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Defusing Transcendental Empiricism: Deleuze, Hume, and Empiricism

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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This dissertation addresses the problem of conflating the conditions of experience with the given of experience. The conditions of experience are by definition not contents of experience. There are ideal conditions and material conditions, which we find studied respectively in transcendental idealism and the neurosciences. The given of experience is a search towards originary experiences. This conflation between condition and given also confuses the distinction between the ground of experience, which is transcendental, and the foundation of experience, which is immanent. This confusion rises to the forefront of philosophical discourse when Deleuze calls his position 'transcendental empiricism.' I ask the question, "What does transcendental empiricism mean?" My answer is that it is not a meaningful phrase. Based on an account of Descartes' epistemological foundation, the response to Descartes by British empiricism, and Deleuze's appropriation of Hume's empiricism, I show empiricism to be a practice that excludes and undermines the transcendental in order to reveal the purely empirical. I support this answer

by constructing an historical narrative of early modern philosophy that relies upon extensive citations and a documented assessment of Deleuze's appropriation and defense of Hume's empiricism. In the process of critiquing 'transcendental empiricism,' empiricism comes to be understood as a questioning that destabilizes already existing and generally accepted theoretical structures and categories of representation.

Dedication Page

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Kelly Kravet. It is dedicated to my three children, Vivian, Ethan, and Ivy. Altogether, they are the inner constellation that illuminates my life. I also dedicate this work to my parents, Robert and Harlene Kravet, as well as my wife's parents, Ronald and Sue Schornak. There is little that can replace the love of family, and for me there is nothing that can replace it.

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Preface

> [Hume] then diverted himself with inventing several jocular excuses which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. 'Upon further consideration,' said he, 'I thought I might say to him, Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see how the Public receives the alterations.' But Charon would answer, 'When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat.'
>
> Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strahan, ESQ. Kirkaldy, Fifeshire, Nov. 9, 1776.
>
> David Hume, The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 (1778) Volume I

In a private moment before his death, David Hume had some fun conversing with his friend, Adam Smith. Not exactly a pleasant moment, though Hume was at peace with himself, and despite the discomfort of his sickness, able to joke and speak openly about the situation. Hume could feel he was close to the end and had been thinking about the humorous *Dialogues of the Dead* by the 2nd century rhetorician and satirist, Lucian of Samosata. Hume imagined himself in conversation with Charon, the ferryman that brought travelers across the river Acheron. Traveling across that river was a leap across a boundary that marked the end. And though for you, the reader, this is the beginning of my dissertation, for me it is the end. And to be honest, it was about time. I have been standing at the river banks for longer than I care to mention. But before I could end the endless stream of dissertation alterations and edits, I would need to be ferried across that mythical finish line. In this fantasy of mine, which was certainly fueled by exhaustion, I find that there is no one standing inside the boat to provide me passage across the Acheron. I wait. Perhaps, it is break time and Charon is distracted. Is he reading the news? Is he listening to the latest political analysis or following the current crisis? Perhaps Charon has discovered the internet. Soon enough, I realized that in my story, I must be my own Charon. I hopped onto the planks of the boat, grabbed the ferryman's pole, and pushed myself across the river. At least that is what it felt like. Did I make it across? Well, you have the evidence in your hand, or in these days, upon your screen.

This project began in 2006-7, when I first conceived my dissertation proposal in consultation and conversation with my late advisor, Professor Hugh J. Silverman. It was a very

different project in its conception. It began with my interest in a book by Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. I was interested in Deleuze's concept of the head in Bacon's paintings. I wanted to connect this to Emmanuel Levinas' work on ethics and alterity. I thought an argument could be made that Bacon's heads were images of the other in Levinas' ethics and his positing of the face-to-face relation. I envisioned a bridge between Deleuze's aesthetics and Levinas' ethics, but I needed to find the basis for this bridge.

I turned to an observation made by Jacques Derrida about Levinas at the end of his essay, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas." Derrida writes:

> But the true name of this inclination of thought to the Other, of this resigned acceptance of incoherent incoherence inspired by a truth more profound than the 'logic' of philosophical discourse, the true name of this renunciation of the concept, of the a prioris and transcendental horizons of language, is empiricism. For the latter, at bottom, has ever committed but one fault: the fault of presenting itself as a philosophy. And the profundity of the empiricist intention must be recognized beneath the naïveté of its historical expressions. It is the dream of a purely heterological thought at its source. A pure thought of pure difference. Empiricism is its philosophical name, its metaphysical pretention or modesty. We say the dream because it must vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens. But perhaps one will object that it is language which is sleeping. Doubtless, but then one must, in a certain way, become classical once more, and again find other grounds for the divorce between speech and thought. This route is quite, perhaps too, abandoned today.[1]

This endorsement of Levinas as being an empiricist, particularly in what I consider the most powerful moments in his philosophical work, along with Deleuze's consistent identification as an empiricist and a transcendental empiricist gave me my bridge. Deleuze and Levinas were not often grouped together and I thought I had found a way to bounce them off each other. I had been working on both Levinas and Deleuze, but at this point decided to focus on Deleuze and empiricism first.

My focus on Deleuze transitioned to a close study of Deleuze's first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. The study of Deleuze's Hume quickly grew to be a project in itself. I realized after many pages that it made sense to shelve my work on Levinas and concentrate on Deleuze. I re-envisioned my dissertation as having a theoretical section and a practical section. I would begin with the theory of Deleuze's Humean

[1] Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (New York: Routledge Classics,1978, 2001 Edition), 189-90.

empiricism, and then connect this to the Deleuze's study of Francis Bacon's practice of painting. Professor Silverman advised me to make a list of the most important features of Deleuze's Humean empiricism and write on them. It was soon after this point, while I was in the midst of working out Deleuze's empiricism, that Professor Silverman passed away. I am sure he had quite a conversation with Charon. I was very fortunate and grateful to find a new advisor, Professor Edward S. Casey. Professor Casey's guidance and encouragement came at the right time, as I was feeling somewhat defeated. At this point, I was already grappling with the difference between empiricism and transcendental empiricism. Of the seven features of Deleuze's Humean empiricism, I decided to shelve five of them. Like many, I have found the dissertation process to be an exercise in cutting out large amounts of finished and half-finished work, hopefully for use another day. I now limited myself to the idea of a problematic empiricism that exhibited itself in the problem of the subject, which became chapter four. And chapter five focused on an empiricism of immanence or the problem of transcendence. Professor Casey advised me to add more about Hume and the basics of his empirical theory. This became the impetus to produce chapters two and three on Descartes and British Empiricism respectively. Of course, along the way, I shelved my work on Deleuze and Francis Bacon, the original inspiration for this dissertation!

From all of this, I hope I have scrapped together a flawed, but hopefully interesting and philosophically challenging dissertation about Deleuze, Hume and Empiricism.

Acknowledgments

I must first acknowledge my wife, Kelly Kravet. Every step of the way, she has shared the tears, sweat, and breakthroughs of my dissertation. I also want to acknowledge my three children, Vivian, Ethan, and Ivy. I hope I can impart in them the same love of academia. The support of my parents, Robert and Harlene Kravet, as well as the support of my wife's parents, Ronald and Sue Schornak, were integral to its success. I wish to remember and thank my first advisor, Hugh J. Silverman. His early support and interest in my work was exactly what I needed. My advisor, Edward S. Casey, has pushed me over the finish line and I will forever be grateful. I must acknowledge the rest of my committee, Harvey Cormier, Jeffrey Edwards, and Leonard Lawlor. Their comments and critiques have catapulted me forward. I need to also recognize the Philosophy Department of Stony Brook University. I have always felt honor and appreciation that I was admitted into the doctoral program. The administrative staff, Alissa Betz, Katie Amella, and Ann Marie Monaghan, have been good friends and lifesavers throughout the project of my dissertation. I also wish to acknowledge the many friends I have made among my colleagues in the graduate program.

Chapter 1 – Introduction: Turning toward Empiricism and the Question of the Transcendental

Deleuze refers to himself as a "transcendental empiricist." As a new term in philosophy, this term calls for testing, questioning, debating, by the philosophical community as to what it is and whether it signifies something new or, even more basic, whether it signifies something coherent or meaningful. Furthermore, we can ask what this label does, in other words, what speaking or writing the phrase 'transcendental empiricism' causes to happen when injected into a meaningful discourse about primary positions in philosophy.

If I can take a moment to step outside the project before us, this dissertation serves as an example of what happens. If we ask, what does 'transcendental empiricism' do, one answer is that it produces doctoral dissertations! So what is the dissertation that we have before us? My position concerning my thesis about the problem of 'transcendental empiricism' is that the words within the label, 'transcendental' and 'empiricism,' fail to hold together. Deleuze has created an instability in language, he has tied together ideas that forcefully push against each other. The force and tension builds as we question the coherence of the meaning between these two words. Ultimately, we will find that meaningful fission occurs. If this label were an atom, our tampering into its meaning would cause something on the level of a mushroom cloud. And this nuclear fission exposes the gap between the transcendental and the empirical, which I argue is Deleuze's ultimate goal.

Using this metaphor of a bomb in the contemporary context is a lightning rod for controversy and I do not mean to enter the fray of analyzing the 'War on Terror' or the 'Global War on Terrorism.' Though, it is ironic that these phrases or slogans themselves may fail to meaningfully cohere. Despite the seriousness of terrorism, I want to play with the idea of terrorism for a moment with respect to philosophy. For many, Deleuze is considered a philosophical terrorist that lobs bombs and, to paraphrase a former U.S. President, tries to destroy who we are. The same can be said for David Hume and his books that some took to have targeted epistemology with bombs that left a terrain without structures, just a bombed-out landscape that was called radical skepticism. And to make this even starker, Deleuze and Hume can be seen as suicide bombers, in the sense that they do not attack from afar or attempt to escape the carnage themselves. In light of this metaphor, I incorporated into the title the idea of defuse-ment, which I understand to be the separation, sometimes only temporarily, of the combustible components. While defused, there is an opening for comfortable reflection on what is happening and why. Of course the only permanent way to defuse a bomb is to set it off in a controlled environment. With this in mind, I will point in the conclusion to Deleuze's study of Francis Bacon's portraits, a painting practice that isolates and explodes the human figure.

The method of approach to the guiding question (What is transcendental empiricism?) is to begin with the noun, empiricism, rather than the adjective, transcendental. What is *empiricism* for Deleuze? To this we turn to his first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. This is Deleuze's study of British Empiricist, David Hume. To understand Hume, I present a limited philosophical narrative of the context in which he arose, Early Modern (Western) Philosophy. To understand this period, we return to René Descartes, the philosopher generally considered to represent the beginning of Modern Philosophy. Chapter two focuses on Descartes and the beginning he proposes for this new era in philosophy. The decision to start with Descartes is not arbitrary. Descartes' work is a challenge to empiricists and skeptics. He begins with doubt, in a way embracing doubt, and then attempts to identify, if possible, where doubt cannot reach. Descartes' position became a challenge to subsequent thinkers on whether or not Descartes had brought to light the indubitable.

After presenting the Cartesian context, we turn to British Empiricism in chapter three. I aim to elucidate relevant aspects of British Empiricism as a response to Descartes. I focus on the three central figures of British Empiricism, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Throughout, I will rely heavily on direct and extended quotations as a way to keep my interpretive work as close as I can to the original statements.

Once I have produced a sufficient context and summary of Hume, I turn to Deleuze's appropriation of Hume's philosophy. In chapter four, I accomplish this by considering Deleuze's focus on the problem of subjectivity in a Humean empiricism. In chapter five, I explore the problem of transcendence, as Deleuze presents it, in this Humean empiricism. I also elaborate on the relation between transcendence and the transcendental in regard to a Humean empiricism.

Based on the accomplishments of chapters two through five, I conclude in chapter six that 'transcendental empiricism' is a phrase that does not hold together and in fact acts as a way to reveal the dualism of the empirical and the transcendental, which fit together historically as a cycle between questioning or problematizing and axiomatizing or determining. This dualism is understood by Deleuze as forces that he calls de-territorialization and re-territorialization.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is intended to further elucidate the terrain, stakes, and motivation of this project.

1.1 Guiding Questions

Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) is a mid-20th century philosopher who always identified himself as an empiricist and who wrote his first book on the British empiricist David Hume (1711-1776). His relationship to Hume is often overlooked in Deleuzian literature, but is

necessary for understanding Deleuze's contribution to post-structuralist thought. Deleuze is often understood within a Kantian light and this can obscure his commitment to a Humean empiricism.

In 2010, Professor James Williams, a Deleuzian scholar, identified three important questions about Deleuze's philosophical work. These questions were part of a review he wrote on the book *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* by Levi R. Bryant.[2] Williams wrote,

> Three deep philosophical questions have to-date remained without comprehensive answer in Deleuze scholarship...1. In exactly what way, if at all, is Deleuze's philosophy transcendental? 2. If we accept Deleuze's description of his philosophy as empirical, how can we accomodate that label with the obvious divergences between his work and traditional empiricism, notably in light of the question of the transcendental nature of his philosophy? 3. What is Deleuze's *philosophical* method, as opposed to the many practical and theoretical methodological approaches that can be traced through his work with Félix Guattari (schizo-analysis for instance)?[3]

William's third question makes explicit that the question of empiricism is a line of enquiry that separates Deleuze from Guattari. Understanding Deleuze as an individual philosopher is difficult or impossible in the joint works, where individual authorship is never identified. The joint works are intended to be authored by a multiplicity, or a multiplicity of multiplicities. In light of this, this project is an investigation of Deleuze individually. Williams' first two questions are linked together and motivated by Deleuze's occasional identification as a practitioner of transcendental empiricism. As for the first question, in terms of whether and how Deleuze's philosophy is transcendental, this work hopes to help answer this question. And with respect to the second question, by considering Hume's empiricism and Deleuze's appropriation of it, this project will contribute to the project of identifying Deleuze's place, or places, within the tradition of empiricism.

1.2 Historical Context

Underlying this work is the basic question, what is empiricism? In its modern philosophical sense, the word *empiricism* became an established term at the very end of the 18th

[2] Williams review is critical of Bryant because he fails to fully consider Deleuze outside of a Kantian context. Williams particularly notes the importance of considering Hume.

[3] James Williams, "Review Article: Levi R. Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence*, Northwestern University Press, 2008," *Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy*, no. 9 (2010): 115.

century.[4] It arose in opposition to rationalism and replaced such terms as experimental or observational philosophy. Empiricism came to represent a basic epistemological claim that all knowledge of the world must be derived from sense experience. This work often approaches empiricism from this epistemological definition, but does not limit empiricism to epistemology. Empiricism has meaning as an approach to philosophical issues in general and places constraints on ontological, metaphysical, ethical, moral, aesthetic, and political positions. This dissertation comes to understand empiricism as a kind of post-rationalism.

Deleuze claims he is an empiricist. But he also claims he is a transcendental empiricist. The second claim, which will be considered in more depth within this work, raises questions about what Deleuze means by empiricism. With this question in mind, I have focused heavily on Deleuze's first book, where he engages the thought of David Hume, the radical empiricist of early modern philosophy. It might appear that transcendental empiricism is a nod to Kant and his attempt to unite sensibility and the understanding. Kant's famous line, "Thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,"[5] seems to show both sides are necessary for a successful representation. This work will pick out various elements of Kant's philosophy that were already present in Hume's empiricism. In fact, Deleuze tries to turn the tables on Kant and present him as a Humean. In this alternative portrayal, Kant appears as a Humean that violates empiricism by failing to fully question, or problematize, subjectivity.

Ultimately, I will present reasons for considering Deleuze's allegiance to empiricism as a post-modern attempt to put forth a theory that is neither neo-Kantian nor phenomenological, two main transcendental theories in 20th century French thought. Instead of arguing these theories are wrong, Deleuze uses Hume to argue that one can probe deeper. Deleuze touches on this in his writing about the painting of Francis Bacon. Deleuze writes,

> "The phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it merely invokes the lived body. But the lived body is still a paltry thing in comparison with a more profound and almost unlivable Power [*Puissance*]...Beyond the organism, but also at the limit of the lived body, there lies what Artaud discovered and named: the body without organs...The body without organs is opposed less to organs than to the organization of organs we call an organism. It is an intense and intensive body. It is traversed by a wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to the variations of its amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. Sensation is not qualitative and quantified, but has only an intensive reality, which no longer determines within itself

[4] "empiricism." *Dictionary.com Unabridged*. Random House, Inc. 01 Apr. 2015. <Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/empiricism>.

[5] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and edit. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B 75, 193-4.

> representative elements, but allotropic variations. Sensation is vibration."[6]

Deleuze moves from a level of organization and representation to one of intensity and reality. This move to intensity, reality, and immanence is Deleuze's method for suspending transcendental truths and transcendental conditions. One rarely finds in scholarship a connection in this move to Hume, but it is Hume that distinguishes experience by intensity. In fact all experience is characterized by intensity. Ideas are generally less intense than sensation, yet intensity can be increased, or magnified, through associations. In Chapter Three, I will discuss how Hume's use of intensity is building off of Berkeley, who first introduces intensity as one of three characteristics for distinguishing reality.

It must also be noted that Deleuze is usually identified as working within post-structuralism. Within a post-World War II France, structuralism was the dominant theory. But a 'scientific' theory that left little to the individual, since everything was determined by the structural whole, caused unrest for many of the philosophers that survived the horrors of the war and occupation. This accounts for why theorists found it necessary to re-till the philosophical landscape by cracking and destabilizing what appeared to be solid structures. This productivity and reinvention in French philosophy parallels the situation of early modern philosophy, where religious war rocked the landscape and the accepted authority of scholasticism and Aristotelian sciences showed signs of failure, which led in part to the arrival of modernity.[7]

1.3 The Troubled Ground of Empiricism

In the introduction to the English translation of Deleuze's first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, Constantin Boundas notes the interest in empiricism by late 20th Century French philosophers. Boundas writes, "Truth to tell, a few commentators did make the point that the new French theoretical interest in empiricism indicates an active search for a ground which, unlike transcendental fields, would be hospitable to rhizomatic synapses and diagrammatic displacements."[8] Why the growing interest in

[6] Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 39.

[7] For a recent attempt to connect the cultural context of early modern philosophy particularly as post-Thirty Year's War of the Reformation with the cultural context of a post-war 20th century continental philosophy, see: Mark Greif, *The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933–1973* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 4. [Note that Boundas does not make the distinction between ground and foundation, which will be addressed in the conclusion.]

empiricism when Husserl had argued empiricism can make no universal claims or disclosures?[9] And Heidegger, who is very influential upon these French theorists, turns from Husserl, but not towards empiricism. Heidegger argues in *The Origin of the Work of* Art that we never first see sensation, the traditional empirical foundation.[10] Instead, we are naturally embedded within, or thrown into, a hermeneutic "as" structure that always discloses interpretations. Against an empiricism that returns to a pure sensation, Heidegger claims in *Being and Time* that we naturally perceive objects in terms of tools aimed toward specific ends and we fall unreflectively into a pragmatic web of action.[11] Even when confronted with a work of art that separates the tool from its functionality, we still see the bundle of sensation always as something, always within a hermeneutic structure that tends towards the event of an ontological disclosure. And the disclosure of being is not sensational, but meaningful. Hegel as well does not endorse empiricism. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel's German idealism traces the history of the Absolute Idea being realized through the history of the human spirit and human culture. He uses his method of dialectic to move beyond a pure empiricism, which is where the human spirit begins, by positing a subsisting subject and object as a sufficient resolution to the problem of the ungraspability of the flux of the here and now. For Hegel, empiricism is the historical beginning, though naïve first step in the process of realizing the rational. Hegel conceives the "diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth."[12] Each philosophical system leads to another and "their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity."[13] From within Hegel's historically situated point, he is at the end of philosophy. The system is complete and it is only a matter of culture embracing and enacting this final stage, as seen from his perspective, of freedom.

So for Deleuze and others to turn back to empiricism was a radical move. With respect to the Hegelian system, it meant re-engaging and rethinking the beginning. Vincent Descombes writes that these three philosophers, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, were known as *the three H's*

[9] "We need only ask the empiricist about the source of the validity of his universal theses (e.g., 'All valid thinking is based upon experience as the only presentive intuition'), and he becomes involved in a demonstrable countersense. After all, direct experience only presents particular singularities and no universalities; therefore it is insufficient." Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book – General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 37.

[10] "We never really first perceive a throng of sensation, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges [the traditional Lockean empirical position that things are substances and their accidents]; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e. listen abstractly." Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, edit. David Farrel Krell, "The Origin of the Work of Art," trans. Albert Hofstadder (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 151-2.

[11] "The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge.'" Martin Hedeigger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), <67>, 95.

[12] G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Miller, A.V. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 2.

[13] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 2.

by philosophy students of the French academy.[14] All major work in France around the middle of the 20th Century was connected to *the three H's*, and to go outside them to study and embrace someone like Hume was considered outside the norm. Descombes states that in the 1960s, the 'masters of suspicion' – Nietzsche, Marx and Freud— became the dominant philosophical figures. So if Boundas is correct about the turn to empiricism, what was this empirical ground that emerged that was hospitable to the new philosophies of various French academics in the humanities? For Gilles Deleuze, what was empiricism?

Looking from outside France, from the perspective of an American academic, the continental tradition was understood to belong within a tradition of rationalism starting with Descartes. This association was in contrast to the analytic tradition that was dominating Britain and the United States. Analytic philosophy was considered generally as aligned with empiricism. Hugh J. Silverman writes in the "Introduction" to *Inscriptions: After Phenomenology and Structuralism*, "While analytic philosophy – comprising the inheritors of logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, and linguistic analysis – draws primarily upon models established in Britain and arising out of eighteenth century empiricism, continental philosophy appeals to modes of articulation operative in Western Europe since Descartes and the rationalists."[15] The roots of the contemporary schism between continental and analytic philosophy is traced back to the modern divide between rationalism and empiricism, or as commonly known – continental rationalism and British empiricism. In the early 20th century, empiricism was generally associated with a realism that denied metaphysics or anything that could not be traced back to a sensible referent. Many traditional philosophical concepts and fields were dismissed as nonsense and illusion because they could not be reduced to sensation. Empiricism was here appropriated as a project to cleanse and reconcile language with sensational experience. But a British Empiricist like Hume and his position of radical skepticism can lead in a different direction and Deleuze highlights this alternative when he takes up the problem of empiricism. One could say that in Deleuze's expository investigation of Hume, he is marking out a continental empiricism. Using models that either emerged or were definitively appropriated in eighteenth century empiricism, Deleuze and others are reinventing continental philosophy under the influence of empiricism.

One can argue that this return to the empiricists and empiricism in late 20th century France was to help set the stage for another revolution against the then dominant philosophies in France in the latter half of the 20th century, phenomenology and structuralism. Deleuze is writing about Hume in the 1950's and in the 1960's, new fields emerged like deconstruction and post-structuralism. These new fields are sympathetic to an empirical approach in the sense that they posit as foundational an outside to a set rational structure, just as traditionally, sensation is

[14] Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 3-4.
[15] Hugh J. Silverman, *Inscriptions: After Phenomenology and Structuralism*, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 1.

separated from and outside of the understanding. John Rajchman adds to this assessment that Deleuze's move to empiricism sets the scene to escape all the dominant philosophies of Western Philosophy at that time. Rajchman writes in the introduction to *Pure Immanence*, "Indeed, it was through his logic and his empiricism that Deleuze found his way out of the impasses of the two dominant philosophical schools of his generation, phenomenological and analytic, and elaborated a new conception of sense, neither hermeneutic nor Fregean."[16] For Deleuze and perhaps some other French philosophers in the 1950's, empiricism operated as a reset button that allowed the next generation of philosophers to begin anew, or break free from prevailing traditions, in order to re-encounter active, but hidden premises and create new concepts.

In collegiate study of Modern Philosophy, British Empiricism is taught typically in opposition to Continental Rationalism. Locke, Hume, and Berkeley are the traditional standard bearers of 18th Century British Empiricism. And within this accepted narrative, Hume's empiricism, the pinnacle of empiricism, motivates Kant to challenge accounts of the human subject's conceptual and sensational experience of the world.[17] Hume forces Kant to abandon lingering dogmatic assumptions about the existence of such things as causality. And Hume inspires Kant to develop his Copernican revolution, which reverses the relationship between human experience and the world such that if the objects of the world are to be perceived at all, the thing itself must conform to the human's transcendental conditions of experience. Kant acknowledges empiricism as a legitimate challenge to traditional rationalism, and it forces new positions like his own, a transcendental idealism. But for Kant, empiricism by itself is something to be rejected. Starting with Kant, there begins a succession of rejections of empiricism in continental philosophy.

Jean-François Lyotard captures phenomenology's dismissal of empiricism succinctly when he writes about Husserl's argument[18] against empiricism's legitimacy to make universal claims. Husserl argues that universal claims are a necessary condition for any independent foundation of truth, and empiricism can make no universal claims. Lyotard summarizes Husserl's position:

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[16] John Rajchman, introduction to *Pure Immanence: Essays on Life*, by Gilles Deleuze, trans. Anne Boyman, (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 7.

[17] "I freely admit that it was the remembrance of David Hume which, many years ago, first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a completely different direction." Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Preface, 4:260.

[18] Husserl writes, "Of course, Hume did not ask the question, or at least did not say a word, about the status of the reason – Hume's – which established this theory as truth, which carried out these analyses of the soul and demonstrated these laws of association. How do rules of associative ordering "bind"? Even if we knew about them, would not that knowledge itself be another datum on the tablet?" Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §23, 88.

> Basically, the assumption at the root of all empiricism is the claim that experience is the sole source of truth for all knowledge – but then this claim must rely, in turn, on the proof of experience. Yet experience, never furnishing more than the contingent and particular, cannot provide science with the universal and necessary principle of such an assumption. Thus, empiricism cannot be understood through empiricism.[19]

Husserl begins the method of phenomenology in *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I* by bracketing traditional empiricism, suspending empirical experience in what he called an epoché, in order to ultimately inspect the contents of the transcendental mind. Husserl's science of phenomenology aims to focus upon the transcendental structures, content and actions that are revealed in a study of the intentional relation that is consciousness. The intentional structure and the transcendental ego are necessary and universal to all contingent experience that the ego happens to experience, but can also be separated from contingent experience. The phenomenological method allows one, any conscious subject, to explore and disclose these essential structures, contents, and processes in a separated field of study. As essential structures, Husserl argues he is on good ground to make universal claims, to posit a science that is a true and certain foundation for all sciences that cannot be separated from contingent experience. In the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" in *Logical Investigations: Volume I*, Husserl presents the conflict between psychologistic theorists like J.S. Mill and anti-psychologists, which would include Kant.[20] Psychologists place logic within psychology, the study of real mental content and actions. Anti-psychologists argue that logic is not enclosed within a science of observation that at best presents 'truths' contingent to particular workings of particular minds, which is to say a truth that is not absolute, but relative. The psychologist places the truth of logical, or mathematical, claims in the mental operations that perform these thoughts. Husserl sides with the psychologists, but argues they have not developed their arguments enough. Anti-psychologists point to the prescriptive and descriptive divide to make the point that 'what is' is not the same as 'what ought to be.' Ironically, it is Hume that forcefully argues for this divide, and though Husserl rejects Hume, he also counts Hume as an important predecessor in the development of phenomenology. The psychologists still argue that normative ideas must be thought, and thus they reject this is/ought divide as placing logic, the study of normative principles for logical thought, as outside psychology. Husserl argues that anti-psychologists have failed to win the argument because they have not carved out a 'pure' logic that stands separated from a logic that always remains entangled in the empirical observation of acts of consciousness. The pure logic always operates in tandem with an empirically immersed logic. The pure logic is a pure transcendental logic. Husserl relies on the idea of purification to reach what he argues is the

[19] Jean-François Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, trans. Brian Beakley (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), 38.

[20] See "Chapter 3: Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments" in *Logical Investigations: Volume I*, by Edmund Husserl, trans. J.M. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001), 40-5.

universal and necessary. Husserl's argument that empiricism is by definition always immersed in the contingent means that it will always fail to provide anything universal or essential that would ground a science. The contingent cannot be the ground for universal laws, at least universal laws that have legitimacy to be considered certain rather than probable. This argument that the empiricist cannot legitimately make any universal claims, which includes the claim for the truth of empiricism, seems to be strong.

But philosophers such as Deleuze are neither motivated nor engaged as a primary interest in the practice of legitimating and grounding knowledge and science. Without an epistemological imperative for the certainty and universality of clear and distinct foundational axioms, there is no initial motivation for bracketing the contingent in order to expose a domain of pure essences that may serve as the necessary condition and foundation of knowledge. The empiricism of Deleuze does not follow an 18th century empiricism of epistemological foundationalism that is constructed from and self-justified by the bricks of sense data, which Husserl calls sensationalism in *The Crisis of European Sciences*.[21] In place of justification, Deleuze engages the problem of constitution. He asks how the experiential mind self-constitutes a subjective, transcendental mind. And Deleuze's primary interest is to engender the new, to conceive and realize creativity.

In Husserl's final book, *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, he is quite dismissive of empiricism. His general opinion is summed up in the following, "Locke's navets [sic – naïveté] and inconsistencies lead to a rapid further development of his empiricism, which pushes toward a paradoxical idealism [Berkeley] and finally ends in a consummated absurdity [Hume]."[22] Though Husserl's observations are not exactly complimentary, at least Hume has perfected something others have left incomplete. But Husserl's observations also show that his definition of empiricism is too narrow to include a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism. Husserl states that empiricism's "foundation continues to be sensationalism and what appears to be obvious, i.e., that the sole indubitable ground of all knowledge is self-experience and its realm of immanent data."[23] Husserl assumes empiricism's focus is to establish an indubitable ground for knowledge in sensation as the solution to an epistemological mandate for a solid foundation and structure, yet Deleuze will focus empiricism through Hume as a questioning of subjectivity that establishes an immanent foundation. It is from this foundation that subjectivity emerges as a transcendental ground, as well as all other ideas that transcend the primal given or go beyond what is originally given. Husserl restricts experience in empiricism to be self-experience. There is no consideration of a non-subjective experience, experience in itself as something that could then constitute subjective experience. In fact, Husserl finds that one of Hume's main contributions towards the development of phenomenology is his isolation of the mind and experience from any external

[21] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §23, 86.

[22] Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, §23, *86*.

[23] Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, §23, *86*.

references. Hume effectively performs the epoché when he denies all substances. For Husserl, Hume's speculation about pure immanence points towards a pure logic. Hume's absurdity, according to Husserl, is to cast all normative ideas, which would include logic, as fictions relying upon the imagination to turn repeated cases into rules. Thus, only skepticism is possible with regard to any positing of knowledge or truth despite the implicit and paradoxical assumption that empiricism is true. It is evident that Husserl cannot disassociate subjectivity and experience when he writes, "Hume ends up, basically, in a solipsism."[24] Husserl is making this claim because in empiricism he finds Hume has put forth a theory where the self is stuck within this stream of subjective sensation and imagined ideas. But according to Deleuze, Hume escapes solipsism in an original way by escaping subjectivity itself. It is not a Cartesian escape, an escape to an outside objectivity guaranteed by the nature of a transcendent idea within the mind, but there can be no solipsism if there is no self. Husserl also argues Hume has merely put forth a psychologism, a study of how the human mind psychologically constructs mental objects, which makes empiricism contingent to human psychology. This puts Deleuze in line with Husserl's explicit critique of J.S. Mill, as discussed earlier. Yet, Deleuze's Hume aims to consider experience and mind, despite any psychological processes that happen to underpin the experience. These psychological processes are opaque to the mind; they are outside experience. Thus, with respect to Deleuze's Humean empiricism, this criticism of psychologism misses its mark. Husserl finds that Hume's genius was to find that "the life of consciousness is a life of accomplishment."[25] Both Hume and Husserl show that the complexity of pure experience is the result of active principles from different faculties seizing and constituting basic givens. The difference is that Husserl foundation is transcendental, while Hume begins with pure experience and then accounts for the emergence of a transcendental ground. Hume's barren foundation forces him to accomplish more.

In conversation with Claire Parnet, which was collected, edited and merged into prose by Parnet in *Dialogues II: Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet*, Deleuze says:

> Of course, every history of philosophy has its chapter on empiricism: Locke and Berkeley have their place there, but in Hume there is something very strange which completely displaces empiricism, giving it a new power, a theory and practice of relations, of the AND, which was to be pursued by Russell and Whitehead, but which remains underground or marginal in relation to the great classifications, even when they inspire a new conception of logic and epistemology.[26]

[24] Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, §23, 88.

[25] Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, §24, 90.

[26] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Continuum, 2006), 11.

Deleuze singles out Hume for reinventing and radicalizing empiricism such that a "theory and practice of relations" emerges and generates a new line of philosophy. This new philosophy is in part a way to cope with the radical foundation of empiricism, the flux of experience. Relations between terms, terms being the original given that collectively composes the mind, are posited as independent of the terms. Thus we perceive separately relations and terms, which William James also argues for in his radical empiricism.[27] Relations cannot be reduced to qualities of the terms. This gives us a starting point, assemblages of terms and the subsequent, or synchronous, relations between them, with 'and' being the simplest relation. The beginning is a dualistic plurality of relations and terms.

1.4 Deleuze and Hume, and a note on methodology

For Deleuze and empiricism, 1953 was a busy year. Deleuze first published an edited collection titled *Instincts et institutions*.[28] This collection of excerpts displayed and explored the nature-culture divide. From this study, Deleuze focused upon a philosopher that challenged the nature-culture divide by unfixing nature and naturalizing culture. Deleuze's book was an examination of Hume's theory of subjectivity. From the very beginning of his publishing career, Deleuze exhibited an interest in the British Empiricists, though few would place him in this particular camp. Besides two brief essays on Hume, Deleuze never explicitly and singly engages British Empiricism[29] in an extended format again. But Deleuze consistently calls himself an empiricist, sometimes qualified as transcendental or radical.

Jon Roffe writes in the book, *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineages*, "Gilles Deleuze's first book, devoted to David Hume, is often neglected when surveying his work."[30] In trying to construct the über-empirical Deleuze, this text will heavily rely on *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. Roffe speculates on why this first book has largely been disregarded. His first thought is that Deleuze rarely writes the name Hume in his subsequent works. This is true, though empiricism never leaves his vocabulary. The second suggestion is, "*Empiricism and Subjectivity*...is couched in terms which have no place in the mature Deleuze's work: association, laws of nature, purposiveness, passion and sympathy, all drawn from Hume's philosophy, never feature in any subsequent publication."[31] This may be true, but the terms have correlations that are very close. For instance, laws of nature, which Deleuze and Hume use indistinguishably with principles or

[27] William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912).
[28] *Instincts et institutions*, ed. Gilles Deleuze, (Paris: Hachette, 1953).
[29] Deleuze also appropriates tools from other British empiricists of the 18th century like Locke and Berkeley. Locke's use of the *tabula rasa* as well as Berkeley's ontology of the plane are re-fashioned by Deleuze. A full examination of Deleuze's empirical roots would need to consider these other empiricists, but I shall not be able to pursue this project in the current work.
[30] *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*, ed. Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 67.
[31] Eds. Jones and Roffe, *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*, 67.

instincts of nature, are juxtaposed against laws of human nature in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. Deleuze examines Hume in terms of how human nature, and the principles of human nature, emerge out of nature, or more precisely the principles of nature that constitute the given. In *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze writes about becoming-animal and becoming-human, which corresponds closely with the relationship between nature and human nature in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. Roffe's speculations on why scholars have neglected *Empiricism and Subjectivity* is a question that should probably be first investigated by questioning Deleuzian scholars that have never mentioned the work. Roffe completes his essay on Deleuze and Hume by examining some themes, from Deleuze's first book, that continue and undergo various changes throughout Deleuze's opus. My larger project, expanding on this dissertation, is to connect certain empirical themes from *Empiricism and Subjectivity* with Deleuze's logic of sensation in *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* in order to make explicit a striking consistency between Deleuze's early study of empiricism and his later work.

Deleuze's written opus can be divided into his work on the history of philosophy through a series of monographs, his philosophy works in his name only, and his collaborations with Félix Guattari. This organization has the potential to be a convenient way to dismiss, or compartmentalize, Deleuze's historical work as less relevant to Deleuze's own, unique philosophy. The monographs are generally considered idiosyncratic, straying from traditional interpretations, and thus they provide as much insight into the author as into the subject. The collaborative efforts complicate Deleuzian Studies as it is near impossible in these works to separate Deleuze from Guattari, which was in part the intent of joint authorship. If we apply Deleuze's philosophy of difference to him, he never intends to present himself singularly, with a single face or a single message. Deleuze generally writes in the first person plural, a 'we' that includes the reader, but also multiplies the speaker. Deleuze also redefines terms such that over time, spanning across his body of work, and simultaneously in each work, terms have multiple meanings.

One approach, and this one is taken here, is to abandon any objective project for revealing the "true" Deleuze. Instead we can construct a version of Deleuze and explore the consequences of that Deleuze. The aim here is to construct a version of Deleuze firmly embedded in his early exposition of Humean empiricism. The aim is not to present Deleuze's definitive and final position with respect to empiricism, nor to demonstrate an evolution of Deleuze's theory through a chronological study of his works, nor even to take into account every position Deleuze has taken up with respect to empiricism. The aim is to create one version of Deleuze out of a collection of particular quotes. It is an assemblage that heavily focuses upon Deleuze's first book, where he explicitly explores Hume and empiricism. There are certainly other Deleuzes that can be constructed, even from his first book, though it is not the aim here to construct multiple Deleuzes. In the end, this empirical Deleuze is *a* Deleuze, but not *the* Deleuze. This approach treats Deleuze as a whole, a totality that is capable of expressing each Deleuze, as a virtuality that can be selectively actualized, or individuated, into many differenciated and

actual individuals. The result is a Deleuze, we can speak of Deleuze, but there is only one actuality that emerges from virtually an infinite number of Deleuzes.

I am reading Deleuze's relationship to Hume as similar to Plato's relation to Socrates. Deleuze takes up a former figure, just as Plato takes up Socrates, and animates him. Plato brings Socrates back to life in the dialogues. Deleuze performs the same resurrection of Hume in his book. In this situation, it becomes impossible to disentangle the two figures, the animator and the animated. Sometimes I refer to Deleuze's Hume. While at other times, I speak singularly of Deleuze and Hume. In the end, I am taking Deleuze and Hume as bound together around a single empiricism, which I call Humean-Deleuzian empiricism.

Chapter 2 – Early Modern Philosophy and René Descartes

This chapter aims to present and problematize Descartes' philosophical project that begins with an indubitable foundation in the 'I think.' This is necessary for understanding how Hume's problematizing of the subject can be seen as an answer to Descartes' claim of finding that which cannot be doubted. In addition, the 'I think' of Descartes carries forward to Kant as equally foundationally necessary to the judgments of objects of representation. Thus, this chapter can be read as anticipating ways of problematizing Kant.

2.1 Early Modern Philosophy and Rationalism

2.1.1 Introduction

Early modern philosophy, specifically during the age of enlightenment, demarcates a period of western history that is marked by great advances in science, experimental methods, and mathematics, the championing of reason and individuality, and a prolific exchange of ideas throughout Britain and across the continent of Europe. Though all areas of philosophy were debated and flourished, epistemology became a central field of study. René Descartes set the agenda when he attempted to reveal the foundations of knowledge in the modern era, certain irrefutable ideas that could construct a demonstrable body of knowledge.

Deleuze's main focus in his study of Hume, and Hume's place within early modern philosophy, is the problem of human subjectivity. It is not immediately apparent how subjectivity and empiricism fit into a trajectory of philosophical enquiry that begins with Descartes and his quest for certainty. To provide the proper context, a brief and selective narrative of the history of early modern philosophy that focuses on the issue of the self is necessary. As the intent is to make Deleuze's engagement with Hume understandable, I do not attempt to present or summarize the wide range of scholarly debate that populates the literature covering each figure, as well as scholarly work on each figure in contrast to other major figures and the period at large.

For the most part, this chapter and the following remain historically situated in the early modern era, but it also considers some later appropriations and interpretations when relevant to the larger goal of understanding Deleuze's empiricism in its postmodern context. The chapter focuses on René Descartes and his epistemological project. Descartes sets the issues and context for much of early modern philosophy. The focus of this chapter is on Descartes' concern for a proper philosophical beginning as set down by his first principle, the first positive claim that arises when practicing his methodical doubt. A close study of the first principle and how Descartes arrives there will show the importance of subjectivity.

Many important developments and positions in rationalism, and empiricism in the following chapter, are ignored and this leaves obvious gaps in the narrative. For the purposes of this project, these developments would have broadened our understanding of the possible ways for conceiving substance, causality, and subjectivity. Yet these gaps are intentional, lest this project spiral so far out from its focus that it becomes merely a history of early modern philosophy.

The development of rationalism into various positions is largely a response to Descartes and his idea of substance. Of note are Spinoza and Leibniz, who were originally included in this chapter. Baruch Spinoza's rationalist critique of substance dualism is an important part of the story. Spinoza begins with the idea of an infinite substance and argues that the only possible substance is infinite with infinite essences. Deleuze produced multiple works about Spinoza and his development of a philosophy of immanence, an immanence that arises from a substance monism.[32] Spinoza identifies subjectivity as an expression, among an infinity of possible expressions, of the parallel essences of thought and extension. Each essence is one of an infinite of attributes of the one infinite substance, nature or God. Gottfried Leibniz's rationalist critique of the Cartesian theories of substance, body and dualistic causality are also illuminating to the discussion at hand. Leibniz's theory of the substance begins with understanding what it means to be simple. His theory of the subject is tied to the infinitesimal substance, the 'monad,' that is predicated by an infinite of perceptions and disconnected from all other minima. The monad is caught within a series of changes that are traced back to an original cause and these changes are in harmony with all other monads. Deleuze writes about Leibniz and the process of integration in which the infinitesimal folds together to seemingly form larger units.[33] Rationalist interventions usually begin with how basic ideas like substance, thinking, and subject are conceived. For the rationalist, the world is known through ideas and their logical consequences.

Kantian and Husserlian appropriations and interpretations will be addressed at points, as they provide perspective and concepts that help to paint a picture of Deleuze's criticism of identity and subjectivity in transcendent and transcendental forms. Immanuel Kant understands Hume's criticism of rationalistic and empirical thought as a devastating attack that serves to awaken one to the issues at hand. But Kant disagrees with Hume's conclusions and offers his own 'Copernican' solution. Kant becomes both Hume's greatest supporter and his greatest critic. Kant develops a theory that bridges rationalism and empiricism together as two necessary sides to phenomenal experience. At points, we will consider the Kantian position, which represents the greatest threat to Hume's empiricism. Likewise, we also consider phenomenology, beginning with Husserl, as a critical threat to Deleuze's empiricism. Deleuze is both indebted to many concepts and descriptions of consciousness that Husserl produces, but also distances himself

[32] See: Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990). Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988).
[33] See: Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press, 1993).

from phenomenology and critiques transcendental phenomenology from an empiricist position. Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*[34] offer a reading of Descartes that brings him towards the transcendental project of phenomenology to ground all science. In this project, Descartes, Kant and Husserlian phenomenology are grouped together as an alliance that pushes against and helps to define Hume's and Deleuze's position of empiricism.

2.1.2 Questioning Descartes

This chapter will challenge any simple understanding of the now cliché Cartesianism, "I think, therefore I am," as ignoring the vast amount of issues and complexities that arise at this starting point. This phrase is possibly the most well-known piece of philosophy in our culture, yet it is little understood. This phrase, which Descartes uses as the foundation to the rest of science and philosophy, represents the beginning of modern philosophy. The problem of certainty, existence, being, the status of thinking, perception, sensation, and the meaning of the language used to communicate and express these claims will drive much of the early modern debate just as Plato drove much of the debate in ancient western philosophical circles.

Descartes' believes that his first principle, when properly conceived, is wholly understandable, simple, and certain. In the *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes writes under 'Principle Ten', "I shall not here explain many of the other terms which I have already used or will use in what follows, because they seem to me to be sufficiently self-evident. I have often noticed that philosophers make the mistake of employing logical definitions in an attempt to explain what was already very simple and self-evident; the result is that they only make matters more obscure."[35] This position that the ideas need not be defined as long as they are fully conceived by the thinker emerges with another position that ideas are innate. The theory of innate ideas assumes that humans begin with certain basic ideas as part of their constitution. These simple ideas, created and given by God, are the building blocks of thought.

Deleuze criticizes Descartes' self-defining beginning. Descartes claims that because his first principle is self-evident, this implies that the meanings of the terms are also self-evident. The self-evidence means that there are no other necessary premises that need to be established. The question that Deleuze raises is, to whom? To whom are the first principles self-evident and the terms self-defining? Deleuze argues that in fact there is a presupposition when Descartes asserts that thinkers must properly contemplate the ideas. By denying all objective presuppositions, in the sense of categorical essences, Descartes has merely transferred his presuppositions to the subjective side. Deleuze makes this same criticism against Hegel who

[34] Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982).
[35] René Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 195.

begins with the subjective. Deleuze also criticizes Heidegger when he begins with a pre-ontological understanding of Being that already resides within the subject. Deleuze writes:

> Descartes, for example, in the *Second Meditation*, does not want to define man as a rational animal because such a definition explicitly presupposes the concepts of rationality and animality: in presenting the Cogito as a definition, he therefore claims to avoid all the objective presuppositions which encumber those procedures that operate by genus and difference. It is clear, however, that he does not escape presuppositions of another kind – subjective or implicit presuppositions contained in opinions rather than concepts: it is presumed that everyone knows, independently of concepts, what is meant by self, thinking, and being.[36]

The *zoon logikon* comes to Descartes through Aristotle and the scholastics. It represents the dogmatic authority of Descartes' schoolmasters, the very education he is questioning. Descartes questions authority by asking the individual to think for herself, to independently confirm or deny that which she presents as her own experience. Descartes initiates modernity by embracing the values of individualism, experiment, and the public sharing of ideas. Ironically, Descartes' goal is to find a new authority that cannot be questioned or doubted.

Deleuze argues that Descartes' critique of the knowledge taught in the schools of his youth requires that he admonish the intellectual, the professor, all established cultural authorities. Descartes replaces the schoolmaster that goes by the book with what Deleuze calls the idiot. But what value does the simpleton bring to philosophy and how does this relate to subjective presuppositions? Deleuze writes:

> We would do better to ask what is a subjective or implicit presupposition: it has the form of 'Everybody knows...'. Everybody knows, in a pre-philosophical and pre-conceptual manner...everybody knows what it means to think and to be. ...As a result, when the philosopher says 'I think therefore I am', he can assume that the universality of his premises – namely, what it means to be and to think... – will be implicitly understood, and that no one can deny that to doubt is to think, and to think is to be. ...*Everybody knows, no one can deny*, is the form of representation and the discourse of the representative. When philosophy rests its beginning upon such implicit or subjective presuppositions, it can claim innocence, since it has kept nothing back – except, of course, the essential – namely, the form of this discourse. It then opposes

[36] Deleuze, Gilles, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 129, original emphasis.

> the 'idiot' to the pedant, *Eudoxus* to *Epistemon*, good will to the overfull understanding, the individual man endowed only with his natural capacity for thought to the man perverted by the generalities of his time. The philosopher takes the side of the idiot as though of a man without presuppositions. In fact, *Eudoxus* has no fewer presuppositions than *Epistemon*, he simply has them in another, implicit or subjective form, 'private' and not 'public'; in the form of a natural capacity for thought which allows philosophy to claim to begin, and to begin without presuppositions.[37]

According to Deleuze, Descartes values the idiot for his good will. The idiot approaches thought with sincere motivation and clean deliberation. This is someone that is not trying to protect any book knowledge, a past authority. The idiot is someone without self-interest in maintaining the status quo. It is exactly the fresh start that Descartes seeks. Yet, Deleuze points out that there are suppositions in this form of discourse, the discourse where someone says, "Everybody knows..." These subjective suppositions are labeled as good will, or good sense, and common sense.

This labeling makes it difficult to oppose Descartes. What sort of person would deny *what everybody knows...*? But if it is the idiot that supports this discourse, then who is it that might stand against good will and sense. Deleuze writes, "On the contrary, it is a question of someone – if only one – with the necessary modesty not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying what everybody is supposed to recognise. Someone who neither allows himself to be represented nor wishes to represent anything. Not an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to think, either naturally or conceptually. Only such an individual is without presuppositions."[38] The critic must take the stance of the villain. The critic must attack what appears good, innocent, and obvious. This discourse that aims towards truth takes on a moral dimension. In Nietzschean fashion, Deleuze exposes a moral image of thought, that one must have a good will, to participate in this Cartesian quest for truth and certainty. The following takes this spirit of ill will to press against an exposition of Descartes' solid foundation and expose some of the issues that are hidden away.

2.2 René Descartes

2.2.1 Method of Doubt

[37] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 129-30, original emphasis.
[38] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 130.

Descartes emerged in the Enlightenment as a champion of philosophy and natural philosophy. He addressed both the larger intellectual audience of Europe by writing in French and the elite intellectuals by writing in Latin. He aspired to write the next great textbook to be taught in the colleges emerging across Europe. He claimed to have been inspired by a vivid dream that led him to question his entire education and invited his colleagues to begin anew with him. His work in philosophy tied together claims of epistemology and ontology, claims about knowledge and claims about existence. Descartes is the key to understanding modern philosophy's interests and obsessions. The following reveals why the subject is important and the significance of Hume's and Deleuze's attack upon it.

When Descartes set out to find the foundations of human knowledge, basic thoughts that we know for certain, he employed a method of systematic doubt. This method was intended to temporarily discard anything that could reasonably be doubted by imagining it to be false. Reasonable doubt was achieved if there was any ground, real or potential, for fallibility or illusion. The aim was to uncover any thought that was impossible to doubt by exhausting all these possible avenues of doubt. Descartes used a method that anyone could employ and it appeared to be quite simple. He took doubt, the greatest enemy of faith, and turned it into a positive tool. The intellectuals of Europe and England were asked to independently confirm this thought experiment.

Besides breaking free from premises that were considered true by the authority of tradition, whether it be the authority of ancient and medieval philosophers or the church itself, Descartes is also undermining reliance on the senses to expose truth and knowledge. Descartes is able to table any thought that was directly attributable to his senses because senses like vision are not infallible and thus it is possible that the objects that we see may not be as we see it, or more to the point, it is possible that they are not even there at all.[39] In using the senses we often make mistakes. What appears blue turns out to be green, what appears to be bent turns out to be straight, or what appears to be a small dog is just a shadow. Thus, there is always the possibility of error when relying on ideas that arise from sensation. Taken one step further, it is possible that all that we sense, the physical world in its totality, might just be a dream. In the moment, it is possible for a dream to appear entirely real as it is happening. In such a vivid dream, what we took to have occurred has not actually occurred; what we thought existed does not exist. Thus in a radical move, Descartes determines that, at least temporarily, the thoughts we have of the material world that we experience through the senses must be considered false. If there is to be anything certain, it must be grasped through reason.

[39] Descartes distinguishes between qualities of an object that are grasped through the senses and essences that are grasped through reason, such as extension, duration and motion. These essences are clear and distinct ideas, but they do not in themselves guarantee the existence of material substances. In the Fifth and Sixth Meditation, Descartes will revisit sense experience and judgment. At this point, he argues that due to the proof of a benevolent god, he can trust that his sense experience and rational judgment are not always fallacious or an illusion, thus proving the existence of material substance and independent bodies.

By a process of elimination, Descartes now considers the immaterial, simple conceptual matters such as mathematics and geometry, which we grasp through reason alone, rather than the senses. One point to be made is that essences, which we grasp through reason, persist equally in our waking and our dreams. Thus, this is not a cause to doubt pure ideas. Though any idea that is not clear and distinct to Descartes, or the one who is attempting this project, must be doubted because the confused idea may be or not be whatever one guesses at the time. Avoiding any confused thoughts, Descartes must determine whether any ideas that are clear and distinct are indubitable. For instance, the mathematical thought that 2 + 2 = 4 is a clear and distinct idea. Descartes is unable to think that 2 + 2 equals anything other than 4, whether awake or dreaming, and every aspect of the idea is clearly and distinctly conceived. This would appear to qualify as something beyond doubt, but Descartes considers two alternatives that place even these ideas into doubt. The first alternative is an internal source of error, while the second alternative is due to an external source.

The first option is that the very faculties that constitute Descartes' understanding are imperfect and fallible. For Descartes, this option rests on the condition that there is no god, no perfect creator of the human ego. Descartes writes, "Let us...grant...that everything said about God is a fiction...then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they [those that take this atheist position] make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time."[40] With an imperfect origin, there is no guarantee that any thought, no matter how well conceived, is not corrupted by the very process of thinking. Descartes has a problem if there is a perfect God that creates humans with faulty faculties that deceive them. How can perfection create imperfection and utter deception? In fact, Descartes will give proofs for God's existence and then have to explain how human error and deception can exist alongside a perfect creator. But within the case of imperfect faculties, Descartes concludes that there is no way not to doubt everything thought. As one will see with the second alternative, this option appears to show nothing is indubitable. Since Descartes does go on to offer what he believes proves God's existence, he does not pursue this option any farther, and instead deals with the issue of a perfect creator alongside the undeniable existence of human error. If one does not accept Descrates' proof of God's existence as a way to insure the integrity of the faculties, one must look for other ways in which we insure the integrity of the faculties. It is here that one might find a problem with a strictly individualistic approach to epistemological inquiry. On one's own, there is nothing to test one's faculties against. It is only within a community of other thinkers that one's thinking can be compared and contrasted to other's thinking. Descartes recognizes this in that he publishes his work not just to share his thinking, but to seek objections and confirmations that might expose issues in his thinking. Peer review is not explicitly written into Descartes' method of doubt in the *First Meditation*, yet his actions show that it is part of the process of uncovering the indubitable. Yet, even that which is

[40] René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 14.

universally accepted could be wrong and is still a potential subject to doubt, as we will see in Hume and Deleuze.

With regard to the second alternative, besides the fallibility of senses and the self-deception of vivid dreams, perhaps something external to the ego and hidden to the ego is capable of deceiving Descartes and his rational grasp of essences. Descartes suggests that there may be an evil demon outside him with greater powers of thought, an intent to deceive, and the ability to deceive him in such a way that he is completely unaware of the deception.[41] This demonic deceiver might trick Descartes with respect to his doubting or the content of his doubt. The possibility of such an outside deception means Descartes must now consider even the idea of 2 + 2 = 4 to be false. Descartes is in the awkward position that he must doubt, and temporarily imagine as false, any pure thought or essence that is clear and distinct.

With the possibility that all knowledge is outside human grasp, Descartes is left searching his thoughts and wondering whether there is any proposition at all that is beyond doubt. He even offers the contradiction that perhaps he can only be certain of uncertainty. This first principle would have to be an idea that is clear and distinct and persist whether awake or dreaming, but also something that the great external deceiver would be incapable of producing as a deception, and be true even if his faculties were imperfect.

From the perspective of a scholastic philosopher, there is a glaring absence of faith and god in the early part of Descartes' project. And like many philosophers of this time, Descartes had to be wary of charges of atheism as well as deism, with respect to a disengaged, disinterested, and detached god that contradicted church doctrine. Descartes can argue that in order to appeal to atheists and bring them to God, he must first engage them without God using a method that they are familiar with, like doubt. But since Descartes is searching for something that cannot be doubted and there were many that doubted the existence of god, it must be the case that on principle faith cannot support his thinking. Furthermore, taking something to be true on faith is exactly the kind of dogmatic authority that many enlightenment thinkers attempted to overthrow.

Descartes' solution was ingenious, though perhaps not original. The solution was a thought that was clearly and distinctly conceived. It was a thought that Descartes could not doubt regardless of whether he was awake or dreaming. The thought did not rely upon the fallible senses. As well, the thought could not be doubted even if there happened to be a powerful demon

[41] For Descartes, God is also hidden to the ego and has the power to influence thought and perception, but does not have the intent to deceive. One can question whether deception is always intentional and evil, or merely the consequence of being a transcendent cause to a solipsistic mind. Though someone is visually invisible to a blind person, this does not mean that the unseen person is practicing deception in an intentional or evil way. Interesting parallels between Descartes' demon, Freud's unconscious, and Levinas' Other is a topic I am investigating outside this particular work.

capable of complete deception.[42] On top of these previous possibilities, Descartes considers the possibility that his soul is the product of chance or fate, rather than designed by God or a demon. In this atheist case, Descartes considers the possibility that there are imperfections in his nature that invisibly corrupt his thinking on such clear and distinct ideas as that there are four sides to a square. Even under this case, Descartes still finds one indubitable thought. In fact for Descartes, the atheist position remains a possibility until after he has found something indubitable. Once an indubitable idea is revealed, Descartes uses his conceiving of an idea of infinity and his claim that this idea of infinity is inadequate to infinity itself, to conclude God's existence and creative power. So what exactly is Descartes' indubitable thought? This is not exactly clear, but it has to do with thinking, existing, being, and the ego.

What follows is an in-depth exploration of Descartes' indubitable thought, his epistemological foundation, and its consequences. Hume and Deleuze will challenge the indubitableness in a radical way, which is why it is important to set this context. From Descartes' indubitable foundation, he comes to conclude various metaphysical claims. In terms of what exists, Descartes argues that there must be a thinking substance, independent of physical bodies, that exists and can contemplate pure (immaterial) thoughts. This is the soul and it is independent of the body since it can be conceived without any reference to bodily extension. From here, Descartes attempts in various ways to build on what he knows for certain by proving the existence of god and then proving the existence of bodily existence. In the end, Descartes' conception of the human is a union of body and soul. He presents a substance dualism of *res extensa* (extended or corpuscular substance) and *res cogitans* (thinking substance). These are two substances that can be conceived entirely by themselves and thus are completely independent. So for Descartes, the soul exists independent of the body. The body itself is physical and mechanical. The soul is immaterial and mental. The union of these independent substances gives early modern philosophy its first great metaphysical problem. How do these independent substances interact? How is substance dualism possible? The physical body interacts through the physical action of colliding extended bodies, but the soul is not something that can be touched or pushed physically. In the other direction, thoughts are not physical objects that can manipulate bodies. Thus, how can the body possibly influence the soul, and vice versa? This problem of explaining cause and effect between exclusive substances is the problem of causal interaction. Hume will respond to this issue by questioning causality itself. Thus for Hume, the problem of necessary connection is not restricted to the issue of substance dualism. Every major philosopher

[42] Descartes is careful to distinguish between God and the evil demon. The demon as evil is deceptive and acts to deceive by nature. Descartes argues at the end of the *Third Meditation* that God as perfection will not deceive due its nature. Deception arises from imperfection. The questions remains that though God would not deceive Descartes, would God be capable of deceiving Descartes with respect to this indubitable thought? This question can be rewritten as to whether God chooses not to deceive Descartes' with respect to his indubitable thought, or is it the case that god cannot deceive Descartes on this one thought? Not a new question, Plato addresses this question with respect to gods and piety in the *Euthyphro*. Descartes' proposal of the demon sidesteps the issue of perfection, which allows Descartes to consider an agent capable of 'perfect' deception. Though according to Descartes, even the 'perfect' deceiver is incapable of perfect deception. This implies that deception is something that cannot be perfected, or is never complete, perhaps comparable to Gödel's *Incompleteness Theorems*.

subsequent to Descartes has a different answer to this problem. Descartes is aware of this issue in his substance dualism, and faced the question directly in his reply to letters from Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia.[43]

Returning to the indubitable starting point of which Descartes' entire philosophy rests, the role of doubt in uncovering this starting point should be reconsidered. Descartes' methodic doubt cannot positively identify a claim. It can only remove from contention categories of ideas, like sensational ideas. In fact with the case of the demon, Descartes doubts his ultimate category of thought, clear and distinct ideas that are purified of any sensation. The rational impetus behind the discovery of his indubitable thought is not clear. Descartes refers to a dream he had that gave him the ideas for his project. Doubt is a way of testing a thought, but it does not point towards any particular thoughts.

The popular iteration of Descartes' indubitable thought is "I think, therefore I exist." This has the form of an argument. "I think" is the premise and "I exist" is indicated by "therefore" as the conclusion. Yet, if this is a valid argument, it is missing a middle step in the syllogism, the major premise: "If something thinks, then something exists." But for every premise that Descartes relies on, he will need to justify it, lest he falls back into the same trap of relying upon dogmatic authority to assure the truth of each premise, which he has already established is not enough to guarantee certainty.

Instead of relying upon an argument structure, Descartes argues first principles, an indubitable thought, must verify itself. Thus, Descartes is looking for a first thought that is self-evident. It must refer to itself in some way such that doubt becomes impossible. Positively, Descartes is searching for a self-referential thought that by referring back to itself, it establishes itself as indubitable. Equally, this thought must be of a different kind than the clear and distinct ideas that were all put into doubt due to the demon.[44] As self-evident, Descartes seeks a thought, or thoughts, that require no prior premises. Thus, there is technically no conclusion and no inferences being made from a premise to a conclusion. In the second set of objections and replies to the *Meditations*, which were objections composed by theologians and philosophers and compiled by Marin Mersenne, Descartes replies:

> *Thirdly*, when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled

[43] A complete answer to the issue of causal interaction requires considering more than just Descartes' response in the letters about the consideration of the union of two substance as becoming in a way a third substance. One must also consider Descartes' natural philosophy concerning optics, the pineal gland, and the complex functions that a purely physical body was capable of executing. Descartes considered all animals to be soul-less machines, yet they were quite capable of sensation and exhibited complex decision making. One must also consider Descartes' theory of the passions and animal spirits.

[44] This second requirement is not explicitly discussed by Descartes, but will become important here when distinguishing particular, specified thoughts, such as "I think 2 + 2 = 4," versus non-particular, general, or abstract, thoughts, such as "I think."

> when we are no longer attending to the arguments by means of which we deduced them. Now awareness of first principles is not normally called 'knowledge' by dialecticians. And when we become aware that we are thinking things, this is a primary notion which is not derived by means of any syllogism. When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist', he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premise 'Everything which thinks is, or exists'; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing. It is in the nature of our mind to construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones.[45]

Here, Descartes clarifies that the "I am thinking," "I am," "I exist," and "I am a thinking thing" are matters of experience, native ideas that are intuited. These intuitions are pure acts of thinking. The difference between the ideas of *being* ("I am") and *existence* ("I exist") will be developed when the phrasing in the *Meditations* is explored below. It might seem odd that the philosopher considered the father of rationalism in early modern philosophy is starting with experience and claiming that a general universal claim is constructed after the fact. We can understand Descartes' experiential beginning as an appeal to the empiricists that he is arguing against. If an empiricist begins with experience, Descartes is arguing that she will end up following the rest of Descartes' argumentation to become a rationalist. Descartes wants to direct empiricists to pure thinking of pure ideas, which are thoughts uncontaminated by the senses, and he appears to reach this goal through his method of doubt.

There are two challenges that empiricists can direct toward Descartes with respect to his method of doubt and its initial application to ideas of sensation. One challenge is that there is no compelling justification for why Descartes begins with ideas of sensation rather than pure ideas. This undermines any argument that Descartes could make for why he begins as an empiricist. Empiricists argue that all ideas are reliant upon sense experience in some way. Thus, an empiricist starts with sensation and provides a genetic account of ideas. For the empiricist, one does not just come to know the world through the senses, but one also comes to generate the ideas from which we understand the world that we know through sense experience. So, empiricists have a reason to begin with sensation, but Descartes and rationalists do not have a reason to start with sensation.

[45] René Descartes, "Objections and Replies," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 100.

Subsequent rationalists to Descartes like Spinoza and Leibniz will move farther away from experience when beginning their philosophical theorizing. For example, Spinoza begins the Ethics with definitions and then axioms, following the structure of a geometric proof, rather than first appealing to experience and the intuition of pure ideas. In other words, the content of thought becomes more important than the act of thought. Likewise, Leibniz is concerned with the definition of a simple substance and the consequences of this definition. Husserl and phenomenology will return to Descartes to emphasize both the act of thought and the content of thought equally. Husserl interprets the method of doubt as comparable to necessary phenomenological tools that distinguish and isolate inner experience and the transcendental structure of thought as the foundation of science and knowledge.

Another empiricist challenge to Descartes is that he does not search for a self-referential sensational experience that might be indubitable. The perceptual role of the mirror, developed by Jacques Lacan as a stage in the institution of a symbolic order, is one example of something sensible that is comparable to Descartes' indubitable thoughts that establish self-existence and being. Thus, though Descartes appears to begin his project as an empiricist in order to persuade the empiricist to become a rationalist, it is questionable whether an empiricist would begin this way.

Descartes' method of doubt is useful for testing particular ideas and by way of generalization, discounting categories of thought, but it cannot positively direct thought toward any specific innate idea or category of thought.[46] By elimination, one is directed to look toward other kinds of thought that have not yet been tested, but the categories of thought included in what has not yet been tested is not clear and it is not always clear what exact category of thought has been discarded until one is clear about what aspect of the suspicious idea the doubter has successfully deployed doubt.[47] For in the above paragraph, it is argued that there might be a category of sensation, self-referential sensations, which are not part of the category of thought that is effectively being doubted. Descartes may have only successfully doubted sensations that reference exterior representations. Since all pure ideas are innate for rationalists, the indubitable thought and the category of thinking for which it is included, is already present to the mind, just not identified or distinguished by essence, category, or predication. Doubt is not a tool that is necessary for conceiving the indubitable thought and the kind of thought of which it is included, for one could freely direct intuition towards any content of the mind. Attempting to doubt

[46] Descartes' proof of God relies upon the idea of infinity, but there is no method that directs him to contemplate infinity, just as there is no method that directs him specifically to conceive "I think" or "I exist." What may offer guidance is reflection on what it means to be self-evident.

[47] Perhaps Descartes prematurely doubts all idea of sensation. Descartes argues the organ of sensation is imperfect and this short-circuits any attempt to divide the idea-content of the organs of sensation into different categories of thought such as ideas of external objects in sensation and ideas of the self in sensation, which might have led to an indubitable sensation. On the other hand, the mind is assumed by Descartes to be a substance that is capable of perfect conception and thus just because some ideas are confused or wrong does not lead Descartes to assume that the mind itself is imperfect.

something is necessary for testing that which appears indubitable to be confirmed as truly indubitable.

The method of doubt is helpful for forcing the mind to distinguish different ways for categorizing ideas when it distinguishes which essence makes the thought uncertain. Descartes distinguishes ambiguous or confused ideas in the *Meditations* from those ideas conceived clearly and distinctly. This distinction effectively separates ideas that appear false or potentially false and ideas that *appear* to the soul as 'indubitable' in the sense that one cannot conceive the idea in any other way and the clearness and distinctness appear to be an expression of the idea's truth. The challenge for Descartes is showing how he can transition from something that appears to be certain to something that appears to be certain and is certain when confronted with radical doubt. Instead of severing appearance and reality, Descartes is searching for the coincidence of appearance and reality, a true representation. From the quote above, Descartes' position is that while he is conceiving a clear and distinct idea, he must simultaneously attempt to doubt that idea methodically, using the extreme case of the demon to deploy a doubt that cannot be extended any farther, which Descartes argues would successfully test the reality of certainty against the appearance of certainty.[48]

In the prior quote, Descartes makes the distinction between primary notions, also called first principles, which are experienced, and knowledge, which is constructed. Knowledge is the product of previous deductions that are recallable in memory. That which is recallable in memory eventually refers back, if it is a true memory, to an act of conceiving in a now past present. The previous deductions and experiences become accepted premises. Knowledge is produced when one makes inferences from accepted premises to new conclusions. By contrast, a primary notion or first principle is experienced in the present. The indubitable nature of a primary notion is established by concurrent experience of self-evidence. In the case of Descartes, this self-evidence is the inability to doubt the notion. But the self-evidence, if it is to be certain, is more than just one's ability to doubt something, for one person could doubt everything without justification or with false justification. For this reason, the strength of Descartes' method relies upon the consistency and thoroughness of the doubting. If we are thoroughly convinced that all doubts have been exhausted, using the highest standards, then we are compelled to accept Descartes' claims.

2.2.2 First Principle

[48] Two challenges to Descartes remain. First, is there a way to know whether the case of the demon is in fact the most extreme level of doubting that can be deployed? Second, how can Descartes be certain that he was not able to doubt "I think" when it might be the case that it only mistakenly appears that he was not able to doubt this idea. These questions of the completeness of the method of doubt and the veracity of the results of the testing will be indirectly addressed in the following when addressing respectively the logic of the mutual exclusivity in the levels of doubt and the abstractions or generalizations that are made to the ideas that are tested as indubitable.

The exact wording of the indubitable beginning that identifies the foundational primary notions changes between three different published works of Descartes. Part of this is due to the fact that the earliest version is written in French and the latter two are in Latin. In addition, Descartes oversaw or helped in translating his work between Latin and French and vice versa, which brought more variation. Descartes has referred to this beginning in different ways in various places throughout his career, such as in the reply to an objection quoted above, which adds more variation. The translation that is used here, a translation by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (CSM), varies from traditional renderings. The best approaches to understanding Descartes must consider the three major instantiations of Descartes' first positive notion. I will work chronologically backwards, like an archaeologist digging deeper into a site, to consider Descartes' phrasing, translators' decisions, the impact this has on Descartes' theory of the ego, and how this investigation relates back to Hume's and Deleuze's problem of subjectivity in empiricism.

The latter of the three works is *Principles of Philosophy* (1644 Latin version, 1647 authorized French version). Descartes writes in Part I, Principle VII:

> *7. It is not possible for us to doubt that we exist while we are doubting; and this the first thing we come to know when we philosophize in an orderly way.*
> 7. In rejecting – and even imagining to be false – everything which we can in any way doubt, it is easy for us to suppose that there is no God, and no heaven, and that there are no bodies, and even that we ourselves have no hands or feet, or indeed any body at all. But we cannot for all that suppose that we, who are having such thoughts, are nothing. For it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the very time when it is thinking, exist. Accordingly, this piece of knowledge [this inference – French version][49] – *I am thinking, therefore I exist* – is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way.[50]

In this final version, Descartes frames the primary notion as an ongoing activity or condition, under which it would be impossible to doubt that I exist. It is only while actively doubting, engaged in this thought activity, that one cannot doubt that the ego exists, and if one cannot

[49] Descartes wrote his philosophical works in both Latin and French. Using French gave his work a broader appeal, while Latin was the language of serious academics. His Latin works were translated to French, sometimes by an authorized translator, and vice versa. The English translation I am using, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* – Volumes I and II (1985), includes significant differences in the French or Latin version when that version was either written by Descartes or authorized and supervised by him.

[50] René Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 194-5, original emphasis.

doubt, then one can positively claim with certainty that I exist. In Descartes' reply to the objections of the *Meditations* above, he argued these first claims, primary notions, are not knowledge. Yet here he refers to this thinking and existing as knowledge.

Part of this apparent discrepancy can be accounted for using Descartes' theory of knowledge. Descartes argues the certainty necessary for something to be attributed as knowledge can only be guaranteed by the existence of God. The necessity of God is due to the reliance on memory. Memory is often faulty and was a victim to methodical doubt. But our ability to recall a claim as already proven true only becomes a reliable faculty once Descartes guarantees it in his proof that God exists and that God would not create a deceptive faculty. Descartes will argue that memory can be relied upon under proper conditions and use of the faculty. Before the reliance of memory is established, one must reconstitute the experience of conception and evidence simultaneously. But this only works for ideas like primary notions that are self-evident. And even primary notions that are referred to after the fact, in a language claim, to be true rely upon the memory of the self-evident notion establishing its truth. Thus when Descartes refers to the primary notion in a claim, he is speaking about knowledge, as long as this is after Descartes' proof of God. Yet in this *seventh principle,* Descartes is clear that this is at a stage where he supposes that "there is no God." Descartes' choice of words is difficult to reconcile against his early comment that distinguishes knowledge and primary notions. It is possible that Descartes changed his mind, but it is also possible that this final work that was meant to be a general textbook and was never fully completed lacked the nuance of the extended *Mediations*.

The translation, "I am thinking, therefore I exist," differs from the commonly known phrasing, "I think, therefore I am." The original Latin of *Principia Philosophiæ* states, "*ego cogito, ergo sum*."[51] "Cogito" is the first person simple present tense of the infinitive, "to think." And "sum" is the first person simple present tense of "to be." A straightforward translation of the Latin would appear to be the commonly referred to Cartesianism. This raises the question of the difference between "I think" and "I am thinking", which will be addressed first, and then "I am" and "I exist." Perhaps for pedagogical reasons, the translators aimed to avoid the now cliché phrasing as a way for students and readers of philosophy to think through this well known statement again as something new. Or, for philosophical reasons, CSM may have thought their translation was closer to Descartes' intended meaning. In the following, the latter will be further explored.

The CSM translation uses the first person present tense, indicative mood, progressive verb form, "*I am thinking*," to indicate the fact of an ongoing, incomplete and continuous activity in the present without specifying a definitive beginning or end. The original Latin uses the simple present tense, "*I think,*" which is a verb form that leaves some determining factors ambiguous. Context and the nature of the verb determine the exact meaning of this instantiation.

[51] René Descartes, *Principia Philosophiæ*, Digital Copy of first edition (Amstelodami, apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, 1644), U.S. Library of Congress < http://www.loc.gov/item/46028327> accessed 06.27.15.

The present tense can indicate either a habitual activity or an activity that is completed with the completion of the sentence-thought. For example, "I slice carrots," can mean my job each day is to slice all the carrots or the fact that when I complete this thought, I have completed to some extent, in this present moment, the slicing of some carrots. Alternatively, "I am slicing carrots" indicates the fact of an on-going process that continues in the present. How many carrots have been sliced is undetermined, but the progressive tense implies that the activity is continuing and thus there are more carrots to slice. The habitual meaning gives the verb a predicative role by linking an activity as a predicate to a subject. The subject is a carrot slicer. From the preceding context of Descartes' methodical doubting, Descartes does not intend "*I think*," to be an assertion about his habitual activities, but the recognition of the fact of his doubting. Yet, when Descartes subsequently defines the ego as a thinking substance, he uses thinking as a verbal adjective, and the modified substance as a predicate linked to the ego. Thus he slides from thinking as a factual event, to a repetitive or habitual activity, to being a substantial essence. The ambiguity of the present tense helps define the two poles of the transition, event/fact and essence.

If we accept Descartes' use of the verb 'to think' as an active verb, both verbal forms by themselves, without added context, leave undetermined the extent of the activity's duration or the nature of the activity itself. With respect to the simple present tense, the duration of time can contract towards a single moment. Descartes does not address whether a thought is something present all at once, like an image, or a temporal process, like a melody. When considering the nature of thought-activity, is thinking about one thing like the repetition of a melody or staring at an image? Descartes does not address the temporality of the present as to whether he understands it as an instant, using a punctual sense of time, or a duration, using a continuous sense of time. Descartes relies on the present because memory is not available to him. Methodical doubt led him to deny any idea that relies on memory in his quest for certainty. The question arises whether memory plays a role in synthesizing the present? For Descartes, if memory is built into thinking in the present, then even the present is suspect. Husserl addresses this issue when he writes about time-consciousness.[52] In content like a melody, Husserl argues that the immediate past content is preserved in the present as a 'retention,' which is something different than memory. Retention is conceived like a horizon that operates as a background against the current focal content of consciousness. Husserl also describes a protention, or expectation, that presents itself as another horizon to the focal content. Yet if retention is like memory, perhaps different than what cognitive scientists call short-term memory, though still a form of memory in the sense that it sustains something that is no longer directly-passively sustained, then Descartes must begin with an intuition that is complete in itself, all at once, and without a horizonal context that retains the immediate past and projects the immediate future. We will return to Husserl's theory of internal time consciousness in the conclusion as it pertains to Deleuze's distinction between the empirical and transcendental.

[52] Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, trans. John Barnett Brough (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

Descartes' thinking of a thought all at once must sustain itself continuously. For Descartes, thinking is determined to be the essence of immaterial substance, just as extension is the essence of physical substance. As long as a thinking substance exists, it cannot be the case that it is *not* thinking. Just as a physical substance cannot lose the quality of extension, for if it does, it ceases to exist. In this sense, the CSM translation using the progressive verbal form fits with Descartes' theory that thinking must continuously happen throughout the life of the soul's existence.

The possibility that the same soul could pop in and out of existence as it thinks and stops thinking is not a possibility for Descartes. Descartes argues that one thinks while awake, but also while asleep by dreaming. There are no gaps. The continuity of subjective thinking, and thus a continual existence, is assumed by Descartes, just as he assumes that there are no voids in physical space. The empiricists will offer alternative conceptions of the self. Locke defines the human person as a continuity of ideas that form a continuous psychological narrative of self-awareness and self-concern, but he does not assume a temporal continuity of existence, nor a corporeal continuity. Locke separates the self from substance. He argues that some people do not dream when they sleep and that it is possible the same self could emerge in a different body. Berkeley will challenge assumptions about the continuity or persistence of substantial existence, but only on the object side, not the subject. Hume will challenge all existential claims.

Descartes uses a very inclusive sense of the term 'thinking.' Descartes writes, "There are other acts which we call 'acts of thought', such as understanding, willing, imagining, having sensory perceptions, and so on: these all fall under the common concept of thought or perception or consciousness, and we call the substance in which they inhere a 'thinking thing' or a 'mind'. We can use any other term you like, provided we do not confuse this substance with corporeal substance."[53] This quote is from Descartes' response to objections made by Hobbes. Hobbes argues that thought is inseparable from material substance. Descartes makes it clear that he considers "thought," "perception," and "consciousness" to be interchangeable as immaterial ideas. Descartes argument for thought to inhere in an immaterial substance is that thought can be conceived entirely separate from extension, the essence of material substance. Hobbes argument is that we never encounter or experience the act of thinking without it coming from a material body, and that we never encounter in direct experience an immaterial substance. Descartes' dualism assumes that each substance has only one essence and that thought and extension are essences. The consequence of this dualism is the problem of interaction. How is it possible for different substances to have a causal relationship in either direction? The problem for Hobbes' materialism is explaining the experienced difference between thought and body.

The CSM translation choice of "exist" for the Latin "sum" is problematic, but the issue is best understood when we consider what Descartes wrote in the middle work, the *Meditations*,

[53] René Descartes, "Objections and Replies," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 124.

where the CSM translation for "sum" is the standard "I am". In the Second Meditation of *Mediations on First Philosophy* (1641), Descartes writes:

> I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all, added in French version] then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.[54]

In the *Meditations*, Descartes presents his most complete version of his method of doubt. Here Descartes does not include "I think" or "I am thinking" as the premise of his initial proposition of certainty. How does keeping the subjective process of thinking outside of the self-evident thought change Descartes' foundation? In the *Meditations*, the original Latin is "*ego sum, ego existo*."[55] The inconsistency of the CSM translation[56] of "sum" between the *Principles of Philosophy* and the *Meditations* is an issue of translation that goes beyond the delineated scope of this work, but it does offer the opportunity to engage another issue, the difference between being and existence.

This difference shines light on the distinction between subjective processes and the objective propositions. The subjective process is the thinking or conceiving. The objective proposition, which could be called a fact about the world[57], is "*I am, I exist*." Without the premise phrase, "*I am thinking*," there is no longer need for an inferential indicator like "therefore" that signals a conclusion. This leaves the "I am, I exist" as a simple proposition that Descartes finds to be self-evident. Yet the "I am thinking" does not exactly disappear. Descartes

[54] René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 16-7, original emphasis.
[55] René Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, digital copy, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/23306/23306-h/23306-h.htm> accessed 05.27.15.
[56] John Cottingham was the principle translator for both of these works. [René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ix.
[57] Note that Descartes has limited himself here to the immaterial world.

states that the propositions "I am" and "I exist" are thoughts actively being conceived and upon which he meditates. The claims could be rewritten as "I think/I am thinking 'I am,' I think/I am thinking 'I exist.'" But, Descartes is arguing the proposition "I am, I exist" is true, not that "I am thinking this proposition" is true. In fact there are two levels of description, or what Locke will later call consciousness. First, is the basic description that "I am, I exist." This statement is found by Descartes to be a certain description of the world, and thus to become knowledge. This is the foundation of Descartes' epistemology. The second description is a self-description, "I am thinking '*I am, I exist*.'" The self-evidence of the first description relies upon the self-description, or self-consciousness, that *I am thinking*.

Self-description only works as self-evidence when the description is about the ego. The proposition's subject is "I" and this first-person singular pronoun refers back to that which is conceiving the proposition, the ego. The first-person point of view indicates the speaker or conceiver of the proposition. Descartes' argument would not work if he considered the phrase "Gassendi is, Gassendi exists." The standard of self-evidence requires that the claim must reference back to itself, including the manner and condition of its rendering, as evidence of its claim. The condition of the claim serves as self-evidence. Self-evidence cannot rely on an outside fact. The proposition must refer back to the condition of its rendering, that it is being conceived by that which exists, the ego or "I." The objective proposition is a positive claim about someone's existence and because the proposition uses the first person point of view, it refers back to the same ego that is conceiving, or thinking, by subjective processes this particular proposition. Though Descartes uses the word 'ego' undefined, it still indicates a self-referential motion that links the self-evident thought "*I exist, I am*", which is a fact or true description of the world, back to the condition or process of conceiving this thought. In order for self-evidence to function, there must be a circle by which the thought is confirmed by the very conditions that make the thought possible. The circular nature of self-evidence raises the question of validity, except Descartes argues there is no inference here to be judged of its validity.

Though, it must be repeated from earlier that the self-evidence of Descartes' foundational claim arises in the context of his methodical doubt. Methodical doubt is a practice in which Descartes works to deploy increasing forms of doubt to insure that he has doubted everything that he can justifiably, i.e. rationally, doubt. The importance of this context can be overlooked, but it exposes the fact that self-evidence by itself is not enough to insure certainty. The distinction was made before between that which appears certain, clear and distinct ideas, and that which is certain, due to its resistance to all forms of rational doubt. At this point in the *Meditations*, Descartes has conceived the ultimate form of doubt he can imagine, a doubt that takes up the possibility that an external, more powerful force has completely deceived him. Even for ideas that present themselves clearly and distinctly in the natural light of reason, Descartes must face the possibility that these too are deceptions. It would appear that under the hypothesis of the demon, nothing could be without some doubt and thus nothing can be certain. If that is the case, skepticism becomes the only rational position that one can decisively take. But Descartes'

does determine that the propositions "I am" and "I exist" do not only appear true, but are true. Resistance to Descartes' final attempt at doubting relies on some unstated assumptions about thinking and ideas. This implies that Descartes has not begun completely free of assumptions, or premises. Here are six assumptions. First, every idea has an author. Second, one does not have to be the author of the idea which is being conceived by the ego. Third, it is possible for an other, e.g. the demon or God, to author and implant a thought in another ego.[58] Fourth, if an idea is being conceived, the conceiver is either the author and recipient of the idea or just the recipient of the idea. Fifth, existence applies equally to being either an author-and-recipient of an idea or just being a recipient. Sixth, under these conditions, it is clear that being the author of a thought is not necessary to exist. Thus whether the ego acts as author and recipient or just the recipient, the ego exists. In this respect, the content of the thought and whether it is true or false, is inconsequential to the question of existence once it is established that an idea is conceived. By making "I exist, I am," the content of a conceived thought, Descartes creates his circle of self-evidence in appearance as a clear and distinct idea and in reality when tested by his highest level of doubt.

In the *Meditations*, Descartes deemphasizes the subjective act of thinking to emphasize the soundness of the thought itself, "*I am, I exist*." This is despite the importance that the subjective act of thinking plays in the self-evidence and test of doubt. Whether Descartes actively makes a judgment about the soundness of these thoughts or passively recognizes the truth of these claims is not clear. It is clear that Descartes focuses on two specific thoughts, "I am" and "I exist," rather than any thought because his aim is to show first-person being and existence cannot be doubted. Whether "am" and "exist" are interchangeable, or slightly different, is the next focus of our inquiry.

In the *Meditations*, Descartes claims both "I am" and "I exist," while in the CSM translation of the *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes only concludes that "I exist." Is Descartes being redundant when he states being and existence? Perhaps in one sense he is, which will be expanded in the following, and this could be why he drops "I am" in the later text.[59] Descartes' reflections for the rest of the "*Second Meditation*," after he cannot doubt his being and existence, pertain to what exactly exists when one references the ego under the restrictions that are established in his methodical doubt. Descartes transitions from "I am, I exist," to "What am I? What exists?"

[58] With assumption three, it looks like Descartes is distinguishing an active and passive aspect of thinking, depending on whether authorship is internal or external. Yet authorship of ideas is complicated by the fact that all pure ideas are innate to the soul. Descartes will credit God, not the demon, with supplying all innate ideas to the soul. As for ideas that are then authored by the soul, this would have to be ideas that are sensory and come about from the union of the soul to a body and the subsequent experiences. Descartes assumes a scholastic theory that one can only author an idea that is equivalent to or below the subject's level of formal reality. Descartes will use this assumption to argue that any finite soul could never be the author of an idea of infinity.

[59] Descartes might be redundant in including in the *Principles*, "*I am thinking*," since in the *Meditations*, it is assumed that the idea is thought in the present.

Descartes does not appear to make a clear distinction between being and existence at this point in the text. But in his second proof of God, a version of the ontological argument, Descartes argues that existence is an attribute of God. And as God is perfect, all characteristics are also perfect. For Descartes, a perfect existence implies out of necessity actual existence, lest the character of existence be limited. One challenge to Descartes is whether existence is the kind of thing that can be a predicate.[60] And a related challenge is whether the idea of something perfect could ever prove the existence of a referent to that idea. In this case, being is understood as essence. Thus, Descartes is uniting existence and essence. Most empiricists, as well as Kant, will argue essence excludes existence.

A brief linguistic analysis of the two verbs shows they have a wide array of definitions and grammatical functions. Basic familiarity with philosophy is enough to know being and existence are difficult, contentious, and fundamental concepts in philosophy. Descartes does not attempt to define these terms. These are basic concepts for him, which means all one has to do is conceive them in order to understand them.[61] If this is not satisfactory, it is helpful to consider the two ways that Descartes uses "to be" in the *Meditations*. In the first use, "I am," as well as "I exist," is unqualified. This suggests that "I am" is not being used to indicate predication. In this limited sense, there does not appear to be any difference between being and existence. "I am" and "I exist" seems to establish or recognize the ego as something.[62] Descartes next step is to answer the question, "What am I?" His answer is, "I am a thinking substance." Here, he is using being to link the ego to a predicate, which is the mode or property of a substance. Functioning as a linking verb in this particular use, being establishes a definition or set of essential and inessential characteristics. Thus, the first use of being and existence is recognition of existence without definition, but the second use of being is recognition and definition.

The subject pronoun, "I," refers to something without entirely defining it. For instance, first-person subject pronouns generally lack gender information, but they do indicate a particular subject that is speaking or conceiving the sentence. Thus "I am, I exist," does assume a subject due to the first-person verb and the first-person pronoun. The German philosopher-scientist-

[60] Perhaps a stronger argument for Descartes rests on the scholastic assumption that objective reality, the reality associated to a representation, can never be greater than the formal reality of the represented. In other words, substances have more reality than modes of substances because modes are dependent upon substances. With this premise, Descartes argues that only an infinite being could adequately think or conceive an infinite idea, the representation of infinity. Thus, Descartes sets up the idea of infinity as referencing back to a unique conceiver, just like the idea of "I am, I exist" references back to a specific thinking ego.

[61] One looks to Heidegger to find a similar position. Heidegger's central question in *Being and Time* is, "What is the meaning of Being?" His work towards answering this question is guided by a pre-ontological understanding of being. Both Descartes and Heidegger posit an original understanding of being that cannot be articulated, it is just part of our conceptual experience.

[62] Earlier, it was suggested something like a mirror-image might be a correlate to Descartes' certain beginning. For this to work, the mirror image, like in Lacanian theory, was a sensible self-referential encounter that established the existence of the symbolic ego and a referential structure. Perhaps, the language can be stripped down in Descartes to just the word "I." "I" operates as a self-referential signifier, which as a thought being conceived in the present, implies both thinking and existence. Could Descartes have merely thought "I" to begin his project?

anglophile[63] Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799), known for developing an early theory of thought-experiments[64] and the aphoristic author of *The Waste Books*, argues that Descartes has assumed too much in using the first person active voice and suggests the third person passive voice, "there is thinking," is a better beginning for the first principle. With this beginning, the self evident claim would be, "There is. There exists." Following Descartes, the next question would be, "What is? What exists?" And the answer would have to be, from the perspective of a substantialist, "A thinking thing." By adding more information to the sentence, a subject can be indicated for the passive voice verb-action, such as "there is thinking by me." But in this case, there is no subject explicitly indicated. There are two possible interpretations. Either Lichtenberg proposes that this first principle should leave the subject less determined, as something implied, but neither stated nor conceived. This position assumes all thinking is subjective. Or the more radical position, Lichtenberg could be proposing that thinking does not require a subject at all. This would mean there could be subject-free thinking, an action without an actor.

One criticism of removing the subject is that this would allow for valid claims that are not true.[65] Bernard Williams argues that if thought A and B are stripped of subjective reference, then they can be joined together through conjunction to form the valid inference "There is thinking A and B." In the case where thought A and B have never been thought by the same subject, Williams argues that this claim is false, when all the premises are true. His conclusion is that subjectivity is essential to thinking. Thinking must always be referenced to a subject or subjects. William's objection only applies to the first position that all thinking is subjective. Descartes also only considers the case that thinking is necessarily subjective. Descartes' project is descriptive. He describes the activity of his mind in conceiving ideas. Thus, Descartes would have to resist Lichtenberg on the grounds that the impersonal passive tense is not an accurate description of what he is doing, or finds himself doing. The unexplored option is that thinking can be stripped of subjectivity. Deleuze will argue it is Hume that finds a way to conceive experience without subjectivity by problematizing subjectivity.

Taking a step back, there seems to be three elements that one can isolate when conceiving "I am, I exist." There is the active subject as the "I am thinking." There is the moment of self reference when one states, "I." And there is the processing without subjectivity in "There is thinking." As rationalism and transcendental idealism assume a subject or transcendental subject, it will be only be a radical empiricism that explores the third element, experience without subjectivity. The third option is Deleuze's Hume.

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[63] R.J. Hollingdale, introduction to *The Wastes Books*, by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (New York: New York Review Books, 1990), xix.

[64] James Robert Brown and Yiftach Fehige, "Thought Experiments", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), edit. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/thought-experiment/>.

[65] Bernard Williams, *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 79-80.

The condition of the idea "*I am, I exist*," was explicitly stated in Descartes' final incarnation of his epistemological foundation in the *Principles*. In the *Meditations*, the condition was implicit in the epistemological foundation. There is an earlier expression of the first principle. The earliest published instance of Descartes' new attempt at the foundations of epistemology is in *Discourse on Method* (1637). In the Preface to the *Meditations*, Descartes makes a note about this earlier work:

> I briefly touched on the topics of God and the human mind in my *Discourse on the method of rightly conducting reason and seeking the truth in the sciences*, which was published in 1637. My purpose there was not to provide a full treatment, but merely to offer a sample, and learn from the views of my readers how I should handle these topics at a later date. The issues seemed to me of such great importance that I considered they ought to be dealt with more than once; and the route which I follow in explaining them is so untrodden and so remote from the normal way, that I thought it would not be helpful to give a full account of it in a book written in French and designed to be read by all and sundry, in case weaker intellects might believe that they ought to set out on the same path.[66]

From the quote, Descartes makes clear that he is not presenting the most detailed and complete version of his thoughts on the matter in *Discourse on Method*. Descartes' fear that the French language makes his thought accessible to those that might not be able to handle the complexities of philosophy seems to be unfounded as he authorized translations of the work into Latin to achieve the widest readership. If certain texts were only meant for the unschooled, why would he make them available to the elite? The quote shows that Descartes considered the *Discourse* to be a trial exposition of his philosophical methods, foundation, and autobiography. Yet the trial version is indistinguishable in the CSM translation from the version in the later *Principles*.

In what is very much a summary of the *First Mediation*, Descartes writes in *Discourse on Method*:

> I do not know whether I should tell you of the first mediations that I had there, for they are perhaps too metaphysical and uncommon for everyone's taste. And yet, to make it possible to judge whether the foundations I have chosen are firm enough, I am in a way obliged to speak of them. For a long time I had observed, as noted above, that in practical life it is sometimes necessary to act upon

[66] René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 6-7, original emphasis.

> opinions which one knows to be quite uncertain just as if they were indubitable. But since I now wished to devote myself solely to the search for truth, I thought it necessary to do the very opposite and reject as if absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt, in order to see if I was left believing anything that was entirely indubitable. Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I decided to suppose that nothing was such as they led us to imagine. And since there are men who make mistakes in reasoning, committing logical fallacies, concerning the simplest questions in geometry, and because I judged that I was as prone to error as anyone else, I rejected as unsound all the arguments I had previously taken as demonstrative proofs. Lastly, considering that the very thoughts we have while awake may also occur while we sleep without any of them being at that time true, I resolved to pretend that all the things that had ever entered my mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something. And observing that this truth '*I am thinking, therefore I exist'* was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.[67]

Again, the CSM translation uses "I am thinking" and "I exist" instead of "I think" and "I am." The original French phrasing is "*je pense, donc je suis.*"[68] The translators have opted to stress the progressive nature of the verb and a simple claim of existence. As stated earlier, this first incarnation is very close to the final Latin phrasing, "ego cogito, ergo sum" in *Principia Philosophiæ*. The transition that CSM makes from the verb "to be" to the verb "to exist" is an issue in the CSM translation. At this first point, Descartes does not define *what* exists. Perhaps CSM do not want the reader to interpret "I am" as an incomplete phrase that is lacking a predicate. But this translation decision also obscures the natural flow of Descartes' thought from "I am" to the question "I am what?" This transition from the assertion of bare, or undefined, ego existence to a defined existence is something that Deleuze focuses upon in Descartes.

Another important observation is that Descartes make a division between his practical life and philosophical life. Descartes observes that in practical life, one often has to commit to

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[67] René Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I*, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 126-7, original emphasis.

[68] René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, digital version, < http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13846/13846-h/13846-h.htm> accessed 05.27.15.

dubious beliefs. Perhaps due to time constraints, one must take decisive action using incomplete information. Descartes gives as an example, treating the dubious as indubitable. He thus presents practical life as self-deceptive or illusory. But in philosophy, Descartes observes that the opposite is true. Philosophy is a retreat, or reprieve, from action. In a state of reflection or meditation, the questions, doubts and rational testing can be taken to their limits. For Descartes, philosophy is the expulsion and banishment of fiction. Descartes divides his life into his practical life, where doubts must be ignored or embraced as certain, and his philosophical life, where doubts are never ignored and they destroy certainty. In the First Meditation, Descartes writes, "I know...that I cannot possible go too far in my distrustful attitude. This is because the task now in hand does not involve action but merely the acquisition of knowledge."[69] Descartes makes this statement just after cautiously considering the position that denies the existence of God. The discrepancy, or even contradiction, between living amongst these two regions, where in one Descartes embraces fiction and where in the other, he banishes it, is not usually held against Descartes. This lack of criticism may be because of Descartes' subsequent position and proofs that God exists. Yet, Descartes was criticized in his day of atheism and withheld publishing works due to the very real possibility of church trials and punishments. On the other hand, Hume makes a similar division between practical life and philosophical life, between a region without fiction and a region with fictions, and faces continued deep criticism over it in such a way that some argue it invalidates his philosophy. This will be explored at a later point.

Now that each version of the first principle has been addressed above, one can see that Descartes' strategy to reach self-evident certainty relies consistently upon abstraction, though he doesn't say this explicitly. Descartes' first principle starts with "*je pense*" in the *Discourse* and "*ego cogito*" in the *Principles*. Descartes' project would never reach an end point if he had to contend with every particular thought. From the beginning he takes particular examples of types of thinking to dismiss entire categories of thought, such as all thoughts involving sensation. Descartes' methodic and serial doubting involves inferences of abstraction and reduction that aim to reach a 'pure' thinking. In the *Meditations*, Descartes claims it does not matter what is thought, as long as thinking is established. In each instance, Descartes does not assert the thinking of any particular thought. Any particular thought can be doubted, even clear and distinct thoughts. Descartes needs a way to bypass the fact that any particular claim is dubitable. He does this by arguing that the dubious content of thought is irrelevant, all that matter is that the thinking itself is self-evident. Descartes generalizes "I am thinking this particular dubitable idea" to merely "I am thinking." Any particular thought is open to doubt, even that which appears clear and distinct, such as '1+1=2.' Any descriptive proposition that aims to represent the mind's activity in the present, the particular thinking of some particular thought, is suspect. Descartes escapes the skeptical trap that everything is dubitable through abstraction. What is dubitable is every *particular* thing. Rationalism presents a way to move from particular thoughts to thinking in general as the ground of knowledge. Even the thought that "I am thinking I exist," which

[69] René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 15.

might seem to be Descartes' self-evident principle, is problematic because according to Descartes any particular thought, regardless of what that particular thought is, could be a distortion perpetrated by the hypothetical evil demon. Thinking and existence is only established in the abstract. Descartes and rationalism must abandon all observation for a product of the understanding, the abstract generalization.

The transition from a series of particular thoughts to thinking in general appears to be a transition from the concrete to the ideal. It is beyond the scope of this work to consider the meaning of what Descartes calls the thinking substance. Descartes' ego appears to be between a transcendental ego, as one finds in Kant or Husserl, and a concrete and abstract ego. Using Deleuze's later work on cinema, one could say Descartes produces a concrete image of the abstract ego in motion by compiling and describing all different kinds of doubting. The movement-image of Descartes incessant and constantly evolving doubt is in the abstract an image of thinking itself. Part of the reason Descartes is a touchstone for all of modern philosophy is that his thinking exists between, and attempts to connect, essence and existence. As one closely inspects his writing, as we have done here, one finds openings to a deeper rationalism and empiricism.

In *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze interprets Descartes' "I think" in a novel way. Deleuze's interpretation occurs in the context of his project to truly think difference in itself. This difference is produced in the mind when reflecting on the repetition of the same. Opposed to a difference that is conceptualized in opposition to sameness and identity, difference in itself is an event of virtual multiplicity[70] that is differenciate-able into actual, determined identities. Deleuze interprets Descartes' "I think" as the differenciated instantiation, the fixing of that which is undifferenciated. Deleuze writes, "Descartes's Cogito operated with two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. The determination (I think) implies an undetermined existence (I am, because 'in order to think one must exist') – and determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks."[71] Deleuze reverses the order for Descartes. The "I am," which is always second in the first principle, is prior to the "I think." The "*ego cogito"* also transforms the "*ego sum*." Thinking determines the being to be a "thinking thing," or '*res cogitans*." Under Deleuze's intrepretation, contemplation is a radically transformative act.

Deleuze will counter Descartes' position with Kant's criticism. Kant argues one cannot go from the undetermined directly to the determined. Deleuze writes:

[70] In the entry on Deleuze in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, it states, "In his magnum opus *Difference and Repetition*, he tries to develop a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science—a metaphysics in which the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces essence and virtuality replaces possibility." [Daniel Smith and John Protevi, "Gilles Deleuze", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), edit. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/deleuze/>.]
[71] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 85.

> The entire Kantian critique amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination ('I think') obviously implies something undetermined ('I am'), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the '*I think*': 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the *being itself*, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'* Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination).[72]
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> * Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), "General Note on the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology," 382.

For Kant, the undetermined is not directly available to thought. Contemplation is limited to representation or appearance. Thinking cannot escape the phenomenal. Kant turns towards the conditions of appearance, the transcendental conditions of representation. These principles when synthesized form the categories of understanding necessary to construct ideal representative objects. The transcendental turn brings about Kant's Copernican revolution such that objects as they are in themselves must conform to the conditions of the understanding and sensibility in order to be represented as a phenomenon. It also places limits on what can be known.

With this in mind, two main questions of this project remain unanswered. What is empiricism for Deleuze? And what is transcendental empiricism for Deleuze? In relating Descartes to Kant, we have jumped over the important contributions of British Empiricism. This will be considered in the next chapter. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze connects the transcendental turn to his goal of conceiving difference in itself. Deleuze writes:

> This third value [the determinable] suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference – no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an *a priori* relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time...*[73]

[72] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 85-6, original emphasis.
[73] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 86, original emphasis.

* Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), "Analytic of Concepts," note to section 25, 169.

In order to understand the difference between transcendental difference and empirical difference, and its relation to time, we will need to consider Hume and his theory of associationism. Association is understood as principles of contraction, the activity of synthesis. It will be Hume that first forms a complete theory around this activity. In the conclusion, we will return to *Difference and Repetition*, and Deleuze's Humean distinction between the empirical and the transcendental.

Chapter 3 – British Empiricism

This chapter aims to present empiricism as a reaction to rationalism. Locke's novel issue of personal identity is reframed as responding to problems present in Descartes' indubitable foundation. The goal is to contextualize the radical theory of Hume's empiricism that Deleuze appropriates for his own philosophy.

3.1 Early Modern Philosophy and Empiricism

The label 'British Empiricism' was applied to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume not during their careers, but afterwards. In fact, the term 'empiricism' was not yet in use either. The British Empiricist traced their intellectual heritage in the early modern period back to Francis Bacon. Bacon was the first to successfully elaborate a method for studying natural philosophy that stressed a scientific method based on observation and experiments.

Another early proponent of empiricism was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes was not often publicly embraced by other thinkers due to the accusations of atheism against him and the consequences that fell upon any thinker deemed an atheist in this period. In the following, Hobbes provides an early modern account of an empiricist position. He writes:

> 2. If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of *it will be*, or, *it will not be*; or, *it has been*, or, *has not been*. All which is *opinion*...
> 3. No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but only, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.[74]

[74] Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan*. edit. J.C.A. Gaskin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), "Part I: Of Man, Chapter VII: Of the Ends, or Resolutions of Discourse," 42-3, original emphasis.

In opposition to Descartes, where knowledge about the world comes from clear and distinct ideas, Hobbes restricts facts about the world to sensation. The consequence of this position is that rationalists cannot claim any certainty, absolute knowledge, about facts of the world. Thus, each of the rationalist theories of substance, which for Hobbes are strictly discursive claims about what exists in the world, is relegated to opinion. Hobbes is also arguing that causality, in terms of knowledge of consequences or science, is always a conditional claim. It is necessary that sensation establish the fact of the cause and then the effect. Hobbes argues one cannot think their way into knowing the world, one must open the eyes and experience it. Hobbes takes the position that subjects are purely extensional. Mechanics explains causation and all human activity and change. Hobbes sets the empiricist's trajectory by using sensation as the foundation to epistemology and countering Descartes who beings with pure thinking and the immaterial soul.

The first section of the chapter is on Locke and explores his empirical response to Descartes' rationalism. Locke's attack on innate ideas and his intractable division between consciousness and substance form the beginning of a developing empirical alternative to and critique of rationalism. The next section on Berkeley addresses a trajectory in empirical thought to excise experientially unsupported concepts by attacking the assumption of objective substance. In the final section, Hume is presented as the apex of an empirical critique of rationalism. This section presents a short exposition of relevant positions in Hume's philosophy and his critique of what remains of the rationalist assumptions. This chapter sets up the next chapter where Deleuze's appropriation and development of Hume's empiricism is investigated.

3.2 John Locke

John Locke (1632-1704) creates the template that the subsequent British empiricists use to think about basic issues in epistemology, metaphysics, and ontology. Locke is the first early modern empiricist to define subjectivity entirely by consciousness of ideas and to develop a theory of how ideas emerge from sensation. This focus upon ideas stems from Descartes' meditation on thinking and the ego, as well as ideas and the epistemological standards of clearness and distinctness.[75] But Locke's empirical theory contrasts with Descartes and the

[75] "Locke adopted the Cartesian language of ideas to characterise our experience. That Descartes was the source for this aspect of Locke's thought is difficult to doubt. It was Descartes who first gave 'ideas' a central place in his account of knowledge, whereas others who were strong influences on Locke did not. Thus Francis Bacon scarcely uses the term, and Boyle similarly eschews it. Hobbes, too, though not an overt influence, but perhaps more influential than Locke cared to admit, made no epistemically central use of the term." [G.A.J. Rogers, "The Intellectual Setting and Aims of the *Essay*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding,"* edit. Lex Newman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15.]

rationalists that grounded subjectivity, the soul, and ideas in the concept of substance. Locke separates ideas from substances by taking ideas as emergent phenomena. He delineates a path from our original experience of the touching sensation and the impenetrability we feel when pressing against objects to the subsequent positive idea of solidity. Locke's theory of how ideas are acquired and formed through experience and not pre-given is part of his attack against innate ideas. The theory of innate ideas assumes that certain ideas are original to the mind, which is a central premise of rationalism. In line with empiricism and prior to Locke, Hobbes had argued that pure discourse using categories that refer to things in the world can only support a conditional statement about the world. Locke goes farther in establishing empiricism by arguing that any discourse on knowledge, the intuition and analysis of ideas, must first be founded on experience. Locke argues that the mind begins empty of ideas. Like Hobbes, this is an argument against the legitimacy of the early modern rationalist's foundational premises that pertained to facts, reality, and existence, which are based in large part on their respective innate ideas of substance. But where the rationalists have dismissed sensation as lacking certainty and universality, Locke is arguing that all human understanding about the world is necessarily derived from these sensations and based upon experience.

3.2.1 Fundamentals of Locke's Empiricism

Locke's claim that experience is the origin of all ideas that are about the external world, which are distinct from ideas that are about human consciousness itself, is a core proposition of early modern empiricism and guides the development of empirical theory. By turning to the grounds of individual experience, the modern thinker, whether empiricist or rationalist, individualized thought and protected against the imposed external authority of a dogmatism that plagued scholastic argument. In deriving all ideas about the external world from experience, Locke is claiming that experience of the world is produced, or supported, by the world. Thus, the ideas that compose consciousness are not the world itself. Substance and consciousness are divided. This division is also a key premise that motivates any phenomenology. The division is most obvious when ideas reference the material world. Though, Locke also proposes distinguishing between the idea and the substance that underlies the idea, whether it is immaterial, material, or some other kind of substance that constitutes ideas. Locke defines substance in the following: "The *Idea* then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that Support *Substantia*; which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain

English, *standing under*, or *upholding*."[76] Locke's definition of substance arises, as he says, from the limits of the imagination, in the sense that the imagination needs there to be something standing under the qualities that register as ideas in our consciousness. Locke understands substance as a supposition. The status of a supposition is hypothetical and means Locke must be open to considering and judging other possible hypotheses. But Locke also argues our idea of substance naturally arises in experience. He writes:

> §1. The Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple *Ideas*, conveyed in by the *Senses*, as they are found in exteriour things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple *Idea*, which indeed is a complication of many *Ideas* together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple *Ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose some *Substratum*, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call *Substance*.[77]

The empiricist must account for how ideas emerge, how they are acquired in consciousness. The *repeated* experience of the same qualities *together* motivates the idea of a *unity* of these qualities, which causes the idea of unity itself to arise as a separate object of consciousness and that unity to underlie and possess the reoccurring qualities. But in a move that also complicates the matter, Locke turns to the nature of language to suggest a similar development occurs. Locke argues that in language a single word can be used to point out many particulars and that it naturally arises after the fact of this repeated usage that the particulars grouped together in one word suggests a unity, which can be understood as an underlying general category, of which the particulars then partake and the word now references. If the common name is categorical in nature, a potential issue arises. One must ask why in the first place a single word is being used to point out various particulars about whether thinking within a categorical structure arises out of experience or is assumed before experience. If there is a reason beyond mere convenience, it suggests that the generality of the term is already assumed. If there is no pre-existing reason to use the same word, and it is chance that the same word is recycled, perhaps more likely to happen due to a child's limited vocabulary, then Locke may not have an issue. In summary, an issue in Locke is whether language, the way in which we communicate ideas, suggests the general or assumes the general.

[76] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edit. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press-Oxford, 1975), Book II, Chapter XXIII, §2, 296.
[77] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXIII, §1, 295.

Along the same lines of the division between the particular and the general, Locke posits the terms real and nominal to distinguish between substantial existence and the objects of human understanding that exist in consciousness. While substance is understood by Locke as having the power to produce ideas within the mind, the human understanding has the power to use acquired ideas to serve as generalizations and develop systems of classification in an effort to understand the world of which we are conscious. The nominal is the object of human understanding and exists solely within consciousness. It is signified and communicated through language. Thus while the relationship between words and ideas are arbitrary and culturally instituted, the relationship between a substance and the idea produced within consciousness is a necessary connection due to the essence of the substantial body and the receptive nature of sense organs. When Locke speaks of essence, that which makes something what it is, he speaks of both real and nominal essences. The real essence refers to the essence of the substance, which Locke determines to be the structure and content of the substance at its most basic level. Whereas the nominal essence is the determination by human understanding of what in our experience makes something be that particular thing or kind of thing. A nominal essence assumes there to be a system of classification already in place such that something fits into one category and not another. Surprisingly, Locke's empiricism begins with experience, but finds itself positing real essences that are outside experience. And the real essence, when is defined as the basic substantial structure and content of a body, is both determined to be both outside consciousness and yet emerges as the possible content of atomic and molecular sciences.

These issues of the access and limits to human understanding that arise in Locke's theory are cause for considering what motivated this theory that separates human understanding from real essence. Locke's empiricism posits a division between substantial existence and the systematic and representative consciousness. This division is motivated by Locke's attack on traditional Aristotelian form and the subsequent scholastic appropriation of Aristotle's theory. Locke is responding to the position that species' particulars are fully determined by the shared form that shapes matter. Aristotelian theory equates species, which is the general term, to form, which is the immaterial design that organizes matter and the human understanding when communicated to the soul. Locke is arguing that how humans understand the species to be, which is how Aristotelian form is understood, was confused with real essence, what something is outside human understanding by itself. This correction to Aristotelian theory is why Locke argues that substantial existence is always outside, underneath, and free of consciousness and the understanding. Locke ties the innate ideas of rationalism to Aristotelian form that fixes substance into species and thus argues ideas, whether they be innate or acquired, do not govern and determine real existence. These ideas exhibit how things are represented in the human understanding. Thus rationalism is attacked by Locke both in terms of innateness and the active nature of ideas as fixing substance. Locke's evidence of a problem in rationalism with respect to this active nature of ideas to determine existence is what he calls monsters. Monsters are particulars that contradict the specie's determined form. Locke argues that rationalists cannot explain monsters within their theory. Locke writes:

> The former of these opinions [that natural things partake in a certain number of essences], which supposes these *Essences*, as a certain number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural Things. The frequent Productions of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange Issues of humane Birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this *Hypothesis*: Since it is as impossible, that two Things, partaking exactly of the same real *Essence*, should have different Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the same real *Essence* of a Circle, should have different Properties.[78]

Locke uses the idea and observation of monsters and changelings to pick out particulars of a species that violate the accepted essential qualities that define what Locke will distinguish as the nominal species, the species as determined in the human understanding. [79] These exceptions require an explanation that goes beyond allowing for accepted accidental variation within a species. Locke is arguing that there is essential variation, which violates the definition of what it means to be an essence, to be un-variable. For Locke, the explanation requires distinguishing our understanding that applies a system of classification to what we observe from the actual constitution of substantial objects which is not governed or restricted by our consciousness. There is an unresolved issue in Locke on whether there are natural kinds and species that are determined by the real essence. Though, to posulate on a natural organization as the real organization of substantial bodies into a categorical hierarchy seems to assume there is a natural understanding at work, but any postulation of an understanding leads to all the same issues of division between idea and substance. And the problem with fixed essences is that they restrict change and Locke is attempting to postulate a theory were all change is possible. Thus for Locke, the forms in the understanding, essences determined from our experience, can be violated because these essences are only nominal and have no restrictive power over the real essences. And the real essence, for Locke, is only identical to a particular material arrangement in space and time and can change from moment to moment.

In a way Locke has taken Aristotelian form and split it into the existential form, the actual content and structure of a substantial body at a point in time, and the universal form of understanding, the categories used by human understanding to classify and organize our experience of bodies. Locke's theory produces an objective and subjective form, what a substance is and what a substance means to human understanding. Locke's theory points towards a substantial realism and a conscious idealism. The realism becomes materialism for one strain

[78] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Chapter III, §17, 418.
[79] Deleuze will pick up on the idea of monsters and that which violates the assumed pre-existing fixed forms. This will become a focus in his study of the paintings of Francis Bacon, whose portraits are often described as monstrous.

of empiricism, while the conscious idealism will become a subjective idealism for the next major British empiricist.

Locke develops his theory of experience and consciousness, the content of which is organized into our nominal system of the understanding, by distinguishing two types of sense, internal and external. Internal sense produces our experience of the workings of the mind, while external sense produces the experience of sensation. Experience and consciousness are interchangeable and are the awareness of ideas in the mind and the awareness of the awareness. Each sense is the reception of internal or external stimulation upon a passive mind that produces an idea. All the material of the understanding, which is actively divided and combined, comes from either external or internal sense experience. Locke distinguishes between secondary qualities like color, taste, and smell, and primary qualities like extension, solidity, and figure. The secondary qualities are the sensations, or ideas, produced within the mind by the power of the existent substance, ideas which are either simple or complex ideas. As products of the mind, secondary qualities are dependent on the mind to exist. Primary qualities arise as necessary consequences of secondary qualities, or one could say as underlying conditions for the secondary qualities. The primary qualities are independent of sensation, and thus are taken by Locke to exist independent of the observer's mind. Yet there is confusion in terms of whether there is an independent nominal object as there is an independent real object. Substance is generally defined as that which is independent of all qualities and thus only the bearer of qualities. But the nominal object, the object of consciousness, is both independent in that the idea itself underlies all different qualifications of ideas and yet ideas are also distinguished from the substantial independence that may underlie them. There is thus ideal independence of the nominal body and substantial independence of the substantial body. In Locke, the relationship between the nominal and the substantial is unresolved.

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities calls to mind Descartes' distinction between the sensible and essential properties of a physical object, which Descartes makes explicit in his example of the changing ball of wax. Yet, while Descartes claims an essence is a clear and distinct idea, Locke determines that primary qualities are hidden and obscure ideas that hide behind sensation. This conflict goes to the heart of the disagreement between rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism grounds knowledge about the world in the understanding and logic of pure ideas and empiricism grounds knowledge about the world in experience and chronology of experience. While the rationalist can attain certainty about the world if the pure ideas are taken to be true, the empiricist must always limit what can be known for certain.

Locke's method for attacking innate ideas is not a definitive proof that innate ideas contradict another core premise or that innate ideas are internally contradictory. Locke's argument is not for the impossibility of innate ideas. Instead Locke argues that if he can show a way by which ideas might emerge out of sensation, this would be enough to raise doubt on a theory that is taken by the rationalists to begin with indubitable and necessary ideas. One might

be further persuaded by Locke's empiricism on the grounds that it is simpler, one assumes less in the beginning, and it seems to mirror how human minds develop in complexity over time through experience, learning, and maturing. Though, the rationalist can still argue that ideas can be both innate and recalled through experience instead of generated through experience as the empiricist proposes. The theory of recollection, as a way of supporting the existence of innate ideas, is as old as Plato. Locke writes:

> §1. It is established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain *innate Principles*; some primary Notions, Κοιναί ἔννοιαι, Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles.[80]

This agenda commits empiricism to establishing a genetic account of the chronological emergence of the contents of the mind. The empiricist asks where ideas come from for the human understanding and how ideas are constituted in the understanding. Locke considers all content in the mind, including sensation, to be ideas. Descartes makes the same assertion. Rationalists provide a logical account that begins with certain pre-existing principles and notions about what exists and uses those ideas to construct further propositions that are logical consequences of the premises. The rationalist's certainty is guaranteed by the acceptance of the original notions as certain, unchanging, eternal premises, usually attributed to God. The rationalist's argument is universal and not relative like the empiricist to the human experience of the world. Locke starts with experience and then considers various hypotheses, the rationalist's 'hypothesis' and the empiricist's. In the quote above, Locke claims that knowledge arrived at empirically, within the empiricist's hypothesis, is just as certain as that in the rationalist's hypothesis. A rationalist will necessarily find this unacceptable, since as Descartes has argued, sensation by itself without a divine guarantee is subject to doubt.

Locke limits the human ability to attain certainty, which is the ability for humans to gain knowledge, to areas where the intended subject is human consciousness itself. Locke takes Descartes certainty of the thinking substance, *res cogitans*, and strips away substance leaving human thinking to be certain of human thinking and skeptical of substance. For Locke, moral science, which are the ideas within us of goods, evils, and the will, becomes the area where human understanding can attain certainty. As for physical sciences, which Locke calls natural

[80] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book I, Chapter II, §1, 48.

philosophy, one must rely on methods of observation and experiment to make educated guesses about the nature of physical substances and how to manipulate it for human benefit. Locke writes:

> §10. I deny not, but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be able to see farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one, that is a Stranger to them: But yet, as I have said, this is but Judgment and Opinion, not knowledge and Certainty. This *way* of getting, and *improving our knowledge in Substances only by Experience* and History, which is all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of *Mediocrity*, which we are in this world, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several Properties. Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.[81]

The empiricist's position of human mediocrity situates one in an in-between state, not completely blind, but far from achieving a perfect, apodictic, intuitive vision of the substantial world. Locke again argues that empiricism must take a skeptical epistemological position in regard to substances, while also proposing as a consolation that the utilitarian goals of gaining health and happiness can replace the unattainable end in itself of absolute truth. Thus, there is still good reason to pursue natural philosophy, and one can evaluate opinions and judgments on the nature of substance on pragmatic grounds. In the *Essay on Human Understanding*, Locke suggests that in a subsequent work he would elaborate upon his claims that ethics and morality are not ultimately valued as a means towards an end and that these fields can be known with apodictic certainty and reach a level of science, but he never writes this subsequent essay. Hume will challenge all sciences, particularly when he questions the legitimacy of cause and effect, thus questioning whether any science is possible and whether all we judge are opinions using ultimately pragmatic standards.

The above quote arises in the context of a discussion on the limits of knowledge with respect to extended substances, though the same issue will arise when concerning the nature of immaterial substances such as the soul or mind, if these immaterial substances exist. The possibility that immaterial substances exist is entertained by Locke. Since substance itself is a

[81] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Chapter XII, §10, 645.

hypothetical supposition, it could apply to various ontological possibilities. As a consequence, consciousness may not emerge solely from material substance.

Locke's work rests on a hypothesis of representation, which is the assumption that humans happen to be fitted with organs of representation, the sense organs. The composition and content of substantial bodies is represented in the mind in the simple and complex ideas that arise from them. Locke is making an early argument for phenomenology, that consciousness of the substantial world is imprisoned within representation and that representation itself is limited by our imperfect faculties, yet it lacks Kant's situating within the ego, or the transcendental ego, the principles of representation itself. Consciousness and a unified or connected experience of the objects of consciousness, which Locke refers to as the self or personal identity, are not substances. Though Locke does not explicitly state this, one could say he brackets substance to isolate the self.

In addition to positing the unavoidable veil between consciousness and substance, Locke's skepticism with respect to knowledge, truth, and certainty in natural philosophy is further motivated and supported by his denial of innate ideas. If the proposition that we already have innate knowledge of the external world and substance within the mind is true, then experience is no longer necessary for access to truth about substance. Subsequently, Locke characterizes the initial mind as a blank slate and all contents of consciousness, the ideas, as acquired. Capitalizing on the long-standing metaphor of the *tabula rasa*, the blank clay writing tablet, Locke emphasizes the causal structure of the senses and the passive nature of the mind for receiving stimuli that form ideas. Locke writes:

> §2. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From *Experience*: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about *external, sensible Objects*; *or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking*.[82]

One can see from this quote that for Locke there is nothing within the mind that is available to the understanding before experience provides ideas. The main challenge to this position is over the availability of content like logic and mathematics to the understanding. In regard to logic, Locke can argue that these principles arise from considering the operations of the mind itself.

[82] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter I, §2, 104.

Locke claims that in addition to external sense, there is internal sense, ideas generated upon the mind that reflect the operations of the mind itself and that these operations exhibit regularities that give rise to ideas of logical principles. For Locke, this would seem to account for the emergence of logical content in the mind. As for mathematics, Locke must argue mathematical abstractions and rules are generalizations of particulars. For instance, infinity emerges after the experience of repeated addition, an operation of the mind, upon a growing collection of particulars, which are first encountered in external sense. Thus, Locke and the empiricists have an answer to the claim that logic and pure mathematics are innate. Though, the disagreement between rationalists and empiricists is easily confused when one does not clarify the point of disagreement. The two sides agree that for a particular mind the ideas are thought within experience. They disagree over whether the ideas that are thought were already within the mind or are a product of experience and the actions of the mind. For Locke, the two sides do not disagree that the principles and concepts appear to be absolute, instead of relative to an individual's experience. Yet, for Locke, the mark of absoluteness is that we can imagine the idea in no other way, which raises the specter of relativism. While for the rationalist, the absolute nature of logic and mathematics is because these ideas are in fact absolute and intuited directly. Though, an empiricist such as Locke is not claiming that mathematics and logic only exist within the mind, just that they emerge as ideas within the mind due to experience, imagination and the understanding. As for ideas existing outside the mind, this is something the empiricist cannot speak about, to affirm or deny.

The nexus that connects experience and ideas is the subject. This is as true for Descartes as it is for Locke. Locke's mind is nothing, using the analogy of an empty page, until experience provides it with the stimulus to begin forming simple and complex ideas. Likewise the ideas that emerge that are not directly experienced internally or externally and yet appear as necessary conclusions are attributed by Locke to a limited imagination, such that one cannot imagine any other possibility. Thus, for Locke the idea of the Cartesian division between body and soul naturally arises in most people. Of the relation between these two ideas and the problem of interaction, Locke writes:

> §28. Another *Idea* we have of Body, is the power of *communication of motion by impulse*; and of our Souls, the power of *exciting of Motion by Thought*. These *Ideas*, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we *are equally in the dark*. For in the communication of Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or

> stop our Bodies by Thought; which we every moment find they do.[83]

Thus, one sees here that Locke is caught within a troubling skepticism and openly admits his ignorance. It is troubling because one is skeptical about the underlying nature of one of the most basic and familiar ideas and experience, which is the structure and causal action of subjectivity. We experience the idea of communication of motion from one body to another such that it appears something is transferred, as we also experience the idea of the excitation of body by thought, but we do not experience an idea of what exactly is communicated or how exactly thought excites bodies. And if we were to imagine what exactly is transferred and how it is transferred, there is not one and only one way that occurs to the thinker. For Locke, the problem of interaction that arises from Descartes' dualism, the issue of how the soul can be in a causal relationship with the body, is complicated by an ambiguity in Locke's use of the word "soul" as either immaterial substance or thinking and consciousness.[84] But regardless, the interaction itself is not available to experience and thus cannot be known. And while Descartes assumes that motion is transferred between material substances that are solely defined by extension in a purely mechanical way, Locke recognizes that experience fails to directly reveal the assumed mechanical transference of motion between any two material substances. Thus, Locke is skeptical with regard to understanding how any interaction, communication, or excitation between substances or thinking occurs, but not that there is interaction, communication, or excitation.[85]

Despite Locke's skepticism with respect to the workings of motion and its transference, he still posits a causal connection between the soul and body because experience gives rise to the idea of this connection. He refers to this connection as a vital union in chapter XXVII on "Identity and Diversity" in Book II of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. This

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[83] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXIII, §28, 311.

[84] Some of the confusion is resolved by Locke's use of the term self, which is not substantial, in lieu of soul. Some of the confusion remains because Locke leaves the door open that the self's substantial counterpart could be either an immaterial substance, which is the traditional notion of soul, or a material substance.

[85] The following quote repeats the same theme as before with respect to the limits of knowledge from within a thinking consciousness, but also adds new references to the idea of nature and hidden causes that will resonate with Hume's conception of nature. Locke writes: "§29 To conclude, Sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended Substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience assures us of the Existence of such Beings; and that the one hath a power to move Body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear Ideas, both of the one, and the other. But beyond these Ideas, as received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Causes, and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension, clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easie as the other; and there is no more difficulty, to conceive how a Substance we know not, should by thought set Body into motion, than how a Substance we know not, should by impulse set Body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover, wherein the Ideas belonging to Body consist, than those belonging to Spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple Ideas we receive from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which, the Mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would prie into the Nature and hidden Causes of those Ideas." [Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXIII, §29, 312.]

important chapter, which was not part of the first edition of the Essay, explores aspects of unity and diversity with respect to various entities that exist and are subject to change. Through the chapter, Locke considers plants (living bodies), animal bodies (capable of motion by internal force), machines (only capable of motion by external force) and humans. With humans, he distinguishes three levels of unity, that of substance, man, and person. At the level of substance, everything is identical with itself in terms of substantial structure and content at a particular time and place, but changes from moment to moment. Man is that which is continuous in the changing substance such that one can refer to that body. And person is synonymous with self or personal identity and is that which distinguishes a particular thinking consciousness that continuously experiences ideas, as opposed to the continuous bodily unit. In the following passage, Locke explores the relation between self and body.

> §11. That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touch'd, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our *selves*: *i.e.* of our thinking conscious *self*. Thus the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of *himself*: He sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himself*, any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the *Substance*, whereof *personal self* consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal *identity*: There being no Question about the same Person, though the Limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.[86]

The idea of a vital union between soul and body clearly mirrors Descartes' response to questions about how two distinct substances can interact. Descartes argues that interaction is possible because there is a union between body and soul. Descartes claims that this union is dissolved with death. In the above quote, Locke's empiricism leads him to drop the term soul and its substantial implications in order to speak of consciousness, which is thinking and ideas apart from any substantial matter, whether material or immaterial. Personhood, or subjectivity, is not a substance, but according to the ideas that arise from experience, it does unite with substantial bodies. Locke's point that the body can change without creating a new person is important for further establishing this non-substantial entity. Besides being distinct from substance, the person is wholly defined by an experience that is continuous and accumulative. The continuity allows identity to exist despite temporal change and the accumulative nature means that the person is not restricted only to the present, but carries along the past into the ever changing present.

[86] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXVII, §11, 336-7.

Locke further defines the self in terms of experience in two key ways that have the structure of reflexivity and intentionality. The first is awareness and self-awareness of the senses. The person senses something such that sensational ideas arise in the mind. At the same time the person is conscious that these ideas are present and that these ideas are possessed by the self. Locke writes:

> §9. This being premised to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls *self*: It not being considered in this case, whether the same *self* be continued in the same, or divers Substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal identity*, *i.e.* the sameness of a rational Being:...[87]

Thus, the accumulation of experience is doubled at each moment. The person experiences the content of sensation and the experience of that experience. The second way in which experience is doubled is the concern we experience in terms of feelings of pain and pleasure and the experience of the emotions as owned by subject. Locke writes, "§17. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that consciousness extends."[88] Locke has split sensation and passion, and Hume will capitalize on this distinction. The passions are related to care and concern, while sensation is related to representation. This split between representation and concern mirrors Hume's division between principles of association and principles of affect.

[87] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXVII, §9, 335.
[88] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXVII, §17, 341.

3.2.2 On Personal Identity

The clear opposition between empiricism and rationalism, something taken for granted in the history of philosophy, becomes blurred by positions shared by both sides as well as by internal differences within each camp that undermine a unified position. An examination of Locke's theory of the person placed in contrast to Descartes' theory of the ego is one way to bring back into focus the key difference between the philosophical methods that are connected to empiricism and rationalism. The issue of the ego and the person is central to Deleuze's understanding of Hume, empiricism, and early modern philosophy. Locke's theory of the person is similar to Descartes' theory when Locke speaks of a soul and a body. This matching of terms and Locke's contention that this division naturally occurs to the human understanding belies the underlying transition from rationalism to empiricism, and from the substantial ego to the psychological ego. If we take the premise "I think" to be an inference, Descartes' chosen ground begins with a rational deduction, which will be discussed below. Locke's chosen ground begins with the descriptive observation of experience, which is Locke's reporting of the ideas that emerge to partake in the developing continuum of a consciousness. What Descartes calls the ego, Locke calls the person. With both philosophers, their concern for the subject arises in the context of epistemological questions on the possibility and scope of knowledge about the world. This concern for knowledge arises in the context of a fractured Europe, the direct result of the Reformation. With respect to this epistemological concern, Locke's empiricism places trust in experience and this is juxtaposed against Descartes' rationalist trust in inference. For Descartes, what one knows for certain about the world is the result of inference. For Locke, what one knows about the world is through experience and limited to experience too. Yet Descartes methodological beginning starts with empirical reports of each particular doubt. And Locke immediately makes inferences from experience to the idea of substance, an idea which has no sensory correlate. Descartes' original reports of his experience lack certainty and Locke's subsequent inferences towards that which exists independent of experience lacks certainty. The divergence starts here and with subsequent empiricists widens till Hume threatens both empiricism and rationalism with his radical skepticism.

Locke's investigation of what it means to be a person reflects Aristotelian concerns. Locke asks what it means for a person to persist through change and this is similar to Aristotle's distinction between being, which remains the same, and becoming. In Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Chapter XXVII, titled "Identity and Diversity," is where the issue of self and personal identity is addressed. Locke writes:

> §9. This being premised to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is

> inseparable from thinking, as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls *self*: It not being considered in this case, whether the same *self* be continued in the same, or divers Substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal identity*, *i.e.* the sameness of a rational Being:...[89]

This is a different definition of the person than what we find with Descartes. Descartes reasons that a substance is defined by a single essence and different substances must have different essences. Soul is defined by thinking and body is defined by extension. Locke begins in an Aristotelian fashion by listing what is observed to be essential features among those entities that are commonly taken to be persons: rational, intelligible, thinking beings. But this definition of a person, or the ego, is not very different than Descartes' definition. Locke separates himself from rationalism by claiming the person is an entity of consciousness, which could be called the psychological ego. Descartes' ego is a substance and Locke's ego is consciousness. Locke doesn't deny substance, and in fact includes substance in his reflections, but substance is always oblique and hidden. Locke further distinguishes thinking from consciousness by arguing that it is consciousness that make a person different than other thinking animals. Ascribing thought to animals treads on sacrilegious ground in the early modern period, as only humans were believed by most of the faithful to have souls. Locke infers that animals think based upon observed animal behavior. Descartes argues that animals are entirely mechanical and it is only the human cogito that thinks, a separate substance that is united with material substance. All movement in extension is purely mechanical and, apart from any divine influence, can be explained by physics. Locke argues that what makes humans special is not thinking, for animals had the physical machinery of thinking, but consciousness. Consciousness as Locke explains in the above citation is closer to the contemporary sense of self-consciousness, an awareness of one's awareness. In some ways, Locke's idea of consciousness closely resembles Descartes first premise, "I think." Descartes' premise could have been less specific by claiming that "there is thinking." But instead, Descartes asserts the self-realization that one *is* thinking. But in the context of Descartes project and my interpretation, the "I think" is an abstraction, which is quite different than the accompanying self-awareness that Locke is describing. I will argue that Descartes first engages in particular thinking and then steps back to make inferences about the self in general. And Descartes particular thinking quickly become categorical as he tries to

[89] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXVII, §9, 335.

invoke and dismiss entire categories of thought. Locke is arguing that in the very experience of particular thinking, whether it is doubting or something more basic such as sensation, there is also a self-awareness that is also always present. The self for Locke is entirely psychological, without a physical component, the persistence of consciousness as the continuity of this parallel stream of awareness and self-awareness.

Locke is concerned with how one is able to identify that a person at one point is the same person at another point. This issue of change and persistence was addressed by Aristotle when he considers the difference between being (essence) and becoming (change). Identity appears trivial when all characteristics are the same, when a person at one point is compared to itself at the same point. This trivial case is captured in Leibniz's principle, the Identity of Indiscernibles, where identity is tied to indistinguishable predication. Leibniz is a younger contemporary of Locke. Leibniz's response to Locke's *Essay* was completed just as Locke died, which caused Leibniz to withhold publication since the intended target could no longer defend himself. For Leibniz, monads are created with full and infinite predication already established and determined. Leibniz's reflection on substance leads to the idea of the monad as infinitesimal, which means monads lack extension. Thus, predication alone can uniquely distinguish and identify each monad. Under these conditions, Leibniz avoids the difficulty of pursuing some underlying constant to establish identity. When an entity persists and its predication changes, establishing identity becomes more difficult. Identity is no longer the task of matching predicates, which is captured by the logical formula of the Identity of Indiscernibles: $\forall F(Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x=y$. One of Aristotle's answers for what remained constant despite change in physical objects was the material cause, the hypothesis of unformed matter or pure substance. Unformed matter stays constant as standing below the imposed designs when all other physical features are variable. Though, since unformed matter is never experienced as unformed, this proposal is only useful as a hypothesis for making change and identity possible. For living bodies, the additional supposition of an ambiguous vitality, something like breathe or a vital force, is presented as the constant among the wide array of changes that the living body undergoes. Locke cites these Aristotelian constants, but he also presents a uniquely empirical approach to the self.

Locke's reliance on experience over inference means that instead of relying on the Aristotelian metaphysical structure of form (eidos) and matter (hule), for which the two are never experienced in themselves separately, Locke relies solely upon observable evidence in experience. It is experience itself that Locke calls the self. His empiricist answer for establishing identity is the continuity of human experience and its continual reference back to the same "self." The continuity through the changes in time and place allows one to establish identity between two different moments and places. Locke applies this standard of continuity to different changing entities depending on what he is attempting to establish as an identity.

Table 1: Identity and diversity in Locke.

	Entity 1	**Entity 2**	**Entity 3**
Locke's Term of Reference	"Person"	"Man"	"Substance"
Type of Entity	Consciousness -Idea	Consciousness -Idea	Substance
Type of Essence	Nominal	Nominal	Real
The idea in which it is unified	Mind	Body	No idea that unifies; it is what it is outside consciousness– oblique collection of minute parts
Persists through time	Yes	Yes	No, Identical only to itself at a single point in time and space
Idea represents	Continuity of a consciousness	Continuity of a represented collection of corpuscles	Idea fails to represent any defined thing, beyond an oblique content and structure
Comparable to	Subject	Object	Object in itself

Locke identifies two other entities, or levels of reference, that are associated with the person. [See Table 1] One can refer to consciousness, pure substance, or a mixture of substance and consciousness as the conscious representation of substance. Consciousness persists as the self or person, independent of that which lies beneath consciousness. Pure substance is outside and beyond human consciousness and representation. It references what something is in itself, the real essence, instead of how it is represented in consciousness in ideas, nominal essence. Though for Locke, the notion arises that the real essence of this independent entity can be divided into minute parts, which is Locke's atomism or corpuscularism. At this level, there

is no persistence of a unity because there is nothing for consciousness to grasp, no categories or unifying ideas, for which a continuity can be represented. Everything dissolves into its minute parts. Thus pure substance is identical with itself only at the same time and same place. Any change in time, the minimum change possible, is an absolute change for substance. For Locke, persistence must have some element of consciousness for which categorical labels, a nominal essence, can naturally arise and identify designated units. It is questionable whether Locke meant substance could never have persistent unities, real kinds that unite the minute parts, or whether he meant to restrict his argument to human experience and consciousness and that a person can never assert with certainty any persistence of unities at the level of substance. The third category, the mix of consciousness and substance, is easily confused. This entity is an idea in human consciousness and not a substance. Yet the idea is a representation formed through human understanding applied to sensation. These ideas organize and collect sensation into a represented unity of secondary qualities and inferred primary qualities. Within experience, one forms the idea of the body as a representation of a unified substance. For Locke, a body is the idea of a unity of substance that performs some purposeful action. Bodies perform actions. The difference between a living animal body and an artificial body like a machine is the source of movement. In the living body, there is an internal source that can initiate movement, while for machines or non-living bodies, the source of movement is only external. Locke notes that the body can change, one can lose fingers, and this will not affect the continuity of the person. The mechanical nature of all bodies means the human body is not anything that uniquely identifies the human person. This was true for Descartes and represented a growing modern perspective about extended things that departed from Aristotelian theories. For Aristotle, the soul was the form of the body, and body was the matter of the soul. They were necessarily united and only divisible in thought. Descartes argues that the essence of the material world is purely extension, which is entirely separate from thought. Thus the world is doubled, and form and matter are doubled also. Extended matter has form through its material structure and is subject to the laws of physics as they are found.[90] For Descartes, without a soul, humans are just machines like other animals. Though possible, Locke is neutral on the actuality of two substances. Descartes' substantial souls are not directly present to experience as a substance. For Locke, if there is a second substance, or a mix of substances, that underlies consciousness, it is only a guess. Though Locke does assert there must be at least one substance underneath consciousness. The one thing evident to Locke that makes humans unique is consciousness. It is experience itself as the continuity of a stream of consciousness, self-consciousness, and its attending faculties that defines the person. Thus empiricism[91], a theory that begins with experience, is for Locke a theory that also begins with

[90] Extension was also subject to the will of the soul when it was united with a soul.

[91] Empiricism has a subjective and objective interpretation. On the objective side, empiricism is associated with experimental methods and science. I am suggesting here that we focus on the subjective side, which takes experience to be subjectivity itself. The etymology of experience includes both the Greek *empeiria*, which means "experience," and a deeper root, *peira*, which means "trial and experiment." ["empiric," *Dictionary.com Unabridged*, Random House, Inc., May 23, 2015, < http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/empiric>.] When thinking of empiricism as experience and turning to Locke's definition that a person is experience, it is a simple step to make a substitution and identify empiricism as a theory founded in the person and subjectivity.

personhood and subjectivity. The issue of subjectivity will be Deleuze's main concern when he turns to Hume and empiricism.

Locke defines the self or person in terms of consciousness which he argues accompanies all thinking or experience. That we both think something and know that we are thinking something gives experience a structure of intentionality and reflexivity. This means the blank slate of the mind is given both ideas of sensation and an idea of the self in experience. Locke considers consciousness in two ways, which will appear to influence Hume. The first is awareness and self-awareness of the senses. The person senses something such that sensational ideas arise in the mind. At the same time the person is conscious that these ideas are present and that these ideas are possessed by, or associated to, the self. The second way in which experience is doubled is through concern. Concern is experienced in feelings of pain and pleasure, but at the same time we experience the emotions as owned by the self, we know that this is my concern. Locke writes, "§17. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that consciousness extends."[92] Concern captures our experience of the passions. These emotions contribute in determining the will[93] and lead to the arising of general notions of happiness and the good and misery and the bad, which bring about the idea of moral influence upon the determination of the will. Concern also contains within itself movement in two directions. There is a contraction back to the self, which is a single continuous consciousness, but also an extension of what the self is concerned with and closely associated to that extends out to the body, the family, and all that concerns the consciousness. Locke has split sensibility and passion and Hume will capitalize on this distinction when he theorizes about the principle of association and the principle of the passions.

3.3 George Berkeley

George Berkeley makes a criticism of Locke's empirical theory and offers an alternative in its place. He presents himself as a weaker thinker than others, one that has not written on such a wide array of issues, and likens himself to someone that is short-sighted. Yet, he plays this

[92] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXVII, §17, 341.
[93] Locke's covers the will in Book II Chapter XXI. The assertion of free will in Locke's work is controversial. One distinction that Locke makes is to distinguish voluntary action from involuntary action. Voluntary actions appear to be acts where the self had the power to initiate and terminate the activity. But these voluntary acts are also determined by other factors that influence whether one will initiate or terminate one activity over another. There is the danger in Locke of an infinite regress of wills as well as a breakdown in the distinction between what is voluntary and what is involuntary.

weakness as a strength in that by being forced to hold everything close to his face, he might see something that "better eyes"[94] have overlooked. Berkeley locates the source of error, with Locke in particular, in unnecessary and superfluous assumptions. Berkeley writes, "And surely it is a work well deserving our pains, to make a strict inquiry concerning the first principles of human knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides: especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided."[95] Berkeley continues on to attack the principle of material substance, matter. Alongside his attack on matter, Berkeley argues for a metaphysics that posits only subjects and ideas. As we will see in the next section, this negative criticism and positive theory represent a bridge between Locke and Hume in the history of British Empiricism.

3.3.1 Critique of Locke

Though Berkeley is an empiricist when it comes to knowledge about the world, he gives an *a priori* argument against the concept of material substance. He argues that there is an unavoidable contradiction in trying to formulate an idea of material substance. Berkeley challenges his opponents, mainly Lockean materialists, "[I]f you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or in general, for any one idea or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind conceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause"[96] Berkeley argues that the idea of matter is that which exists independent of thought, in other words, that which is not an idea in any way. The exclusivity of this distinction means that matter cannot become thought. Thus, if matter is inconceivable, it is a contradiction to then conceive it. Thus, whenever someone presents the concept matter, they have in fact just presented a definitional, or *a priori*, contradiction.

The problem remains for Berkeley that just because something is inconceivable does not necessarily entail that it does not exist. Berkeley has two responses to this situation. His first response is to raise the specter of skepticism. If something exists that we cannot conceive, and since this is a priori determination it is something that we can *never* conceive, then we are destined for absolute skepticism with regard to it. In fact, who is to say there isn't an infinite number of substances in the world that are inconceivable to human perception by definition and thus forever unknowable. Berkeley presents the prospect of skepticism as the ultimate problem for epistemology and more like a disease that can spread to other areas such as faith. Descartes

[94] George Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, edit. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 38.
[95] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 38.
[96] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 60.

set the goal of modernity as finding certainty and establishing a body of knowledge. In this context, skepticism is utter defeat.

Berkeley's second response to the case, that if matter exists, it is unknowable, is to assume that matter exists and then ask what this assumption solves. Berkeley writes, "as for all that compages of external bodies which you [materialists] contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist."[97] Berkeley deploys a strategy for judging the idea of matter in terms of its pragmatic value. Does assuming that matter exists help to explain anything about the world? There are also two responses to this question. The first is the Cartesian response. Descartes assumes a substance dualism between thought and extension. He is challenged on how it is possible for two entirely distinct substances to interact. The problem of interaction is an issue for any dualism. Descartes' response was that there is union of thought and extension, of soul and body, which is physically located in the approximate center of the brain at the pineal gland. The 'union' solution did not exactly quiet all the protests for the question remained of how a union was possible. Berkeley writes, "[F]or though we give the materialist their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind."[98] Thus, Berkeley claims positing matter causes us more problems. This does not disprove the existence of matter, but disinclines one towards taking this position.

The second response to assuming the existence of matter, despite matter being inconceivable, is to consider Locke's position. Locke describes the idea of substance as emerging to the mind from the imagination in order to posit something that lies beneath and unites all the different primary and secondary qualities into one object. As his imagination can offer no other way to unite the distinct qualities, he assumes that there subsists a unity below the ideal level of qualities both directly and indirectly experienced. Thus, substance has a value for Locke, it is that which connects, unites, glues together qualities, as well as being the unified source of those qualities. As a source of the qualities, of course Locke runs into something similar to the Cartesian problem, how does matter interact with consciousness? As for the unity that an underlying substance provides, Berkeley questions whether this is in fact necessary. In fact, Berkeley argues that perceptions of particular objects stick together within perception and there is no need to look outside for a material glue. The picking apart of perceptions, ideas of particular things, into distinct aspects that are considered categories in themselves is called abstraction. Berkeley writes:"To be plain, I admit myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet, it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should

[97] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 60-1.
[98] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 59.

exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid."[99] Berkeley allows for abstraction when the idea being abstracted can exist on its own. For instance, a hat can be separated into brim and cap. Thus when one sees a hat, the idea of a hat, one could abstract to the idea of the brim and the idea of the cap, or the idea of the qualities for shielding the eyes from the sun and shielding the scalp from the sun. But Berkeley argues certain qualities cannot be extracted from each other such as shape or color of a toy train. Every conception of a toy train is in fact particular, though there are many shapes and colors that a toy train may take, in order to conceive it, one must conceive it with a particular shape and color. Berkeley infers from this that though he may be able to abstract in the sense of breaking apart an idea of something into free-standing parts, there are no such things as pure abstract ideas, that is universal concepts that lack all particularization. With Berkeley's argument against abstract ideas, he then can argue that perceptions hold together on their own and do not need something beneath to guarantee unity and identity persisting through qualitative changes. Thus, Berkeley can argue that matter is not needed to explain the unity and connection among qualities, since conception itself requires them to be one.

To be fair, Locke never asserts that one can conceive an image of a universal. It would be foolish to think there is an image of a triangle that is equilateral, isosceles, and scalene all at once. Locke argues that a particular image comes to stand as itself and also a symbol of the idea of an abstract triangle. And the symbol is meant to signify what is similar among many different triangles. The particular symbol that is chosen is arbitrary. Thus for Locke, abstract ideas have no particular conception, but rather a symbolic conception. Though, Berkeley's argument about the limits to perception of particulars and his argument that the conceptual unity can be accounted for within perception itself is compelling and challenges the necessity of positing a substance.

In summary, Berkeley does not prove that matter does not exist. But he does make compelling arguments that matter, if it exists as independent from ideas, is unknowable and raises difficult questions about dualistic interaction. Berkeley holds Locke to the empiricist premise that the world can only be known through experience. And by this premise, Locke's face a serious challenge over his commitment to substance. Locke had no empirical evidence for believing in matter. He assumes there to be something in the world that he cannot perceived or experienced. So, if one assumes as Berkeley does that there is no matter, what metaphysical and epistemological positions does this position support?

3.3.2 Subjective Idealism

[99] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 41.

Berkeley's positive theory is based upon his metaphysics of immaterialism that there is no matter. But this is a negative conception. The positive conception begins by describing the things of experience as constituted by a collection of ideas. Thus what some commonly refer to as things, are in fact perceptions, ideas, or collections of ideas. In addition, Berkeley writes: "[B]esides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call *mind, spirit, soul,* or *my self*."[100] Thus, Berkeley begins with perceptions and a perceiver.

Though, there is a potential problem with Berkeley's justification, which appears to rest on common sense. Berkeley writes, "It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways."[101] This parallels Descartes discourse of good will and common sense, which Deleuze criticizes.[102] Ironically, a criticism of Berkeley is that his subjective idealism, or immaterialism, defies common sense. People commonly do not believe they are seeing ideas, but objects. Thus, common sense is used to both support and critique his work.

Without matter, Berkeley argues that only perception and the perceiver exists. This means that for an object to exist, it must be perceived, because only ideas of objects exist. Berkeley's famous equation is in the following sentence. "Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."[103] Thus the world is just ideas, and for an idea to exist, it must be actively perceived. Being and perception imply each other. Berkeley combines empiricism with idealism.

One common question is if everything is an idea, how does one tell the difference between what is real and what is imaginary. In one sense, the real and the imaginary are equal since they are both perceived ideas, and by Berkeley's argument, this equally implies conceptual existence. But Berkeley distinguishes between different kinds of ideas in two ways. In one distinction, he draws on the Cartesian principle of authorship to distinguish ideas that he can generate, manipulate, and terminate and those that he cannot. Of those that Berkeley does not control, he infers that there must be another author. Berkeley writes: "But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose

[100] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 53, original emphasis.
[101] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 53.
[102] See Chapter 2, End of Section 2.2.1.
[103] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 54, original emphasis.

whether I shall see or not, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them."[104] These ideas which are beyond the control of the perceiver are the ideas that will be considered real. Something is real if when it is perceived, the perceiver has not the ability to manipulate the idea.

A second way that Berkeley distinguishes ideas is by their character. Berkeley writes: "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author."[105] The strength and liveliness of ideas of sense also distinguish them as real. Hume will also use this distinction when distinguishing between *sense impressions* and the imagination, but not to determine what is real. Berkeley also is arguing that the greater strength, liveliness, and detail of the sense also correspond to a greater will that is authoring the ideas. Furthermore, Berkeley argues that the consistent repetition of sensory ideas, which are being willed by their author, gives the perceiver the notion that these real objects are law–governed. Through empirical observation, Berkeley argues, one can learn these *laws of nature*, which are the will of the author of these consistently repetitive ideas.

Another question that is asked of Berkeley is that if real things as merely ideas only exist when being perceived, are they annihilated when no human currently perceives them? It would seem odd for ideas of real things to come in and out existence. Berkeley proposes that there must be a will that not only authors the ideas of real things, but also continually perceives each of them. Berkeley believes that such an author that has the power to create these ideas, to will them in a perfectly ordered way, and to perceive them all at once and for as long as they are existing, must be an infinite and perfect will. For Berkeley, this, of course, is God.

A final question is if Berkeley denies material substance, does he also deny spiritual, or thinking, substance? This is addressed in the 'Third Dialogue' of the *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. Hylas asks Philomenous, who represents Berkeley in the dialogues, "[Y]ou acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no idea of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit matter or reject spirit. What say you to this?"[106] Berkeley can have no idea of spirit because as a substance, it is independent of ideas, which are all dependent upon being perceived. Philonous responds that "it is no repugnancy to say, that a perceiving thing should be the subject

[104] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 63.
[105] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 63.
[106] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 180.

of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them."[107] So Berkeley denies material substance, but posits a spiritual substance. His defense of what seems like a conflicting position is Cartesian. Berkeley argues that he has "immediate evidence" of spiritual substance. This evidence is the Cartesian self-evidence that "I am thinking," therefore "I am, I exist" and thus "I am a thinking thing." As for the existence of other spiritual substances, other spirits, Berkeley admits he has neither immediate evidence nor demonstrative proof, but since he has proven the existence of one spirit, he argues that if he finds signs of other spirits, he can argue that they probably exist. And the more signs he see of other ideas appearing to have their own ideas, the more probably that these are in fact spirits like he is.

Berkeley's position that there is spiritual substance and it is known by human understanding will be challenged by Hume. And just as Berkeley challenges Locke on empirical grounds, Hume will also challenge Berkeley using empiricism.

3.4 David Hume

David Hume (1711-1776) was a controversial figure in philosophy. After being accused of atheism, he was denied an academic post and spent his career outside the academy. He did visit Paris, the center of intellectual activity on the continent and was a celebrated guest of the salons. For a period, Hume even hosted Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788) in England, until there was a falling out. Rousseau was fleeing rather serious reaction to his work from governmental, religious, and perhaps vigilante forces. Hume's first major work, *Treatise on Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects* (1739-40), was not well received. In 1748, Hume published *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, a shorter, reworked, version of 'Book I' of the *Treatise*. His work went on to be widely distributed and read throughout Europe for his innovations and radical conclusions within empiricism. The second revised text omitted the section on personal identity, which is Deleuze's key to understanding empiricism. Hume's conclusions on subjectivity are radical and perhaps burying this section helped lead to wider readership and public acceptance. The following will summarize and cite the major distinctions and principles that Hume relies on in his work and the consequences of holding them, particularly in relation to subjectivity, but also to causality and material substance.

[107] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, 180.

3.4.1 Hume's 'Introduction' to *A Treatise of Human Nature*

Hume reveals much of his program in the 'Introduction' to the *Treatise* and begins with a criticism of his predecessors. He claims that their philosophical systems all rest on weak foundations. He writes, "'Tis easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning."[108] Note that he is not criticizing their reasoning, but rather their principle premises that go unsupported. Descartes' great search is to find a principle that is self-evident, a certain foundation. But Hume is specifically targeting Locke and Berkeley. The irony of this criticism is that Hume challenges his own foundations and raises at points the flag of skepticism.

As an empiricist, Hume will begin with experience in the present tense.[109] Hume argues that it is human experience that grounds all other disciplines, for every discipline must be thought, perceived, studied through experience. This may sound as if human nature is a lens[110] through which Descartes undefined "I" peers. Rather, experience should be understood as the medium through which all other sciences are engaged and constituted. Hume proposes a science of human nature to understand the anatomy of experience and describe its operation. He writes, "'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics*, *Natural Philosophy*, *and Natural Religion*, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties."[111] According to Hume, the sciences closest to human nature are Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics. With an understanding of human nature, Hume argues we will gain insight into how the ideas within each science emerge and under what conditions or limits we should understand them. Hume writes, "And as the science of man is the only foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give this science itself must be laid on experience and observation."[112] The science of human nature, or human experience, is itself only accessible to us through experience. We will study experience through experience. Thus, we have again a similar situation to Descartes. For Descartes, his first principle must give its own support or evidence. For Hume, experience does not give its self-evidence, but it must give its constitution. This can be interpreted as a shift from epistemology, Descartes' enterprise, to psychology, the constitution of beliefs within a psyche. Yet this obscures the fact that Hume is still interested in the question of knowledge and how human nature impacts both

[108] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*, trans. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1896), Introduction, xvii.
[109] This should echo Descartes' beginning with thinking, or doubting, in the present tense. Yet while Descartes' beginning is to find within thought that certain, self-evident principle, Hume questions thinking and thought in order to distinguish its constitutive elements and, to use an anachronistic term, evolving nature.
[110] Perhaps ground by Spinoza.
[111] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, xix, original emphasis.
[112] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, xx.

the belief in knowledge, the truth status of truth-claims, and the possibility of knowledge. Consequently, Hume practices both epistemology and psychology simultaneously. He makes them inseparable.

In fact, Hume makes the science of human nature an inseparable part of any science. For this reason, Hume believes his work is the most important task of intellectual labor. Hume writes, "Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation."[113] Here, Hume is referencing the work of Isaac Newton (1642-1727). It is the work of Hume that will help humanity properly frame the advances Newton makes in natural philosophy, for instance, Newton's discovery of the principles of motion. But just as Hume distinguishes himself from Newton, he is also connecting himself to Newton's already established success. It is Newton that has demonstrated the achievements of experimental methods and observations. Hume will co-opt such principles as assuming nothing before extended observations. This is Newton's famous Latin phrase, *hypotheses non fingo*, from *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687). The pretensions that Hume critiques at the beginning are the same as Newton's hypotheses. They are both unproven claims.

Yet one might distinguish between hypotheses that arise after observation to hypotheses assumed before observation. Hume does not think we should abandon any attempt to study, investigate, propose, and imagine possible first principles. Hume writes, "For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations."[114] Hume's empiricism does not ban hypotheses, but instead presents a series of rules for how and when to propose or imagine them. Hume argues that whatever we experience in relation to mind or external bodies are ideas. Thus to form a hypothesis, we must perceive these ideas as effects of something hidden, the essence of the idea, which is responsible for producing the idea. Thus to form a hypothesis at all, we must come to see the ideas of experiences as effects. A science of human nature will have to consider how our ideas become infused with a belief in causality such that these ideas are conceived, or better yet – felt, as effects of causes. Hume will find problems with causality and inductive reasoning which threatens to undermine the very basis of any rational system, even the heart of science, the science of human nature. For some, this is the specter of skepticism. If a science of human nature is the study of the principles of human nature. And principles are causes. And causality is unjustified. Then the very concept of the science of human nature cannot be justified. Though, Hume and his philosophy can also be understood as a series of phases. If the primary phase is radical skepticism, the secondary phase, which is the science of human nature, is post-

[113] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, xxi.
[114] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, xxi.

skepticism.[115] There will have to be life after skepticism. At some level, this post-skepticism will have to accept, or incorporate and recognize, the constitutive role of the imagination in the science of human nature.

Hume will place limits on what can be claimed about the first principles. First, and foremost, they can never become more than just a hypothesis. Hume writes, "And tho' we must endeavor to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical."[116] Thus, Hume condemns all philosophy and science to be speculative in nature. By Hume's arguments, Descartes' quest for knowledge based on self-evident first principles is doomed. In contrast to Descartes, Hume initiates an era of speculative knowledge, or speculative science. Yet, there are still rules for practicing a reasoned speculation. Since speculation is not justified, Hume argues we should speculate as little as possible. The principles that we hypothesis should have the most general of characters in order to explain the widest range of effects possible. In the *Treatise*, there are two speculative principles of human nature, the principle of association and the principle of passions.

One might recognize that the position of post-skepticism has precedence in Western Philosophy. Hume writes, "And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles."[117] It was none other than Socrates in the Platonic Dialogues that professed his ignorance to his interlocutors. Yet this ignorance, motivated Socrates to incessant dialogue and inquiry, and by the prophets of the Delphi, he was determined to be the wisest man of what we call Ancient Greece. And so Plato showed that a particular type of ignorance, or a particular response to ignorance, which we call Socratic ignorance, was in fact wisdom. [118] This raises the question of what is the meaning of wisdom and knowledge and what is the difference between wisdom and knowledge, something that will be left unanswered. One more thing to note is that science never reaches any closure. Its principles are always open to future revision or rejection.

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[115] For an introduction to the concept of post-skepticism, see: David Fate Norton, "An Introduction to Hume's Thought," *The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Second Edition*, edit. David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-39.
[116] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, xxi.
[117] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, xxii.
[118] For the connection between Hume and Plato, see: Bernard Freydberg, *David Hume: Platonic Philosopher, Continental Ancestor* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012).

3.4.2 Observation and Experiment

Before hypotheses are made, and philosophy takes on a speculative character, Hume's project is descriptive. He asks us to make basic distinctions about our perceptual experiences from our observations and experiments. These distinctions are empirical in the sense that they are established and justified by one's experience. There are two main distinctions he makes. The first seems to follow Locke, in that there are complex and simple perceptions and that the complex perceptions are composed of simple perceptions. Yet, there is a difference. Hume perceives from the top down, from complex to simple. For Hume one can perceptually divide a complex perception and continue isolating divisions of that perception until one reaches a point where one can perceive no parts, and this is a simple perception. This forms Hume's theory of atomism. Deleuze's response to critiques of atomism is addressed in the following chapter. Of note for now is that Hume does not argue that the experiences he lives each day begin by experiencing simple perceptions that are subsequently associated together. As part of Hume's descriptive beginning, he observes that we can atomize our perceptions that arrive whole in experience, and in the process lose all structuring of that perception. Hume will speculate on how atomization is reversed, how the parts can become a whole, a pattern again. Hume observes that in conceiving a simple atom of experience, there is nothing within that atom that implicates it into any larger whole. Since there are complex perceptions, it must be the case that these simple atoms can be united, or be related, to form larger wholes. Hume argues that these associations must be established from something outside the simple content of perception. This is his first hypothesis, that there are operative principles of association that connect our perceptions. Deleuze will refer to this as Hume's associationism and atomism, dualistic theories of structure and content, of synthesis and analysis.

Hume second major distinction is based upon the experience or feeling of force in a perception, particularly the strength or faintness of the feeling. This observation follows Berkeley's distinction between ideas of real objects and ideas of illusory or imagined objects. Berkeley claimed that ideas of real objects showed certain characteristics. First, the ideas were not subject to the will of the perceiver to manipulate them in any way. Second, these ideas were especially detailed and distinct. And third, the ideas had more force or strength to them. Hume capitalized on this last feature – the strength or force of a perception – to make a primary distinction between two types of perceptions. Hume called the more forceful perceptions, impressions, and the less forceful, ideas. He writes:

> We may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated *Thoughts* or *Ideas*. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a

> general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom and call them *Impressions*; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.[119]

Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas, which are considered a Humean invention, follows Berkeley's distinction between the real and imagined quite closely. Both will equate existence with perception. Hume writes, "[*A*]*ll our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*."[120] Where they first part is that Hume will argue against Berkeley's theory that persistence is guaranteed by the continuous perceiving by God of what the subject will perceive as real objects. This difference arises because Hume does not assume there is a subject, God or human, that manifests the intensity of the percept. Hume will propose as a hypothesis that instincts, which over time come to be seen as principles of nature and human nature, constitute, select, and associate the content of the mind. A second parting between Berkeley and Hume is over the concept of the real. While Berkeley associates the real with an intense and detailed existence that is independent of the human subject's perceiving, Hume proposes that reality is a belief based on feelings of intensity associated with a percept. Thus, impressions as the given are not real, but as highly intense contents of the mind, they come to be believed as being real, in relation to less intense contents of the mind.

Besides tying force to belief, Hume observed that the less forceful ideas were often the same perception, just less forceful. One could distinguish between an idea of Malebranche and an impression of Malenbranche by the force and vividness of the perception. One could also distinguish the two temporally, one could not recall the memory of an image until one first had the impression of that image. As well, ideas were subject to and manipulated by the will, but impressions were involuntary. Hume concluded that ideas are copies of impressions. Simple ideas were defined as copies of simple impressions, and complex ideas could be divided into simple ideas that were again copies of simple impressions. That impressions preceded ideas followed the traditional empirical position that ideas are not innate, ideas are a product of experience. Commonly called the copy principle, Hume faced serious challenges to its postulation. One potential way to discredit the copy principle was to demonstrate that there was at least one idea about the perceived world that was not derived from a simple impression. This would prove by example that not all ideas were copies of impressions. Deleuze's consideration

[119] David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, edit. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Section II – "Of the Origin of Ideas," 18.
[120] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Appendix, 636.

of this possibility will be considered in the next chapter where he responds to Hume's own example of the missing shade of blue. At issue in the shade of blue problem is that this idea has a correlated impression, but is thought before that impression is part of experience. There are many ideas that lack a derivation to impressions. Subsequent empiricists, such as the Logical Positivist, took it upon themselves to point out all ideas that could not be derived from impressions and then argue these ideas are meaningless. It is apparent though that Hume understood the role of the science of human nature as deriving reasonable explanations for how exactly these ideas arose in the first place. As well, Hume's hypotheses are posited to help explain experience, but have themselves no direct derivation to impressions. There is no impression of an instinct. The copy principle, which makes ideas subsequent to impressions, is a way to argue that everything we know or, as Hume will argue, believe, arises out of experience. What will become evident in the concluding chapter of this work is that the temporality of impressions and ideas is the essential difference. Ideas are imbedded in a history, they span across time, while impressions have a temporality of the isolated present, the immediate now. Deleuze will only come to explicitly address this distinction in *Difference and Repetition*.

One must make a distinction between belief, hypotheses, and logical deductions. For Hume, a hypothesis is not necessarily a belief. In fact, it can go against our beliefs. A hypothesis is a speculation, based on observation and experiment. Hypotheses are proposed and evaluated in the science of nature and human nature. Hume aims to propose first principles that have the broadest consequences in explaining our experience. These first principles are proposed by Hume to be natural instincts, or involuntary powers that produce perceptual content and associations. Hume's science of human nature is attempting to give a natural account of ideas by beginning with natural, animal, instincts. In the interest of simplicity, Hume does not speculate on anything outside the 'natural' world, the supernatural, to account for ideas at first, and would only resort to more complexity if there were elements he could not explain otherwise. Though the instincts are not experienced in themselves, what we experience are the effects of instincts. Thus, Hume does make speculations that go outside experience, transcend experience. Similarly, Kant theorizes on the conditions of experience, but Kant logically deduces the conditions of experience, which gives those conditions a different truth status. Deleuze distinguishes two kinds of conditions, which can be correlated to Kant and Hume. Kant studies the logical, or potential, conditions of the entire abstract structure of experience, which he calls the transcendental conditions. Hume is speculating on the actual conditions of experience, that which constitutes and constructs the actual perceptions being experienced in the present, or from the point where experience begins. Hume's hypothesis proposes that the actual conditions of experience, the active instincts producing content and relations, evolve over time. This evolution involves the development of habits, which operate like complex instincts in that they involuntary influence and produce perceptions, and habits evolve through the understanding and the imagination into principles and laws within a system.

It important to stress that Hume argued beliefs are not based on reasoned observation and experiment. This was a radical claim because many people still held the Aristotelian definition of humans as rational animals that hold rationally justified beliefs. Hume argued our beliefs have nothing intrinsically to do with reason. Belief is a feeling, an impression, and humans do not have direct control over our impressions, these forceful feelings.[121] We may come to the point where we think our beliefs are unjustified, yet if they still feel forceful, they are still our beliefs. Just as Berkeley argues ideas of real objects are beyond our direct voluntary control, beliefs are also beyond the direct control of the will. Since direct impressions are forceful, they are believed. Ideas are less forceful, less vivid, and thus we do not believe them to the same degree. Yet, we do believe certain ideas and not others. Thus Hume reasoned that there must be a way for the force of something to increase or decrease. Hume's answer was his hypothesis of the principle of association. As an idea was associated and repeated more, it became more forceful. Hume created a perceptual physics, where forces were calculated based upon associations and one other principle. The other principle was the principle of passions. For Hume, affects constitute the given of experience like impressions of sensation. They are both original contents of human experience. Passion will be discussed when relevant, but for the most part, they are excluded from this work. Original affects are called impressions of reflection by Hume. Hume makes a distinction between impressions associated to the sense organs and those associated to the internal workings of the mind. As a consequence, impressions of sensation in themselves are devoid of affect. The association of any affect with any impression of sensation does not violate any principle of experience. The consequences of this free association has radical effects on Hume's theory of morality. For it implies that any sensible experience of the world is not innately good or bad. Morality arises out of the repeated associations that structure sensible and passionate experience. For some, this was taken to mean that the world is devoid of morality and humans artificially apply moral essences to objects, actions, and events.

While belief is a feeling, knowledge, at least the kind of knowledge that Descartes was seeking, is evidence based support of a perception and has nothing to do with feeling. The empirical position is that the only evidence that can support knowledge about the world must ultimately be based upon experience and experience begins with impressions. Thus any knowledge claim needs to trace itself back to the present tense experiencing of impressions. Of course, Descartes begins by showing how one can be deceived or mistaken by sense impressions. One objection was the example of a straight stick being partially submerged in water. The stick appears to be angled at the submersion point, yet we also have experience that the stick is straight. This objection raises the issue of how empiricism handles illusions and faulty experience. Descartes rejected sense experience as a foundation for knowledge on just this account. If experience can be shown to be unreliable, one tenable position is that knowledge of

[121] This is not entirely accurate. As we will see, Hume finds that ideas become more vivid when they are repeated and increasingly associated with other more forceful perceptions. Thus, something like brainwashing, would capitalize on the power of associations like repetition to make ideas more forceful and attempt to reach the threshold of intensity where the feeling becomes that of a closely held belief.

the experienced world is always at best fallible and open to further experiential evidence. Despite this issue, Hume calls ideas with sensible support matters of fact. Matters of fact are contingent ideas because their opposite is not a contradiction. Complementing matters of facts are relations of ideas. These are beliefs that are solely about the associations that form between ideas. These ideas tell us nothing about the world as they do not reference back to impressions. Thus there are two questions that one can pursue for Hume. One can ask about how a particular belief is generated, a psychological question about the science of human nature, and for that same belief, one can ask whether it is supported by the evidence of experience, an epistemological question.

Hume argues that he has determined three principles of association that can account for all relations of ideas and impressions that are instinctually formed. Hume's method is to observe related ideas and impressions and explain the attraction between the content of the mind much the same way Newton postulated gravity to explain the attraction between masses. The three basic principles of association that naturally attract and link ideas and impressions are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Different perceptions that resemble each other are naturally associated. This occurs at the simple and complex level of perceptions. Hume will use this relation to explain how naturally, in the sense that this evolution begins with the powers of nature, one might come to form an idea of identity and persistence. When two ideas, or an idea and an impression, show a very strong resemblance, one can imagine that association to be a relation of identity and imagine and understand this to be possible by way of substantive persistence. As well, perceptions that are perceived consecutively, either at once or one after the other, naturally form relations of contiguity. Hume will be able to use this relation to explain how naturally one might come to form an idea of time and space as constructed out of contiguous minimal perceptions. Controversially, Hume will argue experience only supports the idea that space and time are finitely divisible. Hume argues that between two perceptual points in either time or space, one cannot perceptually divide up that quantity infinitely. At some point we cannot perceive a smaller segment. This conception of time and space avoids Zeno's paradoxes of motion, but it also relies on a distinction between what one can perceive and what one can conceive. As we will see in the following chapter, Deleuze appropriates this position, but also augments it with Bergson's atomism of variable durations. And finally, perceptions naturally form relations of cause and effect. The relation of cause and effect is the basis for all science. The principles postulated in the science of human nature are causes, and the effects are associated perceptual content. Hume claims that these three principles of association that arise in and through experience account for the structure of all ideas, beliefs, and knowledge about the world. Kant will reject this claim by reasoning that experience is contingent and the structure of understanding and sensibility is not a matter of contingency. This will lead Kant to claim the structure of understanding and sensibility must exist *a priori* within the human faculties such that experience conforms to this necessary structure.

Hume uncovers an issue internal to his system when he seeks the experiential evidence for justifying causation. But before the epistemological question of veridical support is

addressed, Hume addresses the psychological question of how the idea of causation emerges as a belief. Hume uses a classic example, a thought experiment involving two billiard balls. When one balls rolls into the other and the other balls rolls away, one commonly perceives the relation between ball one and ball two as causal. The first ball and its motion are the cause and the second ball and its motion are the effect. One does not see this interaction as random, unprincipled, or chance events. One commonly understands that there is a connection between the two events such that the ball-two event necessarily follows the ball-one event. We understand there to be a necessary connection between the events. Yet, Hume speculates that all we initially experience are a series of impressions. We do not see a mechanism of causation. We can divide the experience into a series of images, but these images impart nothing about causation, a necessary connection. Hume considers the case that someone has never seen a billiard ball strike. Without having seen this event occur before, one has no way of knowing what will happen. There are many directions the ball might roll, or not roll at all, when struck by another ball. So Hume argues seeing something happen for the first time provides no impetus for coming to see the relation as causal, rather than merely conjunctive. Hume argues that we must first come to observe repeated similar conjunctions. Yet, if the first instance did not provide any perceptual evidence of causation, then repetition of the same should not either. Note that Deleuze will focus on the repetition of same to reveal pure difference, that which differentiates two instances of the same. Though for Hume, the point is that no matter how many times the billiard ball example is repeated, it provides no new information with regards to the events such that we might be able to reason something new. Thus whatever changes occur, it is not due to the given experience. The constant conjunction develops an involuntary associative expectation that when we see event one, we immediately associate event two, and vice versa. Hume writes, "For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of *Custom*."[122] With repetition and the proliferation of associations that occur within a constant conjunction, the intensity of each element increases. The greater the feeling of intensity, the more immediate is the belief. This expectation, habit, or custom of associating the two events comes to be imagined as a necessary connection. At this point, any possible violations of the expectation have imperceptible associative intensity. This idea of necessary connection pervades practically all our experience such that causality becomes a primary principle of human nature. In answering the psychological question of how causality emerges as an idea in the mind, Hume hypothesizes that it is the imagination that makes a leap from constant conjunction to necessary connection. This hypothesis poisons the epistemological question because the move from expectation and habit to causality lacks experiential evidence. As causality is a fundamental principle of association, to not be able to justify it, and Hume argues that inductive arguments never have the evidence to support the conclusion, we are left with the uncomfortable position of denying causality or accepting it as rooted in the imagination.

[122] Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding*, Section V – "Sceptical Solution of these Doubts," Part I, 43.

The fact that there is no clear causal link that arises directly in experience that would epistemologically justify a causal link was already observed by philosophers. Malebranche had noted this and used it to argue for occasionalism. This is the position that God is the only possible and actual cause of all actions and intervenes between event one and event two. Leibniz also relied on the illusion of causality in his principle of pre-established harmony. This was the theory that distinct entities, monads, could not and did not interact. Leibniz argued that all perceived external interaction was an illusion and every distinct entity necessarily followed an already set series of motions that were internally linked. Yet, Hume is the first to not offer a substitution to common sense causality. Instead, he leaves perceived causality as an illusion perpetuated by the imagination and embraced by the understanding, which reasons upon an ordered and principled, rational, world. Typical of Hume, he ends up with a blend of absolute skepticism, most of what we say we know about the world depends on causality, and empirical explanation that shifts from certainty to probability.

3.4.3 Questioning Personal Identity

We now address the main focus of this project, Hume's theory of subjectivity. Descartes' substantive subject was earlier challenged by Locke's empirical approach. Locke distinguished consciousness from substance and argued we were without empirical evidence with regard to any underlying substance, whether it be material or immaterial. By defining a person by a continuity of consciousness, Locke initiated a fifty year debate on subjectivity and personal identity before Hume entered the scene. Much of the debate argued over the two possibilities of a material or immaterial substance persisting as the substantial condition for subjectivity.

The debate was exemplified in a published exchange between Samuel Clarke, an immaterialist, and Anthony Collins, a materialist, during the latter half of the first decade of 18th century.[123] Hume's approach to the debate was, "These philosophers are the curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere. In order to put a stop to these endless cavils on both sides, I know no better method, than to ask these philosophers in a few words, *What they mean by substance and inhesion?* And after they have answer'd this question, 'twill then be reasonable, and not till then, to enter seriously into the dispute."[124] Hume's strategy in part is to end the materialist/immaterialist debate by arguing the idea of substance itself lacks meaning. Like his critique of body and matter, he refers to the copy principle that every simple idea is a copy of a simple impression. If there are no

[123] Jane McIntyre, "Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity," *The Cambridge Companion to Hume: Second Edition*, edit. David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 2009), 180-2.
[124] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section V, 232, original emphasis.

simple impressions that correspond to the simple idea of substance, then substance has no meaningful anchor in experience and lacks any justifiable standing to be entertained as existing.

The critique of subjective substance completes the radical direction of early modern empiricism. Locke divided consciousness from substance, and though he argued it was a necessary concept, he also argued it was outside the limits of knowledge. Berkeley had used empiricism to critique and dismiss the idea of matter and defend a subjective idealism. Now, Hume has critiqued subjective idealism on the grounds that there is no underlying substantive subject generating perception. One is left with experience on its own, the existence of impressions and ideas that neither refer outside experience nor assume underlying substantial conditions. Kant will respond to Hume by arguing that there are transcendental conditions necessary for there to be representational experience. One can interpret Hume's principle of association as an example of a transcendental condition, though for Hume association was the consequence of instincts, instincts that were hypothetical suppositions instead of deduced principles. Hume treats the transcendental like substance, as transcendent to experience.

In addition to challenging the meaning of substance and inhesion, the second part of Hume's strategy is to recast substance in such a way that it resembles a proto-existentialism. Hume achieves this by narrowing how substance is defined. A traditional definition aims to conceive that which persists unchanged and holds together through inhesion all the characteristics that change. Instead of defining substance in terms of inhesion, Hume focuses the definition to only that which exists independently. Hume writes, "[S]ince all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing [sic] else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing [sic] else to support their existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance."[125] Whereas substance traditionally aims to explain the unity and identity of a flux of secondary characteristics, Hume takes those characteristics in their atomization to be substantial, to have independent existence and collectively to compose the mind.[126] Primal existence is interpreted as the collection that composes the mind and first defines consciousness. This collection precedes essence in the sense that ideas first emerge as copies of impressions. And though one might argue that Hume's theory of nature and human nature preclude any primal freedom to existence, Hume's theory of nature and human nature do contain the seeds of freedom in two ways. First, human nature transcends nature and the original given through the imagination. Thus human nature rests upon the freedom of the imagination. Second,

[125] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section V, 233.

[126] Deleuze will make a distinction between the molar and the molecular. This distinction is often associated with Leibniz's theory of the monad, another atomic theory, and it arises in Deleuze's book on Leibniz, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1993). But this distinction between the molar and the molecular also follows from Hume's treatment of atomization. The difference between the two is that while Leibniz, a rationalist, theorizes upon an assumed ontological atomization of the universe (an infinity of perspectives) by the definition of substance, Hume finds that one can hypothesize on the atomization of the mind from the given of experience and then define the ontological status of this collection. Leibniz atomizes subjective perspectives, while Hume atomizes the contents of experience.

it is the nature of the mind to form habits, but what habits are formed is not already determined. And while Hume will use the principle of causality to argue a kind of determinism, he also argues the inductive argument behind causality is ultimately unjustifiable. In the following chapter, we will partly address Deleuze's tendency to understand Hume in an existentialist manner.

Hume's argument against substance leaves him to answer two questions. The psychological question is how does the idea of substance emerge in the first place. And the epistemological question is under Hume's empiricism, what claims about personhood are justified when we abandon the substantial ego. Both issues begin with the speculative foundation of the mind, a collection of given impressions. From here Hume answers the psychological question by speculating on the instincts, processes and habituations that form an associative structure in the imagination that leads one to conceive and imagine the unity and persistence of a person. Memory and repeated linkages of resemblance, affective relations that engender sympathy for the past and future selves, and causal associations that tie together changing states bring Hume to a point where the imaginative leap to personal identity and a substantial self is explainable. Yet the epistemological question forces us to consider what impressions are at the foundation of this idea of self. Hume argues there is no one impression of self that is continually experienced. Instead experience is a flux of very different types of impressions, from affects to sense impressions. Hume concludes that the person is nothing more than this collected stream of distinct impressions at any one moment. And over time a succession of similar impressions. This is called the bundle theory of the self. Hume writes, "But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind [those that claim to have an always present impression of the self], I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."[127] Experience provides no evidence that we are anything beyond this collection, despite imaginative leaps that are not derived from impressions.

Experience also does not give evidence that any impressions or ideas from one moment are the same in the next moment. Hume offers no evidence of a self that persists, yet associative links form a bond between the slices of this succession, and these links are mistaken for identity. Hume writes, "The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu'd object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects."[128] This confusion between a diversity of resemblances and identity of sameness can be recognized, yet the forces of human nature lead one to continually fall into the confusion. Hume writes, "Our propensity to this mistake is so great from the resemblance above-mention'd, that we fall into it before we are aware; and tho' we incessantly correct ourselves by reflexion, and return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain our

[127] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, 252.
[128] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, 254.

philosophy, or take off this biass [sic] from the imagination."[129] Note that even in arguing against a self, Hume uses the world self and possessive adjectives, which refer to a self. Hume argues that the final response, instead of fighting against the propensity to assert and believe in a self, is to accept it. Hume writes, "Our lasts resource is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a *soul*, and *self*, and *substance*, to disguise the variation."[130] Hume clearly takes the self to be a fiction, but also argues that it is practically unavoidable. A dichotomy is set up of a practical world of fictions and philosophical world of impractical truths.

It is easy to forget the status of associations. These links are not impressions, but felt transitions from one distinct element to another. Hume writes:

> But, as, notwithstanding this distinction [that every distinct perception has a distinct existence] and separability, we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity; whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or only associates their ideas in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them. This question we might easily decide, if we wou'd recollect what has been already prov'd at large, that the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examin'd resolves itself into a customary association of ideas.[131]

It is clear that Hume's theory of the fictional self does not have underneath it a united collection of elements. The associations are felt as transitions. The ease of the transition means the differences do not stand out as much. All continuities between the elements, such as only experiencing minor changes or continuing similar aims, make that transition easier and smoother and this feeds the move to perceive the elements as the same.

In a critique of Locke, Hume claims we imagine new principles to unite together these identities and explain the continuity. Hume is referencing, though not directly, Locke's taxonomy of material objects, plants, animals-bodies, tools, and persons. Following Aristotle,

[129] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, 254.
[130] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, 254, original emphasis.
[131] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, 259-60.

Locke argues that all plants maintain their identity through a principle of life that continues among the changes from seed to mature plant. Material objects maintain a principle of organization despite changes in the actual material. Yet, Hume accounts for all associations that motivate imagining a self or any identity from the principles of contiguity, resemblance, and cause and effect. Though, Hume argues contiguity is not applicable to selfhood as it persists through time. Resemblance relies upon the memory to find transitions between ideas that have little difference. Hume makes the claim that without memory, there is no way that the mind would conceive the fictional idea of a self. The association of cause and effect is not restricted to similarity. In fact, causality can link drastically different ideas as part of a causal chain. And causality can extend to periods in the fictional self's life where memory has failed.

If identity is a fiction that is based upon the ease of transition from resemblance and cause and effect, then the exact parameters that define the acceptable scope of change and the directness of cause and effect are not clear. How much must one change, before we come to the conclusion that this is not the same person? This issue also extends to the discussion of identity in basic objects? For instance, how much must someone alter a design before one can claim it is not a copy of the original? How many changes can be made to a house or boat, before one can claim it is a different object? These matters, Hume argues, is left for the community to determine. Rules governing identity are social constructions. Matters we might have thought were objective facts become subjective group decisions.

In the following chapter, we will focus on how Deleuze engages, appropriates, and defends Hume's empiricism.

Chapter 4 – The Problem of Subjectivity

Hume left the problem of personal identity, which is covered in the *Treatise*, out of the *Enquiries*. Despite this intended omission, Deleuze makes Hume's problematizing of subjectivity the central act and issue of empiricism. This chapter aims to understand the relevance of problematizing subjectivity, how the problem of subjectivity relates to Kant, and how Deleuze attempts to strengthen Hume's empiricism.

4.1 Putting in Question, and Skepticism

As a characterization of empiricism, problematic can be understood in different ways. In one instance, problematic distinguishes solution philosophy from problem philosophy, where the latter puts something generally accepted into question. Problematic can also point to a conflicted state that is irresolvable, where antagonizing sides that are not necessarily opposites, are left struggling without resolution. In general, that which is problematic is defined by unsettled questions and conflict.

A key difference between the way traditional empiricism is defined and Deleuze's definition lies in the fact that traditional empiricism defines itself as an answer to an assumed question. The traditional question that empiricism answers is epistemological in nature; where do ideas come from such that knowledge is possible? Deleuze writes, "The classical definition of empiricism proposed by the Kantian tradition is this: empiricism is the theory according to which knowledge not only begins with experience but is derived from it."[132] The traditional directive is to determine the origin and thus legitimacy of ideas and their claim to be knowledge. Besides rejecting this definition on the basis that it is not a question, Deleuze rejects the Kantian definition with three arguments that address the specifics of this definition.[133] First, Deleuze argues that knowledge is not the definitive aim of empiricism. Second, the first part of the definition could apply to any philosopher, even Plato can be said to begin with experience. Third, experience is defined in two ways by Hume. In the first way, which is the primary definition, experience is a simple collection of perceptions that excludes relations. Relations are defined as effects produced in part from the principles of association. Since knowledge is dependent upon relations, with respect to this first definition, experience cannot be the ultimate source of knowledge, as a traditional empiricist would argue. Knowledge transcends experience. Alternatively, experience is defined as a complex duality that forms a self-reactive whole, a whole that can self-constitute transcendent notions and transcend itself. In this case, knowledge

[132] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (Columbia University Press, New York, 1991), 107.
[133] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 107-108.

cannot be simply derived from experience and the traditional empiricist definition does not hold. The Kantian definition of experience as it was applied to empiricism misses the complexity, duality and invention that compose the whole of experience.

The traditional answer for the traditional empiricist, who is primarily concerned with legitimating knowledge, is that the origin of all initial ideas, our abstract concepts, is a causal chain. Ideas are generated through representations and images, which are formed through impressions or sense data, which are generated from the aesthetic mechanisms of the senses that collect or accumulate a flux of sensory impulses. Ideas are thus ultimately grounded in the experience of sensation and at least initially represent those sensations. Empiricism consistently holds to the position that there are no innate ideas or a priori knowledge of reality. Though Deleuze will point out that Hume challenges any denial of innateness altogether because the original given, the immanent level of sensation, composes the mind and is by definition innate in terms of being present from the very beginning. For the radical birth of the mind, there is the original given of sensation. It is ideas that are not innate as already present in the mind from the beginning. Because senses are considered the only access to reality, the sensory foundation of ideas is used to ensure, or test, that ideas have some sort of objective reality, not in the Cartesian and Scholastic sense that ideas represent a level of formal being, but merely by whether ideas can be traced back to sensation. Anything that cannot be traced back to sense impressions is without meaning in the sense that it ultimately does not refers to reality. Thus traditional empiricism is both representationalist because sense images represent or correspond to reality, and reductivist because any legitimate thought about the world or reality must reduce to a sensational origin.

Deleuze is against the formulation of empiricism as merely a solution to the search for an epistemological foundation, a guarantee for truth and reality, which historically ended up being a way to cut off conversation on many topics that did not meet the requirements of a sensational origin. Deleuze argues for and in Hume finds an empiricism that opens up lines of thought, lines of questioning, that always remains open to the philosopher. Deleuze defines what it means to be a philosophical theory:

> We must understand what a philosophical theory is, the basis of its concept, for it is not born from itself or for the fun of it. It is not even enough to say that it is a response to a set of problems. Undoubtedly, this explanation has the advantage, at least, of locating the necessity for a theory in a relation to something that can serve as its foundation; but this relation would be scientific rather than philosophical. In fact, a philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, *to*

> *the very end*, of the necessary implications of a formulated question.[134]

Here Deleuze distinguishes between scientific and philosophical theory. Scientific theory is a response to questions of a physical and pragmatic nature. While philosophy is the formulation of basic questions about our experience that one can ask and subject to experience itself. Deleuze will also use the term human science to describe philosophy as a science of human experience that is limited by the bounds of experience. Deleuze writes, "It [the elaboration of a question to the very end that] shows us what things are, or what things should be, on the assumption that the question is good and rigorous. To put something in question means subordinating and subjecting things to the question, intending, through this constrained and forced subsumption, that they reveal an essence or a nature."[135] In analyzing the scope, assumptions, and effects of the question itself, Deleuze is arguing that something is revealed. Berkeley was able to question the necessity of extended substance. Hume was able to question all transcendent categories, but most of all the subject itself is questioned. For Deleuze, philosophy does not solve problems. Philosophy reveals insights through the elaboration of basic questions that shake the foundations of our assumptions.

The question of empiricism, which Deleuze defines as the question of the subject, leads one to accept as reality a flux of images that in themselves cannot justify knowledge of the most basic assumptions like self, world, causality, etc. This is the consequence of questioning subjectivity. By undermining every basic assumption, Hume was always considered the most radical of empiricists. Hume was considered more radical than Berkeley and his subjective idealism because a consequence of Hume's empiricism was that he denied even knowledge of the existence of the self. With Berkeley, the self as perceiver was a necessary condition for perception and thus for maintaining reality. Hume, in dropping even the assumption of the self from the empirical origin is ultimately forced to entertain the most radical of skepticisms. Yet, Hume argued despite this theoretical position of radical skepticism, when he acts, when he engages in everyday life, that skepticism dissolves away. Philosophy emerges from a curiosity, a questioning or problematization of the origin of our ideas, and ultimately of the human subject. Hume responds to critics in the following: "*My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say sceptism* [sp?], *I want to learn the foundation of this inference."*[136] It is the philosopher that questions what is before us, that puts what is naturally before us into question. The empiricist becomes skeptical only after an enquiry into the foundation, the legitimacy, the ground of the mature given, that which is commonly accepted, both personal and cultural beliefs. Hume is arguing that by nature humans are irrational, affectively driven and dogmatic and it is philosophy that reflects upon and questions

[134] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 106.
[135] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 106.
[136] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 95, Deleuze's italics. [David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals*, edit. L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), Section IV, Part II, ¶32, 38.]

our beliefs. Skepticism arises because there is no justificatory ground for the assertions we make, there is only the flux of sensation as originally given in images and affect. At the same time, Hume accepts the criticism and paradox that his actions betray this philosophical position of skepticism of self, world, etc. Hume isn't skeptical that a piece of bread will nourish him when offered food. But Hume's everyday actions, like eating bread, and the assumptions about the world that these actions imply come before philosophical enquiry. Subjectivity and belief in the transcendent must already be in place if it is to be put in question. The enquiry, to question the subject and to put my very subjectivity in question, is to question those actions and their assumptions that are already deployed and to some extent successfully satisfying one's interests. And by changing the mode of these basic assumptions to unfounded in experience and thus fictional doesn't mean they should be automatically dropped. This Humean position is to a certain extent taken up by Kant. Kant argues that that are certain ideas that surpass the limits of human reason and encompass what is outside the limits of experience. And yet these illusions are still helpful or necessary in our thinking and experience. Kant argues that we properly recognize them as illusions. These are ideas like God and world that anticipate infinite. A rational thinker uses these ideas as the horizon of rationality. For the empiricist, acting and participating in society doesn't invalidate the radical skepticism, the skepticism merely changes the mode of these beliefs to a fictional invention and asks how they arise in the first place.

4.2 Foucault's Problem of the Subject

Deleuze conceives empiricism as the expression of a very basic question, perhaps the most basic. The question of empiricism aims for the center of experience, something taken for granted by most or maybe all – subjectivity. Empiricism works to problematize subjectivity itself, to consider subjectivity as constituted in the given, and to ask how the subject comes to be. Foucault is also chiefly concerned with the question of the subject, at least in his early work, and directly defines it in an essay called "Power and Subject." This essay was first published as an appendix in a retrospective of Foucault's work titled *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. Foucault and Deleuze were closely aligned and Foucault's discussion on the question of the subject is worth pointing out to broaden the context of the question. When Foucault approaches the *question of the subject*, he writes, "My objective [referring to the histories and archaeologies Foucault has produced]...has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects."[137] Thus, for Foucault, to question the subject is to ask how the subject came to be in the fashion that it exists, or as Foucault says, "the objectivizing of the subject."[138]

[137] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Second Edition with and Afterward by and Interview with Michel Foucault* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 208.
[138] Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 208.

In his essay, Foucault wrote the first part in English; "objectivizing" is his word choice. Foucault identifies three different types of objectivization of the subject. The first type arises out of institutional or disciplinary fields and sciences that structure the subject. The various fields and sciences structure the subject in different ways. In terms of language and shaping the subject through language, Foucault cites the development of a *grammaire generale*, philology and linguistics as structuring the speaking subject. The productive subject is objectivized through structures of wealth and the science of economics. How the subject relates to and identifies as a living body and spirit is objectivized through the sciences of natural history and biology. Each of these disciplines and the body of knowledge that they instantiate objectivize the subject in different ways, which the philosopher-archaeologist is now tasked with unearthing. The second type of objectivization is what Foucault calls dividing practices. These are the various taxonomies that are created and developed in history to categorize and thus objectify subjects. Foucault notes that these divisions may be applied to an individual subject or to a social division within the culture. Foucault includes examples like the distinction between sane and insane, sick and healthy, and criminals and the 'good people.' The way in which each of these distinctions is fashioned is tied to historical moments, and the way in which a human being uses and relates to these distinctions as they exist in that cultural moment objectifies the subject in a certain way. The final type of objectivisation is self-objectivisation. This mode is characterized by how someone recognizes herself *as* a certain kind of subject, a hermeneutics of the self. An example of this form, which Foucault investigates, is the domain of sexuality. Foucault notes in his essay that these three different modes of objectivization follow chronologically, more or less, the transition of his focus on the question of the subject.

Foucault distinguishes his investigations of the problem of the subject with the Cartesian approach. He associates his investigation with the Kantian approach. Foucault refers to the essay "Was heisst Aufklärung?" published by Kant in 1784 in the monthly magazine *Berliner Monatschrift*. Foucault is drawn to this essay because Kant asks, "What's going on just now? What's happening to us? What is this world, this period, this precise moment in which we are living?"[139] Kant asks a historical question applied to the current historical moment and assigns responsibility for answering to philosophy. Kant is essentially addressing the question in the first person plural, subjects collectively questioning their subjectivity and its constitution. Philosophy as critique comes to acknowledge that the task of a historically situated critique is its own. It is tied to this moment, and thus historically situated. Instead of outside, it is a critique from within the current conditions. One might ask, what forces today shape the contemporary subject? And each successive generation of practicing philosophers would need to acknowledge the philosophical task of asking what forces shape us right now. Foucault writes, "Kant's question appears as an analysis of both us and our present."[140] Foucault contrasts this with Descartes investigation of the subject. Descartes' work aims to reveal and demonstrate the universal essence of subjectivity, not a historically situated subjectivity. Foucault writes, "Compare this

[139] Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 216.
[140] Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 216.

with the Cartesian question: Who am I? I, as a unique but universal and unhistorical subject? I, for Descartes, is everyone, anywhere at any moment? [sic]"[141] Foucault finds that for Descartes, subjectivity is not historically contingent. The same could be said for Plato and early Husserlian phenomenology. In each of these philosophies, the ego is universal and the transcendental knowledge derived from the ego is both certain and universal. Thus we have a universal philosophy of essential egoism in opposition to a critical and historical philosophy.

Foucault argues eloquently for the importance of a critical and historically contingent philosophy. He writes:

> ...the task of philosophy as a critical analysis of our world is something which is more and more important. Maybe the most certain of all philosophical problems is the problem of the present time, and of what we are, in this very moment.
>
> Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind," which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures.
>
> The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.[142]

Foucault's ultimate aim is to liberate subjects from various fashions of subjectivity in order to find forms of subjectivity that promote an autonomy that does not totalize. This alternative form is not unlike the autonomy Kant argues for in his essay with respect to how enlightenment must aim to give individuals the means and courage to freely think for themselves. In revealing forms of subjectivity to be historically contingent, the possibility arises for new options of subjectivity to become viable in the present as the present changes.

Returning to Deleuze, we can now distinguish Foucault's philosophy from Deleuze's empiricism. This can be accomplished by understanding how Foucault defines subjectivity in two ways: "There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and

[141] Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 216.
[142] Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 216.

dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to."[143] In both cases there is always an identity, a self that is subjugated either from the inside or the outside. The problem of the subject for Hume and Deleuze is not that there is a self that is always objectified in some way, whether it is by forces internal or external. Deleuze and Hume are working out the emergence of the subject and self itself. They are asking the question of how there comes to be a self and subjectivity at all. This might appear to place them in the Cartesian camp of the universal ego, but this is incorrect. For Deleuze and Hume, the subject and self are historically contingent; they are produced as effects of processes upon the original given. The Cartesian subject, the ego, is revealed to be the transcendental condition of subjectivity. Therefore, for Descartes the ego is a universal ego that was always there. Deleuze and Hume are aiming at something more fundamental than Foucault, the historically contingent effect of subjectivity itself. For Deleuze and Hume, the problem of the subject is asking how the subject comes to be, rather than assuming subjectivity to be a transcendental condition. Foucault's project can be added onto Deleuze's and Hume's project once there is the subject itself to be subjected by internal and external forces.

Deleuze argues that empiricism, the problem of the subject, ought to be conceived as an open problem, which the philosopher is not tasked with solving, but rather aims to understand and articulate the consequences of that problem. What does it mean if subjectivity is not given, but an effect of processes upon the given? It is the philosopher's job to follow and elaborate upon the implicit premises and consequences of the problem itself and furthermore to deploy an internal critique of those grounds and consequences that arise from the way in which the problem is stated. The philosopher's task is to examine the question that empiricism expresses. So as traditional empiricism was locked into legitimizing knowledge through sensibility, Deleuze's empiricism problematizes our subjective experience by asking a central question: How does the subject itself emerge from the original given in experience? Deleuze argues that Hume fundamentally rethinks subjectivity, his most radical achievement, and this is why we should consider the question of the emergence of subjectivity as the central question to Hume's philosophy of empiricism. The question of the subject is often in the shadows of Hume's critique of causality, religious beliefs and ethical emotivism. The subject with which Hume is concerned is the human subject, that which emerges from or by human nature, and not merely by nature. If one were to rewrite the Delphic maxim "Know Thyself," it would have to be "Account for Thyself's Emergence."

4.3 Presuppositions and Starting Points

[143] Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 212.

A key difference between empiricism as a solution versus empiricism as the problematizing of ordinary experience, perception and belief is the status of the operative assumptions. If empiricism answers a question, there are accepted presuppositions already in play that must be assumed as true. There are certain axioms that have already justified the question to be answered. While empiricism as a problem also brings along with it presuppositions that are implied by the question, such as subjectivity being emergent and that there is experience before human subjectivity, the status of these presuppositions, which are part of the question, are also in question. In problematizing our day to day experience, nothing has been accepted as true or necessary. Everything takes on a hypothetical status in an open problem.

Husserl's phenomenology reinvigorated the modern quest to radically begin philosophy without presuppositions, and to establish a method for discarding or suspending all presuppositions that are naturally in play before one even begins. Husserl's attempt to find a pure starting point involves dropping the natural attitude that what we perceive are spatio-temporal objects in the world. He then refocuses our attention to the pure objects of consciousness. It is this pure object that Husserl refers to in his often cited motto, *to the things themselves*. Husserl relies on the insight that consciousness is intentional, that acts of consciousness are always with an object. Husserl divides consciousness, only theoretically, into the noetic processes of intention and the object of the intentional act, the noema. He then investigates the noema, the intentional core of experience. Deleuze presents Hume's empiricism as also stripping away the referential aspect of perception and focusing upon the images themselves as the objects that compose the mind. Here, a key difference is that classical phenomenology is clearly a transcendental practice, while empiricism strives for immanence.

The modern obsession for the proper starting point for practicing philosophy began with Descartes and his search for an epistemologically certain foundation. Descartes' stated beginning was to question all claims until he found suppositions he, or anyone, was incapable of questioning. His doubt was a method, a provisional skepticism to determine that which is necessarily certain. Deleuze's Hume doesn't use skepticism as a method, but rather as a mode of philosophy. In this mode, all is in question and all that one deals with is in question. When he asks how the subject came to be, subjectivity itself is problematized. It is a radical skepticism that also forces the skeptic to begin with specific questions that initially apply to the current mature perception of things. One begins with a subject asking a question, raising a problem, to put in question the legitimacy of subjectivity itself. The radical skeptic never makes any concrete affirmations, there is no certainty here, though Deleuze makes the case that something undetermined and indeterminable must be posited. Deleuze understands Hume to be a positive skeptic.

By approaching philosophy, and particularly empirical philosophy, as a question directed at accounting for the emergence of the mature subject of experience, Deleuze offers another alternative in the quest for a philosophy without presupposition. This option doesn't strip away presuppositions, but reclassifies them as conditional suppositions due to a fundamental

questioning that asks how basic categories like self, world, meaning, came to be present in experience. Hume is working out the immanent situation of the given, not the transcendental conditions. Hume turns philosophy towards the observed succession of events, rather than using reason to demonstrate the necessary conditions of an idealized realm or in the case of phenomenology, to investigate the pure transcendental objects of consciousness in order to uncover underlying transcendental fields and horizons that structure consciousness. It is not the case that Hume's empiricism is without presupposition, but rather it is a philosophy where all presuppositions are necessarily given a skeptical status because one isn't concerned with their ultimate truth, but with how they came to be as they are. Unlike many "empiricists," Hume doesn't avoid speaking about concepts that have no link to an original given in sensation. On the contrary, he asks how it is, in terms of a chain of events, that something, such as the idea of the self, emerged, which is often outside the original given of experience, the sensational given. With empiricism, philosophy becomes historical and hypothetical.

4.4 Skepticism and Epistemology

Hume is said to have taken empiricism to its radical conclusion and ended up with a radical skepticism that denies the empiricist from using any categorical thinking. An empiricist that finds no justification in sensation to support the existence of causality, the self, existence, etc. The empiricist is left conceptually paralyzed with only a succession of unintelligible images. Hume was said to have taken empiricism over from Berkeley and poisoned the last remaining presumption, the self – subjectivity. The culminating state of *aporia* was considered by many to be the dead end of empiricism, though for Socrates *aporia* is the preferred philosophical beginning. For Socrates, it was only when an interlocutor reached *aporia* that the possibility emerged for deeper enquiry in a new direction. Deleuze's Hume does not discard ideas of self, existence and the other categories as meaningless and unspeakable because they are not derived purely from sensation, but instead tries to account for how these ideas might have emerged in mature human experience. Much like Husserl's phenomenological method of bracketing consciousness in order to examine the objects of consciousness themselves, empiricism considers the ideas, images and affects of the mind without making reference to something outside the mind. Empiricism's anti-representationalism isolates the sensation, ideas and affects that compose experience. So instead of discarding ideas of the self or subjectivity, it is re-presented as a result of this empirical inquiry as a fiction, or of having the same status as fiction. These ideas are fictions because they cannot solely be derived from the original given of sensation. Hume's hypothesis is that these ideas that go beyond the given are created by the imagination and then mixed in with the whole of experience. The imagination is unbounded and free to excessively extend its inventions. Reason acts as a corrective against the excesses of the imagination. Despite being an effect of the imagination, the fictional account strives to be

internally consistent and systematized by reason. Deleuze writes, "We must now raise the question: what do we mean when we speak of the subject? We mean that the imagination, having been a collection, becomes now a faculty; the distributed collection becomes now a system. The given is once again taken up by a movement, and in a movement that transcends it. The mind becomes human nature. The subject invents and believes; *it is a synthesis of the mind*."[144] So empiricism, in the philosophical mode of a question or problem, doesn't provide any ultimate solutions, but does produce an understanding of the fictional implications and consequences when one fundamentally questions our most mature ideas, the most fundamental being subjectivity. Despite these ideas being fictional in nature, a product of the imagination, the question of the subject emerges in the midst of a practical life. The practical context in which empiricism occurs, or for that matter the context of any theory, is an often neglected aspect. Deleuze's Humean empiricism binds together skepticism and pragmatism in the problematization of the subject.

Despite this position of philosophical skepticism, Deleuze's Hume can and does still frame itself within the epistemological problem of truth since people commonly make knowledge claims. The empiricist does not deny that people have beliefs of truth and knowledge in everyday experience. The empiricist must ask how it comes to be that humans believe and assert truths despite an ultimately underlying skepticism.[145] These acts of belief are tied to the emergence of the subject. It is the human subject that believes truths and makes knowledge claims. By questioning the emergence of the subject, Hume opens up the possibility of something before the subject. One must retrospectively trace and evaluate the movement from the original given that composes experience to subjective belief and its corresponding ideas. Deleuze writes:

> From what is given, I infer the existence of that which is not given: I believe. Caesar is dead, Rome did exist, the sun will rise, and bread is nourishing. At the same time through the same operation, while transcending the given, I judge and posit myself as subject. I affirm more than I know. Therefore the problem of truth must be presented and stated as the critical problem of subjectivity itself. By what right does man affirm more than he knows?[146]

[144] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 92.

[145] Derrida explores in *The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac* how the French empiricist Condillac explains the existence of the frivolous in language and thought, Deleuze and Hume are here attempting to explain the existence of that which we take most serious, truth and knowledge. Empiricism is forced to explain everything that emerges on top of the original sensational and affective given. One major difference between Condillac and Hume is that Condillac posits a real outside the senses that is mirrored by the senses. For Hume, images are the starting point; there is no outside real that is represented. Images are the real.

[146] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. by Constantin V. Boundas, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1991), p. 86.

The situation that we find ourselves in, as humans, is one involved in believing things and that means believing them to be true. Just as the empiricist problematizes the subject, the empiricist problematizes truth and knowledge. But truth and knowledge in themselves are not questioned, it is the human subject as a knowing subject that is questioned. When Deleuze asks about the right to know, he is asking about the legitimacy of the transcendent movement. Deleuze's point is that one doesn't just ask how the subject emerged, but how the knowing subject emerged. Our questioning of subjectivity and knowing are simultaneous. Empiricism is not solving a problem of epistemology. Empiricism is putting epistemology in question and asking how it is that the subject is found to be epistemological. Composed of felt sensations and affects, which is the prior and foundational given is a set of images. Deleuze and Hume ask how one goes from a succession of images to belief in self, others, a world, existence, predication, etc? Thus the empiricist is not interested in demonstrating true justified belief, but is concerned with how one can account for the transition from sensational, or primal, experience to the knowing subject. Belief itself is shown to be intractably problematic. The presentation of a belief implies truth claims; this is what the subject *believes*. But the transition from a description of the given to a truth assertion involves a transcendence of the given. And transcending the given is an effect of the imagination, which gives the belief a fictional element. The imagination is precisely that which we don't necessarily believe because it is invented. Thus belief is problematic due its fanciful origins clashing with its truth claims.

Implied in the question of right is the question of origin and grounding. Where does the transcendent come from? Some might trace the transcendence and the structure of transcendence back to the condition of temporality and temporality itself. Time is a structure where the now goes beyond itself to a new now which was the future. But empiricism cannot point to time, which is never experienced in itself. Empiricism's contribution to philosophy is in looking to the natural given of a flux and the instinct to associate, which is experienced as a principle of association. Putting one element next to another, simple conjunction, *this and that*, is part of the empirical origin of transcendence. This is the logic of the 'and' that Deleuze devises in *Difference and Repetition*. Though unlike traditional conceptions of temporality, the 'and' has no essential direction; it can move in all directions and does not need to be continuous or diachronic. First, there is experience, actual experience as opposed to the conditions of possible experience, this flux of impressions and the associations between them that are external to the original impressional elements.

At this point, Husserl's earlier critique of empiricism can be revisited. He argued that empiricism makes universal claims about what counts as knowledge, and yet empiricism is solely based upon contingent experience. Husserl brackets the natural attitude when practicing phenomenology as a way to avoid the 'problem' of contingency. One's experience of the world is an unending succession of contingencies and thus cannot lead to any universal claims or foundations. In order to investigate ideas themselves, which are transcendental and universal, Husserl developed his method for focusing solely upon the ideas of consciousness themselves.

Husserlian phenomenology is founded upon, and its success relies upon, Husserl's 'discovery' of an experiential escape from the unending contingency to a transcendental ground. This escape relies upon positing as original a split between internal and external experience. Once the transcendental is isolated from external contingencies, Husserl investigates these pure ideas through various experiments in order to reveal and isolate the very essence of ideas themselves from internal contingencies inside the structure of consciousness. Husserl in fact uses the faculty of the imagination as a way to vary ideas themselves to reveal what is contingent, and thus variable, and what is not. Husserl takes the limit of the imagination to be disconnected from the limits of human psychology. When the imagination of an ideal and universal consciousness can no longer vary an aspect of an ideal object, the problem of contingency comes to reveal a necessary, universal, transcendental foundation. For a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism, the problem is not contingency, but the subject, that which is transcendental and necessary. Thus empiricism finds in the imagination a faculty that transcends the given contingencies, the ground of contingency, to produce essences.[147] Though, in light of the imagination, a skeptical empiricism does not assert that there are *no* truths or that there *are* truths in any absolute way. Empiricism tries to account for the emergence of any truth assertion, which transcends the given, in a human subject, which transcends the given. What is the historical process that brings a mind from the original given to include the existence of the idea of truth or belief? This question of the emergence of an idea or belief is a central question of empiricism. Empiricism finds the idea's emergence cannot be solely accounted for from the original given without appealing to the processes of the imagination, principles of human nature, which transcend the given through invention. Husserl's phenomenology evolves from a static phenomenology that examines ideas for essences to a genetic phenomenology that accounts for the idea in time as it develops and a body of knowledge that increases throughout history. This shift suggests a movement towards a Humean empiricism, except Husserl is still committed to a transcendental account.

It might appear that Deleuze has now reunited empiricism with epistemology where epistemology is the dominant focus of all empiricism when he states the "problem of truth" is the "critical problem of subjectivity itself" in the prior quote. The problem of truth is certainly an important problem, and is a dominating focus of modern philosophy, particularly with the rise of science, and contemporary philosophy, particularly in the analytic tradition. Yet, Deleuze is quick to modify this claim by expanding the scope of activities and ideas of the mind. He writes:

> We are also subjects in another respect, that is, in (and by) the moral, aesthetic, or social judgment. In this sense, the subject reflects and is reflected upon. It extracts from that which affects it in general a power independent of the actual exercise, that is, a pure function, and then transcends its own partiality.

[147] For Hume and Deleuze, the imagination is a faculty that produces the new, transcends the given, but it does this in part by breaking the given down to component parts and then reassembling them. Deleuze will develop a theory of territorialization and deterritorialization that mirrors the activity of the imagination.

> Consequently, artifice and invention have been made possible. The subject invents; it is the maker of artifice. Such is the dual power of subjectivity: to believe and to invent, to assume the secret powers and to presuppose abstract or distinct powers.[148]

Thus, the problem of truth may be critical, but any form of judgment raises the same issues in the problem of subjectivity. All acts by the subject are expressed within a subjective structure of belief and invention and objectivity itself arises in these actions. In this sense, epistemology is no different than aesthetics or ethics. In the original given of experience, the mind is a collection of sensational images and affects, but there are no ideas of powers or the exercising (of power), just as there are no ideas of an underlying subject. It is empiricism's contention that these ideas emerge as the effects of the principles of human nature, carried out in part by what is called the imagination, which first creates ideas as image copies of sense impressions. The subsequently invented ideas are believed, which means the human subject takes ownership and deploys that which is created in an intentional structure. These additions are incorporated into the entire assemblage that composes the mind. Thus the whole, the operation of the whole, transforms and evolves, as previous assemblages invent ideas and systemize the collection. For empiricism, power is understood to be that which underlies any kind of action taken, a hidden potential that the hidden subject can claim ownership to when it becomes bound up in a faculty. An action becomes an exercising of a power, the practicing of a craft, once the idea of a power is established as an effect of the processes of abstraction by a subject. Abstraction relies upon the invention of transcendent ideas, in this case a power, and the invention of a subject that abstracts, and when abstracted far enough an idea becomes independent even of the subject.

Part of the difficulty in accounting for belief and invention is that these two powers don't seem to go well together. If something is an invention, a product of the imagination, there are no rational grounds for belief. The human subject believes that which is not there, and yet the very construction of the subject itself and these objects of judgment are based on this transition, the transcending of the given. Deleuze writes:

> In these two senses [to believe and to invent], the subject is normative; it creates norms or general rules. We must explain and find the foundation, law, or principle of this dual power—this dual exercise of general rules. This is the problem. For nothing escapes our knowledge as radically as the power of Nature, and nothing is more futile for our understanding than the distinction between powers and their exercise. How can we assume or distinguish them? To believe is to infer one part of nature from another, which

[148] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 86.

> is not given. To invent is to distinguish powers and to constitute functional totalities or totalities that are not given in nature.[149]

For Kant, normativity is part of the essence of humanity. The moral law, as well as the principles of understanding and sensibility, are within us as the very conditions of experience and judgment. Empiricism does not presume there are laws and principles as transcendental subjective conditions. Instead, empiricism attempts to account for the emergence of perceived laws and principles by beginning with an originally passive collection and the activity upon that collection of what are considered original instincts, which is referred to as nature. Empiricism traces normativity back to believing and inventing, both of which involve transcending nature, the original given. But there is a problem in speaking of nature, of grounding the mind in nature; nature is outside experience, which is where empiricism radically begins.

In the effort to find the ground for the emergence of the human subject, a wall is hit at the level of nature, which could also be called the given. A problem of empiricism is its presupposition-less foundation; the starting point is shrouded in darkness. There is no experience of that which produces the original given, sensual and affective impressions and the principles of nature, or the powers of nature. Empiricism gives an account of how subjectivity can arise from the given, but has no way of accounting for the production of the given itself, or nature itself. Empiricism is a study of experience with a definitive starting point, the mind composed of its original assemblage of impressions and affects, which is the beginning of experience, our primal experience.

4.5 Criticizing a Problematic Philosophy

Deleuze's Humean empiricism is problematic. It questions how subjectivity and our existing belief system came to be and provides a hypothesis of how human nature has effects that transcend the effects of nature. There have been many critiques and objections of Hume and empiricism's radical philosophical approach and its consequences. Deleuze offers a standard for deciding which critiques are legitimate. The standard is that others must address the question that is asked rather than the consequences of the question. This is the standard because the root of empiricism is a question. Deleuze writes:

> It follows that we cannot raise against Hume any objections we wish. It is not a matter of saying: he pulverized and atomized the given. It is only a matter of knowing whether the question he raises is the most rigorous possible. Hume posits the question of the subject and situates it in the following terms: *the subject is*

[149] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 86.

> *constituted inside the given*. He presents the conditions of possibilities and the criticism of the question in the following way: *relations are external to ideas*. As for atomism and associationism, these are but the implications developed from *this* question. If we want to object, it is this question that we must assess, and nothing else: really, there is nothing else.[150]

The "subject is constituted inside the given" is not literally a question, but Deleuze is positing it as the hypothesis of empiricism. Empiricism asks for an account of the emergence and belief of the idea of subjectivity within a mind that begins with experience. The hypothesis leads the enquiry and investigation into the consequences of this possibility. To fundamentally criticize Hume, and empiricism, one must address the root of its thinking. Associationism and atomism are consequences of this root question. If the subject is constituted in the given, then the given itself does not originally include the subject. The empiricist posits as the most basic question to the situation at hand, the question that puts the most at stake in our current standpoint, that of subjectivity and the subject, and asks how this idea and belief came to be constituted. In asking this basic question the empiricist must hypothesize that the subject is constituted within the given. Atomism is a theory of the given, in which primal experience is composed of assemblages of sensation and there is a limit in terms of the smallest perceivable image, an imagistic atom. Associationism is the theory that relations are external to their terms. If they were not external, then the atoms of sensation and the impressions of reflection, the terms, would alone be enough to constitute the subject as part of the given. But then it would not be correct to say that the subject is constituted in the given. The subject would not be constituted at all. The subject would be given. Thus separating atoms and relations as an original dualism is a necessary consequences of Hume's hypothesis that the subject is not given, that one can question the subject's constitution. To truly engage empiricism, one must engage this question that gets to the heart of our experience, the question of the subject and subjectivity.

It is worthwhile to consider a legitimate critique of Hume and empiricism. Deleuze writes, "In truth, only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question, that it does not force the nature of things enough, that it should be raised in another way, that we should raise it in a better way, or that we should raise a different question. It is exactly in this way that a great philosopher objects to another: for example, as we will see later, this is how Kant criticizes Hume."[151] There are many similarities between Hume and Kant. Both philosophers begin with the subject and its experience, in terms of starting with mental phenomena and the limits of the mind. In both, the principles of reason are divided from the principles of sensibility. In between reason and sensibility are the principles of the imagination, which act as the bridge that enables the mature subject to experience and connect sensibility to the understanding through images. For both

[150] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 107.
[151] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 107.

philosophers, the imagination is the key faculty for a functioning human subject. Hume asks how the imagination transforms principles and powers into faculties, from nature and human nature to the subject, world and knowledge. Kant posits the imagination as the necessary faculty for there being images at all, whether solely of the understanding in a pure idea or as an external representation where the products of sensibility and understanding are produced and linked together in an image.

With any dualism, there is a question of how one can account for interaction, connection, or even parallel action across the divide that separates what is distinct. There are various dualisms in a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism, from associations and impressions to experience of the given and subjective experience that goes beyond the given. One must ask about the relationship between the level of nature, which constitutes the given, and the level of human nature, which transcends the given. Deleuze writes:

> This relation between nature and human nature, between the powers that are at the origin of the given and the principles that constitute a subject within the given, must be thought of as an accord, for the accord is a fact. The problem of this accord provides empiricism with a real metaphysics, that is, with the problem of purposiveness: what kind of accord is there between the collection of ideas and the association of ideas, between the rule of nature and the rule of representations, between the rule of reproduction of natural phenomena and the rule of the reproduction of mental representations?[152]

It is confusing that Deleuze would say the fact of the accord, and the problem of the accord, is a metaphysical problem. He cannot mean that the empiricist is now forced to consider and accept that there are transcendental conditions beneath the collection that composes the mind. This would no longer be empiricism, which pushes one to start with experience, a strictly *a posteriori* beginning. An *empirical* metaphysics gives as answer to the question of the accord an account for how the apparent agreement across nature and human nature as experienced is constituted. It is easy for an empiricist at this point to betray empiricism and posit an outside transcendental creative ego that is responsible for the accord. Kant will turn the tables and argue whatever is outside in nature as objectively constituted must conform itself to human nature if it is to be subjectively experienced. But the empiricist will take a different route and consider what is originally given in experience, and this is where Hume and Deleuze first give an account of the consititution of a radical purposiveness in the original given. Included in the given as passively constituted, in respect to a subjective agent, and passively connected are not only impressions

[152] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 109.

and the principles of association, but passions and principles of affectivity.[153] The empiricist will then need to give an account of purposiveness as it develops, changes and incorporates itself as the given is transcended by human nature. Deleuze will point out a series of stages between the given and the fully formed subject, between the action of powers and the exercise of faculties by an underlying subject. Deleuze will lay out how Hume begins with the principles of association and the principles of passion, a dualism of processes that account for purposiveness itself, which requires both a structure (association) and direction (passions). Hume and Deleuze will argue the principles of passion must come first, though both work successively together through a series of transformative stages to construct the mature subjective mind.

Kant's argument is that Hume's empiricism cannot account for the accord between human nature and nature. How is it that what is produced through the imagination fits or agrees with what is produced by nature? How is it that the processes are able to process the particular content produced by nature, to connect with actual content, and to form associations between these particular contents? The mind that transcends itself becomes the subject exercising faculties. How is it that a subject exercising faculties, a product of the imagination, a creation, is in accord with the already existing nature? Kant's contention is that Hume's only argument is that the accord is merely accidental and appears to work in both directions, nature is in accord with human nature and human nature is in accord with nature. This would be a fortunate accident for Hume, but Kant will not accept an accidental accordance where mere chance justifies and explains the accord. Kant argues that without this chance connection for Hume, the processes of association would lie dormant and never come to light. In order for the principles of human nature to be disclosed, they must actively be applied. Kant's rejection of chance forces him to conclude that the imagination must already have synthesized the established rules for creating images and constructed the framework of image and relation, such that nature conforms to this pre-existing, *a priori*, system and rules that form the most general objects. In the first edition of the transcendental deduction, in the section titled, "The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination," Kant writes, "There must then be something which, as the *a priori*, ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible...this synthesis of imagination is likewise grounded, antecedently to all experience, upon *a priori* principles, and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of all experience."[154] Kant's question is appropriately addressed to the efficacy of the question. Kant is not arguing that the question of the subject creates consequences that are in conflict with a reality that transcends the theory. He retains the principles of a critical philosophy that works within the limits of experience. Does Hume's problematization of the subject push things far enough to deal with the accord between nature and subject? Deleuze argues that Hume

[153] Eventually, Deleuze will include concepts as passively constituted when encountered as bundles of conceptual difference. In *What is Philosophy*, Deleuze will develop his tripartite set of givens: percepts, affects and concepts.
[154] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Toronto: Macmillan, 1929), 132-3. Also cited in: Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 110.

has an answer beyond accidental accordance without abrogating to a Kantian transcendental condition. This answer involves following the mix of the principles of association and principles of passion as the mind successively matures within purposiveness.

If nature conforms to the imagination as Kant argues, the imagination must be fully developed before experience. The *a priori* synthesis of the imagination means that the principles of the imagination are capable of producing both pure objects of the imagination and the relations between them. There is thus a transcendental synthesis in the imagination and a transcendental subjectivity that accounts for the unity of apperception. Kant writes, "For if we can show that even our purest *a priori* institutions yield no knowledge, save in so far as they contain a combination of the manifold such as renders a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproductions possible, then... experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproductibility of appearances."[155] Thus, Kant rejects associationism, which asserts relations are independent of the objects and cannot have a single or simple origin. But for Kant, in order to be able to reproduce experience, the framework must already have been producible *a priori*. This is why Kant is not an empiricist. Kant's main hypothesis is that the given must conform to the already formed subject.

In Deleuze's first book, he does not address whether Kant or Hume is more convincing. Deleuze writes, "We need not attempt this assessment here; it belongs to philosophy, and not to the history of philosophy."[156] For Deleuze to assume history makes no general judgments seem naïve, yet to explicitly take sides or definitively engage Kant's criticism is not necessary. Though, it speaks in favor of Hume that Deleuze will go on for the rest of his career to identify as an empiricist. Kant's criticism ultimately fails to account for the complex nature of the historical mind as it progresses. Kant provides a theory of the logical conditions of subjectivity, outside time, rather than the real or actual conditions within time. The effects of nature and human nature are entangled and successively build upon each other to create a whole that cannot then be put in a simple correspondence with nature or even successfully disentangled. Nor is there a simple genesis where subjectivity develops and grows from a simple origin. Like Kant's transcendental idealism, empiricism is limited to mental content and processing. But for empiricism, the mental is the physical in consciousness, the interplay of impressions, reflections, affects is a physics. Mental objects, effects and processes literally interact with each other to create new wholes with new objects, effects and processes. And anything outside experience, or outside empiricism's derivation back to nature's given, is left a mystery.

Deleuze provides a clue to how he might explain Kant's philosophy next to Hume's. He finds in Hume the mapping of a transformation that repeats itself. The original given is always passive, but when associated with a subject becomes active. Deleuze writes, "we always encounter the same transformation: time was *the structure* of the mind, now the subject is

[155] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, (Macmillan, Toronto, 1929), p. 132-3.
[156] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 107.

presented as *the synthesis* of time."[157] The given structure is transformed into the effect of an active process of the subject. Acts of synthesis are the force behind Kant's transcendental apperception, the ultimate synthesis of experience to a single subject. For there to be a unified subject, there must be a synthesis. Hume is charting a course from mind to subject, from the passive given to the active subject that transcends the given. Kant's theory works with the mature mind, the already formed subject. Hume traces the evolution of the mind by asking how the subject emerged, rather than assuming the subject is a condition of experience. If empiricism is to begin with the given, it must begin passively.

Finally, why question subjectivity at all? With respect to modern philosophy, problematizing subjectivity must be taken as a very radical step. In Descartes' search for certainty, he finds the one thing he cannot doubt, the one thing he cannot question, is the ego thinking thoughts. The self as the center and foundation of consciousness is taken for granted by most of Western Philosophy. Subjectivity is a persistent brick in many of their tenuous and shrinking foundations. Kant's transcendental idealism needs the transcendental ego as the transcendental agent of synthesis. Then there is the dominate heritage active in French philosophy of the early 20th Century, *the three H's*, from which Deleuze is distinguishing himself by taking up Hume and empiricism. Hegel's philosophy doesn't begin with a subject and this brings Hegel initially in line with empiricism, but its first move is the positing of a subject as a solution to the initial problem of experience, a lack of identity and sameness. This first move is made in the context of realizing the ultimate identity, something already transcendentally present and shaping the teleology of each movement – the Absolute Idea. Thus the possibility of a Hegelian empiricism is always embedded in the context of German Idealism – a transcendental, teleological, universal soul or spirit of the world, something like a God-ego. Husserl's transition to the transcendental is a transition from a particular ego lost in the natural standpoint to the transcendental ego in a transcendental standpoint. There is always an ego in phenomenology. Heidegger asks at the beginning of Introduction to Metaphysics, "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?"[158] For early Heidegger, Being and Dasein, the being that asks of its own being, are central. There is Being and beings, and it is Dasein, which in asking of its own being, that reveals the nature of Being. But this dichotomy is challenged by Hume and Deleuze that write about something beyond Being, not nothing, and the ground of being and the subject. Ultimately, Hume has found a way to question the ego, the subject, that persistent brick.

4.6 Existential Considerations

[157] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 94.
[158] Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 1.

A Humean-Deleuzian empiricism is existential and can be seen as a forerunner to existential phenomenology and existentialism. Martin Heidegger's early work was labeled 'existential phenomenology' due to its focus on revealing the meaning of Being through an interrogation that begins with the human subject, dasein, as dasein finds itself, already involved, thrown into, and inseparable from a world that begins instrumentally, or pragmatically. This work influenced Jean-Paul Sartre and his development of 'existentialism.' Existentialism was summarized by Sartre in a basic tenet, "existence precedes essence."[159] For the ego, one must first do and experience something, exist, before one can be something, have an essence. The subject begins undefined. A Humean-Deleuzian empiricism also begins with existence in the above two senses. The empiricist questions the subject as she finds herself inextricably imbedded. The empiricist begins with and as a subject already thrown into the world, already incorporating beliefs that transcend the given. The empiricist also turns away from investigating a transcendental ground of possible experience, essence, and instead investigates an existential ground of actual experience. But there appears to be a clash between a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism and existentialism. Sartre's existentialism strongly denies human nature. Human nature, as well as nature, is the same in Sartre's existentialism. It is an essence. And for the human subject, there is no prior human nature, which *is* the freedom that humans must face or else live in bad faith. Though, human nature in empiricism is *not* the fixed essential characteristic that existentialism denies. An empirical human nature originates from the description of activity, the consistent associations that form among the contents that compose the mind, which come to be taken as principles and explain the emergence of a subject. Existentialism already begins with subjectivity, but it is an empty ego, a consciousness of that cannot be defined. Empiricism begins before the ego, before subjectivity, with experience that is without subjectivity. A rejection of human nature, as something outside history, a fixed universal essence, is also something that Foucault would endorse.[160] Foucault begins with subjectivity as a given and researches how the subject is subjected throughout history by cultural structures and power such that what it means to be a subject changes. Human nature attempts to fix something that is for Foucault historical and subject to change, or for existentialism, something that is radically free. In empiricism, human nature doesn't define or fix the subject, it produces subjectivity and a belief in subjectivity, which then is defined and shaped, voluntarily or through cultural forces.

Empiricism distinguishes itself by positing a given that is before subjectivity, which is motivated by problematizing subjectivity itself, rather than one particular kind or instance of a subject. The given is not the starting point of empirical enquiry. The empiricist, like the existential phenomenologist, starts as she is thrown into an experience, an experience flush with transcendent beliefs. The empiricist questions transcendence and this projects the enquiry towards a given, an immanence that is grounds for transcendence. Empiricism must explain, describe and characterize the given. Deleuze writes:

[159] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 20.
[160] See Chapter 2 – Foucault's Problem of the Subject.

> But what is the given? It is, says Hume, the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions. It is the totality of that which appears, being which equals appearance; it is also movement and change without identity or law. We use the terms "*imagination*" and "*mind*" not to designate a faculty or a principle of organization, but rather a particular set or a particular collection. Empiricism begins from the experience of a collection, or from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. In fact, its principle, that is, the constitutive principle giving a status to experience, is not that 'Every idea derives from an impression' whose sense is only regulative; but rather that 'everything separable is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different.'[161]

There are two elements of the given, existence and difference. Though it isn't explicitly stated, it is Berkeley that first strongly connects the given with existence in *Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710). For Berkeley, existence is restricted to that which is given in sensible experience. Thus what exists is that which is perceived, *to be is to be perceived*.[162] These objects are not representations of things; they are the things. For Berkeley, there are subjects and perceptions and that is existence. The given of Hume follows the same logic, that which is given are impressions, or appearances, not objects. But Hume departs from Berkeley in giving existence to subjects. For Hume, mind and imagination are defined merely as collections, sets of these impressions. These sets are filled with different impressions and those different impressions become part of an increasing set. The flux of impressions produces the characteristic of change and motion. Existence as appearance is also existence as difference, as flux.

Deleuze is attempting to think and present the given in itself. The principle that all ideas are derived from impressions gives chronological priority to impressions. It does not merely have a regulative sense, as Deleuze argues, but it is mainly used to discard ideas that lack this derivation. It can become merely regulative for someone attacking metaphysics. The alternative principle that Deleuze gives to define the given is attempting to describe experience at its most basic level. As a collection, the given must be composed of elements. To be an element, something must be distinguishable and to be distinguishable, something must be different than that which it is distinguished. Existence is perception. Existence is a collection. Experience of a

[161] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 87.

[162] "That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by anyone that shall attend to what is meant by the term *exist* when applied to sensible things... Their [any object's] *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them." George Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues*, edit. Howard Robinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 edition), §3, 25.

collection must be a process of distinguishing that which composes the collection. To distinguish is to experience differentiation.

The given is a collection and experience is the way in which the given is given. As a collection, the given is a plurality. Thus, existence is a pluralism too and experience is experiencing pluralism. Deleuze writes, "Therefore, experience is succession, or the movement of separable ideas, insofar as they are different, and different, insofar as they are separable. We must begin with *this* experience because it is *the* experience. It does not presuppose anything else and nothing else precedes it. It is not the affection of an implicated subject, nor the modification or mode of a substance. If every discernible perception is a separate existence, '[it has] no need of any thing to support [its] existence.'"[163] At its most basic, experience is a succession of differentiations of existing elements. There is no underlying subject, as Berkeley assumes. The "affection of an implicated subject" is not understood as referencing affects, which are part of the given, but rather the assumption that an underlying subject 'feels' the impressions. Nor are the differences modes of one substance, as Spinoza postulates in theorizing a radical monism. Existence is truly plural and experience of the given is not subjective.

4.6.1 Kant's Existential Critique of Rationalism

In translator Constantin Boundas' Introduction to *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, he references Vincente Descombes as a commentator that was early to point out this embracement of empiricism by some contemporary French philosophers.[164] Descombes wrote the survey, "Modern French Philosophy," as an introduction to French philosophy for an "Anglo-Saxon" audience.[165] In a section titled "The Search for a Transcendental Empiricism," Descombes presents Deleuze as articulating a position outside the limits of rationalism by focusing upon difference itself.[166] Descombes writes: "What eludes this rationalism, then, is difference as such. The difference between *discovery* and *rediscovery* is the gap which separates an experience from

[163] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 87-8. The Hume quote: David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edit. L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1896), Section 1.4.5 ¶5, 233.
[164] Constantin Boundas, "Translator's Introduction," in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 4.
[165] Alan Montefiore, "Forward," in *Modern French Philosophy*, by Vincent Descombes, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), viii.
[166] Despite this acknowledgement of empiricism's role, Descombe clearly sees Deleuze as having a Kantian heritage, not a Humean one. He writes, "Gilles Deleuze is above all a post-Kantian. His thought is subsequent to Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, in which the ideas of the soul, of the world and of God are criticized. No experience can justify us in affirming a single substantial self, a totality of things and a first cause of this totality." [Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 152.]

its reiteration – whence the problem of *repetition*."[167] The problem of repetition, for the rationalist, is evident when the two iterations are most similar, when they are basically indistinguishable. The traditional rationalist relies solely on a priori categories to wholly constitute the concepts of these iterations. The rationalist will then posit a single concept for each instance of the object and since the iterations are a repetition, in each instance the concepts are identical. Thus for the rationalist, the difference between instances is entirely lost because the conceptual apparatus cannot account for difference in identical repetition. Descombes notes that the correction for Deleuze on the grounds of his empiricist critique is that "[r]epetition should therefore cease to be defined as the return of the same through the reiteration of the identical; on the contrary, it is the *production* (in both senses of the word: to bring into existence, to show) of difference."[168] It is the experience of repetition, the empirical experience of repetition, which allows one to enter a hospitable ground for difference as such to emerge. Empiricism stakes a claim to expose something outside the scope of rationalism. Blindness to difference appears to be an irresolvable criticism of rationalism, though to include change would be considered a corruption of universal, unchanging essences.

Abstraction is the isolation of the idea from the object. For a Kantian, the underlying idea for objects of experience are transcendentally synthesized a priori while for an empiricist, those ideas are synthesized products of the imagination that transcend the original flux of impressions. Despite this difference, the act, or process, of abstraction precludes one from the purely empirical and difference itself. Descombes notes that Kant has also argued abstraction leaves existence unrecognized in his argument against the ontological proof of the existence of God. Descombes cites Kant's critique as the germ of "the existential revolt against abstraction." [169] Deleuze clearly finds this critique is already present in Hume's empiricism. Descombes finds that this attack upon abstraction, which is part of Kant's critique of Idealism, was left largely unexplored by continental theorists. Descombes cites the French idealist philosopher Léon Brunschvicg's definition in André Lalande's *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie* (1927) that idealism is to take "*being* and *being known"* as equivalent.[170] He uses an experiment from Kant to show the issue. [171] Consider the idea of an hundred coins from whatever denomination is most dear to you. Now compare the idea of an hundred real coins with the idea of an hundred possible coins. In either case Kant argues the idea of the 100 coins are equivalent. Consequently, the idea of an actual God and the idea of a potential God are the same and the limits of reason preclude us from using an idea of a God, or God, to prove its existence. Concepts are indifferent to existence, though there is undeniably a difference in real wealth when

[167] Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 154, author's emphasis.
[168] Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 154, author's emphasis.
[169] Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, 19.
[170] Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, 19, author's emphasis.
[171] Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, 19, author's emphasis.

one has the money at hand. Existence, Kant points out for us, escapes rationalism's a priori, ideal structure of conceptualization and predication.

Consider the paragon of rationalism and idealism, Plato, and his goal of disclosing the abstract as truth. The platonic idea is universal, fixed, the same. While the objects that participate in the idea, which are recognized as corrupted, shadow instances of the idea, are varied, changing and different. The empiricist finds that abstraction sheds both difference and sensation, casts both as composing a corrupted, illusory shadow world, and this allows the ideal to emerge as an indifferent universal that is eternal, unchanging and pure all along. This rationalism and idealism that is inhospitable to difference and existence, motivates the empiricist to turn towards a different ground.

Positioned against a rationalistic idealism, empiricism seeks a ground that aims to retain the encounter with this existential difference in experience, an empirical idealism. In a later work, Deleuze contrasts an 'abstraction' to a rational (or a priori) essence with an 'emancipation' to an empirical (or a posteriori) essence. The empirical essence is a free and open image that contrasts with the fixed and closed image of an abstracted essence. The transition from abstraction to emancipation is the key to retaining and revealing existence and difference. In *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*, Deleuze writes:

> In other words, the essence of the cinematographic movement-image lies in extracting from vehicles or moving bodies the movement which is their common substance, or extracting from movements the mobility which is their essence. This was what Bergson wanted: beginning from the body or moving thing to which our natural perception attaches movement as if it were a vehicle, to extract a simple coloured 'spot', the movement-image, which 'is reduced in itself to a series of extremely rapid oscillations' and 'is in reality only a movement of movements'. Now, because Bergson only considered what happened in the apparatus (the homogenous abstract movement of the procession of images) he believed the camera to be incapable of that which the apparatus is in fact most capable, eminently capable of: the movement-image – that is, pure movement extracted from bodies or moving things. This is not an abstraction, but an emancipation. It is always a great moment in the cinema, as for example in Renoir, when the camera leaves a character, and even turns its

> back on him, following its own movement at the end of which it will rediscover him.[172]

In switching from abstraction to emancipation, Deleuze is able to isolate images, without transcending the image to a pure idea. Thus one never loses difference as happens in an abstraction, which is necessarily transcendent. Deleuze is developing an empirical theory where images are encountered in the actual, i.e. in some determined way, but also immanently. The images are called "essences," and are in fact encountered in experience, in the flow and composition of images.

Deleuze is referring in the above quote to Bergson's contention that cinema is incapable of presenting a movement-image. This critique is based on the physical format of film, a sequence of fixed images or cells. Thus, Bergson contends one is never truly given an image of movement in film, which requires a span of change. Instead, cinema presents arbitrary slices, the individual cells of the film negative that are shuttled through the film projector one frame at a time. As fixed images, even though they are serial, Bergson argues the medium misses altogether the continuity and indivisibility of movement and change itself. Deleuze disagrees and this fits in with his Humean empiricism. Just as Hume contends there is a perceptual atom of sensation in terms of size – a grain of sand, I would argue on Deleuze's behalf that there is also a perceptual atom of sensation in terms of speed. Cinema presents the series of images at a speed such that we do not see a series of still images, we see one continuous image of moving objects. This is why Deleuze argues Bergson was looking at the instrument, the projector, instead of the screen, the image. The image on the cinema screen is not still. This technology is able to produce the seamless image of moving objects. The movement-image emancipates movement itself from an image of moving objects. There is yet a further emancipation that emancipates time from movement. This produces what Deleuze calls the 'time-image.'

In Cinema I, Deleuze describes the complexity of movement and this empirical essence that distinguishes units of movement at various levels and in various parts that are all in direct relation to each other as members of one immanent set. The result is a proliferation of images of becoming, change, and endurance. Each of the impressions are felt as experience. Opposed to a rationalistic idealism, variation and change itself are not lost in the empirical approach, they are finally isolated and highlighted in experience. There is always a plurality of movement in relation, or potentially awaiting relation, to the other movements. Deleuze continues:

> By procuring in this way a mobile section of movements, the shot is not content to express the duration of a whole which changes, but constantly puts bodies, parts, aspects, dimensions, distances and the respective positions of the bodies which make up a set in the image into variation. The one comes about through the other. It

[172] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema I: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 23.

> is because pure movement varies the elements of the set by dividing them up into fractions with different denominators – because it decomposes and recomposes the set – that it also relates to a fundamentally open whole, whose essence is constantly to 'become' or to change, to endure; and vice versa.[173]

Note the language of cinema. The shot is not a still. The shot covers a span of time. One sees moving objects and movement itself. But the shot is also not a single movement. The decomposes into parts, but this is not a simple decomposition where the mutually exclusive parts from a straightforward physical dissection add up to the original whole. A part must be complete in itself of a distinct movement. There is a motion of the whole body standing to attention. There is also the motion of the hand, obviously also part of the body, reaching out to wait for the grasp of another hand. These are two distinct movements despite the overlap. Deleuze finds that the focus upon movement-itself, the emancipated image of movement, sets off cascades of further disclosures of other particular movements. And once distinguished, all these movements can then be related to each other, creating a variable flux of relations. Each component of movement also relates back to the largest unit of movement, the movement of everything in the film from start to finish. Outside of film, one can speculate on the movement of the universe from beginning to end. Deleuze calls this totality of movement an open whole because it lacks clear boundaries and delineation which might fix it. The open whole is inclusive of all movements and unites all motion together. This is not a generalization by way of abstraction, which would transcend and cover over existence. The open whole is immanently present in the composition of the mind.

Deleuze is developing an empirical description of consciousness and experience using his expanded sense of image, the moving image. What Deleuze calls essences are not transcendental categories. These essences are components of the mind, an object, not a condition. As components, they are immanently part of experience. Deleuze is describing an existential essence, the emancipated image of pure movement, of becoming.

Existential does not imply the existence of the thing-in-itself, or any such outside object being represented in the image, or causing the image. To say that an entity exists is a transcendence of the given. Existence is not a quality of objects because empirical existence is tied to experience and one never experiences existence. The presence of images, impressions, now defines existence. To posit anything outside the image, the impressions that are present, is to insert a fiction into our experience, the fiction of external, or distinct, existence. Deleuze writes of Hume:

> On the other hand, *distinct existence* rests on an equally false use of causality, that is, on a fictitious and contradictory causality. We affirm a causal relation between the object and our perception of it,

[173] Deleuze, *Cinema I: The Movement-Image*, 23.

> but never do we seize the object independently of the perception that we have of it. We forget that causality is legitimized only when past experience reveals to us the conjunction of *two* entities. In short, continuity and distinctness are outright fictions and illusions of the imagination, since they revolve around, and designate that which, by definition, is not offered to any possible experience, either through the sense or through the understanding.[174]

To be existential is to begin in experience with difference, not to begin with the existence of entities. The empiricist argues that the a priori, which is integral to any rationalism and the Kantian critical project, is invented after the fact. The "fact" here being the succession of images being processed, or as updated by Deleuze to include the movement-image and the time-image, is the totality of experience. This empiricism doesn't deny the a priori, but explains how it is produced. In empiricism, the a priori isn't before experience, but an invented response to an experience that at first is without any anchoring or fixed ground. The existential is an attempt to emancipate experience from inventions like the a priori in order to experience that which is outside the systematization and confinement of abstraction that dominates typical perception.

[174] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 78-9.

Chapter 5 – The Problem of Transcendence

This chapter rethinks the problematizing of subjectivity as a case of problematizing transcendence. The result of this problematizing is revealing immanence. Perhaps controversially, it treats the transcendental as transcendent. But this interpretation of transcendence is not in respect to being outside the subject, but rather being outside experience as experienced. If the conditions of experience are not themselves experienced, then they must be transcendent to experience itself. This is a key argument of Deleuze and will lead to the final chapter that offers the concept of foundation as a contrast to ground. The chapter ends by comparing the implications of Deleuze's radical immanence in empiricism in contrast to transcendental theories of the subject and the embodied subject.

5.1 Immanence and the Problem of Transcendence

Particularly in an empirical philosophy of consciousness that grounds itself in the given of experience, immanence is an important concept that invokes directness, rawness, the given, the unmediated and the unconditioned, but its relevance and importance spreads out to all of philosophy. Typically, immanence is thought dialectically in opposition to transcendence, often on theological matters. This opposition can be mapped out in various ways to a myriad of important distinctions like earthly and divine, material and immaterial, matter and idea, internal and external, concrete and abstract, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, reality and appearance, participant and observer, visible and invisible, body and soul, finite and infinite, nature and god, etc. In Western Philosophy, one can trace this division between immanence and transcendence back to an issue in Plato's philosophy that is commonly referred to as the problem of participation. What is the nature of the relationship between intellectual forms and perceptual material objects? Are forms immanent to a degree, fully immanent, or fully transcendent to the material world?

Descartes' philosophy of substance dualism brought to the main stage the difficult problem of how soul or mind, thinking substance, interacts with bodily, mechanical substance. If material and immaterial substance are mutually exclusive, fully transcendent to each other, there is no way in which they are immanent to each other since there is no point of common ground between them. This raises the question of how the body influences the mind and how is it that the mind might influence the body? If there is causal interaction between the substances, as a material or immaterial physics, Descartes faces major problems in explaining how these causal relations across mutually exclusive substances are possible. In Descartes letter to Princess Elisabeth, where she challenges him on this issue, Descartes suggests there is no division

between body and soul in an active subject when body and soul are united.[175] The union of body and soul, a temporary condition, would be like a third substance. This still leaves open many issues such as how two transcendent substances could possibly be united. The body-soul divide is nothing new and can be found in Platonic myth.[176] Traditionally, the body is immanent and the soul is transcendent. We will find that in Deleuze's Humean Empiricism, that which is given in experience and collectively called the mind is immanent and substantial. The body is an idea formed in the mind that transcends the given. In this sense empiricism's response to Descartes is to posit a substance monism, the substance being that which composes the mind. Instead of beginning with an ego thinking thoughts, in Descartes' case doubts, there are just thoughts (impressions) sans an ego at the beginning. Though Deleuze argues there is a dualism, not of substances, but of mind and nature, which is the duality of structure and content and processing and the processed. And with human nature, the mind transcends itself with respect to the original given.

In Modern Philosophy, a philosophy of immanence usually brings to mind Spinoza and his recasting of God as wholly immanent and one with Nature. Perhaps beginning with Spinoza, the idea of immanence without transcendence, a non-dialectical immanence, is most clearly expressed in Western Philosophy.[177] Dialectical thinking always needs the other side in order to define a term and thus subordinates one side, such as immanence, to the necessity of the other side, such as transcendence. But what would it mean for empiricism to suggest a pure immanence, that which can be thought by itself? Just as Deleuze later attempted with "difference" in *Difference and Repetition*, by separating difference from the same, and giving difference a sense that doesn't subordinate itself to the same, one can try to elicit immanence with respect to itself only. As the focus on difference helps Deleuze to establish a fundamental pluralism, the focus on immanence helps to establish a fundamental monism, which leads to Deleuze's infamous equation, pluralism equals monism.

Hume's radical move to strip away anything transcendent or transcendental in determining the origin of experience confines the given to that which is strictly immanent. With respect to the subject, there is a passivity inherent in this beginning. What is immanent is the passively given by nature whose activity is hidden, or opaque, to experience. This experiential immanence, which gives itself a concrete and absolute beginning when restricted to experience, contrasts with the rationally determined, universal and eternal immanence of Spinoza. With respect to the prior chapter, immanence is the other side of the coin to the problematic nature of

[175] René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 325.
[176] Plato, "The Republic", trans. Paul Shorey, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, edit. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 611c, 836.
[177] From the pre-Socratics, Heraclitus' reflection on fire (change) and Parmenides' reflection on Being are both early instances of attempting to abandon a dualistic doxic system and contemplate a non-dialectical monism. As well Plato's dualism can become a monism when the material objects are taken to be illusions, shadows, insubstantial.

empiricism as the questioning of subjectivity.[178] By questioning subjectivity, by asking how subjectivity arises, one is pointing to an experience prior to subjectivity, a ground that is wiped clean of anything transcendent, that which is entirely immanent. The problem of subjectivity is the problem of transcendence, or how transcendence emerges from pure immanence. With the emergence of subjectivity, there is the emergence of transcendence and the positing by the subject of the transcendental.

5.2 Concern for Immanence

Deleuze's concern for immanence is found throughout his corpus and linked to various philosophers, but his preoccupation with immanence starts in his first book on Hume (1953). Fifteen years later, it is of course a central theme in his book on Spinoza (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 1968), as Spinoza's central argument was against a transcendent God and for the absolute immanence of God and Nature together as one in a radical monism. Deleuze also speaks, with resonances of Heidegger's investigation of the meaning of Being, of the unity expressed in the univocity of Being. Deleuze writes, "The significance of Spinozism seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality...Thus all likeness is univocal, defined by the presence in both cause and effect of a common property." (Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 180) A central idea of expressionism is that an expression does not refer to a transcendent meaning, but instead is meaningful in itself, which produces the concept - immanent meaning. Spinozism maps out how to think of everything, both cause and effect, as an expression, or mode, of the infinite, thus nothing is outside or transcends this absolute and immanent infinite. The key reflection is immanence, thought in terms of itself alone as a radical immanence and not dialectically attached to transcendence. In the expressionism of Spinoza, everything is immanent. In a late text, *What is Philosophy?* (1991), Deleuze with Guattari write, "Spinoza is the vertigo of immanence from which so many philosophers try in vain to escape."[179] Due to these superlative statements, in Deleuzian studies, immanence is closely tied to Spinoza.[180] The rationalism of Spinoza is a meditation on the concept of immanence and the consequences of this radical idea, but with Hume and empiricism, the investigation always turns towards the ground of experience. The empirical investigation reveals immanence as the flux of non-subjective original experience, which is revealed when the subject is put in question and one asks how this transcendence emerges. This flux is free with respect to the impositions made by a subject. In *Capitalism and*

[178] If I am going to use the metaphor of a coin with Deleuze, I should also say that a Deleuzian coin would never be limited to just two sides. Deleuzian coins, as I imagine them, might be better pictured as infinite-sided dice.

[179] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 48.

[180] In his work on Deleuze and Immanence, Christian Kerslake (see bibliography) closely ties immanence in Deleuze to Kant, where the phenomena is immanent and the noumena is transcendent, and to Hegel, whose system tracks the teleological movement of the absolute idea becoming absolutely immanent.

Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari describe pure capitalism as immanence. Here one can read this immanence as a flux that lacks outside mediation, a transcendental regulator. In Deleuze's final essay, "Immanence: A Life," he is still caught within the vertigo of immanence. He states, "[I]t is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence."[181] The plane of immanence is an ultimate image of the whole of the active flux, whether conceptually, perceptually, or affectively, at the level of intensities. This pure immanence is equated by Deleuze with pure life. The metaphor of the plane also resonates with Locke's popularization of the *tabula rasa*, an empiricist commitment to an experiential ground that lacks innate transcendent ideas and begins passively with the given of experience.

Published November 7, 1995 on page A10 in the French news daily *Libération* is Derrida's eulogy to Deleuze.[182] It is titled 'Il me faudra errer tout seul." A translation, from a defunct on-line journal, titles the text, "I'll have to wander all alone."[183] Derrida's initial reflections after the suicide of his respected colleague and friend were in part focused upon the very question of immanence. The final paragraph is:

> I will continue to begin again to read Gilles Deleuze in order to learn, and I'll have to wander all alone in this long conversation that we were supposed to have together. My first question, I think, would have concerned Artaud, his interpretation of the "body without organ[s]," and the word "immanence" on which he always insisted [or held], in order to make him or let him say something that no doubt still remains secret to us. And I would have tried to tell him why his thought has never left me, for nearly forty years. How could it do so from now on?[184]

In the first sentence of the eulogy, Derrida references a verbal agreement between Derrida and himself to publish a future discussion between them. According to Derrida, Deleuze agreed to the project during a car ride while returning from a dissertation defense. With Deleuze's death, this recorded conversation would never come to fruition. Yet Derrida, against the impossibility of having that conversation, begins the conversation in the eulogy. He wants to ask Deleuze about immanence and the "body without organs," which is the immanent body, that body which is unregulated, without a transcendent structure or synthesizing ego. The immanent body can be contrasted with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological lived body. The phenomenological lived body ambiguously combines the body as a transcendental condition to subjectivity and the body, not as a possession, but as the mode in which the subject exists.

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[181] Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on Life*, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 27.
[182] Jacques Derrida, "Il me faudra errer tout seul," *Libération*, November 7, 1995, accessed May 27, 2014, http://next.liberation.fr/culture/1995/11/07/il-me-faudra-errer-tout-seul_149753.
[183] Jacques Derrida, "I'll have to wander all alone," trans. David Kammerman, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.usc.edu/dept/comp-lit/tympanum/1/derrida.html.
[184] Jacques Derrida, "I'll have to wander all alone," trans. David Kammerman, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.usc.edu/dept/comp-lit/tympanum/1/derrida.html.

Perhaps, Leonard Lawlor would also engage Deleuze on the question of immanence. In his book *Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy*, presents four features that in his view *animate* "the great French philosophy of the Sixties."[185] The first feature is immanence. Included in his list of great French philosophy in the sixties is Deleuze, who published his first recognized master work *Difference and Repetition* in 1968. This is fifteen years after his first book on Hume, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, which this dissertation is extensively mining. Lawlor's book focuses on early twentieth century continental philosophy, but his selection of philosophers and texts are intended to present the lines of thought that ultimately lead in a coherent and continuous way to the groundbreaking French philosophy of the 1960's. Lawlor intends to show that this groundbreaking philosophy in fact has its own unbroken ground. If we consider immanence to be an empiricist theme, then Lawlor is arguing empiricist themes like immanence are a driving force behind the innovation in this period of philosophy. Of course for a rationalist like Spinoza, immanence is an idea that is logically unfolded. In the case of Lawlor's book, immanence is interpreted as primary and originary, a starting point for philosophical theorizing and lived experience. Though, Lawlor's interpretation of immanence differs from a Humean-Deleuzean account. Lawlor writes, "...where immanence is understood first as internal, subjective experience, but then due to the universality of the epoché, immanence is understood as ungrounded experience..."[186] Here, Lawlor sets forth a phenomenological interpretation of immanence in this work that ties immanence to subjective experience, whether a particular subject or a universal subject. Immanence is understood to be that which is experienced, whether in the natural attitude of a specific subjective "I" and a real objective world or the experience of the transcendental and the universal ego, a "transcendental I" and the transcendental objects of consciousness that are no longer grounded in an external world. There is thus the initially naïve immanence of a subject's experience, which takes place internally though this is not always evident to a subject engaged with an outside world, and then a phenomenological immanence of the pure ego and pure concepts which is only explicitly experienced through the practice of phenomenology. While a Humean-Deleuzian account agrees that immanence is a key animating feature of the French philosophy of the 1960s, immanence is not taken as the starting point of philosophical reflection and inquiry, and all experience is not automatically immanent. Empirical philosophy begins with the mature mind asking questions, putting into question various accepted interpretations and systems of belief, and these belief systems rely upon transcendent objects and subjects that are not immanent. In fact, empiricism begins with the problem of the transcendent. Just as before, empiricism began with the problem of the subject. If we accept this starting point, the consequence is turning towards an absolutely immanent beginning and these transcendent objects and subjects are found to be partially created from the powers of the imagination, and thus carry, at least partially, a fictional status. By empiricism critical questioning, immanence is revealed as the original given of experience, which is unconditioned by the principles of human

[185] Leonard Lawlor, *Early Twentieth-century Continental Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), viii.
[186] Lawlor, *Early Twentieth-century Continental Philosophy*, viii.

nature, a naturally given totality or collection that comes before and the grounds for the emergence of transcendental mental objects. Immanence is the natural starting point; a mind composed of the given of experience. Transcendence is an expression of human nature, the imagination and reason. There is a shift here that mirrors the shift that Lawlor has indicated of immanence as grounded to ungrounded experience. The problem of the transcendent reveals a transcendence that must transcend a prior ground. This is immanence as the ground of transcendence. Then there is the immanence that recognizes nothing prior to it as transcendentally outside, ungrounded immanence. An ungrounded immanence is experience without transcendental conditions or transcendent objects of belief. Lawlor's conception of grounded-ness is connected with phenomenology's transition from a concrete subjectivity embedded in a world of independent objects to the transcendental ego that detaches from the natural world of independent objects, thus ungrounded, and focuses upon the pure transcendental ego and its pure intentional objects of consciousness.

In the first appendix of Lawlor's *Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy*, he revisits the idea of immanence, particularly focusing on Deleuze (and Guattari). Here, Lawlor places immanence in the context of anti-Platonism, or as an early Deleuze called it "reversing Platonism." Lawlor gives two senses to the word immanence. This first sense is oppositional. One turns from a transcendent world to an immanent world, from transcendent ideas to inner experience.[187] Though it is not entirely clear how inner experience differs from transcendent ideas. Lawlor still appears to be using a phenomenological sense of immanence that relies upon a transcendental reduction, rather than an empirical sense of immanence that drops inner experience and the necessity of subjective experience. Transcendent ideas and a transcendent world are posited as outside experience. This raises the question of how one might possibly turn one's gaze away from it. The second sense of immanence is becoming. Lawlor traces this back to Husserl and Bergson and the temporal structure of experience. A structure defined by retention and repetition along an open span captures this sense of becoming. Yet becoming can be opposed

[187] Lawlor claims this move from transcendence to immanence is part of our Cartesian heritage that is the natural consequence of anti-Platonism. I take issue with this claim and find Descartes' work preserves Platonism inside rationalism in light of the scientific revolution. Descartes' substance dualism, maintains that all thought and thinking substances are transcendent from extension, physical substances and mechanical bodies. Descartes walls off the body from thought, experience, and subjectivity. "Inner experience," then, contains the language of both transcendence by way of the soul, and immanence by way of experience, which closely matches phenomenological immanence. Inner experience as the experience of the transcendent ego, whether in the particular or universal, is quite close to Plato's soul contemplating the forms as images. Thus, this is never a pure immanence. Interestingly, the idea of infinite, or the human mind encountering an idea that is beyond or transcends her own finite being, is central to Descartes' system and part of a controversial step in the *Meditations*. This actually resonates with Deleuze's study of encountering Frances Bacon's paintings. Deleuze would read this encounter as leading to the immanent, possibly Descartes' only moment of immanence, because the actual idea of infinite escapes all the transcendent structures that cover over immanent experience. Though for Descartes, he would not use the language of transcendent structures. His reasoning about the experience of infinite rests on a Scholastic theory of formal and objective reality, which restricts a formally finite object from creating an infinite representative idea. Though, Descartes rejection of dogmatism, his insistence on philosophical method and independent confirmation are themes, ironically also found in Plato, which will lead one to look for an immanent ground of experience, as the empiricists carry out.

to being, and can be understood as the passage towards being. Becoming needs being. Becoming only emerges as an idea once the mind has transcended itself and being is posited by the imagination. The image of a plane of immanence lacks a traditional temporal structure, which tends to be a linear model. The plane of immanence moves in all directions at once, which can be mapped to an expanded sense of temporality. We need a third sense of immanence for Deleuze. This is the idea of difference itself differing.

At this point, it should be apparent that immanence is an important feature or characteristic to contemporary continental philosophy, but there are many types of immanence that compete against each other: Kantian, phenomenological, Spinozan, Hegelian, empirical.

5.3 Distinguishing a Humean-Deleuzian Empirical Immanence

To fully understand what is meant by immanence in a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism, I will try to clear up what I believe are two common misconceptions of Deleuze and the origin of his work. Deleuze's work is often tied to Kantianism and phenomenology, which tends to obscure the empiricism in his work. To do this, I first turn to the issue of immanence and the label of *Transcendental Empiricism*, which is used by Deleuze and others to describe Deleuze's philosophy. This label always places Deleuze in the context of Kantianism and transcendental idealism. The aim is to establish the incompatibility of assuming an original transcendental ground alongside the immanence of empiricism. Following this point, immanence is considered within the context of phenomenology, and specifically a corporeal phenomenology. This will distinguish two types of immanence, with respect to corporeal phenomenology and to empiricism. In the following section, immanence is considered within empiricism as anti-representational experience.

5.3.1 The Kantian Transcendental

A major difficulty in Deleuzian studies is the attempt to understand what Deleuze means when he refers to his work as transcendental empiricism. This term is not used in his first book on empiricism, but shows up later in *Difference and Repetition* and makes appearances after that. There are labored attempts to reconcile this awkward marriage of terms. It is my contention that the phrase "transcendental empiricism" is intended to confuse rather than clarify. Placing "transcendental" next to "empiricism" was intended to have a performative effect, as a joke that exposes an absurdity, rather than being a meaningful reference. In other words, rather than specify any meaningful theory, it was meant to play out the contradiction in terms, to give the experience of the impenetrable – an *aporia* – that there can be no transcendental empiricism.

And like Plato, the aporia either leads nowhere or opens up a deeper analysis indebted to the creativity of the intellect.

In a similar interpretation, Claire Colebrook considers transcendental empiricism to be a challenge for the reader. She writes:

> [W]e will look at Deleuze's explicit description of his own philosophy as 'transcendental empiricism', a term he used in his earlier work (*Difference and Repetition*, published in French in 1968) right up until *What is Philosophy?* [*published in 1991*] his much later work with Guattari. The main point is that Deleuze did not see transcendental empiricism as a theory; it was a challenge. Most *transcendental* philosophies have some sort of transcendental foundation that explains experience, the most usual being the 'subject'. But Deleuze constantly seeks freedom from any single ground or origin, precisely because he strives to think life as becoming rather than being. Transcendental *empiricism* therefore uses the concept of 'empiricism' – the concept of experience or given-ness – to think of an experience, life or becoming that has no ground outside itself.[188]

Colebrook identifies the essence of a transcendental philosophy to be the use of a transcendental foundation, which is transcendent to experience, to explain experience. From outside experience, this explanation grounds experience within a meaningful and stable structure. Transcendentalism also assumes a transcendental structuring, or synthesizing of the structure, that occurs outside experience. But Colebrook makes it clear that Deleuze defines empiricism by the rejection of the transcendental as a ground that originally provides order to experience, to which the objects of experience must conform. This is why becoming is stressed in experience instead of being. Being is a transcendent category. Becoming challenges being, since a flux of becoming excludes any moment of being. Becoming is a process that lacks an underlying invisible skeleton, a pre-existing transcendental structure that fixes it. So with the phrase "transcendental empiricism," one is compelled to ask: how the transcendental can be married to that which rejects the transcendental? The options appear to be that one must sacrifice either the transcendental or empiricism.

In the survey *Modern French Philosophy*, Vincent Descombes describes Deleuze's work as moving towards transcendental empiricism.[189] This places Deleuze's work within the camp of a neo-Kantian project, rather than fully embracing its Humean heritage. With Descombes, Kant's transcendental idealism is generally described as a position that argues there is no experience of

[188] Claire Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (London: Routledge, 2002), 69.
[189] Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott Fox and J.M Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

a thing-in-itself, only the appearance of things in the mind, and phenomenal experience is shaped by certain necessary transcendental conditions. Thus, any objects of external experience must conform to certain conditions of the understanding and sensibility. The conditions of experience, whether in the understanding or sensibility, are *a priori* and necessary and this makes them transcendental. This was a position that incorporated both rationalism in the faculty of the understanding and empiricism in the faculty of sensibility. It is also a critical philosophy that begins within phenomenal experience and argues that what is determined to be necessary in all understanding and sensibility is in fact the transcendental condition of those faculties. But what would a transcendental empiricism be? Would it mean uncovering the transcendental conditions of the faculty of sensibility, half of the Kantian project? This is confusing when we consider what Deleuze says about the transcendental and empiricism in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*.

> We can now see the special ground of empiricism: nothing in the mind transcends human nature, because it is human nature that, in its principles, transcends the mind; nothing is ever transcendental. Association, far from being a product, is a rule of the imagination and a manifestation of its free exercise. It guides the imagination, gives it uniformity, and also constrains it. In this sense, ideas are connected in the mind—not by the mind. The imagination is indeed human nature but only to the extent that other principles have made it constant and settled.[190]

This quote covers much of the core of a Humean-Deleuzean theory of mind, imagination, association and human nature. Descombes maintains that Deleuze's project is to work out a transcendental empiricism, yet Deleuze is claiming here that nothing is transcendental in empiricism. There are no transcendental conditions that in turn must be synthesized by a transcendental subject or ego. A main difference between the Kantian position and a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism is in how the mind is conceived. For Deleuze and Hume, the subjective mind is a complex state that is develops from and transcends a simpler, immanent mind. In an empiricist investigation, one always begins with the complex mind and then attempts to work back towards the simpler, immanent mind. The simpler, immanent mind begins with the flow of impressions and the instincts that naturally, that is passively, exhibits a structure. This passivity supports the empiricist position that there is experience without a subject. The original objects of the mind are observed as being related in different ways to each other and this is taken as being due to principles, or rules of nature. For example, we observe objects falling and then posit the fall is due to the rule of gravity in the domain of observed objects. We never observe a rule, or a nature, but after repeated similar experience, we develop habits of expectation and eventually imagine there is a rule that actively governs. Deleuze writes, "Empirical subjectivity is constituted in the mind under the influence of principles affecting it; the mind therefore does not

[190] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 24.

have the characteristics of a preexisting subject."[191] The processes operative on the contents that compose the mind, basic principles of association and the passions, are not initiated by a subject. There is no "I" that subsists through time as a condition for all experience, a unified will that processes the contents of the mind. As experienced, these processes are just the way in which reflections of impressions are constituted, selected, associated, etc. Again, it is like the natural law of gravity; from within the limits of experience, this is just how impressions behave at a site of assemblage. Empiricism is not seeking a neurological description of the mind, which would go beyond experience to study and measure the activity and correlations of neurons. Neuroscience is not empiricism because it is not an enquiry into the limits of experience as experienced. Scientists can certainly develop correlations between experience as experienced and neurological activity, but empiricism restricts itself to and begins with experience when it questions the generally assumed transcendental self based on the ground of its experience and then seeks to understand the implications of a non-subjective experience becoming subjective experience.

The problem of the subject only emerges when there is a subject questioning her subjectivity.[192] This is the ultimate critical stance, questioning subjectivity from within subjectivity. Empiricism begins with a subject and works backwards tracing a path from a subject to non-subjective experience. This marks the path from a believing subject to the original given, a totality of impressions, or intensities. Beyond eliminating anything that goes beyond the given, how the mature subject experiences the given, revealing the given as given, is not clear. Deleuze will find in the painting of Francis Bacon a practice that approaches immanence. At this point, one can ask about the relationship between subjectivity and the original given, pure immanence. Beliefs transcend the given. The self is not given as an impression. As transcendent, this appears to be a case of radical emergence. A standard problem in emergence is whether that which emerges can enter a causal relationship to the underlying activities from which it emerged. There are two key factors to remember. First, anything produced in the mind creates something else in the mind as ideas and reflections. We never leave the mind because the mind is the just the collection of all intensities, whether impressions, affects, reflections, memories, etc. The given is transcended, but the mind ultimately re-totalizes the collection. Deleuze writes that the mind is transcended, and this is correct if we consider the mind as it was. The mind is a totality of elements. The given and all the relations that naturally form are the mind in the beginning. The collection is transcended when the-mind-at-that-point is transcended. But the new collection incorporates a new totality which is now considered the mind. Transcendence is being used in two ways. There is the transcendence of that which is outside the mind, as either transcendental or material conditions of experience. This is in opposition to the immanence of the mind and experience. Then there is the transcendence of the mind, creating something outside a current

[191] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 29.

[192] Hume presents a subject that questions its subjectivity. Heidegger's presents dasein as the being that questions its Being. This is another way in which Deleuze moves the heritage of continental philosophy over to British Empiricism and in particular, Hume.

totality that is then brought into the totality. This is the transcendence of the new, something beyond what was given. But everything that is new is also created through imaginative processes that are applied to impressions that are processed associatively and affectively. Here we can distinguish between the pure immanence of the given and the mixed immanence of the given and ideas which transcend the given. It is mixed because it includes illusions, creations of the fancy. Human nature produces illusions, imaginative ideas that leap beyond the given. Human nature is the observed repeated, associative behavior of that which composes the mind. Part of this behavior is the production of new reflections. Human nature is imagined as a collection of processes, or applied laws, that are operative upon the results of nature and human nature. Part of human nature, the imagination, exercises a level of freedom such that it creates reflections and associations from the already given and its component elements that are novel. The human subject, as a product of the contents of the mind that are given over to natural processes and instincts, is only imagined as an original transcendental condition of the mind, though it is not imagined as such. In empiricism, the mind is hypothesized to be originally an unconditioned assemblage. When there is a set of impressions, or intensities, there is a mind.

Transcendental empiricism is a misleading phrase because empiricism is not concerned at all with the conditions of empiricism. Empiricism is concerned with what happens once there already is a mind, a collection of impressions. The flux of these first impressions, which is reproduced by the memory as a reflection and associated back to the present impressions, only later is conceived of as materially and/or transcendentally conditioned. The original mind is taken to be a composition of impressions, completely devoid of beliefs and well-formed ideas.[193] Once there is a stream of impressions, there is a mind, which is just the totality of those impressions. There is no experienced active synthesis of the totality; the collection itself is experienced as a passive totality. One might ask how a passive totality came to be, but this is beyond experience which starts once there already is an ongoing totality. Empiricism, which always begins with a subject actively questioning subjectivity, finds this passive flux as the hypothesized starting point. Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism restricts itself to experience and the mind and puts subjectivity in question. Any necessary physical conditions, or logical conditions, are beyond the scope of an empiricism that is solely concerned with the mind and experience as it first begins as experience and mind. Perhaps immanental empiricism is a more appropriate title for a project that works out the implications of a mind and experience that eventually transcends itself. Though the empiricist is concerned with where and how the belief and idea of transcendental conditions emerges. How did it naturally come to be that humans live filled with such an imagined sense of themselves, others and the world? The empiricist both undermines the legitimacy of transcendentalism, or belief in the transcendent, while at the same time offering a

[193] Deleuze, along with Guattari, will begin with three different kinds of impressions in the book, *What is Philosophy?* These original impressions are percepts, affects and concepts. Each of these impressions, as experienced immanently, is unstructured, unconditioned, yet capable of being structured and given a determinate form. As imminent, they are characterized as difference itself, that which can be differentiated and produce the same, which can also be described as fixed expressions of difference.

hypothesis on how and why beliefs and ideas quite naturally emerge appearing as legitimate ideas.

Perhaps in trying to save the "transcendental" of transcendental empiricism, one can argue there is a condition that is set forth in empiricism. This is the condition that there are no conditions, that empiricism sets forth the unconditioned as the condition. But this produces a classic paradox. The empiricist assumes one assumption. The assumption is that there are no assumptions. If the empiricist has in fact made an assumption, put forth a condition of empiricism, then the assumption itself is false. If the assumption is true, then the empiricist cannot make the assumption. Is empiricism a paradox? The phrase "transcendental empiricism" when it means the conditions of the unconditioned, the imminent, is a paradox. That is why I argue against a literal interpretation of the phrase transcendental empiricism and instead claim it has a performative function. There are other potential problems with the terminology of empiricists. The language of receptivity, passive synthesis and the given present challenges to the empiricist's sense of immanence. If we claim the flux of impressions are received, it is valid to ask who or what the source is that is actively sending these impressions. If we claim there is a passive synthesis, we can ask if something externally performed the synthesis. If we claim the impressions are given, it is valid to ask questions that imply an outside giver. The language can cause one to easily slip back into a rationalist or Kantian framework. The mind is first defined in Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism as a collection of impressions. These impressions in themselves have no connection. All relations are external to the objects. Relations subsequently form by nature and human nature. But how can even this set of impressions be considered a collection, and thus loosely identified, and related or associated, together as a unit? Deleuze will later use the image of the plane. The plane is a decentered and infinite field that extends out in all directions. The plane is the image of the place of immanence.[194] But for empiricism to avoid being paradoxical it appears it must say nothing of conditions, our use language that implies or suggests an outside because this would validate the previous challenges. Silence is often taken to be an anti-philosophical position in that it shuts down thought. Alain Badiou makes these charges in his book on Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy*.[195] Is silence a legitimate methodological position against claims that any investigation into the conditions of empiricism is a trap? Empiricism must be able to justify or explain this silence.

Empiricism finds in experience a pure beginning where something undefined and unconditioned is present and develops into a more complex totality. It is a philosophy of origins, starting points, and the consequences of those origins.[196] Empiricism questions subjectivity in

[194] There is a classic reversal here, where place comes before space. Space is invented as the condition of place after the fact.
[195] Alain Badiou, *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy*, trans. Bruno Bosteels (London: Verso, 2011).
[196] Though in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* Deleuze stresses the transition to subjectivity and argues it is the subject that most interest the empiricist, not this non-subjective origin. Though he will go on to develop a theory of difference, virtuality, and the body without organs that is precisely interested in this immanent plane. It appears

such a way that it opens up an investigation into experience before subjectivity, experience cleansed of subjectivity, which is this pure beginning. Yet more accurately, it is a beginning that is stripped of human subjectivity. Empiricism must deploy then a process of purification that aims to uncover or tend towards an absolute immanence that is not mediated through the categories of the understanding by the human subject. This method of peeling away certain beliefs or concepts to isolate a foundation for experience and knowledge is a common practice for much of modern philosophy. Philosophical method is essential for any philosophy that looks for independent confirmation within a community of colleagues. Humean-Deleuzian empiricists are a community that questions subjectivity and applies methods, often thought experiments, for stripping away subjectivity in experience to reveal a pre-subjective, unconditioned, unmediated mind. Descartes begins his rationalist project of establishing certainty and a solid epistemological foundation by using doubt to strip away anything doubtable, and thus not absolutely certain. One can interpret Descartes' project as searching for the point where doubt is silenced because doubt is impossible. Kant aims to uncover the transcendental conditions of the understanding and sensibility for phenomenal objects. Kant strips away anything contingent in order to determine what is absolutely necessary for any understandable and sensible object of representation. Kant's key proposal is that what is necessary is not itself a part of experience, but instead a condition for there to be experience at all. According to Deleuze, Hume's project is to strip away anything that we can attribute to the human subject in order to reveal that which is before subjectivity. One strips away all that is added onto "the given" of the mind, an additive process that occurs through faculty of the imagination. This empiricist method aims towards the immanence of impressions that together originally composed the mind. The characteristic of immanence is always posited in relation to our necessary and practical starting point, that of the subject that has transcended from this level of immanence. Thus empiricism is a process of stripping away the concepts and beliefs that are taken to be emergent and transcendent from a simple, passive beginning. Empiricism always begins from the mature experience of the human subject that can question subjectivity as an original given. Thus empiricism never looks for the conditions or non-conditions of immanence, but strips away human conditioning so it can uncover an imminent and absolute beginning or origin, the original given, for what will be a human subjectivity. As the immanent appears without conditions, it would appear to exist *ex nihilo*. Yet this nothing, that sets the stage for the mind to have a hard and abrupt beginning, is not making the claim that nothing exists before the mind. Empiricism is not a metaphysics that establishes or speculates on modes of existence. Empiricism investigates the mind and the legitimacy of its ideas in terms of our observations of the active processes of the mind. So, to answer that potential accusation of anti-philosophy against this Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism, it would be unwarranted. One confuses the voluntary choice to stop speaking of conditions with the impossibility of speaking about conditions. Empiricism here is presented as a radical critical

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Deleuze changes his mind, and this may reflect why he wants to qualify empiricism. If empiricism is unconcerned with the plane of immanence, and he is, he will need to distinguish himself.

philosophy that pre-dates Kant's critical transcendental idealism and exposes the limits of immanence and how those limits are transcended.

The proposition was previously raised that one must sacrifice either the transcendental or empiricism, because it was untenable to hold them both together. Sacrificing empiricism would be a rejection of the pure given-ness of experience, the pure immanence of what are considered naturally constituted and selected impressions or intensities that as a collection mark the hard beginning of mind. Reference to nature complicates this pure beginning. As immanent, there is nothing that stands outside the set of impressions or intensities that are given. But this passive beginning, the receptivity of the given, is presented as actively given to the later constituted subject. "Nature," used in the context of a *natural* constitution and *natural* selection of original impressions that constitute the mind, is an opaque term. It represents whatever has initially selected and constituted the impressions or intensities, and the activity of association and affectivity that follows. To the subject, it appears to govern the relationships that are formed. For Hume, working from the perspective of a receptive consciousness, nature is an impenetrable mystery to experience. A key characteristic of experience is that it begins with the set of impressions that compose the mind and accessing anything before that point is by the definition of experience, not just inaccessible, but not experience.

Sacrificing empiricism would be a rejection of the possibility of a presupposition-less beginning. A transcendental ground is not given in experience, but necessarily presupposed by experience. Transcendental Empiricism is perhaps a better description of the paradoxical Kantian theory that attempts to combine rationalism and empiricism. There is a fundamental contradiction in asserting a transcendental ground while also limiting oneself to phenomenalism. The alternative, sacrificing the transcendental, necessarily means embracing the immanence of empiricism's origin. Without a transcendental ground before experience, the beginning is a pure flux of impressions without systematic meaning or original structuring. The structure and meaning of experience can only subsequently occur as something beyond, or transcending, the original given. For empiricism, meaning and the idea of a transcendental ground will be emergent events that call for understanding how and why they emerge.

We can speak of an a priori, anything which is before experience, in two different senses. There is an atemporal a priori that is a condition of experience, and thus not experience itself and not experienced. This is the Kantian a priori. Then there is a temporal a priori, the activity and material conditions before there is the collection of impressions or intensities that compose a particular mind. We can speak of a temporal a priori because experience begins, and by having a beginning, one can point to a before. Whatever is before the mind and experience is opaque and referred to as nature. Empiricism is positing a hard beginning for experience where both a priori's, transcendental conditions and material conditions, are not given in experience and thus are irrelevant to a philosophy that restricts itself to the given of experience and all that follows. Mind begins with the assemblage of the impressions and anything before the original assemblage, this pure given-ness of the original impressions, is outside the bounds of experience.

This is a critical stance where experience doesn't begin and cannot go outside itself. There is experience and then through the activity of human nature, the mind transcends itself and incorporates the transcendent objects of belief, but one never transcends the mind in such a way that it cannot in turn become an addition to whole of the mind. This Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism does not deny the possible existence of the a priori, but it does argue that the a priori is beyond experience, and thus not applicable to the given of experience as experienced. If we are to begin with experience, we cannot address the a priori, as it is beyond the limits of experience, and it is only a topic of discussion once human nature transcends nature, and the human subject is posited as actively believing and synthesizing concepts and intuitions. The Kantian position can rest atop a Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism as a product of the imagination (free and creative acts) and reason (systematizing acts that enforce consistency and coherency). In a Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism, acts always occur first and then are attributed to an object of belief, which is first a power and then a faculty of the ultimate object of belief - subjectivity, the self. Empiricism is an experiment in giving priority to experience and the mind, taking a critical position towards experience and the mind, and making subjectivity a product of experience rather than a condition of experience. The opaqueness of immanence is responsible for the radical skepticism that is a consequence of Hume's empiricism.

5.3.2 The Phenomenological Transcendental

Deleuze has written about and relied upon many philosophical figures like Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, Spinoza, Leibniz, Bergson or Foucault, but with respect to sensation and perception, he is often understood by experts in either a Kantian light, and thus transcendentally, or phenomenologically, which according to Husserl is in many respects Kantian due to the positing of the transcendental ego in phenomenology, though Husserl will argue Kant is not radical enough in his transcendentality by personally engaging in a transcendental investigation.[197] Husserl summarizes his sense of the transcendental in the following:

> I should like to note the following right away: the expression 'transcendental philosophy' has been much used since Kant, even as a general title for universal philosophies whose concepts are oriented toward those of the Kantian type. I myself use the word 'transcendental' in the broadest sense for the original motif...which through Descartes confers meaning upon all modern philosophies, the motif which, in all of them, seeks to come to itself, so to speak — seeks to attain the genuine and pure form of its task and its

[197] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §27, 98-100.

> systematic development. It is the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life in which all the scientific structures that are valid for him occur purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, and have become and continue to become freely available. Working itself out radically, it is the motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in this source and thus ultimately grounded. This source bears the title I-myself, with all of my actual and possible knowing life and, ultimately, my concrete life in general. The whole transcendental set of problems circles around the relation of this, my 'I' — the 'ego' — to what it is at first taken for granted to be — my soul — and, again, around the relation of this ego and my conscious life to the world of which I am conscious and whose true being I know through my own cognitive structures.[198]

The following will explore and disentangle a phenomenological sense of the transcendental and immanence in relation to an empirical sense of the transcendental and immanence.

Just as "transcendental empiricism" confuses Deleuze with Kant, this phenomenological root conceals the origin of Deleuze's philosophical work as a Humean empiricist. For instance, in the introduction to *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Daniel W. Smith, who is also the translator, writes, "The notion of "sensation" one finds in Deleuze is taken initially from the phenomenological tradition. Erwin Straus, in his classic book *The Primary World of the Senses* (1935), had established a fundamental distinction between perception and sensation. Perception, he argued, is a secondary rational organization of a primary, nonrational dimension of sensation (or "sense experience," *le sentir*)."[199] Clearly, Smith does not excavate Deleuze's Humean roots. This distinction between secondary and primary, between the rationally organized and the non-rational appears to be the same distinction between immanent experience and subjective experience. Except with Hume, we must in fact admit that perceptual organization is in fact rooted in the irrational – the imagination. It is irrationally organized. The role of the fanciful in the organization and transcendent structure of perception carries with it important skeptical consequences not found in phenomenology. With respect to modern philosophy, Deleuze's notion of sensation can just as well be initially traced back to Hume. Any resemblance to the phenomenological tradition can be explained by the fact that because phenomenology arises to some degree out of Kant, and Kant, Deleuze is arguing, arises more than is commonly accepted from Hume, there is a definite lineage that connects them. And it is Hume that first questions

[198] Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, §26, 97-8.

[199] Daniel Smith, "Deleuze on Bacon: Three Conceptual Trajectories in *The Logic of Sensation*," in *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, by Gilles Deleuze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2004), xiv.

subjectivity and questions how second order perceptions are constructed and transcend first order sensation. Smith should be referencing Hume in his introduction.

Smith notes that Deleuze does fundamentally disagree with Kant by maintaining the objects of sensation can be perceived without the need for sensation to be turned over to the faculty of understanding. This is Hume's position, though this is not stated. The situation is also more complicated than a higher order process rationally organizing the first-order sensations to create a realm of understandable experience that is the only realm. This distinction can be overlooked when reading too much of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*[200] into Deleuze. For Kant, sensation must necessarily fit the structures set forth by the faculty of understanding for there to be perceptual experience, a phenomenon. This is part of Kant's Copernican revolution that takes all experience of the external world to be representational of an opaque thing-in-itself. One does not see things as they are in themselves, things must accommodate themselves to the conditions of sensibility and understanding as synthesized by the transcendental ego. All experience is subject to transcendental conditions of both sensibility and the understanding. And sensible content is further subject to the ordering imposed by the conditions of the understanding. Within the phenomenological tradition, Straus also departs from Kant by positing two free standing experiences, perception and sensation. Sensation does not necessarily need to be organized by the transcendental conditions and categories of the understanding to be experienced. It streams alongside perception, often going unnoticed. This is a major break between Kant and phenomenology. Sensation does not need to be organized by the understanding in order to be experienced. Yet Kant and phenomenology do not emphasize sensation as important. Husserl distinguishes between the noema (the meaningful formal object of noetic intentional processes) and hyletic data (the sensory matter of intentional experience, even after the transcendental deduction). Hyletic data in itself is not representational of any object; it is pure *qualia*, feeling. It is only when experienced with the noema that sensation is representational. For Husserl, hyletic data is not as important as the noema, which is the meaningful object of intentionality. Husserl goes from a subject naively perceiving the world to a transcendental subject reflecting upon intentional consciousness. A Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism starts with a subject naively perceiving the world and then moves toward the immanence of the mind, in order to work out the emergence of subjectivity.

Hume's mind is the collection of all that is given and begins with whatever impressions first arise. These impressions are not appearances of something, they are pure impressions, or as a collection – pure images. While for Kant, an object of experience always points towards an opaque outside; it is always a literal phenomenology. The same is true of Phenomenology. But the pure images of empiricism are absolutely immanent. There is no initial outside that one points towards or an inside one can turn to in the mind. And since there is no transcendentally organizing subject that dissolves the immanent through the mediation of transcendental organization, all that composes the mind is always immanent and always present in empiricism.

[200] Kant's presents ideas in the *Critique of Judgment* that complicate this simplification.

The mind is defined as the totality of all the impressions, but even the term impression can be misleading if we then ask what outside objects have made the impression. Within empiricism's theory of mind, these impressions, or intensities, are things, reality, matter to the original mind because there is no distinction between representation and object represented. The impressions are never impressions of something; they begin as mere impressions, a flux of mere impressions. The primary distinction in a Humean-Deleuzian study of experience isn't between a rationally organized and non-rational dimension of experience. Instead there is a gradual genealogy that follows the instincts and processing that provide an explanation for how an instinct becomes a tendency, which becomes a habit and then is imagined to be a law or principle that motivates the emergence of ideas, like the self, that transcend the given impressions. There is a logic of sensation, of how impressions are associated before the given is transcended and imagined in light of transcendent ideas and beliefs. The main difference in Empiricism is between nature, which is originally impressions of sensation and passions, but almost immediately also includes impressions of reflection, and relations from the processes that instinctually act upon those felt images *and* human nature, the positing of a transcendental system and objects, the emergence of the human subject. Though this distinction between nature and human nature are completely intertwined and form a totality in the mature mind.

With respect to the origin of the mind, Deleuze writes:

> The impressions of sensation are only the origin of the mind; as for the impressions of reflection, they are the qualification of the mind and the effect of principles in it. The point of view of the origin, according to which every idea derives from a preexisting impression and represents it, does not have the importance that people attribute to it: it merely gives the mind a simple origin and frees the ideas from the obligation of having to represent *things*, and also from the corresponding difficulty of having to understand the resemblance of ideas. The real importance is on the side of the impressions of reflection, because they are the ones which qualify the mind as subject. The essence and the destiny of empiricism are not tied to the atom but rather to the essence of association; therefore, empiricism does not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather the problem of the constitution of the subject.[201]

The origin is immediately qualified by processes of association like resemblance, contiguity, passion and eventually causality as well as the production of copies, impressions of reflection, and copies of copies. The qualified elements of the mind are still in relation to the unqualified, such that the impressions of reflection and impressions of sensation are together in the sense that

[201] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 31.

they can all be associated with each other. There are no boundaries or limits to association between the present elements that compose the mind. Most people do not naturally associate a number with a color, but with synesthesia we see that some make these associations quite naturally.[202] Association can occur between any element that composes the mind. Though there are observed general tendencies for association that show up across a majority of humans which are called instincts. Nature is these original tendencies that commonly arise with respect to sensation. If there was no observable consistency across the species, there would be no nature or human nature. To illustrate the mind's additive nature, Deleuze describes the mind as percussive; all the successive qualifications vibrate along with the original vibrations. Each element is separate and relations are formed between the elements. And there is a totality as well of all the activity experienced together. The mind transitions from a simple state to a complex state as more impressions are active and simple instincts gradually lead to complex habits. This raises the difficulty or impossibility of returning to the given, though from within the complex, mature state, one can hypothesis about the state of pure immanence and one can go through the exercise of disregarding ideas and beliefs that transcend the given, though this is not the same as original experience and can only end in an absolute skepticism.

Deleuze is also arguing in the above quote that atomism and impressions of sensation have been overemphasized in empiricism by focusing on what he calls the "point of view of the origin." What motivates Deleuze's push away from atomism and impressions of sensation as an origin? Why the switch in emphasis to qualification-ism and the constitution of the subject? Deleuze states atomism solves some problems for empiricism by providing a simple origin and insulating ideas from having to represent things, which he refers to as the problem of resemblance. If ideas represent things, this posits something outside experience that is mediated. Ideas are still representational, but here they represent impressions of sensation and not some transcendent thing. Impressions of sensation as originally given do not represent anything, they merely compose the mind.[203] Without directly stating why, Deleuze may be arguing against a movement that emphasizes the origin of the mind because he actually wants to delegitimize an analytic movement to end philosophical discussion of ideas that lack a direct counterpart with the impressions of sensation. This is understandable because his Humean argument is that

[202] Though with synesthesia, the experience of a double, or triple, association challenges what exactly is given. Are the numbers that are experienced alongside colors, impressions of reflection or more like impressions of sensation, an original given that grouped together (in a plane of immanence) composes the mind? Deleuze will come to posit three different original givens, percepts, affects and concepts that emerge from an actualization of difference itself.

[203] Berkeley is known for developing this insight in British Empiricism. There is nothing justifiably outside the perception that the perception would represent. This is because there is no experience of something beyond the impressions and reflections that compose the mind that would justify positing it as a given. Berkeley's theory is a radical form of idealism. Perception and the perceiver are all that can be said to exist, and an infinite perceiver is the guarantor of a continuous existence for perceptions that are finitely perceived in human perception. With Hume, the perceiver as a subject is put into question and the original given is hypothesized as prior to subjectivity. The meaning of idealism when tied to the subjective and subjectivity no longer applies to a Humean empiricism. As well, by stepping outside subjectivity, this impersonal ground does not tie existence to a subjective source. The personal, the subject, emerges out of the impersonal. By default then, one must assert an original ideal materialism where impressions, the perceptions, are taken as the very objective material of the mind, that which exists.

subjectivity and human nature is the very transcending of the given. Thus an analytic movement that ends discussion of that which transcends the given would fail to investigate the real human condition, one partially grounded in the imagination. Empiricism can be understood as a correction against rationalism and the axioms of rationalism by forcing one to justify ideas through recourse to sensation and experience. But undermining the last great belief - the existence of a transcendent self - and tracing how subjectivity emerges in the qualified mind, shows in fact how rationalism and any transcendental philosophy actually comes to be viable, believable, and operative in the emergent subject.

Deleuze is also arguing that that the essence of empiricism is with associationism, not atomism. Perhaps for Deleuze, this de-essentialization of the origin offers empiricism the leeway such that this particular way of speculating on the origin, atomism of sensation, could change without essentially changing empiricism. Then the simple origin, that empiricism begins somewhere, would be an essential component of empiricism, but the exact nature of the origin is an open question. While the one thing that is essentially determined in empiricism is that the initial mind is qualified and that subjectivity emerges at some point in the qualified mind. For Deleuze here, the constitution of the subject becomes the essence of empiricism. Deleuze is well aware that atomism is attacked and used to dismiss empiricism wholesale. So Deleuze is arguing that this is the wrong target for critics because the nature of the origin is not essential for empiricism. Deleuze wants to move the crux of empiricism over to the problem of subjectivity, the implication that subjectivity is an emergent process and that one can hypothesize about its emergence and the imagination's role in this emergence. And if subjectivity is emergent, then it isn't a transcendental condition or a necessary transcendent object. But despite Deleuze's redirection towards qualification this line of questioning still leads the investigation towards a wholly immanent beginning. Atomism is one way of speculating on the nature of that wholly immanent beginning. In atomism, impressions are composed of atoms of sensation, the smallest unit of a sensation. The atom is the hypothetical building block of sensation. Atomism is attacked on the grounds that atoms in themselves are never experienced, which appears to undermine a philosophy that grounds itself in experience. For example, one never experiences one atom of redness. Nor does one experience a block of sensation stripped from its surroundings. There always appears to be some sort of gestalt, a whole of foreground and background. In Chapter Five, we will see how Deleuze undermines the hierarchy of a foreground and background in order to practice empiricism by engaging this qualification, this transition, of the mind. Deleuze partly insulates empiricism from this charge that atomism is flawed when he claims empiricism is the hypothetical consequences of questioning subjectivity. Thus atomism is one possible consequence of the original problematizing of subjectivity. Deleuze's later works can be seen as developing an atomism that is consistent with empiricism when he further develops concepts of immanence, pluralism, univocity, and difference.

There are also challenges to empiricism with respect to the synthesizing of these atoms and the amount of time necessary to fully synthesize each perception. This is a problem because

sensation and perception are generally experienced as instantaneous and whole, an entire field. Deleuze's subsequently develops a theory of the plane of immanence, which is infinite, complete, open and instantaneous. It is an image of the whole all at once, rather than a scattered collection of points in need of synthesis. The plane of immanence is reminiscent of the tabula rasa of Locke, though Deleuze's base will be defined by its pluralism of undifferentiated difference, not an empty Lockean slate that is marked from the outside. Deleuze and Hume argue that the relations between the elements are not originally given as internal to the original impressions. Arising from instincts and habits, the relations are an addition to the impressions. Experience is instantaneous and whole, but the whole is qualified over time with the addition of relations, associations, impressions of reflection. Since these associations are first formed by instinct, laws of nature, there is no already existing subject that is actively synthesizing a whole. The original given, without associations or even repetition, would be an un-synthesized (un-related) collection or flux. Thus, the issue of synthesis is not relevant to the origin. In terms of our mature subjective perception, one could argue it is habit that we automatically, spontaneously, see wholes, rather than atoms in need of association. With the origin, there still is the question of what makes the collection of impressions a collection at all. On one hand, the bundling of the original bundle of impressions is a matter of nature, and nature is opaque to all inquiry. On the other hand, this collection or composition of impressions is not necessarily synthesized. One could imagine a group of unrelated objects in which neither the objects individually or considered in various random sets would justify in itself any specific associations. Relations are outside the object, and when there is more than one object, outside the objects. Nature and Human Nature associate the contents of the mind; the objects do not associate themselves. Nature and Human Nature fix the contents in a structure. Deleuze reverses the traditional order of structure and content, found in both Kant and phenomenology. The structure is no longer a priori to the concrete content of experience. First there is concrete experience and then structure is determined (imagined) in response to the concrete example.

Deleuze also points out Hume's distinction that the perceived image of a grain of sand and one thousandth of that grain are virtually the same. The perceptual minimum is different than the physical minimum and the mathematical minimum. A physical minimum is the smallest particle, or family of particles, that physics has observed or confirmed to some degree of general acceptance to be the building blocks of matter. We do not experience physical atoms. The mathematical, or geometrical, minimum is a point defined as a 0-dimensional mathematical (abstract) object that has no size.[204] Euclid defines a geometrical point in *Elements*, Book 1, Definition 1, as "that which has no part."[205] As infinitely small, all dimensions approach the limit of zero. Problems can arise when one confuses a geometrical point, atom, or minimum with a perceptual point, atom, or minimum. The difference is that we can attempt to conceive infinitely smaller perceptual atoms, but our actual perceptual image stops at some point and just keeps

[204] "Point", *Wolfram Mathworld*, accessed June 10, 2014, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Point.html.
[205] Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements: Volume 1*, trans. T.L. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 153.

repeating as we propose smaller amounts. The minimum of empiricism cannot be measured like a material atom that has size, but it also can't be infinitely small and without size like a mathematical point. As a perceptual minimum, it captures a point where one is incapable of producing a smaller image, incapable of dividing the image further. Empiricism always begins with experience, the perceptual. This distinction protects empiricism from an infinite regress, where one is never able to even stage with certainty that there is a minimum. The essence of atomism is the positing of an indivisibility. Deleuze will revisit the topic of that which cannot be divided, particularly when he writes about Bergson, time and duration. One key insight is the distinction between a division that fundamentally changes the object at hand and one that does not. One might be able to slice up the indivisible, but not without fundamentally changing it. This new sense of divisibility will also give a new sense to the concept of an atom. As well, Deleuze will write of zones (an undefined area) instead of points. Zones lack the well-defined boundaries of what is commonly assumed to limit an atom. Durations invoke an indivisible stretch of time that may last varying lengths of infinitely divisible clock time. Thus Deleuze will return to atomism, the affirmation of indivisibilities, but reshapes it according to a plurality of durations and zones of indivisibility. Deleuze will also make use of the distinction between the molar and the molecular. The molecular, the level of the traditional atom, is not denied, but also not what is captured by perceptual experience. We naturally perceive at the molar level. The molar is an integration of the molecular into a larger whole that is based upon the mathematical calculus of integrating infinitesimals.

Deleuze is arguing that the emphasis upon sensation in empiricism, which comes about when focusing on atomism, can take sensation to be something more than it gives itself as and this undermines immanence. The emphasis on sensation often implies to those that do not hold a pure empiricism that something outside, transcendent, is being sensed. This is also Locke's position. Positing an original cause of sensation, despite the problem that causality itself is not given, which makes it impossible to experience the original given as an effect, undermines a pure empiricism. For one thing, there is no thing-in-itself given in empiricism. The thing-in-itself is produced with the imagination as an idea when the mind transcends the given. If it was the case that a thing-in-itself was given, one would conceive originally in experience that which causes the sensation, but the causes of sensation are the unseen conditions that allow for sensation, which by definition are outside experience. One might still ask, despite our incapacity to experience it in any way, are there un-experienced transcendental or material conditions of the original given and the instincts that form the active mind? But Deleuze stops this inquiry and speculation. It is not the case that empiricism denies the possibility of un-experienced transcendental and material conditions of perception and specifically sensation. But being outside the bounds of the given, and never being given within experience, these conditions are never part of human experience. Deleuze writes, "But the fact is that philosophy, being a human science, need not search for the cause; it should rather scrutinize effects. The cause cannot be *known*; principles have neither cause nor an origin of their power. What is original is their effect

upon the imagination."[206] This highlights a main difference between empiricism and Husserlian phenomenology. Phenomenology is not a human science. The human sciences lack the universality that Husserl needs in order to find a foundation that will support universal claims. Husserl must transcend human sciences and he does this by investigating transcendental consciousness, that which makes possible, a human subjectivity. Deleuze cuts off any deeper or transcendental inquiry when he identifies empiricism and philosophy in general as a human science. What does this categorization intend to highlight? Reference to a human science recalls Hume's use of moral science and political science, as well as Auguste Comte's definition of science and Wilhelm Dilthey's division of the sciences and human sciences. Hume uses the term moral science and political science to specify a study of the conditions and factors that shape or determine human activity, i.e. human nature as observed in the field of politics and ethics. As a science, consistent observations lead to the stipulation of laws and principles that one never observes being broken. Nothing is claimed with certainty; arguments of probability are composed. A key insight for Hume that Deleuze points out is that reason alone, working within an associative structure produced through laws of association, is not enough to determine action. Actions require the impulse of passion as a deciding force among various options. Hume's empiricism teaches the foundational importance of the imagination and the passions for subjectivity to emerge. Principles of passion instate partiality in neutral associative structures. The study of human nature, a human science, must investigate the consequences of associative structures and passions, the principles of association and passion that appear to govern that which composes the mind, in order to explain and understand actions that appear to be decisions. Hume makes the case that causes cannot be inferred from effects. For example, this is used to argue that the existence of the world is not enough to infer the existence of a deity that caused the world. There is no valid inference.

Auguste Comte develops the idea of positivistic philosophy based on the idea that "[t]he third or positive attitude consists in recognising that we cannot know the real nature and the real causes of things at all, that all we can do is to formulate laws which govern the succession of phenomena in our experience; to do this is the task of science."[207] This third stage arrives after a theological and metaphysical stage and sets limits upon human scientific investigation that disqualifies theological and metaphysical assumptions. Hume wrote in the early to mid 18th century exposing how what we took to be certain knowledge were beliefs that arose in part from the imagination. By mid 19th century, Comte wants to cleanse science of anything involving the imagination. This will culminate in the 20th century with a strict, reductive behaviorism. Behaviorism inverts experience from 1st person to an observational 3rd person. The dominance of this 3rd person standpoint conceals that empiricism, at least with Hume and Deleuze, begins with a subject's mature experience, laden with transcendent beliefs, and the questioning of subjectivity. The individual's experience is supplanted by outside observation. Phenomenology and its transcendental investigation by an intentional consciousness are forbidden by this

[206] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 25
[207] H.A. Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 17.

empirical tradition. Yet at about the same time that Deleuze is writing *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, cognitive science is challenging behaviorism. Hume is often recognized as foundational in cognitive science. His study of nature and human nature developing out of instinctual processes is a predecessor to the study of mental processing by cognitive scientists. Phenomenology and cognitive science are also related, though cognitive science lacks the broader interests of phenomenology which includes thinks like ontology. An interesting correlation is that behaviorism, with its radical denial of any transcendent beliefs, best fits an investigation at the pre-subjective level of immanence. While, cognitive science and phenomenology best fit an investigation of the transcendent subject that is a consequence of human nature and primarily the imagination. Empiricism encompasses and accounts for both levels.

In his contribution to philosophy of science in the latter half of the 19th century, Wilhelm Dilthey makes the distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences. Unlike Comte and his dismissal of anything not publicly observable, Dilthey argues that the human sciences, which take socio-historical reality as its subject matter, ground itself not just in experience, but in inner experience. In 1883, Dilthey wrote,

> Only inner experience, in the facts of consciousness, have I found a firm anchor for my thinking, and I trust that my reader will be convinced by my proof of this. All science is experiential; but all experience must be related back to and derives its validity from the conditions and context of consciousness in which it arises, i.e., the totality of our nature. We designate as "epistemological" this standpoint which consistently recognizes the impossibility of going behind these conditions. To attempt this would be like seeing without eyes or directing the gaze of knowledge behind one's own eye...It became further evident to me, however, that it is from just this standpoint that the independence of the human sciences...can be grounded. From this standpoint our conception of the whole of nature proves to be a mere shadow cast by a hidden reality; by contrast, only in the facts of consciousness given in inner experience do we possess reality as it is. The analysis of these facts is the central task of the human sciences.[208]

Dilthey reverses the traditional importance of natural science by claiming all science that relies on experience, further relies on inner experience. On top of that, it is the human sciences that are able to experience experiences for what they are, and not as experiential representations of some unknown thing-in-itself. Just as Deleuze and Hume stress, for Dilthey, nature is opaque. The

[208] Wilhem Dilthey, *Selected Works: Volume 1: Introduction to the Human Sciences*, edit. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 50.

human sciences that study inner experience and the conditions and context of consciousness investigate experience not as representation, but as experience itself for the consciousness, inner experience. This inner experience is immanence for Dilthey, but inner experience is not part of Hume's and Deleuze's empiricism as the original given.

At the turn of the century, Husserl rejects the status of human sciences. He wants to study consciousness, but not as specific to humans, but as a universal study of consciousness that can make universal claims. Early charges against him of psychologism make Husserl adamant that phenomenology cannot be merely a human science. Human science becomes transcendental science and inner experience becomes transcendental experience. This in turn makes the transcendental immanent to consciousness. Thus phenomenology cannot accept Deleuze's claim that philosophy is a human science. Though, phenomenology doesn't seek anything behind that which can be experienced by a consciousness in the phenomenological investigation. Phenomenology is still an investigation of the acts of consciousness and the transcendental structures of consciousness.

With Hume, the given of the mind with the principles of nature is transcended with the principles of human nature. The human is this transcendence. Thus human sciences are a study of the qualified mind, that which transcends the given. A transcendental science like Husserlian phenomenology explores the necessary and universal conditions of intentional consciousness as internally experienced. Thus it must establish a realm of experience that is transcendental, that focuses upon the transcendental structures and objects of consciousness. The Humean-Deleuzian Empiricism must argue that these transcendental structures are not a condition of experience and consciousness, but a product of experience that transcends the given. Human sciences operate from within experience and must take into account individual experience. Empiricism begins with a human subject putting in question subjectivity by treating subjectivity as an effect. This philosophy is not universal but relative to a mind with certain instincts that leads to certain behaviors and beliefs. With respect to knowing the cause of principles, the limits that Deleuze recognizes is the limit point of the human condition, the limits of consciousness and experience. Questioning subjectivity sets up the distinction of human nature and nature, and asks how human nature arises out of nature. To consider the human as a product of a simpler mind and experience, yet still mind and experience, is possible. But to ask what powers are acting beneath the mind is to try to experience that which is not experience or mind. Deleuze is arguing that transcendental conditions are beyond the initial scope of empirical enquiry at the level of the immanent. Kantian transcendental conditions and phenomenology's investigation of the transcendental can be explained by empiricism as studies of emergent ideas that rely upon the imagination to become present in the mind. While "true" transcendental conditions of the initial given must necessarily remain unknown, left in mystery, lost forever in a radical skepticism that is a consequence of the empiricist critique. In the *Treatise*, Hume writes, "Impressions may be divided into two kind, those of SENSATION and those of REFLECTION. The first kind arises

in the soul originally, from unknown causes."[209] Thus, whatever the causes of original principles or sensations, the empiricist that studies the mind can only focus upon the effects, the images themselves in the mind and the often less vivid ones in the imagination.

Deleuze grounds empiricism, not in the world or in a subject, but in the original given of a mind, where sensation with principles acting upon them form associated images, a flux of impressions. These images all together are the original mind. But Deleuze focuses on the distinction in Hume between the mind and the subject. The mind comes before the subject. The mind, at the level of the given, is the plane of immanence. The subject emerges from, or transcends, the given, immanent mind when the mind reaches a complex state and the imagination creates ideas that go beyond the given. Deleuze claims a mind that begins with atoms of sensation composed into images in the imagination is a simple origin. It is simple because it lacks any form or organization. The mind begins with a given that is then processed. Raw sensation is formed, or connected, into images. And ideas that are constituted as a reflection of sensation no longer make any claims to representing the thing-in-itself, they represent images. Deleuze writes, "The mind is not subject; it is subjected. When the subject is constituted in the mind under the effect of principles, the mind apprehends itself as a self, for it has been qualified."[210] Deleuze's empiricism is driven by the question of how the subject is constituted from the given, or how immanence constitutes transcendence.

The distinction between Husserlian phenomenology and Humean-Deleuzean empiricism can be mapped to the difference immanence takes in a Husserlian transcendental immanence and a Humean-Deleuzian immanence that constitutes transcendence. The immanence of Husserl has an intractable contradiction. It is both transcendental, as the transcendental conditions of consciousness, and immanent as part of a stream of experience, transcendental experience. Husserl faced criticism that his phenomenology was too disconnected to the world, too steeped in theory. This was in part motivation for Martin Heidegger's split from Husserl and his development of the indivisible formula, being-in-the-world, and his instrumental starting point. Maurice Merleau-Ponty went farther in grounding phenomenology when he developed a theory of embodiment that corporealizes the transcendental, a corporeal phenomenology. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no longer a Cartesian disembodied ego that opens onto a body and a world, but an ego-body within a bodily world. The subject is an object and the object, the body, is a lived subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty writes, "Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world."[211] The inseparability of subjectivity, body and world that Merleau-Ponty posits as a fact

[209] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*, edit. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1896), 1.1.2, 7.
[210] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 31.
[211] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), 408.

of existence is seen in the eyes of the empiricist as repeated and early association that over time is naturally felt and believed to be inseparable. As well, the body which is a transcendental condition of subjectivity, is seen by empiricism as a transcendent constituted in the given through nature and ultimately, human nature.

There is a complicated relationship between the lived body, the ground of subjectivity, and the body. The phantom-limb syndrome highlights this relationship. The lived body may still experience sensation, like an itch, and movement, such as extending a hand, in a missing limb, particularly when the missing limb is not in one's field of vision. This disconnect between the lived body and the physical body shows that the lived body is habitual, it develops set ways out of repeated feedback, and once solidified, the bodily schema is not easily transformed. The lived body and the physical body are both immanent and transcendent. The lived body as experienced is immanent, as separate from the physical is transcendent, as the condition of subjectivity is transcendental. The physical body as bodily is immanent, as outside experience is transcendent, as the condition for a lived body is transcendental. The ambiguity of transcendence and immanence presents the subjectivity as play between transcendence and immanence. Subjectivity is an in-between that slides in both directions.

The body as an object is undeniably sexed. This opens corporeal phenomenology up to some insightful feminist critique. Iris Marion Young takes on this challenge in her classic essay, "Throwing Like a Girl."[212] The essay provides a chance to consider immanence and transcendence in a corporeal phenomenology. She writes:

> While feminine bodily existence is a transcendence and openness to the world, it is an *ambiguous transcendence*, a transcendence that is at the same time laden with immanence. Now, once we take the locus of subjectivity and transcendence to be the lived body rather than pure consciousness, all transcendence is ambiguous because the body as natural and material is immanence. But it is not the ever-present possibility of any lived body to be passive, to be touched as well as touching, to be grasped as well as grasping, which I am referring to here as the ambiguity of the transcendence of the feminine lived body. The transcendence of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is a transcendence that moves out from the body in its immanence in an open and unbroken directedness upon the world in action. The lived body as transcendence is pure fluid action, the continuous calling-forth of capacities that are applied to the world. Rather than simply beginning in immanence, feminine bodily existence remains in

[212] Iris Marion Young, "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality," in *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27-45.

> immanence or, better, is *overlaid* with immanence, even as it moves out toward the world in motions of grasping, manipulating, and so on.[213]

Young defines a Merleau-Pontian transcendence as a movement by the subject towards the world. This is a fluid movement that expands subjectivity and blends it with objectivity, the outside world. Likewise, immanence is a passivity or receptivity that is the beginning of subjectivity. The feminine lived body is seized by a dominating immanence that overwhelms and stunts transcendence. Young identifies three modalities of feminine movement. Motility is characterized by ambiguous transcendence. Due to the dominance of passive immanence, active transcendence is restrained and riddled with immanence. Young identifies an inhibited intentionality where feminine motility lives out both an "I can" and an "I cannot" simultaneously. And as a third major characterization of feminine motility, Young notes that there a discontinuous unity with the world, or the present environment. This discontinuity is a result of an impeded transcendence that cannot freely transcend and unite body and world. A corporeal phenomenology and the condition of women as subjects in a western culture give us a new sense of immanence, one that is negative. Immanence is given a limited place within the beginning of subjectivity, but must be overlaid by transcendence, for free and uninhibited subject to exist.

There are a few distinctions and similarities that can be made between this immanence and transcendence and empiricism's. Both empiricism and corporeal phenomenology begin with immanence. A main distinction is that with empiricism transcendence is constituted in the immanent. With a corporeal phenomenology, there is an ambiguity between immanence and transcendence such that transcendence is not constituted, but freed up and allowed to become dominant. The corporeal subject begins in immanence, but that immanence is also transcendence. It is the difference between being touched and touching, there is a shift, but not the constitution of something new. The given is laden with immanence and transcendence, and it is a matter dominance and free play. There is a distinction and a unity between world and subject in corporeal phenomenology. In immanence, the world is separate from the subject, a discontinuity that ruptures the subject from world. While in transcendence, a unity between subject and world is enacted. In empiricism, immanence makes no distinction between subject and world because there is no subject or world originally. Immanence is before this distinction. Essentially, empiricism initially posits a pure immanence, an immanence that is not defined in opposition to transcendence. But a new issue arises here. What role does immanence play for the empirical subject once the transcendent is constituted? What benefit or disadvantage is there for the empiricist in investigating immanence? Does the feminist critique of corporeal phenomenological immanence also apply to empirical immanence? Hume writes about a paralyzing skepticism that is rectified as soon as he starts partaking in his regular activities outside philosophy. What is the relation between skepticism and the restrictions and

[213] Young, "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality," 36.

contradictions forced upon female subjectivity? What would it mean to say, "throwing like a skeptic?" The skeptic temporarily challenges transcendence to uncover an immanence while a woman's transcendence is constantly challenged by the presence of immanence pushed forth by a sexist culture.[214]

Young connects Merleau-Ponty and a corporeal phenomenology back to Kant's transcendental idealism to create something like a transcendental corporealism. She writes:

> Merleau-Ponty gives to the body the unifying and synthesizing function that Kant locates in transcendental subjectivity. By projecting an aim toward which it moves, the body brings unity to and unites itself with its surroundings; through the vectors of its projected possibilities it sets things in relation to one another and to itself. The body's movement and orientation organizes the surrounding space as a continuous extension of its own being [Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.143]. Within the same act in which the body synthesizes its surroundings, moreover, it synthesizes itself. The body synthesis is immediate and primordial. "I do not bring together one by one the parts of my body; this translation and this unification are performed once and for all within me: they are my body itself" [Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.150].[215]

Though Young attributes an affinity here to Kant, in the sense of a synthesis and unification of what would otherwise be a disjointed collection, there is also a subtle difference. Kant begins with a reflection on the limits of phenomenal representation and posits the necessity of transcendental conditions for the possibility of representational experience. The conditions and

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[214] "They [the modalities of feminine bodily comportment, motility, and spatiality] have their source, however, in neither anatomy nor physiology, and certainly not in a mysterious feminine essence. Rather, they have their source in the particular *situation* of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society...Women in sexist society are physically handicapped. Insofar as we learn to live out our existence in accordance with the definition that patriarchal culture assigns to us, we are physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and objectified. As lived bodies we are not open and unambiguous transcendences that move out to master a world that belongs to us, a world constituted by our own intentions and projections." [Iris Marion Young, "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality," in *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42-3.] "[T]he woman lives her body as *object* as well as subject. The source of this is that patriarchal society defines woman as object, as a mere body, and that in sexist society women are in fact frequently regarded by others as objects and mere bodies. An essential part of the situation of being a woman is that of living the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject's intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and intention." [Iris Marion Young, "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality," in *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 44.]

[215] Young, "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality," 37-8.

the synthesis must necessarily be in place before there can be experience. Young asserts that the body unites and connects to the world when it engages the world in teleological action. The impetus of the synthesis in corporeal phenomenology is pragmatic and seemingly existential, yet is also described as a field of potential bodily actions towards the world. The mix of transcendental and immanent elements fits with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of ambiguity. A pragmatic beginning is also present in empiricism, but it is explained through the principles of association and passion. In the ambiguity of Merleau-Ponty, Kant's transcendental is substituted with a different concept, primordiality. The primordial is integral to Heidegger, as that which tradition covers over. It is primordial experience that Heidegger wishes to uncover by the destruction of tradition, such that the thinker can experience again the original experiences that give rise to the disclosure of the meaning of being.[216] Primordiality is not transcendental because it begins with experience, but it isn't necessarily purely immanent. The primordial is the original given. With a corporeal phenomenology, transcendence and immanence are primordial with transcendence coming to dominate immanence. In empiricism, pure immanence is primordial, transcendence is secondary. The philosophical shift towards primordiality initiated by Heidegger is a shift away from Husserl's pure transcendental to a mix of the transcendental and the immanent, yet still not the pure immanence of Hume and Deleuze.

5.4 Immanence and Representation

There is a Spinozan transition in Hume where nature and the transcendent, in terms of the transcendental, become one, though without either ever being immanent. The transcendental and material conditions of the mind and the principles are brought together as outside of experience, opaque to experience, and thus irrelevant to the experience of experience, that is, irrelevant to a critique of experience from within experience. Being grounded in pure immanence, one can at most be agnostic, there is a possibility that transcendental and material conditions exist. The possibility of something existing outside experience is always possible in any ontology, but

[216] "When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand. Dasein has had its historicality so thoroughly uprooted by tradition that it confines its interest to the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic and alien of cultures; and by this very interest it seeks to veil the fact that it has no ground of its own to stand on." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 43.] "If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking *the question of Being as our clue*, we are to *destroy* the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways which have guided us ever since." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 44, original emphasis.]

being outside experience and by definition, there being no way within experience to encounter it as experience, as immanent and primordially given, necessarily excludes the transcendental and nature from the experientially grounded investigation. And any subsequently formed beliefs of the transcendental rely upon the imagination to transcend the given and thus are part of a fictionalism, not the original ground of experience. This immanent beginning gives one what could be considered the realism of empiricism. Impressions as impressions, not representations, are the primordial given. Being all that there is, anti-representational impressions are the real, the material, the basic compositional substance from which all else emerges and transcends.

Deleuze writes about the primordial given as an effect without a cause. In order for there to be a radical given and beginning, it is necessary that these impressions are not caused by some transcendental source that is experienced as part of a causal chain, which would make them representational. Deleuze writes:

> On the other hand, the mind is not the representation of nature either. Not only are perceptions the only substances, they are also the only objects. The negation of the primary qualities corresponds now to the negation of the principle of sufficient reason: perception gives us no difference between two kinds of qualities. The philosophy of experience is not only the critique of a philosophy of substance but also the critique of a philosophy of nature. Therefore, ideas are not the representations of objects, but rather of impressions; as for the impressions, they are not representative, nor are they adventitious; rather, they are innate.[217]

In empiricism, the problematizing of the subject and transcendence brings one to a pure immanence and a subject-less experience. The principle of sufficient reason, that every effect has a cause, is broken in the case of the origin of the mind as purely immanent. This immanent mind is also not representational, which breaks Kant's rule that all experience is representational, phenomenal. Pure immanence is also innate, in a primordial sense, but not transcendental. It is innate because pure immanence doesn't come from somewhere, which would then indicate a transcendental source.

Revealing pure immanence requires a critical standpoint, one begins by critically engaging and questioning a naturally held standpoint, but so does a transcendental philosophy like Kant's transcendental idealism or Husserl's phenomenology. Deleuze describes the difference in critical philosophies when he writes:

> Initially, it is a difference in plan that opposes critical philosophies. We embark upon a transcendental critique when, having situated ourselves on a methodologically reduced plane that provides an

[217] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 88.

> essential certainty—a certainty of essence—we ask: how can there be a given, how can something be given to a subject, and how can the subject give something to itself? Here, the critical requirement is that of a constructivist logic which finds its model in mathematics. The critique is empirical when, having situated ourselves in a purely immanent point of view, which makes possible a description whose rule is found in determinable hypotheses and whose model is found in physics, we ask: how is the subject constituted in the given? The construction of the given makes room for the constitution of the subject. The given is no longer given to a subject; rather, the subject constitutes itself in the given. Hume's merit lies in the singling out of this empirical problem in its pure state and its separation from the transcendental and the psychological.[218]

Transcendental and immanent philosophies use different methods which lead them to ask different questions and use different models of explanation. A transcendental method reaches a transcendental or essential level that is deductive and certain. The model for the transcendental is mathematics, where certain fundamental axioms in the transcendental field are synthesized, or constructed in such a way, to create a solid structure or system. The main question then is how a given, experience, is possible given the transcendental structure. An immanent philosophy deploys methods for reaching a plane of immanence and attempts to describe the activity between the elements of immanence. It speaks about the plane of immanence in terms of hypotheses that lack certainty and are conjectures of probability that can become more or less probably through observation and experiment. This is similar to physics and its attempts to describe the activity between physical objects. The question of an immanent philosophy is then how the subject, which is lost in immanence, is constituted, and as immanent and thus fully isolated, it must be self-constituted. A lingering question here is how one actually achieves through method, immanence.

Deleuze will continue his empirical project and this trajectory towards immanence in his 1968 book, *Difference and Repetition*. It is here that we see his most developed reflections on what would constitute a plane of immanence. But we also see some fundamental divergences from the boundaries that were set in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. These transgressions might appear as if Deleuze is distancing himself from Hume and taking a new and separate path. But the case will be drawn here that Deleuze's subsequent work does not contradict a Humean empiricism and there is no need to abandon a Humean-Deleuzean empiricism.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze sets out to conceive difference as it is in itself, not in relation to the same or identity. Difference is traditionally subordinated to the same; it is

[218] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 87.

defined as alterations of the same. The same, or identity, is also the self that subsists beneath the flux of sensation. The same is what Hume has questioned when he grounds thought in experience. The same is a transcendence. Difference in itself is the element of pure immanence, that which populates the plane of immanence. Just as transcendence is constituted in the pure immanence of the given, the same is an integration of infinitesimals of difference. Deleuze's project is to investigate how one can conceive and imagine difference itself. Deleuze writes:

> Difference must become the element, the ultimate unity; it must therefore refer to other differences which never identify it but rather differenciate it. Each term of a series, being already a difference, must be put into a variable relation with other terms, thereby constituting other series devoid of centre and convergence. Divergence and decentring must be affirmed in the series itself. Every object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences. Difference must be shown *differing*. We know that modern art tends to realise these conditions: in this sense it becomes a veritable *theatre* of metamorphoses and permutations. A theatre where nothing is fixed, a labyrinth without a thread (Ariadne has hung herself). The work of art leaves the domain of representation in order to become 'experience', transcendental empiricism or science of the sensible.[219]

Deleuze is pursuing the very project that is started in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, the problem of transcendence and the pursuit of pure immanence, and he points to art as a field and practice that realizes immanence. The art that is empirical is not representational. It is here that Deleuze uses the controversial phrase "transcendental empiricism" to distinguish between art that is representational and art that is experience in itself. Transcendental is compared here to science as empiricism is linked with the sensible. It is not clear why the immanent is considered transcendental. Immanence is compared to a labyrinth that one cannot escape because the transcendent Greek goddess Ariadne, who offers the only escape from the labyrinth by way of following a thread, has destroyed herself. With the transcendent gone, immanence is an experience without fixed ends, anchors or a subject. With immanence as this inescapable labyrinth, the question of how the subject is constituted in the immanent given becomes all the more radical.

Deleuze transgresses the boundary of sensation in experience as established in his study of Hume. He makes an argument that one must go behind the qualitative diversity that composes the flux of sensation to that which causes the qualitative diversity. To some extent, this explains

[219] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 56, original emphasis.

why he uses transcendental here, an investigation of the conditions of qualitative sensation, in terms of the outside cause, would be a transcendental empiricism. Deleuze writes:

> It is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what *can* be represented in the sensible. True, the inverse procedure is not much better, consisting of the attempt to withdraw the pure sensible from representation and to determine it as that which remains once representation is removed (a contradictory flux, for example, or a rhapsody of sensation). Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being *of* the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. It is in difference that movement is produced as an 'effect', that phenomena flash their meaning like signs. The intense world of differences, in which we find the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible, is precisely the object of a superior empiricism. This empiricism teaches us a strange 'reason', that of the multiple, chaos and difference (nomadic distributions, crowned anarchies). It is always differences which resemble one another, which are analogous, opposed or identical: difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing. Each difference passes through all the others; it must 'will' itself or find itself through all the others.[220]

Deleuze sets up two rejected alternatives in empiricism. The first is Kantian in nature. This is the determination of the conditions for possible representations in experience. The conditions of possibility do not address that which is actually and concretely encountered. The second alternative is removing all representation from sensation in order to reveal sensation itself. This is a return to the immanence of sensation, yet here Deleuze is arguing that it is an unacceptable position. The flux of sensation is contradictory, which I take in the sense that we speak of it as something and nothing at the same time. A "rhapsody of sensation" suggests a "composition irregular in form" and an "improvisation"[221] that leaves one without any sense of how we come see things. Perhaps, the opacity of nature, this impenetrable boundary of experience, is no longer enough of an answer, to stop transcendental inquiry. Deleuze is arguing that instead of looking for the conditions of possibility or a material sensibility without representation, that one aim for the being of sensation, a transcendental being called difference. How can Deleuze reconcile an empiricism where nothing is transcendental with difference being the transcendental being, the

[220] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 56-7, original emphasis.
[221] "Rhapsody," *Dictionary.com Unabridged*, Random House, Inc., accessed August 19, 2014, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rhapsody.

material conditions or substance, of sensation? The key is to any reconciliation is that the philosopher is not subject-less. The philosophy is always already thrown into subjectivity. The "rhapsody of sensation" is always presented to a subject experiencing that stream. The philosopher can theorize about a pure immanence without subjectivity, but this is always coming from a subjectivity embedded with transcendent beliefs. So this transcendental empiricism can be understood as a rethinking of the transcendental in light of what is revealed by an empiricist questioning of subjectivity, a radical skepticism, an imagined subject and world, etc. We naturally transcend the given. How might we better imagine the conditions of sensation? Then, Deleuze's answer is to think of difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the transcendental. This is a transcendental that stays within empiricism's rule that there is no already synthesized structure before experience. Yet it is still beyond, in this case behind, the given of experience, it is still transcendent, it is still something created out of fancy. Deleuze thinks of the difference and the plane of immanence as existing virtually. It is something that is never present, but almost present, almost there, almost actual behind the fixed actualities that we do perceive. One can imagine that difference is the real. If one forgets that this is all imagined, a product of the fancy, then one does step outside this Humean-Deleuzian empiricism. A transcendental empiricism that is still consistent with a Humean-Deleuzian empiricism is an empiricism that lets the empirically enlightened subject re-imagine the transcendental as an immanent, real, source of our fixed, transcendent world of things and representations, which are expressions of this difference.

There is a lingering problem with Humean-Deleuzian empiricism and a pure immanence that is before the constitution of the subject. How do we, subjects, experience subject-less experience? This may be part of the contradiction that Deleuze find in the stream of sensation purged of representation. Deleuze does not answer this question when he allows for experience of the virtual, for the virtual is also not present, but virtually present and thus the question remains of how it is in fact experienced. Empiricism and pure immanence points somewhere that the subject cannot go. This is a problem and Deleuze will find a practical solution in the painting of Francis Bacon.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Turning toward the Future

This dissertation has aimed to recover a sense of empiricism that is often overlooked, ignored, or misunderstood, due to its radical consequences. One consequence, radical skepticism, was not an absurd and inescapable end for Hume, but the starting point for a post-skepticism that argued for how one could best manage in a situation where philosophical thought revealed absolute skepticism and practical day to day life treated fiction as truth. The clash between these two worlds, one of reflection and one of day to day action, exemplifies the dualistic character of human life, of one that is formed by nature and human nature. Deleuze also deploys dynamically related dualisms such as his distinction between the molar and the molecular. The molar level represents being, that which has been differenciated, which follows closely to Hume's human nature that transcends the given. The molecular level represents becoming, the pluralism of micro-changes that helps us to conceive difference itself. The empirical and the transcendental are a dualism in this vein, which is why the nomenclature of transcendental empiricism is problematic in understanding Deleuze. Though, this dualism can collapse momentarily into the purely empirical as a foundational moment, just as we can collapse into the purely molecular. This pure empiricism is a moment of radical passivity, where subjectivity disappears. Cosmologically speaking, the purely empirical is like the big bang of consciousness, the moment that both resets the universe and sets the stage for being able to experience conditioned content. There is important value in being able to theorize about a pure empiricism, and to attempt to experience something like a pure empiricism. The resetting of established and determined experience opens up new creative possibilities. It leads Deleuze to conceive the idea of difference in itself as the foundation of all differentiation. It is a theory that occurs to Deleuze after his study of Hume and its post-radical empiricism and skepticism. For Deleuze and Hume, empiricism is not a place we live our day to day lives. It is a place entered through difficult and abstruse reflection, a practice that involves reaching a radical level of passivity and dissolving the subject.

6.1 Empirical Foundations and Transcendental Grounds

Deleuze reflects on the transcendental and the empirical with respect to the constitution of time. In so doing, he makes an important distinction between the founding and the grounding of experience. He associates founding with the emergence of a contracted present, one that emerges from a fleeting flux of now's that are passively synthesized by habit, the repetition of

the same. This contracted present is a pure present detached from any continuity. As Hume argued that any continuity is imagined, it is the same with this temporal present, which is experienced without the intervention of the imagination. Deleuze calls this the present present. To collapse into a pure empiricism is to collapse into this present present. This moment is the foundation of experience, as it marks the hard beginning of consciousness, a beginning that repeats itself without ever synthesizing into anything more than this atomically contracted moment. On the other hand, Deleuze argues that memory brings a former present back as the past in a new present. These two points synthesize into a line and this line extends both forwards and backwards. This temporal span is the ground of experience, that which conditions all possible experience. The present is embedded in this ground. Thus, Deleuze conceives both the ground and the foundation of experience through the form of time. In a sense, Deleuze places Kant's reflections on time in Hume's framework. Though it is Descartes' "I think," which begins the modern era and first brings time and subjectivity together.

In a difficult passage from *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze writes:

> This active synthesis of memory is founded upon the passive synthesis of habit, since the latter constitutes the general possibility of any present. But the two syntheses are profoundly different: the asymmetry here follows from the constant augmentation of dimensions, their infinite proliferation. The passive synthesis of habit constituted time as a *contraction* of instants with respect to a present, but the active synthesis of memory constitutes it as the *embedding* of presents themselves. The whole problem is: with respect to what? It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an *a priori* past, that a given former present is reproducible, and the present present is able to reflect itself. Far from being derived from the present or from representation, the past is presupposed by every representation. In this sense, the active synthesis of memory may well be founded upon the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the other hand it can be grounded only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself. Whereas the passive synthesis of habit constitutes the living present in time and makes the past and the future two asymmetrical elements of that present, the passive synthesis of memory constitutes the pure past in time, and makes the former and the present present (thus the present in reproduction and the future in reflection) two asymmetrical elements of this past as such.[222]

[222] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 81.

Deleuze is arguing that there are ultimately two kinds of passive synthesis. That of habit constitutes the foundation, a present present, and the passive synthesis of memory constitutes the a priori ground of representation. Deleuze distinguishes between contraction and embedding to characterize the difference between foundation and ground. Citing Bergson, Deleuze argues there are four constitutive paradoxes in this paradigm of the syntheses. These paradoxes are connected to the relationship between foundation and ground. Despite the empirical in its contraction becoming primal, the transcendental emerges from the empirical as contemporaneous, coexistent, pre-existent (as the a priori). There is an inescapable paradox when the contingent constitutes that which is universal, necessary and eternal. Time is constituted in the empirical present, but once it is constituted, time as the *a priori* conditions of representational experience is also constituted. Deleuze's work reveals foundation and ground, the empirical and the transcendental, as both genetically related and positively opposed. Either way, it makes no sense to then speak of a transcendental empiricism.

In concluding this section, it is helpful to translate Deleuze's intervention into the history of philosophy into a critique of early Heidegger. Heidegger's theory of the subject begins with *dasein*, commonly translated into English as 'being-there.' Deleuze does not dispute that subjectivity is a determination and inclusion in a world that is already meaningful, which characterizes Heidegger's being there. Deleuze's intervention is to question both the subject and its thrown-ness, to undermine the "there" of dasein and the "being." Deleuze, through Hume, argues that subjectivity is a product of experience, instead of a condition of experience. And underneath being is becoming. Deleuze's focus on the constitution of time, in terms of a contraction into a present present, deforms and collapses the being-there to a being-now, and ultimately a becoming-now. Now it is Deleuze's present present that is before the constitution of conditions that give meaningful, representative experience. Deleuze's intervention is not to reject Heidegger, but to dig beneath subjectivity and meaning, and find the foundations of experience that frame representative experience.

6.2 Answering to the original question: The Problem of Transcendental Empiricism

The entirety of this project has rested upon one argument, *reduction ad absurdem*. The idea of a transcendental empiricism is a contradiction; it is proposing a transcendental anti-transcendentalism. The structure of the argument has been to situate British Empiricism (Chapter Three) as a response to Descartes' rationalism (Chapter Two), in order to contextualize Humean empiricism. Then, I presented some of Deleuze appropriations and corrections of empiricism (Chapter Four) and finally distinguished empiricism from transcendence and transcendental

philosophy (Chapter Five). The aim has been to elucidate an empiricism that is clearly in conflict with transcendentalism. If I have succeeded, it does not mean the end of transcendental thought. Instead, it places transcendental enquiry as arising from an empirical foundation.

It seems clear that when Deleuze was attempting to conceive difference in itself in *Difference and Repitition*, he was not exactly practicing Humean empiricism anymore. Though, he also was not abandoning empiricism. It is my guess that Deleuze was struggling to invent the best terminology for describing his current practice and 'transcendental empiricism,' a linguistic bomb that exploded apart, seemed to be an interesting choice of words to fill this role. The fact is that empiricism is part of a cycle and it is difficult, restrictive, and rather boring to quarantine oneself into a perspective that undermines all conceptual structures. Thus, Deleuze's subsequent work, officially begun in his classic 1968 text, was to try to re-think the singular idea of difference in itself, rather than a difference opposed, bound, and subjugated to the idea of the same. Difference in itself could be considered a condition of determined phenomena. But the conditions of experience are not experienced themselves because they are what give shape to experience. Thus conditions are outside experience. Difference in itself is not outside experience, it is experience without conditioning. The division between conditions and unconditioned experience also divides grounds and foundations. Grounds of experience are outside experience, while the foundations of experience are unconditioned experience. Difference in itself is best understood a foundation, which implies that the title of transcendental empiricism does not apply. If anything a philosophy of difference is a foundational empiricism.

Another way of attempting to understand 'transcendental empiricism' is to consider Husserl's division of internal and external consciousness. In this sense, transcendental empiricism is another name for transcendental phenomenology, a discipline that isolates internal experience. Phenomenology is the direct experience and manipulation in the imagination and using the intellect of the transcendental objects of transcendental experience. Phenomenology is descriptive of the direct experience of inner consciousness. The problem is that empiricism, as Hume and Deleuze have defined it, is not captured by a transcendental phenomenology. Hume's empiricism drops all external reference. This seems to restrict Hume to internal consciousness. Phenomenology ultimately dips below inner consciousness to the transcendental grounds of inner consciousness, the logical grounds of experience. As well phenomenology is the study of representational phenomena. In this respect, phenomenology is influenced by Kant and Kant's response to Hume. On the other hand empiricism's rejection of external referents is also a rejection of the internal. There is no distinguishing between external or internal until they are constituted together using the imagination. Thus, this pure empiricism is not meant phenomenologically and the label still cannot be resolved. Perhaps, Deleuze should have called his work immanental empiricism.

6.3 The History of philosophy

The history of philosophy is a progression when one considers philosophy regionalized into separate particular camps that internally progress. There are advances within the thought of each region that carry them forward. But stepping outside the internal development of a particular region, the whole shows no winner. Instead, there is cyclical structure of dominant camps, sometimes that dominance spreads and popularizes to the level and dominance of an empire, but there is never an end to the competition.

Philosophy as a historical practice is cyclical because each particular philosopher is historically situated and cannot hold all philosophical positions and perspectives at once. Thus, philosophy as a practice cycles between foundation and ground, between the empirical and the empirical with the transcendental, between difference itself and difference with determined, conditioned representation. Of both sides, empiricism is the great mover of the cycle as it is the dismantler of all theory.

Deleuze argues that he feels trapped by the history of philosophy, caught up in debates about the meaning of already conceived ideas. But it is when Deleuze considers the tension between conflicting philosophers, between rationalism and empiricism, and when he holds the match of empiricism to the situation, that he creates explosions that lead to new theories that re-work, re-fashion, and re-invent what has come before. It is when we experience historical entrapment that we find ways to escape and begin again. Empiricism's power of renewal is important like a vaccination dose to guard against cultural stagnation and fixation. Cultures become diseased and begin dying when they solidify perspectives and the conditions of those perspectives.

Much of this project has focused upon the consequences to epistemology from empiricism. One must also consider the consequences to ethics. Empiricism also undermines ethical grounds, principles that govern ethical commitments, and reveals ethical foundations. This project intended originally to connect Deleuze to Levinas. It is with Levinas' ethics of alterity that we find an ungrounded ethics, a foundational ethics. It is easy, particularly due to the early modern heritage of empiricism, to become caught up in epistemological considerations and forget about ethics.

6.4 Value of Philosophy

Philosophers must defend themselves and their work. When not working upon this project, I am often asked, and often by family, what is the point of my work? What use does it have? What value does philosophy have? What contribution does it make? What these questions imply is that philosophy might be a luxury of the intellectual class. Is this work at all relevant to practical life? These are serious questions that I think an honest philosopher, in the midst of his or her work, will raise by himself or herself.

In the preface I began with a quote from Adam Smith, giving an account of one of his last conversations with Hume. Now, as I come to the end of this work, I will continue this citation with the second part, for Hume had one more line of reasoning he could relay to Charon in an attempt to further delay his death. Hume was quoted by Smith as saying, "But I might still urge, 'Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the Public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal [sic] of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.' But Charon would then lose all temper and decency. 'You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy, loitering rogue.'"[223] And thus Smith revealed a concern and side of Hume that is often lost in charges of presenting an absurd skepticism[224] that defies common sense and an ill will to deny what everyone accepts. Hume, the reformer, is important to the culture and has a practical role to play.

David Fate Norton, the current co-author of the critical edition of the *Treatise*[225], writes:

> Serious topics treated at times with nonchalance: this has been enough to lead some of his critics to suppose that rhetorical *effect* was to him more important than *truth*. Hume did at times treat serious topics lightly, and he did have reservations about claims to have found ultimate principles or The Truth, but these facts are entirely consistent with his most fundamental and unmistakably serious aim...Hume had no thought of reforming the fundamental dispositions of human nature itself. These he took as settled, and utopian schemes dependent on a changed constitution of humanity he dismissed without qualification...Reformation [for Hume], if it is to take place, will affect individuals, and will be in the form of that refinement of character that results from new *habits of mind*,

[223] Adam Smith, "Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strahan, ESQ., Kirkaldy, Fifeshire, Nov. 9, 1776," in *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688: Volume I*, by David Hume (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), xxxvii.

[224] Husserl makes these charges against Hume that his empiricist conclusion is an absurd skepticism, but he also credits Hume as forbearer to phenomenology. See chapter one for references. Fellow Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796), ridicules Hume's empiricism in his philosophy of common sense.

[225] David Hume, "A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects," in *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, Volume I: Texts*, edit. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).

> and, most particularly, from new *habits of belief*...Hume's postskeptical philosophy does not counsel us to suspend all judgment, belief, affirmation. Instead, accepting the basic lessons of skepticism, it attempts to show us how to moderate our beliefs and attitudes. Those who practiced his principles would, Hume thought, learn how to avoid that combination of arrogance, pretension, and credulity that he found so distasteful and stifling, so *dangerous* in its typical manifestations, religious dogmatism and political faction.[226]

This same disposition of reform that Norton praises in Hume could be said to motivate Deleuze. The work of reform is always a long term project and the reformers often do not get to see the changes they supported. For changing habits requires repetition and a proliferation of associations. Reform through philosophy can never be expected to be immediate and is always supported by associated forces of reform in different disciplines and practices. But I think if someone asks of the value of this radical empiricism, and this dissertation, long term reform is a decent answer.

6.5 Future Directions

This project was originally much larger, so large I was overwhelmed by the scope. I have learned and still am learning to focus myself upon smaller, achievable goals. I have claimed above that the argument of this dissertation is *reductio ad absurdum*. This argument proves the contradiction of a tentative premise, but it also helps to define the contours between meaning and absurdity. I have come to view this dissertation as delving into and defining a *theory* of Humean-Deleuzian empiricism. The next logical step would be to investigate the practice of Humean-Deleuzian empiricism. This marks a shift from theoretical empiricism to applied empiricism. Deleuze accomplishes this in his study of the painter Francis Bacon. In *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze investigates the methods Bacon employs to create a painting that is not read, or understood, but directly hits the nervous system.

One practical discovery in Deleuze's investigation is that action paintings like those of Jackson Pollock descend the spectator into a chaos where there are no anchors to sustain a critique or un-ground particular objects of perception. Every time one perceives an action painting, there is only chaos. This is why Bacon restricts himself to simplified portraits where he

[226] David Fate Norton, "An Introduction to Hume's Thought," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Second Edition*, edit. David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 33-35.

a limited chaos, or zones of chaos, can emerge. Bacon draws figures and heads. Deleuze uses Jean-François Lyotard's concept of the figural[227] to write about how Bacon imposes the empirical foundation of an embodied subject upon the spectator. The relationship between perceiver and perceived is not of knowledge, for the image resists categorization. Instead Bacon presents us with an encounter, a relationship, which raises ethical considerations. Levinas' ethics of alterity comes to mind as a suitable theory for investigating this applied empiricism.

Deleuze finds in Bacon a tool box of methods for transitioning an image that is fixed and grounded in categories of representation into an unfixed force of sensation that directly hits the nervous system. Bacon works to escape narrative, illustrative, and traditonal figurative works that are read and interpreted. One entrenched mechanism of perceptual meaning comes from gestalt theory, the division of an image into figure and ground. Deleuze follows Bacon's commentary in interviews to present a method that flattens the image, such that figure and ground occupy the same plane and become entangled in movements and forces of contraction and expansion. One must also fight against clichés, the ready-made and fixed ideas that already determine thought and image. These determinations already inhabit the blank canvas and it is the artist's job to erase the blank canvas in order to begin free of the chains of representation. Bacon uses methods of chance and attunes himself to the interactions of paint and canvas that occur outside any intended consequences. Vision itself becomes haptic vision, a vision of force and intensity, of touching and being touched, rather than symbols decoded according to traditional categories of representation.

The theory of empiricism that is developed in this project illuminates Deleuze's study of Bacon. The shift from epistemology to ethics follows a shift from metaphysics to aesthetics. Skepticism, a position of epistemology, must have its correlate in aesthetics and ethics. The question of what correlates is the seed of new study and another project.

sic erat cogitatum

[227] Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

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