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The Place of Europe in Husserl's Critique of Reason

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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This dissertation examines the "political" philosophy of Edmund Husserl through a critique of the concept upon which it depends: Europe or The West. Although this concept comes to play a decisive role in Husserl's phenomenology as a whole, he never adequately clarifies its meaning or accounts for the significance it assumes in his final attempted treatise: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Because the concept "Europe" connects the cognitive aims of philosophy and science with the defining aspirations of a single historically specified humanity, it has received due attention in ideologically charged discussions of Eurocentrism. In this context, philosophical questions as to why an epistemologically oriented reflection should have recourse to such a concept, and what its content might be, are too often forgotten. I take these questions up, showing that the concept is not a product of Husserl's historical circumstances, but rather functions in a fundamental reflection on the possibility of philosophical vocation as such. To understand what that function is, I situate Husserl's Europe within the problematic of political philosophy as presented in Plato's *Republic*, namely, whether and how philosophy might become a vocation of the polis. By rooting the possibility of Europe in the paradoxical conditions Socrates identifies for the existence of a philosophical polis, I provide a critical perspective on the issue that anchors it in the history of philosophy and puts challenging questions to Husserl's final conception of phenomenology.

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***Introduction*:**

Edmund Husserl's final attempted treatise, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (*Crisis*), raises several questions about the nature of the phenomenological project as a whole. In this text, a form of inquiry never before accorded methodological priority takes over the role of introducing phenomenology as philosophy. It is now from the perspective of a teleological-historical reflection on science and its crisis that we first arrive at transcendental subjectivity, the proper field of phenomenological research. On the basis of this reflection, phenomenology discovers that it is more than a self-grounding method of theoretical investigation, and takes on its full meaning as an "unavoidable" transformation of the modern philosophical project. Manuscripts composed by Husserl during the writing of the *Crisis* make it clear that he regarded its new approach to phenomenology as inherently more radical and comprehensive than that of previous texts. The concepts that function methodologically in the new approach of the *Crisis* thus take on a privileged importance. They concern ultimate phenomenological beginnings and horizons of self-understanding. The *Crisis* poses immense interpretive difficulties, however, because it is more a demonstration of this new approach to phenomenology than its clarification. For better or worse, the work Husserl intended as the definitive statement of phenomenological philosophy appears to us as a bold venture into uncharted territory.

A rich tradition of interpretation has tried to come to terms with the questions to which the novel conceptions of the *Crisis* give rise. How can a philosophy rooted in the return to the *cogito* also require a historical introduction? Can Husserl discover a *telos* inborn in this history without engaging in ungrounded speculation? What exactly is meant by a "crisis of science," and does Husserl really expect phenomenology to resolve it? Do the concepts of responsibility, faith and spiritual health appealed to in connection with the crisis-problematic imply an existential, ethical or even religious grounding of the scientific enterprise? The most thoroughgoing attempts to confront these questions have not shied away from acknowledging the difficulties they pose for the integrity of Husserl's program as a whole. The *Crisis* is not only the vanguard of Husserlian phenomenology, but has also become a valuable resource for its self-critique.

Perhaps the most important and mysterious concept of Husserl's *Crisis* is "Europe." The concept is especially important because it controls every methodological aspect of Husserl's reflection. The knowledge-productions subject to critique are "European sciences," the historical-teleological reflections concern "European history," the critical situation of the present decides the fate of "European existence," and we, who are called to take responsibility for the crisis, are addressed as "Europeans" reflecting on "our Europe." Husserl even anticipates that the outcome of his final treatise will positively decide "whether the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civilizations bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning…"[1] The concept is especially mysterious

[1] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970)[Hereafter Crisis], p. 16.

because it controls the reflection, as it were, by force rather than by reason. Despite the encompassing role of Europe in his final treatise, Husserl never carries out a satisfying reflection on the legitimacy of this concept and the essential position that it comes to occupy. Was it somehow obvious to Husserl that Europe, by which he means the civilizational horizon that we would today call "the West," should be the birthplace, crucible, and frontier of theoretical reason?

With a few notable exceptions, scholarship has tended to treat Husserl's Europe as a somewhat suspicious idea, most likely the product of an ideological Eurocentrism, the disavowal of which would not touch the core of Husserlian phenomenology itself. This is not our position. Husserl's Europe is neither a simple mistake that might be rectified through a correct understanding of phenomenological concepts, nor is it a symptomatic expression of his time. The aversion to Eurocentrism that has motivated the easy criticism of Husserl's Europe is actually no less an ideological episode in the history of the West than Eurocentrism itself. Husserl was certainly cognizant of the "Eurocentrism" debates of his time. He undertakes his reflections on Europe in full awareness of a cosmopolitan relativism that was already popular in his day, and vehemently resists it. Yet he simultaneously anticipates the critique of his conservatism and identifies himself with its insurgent attitude: "I would like to think that I, the supposed reactionary, am far more radical and far more revolutionary than those who in their words proclaim themselves so radical today."[2] An exploration of Europe as the boundary of Husserl's phenomenology will no doubt produce results relevant to our contemporary debates concerning Eurocentrism and philosophy. But the roots of the concept reach far deeper than the ground upon which these ideological battles rage, and touch upon dilemmas that ordinary political convictions cannot illuminate or decide. Before mapping out "radical" and "conservative" positions, we will have to discover the unique question that Husserl's Europe puts to philosophy, to which every such position would have to respond.

Europe encompasses Husserl's phenomenology to the extent that the latter claims to deliver a critique of reason in which scientific rationality will not only become capable of understanding the basic concepts that constitute fields of inquiry, but also of recovering its *Lebensbedeutsamkeit* (life-meaningfulness) from the perspective of a *Geschichtlichkeit* (unitary historical development) in which it is contained. The recovery of the life-meaningfulness of scientific rationality is at stake, for Husserl, *only* within Europe. It is for reasons of principle rather than of cultural and geographical happenstance that the phenomenological critique of reason will pertain only to European sciences. Because of this European boundary, Husserl's phenomenology cannot countenance the emergence of a scientific enterprise that would have no justifiable integrity according to traditional ontological and epistemological differentia,[3] but whose

[2] Crisis, p. 290.

[3] The differentia suggested by Kant in *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* can serve as a paradigm: "The peculiar features of a science may consist of a simple difference of object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps all three conjointly. On these features, therefore, depends the idea of a possible science and its territory." Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. Paul Carus and revised by James W. Ellington. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), p. 9. In chapter one, we will explore Husserl's classification of sciences according to regions of being and their eidetic and empirical constitution. In chapter three, we will discover how he later unifies these sciences in "Europe."

rightful independence would consist in disclosing and critiquing Europe as the horizon of the critique of reason, thus invoking an unheard-of "post-European" *Geschichtlichkeit* as the ground of science's *Lebensbedeutsamkeit*. Whether the inability to reckon with this possibility represents a limitation for philosophical reason is a question only first made possible for phenomenology via a critical assessment of Husserl's Europe. As we fix the level of this problematic, it will become clear that different interpretations of Europe's factual history cannot contest Europe's function as the horizon for the phenomenological critique of reason. At stake is rather a fundamental "political" orientation of science as such, including the empirical sciences through which historical realities might be determined.

Husserl's critique of reason takes place from this "political" orientation, and, in reflecting on Europe, eventually carries out an explicit *commitment* to it. This critique, however, does not identify the philosophical problematic to which the commitment to Europe belongs. The significance of this "political" orientation of science thus remains obscure and susceptible to misconstruction at the hands of historicism or other relativisms. We propose to discover the proper problematic from which to understand Husserl's Europe by returning to one of the oldest, most urgent problems in the history of philosophy: the dilemma of the philosophical polis as originally posed in Plato's *Republic*. Plato's text is a unique reflection on the problem of political philosophy. Political philosophy here does not mean a specific branch of philosophical inquiry that attempts a rational discourse about political affairs, nor does it presume some inevitable partisanship by virtue of which putatively disinterested philosophy is invested in the political conflicts of the day. It instead centers on the question of whether and how it is possible for philosophy, as a whole and in its theoretical purity, to be included in a polis.

We will have to discover what "polis" means within the problematic that lies at the center of *Republic*. The philosopher king, the imperative to guardianship, the return to the cave: these charming episodes of philosophical literature have a systematic meaning when rooted in the problem of the polis, which is not a topic for "political science," but the horizon in which the political significance of the philosophical task—and thus of science as a whole—is at stake. In *Republic*, the transition from theoretical to practical reason is understood through a calling of philosophy to service within the horizon of a polis. The synoptic vision of philosophical subject-matter as the totality of true, wholly knowable being is not sufficient if philosophy is to grasp its meaning as a task. Instead, it is drawn into an ultimate revelation in which faith and presentiment seem to supplement direct theoretical insight and which is also the occasion for its teleological connection to a concrete human adventure that philosophical interest, paradoxically, is required to ignore. Plato has Socrates assert that a polis in which this calling of philosophy occurs is theoretically conceivable but practically implausible. The Europe concept *is* Husserl's "political philosophy" as a decision within this Platonic problematic. It represents his claim to begin philosophizing from a polis in which the political synthesis of theoretical and practical reason is a constitutional requirement. Plato's text affords a critical perspective from which to evaluate what is involved in Husserl's claim to Europe, the possibility of confirming the claim, and the political responsibilities shouldered by the philosophy that would do so.

It is often remarked that, for Husserl, the motivation for doing philosophy is the pursuit of radical self-responsibility, and is thus ethical in nature. Further, since the

pursuit of self-responsibility always entails a transformation in one's relations to others, this ethical task is social in its scope. Husserl is thus seen to revive the Socratic conception of philosophy as an ethical commitment enacted in the midst of communal life.[4] But how does this revival stand with respect to the political problem that thoroughly defines Socrates as a philosophical figure? Plato's presentation of Socrates is designed to confront philosophy with the fact that a vocational commitment to its pursuit places one outside the bounds of the political. The particular kind of integration of vocational lives achieved in the polis does not include the philosophical life. Philosophy understands itself as a uniquely non-political vocation and the polis understands it as essentially anti-political. It is precisely this situation that Husserl claims to have overcome by discovering Europe as philosophy's vocational horizon. In Europe, philosophy is called into service, and bears witness to Europe's mission for the world. This dissertation aims to expose Europe as the ground of the phenomenological critique and revival of philosophy, so as to ask whether thinking still stands on that ground today.

Engaging neither in apologetics nor criticism, we will seek to illustrate the legitimate philosophical motives that provoke Husserl to take on the burden of what can only seem an exorbitant, speculative hypothesis. The recourse to Plato is not a point of historical comparison, but serves to show that this seeming excess on Husserl's part is actually a confrontation with a problem of philosophical responsibility that is perhaps perennial. In pursuing Husserl's thought to this extreme, we find that he is not as rigorous, disciplined or convincing as on many "topical" matters. Here we must be careful about the attitude we adopt. If our argument is correct, then the Europe we are investigating is not a topic for Husserl's phenomenological method, but rather the horizon in which the whole philosophical task receives a meaning in relation to historical life. The fact that Husserl is less clear here than elsewhere should not prompt suspicions that he is engaging in merely occasional or rhetorical remarks. Rather, it indicates a struggle to justify, express, sometimes merely leave traces of, a conviction that may finally have the status of an existentially necessary presupposition. On the one hand, we will try to present this presupposition as profound rather than frivolous, in fact as systematically crucial to Husserl's whole program. On the other hand, by making explicit Husserl's implicit maneuvers in the vicinity of this issue, we will no doubt draw attention to ideas that seem probable at best. Our intention here is not to "undo" phenomenology by showing the questionability of one of its fundamental concepts. It is merely to follow Husserl's thought into this hazardous territory, to try to make sense of what happens there, and to see if he uncovers a live problem for those who want to think further or differently.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part aims to establish the absolutely fundamental character of the Europe-problematic in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl will eventually project Europe as the horizon from which all topical research within phenomenologically reduced consciousness can become aware of its full significance. The first chapter charts a genealogy that demonstrates how the European horizon comes to encompass phenomenological philosophy, conceived as the

[4] See, for example, Dan Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*. (New York: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 68.

eidetic science of absolute consciousness. We will argue that the encompassing role of Europe does not enter into conflict with, but rather presupposes, the absolute nature of phenomenological subject-matter. To this end, we will reconstruct the trajectory of thought by which Husserl sought to establish phenomenology as *theoria*, the universal science of all true being. Having done so, we will be able to confirm that the Europe that encompasses phenomenology cannot be explained by non-phenomenological science. We will also attempt to dissociate the Europe-problematic from every worry about, or compromise with, historicism or cultural relativism. Europe will instead encompass phenomenology at the term of a reflection by which Husserl attempts to assume responsibility for the possibility of philosophy's existence as a task. The legitimacy of the phenomenological reduction and the absoluteness of the field of investigation that it discloses are not thereby jeopardized. The Europe concept will rather concern the task-significance of *that very work*, conceived in its proper epistemic autonomy.

The second chapter attempts to introduce the philosophical problematic to which Husserl's Europe belongs, and thus arrive at a provisional definition of Europe itself. This problematic concerns the vocational being of philosophy. Every vocation is a tradition of work originally established for the purpose of fulfilling a requirement that emerges outside the sphere of the vocational praxis. For Husserl, it is because of its inclusion in Europe that philosophy has this kind of being. Returning to *Republic*, we will consider what it would mean for philosophy to be "included" in a social formation in the same way as other vocations. The "strict account" of *techne* initiated in book one will establish an interpretive attitude that considers all vocations only from within the mode of attention characteristic of their accomplishment. In Husserlian terms, this will amount to considering vocations from within the epoche that constitutes their proper field of work. Devoted solely to the objects over which it is set, each vocation nonetheless understands its own serviceability and power from the horizon of a world pre-given to practical understanding. In *Republic*, this world of praxis is called a polis. The problem of philosophy's political inclusion will stem from the fact that its vocational epoche is also an "epoche of all praxis." It is a purely theoretical vocation, the results of which are not meant to serve interests that terminate in the world pre-given to practical understanding. How can that vocational life, viewed from inside the epoche in which it lives, possibly "fit into" a social whole? The only polis capable of including philosophy will prove to be one in which it has been called to serve a praxis of ruling that aims to replace the functional truths of praxis with norms of theoretical reason. Having investigated the nature of this calling and this praxis of rule, we will identify Husserl's Europe as philosophy's vocational horizon.

Our third chapter demonstrates how Europe, so identified, functions as the political boundary of the phenomenological critique of reason presented in the *Crisis*. We will show that Husserl's concept of scientific crisis is an essentially "European" concept. After defining the field of phenomena normally associated with the concept of crisis (historicity, sedimentation, objectivism, etc.), we will argue that they only occupy Husserl's attention because they concern the motivation for, and the resolution of, a crisis with which they cannot be strictly equated. The crisis of science concerns neither the fundamental historicity of theoretical acquisitions, nor scientific prejudices rooted in the natural attitude. Positively defined, the crisis of science is a loss of its leading function with respect to natural life. Because Husserl *defines* Europe as the only mode of historical

existence in which *theoria* is called to lead, it is the condition for the occurrence and overcoming of crisis. We will attempt to explicate the concepts by which Husserl understands this crisis as a "sickness." These concepts all pertain to the health of a vocationally defined life within the unity of its historical development. Described according to this medical idiom, the crisis is the life-weariness and distress caused by the unbelievable nature of the belief in which Europe must believe if it is to live. Because this belief is the possibility of living under the guidance of philosophical reason, the philosopher is capable of experiencing the European crisis from the perspective of her own vocational crisis. The possibility of her personal calling is the possibility of Europe's destiny. In *Republic*, the healthy vocational life is equated with the experience of one's vocation as a calling or defining purpose (ἐπιτήδευμα). We will analyze this experience as a temporal phenomenon in which vocation appears as assigned from the past, confirmed in the present, and pledged to the future. This inward experience of vocation as a task that one is "meant to" carry out is a discipline of faith, courage, and commitment on the basis of which history appears as the dimension where the verification of the authenticity of one's calling is at stake. This experience will prove to be the existential ground for the historical discovery of Europe as philosophy's vocational horizon. Phenomenologizing subjectivity, in the final analysis, is not cognitive, but vocational.

The second part of the dissertation explores the categories through which Husserl attempts to render believable his belief in the existence of a historical Europe. These categories will have to account for the possibility of its beginning, maintenance and global ramification. We discover them to be denationalization, Renaissance, and Europeanization. If understood strictly within the bounds of these categories, Husserl's Europe proves a challenge, not only to Eurocentric accounts that would guard and promote theoretical reason as if it were a European heritage, but also to attempts to counteract this Eurocentrism by revealing the actual history of reason in all its civilizational and geographical diversity. Precisely because it contains *theoria*, Husserl's Europe will have a paradoxical mode of inhabiting history that sets it apart from all other civilizations, but also from the Europe that we take for granted as a geo-political entity.

Husserl himself does not provide a systematic treatment of the categories according to which he makes sense of Europe's historical being. Instead, we discover a remarkable absence of any serious attempt to engage the "actual" history of the "actual" Europe. The *Crisis* never once traces the development of European economic, religious, or political institutions. One might be tempted to argue that such a history is of obvious importance to Husserl's Europe concept, and that his sketch must be supplemented by reflections of a more concrete nature. We argue, however, that Husserl was never interested in constructing a history of Europe. His references to "Greece," the "Middle Ages" and the "Renaissance" are not placeholders for detailed investigations into Europe's spiritual development. They rather pertain to a paradoxical historical structure that uproots the conditions presupposed by conventional historical understanding.

These paradoxes are outlined in the *Republic*. The explicit teaching of that text is not that the coming into being of a philosophical polis is impossible, but rather that it is exceedingly difficult, and therefore highly unlikely. If we interpret these difficulties according to a commonsense understanding of historical possibility, we will inevitably conclude that the practical realization of the polis is impossible. The difficulties involved here concern the conceivability of the original emergence and sustained becoming of a

social formation dedicated to overcoming *doxa* and thus to a continual letting loose (κάθαρσις) of all traditions effective in customary life. Socrates' presentation suggests that the philosophical polis must be founded on the voluntary banishment of all adults, and seems to imply that such banishment can only take place in a city that is *already philosophical*. The philosophical polis presupposes itself. In the face of such paradoxes, should one not conclude that Plato's presentation actually forces the acknowledgment that the philosophical polis can have no traction in history? The analysis of Husserl's categories of European existence reveals, however, that the historical possibility of *just some such polis* and *just some such paradox* becomes decisive for phenomenology.

The fourth chapter concerns "denationalization." For Husserl, European culture is defined by the fact that it values theoretical truth as the final court of appeal for any question that may emerge in the course of non-theoretical existence. Theoretical truth is defined by the fact that its validity is entirely independent from its serviceability within the practical interests of community life. This means that Europe is that paradoxical world horizon in which such truth is valorized *from the perspective of community life itself*. To have become such a world, Europe must have originally emerged through the transformation of a communal world in which traditionally grounded truths still possessed an ultimate validity. Husserl calls this world-form the "nation." The nation is a homeworld that offers to its participants a horizon of appropriation in which one's destiny is attainable. Husserl gives an account of how the hermeneutic possibilities available from this horizon determine the framework of pre-theoretical truth seeking, and attempts to explain the motivational path that leads to its overcoming. The possibility of this overcoming is forged in "political historicity," a style of historical existence in which sustained encounters between nations enable new forms of world-consciousness and critique. However, international communication only gives rise to the theoretical project by revealing its own absurdity as an ultimate form of intersubjective understanding. The goal of *episteme* contains a critique of political historicity in its very meaning. The Greece of Europe emerges by taking this critique upon itself and defining itself by it. A Greece grown mature in the cultivation of its traditions in international space effectively banishes its adults. It thus transforms into a community whose life-horizon is determined by the promise of theoretical truth.

The fifth chapter is devoted to "Renaissance." Because Europe is defined by its dissatisfaction with traditional validities, it bears its own history in a unique manner. Husserl's reflections on the first emergence of rational culture are meant to account for the possibility of the historical fact he calls "ancient Greece." Greece is the origin of Europe. But this claim to Greek origin does not invoke the maintenance of an unbroken historical heritage. Husserl's claim is rather that Europe begins in a Renaissance by which it discovers Greece as its origin. Husserl does not go back to Greece to find the origin of Europe. He recognizes this going back as a structural aspect of Europe itself. The situation here is complicated. What Renaissance Europe identifies as the essence of the Greece that it seeks to renew is precisely the latter's turn against all traditional validities in order to live according to the rule of theoretical reason. Husserl's Europe models itself on a historical Greece exactly to the extent that this latter is defined by its will to break out of history. The Renaissance is not a period in European history, but rather the temporal orientation by which Europe transcends history from within. European humanity will be faithful to its historical origin exactly insofar as it begins

anew. It must devalue every "middle age" that would expose its Greek heritage to the trials of a historical passage in which it would become a passively inherited tradition. Europe does not constitute its history through myth, narrative, or historical science, but through its free devotion to an anti-traditional impulse of the past. The renaissance structure of Europe involves Husserl in the paradox that the philosophical polis must have already begun in order to begin. The possibility of its ending will pose a similar dilemma.

The final chapter offers a critical reflection on Husserl's concept of Europeanization. Despite its transcendence political historicity, Husserl's Europe retains a geo-political position. Europe is not an idea. It had a beginning, it could come to ruin, and it borders a non-European world with which it must enter into some kind of relationship. This relationship, for Husserl, must be one of Europeanization. Husserl's Europe only exists as a *spreading* synthesis of nations. For Husserl, to claim that Europe is a rational culture means to believe that "the Europeanization of the world" is a rational process. Such a belief may seem highly naïve or "dangerous" if viewed as an historical interpretation of Western imperialism. In *Republic*, the philosopher called into the life of the polis always has war on his mind; indeed, the violent confrontation with non-philosophical social formations would seem to fall under a definition of war that conforms to criteria of justice: it will be violence that does not do *harm*. Is Husserl simply inheriting this legacy? It may also seem that the goal of such world-wide Europeanization is futile. Would it not entail eradicating the distinction between home and alien worlds, a distinction Husserl recognizes to be an essential category of all historical existence? We argue that Husserl's idea of worldwide Europeanization is a critical resource vis-à-vis actual processes of Westernization, but that it also depends upon a world-picture that, while not theoretically impossible, would have to engage a skeptical critique before being defensible. Husserl's Europe is not an accumulated mass of power and tradition. It finds itself in a Renaissance in which all institutionalized interpretations become questionable in light of the promises of theoretical reason. To identify a boundary between Europe and non-Europe, and to seek its dissolution, cannot mean to incorporate a previously independent culture into an established homeworld. Nonetheless, Husserl judges that Europe is the *only* culture that has identified itself with the overcoming of tradition. This entails that any outbreak of rational culture will necessarily owe its possibility to the Greek origin, itself already incorporated into the renaissance structure of Europe as its *arche* and *telos*. He thus equates the becoming reasonable of humankind with its Europeanization. We ask whether this attitude is itself reasonable, and explore the consequences this question has for the European unification of sciences upon which the crisis-problematic depends.

Our reflections will seek to establish that Husserl's phenomenology, which attempts a critical renewal of Western philosophy, stands committed to the political possibility that Plato merely poses as a problematic dissideratum. Rendering explicit this commitment as a decision underlying phenomenology—and hence, for Husserl at any rate, modern philosophy as a whole—makes possible a number of critical attitudes. Does one affirm philosophy to be continental, a task assigned by the Renaissance constitutive of European life and only thus bound to the health and fate of historical humanity? Does one stand ready for the appropriation of *theoria* from a post-European perspective, which

one would not oppose to Europe as some other place or time, but as another vocational horizon in which thinking is called precisely to critique the unbelievability of the continental world-picture? Has the decision between these alternatives already been made? What would it mean to stand before it? We will see that Husserl had already made his decision on the basis of a reflection in which "history" appeared as the dimension in which to confirm a teleology of reason. By confirming this teleology, he proved that the decision was not arbitrary, that it was demanded or required by the *Geschichtlichkeit* in which he was standing. The claims of Europe having already once been voiced, are such confirmations any longer believable? Is that history in which Husserl stood still our history? Must we today undertake some such reflection on our own, thus risking a contest between "epochs" of philosophy? Or must one rather de-politicize *theoria* altogether, acknowledging its concern with political incorporation to be a metaphysical excess. Can theoretical reason only acquire life-meaningfulness by pursuing an unreasonable desire to identify itself with the power and destiny of a *Geschichtlichkeit*? We hope to show that these questions need to be taken into the phenomenological sphere, if for no other reason than to come to terms with phenomenology's own heritage.

PART ONE:
EUROPE AS THE FINAL PRESUPPOSITION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

Philosophy can only take root in a radical reflection upon the meaning and possibility of its own scheme.

---Edmund Husserl, *Ideas I*[5]

This polis you are founding, it will be Greek won't it?

---Socrates, *Republic*[6]

[5] Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillin, 1931) [Hereafter Ideas I], p. 20.

[6] 470e.

Chapter One:
The Emergence of the Europe-Problematic in Husserl's Thought

1.
Clarification of Consciousness as Philosophy's Field of Work

The hypothesis this work seeks to test is that Husserl's philosophy is encompassed by Europe in such a way as to raise new questions and dilemmas for phenomenology, questions and dilemmas we provisionally call "political." A science is encompassed by a given reality if either its subject-matter or its own scientific activities can only be understood in their full significance by supposing the reality in question, which itself lies beyond the scope of explicit scientific concern. In order to define the encompassing role that Europe plays in Husserl's phenomenology, it is thus necessary to clarify the proper subject-matter of phenomenological research. The subject-matter of phenomenology, to which phenomenological activities themselves belong, is consciousness: the domain of being in which experience is manifest. Husserl's phenomenology remains distinct from its most influential adaptations because it claims that research into this domain is tantamount to the realization of philosophy in the classical sense of *theoria*: the universal science of all possible true being. This claim depends upon understanding consciousness as an absolute or all-encompassing sphere. Consciousness does not belong to a broader reality with which the philosopher must become acquainted. It constitutes the field of work in which a philosophical knowledge of all true being becomes possible. To justify this view would be the task of a general introduction to Husserl's phenomenology.

That is not our interest here. We must, however, acknowledge that the all-encompassing nature of the phenomenological field poses unique difficulties for the thesis that Europe nonetheless encompasses this science. The political questions in which Husserl's Europe involves phenomenology will not result from positioning consciousness relative to geopolitical realities that would influence it from without. If the encompassing role of Europe has a scientific meaning for phenomenology itself, it will not conflict with the discovery of consciousness as an absolute sphere of being. It will rather be because Europe somehow bears on the philosophical work that realizes the goals of *theoria* by investigating the infinite field of topics there available for investigation. To understand Europe in its encompassing role, we must thus familiarize ourselves with the absoluteness of consciousness, even if we do not justify or criticize it. This abstention from criticism should not signify that we take for granted the methods by which Husserl discovers consciousness. We rather seek to explore new difficulties that emerge for phenomenology at a level that Husserl himself will judge to be more fundamental.

Given our purposes, we can draw upon *Ideas I* as a definitive statement regarding phenomenology's claim to be the universal science of all possible true being. Although Husserl's philosophy will undergo significant changes after this text, the general line of reasoning he there establishes as to why consciousness represents the research-domain in which *theoria* is possible will remain decisive for all that follows. We here interpret this

line of reasoning as responding to a three-fold task required by the demands of *theoria*. First, to be a universal science, philosophy must have as its subject-matter a domain of being that includes all possible being. It cannot abstract from some total reality, focusing its attention one sector of the universe, while admitting that certain matters lie outside its purview. It must instead investigate a domain of being without outside, and without connection to a broader whole. Second, this all-inclusive domain must be a domain of *true* being. What appears in this domain must do so with apodictic self-evidence, i.e. it must be strictly unimaginable for it not to be, or to be otherwise. Third, if it is to be answerable for the possibility of all scientific claims, philosophy must be an eidetic inquiry. Eidetic inquiry is concerned strictly with the essential objects and relationships that determine *a priori* the bounds within which empirical inquiry can make discoveries in accordance with scientific legitimacy. The central task of *Ideas I* is to demonstrate that consciousness is an absolute, irrelative domain of being accessible to insight with perfect evidence. This domain must also admit of a specifically eidetic inquiry. An eidetic inquiry into a domain of being that includes all possible domains, and thus all possible scientific investigation, can claim the status of an unsurpassable, if endless, critique of reason.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl approaches the possibility of a universal science in a structural fashion before engaging the special difficulties involved in discovering consciousness as its subject-matter. We shall follow that order here, beginning with the problem of a purely eidetic science. To gain provisional insight into the possibility of eidetic science and its authority over empirical inquiry, it is not necessary to cultivate an attitude original to phenomenology. It is only necessary to consider the achievements of existing eidetic science. This procedure means delaying very important problems about the "experiencing" at work in the apprehension of the *eidos*, problems to which concrete descriptions cannot help but allude.

Geometry occupies a privileged position in Husserl's exposition of eidetic science. While Husserl warns against understanding phenomenology as "a geometry of experiences,"[7] phenomenology's *eidetic* character will find a perfect analog there. When a geometer makes assertions regarding a geometrical matter, a triangle for instance, she makes judgments whose scope of applicability obviously exceeds the particular shape she may employ as a model. She makes judgments, as we say, about triangles, right triangles, isosceles triangles, etc. "as such" or "in general." The extension involved here transcends every collection of individuals. The assertion rather states that every *possible* triangle or triangle of this type will necessarily conform to geometrically determined rules. For Husserl, judgments applied to individuals "as such" or "in general" can only claim unconditional generality and absolute necessity when they predicate relationships that are not grounded in the contingent ways of being of spatiotemporal individuals, but rather in essential ways of being that would hold under all conceivable circumstances. These essential relationships belong to an *eidos* that Husserl treats as an object in its own right. The rules governing possible modes of individual being are not conventions of definition, but express something that can be seen with evidence. It is because it is an essential predicate of the *eidos* "right triangle" that the sum of the squares of its two legs equals the square of its hypotenuse that I can know 1) that every conceivable right triangle will exhibit this set of relationships, and 2) that they do so, not as a matter of fact, but necessarily, i.e. in accordance with unbreakable rules prescribed by the ways of being of the *eidos*.

[7] Ideas I, p. 185.

To speak of the *eidos* as an object in its own right certainly invites the objection of metaphysical speculation, or so-called "Platonism." But we must correctly understand the broad definition of "object" under which Husserl will include both the sensible individuals we see through perception and the essences we see through essential intuition. Husserl's definition is itself grounded in a reflection on the *eidos* "object." It is no doubt circular that the clarification of the objectivity of the *eidos* should itself depend upon an eidetic seeing. This circularity is in fact an explicit requirement of Husserl's entire project. It is a foundational principle of phenomenology that a claim can only attain final justification through a seeing encounter with evidence. To establish that the *eidos* is necessarily an object, one must make an unconditionally universal judgment grounded in the *eidos* "object." This is the grounding Husserl appeals to: "Every possible object…," writes Husserl, "has indeed *its own* ways…of coming under a glance that presents, intuits, meets it eventually in its 'bodily' self-hood."[8] By "bodily self-hood" [*Leibhaften Selbstheit*], Husserl obviously does not mean sensuous presence. He employs the expression to describe a broader mode of appearing essential to all conceivable objects, both sensible and eidetic, that of being itself-given. What is "itself given" is not mind independent. On the contrary, it is the correlate of "seeing" (or intuition), of which sense perception is only an example. The way of access to a sensible individual as "itself-there," the way it can be encountered as optimally manifest, is through perception. The *eidos*, as an object, will accordingly have *its own ways* of being seen.

Of course, seeing an *eidos* requires an effort of productive cognition from which the passivity of sensible perception frees us. Our vision is already stuffed full of sensible individuals. It is in fact tempting to interpret any other kind of object as an abstraction built up on their basis. Husserl recognizes that essential vision too "rests on" a drive toward "the visible presence of individual fact."[9] When I try to see the *eidos* "extended material object," I inevitably bring a particular extended object before my mental gaze. But Husserl holds that I can eventually adopt a perspective on a series of particulars such that they appear as completely arbitrary exemplars of corresponding eidetic structures that prescribe rules of possible being. This chair has the property of being grey, not because of a rule of possible being, but because of events particular to our world. It *necessarily* has color, however, because being colored is an essential predicate of the *eidos* extended material object. This aspect of the *eidos* does not come into view as a positive island of being. It emerges as a correlate of my awareness that I could indefinitely continue to produce arbitrary examples of extended objects each of which would illustrate the *very same essential relationship*. This kind of eidetic seeing is as good a source of justification for eidetic claims as perception is for empirical claims. On this theory, unconditionally general assertions ("every extended material object is colored") are meaningful and open to confirmation or refutation only because they appeal to the possibility of this vision. The fact that eidetic seeing sees an object does not entail that it sees everything about it, nor does it mean that every assertion that invokes this seeing is actually based on it.

It is essential to essential seeing that it can "rest on" fictive illustrations just as well as on real ones. It is geometrically irrelevant, for instance, whether the figure used to illustrate an essential property of triangles as such actually exists.

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[8] Ibid., p. 49.

[9] Ibid., p. 50.

> The *geometer* who draws his figures on the blackboard produces in so doing strokes that are actually there on a blackboard that is actually there. But his experience of what he thus produces, *qua* experience, affords just as little *ground* for his sight and thought of the geometrical essence as does the physical act of production itself. Whether or no he thereby suffers hallucinations, and whether instead of actually drawing the lines he draws his lines and figures in a world of fancy, does not really matter.[10]

When Husserl speaks of "experience" (*Erfahrung*) in this context, he means specifically experience as "consciousness that apprehends or sets up reality."[11] In this sense, experience is entirely unnecessary for eidetic insight, and judgments about the *eidos* make absolutely no existential claims regarding experienced realities: "*the positing of the essence*, with the intuitive apprehension that immediately accompanies it, *does not imply any positing of individual existence whatsoever; pure essential truths do not make the slightest assertion concerning facts*."[12] Likewise, judgments about corresponding individuals in the form "as such" or "in general" do not bear upon realities in their existence. The geometer judges about what is individual only insofar as it counts "purely as an instance of essential being."[13]

This claim is pivotal for Husserl in demonstrating the independence of eidetic from empirical scientific inquiry. A purely eidetic science, which consists solely in judgments concerning essences and unconditionally universal judgments concerning the corresponding instances presupposes absolutely nothing regarding the being of the factual world. It does not need to know anything about it, or even that it exists. Matters of fact appear there only in an illustrative function, and might just as well be imaginary. The sphere of research open to an eidetic science like geometry thus remains completely aloof from every development in the factual world, and untouched by every scientific discovery about real entities. Sciences of fact, on the other hand, will be intrinsically dependent on the ways of eidetic being, and hence on the sciences that discover them: "*No fully developed science of fact could subsist unmixed* with eidetic knowledge, and in consequent *independence of eidetic sciences*…."[14] To the degree that a science is interested in existing realities, it focuses on a realm of being, and exercises a kind of seeing, that cannot itself yield an ultimate account of its own subject matter. To understand the concepts it employs in its claims about facts, empirical science would have to appeal to eidetic knowledge.

Husserl describes this necessary dependence of empirical science along two distinct trajectories: material and formal. The idea of a dependence on formal eidetics is relatively straightforward. No matter what its subject-matter, a science of fact will always study objects of some sort, which can be subsumed under the formal category "object-as-such."

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[10] Ibid., p. 55.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., p. 51.

[13] Ibid., p. 52.

[14] Ibid., p. 56-7.

Its research must therefore conform to the eidetic laws governing every possible object and the judgments that judge about objects. These are the subject-matter of those eidetic disciplines that Husserl calls "formal-ontological." For him, this group includes formal logic, arithmetic, algebra, pure analysis, and the theory of manifolds.[15] From a Husserlian perspective, it is absurd to believe that physical investigations could ever discover something in the universe that would speak against the formal-logical law of non-contradiction. On the contrary, in its study of physical objects, physics is *a priori* bound by the logical laws governing objectivity in general. Should something ever speak against a logical law, decision in this matter would fall exclusively to logical insight, which, for its part, would make no use of empirical positing whatsoever. If it is strictly unimaginable that an object simultaneously and in the same respect be A and not A, then it makes no sense to say that physical results "indicate" such a thing. The idea that such statements would be justified by the fact that "our experience" is somehow limited with respect to an unimaginable reality is, for Husserl, equally nonsensical. To understand why, we will have to consider the phenomenological reduction.

First it is necessary to understand Husserl's doctrine of the material dependence of empirical on eidetic science. From the standpoint of formal eidetics, every conceivable empirical science studies the same thing: mere objects as such. No matter the kind of object, formal ontology can determine *a priori* the bounds within which any empirical science can legitimately judge about it. According to Husserl, there are also material eidetic sciences, whose materiality in no way speaks against the purity of their eidetic character. As opposed to formal ontology, Husserl recognizes regional ontologies, each of which supplies *a priori* laws governing a particular region of being. Experience, as a matter of fact, shows us a diversity of empirical objects and relationships. In my surroundings, I am aware of the material things in my vicinity, of myself and other people, of broader social realities, etc. Everywhere, I am cognizant of relationships between these things as dependent or independent, effect or cause, motive or outcome. The possibility of regional ontology means that any given empirical object must necessarily possess certain characteristics and participate in certain relationships because of the kind of object that it is, and that these determinations are available to a purely eidetic insight on the basis of which it is possible to make unconditionally necessary judgments about corresponding individuals under the rubric "as such."

There is no question here of deducing the necessity of the particular individuals themselves, or of somehow anticipating their factual diversity beginning from eidetic seeing. Instead, beginning from contingent empirical givens, the regional ontologist would seek methods of sorting out the networks of essential relationships rooted in the region of being exemplified in these givens. At the end of this research, the empirical givens could be understood as instantiating pure regional possibilities. A material thing is necessarily extended and displays sense-qualities spread throughout it. For regional ontology, this necessity is not analytic. As opposed to the uniform formalization of all objects under the *eidos* object-as-such, Husserl will emphasize that general kinds "lie in" [*liegen in*] or "are contained in" [*Enthaltensein*] individuals as *their own*, higher genera in lower genera, etc.[16] Genera are not heuristic ways of sorting out objects. Husserl would rather have us think of

[15] Ibid., p. 57.

[16] Ibid., p. 66.

the more general as a part intrinsically included in the more specific whole. When we judge that an individual is a specification of a kind, this kind is precisely *specific to* or *definitive of* the content of the individual or to underlying genera.

For Husserl, a genuine "region" designates the highest or most general essence with positive content that belongs to a concrete individual as its essence. The goldfish swimming in my tank is most generically an animal reality. This might mean, among other things, that it is necessarily motivated by the surrounding environment to behaviors, that it has a body that necessarily inhabits the same space as other material bodies, which can affect it as a cause rather than a motive, that its body also has all the characteristics of a material object, etc. In the terminology of *Ideas I*, the totality of such truths, all grounded in the same regional essence, here "animal reality," make up a regional ontology. The most fundamental truths among these, which function in the comprehension of all the others, Husserl calls "regional axioms," and the concepts which function in these axioms—such as "body," "environment," "motivation," "behavior," etc.—regional categories.

> These concepts express not merely, as do concepts generally, specifications of purely logical categories, but are distinguished by this, that by means of regional axioms they express the features *peculiar to* the regional essence, or *express in eidetic generality what must belong "a priori" and "synthetically" to an individual object of the region*.[17]

It is the paramount goal of a regional ontology to clarify the meaning of these concepts that define and determine the relationships between regional essences. According to Husserl, this task will turn out to be impossible outside of phenomenology.

We can now see that every conceivable science of fact must not only obey the laws prescribed for it by the formal eidetic disciplines. To understand the basic meaning of its subject-matter, it must also have recourse to the eidetic truths of the ontology of the region within which its objects fall. Geometry plays such a privileged "pedagogical" role for Husserl because it is clear confirmation of the possibility of a purely eidetic, non-analytic science. Geometry concerns itself with an "essential phase" of the regional *eidos* material thing, namely its spatial form.[18] No matter what material things empirical science may investigate, they will *a priori* conform to the geometrical laws that govern their extension, regardless of whatever developments or controversies may occur within geometry itself. Geometry, however, is a mathematical science. It thus develops through the construction of exact essences (as opposed to morphological essences) and deductive inference. This particular style of eidetic material science does not determine the proper form of construction for other material eidetic disciplines corresponding to the phase "spatial form," to other essential phases of the regional essence "material thing," to say nothing of other regions and their essential phases. The lesson to be learned from the success of mathematical, material, eidetic science is not that eidetic insight should be equated with mathematization. Rather, the example of geometry's eidetic authority over one phase of material thing-hood signals for Husserl the partial fulfillment of a scientific task that extends over all possible objective spheres: "…individuals must be determinable in terms

[17] Ibid., p. 70.

[18] Ibid., p. 58-9.

of concepts and laws and under the leading of 'synthetic a priori principles,' and all empirical sciences grounded in their own regional ontologies, and not merely on the pure logic which is common to all sciences." [19]

In the demarcation of regions, in the clarification of regional categories and axioms, and in the elaboration of regional ontologies, Husserl constructs a plan for the rationalization of all scientific inquiry into reality. We note, however, that nowhere in this great hierarchy of possible knowledge will we find "consciousness" *in the definite sense it has for phenomenology*. Consciousness is "the sphere in which experiences have their being."[20] But Husserl's "consciousness" does not name a form of reality that falls under the governance of a particular regional essence, nor does it name a particular regional essence itself. It will rather designate the domain of being from which beings of every possible region, as well as every possible regional essence, become accessible in a radically scientific way. Husserl thus calls consciousness the "region of regions" or the "Ur-region." Only in its investigation will the project of *theoria* have an appropriate subject-matter.

Husserl emphasizes a distinction between consciousness, as the region of regions, and the purely formal region "object-as-such." This distinction is important because the investigation of the formal region might already seem to provide scientific access to beings of all possible regions as well as to the regional essences themselves. If this were the case, *theoria* would be identical with those analytic disciplines that pertain to formal objectivity and the judgments that judge about it. The search for authoritative universal knowledge would be equivalent to finding ways to analyze objects in accordance with those disciplines. The formal-logical categories of the "object-as-such" are indeed universally applicable. Consciousness, just as much as a goldfish, can be treated as an object in the formal-ontological sense. It is crucial, however, that while formal ontological categories do indeed govern every possible object, they do so in a completely empty fashion that does not respond to *what* the objects essentially are. Higher genera are definitive of underlying genera or individuals. The material essence "lies in" the individual. It is "that which in the intimate self-being of an individual discloses to us '*what*' it is."[21] When we judge that an individual object and all its genera count as logical objects, on the other hand, we do not heed their positive content and indeed must remain indifferent to everything that shows us what they are. For this reason, Husserl claims that rather than being the region of regions the formal region "*is properly no region at all, but the pure form of region in general*."[22] The formal essence "object-as-such" cannot be the region of regions because it does not "lie in" the various material regions, and thus does not afford an access to the being of individuals. Husserl thus calls it a "quasi-region," which formally subsumes all individuals, while embracing the content of none.

Even contrasting the formal quasi-region "object as such" with consciousness is to risk misunderstanding. Something is in consciousness because it appears. If consciousness is the region of all regions, it seems that every possible object is defined by

[19] Ibid., p. 71.

[20] Ibid., p. 132.

[21] Ibid., p. 48.

[22] Ibid., p. 60.

its being an appearance (including the "object as such"). This is in fact true for Husserl. We must not understand this to mean, however, that it is a universal property of beings that they appear. Appearing is rather the framework of all properties, modes, relations, and beings as such. The claim that all objects are appearances says what they are by expressing the *how* of every conceivable *that* and *what*. The doctrine of intentionality, that consciousness is always consciousness *of*…, does not connect consciousness to something else that is, as it were, already there. Appearing in experiencing is the way objective reality is there as objective reality. In accordance with this universality of appearing, Husserl will make an essential distinction between transcendent and transcendental being. Transcendent being is being as reality, whether individual, abstract, essential, formal, material, etc. Transcendental being is consciousness as the domain of being in which all reality appears.

> [Consciousness] is the original category of being generally (or, as we would put it, the original region), in which all other regions of Being have their root, to which they are essentially related, on which they are therefore one and all dependent in an essential way…The relations between phenomenology and all other sciences…have their ground in this essential relation between *transcendental* and *transcendent* Being. Their very meaning implies that the domain over which phenomenology rules extends in a certain remarkable way over all the other sciences…[23]

As a transcendental region, consciousness will have regional categories of its own, which will thus function in the disclosure of all possible being within the domain of conscious experience (*Erlebnis*). It will be the primary task of phenomenology to fix conceptually these categories, and thus to ground unconditionally universal judgments concerning experience "as such."[24]

These structural or classificatory considerations make clear what kind of science phenomenology wants to be: the material eidetic science of consciousness, the region of regions. Still, how can we win insight into the right by which consciousness can occupy this position? Consciousness is supposed to designate the "sphere in which experiences have their being." But we already know about this sphere and its place within the order of realities. Consciousness is in the world of which it is consciousness. It "takes place" here in my body, and is a feature of my being as an animate organism. There, in that desk lamp, there is no consciousness; here, "in me," or, perhaps, "in my head" there is. One does not really need to consult science to verify this. In truth, one only need be familiar with wine and roses to know that consciousness stands in reciprocal relations with the physical environment and with the state of its organic substrate. Certain branches of

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[23] Ibid., p. 194.

[24] An experience (*Erlebnis*) thus has unconditionally prescribed ways of being. This challenges a common treatment of experience in the thought experiments of philosophy. An eidetic science of experience cannot "experiment" with multiple worlds, omniscience, or bodiless perception. Such experiments can only be useful in marking off the limits of possible experience. If they prove essentially unaccomplishable, they may not be presumed in order then to demonstrate something on the basis of this presumption. Experience will have *its own* eidetic laws, which any rational investigation will have to obey.

psychology may abstract from these realities, and consider everything solely from a "first person perspective." That, however, is precisely an abstraction. It considers experiences as if they were apart from the broader reality in which they occur. According to such views, consciousness would be a strictly regional phenomenon. The attempt to elevate it to the region of regions, the eidetic science of which would prescribe *a priori* laws for all possible being, can represent nothing other than a dogmatic one-sidedness, a kind of subjectivism or idealism bound to end in absurd consequences.

One cannot decisively overcome such prejudices without employing the phenomenological reduction.[25] The reduction is a method designed to reveal consciousness in its native absoluteness, which no subsequent interpretation can cancel. Given its methodological purpose, the reduction cannot be an abstraction, a partial focusing, or a suspension of certain subject-matters in favor of others. We must understand the reduction to consciousness in the etymological sense of the word. It will be a way of leading all being, empirical and eidetic, back to the domain in which it can become the object of absolutely certain judgments. For Husserl, this will amount to saying that it leads being back to the domain in which it is true being.[26] In Husserl's estimation, properly understanding the sense of this reduction is the most difficult step involved in recognizing phenomenology to be the universal science of all true being. To establish the possibility of purely eidetic science, it is necessary to overcome a dogmatism that resolves only to believe in empirical objects without first investigating the various forms of judgment and *what* they judge about. Husserl admits that such empiricism and the boogieman of "Platonism" it will oppose to eidetic insight are formidable obstacles to phenomenological philosophy. Yet, compared to the prejudices that thwart the recognition of consciousness as an absolute field for such an eidetic inquiry, they are insignificant.

These prejudices Husserl summarizes under the name "natural attitude." We can restrict our consideration of the natural attitude to how its general way of viewing things configures experience, and thus its domain, consciousness. In a word, the natural attitude views the world as transcendent to the experience that engages it. The world is "out there" for experience to find out about. This understanding is rooted in an unexpressed or tacit thesis, a foundational belief in transcendent reality (which Husserl calls "ur-doxa") that supports every doubt about the reality of particular worldly entities. This belief governs the non-scientific living in which all my interests concern realities and real possibilities that converge in the one spatiotemporal world in which I live. It also governs those scientific pursuits that seek, on the basis of these realities, to determine what is really real, stable, predictable, or lawfully regular about them. It is thus compatible with every possible empirical science. But it also governs the entire schema of non-phenomenological eidetic sciences. Although eidetic judgment itself contains no direct positing of empirical reality, it is not incompatible with the interpretation of its objects as exterior to experience (*Erlebnis*)—as supposedly occurred in "Platonism." Nor are the

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[25] Given our purposes, we will simply speak of "the" reduction, focusing on the common element involved in the various reductions Husserl executes in pursuit of specific ends within the phenomenological project.

[26] Ideas I, p. 358: "*Truth* is manifestly the correlate of the perfect rational character of the protodoxa, the believing certainty." In other words, true being is the being that can be believed in, that it is, and that it is the way it is, on the basis of indubitable evidence.

sciences based on this form of judgment incompatible with a tacit reference to the spatiotemporal world as the totality of realities that purely eidetic judgments are meant to explain. Husserl thus asserts a distinction between the all empirical and eidetic sciences compatible with the natural attitude and the science that will lead the whole of being back to the dimension of absolute consciousness. The former he calls "dogmatic"[27] sciences, the latter phenomenological.

Scientific inquiries proceeding from the natural attitude have already made a basic decision about the place of experience in the order of being. The natural attitude views reality as transcendent to experience. Experience will thus take place "in" this reality. The real world is the setting of experience. The reality that most immediately surrounds experience, in which experience constantly finds itself, is the reality of material things. Beginning from the natural attitude, it is thus obvious that: "Individual consciousness is interwoven with the *natural world* in a *twofold* way; it is some *man's* consciousness, or that of some *man* or *beast*, and in a large number at least of its particularizations it is a consciousness of this world."[28] Within the natural world, there are thus conscious organisms, of which I am one, that undergo or execute experiences that result in a perspective on this world.[29] These sentiments, whether explicit or not, will underlie every natural-attitude study of consciousness. They root experience in a subject of that experience, who, by virtue of her embodiment, has a place in the surrounding natural world. When Husserl speaks of the "natural world" in such contexts, he certainly wants to emphasize the material stratum of the external world, or nature in the narrow sense, with which experience seems to be immediately united in the organism. But we can equally understand natural world in the broader sense of "surrounding world" in all its social and historical aspects. To situate experiencing within such contexts is no less indicative of the study of experience in the natural attitude.

From this attitude emerge a number of scientific problems about how to understand the relation between experience and the natural world. On the one hand, the study of material reality, which includes the experiencing organism, should be able to explain experience as an event that occurs within nature. Between the experienced objects and the experiencing organism occur natural processes that, in accordance with the general hypothesis of empirical natural science, should be susceptible to rational explanation according to relationships of causation or functional dependency. But is the lived-through appearing of things itself reducible to the space-time of nature? Is it merely a lack of sophistication that prevents the natural sciences from explaining *experiencing itself* rather than modeling it or isolating conditions without which it would be

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[27] Ibid., p. 166. Husserl understands the "dogmatism" of non-phenomenological sciences as a positive force in their development. Since we lack a definitive philosophy, such sciences would do better to disregard every doubt as to the possibility of their research raised by "epistemology," and simply "find the data of knowledge there where they actually face you, whatever difficulties epistemological reflection may *subsequently* raise concerning the possibility of such data being there." (Ideas I, 86). The dogmatic attitude will, however, prove incompatible with the goal of phenomenology, which wants to become precisely that definitive philosophy that we lack.

[28] Ibid., p. 113.

[29] As Husserl characterizes this natural attitude opinion: "I, the real human being, am a real object like others in the natural world. I carry out *cogitations*, 'acts of consciousness'…and these acts, as belonging to this human subject, are events of the same natural world." Ideas I, p. 102.

impossible? Is there not rather something of a non-natural order in the experiencing or appearing for which a fully sufficient explanation would have to account? On the other hand, through a focus on experiencing itself, it becomes apparent that the whole external world, not only my immediate, shifting surroundings, but also the scientifically determined universe, is nothing more than a correlate of experience. Everything is then relative to experience. Given the commitments of the natural attitude, this relativity results in an epistemologically intolerable situation. It means that everything we can see and know depends upon the "make up" of a particular experiencing organism. What we take for reality is really only "our perspective," rooted in our particularly human being, with its biological, cultural, and other determinations. But what then can this "really" really mean? Both of these standpoints have subtle elaborations and methods of coping with the paradoxes to which they give rise. Husserl understands them under the titles of "naturalism" and "psychologism" (or "historicism"). They have in common the attempt to arrive at a unifying conception of being beginning from the idea that in order to do so, one must connect consciousness to the natural world, or relativize the natural world with respect to human consciousness. However complex or "dialectical" the solution to this problem may be, *Husserl will always regard its very premises as concealing the native absoluteness of consciousness*. The reduction is designed to undo these premises.

Since it must first uncover the absolute domain to which it will lead all being back, the phenomenological reduction cannot initially appear as a reduction. It instead appears as the free decision to "put out of action" the ur-doxa of the natural attitude. The reduction thus initially functions as a suspension or "epoche." The decision to disempower my primary belief in the being of the world is quintessentially artificial. Never in the course of my life has this belief led me astray. Of course, certain realities have turned out to be other than I first thought. I have been mistaken as to the existence or properties of particular objects of perception; I have been misled as to "what was actually going on" in certain situations in my personal and social life and have committed myself to various worldviews that I later came to see as mistaken. Nonetheless, far from disrupting the functioning of the ur-doxa, the process of being mistaken about reality requires it. Only by maintaining a belief in the reality of the surrounding world as the setting of experience can I doubt whether certain things really belong to it, and eventually decide that "really," i.e. transcendently, there is something else. The life of non-phenomenological science only radicalizes this belief. On the basis of the world that we already believe in as real, it seeks to determine with certainty its actual form and content. While it may confound our naïve opinions, it only rationalizes our most fundamental belief. The phenomenological epoche is the decision to shut down the engine that drives all of the inquisitive and critical engagements that begin from a belief in the reality of the world around us.

The sort of suspension Husserl applies to the ur-doxa is very specific. In *Ideas I*, he suggests that we can best understand it beginning from an act of unmotivated doubting. The desk on which I am working is bathed in sunlight streaming through the window. I have absolutely no reason to doubt that its surface is brown. As I am now looking at it, it seems that I cannot doubt it. When I nonetheless *try* to doubt it, I may adopt several strategies. I may, for instance, suppose the opposite, that it is not brown, and see if any motives in support of this supposition meet some minimal criterion of believability. Husserl's suspension is not a form of doubt. It corresponds, however, to a

particular phenomenon that the attempt to doubt brings to light. Before I arrive at any counter-evidence, the very attempt to doubt my conviction transforms it in a decisive way. I am as convinced as ever of the brownness of this desk, since I have no counter-evidence. It is still there before my eyes. Yet, insofar as I am actively engaged in the attempt to doubt it, I regard the conviction as suspended: "while remaining what it is, *we set it as it were 'out of action,' we 'disconnect it,' 'bracket it.'*...The thesis is experienced as lived (*Erlebnis*), *but we make no use of it*."[30] The suspending is thus "compatible with the unshaken and unshakable because self-evidencing conviction of truth."[31] I am still convinced of this brown surface before my eyes, and still convinced in the same way as before I began to try to doubt, but I no longer rely on this conviction and its object. I no longer use it to arrive at other convictions. The positive judgment, the positivity of which remains in full force, now has no direct power of persuasion over me. Husserl calls this a "disconnection of a living conviction that goes on living."[32] It is precisely this operation that Husserl wants to apply to the fundamental ur-doxa that orients every experience in the natural attitude:

> Instead of living naively in experience (*Erfahrung*), and subjecting what we experience, transcendent nature, to theoretical inquiries, we perform the "phenomenological reduction." In other words: instead of naively *carrying out* the acts proper to the nature-constituting consciousness with its transcendent theses and allowing ourselves to be led by motives that operate therein to still other transcendent theses, and so forth—we set all these theses "out of action"…[33]

A key phrase in this passage is "all these theses." Ludwig Landgrebe astutely notes that the phenomenological field is not opened "merely by inhibiting, one by one, the doxic theses of separate acts, separate believings"; instead, "their *basis* must also be affected by the *epoche*; indeed the *epoche* must relate primarily to their basis."[34] The phenomenologist must execute this disconnection in advance with respect to every particular instantiation of the ur-doxa. The epoche thus has the sense of a resolution to disconnect the living conviction in the totality of transcendent reality, or what we ordinarily call "the world." Not only must this disconnection be maintained, its sense must also be held fast throughout phenomenological inquiry. It must not transform into a position in a debate about the existence or non-existence of the world, but rather remain an attention to a *living conviction* that has simply been disconnected.

Under this methodical abstention, the inquiry into "experience" undergoes a radical modification. It can no longer take as its subject-matter a process that involves an

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[30] Ideas I, p. 98.

[31] Ibid., p. 99.

[32] Ibid., p. 99.

[33] Ibid., p. 140.

[34] Ludwig Landgrebe, *The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Six Essays*. Edited and with an Introduction by Donn Welton (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 125.

interaction between an organism and its environment. The thesis that roots my experiencing in this human body, itself a being in the surrounding world, falls under the scope of the phenomenological disconnection. I still believe in this thesis. I may not, however, accept it, make use of its results, or think in its terms. The same holds for every thesis that posits a material nature in relation to which "experience" would stand as a dependent variable. The experience accessible to investigation from within the epoche can belong to no region of reality, nor can it enter into a real relationship, causal or motivational, with any such region, whether it be "nature," "culture," or "history." Consciousness, the domain in which experiences have their being, can have no setting in the world.

Husserl's claim is that disconnecting our fundamental belief in reality clears the way for the study of consciousness on its own terms: "consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnection."[35] Holding the epoche in place, I can direct my attention to my experiencing as a happening purified from all bases in reality. For instance, the true being even of my most passive perceiving does not consist in a physical relationship between my organism and transcendent entities. It is rather a believing-looking, an unquestioning accepting *of* these entities as transcendent; it is simultaneously an owning of this believing-looking as "mine," as something that takes place "here," in my body, which I feel to be present in the same space as the perceived objects. The believing-looking, and the owning and localizing of this experiencing lose nothing of their own being should it turn out that, according to objective observation, the perceived transcendent entities, or my perceiving body, are not real. Neither, however, do the *objective components* of these experiences insofar as we consider them from within the epoche, i.e. strictly as they appear within the experiencing that believes in their reality: the transcendent objects *as perceived*, the perceiving body *as felt*, *as the object of localizations*. If there is a "withdrawal from the senses" here, it is not eliminative. The reduction does not retreat to a purely intellectual "soul." One may speak of a withdrawal only in the sense that the reduction will reveal all world-positing, both perceptual and intellectual, from the perspective of the experiencing in which it occurs.

In Husserl's terminology, the objective components of experience viewed under the control of the epoche are called noematic phenomena. Husserl's whole presentation is designed to enforce the recognition that we in no sense diminish the reality of experienced objects by including them in the phenomenological domain under the proviso *as experienced*. In the natural attitude, it was obvious that to regard objectivity as relative to experience meant precisely that. Rather than existing transcendently, reality would be a mere appearance to human being and its empirically shaped faculties. Within the epoche, however, experience is no longer set into a broader reality with which it stands in connection. There is nothing about the "outsideness" of reality with respect to experience, of its "being there whether experienced or not," that we cannot discover from within experience as a non-real happening, which is where this transcendence asserts itself as such. The natural attitude simply believes in this assertion, and makes use of it in all its non-scientific and scientific interests. Having placed the ur-doxa "out of action," we encounter the object of this believing in all its fullness of presentation and claim to independence, exactly according to this presentation and this claim. Reality, in which we

[35] Ideas I, p. 102.

continue to believe, reveals itself as the correlate of this belief and its modalizations (doubt, certainty, etc.). The discovery of consciousness as the field from which to disclose all reality as true being does not free us from deception by reducing our beliefs to judgments, our passive acceptances to acts of the intellect. Instead, by focusing on the various modes of experiencing, we discover the world *as it is given*. The reduction of *Ideas I* already meets the requirement of radical reflection so well articulated by Merleau-Ponty in *The Visible and the Invisible*. It does not "reduce in advance our contact with Being to the discursive operations with which we defend ourselves against illusion."[36] It rather "suspend[s] the faith in the world only so as to see it."[37] The phenomenological reduction is a method that reveals reality as it actually is.[38]

At the same time, the reduction reverses the configuration of experience that arises out of the natural attitude. Reality is not the setting for experience. Experience is the setting for reality:

> The whole *spatio-temporal world*, to which man and the human Ego claim to belong as subordinate singular realities, is *according to its own meaning mere intentional Being*, a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being *for* a consciousness. It is a Being which consciousness in its own experiences (*Erfahrungen*) posits…but *over and beyond this*, is just nothing at all… Reality, that of the thing taken singly as also that of the whole world, essentially lacks independence.[39]

In turn, Husserl will argue that consciousness, as it appears from within the phenomenological epoche, has no need of reality in order to be. It is essentially independent.[40]

We remarked earlier on the constancy with which the natural attitude maintains a belief in the world, and this throughout individual episodes of disharmony and illusion. While single things may turn out not to be, or to be other than I now think, I continue to maintain my belief in the world-of-things, a harmonious encompassing reality, in which the true meaning of these anomalies is included. I can continue to do so because experience has *in fact* never spoken against this belief. Husserl asks us to imagine that experience is not in fact so constituted. It could be, for instance, that there were no real things, instead only "fleeting concentration-centers for intuitions…being wholly incapable of constituting self-preserving 'realities,' unities that endure and 'exist in

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[36] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 39.

[37] Ibid., p. 38.

[38] See also Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologischen Reduktion: Texte aus dem Nachlaß (1926-1935)*. Ed. Sebastian Luft. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Adademic Publishers, 2002),[Hereafter, HUSS XXXIV] p. 313: "*die Epoche war nur und bleibt die Methode, das mundane, das jeweilige objective Sein rein als das zu behandeln, was es ist und immer war*…"

[39] Ideas I, p. 139.

[40] Ibid., p. 137: "*Thus no real thing*, none that consciously presents and manifests itself through appearances, *is necessary for the Being of consciousness*…"

themselves whether perceived or not perceived.'"[41] In this situation, the whole matrix of empirical sciences, as well as their corresponding eidetic inquiries, would be without an object. And yet, the object of phenomenology, experiencing as such, would remain: "*the Being of consciousness*, of every stream of experience generally, *though it would indeed be inevitably modified by a nullifying of the thing-world, would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence*."[42] The possibility of this nullification in no way detracts from the force of the factual reality of the world. It rather reveals it in its full contingency. The being of consciousness does not guarantee the being of the thing-world and its essential categories. Is this experience imaginable? The most obvious objections to it are rooted in the most tenacious theses of the natural attitude (consciousness is in the body, which is in the thing-world, etc). Perhaps this experiment is Husserl's best designed "test" of the rigor of the phenomenological epoche.

Phenomenological consciousness is not only a domain of being that includes all possible realities and whose being is radically independent form them. It is also a domain of being that is accessible in such a way that its being is categorically undeniable, a characteristic essentially lacking in all transcendent being. Consciousness appears to itself in a different fashion than appearing objects. All phenomenological research will take place through this access, and every phenomenological claim will appeal to the certainty it affords. This access to experiencing occurs via "reflection." Certainly, reflection plays a prominent role in the natural attitude, both in non-scientific and scientific life. The reflection that concerns us here will take place under the discipline of the phenomenological epoche. It is also crucial to distinguish this reflection from a "considering" that turns its attention to some experience in which I am no longer living. Such reflections will play an important role in Husserl's phenomenology. This is not, however, the kind of reflection that discloses conscious experiencing itself as an indubitable being. Rather than following those cognitive connotations of the word, we should think of standing in front of a mirror *to the extent that* in such a reflection something shows itself to itself as it now is. Having carried out the phenomenological epoche, I can modify my attention so that the experience I am now undergoing comes "before itself." The experience of this doubling-up Husserl calls "immanent perception;" it is the form of reflection by which consciousness appears before itself as consciousness.

Immanent perception is a "perceiving reflection"[43] that can occur within every possible mode of experiencing (and not merely perceiving itself). We can accomplish it through a "shifting of the glance" from whatever objectivity appears in the experiencing, to the experiencing itself, in which the objectivity appears. This experiencing is a non-real, non-spatial unfolding or flowing, a seeing, an imagining, a willing, etc. If we require a representational metaphor for experiencing, we could say that if the various objectivities of the world are figures on a movie screen, then our experiencing is the "rolling" of the film—not the film itself, but its rolling. The rolling of the film has no place on the screen, but this happening is the event through which everything appears there. For Husserl, to perceive experiencing is to have it appear as "itself-there," or there

[41] Ibid., p. 137.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., p. 130.

in "primordial presence." This definition of perception obviously also applies to the perception of transcendent realities. When I perceive this desk, I carry out the kind of experience in which it can be there in the most authentic way possible (as opposed, for instance, to verbal reference, imagination, or memory). It is essential to every transcendent spatial object, however, that it can only be "itself-there" through partial appearances that indicate the whole. For Husserl, this means that the assertion of existence based on the primordial "being-itself-there" of such an object only remains within rational bounds when it asserts it to be real "on the supposition that the advance of experience does not bring in its train 'stronger rational motives' which exhibit the original positing as one that must be 'cancelled.'…"[44] In the immanent perception of experiencings, however, one encounters the primordial presence of something absolutely undeniable: "*All corporeally given thing-like entities can also not be, no corporeally given experiencing can also not be*."[45]

When, living through a perceptual certainty, for instance that this desk is brown, I unhinge my attention from the convincingness of this sense-quality, and focus on the believing that I am now undergoing, I cannot doubt the being of this believing and its objective component *as believed*. This reflection has a discovering function. It does not create the experiencing it brings into view. As a "bending-back" of experience on itself, immanent perceiving reflection "has this remarkable peculiarity that that which is thus apprehended through perception is, in principle, characterized as something which not only is and endures within the gaze of perception, but *already was before* this gaze was directed to it."[46] What is thereby discovered, as already underway and now unfolding, is a matter of indubitable existence:

> If reflective apprehension is directed to my experience, I apprehend an absolute Self whose existence (*Dasein*) is, in principle, undeniable; it would be nonsense to maintain the possibility of an experience *given in such a way not* truly existing…so soon as I glance toward the flowing life and into the real present it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as the pure subject of this life…I say forthwith and because I must: *I am*, this life is, I live: *cogito*.[47]

The phenomenological reduction to consciousness thus makes me aware of myself as the subject of a flowing experiencing by which the world, and I myself as a worldly subject, have attained, and will continue to attain, whatever sense they possess as reality. It is *this* experiencing that is to be determined in its eidetic structures. Nothing is thus further from phenomenology than a philosophy that would appeal to "our intuitions," by which is meant convictions about the world built up in the natural attitude, as a standard against which to measure theoretical constructions.

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[44] Ibid., p. 355.

[45] Ibid., p. 131.

[46] Ibid., p. 128.

[47] Ibid., p. 130.

The proper meaning of the "I" and the "life" to which Husserl here appeals cannot be tied to any empirical entities, and will have to become clear from within immanent reflections carried out under the epoche. Husserl does not dogmatically decide that the self-presence of consciousness in immanent perception is "simple" or "immediate." The life of consciousness is indubitably present to itself in the flowing of time. In *Ideas I*, Husserl is already cognizant of the problems relating to the consciousness of inner-time and their foundational role in exploring the self-presence of experiencing. Even an experiencing, he writes, "cannot be grasped adequately in its full unity. It is essentially something that flows…"[48] But this flowing *just is* the most primordial form of presence. The consciousness that apprehends consciousness in its own flowing encounters it as "that which truly is."[49] The life of absolute consciousness could never have been present to itself at some "point" of time. We cannot oppose the flow of time to a self-presence of consciousness that would be instantaneous and *thus* absolute (in the lectures of 1905 Husserl already views the flow *as* absolute subjectivity). Despite explicitly avoiding a detailed analysis of inner-time in *Ideas I*, Husserl consistently treats it as a problem concerning the very form of the life of absolute consciousness. Consciousness is absolutely present to itself as flow.

In its inclusion of all possible objects as appearances, in its independence with respect to the being of every reality, and in its indubitable presence to itself, phenomenological consciousness is an *absolute* domain of being. The phenomenological epoche thus makes possible a reduction of all conceivable being to its being revealed from within this absolute domain. This is "the basic field" of phenomenology:

> we direct the glance of apprehension and theoretical inquiry to *pure consciousness in its own absolute Being*…we *tie up* the *performance* of all [natural attitude] cognitive theses, i.e., we place in brackets" what has been carried out, "we do not associate these theses" with our new inquiries; instead of living *in* them and carrying *them* out, we carry out acts of *reflexion* directed toward them, and these we apprehend as the *absolute* Being which they are. We live now entirely in such acts of the second level, whose datum is the infinite field of absolute experiences—*the basic field of Phenomenology*.[50]

Every object of every region, every essence and every essential relationship, will have its true being within this field. This means also: the subject matters and cognitive accomplishments of all non-phenomenological sciences. It will be a primary task of phenomenology as *theoria* to explicate, first of all, the eidetic categories of its own ur-region, and then those of the formal and material regions that appear from within it.

Likewise, the procedures of phenomenology itself, its own access to its field of work, and its methodical pursuit of its tasks, will constitute problems approachable only from within consciousness itself: "The essential relation of phenomenology to its own self here reveals itself in this, that what there under methodic reflexion under the rubrics:

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[48] Ibid, p. 127.

[49] Ibid., p. 365.

[50] Ibid., p. 140

clearness, insight, expression, and the like, is considered and established, itself belongs on its own side to the phenomenological domain."[51] Because phenomenology itself "happens" in the absolute domain of consciousness, every attempt to situate phenomenological procedure within a broader reality will make use of theses and perform cognitions that will require, for their own clarification, phenomenological reflections. Phenomenology is the source of its own critique.

Our reflections have laid out in quite general terms Husserl's doctrine of consciousness as the field of phenomenology. Our aim has not been to say anything new to the phenomenologist, or to persuade the skeptic, but to win a position from which to approach the encompassing role of "Europe" in Husserl's thought. We now know that if Europe should encompass phenomenology in a way that is phenomenologically meaningful, it will encompass the whole scientific effort as comprehended from the perspective of the reduction. Every empirical, eidetic, formal, material, dogmatic and phenomenological science will somehow be a "European" science. We also know that no science other than phenomenology will be able to explain the encompassing Europe or the mode of its encompassment. Every dimension of reality stands in relation to other dimensions, and thus admits of clarification from other scientific perspectives. There is thus a mutual encompassing of sciences. The purely psychological study of experience, for example, does not focus on the physical realities that govern both its activity and its subject-matter. Physics, conversely, will not scientifically attend to itself or its objects as subjective human experience. Each discipline is capable of understanding the domain of reality that encompasses the other. This is a very simple way of putting a complex issue. But it can serve to highlight the distinction between these relations and that between phenomenological science and non-phenomenological science as a whole.

Phenomenological consciousness and its contents belong to a dimension that cannot be clarified from the "dogmatic" perspective. Realities and their corresponding sciences essentially relate to one another. However, it is basic to Husserl's approach that "the realm of experience as absolute essences…is radically and essentially different. It is shut off fast within itself, and yet has no boundaries which might separate it from other regions…it is the whole of Absolute Being in the definite sense stressed by our analyses."[52] The Europe that encompasses phenomenology will not do so because it is a reality that impacts phenomenological consciousness from without. We will see that, for Husserl, phenomenologizing conscious is in fact necessarily a "European" consciousness. This cannot indicate, however, that it stands within a network of relationships susceptible to empirical clarification: "Consciousness, considered in its 'purity,' must be reckoned as a *self-contained system of Being*, as a system of *Absolute Being*, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system."[53]

It is especially important to emphasize the lack of a real relation between the phenomenological field and various regions of reality in the case of those cultural-historical sciences that study the world in which Europe obviously appears. Human

[51] Ibid., p. 175.

[52] Ibid., p. 141.

[53] Ibid., p. 139.

beings act and think under the influence of various historical communities, forming and being formed by their institutions, customs, and styles of life. We are familiar with Europe as one such social formation in the surrounding world, a formation to which Husserl and those who most immediately influenced him belonged. Every step of phenomenological method obviously occurred within this social environment. Phenomenology itself is an intellectual movement within world history that bears the influence of, and exerts effects upon, our broader cultural life. Is it through the scientific development of such natural attitude reflections that we will understand the "Europe" that encompasses phenomenology?

For the encompassment to pertain to phenomenology itself, it would have to occur to a phenomenologist. Such a person has once carried out the phenomenological reduction and knows that she could carry it out again. Living in the natural attitude, she does not simply forget the evidence and scientific import of the reduction. She now is of the conviction, even if she does not bother to confirm it, that every appearance of transcendent reality is relative to the transcendental life of consciousness. If the field of phenomenological activity has once been clearly disclosed, its subsequent interpretation as a province of reality can have no scientific status.[54] For the phenomenologist, then, it is impossible that such natural-attitude reflections could have the sense of encompassing phenomenology in the European world. The discovery of phenomenology within the context of Europe as a social-scientific or cultural-historical theme is a legitimate discovery, but it would have no bearing on the meaning of phenomenologically clarified questions and problems.

And yet, Husserl's *Crisis* clearly indicates that Europe is an encompassing dimension for phenomenological *theoria*. According to what that text shows, phenomenological consciousness focused on phenomenologically clarified questions and problems can only attain an ultimate understanding of what it is doing by somehow situating itself with respect to Europe. How are we to understand this?

2.
The Fundamental Character of the Europe-Problematic

The only way forward is to discover the motivations internal to phenomenological science that will lead to the discovery of Europe in its encompassing function. We thus focus on the phenomenological project "from the inside." We view in it the pursuit of its own theoretical goals, not "from the outside" in relation to a surrounding European context. In this attitude, we will trace a shift in Husserl's conception of the ultimate problems of phenomenological science. This shift does not entail a reevaluation of the doctrine of phenomenological insight as much as a growing awareness that clarity of insight has to be matched by clarity of purpose. In the works the attempt to introduce phenomenology as philosophy, Husserl increasingly grapples with the problem of how to take responsibility for the existence of philosophy itself as a *goal*. From the beginning,

[54] HUSS XXXIV, Nr. 22. Husserl thus recognizes a "transcendental philosophical function" in the return to the natural attitude insofar as it constantly furnishes us a "transcendental guide [*Leitfaden*]" for phenomenological work.

and at each step, phenomenological method seeks the way to an end that is not itself a transcendentally reduced or eidetic theme, but rather a concrete objective taken over from the surrounding world. This fact will eventually provoke Husserl to philosophical reflections that he considers to be of ultimate importance. They concern the manner in which one has already taken over the goal "philosophy" in the first place. The responsible philosopher must also take account of this presupposition, so near, so much on this side of all topical work, that it is overlooked. It is in view of *this appropriative reflection of philosophy as a concrete task* that Europe appears as the horizon in which the entirety of phenomenological work will have its full significance. It will win that significance precisely as *theoria*, as an irrelative, absolute science. The unification of sciences as "European" will not ground rational inquiry in an anthropological reality, but rather in a form of purposeful life that gives to science as a whole it meaning as a historical task. According to Husserl, anyone, anywhere, who today wants to understand the significance of her scientific work will have to become cognizant of this European horizon.

To explore this territory, we must understand how the phenomenological project is deepened such that methodical access to the field of philosophical topics becomes legitimate only at the term of a reflection that responsibly appropriates *theoria* as a task. Returning to *Ideas I*, we can assess Husserl's thought at a stage where the appropriation of the theoretical project still poses no serious theoretical dilemmas. That text, as we have seen, is always already oriented by the epistemic demands of *theoria* as the universal science of all possible true being. Husserl explicitly acknowledges this fact. Indeed, when he first introduces the phenomenological reduction, he understands it as serving the purposes of this scientific project. Comparing his own method of disconnection with that of Cartesian doubt, Husserl writes: "A procedure of this sort, *possible at any time*, is, for instance, *the attempt to doubt everything* which Descartes, with an entirely different end in view, with the purpose of setting up an absolutely indubitable sphere of Being, undertook to carry through. We link on here…"[55] And then, immediately before setting the reduction in place, Husserl once more emphasizes that "our design is just to discover a new scientific domain, such as might be won *precisely through the method of bracketing*."[56] The setting out of action of the ur-doxa here appears as a "linking on" to the purposes of an inherited theoretical project. Is that not a problem?

For the Husserl of *Ideas I*, it is not. At the point where his position regarding eidetic intuition requires him to confront existing empiricist doctrine, Husserl announces a methodological policy that governs the whole of his engagements with existing "philosophy." He calls this policy the "philosophic epoche."

> Our previous reflexions have been, as all that are to follow should be, free from every relation of dependence on a "science" so contentious and contemptible as is philosophy. In the fundamental positions we have set up we have presupposed nothing, not even the concept of philosophy, and we intend to hold on to this policy henceforth. The *philosophic epoche*, which we propose to adopt, should consist, when explicitly formulated, in this, that *in respect of the theoretical content of all previous philosophy, we shall*

[55] Ideas I, p. 97.

[56] Ibid., p. 99.

> *abstain from passing any judgment at all, and that our whole discussion shall respect the limits imposed by this abstention*.[57]

This epoche will ensure that wherever Husserl's phenomenology "links on" to existing philosophy, it will not do so in a dependent manner. The freedom and independence of these associations are evidenced by the fact that Husserl will never rely on any existing philosophical doctrine to ground a phenomenological judgment: "Only as facts of our environment, not as agencies for uniting facts together, do theories concern us at all."[58] Husserl approaches Descartes' attempt at universal doubt, for instance, as the instantiation of a pure possibility for experience from the perspective of an eidetic reflection on such an attempt "in general." This means that Descartes' doubting appears in the function of a purely illustrative example whose very existence is a matter of theoretical irrelevance. The ground for the phenomenological judgment as to the possibility of universal doubt can lie nowhere other than in the primordial evidence of essential insight itself.

Husserl gives positive expression to this absolute independence of phenomenology from all existing philosophy in his "principle of all principles." He explicitly formulates the principle as the resolution "that every primordial dator intuition is a source of authority (*Rechtsquelle*) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it presents itself."[59] Husserl announces the principle at the close of his critical engagements with "philosophy." It is meant to emphasize that no existing theory could ever excuse the phenomenologist from the responsibility of seeing. Whatever decisions phenomenology may make, and however these decisions may stand with respect to received doctrine, they will have their legitimate basis solely in what the reflecting phenomenologist sees with self-evidence, i.e. in the mode of its being "itself-there." This principle is not a form of intellectual bullying that replaces reasonable judgment with bald assertion. On the contrary, it seeks to make explicit the appeal to immediate evidence that ultimately underlies every reasonable judgment, and thus forces an account of the "seeing of evidence" itself. It is in this account, and not by virtue of some supposed obviousness, that the principle itself will win the status of being self-grounding. Rather than seeking guidance from theories that would blindly pronounce upon what sort of beings are there to be seen, phenomenology will thus be a discipline of seeing being according to its own proper manners of evidence, only then making judgments whose meaning and scope appeal directly to what has been originally intuited.

In the philosophic epoche and the principle of principles, Husserl provides a framework in which phenomenology can attempt to become *theoria* without presuming any existing theoretical science. Can we not, however, detect a problem in the fact that Husserl builds this framework as a response to the demands of the project of *theoria* itself? Is not the *existence* of this project presupposed as the motivational ground

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[57] Ibid., p. 72.

[58] Ibid., p. 95.

[59] Ibid., p. 83.

underlying every methodological procedure? Husserl's first allusion to the principle of principles makes quite clear the motives behind its introduction: "Genuine science, and the genuine absence of bias which inwardly distinguishes it, demands as the foundation of all proofs judgments which as such are immediately valid, drawing their validity directly from *primordial dator intuitions*."[60] The project of genuine science *demands* adherence to the principle of principles. It *requires* that one seek original sources of validity in independence from the authority of all previously existing doctrine. Is it then really possible for Husserl to hold to his claim that, in addition to suspending the content of all existing philosophy, he will not presuppose "even the concept of philosophy"? It is not only in his late writings that Husserl understands phenomenology as the taking over and fulfillment of a theoretical task that animates philosophical history. Indeed, he already believes that "phenomenology is as it were the secret longing of the whole philosophy of modern times…"[61] From the perspective of *Ideas I*, however, philosophy's existence as a task does not raise any systematic problems for phenomenology itself.

In the *Paris Lectures* and *Cartesian Meditations*, these very same issues become pressing problems for Husserl. At the outset of the first meditation, Husserl in effect separates the two levels we were able to discern in the philosophic epoche of *Ideas I*. He recognizes that refusing to rely on established scientific doctrine as a guide for phenomenological procedure does not change the fact that "the general aim of grounding science absolutely shall indeed continually motivate the course of our meditations."[62] For the Husserl of *Cartesian Meditations*, this "fact" indicates the presence of an important methodological dilemma. Rather than simply recognizing *theoria* as the guiding aim of phenomenology, Husserl now deems it necessary "to find the legitimate manner *in which to make it our aim*."[63] It is crucial to emphasize the essential precedence this problem has with respect to every phenomenological procedure. It concerns the appropriate appropriation of the very goal to which phenomenology would deliver the way. To be able to begin in a radical fashion, phenomenology must take over the goal of philosophy as *theoria* in full understanding of how and whence it is taken over, and thus without unnoticed prejudices.[64] The difficulties associated with appropriating the theoretical goal are *introductory difficulties* in the radical sense. They concern the possibility of being able to begin doing philosophy. These difficulties will eventually cause Husserl to reformulate the project of philosophical introduction in general.

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[60] Ibid., p. 75.

[61] Ibid., p. 166.

[62] Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) [Hereafter Cartesian Meditations], p. 8.

[63] Cartesian Meditations, p. 8. My emphasis.

[64] Of paramount importance here are the prejudices suggested by the successful functioning of particular sciences. Husserl accuses Descartes of failing to recognize the *cogito-cogitatum* as an infinite field of philosophical work precisely because of such prejudices. His "admiration of mathematical natural science" (24) leads him to treat the *cogito* as an axiom from which an explanatory science might be deduced. This interpretation is further reinforced by Husserl in the sections of the *Crisis* devoted to Descartes. See especially section 18.

Husserl's proposed course of action, which he says he can only indicate rather than explicitly execute, consists in an "immersion in the characteristic intention of the scientific endeavor."[65] Without assuming the validity of any of the existing sciences, Husserl fixes his attention on the nature of the validity that they seek to attain. By discovering what all factually existing sciences "really aim at," he will explicate "the genuine concept of science" by which they are guided. As a result of this explication, he is able to "extract" the operative phenomenological working-goals of perfect evidence, univocal expression, unconditional validity, etc. from the striving characteristic of science in general. It is as a product of this extraction that he now discovers the principle of all principles. In *Ideas I*, Husserl introduced the principle as a self-grounding guarantor of phenomenological independence from all existing sciences. In the *Paris Lectures*, he explicitly *derives* it from a reflection on existing scientific praxis.

> At the beginning, however, to presuppose even the possibility of that goal [of *theoria*] would be prejudice. We are satisfied to discover the goal and nature of science by thinking ourselves into [*hineinverstehen*] the activity of the sciences. It is the spirit of science to count nothing as really scientific which cannot be justified by complete evidence. In other words, science demands proof by *reference to the things and states of affairs themselves, as these are given in original experience and intuition*. Thus guided, we, the beginning philosophers, make it a principle to judge only by the evidence. Also, the evidence itself must be subjected to critical verification, and that on the basis, of course, of further available evidence.[66]

When Husserl speaks of science as a feature of our surrounding world, he is referring to a praxis guided by this ideal of absolute justification. Whatever other interests may influence the realities of research, they do not diminish the aiming at perfect knowledge which is essential to science as such. Husserl thus bases the appropriation of phenomenology's animating goal on the claim that a "final idea of science," identifiable with *theoria* itself, actually animates existing sciences. He writes in *Cartesian Meditations*: "The Cartesian idea of a science (ultimately an all-embracing science) grounded on an absolute foundation, and absolutely justified, is none other than the idea that constantly furnishes guidance in all sciences…"[67] In addition to unifying the sciences with respect to the being they all investigate, Husserl now unites them under a definite form of striving, in which phenomenology shares, and that it is capable of fulfilling. This certainly represents a different kind of "linking on" to *theoria* than that exercised in *Ideas I*, where its independence was ensured in advance by the philosophic epoche and the principle of all principles.

We appreciate the extent of this difference when we realize that in carrying out his reflective "immersion in the characteristic intention of scientific endeavor" Husserl

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[65] Cartesian Mediations, p. 9.

[66] Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures*.Trans. Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 5-6. Translation Modified. See Die Pariser Vorträge, Husseriliana I, p. 6.

[67] Cartesian Meditations, p. 11.

has as his object the sciences considered straightforwardly as "facts of Objective culture."[68] In the title of the section devoted to this consideration of science, Husserl speaks of "becoming immersed in science qua noematic phenomenon."[69] If we respect the proper methodological order of problems, we see that this characterization is premature. It is the very aim of *theoria* that Husserl is here trying to appropriate. Only on the basis of this immersion in science as a fact of objective culture will he be able to *derive* the evidential criteria that motivate the enactment of the phenomenological reduction, which, in its turn, will first show us what a noematic phenomenon is. Husserl admits that by taking over the guiding idea of science in such a manner "we get into what are, at first, rather strange circumstantialities."[70] Chief among these seems to be that the entire phenomenological enterprise, which is sworn against relying on the reality of any worldly circumstance, now does so at the crucial point of its being able to begin. Of course, philosophy always begins in non-philosophy, phenomenology in the natural attitude. But in this case, the initial reliance on worldly circumstance is the source of the animating goal of phenomenological work, and, rather than being disempowered within the dimension of transcendental experience (as is the natural attitude the moment it appears as such), it will instead continue to drive phenomenological procedure at each step. The research program of phenomenology, even and precisely to the extent that it moves within the reduction, now appears to be the working out of an intention born by the surrounding world of culture.

In the preface to *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (*FTL*), Husserl develops an even more concrete engagement with these problems of beginning. Here, Husserl once again attempts to make *theoria* his aim by linking on to a project that he discovers in the surrounding world. The starting point of this text is "the historically given relation of the idea of genuine science to logic as its antecedent norm."[71] In this context, Husserl is not thinking of logic as one of the formal disciplines that would concern itself with categories of the quasi-region "object-as-such" and its corresponding judgment-forms. That definition of logic now appears as a residuum of the original sense of the logical task. This latter Husserl understands in terms so universal as to allow us to identify logic with *theoria* itself. Logic was to be the science devoted to "the clear theoretical explicating of the genuine sense of all science as such."[72] Factually subsequent to the sciences, it was to determine principles for genuine cognition that possess a juridical precedence with respect to all factual cognition, and can thus serve as norms for "rightly shaping scientific production."[73] Having inherited this critical project, Husserl will seek to justify the

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[68] Ibid., p. 9.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969) [Hereafter Formal and Transcendental Logic], p. 7.

[72] Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 1.

[73] Ibid., p. 1.

conviction "that an actually philosophical logic…can grow up only in the nexus of a transcendental phenomenology."[74]

What, then, is new in this approach? *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Paris Lectures* discover the goal of *theoria* through a reflection on the formal moments contained in the idea of genuine science as manifest in actual scientific praxis (the kind of evidence, judgment and expression that existing sciences seek). *FTL* begins by reflecting on a "historically given" project to transform science into genuine science by means of something called "logic." Whereas *Cartesian Meditations* simply sought to identify the *form* of striving characteristic of science as such, *FTL* links onto this striving in its historical concreteness. We might say that the approach of the *Cartesian Meditations* only aimed to appropriate the form of a goal, while that of *FTL* seeks to take over a goal from the perspective of the project in which it functions as a living *telos*. Correlatively, phenomenology will no longer deliver the fulfillment of a *form* of science, but of that concrete historical endeavor, long ago "established" by Plato, passed down through the generations, and available to us in the present as a feature of our cultural life.

It is now from this concrete present, traversed by the aims of an unfinished scientific project, that Husserl will take his bearings. An eidetic reflection on the "characteristic intention" of science cannot account for the dimension of historical responsibility from which phenomenology begins. To understand itself as pursuing the fulfillment of the logical project, phenomenology must reflect on the *actual* intentions of that project. Phenomenological logic cannot set itself alongside historical logics as a doctrine conceived in independence from them. In order to account for the being-there of its own goal, it must consciously appropriate the unfulfilled intentions of the tradition and carry them forward. This necessitates a historical reflection that determines what logic has always sought to be, and that judges the validity of logical tradition in light of its own aims. Such a reflection also casts the "present scientific situation" in a critical light. Having inherited the ideal of logic along with actually existing science, Husserl is in a position to diagnose "a tragedy of modern scientific culture."[75] The sciences of today, he writes, have "abandoned" their original goal of "scientific self-responsibility" in favor of technical proficiency, and practical applicability.[76] It is beginning from this dramatic conception of the present that phenomenology will appear as a productive transformation of logical tradition that redeems its inherent value. If phenomenology succeeds in making logic possible, it will be in response to the demands of this historical endeavor, in relation to which "our present situation" appears intolerable. Husserl's starting point thus appeals to a "we today" charged with a scientific task from the depths of our past. Phenomenology will now seek to understand itself as the fulfillment and justification of a historical teleology.

Husserl calls the reflection that seeks to accomplish this understanding *Besinnung*. A *Besinnung* is a reflection on a project in which I have already been engaged. It seeks to clarify what is underway in that engagement, whether the project is

[74] Ibid., p. 13.

[75] Ibid., p. 3.

[76] Ibid., p. 5.

actually capable of fulfillment, and the stakes involved in failure or success.[77] Husserl understands such reflection as simultaneously clarifying and creative. It will seek to "produce" the genuine sense of logic through a "conversion" of the inherited tradition.[78] Beginning from a "vague pre-delineation" of what logic has always sought to be, Husserl will carry out a critique of logical doctrine that attempts to bring obscurely intended content into the mode of full clarity while undoing whatever prejudices within the tradition stand in the way of logic's realization. However much Husserl emphasizes the creative aspect of this *Besinnung*, up to the point of saying that it will produce the proper sense of logic for the first time, this proper sense will nonetheless be the fulfillment of a tradition that was already aiming at it. The terms of the *Besinnung* would collapse if Husserl were simply to *attribute* to logical tradition the "final sense" to which his critical investigations aim to lead it. Husserl's attitude at the outset of *FTL* is that the best proof that the goal of logic (in the pregnant sense) actually animates our scientific history lies in the work of the *Besinnung* itself. Through its critical engagements with the tradition, it must produce the certainty that the final sense to which it converts logic is the final sense interior to the tradition itself. Outside of this critical re-working for oneself, no genuine access to the *telos* is possible.

This style of *Besinnung* becomes the method of the *Crisis*, Husserl's final attempted introduction to phenomenology. In the forward, Husserl explicitly lays out his aim. The text:

> *Macht den Versuch, auf dem Wege einer teleologisch-historischen Besinnung auf die Ursprünge unsere kritischen wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Situation die unausweichliche Notwendigkeit einer transzendentalphänomenologischen Umwendung der Philosophie zu begründen. Sonach wird sie zu einer eigenständigen Einleitung in die Transzendentale Phänomenologie*.[79]

This *Besinnung* has much in common with that of *FTL*. It seeks to appropriate a scientific project beginning from a concrete present in which the fate of that project is at stake. Phenomenology will understand itself as a transformation of that project, a transformation that is unavoidably necessary if the project is to realize its *telos*. It once again has its audience in a "we" who are to take responsibility for the critical nature of our situation, and thus recognize the transformation as a matter of practical necessity.

What is obviously new here is that this *Besinnung* now has something called "philosophy" as its object. In *FTL*, Husserl restricted himself to critical reflections on a theoretical project that had come to understand itself as a specialized, even technical,

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[77] For a useful guide to the different uses of *Besinnung* in German and "reflection" in English, as well as a discussion of the role of *Besinnung* in the *Crisis*, see James Dodd, *Crisis and Reflection*: *An Essay on Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2004) [Hereafter Crisis and Reflection], p. 4.

[78] Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 13.

[79]Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transcendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie 1934-1937*. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana Vol. VI. (The Haag: Matinus Hijhoff, 1954). [Hereafter Krisis], p. xxiv, see Biemel's note.

discipline. He thus spoke of bringing logic to fulfillment "within the framework" of transcendental phenomenology. In the *Crisis*, he proposes to investigate the history of that science that understands itself as "the one all encompassing science, the science of the totality of what is."[80] Phenomenology as a whole is now identified with the project upon which he reflects. At the term of the *Besinnung*, phenomenology will appear as the final form, in the sense of a genuine beginning, of the philosophical project itself. At once clarifying and productive, rescuing intended sense as it cancels obscuring prejudice, the *Besinnung* will "basically and essentially" transform "the total sense of philosophy," while simultaneously showing "that all the philosophy of the past, though unbeknown to itself, was inwardly oriented toward this new [phenomenological] sense of philosophy."[81] The reflection will thus confirm the existence of a single philosophical project that arrives at its proper method and field of work in phenomenology. In his 1911 *Logos* essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," Husserl complained that at philosophical conferences the philosophers themselves meet one another, but remain representatives of different philosophical "schools," which remain divergent "points of view," incapable of coming together within a unitary project. This represented, for Husserl, a scientifically intolerable situation. The *Besinnung* on philosophy will orchestrate a genuine conference of philosophies, bringing them together from the perspective of their phenomenological critique and incorporation.

Although such a procedure is bound to seem self-satisfying,[82] there is actually nothing grandiose about Husserl's proposed method of historical-teleological investigation in the *Crisis*. His aim is not so much to master the whole of philosophical history as to overcome the illusion that his own contribution is a personal or private accomplishment. His method will reveal that his own philosophical discovery only belongs to him as the bearer of a will that belongs to his philosophical ancestors.[83] Beginning from a conviction in phenomenology as the final form of philosophy, Husserl will submit it to a kind of suspension such that it, as it were, remained to be discovered. Rather than opposing or comparing "his" philosophy to other philosophical doctrines, he will instead, on the basis of existing documents, return to events in philosophical history that are *decisive* or *fateful* from the perspective of its phenomenological end. The method that understands this eventful significance cannot approach other philosophies as stable "positions" to be criticized from the perspective of one's own. Nor can it merely explicate these doctrines as they understood themselves. It is rather necessary to express and harness the unexpressed potential contained in these events (as seen from the present), as well as to clarify the motives that caused this potential to remain implicit (and thus left to future investigations to discover). Proceeding in the order of historical motivation, but without attributing any overarching logic to the development, Husserl will thus uncover and craft a single project animating the apparently un-unified history of philosophy. At the term of the reflection, he will arrive again at phenomenological

[80] Crisis, p. 8.

[81] Ibid., p. 18.

[82] See, for instance, Paul Ricoeur *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*. Trans. Edward Ballard and Lester Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 170.

[83] Crisis, p. 71.

method, which now has a new sense because it appears as the term of a history that has opened up its possibility. The procedures by which phenomenology seeks to suspend inherited doctrine and guarantee the independence of its research now take on a rich ambiguity. They are equally full participation in the inherited tradition of *theoria*. Because it arrives at its method and field of work through a critical appropriation of its animating goal, this new form of introduction requires no further supplementation. It is, to use Husserl's expression, *eigenständig*,[84] capable of standing on its own.

In his final systematic essay, *Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschichte*, Husserl emphasizes the privileged position that the new mode of introduction applied in the *Crisis* holds within his program as a whole. He judges it to be the most radical mode of introduction because it is capable of grounding the very possibility of "philosophy" as a goal. Grounding the possibility of "philosophy" as a goal does not just mean determining whether and how the goal is achievable. It means taking responsibility for the very existence of the goal itself *as a goal*. Instead of simply taking over the goal "philosophy" as a factual possibility belonging to our surrounding world, it is necessary to inquire into the possibility of this possibility; it is necessary "*das Ziel 'Philosophie selbst'... radikal in Frage zu stellen.*"[85] Despite its radical questioning, this style of critique is opposed to skepticism because it is existentially structured by a living commitment to the working-goal "philosophy itself." By suspending the functioning of the working-goal, by calling its possibility into question, it becomes possible to appropriate it, and thus arrive at a new clarity regarding one's work. It is now as a suspension and questioning of working-goals from within a living commitment to their fulfillment that Husserl understands the *Besinnung* of the *Crisis*. Failing such a reflection, the philosopher would comport herself no differently than any worker whose interest in successful work keeps her focused on the goal and the way to the goal, but who never has cause to ask how such a working goal is even possible.

In view of such a task, the preoccupation with discovering the proper field and method for philosophical work appears one-sided. It seeks the way to a goal that remains unquestioned in its being as a goal. Husserl even asserts that without a reflection on the very possibility of philosophy as a goal, "*alle Mühen um eine Methode sind vergeblich*."[86] He does not mean that the method could not succeed. His point is rather that even if the method should discover a way to *theoria*, it would still naively accept the "*besonderen und gewisser offenbar allgemeiner Voraussetzungen, die überhaupt in allen*

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[84] The translation we inherit from Carr can be misleading. From "*Sonach wird sie zu einer eigenständigen Einleitung in die Transzendentale Phänomenologie.*" he translates: "Accordingly, it becomes, in its own right, an introduction to transcendental phenomenology." Obviously, we must not be misled into thinking that the adjective *eigenständigen* is an adverb modifying *wird*. It does not describe how the investigation becomes, but *what* it becomes. More importantly, the decision to translate *eigenständig*, whose most obvious meaning is "independent," as "in its own right" leads one to believe that Husserl wants to indicate that this investigation is *also* an introduction, just like the others. In fact, he is describing this introduction as one that can stand on its own.

[85] Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transcendentale Phänomenologie: Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlaß 1934-1937*. Ed. Reinhold N. Smid. Husserliana Vol. XXIX. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993)[Hereafter HUSS XXIX], p. 383-4.

[86] HUSS XXIX, p. 387.

Wegen als Selbstverständlichkeiten liegen." [87] These include, for instance, that *theoria* is available as a living project, that it was once newly established and can attain *its* fulfillment beginning form the demands it makes on us in the present. To carry out a critique of these presuppositions means to cease being guided by them, to make them explicit, and to attempt to bring them to original evidence as far as their nature allows. And yet, in carrying out this work of suspension and reflection, philosophy does not really interrupt its pursuit of the goal *theoria*. The presuppositions connected with the existence of "philosophy" as a goal are equally presuppositions that the goal of philosophy, as presuppositionless science, requires us to address. In no way, then, does Husserl view the *Besinnung* on the goal "philosophy" as external or "meta" in relation to philosophical work itself. It is rather an "*Arbeit der Probleme der letzten Voraussetzungen*."[88] Only from *within* this ultimate critique will the discovery of philosophy's field and method enable genuine philosophical work. In *FTL* Husserl opposed *Besinnung* to "starting from absolute cognitive subjectivity" as an "other way" of radical beginning.[89] By the time of his last essay, he understands it to be "more principled" and "more systematic." [90] Husserl goes so far as to claim that this work on the assumptions of all possible method represents a level of radical questioning never before attained in the history of philosophy.[91] At the very least, he considers it the apex of phenomenology's career of self-criticism.

We have now outlined how Husserl comes to embed the phenomenological doctrine of intuition within a *Besinnung* on the concrete project that demands theoretical insight in the first place. We have also identified *Crisis* as the text in which this method bears the burden of providing a systematic introduction to phenomenology as a whole. There are immense challenges involved in understanding Husserl's method of *Besinnung* in the *Crisis*. The teleological access to history it involves, the kind of unity and necessity it will claim for the development it unearths, its equation of historical and personal reflection, the ethical-epistemological concept of responsibility to which it appeals, and the transition between the teleological reflections and phenomenological method itself—these are all puzzles in their own right. Our primary concern, however, is not with the details of Husserl's *Besinnung* on philosophy, but with the striking fact that this ultimate reflection takes place entirely within "Europe."

As a fact about Husserl's *Crisis*, the encompassing role of "Europe" is clear enough. It adjectivally determines as "European" every term that we have seen to be essential to the *Besinnung* on *theoria*. The sciences subject to critique, the teleological-historical reflections in which the critique consists, the critical situation that motivates the critique, and we, the subjects of the critique, are all qualified as "European." Europe, then, is the element in which the ultimate self-understanding of phenomenological philosophy moves. The entire effort to appropriate *theoria* as the goal to which

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[87] Ibid, p. 415.

[88] Ibid., p. 418. My emphasis.

[89] Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 10.

[90] HUSS XXIX, p. 426.

[91] Ibid., p. 397.

phenomenology delivers the way takes place "in" Europe, *of which we can now say that it is the ultimate horizon for phenomenological inquiry.*

3.
Dissociation of Europe from the Problems of Relativism

If Europe is the horizon in which phenomenology appropriates the goal of *theoria*, we are left to wonder what the fact of this European containment means about the goal "philosophy"? What kind of containment is this? How is it discovered? What consequences does it have? At first it seems that problems of relativism loom large. Once we abandon the abstraction of considering philosophy as a scientific method, and instead view it holistically as a project long since established and passed down through the generations, we admit its irreducibly historical character. Introducing his teleological reflections on European science, Husserl writes that "we as philosophers are heirs of the past in respect to the goals which the word 'philosophy' indicates, in terms of concepts, problems and methods."[92] Further, the tradition the philosopher inherits has never existed in a vacuum. From the moment of its first institution, the philosophical project has stood in relation to a broader context of non-philosophical life, by which it is inevitably engaged. Husserl recognizes this as well: "human philosophizing and its results in the whole of man's existence mean anything but merely private or otherwise so constricted goals of culture."[93] The approach of *Besinnung* thus demands that Husserl understand the philosophical task from within its most relevant historical life-horizon. This horizon, for Husserl, is "Europe," and not, for instance "India" or "China." Husserl and the thinkers that influenced him most directly were, after all, Europeans. Will his philosophy not then bear the mark of the European spirit?

The fact that Husserl binds his philosophy to a particular historical-cultural horizon naturally calls into question its claim to be *theoria*. By having phenomenology appropriate its defining purpose on the basis of a particular world, it seems that Husserl softens his scientific view of philosophy in favor of a hermeneutic sensitivity to the fact that "the philosopher does not speak from nowhere." Does not the encompassing role of Europe have the consequence that Husserl must reconsider phenomenology's claim to be rigorous science, along with the validity of the whole procedure by which this claim was advanced in *Ideas I*? Must not the status of consciousness itself be reconsidered, and demoted from the rank of an unconditioned to a conditioned domain of being?

Husserl's *Crisis*, however, contains no such reconsideration. At no point will he recognize a conflict between philosophy's situation in Europe and the absoluteness of its research and corresponding field of work. In his final essay on the method of the *Crisis*, Husserl criticizes *Ideas I* as an inadequate introduction to philosophy. Yet, in the same breath, he asserts that it nonetheless represents the discovery of a valid philosophical method "*die jedem von uns als neuzeitlichem Philosophen ohne weiteres zugänglich*

[92] Crisis, p. 17.

[93] Ibid., translation modified.

ist."[94] Such an evaluation would be impossible if the new mode of beginning offered in *Besinnung* rendered problematic the status of consciousness as ur-region. For Husserl, the new problem brought into view by *Besinnung* is not the validity of the method and field of work outlined in *Ideas I*.[95] That text is inadequate as an introduction primarily because it partakes of those presuppositions that belong to every philosophical method whatsoever. It does not, in other words, question precisely how it is "accessible," "without further ado," to "each of us" as "modern philosophers." The terms of this accessibility suppose the taking over of a philosophical project for which the method of *Besinnung* will attempt to take responsibility. Our genealogy has located the *Besinnung* of Husserl's *Crisis* at the culmination of his effort to appropriate *theoria* as a goal. In this effort, it is always the significance of phenomenology as a whole, precisely as a philosophical method of work in the field of absolute consciousness that is in question. At no point was there an issue as to whether realities of a specific region might over-determine consciousness "from without," and thus compromise its transcendental integrity.

This is confirmed by Husserl's presentation of phenomenological method within the *Crisis* itself. Although Husserl there arrives at phenomenology on the basis of a historical-teleological reflection on European science, he will never equivocate on the ability of the epoche to put out of action, "with one blow,"[96] every motivation that would presuppose the reality of the pre-given world. Through the epoche, he says, "an attitude is arrived at which is *above* the pregivenness of the validity of the world…as the field of all acquired and newly established life-interests."[97] Under the epoche, "the gaze of the philosopher in truth first truly becomes free: above all, free of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pregivenness of the world."[98]

> Given in and through this liberation is the discovery of the universal, absolutely self-enclosed, and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world-itself and world-consciousness…And there results, finally, taken in the broadest sense, the absolute correlation between beings of every sort and every meaning, on the one hand, and absolute subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic validity in this broadest manner, on the other hand…[The world] is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the

[94] HUSS XXIX, p. 399.

[95] Certainly, Husserl never thought that the method of *Ideas I* was beyond criticism. In the *Crisis*, for instance, Husserl worries that enacting the phenomenological reduction to consciousness without first undertaking a description of the "life-world" as inclusive of every regional reality could create confusion as to the subject-matter of phenomenological research (155). Such criticisms, however, essentially concern the best strategy for correctly displaying the absolute character of transcendental consciousness, and the scope of the research into its essential structures. The absoluteness of transcendental consciousness is not itself criticized.

[96] Crisis, p. 150.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid., p. 151.

> subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities the world "is" at all.[99]

This formulation is no less bold concerning the encompassing nature of the phenomenological field than the passages from *Ideas I*. Neither the scope of the epoche nor the absoluteness of consciousness as a domain of being suffers any attenuation because of the new approach of the *Crisis*. By situating the ultimate *Besinnung* within Europe, Husserl does not think he has situated phenomenology's field of work "in" or "relative to" the realities of a particular cultural-historical world that would influence it from the outside.

Nor does Husserl consider it necessary, anywhere in the *Crisis*, to undertake a serious analysis of "European history" outside of philosophy. He does not situate the development of philosophical and scientific ideas alongside the empirical domains of religion, politics, or economy. This is not because he has abstracted philosophy from its European context, but precisely because "the genuine struggles of European humanity *as such* take the form of struggles between the philosophies…"[100] All the decisions Husserl hopes to reach concerning the meaning of European history will result from a *Besinnung* concerning a handful of philosophers. The European horizon of inquiry not only leaves untroubled the absolute character of philosophy as *theoria*; it also does not require philosophy to know anything about non-philosophical history in order to understand itself.

These points are confirmed if we consider how Husserl approaches the theme of the "life-world" in the *Crisis*. The terms "life-world" and "surrounding world" generally refer to that spatiotemporal whole that I have already assumed as the ground of any particular interest or motive in my everyday concerns. This world surrounds me as a unique horizon of meaning-implications in which everything that appears indicates further appearances according to a general harmonious style of unfolding. From it, I encounter everything material, animal, or cultural that engages my attention. Husserl emphasizes that the sciences have traditionally taken this world for granted as a starting point without ever clarifying it according to its own structures. His procedure in the *Crisis* clearly indicates, however, that he has no intention of situating the entire architecture of phenomenological science relative to the ways of understanding that can emerge and guide one's encounters in some such world. As Landgrebe points out, Husserl's engagement with the theme of the life-world was rather "his last step in the concrete explication of the program of reduction."[101] Husserl exposes the life-world as the presupposition of science in order then to refer the life of the life-world back to the transcendental life of consciousness as the condition of possibility for its appearance. By approaching the life-world as a transcendental theme, Husserl once again asserts the methodological priority of phenomenological science over every science of the world, physical or cultural. Phenomenology does not study the life-world as anthropology or

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[99] Crisis, p. 151-2.

[100] Ibid., p. 15. My emphasis.

[101] Ludwig Landgrebe, *The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Six Essays*. Edited and with an Introduction by Donn Welton (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 186.

history might, from the perspective of the life that naturally lives in the world as its pre-given horizon. It aims to reflect on "the life which effects world-validity in natural world-life…;" and *this life* "does not permit of being studied from the within the attitude of natural world-life."[102] Husserl's interest lies in the universal structures of "the how of the pregivenness of the world," a subject only accessible from the domain of transcendental subjectivity, "a universal framework in its own right."[103]

All of this shows that the *Crisis* simultaneously refers to its encompassment in a European horizon and refuses to admit into philosophy itself any dialectical relationship between consciousness and concrete historical cultural realities. Confronted with this apparent contradiction, it is tempting to conclude that Husserl was simply unwilling to recognize the consequences of his new approach to phenomenology. On this view, although Husserl may not have intended to jeopardize phenomenology's status as *theoria* or its independence from external cultural influence, his procedure in the *Crisis* nonetheless implies this result. This is the basic perspective of David Carr, who adopts this critical attitude in a way that indicates a possible approach to the Europe-problematic. The path suggested by Carr is no doubt fruitful. We hope to show, however, that another approach is possible, one true to Husserl's express intentions that nonetheless harbors critical consequences for phenomenology as a whole.

Carr's critical attitude depends upon his thesis that the most pressing concern of Husserl's *Crisis* is to expose and undo unnoticed historical prejudices that influence the reflecting philosopher, and would compromise the theoretical rigor of her work. According to a genealogy Carr presents in *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*, at the time of *Ideas I* Husserl believed he could free himself from such prejudices through simply enacting the philosophic epoche. However, an increasing attention to the passive transference of meaning in the social world leads Husserl to a newfound appreciation for the strength of historical prejudices, which, after all, determine the philosopher as much as anyone else. By the time of the *Crisis*, Husserl thus deems it necessary to employ a new method of reflection in order to secure phenomenology's independence from its inherited philosophical past. In this connection, Carr speaks of a "historical reduction" designed to "overcome the historical prejudices of consciousness, which, *no less than the natural ones*, prevent the philosopher from grasping the *Sachen Selbst*."[104] This reduction is a "reliving of our philosophical prejudices, a repetition of the philosophical *Selbstverständlichkeiten* under which we turn to philosophy in the first place."[105]

The *Selbstverständlichkeiten* Carr has in mind are not those to which Husserl refers as lying in the path of every philosophical method whatsoever: the existence of philosophy as a goal, that it was once instituted through human activities, that it is accomplishable, etc. Carr instead refers to the passive taking over of specific methods and problems from the philosophical tradition, which can unwittingly prefigure one's own thinking. The historical reduction "aims precisely at the particular configuration of

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[102] Crisis, p. 148.

[103] Ibid., p. 146-7.

[104] David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 186-7. My emphasis [Hereafter The Problem of History].

[105] The Problem of History, p. 117

historical-cultural prejudices peculiar to the philosopher and his own age."[106] In *Interpreting Husserl*, Carr writes that "the *Crisis* is essentially the construction of a history which reflects the philosopher's own philosophical prejudices for purposes of overcoming those very prejudices."[107] In his translator's introduction to the *Crisis*, he asserts that Husserl's historical reflections have the same goal as the philosophic epoche of *Ideas I*, suspending the influence of existing scientific doctrine: "Husserl's entire treatment of the *facts* of Western philosophy could be seen as an attempt to accomplish what he *thought*, in the *Ideen*, had been done in one sentence."[108] Important as the critique of historically constituted scientific assumptions may be, doesn't the recognition of those more fundamental assumptions outlined in Husserl's final essay indicate a task essentially different from the philosophic epoche? Indeed, don't methods designed to overcome particular "historical-cultural prejudices" in the hope of achieving theoretical goals constantly make use of those *Selbstverständlichkeiten* that frame every possible philosophical method? If the *Crisis* was to confront those presuppositions, the historical reduction would be insufficient.

If a historical *Besinnung* was necessary in order to overcome historical prejudices *and finally reach the Sachen Selbst*, then we might reasonably wonder with Carr how one could ever know that the revisiting of historical prejudice had finally succeeded and placed the philosopher before a field of absolute inquiry. Once we admit that the philosopher too is "in history," can we ever rule out that he participates in a historical development whose power of influence exceeds his ability to think for himself? Once phenomenology admits that it must reflect on *facts* belonging to a "particular historical time and place" in order to see clearly, then how can it ever enforce its claim to pure eidetic insight and the universally necessary judgments it warrants?[109] We should also have to recognize that the application of the historical reduction to philosophical history, while certainly necessary, is by no means sufficient. While the prejudices that stem from philosophy's own tradition may exercise the most obvious influence over the reflecting philosopher, those stemming from the general cultural milieu certainly play a role as well. After all, as Carr reminds us, "philosophy is still a particular episode in the long history of the world, one of which we still happen to be a part."[110]

We philosophers are human beings. Philosophy is in history. Admitting to facts like these need not relativize all philosophical claims in the same way. Perhaps the highest levels of eidetic insight are less affected by historical prejudice. Should we not, however, be suspicious of eidetic judgments concerning those elements of our world most over-determined by culturally specific interpretations? Even if the determination of the categories belonging to the ur-region should prove attainable with pure eidetic

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[106] Ibid., p. 264.

[107] David Carr, *Interpreting Husserl*: *Critical and Comparative Studies*. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 90.

[108] Crisis, translator's introduction, p. xxxviii.

[109] The Problem of History, p. 118-119.

[110] The Problem of History, p. 225.

insight, the impossibility of eidetic insight regarding correlations pertaining to particular regions would seem to indicate that consciousness itself has a "surface" by which it is exposed to influence by the factual world, regardless of the attitude it effects. Carr, who is fully aware of Husserl's arguments against historicism,[111] believes that the *Crisis* writings point to difficulties for a phenomenology that wants to avoid the absurdity of relativism, and yet admits the impossibility of ever getting over history. Europe, which would name the "particular historical time and place" from which Husserl begins, would thus seem to indicate the ultimate horizon for the endless work of Carr's "reduction" of historical-cultural prejudices. This would entail a continual revisiting of European scientific traditions and their place in the history of European institutions in order to ensure, as far as possible, a freedom from historical prejudice.

We disagree, however, with the thesis that underlies Carr's critical attitude. The primary aim of Husserl's final *Besinnung* is not to finally or better reach the *Sachen Selbst*, but rather to understand the whole methodical work by which it grasps the *Sachen Selbst* as the fulfillment of an appropriated goal. In the *Besinnung* of the *Crisis*, Husserl does not engage history in order to clear his head of traditionally inherited prejudices that had prevented the possibility of a scientific philosophy. His aim is to uncover evidence of a single philosophical project discernable beneath multiple philosophies that will be brought to fruition in the genuine beginning of phenomenology. The obscurity that plagues Husserl is the historical meaning of rigorous science itself. Far more true to Husserl's express intention is James Dodd's approach in *Crisis and Reflection*, which never loses sight of the fact that the *Crisis* is an effort to take responsibility for philosophy as a task, and that all the methodological dilemmas the text poses must be approached with this in mind. From the beginning, the history that engages Husserl has been determined by an anti-traditional impulse that, in philosophy and science, attains its effective fulfillment. To be sure, this history is rife with failure and lack of clarity, but it also teaches us that the power of history to cloud the mind with its sediment is not insuperable. Reflecting on Husserl's engagement of history, Dodd observes:

> That is, it is this *defeat of history* that we are called on to perform; that is what is required by the idea or telos that defines our historical being as such. To fix our historical relation to the task of science through inner critique is to clarify historical life of all naivete, and in this sense to free life form a certain kind of historical experience. And it is *this* task, assigned by a *Stiftung* made in full awareness of the obscurity of history and acting against it, that gives birth to what Husserl calls 'modern philosophical humanity.[112]

The *Crisis* does not question the validity of phenomenology's methodological concepts in light of a serious consideration of the merits of historical relativism. As an extreme way of articulating this position, one might agree with Roman Ingarden's assessment that

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[111] The Problem of History, p. 115.

[112] Crisis and Reflection, p. 71-2.

there is nothing doctrinally new in the *Crisis*.[113] History rather becomes effective as the horizon in which "the doctrine" must be appropriated.

Even at the point in the *Crisis* when Husserl is most explicitly attuned to the power of historical prejudices to block the way to phenomenology, he regards them as insignificant compared to those rooted in the essence of the natural attitude:

> Of course the power of historical prejudices also plays a constant role here, especially of those which, coming from the origin of the modern positive sciences, dominate us all. It is of the very essence of such prejudices, drilled into the souls even of children, that they are concealed in their immediate effects. The abstract general will to be without prejudice changes nothing about them….Nevertheless, these are *the slightest difficulties* compared to those which have their ground in the essence of the new dimension [of consciousness] and its relation to the old familiar field of life.[114]

The new beginning of the *Crisis* was not necessary in order to overcome these slightest of difficulties. If they are overcome, they will be overcome along with the greatest difficulties through the *concrete, methodical* will to be without prejudice expressed in the phenomenological epoche. In *Ideas I* as well as the *Crisis*, the only way to decisively overcome historical prejudice is to knock out, "with one blow," the natural attitude in which all such prejudices are relevant and effective. One can, of course, claim that Husserl badly underestimates the force of inherited philosophical prejudice, and the phenomenological epoche, as he conceives it, is possible only as an ideal that would guide various hermeneutic practices of self-awareness. The paradoxes that await the attempt to secure evidence for such a claim are familiar territory for the phenomenological critique of historicism.

For our part, we follow Husserl's express intention in the *Crisis*. We do not understand it as a reflection primarily designed to root out otherwise intractable historical prejudices, but rather as an attempt to positively appropriate and understand the goal that orients the work of *theoria itself*. By adopting this approach to the *Crisis*, we thus make a basic determination about how to understand the "Europe" that plays an encompassing role there. Europe will encompass *theoria*, not as the horizon for an endless historical reduction, but as the horizon in which reflection can appropriate and understand *theoria* as a historical task. The question raised by the Europe problematic is not whether situating phenomenology in Europe might compromise its status as rigorous science. It is rather provokes us to ask what *positive methodological role* Europe serves for Husserl, and how this role is possible. We will thus be able to disentangle the "geo-political" issues contained in the Europe-problematic from an anti-philosophical skepticism, and discover that they concern the whole of *theoria* itself. The value of this proposed perspective will no doubt depend upon its ability to raise new questions inaccessible from the perspective that would treat Europe as the horizon for an infinite historical reduction.

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[113] Roman Ingarden, "What is New in Husserl's 'Crisis'?," *Analecta Husserliana*, 2 (1972), p. 26-7.

[114] Crisis, p. 120. My Emphasis.

By following Husserl's express intention we in no sense renounce a critical attitude. Instead, we up the stakes. The new problems phenomenology will face in its claim to Europe will not involve irreducibly situating consciousness in the world or viewing philosophy as an anthropologically bound praxis, problems which, in Husserl's eyes, the established methods of epoche and reduction are perfectly capable of dissolving. If we desist from associating Husserl's Europe with the well-worn terrain of historical and cultural relativism, we will discover that it belongs to a new problematic. This problematic is one over which Husserl himself does not have complete control, and yet concerns the significance of his entire phenomenology. Indeed, when we pose questions as to how philosophy is essentially connected to the broader unity of European life, how this connection is discovered, and what its consequences are, we exceed the boundaries of what Husserl can account for in the discipline of his scientific methods. Europe is the framework for the ultimate *Besinnung* of Husserl's phenomenology, but the *Besinnung* does not make a problem out of this framework. It is as if Husserl's placing philosophy in Europe is the consequence of a fundamental decision that his own reflections never explicitly revisit.

To get a handle on Husserl's Europe, we must adopt the perspective of a *Besinnung* that understands the submerged problematic to which Europe belongs as decisive for the philosophical project as a whole. Husserl's decision would then become comprehensible as a fateful event in the philosophical project, and we would be in a position to evaluate its meaning and validity from the standpoint of the present.

The *Besinnung* that we seek is not something we have to invent for ourselves. It was already there at the very outset of academic philosophy. The problematic in which we propose to situate Husserl's Europe was of vital importance to Plato, who recognized that it concerned the whole of philosophy as a task. In *Republic*, he presents this problematic in systematic terms as the question of whether and how philosophy might belong to the polis as a legitimate sphere of interest. In rediscovering this question, we will find the perspective from which to evaluate Husserl's claim to Europe. Our aim in having recourse to *Republic* is not to compare Plato and Husserl in an external fashion. It will gradually become clear that Husserl reinvests philosophy in this Greek question, not only from the perspective of a Europe that is its affirmative answer, but also, against everything Plato's Socrates says and shows, so as to insist that the Greece that was the context of this question *was already* Europe's origin.

Chapter Two:
The Problematic of Political Philosophy in Plato's *Republic*

1.
Philosophy in its Vocational Horizon

Thus far, our investigations have tracked a movement of radical reflection in which phenomenology questions the goal to which its method would find the way. We have shifted our attention away from the infinity of topics available within the phenomenological field and onto the appropriation of the task that would already orient the engagement of this field. But we must follow Husserl further into the unnoticed foreground of philosophical interest. Obviously, phenomenological reflection is driven by purely cognitive interests. This "theoretical" attitude, for Husserl, defines the entire philosophical project. Husserl's claim to Europe as the horizon for the appropriation of this project concerns the relation of this attitude and its accomplishments to a broader unity of cultural life. This relation takes place in what we will provisionally call a "vocational horizon." Our positive account of what is at stake in Husserl's claim to Europe will proceed by interpreting it as philosophy's vocational horizon.

When viewed as a concrete project, philosophy for Husserl is not a method or a discipline, but a vocation. This is evident in the final interpretive schema Husserl proposes for the *Besinnung* of the *Crisis*. In his last systematic essay, Husserl claims that the reflection on the teleological unity and methodological possibility of *theoria* is best understood as an attempt to appropriate the vocational being of philosophy. [115] Despite its unique status as a "knowledge vocation," philosophy, if it is possible, will share certain structural features with those "ordinary vocations" (*gewöhnliche* or *übliche Berufe*) furthest removed from the field of philosophical work.[116] All vocations, says Husserl, make available working goals in such a way that individuals can take them over as goals common to the intergenerational vocational subjectivity, and thus become practitioners *of* that vocation.[117] The tradition of work through which these goals are taken over must also

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[115] HUSS XXIX, p. 363. Husserl identifies the vocational being of philosophy as a guiding assumption of the *Crisis* in an introduction to *Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschsichte* that he felt compelled to add almost one year after completing the subsequent parts of the text at the end of August, 1936. See Smid's footnote, p. 362.

[116] For Husserl, the vocations farthest removed from philosophy are those consisting largely in manual labor (*gewöhnliche* or *übliche Berufe*). In another late manuscript (Nr. 24 p. 282.10), Husserl distinguishes vocational philosophy from tasks that produce other *Geisteswerke* ("art" is his working example here). For our purposes, however, the comparison with the *gowohnliche Berufe* is more fundamental since it points to the most general criteria for vocational being.

[117] In Husserl's words: "*Jedem Beruf entspricht eine ihm eigene Aufgabe*. *Nicht eine Aufgabe vereinzelter Menschen, sondern eine im Gemeinschaftsleben und durch die Folge der Generationen, der historischen Zeiten sich verbindende Aufgabe…Jede Aufgabe bezeichnet ein durch eine gewisse Tätigkeit, ein giwisses Handlen zu verwirklichendes Ziel.*" HUSS XXIX, pp. 364, 374

make possible their renewal as "true" or accomplishable goals.[118] The explicit aims of the *Crisis*, as spelled out in its preface, orient it toward confirming that philosophy fulfills these two criteria of vocational being.

In this essay, Husserl also identifies a third structural feature of vocational being: serviceability. Properly vocational work renders a service (*Dienst*) that responds to a requirement or need (*Bedürfnis*) emerging from beyond the sphere of the vocational praxis itself.[119] It is striking that the *Crisis* never attempts to demonstrate the serviceability of *theoria* in the same manner that it does its teleological unity and methodological possibility. Instead, Husserl approaches these latter tasks already armed with the conviction that philosophy has a decisive significance for non-philosophical existence. From the beginning, this conviction guides Husserl's effort to take possession of the philosophical task and charges it with a grave humanitarian responsibility:

> In *our* philosophizing, then—how can we avoid it—we are *functionaries of mankind*. The quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of mankind.[120]

Husserl will never call into question the conditions of this responsibility. We will see that they are rooted in Europe in its function as philosophy's vocational horizon. For Husserl, it is only by virtue of Europe that philosophy becomes existentially decisive for humanity.

Philosophy will render its vocational service by responding to a need that emerges beyond its field of work. It thus seems that it will become vocationally serviceable by entering into "synthesis" with non-philosophical, or practical, life. Is it permissible to speak of theory entering into synthesis with practically interested life? Was theory something purely theoretical before this entry? When, and for whom? Approached phenomenologically, the purity of theory could only be legitimated through the discovery of a concrete life that would sustain it in separation from all other interests. If we look into what underlies *theoria* as a constituted system or doctrine of expressed theses, we find that it only becomes what it is in definite acts of communication: reading, writing, inner-dialogue with voices that are never entirely one's own. To count as actual theory-formation, these acts must occur within the parameters of a subjective orientation devoted exclusively to theoretical ends. Husserl indeed holds that such an exclusive devotion is possible as an ideal guiding and regulating relatively successful accomplishment. He recognizes something like a "vocational epoche." Increasingly in his later writings, Husserl treats the adoption of the theoretical attitude as a rather remarkable instance of an epoche exercised in all vocational work. Vocational interest involves temporarily regarding everything not pertaining to vocational accomplishment with strict indifference:

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[118] HUSS XXIX, p. 377. See also HUSS. XXIX, pp. 282, 283.

[119] Ibid., pp. 363, 378, 387.

[120] Crisis, p. 17.

> as men with a vocation we may permit ourselves to be indifferent to everything else, and we have an eye only for this horizon as our world and for its own actualities and possibilities—those that exist in this "world"—i.e., we have an eye only to what is "reality" here (what is correct, true in relation to this goal) or "unreality" (the incorrect, the mistaken, the false).[121]

By executing this epoche, one makes oneself the locus where purely vocational motives are effective for subjectivity. This devotion of vocational subjectivity to vocational interest under the vocational epoche is what sanctions meaningful talk about theoretical motives and goals, as well as any synthesis they may "enter into" with practical life. To discuss *theoria* "in itself" is to consider it solely in terms of this devotion, i.e. according to the life in which it actually develops as a movement of interest.

Of course, the person who adopts the theoretical attitude can also take on practical attitudes and thereby accomplish a synthesis between theory and praxis on the basis of the unity of her psychic life. This synthesis, however, approaches theory from motives arising in a personal nexus. Everyone will accomplish it in her own way according to the circumstances under which she has to make sense of her experience. It is a wholly different question how a synthesis might occur that is regulated by what is essential to *theoria*, such that *theoria itself* would become practical. Husserl's Europe will prove to be the historical horizon in which such a synthesis is demanded.

We underestimate the methodological importance of Europe if we assume that *theoria* in and of itself effects the imperative that it become practical. Husserl's analysis of philosophy in terms of vocational epoche and interest in fact excludes such a possibility. In a passage from the *Vienna Lecture* that will continue to occupy our attention, Husserl emphasizes that *theoria* becomes what it is as a "closed unity" that arises only for the life that lives "under the epoche of all praxis." Life devoted to *theoria* is completely indifferent to practical motives. It enters into genuine synthesis with praxis only when it is *called* from its closed unity. The genuine synthesis between theory and praxis only occurs:

> in the transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude, such that *theoria* (universal science) *arising within a closed unity and under the epoche of all praxis*, is called (and in theoretical insight itself exhibits its calling) to serve mankind in a new way, mankind which, in its concrete existence, lives first and always in the natural sphere. This occurs in the form of a new sort of praxis, that of universal critique…[122]

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[121] Ibid., p. 379.

[122] Ibid., p. 283. The german runs:. "…die in geschlossener Einheitlichkeit und unter Epoche von aller Praxis erwachsende Theoria (die universale Wissenschaft) *dazu berufen wird* (und in theoretischer Einsicht selbst *ihren Beruf erweist*), in einer neuen Weise der Menscheit, der in konkretem Dasein zunächst und immer auch natürlich lebenden, zu dienen." Krisis, p. 329. My emphases.

The *Vienna Lecture* explicitly presents this calling to universal critique as *one possible manner* of synthesis between theory and praxis. It is by no means guaranteed by the existence of *theoria* itself. Husserl will rather treat it as an extraordinary possibility when compared with more "obvious" forms of synthesis.[123] If European humanity proves to be defined by this calling of *theoria* to service, then it is responsible for realizing possibilities that are not fulfilled by the project of universal science itself.

Aron Gurwitsch's 1956 commentary on the *Crisis* alerts us to a slippage that causes the positive content of Husserl's Europe to disappear behind idea of *theoria* itself. Explaining what Husserl means by "crisis," Gurwitsch writes that European humanity (here "Western man") has become unfaithful to "the very idea that defines and constitutes him as Western man":

> That idea is no other than the idea of philosophy itself: the idea of a universal knowledge concerning the totality of being…Closely connected with this idea, whose first inception in ancient Greece in the VIIth and VIth centuries B.C. marks the historical beginning of Western man, is the idea of a truly human, i.e., philosophical existence, an existence oriented toward ideas, ideals and norms of autonomous reason, which alone permits Western man to live in conformity and at peace with himself.[124]

First Gurwitsch asserts that the idea of philosophy itself constitutes European humanity, both in its essence and origin. To be European would then be synonymous with devoting oneself to the realization of universal science. Any discussion of Europe would ultimately reduce to a discussion of the task of *theoria* itself. This is what happens in P. Philip Buckley's handling of Husserl's concept. For him, "the term 'European' is to some extent redundant when applied to science," or even more "just a name for the universal idea of science."[125] But Gurwitsch suddenly corrects course. It is instead the *closely connected* idea of an existence oriented by philosophical reason that guides the life called Western or European. Husserl's Europe, it seems, is not defined by the realization of philosophy, but more precisely by *requiring* philosophy in order to *live* in conformity with itself.

Husserl's Europe is defined by its requiring philosophy as a necessity for life. Unless one keeps this in mind, one risks treating Europe as a mere place-name indicating where *theoria* happened to have originated. This is a risk run by Rudolphe Gasché's recent study of Europe. Gasché's chapter on Husserl is totally faithful to the latter's intention to define European humanity *solely* in terms of a new sort of critical praxis first made possible by the theoretical project. However, it understates the strange requiring of philosophy constitutive of Europe by treating the praxis of universal critique as guaranteed by the epistemic demands of *theoria* itself: "Episteme is practical because such knowledge comes with certain requirements or ideal injunctions, whose

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[123] Ibid., p. 283.

[124] Aron Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 17, 380-399, March 1956.

[125] R. Philip Buckley, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1992)[Hereafter, The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility], pp. 27, 31.

realization…demands to be enacted in full at every moment."[126] The idea of philosophy "is introduced as bearing from the outset on the human being's life. It is the request that everyone shape his or her life freely—free from all traditionalist conceptions—by not acting or advancing anything that cannot be accounted for in terms transparent to all… the idea of philosophy coincides with the unsettling demand to ceaselessly account for oneself and to secure thus something that merits being called 'universally human.'"[127] But the ideal injunctions of *theoria* are binding for the person precisely insofar as she is a theoretician. This is not how "*theoria* becomes practical,"[128] but rather how it first becomes what it is: *theoria*. It will become practical when the products of theoretical life are integrated into interests originating beyond the closed unity of its field. This synthesis may happen in a number of ways, including the technological employment of theoretical results in the service of natural interests. The universal critique described by Gasché presupposes a horizon of communal life in which *theoria* becomes the object of a remarkable valuation that constitutes it as decisive for human existence.

The praxis of universal critique presupposes the idea of philosophy. But its calling of philosophy into service is not an activity that occurs in the closed unity of theoretical life. Husserl's *Crisis* makes one think that science itself brings about a critical transformation of culture because Husserl there engages the sciences from *within* the European horizon. That remarkable synthesis between *theoria* and praxis has always already been required, and the text assumes that requirement as the condition of possibility for the responsibilities that it already bears. As Anthony Steinbock puts it, for Husserl the whole of philosophy "*receives its value* in the context of an ethical life, according to the demands of an ethical individual and communal self-regulation."[129] Europe is that civilization whose style of self-regulation demands the synthesis of *theoria* and praxis in the form of universal critique. From the beginning, the *Crisis* is an attempt to justify that valuation of *theoria* supposedly constitutive of European life. Husserl's thinking is in service to Europe. It takes its orientation from this European boundary, but it will never transgress it.

We ourselves cannot inhabit Europe in this fashion if we are to arrive at a critical evaluation of its methodological function. We must instead discover a perspective from which the demands Europe places on philosophy are not effective, but would instead represent the solution to an unresolved problem. This problem concerns how philosophy, considered as a whole and in the purity of its vocational interest, might receive its proper value by rendering a service in the context of communal life. We have said that Plato's *Republic* once posed this very problem in a systematic fashion, and as a matter more fundamental to philosophy than any topical inquiry. *Republic* defines this problem as the problem of political philosophy. Philosophy will be political if it is capable of fitting into the polis as a legitimate movement of vocational interest. In its original terms, this problematic is quite distinct from anything that would interest political science or theory.

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[126] Rudolphe Gasché, *Europe or the Infinite Task: A Study of a Philosophical Concept*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) [Hereafter, Europe or the Infinite Task], p. 23.

[127] Europe or the Infinite Task, p. 27.

[128] Ibid., p. 29

[129] Anthony Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995) [Hereafter, Home and Beyond], p. 202. My Emphasis.

Republic refuses to attempt a rational discourse on political affairs without drawing attention to the central and more fundamental problem of whether and how purely theoretical rationality might be included in a unity of social life. By recovering the original terms of this problematic, we hope to disclose the context in which it becomes possible to understand Husserl's Europe in its full methodological significance. Europe will be the key to Husserl's "political philosophy." It claims an affirmative answer to the question posed at the heart of Plato's *Republic*.

2.
Philosophy as Techne in the Strict Sense

As heirs to the tradition of political science who are used to reasoning about politics as a specific philosophical subject-matter, we must take special precautions in order to recover the scope and significance of this question as it appears in *Republic*. We already know too much about "politics," "political issues," "politicians," "constitutions," and "citizens" to understand the very terms in which this question was asked. Making a method out of a suggestion of Allan Bloom, we thus carry out a terminological regression that roots the meaning of all these terms in the word "polis." τα πολιτικὰ (political issues) are simply affairs concerning the polis. The πολιτὴς (citizen) is simply one who belongs to the polis. πολιτικὴ (politics) is simply the art set over τα πολιτικὰ, and the πολιτικὸς (politician) is simply the one who possesses this art. Finally, the πολῑτείᾳ (constitution), from which, via Cicero, we derive the somewhat spurious title *Republic*, simply refers to the inner organization that gives the polis its form.[130] As for the polis itself, the center around which these political phenomena revolve, let us leave that open. We do not yet know what the polis is for that unique way of questioning characteristic of *Republic*. Through this regression, we can avoid the prejudices that prefigure the meaning of any discussion of things "political," and allow the political terminology of *Republic* to take on meaning in connection with the central problematic of the text.

Of course, the theme of the polis is the occasion for Socrates to investigate several philosophical topics in *Republic*. From his first introduction of the theme, Socrates treats the polis as a large surface upon which dim eyes can read the logos of justice, whose proper place, we will subsequently discover (443c), is the individual soul. The polis theme thus serves the needs of a peculiar sociological and psychological inquiry in which the discussion of society is something slightly more than a veiled discussion of the soul. It is not something to be looked through, but the unfolding of a distinct surface on which the logos of justice can be deciphered, even if we are constantly invited to *transfer* what we make out there to the psychology of the tripartite soul.[131] The relation of the city to the soul, however, is only part of the story. The topics of philosophical psychology and

[130] Alan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*. (New York: Basic Books, 1991), p. 439-440 fn. 1.

[131] An account of the right way to analyze this relationship, and a critique of some of the most common wrong ways, can be found in G.R.F. Ferrari, *City and Soul in Plato's Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

sociology are overtaken at the center of the text by a question about whether the whole of philosophy itself, as a vocational interest, belongs to the polis. One reduces this question to a psychological or sociological mode only by ignoring its natural precedence in relation to all topical concerns.

Right from the beginning, the pursuit of this question produces a discourse on the polis that clearly exceeds the terms of the city-soul analogy. The citizen-workers who are the sole inhabitants of the "true" city in book two are not merely an external manifestation of the appetitive or money-loving division of the soul. Even when Socrates considers this basic class of citizens as one part of a political unity, he does not understand them exclusively in terms of their desire for material goods.[132] The *demiourgoi* represent the way in which one properly belongs to a polis at all. The inquiry into how one belongs to the polis through one's work is not merely an image for the propriety of psychological functions in the soul. It is already preparation for the central question of whether the philosopher can belong to the polis through philosophizing. We will see that *Republic* introduces this inquiry through anti-psychologizing controls such that the belonging of the citizen-worker to the polis is decided strictly on the basis of the field of interest that defines her work. The question is raised, we might say, from within the "vocational epoche."

In *Republic*, the way in which one belongs to the polis is by having a *techne*. The term *techne* means something specific in *Republic*. It is not restricted to the skillful production of material products. Socrates will consider as *technai* the work of all three classes that make up his ideal city, as well that of the philosophers themselves. As Leo Strauss has noted, in *Republic* citizenship itself is equated with being a craftsman of one kind or another.[133] Provisionally, we can understand *techne* to mean job, task, and calling, according to it the range of meanings we hear in "vocation." Because it is by virtue of one's *techne* that one belongs to the polis, the question of the philosopher's political inclusion must be oriented by the analysis of the meaning of *techne*. Before attending to the special problem of philosophy's being as a *techne*, it is first necessary to explicate the systematic meaning that *techne* has in *Republic*. The natural starting point for this explication is the "strict account" (*akribes logos*) of *techne* initiated by Thrasymachus in book one. Despite many interpretive possibilities suggested by the dramatic situation of this account, we choose to take it in all philosophical seriousness. Socrates' agreement to pursue this account, and his inquiry into its implications, lays the basis for his development of the polis theme throughout *Republic*, and, at its center, the question of philosophy's political inclusion. If the account seems overblown in its application to "ordinary vocations," we should perhaps entertain the suspicion that Socrates already has the case of philosophy in mind.

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[132] Malcolm Schofield has precisely identified the point at which Socrates begins speaking of the producer class as concerned with money and material acquisition. This comes at 434a, directly before the partition of the soul, as if to prepare that class to function in the psychological discussion: "From then on, his way of identifying the third class is to talk of the business or money-making class…anticipating the specification of 'gain-loving' as one of the three species of human being in book 9." Malcolm Schofield, *Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought: Plato*. (New York: Oxford University Press, New York 2006), p. 257.

[133] Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 79. Strauss provides citations showing that soldiers, philosophers, and even God appear as "artisans" in *Republic*.

The strict account of *techne* is strict because it forces us to abandon commonsense interpretations of what it means to "have a job." Normally, everyone speaks about *technai* as if they belong to people. Someone is a doctor or a cobbler because it is what she does. Her reasons for doing it, and doing it in the way she does, are only apparent when considered in the context of her personal motivations and the circumstances from which they arise. As against this ordinary way of speaking, the account considers doctors or cobblers exactly insofar as they are doctors and cobblers; it views the worker from the perspective of that which makes her a worker. This means that rather than understanding the *techne* within the context of personal motivations belonging to the worker, the account will only consider the worker insofar as she is motivated by the *techne*. In Thrasymachus' first statement controlled by the strict account, this focusing has a temporal sense. He will consider the worker to be a worker only *when* she is actually working, which means, only when she is under the discipline of the *techne*:

> According to the strict account…no one of the workers errs. For it is *when* his knowledge fails (abandons him) that the one erring errs—at which point he is not a worker; with the result that not one worker or expert or ruler errs *at the very time* when he is ruling, but everyone would say that the doctor erred and that the one ruling erred. (340e)[134]

At no point will Socrates challenge Thrasymachus' decision to view work as under the perfect guidance of knowledge. Instead, remaining within the parameters of the strict account, he uses the opportunity to focus on the kind of knowledge that a *techne* is. Such knowledge, says Socrates, stands in a particular relationship to the objects over which it is set. Each technical knowledge is organized so as "to seek and to furnish what is advantageous" for its subject-matter (341d). The subject-matter requires such attention because it is πονηρὸν, deficient or lacking in one respect or another. The *techne* itself, however, is not πονηρὸν. Its whole being consists in attending to the advantage of its object, and it does not seem to require the attention of yet another *techne* in order to achieve this more perfectly (342a). Clearly, Socrates cannot reasonably deny that other *technai* may furnish the tools or materials necessary for carrying out a certain job. His point is rather that in attending to the advantage of τὸ πονηρὸν, the *techne* itself "orders" those tools and materials (both in the sense of demanding and arranging). In this, the *techne* requires no technical assistance and is already as perfect as is possible. From this self-sufficiency of the *techne* and the standing-in-need of its subject-matter, Socrates concludes that "the *technai* in fact rule over and are stronger than that of which they are the *technai*" (342c).

There is, of course, a well-known eristic context for this exchange. Thrasymachus introduces the strict account in order to defend his thesis that justice is the advantage of

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[134] κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον…οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός: ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἥμαρτεν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτεν. The temporal interpretation of the genitive absolute (ἐπιλειπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης) is justified by the following ὅταν. ἥμαρτεν is aorist, emphasizing that the conventional discourse concerns the, now past, moment of error.

the stronger. His first full formulation of the thesis defines justice as obedience to rulers, who are stronger than the ruled, and are thus able to impose laws that serve their own interests. It is in response to Socrates' objection that rulers can make mistakes, thus enforcing laws contrary to their interests, that he first enforces the strict account. For him, its most important consequence is that all work, strictly considered, is constantly accompanied by knowledge, and thus essentially free of error. By carrying the account further, Socrates discovers that the ruling-ruled relation, which Thrasymachus understood as occurring between two distinct groups of people within the practice of a particular "ruling" *techne*, is a universal feature of *technai* as such. Thrasymachus' definition of justice is now in jeopardy. If "ruling" in Thrasymachus' sense is only a particular species of the ruling that belongs to all *technai*, and if this ruling is essentially concerned with attending to the advantage of what is weaker than itself, then a ruler (in the narrow sense), precisely insofar as he is in the possession of a *techne* (is "one of the workers"), is not guided by his own advantage.

In the development of the strict account, the argumentative fallout of Socrates' position is not as important as its reinterpretation of interpersonal relationships as occurring within the *techne's* relationship to *its own* subject-matter. Socrates first introduces the topic of *techne* into the conversation through a similar maneuver. Before Thrasymachus' intervention, the standing definition of justice was that attributed to Simonides: "it is just to give to each what is owed to him" (331e). Polemarchus, steered away from an economic interpretation by Socrates, comes to interpret the definition as meaning that I owe help to my friends and harm to my enemies. Socrates formulates the principle behind this interpretation to be: it is just to give to each what is appropriate to him (332c). Up to this point, the conversation has assumed that justice prescribes what owed or appropriate things one should give to *others*. Now, Socrates introduces *techne* into the discussion:

> Then what do you think he'd answer if someone asked him: "Simonides, which of the things that are owed or that are appropriate for someone or something to have does the *techne* we call medicine give, and to whom or what does it give them?"
> It's clear that it gives medicines, food and drink to bodies.
> And what owed or appropriate thing does the *techne* we call cooking give, and to whom or what does it give them?
> It gives seasonings to food. Good.
> Now, what does the *techne* we call justice give, and to whom or to what does it give it?
> If we are to follow our previous answers, Socrates, it gives benefits to friends and does harm to enemies. (332b-d)[135]

Polemarchus does not say that medicine gives health, which is owed or appropriate to the sick, or that cooking gives food, which is owed or appropriate to the hungry. The analysis he gives, and which Socrates approves, considers *technai* as giving what is owed or appropriate to the subject-matter over which they are set. We expected to hear that

[135] 332b-d Grube-Reeve. Translation modified.

cooking is a friend to the hungry, but have learned that it is a friend to unseasoned food. In the (ultimately ill-fated) attempt to treat justice as a *techne*, "friends" and "enemies" will occupy the structural position, not of the hungry or the sick, but of food and bodies: a subject-matter, either a whom or a what, which is in some respect πονηρὸν, and to which the *techne* gives what is owed or appropriate.

In the strict account, Socrates will ground this indebtedness of the *techne* to its subject-matter in an attitude of devoted focus that defines the worker as such.

> No one in any position of rule [i.e. in the possession of a *techne*][136], insofar as he is ruling [i.e. working], either looks after or orders what is advantageous to himself but what is advantageous to what is being ruled and for which he would work, and looking (βλέπων) to that and to what is advantageous and suitable to it (τὸ ἐκείνῳ συμφέρον καὶ πρέπον), he says what he says, and does what he does, and so forth (342e).

This account is indeed implausible if it is taken to concern the psychological motives one might have for going to work. In her commentary on *Republic*, Julia Annas takes just such an approach, and accordingly finds Socrates' point of view "artificial,"[137] and "absurdly optimistic."[138] Both judgments are based on the fact that the account goes against our normal intuitions about why people work. On our interpretation, however, the strict account of *techne* does not concern the motives behind a *techne*, but rather the kind of looking internal to the accomplishment of the *techne* itself. It considers the worker, not as an individual who works, but precisely to the extent that her looking is brought under the discipline of a *techne*. The elimination of all motives except those grounded in securing the advantage of the subject-matter is not the result of a reflection that "artificially" chooses to abstract from certain features of a concrete action. It is instead effected in the working itself. A *techne* is a knowhow that lives in the disciplined look of the working worker. Only to the extent that the speech and actions of the worker are guided by this disciplined looking do they enter into the work at all.

The passage at 342e is a description of *techne* in its living methodical accomplishment. The looking, for instance, that is in the possession of the sewing *techne* looks to the garment, which is in some way πονηρὸν: deficient, wanting or even completely lacking. It looks to this in terms of *what is advantageous for it* (τὸ συμφέρον). This means that in addition to looking to what is deficient (what is worked on) it looks to what is needed in order that this deficiency may be provided for (what is worked with). Looking to something is not the same as seeing something; it refers to what is salient, what calls for notice. Something's calling for notice follows strictly from its relevance for giving advantage to what is worked on. The garment (τὸ πονηρὸν) is

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[136] Cf. 342c-d The conversation leading up to this statement makes it absolutely clear that a "position of rule" means being in the possession of a techne, not being a "ruler" in the narrow, conventional, sense. Directly before stating his general principle, Socrates reminds Thrasymachus that "a doctor in the precise sense is a ruler of bodies" and "a ship's captain in the precise sense is a ruler of sailors."

[137] Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 47.

[138] Ibid., p. 49.

damaged in this way and thus *requires* these needles, these stitches, etc. The sewer is distinguished from the non-sewer because she regulates her actions in strict accordance with such requirements as are discerned by this two-pronged look. The abstract knowledge she may have about methods and tools only testifies to her being in the possession of a *techne* if it was once called forth by live imperatives detected in the field of work itself.

The technical product or result (what is worked for) is also manifest in the field of work. It too appears strictly as fulfilling the requirements of the deficient subject matter, not external human interests. Socrates does indeed hold it essential to a *techne* that it prove capable of producing a useful result. Already, in his first discussion of *technai* with Polemarchus (333a), he assumed that the individual in the possession of a *techne* is a useful individual, someone who can be a good partner or offer help. In the strict account, he introduces this aspect of *techne* in a more precise fashion:

> Don't we say that each of the technai is different from the others in that each has a different value/power (δύναμιν)?...Therefore each renders (παρέχεται) to us some distinctive service (ὠφελίαν) but not one that is common, for example doctoring the service of health, and piloting the service of safety at sea. (346a)

We have seen that each *techne* looks to τὸ πονηρὸν in terms of τὸ συμφέρον, what it requires. Everything the worker says and does she says and does under the guidance of this looking. Each *techne* also possesses a distinctive δύναμις in accordance with which it produces an ὠφελεία.[139] But the worker at work does not *look to* the result interpreted as a service (ὠφελεία); her work renders it up (παρέχεται).

We can clarify this distinction between the product seen as a service and the product seen as the advantage of a deficient subject-matter by way of an example. Early in his discussion with Thrasymachus (341e), when he is trying to establish *techne* as a form of rule over τὸ πονηρὸν, Socrates says that the doctoring art was discovered in order to provide for the deficiency of the body by seeking its advantage. Now, when he is explaining the place of ὠφελεία (346a), he identifies the service of doctoring as "health." Within the structural analysis of the medical *techne*, are not the advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) of the deficient body (τὸ πονηρὸν) and health (ὠφελεία) one and the same? They do indeed refer to the same object: the human body as healthy. For the one doctoring, however, the healthy body is never salient as something serviceable in the sense that it satisfies a human need or requirement.

Whatever appreciation the doctor may have for the healthy body as a source of happiness or vitality, it is not to this that she looks in her work. To the doctor in the strict sense, the healthy body does not appear as something someone needs or requires. And this holds whether she is working on herself or on someone else. The look under the discipline of the *techne* only apprehends the healthy body as something πονηρὸν, which

[139] Socrates will distinguish the δύναμις of each *techne* on the basis of the ὠφελεία that it makes possible. This is in accordance with his general doctrine of powers that he lays out while considering the epistemic possibilities of the soul (477c).

thus has *its own requirements* to which the indebted technician must respond. One in the possession of the sewing *techne* does not look to the garment as something providing warmth, protection, or concealment. It is the wearer of the garment who looks to these things, and it is not the special business of the sewer to put herself in the wearer's place. The sewer's knowledge that warm garments are a help to cold people is in fact incidental to the knowledge that defines her craft and makes her a sewer.[140]

It is according to this technical distinction between τὸ πονηρὸν and its τὸ συμφέρον, on the one hand, and ὠφελεία on the other, that we should understand the famous exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus about shepherding. Having listened to Socrates demonstrate how the strict account implies that every worker is interested solely in the advantage of the weaker thing over which his *techne* rules, Thrasymachus, accusing Socrates of naivete, attempts to root the worker's self-interest in his directedness toward the anticipated product of his work. Thrasymachus' shepherd only "seeks the good" of his sheep in "looking to" (βλέποντας) the good of his master and himself (343b). In the eyes of the shepherd, everything he so carefully works on and works with is taken up into an encompassing concern for the satisfaction provided by the product. Mediating social relationships may mean that this product directly satisfies people other than the shepherd himself (indeed, Thrasymachus speaks of the shepherd's master). But every worker, insofar as he is in the possession of a *techne*, attends to his work only because he is first of all attending to his own satisfaction. At the highest level of abstraction from his product's use-value, this would mean that he looks to make money. Socrates' response, which is where he first introduces the terms δύναμις and ὠφελεία into the account (346a), amounts to an insistence on the technical suspension of all personal interests:

> Shepherding is concerned only to provide what is best for the things it is set over, and it is itself adequately provided with all it needs to be at its best when it doesn't fall short in any way of being the *techne* of shepherding. That's why I thought it necessary for us to agree before that every kind of rule, insofar as it rules, *does not seek anything other* than what is best for the things it rules and cares for…(345d)[141]

This approach to *techne* does not, as Strauss for instance supposes, imply the thesis that the genuine worker is altruistic. Strauss points out that in the paradigmatic case of statecraft, Socrates claims that the rulers rule by looking to the advantage of the ruled. It seems natural, then, that we should recognize concern for others as a general feature of all *technai*: "For the artisan in the strict sense proves to be concerned not with his own

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[140] In his study of *Republic*, Leon Craig writes of a basic "conflict of interest" between the craftsman and the consumer. The craftsman wants money, and the consumer wants quality. Such an observation belongs to a psychology of economics. Within the strict account of *techne*, however, we may speak of a deeper conflict of interest between the worker and the consumer. The worker at work is interested in products solely as fulfilling the needs of the worked-on subject-matter. The consumer is interested in them as serving human needs. Leon Harold Craig, *The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) [Hereafter The War Lover], p. 163.

[141] Grube-Reeve. Translation modified.

advantage, but with the advantage of the others whom he serves: the shoemaker makes shoes for others and only accidentally for himself; the physician prescribes things to his patients with a view to their advantage." The artisan in the strict sense, he concludes, "is only concerned with the well-being of others."[142] Perhaps the strongest evidence in the strict account for Strauss' interpretation is a passage often translated to the effect that "no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, looks after or orders what is advantageous to the doctor, but what is advantageous to *the patient*" (342d my emphasis). Does this not show that Socrates' technician, precisely insofar as he is guided by his disciplined look, looks after others?

When we consider the passage in context, another interpretation suggests itself. This comment about doctoring occurs within a list of examples by which Socrates hopes to illustrate that no *techne* seeks the advantage of *anything else* other than that of which it is the *techne* (342b). Medicine, says Socrates, considers the advantage only of *the body*, horsemanship only that of *horses*, etc. (342c). These subject-matters, these things of which each respective *techne* is the *techne*, are what technical knowledge "rules over" (342c). Having established this, he now asks Thrasymachus about the doctor once more: "Then, isn't it the case that no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, looks after or orders what is advantageous to the doctor but to τὸ κάμνοντι [literally: what is sick]? For the doctor in the precise sense was agreed to be a *ruler of bodies*" (342d my emphasis). To drive home his point, Socrates then asks Thrasymachus the same question about the captain, who has been strictly defined as "a ruler of sailors"(342d). Such a man looks after the advantage "of the man who is a sailor and is ruled." (342d). On the basis of these cases Socrates now states that no one in the possession of a *techne* looks after or orders his own advantage, but the advantage of that which his *techne* rules. Clearly, the participial phrase τὸ κάμνοντι refers to the sick body, the designated subject of medical rule.

For Socrates, what is worked for is what is worked on. The only advantage *looked to* by a *techne* is that of its subject-matter, the deficient object over which it properly rules. In certain cases, such as captaining or statecraft, Socrates formally identifies this subject-matter with human beings considered in some particular respect. But in the case of shoemaking, for instance, the object whose advantage is sought is the shoe itself, not other people (and accidentally the shoemaker himself) insofar as they require shoes. Thrasymachus understands Socrates' intent well enough. The latter, he says, is under the delusion that shepherds ultimately look to the good of *the sheep* rather than the good that may come to themselves and their masters. He does not accuse Socrates of believing that shepherds look after the advantage of the hungry and the cold. The thesis that Thrasymachus challenges Socrates to defend is not that technical accomplishment is altruistic, but rather that it does not look to its ὠφελεία, its product understood as a fulfillment of human needs or interests.[143]

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[142] The City and Man, p. 79.

[143] We can see why Socrates' attempt to posit wage-earning as a distinct *techne*, which can operate concurrently with all the others, raises difficult structural issues for the strict account. If wages are the service of wage-earning, then what might its deficient subject-matter be? By categorizing wage-earning as a *techne*, Socrates rules out the possibility that the wage-earner, insofar as he is a wage-earner, looks after his own interests, or those of anyone else.

The rigorous separation between τὸ πονηρὸν and ὠφελεία indicates that a *techne* becomes what it is under a suspension that sets it off from engagement with human interests. My being in the possession of a *techne* does not imply anything about my interest in helping others or in helping myself. The strict account of *techne* does not break work apart into an abstract knowledge and an application of that knowledge as determined by the "moral character" of the worker. Someone who uses "her skills" or "her knowledge" in order that she may satisfy a personal need or damage the object of work is not, to that very extent, working. She is outside the discipline of *techne*. When technical vision looks into the dimension of human interests, it will do so only insofar as these figure in the field of work defined by τὸ πονηρὸν and its τὸ συμφέρον. The looking itself is not engaged by these interests. For it, the ὠφελεία has no salience. Questions about self-interest and altruism are not relevant in a reflection on the worker in the strict sense imposed by the account.

This being the case, we are left to wonder how the categories δύναμις and ὠφελεία enter into the rigorous analysis of *techne*. First with Polemarchus (333a) and then again with Thrasymachus (346a), Socrates conducts the pedestrian exercise of listing off the powers and services of various *technai*. The method involved here is based on the simple perception of use-values within a given cultural context. Educated perception already understands products as such, i.e. as the result of human activities and as meant for specific uses. From here, one can explicitly identify various serviceable products as the result of various productive activities, thereby understanding the social value of the activities themselves. One thus sees how the various *technai* fit into the life of a community. For the acculturated adult, an exercise like this is mere child's play. Socrates has his interlocutors carry it out in a removed overview of *technai*, not by an inward consideration of technical looking in the manner imposed by the strict account. So the question remains as to whether and how the δύναμις and ὠφελεία become present for the worker in the strict sense.

We can pursue this question back to Husserl's conception of the vocational epoche. Despite the extreme nature of the vocational focusing appealed to in the strict account, it seems to have phenomenological value. Undertaking any practical task involves the resolution to look out for what is relevant to its fulfillment so as to be motivated to the appropriate responses. This readiness is the context from which abilities to carry out the task are actualized. The vocational epoche pushes this focusing to the limit. Whoever goes to work under it resolves to become the subject of the task rather than treating the task as the object of *her interests*, many of which are external to the work itself. To the extent that I go to work, I inhibit the references normally born by the task at hand to purposes whose realization first of all requires the completion of the task. The work is thus abstracted from the tasks I take on as the subject of such interests. Under the vocational epoche, my responsibilities to myself and to others are governed by my responsibility to what the work itself requires. We can make this distinction clear by imagining any kind of practical activity first as occurring in the fulfillment of broader interests and then professionally. To be a "professional," in this sense, means to set aside all those interests that occupy me in my broader social life. A vocation will prove to be

more than a mere profession, but the professional character of vocational occupation stems from the nature of the epoche under which it transpires.[144]

In a sense that corresponds to the "looking" of *Republic's* strict account, Husserl thus writes that the vocationally occupied: "have eyes for nothing but their ends and horizons of work" and that "the rest of the world…lies outside [their] interest."[145] The unrealized working goal "makes"[146] the field of work in which vocational vision looks out for relevancies. Everything else is a matter of indifference. At the same time, Husserl makes clear that this epoche is executed from within the horizon of a pre-given life-world (Ch 1.3). When Husserl claims that the vocational epoche occurs within this horizon, he does not mean that, as a matter of fact, the life-world remains there although the vocational worker happens to be indifferent to it. He rather means that it is there for the one standing under the vocational epoche:

> That this whole effective life and this whole work-world is held within the always obviously existing world in the most universal and full sense of the life-world, that the particular activity and works presuppose *its* "truth and falsity" in terms of what exists and what does not exist, of what is right and wrong in the broader and broadest sphere of being—this lies outside our [the worker's] interest, although in the life of particular interests we make use according to our particular needs of what exists in the broader sphere. Thus when we are living thematically in the particular world (under the rule of the highest end that "makes" it), the life-world is unthematic for us.[147]

The field of work in which the vocational worker stands is not some island of reality. Indeed, its very reality is only understandable on the basis of the references it bears to broader contexts in which it is nested. The doctor at work believes in the reality of these instruments, of this disease, of this patient, of the effects that his actions will or will not bring about. When she is engaged in her field of work, she will constantly assign these entities their place within the broader world, the same world in which she lived before she went to work. This obvious being-there of the encompassing life-world is of no

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[144] We can here indicate the open question how to understand Marx's theory of alienation in relation to this attempt to verify philosophy as a vocation. On the one hand, one might decide that the kind of abstraction accomplished by the vocational epoche operates at a level beneath the *understandings* of this work implied by various conditions of production. The experience of the separation between life and work that Marx criticizes as "alienation" would thus be the consequence of a contingent social arrangement, whereas vocational abstraction (as achieved through the vocational epoche) would remain a necessary feature of all imaginable going-to-work, even in a society in which social control over the productive process allowed it to appear as fully integrated into an individual's social life. Alternatively, one might decide that this vocational abstraction, and the distinction between work and social life upon which it is based, is precisely the object of Marx's critique. In this case, Husserl's insistence that philosophy understand itself vocationally provides a new perspective on Marx's professed rejection of philosophy as a separate enterprise. Regardless of its content, "philosophy," insofar as it sees itself vocationally, is a high-minded simplicity by Marxist standards.

[145] Crisis, p. 383.

[146] Crisis, p. 379.

[147] Crisis, p. 379.

interest to her, nor is her presupposition of its being-there. Both lie beyond the field of vocational vision.

Husserl often refers to the life-world as the horizon of all praxis. As such, it is the correlate of a general practical attitude that underlies every act of practical focusing. In executing the vocational epoche, I can continue to persist in the general practical attitude, and thus continue to accept this very world as an obvious encompassing horizon from which I understand vocational work and its products. In "going to work," I simply bracket the efficacy of certain kinds of worldly motives in favor of others. The pre-given life-world retains its relevance as a general horizon of praxis, even if entities beyond the particular field of work constituted through the vocational epoche remain out of focus. It is from this horizon that the working worker already understands the power/value and serviceability of her work within a network of interests, even though she never takes her eye off the subject matter and what it itself requires.

When Socrates conducts the pedestrian exercise in the identification δύναμις and ὠφελεία in the case of various *technai*, he speaks from a general practical attitude that has a particular shared life-world as its pre-given horizon of praxis. This understanding of how any given *techne* "fits-into" the whole of social life is not the sole prerogative of administrative reflection. It constitutes an interpretive background available in the work itself. But if the epoche carried out by the worker at work takes place against an interpretive background in which the product of work remains comprehensible as an ὠφελεία, is not the basic point Thrasymachus wanted to make about workers still valid? Perhaps he misspoke in claiming that the shepherd, as such, looks only to the advantage of his master and himself; but he nonetheless understands his work within a context of human interests. Since Socrates has no doctrine of altruism to oppose to Thrasymachus, should we not admit that once we have taken this context into account, each will pursue self-interest (broadly understood) so far as she is able?

It was precisely in order to appeal to such a context of interest that Thrasymachus first introduced the concept of the polis into the discussion. Until that point (338d), Socrates and his interlocutors had considered justice as the source of norms for individual behavior without considering its function in collective life. Thrasymachus wants to address justice within a critical political economy that takes the polis as its primary unit of analysis. His polis is a context of struggle between rulers and ruled in which each worker-citizen with open eyes understands everything in terms of self interest. It is by appropriating the polis theme that Socrates will extend the strict account of *techne* into the dimension of technical δύναμις and ὠφελεία. Will he consent to Thrasymachus' interpretation of political life as founded in self-interest?

We are here adopting a highly artificial perspective on the polis. It is not in view as a complex sociological phenomenon, but solely as a community of workers in the strict sense. Just as one is permitted to understand obviously unrealistic aspects of Socrates' political descriptions by anticipating that the polis functions as the soul writ large, we can also understand them within the methodological context determined by the search for the proper interpretation of δύναμις and ὠφελεία. For this inquiry, the polis is under consideration strictly as a co-ordination of *technai* in terms of their serviceability and correlative power. Strauss observes that: "when Socrates speaks about the primary needs which bring men together, he mentions food, housing, and clothing but is silent about procreation. He speaks only of those natural needs which are satisfied by means of

arts…He abstracts from procreation in order to be able to understand the city as an association of artisans…"[148] It is not some inattentiveness to the facts of city life that causes Socrates to present the polis in this fashion. He is rather concerned with the fitting together of *technai* themselves in order to approach the particularly problematic case of philosophy.

Each polis of *Republic* is a coordination of *technai* considered on such a scale that it serves no further technical goal.[149] Because of this lack of an external aim, the polis can function as a work-world from whose horizon the serviceability of *techne* becomes understandable in a unique form. The doctor, for instance, may understand herself as a hospital worker, or a functionary of healthcare as a whole, thus situating her work within a broader cooperation of *technai* guided by its attendance to an enlarged subject-matter. But if she were to understand herself as a polis-worker, she would interpret her work as accomplishing nothing other than the polis itself as a coordination of *technai*. To achieve a political understanding of one's *techne* would be to understand why, apart from the production of any particular result, one coordinates one's work with that of others at all. The enumeration of technical services and powers that Socrates attempts with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus is a way of distinguishing *technai* from one another. It does not consider the criterion of serviceability that makes the various services serviceable. Such a consideration can only occur from the perspective of the polis as a whole, or for the citizen who makes herself responsible for that perspective. It will remain for Glaucon and Adeimantus to discover the principle of technical serviceability. They will do so through the building of cities.

If the polis were not a context that already encompasses every work-world, each worker, in "going to work," could choose to bring her working capabilities and products into relation with those of others for the first time. In making this choice, she might understand why it was important to go to work in the polis at all. She would thus gain insight into the originating principle (ἀρχὴ) of the polis as a coordination of *technai*. In *Republic*, we have privileged access to this principle because Socrates and his interlocutors build their cities *in speech*. Their words are the source of its very origination. Socrates and his pupils will not only carry out their work as founders in accordance with this ἀρχὴ, at key points they will also reflect upon it as an explicit theme, and attempt to formulate it. Glaucon and Adeimantus, the builders of these cities, have just provided a trenchant justification for Thrasymachus' political economy of self-interest, a justification from which they want to be dissuaded. The discussion regarding the ἀρχὴ of the polis will thus proceed by distinguishing the true principle of city construction from a pseudo-principle, with which it is initially confused. Only a polis constructed according to the true ἀρχὴ will prove capable of including the philosophical vocation according to its proper ὠφελεία and δύναμις.

It is according to the pseudo-principle that Socrates and Adeimantus explicitly construct the first city of *Republic*. Though this polis will contain both justice and

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[148] The City and Man, p. 95-6.

[149] Only under this definition does the polis make sense as the appropriate analogy for the tripartite soul in the consideration of justice. When the individual soul is investigated as an articulated whole, it is from the perspective of its inward ordering, not the goal at which it aims.

injustice (369a), Socrates guides Adeimantus into understanding its foundation according to the following ἀρχὴ:

> Well then, a polis is born, as I suppose, since it happens that each of us is not self-sufficient, but in need of many things—or do you mean to found the polis in some other principle?... Indeed, then, one seeking out another for one need (χρείᾳ), and another another for another, we, needful of many things (πολλῶν δεόμενοι), assemble in one dwelling place, many partners and allies—for this dwelling together we sat down the name "polis."… Indeed, one man gives a share to another, another to another, if he gives something or receives it, *believing it to be better for himself*. Come then, let us make a polis in speech from this principle. Our need (χρείᾳ), as it seems, will make it. (369b-c)[150]

It is because human beings are naturally πολλῶν δεόμενοι that each goes to work in the context of the polis. It is as if each pre-political worker were to say to herself: I can better fulfill my own multifarious need (χρείᾳ) by entering into commerce with others than by attempting to accomplish this on my own. Each worker uses the polis for his own purposes. The founders themselves act according to this motive. Socrates and Adeimantus will construct the polis according to *their need*, conjuring into being the workers capable of fulfilling it.

In such an understanding of the polis, the virtue of the division of labor is that each can better fulfill his own needs through the mediation of exchange. Specialization, says Socrates, results in "more plentiful and better quality goods" (370c). Each goes to work in her own field because the ὠφελεία she thereby renders will better fulfill the needs of others and, ultimately, her own. Others are partners and allies for me in my fulfillment of my own needs. The political δύναμις of work lies in its ability to procure this fulfillment. The principle governing the coordination of *technai* is thus economic in nature. Economics is the secret of political association. Each worker will understand her fitting into or belonging to the polis because she knows that her needs, whether basic or extravagant,[151] bind her to the work and needs of others. A polis is essentially a need-

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[150] We translate ἀρχὴ as "principle" or "originating principle," rather than "beginning." The ultimate justification for this decision comes in book IV at 433b-c, when Socrates, referring to their city-building in book II, says εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι. "Immediately upon our beginning to construct the polis, we happen, with the help of some god, to have hit upon something of a principle and blueprint of justice." The precise part of the conversation to which Socrates here refers is most likely 370b, where Socrates first introduces the idea that the polis affords each the opportunity to carry out a single task (ἔργον) to which he is by nature suited.

[151] The admission of extravagant needs or luxurious products into the polis is the result of Glaucon's intervention that begins at 372c. Socrates consents to building a luxurious city only after remarking that the "true" or "healthy" city is the one constructed to satisfy modest or basic needs. Of course, it is in the attempt to satisfy these multiplying needs that the founders confront the necessity of war, and thus of training the guardians that will ultimately require a philosophical education. This distinction between the healthy and feverish cities, and the development through which the later is ultimately reformed, are important features of polis-construction in *Republic*. However, we must not confuse this issue with the

coordinating mechanism. This conception conforms perfectly to Thrasymachus' account of technical accomplishment. A whole tradition of political economy and political science will build upon it. Socrates himself will assert that every existing polis of which he is aware has been built up according to this principle of association. Such cities, however, will be incapable of including the philosopher.

The true ἀρχὴ of the polis (or the ἀρχὴ of the true polis—422e) is political justice itself, defined as doing that task for which one is by nature suited (433a). A true polis is not a need coordinating mechanism, but a vocational horizon. The coordination of *technai* serves to free vocational work from the material interests of life and allows it to become an end in itself. Already in the construction of the first city, Socrates shows that the political division of labor responds to concerns other than the efficient production of high-quality products. It is right for each citizen-worker to perform one task, not only because it will yield a greater quantity of better goods, but because it gives expression to the diversity of human nature and because each worker is one person, not many (370b). Later (423d), Socrates will assert that the worker *becomes one* by doing the one task for which she is suited. It is in order to be able to undertake this kind of work that one would enter in the polis in the first place. Each techne has a δύναμις and ὠφελεία insofar as it frees up each worker for dedication to her own vocational work.

Farming is not serviceable because it satisfies the potter who is happy eating corn. The happiness that comes from the fulfillment of multifarious need is not political happiness. Those called potters may be happy eating corn and those called farmers dining on fine china. It is possible to construct a "city" in this fashion, but then "a farmer wouldn't be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, and none of the other schemas of work, from which a polis is born, will at all hold up" (421a). The strictness of Socrates' account of the polis as a coordination of *technai* is here quite evident. If one "is talking about farmers and banquiters who are happy as they would be at a festival rather than in a polis, then he isn't talking about a polis at all, but about something else" (421b).[152] Geographically speaking, a festival may be in a city. For the strict account, it is in principle an extra-political affair. To enter into the polis by going to work is precisely to renounce the self-interested directedness towards χρεία. The aim of the city is not consumption,[153] but the life of production itself: vocational repayment of debts to τὸ πονηρὸν . Each *techne*, no matter the nature of its product, renders a service and exercises a correlative power because it contributes to a thriving vocational life for all. The polis exists in order that each might be able to pursue her own work. The question of

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more basic problem animating the polis-construction. This is to distinguish the true ἀρχὴ of the polis, which will indicate the definition of justice. Socrates clearly holds that the construction of the first (moderate) city already allows for a research into its justice *and injustice* (371e). He reacts to Glaucon's complaint that he has built a city fit only for pigs by saying that studying a luxurious city will *also* serve the purposes of such a research (372e).

[152] Grube-Reeve. Translation modified.

[153] Multifarious need naturally needs to be fulfilled within the polis. The life of need fulfillment is not eradicated. It does, however, become a subordinate part within the functioning of the polis as a whole (just as the appetitive part of the tripartite soul is inside the psychological whole). Needs need to be satisfied because they fulfill conditions necessary for the self-realization of the community according to its originating principle.

philosophy's political inclusion will be posed in terms of whether it upholds this principle.

The difficulty of this inclusion will only become clear if we bear in mind the strict account of *techne*. From now on, when we speak of "the philosopher," we refer, not to an individual who practices philosophy, but to an individual exactly insofar as she is involved in the actual attending that makes of her a philosopher. The question of philosophy's political inclusion is the question of whether *that life*, which lives solely in its orientation to the field of work proper to philosophy, can comprehend its value and servicabililty within a community horizon. Conceiving philosophy's inclusion in the polis has nothing to do with looking into how philosophy, despite the professed purity of its interest (its "mind"), remains connected to a broader sphere of interests and social relationships because the philosopher too is a needful human being, with a body that wants rest, food, shelter, companionship, etc. This is surely a sociological fact, albeit an uninteresting one. However, according to the strict accounts of *techne* and polis, the *body* of the philosopher would only live and sleep in the city if her vocational life, according to its own interests and motives, fits into the community horizon.[154]

3.
The Problem of Philosophy's Serviceability and Power

The political inclusion of philosophy involves special difficulties rooted in the fundamentally impractical character of the philosophical vocation. Philosophy looks in a different direction, in a different way, than all other vocations. While all other vocations operate on the basis of the general practical attitude, philosophy sets this attitude out of action. It is not interested in the world as it is disclosed to this attitude. It is according to this basic difference of orientation that Socrates sets philosophical dialectic apart from "all other *technai*." Philosophy, he says…

> attempts to grasp, concerning everything, according to a methodical route, what each is. All the other technai are either oriented toward the opinions and desires of human beings or toward generation and composition or toward tending to what is being grown and composed—each and every *techne* being turned toward its work. (533b)

Philosophy does not lack concern for the world of human interest and becoming. On the contrary, philosophy is concerned with everything. It is distinguished from all other *technai* because it is not likewise oriented toward this world. Even when he justifies the

[154] In *Theataetus*, Socrates, comparing the philosopher to the "practical man," asserts that "only the body of the philosopher lives and sleeps in the polis. His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these [practical] things are of little or no account, spurns them, and pursues its winged way…"(173e). See the translation by M.J. Levett and Myles Burnyeat in: Plato, *Complete Works*. Edited, with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). This statement assumes the polis to be a need coordinating mechanism, and addresses the problem of philosophy's political inclusion from that perspective. According to the strict account of *Republic*, however, one does not belong to a polis because her needs motivate her to settle in the vicinity of others.

idea of the philosopher-king, Socrates will do so by appealing precisely to this characteristic disorientation. The philosopher in the strict sense, he says (500c), has no leisure to look toward the practical affairs of human beings (βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας).

Husserl refers to this lack of leisure for practical affairs as the theoretical attitude. The theoretical attitude is a broad concept for Hussserl. It is not to be confused with the specifically phenomenological attitude, which emerges through a reduction carried out from within the theoretical orientation. The theoretical attitude governs every scientific enterprise, phenomenological or non-phenomenological, eidetic or empirical, etc. (Ch. 1.1). For Husserl, the philosophical project has always been the effort to go after the whole of truth in the theoretical attitude. If phenomenology has discovered a method and field of work in which philosophy is actually possible, it is as the fulfillment and genuine beginning of this theoretical endeavor. The difficulties associated with the Europe concept thus involve the attitude fundamental to the entire philosophical project. Husserl's Europe is the paradoxical world in which the products of vocational work executed in this attitude are, in their original mode of being, practically useful.

The theoretical attitude is not characterized by its exclusion of non-intellectual experiences (such as perception) in favor of judgments or calculations.[155] Instead, "what is characteristic of it lies in the *manner* in which such lived experiences are performed or carried out in the function of knowledge."[156] Life in the theoretical attitude is interested *solely* in an attentive determining of how and what things are "in themselves." It wants to see even practical goals and values *apart* from all relation to their live efficacy. A theoretical theme is a fragile entity. It itself bears practical meanings and appears against a world horizon heavy with non-theoretical significance. Life in the theoretical attitude notices these things, but it lives through them as irrelevant background rather than "living in" them as motivations. [157] The rich associational networks between theoretical and non-theoretical themes can always prompt a reversal of attitude such that the practical background comes to the fore and once again holds life in its grip. However, it is also possible to resolve to "go to work" theoretically.

To "go to work" in the theoretical attitude is to resolve to inhibit this possibility of reversal, and to focus strictly on theoretical themes. Every vocational epoche is a focusing by which the working worker permits herself to remain indifferent to everything lying outside the field of work. In the case of non-theoretical vocations, this epoche takes place within a life-world horizon that remains relevant for a general practical attitude. Theoretical work is defined, however, by the fact that its vocational epoche is simultaneously what Husserl calls an "*epoche* from all praxis."[158] Rather than

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[155] In practical attitudes, one can certainly make judgments, carry out reflections, seek to find out the truth, etc. On the other hand, the theoretical attitude includes not only judgments, but also a whole range of pre-predicative experiences as well, such as theoretical sense-intuition.

[156] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution.* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1990) [Hereafter, Ideas II], p. 5. My emphases.

[157] Ideas II., p. 10.

[158]Krisis, p. 329.

foregrounding and abstracting a certain domain of end-directed praxis within the horizon of the life-world, this epoche suspends the totality of those interests that make of the worker a practical agent at all. The theorist resolves to become a "non-participating spectator"[159] with respect to the entire world engaged by the general practical attitude.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl suggestively describes how this non-participation modifies the way in which the pre-given life world functions in the disclosure of objects. For the one who resolves to focus only on theoretical themes, that world is now an irrelevant background whereas it was before an "encircling sphere." The world as encircling sphere gives to everything in it "a true and proper place." This is obviously not meant to imply simply that certain things belong in certain spaces. That kind of belonging is a mere example of what Husserl is getting at here. The "true and proper place" of things refers to those contexts of praxis that every cultural object immediately indicates as *its own*. The objects belong to these contexts, are in place there. The contexts also refer to other practical contexts, and so on indefinitely. The practical situations to which an object belongs are not revealed beginning from an un-situated object. These situations also guide vision to the discovery of objects. Those bicycles all locked up together and strewn across the courtyard, for example, belong, not only to the context of bike riding, but immediately indicate the whole broader context of student life, the university, etc. and are also discovered from this context. The pre-given world of praxis is like a sphere not only in its spatial deployment around the perceiving, acting subject at its center, but also because it holds itself together as a well-ordered cosmos. There are no hard "edges" where objects and contexts break off. This continuous reference without edge is the encircling or surrounding nature of the world pre-given to practical understanding. Its encirclement will be, for Husserl, the intimacy of home, but also, from the perspective of theoretical interests, limitation, an endless movement in the dimension of finitude.

From within this encircling world horizon of praxis, one can consider themes that bear theoretical meanings. One simply does not "live in" them as theoretical. When a theoretical theme is actively engaged on its own account, it undergoes a disconnection from its place within contexts of involvement. Husserl here describes the "new standpoint" of the theorizing mathematician in relation to the pre-given life-world (here "natural world").

> The natural world still remains "present," I am at the natural standpoint after as well as before, and in this respect undisturbed by the adoption of new standpoints. If my cogito is active *only* in the worlds proper to the new standpoints, the natural world remains unconsidered; it is now the background for my consciousness as act, but it is *not the encircling sphere within which an arithmetical world finds its true and proper place*. The two worlds are present together but disconnected…[160]

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[159] Crisis, p. 285.

[160] Ideas I, p. 94. My emphases.

Theoretical mathematical judgments can be either pure or applied.[161] They are likewise opposed to a practically employed mathematical judgment. In this latter case, the basis for the application (the fact) lies within a practical field, with its governing interests and ends. When I calculate a tip on a bill at a restaurant, I surely enter into an arithmetical world, but this world constantly has "its true and proper place" within the encircling sphere of the life-world as the horizon of praxis.

To transform the life-world from encompassing sphere into disconnected or irrelevant background is also non-participation in the sense that one abstains from a certain kind of collective activity. Interest in a theoretical theme is equally a strange disinterest in that world where everything has its true or proper place. It is in the world of proper places that one acts as a member of the community relative to that world. In direct or indirect communication with others, one is constantly sharing in a shaping and reshaping of contexts of praxis. One is constantly offering help and being a partner, pointing things out, employing things for their intended purposes, critically solving problems obstructing working goals, etc. One is constantly following the practical suggestions of things in customary ways on the basis of ends that are commonly understood and engaged. Even when "taking a break" these suggestions make their presence felt. All non-theoretical *technai* "go to work" on the basis of this world of praxis and remain encircled by it in their self-understanding. The theorist, however, does not aim at ends that are understandable *as theoretical* by virtue their place in a world relative to established or emerging practical interests. Going to work in the theoretical attitude thus involves an interruption of one's life as a co-subject of a surrounding practical world. In this connection, Husserl speaks of a depersonalization of the subject of the theoretical attitude.[162] Only on the basis of this depersonalization will it be possible to seek methods for the production of theoretical products: validities that are not contingent upon governing practical interests particular to me and my community, but instead hold good presumptively for everyone, once and for all.

This sketch of what it means to go to work in the theoretical attitude puts us in position to appreciate the difficultly involved in philosophy's discovery of an ὠφελεία and δύναμις proper to its own field of work. It is from the perspective of the general practical attitude, we said, that the distinctive power/value and service of each *techne* are readily understandable. The world given to this attitude is continually posited as an encircling sphere throughout every non-theoretical vocational epoche, and thus functions as a horizon from which the worker can understand how her work fits into a social whole. The vocational epoche that governs philosophy, however, regards as irrelevant the horizon of world-interpretation on the basis of which we normally understand the value and serviceability of vocations. The product for the sake of which the philosopher does everything she does and says everything she says has no place in this horizon. The one

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[161] Ibid., p. 54. The pure mathematical judgment is wholly eidetic in nature. If it refers to an individual or a range of individuals, these have the status of being examples whose existence or non-existence is completely irrelevant. In an applied, theoretical mathematical judgment, the individual or range of individuals is theoretically posited as a *fact*, while the judgments concerning it have the character of eidetic necessity insofar as they pertain to an instance of essential being.

[162] For Husserl, the "person," strictly defined, is a member of a social world. See Ideas II sec. 3 See also, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, p. 144. In the transmission of pre-scientific wisdom, i.e. knowledge grounded in the reflection on empirical experience in light of practical ends, "personality directs itself to personality...Science, however, is impersonal."

doing philosophical work looks, with respect to each thing, only to *what it is*. How, then, should the determination of being as it is *apart* from all interests that develop and find fulfillment within the pre-given life-world horizon render up a service to the community?

We miss the inherent difficulty of this problem if we pose the question of philosophy's serviceability from the perspective of the general practical attitude. The general practical attitude understands what things are good for. In this way, it can certainly encounter philosophical results. For instance, practical vision can aim at practical ends by measuring a specific situation against a theoretical one in which definitions, relationships, and the bond between premises and conclusions hold with universal validity. This vision can guide the accomplishment of routine practical tasks, but can also operate at a higher level, where it seeks solutions to unsolved practical problems. In all cases, it encounters the theoretical situation as a feature of a broader practical field. The theoretical activity is a moment in the fulfillment of practical interest. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl describes this outlook as that of the "technologist" (which we should not confuse with that of the worker in the broadest sense in *Republic*):

> The attitude of the technologist (not the technician but the person devising a technology) is essentially different from that of the scientist. It is a practical and not a theoretical attitude—even when the technologist incidentally runs into scientific problems and solves them in the interest of technology. His theorizing is then but a means to some (extra-theoretical) practice.[163]

The technological employment of theory immediately suggests the production of material devices through the application of mathematical physics. The useful products that result from this practical theorizing certainly "fit into" our life-world, where they serve a variety of human interests, dramatically increasing their scope, power, and efficacy, and perhaps altering their very character. The genealogy by which one could trace such products back to purely theoretical and eventually philosophical activity is not difficult to project. According to this view, "technology" would be the defining feature of that life-world in which theoretical science renders its distinctive service.

But we must interpret the technological employment of theory in a broader fashion, such that it includes every consideration of theoretical problems or results with an eye toward the accomplishment of a goal that has its significance within the horizon of an encircling life-world. In this broader sense, the concept will encompass two attitudes toward theory that we might initially mistake for alternatives to technological employment in the narrow sense.

The first technological attitude turns to philosophy in the hope that it can make the human being wise. Living in the general practical attitude, one constantly confronts dilemmas about how to live, about what attitude to adopt toward situations in various dimensions of praxis. "Philosophy" may be helpful here. From this perspective, the "philosopher" is an aloof character whose lack of involvement is the source of generally applicable wisdom. Precisely because philosophy has no interest in my concrete circumstances, it renders results that afford me a global perspective on my life that I

[163] Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 32.

could not otherwise attain. To have a "philosophy" means to possess a coherent view of things that allows one to interpret and navigate the course of life. Rather than serving a specific praxis, philosophy thus provides a view of the whole, a "world-view," in accordance with which one can live well. This attitude is technological because it seeks to apply philosophy to the course of a single, finite life. The practical world in which this life lives is the horizon in which the acquisition of wisdom matters. In the 1911 *Logos* essay, Husserl argues that the goal of wisdom would be senseless if it "were not in principle to be realized in the course of an individual life by way of constant approach."[164] The seeker after a world-view "wants to have his system and to have it soon enough to be able to live by it…"[165] The "individual life" within whose span wisdom matters may be extended to include the life of communities at various levels. One may seek wisdom, not for herself, but in order to communicate it to the next generation, etc. The goal of wisdom is nonetheless the attainment of a world-view in accordance with which life might *then* proceed in the most well-fated manner possible. Given this attitude to philosophy, the latter would render its service in a community guided by a wisdom tradition that provides a spiritual resource for understanding and facing down life's dilemmas.

The second technological attitude worth designating is really a specification of the first, but brings with it a distinct existential stance. We can call this attitude that of "engaged critique." This attitude looks to theoretical ideas in order to effect some change, whether in opinions or circumstances, in the surrounding world of life. This change may even be in the realm of ideas itself, since these are already interpreted as being in dynamic interplay with contexts of praxis. The attitude of engaged criticism takes its starting point from an appreciation of the power of ideas to shape everyday ways of interpreting circumstances, and thus to prefigure the visibility and force of motives that drive decisions and projects in personal, interpersonal and institutional life. This shaping can either occur in a passive manner, and thus without express judgment, or else actively. Engaged criticism seeks, on the one hand, to bring these passive processes into full awareness such that they become the objects of judgments in light of the goals to which the criticism is committed. On the other hand, it may actively seek to institute its own agenda of ideas. Engaged criticism focuses on criticizing theoretical ideas because it sees these as particularly powerful "tools" in the shaping of understanding. Again, precisely because they are the most removed from the immediacy of life, these ideas have the capacity to determine the interpretive frameworks within which situations appear and are subject to reflection and analysis. By addressing theoretical ideas, criticism traces praxis-guiding opinions and prejudices, if not back to their empirical source, at least up to their most explicit and comprehensive formulation. The seeker of wisdom wants philosophy to interpret the world of life, the engaged critic wants philosophy to change it. The two attitudes have in common that theoretical ideas appear from the perspective of a living commitment to goals within the horizon of the pre-given world of practical engagement. They are thus practical attitudes with respect to theory and are technological in the sense of Husserl's definition.

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[164]Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 135.

[165] Ibid., p. 143

Husserl understands all such approaches to theory as processes of finitization (*Verendlichung*). In their original meaning, theoretical results are unbound from every particular context of praxis, and in this sense infinite. Theoretical science aims at a single same-same truth that all factual processes of verification ever to be attempted would confirm, and would confirm precisely as unconditioned by the factual circumstances of the verification. [166] As originally intended in theoretical judgment, theoretical truth does not belong to the world as a factual state of affairs upon which we can rely in order to get something done. It is never a truth "true enough" to be taken up as a means and employed under particular circumstances in order to fulfill particular purposes. This does not mean that there is no experience of optimal theoretical evidence. It means that even in the case of optimal evidence, the theoretical intention is not fulfilled as the satisfaction of the conditions necessary for a further praxis.

In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl describes the process of finitization as an "obvious" mode of synthesis between theory and praxis.[167] The implication is that we are well acquainted with this kind of synthesis, and may even believe that there is nothing more to expect from *theoria*. But finitization does not represent a genuine synthesis between the theoretical and practical attitudes. It is instead a new frontier of interest for the practical attitude itself. *Theoria*, for its part, remains closed up in itself, incapable of rendering its proper service and without motive to reflect upon its serviceability. Finitization will not result in a service *proper* to the field of work distinctive to *theoria*. Non-theoretical vocations constantly furnish products that satisfy practical interests within the horizon of the life-world. Philosophy, the only vocation productive of infinite products, will only *incidentally* serve these interests. The life that runs its course in the general practical attitude will make use of philosophical results as it sees fit, in accordance with its aims. This "making use of," however, overlooks the infinitude definitive of theoretical products as such, and thus misses the distinctive role that philosophy has to play in non-philosophical life. It is as if a virtue specific to theoretical products determines their normal employability, and that the philosophical vocation can only be seen in its proper value when this employability is manifest.

It is only in comparison with this employability that the use made of philosophical results in the practical attitude would appear as a misuse. This misuse is not analogous to employing products of non-theoretical vocations for abnormal ends—employing a hammer as a paper-weight, for instance. When I employ a tool improperly, I nonetheless take advantage of its practical properties, whether these are incidental or essential to its proper use. As a driver of nails, the hammer has a heaviness that was, from the beginning, a practical property. Before the hammer's invention, heaviness was already manifest in the surrounding world as a power by which things held other things down or in place, by which one thing could be "driven through" another, etc. To hold down paper with the heaviness of a hammer is a conventional misuse, but it employs the hammer from the same general attitude out of which the hammer must have once been invented; I look to

[166] "In science, the ideality of the individual products of work, the truths, does not merely denote repeatability, such that sense is identified [with what was produced before] and confirmed…: it wants to be unconditioned truth. This involves an infinity which gives to each factual confirmation and truth the character of being merely relative, of being a mere approach in relation precisely to that infinite horizon in which the truth-in-itself counts, so to speak, as an infinitely distant point." Crisis, p. 278.

[167] Crisis, p. 283

surrounding objects hoping to use their powers to win advantage over other objects, and thus to accomplish practical ends. The situation with theoretical products is quite different. Although Husserl will recognize practical interests functioning in the genesis of theoretical ideas (as in his famous analysis of geometry), the creation of the theoretical product itself can only occur under the epoche of the whole world of praxis. The theoretical product has no practical qualities. Its being theoretically true does not include its being dependable, reliable or powerful in the way that it will appear so for the technologist.

But if *theoria* is not truly serviceable from the perspective of the general practical attitude, then how can it serve a praxis external to the field of its own vocational work? An answer to this question is necessary if Husserl's approach to the *Crisis* is to be justified. Further, is not this very question illegitimate from the standpoint of the theoretical attitude? What business does philosophy, in the strict sense, have in wondering about the serviceability of its work? Why should the theorist, who is turned away from all those interests that involve her as a subject of her surrounding life-world, come to care about the question of how or whether her work fits into this horizon? We have already noted the curious place that the determination of philosophy's vocational serviceability occupies within Husserl's final *Besinnung* on *theoria*. The existence of a teleologically unified and methodologically accomplishable philosophical project is implicitly intended by anyone who seriously undertakes philosophical work. Husserl's attempt to explore the possibility of fulfilling this intention is thus a reflection on the assumptions necessarily contained in this undertaking. But the will to accomplish philosophical work does not inherently contain the intention of the serviceability of this work. In fact, the vocational epoche of the theoretical attitude, which determines the philosophical project in its entirety, expressly sets out of action all such intentions. Something remarkable would have to happen in order for philosophy's serviceability to become an issue from the standpoint of *theoria* itself.

4.
The Discovery of Philosophy's Serviceability and Power

In *Republic*, philosophy's serviceability becomes an issue for the philosopher when she experiences the authority of the law upholding the founding principle of the polis. The philosopher does not first of all belong to the polis and then experience the law. It is the law itself that introduces her, as well as every worker-citizen, into the polis. The function of the law, says Socrates, consists in

> harmonizing the citizens by persuasion and constraint, making them give a share of service (τῆς ὠφελίας) by which each would be able to serve (ὠφελεῖν) the community, and when it introduces such people into the polis, it does so not in order that each be allowed to go to work at whatever each wants, but in order that it may dispatch them for the binding together of the polis. (519e-520a)

In turning to one's own work out of obedience to the law, and thus understanding one's *techne* from the perspective of the polis as a whole, one becomes a citizen. Socrates usually describes the politically incorporated *techne* as an ἔργον, which readily translates as work or job. But for work to be political work, for it to be a "vocation of the city"(433a), it must contribute to the proper functioning of the whole. ἔργον thus means assigned task or function. An ἔργον is assigned by the law that enforces the just arrangement of the political whole. By having and fulfilling one's *techne* as an ἔργον, one upholds the shape, or the formal constitution (πολιτεία) of the polis.

To be included as a citizen, the philosopher would have to experience this assignment on the basis of the field of work and vocational epoche proper to philosophy. Philosophy will have to discover for itself that its focused engagement in philosophical matters renders up an ὠφελεία that harmonizes the community as a whole, and that it thus exercises a political δύναμις within the vocational horizon. Philosophy must come to experience its work as an ἔργον in response to an imperative that has the force of a justly imposed law. Only thus will the philosopher become a genuine citizen who contributes to and obeys the πολῑτεία. This is what it means for philosophy to be included in the polis.

We recall that in the *Vienna Lecture* Husserl also describes philosophy becoming aware of its vocational serviceability in an authoritative calling that emanates from beyond the sphere of theoretical reason:

> *theoria* (the universal science), arising [*erwachsende*] within a closed unity and under the epoche of all praxis, is called (and in theoretical insight itself exhibits its calling) to serve mankind in a new way, mankind which, in its concrete existence, lives first and always in the natural sphere. This occurs in the form of a new sort of praxis, that of the universal critique…[168]

Theoria only gets interested in its serviceability because of an event that happens to it. This event does not bring theoretical science out of itself, but brings it to understand itself, theoretically, as a service. The transition into this new standpoint requires that *theoria be called to service*, and that it comes to know, with theoretical insight, that it is so called. We emphasize: 1) that *theoria* is *called* to service, which means that theoretical interest does not interest itself in finding a role to serve in a social whole until it experiences being assigned this role. In other words, the possibility of philosophy's vocational serviceability even appearing as a theoretical problem depends upon this experience of assignment, and 2) that it is precisely *theoria*, "under the epoche of all praxis," that is called. It is *theoria* as indifferent to every practical motive, as radical disengagement. This means that *what* is to be of service are theoretical results in their original mode of being, as intended in theoretical judgment—as opposed to all use of theoretical results that appear relevant within particular horizons of praxis. It is in this experience of being called that philosophy will originally discover its vocational function.

From whence does this call originate? How is it encountered? And why should *theoria* heed it? Nowhere in the *Crisis* will Husserl subject this experience of being called to a detailed description, nor will he inquire into its possibility. Instead, the entire

[168] Ibid.

Besinnung of the *Crisis* occurs within its grip. We have already noted that, from the start, Husserl understands the project of taking possession of the philosophical task from the perspective of philosophy's responsibility to carry out its vocational service to non-philosophical humanity. Perhaps it is precisely because the *Crisis* is always already responding to this call that it never thematizes it as a theoretical issue.

The perspective of *Republic* poses no such problem. Socrates and his interlocutors construct a polis in which philosophy will be called to service, but their own philosophizing does not occur within the range of this call. The philosophers who heed the call to service are mere figures within a hypothetical city conceived in explicit contrast to all existing cities in which philosophers might live and carry out their work. It is in direct opposition to what philosophers are in fact "allowed to do today" (519d) that Socrates conceives their being called into political service. Strictly speaking, philosophers "of today" do not belong to any polis. They are unserviceable (ἀνωφελὴς) because the πολῑτεία in which they have been brought up has no use for them. In every existing polis, the coordination of *technai* does not accommodate the philosopher as someone who, by doing his own work, aids justice (496d). If anyone today becomes a genuine philosopher, it will be *despite*, not because of, the πολῑτεία in which she has been brought up. Such is the effective philosophical situation in which Socrates will imagine a polis in which philosophers are called to service.

The discussion of the imperative to service occurs within a purely theoretical polis-construction that we must carefully separate from a line of inquiry initiated by Glaucon at 472a. That inquiry eventually concerns the practical possibility of the philosophical polis. It asks how it is possible that one of the existing cities could take on a constitution in which philosophy could be of service. Within this inquiry, Socrates will investigate the difficulties involved in the establishment and endurance of such a polis in *our actual history* (499d). In the second part of this work, we will explore these difficulties. For now, however, we limit ourselves to clarifying the structural definition of the philosophical polis. In terms of *Republic*, this means remaining within the theoretical construction, interrupted at 472a and resumed at 502c, in which the founders think up a polis appropriate to philosophical serviceability, educate philosophers, and then introduce them into this polis by means of the following imperative:

> We will say that men of that (philosophical) sort who come to be in the other cities act fairly in not sharing in the labors in them. For unbidden (on their own recognizance), they grow up in each polis outside the requirement of the πολιτεία. And it is just for what is self-grown, indebted to no one for its upbringing, to be zealous in not paying to anyone recompense for having been raised. But you we brought up, for yourselves and for the rest of the polis, as kings and, as it were, leaders of the swarm…Therefore, there must be a down-going (καταβατέον οὖν). (520b-c)

This dramatic presentation of philosophy's being called to service gives us a perspective from which to address the questions we put to Husserl. Who calls the philosopher to service, how, and why should the philosopher obey?

The philosopher's vocational interest gives her no leisure for the practical affairs of human beings (500c). She is called into service by Glaucon and Socrates themselves. But who are Glaucon and Socrates? They are the founders of the polis, guardians of the foundational law that upholds its ἀρχὴ and thus the justice of its πολιτεία. As founders, Socrates and his interlocutors constantly insert themselves into the polis they construct in speech. They imagine, for instance, what they themselves will say to the philosophers. And yet, Socrates distinguishes the philosophical polis from the others built in speech by the fact that in building this polis, he and his interlocutors will have to include in their political creation individuals who will effectively take their place as founders. He says to Adeimantus that the building of the philosophical polis will be different from that of the "guardian city" (books two through five) in that they will now address the fact that "there must always be some people in the polis who have a theory of the πολιτεία, the *same one that guided you, the lawgiver, when you made the laws*" (497c).[169] By applying the law of justice to the philosophers, by including philosophy in the πολιτεία, Socrates and his interlocutors will complete the polis by communicating their own responsibility as philosophical founders to figures within their city.

How does this situation then appear from the perspective of the philosopher who inhabits the fictive polis? This philosopher is who she is by virtue of her devotion to the sight of true being within the vocational epoche definitive of the theoretical pursuit. In the most surprising of revelations, she now encounters philosophy, in the persons of Socrates and Glaucon, as a constitutive power at the foundation of the polis. It is philosophy itself that upholds the proper arrangement for uniting philosophical and non-philosophical life. Philosophy commands from this surprising position of having already organized a πολιτεία in which it was a socially sanctioned possibility to become someone who has no leisure to look into human affairs. It is thus through an encounter with philosophy as a power that already underlies the constitution of the polis that philosophy, as a purely theoretical endeavor, comes to know that it has a politically crucial service to fulfill. A ruling philosophy, already installed at the origin of political life, commands the theoretical philosophy that has no leisure for politics. This encounter teaches the philosopher that the perfect autonomy of her theoretical interest does not make her unbidden with respect to the constitution under which she lives. Precisely as a philosopher, she has been brought up under a constitution that *requires* her as a citizen, in fact as *the* citizen who is responsible for the well-being of the polis as a whole. The encounter reveals that even her very access to philosophy as a "closed" vocation depends upon the philosophical πολιτεία. There is a parallel between Socrates' "brought up" philosopher and Husserl's "arising" or "growing-up" [*erwachsende*] *theoria*. The history of philosophy's coming into its own, its maturation, is due to the philosophically founded form of life from which it is now called to civic responsibility.

The source of the imperative that confronts the philosopher with her civic responsibility is philosophy itself, recognized as the power that has founded her πολιτεία. This indicates that the decision to exercise her distinct political function in full awareness of it *as a function* cannot be motivated by pre-philosophical or ideological bonds of community. Malcolm Schofield poses the problem by asking whether the noble lie of book three continues to motivate *philosopher*-guardians in their decision to carry

[169] Grube-Reeve, modified.

out their politically assigned task (at 414c, before philosophy becomes an explicit topic, Socrates wants "even the rulers" to believe the lie). Schofield argues that because the study of philosophy reveals something "incomparably more important than the city" only the "unphilosophical and pre-dialectical dictates" of patriotism could possibly compel philosophers to act from political duty. Citing Michael Walzer, Schofield includes among such dictates "loyalty to particular people, the sense of being at home with those people, and the longing for generational continuity." These communal bonds, which the noble lie was designed to perfect, are all rooted in one's allegiance to the 'involuntary association' into which one was born: "Plato's philosophers return to the Cave because they acknowledge their membership of their own involuntary association, and the power of the reasons for returning that—not philosophy—exerts upon them."[170] This is perhaps the most realistic interpretation of a highly unrealistic situation. But if pre-philosophical reasons are decisive in the philosopher's willingness to act as a citizen, has she really encountered philosophy as the constitutional foundation of her πολιτεία? Does not that encounter undermine the decisiveness of every appeal to autochthony, whether historical or mythic, as the basis for political duty? Whatever the reasons for philosophy's acceptance of its political task, they stem from an imperative experienced in the face of philosophy itself—not as closed *theoria* but as a constitutional philosophy that has already opened the proper relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy.

We also have to disagree with a more basic assumption of Schofield's. We cannot equate the cave of book seven with the city in which Socrates and Glaucon require the philosopher to assume her vocational responsibilities in accordance with the law. The cave is rather the image for those "other cities" in which a philosopher could only emerge "outside the requirement of the constitution." That story does not end with the philosopher assuming a constitutionally sanctioned function, but with her facing certain death by becoming involved in human affairs (517a). The down-going of the called philosopher is not analogous to that of Socrates himself.[171] Socrates practices his craft in an actually existing polis, where it is unbidden. The philosopher called to service by the founding power of the constitution, on the other hand, renders her service in a polis that already accommodates her. The cave allegory, with its violent conclusion, is not the model, but rather the foil for the πολιτεία in which the civic responsibility of the philosopher is at stake. In the underground city, the philosopher can only participate in collective life by leading others above ground and becoming a martyr for an apolitical cause. In the polis in which the philosopher has been called, philosophical vision is not understood as blindness but as the norm of vision itself, and philosophy is assigned a political function proper to its own kind of work. It is the unlikely domain of peaceable or "moderate" relations between philosophy and collective life. [172]

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[170]Malcolm Schofield, *Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought: Plato*. (New York: Oxford University Press, New York 2006), p. 308-9.

[171] *Republic* begins with Socrates saying κατέβην –I went down.

[172] Eva Brann's unorthodox interpretation of the cave allegory contributes a valuable perspective to the study of the problematic of political philosophy in *Republic*. See Eva Brann, *The Music of the Republic: Essays on Socrates' Conversations and Plato's Writings*. (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2004). She attempts to de-center interpretations that view the cave allegory exclusively in terms of its symbolizing the entire divided line within the possibilities for representation available in its lower half. According the

We are now ready to consider Europe as the horizon in which Husserl experiences the being called of philosophy to service. In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl offers his most direct definition of the Europe that encompasses the investigations of the *Crisis*. He defines Europe as a unique spiritual shape (*geistige Gestalt*). A spiritual shape, says Husserl, binds together purposeful activities and accomplishments carried out by persons and associations of persons. It has become routine in discussions of Husserl's Europe to echo his assertion that the kind of unity belonging to a spiritual shape is not territorial contiguity "as on a map."[173] By means of this caveat Husserl merely points out that a spiritual shape does not define the land mass on which a group of people might live, but that living itself.

> Here the title "Europe" clearly refers to the unity of a spiritual life, activity, creation, with all its ends interests cares and endeavors, with its products of purposeful activity, institutions, organizations. Here, individual men act in many societies of different levels: in family, in tribes, in nations, all being internally, spiritually bound together, and, as I said, in the unity of a spiritual shape. In this way, an all-together-binding character [ein allverbindender Charakter] is given to the persons, associations of persons, and all their cultural accomplishments.[174]

A more difficult problem posed by the concept "spiritual shape" lies in identifying the kind of unity it impresses upon life considered in its spiritual aspect. The spiritual shape unifies life in a particular "character." What does this mean?

The unity of spiritual life in its traditional and historical coherence is not itself a spiritual shape. It is rather according to *its* spiritual shape that such a traditionally unified life will manifest a defining character. The spiritual shape expresses something distinct in *how* tradition is lived. The diversity of spiritual shapes would thus seem to represent an array of "character types" belonging to higher-order personalities. As with character types at the level of individual life, these would become manifest in the ways that purposeful life lets itself be motivated to the pursuit of ends under environing

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standard view, the above-ground sensible world in the cave allegory corresponds to the dimension of forms in the divided line. Brann argues, however, that there is another axis according to which we have to interpret the cave allegory. The divided line considers the powers by means of which the soul apprehends being in its totality. The cave, however, introduces the fundamentally new consideration of "human badness in all its organized obtuseness" (214). The line image only analyses and orders two of the three powers into which Socrates divides the soul at the end of book five: knowledge and opinion. Ignorance remains unconsidered. Brann understands the level outside the cave as the dimension, not of eidetic reality, but simply as that of rectified perception, perception that understands becoming as participation in being. The cave itself is a "terrestrial underworld" in which perception orients itself to the non-being in becoming, to that which is false, private, and the product of distortion. Brann thus understands the cave, not simply as an epistemological level on the divided line (symbolizing the world of perception and imaging), but rather as the context of cultivated ignorance inhabited by the citizens of a non-philosophical polis: "the cave is the human city always and everywhere" (215).

[173] Crisis, p. 273.

[174] Crisis, p. 273-4. Translation modified.

circumstances of various sorts. [175] The adjectives "Italian," "European," "Chinese" or "Asian" would refer to general but unmistakable attitudes toward the world, each constituted in the long-developing course of collective life, manifest in every dimension of cultural existence, and perhaps emblematized in "typical" individual personalities or products. If there is no "Asian," "European" or some such character, this would be because in the diversity of languages, customs, political histories, etc., one cannot discern a distinct manner of interpreting and reacting to circumstances.

In the *Vienna Lecture*, however, Husserl applies the concept of spiritual shape in an ambiguous fashion. On the one hand, the concept indeed grounds a distinction between character types in higher order personalities. On the other hand, this distinction distinguishes between *all* character-types constituted in the course of a particular life motivated by historical circumstances, thus defining "personality" in the conventional sense, and a character type defined by its wanting to become something more than a personality. Husserl distinguishes between spiritual shapes according to the "norm-style" that governs traditional development: "Humanity (or a closed community such as a nation, tribe, etc.), in its historical situation, always lives under some attitude or other. Its life always has its norm-style and, in reference to this, a constant historicity or development."[176] For Husserl, the governing attitude of a spiritual life is the attitude capable of prescribing norms and goals that function as ultimate for it. The attitudes Husserl here has in mind are not the rich diversity of existential postures that define "personalities." Strictly speaking, the *Vienna Lecture* only distinguishes between two spiritual shapes: that life governed by the general practical attitude (in its various forms) and that governed by the theoretical attitude. Concretely, this amounts to the distinction between non-Europe, in the diversity of its "merely anthropological" shapes, and Europe, set apart by its wanting to be governed by theoretical reason. One is reminded of the paradox suggested by Kant in the *Anthropology*. The person of genuine character wants to bind herself to principles given by reason. If she leads her life in this fashion, she will perhaps appear as an eccentric from the standpoint of convention, but because her only motivating principles are those that would be valid for everyone, she is never an eccentric, never "a character" in that sense.[177]

This concept of spiritual shape thus has deep parallels with the πολιτεία of *Republic* insofar as it functions in the problematic of political philosophy. The most important distinction between such shapes does not concern the multiplicity of personalities, all of which eventually transform into one another, but between all such sociological or psychological types and the shape ruled by reason. Europe, according to its formal definition, is the spiritual shape in which the theoretical attitude functions as the governing norm-style. The kind of seeing accomplished in *theoria* is held responsible for determining the ultimate meaning of everything visible in non-theoretical life. "Within European civilization," writes Husserl, "philosophy has constantly to exercise its

[175] See, for instance, section 60-d in Ideas II.

[176] Crisis, p. 280.

[177] Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), p. 204.

function as one which is archontic for the civilization as a whole."[178] From the European horizon, philosophy thus appears as the one vocation responsible for the integrity of purposeful life in its totality: "True—universal philosophy, together with the special sciences, makes up only a partial manifestation of European culture. Inherent in the sense of my whole presentation, however, is that this part is the functioning brain, so to speak, on whose normal function the genuine, healthy European spiritual life depends."[179] Philosophy is the power at the foundation of European life that gives it its definitive shape. "Europe," writes Husserl, "was born out of ideas of reason, i.e. out of the spirit of philosophy."[180] With such statements, Husserl believes that he grasps the "central, essential nucleus" of "Europe" as a phenomenon.[181]

Such formulations purportedly testify to an experience of Europe itself as a spiritual shape in which *theoria* is the constitutional power. This occurs, as we have seen, in the experience of a call. In Socrates' fictive polis, the philosopher's knowledge of her serviceability was coincident with her being called to service because she encountered the constitutional power of philosophy directly, as it were, in the person of the philosophical founder. In the presence of the philosophical founder as personified law, there was no need to verify the constitutional power of philosophy. Husserl's description of the call, however, is two-phased: *theoria*, under the epoche of all praxis, is called, *and* it demonstrates, in theoretical insight, *that* it is called. The theoretical verification that *theoria* has a service to fulfill is based upon an initial encounter, the calling itself, that is not itself an experience of theoretical insight, and that first gives the process of confirmation its guide. If the source of this call is philosophy understood as a power already underlying the integrity of the spiritual shape to which the philosopher belongs, then "Europe," precisely as governed by philosophy, must somehow become manifest to Husserl at a level preceding his theoretical determination of it. This is because, for Husserl, the experience of philosophy's "already underlying" the integrity of Europe is genuinely *historical* rather than fictitious. He does not claim merely to construct Europe in speech, but to have already found himself in it. The communication of responsibility from philosophical foundations to *theoria* now comes from the past. In an aside in the *Crisis* that mirrors his description from the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl speaks of the significance that has been *historically entrusted* to philosophy within Europe. This past entrustment becomes the source of a "scientific conscience that calls to us in universal and radical reflection."[182] How does this call that historically occurs to philosophy light up history as the dimension in which to confirm its authority?

The *Vienna Lecture* leaves us one trace of this experience. Husserl reveals that his claims about Europe are "the expression of a vital presentiment which arises in unprejudiced reflection…this presentiment gives us an intentional guide for seeing in

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[178] Crisis, p. 289.

[179] Ibid., p. 290

[180] Ibid., p. 299

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid., p. 197.

European history highly significant interconnections in the pursuit of which the presentiment becomes a confirmed certainty for us. Presentiment is the felt signpost for all discoveries."[183] This presentiment delivers the motivation and direction for the historical investigations at whose term Husserl hopes to confirm the theoretical determination of Europe's spiritual shape. Because he makes this motivational ground visible and seeks to follow the course it prescribes, Husserl believes his inquiry exceeds the rationality of a merely "speculative interpretation of our historical development."[184]

At other junctures in his program, Husserl reflects on the epistemic value of the presentiment that traces out the path along which a truth might then be confirmed as such. These presentiments arise on the basis of a dense network of unnoticed suggestions rooted in a prior familiarity with the subject-matter in question. In their grip, one finds oneself committed to an unverified truth. In *Ideas II*, Husserl considers the case of a psychological evaluation of personality. A particular behavior indicates a person's total character such that the researcher is already in pursuit of specific anticipated connections in her psychic life. This experience is "just the opposite of intuition, i.e. insight, and is instead a *presentiment*, a pre-seeing without seeing…The actual nexus is then but a goal grasped in anticipation, an empty intention, one which is so determined however, that we follow the tendency, with its determinate direction, and in the fulfillment of it can acquire a chain of actual intuitions."[185] One pursues the nexus in such and such a manner because one is already operating under a specific anticipatory hypothesis, itself founded in felt-presentiment. In order to verify the hypothesis, one must set out without guarantee along the path prescribed by it. The anticipatory hypothesis prescribes a path for discovery. In his treatment of Galileo, Husserl implies that the process of discovery itself, no mater how methodical or creative, is not a part of science in the strict sense: "discovery is really a mixture of instinct and method. One must, of course, ask whether such a mixture is in the strict sense philosophy or science—whether it can be knowledge of the world in the ultimate sense…"[186] It would seem that genuine scientific knowledge relates to discovery only by understanding it according to its conditions of possibility, without any admixture of instinct.

What should be made of the fact Husserl's Europe is encountered via felt-presentiment and discovery? Is this crux of Husserl's whole program founded not on a knowing, but rather on an experience in which one tries to take responsibility for the historical involvement by which one is already committed to knowing? These questions will occupy us in the following chapter.

5.
Philosophy's Rule

[183] Ibid., p. 275-6. Translation modified.

[184] Ibid., p. 275.

[185] Ideas II, p. 286.

[186] Crisis, p. 40.

We now turn to the central question of the service to which philosophy is called. In *Republic*, Socrates expresses this quite plainly in saying that philosophy has the job of ruling. "Ruling" is one of those political terms in *Republic* that leads us into interpretations alien to its original problematic of political philosophy. Socrates does occasionally speak of a "philosopher king," and identifies a coincidence of philosophy and "political power" (δύναμις πολιτικὴ) as the only situation in which a genuine polis is possible. And yet, as Eva Brann rightly emphasizes, at no point during their education do these philosopher-rulers receive training in anything resembling political science or statesmanship in the traditional sense. In order to serve by ruling, philosophy does not enter into synthesis with another established *techne*, that of "politics" (πολιτικὴ). [187] The philosopher is not the individual best suited to take over the duties of rule traditionally assigned to someone else.[188] She will rather rule in a manner determined by and proper to the philosophical vocation. As Schofield observes: "Throughout his exploration in book 6 of the idea that philosophers should become kings (or vice versa), Socrates treats kingship simply as the possession and exercise of supreme power, not as a form of expertise."[189] Philosophy exercises its own political δύναμις in ruling supremely. According to what we have gathered from the strict account of *techne*, this means that it is through the praxis of rule that philosophy will fit into the vocational horizon of the polis by rendering a service and fulfilling a function. We should derive the meaning of "ruling," however, from nowhere other than the problematic of *Republic's* central books.

The word Socrates most often uses to describe his "philosopher ruler" is ἡγεμών, one who is able to lead or show the way in the sense of being a guide. The philosopher is suited to carry out this leading or showing chiefly because of her *sight* (484b). In the central books of *Republic*, where the political power of philosophy is at stake, Socrates devotes a great deal of attention to defining the vision that belongs to the philosopher in the strict sense. The philosopher's vision focuses solely on the being of each thing, as apart from its involvement in praxes and worldly contexts (476a). When defining the philosophical vocation, Socrates views the opposition between the empirical and the eidetic not simply as a distinction between the many manifestations of being and the one eidos of which they are the manifestations, but more importantly as an opposition between the two realms of interest in which the many and the one are first of all salient. Throughout the final section of book five, Socrates emphasizes that the sight of being,

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[187] Such is the position of Strauss, who writes that the rulers of the best polis "must combine the two heterogeneous activities of the philosopher on the one hand and of the king on the other." *The City and Man*, p. 101. Our position is opposed to such an interpretation if it implies that the "activity" of the king is already clear given what we know of the conventional exercise of power.

[188] It is true that Socrates argues that philosophers are best suited to rule because only they have access to a form of life from whose perspective political rule seems a low occupation. They will thus not fight over the privilege of ruling, but will view it as a necessary task. He also suggests that the philosophers' love for intelligible things will protect them from the lust after honor and material wealth that often overwhelms other leaders. These arguments, however, are of a subsidiary nature. Socrates' primary concern is not to show that the philosopher's lofty vocational interest makes her best suited for any kind of rule, but to show that this vocational interest will make it possible for her to carry out a unique form of rule.

[189] Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought: Plato, p. 157.

which he calls knowledge, requires a suspension of all interest in the outcomes of human actions, matters of taste and conviction, and the truth about particular realities involved in contexts of praxis. Such matters are salient only for the one who tries to see in the world of doxa. Socrates will eventually characterize this doxic looking as blind (506c) because it does not look to the kind of being that is what it is. For a vision oriented toward the individuals, happenings and outcomes that belong to the world of praxis, a being that is indifferent to the course of this world is absolutely irrelevant, and thus invisible. According to the phenomenological definitions we have established, we can interpret this doxic looking as exercised in the general practical attitude, and the looking of knowledge as exercised under the epoche of all praxis.

Socrates will thus argue that the vision of the philosopher looks into in a different domain than that of the non-philosopher. Knowledge and opinion are two distinct powers, each set over a distinct aspect of being—the one to see it as it is, the other to see it in its worldly relevance, in its connection with praxis: "Opinion, then, is set over one thing, and knowledge over another, according to the power of each"(477b). The vision of the philosopher is clearer than that of the non-philosopher, but not with respect to things given under the same aspect. Its vision is clearer because it looks into matters that are inherently truer (511e), that are what they are regardless of context or perspective. The philosopher is not invested in being right about matters which, because of their very nature, she can be wrong about. She is not interested in making prognoses, taking sides, or interpreting events. In the cave allegory, Socrates will depict in dramatic form the radical distinction between the domains of vision for doxa and knowledge. The one is below ground, the other above. If the philosopher were to travel underground, says Socrates, he would hardly be able to see a thing. His eyes are "filled with darkness" upon his return to the world of doxa (516e).

It is in order that she may overcome her blindness to the shadowy, shifty realities of doxa that Socrates forces each philosopher to take up an interest in the pre-given world of praxis: "So you must go down, each in his turn, into the common dwelling place of the others and get habituated along with them to seeing the dark things. And, getting habituated to it, you will see ten thousand times better than the people there…you'll know each image for what it is, and also that of which it is the image"(520c). The philosopher will eventually see exponentially better in the dark than her non-philosophical counterparts. But why, and in what sense? In order that we not be led astray, it is important to emphasize that Socrates envisions the philosopher's time of habituation to darkness as compensating for her relative *inferiority* in practical experience (484e, 539e). It is not meant to distinguish her as a visionary in practical affairs. The goal of this period of habituation seems to be the attainment of a general literacy in non-philosophical life, such that the philosopher will be familiar with the discourses and praxes that determine the situation in which she will take up her rule.

When Socrates claims that the philosopher who has overcome her blindness to conventional realities will see ten thousand times better than the non-philosopher, it is solely with reference to her ability to recognize being as it is *as well as* being as it is manifest within specific horizons of praxis. The vision by which the philosopher will lead is bifocal. It is a coordination of the seeing proper to her philosophical vocation, to which none of the other workers has access, with the common seeing in the dark. The ruling of Socrates' philosopher does not depend, then, on a vision that *looks ahead*, *oversees*, or

plans with respect to the practical affairs of human beings. These powers of foresight and administration require no orientation toward the world of true being, and there is no reason that the philosopher should be especially suited to carry them out. As Gadamer observes, "the cave-dweller knows full well how things tend to go in social and political life and what practices promise to be successful there."[190]

If we insist on interpreting the πολιτικὴ of the philosopher of *Republic* as architectonic, then we should do so in explicit contrast to Aristotles' account of politics as the master-craft in the opening sections of the *Nicomachean Ethics.* There, πολιτικὴ is directive and administrative. It encompasses the ends of all *technai* in the same manner that generalship encompasses those of soldering: it is for the sake of the ends of the former that the ends of the latter are pursued. Politics "uses" all the other *technai* by setting and pursuing ultimate ends. It determines the target at which every activity within the polis aims, and organizes these activities, employs or does not employ them, in the service of its attainment (1094a-b). If we understand the leadership of the philosopher of *Republic* according to this model of πολιτικὴ as master-craft, we will think that the philosopher-kings, as Bloom has it, "command the artisans as to how they are to use their arts."[191] Or, as Annas implies, that the rulers will dictate whether and when to apply the various *technai*, decisions for which the knowledge internal to each *techne* offers no help.[192] While such assessments may hold for conceptions of political expertise Socrates puts forth in other dialogues (e.g. *Charmides*, *Euthydemus* and *Statesman*), they do not apply to *Republic*, where, as Schofield points out, "there is no focus on its [political knowledge's] *use* of other forms of expertise."[193]

Still, the strongest motive for rejecting such views emerges from a consideration of how Socrates presents the form of the good, the final and most important subject-matter in the preparatory education of the philosopher-king (506a, 540a). The πολιτικὴ of the philosopher would be directive and administrative if insight into the good taught her to search out ultimate aims within the domain of praxis. We indeed expect such an interpretation on the basis of the preamble Socrates presents to Adeimantus. He rehearses the familiar doctrine that it is by virtue of its relation to the good that everything becomes "useful and beneficial." Even knowledge of other things without knowledge of the good is no more beneficial than having some possession without knowing what it's good for (505a). And finally: "Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake" (505e). Socrates thus introduces the good as an ultimate end, the knowledge of which would bring into clear view the benefit and use of everything. It might thus seem that he wants to teach his rulers to lay out practical agendas for mobilizing the powers of every *techne*, including philosophy itself, which would thus fall under the administrative and directive guidance of πολιτικὴ.

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[190] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. Trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 78.

[191] The Republic of Plato, p. 374.

[192] An Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 26.

[193] Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought: Plato, p. 161.

After this preamble, however, Socrates delivers his analogical discourse on the good that treats it as the paternal likeness of the sun. The good is to the intelligible domain what the sun is to the visible domain. Without entering into the intricacies of the sun's relationship to light, shadows, sight, being-seen and coming to be, their analogues in the intelligible domain, and their deployment in the divided line, it is evident from Socrates' presentation that the good is something like the origin of the correlation between insight and its objects and the possibility of awakening interest in seeing true being.[194] The good is the cause of clarity in intelligible vision just as the sun is the cause of clarity in perceptual vision. Does one then want to bring this account together with the preamble by interpreting "the good is the cause of knowledge and truth" (508e) to mean that the ideas themselves only become clear for us when we want to employ them in light of some normative principle for action?

That would run counter to everything Socrates teaches about the relation between knowledge and praxis in *Republic*. The realization of ideas in deed does not make them truer or clearer (472d-473e). The preamble is rather connected to the analogical presentation because the latter makes good on one of the two interpretive possibilities Socrates initially presents to Adeimantus. Doctrine teaches that the ultimate end, for the sake of which the soul does everything it does, is either knowledge or pleasure. The latter is ruled out because of the existence of bad pleasures, the former because of the sophistical treatment to which it has been subjected. The knowledge that is supposed to be the good is knowledge of the good itself. So long as no account of the latter is forthcoming, the position is "ridiculous" (505b). By giving us an inkling of what the good itself is, Socrates has rendered palatable the position that the good is knowledge of the good itself. *What*, then, is the good? Socrates himself feels unprepared to state this positively. He does tell his audience, however, that the knowledge that is to function as an ultimate aim for the soul is knowledge of the origin and conditions of knowledge, particularly of theoretical knowledge. The glimpse of the good does not prepare the philosopher-kings for rule by showing them a practical value to which theory itself should be subordinate (on the contrary, having once glimpsed the good, their natural impulse will be to delight in its contemplation and "refuse to act"(519c)). Instead, the ultimate aim of the soul is identified with the highest form of philosophical knowledge. In comprehending the rank order of being unified under the good, the future kings learn to see the whole dimension of becoming as a shadow pointing back to the reality that only philosophy strives to know. The cave allegory teaches that the one being educated only correctly orders the levels of reality, and so considers her reorientation a "happy" one, upon glimpsing the sun in its proper place (516c).

It is naturally a paradox to assert that such knowledge will render everything "useful and beneficial," or, as Socrates put it later (517c), will enable sensible praxis. We concur with Stanley Rosen when he writes that "we learn nothing in particular thanks to the Good; rather, the expression refers to the existence and intelligibility of the particular Ideas and, through them, of the particular entities of genesis. To say that the Good is

[194] The sun is not only the source of light, and thus of the "horizontal" correlation between powers of soul and their proper objects, but also, as the source of shadows, of the possibility for the soul's "vertical" climb from investment in images to the original beings of which the images are images. The original shadow cast by the good, in relation to which it stands as the original, is its child, the sun itself.

being and intelligibility is surely to cover too wide a ground to be useful in discriminating the worth of one action from another."[195] Rosen draws the conclusion that the good, so defined, "seems to be of little help to the philosopher-king."[196] This would certainly be the case if the πολιτικὴ of the philosopher involved evaluating competing courses of action. But what if rule instead consisted in elevating above every good attainable through action the good of inquiring into the obvious presuppositions that practical understanding cannot help but employ in seeking ends? The paradox that knowledge of the good renders everything useful and beneficial will prove to be the positive content of philosophical rule, of which we are at least certain that it does not prescribe normative principles in light of which pragmata become clear, polarized, and readily employable.

In establishing the strict account of *techne* in book one, Socrates asks Thrasymachus a question that he expects him to answer in the negative: "Does a *techne* need some other virtue, *as the eyes are in need of sight*, and the ears in need of hearing, so that another *techne* is needed to seek and provide what is advantageous to them?" (432a).[197] Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that each *techne*, insofar as it is the *techne* that it is, already proceeds unerringly to render advantage to its τὸ πονηρὸν. What Socrates really wants to establish here is that no *techne* is itself πονηρὸν in the same way as its subject-matter, a situation that would require an infinite regress of *technai*, each attending to the deficiency of the other (342b). In the realm of opinion and becoming, each *techne* is already sovereign and rules. Perhaps decisions about the use of its products or the conditions under which it should be practiced are not its business. If these decisions do not concern the advantage of the deficient subject-matter over which the *techne* is set, perhaps they fall under the purview of some directive *techne*, itself wholly oriented toward the realm of opinion and becoming. Non-philosophical *technai* require philosophical rule, not because they need a master-craft to discern further ends for their employment, but simply because they participate in that general form of purposeful life oriented toward opinion and becoming. Even when it is unerring, this kind of life-interest does not look into those most obvious presuppositions from which it sets out. Even when they refer to ideas and proceed explicitly and logically, all *technai* other than dialectic are assumptive in nature (533b). They proceed on the basis of conventional understandings and their fixation in language and thus remain in need of sight, not a sight that looks ahead, but a clarifying insight into the measures already operative in practical understanding.

It is possible, on the basis of *Republic*, to determine that Socrates' philosopher-kings are burdened with a wide variety of administrative duties. Strictly speaking, however, the most far-seeing administrative and directive *technai* would also stand in need of philosophical rule. Our chief interest must be to identify the nature of the ruling that constitutes the political task for which philosophical vision is required. This practice of ruling employs philosophical vision in the following fashion. The one ruling looks to what is most true, τὸ ἀληθέστατον. This means she looks away from the world of human praxis and its objects of opinion to contemplate what remains unchanging and undeniable

[195] Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Republic: A Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 268.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Grube-Reeve. Translation modified.

in its self-evidence. The ruler looks into true being in order to discover measures, norms or laws (νόμιμα) for human praxis. This discovering is either a discovery or a re-discovery. The one ruling, Socrates says, seeks either to establish such measures or to guard their integrity. These measures are not merely new conventions crafted in rough accordance with purely theoretical ideas. *They are the ideas themselves*. The ruler establishes theoretical truth itself as the norm or measure of non-theoretical life. She "puts what she sees there" in the intelligible realm, here, "into people's characters," and thus becomes a craftsman of virtue (500d). Socrates' metaphorical idiom for the practice of philosophical rule is a painting, inscribing, or drawing that would overcome the limitation of those merely imitative or image making arts. The bifocal look of the ruler transfers the very thing it sees in one place to another.

> Looking off, as painters do, toward what is truest, and ever referring to it and contemplating it as precisely as possible—to give νόμιμα about what is fine and just and good, if any need to be given, and as guardians to preserve those that are already established…I suppose that in filling out their work they would look away frequently in both directions, toward the just, the fair, and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and, again, toward what is in human beings (484c-d, 501b)[198]

It is a well-known tactic of power to consolidate rule by taking advantage of native customs, thus harnessing the force of established tradition to serve its own aims. Philosophical rule is too intransigent to utilize such a tactic. It will refuse to compromise with given conditions. It looks toward what is in human beings, not to find a middle ground between theoretical ideas and traditional life-ways, but solely to ensure that the latter have given way to the former. Because it seeks to *replace* human convention with theoretical truth, this practice of ruling cannot proceed without a "wiping clean"(κάθαρσις) of the dispositions of human beings:

> Taking the city and the characters (customs, habits) of human beings, they would first wipe them clean—effect a catharsis—(πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν), as if with a writing tablet, which is not at all easy. And you should know that this is the plain difference between them [the philosophical rulers] and others, namely, that they refuse to take either an individual or a polis in hand or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to clean it themselves…they would erase one thing and draw in another again. (501a-b).

This catharsis, this erasing and drawing in, is something the rulers do ἀπεργαζόμενοι, in the course of working (501b). It is the process of philosophical rule itself. It is not a description of the first thing philosophers will have to do before instituting their program of rule.[199]

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[198] Bloom. Translation modified.

[199] This interpretation is suggested by Strauss, The City and Man, p. 126.

Described in such terms, the catharsis effected by the practice of philosophical rule sounds destructive and violent. We will later see what it requires given the conditions imposed by Glaucon's practical inquiry. In the theoretical polis that Socrates and his interlocutors have constructed in speech, however, the subject of philosophical rule has willingly submitted herself to this catharsis. The ruled citizen is not a philosopher, but she is nonetheless philosophic which is to say moderate in the sense Socrates gives to that word. She agrees that philosophy should rule. As open-eyed consent, this agreement would entail the preparedness to devalue every tradition on the basis of which one already has norms for praxis. One lives in the anticipation that purely theoretical ideas can supplant these norms, and provide infinite ideals against which one would measure every possible worldly realization. Even those norms initially established through this form of rule are open to transformation insofar as they have lost their original integrity by becoming conventionalized and traditional. The one willing to be ruled recognizes the authority of theoretical truth continually to interrupt the life of practical interests and destabilize the traditional world in which they run their course. Such are the consequences of making one's soul a writing tablet for the logos of theoretical truth.

The metaphor naturally has its limitations. To have a measure of theoretical reason inscribed into one's soul means to be resolved to act *from* it in an understanding way. To be ruled effectively, one cannot blindly sanction the absolute authority of theoretical ideas, but must undertake the active work of seeking to see them in their own light. Socrates provides few specifics on non-philosophical consent to philosophical rule in the polis that includes within it the theory of its own construction (497c). He does, however, recognize philosophic understanding as a condition for being ruled effectively. In his recitation of the myth of Er, Socrates says that the soul who chooses to live his next life with the greatest tyranny had "lived his previous life under an orderly constitution, where he had participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy" (619c). The guardian city that enforces virtue via useful falsehood is a good and just city, but it belongs to a developmental logic in which tyranny is not far off. The fully philosophical city, which would interrupt all logics of development in a way we will later consider (Ch. 5.1), legislates itself in the light of ideas. The civic virtues that bind the polis together, normally the product of habituation, are now to emerge solely from the exercise of reason (518e). As Brann puts it, "the fourth or philosopher city will have no constitution separable from its philosophically guided life."[200]

To broach Husserl's Europe on the basis of *Republic's* philosophically ruled polis we need not reflect on the positive content of the specific policies Socrates proposes for the guardian city. Socrates surely accomplishes many things in the discussion he conducts concerning communism in book five. Among the most important is the weaning of his city-builders from the authority of convention in *all* matters, even those where convention masquerades as nature, and, deeming unconventional views unnatural, meets them with scornful laughter, ridicule and rage (452d). The topic of maleness and femaleness is an ideal test for potential philosopher-rulers who must learn to equate the ridiculous and the ugly with the unreasonable (453d-e, 457b). The obviously unworkable nature of Socrates' system of mating and child-rearing is irrelevant when the discussion

[200] The Music of the Republic, p. 137.

is viewed as preparation for the introduction of philosophy as the ruling element of the polis. Communism with respect to lovers, children and property is now replaced by the only communism radical enough to fulfill Socrates' true demands: shared allegiance in all matters to insight won from theoretical reflection. This may seem to be an extreme state of affairs. As we know, its historical realization will point to a number of paradoxes that lead Socrates to judge it implausible. We will soon examine the postulates about doxa and the majority that underlie these paradoxes (Ch 4.1). First we have to establish that nothing less than philosophical rule—and nothing so easy as communism with respect to empirical goods and people—is demanded by the form of life to which Husserl's Europe concept refers.

For Husserl, Europe is defined by its valuation of a "new sort of praxis" that intervenes in human history. It is called "universal critique." The newness of this praxis is best understood in contrast to every imaginable form of "engaged critique" (Ch. 2.3). Engaged critique, we recall, moves within the compass of concerns that matter to me as someone accomplishing things within the encircling horizon of the pre-given world. The truths that such a critique brings to light have a validity essentially bound to the community and situation of interest in which they emerge. Husserl calls such truths "relative truths." Universal critique, on the other hand, proceeds from the recognition that unconditioned truth, the kind of truth aimed at in theoretical inquiry, is "the universal norm of all the relative truths that arise in human life."[201] To submit to universal critique means to regard relative truths, precisely because of their having emerged through particular traditions of praxis, as insufficiently true. The aim of this critique is to upend everything delivered by common tradition in order to attain the only commonality now seen to be genuine: shared recognition of universal truth.

In committing to universal critique, one resolves no longer to rely on precisely those reliable, stable traditions that have been shaped and tested in the crucible of experience because they have not been brought before the bar of theoretical reason. This does not mean that the course of life suddenly grinds to a halt in the face of critical reflection. The institutions of social life continue to function and to reproduce their preconditions. One continues to act passively in taking over traditions of work, leisure, worship, etc. But one now does so only *provisionally*. One lives under the imperative that every accepted tradition, which was one day established through practical innovation and transmitted through education, habit or force, must be tested as to its reasonableness in the light of theoretical ideas. To have submitted to universal critique does not mean to have stopped acting. It means to be wrapped up in praxis in the conviction that practical understanding, even when successful in its aims, is unclear about what it is doing. In Husserl's terms, it means to have recognized the theoretical attitude as the "governing norm style," i.e. the attitude capable of reaching definitive answers to the problems and questions that emerge in the course of experience.[202]

Husserl occasionally expresses the conviction that the realization of philosophy as universal science should make possible a universal rational praxis no less than the realization of mathematical science as done so within the domain of physical nature. This

[201]Crisis, p. 287.

[202] Ibid., p. 280.

can give the impression that Husserl envisions a world in which philosophical results would function in "formulae" to which non-philosophical life would refer in order to discern rules according to which to make sense of the world. The universally rational praxis of critique, however, has little to do with rule following. It does not rationally organize society; it rationally disorganizes and transforms everything "societal" in society. We have seen that the philosopher is a strange guide. She does not go ahead to prescribe, but comes afterwards in pursuit of the inherently assumptive nature of practical understanding. The city that has taken on the constitution of philosophical rule does not have geometrical formulae that guarantee the flawless execution of plans. Its guiding philosophical vision does not tell what to expect. Husserl too primarily conceives universal critique as disrupting what has been taken for granted, not as supplying rules upon which to depend.

> [Universal critique is] the critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural products and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man; and thus it also becomes a critique of mankind itself and of the values which guide it implicitly or explicitly. Further it is a praxis whose aim is to elevate mankind though universal scientific reason, according to norms of truth of all forms, to transform it from the bottom up into a new humanity made capable of an absolute self-responsibility on the basis of theoretical insights.[203]

The critique directs itself toward everything that has "already arisen" just because it has already arisen and become traditional. To submit to universal critique means to embrace the imperative that the whole of cultural life "must receive its norms not from the naïve experience and tradition of everyday life, but from objective truth."[204] The "absolute self-responsibility" of which one now wants to be capable requires a militant refusal to rest with what suffices for practical success and the agreement of sensible people.

In universal critique, the necessity of subjecting all cultural life to theoretical norms is experienced as a practical necessity. In pre-theoretical culture, human beings constantly evolve conventional wisdom with which to make sense of the surrounding world. But the panorama of world cultures, as well as a developmental investigation into one's own, will reveal that these world-views are impermanent and in conflict with one another. They ultimately represent only the best possible understanding of the world under definite but shifting conditions. At the end of his 1911 *Logos* essay, Husserl asks whether, confronting our own life and world dilemmas, we too are not forced to arrive at the best possible solutions, even if they be provisional in nature. For the sake of alleviating our present confusion and forging a coherent world-understanding by which to guide our decisions, is not each of us obliged to learn from the vast wealth of human experience and construct a "wisdom philosophy" by which to live? To this need of the present, universal critique opposes its own practical urgency. The new form of veracity aimed at by *theoria* promises to rationalize the controversy of pre-theoretical life. To will universal critique is to believe in and pursue this promise, not so that the truth may be

[203] Ibid., p. 283.

[204] Ibid., p. 287.

known, but rather so as not to burden future humanity with the controversy and confusion of conventional wisdoms that govern the present. It is, as Husserl writes, "for the sake of time" that "we must not sacrifice eternity; in order to alleviate our need, we have no right to bequeath to our posterity need upon need as an eventually ineradicable evil."[205] Socrates cites the same motive for instituting philosophical rule. Failing a coincidence between philosophy and δύναμίς πολιτικὴ, "cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race"(473d).[206]

Universal critique's intervention in the field of pre-theoretical life springs, in the final analysis, from practical motives. We must assert this in full understanding of its complete impracticability. Its critique is "universal" precisely because it is not bound by any commitment to goals within finite horizons of praxis. It does not criticize things by judging them "in light of" such commitments and the knowledge based upon them. Further, it interrupts functioning praxes and confronts them with truth-criteria entirely *irrelevant* to their fulfillment. The theoretical insights looked toward by universal criticism transcend the most stringent conditions of factual agreement that a worldly application could possibly require. Universal criticism pursues an interest in truth totally unhinged from any interest in success. And yet, Husserl will conceive this praxis as immanently practical insofar as it responds to an urgent need for governance experienced at the heart of natural life. The possibility of universal critique requires that non-theoretical life elevate theoretical truth to an "absolute value."[207] It is the man of doxic vision who "knocks at the door" of the one capable of ruling him (489c). Universal critique responds to a kind of practical interest in theoretical truth, to the practical decision that such truth possesses a normative force for praxis that outweighs all empirically validated powers. Husserl thus understands universal criticism as a synthesis between the "totally unpractical" work of the theoretician and the universally practical work of the genuine statesman, who, "in his praxis would serve the praxis of all."[208] At one point in the *Crisis*, Husserl writes that the humanity that submits to universal critique believes in philosophy as its *Führerin*.[209] Husserl's is essentially a doctrine of the philosopher king.

We have now described the service by virtue of which philosophy belongs to its polis. It is the praxis of ruling, which we have understood as universal critique. Up to this point, however, we have tolerated a basic ambiguity that cannot go unresolved. We have not yet asked whether philosophy, upon discovering its serviceability within the suitable πολιτεία, itself carries out its service and *becomes* universal critique. Is philosophy included in the polis as what it was before the event of its being called, or only by

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[205] Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 141.

[206] Grube-Reeve.

[207] Crisis, p. 287.

[208] Ibid., p. 282.

[209] In describing the collapse of such a humanity, Husserl speaks of: "*Die Skepsis hinsichtlich der Möglihckeit einer Metaphysik, der Zusammenbruch des Glaubens an eine universale Philosophie als Führerin des neues Menchheit…*" Krisis, p. 10.

transforming itself into something new? This ambiguity is reflected in Husserl's own presentation in the *Vienna Lecture*. On the basis of his descriptions, it is difficult to know whether philosophy's discovery of its position within the vocational horizon of Europe requires that it *become the project* of universal critique, or simply that this project calls upon philosophy precisely as pure *theoria*, and that the latter, in order to understand itself theoretically, must only verify that it is so called upon.

On the one hand, Husserl speaks as if *theoria* and universal critique are two different projects. Such a conclusion seems implied by what we have already established. *Theoria*, the universal science of all that truly is, is not identical with universal critique as the measuring of all traditional validities against the bar of theoretical truth. This latter requires a hermeneutical beginning in traditional understandings, an immersion in and methodological attention to their ways of seeing, so as to be able to evaluate them in the light of philosophical reason. This is why universal critique, unlike *theoria*, belongs to the class of praxes, all of which, according to a definition employed throughout the *Crisis*, operate on the presupposed "ground" of the concrete life-world.[210] The universally critical stance arises in "the transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude,"[211] and is distinguished from both the theoretical and architectonic attitudes as "yet a third form of universal attitude."[212] Husserl will directly state that *theoria* "creates" the stance of universal criticism, "a human posture which immediately intervenes in the whole remainder of practical life."[213] According to this view, the universal critical attitude presupposes, and is distinct from, the theoretical attitude.

On the other hand, Husserl also writes that philosophy "has grown up out of the universal critical attitude,"[214] thus seeming to found the former in the latter. At one point, he even describes the universal critical attitude as the essential core of the theoretical attitude itself: "What is most essential to the theoretical attitude of philosophical man is the peculiar universality of his critical stance, his resolve not to accept unquestionably any pregiven opinion or tradition."[215] Is the praxis of universal criticism the business of philosophy? On balance, Husserl seems to answer this question negatively. The project of *theoria* includes a universal critical attitude in its resolution not to accept pre-given opinion. It itself, however, is not a praxis. Its interest lies in seeing theoretical evidence for its own sake, not in critiquing governing doxic regimes: "*theoria* (universal science), arising within a closed unity and under the epoche of all praxis, is called, and in theoretical insight exhibits its calling, to serve mankind in a new way…*This occurs in the form of a new sort of praxis*, that of the universal critique of all life…"

Socrates makes a point of dramatizing this issue in his philosophical polis. The imperative to guardianship calls the philosopher away from her proper business to

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[210] See Crisis, pp. 111, 121, 142.

[211] Crisis, p. 283.

[212] Ibid.

[213] Ibid., p. 287.

[214] Ibid., p. 288.

[215] Ibid., p. 286.

undertake a secondary job for which she is nonetheless the only suitable candidate. The calling in which the philosopher discovers her serviceability thus has the sense of an imperative to take on a new task, one which is not identical with philosophy itself. In outlining his career-plan for philosopher-kings, Socrates states that "each of them will spend most of his time with philosophy, but, when his time comes, he must labor in the affairs of the polis and rule…"(540b). Ruling, then, is not the same as philosophy. It is rather a praxis philosophy makes possible and through which philosophy itself becomes a work of the city. Philosophy does not rule, but the person who philosophizes must. On the basis of this dramatic set-up, it is the person who obeys the imperative to rule, and thus actively includes philosophy in the polis. Philosophy and ruling are thus united in the person of the philosopher, who accomplishes two distinct vocations. Through this "psychological" approach, Socrates invites us to ask about the motives of the philosopher's political obedience.

We can, however, suspend Socrates' psychological treatment of the philosopher and return once more to the strict account of *technai*. That account, we recall, offers a structural treatment of every work of the polis according to the deficient thing on which it works (τὸ πονηρὸν), the advantage it seeks for it (τὸ ξυμφέρον), and the power (δύναμις) and service (ὠφελεία) it displays in fitting into the polis as a function (ἔργον). The account does not consider *technai* within the motivational nexus of personal life, and instead considers the person only insofar as she is in the possession of the *techne* in question. It is from this perspective that we should understand how philosophy itself, or the philosopher in the strict sense, fits into the polis through the praxis of rule.

Ruling, just like philosophy, looks to what is most true (τὸ ἀληθέστατον), but it does not look to this as that for the sake of which it does everything it does and says everything it says (342e). Within the ruling *techne*, τὸ ἀληθέστατον does not occupy the structural position of τὸ πονηρὸν but rather of τὸ ξυμφέρον. Ruling looks to what truly is for the same reason that it looks to "what is in human beings": because it conduces to the advantage of, or is required by, a lacking, or needful subject-matter. This subject-matter, τὸ πονηρὸν**,** is human vision. This vision is deficient; it is unclear, unguided, and blind even when it is unerring—not because it cannot see accurately and far-off into its own dimension, but because it does not understand the norms of which it has already been making use. In the philosophical polis, the human being, the subject of such vision, knocks at the door of the one who can rule her. Only thus is she a law abiding citizen. Attending to the need of human vision in the same manner that doctoring attends to the sick body, ruling leads the search for measures (νόμιμα) that would satisfy the evidential demands of theoretical knowledge. Within the horizon of the philosophical polis, the search for theoretical measures responds to a practical interest and thus counts as an ὠφελεία, a service to human life. It is in accordance with its serviceability that the power or value (δύναμις) of ruling itself will be understood. Viewed from the perspective of the polis, ruling has the status of an ἔργον, a function required, as it were, by the πολιτεία itself.

The philosopher in the strict sense looks only to what is most true and does not aim to render νόμιμα as ὠφελείαι. The philosopher does not go to work in the half-light of praxis. Only because of her compete disinterest in all human affairs and predicaments is she able to grasp being as it is, apart from all worldly involvements. Everything the philosopher does and says is geared toward seeing true being. This sight is the one

lacking thing, τὸ πονηρὸν, after which all the logos and poeisis of the true philosopher strives. This striving itself cannot render νόμιμα. That would require an attendance to the human situation, and beginning from its point of view. What the purely theoretical work of the strict philosopher renders is the bi-focal vision that the praxis of ruling will employ. It makes possible the going down of philosophy. We thus say that philosophy, in its strictly theoretical orientation, enables a new sort of praxis, that of rule in the sense of universal critique. Within a πολιτεία that demands such rule, philosophy can interpret this praxis as its distinctive product, which "fits into" the life-world, not by serving the life of natural interests, but by continually involving it in a movement of revolutionary transformation *qua* catharsis of all tradition. Philosophy thus interprets itself from the polis-horizon as an ἔργον, a constitutionally assigned function.

According to this interpretation, phenomenology will not take on any new duties within the vocational horizon of Europe. It does not become anything other than *theoria*, the universal science of all that is: "Within this ideally directed total society philosophy *retains* its guiding function and its particular infinite task: the function of free and universal theoretical reflection."[216] By discovering its situation in a spiritual shape that calls for universal critique, phenomenology is not burdened with non-theoretical tasks. It must rather comprehend the full scope and nature of the responsibility it bears in carrying out its own proper work. The philosopher comes to realize that she has come of age within a form of life that ascribes to philosophy a function on which everything else depends. The European horizon will account for the entire *world-historical significance* Husserl wants to attribute to phenomenology conceived as *theoria*. Philosophy is not an activity of idle freedom, a suspension of workaday concerns that makes room for a curiosity about the way things actually are. Nor is merely a quest for personal fulfillment, the province of the outsider or the untimely man. It is serious business, a vocation that upholds the integrity of the constitution that determines the proper form of communal life. It is beginning from this understanding of philosophy that Husserl will attempt his most comprehensive introduction to phenomenology.

We have already noted that, as a matter of fact, Husserl's *Crisis* will never attempt to involve phenomenology in the non-theoretical horizons of praxis belonging to the European world. The text contains no serious analysis of European politics, religion, economy or other cultural spheres. Instead, Husserl will proceed from the unlikely starting point that by attending to the history of European philosophy he engages everything of essential importance to European humanity as such. Such an approach is only possible given the intuition of Europe as the spiritual shape that has the theoretical attitude as its governing norm-style, a polis that demands philosophical rule. By righting philosophy, Husserl believes that he rights the whole of European existence. Philosophy, to borrow a famous image from *Republic*, is the captain of the European ship. It is because of this underlying conviction regarding Europe that Husserl never makes it his business to lay out "plans" for actually effecting the decisive spiritual impact he attributes to philosophy within the context of the "crisis." Several scholars have viewed this omission as a weakness of that text. James Dodd, for instance, challenges the idea that, given the severity of the crisis Husserl describes, phenomenology itself can generate the

[216] Ibid., p. 289.

"spiritual impact" required to bring about the necessary changes.[217] For Philip Buckley, this worry takes the form of an administrative question. He complains that, in Husserl's *Crisis*, "the mechanics of how a well functioning philosophy actually entails a well-functioning culture remain unclear."[218] He skeptically questions whether the critical activity of philosophers "would be noticed; if noticed, whether it could be widely implemented, and if implemented on a large-scale, whether this would be sufficient to cure the crisis."[219]

Such matters do not seem to interest Husserl. For him, the connection between the crisis of science and the "culture" in which it occurs is in no sense a problem of mechanics, or of how philosophy might succeed in "having an impact" on non-philosophical life. A well-functioning philosophy entails a well-functioning culture because the horizon of Husserl's "crisis" is Europe. If Europe exists, then philosophy, the universal science of all that is, is already called to service in a decisive function, and need only take care of its own business in order to ensure the fundamental health of European life as a whole. Husserl himself will never *question* the existence of Europe. In the second half of this work, we will come to appreciate how astounding this is given the remarkable manner in which his Europe must have entered into and sustained itself in history. For now, we turn to a demonstration of the encompassing role that this Europe, philosophy's vocational horizon, plays in Husserl's final treatise. Having done so, we will be able to see clearly that Husserl's final conception of phenomenology stands or falls with the validity of his Europe concept.

[217] Crisis and Reflection, p. 222.

[218] The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility, p. 119.

[219] Ibid., p. 121.

Chapter Three:
Europe as the Political Boundary of Husserl's Critique of Reason

1.
The Heart of Husserl's Crisis Concept

Having attained a structural definition of Husserl's Europe, we will now attempt to establish that this Europe founds the entire approach of his final treatise: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The critique of scientific reason on the basis of which this text discovers the method and field of phenomenological research is grounded in the concept of a "crisis of science." This concept will turn out to be inconceivable for Husserl outside of Europe. Europe is not merely the place or historical development in which a crisis of science happened to occur, or to engage Husserl, who happened to be European though he might have been Chinese. Husserl's concept of scientific crisis pertains exclusively to European sciences and does not allow for "cross-cultural" application. Further, although Husserl will sometimes speak of a "European crisis," from a systematic perspective the concept does not concern cultural phenomena other than science itself. Every genuinely "European" crisis must be a crisis of science just as every crisis of science as such must be a crisis of Europe. By thus binding the fate of science to the fate of a historically determined community, Husserl will interpret the critique of reason as the defense and cultivation of European life. The nature of the necessity that binds the crisis of science to Europe needs to be thought through.

To see how Europe enters into the very definition of scientific crisis, we will have to disentangle this latter from the problematic of a breakdown in science's "scientificity" (*Wissenschaftlichkeit*). The breakdown in science's *Wissenschaftlichkeit* is intimately related to the crisis of science. It is its cause. Husserl's *Crisis* thus devotes tremendous energy to diagnosing this breakdown and, as far as possible, initiating critical reflections capable of struggling against it. Because the phenomena involved in this breakdown play such a prominent role in the *Crisis*, many commentators have simply identified them with the concept of crisis. After circumscribing the issues involved in this breakdown, we will show that only by isolating a different set of phenomena that define the crisis itself is it possible to understand the motivational situation that drives Husserl to undertake his critical analyses of science's scientificity in the first place. It will then become clear that only within Europe do such critical analyses concern a "crisis of science" at all. Europe is the horizon in which the breakdown in the scientificity of science is a matter of vital importance, life or death, i.e. in which it is really a crisis at all.

The heading to *Crisis* part one, section two unambiguously states what Husserl means by the crisis of science. It is the loss of science's life-meaningfulness (*Verlust ihrer Lebensbedeutsamkeit*). Interpretations that equate the crisis with what we are calling the breakdown in scientificity understand this loss as a forgetfulness that accrues to science by virtue of its necessary sedimentation in a concrete tradition. Thus alienated from its own activity, it becomes possible for creative scientific subjectivity to encounter its products as absolute objects. The struggle against this failure of mindfulness at the

heart of scientific life ultimately appeals to our responsibility as purveyors of *logos* in speech and writing. Husserl does indeed make such an appeal. However, the call to theoretical self-responsibility—to know what one means when one speaks, writes and reads scientifically—is itself required because of one's existence as a European, the ultimate subject of Husserl's *Crisis*. The life-meaningfulness of science is not finally to be lost and won in the forgetting and recovery of original spheres of intuition. It would not be restored because science had reopened its autochthonous connection to the life-world and the life of pure consciousness that is its root. Instead, the militant will to recover scientific thought from history and language within history and language is first of all necessary because theoretical life has been assigned a "leading meaning" within the historical life-form described by Europe. It is the belief in this assignment as a unique historical occurrence that will prove to be the condition of possibility for the *loss* of science's life-meaningfulness.

Bringing the decisive role of Husserl's Europe into view is always a matter of revealing an implicit framework that allows the explicit analyses to operate. We will proceed by entering into the details of the "crisis" understood as a breakdown in science's scientificity. This will prepare us to analyze the loss of science's *Lebensbedeutsamkeit*. This loss, the crisis itself, will prove to be a sickness afflicting the European *Geschichtlichkeit*, from whose horizon alone the breakdown in science's *Wissenschaftlichkeit* requires critique. It will then be possible to raise critical questions about how Europe limits or forms the boundary of Husserl's critique of reason.

According to one dominant interpretation, no doubt warranted by Husserl's most pressing concerns, the crisis of science is rooted in the unavoidable historicity of theoretical acquisitions. Already in *Ideas I*, Husserl recognizes that the preservation of theoretical results is not a contingent matter lying outside the theorist's domain of interest, but indicates a universal methodological problem that threatens the genuine character of all science from within its own accomplishment.

> Science is possible only when the results of thought can be preserved in the form of knowledge and remain available for further thinking as a system of propositions distinctly stated in accordance with logical requirements, but lacking the clear support of presentations, and so, understood without insight…[220]

The preservation and inheritance of scientific results, necessary to science itself, introduces a dimension of non-seeing into the scientific endeavor. One can only arrive at full intuition of available scientific knowledge by treating distinctly expressed propositions as indicators of original acts of thought that must be revived. Likewise, to originally establish a scientific result is to intend its preservation *and* its future re-origination. The theoretical acquisition is only acquired in a traversal of the historical dimension from which its validity is independent.

In *Crisis* period writings, the intuitional grounding of scientific propositions is explicitly equated with the historical self-clarification of scientific traditions. Husserl will claim that epistemic grounding is the same as historical understanding. Science purports to overcome the passive transformations of meaning that affect all other cultural works.

[220] Ideas I, p. 176.

The object of clear scientific intuition is supposed to be absolutely identical for everyone, entirely unbound from the perspectival conditions under which it appears. It thus exhibits a kind of perfect objectivity; it is an "ideal object." In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl distinguishes these "ideal objects" of scientific production from all other cultural products: "repeated production creates not something similar, at best equally useful; it produces in any number of acts of production by one person or any number of persons something identically the same, identical in sense and validity."[221] They are, in an unparalleled sense, "common property."[222] But this universality and changelessness accrue only to the one who trades in a tradition. Scientific consciousness presupposes that the very same thoughts that once occurred to innovators in the history of a science are available to me in the present. But this is always on the basis of documents, which function as a preserve, or a site of possible reawakening. The attempt to rediscover what a scientific predecessor thought is surely not a matter of attributing intellectual authorship to historical personages. Instead, I hope to appropriate for myself a meaning that, from the moment it once came into being, was already absolutely identical in sense and validity for whoever would rediscover it.

It is precisely because of this identity that the historical dimension initially appears irrelevant to the pursuit of scientific aims. Insofar as I treat Descartes' *cogito* or Pythagorous' theorem as part of a living theoretical enterprise, they are wholly of the present. I do not need to occupy myself with the fact that in understanding these concepts I am revisiting the thought of the past. The validity or non-validity of the thought is completely independent from the past circumstances under which it was originally conceived. As a working theorist, I thus have no reason to transport myself "back" to these circumstances. If I do so, as I might in the case of attempting to recall a thought I had yesterday, this is because I have actually *forgotten* the thought. As soon as I remember it, however, I am face to face with the thought itself, not as something belonging to the nexus of my past experience, but as something I am actually reproducing now in the present.[223] For this reason, the working theorist is on firm ground in claiming the irrelevance of every reference to the past of her science—in its very past-ness—for theoretical work. Husserl agrees that the facts of intellectual history are entirely irrelevant for the working theoretician. Such facts would only matter if they could help decide the validity or non-validity of ideas. And yet: "to desire either to prove or to refute ideas on the basis of facts is nonsense."[224] Husserl does not stray from this anti-historicist formulation of 1911. When he makes of science's historicity a crucial problem for science itself, it will be in terms fundamentally different than those of the historicist.[225]

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[221] Crisis, p. 278.

[222] Ibid., p. 287.

[223] See Crisis, p. 360.

[224] Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 126-7.

[225] In the *Origin* itself, Husserl will reiterate his commitment to this position: "In principle, then, a history of philosophy, a history of the particular sciences in the style of the usual factual history, can actually render nothing of their subject matter comprehensible." Crisis, p. 372.

The Origin of Geometry (*Origin*) is Husserl's most detailed exploration of how science's necessary involvement in history becomes a source of the breakdown of its *Wissenschaftlichkeit*. Geometry serves as a privileged example here for reasons to do with the projected construction of the *Crisis* as a whole.[226] However, in relation to the essay's main thematic (historicity and scientificity), geometry is a good example for other reasons. Geometry's status as an exact, deductive science with a long tradition of forward development and successful technological application makes it perfectly clear that Husserl's reflections on the breakdown of science's scientificity do not imply its failure to make valid discoveries and build upon them in a systematic fashion. Geometry's exactness and logical rigor make it the perfect site for discovering the unseeing understanding that accrues to all sciences on the basis of their historicity. Although the particularities of geometrical science to some extent determine Husserl's analyses, they are intended to indicate problems universal to science as such. In our effort to circumscribe the problematic of science's scientificty in the historical dimension, we will meet the essay, as far as possible, at this most general level.

Husserl's starting point in the *Origin* is that even when we consider it in its apparent synchronism as a system of established truths, science has no existence outside of history. With this claim, Husserl does not intend to "insert" science within a "broader" historical context of what happened when. The attempt to situate scientific activities in relation to facts about the past actually knows as little about "history" as the working geometer. In pointing to past events, it takes for granted the historical nature of the present (that it contains within itself a traditionalized past, itself a past present containing its continuum of pasts, etc.) without attending to it. In the *Origin*, history does not refer to a course of factual events, but rather to the structural *a priori*, or the very "coursing," by which any past has taken on its sense of pastness: "history is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the intertwining of original formations and sedimentations of meaning."[227] Under this definition of history, Husserl will consider science's historicalness from within the presuppositions of its genuine accomplishment. By claiming that science is necessarily historical, Husserl is claiming that science's own defining goals involve it in this movement of origination and sedimentation. He does not point out a sociological fact that would not pertain to the scientific enterprise in its living execution. To say that sciences are historical because they are carried out by human beings who cannot help but bear motives constituted within their developing cultural worlds ends in a skepticism that becomes absurd when it has to account for its own validity; more importantly, it means nothing to the theorist who lives the scientific impulse *from within*, and who directs her whole attention to the establishment of truths unconditioned by the circumstances of their production.

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[226] The text of the *Origin*, although never brought to publication by Husserl himself, was clearly intended for inclusion in the *Crisis* as a supplement to the analyses of Galileo that appear in section eight of part II. There, "ready-made geometry" functions as a pre-given material in Husserl's consideration of the motivational situation that governed the genesis of mathematical physics. By inquiring into the origin of geometry itself, Husserl thus deepens *that* analysis, which occupies a foundational position in his diagnosis of "modern dualism."

[227] Crisis, p. 371.

Husserl instead proceeds from within the scientific impulse. It is "by exhibiting the essential presuppositions upon which rests the historical possibility of a genuine tradition, true to its origin, of sciences like geometry" that he will make understandable "how such sciences can vitally develop for centuries and still not be genuine."[228] It is thus from within the essential nature of the attempt to establish unconditioned truth that Husserl will detect the force of history as a source of a breakdown in science's scientificity. As we have seen, to establish an unconditioned truth means to establish it as perennially identical. This holds first of all for me myself. To claim to have established something scientifically is not only to claim to have once been certain of the establishing grounds, but also to claim the ability to revive at will the founding experience of evidence in which these grounds originally function as establishing of scientific validity. But this claim to revival—or "reactivation"—only applies to me as an example of the "everyone" that I intend as the grounding subject of theoretical judgment. To claim a scientific truth is to claim that every rational subject can effect the reactivation that will bring it to original evidence. It is in connection with the activities involved in both making and fulfilling this claim that Husserl will discover the phenomena essential to the historical breakdown of science's scientificity. These are the phenomena that the dominant interpretation identifies with the "the crisis of science."

In *Ideas I*, Husserl located the exposure of science to history in the fact that the "results of thought" had to be "preserved." In the *Origin*, he approaches this problem with greater attentiveness, and from a slightly different perspective. He now emphasizes how the act of documentation is required by the task of *creating* (not simply preserving) a truth identical in sense and validity for every conceivable subject of knowledge. The intention to produce a kind of perfect objectivity for truth, to let it stand against every possible experiencing in the integrity of its own self-sameness, cannot find fulfillment in the mutual understanding brought about by dialogue. In mere oral communication "what is lacking is the *persisting existence* of the 'ideal objects' even during periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer wakefully so related or even no longer alive."[229] Only in the act of documentation does the meaning-formation acquire the sense of being related, in advance, to absent knowing subjectivity:

> The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual…the writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being of the meaning-structure…It becomes sedimented, so to speak. But the reader can make it self-evident again, can reactivate the self-evidence.[230]

It is because writing-down institutes a kind of discoverability for ideal objects that is freed from every particular episode of interpersonal communication that these latter attain

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[228] Ibid., p. 367.

[229] Ibid., p. 360.

[230] Ibid., p. 360-1.

a "persisting existence." The physical durability of the documenting materials (ink, paper, etc.), while naturally essential to the being of the written sign itself, is here secondary. Brought under the norms of clear and univocal expression, documentation is meant to ensure the having-been-said-once-and-for-all of the scientific proposition. It exposes *what* is said in the documentation to a possible infinity of reactivations in which it will be "identically repeatable with self-evidence" in the "identity of its actual meaning."[231]

It is crucial to underline that the act of writing-down is *constitutive* of scientific truth, not something that happens to it. Derrida, who is perhaps the most attentive reader of these passages, rightfully insists upon this:

> writing is no longer only the worldly and mnemotechnical aid to a truth whose own being-sense would dispense with all writing-down. The possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity: it is the *sine qua non* condition of Objectivity's internal completion. As long as ideal Objectivity is not, or rather, *can* not be engraved in the world…then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted. Therefore, the act of writing is the highest possibility of all "*constitution*," a fact against which the transcendental depth of ideal Objectivity's historicity is measured.[232]

This reflection on writing reveals that it is *the very act* responsible for producing the ideal objectivity demanded by the idea of scientific truth that inscribes this truth in a linguistic reality where it can be taken over, referenced, and manipulated without the reactivation of meaning it was meant to open to an infinite subjectivity. The community of readers is inherently susceptible to what Husserl calls "seduction of language."[233] Linguistic signs passively call to mind established significations without necessitating the conversion of what is thus passively awakened into the object of an act of meaning in which the subject produces for himself what is thereby meant. The expressed proposition, in its self-sufficiency, frees the reader from undertaking the work of original expression by which she could acquire it for herself.

Husserl's concern, however, is with the functioning of passively received results within scientific work itself. Strictly speaking, this work never relates to language as does passive, everyday understanding. Scientific attention to propositions bearing scientific meaning involves, from the beginning, a reduction of linguistic signs to what Husserl calls their "logical" function. This means that the instrumental, analogical, indicative and intimating functions of signs, as well as their metaphorical and occasional usages, [234] have all been screened off. Any distortion of meaning due to the reintroduction of these pre-scientific linguistic functions would merely represent a failure of scientific discipline,

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[231] Ibid., p. 362.

[232] Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*. Trans. John P. Leavy, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989)[Hereafter, Introduction to the Origin], p. 88-89.

[233] Introduction to the Origin, p. 165.

[234] For a concise summary of these functions and usages of signs, Donn Welton, *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 207.

and would not concern a breakdown internal to the aims and attitudes fundamental to science itself. The *Origin* thus focuses on how the linguistic sedimentation of theoretical results makes possible a peculiar kind of activity that takes over, understands and works with expressed materials in a scientifically productive fashion without ever undertaking a reproduction of the ideal objects originally intended through the expressions.

It is in the context of describing this activity that Husserl now considers the procedure of explication (*Verdeutlichung*). The final section of *Ideas III* makes a distinction between acts of *Verdeutlichung* within a process of intuitive clarification (*Klärung*) of noemata and a mere *Wortverdeutlichung* that operates with true propositions and their word-meanings within the context of constituted science.[235] In the *Origin*, explication refers strictly to that broad range of "logical dealings" with expressed propositions, including those which render propositions susceptible to such dealing in the first place. In the passive taking-over of a theoretical proposition, the meaning therein expressed necessarily first becomes "our meaning" as something "vague and undifferentiated." In *Verdeutlichung*, we address ourselves to this meaning with the intention of "extracting one by one, in separation from what has been vaguely, passively received as a unity, the elements of meaning."[236] We thus become capable of "bringing the total validity to active performance in a new way on the basis of the individual validities." When Husserl refers to the ability to carry out this kind of analysis and reproduction, he has in mind the kind of learning that allows scientific traditions to develop through practices of instruction.[237] Here is included the distinguishing, defining and analysis of terms, making explicit the scope for the legitimate application of operations, etc. Everything made use of within the life of a science must have once been "learned" in this fashion. Only on that basis can one legitimately economize or automate theoretical activity in seeking higher-level results.

Through acts of explication, one converts passively appropriated theoretical propositions into meaning-structures "in the mode of having been originally produced."[238] As such, the theoretical result becomes identifiable and communicable—*common* in the radical sense demanded by the goal of theoretical truth: "The explicated judgment becomes an ideal object capable of being passed on."[239] Explication is also generative. Husserl includes within its scope those logical activities that move within the realm of explicated sentences and generate new ones. Explication thus encompasses those forms of disciplined creativity in which innovation can occur according to steps strictly verifiable in their validity. Although explication produces and re-produces scientific

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[235] See Edmund Husserl *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Drittes Buch.* Ed. Marly Biemel. Husserliana vol. V [Hereafter HUSSS V], pp. 94-105, especially p. 102: "*Die Wortverdeutlichung (die verbale Sinnesanalyse) hat eine propädeutischen Funktion für die eignetlich zu vollziehende intuitive Verdeutlichung*."

[236] Crisis, p. 364.

[237] Ibid., p. 366.

[238] Ibid., p. 364.

[239] Ibid.

results that can remain self-same in their meaning and validity, and although these "logical dealings" remain in contact with vague intuitions which *could*—it is supposed—be made evident, it does not, for Husserl, amount to reactivation. At no point during explicative processes does the one dealing with ideal objects have to undertake an activity that would regenerate them *as if*, or *again*, for the first time. Although it itself is an activity, explication thus remains "a thinking *in terms of things* that have been taken up merely receptively, passively, which deals with significations only passively understood and taken over, without any of the self-evidence of original activity" (my emphasis). [240]

The reliance of *Verdeutlichung* upon the *terms* in which it thinks is indeed decisive in distinguishing it from reactivation. The analyses of the *Origin* suggest that explicative activities, to whatever extent, allow the expressions themselves to stand in for the ideal objects presumably once instituted on their basis, and which a genuine reactivation would originally reproduce. Husserl makes a point of emphasizing that the words or symbols on the basis of which one can reactivate the objects of theoretical activity are themselves idealities. Each is "identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons…" and "occurs only once" within its language. [241] As such, they bear established definitions, verbal or symbolic meanings fixed within the context of the science. It seems that explication, the logical activity "tied specifically to language…,"[242] lets the ideality of the linguistic elements and their word-meanings, which constitute the medium of scientific thought, take the place of the objects proper to the science itself, and thus frees the scientific worker from having to produce these objects in their original evidence (hence the designation "*Wortverdeutlichung*" in *Ideas III*). In geometry, for instance: "rendering the concepts sensibly intuitable by means of drawn figures is substituted for the actual production of the primal idealities."[243] The definition and scope of operations legitimately pertaining to a "point" in Euclidean geometry can be learned and dealt with on the basis of a symbolic recognition that never aims to re-originate, as if for the first time, the ideal being belonging to the point itself, which is essentially different from that of the notation in which it is expressed and the symbol-meaning it indicates. In scientific tradition, acts of explication proceed in awareness of the fact that such origination once occurred. What is crucial is that reliance on the linguistic forms, to whatever extent, makes it unnecessary to attend to the origination as a present task.

This process of *Verdeutlichung*, founded on the scientifically necessary act of documentation, is itself scientifically necessary. It is prerequisite for the scientific progress that Husserl understands to be essential to the meaning of science itself. [244] In order to aim at new results, theoretical work has to "work with" established results in the form of explicated sentences. In the *Origin*, Husserl will admit that in sciences like

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[240] Introduction to the Origin, p. 164.

[241] Crisis, p. 357.

[242] Ibid., p. 364.

[243] Ibid., p. 366.

[244] Ibid., p. 278.

geometry, where the validity of later constructions depends upon that of a whole chain of former constructions, a synthetic revival of all the sedimented components that function in any given scientific judgment is practically impossible. Explication, like documentation itself, threatens to render science superficial, but it is necessary to its pursuit of genuineness. In the *Crisis*, Husserl will extend this judgment of necessity to include the automating of scientific method that he describes with the term "technization."[245] Rather than executing its steps in a conscious effort to determine the being of its subject matter, method, through a systematizing self-reflection, transforms itself into a process governed by rules freed from all intuitive connection to the subject matter itself. An art of achieving correct results thus becomes possible in which only "those modes of thought, those types of clarity which are indispensable for a technique as such are in action."[246] Husserl compares this kind of technical thinking to that demanded by a complex game. It includes, not only the ability to recognize which operations are possible within a given situation, but also that creative instinct that guides experimentation in solving a problem in accordance with the rules: "one operates with letters and with signs for connections and relations (+, X, =, etc.), according to *rules of the game* for arranging them together…Here the *original* thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the correct results …is excluded."[247] Husserl's example here is arithmetic, but he will claim a universal applicability for his analysis: "to the essence of all method belongs the tendency to superficialize itself in accord with technization."[248]

These stages in the uprooting of evidence from its original sources are all presuppositions of genuine science in its historical concreteness. Husserl's ideal of scientific responsibility does not involve the purism that would refuse to move forward for fear of losing one's footing. That would reduce genuine science to the unending regress to origins, an un-doing of every established result and method in order to repeat it obsessively in its original evidence. In the end, such purism, refusing the risk of documentation itself, would undermine the possibility of responsibility. Taken to its limit, it would result in a private meditation, an attempt to remain "in the moment" of insight

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[245] Ibid., p. 47. The context here is Husserl's analysis of mathematical physics in part one of the text: "Actually the process whereby material mathematics is put into formal-logical form…is perfectly *legitimate*, indeed necessary; the same is true of the technization which from time to time completely loses itself in merely technical thinking."

[246] Ibid., p. 46.

[247] Ibid.

[248] Ibid., p. 48. It is true that language seems to "seduce" differently in the case of sciences, like phenomenology, whose inherent inexactness does not permit a definite fixing of unambiguous rules for the manipulation of symbols. Husserl's analyses of the "seduction of language" tend to focus on the kind of thoughtlessness that can accrue to mathematical-logical thought precisely *because* of its exactness. This is probably because the seduction of language within descriptive sciences mirrors the general phenomena of passive understanding that are a part of everyday life. Here, the understanding is not lured into a game of manipulating symbols according to definite rules. Instead, it is precisely the connotative, associative, suggestive power of language that provokes a dreamy, indefinite, thinking that gives up focusing on the signification that scientific judgment wants to express. Through immersion in the language of a descriptive science, it is possible to become literarily proficient, even scientifically creative, without grounding the meaning of terms in original evidence.

where one would not have to answer even to the reminders of inner-speech. Science would then be the undoing of science. For Husserl, science only exists when its productions are intersubjectively available in a documented form, and thus involved in the interweaving of original and sedimented meaning that is history. In long-established and developing sciences, it is *only* in the mode of unoriginality that previous accomplishments can support contemporary work that aims at original productions. What Husserl demands of genuine science is not that it actually attempt the impossible task of continually rebuilding its entire edifice in the original self-evidence of one total-reactivation. It must rather proceed in the certainty that such a reactivation is ideally possible. The working geometer, for example, must be certain that if she were not limited by her merely human capacities, she *could* revive the original meaning of every component material and chain of evidence involved in her attention to higher-order problems. Only on the basis of this certainty does she have the right to bequeath her own result to future geometrical activity as a finding that can itself be employed. Thus, the reliance upon acquired theoretical results within the course of theoretically interested life is ideally provisional in nature, even if it can never *in fact* be overcome due to contingent anthropological limitations.[249] Parallel to the ideal of infinite scientific progress is the ideal of an infinite self-critique that would restore to every functional theoretical result its original evidence.

The need to know that this reliance is only insurmountable as a matter of contingent fact points to a new task for scientific consciousness. Husserl argues that it is a necessary presupposition of all work within constituted scientific fields that a reactivation is possible that would retrace the motivational path by which the fundamental concepts of the science *must have first been* created out of a life-world in which that science did not yet exist. In the original constitution of these fundamental concepts, one can discern the genesis of the field of the science in question, which already unifies, in advance, every conceivable development within its bounds. We must not misunderstand the kind of unity Husserl here has in mind. As Derrida notes in his analysis of the *Origin*, the seminal basis of scientific unity to which such a reactivation would return does not entail a decision in favor of any specific doctrine within the science in question, nor must it encompass all existing theories in a general scientific framework or system. The original genesis of the field does not foretell a "systematic" coherence at all. Instead the inquiry seeks to discover the genesis of the single open *project* that will make all subsequent systematic elaborations, conflicts, and revolutions understandable, precisely as elaborations, conflicts, and revolutions within the history of a single science.[250] Since this original genesis sets up and defines the meaning of the scientific field, it determines the significance whose recovery would be at stake in reactivations carried out within it. It is only by actually carrying out a reactivation of this field-constituting genesis that one would understand the ideal possibility of a total reactivation *within* the field.

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[249] See Crisis, p. 365.

[250] Introduction to the Origin, p. 52-53. This position bears comparison with Derrida's forced attempt, in his 1953/54 dissertation, to create an *aporia* for Husserl whereby the only way to know that geometry began with an act of subjectivity would be to suppose "that the total sense of geometry is known and completed." Jacques Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy*. Trans. Marian Hobson. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) [Hereafter, The Problem of Genesis], p. 166.

The reactivation of fundamental field-constituting concepts would not finally bring the movement of scientific consciousness to a rest. On the contrary, it would upset the whole tradition of inherited propositions by treating it as an appeal to originating activities that no amount of explication or learning can understand. Rather than securing a remove from processes of de-origination, the fundamental reactivation succeeds in drawing the whole of a science, right from its origin, into the dimension of sedimentation. The reactivation will introduce a scientific discourse that not only seeks to describe originating activities of scientific consciousness, thus fixing and clarifying them conceptually, but which ceaselessly draws attention to its own status as discourse, i.e. as clarifying only through the forgetting of originating activity. Now, unlike the idea of a complete reactivation that would revive the entire chain of founding and founded scientific evidences involved in a complex scientific judgment, the reactivation of fundamental field-constituting concepts is, for Husserl, an actually accomplishable task. Beginning from the proximate pre-scientific materials, one would only need to understand fully (i.e. reactivate) the conscious accomplishments by which the primary scientific objects once came into being as "first steps" within a horizon of future progress. With reference to the case of geometry, Husserl argues that without the ability to accomplish such a primordial reactivation, science has no access to its own meaning:

> Without the actually developed capacity for reactivating the original activities contained within its fundamental concepts, i.e., without the what and the how of its prescientific materials, geometry would be a tradition empty of meaning; and if we ourselves did not have this capacity, we could never even know whether geometry had or ever did have a genuine meaning, one that could really be "cashed in."[251]

For a science to be genuine, it must make available for future scientific subjectivity not only scientific results, but the ability to regenerate the foundational sense of the science itself.

Because it only exists and progresses on the basis of the conservative and innovative powers of explicative thought, science is necessarily in the position of needing to undertake these regressive tasks. This need cannot be fulfilled as a matter of fact. The total reactivation, as we have seen, is an idea, and the evidence won by the reactivation of field-constituting concepts is itself subject to sedimentation. Science true to its ideal of scientificity, we might say, exists in the consciousness of this need that it cannot fulfill. It exhibits a militant will to reactivation that is never satisfied, and which is necessarily forestalled for the sake of learning and novel production. The scientific interest must confront and take responsibility for the fact that the realization of the scientific ideal implies an inner dissolution of the scientificity of science itself. The very constitution of scientific truths involves them in a movement of de-origination to which the scientific interest must be attuned if it wants to understand itself and the possibilities of its fulfillment. However, precisely because science can progress on the basis of explication alone, it is also constantly prone to overlook this need as a need. It can live on credit alone, as if its meaning could be cashed in. The decisive eclipse of science's scientificity,

[251] Crisis, p. 366.

for Husserl, does not consist in the scientifically necessary phenomena of documentation, explication, automation, and technization, but rather the loss of the *need* to recover the acts of original production whose reactivation such processes claim and presuppose.

As a motivational bridge between science's necessary proneness to neglect the need of regressive tasks and the event of this neglect itself, Husserl often appeals to "success."[252] He has in mind the "immense, though not understood, practical usefulness"[253] of science as applied to the factual surrounding world in which human interests seek fulfillment. Husserl ascribes a blinding power to this "success" and the "prosperity," "fruitfulness," or "productivity" it brings with it.[254] For this knowing enchanted by its own efficacy, there is a mutual reinforcement of technical thinking and technological application. On the one side, the obvious availability of scientific truths as expressed acquisitions frees up an interest that, taking these results in hand, looks toward their possible employment in the service of practical ends. On the other, the non-genuine character of technical, operational thinking finds its ultimate support and justification in the fact that its correct results also "work" rather than in a reactivation of the original acts of understanding that first constituted as legitimate scientific materials the terms in which such thinking moves. From the perspective of technologically seduced thinking, the regressive tasks are *irrelevant*. They will not enhance the kind of clarity necessary for the rigorous application of knowledge to the world. The operations of *Verdeutlichung* are sufficient for this task. If sedimentation is a "problem" for science, this is only because the theoretical attitude of the scientist has given way to the practical. It is the interest in "success" that causes scientific life to cease experiencing the scientific necessity of the infinite tasks of reactivation; but scientific life, strictly speaking, is not interested in success. This last concern thus brings us to the brink of empirical sociological or psychological issues that are again external to the goals of science as such.

What the reflection on sedimentation accomplishes, then, is the discovery of a new frontier for scientific self-responsibility *within the dimension of sedimentation*. Are we here at the heart of the crisis concept? Let us summarize what this would mean. The crisis of science would be identified with the latter's participation in the dimensions of language and history. [255] It would reveal itself in sedimentation, explication, technization, and various processes through which thought abbreviates or economizes itself in order to make progress. It would be motivated by an interest in practical successes that seem to excuse theoretical irresponsibility. The crisis would have the temporal shape of a distancing from origins on which one rests, and which one constantly presupposes, but which have not been reactivated so as to renew the present project. Accordingly, the response to crisis would amount to the full awareness of the crisis. It would consist in awakening scientific consciousness to the necessity of regressive inquiries, and in actually accomplishing those primordial reactivations that would introduce the original genesis of fundamental concepts into the historical circulation of logos.

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[252] Ibid., pp. 366, 368.

[253] Introduction to the Origin, p. 169.

[254] See, for instance, Crisis, p. 6 and Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 2.

[255] Introduction to the Origin, p. 92, fn.

Within this interpretive framework, science's lost *Lebensbedeutsamkeit* refers to the meaning science would have for us if we could in fact reactivate the original genesis of scientific fields from the perspective of the pre-scientific life-world. This reactivation would rob constituted scientific ideas of the obviousness by virtue of which their very status as ideas becomes obscured, and by virtue of which they seem to belong to an objective universe whose meaning owes nothing to creative acts. To recover the sense of these ideas as products means to be in a position to retrace their production beginning from the pre-scientific world in which I am always already living, a world whose essential structures have always been and will always be the same.[256] Beginning from a reflection on the nature of my own surrounding life-world, in which scientific ideas are already sedimented, I can thus understand their original creation as a possibility for human activity and attempt to assume full responsibility for the constitution of their original meaning. There is little doubt that Husserl understood this task as essential to phenomenology's critique of reason during the time of the *Crisis* writings. We nonetheless contend that the historical breakdown in scientificity that they address is not "the crisis of science." The *Lebensbedeutsamkeit* that science has lost because of its crisis is not its understandability as an accomplishment on the ground of the pre-scientific world of life.[257]

One telling sign of this is that Husserl consistently treats the crisis as a temporary condition, one which calls for decision and resolution in order to find a way out. And yet sedimentation and forgetting are inescapable aspects of the fundamental historicity of all science. This applies also to phenomenology even as it makes explicit problems out of these issues. The fact that the operation of creative scientific consciousness on the basis of the life-world has been announced as a scientific theme does not exempt the scientific treatment of that theme from involvement in tradition, forgetfulness, etc. As Derrida often emphasizes, the sedimentation of theoretical results is a condition of possibility for their origination. All science, including phenomenology itself, has a genuine existence only in the militant will to reactivation, which can never decisively overcome the non-seeing understanding against which it directs itself. The problem of sedimentation is ever-present, irresolvable, and yet never an emergency. It never *emerges* because it is identical with the very manifestation of reason in history. Interpreters who identify the

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[256] Crisis, p. 378.

[257] On the basis of this first interpretation it seems possible to abstract a general theory of "crisis" applicable to traditions other than science itself. In human endeavors of all sorts, is it not a necessary danger to neglect the meaning of originally founding acts, to develop "dealing" mechanisms that allow the tradition to understand itself and progress without renewing the sense of its origin, and to face the lures of mere "success"? Is it not an immense and valuable task of criticism to diagnose the "crises" of personal relationships, social institutions, nations, even entire societies, and to inspire a militant will to renewal and critique? Husserl's "crisis" would then be a structural phenomenon, articulated into levels where it would impact various dimensions of our existence (science, culture, etc.). Does Husserl's "Europe" then name a particular civilizational horizon in which this manner of reflection would be brought to bear? Such is the approach of P. Philip Buckley in his *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility*. He views the development of Husserl's project as based on the expansion of the conception of crisis "to encompass ever wider domains." Beginning from the crisis of arithmetic, Husserl then goes on to analyze the crisis of logic, philosophy itself, and finally culture. "Europe" names the domain in which the application of the crisis-analysis to culture occurs (66-7).

crisis of science with its linguistic inscription or historical sedimentation are right to conclude that it is an inevitable, ineradicable condition. It would be, as Dodd has it, a normal feature of reason.[258] Or, as Derrida revealingly writes in his 1953/54 dissertation: "The crisis is thus, *contrary to what Husserl says*, an internal necessity of history" (my emphasis).[259] For Husserl *does say* that there is a way out of the crisis, indeed more than one way,[260] and clearly holds that the phenomenological transformation of philosophy is the key to its successful resolution. To treat the crisis of science as a permanent feature of reason is to come into tension with Husserl's basic attitude in the *Crisis*.

Perhaps we draw nearer to Husserl's concept of scientific crisis if we focus, not on the historicity of science as such, but rather on the particular concrete tradition of scientific self-understanding that we have inherited on its basis. This tradition of self-understanding is beset, according to Husserl, by prejudices rooted in the natural attitude. These prejudices have the effect of obscuring the fact that consciousness is the field of work in which *theoria*, the highest goal of science, actually becomes possible. So long as it remains ignorant of this field, the attempt to unify and ground scientific knowledge will necessarily lead to absurd consequences. The "crisis" of science will thus find its most acute expression in those attempts of science to fulfill the demands of *theoria* through an illegitimate absolutization of what are, in fact, relative domains of being. Throughout his intellectual development, Husserl understands these attempts as various forms of objectivism and subjective relativism. They result from equating knowledge of all true being with knowledge of an external reality, on the one hand, or with knowledge of an internal human experience on the other (as "opposed to" external reality, and thus the other side of the same dualism). Their effect is either to ruin the validity of scientific judgment by incorporating it into the life of an empirical psyche and its functions, or else to posit objectivities whose entry into our mental life remains mysterious and can only be accounted for via metaphysical hypotheses. To comprehend the crisis of our scientific tradition would thus mean to comprehend the genesis of these positions according to their inner motivations within the context of a single historical development.

The *Crisis* no doubt attempts this comprehension through its concrete history of modern philosophy. Husserl no longer engages objectivism and subjective relativism as abstract positions in opposition to which he will measure the worth of a phenomenological theory of knowledge. These prejudices rather take shape and are addressed within the unity of a singe theoretical tradition called "modern philosophy." This tradition, in sum, is the historical struggle to reconcile the epistemic goals of *theoria* with the discovery of subjectivity as the dimension of all experience and judgment. Husserl will now trace the origin of objectivism back to specific transformations in the history of science, particularly the forgetting of the subjective activities and original evidences involved in the constitution of mathematics and mathematical physics. The attitude that treats the intuitively experienced world as a "merely subjective representation" of an objective nature, the mathematical *ratio* of which is the only thing that can be known with certainty, is now linked to a concrete scientific development

[258] Crisis and Reflection, p. 49.

[259] The Problem of Genesis, p. 172.

[260] Crisis, p. 299.

accomplished by personae: Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza. Likewise, the countervailing position of "empirical idealism," which discovers the root of all objectivity, scientific and otherwise, in the experiencing of the human psyche, takes shape in the concrete development that starts with Berkeley and Locke and leads to the "skeptical psychology" of Hume. Finally, the "transcendental motif" that eventually culminates in the phenomenological discovery of consciousness is nurtured in certain thoughts of Descartes, Kant, and nameless "German Idealists." This development prepares the way for transcendental philosophy with the idea that subjectivity is not a psychological entity in the world, but rather the experiencing through which the world attains whatever validity and meaning it could ever possess as world. Husserl regards the historical articulations of this idea as unsystematic, constructivist, even mythical, and thus unable to overcome objective dualism and establish a unification and grounding of science in transcendental subjectivity.

The tension between the sides of modern dualism and the transcendental motif that unsuccessfully tries to overcome them is the dominant plotline of the history of philosophy Husserl presents in the *Crisis*. We do not need to enter into the details of this plot or expose its obvious inadequacy from the standpoint of a classical history of philosophy. The question is whether the obfuscation of absolute consciousness through scientific dualism in the modern tradition is the "crisis of science" to which Husserl's final introduction to phenomenology was to be the clarification, response and resolution.

An affirmative answer would interpret the lost *Lebensbedeutsamkeit* of science as the comprehensibility it would have were it freed from the misinterpretations of objectivism and subjective relativism. It is a constant refrain of Husserl's that objectivism cannot successfully understand universal validity as a norm of scientific enterprise (even in natural science) beginning from "nature" conceived as the domain of all knowable being. Neither can subjective relativism account for the principled nature of its denial of universal validity that it claims to accomplish by inserting all scientific accomplishment within putatively all-encompassing empirical domains of spirit. Science, defined precisely as that enterprise productive of truths possessing ideal objectivity, will only become comprehensible as a subjective and intersubjective activity when the life that carries out scientific accomplishments is no longer viewed in advance according to the attitudes that define the fields of natural and empirical-historical inquiry. The phenomenological reduction to absolute consciousness would finally disclose the domain of life within which these attitudes become visible as relative attitudes constitutive of relative ontological regions, and in which questions concerning the nature of scientific validity could be posed from the perspective of pure consciousness itself.

By rooting the crisis of science in its becoming incomprehensible as a subjective accomplishment, this interpretation, like that based on the notion of sedimentation, encourages a trivialization in which the concept is mistaken for a contribution to the popular sociology of modern humanity's "alienation" from science. Most people today, is it said, do not understand science although they defer to it as an authority capable of distinguishing reality from non-reality and constantly depend upon the workings of its technological effects. Science and its products, it is said, have outrun their proper function of enhancing human ability and serving human interest, and have configured our surrounding world so as to cripple our capacity for original action and thought. If

Husserl's concept of scientific crisis in fact referred to this state of affairs,[261] its investigation would be best carried out by critical sociological inquiries into how science functions within the context of other social institutions and the human interests they represent. Such inquiries clearly do not concern Husserl in the *Crisis* itself.

This trivialization aside, it is rather difficult to equate objectivism as such with the concept of crisis operative in Husserl's final treatise. It is true that unlike the breakdown of scientificity rooted in the fundamental historicity of scientific acquisitions, the objectivist breakdown permits of a definite solution. In fact, only from the standpoint of this solution is the breakdown comprehensible. Only beginning from the discovery of consciousness as the absolute region of being will the history of attempts at *theoria* appear as misguided, incomplete, or as indicative of a final, successful *theoria* to come. Husserl's critical engagement with the history of modern philosophy-science in the *Crisis* actually transpires, not merely in light of a "transcendental motif," but in full possession of a transcendental field and method for philosophy.[262] It is from the perspective of his own phenomenology that Husserl can seek to discover the historical adventure in which this motif "seeks to come to itself…seeks to attain the genuine and pure from of its task and its systematic development."[263] There is obviously a critical question to raise here about the legitimacy of a teleological approach to philosophical history that never seems to expose to historical events the final sense that organizes the teleology (Ch 1.2). It suffices to point out that the history of the objectivist derailment of *theoria* is a drama told from the perspective of its resolution, and that it does not live up to the pathos of crossroads, decision, resolution, etc. that surrounds Husserl's talk of "crisis." Viewing the situation in this manner, Buckley rightly comments that "it is a curious type of crisis, indeed, when from the beginning one knows that meaning is always there to be recovered."[264]

Both the problematic of historical-linguistic sedimentation and that of objectivism are patently decisive for the critique of reason attempted in the *Crisis*. It remains to show that they are contained within a broader problematic from which their very decisiveness stems, and in which the genuine sense of the crisis is rooted. The tremendous importance of the breakdown of science's scientificity is that it *motivates* the crisis of science. Likewise, the effort to recover the dimension in which this breakdown becomes comprehensible is a *response* to the crisis of science. But the crisis itself is another matter, and requires its own conceptual clarification. To clarify the crisis of science is to clarify the motivational situation that determines Husserl's criticism of the breakdown in science's scientificity as a necessary undertaking. The fundamental role of Europe in the crisis of science will thus become apparent. It is on the ground of Europe that the critique of objectivism will become a matter of vital importance, decision, and resolution. Europe is not a particular "life-world horizon" in which the crisis of science, conceived according to the previous two frameworks, occurs. It is rather the horizon within which there can be a crisis of science at all.

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[261] As is suggested, for example, by Buckley. The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility, pp. 25, 28.

[262] Derrida emphasizes this point. The Problem of Genesis, p. 172.

[263] Crisis, p. 97.

[264] The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility, p. 130.

2.
Determination of Crisis as an Essentially European Phenomenon

In part one, section two of the *Crisis*, Husserl establishes the perspective (*Betrachtungsrichtung*) from which he intends to define the "crisis of science." His attention is not trained directly on *the scientificity of the sciences*, but rather on a phenomenon whose investigation will deliver *a compelling motive* for undertaking a critique of this scientificity. It is by taking up the perspective of "the general lament about the crisis of our culture and the role here ascribed to the sciences" that Husserl will discover "motives…for subjecting the scientific character (*Wissenschaftlichkeit*) of all sciences to a serious and quite necessary critique…"[265] The fact that Husserl carries out his critique of scientific reason beginning from a reflection on "the crisis of our culture" would seem to indicate that the crisis of science comes into view from a broader socio-cultural context in which it transpires. This would in fact be the case if "our culture" did not, from the outset, refer to European culture, which will prove to be *strictly identical* with the ascribing of a quite peculiar role to the sciences:

> This is not just a matter of a special form of culture—"science" or "philosophy"—as one among others belonging to European mankind. For the primal establishment of the new philosophy is…the primal establishment of modern European humanity itself—humanity which seeks to renew itself radically, as against the foregoing medieval and ancient age, *precisely and only* through its new philosophy."[266]

The crisis of "our culture" concerns nothing other than its ability to seek its radical renewal through science.

The inability or breakdown that initiates the crisis of science is neither a disconnection from the origins of scientific intuition, nor a failure to break from the natural attitude, but rather a change "in the general evaluation of the sciences. It concerns not the scientific character of the sciences but rather what they, or what science in general, had meant and could mean for human existence."[267] The crisis of science refers to its *devaluation* from the perspective of human existence. Beginning at the turn of the nineteenth century, writes Husserl, science was deemed incapable of addressing the questions that humanity "finds the most burning." These questions "concern man as a free, self-determining being in his behavior toward the human and extra-human surrounding world and free in his capacity for rationally shaping himself and his surrounding world."[268] Insofar as he is concerned with the crisis, Husserl never considers

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[265] Crisis, p. 5.

[266] Ibid., p. 12. My emphasis.

[267] Ibid., p. 5.

[268] Ibid., p. 6.

the positivistic restriction of science as a mere theoretical error, but as a harbinger of this devaluation. Such a perspective naturally presupposes the valuation in relation to which this devaluation has its meaning. It is this valuation that would constitute the life-meaningfulness of science as an enterprise capable of orienting the human being in her capacity for rationally shaping herself and her surrounding world.

The valuation in question is born, for Husserl, in the Renaissance in which Europe becomes what it is.

> As long as this [positivistic self-interpretation] had not yet happened, science could claim a meaning (*Bedeutung*) for the European humanity that shapes itself completely anew beginning from the Renaissance. Indeed, as we know, for this shaping anew, science could claim the leading meaning (*führende Bedeutung*). Why science lost this leadership (*Führung*), why there occurred an essential change, a positivistic restriction of the idea of science—to understand this according to its *deeper motives*, is of great importance for the purpose of these lectures.[269]

European humanity comes into being to the extent that it sees in scientific rationality the promise of a new "form of existence," that of "freely giving oneself, one's whole life, its rule through pure reason or through philosophy."[270] This new humanity embraces the imperative that "the whole human surrounding world, the political and social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew through free reason…"[271] On the basis of the *Vienna Lecture*, we have defined this form of existence as the will to universal critique, or as living under the theoretical attitude as the governing norm style. The Europe of Husserl's *Crisis* is synonymous with the form of communal existence founded on the belief in philosophy as ruler or leader. It is from the perspective of the Renaissance constitutive of Europe that the devaluation of science's existential significance becomes comprehensible.

The above passage also makes clear how to understand the lost life-meaningfulness of science that defines the crisis. The life-meaningfulness of science is precisely that *"leading-meaning" (führende Bedeutung) ascribed to it within Europe*. By inquiring into the origins of modern dualism, Husserl will seek to understand why science lost this leadership, and aim to restore it to a position in which it can fulfill the archontic

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[269] Ibid., p. 7. I have modified Carr's translation. Carr translates *führende Bedeutung* as "major role." This non-literal translation is certainly justified. Husserl, however, is clearly playing off the literal sense of *führen* as "to lead." The next sentence refers back to this phrase antecedently: "Warum sie [Wissenschaft] diese Führung verlor…." I have also emphasized the extent to which Husserl seems to identify European humanity with the shaping anew of the Renaissance. The original German runs: *Solange es sich noch anders verhielt, konnte die Wissenschaft für das sich seit der Renaissance völlig neu gestaltende europäische Menschentum eine Bedeutung beanspruchen , ja, wie wir wissen, für diese Neugestaltung die führende Bedeutung. Warum sie diese Führung verlor, warum es zu einer wesentlichen Änderung, zur positivistischen Einschränkung der Wissenschaftsidee kam – das nach seinen* tieferen Motiven *zu verstehen, ist für die Absicht dieser Vorträge von Wichtigkeit*. (Krisis, p. 5)

[270] Crisis, p. 8.

[271] Ibid., p. 8.

responsibilities with which it has been charged. The *Crisis* writings can only address the problem of science's scientificity beginning from this European horizon. Whether it is a question of bringing science to an understanding of its own genesis in the pre-scientific world of life, or of discovering an animating teleology by which to unify and redeem the sense of the theoretical project, Husserl's reflections derive their existential significance from the presupposition of Europe, the *Geschichtlichkeit* in which the leadership of science is at stake. Only within Europe is such a critique a matter of cultural life or death. The uprooting of science from its subjective sources only brings about a *crisis* within a historical development defined by its promotion of the theoretical attitude to the governing norm-style. The progression of the opening sections of the *Crisis* is quite logical in this respect. The definition of the crisis as the loss of science's life-meaningfulness occurs *within* the reflection on the horizon in which this life-meaningfulness is constituted: European humanity.

The unassignability of the leading role to science within the European *Geschichtlichkeit* is the crisis of science itself. The crisis of science, the loss of its meaningfulness for life, is thus *in principle identical* with the crisis of Europe. This is why Husserl's reflection on "the crisis of our culture" does not require analyses concerning extra-scientific cultural phenomena. The author of the *Crisis* has no interest in critiquing and recovering the founding intentions of European political, religious, or economic institutions.[272] Instead, the leading-meaning of science for life, whose loss determines the sense of the scientific crisis, is what defines European culture as European. To do justice to Husserl's intention, we must reject the idea that the crisis refers to an affliction that plagues European "culture" in general, and therefore its philosophy or science *as well*.[273]

The phenomenological critique of reason carried out in the *Crisis* literally makes no sense outside of Europe. The teleological reflections by which Husserl makes comprehensible the failed attempts to carry out the project of *theoria* concern the development of *European* sciences. It is only because they participate in the European *Geschichtlichkeit* that they will have been capable of entering into a crisis at all. One misses the mark by analyzing Husserl's "scientific crisis" according to those natural attitude prejudices that have thwarted the successful realization of *theoria*. One must rather focus on those concepts by which Husserl is able to understand this failure as jeopardizing a whole "form of existence." Likewise, the fundamental historicity of theoretical products can only contribute to a "crisis" insofar as the sedimentation and reactivation of theoretical sense takes place within a *Geschichtlichkeit* where the leadership of philosophy is at stake. To get at the heart of the "crisis" that orients

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[272] Klaus Held, working from a generally phenomenological perspective, sees the essence of European culture in the will to science *and democracy*. He roots these two cultural forms in a certain "world openness" that he claims is the original attunement of European humanity as such. Held's analysis, while interesting in its own right, is not true to Husserl's strict concept of Europe in the sense that he weds the latter to something beyond the valuation of science or philosophy itself. In part two, we will see why no political concept or institution could ever be definitive of Husserl's Europe.

[273] This perspective is assumed, for instance, by Janet Donohoe in her *Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology* (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2004). See especially p. 151.

Husserl's final treatise, we will have to pose the problem of its definition from the perspective of the Europe problematic. The concepts central to this definition will prove essentially different form those involved in the problematics of sedimentation and objectivism.[274]

3.
Definition of the Crisis of Science as the Sickness of European Life

Our interpretation of the crisis as the loss of science's leading meaning within the European horizon will now guide us in understanding Husserl's classification of it as a "sickness." The meaning of crisis as sickness depends upon the way that Husserl defines the health of purposeful striving within a *Geschichtlichkeit*. Crisis as sickness is comprehensible only with a view to the unity of purposeful life that it afflicts. If the crisis of science is "a disorder or illness," it does not, as Derrida thinks, concern language.[275] Its host is rather Europe, that spiritual organism whose health depends upon philosophy as its "functioning brain."

In part one of the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl approaches the theme of crisis in explicitly medical terms: "The European nations are sick; Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis."[276] Husserl at once guards against any physiological reduction of the medical idiom that he here introduces. This sickness does not afflict life in the physiological sense, but "purposeful life accomplishing spiritual products: in the broadest sense, creating culture in the unity of a historical development (*in der Einheit einer Geschichtlichkeit*)."[277] The opening sections of the lecture, which fix the proper attitude from which to address the European sickness, explicitly prohibit us from viewing the "life" involved here as in any way connected to a "corporeal basis" that could become the subject-matter of physical science.[278] The language of medicine does not provide a "metaphor" for addressing the crisis. Medicine itself is rather a two-fold discipline

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[274] We thus find it terminologically inaccurate to speak of an "internal crisis" of science, which would concern sedimentation and objectivism, and an "external crisis" of science which would concern its meaning for life. Such is the suggestion of Buckley, p. 24. The two problematics (that of science's eclipsed *Wissenschaftlichkeit* and its lost *Lebensbedeutsamkeit*), while intimately related, do not concern the same phenomenon from two different perspectives.

[275] Intro to the Origin, p. 92 fn. Derrida's definition of crisis as "a disorder or illness of language" is based upon his analysis of the phenomena associated with the essential historicity of theoretical products, a problematic we hold to be marginal to that of the "crisis" itself. It is noteworthy that although Derrida attempts to define "crisis" on the basis of *The Origin of Geometry*, Husserl never once uses the term "*Krisis*" in that text. In his 1953/54 dissertation, Derrida equates "crisis" with all forms of passivity and attention to constituted products. The temporal and synthetic nature of consciousness itself will thus entail the perpetual "promotion" of crises. *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Phenomenology*, p. 172.

[276] Crisis, p. 270.

[277] Ibid.

[278] Ibid., p. 270-271.

pertaining to two distinct kinds of life. On the one hand, it concerns every form of life belonging to human beings or other psycho-somatic unities, regardless of whether it treats mental or physical illness in abstraction. On the other hand, it concerns purely spiritual, culture-creating life, understood as a self-enclosed and all-encompassing domain. In pursuing its purposes, this life stands in motivational relation, not to a physical world, but to a "surrounding world" whose entire being is itself a subjective validity. If we have abandoned all objectivist prejudice, we will understand that this life and its correlative world include the very sciences that found medical praxes capable of diagnosing psycho-somatic sickness. These sciences themselves are therefore open to examination from the perspective of their being forms of spiritual, culture-creating life within the unity of a *Geschichtlichkeit*. This would be the case, says Husserl, had a scientific medicine been developed that ministers to *this kind of life*.

It is striking that the *Vienna Lecture* never provides a satisfactory definition of the health proper to this kind of life. Husserl asserts as something obvious that "there exists the distinction between powerful thriving and atrophy [*kraftvollem Gedeihen und Verkümmern*], that is, one can also say, between health and sickness [*Gesundheit und Krankheit*], even in communities, peoples, states."[279] However, the *Vienna Lecture* never subjects the "energetic thriving" here equated with the health of purposeful, culture-creating life to a phenomenological description that would definitively free it from every physiological concept and determine its own proper sense. And yet, does not the meaning of this "thriving" decide the character of the European sickness and that of the medical treatment it would require?

The concept of spiritual health that functions implicitly in the *Vienna Lecture* concerns *Geschichtlichkeiten* insofar as they are unities of *vocational life*. Thus far, we have considered vocational life according to the epoche that intermittently divests non-vocational ends of their motivating power (Ch. 2.1), as well as the interpretation of this work as a "political" function or ἔργον (Ch. 2.2). We now consider the exceptional possibility that such a vocational task be constituted as a calling in a more pregnant sense. It is possible to posit a task as the sphere of striving in which one's *self* is to be realized.

Let us call this positing dedication of the self to the task. Life is not already a task. The constitution of a task involves an explicit identification of goals, means, obstacles, etc. beginning from an end-directed living already underway. For this reason, one always comes upon or takes up a task. This holds, of course, for vocations as well. Something happens, circumstances conspire, history occurs, and one winds up vocationally occupied in one way or another, a situation which one can resist or accept. To dedicate oneself to a task, to constitute it as vocational in the pregnant sense, is no longer to have it be something that happened to me, a part of my history, or a "facet" of my life. Dedicational devotion to a vocational goal is not self-discipline or sacrifice of the self to the task, but rather the finding or realization of the self in the task.[280] Dedication *defines* oneself by pursuit of the task, such that the task itself gives a unifying sense to the historical development of the whole personal life. In Husserl's words, such a goal functions as a "practical ideal…of which one cannot lose sight through one's whole life without

[279] Ibid., p. 270. Translation modified.

[280] Dodd's study introduces a similar distinction between a task as merely "something to do" and a "fundamental task" that requires one to exist in a certain way. Crisis and Reflection, p. 64.

compunction, without *being untrue to oneself* and thus becoming ill-fated [*unselig*]."[281] Dedication thus refers, not only to the devotion of the will to the task, but also to a temporal understanding that we will try to explore. Such dedication may determine personalities at the level of individual or collective life. Europe itself, for Husserl, will be a vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* in this sense. It will become what it is only in dedication to its defining task.

Republic refers to this aspect of vocation as ἐπιτήδευμα. The term is conventionally translated as life-pursuit or business, or else remains generally undistinguished from the various terms used to translate *techne* and ἔργον. It does, however, bear a distinct word-meaning and tends toward a distinct function as a term in the interpretation of *techne*. The most direct formulation of its significance comes at 423d when Socrates tells Adeimantus that each worker of the genuine polis, in pursuing his ownmost calling (ἐπιτηδεύων—present participle), *becomes one person*. If ἔργον interprets *techne* in terms of its being required by the πολιτεία of the polis, ἐπιτήδευμα interprets it in terms of its being proper to the φύσις of the worker. The originating principle of the polis is that each *techne* be an ἔργον that is simultaneously an ἐπιτήδευμα (453-e). Each will thus be unifying herself as one person while unifying the polis by doing the work of the community. In the noun ἐπιτήδευμα, one hears the combination of the preposition ἐπι, "for the purpose of," and the demonstrative pronoun τοδε, "this." Such is the meaning of ἐπιτήδες, the related adverb "for a special purpose." A *techne* has the status of an ἐπιτήδευμα if it so engages and occupies the worker's attention, learning and exertion that she comes to identify it with the highest purpose of her life, and can assert that she "was meant for this." Unfortunately, Socrates' most explicit reflections on the relationship between φύσις and *techne* occur in an administrative mode rather than through an inward consideration of technical accomplishment. The criteria for distinguishing those citizens naturally well-suited to a given task from those naturally unsuited are laid out from the perspective of an educational assessment of pupils (455b). The properly phenomenological problems that would come into view by considering the coordination of φύσις and *techne* in the experience of ἐπιτήδευμα here remain undiscovered.

It is nonetheless the experience of vocation as ἐπιτήδευμα that governs Socrates' rather remarkable discourse on *medicine* in book three. It is here that the political problematic of *Republic* provides a relevant introduction to Husserl's account of spiritual heath and sickness. Although Socrates' medical topics are physiological in nature, the distinction between good and bad medicine depends upon its care for vocational life strictly in its purposive dimension. Good medicine has the sole task of retuning the worker to her work. Its goal is the restoration of that striving that the worker in the possession of an ἐπιτήδευμα would identify with the value of living itself. The citizen seeks treatment because "there was some task that if he was not doing, it was not worthwhile to go on living."(407a)[282] Medicine seeks only to serve the health of that

[281] Crisis, p. 291. Translation modified.

[282] This is a past general conditional sentence, which expresses a rule-governed relationship between protasis and apodosis. If the worker was not capable of doing his work, then his life wasn't worth living. Extenuating circumstances play no role here.

purposeful life geared toward a task without which it cannot live. When it has its final aim in physical health, medicine becomes a force of decadence, an aid to mere survival, and "makes dying a lengthy process" (406b). Such a medical practice would ask citizens to place their health before their work. But for the worker of a vocation the healthy body is a "working force" to be drawn upon within vocational life. If illness or injury should prove so debilitating that survival would require a form of living preoccupied with the sick body, the worker will take his chances at work: "life is no use to him if he has to neglect his work and always be concerned with his illness…he'd bid goodbye to his doctor, resume his usual way of life, and either recover health or, if his body could not withstand the illness, he'd die and escape his troubles" (406d-e).[283] Medicine that would aid survival alone is actually a "nursemaid to the disease" (406a). The true task of medicine is to hold the vocational worker in the consciousness that without her work life is not worth living. This discourse on euthanasia and vocational devotion belongs to the strict account of *techne*. It applies only to those living in the possession of an ἐπιτήδευμα.

The full experience of vocation is thus not the subordination of oneself to a role. In the devoted attention to and readiness for what a work requires, one transcends the social constitution of the task as a role and becomes oneself in dedication. The strict account of *techne* goes *further* than the heteronomy and replaceability often associated with "technological" society. It argues that the comparative consciousness that defines one in relation to replaceable others within a world of social convention is overcome in pursuit of vocation itself. Seen strictly, Socrates' "medical man" (350a) does not want to outdo other medical men, nor non-medical men *as men*; nor does he want to be *as good as* the other medical men. He wants to find himself in devotion to the medical discipline. The same would hold, apparently, for the true carpenter, farmer, banker, shop-keeper, etc. Perhaps it is not just intellectualist prejudice that makes us suspect that no ordinary vocation of the polis could provide this opportunity for self discovery, and that the discourse is actually meant for a reflection on philosophy and related philosophical devotions. .

We will find this strange, exaggerated, and perhaps perverse account, where health is equated with staking one's ability to live on devotion to a defining task, echoed in Husserl's medical examination of European vocational *Geschichtlichkeit*. As a preliminary, it is first necessary to discover more explicitly the concepts of spiritual health and sickness that he applies in that examination. We turn to two passages. The first is from the conclusion of Husserl's 1911 *Logos* essay, where he suddenly discusses philosophy, not as scientific method or field, but rather as the goal to which "our age" is summoned "according to its vocation."

> He who is capable of awakening faith in [*Glauben*], of inspiring [*erregen*] understanding of [*Verständnis*] and enthusiasm for [*Begeisterung*] the greatness of a goal, will easily find the powers [*die Kräfte*] that move toward this goal [*die sich diesem zuwenden*]. I mean, our age is according to its

[283] Grube-Reeve.

> vocation a great age—only it suffers from the skepticism that has disintegrated the old, unclarified ideals.[284]

The second is from the beginning of Husserl's *Kaizo* article of 1923, where, reflecting on the lack of "vital energy" in European culture, he makes the following assertion, which clearly claims an eidetic level of generality.

> A nation or a people [*Menschheit*] lives and creates in the fullness of power [*in Fülle der Kraft*] when it is supported by an energy-sustaining faith [*in Schwung haltenden Glauben*] in itself and in an aesthetic and moral sense of its cultural life—when a nation does not merely strive to keep alive, but instead lives from what is great in its own eyes and is fulfilled [*befriedigt*] in its increasing success in actualizing genuine and enriching values." [285]

What can we glean from these two passages, which span the difference between individual and communal striving in the direction of a single phenomenon?

It is by correctly relating to the *greatness* of the vocational goal that purposeful striving will attain its optimal form. By understanding, having faith in, and enthusiasm for the greatness of this goal, the subject of the task lives in a clarity of purpose that enables an "easy finding" of the power necessary for its accomplishment. Thriving vocational life thus lives in the fluent discovery and calling forth of the powers necessary to accomplish something great.

The concepts employed here require some analysis. The second passage clearly indicates that the *Kraft* or *Kräfte* necessary for the accomplishment of something great are *lived in* and *created in* by the subject of the task. They are not working forces applied from the outside. Husserl does not mean, as one might think from the first passage, that in promoting the greatness of a goal one is sure to find others willing to take up the same task. The subject of thriving purposeful life experiences the full exercise of *its* power in the clear-headed striving toward its defining goal. This power is experienced as its own because the sense of its life *consists* in the realization of what is great in its eyes.

This emphasis, "great in its own eyes," shows that Husserl is not here concerned with finding an objective criterion against which to measure the greatness of goals. Greatness here is strictly correlative to the energetic thriving of the will. A goal is truly great to the extent that it demands from the willing subject an unswerving dedication, a summoning of its total energy and attention, thus freeing it from the restlessness and diffusion of power that attend the pursuit of interests that vie with one another. Greatness, then, is the object of what Hegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, calls "passion": "if interest be called passion, inasmuch as the whole individuality, to the neglect of all other actual or possible interests and claims, is devoted to an object with every fiber of volition, concentrating all its desires and powers upon it—we may affirm absolutely that nothing

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[284] Philosophy and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 145. Translation modified.

[285] Edmund Husserl, *"Renewal: Its Problem and Method*" in *Husserl: Shorter Works*. Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press and The Harvester Press, 1981)[Herafter, Renewal], p. 326.

great in the World has been accomplished without passion."[286] One may object that a will dedicated to great things can perpetrate unconscionable evils. But this is actually no objection. Even in *Republic*, this "moral" question is divorced from the consideration of greatness. Health in the sense of vigor is regarded as conducive to both the greatest good and the greatest evil (491d-e). Its opposite is mere survival. A life oriented by what is great does not merely seek to live out its life. It does not live "from itself" as the subject of interests that require fulfillment. Instead it dedicates its self by living "from what is great," by striving toward its actualization.

In thriving vocational life, this greatness, it is true, has to be *understood*. The dedicated subject must be clear that and how she is motivated by *what she has dedicated herself to* rather than by obscure non-vocational drives or influences. But understanding the greatness of the devotional goal is apparently insufficient for healthy striving. In the passages above, Husserl couples understanding with faith, enthusiasm and fulfillment. In similar passages, he will introduce other terms of seemingly emotional resonance. Anticipating a terminological tendency of Husserl himself, let us refer to this experience simply as "faith" or "energy-sustaining faith." In the life of vocationally dedicated subjectivity, understanding is in reciprocal relation with an energy-sustaining faith with which it cannot be identified, and which refers to the act of dedication itself. The object of the faith of vocational subjectivity is nothing other than "itself" or its "sense of cultural life." It believes itself to have been defined by the pursuit of greatness. Understanding is itself inspired or aroused [*errgen*] by this experience of full-fledged dedication.

When vocational life is in the mode of "energetic thriving," it works toward the achievement of its goal in such a way that this faith and understanding reinforce one another and are reinforced by the accomplishing work. Clarity, belief and success complement one another. Conversely, "atrophy" arises in a lack of clarity regarding the animating goal. This occasions a skepticism that destroys unclarified ideals. Skepticism in this context is not a strictly cognitive attitude, a doubting of what is not clear. It suffers the disintegration of the vocational goal as unbelievable, incomprehensible and dispiriting. Skepticism is a weariness, a lack of power in the face of the revelation of the "untruthfulness and senselessness" of vocation life. "It is precisely this revelation," writes Husserl, "which drains it of its vital energy."[287]

These descriptions are only guidelines for an investigation that would enter into the experiences of "faith," "understanding," "enthusiasm," "power," etc. after fixing the interpretive orientation from which such terms can be protected from tempting physiological and emotive-corporeal misconstructions. We will make a suggestion in this regard. First, it is necessary to bring this general concept of spiritual health and sickness to bear upon Husserl's examination of the European *Geschichtlichkeit*. If Europe is sick, is in crisis, it will be because the purposeful, culture-creating life proper to its *Geschichtlichkeit* can no longer believe in the greatness of the vocational goal that was to define the meaning of this life. It will be because an obscurity in this goal, coupled with a lack of successful progress towards its attainment, has disempowered the striving

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[286] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*. (New York: Dover Publications, 1956). p. 23.

[287] Renewal, p. 326.

characteristic of European life, sapped it of its vital energy. It is indeed in terms of these concepts that Husserl describes the "crisis," both in the *Vienna Lecture* and in the *Crisis* itself. This lack of belief in the defining goal of Europe's *Geschichtlichkeit*, and the consequent inability to strive toward it with clarity of purpose and enthusiasm, do not refer to a "merely subjective" reaction to the crisis. They are the crisis itself as an affliction of purposeful, culture creating life in the unity of a vocational *Geschichtlichkeit*.

We have seen that Husserl defines European humanity by its will to subject every aspect of its existence to critique in the light of theoretical ideas. In Europe there dawns "a new human epoch—the epoch of mankind which now seeks to live, and only can live, in the free shaping of its existence, its historical life, through ideas of reason…"[288] European life *only can live* in striving to live under the governance of *theoria*. This means that it *cannot live otherwise*. We have to take this formulation of the *Vienna Lecture* seriously. European humanity is the subject of a vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* in the pregnant sense. Europe becomes Europe strictly and solely in dedicating itself to reshaping its world through ideas of reason. The vitality definitive of Europe stems exclusively from the practical viability of this striving. Should this striving prove impossible, the "new sort of historicity"[289] that makes Europe what it is would collapse. A Europe that would survive its calling, living on with the help of bad medicine, a physical body no longer thrown into its defining purpose—that would be no Europe at all.

Our preliminary engagement with Husserl's description of the healthy vocational life has taught us that the possibility of energetic striving depends upon a faith in the greatness of the goal whose realization is at stake. In the *Crisis*, Husserl lays heavy emphasis upon this faith as the source of Europe's vital energy. Echoing his general formulation from the *Kaizo* article, Husserl writes that the faith in the greatness of the goal of subjecting all life to the norms of theoretical reason is an energy-giving belief (*schwunggebender Glauben*).[290] On the basis of this faith, theoretical rationality is not construed in opposition to life, but becomes life's greatest, all-consuming passion. This passion for theoretical rationality was to be the driving engine of Europe.

The ability to believe in theoretical reason as the highest possibility of European *Geschichtlichkeit* results in clarity of purpose and resolution that in turn spur progress toward the goal itself:

> In light of this [belief in universal philosophy] we can understand the energy [*Schwung*] which animated all scientific undertakings, even the merely factual sciences of the lower level; in the eighteenth century (which called itself the philosophical century) it filled ever widening circles with enthusiasm [*Begeisterung*] for philosophy and for all the special sciences as its branches. Hence the ardent desire for learning, the zeal for a philosophical reform of

[288] Crisis, p. 274.

[289] Ibid., p. 277.

[290] Ibid., p. 10

> education and of all of humanity's social and political forms of existence, which makes that much-abused Age of Enlightenment so admirable.[291]

Husserl's only focused thought about extra-philosophical European culture in the *Crisis* concerns a kind of emblem of this thriving life. In Beethoven and Schiller's "Hymn to Joy," he finds an "undying testimony" to the energy of a European humanity that believed in the possibility of its proper, highest goal. It is in direct opposition to this expression of powerful, clear-headed striving that Husserl conceives the state of European crisis: "It is only with painful feelings that we can understand this hymn today. A greater contrast with our present situation is unthinkable."[292]

Husserl describes this present situation, the situation of crisis, as one of skepticism. The skepticism that characterizes the crisis should not be confused with skepticism as an antithetical position within philosophy, as when Husserl speaks of the "skepticism" of Hume. It is rather skepticism opposed to energetic striving on the level of purposeful, culture-creating life. In this case, it concerns precisely that greatest goal of the European *Geschichtlichkeit*. This skepticism views philosophy as a whole from the perspective of its promising "a new form of existence," and finds the promise unbelievable. *The crisis of science refers to "the collapse in the belief in a universal philosophy as the guide for the new man.*"[293] If European humanity, "animated and blessed with such an exalted spirit, did not hold its own, it must have been because it lost the energy-giving faith [*schwunggebenden Glauben*] in its ideal of a universal philosophy."[294] Such skepticism has vital consequences. By doubting the possibility of the *theoria* that was to make European life possible, such skepticism deprives it of its energy-source and clouds its clarity of purpose. The skepticism that defines the crisis is a state of insecurity and distress.

In no sense, however, is this skepticism is mere attitude problem. It cannot be overcome through blind faith and optimism. Husserl will thoroughly condemn all such "consolations."[295] The unbelievability of Europe's vital belief is an unbelievability that must be recognized. The distress into which Europe has fallen is "a sober fact."[296] Moreover, it has its well-grounded motives. In fact, one might suspect that the only honest resolution to the crisis is to admit that the faith in the leading meaning of reason exhibited in the "Age of Enlightenment" was ill-founded, and that the present state of skepticism has its roots in the former state of naive belief. Husserl too is "certain that the European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism."[297] This is what motivates his

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[291] Ibid.

[292] Ibid.

[293] Ibid., p. 12.

[294] Ibid., p. 10. Translation modified.

[295] See, for instance, Crisis, p. 11.

[296] Crisis, p. 17.

[297] Ibid., p. 290.

critique of the "naïve" rationality characteristic of the Enlightenment: "The most general title for this naivete is *objectivism*, taking the form of the various types of naturalism, of the naturalization of the spirit."[298] Here, the following must be emphasized. Within the crisis problematic, objectivism is not just a theoretical mistake, but is immediately implicated in the *disempowerment* of European life. Objectivism is addressed as the primary motive for the skepticism undermining the energy-giving belief that lets European life create in the fullness of its own power. It is for this reason that the *Crisis* devotes such attention to its critique.

There is a crucial distinction, then, between Husserl's *critique* of naïve forms of theoretical rationality, including those belonging to the renaissance period, and his unshakable *commitment* to the Renaissance itself as the valuation of theoretical reason as such that defines Europe. Only from the perspective of this latter commitment does objectivism prevent science from carrying out its *assigned role*. Husserl's criticism of the naïve science that renders unbelievable the belief in the leading-meaning of *theoria* reaches all the way back to the historical origin of Europe. Yet the belief itself, which *is* Europe's origination, will never be characterized as "naïve" and is in fact beyond criticism. The belief that science as such (and not merely the "human sciences") is capable of deciding those "burning questions" concerning the possible rationality of human existence is unavoidable for European existence. It is Husserl's unshakable belief in the necessity of this belief that causes him to admire the "Age of Enlightenment." He will thus simultaneously characterize as "mistaken" Enlightenment forms of theoretical reason and laud the decisive existential significance accorded to them. The nature of the crisis problematic leads Husserl to accord first place to an epoch whose form of philosophical rationality he finds theoretically untenable: "The reason for the failure of a rational culture," he asserts in the *Vienna Lecture*, "…lies not in the essence of rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in 'naturalism' and 'objectivism'."[299]The leading meaning ascribed to the goal of theoretical knowledge, and the consequent zeal and enthusiasm with which it was sought, determine the Age of Enlightenment as the example of healthy European life against which Husserl measures the crisis that was destined to befall it.

To become aware of Europe's crisis is to stand face to face with the decision of whether to give up on its vital, and yet unbelievable, belief. Europe's sickness is a being-weary in the face of skepticism regarding the goal definitive of its *Geschichtlichkeit*. It is no longer capable of striving toward its greatest ideal with clarity of purpose. This weariness is the "greatest of all dangers"[300] because it can end in the decision to give up the struggle to recover the believability of the energy-giving belief through which Europe can become what it is. No small part of European life, perhaps, belongs to a humanity that has already "collapsed" (*dem schon zusammengebrochenen Menschentum*).[301] This collapse would be Europe's spiritual death, its downfall (*Untergang*). Plato's discourse

[298] Ibid., p. 292.

[299] Ibid., p. 299.

[300] Ibid.

[301] Ibid., p. 15.

on medicine in *Republic* teaches that, under certain circumstances, the best practice is to abandon the "troubles" of a vocational life that can no longer effectively mobilize working forces. Husserl explicitly recognizes this surrender as one of the "two ways out of the crisis of European existence."[302] Giving up on Europe is theoretically possible. Husserl's unwillingness to embrace this possibility is strictly a matter of existential necessity. He *refuses* to entertain the possibility of Europe's downfall as a path for thinking. We ourselves will try to entertain this possibility when the opportunity presents itself (Ch. 5.3, 6.4). The attempt to approach the goal of *theoria* beginning from Europe's *Untergang* travels a difficult path, though perhaps no more difficult than that down which Husserl's thinking has always already begun.

Husserl, then, stands before a genuine emergency born from European humanity's devaluation of the defining goal of its *Geschichtlichkeit*. This change has forced upon European life a decision born from its naïve devotion to the rationalist ideal.

> There are only two escapes [*Auswege*] from the crisis of European existence: the downfall of Europe [*Untergang Europas*] in its estrangement from its own rational sense of life, its fall into hostility toward the spirit and barbarity; or the rebirth of Europe [*Wiedergeburt Europas*] from the spirit of philosophy through a heroism of reason that overcomes naturalism once and for all. Europe's greatest danger is weariness [*Müdigkeit*]. If we struggle against this greatest of all dangers as 'good Europeans' with the sort of courage [*Tapferkeit*] that does not fear even an infinite struggle, then out of the destructive blaze of lack of faith [*des Unglaubens*], the smoldering fire of despair over the West's mission for humanity, the ashes of great weariness, will rise up the phoenix of a new life-inwardness and spiritualization as the pledge [*Unterpfand*] of a great and distant future for man: for the spirit alone is immortal.[303]

Husserl meets the decision imposed by the crisis by confronting the unbelievablility of Europe's highest ideal *from within* European spiritual life and willing its health. To do so means to regard disbelief in the leading-meaning of *theoria* as a practical impossibility, to live within the unbelievable belief and struggle to make it believable. This is the "plight," the "painful existential contradiction"[304] that the *Crisis* presupposes as its starting point: "The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we *cannot* let go…And yet, how do we hold on to this belief…what should we, who *believe*, do in order to *be able* to believe?"[305] Rather than attempting to "move on" from the European *Geschichtlichkeit* as a casualty of historical becoming, Husserl will seek a rebirth of its birth in Renaissance—a renaissance of a renaissance, a rebirth of a rebirth. This second re-birth will be mature.

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[302] Ibid., p. 299. Translation modified.

[303] Ibid.

[304] Ibid., p. 17.

[305] Ibid.

Having passed through the trial of life-threatening skepticism, the renaissance of the Renaissance will have to include a critical justification of its belief in *theoria* as the guide to a new, and finally unsurpassable, *Geschichtlichkeit* in the life of humanity. Such is the medical intervention Husserl proposes.

Perhaps the most immovable, irreducible foundation of Husserl's *Crisis* is the belief in the existential necessity of believing in reason as a guide for human existence. Husserl tells us that we Europeans *cannot* let it go, that we must find a way to be able to believe. The *Crisis* presupposes that whoever is capable of decision in the crisis is *inconsolable* when confronted with the spectacle of human history as an unending concatenation of culturally relative perspectives; indeed, she *cannot live* in such a world.[306] This methodologically foundational belief concerns the *existential necessity* of theoretical reason, not in its possibility as an intellectual accomplishment. The question thus becomes: is the belief in reason really necessary? What kind of reflective procedure could possibly show that the inconsolability of the good European is sound rather than delusional? At the close of *Crisis* part one, Husserl seems to tell us exactly what must be done: "What is clearly necessary…is that we *reflect back*, in a thorough *historical* and *critical* fashion, in order to provide, *before all decisions*, for a radical self-understanding: we must inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy, what was continually sought by all the philosophers and philosophies that have communicated with one another historically; but this must include a *critical* consideration of what, in respect to the goals and methods [of philosophy], is ultimate, original, and genuine and which, once seen, apodictically conquers the will."[307] But in the published parts of the *Crisis*, this *Besinnung* takes the form of a teleological reconstruction of modern philosophy from the perspective of Europe as the *Geschichtlichkeit* in which human culture is already defined by its faith in reason. The original meaning of that faith, which governs the reflection itself, is not looked into or justified. For the *Besinnung* of the published parts, what was always sought in philosophy was simply phenomenology itself as the true form of the transcendental motif.

To look into and justify the faith in reason as an existential necessity, the question of what was always sought in philosophy will have to be posed, as it were, from both sides of the European boundary. It will not be sufficient to satisfy the vital requirement of European life (apparently already constituted) by delivering a philosophy free of the traditional obscurities. The original requiring of philosophy will have to be reactivated. "What was originally and always sought in philosophy" will have to appear as a response to that requiring. In this way, the good European, inconsolable without her belief in philosophical reason, will be able to *identify* her inconsolability with that experienced in the face of a pre-philosophical condition in which certain intolerable contradictions make philosophy itself (and not one of its technological outcomes) a necessity for life. Only a reflection on Europe beginning from its pre-history could accomplish the justification of the faith that functions as Husserl's starting point in the *Crisis*. In Chapter 4, we will explore certain *Crisis* period manuscripts in which Husserl outlines such a reflection. For our current concerns, however, it is more important to consider the conditions under

[306] Ibid., p. 7.

[307] Ibid., p. 18.

which the whole battery of reflections Husserl attempts in the crisis writings are to function as "spiritual medicine."

4.
Rededication and its Presuppositions

We have defined the crisis of science as the sickness of the vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* that Husserl calls Europe. It is from within this historical unity of purposeful life that Husserl carries out his diagnosis and from which he intends to help restore its vitality. By shifting the center of the crisis problematic from the scientificity of science to the health of a vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* (or by interpreting the former in view of the latter), we have indicated that the resolution of the crisis would not consist in clarity of insight, but rather in clarity of purpose (or in the former as essential to the latter). Is not living in the dedication to a goal, even if to the goal of knowing, different than knowing? Indeed, when Husserl describes the resolution of the crisis, he does not speak of understanding or knowing except within the framework of a broader experience of purposive self-possession ("faith," "enthusiasm," "power," "joy," "pledge," etc.). The justification of the faith that defines Europe will not aim at theoretical knowledge as much as full-hearted commitment to a great goal.

This does not detract, of course, from the role that theoretical knowledge is to play in enabling clarity of purpose. Europe, as Husserl says in the *Crisis*, will be reborn *through* a heroism of reason— the overcoming of its self-alienation in objectivism. In the *Kaizo* article of 1923, reflecting on the "sustaining faith" of peoples, Husserl writes:

> The faith that sustains us—in *our* [European] culture it *must* not rest here…this faith can "move mountains," not merely in fantasy, but in reality, only if it is transformed into prudent, rationally insightful ideas, only if it is in them that it brings to complete determination and clarity the essence and possibility of its goal and of the method by which it is to be attained. In this way, our faith first creates for itself its own rationally justified foundation. Only such clarity of thought can summon joyful work and give the will, the resoluteness, and the all-pervasive power to carry out acts of liberation.[308]

What must be emphasized, however, is that clarity of thought is achieved from and for the sake of clarity of purpose. Faith creates it for itself. The European *Geschichtlichkeit* has its defining purpose in philosophical self-regulation or universal critique. For Husserl, the necessity of grounding our sustaining faith with rational insight (in *our* culture it *must*) is itself grounded in what Europe demands of us as Europeans.

Thus, insofar as they are meant to contribute to an overcoming of the crisis, all of Husserl's reflections (whether they concern philosophy's methodological possibility, its teleological unity, its triumph over objectivism, its awareness of forgetting and sedimentation, or its origin in the life-world) occur within the context of an effort to *rededicate* European life to its defining task. We know that for Husserl this rededication

[308] Renewal, p. 327.

transpires from a perspective that has never abandoned the initial dedication. As a work of purposive clarification, it will proceed by means of the commitment that it hopes to confirm.

Vocational subjectivity can confirm its task as a defining calling only by destining the whole of its life to its accomplishment. No part of its life can exist outside the calling that gives it unity and meaning. The whole history of the vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* is thus the dimension of the rededication. At first, this proposition seems laughable. Someone has chosen musicianship or carpentry as a calling, and then has cause to reflect on whether this is really what she was meant to do. What can that possibly have to do with events in her historical horizon like the French Revolution or the Second World War? Would one advance the blatantly ridiculous thesis that the whole of world history prepared for my vocational decision? But for the act of rededication there are not two histories, a history of the world and a history of the self. The unity and meaning of personal life-history are at stake in an encompassing fashion. The events of world history are at issue only insofar as they originated and remain bound to those unique discovering encounters by which they entered into the unfolding synthesis of meaning within a personal life. The child musician encounters the Second World War as a "historical event" in elementary school. Perhaps it never interested her, that itself betraying an instinct for the aesthetic rather than the political, etc. A similar distinction would have to be made at the level of a higher-order personality in crisis concerning "the sense" of its life. Events connecting it to neighbors and predecessors would be viewed from within the developing unity of its tradition.

This does not mean, of course, that rededication has to recollect and anticipate every episode in the historical continuity of a personal life. Husserl's reflections on the history of Europe, although grandiose, are anything but encyclopedic. It is rather a question of opening this history for interpretation such that its temporal dimensions necessitate the task in accordance with their respective meanings as past, present and future. This opening is first a passive awakening to historical horizons in which one already finds oneself. Following the hint left by Husserl (Ch. 2.4), we may describe it as a presentiment, a feeling that there is something in history for one to do. Once awakened, this opening becomes a perspective on the historical horizons, and can eventually guide a work of dedicatory reflection. Our suggestion here is that the best interpretation of Husserl's descriptions of health or non-crisis in purposeful life ("faith," "enthusiasm," "power," "joy," "pledge," etc.) is to see them as aspects of vocational subjectivity's temporal self-understanding in dedication to its defining task. In the context of Husserl's rededication, these terms would then refer, not to emotional states of the one reflecting, but rather to the openness to history by virtue of which it is first of all possible to rededicate oneself to a defining task in the strong sense. With this suggestion, we are in some respects following the approach of Dodd's penetrating study of the *Crisis*. Dodd understands Husserl's engagement with history in the *Crisis* from the perspective of the effort to clarify one's being "fully possessed," "claimed," or "necessitated" by a task.[309] The very possibility of the crisis-problematic, we might say with Dodd, depends upon "the human capacity to engage tasks and claims on the plane of historical existence."[310]

[309] Crisis and Reflection, pp. 54, 64, 208.

[310] Ibid., p. 210.

We ask, then: How is historical existence present, past and future for the one aiming to become possessed within the unity of a vocational *Geschichtlichkeit*?

Husserl's language on this matter is not precise. Neither is it even a question of philosophical terminology concerning a theme. Husserl's expressions are instead the trail of a philosophical experience that never noticed itself as a theme. Occasionally, Husserl refers to purposive clarity as a whole as something won through, and evidenced by, "faith." He thus marks a distinction between healthy striving and the insight of theoretical knowing. Other times, however, "faith" appears as one element in a group of attitudes indicative of vocational health. One might follow the historical fault lines of this group and organize these attitudes in relation to the past, present, and future as the dimensions for the respective assignment, confirmation, and pledge of the defining vocational task.

Faith holds open the past as the dimension in which vocational subjectivity can *assign* itself its task as necessitated. The accomplishing of the task is not the outcome of a past history, but its end. The reflection that discovers this assignation is already a work of faith that aims to make this faith believable. It already believes that the past will show how the calling was already being prepared. For the faith of called subjectivity, the past does not motivate from the "outside" through a passively appropriated context because it is already "inside" the teleological unity of the task. Beginning from her end-directedness, the one reflecting intervenes in her own historical horizon and fashions a teleology of which her present accomplishment would be the fulfillment. [311] If she there discovers signs, fateful events that create possibilities only to be fulfilled through her defining work, this is not necessarily because she foists her personal meaning upon history, but perhaps because she realizes that her will *comes to her* and *is of* the past. The faith of called subjectivity holds fast to this "perhaps." Faith will always regard "the total historical complex," to use Husserl's words, "as a personal one."[312] But this equally means to strip one's vocational work of its illusory "private" and "non-historical" status and to identify it *"as* the will" of "spiritual forefathers."[313] In crafting a single historical teleology that prepares the task she is destined to accomplish, she becomes clear about who she, as the accomplisher of this task, is to become by defining herself in dedication. It is one and the same thing, writes Husserl, "to make comprehensible the teleology in the historical becoming of philosophy" and "to achieve clarity about ourselves."[314] The faithful reflection on the past assigns the called subject to the fate she *was meant* to accomplish. In the accomplishment of the task itself, the faithfully understood past is not reflected on as such, it rather supports the activity, emboldening it, driving it, giving it energy.

As a temporal orientation of called subjectivity, faith stands in a reciprocal relation with *courage*, which holds open the present as the dimension in which this

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[311] HUSS XXIX, p. 397. : "*wir müssen in unsere Geschichte eingreifen um sie zu eine Teleologie zu machen*."

[312] Crisis, p. 70.

[313] Ibid., p. 71.

[314] Ibid., p. 70.

assigned fate is to be *confirmed*. The fulfillment of what called subjectivity assigns itself from the past must be accomplished. Called subjectivity does not make a teleology out of its vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* as a contemplative exercise after having accomplished its task. The task can only be accomplished as *its* task (i.e. not passively, anonymously and privately) on the basis of that teleology. Husserl does not contrive a "crisis" in order to fashion a dramatic anticipation of a dilemma that had already been resolved.[315] On the contrary, the reflection proceeds from a *Stillhalten* provoked by an intolerable obscurity in the meaning of the task to which one was dedicated.[316] Faith is essentially bound to courage because the former is a *schwunggebender Glaube* for a present engagement. Courage means clear-sighted engagement in a field of possibilities, emboldened by the call of the assigning past. But engagement is also risk. Called subjectivity risks becoming incomprehensible to herself, ill-fated, in the failure of her work. But to risk is also the only way to necessitate the calling. One must have the courage actually to become what one was meant to become by executing one's destiny, which is at stake in the present. The whole teleological organization of past events in the *Geschichtlichkeit* must be confirmed as what must have been in order that this task require accomplishment. While intervention in the past occurs via faithful reflection, intervention in the present is a matter of action. It governs what one must *do* in order to be able to have faith.[317] Just as adversity or obscurity in the present cause faith to waver,[318] leaving the called subject lost as to what she was meant to do, so does taking courage from the present make believable the faithful hold on the past. And yet courage is also faith in that broader sense Husserl often uses. Courage takes courage from the present because it believes in the promise of the possibilities it engages.

Faith intends the past as the dimension for the assignment of a confirmed fate; courage, the present as the dimension for the confirmation of an assigned fate. This reciprocal relation of past and present occurs out of a future dimension held open by commitment, the temporal orientation of called subjectivity for which fate is *already pledged.* The committed future is the temporal dimension in relation to which the fateful course of things has now already become irreversible. There is always, Husserl says, an "existential 'if'" that calls into question the necessity of fulfilling a vocational *telos*. Commitment intends the future such that this "if" offers no "way out" [*Ausweichen*] to vocational subjectivity.[319] The committed future is how my destiny is already at hand. It cannot be overcome or transformed through the intervention of unforeseeable events because it is already too late. The teleological organization of the past that ends in the action of the present was always the pledge of the future (subjective genitive). The alternative to its fruition is not a transformation that would recast the meaning of the past, but simply a disaster that would reveal everything to have been purposeless: a possibility

[315] See, for instance, Buckley's articulation of this suspicion. The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility, p. 130.

[316] HUSS XXIX, p. 376.

[317] Crisis, p. 17.

[318] Ibid., p. 10.

[319] Ibid., p. 17.

that must be impossible, in the face of which one *cannot live*. Commitment is not the free alienation of my possibilities to some later time. It is a responsibility to the future that has already announced that it is, and has been, at hand. No matter how "far off," the committed future is the dawning of something necessitated, which has already been, and is now, being realized. In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl equates the overcoming of crisis with a clarity of purpose in which striving can once again understand itself *as the pledge of a great and distant future*. It is the experience, now, of the present of the past as the pledge of the future that Husserl equates with healthy vocational striving, not the eventual realization of the future "at some later time."

The analysis of the temporality of called subjectivity indicates an experience of the whole of its *Geschichtlichkeit* through whose clarification it will accomplish a rededication to its task. First in a presentiment, history becomes available not as a dimension in which the vocational task is passively taken over as already projected, but as a dimension *destined to*, and *necessitating of* the calling. This way of being historical would found the "must" to which Husserl here appeals in his reflection on the vocational goal "philosophy."

> *Sie kann nur Ziel sein in eine Berufung, aus einem kategorischen Imperativ, die weder er noch irgend jemand ihm von außen her auferlegt haben könnte, und sein apodiktisches "Muß" ist als sein eigestes Telos, als sein ihm "Lebensziel,"* schon bevor er dazu kommen möchte, wenn überhaupt*, es als Lebensziel zu formulieren*.[320]

Called subjectivity is fully possessed by the task, and can fully possess itself in the task, because it has appropriated the entire historical dimension to the finality of the project in which it becomes itself. Enthused by its destiny, the subject of the vocation lives and creates in the fullness of its power.

Do not these "moments of clarity," productive as they may be for the dedicated pursuit, depend upon the misunderstanding that one's dedication can constitute an origin for a history? Perhaps belief in the destination to greatness is a necessary prerequisite for the accomplishment of great things. But this enthusiasm is also mania or violence since it can always be shown that the task does not assign history, but rather takes place in it, which means that it continues to bear developing possibilities indifferent to the affirmative necessitation of destiny. Can this maniacal or violent relationship to history, which may very well explain the power and energy of the "called and chosen," really serve as the basis for a reasonable critique of reason?

Husserl's own analysis of personal subjectivity and its ends suggest that such an appropriation of history cannot help but ignore the truth. Dedication is a decision and a commitment. Every decision or commitment has motivational grounds that do not lie in other decisions or commitments, but rather in the passive genesis of lived experience itself. Husserl speaks of an "intertwining" of the life of position-taking with "the causality in the deep grounds of association and apperception."[321] These deep grounds are

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[320] HUSS XXIX, p. 410. My emphasis.

[321] Ideas II, p. 235.

obscure and indefinite. They reveal themselves slowly over time and can always appear otherwise in the future. The obscure motives, inclinations and tendencies that reign there were not built up in accomplishments of the personal Ego, but in the formation of that Ego through a passive and implicit taking over of tradition. Husserl thus grants to *influence* a universal and invisible reign over the person. He writes, in *Ideas II*: "The development of a person is determined by the influence of others…This influence determines personal development, whether or not the person himself subsequently realizes it, remembers it, or is capable of determining the degree of the influence and its character."[322] To the influence of others, one could simply add the hidden influence of passively accumulated experience itself. End-directed activity thus carries forward the motivational lineage of a broader, deeper history that, functioning as unnoticed background, might later announce itself as an agent of influence. Personal subjectivity, in pursuing its end, is also an expression of this deep, sub-personal and interpersonal history.

The familiar twists of psychological plotlines can illustrate the point. A soldier dedicates himself to his work as a vocation. If this is full-hearted, faithful, dedication, he works under the presumptive commitment that he "was meant" for this task. It is not a mere role, distraction, or a facet of his life; in fact it is the rest of life that appears this way. Soldiering defines him. In his dedicatory attitude toward his past, he finds signs, "chance" events, natural capabilities, all of which assign him to his calling as his. He courageously engages the present as a dimension of possibility in which failure or success will dash or confirm his destiny, and the future is a pledge that the fulfillment of his calling is at hand. He defines himself by the values, worldview, and dispositions *proper to a soldier*, not those foist upon him by accidents. However, it can happen that he later discovers his commitment to martial discipline was motivated by a fear of his own tendency toward capriciousness, which he needed to overcome in order to please authority figures from his childhood, etc. The meaning of the motives that engage him in soldiering, his whole commitment and decision, is obviously open to alterations, not just in the course of his personal history and its self-interpretation, but also as it will appear within larger historical nexuses. Don't we say that the person who persists in a dedicational attitude forms a kind of world-representation or life-picture that may sustain striving, but is ultimately mythical?

Dedication believes it can make decision the origin of a history. It forms an image of the vocational subject such that she is motivated only by a history destined to the finality of her defining task. An unwavering dedicative faith would experience its calling from the horizon of a history that had no new thesis to put forth. This perspective is insensible, not only to future events that could recast the meaning of the present, but also to the power of the unnoticed motives, inclinations, and tendencies that crowd the horizons of present understanding. In short, it seeks to live by means of a kind of clarity improper to the depth and density of life itself.

Following this line of thought, one would say that, in truth, there are no genuinely accomplished moments of clarity for called subjectivity. To really understand one's dedicative faith, courage, and commitment would rather require an unceasing struggle for relative clarity against the backdrop of what is functioning passively and silently,

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[322] Ibid., p. 281.

indifferent to the assertion of destiny. Full dedication to the task would thus require a "representation" or "image" of the *Geschichtlichkeit* in question that conceals motives that operate indeterminately beneath its picture of things. The vocational life that tries to gather past, present and future into its finality remains within a larger, indistinct, incomprehensible life-unity. The world is the bearer of destinies; destiny does not bear the world. The picture of things by which the faithfully dedicated subject lives is a kind of ideology that clarifies its purposes; but to live according to such a picture is really blindness to life. This will hold for the higher-order personalities as well. Despite what Husserl says, the European *Geschichtlichkeit* is merely an interesting episode within the total significance of an unfolding world history that will continually enrich and alter its true significance. To think otherwise would be to believe in a myth.

When *Republic* tries to show us the history of a life as governed by a chosen destiny, it can only do so by contriving a mythical sphere beyond the definite possibilities to which worldly subjectivity is always already given over. The temporal structures of ἐπιτήδευμα are revealed in a mythical scene taking place beyond the forgetfulness one has always already accrued by having been born into history. We cite here from Socrates' relation of the myth of Er near the close of *Republic*.

> After all the souls had chosen their lives, they went forward to Lachesis [Fate who sings the past]…and she *assigned* to each the daimon it had chosen as guardian of its life and fulfiller of its choice. This daimon first led the soul under the hand of Clotho [Fate who sings the present] as it turned the revolving spindle to *confirm* the fate that the lottery and its own choice had given it. After receiving her touch, he lead the soul to the spinning of Atropos [Fate who sings the future], to make what had been spun *irreversible*…Then…they went from there under the throne of *Necessity* and…traveled to the Plain of *Forgetfulness*. And there, beside the river of *Unheeding*…they camped. All of them had to drink a certain measure of this water…and as each drank, he forgot everything and went to sleep. But around midnight there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake, and they were suddenly carried away from there, this way and that, up to their births, like shooting stars. (620e – 621a, Grube-Reeve. My emphases)

To experience the choice of our fate necessitated for us in the three temporal horizons, one would have to be before or after one's having been born. Recourse to a mythical time on the other side of time is needed to persuade us that history can assign us our ownmost task.

This does not necessary mean, however, that the rededication of *European life* to its defining goal in the historical horizon is based on a mythical consciousness and its "representation" of history. This is because Husserl claims that Europe is the vocational subject of tasks that are infinite. Infinite tasks are wholly task-like. They are come upon within the course of a purposive life and are constituted in acts that identify a stable field of goal-directed activity. Infinite tasks are not opposed to finite tasks because they are endless. All infinite tasks are without end, but this is not what defines them as infinite. Many finite tasks, according to their internal logic (repetitive, incremental, etc.), can also go on *ad infinitum*. Sisyphus has a finite, endless task. The infinite task is distinguished

from the finite task because, although it is something appropriated historically, it is untraditional in its essence. Again a distinction is necessary. Untraditional does not primarily mean novel in the sense of breaking with established norms. This, again, is true of all infinite tasks, but also of many finite ones. Instead, the defining untraditional character of infinite tasks is that their original motivational sources are not contained in what Husserl calls the "finitely surveyable worldliness of a surrounding world."

In traditional tasks, the teleological movement of life in which they are accomplished is an understanding from within the horizon of a concrete surrounding world (Ch 2.3). Motivation is provocation to goal-directed consciousness by a stimulating sense. It is what originally "moves" teleological life-movements. In traditional tasks, the sense by which motivation motivates is derived from its place in a surrounding world-horizon. Of the man of finite tasks, Husserl writes: "his ends, his activity, his trade and traffic, his personal, social, national and mythical motivation—all this moves in the finitely surveyable worldliness of a surrounding world [*alles bewegt sich in endlich überschaubarer Umweltlichkeit*]."[323] The fact that the surrounding world is surveyable does not mean that it is a meaning context exhaustible by a thorough looking-over. Its worldliness is a unique, indefinite and endless spatiotemporal nexus of meaning in which indications draw a particular perspective into new experience. Interpretative understanding can always push farther into the given horizons, but always beginning from the shifting position in which one finds oneself. These horizons are endlessly surveyable, but in the mode of finite, perspectival, interpretation.

The subject of a surrounding world, the "he" to which Husserl refers above, is not there before being motivated from this horizon. Her very personality and the meaning of all her actions form in the history of acts by which she reacts to the circumstances she discovers there. The vocational motivations of such a subject, as we have tried to illustrate, also move within the finite surrounding world. The task's defining goal and field of engagement were born out of motivated interests that seek fulfillment there. In all finite tasks, the pursuit of the goal is an expression of life-worldly circumstances.

Conceived negatively in relation to traditional (finite) tasks, untraditional (infinite) tasks are free from this dimension of circumstance and expression of circumstance. For Husserl, they are only opened to humanity via the philosophical vocation. Philosophy, like many other tasks, can never be finished. In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl does indeed describe philosophy in terms of the *ad infinitum* of its task-logic. The philosophical interest views each factual confirmation of truth as in advance relative in relation to the goal of its being unconditioned truth, which "counts, so to speak, as an infinitely distant point."[324] Likewise, each philosophical attainment is already understood as material for the construction of further truths "and so on again and again."[325] But Husserl is also clear that the nature of the "acquisitions" that philosophy seeks endlessly to synthesize and verify dictates that the "field" of this endless work is already infinite. The work itself is infinite because *the infinity of the philosophical acquisitions is itself* the

[323] Crisis, p. 279. Translation modified.

[324] Ibid, p. 278.

[325] Ibid.

Arbeitsfeld within which these endless pursuits are motivated.[326] The kind of infinity proper to the scientific-philosophical acquisitions themselves is that of pure ideality. The purely ideal, as we have seen, is defined by its self-sameness in sense and validity over against all empirical experiencing. The ideality of philosophical acquisitions is thus opposed to all cultural products whose meaning is bound to the context of a "finitely surveyable" surrounding world. When Husserl writes that "unlike *all other cultural works*, philosophy is not a movement of interest which is bound to the soil of the national tradition,"[327] he does not mean to imply that other cultural works could not be translated from one finite world-horizon to another. He rather means that philosophy is unique in its never having been born from such a world-horizon. ("Nation," for Husserl, means exactly "having been born.")[328] To set to work in the field of pure idealities means to engage motivations free from senses that stimulate from the horizons of a finite surrounding world. As Husserl puts it in *Ideas II*, passivity continues to function, but submits for judgment material that "no longer contains any implicit theses."[329] The person who would dedicate herself to this work commits to an endless overcoming of her finite personality so as to become a "philosopher," seeker and guardian of universal validities.[330]

As an illustration, we can suppose that our soldier later becomes a dedicated mathematician. The meaning of the motivations that define him as a mathematician do not belong to the same dimension as those that defined him as a soldier. He is motivated by pure ideas. The capabilities and "values" that he must develop to fulfill his task are rooted what these ideas and their pursuit demand. The meaning of what he works on and works with, his figures, numbers, and formulae, his methods of deduction, etc., everything that he responds to within his field of work and shapes him as what he is—a mathematician—are perfectly stable vis-à-vis the course of history in finite worldliness. Future worldly events will never make it so that this theorem, in this mathematical context, takes on a new meaning *because of them*. Mathematics will naturally continue to have a shifting meaning in the personal life of the mathematician, and, interpreting himself as a "man of finite tasks," he may seek to find a meaning for his work. Strictly speaking, however, the vocational dedication to an infinite task will only discover those motivations in the historical horizon that paradoxically provoke the transcendence of that horizon.[331]

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[326]Krisis, p. 324. Philosophical acquisitions are "*idealen Erwerben, deren unendlichkeit selbst das Arbeitsfeld ist*."

[327] Crisis, p. 286 My emphasis.

[328] HUSS XXIX, p. 9 fn. "*Natio* im ursprünglichsten Wortsinne gebraucht!"

[329] Ideas II, p. 235.

[330] Crisis, p. 285: "life becomes receptive to motivations which are possible only in this [philosophical] attitude, motivations for new sorts of goals for thought and methods through which, finally, philosophy comes to be and he becomes a philosopher."

[331] The question of whether there can be a philosophical or mathematical soldier is a question that will concern us, in more than one way, in the reflections to come.

Because Husserl's Europe comes into being by dedicating itself to an existence regulated by philosophical ideas, it defines itself as an untraditional history, or a history of de-traditionalization. This is what Husserl means by calling European history the "cutting off of finite mankind's development as it becomes mankind with infinite tasks."[332] Europe's defining historical task is this very cutting off and transformation. This task could not possibly be assigned to it from the depths of a traditional past. The necessitation would rather originate in a historical passage of traditional history into untraditional history. It is in that paradoxical passage, when traditional motives make it necessary to overcome tradition, and hence to strip traditional motives of their necessitating force, that European humanity discovers its necessitation in the historical dimension. To live in the fullness of its power, European life must be able to experience the task of universal critique as assigned, confirmed, and pledged in the temporal horizons of history. We will see in the second part of this work that this amounts to discovering "Greece" as an article of faith, "Renaissance" as a category of courage, and "Europeanization" as the irreversible future-at-hand. These three historical phenomena refer in temporally different dimensions to the same task, universal criticism or the passage from finite to infinite historicity. Their discovery will be a matter for faithful reflection that will attempt to make them understandable for a vocational subject that needs to be able to believe. We will also see that the tendency of vocational understanding toward mania and violence cannot, in the end, be completely overcome.

The rededication that seeks to renew the European faith does not interpret any world-horizon other than that of finite humanity *in its passage* into humanity as the subject of infinite tasks. In this passage, nothing of finite history is carried over. Or, put differently, everything from every finite history enters into revolutionary transformations from a perspective radically free from its lineage. The rededicating movement is thus freed from any inaugurating event that would root the sense of the task in the circumstances and motives belonging to surrounding worlds of the past. Precisely because the task is infinite, the destination of history to the task is not absurd *a priori*. An infinite task admits of a faithful appropriation that becomes a rational understanding rather than a mythical experience of practical clarity and self-possession. If we are to believe Husserl, the European vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* constitutes itself, from beginning to end, in strict opposition to all traditional determination as a breaking with all particular world-horizons for the sake of disclosing the one true world for the one true humanity.

The European achieves rational autonomy without becoming the vehicle for the functioning of an a-historical, ultimately a-human reason. She liberates itself from the dimension of finite tasks through devotion to an *infinite* task, wholly unbound from the course of mundane history and the depths of unknown heritage and yet assigned, confirmed, and committed in the temporal self-understanding of vocational subjectivity. Husserl thus fully historicizes reason without the slightest compromise with historicism. The endlessness of finite history is a dizzying perplexity for him, an ever-changing, indefinite network of deep motivation that binds humanity together through unnoticed impulses and other-influences. It is a single life of spirit "with a plenitude of human and cultural types which nevertheless flowingly interpenetrate one another. It is like a

[332] Crisis, p. 279

sea…"[333] At its core, the crisis problematic presupposes the reasonability of the faith, courage, and commitment that open "history" (the single life of spirit) for the assignment, confirmation, and pledge of an infinite task. It also presupposes European humanity as the subject of this opening and the bearer of this task.

This presupposition is historical through and through. The passage from traditional history into untraditional history is supposed by Husserl to be a real historical event. The dedication to philosophical reason as a necessity for life, a movement that does not carry forward any historical tradition, is itself treated as an historical fact. If this were not the case, Europe would be a pure *eidos*. As Derrida notes in his dissertation, its *a priori* freedom from historical determination would give it no inherent synthetic connection to any historical civilization.[334] "Europe" would not have historical roots anywhere, and as an idea it should be able to take root anywhere, regardless of historical circumstance. But Husserl believes that a certain historical civilization constituted itself in the actual passage from finite into infinite history, and that it bears that passage as a task failing the pursuit of which it would become untrue to itself, ill-fated—in short, that it cannot live otherwise. He believes in a "Greece" that was once upon a time compelled to make reason its highest authority; he believes in a "Renaissance" in which European humanity turns against its traditional life, believes in this "Greece" and forms itself in its image. According to Husserl's earnest belief, these things are not the historical ideology of philosophy. Philosophy rather discovers its historical purpose beginning from the real departure from finite history they accomplish. From this belief stems the properly political nature of Husserl's critique of reason. It singles out one actually existing spiritual shape as philosophy's vocational horizon. The subject of phenomenological philosophy is not finally cognitive, but rather vocational, the bearer of a historically assigned task, a subject of crisis.

5.
The Subject of the Crisis

Who exactly is the privileged subject of crisis and of the *Crisis*, the "we" to whom Husserl constantly refers? Husserl's reflections on the crisis appeal to a collective subjectivity called "European humanity." This humanity refers to the life of nations, institutions, organizations, families, and individual persons, in which the goal definitive of European subjectivity may be only partially or not at all directive.[335] This vague collectivity is the agent of the valuation and devaluation, of the belief and skepticism, of the energy and weariness through which Husserl defines the crisis. The state of Europe's

[333] Crisis, p. 274. Husserl also compares the single life of an historically interconnected humanity to a sea in Part I of the *Crisis*. See Crisis, p. 7.

[334] The Problem of Genesis, p. 155.

[335] Crisis, p. 276. "Of course, it [the definitive norm] does not inhabit all persons, it is not fully developed in the personalities of a higher level that are constituted by intersubjective acts; nevertheless, it inhabits them in the form of a necessary course of development and spreading of the spirit of norms that are valid for all."

spiritual health thus seems to depend upon collective shifts in attitude and valuation the sources of which, like those of all historical trends, are diffuse and insusceptible to precise determination. Husserl constantly posits "European humanity" as the source of the will to universal critique and as the subject that suffers its disintegration. The entire crisis-problematic would be empty of meaning without the conviction that there actually exists a form of communal existence defined by the belief in the leadership role of *theoria*. Still, although Husserl posits this collective subject, he never views the crisis as a situation at all out of his hands. Its resolution never seems dependent upon the attitudes or decisions of anyone other than Husserl himself. This is because the Europe hypothesis implies that the philosopher has already been held responsible for ensuring the functioning of the spiritual shape as a whole. The philosopher thus bears the European crisis of faith within that of her own personal vocation. Should skepticism infect philosophy, then the whole project of Europe is ill-fated. The collective dilemma of European spirit is the professional responsibility of the philosopher. The subject of the crisis, the one who is capable of deciding its outcome, is no one other than the philosopher. The hypothesis of Europe thus implies the coordination the philosopher's personal and civilizational levels of vocational *Geschichtlichkeit*.

It is equally important to emphasize that the philosopher is the subject of the crisis only and precisely as a European. The philosopher who is capable of accompanying Husserl in his reflections in the *Crisis* is someone who *cannot live otherwise* than in the belief in *theoria*: "The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we *cannot* let go."[336] The practical impossibility of abandoning the goal "philosophy" is surely rooted in its personal significance as an ἐπιτήδευμα. The responsibility to such a task is identical with self-responsibility. However, the framework of *individual* self-responsibility does not account for the necessary character of the philosophical task. The philosopher who is the subject of the crisis "cannot let go"[337] of the goal of *theoria* because she knows that she has been called to a task essential to the life of the *Geschichtlichkeit* as a whole. Like the called philosopher in Socrates' imaginary polis, she has come to understand philosophy as a power underlying the integrity of a form of communal existence (πολιτεία) and, at the same time, understands the community as one to which she belongs by virtue of her own vocation, which is an ἔργον, a task assigned for the sake of the community itself. The subject of Husserl's crisis is the philosopher-citizen in the technical sense indicated in *Republic*. She is the philosopher in the service of a function, the philosopher as a functionary: "In *our* philosophizing, then—how can we avoid it—we are *functionaries of humankind*. The quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of humankind (*Menschheit*)."[338]

In passages such as these, Husserl's failure to mention Europe as the only possible mediation between "humankind" and philosophy should only serve to underscore the degree to which it now goes without saying. In the *Veinna Lecture*, it is Husserl's explicit

[336] Ibid., p. 17.

[337] Ibid.

[338] Ibid. Translation modified.

and perhaps primary aim to show that the philosophical task is assigned a functional value *only within* the spiritual shape that defines Europe. The dedication of human existence to reason initiates "a remarkable teleology, inborn, as it were, only in our Europe."[339] This teleology, it is true, "makes itself known, *from the standpoint of universal mankind as such*, as the breakthrough and developmental beginning of a new human epoch…"[340] But this just means that Europe appears as the privileged form of historical life in whose image all non-European forms are expected to recognize their true selves and to which they are ultimately destined to conform.[341] The philosopher only has a responsibility to general humanity as the leading representative of Europe. In the introductory part of the *Crisis*, this relationship between Europe and non-Europe is presupposed. When Husserl there speaks of the responsibility the philosopher bears with respect to the true being of *Menschheit* as such, he appeals to a *telos* proper to all humankind that "can only come to realization, if at all, through philosophy."[342] But the relationship of non-European humankind to Europe necessarily intervenes in its relationship to philosophy. Europe is the sole vehicle of the philosophical transformation of culture. Husserl thus hopes that the redemption of the theoretical project in phenomenology will not only resolve the European crisis, but will eventually justify the "Europeanization of all other civilizations" by proving that it "bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning, one which is proper to the sense, rather than to a historical non-sense, of the world."[343]

We can anticipate here how the keeping faith of the philosopher is connected to an entire geo-politics. Her professional clarity of purpose is immediately conveyed to Europe and its destiny: to "[distinguish] itself…from history in general."[344] According to Husserl, Europe has risen out of the sea of diffuse, interpenetrating spiritual formations and undertaken to become a spiritual continent (holding itself together) on whose shores non-European humanity can save itself from being swept away by history. The philosopher's clarity of purpose is synonymous with clarity regarding the West's "mission for humanity." Such would be the perspective of a continental philosophy wholly awake to the meaning of its task. In the second part of this work, we will examine the nature of this "Europeanization" and its unexpressed presuppositions. For now, it suffices to establish that it is as a functionary of Europe that the philosopher bears responsibility for humankind. It is thus the European hypothesis that coordinates not only the professional and civilizational vocations of the philosopher, but also these with the vocation belonging to historical humanity as such. In courageously confronting the unbelievability of Europe with the necessity of being able to believe, the philosopher, the

[339] Ibid., p. 273.

[340] Ibid., p. 274. My emphasis.

[341] Ibid., p. 275.

[342] Ibid., p. 17.

[343] Ibid., p. 16.

[344] Ibid., p. 277.

"good European," works on behalf of the total vocational subjectivity of philosophy, of her historical community, and of humankind.

Husserl explicitly names this "good European" as the subject responsible for confronting the crisis. This good European is the philosophical subject of Husserl's final systematic attempt to establish phenomenology as *theoria*. Only she can follow its method: to start from the "painful existential contradiction" and carry out a reflection on the role ascribed to the sciences in "our culture." For every use of the first person plural in the *Crisis*, we can understand "we Europeans."

This specification of phenomenological subjectivity enters into coincidence with the "self-suspending of the phenomenologist" that Husserl states as a methodological necessity in sec. 64 of *Ideas I*. There, Husserl recognizes that the requisite use of personal pronouns in expressing the execution of methodical steps within phenomenology generates an ambiguity that threatens to obscure the genuine sense of the phenomenological reduction. Such expressions give the impression that it is in fact impossible that "we phenomenologists set *ourselves* out of action."[345] To defuse this misunderstanding, Husserl emphasizes that the "we" that refers to the subjects of phenomenological science must be purified of all reference to actual human beings as subjects of the surrounding world: "we apply to ourselves the rule of phenomenological reduction which bears on our own empirical existence…"[346] The phenomenologizing subject's self-interpretation as a "good European" does not situate her within the horizon of an anthropologically specifiable community. It is precisely by understanding herself as the subject of purely transcendental experience, and thus as "standing above" every empirical form of life, that the phenomenologist will come into her own as a good European. This is, to be sure, to have it both ways. As we have already emphasized, the test of the Europe-problematic is to see whether the double assertion of theoretical independence and European containment renders phenomenology's European horizon meaningless, or whether it rather points to substantive problems that would remain obscured if we were to interpret Europe as the horizon for endless historical reduction (Ch. 1.3).[347]

It is from the horizon of Europe that *Besinnung* can be interpreted as medicine. The medical understanding of crisis does not, as Dodd fears, necessarily imply a

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[345] Ideas I, p. 173.

[346] Ibid.

[347] The ability to test this problematic presupposes the recognition that the Europeanness of the philosophical subject of Husserl's *Crisis* has nothing to do with geographical, linguistic, or ethnic heritage. Nor does it conflict with the intention, essential to every theoretical work, that its results be identically accessible for every rational being. Instead, Husserl becomes convinced that it is impossible to understand phenomenology without comprehending it from the perspective of the modern philosophical project in which it is a final revolution. Adequately understanding this latter as a project requires acknowledging the decisive role it has been assigned (and precisely the fact of this assignment remains obscure) within that concrete historical development that constitutes itself in European Renaissance. The philosopher is a European insofar as, on the basis of reflections that her own commitment to *theoria* necessitate, she acknowledges that she is called to carry out the function capable of resuscitating this completely novel form of spiritual life.

distinction between the doctor, untouched by the sickness she cures, and the patient.[348] The *Crisis* attempts to administer the spiritual medicine that Europe requires from the perspective of a fully self-aware participation in the adventure of European life. The philosopher is in a privileged position, not because she is unaffected by Europe's spiritual sickness, but rather because the disorder of her own vocational life is a disease affecting the European organism as a whole. On the hypothesis of Europe, the philosopher knows that the health of philosophy will make possible the health of the entirety of non-philosophical life that wants to be subject to its rule. Her attempt to cure the crisis thus transpires as an exercise in self-medication. If the European organism has a healthy "brain," its defining goal will again become believable, and inspiring of energetic action. The *Besinnung* of the *Crisis* takes place entirely within the medical context of Europe's spiritual sickness, and can only be understood by actually suffering the "painful existential contradiction" that it provokes in those who want to struggle against it. The reflections on the historical unity and achievability of philosophy *occur from within the horizon of European spiritual life, and are motivated by the fact that the one reflecting lives from this horizon*. These reflections not only concern "European history," but respond to an imperative that grips the reflecting philosopher precisely as a European.

The unification of the sciences is thus effected on the plane of vocational *Geschichtlichkeit*. The sciences are all European, not because they express the "character" of a historical community that might also be expressed in its art or literature, but because they, precisely in their aspiration to universality, are responsible for demonstrating the possibility of a truth-ideal without which Europe cannot go on living. Science is called to participate in and justify the Renaissance out of which European humanity has wanted to reshape itself. The concept of "crisis" that governs Husserl's most radical critique of reason only speaks to those who have ears for this call that comes from and goes to Europe's rebirth.[349]

We have now reached the extent of the methodological function of Europe in Husserl's phenomenology. Europe is the rock upon which Husserl founds his philosophical humanism. The fate of philosophy and that of humankind are inextricably bound, but this is not because philosophy was born from some confluence of events in cultural history that it reflects and carries forward from the depths of its memory. The destiny of philosophy has never taken shape within the possibilities disclosed from a particular world-horizon. Philosophy is rather summoned to participation in a humanity that can only become what it is by shaping its world in the radical transgression of these horizons, a transgression that can only proceed *from* philosophy: "the European world was born out of ideas of reason, i.e. out of the spirit of philosophy."[350] But *was* such a world ever born? Does not everything now depend upon this assertion of *fact*? In part

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[348] Crisis and Reflection, p. 46-47.

[349] However rigorously we are able to reconstruct Husserl's descriptions of "purposeful life" on their own terms, and thus independently from all physiological metaphors, the picture of philosophy as the "brain" upon whose healthy functioning depends the health of the entire European "organism" will retain an essential teaching power. From the beginning, the effort of philosophical subjectivity to enable a healthy striving toward its own vocational goal occurs *within* the vocational unity of European life. Philosophy is the vital organ *of* the European life-form.

[350] Crisis, p. 299.

two of this work, we will critically examine those reflections by means of which Husserl attempts to make this assertion comply, if not with the demands of theoretical insight, then with the self-understanding of the vocational subjectivity that cannot live without it.

PART TWO:
THE CONDITIONS OF EUROPEAN EXISTENCE

> Until political power and philosophy coincide in the same place…the πολιτεία we've been describing in speech will never come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of the sun. This is what for so long was causing my hesitation to speak: seeing how very paradoxical it would be to say.
>
> ---Socrates, *Republic*[351]

> In the breakthrough of philosophy in this sense, in which all the sciences are thus contained, I see, paradoxical as it may sound, the primal phenomenon of spiritual Europe. Through more detailed considerations, short as they may be, the apparent paradox will soon disappear.
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> ---Edmund Husserl, *Vienna Lecture*[352]

[351] 473d-e. Bloom. Translation modified.

[352] Crisis, p. 276.

***Introduction to the categories of European existence*:**

Our reflections in part one have demonstrated the great extent to which Husserl's philosophical project comes to depend upon the existence of Europe. It is true that Husserl presents the viability of Europe as dependent upon the success of the self-supporting introduction to philosophy that the *Crisis* will provide.[353] Nonetheless, this very situation presupposes that he has posited Europe as an established vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* suffering from a life-crisis that only the realization of philosophy can resolve. In speaking of Europe and European humanity, Husserl does not believe that he is explicating an "idea," a practical postulate that is not theoretically absurd, and whose existence as such becomes the object of a rationally determined will. In his *Idea for a Universal History*, Kant writes that "philosophy can have her belief in a millennium, but her millenarianism is not Utopian, since the Idea can help, though only from afar, to bring the millennium to pass."[354] The philosophical construction of world history thus proceeds "in accordance with an Idea of how the course of the world must be if it is to lead to certain rational ends."[355] Husserl's Europe is more than this mere idea. It is rather the historical teleology in which the idea lives. [356] Husserl consistently treats the origination of Europe as an event in the past indicative. Europe *was born* and can only continue to live in the faith, courage and commitment that hold open history for the assignment and bearing of infinite tasks.

The philosopher who is called to service in Husserl's Europe does not simply will the creation of a rational culture because it is demanded by the very idea of rationality itself. Like Plato's philosopher-king, she is called to the consciousness that she *has been brought up* under the conditions of a πολιτεία unlike all others, one in which her leadership is demanded. For Husserl, it is *because* theoretical reason has been called to service within Europe that it can set itself the task of *knowing* that it has been called, and can ultimately identify its own theoretical ends with the practical striving of European humanity.

If Husserl's Europe is not an idea, then its essential function in his final attempt to introduce phenomenology seems to necessitate the question of whether it in fact exists. The kind of evidence we should expect in this matter, however, depends upon *how* Husserl's Europe *can* exist. It would be aimless to search for evidence of something without first understanding what it is, and thus the way in which it can be present. The very nature of what Husserl supposes Europe to be means that it cannot enter into and maintain a historical existence in a manner comparable to other "merely anthropological" communities. Husserl understands Europe's existence as a *breaking event*. Europe is the

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[353] Ibid., p. 16.

[354] Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History" in *On History*. Ed. Lewis White Beck, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Anchor and Emil L. Fackenheim (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 21-22.

[355] Ibid., p. 24.

[356] Crisis, p. 299.

breakthrough (*Durchbruch*), breaking-in (*Einbruch*) or breaking-out (*Aufbruch*)[357] of *theoria* in relation to pre-theoretical cultural life, and the movement of upheaval (*Umbruch*) this life undergoes by passage into a life of infinite tasks. This breaking of pre-theoretical culture by *theoria* is not something that happened once upon a time "at the beginning" of Europe and subsequently became a part of Europe's past. The breaking-through and bearing of this break are the perennial beginning of Europe. It is how Europe establishes itself as Europe.

Understanding the possibility of Europe's historical existence will not depend upon constructing a continuous narrative of cultural transmission. This is because the defining task of Europe stands in a paradoxical relationship to cultural transmission itself. The fact that Husserl's *Crisis* supplies no re-construction of Europe's cultural heritage is not an accident. It is certainly possible to attempt a reconstruction of European heritage from the "standpoint" of Europe's immanent rationality (in Ch. 5 we will consider the example of Jan Patočka). But the very categories through which Husserl understands Europe prohibit its being properly displayed through historical narratives of transmission or genealogies of any sort. In chapter 3, we argued that the faithful rededication to European life would have to approach Europe from both sides of its boundary. It would have to necessitate that strange passage of humanity from traditional to untraditional tasks. For it is in that passage alone that Europe exists historically. The second part of this work investigates the categories through which Husserl understands that passage, and hence Europe's historical existence. These categories are denationalization (Ch. 4), Renaissance (Ch. 5), and Europeanization (Ch. 6). A systematic reflection on these categories as essential to the very conceivability of Europe's existence does not occur in Husserl's thought. The categories are instead employed, sometimes casually, without a criticism of their meaning. For this very reason, Husserl's thoughts on the Europe of the *Crisis* remain susceptible to misinterpretation within the context of an "obvious" historical understanding.

It is once again from *Republic* that we will take our bearings. In the terms of an overtly hypothetical discourse, that text lays out the problems that Husserl finds himself involved in because of his belief in Europe's historical existence. Socrates encourages us to view the historical possibility of the philosophical polis with great skepticism. It is as a response to the very difficulties raised by this skepticism that we will understand the categories of Europe's historical existence in Husserl's *Crisis* writings.

Republic contains a discrete reflection on the practical possibility of including philosophy in the polis (471e – 502d, 541a). This reflection differs fundamentally from that concerning the inclusion of philosophy in the polis that Socrates and his interlocutors found in speech. There, the political synthesis of theoretical and practical reason was conditioned solely by the needs of political philosophy itself. Socrates had Glaucon fit philosophy into a polis that they themselves had designed and reformed such that it might include it. The fictive philosopher was thus brought up under a πολιτεία that already required her rule, and she consented to render her political service in the face of an imperative that issued from Glaucon and Socrates themselves, who personified the philosophical power underlying the established constitution. The philosopher's education and her inclusion in the polis were thus purely theoretical problems of polis-construction,

[357] The term is difficult to translate into English while maintaining the "break" from the German "*bruch*." It has the sense of departure as a breaking of camp, as a setting out.

and involved no reference to actually existing cities. At 471e, however, Glaucon proposes to alter the terms of the discussion in a decisive fashion. He wants to replace the theoretical clarification of an ideal, which would guide praxis whether or not it should prove possible, with a theoretical demonstration of the practicability of that ideal. For this new line of inquiry, the problem of the political synthesis of theoretical and practical reason amounts to conceiving the *transformation* through which an actually existing polis might subject itself to philosophical rule.[358] If this transformation is conceivable, then the philosophical polis is in principle accomplishable.

Socrates' willingness to take up the perspective of this inquiry is in itself curious. In consenting to do so, he dramatizes philosophy's paradoxical interest in the realization of its political power. Socrates first addresses Glaucon's question by placing it outside the bounds of properly philosophical reflection. Demonstrating the practicability of the philosophical polis is not a philosophical concern. He reminds Glaucon that in their discussions of justice and happiness, "we weren't trying to discover these things in order to prove that it's possible for them to come into being" (472d). The kind of discussion they are engaged in will thus not be "any less reasonable" if it cannot prove the possibility of the theoretical city (473e). Because praxis in no way confirms or enhances the truth of theoretical ideas by realizing them (472e), the philosopher has absolutely no stake in this eventuality. Philosophy has no interest in transforming one thing into another. Socrates' final statement regarding the philosophical polis, which he will address to Glaucon, is that "it makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere" (592b). Insofar as he pursues his own philosophical interests, Socrates claims to be entirely indifferent to its possibility. It is only in order "to gratify" Glaucon that he engages the practical inquiry at all. This attitude is reinforced by what Socrates will claim about the philosopher's natural disinclination toward political participation. She does not want to rule, but must be compelled to do so.

And yet, Socrates teaches that the philosopher "will be more exalted [μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται]" (497a) if she finds a constitution suited to philosophy. He also claims that, from the perspective of philosophy itself, the discovery of a philosophically governed πολιτεία would be "the greatest of things" (497a). He laments that if only philosophy were actually accommodated by a human polis, "it would be clear that it [philosophy] is really divine and that other natures and vocations are merely human" (497c). While Socrates' philosopher certainly rules under the compulsion of political duty, and perhaps even out of "pity",[359] we cannot overlook that philosophy's inclusion in a polis is a glorification of its task. Despite all reason, is there not then a philosophical interest in the possibility of its ruling? Does not philosophy gratify itself in gratifying the human desire

[358] Strauss shrewdly notes that Socrates implicitly rules out the possibility of generating a philosophical polis out of previously unassociated individuals. The foundation of the polis will presuppose that "process of long duration during which pre-political men become political men." The City and Man, p. 126. This also means, as Strauss points out, that the transformation must take as its starting point an association of individuals "passionately attached" to the traditional customs, conventions, and laws of their native land. We will discover this same dynamic in Husserl's account of the genesis of Europe.

[359] This side of the motivational equation is emphasized by both Strauss and Brann. Strauss writes that "the philosopher serves the city, even the good city, not, as he seeks the truth, from natural inclination, from *eros*, but under compulsion." The City and Man, p. 128. Brann, for her part, asserts that "when all is said and done, the rulers at the apex of the *Republic* enter politics only out of pity, gratitude, and simply decency." The Music of the Republic, p. 135.

to realize the best of all possible worlds? Mustn't we then consider the philosopher's involvement in this discourse with the skepticism due to someone who loudly feigns disinterest (472a, 474a) while his greatest possibility hangs in the balance? The Husserlian and Socratic descriptions of the philosophical polis both insist that it comes into being when philosophy *is called upon* from within the still of complete theoretical indifference to human affairs. But despite the elaborate methodological justifications, do not these discourses finally reveal that philosophy is really interested in building cities and presiding over them?

We are looking to *Republic* as a guide to the problem that Husserl's Europe would solve. We must then determine: what is the verdict of *Republic* regarding the practical possibility of the philosophical polis? And what are the reasons for this verdict?

We have seen that Socrates' strictly theoretical definition of philosophy makes it difficult even to imagine a polis in which philosophy might serve its proper function through rule. The coming into being of such a polis entails additional, even greater, difficulties. And yet, the explicit teaching of Socrates regarding the realization of the philosophical polis is that, although highly difficult, it is by no means impossible (473c, 502c). We will examine the motives that have led commentators to look behind this explicit teaching and interpret the philosophical polis as essentially unrealizable. First, we must consider the difficulties inherent in its realization as Socrates presents them.

The first difficulty is that a philosopher will now have to emerge in one of the actually existing cities. The extraordinary unlikelihood of this event escapes us if we understand the "philosopher" according to our academic conventions. Strictly speaking, the philosopher is an individual who wholly consumes herself in a passion for theoretical truth. In her quest for knowledge, she has no desire to prove herself better than others, to win praise, or to confirm or negate the correctness of socially sanctioned opinions (490a, 500b). In her work, she absolutely disinvests herself from the realm of doxa, understood in the double sense of convention and reputation. Reflecting on the nature of existing cities, Socrates provides an explanation for why it is almost impossible for such a personality to develop there, especially in those places where "philosophy" is practiced. This explanation appears to take place at the level of psychological probabilities, but it actually reveals fundamental issues concerning the very possibility of the historical breakthrough of the theoretical interest.

Socrates builds his explanation around a central paradox: the very character-traits that qualify someone to pursue philosophical work all but guarantee that she will never engage in genuine philosophy. The youth suited to a philosophical education is "smart," loves learning, progresses quickly in her studies, and has a good memory for what she has already learned (486d). Her interest in academic matters causes her to withdraw from the heated contest for reputation and material wealth, and thus portends a measured and independent character (485d-486a). Because she is guided purely by her love of learning, this "smart" youth is also strong and robust. She has not retreated into academic concerns for fear of risking herself in the uncertain ventures of life. Her aloofness thus makes of her someone who is trustworthy and resolute in decision and action, who cannot easily be intimidated or bribed, and who will remain a steadfast ally in the face of daunting obstacles (486a-c). Having concluded that such a character is indeed possible, Socrates, prompted by Adeimantus, goes on to consider its fate in the actually existing polis.

This fate is determined by the fact that all the virtues that would equip someone for the philosophical task are equally virtues from the perspective of praxis that engages, however critically, in the realm of doxa. Socrates' character-description of the potential philosopher associates knowledge with strength, trustworthiness, integrity, consistency. In the actually existing, non-philosophical polis, "knowledge" is already of supreme value. It tests and justifies opinions that bear on questions and problems raised by practical interests. Only beginning from this situation can the would-be philosopher learn the value of her capacity for knowledge. According to Socrates, this learning will inevitably occur in a process of education presided over by "the majority."

Socrates defines this majority as having the power to educate "most completely" (492a). This figure of the majority turns out to be synonymous with the communal basis of pre-philosophical knowledge. The majority does not mean most of the people as much as it refers to numerousness or community itself, which is then considered in its function of determining the content and strength of convictions. Some number of the majority, gathered together somewhere in the strength of their convention, mould one another through praise of some things and blame of others, through approving some views as correct and objecting to others as incorrect. This education does not stop when the direct communication of the convention momentarily ceases. The majority shapes a surrounding conventional world that echoes and hence redoubles the force of its proclamations. The decisions of the numerous seem confirmed by nature itself (492c). One draws one's opinions from the majority not because one has been robbed of one's individuality, but because as an individual one lives in and thinks according to a common world, constituted and re-constituted in mutual understandings. It is the very interest in the realm of opinion that causes one to participate in some number of the majority and its changing conventions. The manifold of pragmatic and aesthetic entities is given over to conventional interpretation. Opinable realities, says Socrates, roll around "according to the many conventions of the majority."(479d)

Some number of the majority, coming upon the smarts and strength of the pre-philosophical character, immediately recognizes in it a formidable power to be made use of in the pursuit of its interests (494b). Through constant flattery and petition, this number will persuade the youth that she is of no small importance in the realization of the most worthy ends. Under normal conditions, the educative power of convention is most complete. But the would-be philosopher faces a particularly militant effort to dissuade her from her proper vocation. In the eyes of the majority, philosophy in the strict sense, which entails the complete disengagement from the world of praxis and opinion, is the most egregious waste of the talents of the gifted youth. Any number of the majority, no matter what its aims, will "inevitably disapprove" of philosophy (494a). Subject to their constant adulation, and offered by them a public arena in which to display and exercise her talents, the would-be philosopher comes to associate with some number of the majority. She turns her intelligence and quick thinking to involvement in controversy, to confirming, justifying, criticizing or lending the air of truth to the convictions of this number. Elevated to such a reputable position in the world of doxa, the would-be philosopher is filled with a pretension and pride wholly inappropriate to the pursuit of philosophical matters, and eventually becomes averse to traveling the long and difficult road that would lead to their investigation (494d).

This account of the capture of proto-philosophical interest by the majority is apparently based on immutable principles. The would-be philosopher does not cynically abandon her will to evidence. Rather, the epistemic framework within which she seeks evidence cannot break free from its reference to the communal basis of knowledge: some number of the majority and its worldly interests. Despite his presentation of it as a likely narrative, Socrates judges this process of capture to be inevitable for every philosophically inclined human being. He has Adeimantus agree that there is no possibility that such a person will ever practice philosophy (495a). The only practice of knowledge that can ever emerge in the context of a historical polis is the sophisticated engagement in controversy, the smart justification or refutation of opinions born in and relevant to the world of praxis.

If the practical interests of the majority determine the framework for the valuation of knowledge, and eventually succeed in engaging the talents of the would-be philosopher, "philosophy" as the idea of a disengagement from praxis can only be understood as leisure. It is as a leisure activity that philosophy is then embraced by a different sort of character. Naturally lovers of reputation or material wealth, these individuals flock to the "philosophical" life because of its easy dignity. Socrates often emphasizes the intense beauty and pleasure experienced in acts of philosophical contemplation. But the outward activities that accompany "philosophy" also offer pleasantries to those who take it up for motives other than dedication to theoretical truth. Those who are most clever at non-philosophical work, perhaps feeling that it is beneath their stature, are particularly attracted to this easy dignity of philosophy. So also are those, we may add, whose lack of skill makes work especially irritating and thankless. Such people are "like prisoners escaping from jail who take refuge in a temple" (495d). Drawn to philosophy primarily as a means of avoiding a worse fate, they have no serious interest in seeking theoretical truth and are happy to enjoy the pleasantries of academic life. The desire for leisure, precisely as an "escape," is an interest bound to the world of praxis, and cannot animate a demotion of doxa in light of episteme. According to Socrates, such escapees will never produce anything other than impressive sounding talk and argufying (496a). The actually existing polis can only take on "philosophy"—a knowledge that would be disengagement—as an effeminizing game or sport. It can have no place in the serious life-pursuits that define communal life.

As realm of doxa and practical interest, the historical polis captures philosophy before it can start. The ones called philosophers in existing cities, to the extent that they have philosophical natures, have been corrupted into engagement in controversy, and, to the extent that they do not, they have simply been enjoying the accoutrements associated with the "life of the mind." Socrates attributes such perfection to the majority's educative power that it is difficult to see how a philosopher could ever arise. And yet, he will assert that it is possible for a genuine philosopher to come into being. The list of scenarios Socrates offers here seems a rather rhapsodic collection derived from his own experience: a genuinely philosophical nature comes of age in exile, or in a city too small to tempt her with its honors, or suffers from debilitating physical injury, or, finally, is a truly divine nature, an "exception to the rule" who is impervious to corruption at the hands of the majority (496a-c). What is crucial, however, is that Socrates interprets all of these scenarios, and not just the last, as divine dispensations that save the philosophical nature

from ruin at the hands of human beings (492e).[360] When such an unlikely fate befalls those very few who happen to possess philosophical natures, it is a truly miraculous occurrence, entirely beyond the purview of human planning or action. The difficulties involved in conceiving the historical genesis of the philosopher lead Socrates to admit its possibility only as a divine intervention in human history.

Conceiving the genesis of the philosopher out of an existing city turns out, however, to be only the first of the difficulties faced by the practical inquiry. In the theoretically constructed polis, the philosopher was compelled to rule by the philosophical founders who appeal to the fact that she has become what she is according to the requirements of a philosophically governed πολιτεία. This is no longer the case. The actual philosopher does not have her genesis in a city thought up by philosophical founders, but in one of those "other cities," in which she has grown up "unbidden," "outside the requirement of the constitution" and is "indebted to no one" for the nourishment of her character. Such a philosopher, who owes the city nothing, and whose passion is wholly consumed in the search for the sight of true being, must of her own accord decide to assert her position of rule. Even should she arrive at such an unnatural decision, it would be futile unless the non-philosophic majority, who "inevitably oppose" philosophy, should consent to be ruled (philosophical rule, in the strict sense, has reason as its only force; for the king to become a philosopher would mean that he rules, from the beginning, philosophically). The more "natural" solution to the problem, however, is even more paradoxical: "the natural thing is for the sick person, rich or poor, to knock at the doctor's door, and for anyone who needs to be ruled to knock at the door of the one who can rule him. It isn't for the ruler, if he's truly any use, to beg the others to accept his rule" (489b-c). The majority must not merely consent to philosophical rule. They must call upon philosophy's service.

To the extent that it is carried out under the conditions imposed by the practical inquiry, the attempt to define the philosopher and philosophy (beginning at 474b) is presented as a hypothetical attempt to persuade the non-philosophical majority of the wisdom of petitioning for philosophical rule. The discussants, as Strauss puts it, must persuade the majority to persuade the philosophers to rule.[361] Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus no longer function as philosophical founders of a theoretically generated city. They instead think themselves into the position of being advocates for philosophical rule in some existing city.

Philosophical rule can only occur as a catharsis of everything customary (501a). The majority must then be persuaded to cease being guided by the conventions that render coherent the practical and aesthetic worlds in order to take their lead from theoretical ideas. Socrates' presentation is ambivalent as to the outcome of this attempt.

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[360] It is also possible to interpret Socrates as opposing such mundane cases to that in which divine intervention is involved. This would set apart his own case, in which the philosopher is saved from political involvement through the work of a daimonic sign (496c). The main current of the text, however, suggests the interpretation we have offered above. At 492e, Socrates tells Adeimantus that "if anyone is saved and becomes what he ought to be under our present constitutions, he has been saved—you might rightly say—by a divine dispensation." When Socrates later turns to the consideration of the "very small group who consort with philosophy in a way that is worthy of her"(496a), and mentions in this connection the possibilities of exile, sickness, etc., we must assume that he is referring to those that have been saved.

[361] The City and Man, p. 124

On the one hand, he has Adiemantus agree that the majority, because of what they are, can never in any way tolerate the reality of eidetic being as opposed to that of the many things determined according to convention and relevant to the interests of praxis. "The majority," asserts Socrates, "cannot be philosophic" (494a). This is not a question of the majority becoming philosophers, but merely philosophic (*philosophon*), which is to say allegiant to the philosopher in her attempt to render the service of rule. According to Socrates, no number of any majority can become philosophic because of the investment in the domain of doxa that essentially characterizes the majority as such. They can be swayed to many opinions and spurred to undertake many actions, but the majority will never tolerate the opinion that the world of opinion and action must undergo a continual catharsis from the perspective of philosophy. On the other hand, Socrates brings the practical inquiry to an end by asserting that the anti-philosophic nature of the majority is only due to their good judgment concerning those non-philosophical leisure lovers who pose as philosophers (500b). The majority will thus be well-positioned to "realize that what we are saying about the philosopher [i.e. that she should rule] is true"(500d); they will "become altogether gentle and persuaded"(501e); and will gladly agree to "wipe clean" of tradition the slate of their city and their own souls. After baiting Adeimantus to echo his own negative assessment concerning the anti-philosophical majority, Socrates proceeds to accuse him of making "wholesale charges" against them. He informs Adeimantus that the majority can indeed arrive at a different opinion regarding philosophy if a philosophical advocate were to define philosophy and the philosopher for them, "as we did just now" (500a). The structure and tenor of the discussion creates the distinct impression that Socrates is no longer speaking about the persuasion of the majority as such, but rather of the interlocutors with whom he is presently engaged—a possibility to which we will return shortly.

Greater than and prior to every practical difficulty associated with the actual governance of the philosophical polis is the problem of its original institution. The majority must willingly *banish itself* from the polis. In other words, the validity of everything that has matured in the crucible of cultural practice must be suspended in the face of the possibility of a new beginning that might found itself in the light of ideas. The new polis cannot take over the ethos of its parents, not because it is decadent or deficient, but precisely because it is an empirically constituted tradition. The adults are thus banished beyond the city's bounds so that "the children" might be raised "free from the ethos of their parents" according to the norms of philosophy (541a). The parents become the founders of the philosophical polis by willfully renouncing their influence over the next generation. Socrates can find nothing in the logic of historical development that would support the possibility of such a revolution against tradition as such. He instead stakes the claim to its practicality on his conviction that in the whole of historical time it is possible that a "chance event" (499b) could compel the polis to cease reproducing itself according to the educational power of the majority, and to renew itself under philosophical rule. Such an event amounts to the majority divesting itself of the power to rule by means of opinion and convention. (The majority possesses this power under every non-philosophical form of governance, not merely the democratic. Every monarch or tyrant will belong to some number of the majority, and will "associate" with them according to convention).

Reflecting on Socrates' handling of the practical inquiry, Brann proposes that Plato is here trying to reveal to us the "founding paradox" of the philosophical polis. In Socrates' alternate proposals of initiating the city by cordoning off a fully grown guardian class from the influence of the other classes, and of accomplishing the same through the banishment of adults, Brann detects the truth of the matter: the only citizens capable of actually initiating the polis would be those already obedient to its constitution. The city out of which the philosophical polis could emerge "would have to be a city already so constituted as to be willing to accept the rule of philosophers."[362] Only those products of a philosophical, i.e. unconventional, upbringing could bring philosophy into the polis. "The just city," writes Brann "can only be realized by its own children: *To begin it must already have begun*."[363] The transformation from a non-philosophical to a philosophical polis cannot occur in the manner of transitions between non-philosophical forms of government because there is nothing in the world of convention that provokes its wholesale overthrow as a guiding light for praxis. It seems that the forces capable of setting such a city in motion can only "get going" by being presupposed. What was conceivable within the methodological situation of the polis generated according to speech seems inconceivable within the historical horizon. To be called to service, the philosopher must discover philosophy as a constitutional power *already underlying* the polis.

Plato also dramatizes this paradox for us in the introductory section of the *Timaeus*. Critias there responds to Socrates' wish to be entertained by having his model city put into motion with an elaborate preamble. Its effect is to realize the polis in the historical dimension by asserting its existence in a past wholly unbound to the present by any form of historical transmission. Critias retrieves for Socrates a history that is in every sense irretrievable. He asserts this history on the strength of a story once told to him at ten by his grandfather of ninety, who had himself heard the story from his father, who had, in turn, heard it from Solon. Critias, who "didn't remember Solon's story very well" (26a), has apparently been roused to an accurate memory of it by Socrates' description of the guardian city, and, although he suspects he would be unable to recall what was said yesterday, says he would be "extremely surprised if any part of this story has gotten away from me" (26b). The story itself refers to a history that is even more irretrievable. Athens, according to the record of historical fact, was, long, long ago, the very city that Socrates has modeled. This Athenian past, however, is inaccessible via the Athenian present because every trace of its existence has been obliterated in a natural catastrophe. The history is transmitted to Solon via an Egyptian priest, guardian of a veritable temple of history that, because of its auspicious geographical position, is able to protect the record of all historical events against natural annihilation. It is thus simultaneously asserted that this ancient city *is* "the city that is Athens today" (23c) and that there exists no traceable line of influence that spans the catastrophic event and links this Athens to its long-past. The truth of both the story and the history it relates are unduly emphasized by Critias and Socrates (21a, 21d, 26e). To tell such a true story is the best possible way, Socrates says, to celebrate the patron goddess of Athens. Any attempt to realize Socrates' city beginning from the Athenian democracy will have the sense, not of building a philosophical polis

[362] The Music of the Republic, p. 95.

[363] Ibid., p.129. My emphasis.

from a non-philosophical one, but of remaining faithful to an historical past that is one's own, but from which one has been radically disinherited, and whose own historical genesis, furthermore, remains unexplored.

Brann interprets the fact that the philosophical city can only historically establish itself by presuming its prior establishment as evidence that it is not intended by Socrates to be a viable political model at all. Brann takes Socrates at his word that the cities he and his interlocutors found "in speech" are not intended to be working models for actual political communities.[364] As we have seen, this is indeed Socrates' explicit retort to Glaucon's introduction of the practical inquiry. It is also, as Brann points out, signaled in the fact that none of the cities in speech generates its own first generation: "these cities do not, in the beginning, generate their own populations in a natural way; they are artificially constructed."[365] Under the conditions of the practical inquiry, however, Socrates clearly claims that the philosophically governed polis is a practical possibility (albeit implausible). Brann will interpret this claim, and Socrates' apparent interest in defending it, as a kind of dissimulation by which Socrates *effects*, then and there with his interlocutors, the community he describes.

Brann's thesis is that Socrates, through the philosophical conversion of his interlocutors in the central books, actually founds a dialogical or educational community that is philosophically governed, and that it is this form of community, rather than a "political" one, whose practical accomplishment is at stake. Socrates' educational community, for Brann, is literally dialogic in the sense that it is formed through successive interactions between one philosopher and his students.[366] It thus involves no number of the majority. In his conversation with Adiemantus, writes Brann, "Socrates completes the practical foundation of that other city, which is *independent of the Many*, his own dialogic city."[367]

> Socrates resolves, or rather, bypasses, the founder's paradox by founding, through conversation, *right here and now* an educational community whose members are all the present and future participants in the dialogue. The very development of this community 'in speech,' that is, the course of the argument itself, educates its interlocutors 'in deed'…The establishment of this dialogic community and the conversion and reformation of *its* philosopher citizens is itself *the* Socratic accomplishment—not the preparation of future philosopher kings… [368]

If the consideration of the practicability of philosophical rule in the polis is a mere projection by means of which to establish it dialogically in education, the result is that

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[364] Ibid., p. 124.

[365] Ibid.

[366] Ibid., p. 142.

[367] Ibid., p. 168. My emphasis.

[368] Ibid., p. 96-7.

"Socrates transforms a political question into an educational one",[369] and that "the point of the *Republic* is not a political but a personal founding…"[370] It is indeed this "transformation of politics into pedagogy" that Brann believes is forced on Socrates by the "'founding paradox' of the ideal city."[371]

Brann's thesis is supported, not only by the methodological hierarchy that ranks the individual soul above the city in the investigation of justice, but also by numerous hints suggesting that the subject of the education intended for the fictitious guardians is actually Glaucon himself.[372] The philosophical polis, according to this thesis, "is coming into being while Socrates and Glaucon converse."[373] By indulging Glaucon's interest in the potential realization of the polis in the political realm, Socrates is eventually able to convert him to the philosophical way of life, which means, in the end, converting him to radical indifference toward the realization of such a polis anywhere other than in his own soul (591e-592b).

Strauss, for his part, arrives at the conclusion that the possibility of the philosophical polis is a "fiction" maintained by Socrates for essentially pedagogical purposes. Strauss has it that Plato's text, in opposition to Socrates' expressed thesis, is meant to convey precisely the impossibility of the philosophical polis.[374] In Socrates' persuading Adiemantus that philosophical advocates will persuade the majority of some existing city to persuade philosophers to rule, Strauss sees, not the dialogical foundation of a philosophical community, but rather a kind of ironic object lesson in the inability of persuasion to bring about realities contrary to nature: "the *Republic* repeats, in order to overcome it, the error of the sophists regarding the power of speech."[375] The "sanguine account of the multitude"[376] that Socrates suddenly opposes to his sober diagnosis of their anti-philosophical nature, is thus interpreted as a caricature. It is by having Socrates draw up the fiction of the polis that can include philosophy, and stubbornly maintain it as a practical possibility, that Plato's text can effect what Strauss considers "the broadest and deepest analysis of political idealism ever made."[377] According to Strauss, it is in order to arouse outrage at the manifestation of injustice in actually existing cities that Socrates intentionally maintains the fiction of the philosophical polis as a historical possibility.[378]

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[369] Ibid., p. 94.

[370] Ibid., p. 96.

[371] Ibid., p. 95.

[372] Ibid., p. 141.

[373] Ibid., p. 142.

[374] Ibid., p. 127.

[375] Ibid.

[376] Ibid., p. 133

[377] Ibid., p. 127.

[378] Ibid., p. 129.

The nature of the "analysis" of political idealism is thus one of indirect critique through performance. On this account, Socrates' final purpose in positing the coincidence of philosophy and political power as the condition for the realization of the best city is to establish clearly the natural boundary that prevents philosophy's political inclusion: "Socrates makes clear in the *Republic* of what character the city would have to be in order to satisfy the highest need of man. By letting us see that the city constructed in accordance with this requirement is not possible, he lets us see the essential limits, the nature, of the city."[379]

Such perspectives on *Republic's* practical inquiry have the advantage of sparing the text from interpretations that would criticize the "unworkable" character of the philosophical polis without realizing that this unworkability is, to a very great extent, exactly what Plato seeks to dramatize. We must be suspicious of these interpretations, however, insofar as they view the text as radically indifferent toward, or else outright hostile to, the practicability of the polis. The conditions for the realization of the philosophical polis certainly determine it as a paradoxical possibility. The initial coming into being of such a polis seems to presuppose an intervention wholly unintelligible according to the logic of human development, and its founding seems to require that it already has been founded. Further, the fulfillment of these extraordinary conditions is not even necessary in order for philosophy to maintain its autonomous existence on the basis of a dialogical community devoted to *theoria*, a community that, from within the epochal limits of its governing interest, is supposedly indifferent to the establishment of a polis that might include it. Nonetheless, through an ulterior interest, Socrates interprets philosophy's exilic status as an imperfection, and its unserviceable autonomy as a consolation. One would avoid what is perhaps most fundamental and difficult by reducing *Republic's* discourse on philosophical vocation and the polis to a stratagem within the education of the individual soul.[380]

Socrates tells us that it would be better, in fact the best, if philosophy were somewhere, someday called into a political horizon. This would be the best thing, not only for practically striving humanity, but because it would bring to full expression the nature of philosophy itself. In order for this to happen for the first time, it has to have happened already, and it cannot have ever happened within the history of the traditional life of communities. Socrates consoles himself and his interlocutors with the second best thing: a philosophy that understands its task strictly within the horizon of a divine assignment. Isn't this consolation also an invitation to test and think through the paradox that attends the best thing?

Husserl's Europe describes the *Geschichtlichkeit* in which this political inclusion of *theoria* has been accomplished by strictly historical means. If he is to inspire faith in its reality, then he will have to understand the emergence and calling to service of *theoria*

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[379] Ibid., p. 138.

[380] Reacting against the typically Straussian position that *Republic* aims to demonstrate the impossibility of a synthesis between the city and philosophy, Gadamer asks the appropriate question: "But what is the whole point of Plato's invention?…Are we supposed to read this political utopia only negatively and be convinced by it only of the irreconcilability of theoretical and civic life? If so, a great expenditure of intelligence and wit has been wasted. For a blind man would see that such a state is impossible, and precisely its *im*possibility is underscored by the clumsy and circuitous demonstration of its possibility." The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, p. 70.

beginning from a pre-philosophical polis that thinks and acts according to doxa. He will also have to contend with the suspicion that this genesis will always presuppose itself in order to get underway. We will see that Husserl's understanding of Europe's historical existence does not clear up the "founding paradox" posed by Socrates. Husserl will not show that the philosophical polis can emerge and become in the manner of an anthropological tradition. Europe is rather *the historical realization of that paradox*.

Chapter Four:
Europe's Genesis: Denationalization

1.
The Geo-Political Genesis of Philosophy

Europe originates in the historical passage from finite to infinite tasks occasioned by the breakthrough of philosophy. To comprehend this passage as an existential necessity, and thus to justify the belief definitive of Europe, Husserl will have to show how the breakthrough of philosophy occurred in a motivational context where it resolved intolerable contradictions in the historical life of a historical people. In a series of manuscripts composed during the writing of the *Crisis*, Husserl attempts such a reflection.[381]

There is much that is traditional in Husserl's account of the historical breakthrough of philosophy. Husserl defines philosophy as the elevation of *episteme* above *doxa*, i.e. as the search for universal rather than "merely" relative truth. He also follows ancient tradition in grounding the origin of philosophical interest in the experience of wonder (*thaumadzein*). What is striking about Husserl's reflections is the decisive role they attribute to geopolitical conditions in the emergence of philosophy. According to Husserl's account, there is no fundamental attunement that has always been able to call each human being to philosophy. In order for properly theoretical interests to become effective, certain setting conditions are required, all of which are rooted in a style of communal living Husserl calls "political historicity" (*politische Geschichtlichkeit*). The subject of Husserl's reflections is thus the human being living in a nation among nations, "national Dasein." Philosophical wonder will originate in a context of international communication. It is through specific transformations made possible in this context that the distinction between *episteme* and *doxa* first emerges in national Dasein. Husserl will tie the original existential meaning of philosophical interest to its transcendence of nationally and internationally bound forms of critique. Europe has its historical birth in a movement of denationalization.

Husserl consistently refers to the Greece from which Europe was born as a nation: "Spiritual Europe has a birthplace. By this I mean not a geographical birthplace, through this is also true, but rather a spiritual birthplace *in a nation* or in individual man and human groups *of this nation*."[382] If the role of Greece in Husserl's discourse on Europe is intelligible, it will be in light of an eidetic clarification of the possibilities belonging to national life as such. The *Crisis* period texts that attempt this clarification are guided by

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[381] I primarily draw upon manuscripts written in the months surrounding the publication of parts one and two of the *Crisis*: *Der Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie* ("Die Wien Vorlesung"), *Der Ursprung der Geometrie*, *Menschliches Leben in der Geschichtlichkeit Nr. 1-4*, and *Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschichte*. In the interest of constructing single coherent account, I mention individual manuscripts by name only when it bears on the overall argument.

[382] Crisis, p. 276. My Emphasis.

an analysis of the nation as the final horizon in which practically oriented *doxa* can function as the ultimate form of knowledge. Making the birth of Europe comprehensible will entail a reactivation of the motivations in light of which the doxic framework of national life had to be transcended. Astoundingly, these motivations do not spring from a variety of cultural transformations. As often as he repeats this reflection, Husserl will root the proximate motivations for denationalization in a single practice or discipline. This is "travel," or the curious overview of national worlds. Only it is capable of releasing the possibilities that will shatter the international framework of political historicity. These manuscripts effectively introduce the task of providing a geo-political account of the genesis of philosophy. After making explicit the proper methodological context for this account, we will attempt to follow Husserl's trail and reconstruct a single genetic development whose necessity is as evident as possible. We will then be in a position to evaluate the significance of this account for the meaning of Europe.

2.
Methodological Concerns

It is ultimately through a reflection on the genesis of philosophy itself that Husserl discovers the "nation" as the context from which the *episteme / doxa* distinction breaks through and "travel" as the means of its release. Husserl's reflections on the origin of philosophy are defined by the methodological considerations at work in his general attempt to understand the genesis of scientific fields. In the *Origin*, Husserl states that the task he there prescribes for geometry must be extended to philosophy itself: "only the consciously set task of [discovering] the historical origin of geometry…can provide the method for a geometry which is true to its historical origins and at the same time is to be understood in a universal-historical way; and the same is true of for all sciences, for philosophy."[383] The reflections on philosophy will thus encounter some of the same difficulties that turn up in the *Origin*. These difficulties stem from the fact that every scientific field has roots in concepts the validity of which is independent from the circumstances of their historical formation. The attempt to discover the "historical origin" of such concepts sounds like an exercise in storytelling, most likely fictitious, that is in any case irrelevant to the exercise and critique of scientific reason.

First, let us distinguish Husserl's inquiry into scientific genesis from storytelling. The account of an historical origin immediately provokes an interest as to whether it is true, in the sense of factual, or false, in the sense of fictitious. This interest is misguided if directed to Husserl's accounts. Husserl does not intend to relate a factual narrative, but rather to set bounds of intelligibility that would apply even to fictitious origins. Husserl's reflections on the origin of a scientific field concern the very possibility of its historical emergence, a possibility that any search for historical *facts* about a science's beginning would already presuppose. With respect to geometry, Husserl writes: "we inquire into that sense in which it appeared in history for the first time—in which it had to appear [*aufgetreten sein mußte*], even though we know nothing of the first creators and are not

[383] Crisis, p. 372.

even asking after them...There is an inquiry back into the submerged original beginnings of geometry as they necessarily must have been [*notwendig gewesen sein mußten*] in their 'primally establishing' function."[384] If it is to make sense, a fictitious recounting composed of imagined elements would also have to respect the necessary structures governing the first arising of the science. In Husserlian terms, the investigation into the origin is purely eidetic in nature despite its concern with an emergence or becoming. It does not try to produce a possible story, but rather focuses on the conditions, materials, and transformations necessarily involved in any possible story that could arrive at the constituted sense from which the reflection begins.

These inquiries are about science in its present state. In order to understand what one is asking about, a preliminary definition of the science in question has to guide the identification of what was necessarily involved in its genesis. This definition is derived from a reflection on the broadest goals animating research in the present. In the case of geometry, Husserl speaks of "all disciplines that deal with shapes existing in pure space-time."[385] In the case of philosophy itself, he refers to the "contrast of *doxa* and *episteme*."[386] As we noted with reference to Derrida in chapter 3.1, such definitions are not meant to entail a decision in favor of any specific scientific doctrine, but rather indicate the one open project that would unite all systematic elaborations, conflicts, and revolutions in the history of a single science. Understanding this project as a project, however, requires understanding the historical genesis of the scientific field. Such, at any rate, is Husserl's central methodological claim. Although it guides the inquiry into genesis, the definition of the scientific field only becomes clear in the course of the genetic inquiry. To understand the meaning of "pure space-time" or "the contrast of *doxa* and *episteme*" it will be necessary to consider these field-defining ideas from the perspective of their original genesis. For Husserl, "the problem of genuine historical explanation comes together, in the case of the sciences, with 'epistemological' grounding or clarification."[387]

This claim raises the question about the scientific relevance of Husserl's inquiry. According to Husserl's general classification of the sciences,[388] every empirical inquiry into a given subject-matter depends upon a corresponding eidetic research concerned solely with "pure concepts." It is this fundamental level of scientific engagement that Husserl's reflections on genesis engage. The meaning of pure concepts "does not depend on the contingency of the element actually given as the point of departure [for their formation]…;" they are thus "capable of *prescribing rules to all empirical particulars*."[389] Judgments regarding such concepts aim at truths that will remain

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[384] Ibid, p. 354.

[385] Ibid., p. 354.

[386] Ibid., p. 285.

[387] Ibid.,, p. 373.

[388] Ideas I, p. 56-7.

[389] *Experience and Judgment*: *Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 340.

absolutely identical across a history of instantiations. As Husserl emphasizes in the *Origin*, what such judgments express "exists only once, no matter how often or even in what language it may be expressed."[390] In chapter 3.1, we emphasized how this identity justifies a certain disregard for the historical dimension within the life of a science. The validity or non-validity of scientific judgments is completely independent from the historical circumstances under which they are formed.

Nonetheless, Husserl will argue that this freedom from history must have itself been historically accomplished. Scientific concepts can be handed down and taken over with an identical sense and validity. But as handed down, they also refer to a first origin, an origin of something that can persist in an identical meaning. Husserl sees this reference to a first origin as a tacit claim inevitably operative in scientific consciousness. Any science of the present, with all its acquired results, problems and methods, is implicitly understood as a tradition that has "arisen out of human activity," that has its "first inventors" who formed it out of "materials at hand" through "first creative activities."[391] The "general conviction" of scientific consciousness that pure concepts are "valid with unconditioned generality" is equally a claim that such validity was once able to emerge from a historical present in which it did not yet exist.[392] Present scientific research is thus implicitly committed to a belief in the historical event of the primal establishment that the eidetic reflection will attempt to confirm according to its essential possibility. The clarification of the historically independent validity of *already constituted* concepts does not undo this implicit commitment. From Husserl's perspective, when critical reflection seeks formal, a-historical conditions for the possibility of pure concepts, [393] it has already tacitly presupposed their historical genesis. The formal reflection thus protects the purity of conceptual meaning against historical relativism only at the cost of neglecting and concealing "precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of history."[394] Without denying our experience of historically invariant meanings, Husserl emphasizes that these meanings are only accessible as the meanings they are within the historical horizon (on the basis of language, sedimentation and revival). The possibility of their historical actuality has to be accounted for.

Husserl's own reflections will seek to discover what must have been involved in those creative activities that realized field-defining concepts for the first time beginning from a historical present that, in its essential features, was identical with our own. He thus appeals to an a priori of history itself that contains "highly abundant component elements."[395] Every possible tradition refers to structures of temporal becoming, communication, and material nature. It is within and according to these universal

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[390] Crisis, p. 357.

[391] Ibid., p. 355-6.

[392] Ibid., p. 377.

[393] This, of course, was the procedure of Kant. For a concise comparison of Husserlian and Kantian approaches to the historical genesis of scientific reason see Derrida, *Introduction to the Origin*, pp. 38-43.

[394] Crisis, p. 370.

[395] Ibid., p. 371.

structures of the surrounding world, which are "the same today and always,"[396] that particular cultural configurations—among them the sciences—emerge and build upon one another. Guided by the definition of the scientific field, Husserl seeks to identify those configurations that must have functioned as proximate materials for the activities productive of fundamental concepts. Accessing these materials in their "primally establishing function" requires an abstraction from everything in our surrounding world that presupposes the scientific project in question.[397] Going back to the brink of its own origin, scientific understanding has to be able to reproduce its field out of the pre-scientific world. Otherwise, its method presupposes as mystical accomplishments those decisive steps on which everything else depends.

Within this general style of reflection, the inquiry concerning philosophy bears special responsibilities. Genetic inquiries of the type exemplified in the *Origin* are discrete in their scope because they only respond only to those claims implicit in the science in question. A science is held responsible for discovering "the 'what' and the 'how' of *its* prescientific materials."[398] The reflection on philosophy also makes a problem only of its own origin. But no special science is responsible for insight into what must have been involved in the original distinction between science as such and every doxic pursuit of truth. Indeed, among the proximate materials Husserl identifies for the origin of a pure geometry are "the philosopher" and her "theoretical world-view and world-knowledge."[399] The problem of accounting for the theoretical attitude and its distinct cognitive interest belongs to the self-clarification of the philosophical field alone. The reflection on philosophical origins must understand the emergence, not of a particular field of pure concepts, but of the interest in pure knowledge in general.

Unlike the transformations productive of special scientific interests, those originally productive of the philosophical field (science "as such") explicitly divest an entire way of knowing, previously decisive in every aspect of natural life, of its right to decide. Considered as a cultural phenomenon, the philosophical vocation is thus borne by interests whose emergence transforms the sense of the world-horizon from which non-philosophical culture lives. The primary subject-matter of Husserl's regressive inquiry into the *doxa* / *episteme* distinction thus encompasses not only the "first philosophers" and their intellectual accomplishments, but also the world-horizon capable of supporting such innovators, and its transformation in the face of the revolutionary prospects harbored in the philosophical task.

By treating certain transformations within the cultural world as proximate material for the genesis of philosophical interest, Husserl does not intend to make that interest relative to the historical development that precipitates it. The passage from traditional to untraditional history is really a passage into untraditional history. History includes *theoria* without relativizing it to an anthropological genesis. For this reason, Husserl will continue to regard the term "philosophical anthropology" as an oxymoron,

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[396] Ibid., p. 378.

[397] HUSS XXIX, p. 380.

[398] Crisis, p. 366. My emphasis.

[399] Ibid., p. 376.

despite the motives that bring him to focus ever more on the world of culture.[400] The reflection that returns to a pre-philosophical world does so in the awareness that the life of traditional motivations is all-encompassing only from the perspective of the general practical attitude, which is a "relative attitude" according to the definition of *Ideas II*. All relative attitudes "constitute only relative and restricted correlates of being and sense."[401] Reflections within relative attitudes are incapable of clarifying the distinctive modes of apperception according to which they engage the world. That task falls to phenomenology, which claims to operate out of an absolute attitude on the basis of the reduction. There is no question, then, of containing philosophy within the sphere of finite worldliness. What is at stake here is rather the discovery of those transformations within the cultural world, *as constituted in the general practical attitude*, that must have first made accessible the theoretical attitude (of which the phenomenological attitude itself will be the most complete expression).

We have seen that Husserl intends the subject of these reflections to be "the good European." Such an inquirer must undertake special procedures in order to gain access to national reality in its function as the final horizon of doxa. According to Husserl, "we Europeans" do not live in our nations as ultimate horizons. This is not because we can geographically traverse their boundaries. It is strictly because the historical emergence of theoretical interest has already reconstituted the very sense of national boundaries in accordance with the movement of denationalization it provokes. For Husserl, "our" national traditions already face the test of a critique that would spring from untraditional sources, from roots that no native soil could nourish. To bring the nation into view as the birthplace of *theoria*, we will have to look into our surrounding world as totally bereft of the normative authority of theoretical truth for critical practice. The possibility of such an investigation is not hindered by the fact that our pre-theoretical pursuit of truth continually makes use of finitized artifacts of *theoria*. The investigation concerns the origin of the theoretical interest and the claim it makes on non-theoretical life. The technological employment of dependable scientific validities does not in itself access that origin (Ch. 2.3). As a limiting case, one might conceive a pre-theoretical world in which every scientific proposition of the present had been discovered, but precisely in a pre-theoretical way, and thus according to pre-theoretical criteria of truth.[402] Husserl does not ask us to leave our world behind, but to reflect on it. Through an abstractive focusing, this reflection reveals what our world necessarily shares with the world from which philosophy must have once been born. The path to understanding a pre-philosophical humanity, writes Husserl, is an "*Abwandlung unseres alltäglichen Lebens*."[403]

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[400] See, for instance, Husserl's lecture of 1931 on "Phenomenology and Anthropology" in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, pp. 315-323.

[401] Ideas II, p. 189.

[402] It is not difficult to imagine that the pursuit of finite life-interests could result in the production of isolated knowledge-claims that would be verified as theoretically true by theoretical science. What Husserl regards as *unthinkable* is that the pursuit of practical goals could "merely by the way" establish the project *theoria* itself. This is because the sense of *theoria* as a "research aspiration" contains an explicit resolve not to be engaged in the world that orients praxis. See Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 143.

[403] HUSS XXIX, p. 380.

3.
The Nation as the House of Doxa

In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl presents a highly condensed description that contains everything essential to his analysis of the origin of philosophy:

> Incipient theoretical interest, as *thaumadzein*, is obviously a variant [*Abwandlung*] of curiosity, which has its original place in natural life as an intrusion into the course of "serious living," either as a result of originally developed life-interests or as a playful looking-about when one's quite immediate vital needs are satisfied or when working hours are over. Curiosity (here understood not as a habitual "vice") is also a variant [*Abwandlung*], an interest which has separated itself off from life-interests, has let them fall. In this attitude, the potential philosopher observes first of all the variety of nations, his own and others, each with its own surrounding world, with its traditions, its gods, its demons, its mythical powers, valid for it as the simply self-evident actual world [*schlechthin selbstverständliche wirkliche Welt*]. Through this astonishing contrast, there appears the distinction between world-representation and actual world [*Weltvorstellung und wirklicher Welt*], and the new question of truth arises: not tradition-bound everyday truth, but an identical truth which is valid for all who are no longer blinded by traditions, a truth-in-itself.[404]

The new question that defines philosophy emerges on the basis of a curious overview of contrasting national worlds. To understand the necessity Husserl wants to accord to his account, we will have to examine the meaning of its central terms and their role in this transformative experience.

We first ask about the nation. We know of the potential philosopher, not only that she is an observer of nations, but also that she belongs to one. What does belonging to a nation mean for Husserl? Or more specifically, what aspects of national belonging will prove crucial in laying the foundation upon which the concept of a universal truth can first emerge?

In the *Origin*, Husserl identifies awareness of a "horizon of civilization" as an essential feature of world-consciousness.[405] This horizon accounts for the certainty in every particular experience of a possible communication with others about a linguistically expressible common world. Such communication is always in principle possible, even when it is not in fact occurring. The horizon of civilization is "always," Husserl emphasizes, "open and endless."[406] No numerable community of human beings can possibly exhaust the field of perspectives indicated by a worldly object or situation.

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[404] Crisis, pp. 285-6. Translation modified.

[405] Ibid., p. 358.

[406] Ibid.

The world is given, "from the start," as "the world for all;" its expressibility refers to "a common language,"[407] not as a specific mother-tongue, but as the possibility for translation in general. It is *within* this endless openness of which it is always implicitly aware that world-consciousness continuously privileges, in the sense of primarily taking for granted, the possibilities for normal communication that belong to *its own* civilizational horizon, or its "homeworld." The nation will be such a privileged horizon of communication: "Each nation is a personal world and a material surrounding world in which each understands the others and understands them as intentionally related to this same generally understandable native [*vaterländliche*] surrounding world of cultural things and cultural processes."[408] The endless openness of the civilizational horizon guarantees that the appearance of the nation in world-consciousness is coupled with the awareness, however implicit, of an alien beyond.

Husserl's concept of homeworld has been thoughtfully analyzed and suggestively elaborated by Anthony Steinbock in his study *Home and Beyond*. A homeworld, for Steinbock, is not simply a common world, the correlate of a first-personal plural subjectivity, but is discovered in acts of appropriation whereby its "our-ness" manifests. The description "our world" expresses "the process involved in the constitution and reconstitution of a home, namely that a home is formed through *appropriation* and *disappropriation*.…The home is the communal appropriative sphere through which 'we' are constituting and constituted…"[409] In other words, the homeworld is the matrix of traditions in which a concrete "we" discovers itself as a possessing and dispossessing agent in relation to this matrix. Since these possessive responsibilities occur against the background of the open civilizational horizon, Steinbock will assert that the homeworld only comes into being as such through an intentional relation to the alien. The meanings of home and alien are "co-constitutive," "co-relative" and "mutually delimited," which means that "neither the homeworld nor the alienworld can be regarded as the 'original sphere.'"[410] Acts of appropriation that constitute the home do so in awareness of the alien just as acts of transgression that bring one into an alien world also bring one into intimate relation with the home. In each case, the determination of homeworld and alienworld is a matter of "difference as an intersubjective encounter."[411]

In the passage from the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl indicates that in the case of national belonging this co-constitution of homeworld and alienworld is capable of generating the idea of universal truth for the first time. The person, however, belongs to many homeworlds at once (family, city, work-world, etc.). Why should the experience of relative differences between these other contexts not motivate the idea of irrelative or

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[407] Ibid.

[408] HUSS XXIX, p. 42.

[409] Home and Beyond, p. 222

[410] Ibid., p. 179.

[411] Ibid., p. 178. Steinbock thus advocates an account of multiple life-worlds, not from an aerial view that would distinguish between them, but by identifying the features of the liminal encounter in which they are differentiated.

universal truth? What characteristics of the nation distinguish it as the kind of homeworld from which the *episteme* / *doxa* distinction can first emerge?

The first answer to suggest itself is that when Husserl talks about a nation he simply refers to the most encompassing homeworld to which one can belong. A question arises, however, as to what is meant by "encompassing" and "belong." Steinbock points out that homeworlds "do not englobe each other like Russian matryoshka dolls."[412] Such a picture misconstrues participation in home-life as a matter of geographical containment rather than understanding it as a matter of carrying out those appropriative and disappropriative activities through which the home appears as ours. In order to appropriate or disappropriate some aspect of home-life, one first has to become aware that facts and possibilities taken for granted as familiar are the outcome of contingent decisions and accomplishments in the history of the home-community. Appropriation, writes Steinbock, "takes up *pregiven sense as stemming* from a homeworld and its unique tradition."[413] If the nation is the most encompassing form of homeworld, it is not because all the "smaller" homeworlds are geographically contained inside it, but because the appropriative activities in which they are discovered as homeworlds refer to the nation as a common familiar world.

In its function as a familiar world of pregiven sense, the homeworld remains undiscovered as homeworld. Acts of appropriation are revelatory accomplishments in which the familiar world "comes into relief."[414] As such, they indicate a one-dimensional mode of belonging that precedes the revelation. To employ a pun of Steinbock's, we here belong to our world in a "sub-liminal" fashion.[415] In the familiarity of the undiscovered homeworld the "alien" is also disclosed, but precisely according to familiar typifications belonging to the undiscovered homeworld. As familiar world, the homeworld is not given as one of many worlds belonging to a single world-horizon. Nor is it the object and context of appropriations that constitute it as homeworld from an awareness of the alien qua alien. It is rather a perspective on the world itself, a way in which worldly realities appear.

This world appears, to use Husserl's expression, with a "traditional face."[416] This does not mean that it appears as the product of processes of acculturation, but rather as already handed over to human activity. In the undiscovered homeworld, objects have already been explicated according to cultural predicates, but this "already explicated" is precisely not given. Instead, things are already understood and exert motivational force from within the practical situations in which they normally function. All this belongs, as

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[412] Ibid., p. 185.

[413] Ibid., p. 180. My emphasis.

[414] Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Dritter Teil: 1929-1935*. Husserliana Vol. XV.Ed. Iso Kern. (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1973). 176 n. 1. Cited in Steinbock, Home and Beyond, p. 182.

[415] Home and Beyond, p. 227.

[416] HUSS XXIX, p. 383.

Husserl puts it, to the constitution of the actually present objects as such.[417] It is also assumed as a matter of course that other people direct themselves toward this same world and are capable of understanding it according to typical modes of divergence (children as children, elderly as elderly, foreigners as foreigners, etc.). The subject of the familiar homeworld is thus a participant in an ongoing process of communalization (*Vergemeinshaftung*) through which its reality is determined and shaped. This process is not a factual activity within the surrounding world, as if this latter were already a fixed context, but is constitutive of it; it is the way we *have* this world: "Persons in their current communalization in the influx of indirect communication have the same world as the world that truly is in the form of a constant and necessarily unfolding amendment and correction."[418] Life in the undiscovered homeworld is effectively involved in things on the basis of the invisibility of the traditional character of everything traditional. It takes for granted the literacy by virtue of which a community is the subject of its world. The functioning of this communalization is not necessarily brought to a halt in those reflective transformations that bring its traditionality into view.

Husserl will take the position that the participant in the pre-theoretical nation can only discover and participate in other intra-national homeworlds on the basis of the nation as a functioning context of intelligibility. He asserts that the determination of relative differences between familial, regional, vocational and socio-economic homeworlds occurs by virtue of those communicative possibilities already taken for granted within the national horizon. What counts as valid or good will vary according to landscape, social rank, etc., but "these differences and their extensive equalization trough reciprocal adaptation belong to the old familiar form of everydayness in which normal practical life takes place."[419] The identification and negotiation of situational relativities makes use of hermeneutic and adaptive possibilities common to the national community as a whole: "The generally common ground [*allgemeinschaftliche Boden*] for all experiences and all testing of experiences, for all propositions and propositional truths is the already valid traditional or historical world of the nation…Every dispute, every resolution of what is disputed, every perception and other experience presupposes this horizon, i.e. transpires in it as something valid *a priori*."[420] Husserl thus defines the nation as the "*Totalsituation* in which all particular situations are resolved / contained [*beschlossen sind*]."[421]

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[417] In Ideas I, we read: "Without further effort on my part, I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but with value-characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth. Things in their immediacy stand there as objects to be used, the "table" with its "books", the "glass to drink from," the "vase," the "piano," and so forth. These values and practicalities, they too belong to *the constitution of the "actually present" objects as such*…," p. 93.

[418] HUSS XXIX, p. 6

[419] Ibid., p. 388.

[420] Ibid., p. 44-5.

[421] Ibid., p. 385.

This *Totalsituation* will continue to function as horizon of understanding in the critical search for truth. When national Dasein seeks to overcome naïve opinion and arrive at judgments that count as knowledge, she seeks to determine "what in itself is, and is so well-proven that everyone could convince herself of it."[422] But the meaning of this formulation is determined by the national horizon. The national world defines the contours of the evidential framework within which judgments can become certified as knowledge. Husserl effectively claims that there are national bounds to what Henry Pietersma has called the optimal epistemic situation, the situation in which all conceivable "epistemic distance" between the knower and the reality claimed in her judgment has been traversed.[423] It is of course possible that truth-claims made from this horizon might receive confirmation in the theoretical attitude. They may turn out to "have a scientific basis." But it is precisely the origin of this basis for which Husserl is trying to account. He is interested in what lies in the intention of such truths from within the horizon of the pre-theoretical national world.

Husserl argues that the "everyone" intended as the subject capable of grounding truth-claims is assumed to be those mature adults (as opposed to children or the deranged) who have grown up "normally" within national traditions. The concept of epistemic authority is thus limited by the idea of adulthood or normal acculturation. Equally, the method by which this "everyone" should be able to "convince herself" of a judgment is essentially one of empathy across similar situations. Deciding what is abidingly true, says Husserl, "requires the ability to put oneself into and accept as valid the situation and situational interests."[424] One brings oneself into the situation pertinent to the claim by beginning, as it were, from the national world as *Totalsituation*. There is no motive to define methods for attaining insight such that they would be re-constructible for any knowing subject, regardless of culture. Finally, Husserl argues that the evidential criteria that determine when a truth has been sufficiently established are relative to the kind of practical interest operative in the situation to which the claim pertains. The national world is "a generally valid and familiar typology [*Typik*] of practical situations in which the practical interest belonging to them determines, through its normal fulfillment, what is true and what is false."[425] Truths need to be reliable for certain activities, always within the total-activity of national life itself. Reflecting on "the national life-praxis," Husserl concludes that "a question about an irrelative truth is actually not possible here."[426] The subjectivity, method and interest presupposed in the

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[422] Ibid., p. 8.

[423] Henry Pietersma, 38-43. "Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True" in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals* ed. and with introductions by Frederick Elliston and Peter Mc Cormick. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1977. In this essay, Pietersma's framework of "epistemic situations" and "epistemic distance" provides a clear overview of Husserl's general doctrine of evidence as the experience of truth. Our exposition here must presuppose the essentials of that doctrine without entering into them.

[424] HUSS XXIX, p. 9.

[425] Ibid., p. 8.

[426] Ibid., p. 9.

search for knowledge show that the relativity of truth to the life of the nation positively determines its truth-value.

The epistemic framework for the critique and renewal of traditions is itself traditional in that it is rooted in the practical strivings of a particular community and its search for regulating norms, what Steinbock calls its "generative force."[427] Autonomy in relation to this traditional matrix could only mean cutting oneself off from the vital sources of critique itself. Critique of national tradition is nationally bound because it seeks to reaffirm, to clarify, to make genuine and authenticate the particular projects into which national subjectivity has been thrown by virtue of its inheritance. It seeks to realize, as Steinbock says, the "best possible of the homeworld through a renewal *of its* generative force."[428] Truth, and the critical reason that aims at it, thus remain relative to the communal basis of pre-philosophical knowledge: the encompassing practical situation of the nation.

According to Husserl, then, we must regard the question of irrelative being as *unthinkable* within any thinkable pre-theoretical nation. There is no possible motivation within the national horizon for making a problem out of the relativity of true being to national life in its practical striving. Even if the nature of this relativity should become a theme for reflection (a possibility of which Husserl is highly skeptical),[429] it would not appear as a *limitation* from the standpoint of the goals of knowledge. All problems for knowledge are posed in relation to the "generative force" of national life, and have the renewal of that force (in clarity and responsibility) as their aim. Only by beginning from the perspective of the nation as the ground of all conceivable knowledge, from the inconceivability of a "merely" national reality, can Husserl locate the genesis of the possibility of the distinction between *doxa* and *episteme* in international travel.[430]

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[427] Home and Beyond, p. 205.

[428] Ibid. My emphasis.

[429] HUSS XXIX, p. 388.

[430] This insistence that the genesis of the idea of irrelative knowledge requires transcending the national horizon bears comparison with a seemingly contradictory line of thinking that Husserl presents in *Ideas II*. There, Husserl shows how the discovery of abnormal world-descriptions within an established interpersonal association can have the effect of unseating the presumed authority of the normal descriptions of the same reality, and of relegating the experienced object upon which such normal descriptions are based to the status of a mere appearance. In this relativity of normal and abnormal experiencing of the surrounding world, Husserl detects the motivational ground for research into an objective, which is to say indescribable, nature.

> The differences in 'world-pictures,' i.e., in empirically intuited worlds of things, which come to the fore within intersubjective consensus and which, despite their discrepancies as to content, nevertheless manifest themselves in intersubjective understanding as experiences of *the* world, of one and the same world, together with the impossibility, which results, of arriving on the basis of actual experience at unconditionally valid judgments about this world, necessitate theoretical research in the form of natural science. (218)

The framework of *Ideas II*, however, does not require an account of the origin of theoretical interest. It rather seeks to adjudicate the proper relationship between two relative theoretical attitudes (those of the human and natural sciences) through a phenomenological investigation into the regions of being that they

Husserl thus seems to presuppose a radical distinction between intra-national and international relativities. He claims that the experience of divergent views *within* the nation cannot motivate the idea of irrelative truth because their discovery as divergent views relative to the same common surrounding world "poses no difficulty."[431] On the other hand, he will eventually describe the divergence *between* national world-views as an "incompatibility at the level of being" resolvable only by discovering an entirely new conception of truth.[432] If intra-national differences are understandable as differences on the ground of hermeneutic structures of a privileged civilizational horizon, why shouldn't international differences be understandable on the ground of the civilizational horizon itself? International communication would certainly face new difficulties, but it would determine nationally relative truths as *relative* in the same way that national communication determines regionally or socially relative truths (though mutual adaptation, recognition of differing practical interests, distinction between the normal and the abnormal, etc.). After all, are not the alien-nations present at the brink of philosophy *already* in communication with the home-nation without having provoked the idea of a "merely relative" truth?

This possibility of international communication is not only acknowledged by Husserl, its realization represents a distinctive form of historical life: "political historicity." This way of living historically is defined by national Dasein's awareness of "nations," her own and others, as features of the surrounding world. Insofar as the nation is a horizon of world-understanding, there is no line in the sand at which national reality stops: "Every nation apperceives its respective foreign-nations. In this apperception, they belong to its surrounding world of life [*Lebensumwelt*]."[433] The concrete contents of foreign national life count within the horizon of the home-nation as relatively incomprehensible against the background of a civilizational comprehension "which renders it understandable that these are human beings, living as human beings in familial communities, conducting trade and commerce, forming the unity of a politically organized nation [*Staatsnation*]."[434] In the familiarity of the homeworld, this understandability of the alien nation occurs within the typology of home-understanding. The alien is a typical deviation. But the relation to the alien that Husserl seems to privilege as essentially "political" involves *entering into* [*Eintreten*] the historical developments [*Geschichtlichkeiten*] that constitute the life of the alien nation.[435]

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take as their respective themes. The necessitation mentioned here by Husserl concerns the passage from the personalistic into the naturalistic attitude, not from the pre-theoretical into the theoretical. The latter transition, which is presupposed by the former, has its historical beginning in a national horizon that cannot support the idea of nationally irrelative truth. Only a particular form of movement between national realities will destabilize this horizon and set humanity the task of achieving a new kind of truth, and of determining how to live in the knowledge of its possibility.

[431] HUSS XXIX, p. 9.

[432] Ibid., p. 13.

[433] Ibid., p. 41 fn.

[434] Ibid., p. 42.

[435] Ibid., p. 10.

Steinbock's notion of "transgression" provides a helpful framework for understanding what is essential to the political level of historicity in Husserl's analysis. In a transgressive encounter, the alien no longer appears as an anomaly against the background of normal home-life. Instead, the relative incomprehensibility that attends the perception of the alien as anomalous "reaches deeper into an incomprehensibility that has the integrity of another normativity, one that cannot be overcome through a simple appropriation."[436] This can occur insofar as the alien is experienced as bearing its own alien homeworld to which it belongs. As an alien *home*world, the world of the alien is no longer a limitation in which the alien is "wrapped up." It is rather given as home to the alien *in the very same way as my home is home for me*. This does not mean that one reductively understands the alien world in terms of one's home. On the contrary, the genuine foreignness of the alien world, its inaccessibility as "mine," is first brought about by its being encountered as an alien *home*. A transgressive encounter, writes Steinbock, "crosses over the limits and thus brings an explicit experience of the limits into being."[437] This crossing over is no doubt invoked in Husserl's reference to the "entry into" another nation's *Geschichtlichkeit*. Such an entry requires an attempted participation in the homeworld of the alien nation, even if only in imagination. One thus experiences not only "the integrity and limits of the alien," but also realizes the particularity of the home, thereby gaining it "in a more intimate mode of accessibility."[438]

The new possibilities that transgression opens for the critical shaping and determination of the national homeworld are numerous: movements of rejection, reaffirmation, comparison, combination, etc. These modes of critical consciousness do not, however, disrupt the interpretation of truth as *doxa* relative to a national community and its interests. As Steinbock himself emphasizes, they respond to the alien by re-appropriating home traditions: "critical activity…can be interpreted as disappropriating the current normality, and generatively speaking, the tradition, even though its purpose is precisely to realize more fully that very normality and tradition;"[439] or again: "Through liminal transgressive encounter with the alien, homecomrades realize their *own* possibilities."[440] In political historicity, competing national validities simply reflect the reality of competing nations between which one must choose, or else negotiate novel adaptations, syntheses, etc. Even the cosmopolitan resolve ceaselessly to reform native traditions in light of alien traditions is not the same as the idea that tradition as such is

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[436] Home and Beyond, p. 242.

[437] Ibid., p. 249.

[438] Ibid., p. 244-5. Against certain insinuations of Steinbock, we have to assert with Husserl that this kind of international understanding does not at all imply good feeling. Nations will understand themselves and one another in a political fashion: "*ob in Einstimmigkeit oder Streit, ob in Liebe oder Haß, in Krieg oder Frieden*." HUSS XXIX, p. 10. What is essential is not the tenor of the relationship, but that the home-nation becomes directly involved *in* the alien *Geschishctlichkeit* and the alien-nation *in* the home. War with an alien nation can be transgressive. Hospitable relations can transpire according to the typifications of the homeworld.

[439] Home and Beyond, p. 230

[440] Ibid., p. 245.

blinding when compared to truth-in-itself. Husserl's Europe will emerge on the basis of the *overcoming* of political historicity, and must not be defined in terms of comportments toward the alien possible within it.

If contact between nations prepares the idea of universal validity it is not due to a blurring of national traditions through international exchange, but rather because of a totalizing claim harbored in the national horizon, the acceptance of which would constitute the highest form of national belonging. Husserl's definition of the pre-theoretical nation as a *Totalsituation* contains the idea that it affords its participants an appropriative context that accommodates every meaningful life-interest. To take on the roles and occupations that define a meaningful lifetime, it *may* be necessary that I venture beyond the world belonging to my family, my colleagues, my city or my town, and become an appropriating subject in relation to traditions that are not rooted there. It is never *necessary* to abandon the home-nation as the traditional world whose criticism and renewal shape my possibilities for becoming who I am. Having been born into a nation, I can entrust my lifetime to its world, destining it to those possibilities bequeathed through national traditions. Husserl insists that his word "*Nation*" be understood etymologically, as a "having been born."[441] We may define the national world by its claim to accommodate its members such that one can live a whole lifetime in the continuity of certain traditions into which one has been born (language, customs, etc.). It is the multiplication of this totalizing claim that will provoke the philosophical question and eventually destroy the international basis of political historicity.

4.
Mythical Knowledge as Cosmic National World-View

The nation's claim to accommodate the destiny of its inhabitants is "formulated" in terms of a national mythological knowledge. In the passage from the *Vienna Lecture*, the decisive function of myth in the genesis of philosophical interest is not so clear. Husserl mentions the variety of nations, "each with its own surrounding world, with its traditions, its gods, its demons, its mythical powers." We will see, however, why it is necessary that the potential philosopher's overview of nations focus on contrasting national mythoi.

Husserl accords a very broad meaning to mythological knowledge. It is specified only in terms of the distinct subject-matter to which its conceptualizations ultimately refer. This subject-matter is "nature" as it appears to pre-theoretical, national Dasein. Here, nature is neither the objective nature of mathematical physics nor the ecosystem of environmental science. It is nature as it originally appears in relation to practically interested life within a pre-given civilizational horizon. We here attempt to organize and elaborate on Husserl's brief but suggestive descriptions of the nature that will be conceptualized in mythological knowledge. Nature is defined by the unique way it *encompasses* the world of praxis and the correlative *dependence* of praxis upon the encompassing world of nature.

[441] HUSS XXIX, p. 9. n. 1.

1. Nature is depended upon as earthground, the single unmoving universe of praxis. "For every people and every one of its members, the people's surrounding world is related to the unity of the universal (all-civilizational [*allmenchheitlichen*]) earthground."[442] The earthground is spatially articulated as landscape under the sky and above the hidden depths: "This [earthground] is terra with hidden earthly depths and earthground under the sky."[443] The arc of the single sky, no less than the earthground as a whole, does not move, and arcs over a landscape whose unity is in advance foretold, despite all possible topological and elemental diversity. To describe our original access to this landscape, it is helpful to employ Husserl's idea of "horizon-certainty."[444] In all my locomotion, I already possess an implicit knowledge of the whole of this continuous landscape, not because I or others have previously traversed it, but because I already have it before me, in the manner of an undetermined horizon, as the dimension for any traversal at all. The landscape-beyond is given as already there in its indeterminacy, passable or impassable, inhabitable or uninhabitable, but always as landscape *under* the sky and as the surface of hidden *depths*. It is impossible to think about getting under the depths of the earth, which is always fundamentally "down" just as much as the apex of the sky is a fundamental "up" irrelative to all bodily positioning or practical orientation.[445] In relation to the sky-realm above and the depth-realm below, the entire surrounding world of practical life, which rests upon the landscape, is a realm-between: "The primal surrounding world is a realm-between [*Zwischenreich*], between earth and sky."[446] This natural universe of sky-landscape-depths is never visible as if it were an object. It is the encompassing whole that contains, in advance, every object, movement, event or happening.

2. Nature is depended upon as the domicile of raw material for praxis. From out of the sky, the landscape and the depths, it is possible to "remove" (*ablösen*) objects into the practical world.[447] This removal is not restricted to a physical taking out, but also

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[442] Ibid., p. 38.

[443] Ibid.

[444] Crisis, p. 374.

[445] Husserl defends his thesis of the un-moveable, non-planetary nature of the earthground against putative counter-evidence derived from astronomical physics and the experience of space-travel. Appealing to conditions involved in the discovery of all physical bodies, Husserl argues that the unmoving earthground is constitutive of, rather than invalidated by, the experience of the earth as a "sphere." The obvious counter-evidence to the fundamental downwardness of earthly depths comes from the picture-thought that one could presumably dig a hole through the planet earth and come out "on the other side." The thought experiment has to be pursued. Would being lowered into a hole in North America and coming out in South Asia reverse the downward sense of earthly depths, or would it merely involve a temporarily loss of orientation, and end with the experience of having been turned "upside down"? See Husserl's manuscript "Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does not Move" in Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, Including Texts by Edmund Husserl*. Ed. Leonard Lawlor with Bettina Bergo. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002), p.117-131.

[446] HUSS XXIX, p. 38.

[447] Ibid., p. 43.

refers to the practical vision that, in "picking out" such usable material, would guide any physical removal. Earthly bodies are domiciled in (*beheimatet im*) the landscape, heavenly bodies in the sky. The earthground is a domicile, a dwelling place for flourishing forms, with their distinct ways of appearance and behavior. Elements and animals inhabit a pre-cultural environment in which they form and persist. National Dasein understands this environment because she is already in tune with it; its sensed qualities awaken desires, its contours afford behaviors, etc. But national Dasein also picks out natural materials from this domicile, and gives them meanings by which they acquire a place in the homeworld of praxis. Nature is thus present to the practical attitude as an elemental fund of useable materials to be found or picked out. Once picked out, the cultural significance of the object can inform its natural material, which is now integrated into the surrounding world of praxis as a relevancy legible within practical situations. Nonetheless, every cultural object, by virtue of its corporeal basis, bears in its sensuous fullness—its extension, shape, texture, color, smell—a connection to the earthground as its domicile. Nature persists in each cultural thing of the surrounding world. Each thing secrets away an aspect of itself that doesn't belong to the horizon language-world-others; this aspect slips away and yet is the silent, illegible support of the entire cultural domain.

3. Nature is depended upon in the reliance of praxis on the grace of natural powers. The natural universe sky-landscape-depths, the realm of all happenings and the fund of all material, is also the domain of powers "on whose favor and disfavor worldly Dasein [*umweltliche Dasein*] depends."[448] Husserl calls these powers "mythical" in anticipation of their conceptual interpretation. But we must first understand their presentation to the practical attitude. All cultivation depends upon the fecundity of the landscape, the light of the sun, the coming and going of rain. All construction depends upon the holding steady of the ground and the calmness of the wind. Such dependencies may come to the fore when natural events disrupt the normal conditions of praxis.[449] However, these disruptions reveal that praxis *constantly* "works with" natural powers in pursuing the successful realization of its goals. In the realm of practical activity, "the human being and mythical powers function together everywhere."[450] Husserl goes so far as to say that human activity is only one side of a "two-sided praxis" in which natural powers co-participate.[451] These natural powers are not simply features of the environment, but also of the "I" that inhabits environments. The body as the subject of locomotion is fundamentally oriented by nature as earthground and its living organism inhabits nature as domicile. The system of possible bodily actions indicated by the "I can" that attends practical perception also feels itself modulated by degrees of drowsiness, disease, fatigue, etc. that overtake the body and that reveal its optimal condition to be dependent upon natural powers. Every animal reality is constantly "open

[448] Ibid., p. 38.

[449] HUSS XXIX, p. 38: In this connection, Husserl describes nature as "*das Reich der Vulkanausbrüche, der Erdbeben, der Stürme*, <*der*> *Gewitter, des himmlischen Feuers, der Überschwemmungen etc*."

[450] Ibid., p. 44.

[451] Ibid., p. 39.

to the influx of mythical elements" because everything it does is founded in the vital functioning of bodily life.[452]

To experience natural powers in *their praxis* is something other than to take natural conditions into account as relevant to my practical interests.[453] It means to apperceive nature as a co-shaper of the surrounding world, a participant in the process of communalization. In the original constitution of nature "there are no pure things as dead materials...merely physical things in the later sense, the sense of our world free of gods [*entgötterten Welt*]"[454] Natural events never appear solely as effects of causes, but as expressions of a pre-historic power, of a "can" whose scope of influence encompasses the entire human world. If we consider the subjectivity of nature at a level anterior to its mythical interpretation, we will perhaps recognize it in the "it" of common expressions like "it is getting dark" or "it is raining." These statements do not just refer to working-conditions of our doings, but contain a reference to nature as a dimension of un-human praxis.

Present to National Dasein as universe of happenings, elemental fund of raw materials, and reich of non-human powers, nature can become a theme for knowledge within the evidential framework of the national world. The connection of mythical knowledge to practically constituted nature as its subject-matter is essential. It is only because involvement with an encompassing nature is a necessary feature of all historicity that Husserl can assert, as he does in the *Vienna Lecture*, that the presence of mythical motifs and praxis in pre-theoretical civilization is not only "a known fact, but also a necessity essentially available to insight."[455] Mythical knowledge aims at what Husserl calls an "*Animistik*," an overview of natural-universal forces, powers, elements, gods, demons, etc. and their effects on the human world.[456] Because nature is here constantly apperceived according to its encompassing being as universe, fund and reich, knowledge of nature is an encompassing knowledge. Nature, considered as a totality, is involved in every human activity, and precisely as a force more fundamental, expansive, and powerful than the praxis that depends upon it. The interpretation of nature in the form of mythical knowledge bears upon the totality of beings within the world-horizon: "Mythical apperception and apperception of the world, apperception of everything that is there in the surrounding world, is animist-mythical."[457] Mythical knowledge thus "frames [*formt*] each and every thing in the national world and also in its historical continuance."[458] In it, the national world as such comes into explicit view: "the world as a

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[452] Crisis, p. 284.

[453] See Heidegger's description of "taking nature into account." Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time: A Translation of* Sein und Zeit. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) [Hereafter, Being and Time].

[454] HUSS XXIX, p. 44

[455] Crisis, p. 283.

[456] HUSS XXIX, p. 45.

[457] Ibid., p. 44.

[458] Ibid.

totality becomes thematic…the world which is concretely, traditionally valid for the civilization in question (a nation for example)…"[459]

Like all nationally constituted knowledge, mythical knowledge is practical (Husserl often refers to it as mythico-practical). Whatever discoveries it may make regarding the genesis, classification and effects of natural powers, mythical knowledge "is meant to serve man in his human purposes so that he may order his life in the happiest possible way and shield it from disease, from every sort of evil fate, from disaster and death."[460] Mythological knowledge is unique in the universality of its practical scope. It concerns the nature that encompasses the world of *all* praxis—military, political, familial, etc. Husserl thus classifies the attitude that seeks mythical knowledge as "practical-universal."[461] This universality, of course, is relative to "the civilization in question" and the world that is "traditionally valid" for it. Mythical knowledge, then, is knowledge relative to national life as a whole. It provides for national Dasein a coherent view of the encompassing cosmos in which she seeks out her destiny. The totalizing claim of the nation thus hinges upon what Husserl calls a "national religion."[462] We should understand this term as broadly referring those practices guided by mythical knowledge in which national Dasein seeks her destiny in the cosmos. Mythical knowledge serves religious praxis on the basis of a commitment to national life as bearer of destiny. It embraces, accommodates, provides ultimate orientation, and becomes binding as the correlate of the entrustment of one's destiny to the national horizon. The true being of national gods and the national *Animistik* as a whole is relative to the project of national life to which one entrusts one's lifetime.

For Husserl, it is crucial that the mythico-practical interest leads to knowledge of mythical powers as determining the course of national history at various levels of communal existence. Through their intervention, mythical powers, which are world-encompassing (*weltumspannend*), become characters and participants in national life.[463] The appearance in the civilizational horizon of multiple conflicting *Animistiks*, each of which provides ultimate orientation for whoever has entrusted herself to the traditions of national life, is an essential precondition for the historical emergence of philosophy. In this connection, Husserl emphasizes the critical role, not just of foreign nations, but particularly of the foreign mythoi that define the "worlds" of nations. The foreign nationals "have, in their territory, not only different forms of life (customs), different laws, accordingly a different legal life, but also different religions—a different world-concept [*Weltauffassung*] which gives to their activities and accomplishments, their cultural formations generally speaking, a different sense [*Seinssinn*]. They have different myths, different gods, a different mythically apperceived world."[464]

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[459] Crisis, p. 283.

[460] Ibid., p. 284.

[461] Ibid., p. 283.

[462] HUSS XXIX, p. 44.

[463] Ibid., p. 388.

[464] Ibid., p. 11.

5.
International Curiosity and the Breakthrough of Philosophy

The mere presence in the world-horizon of foreign *Animistiks* is not sufficient to motivate the historical emergence of philosophical interest. According to Husserl's account, the critique of truth as nationally bound *doxa* only becomes possible when the variety of mythically apperceived national worlds has been encountered in the attitude of curiosity. We now consider why this is the case.

The passage from the *Vienna Lecture* clearly articulates curiosity into two levels: 1) In its original place in natural life, curiosity is distinguished as the life-interest that lets serious life-interests fall away; 2) *Thaumadzein* is a variant of curiosity distinguished by its wondering. It is this wondering curiosity that takes an interest in the variety of national worlds and falls into astonishment before the new question of truth.

The passage directly echoes Heidegger's well-known analysis of curiosity as a "tendency toward seeing" belonging to the everydayness of Dasein.[465] Despite Heidegger's claim that "curiosity has nothing to do with the contemplation that wonders at being, *thaumazein*…,"[466] his description will help elucidate the reasons why Husserl assigns to curiosity a specific, crucial place in the development of philosophical interest. For Heidegger, when Dasein finishes or interrupts what it is busy with, the circumspection that guides its taking-care-of becomes free. Heidegger calls this way of being resting [*Ausruhen*]. It is a modality of care in which care no longer "*has to* bring near" what is at hand in the work-world. The silencing of this imperative is what makes rest restful. To rest means to look away from the near-at-hand things with which Dasein is involved in an everyday way. Freed circumspection, because it is circumspection, continues to bring things into the purview of Dasein. But it does not bring what is distant to hand such that it would function in the context of a work. In turning away from what is nearest without getting involved, freed circumspection "lets itself be intrigued just by the outward appearance of the world."[467] Because Dasein is "just curious," it holds beings clear of the familiar surround of taking-care-of-things. It is for this reason that it "tends to leave the things nearest at hand for a distant and strange world."[468] This description might very well pertain to what Husserl calls curiosity in its "original place in natural life."

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[465] Being and Time, p. 159. The methodological frameworks in which the two analyses occur are very different. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's aim in addressing curiosity is explicitly existential and ontological. He is not primarily concerned with accounting for the possibility of theoretical cognition. Husserl's analysis occurs within what Heidegger characterizes as a traditional inquiry that tries to discover the origin of science in this particular tendency of Dasein. We have outlined the methodological situation of Husserl's reflections at the beginning of this chapter.

[466] Being and Time, p. 161

[467] Ibid.

[468] Ibid.

The wondering curiosity that Husserl equates with incipient theoretical interest is a development rooted in original curiosity, but is precisely an *Abwandlung*, a variant. We can specificity this attitude by considering how it constitutes the arbitrary. In serious practical engagements, the arbitrary appears under the sign of the irrelevant. It is the "might as well be otherwise" of everything impertinent to what is going on. Constantly at play in practical orientations, however, is a glancing contact with the irrelevant that does not overlook it for its irrelevance but rather sojourns in its indifference to the task at hand. In rest, where pressing practical interests are dropped, curiosity enjoys looking into the irrelevant as such. But as a wondering, curiosity becomes contemplative and inquisitive. It takes an interest in the arbitrariness of things in a positive fashion: the arbitrary might as well be otherwise *and yet it is such as it is*. In this manner, curiosity discovers the arbitrary as a cognitive theme. In pursuing its interests, curiosity exhibits a remarkable kind of carefulness that enters into tension with the flightiness on which Heidegger focuses. In this mode, curiosity is perhaps best interpreted, not as *Neugier* (a greed for the new), but simply as *curiosus*, carefulness as opposed to carelessness. Everyday praxis is careless in its blindness to everything non-salient from the perspective of what is going on. This "natural living" is incurious—directed toward definite possibilities, and responsive to "serious" demands issuing from practical situations. The greedy consumption of irrelevant sights, sounds and information that occupies "free time" equally finds nothing demanding careful consideration in the trivialities with which it busies itself. Wondering curiosity escapes the alternative between the relevant and the irrelevant and the rhythm of work and rest on which it is based. It is an attitude of playful *carefulness* that attends to things for no other reason than to attend to them, a studiousness oblivious to every pressing matter.

Husserl thus follows what Heidegger characterizes as the traditional route of grounding theory in a cognitively oriented curiosity. And yet, Husserl will outline a motivational path that opens the theoretical interest only by exhausting and transcending the resources of curiosity in the search for genuine knowledge.

The nation in political historicity is continually engaged with alien-nations and the mythoi that define them. These engagements, however, are primarily serious matters. War, negotiation, trade, alliance, etc. occur within practical situations belonging to the *Totalsituation* of the nation. Curiosity lets all these serious life-interests fall away. Although it tends to become captivated by strange and distant worlds, curiosity is not caught up in the drama that lends to them their depth as rival homes of historical existence. It lets itself be intrigued merely by the outward appearance of alien worlds, tending to form caricatures in which they appear as distinct, coherent pictures. Such are the objects of curiosity in the international movement that Husserl describes. Curiosity does not strand understanding in the inaccessibility of the alien homeworld. It moves from world-picture to world-picture, taking in their variety. Its power to destabilize the claim of the home mythos does not stem from a serious meditation on its validity. Rather, in fulfilling its interest in the variety of world-pictures, curiosity's obliviousness to every serious concern allows it to encounter the home-nation as yet another caricature. Privileged in this consciousness is the arbitrariness of each world; it is what it is though it might have been otherwise, and yet each is valid for its participants *in the same way* as self-evidently actual. The running through of the various mythical world-apperceptions

results in an "identity producing synthesis [*Identitätssynthese*]" that constitutes both home and alien worlds as naïve world-representations.[469]

Husserl can only attribute such revelatory power to the rhapsodic movement of proto-philosophical curiosity because it transpires against the background of political historicity. It presupposes those serious movements of critique rooted in what Steinbock calls transgression. The potential philosopher has inherited traditions of transgression. The international history of war, trade, negotiation, etc. has shown her that foreign national worlds really are *valid* for aliens and that her own nation is just one homeworld amongst others. The unique power of wondering curiosity is that it does not approach foreign systems of validity in an invested attitude that brings one into a more intimate, critical relation to the home. The disconnected attentiveness to what is arbitrary in things allows for the picturing of the national homeworld as yet another system of relative validity to which the wonderer is not specially bound by any pressing life-interest.

The curious overview of national-mythical worlds does not in itself motivate the idea of universal truth. The *Vienna Lecture* glosses over a crucial step in simply stating that the new question of truth arises "through" the astonishing contrast of nationally valid worlds. The astonishing contrast first ends in a comic spectacle of human provinciality. In serious attitudes, the contrast between national mythoi is acceptable because our mythos, rooted as it is in our national life, is an effective mythos to which we have entrusted ourselves.[470] But for the dispassionately curious spectator who sees all humanity wrapped up in contrasting world-views, each of which understands the others by centering itself, this seriousness is itself comedic. Whoever has really appreciated this spectacle can never wholly return to serious life-interests in the national horizon. In this case, curiosity not only momentary suspends serious life, but radically unhinges it. Here is perhaps the motivational source of that cultural relativism that philosophy, once it has

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[469] HUSS XXIX, p. 44.

[470] The problem of the "true" being of the home-nation's gods in comparison with gods occupying analogous positions or roles in a foreign *Animistik* can be likened to the case of foreign words in a foreign language. This writing implement lying on the desk is a pencil. The reason for this is my having been raised in the English language, but in my perceiving recognition I do not "call" it pencil. The word rather embraces perfectly what this thing is, expresses everything essential to its sensuous and practical being, and is ready to be spoken in my interior voice at the suggestion of the thing itself. In German, a pencil is called "*Bleistift*". This foreign word is a "true" word because it says what a pencil is. But it will always be off-center with respect to the thing itself; it does not grab hold of everything about it with the same perfection, and because of this "calls" the pencil something rather than expressing was it is. I know about the off-centeredness of *Bleistift*, not for having remained in English, but precisely to the extent that I have traveled into the German language and participated in it. I have thus really discovered firsthand and with the utmost clarity that *Bleistift* says pencil in German. But the two words are only interchangeable via an assumption that conveys to the foreign word the same expressive power I find in the native word. This assumption is of course illegitimate. The foreign word occurs in a foreign linguistic context that is singular in its articulated coherence (I guess that German ears hear the *Blei* in *Bleistift* with its associations to a whole family of compound forms whereas pencil is immediately coupled, by virtue of its word-sound and function, with the pen). To the extent that *Bleistift* is a full and true word for the native English speaker, it is because she de-centers it and has it say pencil. The expressive power belonging to *Bleistift* itself within the German language is not a fully *effective* power for her.

been established, will catch in a contradiction by treating it as a principled position.[471] According to its historical origin, however, such relativism is an irreverent response to the provinciality of principled living, and its only true contradiction would be to make itself into a serious doctrine. It is not a coincidence that philosophy will enter into conflict with the sophistic arts that cynically play mercenary in a contest of relative truths. This sophism is coeval with philosophy; it springs from the same source, and is, as it were, its sibling.

This consideration highlights that the genesis of philosophy is most immediately tied to the effort to continue serious life having faced down the comedy of human provincialism. The first philosopher had to have judged the spectacle of humanity in its allegiance to relative world-views to be intolerable from the standpoint of the ongoing tasks of critique. National Dasein can no longer seriously determine and shape her reality in accordance with the evidential framework that formerly governed the verification of judgments. According to Husserl, the only possible way to continue the critical determination of reality is to demote all truths verified in the national framework, including the ultimate truths of mythical knowledge, to relative world-representations *of* a world-in-itself. The national mythoi, one's own and those of the others, now count "as distinct conceptualizations of the same world in distinct historicities."[472] Truth-in-itself is no longer attainable through the immanent critique of nationally bound traditions in the international horizon. One must rather find methods of discovering the one identical reality to which they all refer. The distinction between *doxa* and *epiteme* has become a necessary task. Its original significance is inseparable from the idea of a universalization of humanity ("all who are no longer blinded by tradition") in its critical determination of the one, self-same world.

At every stage, Husserl's inquiry appeals to possibilities gradually built up in the course of historical development. The curious variation on national mythically apperceived worlds is not a fortuitous synthesis one day happened upon and executed in the unity of a single experience. The constitution of the variety of national world-pictures presupposes trials of transgression as well as disciplines of international curiosity that consistently develop their subject-matter without broaching the "new question of truth." Further, the "*wirkliche Welt*" that comes into view for the accomplished synthesis is nothing more than "the vague thought of what is identical for innumerable nations."[473] A long historical path stretches from the appearance of this vague thought in individual subjectivity to the formation of a vocational community dedicated to *theoria*. Nonetheless, the curious overview of nations, itself occurring against the background of political historicity, hands over to historical humanity the concrete possibility of developing the philosophical interest. For the national Dasein that originally executes or inherits this transformation, "life becomes receptive to motivations which are possible only in this [philosophical] attitude, motivations for new sorts of goals for thought and

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[471] For an example of Husserl's favored mode of exposing this contradiction, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 126-7.

[472] HUSS XXIX, p. 13.

[473] Ibid., p. 45.

methods through which, finally, philosophy comes to be and he becomes a philosopher."[474]

The pursuit of the new question demands the formation of a vocational community that is no longer interested in learning from the international exchange of *doxa*. For the philosophically interested, the mutual enrichment and critique of world-representations can never clarify the world as it is. It is in the service of seeing what is in itself identical in meaning and validity that the epistemic framework of non-philosophical understanding will have to be denationalized. Common language and literacy, homebound forms of normality and maturity, and the whole matrix of national customs and traditions will continue to function in the pursuit of theoretical truths. But the pursuit of theoretical truth demands that they no longer be *decisive*. Everything national must appear as a contingent mode of access to truths identically accessible from any empirical *Geschichtlichkeit*. The "everyone" intended as the subject of philosophical truth is thus not international humanity in the full diversity of its complementary world-views, but rather those of every nation who know they cannot see according to their native traditions. For Husserl, philosophy is not another nationally bound project that reforms itself in international space through critique and response. No national, international or intranational formation of political historicity can accommodate the philosophical vocation. To dedicate oneself to philosophy, one must engage motivations that do not lie in the finite worldliness of national life. But this transcendence of national horizons is internal to the vocational community and its "new form of communalization."[475] The form of synthesis achieved between this vocation and the remainder of nationally bound praxis is another question.

6.
The Possibility of "Greece"

Viewed from the perspective of the concerns governing the *Crisis* as a whole, Husserl's reflection on the geopolitical emergence of philosophy is meant to confirm the historical possibility of "Greece," the "spiritual birthplace" of Europe. We should thus locate the origin of Greece at the term of the genesis outlined above. Greece is the nation that once upon a time tried to accommodate philosophy and thereby instituted a novel mode of living historically, "a historicity of a new level."[476]

The national accommodation of philosophy is inherently paradoxical. We read again that provocative phrase from the *Vienna Lecture*: "Unlike all other cultural works, philosophy is not a movement of interest which is bound to the soil of the national tradition."[477] This sweeping contrast, we said, is based on the claim that, unlike all

[474] Crisis, p. 285.

[475] Crisis, p. 286.

[476] HUSS XXIX, p. 15.

[477] Crisis, p. 286.

cultural products and methods that circulate in political historicity, philosophy, according to its defining interest, *was never bound* to a national context of meaning. The possibility of Greece depends upon a collective decision to revolutionize national life in light of this a-national movement of interest. This decision is not already guaranteed by the breakthrough of theory itself. Husserl depicts it as the result of a protracted struggle between traditional and untraditional camps within the "sphere of political power."[478] Either philosophical knowledge becomes finitized so as to serve the traditional interests of practical life, or else practical life infinitizes itself through a process of universal critique (Ch. 2.3). Greece becomes the Greece that births Europe when it judges the life of finite tasks to be intolerable and dedicates itself to universal critique. If the Greek nation once defined itself in this project of criticism, it committed itself to its own denationalization.

In Greece, philosophical communalization is not limited to a vocational sphere that relates to the rest of culture only haphazardly via the non-vocational lives of the personalities who carry it out. The dedication of Greek life to philosophical existence necessitates, for Husserl, that it not be so limited: "the spread [of philosophical interest] *cannot occur exclusively* as one of vocational scientific inquiry; it occurs [rather] as a movement of education [*Bewegung der Bildung*] reaching far beyond the vocational sphere."[479] With this movement of education, Husserl refers to nothing less than the thoroughgoing "upheaval of national culture."[480] Whether national traditions are ultimately "discarded" or "formed anew in the spirit of philosophical ideality,"[481] they are first of all unhinged from the justificatory framework belonging to the mythico-practically apperceived world: "Everything is relativized in the critique proceeding from theoretical reason [*Kritik aus theoretischer Vernunft*], truth and being [themselves] receive a new sense."[482] Greece thus elevates the theoretical attitude above the mythico-practical as the orientation capable of providing an ultimate view of the whole in which the praxes of natural life move. This reorientation is not only a matter of replacing "priests" with "philosophers." Because philosophy takes over the governing responsibilities of the ruling knowledge, its new attitude entails "a far-reaching transformation of the whole praxis of human existence, i.e., the whole of cultural life…"[483] The entire traditional inheritance that prefigures possibilities for thinking and acting is no longer appropriated or disappropriated through a critique that renews the generative force of a historical community. Instead, empirical-historical rootedness itself, adherence to tradition as such, is made a problem: "Historical Dasein [*Das geschichtliche Dasein*] is constantly submitted to critique."[484] Greece initiates "a historicity of a new

[478] Ibid., p. 288.

[479] Ibid., p. 287.

[480] Ibid., p. 288.

[481] Ibid.

[482] HUSS XXIX, p. 12

[483] Crisis, p. 287.

[484] HUSS XXIX, p. 15

level [*eine Historizität neuer Stufe*]"[485] in which traditional history itself needs to be overcome.

The trajectory of thought we have reconstructed from the manuscripts clearly shows that this self-imposed denationalization is not to be equated with openness to alien traditions. The novelty of "Greece" cannot lie in a commitment to transgression and cosmopolitan curiosity. Husserl integrates these moments into the genesis of philosophical culture precisely to establish that the latter involves their explicit devaluation as insufficient forms of critique. A phenomenological definition of Europe such as that offered by Klaus Held, however illuminating in its own right, must be recognized as incommensurable with Husserl's own position. By identifying European spirit with wonderment before the "one world" that "*is* only as the ordering *of* the many worlds,"[486] Held makes a philosophically oriented Europe compatible with "modest awe" in the face of the other as an origin of world-constitution.[487] The peculiarity of Europe thus "consists simply in the openness for non-European cultures that began among the Greeks…;" or again: "What is properly European resides in its not having closed itself off to the outside… Europe found itself in that it established its existence in relation to, or more precisely, *as* relation to foreign cultures *in* their otherness."[488]

Husserl might argue that such a depiction is appealing because it avoids those unpleasant responsibilities that accompany the Greco-European heritage. In Husserl's view, European humanity must constantly critique the provincialism of its own traditions. But it does so by *remaining true to itself* as the "historical teleology of the infinite goals of reason,"[489] not by transcending itself in the direction of non-European cultures. Every hermeneutic discipline of estrangement, comparison, and critique in light of cultural difference would seem to be regulated by a specifically Greco-European self-responsibility that demands insight into the universal. Rodolphe Gasché recognizes Husserl's intention well when he writes that Greece overcomes its national bounds via the "constitutive foreignness of the universal."[490] It is not the alien homeworld, but rather the manifestation of the universal itself that unseats the nation or the community of nations as the ultimate horizon of truth. Closed nationalism and open cosmopolitanism are two poles defining the boundaries of a political historicity whose possibilities are transcended the moment the goals of theoretical reason become historically effective. As the bearer of this transcendence, Husserl's Europe cannot properly understand itself through transgressive encounters with its others.[491] It rather holds its ground as the

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[485] Ibid.

[486] Held, Klaus. 2002. The origin of Europe with the Greek discovery of the world. *Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* 7 (Fall): 91.

[487] Ibid., p. 100.

[488] Ibid., p. 101.

[489] Crisis, p. 299.

[490] Europe or the Infinite Task, p. 70.

[491] Crisis, p. 275.

initiator of "a universal cultural spirit [which], drawing all of humanity under its spell, is thus an advancing transformation in the form of a new historicity."[492] Far from proceeding by way of transgression, this transformation is "the history of the cutting-off" of non-European life.[493] Is not this description, precisely because of the violence it implies, more appropriate to the historical tendencies unleashed with the European project than the description of Europe as "relation to non-European cultures in their otherness"?

Steinbock's solution to the troubling implications of Husserl's Europe is to judge the concept to be philosophically impossible. With reference to Europe, Steinbock writes that Husserl "sometimes feels compelled" to posit "an overarching totality" that would pretend to surpass the irreducible co-relativity of home and alien worlds through the "universalization of a homeworld."[494] Steinbock concludes that, because the alien can never become wholly accessible from the perspective of the home, such a synthesis could only be dissimulative, concealing violence against the "limit-claims" of the alien.[495] As we have seen, Husserl's "compulsion" to transcend the perspectivalism of home-alien encounters is motivated by the need to make historically comprehensible the epistemic claims of philosophy itself. If the home-alien structure is irreducible and operative at all levels of human understanding, then the highest form of reason consists in disclosing and assessing those possibilities belonging to one's particular culture as it has been formed in the open horizon of civilization. Appealing to the inevitable "historical imbeddedness of the individual in a generative tradition," Steinbock argues that "critique, most profoundly, would not be 'free' in the sense of autonomy or being unconstrained, but in the sense of a freeing up of possibilities, of emancipating present and future best possible ways for generating a homeworld, evaluating them as they are historically emerging."[496] Husserl's Europe concept purports to reconcile just this inevitability of historical embeddedness with the autonomy of philosophical reason. Is not such a reconciliation necessary even if only to ratify the epistemological force of the *a priori* concepts governing historicity itself? Is it not already implied in the attempt to understand every factual home-alien encounter according to the universal structures (homeworld-alienworld, tradition, language, empathy etc.) that govern its possibility?[497]

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[492] Ibid., p. 277. Translation modified.

[493] Ibid., p. 279.

[494] Home and Beyond, pp. 185, 235.

[495] Ibid., p. 250.

[496] Ibid., p. 205-8.

[497] To answer this accusation, it would be necessary to reevaluate the phenomenological method of access to the *a priori* in light of the inevitable relativity of home and alien worlds in political historicity. An effort in this direction was undertaken by Merleau-Ponty in his essay "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," published in the collection *Primacy of Perception*. He there argues that the method of free variation employed in eidetic seeing can never declare the *a priori* irrelevance of an encounter with the facts of foreign worlds. The reflecting phenomenologist can never rule out that involvement in her homeworld has over-determined the course of examples that she takes as completely arbitrary illustrations of pure possibilities. An engagement with ethnological facts is "indispensible for any true apprehension of the

If we somehow know that there is no getting beyond the structures of political historicity, then we also know that Husserl's Europe is a mirage. Husserl, of course, claims otherwise. Europe, for him, represents "a supranationality of a completely new sort" based on "a new spirit, stemming from philosophy and its particular sciences, a spirit of free critique…"[498] It is thus not "merely an anthropological type like 'China' or 'India.'"[499] Its expansion occurs because non-European civilization "Europeanizes itself," each nation pursuing its *own task* of denationalization.[500] But these claims that Europeanization is something other than the imperialistic domination of one homeworld by another are necessarily signs of that domination and have the effect of concealing it. Philosophy, which came into existence by destabilizing the claim of any civilization to constitute a final horizon of critique, once again falls prey to mythic, totalizing narratives by identifying its cognitive aims with Europe's imperial designs. Despite his proclamations to the contrary, Husserl actually reveals philosophy to be political-historical by tying its realization to the decision that "the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civilizations bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning…"[501]

Husserl's reflections on the geopolitical origin of philosophy aim to show that such cynicism is untenable as a philosophical position. The very belief in the goal of *episteme* implies historical transformations for which one makes oneself responsible in pursuit of the goal itself. In reflecting on these transformations, one becomes conscious of oneself as the representative of a historical humanity that cannot accept the idea that history is simply a confluence of anthropological types, each with its relative norms,

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possible" because of the unforeseeable "impulse" it can lend to philosophical imagination (90). In short, the philosopher interested in self-same truth must continue to make use of transgression. Merleau-Ponty claims that this conclusion is implied by the trajectory of Husserl's own thinking, and particularly evidenced in a letter to Levy-Bruhl concerning foreign life-worlds he composed roughly two months before delivering the *Vienna Lecture*. Derrida's rebuttal to Merleau-Ponty, presented in his *Introduction to the Origin of Geometry* (112-3), seems decisive at least as a matter of historical critique. He shows that Merleau-Ponty misunderstands the aim of free variation as an effort to pre-conceive all possible experiences in their diversity, and thus as a "replacement" for factual inquiry. Husserl never intended such a thing. In fact, an eidetic philosophy that simultaneously aspired to "learn from" factual reality would, despite it modest self-presentation, actually aim to take the measure of everything. It would rejoin, as Merleau-Ponty himself indicates, "phenomenology in the Hegelian sense" (92): a philosophy that claims to understand all actual experience in its actuality by reconciling it with reason. We also concur with Derrida that Husserl, far from sensing a conflict between the reality of relative worlds and the purity of eidetic insight via free variation, consistently uses the latter as an explicit means of accounting for the former, even in his last writings. It is at any rate clear that Husserl presents his account of the origin of philosophy out of political historicity as an effort to account for the historical possibility of *episteme*, not a hermeneutics of universalism through exchange. Transgression functions in the historical background of philosophy, but it plays no methodological role in its pursuit of the new question of truth. It makes room for a kind of question that it cannot answer.

[498] Crisis, p. 289.

[499] Ibid., p. 16.

[500] Ibid., pp. 275, 289.

[501] Ibid., p. 16.

ideals and validities that make up a coherent relative world.[502] The historical emergence of philosophy out of political historicity has once and for all established the project of a universal humanity that would not result from the imperial expanse of civilizations. Seen in this light, Husserl's reflections on the origin of Europe seek to clarify the historical conditions for the principled critique of empire, imperialism, or whatever names one gives to projects of world-wide expansion that occur within political historicity and thus through the dominance of one relative homeworld over others.

This retort does not dissolve the difficulties involved in Husserl's conception of Europeanization. Although Husserl's reflections show that the philosopher is required to take responsibility for the project of universal humanity by virtue of the historical genesis of her field, and although this responsibility would be taskless if it did not move in a specific historical matrix of appropriation, it is not necessary to identify this matrix with the history of Greco-Europe. Are there not other origins one could look to besides Greece? And does not the very nature of the crisis-problematic presuppose that the task assigned from Greece can become irrevocably lost to the irresponsibility of a humanity that misappropriates it? If this had happened, the belief in a Europeanized Greece would be a symptom of that irresponsibility, a conservative apology for a humanity that had already "collapsed." Husserl's reflections on the origin of philosophy proceed on the basis of a commitment to the European matrix of appropriation and seek to render that commitment understandable. Belief in the factual event of "Greece" is an article of faith that eidetic insight can clarify as a pure possibility. The vocational subjectivity of the good European inevitably shapes Husserl's reflections, and binds his commitment to universal humanity to a universal Europeanization that we will have to examine (Ch 6).

Supposing Europe as philosophy's vocational horizon, we still have to ask if the return to "Greece" in its departure from political historicity has really clarified the origin of Europe. Does not the possibility of this "return to Greece" itself have to be accounted for? The return returns to a Greece that is European in Husserl's sense of the word. On the basis of what historical connection does the Europe of the present find its way back to the archaic Europe of Greece? How does it discover Greece as *its* historical birthplace? These questions are complicated by the fact that by positing a "philosophical" Greece Husserl enters into direct contradiction with Plato and his Socrates, perhaps more qualified than any to assess the philosophical bearing of their homeworld. In *Republic*, the philosophical polis was discussed in explicit contrast to every existing political arrangement. There, philosophy understood its task on the basis of divine, not historical-political, assignment. Do we then have to do with a difference of historical judgment regarding the philosophical character of Greece? On the contrary, we will see that the inquiry into Greece as the birthplace of Europe does not yet bring the question of Europe's origin into full view. The Greece of Plato and Socrates, to tell the truth, was not yet Europe. This is because Europe first establishes itself in history *by returning to a historical Greece*. The historical origin of Europe does not lie in its birth, but in its rebirth of that birth. Europe exists historically via Renaissance.

[502] Ibid., p. 7.

Chapter Five:
Europe's History: Renaissance

1.
Europe's Incorporation of its Ancient Origin

Husserl's reflections on the pre-theoretical nation are meant to clarify as pure possibilities the transformations to which any empirical account of the historical origin of Greece would necessarily testify. This Greece is not just any social formation, but that birthplace and cradle of philosophical interest to which modern philosophy incessantly makes appeal. It was in Greece that *theoria* first appeared as a task essential to shaping a world that might accommodate the ultimate goals of culture-creating life. It is in this Greece that Husserl's Europe has its origin.

We know that this Greece did not exist for the Platonic reflection that began from Greece as a historical reality. In fact, *Republic* teaches that a social formation such as Husserl's Greece is an historical implausibility. If we nonetheless believe that a unique nexus of events once actualized those possibilities essential to ancient Greece, we still face the massive problem of connecting this Greek origin to the European present out of which it is appropriated as *its* origin. Husserl's claim that ancient Greece is the spiritual birthplace of modern Europe seems to depend upon an implicit interpretation of world history that would have to be verified as in agreement with the facts. This verification could only occur at the term of a monumental effort of historical research that would discover the persistence of what was essential to Greece through all the cultural transformations and displacements that intervene between the ancient world of Socrates and Plato and the contemporary world in which Husserl summons his good Europeans to reflection. Further, because Husserl claims that the historical teleology of the infinite tasks of reason is "inborn…only in our Europe"[503], this research would have to establish a lineage whereby theoretical reason passes from Greece to Europe without animating the spiritual life of those civilizations Husserl classifies as non-European.

This research is nowhere to be found in Husserl's *Crisis* writings. Instead, Husserl seems to take his historical bearings from a painfully general schema of ages, "ancient," "middle" and "modern," that connect Europe to its hallowed origin. The glaring lack of precision in this framework creates the impression that the Greco-European connection in Husserl's work simply assumes the legitimacy of governing historical narratives that are highly questionable from the standpoint of serious historical research and whose ideological function seems readily apparent. It is entirely possible that Husserl accepted such historical narratives. He never seems to call them into question.

Within the framework of his reflection, it was in fact impossible for him to call them into question. This is not due to the power of their ideological influence. It is rather because the analysis of Europe's connection to its Greek origin is not permitted to make

[503] Ibid., p. 273.

any claims regarding the actual transmission of culture from one generation to the next. If it is a philosophical polis, Europe cannot have a history such that it would passively assume a heritage at its origin and hand it down in the manner of a developing tradition. The polis, as Socrates' teaches, does not blossom at the term of a long process of cultural maturation, but through the overcoming of adulthood. Husserl's claims about Europe's connection to its ancient origin do not meddle in the project of a "speculative interpretation of our historical development."[504] Husserl, to echo an assessment of Derrida, never became interested in "history" in this sense.[505] The schema of European ages is not a general sketch on the plane of empirical historical development that detailed investigations might fill in. We will see that the ancient, middle, and modern ages are components of a Renaissance that is not a period "in" European history but Europe's mode of autonomously appropriating the entire historical phenomenon from within. It would be unfair to criticize Husserl for privileging certain events within European history that confirm his idea of what Europe should be.[506] In fact, he is really concerned only with one event, the Renaissance, which determines what European history is. Let us try to examine this Renaissance according to its own structures rather than deciding beforehand that it belongs in the context of a broader European history.

According to Husserl's conception, the Renaissance is how Europe exists historically. The Renaissance is never "left behind" by the forward march of European history because it determines "*the whole meaning* of the modern period."[507] It is thus the background against which Husserl will attempt his teleological reconstruction of modern philosophy. The rough historical divisions Husserl employs in this reconstruction (he speaks, for instance, of "centuries") are not to be placed alongside the Renaissance as if on a timeline. They are internal to the development of the Renaissance itself. For this reason, Husserl's explicit discussions of the Renaissance in the *Crisis* do not occur within the course of his teleological reconstruction of modern philosophy, but in those methodological sections that fame the discussion as a whole by identifying the subject of the historical inquiry: European humanity as such. It is in and only in Renaissance that European humanity establishes itself historically.

In the introductory sections of part one, Husserl understands the Renaissance as the movement of self-definition through which European humanity dedicates itself to the infinite task of universal criticism. By dedicating itself to reason in this fashion, European humanity pursues a radical autonomy from history that is simultaneously a faithful

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[504] Ibid., p. 275.

[505] Introduction to the Origin, pp. 116-117.

[506] In her article "Is Europe an Essence?," Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab treats Husserl's discourse on Europe as an example of the construction of the cultural self: "the cultural self is to be constructed with a selected number of facts and givens chosen from the manifold of the past and present…." (70). Whatever incredulity Husserl's concept of Renaissance warrants, he does not choose to emphasize it at the expense, say, of the Crusades. To understand Husserl, we will have to recognize that the concept functions in a process of "self-construction" that occurs as an explicit effort to transcend all cultural formations and their historical "manifold." "Is Europe an Essence? Levinas, Husserl and Derrida on Cultural Identity and Ethics." *International Studies in Philosophy* 34, no. 4: pp. 55-75.

[507] Crisis, p. 197. My emphasis.

allegiance to the past: "In the Renaissance, as is well known, European humanity brings about a revolutionary change [*Umwendung*]. It turns against its previous [*bisherige*] way of existing—the medieval [*die mittlealterliche*]—and disowns it [*entwertet sie*], seeking to shape itself anew in freedom [*in Freiheit neu gestalten*]. Its admired model is ancient humanity [*antiken Menchentum*]. This mode of existence [*Daseinsart*] is what it wishes to reproduce in itself [*es an sich nachbilden*]…" Renaissance is at once a reproduction and a shaping anew in freedom. These opposites can only coincide insofar as the *Daseinsart* it reproduces consists solely in the will to universal critique through *theoria*, or, as Husserl here calls it, the "philosophical form of existence." From the perspective of the Renaissance, ancient Greek humanity is essentially defined by:

> nothing other than [*nichts anderes als*] the philosophical form of existence: freely giving oneself, one's whole life, its rule through pure reason or through philosophy…Philosophy as theory frees not only the theorist but any philosophically educated person. And theoretical autonomy is followed by practical autonomy. According to the guiding ideal of the Renaissance, ancient man forms himself with insight through free reason. For this renewed 'Platonism' this means not only that man should be changed ethically [but that] the whole human surrounding world, the political and social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew through free reason, through the insights of a universal philosophy.[508]

Husserl's presentation of this "well known" historical phenomenon is based on principles that actually undermine every attempt to discover Europe's identity in the course of historical development.

1. *The Renaissance seeks to reproduce "nothing other than" the philosophical form of existence*. As Husserl conceives it, the Renaissance does not model Greek art, Greek politics or any other feature of Greek culture. It wants to emulate only the will to critique established culture in light of universal philosophy. This also means that dedication via Renaissance does not bind European humanity to any particular form of philosophical rationality favored by the Greeks. In the *Crisis*, Husserl in fact emphasizes that the modern philosophical project is based, *from the beginning*, on a decisive departure from Greek thought: "The first thing we must do is understand the fundamental transformation of the idea, the task of universal philosophy which took place at the beginning of the modern age when the ancient idea was taken over. From Descartes on, the new idea governs the total development of philosophical movements and becomes the inner motive behind all their tensions."[509] The exact nature of this transformation, which concerns a new conception of the *a priori* in mathematics, need not concern us here. What is essential is that this "new idea" occurs *out of the Renaissance*, which is devoted to the reproduction of a *Daseinsart* and not a particular style of scientific rationality: "In accordance with this ancient model [*Gemäß diesem antiken Vorbild*]…a theoretical philosophy should again [*wieder*] be developed which was not to be taken over blindly

[508] Ibid., p. 8.

[509] Ibid., p. 21.

from the tradition but must emerge anew [*neu werden soll*] from independent inquiry and criticism."[510] The Renaissance does not take over forms of theoretical rationality from the Greeks. *Theoria* conforms to the Greek model only if it is *again* constituted *anew* in independent inquiry. The Renaissance deviates from its proper sense precisely when it begins to prefer Greek cultural forms and abandons the radical indifference to cultural or historical origin inherent to theoretical interest in truth. The true "Renaissance man" would echo Husserl's statement at the conclusion of his 1911 *Logos* essay: "To one truly without prejudice, it is immaterial whether a certainty comes to us from Kant or Thomas Aquinas, from Darwin or Aristotle, from Helmholtz or Paracelsus."[511]

The disowning or devaluation of the "middle age" that occurs in the Renaissance is thus ambiguous in nature. On the one hand, the medieval epoch is available out of the Renaissance. Every intellectual endeavor belonging to that historical "period" is potentially valuable material in the effort to reproduce the Greek *Daseinsform*. Just as there is nothing inherently praiseworthy in Greek art, politics, or science, so is there nothing inherently objectionable in medieval cultural forms. On the other hand, the Renaissance completely disowns the middle age as a way of standing in relation to the Greek past, which means, from the perspective of the Renaissance, of standing in relation to Europe's own birth. The Renaissance turns against every "middle age" that would mediate between Europe's present and its Greek foundation as a conveyance of heritage. While the Renaissance establishes itself by *reproducing* the Greek origin in its purity, the middle age takes it over and modifies it in the course of historical development.

Was the Europe of the middle age, then, really Europe? Husserl does refer to it as Europe's own *bisherige Daseinsweise*.[512] This ambiguous movement by which Europe becomes what it is by disowning what it was is an essential structure of the Renaissance. Europe comes into historical existence when faithfulness to its Greek origin requires that it stop becoming what it was "up until now." What Europe was up until now, through the accumulated force of cultural tradition, was not really Europe. The "middle age" thus encompasses everything back to and including the Greek origin insofar as it functions as lineage. It is without contradiction that Husserl, directly after characterizing the Renaissance as a disowning of the middle age through the reproduction of *anitken Menchentum*, suddenly *includes* the "ancient age" alongside the medieval as a target of European disownment. European humanity "seeks to renew itself radically, as against the foregoing medieval and ancient age [*gegenüber dem bisherigen, dem mittelalterlichen und antiken*], precisely and only through its new philosophy."[513] In reproducing what was essential to Greece, the Renaissance turns against history as "the foregoing" or "the up until now"; it turns against the *bisherig* as such.

The free appropriation of insight with complete indifference as to its historical or cultural origin also extends in principle to non-European experience. By defining itself as the rebirth of Greece, Europe becomes responsible for the denationalization of truth-

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[510] Ibid.., p. 8.

[511] Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 147.

[512] Krisis, p. 5.

[513] Crisis, p. 12.

seeking that characterizes the philosophical way of existence. Husserl acknowledges that the Greeks "did in fact learn much" from "wise Egyptians, Babylonians, etc."[514] We have seen, however, the rigor with which he seeks to distinguish the specifically Greek way of learning from every manner of inter-cultural hermeneutics. Greece is not a participant in the dialogue of nations. According to Husserl, it is free to learn from other nations and their traditions in a radically new way because it alone can no longer console itself with a worldview. Husserl's demotion of Chinese and Indian philosophy to the status of so-called philosophy in the *Vienna Lecture* is thus perfectly consonant with a readiness to "learn from" figures in these traditions. The Renaissance establishes Europe as the sole custodian of the Greek life-project of needing to live according to the universals discoverable in theoretical reason. Prejudicial preference for one cultural tradition over another should play no role here. Any attempt to overcome Husserl's Eurocentrism must begin from the recognition that its principles already account for and justify every critique of narrow-mindedness rooted in an allegiance to a particular set of cultural institutions.

2. *The Europeanized Greece does not belong to Europe*. As opposed to the Platonic interpretation, Husserl claims that Greece was in fact constitutionally determined by the philosophical form of existence. In the Renaissance that defines it, Europe seeks to replicate this *Daseinsart*. Husserl's Renaissance thus involves the retroactive Europeanization of Greece. It determines Greece as the first historical breakthrough of what is essential to Europe.

At the same time, Greece, as it is given to the Renaissance, did not itself construct its *Daseinsart* on an historical model. It did not establish itself in the Renaissance of an ancient origin. Europe's Greece is thus wholly un-European because Europe is defined by understanding its rational task as an historical assignation from the past. Europe comes into historical existence by emulating a Greece that *did not exist historically* in the sense that its defining possibility was not made available to it by past accomplishments. Europe establishes itself by turning against tradition in the name of an ancient origin. Greece, since it is that origin itself, does not originate the European mode of appropriating history.

In this consists the only and the decisive difference between Europe and its Greece. Other than its becoming the object of a historical rebirth, the Greek origin remains unaltered by its appropriation in the Renaissance. It is the same origin: the will to shape oneself and the surrounding world in accordance with pure theoretical reason. Modern philosophical humanity, according to Husserl, appropriates this *Willensrichtung* via repetition, not alteration:

> We are what we are as functionaries of modern philosophical humanity; we are heirs and cobearers of the direction of the will that pervades this humanity; we have become this through a primal establishment [*Urstiftung*] which is at once a reestablishment [*Nachstiftung*] and an *Abwanderung* of the Greek primal establishment. In this [*dieser*] lies the *teleological beginning* [*teleologische Anfang*], the true birth of the European spirit as such.[515]

[514] Ibid., p. 279.

[515] Ibid., p. 71. Translation modified.

In his translation of this passage, David Carr treats *Abwanderung* as if it were *Abwandlung*. We thus read that the European primal establishment is at once a reestablishment and a "modification" of the Greek primal establishment. We have already seen that Husserl presents the shifts in theoretical rationality instituted at the outset of the modern period as developing *in accordance with* the ancient model provided by the Greek *Daseinsart*. They do not "modify" the Greek *Urstiftung* at all. Such modifications rather occur out of the *Abwanderung* of the Greek *Urstiftung* that determines the Renaissance as such. *Abwanderung* is a term of displacement, not alteration. It indicates that the Greek *Urstiftung* did not stay put, but moved elsewhere, where it has shown up *again*. If one must speak of the Renaissance as a modification of the Greek primal establishment, this is only in the structural sense that the *Urstiftung* is now simultaneously *Nachstiftung* and *Abwanderung*: reestablishment, repetition, reproduction and thus historical self-understanding.

3. *Europe does not begin in Greece*. Husserl does not have to figure out how to get from ancient Greece "up to" modern Europe because Europe does not begin in ancient Greece. It rather begins in the movement of Renaissance through which Europe dedicates itself to the reproduction of the Greek *Daseinsform*. The grammar of the above passage actually allows for multiple interpretations. Does the "*dieser*" in the final sentence refer solely to the phrase "the Greek primal establishment" or rather to the entire clause in which that phrase occurs: "a primal establishment which is at once a reestablishment and an *Abwanderung* of the Greek primal establishment"? In which of these does one discover the teleological beginning and true birth of the European spirit as such? Does Europe begin in an ancient *Urstiftung* or in an *Urstiftung* that is also a *Nachstiftung* and *Abwanderung* of the ancient *Urstiftung*? Carr's translation, which renders *dieser* as "the latter" and thus construes "the Greek primal establishment" as its antecedent, certainly conforms to German grammar and usage. The general bearing Husserl's historical project, however, suggests something different.

If the teleological beginning of Europe were in ancient Greece, then the Renaissance would be a very late "period" of European history. Husserl's teleological reflections, since they aim to explicate the unitary sense of that history, would then be responsible for tracing the entire development *initiated* in Greece, and taken over through Romanization, Christianization, etc.: "*In dieser Not uns besinnend, wandert unsere Blick zurück in die Geschichte unseres jetzigen Menchentums. Selstverständnis und dadurch inneren Halt können wir nur gewinnen durch Aufklärung ihres Einheitsinnes, der ihr von ihem Ursprung her eingeboren ist mit der neugestiften, die philosophischen Versuche als Triebkraft bewegenden Aufgabe.*"[516] The unitary sense running through the history of present-day humanity is inborn there right from its origin with its newly established task. In discovering this sense, however, Husserl does not even indicate the project of a global reconstruction of Western history "from Greece to the present." His teleological reflections begin in the Renaissance. The attempt to demonstrate the possibility of the historical genesis of a nation such as ancient Greece serves to show that the belief in ancient Greece constitutive of the Renaissance is believable according to the essential possibilities of historical development.

[516] Krisis, p. 12

Europe is thus connected to its ancient origin without laying claim to any coherent passage of tradition along a chain of generations. As we have emphasized, a philosophical polis *cannot* begin at the term of such a passage. When Socrates wanted to see his polis realized in the dimension of historical becoming he was told that *it already had begun*, long, long ago, but that this beginning was not accessible as a beginning through the backward references of historical artifacts. It is good luck for us that *Timeaus* identifies Egypt as the sanctuary that allows Athens to reconnect with its philosophical origin across the dimension of narrative history. The facts of intellectual history do indeed show that Greece received its philosophical impulse from the East, and that the products of its philosophical labor were for a long time neglected by "Europe" while they were treasured by the Islamic world. This history also could have been otherwise; its course is, strictly speaking, irrelevant given Husserl's concerns. But a situation in which empirical history has radically disinherited Europe from the origin it would claim for itself is the optimal limit-situation from which to bring the nature of Renaissance into stark relief. European humanity founds itself by believing that Greece once existed as a philosophical polis and by freely dedicating itself to its reestablishment. It can claim exclusive rights to this origin on the condition, not that no other civilization has come into contact with the essence of Greek culture, but that no other civilization has claimed this origin for itself in the only manner it can be respected as the origin that it was. The only acceptable method of appropriation is to turn against every middle age that would link present-day culture to Greece as the beginning of a tradition, and to birth it anew in Renaissance.

2.
Europe is not within History

It is beginning from these principles of Renaissance that we have to approach Husserl's claim that modern philosophical humanity—or Europe—is not a part of history. Introducing the historical-teleological part two of the *Crisis*, Husserl writes:

> Our interest is confined here to the philosophical modern age. But this is not a mere fragment of the most encompassing historical phenomenon [*des größten historischen Phänomens*] we have just described, that is, humanity struggling to understand itself (for this phrase expresses the whole phenomenon). Rather—as the reestablishment of philosophy with a new universal task and at the same time with the sense of a renaissance of ancient philosophy—it is at once a repetition and a universal transformation of meaning [*ineins eine Wiederholung und eine universale Sinnverwandlung*].[517]

Husserl thus opposes to mere participation in the ongoing struggle of historical humanity a repetition and universal transformation of sense. Because modern philosophical humanity is this repetition and universal transformation, one does not really "confine"

[517] Crisis, p. 14. Translation modified.

one's historical interest in making it the sole object of historical inquiry. How are we to understand this?

The whole historical phenomenon, Husserl would have us believe, is expressed in the phrase: "humanity struggling to understand itself." This description does not aim to express the historical nature of history (its very historicity), which Husserl describes as the interweaving of original and sedimented meaning-formations (Ch. 3.1), but rather to sum up the "human meaning" of history. It aims to express what gives to purposeful life within the historical dimension a unity of teleological sense. The statement that the meaning of history is "humanity struggling to understand itself" lends itself to two opposed interpretations. Either, it means that the meaning of history is essentially open, that its only meaning is the ongoing struggle for self-understanding. In this case, the formulation has historicist implications. Or else, it appeals to a definition of true humanity, and asserts that the meaning of history is humanity's struggle to understand itself according to it.

Husserl does indeed presuppose such a definition of true humanity in his summation of the historical phenomenon. This definition and its presupposition, however, are not experienced as an act of theoretical stipulation. The definition of humanity presupposed by Husserl rather occurs in that act of self-definition that constitutes a calling, which we have called dedication. In dedication, one defines one's true self such that it is at stake in the realization of a task. Husserl presupposes this definition in the sense that he believes it was once initiated as a historical project by ancient Greece: "the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its *entelechy*."[518] The definition of true humanity thus refers to the vocational dedication of Greece to discover its true self only in the task of universal critique. Greek humanity "seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature…"[519] Because it is vocational, this self-definition is only accomplished in *the faithful struggle* to realize the defining task: "if man loses this faith, it means nothing less than the loss of faith 'in himself,' in his own true being. This true being is not something he always already has, with the self-evidence of the 'I am,' but something he only has and can have in the form of the struggle for his truth, the struggle to make himself true."[520]

According to this Greek definition, the true being of humanity consists in the faithful struggle to realize the infinite tasks of reason. If we insert this definition into Husserl's summation of the historical phenomenon, we arrive at the following formulation: history is the struggling of humanity to understand itself as the struggle to realize the infinite tasks of reason. Is it redundant to describe history as humanity's struggle to understand itself as a struggle for reason? The seeming redundancy rather interprets history as a vocational phenomenon. This "understand itself as" refers to the act of a dedicated subject. History proper begins only when a human community defines its

[518] Ibid., p. 15.

[519] Ibid.

[520] Ibid, p. 13.

true self in relation to the struggle for *episteme* over against *doxa*. Pre-philosophical humanity, of course, already knows about and values the distinction between truth and opinion. This valuation occurs, however, within a framework of human interests to which the search for truth is always already in service (Ch. 4.3). Husserl thus understands reason in pre-philosophical humanity as "isolated and relative."[521] It is a mere "prefiguration" [522] of history as such, when the true self of humanity is "only possible" in the struggle for reason. Of course, there is a passage from pre-historical to historical humanity, from finite to infinite tasks. But the passage is equally a radical beginning because it opens a dimension of responsibility that exceeds every traditional claim. Greece begins history by initiating the universal *Sinnverwandlung* in which humanity *defines its true being* through tasks of *episteme*.

But in Greece, this *Sinnverwandlung* was not *at once* or *at one with* (*in eins*) *Wiederholung*. Only through Renaissance does it become impossible simply to "continue" the project of historical humanity. Europe does not come "after" Greece as a furtherance of its defining task. That task is instead understood as *at one with* responsibility to the past. Autonomy is identified with repetition. If the historical phenomenon is humanity's effort to define itself as the vocational subject of infinite tasks, then the Renaissance is consciousness of history as a whole. In this sense, Europe is not a part of the historical phenomenon because it contains all of it as the dimension of its own self-understanding.

From another perspective, Europe is not part of history because it has sworn off what is normally called history: the life of humanity devoted to finite tasks. Husserl understands this pre-historical history as universal other-influence in the dimensions of succession and geographical proximity. Every possible community will in fact accrue such a history. In the *Vienna Lecture*, we read: "Every spiritual shape exists essentially within a universal historical space or in a particular unity of historical time in terms of co-existence and succession; it has its history."[523] By drawing attention to this banality, Husserl wants to emphasize that any "historical" community is nested in motivational relationships with its neighbors and predecessors. The cultural forms of our homeworld carry forward intentions that have their origin outside the life of the home community. In the attempt to fully understand ourselves, we will thus be transported further and further from the here and now: "So if we pursue the historical interconnections, beginning, as is necessary, with ourselves and our nation, the historical continuity leads us further and further…"[524] Entering into the spiritual life of ever more remote shapes, we will discover that they are in turn under the influence of neighbors and predecessors: "In antiquity ultimately, we are led from the Romans to the Greeks, the Egyptians, the Persians, etc.; clearly, there is no end."[525]

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[521] Ibid.

[522] Ibid.

[523] Ibid., p. 274.

[524] Ibid.

[525] Ibid.

But Husserl does not simply intend to point out the endless connections that bind particular peoples or communities to one another. He wants to effect the intuition of the *single life* in which such peoples or communities are formed and into which they dissolve. It is this single life, he believes, that is actually brought into view by reflection on "historical connections":

> Through such a procedure mankind appears as a *single life* of men and peoples bound together only by spiritual relations, with a plenitude of human and cultural types which nevertheless flowingly interpenetrate one another. It is like a sea, in which men and peoples are the fleetingly formed, changing, and then disappearing waves…[526]

The diverse manifestations of historical life thus appear as ephemeral surface features of the single trans-personal life of history itself. How can we arrive at this conclusion?

The reflection described above concerns anthropological "types," whether they be individual (human) or communal (cultural). In ordinary language, we call these types "personalities." The claim thus amounts to the assertion that personalities are not constituted solely in the acts of an individual or communal Ego, but are rather passively formed by "flowing interpenetration" in historical life. The formation of personality always owes something to a life that is not "mine." It is important to emphasize that this claim concerns a reflection upon oneself as a human being amongst others. The discovery of a transpersonal "single life" at this level does not call into question the incomparably unique awareness I have of my own pure Ego as the self-same pole of all my experiencing. The reflection rather takes its bearings from within that level of social life where "comparisons" between Egos are indeed in order. [527]

We can access the source of Husserl's intuition by once again returning to his analysis of *Geist* in *Ideas II*. Living in the general practical attitude, it is always possible, says Husserl, to raise the question of what defines or distinguishes "me." Such a reflection would have as its intended object a "personal Ego" that, as Husserl puts it, "shows itself according to its 'personal features'."[528] These features make up what we customarily call personality. They refer to those "characteristics," those ways of doing, evaluating, etc. that give an individual typicality to my developing existence. Reflecting on my characteristics, I can always differentiate myself from others by pointing to defining features, which assure me that "I do have my peculiarities."[529] And yet, further

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[526] Ibid.

[527] See Dan Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-pragmatic Critique.* Trans. Elizabeth Behnke (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001) [Hereafter, Transcendental Intersubjectivity], pp. 82-83, 193. Zahavi here presents a succinct and lucid treatment of the manifold sense of "Ego" in Husserl's reflections. Particularly instructive here is his insight that the pure Ego, as the unity of the stream and as pole of action and affection, has a uniqueness that "is not first established by way of a contrast" (83).

[528] Ideas II, p. 261.

[529] Ibid., p. 266.

investigation will always reveal that those very characteristics by which I can define myself turn out to owe much to others.

So long as they are free from naturalistic distortions,[530] reflections on the peculiar character of a personal Ego remain within the nexus of a history of acts and their motivating circumstances in the surrounding world. Because motivation is provocation through sense and sense alone, [531] the personal Ego can only be motivated by what it has already apprehended: "The objects of the surrounding world…by which [the Ego] is motivated, are, all of them, originally constituted in acts of this Ego."[532] This would seem to suggest that the characteristics built up in the act-history of the Ego are its own in a preeminent sense, since they emerge through dealings with a world whose meaning points back to the Ego itself. But such a view, which is ultimately solipsistic, overlooks that the objects of the surrounding world, while they certainly owe their significance to a chain of experiences in which they have appeared for me, are, according to their essence, *public*. The objects that appear in these experiences are objects that are there "for anyone." This means not only that their appearance as transcendent objects necessarily includes an intentional reference to an indefinite "open intersubjectivity."[533] It also means that they have an immediate relevance for what I am doing according to *conventional* meanings and use-values that I assume at the ground of my motivation.

We have seen (Ch. 3.3) that this fundamental sociality of the objects of the surrounding world justifies Husserl's doctrine of a universal and hidden reign of influence over the personal Ego. To be motivated by common objects and situations, even if one is motivated in an "uncommon" way, is to be motivated such that the provoked act carries on the purposeful life of others, who themselves bear the life of unknown contemporaries and predecessors. The claim is not that my actions fulfill the plans laid out for me by others. It is rather that the basic literacy I have in my surroundings, by which I apprehend everyday objects and situations according to their value and purpose and know how to handle them, is founded on an apprenticeship of appropriation in which the experience of others has already determined the meaning of things. Even in her most distinctive peculiarities, the individual can be shown to carry forward a motivational lineage that binds her to a community and its specific history. There are no ultimate boundaries to personality. It takes shape between the self and the others. Personal life is a social elaboration, not an autonomous creation. This means that personality, which encompasses not only ways of acting, but also the values that orient

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[530] For instance, the physical shape, size, and location of my body have no bearing on my individuating character, whereas my attitude and comportment toward my own body as a value-laden feature of my surrounding world does.

[531] This as opposed to those relations of causation based on physical properties, which, as Husserl always reminds us, are themselves *motivated* in the experience of the surrounding natural world.

[532] Ideas II, p. 225.

[533] Zahavi employs this term in a precise sense to refer to that level of intersubjectivity already involved in the constitution of any transcendent object. The aspects of the object currently unavailable to my perception lie in the horizon, not as objects of a possible future consciousness, but as co-existing with the currently perceived aspects. The indefinite or "open intersubjectivity" answers the question of *to whose* experience these unperceived aspects refer. Transcendental Intersubjectivity, p. 51.

action and indeed an entire "worldview," is an inheritance without a definable source. Inheritance is mysterious because one can never know the whole of what one owes to others, nor single out an absolute source.

To understand the single life of spirit of the *Vienna Lecture*, we need only expand this reflection to "personalities of higher order." Just as the person is under the influence of others through the mediation of the surrounding world common to her community, so will the life-ways distinctive to this community bear the influence of other communities through their belonging to a common world-horizon. There is a "globalism" inherent to social life just as there is a sociality inherent to personal life. The same historical or anthropological reflections capable of clarifying the definitive character of a people, nation, or civilization will thus inevitably trace this character back to alien influences. These include not only those dramatic encounters in which worlds collide, but more importantly those subtle courses of motivation through which the traditions of one community infiltrate those of another. When empirical investigations follow up on these lines of influence, not only do they reveal the connections obtaining *between* peoples. They also expose the *indefiniteness* of all spiritual shapes considered as unities of life bearing an individually typical character. The life of the alien is then not wholly alien because it is at work in that of the home. The life of the predecessor is not wholly past because it is at work in the present. From the perspective of such an investigation, these distinctions are relative within the unity of a single motivational nexus.

We thus arrive at two essential aspects of spiritual history: 1) a potentially *endless* chain of motivational connections between one community and another in historical space-time and 2) an attendant *indefiniteness* to all defining characteristics. Husserl is thus a radical proponent of non-essentialism and non-identity in the realm of cultures. The stable identity he claims for Europe does not result from the application of an "essentialist" doctrine of culture.[534] Anthropological formations are rather essentially non-definite by virtue of the single motivational continuity into which they are integrated, even if only by the acts of discovery that integrate them. All spiritual shapes dissolve into *one* teeming historical continuity.[535]

Europe too exists in the endless finitude of this historical continuum. It is defined, however, by its refusal to continue living in this way. Living in finitude, it lives toward poles of infinity.[536] Husserl would never credit the Renaissance with establishing the "autonomy" of European humanity if it meant going back to Greece as a cultural ancestor or parent. By defining itself in Renaissance, European humanity rather asserts that it

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[534] Kassab is surprised to find that Husserl's definition of Europe as a culture governed by the theoretical attitude, and thus engaged in constant self-critique, does not give it a "broken, or at least open, and thus non-essentialist identity" (63). From Husserl's perspective, dedication to universal critique is precisely the *only* way for a culture not to be set adrift in the single life of spirit.

[535] Of course, the oneness of this humanity remains essentially mysterious. The inheritance that binds child to parent, for instance, works through a countless number of influences, only a few of which will ever be noticeable in direct reflection. Understanding the legacy that binds one generation, or one historically unified culture to another is an even more daunting prospect. Critical investigations that "inquire back" into traditions of influence can never claim to be exhaustive. Interests rooted in the present will determine the scope of the inquiry, and will decide what counts as a "successful" clarification.

[536] Crisis, p. 277.

cannot live otherwise than by rising out of the sea of shifting anthropological types in which all defining values are set adrift: "if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so…Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment?"[537] Husserl here appeals directly to the refusal that he would have found European life.

Renaissance means that this refusal of history as the endless life of finite tasks is at one with a positive appropriation of the historical dimension for the assignment, confirmation and pledge of infinite tasks. Europe becomes what it is by making itself the subject of a dedication founded in the temporal structures of vocational subjectivity: faith in the past, courage for the present, and commitment to the future. The faith in reason without which true humanity would lose faith in itself does not mean belief in the possibility of certain forms of apodictic evidence. For Husserl, it is ultimately a historically directed faith. It is faith that history is not an unending concatenation of anthropological types because "Greece" once established an infinite task. It thus sustains and requires the courage for accomplishing the task in the present, and the commitment to its having been made irreversible from the future. The foundational role of this faith, courage, and commitment becomes known to the philosopher who does not passively set to work within some institutionally defined context, but who wants to discover the resources that support her project from within.

It will be said that this entire scheme, as well as the definitions of history and humanity it implies, amounts to presupposing the Renaissance. That is exactly what we hope to have made clear. Husserl exhibits and takes on this presupposition as a willful commitment necessary to the philosopher who works in full awareness of the responsibilities implied in her task. As Ricoeur puts it in his study of Husserl, "the conviction that the Idea of philosophy is the task of European man is not an inductive conclusion, or an ascertainment of fact, but rather a philosophical requirement."[538] We will now contrast this position with an approach that would forego these Renaissance structures and appeal directly to "historical fact."

3.
The Disappearance of Europe into History

Husserl's Renaissance doctrine implies that every attempt to associate Europe with a Greek philosophical origin by means of historical narrative is un-European. It thus contains a critical impulse directed against a common form of storytelling by means of which modern philosophy makes itself relevant to the aims of human culture. The result of Husserl's approach is that no such narrative, however it may stand with respect to the

[537] Ibid., p. 7.

[538] Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, p. 169.

standards of empirical historical research, can fulfill the function of delivering to Europe the philosophical Greece that it wants to appropriate as its origin. In Husserl, the Eurocentric conception of reason depends upon the viability of purposive structures that make history susceptible to a teleological rendition from the perspective of a calling. The "speculative interpretation of our historical development," on the other hand, would claim to define Europe as a Renaissance of philosophical Greece through a general survey of historical facts. From Husserl's perspective, these interpretations are open to criticism from more disciplined and comprehensive ways of understanding the empirical development of spirit. Jan Patočka's *Plato and Europe* and *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* are important texts to study in this respect because they take over Husserl's problematic without making visible the Renaissance that guides the historical return to philosophical Greece. It thus invites a critical confrontation with other interpretations of European history on the plane of empirical development. At the same time, precisely by letting the Renaissance sink into history, Patočka suggests a new perspective on the structures of vocational subjectivity that Husserl deems necessary to the responsible philosopher. He makes philosophy reckon with the possibility that Europe has already disappeared.

Patočka is quite faithful to the original terms in which Husserl conceived the issue of Europe. *Plato and Europe* mirrors the pattern of the *Vienna Lecture* and the published parts of the *Crisis*. The "radical problematic" of phenomenological seeing, which the philosophically eager are ready to "take up," is forestalled in favor of a more fundamental reflection on philosophy's role in the fundamental "human situation."[539] Europe is the perspective from which the outcome of this situation is to be decided. Delivering the lectures on which the text is based in 1974, Patočka claims that "from the time that Husserl wrote his *Crisis*, in actual fact no philosopher has reflected on this problem of Europe…"[540] Patočka's definition of European humanity is worked out according to a new conceptual framework. European humanity is defined by its project of caring for the soul: "care of the soul is the central theme around which, I think, the life plan of Europe crystallized."[541] The way in which Patočka interprets this phrase, however, brings his definition into line with that of Europe as the spiritual shape governed by the theoretical attitude as its norm-style. The soul is that in the human being that is capable of truth as clear insight into being. He who cares for the soul devotes himself to becoming a "being of truth" by making truth "the law of his life…in every domain in which man is involved."[542] Europe is once again the philosophical polis, where universal critique renders provisional every customary understanding. Or, as Patočka rather mildly formulates it, where there "is always a discussion of philosophy with un-philosophy, with un-philosophical reality."[543]

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[539] Jan Patočka, *Plato and Europe*. Trans. Petr Lom. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002)[Hereafter, Plato and Europe], p. 41.

[540] Plato and Europe, p. 152.

[541] Ibid., p. 15.

[542] Ibid., p. 36.

[543] Ibid., p. 129.

Like Husserl, Patočka also claims that something called "Greece" once instituted the "life plan" definitive of Europe, that it did so through the emergence of philosophy on the basis of mythical understanding, and that this decisive event is unique to Europe: "*only in Europe* was philosophy born in this way, in the awakening of man out of tradition into the presence of the universe, only in Europe, or better said, in what was the embryo of Europe—Greece."[544] From start to finish, however, Patočka conceives the relationship between Europe and its Greece as one of *inheritance*. The philosophical form of existence essential to Greece is passed down through the years, exposed to potential abandonment through the course of cultural transformations, but ultimately preserved through these modifications as the core value uniting Greece, the Helenistic empires, the Roman Empire, Medieval Europe and, finally, Modern Europe:

> After the catastrophe of the Greek polis, it become important that this *inheritance* remain alive, an inheritance of thinking about the state where philosophers might live, about a state of justice founded not on mere tradition, but rather on *looking-in* [*nahlednuti*]. Again, after the catastrophe of the Greek cities, when the Hellenistic empires of the Diadochs arose, from which then eventually Roman monarchy emerges as the last great Hellenistic power, then philosophers arrived with the program: this state should be the ground of justice, this should be the state of philosophers…And this empire again was destroyed…The moment this great empire was wrecked, the primeval example of all empires, it left behind a heritage…In this way, one heritage leads to another, and through catastrophe, despite their [sic] destructive consequences, this heritage is spread throughout the world…In that way, through catastrophes, this heritage is kept alive.[545]

There was born in Greece a unique heritage that has weathered catastrophe and survived "up to" modern Europe, at each stage animating humanity with the project of philosophical existence.

Patočka's departure from Husserl regarding Europe's mode of historical being is most evident in his incorporation of the Middle Ages into a single course of development that runs from Greece up to the present. Concerning the fall of the Roman Empire, Patočka writes that "there was also an inheritance there, and this inheritance goes back to the Greek polis. What was common …was formed by the spirit of Greece. Thus was later born medieval Europe…"[546] Patočka's Europe is not constituted in a disowning of what Europe was. It is rather born by rescuing and carrying forward an ancient heritage from the "wreckage, first of the Greek polis, and then of the Roman empire."[547] One need not dwell on the details of Patočka's presentation to recognize that it really does suggest a

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[544] Ibid., p. 88.

[545] Ibid., p. 88-89.

[546] Ibid., p. 11-12.

[547] Ibid., p. 10.

sketch of global history from Greece to the present. It claims to trace, *beginning from Greece*, a changing but surviving heritage that determines the essential character of a unitary *Geschichtlichkeit*. "*The history of Europe* is in large part, up until, let us say, the fifteenth century, *the history of the attempt to realize the care of the soul*."[548] We postpone for the moment the question of what might have thereafter begun to determine the history of Europe.

Once the claim to Europe's defining character is advanced, not at the level of vocational structures that overcome finite history in order to appropriate it, but rather at the level of finite historical development itself, it becomes susceptible to a challenge Ricoeur thought he could level against Husserl. Ricoeur asserts that "as soon as one affirms that the Idea is not only the task, 'the obligation', but also the historical reality of the Occident," then the interpretation must "[confront] itself continually with the history of the historian…It is then quite necessary that the proposed reading be compared with other possible readings of history, for example, as history of labor, of law, of the state of religion, etc…"[549] In speaking of the Idea as Europe's "historical reality" rather than as its mere task or obligation, Ricoeur is referring to Husserl's claim that "European" culture is not merely a practical postulate of the rationally determined will, but was rather inborn in history with ancient Greece. In Platonic terms, the philosopher is called into the service of her polis because she awakens to the fact that philosophy *was* the constitutional power out of which it originated. By claiming this historical reality through Renaissance, however, Husserl does not commit himself to a "reading of history" that would rival those of historians. He makes contact with that history, as it were, only tangentially, at the single point of its passage into infinite tasks (in the Greek *Urstiftung* and the European *Nachstiftung* in Renaissance). Furthermore, he makes this contact via an appeal to the faith-structures upon which it depends. If the historical reality of the Idea is rather claimed in the dimension of the historical continuum, the confrontation Ricoeur suggests is indeed in order.

Husserl's approach leaves the task of historical interpretation entirely in the hands of the historians. He would compel them to accept his claims about Europe's "ages" and its "historical mission" only at the level of a reflection on their own commitment to scientific rationality as such, not by opposing one version of events to another. Take, for example, the interpretation of Europeanization. For Husserl, the Europeanization of the world *must* bear witness to the rule of an absolute meaning because if it did not, there would be no perspective from which to believe in anything other than history as the setting adrift of all life-forms, a scenario to which he, as a good European, could never reconcile himself. The past history of actual Europeanization needs to be redeemed from the perspective of a pledged future which must come about as the correlate of vocational commitment to a task. The meaning of Europeanization will be decided in a decision that necessarily implicates the philosopher or scientist by virtue of her defining aims.[550] This view is obviously open to interrogation on a number of fronts.

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[548] Ibid., p. 37.

[549] Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, p. 168.

[550] Crisis, p. 16.

It is quite different, however, from Patočka's empirical-historical claim that "as its foundation, European civilization has insight into the nature of things, while all the others have tradition as their foundation," and that "for that reason European civilization became universal."[551] Observing the general contours of the historical continuum, one is supposed to conclude that Europe *became* universal *because* it was the bastion of reason. We see that when Ricoeur's proposed confrontation takes place, the speculative interpretation of Europe's development will look like a philosophical myth in comparison with analyses drawn from the disciplines of historical research.

In one sense, then, Patočka disappears Europe into history by treating it as an episode in the spiritual continuum. His formulation of the issue is noteworthy, however, because in addition to disappearing Europe into history he also makes the historical claim that it *has disappeared*. In this sense, his failure to appropriate the purposive structures constitutive of the Renaissance is no failure at all. Those purposive structures have collapsed because Europe has disappeared. "We live in a period following this collapse, and we live in an epoch of further and further decay of this past."[552] Patočka's narration of Europe has the form of a eulogy. It is told from the point of view of a "today, when Europe has come to an end…is definitely at an end."[553] Something in history happened such that Europe "destroyed herself."[554] According to Husserl's view of things, Europe's destruction would mean that history really always was and forever will be that endless welling up and dissolving of peoples, values, and institutions. Once the Renaissance has collapsed as an existential determination of European humanity there is no going back to it. The Renaissance was a form of self-understanding that immunized against nostalgia by binding the historical present wholly to the past exactly insofar as it was defined as the awakening to presence. Once it has passed into history, Renaissance itself can only appear as a form of nostalgia, a desire for what came earlier. Patočka, so attuned to Husserl's problematic, only mentions Renaissance once in *Plato and Europe*. He does so in order to denounce it as a form of "romanticism" or "nostalgia."[555]

What could it mean that Europe has disappeared? We know that while Husserl recognized *die Untergang Europas* as a conceivable outcome of the crisis, he refused to entertain it as a practical possibility. Even though he consistently begins his reflections on Europe by emphasizing the irrationalism of thought and action into which its civilization has fallen, Husserl does so in order to appeal to critical resources that he identifies with the essence of European life itself, and which, for whomever continues to be able to believe, cannot be destroyed by historical calamity. By claiming to begin his reflection in the wake of Europe's destruction, Patočka raises the possibility that something could have come to pass that definitively renders unbelievable the belief that European humanity bears an infinite task.

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[551] Plato and Europe, p. 221.

[552] Ibid., p. 41.

[553] Ibid., p. 9.

[554] Ibid., p. 9

[555] Ibid., p. 223.

Patočka proposes that a structural deformation of European life has occurred. Theoretical insight is not addressed from the task of universal critique (care of the soul) but is rather harnessed for the novel powers it supplies to projects of world-mastery: "the care of the soul transformed itself in such a peculiar way, that it become pretty much unrecognizable under the weight of something that might be deemed a concern or care about *dominating the world*. That is another, also unique and incomparable history, but one that more than anything else contains the germ of what has taken place before our very own eyes: *Europe has disappeared*, probably forever."[556] In the fourth of his *Heretical Essays*, Patočka describes this transformation in similar terms: "The great turning point in the life of western Europe appears to be the sixteenth century. From that time on another motif comes to the fore, opposing the motif of the care of the soul and coming to dominate one area after another, politics, economics, faith and science, transforming them in a new style. Not a care *for the soul*, the care to be, but rather the care to *have*, care for the external world and its conquest, becomes the dominant concern."[557]

The rise of this motif gives to scientific knowledge a new meaning. It is no longer the means of self-realization via infinite critique, but worldly power. Patočka identifies Bacon as the bearer of Europe's deformation: "Bacon will formulate a wholly new idea of knowledge and cognition, profoundly different from that which motivated the care of the soul: knowledge is power, only effectual knowledge is real knowledge, what used to apply only for practice and production now holds for knowledge as such."[558] When considering "European sciences," one is now obliged to see the institutions through which knowledge is made effectual as internal to the meaning of science itself. Because Husserl defines Europe as Renaissance, he is able to interpret science as the intellectual organ of the European life-form (its "brain"),[559] and thus strictly in terms of the unique kind of evidence it seeks. For him, the worldly use of scientific results was an empirical matter accidental to science's defining aims and so to the culture that defined itself in light of science. But by making Europe subject to the transformations of finite history, Patočka is able to claim that *after a certain point* science is no longer European by virtue of its function in a life-project of universal criticism, but rather by virtue of its incorporation into a system of world-dominance. "Europe truly was master of the world. It was master of the world economically: she after all was the one who developed capitalism, the network of world economy and markets into which was pulled the entire planet. She controlled the world politically, on the basis of the monopoly of her power, and that power was of scientific-technological origin. *All of this was Europe*."[560] The two

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[556] Ibid., p. 89.

[557] Patočka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History. Trans. Erazim Kohak. Ed. James Dodd. With Paul Ricoeur's preface to the French edition. (Chicago: Open Court, 1996)[Hereafter, Heretical Essays], p. 83

[558] Heritcal Essays, p. 84.

[559] Crisis, p. 290.

[560] Plato and Europe, p. 9.

world wars, through which Europe at last "definitely wrecked itself" are an outcome of the "internal logic of the European situation" in which science and technology function as "knowledge of the great powers."[561]

The deviation by means of which theoretical knowledge serves mundane powers rather than ruling them through criticism is of course already comprehended in the concepts of scientific negligence Husserl employs in his later writings. We recall that Husserl roots the abandonment of the infinite self-responsibility demanded by the theoretical interest in the pursuit of "success," i.e. fulfilling non-scientific interests by shaping the surrounding world (Ch.3.1). It is the prospect of "success" or "prosperity" that threatens to seduce the theoretical attitude into concerns proper to the technologist. What Patočka suggests, however, is that the technological attitude can come to dominate the European *Geschichtlichkeit* as a whole and to such a degree that it can no longer be seen to bear the promise of *theoria* and universal critique. Patočka's description of Europe's downfall into a project of dominance is no longer, as it was for Husserl, a matter of holding Europe responsible for deviating from its historical vocation. It is simply the description of a change in what Europe essentially was.

In Patočka's overview of European history from Greece to the present, he roots the collapse of great empires in a "moral situation" that stems from an inability to realize the life-plans that were to define them. The "inhabitants," "public" or "citizenry" thus become "alienated" or "estranged" from the institutions that bear official responsibility for guarding and realizing the defining ideals.[562] The moral situation to which Patočka refers is essentially one of an hypocrisy that strays so far from the principles to which it appeals that they can no longer function in the immanent critique of hypocrisy, that hypocrisy itself is thus no longer believable as a failure to realize defining ideals, and that the social formation rather becomes defined by its hypocrisy, which can no longer support even indignant reaction. This "moral element" claims Patočka, is "much, much more important" than any other historical factor in accounting for the collapse of world-historical empires.[563]

Still, if Europe was once what Husserl claims, then it can it really collapse by becoming hypocritical? Is it not rather true that Europe first makes hypocrisy itself possible insofar as it produces the appeal to pure principles as a meaningful practical attitude? Does not the use of hypocrisy as a category of historical judgment presuppose belief in an effective claim made upon historical humanity by principles of reason? If European humanity was defined by making this claim effective, then doesn't holding Europe accountable for the deformation of reason into technological domination amount to belief in Europe, and the will to renew it from within? Of course, hypocrisy can simply mean inconsistency between professed and effective values. So long as the appeal to motivations of pure reason has no meaning, however, this conflict occurs between values that appear praiseworthy within the framework of a familiar world where distinctions between "true" and "untrue" values will be justifiable relative to interests that terminate there. Hypocrisy as mere discrepancy between speech and deed can itself appear as a true

[561] Ibid., p. 9-10.

[562] Ibid., p. 11.

[563] Ibid.

value given a particular context. But if hypocrisy signals the degeneration of a "moral situation", it is because universal *principles* have been appealed to but abandoned in favor of particular interests. To clarify, uphold and guard these principles as measures of praxis—was that not the imperative first brought into history as an absolute, defining value by Europe and its Greece? Should we then add to the wonders of Husserl's Europe that it is the condition for the possibility of the criticism of its own hypocrisy? That this criticism is finally allegiance to and furtherance of Europe?

That would mean that Europe's present historical situation could never warrant the decision that it had strayed so far from its defining goals as to be beyond revival. If Europe were simply an idea of reason rather than the historical teleology from which such ideas are assigned, the historical present could indeed hold no power over it. But that is not Husserl's view. There can be a crisis of Europe because it claims subjectivity in the faith, courage, and commitment that constitute history as the dimension of vocational calling. Within the analysis of crisis as a medical emergency for vocational life, Husserl recons with incurability under the concept of *despair*, the negative counterpart to courage that struggles to will one's assigned calling. If it is no longer possible to take courage from the present, vocational subjectivity cannot hold open history as the dimension for the assignment of the infinite tasks of reason. Europe is beyond saving if its historical situation has become hopeless.

How could European hypocrisy bring it to the point of despair? Perhaps Patočka tries to grasp this possibility in his ultimate explanation for Europe's disappearance: "I will try to show you that Europe as Europe arose from this motif, from the care of the soul, and that it became extinct as a result of that, that it forgot about it."[564] Maybe this forgetting is a very strange, extreme idea. It can account for an actual extinction only if it refers to a disorientation in which European life loses its way beyond the possibilities of rededication that work via faith, hope and commitment. We may best understand it as a counterpoint to Kant's argument in the *Anthropology* that the first introduction of a universal principle into an individual life marks "the beginning of a new epoch" and that the radical transformation it demands is, for that life, "*unforgettable*."[565] Forgetting would then be a kind of radical hypocrisy in which Europe does not stray from its principles, but rather abandons its self-determination as the will to find principles at all. The present from which Europe could not be resuscitated would be one in which hypocrisy and its criticism had themselves become meaningless, in which it was no longer possible to believe that there was an historical interest in the claims of reason. Patočka's perspective seems to be that the massive centuries-long experience of imperial expansion and its culmination in world war is sufficient to warrant such an interpretation of the present epoch. Husserl's faith in Europe protected him from having to think seriously about non-philosophical aspects of European history. Because European humanity was defined by its will to universal critique, the realization of *theoria* was "the only way to decide" its fate.[566]

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[564] Ibid., p. 70.

[565] Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 206.

[566] Crisis, p. 15.

Patočka's perspective remains vitally connected to the Husserlian problematic because it makes visible the purposive setting from which its empirical reflection begins. Patočka seems to acknowledge the despair out of which he recollects Europe as an historical occurrence. Introducing the fundamental context of his reflections, Patočka states that "a situation is entirely different, depending upon whether people who are in a situation of distress give up or do not give up. In a hopeless situation it is still possible to behave in very different ways."[567] Husserl's description of crisis as sickness has taught us that a genuinely hopeless situation is not one in which death is inevitable, but one in which it has already occurred. Human beings might live in the face of a hopeless situation, but the temporal structures supporting the purposeful life itself have already collapsed. The *Geschichtlichkeit* defined by that pursuit has already sunken into history. The ones who survive are no longer animated by its defining goals. The effort to discover when and why that life has collapsed occurs on this side of the departure. It is one of the possible ways to behave when a situation has become hopeless. Is that the full meaning of Patočka's eulogy?

That may well be the case. And yet, Patočka does not seem to be done with Europe. He wants to pose as a genuine question whether in the European inheritance "there exists something that could to some extent be believable even for us, that could affect us in a way so that we could again find hope in a specific perspective, in a specific future, without giving in to illusory dreams and without undervaluing the toughness and gravity of our current situation."[568] This assessment of "our current situation" is a somber echo of *Crisis* and the *Vienna Lecture*. While Husserl attempted to form the subjectivity necessary for the teleological confirmation of Europe by summoning we who refuse to abandon faith, Patočka requires for his inquiry we who have lost all hope and who wonder whether we shall find it again. But how should we find it? Patočka's historical reflections never succumb to the assurances that some overarching dialectic would offer. Europe came into being on the wreckage, first of the Greek polis and then of the Roman Empire as they fell to hypocrisy. This does not portend, however, that Europe, itself having become empire and hypocrisy, will overcome itself in taking on its true form. It rather signifies that Europe, which had rescued what was essential to those dying worlds, is now itself dead, and of similar causes. *Plato and Europe* is a text dominated by the theme of aging and decay. The care of the soul is itself understood as a resistance against the "entire declining tendency of the world and of life."[569]

Patočka's position also prevents him from anticipating that non-Europe might rekindle, take over, or transcend the spirit of Europe through a critique of its historical outcome. Non-Europe can be of no help here because it has been wholly harnessed to Europe in its downfall. Patočka's references to non-Europe are of two sorts. On the one hand, he claims that non-European culture cannot legitimately universalize itself since that would represent one particular tradition "swallowing up" others.[570] This position is

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[567] Plato and Europe, p. 2.

[568] Ibid., p. 12.

[569] Ibid.

[570] Ibid., p. 221.

simply the expression of the view, shared by Husserl, that Europe is the sole emissary of philosophy's worldly mission. Whatever has not been yoked to Europe in its downfall is still traditional culture in its particularity. On the other hand, he addresses non-European formations as the "inheritors" of a hypocritical process of Europeanization who, for that reason, "will never allow Europe to be what it once was."[571] Europe is extinct, definitively at an end. Non-Europe cannot revive it and will obstruct any effort it makes to revive itself. Why, then, does Patočka undertake his reflections at all? Why is he not done with Europe?

Europe was to be the historical formation in which the infinite tasks of reason were borne by humanity situated in finite worldliness. By eulogizing this Europe, by recollecting it in the finite dimension of historical becoming as something that is now impossible, does Patočka perhaps carry out that movement of infinite resignation that Kierkegaard holds possible for any vocationally determined subjectivity?[572] The knight of infinite resignation does not let go the interest that was to make him who he was to be. Instead, he "will recollect everything, but this recollection is precisely the pain, and yet in infinite resignation he is reconciled with existence."[573] The eulogizing recollection determines the dedicational interest as unfulfillable in finitude; it completely weans the will from the desire to see its goal manifest in actuality and redeems it as the expression of an "eternal form that no actuality can take away from him."[574] If eulogizing Europe carries out this movement of resignation thoroughly, Patočka's strange appeal to take hope in a hopeless situation would no longer express a temporally articulated vocational subjectivity, but rather that faith that knows it will actually attain the object of dedication *by virtue of the absurd*. Then the history of Europe is recollected precisely in order to verify its impossibility as a project. Only when one is completely resigned to the fact that it cannot happen in history, and sublimates all desire for it in the realm of pure ideality, is one poised to make the final, unthinkable leap of believing in it anyway because the absurd will bring it to pass.

This basic orientation would not be so far from Socrates' express judgment about the practical possibility of the philosophical polis. After convincing Adeimantus that nothing historically understandable could bring it about that philosophy will be compelled to rule in a polis, he appeals to a "chance event" (499b) that can nonetheless do so and in which he encourages his interlocutor to believe. The crucial difference, however, is that Patočka's reflection takes place upon the demise of Europe, which he defines as the sole crucible of universal critique. If a Kierkegaardian faith is here possible, it would only be on the basis of a disciplined resignation achieved by

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[571] Ibid., p. 9.

[572] "It goes without saying that any other interest in which an individual has concentrated the whole reality [Realitet] of actuality [*Virkelighedens*] can, if it proves to be unrealizable, prompt the movement of resignation." Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling / Repetition: Kierkegaard's Writings*. Trans. Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong (vol. 6). (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)[Hereafter, Fear and Trembling], fn. 41.

[573] Fear and Trembling, p. 43.

[574] Ibid., p. 43-44.

recollecting Europe itself. When he has to oppose his view on Europe to defeatism, Patočka does not express optimism that Europe is revivable. That would be to maintain Europe as the vocational horizon from which to accomplish a rededication to its defining goals. He instead speaks of "redressment" and "repetition."[575] The philosopher who would understand the meaning of her task must repeat and redress the Europe that is at an end as something that is at an end. These movements take place beyond the crisis problematic. They begin upon the discharge of philosophy from its archontic function and the responsibilities it entailed. The recollection of Europe in repetition and redress is not gripped in the enthusiasm of dedication, but neither is it a work of nostalgia, or resurrection. It will simply do Europe justice, neither pretending it was greater than it was, nor sublimating disappointment by belittling it. Thus knowing what Europe was, that it has definitively ended in a falling world empire, that it is no longer possible, philosophy would be ready, not to rekindle hope, but, by virtue of the absurd, to find it, that very same hope, again.

However, Patočka's writings suggest that this repetition and redressment are something other than a movement of resignation. They are animated by the belief that European history may have left something behind. The something left behind would not belong to what Europe bequeathed as an inheritance. Instead, within that inheritance there may be something that was left unattended to, something that harbors the possibility for an afterlife or another life for Europe. Some unrealized tendency may have been at work that allows for the transformation of Europe into something more exalted than the devotion to reason as the realization of the true self and the true world. In his fifth essay, Patočka names this unrealized tendency. It is Christianity: "the greatest, unsurpassed, but also un-thought-through human outreach that enabled humans to struggle against decadence."[576] Something called Christianity was of course taken up into the drama of European history. But for Patočka, this Christianity was over-determined by the framework of Platonic *theoria* and linked to the fate of European imperial powers. The fundamental transformations in the shape of European self-responsibility that Christianity harbors, the ones Europe left behind, are still largely unknown.

We will not go into Patočka's outline of these unexplored transformations (Derrida has focused on them in his chapter "The Secrets of European Responsibility" in *The Gift of Death*.[577]). What has to be highlighted is that the kind of repetition and redressment that discovers these or any such transformations is impossible for Husserl by virtue of his commitment to Renaissance. Husserl can recognize no "history" or "genealogy" of European responsibility. There is a historical development of the modern philosophical era, but this development, responsible for the whole of history as such, occurs within the Renaissance that determines its *entire meaning*. Once the vocational commitment to the infinite tasks of reason has defined historical humanity, nothing can "happen" that would essentially transform it. The attention to history that would look for or await this happening is henceforth irresponsibility and relapse into finite assignments.

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[575] Plato and Europe, p. 151.

[576] Heretical Essays, p. 108.

[577] Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

The reasoned assessment and critical evaluation of historical fact should rather understand itself as owing its possibility to, and deriving its purpose from, the Greek awakening to infinite tasks. Only in this way does the study of history participate in the courageous refusal to submit to what its course teaches. Put differently, if something actually did "happen" to Europe in the course of its development, or if it is still happening now, it has rendered Husserl's philosophy—not his philosophy of history, but the vocational framework that determines the meaning of his whole philosophy—an artifact of European history.

Chapter Six:
The Relation of Europe to its Others: Europeanization

1.
Europe's Global Position and its Tendency to Spread

Husserl's reflections on the birth of Greece show that Europe emerges on the basis of political historicity. The appearance in world-consciousness of one's home-nation as an actor in an international space of nations was necessary in order for Europe to begin. In its dedication to universal critique, Europe transcends the hermeneutic structures of political historicity. It does not, however, destroy them. Husserl's good European undertakes her infinite tasks beginning from an embedment in these structures. Europe lives toward poles of infinity, but only by living in finitude.

Europe is thus one manifestation of humanity in the midst of others. It inevitably appears as a familiar homeworld with unitary traditions and projects at various levels of cultural life. Trying to awaken the audience of the *Vienna Lecture* to their distinct European identity, Husserl has them think themselves "into the Indian historical sphere [*die indische Geschichtlichkeit*]."[578] There, he says, we experience a unity of life "alien to us. Indian people, on the other hand, experience us as aliens and only one another as confreres."[579] Because it is one *Geschichtlichkeit* in touch with others, Europe necessarily understands itself according to this "difference between familiarity and strangeness."[580] It is important to underscore that Husserl recognizes this difference as a "fundamental category *of all historicity*," even if he believes its application "cannot suffice" for understanding the unique identity of Europe.[581]

This is significant because it means that the self-definition in which Europe is established necessarily has the sense of a *distinction* from non-Europe. Husserl's attempts to clarify Europe's "unique"[582] and hence incomparable status inevitably contain a comparative reference to non-Europe. The *Crisis* is to decide "whether European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea…;" but Husserl, it seems, must complete the thought: "rather than being merely an empirical anthropological type like 'India' or 'China'."[583] Neither is it enough for Husserl to confirm that Europe is the horizon for the assignment of an infinite task. This "remarkable teleology," he says, is "inborn, as it

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[578] Crisis, p. 274.

[579] Ibid.

[580] Ibid., p. 275.

[581] Ibid. My emphasis.

[582] Ibid., pp. 274, 275.

[583] Ibid., p. 16.

were, *only in our Europe*."[584] However questionable Husserl's judgment might be regarding Europe's exclusive claim on an infinite task, it is clear enough that he could not have left non-Europe alone. As a historical development in international space, Europe can only arrive at self-understanding through its awareness of other shapes in the civilizational horizon.

Husserl's definition of Europe as distinct from its others inevitably invokes geographical differences. Husserl famously warns against geographical reductionism in the definition of Europe:

> Thus we refer to Europe not as it is understood geographically, as on a map, as if thereby the group of people who live together in this territory would define European humanity. In the spiritual sense the English Dominions, the United States, etc., clearly belong to Europe, whereas the Eskimos or Indians presented as curiosities at fairs [in Europe], or the Gypsies who constantly wander about Europe, do not.[585]

It is obvious, however, that the protection against geographical reductionism works by means of geographical intuition. The Gypsies who "wander about" geographical Europe or the Indians put on display there do not belong to spiritual Europe. And yet, the English Dominions, geographically disconnected from the continent, or the United States, across the ocean, do. Presumably, Husserl could further pursue this division between those who participate in Europe's defining project and those who only "wander around" Europe. He could continue to identify outposts and bands of non-Europe within the United States, the English Dominions, etc. He could not, however, pursue it so far that reference to these delimited territories would no longer provide at least symbolic orientation for the spiritual distinction he is attempting to draw. Europe is not a thought, but a unity of purposeful life accomplished in individuals, groups, institutions, etc. Husserl defines Europe by its defining task. The working of the task, however, requires a territory. This latter functions, as Steinbock puts it, "as the inscription of symbolic historical limits…on the global earth."[586] We may thus speak of Europe having a "global position."

By virtue of its global position, Europe emerges historically alongside a humanity that was never European. Is Europe then free to pursue a relationship with its neighbors in different ways, in accordance with changing interests and conditions? Or is there rather something in the Europeanness of Europe, something in its defining task, which determines the character of this relationship? Husserl will embrace the second alternative. The *Vienna Lecture* includes a thread of reflections in which Husserl derives the nature of this relationship from a consideration of emergent Greece in the midst of its neighbors. The global bearing proper to Europe will prove to be Europeanization: the spread of Europe into "spiritual spaces" that have never been Europe.

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[584] Ibid., p. 273. My emphasis.

[585] Ibid. Translation modified.

[586] Home and Beyond, p. 167.

Given Husserl's understanding of Europe, it is not surprising to find that he discovers the basis for its proper orientation toward non-Europe in the nature of philosophical ideas. Husserl regards these ideas as the only form of absolutely common property possible in human experience. They maintain an identity of validity and sense apart from every possible encounter-situation in which they take on a personal significance. In the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl suggests that any interest directed toward these objects will thus exhibit a "necessary tendency" [*notwendige Tendenz*] to spread.[587] In Greece, the spreading of such interest is necessarily two-fold (Ch.4.5). It occurs not only as an expanding vocational community of philosophers, but also as an expanding "community of the educated"[588] who revolutionize the national culture by incessantly testing the authority of all empirically established norms against what might be established through theoretical reflection. The mechanism of this spreading, Husserl says, is "sympathetic understanding"[589] [*Nachverstehen*]. We should, however, be attuned to the possibility that there is something unusual in this sympathy, since it functions like a "spell,"[590] and is powerful enough to break the "will to spiritual self-preservation."[591]

Crucially, there are two distinct phases to this spreading of philosophical interest. Without ever drawing attention to it as an express judgment, Husserl repeats throughout the *Vienna Lecture* that the two-fold spreading of philosophical interest occurs *first* in the home nation *before* it spreads to alien nations: "This, then is accomplished, at *first* within the spiritual space of a single nation, the Greek nation, as the development of philosophy and philosophical communities. Together with this there arises, *first* in this nation, a common cultural spirit [which,] drawing all of humanity under its spell, is thus an advancing transformation in the form of a new type of historical development."[592] Or again, "this [spread] occurs *first* within the home nation."[593] And finally: "we have now sketched the historical motivation which makes understandable how, beginning with a few Greek eccentrics, a transformation of human existence and its whole cultural life could be initiated, *at first* in their own *and then* in neighboring nations."[594] These formulations indicate a distinct stage of development during which the Greek nation brings cultural upheaval upon itself, thereby becoming the Greece of Europe, *before* this European spirit spreads to other nations.

The necessity of this priority can only be grounded in the coherence of the national world as a familiar context of communalization. However peculiar a cultural

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[587] Crisis 287. Translation modified.

[588] Ibid., p. 288.

[589] Ibid., p. 287.

[590] Ibid., p. 277.

[591] Ibid., p. 275.

[592] Ibid., p. 277. My emphasis.

[593] Ibid., p. 287. My emphasis.

[594] Ibid., p. 289. My emphasis.

formation philosophy is, its very peculiarity could only be understood and confronted on the basis of a language and world of cultural reference common to philosophy and non-philosophy. We already knew that the coherence of national life within political historicity was necessary for the historical breakthrough of philosophy (Ch. 4.2, 4.3). We now see that, according to Husserl, this coherence continues to define the boundary for the philosophical transformation of culture *up to some point* at which the new *Daseinsform* initiated in that nation begins to draw the rest of nationally organized humanity under its spell.[595] The necessary tendency of expansion seems to involve a constituted Europe, already defined by its pursuit of infinite tasks within the "spiritual space" of a single homeworld, spreading into spiritual spaces that were never European. When it spreads, Greece is already constituted as Europe in the sense that, despite its self-definition through universal critique alone, it can no longer go back to never having been European. Greece becomes itself only by resolving to critique everything traditional in its cultural horizon. But precisely that resolve and that self-definition constitute it as the center of an advancing transformation that incorporates the rest of humanity only when it abandons a certain will to preserve itself as what it was.[596]

We have good reason to suspect that this spreading of Europe into non-Europe will result in a recurrence of the struggle Husserl holds necessary to the Europeanization of Greece at its origin: "Those conservatives who are satisfied with the tradition and the philosophical men will fight each other, and the struggle will surely occur in the sphere of political power."[597] Husserl does not say that philosophical culture will have to struggle against the sphere of political power, but that the struggle between philosophical and non-philosophical culture takes place within the sphere of political power. Before it emerges victorious, the movement of education and critique contends with established tradition within established institutions of contention. Husserl is no doubt imagining Socrates before the court in Athens.[598] But the whole meaning of the conflict between Socrates and his city is determined by his having entrusted his life to its laws. The representative of philosophical culture lives and dies as a citizen of the homeworld that he stood accused of injuring. When the political struggle described occurs as a consequence of the encounter with a constituted European nation, the "traditional men" will no doubt recognize philosophical culture as the expression of a foreign *Geschichtlichkeit*. Would they be wrong? Would they be more wrong than those who embrace Europeanization over the will to self-preservation?

It is on the basis of these sparse reflections on ancient Greece, and without taking up the questions they provoke, that the *Vienna Lecture* would seek to make

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[595] Ibid., p. 288. In the *Vienna Lecture* Husserl claims that a "certain level of prescientific culture" is necessary before non-Europe can Europeanize. See his reflections on the political nation as the historical locus for the emergence of universal critique (Ch. 4): "Only the capacity for a universal critical attitude, which, to be sure, presupposes a certain level of prescientific culture, must be present."

[596] Ibid., p. 275.

[597] Ibid., p. 288.

[598] Ibid. "The persecution begins at the very beginnings of philosophy. Men who live for these ideas become the objects of contempt. And yet ideas are stronger than empirical powers."

Europeanization comprehensible as an essential feature of Europe's historical development. Europe is a "supranationality" that exists as a "spreading synthesis of nations."[599] This synthesis does not spread through dialogue or movements of mutual influence between Europe and what has never been Europe. Those relations pertain, for Husserl, between anthropological types within the sea of finite history. The synthesis between Europe and its others instead occurs via a unidirectional addition, an accretion of the spiritual continent that is Europe. Overcoming the power of every motive binding them to the religious-mythical traditions that make them who they are, the Indians will find reason to Europeanize themselves, "whereas we [Europeans], if we understand ourselves properly, would never Indianize ourselves."[600]

One of the stated tasks of the *Crisis* is to affirm that the spread of Europe is the result of reason and proper understanding. We underline once again that this affirmation is not a straightforward historical judgment, but depends upon the successful outcome of the *Crisis* itself. Only then "could [it] be decided whether the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civilizations bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning, one which is proper to the sense, rather than to a historical non-sense, of the world."[601] Nonetheless, we must also underline that the decision bears upon the very spectacle or drama [*Schauspiel*] unfolding before Husserl's eyes, not some idealized vision of Europeanization of which one would never suspect that it was a historical nonsense (i.e. driven by motives constituted in political historicity). If Europe does prove to bear an infinite task, does that then mean that the whole grotesque spectacle of Europeanization would be justified?

Husserl would rather argue that Europe's responsibility to an infinite task first makes possible a principled criticism of that spectacle. If Europe's defining task destines it to spread, good Europeans would have to critique the spectacle of Europeanization as a predicament essential, not accidental, to their history. Here, we can once again oppose Husserl to Patočka. The latter sees in the phenomenon of European expansion the seed of its downfall into the project of "world domination": "Unquestionably, the expansion of Europe beyond its original bounds, an expansion that replaced mere holding of the competing non-European world at bay, contained within itself the seed of a new life pernicious to the older principle."[602] For Husserl, who is unwilling to let Europe die, it must still be an open question whether the expansion of Europe testifies to its philosophical mission.

It is thus the meaning of the whole global activity of Europe that is at stake in the crisis-problematic. Buckley expresses quite well the dilemma that Husserl must have posed to himself in this respect: "Is its dissemination throughout the world based on another culture's recognition that its 'true humanity' is to be found in the adoption of the philo-scientific paradigm? Or is it not simply the success which European science has

[599] Ibid., p. 289.

[600] Ibid., p. 275.

[601] Ibid., p. 16.

[602] Heretical Essays, p. 83.

displayed which has made it so universal?"[603] This question, like every question of crisis, must be posed from an awareness that *one's own* defining beliefs hang in the balance. Husserl does not pretend to approach it as if it were a matter for disinterested assessment. He calls into question the meaning of Europe's globalization in open anticipation of confirming his belief in the Europe of infinite tasks. We are now well aware that the problem of the *Crisis* is being *able to believe*.

We have argued that Husserl understands the possibility of Europe's birth through the category of denationalization and its establishment through that of Renaissance. Is it finally the possibility of Europe's association with non-Europe that will reveal Husserl's belief to be delusional? Denationalization and Renaissance function in Europe's attempt to understand its own origination. But to affirm that the spectacle of Europeanization testifies to the rule of reason over history, Husserl will have to run the risk of making philosophy the representative of imperial expansion.

2.
Europeanization and Violence

According to Husserl, Europe is first Europe before it draws what has never been Europe into the process of Europeanization. The European continent spreads by means of spiritual accretion, not by entering into a give and take with its others. This process therefore seems to fall under a certain definition of "violent" relationships between home and alien worlds. In Steinbock's study of the home/alien problematic, he provides two complementary definitions of violence, the first of which would seem to describe the activity, the second the goal, of Europeanization. If this is so, Europeanization would be violence from beginning to end.

Steinbock defines the first side of violence as a "hierarchical domination" that "denies the uniqueness of the alien and attempts to subsume the alien under the rule of the 'first.' It reifies limits by making an axiological asymmetry merely a one-sided relation in which the 'first' is *not* responsible for or responsive to the alien in the mode of inaccessibility."[604] This definition of violence must be understood in terms of Steinbock's account of transgression, in which the co-constitutive and asymmetrical relationship between home and alien is revealed and responded to. In transgression, I encounter the alien, not as anomalous, but in her "generative depth,"[605] i.e. as the bearer of an alien *home*world that is home for her in the same way as my home is home for me. Recognizing this sameness does not mean that I can appropriate either world as my home. Rather, it is identical with my awareness that my generative rootedness makes the alien *home*world, as such, inaccessible to me, and that the very hominess of my own home is defined in relation to this inaccessibility. "Transgression [*Überschreitung*]

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[603] The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility, p. 32.

[604] Home and Beyond, p. 250.

[605] Ibid., p. 242.

literally crosses over the limits and thus brings an explicit experience of limits into being."[606] One does justice to these limits by responding to the alien in the mode of her inaccessibility. This is at one, for Steinbock, with developing a critical attitude toward the home as one world formed in relation to others. In violence as domination, however, the alien is assumed to be "essentially accessible" to the home.[607] Correlatively, this entails that "the home is not responded to critically in its limitedness and uniqueness peculiar to its own generativity. That is, it assumes that one's own generativity is purely or immediately accessible."[608]

This last assumption accounts for the understanding of the home as a "first" that subsequently enters into a one-sided relationship with an alienworld that cannot call it into question. Is this assumption not at work in the movement whereby a constituted Europe "draws" non-Europe "under its spell"? The good European can avail herself of the new perspectives she discovers by thinking herself into the *Geschichtlichkeiten* of China, India, or wherever. But *if she understands who she is*, she would never enter into a transgression that could call Europe itself into question or transform it in response to its others. The good European does not come to understand herself through transgression. On the contrary, if she understands herself she will never place her essential identity at stake through a crossing over of limits. Doesn't this mean that Europe's identity is a violent one, and that the process of Europeanization is not transgression but violence?

The second side of violence, for Steinbock, presents itself as a way of overcoming domination. In the name of rectifying the unidirectional accessibility of the alien to the home, this violence seeks to achieve "the *reversibility* and *symmetry* of perspectives."[609] It depends upon the assumptions of a "mutual accessibility" and "equal and interchangeable" responsibility that would allow one "to speak from the perspective of the alien and for the alien."[610] This is again to pretend to traverse that "distance of generativity"[611] that guarantees an irreducible inaccessibility of the alien. Invoking Levinas, Steinbock asserts that "we who are at home are responsible asymmetrically toward the alien and for ourselves *in our unique way* without being able to contest that this responsibility holds equally for the alien or to enforce the same type of response."[612] Does not the goal of Europeanization consist precisely in drawing all civilizations into a single modus of responsibility? The violence of Europeanization would then subside in a peace that is also violence. The universalization of frameworks of criticism in which one is responsible for oneself and one's claims is actually the irresponsiveness of one *way* of responsibility to others.

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[606] Ibid., p. 249.

[607] Ibid., p. 251.

[608] Ibid., p. 251.

[609] Ibid.

[610] Ibid., p. 252-3.

[611] Ibid., p. 253.

[612] Ibid., p. 252. My emphasis.

Steinbock unifies these two sides of violence in a definition of violence as such. It is the injury of limit-claims made by the alien in an encounter situation. What makes violence violent is not the physical act of breaking the integrity of a limit, but the failure to heed those limit-claims, implicit or explicit, that bear upon things.[613] In this act of injury, it is in fact "the entire intersubjective and interpersonal structure, home/alien [that] is violated. It is essentially a breach of responsiveness to the interpersonal process of co-generation, or put differently, to existence that becomes in and through their co-generative structure."[614] This definition would seem to provide an apt summary of the Europeanization phenomenon as Husserl presents it in the *Vienna Lecture*. Europeanization is no doubt violence as opposed to transgression.

The basic intent of Husserl's approach, however, shows that Europeanization depends upon an even grander or more encompassing violence to the "interpersonal structure home/alien." This "fundamental category of all historicity," we recall, cannot suffice for understanding the defining possibilities of Europe's historical existence. Within relations between home and alien worlds there must be possible a violence to co-generativity that would no longer be dominance or its dissimulation in a pretended reciprocity, but a direct and effective overcoming of the structure itself as the ultimate horizon of intersubjective understanding. One would belittle this violence by interpreting it as the injury of limit-claims in an interpersonal encounter.

For Husserl, it is ultimately the historical reality of effective philosophical interest itself that requires us to grapple with the possibility of this kind of violence. The field of pure ideality discovered by philosophy makes possible a new way of living historically: the cutting off of finite tasks [*Geschichte des Entwerdens des endlichen Menschentums*]. There can now emerge a new type of person, who will recognize no higher authority in the determination of beliefs and actions than what these ideas show to be true. Husserl identifies this new direction of will as the desire to rule oneself by philosophy.[615] We have seen that this new kind of rule can only take hold of a community by vying with constituted "empirical powers" in a "fight" or "struggle" in which philosophical ideas will triumph because of their "strength."[616] But this is a new kind of strength and a new kind of conflict, wholly unknown to political historicity. For the first time, there is a struggle of traditional humanity *as such* against a disturbance stranger than any alien tradition. The ideas that drive this disturbance were never bound to a national soil. They threaten the traditional identity of the nation, not with domination at the hands of an alien power, but with new forms of communalization that require the transcendence of national understanding as such. The violence of philosophical ideas is violence because it is universal communalization; it is violence *as* universal communalization. But according to Husserl, this violence exerted by philosophical ideas against established culture enters global history via a nation that first of all suffers this violence and makes it its own. The

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[613] Ibid., p. 250: "Strictly speaking…limits are neither respected or injured, only implicit or explicit limit-*claims* by persons peculiar to an intersubjective or interpersonal encounter…"

[614] Ibid., p. 251

[615] Crisis, p. 12.

[616] Ibid., p. 288.

Greece returned to by Europe is a philosophical polis in the midst of "merely anthropological" humanity. Once Europe is constituted, philosophical rule stands in ambiguous relation to political-historical violence in the global arena. One cannot be certain that its cutting off of finite humanity is not rather encroachment, domination, and injury.

Republic warns us that philosophy introduces into political relations the possibility of an ambiguous violence that claims to do no harm. The problem is prepared quite early in book one. In the text's opening round of discussion, Polemarchus ("War Ruler")[617] proposes to define justice as the benefitting of friends and harming of enemies. This view assumes that justice and harm are compatible because of basic divisions inherent to social and political life. There are alliances and wars, friends and enemies. Justice will be giving to each of these groups what they deserve. Socrates will soon instruct his pupils in an exercise in the philosophical building and ruling of cities. Does the philosopher here persuade the War Ruler that the just man should not wage war, or rather that his war will be just? I here present Bloom's translation with slight modifications.

> "Is it, then," I said, "the part of a just man to harm any human being whatsoever?"
>
> "Certainly," he said, "those who are both bad and enemies (ἐχθροὺς) ought to be harmed."
>
> "Horses being harmed (βλαπτόμενοι), are they becoming better or worse?"
>
> "Worse."
>
> "With respect to the virtue of dogs or to that of horses?"
>
> "With respect to that of horses."
>
> "And dogs being harmed (βλαπτόμενοι), are they becoming worse with respect to the virtue of dogs and not to that of horses?"
>
> "Necessarily"
>
> "Should we not assert the same of human beings, my comrade—that being harmed (βλαπτομένους), they are becoming worse with respect to human virtue?"
>
> "Most certainly." (335b-c)

If we interrupt the discussion here, we notice that harm, injury, or hindrance (βλάπτειν) has taken on a precise meaning. When something is being harmed, it is being made worse with respect to *its* defining virtue. It is not clear whether Socrates thereby intends to completely define harm or only to point out a necessary aspect of being harmed. In either case, being worsened with respect to one's proper virtue is not an external consequence of being harmed (all of the participial constructions are present tense), but an internal part of its meaning. The conversation will admit no general concept of harm rooted in pain,

[617] This practice of translating the meaning Greek ears would certainly hear in the names of Plato's characters, and even substituting the translation for the "Greek" names, is utilized by Craig with wonderful effect. See especially the first chapter. The War Lover, pp. 3-21.

physical destruction, dominance, etc. To be harmed means for something to be made worse with respect to *its* defining virtue.

> "But isn't justice human virtue?"
> "That's also necessary"
> "Then, my friend, human beings being harmed (βλαπτομένους) necessarily become more unjust." (335c)

We are of course prohibited from thinking that harmed human beings become unjust because, having been harmed, they get angry and retaliate. To be harmed now *means* to become unjust since we have agreed to the premises that justice is the proper virtue of man and that something, being harmed, is made worse with respect to its proper virtue.

Socrates proceeds to spring a contradiction on Polemarchus on the basis of the assumption that the very practice of disciplined attendance to a subject-matter cannot, in itself, make others worse regarding that same disciplined attendance. Socrates' examples of musicians and horsemen making human beings unmusical and unhorsemanlike leave undecided whether he has in mind contexts of direct instruction or rather imitation. Either way, Polemarchus must admit that it is impossible that just human beings, by means of their justice, make other human beings unjust (335d). The conclusion is soon formulated again: "It is not the function (ἔργον) of the just man to harm either a friend or anyone else." (335d-e)

On its own terms, this discussion can hardly be taken for an equation of justice with non-violence conceived according to concepts of dominance or limit-breaking. It simply establishes that harming and justice-doing will be mutually exclusive. But when Polemarchus is forced to carry out this disjunction, his received meaning of "harm" likely undergoes a greater modification than that of justice. Justice cannot mean harming primarily because harm does not mean what Polemarchus took it to mean. Polemarchus, no doubt, wants to make his enemies suffer, endure physical pain, defeat, humiliation, financial loss, etc. He now understands that that sort of human suffering is not harm. Harm is becoming unjust. He has also been made to understand that the just man cannot bring this about through the pursuit of those very tasks that make of him a just man. The actions of that sort of man determine what counts as harm. Whatever sufferings the just man causes human beings to experience, he cannot harm them because he is a worker of human virtue. Perhaps Socrates is not trying to pacify the War Ruler, but to peak his curiosity about justice as a possession that would make even of his war a good work.[618]

If we view this discussion from the perspective of the polis-problematic, it seems even less likely that Socrates wants to equate justice with peace, non-dominance, the respect of limits or non-injury. According to Socrates' teaching, justice is the part-wise discipline within any articulated form of life that allows for the moderate submission to the rule of reason. Must a polis founded upon a just constitution, i.e. ruled by philosophy, abstain from war? Socrates does remark to Glaucon during the construction of the feverish city that war, whether it works good or evil, has its origin in the same things that

[618] The idea that understanding the new interests introduced into human life by philosophy requires an explicit and shocking redefinition of everyday concepts is not particular to this discussion. It occurs again with "dreaming" in book five (476c).

produce great evils, both public and private, in cities (373e). This is hardly a straightforward condemnation. We must also consider it within the total psycho-political context of *Republic* in which there is the greatest affinity between war and philosophy.[619] As Craig remarks, "from the moment the warriors first make their appearance to the final discussion of selecting rulers for the regime, philosophy and warfare are conjoined (376bc, 543a)."[620] The philosopher-guardians are initially recruited from the ranks of the warrior class. The reasonable reform of everything customary in the guardian city does include a critique of the conduct of war that reserves for barbarians its most brutal practices. However, Socrates continues to make use of Polemarchus' term, ἐχθρος, in his descriptions of both Greek and non-Greek combatants. The latter are enemies of the just city "by nature," and therefore met in war, whereas the former are merely instigators of factious dispute (470b-c, 471a-b). Even in the explicitly philosophical polis, the guardian is "both warrior and philosopher" (525a). When Socrates outlines his preparatory curriculum for the philosopher king he emphasizes that it employs scientific subject-matter strictly for the purpose of weaning the soul from its concern with sensible being and pointing it toward the pure ideas of philosophy. And yet, the curriculum is still bound to fulfill the requirements of a single practice: war (527c). This remains the case although Socrates reprimands Glaucon for thinking that preparation for war is anything more than a necessary by-product of scientific education (527e). Even in Socrates' most prized pupil, the interest in war is never wholly sublimated in, or dissociated from, the interest in fighting for the truth.[621] He remains something of a War Ruler.

There is an interpretation espoused by Strauss and Bloom according to which the necessity of war even in the philosophical city demonstrates that cities are inherently unjust. Commenting on the discussion between Socrates and Polemarchus in book one, Strauss contends that: "Since the city as city is a society which from time to time must wage war, and war is inseparable from harming innocent people (471a-b), the unqualified condemnation of harming human beings is tantamount to the condemnation of even the justest city."[622] Bloom, reflecting on the emergence of the first city fit for human beings, observes: "It would appear from this presentation that war is requisite to the emergence of humanity…paradoxically, this is the first human city. It cannot claim that it does not harm other men."[623] Later in his analysis, he draws the conclusion: "In relation to its

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[619] An exploration of this affinity is well beyond the scope of our concern. The War Lover, Leon Craig's study of *Republic*, thoroughly examines this affinity, especially in its psychological dimension.

[620] The War Lover, p. 19

[621] Craig's psychological analysis of Adeimantus and Glaucon shows the extent to which the aim of Socrates' pedagogy vis-à-vis the brothers is to transform warrior-like lovers of victory into lovers of wisdom: "some lovers of victory can be transformed into lovers of wisdom upon their coming to see the pursuit of wisdom as the greatest challenge of all, one calling for the finest virtues and greatest exertions…and if there is some deeper connection between philosophy and warfare—as the entire dialogue seems to suggest—perhaps the ones *best* suited for philosophy are *not* those who are *gentle* by *nature*…but rather those whose great spiritedness makes them passionate lovers of victory. "(79).

[622] The City and Man, p. 75.

[623] The Republic of Plato, p. 348.

neighbors, the city is not motivated by considerations of justice but by those of preservation. Justice has to do with the domestic life of the city and cannot be extended beyond its boarders."[624] This Straussian interpretation confronts pacifism with a tough-minded, manly realism. War is sometimes necessary in political life. It necessarily involves harm. Therefore, philosophy cannot realize its justice in the context of the city and its relations with its others.

But doesn't this manliness shy away from the most violent possibility contained in *Republic*? By interpreting as *harm* (βλάπτειν) the burning of houses, the ravaging of lands, and other such suffering (471a-b), it overlooks the most disconcerting implication of the early discussion with Polemarchus and the subsequent place of war in the philosophical city. The justest city is a spiritual shape governed by philosophy such that all life-practices are subject to universal critique. Like all historically occurring shapes, this one is finite and thus comes into being in the midst of potential rivals. The fact that the philosophical city must reckon with a violent confrontation with others, does not, however, undermine its justice. It rather introduces into history the possibility of a new war-footing. Someday, under some circumstances, war might be waged in order to safeguard, not this or that historical tradition, but the historical bastion of reason itself. That eventual war might involve the mobilization of destructive forces, the cutting off of life, its enslavement and incorporation. But this brutality should not cause the upholder of the philosophical constitution to flinch in her certainty that such war was not harmful to humanity.

The extent to which practices of "hierarchical domination" within political historicity are non-injurious from the standpoint of a philosophical constitution is clear from a speech Socrates makes to Glaucon in book nine about a *certain kind* of slavery. This slavery can justifiably occur when a person or a city not yet ruled by reason enters into relation with one that is. Socrates' presents this description as part of his most complete defense of the thesis that justice is beneficial *for all*.

> In order that such a [unreasonable] man also be ruled by something similar to what rules the best man, don't we say that he must be the slave of that best man who has divine rule within himself? *It's not that we suppose the slave must be ruled to his own harm* [βλάβη]…but that it's better for all to be ruled by what is divine and prudent, especially when one has it as his own within himself; but, if not, *set over one from outside*, so that insofar as possible all will be alike and friends, *piloted by the same thing*…[it is similar with] the rule over children, their not being set free until—having cared for them until we establish a regime in them *as in a city*, and until—having cared for the best part in them with the like in ourselves—we establish a similar guardian and ruler in them to take our place; only then, do we set them free. (590c-591a Bloom modified).

This rule is imposed "from outside," by a ruler who comes *first* and already possesses the constitution that the ruled, insofar as possible, will adopt. In its ideal form, this rule institutes a dependence only so as to awaken in the ruled an autonomy of which it was

[624] Ibid., p. 372.

previously incapable. Socrates suggests that we can apply the account to cities: If a philosophical polis were to rule over its others, it could not harm them because its rule would be synonymous with universalizing the *telos* of reason. When the violence is over, all will be piloted by the same thing.

The appeal to a violence that is ultimately non-injurious because it serves the interests of those upon whom it is inflicted, interests that are unknown to the sufferers and known to the perpetrators via a universal reason that has only come to full awareness for *them*—this apology would seem to be an eventuality for any philosophical polis that emerged out of political historicity. Has not some version of it been tendered by Europe ever since its renewal in Renaissance became synonymous with the Europeanization of other civilizations? The ideological expression of this apology is familiar to anyone who has contemplated "the spectacle of Europeanization." Patočka held that Europe's defining task changed during the course of history. This allowed for the admission that the European appeal to reason had come to serve its will to domination and was no longer even hypocrisy. Husserl's starting point is in the painful existential contradiction of the crisis-problematic (Ch 3.3). This prevents him from narrating the downfall of Europe. Does it then commit him to an apology in which violence toward non-Europe is justified by a teleology of reason of that animates Europe *alone* and *first of all*?

3.
The Europeanizing Attitude

It is tempting to think that Husserl might have avoided these issues if he had only kept an "open mind" about non-European spirit. Confirming the assignment of an infinite European task would have been a hazardous exercise in self-reflection, but would not have foreclosed the possibility that there are other vocations to reason proceeding from non-European sources. Instead, Husserl asserts that Europe is the *only* spiritual shape defined by an infinite task. The reflection on the meaning of Europe will thus verify a totalizing vision of historical humanity. For any historical present after the Renaissance, we know *a priori* that global humanity will be divided in one of the four following ways:

1. A global European solidarity of humanity in its dedication to the infinite tasks of reason through the free appropriation of the Greek *arche* in Renaissance.
2. A co-existence between a globally positioned Europe and any number of spiritual spaces undergoing the passage from finite to infinite historicity through which they will join Europe.
3. A co-existence between a globally positioned Europe, Europeanizing spaces, and humanity that has not yet reached the level of "pre-scientific culture" necessary to begin Europeanizing.
4. A co-existence between Europe and humanity not yet ready to undertake Europeanization.

In all cases of co-existence, Europe represents the goal, known or unknown, of any discoverable spiritual shape. The course of history has already become irreversible, with Europe as its future at hand.

Let us call this vision of global humanity the Europeanizing attitude. Beginning from this outlook, Europe, with its whole untold course of future development, is the final form of historical life. Whatever unforeseen adventures may occur within it, however it may be enriched or deepened, this final form has already broken through in a certain sector of global humanity and cannot be surpassed. The violence foretold by this attitude is not tempered, but rather given full expression, in the assertion that the *telos* animating Europe is *also* universal to humanity itself. Such an assertion is simply another way of expressing that the Europeanization of all other civilizations would bear witness to the rule of reason. Is it reassuring to hear Gasché, for instance, attempt to diminish the uncanny privilege Husserl gives to Europe? "No superiority, let it be said, derives from the factual firstness of this idea in Europe. This task, generated by Europe, is not something that belongs to Europe as a private possession…Although anyone can lay claim to this task, and rename it accordingly, 'Europe' remains the name for this task…because having emerged in Europe *for the first time*, it binds the Europeans, *first* and *foremost*."[625] The thesis claiming the firstness and foremostness of Europe also claims its lastness and uniqueness. However it may be taken over and renamed, it will always be true that this task "generated by Europe" comprehends the whole historical phenomenon (Ch 5.2).

The Europeanizing outlook of the *Crisis* is based on the thesis that there is an infinite task "only in our Europe." Can Husserl provide evidence for the thesis? Is the Europeanizing attitude a rational attitude? How does Husserl know that nowhere in the humanity "wandering around" geographical Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States, nowhere in the humanity at the edge at the Europeanizing process, nowhere in the humanity in those massive civilizations to the East, nowhere in the humanity settled in some remote quarter, etc. is there another *telos* of infinite tasks with some other source? Concretely, this question amounts to how Husserl knows that the framework of governing norm-styles he outlines in the *Vienna Lecture* applies to factually existing historical humanity in the way he asserts that it does. Husserl there assigns each governing attitude to particular communities. The primordial natural attitude, which governs humanity for whom Europeanization is not yet possible, falls to the Paupans,[626] perhaps to Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples as well.[627] The universal-practical or religious-mythical attitude, which governs humanity for whom Europeanization is a live

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[625] Europe or the Infinite Task, p. 29-30. My emphases. Gasché's phrasing here betrays an ambiguity also found in Buckley's analysis, and which will occur whenever Europe is discussed as an "idea" or equated with science itself. Gasché's first two uses of "Europe" clearly treat it as a spiritual shape in Husserl sense. The third usage treats "Europe" as the name of a task. The fourth and fifth usages return to Europe as a spiritual shape. For a similar attempt to "assuage" suspicions of imperial intent see Ricoeur, who believes he *combats* the suspicion that Husserl is an apologist for imperialism by recalling that the Idea that animates Europe alone also defines humanity itself. *Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology*, p. 151.

[626] Crisis, p. 290.

[627] Ibid., p. 273.

possibility, characterizes India, China, ancient Babylonia and Egypt.[628] Finally, the theoretical and universal-critical attitudes belong *only* to Europe in its supranational unity.[629] Husserl does not claim that his anthropological divisions are exhaustive, but the whole lecture aims to demonstrate that the "differences of principle" apply in such a way as to confirm that Europe is peerless in its defining tasks and responsibilities.[630]

What might be the justifying grounds for Husserl's "only in our Europe" thesis? It seems that there are two possibilities worth considering. First, Husserl's judgment might rest on an implicit argument that would infer from the fact that he does not know of a non-European *telos* the conclusion that there cannot be a non-European *telos*. This possibility is not as absurd as it might seem. For Husserl, infinite tasks can only enter human history when philosophy is pursued as a theoretical science.[631] This pursuit, as we have seen (Ch. 3.1), cannot exist outside traditions of documentation in which theoretical results become available for an insightful reconstruction essentially unbound to cultural particularities. There is no secret life of reason. It is rather the "necessary tendency" of every interest born of philosophical concern to spread as common property. Such considerations would not warrant the conclusion, however, that the factual lack of acquaintance in one scientist or scientific community with some such tradition means that it does not exist.

A second, more likely possibility is that Husserl's judgment is an inductive hypothesis made on the basis of available ethnographic and literary data. This means that there *could* at present be a non-European infinite task with a historical root other than Greece and its appropriation in Renaissance. It is then merely probable that only Europe is a historical sphere of infinite responsibility. There *should be* two important consequences to this for Husserl. First, he should be able to account for a non-European *telos* as a pure possibility, even if it is not fulfilled in fact. He does not attempt to do this. Such a project instead seems interrupted by Husserl's resolution that the very task of pure eidetics owes its historical possibility to the breakthrough accomplished only in Greece. Second, it means that the two options Husserl presents as ways out of the crisis, European rebirth or barbarism,[632] cannot claim to exhaust all the possibilities for historical humanity considered as a whole. Yet Husserl will always *act* as if it does.

There is a further epistemological difficulty in Husserl's "only in Europe" claim. Whether it confirms merely the probability of its non-existence or its necessity, Husserl's not knowing about a non-European *telos* depends upon the rigor of Europe's ethnographic knowledge at any given time. What grounds do we have for believing that such research does not also participate in the same presumptive commitment to the Europeanness of reason that orients Husserl's own critique of science? If Husserl wanted to find empirical grounding for his "only in Europe" hypothesis, could he simply turn to

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[628] Ibid., p. 279.

[629] Ibid., p. 273.

[630] Ibid., p. 279-280.

[631] Ibid., p. 278-9.

[632] Ibid, p. 299.

the European sciences without examining whether the determination of the anthropological realities in question was oriented by the very conviction that he wanted to confirm? If Husserl did not ask himself this question, could it be because his seemingly unjustified claim to the exclusive responsibility for infinite tasks *does* in fact express something essential about European science and the humanity that lives by it? We will return to this final question.

We accept, then, that there is no convincing justification for Husserl's confidence in his "only in Europe" assertion. It is quite plainly a presumptive commitment that serves to round out and simplify a world-picture. On the basis of this presumption, Husserl excuses himself from wondering whether Europe might have a rival or peer in the sphere of infinite historicity. He does not have to consider what new responsibilities that would introduce into his critical historical reflection. If the thesis is ideological in this sense, it is necessary to ask ourselves what this ideology serves. What kind of project does the closed-mindedness of the Europeanizing attitude serve to support?

One possibility is that the claim to a uniquely European mission of reason is meant to justify the remaking of all non-European worlds through the take over of European institutions. Because Europe alone bears a *telos* of universal reason, the forms of economy, politics, law, medicine, etc. that have emerged through its historical development are in principle universalizable. To enter into a "cross-cultural" dialogue about the merits of these basic forms would be absurd. European institutions, formed in the work of a rational or scientific culture, bear within themselves insight into the nature of things. The responsible European is the one who admits this fact and does not hide from its difficult consequences. Europeanization will be the process by which these institutions, the "heritage" of Europe, spread across and globalize humanity.[633] In this case, the Europeanizing attitude would be an imperial attitude committed to the expanse of one homeworld over others on the basis of its unique claim to reasonability.

This is clearly not Husserl's perspective. The experience in which the Europeanizing attitude of the *Crisis* takes shape testifies to its incompatibility with "confidence" in the rationality of European institutions. Although Husserl clearly anticipates a positive resolution to the decision that Europe is the sole bearer of an infinite task, that resolution can only come at the term of a reflection: "what is clearly necessary is that we *reflect back*, in a thorough *historical* and *critical* fashion, in order to provide, *before all decisions*, for a radical self-understanding."[634] In order to know how it stands with respect to non-Europe, Europe first has to attain critical, historical, self-understanding. Of course, the fact that the formation of the Europeanizing attitude occurs in critical historical self-reflection does not in itself rule out an imperialist stance. It is rather Husserl's definition of the European self that makes the self-reflection incompatible with imperial designs.

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[633] Plato and Europe, p. 88-9. Patočka does occasionally verge on what we might call "mundane Eurocentrism" as at attitude of political historicity. In the closing discussion of *Plato and Europe*, Patočka, in what is admittedly a rather lighthearted comment, boarders on this position: "Everyone understands European civilization, because the principle of European civilization is—roughly spoken—two times two is four. From that arises a singular continuity and the possibility of generalization," p. 221

[634] Crisis, p. 17.

The project of self-understanding to which Husserl refers is nothing other than the work he carries out in the *Crisis* writings. We have seen that the fundamental diagnosis Husserl arrives at there is that Europe cannot go on, cannot further itself, except through a reestablishment of itself *as* Renaissance. The European life-form is a vocational *Geschichtlichkeit* that cannot live otherwise than in dedication to the free shaping of its historical life through infinite tasks.[635] The organ of this free shaping was to be theoretical reason in the form of philosophy. Thus, every institution, everything already "established" and familiar in Europe is only an expression of European identity in the movement whereby it is subject to transformation in universal critique. This is so for every institution taken over as an obvious validity, including philosophy itself. "Scientific culture," for Husserl, is not a set of institutions that realize the rational organization of life, but rather a process of revolutionizing institutions by continuous passage from finite to infinite dimensions of responsibility. As a result of European history, Europeans inherit institutions that bear the mark of this passage, "there are, for us Europeans, many infinite ideas (if we may use this expression) which lie outside the philosophic sphere (infinite tasks, goals, confirmations, truths, 'true values,' 'genuine goods,' 'absolutely valid norms)…"

> But they owe their analogous character of infinity to the transformation of mankind through philosophy and its idealities. Scientific culture under the guidance of ideas of infinity means, then, a revolutionization [*Revolutionierung*] of the whole culture, a revolutionization of the whole manner in which mankind creates culture. It also means a revolutionization of its historicity, which is now the history of the cutting off of finite mankind's development as it becomes mankind with infinite tasks.[636]

The recollection of Europe within the sphere of its original self-definition as Renaissance thus realizes European identity in the fullness of its power only by undoing European identity as a figure in political historicity. What makes Europe first by right is not the possession of "developed" economic, religious or political formations that others would benefit from taking over. It is first by right only because in beginning anew, in attempting to free itself from all traditional determination, it is equally *returning to itself*. Only at the term of this return by which Europe establishes itself as *first* will Husserl judge it to be the frontier of history: "Only then could it be decided that European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea…"[637] The Europeanizing attitude begins from a confidence, not in European institutions, but rather that Europe possesses within itself the critical resources to call into question the entirety of its traditional acceptances.

This attitude would then view as pseudo-Europeanization or non-Europeanization the mere furtherance of European traditions in non-European spaces. In a dense and enigmatic passage form a crisis-period manuscript on historicity, Husserl goes so far as to

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[635] Ibid., p. 274.

[636] Ibid., p. 279.

[637] Ibid., p. 16.

conclude that the Europe that Europeanizes is not Europe any longer. This formulation does not forbid Europe from Europeanizing. It rather contrasts pseudo-Europeanization as straightforward continuance of Europe with genuine Europeanization as the paradoxical continuance of Europe as Renaissance.

> It is as if the Earth should become the unified territory of a supranational unity of all peoples, a supranation, as it were, from sources of objective reason, as Europe itself has become [*geworden ist*], thus an expanded Europe; but that must of course not be misunderstood. Europe arose from an expansion of the rational internationalism of the Roman Empire. This expansion could have been [*konnte*] described as Romanization, which itself contained Hellenization through Hellenic philosophy.[638]

The passage begins with a characterization of what the globalization of humanity *seems to imply* for Europe (*es ist so, als ob…sollte*). The final inference before the semicolon, "thus an expanded Europe," depends upon an intuition of Europe's empirical-historical priority. Global humanity should continue to unify itself in the way Europe *has already* done so. This means that the European life-form will expand. Husserl then proceeds to alert us that the nature of this expansion can be misunderstood. After this warning, he describes Europe as emerging out of the *Roman Empire*, a thesis completely foreign to his systematic reflections on Europe in the *Vienna Lecture* and *Crisis* part one. Husserl is here supplying the apparent justification for the false inference. His method is identical to that adopted in paragraph fifteen of the *Vienna Lecture*. [639] He executes a past-ward directed reflection such that Europe appears as *one part* of a historical continuum of spiritual shapes interpenetrating one another in cooexistence and succession. We are in the sea of history. Given this stance toward the historical continuum, it *was possible* to describe (*konnte*) Europe as the outcome of Romanization, Rome as the outcome of Hellenization, and so forth. We will also expect this evolution to continue as Europe, what has become out of this process, Europeanizes.

Having described the misunderstanding and inhabited the attitude in which it forms, Husserl now returns to a present tense characterization of Europe. He will now render paradoxical the thesis that the global organization of humanity implies an expansion of Europe because Europe *started* a development that will continue:

> But what has become [namely, Europe] as a relatively closed shape, *is nonetheless something new* [*ein Neues*], that is, the incorporation of the thereby transformed spirituality of the incorporated nation. Equally, the expanded Europe will thus not be Europe any longer, and yet, it will be a continuation of what has up until now [*bisher*] been the fundamental character of Europe, but also a tremendous deepening.[640]

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[638] HUSS XXIX, p. 16.

[639] "Every spiritual shape exists essentially with a universal historical space or in a particular unity of historical time in terms of coexistence and succession; it has its history. So if we pursue the historical interconnections…" Crisis, p. 274.

[640] HUSS XXIX, p. 16.

A nation only becomes European for the first time through a transformation of its whole spirituality. Through this process, Europe itself becomes something new. This is not because Europe has taken something new into itself, but because Europe can only "live on" or "expand" *as* something new. Europe can only properly expand on what it has been up to now [*bisher*] as an expanding renewal that turns against the *bisherig* as such (Ch. 5.1). Only in this paradoxical manner can we speak of a Europe that expands in accordance with its fundamental character.[641]

We thus see that Husserl's conviction about the firstness, lastness, and uniqueness of Europe is nonetheless incompatible with the takeover of one world by another. The universalization of Europe would not result in a cultural monolith. Steinbock often argues that Husserl's desire for the Europeanization of humanity contradicts his own insights about the irreducible co-relativity of home and alien worlds. Indeed, in the *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl simultaneously asserts that the difference between home and alien is a fundamental category of all historicity and that a universal Europeanization would be the work of reason. There is no contradiction here, however, because Europeanizing humanity links onto an established Europe only insofar as it takes over the *same* universal-critical perspective vis-à-vis its *own* traditions. For Husserl, contra Steinbock, there is indeed only one project of being ultimately responsible, and it has been once and for all discovered by Europe. But each historical formation has its own responsibilities. These arise in the universal critique of the traditional understandings in which it is implicated. Husserl argues that there are two possible modes of comportment toward tradition in universal critique, either a tradition is "completely discarded" or its content is "formed anew in the spirit of philosophical ideality."[642] Complete discarding, however, is still a mode of comportment in relation to an inheritance that is *one's own*, and thus a "personal" responsibility. The Europeanizing nation always undertakes its critical unbecoming [*entwerden*] in a sphere of life practices, languages, religions, etc. which will never not have been its own. For this reason, Husserl always describes Europe as a complex, not a simple, unity. Europe is a synthesis of nations with a diversity of tasks, all infinite and *hence* European: "each nation, precisely by pursuing its own ideal task in the spirit of infinity, gives its best to the nations united with it."[643] The infinite task that defines Europe is *one* insofar as it is the task of passage from finite to infinite tasks, but the task is necessarily articulated into particular "infinite spheres"[644] where it is actualized as the universal critique of tradition.

The attitude of Europeanization that the *Crisis* was to justify contains, in itself, criteria for a trenchant critique of imperial domination and its dissimulation via the

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[641] For an alternate interpretation of this passage, see Gasché, p. 355 fn. It is also likely that Patočka derives his vision of Europe as a heritage preserved upon the death of empires from this passage. See Plato and Europe, p. 11.

[642] Crisis, p. 288.

[643] Ibid., p. 289.

[644] Ibid.

imposition of institutionally sanctioned "universal norms." This does not, however, make it an attitude of transgression. This critical historical reflection of the *Crisis* does not at all resemble Steinbock's notion of critique as a mode of responsibility for the co-generativity of home and alien worlds. That critique would approach the homeworld as forming through its relation to the inaccessible alien: "the main import of critique would be to deepen the homeworld *as* homeworld in its liminal encounters with an alienworld..."[645] The self-understanding accomplished in the *Crisis* never tries to understand European identity as an outcome of responses to its others. In this sense, the reflection assumes that it has a grasp on its own generativity. According to Husserl's methodological formula, the entire historical reflection of the *Crisis* is a personal one. This means that the one reflecting assembles, reactivates and criticizes the historical impulses that animate him so as to appropriate them as his own.[646] Husserl opposes to this method an empirical view that would consider history "from the outside," but he never considers conceiving the personal-historical task "which is truly our own"[647] *as a response* to an alien other. The self-understanding in which Husserl's attitude of Europeanization forms is already non-responsiveness to the alien in Steinbock's sense. The responsibility the European has for humanity as such does not derive from an encounter with non-European humanity in its otherness, but rather from a reflection on Europe within the limits of its own self-definition.

We can now evaluate Husserl's Europeanizing attitude in relation to those two "warnings" about philosophical violence we gleaned from *Republic*. Europe indeed identifies itself with a task that cannot, in its very execution, do harm to others. The work of universal critique is nothing other than justice as the disciplined adherence of life to the rule of reason. Europe knows that this is human virtue and identifies itself with it on the basis of a self-reflection for which it assumes full responsibility and which does not respond to anyone else. If it is true to itself, Europe can do no harm. To make this claim is not to give oneself license to act with impunity. It is rather to require of oneself continual self-reflection and criticism in order to know that one is not doing harm. This ability to know for oneself that one is not doing harm was not possible in political historicity. If non-injury means responsiveness to the claims of an inaccessible alien who is responsible otherwise than we are, the knowledge of what constitutes non-injury in a specific situation will depend upon an interpretation of those claims that develops in an ambiguous dialogical situation. One could only know that one was not injuring the alien by imposing an interpretive framework of the homeworld on a situation that exceeds it, which would mean injuring the alien. In political historicity, the courage to remain in the ambiguous situation of transgression, rather than justifying oneself according to established customs and codes, would constitute an ideal of *openness* to which one could only oppose closed-minded particularism. Husserl will claim, from the perspective of Europe, that this openness is blind and irresponsible.

Equally, Europe claims to possess the constitution within itself to which all humanity is destined. It thus positions itself as a *first* that will eventually draw all other

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[645] Home and Beyond, p. 255.

[646] Crisis, p. 71.

[647] Ibid.

nations into its sphere: "all will be alike and friends, piloted by the same thing" (590d). The paradox that this firstness accrues to Europe only at the point of its courageous rebirth in Renaissance does not change the fact that it will retain in its fundamental character through all encounters with others, whereas all others will take on a fundamentally new defining task.

Has Europe really unseated responsiveness toward the alien and immanent critique of the home as ultimate horizons of human responsibility? Its very claim to have done so brings into history a global attitude whose violence exceeds that of the dominating personality and its dissimulations. For a conquest or imperial expansion is essentially temporary in nature; it is an episode in political historicity. Europe's decision that it bears full responsibility for the rational universalization of humanity establishes it as a final *telos* that only Europe's irresponsibility *to itself* could cause to vanish from the earth. The Europeanizing attitude entrusts historical humanity to Europe, and it does this in the name of all. In Husserl, this attitude comes to full expression precisely because he presents it in its purity, untainted by imperial desire, and free of allegiance to any cultural tradition other than philosophy itself.

4.
The Idea of Post-European Science

It is ultimately impossible to verify that the historical process of Europeanization is a departure from the European ideals expressed in Husserl's pure attitude rather than Husserl's pure attitude being an idealized rendition of that historical process. To make that determination one would have to know that an infinite task had actually been taken on by Greece and taken over by Europe in the Renaissance. Husserl never claims to be able to establish these things outside a context of faith and decision that he holds essential to the scientific pursuit as a meaningful vocation: "whether the *telos* that was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy…is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its *entelechy*."[648] But the resolution that Husserl cannot let go is actually *essential* to scientific vocation only on the strength of the insupportable claim that Europe is the sole spiritual space in which the life-meaningfulness of science is at stake.

Still, perhaps the claim itself is unimportant in the sense that it could be retracted without altering the content of Husserl's critique of science. Where else, after all, outside of Europe and its Greece would one turn? And why would one turn there? Does one want to start exploring alternative traditions and world-views to find a secret inaccessible to European rationality? And what would be the rational value of such a discovery if it could not be made the object of universally re-constructible insights and thus freed from its traditional context in a "European" fashion? Husserl presents mysticism, exoticism and irrationalism as the only philosophical alternatives to belief in a European responsibility to infinite tasks.

[648] Ibid, p. 15.

There is, however, another possibility. Another spiritual space for the recovery of the life-meaningfulness of science might emerge by treating Husserl's Europe thesis as essential to European science itself. On this view, the "only in Europe" thesis is not something incidental or retractable. The thesis in fact frames the entire idea of scientific crisis. In both the *Vienna Lecture* and part one of the *Crisis* itself, Husserl will presuppose consent to the thesis as the condition for understanding the high stakes of the decision regarding Europe. One could argue that the whole experience of necessitation that forms Husserl's methodological starting point in the *Crisis* is based on the "only in Europe" thesis, which he always treats as something self-evident. If the thesis is incidental, why does Husserl make non-Europe's merely anthropological status a European concern? If it is retractable, why does Husserl make it the basis for everything for which he makes himself responsible? In making this self-evident thesis the basis for the purposive unification of European sciences, perhaps Husserl really does express the conviction foundational to his scientific epoch. The incidental thesis, which barley needed to be said, would then form an essential part of the internal content of that philosophical-scientific task that Husserl expects us Europeans to recognize and appropriate as "our own."[649]

The thesis itself need not be formulated in scientific work to function in the sense of the scientific task. All of Husserl's reflections on what we have been calling philosophy's vocational horizon aim to explore commitments essential to the meaningfulness of science as a task that need never occur to the scientist in her topical work. It is a great virtue of Husserl's *Crisis* writings that they attempt to expose the purposive infrastructure animating science and to appropriate it in the light of day, indeed to make of it a scientific theme. Judging from Husserl's reflections, the "only in our Europe" thesis is an essential component of that infrastructure. He simply never submits it to a critical reflection that would confirm its believability. Instead, it functions as an obvious point of reference for the entire exercise of self-responsibility. If adherence to that obviousness defines what European science is, up to and including its most self-conscious critique, then another level of reflection seems necessary in order to question that obviousness. That reflection would begin by identifying the insupportable assumption of total responsibility for universal humanity as a defining feature of European science.

Would that reflection be immanent European critique, or would it proceed from other sources? This question about other sources does not primarily concern other places on the map, other literatures, people from other territories, etc. though it does also concern these things. It primarily concerns a different purposive infrastructure for the philosophical-scientific task. It was *this* question that European science was unable to ask itself:

> Here we encounter an obvious objection: philosophy, the science of the Greeks, is not something peculiar to them which came into the world for the first time with them. After all, they themselves tell of wise Egyptians, Babylonians, etc., and did in fact learn much from them. Today we have a plethora of works about Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, etc., in which

[649] See Crisis Sec. 15.

> these are placed on a plane with Greek philosophy…Naturally common features are not lacking. Nevertheless, one must not allow the merely morphologically general features to hide the intentional depths so that one becomes blind to the most essential differences of principle.[650]

The Europe thesis does not deny that European philosophy or science can learn from non-European culture. It is rather a conviction about the intentional depths of the scientific task itself. Husserl is convinced that the task of scientific knowledge, which is presupposed in every attempt to know theoretically with anyone about anything, indeed the task that first makes the community of knowers ideally infinite, is assigned from Europe's Greece and nowhere else. Despite the constant contact of Greece with "the great and already highly cultivated nations of its surrounding world,"[651] Husserl will assert without equivocation that "the theoretical attitude has its historical origin in the Greeks."[652] To adopt the theoretical attitude is to carry out a Greek assignment. The theoretician who carries out a critical reflection on her work will become aware of this assignment, and, making herself responsible for it, will become a "good European."

For the critique that can ask itself if it proceeds from other sources, what actually has its origin in the Greece of Europe is *not* the theoretical attitude, but the theoretical attitude conceived as the expression of a nation that takes it over and identifies itself with it. This, as Husserl shows, is what Europe enacts in the Renaissance that appropriates Greece. The critique of this situation would not aim to root the assignment of *theoria* somewhere else (perhaps to wage war against Europe and its Greece), in a broader territory (to expand Europe and its Greece), or in global humanity as such (to overcome the provincialism of political historicity once and for all). It would instead seek to make a theoretical problem out of the necessary and ambiguous bond between political historicity and the infinite historicity that Husserl can only call Europe. To get underway, this critique would have to revisit the reflections in which Husserl uncovers this problem, though always from the standpoint of his European solution.

Husserl shows that the critique of science's meaning as a historical task develops within a vocational horizon from which that task is assigned. For Husserl, that horizon is the "spiritual shape of Europe." The purposive grounding and unification of sciences in Europe was never for him a question of doing science differently, having it done by certain persons, or of reorganizing or restricting its subject-matter. The regional classification of sciences in *Ideas I* and the phenomenological tasks of epistemological grounding that it established are not placed in question by Husserl's reflections on Europe. The purposive grounding of science was to disclose the historical framework in which the scientific task itself had a defining meaning for humanity. Through the disclosure of this framework, science would finally win, not just theoretical clarity, but clarity of historical purpose. On the basis of the history of Renaissance that defined her as a European, the scientist was to be able to commit herself to theoretical work as an assignment necessitated by the vital need of humanity.

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[650] Crisis, p. 279-280

[651] Ibid., p. 285.

[652] Ibid., p. 280

We have to consider in the same fashion the issue of the sources of the post-European critique. Whatever questions it might raise about who does science, doing it elsewhere or differently, or the scope and organization of its subject-matter, they are rooted in a more fundamental problem regarding the historical framework in which clarity of scientific purpose is possible. The critique addresses itself to the problematic nature of Europe's claim to total responsibility for universal humanity. The spiritual shape of Europe, for Husserl, establishes itself in Renaissance as the renewal of the Greek imperative to rule oneself by reason. Does not a new, previously impossible, spiritual shape emerge in the face of that establishment, a spiritual shape defined in ambiguous distinction from Europe and unified by a new attitude? This attitude is a skeptical questioning of Greco-European rule, not insofar as it is rule or insofar as it is rule by reason, but insofar as rule by reason identifies itself as Greco-European and thus risks becoming unbelievable as reason. Is there not a territorial symbolization in which the humanity defined by this attitude understands its historical limits and possibilities? Is there not in fact everywhere in Europe's global expanse a non-Europe an after-Europe or a borderland Europe that has historical roots in an ambiguous relationship to European reason and all its immanent reiterations and critiques? One might invoke, on the basis of one's own participation, a humanity that wants to live by reason in skeptical awareness of the "Europe problem."

The "Europe problem" stems from the implication in political historicity of the *Geschichtlichkeit* that transcends it, from the difficulty of deciding that its violent attitude toward "finite humanity" is universal communalization rather than domination and its dissimulation. A critique of Europe as the horizon for the critique of reason can never comprehend Europe by means of retreat to political historicity as the ultimate form of human understanding. Husserl's reflections effectively reveal that such an attitude is incapable of grappling with the historical possibilities unleashed by philosophy. The development of the European sciences has shown that the project of realizing *episteme* over *doxa* is not just a delusion or the violent assertion of one doxic position over others. It is a genuine task, realized more or less perfectly, occasionally with the help of transgression, but according to insights that answer to the demands of universal re-constructability. Can we who live in the vicinity of this project console ourselves with the idea that the critical determination of the reality in which we live is a matter of "best possible" [653] solutions that spring from limited cultural traditions? If not, then the philosopher or scientist is implicated in the project of a universalizing humanity by the very nature of her task.

On the other hand, the critique would also fail to comprehend Europe if it were to discover the life-meaningfulness of science on the basis of some other shape that would take responsibility for the universalization of humanity. Even if that shape defined itself over against Europe and its false universalisms, injustices, hypocrisy, etc., it would actually be just another Europe in terms of the basic ambiguities that would beset its self-definition and the violence of its global understanding. If events make it such that one no longer believes in Europe as the figure of universal humanity, but rather in some other figure, with its own means of linking its birth, maintenance, and global position to the passage from finite to infinite responsibilities and tasks, that would be a monumental shift

[653] Home and Beyond, p. 205.

in history. It may even animate the scientific enterprise at all levels with the "energy" of that new establishment, awakening a "zeal" for the reform of "social and political forms of existence."[654] That re-rooting of belief, however, would not make a problem out of the excesses theoretical reason gets involved in by trying to discover its historical purpose in a globalizing movement of humanity. The irony of Husserl's efforts to ground the believability of a life guided by reason in a reflection on Europe is that they have the effect of making Europe itself, or something like it, less believable.

Clarity of historical purpose would rather have to be found in the critique of Europe itself, a critique that does not know if it is immanent critique. All the categories involved in the genesis of philosophy out of political historicity would have to become problems in their own right: nation, myth, entrustment, curiosity, the comic overview of nations, the "struggle" of philosophy with empirical powers, the movement of education, denationalization, Greece, Renaissance, Europeanization etc, but this time not from the perspective of an assumptive commitment that polarizes everything in the direction of a necessary decision. The clarity that decision required, summed up in the global picture of the Europeanizing attitude, is itself obscurity. In Husserl, the experience of philosophy as a historically assigned calling responded not only to philosophical history but to the defining mission of a spreading synthesis of nations. The reflecting philosopher thus became a whole person. The life of pure reflection was reconciled with the life of citizenship, complete abstention from social life became synonymous with the highest function of social life. This is a picture of philosophical health. In *Republic*, it was contemplated as the "best thing," both for the philosopher and for the community it would save (497a). In Europe, Husserl posits a historically instituted life-form that *cannot live* without this kind of health, and for which only philosophy is good medicine.

The critique that emerges in the face of the Europeanizing attitude is not certain that the proclaimed victory of philosophical ideas in the space of a nation or synthesis of nations is not rather a victory for those empirical powers, in city and soul, that see in theoretical reason a power as well. The possibility of a Greece that was not the Greece of Europe, which never dedicated itself to the philosophical *Deseinsform*, is not considered by Husserl. For him, the struggle between the philosophical and the traditional men in Greece is actually over before it starts. The outcome is guaranteed by the fact that "ideas are stronger than any empirical powers."[655] This superior *strength* of ideas, not their permanence, immutability, or invincibility, but their strength in a contest with empirical powers for the devotional energies of human beings, is the supposition on the basis of which Husserl's Greece is possible. We know that the most systematic Greek reflection on this situation concluded that only the majority had the power to educate most fully (492a). In the political struggle of ideas against empirical powers is it really possible to claim victory *in the name of Greece*? Can the universal communalization in light of philosophy and the overview of anthropological humanity it makes possible be entrusted to a spreading synthesis of nations? Husserl's reflections are clearest when they show the goal of *episteme* and the universal humanity it portends as a revelation on the basis of the desire to return to serious living after having contemplated the absurd spectacle of

[654] Crisis, p. 10.

[655] Ibid., p. 288.

political historicity. This revelation happens before Greece. Greece's embrace of philosophy as its defining form of existence is required by the hypothesis of a historical Europe, but not by Greece itself. Perhaps in carrying out a reflection on the categories of the genesis of philosophy free from this requirement *theoria* could discover a critical historical purpose, the claims of Europe having already once been voiced.

Conclusion:

What does Husserl's ultimate reflection allow us to state conclusively, beyond the dilemmas with which his Europe confronts us? The critique of theoretical reason that attempts to ground and unify the sciences must also clarify *theoria* in terms of its vocational coherence. This level of reflection is required because of the philosopher's pursuit of philosophy as a goal. The goal itself must be clarified as a goal even if the method for its progressive attainment has been secured. To clarify *theoria* as a goal means to discover the historical task in which this goal has its animating power. If philosophy is necessary, one will be necessitated to it on the basis of this historical task. The forging of this necessitation is the work of a vocational subject who dedicates herself to the task, who seeks clarity of purpose by means of vision. All involvement in the carrying out of tasks refers to a past in which the task was given, a present in which it is undertaken, and a future in which must be done. The dedicational reflection discovers in these temporal horizons the necessitation of the task, the past as assignment, the present as confirmation and the future as pledge. The theoretical task encounters special difficulties in this work of dedication. Because of the infinite nature of its field, the task develops in a motivational nexus unmoved by the historical dimension that moves the person. All teleological self-understanding within the history of theory begs the question of its significance within the human history from which it must have once originated. However, the necessity of the task seen from the historical dimension could only be the necessity of overcoming the historical dimension from within.

Has there been an historical experience of this necessity? The affirmative answer to this question seems implied in the existence of philosophy itself as an established field of vocational interest. The validities of *episteme*, although unbound to the circumstances of their historical formation, point back to an original distinction between *episteme* and *doxa*. This original distinction was a human accomplishment that, while not motivated by any finite historical interest, indicates the will to overcome finite historical interest. The subject of constituted theoretical reason identifies herself as a functionary of a historical will that, in a paradoxical response to historical motives, can no longer go on living in the endless flux of finite history. The vocational clarification of *theoria* now requires taking responsibility for the meaning of this historical life according to its defining goals. These goals, rooted in the overcoming of finite and traditional understanding, are ultimately at one with the universal communalization of humanity. The history of their realization thus upsets history as a whole. The philosophical work of dedicational reflection is now forged in the temporal horizons of a history of universalization. The critique thus risks projecting onto global humanity the mania and violence implied in every interpretation of oneself as a called subject. Philosophy in the name of universal communalization verges on non-knowledge and force.

Is the course of reflection that Husserl travels justified? Can one prove that philosophy is historically necessary? Husserl does not hide the element of decision and belief involved here. On the one hand, the risks Husserl runs are grounded in a belief in the universalization of humanity, a belief to which philosophy seems committed by virtue of the historical genesis of its field. Of course, for the philosopher, belief in the project is not sufficient. *To be able to believe*, she must clarify its possibility. Universal humanity is

neither a fact nor an idea derived from the formal requirements of reason itself. It is a task effective only for the historically embedded will that would accomplish it. The clarification of the task thus takes the form of a reflection on the historical conditions for the possibility of its assignment. This philosophical responsibility remains the same, whether in Europe or beyond. On the other hand, by assuming this responsibility on the basis of Europe, Husserl makes of philosophy a constitutional power at the foundation of a political formation. The reflections on the historical genesis of philosophy and universal critique show that they emerged at the periphery or in the vicinity of a nation. Husserl takes the leap of identifying philosophy and universal critique as accomplishments occurring *within* the spiritual space of a single nation: Greece. This leap is the foundation of the Europeanizing attitude and its entire world-picture. It departs from what is philosophically required in the only way we would expect from Husserl, an overstatement of self-responsibility.

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