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**“A Taste of the Great, Wide World”:  
The Cigarette, Public Health, and Consumer Culture  
From the Third Reich to the Federal Republic**

A Dissertation Presented

by

**Kraig Thomas Larkin**

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

in

**History**

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Abstract of the Dissertation

**“A Taste of the Great, Wide World”:  
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“The Taste of the Great, Wide World” contends that the history of the cigarette question in twentieth-century Germany holds tremendous insight into the political values and nature of governance in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In spite of Germany’s reputation for placing the needs of the community ahead of personal liberty, the FRG constructed a permissive culture of cigarette smoking characterized by the state’s reluctance to forcibly interfere with an individual’s right to smoke. Rather than adopt a strict prohibitionist model of prevention, the West German response to the smoking and health debates in the latter half of the twentieth century relied upon notions of self-regulation and rational consumption on the part of individual consumer citizens. This reluctance underscores the sensitive nature of regulation within a liberal, democratic state. Even though a growing body of medical literature suggested cigarette use posed a significant threat to individual smokers and those in their presence, the West German government repeatedly refused to introduce and enforce strong tobacco control measures. This dissertation highlights the mutually interdependent relationship between public health and consumer culture, as the smoking and health debate necessitated that the state find an acceptable balance between these two worlds. Within a Cold War context that identified consumption as a hallmark of democratic rights and following numerous instances of tobacco shortages in the first half of the century, the FRG made voluntarism the cornerstone of its resolution to the cigarette question. The origins of this approach can be found in the experiences of scarcity and constrained consumption during the Second World War and immediate postwar period, when the cigarette emerged as an *ersatz* currency on the black market and a symbol of democracy.

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## List of Abbreviations

ÄARG = Medical Working Group on Smoking and Health

AfJ = Education Office for the Protection of Youth

AgV = Consumer Working Group

AJC = American Jewish Committee Archives

ARD = First German Television Station

BAB = Bundesarchiv Berlin

BAT = British American Tobacco Company

BDM = League of German Maidens

BDW = Association of German Advertising Consultants

BKA = Federal Cartel Office

BMJ = British Medical Journal

BuArch B = Bundesarchiv Koblenz

BZgA = Federal Center for Health Enlightenment

CDU = Christian Democratic Union

DAF = German Labor Front

DHS = Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren

DKZ = Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale

DM = Deutsche Mark

DP = Displaced person

DSR = Deutsche Städte-Reklame GmbH

ECA = Economic Cooperation Administration

ERP = European Recovery Program (or Marshall Plan)

FAS = Foreign Agricultural Service

FAZ = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

FDP = Free Democratic Party

FRG = Federal Republic of Germany (West German)

GDR = German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

GWB = Law Against the Restraint of Trade

GYA = German Youth Activities

HH = Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover

HIA = Hoover Institution Archives

HJ = Hitler Youth

HSTL = Harry S. Truman Presidential Library

ICD = International Control Division

JEIA = Joint Export-Import Agency

JWT/Duke = J. Walter Thompson Collection, Duke University

LMG = Lebensmittelgesetz (Food Law)

MdA = Museum der Arbeit, Hamburg

NACP = National Archives at College Park, Maryland

NDP = National Democratic Party of Germany

NDsW = Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv-Staatsarchiv Wolfenbüttel

NFT = Nicotine free tobacco

NMAH = National Museum of American History Archives Center, Washington D.C.

NSDAP = National Socialist German Workers Party

NSF = National Socialist Women's Association

NYT = New York Times

OMGB = Office of the Military Government, Bavaria

OMGH = Office of the Military Government, Hesse

OMGUS = Office of the Military Government, United States

PRO = Public Records Office of the United Kingdom

PSB = Public Safety Branch

RCP = Royal College of Physicians

ReeA = Reemstma Archive, Hamburg

RL = Reine Luft

RM = Reichsmark

RMP = Royal Military Police

SA = Sturm Abteilung

SED = Socialist Unity Party

SPD = Social Democratic Party

SS = Schutzstaffel

S&S = Stars & Stripes

TNA = National Archives of the United Kingdom

UNA = United Nations Archive

USDA = United States Department of Agriculture

VdC = Verband der Cigarettenindustrie

ZAW = Central Committee for the Advertising Industry

ZDF = Second German Television Station

ZfG = Central Institute for Health

ZfK = Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung

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## Introduction

In early 2008, former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt ignited a controversy when he and his wife, Loki, violated new public smoking restrictions by lighting cigarettes inside a Hamburg theater. Anti-smoking groups immediately condemned Schmidt's disregard of the law and pressured prosecutors into opening a formal investigation. Shortly before this episode made international headlines, eleven state governments in the Federal Republic implemented tougher limits on smoking in bars, restaurants, and theaters. Frustrated business owners tried to circumvent the new constraints by transforming their establishments into smoking clubs and churches. One enterprising businessman bypassed regulations requiring restaurant patrons to take their habit outside by cutting holes in the wall, thereby allowing his clientele to comply with the order without actually exiting the premises. At the same time these stories of civil disobedience and protest garnered attention, other cigarette-related stories cast a pall over the issue of tobacco control. In Munich, two young men allegedly assaulted a pensioner at a subway station after the victim demanded they put out their cigarettes. In an ill-conceived protest, a smokers' rights website equated the stigmatization of smokers in present-day Germany with the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich via the sale of a t-shirt featuring "*Raucher*" (smoker) emblazoned across a yellow Star of David.

Apart from collectively underscoring the intensity of ongoing cultural and political debates about the place of smoking within Germany, these stories also illuminate a persistent source of tension within a liberal society – namely, the delicate nature of

regulation in a democratic polity that seeks to balance the preservation of individual liberty with the general welfare of the community. The manner in which a state responds to a public health dilemma is a reflection of the deepest assumptions of its political culture. In the case of Germany, where there is a long tradition of statutory intervention in matters of preventive public health, the Federal Republic has exhibited a reluctance to intervene in the rights of citizens to engage in a behavior, which, especially since the 1960s, has been deemed to be harmful to both individual consumers and those around them. The growing body of knowledge regarding the cigarette question has posed a significant public health dilemma for the democratic state, since protecting the health of the broader public could potentially empower the state to infringe upon the individual's right to make lifestyle choices for themselves. Finding a common ground in the smoking and health debates acceptable to all parties, respectful of both civil liberties and public health needs, has been a recurring source of conflict for authorities, consumers, the cigarette industry, and advertisers for decades.

Within a liberal democracy, an “ethic of autonomous selfhood” complicates attempts to impose restrictions on cigarette smoking as states rely upon individual consumers to act as reasonable agents in measuring and preferably minimizing risk.<sup>1</sup> Citizens are expected to voluntarily exercise self-restraint when engaging in potentially harmful behaviors, allowing authorities to avoid prohibitionist models in regulating risk.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Paulette Kurzer, Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Baldwin, “Can There Be a Democratic Public Health? Fighting AIDS in the Industrialized World,” in Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century, eds., Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard, and Patrick Zylberman (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008), pp. 26-28.

This expectation became particularly evident in western states as the focus of preventive public health and medicine shifted from contagious to chronic diseases in the middle of the twentieth century. As a result of the emphasis placed on preventing chronic diseases, especially between the end of the Second World War and AIDS epidemic of the 1980s, public health practitioners increasingly directed their attention to lifestyle choices and management, thereby putting the burden on the individual when it came to balancing risky behavior and the chances of developing a deadly disease.<sup>3</sup>

The complex history of the cigarette in Germany further complicates the chances of simultaneously satisfying those who argue that individual liberty must be respected at all times and those who demand that the state adopt a more forceful approach to protect the welfare of the public. Proponents of tobacco controls in the Federal Republic pursue their objectives under the shadows of the Third Reich. In recent years, they have had to contend with repeated counterarguments that frame smoking restrictions as a form of health fascism, harkening to the authoritarianism and persecution characteristic of the Nazi dictatorship. At the same time, anti-smoking groups remain undeterred and have continued their quest to curtail if not completely eliminate smoking in Germany, a battle that has come at a substantial human and financial cost. Lung cancer comprises the largest proportion of smoking fatalities in Germany, accounting for nearly 30,000 cases per annum.<sup>4</sup> Germany accounts for more than 14% of all tobacco-related deaths in the

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<sup>3</sup> Dorothy Porter, "The Social Contract of Health in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: Individuals, Corporations, and the State," in Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century, eds., Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard, and Patrick Zylberman (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008), p. 46.

<sup>4</sup> Leonhard Knorr-Held and Evi Rainer, "Projections of Lung Cancer Mortality in West Germany: A Case Study in Bayesian Prediction," Biostatistics 2:1 (2001), p. 109.

European Union, though it constitutes only 6% of the EU's population.<sup>5</sup> Financially, the World Health Organization estimates that Germany's annual health-care expenditures for tobacco-related diseases will exceed \$6 billion.<sup>6</sup>

Despite these alarming figures, Germany's experiences with tobacco – particularly the cigarette – have produced a permissive culture of smoking, which has significantly influenced the strength and enforcement of tobacco control legislation and helped solidify Germany's reputation as one of the last remaining refuge for smokers within the industrialized, democratic world. A 2002 travel guide for English-speaking tourists described Germany as a “smoker's paradise” where it “sometimes seems as if every living adult German smokes” and American anti-smoking attitudes are dismissed as overly “fanatic.”<sup>7</sup> Germany's status as a smoker's sanctuary emerged through its obstructionist tendencies vis-à-vis tobacco control measures in the European Union, as well as through everyday practices where smoking remained “your private pleasure, and nothing to make excuses about.”<sup>8</sup> Although this reputation has been and continues to be challenged, as evidenced by the most recent wave of anti-smoking legislation, the Federal Republic has maintained a culture of smoking far more liberal in its orientation than in the United States and western EU countries. The respect for individual rights – i.e., the

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<sup>5</sup> Knut-Olaf Haustein, Tabakabhängigkeit: Gesundheitliche Schäden durch das Rauchen (Köln: Deutscher Ärzte Verlag, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> World Health Organization, WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2008: The MPOWER Package (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008), p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> Hyde Flippo, When in Germany, Do As the Germans Do: The Clued-In Guide to German Life, Language, and Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), p. 60.

<sup>8</sup> “Under a Black Cloud: Non-smokers in Germany – Nowhere to Hide,” Munich Found, September 2001, <http://www.munichfound.com/archives/id/61/article/1188> (accessed 12 January 2002).

right to smoke – in Germany, even when the federal government has formally acknowledged the plethora of health risks associated with the cigarette, represents a stark and perplexing contrast to Germany’s reputation for placing the needs of the community ahead of personal liberty.

## **Literature Review**

This dissertation seeks to explain the emergence of Germany’s permissive culture of smoking and its reliance upon notions of self-regulation to manage the cigarette question in the latter half of the twentieth century. The theoretical underpinning of this study is Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality.<sup>9</sup> Foucault used the concept of governmentality as a means of studying the complex nature of power and its application within liberal societies, where, as he argued in The History of Sexuality, “never have there existed more centers of power.”<sup>10</sup> To Foucault, the means of disciplining the citizenry in modern, industrialized societies extends well beyond the formal state to include other institutions and means of social control where knowledge is produced and disseminated with the objective of creating self-regulating agents. These alternative forms of suasion include the establishment of positive social and cultural norms through a variety of forums, such as education and advertising. The “polymorphous techniques of power” available to the state and other institutions in a liberal society rendered overtly

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<sup>9</sup> Michel Foucault, Paul Rabinow, and Nikolas S. Rose, eds., The Essential Foucault: Selections From Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 229-245. Also see Nikolas S. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 61-97.

<sup>10</sup> Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 48-49.

coercive methods superfluous.<sup>11</sup> In the case of smoking and health in post-fascist Germany, the West German state did not need to compel behavior, particularly in light of the memories of Nazi anti-smoking measures and Germany's experiences of constrained consumption. Rather, it could depend upon more subtle forms of social control. This can be seen clearly in the Federal Republic's initial embrace of voluntary advertising codes, whereby the cigarette industry promised to police its own marketing practices in place of any form of state control over advertising, and in the state's reliance upon health education programs to construct rational, well-informed consumers who could decide for themselves whether to smoke or not.

Edwin Ackerknecht and Peter Baldwin's works on what public health responses to contagious disease epidemics reveal about styles of governance in the modern era comprise an important point of departure from Foucault's theory of governmentality. Ackerknecht's work on nineteenth-century preventive health care has exercised a lasting impression upon the historiography of public health, as he posited the nature of a state's handling of contagious disease epidemics was a direct reflection of the political regime's character. Repressive governments, according to Ackerknecht, deployed equally repressive measures that infringed upon individual freedoms in the hopes of preventing the spread of contagious diseases. In contrast, liberal governments utilized prophylactic methods and hygienic tactics designed to minimize the level of state intrusion on individual life and preserve the integrity of civil society and personal freedom.<sup>12</sup>

Ackerknecht's argument held that political culture rather than the disease determined the

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<sup>11</sup> Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> Edwin Ackerknecht, "Anticontagionism Between 1821 and 1867," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 22 (1948), p. 5.

type of preventive public health practices put into effect in a given society. This line of thinking dominated much of the literature on prevention, often framing the state's role in public health as being relatively unchallenged.<sup>13</sup>

As this dissertation shows, Ackerknecht's underlying assumption, namely that examining the methods used to resolve public health issues is a window for historians to uncover the true values of a given state and society, can also be applied to chronic diseases. The works of Allan Brandt and Virginia Berridge on smoking and public health in the U.S. and Britain, respectively, build upon this notion. Brandt's exhaustive study reveals competing visions of the state's responsibility to regulate voluntarily assumed risks.<sup>14</sup> As in West Germany, the U.S. rejected the use of prohibition, which it had once used unsuccessfully in relation to alcohol. Unlike West Germany, the American state exercised a greater role in trying to guarantee the creation of fully informed, self-regulating agents of consumption. The tensions Berridge identified between those favoring "systematic gradualism" and coercive measures to control tobacco use in Britain are very similar to those that could be found in the Federal Republic.<sup>15</sup> Yet, the West German context diverges from the British and American cases due to the Nazis' politicization and racialization of smoking in the Third Reich and the rise of the "cigarette economy" in the immediate postwar period, two factors that contributed to the

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<sup>13</sup> George Rosen, A History of Public Health (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). Rosen originally published this study in 1958, a decade after Ackerknecht delivered the Fielding Garrison Lecture that served as the basis for the above-cited article.

<sup>14</sup> Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> Virginia Berridge, Marketing Health: Smoking and the Discourse of Public Health in Britain, 1945-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).



postwar culture of smoking. Cigarette companies, advertisers, and smokers alike equated the freedom to light up in the Federal Republic with individual liberty in the aftermath of the experiences of Nazi anti-smoking efforts and the tobacco shortages of the occupation era.

But the breakdown described by Ackerknecht is not as immediate or as straightforward as he initially argued. His dichotomous approach neglects to take into account those cases whereby liberal governments willfully subverted the sanctity of individual liberty through the use of quarantine.<sup>16</sup> Peter Baldwin's work on the relationship between governance and public health approaches has sought to complicate Ackerknecht's basic premise. In his exploration of different national responses to the AIDS epidemic of the late twentieth century, Baldwin determined that those countries most likely to insist upon the preservation of civil liberty (e.g., the United States) were typically among the first to abandon its commitment to liberal political values in favor of stringent tactics aimed at protecting the broader public from potential harm at the hands of infected individuals. By contrast, industrialized nations with a strong track record of state interference in the private sphere to manage public health interests (e.g., Germany) often exhibited greater reluctance to curtail personal freedoms in the name of public health.<sup>17</sup> Baldwin's work on AIDS draws attention to a discrepancy between perceptions of public health cultures in different national contexts and the actual policy initiatives undertaken in these states to address a major public health crisis. By acknowledging the

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<sup>16</sup> Judith Walzer Leavitt, Typhoid Mary: Captive of the Public's Health (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997). To prevent the spread of typhoid, the New York City Public Health Department quarantined Mary Mallon ("Typhoid Mary") for several years.

<sup>17</sup> Peter Baldwin, Disease and Democracy: The Industrialized World Faces AIDS (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

contradictions between political values and public health practices vis-à-vis AIDS, Baldwin seemingly turns Ackerknecht's argument on its head. More importantly for this project, it highlights an important distinction between the ways in which democratic ideals are viewed and, in certain cases, cast aside in the face of a crisis of this magnitude. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the Federal Republic's handling of the smoking debate in the 1960s and 1970s mirrors the divergence Baldwin identified between the U.S. and Germany in the 1980s and beyond. In other words, the Federal Republic's insistence upon safeguarding individual rights when trying to prevent diseases tied to risky behavior predates the AIDS epidemic.

The implications of this line of research regarding the authenticity of democracy are numerous. The manner in which the state or society manage known risks is a reflection of said state's faith in its own citizenry's ability to identify and avoid risky behavior. In essence, the balance between personal responsibility and the need for state intervention in supervising individual comportment poses fundamental questions about what constitutes risk, where the limits of regulation reside, and the best means to police social spaces where the potentially hazardous actions of some put others in harm's way. Together, these issues point to the sensitive nature of regulating lifestyle in a liberal, democratic society presumably entrusted by civil society to safeguard personal freedoms. Baldwin's contention about the seemingly paradoxical nature of how various industrialized states have managed the AIDS epidemic challenges Ronald Bayer's argument that an "implicit ideology of restraint" and "ethos of privacy" hamstrung the American government's handling of monitoring and responding "to private acts that have critical social consequences." Both Bayer and Baldwin, however, recognize that "liberty

and communal welfare” remain in a constant “state of tension in the realm of public health policy,” as the protection of civil liberties and the general public often requires very different sets of actions.<sup>18</sup> A multitude of factors – including but not limited to political culture and historical precedent – set the contours of the types of actions available to public health officials charged with managing health risks and epidemics.<sup>19</sup> This project, then, seeks to expand our current comprehension of the forces at play in shaping the formation and implementation of public health policies and attitudes by drawing economic interests and, more importantly, conceptualizations of the consumer as an active agent into these discussions.

In certain respects, this argument challenges much of the existing literature on smoking, consumption and health within the German context. Political scientists interested in contemporary tobacco control efforts in the Federal Republic highlight Germany’s reputation for lax regulations and obstructionism within supranational bodies charged with developing and implementing anti-tobacco measures.<sup>20</sup> Though these characteristics reinforce the notion of an overly permissive culture of smoking in Germany, these studies tend to bookend this history by focusing exclusively upon the attention-grabbing history of Nazi anti-smoking campaigns and present-day anxieties

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<sup>18</sup> Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the Politics of Public Health (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), pp. 1-19.

<sup>19</sup> Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>20</sup> Alice Cooper and Paulette Kurzer, “Rauch ohne Feuer: Why Germany Lags in Tobacco Control,” German Politics and Society 21:3 (2003), pp. 24-47; Francisco Duina and Paulette Kurzer, “Smoke in Your Eyes: The Struggle Over Tobacco Control in the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy 11:1 (2004), pp. 57-77; and David Simpson, “Germany: How Did It Get Like This?” Tobacco Control 11:4 (2002), pp. 291-293.

about the insidious influence of tobacco lobbies at all levels of government. In doing so, they neglect the lengthy and complex history of smoking and tobacco control between the 1930s and the present. Robert Proctor's important work on the history of health in the Third Reich is a big reason why so much attention is given to the Nazis when it comes to tobacco control. Proctor's detailed account of Nazi-era tobacco politics reveals the state's extensive efforts to manage individuals' patterns of consumption in the name of racial health. The Nazis incorporated various types of disciplining to deny Germans the right to risk disease through unhealthy practices, such as excessive smoking and drinking. More importantly, Proctor shows that German scientists in the 1930s led the charge into uncovering the medical risks associated with smoking through the use of epidemiological methods, the same methods later used by American and British scientists to establish a causal connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.<sup>21</sup> Yet, as Chapter 1 of this dissertation argues, the culture of smoking in Nazi Germany was characterized by an ambivalence that produced a confusing set of messages and edicts. Though the history of Nazi anti-smoking campaigns undoubtedly contributed to the postwar culture of smoking in the Federal Republic, the contradictory nature of Nazi tobacco politics undermines those arguments that attribute postwar liberalism directly to Nazi authoritarianism.

The appeal of the Nazi period is undeniable and has shaped the discourse of public debates on smoking in the early twenty-first century, but it also overshadows the postwar history of tobacco and regulation. The public health discourses and ideologies in the Federal Republic between the 1950s and 1980s had as much of an impact on the formation of Germany's contemporary culture of smoking and lax controls as what

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<sup>21</sup> Robert N. Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

happened under the Nazis. With few exceptions, historians have paid scant attention to the intervening period in either East or West Germany. Young-Sun Hong found that the ruling Socialist Unity Party in the German Democratic Republic felt limited in its ability to impose restrictions on smoking in light of the chronic shortages in desirable consumer goods.<sup>22</sup> For the West, Christoph Maria Merki and Henner Hess have examined changes in distribution and the role of the cigarette in the postwar black market.<sup>23</sup> Our understanding of the history of smoking and tobacco control in the Federal Republic remains limited – particularly with regard to the evolution of public health discourses and practices in the post-fascist culture of consumption.

This project is also informed by recent trends within the historiography of consumer culture, which offers historians a useful means of examining the connections between consumerism, identity, and the political implications of consumption.<sup>24</sup> Lizabeth Cohen’s analysis of mass consumption in twentieth-century America explores the interplay between consumption and citizenship, distinguishing between the “citizen consumer” and “purchaser consumer.” For Cohen, the former consumed goods and services for the purposes of benefiting society, while the latter acted solely out of self-interest. The structure of America’s culture of consumption did not afford all consumers

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<sup>22</sup> Young-Sun Hong, “Cigarette Butts and the Building of Socialism in East Germany,” Central European History 35:3 (2002), pp. 327-344.

<sup>23</sup> Christoph Maria Merki, “The Changing Perceptions of Tobacco: Smoking in Germany During the 1930s and 1940s,” in Order and Disorder: The Health Implications of Eating and Drinking in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Alexander Fenton (East Linton: Tuckwell, 2000), pp. 323-338; and Henner Hess, “The Other Prohibition: The Cigarette Crisis in Post-war Germany,” Crime, Law & Social Change 25 (1996), pp. 43-61.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton, eds., The Politics of Mass Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America (New York: Berg, 2001).

the same possibilities to act on self-interest, often eschewing racial and ethnic minorities, the working class, and women. The “consumer’s republic” that ultimately materialized was beset by deep social rifts, which producers and marketers increasingly appropriated and exploited as they segmented the market for the purposes of selling goods and identities.<sup>25</sup> Cohen’s breakdown of American consumer history is also relevant to studies of consumer culture in twentieth-century Europe, particularly for those areas most directly affected by the “Americanization” of European markets. Similar to the arguments Ackerknecht and Baldwin made about the relationship of public health and styles of governance, Cohen’s study underscores how attitudes and policies toward consumption can offer insight into political values.

Victoria de Grazia’s Irresistible Empire traces the triumph of American consumer society in twentieth-century Europe through the eventual creation of a “Market Empire” where American values and democratic ideals are conflated with consumer goods.<sup>26</sup> The American model emerged triumphant over competitive systems, whether it was the “bourgeois regime” of consumption in Western Europe or the planned economies of totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe. In this empire, egalitarianism is characterized by a shared ability – or desire – to participate in the consumption of mass-produced consumer goods. The politicization of consumption came to be an important point of contention during the Cold War, as Western European states gradually accepted consumerism as a defining element of the Western experience, while socialist regimes

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<sup>25</sup> Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

that struggled with chronic shortages repeatedly denounced the decadence of the West.<sup>27</sup> Though it is an invaluable addition to the historiography of Americanization and the history of consumption, De Grazia tends to overstate the extent to which the American style displaced existing regimes of consumption in Europe, as well as the general level of coordination behind the export of this American Market Empire. This is problematic on two levels as it effectively ignores the qualitative differences between European and North American consumer cultures and also downplays the level of Europeans' agency in navigating the assimilation of American goods, practices, and symbols into pre-existing cultures of consumption. Chapter 3 of this dissertation addresses this particular issue, drawing attention to the complex network of relationships involved in the creation (or recreation) of tastes and styles in the West German cigarette market after 1945. In this case, the expansion of the Market Empire in the western zones of occupation and Federal Republic was hardly a one-sided process of Americanization. Though American tobacco and cigarette brands acquired prominence in the West German market, this development was contested by German tobacco manufacturers and companies, Greek and Turkish tobacco suppliers who depended upon access to the lucrative German market, and even German consumers themselves.

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<sup>27</sup> David F. Crew, ed., Consuming Germany in the Cold War (New York: Berg, 2003). On consumption in East Germany, see Ina Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1999); Katherine Pence, "Women on the Verge: Consumers Between Private Desires and Public Crisis," in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics, eds., Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 287-322; Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); and Judd Stitzel, Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics, and Consumer Culture in East Germany (New York: Berg, 2005).

Both Cohen and De Grazia raise attention to the role – and conflation – of democracy with consumption in the twentieth century. In other words, democracy in the Market Empire could best be obtained via consumption and soon came to be understood as the “exercising of free choice” within the market, a connection that the Americans actively reinforced during the Allied occupation.<sup>28</sup> By the 1960s and 1970s, any sort of state interference with the consumer’s right to smoke could be discursively framed as a direct threat to the very essence of democracy within West Germany. The centrality of consumption to the overall narrative of West Germany’s development from the immediate postwar period through the present is undeniable, though the Federal Republic’s first years were characterized by austerity.<sup>29</sup> Together, the experience of constrained consumption and the identification of consumption as a core component of democracy left an indelible mark on the regulatory framework adopted in the Federal Republic during the 1960s and 1970s. West Germany’s reluctance to crackdown against smoking shows that we must examine public health regulation within the cultural and economic contexts. The case of the cigarette illustrates the degree to which consumerism integrated itself into the very fabric of the Federal Republic following prolonged experiences of scarcity and came to be seen by broad segments of West German society as a sign of democratic freedom, because, even though its use could ultimately kill the

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<sup>28</sup> Jennifer Fay, Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of Postwar Germany (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

<sup>29</sup> Michael Wildt, Am Beginn der “Konsumgesellschaft”: Mangelenerfahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandshoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1994); Axel Schildt, Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und “Zeitgeist” in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre (Hamburg: Hans Christians Verlag, 1995); and Jennifer A. Loehling, From Rugs to Riches: Housework, Consumption, and Modernity in Modern Germany (New York: Berg, 1999).



consumer, it remained a legal behavior. To be a citizen in the Federal Republic during these years meant one possessed the democratic right to risk disease via smoking.

## **Project Outline**

This dissertation traces the history of the cigarette in Nazi and West Germany from the 1930s through the 1970s in order to determine precisely how and why Germany evolved from a model of an anti-smoking state in the pre-1945 era to one of the last havens for smokers in the twenty-first century. Chapter 1 explores the history of smoking and tobacco control in the Third Reich with an emphasis on the authoritarian regime's desire to pursue its own racial objectives while maintaining a certain level of popular support and obedience. These contradictory objectives produced an undeniably ambiguous culture of smoking within the Third Reich, one that was characterized by a series of stark contrasts that made the ambivalence of Nazi attitudes and policies regarding tobacco use and control quite evident. Vitriolic anti-smoking propaganda that portrayed the smoker as an insidious threat to the racial community on par with Jews or Bolsheviks co-existed with the regime's reluctance to enforce its own tobacco control measures. The opening of an Institute for Tobacco Hazards Research at the University of Jena in April 1941, approved by Hitler, had to contend with the cigarette smoking of prominent Nazi officials and German celebrities, including the Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. The Four Year Plan administered by Hermann Göring prioritized armament production over the manufacturing of consumer goods, while Goebbels and Martin Bormann criticized the idea of imposing constraints on smoking in the interest of maintaining morale. In essence, despite the racialization of tobacco

consumption, the totalitarianism of the Nazis did not extend to cigarette smoking as they frequently overlooked moderate tobacco use by adult males, but maintained the German woman does not smoke. When the Nazi state directly addressed the cigarette question, they did so with a keen focus on tobacco use by German youths and women of childbearing age, thereby implicitly condoning and legitimizing smoking on the part of German men, a trend that continued to shape smoking policies and practices well after 1945.

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the complex history of the cigarette and tobacco politics during the Allied occupation of Germany. The postwar cigarette economy, the focus of the second chapter, operated as a contact zone that brought diverse groups of people into close proximity with one another in the course of bartering.<sup>30</sup> The cigarette – a crucial prop in the expansion and normalization of the underground economy – quickly emerged as the most important black market currency. As economic agents, occupation personnel, the occupied, and displaced persons (DPs) entered into black market trades on different footings, partly determined by their access to large quantities of cigarettes. Yet, the black market not only created unique opportunities for economic exchange; it also functioned as a space for social and cultural encounters, facilitating contact between the occupied and their occupiers. For many Germans and DPs, the inflated black market value of cigarettes not only meant they were too valuable to be smoked, but also that something as mundane as a carton of cigarettes could have a substantial impact upon their overall standard of living and influence how people viewed and interacted with those individuals of other nationalities and cultures. At the same time, American officials

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<sup>30</sup> Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 6-7.

imbued the cigarette with the power to democratize Germans as they transitioned from fascist dictatorship to a post-fascist society.

Chapter 3 charts the international competition between the United States and Germany's traditional tobacco suppliers – primarily Greece and Turkey – to control the highly lucrative legal cigarette market. The American cigarette industry and tobacco growers firmly believed the Allied victory over Germany meant the sizeable market was no longer up for grabs, despite Greece and Turkey's previous dependence upon tobacco exports to Germany. For the American government, the potential displacement of Greek and Turkish tobacco from Germany prior to the unveiling of the Truman Doctrine carried significant Cold War implications, since the loss of the German market would have further destabilized the already shaky political situation in Athens and Ankara. The political and economic stakes forced occupation authorities to seek a balance between preserving pro-Western governments in Greece and Turkey and placating the interests of the American tobacco trade. The tobacco battles between 1945 and the early 1950s were characteristic of the construction of America's Market Empire, which “regarded other nations as having limited sovereignty over their public space.” Instead, the Market Empire promoted the creation of a universal culture based upon American principles and embodied in the adoption of practices and commodities associated with American consumer culture. The Market Empire derived power from the “democratic ethos” of consumption and through the establishment of new social norms and identities.<sup>31</sup> In this sense, the American tobacco trade anticipated the spread of a “democratic” character through the widespread availability of those goods that epitomized American modernity,

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<sup>31</sup> De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, pp. 6-9.

even if the pursuit of their objectives ran afoul of the needs and desires of America's Cold War allies or even German smokers.

Chapter 4 examines the history of print cigarette advertising in the first three decades of the Federal Republic to explore how ads reflected the transition to a youth-oriented capitalist consumer culture built upon a foundation of consumer citizenship. As reflections of the culture in which they are produced, ads offer historians valuable insight into the *Zeitgeist* of a specific historical moment. In this case, the advertising campaigns of several popular brands of cigarettes – one of the most heavily advertised commodity in postwar Germany – reveal the complexities of fashioning social and political identities that fit the consumer landscape of the Federal Republic. For instance, campaigns for Eckstein No. 5 or Marlboro underscore postwar anxieties related to the fluidity of gender roles and identities amidst a supposed *Frauenüberschuss* (surplus of women). Likewise, other brands marketed themselves as international and cosmopolitan in nature, indirectly reflecting the unease many West Germans felt with regard to overt displays of nationalism in the wake of the Second World War and Final Solution. Exploring the emergence and evolution of these campaigns enables us to identify how cigarette companies used advertising to integrate smoking in a positive way into popular understandings of gender and citizenship in the Federal Republic.

Chapter 5 explores the history of cigarette advertising regulations in the Federal Republic beginning in the mid-1960s, where the industry employed a system of voluntary self-regulation to delay the introduction of formal restrictions on tobacco marketing. Throughout the conservative Adenauer era, the West German state exhibited little willingness to restrict the marketing of cigarettes on public health grounds, opting instead

for a more hands-off approach. As the body of knowledge about the risks associated with cigarette smoking grew with the release of damning reports by the Royal College of Physicians and the U.S. Surgeon General in the early 1960s, the Health Ministry explored the possibility of implementing significant restrictions or a complete ban on tobacco advertising. Though the cigarette trade's decision to establish a voluntary ad code and police itself initially received some support from the Health Ministry, which felt its own objectives would take too long to move through the political process, it ran afoul of the Economics Ministry and advertisers. The former objected on the grounds that any industry-wide agreement violated the Federal Republic's anti-cartel law. The law, instituted in 1957 to prevent the formation of industrial monopolies, reflected prevailing beliefs in the Adenauer era that the Nazi dictatorship came to power largely due to the machinations of powerful and anti-democratic cartels in the Weimar Republic. As such, any violation of the ban on trusts seemingly threatened to bring Germany's recent past right into the present. For the advertising industry, the prospect of state regulations against cigarette ads was a source of concern tied directly to the Cold War. Marketing, from their perspective, represented a hallmark of a liberal, democratic, consumer culture and, in the case of potential health hazards, fulfilled an important role as a conduit of product information that served to educate consumers about the need for filters or cigarettes containing less nicotine and tar. They deemed the Health Ministry's push for a ban as a direct threat to the very essence of the democratic state. To eliminate all tobacco marketing from the landscape of West Germany's consumer culture would have transformed the free market into something resembling the socialist planned economies of the Soviet bloc. Ultimately, the cigarette industry staved off legal restrictions for at

least an additional decade, due in large part to their ability to frame voluntarism as the regulatory framework that best fit the structure of a liberal, democratic state.

As Chapter 6 shows, the Cold War divide also colored the debate surrounding the utilization of stringent measures to control the health effects of smoking. As distinct West and East German identities took shape, the idea of the state possibly restricting the consumer's opportunity to smoke not only had to contend with the long shadows of fascism, but also risked being associated with a style of governance characteristic of the Soviet bloc. The Nazi past and Cold War present combined to create a situation in which the West German state's intervention in the private citizen's act of smoking could be interpreted as a violation of individual liberty and the core democratic values of the Federal Republic – those same values that served to distinguish West Germany from its predecessor and its neighbors to the East. Put more succinctly, the centrality of consumption to the West Germany identity meant that the right to smoke – and, by extension, the right to risk disease – superseded the rights of the state to protect the welfare of its citizens by preventing such risky behavior. Even as West Germany introduced restrictions on tobacco ads by the mid-1970s as part of a larger push to protect consumers, the state remained quite reticent to take a more forceful approach when it came to the actual act of smoking. The state had no business compelling individuals to adhere to a particular set of behaviors to guarantee sound health. Health education campaigns offered the state a means of influencing the behavior of individual citizens without resorting to compulsion. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, anti-smoking programs repeatedly presented the issue of smoking as a matter of individual choice that needed to be made by a rational and informed consumer.

Predictably, this approach came under intense pressure by the mid-to-late 1970s, as notions of passive smoking, nicotine addiction, and the rise of a non-smoker consciousness increasingly altered the debate on smoking and health. Passive smoking weakened arguments about the voluntary assumption of risk by well-informed smokers, as an individual's smoking now posed an involuntary threat to innocent bystanders. Increased attention to the addictive nature of nicotine also raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the rational consumer model, as addictive behavior denotes compulsion. Yet, the state continued (and continues) to utilize a piecemeal approach to the cigarette question, refusing to ban smoking altogether. Instead of prohibiting smoking, the state continues to rely upon health education programs to steer consumers away from risky behavior without resorting to force. The state has depended upon less confrontational methods of regulation, such as public opinion and social ostracism, in their attempt to use indirectly regulate behavior without appearing to infringe upon or weaken popular understandings of individual liberty. Citizens in the Federal Republic have maintained their right to risk disease, provided they do not put others in jeopardy.

## Chapter One

### “The Greatest Poison For Our People”: The Cigarette in the Third Reich

On 5 April 1941, many of the leading politicians, physicians, and racial hygienists in the Third Reich gathered together at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena to celebrate the founding of a new Institute for Tobacco Hazards Research (*Institut zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahren*). Karl Astel, a Professor of Medicine, SS member, and head of the local offices for racial and public health, headed the new center. Dignitaries present at the introduction included the Reich Physicians' Leader Leonardo Conti, Reich Health Office President Hans Reiter, and the Gauleiter for Thuringia, Fritz Sauckel. Apart from the pomp and circumstance of the opening festivities, which incorporated the music of Mozart and an address by Reiter, the Institute also hosted a conference on the dangers of tobacco consumption. During the course of the proceedings, conference organizers shared with the audience a personal telegram from Adolf Hitler, who in addition to donating 100,000 RM sent his “best wishes for your work which will liberate mankind from one of its most dangerous poisons.”<sup>32</sup>

The creation of the Institute for Tobacco Hazards Research represented the culmination of a public health and racial hygiene campaign to protect the German *Volkskörper* from the deleterious effects of tobacco products. A relatively unknown

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<sup>32</sup> Susanne Zimmermann, Matthias Egger and Uwe Hossfeld, “Commentary: Pioneering Research Into Smoking and Health in Nazi Germany – the ‘Wissenschaftliches Institut zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahren’ in Jena,” *International Journal of Epidemiology* 30 (2001), p. 35; and George Davey Smith and Matthias Egger, “Smoking and Health Promotion in Nazi Germany,” *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health* 50 (1996), pp. 109-110.



disease before the twentieth century, bronchial carcinoma accounted for approximately 1% of all cancer-related autopsies at the Institute of Pathology at the University of Dresden in 1878. Over the first three decades of the twentieth century, the rates of cigarette smoking and lung cancer among German males grew considerably and had become a major health concern by the 1930s.<sup>33</sup> The push to prevent Germans from damaging their racial health through the consumption of cigarettes and similar products was part of the Nazi pursuit of bodily health. According to leading racial hygienists and anti-smoking figures within the Nazi party, tobacco products played a leading role in the aetiology of various types of carcinoma, threatened the reproductive health of both women and men, hampered the physical development of youth, and undermined the productivity of the German laborer. To support these claims, the Nazi regime and anti-smoking groups promoted scientific research into the consequences of tobacco use for racial health, including those studies carried out at the Institute in Jena. Epidemiological studies conducted by German researchers provided the state with a statistically backed medical rationale to forcibly intervene in the private act of consumption for the general benefit of public and racial health.

Health was not a lifestyle to strive for in the eyes of the Nazis. Rather, it was the very foundation of racial citizenship in the Third Reich, as individual health played a vital role in determining national and racial strength. Therefore, each German citizen had a “duty to our people” to pursue and maintain health.<sup>34</sup> A 1941 guide on health for Hitler

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<sup>33</sup> Hanspeter Witschi, “A Short History of Lung Cancer,” Toxicological Sciences 64 (2001), pp. 4-6.

<sup>34</sup> Hans Reiter, “Alkohol und Nikotinmissbrauch und gesundes Volk,” Ärzteblatt für Pommern, Mecklenburg und Lübeck 4 (1937), p. 5.

Youth members and their parents stressed that “your body belongs to your nation,” whereas any belief in the “right of self-determination” over one’s own body as exhibited through the pursuit of hedonistic pleasures displayed Marxist tendencies.<sup>35</sup> For many leading figures responsible for shaping racial and public health policies within the party, this obligation to preserve health (*Gesundheitspflicht*) required a combination of self-disciplining on the part of the individual citizen and coercion by the state to ensure compliance. The Nazi campaign against smoking represented one line of attack in a much broader effort to minimize the damage caused by the consumption of “racial poisons,” a phrase used among racial scientists in the late nineteenth century that resonated with the hygienists, physicians, and educators responsible for strengthening the German racial stock in the Third Reich. To protect the *Volkskörper*, they introduced public information campaigns to promote the consumption of whole grain bread over highly refined white bread and to reduce excessive drinking.<sup>36</sup> The repeated insistence that individuals did not have a right to risk sickness served as a guiding tenet of Nazi preventive public health policy and justified a prohibitionist approach to the smoking question. Yet, the authoritarian regime’s overall approach to tobacco use amounted to a patchwork of inconsistently applied policies due to Germans’ protracted experiences of

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<sup>35</sup> Wolfgang Eberhard Kitzing and Robert Hördemann, Erziehung zur Gesundheit: Ein Handbuch für Jugenderzieher und Eltern (Berlin: Reichsgesundheits Verlag, 1941), p. 220.

<sup>36</sup> Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 235-237; Elke Hauschildt, Auf den richtigen Weg zwingen: Trinkerfürsorge, 1922 bis 1945 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus Verlag, 1995); and Hermann Fährenkrug, “Alcohol and the State in Nazi Germany, 1933-1945,” in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, eds., Susanna Barrows and Robin Room (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 315-334.

constrained consumption and the state's need to ensure a necessary level of popular support.

Racial hygienists and anti-smoking leaders predicated their interventions not only on racial dogma, but also on a growing body of scientific knowledge linking tobacco with a range of diseases, primarily lung cancer. Scientists working in Nazi Germany were at the vanguard of epidemiological research on the correlations between smoking and bronchial carcinoma. Germany's work in oncology and epidemiology garnered an international reputation. Apart from publishing the findings of German scientists such as Fritz Lickint, Eberhard Schairer and Erich Schöniger, German medical journals received submissions from tobacco researchers around the world. For example, Ángel Roffo, an Argentine oncologist, published the results of his clinical experiments into the carcinogenicity of tobacco in the *Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung (ZfK)*. Whereas Roffo relied upon laboratory experiments to focus scientific attention on the role of tar in producing tumors, Lickint and key tobacco scientists in Germany turned to statistics to build an argument against smoking. Together, Roffo and Lickint cited each other's works throughout the 1930s and 1940s, using their respective studies as evidence of a need to combat the dangers of tobacco consumption.<sup>37</sup>

As research into the history of Nazi-era tobacco controls has grown in the last decade, the tobacco industry and smokers' rights advocates have repeatedly appropriated the results of this scholarship to caution against the rise of totalitarianism in the form of

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<sup>37</sup> A. H. Roffo, "Krebserzeugende Tabakwirkung," *ZfK* 8:5 (1940), pp. 97-102. Roffo's study, cited by Schairer and Schöniger in their 1943 study, claimed "95% of patients with lung or throat cancer were heavy smokers" and that the rare cases of throat cancer among women occurred amongst heavy smokers. Also see Robert N. Proctor, "Angel H. Roffo: The Forgotten Father of Experimental Tobacco Carcinogenesis," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 84:6 (June 2006), pp. 494-496.

health fascism. The use of this history to counter present-day tobacco control efforts, however, tends to neglect both the pre-history of German anti-smoking efforts and the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the Nazi-era culture of smoking. Many of the smokers' rights activists ignore that fact that, while Nazi anti-smoking measures elicited praise from Roffo and many other contemporaries, the Nazis' motives, objectives, and enforcement of these policies proved to be contradictory and frequently at odds with Nazi racial hygiene. Even though Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler objected to tobacco use, other prominent figures and smokers – namely Joseph Goebbels and Hermann Göring – rejected the prohibition of tobacco use because they feared that doing so would negatively influence public morale.

### **Tobacco Consumption and Control in Germany Between 1914 and 1933**

The cigarette's rise in Germany began in earnest during the First World War, largely because soldiers found it to be the most effective medium for consuming tobacco within the trenches. Cigarettes were better suited to the pace of trench life in comparison to other popular forms of smoking, plus they offered soldiers a means of suppressing hunger, countering boredom, and promoting sociability among comrades. The practical realities of a soldier's life in the Great War legitimized cigarette smoking as a masculine form of tobacco consumption, leading to dramatic increases in cigarette sales in the years after the war. At the same time, anxious military authorities sought to stem unacceptable smoking by youth on the home front and preserve stocks for frontline soldiers by banning public smoking for those under sixteen. The statistics, however, reveal that efforts to curb smoking during the war failed to prevent an increase in cigarette use. Two years

before the war's outbreak, the average German smoked 128 cigarettes per year; by 1920, that figure had nearly doubled, as Germans consumed nearly 319 cigarettes per annum.<sup>38</sup>

The substantial growth in cigarette smoking during and following the First World War occurred in spite of the existence of an active anti-smoking movement. In the late nineteenth century, the temperance movement in Germany provided an important foundation for the popularization of anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol arguments based upon medical knowledge, rather than moral condemnation. Temperance advocates came from across the political spectrum and identified tobacco consumption as a significant threat to national strength and productivity.<sup>39</sup> They also began to establish organizations specifically geared toward combating tobacco's increased presence within German society in the early twentieth century. Groups such as the German Association Against Tobacco and for the Protection of Non-Smokers (*Deutsche Tabakgegnerverein zum Schutze für Nichtraucher*), a short-lived private club founded in Berlin in 1904, and the Association of German Tobacco Opponents (*Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner*), founded in 1910, pushed the cigarette question into the public sphere through lectures and the development of an anti-smoking journal.<sup>40</sup> Dresden, the center of tobacco manufacturing

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<sup>38</sup> Henner Hess, *Rauchen: Geschichte, Geschäfte, Gefahren* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1987), pp. 43-46; Roman Sandgruber, *Bittersüße Genüsse: Kulturgeschichte der Genussmittel* (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau, 1986), p. 118; and Eve Rosenhaft, "Restoring Moral Order on the Home Front: Compulsory Savings Plans for Young Workers in Germany, 1916-1919," in *Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War*, eds., Franz Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin Coetzee (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. 87-89.

<sup>39</sup> Paul Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 283. Also see Proctor, *Racial Hygiene*, pp. 11-45.

<sup>40</sup> Robert N. Proctor, *The Nazi War on Cancer* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 177-178.

in pre-war Germany, also housed some of the strongest anti-tobacco groups in the nation and hosted the First International Congress of Tobacco Opponents in 1914. The early anti-smoking groups paid particularly close attention to control efforts in North America and offered praise to their American counterparts in the wake of the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, which imposed a nationwide prohibition against alcohol.<sup>41</sup>

Although anti-smoking groups continued to rely upon morality as a weapon to challenge smokers, numerous scientists and physicians adopted scientific and medical arguments to bolster their case against tobacco. Military physician E. Beck, for instance, attributed Germany's defeat to the negative health effects of smoking and alcohol use by soldiers on the frontlines. But smokers continued to partake in the habit for a variety of reasons, be it a pursuit of comfort or style, the desire for stimulation, the promotion of sociability, or the result of habituation. Although anti-smoking scientists criticized tobacco use in general, they held a particular disregard for women's smoking. As early as 1924, moral reformers demanded women cease to use all forms of tobacco in order to prevent unnecessary damage to their reproductive abilities and to redirect their attention away from self-indulgence and toward their roles as "defenders of the household."<sup>42</sup> The

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<sup>41</sup> John C. Burnham, Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior, and Swearing in American History (New York: NYU Press, 1993), pp. 23-49. The German anti-smoking organizations heralded similar measures enacted against tobacco and alcohol use in individual Canadian provinces during and shortly after the First World War.

<sup>42</sup> Edgar Bejach, Die tabakgegnerische Bewegung in Deutschland mit Berücksichtigung der ausserdeutschen Tabakgegnerbewegungen (Medical dissertation: Friedrich Wilhelms Universität zu Berlin, 1927), pp. 5-7; Robert Hofstätter, Die rauchende Frau: Eine Klinische Psychologische und Soziale Studie (Vienna: Holder Pichler Tempsky A.G., 1924), pp. 238-240; and Louis Lewin, Phantastica: die Betäubenden und Erregenden Genussmittel – für Ärzte und Nichtärzte (Berlin: Stilke, 1924), pp. 320-322.

Union of Tobacco Enemies in Leipzig urged authorities to introduce legal restrictions prohibiting women from consuming tobacco in any form, a plea that fell on deaf ears.<sup>43</sup>

Much to the dismay of anti-tobacco groups, scientific research by Lickint and Victor Mertens linking cigarette smoking with lung cancer in the 1920s had limited influence over the habits of smokers, since their work rarely escaped the confines of the academy or entered popular discourse.<sup>44</sup> Instead, depictions of smoking in film, print, and advertisements contributed to the growing popularization of the cigarette in the interwar era, portraying it as a fashionable and comfortable means of contending with stress, sparking thought and creativity, or conveying a sense of allure and sexual appeal. More than any other type of tobacco consumption, cigarette smoking had become an important symbol of modernity and style in the interwar era. This was particularly true for the “new woman” of the Weimar Republic, who deployed the cigarette as a sign of liberation, as an expression of fashion sense, and as a means of staking a claim to the public sphere.<sup>45</sup> For consumers directly affected by the Depression, cheaper cigarettes presented a more affordable tobacco option than cigars and pipes. Moreover, many smokers used cigarettes as a means of easing the pressures associated with everyday life during the Depression. Smoking helped offset hunger pains resulting from a lack of food and poor nutrition.

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<sup>43</sup> Kerry Segrave, Women and Smoking in America, 1880-1950 (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2005), p. 96.

<sup>44</sup> Fritz Lickint, “Tabak und Tabakrauch als ätiologischer Faktor des Carcinoms,” ZfK 30 (1929), pp. 329-365; V. E. Mertens, “Zigarettenrauch eine Ursache des Lungenkrebses,” ZfK 32 (1930), pp. 82-91; and Fritz Lickint, Tabakgenuss und Gesundheit (Hanover: Bruno Wilkens, 1936).

<sup>45</sup> Barbara Kosta, “Cigarettes, Advertising, and the Weimar Republic’s Modern Woman,” in Visual Culture in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. by Gail Finney (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 134-153.

By the 1930s, the anti-smoking movement in Germany drew upon decades of combating the allure and uses of tobacco products. The relationship among a fairly diverse group of scientists, racial hygienists, and moral reformers and the Nazi party was complex, but the latter's official stances vis-à-vis smoking allowed for some connections to be established. To illustrate, Lickint, a Social Democrat, managed to continue his research for much of the rest of the decade before his political leanings caught the attention of the party.<sup>46</sup> It is clear, though, that the Nazis celebrated the careers of a number of figures influential in the temperance and anti-smoking groups of the first part of the century and that their racial ideology appealed to a number of racial hygienists, many of whom had been active in those movements.<sup>47</sup> Throughout the 1930s, leading anti-smoking activists in Germany found like-minded party officials in positions of significant influence and ushered in some of the most aggressive policies and campaigns against tobacco consumption – and cigarette use in particular.

### **The Nazi Culture of Smoking, 1933-1939**

The Nazis' insistence that each citizen had an obligation to remain healthy (*Gesundheitspflicht*) in the interest of maximizing national and racial strength imbued smoking with enormous political and racial meaning, transforming it into a matter of significant public interest. The need to preserve individual physical and racial fitness through preventive health practices, including abstaining from the consumption of racial poisons, not only benefited the *Volkskörper*, but also empowered the state with sufficient

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<sup>46</sup> Knut-Olaf Haustein, "Fritz Lickint (1898-1960) – Ein Leben als Aufklärer über die Gefahren des Tabaks," *Suchtmedizin in Forschung und Praxis* 6:3 (2004), p. 249.

<sup>47</sup> Proctor, *Racial Hygiene*, pp. 48-50.



justification to intervene in acts of private consumption and to compel Germans to adhere to particular behavioral standards. In the Third Reich, one did not have the right to unnecessarily risk contracting a debilitating disease, especially if it could have been avoided through a strict adherence to proper behaviors. Yet, individual desires to consume and the regime's need for overall compliance of the body politic often mediated the state's ability to enforce behavioral standards upon the citizenry, interfering with the enactment of prohibitionist public health policies in the process.

The Nazi regime also proved to be quite ambivalent with regard to cigarette smoking during the Third Reich. Leading Nazi figures condemned tobacco as a racial poison and ultimately oversaw the implementation of the most ambitious state-driven anti-smoking campaign in the world. Yet, the attacks on smoking as part of the broader racial ideological project were often contradictory in terms of focus and level of enforcement. Public smoking on the part of prominent Nazi representatives and German celebrities undermined measures designed to curtail tobacco use by the general public. Sauckel blasted his compatriots for providing “inadvertent opposition propaganda” to the cause of smoking and detriment of public health.<sup>48</sup> Even as architects of Nazi racial health policies attacked smoking, other wings of the party recognized the utility of alleged racial poisons within specific contexts, deploying tobacco products and alcohol as incentives for those members of the national community responsible for constructing a racial utopia. The Nazi state distributed extra cigarettes and alcohol to those German soldiers charged with the task of rounding up and executing Jews and Bolsheviks, even as the regime fought to prevent certain population groups within the Reich – namely,

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<sup>48</sup> Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter BAB) NS 18 / 226, Besprechung mit Gauleiter Sauckel über die Steuerung der Propaganda gegen den Tabakmissbrauch, 20 May 1941.

women of a reproductive age and adolescents – from lighting up on the grounds that smoking posed a significant threat to individual and communal health.<sup>49</sup> The conflicting messages inherent in these two examples effectively undermined the strength of anti-smoking propaganda, as smoking was both officially denounced and tolerated within the Nazi culture of consumption, provided cigarettes were smoked by men.

The early mix of condemnation by police and health officials and continued smoking by high profile figures smoking did not disrupt the growth of cigarette smoking in Germany. Following a brief decline in consumption due to the effects of the Depression, cigarette and cigar consumption in Germany increased by approximately 50% between 1932 and 1938.<sup>50</sup> By 1935, consumption rates had reached their highest levels in six years.<sup>51</sup> Although opposition to smoking on the grounds of health existed within the Reich, the government's coffers expanded as a result of increased smoking, taking in more than 1 billion Reichsmarks through tobacco taxes and tariffs in 1937-1938.<sup>52</sup> Although the overall market for tobacco products in Germany recovered considerably by the mid-1930s, the charges that smoking constituted a public health risk to the *Volk* combined with a national program to grow sufficient tobacco stocks

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<sup>49</sup> Alcohol and tobacco products were common components of mass executions along the Eastern Front during the war. See Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 68-69.

<sup>50</sup> Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 268.

<sup>51</sup> Notes on the German Tobacco Situation, 17 February 1937, Germany Tobacco 1930-1939; Narrative Reports, 1920-1941 (hereafter NR); Records of Foreign Agricultural Service, Record Group 166 (hereafter RG 166), National Archives at College Park, Maryland (hereafter NACP).

<sup>52</sup> See Franz Karl Reckert, Tabakwarekunde: der Tabak, sein Anbau und seine Verarbeitung (Berlin-Schöneberg: M. Schwabe Verlag, 1942). Also see Robert N. Proctor, "The Anti-Tobacco Campaign of the Nazis: A Little Known Aspect of Public Health in Germany, 1933-45," British Medical Journal 313 (1996), pp. 1450-1453.

domestically prompted the regime to remove tobacco from its list of “vital” import commodities in December 1935.<sup>53</sup> The degree of anti-smoking propaganda faded following this shift in designation and consumption rates increased through the early war years, even after the state imposed a 20% war levy on tobacco in 1939.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the party’s official stance on smoking, Hitler’s rise to power proved to be a financially lucrative development for the German manufacturers of cigarettes. Even the Sturm Abteilung (SA) seized the opportunity to generate revenue by marketing Storm cigarettes.<sup>55</sup> Cigarette companies and tobacconists rushed to capitalize on the Nazi rise to power by introducing new brands with distinctly militaristic and nationalist overtones, such as Kommando, New Front, and Comradeship.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, tobacco companies jumped on the commercial appeal of Hitler and the vibrant Nazi movement by appropriating the very likeness of the Führer and party institutions in its marketing

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<sup>53</sup> Loyd V. Steere, “The Tobacco Situation and Outlook in Germany,” 18 August 1936, Germany Tobacco 1930-1939; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>54</sup> Edwin C. Kemp, “German Cigarette Production on an Assured Raw Material Basis,” 14 December 1939, Germany Tobacco 1936-1940; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP. The Reich government increased the tobacco levy from 20% to 50% in November 1941, but disruptions in the procurement of tobacco resulted in decreased consumption by the end of the year. See Sam E. Woods, “Increase in German Tobacco Tax,” 3 November 1941, German Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>55</sup> Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis, 1929-1935 (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 128-129. The SA also encouraged its members to attack retailers selling competitors’ brands, especially those of the Reemtsma company, which had built up a tobacco empire in the 1920s and early 1930s. Reemtsma, apart from being the largest tobacco firm in Germany, had a tense relationship with the Nazi party due to the presence of a Jewish board member. To ease pressures on his firm, Philipp Reemtsma carried favor with Göring, donating millions to the high-ranking leader’s burgeoning art collection. See Kurt Pritzkolet, Auf einer Woge von Gold: Der Triumph der Wirtschaft (Vienna: Kurt Desch Verlag, 1961), pp. 215-217; Rudolf Diels, Lucifer ante Portas (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1950), p. 299; and Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 234-235.

<sup>56</sup> Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 69-70.

practices. Reemtsma, for instance, promoted the sale of its brands by including a series of Nazi-themed cigarette cards in its packs. This marketing campaign encouraged consumers to collect an entire set of cards and place them in the corresponding space in the accompanying album. Many of the albums had specific themes, such as Reemtsma's Nazi-inspired series entitled "Germany Awakes" – a reference to the nation's revitalization under Hitler's stewardship.<sup>57</sup> In addition to using Hitler and the Nazis, cigarette albums featuring images of German history and geography provided commercially and politically mediated visions of the nation. Collectors consumed images of German contributions to technological advancement, as well as depictions of the pure and virtuous German homeland, which aimed to reinforce a sense of connection and national community across vast spaces. Albums also directed attention toward the Nazi racial hierarchy through portrayals of racial difference.<sup>58</sup> Other series focused on German military achievements in the First World War and Germany's colonies prior to 1918, constructing a narrative of recent German history that directly linked Germany's days as a world power before 1918 to the Third Reich, while simultaneously bypassing the decadence and decay of the Weimar era. Cigarette cards provided the regime with an informal means of public education, as various series reinforced critical Nazi values, including the valorization of military service, duty to the national community, the

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<sup>57</sup> Erik Lindner, Die Reemtsmas: Geschichte einer deutschen Unternehmerfamilie (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 2007), pp. 110-113.

<sup>58</sup> For example, see Heinrich Heffter, Deutsche Kolonien (Dresden: Cigaretten-Bilderdienst, 1936).

celebration of masculine labor, a celebratory vision of German history and culture, overcoming adversity, and racial superiority.<sup>59</sup>

Numerous party officials at the local and national level took exception to the cigarette companies use of Nazi symbols and themes to sell cigarettes. They understood smoking to be detrimental to the *Volk* and inherently at odds with Nazi objectives. A 1935 guide published by the Reich Committee for Public Health warned potential marriage partners about the intrinsic risks of pleasurable consumption with respect to national and racial strength. Based upon a list of ten commandments drawn up by Hermann Böhm for his 1935 series May I Marry My Cousin? (Darf ich meine Base heiraten?), possible mates had to “keep your mind and spirit pure” by eschewing the “prospects of pleasure,” much like marital partners needed to avoid contracting venereal disease. As advised in the ninth commandment, “marriage is not a temporary game between two people but, rather, a lasting bond that is of great importance for the life of the individual as well as the entire nation.”<sup>60</sup> Since the racial community could only be as strong as its weakest link, it was imperative not only for marriages to be approved by proper authorities, but also to result in offspring uncontaminated by blotted ancestry and environmental poisons.

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<sup>59</sup> Geoffrey J. Giles, “Popular Education and New Media: The Cigarette Card in Germany,” Paedagogica Historica 36:1 (2000), pp. 454-458; Geoffrey J. Giles, “Through Cigarette Cards to Manliness: Building German Character With an Informal Curriculum,” in Gender, Colonialism and Education, eds., Joyce Goodman and Jane Martin (Portland: Woburn Press, 2002), pp. 74-86; and Koonz, pp. 77-81.

<sup>60</sup> Hermann Böhm, Darf ich meine Base heiraten? (Berlin, 1935). The Ten Commandments has been reprinted in Susan D. Bachrach and Dieter Kuntz, eds., Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race (Washington D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2004).

Women – particularly those of reproductive age – and youth formed the principal demographic of anti-smoking propaganda and measures throughout the Reich, while men’s smoking was implicitly condoned. The Nazi vision of a life devoted to motherhood for German women stood in stark contrast to many of the popular female fashions of the Weimar era. The adage “the German woman does not smoke” proved to be one of the most memorable components of Nazi propaganda directed at women during the Third Reich, suggesting that women’s citizenship and racial worth stemmed from their ability to abstain from tobacco. In the years following the collapse of the Nazi regime, many women explicitly recalled the gendered anti-smoking propaganda when thinking back upon Nazi attitudes toward and policies regarding women. According to these women, the Nazis often invoked the claim in conjunction with references to the regime’s specific vision of German women as pure beings unadulterated by cosmetics and ready to “have a thousand children.”<sup>61</sup> In a 1936 treatise on the role of female doctors in improving racial hygiene, gynecologist and racial hygienist Agnes Bluhm proclaimed the use of cigarettes during pregnancy resulted in abortions, which had been criminalized for Aryan women of sound hereditary health.<sup>62</sup> Paul Bernhard, who made use of resources at the Institute in Jena to study the impact of tobacco consumption on fertility, argued that smoking more than three cigarettes per day dramatically decreased a woman’s likelihood of becoming pregnant.<sup>63</sup> Anti-smoking propaganda further claimed

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<sup>61</sup> Alison Owings, Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 173 and 344.

<sup>62</sup> Agnes Bluhm, Die rassenhygienischen Aufgaben des weiblichen Arztes (Berlin: A. Metzner, 1936). Also see Proctor, p. 189.

<sup>63</sup> Paul Bernhard, Der Einfluss der Tabakgifte auf die Gesundheit und die Fruchtbarkeit der Frau (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1943).

non-smoking marriages resulted in more than three times as many births as those featuring smokers.<sup>64</sup>

The attacks on women's use of cigarettes went beyond the potential consequences smoking could have on their reproductive roles. The critiques also tapped into prevailing social anxieties regarding women's apparent vulnerability to materialism and loss of respectability by wearing cosmetics, drinking alcoholic beverages, or lighting up in public. In one of the earliest anti-smoking measures, Erfurt authorities posted signs in restaurants, cafés, and wine parlors bearing the inscription, "Ladies are requested not to smoke." According to the local chief of police, such signs were needed to "combat the indecency of women smoking in public." News of the move appeared in an article entitled "Women Should Not Smoke in Public," which added that all German citizens would "want to contribute to the fight against this indecency and to remind women whom they meet smoking on the streets of their duty as German wives and mothers."<sup>65</sup> This police-led effort to condemn women's smoking fit within the broader Nazi propaganda campaign against women's use of tobacco, alcohol, and cosmetics.<sup>66</sup> The League of German Maidens (BDM), the party's sister organization to the Hitler Youth (HJ), also criticized women's smoking as utterly lacking in feminine respectability and organized a

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<sup>64</sup> General Secretary Aschenbrenner to Nationalsozialistische Korrespondenz, 17 May 1939, Box 303, Folder 2 Tabakwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, DKZ, HIA.

<sup>65</sup> Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life* (London: Jarrolds Ltd., 1939), p. 96. The original article, "Frauen sollen nicht öffentlich rauchen," appeared in the 19 August 1933 edition of the liberal newspaper *Vossische Zeitung*, which was shut down by the Nazi regime the following year.

<sup>66</sup> Press accounts also noted Hitler would not attack Germans' "beloved beer" as part of his effort to wean Germans off of stimulants. "Hitler verbannt den Tabak," 7 March 1939, Box 303, Folder 1 Tabakwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter DKZ, HIA).

campaign against Marlene Dietrich, the femme fatale who raised eyebrows with her beauty and provocative on-screen smoking. Dietrich's use of cigarettes and cosmetics, according to the BDM, meant she abandoned all claims to being an authentic German woman.<sup>67</sup>

Smoking on the part of high-profile women associated with the Nazi party and state, however, significantly weakened the push to curtail cigarette use among women in general. Eva Braun and Magda Goebbels, for instance, were notorious smokers. Goebbels' habit was quite extravagant, as she smoked her cigarettes with a gold-tipped mouthpiece.<sup>68</sup> (Figure 1.1) In May 1939, the International Association for Tobacco Science Research took great joy in circulating reports that Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, who the Nazi regime had bestowed with numerous awards for her service as head of the National Socialist Women's Association (NSF), had been spotted smoking in Amsterdam.<sup>69</sup> Having formed in 1938 to defend the interests of the tobacco trade against the growing anti-tobacco sentiment within the party, the group had run amuck of key figures such as Reich Health Führer Leonardo Conti in the process. The Amsterdam episode gave the defenders of tobacco an opening to contest the increasingly one-sided

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<sup>67</sup> Eva Koppenhöfer, Frauen und Zigaretten: Über das Ambivalente am Rauchen und seine Ausprägungen in weiblichen Lebenszusammenhängen (Herbolzheim: Centaurus Verlag, 2000), p. 63. Dietrich, who emigrated to the U.S. in 1930, emerged as an outspoken critic of the Nazi regime. Her repudiation of the Nazis likely made her an attractive candidate for criticism in the eyes of party leaders.

<sup>68</sup> Guenther, p. 108.

<sup>69</sup> General Secretary of Internationale Tabakwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft e.V. to Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale, 22 March 1939, Box 303, Folder 1 Tabakwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, DKZ, HIA. Also see Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 167-173.



public relations battle.<sup>70</sup> For the pro-tobacco group, though, Scholtz-Klink's cigarette epitomized the inherently hypocritical nature of Nazi anti-smoking messages.

Despite this type of setback, critics continued to connect abstention from smoking with purity, often through the depictions and references to Hitler, but it was increasingly apparent that such arguments failed to resonate with German consumers. In an economy geared toward rearmament and a culture of consumption marked by repeated promises of future prosperity in exchange for the sacrifice of certain luxuries and pleasures in the present day, the cigarette possessed the rare combination of being popular, powerful, readily available, and comparatively cheap.<sup>71</sup> For a brief window between the 1935 decision to remove tobacco from the list of vital goods and the outbreak of war, cigarette smokers did not have to contend with nearly as many limits on their opportunity to consume as did cigar and pipe smokers, which faced potentially crippling losses because of the remarkable popularity of cigarettes. In contrast, the “outstanding exception” of the cigarette industry enjoyed a tremendous boom during these years because the state did not directly interfere with production, largely due to the fact that cigarettes were one of the few popular consumer goods that could be produced in sufficient quantities and actually reach smokers.<sup>72</sup> As a result, the cigarette industry witnessed fairly dramatic

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<sup>70</sup> Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 238-242.

<sup>71</sup> Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Penguin Books, 2007); R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Hartmut Berghoff, “Enticement and Deprivation: The Regulation of Consumption in Pre-War Nazi Germany,” in The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America, eds., Martin J. Daunton and Matthew Hilton (New York: Berg, 2001), pp. 164-184.

<sup>72</sup> Loyd V. Steere, “Notes on the German Tobacco Situation,” 23 October 1937; and “Notes on the German Tobacco Situation,” 17 February 1938, Germany Tobacco 1930-1939; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

growth in comparison to other tobacco products; cigarette sales increased by as much as 9% in the summer of 1938 alone.<sup>73</sup>

The continued advance of the cigarette within Germany's smoking culture was cause for alarm in the eyes of many scientists and anti-smoking party leaders. As the German military prepared for war in the late 1930s, German medical science took a much closer look at the impact of cigarette smoking on the individual body. The party's racial hygienists and public health leaders, in turn, used the evidence generated in a number of studies on smoking and health to argue for the reduction of tobacco use via restrictions – if not the wholesale elimination of smoking – in the name of protecting racial health and military strength.<sup>74</sup> Unlike the morality driven smoking bans introduced in the U.S. and Canada during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fight against the cigarette in the Third Reich increasingly drew upon the latest scientific research to frame the issue directly in terms of health, thereby offering a modern rationale for the state to interfere in what many regarded to be a private matter of consumption. In the process, they also offered highly racialized visions of smoking and science.

### **Race, Tobacco and the *Gesundheitspflicht***

The period between 1939 and 1943 marked the peak of the anti-smoking push within the Third Reich. German scientists, including Lickint and Franz Müller, used epidemiological methods to identify cigarette smoking as the most likely explanation behind the dramatic increase in lung cancer rates in the twentieth century. Müller's 1939

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<sup>73</sup> "Notes on the German Tobacco Situation," 17 August 1938, Germany Tobacco 1930-1939; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>74</sup> Kittel, pp. 242-248.

article, “Tabakmissbrauch und Lungencarcinom” surveyed nearly one hundred medical histories to determine how many lung cancer patients had been smokers and measure their regular consumption of cigarettes. His findings offered some of the strongest evidence against smoking to date, suggesting that “extremely heavy smokers” and “very heavy smokers” developed lung cancer at a far greater rate than non-smokers or occasional smokers. Given the social prescriptions against women’s smoking, these findings also explained why lung cancer was an overwhelmingly male disease. Though he conceded that smoking did not explain every single case of lung cancer, Müller adamantly rejected the notion that industrial pollution and automobile exhaust were the chief causes behind the lung cancer epidemic.<sup>75</sup>

Lickint also continued to study the physiological effects of smoking in the Third Reich. Although his past membership in the Social Democrats ran him afoul of some Nazi health officials, particularly Astel, Lickint used his research as a platform to actively campaign for legislation to control the use of tobacco. In the same year that Müller released the results of his retrospective case control study, Lickint published Tabak und Organismus, described as “arguably the most comprehensive scholarly indictment of tobacco ever published” and “the last comprehensive work” on smoking and health to be written in Germany in the twentieth century.<sup>76</sup> The 1,200 page work, published in conjunction with the Reich Committee for the Struggle against Addictive Drugs and the German Antismoking League, is memorable for its detailed account of the assorted health

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<sup>75</sup> Franz Hermann Müller, “Tabakmissbrauch und Lungencarcinom,” ZfK 49 (1939), pp. 57-85.

<sup>76</sup> Fritz Lickint, Tabak und Organismus: Handbuch der gesamten Tabakkunde (Stuttgart: Hippokrates Verlag, 1939); Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 184-186; and Knut-Olaf Hausteil, Tobacco or Health? Physiological and Social Damages Caused by Tobacco Smoking (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003), p. vii and 13.

risks associated with tobacco use, which Lickint also publicized through a series of public lectures. Based on a thorough examination of existing literature, Lickint identified smoking as the leading cause of cancers along the *Rauchstrasse*, the pathway for inhaled smoke beginning with the point of contact at the lips and finishing in the lungs. Smoking, moreover, played a substantial role in the development of ulcers, arteriosclerosis, and a laundry list of assorted illnesses. Lickint was among the first to refer to the concept of passive smoking (*Passivrauchen*), whereby smoking affected those in the presence of the individual user.<sup>77</sup>

Two years after the publication of Tabak und Organismus, the Jena Institute for Tobacco Hazards Research began operations and quickly emerged as one of if not the most important epicenters of the anti-tobacco movement in Nazi Germany. Under the stewardship of Astel, a man renowned for slapping cigarettes out of the mouth of university students, the Institute sponsored numerous research projects investigating the impact of tobacco on physical health. From its April founding in 1941 until its closure shortly before the end of the war, scientists conducted studies on female smokers, nicotine poisoning, the neurological effects of tobacco ingestion, and the impact of tobacco on worms and animals, as well as the relationship between smoking and lung cancer.<sup>78</sup> Published by the Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung in 1943, Schairer and Schöniger's "Lungenkrebs und Tabakverbrauch" ("Lung Cancer and Tobacco

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<sup>77</sup> Though Lickint began discussing the concept in 1935, it did not become a central element of anti-smoking activism and research until the 1960s and 1970s. Ernst Schönherr had already discussed the possibility that cigarette smoking jeopardized the health of non-smokers in 1928. See Ernst Schönherr. See Ernst Schönherr, "Beitrag zur Statistik und Klinik der Lungentumoren," ZfK 27 (1928), p. 443.

<sup>78</sup> Zimmermann et al., pp. 35-37.

Consumption”) greatly expanded the field of data used by Müller to better gauge the connection between cigarette use and bronchial carcinoma. In addition to compiling the smoking history of nearly two hundred individuals who succumbed to lung cancer, they also collected medical histories of more than five hundred deaths from other types of cancers. The prevalence of stomach and colon cancer among smokers and non-smokers were fairly equal, according to Schairer and Schöniger, while almost all of the lung cancer patients had been smokers. As had been the case with Müller’s study in 1939, Schairer and Schöniger believed they had identified the principal culprit behind the lung cancer epidemic of the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>79</sup>

The totality of the studies produced during this timeframe offered the most compelling evidence against the cigarette, reinforcing the sense that smoking endangered the consumer’s health. One of the most leading sources for the dissemination of anti-smoking sentiment within the Third Reich came from the pages of Reine Luft (Clean Air), later renamed Die Tabak Frage (The Tobacco Question). Though it was not a Nazi publication per se, the journal coordinated its message with broader aspects of Nazi ideology and each issue featured prominent party figures and quotes from the Führer. In addition to printing articles addressing the negative health effects of tobacco use, Reine Luft discursively and visually linked tobacco use to racial and national enemies. The cover of the January-February 1941 issue, for example, included a caricature of Winston Churchill and his famous cigar beneath illustrations of a distinctly Jewish figure and pipe-smoking skeleton. The headlines proclaimed that Jews were responsible for both

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<sup>79</sup> Eberhard Schairer and Erich Schöniger, “Lungenkrebs und Tabakverbrauch,” ZfK 54 (1943), pp. 261-269; Proctor, pp. 213-217. For the English summary of the 1943 study, see E. Schairer and E. Schöniger, “Lung Cancer and Tobacco Consumption,” International Journal of Epidemiology 30:1 (2001), pp. 24-27.

tobacco taxes and English socialism, all while tobacco resided in the “shadow of world affairs.” The journal made the connection even more explicit by contrasting images of tobacco’s threat to “its victim” and the sexualized threat Jewish men posed toward German women. The former featured an illustration of a devilish figure smiling ominously as a weary-eyed chain-smoker lights a new cigarette. Under the headline, “Tobacco has its victim,” the devil offers a “Jud Süß,” a reference to the well-known anti-Semitic film directed by Veit Harlan, which had appeared one year earlier. On the subsequent page, a still photo from the film shows the sinister Jew, played by Ferdinand Marian, forcing a woman up against the wall beneath a caption that substituted “The Jew” for tobacco.<sup>80</sup> The highly popular box office hit played upon a number of stereotypes that would have been quite familiar to German audiences in 1940. The financially struggling Duke of Württemberg entered into a number of contractual agreements with a Jewish lender from Frankfurt named Oppenheimer, who used his position to gain access to the dukedom for Jews, who had previously been prohibited from living in Württemberg, as well as control over taxation and transportation. Tapping into sexual tropes regarding the pervasive risk Jewish men presented to German women, Oppenheimer repeatedly lusts after Dorothea, who eventually relents and sleeps with him in order to have her husband released from prison. Ashamed and dishonored by her affair, Dorothea eventually commits suicide, whereas Oppenheimer is eventually arrested and put on trial for corrupting a German woman.

Tobacco use also served to reinforce notions of racial otherness. In support of a 1941 article on the history of the struggle against tobacco by Johann von Leers, a

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<sup>80</sup> Reine Luft (RL) 23:1 (Januar-Februar 1941), pp. 10-11.

historian at the University of Jena best known for studying the “criminal nature” of Jews, Reine Luft published a cartoon featuring an assortment of “asocials.” The figures depicted included a cigar-smoking capitalist carrying a bottle of whiskey and holding hands with a cigarette-smoking Jew. Following closely behind the two men were an African, an Asian, a prostitute, and an effete intellectual, all of whom are shown smoking some form of tobacco. To further strengthen the connotation of degeneracy and death, the collection of “asocial” characters walk amongst skulls and beneath a thick cloud of smoke.<sup>81</sup> Articles on the effects of tobacco consumption among Africans and the indigenous population of Greenland also underscored the supposed racial dimensions of tobacco consumption. Both articles incorporated photographs of its subjects consuming assorted tobacco products. The latter article focused exclusively on oral hygiene and health among Greenland’s pipe-smoking Inuit population, complete with stained or missing teeth. By contrast, the cover of the corresponding issue featured a smiling member of the BDM, displaying a full set of clean and presumably healthy teeth.<sup>82</sup>

The Alliance also deployed Reine Luft to attack tobacco use on the grounds that it subverted health on a variety of levels, ranging from the damage inflicted upon the individual consumer to the weakening of collective health. Articles warned readers that smoking in the armed forces hampered the ability of soldiers and “diminishes military strength.”<sup>83</sup> Additionally, the consumption of tobacco products “endangers racial health,

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<sup>81</sup> Prof. Dr. J. von Leers, “Der Kampf gegen den Tabak in der Geschichte,” RL 23:3 (May-June 1941), pp. 119-121.

<sup>82</sup> Dr. P. O. Pedersen, “Ueber den Tabakgenuss und seine Wirkungen in der Mundhöhle bei Grönländern,” RL 24:1 (Januar-Februar 1942), pp. 5-12.

<sup>83</sup> Dr. med. Habil. Lepel, “Chronische Tabakschäden und Wehrdienstfähigkeit,” RL 23:2 (März-April 1941), pp. 43-51.

labor and military power, and the aims of population policy,” meaning the behavior of the individual represented a significant threat to the general welfare of the *Volk*.<sup>84</sup> Such sentiments peppered the journal’s pages, repeatedly reminding readers of the need to maintain the strength of communal bonds on the basis of a shared racial identity.

Numerous editions reminded readers of their role within a movement that transcended individual desires and needs. On multiple occasions during the war, the journal prodded “racial comrades” to “think of your compulsory biological service,” implicitly chastising smokers for pursuing temporary pleasure at the expense of their fellow racial citizens.<sup>85</sup>

The articles, illustrations and prescriptive literature tapped into several Nazi tropes to build the multifaceted case against smoking. In addition to repeatedly highlighting Hitler’s personal objections to tobacco use, the editors frequently employed non-tobacco specific passages originally published in Mein Kampf or from his speeches to connect their cause with the popular leader.<sup>86</sup> The inside cover of one issue, for example, repeated Hitler’s claims from Mein Kampf that those who fail to utilize a readily available remedy to a well-known danger were “weaklings” suffering from “cowardice.”<sup>87</sup> Likewise, philosopher Hans Reiner of Martin Luther Universität in Halle-Wittenberg argued all tobacco was a “direct danger” to German culture. Reiner called for a defense against the degenerative poison so as to preserve all distinction

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<sup>84</sup> These claims were made in slogans that appeared on both the inside of the front and back covers of the March-April 1941 issue.

<sup>85</sup> Dr. med. B. Kemkes, “Tabakgebrauch und Volksgesundheit,” RL 23:2 (März-April 1941), p. 51.

<sup>86</sup> See the May-June 1941 edition of RL, p. 81.

<sup>87</sup> See the March-April 1941 issue of RL.



between the civilized culture of Germany and those of “barbarous” populations.<sup>88</sup> In response to Reiner’s dire warnings about tobacco use, a soldier from the Eastern front reported his unit decided to quit cigarette smoking and require those who continued to consume tobacco products to pay a small fine.<sup>89</sup> Perhaps the most blatant example of the journal’s use of Nazi party attitudes or policies could be found in the footer of Reiner’s article. According to the slogan, “individual thought” represented the “design flaw of the past,” necessitating the subjugation of individual desires to communal needs.<sup>90</sup>

Anti-smoking activists also attacked tobacco use on economic grounds, whether through claims of wasteful consumption or arguments about the negative effects of tobacco use on labor. Anti-smoking propaganda argued money spent on tobacco products had been foolishly wasted, as consumers could have easily used their purchasing power to buy consumer goods that would not weaken the race. According to these arguments, smokers could have spent their money on radios, travel, Volkswagens, and a range of other popular commodities if only they had foregone the extravagance of lighting up.<sup>91</sup> Anti-smoking appeals accused smokers of weakening the nation’s productive capacity. Otto Graf, a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Occupational Physiology in Dortmund, argued that nicotine constricted the flow of blood, thereby ensuring that smokers would not perform at their maximum capacity. He also argued that tobacco reduced efficiency with respect to performance (*Leistung*) and

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<sup>88</sup> Prof. Dr. Hans Reiner, “Der Tabak, eine Kulturgefahr,” RL 23:1 (January-February 1941), pp. 23-29.

<sup>89</sup> Dr. Hans Reiner, “Bekenntnisse von Rauchern,” RL 24:1 (Januar-Februar 1942), p. 20.

<sup>90</sup> See the January-February 1941 issue of RL, p. 28.

<sup>91</sup> Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 224-225.

productivity (*Leistungsfähigkeit*) by disturbing the functioning of the heart, causing tremors, sleeplessness, dyspepsia, and a loss of appetite.<sup>92</sup> The journal cited the importance of preserving the integrity of labor power – for the benefit of both Hitler and the *Volk* – in an article challenging the tobacco industry’s promotion of nicotine-free tobacco as a form of safe smoking.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, the article argued that the use of tobacco products “disturbed the activity of the central nervous system,” resulting in weariness, an inability to concentrate, thoughtless behavior, and the “paralysis of self-criticism.” These claims appeared alongside illustrations contrasting the performance and attentiveness of tired-looking users of tobacco and diligent laborers who did not consume any sort of tobacco.<sup>94</sup> The smoker’s self-serving pursuit of fleeting, individual pleasure came at the expense of the Führer, the *Volksgemeinschaft*, and the state.

A full-scale prohibition of tobacco consumption remained highly unlikely given the overwhelming popularity of smoking, not to mention its addictive nature. Recognizing that the imposition of extensive restrictions on tobacco use might result in a consumer backlash, the party supported research into reducing the harm of cigarette smoking. Responding to Conti’s demands for more research into the “nicotine danger,” Paul König’s conducted a series of experiments at the Reich Institute for Tobacco Research to minimize nicotine levels in cigarettes.<sup>95</sup> Already by 1936, the Forchheim

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<sup>92</sup> Prof. Dr. O. Graf, “Tabakgebrauch und Leistung,” RL 23:2 (Mai-Juni 1941), pp. 115-116.

<sup>93</sup> “Vorsorge und Fürsorge am Menschen und am Arbeitsplatz – Entwöhnung – Ersatzmittel,” RL 23:2 (März-April 1941), p. 65.

<sup>94</sup> See the back inside covers of the January-February and March-April 1942 issues of RL.

<sup>95</sup> BAB NS 18 / 226, Walter Tiessler, 12 May 1941; and Propaganda gegen die Nikotin-Gefahren, 16 May 1941. The institute had been founded in 1927 as the Institut für Tabakforschung (Institute for Tobacco Research) to improve the overall quality of domestically produced tobacco

institute claimed success in producing cigarette tobacco supposedly devoid of nicotine.<sup>96</sup> Both the state and tobacco industry took great interest in König's work, which held out the promise of developing a safe cigarette. If successful, it would have allowed smokers to satisfy their individual needs and desires without sacrificing communal health. The possibility of safely manipulating nicotine levels also had the added benefit of potentially reducing Germany's dependence upon foreign tobacco suppliers. By 1939, the Reich Institute estimated the availability of their nicotine-free tobacco (NFT) had resulted in a significant decrease in nicotine consumption, approximately 8,000 kilograms less than the previous year.<sup>97</sup> Lickint supported the production of NFT and urged the state to invest in the protection of consumers by perfecting König's methods.<sup>98</sup> Despite the wide interest in König's research, NFT constituted a small proportion of German tobacco production during the war, and consumers continually turned to cigarettes containing nicotine.<sup>99</sup>

The scientific and public health work conducted in the 1930s and war years reinforced calls for the state to introduce restrictions on smoking in the interest of public

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before the Nazis renamed it as part of the *Gleichschaltung*, at which point it was placed under the aegis of the Reich Ministry for Foodstuffs. See Dr. Norbert Billenkamp, "80 Jahre Tabakforschung in Rheinstetten-Forchheim," *Landinfo* 1 (2008), p.3.

<sup>96</sup> "The German Supply Situation for Raw Tobacco," 24 November 1936, Germany Tobacco 1930-1939; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>97</sup> Edwin C. Kemp, "Production of Nicotine-Free Tobacco," 3 November 1939, Germany Tobacco 1936-1940; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP. In addition to the German state and tobacco industry, the U.S. Department of Agriculture closely followed König's work in the 1930s and early war years.

<sup>98</sup> Lickint, *Tabak und Organismus*.

<sup>99</sup> Sidney A. Belovsky, "German Notes on Tobacco," 13 May 1941, Germany Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP. The USDA cited an April 1941 *Süddeutsche Tabakzeitung* article on NFT, which claimed it comprised approximately 5% of overall production.

and racial health, though Proctor notes Müller never explicitly linked his analysis of smoking and lung cancer to the subject of race.<sup>100</sup> The implementation of anti-smoking measures in conjunction with this increased scientific and medical attention to the health risks of cigarette use did not proceed smoothly, and the policies remained unevenly enforced. Within the party, SS head Heinrich Himmler and German Labor Front Director Robert Ley favored the idea of imposing strict controls on the production, distribution, advertising, and consumption of tobacco products, whereas others actively worked to weaken the extent and efficacy of such policies. As head of the SS, for instance, Himmler personally ordered an SS Sturmbannführer to abstain from smoking cigarettes or other tobacco products for a period of two years because he believed that smoking exacerbated an underlying medical condition and suggested a lack of discipline.<sup>101</sup> An inability to exercise proper self-control did not fit with Nazi health policy, since it violated the principles of the *Gesundheitspflicht*.

Hitler Youth and BDM meetings repeatedly reminded young Germans of their health-related duty. One of the most important means for Germans to ensure proper health was to abstain from racial poisons, such as alcohol and tobacco, while maintaining a proper diet featuring plenty of whole grain and limited ingestion of highly refined food products. Racial hygienists often pointed in particular to cigarette smoking among Germany's youth and women of reproductive age as grave threats to racial strength, both in the present and future. Nazi youth organizations frequently required its members to attend lectures on the importance of bodily purity for the sake of the *Volksgemeinschaft*,

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<sup>100</sup> Proctor, pp. 196-197.

<sup>101</sup> Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (London: Cape, 1974), p. 280.

though signs already indicated that many young Germans had already smoked. Hitler Youth members learned that tobacco and alcohol not only harmed one's body, but also hampered the development of character.<sup>102</sup>

A sizeable proportion of German youth had already experimented with cigarettes by the late 1930s. A survey of HJ camp attendees found only seven of nearly 400 youth had abstained from smoking. Youth policy leaders in the Third Reich also studied smoking patterns among German students, finding that nearly one of every seven 14-15 year olds and one-third of 16-17 year olds smoked regularly.<sup>103</sup> In light of such figures and the health risks of nicotine to vulnerable population groups, anti-smoking groups along with racial health experts within the party continued to call for a purification of Germany's youth in order to contain a growing epidemic of smoking-related diseases. The subsequent campaign against smoking sought to cleanse the *Volkskörper* of racial poisons through a mix of coercion and compulsion. Though much of the effort to combat smoking focused on the individual consumer, the regime also targeted the tobacco industry and advertisers in its effort to control the dangerous effects of cigarette smoking. While researchers in Forchheim worked to perfect a safe cigarette through the continued development of NFT, the state took a formal interest in tobacco marketing methods by 1941, bringing certain styles of advertising under closer scrutiny and control. The cumulative effect of these disparate efforts to eliminate the harmful effects of smoking was quite mixed, due in large part to the state's relative ambivalence about actually controlling tobacco consumption. The drive to control health risks posed by cigarette

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<sup>102</sup> Kitzing, pp. 236-237.

<sup>103</sup> "Du hast die Pflicht, gesund zu sein!" January 1939, Box 302, Folder Tabakgegner, DKZ, HIA.

smoking had to contend with the demands of the war economy and the regime's desire to preserve morale through the provisioning of a popular commodity.

### **“The Greatest Poison For Our People”: Tobacco Control During the War**

In early March 1939, representatives of the *Hauptamt für Volksgesundheit der NSDAP* (Main Office for Racial Health of the NSDAP), *Reichsgesundheitsamt* (Reich Health Office), and the *Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch* (Reich Center Against Alcohol Abuse) convened the second conference on “Racial Health and Poisonous Pleasures” (*Volksgesundheit und Genussgifte*). To improve the overall health and vitality of the “racial community,” the conference attendees released a series of twelve demands related to the excessive consumption of alcohol and tobacco, beginning with calls for adolescents and pregnant or breastfeeding women to abstain. They also sought to exercise control over the nature of alcohol and tobacco advertising by granting the Main Office for Racial Health and the Reich Health Office greater authority to regulate the content and nature of marketing materials. In particular, they called for the prohibition of ads suggesting that alcohol and tobacco products promoted or protected health. Other demands endorsed the opening of alcohol-free restaurants, the increased production of alcohol-free beverages, and the use of one-third of consumer taxes to construct new housing for “hereditarily healthy, child-rich families.” Moreover, they also argued that public health programs needed to improve the quality of alcohol and tobacco-related education for all age groups, especially in regards to the dangers associated with abusing

these goods. Adhering to these demands would serve to remind Germany's youth that a "healthy lifestyle is a national duty."<sup>104</sup>

The call for action to control the damage caused by alcohol and nicotine echoed a comprehensive list of demands issued a month earlier by the German Union for Combating the Dangers of Tobacco (*Deutschen Bundes zur Bekämpfung der Tabakgefahren e.V.*).<sup>105</sup> The Nazis attached the Alliance to the Reich Working Group to Combat Narcotics (*Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Rauschgiftbekämpfung*) in 1936 as part of their Nazification of German society. Moreover, the Alliance stressed the importance of identifying tobacco as the source of danger as opposed to nicotine, which constituted but one element of a far greater problem. In addition to challenging the classification of tobacco as a *Genussmittel*, or natural stimulant, the demands attacked the tobacco industry's marketing methods, brand names, and production techniques intended to deceive consumers by offering the impression of harmlessness. Instead of allowing ads to feature references to low-in-nicotine cigarettes, for example, the Alliance believed cigarette packs and promotional materials should be branded with a skull to establish a connection between smoking and death.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> "Gegen Missbrauch von Alkohol und Nikotin," 4 March 1939, Box 14, Folder Alkoholmissbrauch 1939, DKZ, HIA.

<sup>105</sup> In April 1939, the party pushed the Alliance to change its name to the Bund zur Bekämpfung der Tabaksucht (Association for Combating Tobacco Addiction), since "Tabakgefahren" was too ambiguous. Though nothing appears to have come of this request, it shows a desire on the part of the Nazi party to create a stronger and negative connotation for tobacco in the minds of potential consumers. The Reich Working Group to Combat Narcotics was formally a part of the Reich Committee for Racial Health Service, an Interior Ministry office responsible for the Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Progeny in 1933. Ernst Bauer (Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch) to Herrn Schweig, 21 April 1939, Box 302, Folder Tabakgefahren, 1939, DKZ, HIA.

<sup>106</sup> "Unsere Forderungen gegen die Tabakgefahren," February 1939, Box 302, Folder Tabakgegner, DKZ, HIA. The group reprinted their demands two years later in the journal Reine

The German Union's list of demands also linked the use of tobacco products with a failure to fulfill the "obligations" of citizenship in a racial state. Membership in the *Volksgemeinschaft* necessitated not only considering the potential implications of smoking for racial health, but also the economics and public safety repercussions. The economic argument against smoking in the Third Reich took a variety of forms and was taken up by other outlets, including the anti-smoking periodical Die Tabak Frage (The Tobacco Question). Tobacco use put the individual at risk by diminishing their overall productivity, but also represented a significant public safety threat. Careless smoking on farms or in factories could cause massive conflagrations, resulting in the destruction of harvests or finished products, thereby weakening the overall war effort through unnecessary material losses. In 1942, Die Tabak Frage reprinted a poster put out by the *Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft Schadenverhütung* (Reich Working Group for Damage Prevention) reminding farmers of their need to exercise caution in the vicinity of their highly flammable harvest.<sup>107</sup> By 1940, police forces throughout Germany enforced ordinances governing smoking near crops, while "no smoking" signs were prominently displayed in factories containing combustible goods. In one instance, the state sentenced a worker to death for causing a fire by smoking inside of a spray-paint factory.<sup>108</sup> The demands focused attention primarily on the need for more effective preventive measures due to the racial and physiological effects of smoking as opposed to overriding concerns with public safety risks. For instance, they advocated the combination of warnings, as

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Luft (hereafter RL). See "Unsere Forderungen zur Bekämpfung der Tabakgefahren," RL 23:2 (März-April 1941), p. 65.

<sup>107</sup> Die Tabak Frage 24:4 (July-August 1942).

<sup>108</sup> Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 203-204.



epitomized by the mixture of public smoking and vending machine prohibitions – which became a staple of the anti-smoking movement in the 1960s – with “special attention” to the welfare of tobacco patients. The Alliance insisted that women of reproductive age and young people up to age 21 should abstain from all tobacco consumption, and called for the prohibition of tobacco sales to those eighteen years of age or younger, as well as a ban on all tobacco advertising.<sup>109</sup>

The regime eventually took action against tobacco advertising with the tacit support of the *Werberat* (Advertising Council) in 1941. The place of ads in the Reich proved to be a divisive issue for party leaders in the late 1930s. The left wing of the party supported blanket restrictions, while others identified the crucial role of advertising in directing consumers’ purchasing power to proper channels. As Minister for Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, Goebbels praised advertisers as “vanguards” of civilization and “pioneers” responsible for blazing a path toward progress.<sup>110</sup> But just two years earlier, the State Secretary of Goebbels’ ministry, Walther Funk, criticized misleading advertisements as a danger to consumers and the national economy. Funk, who would later assume the position of Minister of Economics, informed his audience at the 1936 Continental Advertising Congress that the state needed to “supervise” advertising practices to ensure compliance with the party’s objectives and eliminate deception.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> “Unsere Forderungen gegen die Tabakgefahren,” February 1939, Box 302, Folder Tabakgegner, DKZ, HIA.

<sup>110</sup> Goebbels Speech to Continental Advertising Congress of 1938, Box 262, Folder Reklame-Kongress, DKZ, HIA.

<sup>111</sup> “Speech held by Mr. Funk at Opening of Continental Advertising Congress,” 24 November 1936, Box 263, Folder Reklame-Kongress 1936, DKZ, HIA.

By April 1939, Advertising Council President Heinrich Hunke called upon tobacco companies to acknowledge and adapt to the prevailing sentiments. Hunke specifically identified the improper characterization of cigarette use as a safe activity as “inadmissible” in light of the body of medical knowledge suggesting otherwise. Responsible advertisers would give greater credence to the more important principles of strengthening “Volk, health, and the economy,” rather than prioritize the pursuit of individual profits and sales.<sup>112</sup> In December 1941, the Advertising Council formalized a series of restrictions on both the content of advertisements and marketing techniques designed to protect the *Volk* from deceptive tobacco ads. The new guidelines mandated that cigarettes ads could not associate smoking with masculinity, depict sportsmen or other masculine role models for male youth, target or include women, link cigarettes with automobile, or ridicule anti-smoking leaders and arguments.

With respect to advertising methods, the new measures prohibited tobacco companies from using specific types of platforms to deliver their message and location. Beginning in early 1942, they could no longer utilize film advertisements, send ads via mail, or place ads in certain sections of newspapers and periodicals. Additionally, tobacco companies could not place ads in post offices, on billboards along railway lines, on bus billboards, or in the vicinity of sports fields or athletic competitions including automobile racetracks.<sup>113</sup> The 1941 restrictions stopped short of imposing a

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<sup>112</sup> “Die Auffassung des Werberates der deutschen Wirtschaft hinsichtlich der Tabak- und Alkoholwerbung,” 15 April 1939, Box 302, Folder Tabakgegner, DKZ, HIA.

<sup>113</sup> “Werberat,” Chronica Nicotiana 3:1 (1942), pp. 91-92; “Berlin: Control of the Use of Alcohol and Tobacco,” Journal of the American Medical Association 113 (1939), pp. 2163-2164; and Harrison Lewis, “German Economic Notes: Increased Restrictions in Advertising of Tobacco Products,” 14 January 1942, Germany Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP. The complete list of restrictions has been reprinted in Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 204-206.

comprehensive prohibition on tobacco ads, but they hampered tobacco companies' ability to publicly identify cigarette smoking as a healthy, modern, and racially acceptable form of pleasure. According to the preamble of the restrictions, tobacco ads would only be permitted should they adhere to these new standards, meaning they would no longer hinder racial prosperity. Naturally, the continued appearance of tobacco ads, even those that obeyed the new advertising regulations, frustrated prohibitionists.<sup>114</sup>

The emphasis on abstinence with respect to tobacco use among German youth and young women represented a cornerstone of Nazi policies vis-à-vis smoking. In general, the "12 Demands Against Alcohol and Tobacco Abuse" articulated by state agencies and the similar list put forth by the Alliance acted as a foundation for the state's enhanced role in controlling the consumption of tobacco products by these groups. According to the Main Office for Racial Health of the NSDAP, the party "took up the emphatic fight" against alcohol and tobacco through education and enlightenment. In doing so, they demanded youth accept abstinence as a social duty, though adults were free to enjoy these *Genussmittel* in moderation.<sup>115</sup> Implicit in their attitude toward smoking among adults, however, was a sense that only adult males could practice moderation. According to a pamphlet regarding the impact of stimulants upon the performance of sailors, doctors and medical aid station personnel needed to warn sailors about the risks of chain smoking, including chronic fatigue, which could directly affect one's ability to carry out his duties. Moderate tobacco use, though, did not necessarily damage a smoker's

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<sup>114</sup> Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, p. 206.

<sup>115</sup> Dr. med. Bockhacker, Hauptamt für Volksgesundheit der NSDAP, "Information über die Bekämpfung des Alkohol- und Tabakmissbrauchs," 1939, Box 302, Folder Tabakgefahren, 1939, DKZ, HIA.

health.<sup>116</sup> Opinions varied on this position, often dependent upon the target audience. Health guides for HJ members warned that smoking in general could deprive men of their sexual potency or cause degeneracy, thereby interfering with their abilities with respect to the principal objective of Nazi population policy – increasing the number of child-rich families.<sup>117</sup> The addictive behavior of chain smokers, moreover, revealed a weakness of character and fundamental lack of self-discipline, highlighting the smoker’s inability to subordinate individual desires to the needs of the *Volk* and state.

Despite the stark contrast in the regime’s public stance regarding tobacco use among different population groups within the racial community, certain leaders sought to harden tobacco discourses and policies. Robert Ley, leader of the German Labor Front (DAF) and chronic drunk, dismissed the validity of moderation in a series of lectures to Hitler Youth members in the spring of 1939. Nicknamed “the Reich Boozer,” Ley’s abuse of alcohol may have also provided him with special insight into the treacherous division between moderation and excessive consumption of racial poisons – all Germans had to abandon both alcohol and tobacco.<sup>118</sup> Yet, in light of such proclamations from high-ranking leaders, the Nazi state guaranteed tobacco to its citizens through rationing.

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<sup>116</sup> Zur Beurteilung der Genuß- und Reizmittel bei der Ermüdungsbekämpfung und Leistungssteigerung (Berlin: Kriegsmarine Merkblatt III, 1940), pp. 17-20.

<sup>117</sup> Proctor, p. 189.

<sup>118</sup> Geoffrey J. Giles, “Student Drinking in the Third Reich: Academic Tradition and the Nazi Revolution,” in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, eds., Susanna Barrows and Robin Room (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 142.

## **Tobacco Consumption and Rationing**

Rationing via the distribution of “smoker control cards” began at a local level in 1940 and remained in effect until 1948. The rationing system was in and of itself a product of prevailing attitudes toward smoking. Men and women, for instance, were eligible to collect tobacco rations at different ages. Initially, women had to be 21 or older in order to legally acquire tobacco products, whereas males over 18 received a tobacco ration. Women also had to navigate restrictions on precisely when and on which goods they could use their smoker cards. Whereas ration policies entitled men to purchase any type of tobacco product each day of the month, some localities limited women exclusively to the purchase of cigarettes on alternate days.<sup>119</sup> As tobacco supplies decreased during the war, authorities redefined eligibility according to age. Women bore the brunt of the burden under the new rationing guidelines, which raised the age limit for female consumers from 21 to 25, while the cut-off for male consumers remained unchanged.<sup>120</sup> The gendered nature of tobacco rationing in wartime reflected existing sentiment regarding women’s smoking. Plus, attempts to minimize women’s consumption of tobacco products amidst limited supplies enabled authorities to preserve stocks of cigarettes, cigars, and smoking tobacco for soldiers and male civilians.

Historians Shelley Baranowski and Hartmut Berghoff have argued that the foundation of Nazi consumer policies revolved around calls for present-day sacrifices on the part of individuals in exchange for future prosperity to be enjoyed by the entire racial

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<sup>119</sup> William L. Smyser, “Rationing Cards for Tobacco Products,” 12 November 1941, pp. 2-3, German Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>120</sup> Harrison Lewis, “German Economic Notes: Control System Introduced for Distribution of Tobacco Manufacturers,” 6 March 1942, p. 2, German Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP.

community.<sup>121</sup> Invoking the need for sacrifice allowed the Nazis to obscure the depths of deprivation and scarcity with respect to the opportunities to consume in Germany.

Already by 1942, though, the Nazi government experienced great difficulty in accessing enough tobacco to satisfy the demands of ration requirements. This was particularly evident with respect to cigarettes. Despite the confiscation of more than 270,000 tons of raw tobacco from Greece in the spring of 1942, which should have theoretically been sufficient for Germany's tobacco needs, and negotiations with Turkish and Balkan suppliers for additional raw tobacco, persistent shortages forced producers to tap into domestic tobacco supplies.<sup>122</sup> Apart from diminishing the quality of cigarettes, for which German-grown tobacco was not suited, the questions of supply affected the ability of tobacconists to meet ration requirements. In several German cities in 1942, shops could only afford to distribute two or three cigarettes per visit.<sup>123</sup>

Queues and hoarding typified the tobacco consumer's life during the war, largely due to the fact that the number of smokers increased at a far greater rate than tobacco could be produced or imported into Germany. Already by December 1939, tobacco retailers were unable to meet demand. American journalist John Raleigh McCutcheon

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<sup>121</sup> Shelley Baranowski, Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Berghoff, "Enticement and Deprivation." In contrast to such studies, Götz Aly argues Nazi policies of confiscation during the war offset shortages and deprivation in Germany, providing many soldiers and their families with an unprecedented standard of living. Although the sanctioned plunder created new opportunities for Germans to partake in consumption, those inside of Germany continued to navigate a consumer culture often bereft of desirable goods. The confiscation of Greek and Turkish tobacco did not offer a solution to the increased wartime demand for cigarettes. See Götz Aly, Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State, trans. by Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), p. 246.

<sup>122</sup> Aly, p. 246.

<sup>123</sup> James Somerville, Liaison Officer with Ministry of Economic Warfare, to Secretary of State, 29 July 1942, Germany 1942-1945; NR 1942-1945; RG 166, NACP.

observed “nearly bare” counters at department stores, which drew the ire of irritated customers, who expressed their frustration with shortages through a litany of unpleasant comments directed at the clerk.<sup>124</sup> Rumors circulated that companies began substituting other ingredients in the place of tobacco. Shoppers speculated that a recurring change in the flavor of Johnnies, a relatively popular brand, could be attributed to the use of camel dung shipped in from occupied North Africa.<sup>125</sup> Reports from various American consulates in Germany noted that the press took a critical view of cigarette smokers who displayed a “nervousness in buying” and “hog psychosis” in response to anticipated shortages, though this did not dissuade anxious smokers from going shop to shop to accumulate as many cigarettes and cigars as possible.<sup>126</sup>

The state, fearing discontent among a population denied one of the most basic pleasures in life by the war, introduced regulations on tobacconists’ hours of operation and tobacco rationing schemes in 1940 and 1941 to improve consumers’ access to those very commodities racial hygienists claimed damaged the *Volk*. Local party leaders in Berlin required tobacconists to maintain regular store hours throughout the day to ensure equitable distribution of all tobacco products.<sup>127</sup> Retailers who refused to remain open late into the evening so as to provide workers with sufficient opportunities to purchase

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<sup>124</sup> John Raleigh McCutcheon, Behind the Nazi Front (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1940), pp. 274-275.

<sup>125</sup> Terry Charman, The German Home Front, 1939-1945 (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1989), pp. 53-56.

<sup>126</sup> Sam E. Woods, “Tobacco Distribution in Germany,” 27 September 1941, pp. 2-3; and Woods, “Tobacco Supply Problems in Germany,” 19 August 1941, p. 3, German Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>127</sup> Sam E. Woods, “Tobacco Shops Required to Keep Open in Berlin,” 19 May 1940, p. 2, German Tobacco 1936-1940; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

tobacco products had to relinquish a portion of their supplies to competitors.

Tobacconists also had to set hourly quotas of cigarettes to ensure customers entering the shop at the end of the day would be able to purchase their ration and thus prevent the appearance of potentially upsetting sold out signs in front of tobacconists. Although local authorities monitored the hours of operation of tobacco shops to maintain order, war needs prompted the closure of nearly two-thirds of all cigarette factories in 1942 and the elimination of a large number of cigarette brands. Employees of the affected factories found new work in munitions production and other types of “more important work.”<sup>128</sup>

The shortages of tobacco products put regular smokers in a very tough position, prompting many of them to develop alternative strategies to satisfy their desire to light up. By 1944, the Reich Health Office took note of increased cases of tobacco mixed with foreign substances, such as tea or lime tree leaves. Health authorities worried the use of anything other than “genuine” tobacco would harm consumers, which would in turn weaken the overall war effort.<sup>129</sup> Stories about the potentially fatal effects of *ersatz* tobacco also threatened to create hysteria, a concern König brought to the attention of the Reich Health Office when he directed attention toward a series of inaccurate news reports regarding the death of a 67 year-old postal worker shortly after smoking rhubarb leaves. König and the Reich Health Office agreed the misleading coverage linking the fatality to

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<sup>128</sup> Robert T. Cowan, “German Industrial Notes,” 5 May 1942, pp. 2-3, German Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>129</sup> BAB R 86 / 4041, Fachuntergruppe Rauch-, Kau- und Schnupftabakindustrie to President of the Reichsgesundheitsamt, 3 April 1941.



the consumption of tobacco alternatives spawned unnecessary panic at a critical juncture in the war.<sup>130</sup>

The state's willingness to allow private citizens to grow their own tobacco during the war so as to augment rations further complicated matters with respect to both the production and distribution of tobacco in the Reich and the general anti-smoking tenor of Nazi racial hygiene. Interested Germans could cultivate up to 200 plants, provided they paid necessary fees to the local government and guaranteed the finished product would not wind up on the black market.<sup>131</sup> Local authorities envisioned private cultivation simply as a "stopgap" measure to offset war-induced stress on the system of tobacco production and distribution in Germany.<sup>132</sup> König's institute published guides offering technical advice to assist novice farmers on the most effective procedures.<sup>133</sup> The relatively decentralized system of privately grown tobacco designed for personal consumption as opposed to commercial exchange may have addressed the immediate problem of supply, but it created additional difficulties for growers, consumers, health authorities, and the tobacco industry. The production of tobacco by novices meant many Germans consumed improperly fermented tobacco in the latter years of the war, thereby increasing the potential health risks of smoking. Representatives of the cigarette industry complained bitterly to the Reich Health Office in late 1944 about the lack of standards for

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<sup>130</sup> BAB R 86 / 4041, Paul König to President of Reichsgesundheitsamtes, 6 January 1944.

<sup>131</sup> BAB R 86 / 4041, Reichsminister für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft to Reichsminister der Innern, 11 May 1944. The Nazi system for private cultivation remained in effect in the British and American zones of occupation following the end of the war.

<sup>132</sup> BAB R 86 / 4041, König to Reichsgesundheitsamtes, 6 January 1944.

<sup>133</sup> Paul Koenig, Tabak aus eigenem Garten: vom Trocknen, Fermentieren und Beizen für den Selbstverbrauch (Karlsruhe: Maier, 1944).

privately produced tobacco, which they insisted contained far more nicotine than professionally grown tobacco from Germany's traditional suppliers.<sup>134</sup> The industry's attack on private cultivation likely stemmed from a strong desire to protect its commercial interests rather than any impetus to guard consumers from the dangers of nicotine. Despite the protests of the cigarette industry and potential health risks, the state continued to refuse to prohibit individuals from growing their own tobacco. Private cultivation not only served to alleviate the chronic problem of tobacco shortages, it also offered a degree of pleasure amidst increasingly bleak circumstances.

### **The Cigarette at War**

The ambivalence of Nazi attitudes and policies vis-à-vis smoking came through most clearly with respect to cigarette use in the armed forces. Shortly before the war, Hermann Göring prohibited members of the air force from publicly consuming tobacco or alcohol while in uniform. Göring justified the crackdown on the grounds that military service was "a duty of honor for every soldier" that demanded proper comportment.<sup>135</sup> Yet, the distribution of tobacco products throughout the war years favored soldiers over civilians, as regions with a large number of military installations and personnel, armaments factories, or labor camps typically received additional tobacco supplies. The sacrifice of soldiers on the field of battle required civilians to sacrifice cigarettes and cigars for the good of the war effort. Civic associations and party organizations called

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<sup>134</sup> BAB R 86 / 4041, Fachuntergruppe Zigaretttenindustrie to President of the Reichsgesundheitsamts, 30 November 1944.

<sup>135</sup> "Notes on the German Tobacco Situation," 3 June 1939, p. 6, Germany Tobacco 1930-1939; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

upon civilians to adjust their personal smoking habits so as to ensure an adequate supply of tobacco for soldiers. Women, in particular, faced increased pressure to modify their habit or completely abstain from smoking altogether, since soldiers should be given “first consideration” in all matters of comfort and convenience. For example, the German Women Students Organization issued a plea to its charges to relinquish cigarettes as a sign of their appreciation for the martial sacrifice of German men.<sup>136</sup> The efforts to reward soldiers’ service with sufficient access to tobacco products made it increasingly difficult to also satisfy civilian demand.<sup>137</sup>

The issuance of tobacco rations to soldiers may have appeared hypocritical considering the plethora of propaganda throughout the Reich that claimed smoking induced fatigue. As in the First World War, though, cigarettes represented a fundamental part of the soldiering experience. Despite causing exhaustion, smoking fulfilled multiple – and seemingly contradictory – psychological functions. In a letter to his family in the spring of 1940, Ernst Kleist explained most men only remained upright through the powers of nicotine and alcohol.<sup>138</sup> Lighting up and puffing away on cigarettes helped soldiers pass time and deal with hunger, particularly during the leaner years toward the end of the war, while also steeling nerves and providing an opportunity to momentarily forget the rigors of combat. (Figure 1.2) For many, the simplicity of smoking offered a temporary reprieve and allowed soldiers a chance to feel like ordinary men once again, as

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<sup>136</sup> Sam E. Woods, “German Women Students Requested Not to Smoke,” 12 June 1940, p. 2, Germany Tobacco 1936-1940; NR 1920-1941; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>137</sup> Paul H. Pearson, “Shortage of Cigarettes Faces Retail Trade in Germany,” 8 July 1941, p. 2, German Tobacco 1954-41; NR 1950-1954; RG 166, NACP.

<sup>138</sup> Walter Bähr and Dr. Hans W. Bähr, eds., Kriegsbriefe Gefallener Studenten, 1939-1945 (Tübingen/Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1952), pp. 26-27.

did the sharing of cigarettes, which promoted the formation of bonds among comrades.<sup>139</sup> Propaganda campaigns on the home front even encouraged local communities to conserve, collect, and distribute tobacco goods to soldiers passing through their neighborhoods as a sign of gratitude and solidarity.

Although anti-smoking leaders questioned the practicality of providing cigarettes to soldiers, several influential party leaders rejected calls to cut off tobacco rations. Martin Bormann used his position as head of the Party Chancellery to quash a comprehensive propaganda campaign to be directed at smokers.<sup>140</sup> Likewise, Goebbels vehemently objected to any endeavor that would deprive soldiers or civilians of the opportunity to smoke during the war. The Propaganda Minister, whose own heavy smoking likely factored into his opposition, believed anti-smoking propaganda and potential restrictions on consumption hampered the overall war effort by negatively affecting morale. Goebbels' opposition to anti-smoking efforts during the war years took a variety of forms. He condemned Reine Luft for its "combative character" and "polarizing attitude," which distracted attention from the Reich's more immediate concerns.<sup>141</sup> Furthermore, as Propaganda Minister, he saw anti-smoking propaganda as a threat to both his personal and professional interests. By cracking down on the most vocal and virulent anti-smoking sources, Goebbels sought to consolidate his authority over all matters of public enlightenment. As German troops invaded the Soviet Union,

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<sup>139</sup> Richard Klein, Cigarettes Are Sublime (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 135-156. Also see Stephen F. Fritz, Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1997), p. 39 and 72.

<sup>140</sup> BAB NS 18 / 532, Bormann to Gauleiter Sauckel, 5 July 1941; and BAB NS 18 / 226, Braeckow to Minister, 24 May 1941.

<sup>141</sup> BAB NS 18 / 226, Walter Tiessler to all Gauringleiter, 5 July 1941.

Goebbels' Ministry alerted all Gauleiters of the need to adhere to his office's standards and instructions with respect to the production and distribution of all propaganda materials. His directive specifically targeted misguided anti-smoking posters authorized by local state offices in Mecklenburg and in the Ruhr area. The Mecklenburg poster intimated that smoking directly thwarted Hitler's will since the Führer himself loathed tobacco use and described nicotine as "one of the most dangerous poisons." Lighting up in spite of Hitler's warnings, then, was tantamount to treason because it weakened the strength of the *Volk*. Apart from rejecting the direct attack on smokers, Goebbels chastised local officials for permitting the display of anti-smoking propaganda that had not been approved by the national party.<sup>142</sup>

Amazingly, disputes over the place of cigarette smoking in the Third Reich persisted until the final months of the war. Specifically, the inclusion of tobacco products in the rations for Germans under the age of 18 conscripted into military service stood at odds with existing policies regulating tobacco consumption. Beginning in March 1940, German youth protection laws prohibited underage smoking in public as part of a larger effort to instill discipline and order on the home front. The ban represented one element of a much broader fight against the apparent rise of juvenile delinquency, which many attributed to the absence of strong father figures due to the war. In addition to the embargo on public smoking, the measures for the protection of youth called for strict curfews, the prevention of alcohol consumption, restrictions on attending the movies, and a ban on certain styles of dancing. The cumulative effect of the youth protection laws was to expand the definitions of criminal behavior and juvenile delinquency in the eyes

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<sup>142</sup> BAB NS 18 / 226, Das Propagandaministerium, 7 June 1941; and Besprechung mit Gauleiter Sauckel über die Steuerung der Propaganda gegen den Tabakmissbrauch, 20 May 1941.

of the German police. In essence, the laws criminalized the very notion of leisure time and recreational behavior as a means of cracking down on the potentially subversive conduct of “wild youth.”<sup>143</sup> Although they had great difficulty in enforcing behavioral standards on German youth, there are a few reported cases of the Hitler Youth disciplining underage smokers. In one instance, a repeat offender was sentenced to three weeks detention in a military camp after a Hitler Youth leader caught him smoking at night. The court overseeing juvenile cases determined that incarceration at the military camp was prudent due to the extent of the 14 year-old’s chronic disciplinary problems, which included a record of multiple arrests and repeated failure to attend HJ meetings. In delivering its ruling, the court attributed many of the defendant’s failings to his mother, who appeared unable to control her son.<sup>144</sup>

The restrictions on public smoking by German youth proved to be a significant policy headache in the final six months of combat and they highlighted many of the contradictions of Nazi-era tobacco policies. Many HJ members called upon to serve in combat seized upon their newfound status as soldiers and adults, taking advantage of the opportunity to smoke and drink.<sup>145</sup> Yet, although soldiers under 18 received rations, they could not consume them in public. In effect, ration policies and the youth protection law countered one another, creating a scenario whereby underage soldiers were entitled, but

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<sup>143</sup> Alfons Kenkmann, Wilde Jugend: Lebenswelt grossstädtischer Jugendlicher zwischen Weltwirtschaftskrise, Nationalsozialismus, und Währungsreform (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1996), p. 151; also see Michael H. Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 150.

<sup>144</sup> The case in question is cited in Heinz Boberach, ed., Richterbriefe: Dokumente zur Beeinflussung der deutschen Rechtsprechung, 1942-1944 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1975), pp. 204-205 and 220-221.

<sup>145</sup> Kater, p. 202.

not entitled; they could possess tobacco products, but they could not publicly smoke them. Critics argued it was inconceivable to demand that Germany's youth take up arms in defense of the Fatherland, but prohibit them from smoking. According to this logic, it was foolhardy to preclude those under 18 from consuming their tobacco ration, since the enemy did not differentiate German soldiers according to age during combat.<sup>146</sup>

In contrast, representatives of youth welfare associations, as well as leaders of the Hitler Youth and League of German Maidens, condemned the notion of supplying young soldiers with tobacco rations. They argued that the inclusion of tobacco rations contradicted the objectives of racial health education, resulting in mixed messages. For youth, it appeared as if the state provided the very fruit it claimed to be forbidden.<sup>147</sup> To minimize the likelihood of youth turning to cigarettes, supporters of the public smoking ban also called upon local leaders and housewives to refrain from distributing cigarettes to young Germans as a reward for special achievements, completing errands, and assisting in organizing air raid evacuations. Tobacco products did not constitute an appropriate incentive in such cases because it was the "natural duty" of Hitler Youth members to perform such tasks. More importantly, allocating cigarettes to those in the HJ and BDM countered the prevailing principles of racial hygiene, gave smoking an air of acceptability, and ultimately paved the way for Germany's youth to become addicted to nicotine.

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<sup>146</sup> BAB R 1501 / 3069, Reichsminister des Innern to Reichswirtschaftsminister, December 1944.

<sup>147</sup> BAB R 1501 / 3069, Dr. Klemer to Reichsminister des Innern, 19 January 1945; and Reichsminister des Innern, February 1945.

Paradoxically, the Nazis did not encourage its racial and political enemies to smoke in the camps, despite the potential health risks ascribed to tobacco consumption. Many Nazi leaders feared the provisioning of sufficient tobacco supplies to camp populations would damage public morale should it become public knowledge, since such a scenario could be construed as prioritizing the tobacco needs of camp inmates over those of German citizens. In fact, camps often instituted restrictions against smoking, regulating the where and when inmates could light up. Buchenwald prisoners, for instance, were prohibited from smoking during work detail or in the blocks.<sup>148</sup> According to testimony delivered shortly following the liberation of the camp, an “asocial” was put to death for smoking outside of his free time.<sup>149</sup> Smoking prohibitions appear to have been fairly common. In the diary he secretly composed and hid during his captivity, Odd Nansen noted the existence of bans in several facilities and was even forced to create “Smoking Prohibited” signs.<sup>150</sup> Though the extent to which such smoking rules were enforced is unclear, there is evidence that camp guards punished entire blocks for the surreptitious smoking of individual prisoners.<sup>151</sup>

Nazi leaders and camp officials also recognized the incentive value of cigarettes and other tobacco goods, with respect not only to inducing inmates to carry out menial tasks, but also for guards and kapos to perform unsettling and bloody labor. Former

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<sup>148</sup> David A. Hackett, ed., The Buchenwald Report (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 57.

<sup>149</sup> Hackett, p. 160.

<sup>150</sup> Odd Nansen, From Day to Day, trans. Katherine John (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949), p. 111.

<sup>151</sup> Nansen, p. 323. Nansen related a second-hand story in which prisoners had to stand outside in freezing temperatures for two days after a barrack burned down due to an inmate’s smoking.



inmates of Buchenwald recalled agreements between sentries and kapos, whereby the former delivered various forms of tobacco to the latter in exchange for forcing other camp prisoners to enter restricted territories, whereupon they would be either beaten or shot.<sup>152</sup> For each execution, SS sentries often received special material benefits, including three-day leaves, food, and tobacco.<sup>153</sup> A similar set of circumstances existed at Auschwitz, according to testimony given at the 1964 trials in Frankfurt. The commandants of the *Einsatzgruppen* on the Eastern front afforded their men frequent “cigarette breaks” to ease the mental burden of performing mass executions.<sup>154</sup> Nothing could better illustrate the Nazis’ ambivalent relationship to tobacco than the fact that the part rewarded those responsible for carrying out the “Final Solution” with racial poisons.

## **Conclusion**

The racial state’s foundation was the *Gesundheitspflicht*, which obliged each citizen to preserve the long-term health of the *Volk* by placing the needs of the collective ahead of the desires of the individual. Throughout the Third Reich, anti-smoking propaganda repeatedly reinforced this sense of duty to remain healthy by urging Germans to abstain from smoking since tobacco was a degenerative racial poison that threatened to weaken the hereditary stock of the German race. Writing nearly a decade after the war, neurologist Kurt Pohlisch declared that Germans had no use for health education with regard to tobacco because the Nazis had through a combination of racial health practices

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<sup>152</sup> Hackett, p. 176.

<sup>153</sup> Hackett, p. 373.

<sup>154</sup> Browning, p. 65.

and economic policies created a “nicotine-starved society.” As this chapter has shown, however, the National Socialist approach to the cigarette question was much more complex than a simple case of denouncing tobacco as a racial poison and, for a variety of reasons, it did not lead to the draconian resolution Pohlisch described in 1954. Despite the influence wielded by tobacco opponents in shaping health policies, the Nazi state’s need to preserve popular support undermined the attacks on smoking. Since it was one of the relatively few widely available consumer goods in the latter half of the 1930s, the government could not run the risk of alienating supporters by adopting a prohibitionist stance toward tobacco use.

In the context of the *Gesundheitspflicht*, the regime successfully imbued the private act of smoking with public consequences. To protect the general welfare of the *Volk*, the party supported extensive scientific research into the possible risks of smoking and introduced numerous tobacco control measures at the national, state, and local levels. Besides placing limits on who could legally smoke, where smoking could take place, and when it could occur, the state imposed restrictions on the marketing of tobacco goods. The Nazis were, in many ways, at the vanguard of tobacco politics in the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, their willingness to enforce their own controls often fell short. Smoking restrictions often applied only to women or adolescents, if at all, as the police rarely enforced the prohibition on public smoking by German youth under the age of sixteen. Tellingly, the party and the military distributed cigarette rewards to those responsible for carrying out the execution of the Nazis’ racial ideology on the Eastern front, even as they officially declared tobacco to be one of the most dangerous racial poisons in existence.

The ambivalent culture of smoking within the Third Reich speaks volumes about the limits of the Nazi dictatorship. The anti-smoking policies enacted by the party were far more cautious than either Pohlisch or the smokers' rights groups of the twenty-first century would have us believe. This ambivalence did not deter Germans from smoking or seeking outlets to smoke, as evidenced by the spread of black marketing and private cultivation in response to the wave of sold out signs outside of tobacconist shops during the war. The experience of constrained consumption persisted into the immediate postwar period and is the subject of the following chapter.

## Chapter Two

### “Powerful Butts”: The Cigarette During the Allied Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949

In September 1947, the Fraenkische Presse published “the journey of an American cigarette,” a story originally attributed to General Joseph T. McNarney, the former Military Governor of the American zone of occupation. In this tale, the cigarette passed through six sets of hands, from an American GI and his *Fräulein* to a cobbler, coal dealer, butcher, plumber, and eventually a farmer. Despite the “temptation” to light up and long looks at the cigarette, none of the Germans before the farmer seized the moment by enjoying “the luxury of smoking a real cigarette.” Instead, the Germans traded the individual *Ami* cigarette for shoes, coal, meat, and potatoes. Unlike the others before him, the farmer lit his cigarette as he “peacefully settles between his nice furniture, genuine Persian rugs and Swiss clocks all of which he swapped for foodstuff,” satisfying his lone, unfulfilled desire – a craving for nicotine.<sup>155</sup>

Although McNarney’s account of the American cigarette in occupied Germany exaggerated the worth of a single cigarette, it spoke to the inflated value of tobacco products during the occupation. Already by July 1945, Berliners reportedly paid up to \$20 for a package of American cigarettes, while the New York Herald-Tribune estimated

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<sup>155</sup> Frazier Hunt, “The Trail of a GI Cigarette,” Reader’s Digest (July 1947), p. 102. Also see “General McNarney’s German Story,” Fraenkische Presse, 15 September 1947; Fraenkische Presse; Scrutiny Reports of German Newspapers, 1945-1949 (SR), Records of the Press Branch (PB), Records of the Information Control Division (ICD); Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 260 (RG 260), National Archives at College Park, Maryland (NACP).

that American personnel could receive \$150 for a single carton.<sup>156</sup> A typical pack fetched approximately \$30 a year later, though a pack of more popular American brands like Chesterfield could go for as much as \$90.<sup>157</sup> The various exchanges in McNarney's anecdote point to the centrality of the cigarette in immediate postwar society and the prevalence of a barter economy, while the decision to forego pleasure by giving into temptation illustrated the degree of constrained consumption brought about by the material realities of everyday life during the first years of the Allied occupation.

The cigarette's sojourn also revealed the myriad of functions simultaneously fulfilled by the cigarette within the immediate postwar context. Commodities and everyday objects possess multiple functions and layers of meaning for those that use and interact with these goods. Shifts within the political, economic, and cultural climate greatly influence the "social life of things."<sup>158</sup> In this case, the cigarette acted as both a commodity and a form of currency in the chaotic economic atmosphere of the occupation era. On the one hand, the cigarette proved to be vitally important in navigating the rigors of daily life in the war's aftermath. In an article for Die Welt, a "young widow" succinctly encapsulated the remarkable power of tobacco by claiming, "one would not

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<sup>156</sup> Joe Fleming, "Army Finishes Cigaret Mart Begun by GIs," Stars & Stripes (hereafter S&S), 22 May 1947, p. 4; "Stateside Newspaper Ponders Puzzles of Cigaret Currency," S&S, 1 September 1946, p. 2.

<sup>157</sup> Arthur D. Kahn, Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout – Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), p. 162. Also see Joel Sayer, "Letter From Berlin," in The New Yorker Book of War Pieces (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947), pp. 505-506; "Black Markets Underground in Bavaria," S&S, 16 December 1945, p. 1; and Rainer Gries, Die Rationen-Gesellschaft: Versorgungskampf und Vergleichsmentalität: Leipzig, München, und Köln nach dem Kriege (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1991), p. 309.

<sup>158</sup> Arjan Appadurai, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

get far without cigarettes.”<sup>159</sup> As a commodity, the cigarette offered respite from stress, alleviated hunger pains, and made the monotony of clearing rubble or standing in queues more tolerable. At the same time and in the words of writer Thaddäus Troll, “the cigarette currency powered the country” between war’s end and the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June 1948.<sup>160</sup>

The cigarette acted as both a financial and social link among diverse groups of people, as in McNarney’s tale, where it indirectly connected the GI and farmer through a black market network. At the same time it connected people together, the cigarette brought the uneven distribution of power and wealth in the immediate postwar context into sharp relief. As the source and actual consumer of the American cigarette, respectively, the GI and farmer enjoyed special privileges due to their relative advantages with respect to supplies. The other actors in McNarney’s yarn simply could not afford to smoke the cigarette. Instead, they had to rely upon its exchange value on the underground economy of occupied Germany. Given its value and influence within the culture of exchange, the cigarette evolved into the “collective symbol of the black market era.”<sup>161</sup> As such, the cigarette represented one of the most important sources of contact between occupiers and occupied. The postwar black market in occupied Germany functioned as a contact zone, a space in which “peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually

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<sup>159</sup> The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) FO 1034 / 43, 13 May 1947, “Die Welt.”

<sup>160</sup> Thaddäus Troll, “Vom Schwarzen Markt,” in So lebten wir...: Ein Querschnitt durch 1947, ed. Hans A. Rümelin (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), pp. 62-65.

<sup>161</sup> Malte Zierenberg, Stadt der Schieber: Der Berliner Schwarzmarkt, 1939-1950 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), pp. 279-287.

involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict.”<sup>162</sup> These “powerful butts” so worried journalist Arno Scholz that he cautioned readers of the British-licensed Telegraf that the Allies would use the “volatile” currency as “a weapon of revenge with gruesome effect” to further Germany’s despair. To Scholz, the occupiers exploited the misery and want of war-weary Germans who exchanged all items of worth for cigarettes, which they could use to offset chronic hunger pains.<sup>163</sup> Tobacco shortages had created a climate in which these powerful butts shaped the very nature of both formal and informal relations within the contact zone.

### **The Cigarette Economy**

The U.S. Military Government delayed large-scale importation of tobacco stocks into Germany until 1948 in order to focus on acquiring enough food to feed the occupied population and displaced persons. As a result, tobacco supply depended upon rations offered to occupation soldiers and personnel, the inclusion of tobacco goods in relief packages prior to the prohibition on private imports, domestic production, and the cultivation of tobacco in private gardens. Together, these sources failed to meet the needs of both the military and civilian population in the American and British zones of occupation, partly because there had been no domestic tobacco crop in 1945 due to combat on German soil.<sup>164</sup> Moreover, U.S. officials responsible for monitoring the

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<sup>162</sup> Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 6-7.

<sup>163</sup> Arno Scholz, “Die Macht der runden Stäbchen,” Telegraf 163:2, 16 July 1947, p. 3.

<sup>164</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Tobacco Industry in Western Germany,” 12 October 1946; Germany: Requests-Tobacco; Narrative Reports, 1946-1949 (hereafter NR); Records for the Foreign Agricultural Service (hereafter FAS), RG 166; NACP.

tobacco situation in Germany noted the 1946 yield produced in Germany “was of low quantity and low quality,” resulting in a “gradual but steady deterioration.” Despite the fact that several “modern, well-equipped” tobacco plants survived the war intact and “could operate at near pre-war capacity if the materials were available,” many observers believed Germany’s tobacco industry could not possibly recover.<sup>165</sup>

The lack of sufficient raw tobacco imports from abroad placed enormous pressure on authorities overseeing the distribution of tobacco rations to German civilians and displaced persons. An August 1946 consulate report observed that the global tobacco market had been upended by the war, making large-scale import programs to Germany virtually impossible.<sup>166</sup> Alarmist reports described “catastrophical conditions in tobacco supplies” that would ultimately lead to “unrest among the laboring classes.” Although the report acknowledged food as a higher priority than tobacco cultivation, it also claimed that the general supply of tobacco in the American and British zones of occupation would be depleted by mid-1947 and that this deficit could not be offset by domestic production alone.<sup>167</sup> Similar reports from the spring of 1947 noted that German tobacco processing plants in the joint American-British zone of occupation temporarily ceased operations

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<sup>165</sup> Martin J. Hillenbrand, “Economic Developments in Bremen Area Since Beginning of Occupation Period,” September 1947; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, “German Tobacco Situation,” 18 September 1947; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

<sup>166</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Conditions in German Tobacco Trade and Industry,” 14 August 1946; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

<sup>167</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Tobacco Situation in American and British Zone,” 22 January 1947; and Maurice W. Altaffer, “Stagnation in the Distribution of Tobacco Products in the British Zone of Occupation in Germany,” 14 August 1946; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.



because of the rapidly shrinking stock, making the immediate import of raw tobacco from abroad absolutely “necessary.”<sup>168</sup>

The combination of restricted domestic tobacco production and the cessation of tobacco imports between the latter stages of war and the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in 1948 resulted in tremendous shortages. The poor yields from German tobacco production combined with the absence of sizeable imports meant that German smokers in had to contend not only with a “steady deterioration in the quality of tobacco products,” but also with a persistent uncertainty regarding the overall supply.<sup>169</sup> Shortages stemming from these chronic conditions led to the dramatic inflation of tobacco prices on the underground economy, a development reinforced by Germans’ overwhelming lack of confidence in legal tender. Germans, occupation personnel, and displaced persons (DPs) increasingly turned to the cigarette as a form of *ersatz* currency since diverse groups of people separated by language and culture could easily recognize cigarettes. Cigarettes also proved to be an effective form of currency because the rate of inflation could be theoretically managed via smoking.<sup>170</sup> The ubiquity of cigarette trading prompted an

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<sup>168</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Conditions in the Tobacco Industry in the American-British Zones,” 23 May 1947; NR 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

<sup>169</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Tobacco Industry in Western Germany,” 12 October 1946; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, “German Tobacco Situation,” 18 September 1947; Germany: Requests-Tobacco; Narrative Reports, 1946-1949 (NR); Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service (hereafter FAS), RG 166; NACP.

<sup>170</sup> Christoph Maria Merki, “Die amerikanische Zigarette – das Mass aller Dinge: Raucher in Deutschland zur Zeit der Zigarettenwährung,” in Tabakfragen: Rauchen aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht, ed. Thomas Hengartner and Christoph Maria Merki (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 1996), p. 66; Günter Schmölders, “Die Zigarettenwährung,” in Sozialökonomische Verhaltensforschung: Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Günter Schmölders, ed. G. Brinkmann, B. Strumpel, and H. Zimmermann (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot Verlag, 1973), p. 166; Claus-Marco Dieterich, Dicke Luft um Blauen Dunst: Geschichte und Gegenwart des Raucher/Nichtraucher-Konflikts (Marburg: Jonas Verlag, 1998), p. 35-37; Robert Sobel, They Satisfy: The Cigarette in American Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1978), pp. 140-141; Paul

American journalist to wonder if anyone actually smoked cigarettes in Germany, “or do they pass from hand to hand until the packages fall apart?”<sup>171</sup>

The exact black market value of cigarettes varied considerably during the course of the occupation period due to several factors. The country of origin exercised considerable influence over the worth and status of cigarettes, as black market operators and consumers tended to attribute greater value to American and English brands over German and Russian cigarettes due to the belief that their cigarettes possessed superior taste. Given this hierarchy, proximity to American soldiers and dependents proved vital to securing sufficient stocks of *Amis*. Germans employed in the offices of occupation administrators, entertainment spots frequented by GIs, or working in Americans’ private quarters often reaped the rewards of tips in the form of cigarettes or having first crack at the contents of ashtrays. Those with family in the United States also benefited from the inclusion of cigarettes and other scarce goods in CARE packages. Finally, the black market value of cigarettes was subject to market forces. The occupying governments’ policies on tobacco production, importation, and distribution affected pricing, as did the introduction of black market countermeasures, which further restricted the availability of tobacco goods and had the unintended effect of pushing up the price even further.

Many Americans serving in Germany capitalized on the opportunity to sell their fifty-cent pack of cigarettes for upwards of \$100 and potentially earn an annual income of

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W. Meyer, Die Zigarette als Generaltauschware im deutschen Schwarzen Markt, 1945 bis 1948: Ein Beitrag zur Geldgeschichte und Geldtheorie (Augsburg: Sonderdruck, 1984), pp. 8-9; Henner Hess, “The Other Prohibition: The Cigarette Crisis in Post-War Germany,” Crime, Law & Social Change 25 (1996), pp. 51-52; and Douglas Botting, In the Ruins of the Reich (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 178-179.

<sup>171</sup> “Stateside Newspaper Ponders Puzzles of Cigaret ‘Currency,’” S&S, p. 2.

\$12,000 by routinely selling their Post Exchange (PX) rations to Germans and DPs.<sup>172</sup> Commercial shipping companies encouraged soldiers and dependents to take advantage of the economic situation in Germany by openly advertising their willingness and ability to transport cartons to APO addresses in Germany.<sup>173</sup> Germans and DPs without guaranteed access to tobacco products often resorted to selling individual cigarettes to avoid wiping out their personal stock in a single trade. Plus, bartering a single cigarette greatly increased the number of potential buyers given the lower cost in relation to a pack or carton of black market cigarettes. In late 1945, a single *Ami* went for RM 2. Six months later, the price had quadrupled, a clear sign of the economic deterioration characteristic of the so-called “three wild years” at the end of the war.<sup>174</sup> German brands, such as Bosco, Hoco, and Africaine, were significantly cheaper than American cigarettes, as individual pieces sold for RM 3 in mid-1946.<sup>175</sup> Black market prices proved to be less stable in advance of and immediately following the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June 1948. Less than two months prior to currency reform, an American pack of cigarettes went for approximately \$35 in the U.S. zone.<sup>176</sup> The prices of American cigarettes dropped following the introduction of the new legal tender, leading to a

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<sup>172</sup> Botting, p. 187; Gries, p. 309; and Vladimir Petrov, Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 205-206.

<sup>173</sup> Copies of such ads ran by Columbia Overseas Parcels in New York or Ace Mail Order Company in East Orange, New Jersey, can be found in the papers of Charles P. Kindleberger. See Memoranda [5 of 5]; Division of German and Austrian Economic affairs File, 1945-1947; State Department File, 1945-1948; Charles P. Kindleberger Papers; Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL), Independence, Missouri.

<sup>174</sup> “Black Markets Underground in Bavaria,” S&S, 16 December 1945, p. 1.

<sup>175</sup> Gries, p. 309.

<sup>176</sup> “Cigaretts Quoted at \$40 Per Package in Berlin,” S&S, 2 May 1948, p. 5.

reversal though not an elimination of black market conditions in Germany. More specifically, black marketers could purchase American cigarettes at values less than the legal price in the weeks following the unveiling of the Deutsche Mark. In the intervening years, the cigarette emerged as a central element of both daily life and Germany's economy during the Allied occupation.

### **The Funeral of the Last Normal Consumer: Tobacco and Coal Mining**

The “universally recognized value of cigarettes” made them “one of the most important if not the most important form of incentive good” in occupied Germany.<sup>177</sup> This was particularly true in the case of coal mining, which most economists believed to be the linchpin to Germany's economic recovery. Weakened by years of scarcity, miners' productivity paled in comparison to pre-war levels. A 1947 assessment of labor conditions in Germany found it “now takes at least two miners to do the work of one before the war.”<sup>178</sup> In drawing upon the appeal of cigarettes, along with schnapps and other valuable black market commodities, the Military Government and employers established a direct link between production and the opportunity to consume, especially in the mining industry in the western zones. A report to the Bipartite Economic Control Group on the value of the gift parcels claimed that the “insufficient supply of tobacco for

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<sup>177</sup> Edward F. Ragland to Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army, 31 December 1947; OAG, GC; EO; RG 260; NACP. Both Ragland and Gray had close ties to the American tobacco industry. Ragland served as the Vice President of the Tobacco Institute between 1959-1971, while Gray served on the Board of Directors at R. J. Reynolds between 1960-1979. Gray's father, Bowman Gray, Sr., was a former President and Chairman of the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. See Nannie M. Tilley, The R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

<sup>178</sup> Lewis A. Brown, A Report on Germany (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947), p. 210.

the working population” was “an essential factor in the unsatisfactory efficiency of a population generally known as being very industrious.”<sup>179</sup> From the coal industry’s perspective, American cigarettes represented an important means of improving what struck many contemporary observers as a “completely hopeless picture” with respect to coal production.<sup>180</sup>

Beginning in 1947, the American and British Military Governments, in conjunction with coal industry leaders and trade unions, established an incentive program for the “immediate and potential increase of German coal output as a first step for rescuing Germany from her misery.”<sup>181</sup> Reviving the coal industry depended upon the industry’s ability to recruit able-bodied men to work in the mines as opposed to using their time to participate in the black market or go “hamstering,” whereby residents of German cities ventured out to rural areas to either forage for food or barter with farmers. The Miners’ Point System offered workers the chance to accrue points through regular attendance or reaching specific production targets. The points could then be used to purchase scarce goods, including cigarettes, coffee, clothing, and soap. Although Ruhr miners were among the best compensated laborers in all of Europe, the schemes failed to have an immediate impact on coal production and could not prevent the radicalization of

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<sup>179</sup> G. Schmidt to Bipartite Economic Control Group, 20 May 1947; Subject: Gift Parcel Cigarette Service; IB, ED, RG 260; NACP.

<sup>180</sup> Werner Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1984), p. 7; Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland, 1945-1948: Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlags-Anstalt, 1975), pp. 138-139.

<sup>181</sup> Dr. Ernst Deissmann, Secretary of the Coal Working Party, Düsseldorf, “Report submitted to the German Executive Committee on the Miners’ Point Scheme,” March 1947; General Records of the Consumer Goods Section, 1946-1949, ED, RG 260; NACP.

worker consciousness in the wake of ration cuts in 1947.<sup>182</sup> In order to qualify for points, workers had to maintain a spotless attendance records and risked losing points for missing three shifts within a one-month period.<sup>183</sup>

Critics warned that the benefits for coal workers would antagonize German workers in other industries. Similarly, the Miners' Trade Union, which had been involved in the initial negotiations for the point scheme, argued that different levels of rewards for above ground and underground workers at the collieries threatened worker solidarity.<sup>184</sup> Individual miners, moreover, were ambivalent because they feared that the program was supplied at the expense of their families. According to the Public Opinion Research Office in the British zone, miners' privileged status, which entitled them to greater amounts of desirable black market commodities than the typical German citizen, made them a popular target for verbal abuse from their fellow Germans. The survey indicated that a popular joke circulated amongst non-miners asked why care parcels for mine employees included decidedly unnecessary items for a relief package such as a top

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<sup>182</sup> TNA: PRO FO 1028 / 375, 1 April 1949, Miners' Rations. Also see Abelshausen, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945, p. 40; and Nicholas Balabkins, Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament, 1945-1948 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 115-116.

<sup>183</sup> Public Opinion Research Office, Political Division, The Ruhr Miner and His Family, 1947: A Social Survey (Bielefeld: March 1948).

<sup>184</sup> Brigadier General William H. Draper, Jr., to Lt. General Brian Robertson, 10 July 1946; Memoranda, 1946 [1 of 5]; Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs File, 1945-1947; State Department File, 1945-1948; Charles P. Kindleberger Papers, Box 4; Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL), Independent, Missouri. Also see TNA: PRO FO 1051 / 1100, 2 October 1947, Miners Incentive Scheme.

hat and black suit. The punch line proclaimed they were needed so “the miner can go decently clad to the funeral of the last normal consumer.”<sup>185</sup>

Despite the mixed results, the American and British Military Governments continued to test the cigarette’s usefulness – both as an economic inducement and a form of propaganda. The Revenue Branch of the Reparations, Deliveries & Restitution Division in the British zone proposed distributing cigarettes seized by anti-smuggling units to German employees charged with dismantling factories, which was a form of labor deemed “most distasteful to Germans.”<sup>186</sup> At one point, American authorities even sought permission to provide extra cigarette rations to German volunteers working as or on behalf of defense counsel in war crimes trials.<sup>187</sup> Perhaps the best example of deploying cigarettes as a form of American propaganda arose in late 1947 and early 1948, when the Associated Tobacco Manufacturers, based in the United States, proposed importing tobacco into Germany to produce so-called “propaganda cigarettes.” Distributed under the brand name of “Friendship,” these cigarettes would “tell the story of American aid” in Europe through special labels on cigarette packs. American Military Governor General Lucius D. Clay, a chain smoker, ultimately rejected the proposal due to its lack of sufficient propagandistic value and the likely cost of such a project.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> The Ruhr Miner and His Family 1947, pp. 44-45.

<sup>186</sup> TNA: PRO FO 1046 / 243, 10 November 1947, Reparations, Deliveries & Restitution Division to Revenue Branch, Subject: Inducements to Workers.

<sup>187</sup> G.H. Garde to Commanding General, 7 January 1947; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP.

<sup>188</sup> Ragland to Gray, 31 December 1947; Gray to General Lucius D. Clay, 27 January 1948; and Clay to Gray, 4 March 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP.

## **A Few Cigarettes Will Do Wonders**

The American and British Military Governments relied on the wartime rationing scheme introduced by the Nazi government discussed in the previous chapter. The program, which had initially been implemented in 1940, remained in force until four months after the June 1948 currency reform. Persistent shortages in available supplies necessitated the lengthening of ration periods to six weeks in May 1946 without an adjustment to the overall size of the ration. The longer period, which was originally slated to last only a few months, remained in effect until the abandonment of the tobacco rationing in 1948. The ration, forty cigarettes or the equivalent in other tobacco products for males over the age of eighteen, implicitly guaranteed tobacco to Germans at regular four-week intervals. As in the Third Reich, rationing policies in the immediate postwar period reflected gendered attitudes toward smoking. German women had to be twenty-five years of age to qualify for a ration coupon and, even then, had to settle for half-rations in comparison to adult males. Women over fifty-five had to specifically request a ration card since they were not automatically eligible to receive a tobacco ration.<sup>189</sup> Such distinctions according to sex put women in a generally weaker position to navigate the underground economy than German men.

For most Germans and DPs throughout the occupation, cigarettes remained too expensive and valuable to smoke. Non-smokers enjoyed a distinct economic advantage in relation to smokers, since those without the desire or compulsion to consume tobacco products could sell or trade their tobacco rations for food, soap, and other necessities. This discrepancy frustrated many smokers, some of whom called upon

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<sup>189</sup> Merki, "Die amerikanische Zigarette," p. 69. The situation was not as acute in the French zone, where most of Germany's domestic tobacco cultivation occurred.



authorities to rescind tobacco rations for non-smokers. The exorbitant cost of tobacco products seemingly penalized cigarette smokers who wished to use their tobacco as commodities as opposed to currency. Heavy smokers, in particular, faced enormous difficulties adjusting to the realities of daily life in the “cigarette economy.” A Bavarian dentist told the Süddeutsche Zeitung that his smoking habit would ruin him in time, forcing him to stretch his practice into rural areas where peasants exchanged food as compensation for his services.<sup>190</sup> Observers frequently insisted German smokers who could afford to smoke cigarettes came from the upper class or secured a lucrative lifestyle through illicit and immoral behavior. Bill Mauldin captured this sentiment in an editorial cartoon for Stars & Stripes in which two onlookers determined a passerby “must have made a fortune” because “he has cigarets to burn.”<sup>191</sup>

Further complicating matters for smokers and ration administrators, the overall number of smokers in Germany increased over the course of the final years of the war and in the immediate postwar period, precisely when shortages were most acute. In the mid-1950s, Pohlisch estimated that approximately two-thirds of Germans over the age of sixteen smoked cigarettes.<sup>192</sup> The growth in the number of smokers as a percentage of the total population in part reflected the multiple functions of tobacco products in the difficult economic climate. In the American zone, drastic and persistent food shortages prompted one writer to quip that occupying authorities granted Germans “1550

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<sup>190</sup> “Attitude Towards Black Market,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 August 1947; Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SZ); SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>191</sup> Bill Mauldin, S&S, 2 June 1947, p. 2.

<sup>192</sup> Kurt Pohlisch, Tabak: Betrachtungen über Genuss- und Rauschpharmaka (Stuttgart: Thieme Verlag, 1954), p. 134; and Proctor, pp. 242-247.

theoretical calories” through rations.<sup>193</sup> Given the dearth of available food supplies, those with access to tobacco products increasingly used smoking as a pharmacological answer to hunger pains, as opposed to smoking in pursuit of pleasure. Relief workers and occupation personnel noted Germans in possession of cigarettes frequently scheduled their consumption of nicotine in such a way as to minimize pain and discomfort associated with hunger and malnutrition.<sup>194</sup> Apart from addressing the food shortage, smoking represented a distraction from the travails of everyday life. The process of acquiring tobacco and ritual of lighting up enabled smokers to temporarily relieve stress or boredom that was all too commonplace.<sup>195</sup>

The cumulative effects of shortages and the rampant black market trade in cigarettes reshaped German smoking habits over the course of the 1940s. More specifically, two distinct trends took shape as the number of tobacco consumers increased, while per head consumption of tobacco decreased considerably. German cigarette use, for instance, declined dramatically from 1,022 cigarettes to 465 per German, but more people turned to smoking as a survival strategy and coping mechanism within a general climate of scarcity. Some went so far as to specifically schedule their

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<sup>193</sup> Kurt J. Fischer, “US-Zone 1947,” in Rümelin, p. 26.

<sup>194</sup> Joel Carl Welty, The Hunger Year in the French Zone of Divided Germany, 1946-1947 (Beloit: Beloit College, 1993), p. 145; Gustav Stolper, German Realities (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948), p. 99; and Pohlisch, p. 169.

<sup>195</sup> Christoph Maria Merki, “The Changing Perceptions of Tobacco: Smoking in Germany During the 1930s and 1940s,” in Order and Disorder: The Health Implications of Eating and Drinking in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Alexander Fenton (East Linton: Tuckwell, 2000), p. 333.

smoking each day in order to minimize their pain and hunger.<sup>196</sup> The combination of a larger population of smokers and inadequate supplies resulted in immense demand for a scarce product, creating large headaches for smokers and authorities alike. Germans and DPs drew upon and adapted pre-existing survival strategies used during the war or previous economic collapses, including private cultivation, *Kippensammlung* (collection of cigarette stubs), and the use of substitutes and additives. In turn, occupation and civilian authorities sought to rein in the black market via a variety of disciplining techniques ranging from raids of popular black marketing spots and publicly shaming black marketers to the appropriation of black marketing in officially sanctioned barter marts and the introduction of a private import ban in the U.S. zone.

Postwar Germany transformed itself into a barter society, a process made evident by retailers and black market traders who quoted prices in cigarettes as opposed to Reichsmarks. American and German observers alike declared the underground economy to be a “necessary evil.”<sup>197</sup> According to Thaddäus Troll, it did “not appear possible to live a life free from the black market.”<sup>198</sup> Participation in the black market required access to valuable commodities, including chocolate, coffee, soap, and food. The exaggerated value of tobacco products meant that illicit trading in cigarettes became “not only a way of life” but also “the means of life” for many Germans.<sup>199</sup> In his memoir

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<sup>196</sup> Pohlisch, p. 162 and 169-171; Stolper, p. 99; and Merki, “The Changing Perceptions of Tobacco,” p. 333.

<sup>197</sup> Lewis H. Brown, *A Report on Germany* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947), p. 243).

<sup>198</sup> Troll, pp. 62-65.

<sup>199</sup> D.A. Gallant, Chief Agent, “Black market Operations in Munich,” to Office of the Provost Marshal, 19 February 1948; 383.8 Black Marketing 1948; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

recounting relief efforts in the French zone, American Quaker Joel Welty explained, “a few cigarettes will do wonders” when it came to locating scarce goods and securing vital services.<sup>200</sup> Emblematic of this type of economy was sociologist Hilde Thurnwald’s discovery of a Berlin family erecting road signs declaring their desire to trade their tobacco for foodstuffs.<sup>201</sup>

Whereas many viewed the black market activities of Germans – and DPs to a lesser extent – as an unfortunate necessity brought about the social and economic circumstances of the occupation, much of the trade was driven by American soldiers’ greed and exploitation of German misery. The potential pay-off from a single large trade or a series of small deals on the black market proved to be quite appealing to many GIs and those with immediate access to highly valued goods. Stars & Stripes repeatedly ran articles on PX warehouse thefts by Americans and German employees, who found the large amounts of valuable black market commodities too attractive to pass up.<sup>202</sup> The Quartermaster’s Depot in Ludwigsburg, for example, claimed it lost nearly \$10,000 per day in goods through theft.<sup>203</sup> Stars & Stripes declared October 1945 to be a “black market month,” since soldiers shipped more money back to the United States than had been paid out by the Army. The introduction of caps on the amount of money that

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<sup>200</sup> Welty, p. 26.

<sup>201</sup> Hilde Thurnwald, Gegenwarts-Probleme Berliner Familien: Eine Soziologische Untersuchung an 498 Familien (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1948), pp. 81-83.

<sup>202</sup> For example, see “11 Germans Sent to Prison For Theft of PX Cigarettes,” S&S, 27 June 1947, p. 3. In this case, the thieves reportedly stole more than 900 cartons of cigarettes valued at approximately 1,000 marks per carton.

<sup>203</sup> Botting, p. 182.

soldiers could mail home proved to be fruitless in curtailing black market excesses, though, since GIs and civilians alike could simply attribute their windfalls to fortuitous nights at the poker table.<sup>204</sup> It did, however, encourage American personnel to focus increasingly on the acquisition of valuable objects, such as antiques, furniture, silverware, and war souvenirs, or various services, such as housecleaning or dog sitting. Relics of the Nazi past proved to be particularly popular with American soldiers, as depicted in a March 1947 Frankenpost cartoon, which showed a German wife berating her husband for burning their copy of Mein Kampf after another woman successfully traded Hitler's tome for several cartons of Camel cigarettes.<sup>205</sup>

### **A Nation of Bowed Heads**

In light of the inflated black market value of cigarettes, it is not surprising that many Germans, DPs, and occupation personnel went to great lengths in order to secure and capitalize upon their cigarette holdings. American soldiers enjoyed a privileged status in relation to Germans and DPs thanks to their PX rations, which provided an instant source of black market revenue. Chronic shortages and the potential range of uses for tobacco products led many Germans and DPs of all ages to develop alternative means of acquiring tobacco products. Children and old men competed with one another as they scoured the streets in search of butts (*Stummeling* or *Kippensammlung*) to fashion new cigarettes out of the remnants of discarded cigarettes. Those with sufficient space

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<sup>204</sup> "ETO Troops Seize Chance to Send 'Big Money' Home," S&S, 31 October 1945, p. 1. Also see John Willoughby, Remaking the Conquering Heroes: The Social and Geopolitical Impact of the Post-War American Occupation of Germany (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 21; and Petrov, p. 206.

<sup>205</sup> "Cartoon," Frankenpost, 26 March 1947; Frankenpost (FP); SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

cultivated tobacco at home, primarily in order to trade their own stash on the black market, while others sought out substitutes for authentic tobacco or turned to additives.

*Stummeling* evolved into a common practice in cities and towns with significant GI populations. For many American observers, the sight of Germans stooped over to snatch used cigarettes from the street epitomized the despair and hopelessness of ordinary Germans. Stub-collection quickly became normalized, prompting Eugene Davidson to describe Germany as a “nation of bowed heads.”<sup>206</sup> Stories of tram conductors stopping their vehicles to gather a “Gross Stomp” from the gutter and physical altercations between Germans, old and young alike, over cigarette butts illustrated the depths of Germany’s decline.<sup>207</sup> Collectors of various ages and backgrounds frequently engaged in physical combat with one another in the scrums that formed, shocking and entertaining military personnel in the process. (Figure 2.1) The level of aggression displayed in the pursuit of a single cigarette butt and the Allies’ willingness to exploit Germans’ economic misery etched itself into Germany’s cultural consciousness and remained there for decades after the occupation. Filmmaker Rainer Werner Fassbinder incorporated a battle over a GI’s discarded cigarette into the opening scenes of Das Ehe von Maria Braun (1979), identifying it as both a survival strategy and critical symbol of Germany’s demise.

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<sup>206</sup> Eugene Davidson, The Death & Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1959), p. 85.

<sup>207</sup> “Now You Tell One...” Red Circle News, 27 September 1945, p. 2; OMGB/Intel/“Bavarian” (Newspaper) 27 Sep 45 – 31 Jan 46” (Bav.); General Records of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria (OMGB); The Control Office; Records of the Executive Office; RG 260; NACP.

Germans and DPs who worked in close proximity with American soldiers or in restaurants they frequented held an advantage over other collectors of cigarette butts. Waiters employed in cafés and restaurants frequented by U.S. personnel reportedly earned “the equivalent of a \$1,000-a-week-income” by selling reconstituted cigarettes from the contents of ashtrays.<sup>208</sup> Life correspondent and war veteran Julian Bach, Jr. claimed that a study of cafés along the popular Kurfürstendamm in Berlin revealed that ashtrays rarely went untouched for more than a minute after the patrons departed. Waiters often had to contend with competition from young Germans who stormed the clubs to confiscate valuable butts.<sup>209</sup> As a common social practice, *Stummeling* even warranted advice columns in local papers. Newspaper editor Walter Kloeck recommended readers focus on streets frequented by Americans where “butts of very respectable length fly out” of American vehicles and “may lie in the gutter for up to 15 seconds.” Kloeck, who claimed to scour the streets at night in search of tobacco to offer guests when hosting dinner parties, advised against loitering in the immediate vicinity of popular GI hangouts since the “street urchins simply can’t be beat.”<sup>210</sup>

Aside from serving as a way to augment tobacco rations, the rituals surrounding *Stummeling* were performative in nature and offered a forum for occupiers and occupied to express anxieties. In letters to friends, a member of the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps complained about mess hall waiters helping themselves to lit cigarettes resting on

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<sup>208</sup> Arthur Noyes, “Cigarette Butts Make Waiters Rich in Vienna,” S&S, 6 January 1946, p. 3.

<sup>209</sup> Julian Bach, Jr., America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation (New York: Random House, 1946), pp. 69-70.

<sup>210</sup> “Collecting of Stubs,” FP, 27 August 1947; FP; SC, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

the edges of ashtrays.<sup>211</sup> Several soldiers submitted gripes to the “B-Bag” in Stars & Stripes, expressing their dismay at the “undemocratic” and harassing behavior of Germans toward GIs who dared to smoke in public.<sup>212</sup> Others saw opportunity for amusement in the widespread practice. A journalist in Berlin recounted seeing one smoker deliberately attract a “circle of children, able-bodied men, and whiskered old men, all waiting to dive for the butt.”<sup>213</sup> During the early stage of the occupation, numerous GIs conveyed their contempt for Germans through the seemingly ritualistic destruction of butts by grinding them into the ground with their boots or tossing the remnants into water. Such behaviors reportedly declined in frequency as the U.S. demobilized soldiers with combat experience and replaced them with troops who had not directly participated in the war against Germans.<sup>214</sup> Don Sheppard, a cartoonist for Stars & Stripes, portrayed the potential maliciousness of ordinary GIs who took perverse pleasure in teasing Germans with cigarette butts in a comic depicting a GI snatching a stub away from a hand reaching down to pick it up off the street, underscoring the degree of economic inequality between the occupier and occupied. (Figure 2.2) In contrast to Sheppard’s portrayal of *Kippensammlung*-related sadism, the satirical “Dream of the German Who Grows His Own Tobacco” in a Bavarian newspaper inverted the positions

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<sup>211</sup> Major Anne E. Alinder, Bulletin No. 4, 2 November 1945; Research Center, Wisconsin Veterans Museum.

<sup>212</sup> T/5 Philip C. Howse, 9<sup>th</sup> Inf. Div., “Let GI Maintain His Own Self-Respect,” S&S, 6 December 1946, p. 2.

<sup>213</sup> Sayer, pp. 505-506; Pfc., 35<sup>th</sup> Constab. Sq., “Advises Field-Stripping Cigaretts,” S&S, 7 October 1946, p. 2.

<sup>214</sup> Walter C. Krause, So I Was a Sergeant: Memoirs of an Occupation Soldier (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1978), p. 36.



of power by depicting two desperate GIs in hot pursuit of a well-dressed German man happily smoking his cigarette.<sup>215</sup>

Such customs underscored how the economic value of cigarettes allowed occupation personnel to employ the discarding of cigarettes as a means of conveying political and cultural animosities, a reality that was not lost on many young Germans. Recalling their experiences in the 1940s, several German children recalled distinct patterns in the smoking habits of American and French soldiers. According to these accounts, the French typically “smoked cigarettes down to nothing” before inserting a needle into the remainder of the butt, thereby allowing the soldier an opportunity to use up “the last bit until nearly nothing remained.” Doing so denied German stub-collectors the opportunity to scoop up a potentially valuable cigarette butt.<sup>216</sup> In contrast, many Germans remembered the Americans as being far more generous than their French counterparts. Whereas French soldiers would smoke the entire cigarette, Americans “took a few puffs and then threw away their cigarettes.”<sup>217</sup>

Numerous American observers worried about the potential impact a life of *Stummeling* could ultimately have on the moral and physical development of German children. Those who objected to the exploitation of young children recommended several strategies to bring an end to the “dead-end kids” scouring the streets with tin boxes to

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<sup>215</sup> Trend: A Report of Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 47, 29 October 1947 (13-30 October 1947); 13/142-3 10a Trend Bavaria 1946/1948 #28-54 (Trend Bav.); Records of the Land Director: Reports, Division Publications & Related Records, 1945-1949 (LD); OMGB; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>216</sup> Wolfgang W. E. Samuel, The War of Our Childhood: Memories of World War II (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002), pp. 241-242.

<sup>217</sup> Samuel, p. 31.

collects stubs.<sup>218</sup> The easiest solution was for GIs to field strip their butts after smoking, which entailed removing the remaining cigarette paper and dumping any left over tobacco out to make collection impossible. Soldiers involved with the German Youth Activities (GYA) in Bremen expressly prohibited its young German patrons from the “universal practice” of *Kippensammlung*. According to GYA volunteers, the organization’s “first commitment” was “to teach the children not to pick up butts and not to beg.”<sup>219</sup> In Bremerhaven, the GYA organized a picket line along “Tobacco Road” to rebuild the children’s moral value, while simultaneously discouraging delinquency. The young protesters carried signs reading, “Make the Butts Kaputt, Not the Youth” and “Discourage Street Gangs: Kids Need Self-Respect.”<sup>220</sup> (Figure 2.3)

Germans also turned to the private cultivation to secure additional supplies of tobacco and possible black market currency.<sup>221</sup> Initially, the British and American zones of occupation maintained pre-existing policies, which limited private tobacco farmers to 200 plants per family. Those interested in growing their own tobacco plants had to pay a

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<sup>218</sup> The “dead-end kids” refers to a series of popular plays and films in the United States about a band of juvenile delinquents, whose acts of degeneracy present a threat to the social order. “The German View: A Report for Counter-Intelligence,” 19 November 1945; Public Opinion – Germany (The German View); Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-1954 (FAR); Operations Branch (OB); Administrative Services Division (ASD); Records of the Adjutant’s General Office, 1917-, RG 407; NACP.

<sup>219</sup> “Bremen Boys Club: A U.S. Sergeant Finances a Lesson in Democracy,” *Life*, 9 December 1946, p. 36. Also see L. H. Berlin, “Comment on GYA,” *S&S*, 23 January 1947, p. 2.

<sup>220</sup> Photograph No. 111-SC-286413; “German Youth Movement,” 15 June 1947; U.S. Army Signal Corps; RG 260; NACP. The use of “Tobacco Road” in this protest may have been a reference to the popular play and subsequent film based on Erskine Caldwell’s 1932 novel, *Tobacco Road*, which told the story of impoverished sharecroppers during the Great Depression.

<sup>221</sup> Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 117-118; Michael Wildt, *Der Traum von Sattwerden: Hunger und Protest, Schwarzmarkt und Selbsthilfe* (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1986), pp. 87-90.

RM 48 licensing fee in order to plant the maximum amount, which could ideally produce ten kilos of raw tobacco.<sup>222</sup> The license, however, required tobacco growers to deliver their yields to tobacco manufacturers. Already in 1946, homegrown tobacco enterprises produced more than twenty-two times as much tobacco as professional tobacco farmers.<sup>223</sup> Given the discrepancies and the black market values of tobacco products, private growers had limited incentive to actually deliver their crop to manufacturers. In light of the black market's temptation, the U.S. and British zones reduced the cap from 200 to twenty-five plants, or 1.5 kilos, in 1947.<sup>224</sup>

Notwithstanding the cost of printing due to paper shortages, publishers released several self-help guides for the planting and harvesting of tobacco in small plots.<sup>225</sup> The do-it-yourself style guides and newspaper advice columns acted as a forum for Germans to express and address their tobacco longings after prolonged periods of constrained consumption. Tony Kellen's Tabak im Garten promised readers an end to long queues and "sold out" signs at the tobacconist's shop should they follow the directions.<sup>226</sup> Most pamphlets acknowledged the "hard work and effort" required to privately cultivate

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<sup>222</sup> Seirs, "Tobacco Situation," 10 March 1947; GR, IB, ED; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>223</sup> Merki, "Die amerikanische Zigarette," pp. 62-63.

<sup>224</sup> John M. Warde, Textiles & Consumer Goods Section, "Report of Discussion Held with Mr. A. M. Spears, Tobacco Expert, Handicrafts and Economic Inspectorate, CCG, at Minden," 24 March 1947; BECG (US) Tobacco; GR, IB, ED; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>225</sup> The Reich Institute for Tobacco Research released a guide promoting home cultivation of tobacco in 1944. See Proctor, p. 246.

<sup>226</sup> Tony Kellen, Tabak im Garten: Anbau und Fermentation für jedermann (Stuttgart: Kosmos, Gesellschaft der Naturfreunde Franck'sche Verlagshandlung, 1946), p. 6.

tobacco.<sup>227</sup> Such comments on the part of the authors tapped into prevailing anxieties regarding a lack of productivity among German workers, as expressed by occupation authorities, German business leaders, and economists.<sup>228</sup> Successfully growing tobacco, though, allowed readers to indulge themselves in a far more respectable manner than resorting to the infinitely more dangerous spaces of the black marketing or the chaotic and competitive world of *Stummeling*.<sup>229</sup> Margarete Heydenreich heralded tobacco as a “miracle plant” and a “life treasure,” less than a decade following the most intense period of Nazi anti-smoking efforts.<sup>230</sup> According to Heydenreich, privately growing one’s own tobacco created opportunities for leisure, relaxation, and recovery in a difficult environment.<sup>231</sup> Heydenreich’s pamphlet stands out given the strong views against women’s smoking, which remained a fundamental component of the postwar culture of smoking – particularly with respect to the issue of fraternization. Another set of instructions for the individual planter objected to the extension of tobacco’s benefits to other, more vulnerable social groups, arguing women and youth should not be permitted

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<sup>227</sup> Alfred Kitze, Selbstgebauter Tabak (Berlin: Deutscher Bauern Verlag, 1946), p. 3.

<sup>228</sup> Walter Eucken and Fritz W. Meyer, “The Economic Situation in Germany,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 260 (November 1948), p. 56.

<sup>229</sup> F. A. Dieckmann, Tabak aus heimischen Kräutern: Anleitung zur Sammlung und Zubereitung von Kräutertabak (Berlin: Verlag Naturkundliche Korrespondenz, 1946), p. 3.

<sup>230</sup> Margarete Heydenreich, Mein Tabak: eine Edelkultur: Ein Tabak-Brevier für alle, die ihn lieben (Pilsenhöhe: Tabak-Edelkulturen, 1947), p. 5.

<sup>231</sup> Heydenreich, p. 71.

to smoke. The authors specified tobacco consumption should be limited only to adult men.<sup>232</sup>

The ability to grow tobacco in home gardens provided private individuals with a semblance of power, as they no longer depended exclusively upon the inconsistent rations offered by occupation authorities or the exploitative black market. The quality, however, could not be guaranteed. Alfred Lattinger argued that tobacco produced on small plots was occasionally superior to the limited amount of tobacco readily available for purchase.<sup>233</sup> The quality of privately cultivated tobacco could not be guaranteed, however, which limited its emancipatory potential – as did the fact that a large portion of backyard tobacco was destined for the black market. As F. A. Dieckmann’s leaflet explained, the “smoker had learned to be content without asking much in terms of quality,” adding that home-grown tobacco may deliver a “pleasant taste” and “good combustibility,” but that it could not duplicate the effect of nicotine in professionally-manufactured cigarettes.<sup>234</sup>

Recognizing the tremendous variations in tobacco quality, some pamphlets simply set the standard for success in terms of “smokeable quality,” without offering any definition of what constituted “smokeable.”<sup>235</sup> Other guides instructed readers to pay particularly close attention to the aroma, which could be used to determine the tobacco’s

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<sup>232</sup> Tabakanbau- und Tabakverwertungs-Gesellschaft m. b. H., Die Praxis im Tabakanbau: zum Selbstunterricht für Pflanze (Döbeln, 1946), p. 31.

<sup>233</sup> Alfred Emil Lattinger, Der Tabak-Eigenbau (Graz: Leykum, 1946), p. 3. Also see Madlen Lorei and Richard Kirn, Frankfurt und die Drei Wilden Jahren: Ein Bericht (Frankfurt: Verlag Frankfurter Bücher, 1962), p. 92.

<sup>234</sup> Dieckmann, pp. 3-4.

<sup>235</sup> Kellen, p. 6.

quality.<sup>236</sup> In this regard, the aroma of American brands, particularly Chesterfield and Camel cigarettes, set the standard.<sup>237</sup> For occupation soldiers and many non-smokers, the unappealing and offensive smell of German tobacco was a surefire sign of the tobacco's origins and made it an easy "target of ridicule." This did not dissuade Germans from cultivating their own tobacco, as evidenced by the "small lines of tobacco leaves hanging on the sunny sides of houses and sheds" and any other areas where the crop could be properly dried out.<sup>238</sup> Desperate smokers exhibited a willingness to use any type of combustible material in order to replicate the experience of smoking. Those who consumed the typically inferior home-grown tobacco – or tobacco made from additives or substitutes – ascribed greater meaning to the act of smoking as opposed to the actual pharmacological effect or potential health risks. The unpredictable chemical composition of tobacco featuring dried tea or cherry tree leaves, dandelions, or other "forest matter" created additional health risks, but often represented a last resort.<sup>239</sup>

### **The Cigarette and Fraternization in the Contact Zone**

Apart from economic power, Americans, Germans, and DPs used cigarettes to convey a variety of interests and ideas ranging from political values to social standing and sexual interest. The cigarette's significance in establishing and altering the contours of both formal and informal relations among occupiers and the occupied helped shape

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<sup>236</sup> E. Weber, Ratschläge und Winke für den Tabakpflanzer (Halle: Alle Welt-Verlag, 1946), p. 5.

<sup>237</sup> Meyer, p. 10; Pohlisch, p. 137.

<sup>238</sup> "Tobacco," Bavarian, 1 November 1945, p. 3; Bav.; OMGB; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>239</sup> See Pohlisch, p. 166; Hess, pp. 47-53.

both daily life and German-American relations. The availability, use, and even discarding of cigarettes had the ability to redefine relationships between the occupiers and occupied. As such, they also influenced popular attitudes toward GIs, the Office of the Military Government of the U.S. Zone (OMGUS), and key social and economic policies that affected everyday life in the U.S. zone.<sup>240</sup>

Numerous Americans, including the Land Director of Bavaria, Murray D. Van Wagoner, viewed cigarettes as a crucial link between the Military Government and their local counterparts. The incorporation of tobacco products into political meetings with Germans presented an opportunity for social and political bonding, while moving away from past conflicts. The Information Control Division (ICD) petitioned OMGUS for additional cigarettes and food to pass along to contacts and informants for the purposes of gathering intelligence within the U.S. zone. ICD insisted their lack of extra rations “severely handicapped” the Intelligence Branch, since most Germans needed or wanted

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<sup>240</sup> On the history of political structures and reform efforts with regard to key occupation objectives, see John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); The Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Washington D.C., 1950), pp. 21-33; and Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany (New York: Berghahn Books, 1996). Recently, historians have begun to view the history of the Allied occupation through informal relations and cultural practices. See Maria Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Heide Fehrenbach, Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Donna Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965 (New York: NYU Press, 2007); and Perry Biddiscombe, “Dangerous Liaisons: The Anti-Fraternization Movement in the U.S. Occupation Zones of Germany and Austria, 1945-1948,” Journal of Social History 34:3 (2001), 611-647.

to be plied with material benefits in exchange for information.<sup>241</sup> Van Wagoner requested additional cigarette rations and assorted tobacco products for dealing with local German officials in Bavaria, suggesting the failure to offer cigarettes reflected poorly upon the Military Government. An American's offer of a cigarette to a German, according to Van Wagoner, transcended proper etiquette and, as a "democratic" gesture "natural" to American citizens, affected local and foreign relations. The example set by the American could help instill democratic character among the Germans, who would reflexively emulate this behavior. The inclusion of tobacco products in such meetings did not constitute bribery or corruption because the "entire purpose is a display and proof of courtesy and good manners by the Americans to his German visitors," bolstering the cause of democratization through learned behavior and "occupation mimicry."<sup>242</sup> Germans often made their expectations known through the "ostentatious display of ash-trays and matches" during scheduled meetings. Proponents of Van Wagoner's suggestion claimed "there is no doubt that every smoker will answer more easily and frankly when offered a cigarette."<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> B.B. McMahon, Chief of Division, to Office of Director of Information Control, 13 September 1946, Subject: Operational Supplies; ICD, OMGB; RG 260, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Germany (BuArch B).

<sup>242</sup> Murray D. Van Wagoner, Land Director OMGB, to Major General George P. Hays, Deputy Military Governor OMGUS, 19 February 1948; James E. King, Jr., Acting Secretary General, to Van Wagoner, 28 February 1948; AG 439 Tobacco; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP. On reflexive democracy within the occupation context, see Jennifer Fay, Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of Postwar Germany (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 24.

<sup>243</sup> Dr. Jürgen Weisker et al., ICD Interrogators, to Mr. William Dieffenbach, 21 May 1946, Subject: Request for Additional Food-rations, Tobaccos and Shoes; ICD, OMGB; RG 260; BuArch B.



Of far greater concern to OMGUS, many German males, and Americans in the United States were the more informal social and sexual relationships struck up between GIs and German women. In advance of the American occupation, the military's Pocket Guide to Germany, distributed to all soldiers in late 1944, explicitly forbade servicemen from having any social or sexual contact with Germans, regardless of age or sex.<sup>244</sup> The question of fraternization increasingly came to be dominated by heterosocial and, more importantly, heterosexual relationships, as both German and American authorities came to see GI interactions with German men and children as normal. Due to the demographic dislocations produced by war and the concomitant social and economic transformations brought by defeat, German women took on more prominent positions within the family unit. In the absence of men, they also assumed a greater public presence through their labor in clearing debris from city streets, as epitomized by the *Trümmerfrauen* ("rubble women") during the so-called "hour of the women."<sup>245</sup> The seemingly radical reorientation of German society in the midst created what many perceived to be a crisis in German masculinity. As the Süddeutsche Zeitung declared in December 1945, the "masculine era is over."<sup>246</sup> Social and sexual contacts between Americans and German women exacerbated these anxieties and remained a contentious subject throughout the occupation, one that helped shape and was shaped by changing gender roles and identities.

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<sup>244</sup> United States Army Service Forces, Pocket Guide to Germany (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944).

<sup>245</sup> Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 75-107.

<sup>246</sup> Walter Brockmann, Press Control Officer, to Lt. Col. G. Ring, Press Control Section, "Report for Individual Licensed Newspapers," 28 December 1945; SZ; SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

The inclusion of cigarettes and other luxury goods in German-American relationships complicated matters considerably. The manner in which GIs and Fräuleins offered, exchanged, or consumed cigarettes depended greatly upon the nature of the specific relationship. The distribution of cigarettes by a GI to a German man was typically viewed as an act of courtesy or diplomacy. In contrast, the possession of American cigarettes was often sufficient cause for German men or American journalists to dismiss German women as disreputable and immoral Fräuleins. German women who developed bonds with occupation soldiers ran the risk of being characterized as “professional Fräuleins.”<sup>247</sup> Such depictions, though, oversimplified the causes and meaning of such relationships to the parties involved, implying that American men and German women were incapable of forging authentic emotional bonds. German women “surrendered” and “would willingly sell” themselves in exchange for cigarettes.<sup>248</sup> In a piece for Stars & Stripes, Betty Luros wrote that German women were naturally promiscuous since their “embraces were transferred” with ease from the SS to GIs for “a few cigarettes or a chocolate bar.”<sup>249</sup> To many children, the issuance of cigarettes to German women served as a tangible sign that the hostilities had concluded. As a young boy, Bernd Heinrich believed such transactions signified that “the war was over” for women and children.<sup>250</sup> Similarly, Wolfgang Samuel viewed women in relation to their

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<sup>247</sup> “German Paper Reproves ‘Professional Fräuleins,’” S&S, 1 March 1947, p. 12.

<sup>248</sup> Leon C. Standifer, Binding Up the Wounds: An American Soldier in Occupied Germany, 1945-1946 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), p. 144. Also see Krause, pp. 182-183 and p. 35.

<sup>249</sup> Betty Luros, “Veronica Dankeschoen Gets Notices in German Papers,” S&S, 1 August 1946, p. 8.

<sup>250</sup> Samuel, The War of Our Childhood, p. 153.

cigarette value, concluding that German women were worth approximately one pack of cigarettes from a foreign soldier.<sup>251</sup> The cigarette possessed tremendous power within the context of social and sexual relationships between GIs and German women, as their mere presence automatically undermined the authenticity of these connections.

OMGUS initially used the fraternization ban as a political message to remind Germans of their collective guilt for crimes committed during the Third Reich. The Military Government identified German women as security and public health threats preying upon naïve GIs seeking companionship in a strange land. Journalists and editorial cartoonists for Stars & Stripes adopted the figure “Veronika Dankeschoen,” or VD, to embody the multiple dangers that German women presented toward American soldiers and objectives in Germany. Veronika, who was frequently portrayed as a rotund woman who did not suffer from want and who often appeared in Nazi regalia, was a heavy smoker. She chastised her GI boyfriend for delivering unpopular brands and occasionally appeared as a compulsive smoker with multiple cigarettes hanging from her lips. As Nazi symbols hinted at Veronika’s political failings, her heavysset appearance and excessive smoking functioned as visual cues to her suspicious moral background. (Figures 2.4 and 2.5)

Germans also criticized women for being “with the Ami for the Ami,” intimating that they secured American benefactors solely for the purpose of maintaining steady access to American cigarettes.<sup>252</sup> A small, largely unorganized series of local anti-

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<sup>251</sup> Wolfgang W. E. Samuel, German Boy: A Child in War (New York: Broadway Books, 2000), pp. 345-346.

<sup>252</sup> Pohlisch, p. 143; Hess, “The Other Prohibition,” p. 54; and Merki, “Die amerikanische Zigarette,” p. 72.

fraternization movements in Germany appropriated the image of Veronika in its propaganda, which overwhelmingly targeted German women as opposed to their GI boyfriends.<sup>253</sup> In addition to public shaming rituals, including hair shearing, German men put up posters asserting the legend of the quick surrender, claiming “He fell for the Fatherland, she for cigarettes.”<sup>254</sup> Anti-fraternization propaganda openly suggested any woman in the company of an American soldier was a prostitute seeking material favors and asked “is this behavior of the German women not shameful?”<sup>255</sup> German men projected their anger and frustration with their own inability to provide such resources in the midst of a “sexual competition” with GIs onto German women, where cigarettes represented potency, status, and opportunity.

A street poster most likely erected by ideologically-committed teens and young adults in the days following the cessation of hostilities reprimanded women for fraternizing with Americans illustrated these anxieties, claiming fraternizers had betrayed “exhausted” soldiers who fought for six years in contrast to the “five short minutes” on the part of German women. “Whoring with strangers” of all races for cigarettes and coffee “defiled” all Germans.<sup>256</sup> Women’s public sexuality challenged traditional sexual

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<sup>253</sup> Biddiscombe, p. 622. Also see Perry Biddiscombe, Werwolf! The History of the National Socialist Guerilla Movement, 1944-1946 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). In isolated cases, bands of young German males and former Wehrmacht soldiers attacked GIs, including incidents of castration and murder.

<sup>254</sup> Christoph Boyer and Hans Woller, “Hat die deutsche Frau versagt? Die neue Freiheit der deutschen Frau in der Trümmerzeit 1945,” Journal für Geschichte 2 (1983), p. 36.

<sup>255</sup> Fritz, p. 210.

<sup>256</sup> Fehrenbach, p. 46; Boyer and Woller, p. 36; and Suzanne zur Nieden, “Erotic Fraternization: The Legend of German Women’s Quick Surrender,” in Home/Front: The Military, War and

roles and gender identities within the chaotic atmosphere of the occupation. The poster closed with a thinly veiled threat about the fate of these women, suggesting “the Russians will come for you soon,” and added that no German man would ever respect the fraternizers.<sup>257</sup> Interracial couples stirred up anxieties among white GIs as well as German men, resulting in numerous confrontations in GI clubs and taverns catering to American troops.<sup>258</sup> Kurt Fischer’s description of conditions in the U.S. zone in 1947 claimed German women’s presence at “Negro clubs,” where couples engaged in “savage rejoicing,” danced wildly, and tossed cigarettes to performers on stage, amounted to a “late revenge for slave markets.”<sup>259</sup>

Anti-fraternization discourse in German newspapers, licensed by the occupation authorities, also made direct reference to the material privileges enjoyed by German women. Journalist Walter Gong repeated the adage of the Nazi era – the “German woman does not smoke” – in his objections to the “gay girls of the evening.” By recycling the popular claim from Nazi anti-smoking propaganda, Gong insinuated the female smokers of the occupation era were not authentically German.<sup>260</sup> The

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Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. by Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (New York: Berg, 2002), p. 303.

<sup>257</sup> On mass rape see Normal Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 78-90; Atina Grossmann, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women By Occupation Soldiers,” in West Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era, ed. by Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 33-52.

<sup>258</sup> Höhn, pp. 85-108. Many GIs from the south saw interracial relationships as a violation of the principles of segregation.

<sup>259</sup> Fischer, p. 8.

<sup>260</sup> “Main Echo,” 14 May 1946; Main Echo; SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

Schwäbische Donau Zeitung also questioned the sincerity of these relationships in a short story entitled “Youth Among Themselves.” Two young women, Emma and Lotte, “have close relationships to the occupation power,” which they use to get cigarettes. When Emma inquired if Lotte would meet her GI boyfriend, Lotte explained a rendezvous was unnecessary because her cigarettes would “last me until tomorrow!” The Press Branch of the American Military Government, which was responsible for monitoring German publications in the U.S. zone, described the joke as “insulting to the Germans and the Americans.”<sup>261</sup> Anti-fraternization propaganda created and distributed by frustrated veterans and Nazi holdovers reflected increased anxieties about shifting identities and roles in the wake of military defeat and a changing geopolitical landscape that ultimately resulted in the partition of Germany.

German women, for their part, did not passively accept the negative characterizations as presented by men. An unidentified female journalist for the Main Post objected to the reduction of German women to nothing more than cigarette-driven prostitutes. She blamed existing social and economic conditions on the failure of German men, arguing women had suffered from loneliness for years due to the war. American men, who had yet to lose “their chivalrousness even in war,” won over German women. Fraternization, according to this view, did not represent a social or political evil, but rather a rare forum to find companionship and love “independent of national barriers.”<sup>262</sup> Someone purporting to be Veronika wrote a scathing response to Gong, admonishing the journalist for his jealousy, which stemmed from the fact that “nobody will offer you a

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<sup>261</sup> “Sideline,” 21 November 1946; Schwabisch Donau Zeitung; SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>262</sup> “German and Americans,” 28 October 1946; Main Post; SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP.

cigarette!”<sup>263</sup> Although Veronika challenged Gong’s characterization of German women, she did so by inverting one of the fundamental arguments of anti-fraternization discourse and reasserting the central role of cigarettes and other luxury goods in German-American heterosocial and heterosexual relationships. In doing so, she not only laid claim to public space and public smoking on behalf of all German women, she also threatened to disrupt the sexual hierarchy in German society.

The existence of German-American sexual relationships threatened the psyche and sexual identities of German men. The effects of war, including captivity in Soviet prison camps, produced a “surplus of women” and reduced the number of potential male partners for German women. Moreover, many of the German males present in occupied Germany were either too old, too young, too disheveled, too broken, be it due to physical injury or psychological scars.<sup>264</sup> The postwar demographics provided women with increased power and leverage in selecting sexual partners, as they could eschew German men altogether and pursue relationships with occupation personnel. Within this context, the reasonably well-fed and healthy American soldiers loaded with PX rations and contacts in the United States ready and willing to send more supplies were more attractive as potential partners. Material considerations played an important role in bringing German women and American men together, though it is not possible to establish how many relationships were formed exclusively because of food, cigarettes, or

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<sup>263</sup> “Veronika Dankeschoen,” 19 September 1946; Nuernberger Nachrichten; SR, PB, ICD; RG 260; NACP. Emphasis in the original.

<sup>264</sup> Frank Biess, “Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of Masculine Citizenship in West Germany, 1945-1955,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. by Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 59-61; and Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 107-110.

nylon stockings. Thurnwald's 1948 sociological survey of Berlin families found many parents approved of their daughters' involvement with U.S. troops, citing the "gifts of love" (*materiellen Liebesgaben*) as the primary reason for their consent.<sup>265</sup>

The transfer of cigarettes from Americans to German women even clouded criminal investigations of sexual violence. An April 1947 inquiry by the Royal Military Police (RMP) into an alleged rape of a twenty-two year old German housemaid by an American officer took the material exchange into account when determining whether or not a sexual assault had occurred. According to the victim's account, the armed assailant entered her room late at night and began to fondle her. As she broke down in tears, her alleged rapist offered a cigarette to "calm" her down, which she initially refused on the grounds that she did not smoke. Shortly thereafter, a second woman unknowingly interrupted the assault. The accused then spoke to both women for a brief period and again offered cigarettes, which both women accepted. After successfully dispatching the second woman, the American officer proceeded to rape the German maid. Given the inability to establish whether penetration had indeed occurred, the victim's tendency toward promiscuity, and the exchange of the cigarette, the RMP determined no rape took place. According to the police report, acceptance of the cigarette signified the "element of fear" on the part of the victim "had diminished, if not disappeared altogether," thereby turning a possible sexual assault into an act of consensual sex.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Thurnwald, pp. 146-147.

<sup>266</sup> 83<sup>rd</sup> Special Investigation Section, Corps of Royal Military Police, to Officer Commanding, Subject "Allegation of rape by German housemaid employed at No. 13 American Officers Mess," 15 April 1947; AG 250.1 Morals & Conduct Vol. II; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.



## The Black Market and DPs

As the various anecdotes indicate, the existence of fraternization bans at the outset did not prevent Americans, Germans, and DPs from seeking potential black market trading partners. The commercial landscape of the black market proved to be one of the most common sites of social and cultural interaction among diverse populations. Black market discourses depicted the cigarette economy as a social institution that reflected popular attitudes and beliefs about specific groups of people active in illicit trading. By and large, Americans and Germans identified Jewish and Polish DPs as the most common transgressors of large-scale and exploitative black marketing.<sup>267</sup> Many non-Jews blamed Jewish DPs for the sheer scale of the postwar black market. Discourses that explained the root cause of Jewish involvement on the black market frequently linked common beliefs during the immediate Nazi past with much older stereotypes connected Jews with usury and financial greed.<sup>268</sup> Although occupation authorities recognized that other

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<sup>267</sup> Juliane Wetzel, “‘Mir szejnen doh’: München und Umgebung als Zuflucht von Überlebenden des Holocaust 1945-1948,” in Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), p. 355; Höhn, pp. 121-125; Fritz, pp. 235-255; and Laura June Hilton, “Prisoners of Peace: Rebuilding Community, Identity and Nationality in Displaced Persons Camps in Germany, 1945-1952,” (Ph.D. diss: The Ohio State University, 2001).

<sup>268</sup> Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, “Jüdischer Überlebende als ‘Displaced Persons’: Untersuchungen zur Besatzungspolitik in den deutschen Westzonen und zur Zuwanderung osteuropäischer Juden 1945-1947,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (1983), pp. 441-442; Juliane Wetzel, “An Uneasy Existence: Jewish Survivors in Germany After 1945,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 131-144; Constantin Goschler, “The Attitude Towards Jews in Bavaria After the Second World War,” in West Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 231-249. On the history of stereotypes linking Jews with money, usury and greed, see Sara Lipton, Images of Intolerance: The Representation of Jews and Judaism in the Bible moralisée (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 30-53; R. Po-Chia Hsia, “The Usurious Jew: Economic Structure and Religious Representations in an Anti-Semitic Discourse,” in In and Out of the Ghetto: Jewish-Gentile Relations in Late Medieval and Early Modern Germany, ed. R.

groups actively participated in the black market, the discursive link between Jewish DPs and the “cigarette economy” established by Germans and American served to racialize the black market. As early as August 1945, American officials attributed 90% of all black marketing in Munich to non-German nationals, while a report from Erlangen claimed it was “known beyond the reasonable doubt that 70% of all black market goods originate from DP sources.” However, less than one-fifth of cases brought to court in Erlangen featured DPs as defendants.<sup>269</sup>

American reports on the black market and criminal investigations condemned Jewish displaced persons for their illegal and immoral behavior, suggesting they used their “untouchable status as former political persecutees and concentration camp victims” as a means of protection from criminal proceedings. Likewise, Germans insisted Jews used the black market as a “legal form of revenge for political persecution and ill-treatment in concentration camps.”<sup>270</sup> Polish DPs reportedly used the temptation of assembly center black markets against Germans. According to Hulme, residents of the Wildflecken DP center in northern Bavaria coaxed individual Germans into the camp for

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Po-Chia Hsia and Hartmut Lehmann (Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 161-176; Marion A. Kaplan, The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 99-108. Such stereotypes in occupation-era Germany stood in stark contrast to Germans’ self-perceptions of obedience. See Alan Kramer, “‘Law-Abiding Germans’? Social Disintegration, Crime and the Reimposition of Order in Post-war Western Germany,” in The German Underworld: Deviants and Outcasts in German History, ed. Richard J. Evans (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 238.

<sup>269</sup> Major David R. Blossom, “Legal Section, Reasons for Promulgating Notice Prohibiting Certain Activities Connected with Black Marketing,” 4 August 1945, p. 2; Black Market Notice; General Records of Munich Resident Liaison & Security Office, 1945-1949; Records of Field Operations Division; OMGB; RG 260; NACP. Also see Annual Historical Report for Stadt and Landkreis Erlangen, p. 12; Military Government Liaison & Security Office; OMGB; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>270</sup> Annual Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria (AHR, OMGB), p. 139; Vol. I, Covering Period From 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947; GR, EO; OMGB; RG 260; NACP.

the purposes of barter, baiting potential marks with margarine and “as many cigarettes” as they could possibly carry. Upon concluding a transaction, the camp’s police detained unsuspecting outsiders and transferred custody to the Military Police for processing on charges of trespassing and possession of unauthorized materials.<sup>271</sup>

Advocates for Jewish DPs and refugees within the American occupation leadership highlighted the involvement of Germans and GIs in comparison to Jewish DPs. They countered that the popular perception of assembly centers as black market “havens” or “asylums” beyond the jurisdiction of German police, who were legally prohibited from entering DP camps without Military Police supervision, resulted in biased accounts and attitudes toward DPs. Jewish relief organizations feared the imbalanced portrayal perpetuated anti-Semitic stereotypes and jeopardized Jews in the process.<sup>272</sup> In his capacity as the Advisor on Jewish Affairs in Germany for the American Jewish Committee, William Haber informed Clay that misconceptions regarding Jews and black marketing risked creating a “very bad impression” among influential Congressional visitors tasked with resolving the postwar refugee crisis.<sup>273</sup> Moreover, they rightly highlighted a discursive discrepancy in the depiction of German and DP involvement in black marketing. Germans who engaged in illegal activities did so as part of a “fight for survival,” in comparison to the “utter disregard for law and

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<sup>271</sup> Kathryn Hulme, *The Wild Place* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), pp. 125-126.

<sup>272</sup> Report on Certain Aspects of Jewish DPs’ Problems in Germany and Austria, Prepared by Mr. Harry Greenstein and Major Abraham S. Hyman, 15 September 1948, p. 6; AG 383.7 United Nations Displaced Persons Vol. VI 1948; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>273</sup> William Haber, Confidential Memo on Session with American General Lucius D. Clay, 15 January 1948, p. 2. American Jewish Committee Archives (AJC), <http://www.ajcarchives.org>, 15 August 2006. Also see Goschler, pp. 238-240.

order” exhibited by DPs, who also had to contend with popular stereotypes that insisted “all DPs are Jews” and “DPs are lazy and won’t work.”<sup>274</sup> A German-Jewish survivor also pushed back against the notion of Jewish DPs’ collective guilt, questioning why such a concept could be applied to the victims of fascism but not toward those responsible for perpetrating or enabling Nazi crimes.<sup>275</sup>

Despite resistance from DPs and their advocates, Germans and Americans continued to view camps as black market centers. Zeilsheim, a camp located near Frankfurt in the American zone and consisting primarily of unemployed Jews, acquired a reputation as “the source of all evil” and a “hotbed” of illegal behavior.<sup>276</sup> MP raids unearthed extensive stocks of popular black market commodities.<sup>277</sup> Authorities blamed the DPs for deteriorating conditions in the areas surrounding the camp and urged that the DP center be shut down to decrease the problems associated with policing displaced persons. In their minds, DPs stood in the center of a constellation of immorality, linking the nebulous worlds of black marketing and criminality with the existence and rapid spread of venereal disease.<sup>278</sup> The rationale behind the recommendation effectively

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<sup>274</sup> AHR, OMGB, p. 138; GR, EO, OMGB; RG 260; NACP. Also see United Nations Archives (UNA), S-0425-0031-05, Report on Displaced Persons in American-Occupied Germany, 1 January 1947. TNA: PRO FO 1046 / 423, 20 February 1948, B.J. Doyle to Assistant Controller of Frontier Control Service.

<sup>275</sup> See Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p 173.

<sup>276</sup> Merki, “Das amerikanische Zigarett,” p. 74; Lorei and Kirn, pp. 157-162.

<sup>277</sup> Study and Recommendations Regarding DP Camp at Zeilsheim, 4 January 1947; AG 383.7 Displaced Persons OMGUS 1945-46 Vol. II; and Colonel James H. Rowe, “Results of Raid at Zeilsheim Camp,” 2 January 1947; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>278</sup> Colonel James H. Rowe, Study and Recommendations Regarding DP Camp at Zeilsheim, 4 December 1946; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

absolved the local community of responsibility for the social and economic state of affairs. In closing the camp in early 1947, OMGUS officials expressed concern with prevailing German public opinion regarding DPs and openly ascribed responsibility for the conditions to Jewish DPs, who, they maintained, had “drawn” Germans into criminal and immoral behavior.<sup>279</sup> Shutting down the camp also benefited the Americans by creating more space to house soldiers and their dependents, while also negating any potential backlash and embarrassment stemming from Americans’ participation on the Zeilsheim black market.<sup>280</sup> United Nations assembly centers with predominantly Jewish populations also attracted greater scrutiny from local German police, Military Government officials, and even UN representatives, prompting the latter to hold a special conference in early 1948 on preserving law and order in “Jewish camps,” which conference reports identified as the center of black marketing in Germany.<sup>281</sup>

Relief agencies and the U.S. Army both utilized cigarettes as a means of coercing improved behavior from DP populations. The camp leaders at Itzehoe, a predominantly Latvian camp, used cigarettes as a labor incentive to boost local timber production.<sup>282</sup> Many camp residents, however, refused to participate in labor programs that contributed

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<sup>279</sup> Lt. Colonel G. H. Garde, Adjutant General, to Commanding General, USFET, Recommendation to Abandon Displaced Persons Camps at Zeilsheim, 3 January 1947; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>280</sup> Report filed by William Haber, Adviser on Jewish Affairs, 10 June 1948, pp. 2-3, AJC, <http://www.ajcarchives.org>, 15 August 2006.

<sup>281</sup> Minutes of Special Conference Held in the Library, Harnack House, 11 February 1948; AG 383.7 United Nations Displaced Persons Vol. II 1948; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP. The Public Safety Branch convened the conference.

<sup>282</sup> UNA, S-0408-0034, Commandant & Office Leader to the Deputy Director UNRRA Team 289 (Itzehoe), 13 February 1947.

to Germany's economic recovery, since the UNRRA could not compel the inhabitants of DP centers to contribute to the rebuilding of Germany.<sup>283</sup> Although their disinclination to support the reconstruction of Germany may have been entirely understandable, this policy nevertheless supported the prevailing stereotype of DPs as lazy and unproductive, and thus contributed to an escalation of social and political tensions between Germans and DPs. Apart from food, relief workers determined that cigarettes constituted the most popular and effective leverage in coaxing DPs to offer their labor.<sup>284</sup> In contrast, UN relief workers threatened to withhold cigarette rations from DPs who participated in black marketing activities.<sup>285</sup>

By assigning responsibility to DPs, Germans and Americans frequently minimized or rationalized the significance and nature of their own involvement in the black market. Many Germans attributed the black market, which was not a postwar creation, to the presence of foreign elements. Apart from lambasting DPs for perpetuating German misery, many German officials and commentators decried both American exploitation of Germans' economic vulnerability and the Military Government's apparent toleration of the cigarette trade. Germans complained about Americans who also utilized the black market as a form of economic revenge for the war, strangling the German economy via "powerful butts."<sup>286</sup> Numerous writers bristled at the

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<sup>283</sup> UNA, S-0425-0031-05, Report on Displaced Persons in American-Occupied Germany, 1 October 1946. Also see Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies, p. 223.

<sup>284</sup> UNA, S-0409-0012, Zone Director to Regional Directors, 10 February 1947.

<sup>285</sup> UNA, S-0407-0014, Camp Leader Meesen-Barracks to Blockleader Bl.2 Meesen-Barracks, 20 February 1947.

<sup>286</sup> Also see Arno Scholz, "Die Macht die runden Stäbchen," Telegraf, 16 July 1947, p. 3.

notion that occupation personnel carelessly turned Germany's history and tradition into "smoke and puff," while the country's cultural heritage was "smoked into thin air" as GIs opportunistically sought to "satisfy the need" of German smokers.<sup>287</sup> To a certain degree, Germans perceived their own participation in the black market as an extension of *fringsen* – the term used to denote Cardinal Frings' absolution for Germans guilty of petty theft "for the purpose of feeding and preserving self and family, and only for immediate usage" – in so far as it amounted to a short-term survival strategy that neither reflected German values nor signified social deviance.<sup>288</sup> Thus, even when Germans consumed cigarettes or other popular consumer goods secured via illegal transaction, responsibility for the postwar state of affairs was made to rest on DPs or occupation soldiers.

The U.S. presence in the cigarette economy should not be underestimated, especially given the extensive shortages of tobacco products. Moreover, military officers and many prominent Americans, including White House Cabinet officials, members of Congress, and the wives of the Secretary of State James Byrnes and Senator Tom Connally, seized the opportunity to turn their own PX cigarette rations into German antiques during official visits. Ordinary GIs justified their own participation in black market trades by pointing to and reiterating the numerous reports of officers who openly

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<sup>287</sup> "Occupation Cigarettes," *FP*, 8 February 1947; *FP*; *SR*, *PB*, *ICD*; *RG* 260; *NACP*. Also see "Black Market Cigaret Ban," *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, 6 June 1947; *Frankfurter Neue Presse*; *SR*, *PB*, *ICD*; *RG* 260; *NACP*.

<sup>288</sup> Wildt, pp. 101-103 and p. 123; Kramer, p. 241. On *fringsen*, see Samuel, *The War of Our Childhood*, pp. 98-99; Gries, p. 307; and Dieter Felbick, *Schlagwörter der Nachkriegszeit, 1945-1949* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), p. 580.

engaged in illicit deals or condoned their men's illegal conduct as a benefit of victory.<sup>289</sup> For OMGUS, the American presence on the black market, in conjunction with increased rates of public drunkenness, automobile accidents, and venereal disease, endangered the reputations of both the United States and occupation objectives.<sup>290</sup> An investigation into a major black market operation in Schweinfurt, based in large part on the trade and sale of cigarettes initially destined for the Red Cross and soldiers' snack bars, jolted OMGUS officials, who feared the lack of troop discipline would ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the occupation mission and generate discontent among German civilians. One American officer testified that "90% of Military Government officers and 90% of the employees" in Schweinfurt engaged in illegal transactions with a Dutch national, who acted as an intermediary. In his testimony, the Public Safety Officer stated, "black market activity of nearly every description stems from American troops," since they represented the principal "source of material which is usually channeled into the black market." Witnesses repeatedly told investigators, "Americans can't do anything about [the] Black Market because they are too deeply involved themselves" and "if you want to get something on the Black Market, go to [the] Military Government!"<sup>291</sup> Public opinion

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<sup>289</sup> Robert Haeger, "No More Conquerors," in This Is Germany, ed. Arthur Settel (New York: Sloane, 1950), pp. 7-8; Walter Rundell, Jr., Black Market Money: The Collapse of U.S. Military Currency Control in World War II (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 54; Botting, p. 175; and Sobel, p. 145.

<sup>290</sup> Joseph T. McNarney to Commanding General, 25 March 1946; AG 250 Discipline OMGUS 1945-46; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>291</sup> Special Agent Joseph T. Helling, Summary Report of Investigation, 28 March 1947; Testimony of Major Bryrn A. Evans, Executive Officer of the 27<sup>th</sup> Constabulary Squadron, 10 June 1947, Exhibit B 2; Testimony of First Lt. Paul F. Kinnucan, Company A, Public Safety & Special Branch Officer, 12 June 1947, Exhibit B 10 (B 10); and Captain Huffman, CE Military Government, Company A, 14 June 1947, Exhibit B 19; AG 383.8 Report of Alleged Black Market Activities in the Schweinfurt Area (Schweinfurt); GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.



surveys revealed that the Germans had little confidence in American authorities' ability to solve the pervasive black market problem and concomitant shortages.<sup>292</sup>

### **“Don’t Flog Them On the Black Market”: Controlling the Cigarette Economy**

The rampant black market represented a fundamental obstacle to economic recovery and reconstruction, while occupation leaders deemed the active participation of foreign personnel and dependents a “very serious potential security situation.” Extensive American involvement in the “cigarette economy” at the expense of German civilians risked giving Germans the impression that “things were far better” during the Third Reich.<sup>293</sup> However, reining in the black market and the cigarette trade in the U.S. and British zones created substantial obstacles for the occupiers regarding the function of economic controls within a context of material deprivation and purported democratization. The Governor of the American zone of occupation, General Clay, recognized authorities could not “swamp Germany with cigarettes” to counter inflation given the prolonged limitations in tobacco supplies.<sup>294</sup> But in an attempt to discipline the behavior of soldiers and civilians alike, the U.S. and British Military Governments adopted policies specifically designed to limit the underground economy through raids

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<sup>292</sup> Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 198-199. Also see Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 253.

<sup>293</sup> Depredations by United States Military Personnel, 1946; AG 250.1 Incidents – American OMGUS 1945-46; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>294</sup> Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 336.

and import controls. These measures accompanied information campaigns regarding the moral and economic dangers of engaging in black market activities, which were directly aimed at occupation personnel, as well as attempts to corral the black market into closely regulated spaces.

Allied authorities and German police utilized raids of popular black market sites as one of the earliest and most common forms of combating unlawful trade. Raids on DP camps, train stations, and other well-known black market spaces in major urban centers proved to be complicated affairs. Authorities focused on trains and train stations due to the widespread practice of “hamstering,” in which urban residents traveled to rural areas by train to trade goods with farmers. Conducting raids on the railways, however, hampered rail operations, which constituted the most important form of public transit amidst the chaos of rubble-strewn streets and cityscapes. As a result, the Public Safety Branch (PSB) of the British zone required notification of pending raids be delivered several hours in advance and recommended that the police restrict themselves to smaller stations in order to avoid traffic congestion on an already beleaguered rail network.<sup>295</sup> For police and occupation leaders, searches represented an attempt to impose order upon a situation seemingly lacking in order. Yet, reports and news accounts claimed “mass raids were not ‘worth a damn,’” and frequently failed to produce enough of a disincentive to deter Germans, DPs, and occupation personnel from engaging in illicit activities once the police departed.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> TNA: PRO FO 1058 / 542, 3 June 1946, Black Market – Searching of Trains and Passengers.

<sup>296</sup> Haber, 10 June 1948, p. 13. Also see Nadeane Walker, “Who? Me? All Innocent in Cigarette Raid,” S&S, 6 December 1945, p. 3.

In addition to their limited effectiveness, raids on popular black market spaces created public relations headaches for the occupying governments. Clay felt such measures were “unconstitutional” in the American sense, thereby jeopardizing the broader aims of the occupation. Members of the PSB advocated the curtailment of such actions since the unpopular tactic undermined efforts “to get the Germans to believe our ‘democratic’ claims,” much like the VD raids used by public health officials to monitor and prevent the spread of venereal disease.<sup>297</sup> According to such views, American involvement in the cigarette economy stood in opposition to the idea of democratic citizenship and implied the occupiers and occupied did not have to abide by the same rules of democracy. An OMGUS investigation into media and public reactions to a large-scale raid of a Frankfurt train station in early 1947 observed a “fundamental conflict between the overall Military Government democratizing objective” and the extreme measures used by German police and American Military Police. The operation, which trapped hundreds of Germans – including priests – and a substantial number of American GIs with their Fräuleins, most of whom were ultimately released, resulted in a sizeable public relations backlash.<sup>298</sup> Some observers compared the raid to the recent past of authoritarianism and heavy-handed policing on the part of the Nazi regime.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> Office of the Staff Secretary, undated; #3308 Police Raids in Prevention in Black Market Activities (3308); Records of Civil Administration Division (CAD), the Public Safety Branch (PSB); RG 260; NACP.

<sup>298</sup> Edwin Hartrich, “Roundup in a Railway Station: Germans in Frankfurt’s Bahnhof Get a Taste of the ‘Democratic’ Police Methods of Today,” 2 February 1947; 3308; CAD, PSB; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>299</sup> F. Taylor Ostrander, Chief, Price Control Section, “Due Process of Law in Preventing Black Market Activities,” 19 February 1947, p. 1; 3308; CAD, PSB; RG 260; NACP.

The popular association of black marketing with DPs prompted officials to focus attention on DP camps and assembly centers as black market havens. German police officials felt Jewish DPs exploited their postwar standing and insisted the protections created a separate standard of law for camp residents, shielding criminals from arrest and prosecution. During a February 1948 conference in Munich, the Justice Ministry complained about the Land Police's need to cease pursuits on more than five hundred occasions in a three-month period due to Jewish DPs' protective legal status.<sup>300</sup> American military authorities required American MPs to supervise German police following the murder of Auschwitz survivor Schmul Dancyger during a March 1946 raid in Stuttgart. The DPs targeted in the raid physically resisted the German police to protest what they characterized as discriminatory treatment considering the near universality of the black market during the occupation era.<sup>301</sup>

In addition to raids, occupation authorities relied upon publicity campaigns, newspapers, and the radio to instill a sense of discipline and morality among soldiers and civilians. Coverage of sensational cases of black marketing and theft of cigarettes from PX warehouses by occupation personnel appeared regularly in Stars & Stripes, reminding troops of the potential consequences of trying to make a killing off of their Lucky Strikes or Chesterfields. Accounts of arrests, court martial hearings, prison sentences, and fines served to remind GIs and dependents about the potential consequences of failing to abide by the military's code of conduct and warned new arrivals about the risks inherent in illicit transactions. Interestingly, though perhaps not surprisingly, articles on cigarette

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<sup>300</sup> Confidential Report filed by William Haber, Adviser on Jewish Affairs, 24 February 1948, AJC, <http://www.ajcarchives.org>, 16 August 2006.

<sup>301</sup> Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies, p. 176 and 224.

thefts and black market trials treated the accused differently depending upon nationality. Stories regarding American involvement in the netherworld of the cigarette economy tended to focus on specific individuals, whereas those accounts detailing German plots and gangs frequently emphasized the size and scope of the racket. Such differences in presentation served to suggest that more Germans than Americans participated in the black market, while also condemning acts of immorality on the part of individual Americans versus the general immorality of Germans in general.<sup>302</sup>

Authorities also viewed the radio as a potential means of controlling the black market, even as U.S. officials in Bavaria noted that black marketers utilized the airwaves to distribute going rates and warn listeners to unload American cigarettes to avoid competition from an influx of cheaper cigarettes.<sup>303</sup> The Black Market Information Committee recommended reports of black market convictions immediately follow weather forecasts because farmers primarily listened to the radio for weather updates, thereby offering the best opportunity to reach likely suppliers.<sup>304</sup> A spring 1947 radio program entitled “The Black Market” and broadcast in the British zone reached out to those soldiers interested in “flogging” their cigarettes. Thus, the soldier who exchanged

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<sup>302</sup> For examples of cases involving American soldiers or dependents, see “2 MG Officers Charged With Illicit Trading,” S&S, 17 December 1946, p. 12; “2 Air Force Officers Accused of Black Market Activities,” S&S, 26 May 1948, p. 1; and “Two Dependents Convicted of Bartering, Fined \$275,” S&S, 20 August 1947, p. 1. For examples of cases focused on Germans or DPs, see “Gang of 9 Draws Sentences For PX Cigaret Robbery,” S&S, 20 June 1947, p. 3; “16 PX Thieves Get Jail Terms,” S&S, 22 August 1947, p. 4; and William B. Lee, “Gang Admits 8,000-Carton Cigaret Theft,” S&S, 26 November 1947, p. 1.

<sup>303</sup> Supplement to Weekly Intelligence Report No. 7 for Week Ending 18 February 1949, p. 3; OMGB/Intel/Weekly Intel Summary 1-13 1 Jan-1 Apr 49; OMGB, CO, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>304</sup> TNA: PRO FO 1039 / 702, 23 November 1945, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Black Market Information Committee.

his cigarette rations for a camera or a leather handbag took essential supplies away from innocent people facing significant hardships. “Flogging” cigarettes went “against those who are trying to see fair play in the distribution of food” and added “to the misery and starvation of thousands who cannot get a fair ration.” Above all else, though, black marketing was distinctly “illegal” and left the occupiers with a “bad reputation in the eyes of the Germans.” It was best to “smoke your cigarettes” or “give them away” rather than “flog them on the black market,” since “there is no law against human charity.”<sup>305</sup>

One year earlier, OMGUS took the controversial step of creating officially sanctioned barter marts in major urban centers within the U.S. zone due to the relative ineffectiveness of major raids and publicity campaigns, as well as the damage to the Military Government’s reputation.<sup>306</sup> (Figure 2.6) The marts, established in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and the American sector in Berlin, appropriated black market trading and relocated it into carefully regulated economic and social spaces. Germans entered the barter shops with personal possessions they wished to barter in exchange for goods brought by GIs to a separate location. Appraisers, after examining the items, determined a point-based value and provided a receipt to the interested party, which could be used to purchase other commodities. The creation of barter marts made it possible for soldiers and Germans to engage in economic transactions without having to physically encounter one another, as the barter center fulfilled the role of mediator. Proponents argued an organized, point-based barter system employing the services of specially trained

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<sup>305</sup> TNA: PRO FO 1046/514, 23 April 1947, Broadcast Script: The Black Market.

<sup>306</sup> Oliver Fredericksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Darmstadt: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), p. 117; Peter R. Senn, “Cigarettes as Currency,” Journal of Finance 6:3 (September 1951), pp. 329-330; “Berlin Barter Market Opens; Cigaretts Bring 22 Trade Value,” S&S, 11 August 1946, p. 5; and Petrov, pp. 213-214.

appraisers provided a fair trading environment, while simultaneously working toward a curtailment of “informal” transactions “based on chance.” Germans could use them as “an outlet” to acquire “miscellaneous household needs” unavailable through legal channels, while Americans traded PX rations for souvenirs and gifts within an economically regulated context.<sup>307</sup>

By providing a “controlled medium of exchange between Americans and Germans,” OMGUS claimed to offer a legitimate alternative to the black market.<sup>308</sup> Barter centers signified a shift from openly combating black marketing to co-opting and sequestering it within a policed environment, since the barter marts ultimately relocated black market trading to a specific time and space under the supervision of Military Government representatives and appraisers. Moreover, Clay insisted the introduction of barter centers in Berlin had the added bonus of improving morale among servicemen and civilian employees who now had the opportunity to acquire goods previously unavailable through legal channels.<sup>309</sup> Opponents, however, questioned the economic and moral value of the barter centers, fearing Germans would view such sites as a sanctioned forum for Americans to traffic in German misery.<sup>310</sup> Others contended that barter marts provided legal cover to the same people active in the underground economy. The Chief of Intelligence for Hesse lamented that the Frankfurt barter center was “for German and

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<sup>307</sup> Jack Bennett, Finance Advisor, to Brigadier General C. K. Gailey, 26 August 1947; Papers of Edward A. Tenenbaum; HSTL.

<sup>308</sup> Smith, pp. 276-279.

<sup>309</sup> General Clay, OMGUS, to General White, USFET, 2 November 1946, p. 2; AG 331.3 Barter Mart (Barter Mart); GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>310</sup> Frederick Winant, Chief, Trade & Commerce Branch, to Control Office, Establishment of OMGUS Barter Center, 19 July 1946, pp. 1-2; Barter Mart; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

American black marketeers” and did little to improve the lot of otherwise law abiding citizens.<sup>311</sup> Sizeable groups of people frequently congregated outside the entrance to barter centers, much like they did at PX stores and commissaries, in order to illegally trade cigarettes and other commodities. According to an employee of the Hessian State Minister for Economics and Price Control, the Frankfurt center “enormously invigorated the black market” by sanctioning “under the counter” transactions.<sup>312</sup>

Apart from contending with the potential encouragement of black market activities, barter mart proponents had to develop a coherent and uniform policy on cigarettes. By late 1946, some officials favored a prohibition on cigarettes, citing press accounts suggesting ninety percent of the cigarettes that passed through barter centers ultimately reached the black market.<sup>313</sup> But effectively counteracting the black market required that the barter centers attract patrons first and foremost. The cigarette question posed a significant dilemma because OMGUS realized GIs would not utilize the centers if they could not trade their cigarette rations as they could on the black market. Officials speculated that Germans would not visit the barter shops if they would not have the opportunity to acquire American cigarettes. Most realized the barter centers served little purpose without cigarettes, but they also recognized allowing a cigarette exchange did not truly address the fundamental economic problems associated with recovery and

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<sup>311</sup> Lt. Col. James E. O’Steen, Chief of Intelligence, to the Director, OMG for Hesse, Irregularities Connected with the Frankfurt Barter Market, 24 September 1947, p. 2; AG 331.3 Camp, Company, and Post Exchanges & Commissary; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP. Also see Frank Grube and Gerhard Richter, Die Schwarzmarktzeit: Deutschland Zwischen 1945 und 1948 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1979), p. 79.

<sup>312</sup> Schulte to Dept. Trade; Barter Centers; GR, EB; BLD; OMGH; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>313</sup> “Army is Battling Cigarette Barter,” The New York Times (NYT), 27 December 1946, p. 8; Herbert M. Bratter, “An Economy Based on Cigarettes,” Nation’s Business, June 1947, p. 42.



reconstruction. By including cigarettes in the barter centers, Germans could now legally possess American cigarettes, provided the pack featured a blue tax stamp.<sup>314</sup>

Theoretically, identifying packs through the stamp would make it easier for police to recognize black market cigarettes, while allowing respectable Germans the opportunity legally acquire a highly popular commodity.

On 27 May 1947, the American Military Government adopted a more draconian approach to the regulation of cigarette supplies when it introduced Ordinance No. 20 – the “Prohibition Against the Import of Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products.” The measure grew out of policy discussions regarding the acceptance of cigarettes in barter centers and sought to augment existing anti-black market strategies through a ban on all private imports of tobacco. The new directive specified tobacco goods could neither be requested nor shipped to the American zone. Additionally, Ordinance No. 20 permitted American authorities or German customs officials to seize and inspect any parcels suspected of containing cigarettes and called for German and Military Government courts to share jurisdictions over violations. Those found guilty of importing tobacco into the American zone faced up to five years in prison and a fine of RM 100,000.<sup>315</sup> Although American officials debated the legality of the import ban, they ultimately determined that a prohibition did not represent an impermissible infringement of civil liberties.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> Lorei and Kirn, pp. 142-143; and Schenk, p. 35. The British did not introduce barter marts due in part to legal restrictions against German ownership of foreign manufactured products. See “Barter Mart Arrests Reveal Bi-Zone Gap,” S&S, 23 October 1947, p. 12.

<sup>315</sup> Ordinance No. 20: Prohibition Against the Import of Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products; OMGUS Directive AG 010.6 (LD) 22 Nov 47; FAR; OB, ASD; RG 407; NACP.

<sup>316</sup> Joseph Fleming, “OMGUS Probers Ask Cigaret Import Ban,” S&S, 27 December 1946, p. 1.

Reactions to Ordinance No. 20 within the Military Government and among occupation personnel varied. Though the decree did not specifically reference the black market, Clay – who reportedly rejected an embargo in December 1946 because he himself smoked sixty cigarettes per day – declared that the prohibition represented an attempt to “kill the heart” of the black market.<sup>317</sup> At the time of the prohibition’s declaration in the late spring, Stars & Stripes reported Clay and most Americans endorsed the decree.<sup>318</sup> News of the measure briefly curtailed the trade in cigarettes as suppliers hoarded packs and cartons to increase black market prices in anticipation of increased demand following the introduction of restrictions.<sup>319</sup> Western Union offices in the U.S. zone reported increased business in the immediate aftermath of the decree’s publication, as soldiers sought to import as many cigarettes as possible before the ban took effect. For “the first time in months,” the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune removed ads from shipping companies offering to import cigarettes into Germany.<sup>320</sup> Though many endorsed the new restrictions, many Americans and Germans questioned the effectiveness of a private import ban. Critics asserted the new restrictions simply treated the symptom of Germany’s continued economic woes as opposed to the actual

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<sup>317</sup> Meyer, p. 17. On Clay’s rejection of the December 1946 proposal, see “Cigarette Embargo in Germany Unlikely,” NYT, 30 December 1946, p. 4.

<sup>318</sup> Joe Rabinovich, “Cigaret Ban Kills Legal Bartering,” S&S, 21 May 1947, p. 12; “Clay Expects Ban Will Kill Black Market,” S&S, 20 May 1947, p. 1.

<sup>319</sup> Ernst Leiser, “Cigaret Import Ban Raises Berlin’s Street Prices 30%,” S&S, 1 June 1947, p. 1.

<sup>320</sup> Rabinovich, p. 12; and “Cigarets Bow Out of Ads in Paris Herald Tribune,” S&S, 23 May 1947, p. 12.

disease, since black marketers could easily concentrate on acquiring and selling other popular but scarce commodities, such as coffee and chocolate.<sup>321</sup>

The added obstacle to the procurement of tobacco rankled many Germans. In response, Germans with friends and family in the United States sought ways to circumvent the restrictions by smuggling cigarettes into the U.S. zone via neighboring countries or other zones of occupation or by hiding individual cigarettes in coffee grounds.<sup>322</sup> Article III of the prohibition provided affected parties with the opportunity to challenge seizures within thirty days. Several Germans petitioned the Military Government to relinquish confiscated cigarettes and other tobacco products. The few remaining letters written to Clay, who claimed he “fully understood the importance of tobacco in the mind of the average German,” and other OMGUS officials, reveal a pattern.<sup>323</sup> Most letter writers were elderly and cited the dire economic circumstances of their daily lives and lasting effects of the war as grounds for exemptions from Ordinance No. 20. One writer, requesting “an act of mercy,” explained that the wounds he suffered during an air raid prevented him from working. Each letter also insisted the confiscated cigarettes, normally a pack or two, were gifts from friends and family meant for private

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<sup>321</sup> “Cigaret Price Skids in Berlin,” S&S, 17 July 1947, p. 3; Delbert Clark, “German Black Market Expected to Survive: Coffee and Other Goods Are Likely to Replace Banned Cigarettes,” NYT, 25 May 1947, p. E5.

<sup>322</sup> Samuel, The War of Our Childhood, p. 234.

<sup>323</sup> “Ban on Cigarets in EC to Remain, Clay Tells Press,” S&S, 4 June 1947, p. 1.

consumption. In each case, OMGUS replied that there were to be no exceptions to the private import ban, regardless of personal hardships.<sup>324</sup>

OMGUS recognized that, given the economic and social importance of cigarettes during the occupation, the prohibition could further undermine both German-American relations and the reputation of the Military Government. The Information Control Division in Bavaria also tracked German public reactions to the ban by interviewing “public opinion leaders” in the state, including local politicians, trade unionists, laborers, clergymen, and business leaders – all of which were traditionally spheres dominated by men. Investigators discovered the ordinance made for strange bedfellows. For instance, both a Catholic bishop and local Social Democratic party leader argued that the ban aggravated existing despair and misery among Germans and created additional unrest and discontent with the occupiers. A Süddeutsche Zeitung editor saw the ban as an attempt on the part of the Americans “to deprive the German people of every pleasure,” echoing Arno Scholz’s “Powerful Butts” article, in which he declared that the Allies deliberately used cigarettes as economic weapons. In contrast, proponents welcomed the ban as “a gesture of good-will on the part of the American occupation forces and a demonstration that a genuine attempt is being made to kill the black market and solve Germany’s economic problems.” The President of the Augsburg Chamber of Commerce, for example, characterized the prohibition as “highly commendable” and long overdue. A Munich lawyer, moreover, praised the new policy as a positive development for capitalism, while blaming the working class for the continuation of the black market. In

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<sup>324</sup> Letter to General Clay, AG 439 Tobacco; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP. Only a handful of letters from German civilians regarding Ordinance No. 20 are included among the OMGUS records collection.

his mind, the ban forced workers to “cease to think in terms of cigarettes” and learn to “have more regard for money.”<sup>325</sup>

The Military Government’s concerns for its reputation stemmed in part from its concerns over the impact the ban would have on black marketing in cigarettes. Even those who outwardly supported the ban were skeptical that it would have a substantial impact on the illegal cigarette trade. Critics, though, argued the scheme would result in higher black market prices rather than reduce black marketing activity. By August, less than three months after the introduction of Ordinance No. 20, Stars & Stripes reported the price for a carton of cigarettes had decreased to RM 600, but was climbing steadily. Well-connected black market operators, meanwhile, refused to sell their supplies for RM 900 per carton in anticipation of prices reaching as high as RM 1400. Those black marketers with steady access to cigarettes and the right sense of timing were in a position to “make enough on one killing to retire.”<sup>326</sup> Due to rising prices and continued black market trading in cigarettes, American authorities privately admitted by late 1947 that the import ban had not had the desired effect.<sup>327</sup>

By late 1947, many observers had come to the conclusion that the increased availability of consumer goods through legal channels and the introduction of a new currency to replace the worthless and discredited Reichsmark could only be achieved by

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<sup>325</sup> Trend: A Report of Political Analysis and Public Opinion, 40, 19 June 1947 (5 June – 19 June 1947) (Trend 40); Trend Bav.; LD; OMGB; RG 260; NACP. Also see Scholz, p. 3.

<sup>326</sup> Russell Jones, “Cigaret Market in Berlin Rises Slowly After Drop: Operators Waiting For Top Price,” S&S, 12 August 1947, p. 3. Also see “EES Reports Theft of 750 Cartons,” S&S, 12 August 1947, p. 3.

<sup>327</sup> C.H. Price, The Rasno Export Agency, 1 December 1947; Germany Prices-Tobacco, 1949-1946; NR; FAS; RG 166; NACP.

successfully curbing the black market. In his reports for Jewish relief organizations, Haber reiterated the need for greater accessibility to consumer goods to reduce black marketing among Jewish DPs.<sup>328</sup> In an effort to restore confidence in legal tender and improve the flow of goods, the joint U.S.-British Military Government of the Bizone, in consultation with German economic advisors, arranged for the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June 1948 to “withdraw excess money from circulation, to eliminate the black market, and to create an incentive to produce.”<sup>329</sup> On 21 June, German citizens in the three western zones formed long queues outside financial exchange centers to trade their Reichsmarks for DM 40. Currency reform ultimately removed upwards of ninety percent of the Reichsmarks in circulation.<sup>330</sup> Moreover, Ludwig Erhard also announced a substantial relaxation of rationing for most goods and eliminated price controls so as to create additional incentives for both production and consumption. Surveys conducted by OMGUS and the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Allensbach suggested Germans anticipated an increase in the general availability of consumer products and a reduction in the amount and necessity of black market trading.<sup>331</sup>

The narrative of currency reform has often treated the introduction of the Deutsche Mark as a pivotal moment in Western Germany’s economic reconstruction,

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<sup>328</sup> Report on Certain Aspects of Jewish DP Problems in the U.S. Zone, Germany and Austria, 6 October 1948, AJC, <http://www.ajcarchives.org>, 16 August 2006. Also see Report filed by William Haber, 20 December 1948, AJC, <http://www.ajcarchives.org>, 16 August 2006.

<sup>329</sup> OMGUS, Monthly Report no. 37, June 1948, p. 6. Cited in Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 198.

<sup>330</sup> Bark and Gress, p. 200.

<sup>331</sup> Merritt and Merritt, pp. 251-252; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1966 (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), pp. 224-226.

complete with the sudden appearance of previously unattainable goods in shop windows, often marking it as a starting point of the economic miracle.<sup>332</sup> However, currency reform did not necessarily signal the demise of the black market. The extensive trade in cigarettes persisted beyond June 1948, as did large-scale cigarette smuggling efforts – particularly across the Belgian border, though it did drive down prices. Proponents of the Deutsche Mark heralded its early impact on the street prices, as cigarettes that had been selling for DM 10 (or RM 100) could be had for as little as DM 4.<sup>333</sup> Throughout late July and August 1948, the Office of the Finance Advisor even observed a slight increase in black market prices for cigarettes from DM 4,50 to DM 6,50.<sup>334</sup> While the arrival of the Deutsche Mark improved morale and the psyche of the German consumer in the late 1940s, the new currency presented new problems with respect to black marketing.<sup>335</sup> Several weeks following the Deutsche Mark’s appearance, tobacco retailers informed OMGUS finance representatives that the duty on assorted tobacco products stifled sales, prompting many consumers to resort to the black market, where prices now hovered slightly below legal rates, a stunning shift from just weeks earlier.<sup>336</sup> Tobacconists,

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<sup>332</sup> On currency reform and the economic miracle, see Mark E. Spicka, Selling the Economic Miracle: Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 26-48.

<sup>333</sup> Russell Jones, “Reform Slashes Mart Prices; Cigaretts at 4 Marks a Pack,” S&S, 8 July 1948, p. 1.

<sup>334</sup> Saul Kagan, Chief of Financial Intelligence Group, to Mr. Burnett, 19 August 1948; AG 0003 C/F Currency Reform Vol. III 1948 (Currency Reform); GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>335</sup> Michael Wildt, “Continuities and Discontinuities of Consumer Mentality in West Germany in the 1950s,” in Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s, eds., Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 214.

<sup>336</sup> Kagan to Burnett, 1 July 1948; Currency Reform; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

struggling to sell cigarettes, attributed the “collapse” in legal sales to high taxes, which threatened to bring the entire industry into an “economic crisis.”<sup>337</sup> Frustrated retailers in Württemberg-Baden complained the competitive black market prices in tobacco goods meant that consumers were not spending their money to purchase their complete share of tobacco rations in shops.<sup>338</sup> Members of occupation forces continued to smuggle cigarettes into the western zones, but these efforts increasingly took on the form of well-organized rackets and criminal syndicates.

## **Conclusion**

More than any other commodity, the cigarette came to epitomize the immediate postwar period in Germany. From its ability to fulfill multiple functions to its inflated value in light of supply disruptions, the cigarette played a vital role in the politics, economics, and culture of the occupation era, especially in its capacity as an *ersatz* currency on the black market. The drastic economic reforms implemented in June 1948 failed to eliminate the black market, but they affected the nature and type of transactions carried out on the underground economy. Illegal exchanges no longer occurred in open spaces among large crowds. Instead, black marketers resorted to clandestine arrangements carried out in cafés or private residences to escape the scrutiny of police forces.<sup>339</sup> The noticeable shift in black market behaviors following currency reform indicate participants recognized their actions violated existing legal statutes. More

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<sup>337</sup> Kagan to Burnett, 6 August 1948; Currency Reform; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>338</sup> Kagan to Burnett, 14 July 1948; Currency Reform; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>339</sup> Kramer, p. 246.



importantly, black marketing lost its status as a reasonable and even socially acceptable behavior for a majority of Germans. While it had not exactly been respectable to engage in black marketing during the occupation, it had at least been normalized. In the wake of the new currency, active involvement in the “cigarette economy” was clearly unrespectable. Once again, morally bankrupt profiteers and dangerous criminals populated the black market, while seemingly more respectable Germans who resorted to the black market for the sole purpose of surviving dreadful social and economic conditions returned to legal channels for consumption. The reach of the black market in these years proved so extensive, though, that it left an indelible mark on the collective national consciousness of the Federal Republic. The persistence of black market trading in cigarettes was due in large part to lingering concerns about the tobacco supply situation in Germany, which had enormous implications for the changing cigarette market in Western Germany, as detailed in the next chapter.

### Chapter Three

## A Phenomenon Born of Scarcity: The Cold War and American Tobacco in Germany, 1945-1952

Two weeks before VE-Day, American, British, and Red Army soldiers exchanged cigarettes in Torgau as a sign of Allied camaraderie and impending victory over German forces. Having “battled across Europe for a Camel,” the shared experience of smoking as they stood before an “East Meets West” poster depicting two soldiers shaking hands epitomized the wartime alliance.<sup>340</sup> (Figure 3.1) Less than four years later, the Association of the German Cigarette Industry (*Verband der Cigarettenindustrie*, VdC) staged another performance of solidarity built around tobacco. In conjunction with the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA), which was responsible for overseeing all export and import agreements in the western zones, the VdC ceremony acknowledged Germans’ “joy and gratitude” for the first postwar import of American raw tobacco as a part of the European Recovery Program (ERP).<sup>341</sup> Members of OMGUS, the JEIA, and VdC gathered at a Bremen dock in December 1948 to celebrate the arrival on the *S.S. Flying Independent* of American leaf, which would “brighten” the faces of long-suffering smokers and contribute to the “rebuilding of Europe in the sense of the Marshall Plan.” The ship’s crew and dockworkers shared cigarettes much like the soldiers in Torgau, suggesting to the world that the Atlantic divide between former enemies had been

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<sup>340</sup> “They battled across Europe for a Camel,” 69<sup>th</sup> Division, US First Army, 26 April 1945; 111-SC-205353, Box 268, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (NACP).

<sup>341</sup> Germany (Territory under Allied Occupation, 1945-1955: U.S. Zone), The Evolution of a Bizonal Organization (March 1948), pp. 14-15.

bridged.<sup>342</sup> The shipment's arrival in Bremen, occurring just as British and American planes were airlifting supplies into blockaded Berlin, marked not only a realignment of the German cigarette market and German-American relations, but also of the geopolitical balance of post-1945 Europe.

Apart from signaling the ritualistic uses of cigarettes to symbolize unity, the Torgau and Bremen encounters highlighted the propagandistic value of cigarettes. These staged performances in 1945 and 1948 reflected the ability of tobacco – and the cigarette specifically – to transcend its role as a commodity and serve as a marker of important transitions in society and international politics. Whereas the experience of relaxation and camaraderie performed in Torgau foreshadowed an end to hostilities, the Bremen affair signified the consecration of new bonds between West Germany and America. More precisely, the arrival of American leaf in 1948 marked an important transition in the reconstruction and reeducation of Western Germany. Victory in war and the Allied division of Germany produced a tremendous opportunity for the expansion of the American Market Empire, as the highly lucrative German tobacco market stood open for potential colonization by the U.S.<sup>343</sup>

The postwar restructuring of the German tobacco market ultimately represented a microcosm of the Cold War, as the implications of occupation-era tobacco policies thoroughly complicated the reconstruction of Western Germany's cigarette market. The actors involved in this contentious process viewed the struggle to control the market as an

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<sup>342</sup> Museum der Arbeit, Reemtsma Archive (hereafter MdA ReeA), Hamburg; "The First Cargo of Tobacco Shipped from the United States to Germany Under the Marshall Plan," December 1948.

<sup>343</sup> Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 6-8.

extension of the growing conflict between the East and the West. The growing competition between Russian and American cigarettes on Berlin's thriving black market quickly came to be seen as an early front line in the Cold War. Though the American and Soviet occupation authorities officially denounced the black market, they also understood the inherent dangers of yielding control of Berlin's cigarette economy to their enemy within the shifting political atmosphere. Both sides recognized the value of building a semblance of ideological affinity through the provisioning of popular commodities, particularly those goods that were high in demand. At the same time, the pressures revolving around the legal cigarette market throughout Western Germany presented additional difficulties. For the Americans, the apparent opportunity to corner as much of the German tobacco market as possible threatened to further destabilize their Cold War allies in Greece and Turkey. Both of Germany's traditional suppliers of tobacco endured domestic turmoil in the wake of the Second World War. Greece was embroiled in a devastating civil war throughout much of the 1940s, while Turkey had to contend with the growing encroachment of the Soviet Union in the Turkish Straits. Amidst such turmoil, neither could afford to lose their biggest consumer of their most important export. These circumstances imbued the fight to control the German market with far greater meaning, as the geopolitical importance of this struggle could be felt not only in America and Germany, but also in two early Cold War hot spots.

In trying to claim the postwar tobacco market as their own, American tobacco growers and their political representatives in Washington D.C. encountered stiff resistance from a variety of sources, including policy-makers in OMGUS and the JEIA, the Soviets, and Germany's pre-war tobacco suppliers. Germany's economic recovery

and reconstruction turned the legal and illegal markets in cigarettes into hotly contested Cold War battlegrounds. As the American Military Government authorized the importation of raw tobacco in 1948, tobacco interests in the United States, Greece, and Turkey fought to control continental Europe's largest market. For Washington and the American Military Government, gaining a foothold in Germany required a delicate balancing act between economic self-interest and Cold War priorities, as American success in Germany threatened the stability of Greece and Turkey, both of whom depended heavily on their tobacco exports to Germany. For the Greeks and Turks, the struggle to regain access to the German market also proved challenging, as their primary competition – i.e., the U.S. – also acted as a financial benefactor amidst Cold War uncertainty and domestic turmoil.

But the battle for control over the German tobacco market also set in motion an equally contested struggle to reshape the tastes of German smokers and to monopolize the political and cultural symbols attached to these different tobaccos.<sup>344</sup> The apparent shifts in German consumption patterns and the establishment of new preferences within the cigarette hierarchy in the late 1940s, however, did not proceed smoothly and often exacerbated international tensions. The resistance to U.S. tobacco illustrated the limits of the Market Empire, as the supposed “Americanization” of the German cigarette market in the 1940s and 1950s faced abundant challenges from competing tobacco suppliers on the world market, German tobacco firms and smokers, and even the black market. At the same time, the American tobacco trade often took exception to the policies governing imports into Germany. They contended that OMGUS and the JEIA, whose purchase of

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<sup>344</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

American leaf often prioritized cheaper over high quality tobacco, failed to recognize the magnificent opportunity the war had created for the U.S. industry. For American authorities in Germany, the cigarette battles on the black market and the simultaneous international competition to supply – if not fully control – the legal tobacco market in postwar Germany necessitated that they strike a proper balance between advancing America’s economic interests without undermining its objectives in the Cold War. This required American policymakers on the scene in Germany to map out a strategy suitable for a responsible hegemon – one that was simultaneously cognizant of local conditions that could be exploited to promote self-interest, while also remaining aware of the broader implications of exercising its economic influence in the local setting.

Although my focus lies primarily with American representatives and agencies, this chapter reveals the array of forces competing to structure and control the postwar German cigarette market. In addition to U.S. agencies, German consumers, German tobacco firms, and Greek and Turkish tobacco representatives all played vital roles in shaping the shifting market, though their influence was far from equal. The competition among international suppliers ultimately affected the kind of cigarettes made available to German consumers. Taste itself was predicated more upon the foreign and economic policies of other countries than it was on the desire of actual smokers. The creation of legitimate opportunities for Germans to consume tobacco mattered most for the U.S. occupation government, as evidenced by their adoption of policies focused on the quantity of tobacco as opposed to overall quality. While this approach threatened the self-interest of the American tobacco trade and the continued expansion of the Market Empire, OMGUS and the JEIA understood consumption to be vital to the overall success

of the democratizing mission in postwar Germany. They disagreed, however, with Washington and the U.S. tobacco industry over the best methods to achieve the desired results. After protracted periods of constraints on consumption, the American occupation sought to train Germans in democratic values and character by generating new chances to participate in capitalist consumption.<sup>345</sup>

### **Berlin's Cigarette Economy as Cold War Microcosm**

In many respects, the soldiers' exchange of cigarettes at Torgau in April 1945 symbolized the zenith of the wartime alliance, as West and East met over some smokes to celebrate Germany's imminent defeat. Among ordinary soldiers, the ideological conflicts and suspicion that had defined the West's attitudes and response to the Soviet Union during the interwar era momentarily dissipated with each puff. Over the next several years, however, the ability of a cigarette to represent East-West togetherness against a common, German enemy deteriorated as political priorities shifted in the postwar climate. Even at its earliest stages, the Cold War brought new dimensions to the politicization of consumption, as the adoption of a particular style or taste came to be seen as an expression of ideological affinity.<sup>346</sup> In the first few years after the war, as tensions mounted between the United States and Soviet Union, the Berlin black market in

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<sup>345</sup> Jennifer Fay, Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of Postwar Germany (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. xviii.

<sup>346</sup> Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); David F. Crew, ed., Consuming Germany in the Cold War (New York: Berg, 2003); Ina Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in DDR (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1999); and Martin Daunt and Matthew Hilton, eds., The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America (New York: Berg, 2001).

cigarettes emerged as an early example of how the Cold War divide politicized the landscape of early postwar consumer culture, turning the underground economy of Berlin into a contested Cold War space that both sides actively vied to control.

Black marketers throughout Germany assigned greater value to American cigarettes during the occupation period because of their supposedly superior quality with respect to taste. Moreover, American goods came to symbolize a possible future of abundance within a capitalist culture of consumption. As discussed in the previous chapter, American personnel stationed in Germany enjoyed the benefits of regular and cheap access to U.S. cigarette brands. Despite the well-known fact that American GIs and civilians frequented and contributed to the extensive black market, the U.S. military magazine Stars & Stripes presented the Soviet Union's encroachment into cigarette trading as a political threat to the German nation. As early as 1945, the newspaper ran occasional stories filled with Cold War overtones about Soviet efforts to capitalize on black market possibilities and German suffering, particularly through the Rasno Export agency. The articles framed Rasno's efforts in Berlin as an extension of the Soviet state and claimed that Russian cigarettes called "Drug" (translated as "Pal") were harmful to consumers because they contained excessive sulfur, which could result in burning sensations, coughing, and sore throats.<sup>347</sup> Though the smoking and health issue had yet to become the subject of intense public debate in the United States, the only reference to the health effects of smoking in the military magazine between 1945 and 1949 targeted the new Russian cigarettes in Berlin. Largely because they were significantly cheaper

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<sup>347</sup> Ernest Leiser, "Russ Cigarets Competing in Black Market," Stars & Stripes (S&S), 9 April 1947, p. 1; "Russian-Made Cigarets Called Harmful," S&S, 27 April 1947, p. 4; and "Not Us, Russians Say of Black Market Deals," S&S, 20 November 1945, p. 1.



than the *Amis*, the Soviet cigarettes proved to be particularly appealing to Berlin's workers.<sup>348</sup>

In contrast to the potential health threat posed by the Soviet Union and its cigarettes, Stars & Stripes and other outlets predictably highlighted America's "phenomenal personal generosity" through the distribution of coffee and cigarettes to friends and employees, pointing to their altruism as evidence of American popularity amongst Germans.<sup>349</sup> OMGUS leaders in Bavaria even encouraged Americans to dispense cigarettes to local elite so as to exhibit American and democratic values.<sup>350</sup> Once the Americans and Soviets began to reconsider the long-term political and cultural ramifications of occupation, the ability to provide material benefits to the German population proved critically important in winning favor and social stability. The long-term success of democratization necessitated the Americans prove the superiority of consumer capitalism to the occupied, which could only be achieved by creating opportunities to engage in the "sensual mode of being." Once convinced of the advantages of consumer capitalism through learned behavior, the Germans would be more likely to adopt a democratic character. The nature of the act – including what was consumed and how it was consumed – mattered considerably in determining the eventual value of "occupation mimicry."<sup>351</sup> Thus, the decision to barter in American or Russian

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<sup>348</sup> Leiser, p. 1.

<sup>349</sup> Robert Haeger, "No More Conquerors," in This Is Germany, ed. Arthur Settel (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1950), pp. 15-16.

<sup>350</sup> Murray D. Van Wagoner, Land Director OMGB, to Major General George P. Hays, Deputy Military Governor OMGUS, 19 February 1948; James E. King, Jr., Acting Secretary General, to Van Wagoner, 28 February 1948; AG 439 Tobacco; GC, OAG, EO; RG 260; NACP.

<sup>351</sup> Fay, p. xviii and p. 24.

cigarettes on the black market reflected one's political orientation and values, a distinction that the American military press repeatedly played up in its discussions of the Soviet role in the Berlin cigarette economy.<sup>352</sup>

Regular access to material goods helped shape the structure of the early Cold War division of central Europe and everyday lives of ordinary German citizens, as was made evident during the course of the Berlin blockade. The availability of cigarettes and similar commodities in the western zones, albeit irregular in supply, offered an excellent opportunity for the Americans to reorient Germans politically toward the West, normalizing the link between consumer capitalism and American consumer goods, while also redefining German taste preferences in the process. Both the American and Soviet occupation authorities understood this point and recognized the use and exchange values of material goods. The Americans, however, held the advantage in terms of offering luxury goods to the Germans, be it in the form of cigarettes, chocolate, chewing gum, or stockings, as those Germans who remained in the Soviet zone did not have steady access to popular consumer goods.<sup>353</sup> Notwithstanding their limited supplies and distribution capabilities, the Soviets reportedly used cartons of cigarettes and food to coerce support for the merger of the Social Democrats and the Communists into the Social Unity Party (SED) and guarantee Communist dominance of the new political party. Coverage of the merger in Stars & Stripes declared, "politics in food-short, cigarette-poor Germany took a

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<sup>352</sup> "Russian-Made Cigaretts Called Harmful," p. 4.

<sup>353</sup> Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

new turn” as the Soviets “rewarded” delegates for their support, but only after the unanimous approval of their merger.<sup>354</sup>

The Rasno Export agency, responsible for importing and exporting goods into the Soviet zone, was heavily involved in cigarette and coffee trading on the postwar Berlin black market. During the Berlin crisis in 1948, the agency cornered the market in the eastern sector while blaming Germans’ economic misery on the West. Though Soviet authorities in Germany were “on the whole less tolerant” of black marketing than the western Allies, Soviet officers and soldiers were widely involved in exploitative deals.<sup>355</sup> At the same time, Soviet propaganda about the black market repeatedly presented the Americans and British as greedy capitalists seeking to exploit German suffering.<sup>356</sup> In response to the chaos and expansion of the underground economy, the Soviet military administration in Germany initiated efforts to police the black market, relying predominantly on raids as a deterrent, leading to the arrest of more than 7,000 people in the final six weeks of 1947.<sup>357</sup> Despite the official denunciations of the black market and the introduction of various measures to combat its existence in the east, Rasno circumvented regulation by answering directly to Moscow, rather than to the Soviet military leadership in Berlin. Rasno’s principal objective was to use the cigarette shortage as an opportunity to obtain foreign currency, particularly the new Deutsche

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<sup>354</sup> “Russians Give Food, Cigarettes To Germans Voting Red Merger,” S&S, 15 April 1946, p. 1.

<sup>355</sup> Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 34 and 173-174.

<sup>356</sup> “Not Us, Russians Say of Black Market Deals,” p. 1.

<sup>357</sup> Jörg Roesler, “The Black Market in Post-war Berlin and the Methods Used to Counteract it,” German History 7:1 (1989), p. 98.

Mark introduced in 1948. Agency representatives had special permission to possess foreign currencies, which had been prohibited in the Soviet zone.<sup>358</sup> From the perspective of Western authorities, Rasno's cigarette-related activities in Berlin reflected the growing divide between East and West. Rasno's structure suggested that the Soviets organized a centralized black market operation, whereas Western accounts presented American involvement in illegal deals as decentralized and the actions of isolated individuals or small groups acting out of self-interest, greed, and boredom.

German attitudes toward Soviet and American interests clearly show that tobacco consumers in occupied territories, including non-smokers collecting their rations, had a lot at stake in the Cold War economic and cultural battles. The continued deterioration of the wartime alliance turned the world tobacco market, and the profitable German market in particular, into a Cold War battleground. American and Soviet attempts to define the parameters of the German cigarette market in Berlin's underground economy did not represent the only supply war for the United States in occupied Germany, as the black market confrontation gave way to a much larger battle between the United States, Greece, and Turkey to control the legal cigarette market. American and British occupation authorities charged with determining tobacco policies for much of western Germany had to contend with competing pressures launched by tobacco growers in each country, trade associations representing tobacco producers, and the national governments, while at the same time maintaining an eye on the larger Cold War conflict unfolding in Germany. The decisions made by economic agencies within occupied Germany reverberated well beyond Germany's borders.

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<sup>358</sup> J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 227.

## **A Phenomenon Born of Scarcity: The Rise of American Tobacco After 1945**

Prior to the war, Germany had satisfied most of its tobacco needs through imports from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Italy. Greece alone was responsible for one-half of all of Germany's tobacco imports. During the war itself, Germany's occupation of Greece provided ample opportunities to secure large amounts of tobacco through confiscation or one-sided trade agreements.<sup>359</sup> Germany's reliance upon Greece for tobacco meant German cigarette smokers before 1945 overwhelmingly consumed cigarettes made from Oriental types.<sup>360</sup> American tobacco growers argued that their limited access to the German market during the Third Reich affected their long-term ability to influence consumer preferences, which went against the apparent desire for American cigarettes described in the previous chapter. The latter stages of the war, however, brought about significant cutbacks in both domestic production and foreign imports, producing a set of conditions in the immediate postwar period that limited the range of tobacco types and, as a result, the nature and composition of cigarettes available in Germany. Apart from contributing to the dramatic growth in the black market trading

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<sup>359</sup> Commander C. G. Tsatsos, Chief of the Greek Liaison Office of the Displaced Persons Branch, to Colonel A. J. D. Biddle, Jr., 17 October 1945; and Colonel Anthony Biddle to Office of the Deputy Military Governor, 18 October 1945; General Correspondence & Other Records, 1945-1949 (GC), Office of the Adjutant General (OAG), Records of the Executive Office (EO), RG 260. Also see Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, 1949-1974 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2006); Mogens Pelt, Tobacco, Arms, and Politics: Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War, 1929-1941 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 1998); and John L. Hondros, "Greece and the German Occupation," in The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization, ed. by David H. Close (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 46.

<sup>360</sup> Gerd Schmitt-Hausser, Das Zigarettens-Brevier: Für alle Freunde der "weissen Geliebten" (München: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1976), pp. 65-66.

of cigarettes in occupied Germany, these circumstances threatened to block Greek and Turkish tobacco producers from their most valuable market.

With the exception of Pearl Harbor, American soil did not bear the scars of the war. Tobacco farmers in the U.S. continued to harvest tobacco during the war years, resulting in a sizeable surplus by the latter half of the 1940s. As a result, American growers enjoyed a tremendous advantage in relation to their competition once the occupation authorities granted a general authorization for imports of tobacco into western Germany beginning in 1948. The nature of the decision-making process affected the types of cigarettes ultimately available in Germany after the war and influenced the development of the West German cigarette market, but the circumstances clearly favored U.S. tobacco. It also had significant implications vis-à-vis foreign relations, as the matter of importing tobacco into Germany enflamed international tensions. Both the Greek and Turkish governments strove to reopen the German market to their most important agricultural product, while American tobacco producers pressured their political representatives to use the United States' power to monopolize the market in the western zones of occupation.

Prior to the resumption of tobacco imports from the United States, American Military Governor Lucius D. Clay and the Bipartite Economic Panel dismissed import-for-export proposals to introduce raw tobacco into Germany to be manufactured into finished products for export to overseas markets as a means of earning foreign currency reserves for Germany.<sup>361</sup> Proponents hoped such programs would restore Germany's

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<sup>361</sup> The Military Government had imported tobacco prior to 1948 for incentive programs to boost production in specific industries, most notably the Ruhr coal mining industry, and to satisfy tobacco rations for displaced persons. Martin J. Hillenbrand, "German Tobacco Situation," 18 September 1947; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

economy to self-sufficiency, which would virtually eliminate the need for an extensive black market. More importantly, the availability of American tobacco for such a program represented a potential boon for American growers, since this would bring U.S. leaf into previously inaccessible markets.<sup>362</sup> The plan, whether motivated by good intentions or a desire to capitalize upon the opportunity to plant the seed of American tobacco in Germany, failed to receive widespread support within OMGUS. Opponents insisted that import-for-export plans were destined to fail since Germany had traditionally imported tobacco goods and did not have an international reputation as an exporter of high-quality tobacco products. Moreover, the American market, which represented the most likely destination for a large percentage of any goods to be produced under such a program, appeared to be “entirely unreceptive” to most new cigarettes, even those produced in the U.S. Additionally, critics of the idea noted the inherent silliness of Germans importing American tobacco for the purposes of manufacturing cigarettes to be sold in the United States. Customs duties and state tobacco monopolies, moreover, made export proposals to other likely countries “unreasonable.”<sup>363</sup> The American Military Government also feared that the high risk of “theft and diversion to illegal channels” likely to occur once the

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<sup>362</sup> Director of Tobacco Branch “Tobacco Export Program for Germany,” 6 May 1948; General Correspondence, 1906-1975 (GC), Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture (RG 16); NACP.

<sup>363</sup> Theodore H. Ball, Director to OSS, “Staff Study Economics Division ‘Tobacco Imports,’” 6 May 1947; “Manufacture of Cigarettes in American and British Zones,” 15 May 1947; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP. Clay rejected the proposals to import tobacco for the “propaganda cigarette” around the same time OMGUS considered the possibility of creating an import-for-export program.

raw tobacco had been delivered to German factories, which would counter ongoing efforts to reconstruct West Germany by fuelling the illicit cigarette economy.<sup>364</sup>

The presence of excess tobacco in the United States is not the only explanation for why U.S. officials in Germany turned to American tobacco growers to satisfy tobacco needs in 1948. As part of the Marshall Plan, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) imported more than 24,000 tons of tobacco – including 200 million cigarettes – into Germany in 1948. The surplus made it possible for the ECA to reject proposals to purchase tobacco from several South American nations, which would have cost more than the cheapest American leaf.<sup>365</sup> More importantly, though, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) shared American tobacco farmers’ desire to realign the German market toward American tobacco.<sup>366</sup> The taste and preference of German consumers were inconsequential when it came to shaping tobacco policy in the Bizone.

By 1948, then, Germany’s pre-war tobacco suppliers and German consumers had to contend with the competing interests of American tobacco producers and the USDA. As early as May 1947, the American consulate in Bremen opportunistically observed the long-term “favorable prospects” for U.S. tobacco in the German market, especially for cigarettes, provided the Military Government and Washington imported sufficient

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<sup>364</sup> OMGUS to AGWAR, 26 June 1947; Records Relating to Trade and Trade Agreements, 1947-1949 (TTA); ED, RG 260; NACP.

<sup>365</sup> Department of the Army cable to OMGUS Economic Advisors, 26 November 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP. Also see Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, p. 245.

<sup>366</sup> Chief of Staff of U.S. Army in Washington D.C. from CSCAD to OMGUS, 7 November 1947; TTA, ED, RG 260; NACP.



quantities of high quality tobacco.<sup>367</sup> Three years later, Stanley Andrews, Director of the Foreign Agricultural Relations of the USDA and the U.S. Advisor on Food and Agriculture to the Military Government in Germany, euphemistically explained to the American Embassy in Paris that the American occupation of Germany and creation of the ECA offered a “period of readjustment” that the Americans should capitalize upon to secure the German market.<sup>368</sup> Any attempt to deliberately “readjust” Germany’s market to favor the U.S. had to take Greek and Turkish interests in the region into consideration, in light of the likely Cold War ramifications of a potential American monopoly.

OMGUS’ decision to resume tobacco imports beginning in 1948 signaled a growing awareness of the role of tobacco in addressing the related problems of declining productivity on the part of German workers and the devastating impact of the black market. It also brought the intentions and desires of American tobacco producers to the forefront. Tobacco growers in the United States anticipated substantial growth in their product’s reach, as they viewed the American victory in war as a victory in the world tobacco market. Having recognized the immense importance of cigarettes in the immediate aftermath of the war in Germany, they also believed that the occupation soldier’s interactions with Germans could benefit American tobacco by introducing new styles and tastes to prospective consumers. In the eyes of some American diplomats and

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<sup>367</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Conditions in the Tobacco Industry in the American-British Zone,” 23 May 1947; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

<sup>368</sup> Stanley Andrews to Barnard J. Gibbs, 22 May 1950; GC, RG 16; NACP.

U.S. tobacco interests, GIs represented walking billboards, popularizing the American style cigarette among German citizens.<sup>369</sup>

American tobacco proved to be quite successful on the German market in the late 1940s, largely due to the popularization of American-style cigarettes by GIs. The American blend, which comprised a mixture of both U.S. leaf with stronger, Oriental tobacco from Mediterranean nations, offered a milder smoke that could be more easily tolerated by smokers. The success of American blends also reflected Germans' limited access to types other than American tobacco. The increased consumption of American cigarettes amounted to a "taste infiltration" into the West German market.<sup>370</sup> By June 1949, more than half of the tobacco imported into the new West German state came from the United States, compared to less than ten percent during the pre-war era. This drastic transition meant Germans in the late 1940s and early 1950s consumed cigarettes of a far different composition than the pre-war period, marking a dramatic shift away from Oriental cigarettes and toward blends combining American and Oriental tobaccos. Approximately 95% of the cigarettes consumed by Germans in the 1930s consisted of Oriental tobacco types as compared to 90% blended cigarettes by 1949. Reports from USDA marketing specialists often implied that the switch in consumer preference represented the expression of consumer demand and desire. According to such views, the postwar success of American cigarette types reflected consumer autonomy. The same reports, however, also expressed doubts about the future potential of American tobacco in

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<sup>369</sup> John J. McCloy, "The Present Situation with Regard to Tobacco in the Federal Republic," 31 August 1951; Narrative Reports (NR), 1940-1954; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), Record Group 166 (RG 166); NACP.

<sup>370</sup> Willi Bongard, Fetische des Konsums: Portraits klassischer Markenartikel (Hamburg: Nannen-Verlag, 1964), p. 64.

relation to Oriental cigarettes, suggesting it was essential to secure the *Amis*' presence on the German taste palette before competing tobacco types could once again find their way to German smokers. This meant American cigarettes would need to be firmly established as the most popular option before the German economy had recovered and German consumers could once again afford the typically more expensive Oriental brands.<sup>371</sup>

Naturally, Greece and Turkey had no intention of surrendering the lucrative and immensely important German market to American tobacco supplies. In countering the apparent U.S. advantage, Greek and Turkish officials tapped into American Cold War anxieties and fears about the potential spread of communism throughout southeastern Europe as leverage. Greek and Turkish representatives reacted bitterly to the realization that the JEIA – comprised primarily of American officials – controlled access to the enormously important German market. Greek economist Theodore Christidis argued the JEIA forced American tobacco onto the German market at the expense of Greek tobacco in the hopes of creating consumer demand for American-style cigarettes.<sup>372</sup> As the first shipments of U.S. tobacco reached Bremen's ports, Greek and Turkish trade groups lobbied the JEIA for greater access to the German market to alleviate the "very obvious" and "grave" cigarette shortage, adding that the refusal to open up put both national economies at risk.<sup>373</sup> The ECA gave assurances to Turkish representatives that a

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<sup>371</sup> J. Barnard Gibbs, "The Market for United States Tobacco in Western Germany," 8 September 1949; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

<sup>372</sup> Theodore A. Wilson, "Oral History Interview with Theodore Christidis," Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, 6 July 1970, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/christis.htm> (9 December 2007).

<sup>373</sup> George Zaphiriou, Executive Vice President of the American-Western European Tobacco Company, to the Joint Export-Import Agency, 3 December 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260, NACP.

“reasonable share” of the German market would remain available as a part of the Marshall Plan.<sup>374</sup> In effect, the Truman Doctrine and American aid to Germany via the Marshall Plan exacerbated underlying tensions between the nations competing for control of the German market.

Despite their apparent advantages in comparison to their Greek and Turkish counterparts, many American tobacco farmers and their political representatives questioned the logic of JEIA tobacco policies. In particular, they objected to the JEIA’s pricing policies, which they viewed as jeopardizing their position in the German market.<sup>375</sup> Prior to the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June 1948, JEIA officials in Germany, contending with significant export deficits in comparison to import levels and an uncertain currency, placed greater emphasis on the quantity of tobacco to be purchased than the quality of the actual leaf. This approach represented the most effective means of immediately addressing the tobacco shortage and related problem of the black market, while working with limited budgets and without diverting resources away from the importation of food.<sup>376</sup> The prioritization of quantity over taste frustrated tobacco farmers in the United States, who countered that “the exceptionally low quality of cigarette leaf purchased by JEIA” from American suppliers did not serve the interests of

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<sup>374</sup> Charles R. Enlow, First Secretary of Embassy, Ankara, Turkey to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 2 March 1949, p. 4; NR, 1946-1949; FAS RG 166; NACP.

<sup>375</sup> Brigadier General C. K. Gailey to CSPID for Parks, 28 February 1948; TTA, ED, RG 260; and Department of the Army Cable to EUCOM Personal for Fowler, 27 February 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP.

<sup>376</sup> Murphy to Secretary of State, 19 March 1948; Murphy to Secretary of State, 28 March 1948; NR, 1946-1949; FAS, RG 166; NACP.

the tobacco industry or the United States.<sup>377</sup> They demanded the JEIA reverse its policy and instead focus on higher quality American leaf to properly cultivate the German market and permanently redefine consumer preference. To bolster their argument, American growers pointed toward black market demand for *Ami* cigarettes as evidence of shifting consumer taste and, as such, they expected the Military Government and JEIA to maximize the long-term possibilities of this transformation.<sup>378</sup>

Cold War tensions further complicated international and trade relations involving tobacco exchanges among the United States, Western Germany, Greece, and Turkey. Britain's diminished influence in southeastern Europe, epitomized by their withdrawal from Greece in 1947, created a potential power vacuum of great concern to Washington.<sup>379</sup> The Communist presence in neighboring Balkan states combined with the absence of western political, military, and economic interests in Greece during the civil war led the Truman administration to conclude that the Soviet Union would acquire a critically important outlet along the Mediterranean in the absence of an American intervention. In March 1947, Truman urged Congress to authorize a sizeable aid package to protect Greece and Turkey from the Communist threat, with three-quarters of the assistance earmarked for Greece. The Truman Doctrine provided both Greece and

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<sup>377</sup> J. Barnard Gibbs and C.B. Cheatham Jr. to Joseph Becker, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, 27 January 1948; TTA, ED, RG 260; Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, N.E. Dodd, to the Production and Marketing Administration, "Tobacco Export Program for Germany," 14 May 1948; GC, RG 16; NACP.

<sup>378</sup> Director of the Tobacco Branch to Administrator, "Tobacco Export Program for Germany," 6 May 1948; GC, RG 16; NACP.

<sup>379</sup> For an exploration of the domestic instability and the economic dynamics behind Greek political developments in the mid-1940s see Athanasios Lykogiannis, Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis, 1944-1947: From Liberation to the Truman Doctrine (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002).

Turkey with operational support to the tune of more than \$400 million to stabilize their respective economies and political situations, while requiring the Americans to station civilian and military advisors in both countries.<sup>380</sup>

This set of international and diplomatic developments in southeastern Europe had significant implications for the reconstruction of the German tobacco market. Greece and Turkey had repeatedly made their desires to reestablish trade with Germany known to both German and American officials, insisting that the sale and export of tobacco to Germany represented a critically important step in ensuring their own stability during the early Cold War era. Prior to the war, for example, Turkey exported approximately one-half of its tobacco to Germany.<sup>381</sup> Greece also faced numerous difficulties stemming from the Nazi occupation, including the German confiscation of tobacco, as well as the devastation and economic complications arising from civil war.<sup>382</sup> In 1947, American military officials assisted the Greek tobacco industry by returning tobacco stocks seized by the German military and Greek collaborators during the war, a move that further aggravated existing shortages in Germany.<sup>383</sup> The Bipartite Control Office in Frankfurt, whose responsibilities included the day-to-day administration of matters related to food

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<sup>380</sup> Howard Jones, "A New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 43-44.

<sup>381</sup> Secretary General of International Chamber of Commerce to Mr. L. Wilkinson, Economic Advisor to the Military Governor of OMGUS, 6 July 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP.

<sup>382</sup> David H. Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War (New York: Longman, 1995); John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981); and Judith S. Jeffery, Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947-1952 (New York: Lexington Books, 2000).

<sup>383</sup> OMGUS signed Keating to AGWAR, 4 May 1947; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; NACP. As a clear sign of the times, the same restricted cable message indicated American MG representatives would seek to purchase the returned tobacco from Greece at discounted rates.

and agriculture, recognized the gravity of the situation facing Greece, noting, “it was necessary for Greece to recapture its foreign markets, especially the German market.”<sup>384</sup>

Without sufficient access to German consumers, Greek and Turkish representatives intimated that their respective governments and political systems would collapse and open the door to a possible communist takeover.

The competing interests of tobacco farmers and national governments forced the civilian and military officials in Germany responsible for negotiating tobacco import agreements to find the proper balance among American, Greek, and Turkish interests, while supplying the German population with enough raw tobacco to meet ration requirements. U.S. officials also took note of the effect tobacco negotiations had upon international relations, even at a time when America had offered aid to Greece and Turkey through the Truman Doctrine. For instance, the USDA grew increasingly concerned with the growth of Turkish and Greek propaganda against the American incursion into central Europe’s tobacco markets, and occupation authorities in Germany feared the potential backlash and political implications of anti-American sentiment.<sup>385</sup>

The Turkish press reportedly declared Clay’s refusal to authorize agreements to exchange large amounts of Turkish tobacco for German textiles as an act of “economic imperialism” designed to preserve the German market for American tobacco. Clay’s refusal, though, was in line with the Military Government’s general economic policy of

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<sup>384</sup> Note of a Meeting Held in the Bipartite Control Office, Frankfurt, 8 January 1948, prepared 14 January 1948, p. 2; JEIA Records Related to Payment and Trade Agreements, 1946-1950; The Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA); Records of U.S. Element, Bipartite Control Office; Records of the U.S. Element of Inter-Allied Organizations, RG 260; NACP.

<sup>385</sup> Deputy Administrator USDA to Wesley McCune, 26 November 1948; GC, RG 16; NACP.

minimizing the export of goods needed in Germany, such as textiles, in exchange for raw materials not deemed essential.<sup>386</sup>

Meanwhile, the complex international competition surrounding the German tobacco market tended to neglect the German consumer, a development that carried significant repercussions regarding the shape of the market as the West German economic reconstruction project of the late 1940s was transformed into the “economic miracle” of the 1950s. Parties on both sides of the Atlantic expected German tastes to revert to pre-war standards once conditions normalized, meaning that blended cigarettes would lose out to straight Oriental cigarettes.<sup>387</sup> The USDA aimed to permanently reorient as much of the market as possible toward American-styled tobacco goods before their window of opportunity closed, while Greek and Turkish representatives insisted historical trade patterns be reinstated in order to avoid the “annihilation of national economies.”<sup>388</sup> For much of this period, then, the voice of German smokers had been largely marginalized, while the import policies of occupation agencies limited the options available to the actual consumers.

As German officials gained increased autonomy in the western zones, leaders, including Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, agreed to purchase large supplies of Greek

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<sup>386</sup> Telegram from Secretary of State Lovatt, 28 May 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260; Murphy to Secretary of State, No. 834, 10 April 1947; NR, 1946-1949; RG 166; NACP.

<sup>387</sup> Director of the Tobacco Branch to Administrator, “Tobacco Export Program for Germany,” 6 May 1948; GC, RG 16; H. Lawrence Groves, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs of the American Embassy in Greece, to the Secretary of State, 8 October 1947; NR, 1946-1949, RG 166; and Maurice W. Altaffer to Department of State, “Tobacco Notes,” 19 June 1950; NR, 1950-1954, RG 166; NACP.

<sup>388</sup> Chief of Staff of U.S. Army in Washington D.C. to OMGUS, 7 November 1947; and George Zaphiriou to Joint Export-Import Agency, 3 December 1948; GC, OAG, EO, RG 260, NACP.



and Turkish tobacco, ensuring these markets would remain open to German exports. The United States, meanwhile, aligned its own understanding of the German smoker with American economic interests. Anxious U.S. officials claimed the West German government “discriminated” against American tobacco to the point of “the total exclusion or exclusion in major part” of U.S. leaf. While tobacco manufacturers and officials in the United States viewed the Marshall Plan as a potential weapon to undo the perceived discrimination against American tobacco on the part of German government, the Turks feared the ERP would provide the United States with another unfair advantage in the competition for the West German market.<sup>389</sup> The American State Department estimated the ratio of American and Oriental tobacco purchased by the Federal Republic declined from 80:20 to 60:40 between 1950 and 1951. Despite the large-scale imports of American cigarettes and tobacco, several American officials continued to issue alarmist reports insisting the German industry was actively working to redirect the market away from American taste preferences under the theory that West German consumers would opt for their previous favorites when presented with a choice between American-style blended cigarettes and straight Oriental cigarettes.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> James C. Cunningham, Consumer Goods Section, to George W. Thomas, Chief Tobacco Branch of the Economic Cooperation Administration, 28 May 1951; Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Knox T. Hutchinson to Honorable Burnet R. Maybank, U.S. Senate, 11 May 1951; Secretary Charles F. Brannan to Honorable W. C. Foster, Administrator of Economic Cooperation Administration, 20 March 1951; Jean Cattier, Chief of ECA Special Mission to Germany, to Minister for Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany Ludwig Erhard, 2 May 1951; GC, RG 16; NACP.

<sup>390</sup> Maurice W. Altaffer, “Tobacco Notes,” 19 June 1950; NR, 1950-1954; FAS RG 166; NACP. Altaffer’s report was based on information culled from two trade journals for the German tobacco industry: Sueddeutsche Tabakzeitung and Deutscher Tabak Kurier.

High Commissioner McCloy, the civilian successor to the position of Military Governor, decried the West German government's efforts to "modify" consumer patterns of consumption away from American-style cigarettes, which, according to German critics, had simply been a "phenomenon born of scarcity" due to "the long period of time in which no other types of blends were available." He insisted "almost all of the cigarettes being sold in Germany are American blends with an average of 60% of American tobacco and 20% each of Greek and Turkish tobaccos," a development that arose directly because of the limited tobacco supplies after 1945 and the popularization of American-style cigarettes brought in by occupation troops, leaving "a very marked preference for American type tobacco blends which had heretofore existed only on a very limited scale in Germany." Nonetheless, McCloy foresaw serious problems for the American cigarette in West Germany's immediate future, suggesting officials in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's administration manipulated tobacco tax rates as "a powerful weapon" to alter "consumer preference," adding that manufacturers in the Federal Republic backed the "discriminatory treatment." In response, McCloy argued "the only course open to the United States" was to use the "economic aid weapon, to influence the German Government to continue to make free dollars available for tobacco, particularly when Greek and Turkish prices are not competitive on the world market." Seemingly echoing the sentiments of the U.S. tobacco trade at the war's end, McCloy proclaimed, "if Germans were going to smoke, it had to be American tobacco."<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> McCloy, "The Present Situation with Regard to Tobacco in the Federal Republic," p. 2 and 10, NR, 1940-1954, RG 166; NACP.

## **Advertising a Phenomenon Born of Scarcity**

The advertising of the period reflected the transition of Western Germany's cigarette market, as leading cigarette manufacturers had to determine the best means of promoting cigarette use amidst difficult circumstances. Reemtsma promoted new "transition" or "intermediate" brands consisting of American blends to build a bridge to a point in the indefinite future when they could resurrect previously successful pre-war brands consisting primarily of tobacco from the Orient, such as Zuban and Eckstein No. 5. In late 1948, Reemtsma introduced Fox and Collie cigarettes, which featured a blend of Virginia and Oriental tobacco, to German consumers. The tobacco company's new offerings represented an important concession to dramatic market transformations over the course of the occupation, legitimizing the changes in the process. A company chronicle that was written in the early 1960s and distributed privately among the firm's executives contended the switch toward the "Anglo-American taste" in the immediate postwar era made it impossible to immediately restructure the West German cigarette market along pre-war lines. The limited stocks of Oriental tobacco produced a temporary phenomenon, which necessitated innovation in the mixing of tobacco to avoid further depletion of the limited supply. Moreover, adopting the American-style blend of cigarette tobacco allowed German firms to tap into the sub-market of GIs stationed in southern Germany.<sup>392</sup> Bavarian civilians had been among the earliest converts to milder,

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<sup>392</sup> Philipp F. Reemtsma, Die Firmenentwicklung 1910 bis 1952: Als Sonderdruck aus den Beiträgen zu einer Firmengeschichte für den Hausgebrauch hergestellt (Unpublished, 1953), pp. 219-220. Also see Bongard, p. 65.

American style cigarettes due to their closer proximity to Americans, as opposed to Germans living in the French or Soviet zones of occupation.<sup>393</sup>

Fox's advertising explicitly highlighted the market transition by juxtaposing sketches of old-fashioned modes of tobacco production in the "Orient" with the technologically advanced methods of production in the United States. In order to establish the brand's identity and purpose during its introductory phase, early Fox ads explained that the blended Virginia cigarette "unites all preferential characteristics of the most important areas of cultivation in America and the Orient." The blend, in these ads, refers to both the "mild and sweet" tobacco mixture and the harmonization of two distinct production methods of seemingly different eras, as represented in the distinct images. America's energetic "speed and rhythm" is depicted through modernized means of production and distribution as compared to the "calm" techniques employed by tobacco growers in the Orient. Thus, in America, tobacco is packed in barrels and transported via forklifts and motorized trucks, while the Orient relies upon laborers carrying baskets or oxcarts.<sup>394</sup>

Similarly, a 1950 Fox ad played with the opening of Goethe's famous poem, "The United States," to symbolize the high quality of the blended cigarette. (Figure 3.2) Whereas the original poem began by stating, "America, you have it better than our old continent," the Fox ad insisted, "America, you do not smoke better." The ad itself contrasts the shipping methods of tobacco producers in both the United States and the Orient. In an American harbor scene, placed at the top of the image, dockworkers load

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<sup>393</sup> Reemtsma, *Firmentwicklung*, p. 238.

<sup>394</sup> Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg) Reemtsma-Archive (hereafter MdA ReeA) MA.A 2005/032.028.043 and MA.A 2005/032.028.042.

barrels of tobacco onto a ship, appropriately named “Virginia,” against the backdrop of a suspension bridge and urban skyline. The scene from the Orient at the bottom of the ad featuring sailboats set against a backdrop of ancient ruins, which implicitly reinforces a hierarchy that places the modern, industrial American approach above the antiquated and pre-modern efforts utilized by tobacco growers of the Orient.<sup>395</sup>

One of Reemtsma’s leading competitors used one of the most innovative approaches to marketing a new cigarette brand in the late 1940s. The earliest ad for Bremen-based Martin Brinkmann’s Texas cigarettes prominently displayed the brand name, an image of a Texas pack, and incorporated a substantial amount of copy, which had been largely absent in the early postwar period.<sup>396</sup> In an ad that ran in Die Zeit on 16 June 1949, Brinkmann assured consumers that Texas cigarettes used the same high quality tobacco and recipe to match the “unusually brilliant and strong smelling composition” of world-renowned American brands. Furthermore, the ad proclaimed this special blend would satisfy the “desires of the German smoker.” Less than three months later, another Texas ad in Die Zeit referred to the continued problems of tobacco supply and distribution in the new West German state.<sup>397</sup> Unlike the previous ad, the 1 September 1949 advert did not include an illustration of the cigarette pack, hinting at the existing shortage. Moreover, the new ad removed the slogan referencing the flavor and

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<sup>395</sup> Mda ReeA MA.A 2005/032.028.031. Also see Tino Jacobs and Sandra Schürmann, “Rauchsignale: Struktureller Wandel und visuelle Strategien auf dem deutschen Zigarettenmarkt im 20. Jahrhundert,” Werkstatt Geschichte 45 (2007), pp. 32-33.

<sup>396</sup> Reemtsma, Firmenentwicklung, p. 243. The limited use of copy was partly the result of paper shortages in the initial postwar period.

<sup>397</sup> Ingrid Schenk, “From Calories to Kidney-Shaped Tables: Consumerism and the Constitution of West German National Identity, 1945-1965.” (Ph.D. diss.: University of Pennsylvania, 1996), p. 66.

sweetness of Virginia tobacco and any mention of the American blend. Instead, it focused on the issue of scarcity and the “unique demand” that accompanied the introduction of Texas cigarettes. Brinkmann proclaimed the “production of hundreds of millions of cigarettes could not satisfy such a stampede.” According to the copy, the numerous signs declaring tobacconists to be sold out of Texas cigarettes disappointed “many of our friends.” In the end, the ad guaranteed production would double through the use of “new and modern manufacturing facilities.”

This ad appeared roughly fourteen months after the June 1948 currency reform, a date often selected as the starting point for West Germany’s “economic miracle.” Following years of constrained consumption due to the war, shortages, and rationing, Brinkmann’s allusion of potential or anticipatory consumption through the promise of increased production fit within broader marketing trends in the decade and a half after the war. As we have seen, the introduction of a new currency in 1948 did not immediately transform patterns of consumption in the western zones of occupation or, after May 1949, in the new West German state.<sup>398</sup> The direct reference to production capabilities reinforced advertisers’ promises of an easier life and the opportunities to consume and enjoy cigarettes in the immediate future. Consumer displays, trade fairs, and advertisements helped “sell” the idea of an “economic miracle” and general prosperity among West Germans.<sup>399</sup> In the case of Texas cigarettes, Brinkmann ensured its

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<sup>398</sup> Michael Wildt, “Continuities and Discontinuities of Consumer Mentality in West Germany in the 1950s,” in Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s, ed. by Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (Washington D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2003).

<sup>399</sup> S. Jonathan Wiesen, “Miracles for Sale: Consumer Displays and Advertising in Postwar West Germany,” in Consuming Germany in the Cold War, ed. by David F. Crew (New York: Berg, 2003), pp. 151-178.

customers that the days of shortages would soon end and smokers could satisfy their demands for the new American style cigarettes through the modernization of postwar tobacco production. In the meantime, subsequent Texas ads throughout 1949 heralded the brand's unique taste and mildness, while trying to drum up demand by directing consumers' attention to the difficulty in locating tobacconists with available supplies. Essentially, smokers knew Texas must be great because they could never find it.<sup>400</sup>

The focus on shortages and pent-up demand gradually gave way, and, by mid-1950, Texas switched to testimonials from an assortment of ordinary citizens attesting to the brand's high quality. Between October 1952 and February 1953, however, Texas' marketing approach indirectly returned to the question of tobacco supplies through a series of ads focused on the harvesting and production processes on a tobacco plantation.<sup>401</sup> By directing consumers' attention to the production and cultivation of tobacco, Brinkmann subtly suggested the drastic shortages fresh on the minds of many German smokers were a thing of the past. The ads, based around illustrations of African-American plantation workers in various districts of Virginia, including Lawrenceville, Charlottesville, and Kingston, follow the step-by-step process of planting, harvesting, curing, and shipping tobacco from the plantation. Collectively, the ads served to reassure consumers of the substantial supply of American tobacco at West Germany's disposal.

The Texas series simultaneously spoke to racial anxieties in the wake of the American occupation of Germany, as they appeared as *Besatzungskinder* (occupation

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<sup>400</sup> Texas ad, Die Zeit, 6 October 1949 p. 7.

<sup>401</sup> The Texas ads appeared every two to three weeks in Der Spiegel beginning on 29 October 1952. The last ad, which showed a plantation worker preparing the tobacco for shipment, appeared on 11 February 1953.

children) entered German schools – and the public sphere by extension – and the release of *Toxi*, a film that traced a German family’s gradual acceptance of the title character, a young Afro-German occupation child. The film, however, concluded with Toxi’s reunion with her African-American father who had not been aware of her existence, implying that “mixed raced” occupation children belonged in the United States.<sup>402</sup> Much like *Toxi*, the Texas ads spoke to Germans’ struggles with racial politics and identities in light of the American occupation. Both the film and advertisements created a fantasy world, whereby Germans could restore the racial hierarchy by redirecting the “occupation children” to America and placing African-Americans at the bottom of the labor hierarchy. In the latter case, the plantation laborers worked to produce goods that would ultimately provide pleasure and relief to white Germans. Less than a decade following the defeat of the Nazi regime, the reworking of the racial order through the film and ads also constituted the redefinition of race itself, as it increasingly became a concept influenced by skin color.

The marketing strategy for Reemtsma’s Ova followed a very different approach by focusing on educating consumers about the nature of the new blend. Reemtsma originally introduced Ova as a regional brand in the 1920s, when there were no brands with national appeal.<sup>403</sup> Following its postwar re-launch, Ova ads took a direct approach in informing consumers about its tobacco mixture, and it utilized the image of an expert

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<sup>402</sup> Heide Fehrenbach, Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 107-131.

<sup>403</sup> Bongard, p. 62. On the pre-war history of the German cigarette market see Jacobs and Schürmann, pp. 34-38; Schmitt-Hausser, pp. 64-74; and Michael Weisser, Cigaretten-Reclame Ueber die Kunst Blauen Dunst zu Verkaufen: Die Geschichte der Zigarette, ihren Industrie und ihrer Werbung von 1860 bis 1930 (Münster: F. Coppenrath Verlag, 1980).



in a white coat to add legitimacy and authority to these claims. (Figure 3.3) Ova's ads called attention to its double mixture following the Piedmont basis, responsible for producing a tobacco consisting of "three separate harmonies": the tobacco of the Orient, American tobacco, and the blending of both types. Reemtsma officials had introduced the brand in this manner as a means of testing the consuming public's willingness to accept an American blend in relatively familiar German packaging as compared to an entirely new brand.<sup>404</sup> In these ads, the tobacco expert used a map of the American mid-Atlantic to teach the uninformed consumers about the origins of Virginia tobacco, tested the quality of cigarettes produced through the double mixing process, and highlighted the process of transforming tobacco leaves into a tobacco mixture suitable for consumption.<sup>405</sup>

Reemtsma also sought to promote the brand and its particular mixture in trade journals with a campaign built around American responses to smoking Ova cigarettes. The "What does America say?" marketing approach featured letters from American tobacco buyers, farmers, warehouse operators, and Miss Virginia 1950, among others, and a German translation. These ads placed Americans in the position of experts capable of judging the effectiveness and authenticity of German-produced cigarettes. Merrill Cox, an auctioneer, praised Ova as a "damned good cigarette," while J. Franklin Mills, a buyer and seller of tobacco, insisted Ova's quality was a reflection of "excellence and craftsmanship of German tobacco laboratories." The letter from the proprietor of Leader

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<sup>404</sup> Reemtsma, *Firmenentwicklung*, p. 235.

<sup>405</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/022.046.149. According to Reemtsma's chronicle, the testimonial form of promotion used to explain the "Piedmont-Basis" and "double mixture" was a classic Reemtsma style prior to the war. Reemtsma, *Firmenentwicklung*, p. 258.

Warehouse in North Carolina, Paul Sanda, reinforced Ova's claims to authenticity by stating "a cigarette as good as the OVA cigarette" required "experience, science, sampling and many laboratory tests." The general manager of a North Carolina warehouse cited his experience in characterizing Ova as a "good cigarette." In another ad, John G. Thomas, the manager of Wilson, North Carolina's Chamber of Commerce, wrote, "Americans like many things the Continental people do." Thomas's letter, featuring a corrected typo to assure readers of the letter's validity, suggests OVA represented an "understanding across the ocean." The blended cigarette, it turned out, had been an effective tool in improving relations between former enemies.<sup>406</sup>

The advertisements for these postwar transition brands shared one remarkable similarity – they rarely if ever showed Germans consuming these cigarettes. Fox and Texas ads showed the various stages of the harvesting, processing, and distribution of tobacco for the benefit of German consumers. Ova relied upon the expert in a white lab coat to convince consumers of the overall quality of the *Doppelmischung*. Or, as in the case of the earliest ads for Texas, advertisers appropriated the "phenomenon of scarcity" theme to build up anticipation. Even as the ads promised a bright future of air filled with *blauen Dunst*, the general absence of Germans smoking in this fantasy world speaks to German cigarette companies' relative uneasiness with the realities of the postwar cigarette market. Rather than incorporate depictions of the actual act of consumption within the visual rhetoric of early postwar advertising, many of these initial campaigns stressed the fact that cigarette companies would eventually fulfill smokers' desires by

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<sup>406</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.046.005 and MA.A 2005/032.046.008.

producing a sufficient supply of cigarettes that would make shortages and queues a relic of the past.

## **Conclusion**

During the course of the late 1940s, America's efforts to balance economic self-interest in the international tobacco market with Cold War politics presented unique challenges, resulting in the creation of a cigarette market that differed in important respects from the pre-war years. The JEIA's decision to import as much of the cheapest American tobacco available into Germany frustrated U.S. tobacco growers, who viewed the German market as their own preserve. Moreover, it threatened the very livelihood of the Greek and Turkish tobacco trades, both of which depended upon access to Germany. Whereas the American tobacco trade anticipated the *de facto* colonization of the German market into the American Market Empire, Greece and Turkey sought to capitalize upon America's Cold War anxiety by hinting at their vulnerability in relation to the Soviet Union. German smokers also had to contend with changes wrought by the import policies, which had been crafted with an exclusive focus on the immediate amelioration of tobacco shortages and no consideration of prevailing preferences as to which type of tobacco had been popular in Germany.

The creation and promotion of new or re-launched brands by Reemtsma and Brinkmann, for example, reflected the uncertainties of the early postwar cigarette market. Rather than possibly tarnish popular pre-war brands comprised entirely of Oriental tobacco, several manufacturers used transition brands as a bridge to capitalize upon the dominance of American blends while waiting for the market to correct itself. The ads of

this period underscored this prevailing sentiment, as they focused primarily on the harvesting process, so as to educate German smokers about the origins of the new style of American-blend cigarettes. Even as these ads sought to promote the consumption of these brands, it is quite telling that they rarely depicted Germans in the act of smoking these types of cigarettes. The emphasis on the production and distribution of cigarettes within early postwar advertising imagery also reflected the industry's concerns regarding its ability to satisfy the overwhelming demand of German smokers after prolonged experiences of scarcity. The ads for these brands also suggest many cigarette companies in the Federal Republic did not anticipate the American blend would have a long shelf life in the West German market, sensing that popular pre-war styles would reemerge and dominate the market once again. By 1953, the West German cigarette industry resurrected many of the pre-war brands as Orient tobacco enjoyed a short-lived renaissance among West German smokers. However, the structures of the West German cigarette market had been indelibly altered by the experiences of the 1940s and American blend cigarettes remained dominant in the long run.<sup>407</sup> In subsequent decades, the American influence would be seen in the rise of filter cigarettes and increased attention to nicotine content within cigarette advertising. Postwar advertisers and cigarette companies increasingly adopted American marketing strategies and, as the Ova ads showed, viewed Americans as the arbiters of cigarette quality. The world of advertising and cigarette promotion continued this trend as part of the construction of a West German culture of smoking.

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<sup>407</sup> Jacobs and Schürmann, pp. 46-48.

## **Chapter Four**

### **West Germany as Marlboro Country: Gender and National Identities in Cigarette Advertising, 1953-1983**

In 1968 Martin Brinkmann A.G. introduced Condor cigarettes with a marketing strategy designed to appeal to “those who appreciate things German,” including German ham, wine, and beer. Critics immediately blasted the brand name as a direct reference to the infamous Condor Legion, the German military unit that fought on behalf of Franco and the nationalists during the Spanish Civil War. The Social Democrats rebuked the campaign’s “mild appeal to muscular nationalism,” while participants in the extra-parliamentary protest movement reportedly destroyed Condor posters. The SPD’s party press denounced Condor as the “cigarette for ex-Nazis” and openly questioned which of the ministers in Bonn would smoke Condors, thereby exposing their fascist leanings. Brinkmann in turn accused student radicals, Communists, and other extra-parliamentary activists of defaming Condor posters with swastikas and a message reminding Germans that the nation’s “downfall” began with the Condor Legion. The intensity of public outrage ultimately compelled Brinkmann to withdraw upwards of 40 million cigarettes from the market and effectively acknowledge its public relations blunder.<sup>408</sup>

Brinkmann, the third largest cigarette manufacturer in the Federal Republic, initiated the Condor campaign amidst widespread political tumult and social unrest in the Federal Republic. Two years earlier, the Christian Democrats and SPD formed the First

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<sup>408</sup> “Condors Absturz,” *Der Spiegel*, 14 October 1968, p. 105. Also see “West Germany: Heil Condor!” *Newsweek*, 28 October 1968, Bates No. 1002402759A, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mzr52d00> (accessed 20 October 2003).

Grand Coalition government headed by CDU member Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a former Nazi party member. Kiesinger's rise to national prominence, combined with the resurrection in the early 1960s of the political far right in the form of the National Democratic Party (NDP), heightened the West German public's sensitivity to expressions of nationalism and, more specifically, to public discussions of the Nazi legacy during the long 1960s.<sup>409</sup> Brinkmann's campaign for a seemingly nationalistic cigarette stood "no chance" of succeeding in the context of 1960s West Germany.<sup>410</sup> In defending their marketing strategy, Brinkmann officials insisted the campaign simply mirrored the wildly successful campaign of Reemtsma's Peter Stuyvesant Filter, whose "taste of the great, wide world" message linked smoking with world travel and cosmopolitanism. While Condor flailed, Stuyvesant's marketing created one of the most memorable ad slogans in postwar Germany and helped establish it as one of the five most popular brands for more than twenty years.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis, eds., Coping With the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); and David Childs, "The Nationalist and Neo-Nazi Scene Since 1945," in The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949: Politics, Society and Economy Before and After Unification, ed. by Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi (New York: Longman, 1996), pp. 213-219. Nearly one-quarter of the NDP had been Nazi party members during the Third Reich and the party's official program espoused support for compensating those affected by the Second World War, referring to former soldiers, SS members, and expellees as opposed to concentration camp victims. NDP candidates enjoyed a fair amount of success in regional elections during the latter half of the 1960s, after the pace of economic growth slowed considerably and the remnants of the far right organized itself in opposition to the New Left.

<sup>410</sup> Rainer Gries, Produkte & Politik: Zur Kultur und Politikgeschichte der Produktkommunikation (Vienna: WUV, 2006), pp. 116-117.

<sup>411</sup> Wolfgang Hars, Lexikon der Werbe-sprüche: 500 bekannte deutsche Werbeslogans und ihre Geschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn & Co. Verlag, 1999), pp. 64-65. Peter Stuyvesant was the first King Size Filter in West Germany, claiming 5% and 10% in its first two years, respectively. The brand peaked at 16% in 1967 and remained a top five brand until the 1980s.

The dramatic failure of Condor in comparison to the remarkable success of Peter Stuyvesant illustrates the importance of the social and cultural politics of advertising, as well as of brand identity. The world of advertising provides a forum to identify and express needs and anxieties, instilling desire and ameliorating fears related to prospective losses of control, individual autonomy, and sense of community. In this respect, advertising functions not only as a means of communication between advertiser and consumer, but also plays important roles in shaping and reflecting the social and cultural contours of a given society.<sup>412</sup> Marketing practices and commercial landscapes create spaces within which national, political, and social identities can be forged and contested; they operate as sites of political, cultural, and moral debate; and they enable advertisers and producers the opportunity to assuage consumer apprehensions and longings. As such, the significance of advertising extends beyond the principal objective of selling products. Ads and public relations reflect broader societal and cultural developments, and they often succeed or fail on the advertiser's ability to effectively tap into public consciousness by appropriating or commercializing contemporary trends and values.<sup>413</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Pamela E. Swett, S. Jonathan Wiesen, and Jonathan R. Zatlín, "Introduction," in Selling Modernity: Advertising in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. by Pamela E. Swett, S. Jonathan Wiesen, and Jonathan R. Zatlín (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 1-26; Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York: Basic Books, 1995); and Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the American Mass Market (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).

<sup>413</sup> For competing views on whether or not ads affect behavior or reflect change, see Michael Schudson, Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious Impact on American Society (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Lorraine Greaves, Smoke Screen: Women's Smoking and Social Control (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1996). For a brief review of these different positions, see Penny Tinkler, "'Red Tips for Hot Lips': Advertising Cigarettes for Young Women in Britain, 1920-1970," Women's History Review 10:2 (2001), p. 251.

Cigarette companies relied upon advertising to establish a distinctive and appealing brand identity as a means of distinguishing their product from the more than two hundred cigarette brands sold in West Germany. The use of lifestyle oriented advertising to create brand identities contributed to the discourse and iconography of national identity and assisted in the establishment of the social and cultural contours consumers drew upon in defining themselves as a society and as individuals. As such, cigarette ads reflected social, cultural, and political tensions regarding the redefinition of gender, sexual, class, racial, and national identities. Yet, in addition to providing a space to navigate social anxieties, cigarette ads also had to contend with problems specific to their particular product. Advertisers had to be wary of both the past – the cigarette’s position in Nazi ideology as well as its centrality to the black markets of the late 1940s – and the present – namely, questions regarding the potential health risks of smoking.

### **Brand Identity and the West German Market**

Tobacco companies relied extensively upon advertising, marketing, and public relations to establish and promote their particular brands in the collective consciousness of the consuming public, making cigarettes the most advertised consumer good in the Federal Republic.<sup>414</sup> In the 1960s, advertisers reflexively incorporated the notion of

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<sup>414</sup> Gerd Schmitt-Hausser, Das Zigaretten-Brevier: Für alle Freunde der “Weissen Geliebten” (München: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1976), p. 74; Helga Berndt, “Sozialpolitische Aspekte der Gesundheitspolitik, dargestellt am Beispiel der Massenwerbung der Zigarettenindustrie,” (Ph.D. diss.: Universität zu Köln, 1966), pp. 91-92; Hans Günter Herppich, “Das Markenbild als Element flexibler Absatzplanung in der Zigarettenindustrie,” in Absatzplanung in der Praxis, ed. by Erich Gutenberg (Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag 1962), p. 117; and Willi Bongard, Männer machen Märkte: Mythos und Wirklichkeit der Werbung (Oldenburg: G. Stalling, 1963), p. 29. Herppich and Berndt both cite examples of smokers’ inability to identify their preferred brand in blind taste tests while Bongard argued it was not technologically feasible to have broad differences in taste in a market featuring more than two hundred brands.



lifestyle into their practice in an attempt to associate their products with a specific understanding of behavior, appearance, and attitude, all of which become routine to the individual who adopts a particular lifestyle.<sup>415</sup> These ads looked remarkably different than those of the preceding decades, as they focused increasingly upon the visual element. Many of the ads from the Third Reich, occupation era, and early Federal Republic incorporated quite a bit of copy and, in the case of Texas and Fox, often addressed the production of cigarettes rather than the act of smoking itself. Through the marketing of particular lifestyles, advertisers built expectations and a sense of connection between the product and the consumer, while simultaneously staking claim to a unique identity.<sup>416</sup> By forging brand consciousness among smokers and non-smokers, cigarette advertising produces a lifestyle “image” to guarantee consumers the quickest possible satisfaction of their particular needs, real or imagined, while consumers selectively use the information available in advertisements to project their own image and set of qualities onto the brand. Lifestyle ads did not market the product as much as they promoted a set of habits, which did not always necessarily involve the actual commodity. Smokers “smoke not only the cigarette but also the image,” identifying themselves “with the social status of the brand image.”<sup>417</sup> Advertisers and anti-smoking activists both recognized the

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<sup>415</sup> Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 81-87.

<sup>416</sup> Luca E. A. Roncoroni, “Der Geschmack der grossen Welt: Semiotisch-Diachrone Analyse der Zigarettenwerbung,” (Ph.D. diss., Universität Zürich, 1996), p. 5; Peter Eckelmann, “Werbung und Wettbewerb auf dem deutschen Zigarettenmarkt,” (Ph.D. diss.: Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, 1970), p. 87; and Berndt, p. 94.

<sup>417</sup> Berndt, pp. 94 and 105; Herppich, p. 117; Schmitt-Hausser, p. 65; and Roncoroni, p. 7. Herppich and Schmitt-Hausser expressed similar sentiments in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively,

importance of branding and advertising to the cigarette industry's ability to construct images and identities that were "deeply ingrained on the mind of the people."<sup>418</sup> Yet, many of the brands discussed in this chapter honed in on similar themes in creating their brand identity. The repetition of key themes within the carefully constructed images reinforces advertising's ability to capture the *Zeitgeist* of a particular historical moment.

Cigarette companies spent enormous sums of money to influence consumer choice. For most brands, success meant claiming one percent of the overall market, which featured more than two hundred different brands. Despite the vast array of choices among brands, the market was highly concentrated, as the four largest manufacturers controlled nearly 97% of the total market.<sup>419</sup> For much of the 1950s and 1960s, three brands dominated their competition. HB (British American Tobacco), Ernte 23 (Reemtsma), and Peter Stuyvesant (Reemtsma) controlled an overwhelming proportion of the market, accounting for more than half of overall cigarette sales.<sup>420</sup> Altogether, the top twenty-three brands comprised nearly ninety percent of the overall market.<sup>421</sup> To put the stakes into perspective, only four of 123 brands introduced onto the cigarette market

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while Luca Roncoroni has more recently elaborated on the notion of purchasing an "idea" as opposed to a product.

<sup>418</sup> IRES-Marketing GmbH, "Die Zigarette im sozialen Spannungsfeld" or "Cigarettes as part of the total social picture (with special reference to Germany)," 1981, Bates No. 502830956/0970, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ocb78d00> (accessed 20 October 2003).

<sup>419</sup> Berndt, p. 89. The four manufacturers were Reemtsma, British American Tobacco, Martin Brinkmann A.G., and Haus Neuerburg.

<sup>420</sup> Willi Bongard, *Fetische des Konsums: Portraits klassischer Markenartikel* (Hamburg: Nannen-Verlag, 1964), p. 61.

<sup>421</sup> Herppich, p. 119.

between 1959 and 1963 reached sales of 100 million per month.<sup>422</sup> Given the heightened risks of failure, tobacco companies invested heavily in marketing. By the end of the 1950s, cigarette advertising accounted for more than 13% of all press advertising in West Germany, and, in an attempt to secure a favorable position in the market, the cigarette industry's advertising expenditures reached 150 million DM in 1961 and continued to rise. The market was saturated with ads that "reached just about everyone."<sup>423</sup>

Apart from this oligopoly, the self-service nature of the cigarette market made immediate brand identification by smokers essential to a particular brand's success. Upwards of one-half of all cigarette sales in the 1970s came via vending machines, making instantaneous recognition of a brand logo, name, or pack critical.<sup>424</sup> The success of individual brands in West Germany necessitated getting packs into the increasingly prevalent cigarette vending machines, of which there were more than 800,000 by the early 1970s.<sup>425</sup> The federal government, moreover, did not impose stringent regulations on the operation of vending machines, which proved to be one of the most effective

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<sup>422</sup> Peter Gilow, J. Walter Thompson Company Frankfurt Office Manager, to Edward G. Wilson, J. Walter Thompson, New York Office, 31 May 1963, Box 4, Peter Gilow Papers, Other J. Walter Thompson Offices Series, 1961-1978, in John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising, and Marketing History, J. Walter Thompson Company Archives, Frankfurt Office Records, Duke University, Durham, NC (hereafter JWT/Duke).

<sup>423</sup> The Structure per Product of Press Advertising in France and Germany, October 1959, folder "1959 May-1961 Mar. Common Market Newsletter," Box 3, Newsletter Collection, International Series: Europe Belgium-Spain, JWT/Duke. Also see Herppich, p. 135.

<sup>424</sup> Berndt, p. 97; Herppich, p. 138. On vending machines and advertising, see Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BuArch B) 189 / 13745, Adolf Wischnath, Board Member of the Ärztlicher Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit e.V. to Herrn Dr. Holl, Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, 15 March 1974.

<sup>425</sup> These figures are taken from a Philip Morris summary of an April 1977 World Tobacco article on the West German market. See "Marketing and Distribution of Tobacco," 16 June 1978, Bates No. 2010052259-2010052315, <http://www.legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lxs02a00> (accessed 30 August 2009).

sources of cigarettes for many underage smokers. Already in the early 1960s, the state rejected proposals to limit the hours of operation for vending machines on the grounds that doing so would significantly impair the ability of businesses to prosper, particularly tobacco retailers whose off hours business depended upon vending machine sales.<sup>426</sup> The proliferation of vending machines in the postwar landscape and the state's *de facto* legitimization of this means of sale reinforced the overarching importance of developing and disseminating a successful brand identity. Despite the immense amount of energy, time, and money spent on marketing campaigns designed to build a strong foundation for cigarette brands, advertisers and tobacco executives still could not predict consumers' responses to specific campaigns.

The cigarette's dependence on the establishment of an effective brand identity makes the study of cigarette advertising in the post-fascist era all the more meaningful. The two most successful brands in the Federal Republic during the last sixty years, Haus Bergmann's HB and Philip Morris' Marlboro, both enjoyed their staying power due to the creation of strong brand images built around iconic, male figures. Marlboro's rise to the top-selling brand in West Germany began within a decade of the unveiling of the famous cowboy-themed Marlboro Man campaign by Philip Morris.<sup>427</sup> HB, introduced by BAT in 1955 as a filter cigarette, rose to prominence in the late 1950s and early 1960s on

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<sup>426</sup> German Bundestag, "Harmful Effects of Cigarette Smoking," May 1975, Bates No. 504851145-504851181, <http://www.legacy.ucsf.edu/tid/rri55d00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

<sup>427</sup> On Marlboro advertising see Michael E. Starr, "The Marlboro Man: Cigarette Smoking and Masculinity in America," *Journal of Popular Culture* 17:4 (1984), pp. 45-57; John G. Blair, "Cowboys, Europe and Smoke: Marlboro in the Saddle," *Revue Française d' Études Américaines* 24 (1985), pp. 195-212; and Bruce A. Lohof, "The Higher Meaning of Marlboro Cigarettes," *Journal of Popular Culture* 3:3 (1969), pp. 441-450.

the basis of a series of animated television ads featuring the HB Mann, Bruno.<sup>428</sup> In the commercials, Bruno experienced tremendous stress as a member of the *Bürgertum* (middle class), struggling to adapt to the daily routine of life within the bourgeois consumer landscape of the late 1950s, made evident by his frequent battles with new technologies. As Bruno's levels of stress reached a boiling point, the HB King arrived to provide the everyman with a relaxing cigarette to reduce the pressure and allow Bruno to enjoy a certain level of peace. Bruno and the comical television spots in which he starred paid immediate dividends as HB claimed nearly one-fifth of all cigarette sales by 1956.<sup>429</sup> HB's success and identity as the cigarette of the typical West German also appealed to many guest workers, who smoked the popular Haus Bergmann brand to expedite the process of assimilation.<sup>430</sup> The different levels of consumer response enjoyed by HB and Peter Stuyvesant versus Condor highlights the need to read ads against the broader context in which they appeared.

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<sup>428</sup> Bongard, p. 65; "HB gegen BH," Der Spiegel, 19 September 1966, p. 173.

<sup>429</sup> Gerhard Paul, "Das HB-Männchen: Die Werbefigure der Wirtschaftswundergesellschaft," Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 4:1+2 (2007) <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Inhalt-2-2007>. Also see Gerhard Paul, ed., Das Jahrhundert der Bilder: Bildatlas 1949 bis heute (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), pp. 218-225. The success of HB can also be attributed to the fact that it was the first filter cigarette introduced in a market that was partly cognizant of the potential health risks associated with smoking.

<sup>430</sup> "Dritter Versuch," Der Spiegel, 4 June 1973, p. 57; Peter F. C. Duerr, Philip Morris, "Project Birgit (NPC Project No. 172), 24 January 1974, Bates No. 2501204271/4272, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rot22e00> (accessed 22 October 2003).

## **Cigarette Brands, Advertising, and Gender in the Early Federal Republic**

Nazi rule, war, captivity, and occupation left German gender relations in a state of disarray by 1945, provoking many German men to believe women were “outside of men’s control.”<sup>431</sup> The demographic imbalance stemming from the war destabilized gender roles and further aggravated the prevailing sense that German men were suffering from a “crisis of masculinity” during the Adenauer era (1949-1963). By 1950, official estimates put the supposed “surplus of women” (*Frauenüberschuss*) – as opposed to a deficit of men – at a ratio of 130 women to 100 men in the twenty-five to forty age group. These figures represented a “surplus” of approximately three million women in West Germany.<sup>432</sup> As a result of this disparity, women took on added responsibilities within the private spheres and assumed a more prominent position within the public sphere. During the 1950s and 1960s, West Germany’s “baby boom” further heightened the political and cultural significance of parenting within the context of gender stabilization, economic growth, and Cold War division.

Recent scholarship has shown that many contemporary commentators prioritized the normalization of the social order and gender relations during the 1950s, both as they were perceived and as they were experienced. Despite the obvious demographic disparity, the culture of the “economic miracle” remained grounded in male privilege and

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<sup>431</sup> Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 67.

<sup>432</sup> Although chaotic conditions raise doubts about the specifics, the first postwar census conducted in 1946 underscored the dramatic demographic trend following the war. The census found there were 2,242 available women for every 1,000 marriageable men. Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 27-28; Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 210-211.

directed women back to the private sphere as soon as possible.<sup>433</sup> The statistical reality did not allow for the type of immediate correction that family experts and conservative social commentators promoted in the hopes of restoring a traditional patriarchal structure. The appearance of cultural signs and visual cues emphasizing male privilege, power, and potency contributed to the political and social “remasculinization” projects of the early postwar era.<sup>434</sup> The restoration of heterosexual domesticity in the 1950s proved to be a central component to the process of remasculinization and postwar gender politics in general.<sup>435</sup>

Throughout the 1950s, cigarette advertising in West Germany contributed to the reconstitution of acceptable masculine identities in a post-fascist context. Cigarette marketing provided a forum for the conceptualization of a new, respectable German masculinity to replace the discredited warrior-hero ideal promoted by the Nazis, which

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<sup>433</sup> Hanna Schissler, “‘Normalization’ as Project: Some Thoughts on Gender Relations in West Germany During the 1950s,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. by Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 365-369; Mark E. Spicka, Selling the Economic Miracle: Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Jennifer A. Loehlin, From Rugs to Riches: Housework, Consumption, and Modernity in Germany (New York: Berg, 2000); and Ute Frevert, Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Katherine Pence, “Labours of Consumption: Gendered Consumption in Post-war East and West German Reconstruction,” in Gender Relations in German History: Power, Agency, and Experience From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century, ed. by Lynn Abrams and Elizabeth Harvey (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 211-238.

<sup>434</sup> Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1989); Robert G. Moeller, “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s: Introduction,” Signs 24:1 (1998), pp. 101-106; Heide Fehrenbach, “Rehabilitating Fatherland: Race and German Remasculinization,” Signs 24:1 (1998), pp. 107-128; Moeller, “The Last Soldiers of the Great War’ and Tales of Family Reunions in the Federal Republic of Germany,” Signs 24:1 (1998), pp. 129-146; and Uta G. Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero? Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s,” Signs 24:1 (1998), pp. 147-162.

<sup>435</sup> Dagmar Herzog, Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 87-88.

had been a common theme in pre-war cigarette advertising.<sup>436</sup> In her study of post-1945 sexual culture, Dagmar Herzog identified an era of “erotic liberality” between war’s end and 1953, when the consolidation of social conservative forces in politics, culture, and religion resulted in a backlash against openness and experimentation.<sup>437</sup> The world of advertising reflected this transition, especially in the case of a sexualized commodity like the cigarette. A series of ads for North State cigarettes in 1953 epitomized the sexualization of smoking culture and advertising in the early Adenauer era, but also marked the end of the erotic liberality of the immediate postwar period.<sup>438</sup>

North State made explicit use of sexualized iconography and highlighted the cigarette’s status as a symbol of male power and virility in a June 1953 print ad to promote its new King Sized cigarette featuring the “double ring” filter in the 10 Pfennig price class. The advertisements, which contained a relatively large amount of copy for early postwar cigarette ads, promised smokers a “Happy End” as in Hollywood films and featured a large banner declaring North State was available in its new size with the double ring feature. A large picture of an opened North State pack stands along the right-

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<sup>436</sup> Günter Dammann, “Salem No. 6 – Die Beste Cigarette Meines Lebens,” in Deutsche Comicforschung: Band 2, ed. by Eckart Sackmann (Hildesheim: Comicplus, 2006), p. 97; and Schmitt-Hausser, p. 68. On fascist masculinity see George L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Annette F. Timm, “Sex With a Purpose: Prostitution, Venereal Disease, and Militarized Masculinity in the Third Reich,” in Sexuality and German Fascism, ed. by Dagmar Herzog (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), pp. 223-255; and Todd Richard Ettelson, “The Nazi ‘New Man’: Embodying Masculinity and Regulating Sexuality in the SA and SS, 1930-1939,” (Ph.D. diss.: University of Michigan, 2002).

<sup>437</sup> Herzog, Sex After Fascism, pp. 68-72.

<sup>438</sup> Jean Kilbourne, Deadly Persuasion: Why Women and Girls Must Fight the Addictive Power of Advertising (New York: The Free Press, 1999), pp. 205-210. The history of sexuality within cigarette advertising stretches well beyond the Adenauer era. In the American case, it is best represented by the Chesterfield “Blow Some My Way” advertisements, which depicted women encouraging their male companions to exhale in their direction.



hand side of the page while the heads of a heterosexual couple are shown in the bottom left-hand corner. Interlocking smoke rings hover above or just in front of the heads of both figures, although they are positioned differently in each ad. In one of the earliest ads from the campaign, the interlocking smoke rings float directly above their heads, with the woman positioned to the right of her companion. Unlike many other cigarette ads depicting a heterosocial image, this particular representation only shows the woman in possession of the cigarette. A cigarette emanating from the words “King Size” on the pack extends across the page and penetrates the smoke ring directly above the woman’s head. The copy instructs the reader to “please pay attention to the Double Ring,” while an arrow meant to bring the reader’s attention to the cigarette’s double ring actually highlights the specific moment of penetration.

Subsequent ads using the same format and layout did not include the act of pseudo-intercourse, and they replaced the photograph of the man and woman with illustrated versions of their heads. The June 1953 ad reads as an ode to male potency and power, one likely intended to offset the association of filtered cigarettes with femininity. The accompanying copy framed the process of smoking in aggressive terms, specifying that the tobacco “must fight through” the double filter. At the very bottom of the image, a caption adds that each “new North State has a ‘Happy End,’ the Double Ring,” further reinforcing the sexualized marketing message. Later North State ads continued to emphasize similar characteristics of the cigarette, including the double ring filter, while eliminating the most overt aspects of the sexualized ad.

Portrayals of masculine Germans in advertisements, shaped in part by prevailing gender and family discourses of the early Federal Republic, provided a vision of what the

dominant – or hegemonic – masculine West German man should look like and how he should behave.<sup>439</sup> Hegemonic masculinity, as an imagined identity, seeks to benefit men in general through the continuation of an unequal distribution of power between the sexes and the maintenance of male privilege, even though it does not have to enhance the status or position of each individual male. The process of creating a hegemonic masculine identity occurs in a variety of venues and forums, including public discourse, lived experiences, and consumer culture. Thus, the world of advertising, particularly for a product infused with sexual meanings, represents fertile ground for exploring the battles over sexual and gender identities.

Print cigarette ads during the Adenauer era placed the new ideal German man squarely in the domestic sphere. Instead of elevating the warrior image as the hegemonic masculine identity, ads for North State, Eckstein No. 5, Player & Sons, and Marlboro cigarettes, among others, depicted the domesticated male and his functions within the home, family, and marriage as the prototypical West German man. Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, advertisements for several brands repeatedly utilized domestic and paternal themes and images to sell their cigarettes. Social class occupied an important role in the establishment of new gender norms for West German men as the restoration of heterosexual domesticity in the 1950s and 1960s meant foregrounding the bourgeois family, particularly within the context of economic reconstruction and the “economic miracle.” Although the reliance upon the private sphere, marriage, and fatherhood may not have been unique to West Germany, the post-fascist and Cold War

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<sup>439</sup> On the concept of hegemonic masculinity as a relational construct see R. W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Michael S. Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (New York: The Free Press, 1996); and Miguel Vale de Almeida, The Hegemonic Male: Masculinity in a Portuguese Town (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996).

contexts gave these subjects added layers of meaning specific to West German consumption in the midst of Germany's social and cultural remasculinization following defeat in the Second World War and experience of foreign occupation.

### **The Normalization of the Domesticated Male**

The commercial application of West German remasculinization is most evident in the advertising for Eckstein No. 5 in the mid-1950s. A popular pre-war brand, Reemtsma's Eckstein No. 5 enjoyed considerable success in the 1930s, capturing nearly one-fifth of the market and earning the nickname "green plague" due to its distinct pack and strong kick.<sup>440</sup> Prior to 1943 and again upon its 1953 re-launch, Reemtsma marketed Eckstein No. 5 as a worker's cigarette, particularly among miners in the Ruhr area.<sup>441</sup> In its earliest postwar campaigns for Eckstein No. 5, Reemtsma emphasized themes of tradition and honor, while maintaining a worker-oriented brand identity with ads referencing labor and laborers. Within a few years, Reemtsma advertisers adopted additional marketing strategies and imagery, as well as a new slogan, to broaden its appeal without completely abandoning previous tropes. By 1957, the popular pre-war brand dubbed itself the "new joy" (*neue Freude*) for West German smokers, precisely when many West Germans began to feel the first effects of the so-called "economic miracle" on their daily lives.<sup>442</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> "Eckstein No. 5," Museum der Arbeit – Werbemittelarchiv Reemtsma (hereafter Mda) <http://www.museum-der-arbeit.de/Museum/Sammlung/wma-reemtsma.php> (24 May 2007).

<sup>441</sup> Mda ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.587 and MA.A 2005/032.022.605.

<sup>442</sup> Eckstein No. 5's postwar success peaked in 1954 with approximately 12% of the market. However, it soon lost its position in the upper echelon of the cigarette market. By 1957, Eckstein No. 5 controlled 7% of the market but this figure fell to less than one percent by the early 1970s.

As part of its new campaign to expand its appeal, Eckstein No. 5's "new joy" campaign employed a rotating series of motifs. The ads, which appeared in numerous weeklies and frequently occupied the back cover of Der Spiegel, combined a large picture with a single orange border along one side of the image, a depiction of the easily identifiable green pack, and the new slogan in orange. In addition, many of the ads also featured a reference to past campaigns through the inclusion of an earlier slogan, "genuine and right" (*echt und recht*), in small, green text. These ads presented readers with remarkable views of the "radiating celebration" of the sun setting over the ocean's horizon; the "charm" of castles along the bank of the Rhine River; and shadows cast by trees on a snowy mountainside.<sup>443</sup> Depictions of the beauty of nature and captions praising those who lived life in the moment encouraged Germans to seek pleasure without making direct reference to cigarette smoking. Apart from the inclusion of the green pack, the images made little reference to smoking.

In addition to a focus on the environment, the "new joy" ads also sought to connect smoking with a lifestyle of leisure. The layout for these advertisements closely resembled the previous set of images, though they did not always include captions. The leisure-oriented campaign focused primarily on heterosexual couples playing on a beach, going for a leisurely stroll toward a lighthouse, riding in a bumper car, playing badminton, or engaged in similar recreational activities.<sup>444</sup> Images emphasizing these

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"Eckstein No. 5," Museum der Arbeit – Werbemittelarchiv Reemtsma. See Michael Wildt, Am Beginn der "Konsumgesellschaft": Mangelersahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandshoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1994).

<sup>443</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.615.

<sup>444</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.606.

heterosexual couples' physical activities did not contain explicit references to smoking or show any subject within the picture engaged in the act of smoking. In contrast, depictions of scenes of possible courtship or heterosexual couples at ease incorporated the cigarette into the image. On rare occasions, women were shown with a cigarette in their hand, underscoring the fact in the public eye that smoking remained a predominantly masculine behavior. The women in these ads, whether they are smoking or not, do not command power or dominance in their stance or through the limited physical contact with their partners. In each instance in which women can be seen with a cigarette, the male subject is also shown with a cigarette and is either positioned above his female partner or placed in the foreground to reinforce the gender hierarchy through what Erving Goffman characterized as the "ritual of subordination."<sup>445</sup> It is worth noting that Eckstein No. 5's advertisements never depicted women outside the accompaniment of men, further underscoring the continued association of cigarette smoking and masculinity at a time when men made up a clear majority of cigarette smokers in West Germany.<sup>446</sup> Reemtsma's willingness to exclude women-centered ads from its Eckstein No. 5 "new joy" campaign is not surprising given the masculine connotation and image

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<sup>445</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.549. Erving Goffman, Gender Advertisements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 41-54.

<sup>446</sup> Herppich, p. 135. By the early 1960s, 60% of West German men smoked while only 20% of West German women smoked cigarettes. This discrepancy can be partly explained by the persistent resonance of Nazi-era claims that the "German woman does not smoke." In contrast, approximately 40% of women in the United Kingdom smoked versus 70% of men, while roughly 30% of American women smoked compared to 50% of American men. On British smoking rates, see Hilary Graham, "Smoking Prevalence Among Women in the European Community, 1950-1990," Social Science & Medicine 43:2 (1996), p. 245. On American rates, see Kenneth E. Warner and Hillary A. Murt, "Impact of the Antismoking Campaign on Smoking Prevalence: A Cohort Analysis," Journal of Public Health Policy 3:4 (1982), pp. 377.

of the brand since its introduction, though the “women surplus” made female smokers an increasingly attractive demographic for tobacco companies in the 1950s and 1960s.

“New joy” ads also portrayed moments of homosocial bonding through leisure or shared work experiences. Here, Reemtsma placed the act of smoking Eckstein No. 5 cigarettes squarely within the experience of male camaraderie, especially during leisure time. Men smoked while drinking beer together, collecting stamps, playing chess, or playing records.<sup>447</sup> Ads featuring men engaged in physical activities like skiing, mountain climbing, or bowling, again omitted the cigarette from the image.<sup>448</sup> In utilizing such diverse subjects in its print advertisements, Eckstein No. 5 took a large step toward broadening its brand identity beyond its pre-war association with working-class men. This was made clear by the inclusion of family-friendly moments between father figures and young children in at least ten different ads that appeared as part of the “new joy” campaign. The utilization of iconography based upon a domesticated father figure is eye opening in relation to debates regarding the impact of absent fathers vis-à-vis juvenile delinquency and youth riots in the mid-1950s.<sup>449</sup>

The father-based images presented readers with an opportunity to fill the actual void of fathers in “half” or “broken” families with an imagined substitute while

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<sup>447</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.590; MA.A 2005/032.022.539; and MA.A 2005/032.022.565.

<sup>448</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.602.

<sup>449</sup> Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 71-105. Also see Joachim Hellmer, Schuld und Gefährlichkeit im Jugendstrafrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1962); Thomas Grotum, Die Halbstarke: Zur Geschichte einer Jugendkultur der 50er Jahre (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1994). Detlef Briesen, Jugend, Delinquenz und gesellschaftlicher Wandel: Bundesrepublik Deutschland und USA nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 2007).

simultaneously counteracting the diminished position of fathers within the family sphere in comparison the enhanced status of postwar mothers.<sup>450</sup> Men who smoked or were depicted smoking Eckstein No. 5 cigarettes revealed no outward scars or limitations stemming from the war. Nor do they appear dependent on self-sufficient women who have assumed a position as head of the family.<sup>451</sup> In their role as substitutes for absent fathers, the paternal figures were available to perform both their “executive” and breadwinning functions in rearing children amidst a backdrop of social apprehension over the direction of West German youth.<sup>452</sup> The fatherly images in the Eckstein No. 5 “new joy” series contributed to the construction of a new male image, blending traditional conceptions of patriarchy with a paternal role that placed greater emphasis on fathers’ direct interaction with their children.

This set of advertisements stressed the relationship between the father and the children, with only one ad including a female subject or maternal figure. This later advertisement, which ran on the back cover of Der Spiegel in November 1956, showed a clown entertaining a handful of enthusiastic children and two adults at a circus event. Each parental figure holds a laughing child in their lap, and neither is shown with a cigarette. The father’s profile is well defined and reflects his active engagement with the moment captured in the image. Although the woman is placed in the foreground, the clown’s amusements require her to turn her head away from the reader, thereby situating

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<sup>450</sup> Dorothee Wierling, “Mission to Happiness: The Cohort of 1949 and the Making of East and West Germans,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. by Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 115-116.

<sup>451</sup> Heineman, pp. 108-136.

<sup>452</sup> Goffman, pp. 32-34.

her in a subordinate position in relation to the father. Her blurred features effectively eliminate any claim to an individual identity or persona.<sup>453</sup>

Other brands also employed visual references to family and the private sphere, but relied on a different approach. Laurens Gelb, manufactured by Simon Arzt, ran an ad depicting a couple photographing their young child on a rocking horse.<sup>454</sup> The copy emphasized three primary features necessary for a “good cigarette”: a natural cork mouthpiece, an oval filter of “modern quality,” and the pleasure of pure Orient tobacco. Even though the advertising emphasized two presumably feminine features, a cork mouthpiece and a filter, the campaign continually depicted women as occupying subservient positions in relation to their male partners. The ads show women placing cigarettes into the mouths of their company, while they themselves do not directly enjoy the benefits of smoking. Men, then, mediate women’s pleasure as the Laurens Gelb ads assigned the latter the function of providing joy and relief to the former. At the same time, the women enjoy a degree of power – albeit limited – within the imagined world of Laurens Gelb smokers since they are routinely in control of the access to cigarettes.

It took nearly three years of advertising and the modification of its campaign before Laurens Gelb finally portrayed women and men smoking together. Once allowed to smoke, though, women lost control of the cigarette pack. Depicted in the hands of their male counterparts, women’s access to cigarettes was now portrayed as being

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<sup>453</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.534.

<sup>454</sup> The ad appeared on the inside cover in both the 26 September 1956 and 3 October 1956 issues.



entirely dependent upon men.<sup>455</sup> The September 1956 ad focused on the young family represents an anomaly within Laurens Gelb print marketing for the period, seeing as how it is the only case incorporating a young child into the fold. Given the limited assimilation of familial or paternal iconography into its sales efforts, the Laurens Gelb strategy does not match Eckstein No. 5's advertising approach from the same era, particularly in its inclusion of the mother and the extensive use of copy. Even so, the ad depicts a complete family containing both parents and a young child embodying the future while reinforcing patriarchal standards through the greater relative size of the father in comparison to the mother and the woman's responsibility to serve her husband.

Unlike the Laurens Gelb ad where neither parent looks in the direction of their child, Eckstein No. 5's depictions portrayed fathers actively engaged with their children in a variety of activities. The men in these ads participated in leisure activities, including sledding, fishing, and playing with puppies.<sup>456</sup> The Eckstein No. 5 fathers were not psychologically, emotionally or physically scarred by the war or Allied occupation. They did not return to their families and homes as "broken" men, as implied in the discourse surrounding returning POWs from Soviet camps in the 1950s. One of the most significant obstacles surrounding the reintegration of POWs into West German society stemmed from protracted generational differences, which created additional tensions within the private sphere.<sup>457</sup> Such difficulties within both the family sphere and for the

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<sup>455</sup> For instance, a Laurens Gelb ad on the inside cover of the 14 May 1958 issue featured a man and woman smoking while standing next to an automobile. While both subjects hold cigarettes, the male figure clearly is in possession of the pack.

<sup>456</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.630 and MA.A 2005/032.022.533.

<sup>457</sup> Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

nation suggests the imagined fathers in the Eckstein No. 5 ads filled a troubling void. Instead of suffering from the burdens and scars of war, they were fully capable of enjoying the company of their kids, horsing around at home, flying a kite, or going to the circus. In one of the few ads from this series to include a caption, an April 1957 ad portraying a father playing with two young boys suggests work comes before pleasure, implying the father's primary function was to be physically and emotionally present in their children's lives.<sup>458</sup> This theme is replicated in the only other captioned father-related ad, which showed a father and young son looking at chicks in a coop. The caption warns fathers that young lives advance quickly and are a sight that brings joy "again and again."<sup>459</sup> When judged against the backdrop of political and cultural debates regarding the returning POWs, the imagined fathers depicted in Eckstein No. 5 ads filled a troubling void within the imagined national family.

Although Eckstein No. 5's initial brand identity prior to 1945 emphasized its place within the worker's life, the postwar ads utilizing the iconography of fatherhood put distance between the patriarch and his occupation. The "new joy" situated the father within the family unit and valued the father's direct involvement with his children.<sup>460</sup> Despite the implications concerning the father's responsibilities produced by these images, a Christmas-themed ad in 1956 reminded readers that fathers were to remain the

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<sup>458</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.620.

<sup>459</sup> This specific ad appeared on the back cover of the 17 April 1957 issue of Der Spiegel.

<sup>460</sup> These father-themed ads appeared at the same time as a spate of sociological publications expressing anxiety for Germany's fatherless future. See Alexander Mitscherlich, Auf dem Weg zur vaterlosen Gesellschaft: Ideen zur Sozialpsychologie (Munich: R. Piper, 1963). On the connection between the weakening of patriarchy as a social institution and the weakening of the nation, see Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, pp. 202-205.

breadwinners and providers in the family. In this ad, a father is shown returning home carrying numerous wrapped gifts through the door; his son and daughter cannot contain their excitement. One of the packages is covered in wrapping paper featuring Christmas trees, while a second gift is marked “Children’s Paradise.”<sup>461</sup> The plethora of gifts implied that paternal success could be best achieved through full participation in consumer culture and, in the process, served to simultaneously legitimize and masculinize consumption within the new consumer culture of the Federal Republic.

(Figure 4.1)

Player & Sons’ P&S Filters employed a series of ads between 1956 and 1958 that inverted the identities and roles of fathers and sons. The marketing campaign emphasized the brand’s ability to reenergize and enliven smokers, promising a calming effect within the first few puffs of an “exquisite” and “unadulterated tobacco.” The copy’s assured readers that P&S would relieve stress, which was a popular theme among cigarette advertisers, as could be seen in the wildly successful HB television ads.

Whereas Bruno, the HB-Mann, sought to expand its appeal by isolating the experiences of the individual male coping with broader social and cultural transformations through humorous commercials, the P&S print ads attempted to employ amusing portrayals of a father’s engagement with his son.<sup>462</sup> Each depiction, which never wavered from an

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<sup>461</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.022.531.

<sup>462</sup> “Zigaretten: Ein Gramm Philosophie,” *Der Spiegel*, 20 October 1965, p. 101. Also see “The German Cigarette Market 1985 – Philip Morris GmbH,” April 1986, p. 1, folder “West Germany: German Cigarette Market (Booklet),” Box 34, Marlboro Oral History and Documentation Project, National Museum of American History Archives Center, Washington D.C., hereafter “NMAH”; Thorismann Wolff, interview by Scott Ellsworth, 10 October 1986, Box 9, NMAH. Humor was not a terribly successful instrument for cigarette advertisers during the Adenauer era. The remarkable rise and dominance of HB in the cigarette market was a rare exception.

exclusive focus on the father-son relationship, consisted of a photographed father and an illustrated son reversing the demographic absence of “real” fathers in postwar society.

The central element of each representation, however, destabilized the typical paternal icon employed in other cigarette advertisements. P&S envisioned a world whereby the child offered cigarettes to his father to “remain lively” (*müunter bleiben*) against a backdrop in which the West German government established the legal age of tobacco consumption at sixteen as part of the 1957 Law for the Protection of Youth in Public.<sup>463</sup> Fitting the “parable of the Sagacious Child,” one of the common advertising motifs identified by Roland Marchand, these ads put the child in the position of benefactor, supplying his father with both the cigarette and reasons to consume.<sup>464</sup> Although the initial ad shows the father accepting a cigarette as a break from work, subsequent ads expand on the themes of role and generational reversal by portraying the father in the child’s role. In these images, the patriarch rides a rocking horse, plays with model trains, horses around, plays with a toy sailboat during a bath, and is tied up dressed like an Indian, effectively transforming the father into an infantilized counterpart to the child. The ads seemingly infantilize the patriarchal figure, but they reinforce his physical presence in the child’s life. Amidst a supposed crisis of juvenile delinquency in the latter half of the 1950s, the P&S ads offer an alternative vision of West German fathers that

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<sup>463</sup> Earlier in the 1950s, Coca-Cola urged West Germans to “take a break” (*Mach mal Pause*) and enjoy a cold drink as part of a “Gospel of Refreshment” – a reward for the backbreaking work of rebuilding after the war. See Jeff R. Schutts, “Born Again in the Gospel of Refreshment? Coca-Colonization and the Re-making of Postwar German Identity,” in Consuming Germany in the Cold War, ed. by David F. Crew (New York: Berg, 2003), pp. 121-150.

<sup>464</sup> Marchand, p. 233.

reiterates the value and importance of having a strong if playful father figure within the family unit.

Father figures became far less prominent in cigarette ads by the middle of the 1960s. Increased doubts about the health effects of smoking combined with the tobacco industry's implementation of voluntary advertising codes to govern marketing practices in lieu of state regulation meant it was no longer suitable to incorporate children into cigarette ads. Nonetheless, the iconography of patriarchy did not disappear entirely following the end of the Adenauer era in 1963.<sup>465</sup> By the mid-1960s, however, representations of fathers in cigarette ads had ceased to carry as much resonance as they held during the Adenauer era. Moreover, the West German cigarette industry adopted a voluntary advertising code in 1966 – including a prohibition on ads depicting or targeting youth – in an attempt to avoid state regulation of marketing practices.<sup>466</sup> Instead, advertisers increasingly relied upon lifestyle themes and strategies located outside of the family, placing greater emphasis on material culture, pleasure, and sexuality. Although such transformation in marketing owed much to the increased public health attention to cigarette smoking and health, it also reflected broader changes in gender roles, social identities, and consumer culture.

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<sup>465</sup> Herbert Verclas of Martin Brinkmann GmbH, to Tom Sutton, J. Walter Thompson Company, London Office Managing Director, 11 July 1962, Box 7, Gilow Papers, Clients Series, 1962-1978, JWT/Duke. Verclas described the RCP Report on smoking and health, released in 1962, as “unfortunate” because of the West German Health Ministry’s interest in the subject and potential introduction of advertising restrictions.

<sup>466</sup> See Chapter V for a discussion of this strategy in the West German context.

## **“The Taste of the Great, Wide World”: Internationalism and Modernity**

In 1959, Reemtsma launched Peter Stuyvesant Filter throughout West Germany, employing a marketing strategy that linked modernity with world travel, mobility and internationalism. Although the tourism industry already began the process of postwar recovery by 1945, few Germans had the means to partake in travel abroad by the late 1950s. By 1960, opinion research indicated approximately one-third of the West German population traveled, but most had come to view the opportunity to go away as a “normal part of modern life.”<sup>467</sup> Peter Stuyvesant’s marketing approach, designed by Swiss-based commercial artist Fritz Bühler, epitomized one of the principal advertising messages on West Germany’s commercial landscape of the 1960s. Other brands, including Peer Export (Cigarettenfabrik Kristinus), Krone (Simon Arzt), and Atika (Reemtsma), blended modernity and cosmopolitanism, but failed to connect with consumers to the same extent as Peter Stuyvesant Filter. These new themes, in contrast to Brinkmann’s failure with the “muscular nationalism” of Condor cigarettes in 1968, paralleled the progression of West Germany’s consumer culture and the country’s eventual acceptance among the community of nations as evidenced by its participation in supranational institutions.<sup>468</sup>

The earliest Peter Stuyvesant Filter ads featured a travel bag bearing the brand name, explicitly linking the brand identity with tourism and consumption. In a meeting to discuss the brand’s identity and market introduction, Reemtsma officials chose the

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<sup>467</sup> Alon Confino, “Dissonance, Normality, and the Historical Method: Why Did Some Germans Think of Tourism after May 8, 1945?” in Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s, eds. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 334.

<sup>468</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955 and was a founding member of the European Economic Community, a predecessor to the modern-day European Union, in 1958.

name to emphasize a mentality of discovery. They specifically highlighted the effect of new supranational unions on political and economic borders in postwar Western Europe, hinting at the potential obsolescence of national boundaries in a new age of mobility.<sup>469</sup> For several years, the ads featured depictions of travelers, modes of transportation, and repeatedly referred to the relative ease of crossing borders. The copy linked the cigarette with elegance, style, and the possibilities inherent in venturing out into a “new world.” For example, a 1961 ad displayed a pack of Peter Stuyvesant Filter cigarettes against a backdrop of assorted timetables for Lufthansa, Air France, Pan Am, Finnair, Alitalia, and numerous other airlines, while asking “Where are you flying?”<sup>470</sup>

The conflation of two sets of experiences, smoking and world travel, remained a constant advertising motif throughout the 1960s. Another Peter Stuyvesant ad, titled “New Time,” surrounded the pack with luggage tickets and promised consumers “new, rich, broad pleasures.”<sup>471</sup> A subsequent ad, depicting newspapers from across the globe, compared Peter Stuyvesant and its mixture of tobacco from disparate parts of the world to the sense of excitement and adventure associated with learning about foreign countries or cultures. The ad claims that the “wonderful mixture” results in “the taste of the great, wide world...and a modern, distinctively fresh and rich pleasure!”<sup>472</sup> Beginning in 1962,

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<sup>469</sup> “Einführungsbesprechung in Köln, Cigaretten-Frischdienstlager, am Sonnabend, dem 27. Juni 1959 um 9.00 Uhr,” p. 11, MdA. MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.048.0025. Bühler’s campaign countered postwar German isolation by displaying the accoutrements of world travel, such as luggage and luggage tickets.

<sup>470</sup> “Einführungsbesprechung in Köln,” p. 14. Beginning in July 1959, Peter Stuyvesant’s film and television ads concentrated on similar themes. The settings for the initial commercials included border stations, hotels, cruise ships, and international trains.

<sup>471</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.048.0064.

<sup>472</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.048.0067.

Bühler and Reemtsma turned almost exclusively to illustrations of airplanes and airports, while maintaining thematic continuity with earlier ads through repeated references to mobility and the power to cross borders. Messages foregrounding the theme of freedom of movement likely resonated with West German consumers agitated over the August 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall. From the advertisers' perspective, Peter Stuyvesant remained "a cigarette for modern-thinking," optimistic, youthful, and active consumers. Bühler used aviation symbols and references to exotic destinations as code to highlight Peter Stuyvesant's ability to function as a "bridge" between countries, continents, and cultures.<sup>473</sup> By the middle of the decade, Reemtsma expanded the range of props to include foreign cuisine and shifted to photographs of pilots, flight attendants, and passengers. The ads continued to herald an age of "boundless technology" in a "borderless world" that freed people from constraints of time and space.<sup>474</sup> (Figure 4.2)

A 1966 ad exemplified Peter Stuyvesant's continued emphasis on internationalism and Germans' continued anxiety over overt expressions of nationalism. Two years prior to the introduction of Condor, the ad displayed the clustered flags of the United States, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Great Britain, Spain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, which was mostly obscured by the Norwegian flag. The copy stated Peter Stuyvesant Filter cigarettes represented one small example of how diverse populations shared much in common.<sup>475</sup> (Figure 4.3)

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<sup>473</sup> "Einführungsbesprechung in Köln," p. 9 and 11.

<sup>474</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.048.0289.

<sup>475</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.048.0200. For another example in which the flag of the Federal Republic is almost completely obscured by the pack itself, see MA.A 2005/032.048.2142.



In short order, Peter Stuyvesant Filter cigarettes developed into one of the most successful brands in West Germany. Sales increased by nearly 40% in the first three years, leading the brand to a third place ranking in terms of total market share. Moreover, Peter Stuyvesant was one of only eleven cigarette brands of nearly 140 introduced between 1958 and 1962 to succeed, which typically meant claiming one percent of the national market.<sup>476</sup> Though this success cannot be solely attributed to the cosmopolitan message and creation of a distinct brand identity – the public’s growing demand for filter-tipped cigarettes in light of growing health concerns was undoubtedly a significant factor – Stuyvesant’s triumph cannot be divorced from the staying power of the Bühler marketing campaign.<sup>477</sup> In addition to introducing Peter Stuyvesant onto a market ripe for filtered cigarettes, Reemtsma also succeeded in gaining a slot for the brand in most vending machines throughout West Germany, which the company deemed an “urgent task” during the brand’s rollout in 1959.<sup>478</sup> The brand’s immense success in its initial decade was due in no small part to the creation of an appealing brand identity that connected middle-class aspirations to partake in international travel with West Germany’s new outward-looking and largely unthreatening national identity.

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<sup>476</sup> “Willkommen und Abschied,” Der Spiegel, 3 July 1962, pp. 31-32.

<sup>477</sup> Herppich, p. 137

<sup>478</sup> “Einführungsbesprechung in Köln,” p. 10. Peter Stuyvesant’s popularity declined in the 1970s in conjunction with new advertising campaigns. Through 1973, the brand relied upon a series of photographs by renowned photographers. Each photo in the “Experience More” campaign depicted a white, heterosexual couple in an exotic locale. By the end of the decade, Peter Stuyvesant returned to the airplane motif with its “Take Off to More Taste” ads. As sales stagnated, the multicultural, cosmopolitan theme took center stage in the late-1980s with ads under the banner “Come Together!” This campaign implored people of all walks of life to “walk together, talk together” and “learn to live as friends.”

## **From Taboo to Kim: Women and Sexuality in Postwar Print Cigarette Advertising**

Advertisers in West Germany rarely approached female smokers directly, if at all, until the 1970s. During the Adenauer era, ads that appeared in Der Spiegel, such as those for Eckstein No. 5 or North State, rarely depicted women outside of the company of men. When shown alongside men, the ads frequently portrayed women in subordinate physical positions, often watching on as their male counterparts smoked. Studies of the tobacco industry and the cigarette market conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s often referenced the Nazi hallmark, “German woman does not smoke.” Hans Günter Herppich’s 1962 study of brand image speculated that cigarette consumption among women would increase once the impact of Nazi propaganda diminished and women’s public smoking ceased to be a “taboo.”<sup>479</sup> It would be too simplistic to assert that the limited number of cigarette ads targeting women in 1950s West Germany was solely due to the Nazi proscription against women’s tobacco consumption in the 1930s and 1940s. After all, the reluctance of cigarette companies and advertisers to directly target women continued in Britain and North America, and seldom did women smokers appear as independent or single prior to the women’s liberation movement.<sup>480</sup>

When advertisers focused attention on women as smokers, they often emphasized a specific component of the cigarette believed to weaken and hence feminize the smoking experience, such as filters or cork mouthpieces. Reemtsma executives believed they

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<sup>479</sup> Herppich, p. 136. In his brief assessment of gender and smoking, Herppich claims that the continued social restrictions on women’s smoking in public stood in stark contrast to popular attitudes in the United States and the Nordic countries.

<sup>480</sup> Cheryl Krasnick Warsh and Penny Tinkler, “In Vogue: North American and British Representations of Women Smokers in Vogue,” Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 24:1 (2007), pp. 9-47.

could make significant inroads with female consumers by incorporating a mouthpiece, even though most cigarettes had abandoned the idea of mouthpieces well before the war.<sup>481</sup> In 1962, the Kristinus Zigarettenfabrik launched an advertising campaign for Lord Extra, the first light cigarette on the West German market. The use of the “light” concept was a marketing response to the developing smoking and health controversy, but the nature of light cigarettes changed over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. By 1977, a cigarette featuring “not more than 10 mg condensate in the smoke and not more than 0.8 mg nicotine” could be legally classified as a light cigarette, though the lack of standards in the 1960s meant many of the earliest light cigarettes were anything but, relatively speaking.<sup>482</sup> The colorful, full-page Lord Extra ads in Der Spiegel promised “pleasure in the style of the new age” (*Genuss im Stil der neuen Zeit*) and helped transform Lord Extra into one of the most successful brands of the era, partly due to the increased “nicotine conscious” nature of West German smokers.<sup>483</sup> Within five years, Lord Extra claimed nearly six percent of the cigarette market, and within a decade it had become the second most popular brand among West Germans.<sup>484</sup>

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<sup>481</sup> Reemtsma, Firmenentwicklung, p. 233.

<sup>482</sup> The West German tobacco industry had long claimed it offered the “lightest” cigarettes. However, the average rates in West German cigarettes likely decreased in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, according to the consumer magazine Test, “light” cigarettes from the 1960s would not be classified as “light” by the late 1970s. See “The Light Ones Have Weight,” Test Magazine, June 1980, Bates #1005145774/5788, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oez/38e00> (accessed 27 October 2003).

<sup>483</sup> “Licensee and New Development Briefings of 630430,” 30 April 1963, Bates No. 2012583112/3115, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/igu14e00/> (accessed 15 October 2003).

<sup>484</sup> “The German Cigarette Market 1985 – Philip Morris GmbH,” April 1986, p. 11, folder “West Germany: German Cigarette Market (Booklet),” Box 34, NMAH. In 1962, Lord Extra earned a market share of 0.5%. By 1971 it claimed 12.5% of the market and peaked at 13.3% the

Although the company and its advertisers did not explicitly seek to create a woman's brand per se, consumers and the tobacco industry increasingly identified Lord Extra as a cigarette for female smokers. The "low nicotine" (*nikotinarm im Rauch*) cigarette's print ads frequently ran afoul of anti-smoking groups because of the attractive depictions of men and women engaged in a broad range of popular leisure activities, including hiking, skiing, sailing, shopping, and watching various spectator sports. Unlike other brands that utilized heterosocial scenes, the women in Lord Extra ads were frequently shown in possession of the cigarette pack, holding a lit cigarette, or holding a cigarette to be lit up to their mouth.<sup>485</sup> While advertisers and cigarette companies had previously marketed to female consumers through male smokers, consumer fears over the potential health risks associated with cigarette smoking and the sense of liberation associated with the developing women's movement in the 1960s provided tobacco companies with the opportunity to directly market to women through light cigarettes.

Advertisers and tobacco companies did not abandon successful marketing strategies that targeted male consumers even as they increasingly and deliberately oriented their products toward women. A 1964 HB ad depicting a man standing directly over a woman underscored the continued reliance upon visual references to male potency and power, while simultaneously acknowledging women's sexual existence. In the ad, the man strikes a confident and powerful pose with his left-hand on his hip and right hand offering a light to his partner, whose head is positioned directly in front of his male

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following year before experiencing a period of gradual decline to 6.4% in 1985, which put it behind Marlboro, HB, and Camel Filter.

<sup>485</sup> Der Spiegel, 2 May 1962, p. 70; Der Spiegel, 13 February 1963, p. 35; and Der Spiegel, 29 May 1963, p. 35. On a few occasions, Lord Extra ads featured only men. For one example depicting two fishermen, see Der Spiegel, 30 October 1963, p. 35.

anatomy and turned slightly over her shoulder to accept the ignition of the phallic symbol. The cigarette is held just outside of her mouth and her lips are parted to add to her sexual allure and convey availability. Cigarette advertisers have used the moment of lighting a cigarette as stand-ins for sexual behavior, as was the case with several ads for Astor cigarettes in the early 1960s and most of the print ads for Lord Extra after it was introduced as a light cigarette in 1962.<sup>486</sup> The relative position of the two figures and the potential symbolism behind the lighting of a cigarette create an image that connects the act of smoking and the moment of lighting the cigarette with explicit sexuality – or male power in the case of HB.

The status and physical positioning of women in West German cigarette ads began to shift at the same time the women's liberation movement took root in the Federal Republic. Advertisers and tobacco companies increasingly identified women as a demographic vital to the long-term success and continued growth of cigarette sales in the midst of mounting anxieties surrounding smoking and public health. Cigarette advertisers increasingly portrayed women as autonomous agents who chose to smoke as a sign of emancipation and empowerment. Tobacco companies throughout North America and Europe gradually introduced brands specifically oriented toward the newly liberated female – illustrating the market's willingness to publicly embrace female smokers as legitimate consumers of tobacco – even if the models in the ads did not comport with popular representations and perceptions of women's rights activists. In West Germany, BAT Germany introduced its first woman's brand, Kim, in 1970, which was soon joined

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<sup>486</sup> For the Astor ads see MdA ReeA 2005/032.001.0562; MA.A 2005/032.001.0888; MA.A 2005/032.001.0694; and MA.A 2005/032.001.0632. Lord Extra advertised extensively in Der Spiegel and claimed approximately 12% of the market by the mid-1970s. "German Cigaret Rival Blocks PM Reinfiler Ads," Advertising Age, 1 March 1976.

by two Reemtsma brands, Candida and California. American tobacco companies also brought their women's brands – including Virginia Slims (Philip Morris) and Eve (Liggett) – to the West German market in the 1970s.<sup>487</sup> Kim, which enjoyed a modicum of success in the 1970s, announced its presence in the Federal Republic by declaring itself “too chic for men's hands.” Although it did not reach the one percent plateau, BAT continued to associate the notion of emancipation with a type of smoke specially suited to female consumers when it unveiled its “Pleasure fit to us” campaign, which suggested that men and women had different needs and desires as smokers. By the 1980s, the first successful West German women's brand marketed smoking's potential function as a form of weight control by proclaiming itself as “slim and sleek.”<sup>488</sup>

Candida, introduced onto the national market in late 1971 as a brand “dedicated to women,” targeted middle and upper-class women aged twenty to forty. In its advertising, which ran until 1975, Candida utilized close-ups of individual women holding cigarettes, though the ads never depict the actual act of smoking. The figures, photographed in soft focus in order to provide a gentler appearance, stare directly at the viewer, as if to return the prospective consumer's gaze in a non-threatening manner.<sup>489</sup> (Figure 4.4) Although the idea of crafting a brand identity geared toward women suggests that advertisers sought to capitalize upon social and cultural transformations in early 1970s West Germany, the advertising copy for Candida reflected the continuity of traditional gender roles and characteristics. According to Candida's marketing strategy, the woman's

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<sup>487</sup> Philip Morris introduced Virginia Slims in 1968 and appropriated themes of emancipation in its marketing, including its infamous slogan, “You've come a long way baby.”

<sup>488</sup> Hars, p. 142.

<sup>489</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.013.09; MA. A 2005/032.013.02; and MA.A 2005/032.013.14.

cigarette was “light and mild and ladylike” and “immediately sympathetic,” but “nevertheless a bit romantic.” A May 1972 ad appropriated feminist claims to autonomy and power by stating, “today one can be what one wants.”<sup>490</sup> The same ad copy also served to challenge the social and political demands of the women’s movement by applying this liberatory message toward a woman’s right to be romantic. Moreover, the use of parted lips to suggest sexual interest and availability was a recurring theme throughout Candida’s marketing. The emphasis on women’s lips was taken to an extreme in a spring 1971 ad that showed a cigarette resting in a disembodied set of “pop art colored” lips. This particular ad asserted that Candida was a mild cigarette “dedicated” (*gewidmet*) to women. The “new mild named Candida” justified its existence by reinforcing sex differences and proclaimed women “have different tastes than men.”<sup>491</sup>

Cigarette advertisers had long used mildness as a means of attracting female smokers. Advertisers initially introduced the “mild” designation to ease consumer anxieties with respect to “throat irritation.” In the process, advertisers came to associate “mild” with femininity, but the health scare beginning in the late 1950s soon normalized the gendered connotation of “mildness.” By the mid-1970s, mild brands advertised their reduced nicotine or tar levels to assuage worried smokers about the long-term effects of their habit. In late 1974, Reemtsma introduced its light brand “California” with a series of brightly colored advertisements depicting leisurely settings and moments. The copy invited readers to test California and assured consumers that the low nicotine cigarette

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<sup>490</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.013.001; MA.A 2005/032.013.028; MA. A 2005/032.013.021; and MA.A 2005/032.013.12.

<sup>491</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/032.013.018.

featured an enjoyable aroma and strong taste befitting of a “new pleasure.”<sup>492</sup> Cigarette companies still felt compelled to assure smokers that “light” or “nicotine-free” brands did not jeopardize the “fabulous taste” of their brands.<sup>493</sup>

Even as late as 1982, tobacco executives and advertisers continued to view female smokers as a growing market. In response to advertising restrictions established by the West German government, tobacco companies looked to brand stretching or diversification to find “new channels of consumer communication.” For BAT Germany’s Kim, this included the signing of a licensing agreement with “well-known Italian designer” Fiurucci “to employ the Kim package graphics on a wide line of fashion items.”<sup>494</sup> Ironically, the maturation of the women smoker demographic during the 1970s and early 1980s occurred alongside the rise and eventual dominance of the iconic and masculine Marlboro. Both Marlboro and Camel cigarettes enjoyed immense success by explicitly associating their product and brand identity with rugged manliness, precisely when women’s smoking rates showed signs of catching up to those of German men. In assessing Marlboro’s tremendous success in the Federal Republic, R.J. Reynolds’ German subsidiary concluded their competitor epitomized a form of masculinity “free

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<sup>492</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/033.012.001; and MA.A 2005/033.012.003.

<sup>493</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/033.012.005; and MA.A 2005/033.012.004. For an example of a testimonial from a male smoker, see MA.A 2005/033.012.008. The “nicotine-free” designation did not mean all nicotine had been eliminated from the cigarette. California cigarettes featured approximately 0.1 mg of nicotine.

<sup>494</sup> D.S. Johnston to John Alar, et al., Trip Report – BAT Germany, 27 November 1979, p. 4, Bates No. 669054326-4334, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oow73f00> (accessed 11 March 2005).



from female sentiment and feelings.”<sup>495</sup> The rugged individualism demanded by the mythical frontier of Marlboro’s fantasy landscape strongly appealed to West German smokers and reiterated the gendered nature of constructing brand identities.

### **Transforming West Germany Into Marlboro Country**

The most explicit attempt to connect cigarette smoking with new understandings of West German masculinity over the course of the 1960s appeared in Marlboro’s initial marketing strategy upon its introduction in 1960. Philip Morris introduced the brand as a woman’s cigarette in interwar American with ads proclaiming it to be as “Mild as May.” In response to struggling sales and the public’s growing awareness of the health risks of smoking, the company redefined the cigarette as a masculine, filter cigarette after 1945.<sup>496</sup> Over the course of the 1950s, Marlboro’s advertising repositioned the brand as the choice of tattooed sailors and cowboys. After several years, the campaign exclusively focused on the rugged, isolated cowboy living out a simple life in a mythical Western frontier untouched by technology. Moreover, the landscape of the Marlboro Man was also removed from the social unrest and cultural dislocations that accompanied the tumult of 1960s America.<sup>497</sup> Even with the legal prohibition of television and radio advertising in the U.S. in 1972, “Marlboro Country” and the iconic cowboy image continued to

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<sup>495</sup> D-P.W. Fischer, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco GmbH, to Jerry Long, Development of Filters Campaign (Camel Filters / Marlboro World), 15 February 1980, Bates No. 500494845-4854, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xdk79d00> (18 March 2005).

<sup>496</sup> Richard Kluger, *Ashes to Ashes: America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), pp. 73-74.

<sup>497</sup> Marilyn Rye, “The Marlboro Man (Marlboro Cigarettes),” in *A Century of American Icons: 100 Products and Slogans From the 20<sup>th</sup>-Century Consumer Culture*, ed. by Mary Cross (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), pp. 138-140.

dominate the cigarette market in the United States, and the brand developed into one of the most successful brands around the world.<sup>498</sup>

Brinkmann, who owned the licensing rights for Marlboro in the Federal Republic, repeatedly rejected Philip Morris' requests to utilize the Marlboro Man visage.

Brinkmann's stubbornness and insistence on building an identity based around leisure delayed the cowboy's ride into West Germany until Philip Morris could exercise creative control on all promotional material, which was only possible when the company opened its own subsidiary.<sup>499</sup> Preceded by a lifestyle campaign consisting of both print ads and television commercials, the West German Marlboro identity of the 1960s honed in on the "well-to-do" consumer under the banner, "Modern People, Modern Lives." The early ads, which deployed scenes of family and friends enjoying the latest fads and technological innovations, stood in stark contrast to the hyper masculine brand image crafted across the Atlantic.<sup>500</sup> When viewed against the successful advertising approach used by Philip Morris and the Leo Burnett ad agency in America, the definition of masculinity outlined in the West German Marlboro ads shows no link between the two campaigns. Brinkmann's marketers claimed Germans "aspired" to the bourgeois lives

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<sup>498</sup> Fockler interview, 9 October 1986, Box 6, NMAH. Philip Morris and the Leo Burnett advertising agency first utilized the "Marlboro Country" phrase in 1962.

<sup>499</sup> George Weissman, interview by Scott Ellsworth, 27 April 1986, Box 9, NMAH. Weissman, heavily involved in Philip Morris' overseas operations and marketing, described the licensing agreement with Martin Brinkmann A.G. as the "only mistake" in transforming Marlboro into an international brand.

<sup>500</sup> See Wolff interview, 10 October 1986, NMAH. In an interview with Philip Morris GmbH Public Relations Manager Thorismann Wolff in 1986, interviewer and oral historian Scott Ellsworth characterized the initial West German Marlboro demographic as the "yuppies of 1962."

modeled in the ads, establishing a connection between the bourgeois domestic space and the new hegemonic masculinity.<sup>501</sup>

The West German Marlboro Man of the early 1960s bore a greater resemblance to the men in Eckstein No. 5 ads, in light of his linkage of family and pleasure, while simultaneously maintaining a sense of male independence through physical space and distance from feminine influences within the domestic sphere. Marlboro's German advertising images frequently portrayed men at moments of rest from acceptably masculine types of domestic labor, such as yard work or car washing. Other ads simply showed men settling down with a cigarette and a newspaper, seemingly escaping the more modern aspects of a modern life.<sup>502</sup> As per Marlboro's vision, men and women in the private sphere typically maintained a significant physical distance from one another, unless the setting was a relaxed, sociable atmosphere allowing for heterosocial interaction or one that required the completion of the family unit through the presence of both parents.<sup>503</sup> The inclusion of doors and windows underscored the recurring theme of distance and separation within the campaign, which included both illustrations and photographed depictions of men in the domestic setting. A February 1961 ad, for example, focused on a father and son building a model car in a living room featuring all

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<sup>501</sup> Weissman interview, 27 April 1986, Box 9, NMAH.

<sup>502</sup> Der Spiegel, 9 November 1960, p. 22. This full-page, illustrated ad shows a man smoking Marlboro and reading the paper while a female figure, situated near the house in the background, carries either a bag or a bucket.

<sup>503</sup> Der Spiegel, 22 February 1961, p. 53; Der Spiegel, 26 April 1961, p. 35. The former ad depicts a group of six men and women relaxing as they smoke and listen to music. The latter ad portrays a mother pushing a young girl on a swing with the father positioned on one knee in front of the swing, with both arms stretched out to receive his daughter. Unlike the illustrated 9 November 1960 advert, these two examples feature photographs of models in leisurely settings.

the accoutrements of a modern, bourgeois lifestyle, including a television, while a female figure arranges flowers in the background. The potentially destabilizing feminine influences of domestic space in this image are rendered harmless by placing the mother outside of the home, as she arranges flowers on the patio. Her appearance, framed by the window, takes on the appearance of artwork hanging on a wall as opposed to an active and involved member of the household.

Among foreign brands introduced to the West German market in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Marlboro proved to be one of the most successful, quickly establishing a one percent market share. However, the brand's relative success in West Germany did not compare to its dynamic growth in the United States.<sup>504</sup> The history of Marlboro's brand identity in West Germany highlights the complexities of creating a successful image for American cigarettes. Executives for the Frankfurt office of the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency noted that Marlboro overcame the "American handicap" through a marketing strategy that combined a focus on young people with the masculinization of home ownership and domestic spaces. According to the advertisers, West German consumers often viewed American cigarettes in a negative light due to their "unhappy connotation" with the black market era.<sup>505</sup> This partly explains

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<sup>504</sup> Letter from Justus Heymans, Philip Morris Incorporated, to George Weissman, 21 June 1963, Bates No. 2012583097/3098, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/arb85e00> (accessed 15 October 2003). Also see Hausmitteilung, undated, Box 17, Gilow Papers, Memoranda Series, 1961-1970, JWT/Duke. On Marlboro's one percent market share, see Wolff interview, 10 October 1986, NMAH. Heymans, writing from Philip Morris' Amsterdam office, discusses Brinkmann's efforts regarding Marlboro in the Federal Republic and, in particular, the brand's regional success in the south and struggles in northern Germany.

<sup>505</sup> Denis Lanigan, Joint Manager of Frankfurt Office, to Edward G. Wilson, J. Walter Thompson Company, New York Office, 10 May 1963, folder "New York," Box 2, Denis Lanigan Papers, JWT/Duke.

Brinkmann's reluctance to adopt the American advertising strategy for Marlboro and its decision to opt instead for images of successful, young, jet-setting people. Moreover, Brinkmann's emphasis on the modern established a West German brand identity distinct from its American counterpart, eschewing the anti-modern image and independent character of the escapist Marlboro Country of the mythic American west. In the United States, the cowboy's masculine identity enabled an imagined retreat away from a culturally divided and technocratic society; in West Germany, the Marlboro Man surrounded himself with displays of technological sophistication.<sup>506</sup>

The end of the 1960s and the 1970s marked a moment of transition for Philip Morris and the Marlboro brand in the Federal Republic. By 1968, the attempts to distance the brand's origin from the United States ended with the introduction of English language slogans accompanying depictions of jet-setting, trendy men and women. These print ads featured collages of attractive women and masculine men, denoting a shift away from earlier marketing strategies that magnified domesticity and masculinized the private sphere to preserve patriarchal authority. However, the new advertising approach did not result in a significant increase in sales. After a decade of frustration stemming from its unfavorable licensing agreement with Martin Brinkmann A.G., Philip Morris established its own affiliate in West Germany in 1970 with the intention of substantially redefining the West German Marlboro identity. Soon thereafter, Marlboro Country effectively

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<sup>506</sup> Weissman interview, 27 April 1986, NMAH. Weissman, who served as CEO of Philip Morris between 1979 and 1984, framed Marlboro's success in and outside of Germany as a consequence of timing with respect to the rise of protest movements, environmentalism, and social anxieties stemming from technological developments. In other words, Marlboro's brand identity was not limited exclusively to the idea of rugged masculinity.

colonized the Federal Republic, as the West German affiliate quickly adopted the American-styled Marlboro Man advertising campaign.

The new Marlboro brand identity immediately resonated with West German consumers, though Philip Morris executives feared consumers would not draw a distinction between their cowboy and the archetype from dime novels or Westerns.<sup>507</sup> Despite these concerns, brand sales increased by more than twenty percent in 1971 and an additional thirteen percent the following year.<sup>508</sup> Between 1974 and 1979, Marlboro cigarettes rose from the ninth position in the cigarette market to second, before finally eclipsing HB cigarettes as the top selling brand in 1985 with a 16.4% market share.<sup>509</sup> Although Philip Morris resented Brinkmann's advertising approach in the 1960s and accused its German partner of deliberately minimizing sales to protect its own brands, George Weissman, a key figure in overseeing Marlboro's international expansion, claimed Marlboro's emergence and Brinkmann's restrictive sales policies were actually key ingredients behind the brand's eventual take-off. According to Weissman, Brinkmann's marketing strategy and awareness of the iconic campaign established in other markets helped foster "pent-up demand" that could only be fulfilled with the introduction of the cowboy ads and increased Marlboro production for the West German

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<sup>507</sup> Troost KG Werbeagentur GWA to Staffan Gunnarsson, Philip Morris Europe SA, "Radiospots for Marlboro in Germany," 19 January 1971, Bates No. 2501263946/3948, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ngr39e00/> (accessed 20 October 2003).

<sup>508</sup> Knut Fockler, interview by Scott Ellsworth, 9 October 1986, Box 6, NMAH.

<sup>509</sup> "The German Cigarette Market 1985 – Philip Morris GmbH," April 1986, p. 11, folder "West Germany: German Cigarette Market (Booklet)," Box 34, NMAH.

market in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>510</sup> The cowboy figure symbolized a masculine form of rebellion and independence. More importantly, the adoption of Marlboro Country advertising provided West German consumers with a “screen” that allowed them to “project their desires.”<sup>511</sup>

The greatest testament to the resonance of the masculine Marlboro image among West German cigarette companies and consumers can be seen in the spate of imitations. Camel, an eminently successful brand in its own right, adopted a Camel Man campaign that bore a striking resemblance to its competitor’s marketing style. Market surveys suggested that this push did not have the desired effect. Although both Camel and Marlboro conveyed independence, Camel tended to attract older, more conservative smokers, while Marlboro enjoyed greater success among the far more desirable younger demographic, which held out promise of better sales in the future.<sup>512</sup> Philip Morris’ competition and anti-smoking groups both tapped into the popularity of the cowboy icon. Reemtsma’s West cigarettes ran cinema ads featuring old cowboys jumping out of the path of a West truck, while West Germany’s Non-Smoker Initiative’s 1981 anti-smoking

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<sup>510</sup> Weissman interview, 27 April 1986, NMAH. See Wolff interview, 10 October 1986, Box 10, NMAH. Wolff, the Public Relations Manager for Philip Morris GmbH, countered Weissman’s argument regarding Martin Brinkmann’s unfair business practices by claiming Brinkmann treated Marlboro as its own brand.

<sup>511</sup> Fockler interview, 9 October 1986, NMAH.

<sup>512</sup> CLS, Development of a Camel Filters Package, 11 February 1980, Bates No. 501248910/8923, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qmt49d00/> (accessed 27 October 2003); Letter from J.B. Stuart, to G. H. Long, Camel Filter – RJR-Germany Analysis, 4 March 1980, Bates No. 503472622, available at <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rkf95d00/> (accessed 27 October 2003).

calendar, Mordoro, satirized Marlboro ads through a series of references to death and murder.<sup>513</sup>

## **Conclusion**

In an attempt to construct distinctive brand identities that resonated with smokers in West Germany, tobacco companies and advertisers tapped into prevailing social, cultural and political beliefs to sway consumers. Their marketing strategies, brand identities, and ads, as a result, provide valuable insights into German pop culture in the age of the “economic miracle” in the Federal Republic. This is particularly evident when placing these ads within the context of ongoing debates regarding proper notions of masculinity and femininity and acceptable conceptions of a West German identity. While the advertisements between the 1950s and 1980s illustrate important developments with respect to gender and national identities in the post-fascist context, they also must be put into context of growing concerns about the health hazards posed by cigarette consumption. The following chapter explores the impact of public health debates regarding cigarette smoking on advertising practices and the roles of both state and industry in the regulation of health and consumption.

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<sup>513</sup> Fockler interview, 9 October 1986, Box 6, NMAH. Also see, Dr. Hans Erich Brandner and Dr. Joachim Kummer, *In re Morris GmbH v. Nichtraucher Initiative München E.V.*, Grounds of Appeal, 12 April 1983, Bates No. 2024949619/9648, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ruq24e00/> (accessed 29 October 2003).



**Chapter Five**  
**A World of Eternal Smiles: Regulating Cigarette Advertising in West Germany, 1966-1980**

In December 1975, Raucher Depesche (Smoker's Dispatch), a magazine published by the West German cigarette industry and distributed free of charge to retailers, declared "all non-smokers" to be a threat to freedom in the Federal Republic, putting them on par with "Communists, extremists, [and] terrorists."<sup>514</sup> The publication decried the ongoing "hate campaign" against smoking and sought to raise awareness to the various acts of discrimination that interfered with the rights of smokers. Articles criticized anti-smoking regulations as an infringement of individual liberty and drew attention to the increasingly antagonistic relationship between smokers and non-smokers. The magazine underscored the apparent vulnerability of smokers in the wake of an eviction of an Aachen smoker from his apartment, asking readers to ponder whether or not smokers even possessed political rights. Other pieces insinuated that the health risks of smoking were illusory and pointed out that the scientific community had yet to reach a consensus about the actual dangers of cigarette use or passive smoking. Almost immediately, anti-smoking activists and politicians criticized the magazine and the industry for its blatant attempt to manipulate and distort public opinion at the expense of the public's health.<sup>515</sup> The VdC publication had two principal objectives: to combat "the

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<sup>514</sup> "Nichtraucher – Bedrohung für unseren freiheitlichen Staat," 9 December 1975, Bates No. 1005145659, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zfz38e00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

<sup>515</sup> The initial issue of Raucher Depesche featured articles titled, "Passive Smoking – A Fairytale" ("*Mittrauchen*" – *ein Märchen*), "With One Another or Against Each Other?"

government's aim to establish the image of the 'ugly smoker'" and promote "tolerance between smokers and non-smokers."<sup>516</sup> The creation of Raucher Depesche in the mid-1970s reflected the cigarette industry's need to develop alternative marketing and public relation strategies to shape public perception at a time when anti-smoking activists and public health officials intensified efforts to prohibit tobacco advertising and create a non-smoker consciousness in an age of passive smoking.

The debate over smoking, which took place on a number of overlapping fronts, was really a debate about the nature of the republic itself. Since the early 1960s, the mounting medical evidence of links between smoking and cancer encouraged public health officials to call for a prohibition on cigarette advertising, if not on smoking itself, and put wind in the sails of a growing anti-smoking movement, which was no longer indebted to ideas about race. As laid out in the pages of Raucher Depesche, the tobacco industry regarded these attacks as a threat to its existence and tried to fend them off by equating consumer choice with freedom and equating the regulation of smoking and advertising with totalitarianism. The issue was further complicated by the new concern with passive smoking, which made smokers appear in new ways as a threat to the health

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*(Miteinander oder gegeneinander)*, "Smoking Does Not Damage the Heart" (*Das Rauchen schadet dem Herzen nicht*), and "Do We Have No More Rights?" (*Haben wir keine Rechte mehr?*). "Raucher Depesche," 1975, Bates No. 20246523-5254, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/klk24e00> (accessed 4 March 2005). The Medical Working Group on Smoking and Health (*Ärztliche Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit e.V.*, ÄARG) successfully sued the magazine, while Bundestag member Jürgen Büssow (SPD) castigated the cigarette industry for deliberately trying to "disorient" the public. See Ferdinand Schmidt, "Ostracize Smoking," 20 December 1976, Bates No. 500269249-9257, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lvf18c00> (accessed 4 March 2005); Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BuArch) B 189 / 17474, Kleine Anfrage 252 des Abgeordneten Büssow, 15 January 1976.

<sup>516</sup> PR-Actions Verband der Cigarettenindustrie Hamburg, 1976, Bates No. 500257485-7488, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xph89d00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

of other citizens. All of these issues raise fundamental questions about the very nature of political authority in democratic societies. In this chapter and the next, I will show how the cigarette industry and their opponents infused the debate over the regulation of tobacco consumption with competing notions of freedom, authority, and self-governance. In this chapter, I trace the development of tobacco advertising restrictions, whereas the following chapter focuses on youth and show how education emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a means for encouraging self-governance. This strategy allowed the state to walk the fine line between the preservation of freedom and the need to exercise authority in the interest of public health.

The tobacco industry's magazine and the response it generated underscore critical themes throughout the complex and hotly contested debate over smoking. The emergence of public discussions over the place and role of advertisements for harmful commodities illustrated the close and shifting relationship between public health and consumer culture within a developing "risk society."<sup>517</sup> Moreover, policy and cultural debates on the function of cigarette advertising provided opportunities for public discussions regarding the evolving role of the state in a post-fascist consumer culture, the balance between corporate and personal responsibility, and national identity.<sup>518</sup> The history of advertising regulation brings the evolution of the complex network of

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<sup>517</sup> Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992). It should be noted that the risks of smoking were but one source of anxiety in the early 1960s. The thalidomide scare, growing awareness of pollution, and continued nuclear proliferation following the construction of the Berlin Wall contributed to a heightened sense of increased risk and anxiety.

<sup>518</sup> Pamela E. Pennock has shown the broader cultural and economic significance of policy discourse with respect to alcohol and tobacco advertising in the United States. See Pamela E. Pennock, Advertising Sin and Sickness: The Politics of Alcohol and Tobacco Marketing, 1950-1990 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007).

relationships among the state, industry, public health activism, and consumers into focus within a dynamic culture of health. Both sides appropriated themes of personal freedom and responsibility in trying to establish the centrality of advertising or regulation to a democratic consumer culture. Advertisers and cigarette companies argued that state incursions into the world of marketing threatened to transform the liberal state into one closely resembling either the Soviet bloc or the fascist past. Public health officials and anti-smoking activists, in contrast, insisted the top priority of a democratic state in a risk society was to regulate harmful activities in order to ensure the safety and welfare of the citizenry.

### **Defining Smoking as a Problem in the Adenauer Era**

During the war and the immediate postwar period, many of the private and local organizations that had attacked cigarette or alcohol consumption and advertising prior to 1945 ceased operations.<sup>519</sup> Those that survived the war formed what they termed a “resistance movement” against the “dictatorship of alcohol and tobacco.”<sup>520</sup> In particular, religious groups, such as the Central Catholic Association Against the Dangers of Addiction in the Federal Republic (*Katholischen zentralen Verbände gegen die Suchtgefahren im Bundesgebiet*), and more secular organizations, including the German Central Office Against the Dangers of Addiction (*Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren*, DHS), lamented that the disruptive effects of the war led the nation’s

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<sup>519</sup> BuArch B 142 / 404, Heinrich Czeloth, “Mitgliederzahl der Katholischen zentralen Verbände gegen die Suchtgefahren im Bundesgebiet. Stand am 1 Januar 1954,” 2 March 1954.

<sup>520</sup> Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 5. Kongress für alcohol- und tabakfreie Jugenderziehung vom 21. bis 23. Oktober 1959 in Kassel, BuArch B 142 / 408.

youth to abandon responsible behavior in favor of “a dream world of movies, motorcycles, cigarettes and alcohol.”<sup>521</sup> Moral reformers bemoaned the spiritual damage inflicted by the “material Zeitgeist” of the Adenauer era, often linking the apparent excesses of hedonistic consumerism with a supposed crisis of juvenile delinquency.<sup>522</sup> The opening scene of the 1956 film Halbstarcken epitomized this popular association, as Freddy Borchert (Horst Buchholz), the leader of a local gang of young hoodlums, brazenly lit a cigarette at an indoor swimming pool. When ordered by the pool attendant to stub out the cigarette, Freddy retorted, “I don’t take commands.” Though youth consumption gradually came to be recognized as an essential element of the postwar, democratic culture of consumption in West Germany in the 1960s, the transition toward the acceptance of a pleasure-driven consumer society generated tremendous anxiety about the future trajectory of the nation.<sup>523</sup>

To many observers, though, the rampant materialism of the Adenauer era was a direct consequence of constrained consumption during the war and occupation eras. A 1953 DHS report insisted young Germans were particularly susceptible to the allure of tobacco and alcohol due to nervousness and spiritual burdens stemming from the “hunger

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<sup>521</sup> BuArch B 142 / 404, Informationsdienst der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, Nr. 3 / 4, November 1954, p. 12. On the history of the Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, see Elke Hauschildt, Suchtkrankenhilfe in Deutschland: Geschichte, Struktur, Perspektiven (Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus Verlag, 1997).

<sup>522</sup> Jahresarbeitsbericht der Hoheneck-Zentrale 1955/56, p. 16, BuArch B 142 / 404. On juvenile delinquency discourses in the Federal Republic, see Detlef Briesen and Klaus Weinhauer, eds., Jugend, Delinquenz und gesellschaftlicher Wandel: Bundesrepublik Deutschland und USA nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007), pp. 7-93.

<sup>523</sup> Detlef Siegfried, Time Is On My Side: Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006), pp. 73-207.

years.”<sup>524</sup> With respect to smoking, the neurologist Kurt Pohlisch argued the Nazis created a “nicotine-starved” society, adding that those opposed to tobacco use must patiently wait for Germans to satisfy their nicotine hunger before moving forward with an anti-smoking agenda.<sup>525</sup> The discourses surrounding the smoking issue in the early Federal Republic suggested that smokers would not be denied the opportunity to light up after prolonged periods of deprivation. In this scenario, then, the objective was to teach adult smokers to be responsible and avoid overindulgence in potentially harmful substances, while schools encouraged youth to abstain altogether. The “unprecedented levels” of cigarette and alcohol advertising in the 1950s, which social conservatives argued had led to a “noticeable decline in public morale,” presented significant obstacles to achieving these objectives.<sup>526</sup>

Leaders of the early postwar anti-smoking movement denounced the “constant, intensive advertising” for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes as a form of commercial “propaganda” that threatened to lead young people astray from a life of Christian morality.<sup>527</sup> At the Fifth Congress for Alcohol and Tobacco Free Youth Education in

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<sup>524</sup> BuArch B 142 / 404, Hans Seidel and Heinrich Czeloth, Die Organisation der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren und der Fachverbände gegen die Suchtgefahren, 6 June 1953.

<sup>525</sup> Kurt Pohlisch, Tabak: Betrachtungen über Genuss- und Rauschpharmaka (Stuttgart: Thieme Verlag, 1954), p. 168.

<sup>526</sup> BuArch B 142 / 404, Hans Seidel and Heinrich Czeloth, Die Organisation der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren und der Fachverbände gegen die Suchtgefahren, 6 June 1953.

<sup>527</sup> BuArch B 142 / 404, Msgr. Heinrich Czeloth, Jahresbericht über die Arbeiten der Bischöflichen Hauptarbeitsstelle Hoheneck-Zentrale, des Kreuzbundes Verband abstinenten Katholiken e.V., der übrigen katholischen Abstinenzorganisationen und der Katholischen Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft gegen die Suchtgefahren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Geschäftsjahr 1 April 1955 bis 31 März 1956, p. 22. A Dr. Rosin forwarded Czeloth’s yearly report to the Health Ministry.

1959, a broad coalition of physicians, educators, and the heads of youth organizations joined together with religious leaders to strengthen education campaigns designed to train youth to adopt a critical eye toward consumer society. Proponents of this approach – including Fritz Lickint, who had published some of the earliest epidemiological studies of tobacco use in the 1920s and 1930s – argued it was possible to disavow the nation’s youth of a perceived social “obligation” to consume, provided leaders could find effective means of countering the plethora of ads for cigarettes and alcoholic beverages that created a wonderland of fantasy consumption.<sup>528</sup> Although they clearly sought to impose significant limits on advertisers, it is important to note that the anti-smoking voices did not demand the federal government take on a significant role in policing cigarette advertising. The absence of the state, though, meant their efforts ultimately failed to produce a strong movement intent upon eliminating tobacco ads altogether.

Calls for the state to take on an active role in the regulation of tobacco advertising in West Germany gained momentum as the public acquired a greater understanding of the medical risks of cigarette smoking through increased media attention of scientific findings from Britain and America at the end of the decade. Epidemiologists in both countries published numerous studies throughout the 1950s that established a strong statistical link between cigarette use and bronchial carcinoma. In the U.S., German émigré Ernst Wynder and surgeon Evarts Graham collected the medical history of nearly seven hundred lung cancer patients and discovered that a clear majority of the subjects

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<sup>528</sup> Fifth Congress for Alcohol and Tobacco Free Youth Education, 1959, BuArch B 142 / 408. In particular, see the essays laying out guidelines to assist youth in schools, the family, and youth organizations.

were smokers.<sup>529</sup> At the same time, Richard Doll and Bradford Hill identified a “real association” between smoking and incidence of lung cancer in Britain.<sup>530</sup> In a subsequent study of the habits of British physicians, Doll and Hill concluded that the remarkable rise in the number of lung cancer cases in the twentieth century could be directly attributed to cigarette smoking rather than atmospheric pollution.<sup>531</sup> Despite offering strong evidence of a connection between immoderate cigarette use and a greater likelihood of developing cancer, both sets of results had a negligible impact upon the lay public. Few people regularly read the Journal of the American Medical Association or the British Medical Journal, but, more importantly, the findings were met by a professional audience skeptical of the legitimacy of statistics-based research and industry intent upon generating as much doubt as possible as to the validity of epidemiology.<sup>532</sup>

The initial findings sparked an intense methodological debate within the Anglo-American scientific community.<sup>533</sup> Critics of statistical analysis argued that the numbers only revealed a correlation and failed to establish causation, thereby limiting the value of epidemiology. In contrast, proponents of the new methodology insisted it offered likely

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<sup>529</sup> Ernst L. Wynder and Everts A. Graham, “Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic Factor in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma: A Study of 684 Proved Cases,” Journal of the American Medical Association 143:4 (1950), pp. 329-336.

<sup>530</sup> Richard Doll and Austin Bradford Hill, “Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung, Preliminary Report,” British Medical Journal 2 (1950), pp. 739-748.

<sup>531</sup> Richard Doll and Austin Bradford Hill, “The Mortality of Doctors in Relation to Their Smoking Habits,” British Medical Journal 1 (1954), pp. 1451-1455.

<sup>532</sup> Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 163-172.

<sup>533</sup> Mark Parascandola, “Skepticism, Statistical Methods, and the Cigarette: A Historical Analysis of a Methodological Debate,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 47:2 (2004), pp. 244-261.



explanations for statistical phenomena, including the stark difference in mortality rates between smokers and non-smokers or men and women.<sup>534</sup> Additional epidemiological research indicated smoking played a pivotal role in the etiology of various cancers, including esophageal and laryngeal cancer, and showed cigarette smokers were at a greater risk of suffering from emphysema and coronary heart disease than non-smokers or consumers of other tobacco products.<sup>535</sup> Several scientists in the U.S. and Western Europe remained skeptical and insisted that only clinical research could definitively establish a causal link between cigarettes and disease.<sup>536</sup> This line of criticism prompted Wynder and others to test the carcinogenicity of tobacco by applying condensed tars to the skin of mice to observe whether or not tumors would develop. When half of the subjects developed tumors, Wynder concluded the combination of statistical evidence with clinical research left no doubt as to the cancerous effects of cigarette smoking.<sup>537</sup>

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<sup>534</sup> E. C. Hammond, "Smoking in Relation to the Death Rates of 1 Million Men and Women," in Epidemiological Approaches to the Study of Cancer and Other Chronic Diseases, ed. William Haenszel (Bethesda: National Cancer Institute, 1966), pp. 127-204.

<sup>535</sup> U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Public Health Service Review, 1967 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 7 and pp. 25-31.

<sup>536</sup> Helmut Schievelbein, ed., Nikotin: Pharmakologie und Toxikologie des Tabakrauches (Stuttgart: Georg Thieme Verlag, 1968); and G. Neurath, B. Pirmann, and H. Wichern, "Zur Frage der N-Nitrosoverbindungen im Tabakrauch," Beiträge zur Tabakforschung 2:7 (1964), pp. 311-319. As in the United States and Britain, the history of tobacco science is complicated by the close relationship between the tobacco industry and scientific research. Neurath et al., for instance, carried out their research for the Reemtsma laboratory and the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie administered the journal. More recently, critics have also questioned the motivations and validity of Schievelbein's research given that the cigarette industry financed portions of his work. See Norbert Hirschhorn, "Shameful Science: Four Decades of the German Tobacco Industry's Hidden Research on Smoking and Health," Tobacco Control 9 (2000), pp. 242-247.

<sup>537</sup> Ernst L. Wynder, Evarts A. Graham and Adele B. Croninger, "Experimental Production of Carcinoma with Cigarette Tar," Cancer Research 13:12 (1953), pp. 855-864. Brandt argued this

The public interest in the smoking and health debate in America and Western Europe intensified with the release of the two damning reports in the United Kingdom and United States. In 1962, the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) Report issued a report that declared cigarette smoking caused several cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. Two years later, the release of Smoking and Health: The Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the United States, represented a watershed moment in the history of smoking and public health as the leading medical figure in America reaffirmed the cigarette's role in the development of cancer. Chaired by Surgeon General Luther Terry, the committee also concluded that smoking greatly increased the likelihood of developing chronic bronchitis, heart disease, and emphysema.<sup>538</sup> These claims, more than the studies that preceded the RCP and Terry Reports, threatened to destroy the tobacco industry's ability to control the dynamic of the smoking and health debate. In the case of the Terry Report, the U.S. government officially declared cigarettes to be the principal cause behind the increased prevalence of lung cancer, thereby giving anti-smoking activists and like-minded public health officials an excellent weapon in the fight for restrictions on tobacco consumption and marketing in order to safeguard the public's health.

The release of the Surgeon General's report in particular attracted widespread media attention in the Federal Republic, prompting Der Spiegel to make the smoking and health issue its cover story eleven days following the report. (Figure 5.1) Yet, the

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paper represented a turning point within the American context, as it "galvanized medical and public attention" on the issue. See Brandt, p. 148.

<sup>538</sup> Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health, Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

statistics-based report faced stiff criticism among many West German medical scientists, some of whom used epidemiological methods to attack the conclusions of the Terry Report. Otfried Mittmann, a professor of medicine at the University of Bonn, excoriated the authors of the Terry Report in the pages of Medizinische Welt for failing to consider other possible factors in the etiology of cancer, which lead them to make a series of “erroneous conclusions” based solely on statistics. In a follow-up, Mittmann further argued against conflating statistical relationships and causality by highlighting that declining birth rates in Alsace and Sweden paralleled a decline in the overall number of storks, but that the two did not necessarily relate to one another.<sup>539</sup> Even those who embraced epidemiological methods, such as the chief physician of the Pathological Institute of Düsseldorf Academy of Medicine, insisted the numbers pointed toward environmental causes to explain lung cancer rates. Reinhard Poche’s own epidemiological study of lung cancer in North-Rhine Westphalia argued air pollution from car exhausts and industrial gases explained the remarkable rise in lung cancer during the twentieth century. Tobacco companies in the U.S. and West Germany seized this kind of statistics-based argument, given that it absolved the cigarette of any responsibility.<sup>540</sup> This reluctance to fully embrace epidemiology may stem from the association of statistical methods with the scientific studies conducted in the 1930s and

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<sup>539</sup> Otfried Mittmann, “Remarks on the Statistical Studies of Pulmonary Carcinoma in ‘Smoking and Health’” 29 August 1964, Medizinische Welt 35 (1964), pp. 1832-1835, Bates No. HK1400141-0156, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytf2aa00> (accessed 15 March 2010). Also see Otfried Mittmann, “Concluding Word,” 26 December 1964, Med. Welt 52 (1964), pp. 2808-2809, Bates No. HK1400195-0200, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cuf2aa00> (accessed 15 March 2010).

<sup>540</sup> Reinhard Poche, Otfried Mittmann, and Oswald Kneller, “Statistische Untersuchungen über das Bronchialcarcinom in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” ZfK 66 (1964), pp. 87-108.

1940s, though there is little concrete evidence at this time to suggest the Nazi legacy overshadowed risk-factor epidemiology in the Federal Republic precisely when it made sufficient inroads to becoming a standard tool for public health practitioners in the U.S. and Britain.<sup>541</sup> Regardless, West German researchers and health authorities had access to the studies conducted in the Anglo-American scientific community no later than the mid-1960s. Skeptics continually denigrated such research due to its inability to establish causation, while proponents of tobacco control measures in the Federal Republic regularly seized upon the work of North American and British scientists to support calls for smoking restrictions and advertising prohibitions, putting the West German cigarette industry in a difficult position.

### **The Tobacco Industry's 1966 Voluntary Advertising Code**

Although Germany has a long tradition of adopting “statutory initiatives” to police health, the Federal Republic employed a “laissez-faire attitude” when it came to regulating cigarette smoking and advertising.<sup>542</sup> Increased media attention and the intensification of anti-smoking education in many schools beginning in the early 1960s heightened the growing debate over advertising restrictions. Just four months following the release of the Terry Report, representatives of the Health and Economic Ministries began discussing the possibility of restricting cigarettes ads through legal means “in the

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<sup>541</sup> On the history of risk-factor epidemiology within the Anglo-American context, see William G. Rothstein, Public Health and the Risk Factor: A History of an Uneven Medical Revolution (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003).

<sup>542</sup> Peter Baldwin, Disease and Democracy: The Industrialized World Faces AIDS (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

interest of maintaining the health of our population.”<sup>543</sup> Despite the mounting body of medical evidence produced on both sides of the Atlantic, the Economics Ministry was initially reluctant to impose a ban since the 1939 Nicotine Ordinance already prohibited companies from using health-based arguments to market their products and argued that West German economic and political values stood in stark contrast to the notion of state intervention in the market. An advertising ban for a specific good, such as cigarettes, was “not compatible with the founding principles” of a “free market economy and free competition.” Moreover, in response to the possibility of including a warning label on cigarette packs as in the U.S., the Economics Ministry explained that “questions of regular habit” needed to remain a matter of “personal responsibility for each individual.”<sup>544</sup> Efforts to find common ground between the two ministries proved fruitless, as any resolution to the conflict necessitated the establishment of a clear set of priorities by the state to balance “the protection of competition against the protection of public health.”<sup>545</sup>

As the federal government struggled to reach an agreement and in order to preempt the state from imposing strict regulations of marketing practices, the VdC oversaw the creation of a voluntary advertising code that spelled out a series of restrictions on advertising content and mediums.<sup>546</sup> During the long and complex

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<sup>543</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Dr. Bernauer, Internal Memo, Re: Einschränkung der Werbung für Tabakwaren und alkoholische Getränke, 25 May 1964.

<sup>544</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft to Abgeordneter Felder, undated.

<sup>545</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, W.G. Schmitz, Memorandum, Re: Beschränkung der Werbung für Zigaretten, 21 December 1965.

<sup>546</sup> The American cigarette industry also deployed a preemptive strategy to forestall federal advertising regulations. See Pennock, pp. 129-132.

negotiations, the VdC actively sought to incorporate the various federal offices into the process to ensure their voluntary code would receive the state's stamp of approval. Schlenker sought to invite the government in as an active – though preferably distant – partner in order to circumvent the possibility of direct advertising controls, which stood in contrast to the far more adversarial relationship between the American federal government and U.S. cigarette companies in the 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>547</sup> In light of the Economic Ministry's objections to a formal advertising prohibition, the Health Ministry welcomed the industry's code, even if enforcement of the new guidelines rested entirely in the hands of private industry. The VdC established a special arbitration board, which it empowered to impose fines up to DM 200,000 per violation.<sup>548</sup>

Cigarette companies agreed not to utilize health-related claims, display immoderate smoking, suggest that inhalation was “exemplary,” explicitly claim that a particular brand was healthier or safer than its competition, present special characteristics – such as the filter, mouthpiece, or cigarette casing – in a manner that implied they added health benefits or an enhanced sensation of “pleasure” (*Genuss*), include prominent figures, celebrities, or athletes within the advertisement, depict athletic events or activities, or use models under the age of thirty – later reduced to twenty-five. The cigarette industry also introduced restrictions on where, when, and how they would advertise, with special emphasis on avoiding young audiences. The agreement precluded signatories from airing television commercials before 7 p.m. or film spots in movie

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<sup>547</sup> Philip Morris, “Smoking & Health – Five Year Plan,” 31 March 1971, p. 6, Bates No. 2501020542-0686 <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fir02a00> (accessed 15 March 2010).

<sup>548</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Richtlinien für die Werbung auf dem Deutschen Cigarettenmarkt, 1966.

theaters before 6 p.m., introducing coupon schemes within cigarette packs, utilizing novelty gimmicks – such as balloons, flags, or free giveaways – with special appeal to children and young people, or advertise in spaces or publications specifically oriented toward youth. Moreover, the 1966 agreement declared companies could not advertise their brands on public transportation that only operated in the Federal Republic or at vending machines.<sup>549</sup>

Several of the terms in the 1966 agreement had been included in the 1941 guidelines, including those prohibiting advertising on public transportation, at athletic facilities, or incorporating sportsmen. Additionally, the cigarette industry's voluntary disavowal of health-based arguments mirrored the 1941 restriction on ads implying tobacco consumption either improved health or did no harm.<sup>550</sup> Although the two sets of regulations shared much in common, the source and initiative behind the 1941 and 1966 guidelines differed. In the case of the latter, the advertising controls originated with the state and represented a part of the Nazi regime's broader racial project, whereas the latter stemmed from the industry's own attempts to counter future tobacco marketing legislation and eliminated the explicitly racial aspects.

Upon the unveiling of the ad code in 1966, Economic Ministerial Director Dr. Rolf Gocht informed the Health Ministry his office was “sympathetic” to the aims of the agreement, but explained the companies' agreement to restrict their own advertising raised considerable “legal difficulties.”<sup>551</sup> In particular, it appeared to violate the 1957

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<sup>549</sup> Ibid.

<sup>550</sup> Proctor, p. 204.

<sup>551</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gocht, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, to Walter Bargatzky, Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 17 February 1966.

Law Against the Restraint of Trade (*Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen*, GWB), which theoretically prohibited the creation of monopolies in order to prevent the rise of an overly centralized economy.<sup>552</sup> Since restricting the ads of an entire industry would require coordination among competitors, any sort of industry-wide agreement would require the approval of the Federal Cartel Office (BKA) within the Economics Ministry to ensure compliance with the GWB.<sup>553</sup> Recognizing that the absence of self-imposed limits “would provoke state intervention” on the part of the Health Ministry, the cigarette industry framed its 1966 agreement as a restriction on the “scope of advertising” with respect to available mediums and the nature of the appeal. The VdC contended that a voluntary reduction in where and how companies could market cigarettes did not amount to a breach of the federal laws governing competition.<sup>554</sup> The industry’s arguments failed to assuage the director of the BKA, Willi Mülder, who informed companies that individual firms could voluntarily restrict their marketing practices, but

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<sup>552</sup> James C. Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945-1957 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 233-289; Volker R. Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 155-181; Rüdiger Robert, Konzentrationspolitik in der Bundesrepublik: das Beispiel der Entstehung die Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1976), pp. 30-32; and Eric Owen Smith, The West German Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 270-302. The GWB was an extension of the Allied decartelization program of the occupation era, but, as Van Hook notes, the law featured a number of loopholes that ultimately allowed for the construction of a “highly organized and cartelistic German economy.”

<sup>553</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Dr. Voigt to Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen (z.Hd. von Herrn Dr. Zoller), Re: Werbung für Tabakwaren, 19 June 1965.

<sup>554</sup> BuArch 102 / 278193, Schlenker to Dr. Langer, 8 February 1966.



viewed an industry-wide approach to reduce advertising as a violation of the GWB.<sup>555</sup>

Those concerned with preserving the integrity of the competition feared the tobacco industry would use self-regulation to consolidate the existing and heavily concentrated market by preventing other companies from marketing future brands and compete with existing cigarette brands for market shares.

### **Expanding the Ad Code: Slogans, Sporting Events, and Television, 1969-1973**

Despite Mülder's concerns, the industry implemented the advertising code in 1966, enabling cigarette companies to evade formal marketing regulations administered by the state. The "beautiful, healthy world of cigarette advertising" would, however, remain contested terrain as anti-smoking activists sought to destabilize the image of the smoker and smoking through health education and publicity campaigns.<sup>556</sup> The cigarette's opponents continued to assert pressure on the state to take action against specific marketing techniques, particularly the use of advertising at special events and the utilization of misleading slogans. Although the VdC enjoyed a far more cooperative and congenial relationship with the West German federal government than their counterparts in America, it remained greatly concerned with the possibility of state action in the interest of public health in light of growing anti-smoking measures in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere in Western Europe.<sup>557</sup>

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<sup>555</sup> BuArch 102 / 278193, Willi Mülder, Bundeskartellamt, to Austria Tabakwerke GmbH, Re: Zigarettenindustrie; Abkommen über die Einschränkung der Werbung für Zigaretten, 24 May 1966.

<sup>556</sup> "Zigaretten-Werbung: Schönes Zwirbeln," Der Spiegel, Nr. 7, 9 February 1970, p. 166.

<sup>557</sup> R.B. Griffith, Preliminary Report on Visits to England, Sweden, Germany, and France: June 25 to July 13, 1966, Bates No. 680204107-4117, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lyy95a00>

Even with growing pressure on the cigarette industry and government to police advertising practices, public health officials and anti-smoking groups struggled with a lack of consensus within their own ranks regarding the appropriate degree of regulation. In writing about the complex issue of cigarette advertising, the consumer protection magazine Verbraucher Rundschau insisted advertising in general included a “social-political responsibility” that transcended its function as a form of commercial art. The article praised the “critical consciousness” of ad agencies that dropped cigarette accounts, but also suggested that marketing limitations were “useless” given advertisers’ creativity in comparison to the stagnant “bureaucratic apparatus” responsible for ensuring compliance with public health measures. After all, a similar ad code in the U.S. had not stopped companies from promoting cigarettes as safe. It was foolhardy to expect different results in the Federal Republic.<sup>558</sup> Dr. Guido Möring echoed the Verbraucher Rundschau report’s insistence that such measures were ineffective. Möring, who castigated smoking as a form of self-abuse and equated addiction with slavery in a booklet published before the Terry Report, framed advertising restrictions as contrary to public health objectives in a 1969 letter to the editors of Der Spiegel. Though he viewed ads as nothing more than “propaganda” designed to instill a false “sense of belonging,” Möring believed ad bans and warning labels were ineffective. Such measures “aroused

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(accessed 18 February 2005). According to Griffith, the VdC had “apparently convinced their Minister of Health that they know more about smoking and health than anyone else, that they are taking responsible actions, and he apparently turns to them for advice.”

<sup>558</sup> “Das Beispiel der Zigaretten-Werbung,” Verbraucher Rundschau 11 (1969), pp. 6-8.

defiance” among a rebellious youth, thereby enhancing the image of smoking as cool and anti-authoritarian.<sup>559</sup>

Although public health officials, federal agencies, and anti-smoking activists remained divided over the best course of action with respect to cigarette advertising, the VdC’s pursuit of additional voluntary restrictions in the early 1970s continued. In a supplemental agreement reached in January 1971, the manufacturers of two of the most popular brands, including market leader HB (BAT) and Ernte 23 (Reemtsma), along with a third firm, agreed to cease using popular slogans as of April 1971.<sup>560</sup> Opponents of smoking and public health politicians claimed the slogans for HB and Ernte 23, “happy people light up” (*frohen Herzen geniessen*) and “of highest purity” (*von höchster Reinheit*), respectively, misled consumers about the benefits of smoking and served to minimize health risks. (Figure 5.2) Ernte 23’s ads depicting tobacco leaves in sun-drenched fields, moreover, came under attack for linking purity with nature.<sup>561</sup> The firms’ voluntary disavowal of its slogans reiterated the industry’s commitment to police itself in an attempt to prevent the state from taking a more direct role in the regulation of marketing.

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<sup>559</sup> Dr. med. Guido Möring, *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 44, 27 October 1969, pp. 20-22. Also see Dr. med. Guido Möring, *Ist Rauchen wirklich Schädlich?* (Bad Homburg: Helfer-Verlag E. Schwabe, 1963). In his booklet, Möring also likened excessive smoking to gradual suicide (p. 17). Möring also addressed his claim regarding defiance and consumption, stating youth had a right to rebel though smoking was not a necessary part of rebellion (p. 12).

<sup>560</sup> Renunciation of the Use of Certain Slogans, 28 January 1971, Bates No. 2073422126, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zqf95c00> (accessed 25 February 2005).

<sup>561</sup> H. Mensen, “Geheime Verführer: Zur Demaskierung der Zigarettenwerbung,” *Rehabilitation* 25:3 (1972), p. 63.

One year later, the West German cigarette industry amended the original 1966 advertising guidelines to prohibit tobacco companies from using the symbols and representations of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games or the 1974 World Cup, which was also hosted by the Federal Republic. The new guidelines explicitly banned cigarette manufacturers from advertising on tickets or public transportation schedules likely to be used by visitors flocked to West Germany for these spectacles; nor could they make use of outdoor ad campaigns in the vicinity of stadiums set to host the popular and well-attended international sporting events.<sup>562</sup> The industry's willingness to do without such potentially lucrative advertising spaces represented an extension of the 1966 agreement's prohibition on using sports, athletes, sports facilities, and acts of physical achievement to associate cigarettes with health and physical fitness. In doing so, the cigarette industry attempted to project an image of corporate responsibility, willingly foregoing valuable ad mediums for the welfare of consumers without having to directly admit any connection between smoking and disease.

In addition, the tobacco industry also focused its attention on various advertising mediums targeted by public health activists and politicians. Recognizing that Käthe Strobel's Health Ministry viewed state regulations as a legitimate public health tool, the VdC elected to significantly reduce outdoor advertising as a preemptive measure.<sup>563</sup> Opponents of smoking and the cigarette industry itself both identified television as the

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<sup>562</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278194, Richtlinien über ein Einsatz von Werbemitteln und "Medien seitens der Beteiligten an der Vereinbarung über Richtlinien für den Werbung auf den deutschen Cigarettenmarkt (Richtlinien 1972)," 21 June 1972.

<sup>563</sup> Strobel served as head of the Federal Ministry of Health Care between 1966 and 1969. In 1969, this office was merged with the Federal Ministry on Youth and Family and was renamed the Federal Ministry of Youth, Family and Health. Strobel served as the Minister until 1972.

most critical vehicle by the 1970s. Together, the cigarette industry, the federal government, public health officials, and anti-smoking activists transformed television into a dynamic and hotly contested space that provided valuable opportunities to shape if not redefine the public debate on smoking and health. In the Federal Republic, the Health Minister's push to revise the Food Law (*Lebensmittelgesetz*, LMG) provided the impetus for the cigarette industry's decision to eliminate television as an available advertising medium. Beginning in late 1970, industry and Health Ministry officials met in a series of meetings culminating in a new marketing policy for the tobacco industry. Following the logic behind the 1966 agreement, cigarette companies voluntarily eliminated all television advertising over the course of late 1971 and 1972. The self-imposed prohibition on cigarette commercials took effect on 1 January 1973, two years after the last cigarette spot aired on American television stations.<sup>564</sup>

The decision to abandon television advertising in the early 1970s brings to light the collaborative relationship among the industry, federal government, and public health officials.<sup>565</sup> Yet, the different parties accepted voluntary agreements to restrict various types of advertising as means of achieving very different objectives. As early as July 1969, Schlenker had informed industry representatives in the United States cigarette

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<sup>564</sup> On the development of the TV ad ban in the United States, see Pennock, pp. 148-165; Brandt, pp. 270-273; and Kluger, pp. 327-335. In the American case, it can be argued that the prohibition on television advertising represented a victory for the tobacco industry and a significant defeat for the anti-smoking movement. The existence of cigarette commercials guaranteed anti-smoking groups free airtime to present powerful indictments of smoking due to the "fairness doctrine." The elimination of cigarette ads cost the anti-smoking movement valuable space on television to attack cigarette smoking and tobacco companies.

<sup>565</sup> In this respect, the West German case bears a stronger resemblance to the approach adopted in Britain during the 1960s and early 1970s than in the United States, though the Philip Morris Five Year Plan cited above suggests the West German government was more "moderate" than the British state in handling the smoking and health issue. See Berridge, pp. 40-41.

companies still advertised on television in the Federal Republic, adding, “they could give [it] up if Government pressure became very great.”<sup>566</sup> Schlenker’s remark reveals the extent to which the VdC viewed TV ads as a bargaining chip in negotiating with the federal government to avoid even greater regulations. Strobel, meanwhile, framed private restrictions as a means of protecting consumers in a timely fashion given the amount of time required to draft and usher proposed legal prohibitions through proper legislative channels.<sup>567</sup>

Advertisers viewed the assorted advertising restrictions as a significant threat to their livelihood. In meetings with the Health Ministry and VdC, stations ARD and ZDF indicated they would respect the voluntary ban. According to Schenzer, TV stations would not lose revenues from the elimination of cigarette ads because that airtime could be easily sold to the advertisers of other commodities.<sup>568</sup> In contrast to the broadcast stations, the Central Committee for the Advertising Industry (*Zentralausschuss der Werbewirtschaft, ZAW*), which represented ad agencies and ad-related organizations, strenuously objected to the proposed amendment to the 1966 guidelines. The ZAW questioned the public health benefits of advertising restrictions, arguing that the reduction of cigarette ads had no connection to cigarette consumption. Moreover, the efforts to prohibit an industry from marketing its product represented a violation of fundamental

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<sup>566</sup> G.F.T., Discussions in Germany, 10 July 1969, Bates No. 1003118503-8507, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ftn08e00> (accessed 18 February 2005).

<sup>567</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278194, Verfügung in der Verwaltung der im Verband der Zigarettenindustrie e.V. zusammengeschlossenen Zigarettenhersteller, 14 March 1972, p. 6.

<sup>568</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Schenzer to Kartte, 24 August 1971.

legal tenets in West Germany.<sup>569</sup> Nonetheless, the ZAW's opposition exerted minimal influence given the Health Ministry and cigarette industry's joint embrace of a voluntary arrangement. By September 1971, the ZAW submitted a letter accepting the terms of the June 1971 revision to the Economics Ministry, which remained concerned about potential violations of laws designed to promote free enterprise.<sup>570</sup>

The ZAW's reluctant acknowledgment of the new marketing guidelines did not necessarily signify an end to the advertising industry's rejection of advertising restrictions. The matter of cigarette ads remained a source of persistent tension between the ad industry and the federal government. One month after the ZAW's letter, an advertising industry trade publication questioned the sincerity behind the West German government's claim to "want more democracy." In the eyes of advertisers, the state's efforts to regulate marketing represented a significant departure from fundamental democratic principles and threatened to destabilize the very foundation of the Federal Republic. In furtherance of the anti-democratic argument, the advertising industry demanded the federal government embrace a "critical partnership" in future policy discussions, including the ad industry along with representatives of the cigarette industry.<sup>571</sup>

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<sup>569</sup> Zentralausschuss der Werbewirtschaft, Medienverbote für Zigarettenwerbung: ZAW-Untersuchung zum Verbot der Zigarettenwerbung in Rundfunk und Fernsehen (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1975), pp. 6-8.

<sup>570</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278193, Dr. Sauter, Memorandum, Re: Erlaubnis gemäss §8 GWB für eine "Vereinbarung über eine Beschränkung der Fernsehwerbung für Zigaretten," 29 September 1971.

<sup>571</sup> BuArch B 189 / 3018, Peters to Poe, Re: Fragen der Zeitung für Marketing und Kommunikation, Hamburg, 20 October 1971. On the conflation of advertising and democratization, see Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 217-222.

Strobel strenuously rejected these types of criticisms in a series of interviews with consumer and business-oriented newspapers. In an interview with Handelsblatt (Trade Journal), Strobel insisted the government had zero interest in instituting an ad ban for any product. She claimed the industry's voluntary reduction of cigarette commercials in lieu of a formal prohibition imposed by the state represented a better fit for a liberal democratic society, since the restrictions governing advertising would supposedly prevent deliberately deceptive marketing practices. Instead, the Health Minister argued marketing practices needed to be "more informative" and convey product information to consumers in a "truthful" and clear manner in order to avoid misleading consumers about the impact of smoking on health and physical performance. Requiring the cigarette industry to offer greater clarity would enable consumers to make informed decisions as to whether or not to smoke and which brands to select. Echoing the ad industry's concerns, the interviewer for Handelsblatt asked Strobel about potential extensions of state regulations to cover products other than tobacco goods, which the Health Minister also strongly denied.<sup>572</sup>

Although Strobel and the federal government endorsed the cigarette industry's voluntary removal of television commercials on top of earlier declarations of self-restraint, the debates over the political meaning of such measures persisted. The President of the Association of German Advertising Consultants (*Bundes Deutscher Werbeberater*, BDW), Wolfgang Ernst, raised the specter of communism in assailing the ban on television advertising for cigarettes as "absurd" (*unsinnig*) while the Vice

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<sup>572</sup> BuArch B 189 / 3017, "Arzneien müssen wirksam und unschädlich sein: HB-Gespräch mit Gesundheitsminister Käte Strobel," 19-20 February 1971. Also see "Schutz der Gesundheit und vor Täuschung," Verbraucher Rundschau 10 (1971), p. 3.



President blasted the elimination of cigarette commercials as an example of the transformation of West Germany's social market economy into a socialist, planned economy (*sozialistischen Planwirtschaft*).<sup>573</sup> The cigarette industry and advertisers frequently argued the absence of advertising in Eastern Europe harmed smokers, where "light" and filter cigarettes claimed significantly lower percentages of the market in comparison to the Federal Republic.<sup>574</sup> ZAW explained advertising prohibitions threatened to transform West Germany's cigarette market into one resembling those of the Eastern bloc by eliminating the most essential means of communicating important product developments to consumers.<sup>575</sup> Advertisers adopted the Cold War comparison to attack state intervention on the grounds that it violated a key tenet of the democratic consumer culture of West Germany – namely, the restrictions on advertising would place undue limitations on the consumer's range of choices by hindering certain brands and types from advertising, creating a marketplace far too similar to the unfulfilling socialist culture of consumption in existence in the German Democratic Republic.<sup>576</sup> In doing so, the public health benefits of regulations would be lost because the restrictions did not

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<sup>573</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278194, "Werbeberater: Zigarettewerbung-Verbot im Fernsehen 'unsinnig'," 12 May 1972.

<sup>574</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, Auswirkungen des Zigarettensrauchens 7/2070, 10 May 1974, Bates No. 1000046931-6942, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/khj97e00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

<sup>575</sup> ZAW, Medienverbote für Zigarettewerbung, pp. 10-13. According to ZAW, per head consumption in Poland (3,218 cigarettes) and Hungary (2,954) exceeded that of the Federal Republic's (2,636).

<sup>576</sup> On consumption and consumer culture in the GDR, see Ina Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1999); Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Judd Stitzel, Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics, and Consumer Culture in East Germany (New York: Berg, 2005); and Young-Sun Hong, "Cigarette Butts and the Building of Socialism in East Germany," Central European History 35:3 (2002), pp. 327-344.

respect the individual's decision to smoke. The freedom to market, in this vision, was a basic right in a democratic system.

Ernst further argued against the removal of television as an acceptable avenue for publicizing tobacco goods because cigarette companies would simply displace redirect their ad expenditures to new mediums. Moreover, he insisted Italy's comprehensive prohibition on cigarette advertising since 1962 had not decreased consumption, proving that such measures were destined to fail. The economic newspaper Wirtschaftswoche also referenced the Italian ad ban in countering proposals for a West German prohibition on cigarette advertising. The paper quoted an advertising manager who proclaimed a ban would be "the beginning of the destruction of the free market economy" and devastate ad agencies throughout the Federal Republic.<sup>577</sup> In the midst of the Food Law reform debates, health officials challenged the validity of international comparisons due to the existence of multiple variables. At the same time, they happily highlighted Italy's lower rate of per head cigarette consumption in comparison to West Germany in order to negate the cigarette industry's claim that ad prohibitions had no relationship to consumption.<sup>578</sup>

The ad industry's continued opposition to state and private restraints on marketing practices highlighted the complications and competing interests associated with conflicts between economic liberty and the protection of public health.<sup>579</sup> Even with the

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<sup>577</sup> "Werbeagenturen: Entlassungen für die Gesundheit," Wirtschaftswoche 4 (18 January 1974), pp. 72-74.

<sup>578</sup> BuArch B 189 / 1421, Priv.-Doz. Dr. med. Franke, Re: Gesamtreform des Lebensmittelrechts, 4 December 1973.

<sup>579</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278194, Dr. Schlecht, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft to Herrn Minister, Re: Erlaubnis nach §8 des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) für die Einstellung der Fernsehwerbung für Zigaretten, 21 February 1972. It should be noted, though,

elimination of cigarette ads on television, the additional revisions to the 1966 code in 1972, and despite the repeated assurances that such an idea was not going to be considered, many continued to call for a formal prohibition by the federal government. Proponents of a ban saw an opportunity to crack down on tobacco marketing in the form of continued legislative debates over the Food Law. In a draft to the Health Ministry, Dr. Schlecht of the Economics Ministry described private advertising restrictions on the part of the cigarette industry as a “temporary solution” that should be replaced by state regulations that could “correspond” to public health and economic needs.<sup>580</sup> A growing contingent within the Bundestag also expressed increased support for a comprehensive advertising prohibition as part of the LMG.<sup>581</sup> For some of the staunchest opponents to smoking within the federal government, the voluntary system of policing tobacco-marketing practices in West Germany paled in comparison to developments in the United States. In measuring West Germany’s comparatively lax advertising regulations against American restrictions, Dr. Uwe Jens, a Social Democrat on the Bundestag’s Food Law Reform Subcommittee and one of the most vocal proponents of replacing the voluntary system with a legal code, questioned how “we in Germany are being ‘more Catholic than the ‘capitalistic’ Pope.’”<sup>582</sup>

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that the Basic Law declared each “person shall have the right to life and physical integrity” and a right to the free development of personality.

<sup>580</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278194, Dr. Schlecht to Bundesminister für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Re: Erlaubnis nach §8 GWB für die Vereinbarung über eine Beschränkung der Fernsehwerbung für Zigaretten, 15 March 1972.

<sup>581</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278194, Röhling, Memorandum, Re: Gesetzliches Verbot einer Fernsehwerbung für Zigaretten, 14 March 1972.

<sup>582</sup> Dr. Uwe Jens, Member of the Bundestag Subcommittee on Food Law Reform, “Health Before Profit: For Food Law Reform – Prohibit Advertising of Tobacco Products,” 17 December 1973,

### **“From ‘Voluntary’ to ‘Legislation’”: A New Regulatory Framework, 1973-1976**

Even as they expanded the scope of the ad code, cigarette companies recognized “a deterioration on the political scene respecting smoking and health in Germany” during the lead up to the Food Law. The negotiations surrounding the consumer protection legislation threatened to transform West Germany’s regulatory climate from one of volunteerism to legislation by granting the state greater authority to enact “significant provisions on the manufacture and advertising of cigarettes.”<sup>583</sup> The growth of opposition toward cigarette smoking and advertising within government agencies and among increasingly organized anti-smoking movement in West Germany created a dangerous scenario for the tobacco industry. The new Food Law, effective 1 January 1975, gave the West German government the authority to introduce restrictions on production and marketing through ordinances without going through the Bundestag. As a result, despite the “incompatible” positions of the Health and Economics Ministries over the issue of state regulation in light of laws preventing the restraint of trade in West Germany, the government formally banned the use of television and radio ads beginning in 1975.<sup>584</sup> However, in the years leading up to this decision, West German cigarette companies, interested federal offices, the media, advertisers and the burgeoning anti-

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Bates No. 2010045643-5646, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uoj68e00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

<sup>583</sup> “The Situation in Germany: From ‘Voluntary’ to ‘Legislation’ In Less Than a Year,” 1 April 1975, Bates No. 2024258879-8882, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bpl98e00> (accessed 7 March 2005). Emphasis in original.

<sup>584</sup> BuArch B 189 / 278195, Dr. Groger, Memorandum, Re: Selbstbeschränkungsabkommen der deutschen Zigaretttenindustrie (Richtlinien 1972), 8 September 1975.

smoking movement engaged in a public relations battle over the meaning of smoking in a consumer culture and risk society. Much of this debate focused on light and mild cigarettes, which typically contained smaller amounts of nicotine and tar in comparison to other brands.

In late 1973, the Christian Democrats pointed to the ineffectiveness of American advertising restrictions and educational measures with respect to cigarette consumption as evidence of the need to develop alternative methods to address public health concerns in the Federal Republic. Likewise, the industry saw the “safer cigarette” through continued research and development as a “far more promising” approach, but argued that product innovations designed to reduce the risks of smoking would be relatively useless in the absence of advertising. In this case, the cigarette companies viewed ads as an essential means of communicating product modifications to consumers interested in reducing health risks. Legal restrictions preventing the cigarette industry from advertising created magnified health risks since smokers would not learn about cigarettes with less nicotine or tar.<sup>585</sup> Light and filter cigarettes had increased their market shares considerably in the decade following the Terry Report. To advertisers and the cigarette industry, this shift within the market had only occurred because ads had conveyed the significance of these new styles of cigarettes to consumers, thereby allowing them to make a well-informed decision.

In the mid-1970s, cigarette companies recognized consumers’ growing interest in supposedly “safer” cigarettes, which sparked an intense competition to promote “low in

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<sup>585</sup> Schenzer, “Lesser Query by CDU Deputies on Effects of Cigarette Smoking – Bundestag Document No. 7/1442 of 13 December 1973,” 17 January 1974, Bates No. 2010045624-5642, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/toj68e00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

nicotine” (*nikotinarm*) and “nicotine free” (*nikotinfrei*) brands. Cigarettes with less than 0.2 mg nicotine could be described as “nicotine free,” while cigarettes with 0.2 mg to 1.0 mg of nicotine fell into the “low in nicotine” category. Brands meeting these criteria could use phrases such as “extra” light or mild in their ads to offset consumer fears of the health risks of smoking. Reemtsma was the most aggressive company in appropriating “light” and “mild” as selling points, as evidenced by the inclusion of a chart listing nicotine and tar levels in ads for R6 cigarettes. Initial ads and billboards for the brand also depicted floating or flying cigarettes near the top of the image to reinforce the extreme “lightness” of the “new type of cigarette.”<sup>586</sup> Though R6 claimed less than 1% of the market by 1974, sales improved dramatically as it grew to control 3% by early 1975.<sup>587</sup> Reemtsma, moreover, proposed a new taxonomy allowing advertisements to claim that “nicotine free” cigarettes were “unsurpassed” in terms of mildness, while brands featuring 0.2 mg to 0.5 mg were “extraordinarily” light or mild, which meant “nicotine free” cigarettes still contained some nicotine. In other words, Reemtsma recommended relaxing the definitions of these different classes of cigarettes. Other companies, however, rejected the proposal out of fear that these changes would reopen the door to unwelcome state action.<sup>588</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> MdA ReeA MA.A 2005/033.053.227 and MA.A 2005/033.053.11.

<sup>587</sup> John J. Howley to W. Edwards, R.H. Orcutt, and E. O’Toole, Re: Advertising Bans – U.K., Finland, France, Netherlands, Austria, Germany, 20 February 1975, Bates No. 91008066-8067, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/opr90e00> (accessed 7 March 2005). The 3% figure represented approximately 300 million cigarettes per month.

<sup>588</sup> Paul Isenring, Philip Morris Europe SA, Inter-Office Correspondence, Re: Germany - Advertising Code - Reemtsma, 10 September 1974, Bates No. 2501443603-3607, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/chg22e00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

In contrast to industry proposals, the new Minister for Youth, Family and Health, Dr. Katharina Focke (SPD) in 1974, decried the “permissible deception” of harmlessness associated with “nicotine free” and “light” cigarettes.<sup>589</sup> Focke and anti-smoking activists alike pointed out that the “defused cigarettes” (*entschärfte Zigaretten*) or “eunuch brands” (*Eunuchen-Marken*) did not eliminate the risks of smoking at all. Although tar and nicotine levels had decreased by nearly one-third since the mid-1960s, public health experts feared smokers intensified the strength of their inhalation with light brands to compensate for the reduced nicotine levels, which could prove disastrous if they switched to a stronger cigarette.<sup>590</sup> Equally worrisome, a series of tests conducted by a Swiss laboratory for the consumer magazine Stiftung Warentest found that the tar and nicotine levels of several popular brands were “significantly higher” than consumers had been led to believe, suggesting that the cigarette advertisers had been deceiving smokers into thinking they could puff away without fear of the potential health risks.<sup>591</sup> The clash over the definition of light and mild cigarettes, as well as the discrepancy between the claims of cigarette companies and the results of the Swiss test pointed to the need for clear guidelines on what constituted the different classes of cigarettes and what kind of information could be conveyed in ads or on cigarette packs.<sup>592</sup>

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<sup>589</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, Rieck to Referat IV C 5, Re: Kleine Anfrage zum Nichtraucherschutz, 30 Dezember 1974.

<sup>590</sup> “Traum von schadlosen Genuss,” Der Spiegel, Nr. 38, 16 September 1974, pp. 54-71.

<sup>591</sup> Paul Isenring, Philip Morris Europe SA, Memo, Re: Germany – Tar & Nicotine Tables, 26 February 1975, Bates No. 1000207009-7011, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/axp74e00> (accessed 7 March 2005).

<sup>592</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, Schenzer, Verband der Cigarettenindustrie, to Dr. Dietrich Barend, Bundeskartellamt, Re: Bekanntgabe von Rauchkondensat- und Nikotinwerten, 20 October 1975.

As with previous agreements, the creation of industry standards required the approval of the Economics Ministry, particularly the Federal Cartel Office. The VdC proclaimed that Reemtsma's threat to withdraw from previous voluntary agreements tarnished the cigarette industry's reputation in certain circles within the federal government. In late 1975, representatives of the BKA argued that previous voluntary agreements to restrict marketing practices had failed and only served to benefit existing brands.<sup>593</sup> Rather than protect the public's health, the voluntary agreements had protected the cigarette industry. New brands continued to struggle to find a foothold in the highly competitive market. Beginning with Reemtsma, individual cigarette companies began to publish nicotine and condensate values independent of any industry agreement. In adopting this type of strategy, Reemtsma and subsequent companies willingly ignored the existing guidelines they themselves had drawn up and continued to violate federal laws written to preserve the sanctity of competition and prevent the formation of cartels.<sup>594</sup>

The Cartel Office's doubts regarding the cigarette companies' desire to publish nicotine and condensate levels confounded not only the cigarette industry, but also consumer advocacy groups and the West German media, forming a temporary but odd alliance in the process. In late January 1976, Schenzer sought to win the BKA's approval for a new agreement by emphasizing the need for "transparency" on the market and the

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<sup>593</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, Dr. v. Stöphasius, Federal Cartel Office, Re: Verband der Cigarettenindustrie, Hamburg; Werbung mit Rauchkondensat- und Nikotinwerten, 27 October 1975; Dr. Groger, Memorandum, Re: Probleme bei Selbstbeschränkungsmaßnahmen der Industrie bezüglich der Werbung, 21 November 1975.

<sup>594</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, Dr. Schenzer, VdC, to Dr. Klaus Stahl, Bundeskartellamt, Re: Werbecode unserer Industrie sowie Vereinbarung über die Bekanntgabe von Rauchinhaltstoff-Werten, 19 January 1976.



need to promote consumer interests. The VdC believed an industry-wide agreement to incorporate this information into advertising would “lead” smokers to “lighter” cigarettes.<sup>595</sup> Consumers groups, such as the Consumer Working Group (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucher*, AgV) praised the “commendable” project of combating illness and disease via an “information project” that would eliminate the need for the state to formalize regulations.<sup>596</sup> However, the director of the BKA vehemently objected to the AgV’s accusations and explained individual companies were free to publicize such information, but he also suggested his agency’s consideration of public interests had led to the “toleration of possibly illegal behavior” (*möglicherweise unzulässige Verhalten zu tolerieren*).<sup>597</sup>

In light of growing opposition from the industry, consumer groups, the press, and from elements of the Bundestag, the Federal Cartel Office eventually accepted the cigarette industry’s proposals for guidelines regarding the marketing of light cigarettes. During the course of the 1970s, anti-smoking groups increasingly adopted consumerist techniques and public relations tactics to challenge the cigarette industry, focusing on an array of issues from marketing practices to protecting non-smokers from the health risks posed by passive smoking. Cigarette companies, under greater scrutiny by both private organizations and the state, sought to insulate themselves from potential economic losses through advertising prohibitions, public health education, and continued anti-smoking

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<sup>595</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, Dr. Schenzer, VdC, to Direktor Willi Mülder, Bundeskartellamt, Re: Bekanntgabe von Rauchkondensat- und Nikotinwerten; Werbecode, 27 January 1976.

<sup>596</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, AgV Kommentare Nr. 4, 27 January 1976.

<sup>597</sup> BuArch B 102 / 278195, Mülder, Bundeskartellamt, to Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucher e.V. (AgV), Re: Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie, Hamburg; Werbung mit Rauchkondensat- und Nikotinwerten, 13 February 1976.

activism and education by identifying new means of publicity for tobacco products and by diversifying their specific brands and company holdings.

### **Advertising Alternatives: *Raucher Revue* and Brand Stretching**

In the latter half of the 1970s, the cigarette industry and individual companies began to adopt new marketing strategies and promotional practices to preemptively evade potential advertising prohibitions while also countering attacks on smokers and cigarette smoking. These efforts took a variety of forms, including BAT's "institutional ad campaign" to portray the company and smoking in a positive light so as to "boost the morale of smokers" as opposed to focusing on specific brands.<sup>598</sup> Far more representative of this shift in marketing were the industry's creation of magazines geared toward smokers and attempts to stretch their brands into other commercial ventures. The cigarette industry launched Raucher Revue (Smokers Revue) in February 1976, only a few months after distributing the highly controversial Raucher Depesche. Although officially published by the Society for the Promotion of German Tobacco Products-Retailing (*Verein zur Förderung des deutschen Tabakwaren-Einzelhandels*), the VdC was quite active in the creation and distribution of Raucher Revue. Unlike Raucher Depesche, which was envisioned as a magazine to promote tolerance between smokers and non-smokers, the cigarette industry positioned Raucher Revue as a magazine specifically for smokers with the aim of "outlining the benefits of smoking; reassuring

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<sup>598</sup> Mary W. Covington, Philip Morris Intl., Inter-Office Correspondence, Re: BAT Germany Ad Campaign, 8 November 1974, Bates No. 2024954587, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ffc46e00> (accessed 4 March 2005). Also see "Smoking and Health – Germany," August 1977, Bates No. 501005751-5785, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cds10f00> (accessed 7 March 2005).

the smokers of their habit.”<sup>599</sup> The magazine, which promoted the cigarette in general as opposed to specific brands, featured physically fit and attractive women on its covers. Nothing apart from the publication’s title suggested these women might be smokers. Yet, the implicit references to athleticism through the inclusion of ski gear or depictions of swimming created positive and healthy connotations for smoking without directly violating the regulations governing advertisements.

A letter to readers published in the first issue spelled out the magazine’s principal objectives. According to the editors, the publication would provide consumers with pivotal information about the pleasures and problems associated with tobacco use. Moreover, it would create a space for discussions regarding the health effects of cigarette smoking with the intention of allowing individuals to make their own informed decisions. The editors also explained that the magazine’s mission was to “defend the smoker against unjustified attacks,” adding, “no one is entitled to deny pleasures because they see themselves as apostles of abstinence.” The final sentence of the opening letter proclaimed the need for people to respect “remaining personal freedom” (*verbleibenden persönlichen Freiheit*).<sup>600</sup> In a climate increasingly at odds with smokers, the editors framed smoking as an act of defense on the behalf of civil liberties and democracy.

The industry used the articles in Raucher Revue to counter a number of the growing public relations problems surrounding cigarette smoking in the mid-1970s, including the social ostracism of cigarette smokers in West Germany, the lack of tolerance exhibited by anti-smoking “fanatics,” and the presence of scientific doubts over

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<sup>599</sup> PR-Actions Verband der Cigarettenindustrie Hamburg, Bates No. 50025-7485-7488, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xph89d00> (accessed 4 March 2005).

<sup>600</sup> Raucher Revue, Nr. 1 (1976), p. 2.

the health risks, especially with respect to “passive smoking.” The magazine attributed the growing “campaign against the smoker” to a “few fanatics” who moved beyond “understandable propaganda” to a “no longer understandable dogma” bordering on “defamation” of smokers on the basis of “unproved prejudices.”<sup>601</sup> The “crusade mentality against the smoker” needed to cease, according to a neurologist’s letter published in the second issue, while an essay on workplace smoking bans attributed the public hysteria over “so-called passive smoking” to “American sectarians and itinerant preachers.”<sup>602</sup> The lack of tolerance and attacks on the social acceptability of cigarette smoking would result in the “permanent isolation of the smoker.”<sup>603</sup> Another article called upon smokers and non-smokers to coexist peacefully, echoing the thawing of relations between East and West in the Cold War.<sup>604</sup> A reader from Nürnberg bluntly described the magazine’s principal function, praising its efforts in defending the “whipping boys of the nation.”<sup>605</sup>

Apart from heralding smokers as the defenders of democracy, the magazine actively sought to heighten doubts about the health risks of smoking while reminding

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<sup>601</sup> “Nichtraucher oder Raucher?” Raucher Revue, Nr. 1 (1976), pp. 2-3; Jochen Willke, “Eine neue Weltanschauung: Die durchgestrichene Zigarette,” Raucher Revue, Nr. 2 (1976), p. 3.

<sup>602</sup> Dr. med. Wiltrud Alexandrowicz, “Die Kreuzzugsmentalität gegen die Raucher Einhalt gebieten!” Raucher Revue, Nr. 2 (1976), p. 2; Ernst H. Haux, “Rauchen am Arbeitsplatz,” Raucher Revue, Nr. 3 (1976), pp. 2-3. Haux’s article was based on an August 1976 radio broadcast.

<sup>603</sup> Willke, p. 3.

<sup>604</sup> Karl Heuter, “Was sagen Ärzte die selber Rauchen?” Raucher Revue, Nr. 2 (1976), pp. 10-11.

<sup>605</sup> “Der Leser hat das Wort,” Raucher Revue, Nr. 3 (1976), p. 2. Most letters supported the magazine, smokers, or the industry, though a couple of letters blasted the “scribble” (*Schmiererei*) or industry irresponsibility.

readers that smokers voluntarily assumed whatever dangers might result. Each issue of the magazine featured tips for moderate smoking under the heading “Important for the Smoker” (*Wichtig für den Raucher*). The guidelines placed the burden of maintaining good health and proper habits on the individual and warned readers that the abuse of all stimulants (*Genussmittel*) was dangerous.<sup>606</sup> Yet, several articles insisted there was no consensus among the scientific and medical communities that smoking represented a legitimate health risk. These pieces frequently cited prominent and established scientists in the Federal Republic, Britain, and the United States to correct the “entirely distorted picture,” which they believed the anti-smoking movement had presented to the public.<sup>607</sup> Interestingly, and likely no coincidence, the proposals appeared alongside articles denying that smoking was a cause of lung cancer or that it functioned as a “gateway” to illicit drugs, as well as pieces that identified air pollution as a greater factor in the development of respiratory illnesses.

In addition to the use of the new publications as an industry-wide substitute for lost advertising possibilities, tobacco firms also developed alternative methods to market or “stretch” their brands. R. J. Reynolds GmbH unveiled the Camel Collection in 1976 to “expand the Camel Way of Life” through men’s fashion modeled after the Camel Man. The initial success of the clothing line encouraged the company to investigate other lines of brand stretching, such as Camel luggage, as a “fall-back position in case of an

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<sup>606</sup> “Wichtig für den Raucher: Auf die individuellen Rauchgewohnheiten kommt es an,” Raucher Revue, Nr. 1 (1976), p. 14.

<sup>607</sup> Thomas Tauter, “Rauchen und Gesundheit: Wissenschaftler diskutieren,” Raucher Revue, Nr. 2 (1976), pp. 6-7. Also see Alexander Helltau, “Befürchtungen der Nichtraucher unbegründet: ‘Mitrauchen’ ungefährlich!” Raucher Revue, Nr. 1 (1976), pp. 6-7. The title translates to “Non-smokers’ Fears Baseless: Passive smoking is Harmless!” On the connection between scientists and the VdC, see Hirschhorn, “Shameful Science,” 9 Tobacco Control (2000), pp. 242-247.

advertising ban.”<sup>608</sup> HB, the top selling brand in West Germany since the 1950s, published travel guides and magazines on nature and the outdoors, while Krone cigarettes produced and distributed board games in an attempt to capitalize on the popularity of Yahtze.<sup>609</sup> Krone’s marketing throughout 1973 and 1974 promoted its game project via the incorporation of assorted board games into its print advertisements.<sup>610</sup> These methods allowed companies to keep popular and well-known logos in the public eye without running afoul of advertising restrictions.

The Marlboro Country & Western Festival and similar music events represented a form of “regional public relations activities in support of marketing,” akin to Marlboro’s sponsorship of Formula One racing teams.<sup>611</sup> A spring 1985 report for Philip Morris based on a thousand surveys of young men and women between the ages of 16 and 29 explicitly reveals the link between such forms of public relations and appealing to youth. The report concluded country & western music “is not very popular among the youth” and “is disliked more than it is liked.” As a result, researchers determined country music concerts had limited appeal among “our main target group,” as opposed to English and American rock or pop music.<sup>612</sup> The survey’s findings proved somewhat surprising in

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<sup>608</sup> C.C. Standen to M.V. Hunter and R.E. Anderson, Re: Camel Clothing Collection (Germany), 9 November 1978, Bates No. 500139598-9602, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tss89d00> (accessed 11 March 2005).

<sup>609</sup> D. Johnston, Memorandum, Re: Trip Report – BAT – Germany, 27 November 1979, Bates No. 669054326-4334, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oow73f00> (accessed 11 March 2005).

<sup>610</sup> See Der Spiegel, Nr. 8, 18 February 1974, p. 46.

<sup>611</sup> “Philip Morris International Corporate Affairs,” 1980, p. 11, Bates No. 2048129267-9296, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rbr42d00> (accessed 19 June 2008).

<sup>612</sup> “Research Summary Report Project ‘Falcon’,” 8 August 1985, Bates No. 2500145298, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zrc42e00> (accessed 19 June 2008).

light of Marlboro's rapid rise following the adoption of the iconic cowboy advertising campaign in the 1970s. Apart from exploring the marketing potential of specific musical genres, Philip Morris GmbH also sponsored art and photography exhibits to enhance the company's public image, distinguishing itself from individual brands. The company carefully tracked its "PR Activities" and often made special note of the context in which prominent individuals not directly associated with Philip Morris acknowledged and praised the company's participation.<sup>613</sup> Such efforts and the company's close attention to these matters indicate Philip Morris had greater interest in benefiting from the appearance of its financial support of German culture than actively promoting the arts. The public relations value of such projects appealed to the cigarette companies as they continued to combat anti-smoking activists and public health officials over the public reception of cigarette smoking and smokers. These methods paralleled ongoing industry efforts to secure the support of politicians and other prominent figures in West Germany through a variety of lobbying strategies, including "Tobacco Day 1982" in Bremen, a "social get-together" for the "warming-up of personal contacts" between cigarette industry executives, members of the Bundestag, press representatives, and ministers at the federal and state level.<sup>614</sup>

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<sup>613</sup> Philip Morris PR Activities Report, 9 April 1980, Bates No. 2501009482-9483, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yox19e00> (11 March 2005); Philip Morris PR Activities Report, 8 May 1980, Bates No. 2501009479, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dpx19e00> (accessed 11 March 2005).

<sup>614</sup> Report on the Cigarette Industry in Germany, 16 September 1982, Bates No. 2501021269-1277, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/asv32e00> (accessed 14 March 2005). Cigarette companies favored the use of lobbying and financial contributions to both the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as a means of gaining influence over policy. See Alice H. Cooper and Paulette Kurzer, "Rauch ohne Feuer: Why Germany Lags in Tobacco Control," *German Politics and Society* 21:3 (2003), pp. 24-47; and Francesco Duina and Paulette Kurzer, "Smoke In Your Eyes:

## **The Attack on Cigarette Advertising: Black Crosses and the Courts**

Voluntary regulations did not satisfy everyone inside and outside of the government, and in the 1970s anti-smoking groups, especially Ferdinand Schmidt's Mannheim-based Medical Working Group on Smoking and Health (ÄARG), ratcheted up their activities against cigarette advertising and smoking in the 1970s. After studying at Jena in the early 1940s, the site of Astel's institute, Schmidt published a dissertation on silicosis and lung cancer in 1947.<sup>615</sup> Between 1960 and 1967, Schmidt served as director of the Academy's Institute for Cancer Research in Potsdam before fleeing to the Federal Republic, where he led the Research Center in Preventive Oncology at the University of Heidelberg. Following a series of publications on the subject of cancer, he issued his first works specifically focusing on smoking in 1966. Schmidt clearly identified his position on cigarette smoking and its relationship to health while still in East Germany through titles such as Because You Smoke, You Must Die Earlier.<sup>616</sup> Regarded as a "pioneer in the prevention of smoking in Germany," he created the Medical Working Group in the early 1970s to influence health policy in the Federal Republic and combat the cigarette industry's image of smoking.<sup>617</sup> The Medical Working Group's agenda blended medical

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The Struggle over Tobacco Control in the European Union," Journal of European Public Policy 11:1 (2004), pp. 57-77.

<sup>615</sup> Ferdinand Schmidt, "Silikose und Lungenkrebs," (Med. Diss., Münster, 1947).

<sup>616</sup> Ferdinand Schmidt, Weil du rauchst, musst du früher sterben (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Gesundheit VEB, 1966). Hoheneck-Verlag, which had published Hans Seidel's works in the 1950s, printed the West German version in 1966. Ferdinand Schmidt, Verkürzt Rauchen das Leben? (Hamm/Westfalen: Hoheneck-Verlag, 1966).

<sup>617</sup> Ärztlicher Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit e.V., "Mitteilungen," 32 (July 2006), p. 8. Available online at [http://www.aerztlicher-arbeitskreis.de/Mitteilungen\\_32.pdf](http://www.aerztlicher-arbeitskreis.de/Mitteilungen_32.pdf) (accessed 14 June 2008).



knowledge with social activism to engage the cigarette industry in a public relations battle over the image of smoking and the identities of smokers and non-smokers, transforming himself into one of “the most vocal and important anti-smoking zealot in Germany.”<sup>618</sup> The ÄARG lobbied government offices for increased protection of non-smokers and improved methods of educating the public about the risks of smoking. Schmidt and his colleagues also stressed the need to formally prohibit all forms of tobacco advertising in the Federal Republic in the public’s interest, an area of intensified activism with the popularization of passive smoking by the mid-1970s.

In his work as head of the ÄARG, Schmidt articulated a vision of an active state on matters of public health, especially with respect to smoking. The principal task of a democratic state was to protect the citizens from unnecessary harm. The government’s tolerance of any advertising for a dangerous commodity represented a profound moral failing on the part of the state.<sup>619</sup> The group frequently appropriated the words of Philip F. Reemtsma, one of the company’s founders, who described the cigarette as a gram of tobacco “and many, many advertising millions.”<sup>620</sup> Cigarette ads amounted to nothing more than an “abuse of freedom” and a “crime against our youth.” In a 1976 petition demanding the government take action to guarantee the rights of non-smokers, the ÄARG condemned the Health Ministry’s apparent tolerance of cigarette advertising and

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<sup>618</sup> PM-EEMA, “Five Year Plan – Book IV Smoking and Health,” 1979, p. 56, Bates No. 2500005953-6018, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jgr02a00> (accessed 11 March 2005).

<sup>619</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, Prof. Dr. med. Ferdinand Schmidt, Massnahmen gegen das Rauchen: Offener Brief an alle Bundestagsabgeordneten. Schmidt likely wrote this letter in late 1979, following the June 1979 Fourth World Congress on Smoking and Health held in Stockholm.

<sup>620</sup> Paul Isenring, Memorandum, Re: Germany – New Food Law/Advertising Restrictions, Bates No. 2501443636-3638, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ybv39e00> (accessed 11 March 2005).

insisted that the state's unwillingness to prohibit tobacco marketing was a national "scandal."<sup>621</sup> By defining the state's primary purpose as one of protecting the public, Schmidt sought to counter arguments that intervention in the economy for the purpose of preventive public health went against the very idea of West Germany and capitalist consumer democracy.

The ÄARG did not limit itself to attacks on the industry, however. Pictures of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in print media and on television frequently showed him with some form of tobacco, prompting the anti-smoking group to denounce the chancellor as a "masked advertiser" for the cigarette industry. By publicly smoking, they held Schmidt forsook his "moral obligation" to create a positive example for the nation's citizens.<sup>622</sup> Many Germans viewed his smoking as a fundamental component of his image and identity, a fact that contributed to the minor 2008 scandal when Schmidt and his wife violating public smoking bans by lighting up in a Hamburg theater. Ferdinand Schmidt also challenged the media. In a letter to the editors of Der Spiegel, Schmidt praised the magazine for a September 1974 cover story on the smoking and health controversy. Yet, he also condemned its "schizophrenia," referring to the publication's willingness to print full-page cigarette ads in the same issue as the article detailing the assorted health risks of cigarette smoking.<sup>623</sup>

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<sup>621</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, Prof. Dr. med. Ferdinand Schmidt to Dr. Katharina Focke, Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Re: 50,000 Unterschriften für Nichtraucherchutz, verstärkten Jugendschutz und gegen Zigarettenreklame, 24 May 1976.

<sup>622</sup> Ferdinand Schmidt, "Ostracize Smoking," 20 December 1976, Bates No. 500269249-9257, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lvf18c00> (accessed 7 March 2005).

<sup>623</sup> For the cover story, see "Traum vom schadlosen Genuss," Der Spiegel, Nr 38, 16 September 1974, pp. 54-71. For Schmidt's letter, see Der Spiegel, Nr. 40, 30 September 1974, p. 20.

In addition to criticizing politicians and the media, the ÄARG regarded the notion of voluntary self-regulation as a “farce,” pointing to the industry’s obvious and frequent violating of its own ad code.<sup>624</sup> In particular, the group took exception to Lord Extra’s “low in nicotine” cigarette ads. Throughout much of the 1960s, Lord Extra frequently depicted smokers taking a break from participating in athletic activities or showed well-dressed smokers as spectators at sporting events. In the face of mounting advertising restrictions in the late 1960s and 1970s, Lord Extra maintained a similar layout and format, relying upon familiar colorful illustrations consisting of some combination of two men and one woman.<sup>625</sup> Even following the implementation of the 1966 code, Lord Extra’s ads routinely showed smokers in leisurely outdoor settings or attending spectator sports. Common scenes included smoking breaks from skiing, hiking, sailing, and fishing, which all served to create an implicit connection between cigarette smoking and healthy living.<sup>626</sup>

Schmidt appropriated the industry and government’s arguments with respect to individual rights when it came to defending acts of vandalism against cigarette billboards. In March 1976, the Ulm police discovered numerous cigarette posters had been covered with black crosses as part of an artistic protest against tobacco advertising.<sup>627</sup> In a letter

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<sup>624</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, Prof. Dr. med. Ferdinand Schmidt to Wolters, Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Re: Verführung Jugendlicher zum Rauchen, 1 December 1977.

<sup>625</sup> For examples of such ads, see Der Spiegel, Nr. 7, 13 February 1963, p. 35; Nr. 10, 27 February 1967, p. 50; and Nr. 6, 5 February 1968, p. 40.

<sup>626</sup> Der Spiegel, Nr. 8, 18 February 1974, p. 85.

<sup>627</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, “Zigaretten-Reklame im Stadtgebiet mit schwarzen Kreuzen übermalt: Aktiver Ulmer Nichtraucher protestiert im Alleingang,” Schwäbische Zeitung, 22 March 1976; “Nachrichtliche Protest-Malerei gegen Tabakreklame: Blausteiner Lehrer bekannt sich zu einer Aktion,” Südwest Presse, 23 March 1976.

to Gerhard Haussmann, a teacher from nearby Blaustein and chief suspect in the graffiti case, the Deutsche Städte-Reklame GmbH (DSR) in Munich insisted Haussmann had “no right” to “debase high-quality printed products” (*hochwertige Druckerzeugnisse entwerten*) since each citizen in “our democratic society” should be able to choose for themselves whether they wished to smoke cigarettes.<sup>628</sup> Haussmann’s defenders turned this argument on its head, insisting that the teacher exercised his own democratic rights by covering the ads with crosses. Not only did the ÄARG deem this to be an act of self-defense, they claimed Haussmann’s actions did not interfere with individual citizens’ right to smoke.<sup>629</sup>

Beginning in the late 1970s, the ÄARG unveiled a new strategy to attack cigarette companies as the Medical Working Group successfully sued Reemtsma over advertising for Ernte 23. A Hannover court agreed with the ÄARG’s contention that the incorporation of young people exhibiting a “lust for life” (*Lebensfreude*) in ads violated restrictions governing tobacco advertising.<sup>630</sup> For Schmidt, the Ernte 23 case represented a potential model for future actions because cigarette ads, by definition, mislead consumers. All ads were set in a “land of eternal smiles” (*Land des weigen Lächelns*) and attempted to divert consumers’ attention away from the myriad of risks associated

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<sup>628</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, Bruss and Peinkofer, Deutsche Städte-Reklame GmbH, Geschäftsstelle München, to Herrn Gerhard Haussmann, Blaustein, Re: Plakatanschlag in Ulm – Beschädigung von Zigarettenplakaten, 26 March 1976.

<sup>629</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, Ferdinand Schmidt to Deutsche Städte-Reklame GmbH, Re: Plakatanschlag in Ulm – Beschädigung von Zigarettenplakaten, 29 March 1976.

<sup>630</sup> BuArch B 189 / 17474, Pressemitteilung: Verstösst Zigarettenreklame gegen die guten Sitten? Also see “Industry and Legal Department,” 10 July 1980, Bates No. 2501009477, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cof87e00> (accessed 14 March 2005).

with smoking. To the ÄARG, depictions of young adults engaged in a host of recreational activities violated the very spirit of the ad laws.<sup>631</sup> The cigarette companies had been skeptical of the anti-smoking group's chances of success within the courts, but they also recognized the significance of the ruling within the court of public opinion. In a private report assessing various developments related to smoking and health controversy, BAT framed Schmidt's threat of litigation as an unacceptable publicity measure to assist the "antis" (anti-smokers).<sup>632</sup> The turn to the courts marked a turning point of sorts in the debate over cigarette ads in the Federal Republic. On the one hand, the decision to enforce advertising regulations via the legal system forced the state to take on a more direct role in policing the marketing practices of cigarette companies. On the other hand, this step came about as the result of the efforts of a private organization frustrated by the state's repeated failure to implement and support the kinds of reforms they had demanded since the industry first introduced the voluntary advertising code.

## **Conclusion**

In the 1960s and early 1970s, West Germany's public health leaders supported a system of advertising regulation that allowed the cigarette industry to set the limits of what could and could not be included in ads. The introduction of the voluntary advertising code in 1966 also enabled the VdC to effectively police itself instead of subjecting the industry's marketing practices to scrutiny from federal regulators. This

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<sup>631</sup> Ferdinand Schmidt, "10 Jahre Ärztliche Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit: Rückblick und Ausblick," Fortschritt der Medizin 98:18 (1980), pp. 714-717.

<sup>632</sup> "Smoking and Health Report, August-November 1978," November 1978, pp. 11-12, Bates No. 2501159209-9225, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xer39e00> (accessed 11 March 2005).

approach was particularly noteworthy in light of a lengthy tradition of state interference when it came to preventive public health, a tradition that remained intact when it came to dealing with the (ab)use of illicit drugs or the AIDS crisis. Instead of insisting upon stringent restrictions or a complete prohibition of cigarette advertising and smoking, the West German state adopted a hands-off model of governance. Public health leaders, though, not only called for self-regulation with respect to cigarette companies and their advertising practices, but also applied this neo-liberal model to individual consumers. As the next chapter shows, anti-smoking education campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s reiterated the importance of individual responsibility and rational consumption in lieu of any attempt to expressly prohibit cigarette smoking on the part of the citizenry. This type of response grew out of several interrelated issues in the postwar culture of consumption of Western Germany. On the one hand, the creation of a prosperous and relatively stable consumer society in the Federal Republic had helped to conflate the ideas of democracy and consumerism, of which advertising was a significant element. On the other hand, the notion of the state interfering with and possibly preventing citizens from consuming a perfectly legal commodity stood at odds with the cultures of scarcity that had dominated Germany's recent past and continued to define the socialist consumer societies of the Soviet bloc.

## Chapter Six

### “Death Throws a Party”: Informed Choice and Consumer Autonomy in Anti-Smoking Education, 1962-1975

In a speech to German physicians on cancer prevention and health education, then Minister of Youth, Family, and Health, Käte Strobel, declared that a liberal, constitutional state could only “assist” citizens in the pursuit of a healthy lifestyle, but not compel them to conform to such a lifestyle.<sup>633</sup> Ströbel’s successor, Dr. Katharina Focke, reiterated this very sentiment in a lecture on women’s health when she explained citizens had to choose to use the state’s assistance in order to achieve and maintain good health.<sup>634</sup> Both speeches revealed the federal government’s hesitation to flex its muscles in the marketplace, even as they openly acknowledged that consumers were stuck as the “weaker partner” in relation to manufacturers due to a lack of sufficient and accurate product information. According to Strobel and Focke, the most effective means of ensuring sound health was the democratization of knowledge. At the same time, the state conceded it could not eliminate the individual’s right to risk harm via the consumption of a legal product through the implementation of widespread smoking prohibitions without abandoning the principles of liberalism. Rather than focus on outright bans, the West German government relied upon public relations and enlightenment campaigns to influence consumer behavior.

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<sup>633</sup> Rede von Frau Minister Strobel vor Ärzten zu dem Thema “Gesundheitspolitik und Umweltschutz in Gegenwart und Zukunft,” 25 October 1971, BuArch B 189 / 3008.

<sup>634</sup> Ansprache von Frau Dr. Katharina Focke, Bundesminister für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit auf der DGB-Kreis-Frauenkonferenz in Köln, 21 March 1973, BuArch B 189 / 3010.

The question of smoking and public health proved to be particularly problematic in the Federal Republic, as the state's reluctance to infringe upon consumer freedom directly conflicted with its self-acknowledged responsibility to protect the welfare of its citizens. In contrast to conceptions of public health in the Third Reich, the democratic state could not deny citizens the right to risk illness and disease through the consumption of legal commodities provided consumers had all the necessary information about the potential risks. In the wake of the state's apparent unwillingness to impose behavioral standards on the citizens of West Germany, the cigarette question forced public health officials to devise strategies to deliver this information to consumers without undermining the sanctity of consumer autonomy. Over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, the public health response to the growing smoking and health crisis in the Federal Republic hoped to reduce smoking by providing information that health officials believed would lead to a free decision not to smoke.

The manner in which societies define smoking as a social problem evolves over time, with numerous forces influencing the development of this definition.<sup>635</sup> The education campaigns and policy disputes explored in this chapter occurred against the broader backdrop of public discussion of risk and consumer protection. Equally important and directly related to the issue of cigarette smoking, the growing anti-smoking movement embarked on a lengthy crusade against tobacco advertising at the same time West Germany's public health system pushed to create an educated public capable of making an informed choice as consumers. Examining the history of anti-smoking education also highlights the inherent ambiguities of social disciplining programs.

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<sup>635</sup> On the social construction of social problems see Joseph R. Gusfield, Contested Meanings: The Construction of Alcohol Problems (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).



Information campaigns in the Federal Republic sought to guide consumers' decisions. Yet, at the same time, the federal government's handling of public health education in the 1960s and 1970s repeatedly reiterated respect for consumer autonomy with the understanding that informed consumers voluntarily assumed the risks of smoking. As such, the dissemination of knowledge through health education programs represents a form of managing individual and social bodies, while maintaining a space whereby individuals could continue to exercise agency.<sup>636</sup>

The battle between tobacco proponents and opponents made specific sites and bodies the subject of contestation. Schools and students, soon followed by public transportation and workplaces, represented the key fronts in the fight over cigarette smoking. In arguing against the cigarette's place in West German society and culture, public health officials and anti-smoking activists directly challenged the respectability of smoking as it had been represented in cigarette ads, film, and television. These groups also laid claim to social spaces as part of the effort to undermine popular conceptions of smoking. More importantly, they raised critical questions about the relationship between public health and consumer culture in a liberal, constitutional, post-fascist state and, by extension, questioned the relationship between the state and the individual in a risk-filled society. The history of anti-smoking education in the 1960s and 1970s offers a unique opportunity to explore the shifting boundaries of liberal governance.

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<sup>636</sup> Denise Gastaldo, "Is Health Education Good For You? Re-Thinking Health Education Through the Concept of Biopower," in *Foucault, Health and Medicine*, eds. Alan Petersen and Robin Bunton (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 113-133; and Larry Frohman, "Prevention, Welfare, and Citizenship: The War on Tuberculosis and Infant Mortality in Germany, 1900-1930," *Central European History* 39:3 (2006), pp. 431-481.

## **The Secularization of West German Anti-Smoking Education in the 1960s**

The British and American reports represented important catalysts for anti-smoking activism and education in their respective countries. Health education in Britain entered an “interim phase” following the RCP Report in 1962, as activists and educators increasingly sought to coordinate efforts on a national scale while identifying specific at-risk groups, whereas the U.S. favored an informed choice framework toward smoking and health in the wake of the 1964 Terry Report in the United States.<sup>637</sup> Pedagogical approaches to the cigarette question in West Germany eschewed regulatory measures in favor of an ethos of voluntarism. Instead of compelling citizens to strictly adhere to behavioral standards, the state would address consumers as rational agents capable of exercising reasonable judgment when presented with information about the dangers of smoking through local and national health education initiatives. This model of governance limited the state’s role to the distribution of information about the risks of smoking, leaving the ultimate question of whether or not to smoke to the actual consumer. Yet, even as they took responsibility for instructing the public about the potential hazards of cigarette use, the Health Ministry was divided over the veracity of risk-factor epidemiology. Many officials expressed doubts about the legitimacy of epidemiological methods when discussing the RCP and Terry reports, indicating numbers did not tell the true story of smoking and health. Despite persistent doubts and debates over the exact nature of scientific and public knowledge on smoking and health, the

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<sup>637</sup> Virginia Berridge, Marketing Health: Smoking and the Discourse of Public Health in Britain, 1945-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 71-75; Christopher J. Bailey, “From ‘Informed Choice’ to ‘Social Hygiene’: Government Control of Cigarette Smoking in the U.S.,” Journal of American Studies 38 (2004), pp. 41-65.

Federal Health Office still viewed education as a critical weapon in encouraging smokers to give up the habit.<sup>638</sup>

Public health workers and teachers insisted on targeting specific groups, namely women and youth, a strategy that gave the impression that cigarette smoking was acceptable to limited segments of society, as had been the case during the Third Reich. The advocates of a reformed health education campaign also recognized the need to incorporate “reliable” scientific information and use “modern advertising psychology” to best counter the effectiveness of tobacco advertising and influence the development of individual behaviors and attitudes. Although the Federal Health Office favored the use of legal restrictions on advertising and anti-smoking propaganda, they stopped short of calling for a prohibition.<sup>639</sup> Instead, it regarded the decision to smoke as a matter of personal choice. Public health officials felt constrained in their ability to coerce citizens to avoid risky behaviors in a democratic society. The very nature of the relationship between the state and civil society had reached a fevered pitch in the early 1960s following the scandalous Spiegel Affair in 1962. On the orders of the Defense Ministry, Hamburg police raided the offices of Rudolf Augstein, editor of Der Spiegel, following

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<sup>638</sup> A rift exists among U.S. public health historians examining the acceptance of epidemiology as a legitimate method of scientific inquiry. Mark Parascandola contends that a genuine debate developed amongst scientific researchers and physicians as to whether or not the results of risk-factor epidemiology offered any insight into the possible causes of cancer prevalence. Allan Brandt rejects the notion of an authentic controversy within the field of science. Instead, Brandt suggests the tobacco industry’s role in funding the scientific research designed to undermine the credibility of statistics is evidence that a controversy had to be manufactured. See Mark Parascandola, “Skepticism, Statistical Methods, and the Cigarette: A Historical Analysis of a Methodological Debate,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 47:2 (2004), pp. 244-261; and Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 159-207.

<sup>639</sup> Der Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes to Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen, 12 September 1962, Re: Tabakkonsum und Gesundheitsschäden, p. 7, BuArch B 310 / 302.

the publication of an article criticizing the preparedness of the Bundeswehr. Thousands demonstrated against the abuse of police power, decrying the blatant violation of the core democratic values and the state's willingness to utilize "Gestapo tactics" against dissenting voices. It was within this combustible atmosphere that the state's public health system relied upon information campaigns to indirectly influence consumers' decisions without appearing to violate individual autonomy.

The adoption of an informed choice model of preventive public health stood in stark contrast to the Catholic authoritarianism and calls for abstinence characteristic of earlier anti-smoking campaigns. The secularization of public health education did not, however, result in the decline of morality-based arguments against smoking. The *Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz* (Education Office for the Protection of Youth, AfJ), one of the leading youth groups working with the federal government on the development of anti-smoking programs in the early 1960s, called upon authorities, schools and families to educate youth with regard to the potential dangers to their "body and soul" so as to allow them to proceed through life with "open eyes."<sup>640</sup> Access to television enabled health educators and smoking opponents to reach a broader audience, though they had to compete there with cigarette commercials for viewers' attention. The employment of mass media as a critical component of preventive public health measures was not new, but it did provide new opportunities to disseminate messages tailored for specific audiences and to distribute health education materials in mediums particularly attractive to anti-smoking activists' prized demographic: youth.<sup>641</sup>

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<sup>640</sup> Aufgaben und Ziele des Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz, BuArch B 310 / 302.

<sup>641</sup> See David Cantor, "Uncertain Enthusiasm: The American Cancer Society, Public Education, and the Problems of the Movie, 1921-1960," *Bulleting of the History of Medicine* 81:1 (2007),

In 1962, the West German Health Ministry, in conjunction with the BZgA and AfJ, sponsored a contest called “Wer hat recht?” (“Who is right?”) for students between the ages of 12 to 16. The 1962 contest, which would become an annual event focused on a specific theme related to health and personal development, centered on the subject of smoking and health and appeared in the periodical Gib acht! (Pay Attention!). The first half of the competition consisted of a survey of student comprehension of tobacco and health, which was developed by a committee of teachers and health professionals. They designed the questionnaire to test students’ general knowledge of tobacco. In particular, they wished to determine whether or not adolescents were fully aware of the poisonous contents of tobacco. The survey also asked students to identify at least two harmful substances in tobacco, calculate the smallest amount of pure nicotine needed to kill a human, and estimate how much money West Germans spent each day on tobacco products based upon annual expenditures.<sup>642</sup>

As part of the second half of the competition, students read two short stories about groups of youth confronting the question of whether to smoke or not, and they then had to identify which characters and arguments within these pieces were correct. In the first story, the ninth grade soccer team at the Goethe School lost to the eight-grade class team by a score of 1-0, despite being favored to win the match. Following the match, the captain and goalkeeper of the ninth-grade squad reprimanded center forward Kurt and left

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pp. 39-69 on the use of film prior to the 1960s to educate the lay public about cancer and cancer prevention. On the importance of mass media framing of the cigarette question since the 1970s, see Roddey Reid, Globalizing Tobacco Control: Anti-Smoking Campaigns in California, France and Japan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 125-126.

<sup>642</sup> Gesundheitswettbewerb, Wissenfragen zum Thema, BuArch B 310 / 302. Also see Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to the Kultusminister/Senatoren der Lehrer, 1 September 1962, BuArch B 310 / 302.

halfback Conny for their poor performance, which he blamed on their smoking. Their teammates echoed the captain's denunciation, telling Kurt and Conny that athletes never smoke because sports and cigarettes are a poor fit and that young smokers were idiots. The smokers risked social ostracism within the locker room as their teammates explained that Kurt and Conny's smoking was unfair to the rest of the squad since they were not playing in peak physical condition. The second story dealt with an argument over one boy's refusal to smoke with his friends. Several youth accused Klaus of being cowardly and insisted that no crime would be committed if they smoked. In response, Klaus explained that he had no desire to ingest a poison, questions the courage needed to engage in activities that endanger health, and insists that smoking is stupid. Klaus also showed a remarkable grasp of the long-term risks, arguing it was better to abstain now so as to avoid the need for medical treatment later in life.<sup>643</sup>

Each story revolved around forms of mediated autonomy through the disciplining nature of peer pressure and community policing, while preserving individual choice and personal liberty as fundamental societal principles. Both tales also entailed peer groups standing in as the voice of authority in place of the state. Kurt and Conny's smoking, for example, came under scrutiny by the remaining nine members of the team due to their missed chances on the pitch. Klaus fended off his friends' efforts to pressure him to smoke, potentially undermining his position within the social network in the process. Although the central figures in each case faced external pressure to smoke, personal autonomy remained intact. This was further underscored by the design of the competition, which was structured around the students' responses to these short stories.

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<sup>643</sup> Gesundheitswettbewerb, Aufgabe, BuArch B 310 / 302.

Schools then submitted these responses to the Health Ministry so that they could be entered into the prize drawing. Larger rewards included three-day trips to Bonn and Berlin and a day at a football stadium where two classes could face off in a soccer match. Through the incorporation of desirable consumer goods, the competition legitimized youth consumption as part of West Germany's transformation into a youth-oriented consumer culture. The extent of participation throughout the Federal Republic impressed officials within the Health Ministry. In particular, officials expressed great interest in the participation of vocational schools, which they deemed to be "especially important." Perhaps the clearest sign of its success, teachers immediately overwhelmed the Health Ministry with requests for anti-smoking materials in the wake of the competition.<sup>644</sup>

Shortly after the student competition, Dr. Hans J. Goetz published "Zum Problem des Rauchens" ("On the Problem of Smoking") for teachers. The brochure, which was complete with numerous photographs, charts and graphs, integrated scientific and economic arguments to dissuade young people from excessive cigarette smoking. In his brochure, Goetz condemned immoderate smoking as a significant risk to the organs and tissues along "Smoke Street" (*Rauchstrasse*), which included the lips, tongue, throat, lungs, and esophagus, such as a potential hazard to the circulatory system as well. According to his estimates, smoking twenty cigarettes per day for twenty years was akin to inhaling ten briquettes of tar. In line with the Federal Health Office's call for anti-smoking propaganda for women and youth, Goetz's brochure stressed women's greater susceptibility by highlighting at-risk areas on a silhouette of a female figure standing with

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<sup>644</sup> Dr. Stralau, Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen, to Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz, 2 July 1963, Re: Schülerwettbewerb 1962/63 zum Thema Rauchen, BuArch B 310 / 302.

her right hand on her hip and her left hand behind the back of her head. Goetz also warned readers that smoking would impair their athletic abilities and cognitive functions, citing the impact of tobacco on the respiratory system and brain, respectively.<sup>645</sup>

Goetz developed his brochure in conjunction with an exhibit on the dangers of smoking and alcohol. In a manner similar to the small and relatively ineffective anti-smoking movement of the 1950s, Goetz articulated the need for an alliance between the home and school in addressing youth's attitudes toward tobacco and alcohol, noting the particular dangers associated with West Germany's "orientation toward consuming," which he saw as characteristic of a pleasure-driven society. Unlike the arguments against the "material Zeitgeist" circulated in the 1950s, Goetz's work did not denounce all forms of consumption. In a 1963 lecture on the exhibit, he explained the risks posed by excessive consumption of clothing, for instance, did not match the health dangers inherent in the immoderate use of tobacco and alcohol. Interestingly, Goetz focused his attention squarely on immoderate consumption of cigarettes, implicitly condoning the moderate of tobacco and alcohol.<sup>646</sup>

Many individuals in regular contact with youth, including teachers and physicians, encouraged the government to produce anti-smoking materials and distribute them to schools and youth groups. His brochure initially filled a critical gap following the 1962 RCP Report and "Wer hat recht?" competition. Although the brochure was well received by teachers, including one who declared it addressed a "great need for our

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<sup>645</sup> Dr. H. J. Goetz, "Zum Problem des Rauchens: Eine Zusammenfassende Darstellung für die Lehrerschaft," BuArch B 310 / 302.

<sup>646</sup> Informationsbesuch der Verwaltung des Kreises Siegburg am 29.1.1963, Das Ausstellungsvorhaben "Suchtgefahren," BuArch B 310 302.



youth,” published reviews and letters submitted directly to the BZgA reveal mixed responses to “Zum Problem des Rauchens.”<sup>647</sup> In an article for Die Zeit, Erwin Lausch criticized the pamphlet for its limited discussion of lung cancer and argued that its “imprecise” information had transformed it into a “warning label, which fails to warn.” Lausch also suggested the brochure would actually encourage rather than deter youth from lighting up while the federal government reaped the financial rewards through tobacco taxes.<sup>648</sup> Other reviewers blasted the brochure’s “misleading text” and boring style. They considered it to be reminiscent of a headmaster’s warning, which “a historian alone could enjoy.” Critics also decried Goetz’s failure to employ a sophisticated publication utilizing the psychological approach of modern advertising.<sup>649</sup> The Interior Minister in North-Rhine Westphalia added the content was “too extensive,” whereas the health education of the public needed to employ “general representations.”<sup>650</sup> These reactions made it clear that health authorities were not comfortable with appearing overbearing and that they felt that many West Germans were not yet prepared for a substantial debate on the issue of risk and smoking due to their insufficient command of the medical knowledge. Public health leaders, then, had to create an educated public capable of making an informed choice, a task that received a tremendous boost from

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<sup>647</sup> Stimmen zur Broschüre “Zum Problem des Rauchens,” 24 September 1963, BuArch B 310 / 302.

<sup>648</sup> Erwin Lausch, “Gewisse gesundheitliche Gefährdungen: ‘Zum Problem des Rauchens’: Eine Warnschrift, die nicht warnt,” Die Zeit, 12 July 1963, BuArch B 310 / 302.

<sup>649</sup> Zur Broschüre: Goetz, H., Zum Problem des Rauchens, BuArch B 310 / 12.

<sup>650</sup> Den Innenminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to Abteilung IV und Prof. Dr. Fritsche, Deutsches Gesundheits-Museum), 12 September 1963, BuArch B 310 / 302.

increased media attention to the ramifications of cigarette smoking beginning in the mid-1960s.<sup>651</sup>

### **Death Throws a Party**

After two years, public health officials decided that “Zum Problem des Rauchens” was directed at teachers more than students, making it unsuitable for the purposes of health pedagogy.<sup>652</sup> Even those targeted by the brochure deemed it unconvincing for young readers.<sup>653</sup> Such reactions prompted the BZgA, the German Health Museum, the Central Institute for Health Education, and Health Ministry to develop alternative materials to propel anti-smoking education for youth and the general population. Apart from the brochure’s lack of resonance, the Health Ministry also had to contend with the fallout of then Health Minister Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt’s poor performance in a television interview in early 1965. Schwarzhaupt appeared on a program addressing a variety of health issues, but her poorly phrased responses left many with the impression that the federal government could not handle a public health crisis.<sup>654</sup> To offset such

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<sup>651</sup> Der Spiegel ran two cover stories on smoking and cancer in 1964 and 1965. “Rauchen: Sind Zigaretten Gefährlich?” Der Spiegel Nr. 4/1964, 22 January 1964; and “Krebs: Krankheit des Jahrhunderts,” Nr. 7/1965, 10 February 1965.

<sup>652</sup> Memorandum to Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen, Re: Raucherbroschüre für Jugendliche, herausgegeben von der Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, BuArch B 310 / 15.

<sup>653</sup> Walter Nagel to Gesundheitsmuseum, Re: Neufassung der Broschüre “Zum Problem des Rauchens,” 2 February 1966, BuArch B 310 / 12. In his letter, Nagel referred to smokers as “slaves,” based upon his observations of POWs during the war and occupation era, when the cigarette punished the “Supermen,” harkening to Nazi racial ideology.

<sup>654</sup> “Scharfe Attacke der CSU gegen Deutsches Fernsehen,” Die Welt, 5 February 1965; “Gesundheitsministerium erwartet Untersuchung,” Die Welt, 9 February 1965; and Dr. Hans Loskant to Werner Hess (Hessischen Rundfunks), 15 February 1965, BuArch B 142 / 2993.

criticism and fill a noticeable lacuna in health education literature, the Ministry approved a proposal to produce an anti-tobacco film and accompanying brochure directed at youth.

The product of these discussions was Der Tod gibt eine Party (Death Throws a Party). Targeted at those 14 and older, the television program was set against a party backdrop complete with music and dancing to create a familiar environment for young viewers. Airing on ZDF, Germany's second television station, in November 1966, the show was immediately followed by an interview with Schwarzhaupt on the subject of smoking. In the opening scenes, a barkeeper offers guests arsenic, strychnine, and prussic acid from bottles featuring a picture of skull and crossbones, prompting a young girl to scream. The barkeeper, described as having a "demonic" face, laughs as if he were simply joking before offering cigarettes to his young guests, which they happily accept. The lit cigarettes fill the room with a blue haze as the camera closes in on a bottle of poisonous nicotine on the bar. As the smoke dissipates, the camera reveals a laboratory and the barkeeper, now dressed in a white lab coat to signify medical expertise and authority, lectures to the revelers with a "serious, but not unfriendly" facial expression. To convey the seriousness of the problem at hand, he injects a mouse with pure nicotine to show the dramatic and deadly effects that small doses of the poison can exert on living organisms. Following this demonstration, the lecturer engages the young people in a discussion about the dangers of nicotine as footage shows a leg amputation due to peripheral vascular disease, or "smoker's leg," whereby the arteries of the lower extremities become obstructed.

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Schwarzhaupt, the Health Minister between 1961 and 1966, appeared on a program entitled "Serious, But Not Hopeless."

The film also sought to demystify the contents of cigarettes for viewers, explaining that researchers had found dust, ammonia, and benzopyrene, a chief suspect in the creation of tumors. Diagrams revealed how the respiratory systems trapped cigarette smoke in the lungs, while athletes detailed how smoking diminished bodily performance. After projecting lung cancer rates for the future, a series of shocking photos escorted viewers through an operation on a cancerous lung before the photos morphed into images of a crowd of people transformed into crosses. Der Tod also identified the sex and gender-specific consequences of smoking, implying that cigarettes endangered women's reproductive organs and risked the health of fetuses and young children through the contamination of breast milk. The lecturer decried society's lack of outrage as scores of children are "led into temptation," even when "reasonable people" would not be so reckless as to leave firearms or poisons within children's reach. After calling for the sacrifice of "our comfort" by abolishing the convenience of vending machines, the young audience left Death's party. The camera follows a young couple to their car, where the man promptly places a cigarette in his mouth. In response, the young woman immediately tosses it out the window, wags her finger menacingly and declares, "you've been warned!"<sup>655</sup> In this case, the disciplining role of the state has been projected onto the smoker's peer, who has the authority to intervene and ensure the consumer made the appropriate choice.

The film underscored broader social and cultural attitudes toward women and smoking, even in the context of shifting gender relations during the latter half of the 1960s. In addressing the particular susceptibility of females with respect to tobacco

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<sup>655</sup> Exposé Arbeitstitel: Nikotin, BuArch B 310 / 19.

consumption, health authorities emphasized women's roles as mothers and potential mothers by stressing the negative effects of nicotine on their reproductive functions. The lecturer warned female viewers of tobacco's damaging effects on ovaries and the higher rates of pre-mature and stillborn births among female smokers. In one scene, the camera showed a woman stubbing out a cigarette in an ashtray before panning around to reveal the woman was also breastfeeding. As the film focuses on this moment of bonding between mother and infant, the lecturer chides the woman's "irresponsible" behavior as the breast had been transformed from a means of sustaining life into a source of contamination.<sup>656</sup> Beyond the reproductive emphasis, the film also treated women as superficial beings concerned primarily with appearances as opposed to substance, highlighting the impact of smoking on skin quality, color and tightness. In response to the film, a female employee within the youth department of the Schönberg Health Office even suggested the film be revised to take advantage of "women's vanity" by going into greater detail on "early ageing" and terrible skin.<sup>657</sup>

Apart from the version released on ZDF in November 1966, production company Brevis-Film GmbH created a second version of the film to be used in schools. Prior to the broadcast, the ZfG and the Health Ministry met with Brevis-Film and determined that the film was an effective means of educating older students, particularly those attending vocational schools, as well as teachers and parents. The filmmakers cautioned against allowing younger students to view the film unless a physician was present to answer a

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<sup>656</sup> Exposé Arbeitstitel: Nikotin, pp. 12-13, BuArch B 310 / 19. Although the film addressed the impact of smoking on male sex organs, the amount of time focused on women is disproportionate, especially in light of the imbalanced smoking rates between men and women.

<sup>657</sup> Ursula Welfonder, Gesundheitsamt Schönberg, to Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof, 15 November 1966, BuArch B 310 / 20.

broad range of questions about smoking and health.<sup>658</sup> Consultants also recommended editing the leg amputation scene, leaving only the sawing action.<sup>659</sup> After viewing the early cut of the planned television program, the president of the German Health Museum noted the relative absence of lung cancer, the most pressing public concern with cigarette smoking. Though the script approved by the Health Ministry referenced lung cancer, it only addressed the subject superficially, leaving many questions about the connection between smoking and bronchial carcinoma unanswered. Brevis-Film responded to such concerns from the public health leaders by explaining the link between cigarettes and cancer was “not yet proven,” making it difficult to foreground the subject.<sup>660</sup>

Regardless of the producers’ doubts, the program was favorably received upon its November 1966 release. Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof of the ZfG had contacted numerous physicians, public health officials, heads of schools, and other prominent figures involved in tobacco research in advance to solicit feedback. A Bad Reichenhall responded that the film was the “first generally understandable introduction” on nicotine abuse.<sup>661</sup> Wolfgang Cyran, author of Genuss mit oder ohne Reue? (Pleasure With or Without Regret?), a survey of the medical dangers of smoking published in 1968, heralded the “special meaning” of the effort to inform the public about the risks of

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<sup>658</sup> Notiz von Herrn Gericke, Re: Raucherfilm, 29 July 1966, BuArch B 310 / 19.

<sup>659</sup> Bericht über mein Gespräch mit Herrn Dr. Engler bei der Brevis Film GmbH am 11 August 1966, 30 August 1966, BuArch B 310 / 19.

<sup>660</sup> Dr. Engler and H. G. Füngeling to Deutsches Gesundheits Museum, Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung, Re: Filmvorhaben “Nikotin”, 25 August 1966, BuArch B 310 / 19.

<sup>661</sup> Dr. Schmidt, Klinisches Sanatorium Trausnitz to Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof, Re: Film “Der Tod gibt eine Party,” 17 February 1967, BuArch B 310 / 22.

cigarette use.<sup>662</sup> Most respondents offered critiques of the program and pointed out areas in need of strengthening. Several viewers criticized the film's vague handling of a young partygoer's question regarding filter cigarettes, which the lecturer identified as being as harmful as unfiltered cigarettes without providing sufficient explanation for a claim that stood in stark contrast to popular understanding and advertising messages.<sup>663</sup> Even in praising the film, respondents noted its ineffectiveness in addressing smokers as opposed to non-smokers. The Mannheim Health Office believed the program would alienate smokers who objected to the rather negative and "extremely" one-sided depictions.<sup>664</sup> Schultze-Rhonhof, for that matter, felt it naïve to think that watching the film would lead smokers to immediately abandon their habits and become "goody-goodies," calling attention to the fact that the producers could only do so much in a twenty-five minute program.<sup>665</sup>

An Esslingen clinic physician who viewed the film as part of a local health education committee had a very strong reaction. Dr. J. A. Laberke argued that the lecturer's headmasterly style in addressing the party guests gave the film a "heavy tone," and he criticized the use of exaggerated poison bottles in the opening scene, which made it difficult to take the program seriously. Moreover, Laberke reported that young viewers

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<sup>662</sup> Dr. med. Wolfgang Cyran to Deutsches Gesundheits Museum, Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung, 9 November 1966, BuArch B 310 / 19.

<sup>663</sup> Dipl.-Sozialwirt Dyballa, Landesverein für Volksgesundheitspflege Niedersachsen e.V., to Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung, 11 November 1966, BuArch B 310 / 21.

<sup>664</sup> Neudert, Staatliche Gesundheitsamt, Mannheim, to Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof, 8 November 1966, BuArch B 310 / 20.

<sup>665</sup> Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof to W. Ludemann, Information Rheinbraun, undated letter, BuArch B 310 / 22.

found the mouse scene unconvincing since most anyone would react to having a garden hose jammed into their stomach. Laberke also denounced the surgical scenes as unaesthetic, ineffective, and incompatible with the goals of informing the broader public about the inherent risks of smoking. Another respondent noted that the absence of substantial changes in consumer habits following the 1964 Terry Report proved educators could not rely upon scientific evidence to achieve the desired objective of getting people to quit or avoid smoking.<sup>666</sup> Fritsche defended the project on the grounds that it was incredibly difficult to produce a health education film that balanced the pedagogical objectives with the needs of the “creative specialists.”<sup>667</sup> In other words, the various forces shaping the production understood effective public health education with a special emphasis on youth had to find a proper equilibrium between enlightenment and entertainment.

Despite the critiques, Schultze-Rhonhof and her colleagues recognized an opportunity to broaden the film’s appeal and effectiveness by making it widely available to schools and interested organizations following the television broadcast. Demand for the film intensified in late 1966 and lasted several years, indicating both educators’ growing interest in broaching the subject of smoking with their students and the relative dearth of readily available material capable of appealing to school-aged audiences. The director of Rheinland’s distribution center for educational films observed an immediate response from schools following the television broadcast, comparing it to the responses

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<sup>666</sup> Dr. Dr. J. A. Laberke, Chefarzt der Medizinischen Klinik der Städtliche Krankenanstalten Esslingen to Prof. Dr. W. Fritsche, 30 November 1966, BuArch B 310 / 19.

<sup>667</sup> Prof. Dr. W. Fritsche to Dr. Dr. med. J. A. Laberke, Re: Film “Der Tod gibt eine Party,” 4 March 1967, BuArch B 310 / 19.



to a more expensive film, “One in Twenty Thousand.”<sup>668</sup> The latter film, which had been produced in 1954 by the American Temperance Association, followed the story of a young man’s experiences with lung cancer. Although it was still in circulation in the early 1970s, teachers felt it was an inappropriate resource because of the visceral impact it had on many young viewers; some reportedly vomited upon viewing a lung operation scene filmed in color and featuring a close-up of diseased tissue.<sup>669</sup>

The influx of requests to Schultze-Rhonhof’s office in December 1966 and January 1967 resulted in an extensive waiting period for schools and youth groups – some as far away as Paris – interested in borrowing Der Tod.<sup>670</sup> This situation remained largely unchanged for a few years, even as additional copies of the film were made available for purchase. A creative staff member of a clinic interested in hosting a viewing party turned the film’s title into a pun, asking Schultze-Rhonhof when Death would again be available to host a party.<sup>671</sup> Schultze-Rhonhof used the opportunity presented by these requests to alert interested parties to a new brochure to augment the film and replace “Zum Problem des Rauchens.”

Buoyed by the apparent success of Der Tod, Schultze-Rhonhof moved forward with her plan to develop a brochure for teachers, parents, and students on the dangers of smoking, a project she initiated more than a year before the film’s release. According to

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<sup>668</sup> Esser, Landesbildstelle Rheinland to Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung, Re: Film Der Tod gibt eine Party, 16 January 1967, BuArch B 310 / 20.

<sup>669</sup> A. Schulte zur Surlage, “Erfahrungen mit dem Film ‘Einer von Zwanzigtausend,’” Rehabilitation 25:3 (1972), pp. 71-72.

<sup>670</sup> Dr. Schultze-Rhonhof to Jugendwerk Maria Theresia, 17 January 1967, BuArch B 310 / 20.

<sup>671</sup> H. Klepzig, Klinik Dr. med. Otto Buchinger to Deutsches Gesundheits Museum and Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung, 20 June 1967, BuArch B 310 / 22.

her correspondence with educators, local youth groups, and physicians, the new brochure would provide information on cigarette smoking in a manner suitable for young Germans, as opposed to the “dated” Goetz brochure. Much like Der Tod gibt eine Party, the brochure did not set out to constrain young Germans’ opportunity to smoke; rather, she wrote “Was stimmt nun eigentlich?” (“What’s Really the Case?”) to promote critical thinking and discussion about the consequences of “heavy” smoking among younger audiences.<sup>672</sup> Neither the film nor the brochure, then, sought to prohibit tobacco consumption per se. Instead, these new materials emphasized the importance of personal responsibility by creating a space in which young Germans were asked to contemplate the consequences of their decisions before starting to smoke.<sup>673</sup> In preparing the brochure, Schultze-Rhonhof consulted with the directors of municipal youth counseling centers, which led her to avoid a paternalistic and confrontational style in favor of one that exhibited flexibility and encouraged independence.<sup>674</sup> Schultze-Rhonhof’s insistence on preserving personal autonomy and individual liberty despite increased concerns over the addictiveness of smoking viewed smokers primarily as agents of consumption rather than as prospective patients.

Many educators expressed interest in utilizing “Was stimmt nun eigentlich?” in the classroom due to its integration of medical facts and psychological design to address questions of motivation and the social origins of cigarette smoking. A cancer awareness

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<sup>672</sup> Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof to W. Ludemann, undated, BuArch B 310 / 22.

<sup>673</sup> Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof to Frau Ursula Welfonder, Gesundheitsamt Schönberg, 3 January 1967, BuArch B 310 / 20.

<sup>674</sup> Bericht über den Besuch bei Herrn Kurt Seelmann, Direktor des Stadtjugendamtes München, 26 February 1965, BuArch B 310 / 12.

group impressed upon Schultze-Rhonhof the need to disseminate the brochure to as many young people in West Germany as possible given the level of difficulty in combating ubiquitous cigarette advertising, which had produced an idealized public understanding of the cigarette through effective visuals and misleading copy.<sup>675</sup> Additionally, the new publication provided a means of delivering valuable information on the potentially devastating health risks without appearing to infringe upon their sense of independence. A youth journal on “natural living” reinforced the theme of personal independence within the brochure by contrasting private autonomy with cigarette dependency. According to its coverage of Schultze-Rhonhof’s brochure, youth had to choose between joining an “army of smokers” and reclaiming their independence.<sup>676</sup>

Despite the positive reception among teachers and physicians, many of whom placed copies of the brochure in their waiting rooms, they also felt that the publication on its own did not represent a suitable response to the cigarette industry’s intensive marketing campaigns. Their reservations stemmed from the extensive photos of youth smoking cigarettes, which they believed would give young readers the wrong impression. Some critics, including the Evangelical Working Group for Youth Protection (*Evangelischer Arbeitskreis für Jugendschutz*) advocated a “more economical” use of such images.<sup>677</sup> One reviewer affiliated with a Göttingen hospital framed his own

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<sup>675</sup> Obermedizinaldirektor, Badischen Landesverband zur Bekämpfung des Krebses to Dr. Christel Schultze-Rhonhof, Re: Aufklärungsschrift für Jugendliche über die Gefahren des Rauchens, 7 May 1968, BuArch B 310 / 16.

<sup>676</sup> “Rauchen? Was kann man einem jungen Menschen empfehlen?” *Jugend und Lebensordnung*, 1968, p. 22, BuArch B 310 / 15.

<sup>677</sup> Hans Böttcher, Evangelischer Arbeitskreis für Jugendschutz in Nordrhein-Westfalen to Bundesarbeitsstelle Aktion Jugendschutz, 4 August 1967, BuArch B 310 / 16.

opposition to the brochure in much stronger terms, claiming that the “unsuitable” publication amounted to nothing less than an “ad” for the cigarette industry. This writer viewed Schultze-Rhonhof’s brochure as another failure in a long line of failures on the part of public health agencies, despite the fact that they knew about the dangers since at least 1962 – the year of the RCP Report.<sup>678</sup> As the issue of youth smoking continued to frustrate anti-smoking groups and health educators, schools evolved into a central site of contestation and contradiction as students used smoking to claim their own space within the school despite the efforts of anti-smoking instructions and teachers’ smoking.

### **Smoking in the Girls Room: The Smoker’s Decree in Lower Saxony**

In 1968, the Education Minister of Lower Saxony issued a controversial decree (*Rauchererlass*), granting students over the age of sixteen in the eleventh grade or higher permission to smoke in designated rooms or corridors in schools or in a “smoker’s corner” (*Raucherecke*) on campus. By creating a space for students to smoke, school authorities hoped to curtail illicit acts of smoking in restrooms. The new decree effectively rewarded students of merit by making eligibility dependent upon grade level, as well as age. Parents’ committees at each school had to determine whether or not to provide the necessary space for students to smoke. Moreover, students interested in utilizing a school’s smoking area needed to obtain their parent’s written consent. One year later, twenty-five of the thirty schools affected by the decree in Braunschweig had authorized students to smoke. Twenty-four of the Braunschweig schools offered students a small piece of territory in the yard, while one school set up a smoking room in the

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<sup>678</sup> Heinrich Koehne to the Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, Re: Referat für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, 18 October 1967, BuArch B 310 / 16.

cellar. According to a report filed with the Education Minister's office, three of the five remaining Braunschweig schools were all girl schools, indicating many Germans continued to interpret the social acceptability of smoking through a gendered lens.<sup>679</sup>

The "smoker's decree" highlighted the inherent complexities of tobacco control and public health education, even as it created a space for the consumption of a legal commodity in a controlled setting. In several instances, parents and public health educators expressed doubts over the inherently contradictory messages embedded within the smoking regulations for students. Proponents framed smoking rooms in schools as a form of prevention, since it theoretically segregated older smokers from younger students, who were more likely to be susceptible to the allure of a subversive behavior commonly undertaken in unsupervised spaces. Schools establishing smoking corners in the yards deliberately provided spaces out of younger students' view to avoid attracting the attention of younger pupils. This move seemingly liberated certain groups of German youth to smoke, while also disciplining the overall student body. By designating certain groups and specific spaces as acceptable for purpose of smoking, the decree marked the remaining students as ineligible and sites as off limits. The principal of a boy's Gymnasium in Braunschweig, for example, welcomed the decree since student smoking would now occur in "disciplined forms." Other schools, however, reported continued problems with unregistered students smoking in the halls and toilets.<sup>680</sup>

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<sup>679</sup> Der Präsident des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks Braunschweig to the Niedersächsischen Kultusminister, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 30 September 1969, Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv-Staatsarchiv Wolfenbüttel (hereafter NdsW), 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

<sup>680</sup> Dr. Linne, Oberstudiendirektor Neue Oberschule für Jungen in Braunschweig, to Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks Braunschweig, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 6 September 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393; Gymnasium für Jungen Holzminden, Re:

Those opposed to allowing students to smoke either inside the school building or on school grounds argued the decree undermined ongoing efforts to inform young Germans about the heightened health risks associated with cigarette smoking. A parents group associated with the Wilhelm Raabe School in Lüneberg, for example, urged the state's Education Minister to employ all possible means to combat youth smoking, but conceded that "enticing forces," such as advertising and the desire to appear grown up, left a far greater impression among youth than any type of educational material.<sup>681</sup> Parents in Goslar questioned why schools would conduct anti-smoking lessons at all if they also permitted students to light up. Either the cigarette was harmful and needed to be prohibited or it was innocuous, making special lessons in biology classes superfluous.<sup>682</sup> The director of an all girls' school in Goslar also questioned the logic behind the new decree, pointing out the "ironic" contradiction between allowing students to smoke and the "provable" health risks posed by cigarette use covered in biology class.<sup>683</sup>

School administrators at institutions with a *Raucherecke* echoed this ambivalence by ordering increased instruction on the health effects of smoking in science courses and

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Durchführung und Auswirkungen des Rauchererlasses, 12 June 1969, Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (hereafter HH), Nds. 110H Acc. 86/82 Nr. 1248.

<sup>681</sup> Der Vorstand des Elternrats der Wilhelm Raabe-Schule, Lüneberg, to the Kultusminister des Landes Niedersachsen, Re: Erlass des Nds.Kult.M. v. 1. August 1968, 23 June 1969, HH Nds 400 Acc 121/81 Nr 720.

<sup>682</sup> Dr. Deininger, Oberstudiendirektor Ratsgymnasium Goslar, to Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks Braunschweig, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 16 September 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

<sup>683</sup> Oberstudiendirektor Dr. Erdmann, Christian Von Dohm Schule Goslar, to the Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks Braunschweig, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 26 September 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

making anti-smoking materials readily available to students. Some schools also strengthened their focus on smoking and health in grades unaffected by the smoking decree in the hopes of minimizing the need for such spatial demarcation in the future. Grade 9-13 students at a boys' Gymnasium in Bad Gandersheim viewed Der Tod gibt eine Party within the first month of the decree's implementation, and they later attended a physician's lecture on the dangers of nicotine abuse.<sup>684</sup> School officials' attempts to counterbalance the decree via a strengthening of anti-smoking education highlighted schools' discomfort with the smoking spaces for students. In an era before the popularization of the concept of passive smoking and the rise of the non-smokers' rights movement, the decree suggested that the rights of consumers to use a legal product outweighed health concerns, provided that the only damage being done was to the consumer.

Apart from focusing greater attention on the question of smoking in schools, the Education Minister's decree also placed cigarette use among teachers in the limelight. Increasingly, the behavior of educators themselves came under closer scrutiny from school and public health officials, as well as parents, who feared students might emulate teachers who smoked in the halls and classrooms. Many students also took note of the apparent hypocrisy between anti-smoking education and adult behavior. As a result, the new guidelines sought to discipline teachers' habits by restricting their cigarette smoking

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<sup>684</sup> In late January 1969, a local insurance agency arranged a viewing of the 1954 American film One in 20,000 for grades 8-13. See Gymnasium Bad Gandersheim to Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks, Re: Rauchen in den Schulen, 13 October 1971, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

to faculty lounges.<sup>685</sup> By attempting to establish standard times and spaces for teachers to smoke, the 1968 decree encouraged educators to exercise a form of self-regulation with respect to their own tobacco habits, thereby linking the rights of students as consumers to teachers' dual role as consumers and agents of discipline.

Permitting students to smoke in designated spaces on school grounds raised fundamental questions. As several school heads pointed out in letters to the Education Minister's office, teachers and school officials could not be expected to effectively police these student spaces for practical reasons. The large number of pupils at most schools made it difficult for teachers to recognize and differentiate between those students with parental permission to smoke and their classmates who surreptitiously attempted to sneak into smoking areas.<sup>686</sup> Teachers also complained about the problems of distinguishing legal-age smokers versus underage smokers.<sup>687</sup> As a result of persistent resistance to women's smoking, female students had greater difficulty acquiring parental consent to smoke than male students. As such, girls continued to smoke in restrooms, which was often made easier given a shortage of female teachers available to police these spaces.<sup>688</sup>

In an October 1971 progress report on the decree, the Gymnasium Adolfinum in

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<sup>685</sup> "Rauchen in Schulen," Schulverwaltungsblatt für Niedersachsen, Heft 9, Jahrgang 20, 1968, p. 253, BuArch B 310 / 15. Participants at the Fifth Congress for Alcohol and Tobacco Free Youth Education in 1959 also urged teachers to limit smoking on school grounds to the lounge.

<sup>686</sup> Oberstudiendirektor Krieg, Lessingsschule Gymnasium in Braunschweig, to Der Präsident des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 23 September 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

<sup>687</sup> Bericht zum Rauchererlass – Rauchgewohnheiten der Schülerinnen und Schüler d. Gymnasiums Grossburgwedel, 17 October 1971, HH Nds. 110H Acc. 86/82 Nr. 1248.

<sup>688</sup> Gymnasium Bad Gandersheim to Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 19 September 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.



Bückerburg noted that staff routinely discovered cigarette butts piled up in the girls' room and speculated that this resulted from the lack of opportunity to smoke at home.<sup>689</sup> The problem in Bückerburg existed in other institutions, as numerous schools complained about cleanliness and disorder. In one instance, the cleaning staff at one Hannover school refused to clean up cigarette stubs and ashtrays.<sup>690</sup> Elsewhere, schools directly tied the availability of space to the maintenance of proper hygienic standards – namely, students had to keep a clean environment or risk losing their corner altogether.<sup>691</sup>

The heightened political and generational tensions of the late 1960s made many wary of exercising “authoritarian” approaches in a democratic state.<sup>692</sup> Several schools indicated teachers had become frustrated with or had no interest in policing students’ smoking in allotted spaces or furtive cigarette use in bathrooms. By 1971, the Gymnasium Adolfinum reported “quasi-police” tactics, including smoker identity cards for students eligible to smoke in school and teacher “raids” in spaces frequented by illicit smokers, failed to produce desirable results. Students allegedly viewed classmates caught in these dragnets as “martyrs,” and most pupils laughed at the unreasonable attempts to strictly regulate the bathrooms.<sup>693</sup> In some cases, unsupervised students

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<sup>689</sup> Gymnasium Adolfinum Bückerburg to the Niedersächsischen Landesverwaltungsamt, Höhere Schulen, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 18 October 1971, HH Nds 110 H Acc 86/82 Nr. 1248.

<sup>690</sup> Ricarda-Huch-Schule, Hannover, to Frau Oberschulrätin Dr. Lehnhoff, Re: Rauchen in Schulen, 21 May 1969, HH Nds 110 H Acc. 86/82 Nr. 1249.

<sup>691</sup> Julianum Gymnasium für Jungen, Helmstedt, to the Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 20 September 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

<sup>692</sup> BMG, Zum Problem des Rauchens, undated, BuArch B 189 / 2259.

<sup>693</sup> Gymnasium Adolfinum Bückerburg to the Niedersächsischen Landesverwaltungsamt, Höhere Schulen, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 18 October 1971, HH Nds 110 H Acc 86/82 Nr. 1248.

smoking in bathrooms allegedly created a “warning system” with lookouts to avoid detection. Despite the inconveniences and continuous transgressions on the part of several students, the director of a Gymnasium in Bad Gandersheim refused to reinstitute a general prohibition against smoking because doing so would mean a “return to dictatorial measures.”<sup>694</sup>

By 1971, schools reported mixed results. A vocational school in Wolfenbüttel praised the decree for improving the school’s hygienic standards by removing smoking from restrooms, but also noted an overall increase in the number of smokers.<sup>695</sup> The Herschelschule in Hannover stated that its students remained in “their corner,” but that teachers had begun to discover signs of smoking in illicit areas.<sup>696</sup> Many school directors, however, favored a repeal of the smoker’s decree due to the general ineffectiveness of anti-smoking education materials in enforcing behavioral standards. The principal of a Braunschweig boys’ school argued efforts to enlighten the student body could not possibly succeed in a social environment that implicitly denied the damaging effects of smoking by permitting young people to light up.<sup>697</sup> The ambiguous results prompted health educators to develop more forceful anti-smoking messages and to

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<sup>694</sup> “Auswirkungen der Raucherlaubnis,” 2 October 1969, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996 No. 393.

<sup>695</sup> Carl Gotthard Langhans Schule, Wolfenbüttel to Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks, Re: Rauchen in den Schulen, 13 October 1971, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996, No. 393.

<sup>696</sup> Herschelschule Hannover to the Niedersächsischen Landesverwaltungsamt, Höhere Schulen, Re: Rauchen in der Schule, 28 October 1971, HH Nds 110 H Acc. 86/82 Nr. 1248

<sup>697</sup> Dr. Keller, Gausschule, Braunschweig to the Präsidenten des Niedersächsischen Verwaltungsbezirks, Re: Rauchen in den Schulen, 19 October 1971, NdsW 4 Nds. Zg. 06/1996, No. 393.

increasingly target younger audiences, though still within a framework that respected individual autonomy.

### **Smoking Games**

In the early 1970s, a number of anti-smoking works directed attention at increasingly younger audiences through the incorporation of direct questions, role-playing exercises, and games. Jens Uwe Martens' Spielen Sie mit? (Do You Want to Play?) and a new health education curriculum from the BZgA for primary school students exemplified the persistence and importance of consumer autonomy and rational consumption, even as educators targeted younger age groups in the early 1970s. As we have seen in the previous chapter, public health authorities implemented stricter tobacco advertising regulations during this period due to growing concerns about the susceptibility of young consumers. At a time when Strobel and consumer advocates lobbied for stricter regulation of advertising practices and a growing awareness of passive smoking spurred non-smokers to exercise their rights with greater frequency and intensity, the BZgA and even the Health Ministry remained ambivalent toward state intervention and the regulation of tobacco consumption.

The cover to Martens' Spielen Sie mit? compared cigarette smoking to a game of Russian Roulette and modeled the fifty-four-page booklet on catechisms, presenting readers with a set of questions requiring them to make a series of choices. At the outset, readers had to sign a pledge to obey the rules of the game. From there, Martens encouraged readers to carefully read each question, select one of the available multiple choice answers, and turn the page to learn about and compare the responses. By

presenting the decision to smoke or not as a game and utilizing a question and answer format, Martens' stylistic approach illustrated the complications of decision-making in a risk society. Yet, an early illustration of a man accepting the offer of a cigarette also showed smoking as an unconscious behavior and called upon readers to think critically before acting.<sup>698</sup> Following a section on the physiological impact of tobacco constituents and startling statistics about lung cancer mortality rates, Martens focused readers' attention on advertising, using the popular Peter Stuyvesant "a taste of the great, wide world" campaign's promises of freedom and independence as an example. Martens dubbed such advertising guarantees as a "masterpiece" of manipulation, inspiring young people to light up as "freedom fighters" at the age of fifteen who "obediently" purchase packs from readily available vending machines. In one of the most direct challenges to the preservation of informed choice in public health education from this era, Martens openly asked whether or not it was wise to allow individuals' freedom to be eliminated through nicotine dependency. Immediately thereafter, however, Martens points out that readers have the chance to refuse to smoke.<sup>699</sup> In framing the discussion in such a manner, Martens simultaneously sought to guide consumers' choices by presenting cigarette use as an unnecessary and potentially fatal risk, while avoiding infringing on the sanctity of individual autonomy.

Though Martens continued to rely upon a model of the rational consumer, he expected that students would opt not to smoke. Cigarette use was clearly constructed as a risky activity that threatened one's subjectivity by turning them into addicts and equated

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<sup>698</sup> Jens Uwe Martens, *Spielen Sie mit?*, 1970, p. 7, HH Nds 110 H Acc. 86/82 No. 1250.

<sup>699</sup> Martens, pp. 37-41, HH Nds 110 H Acc. 86/82 No. 1250.

the choice to smoke with a game of Russian roulette. The final pages of the brochure prompt students to read a translated Reader's Digest article recounting a smoker's transformation into a hideous monster following extensive surgery for throat cancer, which necessitated the removal of his jaw bone. After presenting readers with this grotesque imagery, Martens asks if they would like to accept a cigarette and play the game. Those who respond in the affirmative by becoming a smoker can no longer claim ignorance, as they have been presented with the rules – smoking greatly increases your risk of contracting several types of cancer and heart disease. Those capable of withstanding the pressure to conform are praised for denying the cigarette industry access to its “favorite children” by remaining a non-smoker.<sup>700</sup> Martens, then, employed informed choice as a teaching strategy, but stacked the deck in favor of abstention.

This type of approach also characterized Norbert Bartsch's 1975 health education curriculum covering everyday drugs. Divided into four sections addressing cigarettes, alcohol, prescription drugs, and advertising, Bartsch developed the curriculum for first through fourth grade students because children were exposed to these seductive forces at an early age. The inclusion of advertising as a central pillar of the new health education guidelines brought the close connections between the worlds of consumption and public health into sharp relief. From Bartsch's perspective, the classroom represented one of the few spaces uncorrupted by the ubiquity of advertising, making it important space to learn how to deconstruct marketing messages. Teachers provided children with questions to consider after watching a commercial, in the hopes that reflective exercises would allow students to develop into sophisticated consumers cognizant of how advertisers exploited

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<sup>700</sup> Martens, pp. 51-53, HH Nds. 110 H Acc. 86/82 No. 1250.

certain emotions for the purpose of selling a product. In doing so, public health education took on the role of preparing young pupils to develop into informed and responsible consumer citizens in the future by learning to view ads critically. In accordance with the principles of governance in the Federal Republic, though, the state could not compel nor dictate the right choice to consumers or future consumers.

With respect to smoking, the new program represented an important shift away from targeting older students in favor of those pupils who had limited experience with cigarette smoking, if any at all. To avoid inadvertently luring students to take an interest in tobacco, the curriculum limited most of the anti-smoking lessons and activities to students in the third and fourth grades. The curriculum instructed teachers to promote a healthy lifestyle by reinforcing negative attitudes toward smoking among nine and ten year olds.<sup>701</sup> Interestingly, one of the proposed lessons called upon the teacher to smoke a single cigarette through a tissue in front of the students and to exhale through a second tissue so the class could observe firsthand what enters and leaves the body during the smoking.<sup>702</sup> Although the curriculum presented overwhelmingly negative depictions of smoking and addressed students who could not legally smoke in public, most of the activities drew upon a model of informed choice similar to the one employed by Martens.

Role-playing exercises and illustrated stories about peer pressure figured prominently in the smoking and health portion of the curriculum. Designed to train students in verbal and behavioral strategies for real life encounters with cigarettes, these

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<sup>701</sup> Norbert Bartsch et al., Curriculum Alkohol, Rauchen, Selbstmedikation, Werbung und Gesundheit: Unterrichtseinheiten für das 1. bis 4. Schuljahr der Grundschule (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1975), p. 68.

<sup>702</sup> Bartsch, p. 103. Oddly, the curriculum's explanation specifies teachers only smoke one cigarette due to time constraints rather than cite potential health concerns.

activities focused on the effect of the group dynamic on the decision-making process. Role-playing exercises allowed students to learn and adjust to potential ostracism from peers and test possible responses to an invitation to smoke. By directing students' attention toward the function of the group and the impact of peer pressure, these teaching strategies emulated the central focus of the "Wer hat recht?" stories from 1962. In 1975, the story focused on Peter's reaction to his friends' smoking. Initially, the program called upon the teacher to have students specifically identify reasons why Peter would or would not smoke. In a subsequent assignment using the same characters and situation, students had to fill in the dialogue and make the decision for Peter in order to make them "conscious" of Peter's decision-making process.<sup>703</sup> Ideally, students would have Peter refuse to smoke, either out of lack of interest or consideration for his own health. The lesson plan, though, did not require teachers to correct students should they elect to have Peter try smoking. Instead, following the assignment, the class would reflect upon and explain their decision for Peter.

This did not mark the end of Peter's involvement in the new curriculum. A subsequent assignment called for students to formulate alternative strategies for Peter to employ when embroiled in a conflict with his friends, including leaving the group or seeking an ally among their peers. As in the earlier assignment, the question of individual agency within the group dynamic lay at the heart of this activity. The plan strongly recommended that teachers advise students about the psychological advantage of choosing to leave a group engaged in undesirable behavior as opposed to being excluded

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<sup>703</sup> Bartsch, p. 87.

by one's peers.<sup>704</sup> Respecting the individual autonomy of third and fourth grade students in the matter of tobacco consumption represented a substantial risk since the unscripted activity theoretically allowed students to express curiosity and interest in smoking. Yet, this fit within the program's overall objective of gearing youth to actively "stabilize healthy attitudes" by training them to identify risks and choose the healthier option.<sup>705</sup>

At the conclusion of the lessons on cigarettes, the curriculum called upon students to play a board game. The *Raucherspiel* required players to follow a circuitous route to the final destination: an illustration of a young man declining the offer of a cigarette. Along the journey, players had to decide whether to travel a safe – albeit longer – route along *Gesundheitsallee* and *Sportstrasse*, which featured an illustration of a track and field athlete. To reward those participants who chose this option, these safer streets featured spaces that enabled players to advance their pieces several additional spots. The shorter paths, along *Hustenpfad* (Cough Path) or *Qualmstrasse* (Smoke Street), for example, contained numerous risks, as evident in the accompanying depictions of heavy coughing and chain smoking. Players might land on spots requiring them to lose two turns, move back several places, or go to the hospital until they rolled a six. Near the end of the race, players had to make one final decision. They could opt to take a leisurely stroll along *Frischlufweg* (Fresh Air Way) or choose the shortcut down *Todesweg* (Death Lane), which featured illustrations of a cemetery and a woman smoking while holding an infant. When traveling down *Todesweg*, however, players risked landing on a black spot, which symbolized death and required them to move their piece to the cemetery. The lesson plan called upon students to play the game at least twice, so as to learn as much

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<sup>704</sup> Bartsch, p. 95.

<sup>705</sup> Bartsch, p. 70.



information about the dangers of smoking via chance cards, and then to discuss the intricacies of the contest. For instance, students had to explain their tactical decisions and analyze the board game illustrations in order to better facilitate the lessons of the game to real life situations. The post-game discussion enabled students to reflect upon the relationship between choice and risk.<sup>706</sup>

Martens and Bartsch maintained an emphasis on the necessity of choice. The *Raucherspiel* presented young students with a loose model of risk society by presenting them with an opportunity to exercise personal autonomy in pursuit of their goal while also bringing attention to the potential pitfalls associated with riskier behaviors and decisions. The shortcuts in the board game did not necessarily mean players would be dispatched to the hospital or cemetery, but deliberately portrayed risk-taking behavior as inherently more dangerous. In certain respects, the board game echoed Martens' attempt to get students to recognize cigarette smoking as a high-risk behavior. Both Bartsch and Martens, however, reflected the broader public health and education system's ambivalence toward adopting a paternalistic approach.

### **Out of the Ashes: The Rise of the Non-Smoker**

The anti-smoking education programs put into effect in the Federal Republic in the decade following the release of the Terry Report created space for the articulation of a non-smoker consciousness. Even as the state's role in protecting citizens as consumers emerged as a central point within the smoking and health debates, the new health education guidelines devised by Bartsch reinforced another core component of Strobel's

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<sup>706</sup> Bartsch, pp. 69 & 104.

approach to the smoking and health crisis – namely, the push to promote a positive non-smoker identity to counter the positive images of cigarette smoking in advertising and offer young Germans alternatives. Rather than abandon informed choice and infringe upon consumer autonomy through a smoking prohibition, West German public health officials and educators relied upon public relations campaigns and non-smoker clubs to redefine the public image of non-smokers as cool, hip, and independent.

The non-smoker identity project, which primarily targeted Germans under the age of twenty-five, encompassed a range of sites and activities. Bartsch identified classrooms as crucial sites to undermine perceptions of non-smokers as conservative, authoritarian, and weak. Instead, the non-smoking images in the *Raucherspiel* and illustrated stories presented non-smokers as courageous. In addition, students created collages to offer their impressions of non-smokers in order to reinforce the acceptability of not smoking in social situations.<sup>707</sup> For health educators, this type of work was essential to combating young Germans' mistaken perceptions of cigarette smoking. Surveys suggested children believed that nearly three-quarters of all adults in the Federal Republic smoked cigarettes, a perception that seriously weakened the anti-smoking messages in health education campaigns and materials. BZgA President Fritsch acknowledged the need to cease treating teenagers as a “strange and foreign population” if they were to make any headway in restructuring the public perception of cigarette smoking. Redefining the identity of non-smokers could best be accomplished if educators would promote the formation of non-smoking clubs, distribute newsletters specifically oriented toward

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<sup>707</sup> Bartsch, pp. 75-76.

young non-smokers, and organize events around leisure activities popular with younger audiences, such as film screenings or a battle of the bands.<sup>708</sup>

In May 1972, Minister Strobel conducted a revealing interview with Moderne Hausfrau, in which she called for a powerful non-smoker identity to subvert the image of the socially accepted cigarette smoker, who was often viewed by the public as young and successful risk-taker. Strobel favored the use of anti-smoking advertisements to promote a “progressive, modern, athletic, healthy, fresh, purposeful, fun” non-smoker image, particularly one that fit with the growing public interest in physical fitness. Public health authorities’ increased attention to the representation of non-smokers often proved to be quite superficial in its orientation – especially when addressed toward young women. As had been the case with Der Tod gibt eine Party, Strobel proposed to disarm the power of cigarette ads directed at young women by emphasizing tobacco’s negative effects on their skin. She even offered a potential slogan for a campaign under development: “Smoking makes women look old and wrinkled.”<sup>709</sup> Strobel’s proposal reflected the persistent strength of long-standing cultural attitudes that associated women’s smoking with physical appearance and, by extension, presented the female targets of such an anti-smoking campaign as shallow beings concerned only with vanity.

The Health Ministry and the BZgA also supported the formation of youth led social organizations and local non-smoker clubs as part of their overall push to create an

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<sup>708</sup> W. E. P. Fritsch, “An Antismoking Campaign Among Schoolchildren in Germany,” in The Second World Conference on Smoking and Health: The Proceedings of a Conference Organized by the Health Education Council, Imperial College, London, 20-24 September 1971 (London: Pitman Publishing, 1971), pp. 78-80.

<sup>709</sup> Käte Strobel interview mit Moderne Hausfrau, 1 May 1972, BuArch B 189 / 3019.

“opposition culture” against smoking.<sup>710</sup> At a 1970 physicians’ conference in Stuttgart, Strobel claimed nearly three hundred non-smoker clubs had been founded in West Germany.<sup>711</sup> However, many of these groups consisted of only a handful of members, met irregularly, and frequently stagnated and dissolved without much fanfare.<sup>712</sup> Some non-smoking associations unveiled ambitious agendas, including the Club of Active Non-Smokers in Hannover, which organized a “Day of Non-Smoking” in November 1972 to raise public awareness of smokers’ lack of consideration for non-smokers in Germany and get people to think about the “evil” of smoking.<sup>713</sup>

The Munich based YEAH-Gruppe, a youth club supported by the BZgA, published a series of newsletters featuring the likeness of various American, British, and German celebrities and sports stars questioning the logic and purpose of smoking. Soccer star Franz Beckenbauer announced his preference for cleats over cigarettes, while the Cartwrights of Bonanza fame, pictured in their cowboy hats, directly challenged the popular association of cigarette smoking and rugged masculinity epitomized by the Marlboro Man by asserting cigarettes did not make one a man. German crooner Roy Black, the American pop group The Monkees, and Australia’s Bee Gees also encouraged youth to avoid smoking. The desire to encourage youth to identify with not smoking also

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<sup>710</sup> Käte Strobel Interview mit dem Südwestfunk, 15 February 1972, BuArch B 189 / 3019. In this interview, Strobel deliberately reframed the TV spots as “pro-non-smoker” after being asked about the development of “anti-smoker” commercials in the Federal Republic.

<sup>711</sup> Ansprache von Frau Minister auf der öffentlichen Kundgebung am 26 Mai 1970 anlässlich des 73. Deutschen Ärztetages in Stuttgart, BuArch B 189 / 3006.

<sup>712</sup> Quantitative Erfolgskontrolle der Anti-Raucher-Kampagne “Der neue Trend – No Smoking Please, 21 January 1972, pp. 77-84, BuArch B 310 / 523.

<sup>713</sup> Einladung, October 1972, HH Nds 400 Acc 121/81 No. 720.

led the YEAH-Gruppe authors to exploit young readers' self-consciousness with respect to appearance by highlighting the negative effects of tobacco on skin care and quality.<sup>714</sup>

Although the YEAH-Gruppe contributed to a growing public discourse among youth about the values of not smoking, the organization explicitly preserved the rights of the individual to choose for him or herself. "The Story of YEAH," which provided a brief introduction into the group's formation, insisted that the organizers had "nothing against smoking." This new "clique" reportedly included smokers. Moreover, YEAH-Gruppe turned to reason as justification for rejecting a prohibitionist approach. A brief piece on the types of fathers further reflected the club's respect for individual autonomy. In it, the group dismisses the decidedly outdated style of the "Man of Yesterday," who refused to grant his children permission to smoke, in favor of the more "modern" father, who allowed his sons and daughters to choose since parents could not effectively ban smoking. In its initial issue, the YEAH-Gruppe newsletter also criticized the "same old song" from parents on the issue of smoking prohibitions, condemning parents for making the decision for their children even if cigarettes were unhealthy, as everyone knew. The piece, accompanied by a picture of an isolated young man watching on curiously as three young males smoke in a circle, charged parents with hiding behind the 1957 Youth Protection Law, which set the legal age for public cigarette smoking at sixteen. The brief cover story attributed the group's formation to the lack of respect for young Germans' abilities to act as rational consumers in an age of risk.<sup>715</sup>

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<sup>714</sup> HH Nds 400 Acc 121/81 No. 720, undated.

<sup>715</sup> HH Nds 400 Acc 121/81 No. 720, undated.

Despite the protestations of YEAH-Gruppe members and their confidence in German youth's ability to make the appropriate decision, the group's newsletters reflected the complexities confronting the contemporary public health movement with respect to smoking in a highly developed consumer culture. YEAH-Gruppe tried to redirect young Germans' consumer choices away from cigarettes and toward socially acceptable commodities such as records, radios, and Mopeds. The club's newsletter broke down the amount of money smokers could save and use toward these other desirable purchases if they quit smoking. According to their chart, someone who smoked twenty cigarettes per day could save upwards of 660 DM in a single year.<sup>716</sup> This kind of argument, however, was hardly new, since the Nazi-era anti-tobacco journal, Reine Luft, had also appealed to consumers' desires for luxury goods via illustrations of bicycles, radios, Volkswagens, and vacations engulfed in cigarette smoke.<sup>717</sup> The images from the late 1930s and early 1940s focused on adult consumption, while the YEAH-Gruppe's addressed the consumption habits of West German youth. Moreover, the Nazi-era images implied that smokers' wasteful consumption threatened the health of the race and national economy, whereas YEAH-Gruppe's simple chart appealed to individuals' desires with no direct connection to larger economic or biological considerations.

Alongside non-smoker clubs and anti-smoking television and radio spots, public health authorities employed the techniques and strategies of consumer culture to improve the overall effectiveness of their anti-smoking campaigns. In 1972, the BZgA conducted a survey of young Germans between the ages of fourteen and seventeen to determine the effectiveness of recent anti-smoking campaigns and the success of non-smoking groups.

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<sup>716</sup> HH Nds 400 Acc 121/81 No. 720, undated.

<sup>717</sup> Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer, pp. 224-225.

The survey revealed young that people viewed the idea of such social groups favorably because they provided useful information about health, presented non-smoking as fashionable, theoretically opened up space for youth to act on their behalf, and represented an opportunity for socialization. However, many respondents expressed doubts over the actual nature and purpose of the non-smoking club. In particular, they suspected that official institutions had created the organization as a means of disciplining teenagers. Youthful fears regarding the likely role of health authorities, doctors, the state, or the church hampered YEAH-Gruppe's effectiveness. Yet, local clubs' responses to the BZgA's inquiries showed a persistent problem in attracting and sustaining membership. In several cases, club leaders informed the BZgA they could no longer contact members, resulting in the group's dissolution.<sup>718</sup>

The state's reliance on informed choice and rational consumption throughout the 1960s and early 1970s stemmed from a reluctance to compel citizens to prioritize public health considerations over consumer desires and interests in a liberal, constitutional state. The West German system's acceptance of democratic self-governance in matters of personal consumption through the informed choice model of preventive public health meant that educational initiatives and public information campaigns represented the cornerstones of the state's efforts to address the growing public health threat via cigarette smoking. Public health authorities and educators used the classroom to convey information to the youngest consumers in the West German marketplace in the hopes knowledge of connections between smoking and lung cancer would scare and prevent Germany's youth from seizing the "glowing angel." The limits of a strategy based upon

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<sup>718</sup> Quantitative Erfolgskontrolle der Anti-Raucher-Kampagne "Der neue Trend – No Smoking Please," 21 January 1972, pp. 77-84, BuArch B 310 / 523.

persuasion and enlightenment, however, could be easily seen in the persistence of youth smoking and in the positive popular perceptions of cigarette smokers in West German youth culture.

### **The Challenge of Passive Smoking**

The rise of non-smoker consciousness grew in importance with the popularization of passive smoking beginning in the 1970s. This undermined the legitimacy of informed choice as the preferred means of combating cigarette smoking in a democratic consumer culture. Anti-smoking activists and public health leaders both contended that passive smoking posed risks toward those around the smoker, which meant that the decision to smoke was no longer a matter of individual choice and voluntarily-assumed risk. Anti-smoking groups and public health agencies in the federal government both asserted the rights of non-smokers to sound health and clean air, focusing predominantly on work spaces, public transportation, government buildings, and restaurants. Already by January 1973, leading anti-smoking voices turned to the Basic Law's guarantee of the "free development of personality" as a linchpin in their attacks against smoking. Adolf Wischnatch, a Bielefeld lawyer and associate of Ferdinand Schmidt, argued smoking and the risks posed to non-smokers via passive smoking infringed on their rights since interfering with respiration jeopardized life and, by extension, the development of personality. According to this reading, the Basic Law supported general prohibitions at



work or even in society in the interests of protecting non-smokers, a position that implied that only non-smokers could grant permission to smokers to violate bans.<sup>719</sup>

West Germany's anti-smoking movement latched onto and reinforced the rise of a non-smoker consciousness with its increased use of rights-based arguments as a form of preventive public health. In November 1974, the First German Non-Smoker Congress convened in Bad Neuenahr in the Rhineland-Palatinate and issued an "Emergency Program Against Cigarette Mortality." Among its diverse demands, the program insisted that the German national railway system provide twice as many spaces for non-smokers as smokers. The Congress also urged the government to intervene, implement, and enforce prohibitions against smoking on public transportation that did not feature separate spaces for non-smokers, as well as bans in hospitals, schools, and youth hostels. To guarantee compliance, they proposed creating a national council for the battle against tobacco dangers to be subsidized by the federal government, as in the Nordic countries.<sup>720</sup>

For public health officials and policy, passive smoking complicated the balancing act between the rights of smokers and those of non-smokers, particularly with respect to smoking at work. Public health officials and anti-smoking activists agreed that employers were responsible for protecting non-smoking employees, although they differed in terms of methods and enforcement. Under Focke, for instance, the Health Ministry favored approaches based upon tolerance and mutual respect. Non-smokers were encouraged to place posters or stickers in their workspace to indicate smoking was

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<sup>719</sup> BuArch B 189 / 13745, Bd. 1, A. Wischnath, Freiheit und Verantwortung im Grundgesetz, 6 November 1974. Also see Adolf Wischnath, "Der Raucher muss vor dem Nichtraucher zurückstehen," FAZ, 3 January 1973, p. 11.

<sup>720</sup> BuArch B 189 / 13745, Bd. 1, Notstandsprogramm Gegen den Zigarettentod, 1974.

not welcomed. Shared offices and conference rooms, however, underscored the limitations of this tactic. The seemingly simplest solution, spatial segregation, presented numerous questions about the practicality and social value of restructuring offices. Critics of this approach argued that few employers had sufficient space and ventilation systems to effectively divide their work environments according to the needs and desires of smokers and non-smokers. Unlike strict anti-smoking activists who favored general prohibitions at work, West Germany's public health system viewed comprehensive bans as a violation of the rule of proportionate response, since the use of such measures would be excessive. Instead, health officials insisted upon tolerance and democratic methods to resolve potential disputes. At the start of business meetings, for example, the chair of the meeting should democratically determine the smoking policy and display signs corresponding to the outcome of the group's vote. Thus, attendees would be able to clearly discern the acceptability of smoking via signs reading, "We have agreed not to smoke," or "We will take a smoking break every two hours." The use of democratic means would provide non-smokers with an opportunity to express their concerns over the annoyance or potential risks of second-hand smoke, while avoiding the heavy handedness of an authoritarian prohibition. Instead, the state passed the unpopular job of telling smokers to put their lighters away to private citizens and employers.<sup>721</sup>

Within this framework, much as in Wischnath's legal arguments, non-smokers held considerably more power than smokers. Moreover, non-smokers' interests trumped the principle of informed choice, which held that individual consumers, acting as rational beings, had the ability to interpret conflicting information and decide whether or not to

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<sup>721</sup> BuArch B 189 / 13745, Bd. 1, Nichtraucherschutz am Arbeitsplatz, 21 November 1974.

smoke. As Dr. med. Tycho Brunn of the Lower Saxony Social Ministry claimed in a “situation report” on smoking and passive smoking, “worldwide experience” showed that relying upon information to discipline individual behavior and reeducate citizens proved to be a miserable failure.<sup>722</sup> At the same time, however, the experiences of constrained tobacco consumption in the recent past and the American experience with alcohol prohibition made smoking bans as unattractive if not more so than the risks represented by passive smoking.

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<sup>722</sup> BuArch B 189 / 13745, Bd. 1, Dr. med. Tycho Brunn, Rauchen und Passivrauchen in Niedersachsen: ein Situationsbericht, undated.

## Epilogue

This project began as an attempt to ascertain why Germany developed a reputation as a haven for smokers, an identity that stands in stark contrast to stereotypical visions of Germans as a people overly conscious about their health and the environment. I expected that the legacy of Nazi anti-smoking campaigns would have a permanent presence in the postwar smoking debates, believing many of the debate participants would either cite the excesses of the Third Reich as evidence of health fascism or describe the act of lighting up as a belated form of resistance to the Nazi regime. In this vision, proponents of smokers' rights would point to the recent past as a clear warning to where misguided paternalism and loss of control over individual bodies could ultimately lead, while anti-smoking activists would build upon an existing framework – albeit it one sanitized of overt racism – to encourage the state to take a more active role in establishing preventive public health measures and standards. The existing literature on tobacco control initiatives in Germany in recent years seemingly supported this line of thinking. Alongside the power of the tobacco lobby, scholars interested in present-day responses to the cigarette question in Germany emphasize the importance of the Third Reich's long shadows to explain the apparent reluctance to use compulsion to protect individual and public health from the health risks of smoking.<sup>723</sup> Entering into this project as an

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<sup>723</sup> Alice Cooper and Paulette Kurzer, "Rauch ohne Feuer: Why Germany Lags in Tobacco Control," *German Politics and Society* 21:3 (2003), pp. 24-47.

historian, then, I imagined the Nazi factor would be the critical element shaping postwar public health policies as West Germany navigated the transition from fascist dictatorship and foreign occupation to a liberal, consumer-oriented society.

Yet, the discourses surrounding the cigarette during the period under review rarely broached the subject of Nazi attitudes and policies toward smoking. In fact, one was more likely to encounter a direct reference to the protracted shortages of the Allied occupation and “cigarette economy” than Nazi-era prohibitionist approaches vis-à-vis health and consumption. As the project evolved, it became increasingly apparent that broader developments within the history of consumerism and economics in Germany played greater roles in shaping the history of public health attitudes and policies regarding the potential health risks of cigarette smoking than the looming specter of the Nazi past. Both the Nazis and postwar anti-smoking activists had to contend with the realities and memories of constrained consumption from the Great Depression through the early Adenauer era. After decades of shortages, queues, rampant black marketing, substitutes, private tobacco cultivation, and sold-out signs, West Germans in general finally had the opportunity to purchase and consume cigarettes with relatively few economic, political, or public health obstacles in their way. To paraphrase Kurt Pohlisch, tobacco control efforts were pointless in a society that had long been deprived of nicotine.<sup>724</sup>

Additionally, the construction of a thriving consumer society in the Federal Republic had a number of important consequences that stretched beyond affecting the materiality of everyday life for West Germans. Within the context of the Cold War, it

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<sup>724</sup> Kurt Pohlisch, Der Tabak: Betrachtungen über Genuss- und Rauschpharmaka (Stuttgart: Thieme Verlag, 1954).

granted legitimacy to the West German state in comparison to its East German counterpart, a development that resulted in the increased substitution of “consumerism as the source of core values for the nation.”<sup>725</sup> In relation to the protracted experiences of constrained consumption in the preceding decades, many West Germans saw the development of a prosperous and functioning consumer society as a hallmark of the Federal Republic. Consumption came to acquire a meaning that extended well beyond the acts of purchasing goods and services. Consumers’ ability to act as autonomous agents within the consumer society became entangled with fundamental notions of democracy and liberty, values defined increasingly against the authoritarianism of both the Third Reich and German Democratic Republic. Any interference with freedom of choice came to be seen not only as an intervention in the act of consumption, but also as a direct threat to the very essence of democracy and individual liberty.

The battles over cigarette smoking are fertile territory for historians interested in the intersection of public health and consumer culture. At its heart, the debates over tobacco control initiatives revolve around competing notions of governance – both in terms of the individual’s capacity to effectively manage risk and with respect to the state’s responsibility to protect the citizenry from harm. The issues central to the matters of regulation, restriction, and prohibition are particularly complex for cigarette smoking since cigarettes – unlike illicit drugs – are legal commodities that greatly increase the chance of transforming consumers into patients when used as designed. This connection underscores the need for scholars to view the history of public health politics and

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<sup>725</sup> Erica Carter, How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 5.

practices within the context of the history of consumer society.<sup>726</sup> Whereas political scientists and economists have frequently concentrated their attention on the impact of Nazi-era anti-smoking campaigns and the role of powerful tobacco lobbies in shaping broader official and popular attitudes toward smoking regulations, I contend that the intervening histories of lingering shortages, a vast cigarette black market, and the rise of a consumer-oriented culture of consumption central to West German national identity in the context of Cold War partition exerted as great an influence on the evolution and implementation of preventive public health measures vis-à-vis cigarette smoking in the Federal Republic as Nazi anti-smoking efforts.

This in and of itself does not mean that the history of the cigarette and smoking in the Third Reich have not factored into the long-term construction of Germany's culture of smoking and present-day discourses related to statism and health fascism. The Nazi card, as it were, has come to occupy an important space within contemporary debates with respect to the possibilities and limits of state regulation within a liberal, democratic society. Overt references to Nazi-era experiences are a relatively new facet in the ongoing dialogue within the Federal Republic. For decades, American smokers' rights groups, tobacco companies, libertarians, and conservatives have made direct and indirect references to the Nazi attacks on tobacco in combating present-day public health intrusions on private behavior. Pro-smoking groups and opponents of big government have repeatedly appropriated Robert Proctor's research in the hopes of discrediting

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<sup>726</sup> Dorothy Porter, "The Social Contract of Health in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: Individuals, Corporations, and the State," in Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard, and Patrick Zylberman (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008), pp. 45-60). Also see Nancy Tomes, "Merchants of Health: Medicine and Consumer Culture in the United States, 1900-1940," Journal of American History 88:2 (2001), pp. 519-547.

tobacco control initiatives by linking them to totalitarian and fascist impulses. The Freedom Organization for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco (FOREST) sold copies of Proctor's Racial Hygiene to inform members about the roots of the ongoing persecution of smokers, while Rush Limbaugh has cited Proctor's work in his radio broadcasts.<sup>727</sup> These efforts have run the gamut from the mundane passing reference to health fascism to more extreme cases of moral equivalency, best exemplified by the production of short videos of an actor in an SS officer's uniform railing against cigarettes, smoking, and tobacco companies.

Only much more recently has the history of smoking in the Third Reich been explicitly introduced into public debates about the place of smoking in the Federal Republic, a trend epitomized by the 2008 *Raucher* t-shirt featuring the Star of David. This new twist, however, frequently overlooks the inherent complexities of the culture of cigarette smoking in the 1930s and 1940s. Tobacco control efforts in the Third Reich did not evolve out of a coherent set of policies, nor did the Nazis ever attempt to implement a general prohibition against smoking. Though the regime introduced measures to reduce tobacco use – especially among young women and youth – and Hitler's opposition to smoking was public knowledge, Nazi tobacco policies and the degree of enforcement were remarkably ambivalent. Appeals for Germans to abstain from smoking in order to better the long-term racial health of the *Volk* existed alongside advertisements for SA and SS cigarette brands. The party's denunciations of tobacco as a "racial poison" had to contend with the public's awareness of the smoking habits of numerous Nazi officials and prominent German celebrities. In short, the notion that the Nazis deliberately

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<sup>727</sup> Robert N. Proctor, "On Playing the Nazi Card," Tobacco Control 17 (2008), pp. 289-290.



deprived Germans of tobacco as part of a project of racial cleansing is mistaken, but has become a consistent weapon for those advocating against stringent public smoking laws in the U.S. and the Federal Republic.

Although Nazi anti-smoking efforts evolved haphazardly and although the regime enforced such measures inconsistently, the memory of these policies and attitudes contributed to the discrediting of prohibition after 1945. Coming out of the authoritarianism of the Third Reich and amidst the increasingly plentiful shop windows and store shelves, many West Germans rejected the idea of the state compelling behavior through outright bans. The decision to participate in behavior that was legal though increasingly seen as risky rested with the individual consumer as opposed to the bureaucratic state. The Federal Republic's embrace and conflation of the social market economy, democratic values, and consumer citizenship made it impossible for public health authorities and anti-smoking activists to implement a rigid ban, even if such a ban was intended to protect the public's health from self-inflicted risks. In a liberal consumer culture such as the one created in the Federal Republic during the 1950s and 1960s, the state essentially lacked the authority – or, more precisely, the willingness to assert its authority – to infringe on a private and legal act of consumption. In this framework, lighting up in West Germany assumed far greater meaning and purpose beyond its function in the act of smoking. The right to freely choose to smoke symbolized the Federal Republic's political maturation in relationship to totalitarian regimes of the recent past or in Eastern Europe. Plus, the ability and opportunity to consume at will seemingly proved the superiority of the West's culture of consumption in comparison to the GDR,

where shortages remained a consistent element of the socialist culture of consumption.<sup>728</sup>

In other words, eliminating health fascism reflected West Germany's respect for and commitment to basic individual rights, as consumer citizens enjoyed the privileges of democracy through the exercise of autonomy.

The inability to resolve the tension between increased medical and popular understanding of the physiological effects of smoking and the conflation of consumption and political liberty resulted in the formation of a permissive and liberal culture of smoking. The onus for guarding against the risks of smoking rested with the individual, leaving the state in a position to do little more than inform consumer citizens of the dangers. For public health agents and anti-smoking activists, state maximalism gave way to alternative means of suasion. In lieu of outright bans compelling citizens to adhere to a strict set of behaviors, the West German public health system turned to various forms of education to produce rational consumers who would voluntarily abstain from smoking. Increased attention to information campaigns in the schools and mass media offered authorities important forums to guide behavior and individual decision-making without taking on the appearance of authoritarian paternalism. Part of this process entailed the displacement of coercive powers from the state to assorted social and cultural groups. Anti-smoking education programs targeted the image of the smoker and created positive associations with the decision not to smoke, identifying such choices as a more authentic expression of independence and rebellion. Herein lies one of the most important contributions of this study; namely, forms of power within liberal societies can often take different forms and state authority is frequently displaced to new venues and groups.

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<sup>728</sup> Mary Fulbrook, The People's State: East German Society From Hitler to Honecker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 42-44.

The power of social ostracism and stigmatization of smokers has been central to anti-smoking initiatives in liberal, consumer-oriented societies for the last four decades. Scholars interested in these indirect forms of persuasion have only recently begun to explore their significance and the implications with respect to notions of democracy and personal freedom in a liberal society. Increased scientific and public attention to things like passive smoking and nicotine addiction presented tobacco's opponents with handy counters to arguments about the effectiveness of the rational consumer model that characterized public health responses to the smoking and health crisis between the 1950s and 1970s. Addiction, by its very nature, suggests that consumers had lost all semblance of reason and partook in risky behaviors out of a compulsion rather than a deliberate choice.<sup>729</sup> Passive smoking undermined claims that smokers voluntarily assumed the risks of cigarette use since those in the immediate vicinity of any act of smoking could be said to be at risk. Though cigarette companies and smokers' rights groups vehemently questioned the validity of the concept, passive smoking offered non-smokers and the burgeoning anti-smoking movement a weapon in the battle to control the image of smoking. The popularization of passive smoking in the 1970s provided an entry point for non-smokers to assert their own rights and lay claim to specific spaces.

Since the 1970s, passive smoking was transformed other people's smoke from a nuisance into a genuine risk. Increased public awareness of the hazards associated with exposure to others' smoking posed a fundamental dilemma to the political culture of a

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<sup>729</sup> Caroline Jean Acker, Creating the American Junkie: Addiction Research in the Classic Era of Narcotics Control (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Alex Mold, Heroin: The Treatment of Addiction in Twentieth-century Britain (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); and Timothy A. Hickman, The Secret Leprosy of Modern Days: Narcotic Addiction and Cultural Crisis in the United States, 1870-1920 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007).

liberal society, as the smoker's decision to smoke threatened the well being of those in the vicinity of the smoking. As a result, non-smoker rights groups initiated grassroots campaigns in the United States and elsewhere to guarantee non-smokers sufficient access to clean air. The push to drive smoking out of public transportation, hospitals, taxis, airplanes, government buildings, theaters, restaurants, cafés, taverns, stores and assorted public spaces gained valuable momentum once the public debate no longer focused on voluntarily assumed risks, but rather those imposed upon innocent bystanders.<sup>730</sup>

Anti-smoking groups and public health activists undertook similar efforts in the Federal Republic to varying degrees of success. Already in the 1970s, authorities applied restrictions to where and when smokers could partake in their habit, including limitations or bans in federal offices, schools, hospitals, and public transportation. Though “No smoking” signs may have become more commonplace, regulations governing smoking and the degree of enforcement remained rather lax in West Germany into the twenty-first century. For the state, policing public smoking continued to pose a serious dilemma. Choosing to enforce such restrictions against public smoking and ostensibly supporting non-smokers' rights risked adopting the appearance of authoritarian paternalism, whereas the willful negligence of enforcing existing laws put citizens at risk. The Federal Republic's reputation as a last bastion for smokers in the industrialized world speaks volumes about its path and, by extension, highlighted a stronger desire to preserve the integrity of individual liberty – understood here as having the right to risk illness despite repeated warnings – over any possible appearance of health fascism, which many seemingly equated with the state intruding in individual lives and rights.

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<sup>730</sup> Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 286-315.

Moving forward, scholars will need to take a number of critical developments that go beyond the scope of this study into consideration. German reunification and the growth of the Internet have presented new challenges and opportunities to scholars interested in the history of smoking and tobacco control. As in West Germany, cigarette smoking in the German Democratic Republic increased considerably in the 1950s and 1960s. For the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), cigarettes represented the rare commodity that was both high in demand and often readily available to East German consumers. Vending machines appeared on street corners throughout the GDR during this period, enabling citizens to utilize self-service methods to purchase cigarettes while also improving the system of provisioning in the East German state. The appearance of automated cigarette dispensers proved troublesome for those groups promoting the ideal of clean and healthy living, as well as for the SED, though for different reasons. The state's tolerance of vending machines and of smoking appeared at odds with its campaigns to create the socialist "New Man" and "New Woman." Yet, the existence of these machines provided evidence of the state's ability to provide desirable material goods to the population.

Inevitably, these developments created a public health crisis in the East German state. By the time the Royal College of Physicians and U.S. Surgeon General released their initial findings on cigarette smoking, close to three-quarters of all East German adult males smoked, as did nearly one-fifth of the women. Not surprisingly, lung cancer rates rose dramatically as more East Germans took to the habit. According to official statistics, lung cancer deaths escalated from an annual figure of 1,761 in 1947 to more than 5,200 in

1961.<sup>731</sup> Anti-smoking activists in East Germany challenged the state through petitions to live up to its responsibility to promote healthy living and proper hygiene as part of the ongoing construction of the socialist citizen. In fact, concerted expressions of dismay and frustration with the lax regulation of public smoking in East Germany were already apparent in the late 1950s. Non-smoking employees implored the state to guarantee safe working conditions by bringing an end to smoke-filled rooms, a reality made all the more difficult to bear in light of the frequent party functions to reinforce the guiding ideology of the SED. At the same time, debates over the place of smoking in a socialist society created an officially sanctioned forum for East Germans to express discontent with the ruling party and its apparent unwillingness to protect the rights of non-smokers. Responding to the demands of anti-smoking activists put the SED in a difficult position. The state rejected the notion of compelling smokers to quit or impose stringent restrictions on public smoking because smoking had been long accepted as a form of pleasure that did not disrupt the development of socialism, opting for educational means as a force of persuasion instead.<sup>732</sup> Calls to protect the rights of non-smokers at the expense of those of smokers were met with ambivalence by party functionaries, many of whom smoked. Introducing widespread bans or strict regulations was too risky, as doing so could easily draw attention to the glaring shortages characteristic of East Germany's culture of consumption, be it a lack of exotic fruits, spare car parts, or coffee.<sup>733</sup>

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<sup>731</sup> Young-Sun Hong, "Cigarette Butts and the Building of Socialism in East Germany," Central European History 35:3 (2002), p. 334.

<sup>732</sup> Hong, pp. 335-339.

<sup>733</sup> Fulbrook, The People's State, pp. 229-232.

Cigarettes, it appears, was the rare commodity in the GDR's culture of consumption that was generally available.

There is much work still to be done on the history of health and consumerism in the GDR. As these fields develop, the potential of examining East and West German responses to major health risks such as smoking will also grow. Our comprehension of how both sides politicized consumption and health during the Cold War and how the competing systems viewed the state's responsibility in managing risk will go a long way in improving our overall understanding of the relationship between state and civil society in both the capitalist West and the socialist East. Historians will also need to take into account the impact of reunification upon conceptions of risk, public health policy, and taxation after 1990. The trajectory of political and economic reunification was replete with potholes as the whole process evolved out of the circumstances of the specific historical moment rather than being the result of a deliberate plan. The seemingly spontaneous nature of reunification necessitated the formulation of common policies governing tobacco taxes and the best means of informing the public at the national level about the dangers of smoking. As more sources are made available to researchers, it will be interesting to note what kind of impact the collapse of the GDR and formal reunification had upon the very idea of tobacco control and smoking rates across class and geographical lines, as well as gender.

The remarkable growth of the Internet in the last fifteen years will also need to be taken into consideration. Most coordinated anti-smoking campaigns in the Federal Republic have an online presence these days, offering the potential to reach broader audiences and maximize interaction among participants. This approach also allows for

the creation and mobilization of virtual communities of non-smokers ready and willing to assert their rights – even in the ether of the World Wide Web. The BZgA’s Rauchfrei website includes forums under the banner of “Community,” allowing individuals to connect with one another and share thoughts about smoking, strategies for quitting, and subjects seemingly devoid of any direct connection to smoking, such as forumites favorite songs or reviews of recent film releases. Users active in this thread list their favorite television series, share reviews of new film releases, and discuss their musical preferences. Altogether, the site boasts that more than 11,300 users have registered with Rauchfrei to become active members in an online community free of cigarette smoke. Though the initiative also promotes physical encounters, such as its 2009 beach club sports festival held in a number of different German cities, this online presence greatly expands Rauchfrei’s ability to reach and inform Germans about the dangers of smoking and alternatives before they become addicted to nicotine.

Likewise, the Federal Ministry for Health’s 2009 competition “Be Smart – Don’t Start” is organized around the idea of establishing a network of local anti-smoking efforts to a broader movement. Created for students aged 11-14, the campaign bears a resemblance to the 1962 “Wer hat recht?” contest, which used popular consumer goods as an incentive for students to learn about the risks associated with cigarette smoking. Sponsored by the BZgA, *Deutsche Krebshilfe* (German Cancer Aid), *Deutsche Herzstiftung* (German Heart Foundation), *Deutsche Lungenstiftung* (German Lung Foundation), and the insurance company AOK-Bundesverband, the objective of “Be Smart – Don’t Start” is to create positive impressions of abstinence in the hopes of preventing students from smoking at a stage of development when many transition from



occasional to regular smokers. Classes opting to participate register online and sign a contract committing the students to abstain from November 2009 through April 2010. At the conclusion of each month, classes submit postcards to the BZgA indicating their continued involvement with the program. If more than 10% of a class acknowledges smoking in one week, the class is automatically disqualified from the competition, which features a top prize of a class trip. The campaign's website features an interactive map that shows a breakdown of participating classes by each federal state, as well as a guestbook for individual students and classes to sign. Early comments reflect a variety of responses to the program and smoking, ranging from A.E.'s denunciation of cigarette use as "really uncool" or Gizem's harsh criticism of "Be Smart – Don't Start's" honor code requiring students and classes to disqualify themselves. Gizem and other critics had labeled the effort as "totally stupid" because they feel that no one will adhere to the actual rules. What further sets the 2009 effort apart from "Wer hat recht?" is that it is not a program limited to the Federal Republic. In fact, it is currently being deployed in at least seventeen European countries, making the potential network of anti-smoking organizations and individuals much larger than those campaigns implemented solely at a national or local level.

This leads to a final point of consideration that will surely attract increased scholarly attention in the future. The cumulative body of literature must examine the issue of smoking and health from a myriad of perspectives, as it cannot be neatly compartmentalized as a solely local or national matter, though these represent very important pieces of the puzzle. The simultaneous implementation of anti-smoking programs in several countries and the increased interconnectedness of the world indicates

there is much to be gained by approaching this history from a transnational perspective. This trend has already begun to take shape with respect to tobacco and smoking, as indicated by the recent publication of anthologies employing comparative approaches or viewing the cigarette through a global lens.<sup>734</sup> Adding this layer will undoubtedly allow us to put Germany's permissiveness with regard to smoking into a much broader framework. Apart from enhancing our own understanding of German political culture and regulatory systems in a post-fascist context, incorporating this type of history would also improve our comprehension of what is truly unique about Germany's management of risk in matters of health and consumption. Adopting a broader approach will enable us to put Germany's reputation for obstructionism regarding tobacco control measures within supranational bodies such as the European Union, World Health Organization, and United Nations into the limelight. As a member of these organizations, the Federal Republic has repeatedly blocked legislation governing additional restrictions or outright bans on tobacco advertising, stronger warning labels, and has filed appeals against regulations on behalf of the tobacco industry.<sup>735</sup>

The subject of smoking and health and the implications of this complex relationship will continue to present challenges to politicians, public health officials, scholars, smokers and non-smokers. The battle lines have shifted repeatedly in the last century and remain very much in flux. Der Spiegel recently went so far as to proclaim the ongoing struggles to find common ground as a clear sign that the Federal Republic

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<sup>734</sup> Eric Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds., Unfiltered: Conflicts Over Tobacco Policy and Public Health (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Sander L. Gilman and Xhou Zun, eds., Smoke: A Global History of Smoking (London: Reaktion Books, 2004).

<sup>735</sup> Cooper and Kurzer, "Rauch ohne Feuer," pp. 34-36.

has crossed the threshold into an era in which tolerance has no real place in German society.<sup>736</sup> In mid-2009, supporters of smokers' rights celebrated a legal victory following a Bavarian court's ruling that laws prohibiting smoking inside restaurants and bars were unconstitutional. Yet, the "antis" in Bavaria have successfully petitioned the state to hold a referendum sometime in 2010 to determine the future of the public smoking bans. Put forward by a coalition of anti-smoking and environmental groups and endorsed by both the Greens and SPD, the petition garnered more than 1.3 million signatures supporting the reinstatement of the bans. Political commentators have quickly linked the results of the referendum with broader shifts in Germany's political landscape, identifying it as a potential early backlash against the recent success of Angela Merkel and the CDU/CSU in national elections. Bavarian voters, though, will head back to the polls in 2010 with a chance to decide on the severity of smoking restrictions.<sup>737</sup> It remains to be seen how this particular episode or the bigger picture surrounding the cigarette question will be resolved, but the Bavarian state's use of referendums is further evidence of the significance of democracy and individual liberty in navigating this contentious battleground.

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<sup>736</sup> "Rauchen: Das Ende der Toleranz," Der Spiegel, Nr. 24 (2006), pp. 64-72.

<sup>737</sup> "Nichtraucher-Volksbegehren erfolgreich: Bayern begehren Rauchverbot," taz.de, 3 December 2009, <http://www.taz.de/nc/1/leben/alltag/artikel/1/bayern-stimmt-uebers-rauchen-ab> (accessed 3 December 2009).

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## Appendix



Figure 1.1. Photograph of Eva Braun with cigarette (111-SC-285622). Courtesy of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.




Figure 1.2. Photograph of Nazi machine-gunners lighting up during a break from combat (111-SC-341649). Courtesy of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1946

Over Here

By Clarke



"Mom, I want you to meet Fritzie, we've been picking up butts for his papa."

Figure 2.1. Used with permission from Stars and Stripes. © 1946-1947, 2010 Stars and Stripes.

# OCCUPATION

By Shep |



Figure 2.2. Used with permission from Stars and Stripes. © 1946-1947, 2010 Stars and Stripes.



Figure 2.3. Photograph of a demonstration of Bremerhaven youth against *Stummeling* organized by the GYA (111-SC-286413). Courtesy of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

Saturday, Sept. 21, 1946

Salvos

By Schmerling



**"Don't you think you're smoking a little too much lately, Liebbling?"**

Figure 2.4. Used with permission from Stars and Stripes. © 1946-1947, 2010 Stars and Stripes.



Figure 2.5. Used with permission from Stars and Stripes. © 1946-1947, 2010 Stars and Stripes.





Figure 2.6. Photograph of a queue outside of the Frankfurt barter center in the American zone of occupation (111-SC-276256). Courtesy of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.



Figure 3.1. “They battled across Europe for a Camel.” Photograph of an American and Russian soldier exchanging cigarettes at Torgau in April 1945 (111-SC-205353). Courtesy of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

**AMERIKA** *dü rauchst nicht besser...*




*Wir alle schätzen den würzig-kraftvollen Geschmack des amerikanischen Virginia-Tabaks; kein rechter Raucher möchte seine belebende, anregende Wirkung mehr missen. Ebenso aber schätzen und lieben wir Deutsche von jeher den Duft und das unvergleichliche Aroma echten, edlen Orient-Tabaks.*

*Wer tätig-strebend sein Leben meistern will und sich den Sinn für verfeinerten Lebensgenuß bewahrt hat, wird sich daher - bewusst oder unbewusst - stets für eine Cigarette entscheiden, in der sich das Kraftvoll-Belebende des Virginia-Tabaks mit der genießerischen Delikatesse des Orient-Tabaks verbindet.*

*Beide Elemente aber machen das Besondere der **FOX** aus.*

***TABAKLAND VIRGINIA** und **TABAKLAND ORIENT** geben ihr Bestes zum Besten der **FOX***



*mild und süß*



Figure 3.2. Fox advertisement from 1950. Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.




Figure 3.3. Ova advertisement. Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.

...die  
immer neue  
Freude

ECKSTEIN  
NO. 5  
CIGARETTEN

Figure 4.1. Eckstein No. 5 advertisement. Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.

The advertisement features a vibrant background with a red and blue gradient. In the upper center, the open cabin door of an Iberia airplane is visible, with the word "IBERIA" in red on the door. A group of passengers, including men and women in mid-20th-century attire, are disembarking. One man in a blue suit is waving. To the left of the passengers is a yellow globe icon. In the foreground on the right is a pack of Peter Stuyvesant Filter 21 cigarettes. The pack is white with a red band and features the brand name "Peter Stuyvesant" in a cursive font, "FILTER 21" in a red box, and a crest with the years "1592" and "1672". Below the crest, it says "RICH CHOICE TOBACCOS KING SIZE". Two cigarettes are shown protruding from the top of the pack.

Der Regen blieb zuhause.  
Ankunft unter blauem  
Himmel. Starke Triebwerke  
fliegen uns aus. Grenzenlose  
Technik. Grenzenlose Welt.

Peter Stuyvesant – der Duft  
der grossen, weiten Welt.

Figure 4.2. Peter Stuyvesant Filter advertisement. Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.

# Überall...

Überall, wo solche Flaggen flattern — auf dem Kampfplatz der Stadien, auf den Märkten der Messen — sind sie ein Zeichen dafür, dass wir heute in einer Welt leben und vieles Gemeinsame haben ... mehr denn je auch in dem, was uns gut dünkt und gut schmeckt! Ein kleines und anscheinend unbedeutendes Beispiel: dass alle auch das gleiche Vergnügen an der Peter Stuyvesant haben ... an ihrem besonderen Duft und Geschmack: dem «Duft der grossen weiten Welt»!

The advertisement features a central image of a Peter Stuyvesant cigarette pack. The pack is white with a red band across the middle that reads "FILTER 21". Above the band, the brand name "Peter Stuyvesant" is written in a cursive font. Below the band, there is a crest with a shield and the years "1592" and "1672" on either side. At the bottom of the pack, it says "RICH CHOICE TOBACCOS KING SIZE". Two cigarettes are shown protruding from the top of the pack. The background is a blue sky filled with various national flags on flagpoles, including the Swedish flag, the American flag, and the Norwegian flag. The overall composition suggests a global presence and appeal for the brand.

Figure 4.3. Peter Stuyvesant Filter advertisement. Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.

Sie gibt sich wie sie ist.  
Charmant und blond und lässig.  
Ganz von heute und doch ein  
bißchen romantisch.  
Kurz, Candida.

Die neue  
milde heißt  
**Candida**

Nikotinarm im Rauch.  
extra lang DM 2.-

Candida  
mild  
Waldorf Astoria

Figure 4.4. Candida advertisement. Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.





Figure 5.1. Cover of the 22 January 1964 issue of Der Spiegel, featuring an article entitled, “Are Cigarettes Dangerous?” Used with permission of SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG.

## JAHR FÜR JAHR

*wächst der Tabak heran.*

*Zur rechten Zeit die Partien aufzuspüren und zu sichern, von denen die Tabakmischung lebt – das ist der Schlüssel zu dem gleichbleibend hohen Niveau, das unsere Freunde an unseren Cigaretten so schätzen.*

*Weltumspannend ist das Netz unseres Tabakeinkaufs. Allein im vergangenen Jahr legten die mit der Beschaffung unserer Tabake betrauten Experten 1,5 Millionen Kilometer zurück, um aus der Welttabakernte die Sorten auszuwählen, die den hohen Ansprüchen unserer Mischungen genügen.*

*So konnten auch die für die naturreine ERNTE 23-Mischung entscheidenden Spitzenqualitäten wiederum auf lange Zeit sichergestellt werden.*

H. F. & PH. F. REEMTSMA  
Hamburg

# ERNTE 23



VON HÖCHSTER  
REINHEIT

Figure 5.2. Ernte 23 advertisement featuring the slogan “Von höchster Reinheit.” Used with permission of the Museum der Arbeit (Hamburg), Reemtsma-Archive.