant with the inclusion of the other variables. If I leave out party identification and ideology, gender is marginally significant. It is possible that pro-force values are tied up with party identification and ideology. Peffley and Hurwitz (1985) find evidence that abstract foreign policy attitudes or values are in fact related to ideology. Being Republican, Conservative, having a child in the house, and an increase in age are associated with a greater likelihood of endorsing pro-force values.

Being educated and feeling warmly toward Feminists are associated with a lower likelihood of endorsing pro-force values. It is possible that the reason why the feminist feeling thermometer variable drops to non-significance when the values are included in the prior analysis could be because the pro-force values are mediating the influence of the feminist feeling thermometer.

For the promote democracy value and the strong United Nations value, a gender gap exists with other variables. The black, married, Republican identification, pink collar occupation, and low income variables are significant and all associated with endorsing the promote democracy value. Gender and education are also significant but associated with being less likely to endorse the promote democracy value. For the strong U.N. value, gender and the feminist feeling thermometer are significant and increase the likelihood of supporting a strong U.N. Republican identity, conservatism, and education are all significant predictors of not endorsing this value. Finally, an increase in age, Republican identity, and conservative ideological identity are significantly predictive of endorsing the combat terrorism value.

Summary

In summary, I find modest evidence that the Feminist Consciousness and Marginalization explanations are predictors of the value endorsements. Specifically, individuals that feel warmly toward feminists are significantly more likely to endorse Humanitarian Values and strengthening the United Nations as well as significantly less likely to endorse Pro-Force Values. Low income individuals are significantly more likely to endorse Humanitarian Values and promoting democracy. I fail, however, to find significant gender differences on all the values but only find a gender gap on Pro-Force

Values with women less likely to endorse, strengthening the United Nations with women more likely to endorse, and combating terrorism with women less likely to endorse. Moreover, I fail to find that the feminist feeling thermometer or the low income variables alone mediate the gender gap on these values. These findings lend limited support to the H3A and H3B hypotheses. First, significant gender differences exist on some of the values studied here. Second, predictors of the values include the feminist consciousness and marginalization explanations. But, I do not find that indicators of these explanations alone mediate the gender gap in the value endorsements. Perhaps, this is not very surprising given that the most consistent findings in predicting Pro-Social and Militant-Security Values in Chapter 3 was with personality, specifically altruism.

Explaining the Gender Gap on Support for the Afghanistan War

I begin with an analysis of the gender gap in support for going to war in Afghanistan. Overall, 82.6% of men and 64.4% of women from the 2004 NES sample, similarly 82.4% of men and 65% of women from 2004 Post-interview of the NES 2000-2002-2004 panel, considered the war to have been worthwhile. According to these percentages, there is a sizeable gender gap in retrospective support for the war. Earlier in the 2002 pre-interview of the NES panel study, however, the gender gap was much smaller with respect to support for the Afghanistan War. Support was 89% for men and 84.5% for women. Public opinion polls earlier on also show a smaller gap and generally a greater percentage of women supporting the war. Unlike past military engagements, women were almost equally likely to favor direct action against Afghanistan with 83% of men and 81% of women in the week after 9/11 (Jones, 2001). Although a gender gap soon emerged in an October 2001 Gallup poll found that 88% of men and 72% of women

supported the use U.S. ground troops in Afghanistan with the national average being 80% (Newport, 2001).

Mediation: Pro-Social and Militaristic-Security Values

In accordance with H2A and H2B, I expect to find that Pro-Social and Militaristic-Security Values mediate the gender gap in support for the Afghanistan War. I particularly expect the Militaristic-Security Values to mediate because the Afghanistan War is not a Humanitarian Intervention and instead represents an intervention involving aspects of regime change (i.e. ousting the Taliban) and terrorism. The analysis below shows that values are a significant predictor of support/opposition toward the Afghanistan War but they too fail to fully mediate the gender gap. In Table 5.4, the pro-force values scale is significant (B=1.60 s.e. 0.38, $p<.01$). This variable indicates that as support for the principle of force increases the likelihood of supporting the Afghanistan war increases. Mediational analysis shows that Pro-force values are a significant mediator of the gender gap for the Afghanistan War, mediating 7.2% of the gap. This is a modest percent mediated and indicates a substantively small effect.

Table 5.4 About Here

The pro-humanitarian scale and pro-democracy value are not significant indicating that humanitarian values and the value of promoting democracy are not predictive of evaluations of the Afghanistan war. Believing in the need for a strong United Nations and the need to combat terrorism are significant and the expected direction for each. Again, the gender gap is still significant in the values model (B=-0.85 s.e. 0.17, $p<.01$). According to the sobel-goodman mediation test, 9.47% is mediated by

the strong U.N. value and 7.53% is mediated by combat terrorism. These do not do not indicate substantively large degrees of mediation.

Table 5.5 About Here

Panel: In the 2002 panel data depicted in Table 5.5, the diplomacy versus force item is significant, which is the only value in the 2002 panel data. This variable indicates that as support for the use of force in principle increases the likelihood of supporting the Afghanistan war increases. The gender gap remains marginally significant. In the 2004 panel data in Table 5.6, the pro-force value, or the diplomacy versus force item, is significant and the gender gap remains significant.

Table 5.6 About Here

Summary

In summary, values are clearly important predictors of foreign policy attitudes and in particular support for the Afghanistan War. As I predicted in H2B, individuals high on Militaristic-Security Values are more likely to believe that the Afghanistan War is worth the cost. It is also worth noting that although values are usually conceptualized as prior to attitudes there is great difficulty in parceling out the causal direction of the relationship between values and attitudes. It is possible that individuals supportive of the Afghanistan War are endorsing the pro-force values because of their attitude toward the war and not vice versa. Unfortunately, the values fail to fully mediate the gender gap.

Post Hoc: Marginalization

Because values fail to fully mediate the gender gap, I performed post hoc analysis to investigate whether the marginalization and feminist consciousness explanations have a direct influence on the gender gap rather than through values. I test the Marginalization

Explanation that individuals who are economically marginalized such as low income individuals and those that are politically marginalized such as individuals low on efficacy will be less likely to support war and are behind the gender gap. According to the Marginalization explanation, low income individuals should oppose military interventions out of self-interest believing that military involvement will defer resources from the funding of social programs from which low income individuals benefit. Furthermore, individuals low on political efficacy oppose military interventions because they have little confidence in the system or themselves due to political alienation.

Table 5.7 About Here

Table 5.7 displays the results for the NES 2004 data analysis. The gender gap as shown in Table 5.7 is highly significant as seen in column 1 (B=-0.97 s.e. 0.16, $p<.01$). The second column tests the degree to which the gender gap is mediated by the Marginalization explanation. This model includes the economic and political marginalization indicators without demographic or political controls. The low income variable is significant (B=-0.87 s.e. 0.17, $p<.01$) with low income being associated with a lower likelihood of believing that the Afghanistan war was worth the cost. Efficacy fails to reach significance in this analysis even though it is significant in both portions of the panel analysis. The homemaker variable is significant (B=0.62 s.e. 0.32, $p<.05$) but unexpectedly being a homemaker leads to greater support for the war.[23] The professional occupation and professional-gender interaction are both significant but in opposite directions. The professional occupation variable (B=1.06 s.e. 0.45, $p<.05$) is associated with a greater likelihood to believe the war was worth the cost, and the interaction (B=-

[23] This is the opposite of what one would expect given Eagly's (2004) social role theory which is discussed in greater detail in the summary at the end of this chapter.

0.97 s.e. 0.56, p<.10) is associated with a lower likelihood to support the war. I did not have specific expectations for the professional occupation variable or the interaction variable. Earlier work (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004; Huddy, et al., 2007) has hypothesized that professional women or economic autonomous women may be causing the gender gap in party identification and/or voting, which is why I include this interaction. The missing income variable is also significant but no direction was expected. The gender gap remains significant (B=-0.84 s.e. 0.20, p<.01) in the model. Overall, economic marginalization, as measured by income, is a significant predictor of Afghanistan War attitudes but it fails to fully mediate the gap. I perform mediational analyses using the sobel-goodman mediation test in STATA. Specifically the sgmediation command reveals for the NES 2004 data set that the low income variable is a significant mediator of the gender gap on the Afghanistan War with 7.33% mediated, which is rather low and substantively not a significant percent mediated.[24] The sgmediation test includes a test of whether gender predicts war support, income predicts war support, gender predicts income, and income mediates the effect of gender when both are included as predictors of war support.

Table 5.8 About Here

Panel: As shown in Table 5.8 the gender gap is only marginally significant in the 2002 portion of the NES panel data set. The low income and efficacy variables are significant. Lastly, the pink collar occupation and gender interaction is significant but is in the wrong direction with women having a pink collar occupation being more likely to

[24] The sgmediation command in STATA uses OLS regression when calculating the percent mediated. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, OLS is inappropriate and the percent mediated in this case is not completely accurate.

state that the Afghanistan war was worth the cost. Pink collar occupation, homemaker, professional occupation, and the professional-gender interaction variables were not significant. The gender gap remains marginally significant. The same is generally found in the 2004 panel data in Table 5.9. Depicted in Table 5.9, I find that these explanations are predictive of Afghanistan War support but do not mediate the gender gap.

Table 5.9 About Here

Summary

In summary, I find that the indicators of the marginalization explanation are predictors of support for the Afghanistan War but fail to fully mediate the gender gap. In line with the Marginalization explanation, a consistent trend emerges across the data sets that low income individuals are less likely to state that the Afghanistan War is worth the cost. I expected to find that low income individuals, who should be disproportionately female because of the feminization of poverty (Kimenyi & Mbaku, 1995; Pressman, 1988), would be less likely to support the military intervention in Afghanistan because such costly interventions have the potential to pull funds away from domestic programs upon which low income individuals depend. Unfortunately, this is the only trend to emerge leaving little support for the political marginalization part of this hypothesis meaning that political efficacy does not materialize as a consistent predictor of war support or as a mediator of the gender gap in support of the Afghanistan war. Moreover, although the low income variable is a significant predictor of war attitudes it fails to fully mediate the gender gap. Next I look at the other hypotheses and then I test whether these findings remain with the inclusion of controls as well as party identification and ideology.

Post Hoc: Feminist Consciousness Explanation

Again, I test the possible direct influence of the Feminist Consciousness explanation on the gender gap in post hoc analysis. This explanation predicts that feminists drive the gender gap due to their increased opposition to war, pacifism, compared to non-feminists. In essence I find little support for the Feminist consciousness explanation. Going back to Table 5.7, the gender gap remains significant and sizeable (B=-0.89 s.e. 0.16, p<.01) with the inclusion of the feminist feeling thermometer. The feminist feeling thermometer variable is also significant and in the expected direction, (B=-1.37 s.e. 0.36, p<.01) with an increase in warmth toward feminists being associated with decreased support for the Afghanistan war. Like Economic Marginalization, Feminist Consciousness is a significant predictor of evaluations of the Afghanistan War but it fails to substantially mediate the gender gap. Mediational analysis reveals that the feminist feeling thermometer is a significant mediator of the gender gap on the Afghanistan Wars with 9.42% of the variance mediated by the feminist feelings thermometer. But once again, this is not a highly significant percentage of the gap being mediated and is substantively a rather small effect.

Panel: Table 5.8 shows the test of the feminist consciousness explanation in the panel 2002 data. The gender gap, which was only marginally significant to begin with in this data, is no longer significant in the feminist feeling thermometer model but neither is the feminist feeling thermometer variable. In the NES 2004 panel analysis in Table 5.9, for the feminist feeling thermometer model, the gender gap remains significant and sizeable. The feminist feeling thermometer is also significant.

Summary

In summary, the feminist feeling thermometer is sometimes a significant predictor of opposition, as predicted, to the Afghanistan War but not consistently and it fails to fully mediate the gender gap. The feminist consciousness explanation states that feminists, which should be disproportionately women, are causing the gender gap because of their pacifist beliefs and/or distinct values orientation. Although my findings are in line with previous research that feminists or feminist sympathizers are anti-war, I do not show that they account for the gender gap. This in turn means that women's greater opposition to the Afghanistan War cannot be attributed to feminists or feminist sympathizers.

Contrasting Marginalization, Feminist Consciousness, and Values Hypotheses

The goal of this section is to include the indicators of the different explanations tested in this chapter with demographic and political controls as well as with one another. For the 2004 Afghanistan War Analysis, the following results are displayed in Table 5.10. I include the indicators for all three explanations and controls except for party identification and ideology. Again the gender gap is still significant. The pro force values scale, strong United Nations, and combat terrorism variables are significant. The feminist feeling thermometer variable reduces to non-significance, which is somewhat unexpected given how significant it was in prior models. This issue will be discussed later on in this chapter. The same three demographic controls, sophistication, race, and education are significant.

Finally, I also include party identification and ideology. The gender gap is still significant. The strong United Nations variable is the only one that drops from significance with the inclusion of party identification. The education variable drops in

size considerably but remains significant. The party identification variable reveals that identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood of supporting the war. The ideology variable is significant with conservative identification being associated with a greater likelihood of believing the war was worth the cost.

Table 5.10 About Here

Panel 2002: In the NES 2002 analysis in Table 5.11 the low income, efficacy, pink collar occupation, pink collar-gender interaction, and black variables are significant and gender is no longer significant. As prior work suggests (Nincic and Nincic, 2002), the black variable is highly predictive of being less likely to support the war. It is unclear what is responsible for the gaps reduction to non-significance, when the variables are added one at a time, the gender gap does not reduce to non-significance. The control variable, education is marginally significant with greater years of education leading to greater likelihood of support the war. Low income drops from significance with the inclusion of party identification which is marginally significant. The party identification variable reveals that identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood of supporting the war.

Table 5.11 About Here

Panel 2004: In the 2004 panel in Table 5.12 the efficacy, feminist feeling thermometer, child in the house, mother, sophistication, black, and age variables are significant and gender is no longer significant. This is the same model for which the gender gap was mediated in the panel 2002 analysis. Again, it is unclear which of the explanations or control variables is responsible.[25] The black variable is the only one that

[25] All the correlations between gender and the demographics are below 0.3.

drops from significance with the inclusion of party identification. The feminist feeling thermometer reduces to marginally significant. The party identification variable reveals that identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood of supporting the war.

Table 5.12 About Here

Overall, this analysis has been unsuccessful in mediating the gender gap. Perhaps this is due to the measures included in the NES. I had more success in Chapter 4 mediating the gender gap in the Terrorism condition in the Student Study with Holsti's Militant Values. Even the post-hoc analysis fails to show mediation of the gender gap.

Differing Reliance Among Men and Women

Again because thus far I have failed to find mediation and therefore I performed analysis to investigate whether men and women rely differently on these factors. It is possible that women and men rely differently on values, feminist consciousness, and marginalization when assessing military interventions. I expect to find that these factors are more likely to be predictors of women's attitudes towards military interventions. I do not find evidence that the models for men and women substantially differ. In Table 5.13 the results for the women only and men only models are displayed. Women and men do not appear to significantly differ in terms of what factors predict their support for war. Of the key variables, only the pro-force values and combat terrorism value emerge as significant for both men and women. The economic marginalization and feminist consciousness indicators are not significant for either women or men. The only differences that emerge in this analysis is that race, age, education, and ideology are significant predictors in the women only models not for men and professional occupation is significant for men and not women. Party identification is significant meaning that for

women and men being Republican is associated with an increased likelihood of supporting the war.

Table 5.13 About Here

Panel 2002: Table 5.14 displays the results for the women only and men only models to test whether women and men differ in their reliance on the explanations in the NES 2002 panel. Again there are few distinctions between the results for women and men. In terms of the key variables, pro-force values are significant for both men and women but the scale is no longer significant for men when ideology and party identification, which are puzzlingly not significant, are included in the model. Low income is only significant for women and only without party identification and ideology in the model. Finally, in terms of controls, sophistication is only significant for women as is ideology.

Table 5.14 About Here

Panel 2004: Table 5.15 includes the results for the women only and men only models for the NES 2004 panel data. The pro-force values are significant for women and men. The feminist feeling thermometer is only significant for women and only without party identification and ideology included in the model. Oddly, party identification and ideology are only significant for women. Finally, like prior analyses sophistication and education are only significant predictors for women.

Table 5.15 About Here

Summary of Gender Gap Findings for Afghanistan War Support

In summary, with respect to support for the Afghanistan War I find little support for my mediational hypotheses or for the possibility that men and women differ in their

reliance on these factors. Although I find some support that these explanations are significant predictors of evaluations of the Afghanistan war, they fail to mediate the gender gap in the 2004 NES.[26] The gender gap in both Panel analyses does reduce to non-significance. Although correlational analysis does not reveal a large correlation between gender and any of the control demographics included in the model, additional analysis shows that the inclusion of both of the following: having children in the house and being a mother are mediating the gender gap for both the Panel 2002 and Panel 2004 data sets. This finding lends support for Eagly's Social Role theory that women, who are more likely to inhabit the compassionate, non-violent, nurturing roles of wife and mother are socialized to be anti-conflict. Although Eagly's theory fails to differentiate between women who actually inhabit these roles from women who do not, because all women are presumably socialized for these roles, I find that it is the women who inhabit the role of mother that are mediating the gender gap in support for the Afghanistan War.

Iraq War

Next I will briefly discuss findings on the Iraq War. First it is important to note that the gender gap overall is much smaller on the Iraq War although overall the Iraq War was less popular among men and women than the Afghanistan War. This is true in both the NES panel 2004 and NES 2004. For the 2004 NES 43% of men and 37% of women stated that the Iraq war had been worth the cost resulting in a 6% gap. In the Panel NES for 2004, 49% of men and 45% of women expressed support for the Iraq war resulting in a 4% gap. The findings are quite similar for both sets of analyses. Because the gender

[26] Inclusion of egalitarianism and beliefs about women's role, which could hypothetically be important due to the media coverage of the Taliban's unequal treatment of Afghan women, also fails to mediate the gender gap.

gap is so small in the panel analysis and the results are almost identical to the NES 2004 findings, I do not discuss it below.

Mediation: Pro-Social and Militant-Security Values

In the first column of Table 5.16, gender is significant and in the expected direction (B=-0.28 s.e. 0.13, p<.05). For the final column of Table 5.16, there are similar findings for values as in the NES 2004 Afghanistan analysis. The pro-humanitarian values are not significant. The pro-force values are highly significant and in the expected direction (B=4.33 s.e. 0.43, p<.01). As shown earlier in Table 5.5, there are significant gender differences on the pro-force values with women being less likely to endorse these values. According to the sobel-goodman test of mediation the gender gap on the Iraq War is 50.68% mediated by pro-force values. The strong United Nations variable is also significant (B=-1.20 s.e. 0.23, p<.01) with support for a strong U.N. leading to a lesser likelihood of believing the Iraq war has been worth the cost. The combat terrorism value is significant (B=1.93 s.e. 0.47, p<.01). Mediational analysis shows that both mediate the gender gap for both wars. Specifically, 46.57% is mediated by the strong U.N. value and 22.83% is mediated by combat terrorism. The promote democracy (B=1.18 s.e. 0.27, p<.01) value is also significant with endorsement of associated with increased likelihood of support for the war. Finally, gender is no longer significant with the inclusion of values. Again, this is strong support for the H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis. Perhaps, because the gender gap on support for the Iraq War was much smaller in size, only 6 percentage points in the 2004 NES compared with 18.2 percentage points for the Afghanistan War in the 2004 NES, the key variables have been more successful in

mediating the gap. Otherwise, it is unclear why there is more success mediating the gender gap for the Iraq War than the Afghanistan War.

Table 5.16 About Here

Post Hoc: Marginalization Explanation

Moving on to the economic and political marginalization model, low income, efficacy, and homemaker are all significant. Low income leads to a lower likelihood of believing the Iraq war has been worth the cost (B=-0.63 s.e. 0.18, p<.01). Efficacy is in the opposite direction with respect to the above findings and my expectations (B=0.90 s.e. 0.46, p<.05). Again the homemaker variable is the opposite direction of my expectations and contrary to Eagly's (2004) social role theory leads to greater likelihood of supporting the war (B=0.78 s.e. 0.29, p<.05). The gender gap remains significant in the model and actually increases as it did for the panel analysis on the Afghanistan war (B=-0.45 s.e. 0.19, p<.05). The sobel-goodman test in STATA reveals that the low income variable accounts for 15.34% mediation of the gender gap on the Iraq War. Thus, predictions of the economic marginalization explanation are not strongly supported.

Table 5.17 About Here

Feminist consciousness explanation

In the Feminist feeling thermometer model in Table 5.17, gender ceases to be significant while the feminist feeling thermometer is highly significant. Increases in warmth toward feminists is associated with a lower likelihood of supporting the Iraq war (B=-2.34 s.e. 0.34, p<.01). This provides some strong support for the feminist

consciousness explanation but it is important to note that the gender gap is much smaller to begin with for the Iraq War.

Contrasting Marginalization, Feminist Consciousness, and Values Hypotheses

Table 5.18 includes all three explanations and controls except for party identification and ideology. Again the gender gap is not significant, most likely due to the feminist feeling thermometer and/or the values. The pro force values scale, strong United Nations, combat terrorism, promote democracy, low income, efficacy, and feminist feeling thermometer variables are significant and in the same direction as prior Iraq war models. Again the following controls are also significant: child in house, black, age, urban, and missing income.

Table 5.18 About Here

The results for the final model in Table 5.18 are similar to the prior models results with gender continuing to be non-significant. The strong United Nations, low income, efficacy, and feminist feeling thermometer variables reduce to non-significance. The party identification variable reveals that identifying as a Republican increases the likelihood of supporting the war (B=3.47 s.e. 0.36, $p<.01$). The ideology variable is significant (B=0.78 s.e. 0.23, $p<.01$) with conservative identification being associated with a greater likelihood of believing the Iraq war has been worth the cost. Party identification and ideology appear to be eclipsing the influence of the marginalization and feminist consciousness explanations.

Differing Reliance Among Men and Women

In Table 5.19 the results for the women only and men only models are displayed. The first column is for women only with indicators for all three explanations and controls

except for party identification and ideology. With respect to the key explanatory variables, the pro-force values and promote democracy value are significant for both women and men but the combat terrorism value is only significant for women and only without party identification and ideology in the model. Also, the feminist feeling thermometer is only significant for women but is no longer significant with the inclusion of party identification and ideology. Sophistication and education are not significant in the women only models like it was in prior analyses. Party identification is significant is significant for women and men meaning that being Republican is associated with an increased likelihood of supporting the war.

Table 5.19 About Here

Summary of Support for Hypotheses

Table 5.20 displays a summary of support for the Marginalization explanation, Feminist consciousness explanation, and H2-Gender Gap and Values Hypothesis. The table is broken down into data sets, Afghanistan or Iraq, and whether the variable is significant alone and with controls. There is an X when the variable is significant and in the hypothesized direction and a bold X indicates substantial mediation meaning that the gender gap reduces to non-significance. I look first at the Economic and Political Marginalization explanation. For all of the analyses, the low income variable is a significant predictor of believing that the Afghanistan war has not been worth the cost, but the gender gap remains significant and sizeable. With respect to the Afghanistan War, the low income variable does not remain significant when controls are included in the model or when values are included in the model for both 2004 data sets. For the 2002 panel Afghanistan war analysis and the NES 2004 Iraq war analysis, the low income

variable remains significant until the inclusion of party identification and ideology in the model and its inclusion actually increases the size of the gender gap. This may indicate that the low income variable is picking up the effect of party identification and ideology when these are excluded in the model.

Table 5.20 About Here

To test H2 that values mediate the gender gap, I use several foreign policy values. Overall the findings are in line with expectations. The humanitarian values are not important to evaluations of either of the wars. Pro-Force values are strongly and significantly predictive of support for both wars and this scale is robust to the inclusion of controls, indicators of the other explanations, as well as party identification and ideology. The strong United Nations value and the combat terrorism value are fairly consistently significant and robust to the inclusion of controls and the other explanations. Pro-Force values, combating terrorism value, and promote democracy value all appear to mediate the gender gap on the Iraq war reducing the gender variable to non-significance and they all hold up to the inclusion of controls.

There is a lack of consistent effects for the other economic indicators. The pink collar occupation variable is significant and in the expected direction but only in the 2002 Afghanistan war analysis. As the interaction in these models and the women only/men only 2002 analyses show, pink collar occupation is actually in the wrong direction for women. In the NES 2004 Afghanistan war analysis, the professional occupation variable is a significant predictor of support for the war as is the interaction between gender and professional occupation. In some of the analyses, homemakers are actually significantly

more likely to say that both wars have been worth the cost, but this effect is not robust to the inclusion of controls or the indicators of the other explanations.[27]

For political marginalization, I use indicators of political efficacy. The results are inconsistent. The scale is significant and in the right direction in much of the panel analyses, particularly for men. It is not significant for the NES 2004 Afghanistan war analysis, but it is actually in the wrong direction when significant in the Iraq War models. In the Iraq model, it does reduce to non-significance when party identification and ideology are included similarly to the low income variable.

Next I tested the Feminist Identity explanation. As noted earlier, the feminist feeling thermometer is used as an indicator of feminist identity. This analysis provides fairly strong support for the Feminist Identity Hypothesis. The inclusion of the feminist identity indicator reduces the size of the gender gap with respect to support of the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War. For the latter the gender gap actually becomes insignificant with the inclusion of the feminist feeling thermometer.

In the NES 2004 analysis, the feminist feeling thermometer is robust to the inclusion of controls, continuing to be significant when race, age, income, marital status, education, and occupation are included in the model. It fails to be robust to the inclusion of values, however, no longer maintaining significance once foreign policy values are included in the Afghanistan War model and largely diminishing in size in the Iraq War model. To investigate why this occurs, I ran models to predict the foreign policy values

[27] This goes against Eagly's Social Role Theory (2004) which would expect that although women who do not inhabit traditional roles may still be against the use of force because of socialization, women who do inhabit such roles should be likely to be against the use of force.

as well as performing an Indirect Model in MPLUS.[28] The feminist feeling thermometer is a significant predictor of three of the five values included in the analysis. Specifically, the feminist feeling thermometer is a negative predictor of Pro-Force Values. Given the pacifist history and beliefs of Feminism, this finding is not a surprise. It appears that the inclusion of the Pro-Force values mediates the feminist feeling thermometer. This is confirmed with MPLUS analysis where the Pro-Force values are treated as a latent trait using confirmatory factor analysis. The feminist feeling thermometer is a significant predictor of Pro-Force values but not of evaluations of the Afghanistan War when the latent trait for Pro-Force values is also included. The Indirect Model provides supporting evidence that the feminist feeling thermometer has an indirect effect on evaluations of the Afghanistan War through Pro-Force Values, for which the estimate (-0.004 se 0.002) is significant at conventional levels (z=-1.957). [29]

I do find some support for Eagly's Social Role theory as a significant mediator of the Panel's gender gap on the Afghanistan war. Theories about how motherhood might impact women's public opinion about a number of issues have developed both in the feminist theory literature as well as in the psychology literature. Within the feminist theory literature the impact of the social role of motherhood has been theorized to be more limited in terms of the types of women affected, meaning only women who occupy the role of motherhood. In the psychology literature, the impact of the social role of motherhood is believed to affect all women, possibly to varying degrees. Because the

[28] The results are not presented here because the model fit is so poor. Doing a confirmatory factor analysis with so few indicators for the two factors, Pro-Humanitarian and Pro-Force Values is likely to result in poor fit indices.

[29] The size of the estimated effect appears substantively small; recall that the feminist feeling thermometer is coded from 0-100, which likely accounts for the small size of the coefficient.

inclusion of having children and being a mother appears to be mediating the gender gap in the Panel data with respect to evaluations of the Afghanistan War, I include a brief discussion below of the existing theories and evidence regarding mothers and anti-force attitudes.

In the feminist theory literature, Ruddick (1980) argues that in general social roles strongly influence the ways in which individuals think and behave. Specifically, women's social roles as wives and mothers lead to pacifist ways of thinking and behaving because maternal practices are characterized by nonviolent conflict management such as compromise and reconciliation. Others have also contended that motherhood is associated with caring and nurturing perspectives which would presumably lead to tolerant attitudes toward resolving conflicts including international disputes (Elshtain, 1985). Other theorists have argued for the moral nature of so called maternal thinking which again should be associated with nonviolent approaches to resolving conflict (Dietz, 1985). It is important to note that past research has failed to find supporting evidence for these ideas (Jaggar, 1991, Zalewski, 1994; Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Bendyna, 1996). Specifically, Togeby (1994) found that the opposite appeared to be true; women with non-traditional social roles were more likely to possess attitudes indicative of the gender gap with housewives being least critical of the use of force. In addition, this approach is often criticized for reinforcing gender stereotypes (Jaggar, 1991, Zalewski, 1994).

In the psychology literature, Eagly et al. (2004) discusses an extension of this theory in which traditional social roles may influence all men and women regardless of whether or not they occupy the particular role of mother or breadwinner. More explicitly, social roles theory is that women differ from men because of direct and indirect effects of

having different social roles from men. Societal expectations of gender roles produce stereotypes about men and women which in turn influence their policy attitudes regardless of whether or not the individuals actually occupy stereotype congruent gender roles. This makes it difficult to test this theory, because one cannot simply include being a mother as a variable. A subscale based on the benevolent sexism portion of the Ambivalent Sexism inventory (Glicke & Fiske, 1995) measuring the extent to which some women embrace the positive stereotypes of women as better caretakers may somewhat get at this idea. By and large, the theory does not explain why the gap is not larger. If it is due to the internalization of stereotypes based on traditional social roles regardless of occupying said roles, then one would expect the gap to be even more pronounced because it should impact at the very least the majority of women.

In conclusion, I fail to find much support for my hypotheses in terms of mediation. It appears that these explanations of the gender gap are important predictors of support or opposition to military interventions but fail to fully mediate the gender gap. Perhaps, this lack of support is due to limitations of using a secondary data set. Moreover, the Iraq War as noted earlier and as Jacobson (2007) comprehensively documents has been a highly partisan war in terms of public support. In general, public support for the Iraq war has been highly partisan since before the intervention began (Jacobson, 2007). In particular, Jacobson finds that the gap has had an average partisan gap in 2004 of 63 percentage points with Republicans more likely to support the war in comparison to Democrats. In comparison to other armed conflicts such as Vietnam, Korea, and Kosovo for which the average gap ranges from 11-12 points, the Iraq war is atypically partisan in terms of public support (Jacobson, 2007). This explains why I find

that in the Iraq war models the size of the gender gap and my explanatory variables testing my hypotheses are overwhelmed by the influence of ideology and party identification.

Chapter 5 Tables

Table 5.1: NES 2004 Items

DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
Taking everything into account, do you think the U.S. war against the Taliban government in **Afghanistan** was worth the cost or not?		
Taking everything into account, do you think the war in **Iraq** has been worth the cost or not?		
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES		
Pro-Humanitarian Values:	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.54**	**Inter item Covariance: 0.03**
Should combating world hunger be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all?		
Should promoting and defending human rights in other countries be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all?		
Pro-Force Values	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.49**	**Inter item Covariance: 0.02**
How important is it for the U.S. to have a strong military force in order to be effective in dealing with our enemies? Is it extremely important, very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?		
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1= U.S. should solve with diplomacy and international pressure 7= U.S. must be ready to use military force		
Other Values Items		
Should strengthening the United Nations (and other international organizations) be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all?		
Should helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all?		
Should combating international terrorism be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all?		
Political Efficacy	**Cronbachs Alpha: 0.72**	**Inter item Covariance: 0.05**
Public officials don't care much what people like me think. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree with this statement?		
People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree with this statement?		
Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?		

Table 5.1: NES 2004 Items (continued)

How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think -- a good deal, some, or not much?
Feminist Feeling Thermometer
I'll read the name of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. How would you rate Feminists?

Table 5.2: NES 2004

	Pro-Humanitarian Values		**Pro-Force Values**		**Promote Democracy**		**Strong United Nations**		**Combat Terrorism**	
	β	se	β	se	β	se.	β	se	β	se
Female	0.05	0.12	**-0.26***	**0.11**	-0.17	0.12	**0.60****	**0.12**	**-0.32+**	**0.17**
N	984		984		984		984		984	
Pseudo-R	0.00		.001*		0.00		.012**		.003+	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are OLS coefficients for the Pro-Humanitarian and Pro-Force models and logit coefficients for the remaining models with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the values. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.3: NES 2004

	Pro-Human Values		**Pro-Force Values**		**Promote Democracy**		**Strong United Nations**		**Combat Terrorism**	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Female	-0.01	0.12	-0.15	0.12	**-0.26+**	**0.14**	**0.50****	**0.13**	-0.15	0.19
White	-0.32	0.20	0.12	0.19	0.03	0.22	-0.19	0.21	0.29	0.27
Black	0.19	0.25	0.34	0.24	**0.46+**	**0.28**	0.18	0.27	0.02	0.32
Married	**0.27***	**0.13**	-0.09	0.13	**0.32***	**0.14**	0.20	0.14	0.11	0.20
Child in House	-0.18	0.15	**0.31***	**0.14**	0.19	0.16	-0.15	0.16	0.11	0.22
Party ID	0.01	0.21	**1.89****	**0.21**	**0.85****	**0.24**	**-0.84***	**0.23**	**1.21****	**0.33**
Ideology	**-0.48****	**0.15**	**0.72****	**0.15**	0.16	0.17	**-0.47***	**0.16**	**0.45***	**0.21**
Pink Collar	**0.36***	**0.15**	-0.12	0.14	**0.37***	**0.16**	-0.01	0.16	0.06	0.21
Feminist Feeling	**0.24***	**0.12**	**-0.27***	**0.12**	0.26	0.33	**0.48****	**0.13**	-0.21	0.19
Education (years of)	**0.05***	**0.03**	**-0.19****	**0.03**	**-0.98***	**0.46**	**-0.13***	**0.03**	0.00	0.04
Age	0.00	0.00	**0.01****	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	**0.01***	**0.01**
Low Income	**0.33***	**0.16**	0.20	0.15	**0.39***	**0.17**	0.23	0.17	0.03	0.22
N	984		984		984		984		984	
Pseudo-R	**0.02**		**.07***		**0.03**		**.07****		**.07**	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are OLS coefficients for the Pro-Humanitarian and Pro-Force models and logit coefficients for the remaining models with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate endorsement of the values. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except education and age.

Table 5.4: NES 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Values Included**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.97****	**0.16**	**-0.85****	**0.17**
Pro-Humanitarian Values			0.03	0.36
Pro-Force Values			**1.60****	**0.38**
Strong United Nations			**-1.19****	**0.26**
Combat Terrorism			**2.51****	**0.38**
Promote Democracy			-0.24	0.27
_cons	**1.56****	**0.12**	**-0.84***	**0.43**
N	935		935	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.04****		**0.14****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.5: PANEL 2002 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Value Included**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.39+**	**0.24**	**-0.40+**	**0.24**
Pro-Force Value			**1.21****	**0.41**
_cons	**2.09****	**0.19**	**1.54****	**0.26**
N	640		640	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.006****		**0.023****	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2002; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.6: PANEL 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Value Included**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.92****	**0.19**	**-0.95****	**0.19**
Pro-Force Value			**1.37****	**0.33**
Worry about war 2002			0.07	0.11
_cons	**1.55****	**0.15**	**0.89****	**0.22**
N	640		640	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.033****		**0.058****	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.7: NES 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Low Income and Efficacy**		**Feminist Feeling Thermometer**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.97****	**0.16**	**-0.84****	**0.20**	**-0.89****	**0.16**
Low Income			**-0.87****	**0.17**		
Efficacy			0.68	0.52		
Pink Collar Occupation			0.19	0.38		
Pink CollarX Female			-0.22	0.44		
Homemaker			**0.62***	**0.32**		
Professional Occupation			**1.06***	**0.45**		
ProfessionalX Female			**-0.97+**	**0.56**		
Feminist Feeling Thermometer					**-1.37****	**0.36**
Missing Income			**0.52+**	**0.30**		
_cons	**1.56****	**0.12**	**1.25****	**0.28**	**-2.31****	**0.24**
N	935		935		935	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.04****		**0.08****		**0.05****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.8: PANEL 2002 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Low Income and Efficacy**		**Feminist Feeling Thermometer**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.39+**	**0.24**	**-0.65+**	**0.34**	-0.37	0.24
Pro-Force Value						
Low Income			**-0.77***	**0.33**		
Efficacy			**-1.76****	**0.39**		
Pink Collar Occupation			-0.82	0.58		
Pink Collar X Female			**1.68***	**0.71**		
Homemaker			0.33	0.50		
Professional Occupation			-0.15	0.44		
Professional X Female			-0.03	0.57		
Feminist Feeling Thermometer					-0.81	0.55
Missing Income			-0.43	0.33		
_cons	**2.09****	**0.19**	**3.09****	**0.34**	**2.51****	**0.35**
N	640		640		640	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.006****		**0.085****		**0.010****	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2002; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.9: PANEL 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Low Income and Efficacy**		**Feminist Feeling Thermometer**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.92****	**0.19**	**-1.08****	**0.27**	**-0.90****	**0.19**
Pro-Force Value						
Worry about war 2002						
Low Income			**-0.47+**	**0.28**		
Efficacy			**-1.75****	**0.31**		
Pink Collar Occupation			-0.27	0.52		
Pink Collar* Female			0.55	0.59		
Homemaker			0.42	0.39		
Professional Occupation			0.32	0.37		
Professional* Female			0.11	0.48		
Feminist Feeling Thermometer					**-1.83****	**0.45**
Missing Income			**-0.47+**	**0.26**		
_cons	**1.55****	**0.15**	**2.29****	**0.26**	**2.54****	**0.30**
N	640		640		640	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.033****		**0.101****		**0.057****	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.10: NES 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	All Explanations & Controls		**Party ID & Ideology**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.79****	**0.26**	**-0.79****	**0.26**
Pro-Humanitarian Values	-0.10	0.40	-0.07	0.41
Pro-Force Values	**2.79****	**0.45**	**2.00****	**0.48**
Strong United Nations	**-0.65***	**0.30**	-0.41	0.32
Combat Terrorism	**2.33****	**0.43**	**2.24****	**0.44**
Promote Democracy	-0.01	0.31	-0.09	0.31
Low Income	-0.32	0.23	-0.26	0.23
Efficacy	0.12	0.62	0.07	0.63
Pink Collar Occupation	-0.02	0.43	0.04	0.43
Pink Collar* Female	0.22	0.51	0.09	0.51
Homemaker	0.45	0.39	0.44	0.40
Professional Occupation	**0.81+**	**0.48**	0.77	0.49
Professional* Female	-0.77	0.61	-0.68	0.63
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	-0.29	0.45	0.27	0.47
Married	0.20	0.20	0.08	0.21
Child in House	0.11	0.36	0.12	0.35
Mother	-0.26	0.44	-0.21	0.44
Sophistication	**1.85****	**0.40**	**1.91****	**0.42**
White	0.04	0.30	-0.03	0.31
Black	**-1.19****	**0.35**	**-0.96***	**0.36**
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Education (years of)	**2.11****	**0.69**	**0.16****	**0.05**
Urban	-0.20	0.25	-0.20	0.26
Missing Income	**0.85***	**0.34**	**0.79+**	**0.35**
Ideology (Conservative)	**---**	**---**	**1.47****	**0.34**
Party Identification (Republican)	**---**	**---**	**0.37+**	**0.22**
_cons	**-4.18****	**0.95**	**-5.05****	**1.02**
N	935		984	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.27****		**0.29****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except for years of education and age.

Table 5.11: PANEL 2002 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	All Explanations & controls		**Party ID & Ideology**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	-0.49	0.64	-0.49	0.65
Pro-Force Value	**1.56****	**0.47**	**1.22***	**0.49**
Low Income	**-0.66+**	**0.38**	-0.55	0.38
Efficacy	**-1.26****	**0.42**	**-1.11***	**0.43**
Pink Collar Occupation	**-1.27***	**0.62**	**-1.31***	**0.62**
Pink Collar* Female	**2.13****	**0.74**	**2.16****	**0.75**
Homemaker	0.33	0.55	0.10	0.56
Professional Occupation	-0.68	0.49	-0.70	0.50
Professional* Female	0.60	0.61	0.63	0.62
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	-0.33	0.62	0.24	0.66
Married	-0.08	0.30	-0.10	0.30
Child in House	0.28	0.48	0.24	0.49
Mother	-0.44	0.65	-0.38	0.66
Sophistication	0.51	0.55	0.57	0.55
White	-0.68	0.57	-0.67	0.57
Black	**-2.55****	**0.68**	**-2.21****	**0.69**
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Education (years of)	**0.12+**	**0.07**	**0.12+**	**0.07**
Missing Income	-0.17	0.37	-0.17	0.37
Party Identification (Republican)			**0.81+**	**0.47**
Ideology (Conservative)			0.64	0.56
_cons	1.24	1.36	0.25	1.44
N	640		640	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.163****		**0.176****	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2002; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except age and years of education.

Table 5.12: PANEL 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	All Explanations & controls		**Party ID & Ideology**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	0.33	0.49	-0.25	0.50
Pro-Force Value	**1.65****	**0.38**	**1.11****	**0.40**
Worry about War 2002	-0.02	0.12	0.02	0.12
Low Income	-0.24	0.32	-0.03	0.33
Efficacy	**-1.42****	**0.34**	**-1.16***	**0.36**
Pink Collar Occupation	-0.55	0.56	-0.55	0.57
Pink Collar* Female	0.47	0.62	0.38	0.64
Homemaker	0.16	0.42	-0.19	0.44
Professional Occupation	-0.20	0.41	-0.15	0.42
Professional* Female	0.60	0.52	0.57	0.53
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	**-1.69****	**0.50**	**-0.87+**	**0.53**
Married	-0.05	0.24	-0.09	0.25
Child in House	**0.81***	**0.40**	**0.80***	**0.40**
Mother	**-0.94+**	**0.51**	**-0.91+**	**0.52**
Sophistication	**1.02***	**0.44**	**1.07***	**0.45**
White	0.10	0.37	0.06	0.38
Black	**-1.23***	**0.54**	-0.78	0.55
Age	**-0.02****	**0.01**	**-0.03****	**0.01**
Education (years of)	**0.09+**	**0.05**	**0.10+**	**0.06**
Missing Income	-0.31	0.28	-0.28	0.29
Party Identification (Republican)			**1.16****	**0.37**
Ideology (Conservative)			1.04	0.47
_cons	1.46	1.09	0.01	1.16
N	640		640	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.184****		**0.176****	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except age and years of education.

Table 5.13: NES 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Women Only		**Women Only**		**Men Only**		**Men Only**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Pro-Human Values	0.28	0.55	0.21	0.56	-0.57	0.64	-0.36	0.65
Pro-Force Values	**3.16****	**0.59**	**2.22****	**0.63**	**2.31****	**0.77**	**1.82***	**0.79**
Strong United Nations	-0.62	0.42	-0.35	0.44	-0.57	0.45	-0.32	0.48
Combat Terrorism	**2.27****	**0.59**	**2.06****	**0.60**	**2.50****	**0.69**	**2.50****	**0.70**
Promote Democracy	0.22	0.40	0.20	0.41	-0.30	0.49	-0.49	0.50
Low Income	-0.29	0.31	-0.20	0.32	-0.38	0.35	-0.38	0.35
Efficacy	-0.31	0.84	-0.19	0.86	0.29	0.99	0.05	1.01
Pink Collar Occupation	0.05	0.29	-0.03	0.30	0.20	0.46	0.22	0.46
Homemaker	0.48	0.42	0.48	0.43				
Professional Occupation	-0.13	0.42	-0.05	0.44	**0.96+**	**0.50**	**0.92+**	**0.51**
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	-0.84	0.62	-0.21	0.66	-0.02	0.71	0.49	0.74
Married	0.17	0.27	0.00	0.28	0.20	0.33	0.11	0.34
Child in House	-0.24	0.29	-0.17	0.30	0.24	0.39	0.28	0.39
Sophistication	**1.82****	**0.53**	**1.86****	**0.55**	**2.19****	**0.66**	**2.31****	**0.68**
White	-0.07	0.42	-0.19	0.43	0.17	0.42	0.13	0.44
Black	**-1.76****	**0.51**	**-1.61****	**0.53**	-0.64	0.50	-0.37	0.51
Age	**-0.02***	**0.01**	**-0.01+**	**0.01**	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Education (years of)	**3.66****	**1.02**	**3.56****	**1.05**	0.83	1.18	0.92	1.20
Urban	-0.20	0.32	-0.21	0.33	-0.41	0.43	-0.36	0.43
Missing Income	**0.72+**	**0.43**	**0.73+**	**0.45**	**1.13+**	**0.64**	0.99	0.63
Ideology (Cons)			**0.58+**	**0.30**			0.21	0.34
Party ID (Rep)			**1.22***	**0.43**			**1.70***	**0.60**
_cons	**-5.21****	**1.36**	**-5.63****	**1.41**	**-3.34***	**1.46**	**-4.52****	**1.55**
N	480		480		454		454	
Pseudo R	**0.276***		**0.304***		**0.222***		**0.249***	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except for years of education and age.

Table 5.14: PANEL 2002 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Women Only		**Women Only**		**Men Only**		**Men Only**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Pro-Force Value	**1.83***	**0.66**	**1.49***	**0.68**	**1.39+**	**0.73**	1.13	0.79
Low Income	**-0.90+**	**0.48**	-0.76	0.49	-0.26	0.76	-0.22	0.77
Efficacy	**-0.92+**	**0.56**	-0.72	0.58	**-1.67***	**0.71**	**-1.61***	**0.72**
Pink Collar Occupation	**0.93***	**0.47**	**0.93***	**0.48**	**-1.11+**	**0.66**	-1.07	0.66
Homemaker	0.42	0.57	0.08	0.60				
Professional Occupation	-0.13	0.42	-0.05	0.43	-0.51	0.54	-0.52	0.54
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	0.17	0.83	0.85	0.89	-0.78	0.99	-0.38	1.08
Married	-0.41	0.43	-0.49	0.43	0.13	0.47	0.13	0.47
Child in House	0.08	0.52	0.06	0.52	0.13	0.54	0.09	0.54
Sophistication	**1.89***	**0.84**	**2.03***	**0.86**	-0.70	0.79	-0.63	0.79
White	-1.16	0.79	-1.07	0.80	-0.20	0.85	-0.22	0.86
Black	**-3.23****	**0.95**	**-2.90****	**0.96**	**-1.99+**	**1.05**	-1.69	1.09
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02
Education (years of)	0.13	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12
Missing Income	-0.26	0.44	-0.25	0.44	0.01	0.75	-0.08	0.76
Party ID (Rep)			0.69	0.62			0.73	0.77
Ideology (Conservative)			**1.36+**	**0.80**			0.09	0.86
_cons	0.54	1.92	-0.82	2.02	1.52	2.09	0.93	2.24
N	349		349		291		291	
Pseudo R	**0.201***		**0.224***		**0.145***		**0.151***	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2002; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except for years of education and age.

Table 5.15: PANEL 2004 Was Afghanistan War Worth the Cost?

	Women Only		**Women Only**		**Men Only**		**Men Only**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Pro-Force Value	**1.87****	**0.51**	**1.33***	**0.54**	**1.57***	**0.60**	**1.25+**	**0.66**
Worry about war 2002	-0.10	0.16	-0.04	0.17	0.06	0.20	0.07	0.20
Low Income	-0.22	0.39	-0.04	0.41	0.17	0.68	0.28	0.69
Efficacy	**-1.06**	**0.45**	-0.55	0.48	**-2.34****	**0.59**	**-2.28****	**0.61**
Pink Collar Occupation	-0.12	0.32	-0.12	0.34	-0.57	0.60	-0.60	0.60
Professional Occupation	0.37	0.34	0.54	0.36	-0.04	0.46	-0.02	0.46
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	**-2.24****	**0.66**	-1.13	0.73	-0.57	0.81	-0.15	0.86
Married	0.29	0.31	0.14	0.33	-0.69	0.43	**-0.70+**	**0.43**
Child in House	-0.19	0.38	-0.22	0.40	**1.08***	**0.45**	**1.07***	**0.45**
Sophistication	**1.72***	**0.62**	**1.89****	**0.65**	0.32	0.66	0.30	0.66
White	0.22	0.44	0.12	0.47	-0.17	0.71	-0.19	0.72
Black	-0.92	0.70	-0.50	0.74	**-1.56+**	**0.92**	-1.35	0.95
Age	**-0.03***	**0.01**	**-0.03***	**0.01**	**-0.03+**	**0.01**	**-0.03+**	**0.01**
Education (years of)	**0.13***	**0.07**	**0.14***	**0.07**	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.10
Missing Income	-0.29	0.33	-0.23	0.35	-0.52	0.54	-0.53	0.55
Party ID (Rep)			**1.54****	**0.50**			0.39	0.63
Ideology (Conservative)			**1.44***	**0.63**			0.63	0.74
_cons	0.28	1.47	-1.75	1.58	**2.95+**	**1.79**	2.27	1.89
N	344		344		296		296	
Pseudo R	**0.177***		**0.242***		**0.172***		**0.178***	

Note: Data is from NES Panel 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except for years of education and age.

Table 5.16: NES 2004 Was the Iraq War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		Values Included	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.28***	**0.13**	0.01	0.16
Pro-Humanitarian Values			-0.25	0.35
Pro-Force Values			**4.33****	**0.43**
Strong United Nations			**-1.20****	**0.23**
Combat Terrorism			**1.93****	**0.47**
Promote Democracy			**1.18****	**0.27**
_cons	**-0.19***	**0.09**	**-4.77****	**0.55**
N	931		931	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.004****		**0.21****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.17: NES 2004 Was the Iraq War Worth the Cost?

	Gender Gap		**Low Income and Efficacy**		**Feminist Feeling Thermometer**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	**-0.28***	**0.13**	**-0.45***	**0.19**	-0.14	0.14
Low Income			**-0.63****	**0.18**		
Efficacy			**0.90***	**0.46**		
Pink Collar Occupation			-0.29	0.30		
Pink Collar* Female			0.27	0.37		
Homemaker			**0.78***	**0.29**		
Professional Occupation			-0.37	0.25		
Professional* Female			0.34	0.41		
Feminist Feeling Thermometer					**-2.34****	**0.34**
Missing Income			0.34	0.23		
_cons	**-0.19***	**0.09**	**-0.41+**	**0.24**	**1.04****	**0.20**
N	931		931		931	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.004****		**0.03****		**0.05****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Table 5.18: NES 2004 Was the Iraq War Worth the Cost?

	All Explanations & Controls		**Party ID & Ideology**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se
Gender: Female=1	0.05	0.25	0.00	0.28
Pro-Humanitarian Values	-0.04	0.38	0.44	0.43
Pro-Force Values	**4.80****	**0.48**	**3.37****	**0.53**
Strong United Nations	**-0.82****	**0.26**	-0.41	0.30
Combat Terrorism	**1.37***	**0.50**	**0.88+**	**0.53**
Promote Democracy	**1.30****	**0.29**	**1.21****	**0.33**
Low Income	**-0.51***	**0.23**	-0.37	0.26
Efficacy	**1.32***	**0.57**	0.85	0.64
Pink Collar Occupation	0.09	0.38	0.23	0.43
Pink Collar* Female	-0.15	0.46	-0.49	0.53
Homemaker	0.20	0.36	0.09	0.42
Professional Occupation	-0.29	0.30	-0.47	0.34
Professional* Female	0.30	0.48	0.64	0.56
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	**-1.33****	**0.42**	-0.28	0.49
Married	0.19	0.19	-0.19	0.22
Child in House	**-0.69***	**0.29**	-0.45	0.32
Mother	0.15	0.38	-0.02	0.43
Sophistication	0.30	0.36	0.14	0.41
White	0.02	0.29	-0.06	0.32
Black	**-1.07****	**0.37**	-0.28	0.41
Age	**-0.02****	**0.01**	**-0.01+**	**0.01**
Education (years of)	0.22	0.68	-0.54	0.77
Urban	**-0.46***	**0.21**	**-0.59***	**0.24**
Missing Income	**0.47+**	**0.28**	0.35	0.31
Ideology (Conservative)	**---**	**---**	**0.78****	**0.23**
Party Identification (Republican)			**3.47****	**0.36**
_cons	**-3.82****	**0.91**	**-4.93****	**1.01**
N	931		931	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.27****		**0.41****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except for years of education and age.

Table 5.19: NES 2004 Was Iraq War Worth the Cost?

	Women Only		**Women Only**		**Men Only**		**Men Only**	
1=yes	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Pro-Humanitarian Values	0.13	0.55	0.18	0.64	-0.16	0.55	0.83	0.63
Pro-Force Values	**4.97****	**0.67**	**2.82****	**0.76**	**5.00****	**0.74**	**4.56****	**0.84**
Strong United Nations	-0.65	0.41	-0.05	0.48	**-1.23****	**0.38**	**-0.83***	**0.43**
Combat Terrorism	**1.89***	**0.77**	1.21	0.84	1.10	0.71	0.67	0.75
Promote Democracy	**0.97***	**0.42**	**1.24***	**0.48**	**1.72****	**0.44**	**1.38***	**0.49**
Low Income	-0.33	0.33	-0.18	0.39	-0.46	0.35	-0.36	0.38
Efficacy	0.98	0.84	1.43	0.99	1.22	0.86	-0.08	0.96
Pink Collar Occupation	-0.13	0.29	-0.44	0.33	0.30	0.41	0.55	0.46
Homemaker	0.07	0.40	-0.01	0.47				
Professional Occupation	-0.22	0.42	-0.11	0.50	-0.01	0.32	-0.03	0.37
Feminist Feeling Thermometer	**-1.90****	**0.63**	-0.70	0.74	-0.94	0.63	-0.12	0.73
Married	**0.71***	**0.27**	0.38	0.31	-0.36	0.29	**-0.83***	**0.34**
Child in House	**-0.56+**	**0.29**	-0.49	0.34	**-0.60+**	**0.32**	-0.30	0.35
Sophistication	0.73	0.53	0.39	0.61	-0.06	0.53	-0.07	0.59
White	0.09	0.46	-0.06	0.55	-0.15	0.38	-0.22	0.43
Black	**-1.66***	**0.62**	-0.90	0.72	-0.79	0.49	-0.02	0.54
Age	**-0.02***	**0.01**	**-0.02***	**0.01**	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Education (years of)	1.45	1.04	0.72	1.18	-0.95	1.01	**-2.09+**	**1.15**
Urban	0.02	0.30	-0.06	0.36	**-0.98****	**0.33**	**-1.08****	**0.36**
Missing Income	0.24	0.38	0.10	0.43	**0.76+**	**0.44**	0.60	0.52
Ideology (Conservative)			**1.24****	**0.34**			0.35	0.34
Party ID (Rep)			**3.29****	**0.49**			**4.04****	**0.59**
_cons	**-5.50****	**1.51**	**-6.36****	**1.72**	**-2.43***	**1.24**	**-4.02****	**1.39**
N	483		483		447		447	
Pseudo R-squared	**0.304****		**0.461****		**0.293****		**0.419****	

Note: Data is from NES 2004; +p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors to the left. The dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents said that the war was worth the cost and 0 otherwise. All variables are coded 0 to 1 except for years of education and age.

Table 5.20: Summary of Findings

	NES 2004				**Panel 2002**		**Panel 2004**			
	Afghanistan		**Iraq**		**Afghanistan**		**Afghanistan**		**Iraq**	
		control		control		control		control		control
Values Hypothesis										
Pro-Human Values										
Pro-Force Values	X	X	**X**	**X**	X	X	X	X	**X**	**X**
Strong United Nations	X	X	**X**		NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Combat Terrorism	X	X	**X**	**X**	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Promote Dem			**X**	**X**						
Marginalization Hypothesis										
Low Income	X				X		X			
Efficacy					X	X	X	X	X	X
Pink Collar					X					
Home maker										
Feminist Consciousness Hypothesis										
Prof Oc	X									
Feminist Feeling	X		**X**	X			X	X	**X**	**X**

NA=not applicable because these questions were not included in the survey. There is an X when the variable is significant and in the hypothesized direction and a bold X indicates substantial mediation meaning that the gender gap reduces to non-significance.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions

Common wisdom is that women are anti-war because of gender stereotypes that they are compassionate, nurturing, and anything but forceful. Widely held assumptions about women and their anti-war stance abound. Women are against war because they are mothers who do not want to send their sons to war, and as mothers teach their children peaceful mediation and so politically prefer non-violent resolutions. Women are against war because they sympathize with the innocent individuals whose lives will be affected. Women are against war because they are innately less aggressive. These beliefs about women go far back and permeate various cultures resulting in an almost universal assumption that for the most part all women are always anti-war. The depiction of women as stalwartly anti-war dates back to Ancient Greece with Euripides'tragedy *The Trojan Women* and Aristophanes'comedy *Lysistrata*. Anti-war movements have often included organizations comprised solely of women including the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom during World War I and II and recently Code Pink.

Although this common wisdom dictates that women's anti-war sentiments are a foregone conclusion, the data suggests otherwise. Overall, research suggests that women are often more likely to oppose military interventions than men but the gap is modest in size. Prior work and polling has established that gender differences exist on foreign policy issues particularly the use of force. This work provides an abundance of evidence that women are less likely to support military intervention. For example, a 1994 Gallup poll showed a 19% difference between men and women on support for U.S. troops

invading North Korea and a 1996 CNN poll found a 15% difference on approval for the U.S. troop presence in Bosnia. Polling has also illustrated that gender differences extend to more abstract attitudes regarding the use of military over diplomacy and attitudes toward fighting for one's country. Specifically, a 1994 Times poll revealed a 18% difference in the preference for using military strength versus diplomacy to ensure peace and a 13% difference on whether all should fight for their country, right or wrong. Simply put we know that women are less supportive of the use of force and in particular of military interventions.

After September 11th, though, the media questioned whether women are steadfastly against military interventions. Many reported on the polls immediately after 9/11 that showed a non-existent or at least non-significant gap. A poll conducted within one week after the attacks and released in an early October 2001 Gallup poll found a mere 2% gap with 90% of men and 88% of women supporting a military response to the terror attacks (Jones, 2001). But the gap never really disappeared, in that same Gallup poll released in October 2001 when asked further questions gauging support for military retaliation women were consistently less supportive than men. Specifically, women were less supportive by 5 percentage points of retaliation if it resulted in a commitment lasting several months, by 9 percentage points if grounds troops would be used, by 12 percentage points if the draft would be reinstated, by 16 percentage points if it lasted several years, and by 21 percentage points if it resulted in the death of 1,000 American troops (Jones, 2001). At this time women were also less likely than men by 12 points to support a long-term war against terrorism or direct retaliation against Afghanistan by 5 points and against Iraq by 12 points. Furthermore, as my analysis in Chapter 5 on the National

Election Study data demonstrates the gap on the Afghanistan War was quite sizeable by 2004 with an 18.2% gap in the 2004 NES and 17.4% gap in the 2004 interview for the Panel NES.

A Dynamic Gender Gap

Are women always more likely to be anti-war? Or does the gender gap fluctuate in size and possibly even direction? For example, women might be more likely than men to support humanitarian interventions such as the ongoing problems in Darfur. Other situations like September 11th may not produce a reversal of direction in the gap but rather at least temporarily reduce the gap to a non-significant size. If this is the case, then perhaps conceptualizing the gap as dynamic makes more sense than the traditional notion of a more static gender difference.

Although many have attempted to explain the gender gap in support for military interventions, scholars have for the most part overlooked the dynamism of the gender gap. Therefore, the extant literature fails to account for the observed differences in the size of the gender gap depending upon the situational context of the intervention. This dissertation sheds light on how the gender gap is in fact dynamic. Just as public support for particular interventions differs depending upon the context, so does the gender gap. My experiment illustrates how the gender gap fluctuates in size and sometimes even in direction in response to varied contexts. Here I demonstrate that the gap is dynamic and that women are not always more likely to oppose military interventions. In fact, if the military intervention is to stop a humanitarian crisis, women might be more likely than men to support intervening as I found in the Student Study. In a highly partisan war like the Iraq War, the gender differences are small and actually go away once party

identification is included in the model. We know that a gender gap exists in party identification that women are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (Huddy et al. 2008). So in response to a partisan war, women and men look as though they are similarly less likely to support the war. Even for a highly supported and so called "just" war like the Afghanistan War, a sizeable gender gap, resilient to the inclusion of party identification, eventually emerged.

Origins of the Gap-Support for the Values Explanation

I find much support that men and women differ in their reliance on values. Although values do not always mediate the gender gap, I provide consistent evidence that men and women rely on different values when evaluating military interventions. In the Student Study, women are more likely to rely on their humanitarian values when evaluating intervening for humanitarian reasons. This is also true in the Adult Study where women are more likely than men to rely on universal values in the humanitarian intervention condition. Furthermore, for more traditional types of intervention men rely on militant values in the Student Study when evaluating terrorism intervention. These findings also extend to evaluations of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars for the Student and Adult studies. Women are consistently more likely to have pro-social values be criteria on which they base their assessments of war while militaristic values are more likely to be a factor for men. This seems to indicate that women and men structure their evaluations of military interventions differently through reliance on different sets of values. These findings do not fully explain the origins of the gender gap in support for war but they do provide insight into the different criteria men and women use when evaluating military interventions.

Overall, the explanations offered in this dissertation are meaningful and predictive of support for war. Values emerge as highly explanatory of support for war and a promising explanation of the gender gap on military intervention. In some instances values do mediate the gender gap like in the Student Study where militant values mediate the gender gap in the Terrorism Condition. In other instances, values fail to fully mediate the gap such as in the Student Study where the inclusion of humanitarian values does not eliminate the gender differences in support for intervention in the Humanitarian Condition. The Pro-force values mediate the gender gap on support for the Iraq War in the 2004 NES but fail to do so for the Afghanistan War gap.

The inclusion of party identification in the mediation and moderation models in the Student and Adult studies does not change most of the results. Party identification is often a significant predictor of war support but values remain significant predictors as well. Moreover, values appear to have a more consistent role in gender differences with respect to war support. Specifically, values mediate the gender gap in some cases such as militant values in the terrorism condition of the student study and party identification does not mediate this gender gap. There are two instances, however, where the inclusion of party identification does change the results. First, party identification appears to mediate the gender gap in the humanitarian condition of the student study. But a gender gap persists in this condition when Democrat identifiers are modeled separately meaning that female Democrats are more likely than male Democrats to support humanitarian intervention. Second, the inclusion of party identification reduces the security value type in the terrorism condition in the adult study to non-significance but does not mediate the gender gap.

In light of the above discussion of party identification and values, it is important to note that this dissertation is largely agnostic about the causal ordering of values and party identification. Although most theorists such as Schwartz theorize values are prior to party identification, limited work has claimed that party identification is prior to values (Goren, 2005). This is not an issue that this dissertation directly addresses or attempts to resolve.

Measuring values proves to be a difficult proposition. I use several sets of values in the different studies and analyses. I had particular difficulty with the Schwartz values. I only have two items for each value type and unfortunately I was not able to produce good scales out of these items. Moreover, endorsement of the Schwartz values is skewed with most individuals agreeing that the values are important to them. Perhaps having more items would have resulted in more reliable scales. Additionally, the use of other values scales, such as the humanitarian values and militant values from the Student Study, produced more reliable scales. Future work looking at values as predictors of policy preferences should take into consideration the difficulties of measuring the Schwartz values given their often undisputed support. Instead scales used in prior work predicting policy preferences, such as the humanitarian values and militant values, appear to be better suited to this type of analysis.

Pre-determinants of Values

I also investigate the origins of the gender differences in values. I find no evidence that feminist consciousness or marginalization are predictors of these values and/or mediators of the gender gap on these values. I find a link between the pro-social personality trait of altruism and the pro-social values of humanitarianism and

universalism. Individuals high on altruism are more likely to endorse humanitarianism and universalism. Beyond the altruism and humanitarianism connection, I fail to shed much light on what predicts the values and explains the gender differences in the endorsement of them. Assertiveness does not predict militant values. Perhaps, this is because assertiveness is about one's own behavior and militant values measures how a country should behave. It is possible that assertive individuals may not always be supportive of national level dominance and vice versa. A better personality level predictor of militant values might be authoritarianism instead. Anxiety does not predict the security value type. Perhaps, measures of aggressive tendencies would be a better predictor of the militant values than the Assertiveness subcomponent of the Big Five. Perhaps, Spielberger's Trait Anxiety measure or Carver and White's BIS/BAS measures would better predict a need for security and safety.

Additional Findings

I find that party identification and ideology often swallow the effect of other variables like the economic indicators or feminist identity. In addition, I find that party identification and ideology is often highly predictive of war support. Republicans and conservatives simply appear more hawkish than Democrats and liberals. These political variables also appear closely related to value endorsements with Republicans and conservatives less likely than their counterparts to endorse humanitarianism and universalism as well as more likely to endorse militant values and the security value type. Perhaps, these findings are due to the current political landscape. Given the larger context Republicans and conservatives continue to champion interventions like those they support in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, they might strongly endorse militant

values because of these current military involvements and the security value type because of an ongoing pre-occupation with national security since 9/11. These political controls are obviously an important factor in the support of war and the gender gap.

Future Directions

The study of such gender differences deserves future attention from researchers because of the complexity of real world international disputes and conflicts. This dissertation does not explore how the gender gap might differ in response to complicated conflicts that do not fall into only one category like national interests or regime change. All military conflicts are complicated as are the decisions to intervene. Most conflicts cannot be easily categorized into a single type because they involve more than one of the following: battles over tangible resources, century long religious disputes, global economic consequences, regional disruptions, undemocratic leaders, ethnic cleansing, worldwide security threats, displaced people, mass starvation, etc. When our leaders and the media discuss an emerging or ongoing conflict, they often emphasize certain aspects of the situation leading to the categorizations of regime change, national interests, terrorism, and humanitarian crisis. Beyond simply highlighting particular features of a conflict, politicians also might go as far as to frame these conflicts and the need for intervention according to these categories to garner more public support.

The current global conditions and the ongoing wars provide several examples of differing appeals to these distinct concerns. In terms of national interests, the threats to United States security illustrated with talk of nuclear capabilities in Iran and North Korea as well as in Iraq. Humanitarian concerns include the plight of Afghani women and young girls, the displacement of Sudanese in Darfur, the prison camps of North Korea,

the political prisoners in Iran, and the use of biological weapons against the Kurds in Northern Iraq. The calls for regime change consist of ousting Kim Jong-Il, the Taliban, and of course Saddam Hussein. This is by no means an exhaustive list but it does illustrate how the ongoing and potential conflicts of our current times often involve more than one reason to intervene. Such conflicts, however, often crystallize in a presidential administration's rhetoric and in the public mindset as primarily one type of conflict. Therefore my findings provide insight into how the gender gap may vary in response to different types of conflicts that crystallize into being predominantly about national interests, regime change, or humanitarian. But what about those disputes that do not crystallize, future research should further investigate those conflicts.

One of my most interesting and novel findings is that of the reversal of the gender gap in the Student Study in response to humanitarian intervention. Future directions might include a further investigation of when the gender gap will reverse. How large will the gap be in support for humanitarian intervention when the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war is part of the conflict? What about children being involved such as the use of child soldiers, will this produce a larger or smaller gender gap? Replication of my finding in the Student Study and its extension to other humanitarian issues could provide further insight into the dynamic nature of the gap and women's willingness to support military interventions.

Another potential area for future work is whether the location of the conflict influences the size and direction of the gender gap. In my stimulus materials, I chose to use an African country because of the assumption that most Americans do not have a lot of knowledge about current events on that continent. Furthermore, much of the

presumably limited information Americans receive about Africa is about the many troubles the various countries have with tribal divisions, unequal access to resources, and a history of improper, undemocratic leadership and is therefore conducive to believing that one of the lesser known countries is on the verge of a conflict. How would my findings differ if the emerging conflict was located in South America, Asia, the Middle East, etc.? What about the history of the country in turmoil, would the gender gap vary in response to proposed intervention in a historically democratic country versus a dictatorship like North Korea or a theocracy like Iran?

More attention should go to the electoral consequences of interventions that produce large gender gaps. Public support for public policies is very important to a President's approval rating particularly when the policy involves military commitments. As we have seen recently, a Presidential approval rating can dip very low when the public perceives a military intervention as unsuccessful and regrettable. This can have serious ramifications for a President's ability to win reelection, for a President's Party to win control over the Congress and for his/her Party to win future Presidential races. Presumably, if the public associates a President and his/her Party with a military failure, the approval and electoral consequences can be deleterious. On the other hand, a successful and popular military intervention can have the opposite impact on Presidential approval ratings and electoral prospects of a President's Party. Successfully protecting a nation's interests whether economic or security can probably increase public confidence and support boosting approval ratings and improving a political party's chances for reelection. Finally, neglecting to intervene can also possibly influence these same factors. Talk of President Clinton's failure to eliminate Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s

asserted that 9/11 could have been easily avoided if he had just been tougher on terrorism and had Bin Laden killed. Such discussion may have caused the public to question the Democratic Party's ability to effectively protect the United States.

Moreover in terms of electoral consequences and political leadership, does the popularity of a particular President influence the size of a gender gap in response to a proposed military intervention? In other words, is the gender gap smaller or larger today with respect to intervening in Iran because President Obama has been so tentative to use aggressive rhetoric or propose any type of support let alone aid to those revolting against the status quo? Presumably, presidential popularity can influence public opinion about certain issues because of the president's own policy stance and agenda. Because President Obama pushes diplomacy does the gender gap reduce because men become more likely to support such soft power strategies in light of a popular president's championing of the approach? What if Obama advocated hard power, would the gender gap reduce because women who like him become more likely to back such a strategy in light of his support? These are potential questions for future work on how the gender gap differs in response to popular and/or unpopular leadership.

This dissertation raises many questions and provides important evidence to add to our understanding of the gender gap in support for war. First, the gender gap in support for military interventions does appear to be dynamic. But, why? Is it values; my findings lend modest support to this explanation. Values sometimes mediate the gender gap and consistently, men and women differ in their reliance on values. If it is values, then why do men and women differ in their value endorsements? Is it personality or feminist identity, maybe to some extent but my findings do not consistently show a

relationship between these hypothesized pre-determinants and gender differences in values.

Works Cited

Abell, John D. (1994). "Military Spending and Income Inequality." *Journal of Peace Research*. 31(1): 35-43.

Adorno, T. W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson,, R. Nevitt Sanford. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*, Abridged edition. New York: Harper. (Chapter V, The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends.)

Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. (1989). "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* 83: 123-41.

Altemeyer, Bob. (1988). Enemies of Freedom. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. (Chapter 3, How do People Become Authoritarians?)

Archer, John. (2004). Sex differences in aggression in real-world settings: A meta-analytic review. *Review of General Psychology*, *8*, 291–322.

Bardes, Barbara. (1992). "Women and the Persian Gulf: Patriotism and War." Presented at Conference on the Political Consequences of War. Washington, DC.

Bardi, A. & Schwartz, S.H. (2003) Values and behavior: strength and structure of relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29, 1207–1220.

Batson, C. D., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic emotion a source of altruistic motivation? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40,* 290–302.

Beckwith, Karen. (2002). "Women, Gender, and Nonviolence in Political Movements," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35 (1), March: 71-82.

Bendyna, Mary E., Tamata Finucane, Lynn Kirby, John P. O'Donnell, and Clyde Wilcox. (1996). "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Gulf War: A Test of Competing Hypotheses." *The Social Science Journal* 33 (1):1-22.

Bettencourt, B. Ann, and Norman Miller. 1996. "Gender Differences in Aggression as a Function of Provocation: A Meta-Analysis." *Psychological Bulletin* 119 (3):422-47.

Beutel, Ann, and M.K. Johnson. (2004). "Gender and Prosocial Values During Adolescence: a Research Note." *Sociological Quarterly,* 45 (2): 379-393.

Beutel, Ann M., & Margaret Mooney Marini. (1995). "Gender and Values." *American Sociological Review* 60:436-448.

Bouchard TJ. (1994). “Genes, environment, and personality.” *Science.* 264:1700-1701

Brandes, Lisa. (1992). "The Gender Gap and Attitudes toward War." In Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL.

Brock-Utne, Birgit. (1989). *Feminist Perspectives on Peace and Peace Education.* Oxford: Pergamon.

Caprioli, Mary, (2000). ‘Gendered Conflict’, *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1): 51-68.

_____ (2003). ‘Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force’, *International Interactions* 29(3): 195–214.

Caprioli, M. and Boyer, M. (2001) ‘Gender, Violence, and International Crisis’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4): 503–18.

Carnaghan, E., & Bahry, D. (1990). Political attitudes and the gender gap in the USSR. *Comparative Politics*, *26*, 379-399.

Center for American Women and Politics. (2004). The Gender Gap and the 2004 Women’s Vote: Setting the Record Straight. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Elections/GenderGapAdvisory04.pdf. Accessed June 5, 2007.

Center for American Women and Politics. (2005). Sex Differences in Voter Turnout. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/sexdiff.pdf. Accessed June 5, 2007.

Christiansen, B. (1959). *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality*. Oslo, Norway: Universitetesforlaget.

Clark, Cal. , and Janet Clark. (1996). "Whither the gender Gap? Converging and Conflicting Attitudes Among Women." In *Women in politics: Insiders or Outsiders? A Collection of Readings*, ed. L. L. Duke. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Conover, Pamela Johnston. (1988). "Feminists and the Gender Gap." *The Journal of Politics* 50 (4):985-1010.

Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Virginia Sapiro. (1993). "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (4):1079-99.

Cook, Elizabeth Adell. (1989). "Measuring Feminist Consciousness." *Women and Politics* 9:71-88.

Cook, Elizabeth Adell and Wilcox, Clyde. (1991). "Feminism and the Gender Gap--A Second Look." *The Journal of Politics* 53 (4):1111-22.

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). *NEO PI-R Professional Manual*. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1994). Set like plaster: Evidence for the stability of adult personality. In T. F. Heatherton & J. L Weinberger (Ed.), *Can personality change?* (pp. 21-40). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Costa, Paul, Jr., Antonio Terracciano, and Robert R. McCrae. (2001). "Gender differences in personality traits across cultures: Robust and surprising findings." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81 (2):322-31.

Costain, Anne N. (2000). "Women's Movements and Nonviolence." *PS: Political Science and Politics*, XXXIII (2), June: 175-180.

Cott, Nancy F. (1987). *The Grounding of Modern Feminism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the five-factor model. In M. R. Rosenzweig & L. W. Porter (Eds.), *Annual review of psychology* (Vol. 41, pp. 417--440). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.

Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 33, pp. 41–113).

Eagly, Alice H. (1987). *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Eagly, Alice H., and Maureen Crowley. (1986). "Gender and helping behavior: A meta-analytic review of the social psychological literature." *Psychological Bulletin* 100 (3):283-308.

Eagly, Alice H., Amanda B. Diekman, Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, and Anne M. Koenig. (2004). "Gender Gaps in Sociopolitical Attitudes: A Social Psychological Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87 (6):796-816.

Eagly, Alice H., Abigail A. Mitchell, and Michele A. Paludi. (2004). "Social role theory of sex differences and similarities: Implications for the sociopolitical attitudes of women and men." In *Praeger guide to the psychology of gender*. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Eagly, A. H., and V. J. Steffen. (1984). "Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distribution of Women and Men into Social Roles." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46 (4):735-54.

Eichenberg, Richard. (2003). "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990-2003" *International Security* 28(1): 110-141

Ekehammar, B., Akrami, N., & Gylje, M. (2004). What matters most to prejudice: Big Five personality, social dominance orientation, or right-wing authoritarianism? *European Journal of Personality,18*, 463–482.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke, (1987). *Women and War*. New York: Basic Books.

Eysenck, H. J. (1991). Dimensions of personality: 16, 5, or 3?--Criteria for a taxonomic paradigm. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 12, 773-790.

Eysenck, H. J. (1992). Four ways five factors are not basic. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 13, 667-673.

Feingold, A. (1994). Gender differences in personality: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin, 116,* 429–456

Feldman, Stanley. (2003). "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism," *Political Psychology*, *24*, 41-74.

Feldman, Stanley, and Marco R. Steenbergen. (2001). "The Humanitarian Foundation of Public Support for Social Welfare." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (3):658-77.

Feldman, Stanley. (1988). Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values. *American Journal of Political Science, 32,* 416–440

Friedman, H. S., Tucker, J. S., Schwartz, J. E., & Tomlinson-Keasey, C. (1995). Psychosocial and behavioral predictors of longevity: The aging and death of the "Termites." *American Psychologist*, 50, 69-78.

Gelpi, Christopher, Jason Reifler, and Peter Feaver. (2006). "Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance." Presented at "Wartime Election of 2004" Conference. Ohio State University.

George, Alexander L. and George, Juliette L. (1964). Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York, New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Gidengil, E. (1995). Economic man- social woman? The care for the gender gap in support for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. *Comparative Political Studies*, *28*, (3), 384-408.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. (2002). "Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences." In

Women and Electoral Politics in Canada, edited by M. Tremblay and T. Linda. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ginsburg, Harvey and Miller, Shirley. (1982). "Sex Differences in Children's Risk-Taking Behavior." *Child Development*. 53(2): 426-428.

Goldberg, Lewis R. (1993). The structure of phenotypic personality traits. *American Psychologist, 48*, 26-34.

Goodwin, Robin, Michelle Willson, and Stanley Gaines, Jr. 2005. "Terror threat perception and its consequences in contemporary Britain." *British Journal of Psychology* 96 (4):389-406.

Goren, Paul. (2005). "Party Identification and Core Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science, 49,* 882–897.

Gullone, Eleonora and Moore, Susan (2000). "Adolescent Risk-Taking and the Five Factor Model of Personality." *Journal of Adolescence*. 23:393-407.

Gwartney-Gibbs PA, Lach DH. (1991). Sex differences in attitudes toward nuclear war. *Journal Peace Research.* 28:161–76.

Herman, R; Tetlock, P & Visser, P. (1999) "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework". *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 93, No.3 pp 553-573

Hill, Kevin A. (1993). "The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policymaking: Congressional Voting and American Mass Attitudes Toward South Africa." *International Studies Quarterly* 37(2):195-214.

Hetherington, Marc J. and Michael Nelson. (2003) "Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36: 37-42.

Holsti, Ole R. 1992. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenger to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus – Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates." *International Studies Quarterly* 36: 439-466.

Holsti, Ole R. and James N. Rosenau (1993). "The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs among American Opinion Leaders--After the Cold War." *Millennium*, Vol. 22, pp. 235-278.

Huddy, Leonie, Erin Cassese, and Mary Kate Lizotte. (March, 2008). "Sources of Political Unity and Disunity Among Women: Placing the Gender Gap in Perspective." In Lois Duke Whittaker [Ed] *Voting the Gender Gap.* Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Huddy, L., S. Feldman, C. Taber, and G. Lahav. (2005). "Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3):593-608.

Hurwitz, Jon and Mark Peffley. (1987). "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1099-1120.

Jacobson, G. C. (2006). *A Divider, Not a Uniter.* New York, NY: Pearson

Jaggar, Alison M. (1991). *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.

Jang, K. J., Livesly, W. J., & Vernon, P. A. (1996). Heritability of the big five personality dimensions and their facets: A twin study. *Journal of Personality, 64,* 577–591.

Jang, K. L., McCrae, R. R., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., & Livesley, W. J. (1998). Heritability of facet-level traits in a cross-cultural twin sample: Support for a hierarchical model of personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 1556–1565.

Jentleson, Bruce W. (1998). "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold WarAmerican Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (4): 395-417.

Jentleson, Bruce W. (1992). "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1): 49-74.

Kagan, Jerome (1994). *The Nature of the Child.* New York, New York: Basic Books.

Kimenyi, M. and Mbaku, J. (1995). Female Headship, Feminization of Poverty and Welfare. *Southern Economic Journal*, 62, 44-52.

Kriesberg, Louis and Klein, Ross. (1980). "Changes in Public Support for U.S. Military Spending." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 24(1): 79-111.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Laura A. Brannon. (1993)."The Impact of the Gulf War on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Multidimensional Effects of Political Involvement."*American Political Science Review* 87:963–75.

Lamare, James W. (1989). "Gender and Public Opinion: Defense and Nuclear Issues in New Zealand." *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (3):285-96.

Larson, Eric V. (1996). *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*. RAND: Santa Monica, California.

Lavine, Howard, and Mark Snyder. (1999). Cognitive Processes and the Functional Matching Effect in Persuasion: Studies of Personality and Political Behavior. In J. Olson & G. R. Maio (Eds.), *Why we evaluate: Functions of attitudes* (pp. 97-131). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Lavine, Howard, M. Lodge, J. Polichak, and C. Taber. (2002). Explicating the Black Box through Experimentation: Studies of Authoritarianism and Threat. *Political Analysis, 10*, 342-360.

Lodge, Milton, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh. (1989). An Impression-Driven Model ofCandidate Evaluation. *American Political Science Review* 83:399-419.

Lodge, Milton, Marco Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau. (1995). "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation." *American Political ScienceReview* 89:309-326.

Loehlin, J. C. (1992). *Genes and environment in personality development.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Lyons, Sean, Linda Duxbury, & Christopher Higgins. (2005). "Are Gender Differences in Basic Human Values a Generational Phenomenon?" *Sex Roles: A Journal of Research*, 53(9-10) 763-778.

Marshall, Monty G. and Donna Ramsey Marshall. (1999). Gender Empowerment and the Willingness of States to Use Force. Working Paper. Severn: Center for Systemic Peace.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1985). Comparison of EPI and psychoticism scales with measures of the five-factor model of personality. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 6, 587-597.

_____ (1997). Personality trait structure as a human universal. *American Psychologist, 52,* 509-516

McCrae RR, Costa PT Jr., Terracciano A, Parker WD, Mills CJ, De Fruyt F, Mervielde I. (2002). Personality trait development from age 12 to age 18: longitudinal, cross-sectional, and cross-cultural analyses. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* 83, 1456-68.

Mondak, J. J., and Karen D. Halperin. (2008). "A Framework for the Study of Personality and Political Behavior." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (2):335-62

Mueller, J. (1973). *War, Presidents and Public Opinion.* New York: Wiley. Chapters 2-4, 7, & 9.

Mussen, P., Eichorn, D. H., Honzik, M. P., Bieher, S. L., and Meredith, W. (1980). "Continuity and Change in Women's Characteristics over Four Decades." *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 3, 333-347.

Nincic M. & Nincic D. (2002) "Race, Gender, and War" *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 39 No 5, pp 547-568

Norrander, Barbara. (March 2008). "The History of Gender Gaps." In Lois Duke Whittaker [Ed] *The Gender Gap – Voting and the Sexes*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox. 2008. "The Gender Gap in Ideology." *Political Behavior* 30 (4): 503-523.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. (1983). "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *American Political Science Review* 77:175-190.

Peffley, M. A., & Hurwitz, J. (1985). A hierarchical model of attitude constraint. *American Journal of Political Science, 29,* 871–890.

Pollock III, Philip H., Stuart A. Lilie, and M. Elliot Vittes. 1993. "Hard Issues, Core Values and Vertical Constraint: The Case of Nuclear Power." *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1): 29–50.

Powlick, P. (1991). "Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among Foreign Policy Officials." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35.4: 611-641.

Powlick, Philip J. (1995). "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials." *International Studies Quarterly* 39: 427-52.

Pressman, Steven. (1988). "The Feminization of Poverty: Causes and Remedies." *Challenge* 31(2): 57–61.

Prince-Gibson, Eetta & Shalom H. Schwartz. (1998). "Value Priorities and Gender." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 61:49-67.

Ray, John J. (1981). "Authoritarianism, Dominance, and Assertiveness." *Journal of Personality Assessment.* 45(4): 390-397.

Regan, Patrick M. and Aida Paskeviciute. (2003). Women's Access to Politics and Peaceful States. *Journal of Peace Research* 40(3):287---302.

Rhodebeck, Laurie A. (1996). "The Structure of Men's and Women's Feminist Orientations: Feminist Identity and Feminist Opinion." *Gender and Society* 10 (4):386-403.

Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., & Knafo, A. (2002). The Big Five personality factors and personal values. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*, 789–801.

Rokeach, Milton. (1973). *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: Free Press.

Ruddick, Sara. (1980). "Maternal Thinking." *Feminist Studies* 6 (2):342-67.

———. (1989). *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Sapiro, Virginia. (1991). "Feminism: A Generation Later." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 515:10-22.

Sapiro, Virginia and Conover, Pamela Johnston. (1997). "The Variable Gender Basis of Electoral Politics: Gender and Context in the 1992 US Election." *British Journal of Political Science* 27: 497-523.

Schlesinger, Mark and Heldman, Caroline. (2001). "Gender Gap or Gender Gaps? New Perspectives on Support for Government Action and Policies." *Journal of Politics* 63 (1).

Schwartz, S., G. Melech, A. Lehmann, S. Burgess, M. Harris, & V. Owens (2001). "Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement. *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, 32(5), 519-542.

Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures: Taking a similarities perspective. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32,* 268–290.

Schwartz, S. H. (1996). Applying of theory of integrated value systems: Value priorities and behavior. In C. Seligman, J. M. Olson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *The psychology of values: The Ontario Symposium* (Vol. 8, pp. 1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum

Schwartz, Shalom H. (1992). "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values." In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 25, pp1-65). New York: Academic Press.

Scott, W. A. 1960. "International Ideology and Interpersonal Ideology." Public Opinion Quarterly. 24: 419-431.

Sears, D. O. & Funk, C. L. (1990). Self-interest in Americans' political opinions.(In J. J. Mansbridge (Ed.), *Beyond self-interest* (pp. 147— 170). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)

Sears, D. O. & Funk, C. L. (1991). The role of self-interest in social and political attitudes.(In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 24, pp. 2—91). New York: Academic Press.)

Shapiro, R. & Mahajan, H. (1986) "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960's to the 1980's." *Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol. 50 pp 42-61.

Smith, Tom W. (1984). "The Polls: Gender and Attitudes Toward Violence." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (1):384-96.

Solomon, Zahava, Marc Gelkopf, and Avraham Bleich. (2005). "Is terror gender-blind? Gender differences in reaction to terror events." *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 40 (12):947-54.

Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. (1995). "Dynamic Representation." *American Political Science Review 89*: 543-65.

Tessler, Mark & Ina Warriner, (1997). 'Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes Toward International Conflict', *World Politics* 49(January): 250-281.

Tessler, Mark, Jodi Nachtwey, and Audra Grant. (1999) "Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East," *International Studied Quarterly*, 43(3): 519-531.

Thomas, Sandra P. (2003). "None of us will ever be the same again: Reactions of American Midlife Women to 9/11." *Health Care for Women International* 24 (10):853-67.

Tickner,Anne J. (1992). *Gender in International Relations.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Togeby, Lisa. (1994). "The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Journal of Peace Research* 31 (4):375-92.

Toi, M., & Batson, C.D. (1982). More evidence that empathy is a source of altruistic motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43,* 281-292.

Walker, L. J. (1984). "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review." *Child Development* 55:677-91.

Welch, Susan, and John Hibbing. (1992). "Financial Conditions, Gender and Voting in American National Elections." *Journal of Politics* 54(1):197-213.

Wilcox, Clyde, Lara Hewitt, and Dee Allsop. (1996). "The Gender Gap in Attitudes toward the Gulf War: A Cross-National Perspective." *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (1):67-82.

Winter, D. G. (1987). Leader appeal, leader performance, and the motive profiles of leaders and followers: A study of American presidents and elections. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 196–202.

Wittkopf, Eugene R. and Maggiotto, Michael A. (1981). The Two Faces of Internationalism: Public Attitudes toward American Foreign Policy in the 1970s and Beyond?. *Social Science Quarterly* 64:288-304.

Wittkopf, Eugene R. (1981). The structure of foreign policy attitudes: An alternative view. *Social Science Quarterly* 62:108-23

_____. (1986). "On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence." *International Studies Quarterly* 30(4):425-45.

_____. (1987). "Elites and Masses: Another Look at Attitudes toward America's World Role." *International Studies Quarterly* 31(2):131-159.

Zaller, John. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zaller, John R. (1994). "Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence form The Gulf War." In Lance Bennett and David Paletz (eds.). *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in The Gulf War.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp 186-209.

Appendix

Chapter 3 Appendix
Student Data Values
Modified Militant and Cooperative Internationalism Scales (non-interventionist, isolationist, and militant interventionist values) (Holsti & Rosenau, 1990)

Militant Internationalism (originally the target was communism)

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Any terrorist victory is a defeat for America's national interest.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Al Qaeda like other terrorist organizations is generally expansionist rather than defensive in their foreign policy goals.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: There is nothing wrong with using the C.I.A. to try to undermine hostile governments.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: The United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent terrorism.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: It is not in our interests to have better relations with Middle Eastern countries because we are getting less than we are giving to them.

Cooperative Internationalism

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: The United States should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries is an important foreign policy goal.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Worldwide arms control is an important foreign policy goal.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Combating world hunger is an important foreign policy goal.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Strengthening the United Nations is an important foreign policy goal.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following: Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems is an important foreign policy goal.

Humanitarian Values (NES 1995, Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001)

One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.

It is better not to be too kind to people because kindness will only be abused. (Reversed)

The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society.

People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should. (Reversed)

All people who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others.

One of the problems of today's society is that we are often too kind to people who don't deserve it. (Reversed)

A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others.

I believe it is best not to get involved in the taking care of other people's needs. (Reversed)

Adult Data Values

Power Value Type
How important to you is getting respect from others?
How important to you is making your own decisions?

Security Value Type
How important to you is living in secure surroundings?
How important to you is protection of your nation from enemies?

Benevolent Value Type
How important to you is helping people around you?
How important to you is caring for the well being of others around you?

Universalism Value Type
How important to you is equal opportunity for all?
How important to you is having everyone in the world treated equally?

Chapter 4 Appendix
Feminist Identity:

Do you consider yourself a feminist, or not?

(1) feminist
(2) not a feminist

IF FEMINIST
Would you describe yourself as a strong feminist, or a not so strong feminist?

(1) strong feminist
(2) not so strong feminist

IF NOT A FEMINIST:
Would you describe yourself as strongly opposed to feminists, somewhat opposed to feminists, or not at all opposed to feminists?

(1) strongly opposed to feminists
(2) somewhat opposed to feminists
(3) not at all opposed to feminists

Economic Marginalization:

Household/Parental Income:

Have you in the past or do you presently receive government assistance in the form of food stamps?

Have you in the past or do you presently receive government assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)?

Post Questions:
Measuring Support/Opposition, Strategy Preferences, and Reasons for position/preferences

Describe what comes to mind when you think about Gabon? (Open-ended)

Describe what comes to mind when you think about militarily intervening in Gabon? (Open-ended)

How ENGAGING did you find the description of Gabon?

A. Very Engaging
B. Somewhat Engaging
C. Not Very Engaging
D. Not at all Engaging

How INTERESTING did you find the description of Gabon?

A. Very Interesting

B. Somewhat Interesting
C. Not Very Interesting
D. Not at all Interesting

How COMPELLING did you find the description of Gabon?

A. Very Compelling
B. Somewhat Compelling
C. Not Very Compelling
D. Not at all Compelling

How CREDIBLE did you find the description of Gabon?

A. Very Credible
B. Somewhat Credible
C. Not Very Credible
D. Not at all Credible

What is the likelihood that military intervention will successfully resolve the conflict?

A. Extremely Likely
B. Very Likely
C. Somewhat Likely
D. Somewhat Unlikely
E. Very Unlikely
D. Extremely Unlikely

What is the likelihood that military intervention will have negative consequences for the United States?

A. Extremely Likely
B. Very Likely
C. Somewhat Likely
D. Somewhat Unlikely
E. Very Unlikely
D. Extremely Unlikely

What is the likelihood that military intervention will cause the situation to escalate?

A. Extremely Likely
B. Very Likely
C. Somewhat Likely
D. Somewhat Unlikely
E. Very Unlikely
D. Extremely Unlikely

Which strategy would have the greatest potential for avoiding future threats to United States' interests?

A. Ground Troops
B. Air Strikes
C. Diplomacy
B. Economic Sanctions
C. Nothing

Which strategy do you believe will have the greatest potential for avoiding future threats to United States' security?

A. Ground Troops
B. Air Strikes
C. Diplomacy
B. Economic Sanctions
C. Nothing

Which of the following do you believe will lead to fewer US casualties?

A. Ground Troops
B. Air Strikes
C. Diplomacy
B. Economic Sanctions
C. Nothing

Which of the following do you believe will lead to fewer Gabon casualties?

A. Ground Troops
B. Air Strikes
C. Diplomacy
B. Economic Sanctions
C. Nothing

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Gabon is a threat to the United States that requires military action now.

A. Strongly Agree
B. Somewhat Agree
C. Somewhat Disagree
B. Strongly Disagree

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Gabon is a threat that can be contained with diplomacy now.

A. Strongly Agree
B. Somewhat Agree
C. Somewhat Disagree

B. Strongly Disagree

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Gabon is not a threat to the United States at this time.

A. Strongly Agree
B. Somewhat Agree
C. Somewhat Disagree
B. Strongly Disagree

If the United States government decides to take military action in Gabon, would you favor or oppose it?

A. Strongly Favor
B. Somewhat Favor
C. Somewhat Oppose
B. Strongly Oppose

Student Manipulation Materials

Humanitarian Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. Ethnic conflict has emerged as a major threat to the people of Gabon. Evidence of mass genocide has surfaced. In addition, attacks have also been repeatedly made on humanitarian workers trying to meet the food and health needs of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people.

Many argue for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of genocide: huts set on fire with people locked inside, children with their faces smashed in, men with their ears cut off and eyes plucked out, and mass graves with the corpses of people who had been executed with gunshots to the head."
Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is experiencing a humanitarian crisis. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to stop the genocide and prevent further ethnic cleansing. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

National Interests Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a serious threat to United States' interests. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable

African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. Gabon is the richest oil producing and refining African country, but recent attempts to assassinate the President have led to the destruction of the country's oil industry. President Ondimba began a policy of setting oil fields on fire along with destroying nearby refineries. He has threatened to continue this policy until his political rivals leave the country.

Many argue for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of the threat to worldwide economic interests: the fires in the oil fields, the abandoned oil refineries, and the halt of oil exportations."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is an emerging threat to national interests including the oil industry. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to prevent further damage to the oil industry. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

Regime Change Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a serious threat to democracy. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. With the help of his party President Ondimba was able to change Gabon's Constitution to extend presidential terms to seven years and to eliminate the term limits previously in place. In addition, he has violently squashed all opposition to his rule resulting in what is now equivalent to a dictatorship in many experts' opinions.

Many argue for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of the breaking down of democratic institutions. There are no checks on President Ondimba's power and clearly that is undemocratic. Incarcerating your political competitors and the use of military weapons against peaceful protesters is obviously unacceptable."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is in need of a regime change. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to institute a regime change. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

Terrorism Condition:

Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a growing threat of terrorism. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. Gabon's harboring and aiding to terrorist groups has been escalating and is often accomplished by "behind-the scenes" financing and arming various known international terrorists and their associates. Concerns have also been raised, within the past two months, about the strong possibility that terrorist organizations are operating terrorist training camps in the country.

Many argue for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of aid to terrorist groups. Gabon has become one of the primary swamps for terrorism, harboring terrorists from the region and around the world. This shift is one of the most important recent trends we have identified in terrorism..."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is harboring terrorists. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to prevent further aid to terrorists. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

Adult Manipulation Materials

Humanitarian Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. Ethnic conflict has emerged as a major threat to the people of Gabon. Evidence of mass genocide has surfaced. In addition, attacks have also been repeatedly made on humanitarian workers trying to meet the food and health needs of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people.

Many CIA officials have argued for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of genocide: huts set on fire with people locked inside, men with their ears cut off and eyes plucked out, and mass graves with the corpses of people who had been executed with gunshots to the head."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is experiencing a humanitarian crisis. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to

stop the genocide and prevent further ethnic cleansing. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

National Interests Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a serious threat to United States' interests. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. Gabon is one of the richest oil producing and refining African country, but recent attempts to assassinate the President have led to the destruction of the country's oil industry. President Ondimba began a policy of setting oil fields on fire along with destroying nearby refineries. He has threatened to continue this policy until his political rivals leave the country.

Many CIA officials have argued for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of the threat to oil interests: the fires in the oil fields, the abandoned oil refineries, and the halt of oil exportations. This could be particularly hard on the United States due to its increasing dependence on oil."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is an emerging threat to national interests including the oil industry. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to prevent further damage to the oil industry. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

Regime Change Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a serious threat to democracy. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. With the help of his party President Ondimba was able to change Gabon's Constitution to extend presidential terms to seven years and to eliminate the term limits previously in place. In addition, he has violently squashed all opposition to his rule resulting in what is now equivalent to a dictatorship in many experts' opinions.

Many CIA officials have argued for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of the breaking down of democratic institutions. There are no checks on President Ondimba's

power and clearly that is undemocratic. Incarcerating your political competitors and the use of military weapons against peaceful protesters is obviously unacceptable."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is in need of a regime change. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to institute a regime change. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

Terrorism Condition:
Recent events in Gabon, a west central African country have resulted in a growing threat of terrorism. The current president, President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, has served since 1967. Until recently, Gabon was known as a relatively stable African country. The current situation in Gabon has until now been under the radar and reports are just beginning to emerge about the crisis there.

The current situation has spiraled out of control. Gabon's aiding to terrorist groups has been escalating and is often accomplished by "behind-the scenes" financing of various known international terrorists and their associates through President Ondimba's membership in international Islamic organizations. Although Gabon is predominantly a Christian country, President Ondimba is a member of Islam. Such financial support allows these groups to pursue their destructive goals.

Many CIA officials have argued for the need to intervene to ensure that the current situation does not destabilize the entire region. One United Nations official, Jonathan Brytle, recounts his experiences in Gabon: "Every day we surveyed evidence of aid to terrorist groups. Gabon has become an important financial supporter to these groups. It is clear that President Ondimba's financial support to terrorist organizations can no longer be ignored."

Evidence to date strongly suggests that Gabon is harboring terrorists. The United States and other leading countries in the world must now consider intervening to prevent further aid to terrorists. As of now, no end to this crisis is in sight.

Chapter 5 Appendix
Dependent Variable Questions:
As you may know, President Bush and his top advisers are discussing the possibility of taking military action against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE military action against Iraq -- or is this something you haven't thought about? (only Panel)

Should federal spending on homeland security be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?

Should federal spending on the war on terrorism be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?

Taking everything into account, do you think the U.S. war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan was WORTH THE COST or NOT?

Taking everything into account, do you think the war in Iraq has been WORTH THE COST or NOT?

Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1= U.S. should solve with diplomacy and international pressure 7= U.S. must be ready to use military force

Efficacy/Alienation Scale

Public officials don't care much what people like me think. Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?

People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?

Would you say the government is pretty much run by A FEW BIG INTERESTS looking out for themselves or that it is run for THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE?

How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think -- a GOOD DEAL, SOME, or NOT MUCH?

Foreign Policy Goals (only NES 2004)

Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1= U.S. should solve with diplomacy and international pressure 7= U.S. must be ready to use military force

Should PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

Should PROMOTING AND DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

Should STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS (AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS) be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

Should COMBATTING WORLD HUNGER be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

Should HELPING TO BRING A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT TO OTHER NATIONS be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

Should CONTROLLING AND REDUCING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

Should COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM be a VERY IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, a SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT foreign policy goal, or NOT AN IMPORTANT foreign policy goal at all?

How important is it for the U.S. to have a strong military force in order to be effective in dealing with our enemies? Is it EXTREMELY important, VERY important, SOMEWHAT important,
or NOT AT ALL important?

Anxiety (Only Panel)
How worried are you about our country getting into a nuclear war at this time? Are you very worried, somewhat worried, or not worried at all?

How worried are you about our country getting into a conventional war at this time, one in which nuclear weapons are not used? Are you very worried, somewhat worried, or not worried at all?

How likely do you think it is that the U.S. will suffer an attack as serious as the one in New York and Washington some time in the next 12 months? Would you say VERY LIKELY, SOMEWHAT LIKELY, SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY, or VERY UNLIKELY?