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Body and Horizon: Kant, Husserl, and the Nonconceptual Content of Experience

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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The debate that took place between Herbert Dreyfus and John McDowell a few years back concerning the nonconceptual content of experience was in many ways disappointing. The question addressed in the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, in its most basic form, is why we should think embodied cognition is a more compelling account of our motor engagement with the world than one that casts it in terms of concepts. A question that is not addressed is why we should find the justificatory grounds provided by either thinker more or less compelling than the other. To answer this question, I reframe their debate in terms of the apperceptive content with which both Kant and Husserl are concerned. Apperception is best defined in terms of holistic structures which logically precede and order cognition, whether this cognition proceeds via intuition or concepts. For instance, to grasp a concept is to grasp it as possibly a predicate of judgments other than the one in which it is featured or as part of a conceptual holism. Intuitions, on the other hand, are structured by a part-whole relation in which the wholes of space and time always logically precede their parts. Slices of space and time are always first presented as situated within an indeterminately extended whole. The difference between these two kinds of apperceptive content marks the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual content in the transcendental tradition.

With this distinction in hand I make three major arguments. First, because the part-whole relationship governing space and time is different from the part-whole relationship governing concepts, we can only indicate, but not fully cognize the intuitions by way of concepts. Secondly, though we have good reason to be suspicious of Kant's particular way of justifying his claims about concepts and intuitions, his arguments against the idea that experience is wholly determined by concepts can be reframed as *reductio* arguments that apply beyond the scope of his project. Finally, the distinction between nonconceptual content and conceptual content can also be carried phenomenologically, or through a detailed account of lived experience. Here we find that the kind of cognition proper to the intuitions is housed in the body, in the relation between perception, action, and Husserl's own take on the part-whole relation governing space and time, the horizon.

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Chapter 1

Object and Concept

Introduction

The debate that took place between Herbert Dreyfus and John McDowell a few years back concerning the nonconceptual content of experience was in many ways disappointing. The common ground that Dreyfus and McDowell share, a ground which neither addresses explicitly in their debate, is their debt to the transcendental approach to epistemological problems. I think had they recognized this common debt, their debate could have been much richer. Specifically I think their debate raises questions about the role of transcendental approaches after Kant and what kind of insights we can gain from this kind of approach. It is true that neither is Kantian in any kind of orthodox sense, but the very terms of their debate are to be found in Kant and Kant's distinction between the manifold of intuition and the categories. We can see this especially clearly by looking to the philosophical forerunners of each thinker. Wilfried Sellars' account of the relation between the manifold of intuition and the categories focuses on the imagination. For Sellars the imagination operates such that, for instance, visual experience becomes "infused" or "soaked" with concepts. McDowell maintains this same basic account (though without addressing Kant's notion of imagination specifically) when he claims that concepts must underlie embodied engagement with the world. Husserl, in developing his account of passive synthesis, focuses on Kant's transcendental aesthetic and the structures of perception that operate prior to the Kantian categories. (Heidegger, too, found Kant's account of the imagination and the

Transcendental aesthetic of particular importance). The idea that the structures of perception operate prior to the employment of concepts remains a keystone of phenomenological thought. In Dreyfus this idea emerges in the idea of skillful coping, of being absorbed in a skilled activity without explicit reflection on the various elements of the activity.

Now, the question addressed in the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, in its most basic form, is why we should find skillful coping a more compelling account of our motor engagement with the world than one that includes concepts. Yet, a question that is not addressed specifically enough is why we should find the justificatory grounds provided by either thinker more or less compelling than the other. For Dreyfus, either you do the phenomenological work and see the point or you don't and if you don't so much the worse for your account of experience. For McDowell, the issue concerns the kind of epistemology we ought to be aiming for. We ought not to construct the terms of our epistemology in such a way that we leave unbridgeable gaps between those terms, whether those gaps are those between subject and object or between two different conceptions of the subject. He accuses Dreyfus of inviting the consequences of the latter in making a distinction between the subject as a user of concepts and the subject as one who skillfully copes. Neither approach is ultimately satisfying.

On the one hand, we want more theoretical groundwork in support of the, "either you see it or you don't" approach (though, in fairness, this may be a bit of an oversimplification of Dreyfus' approach). More specifically, what claims can be offered that are compelling and well supported such that it can be explained why having accepted these claims I should then be in a position to see why the nature of the claims I have accepted *requires* that I take motor intentionality as nonconceptual? Dreyfus offers compelling phenomenological insights concerning skillful coping, but relies on what McDowell considers a narrow account of

conceptuality to make his point. Thus, McDowell can easily accept Dreyfus' description of embodiment, but deny that it in any way requires nonconceptuality. On the other hand, we do not want the ideal, or aim of our epistemological theory to merely determine the most expedient means to that end if it means imposing a theoretical viewpoint that ignores viable alternatives. More specifically what claims can be offered that are compelling and well supported such that having accepted these claims I will be in a position to see how the nature of the claims I have accepted *requires* that I take our perceptual and motor engagements with the world (these are often deeply intertwined for phenomenologists) as conceptual? McDowell's view does not take into account well defined phenomenological distinctions between various ways of attending to objects and places all aspects of experience on a common scale. Thus, Dreyfus can accept that concepts are a pervasive aspect of our engagement with the world, but deny that they are all pervasive.

Cast in this light, the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell reveals an impasse. The negative work each does in critique of the other reveals that each thinker conceives of some part of the issue at stake too narrowly. Yet, the positive work each attempts is lacking. What is needed is a determination of and a justification for the proper scope of conceptuality. At this point, someone like Rorty might just throw up his hands and say, "See! There is just no way to choose between philosophical theories. There is nothing deeper than the theories themselves to which we can appeal in our decision, nothing other than, that is, usefulness." Indeed, it is sometimes useful to look at things in subtle phenomenological detail and sometimes useful to look at things as conceptually determined. If, however, we wish for more than this, the question is whether there is a criterion or some kind of foundation that would allow us to decide which branch of this impasse is the right one to start down. To the degree that both are indebted to the

transcendental tradition, this will mean determining the best transcendental account and why it counts as such. This, in turn, will require attending to the difficulties of transcendental philosophy, all of which are articulated in response to Kant.

One might wonder, why focus on Dreyfus and McDowell. It is not as if between them they exhaust all possible philosophical approaches to this problem. Nonetheless, I think the reason their debate is compelling is because it touches on broader issues. These issues concern divisions within Continental philosophy, for instance that between the Hermeneutic tradition and the Phenomenological tradition, as well between the Continental tradition and the Analytic tradition. The former still grapples and struggles with Kant's distinction between the transcendental and the empirical and the latter often takes an unapologetically empirical view of things. Thus, my aim is to tackle these broader issues in the way that I think they should have been, which will mean moving beyond the account of both Dreyfus and McDowell. In fact, I will reframe their debate as a debate within the Kantian tradition. As such, though McDowell and Dreyfus are the impetus for this work, it is decidedly not a work about the philosophies of McDowell and Dreyfus. There are 5 things I will accomplish throughout the course of my analysis.

First, my account will be genealogical in nature, tracing the nonconceptual content of experience from its roots in Kant's approach in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Here, I will be looking at Kant through the lens of the Kantian tradition or through various appraisals and developments of his work with an eye toward developing an answer to our question. In other words, my aim is not to offer a scholarly argument revealing "the real Kant," but to provide a framework for our question and search for tools and materials within this framework that might be helpful in answering it. Secondly, I aim to develop a phenomenological account of the

nonconceptual content of experience (hereafter just nonconceptual content) that serves as a foundational account of all experiential content. As Michael Tye has noted, content is something of a term of art among philosophers and it is difficult to decide on a single proper usage. I propose that there is a kind of content that is *necessarily* the ground for any other kind of experiential content. Defending this view will require reconciling the transcendental with the empirical in a way that does not produce an unbridgeable gap between two kinds of subjectivity. Here, I will sharpen my phenomenological approach through responses to problems that arise within the Kantian tradition, but also through Kantian insights involving concepts of comparison and original acquisition. Thirdly, I aim to establish a link between perception and action that must be theorized with respect to what I will call apperceptive content. Fourthly, I aim to establish distinctions between the different roles that concepts can play with respect to experiential content. Finally, I aim to offer an analysis of how the kind of experiential content I will be discussing is possible via a modified transcendental argument involving embodied subjectivity.

In this first chapter I will, for reasons that are already apparent, develop themes from Kant's transcendental philosophy. Here, I will focus on three main issues in Kant's critical philosophy crucial to developing an account of apperceptive content. My work here will be mostly preparatory. First, I will discuss the problematic nature of objects in transcendental philosophy. The kind of idealism Kant favors leaves us in serious doubt about the role objects play in our cognition of the world or even what objects are. I will survey three responses to this problem, develop Henry Allison's account of the transcendental object, and conclude by making suggestions as to what the proper phenomenological response should be. Supporting the phenomenological response will then be one of the central tasks of this work. Secondly, I will

discuss Kant's account of concepts. This will provide a rich working definition of apperceptive conceptual content that will aid me in presenting the contrastive notion of apperceptive nonconceptual content. Finally, the last section will be dedicated to considering *a priori* judgments after Kant. Here, my aim is to show that the accounts of apperceptive content that develop after Kant are often motivated by shifting accounts of *a priori* judgment. This will pave the way to a discussion of Husserl's account of apperceptive content. To begin, however, I think it will be helpful to more closely define the kind of content I will be concerned with and how it fits into the broader debate concerning nonconceptual content.

Nonconceptual Content: A Brief Introduction

We can call the kind of content I will be discussing apperceptive content. In Kantian terms, apperception is best defined in terms of holistic structures which logically precede and order cognition, whether this cognition proceeds via intuition or concepts. Apperception can be more precisely characterized by three claims. First, there is the claim that subjects always grasp more than what is presented or represented as a condition of grasping what is presented or represented. In the case of concepts, to grasp a concept is to grasp it as possibly a predicate of judgments other than the one in which it is featured. Intuitions, on the other hand, are structured by a part-whole relation in which the whole always logically precedes the parts. Slices of space and time are always presented as situated within an indeterminately extended whole. Husserl accounts for the structure of the horizon in much the same way, but without the overtly

Newtonian aims that characterize Kant's approach. The second claim concerns what it is that is apperceived. What is apperceived is never something fully determinate, is never, for instance, a set of determinate objects coexisting with or anticipated as succeeding a given object.

Apperception is always about three things: the holistic structure which orders content, the features which any possible content must have as ordered by the holistic structure, and the possibilities for cognition within a given structure.

The third is a claim about the subject who does the apperceiving. This is the most controversial and important of the three claims. For Kant and Husserl it is the transcendental subject who apperceives. The problem that arises here is determining the relation between transcendental and empirical subjects. Transcendental subjectivity is characterized, for both Kant and Husserl, in terms of a grasp of the possibilities for cognition within holistic structures which determine the features of what is presented in experience and guarantee the continuity of experience (temporally, spatially via temporality, and conceptually) such that experience is possible at all. Yet, if the transcendental subject is wholly divorced from the empirical subject, the kind of content that belongs to the transcendental realm will remain somewhat insubstantial. Apperceptive content will only explicitly appear within the context of explicitly and reflectively applying reason in order to speculate about logical conditions and priorities. This leaves us at an impasse. Speculative content appears too removed from experience to provide a convincing account of experiential content. We might try to save the approach by developing an account of such apperception for the empirical subject. Yet, can we really make sense of the claim that empirical subjects apperceive in the expansive way usually attributed to transcendental subjects? I think this claim would be hard to defend if the kind of apperception under discussion were to involve the Kantian categories for reasons that will become clear. As a claim about embodied

cognition, about the readiness or disposedness of the body for typical activities, and the gestalt structure of experience, I think the expansive apperception developed within the context of transcendental subjectivity can be defended for empirical subjects. Yet, if it is to be something more than content we merely speculate about, it must be included in the phenomenology of experience. Here, Husserl's accounts of associative syntheses, passive syntheses, temporal syntheses and embodiment will be indispensable to my own account, but are incomplete. They are incomplete because Husserl does not do enough to root these various syntheses in the body.

Apperceptive content is thus constituted by two more specific kinds of content: apperceptive intuitional content and apperceptive conceptual content. Here, it becomes a bit difficult to determine where apperceptive content stands with respect to the broader debate concerning nonconceptual content. Within the contemporary debate, conceptual content is often defined in terms of empirical subjects, in terms of concept possession and use. Nonconceptual content is then defined contrastively against this definition. The general idea is that a subject can be in a mental state that represents the world as being some way or other and need not have the concepts required to specify the way the world is represented by that state. Thus, the kind of content at stake is more specifically *representational* content, or content that is assessable for accuracy; the way we represent the world either gets it right or wrong. Kant is concerned neither with representational content nor empirical concept possession. Rather, Kant is concerned with the conditions for the possibility of representational content and transcendental concept possession. Even though the former concern suggests that the contemporary definition nonconceptual content is not applicable to Kant's critical philosophy, the latter concern would, on the contemporary definition, suggest that whatever content there is at the transcendental level is nonconceptual content. According to Kant's critical philosophy, empirical subjects need have

no grasp of the categories of the understanding in order for those categories to determine the basic features of all experiential content. By contrast, the Kantian distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content concerns the difference between the holism structuring apprehension and the holism structuring concepts. We will discuss this in much greater detail, and Kant's holism of concepts in particular in this chapter, but, briefly, each holism is distinguished by the distinctive rules which govern it.

Yet, Kant's concept holism is hard to maintain on just the terms in which he develops it. In particular, his accounts of *a priori* categories and transcendental subjectivity are difficult to maintain. As we will see Husserl maintains the distinction between apprehension and conceptual cognition for roughly the same reasons as Kant, but in his later work Husserl develops these Kantian distinctions in terms of empirical subjects. Thus, for Husserl it would be appropriate to discuss concept holism in terms of concept possession. There is, however, an important difference between Husserl's view of nonconceptual content and that which forms the focus for the contemporary debate. Husserl argues that nonconceptual content is presentational rather than representational and unlike, for instance David Chalmers and John Searle, does not take presentational content to be a variety of representational content.

In chapter five, I will discuss a few varieties of experiential content and argue that on Husserl's account the basic level of perception is epistemically neutral. I will argue that presentational content concerns the presentation of objects as possibilities for action and perception and involves no claim, explicit or otherwise, as to the determinate inherent properties of those objects. Epistemic neutrality is also to be distinguished from skepticism as well as any other kind of attitude in which judgment is actively withheld. One of the consequences of this epistemic neutrality is that it is not just that we need not have the concepts required to specify

presentational content. Rather, presentational content can *never* be exhaustively specified by concepts. We can thus distinguish the phenomenological view of nonconceptual content from what Richard Heck calls the state view of nonconceptual content.

In his essay “Nonconceptual Content and the Space of Reasons” Heck points out that many of the arguments in support of nonconceptual content actually rest on a distinction between belief states and perceptual states rather than a distinction between two kinds of content. Those who argue in support of nonconceptual content will often claim that having beliefs requires possession of the concepts that constitute those beliefs. For instance, I could not have beliefs about dogs, trees, and computers without having some concept of those things. Perceptual states, argue the nonconceptualists, do not require concept possession. It does not follow from this, however, that the *contents* of perception and the *contents* of beliefs are different, just as it would not follow that my beliefs about apple pie and my desire for apple pie are about different things even though the conditions under which I am in each state differ. On the phenomenological account I will be developing, we can certainly have beliefs about objects as possibilities for action and perception, but the point is that beliefs can never *establish* objects as possibilities for action and perception. Neither can belief directly redeem those possibilities. Thus, beliefs about objects as possibilities for action and perception are merely reports of uniquely *perceptual* content.

For now, I leave these initial considerations as a promissory note for the work to follow, and turn to delve into the deep and difficult waters of transcendental inquiry.

Transcendental Philosophy: An Initial Survey

From a phenomenological perspective, or at least the kind of phenomenology developed through the later work of Edmund Husserl, the work of Merleau-Ponty, and arguably even the work of early Heidegger, the question of content must be considered from the perspective of the transcendental grounds of experience. These grounds establish the outer limits of what is available to us as knowers and perceivers and thus also establish what we can call the possible contents of human experience. We must, however, exercise caution here. The idea of a “container” that is inevitably evoked by the notion of content is in one way apt and in another not when it comes to transcendental research. It is apt because it points to the difference between how we know objects, or the manner in which the world is available for us, and the manner in which it would be available from a “God’s eye view.” The way this difference is characterized varies among transcendental philosophers. For instance, for Immanuel Kant objects are never available to us immediately and wholly as they would be in an intellectual intuition. Rather, our knowledge of objects is always mediated by concepts. Kant writes, “That understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition would at the same time be given, an understanding through whose representation the objects of this representation would at the same time exist, would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness, which the human understanding, which merely thinks, but does not intuit, does require” (B 138). On Merleau-Ponty’s account, in perception we only have facets of objects which we take as the whole object, but these facets are presented with a kind of immediacy not available at the level of concepts.

Yet, the container metaphor is not apt because the aim of transcendental research is not to establish the total group of things to which we have access as perceivers and knowers as if this could be determined by distinguishing what kinds of things and how many of each kind are present in an ontological box. This view would assume our acquaintance with these objects where the aim of transcendental research is to determine how objects of experience are possible at all. Such an approach requires looking past objects to the conditions of their presentation or representation.¹ Kant establishes the initial scope of transcendental research by specifying that the conditions in question are epistemic, or concern the capacity to judge, rather than psychological.

For Kant, the problem with psychological conditions, or the processes by which we form and hold beliefs, is that they are contingent and do not establish the objectivity of what we experience. Hume's discussion of cause, for instance, reduces causality to an associative relation on the basis of which we form expectations or beliefs about what will come next in experience. On Hume's empiricist account the only legitimate objects of knowledge are those we find in experience and a properly constrained empiricist account attends to things just as they are given in experience. Finding the origins of our notion of cause is difficult under such constraints because causality itself, as an object of experience, appears nowhere in our experience of objects and the causal relations we do attribute to objects cannot be determined *a priori*, or purely through reasoning. Nonetheless, for Hume causality must maintain a central role in any account of our engagement with the world because it is only via this relation that, "we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" (Hume, "Enquiries" 26). Ultimately, "causes" and "effects" are established through our experience of the constant conjunction of two objects and

¹ I will discuss the distinction between representation and presentation in greater depth in a later chapter.

the order of their appearance.² Our ability to make predictions rests, in turn, on our recognizing present conditions to be similar to past conditions in which the presence of an object, *a*, was followed by the presence of an object, *b*. Eventually, we get into the habit of, or develop a “propensity” for expecting *b* to follow *a*. Beliefs, for Hume, are then the unavoidable product of habit and manifest in the form of a strong feeling rather than an explicit thought. Thus, Hume claims that belief is, “a species of natural instinct,” and, “more an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (Hume, “Treatise” 183, “Enquiries” 49). Our sense of the connection between two objects via a causal relation is ultimately the product of an internal feeling that constitutes the expectation that one object will follow another.³

On Kant’s view, our notion of causality is not merely a belief formed from habit, but is one necessary feature of objective experience among others. In other words, objects of knowledge could not appear as they do without appearing as standing in causal relations with each other. While causation may not appear in experience in the way that objects do as a third thing mediating the relation between, for instance, one billiard ball and another, it is supplied to objects by the activity of judgment. The distinction between objective experience and the psychological account of experience Hume offers can be further clarified by looking more closely at Kant’s account of objects. First, as has already been suggested, Kant is not concerned with particular objects, but with the features any object must have to appear as an object. This places the focus of Kant’s account on concepts and the nature of the subject to which objects appear as such. Secondly, experiences that are objective in nature rest on judgments in which certain features or properties are attributed to objects rather than to subjects. Again, for Kant,

² “Enquiries” 76

³ “Enquiries” 77

causal relations are not attributable to a state of the subject, or a feeling, but to objects themselves.

This gives us a very broad conception of the aims of transcendental research, but transcendental philosophy is defined as much by the problems it raises as its aims. In the development of the western philosophical tradition following Kant we find many critical responses to Kant's transcendental philosophy as well as attempts to defend and develop transcendental philosophy in response to these criticisms. Many of these criticisms and developments concern content as discussed above in terms of the difference between cognition mediated by concepts and intellectual intuition of objects, or an intuition which generates its objects.

The Thing in itself and Affection

We have already briefly discussed the distinction between a direct intuition of objects, or a "God's eye view," and cognition mediated by concepts. Kant's account of mediation is filled out in his discussion of intuition and judgment. Intuition accounts for how objects are first given as objects of the senses or appearances. Judgment accounts for the relation between concepts (or transcendental categories) and intuitions and how appearances are developed as phenomena, or objects of experience. This raises the questions of what lies beyond sensibility, or what would be available from a God's eye view. Kant writes,

In fact, if we view the objects of senses as mere appearances, as is fitting, then we thereby admit at the very same time that a thing in itself underlies them, although we are not acquainted with

this thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance, i.e., with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. Therefore the understanding, just by the fact that it accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things in themselves, and to that extent we can say that the representation of such beings as underlie the appearances, hence of mere intelligible beings, is not merely permitted but also unavoidable (Pro 4: 314 – 15; 107 – 8).

As Beatrice Longuenesse has noted, the Aesthetic, or Kant's account of the intuitions of time and space, must begin with the notion of the thing-in-itself as the source of all representation. This is because it, "describes our capacity for intuitions as merely 'receptive,' thus not possibly the source of its own representations" (Longuenesse 22). This may seem curious given that Kant's critique of pure reason has as its aim the limitation of the claims of reason. So some distinction between what we can know and what lies beyond our knowledge would seem more properly the result of the critical philosophy. There are two things to note here. First, with respect to Longuenesse's own work on Kant, she has much more to say on the issue, some of which I will discuss here as it relates to our central question. Secondly, if Kant's critical project is to successfully demonstrate the limits of reason, it must be self-contained. We must be able to determine the limits of reason from within them otherwise we will have assumed some position beyond these limits. We would thereby have undermined any claims about having determined the true limits of reason. The determination of limits under this constraint is possible because, as we will find Henry Allison arguing in a slightly different way, reason both suggests something beyond itself and limits itself with respect to claims about that something. Kant found the latter point to be something too often ignored by thinkers of his day. Yet, to even consider the question of the limits of knowledge means that the question must be posed from within those limits.

So even if the constraints imposed by reason are often ignored, they must be somewhat evident, at least on Kant's account. We might say, then, that the critique of reason, if successful, must begin where it ends given the requirement of self-containment. For those of us beginning on the difficult road of critical inquiry, its "proof of concept," or the demonstration of the feasibility of the project as a whole, is in the distinction between a "God's eye view" and our own perspective on the world.

In any case, it is clear that Kant maintains an important place for the thing in itself in his philosophical approach, but the question is how precisely it is to play the role he assigns to it, that of affecting sensibility. One possibility is that the thing in itself has a causal relation with sensibility. This view is, however, problematic as an interpretation of Kant's text for two main reasons. First, in the *Dissertation* Kant had considered the relation between representations and objects to be a causal one, or one in which objects cause representations. As both Longuenesse and Henry Allison note, in the *Critique* there is clearly a shift away from the discussion of affection in terms of causality to a discussion of it in terms of a condition for our representational capacities. Secondly, because causality is attributed to objects through an act of judgment which relates to appearances, this attribution does not and in fact cannot extend beyond sensibility. Nonetheless, given the difficulties and obscurities of the *Critique* there is plenty of room to question whether Kant is entirely consistent in his views on the thing in itself. One might also wonder whether Kant can provide a truly coherent view of representation without the notion of cause. Much rests on what sense can be made of the thing in itself as a condition for our representational capacities rather than a causal condition. Before discussing this, I will first briefly review a few other positions on the thing in itself.

First, there is what we can call the common view. This view is that Kant's notion of the thing in itself undermines his aim of offering a theory of knowledge. If we admit the idea of a thing in itself beyond sensibility, which determines the outer most limit on what is available to us as knowers, then we are also admitting that we cannot know much of anything at all. Paul Guyer's position moves beyond the common view, but is still critical of the idea of the thing in itself. For Guyer, the idea of the thing in itself is dogmatic because it commits Kant to making a determinate claim about something we can supposedly know nothing about. Guyer writes, "Transcendental idealism is not a skeptical reminder that we *cannot be sure* that things as they are in themselves *are* also as we represent them to be; it is a harshly dogmatic insistence that we *can be quite sure* that things as they are in themselves cannot be as we represent them to be" (Guyer 333). One might expect Kant to remain agnostic about the thing in itself given the fact that it is beyond our knowledge. Yet, Kant cannot remain agnostic about the thing in itself precisely because he assigns it a specific role in his theory of knowledge. As noted above, the thing in itself is the necessary starting point of Kant's transcendental approach. As such, it is the *source* of representations that, nevertheless, does not itself provide the *form* constitutive of those representations. It seems that from this distinction between the source of representations and the form of those representations Kant reasons that the thing in itself *cannot* be as we represent it.

As I read Guyer's critique, the claim is that it is a *non sequitur* to argue that our representations cannot correspond to their source from the claim that cognition and the thing in itself play different roles in how we come to know things. There may, after all, be correspondence between our representation of something and the thing in itself underlying that representation even if we cannot know this. The fact that the thing in itself and cognition play different roles does nothing to preclude this possibility. For Guyer, ultimately there is no saving

Kant's transcendental idealism because there is no way to work out a coherent notion of the thing in itself. Guyer does, however, think that we can save something of a general transcendental approach. He writes, "One can accept the transcendental theory of experience finally expounded in the analogies of experience and the refutation of idealism without any commitment to dogmatic transcendental idealism" (335).

Rae Langton, in her reconstruction of Kant's account, discusses the thing in itself in terms of epistemic humility. Langton, like Strawson, sees epistemic humility as a result of the claim that our cognition is receptive and thus must be affected by the object to be cognized. She goes further than Strawson, however, in filling out the nature of this affection. Allison offers a clear account of Langton's view and divides her account into three main claims. First, things in themselves are substances with intrinsic properties. Phenomena, on the other hand, are relational properties of these substances. Secondly, the relational properties of these substances cannot be reduced to intrinsic properties. Thirdly, we are affected by relational properties rather than intrinsic properties and cannot know intrinsic properties. An example that Allison offers to illustrate his own position in the first edition of his work on Kant's Transcendental Idealism will be helpful here. Allison offers this example as an empirical illustration of a transcendental claim, but if the reader were not directed to read it as such it can just as easily be taken as illustrating the kind of Leibnizian position Allison attributes to Langton. The illustration concerns the Newtonian conception of weight. Allison writes, "According to this conception, bodies may be said to have weight only insofar as they stand in a relation of attraction and repulsion to other bodies" (Allison 43). One can attribute weight to bodies only if one considers them as standing in relations of attraction and repulsion. The fact that bodies always stand in relations of attraction and repulsion means that one can never experience a 'body in itself,' but

this does not preclude the possibility of conceiving of a ‘body in itself’ or make this conception somehow incoherent. Just as bodies having whatever intrinsic properties constitute a body as such only manifest weight when standing in certain kinds of relations to other bodies, things in themselves only manifest certain properties in relation to receptive beings (for instance, the property of being rough to the touch). We cannot experience things in themselves apart from our relation to these things, but this does not make the idea of a thing in itself incoherent.

Finally, there is Allison’s view of the thing in itself. Allison’s overall approach to Kant’s transcendental philosophy begins with the idea that for Kant those concepts that mediate our relation to objects (the categories), like that of causality discussed above, are epistemic conditions. Epistemic conditions, in turn, can only be properly understood when considered in relation to discursive cognition. Allison defines an epistemic condition as, “a necessary condition for the representation of objects, that is, a condition without which our representations would not relate to objects or, equivalently, possess objective reality. As such, it could also be termed an ‘objectivating condition,’ since it fulfills an objectivating function” (11). The specific conditions of the representation of objects are, in turn, discursive in nature. The claim that human cognition is discursive is a claim, “that it requires both concepts and *sensible* intuition. Without the former there would be no thought and, therefore, no cognition; without the latter there would be nothing to be thought” (13). Allison argues that though Kant argues from the discursivity thesis rather than for the discursivity thesis, there is an “outline” of an argument for this thesis implicit in the *Critique*. The idea is, as already suggested, objects must be given to the mind because we cannot produce objects by intuiting them. This then requires an account of cognition in terms of discursivity. A consequence of this view is that human knowledge is different in kind and not degree from the kind of knowledge that would be available to a pure

intelligence. Given this methodological outlook, the thing in itself must be maintained as a contrast to things as they appear and as a way of explaining the possibility of discursive cognition. In other words, and to put the matter perhaps a bit too simply, if we begin with the premises that we cannot generate objects through intuition and that objects cannot directly impress their form on the mind, then the most reasonable position to take with respect to human cognition is that it is discursive. This in turn requires considering the objects that affect sensibility as things in themselves, but the premises with which we begin permit us no more than to *consider* the objects affecting sensibility as things in themselves.

Thus, Allison promotes a “two aspect view” in which objects are merely considered⁴ in two ways (as things in themselves and as appearances) rather than a “two world” or “two object” view in which there is an ontological divide between two kinds of objects. Yet, one might wonder why we should accept the premises with which Allison and if he is right, Kant, begins. I think these premises become more convincing as starting points if we consider them as part of a negative definition of knowledge, or the conditions under which human cognition is not possible, to be complemented by a positive account of knowledge, or the conditions under which it is possible. Plato’s *Meno* gives us a helpful framework for understanding this approach. If we had intellectual intuition of objects, there would be no need to attempt to achieve a greater grasp of these objects, or to make judgments that could turn out either true or false given further reasoning and evidence. On the other hand, if we did not know what to look for, we would not be able to take whatever data impresses itself on our minds as anything at all or make judgments about the world by means of it. The point is that human knowledge can only be understood in terms of judgments that can turn out to be true or false. In the case of intellectual intuition we

⁴ Here Allison follows Gerold Prauss in claiming that the phrase, “*an sich selbst*” functions adverbially to characterize how a thing is being considered rather than what kind of thing it is.

would have no need of judgment while an account in terms of sense impressions leaves us without an account of our capacity to judge. An account that searches out the conditions under which human knowledge is possible is then an account of how judgments that can turn out true or false are possible. Here, the relevant ontological distinction is between beings capable of intellectual intuition and beings capable of cognition as judgment and not between two different kinds of objects. I think this Platonic framework also gives us a way of understanding how what Kant calls the “transcendental object” animates cognition.

The Transcendental Object

The transcendental object is somewhat baffling. It appears in the A deduction and all but disappears in the B deduction, surviving mostly in Kant’s discussions of an indeterminate x. Where Kant does mention the transcendental object it is often closely associated with the notion of a noumenon and a thing in itself. Yet, it is not clear whether all three terms should be taken as equivalent. There are indeed points at which Kant explicitly identifies noumena with things in themselves. For instance, Kant writes, “The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory; for one cannot assert of sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition” (A 255/B 310). Unfortunately, he does not consistently treat these terms equivalently throughout the *Critique*. Kant also identifies the transcendental object with a noumenon. He tells us that we are free to call the transcendental object a noumenon because,

“the representation of it is nothing sensible” (A288/B 344). Yet, he also identifies the transcendental object with the necessary unity of consciousness:

The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality. Now this concept . . . concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind for combining it in one representation (A 109).

If the concept of the transcendental object is to be understood in terms of the “function of the mind for combining” the manifold, it does not seem as though we can also identify it with something defined as being beyond that function.

Allison does not so much resolve these inconsistencies as attempt to put the various pieces together in a way that supports the thesis that what Kant is after is a methodological, or logical distinction, rather than an ontological distinction. He does this in three steps. First, he clarifies the object at issue in his two aspect view. For Allison, it is not that appearances can be considered in two ways. This would ignore the line Kant draws between appearances and things in themselves and the way each is apprehended. Instead, it is the object that appears that is considered in two ways. Secondly, he claims that it is the transcendental object that underlies our consideration of things both as things in themselves and as appearances. Finally, he claims that the key distinction for the two aspect view is not between appearances and things in themselves, but between transcendental and empirical objects. Recognizing objects as playing a transcendental role serves as a point of entrance into the transcendental standpoint. It is then only within this standpoint that the distinction between objects as they appear and as they are in themselves becomes evident. In order to clarify what Kant is up to on Allison’s view, I think it

will be helpful to draw parallels with a thinker working under quite different philosophical commitments.

In his work, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* J.J. Gibson develops the theses that animal and environment, “make an inseparable pair,” and that perception is not a passive process, but an activity. At the beginning of his analysis, he cautions the reader against a misunderstanding of what it is to be an animal or an environment. He writes,

The mutuality of animal and environment is not implied by physics and the physical sciences. The basic concepts of space, time, matter, and energy do not lead naturally to the organism-environment concept or to the concept of a species and its habitat. Instead, they seem to lead to the idea of an animal as an extremely complex object of the physical world. The animal is thought of as a highly organized *part* of the physical world but still a part and still an object. This way of thinking neglects the fact that the animal-object is surrounded in a special way, that an environment is ambient for a living object in a different way from the way that a set of objects is ambient for a physical object. The term *physical environment* is, therefore, apt to get us mixed up[.] ... Every animal is, in some degree at least, a perceiver and a behavior. It is sentient and animate ... but this is not to say that it perceives the world of physics and behaves in the space and time of physics (Gibson 4).

For the moment, let's abstract away from the very different philosophical commitments of Gibson and Kant and look at Gibson's methodology for analyzing animal and environment as parallel to that of Kant's analysis of the relation between knower, or cognizer, and object.

The point for Gibson is that we cannot analyze the animal *as* a perceiver and *as* a behavior by beginning with the notion of a physical universe and the stock of concepts available in the science of Physics. These concepts do not lead to the notion of an animal as a perceiver and as a behavior. In the same way, beginning an analysis of what it is to know with objects as exerting a causal force on the mind will not yield an analysis of the subject *as* a knower or *as* a cognizer. This idea of objects does not naturally lead to the notion of a subject as a knower and cognizer. For Gibson, in determining what it is to be an animal in an environment, we cannot confuse what it is to be an environment with the physical reality of the world or we will miss the defining

characteristics of an environment. This does not mean that Gibson is claiming that there are two worlds, the physical world and the world of environments. It just means that in order to discover the constitutive features of an environment we must proceed at a different level of explanation and make the boundaries of that level clear so that we avoid confusion. In the same way, in order to explain how subjects interact with objects when making claims to knowledge, we must make it clear that we are not considering the object primarily as exerting a causal force. It might even be the case that it could exert this same causal force in the absence of any knower or cognizer.⁵ Instead, we are considering the role the object plays in relation to the subject as a knower. This kind of consideration is a logical consideration that will require defining the elements of cognition and the relations and dependencies between these elements. One of these elements is the transcendental object which underlies, as a logical consideration and at a specific level of explanation, both the thing in itself and appearances.

Though this does not resolve all of the inconsistencies in how Kant talks about noumena, the thing in itself, and the transcendental object, I think this is a good account of Kant's methodology. Yet, Allison tends to discuss the transcendental object only from the perspective of the transcendental researcher and not from the perspective of the transcendental subject, something that Kant does explicitly when he discusses it as a correlate of the unity of apperception. From this perspective, I think the transcendental object is something like a condition on the aptness of judgment. This will require some further explanation.

⁵ Thought experiments involving zombies with all the same physical make up as conscious beings but without consciousness are, of course, nowhere to be found in the *Critique*. Nonetheless, I believe it is a helpful tool for understanding the difference between considering things in their physical aspect and considering consciousness, or here the activity of cognition, on its own terms.

The Critical Project and a Self Referential Condition

I have already briefly discussed in connection with Hume that for Kant there are concepts or categories that we bring to bear on experience without which human cognition would not be possible. One way to think of these categories (as a kind of place holder for a more in depth discussion to come) are as presuppositions⁶ that we as human beings universally make about the general features objects, any object, must have. Without these presuppositions we would not be able to take objects *as* objects. So, for instance, the idea that objects stand in causal relations is this kind of presupposition. When we approach an object, any object, we assume that it stands in causal relations with other objects and this is constitutive of our grasp of the object. Now we may end up being wrong about the particular causal relations at work between specific objects in our experience. We may, for example, mistake correlation for causation. This, however, does not undermine our assumption that any given object stands in causal relations with other objects. In fact, this assumption provides the standard against which we determine that we have made a mistake about features of the objects under consideration and the guidance for what will count as the genuine causal relations in which the objects under study do stand. Thus the category is *a priori* because its validity concerns objects in general, is indifferent to the failures of particular

⁶ There is some textual support in the *Critique* for looking at this aspect of Kant's theory in terms of presuppositions, particularly B 141 and 142. Here, Kant discusses the sense in which any judgment, even contingent judgments, include representations related to the necessary unity of apperception. This does not mean that the representations involved in empirical judgments are necessarily related to each other, but that the relation of these representations proceeds according to, "principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, which principles are derived from the transcendental unity of apperception" (B 142). I take it that the principles discussed here are the categories and that the claim being made here is twofold. First, we could not make empirical judgments or any kind of judgment without the principles derived from the *necessary* unity of apperception. Secondly, because this is so, embedded in any judgment there is a presupposition of truth, a presupposition whose content is determined by principles of objective determination of all representations.

judgments, and plays a role in making it possible to form judgments that can be either true or false. For Kant, there are several other categories, or presuppositions, that concern other necessary features of objects and operate in the same fashion.

These presuppositions must, however, be more than just intellectual exercises. There are, after all, lots of things I could assume without having any sense of how those assumptions would actually manifest. I could, for instance, form the assumption that in order to grasp an object as an object I must somehow grasp the specific atomic weights of all the atoms making it up. Yet, I have no idea how such information would manifest in experience. I have no idea how this information would be presented such that it would count for me *as a feature* of an object, x, out in the world. To take another less fanciful example, it might be that a person deaf from birth can form certain assumptions about music. For instance, a deaf person might be able to understand that some noises make a greater impression on the sense of hearing and that this is called loudness. A deaf person might also understand that the position of each note on a stanza mark sounds that stand in certain mathematical relationships. Yet, a deaf person would have no sense of how loudness *would actually manifest* in the world or what it is precisely that makes each note different with respect to hearing. In both cases what is missing is an ordered sensible field in which objects can appear as having particular features. Such a field is not grasped as the sum of the features manifest in it. In the case of sound, for instance, the sensible field is not grasped as the sum of all sounds, but as a field of potentialities constituted by the identity and difference between things of a certain kind.⁷ Certain instances of identity and difference may never actually appear at all. I may never hear a C played both on a guitar and on the violin and I may never hear an A 5 that follows a C# and this will do nothing to undermine my grasp of the field as a

⁷ Husserl calls this kind of relation subordination.

whole. What I have called “having a sense” is having a grasp on a whole in this way, as a field of potentialities rather than a collection of particular things. Having a sense is having a grasp on *apperceptive content*.

Returning now to the level of transcendental inquiry, the idea is that we cannot have valid presuppositions about features of objects in general without an account of how these presuppositions are connected to our sense of the manner in which these features would actually manifest out in the world. I cannot judge, either truly or falsely, that an object stands in causal relations with other objects without having a sense of how causality actually manifests out in the world or what it is for a thing in the world to stand in causal relations with other things. Kant’s answer to this problem draws on his account of the intuitions of time and space. The intuitions of time and space are conditions without which we could not refer our sensations to something outside of us and which provide the sensible manifold with orderability with respect to the categories of the understanding. In providing something, “capable of being ordered,” these intuitions provide material on which the understanding can operate. Intuitions refer to, however, only the most general features of objects as outside of us.

Roughly, spatiality concerns the figure, extension, and position of objects while temporality concerns the simultaneity and succession of objects or also the position of something in a temporal order. A deeper layer persists even under these general features and makes them possible. Space and time are each infinite spans consisting of a homogenous fields. For instance, space is essentially holistic. Something’s being in one place only makes sense with respect to that place being individuated by its relation to other places or at least to a surrounding area. This is the basic scheme for all spatial relations and makes particular spatial properties (extension, figure, position) possible. In short, there is no way to individuate a point in space

without reference to other points in space. Time is holistic in a similar way and with space operates at all limits and always suggests more, but always suggest more of the same. Because of this holism, space and time can be said to contain a manifold of their own separate from the manifold for which they provide orderability. To put it simply, because each is constituted by an infinite span consisting of a homogenous field each is also a manifold.

The imagination provides the ultimate link between the categories and the orderable material in intuition. Imagination is the capacity to represent what is not present and as such is that by which we are capable of representing the whole of space and time via the categories (synthesizing the manifold which constitutes each) and through this representation what it is in general for objects to stand in rule governed relations fixed by the categories in time and space. In Kant's words the concern here is with, "the possibility of cognizing *a priori* through categories whatever objects may come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition but rather as far as the laws of their combination" (B144-145). Imagination provides the sense of a whole (a field of potential instantiations) whose parts need not be simultaneously present in order to grasp the whole and general rules for apprehending particular objects in the world.⁸

This is, again, what I have called *apperceptive content*. Kant writes,

Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. This very same synthetic unity, however, if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of synthesis of homogeneous in an intuition in general, i.e., the category of quantity, with which that synthesis of apprehension, i.e., the perception, must therefore be in thoroughgoing agreement" (B 162).

⁸ Here, we must be especially careful to maintain the distinction between time and space as intuitions and things perceived as situated in time and space. Kant writes, "In space considered in itself there is nothing movable; hence the movable must be something that is found in space only through experience, thus an empirical datum. In the same way the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of alteration among its *a priori* data; time itself does not alter, but only something within time" (B58). Thus, even when considered in relation to the categories time and space only provide a framework with which our apprehension of objects must agree, it does not provide those objects.

Precisely how imagination fulfills its assigned function on Kant's account is a difficult and controversial question⁹, but I will for the moment set it aside. I will instead provide some examples of the kinds of determinations that result from the mixture of the categories and intuitions via the imagination. Prior to approaching specific objects we have already established that all appearances are extensive magnitudes, all appearances are intensive magnitudes, and all alterations in appearances occur according to the law of connection of cause and effect. The thing in itself enters the picture here with sensibility. We are receptive beings and receptivity is the capacity to be affected by objects, the result of which is a sensible manifold. Objects by which we are affected are, in turn, things in themselves. Now to return to the question motivating the present inquiry; where does the transcendental object fit into this account?

I think the notion of a transcendental object, as the correlate of the activity of combining and creating unified experiences, is a self-referential condition of that activity. Implicit in the activity of unification itself is the condition that it is apt only insofar as the object that animates this activity and toward which the activity is aimed is indeterminate but determinable. If the object were already determined or if it were not determinable, then the activity of unification would not be apt. This is implicit in and constitutive of this activity universally. Transcendental research draws this out and makes it explicit. Because the cause at work is a final cause, it respects the boundaries established by Kant's approach.

This fits the account given so far in three ways. First, it maintains the idea that part of determining the conditions under which human knowledge is possible is a consideration of the conditions under which it is not possible. Secondly, it maintains the level of explanation

⁹ Specifically, it is a matter of controversy whether Kant requires the schematism to complete his account or whether the natural conclusion of his account is to be found in the second step of the transcendental deduction.

appropriate for analyzing the subject *as* a knower and *as* a being capable of cognition. Finally, this brings us back to Plato and the *Meno*. In the *Meno* we find reason, or the mind, animated (affected) by the forms it finds back behind things in the world. The mind is ultimately led through a process of recollection to ideas which it had already possessed. Yet, recollection does not really count as cognition. On the view just offered cognition is possible not because the mind is animated via knowledge it already possesses, but is animated by a sense¹⁰ of what is not yet possessed, the indeterminate but determinable object *x*.¹¹

As it stands, this is more an extension of Allison's account than a direct account of Kant's *Critique*. Though I think it does have sufficient textual support to make it at least a plausible interpretation (in particular A 109 cited above) it does stand in need of further support, especially with respect to the B deduction. For now, however, I will leave it as an interpretation of the foundations of transcendental philosophy in general and move on to further aspects of the Kantian system.

I will, however, note that this condition on the aptness of the act of cognition echoes throughout phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl makes indeterminacy a central aspect of his account of perception. In perception, the object appears as the locus of possibilities for action and perception. As such, it remains relatively indeterminate which possibilities will be redeemed

¹⁰ Here, it might seem that I have simply replaced Platonism with obscurity. What is it, after all, to have a sense of what one does not yet possess? Yet, I think the correlate of the transcendental object *x* is the idea of what it is, universally, to be an object. For instance, one might say on the basis of Kant's research that to be an object is to stand in rule governed relations in time and space outside of and in relation to the subject. Determining precisely what these rules are and how they are instantiated outside of the subject is a different matter and depends on the understanding, the intuition, the imagination, and our capacity to judge (to determine the indeterminate.) In other words, the indeterminacy at issue here is not sheer indeterminacy, but already the indeterminacy of objects in general.

¹¹ This would bring Allison closer to Longuenesse and her claim that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is closer to the *Critique of Judgment* than is often thought. Both, claims Longuenesse, conceive judgment as animated by a search for the unity of a system. Nonetheless, Longuenesse discusses the transcendental *x* strictly in connection with phenomenon where Allison seems to assign a broader role to it.

as we encounter the object through actions which reveal further aspects of the object through sense perception. For instance, objects are never presented in their entirety, but only present facets which suggest still others. Yet, these suggestions never determine with certainty what will be disclosed through action and perception. This indeterminacy is only relative because at the very least, we anticipate that the object will be determinable with respect to certain basic features. For instance, it will be colored, it will be extended, and it will be situated in time and space. Husserl makes the further claim that our acquaintance with objects at the level of perception is the foundation for all other attitudes we take toward objects. This view of the object is most like Allison's two aspect view.¹² Here, I will just briefly indicate why this is the case. The full defense of this claim will be provided in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Encountering the object as a possibility for action and perception looks to capture the object only in its significance for us. Thus, this looks to be a fairly straightforward extension of Kantian idealism. Yet, we experience these possibilities directly, immediately, and involuntarily as possibilities of the object itself. When we consider the object with respect to its inherent properties, those things we might take to constitute the essence of the object, the object in-itself, we are considering the same object in a different way. We can also make the further claim that on the phenomenological account I will be developing, if there is anything like a "transcendental object" it is just a way of talking generically about our grasp of objects of perception, every object of perception, as indeterminate and thus as motivating action and perception. The correlate of the transcendental object would then be the transcendental subject understood as a generic way of talking about the agent who disposes over and unifies the facets of indeterminate objects through action and perception.

¹² Dan Zahavi also makes this claim.

Nevertheless, it might at first seem that something like Langton's account of relational properties best captures the distinction between the object as the locus of action and perception and the object as it is in-itself. What Langton's account does not capture, however, is the apperceptive content of experience and the epistemic neutrality of perception. These are issues I will develop in more detail in chapter 5 when I discuss dispositional properties. It is also worth mentioning here that a critique like Guyer's would also miss the mark. Encountering an object as a locus of action and perception does not entail a kind of content that could be instantiated in some possible world as the inherent properties of that object. This I will also discuss in more detail in chapter 5 when I discuss Edenic content. For now, I turn to a discussion of apperceptive conceptual content.

Judgment

Judgment is perhaps the central notion of the *Critique*. As such, both the most powerful and most problematic aspects of the *Critique* concern judgment. I cannot hope to discuss all aspects of Kant's account of judgment here, so I will limit myself to a few key issues and set aside a few others to be discussed later. Here, I will discuss Kant's definition of judgment, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment, the notion of a priori judgment, and the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.

At the beginning of the *Analytic of Concepts*, Kant begins with the claim that, "besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through concepts. Thus the cognition of every,

at least human, understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive” (A 68/B 93). Moreover, where intuition rests on affection judgment relies on functions. Kant writes, “By a function, however, I understand the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” (A 68/B 93). A function, then, refers to the activity of the subject, or what Kant calls the spontaneity of thinking. This spontaneity is set in contrast to the receptivity associated with intuition and affection. The significance of the idea that the activity of the subject in gathering different representations under a common one is a unity is something that will develop throughout Kant’s transcendental inquiry, particularly in the transcendental deduction.

Kant then moves very quickly from the idea that concepts have no use but in judgments to the idea that the understanding is to be identified with judgment; judgment is just the spontaneous cognitive activity of the subject. Because only intuitions are related immediately to objects, a judgment is always a mediate cognition of objects, or a representation of a representation. The language here is bit cumbersome, but the idea is fairly straightforward. One might, for instance, bring certain intuited items under the concept of body or, more simply, represent things as bodies. In a judgment we can then bring our representation of certain things as bodies under another more general concept, such as divisibility. Divisibility can be related to many other concepts, but here represents something about bodies as they are represented, namely that bodies are divisible. Kant concludes that, “All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one” (A 68/B 93). Because all actions of the understanding can be traced back to judgments, we can see understanding as a

faculty for judging. As further demonstration of this, though it is true that cognition is thinking through concepts, concepts are always the predicates of possible judgments. Again, the actions of the understanding can always be traced back to judgment. Moreover, even though ‘bodies’ occupies the subject position in the judgment, “All bodies are divisible,” it is still the predicate of other *possible* judgments. ‘Body,’ as do all concepts, contains representations under it. We can use it in an actual judgment by relating it directly to one of those representations as we do, for instance, in the judgment, “Every metal is a body.” The fact that we only ever find a concept occupying the subject position and nothing more particular or immediate marks thought as essentially discursive.

As is so often the case in the *Critique*, Kant packs quite a bit into a short space in this analysis of the relation between judgment and the understanding. There are, however, three major consequences of his analysis that will help to further clarify what insights are gained through this analysis. First, thought is only possible within a holistic system of concepts. Secondly, the activity of making judgments, of bringing representations together, is cast in terms of a function, a task, or what we can also call an ability or capacity of the subject. Finally, and following from the first two, thought is essentially structured. That is, thoughts are never simple and singular, but always constituted by parts that come together in rule governed ways. Moreover, the content of the thought as a whole, what the thought is about, is a product of its constituents and the way they come together. So, for instance, when thinking about the table at which I now sit, I do not intuit it as a singular object baring no relation to anything else other than itself (as a thing in itself). Instead, I think about it as having a flat surface, as being like other tables in certain respects, and as accommodating my current task relatively well. Certainly, this does not exhaust the kinds of thoughts that I might have about the table, but the point is not

that I have to think about tables in one of these particular ways. It is just that I have to think about the table as related to other representations in order to think about it as a table at all.

As to the idea that the way constituent representations come together makes a difference for what is thought, this can be understood in two ways. First, we can understand this on analogy with the principle of compositionality in the philosophy of language.¹³ So, for instance, the thought that Mary loves John and the thought that John loves Mary have all the same constituents, but in each case what is thought is different. Secondly, insofar as one is able to possess a concept one also has the capacity to compare¹⁴ it with other concepts. This capacity is part of what it is to possess a concept. The aim of any act of comparison is the establishment of a relation between subject and predicate which in turn rests on a determination of what is included in and excluded from the scope of that concept.¹⁵ This includes the extension of a given concept (card tables, dinner tables, and conference tables all fall under the extension of table while books do not) as well as the logical scope of a concept (we know that ‘up’ does not belong

¹³ We must be careful here not to confuse this with Frege’s claim that the compositional principles of language determine the thought expressed by a sentence. Here, I am not attempting to determine the relation between a sentence and the thought it expresses. Instead, my analysis is proceeding purely at the level of thought and only relying on the philosophy of language to help describe the relation between part and whole at the level of thought. Thus, my usage here of ‘thought’ is different from Frege’s.

¹⁴ Beatrice Longuenesse has done perhaps the most work on Kant’s notion of comparison and here I draw on that work. I will discuss her approach more directly in the pages to come, but it is important to note that on her account, Kant assigns a role for comparison with respect to the *formation* of empirical concepts (concepts concerning sensible properties) as well as for a role with respect to concepts themselves. I will take up a discussion of concept formation in my discussion of the transcendental deduction.

¹⁵ Longuenesse, working from the *Prolegomena*, the *Critique*, and the *Jäsche Logik* calls the relation that is established here subordination. She argues that the nature of this subordination is not to be understood only in terms of a concept and its extension. Rather, subordination refers to the subordination of an assertion to its condition. The condition under which a predicate can be asserted to hold of a subject is the condition under which the subject is subsumable under the predicate. The predicate, in turn, is always the condition of another assertion. Kant discusses this in terms of syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Socrates is man and all men are mortal). Rather than discussing syllogistic reasoning, I aim to capture these same basic points via the generality constraint and the idea that thought is essentially structured. I have done this because I think the generality constraint parallels Kant’s claims here nicely, provides greater clarity in exposition, and will supply expediency and broader application in later discussions of conceptuality.

within scope of ‘down’ without any reference to what falls under the extension of each.)

Moreover, in both of these cases, the critical feature of the scope of a concept is that it extends beyond any particular instance of its application, which means that having a grasp on the scope of a concept also means grasping the conditions under which it is applicable.

Given this, insofar as a concept is available to me as a thinker, that concept will provide rules for how it can and cannot be related to other concepts. For example, if one has a concept of a flat surface and a concept of a table then one already possesses the capacity to relate these concepts in determinate rule governed ways given the scope of the concepts in play and thereby form different thoughts or judgments. To possess these concepts is to already have the capacity to compare them and to judge that “Every table has a flat surface” and that, “Some flat surfaces are tables.” The same constituent concepts are at work, but the scope of each concept determines the way in which it can be brought together with others in each case and therefore what judgments or thoughts are possible with respect to the representations at issue. With respect to just these three consequences of Kant’s account of judgment, I think we can see Kant as articulating something close to what Gareth Evans calls the generality constraint.¹⁶

The Generality Constraint

¹⁶ Clearly Evans’ metaphysical views are quite different from Kant’s in that Evans is concerned with the causal relationships between subject and object and the information carried therein. Nonetheless, just at the level of defining conceptuality, there are deep parallels between these two thinkers. This is further supported by the fact that the causal forces at work in Evans’ account of thought are accounted for within his analysis of nonconceptual content.

For Evans, though we have little to go on when discussing our, “conceivings,” the generality constraint must be observed in any such discussion. The generality constraint is rooted in the idea that thought is essentially structured. To be structured means, for instance, that, “the thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that Harry is happy, and the thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that John is sad.” (Gunther 66). To avoid aligning his analysis with any particular theory of thought, specifically theories concerning the language of thought, Evans accounts for concept possession in terms of the exercise of conceptual abilities rather than in terms of the composition of several distinct elements. Thus, what is shared between the thought that John is happy and the thought that Harry is happy is the ability of possessing the concept happiness. Evans also describes this ability more expansively as, “knowledge of what it is for a person to be happy; and this is not tied to this or that particular person’s happiness” (68). Knowing what it is to be happy also entails the ability to predicate things of happiness, for instance that it is an emotion. Similarly, what is shared between the thought that John is happy and John is sad is a single ability, namely the ability to think of or about John. This may seem to contradict the account above because I discussed judgments in terms of ‘constituents’ and even drew a comparison with the principle of compositionality. Nonetheless, because concepts are always the predicates of a possible judgment and a judgment is always the unity of an action on the part of the subject, concepts are defined for Kant in terms of a capacity or ability on the part of the subject. My discussion in terms of constituents can thus be read as a discussion of constituent abilities.

For Evans as much as for Kant accepting the idea that thought is essentially structured is inseparable from committing to a certain view of subjectivity. For example, if we accept that the thought that a is F and the thought that b is G are structured, we are committed to certain

predictions about the subject. Namely, “we are obliged to maintain that, if a subject can entertain those thoughts, then there is no conceptual barrier, at least, to his being able to entertain the thought that a is G or the thought that b is F. And we are committed in addition to the view that there would be a common partial explanation for a subject’s having the thought a is F and his having the thought that a is G: there is a single state whose possession is a necessary condition for the occurrence of both states” (67). The state in question is just the subject’s understanding of, say, “a” in a particular instance which in turn rests on her knowledge of what it is for something to be “a” and knowing that both “G” and “F” are applicable to “a”.

In Kantian language, the idea that thought is essentially structured commits one to understanding the unity of the action of ordering representations under a common one as broad in scope, or, in my language, concerns apperceptive content. That is, the unity of the action in question is not just the unity of this or that particular action. Rather, the unity of any particular action of drawing representations together and making a judgment rests on the subject’s ability to see each particular action as related to, unified with, other such actions. For example, if one really understands what it is to be a flat surface and what it is to be a table one also understands that not all flat surfaces are tables and can formulate this as a judgment. Yet, to do this much, one must also already know that things besides tables are flat. That is, one must know, as a condition of the particular judgment that one is making, what it is for a thing to have a flat surface and be able to, also as a condition of the particular judgment one is making, entertain other particular judgments including judgments about what it is to be a flat surface. This means that in principle one can always work outward to entertain any of the other concepts one possesses. This holds for any judgment.¹⁷ The unity of each judgment (state of understanding)

¹⁷ This may be something of an ideal given that we may not always have complete possession of certain concepts where this means that having a concept should commit us to particular judgments to which we are not in fact

therefore also always entails the unity of the interconnected web of concepts one possesses.

Kant is, however, concerned with more than just establishing some version of the generality constraint in his treatment of concepts. In particular, he is concerned with establishing the “real function” of thinking. As such, Kant’s overall aim is to establish that, “judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception. That is the aim of the copula **is** in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective” (B 141). This will require some explanation. To set this up, let me first fill out the preceding account a bit more.

Kant’s account of apperception makes explicit two things that have remained somewhat implicit in the preceding discussion of the generality constraint. First, if one is to possess a concept and judge by means of that concept then the representations involved in the judgment must be able to be thought as the subjects own. One way of viewing this claim is that concept possession cannot be accounted for in purely behavioristic terms. Something that merely behaves as if it has concepts or only has the capacity to respond differentially to stimuli does not really possess concepts. Secondly, implicit in the very idea of possession is a numerically identical subject who endures such that it can maintain possession. Now because concepts never stand alone but always stand within a structured whole, a self-identical subject must therefore also dispose over this structured whole *as* a structured whole in order to possess a concept. In other words, in order for a subject to think a concept as his own he must also be able to think the structured whole of which the concept is necessarily a part as his own. Otherwise, the whole of which the concept is necessarily a part would be as nothing to him which would in turn mean

committed. Even so, it will still be possible to *entertain* those judgments to which we ought to be committed, but are not.

that the concept would be as nothing to him. Given the discussion of unity above, there are yet further layers to be uncovered here.

Our understanding is not exhausted in the moments in which judgments are made because those judgments contain constituents which we grasp as extending beyond those judgments. For instance, for Kant concepts are always the predicates of possible judgments just as for Evans if a subject really understands that a is G there should be no conceptual barrier to her entertaining the idea that b is G. This does not mean that each time we apply a concept we are also thinking everything that falls within the scope of the concept. Rather, we are exercising an ability that rests on knowing what it is for something to be, for instance, G. Tacit in our exercise of this ability is the understanding that we can also exercise this ability elsewhere to determine other things that fall under G or are related to G in some other way (things that are different from or in conflict with G.) Because G is necessarily related to other concepts which are in turn necessarily related to yet other concepts, it is also necessarily situated within a holistic web of concepts. Thus, insofar as I grasp G, or any other concept, I also tacitly grasp that there is a field of concepts in which it is possible to exercise my conceptual abilities understood generically as the capacity to determine that x is y. Each judgment thus contains a tacit awareness that I can move to other parts of the web of concepts through comparing concepts, forming judgments, and making inferences. This does not mean that one must understand her abilities in terms of the philosophical concepts described here, but that one has a kind of know-how at the level of conceptuality.¹⁸

¹⁸ It is important to stress that this know how is not knowing how to, for instance, manipulate symbols. Nor is it simply knowing how to think things through so that one can make the appropriate response to external stimuli. Rather, the concepts in play at the empirical level have a semantic content or refer to some part of the world and knowing what they refer to is in part constitutive of one's grasp of these concepts. Yet, on the Kantian account there is a further layer of *a priori* concepts. These concepts do not have semantic content that refers to some part of the world. Rather, these concepts relate to the pure intuitions of time and space to generate the conditions under which reference is possible.

The Metaphysical Deduction

To bring things to the **objective** unity of apperception involves mainly two things. First, it involves the application of concepts under sensible conditions, or under conditions in which concepts are always related to an object, x. Secondly, it involves those concepts which determine the necessary features of an object as such. The question to be answered is; what features must an object have to be an object for us? Put a bit differently, what features must an object have such that we can judge that it is indeed an object and not a product of subjective psychological mechanisms a la Hume? For Kant, every judgment aims at an account of the features of an object of experience in terms of those features that are necessary and sufficient conditions for it being an object at all. This adds three restrictions to the account of thought as essentially structured. First, while a web of empirical concepts may be indeterminate with respect to its boundaries, the boundaries of the web of concepts responsible for our ability to determine objects as such must be well defined. This, in turn, limits the judgments or interrelations between concepts that are possible at this level. Secondly, because what is at stake are the features of objects necessary for any subject to take them as such, the concepts, judgments, or more generically the unities at issue must be thinkable by any given subject as her own. We can thus simply refer to a generic subject, the transcendental subject, and a generic unity, the transcendental unity of apperception. Finally, because objects are necessarily experienced as outside of the subject some account of how these concepts are related to the

intuitions and the sensible manifold is necessary. The second and third of these restrictions are discussed in the transcendental deduction, so I will wait to address these restrictions until my discussion of this deduction. The first of these tasks is treated in the metaphysical deduction which I will now briefly discuss.

In the metaphysical deduction, Kant aims to establish the a priori foundations of the categories through establishing that they coincide with the logical functions of judgment. The logical functions of judgment are those functions (in each case the unity of the activity) by which we organize given representations by drawing them together under a concept. In discussing concepts above, I discussed this in terms of rules provided by concepts for determining what falls within the scope of a concept and what does not. I filled out this account in terms of the claim that thought is essentially structured. Kant captures this idea in his claim that, “the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than judging by means of them” (A 68/B 93). Again, concepts never stand alone so that the application of a concept will always include a greater whole of which it is a part, a whole which is in fact just a judgment. Judgments, in turn, are always inferentially connected with other judgments and it is in moving between judgments via inference that we think things through. What moves we can make here, however, are always a function of the scope (in the broad sense I discussed above) of the concepts that are in play. As such, the faculties of concepts, judgment, and thinking can be characterized as a single, “faculty of rules.”

As Longueness notes, these rules provide continuity to the activity of the understanding such that the numerically identical subject who takes up the rule can endure in the awareness of itself as proceeding with a single task. Without the rule, there would be no unity to the activity of drawing many representations under a common one. Moreover, “rules, so far as they are

objective (and thus necessarily pertain to the cognition of objects) are called laws. Although we learn many laws through experience, these are only particular determinations of yet higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others stand) come from the understanding itself *a priori*” (A 126). A first step to arriving at these highest laws, something only fully accomplished in the transcendental deduction, requires that we consider judgments apart from content.

Considering judgment apart from content allows us to see the forms of judgment that the spontaneous activity of the understanding yields in performing its discursive function or in drawing many representations under a common one. What emerges from the activity of combining concepts in various ways is that the scopes of concepts (again in the broad sense discussed above) limit the ways in which concepts can be combined and provide the conditions under which various combinations are possible. In abstracting from content we see these limitations and conditions more clearly and with them the general types of activities by which the spontaneity of the understanding forms judgments or the ways in which it performs its discursive function. What we first find are the logical functions of thinking or those functions which characterize the discursive functions of thought with respect to representations concerning the stuff of our everyday life. The discursive forms at issue here are those which govern judgments about, for instance, metals, bodies, liquids, tables, and chairs. In attending to such judgments apart from content, we find four general ways in which the understanding performs its discursive function and under each of these four headings, three specific forms of judgment or discursive activity. These headings are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Under, for instance, quantity we find universal, particular, and singular judgments while under quality we find affirmative, negative, and infinite judgments.

Kant takes these logical functions as “clues” to the pure concepts of the understanding. Each, viewed apart from content, is a general way of combining many representations under a common one and as such is a concept about concepts. That is, in looking at all the various ways in which we draw together representations under a common one, we begin to see that each particular way we do so is like or unlike others and can be drawn under a common function with some as distinct from others. What is common to discursive activities falling under a particular type is a rule or, what comes to the same, a root concept shared by all functions of a certain type. Here, Allison provides particularly helpful examples. To take just one (admittedly, one that is particularly clear) the categorical function, “requires the concept of a subject of which properties may be either affirmed or denied and therefore a *capacity* to distinguish between a subject and its properties” (Allison 148 my emphasis).” This offers us a clue to a pure *a priori* concept of the understanding, namely substance. A substance is something that is necessarily a subject and not a predicate, something that bears properties, but is never itself a property of something else. Substance, as a category, is ultimately only related to sensible intuition. Only in relation to sensible intuition does it produce a content of thought. Importantly, there is nothing here that commits us to the idea that in order to judge categorically we must *apply* the concept of substance. The claim is only that we could not judge as we do without an *a priori* notion of an object as such and without judgments aimed at truth or an account of objects in terms of their essential features. Substance is part of our notion of an object as such and would figure in an account of an object in terms of its essential features. What links these two levels is that the same functions and so also rules are at work in each. It is the same understanding proceeding according to the same rules, only in one case those rules are at work with respect to sensible

intuitions and in the other they are at work with respect to representations concerning the stuff of our everyday life.

The focus I have placed on the activity of the subject may appear somewhat strange, especially for those who have read Kant through, for instance, Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty tends to treat Kant as developing a view in which the highest principles or laws of the understanding are innate concepts. On Merleau-Ponty's view, idealism of the Kantian sort promises to rid us of the opacity and transcendence of the object in a complete synthesis by bringing the object completely within the grasp of consciousness, completely within the grasp of concepts that have already fully determined objects. Yet, for Merleau-Ponty this is the same as ridding us of the object because it runs against the aptness condition developed above. It is in fact the transcendence and opacity of things that makes perception, or the appearance of objects in time and space, possible. Only the transcendence and opacity of objects can motivate the activity by which we attempt to apprehend them. The account of the thing in itself in terms of the conditions under which cognition would be impossible and in terms of the transcendental object, *x*, already calls this reading into question. Furthermore, in a note to J.A. Eberhard, Kant explicitly emphasizes that his account of the categories of the understanding is not an account of innate concepts. It is, rather, an account of innate capacities. Kant writes,

For impressions are always required in order first to enable the cognitive power to represent an object (which is always its own act). Thus, the formal *intuition* which is called space emerges as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects in general) . . . the acquisition of which long precedes determinate *concepts* of things that are in accordance with this form. The acquisition of these concepts is an *acquisitio derivativa*, as it already presupposes universal transcendental concepts of the understanding. These likewise are acquired and not innate, but their acquisition, like that of space, is *originaria* and presupposes nothing innate except the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (in accordance with the unity of apperception)" (qtd. in Longuenesse 252).

This still leaves the question open as to what best accounts for our relation to objects and whether a phenomenological account rooted in the body would allow us to account for more aspects of our experience than the Kantian account. This question I leave for a later chapter and turn now to briefly considering the challenges to this account of *a priori* concepts.

A Priori Concepts

One of the most common critiques of the metaphysical deduction of the categories is that it relies on the forms of judgment available from general logic. Yet, there is no further argument given as to why the forms that happen to be available to us constitute the complete set of forms. This would make the categories which are deduced from these forms a matter of contingency. Hegel, for instance, critiques Kant on just this point in the *Science of Logic* and there attempts to develop and demonstrate the necessity of the categories of thought by different means. Strawson argues that advances in logic since Kant show that Kant's understanding of logic was in fact limited. Strawson also argues that some of these advances have revealed logical forms which are not apt for the deduction of a category. Quantification, for instance, defies an easy pairing with a concept that accounts for some aspect of an object as such. Longuenesse has defended Kant here by pointing out that Kant very clearly views the forms of general logic only as *clue*. Moreover, the clue is not meant to be a clue to innate concepts that stand in a precise parallel to the forms of general logic. Rather, the clue leads us to the activity of the understanding and reveals how the understanding goes about gathering up representations. Once we discover this activity, we can

view it as independent of the clue that leads us to it and as possessing its own explanatory force. However, this may simply shift the question to how we will know when we have an account of all of our innate capacities.

The difficulties surrounding *a priori* concepts in Kant also naturally lead one to consider the difficulties surrounding the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. As Ottfried Hoffe notes, defining analytic judgments as “true by definition” is not quite right when considering Kant’s use of this term. Determining how to define something is a more demanding task for Kant than is simply recognizing something to be an analytic judgment. Indeed, one can recognize a judgment as analytic without knowing the full definition of the concepts involved. Allison offers two alternative ways of understanding analytic judgments, each accompanied by a way of understanding synthetic judgments. The first way of understanding analytic judgments is as judgments, “whose predicate, B belongs to the subject A as something that is contained (covertly) in this concept A” (A6/B10). Here, the connection between subject and predicate is thought through identity, as in, “Bachelors are unmarried men.” Synthetic judgments would then be those in which B is connected with A, but in which the connection between B and A is not thought through identity and in which B lies completely outside of A. For example, “Gravity acts on all earthly objects.” The second way of understanding analytic judgments is as explicative and resting entirely on the principle of non-contradiction. Nothing is added to the concept in the subject position, but its component concepts, those which we usually grasp only dimly, are made explicit. If we are to believe Aristotle’s arguments in the *Nicomachean Ethics* then the judgment that, “Man is a rational animal,” is of this sort. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are ampliative, or add something to our understanding of the subject of the judgment.

The difficulties of the first way of understanding the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments have been widely discussed. W.V.O. Quine believes, for instance, that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is dogmatic in all of its guises. The relevant aspects of his critique with respect to Kant concern the fact that we cannot reduce the notion of analyticity to something that does not itself require further explanation. For instance, the metaphor of containment lacks precision while defining analyticity in terms of non-contradiction leaves non-contradiction unexplained. Lewis White Beck considers ways to clarify how it is we determine that one concept contains others. One possibility is through introspection where we carefully consider the concepts involved in the judgment. The problem here is that the results of introspection will inevitably rest on the sophistication of thinker. It is also of no help to attempt to define analyticity in a strictly logical manner since this will ultimately rest on the meanings of the concepts constituting the judgments under consideration and this, in turn, will lead us back to introspection.

For Allison, these difficulties make the second understanding of the distinction the more attractive one. On this understanding, the distinction can be understood in a fully epistemic way, rather than introspectively or logically. Ultimately the difference between the two kinds of judgments is that one extends our knowledge and the other does not. This requires an explanation of what counts as an extension of knowledge, but there are resources within Kant's framework to do this. All judgments, so far as the *Critique* is concerned, are judgments under sensible conditions. That is, judgments are always about some object, x. Synthetic judgments are judgments where each part of the judgment is connected with the others only by being referred to the same object. No analysis other than analysis of the object can yield such judgments. Thus, these judgments extend our knowledge of an object by adding determinations

to some object, x . Analytic judgments, on the other hand, do not extend our knowledge with respect to the object, though they may reveal things we are necessarily committed to if we are committed to the truth of a judgment by revealing component concepts. This, quite appropriately given the analysis thus far, draws the distinction in terms of cognitive activity required of the thinker in each case. An actual thinker may be confused about which activity she is engaged in, but this does not mean there is not a fact of the matter. This still leaves the principle of non-contradiction unexplained, but it is not clear why we should not side with Aristotle here and view the principle as primitive, as something we cannot help but employ as soon as we form a thought. This issue requires more space than I can dedicate here and my treatment of it will be somewhat narrow. Nonetheless, a few comments on Quine's treatment of the principle will help to fill out the account.

Quine does not think that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is nonsense, but he does attack our usual reason for drawing the distinction. He thinks those judgments that we call analytic are simply those that are more "recalcitrant" as we go about revising the theoretical frameworks within which we make claims about the world. Thus, the distinction is a pragmatic one, not a logical one. Yet, this claim in fact looks to require the principle of non-contradiction. It is arguable that the distinction between analytic and synthetic is itself analytic. At least, the distinction is not one that its proponents see as derived from experience. Rather this distinction is supposed to determine what counts as something derived from experience by opposing two concepts. When we understand the distinction, we are to understand that, "no synthetic judgment is analytic." We thus also understand that the claim, "synthetic judgments are analytic," violates the principle of non-contradiction. Quine's argument is in fact an attempt to convince us that this last judgment does not violate the principle

of non-contradiction and that in fact synthetic judgments and analytic judgments refer to all the same judgments or are just two different determinations of propositions which are all of the same kind. Moreover, on his account this can be clearly shown by demonstrating how the distinction is derived from experience.

Nonetheless, his argument is only convincing to the degree that we are convinced that there is no violation of the principle of non-contradiction. That is, his argument tacitly rests on this principle, the meaning of which is ultimately derived (at a meta-level) from logical concerns. Concerning this last point, it is difficult to see how one can characterize what it is to be derived from experience without opposing it to analyticity which would again constitute a logical distinction, one not derived from experience. Moreover, while it may be true that phenomenological considerations cannot give us a very strong distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, they do give us a reason to think that the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, insofar as it rests on which propositions can be constructed purely on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction and which require more, is not a distinction that we construct in terms of prospective criteria. Rather, it is always a retrospective characterization of a principle we have already employed or at least of a principle entailed by the kind of distinctions we find we must make in order to reason at all. As such, phenomenological considerations show at least that the distinction is not simply a philosophical tool that we can judge as working well or poorly, but an intellectual reality that we struggle to characterize. To show otherwise requires more than excising mention of it from one's work, it means thinking, arguing and providing convincing arguments without it. As Searle argues, though our characterization of the distinction may lack the precision of criterion, this does not make the distinction void.

Returning now to Kant, he wishes to make a further use of synthetic judgments which complicates things even more. Kant argues that there are synthetic judgments that are also *a priori*. That is, Kant argues that there are judgments which extend our knowledge prior to experience. As Allison emphasizes, it is important to keep in mind here that the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* are distinctions that concern how something is “grounded and legitimated,” or simply how something is known, not what is known. There are not, then, *a priori* objects and *a posteriori* objects. Rather, we can inquire into the empirical ground of objects, but we can also inquire into the conditions of the possibility of representing those same objects *as* objects of knowledge. It seems that synthetic judgments would necessarily be *a posteriori*, but the prospect of *a priori* intuitions to which *a priori* concepts relate opens the way to synthetic *a priori* judgments. I will discuss *a priori* intuitions and their relation to *a priori* categories much more in the following two chapters. Briefly, what determines the intuitions of time and space as *a priori* are the holistic structures of time and space. We must grasp, prior to encountering particular slices of space-time, the spans of space and time as wholes that are logically prior to those particular slices. Grasp of these wholes as logically prior is a function of the imagination and the transcendental schemata, which are intuitions made conceptual or also concepts made intuitional.

I will discuss the schemata in greater depth in chapter 3, but for now, we can consider Kant’s empirical example of a schema, the triangle. The claim is that without intuition we would be left with, for instance, a set of formulas that do nothing to indicate the general shape triangles take and would be left without a way of determining the numerical identity of particular triangles. Having only the concept “triangle” apart from intuition would be akin to having access to an explanation of color that covers the physical, neurological, and phenomenological aspects

of color vision, yet lacking sight. Such an explanation can be no substitute for an understanding of what it is to have a sensible experience organized within a spatiotemporal field or through the successive or simultaneous presentation of extensive, intensive, and relational features such that one can attend to different regions of this field in common with others. Possessing a schema of a triangle is thus knowing what it is for *something* to be a triangle. A schema thus materially extends our knowledge prior to encounters with the particular things. In fact, it makes those encounters possible. The success of this approach ultimately rests with the transcendental deduction, which I will discuss in the next chapter. To end this chapter, I would like to briefly discuss the fate of *a priori* justification after Kant.

A priori After Kant

One of the biggest obstacles that Kant faces is in maintaining the necessity of the synthetic *a priori* judgments of his critical philosophy. Specifically, one wonders why such judgments are not defeasible given the fact that they are synthetic. Kant attempts to maintain their necessity in roughly three steps. First, he argues that time and space are intuitions rather than concepts and that time and space are *a priori*. These intuitions also provide a limit on what we can claim to know because claims to knowledge must necessarily pertain to objects and objects are necessarily situated in time and space. Secondly, Kant argues that the concepts necessary for the cognition of objects as such can be demonstrated through a metaphysical deduction. Finally, the necessity and sufficiency of the intuitions and these concepts in the

cognition of objects as such can only be secured by showing that intuitions are subject to the categories of the understanding. This, in turn, rests on showing that time and space, to be anything to me, must be brought to the unity of consciousness and that this can only be done via the categories, the categories being identified with the unified activity of the subject. In other words, temporal and spatial determinations cannot be features of cognized objects if time and space lie beyond cognition. Because, as we have seen, cognition is identified with the unifying activity of the subject, and this activity is conceptual, temporal and spatial determinations must be cognized under the categories of the understanding if they are to be cognizable features of objects. One of the assumptions Kant seems to be making is that if we can show how temporal determinations are cognizable under concepts, we will then be in a position to see why spatial and temporal determinations are necessary for cognition and why space-time determinations together with conceptual determinations are jointly necessary *and* sufficient conditions for cognition.

I think the trajectory of the continental tradition after Kant is guided in part by the gradual decoupling of synthetic *a priori* concepts from necessity. In other words, step two is thrown into question thus leaving us to question whether anything can be salvaged from steps one and three. Despite the suspicion that the Kantian project as a whole fails to form a coherent whole, the idea that some of the things we believe to be necessary are a product of a kind of rational intuition rather than analyticity or empirical observation remains. Yet, the possibility of a meta-justification of these rational insights appears less and less tenable. Hegel forms a pivot point here. He still believed that such a meta-justification is possible. Yet, for Hegel, this justification is not possible prior to observing the way thought actually unfolds. In fact, only in observing the way thought unfolds can one see demonstrated both those concepts necessarily

involved in our cognition of objects as such and the justification for the claim that these concepts are necessarily at work. Much of the way Hegel's system proceeds¹⁹ is through showing that particular presuppositions governed by particular concepts of objects as such, though appearing necessary or at least obvious and without alternative, are fallible. Certain presuppositions cannot be true because the conditions under which they would be true would also be conditions under which they could not be true. For instance, it might seem obvious and necessary that to know an object we must know it in-itself and with immediacy, or apart from its relation to any other object. Were this true, however, we could not know the object *as* anything at all because objects can only ever be as something to us in relation to other things. Importantly, what we learn through the negation of this presupposition is something determinate. Namely, our relation to objects must be mediated. This forms the basis for a subsequent presupposition which, again, appears necessary or without alternative, but which in its specifics reveals contradictions that again move us along. Eventually through this process of determinate negation we are to reach a standpoint from which all possible conceptual determinations come into view.

We find here that negation or opposition is a necessary feature of conceptuality and that anything that appears to stand outside this system cannot so appear without already standing in a relation of negation or opposition to something else. This relation, in turn, will have a form that can be accounted for within the system of concepts. Dialectical reasoning, which proceeds via determinate negation, yields this standpoint in the form of a rational intuition that rests on an inability to formulate an alternative view or a view not already grounded in the system of concepts. Ultimately, though each particular conceptual determination within the system of concepts is fallible, the system of concepts as a whole, which is generated by the fallibility of

¹⁹ Here I am abstracting away from differences in the aims of *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Logic*.

each particular attempt to determine objects as such, is the truth about how cognition is possible, what the process of cognition involves, and what the proper objects of cognition are. What unifies the process of cognition (dialectical reasoning), the product of cognition (concepts), and the object of cognition (objects as such) is that each is determined by the same form. The form of negation we see in dialectical reasoning determines each. What the *Logic* shows us is that this form, as the form of thought, strives to cognize itself by means of itself in everything.

Yet, in his attempts to turn the fallibility of apparent *a priori* judgments about objects into a positive account of cognition, Hegel unwittingly makes way for the view that *a priori* judgments are defeasible. That is, if history is supposed to have culminated in absolute knowing and if it seems *a priori* necessary that this should have happened, that is unfortunate because there is evidence to the contrary.²⁰ Moreover, though it may appear *a priori* necessary that there is a grand system underlying cognition given Hegel's introspective observations of how thought unfolds, the observations of others may provide evidence to the contrary or produce competing intuitions.²¹ I think defeasibility here leads to weariness of such grand systems and this culminates in a modest rationalism in the hermeneutic tradition and radical suspicion in, for instance, Foucauldian strains of deconstruction. Given my aims here, it makes most sense to briefly discuss hermeneutics and leave discussion of Foucault for another time.²²

²⁰ There are more nuanced views of Hegel's account of history and absolute knowing, but what I am attempting to capture here is the motivation for subsequent developments in the history of philosophy, no matter if these motivations are charitable or not.

²¹ For instance, Gadamer writes, "The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new experience. That is why a person who is called experienced has become so not only *through* experiences but is also open *to* new experiences. The consummation of his experience, the perfection that we call "being experienced," does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and learn from them" (Gadamer 350).

²² For an account of the relation of the Foucauldian project to the Kantian project, see Helene Han and Edward Pile, *Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical*.

In the hermeneutic tradition, we are *justified in thinking of* certain beliefs as grounded *a priori*. These beliefs are determined by the concepts (common meanings) that constitute our linguistic community, for instance that Euclidian geometry is the only possible kind of geometry. Yet, such justification is never a guarantee of *knowledge* that is truly grounded *a priori*.²³ On our own, we may not be sophisticated enough to find alternatives to beliefs we find *a priori* justified, but if we are open to discourse with others, we find such beliefs are always defeasible. This openness requires, “that one does not try to argue the other person down but that one really considers the weight of the other’s opinion. Hence it is the art of testing” (Gadamer 361). Hegel’s dialectic on the other hand, “is a monologue of thinking that tries to carry out in advance what matures little by little in every genuine dialogue” (363). One of the common critiques of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project is that the openness it requires does not seem possible if it is the case, as Gadamer seems to argue, that meaning determines reference. The idea that meaning determines reference can be characterized in terms of “fit.” For Gadamer, meanings arguably reduce to sets of criteria (intensions) which objects either fit or do not. These criteria need not be explicit, but are just those descriptions of objects that are ingrained in and disseminated throughout a speech community. In referring somebody to an object we take it for granted that she has, more or less, the same criteria determining reference as we do when we utter a word or sentence and can by those criteria pick out the same object. Moreover, we could not pick out objects *as this or that* at all without such criteria in play. If what one means by her utterances is wholly determined by the linguistic community of which one is a part, then it is impossible that one could refer to things in common with anyone other than someone who picks out those things by the same criterion. This means that where we can discuss something in common with others,

²³ For an account of the distinction between *A priori justification* and *A priori knowledge* see Laurence Bonjour’s *In Defense of Pure Reason*.

we will already agree on its essential features. Thus, there is here a *de facto* rather than a *de jure* limit on what we can know.

One striking feature of the reception of *a priori* justification and knowledge after Kant is that the importance of the *a priori* intuitions of time and space for limiting what counts as a legitimate claim to knowledge drops out of the picture. Part of the reason for this might be that in the *Critique* time and space are closely associated with the manifold of sensibility which, in turn, raises questions concerning the thing in itself. Arguably, because those who take up the critical project after Kant see the thing in itself as an untenable remainder, they make a move toward a system completely determined by conceptuality. In the case of Gadamer, this is done without considering whether the intuitions of time and space could provide a necessary limit on the play of concepts such that the kind of openness he discusses would be possible. An important exception to this trend is Edmund Husserl. Yet, even for Husserl the insight that this aspect of the Kantian system is integral to any account of experience was gradual.

Husserl's first attempts at a phenomenological philosophy, what can be called categorial phenomenology, discussed synthetic *a priori* rules in terms of regions. Through eidetic variation, or arbitrarily and imaginatively varying an object while maintaining it as the kind of object it is, Husserl believed we could find the essence of the region of which the object is a part. What makes this approach phenomenological is that each region comes to be distinguished by how objects are given in each region which requires rigorous description. How objects are given rests, in turn, on how they are apprehended by the subject, or what kind of, "acts," are involved in the apprehension of objects in a particular region. Thus, objectivating acts pair with material objects while desiring pairs with objects of need. Through this analysis, we also find that there are features or properties shared by all acts and all objects within each region. This insight

reveals rules for what counts as belonging to a region not as a matter of induction, which would turn the whole affair into an empirical project, but as a matter of possible objects of cognition. Eidetic variation does not rest on actual objects, but on arbitrary variation which demonstrates how an object must appear to be an object of a particular kind and what act must be involved to apprehend it as such. Husserl also comes at this from another angle, one that is analogous to working from the conclusion of the *Science of Logic* back through all the various determinations of thought. Here Husserl begins with formal ontology, or that which determines what it is to be a region as such (what it is to be an act and an object at all). He then works down from this position to investigate the specific differences between each region. Parallel to formal ontology Husserl also develops a formal apophantics which treats, “pure grammar,” and logic. This determines the conditions under which discourse is possible.

There are some subtleties in this account that I am passing over, but for my purposes there are two moments to emphasize that will help frame the discussion to come. First, it is notable that Husserl distinguishes formal apophantics from formal ontology. There are important links between a study of objects as such and the possibility of discourse, but in keeping them separate Husserl is already considering the apprehension of objects apart from judgment and discourse. Now, it is true that within each region act fulfillment, or the satisfaction of an intention, is at work and this looks to be very much an explicitly epistemological exercise in which we find objects that fit certain criteria. Nonetheless, the fact that these insights rest on a rigorous description of objects as they are given and which has as an ultimate aim an account of objects as such points toward a deeper account of the primary way in which any object must be given apart from discourse and judgment. This will lead Husserl to move past act fulfillment in his account of intentionality and toward the body and what he will call passive synthesis.

Secondly, Husserl struggles here to discuss ideality in a way that will not result in psychologism while also developing an account that explains how ideal meanings can be a part of concrete thoughts or utterances. At the level of regions, this difficulty manifests in Husserl's emphasis on the acts without which a region and its objects could not be determined in their essence. Husserl handles this by distinguishing between what is given (in this case something ideal) and how something is given (how it appears), the act by which we grasp something and what is grasped, and rules as constitutive (as they are in logic) and those same rules as regulative (as the rules of logic are in concrete practices). With respect to the meanings of concrete utterances, Husserl's initial account is less satisfying. He ends up treating meanings as species (which are ideal) and concrete utterances as individuals standing under those species. On one hand, this view would explain some facts about meaning, for instance, that meanings can be repeated, shared, and do not require the existence of the thing referred to in order to be understood. On the other hand, this seems to commit Husserl to the view that meanings are innate Platonic entities, which is not a phenomenologically apt position. Like Kant, Husserl will move to a transcendental account of acts which looks to avoid the innatist position. Yet, as we shall see the tension between the ideal and the concrete reemerges here. In fact, in many ways the possibility of a phenomenological account of content hinges on whether this tension can be resolved. We shall see whether Husserl's move beyond his earlier accounts of ideality and meaning can satisfactorily reconcile this tension.

Chapter 2

The Irreducibility of the Intuitive

Introduction

So far, the discussion of content has proceeded through a discussion of Kant's critical philosophy. Taken as a whole, the discussion has been constituted by four considerations. These are: the Kantian system, critical responses to the Kantian system, the development of a framework for a broader discussion of apperceptive content, and the development of elements of Kant's critical system after Kant. In this chapter I will return to the last of these considerations in order to do three things. First, I want to chart out the problems posed by a Kantian approach to the question of nonconceptual content and McDowell's alternative. Secondly, I will focus on Kant's critical responses to Leibnizian philosophy in order to argue that there is some content we are required to see as nonconceptual. Here I will 1.) Continue developing an analysis of the way phenomenology develops elements of the Kantian system and 2.) Argue that Kant's critiques of Leibniz capture the general form of the problems that arise on any account which embraces the idea the experience is conceptual all the way down. Finally, I will frame the problems that arise within both Kant's and McDowell's accounts in terms of distinctions developed within Husserlian phenomenology. This will include an account of transcendental subjectivity as it operates in Kant's transcendental deduction and Husserl's earlier works.

Surveying the Rifts

Kant's discussion of *a priori* representations in the aesthetic and in the Metaphysical deduction does not yet demonstrate how the categories relate to time and space as intuitions. That is, we have two kinds of necessary *a priori* representations, but no argument as to why they are necessarily related to each other. This Kant accomplishes in the transcendental deduction of the pure categories. I will begin by focusing on the B deduction, but when discussing Longuenesse's view I will follow her in considering the A deduction. Kant's aim in the B deduction is to work through the notion of apperception to the idea that the categories must relate to the intuitions of time and space if time and space are to be anything to us. More specifically, Kant attempts to demonstrate the necessity of the categories by arguing that in order for a representation to count as anything for me it must be thinkable by me and thinkable as mine in a unified consciousness which functions to maintain the unity of the object thought about. Given the discussion of conceptuality above, when a representation is thinkable and thinkable as mine this representation will never be singular, but always part of a judgment which itself is a part of a system of judgments constituted by logical relations of subordination. Thus, in order for a representation to be thinkable and thinkable as mine, the larger whole of which it is a part must also be thinkable as mine and thinkable by me.

This requires, in addition, a numerically identical subject who persists through and disposes over the drawing together of representations and understands itself as working within a systematic whole. In short, it requires an 'I' that thinks. It follows that if the manifold of

sensibility falling within intuition is to be anything to me and if the manifolds that constitute temporality and spatiality as intuitions are to be anything to me, they must be thinkable by me and thinkable as mine which, by Kant's arguments thus far, will necessarily involve unification through the categories. The challenge is that Kant also wishes to maintain a division of labor between appearances that are ordered such that they are ready to be taken up in concepts (a nonconceptual synthesis) and the conceptual synthesis in which concepts are subordinated to each other.

Four major questions arise here. First, what is the precise nature of the relation between the categories and the intuitions? Specifically, what accounts for the possibility of their interaction? Secondly, if the understanding, via imagination, is already involved in the ordering of sensible data through their relation to the intuitions of time and space, does this mean that the work usually attributed to the understanding is largely accomplished prior to the operation of concepts/categories? Thirdly, what is the relationship between the categories and empirical perception? Kant insists that perception is only possible if it too stands under categories, yet the contingent juxtaposition of things perceived contains nothing of necessity. To put a finer point on it, how does the relation of the categories to intuition account for both the possibility of perception (of the contingent features of the world) and experience (understood in terms of the cognition of the necessary features of objects as such)? Finally, what is the relation between imagination as it is discussed in the latter portion of the B deduction, which concerns the relation between the categories and sensibility, and the imagination as it is discussed in the schematism? On one hand, the schematism looks to be an extension of, maybe even a completion of, the work done in the latter portion of the B deduction. On the other hand, it seems to emphasize an

anticipatory function of the imagination where the deduction looks to emphasize the productive feature of the imagination.

For instance, in the B deduction the emphasis is on the syntheses of manifolds of sensibility which always rest, in turn, on the synthesis or unification of time and space conceived as wholes containing parts. In fact, approaching time and space as containing parts, or units constituting a series, is made possible by the categories (specifically quantity). Yet, what underlies our grasp of a series here is not the *concept* of a whole constituted by parts, but the *intuition* of a single whole without which we could not situate single units with respect to other units or, alternately, local orderings of units with respect to other local orderings. The intuition of something more that is nonetheless continuous with what we already have in view provides the framework within which things can be perceptually located, distinguished, and identified. In the schematism, by contrast, the emphasis is on the conditions under which the categories apply or knowing what it is for something to be a necessary feature of objects as such. Kant's empirical example of the schemata emphasizes the anticipatory element of schemata. The schema of a triangle anticipates every possible particular triangle without being identified with any single one of them. Having the schema is knowing what it is for *something* to be a triangle. Importantly this knowledge does not rest on concept subordination and so is nonconceptual.

In the above questions we find that Kant's methodology, his attempt to analyze each feature of cognition on its own in order to determine what is unique to each, has left us with apparent gaps that must be bridged if the overall aim of his critical project is to be achieved. There are apparent gaps among *a priori* transcendental conditions, for instance, between intuition and the categories as well as between the productive and anticipatory functions of the imagination. There is also an apparent gap between the empirical and the transcendental, one

facet of which is the gap between perception and knowledge in the strict sense. This latter gap can be understood in terms of the difference between an empirical subject who unifies perceptual experience only in the sense that she is a locus of stimulation and gathers whatever perceptual data happens to be locally available and the transcendental subject which apperceives the necessary features of objects as such. In many ways, the terms of the debate concerning nonconceptual content can be found in the distinctions these questions presuppose. The way in which one responds to these questions and either resolves these apparent gaps or undermines the theoretical grounds which produces their appearance, will determine whether one thinks we are required to see certain content as nonconceptual. Moreover, even though we have reason to doubt whether *a priori* categories of the sort Kant discussed are at work in cognition, these same basic questions tend to reemerge with respect to the relation between concepts and sensibility as well as between perception and knowledge, more broadly construed.

For instance, in his book *Mind and World* McDowell maintains Kant's distinction between receptivity (sensibility) and spontaneity (understanding), but conceives of the relation between subjectivity, reason, and conceptuality in terms of empirical subjects for who reasoning and judgment are skills to be cultivated. Here, he uses Aristotle's ethical system as a model for how we should view the structure and place of rationality more generally. McDowell focuses on practical wisdom as, "a responsiveness to some of the demands of reason (though that is not Aristotle's way of putting it). The picture is that ethics involves requirements of reason that are there whether we know it or not, and our eyes are opened to them by the acquisition of 'practical wisdom'. So 'practical wisdom' is the right sort of thing to serve as a model for the understanding, the faculty that enables us to recognize and create the kind of intelligibility that is a matter of placement in the space of reasons" (McDowell 79).

A little further on, he expands on this. He writes,

If we enrich it, then, to include a proper place for reflectiveness, Aristotle's picture can be put like this. The ethical is a domain of rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons. Thereafter our appreciation of its detailed layout is indefinitely subject to refinement, in reflective scrutiny of our ethical thinking. We can so much as understand, let alone seek to justify, the thought that reason makes these demands on us only at a standpoint within a system of concepts and conceptions that enable us to think about such demands, that is, only at a standpoint from which demands of this kind seem to be in view (82).

In this same way, the empirical lives we lead make rational demands on us whether we are in a position to see them or not. We come to recognize these demands only by initiation into a reflective practice in which we learn to question the rational credentials of the things we experience and believe. Crucial to McDowell's argument is the claim that validating rational thinking does not require a standpoint outside that kind of thinking. In fact, understanding rational thought and justifying or validating rational thought will always be a performance of rational interrogation. Thus, McDowell argues for the kind of enclosure of reason by its own limits that we discussed in the last chapter, but McDowell sees himself as moving beyond Kant in bringing this enclosure within the realm of the empirical subject. In doing this, McDowell hopes to avoid all of the hopeless rifts created by Kant's division of the transcendental from the empirical.

Though apperception is not addressed directly in *Mind and World*, I think it is accounted for in terms of an indefinite field of concepts and our understanding of ourselves as possessing the capacity to dispose over this field in working through inferences and checking on the rational credentials of experiences and beliefs. This view is supported by McDowell's essay, "The

Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self'. Here, McDowell offers a Hegelian account of apperception, one that lends further support to his aims in *Mind and World*. McDowell argues that Kant's account of self-consciousness is in fact an attempt to negate the otherness of the object. On Kant's account the object known is entirely a product of the cognitive activity of the transcendental subject. Thus, objects themselves as empirically existing things are inessential to cognition conceived of transcendently. This is problematic for two reasons. First, self-consciousness is only possible as against a determinate otherness. McDowell writes, "That object – empirically knowable reality – does not just disappear with the advent of self-consciousness. If it did, we would have only "the motionless tautology of 'I am I.' Without otherness in the picture, self-consciousness would not be in the picture either" (McDowell "World in View" 155). Secondly, the object is not truly negated in the Kantian system, but recedes into the thing-in-itself which is beyond the reach of the transcendental subject.

Thus, to maintain the possibility of self-consciousness, the object must be authentically *aufgehoben*, or brought fully within the rational sphere of subjectivity while maintaining its otherness. This will involve conceiving of the subject as an empirical subject who confronts meaningful objects that impose demands that are not entirely of the subject's making, but which, nonetheless, are rational. This is a subject, "immersed in life in the world" (165). This latter point both dissolves the apparent rift between subject and object and maintains the independence of the object. McDowell writes, "It is that life, or the individual living it, that is progressively revealed as itself consciousness and then self-consciousness. What it actually is is my self-consciousness, not someone else's. When that becomes clear, empirical consciousness will be integrated with apperceptive consciousness, and the otherness of the world that confronts my empirical consciousness will be purged of its threat to open a gulf between subjective and

objective” (160). Apperceptive consciousness affirms, then, “the whole expanse of the sensible world” (160).

It follows that this expanse is just the field of rational demands the world places on us and thus apperception is about our awareness of our rational capacity to answer to these demands, even those not yet explicitly articulated as such.²⁴ McDowell is especially clear on this point when he argues, “By virtue of the way in which the conceptual capacities that are drawn into operation in an experience are rationally linked into the whole network, the subject of the experience understands what the experience takes in (or at least seems to take in) as part of a wider reality, a reality that is all embraceable in thought but not all available to this experience. The object of experience is understood as integrated into the repertoire of spontaneity at large (McDowell “Mind and World” 32).

McDowell rounds-out his account in *Mind and World* by arguing that spontaneity must be at work in receptivity. He reasons that if spontaneity were not already at work in receptivity, objects of perception, objects not yet *explicitly* judged as being some way or other, would be out of the reach of reason and thus out of the reach of the unity of apperception. McDowell writes, “In ‘outer experience’, a subject is passively saddled with conceptual contents, drawing into operation capacities seamlessly integrated into a conceptual repertoire that she employs in the continuing activity of adjusting her world-view, so as to enable it to pass a scrutiny of its rational credentials” (31). Because apperception (subjectivity) is accounted for in terms of possessing the capacity for rationality and this is identified with, to use Kant’s language, concept subordination, McDowell reasons that perception must be conceptual. It is not, on this account,

²⁴ In his essay “What Myth?” McDowell discusses this in terms of acquiring new conceptual capacities by carving something more specific out of a categorically unified but “unarticulated experiential content of which it is an aspect, so that thought can focus on it by itself” (347).

that objects of perception are *conceptualizable* it is that they are already *conceptual*, already subordinated with respect to, for instance, color and shape and thus has rational linkages to other concepts in the subject's repertoire. This level, what we call McDowell's version of passive synthesis, also ensures that the activity of spontaneity does not completely determine experience; though conceptual all the way down, experience cannot be explained in terms of a radical idealism because the subject does not dispose over and shape all applications of concepts. Summing up, for McDowell, only if experience is conceptual "all the way down" and subjectivity is understood in terms of a capacity empirical subjects have for reasoning can the gaps that appear in Kant's system be resolved.

Though if successful McDowell's account in *Mind and World* would cleanly resolve the divisions to which Kant's system is vulnerable, it leaves us without a way of determining *how* precisely concepts work their way into perception or *how* perception is already conceptual. Also, phenomenologically it is not clear that the experience of making explicit judgments about objects of perception is just the experience of discovering something that was already there just as we come to have it in judgment. Our engagement with objects of perception is not one of concept subordination or often even of fully perceived objects, but of touchstones that both develop through and facilitate the continuation of action.²⁵ In any case, the situation is somewhat more complex for Kant. The *Critique* rests on insights and arguments that require a division of labor between sensibility and the understanding, between the intuitions and the categories. For Kant, if experience is to be possible it cannot be constituted by concepts alone. I think Kant has legitimate concerns here that are relevant even if we find his account of *a priori* knowledge untenable, concerns I do not think McDowell fully responds to but which Husserl does. To get

²⁵ This point requires further development in terms of the relation between perception and action. I will take up this discussion in chapter 3.

the clearest angle on the necessity of a nonconceptual element in Kant's system, I think it is helpful to start with the amphibolies and work back to Kant's account of the intuitions.

Necessary Divisions

In the amphibolies Kant addresses Leibniz's account of the relation between concepts and objects and the problems that arise when we take objects to be wholly and essentially conceptually determinable.²⁶ Kant writes, "Leibniz compared the objects of the senses with each other as things in general, merely in the understanding" (A271/B327). This means that Leibniz takes objects to be completely determinable by concepts. Kant argues that this leaves us without a way of distinguishing between numerically distinct objects that have all the same conceptual determinations. Kant writes,

Of course, if I know a drop of water as a thing in itself according to all of its inner determinations, I cannot let any one drop count as different from another if the entire concept of the former is identical with that of the latter. But if it is an appearance in space, then it has its place not merely in the understanding (under concepts), but also in the sensible outer intuition (in space),... Without further conditions, the difference in place already makes the multiplicity and distinction of objects as appearances not only possible in itself but also necessary" (A272/B 328).

Kant goes on to note similar difficulties when it comes to comparing objects with respect to agreement and opposition, inner determinations and outer relations, and matter and form. As for agreement and opposition, two concepts may not be logically opposed, but the extensions of these concepts may be, nevertheless, actually opposed. There is no conflict in thinking of my

²⁶ Here, I will focus on Kant's reading of Leibniz rather than developing my own.

house as both “halfway down the street on the left” and “halfway down the street on the right”, but these two ways of thinking about the position of my house may be in actual conflict if, for instance, I am actually approaching the house from a direction that will place it on the left.²⁷

Kant also notes that “real opposition always obtains where $A - B = 0$, i.e., where one reality, if combined in one subject with another, cancels out the effect of the latter” (A273/B329). There is no opposition, for instance, in thinking of the same object as travelling at 63 miles per hour and as encountering an immovable object. Yet, in reality the immovable object will oppose, cancel out, the force which propels the object. The problems that arise when inner and outer, matter and form are understood strictly in terms of conceptual determinations and are closely related to those of agreement and opposition.

What is primary for Leibniz are inner determinations. Kant writes, “Substances in general must have something **inner**, which is therefore free of all outer relations, consequently also of composition. The simple is therefore the foundation of the inner in things in themselves (A 274/ B 330).” Excluded, however, are place, shape, contact, and motion so that on this account, there are no objects which share outer relations or which possess relational properties. Thus, substances are only determined with respect to, “**the state of representations**” (A 274/B 330). This means that, “since everything is only internal, i.e., occupied with its own representations, the state of the representations of one substance could not stand in any efficacious connection at all with that of another” (A 275/ B 331). One thing which follows from this view is that the only way space and time can be worked into the account is if they are “intellectualized.” For Kant this means that Leibniz treats time and space as intelligible forms

²⁷ Kant never gives such a specific example as mine here, but it serves as an example supporting Kant’s more general claim that the opposition of directions is, “a condition about which the transcendental concept of reality knows nothing at all” (A273/ B329).

rather than as intuitions, as independent fields in which things are situated. Kant writes, “Leibniz thought of space as a certain order in the community of substances, and thought of time as the dynamic sequence of their states. The uniqueness and independence from things, however, which both of these seem to have in themselves, he ascribed to the **confusion** of these concepts, which made that which is a mere form of dynamical relations be taken for an intuition subsisting by itself and preceding things” (A 275/ B 331). Where substances are concerned, these dynamical relations are pre-established such that there is no interaction between substances in time and space. Space and time are also intellectualized in perception because Leibniz, “wanted to make [time and space] valid for appearances [and] he conceded to sensibility no kind of intuition of its own” (A 276/B 332).

Kant’s own claims about space and time, on the other hand, work to further distinguish concepts from intuition. For Kant we can represent only a single space and a single time. Moreover, parts of time and space always presuppose the greater whole of which they are a part. This means that space and time are not merely collections of parts; rather the parts could not be individuated and situated without presupposition of the whole. A further feature of both time and space on this account is that they are both encountered as infinite. Thus, it is not only that the parts presuppose the whole, but that each part always indicates something more. These features distinguish time and space from concepts. Viewed one way, concepts are ordered hierarchically in terms of genus and species. Theoretically, by adding differentia we can continue generating concepts indefinitely, but this is different from the infinity of space and time. Parts of space and time are not ordered hierarchically but merely situated with respect to each other within a whole that is always necessarily prior to the parts. Moreover, representation of parts of time and space are not constituted through determining differentia, but through limiting the

whole through carving out a portion of it. Viewed another way, each concept holds others within it as constituents. My concept of trees, for instance, contains concepts of leaves, bark, and branches, and perhaps even of photosynthesis, capillary action, and xylem. Yet, if a concept were to contain an infinite number of constituents, it would become too indeterminate to properly serve as a concept, to properly function discursively.

Kant's view of time and space, though certainly not the same as a Newtonian view of time and space, works to ground the possibility of Newtonian views. Time, Kant will eventually argue, is the most important of the intuitions because it is through transcendental determinations of time that we can arrive at *a priori* representations of *objects* of knowledge, of the necessary ways objects must be situated *in the world* in order to count as objects of knowledge. I will discuss this feature of Kant's account more in the pages to come, but for now the important thing to emphasize is that for Kant temporality, conceived in terms of successive or simultaneous units or parts, is the condition for the possibility of measuring objects with respect to quantity and quality. Now, given the difficulty of making good on Kant's account of *a priori* categories, we have reason to doubt whether this particular view of temporality is tenable.

Nonetheless, many of Kant's core insights concerning time and space can be supported phenomenologically. We need only consider the conditions of possibility for our experience understood in terms of our primary way of encountering the world, which is through perception. Here, as in Kant's view, it would be difficult to defend the idea that temporality and spatiality only become determining features of our experience once we have gained a concept of them. Moreover, space and time are not experienced as features of objects in the way that, for instance, being blue and round are. This can be born out eidetically. We can imaginatively vary the shape and color of the object and imagine the object as neither blue nor round without annihilating the

object. Not so with the object being spatially and temporally situated. One might nonetheless argue that temporality and spatiality are analogous to color and shape understood more generally. We might say, for instance, that just as objects generally have shape and color, objects must be spatially and temporally situated. Yet, even here the priority of the intuitions reemerges. We can, in fact imagine a colorless object as long as we imagine it as having a surface that is in principle colorable. But an object without even shape, without any surface at all, is impossible precisely because this would just be an object that can be situated neither spatially nor temporality (if there is no “where”, the question of “when” the object is does not arise).

One may take a different tack and claim that ideas of space and time arise when we grasp the relations between objects, and between those objects and ourselves as embodied perceivers with a point of view. In grasping space, for instance, we understand that the physical interaction between any two objects is always in principle possible, always in principle perceivable, and yet never requires observation. Nevertheless, grasping any of this already presupposes grasp of a whole or a common field within which we and objects are situated such that these various kinds of interaction are possible. Phenomenologically, we must place this feature of spatiality as logically prior to our experiences of objects as spatially situated; it makes such experiences possible. As for Kant’s claims about the infinity of time and space, on the phenomenological account this is understood in terms of the horizontal structure of time and space. As in the Kantian account, any point in either space or time will indicate still further points. Yet, understood phenomenologically with respect to the primary (perceptual) way we experience the world, this indication occurs against a horizon which, insofar as experience is to be possible, always recedes as we approach. For example, any perspective we take on an object will disclose the object within a gestalt in which the object occupies the foreground and other possible objects

of perception form the background. The persistence of the background understood as a structural feature of any possible perceptual engagement with an object is just the persistence of the horizon.²⁸ Because Kant's account of why concepts are different from intuitions rests on a straightforward view of concepts that does not yet involve his account of *a priori* concepts and because his core insights concerning time and space can be supported phenomenologically, the distinction between concepts and intuitions does not rise or fall with the Kantian system.

One might still wonder, however, if there is not some way of individuating objects purely by way of concepts. For instance, if we consider concepts strictly in terms of their discursive function, in their function of selecting certain of the "marks" of an object, concepts begin to look a lot like descriptions which attribute those marks to the object in question. If this is the case, one might wonder, why not develop these descriptions into *definite* descriptions when needed and achieve numerical individuation in this way? If I am, for instance, thinking generally about snowmobiles and means of transportation and how one is subordinated to the other, there is no need to individuate particular objects in the world. Yet, once I begin thinking about Zophia's new blue snowmobile, I will need to individuate one particular object from all others in the world. This can be done through precise quantification. I can think, for instance, that there exists *one and only one* object which is new, is a snowmobile, belongs to Zophia, and is blue. For our purposes, there are two important responses to this approach.

First, given our concern with Kantian philosophy, it should be noted that from a strictly Kantian perspective, the categories can never count as *definite* descriptions precisely because they determine the features an object, *any object*, must have to be an object of knowledge. It is not that this or that object of knowledge *can* be described in terms of the categories or that an

²⁸ I will discuss the horizontal features of experience in much greater detail in chapter 4.

object of knowledge *can* be individuated in terms of some the categories and not others. Rather, any object of knowledge, insofar as it is an object of knowledge, must be determined by (and therefore describable in terms of) the categories. Moreover, any object of knowledge must be determined by each of the categories in order to count as an object of knowledge. Just knowing what features an object of knowledge must have does not, however, give us a way of individuating such objects. It only gives us the rules which determine membership in the set. Individuation is only possible through the intuitions, through situating parts (determined by limitation) with respect to a whole which is always necessarily presupposed. From a Kantian perspective, quantification, insofar as it rests on individuating an existing object from others, must already presuppose the intuitions of time and space, must already presume that the object in question is spatiotemporally situated. And space/time cannot, for reasons already discussed, be fully captured in terms of concepts.

Secondly, from a phenomenological perspective in which there is no longer a concern with Kantian categories, the requirement that an object, insofar as it can object for us at all, must be situated in terms of the intuitions of time and space remains. Even when we conceive of an object in the most general terms as some existent x we do not conceive of it as a variable to which any value at all can be assigned. We already conceive of it as determinable, distinguishable, with respect to its temporal and spatial location. As Husserl argues, even if we do not know the particularities of the object in question, “it is still grasped as an object, and if it is a sensible given, as a spatial object, and, as an object, as one within the absolutely necessary and most general form ‘object in general’” (Husserl “Experience and Judgment” 39).

Another possible response is one favored by McDowell. We can individuate things indexically such that individuation rests entirely on picking out something demonstratively.

McDowell deploys this argument in two different contexts. The first is in the context of responding to Evans' argument that our experience is too fine-grained to rest entirely on concepts already in our repertoire. Evans writes, "Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminate" (Evans 229)? There will be some colors that we will encounter that we will simply not have the concepts for, as when we are looking at color chips with a wide variety of colors. Against this view, McDowell argues that, "one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as the experience, by uttering a phrase like 'that shade', in which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample" (McDowell "Mind and World" 57).

Crucially, for McDowell employing an indexical cannot be like placing my hand on my head and proclaiming, "I am this tall." Using a deictic expression in this way precludes the possibility of reasoning because it is tautological and thus uninformative. What I am really saying is that I am as tall as I am and this does nothing to provide information concerning the relation the concepts in play have to other concepts. For McDowell, there must be a way of reasoning about the thing deictically individuated or relating it to the other concepts that I hold if it is to count as a conceptual determination. McDowell writes, "what ensures it is a concept – what ensures that thoughts that exploit it have the necessary distance from what would determine them to be true – is that the associated capacity can persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can be used in thoughts about what is by then the past, if only the recent past" (57).

The second context in which McDowell deploys the indexical argument, though less explicitly, is in his response to Dreyfus' claim that McDowell's account of conceptuality leaves no room for absorbed skillful activity. Dreyfus charges that on McDowell's account, we would

have to accept that our experience is always detached and calculated. McDowell writes, “When a rational agent catches a frisbee, she is realizing a concept of a thing to do. In the case of a skilled agent, she does not do that by realizing other concepts of things to do. She does not realize concepts of contributory things to do, in play for her as concepts of what she is to do by virtue of her means-end rationality in a context in which her overarching project is to catch the frisbee. But she does realize a concept of, say, catching *this* (McDowell “Response to Dreyfus” 368 my emphasis).” For McDowell, realizing a concept is just “doing the thing in question” as opposed to thinking about it. Moreover, we do not get the thing done by way of some other activity, such as thinking about it. Rather, we just get on with the action. This suggests that in realizing concepts, objects are present as something like indexically individuated things rather than as precisely conceptualized objects.

In her essay, “‘That’ Response Doesn’t Work” Adina Roskies offers a fairly straightforward response to the first of McDowell’s uses for the indexical. She argues that if we are to account for the acquisition of demonstrative concepts, we have no choice but to conclude that there is nonconceptual content. If the demonstrative concept is to be truly novel, then the, “object, property, or relation being demonstratively identified cannot be one for which we have a concept. So the content upon which attention operates or selects in order to form the demonstrative concept cannot be conceptual” (Roskies 123). She further likens McDowell’s account of demonstrative concepts to drawing in the figures in a coloring book without any lines for guidance and argues that there is no “nonmagical” way to explain how such a thing could be possible. The point is that experience cannot be completely underdetermined prior to our acquisition of demonstrative concepts, otherwise there will be nothing to which those concepts could refer.

I am sympathetic to Roskies' account, but one thing she does not account for is McDowell's emphasis on apperceptive, holistic content. McDowell does not explicitly invoke such content with respect to color, but other claims he makes could plausibly be taken to entail that color is apperceptively conceptual. This would mean that we have a grasp, prior to any experience of a novel color, of the whole of the structure of color experience. Grasping the structure of color experience would not entail having concepts for every possible color innately, but would only entail knowing what it is for something to be a color and knowing what it is for a color to be similar to some colors and different from others. Arguably, without the apperceptive structure of color experience, we would not be able to demonstratively pick something out as a color at all. Nonetheless, I think that Roskies argument applies even at this level. Even if there is apperceptive conceptual color content, it is not as if color experience is demonstratively constituted. As Roskies notes, picking out something demonstratively requires actively and intentionally focusing our attention where initial experiences of color do not rest on this kind of attention. While apperceptive conceptual color content may guide this process, it still requires that there be nonconceptual color content that can be conceptual determined.²⁹

McDowell's use of demonstrative concepts in skilled activities fails for similar reasons. For Kant as much as for Husserl, the question would be how we know the thing to which we refer with our indexical expression is, for instance, an entire object that extends beyond the facet seen (the Frisbee) rather than an object which is nothing beyond what is seen. If our experience of things were completely underdetermined prior to concept application, there would be no guidance as to what should be taken as a whole and what a part in the application of those concepts. For both Kant and Husserl, our grasp of the extension of an object, or the "wholeness"

²⁹ I will discuss color in much greater detail in chapter 5.

of an object with respect to its spatiotemporal position, is governed by our grasp of parts as situated with respect to an indefinitely extending whole, a whole which thus extends beyond what is currently available perceptually. This accounts for our understanding that through we never have the whole object in view, it is a whole object nonetheless. This also accounts for our understanding that surfaces are surfaces of an extended object.

Thus, for Kant experience is neither completely determined by concepts nor completely underdetermined. Nor is experience determined minimally by passively employed concepts. Rather, experience is schematically determined. While, as we shall see, schematic determination requires for Kant input from concepts, schema are ultimately governed by the part – whole relationship which governs the intuitions, not of concepts. One of our tasks going forward will be to show how Husserl develops just this aspect of Kantian philosophy in his theory of types and what role schema play in an account of embodied subjectivity and movement.

As an indication of how Husserl modifies Kantian insight, consider again Husserl's account of the horizon of experience. Of the horizon Husserl writes, "The world consciously 'at hand' for me cannot be exhausted by that co-presence – whether it be intuitively clear or in the dark, distinct or indistinct – surrounding the actual field of perception. Rather, its fixed order of being is such that it extends into the unlimited" (Husserl "Ideas I" 52). Unless the entirety of the possibilities for perception is to be contained in a single gaze and its periphery, a single foreground and its background, the background must always be determinable as a foreground with an accompanying background. The horizon thus runs under each gaze, each moment of perceptual focus, assuring the possibility for further perceptual encounters. Thus, the horizon is, in the most basic terms, a system of indications which extends beyond any foreground and

background pairing. Husserl calls the whole which precedes all parts (or all nested gestalts) is the world; the world is the horizon of all horizons.

The (Kantian) Argument Against the Pervasiveness of Concepts

We have seen that Kant's key insights concerning the distinction between intuition and concepts are concerned are plausible even if we do not accept all of his theoretical presuppositions. Because this distinction relies in part on Kant's critiques of Leibniz, I think his insights here also have a life beyond the critique. Now, it is true that in taking aim at Leibniz, Kant is taking aim at what he sees as a flawed metaphysical and epistemological account. But Kant's insights concerning the impossibility of accounting for our engagement with things in the world purely in terms of concepts apply as *reductio* arguments to any account that would attempt to do so. Kant's critique of Leibniz in terms of identity and difference applies fairly straightforwardly to any account which takes the view that objects are individuated purely by the properties concepts pick out.

For instance, identifying one's position egocentrically by means of concepts will not work because the concept will apply equally to any other subject, or any other thing with the same relevant properties, which is oriented in the same way with respect to an identical object. If we accept that concepts are the constituents of beliefs, then John Perry's insights concerning what he calls "locating beliefs" also apply here. True, Perry's immediate concerns in his essay, "The Essential Indexical" are clearly different from Kant's. Nevertheless, I think that both

Leibniz and the project of reducing indexicals to propositions run into problems because identification by way of concepts *indifferently* picks out the properties of those objects. Perry's solution is not, however, to accept anything like intuition. Even so, this does not mean such a solution cannot be constructed with the aid of his insights.

Locating beliefs are about where one is, when one is, and who one is. The gist of Perry's argument is that none of these things can be determined by beliefs about some proposition or other because what I learn about myself when I locate myself cannot be uniquely specified propositionally. This applies whether we view the propositions believed as object involving, as attributing properties directly to objects, or as establishing conditions objects must satisfy. Perry asks us to consider a few examples to make things clear, but we will discuss the first two because I think these are sufficient to make the point. First, imagine that while walking through the supermarket John finds a trail of sugar winding through the store. John thus acquires the belief that the shopper with the torn sack is making the mess and rushes to catch up only to realize that *he* is the one making the mess. This realization counts as the acquisition of a new belief. Second, imagine a professor who has a meeting at noon. Noon arrives, but the professor does not move. Looking at the time, the professor suddenly rushes out. The professor has acquired a new belief, namely that, "the meeting starts *now*." On an initial run through these scenarios, it might seem that the problem is easy enough to solve. John first believes that there is someone out there with the property of being a shopper with a ripped bag of sugar and the property of making a mess. He does not believe John has the property of making a mess. Yet, he comes to believe that John has the property of being a shopper with a ripped bag of sugar and draws the conclusion that John must also have the property of making a mess. Thus, the difference would

seem to be between a belief in a general proposition about some shopper and belief in a singular proposition about John in particular.

Perry argues that this will not work because singular propositions do not actually specify what is learned when we acquire a locating belief. We can see this clearly in the case of the tardy professor. Here, John first believes that noon has the property of being the time when the meeting starts and this is already a singular proposition. So the question is, what other singular proposition could John possibly believe that would explain his sudden realization that the meeting starts *now*? The problem is that any other singular proposition will be equivalent, will just pick out, for instance, Noon on December 28th, 2014. Thus, any belief John holds involving an appropriate singular proposition about the time of the meeting will not explain his acquisition of the belief that the meeting starts *now*, will not explain why his behavior suddenly changes.

Perry further develops his argument in terms of an analysis of *de dicto* and *de re* beliefs. De dicto beliefs are beliefs involving propositions that establish conditions that an object must satisfy to be the object a belief is about. Thus, if I believe that the man in the park is drinking whiskey, I am picking out an object that satisfies the conditions of being a man in the park and drinking whiskey. I do not thereby believe that Jim's cousin is in the park drinking whiskey even if it is in fact Jim's cousin. The latter belief is not one that could be attributed to me because I do not take the object in question to satisfy the condition of being Jim's cousin. Substituting expressions which refer to the same object thus fail in de dicto belief ascription. De re beliefs are beliefs about an object. Here, substitution in belief ascriptions works because expressions are used referentially. Thus, if someone ascribes the de re belief to me that I believe that Jim's cousin is drinking whiskey in the park, what is being ascribed to me is a belief about

that very person in the park and not something more specific about other properties I might take the object to possess.

What the analysis of de dicto beliefs suggests is that just because John believes that the shopper with the ripped bag is making a mess and that John is the shopper with the ripped bag making the mess, it does not follow that John believes that *he* is making the mess. Logically, these cannot be treated as equivalent. More concretely, it may be that John has had a temporary bout of amnesia or absent mindedly assents to the proposition that John is making a mess while distracted by something else. Accounting for John's sudden belief that he is making a mess in terms of De Re beliefs, beliefs in which he himself figures, also fails. For instance, John might see live security footage on a screen in front of him which shows a man from behind who is spilling sugar as he goes. He will then acquire a belief that *that very man* is spilling sugar without realizing that he is that man.

With respect to the analysis I have been developing the failure of de dicto beliefs can be cashed out in the claim that conceiving of ourselves under a concept (or group of concepts) is just to conceive of ourselves as one thing among others that might fall under that concept and as different from other things falling under other concepts. We are thus alienated from ourselves when we conceive of ourselves in this way. We conceive of ourselves as something other than the agents we experience ourselves as being and miss the significance things have from that perspective. We also miss precisely what is significant about egocentric space when we conceive of it conceptually; egocentric space is significant with respect to our action, with respect to how we fill out the space around us in, for instance, looking, grasping, moving, and touching.

De Re beliefs are similarly indifferent. One might claim that the important thing about concepts is just that they pick out objects themselves from among others. This means that anytime I pick myself out by way of concepts, I am explicitly referring to myself whether I am aware of this or not. One consequence of this is that there would be no meaningful difference between a case in which, walking down the aisle at the super market, I notice that I am to the right of (distinguished in position from) the produce and a case in which I notice that the man on the security monitor ahead, a man captured only from behind, is also to the right of the produce when, unbeknownst to me, I am that man. In each case the same object is distinguished from others and in this case with respect to the very same properties. Egocentric space, with its emphasis on embodied agency, gives us a way to distinguish between these two cases.³⁰ Egocentric space, as I shall argue, rests in turn on the action and perception undertaken within a horizon that forms the apperceptive or intuitive content of any of our actions.

Perry, however, draws a quite different conclusion from his consideration of these cases. He argues that what these cases show is that indexical expressions (i.e. this, that, I, and now) cannot be reduced to propositions. The further proof for this is that indexical expressions have a shifting truth value depending on when, where, and by who they are uttered whereas propositions have an absolute truth value. Propositions are either true or false. One conclusion to be drawn is that the meaning unique to indexical expressions is carried by something else than the proposition expressed. Perry argues just this. He claims that the meaning unique to indexical expressions is carried by ones *belief state* rather than the *proposition believed*. The belief state is constituted by the acceptance of a sentence, for instance the sentence, “I am making a mess.” This sentence has an irreducibly indexical element, but since it is not technically a proposition

³⁰ Egocentric space and embodied agency require further discussion, but because my aim here is to point out the importance of Kant’s worries beyond the Kantian system, I am postponing that discussion until chapters 4 and 6.

we need not worry about how to reduce the indexical element. The actual propositions believed will be different for whoever utters an indexical expression, but the belief state will be the same. John will come to believe that John is the one making a mess while I will come to believe that Emiliano is making a mess, but each of us will be in the same belief state. We will each accept the sentence, “I am making a mess.” So it is not what John believes that changes when he realizes that he makes the mess, it is how he believes it, his differing belief states, that makes the difference.

In *The Paradox of Self Consciousness*, Jose Luis Bermudez argues against this conclusion. Bermudez in fact points to one of the general problems of indexical expressions we have already discussed as the reason why Perry’s solution will not work. Perry essentially claims that in order to think “I” thoughts one must master the semantics of the first person pronoun. The central question for Bermudez is how we can account for the mastery of the semantics of the first person pronoun in a noncircular way. If we think that self-consciousness is impossible without the ability to think “I thoughts” we will have to assume that our mastery of the first person pronoun happens without our first being aware of ourselves. If this is the case, to what can the first person pronoun refer such that we can master its proper use? Nothing, it seems. Roskies’ critique of McDowell’s account of demonstrative concepts parallels this argument. Bermudez goes on to argue that a noncircular account is possible if we reject the idea that thought is best accounted for in terms of linguistic mastery and develop an account of how the self is presented in embodied cognition and egocentric space. Though his account of egocentric space is slightly different from the one I will develop, I accept his conclusion here. I will postpone a full discussion of egocentric space until a later chapter.

As to Kant's critique of Leibniz in terms of agreement and conflict, I have already offered an example of how this applies beyond the confines of the Kantian project in terms of spatial location. Again, there is no conflict in thinking of my house as both "halfway down the street on the left" and "halfway down the street on the right", but these two ways of thinking about the position of my house may be in actual conflict if, for instance, I am actually approaching the house from a direction that will place it on the left.

Kant's concerns with Leibniz's discussion of inner and outer, matter and form, are in many ways an extension of the distinction between concepts and intuitions we find in the aesthetic. As to the inner – outer distinction, for Leibniz there is no difference between the essential features an object has in itself and the conceptual determination of that object. Here again we can bracket Leibniz's metaphysical picture and consider Kant's critique in a broader context. Underlying Leibniz's view is the idea that what is essential to being an object of a certain kind are those features which an object possesses apart from its actual or possible relations to other things. Concepts are well suited to pick out these features precisely because concepts work by relations of subordination that are indifferent to spatio-temporal relations. In fact, and perhaps more importantly, to find what is essential to an object is already to disregard its particular, accidental properties, of which its spatio-temporal location and relation to other objects is one; it is already to transform its essential features into something universal. Thus, the ultimate goal is categorical determination (an account of the "inner" features of an object which hold universally) as opposed to hypothetical determination (an account of the features which hold only under certain "outer" conditions).

In its most extreme form, this view would entail that each really existing thing is distinguishable *in itself* (and not with respect to similarities or differences from other things

which are accidental features), or is a monad completely closed off from other things. The impulse to attempt to intellectualize time and space remain here, but pursuing this path would simply run us into the various problems already noted in the aesthetic and in Kant's other responses to Leibniz. In a more modest form, if we understand conceptual relations of subordination as constituting descriptions of objects which, in turn, make it possible to recognize objects, concepts acquire a *de facto* universality rather than a *de jure* universality rooted in the essence of objects. As Cristina LaFont puts it: "On this view, the act of referring is made possible by a linguistic meaning that situates the referent in the conceptual scheme inherent in a given language, and to that extent establishes what the entity is" (LaFont 231). Meaning thus establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying a referent. The problem is that if I have no way of identifying objects but discursively through concepts (or descriptions), then I will not be able to refer to those objects in common with anyone who has even slightly different concepts of those objects. If someone identifies an object through a concept which gathers up more or less "marks" than my concept, then technically that person refers to a different object.

LaFont writes,

If sets of descriptions that constitute the meaning of the terms used by the speaker and hearer do not coincide (because of differences in their 'background knowledge'), they *cannot refer to the same thing*. If the descriptions that, for the speaker, constitute the meaning of the definite description "the new car of Peter" and enable her to identify the referent (e.g., the car that Peter drove yesterday, that is yellow and has five doors, etc.) do not coincide with the descriptions that the hearer associates with that description (e.g., the car that Peter bought in France, that is blue and has four doors, etc.), speaker and hearer are certainly not talking about the 'same thing' (233).

This would preclude the possibility of both disagreement and working toward agreement about something in the world.

One consequence of this would be monadic speech communities in which I can only fully communicate with those who already share the same stock of concepts as I possess, who, *de facto*, already view objects as determined by the same concepts as I hold. LaFont's solution is to argue that expressions can have a pragmatic, referential use that is not governed by the semantics of the sentence. That is, we can refer to objects in the world using a linguistic expression without attributing any properties to the object. Thus, my speech partner who believes that Peter's new car is navy blue can still take me to be attempting to refer to Peter's car even if I talk about Peter's new teal car. This might be true, but it leaves us without an account of how Peter's car shows up as an object in the first place, which was just what the theory of meaning LaFont dismisses was supposed to explain.

Adding to this worry is the fact that the referential use of linguistic expressions looks a whole lot like the speaker reduces the expression to an indexical. It then also relies on the hearer reinterpreting the expression as an indexical expression, as taking the whole thing to amount to, for instance, "*That* car of Peter's." Indexicals typically require the presence of an object, so where the object is absent it operates something like a deferred indexical expression, an expression suggesting that were we both in the presence of the car we would be able to point it out in common. This allows the indexical concept tokened to supersede the concepts which constitute the description. As we have already seen, deferring to linguistic mastery of this kind to explain the possibility of referring to or even thinking about an object leaves us without an account of how things initially arise as objects of thought and reference. Such accounts thus assume possession of the concept in question, even if the concept is indexical.³¹ So, in the

³¹ Kant addresses this problem by arguing that the categories are originally acquired rather than innate. I will discuss this more in the pages to come.

absence of pre-established harmony between speech communities, there is a need for something beyond concepts to ground agreement, disagreement, and concept possession.

Gareth Evans works in this direction in discussing how things are located with respect to egocentric space. Assuming healthy sense organs and no obstructions in the medium of sound, Evan's argues that if locating, say, a loud and clear sound as above and to the right of me were the conclusion of a process of reasoning, then it would be possible that someone else may reason differently and locate the sound as in a completely different position. The fact that this does not happen suggests parallel grasp of a phenomenon as perceptible at a particular location (more or less precise depending on the quality of the phenomenon) relative to one's body and with respect to a common sense modality. Furthermore, it suggests a parallel grasp of the phenomenon as resulting from a cause which can be located in a region of a common space and which is itself perceptible (observable) with respect to at least one sense modality shared in common with another. Given this, we can agree or disagree when speculating about what has caused the sound, use different concepts to pick out the sound, or develop differing concepts to account for how this sound relates to other sounds and our general knowledge of sound.³²

Briefly, as for Leibniz's view of space and time as forms, it is not sufficient to think of space and time as patterns which either emerge from things or determine their order. The former misses the relation between part and whole with respect to the intuitions while the latter misses the horizontal nature of both space and time.

Thus, even outside of the particular framework in which Kant argues for a division of labor between concepts and intuitions, the reasons he offers are good ones and can be applied to

³² This account requires some further development, especially with respect to the relation between perception, action, and the body, but I leave this for a later chapter.

contemporary discussions concerning nonconceptual content. Even if Kant does not anticipate the particular form analyses of these issues take in the contemporary literature, he does capture the general forms of the problems that arise when we take concepts to determine experience at every level. This, however, does not yet count as a response to McDowell's primary concern with such a view.

Husserlian Distinctions and Kantian Methods

We have been working to maintain a division in cognition that McDowell would rather have done with. The question that remains to be answered is: Given the stark division between concepts and intuitions, how are they related? Have we not merely (perhaps needlessly) created a chasm across which no bridge can be built? In order to begin working toward an answer to this question, I would like to lay out, fairly schematically, Husserl's, Kant's, and McDowell's characterizations of and solutions to this problem. The central thread of the analysis here will be provided by Husserl. I will show that Husserl's critique of his own earlier work in transcendental phenomenology can be applied to both McDowell and Kant. Husserl discussed his own work in transcendental philosophy in terms of two approaches, a static and a genetic approach. Within the static approach, Husserl distinguished (somewhat inconsistently) between what we can call a categorial account, which analyzes the conditions of the possibility of intentional objects, and a constitutive account, which analyzes the conditions of the possibility of

interrelations between different kinds of intentional experience.³³ I think that Kant employs something like a static approach in attempting to bring concepts and intuitions together and that we can categorize the B version of the deduction as a categorial approach and the schematism as a constitutive approach. The constitutive approach of both Husserl and Kant respond to important questions McDowell does not consider. In fact, I think that McDowell maintains something like a categorial approach even though his theoretical framework is different from Husserl's. Here, I will focus on the B deduction and discuss Kant's constitutive approach in the next chapter. Kant's constitutive account deserves special attention because here Kant provides a fairly detailed analysis of one of McDowell's key claims, namely that spontaneity is already at work in receptivity. It will also provide insights crucial to developing an account of nonconceptual apperceptive content.

Ultimately, not even the constitutive accounts of Husserl and Kant are enough to close the gap created in a Kantian approach to transcendental philosophy. Husserl later realizes that the only way this can be done is through a genetic phenomenology which, as the name suggests, focuses on the genesis of intentional structures. I will eventually argue that a key aspect of the genetic approach is epistemic neutrality.

A full comparison of Kantian and Husserlian transcendental philosophy would take us far afield, but for our purposes it suffices to note the major difference between them with respect to the focus of their transcendental inquiries. In the *Critique* Kant is primarily concerned with the conditions of possibility of objects of knowledge. Husserl, on the other hand, is concerned with the conditions of possibility of any intentional experience of objects. In *Ideas I* he focuses on perception as the foundation for all possible intentional relations to objects and catalogues its

³³ See *The Other Husserl*, especially pgs. 170 – 173.

structure. The key problem with this approach is that it does not capture the dynamic nature of perception and for the most part simply assumes that the elements of perception that have been catalogued must simply come together if experience of the sort we enjoy is to be possible.

Husserl takes the basic structure of all intentionality to be defined by the correlation between noesis and noema. In the case of perception, perception is categorized as a particular kind of act, or a particular way of determining a noematic core. The noematic core, for its part, consists of a determinable object, *x*, and a noematic sense which provides determinations for the object, *x*. There are two important things to note about this structure where perception is concerned. First, it is an abstraction from actual perception. It gives us only the very basic structure of perception without describing what happens as we actually encounter objects. Secondly, the noematic sense is ideal and does not depend in any way upon our actual encounters with the world. Husserl's way of putting this is rooted in the phenomenological method he employs in *Ideas*.

If we are working from a phenomenological standpoint in which we are concerned with giving an account of consciousness on its own terms, our focus will be solely on the "inherent" moments of the phenomena that constitute our consciousness of this or that object. For instance, consciousness of a tree does not entail that the tree itself is inherent in my consciousness. It does, however, for the Husserl of this period, entail that the tree *as* perceived is inherent in our consciousness of the tree. He writes, "Now, inherent too precisely in perception is this: that it has its noematic sense, its 'perceived as perceived,' 'this blossoming tree there, in space'" (Husserl "Ideas I" 220). It is the noematic sense of an object that determines the "perceived as perceived."

The consideration of actual cases of perception brings with it the problem of how noematic sense is fulfilled or satisfied given that determinable objects can appear in a variety of ways. A large part of this problem is the question of where sensation fits into the picture. Because noematic sense is ideal, it is not inherent *in the process of perception*. As Kant also notes, perception unfolds according to a contingent order. For instance, the color of a tree trunk is, with respect to its noematic sense, a single, identical, unchanged, and thus ideal element. Yet, in actual perception the color of the trunk appears to change as I change my position relative to it and as lighting conditions change. Husserl explains that, “we can find in [the process of perception] ‘something like color:’ namely, the ‘sensed color,’ that hyletic moment of the concrete mental process by which the noematic, or ‘objective,’ color is ‘adumbrated’” (237).

The major problem is that Husserl’s solution for reconciling the hyletic moment with the ideal noematic element of consciousness appears ad hoc. Husserl aims to account for our unified consciousness of the world and this can be done most cleanly by accounting for it in terms of ideal and unchanging elements. There is, in addition, straightforward phenomenological evidence that we at least sometimes approach objects as the “same” or “self- identical.” This leaves the question of what is to be done with the contingent, non-ideal, hyletic aspect of consciousness. In accord with his overall aims, Husserl accounts for it as subservient to the ideal aspects of consciousness and as in no way contributing to the constitution of these ideal elements. This is made all the easier within the confines of his “static” account in which elements of consciousness are catalogued with respect to the role they must play to secure a unified experience of the world.

Because this account gives the impression that we need not worry about the hyletic component once we have assigned it its proper role, it is difficult to say what feature of hyletic

data makes it suited to “adumbrate” an ideal element. Must not the data already have some unique and coherent (ideal?) order of its own if it is to “adumbrate” one ideal noematic sense over another? If this is the case, we need an account of a lower level of consciousness where this coherent order is constituted. We would also then need an account of how this constitution takes place and how this lower level of consciousness is related to the level of consciousness where we encounter things as the same and self-identical.

The evolution of Husserl’s thought is complex, but it suffices to say here that Husserl eventually comes around to this way of thinking in his account of active and passive synthesis. Husserl moves, “to a constitutive characterization, to descriptions of all the modal transformations in retentions, recollections, expectations, etc., and thereby follow a principle systematically ordering the apperceptions, one that cuts across the sorting of apperceptions according to the most general genera of objects (regions of objects actually or possibly existing)” (Husserl “Analyses” 340).³⁴

Thus, Husserl moves from a conception of transcendental philosophy which only seeks to prove that something must be the case if experience is to be possible to a conception of transcendental philosophy which seeks to show how the constituents of experience thus uncovered must be related if experience is to be possible. This involves a reexamination of the hyletic component and results in Husserl placing it on noematic side of things. Husserl’s reexamination also reveals the central role hyletic data plays in passive synthesis and the relation between passive and active synthesis. I will be discussing this further in chapters 4, 5, and 6,

³⁴ Welton notes that though Husserl suggests that a constitutive account should be an account that includes all the various kinds of intentionality and their interconnections, Husserl only gives an account of perception and the transformations there. These transformations include those from certain to doubtful, affirmative to negative, and actual to possible.

eventually arguing that the analysis of passive synthesis can only be completed in an account of embodied subjectivity.

Returning now to Kant, on his account we relate to objects of knowledge in two different ways, as appearance and as phenomenon. The former concerns the manifold of sensibility as we are receptive to it and in its readiness to be brought under the categories of the understanding. The latter are objects of knowledge thought under the categories. Just as Husserl must bring the hyletic and noematic elements of perception to apperceptive unity in order to account for experience, Kant must bring the elements constituting appearance as well as those constituting phenomenon to apperceptive unity in order to account for possible objects of knowledge. Kant's attempts to do this will be the focus of the pages to come, but roughly he approaches the problem in two complimentary ways. We must first note that appearances are made possible by intuition and if intuition is to play a role in the constitution of objects knowledge, it must be grasped as intuition, it must be grasped with respect to the role it plays. That is, intuition must be brought under the "I think," otherwise intuition can play no role which we can apprehend in the constitution of objects of knowledge. If, in turn, we had no inkling of the role intuition plays with respect to situating objects in time and space, then we would be limited to approaching objects of knowledge purely conceptually. We would thus fall into some form of Leibnizianism, the problems of which we have already enumerated.

Kant's first attempt at bringing intuition under the "I think" comes in the transcendental deduction. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant has already made it clear that the "I think" is to be identified with the categories understood as discursive functions and the "I think" is just discursive functionality understood generically. Thus, if the intuitions are to be brought under the "I think" they must be brought under the categories of the understanding. In the first part of

the deduction, Kant does this by showing how the categories relate to the manifold of intuition through the imagination. Imagination is, “the faculty for representing an object even **without its presence** in intuition” (B 151). The manifold of intuition (not to be confused with the manifold of sensibility) is the infinite span, the perpetual succession of parts, of both time and space. We must grasp this manifold through imagination because the infinite span of space and time can never be made wholly present. For these same reasons we cannot really even form an image of the infinite span. We can, however, interpret the infinite span of time through an, “external figurative representation” (B 154). Kant’s specific example of such a figurative representation is drawing a straight line to represent time. Yet, it is not so much the line as a figure that is important as it is that in drawing the line we, “[attend] merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine inner sense, and thereby [attend] to the succession of this determination in inner sense” (B154). Thus, as much as Kant is fixated on the figure of a line as a figurative representation of time, I think that technically any figurative analogue which would allow us to attend to the indefinite progression of the successive determination of inner sense will do.³⁵

This leaves space unaccounted for, but time is the primary intuition insofar as regions of space cannot be synthesized (cognized as wholes) without synthesizing each of the moments in which parts of that space are determined as parts of a whole. In any case, the crucial step here is that because attending to successive determination requires synthesis, it also necessarily requires the “I think” and thus also the categories of the understanding. Thus, the operation of imagination must stand under the categories.

³⁵ If this is right, then this is a way to address the problem Allison notes with Kant’s attachment to the drawing of a line as an interpretation of time. Interpretations require the possibility of alternatives. If a line were the only way of representing time, it would not be an interpretation but merely *the* way to represent time. This, in turn, would be problematic because it would tend to make time look like an object which can be represented.

Though this first part of the deduction contains the key argument where objects of knowledge are concerned, one aspect of cognition has yet to be brought under the unity of apperception. We do not yet have an account of how perception figures in cognition. Objects judged as objects of knowledge are comprehended universally in terms of their necessary features. Perceived objects, on the other hand, are apprehended with respect to contingent features under particular conditions. For instance, for some individual the appearance of one facet of an object (i.e. the front of a house) might happen to follow the appearance of another (i.e. the side of the house), but this does not mean that it is necessary that the appearance of one facet follow the other. Thus, the question is how can an account that is primarily geared toward the conditions of possibility of objects of knowledge also account for objects of perception? What is the relationship between necessity and contingency here?

Kant answers through an argument which works in part by establishing a transitive relationship between elements of cognition he has already analyzed. He has already done the work to show that the “I think” is to be identified with discursive functionality which is identified, as genus to species, with the discursive functions of the categories. These discursive functions are, in turn, identified with synthesis, or the gathering together and maintenance of “parts” as parts of a “series” or whole bound together by rules. In judgments, for instance, concepts are bound together in relations of subordination which are governed by rules provided by the concept in predicate position. If Kant is right, it follows that anything requiring synthesis will also require the operation of the “I think” and so also the categories of the understanding. Thus, though *what* is perceived may be a matter of contingency, *how* the thing perceived is apprehended is not a matter of contingency for Kant because it requires synthesis and thus the categories. Without synthesis, there would be no way for us to hold the thing perceived together

as a whole as we do. In particular, perception requires the syntheses which are achieved with respect to the intuitions.

Kant has already argued in the sections preceding the second portion of the B deduction that the intuitions are not mere forms, but contain a manifold of their own. This manifold is unified *a priori* through an interpretive representation of the infinite span of time. Kant writes, “Thus even **unity of the synthesis** of the manifold, outside or within us, hence also a **combination** with which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time must agree, is already given *a priori*, along with (not in) these intuitions, as condition of the synthesis of all apprehension” (B 161). Kant is not clear here as to what precisely apprehension involves and the A deduction offers a better picture of what synthesis is and why it is required. Nonetheless, Kant offers us enough here to fill in the account.

As is a familiar point by now, in perception we only ever really have facets of objects, never the whole. So the question is, how do we grasp these facets as parts of a unified whole? The answer is, again, that objects of perception are situated in time and space and as such are apprehended in agreement with the syntheses of time and space. What this means more concretely is that though objects are only, for instance, seen from a particular perspective we apprehend the facet we see as part of an extended whole which persists through time. The object is “synthesized” only in the sense that in each moment I engage the object I am anticipating its further facets (grasping it as an extended thing whose exploration entails the possibility of an ongoing experience of it) and retaining experience of the facets I have already perceived as parts of the whole I anticipate in each moment. Such anticipation and retention ultimately rests on the presupposition of a unified time and space within which objects are situated or a stable setting which secures the possibility of ongoing and repeatable experiences of the object. From the first

part of the deduction, we know that this unification is an achievement of concepts operating through the imagination. Kant writes, “But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given **intuition in general** in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to our **sensible intuition**” (B 161). Thus, perception must stand under the categories and fall within the apperceptive unity of the “I think.”

There are two crucial things to emphasize here regarding the relationship between concepts and perception with respect to the reach of the transitive feature of Kant’s argument. First, as is argued in the aesthetic, the contents of time and space are not conceptual and are not subordinated to concepts as subjects are to predicates. This is why the categories relate to the intuitions through the imagination and interpretation. Secondly, objects perceived are not directly subordinated to the categories of the understanding. Rather, the possibility of the constitution of objects (the possibility of perceived objects being experienced as wholes) is grounded in the *a priori* interpretive relation of the categories to intuition. Kant writes,

Thus, if e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the **necessary unity** of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. This very same synthetic activity, however, if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition in general, i.e., the category of **quantity**, with which that synthesis of apprehension, i.e., the perception, must therefore be in thoroughgoing agreement” (B 162).

Intuitions are interpreted as homogeneous under the category of quantity and whatever we perceive must agree with this interpretation insofar as it is situated in time and space. This does not mean that space and time are grasped *a priori* in terms of units like minutes, hours, inches, or miles. Rather, the homogeneity of space and time, which for Kant is constituted by the successive determination of time (inner sense), makes their measurement in terms of such units possible. What all this means with respect to the transitive feature of Kant’s argument is

that though the intuitions and perception are brought under the categories, this is not done discursively. Instead, the discursive rule that would usually operate to subordinate one concept to another operates as an interpretive principle or rule of apprehension. Thus, the principles governing the organization of perceptions are nonconceptual (non-discursive) and the intuitions remain distinct from the categories. Viewed in this way, the first step of the deduction shows us how it is possible for the intuitions to be brought under the categories and thus the unity of apperception while the second step explains how perception is related to the source of synthesis.

This attempt at drawing together the various elements of cognition is vulnerable to three major critiques that are important for our current discussion. First, because apperceptive unity is extended to each element of cognition through the identification of the “I think” with the function of concepts, if this identification fails to hold at any level (at the level of subordination, figurative synthesis, or apprehension) then the deduction fails. The suspect nature of *a priori* categories thus already casts doubt on the deduction. Moreover, if it can be argued that subordination, figurative synthesis, or apprehension can proceed without apperceptive unity then the deduction fails. At the very least, we need a much more precise account of synthesis in particular if we are to see exactly how the “I think” is involved at the levels of cognition which purportedly require it. This chain of identification is also problematic for anyone wishing to maintain a transcendental approach of a roughly Kantian sort while denying *a priori* categories. The question becomes, in virtue of what are the various elements of cognition brought under apperceptive unity, if at all.

Secondly, there is not yet a constitutive account of the relation between the various levels of cognition. If successful, the deduction would only really show *that* the intuitions and perception must fall under apperceptive unity and reveal the nature of the relations involved

(interpretation via the imagination and apprehension in accord with this interpretation). This is not yet an answer to the question of what makes it possible for a subject to transform its relation to an object of cognition. There is no account of the *processes* which govern the *transformation* of the cognition of appearances into the apprehension of objects and of the apprehension of objects into judgments about objects of knowledge. Beyond a few sparse examples, we do not yet know precisely *how* spontaneity is involved in receptivity such that what appears is ready for the categories. An additional difficulty here is that any such account of these transformations must remain *a priori* rather than empirical. As I will discuss in greater detail in a moment, in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Longuenesse makes it clear that the schematism is Kant's way of attempting an answer to the latter of these difficulties. Thus, on Longuenesse's account, Kant already has a constitutive account of experience, though not one founded on intentional categories.

Finally, the deduction does not offer an account of how objects of knowledge are anticipated in the imagination. Such an account is important for independent reasons which I will discuss in a moment, but it is at the very least important to the consistency of the *Critique*. Kant claims that the argument of the second part of the deduction grounds, "the possibility of cognizing *a priori* **through categories** whatever objects may come before our senses...as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making the latter possible" (B159 – 60). As I will discuss in greater detail, the schematism also addresses the anticipatory function of the imagination.

One of the virtues of McDowell's account in *Mind and World*, is that it contains the resources to address the loss of *a priori* categories. McDowell works at a kind of transcendental argument to provide a ground for the sphere on our mental life. We know for sure that we do

have a rich mental life and we can even analyze its constitutive elements. We also know that there are constraints on this mental life, constraints that appear on our mental life as transcending that life, as coming from beyond that life. Because reductionist views cannot help us due to the impossibility of generating the content of intentional states from material that is by definition non-intentional, it follows that the constraints placed on our mental life must be conceptual, yet not intentionally implemented. If the latter were the case, we would fall into an untenable idealism. Thus, certain concepts must be at work *passively* in receptivity. All concepts, at whatever level, are open to rational scrutiny. Nonetheless, those that have the most minimal linkages to higher order rational processes and which are passively employed, such as color and shape, are not likely to be discarded or replaced once scrutinized. It would be irrational, from the perspective of McDowell's work, to deny that the concepts of edge and surface are operative when we perceive color, but maybe the important point is that this only becomes obvious on the basis of rational scrutiny.

Thus, McDowell identifies the sphere of the mental with our ability to reason with respect to all (what are for Kant empirical) concepts rather than a special set of *a priori* concepts. It follows that whatever is to be counted as a feature of the mental sphere, whatever can possibly be something that is meaningful *for me*, must fall within the space of reasons. That is, if something is to be meaningful *for me*, it must be either already subordinated to at least one of the concepts I possess (as in the case of passively applied concepts) or something that can be subordinated to one of the concepts I possess. As argued above, it seems consistent with McDowell's view that there would also be apperceptive conceptual content which facilitates the formation of new concepts. In any case, if I am a fully mature thinker, I must be able to relate whatever concepts I possess to others via intentionally employed rules which are constitutive of

what it is to reason. In this respect, the “I think” assures the continuity of experience in much the same way as it does for Husserl or Kant, only contra Kant and early Husserl, McDowell conceives of the “I think” in terms of an empirical subject of a particular sort.

McDowell compliments this basic scheme with an Aristotelian view of learning and agency (subjectivity) whereby judgment and deliberation are developed as “second nature.” Conceiving of the subject in terms of “second nature” allows McDowell to claim that the subject is natural (not comprised of a distinct mental substance), but distinct in important ways from other natural objects. In particular, we have the capacity to cultivate the know-how required to actively learn, develop, and apply concepts as well as to recognize and supply reasons. This also means that intentionally applying the rules of reason need not require a working philosophical theory of those rules or of concepts.

The first thing to note here is that McDowell’s account is static and categorial. McDowell focuses on three basic levels of cognition (spontaneity, perception, and receptivity) and argues that the condition for the possibility of experience (the mental sphere) is that these levels be related by the capacity to reason/logical relations between concepts. The capacity to reason is, in turn, identified with the subject, albeit an empirical and properly habituated subject. Yet, even though McDowell’s account provides a way of maintaining a broadly Kantian framework while accommodating suspicions concerning *a priori* categories, McDowell fails to recognize two important problems which Kant attempts to address in the deduction and the schematism.

First, McDowell does not attend to what perception actually entails and thus misses important questions about how the features of perceptual objects are organized. McDowell wishes to resist an account of perception which rests on sense data or the “myth of the given.”

McDowell rightly sees a problem with the idea that data which is given as isolated units can: 1.) be brought together into wholes and 2.) provide any clue as to its source. The former is problematic because if sense data is really composed of isolated units, then there would be nothing in those units to suggest how they should be brought together. The latter is problematic because there is no way to determine whether and how the data is manipulated or modified in the medium through which it comes to us. McDowell seems to believe that the only way to avoid this problematic starting point is with a conceptual holism in which there is no possibility for isolated data. Yet, on Kant's account intuitions are holistically structured and not conceptual. More importantly, and as we have discussed, intuitions can account for a feature of our cognition of perceived objects which concepts cannot, namely our apprehension of objects as spatiotemporally situated.

In the second part of the B deduction Kant addresses the problem of how perception relates to the holistic structure of the intuitions yet still falls under the unity of apperception. Kant's answer is that perception is organized in accord with the holistic structure of time and space through interpretive principles that are not principles of subordination. For Kant, the relation of part to whole with respect to the intuitions is not and cannot be a relation of subordination. This means that we cannot capture what is special about intuition by subordinating the concept of part to the concept of whole; we can only describe it or indicate it by using discursive rules interpretively. Our apprehension of particular objects of perception ultimately rests on our capacity to apprehend the extension and duration of any given perceived object as situated within a field, a field which is an infinitely progressing whole logically preceding its parts. While it is true that Kant's account of the intuitions is tethered to a

Newtonian view of the world, we have already discussed how Kant's insights here have life beyond his critical project.

Secondly, because McDowell's account is categorial rather than constitutive, we have no account of precisely how spontaneity is involved in receptivity. By ignoring the intuitions, McDowell frees himself from confronting the issue of how concepts relate to the intuitions and can thus account for all cognition in terms of a common currency of reasons/concepts. Even so, it is phenomenologically evident that attending to something merely perceptually is different from reasoning about something. What, then, is the condition for the possibility of my moving from attending to something perceptually to my reasoning about it? McDowell's account leaves other questions unanswered as well. For instance, if spontaneity is already involved in receptivity how does it function so as to yield something that is already suited to the space of reasons? And how are the concepts passively at work in receptivity applied? What, if anything, are they applied to? As to these latter two questions, it is difficult to see how to give an answer that is not viciously circular if we stick to McDowell's account (we apply the concept of surface to surfaces which we only know as such because they already fall under the concept of surface.) As we shall see, Kant addresses all of these questions in the schematism and his claim that the categories are original acquisitions.

Indeed, Longuenesse focuses on just these facets of the critical project in her development of a detailed account of what it could mean to say that spontaneity is already at work in receptivity.³⁶ Briefly, for Longuenesse spontaneity is involved in receptivity through a capacity to compare and due to the force exerted by the *vermogen zu urteilen* in the form of a

³⁶ Longuenesse's account of Kant, as with most others, is controversial in some of its details. Nevertheless, I think it is the most developed attempt at showing how spontaneity might be involved in receptivity as McDowell claims it must be.

striving toward judgment. This is a constitutive account because Longuenesse attempts to show how Kant accounts for the conditions of possibility for transformations pertaining to intuition, perception, and the categories. On Longuenesse's account, the *vermogen zu urteilen* is at work at each level of cognition both in the form of a striving to judge and in the form of comparisons which organize the material of each level of cognition in such a way that it is already fit for appropriation by the next level of cognition. The final discovery of comparison is the condition for its own possibility, namely the "I think." We arrive at this unity of apperception through comparing the discursive functions of the categories and determining what is identical in them. I think it will be helpful for the present discussion to take a closer look at synthesis, the schematism, and Longuenesse's account of judgment. This is for five reasons.

First, it will highlight the importance of the capacity to anticipate objects of consciousness for cognition. This, I believe, is essentially the role that passively applied concepts play for McDowell, but for reasons that should already be clear, I think we need a clearer account of how such concepts are at work. Secondly, a discussion of synthesis is necessary if we are to fully assess Kant's account and discuss the role synthesis plays in accounts after Kant. Thirdly, it will allow us to analyze a detailed development of McDowell's guiding thesis that spontaneity must already be at work in the deliverances of receptivity. Fourthly, it will allow us to historically situate Husserl's genetic account as well as accounts of cognition rooted in the body. Finally, it will provide resources for an account of nonconceptual content which are applicable beyond the Kantian project.

Chapter 3

Subject and Synthesis

Introduction

In the last chapter we worked through Kant's account of the intuitions both in the aesthetic and the amphibolies in order to salvage arguments supporting the idea that there is some content we are required to see as nonconceptual content. In doing so, we started to work toward a phenomenological account of nonconceptual content. Despite Kant's compelling arguments for distinguishing intuitions from concepts and the continuing relevancy of these arguments, the question of precisely how intuitions and concepts come together remains. Examining Kant's full answer to this question will require a detailed analysis of his account of synthesis and how synthesis generates apperceptive content. This will, in turn, lead to a reframing of our central question in terms of the kind of synthesis that is required if we are to maintain Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions. More precisely, in the absence of a transcendental deduction of the sort Kant hoped for, what kind of synthesis is required if we are to maintain our claims concerning nonconceptual apperceptive content and is such a synthesis defensible?

McDowell sidesteps this question altogether, but in doing so leaves important questions about the relation between receptivity and spontaneity unanswered. In working through these questions, we will take a closer look at Kant's account of synthesis in the principles of the

understanding and Longuenesse's analysis of the schematism. I will argue that though Kant offers us many resources for answering the question of how concepts and intuitions come together and though Longuenesse strengthens Kant's position by casting the schematism as a constitutive account, the emphasis on the subject, Kant's attachment to *a priori* categories, and the absence of an account of *motivation*, or what motivates our turning from one intentional relation to an object to another, renders Kant's account inadequate. This will open the way to a full turn to phenomenology and what Husserl calls a genetic account, but one rooted in the body.

Subjectivity and Synthesis

We have already discussed the transcendental deduction, but I would like to discuss it once more with an emphasis on the relation between subjectivity and synthesis. In some ways, the development of transcendental philosophy after Kant is a series of attempts to properly account for this relation. My own account of nonconceptual content will come to rest on a synthesis governed by embodied subjectivity. Here, in order to prepare the way for this discussion, I will focus on three aspects of Kant's deduction, namely the reciprocity between the unity of consciousness and the synthesis of representations, the consciousness of synthesis, and the unity of transcendental subjectivity as the ground of the unifying or discursive function of concepts. We will find that these three aspects are in fact deeply interconnected.

There are a three key features of synthesis that it may be helpful to mention at the outset and which summarize some of the analyses of chapter one. First, synthesis is for Kant always

about combining representations according to a rule. This happens both in intuition where the result is appearance and the intellect where representations are combined in an object and under a concept (a common representation). Secondly, subjectivity in the form of the “I think” is dependent on the rules governing the combination of representations and the combinability of representations. In order for representations to be anything to a subject, those representations must be thinkable by the subject and thinkable as the subject’s own. This requires the activation of the capacity to combine representations on the part of the subject. Yet, these capacities can only manifest if the representations to be drawn together can in fact be drawn together. That is, these representations must stand in rule governed relations that can be apprehended by the subject as extending beyond any particular instance of their employment. This, in turn, always requires conceiving of concepts (which again are just rules for combination) as part of a larger systematic whole. Kant writes, “A representation that is to be thought of as common to **several** must be regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it also have something **different** in themselves; consequently they must antecedently be conceived in synthetic unity with other (even if only possible) representations” (B 134).

In either the case in which I could not draw representations together due to some kind of recalcitrance on the part of those representations or in the case that I lacked the capacity to draw representations together, “I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious” (B 134). Finally, we also have the capacity to represent the activity of combination as such and this is just to represent the activity distinctive to subjectivity. When we represent the activity of combination, it does not come “through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self activity” (B 130).

Though, “combination does not lie in the objects... and cannot as it were be borrowed from them through perception,” the idea of an object as such plays an important role in determining what thoughts are authentically about the world or count as genuine knowledge *claims*, even if those claims can be falsified. If legitimate knowledge claims rested only on the different possible combinations of concepts, then we could legitimately make knowledge claims about things that are not possible objects of experience at all (not situated in time and space.) This would also lead to the difficulties Kant discusses in the amphibolies of pure reason. Thus, the interplay between subjectivity and conceptuality must always for Kant also be understood as the interplay between subject and object. Allison calls the idea that subject and object must maintain such an interplay the reciprocity thesis. A subject aware of synthesis is not simply aware of the rule governed relations between representations, but is also aware of how those representations come together in an object situated in time and space. The further question here is what it is for a subject to be aware of synthesis.

As Allison notes, the difficulty is that the notion of synthesis is ambiguous as it is presented in Kant. In particular, it is a question as to whether we are aware of the product of synthesis, the activity of synthesis, or both. It is clear that to avoid the consequence of a, “multicolored and diverse self,” or a self for each representation I might have, awareness of synthesis must include awareness of the product of synthesis. Allison’s way of putting this is that synthesis is not simply the same thinker thinking A at time t and B at time t_2 . Rather, synthesis consists in the thinker thinking A and B together in one act. Yet, we are in need of more here to avoid taking Kant’s claim that synthesis is prior to analysis in the wrong way. If synthesis does not simply refer to a single thinker thinking A at time t and B at time t_2 , it also does not simply involve thinking A and B as a single unit at time t_3 . This would still be

consistent with a thinker having three distinct thoughts, none of which the thinker took as connected in any way. It would just mean adding yet more diversity and another color to the multicolored palette of the self. This weighs in favor of the claim that we must also be aware of the activity of combination as such. Awareness of the activity as such means knowing how combination proceeds and what combination entails, which requires knowing the elements to be combined as relatively independent elements. The relative independence of these elements hinges on the fact that we know that their application can extend beyond any particular judgment and that this extension is only possible because a concept is always the predicate of *possible* judgments. Consequently, concepts, even when we consider them independently of the particular judgment of which they are apart, cannot be conceived apart from synthesis.

Again, conceiving of this synthesis does not require having present in mind all the possible combinations of which a concept permits or all possible combinations of representations more generally. Rather, it requires having a grasp of the fact *that* there is a systematic whole of which each concept is a part and a grasp of the ways in which representations can be combined through the discursive function of concepts (e.g. in an object) in any legitimate knowledge claim made from within this systematic whole. The question to be answered now is how we come to grasp the whole as a whole. Kant writes, “combination is the representation of the **synthetic** unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination... it makes the concept of combination possible. This unity which precedes all concepts of combination *a priori*, is not the former category of unity” (B 131.) The category of unity is itself a concept that must, if it is to operate discursively for me, be grasped as part of a larger systematic whole so that it can be grasped as extending beyond any particular case in which it is applied. Because I must see the category of unity as part of a larger systematic whole

it cannot itself account for my grasp of the systematic whole of which it is a part. So my grasp of the synthetic unity of the manifold as a systematic whole cannot rest on the concept of unity revealed in the metaphysical deduction. It rests instead on the “I think” that, “must **be able** to accompany all my representations” (B 132).

I think the key to understanding our grasp of the synthetic unity of the manifold as a whole is to emphasize not just the idea of the I think accompanying all representations, but also the idea that thinking is an ability or activity that we grasp as such. In turn, our grasp of our ability to think, of the unity of the self that employs this activity across different thoughts, compliments and stands in a reciprocal relationship with the idea that concepts extend beyond any particular application in a judgment. Kant writes,

For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined in one cognition. Thus, the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules that not only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object for their intuition, i.e., the concept of something in which they are necessarily connected (A 108).

To grasp one’s activity as rule governed is already to grasp it as reproducible. This in turn requires conceiving of one’s self as being capable of reproducing the activity which the rule governs, or as being capable of applying it in any of the possible judgments in which it can figure without having to actually entertain each of those judgments. Thus, it requires that one can conceive of one’s activity abstractly, as not tethered to any particular instance.

On this view, any of the rule governed (conceptual) activities necessary for cognition are subject to this same condition. Otherwise, the most important feature of concepts, that they extend beyond any particular application, would be as nothing to us. Reciprocally, if at least some of our representations were not conceptual, did not have the property of operating in and

extending beyond particular judgments, we would be unable to become conscious of the discursive activities which make the unity of consciousness possible.³⁷ Developing this idea yet further, becoming conscious of the discursive activities by which we gather many representations under a common one means knowing each of these activities as sharing the common properties of being mine and being discursive. That is, I grasp these activities generically as being of a particular kind and identify myself with this kind of activity given that I can only enjoy a unified consciousness where this activity is operative and where I am conscious of this activity as of a particular kind. As to the latter, in grasping the activity generically, I grasp it as something that can possibly be employed wherever it is possible to gather representations under a concept. I also grasp that when it is employed in particular cases I will always be able to see the relation of the particular instantiation of the activity to discursive activity abstractly conceived. More simply, an abstract grasp of discursive activity makes it possible to see particular discursive activities as discursive. Otherwise, there would be a cognitive activity of mine that would be as nothing to me, or at least it would not count as a cognitive (discursive) activity. The activity

³⁷ Kant's account of the threefold synthesis (apprehension, reproduction, and recognition) in the A deduction supports this view. We apprehend the matter of the manifold of an intuition by running through, distinguishing, and holding together what we find there. This presupposes distinctions in time, distinctions available *a priori*. To see this is to see the manifold as a manifold (to grasp its form as determined *a priori* by determinations of time.) The reproductive synthesis can be understood on the empiricist model of association, but Kant's deeper question is what makes this reproduction possible. Kant reasons that to hold each part of what is apprehended together requires that we successively reproduce elements of the whole which we have already run through. If we could not do this, this would amount to dropping out of consciousness which would preclude the possibility of representing anything. There is another sense of reproduction at work here as well. Reproducing representations through association, reproducing parts of the manifold of experience (parts that themselves have already been synthesized in a continuous consciousness of this process as unfolding within a manifold, within a singular intuition) also presupposes a whole (a "series") to which these representations belong (as "units" of that series) such that the reproduction is a reproduction of something that occupies the same experiential realm. Such reproductions are already in themselves universal (deployed via rules governing association), but not yet recognized as such. To be recognized as such requires recognizing separate acts of synthesis as identical. Recognizing this identity requires *grasping* these acts of synthesis as occupying the same experiential realm, but at distinct moments and thus as transcending any particular experience. Gathering identical acts of synthesis together in recognizing them as identical, and so also gathering the matter synthesized in these acts, is a discursive or conceptual activity. Kant's account of the threefold synthesis is ultimately inadequate because he never quite gives a satisfying answer as to how pure intuitions and empirical representations are related. Nevertheless, his insights here concerning concepts remain important contributions to his project as a whole.

considered generically mirrors, in turn, the possible judgments available to me as a thinker (the synthesis of the manifold as a whole) given that this discursive activity is only possible where concepts are operative. Again, concepts make it possible to conceive of things beyond a singular representation and provide rules for our cognitive activity.

This raises two difficulties. First, it raises the question of what it is to have a “grasp” of an activity as being of a particular kind. Certainly, most who employ discursive activities do not have theories concerning what they are doing or even perhaps identify those activities as conceptual in nature. Secondly, even if we were to recognize these activities as conceptual in nature, the claim that in each of the moments we are employing such activities we are necessarily aware of them as such does not seem to fit the phenomenology of experience and would be cognitively burdensome. In his book, *Kant’s Transcendental Deduction*, Robert Howell argues that Kant does not have satisfactory answers to these questions and thus his deduction fails. I think Howell’s reading of Kant is problematic, but it is worth discussing for three reasons. First, it will help to clarify Kant’s view of synthesis. Secondly, clarifying Kant’s view of synthesis will make it easier to discuss its importance for phenomenological views. Finally, while Howell’s reading of Kant may miss the mark, the problems he raises are important considerations for those after Kant who work with the ideas of apperception and synthesis without the presumption of a secure and encompassing deduction.

Subject(s) and Intuition(s)

Howell conceives of synthesis in terms of the features and aspects of a given object which are unconnected, but given sequentially in a *particular* intuition. These elements, as he calls them, must then be synthesized in order to yield knowledge of an object. Howell argues that on Kant's account synthesis, or combination, requires the strong claim that the subject is aware of all the elements of the intuition at once. Howell reasons that were the subject simply aware of each element successively, it would be possible for the subject to be aware of each element without seeing how each element is connected to the others. Working from this idea of synthesis, Howell goes on to critique Kant's account of apperception as it operates in the transcendental deduction. Howell's argument is fairly intricate including summaries and responses to various possible versions of the transcendental deduction, but there are two main critiques that will give us a good overall view of Howell's major complaints. The first concerns Kant's assumption that human or human-like empirical knowledge must actually or potentially involve the "I think." The second concerns the logical difference between ascribing to myself all representations that are mine and ascribing to myself this or that particular representation.

Howell's characterization of the transcendental deduction casts it in terms of two major moments which are grounded in work Kant has already completed in earlier parts of the *Critique*. First, "the act of thought by means of which H knows through (i) is an act that grasps among its immediate objects (i's) elements" (Howell 164). The variable (i) stands for any arbitrary intuition and H stands for any subject. Secondly, "this act of thought actually or potentially involves the representation "I think" (or "I") and does or can reflect upon itself in every case in which it operates, in such a way as to recognize that involvement" (164). Thus, the categories must apply to all objects that we can or do know and this application must always entail the possibility of self ascription. Howell claims that Kant does not prove, but simply assumes the

second of these. Because this is assumed and not proven, Kant's deduction of the categories, which rests on the tight connection between the categories and the "I think" does not go through. So it might be the case that categories apply where the "I think" is at work, but this does not entail that the "I think" must be at work in each case the categories are at work. That is, Kant does not show, and we have no reason to think, that knowledge is impossible without self ascription.

Howell's second critique develops the first in terms of fallacies of intensionality. These kinds of fallacies concern propositional attitudes, the substitution of co-referential terms, and the specific beliefs, desires, and intentions we can legitimately attribute to someone. For instance, just because Josh believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huck Finn does not mean that he believes that Mark Twain wrote Huck Finn, even though Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain both refer to the same person. The truth value of the report of what Josh believes is not preserved when co-referential terms are substituted. On Howell's account Kant claims that because I know that *all my representations are mine*, I know that, say, representations r,s, and t (these falling within the set of representations that are mine) are mine. Though r,s, and t are *my representations*, substituting r,s, and t for *my representations* does not, simply by the equivalence of the terms, preserve truth value in the report of what I know. Howell captures the basic ambiguity at work by claiming that Kant fails to respect the *de dicto/de re* distinction. There is an ambiguity, for instance, in the report that Carol believes that someone is a spy. This could mean either that Carol believes that the existence of spies is likely or that Carol believes that some individual she has seen who was, say, acting suspiciously is a spy. The first is a *de dicto* belief, or a belief about some general proposition. The second is a *de re* belief, or a belief about some particular object. Howell believes that Kant exploits just such an ambiguity in making the plausible

(though not unproblematic) claim that any subject holds the *de dicto* belief, “I know all my representations are mine” and then treating this *de dicto* belief as if it were a *de re* belief concerning knowledge of particular representations.³⁸

To draw this all together, Howell treats individual intuitions as containing pieces that have been successively presented though not combined into a whole, something like having taken the parts of a piece of furniture to be assembled out of the box and arranging them in the order their assemblage calls for. Running a bit further with the analogy, as I put the furniture together, I may become engrossed in this or that part of the process forgetting the end goal and by the end of the project I may have forgotten some part of the process. Nevertheless, the whole process will still stand under and be governed by, for instance, the concept, “chair.” The “I think” *would* accompany this process through thinking each of the parts of the process under the concept “chair,” but since we do not in each moment think the parts under this concept the concept chair is applied apart from the “I think.” This despite the fact that each of the activities I perform in assembling the chair is mine.

What our reading of the deduction and our analysis of apperception suggest is that Howell’s focus on particular intuitions and first personal ascription is misplaced.³⁹ Indeed, Howell is working with a semantics that concerns particular propositions and whether and how the conditions established by those propositions are satisfied. Subjectivity, on Kant’s account, is best captured in terms of an orientation to the world. To say we have an orientation to the world is to distinguish the way we interact with the world from both the complete passivity of an object

³⁸ Howell notes that though Dieter Henrich does not discuss it in the same terms, he also notes just such an ambiguity in Kant’s account.

³⁹ Howell’s critique would be more apt if it were directed at elements of the A deduction and Kant’s difficulty in determining just how pure intuitions and empirical representations are related in the threefold synthesis. Nonetheless, Kant’s approach in the B deduction appears to proceed with a recognition of this difficulty and a response to it which culminates in the schematism.

and the complete productivity of intellectual intuition. This orientation is to be characterized formally in terms of a spatio-temporal field within which the basic features of objects can be recognized and situated by way of rules of apprehension determined by the categories of the understanding. This is the primary way in which the relation of the categories to intuition should be understood.⁴⁰ As such, Kant is not claiming that because I know all of my representations are mine I know that, for instance, representations r,s, and t are mine. Rather, the claim is that for an object to be a member of the set of things that can be an object of knowledge, it must have certain basic features. If it does not have these features, I will have no way of fitting it into the holistic structure of my mental life, no way of making a knowledge claim about that object. These basic features, the fundamental ways in which an object is significant for me as an object of knowledge, are in turn a product of how I am oriented to the world, not of what I personally can or cannot ascribe to myself at any given moment. It is helpful here to look back to our earlier discussion of indeterminacy and judgment.

Again, a condition on the aptness of judging is that what is judged be indeterminate but determinable. The character of the thing judged about must be such as to facilitate judgment, otherwise the activity is not apt. What the above account of the deduction and the coming discussion of the schemata suggest with respect to this activity is that in a certain sense it does not matter where I “look,” because no matter where I look the situation will be the same. There will be something indeterminate but determinable and determinable with respect to the same fundamental characteristics as any other object of knowledge. With respect to the *Critique*, any object will be, for example, numerically distinct and extended, have qualitative features, and stand in causal relations to other objects. The particular shape things take, their specific

⁴⁰ In “Assessing Kant’s Master Argument: A Review Essay on Robert Howell’s *Kant’s Transcendental Deduction*” Derk Pereboom develops a critique along similar lines.

qualitative features, the precise nature of the causal relations in which they stand, and whether I take note of any of these features is a matter of contingency. Because for Kant the fundamental ways in which an object is significant for us as an object of knowledge are products of how we are oriented to the world, one can say that to be oriented to the world at all is already to take an active role in determining something indeterminate. It is in this more abstract sense that synthesis always involves self ascription, always involves the activity of a subject.

More simply, the way around Howell's critique is to emphasize that the activity of synthesis, in its most basic form, is constituted by a grasp of an *elemental* set of concepts as the forms in which possible judgments always come. Empirically, it is probably the case that our grasp of a concept is only ever demonstrated in and through particular judgments.

Transcendentally, this possibility resolves into a formal accounting of both subjectivity and judgment. It is therefore crucial to remember that judgment is understood specifically in terms of the forms of judgment revealed by the metaphysical deduction, forms which are necessary for cognition. Thus, the "I think" that must accompany all of my representations, insofar as it is to be identified with discursive activity abstractly conceived, is identified with the categories, the categories being the total group of basic discursive functions (representational forms) available to us. One consequence of this view is that empirically, one can never with certainty anticipate the content of judgments or conceptual connections not yet confirmed or combined in some object. Yet transcendentally one can always anticipate that a judgment will be a token of one of the basic types of judgment determined in the metaphysical deduction. Thus, apperception is broad in scope at the transcendental level.

A key feature of this broad apperception, perhaps *the* feature, is that the discursive activity of the subject is grasped by the discursive function of the activity itself. To avoid

confusion, we should again note that the category of unity cannot be applied to the unity of apperception. Yet, if the discursive activity of the subject simply always involves, “a representation that is to be thought of as common to **several** [and is] regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it also have something **different** in themselves,” then it is plausible that we represent our discursive activity as such through the several distinct forms of this activity. This also distinguishes our grasp of subjectivity from an intuition. Intuitions are of singular objects given with immediacy. The fact that subjectivity is understood in terms of an activity distinguishes it from an object and the fact that our understanding of it is mediated by several distinct discursive activities distinguishes it from an immediate representation. So a better way to understand apperception is in the idea that the subject is presented in discursive activity at a formal level and represented as the common “mark” across various forms of this activity by means of that very same activity.

With respect to our aims here, Howell’s analysis provides an important constraint on the account of apperception and synthesis I will offer. Namely, even if what we propose is a synthesis rooted in embodied subjectivity, we must nevertheless be careful to say precisely in what sense the synthesis and what is synthesized are mine. This is a difficult issue because on one hand, one of the tasks of phenomenology is to do away the subject-object distinction so that the subject is accounted for as a part of the world rather than a disembodied mind that stands outside of it. On the other hand, embodied agency must be something more than automatic differential responses to stimuli. Thus, we cannot simply do away with subjectivity. We need a way of accounting for how something is *mine* as an embodied subject rather than a thinking being. What is required is a different kind of reflexivity that still supports apperception. I will

develop an account of embodied reflexivity that I think fits the bill beginning in chapter 4 and continuing in more detail in chapter 6.

For now, we have a few more issues in Kant to discuss. Namely, given the identification of the “I think” with the categories, if the representations of time and space are to be anything to us, they too must somehow fall under the categories. Exactly how they fall under the categories is a difficult question, but the answer will provide a more detailed response to Howell’s worries.

Intellect and Imagination

We have already touched on the important role that imagination plays in cognition in both its productive and anticipatory function. To begin our discussion of the schematism I would like to say more about why the latter, in particular, is important. The general importance of imagination is, once more, that with it we can represent an object without its presence in intuition. Because we require a separate faculty for this sort of representation it stands to reason that an intellectual synthesis cannot provide such representations. The question is why is the difference between these representations important for an account of cognition? Why is it important to have the capacity to form each of these kinds of representations? Here it helps to return to Hume.

For Hume imagination is of great importance in cognition because it allows us to move beyond the immediacy of sense impressions and the contents of memory so that we can anticipate objects and events that are yet to appear. Imagination is identified with causal

inference. Causal inference allows me to access things that, “lie beyond the reach of my senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please” (Hume “Treatise” 108). Imagination, then, frees us from the constraints of memory and the immediacy of sense impressions and permits us to anticipate the objects that populate our universe. I think that imagination plays a role parallel to this in Kant’s critique. The function of the intuitions of time and space is to provide orderability for the manifold of sensibility such that it can be taken up by the categories in an intellectual synthesis. Yet, in having access to something orderable we have access to something that has already been prepared, ostensibly by cognition, but which appears as immediate from the perspective of the intellectual synthesis in that this synthesis is not responsible for the orderability of the material on which it operates.

In other words, with respect to the intellectual synthesis the material for cognition has a relative immediacy and we have no account of how that material is ‘ours’ other than the assertion that it is a product of intuition. It is true that for Kant the categories of the understanding are universal, but with respect to the intellectual synthesis the application of the categories is analogous to memory, always cast “backward” to the material that has already been provided by the intuitions. Again, the conclusion to be drawn from Kant’s account is that the intellectual synthesis is only concerned with what is already present in intuition and how what is already there can be taken up in concepts. The intellectual synthesis does not anticipate whatever objects might actually populate our universe. Yet, to once again echo the *Meno*, we must know something of what we are looking for in order to search for it. In order to show that cognition by way of the intuitions is not wholly passive, or wholly beyond what we can attribute to our own activity as thinking subjects, it must be shown that an apperceptive synthesis is at work here as

well. This would finally bring all functions of intuition (insofar as we believe Kant's account of intuition to be exhaustive) under the purview of the thinking subject, such a subject being defined by its discursive activity which, in turn, necessarily involves the categories of the understanding. Kant writes,

Now, since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to **sensibility**; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, **in accordance with the categories**, must be the transcendental synthesis of the **imagination**, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition that is possible for us (B 151 – B152).

Kant also in this same paragraph distinguishes his account of imagination from that of Hume. The basic difference is that Kant's is an account of how we can anticipate objects *a priori* whereas for Hume imagination is a psychological faculty. For Hume, imagination is constituted by empirical laws of association which make it possible to expect that one sense impression (not yet impressing itself upon one's mind) will accompany another (one that is impressing itself on one's mind.) Kant writes, "Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the **productive** imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the **reproductive** imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology" (B 152).

Schematism as Formal Semantics

In the *Critique* imagination gets its most detailed treatment in the “Analytic of Principles,” where Kant discusses judgment, or the capacity to subsume under rules. Here Kant introduces another kind of representation which is the product of imagination, the schemata. I have briefly indicated how I take the imagination and schemata to be involved in Kant’s account of knowledge and emphasized the importance of the anticipatory function of the imagination in my claim that it plays a role in Kant that parallels the role it plays in Hume. In presenting imagination in this way, my aim is twofold. First, I wish to highlight the importance of something like imagination in any account of experience. Secondly, I wish to point to some of the virtues of Kant’s approach with a view toward eventually discussing how Kant’s approach is transformed in phenomenological accounts of experience. As such, there are certain scholarly questions surrounding the place of the schemata and imagination with respect to Kant’s account as a whole that, while deserving of consideration, will not be included here. Here I am less concerned (though not unconcerned) with how Kant ought to be read and more concerned with how elements of his account of imagination can be and have been developed to form a phenomenological account of how our mental life and our sensible experiences are related. Nonetheless, a discussion of the question of whether the schemata are required is relevant for two reasons. First, it will give us a different look at the issues with which McDowell is concerned. Secondly, it will provide an opportunity to show that the seeds of an account of epistemic neutrality are sown in Kant’s discussion of the schemata.

Some have argued that Kant’s discussion of the schemata in terms of the application of and subsumption of things under the categories renders the schemata superfluous. For instance,

H.A. Prichard writes, “We naturally feel a preliminary difficulty with respect to the existence of this part of the Analytic at all. It seems clear that if the first part is successful, the second must be unnecessary. For if Kant is in a position to lay down that the category of quantity must apply to objects, it is implied that there are no special conditions of its application” (Prichard 246 -47.). J.G. Warnock takes issue specifically with what he sees as Kant’s concern with concept application. For Warnock, once it is shown that we must possess that special set of concepts revealed in the metaphysical deduction there is no further question to be asked about their application. Hoffe argues that Warnock and Prichard have been misled by Kant’s discussion of the schemata in terms of application and subsumption and thus identify, “the relationship of intuition to concept with that of the particular to the general or with that of a subset to the set of which it is a part” (Hoffe 87). Hoffe argues we should instead see the schemata as mediating between a determining form and a determinable matter. The question the schemata answer is not whether the determining form applies to the determinable matter, but under what conditions it does so.

Consider Kant’s empirical example of a schema, the triangle. We already know that concepts apart from intuition, to reverse Kant’s formulation, are blind to the extension of objects and their spatiotemporal distinctness. Without intuition we would be left with, for instance, a set of formulas that do nothing to indicate the general shape triangles take and would leave us without a way of identifying particular triangles. Having only the concept “triangle” apart from intuition would be akin to having access to an explanation of color that covers the physical, neurological, and phenomenological aspects of color vision, yet lacking sight. Such an explanation can be no substitute for an understanding of what it is to have a sensible experience organized within a spatiotemporal field or through the successive or simultaneous presentation of

extensive, intensive, and relational features such that one can attend to different regions of this field in common with others.⁴¹ In the analysis preceding the *Analytic of Principles*, Kant purports to show that categories must apply to intuition and can do so in part because the difference between the understanding and intuition is a complimentary difference, that between matter and form.

Nevertheless, given this difference, given the blindness of concepts to not only extension, but also the intensity of qualities and the relations between distinct objects, knowing that concepts must apply to intuition still leaves open the question of the conditions under which they do. In the case of triangles, Hoffe, developing Kant's example, writes, "we have a general intuition of a triangle which is neither a right triangle nor one having no right angle, which is neither isosceles nor equilateral nor do its segments all differ in length. Graphically representing all triangles, this intuition precedes any picture" (87). If we could not "draw" a triangle in intuition we would have no way of knowing what it is for *some thing* in the world to be a triangle.

Allison, argues along these same lines, but focuses on the distinction between knowing a rule and applying it using the game of chess to illustrate his point. He writes,

To understand the game clearly requires grasping its rules and goal. Since these rules determine which moves are legal or "chessly possible" and the goal defines the purpose for

⁴¹ It is important to note here the difference between the intensive and extensive features with respect to succession. As Longuenesse notes, "Space and time are continua as extensive magnitudes, in which the whole is made up of parts external to one another – this is why the continuum as an intensive magnitude, one that cannot be presented by a successive synthesis of parts, whether discrete or continuous; but whose successive degrees can be represented as continuously represented through time (314)." Thus, sensation is represented as a *quantum*, as something continuously generated on a continuum (say, between 0 and 1) between two instants in time. A sensation is not generated by building upward unit by unit to a sensation of a certain degree nor is it extended in space. Yet, in assigning a degree to a sensation, one also posits an infinite number of degrees and instants, which remain imperceptible and indeterminate, respectively, through which sensation moves from one moment to the next. Thus, with respect to temporality, there is a real aspect to sensation (something continuously generated between two moments) and an imaginary aspect (imperceptible degrees and indeterminate instants). There remains, however, a successive presentation of sensation in the difference between what is presented between one pair of moments (say an intensely bright light) and the next pair of moments (a dim light) even though the change may have traversed infinite and imperceptible units of sensation.

which they are made, it is clear that without this knowledge one would be unable to play chess at all. As any beginner will testify, however, having such rudimentary knowledge is not sufficient to play the game successfully. For the fact that a move is legal does not make it a good move, that is, one that is called for by the particular circumstances (206 – 207).

Actually, despite Allison's intentions, this illustration also serves to show why one might be initially persuaded by concerns like those of Warnock and Prichard. Consider that the rules of chess are constitutive rules rather than regulative rules.⁴² That is, these rules do not regulate some already existing activity, they constitute the activity. One of the things the rules of chess do is, for instance, constitute what it is to place the king in check. This activity does not exist without a rule which constitutes it. A regulative rule pertaining to chess would be an imperative not to, for instance, scream and jump on the table when I have won. It makes sense to ask about the application of regulative rules, when and how they apply within the context of the game of chess. Yet, it does not make sense to ask about when or how constitutive rules apply. Constitutive rules do not "apply," but rather create activities (checkmate, check, knightly moves, pawnly moves, etc). If one wishes to maintain the language of application, one might say that constitutive rules always and necessarily apply so long as an activity of a certain kind is to be maintained. Similarly, if the categories are something like constitutive rules pertaining to the activity of cognition, the question of their application demonstrates a profound misunderstanding about what has actually been demonstrated in the metaphysical and transcendental deductions.

Nevertheless, Kant's emphasis on the function of concepts and the necessity of emptying judgments of content in order to reveal these functions suggest that concepts cannot be strictly identified with constitutive rules like those at work in chess. The distinction between understanding and intuition suggests something more analogous to the distinction between

⁴² See Searle, *Speech Acts*

logical form and semantics. This is difficult to see because ultimately the understanding and intuition are separable only in principle, not in fact. Thus, Kant has a tendency to treat the understanding as always already acting on the material of intuition. Yet, Kant also emphasizes that without a way of determining the conditions under which concepts apply, concepts would be, “without all content, and thus would be mere logical forms and not pure concepts of the understanding” (A135-36/B175).

It is difficult to reconcile these two moments of the critique, but at the very least I think we can see Kant’s theory of the schemata as a response to two related issues. First, within the context of the critique there is a difference between showing that something must be the case and showing how it is the case. If one were convinced by Kant’s work in the deductions or if the deductions really were to do the work Kant thinks they do, one would be ‘boxed in,’ so to speak, by Kant’s arguments. No alternative account of cognition would be available. From this perspective it would just have to be the case that the form provided by the understanding operates on the material of the intuitions. Nonetheless, this does not yet show how one relates to the other. Secondly, one might think that showing that the understanding must operate on the material provided by intuition is sufficient to achieve Kant’s critical aims. Yet, simply knowing that the categories must apply to intuition is not sufficient to keep one from seeing those categories merely as empty forms. This is something like knowing that the two lines of the Mueller-Lyer illusion are the same length, but not being able to see them as such.

In any case, the formal structure of appearance and the categories concern what it is to be an object as such and Kant must bring these aspects together if he is to demonstrate *how* objects of knowledge are constituted. Insofar as Kant attempts this through a search for the conditions under which the categories apply, or the conditions under which the form appearances take

satisfy the categories, we can see Kant as developing a formal semantics which is to determine what features an object must have to satisfy the condition of being an object of knowledge.⁴³ This leaves the difficult question of how, if Kant's account of the categories in the absence of the schemata is simply an account concerning logical form, such a logical structure can be schematized to yield something with a semantic structure (something which sets out conditions objects must satisfy). The answer is that the conditions under which appearances satisfy the categories are conditions that concern the formal (structural) features of temporality. In the simplest terms we can, apart from considering particular appearances, conceive of the various ways in which appearances can be presented with respect to succession or simultaneity according to rules provided by the categories.⁴⁴ Whatever is presented in such a way as to satisfy these rules is an object of knowledge. Another way to look at this is that the formal (structural) features of temporality are suited to satisfying the formal configuration of judgments. Moreover, because the formal features of temporality always encompass a manifold (an infinite span figuratively synthesized) and this in turn determines how appearances are presented, these features are well suited to be mediators between concepts and the manifold of sensibility which is ordered with respect to the manifold of temporality. To make all of this a bit clearer, it will be helpful to consider an example.

⁴³ I think Kant's own attempt to describe the role of schemata in terms of syllogistic reasoning supports this view. At A330-31/B386-87 Kant considers the following syllogism: Everything composite is alterable. Bodies are composite. Therefore bodies are alterable. In short the condition under which the major premise (the rule) is applicable is when something satisfies the condition of being composite. If it satisfies this condition, it also satisfies the predicate of the major premise. In the case of schemata, if the presentation of appearances fits a certain time determination (with respect to series, content, order, or scope) it will also satisfy one or another of the categories.

⁴⁴ It may even be that these rules are also already at work at the level of appearance. As we will see, Longuenesse makes this claim. If this is true, there are two sides of the schemata; anticipatory and productive. The former is knowing what it is for something to be an object of knowledge and the latter is already operative at the level of perception. Indeed, the application of a concept reveals both moments. There is a preconceptual ordering which makes the application of a concept possible and the application itself suggests the general anticipation of objects to which the concept can apply.

Kant's treatment of the schemata is sometimes a bit rushed and cursory. Also, to assess whether it can all work as Kant envisions would require assessing each schema and the nature of the relation between the categories and temporality in each case. Here, I only want to communicate a general picture of the role the schemata are supposed play. With this in mind, let us take a closer look at the category of substance, which is one of the categories of relation, and how it is schematized. Again, a logical form is just a rule which determines how representations are connected. The action of putting representations together is judgment, which is just what is at issue in Kant's discussion of the schemata. In a categorical judgment, analyzed apart from content, we find that the form of a categorical judgment is constituted by a subject to which properties (in the predicate position) are attributed.

This does not yet bring us to a pure category, but because in thinking about the logical form devoid of content we think about "the subject" abstractly in terms of a feature common to any subject (that it bears properties named in the predicate position) we are given a clue to a pure category, substance. Substance, in turn, is something that can *only* ever bear properties and never itself be a property of something else. Thus, not just anything that can bear properties counts as substance in this sense. This raises a problem. Once we have emptied judgment of content and worked to a level of *a priori* judgment, we no longer have access to the everyday objects of which we could predicate properties. Because empirical objects are placed out of bounds, the only alternative, so far as Kant is concerned, is for something else *a priori* to operate in the subject position of judgments about substance. Without this, without schemata, we would have, by way of our transcendental methodology, limited ourselves to mere logical forms. In the case of substance we would be left with the abstract conception of "the subject" we find when considering categorical judgments apart from content.

This is where the *a priori* features of time enter the picture. Once we get to the “Analogies of Experience” Kant has already worked through the schemata pertaining to quantity and quality. These schemata yield, by way of transcendental determinations of time at work in them, extended objects with perceptible qualities. Because transcendental determinations always concern rules which assure universality and necessity, these schemata determine that objects of knowledge *must* have primary and secondary qualities. Yet, they do not say anything about whether there is necessity in the order in which objects appear in space, either singly in terms of the perspectives we take on an object or in relation to each other. Kant writes, “Now in experience, to be sure, perceptions come together only contingently, so that no necessity of their connection is or can become evident in perceptions themselves, since apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of empirical intuition, but no representation of the necessity of the combined existence of the appearances that it juxtaposes in space and time is to be encountered” (B 160).

For Kant, there is only one way to determine the necessary relations that obtain between objects of perception. He writes, “since time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can only come about through their combination in time in general, hence only through *a priori* connecting concepts.” There are two important things to note in this passage. First, as I have already noted, we can only proceed by treating “time in general” or time as an *a priori* field, something we already intuit, within which appearances are situated. This will give us the basic blueprint for the ways in which objects can be combined. Secondly, cognition of how appearances are situated rests on the contribution of the categories. It is important to note that what Kant finds is that while particular relations that hold between objects or in the order of the presentation of an object are contingent, each object must have certain types

of relations to count as an object of knowledge. For instance, objects must be perceived as single persisting objects with causal relations to other objects. The particulars of these relations are to be found out empirically with schematized categories acting to regulate our search for these relations. So, for instance, it is because of the schematized category of causality and dependence that we know what it is for an object to stand in causal relations to other objects and this regulates our inquiry (though sometimes imperfectly) into the interaction of objects.

Focusing now on substance, the question we must ask is what can satisfy the category of substance *a priori* so that we can make good on the clue provided by emptying categorical judgments of content and have something more than a logical form. We find our answer in the structure of temporality, but it is also important to keep in mind that at this point we have appearances with extension and qualities by means of the first two schemata. Thus, the materials we have at our disposal for the schematization of substance are the *category* substance and inherence, *appearances* schematically determined with respect to primary and secondary qualities, and the *intuition* of time. Kant begins with intuition and appearance. He writes, All appearances are in time, in which, as substratum (as persistent form of inner intuition), both **simultaneity** as well as **succession** can alone be represented. The time, therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does not change; since it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be represented only as determinations of it” (A 181/B 224). This is not yet schematized intuition, but is just the bald intuition of time as a substratum. Already, however, we have one “thing” in which certain (temporal) properties inhere. We already have a structure suited to the category of substance. There is still interpretive work to be done because our concern in the schematism is with the necessary features of *perceptible* objects and time is not a perceptible object.

Kant continues, “Now time cannot be perceived by itself. Consequently it is in the objects of perception, i.e., the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered that represents time in general and in which all change or simultaneity can be perceived in apprehension through the relation of the appearances to it” (A 182/B 225). We thus move from an intuition of time to a representation of time through appearances. Appearances are always drawn in accord with the structure of temporality and thus reflect that structure. What appearances show us is something about the necessity of a substratum to the *perception* (rather than intuition) of simultaneity and succession. With respect to appearances, this substratum is represented as something real standing behind appearances. The structure of this “real” thing reflects the temporal field, is an interpretation of this field. Allison calls this, “the backdrop thesis.” Allison writes, “if there were nothing that persists, if everything were in constant flux, then we could not even be aware of succession as such, not to mention simultaneity. Consequently, an enduring perceivable object (or objects) is required to provide the backdrop or frame of reference by means of which the succession, simultaneity, and duration of appearances in a common time can be determined” (Allison 239).

What makes the move from the intuition of time to the representation of time possible is the category of substance and inherence. Kant, writing in the voice of one who has just discovered this, argues, “However, the substratum of everything real, i.e., everything that belongs to the existence of things, is **substance**, of which everything that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination. Consequently that which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same” (A 182/B 225).

To return to the chess example, from the perspective of this analysis the schematization of the rules of chess would proceed somewhat differently than what Allison suggests. Their schematization more properly refers to the idea that the possible material to which the rules of chess can apply can only be anticipated in the schematization of these rules. True, the rules do constitute the board as a board and pieces as pieces, but one must know what can count as a board and what can count as a piece of a certain sort. A board must meet certain minimal requirements with respect to its shape and the number of squares it contains. Pieces must be of a certain size to fit on the board, all but two unique pieces must share certain marks in common with a certain number of other pieces, and all pieces must be different from a certain number of others. Whether the piece that plays the role of a knight corresponds to (looks like) a real knight is beside the point. Given these basic determinations, which are not necessarily about what appears (material of this or that sort) but the relations between what appears and whether these relations can satisfy the requirements of chess, there are an infinite number of possible chessboards where the rules of chess can apply. In this case, the rules are presented simply in terms of what kinds of objects out in the world satisfy the material requirements established by the rules. Not that colloquial usage is always instructive as to philosophical usage, but we might even call someone who could construct a chess board out of a heap of junk “imaginative.” This comes closer, I think, to characterizing Kant’s account than skillfully playing the game.

Understood in this light, schemata lay the groundwork for an account of epistemic neutrality and nonconceptual content in two ways. First, schemata are indifferent to the nature of the material that underlies appearance and only relate to the cognition of that material with respect to its possibilities *as* appearance. Transcendentally, the types of possibilities for the determination of an object are always already settled by the categories of the understanding and

intuition. Empirically, the possibilities for the determination of objects with respect to one of these types is fairly open. For instance, colors, shapes, orders of appearance, and causal relations to other objects can all be varied. Secondly, the schemata are interpretive uses of the categories of the understanding and are governed by the part-whole relation that structures the intuitions rather than the part-whole relation that governs concepts. Within the Kantian framework, this means that at this level no knowledge claim is involved. To see how Husserl modifies this account, it will be helpful to draw on some of the material from chapter 1.

One of the claims I made in chapter 1 is that judgment requires indeterminacy. Here I emphasized Allison's idea that the transcendental object is the correlate of the activity of combining and creating unified experiences. I also claimed that implicit in the activity of unification itself is the condition that this activity is apt only insofar as the object that animates this activity and toward which the activity is aimed is indeterminate but determinable. In my modification of Allison's chess example, the indeterminate transcendental object would be whatever material is suitable for the construction of a chessboard. Moreover, we can look at a board and its pieces from a "transcendental" perspective by viewing it in terms of the schematized rules of chess and the basic types of similarities and differences that constitute any chess board rather than taking a particular chessboard as an exemplar of all chessboards. These basic types will then determine the "empirical" possibilities of chessboards. For instance, if a piece happens to become damaged or even lost, these basic types will determine what an acceptable amount of damage is and what counts as an appropriate replacement.

I think that Husserl accepts this basic framework, but in making perception primary and eventually linking action with perception Husserl brings the indeterminate object within the orbit of the body and places the organ of cognition among its objects. Here, schemata become the

basic ways we engage perceptual objects. These types determine the possibilities for action and perception, possibilities which are redeemed by empirical subjects for whom each perceptual presentation of an object indicates still more, more which requires movement or action to discover. Because the object is not present all at once it always possesses a relative indeterminacy, but this indeterminacy in fact motivates perceptual discovery. The process of perception remains epistemically neutral with respect to what might be considered the intrinsic properties of the object (those properties which would lay the object bare), but nonetheless remains in contact with the object through the possibilities of action and perception it affords. Thus, while Husserl makes it clear that indeterminacy is a necessary feature of our experience of objects, he also makes it clear, like Merleau-Ponty after him, that this indeterminacy is the indeterminacy of the very objects that populate our world. I will discuss this in greater detail in the following chapters. To finish our discussion of the schemata, I would like to look at Longuenesse's account because I think her insights can be used to clarify and compliment aspects of Husserl's development of Kant and they develop Kant's account of the schemata as a constitutive account.

Empirical Concepts and Transcendental Schemata

I have already discussed the trajectory of Kant's influence with respect to *a priori* justification and concepts, but, as I have just indicated, there is also a trajectory to be charted out at the level of *a priori* justification and schemata. As with concepts, this trajectory is guided by a

justified suspicion of *a priori* justification of the sort Kant hoped for. In the context of a discussion concerning nonconceptual content I think there are three important interrelated questions that arise here, questions to which I have already given partial answers. First, how does what I have called Kant's formal semantics, the conditions an object must meet to be an object of knowledge for us at all, develop after Kant. Secondly, for Kant the schemata mediate by way of the formal, structural features of judgments and of temporality. If we move away from these elements of Kant's account, is there still a place for something like the schemata? If so, what is the role of such a thing? What is their relation to the manifold of sensibility and conceptual content?

Finally, if we wish to maintain at least some of Kant's insights concerning the unity of subjectivity while moving away from his account of *a priori* universality, how do we do this without falling into the kinds of problems Howell notes in his more empirical reading of intuitions and subjectivity? After Kant, what (if any) are the necessary relations between the subject, the manifold of sensibility, and conceptual content? Before beginning a more focused discussion of these questions within the context of phenomenology, let me first discuss Longuenesse's account of the schemata. Longuenesse's defense of the claim that the intuitions, schemata, and categories are all originally acquired is suggestive of possibilities for Kant's insights with respect to the questions above. I will not be able to treat all of the subtleties of Longuenesse's account and will bracket her discussion of the relation between the schemata and mathematics because it does not bear directly on the issue at hand. What I do hope to capture is the dynamic set of relationships Longuenesse reveals between the elements of cognition Kant lays out and their common core.

Kant's claim that the intuitions and the categories are originally acquired is most clearly stated in his response to Eberhard's charge that he is an innatist. Kant writes,

For impressions are always required in order first to enable the cognitive power to represent an object (which is always its own act). Thus, the formal *intuition* which is called space emerges as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects in general)...the acquisition of which long precedes determinate *concepts* of things that are in accordance with this form. The acquisition of these concepts is an *acquisition derivativa*, as it already presupposes universal transcendental concepts of the understanding. *These likewise are acquired and not innate, but their acquisition, like that of space, is originaria and presupposes nothing innate except the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought (in accordance with the unity of apperception.)*" (qtd. from Longuenesse 252, Her emphasis).

It is thus clear, on Longuenesse's account, that for Kant we only have innate capacities by which we acquire the categories and the intuitions. These capacities are enabled, in turn, by impressions. Schemata play an important role in both the process of acquiring the categories and the application of categories thus acquired to intuition. In fact there is a tight connection between the intuitions, the schemata, and the categories which is explained by the fact that they have a common source in the *vermogen zu urteilen* or the capacity to judge. On this account receptivity is not only outwardly affected by a manifold of data, but also inwardly by the understanding which has as its *telos* judgment. This ensures that the syntheses of sensibility, syntheses constituted by rules of apprehensions or schemata, are already fit to be taken up by the understanding in intellectual syntheses. Longuenesse writes,

The reason for the correspondence between logical forms of judgment (forms of 'intellectual synthesis,' mere forms of thought reflected in the categories) and sensible syntheses (which alone give a content to the categories, i.e., make them concepts of possible objects) is that the latter are the effects of the acts that tend to produce the former. The act of thinking whose *result* is judgment, because its goal is judgment, affects receptivity and thereby combines the sensible given with a view to judgment. This is how the capacity to form judgments introduces ordering into sensible perception...by *generating* the sensible orderings (figure, succession, simultaneity...) that make possible reflection according to the forms of discursive combination" (202 - 203).

Thus, sensible orderings, which are fit to be reflected in concepts and discursive combination, are generated by, motivated by, our striving to judge. For our purposes, there are three main elements of this account that require further explanation and discussion. These are reflection, the generation of sensible orderings, and the comparison of the sensible orderings thus generated. It is best to begin here with reflection since it gives us a more precise way of discussing how the understanding affects receptivity. Reflection is the name given to three interdependent processes which yield sensible order, schemata, concepts, and judgments. These processes are comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Comparison is about noting differences, reflection is about considering commonalities, and abstraction is about attending to commonalities while bracketing differences. Longuenesse stresses that these three interdependent processes must also occur simultaneously because, given inner affection by the *vermogen zu urteilen*, one cannot be performed without already drawing on the others. That is, comparison already presupposes an attempt to reflect similarities and abstract from differences with the aim of forming concepts, concepts which will figure in judgments.

With just this much, it remains unclear how the categories are acquired by way of reflection. Here, we must deepen our analysis of reflection a bit and more specifically our analysis of comparison. Because comparison always draws on abstraction and reflection, these aspects of cognition will also necessarily be included in any analysis of comparison. It will help to first follow the analysis through with respect to empirical concepts. We will find that the key is to see that the concepts of comparison are at work at each level, but not as concepts *for us*. This is what makes acquisition possible for Longuenesse. The same basic process of comparison is at work at each level of cognition, but what is compared as well as the specific aim governing the comparison is different at each level.

Thus, the concepts of comparison discussed in the, “Amphibolies of Pure Reason,” are key to Longuenesse’s account. There is a pair of such concepts for each type of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, and modality) and each pair guides comparison at the various levels of cognition. Because the first three pairs relate most directly to the acquisition of the categories, I will focus on these.⁴⁵ These pairs are identity and difference, agreement and conflict, and inner and outer. Whether these rules are empirical or transcendental, they govern the privileging of common “marks” or characteristics and the disregarding differences. Empirically, perceptually, these rules facilitate attending to and anticipating only certain properties of objects. For instance, when I walk through a familiar room I do not attend to all the features of each object in the room, but only to the general properties of objects which I must perceive to continue my activity. I can also already anticipate how these properties will present given my experience with the setting. This allows one to anticipate how objects will occupy the perceptual field without yet *judging* how things are or subordinating universals and the marks that fall under them. To put the difference here another way, the part – whole relationship that governs apprehension (the holism of intuitions) is not the part – whole relationship that governs judgment (subordination).

Longuenesse argues that despite this difference, rules of apprehension can still be considered universal because their application is repeatable and thus already extends beyond particular encounters. Rules of apprehension thus *present* a concept that has yet to be *recognized* as such. Now, the *vermogen zu urteilen* remains at work here pushing toward judgment, so the rules of apprehension are in fact generated in order to be compared, comparison being the way concepts are recognized in the rules of apprehension. These concepts, in turn, are already understood as the predicates of possible judgments (already understood as rules governing

⁴⁵ On Longuenesse’s account, the pair matter and form do not guide comparison but rather characterize thinking as such.

subordination related to other such rules now recognized *as* discursive). At the level of apprehension, we compare things in order to see what they have in common or what is *identical* between them and what *differences* can be disregarded. In doing this, we develop rules which govern subsequent perceptual encounters, determining which characteristics of an object should be privileged and which differences should be disregarded. These rules will also direct the anticipation of how something will occupy the perceptual field given previous encounters with certain common characteristics.

Conflict and agreement compliment identity and difference and concern whether rules can logically be applied to the same object. I take it that at the level of apprehension we find that there are just some ways of perceptually approaching things that are incompatible. For instance, attending to the same object as both above me and below me as I walk through a familiar room would simply frustrate my ability to anticipate how objects occupy the perceptual field.

The pair inner and outer, at least on Longuenesse's account, concerns the conditions under which a rule is applied and whether the condition is internal to or external to the subject of predication. At the level of apprehension, some ways of attending to things perceptually are applicable unconditionally. For instance, in every case objects are attended to as having shape, extension, and qualitative features. Other ways of attending to objects will be conditional. For instance, if I am at the bottom of a staircase then a rule of apprehension (a privileging of certain marks) is required for my ascent and this rule will be different from the rule of apprehension that is required for my descent. In each case, a different way of apprehending or anticipating how things will occupy the perceptual field will be motivated by how things initially appear. Granted, the same basic set of privileged marks is present in both the case of ascent and descent, but in each case a certain configuration of these marks is privileged over another. The basic set

of marks are run, (the space of the horizontal surfaces), rise (the space of the vertical surfaces), angle of incline (determined by the angle formed by a line traced along the points formed where the rise of one surface meets the run of another), and the formation of successive right angles opening toward one who traverses the stairs. Importantly, it is not as if I must approach stairs with this conceptual framework in order to perceive the features important for my ascent or descent. Here, these concepts are just a way of referring to, or pointing toward, a way of perceiving and anticipating the successive presentation of points and surfaces.

With this in mind, in apprehending a staircase as ascending or descending what matters is the order in which the points determining incline/decline and the outward facing right angles are presented. In apprehending a staircase as ascending the rule is that if what is first encountered is an outward angle preceding a point and an upward/outward trajectory, then this will be the order of succession along the entire length of the stairs. In apprehending a staircase as descending, the rule is that if what is first encountered is a point preceding a downward/outward trajectory, then this must be the order of succession along the length of the stairs.

It is important to note here that determining identities, differences, agreements, and conflicts is already a part of the process of determining the conditions under which a rule applies. For instance, we apprehend stairs in terms of the basic marks common to any set of stairs apart from differences in materials, outward appearance, length, etc. This determines under what conditions we are to approach objects as stairs and apply a rule (“reproduce” the rule) which allows us to anticipate how this particular object will occupy the perceptual field. Furthermore, a single object can be ascended and descended, so there is no conflict in apprehending objects bearing certain common marks, such as stairs, as permitting both. Yet, ascent and descent conflict logically; the conditions under which we apply the rule that will allow us to anticipate

how ascending stairs will occupy the perceptual field conflict with the conditions under which we apply the rules that will allow us to anticipate how descending stairs will occupy the perceptual field.

At the level of comparing rules of apprehension, we compare rules for identities (rules which privilege the same marks) and differences (rules which are differentiated because they privilege different marks). In and through this comparison we take these rules of apprehension as discursive, as gathering common marks, where at the level of apprehension these rules simply guide perception. The part – whole relationship which governs apprehension (the holism of intuitions) is supplanted by the part – whole relationship which governs concepts (subordination of concepts which are always the predicates of possible judgments). Here again the pair agreement and conflict compliment identity and difference. Those rules of apprehension that are incompatible and would frustrate perception are now *taken to be* in conflict and those that are compatible or attributable to a common object are *taken to be* in agreement. We will also find in this comparison that some things that do not conflict conceptually do conflict perceptually. As in the case of the generation of rules of apprehension, determining identity, difference, agreement, and conflict is already part of the process of determining the conditions under which concepts are applicable. At the level of concepts, conditions on the application of rules are simply taken as such. Each comparison provides greater specification for the rules in question and makes these rules explicit as discursive.

Ultimately, comparison of these rules presupposes that we can run through and distinguish each rule as a “unit” that is part of a single “series” (the set of rules that guides perception). It also presupposes that we can “reproduce” the units we have run through and distinguished in a continuous consciousness of the process. Longuenesse writes, “comparing

representations in order to subsume them under a ‘unified consciousness’ means *generating* the awareness of a rule of apprehension” (118). Without such reproduction we would simply drop out of consciousness, we would retain none of what is accomplished by running through and distinguishing and would be unable to recognize each unit (rule) as anything or as part of a greater whole. Because we can retain what is accomplished by the process of running through and distinguishing, we are in a position to both hold what is distinguished together as a whole and recognize the “units” we have distinguished (rules) as concepts. This level of reproduction rests, in turn, on reproduction at the level of apprehension in the form of repeatedly applying a rule of apprehension when certain marks occasion the expectation of certain others. The *vermogen zu urteilen* motivates this process by providing the sense that there is a systematic whole which can be cognized as such. Indeed, once concepts are formed they are already understood as the predicates of possible judgments and the concepts of comparison make explicit the possibilities for the combination of concepts (concept subordination).

Thus far, we have traced out the development of empirical concepts, but have discussed the acquisition of neither the intuitions nor the categories. As for the intuitions, we have already seen them at work in apprehension. My apprehension of stairs, for instance, requires that my anticipation of the way the stairs will occupy the perceptual field is drawn in accord with the determinations of space as subtending figure, extension and shape, and time as subtending simultaneity (seeing the stairs as a single whole) and succession (anticipating the successive presentation of the particular manner of extension of the object.) This fits with Longuenesse’s account of acquisition in that we would not order things in this way if our capacity to do so were not motivated externally by sensible data and internally by the *vermogen zu urteilen*. Such ordering already entails the immediate intuition of a single thing, or a single whole of which an

instance of sensible ordering is a part. Yet, this does not yet get at the transcendental function of the intuitions and specifically of temporality. For this, we must look to empirical judgments and the structure of empirical judgments. Longuenesse writes,

If I consider only the logical form of the proposition ‘Some men are learned’, this proposition can be converted into another, ‘Some learned individuals are men’. In other words, it ‘can be reversed.’ But if I consider the act of thinking by which the proposition was formed, then I recognize that this act consists of the successive consideration of the x ’s reflected under the concept ‘man’, in order to compare them to the concept ‘learned’, not the reverse. From this viewpoint, just as (following Kant’s explanation in section 14 of the *Critique*) the x reflected under the concept ‘man’ can be only be subject, not predicate, similarly the successive synthesis of such x ’s is what generated the judgment considered in its logical quantity: ‘Some men are learned’. I did not perform the successive synthesis of the units thought under the concept ‘learned’ in order to determine which of them are also subsumed under the concept ‘man’, but on the contrary, I successively considered the units thought under ‘man’ and compared them with respect to the concept ‘learned’”(251).

At this level, the comparison of concepts with respect to identity and difference leads to both the acquisition of the categories concerning quantity in judgment and a transcendental determination of time as subtending the *successive* comparison of x ’s as units, the abstraction from differences between these units, and the reflection of commonalities among these units.⁴⁶ This, then, is a general way of synthesizing x ’s, of running through them, distinguishing them, and holding them together as a manifold ordered within a greater whole (in this case a concept)⁴⁷. What makes this count as an intellectual synthesis is that the x ’s are held together in the recognition of this process as a rule governed synthesis that has proceeded

⁴⁶ Unlike Allison, Longuenesse does not think that there is a distinction between formal intuitions (intuitions that have been “conceptualized”) and the form of intuitions discussed in the aesthetic. She argues that Kant invites the reader to reread the aesthetic in light of his later discussion concerning the schemata. Allison distinguishes between formal intuitions and the form of intuitions discussing the latter in terms of the structural features of time and space. His claim is that these features, rather than being a product of an innate capacity, place external demands on cognition.

⁴⁷ One question this raises is how this synthesis is related to the figurative synthesis. Considering successive “ x ’s” is different from drawing a line as a figurative representation of time. Nevertheless, we can reconcile these two moments by arguing that the figurative synthesis is primary. The idea is that we could not even determine things as distinct x ’s without already having a figurative representation of temporality. Thus, a conceptual interpretation of temporality makes it possible to render concepts temporally.

in a continuous consciousness of this synthesis. Here the form of judgment points toward the categories of unity, plurality, and totality which are determinations of objects of knowledge or objects as such. It also already suggests the schema for categories of quantity, or the establishment of the conditions under which these categories will be satisfied. What will satisfy these categories are the way things appear with respect to syntheses which accord with a rule governing successive consideration of x 's and a comparison which determines that these x 's are "units" a part of the same "series" (concept). In short, objects that can be both *successively* considered and *simultaneously* fall under a rule can be considered as fitting the form of one of the categories. A schematized category thus directs us to anticipate these temporal markers⁴⁸ as markers of objects of knowledge. Thus, we *recognize* the categories as *reflected* in these temporal markers.

This still leaves quite a bit to be discussed with respect to each specific category of quantity, not to mention the other categories. Yet, such a discussion would take us far afield and what we have thus far provides a good picture of Longuenesse's account. For our purposes, there are four important things to take from Longuenesse's account. First, Longuenesse emphasizes a division of labor between apprehension and judgment, between the conceptual and the nonconceptual, or also between presentation and representation. Longuenesse writes, "the act of apprehension is the 'presentation' (*Darstellung*) of a *still undetermined concept*. The determination of the concept will *result* from the act of comparison, but the concept must already be present in an 'undetermined' state, that is, in an intuitive state, or more precisely, as a still unreflected, 'obscure' rule for synthesis" (118). Because, "universality is brought about only by

⁴⁸ Here I use the term "markers" instead of "marks" in order to note that temporality is not a property of objects like, say, roundness or blueness.

the act of comparison accompanied by the acts of reflection and abstraction,” it follows that, “the universality of the concept lies in its use” (119). In short, concepts represent the rules guiding the apprehension of common marks as universal whereas apprehension concerns marks that are intuitively and repeatedly privileged.

Secondly, and following from the first, this gives us a way of distinguishing passive from active synthesis. Passive synthesis is a running through, distinguishing, and holding together of certain privileged marks (as in the above example of stairs) where there is no recognition of a concept. The kind of synthesis at work or the rule which governs how this synthesis proceeds is not yet recognized as such. Yet, the manifold of marks is still apprehended (intuited) as a manifold ordered within a larger (indefinitely extended) whole. Active synthesis is constituted by the recognition of a concept and consciousness of the process of running through, distinguishing, and holding together as governed by a rule which is universal, which extends beyond a particular application and can be repeatedly applied (as the predicate of many possible judgments). Passive synthesis is, then, nonconceptual and active synthesis is conceptual.

Thirdly, and now moving into problems left open by this account, Longuenesse’s does not (nor, I think, does she try to) solve the problems surrounding the legitimacy of Kant’s move from forms of judgment to the categories. Longuenesse does, to some degree, cast this aspect of Kant’s account in a different light by focusing on how the categories are originally acquired, but this does not put to rest the concerns over Kant’s account of the *a priori* noted at the end of the first chapter.

Finally, separate from the scholarly issue of whether inner affection by the *vermogen zu urteilen* is truly a central component of Kant’s account is the question of whether this form of affection really motivates cognition at all levels. Certain phenomenological accounts emphasize

the continuation of action in a milieu as the *telos* which calls on passive synthesis. This shift in focus to action may appear small, but it brings with it the necessity of a new analysis of the subject, doubt concerning the primacy of judgment, and questions concerning whether and how the subject unifies experience

Conclusion

For Husserl, a constitutive account is ultimately inadequate because there is no account of what *motivates* a move from one intentional relation to an object to another. Again, on a Kantian account the terms are slightly different because the focus is on the constituents of cognition with respect to the features of objects of knowledge rather than on the intentionality of mental states and action. Nevertheless, the general idea is that an account which places all of the mechanisms for cognition on the subject side will miss the important role the object plays in motivating cognition. True, an account of cognition given in terms of our striving to judge already entails an indeterminate object which can be determined by judgment. It requires, as Longuenesse notes, outer affection as well as inner affection. The question is whether we can really do justice to outer affection on a Kantian account.

In some ways, Husserl's career, viewed in its entirety, is a protracted struggle to maintain certain Kantian insights while doing greater justice to outer affection. This eventually sees Husserl moving to genetic phenomenology in which, for example, a move to an explicitly epistemic relation to an object is accounted for in terms of how an object which frustrates

intentions at the level of apprehension motivates this move. Here we will see that Husserl maintains something of Kant's formal semantics in his accounts of passive synthesis and types. Even here there are, however, inadequacies which make it clear that only when we view the subject as embodied and among objects of perception which solicit action can we do justice to outer affection and indeed to the idea of nonconceptual content. Here, it will be important to attend to how synthesis, subject, and imagination are related in the body and what kinds of difficulties these notions might give rise to outside of a strictly Kantian context.

Chapter 4

Horizon, Temporality, and Synthesis

Introduction

In working through Kant's account of conceptuality in the Critique our question about what requires us to see certain content as nonconceptual has transformed somewhat. It is now a question about what kind of syntheses and what kind of subject can possibly support such content and why such syntheses and such a subject are required to fully account for experience. For Kant the categories of the understanding are necessary for the transcendental unity of apperception and every aspect of experience must, in some way or other, fall under this transcendental unity to be anything for us at all. Thus, the categories must either govern all levels of synthesis or (as on Longuenesse's reading) must be presented in some form even at the level of apprehension. Yet, we have good reasons to doubt whether the categories Kant believes are at work in experience can be secured by way of a transcendental deduction and this thus undermines Kant's account of synthesis. In his later work, particularly in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl formulates an alternate account of synthesis by developing ideas found in the A deduction of the Critique and attempts to reconcile transcendental subjectivity with empirical subjectivity. Ultimately, Husserl accounts for synthesis by way of something very close to Longuenesse's concepts of comparison⁴⁹ and

⁴⁹ Allison has worried that Longuenesse's account leaves the categories without any real work to do. All the work usually attributed to the categories is already accomplished by the concepts of comparison. The categories become

attempts to reconcile transcendental subjectivity with empirical subjectivity by way of something very close to original acquisition.

The important difference between Husserl and Longuenesse's Kant is that for Husserl apprehension at the level of passivity is not yet even the presentation of a concept. Husserl draws a clear distinction between similarity which approaches uniformity on the one hand and identity on the other. Strictly speaking, the former cannot be a matter of identity because at the level of apprehension things are numerically distinct and governed by the spatiotemporal horizon of experience. Subordination by way of determining what is identical necessarily involves abstracting from numerical distinction. Terminological differences aside, on Longuenesse's account Kant would agree with this distinction, but would insist that whatever is constituted at the level of passive synthesis is already in a form that is recognizable (though not yet recognized) as a concept of the understanding. For Husserl, spontaneity is not simply waiting to welcome the deliverances of receptivity home; the operation of spontaneity entails a shift in intentional attitude which is accompanied by the genesis of conceptual content.

Nevertheless, even for Husserl the deliverances of receptivity are anticipated in spontaneity, just not as strictly as on Kant's account and not in a way that is tied so directly to Newtonian physics. For Husserl, we can develop an account of the a priori principles at work at all levels of synthesis through what he calls eidetic variation. Again, this involves imaginatively varying an object to determine what is essential to it being the type of object it is or, at the most extreme end of variation, what features an object must have to be an intentional object at all.

products rather than instruments of production on this account. This may be controversial as a reading of Kant, but diminishing and subverting the role of the categories while maintaining some mechanism by which synthesis can be accomplished is just what Husserl aims for.

Despite this difference, I think Longuenesse's analysis can help to sharpen some of Husserl's insights concerning synthesis.

My aim in this chapter is to lay the groundwork for discussing Husserl's views on associative and spatial syntheses in the following two chapters. I will offer a general account of how synthesis operates in Husserl's later phenomenology, including a discussion of how synthesis relates to subjectivity and argue that the Husserlian account of synthesis can only be successful if it is rooted in the body. I will then discuss, in a rather schematic fashion, Husserl's account of temporal synthesis and its relation to Kant's account of temporal synthesis. While Husserl's account of temporality is deserving of much more attention, I am confining myself to discussing it in only as much detail as is required to develop my account of nonconceptual content. Having laid the groundwork, I will in chapter five discuss associative synthesis, the contribution Longuenesse's work can make to our understanding of this kind of synthesis, and compare and contrast Husserl's account of experiential content with other accounts in order to develop the idea of epistemic neutrality. In chapter six I will discuss spatial synthesis and embodied subjectivity.

Phenomenology and Synthesis

When discussing passive synthesis and nonconceptual content, Husserl evokes both Hume's and Kant's accounts of imagination. Husserl attempts to give an account of anticipation in its formal and transcendental function as well as its function with respect to particular objects

and particular types of objects. Thus, Husserl attempts to strike a balance between Hume and Kant, discussing the horizon within which objects are situated in terms of “induction” while also drawing on the Aesthetic in his analysis of the formal features of the horizon. Husserl writes,

Every experience of a particular thing has its internal horizon, and by “horizon” is meant here the induction which belongs essentially to every experience and is inseparable from it, being in the experience itself. [...] This original “induction” or anticipation turns out to be a variant mode of originally constitutive activities of cognition, of an activity and an original intention, therefore a mode of “intentionality” which anticipateively aims beyond a core of givenness. However, this aiming-beyond is not only the anticipation of determinations which, insofar as they pertain to this object of experience, are now expected; in another respect it is also an aiming-beyond the thing itself with all its anticipated possibilities of subsequent determinations, i.e., an aiming-beyond to other objects of which we are aware at the same time, although at first they are merely in the background. This means that everything given in experience has not only an internal horizon but also an infinite, open, external horizon of objects cogiven (therefore, a horizon of the second level, referring to the horizon of the first level and implying it). These are objects toward which I am not now actually turned but toward which I can turn at any time and which I can anticipate as being different from what I now experience or as similar, according to some standard or another” (Husserl “Experience and Judgement” 32 -33).

The internal horizon of an object is the system of indications through which the object is apprehended. Objects are never completely available in experience, but only ever display a side or a facet. We take the facet shown as a part of a whole object because we take it as indicating further facets which we can attend to through adjusting our perspective on the object. The external horizon is the background which makes it possible for an object to be thrown into relief in the foreground. This background is not empty, but is occupied by objects which are (under normal conditions) increasingly indeterminate as we move out from our current point of focus. One part of this indeterminacy concerns the diminishing availability of sensible information. Somebody walking through the room in which I am now sitting may for a moment capture my interest, but as I return to writing become a shadowy figure at the distant periphery of my vision.

Another part of this indeterminacy, the more important part, concerns the diminishing specificity with which systems of indication indicate how I should position my body and parts of my body in order to make further facets of an object available. As my focus falls to the lamp, I anticipate the location of the on/off switch according to what the facet facing me indicates. On my periphery sits a cup of coffee, and I have just enough of it in view to reach for its handle as I rise to shut off the lamp. Beyond the coffee and the lamp, my apartment is a familiar setting, but the objects that occupy my apartment and which are not the focus of my immediate attention are not explicitly indicated by what I now attend to. Nonetheless, the apartment is “synthesized” as a familiar whole because I know how I must position myself in order to tie my action into the system of indications constituting the internal horizon of each of the objects there. Thus, my sense of the layout of the apartment is not synthesized through an accounting of each individual object and its coordinates. Rather it is synthesized through knowing that I can get around the apartment and that despite the varying objects I will find there the presented facet of each object will indicate how it is to be explored, manipulated, or taken. The facet that is presented will indicate where and how it will yield to and resist my means of perceiving and exploring it (sponges can be lifted and squeezed in one hand while sofas cannot, certain lights shine so brightly they repel the gaze while others are gentle and inviting, etc.). This is also the case for the shape of and the paths of least resistance through the apartment. Presentation of the facets of walls, doors, passages, and large objects will indicate how I should navigate the apartment in attempting to orient myself to objects of, for instance, use, enjoyment, and curiosity.

Beyond the objects of a familiar setting, every possible object of experience occupies a *general* setting and I grasp this setting in the form of a general “I can.” What makes the setting and the “I can” general is that they pertain to the general way objects must present themselves

within any setting and the way any setting unfolds by our movement through it via the indications constituting internal and external horizons. In the case of objects and settings with which I am already familiar, my anticipation penetrates deeper into the internal horizons of such objects and further along the external horizon of such settings.

It is important to note that internal and external horizons always come together in a complimentary, reciprocal relationship, but whether something counts as an object or a setting for an object is largely a matter of how we are oriented. The buildings I pass walking down the street can be viewed as objects against the background of the city, but the building is a setting relative to the apartments within the building. I can, in turn, attend to the apartments within the building as objects against the background of the building (as I do when apartment hunting) or as settings for the objects typical of an apartment. We have, then, a series of nested gestalt structures where each structure, as well as our movement between each structure, is constituted by the same basic scheme of indication. There is a foreground, most commonly one with a depth which can be explored in the successive presentation of its facets, which simultaneously indicates and is indicated by a background, one with a breadth which can be traversed as we successively attend to the facets of objects set against it.

This basic scheme typifies every possible experience we have of objects and thus also typifies our most general grasp of the external horizon as the space of possible experience. It also makes it possible for us to develop anticipatory schemes specific to particular *types* of objects through the reliability of specific indications. For instance, when presented with a facet of a table, this facet reliably indicates an extended plane of rectangular proportions raised perpendicular to the floor on legs of an equal height. Husserl writes,

[A]s to the external horizon which belongs to each individual real thing and determines its sense, this is found in the consciousness of a potentiality of possible experiences of individual real things: these each have their own *a priori*, a group of types [Typik] in view of which they are necessarily anticipated and which, through every fulfillment by specific possibilities of this realm, remains invariant. But every particular group of types for particular real things (and constellations of such things) is encompassed by the *totality of typification* belonging to the total horizon of the world in its infinity” (36).

The infinity of the horizon Husserl discusses here is governed by the same logic of part and whole Kant discusses in the aesthetic, but is developed in terms of the system of indications within which every possible perceptual encounter is situated. In other words, every possible experience of an object presupposes a perspective that can be taken on the object and this presupposes in turn a position somewhere within the total system of indications. We cannot conceive of an object outside of this system of indications because any object that can be an object for us must necessarily be situated within this system. Hence the totality and infinity of the horizon of the world. Because Kant takes intellectual synthesis as primary, he must account for our grasp of the part – whole relationship of time and space in terms of a figurative synthesis, or a figurative representation which involves the categories of the understanding in the role of rules for interpretation and thus also the, “I think.” Rather than relying on figurative synthesis, Husserl develops an alternate account of subjectivity in order to account for the synthesis of the nonconceptual part – whole relation which constitutes the horizon. This alternate account, if successful, will allow Husserl to bypass conceptual involvement even in an interpretive role and will provide the resources to account for the anticipatory function of cognition. As I have already indicated, rather than conceiving of subjectivity in terms of an, “I think” Husserl conceives of the subject in terms of an “I can.” He writes,

Unfamiliarity is at the same time always *a mode of familiarity*. What affects us is known in advance at least insofar as it is in general a something with determinations; we are conscious

of it in the empty *form of determinability*, that is, it is equipped with an empty horizon of determinations ('certain,' or undetermined, unknown). Correlatively, the apprehension allotted to it has from the first an open, empty horizon of explications to carry out (in the 'I can,' 'I can proceed,' 'get a closer look,' 'turn it around,' and so on) (38).

Even unfamiliar objects within the totality of the system of indications are in a certain sense familiar. We already know that these are objects on which we can take a perspective and explore in the ways that we would explore any other object. Thus, the totality and infinity of the horizon is synthesized in the, "I can" and the "I can" is constituted by the basic kinds of movements and perceptual exploration which we are capable of spontaneously generating. In fact, movement and perception are mutually dependent and their reciprocation provides the engine which drives the, "I can." Each movement provides more perceptual information and this information indicates how we should move (or would have to move) in order to reveal more of an object. Any possible object which can be an object for us must be subject to such exploration. Thus we can say more specifically, as a matter of the most general kind of anticipation, that we run through, make distinctions within, and hold together the total horizon by anticipating determinable objects situated within a system of indications. We can gear into this system of indications at any given point via the reciprocating relationship between movement and perception.

As Husserl puts it: "The apprehension "object in general" – still completely indeterminate and unknown – already entails an element of familiarity, namely as a something that "somehow or other is," that is explicable and can be known in conformity with what it is, i.e., as something which is situated within the horizon of the world considered as the totality of existents, something which itself is already familiar *insofar as* it is a being "in the world"

and correlatively, a being which must enter into the unity of our flowing” (38). This kind of synthesis counts as passive synthesis because it proceeds without input from concepts.

As may already be clear, the structure of the, “I can” parallels the structure of the, “I think” in that the “I can” is an apperceptive unity and is identified with a set of capabilities (some of which we have yet to discuss) which make experience possible. Only, with respect to the, “I can” the capabilities at issue are not *discursive* capabilities. Husserl’s account of passive synthesis is also an extension of what I have called Kant’s formal semantics. Yet, for Husserl the focus is on what he calls (unfortunately not consistently) sense, which is perceptual and governed by the part – whole relationship which constitutes the horizon, as opposed to meaning, which is epistemic and governed by the part – whole (discursive) relationship which characterizes concepts. Sense has a meaning here close to how it is sometimes used colloquially, as in getting the sense of or feel for something. We get the sense of an object, any object, through perception/movement and this always involves exploring the internal horizon of the object against the background of an external horizon. An object, if it is to be an object for us at all, must satisfy the conditions established by the anticipations rooted in the, “I can,” anticipations which concern objects as such.

As in the case of Kant, these conditions are not truth conditions, but conditions of the possibility of both truth and falsity in providing the grounds for the persistent presumption that there is something to judge about or an object with all the basic features objects have, but which we can be right or wrong about in the particulars. One thing that is not yet clear is whether the, “I can” is reflexive in a way parallel to that of the “I think.” If it is not, then the, “I can” cannot provide a ground for cognition that is independent of the, “I think.” On these grounds, on the grounds that apperceptive unity must be identified with concepts (even concepts that are not *a*

priori concepts of the understanding), one might claim that all content should be considered conceptual content.

Reflexivity is important because without it there is no question of consciousness, no question of one for whom the stuff that occupies our universe is significant. Kant accounts for consciousness in terms of the, “I think” or knowing that we know. If there is no such reflexivity at work in the “I can” and if we remain committed to the idea that there are no concepts involved here, then there will be no way to distinguish the “I can” from mere reflex. The “I can” would be indistinguishable from the mechanisms governing differential responses to stimuli.

For reflexivity of any sort to be possible we need something that can provide a ‘substrate’ for reflexivity. For Kant this is reason in the form of discursivity. All concepts are discursive and the categories of the understanding are supposed to be the basic forms of discursivity. It is by this same capacity for discursive thought that we are able to grasp the, “I think” common to each case in which one concept is subordinated to another. Thus, we grasp the discursive nature of thought by means of discursive thought. Moreover, the discursive nature of thought is reflected in how we organize and conceptually gather together objects in the world or how things in the world become addressed to a knower. Two tacit assumptions at the foundation of Kant’s critical philosophy are that nothing else can provide a substrate for reflexivity other than discursive concepts and that consciousness cannot be explained without reflexivity. Thus consciousness and conceptuality must be closely aligned on Kant’s view and also on Kantian views, such as McDowell’s, which do away with Kant’s *a priori* concepts. While self-awareness is phenomenologically self-evident, it is less clear whether only discursive thought can provide a substrate for reflexivity.

As we wade further into a phenomenological account, it is also worth remembering that for Kant, and arguably for many Phenomenologists after Kant, the interesting thing about consciousness, what demands an independent account, is not qualia or ephemeral feels, but reflexivity. Given the reflexive nature of consciousness, we already know that anything which works on an input/output model cannot capture what is distinctive about consciousness or serve as a substrate for reflexivity. This is why Husserl asks us to bracket such accounts of consciousness and really any account which attempts to explain consciousness without first attending to precisely what consciousness is through phenomenological evidence. Such an approach is the best way to give an independent account of reflexivity, an account which treats it on its own terms. What the phenomenology of experience tells us is that reflexivity is an irreducible phenomenon of consciousness, that any attempt to reduce it to something else or ignore it always already employs it as a condition of possibility of such attempts.

Husserl's initial focus on Descartes in this regard brought him to the same conclusion as Kant in privileging conceptuality as the only possible substrate for reflexivity. Yet, as Husserl develops his phenomenological perspective through the years and tracks reflexivity through lived experience, he finds a trace of reflexivity in the, "I can" and the relation between movement and perception. Unfortunately, this is not yet a full account of the substrate of reflexivity supporting the, "I can". This can only be achieved through the body and its proprioceptive and kinesthetic capacities, capacities which allow the body to "grasp" itself by means of itself and find things in the world that are first constituted (synthesized) in their significance to the body. Husserl himself offers an account of the reflexivity of the body in *Ideas II* where he develops the idea that the body grasps itself by means of itself literally. In touching my right hand to my left hand, a reversible touching/touched/touching relationship is formed in which the body is both subject

and object for itself. Yet, the body must be more tightly aligned with Husserl's account of synthesis, types, and the "I can" in *Experience and Judgment* and *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* to fully account for the reflexivity required if transcendental apperception and passive syntheses of the sort he describes are to be possible. In the end, passive synthesis which proceeds entirely in the absence of input from concepts can only be fully consummated in the body as a substrate for reflexivity.

A final thing to note here is that the, "I can" is promising as a structure which draws the empirical and the transcendental together as two features of action rather than two incommensurable realms of subjectivity. My awareness that I can work through a system of indication via movement/perception with respect to one object already constitutes a performative grasp of how this capacity will be at work in the disclosure of any possible object of perception. This performative grasp is constituted by the fact that the systems of indication which we engage through perception and movement always point, precisely as such systems, to indeterminate but determinable objects, and a basic complement of capacities which makes the disclosure or constitution of any object possible. Moreover, any particular determination of an object presupposes that we have found our way to that object through a system of indication which at first indicated this object only indeterminately as a possible object of experience among others. This means that the anticipation of objects as such and the basic complement of capacities that constitute the body are prior to any particular determination of objects. The priority here is logical rather than developmental, but might also accommodate developmental views. Disclosure of an object to a subject (but, of course, not the creation of the object) depends on the object being anticipated, in its broadest features, in the capacities of the subject.

Pushing Husserl's insights a bit further via Longuenesse's account, we can say that particular schemes of anticipation (for instance, anticipating that objects will be located above, below, behind, to the left, or to the right) are *originally acquired* as objects are confronted via the basic capacity of mobility/perception. Given the capacities of our body and the shape of the world, such schemes are *inevitable* as *a priori* structures of cognition and synthesis. Crucially, being inevitable is something different from being innate. Inevitable *a priori* structures require outer affection where innate *a priori* structures would not. Yet, we need an account that assures that what is acquired is neither mere reflex nor the product of an "I think." Again, we need an account which places reflexivity in the body. Moreover, we need an account of inner affection, of how and why we take an interest in the systems of indication out in the world in the first place. For now I postpone a fuller discussion of the body and inner affection in order develop Husserl's account of temporal synthesis and his debt to Kant here.

Temporal Syntheses

For Husserl there are three different kinds of synthesis; temporal, spatial, and associative. The most basic, and thus the one we shall discuss first, is the temporal synthesis. In *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* Husserl argues that the synthesis accomplished in time consciousness, "consists, as we might say, in a universal, formal, framework, in a synthetically constituted form in which all other possible syntheses must participate" (Husserl "Analyses" 171). Here, Husserl credits Kant for establishing the temporal synthesis as primary in the first

edition deduction, but finds Kant's approach limited because, "he only had in mind there the higher lying problem of the constitution of a spatio-temporal worldly object, of an object that transcends consciousness. Thus, his question is only this: What kinds of syntheses must be carried out subjectively in order for things of nature to be able to appear, and thus a nature in general" (171). Kant's account of the threefold synthesis in the A deduction fits Husserl's description here best, so it is worth reminding ourselves of some of the details of this account.

Kant's account of the threefold synthesis is constituted by apprehension, reproduction, and recognition with respect to both single intuitions and the manifold as a whole. We *apprehend* the manifold of an intuition by running through, distinguishing, and holding together what we find there. This presupposes distinctions in time or between moments, distinctions available *a priori*. Because of the part – whole relation which constitutes the temporal span, any given intuition which has duration already indicates, as part, the infinite span of time as the whole. Thus, to grasp a particular intuition as having duration is already to grasp the manifold of intuition as a manifold (to grasp its form as determined *a priori* by determinations of time.) The *reproductive* synthesis can be understood on the empiricist model of association or induction, but Kant's deeper question is about what makes such reproduction possible. Kant reasons that to hold each part of what is apprehended together requires that we successively reproduce elements of the whole which we have already run through. If we could not do this, this would amount to dropping out of consciousness after each moment and this would preclude the possibility of representing anything.

There is another sense of reproduction at work here as well. In Kantian language, reproducing representations through association, reproducing parts of the manifold of experience (parts that themselves have already been synthesized as wholes in a continuous consciousness of

this process as unfolding within a manifold) also presupposes a whole (a “series”) to which these representations belong (as “units” of that series) such that the reproduction and the reproduced occupy the same experiential realm. Such reproductions are already, in themselves universal (deployed via rules governing association), but not yet recognized as such. To be recognized as such requires recognizing separate acts of synthesis as identical. Recognizing this identity requires *grasping* these acts of synthesis as occupying the same experiential realm, but at distinct moments and thus as transcending any particular experience. Gathering together identical acts of synthesis in recognizing them as identical, and so also gathering together the matter synthesized in these acts, is a discursive or conceptual activity. More simply, reproductive synthesis makes it possible to associate objects with each other and engage the same types of objects in the same way.

For instance, once a stair case is *apprehended* in terms of its most salient marks, anything with such marks will motivate an apprehension of the object in terms of these marks so that one can anticipate how the object will occupy space. This anticipation, because it runs ahead of what is actually present and does not rest on direct apprehension, is a reproduction of the previous apprehension. If the reproduction is not grasped as a reproduction of a previous apprehension, then it is not an associative relation that has been established for a subject. The apprehension and the reproduction are not grasped as “units” of the same “series.” When these rules of apprehension are recognized as rules they are recognized as conceptual.

Kant’s account of apprehension and reproduction are most important for Husserl’s account. Sticking with the A deduction for the moment, for both Kant and Husserl it is important that apprehension and reproduction be understood in terms of temporality because experience is only possible if we can maintain consciousness of our experience through time.

For both apprehension and reproduction, there are two ways of understanding the necessity of time consciousness for experience. In the case of apprehension, we could not run through, distinguish, and hold together what we find in intuitions if we were to keep dropping out of consciousness. We must retain what is gathered through the processes constituting apprehension in order to actually apprehend anything. This can be understood in terms of the empirical necessity of continuity in an individual's experience, but when complemented by another of Kant's insights concerning temporality it can also be understood as a transcendental condition. Whatever it is that I apprehend, it must be seen as situated within the part – whole relation between “units” of time and the infinity of time as the total “series” of units. This means that whatever the particular constitution of my empirical consciousness (I may have more than one personal consciousness or a form of consciousness that persists only for a short time, I may have lost all of my memories or be incapable of forming new ones) apprehending a single object will only be possible if we already apprehend objects in general as temporally orderable against the backdrop of the whole of time. This entails a kind of primal retention of the orderability of what is to be apprehended by which we also anticipate that what is thus ordered will fit within the total series of time; each orderable part or facet of an object will either succeed or coexist with other facets. What this amounts to is running through, distinguishing, and holding together the infinity of time through a general rule determining what it is to apprehend objects.

Reproduction is really just an extension of apprehension and can be understood in these same two registers. My experience of particular objects is only possible if I can retain the features particular to the objects I have actually encountered and recall/anticipate these features when encountering that object (or type of object) again. This is a clear empirical constraint on our experience of objects as objects of one sort or another. Transcendentally, and following our

discussion of apprehension, in every encounter with an object we reproduce a primal retention of orderability by way of a primal induction. We “recall” and anticipate the orderability of each object as successive or coexistent with other objects. Each object is already grasped as an orderable “unit” in the “series” of objects of possible experience. There are, however, significant differences between Husserl and Kant, particularly when we consider the B deduction and Kant’s account of schemata. We have already discussed some of these differences, but it is worth rehashing them here as we consider Husserl’s debt to Kant.

A question which Husserl attempts to answer with respect to time consciousness, which Kant does not, is what it is to “see” a moment of time *as* related to other moments. When we mark things as coexistent or successive, what cognitive relationship do we have to the things so marked? One of Husserl’s clearest illustrations of time consciousness, one that has become somewhat standard when discussing his analysis, concerns hearing a melody. When listening to a melody our retention of the preceding note and our anticipation of the following note are essential constituents of the experience, but are somewhat difficult to account for. The kind of retention and anticipation at work here are not the same as explicit recollection and expectation. There is no explicit regard of a perceptual object that has past or that is to come. In fact, such explicit regard would tend to work against listening as a partially passive experience and move us toward analysis, toward attending to specific parts of a performance at the expense of gathering a sense of the unfolding performance as a whole. The idea that we represent absent notes also seems to miss the mark. One difficulty here is settling on just what is meant by representation. Here, it is best to stick to the Kantian account we have been developing.

On this account, representation means cognition of the “marks” common to all objects of a particular sort apart from the concrete manifestation of these marks. With respect to this view

of representation, hearing a single note and then representing certain notes (with certain marks such as key, tone, and loudness) as coming before and after the note would be as good as listening to a song. Yet, the retained note is not the molted skin of the living present which is carried forward, dead and hollow. At any given moment during the time I am listening to a melody, the preceding note is still alive within my consciousness of the presently sounding note and the note to come is already emerging. It is also not the case, however, that the preceding note, the current note, and the note to follow are all present to consciousness in the same way, as if they sound all at once. Rather, the retained note is retained as just past and the following note is protentionally anticipated as a note to come. A note currently sounding has an aura of momentum, one that immediately suggests a precipitating prior note and the inevitability of a note to follow. There is, then, a system of indications or a horizon at work with respect to temporality as well. For Husserl, the indications at work with respect to time consciousness are still intentional, still characterized by directedness toward a perceptual object of a particular sort, but different from representational forms of intentionality.

With respect to retention, Zahavi and Gallagher capture this difference in terms of *presentation* and *intuition*. They write, “unlike episodic memory, the retention *presents* the past; it does not merely re-present it” (Zahavi and Gallagher 77). Moreover, “Rather than being a memory that re-presents the object in question, retention provides us with an *intuition* of a just past object” (78). Yet, as we have seen, presentation and intuition have a complex history within the tradition of transcendental philosophy. Indeed, we will need to proceed somewhat more precisely here to distinguish a phenomenological account from a Kantian account. For Kant, intuition is the immediate and direct cognition of a whole. The intuitions of time and space count as such because the part – whole structure which governs temporality and spatiality

requires that we grasp the whole of time and the whole of space as prior to their parts. Again, while this structure precludes the possibility of conceptually representing the span of these intuitions, concepts are at work interpretively drawing intuitions within the grasp of the unity of apperception. On Longuenesse's account, the interpretive operation of the concepts of the understanding yields the *presentation* of a concept in apprehension that is not yet *recognized* as such. *Presented* concepts account for how objects are synthesized in apprehension and perception. This means that presented concepts are responsible for the continuity of our experience of objects of apprehension and perception and that each moment which constitutes apprehension of an object is presented *via* the presented concept. This yields two ways of understanding the direct and immediate cognition of a whole when it comes to temporality. The first is synchronically, with respect a particular instance of apprehension in which, for instance, I already take a facet of the object for the whole through the presentation of a concept. The second concerns the totality of time as providing the background against which synchronic wholes are situated.

There are two things to note about this account of intuition and presentation. First, it does not situate time consciousness in terms of memory and explicit expectation nor in terms of representation. For Kant, apprehension does not yet concern the "marks" characteristic of an object apart from their manifestation in concrete spatio-temporal circumstances. Secondly, temporal synthesis does not work on its own steam, but requires, as all accounts of synthesis do, an account of apperception and reflexivity. Reflexivity is the difference between collecting successive moments on an indifferent recording device and cognition of temporality as meaningful, as structured in a particular way. We must ask, with respect to what is the totality of time intuited as a whole? Regardless of whether we accept Kant's account of the categories of

the understanding, if we identify apperception and reflexivity with conceptuality, then, given the distinction between intuitions and concepts, some account of figurative synthesis will be necessary to draw intuition within the grasp of the “I think.” The totality of time is here intuited as a whole with respect to possible cognition. Thus, if an alternate account of presentation and intuition is to be offered, one that can be fully distinguished from a Kantian account, it must be offered along with an alternate account of reflexivity.

Another important difference between Kant and Husserl is Kant’s acceptance of a Newtonian picture of time. Though not fully developed in the A deduction, Kant’s analysis of the part – whole relation which constitutes temporality in terms of unit and series will come to serve overtly Newtonian aims in providing, for instance, the ground for the measurability of objects of (scientific) experience. The interpretive function of the concept of quantity, in particular, works to provide such grounds. Other concepts of the understanding function interpretively on the intuition of time to constitute our capacity to cognize and anticipate other necessary features of objects of scientific inquiry (what Husserl just calls “nature”). We anticipate certain temporal markers as markers of objects of scientific inquiry. For Husserl, though Kant’s account of apprehension and reproduction captures the general structure of time consciousness, time is not to be conceived in terms of “units” or in terms of concepts interpretively applied.

Retention and protentional anticipation of the *orderability* of objects and facets of objects is to be conceived, for Husserl, in terms of the horizon of experience and systems of indication. We anticipate, by way of a primal retention, that objects and facets of objects of possible experience will be presented successively and coexist with others. The horizon of experience could not work as a system of indication if we did not already anticipate that objects and facets

of objects will be presented successively. Anticipation of coexistence, in turn, makes it possible for us to conceive of objects and facets of objects as (relatively) permanent (as coexisting with other facets or objects whether we attend to them or not) so that we do not take what is presented at a particular moment in a succession as something entirely new and divorced from what has preceded it and what will succeed it. The total horizon plays a role here parallel to that of the totality of time interpreted through substance on Kant's account; it provides the backdrop against which the appearance of succession and coexistence are possible. Nonetheless, for Husserl, no figurative synthesis is required because the span of temporality is synthesized by means of the, "I can" rather than the, "I think." That is, there is no need to interpret the span of temporality by way of concepts because we already synthesize this span in grasping coexistence and succession in terms of the possible presentation of objects through action/perception.

We can summarize the importance of time consciousness for synthesis by way of three requirements of synthesis. Synthesis requires that we somehow cognize that each moment is related to other moments in particular ways, that we do not drop in and out of consciousness as each moment comes and goes, and that whatever consciousness we do have (if it is to be consciousness of an object at all) is governed by the part – whole structure which constitutes the intuitions. Each of these requirements compliments the others and concerns a slightly different aspect of the necessary continuity of time consciousness. The first requirement provides a general characterization of the continuity of time consciousness. The second requirement concerns the continuity necessary for empirical consciousness while the third concerns the continuity which the transcendental intuition of the span of temporality provides and which is necessary for apprehending an object as an object. As to this last requirement, whatever the deficiencies of empirical consciousness, if we cannot anticipate and expect to retain facets of

internal horizons against the background of external horizons, whatever consciousness would be left to us would not be consciousness of an object or any part of an object.

From the perspective of a static account, a single moment might look to be enough to synthesize the span of time in an immediate grasp of the way in which any possible object of experience must be presented, even if in the next moment we dropped out of consciousness. Nevertheless, on the phenomenological account we have been developing a minimum of empirical continuity or the perception of coexistence and succession of particular objects developed through action, is required for the appearance of inevitable *a priori* structures and the performative grasp of the “I can” on the total horizon. Performance, and in fact action of any kind, requires the synthesis of a *span* of moments, if one can claim that an action has been performed at all. Even a glance or a slight shift in the eyes would count as action here.

Determining precisely how long or short these spans must be is not, however, central to this account. The point is that once we take action as productive of perception and a foundational kind of cognition, we can no longer account for cognition with a static analysis. From the perspective of the, “I can” the latter two requirements for synthesis are jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for experience of the sort we enjoy. Each engagement with a particular object already indicates the total horizon as coextensive with the, “I can.” Yet, this means that the constitution of the total horizon depends, in turn, on agents who are actually capable of navigating the world through action/perception and who are actually able to retain and protentionally anticipate experiences with particular objects such that the total horizon is indicated at all. The empirical structure of experience and the transcendental structure are mutually dependent here and coeval.

This raises a question about the kind of priority what I have called primal retention has. The problem is that if we cannot act without anticipating the orderability of objects via a primal retention, then we have reason to question any claim as to the coeval nature of this transcendental structure and the empirical process of synthesis. There are two complimentary responses to this issue. First, the primal retention of orderability is not a condition of the possibility of movement nor of the basic capacities for perception and mobility that we enjoy. It is only a necessary condition for the cognition of an action as an action. Secondly, this cognition proceeds via embodied apperception governed by the part – whole relation that governs intuitions. With respect to action, the relation between transcendental structure and empirical synthesis is just the part – whole structure of the total horizon viewed from the greatest level of abstraction. Empirical processes of synthesis are synchronic wholes which can be grasped as such only against the background of the total system of indications which is prior, as the total whole, to the synchronic whole. Yet, in the same way that a background is not visible as such without a foreground, the total horizon is not indicated as such without synchronic synthesis.

Conclusion

Though our analysis of synthesis and time consciousness has yielded a more precise account of the formal structures underlying presentation and intuition, it has left us with the questions of what kind of subject can support passive synthesis and what it is that is presented and intuited in experience. The former we shall discuss in chapter six. As to the latter, Husserl

offers a detailed account of what it is that is presented and intuited in experience in his discussion of associative synthesis. It is to a discussion of this that I now turn.

Chapter 5

Varieties of Experiential Content

Introduction

For the Husserl of *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and *Experience and Judgment*, at the level of perception, our interaction with objects does not proceed with explicit concern for the properties of objects. Such concern already involves conceptual relations of identity between objects with those same properties. Rather, facets of objects are apprehended with respect to the most basic kinds of relations that hold between them. These relations are determined by what Husserl calls *associative syntheses*. On this account, proceeding with explicit concern for the properties of objects already entails abstracting from our perceptual engagement with things in world. Conceiving of objects in terms of properties is already to conceive of objects with respect to relations of subordination, or in terms of predicates that are possibly predicates of other judgments.

This might seem a strange claim given that we often think of properties as things that objects either do or do not have regardless of whether we take note of them or not. If this is the case, then it is just trivially true that whenever we are occupied with an object we are also occupied with the properties of that object. Perception would then simply have to proceed with respect to objects and the properties of objects if it is to proceed at all. Here, we are confronted with issues surrounding the content of experience that have been thoroughly debated in the

context of determining the relation between the phenomenal and intentional aspects of experience. Discussing these issues before discussing associative synthesis will help to situate the kind of content that has been the main focus of this work and provide contrasting notions of content through which we can develop the idea of epistemic neutrality. Let me first, however, offer a brief review of apperceptive content.

Apperception is best defined in terms of holistic structures which logically precedes and order cognition, whether this cognition proceeds via intuition or concepts. Apperception of the sort I have been discussing can be characterized by three claims. First, there is the claim that subjects always grasp more than what is presented or represented as a condition of grasping what is presented or represented. In the case of concepts, to grasp a concept is to grasp it as possibly a predicate of judgments other than the one in which it is featured. Intuitions, on the other hand, are structured by a part – whole relation in which the whole always logically precedes the parts. Slices of space and time are always presented as situated within an indeterminately extended whole. Husserl accounts for the structure of the horizon in much the same way, but without the overtly Newtonian aims that characterize Kant's approach. The second claim concerns what it is that is apperceived. What is apperceived is never something fully determinate, is never, for instance, a set of determinate objects coexisting with or anticipated as succeeding a given object. Apperception is always about three things: the holistic structure which orders content, the features which any possible content must have as ordered by the holistic structure, and the possibilities for cognition within a given structure.

The third is a claim about the subject who does the apperceiving. This is the most controversial and important of the three claims. For Kant and Husserl it is the transcendental subject who apperceives. The problem that arises here is determining the relation between

transcendental and empirical subjects. Transcendental subjectivity is characterized, for both Kant and Husserl, in terms of a grasp of the possibilities for cognition within holistic structures that determine what the salient features of what is presented in experience will be and guarantee the continuity of experience (temporally, spatially via temporality, and conceptually) such that experience is possible at all. Yet, if the transcendental subject is wholly divorced from the empirical subject, the kind of content that belongs to the transcendental realm will remain somewhat insubstantial. Apperceptive content will only explicitly appear within the context of explicitly and reflectively applying reason in order to speculate about logical conditions and priorities.

This leaves us at an impasse. Speculative content appears too removed from experience to provide a convincing account of experiential content. We might try to save the approach by developing an account of such apperception for the empirical subject. Yet, can we really make sense of the claim that empirical subjects apperceive in the expansive way usually attributed to transcendental subjects? I think this claim would be hard to defend if the kind of apperception under discussion were to involve the Kantian categories. As a claim about embodied cognition, about the readiness or disposedness of the body for typical activities, and the gestalt structure of experience, I think the expansive apperception developed within the context of transcendental subjectivity can be defended for empirical subjects. Nonetheless, if it is to be something more than content we merely speculate about, it must be included in the phenomenology of experience. Here, Husserl's account of associative synthesis is indispensable but incomplete. Let us set these issues to the side for the moment and explore accounts of experiential content that take the central issue to be the relation between the phenomenal and intentional aspects of experience.

Intentional and Phenomenal Content

The literature concerning the relation between the phenomenal and intentional aspects of experience is vast and diverse. Much of the work on the issue has involved the application of distinctions and concepts developed in the philosophy of language by thinkers like Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Tyler Burge, and Hilary Putnam. There has also been work done on the issue from a phenomenological perspective by, for instance, Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson, and John Drummond.⁵⁰ Rather than proceeding by way of canvassing all of the available approaches, I will proceed by introducing key concepts and distinctions while occasionally pausing to consider specific approaches as a way of clarifying the main ideas. What I am after is a picture of the overall framework that joins these various ways of discussing content.

The first question to answer when discussing the contents of experience is what motivates the idea that experiences have content? In the case of phenomenal content, we can appeal to its self-evidence. It is evident to any conscious person that there is “something it is like” to undergo an experience. Paradigmatic examples of this kind of content are anxiety, joy, fear, pain, and pleasure. What makes these things contents of experience is not that each fills our consciousness at particular times to the exclusion of others. One can simultaneously feel, for instance, pleasure and pain. I might be eating a slice of my favorite kind of cake while a dull

⁵⁰ See “Intentionality and Representationalism” by John Drummond, “Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Mental Imagery” and *Color Vision* by Evan Thompson, and “Husserl’s Noema and the Internalism–Externalism Debate” by Dan Zahavi.

pain throbs in my thigh. The same goes for joy and anxiety. I might feel joy at passing my history exam and simultaneously feel anxious about the next obstacle. What makes these things contents of experience is that the necessary and sufficient conditions of undergoing them is our awareness of undergoing them. For instance, pleasure is not pleasure unless we are aware of ourselves as undergoing it and there is nothing more to pleasure than our awareness of undergoing it. To be clear, awareness in this sense does not require having the psychological concepts necessary for describing and distinguishing between the various experiences we undergo. Rather, consciousness of such experiences is directly constituted by undergoing them. Because we need not have concepts of these experiences in order to undergo them, this is also a paradigmatic case of nonconceptual content.

There is also, so the argument goes, something it is like to, for instance, see a red corvette. Crucially, the point is not that we will inevitably feel something about the red Corvette due to our taste in cars, our color preference, or emotionally charged events that we might associate with the red Corvettes. The point is also not that red tends to be eye-catching while blue tends to mellow in the background. These are also experiences that are associated with colors, but which are not essential to the seeing of the color. I might not find red eye-catching and might not understand when others describe their experiences of being compelled to focus on red objects from among others. Yet, this difference in the phenomenology of our experience would not mean a difference in the color. The point is simply that there is something it is like to undergo seeing red and presumably this is different from what it is like to undergo seeing blue. As in the cases of other phenomenal experiences, undergoing the experience directly constitutes the consciousness of the experience. Nothing mediates between undergoing the experience and

consciousness of the experience. This property of phenomenal content makes it demon – proof and ontologically ambiguous.

The content is demon proof because it is the sort of thing an evil demon bent on deceiving us can never fool us about. The evil demon cannot, for instance, trick me about being in pain. I am either in pain or not. The same goes for having a visual experience of a red corvette. Whether or not there really is a red corvette parked out front, if I have an experience of seeing one I cannot be deceived about having had the experience. Maybe the evil demon is even a bit clever and gives me vivid memories of having seen a red corvette yesterday as a way of deceiving me about visual experience. Yet, in this case the evil demon will not have really deceived me with respect to an *occurring* visual experience, but only about having actually seen the car. When I am deceived in this way, I will have an experience of the car *as remembered*. And having an experience of the car as remembered is, like other phenomenal content, either “on” or “off,” is something I either do or do not experience and cannot be deceived about experiencing. Even if I figure out that I did not see a red corvette yesterday, I will not think that I was deceived about having had the experience. From a naturalistic perspective, phenomenal content is ontologically ambiguous because it has duration in consciousness but no extension in space. Thus, it is difficult to say what kind of thing it is or whether, given that it has no extension, it is a kind of thing at all.

A slightly different problem in this same area is the fact that phenomenal content is undergone through a duration rather than encountered in a place. Any object that we encounter out in the world is taken as relatively durable or as having an existence that endures through a span of time in either a single place or in an interconnected series of places and which is not dependent on our experience of it. Something undergone, something that only has duration, does

not have existence apart from our experience of it. Moreover, even if one were not a naturalist, if one were a Platonist or even just a concept holist, phenomenal content would remain ontologically ambiguous.

From a strict Platonic perspective, though objects in the world may be relatively durable they are not permanent. Permanence is a feature of universal and necessary ideas. For a strict Platonist the fact that phenomenal content is contingent (one may have a different complement of experience types than others or never have experiences of certain types at all) and exists only so long as it is experienced means that it does not belong to the realm of ideas. Even if our ideas of phenomenal content were to persist in a realm of forms, these ideas would not contain the phenomenal features of experience; a concept, idea, or form of, say, redness is not itself red. Thus, even from this perspective phenomenal content remains ontologically ambiguous. We need not, however, be Platonists to commit to the idea that concepts have a kind of permanence.

For instance, concept holism of most any kind entails that concepts have relative permanence. If, as Kant thought, concepts are the predicates of possible judgments, then beliefs of the form “x is y” can be considered the paradigmatic conceptual intentional state. While it is true that beliefs can come and go as we learn new things and revise our views, they are not subject to the same kind of deterioration as objects in space. Whatever beliefs we do hold endure even when we are not considering them. It follows that the concepts constituting these beliefs endure along with these beliefs. I believe, for example, that the sun is a star and that the earth is a planet, and I hold these beliefs whether or not I happen to be actually thinking about the sun or the earth. If someone were to ask me if I believe that the sun is a star, my answer would not be that a moment ago I had no beliefs about the sun, but now that I am considering it I do hold the belief that it is a star and in a moment, when the conversation moves on, I will have no beliefs

about the sun. There are also beliefs I hold that I have never considered, but which are clearly entailed by other things that I believe. For instance, I believe the lights in the café in which I now sit are powered by electricity because of my other beliefs about lights and how lights work. Yet, I have never before now entertained this belief. Phenomenal content, on the other hand, does not work like this. I cannot have a pain that I am not now feeling or an experience of a red object that I am not now experiencing.

Accounts of a different kind of experiential content, intentional content, are motivated largely by errors in experience. That is, many of our experiences purport to be about either objects or states of affairs in the world and these experiences sometimes turn out to get it wrong. Where phenomenal contents, at least on the view we are presently considering, are not accurate or inaccurate, but are rather simply events which do not refer beyond themselves, intentional content is assessable for accuracy. We know, for instance, that we can be misled by hallucinations and illusions into believing something false about the world.

Following A.D. Smith, we can define illusion as “any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is” (Smith 23). Hallucinations, on the other hand, involve the phenomenal appearance of an object that is not actually present. I might, for instance, pass by a façade creating the illusion of a five story building everyday on my way to the subway. Once I see the building from behind, I will recognize that my experience of the building as a five story building was inaccurate. Situations like this give rise to the suspicion that experience might carry misinformation about the world in many more cases than I think and that in fact each experience is assessable for accuracy through further exploration or inquiry.

It is important to note that the way we are misled by experience is different from other ways of being misled.⁵¹ Smoke rising near the lumber yard may mislead me into thinking that the lumber yard is on fire when really someone has, quite irresponsibly, built a bon fire next to the yard. In this case, my belief that the lumber yard is on fire is assessable for accuracy while the smoke, the thing that has misled me, is not assessable for accuracy. Smoke does not, on its own, purport to represent anything, it must be taken as representing something. Experiences, on the other hand, do arguably purport to represent something in the world.⁵²

To put things more succinctly, illusion and hallucination give rise to the idea that perceptual experience is representational, or *contains* information about the world, information that can, at least in principle, be compared with the way the world actually is. There are however, two issues raised by discussing experiential content as phenomenal and intentional. First, this account raises questions about the relation between phenomenal and intentional content. Does certain phenomenal content, for instance having an experience of a red object, entail certain intentional content, in this case the representation of a red object? Perhaps intentional states also entail phenomenal states so that representing a red car in experience will entail phenomenal content of a certain sort. Or maybe phenomenal content should just be identified with qualia, with an entirely subjective experience which refers to nothing beyond itself. Reductionism is also a possibility. Perhaps intentional content really reduces to phenomenal content or vice versa.

⁵¹See Siegel, S., 2010 “Do Experiences Have Contents?” in B. Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 333–68.

⁵² There is some disagreement about this. It may be, for instance, that experiences do not on their own purport to represent something in the world, but that something is represented by experiences only when we take them to represent something. I will discuss this general idea more in the pages to come. See also Travis, C., 2004. “The Silence of the Senses,” *Mind*, 113 (449): 57–94.

Secondly, if our intentional states are only related to the world through representations, are these representations to be considered as intermediaries between ourselves and the world? If so, how can we be sure that we are related to the world at all? It could be that there is no world beyond these representations. As Smith and McIntyre point out, illusion suggests that intentional relations are conception - dependent while hallucination suggests that they are existence - independent.⁵³ As to conception - dependence, the fact that we can be wrong about a specified object suggests that objects are always, “experienced *in a particular way or under a description or under a particular conception*” (Drummond 2). When I encounter the building with the façade, I experience the building as, or under the description of, a five story building rather than a three story building. Note that if my intentional relation to an object is conception dependent, then even when I have an experience that corrects my prior experiences of the object, the corrective experience is just an experience of the object under a different description that I take to be more accurate. My conception of the object, not the objects themselves, are in every case constitutive of the experience. And if conceptions rather than objects out in the world are constitutive of experience, then it should be possible to have an experience of an object whether or not it is actually present.

Existence - independence refers to the fact that we can take up intentional relations to things that do not exist or are impossible. We can believe things about Hobbits, wish that we could walk on Escher’s stairs, and intend to draw a square circle. If intentional relations really are existence - independent, this only complements the kind of idealism suggested by conception - dependence. The descriptions under which we experience objects may be descriptions of objects that do not actually exist.

⁵³ Smith, D.W. and McIntyre, R. (1984) *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Now that we have our two basic kinds of content laid out we can discuss different accounts of how these different kinds of contents are related. This will involve discussing different views of what it is for an experience to be representational and whether it is appropriate to think of experience as representational at all. For instance, some thinkers take representation to be a dyadic intentional relation between subject and object. Others take it to be a triadic intentional relation between a subject, an intermediary (a representation of an object), and the object itself. Still others, namely naïve realists, eschew the language of representation altogether and take objects and properties to be directly constitutive of experience. These issues are often explored by way of distinctions within and between Russellian and Fregean accounts of content. Thus, it is to a discussion of these kinds of content that I now turn.

Fregean and Russellian Content

The issues here form a fairly intricate dialectic. So my plan is to begin by offering a schematic account of Fregean and Russellian content in this section in order to present a general view of the issues involved. In the next section, I will turn to a discussion of how these ideas are applied with respect to a particular issue, namely the issue of color content, to fill in the schematic account with some concrete details.

Organizing the discussion of intentional and phenomenal content around a few key ideas and issues will help to sharpen what is at stake here.⁵⁴ In general,⁵⁵ content is discussed as either Russellian (extensional) or Fregean (intensional) and as either wide (determined externally) or narrow (determined internally). Within most accounts of content we can also distinguish between intentional content (objects and states of affairs) and the intentional attitude taken toward that content (beliefs, desires, and intentions.) Looking first at the Fregean approach, this approach is a natural extension of the idea that experiences are conception - dependent. On the Fregean view, an experience is constituted by modes of presentation of the objects in the experience. A single object or property can have many different modes of presentation. One important thing that a theory of experience involving modes of presentation captures is the idea that experiences have cognitive significance. A classic example of cognitive significance from the philosophy of language involves substituting Mark Twain for Samuel Clemmons in the attribution of beliefs concerning the authorship of *Huckleberry Finn*. If the meaning of a proper name were just its bearer, then Mark Twain and Samuel Clemmons would have exactly the same meaning. Yet, if someone were to say that Paul believes Samuel Clemmons wrote *Huckleberry Finn* when Paul has never heard of Samuel Clemmons and believes only that Mark Twain wrote *Huckleberry Finn*, this would be to misattribute a belief about Samuel Clemmons to Paul. Though ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemmons’ refer to the same person, ‘Mark Twain’ has a different cognitive significance for Paul than does ‘Samuel Clemmons.’ That is, ‘Mark Twain’

⁵⁴The distinctions I will offer are somewhat standard parts of introductory comments in essays on this topic. Here I follow Chalmers’ approach to these issues in “The Representational Character of Consciousness” and Susanna Segal’s take on these issues in “The Contents of Perception” and “Do Visual Experiences Have Contents.”

⁵⁵ I am leaving out a discussion of content in terms of possible worlds because I think the main lines of the issues involved here can be demonstrated through a discussion of the approaches I am including. For instance, Stalnaker’s possible worlds account of nonconceptual content falls under an externalist approach to content while Chalmers’ Two-Dimensional possible worlds account is a combination of Fregean and Russellian approaches.

means something different to Paul than does ‘Samuel Clemmons’ and this is evidenced by the different roles each play in Paul’s psychology. Paul can believe, intend, and desire certain things about Mark Twain and draw inferences from the attitudes he holds toward Mark Twain and this will not entail anything about Samuel Clemmons for Paul.

Fregean modes of presentation establish conditions of satisfaction which, if satisfied by the object or state of affairs it is about, will make a belief or experience of the object true. For instance, if I believe that the guitar in the corner of the room is my father’s guitar, then a condition of satisfaction has been established by my belief, namely that the guitar is my father’s. Someone else may believe that the guitar is Tiny’s guitar. This also establishes a condition of satisfaction, one that I will believe is not satisfied if I have no idea that my father’s nickname is Tiny. The idea that experiences establish conditions of satisfaction that can be fulfilled or not provides a ready explanation for why hallucinations, illusions, and experiences of Escher drawings can be meaningful despite the fact that there may be no actual object corresponding to the experience. Namely, conditions of satisfaction are established in each of these cases that go unsatisfied.

Another strength of this view where perception is concerned is that it provides a fairly straightforward explanation of perceptual constancy. Perceptual constancy is when, for instance, a wall is experienced as having the same color despite the fact that one experiences it across different lighting conditions which make it appear to have varying colors. In the brilliant light of morning the wall may appear bright white while in the evening by the dim glow of a light bulb it may appear a dull yellowish white. Despite these varying appearances, one will not take the wall to have varied in color throughout the changes in lighting. The Fregean explanation is that a single color can be presented in different ways, just like my father’s guitar or the author of

Huckleberry Finn. A single white wall can thus be presented under the mode brightness as well as under the mode of dull yellow.

The Fregean view comes under attack for three main reasons. First, as Drummond, Zahavi, and Evans argue, it does not fit the phenomenology of experience. Phenomenological thinkers tend to favor a dyadic rather than a triadic view of the structure of experience. This is because our experience does not include experiences of intermediaries. Rather, our experiences are simply of or about objects in the world. Secondly, the Fregean approach, as suggested above, veers somewhat close to an idealist or even Platonic approach to experience in which our experiences are determined wholly by the conceptions we have of things. Finally, as we have seen, the Fregean view poses problems for the possibility of communication, agreement, and shared experiences between subjects. If my experience of things is completely determined by my conception of things, it seems to follow that if others do not share the very same conception of things as I do then we will never be able to share a common experience of things, much less communicate or come to an agreement about objects or states of affairs.

For instance, the conditions which an object must satisfy for me to count it as, say, an Elk may be different from the conditions an object must satisfy to count as an Elk for Sam. As a result, if our experiences are determined entirely by our conception of things, Sam and I will never have a common experience of an Elk. Moreover, when we discuss Elk, we will be referring to different things via the different conditions of satisfaction that we associate with Elk. John Searle attempts to save the Fregean outlook from these critiques with his account of intentionality.

As to the charge of Platonism, as a part of his analysis of intentionality, Searle argues that two conditions must hold in order for a visual experience of an object to be a veridical one.

First, “the world must be as it visually seems to me that it is, and furthermore its being that way must be what causes me to have the visual experience which constitutes its seeming to be that way.” Secondly, an account of veridical perception must also include the sense in which perception is causally self - referential. This means that,

[W]hat is seen are objects and states of affairs, and part of the conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience of seeing them is that the experience itself must be caused by what is seen. On this account perception is an Intentional and causal transaction between mind and the world. The direction of fit is mind-to-world, the direction of causation is world-to-mind; and they are not independent, for fit is achieved only if the fit is caused by the other term of the relation of fitting, namely the state of affairs perceived. We can say either that it is part of the content of the visual experience that if it is to be satisfied it must be caused by its Intentional object; or, more clumsily but more accurately, it is part of the content of the visual experience, that if it is to be satisfied it must be caused by the state of affairs that its Intentional object exists and has those features that are presented in the visual experience (Searle 49).

Again, intentionality is that property of mental states by which they are directed at or are about objects or states of affairs in the world. Beliefs, for instance, are directed at or are about objects and states of affairs in the world. Whatever is thought to be the case in a belief, whatever that belief is about, is in turn the intentional content of that belief. Searle maintains that this content carries with it conditions of satisfaction, or conditions that must be fulfilled in order for the belief to be true. Nonetheless, Searle claims that perception is a special case for two reasons. First, Searle claims that perception is *presentational*. Things perceived are available with an immediacy, involuntariness, and directness that is not carried by, say, things believed. Searle concedes, then, that the structure of perception is dyadic rather than triadic. Secondly, because perception has a condition of satisfaction that is self-referential and concerns the causal origin of experiences, perception, by way of its intentionality, cannot be considered wholly conception dependent.

So if, for instance, I see my shoe under the bed, Searle would claim that included in this visual experience is the condition that the experience itself is caused by the shoe out in the world. This condition is not formulated explicitly and is not itself something that I perceive, but is a tacit and constitutive feature of perception. Despite his careful characterization of causal self-reference Tyler Burge has criticized Searle's conception of causal self-reference for not fitting the phenomenology of experience. The main thrust of this critique is that no matter how carefully Searle characterizes causal self-reference, it will always seem a reconstruction of experience and not to capture how we actually experience the world.

Briefly, Searle responds to the last of the critiques of Fregean content by arguing that two subjects need not have exactly the same conceptions of an object or state of affairs in order to communicate successfully. Each needs only a cluster of common conditions in order to fix common reference.⁵⁶ Yet, if we take the idea that sense determines reference with a kind of Socratic strictness, it is not clear how this response ultimately dispels the difficulties.

Looking now at Russellian approaches to experiential content, we can distinguish between a stronger and weaker form of Russellian content. The stronger form follows along the same lines as arguments in favor of the idea that propositions are structured entities (composed of parts joined together in rule governed ways) involving objects and properties. That is, on this view a proposition is constituted by an object, the very thing itself, and its properties, the very properties of that thing, rather than a third thing standing between subject and object, such as a representation. For example, the proposition that the tree is green involves the tree itself and property green. This view is often contrasted with Fregean accounts of propositions which also

⁵⁶ Searle also argues for a, "*background* of practices and preintentional assumptions that are neither themselves Intentional states nor are they parts of the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional states" (Searle 19). This might also help to fix reference, but by its very definition can be no part of Fregean content.

take them to be structured, but composed of modes of presentation (what Frege called sense) rather than objects and properties. For Frege, the referents of the subject and predicate of an expression are always an object and an “unsaturated” or “incomplete” concept, respectively.⁵⁷ Thus, Russellian accounts of experience avoid modes of presentation as intermediaries between subject and object and favor a dyadic structure in which an experience is directly of or about some object and its properties. The strongest version of this is just naïve realism. One of the major problems with this strong version is how to deal with hallucinations. If hallucinations cannot be discriminated from legitimate perceptual contact with the world, on what grounds can we be certain that we ever have legitimate perceptual contact with the world? M.G.F Martin has defended naïve realism against this challenge with a disjunctivist account of perception and represents a clear example of strong Russellianism.⁵⁸

Disjunctive accounts of perception deny the claim that because perfect hallucinations of an object and legitimate perceptions of that same object are indistinguishable, they must share a common factor or be of a common kind. This is not to say that disjunctivists argue that hallucination and legitimate perception can have nothing in common. It is just to say that disjunctivists argue that hallucination and legitimate perception are genuinely different whether or not we are in a position to distinguish them. Disjunctivists of various sorts will disagree on

⁵⁷ Frege reasoned that if complete, saturated concepts were referred to, we would end up with a list rather than an informative proposition. For instance, the proposition, “Socrates is bald” would reduce to the list, “[Socrates][the concept baldness]”. To put it another way, what we are trying to say is that Socrates belongs in the set of bald things, but if we take the set of bald things to be already saturated or complete there will be no room for Socrates. And if this were the case, uttering the sentence, “Socrates is bald” would be like starting and not completing two thoughts, one about Socrates and one about the closed set of bald things. Frege took complete propositions to refer to “the true” and “the false”. Viewed from this perspective, concepts are analogous to function expressions in mathematics which return a value when they take an argument. For instance “baldness” is something like the function “x is bald.” If we plug in something (an argument) for x, namely Socrates, we get a value of true rather than false. More modestly, one can take a proposition to establish a condition of satisfaction which purports to refer to an object rather than “the true” and “the false.”

⁵⁸ See also Michael Sollberger, “The Causal Argument against Disjunctivism” *Facta Philosophica* 9 (2007), 245-267)

just what hallucination and perception can have in common and what it is that makes them genuinely different. J.M. Hinton, who first developed the disjunctivist view, developed this view in terms of language use. For instance, the sentence, “I seem to see a flash of light” looks to be true both in the case that I am hallucinating a flash of light and in the case that I have actually seen a flash of light. This suggests that hallucination and perception share a common factor or are of a common kind because there looks to be one thing, a “seeming”, that will make the claim true in either the case of hallucination or perception. Contrary to this view, Hinton argues that when someone says, “I seem to have seen a flash of light” this should be taken as a “compact” way of saying, “Either I see a flash of light, or I have an illusion of a flash of light” (Hinton 217). This statement will be true if either of the disjuncts is true and there is no common factor that could make both disjuncts true.

Here, I will briefly summarize a few of Martin’s arguments for disjunctivism. As I see it, his overall defense of naïve realism does not rest on securing the certainty of this view, but rather on casting it as the best option from among the alternatives. The main thrust is that there is no overwhelming reason to accept either skepticism or representational theories of experience and naïve realism is the most reasonable view from among these options because it is the most modest and the most phenomenologically accurate. Let’s take the argument from phenomenological accuracy first and then work from this to the idea of modesty. This argument works against intentionalist or representationalist accounts of experience and establishes the sensibleness of naïve realism. Martin argues that when we visualize an object, this visualization will rest on imagining a direct visual experience. In a direct visual experience of an object, the object is taken to be transparently and immediately constitutive of the experience; the subject takes it that the experience could not be what it is without the presence of the object. Thus, if

visualizing the object rests on imagining its presence, the object will be taken as constitutive of the experience by the imagining subject. This, Martin argues, best captures the phenomenology of visualization and can be demonstrated through introspection. Representational theories of experience, theories that take experience to represent objects rather than directly involve those objects, do not have the resources to capture the phenomenology of our experience in this way. If it were the case that representations are constitutive of experience, then to visualize an object would be to call up the representation of that object rather than to imaginatively put ourselves in a position where the object is taken to be immediately and transparently available. And if this were the case, introspection should disclose the representational nature of the imagined experience which, Martin argues, it does not.

Another kind of phenomenological but also epistemological insight on which Martin relies concerns the indistinguishability of perfect hallucination and perception. Martin agrees with the common factor or common kind view that from our perspective hallucination and perception can be indistinguishable, but disagrees with these views concerning what this indistinguishability suggests. Common factor views often posit phenomenal properties that are shared by perceptions and hallucinations. These properties are taken to be constitutive of perceptual experience such that without these properties no perceptual experience is possible. Martin argues that the indistinguishability of certain hallucinations and perceptions suggests no such thing. Nothing more is suggested than that we are not in a position to distinguish between certain hallucinations and perceptions. Moreover, if we suppose that it does follow from this indistinguishability that certain phenomenal properties are necessary and sufficient for perceptual experience, several problems arise.

Martin asks how, under this assumption, we should handle a case in which a hallucination lacks some or all of the properties that are necessary and sufficient for perceptual experience, but is still from our perspective indistinguishable from perception. One option is to argue that if an experience does not have the right phenomenal properties, it is not a genuine perceptual experience. The problem with this is that from the perspective of our commonsense grasp of the phenomenology of our own experiences, this account of experience appears overly narrow. From our perspective, something that appears to be an experience just is an experience. If we were to stretch the common factor view to accurately capture the phenomenology of our experience, it would no longer require metaphysical claims about the properties of experience and simply succumb to Martin's view of experience. We might respond with the claim that anything that is introspectively indistinguishable from perception just will have the phenomenal properties necessary and sufficient to perceptual experience. The difficulty here is that this entails that we will have an introspective grasp of the phenomenal properties of an experience and will even notice when certain of them are missing. Martin argues that such views attribute to us significant cognitive abilities in the tracking of our experiences. His view, he argues, is appropriately modest in that it rests only on claims about epistemic limitations. This, again, does not secure the certainty of his approach, but simply challenges common factor views to justify the immodesty of their approach.

Notice also that no positive account of hallucination is given. The claim is just that there is no reason to think that because certain hallucinations and perceptions are indistinguishable that they must share some common factor. Martin also makes the further claim that there is no reason to think this indistinguishability will possibly obscure the properties that make hallucination and perception different. In fact, it makes more sense to claim that

indistinguishability is only an issue for us because we sometimes find that our perceptual experiences are false, are of a different kind than those of veridical perceptual experiences. Thus, indistinguishability inherits its importance from our already disjunctive grasp of experiences.

One general problem with Martin's approach is that it rests a lot of weight on our buying his phenomenological and introspective claims. As Burge notes, the dependency thesis is vulnerable to the contention that it simply might not be the case that when I visualize an object I imagine the object as perceptually present. Regarding his claims about indistinguishability, Byrne and Logue argue that it may be possible for a mental state to be indistinguishable from perceptual experience and nonetheless not count as perceptual.

The weaker take on the Russellian contents of experience can be summarized as follows: "For any phenomenal character r , there is some property p_r such that necessarily if an experience has phenomenal character r then it attributes p_r " (B. Thompson 5). On this view experiences are not object involving, but rather attribute properties to objects or locations. Theorists of this kind of Russellian content will differ on what kind of properties are attributed and how those properties are attributed. This is a representational view of experience, but is dyadic in nature. Often, proponents of this view describe the phenomenal character of experience as attributing properties by way of maintaining causal and counterfactual relations with things in the external world. More simply, the phenomenal character of experience is described as varying in a regular and rule bound way as a direct result of the varying situation in the external world.

This view of the Russellian content of experience is in part motivated by the fact that two experiences can represent the world as being exactly the same way, but involve numerically

distinct objects. For instance, Colin McGinn argues that, “the content of experience is not to be specified by using any terms that refer to the object of experience, on pain of denying that distinct objects can seem precisely the same” (McGinn 39). If the content of experience were determined by the object experienced then experiences featuring numerically distinct objects should be different experiences. Yet, this is not always the case. When, for example, I see a black Les Paul guitar in the corner of a room one day and return the next day when the guitar has, unbeknownst to me, been replaced by an exact duplicate, the world is represented as being exactly the same on each of these days.

To save the Russellian approach from this critique, Martin Davies argues that, “we can take perceptual content to be existentially quantified content. A visual experience may present the world as containing an object of a certain size, shape, in a certain direction, at a certain distance from the subject” (Block, Flanagan and Guzeldere 314). What is represented in experience, then, is that there is *some* object *X* (rather than *the* object *X*) that has certain properties, such as size, shape, color, and location properties. In the case of the guitar, we can take “guitar” to refer to all of the basic properties associated with such objects. Similarly, we can take “black Les Paul” to specify a color property and the properties associated with the Les Paul model of guitar. Each of the days I view the guitar, on this approach, the content of my experience is just that there is some object *X* at Location *L* with the set of properties *P*. Thus, no specific object determines the content of my experience and two experiences can be exactly the same whether they involve identical, but numerically distinct objects or not.

This view also leaves room for the idea that hallucinations can sometimes take a truth value. If I hallucinate that there is some object *X* with a set of properties *P*, and there is such an object with those properties, then my hallucination successfully refers, but because there is not

actually some X at location L , the experience will not be veridical. One problem with this view is that it will predict that some experiences are veridical which are not. If, for instance, I close my eyes and hallucinate that Melissa is standing in the doorway when she in fact is, then the content of my experience, that there is some X at location L with a set of properties P is in a sense correct. Yet, the fact that I could have such a hallucinatory experience whether or not Melissa is standing in the door suggests that the hallucination is ultimately causally independent of whatever state affairs obtains in the world. This independence weighs against the veridicality of the experience, even when the experience happens to get it right.

In addition to Fregean and Russellian content, we can also distinguish between wide content and narrow content. Wide content is determined externally to the subject. The standard way of defining wide content involves “twin earth” type scenarios. If there were two intrinsic duplicates, one on earth and one on a twin earth, the contents of their experiences would arguably be different despite the fact that they are intrinsic duplicates. The contents of the experiences of Earth Man would include the stuff on earth whereas the contents of the experiences of Twin Earth Man would include the stuff on Twin Earth. This despite the fact that the phenomenal features (the “what it’s like”) of the experiences had by each and the psychology of each are identical. Russellian accounts of content often cast it as wide content. Ironically, one exception here is Russell himself who did not believe that propositions involve public objects. Russellian primitivist and projectivist accounts of color are also exceptions to this.⁵⁹ On a primitivist view, colors are qualitative intrinsic properties that are attributed to objects by color experiences.

⁵⁹ See “The Representational Character of Experience.” Chalmers argues that projectivism and primitivism are not promising because it is unlikely that objects instantiate either the very phenomenal property featured in an experience or the very color property instantiated in the visual field. It is also unlikely that objects instantiate an intrinsic qualitative color property.

As for projectivism, Chalmers writes, “*projectivism* about colors holds that colors are phenomenal properties, or perhaps that they are qualitative properties of a visual field. *Projectivist Russellian representationalism* holds that color experiences attribute these properties to objects, and that phenomenal color properties are equivalent to corresponding representational properties” (Chalmers 358). Primitivism and Projectionism involve contents that are narrow because intrinsic duplicates who share phenomenal properties will have experiences that share representational properties. If Earth Man and Twin Earth Man have experiences with identical phenomenal content then the representational content of their experiences will be identical despite the fact that they inhabit different worlds. Thus, Fregean content is also narrow content because it is not doubled in twin earth scenarios and is also finer grained than Russellian content; there are many ways to pick out a single referent on a Fregean account. The appeal of finer grained Fregean content is that it is suited to psychological explanation because it accounts for the cognitive significance experiences have for subjects.

Though it may already be clear, it is worth pointing out that the distinction between wide and narrow content can be applied to both phenomenal content and intentional content. On Ned Block’s view, for instance, phenomenal content is narrow rather than wide while intentional content is wide rather than narrow. For Block, intrinsic duplicates will have the same phenomenal experience, or experience the same qualia, while the intentional content of the experience of each will vary with the worlds they inhabit. Accounts that take both kinds of content as narrow will typically assert that the phenomenal content of an experience strictly determines its intentionality. On this view, just as sense bears the cognitive significance meaning has for a subject, phenomenal features of experience arguably bear the cognitive significance that the intentionality of an experience has for the experiencer and thus determines what the

experience is about *for the subject*. Those who argue that phenomenal content is determined externally to the subject assert a strong relation between the intentional object and the phenomenology of the experience. On many such views, phenomenology is determined by causal relations to things in the world. Such views are also often disjunctive views of experience which claim that the difference between hallucination and veridical perception has to do with the right causal relations obtaining between subject and object.

Color and Content

It is clear that the issue of content, couched in these terms, is fraught with difficulties. Chief among these is the clash between our intuition that the contents of experience are the very objects and properties experiences are about and our intuition that an account of the contents of experience should reflect something like the cognitive significance those experiences have for a subject. Some have argued that perhaps experience has both kinds of content. Chalmers, for instance, argues that perceptual experiences have both extensional contents which attribute properties to objects and intensional contents which impose a condition on the property attributed. To get a better grasp on what Chalmers is after here, how the general accounts of Fregean and Russellian content are put to work in particular approaches, and to begin working back toward a Husserlian response to all of this, it will help to work with a concrete perceptual experience. The question of how color is represented brings the issues out especially clearly. Often, the question is sharpened by an analysis of the inverted spectrum.

The inverted spectrum without misrepresentation rests on the idea that two people can have different phenomenal experiences while representing the same thing. Let's call the phenomenal experiences we associate with red objects R experiences and the experiences we associate with green objects G experiences. It might be the case, for instance, that the things Nadia experiences as G, Athena experiences as R and the things Nadia experiences as R, Athena experiences as G. To take a particular example, let's say there is a box on the kitchen table that Nadia experiences as G and Athena experiences as R. Because the inversion is global and the very same objects experienced as G by Nadia are experienced as R by Athena, whatever word the community attaches to the property such objects are seen to have will be used in common by Nadia and Athena. Both have learned that the name given to the color of the box and all things of that color is 'green.' So when asked what color the box is, both will respond, "green!" The same goes for the lime in the fruit bowl. As for the ripe Red Delicious apple in the fruit bowl, when asked what color it is both will respond, "red!" though Nadia experiences it as R and Athena experiences it as G. The question arises, who should we take as right and who should we take as wrong?

We might feel the urge to side with Nadia given our presumptions concerning the generality of our own experiences of apples and limes. Yet, our presumption might turn out to be false in some instances or it may turn out that with respect to how those in our community experience color we are in the minority. Moreover, Nadia and Athena will always agree on what is to be called 'red' and what is to be called 'green,' they will place all the same objects in the class of red things and all the same objects in the class of green things. Thus, there is no reason to claim that one rather than the other is in error. Because they agree on which things are 'green' and which things are 'red' we can say that where colors are concerned they share the same

representational content. This suggests that phenomenal content and representational content come apart. When Nadia and Athena are asked to sort fruit from the fruit bowl into red fruit and green fruit, they will agree on where the apple and the lime belong (they will both represent the lime as green and the apple as red), but they will each undergo a different experience (the phenomenal content of Nadia's experience will include apples that are R where Athena's will include apples that are G.)

There are many ways to approach this thought experiment and these often vary according to what kind of property a color is thought to be. If one thinks that color is a physical property such as surface spectral reflectance, one might simply deny that such a scenario is actually possible and maintain a wide Russellian approach to color experience. A wide or externalist approach can also be maintained by arguing that the colors of things are determined by relations between subjects in a community. Such an argument would also be an argument against what is called *representationalism* or *intentionalism* which is the claim that phenomenal content has representational properties. On this view, the fact that Athena and Nadia are in a community where everyone sorts the very same things into the class of "green things" just means that those things *look* green to all of those in the community. In disputes, experts can be deferred to as in a case where we are, for instance, corrected by a painter who tells us that a certain shade is in fact blue rather than green. Block's more recent formulation of color inversion is a particularly strong version of this kind of externalism. Block's inversion scenario is constructed in order to avoid issues surrounding the biological possibility of the kind of inversion scenario used above. Block asks us to imagine an inverted world in which the sky is yellow rather than blue, but in which the color term indexed to yellow is "blue." He then asks that we imagine that we have travelled to this planet and have been fitted with inversion lenses such that we experience the sky

on inverted earth to have the same color as our own blue sky. On arrival we decide to adopt the concepts of the inhabitants. Block argues that the intentional content of our experience will then be decided by the community whose concepts we have adopted. Thus, when we view the sky through our inversion lenses which makes it appear blue the intentional content of the experience will represent the sky as yellow.

Dretske favors an externalist account, but develops this account in terms of the functional properties of sensory systems and supports representationalism.⁶⁰ Dretske argues that sensory systems evolve to serve a purpose for the organism of which they are a part. This function is to provide information about the external environment. Thus, the information or content a sensory system is fit to carry is fixed by the function the system has evolved to serve. The auditory system, for instance, has evolved to carry information about sound, such as its intensity, pitch, timbre, and direction. A sensory system carries information because each of the states it is capable of holding corresponds to a value for the relevant properties of the sense object. Presumably the state can be any arbitrary state within a given sensory system as long as it is suited to carry information that is fixed by evolution. If this is the case, different states within a sense modality can carry the same information. So even though the visual systems of Athena and Nadia occupy different states when each is in the presence of an apple, these states can carry the same information if the right kind of causal relation between these states and the apple is maintained. This means that phenomenal content has representational properties by virtue of the information it carries. Dretske argues that the color experienced is simply experienced as the

⁶⁰ Tye offers an account along these lines as well. He writes, "If optimal conditions were to obtain, *S* would be tokened in creature *c* if and only if *P* were the case; moreover, in these circumstances, *S* would be tokened in *c* because *P* is the case" (Tye 136). Elsewhere, he specifies what he means by optimal conditions. He writes, "In the case of evolved creatures, it is natural to hold that such conditions for vision involve the various components of the visual system operating as they were designed to do in the sort of external environment in which they were designed to operate" (138).

color of the object itself. As for Dretske's view of Block's inverted world scenario, his position is summed up nicely by Tye who writes, "the sensory state that nature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in which your species evolved will continue to do just that even if through time, on Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually caused in you by looking at yellow things" (Tye 119).

It is difficult to accept, as Block does, that phenomenal content has no representational properties at all. Block's view does not fit the phenomenology of experience because the phenomenal features of many experiences are experienced *as* features of objects in the world. Dretske's view fits the phenomenology of experience better, but because his account of content is tied to the evolution of sensory functions designed to carry information he must deny content to any sentient being without an evolutionary history. For instance, if a duplicate of me were spontaneously formed outside of the scope evolution by way of a freak accident (the infamous swampman, for instance), we would have to deny experiential content to my duplicate because his sensory systems would not be the product of evolution, they would not have been designed to carry information. This result is counterintuitive. We would expect anything with the same biological capabilities to process information in the same way or to have experiences with content. A Fregean approach offers a considerably less complex alternative to these approaches to the inverted spectrum.

On the kind of Fregean approach motivated by existence-independence and conception-dependence, the difference between the experiences of Nadia and Athena is a representational one reflecting cognitive significance rather than simply a difference in what its like for each of them to, for instance, experience the color of an apple. Just as "Samuel Clemens" and "Mark Twain" have differing cognitive significance while both referring to the author of *Huckleberry*

Finn, Nadia's experiences of the color of apples and Athena's experiences of the color of apples can be said to have differing cognitive significance while representing the same color. Yet, this view is subject to the general worries about Fregean approaches noted above. In this case the worry would be more specifically about the nature of color properties. If the properties of objects responsible for color experiences can be represented in any arbitrary color experience (in any of a number of modes of presentation), then what grounds are there for distinguishing between such properties of objects by way of color experiences? The intentionality of such experiences would be almost wholly determined by the subject while the properties of objects responsible for color experience, whatever these might actually be, would be at most prompts for experience. Yet, such properties would not be represented as prompts in color experiences. Here, we lose properties and objects as any part of the experience.

Sydney Shoemaker attempts a Russellian solution to the inverted spectrum problem that differs from this Fregean approach in claiming that objects have two distinct *looks*, one of which concerns a prompt of sorts. Shoemaker would agree that the difference between Nadia and Athena is a representational one, but argues that appearance properties rather than modes of presentation account for this difference. When Nadia sees an apple, Shoemaker argues, the apple *looks* red, but it also *looks* to have an appearance property. An appearance property is a dispositional property. Chalmers, summing up such properties, writes,

[D]ispositionalism about color holds that colors are dispositional properties, involving the disposition to cause certain sorts of experiences: for example, redness might be the disposition to cause phenomenally red experiences in a certain class of subjects in normal conditions. *Dispositionalist Russellian representationalism* holds that color experiences attribute these dispositional properties to objects, and that phenomenal color properties are equivalent to corresponding representational properties (Chalmers 359).

Shoemaker argues that dispositional properties cannot be as specific as, for instance, a disposition to cause red experiences in *me* where “me” functions as a rigid designator rather than an indexical expression. If this were the case, phenomenal content and intentional content would come apart because two people having R experiences would attribute different dispositional properties to the object causing the experience (each would attribute a disposition to cause an R experience just in *him or herself*.) Thus, the dispositional property must be something like a disposition to cause experiences in a certain kind (or maybe several kinds) of sentient being under certain conditions.

One of the strengths of this view is that it accounts for color experiences in which “inverts” and “nonverts” share representational properties as well as for distinct experiences of common objects. For instance, when Nadia and Athena are viewing an apple, one has an R experience and the other a G experience and each of these experiences has a different representational property. In R experiences, the apple looks red and looks to be disposed to cause R experiences. In G experiences, the apple looks green and looks to be disposed to cause G experiences. This also means that when Nadia and Athena are both having R experiences, like when Nadia is looking at a red apple and Athena is looking at a green apple, their experiences will share a representational property. When Nadia and Athena are both having R experiences both are having an experience of something that looks disposed to cause R experiences.

Andy Egan offers a detailed analysis of the difficulties surrounding appearance properties. Perhaps the biggest of the problems Egan notes involves maintaining the contrariness of appearance properties. Representing something as being disposed to cause R experiences should be incompatible with representing something as being disposed to cause G experiences. Yet, if we are to claim that Nadia and Athena both have correct experiences of an apple, then the

apple must have both appearance properties. This means further that the apple will have the appearance property associated with R experiences if and only if it has the appearance property associated with G experiences. If, as Egan argues is plausible, coextensive properties are identical, then these appearance properties will be identical and there will be no representational difference between Nadia and Athena's experience of the color of the apple.⁶¹

Chalmers attempts to bring the strands of this dialectic to synthesis by incorporating both Russellian and Fregean contents into his account of experience. In "The Representational Character of Experience" Chalmers attempts to determine whether consciousness is grounded in intentionality or whether intentionality is grounded in consciousness. Going the route of grounding consciousness in intentionality is often a reductive strategy in which the phenomenal character of content is treated as an inert remainder. Chalmers attempts to ground intentionality in consciousness, but not as strongly as, for instance, Searle who grounds all intentionality in consciousness.⁶² Chalmers argues that there is a specific kind of intentional content associated with the phenomenal character of mental states. Intentionality is not reduced to consciousness here, but consciousness is given priority. Chalmers begins by arguing that consciousness involves the instantiation of phenomenal properties and intentionality involves the instantiation of representational properties. He then makes a further distinction between *pure* and *impure* representational properties.

Intentional states, for instance, have *conditions of satisfaction* and in having such conditions have *pure representational properties*. The idea is that many intentional states can

⁶¹ Egan attempts to avoid these and other problems by introducing what Chalmers describes as an "indexical disposition," which is a disposition to cause, say, R experiences in *me* where "me" functions indexically rather than rigidly. Chalmers argues that, "it is not clear that this indexical disposition is a legitimate property, or that it could be shared by objects of veridical perception by different subjects in different environments."

⁶² It is important to note that this is not the same as saying that Searle identifies intentionality with consciousness. Rather, the claim is that intentional relations can only be established by a being conscious of those relations as such.

have the same conditions of satisfaction and these conditions do not depend on the particular attitude in which they figure. For instance, I can believe that the cat is on the mat, assert that the cat is on the mat, and imagine that the cat is on the mat and in each case the intentional content of these mental states will be the same. It is no part of the conditions established that, for instance, the content be asserted rather than believed in order to be the content it is. Thus, these states all have the same pure representational property of representing that the cat is on the mat. An *impure representational property* is identified with the *manner* in which something is represented. It can make a difference, for instance, whether I have really seen the cat on the mat or merely imagine that the cat is on the mat. Each state will color the content in such a way that the content has a different cognitive significance or will play a distinct role in my reasoning. For instance, seeing the cat on the mat might lead me to put out milk where wishing that the cat were on the mat will not typically motivate any such behavior. Similarly, the state of believing that something is red and the state of perceiving that something is red will have different impure representational properties. There is also a stronger distinction to be made here. Seeing an object to be red also (re)establishes the *manner* in which red is instantiated, which is as the property of an object available to vision. It is also true, however, that representing an object as a red object does not always require the occasioning of a visual state. I might have never experienced red things and still believe that red is a warm rather than a cool color.

Yet, as Husserl would argue, where color is concerned the perceptual or visual encounter is *originary* in that we could not have beliefs about redness, for instance, if we were neither acquainted with red objects nor exposed to the reports of those who are so acquainted. This also means that experiences of red objects have a different cognitive significance from beliefs about red objects; beliefs always rest on visual experiences which are direct, immediate, and

involuntary. There is also a difference in the way properties are represented in different sense modalities. For instance, seeing an object to be square is not identical to determining that it is square tactilely.

Chalmers argues that phenomenal properties are plausibly identical to impure representational properties. He also argues that this is the most plausible form of representationalism given the difficulty of identifying phenomenal properties with pure representational properties. For instance, there are a lot of beliefs I now hold which I am not explicitly considering and which, because I am not explicitly considering them, do not have phenomenal properties of any sort. Thus, it is at least plausible that pure representational properties do not require phenomenal properties. It is more plausible, argues Chalmers, that phenomenal properties entail pure representational properties given that perceptual phenomenal states represent the world as being some way or other and are thus assessable for accuracy. Yet it is unlikely that phenomenal properties are identical to pure representational properties because, again, such properties can plausibly be represented unconsciously.

There are two basic reasons why it is plausible that phenomenal properties are identical to impure representational properties. First, specifying the way in which a content must be represented will for certain content exclude the possibility of unconscious representation as does, for instance, specifying representing a red object visually. Secondly, in cases where it looks as if phenomenal differences do not reflect representational differences, the impure content can always be made more specific or details of the phenomenology of the experience can be drawn on to show how phenomenal differences do make a representational difference. For instance, as mentioned above, distinguishing between visually representing a square and tactilely representing a square shows how a phenomenal difference makes a difference to the impure

representational property associated with a perceptual state. It shows that if we were to merely identify perceptual acquaintance with impure representational properties we would not be able to distinguish between these two cases.⁶³

Having established the plausibility that impure representational properties are identical with phenomenal properties Chalmers further argues that this impure content is narrow and involves Fregean content understood as conditions on extension. Thus, representing that something is red establishes a condition of satisfaction that the world must satisfy if the representation is to be true. The condition established is, more specifically, a dispositional one. If something is represented as red in visual experience, this experience will establish a condition on the property attributed, namely that it is, “the property that typically causes phenomenally red experiences” (364). This view is not Russellian because, “the relevant representational content does not directly involve the property attributed by the experience. It may well be that the experience attributes the property of redness to an object, and that redness is a surface spectral reflectance property. This attributed property may enter into the Russellian content of the experience, but it does not enter the Fregean content” (364). This feature of the account provides an answer to inversion scenarios. Two experiences can have the same pure and impure representational properties, for instance the same visual phenomenal way of having the condition on extension “the property that normally causes red experiences” even when these pick out different properties.

⁶³ A more complex case is proposed by Peacocke and involves phenomenal differences that do not make a representational difference in a single sense modality. For instance, as I drive down the road the light pole that is nearest to me will look larger than the light pole that is 50 feet away, yet both will be represented as the same height. Thus, this seems to be a case in which a phenomenal difference (the look of the light poles) does not make a representational difference (both are represented as the same height). In response, Chalmers draws on Tye’s argument that there are representational differences corresponding to the phenomenal differences. For instance, the phenomenal differences will correspond to the representation of different angles of vision and distances.

Chalmers argues that this differs from Shoemaker's account because there is no dispositional property attributed to the object. Rather, the relevant disposition is the subject's disposition to attribute a property to an object, yet the property attributed is not itself dispositional or relational. What is attributed, argues Chalmers, is an intrinsic property. Because no dispositional property is attributed to an object, it is more plausible that the dispositional mode of presentation is indexical and, "will be something like *the property that normally causes red experiences in me*" (367). He also argues that this account does not over-intellectualize experience by claiming that subjects perceive causality along with ordinary objects and properties. The condition on extension is established non-conceptually because the subject need not have the concepts that characterize perceptual content in order to have perceptual content. Chalmers writes, "So a subject's visual experience can have a mode of presentation along the lines of *the object causing this experience* without the subject deploying the concept of causation, or of the experience" (368).

Chalmers maintains that there is a Russellian feature of experience because, in the case of color for instance, there is a physical property attributed to an object and one that is causally related to the color experience. It is just that the Russellian content of the experience is not identified with the representational properties of phenomenal experience. Thus, identical experiences can attribute different Russellian properties. Experience is not, in other words, object involving. It is "condition on extension" involving, so to speak.

In "Perception and the Fall from Eden" Chalmers introduces yet another kind of content called Edenic content in order to fully account for the phenomenology of our experience. Chalmers argues that the way we experience objects is not as having some physical property that is attributed to the object by our experience. Chalmers describes color experience as experience

of, “gloriously, perfectly, primitively,” colored objects (381). When we experience a red object, for instance, we experience that redness as perfectly and primitively instantiated in the object itself. This is the Edenic content of experience and Chalmers identifies it with knowing what it would be for something to be, for instance, perfectly blue.⁶⁴

It is not clear, however, that Chalmers’ attempts at combining Fregean and Russellian accounts of content really gets us out from behind the Fregean shroud. Chalmers suggests that the Russellian content of experience is a physical property like surface spectral reflectance, but it might be that some other property or many other kinds of properties normally cause red experiences in certain people or certain kinds of being. At best, this kind of Russellian content is existentially quantified content of the form, there is some property X that is causally efficacious where, for instance, my experience of blue is concerned. Also, it is not clear that phenomenologically speaking we experience things to be perfectly and primitively colored. A philosopher staring at a brilliantly colored red vase and explicitly considering color might come to such a conclusion, but for a person moving along a busy street wrapped up in getting to the subway, colors experience is a grittier, fuzzier, downright Gomerriic affair in which objects are, by turns, alluring and unappealing.

As should be clear, the initial intuition that perception simply involves objects and properties is more difficult to defend than it first seems. The question before us now is how to approach these issues on an account of apperceptive content.

⁶⁴ A full account of Chalmers’ theory of color would include his account of matching and the imperfect veridicality of color experience in “Perception and the Fall from Eden.” My concern here is not specifically with theories of color, but it is worth being clear about Chalmers’ position. He claims that an experience of a color is veridical if and only if an object instantiates a property that normally causes the experience in question. When this property is instantiated, for instance a property that usually causes my experience of a red surface, this property matches perfect redness. The aim of this account is to do justice to both the idea that we experience the phenomenal properties of perception, specifically colors, as perfectly instantiated and the fact that objects do not really possess those properties.

Associative Syntheses

I will begin by noting three unique contributions an account of apperceptive content makes to the inverted spectrum scenario and then provide support for this view through an analysis of associative synthesis. The main focus here will be the properties of objects as contents of experience. I will discuss objects in a more specific way when I discuss spatial syntheses and the body. The first unique contribution is the claim that “invert” and “nonvert” must have the same apperceptive content in order to be inverted with respect to each other. Developing this idea will involve specifying color as an apperceptive type associated with sight. The second contribution is a distinction between identity on one hand and uniformity/similarity on the other hand. Relations of identity shared between properties are established conceptually and are often considered to be both an abstraction from particular instances of instantiation and a reflection of the intrinsic nature of an object. In Husserl’s words, identifiable properties are, “thematized as something which is *inherent* in the individual objects and yet is not part of them; for the objects compared can also be completely separated” (Husserl “Experience and Judgment” 326). From this perspective, to be an *identifiable property* is already to be ontologically indistinguishable from other properties which can be identified in the same way. In contrast, the relation of similarity is not yet about the *identifiable* properties of an object. Similarity is neither an explicit nor implicit claim about the identity shared between properties in the deep sense above. It is a relation which maintains the distinctness of the objects which are related and

which captures the fuzzy, gritty, and Gomorric nature of perceiving on the run. Similarity is measured in degrees with uniformity being highest level of similarity. Finally, perceptual apperceptive content is constituted largely by relations of similarity/difference, but can be expanded to include some of the distinctions constituting apprehension on Longuenesse's account of Kant. This will pave the way for making two broader claims. First, relations of similarity/difference, agreement/conflict, and inner/outer are constitutive of all phenomenal apperceptive content and are key to genetic phenomenological account. Secondly, these distinctions are nonconceptual both because a subject need not possess concepts of them in order to deploy them and because a conceptual account of apperceptive content would fail to capture its horizontal nature.

Perhaps the first question to answer is how we might distinguish between similarity and identity. Husserl discusses this distinction schematically in *Experience and Judgment* and in somewhat greater detail in *Analyses of Passive and Active Synthesis*. I use elements of both in my analysis of this distinction.

Identity, Similarity, and Epistemic Neutrality

Imagine, for a moment, that you are moving quickly through your living room with the aim of reaching the kitchen for a snack. You move slightly to your left to avoid two objects you have only just glanced at, only considered so far as was necessary to avoid tripping over them. Yet, you have not explicitly considered their color or shape. You have simply assumed that they

are things left behind by a visiting niece and that you will deal with them later. Despite this attitude, one thing that has caught your eye about these two objects is that they appear *similar* in shape and color. Husserl would argue that you have been *affected* by the similarity these two things share and that this affection is constituted *passively* because this similarity was not *actively* looked for, but is simply presented in the experience. Also, because things that are similar are prominent or stand out together and in parallel from a background, similarity also entails difference in that something cannot stand out from a background unless it is dissimilar to that background. Husserl writes:

Every object affects us from a plurality of cogiven objects present in a field, and it may happen that the plurality as such, as a multiplicity of distinct objects, can also affect us as a unity. It is not a mere assemblage of distinct givens, but already in the passivity of preconstitution it essentially includes a bond of internal affinity insofar as the individual objects belonging to it have common [peculiarities], on the basis of which they can be taken together as entering into a unity of one thematic interest...In the activity of colligation which runs through the individual members there takes place a coincidence of similarity as regards what is common to them, and a distinction as regards what is different (322, translation altered).⁶⁵

Now, one of the intuitions motivating Husserl's distinction between similarity/uniformity and identity is that it seems that in order to determine what the *identifiable* properties of, for instance, the two objects are, there must be some relation that holds between objects as a condition of the possibility for the explicit consideration of whether identifiable properties are shared, what those properties are, and what distinguishes these properties from others.

Otherwise, it is unclear why exactly we would take an interest in certain features of objects or undertake certain inquiries. Husserl writes, "What awakens interest is rather *what is passively preconstituted in the coincidence of the like as individually apprehended*; this is the *one* which

⁶⁵ Husserl uses the term "eigenheiten" rather than "eigenshaften" when discussing the commonalities shared between two objects. Where "eigenshaften" can be translated straightforwardly as "properties", "eigenheiten" is better translated as "peculiarities", "characteristics", or "features". I have chosen to translate it "peculiarities" because though the phrasing sounds somewhat strange in English, it does capture Husserl's point that what we are dealing with at this level are the concrete "marks" (to use Kant's term) particular to objects.

comes into prominence on the basis of the coincidence, the identical which is one and always the same, no matter in what direction we may continue; it is this which is *actively apprehended*" (326). This relation will also, then, be the condition for the possibility of getting it wrong about objects. Objects have to show up *as* something and this is determined first by their similarity to certain things, uniformity with respect to others, and differences from still others. Uniformity is just a high degree of similarity, but this still does not yet announce *identifying* content. Beyond similarity and uniformity are relations of *sameness* and what Husserl calls *individual judgments*.

Individual judgments sit halfway between passive synthesis and universal judgments. Husserl writes, "The passive synthesis of coincidence between S and S', which was the ground of the common affection, can now be actively apprehended; we say that S and S' are the same – are p: although S still has *its* moment *p*, and S', in turn, has *its* moment *p*. Like the substrates, their [features] are separated; but in the thematic transition we make, they are coincident, and there is an activity of identification" (324, translation altered). If we say that S and S' are the same, that they share a common predicate, this is not yet to make the "thematic transition" to identification. At this stage, Husserl claims that it is a question of neither "total identification" nor "partial identification" (324). In other words, it is not a question of identification at all. Rather, a claim that two things are the *same* is about making the passively established relation of similarity explicit on its own terms, which means reflecting the numerical distinction between S and S'. I think there are two ways to interpret the claim to sameness.

The first is suggested by Donn Welton in his book *The Other Husserl*. Welton argues that for Husserl there is a difference between attributing the properties featured in a description to a collection of objects and *using* the description to pick out objects that are in some way

similar.⁶⁶ For instance, if before a toast at a party I say, “I see everyone’s wine glass is full of champagne” I do not necessarily mean to be making a claim about the identifiable properties shared by each of the glasses in the room. Some glasses may be filled with sparkling wine or spritzers rather than champagne, but at a glance they all look similar and I simply choose whatever words are at hand that communicate the idea that everyone’s glass is full of clear, bubbly, and slightly yellowish liquid. Moreover, my main purpose in this utterance is to signal that it is an appropriate time to begin a toast, so the differences in the liquids that fill the glasses do not make a difference to my purpose. Our purposes and the context of action will, in general, establish a threshold for what counts as acceptable usage. We have seen a similar distinction at work in Christina LaFont’s solution to the problems plaguing the hermeneutic tradition. The difference is that Husserl provides an account of how objects show up outside the confines of conceptual frameworks and tethers uses of descriptions to what is presented in passive synthesis.

The second way to interpret individual judgments and sameness is as relations of similarity established across the successive presentation of distinct objects. So, for instance, I might initially be struck by the similarity between two drooling, friendly, four-legged animals, but think nothing more of it. I might then be confronted with yet another such animal, and another, and so on. Through these various encounters, I might also begin to notice other similarities and eventually develop a rule of apprehension for these kinds of animals or what Husserl calls a *type*. For instance, upon seeing something with a few of the key features of dogs, I will come to expect the other key features to follow. Yet, again, this expectation is not explicit or epistemic, but is rather guided by the internal horizon of objects of this type. At this level, when I predicate something of these animals, the predicate is simply meant to reflect the rule of

⁶⁶ This mirrors Keith Donnellan’s pragmatic distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.

apprehension which operates as something closer to a rule of thumb which has built into it the possibility that things will deviate from the rule. At this level, then, the aim is not to establish a strict identity between the animals that fall under the rule of apprehension. So when I say, “Those dogs are making a mess of the yard,” I am not making a claim about the inherent nature of those animals, but rather picking out a bunch of things that look to roughly fall under the rule of apprehension. The pragmatic distinction mentioned above works here, too. Someone might, for instance, correct me and say, “one of them is wolf” to which I might respond, “Whatever. The point is that they are making a mess of the yard.” Usage is nonetheless roughly constrained by rules of apprehension as well as by a purpose and a context of action. If, for instance, I make a claim that a bunch of squirrels are making a mess of the lawn when it is clearly a pack of dog-like things, the dissonance between the way I and others view the object will motivate further inquiry into the source of the discrepancy.

Husserl also considers a special case of typification. Imagine, for instance, that we know very little about water and that for all we know water could be XYZ rather than H₂O. Husserl maintains that even such a discovery will again begin with passively established relations of similarity and difference rather than identity, relations which are then thematized in a claim about an identical feature all water shares. He writes, “the more the objects reveal themselves as they are, the more each of them enters into intuition, then all the more numerous are the possibilities which present themselves of finding likeness” (332). And, we might add, all the more numerous are the possibilities which present themselves of finding differences as well. The important difference is that here, the “folk” descriptions of water as potable and clear would serve as the, *“prescientific and...nonessential typification carried out by natural experiential*

apperception” (334). Again, similarity and difference are the two most basic ways in which objects show up for us and showing up is condition for the possibility of scientific inquiry.

For our purposes, all of this Husserlian complexity can be boiled down to a fairly straightforward point. At the most basic level, perception does not establish identity between things in the world, but at most similarity. Considering things in terms of identifiable properties constitutes a separate *taking*. In an explicitly conceptual or epistemic relation to objects, we *take* relations of similarity, uniformity, and sameness *as* suggesting identity given the identifiable properties usually associated with a specific type. One important consequence of this view is that at the lowest level perception is epistemically neutral and cannot be identified with judgments involving identifiable properties. It is important to emphasize that neutrality on the question of identifiable properties is not the same as either an outright negation of such properties or skepticism. Perception at the level of absorbed activity in which things figure in experience (roughly) as possibilities for action and perception is not in any sense an active withholding of judgment. Again, questions of judgment and identity simply do not arise at this level. In fact, for Husserl this level of perception is the condition for the possibility of such questions and it could not play this role if it were not epistemically neutral.

Consider the case in which I am speeding through my living room and moving to avoid some toys my niece left behind. Upon returning for a closer look, I notice that the items she has left behind are two blue blocks stacked neatly next to each other. The question is, did I *represent* these objects as anything in particular as I sped through the room? The answer is, no. Rather something rough, minimal, and indeterminate was *presented*. What I saw was two objects similar in color and shape to each other and different from others. Without these similarities and differences, I would have no way of orienting myself to the scene before me, but the similarities

and differences I do see are fairly rough and minimal. There is, in a sense, just brute similarity and brute difference carried by the spatial and temporal horizons of experience as well as, in this case, the continuum of color. This also constitutes the apperceptive content of the experience and also demonstrates the most general and consistently operative rule of apprehension where perception is concerned; we only attend to as much as is required given the task with which we are occupied. It may be obvious, for instance, when I take a closer look at the Christmas tree that the bulbs are red and the tree is green, but when I walk past it without attending explicitly to it there is only stark-difference-on-the-periphery (tree vs. bulbs) along with similarity-on-the-periphery (the bulbs) set in a triangular gestalt structure (the tree as background and the ornaments as foreground.) It is true that if someone asks me about the tree, I will most likely be able to tell them the colors and the rough configuration of the ornaments. Yet, I think this is only because of a general familiarity with trees and the fact that such trees are meant to be looked at and admired. If I were not familiar with Christmas trees, were not particularly affected by the one standing in my living room, and *only* ever encountered it in the periphery as I focus on other things, I would no doubt have a difficult time saying much about it.

Things that affect us more strongly are filled in a bit more and may give rise to individual judgments, but this is a matter of degree on a continuum of indeterminacy. For instance, my gaze may linger a moment longer on the shiny bulbs and a more specific similarity will be presented. The objects may be presented as *orangeish* or *reddish*, but this only serves to carve out a rough portion of a continuum, a rough type that gives a rough indication of how the internal horizon of the presented objects might be filled in. Yet, even in this case, the objects are presented as indeterminate and thus the full determination of their properties is a task to be completed, not one that has already been concluded. The relation of similarity stands as a

possibility for perception, one that is redeemed in moving nearer and regarding more closely the things that have exerted an affective force on us. We should not, however, view this possibility strictly in terms of modality or in terms of a possible world in which objects actually have fuzzy Gomerriic content primitively. It is also not the kind of possibility which suggests a determinate state of affairs as when we consider that it is possible that Josh is in Montana. The possibility presented in perception is essentially an open one, a possible route presented to an epistemically neutral perceptual capacity. Redeeming this possibility might lead us in any of a number of directions. It might ultimately lead us to a fairly straight forward judgment about colors, but it might also lead to more complex judgments about lighting conditions, angles of vision, and so on. At most, we can say that color vision as a type of perceptual activity has its own complement of typical possibilities as part of its apperceptive content, none of which are either *determinately* anticipated or foreclosed by initial modes of acquaintance at the most basic levels of perception. These possibilities can only become determinate *in-action*, in movement guided by the internal horizons of objects.

A problem here is that when we consider the further implications of this view, it appears to lead to some absurd consequences. For instance, on the view I am promoting when I step outside to check my mailbox and I see it there beyond the lawn, perception will be neutral on the question of whether the mailbox is identical to the one that was there the morning before. It will simply be a nonissue where perception is concerned. Yet, phenomenologically speaking, I think this is the case. Mailboxes are really just combinations of more primitive types. They are the type of thing that can be walked around, they are the type of thing that can be opened, they are the type of thing in which small objects are placed, they are the type of thing that can be reached into, and so on. Mine might be further distinguished by being of a certain shape and color, but

these features will also be the same as others of its type. Thus, when I see the mail box, I simply see an object with *its* features, features similar to those of the object that was there the day before and I engage with it in the way that I would engage any object of such a type.⁶⁷ If, on closer inspection the mailbox no longer has a dent in it, the absence of the dent will exert an affective force and draw me to consider the mailbox more closely. On closer examination I will find that my expectations concerning the mailbox have been frustrated and the question of identity (a question of which properties are those of *my* mailbox) will arise.

This account would, however, also have the consequence that when I, for example, turn my head away from my bookshelf and turn back toward it, perception will be neutral on the question of whether the books there are numerically identical to the ones that were there just a moment before. Yet, for the type of perception we have been discussing in which objects are not being explicitly considered as objects, this is also precisely the case. It is worth repeating that if I were to think about it, it would be absurd to remain neutral on this question because I would have good reasons to think that the books are identical from one moment to the next. But just because it would be absurd to be explicitly neutral on the question of identity does not mean that it would be absurd to be perceptually neutral on the issue. The books on my shelf have a kind of affective draw on me and afford a certain way of glancing at them, different from the kind of glance I might give a crowd of faces or a television screen. Yet, none of this entails or requires that I see the books involved as identical to those in that same place a moment ago. Thinking about *my* book shelf and *the* books on it does entail and require this.

⁶⁷ This insight shares a structural similarity with the idea that the contents of experience are existentially quantified. The difference is that here the significance of the object is constituted by the possibilities it offers for action and perception.

Despite the relative minimalism of the basic level of perception, apperceptive content is fairly rich. Here, it will be helpful to recall two of the key features of apperceptive content. First, there is the claim that subjects always grasp more than what is presented or represented as a condition of grasping what is presented or represented; the whole logically precedes the parts. The second claim concerns what it is that is apperceived. What is apperceived is never something fully determinate, is never, for instance, a set of determinate objects coexisting with or anticipated as succeeding a given object. Apperception is always about three things: the holistic structure which orders content, the features which any possible content must have as ordered by the holistic structure, and the possibilities for cognition within a given structure. Where space is concerned, cognition of the whole of space logically precedes cognition of parts of space. On a phenomenological account of embodiment, grasp of the whole is not figurative but cognized in and through the very actions we take within space. In the context of our present discussion, it is cognized in the “I can” as it relates color vision. Without explicitly considering the two blue blocks that lie on the floor in my living room, minimal affection will spark the awareness that “I can” return, inspect more closely, and step back to take more in. This also involves the awareness that the objects to be explored occupy the same space as I do even apart from articulating this fact. Running under all of this is the structure of temporality which is grasped as a single whole connecting protentional and retentional content and thus providing for a basic coherence. What was and what can be with respect to the “I can” are synthesized in the very awareness that I can return to something previously experienced and explore something a bit more going forward.

A primal retention of the typical features of objects within each sense modality form the very basic *types*, or rules of apprehension which determine expectations concerning the features

any object must have to be an object for us. These types are the general ways in which objects can be similar. Husserl writes, “The typical generalities under which the content of experience is ordered are of different levels. For example, when we juxtapose the types “fur” and “conifer” which we come by in the course of experience, the latter has a greater “extension” and is, therefore, a higher generality. The levels of generality are conditioned by the degrees of likeness of the members of the extension” (334). Eventually we get to types that are not dependent on any other type. In the case of color, the most basic type is the colored object. Husserl writes, “Thus, e.g., the universal ‘brightness’ is founded in the universal ‘color,’ which includes brightness; in turn, color is only conceivable as formed color; more precisely, the formed spatial thing itself – is the complete *concretum* i.e. the universal which, as a universal, is completely independent” (335).

I should note that Husserl’s use of “extension” here does not match the usage used in the discussion above. It is just a way of talking about similarity and sameness from the perspective of the phenomenological researcher. Also, the concrete universal he discusses is equivalent to a rule of apprehension rather than abstract relations of subordination. Its concreteness lies in the fact that it still concerns individual numerically distinct objects.

We can also say a bit more about the typical features of colored objects in order to show more clearly how there is apperceptive content with respect to sense modalities (assuming that the case of color generalizes). Colors form a relational holistic system in which the continuum as a whole precedes the parts. Single colors are only presented against the background of other colors and each color always suggests other possible colors within the spatial horizon of colored objects, or, more specifically, other possibilities in the three dimensions of color space (hue, saturation, and lightness/brightness). This holds even if we bracket Husserl’s claim that colors

are necessarily colors of objects. We would not say that someone blind from birth who is plunged into utter blueness, greenness, or redness rather than darkness experiences color. Such a person would be unable to pick out this color as one thing rather than another because there would be no gestalt against which the color could exert an affective force. In short, the continuum of color is organized by relations of similarity and difference specific to the qualitative element of the field of vision. The apperceptive content of color experience rests in the anticipation that any color we encounter can be situated on the color continuum. When colors remain on the periphery, brute similarity and difference are often enough to satisfy our general anticipation that objects have colors that can be placed on the continuum such that the affective force of these colors does not disrupt other aims we might be pursuing. It also accounts for our sense that more specific determinations of color are always possible. We know that if we turn our regard toward a colored object, we will be affected by ever more specific differences and similarities that fit on the color continuum.

The Inverted Spectrum (Again)

So where does all this leave us where Nadia and Athena are concerned? First, Nadia and Athena must have the same apperceptive content with respect to the same sense modality. This is the really important content because it is the condition for the possibility of any other kind of content in a sense modality. If Nadia and Athena did not have the same apperceptive content with respect to the same sense modality, there would be no possibility for agreement,

disagreement, or inversion where colors are concerned. Secondly, at the lowest level of perception, at the level of Gomorric content, there is not much difference in their experiences. Here we can distinguish between two respects in which the content of experience is Gomorric. One case involves objects in the background of our immediate experience, the other involves objects in the foreground of experience. To capture how the former kind of content operates, we need not even rely on an inversion scenario. Change blindness concerning the background features of a visual experience provides a ready paradigm.

For instance, Mazza V. Turatto and Carlo Umiltà have conducted studies on what is called foreground-background segmentation that offers a psychological account of passive synthesis. Their studies were designed to determine, “whether attention is preferentially allocated to the foreground elements or to the background ones. The results indicated that unless attention was voluntarily deployed to the background, large changes in the color of its elements remained unnoticed. In contrast, minor changes in the foreground elements were promptly reported” (Turatto and Umiltà 202). Given that when it comes to visual scenes, “the corresponding image formed at the retinal level can be conceived as a bi-dimensional array of *uncorrelated luminance points* activating different receptors,” it is difficult to account for how experience is comprised of “meaningful objects, where each object is effortlessly seen as separate from the others” (202 my emphasis). One explanation is that phenomenal experience is constituted by a segmentation process where retinal inputs that are, “likely to be part of the same object in the real world,” are separated from, “inputs that belong to different objects” (202). The question is whether segmentation occurs “pre-attentively” (bottom-up) or whether it depends on the allocation of attention (top-down).

While Turatto and Umiltà do recognize that top-down determinations can make a difference to segmentation, they argue that what ultimately makes any allocation of attention possible are certain gestalt principles working pre-attentively to generate perceptual units or “proto-objects” which can then be attended to. They write,

Although we acknowledge the possibility that attention can influence segmentation, we are more sympathetic with the view claiming that segmentation usually precedes and affects the allocation of attention in the visual field. In this regard, Gestaltists identified different principles that govern visual analysis during image segmentation (Wertheimer, 1923). Known as the ‘Gestalt principles,’ these heuristic processes of grouping used by the visual system join unbundled retinal visual inputs into perceptual units. Similarity, proximity, and good configuration are, for example, some of the perceptual-grouping principles that intervene in image segmentation. Once perceptual units, or “proto objects” are established, attention is then directed to one, or a few of these units in turn. As long as a given “proto-object” is attended, it becomes a spatio-temporal coherent structure, and, by means of comparison with the contents of long-term memory, its identification can take place (Rensink, 2000) (202).

In designing their experiments, Turatto and Umiltà make an important distinction between figure-ground relationships and figure-*background* relationships. In experiments involving a figure and a ground, the ground is a homogenous field on which a figure sits. The classic example is Rubin’s ambiguous figure in which one can alternately see two faces profiled in black or a central white vase. When one is attending to the vase, the faces form a homogenous background while when one is attending to the faces, the vase forms a homogenous background. From this, one might easily draw the conclusion that the foreground dominates experience. Yet, there are two problems with the data resulting from experiments based on this paradigm. First, real experience involves depth in which objects are situated as near or far. This depth forms the *background* of visual experience. Secondly, such experiments often have a top down bias in which subjects are directed to attend to certain portions of the visual field. In order to avoid this bias, Turatto and Umiltà rely on complex two dimensional scenes with depth cues in order to determine whether things in the

foreground or the background are more likely to capture our attention by testing which changes subjects capture from the presentation of one scene to the next. Changes in the foreground are captured with much greater frequency.

The argument I am making extends somewhat beyond the experimental paradigm and data of Turatto and Umlita, but I think it should follow from their experiments. Take, for instance, a case in which someone has decided to pull a prank on me and has painted my red walls green. It is completely plausible that when I wake up in the morning, given that my attention is allocated to objects which facilitate my morning routine, I will not notice this change. The walls for me are just *something-uniformly-colored-in-the-background*. The further and more controversial claim I am making is that most perception operates in this way; most perception operates under a rule which requires that only a minimum of color similarity or difference be apprehended. This claim is in part motivated by the intuition that it would be cognitively burdensome were perception to operate at the level of voluntary and explicit attention at all times. If this is true, then quite a lot of Nadia's and Athena's color experiences will be very much the same with respect to the rough and minimal content of experience. Of course, a lot hangs on how literally we take blindness to operate here. It seems clear, however, that what is being described is not a literal blindness. It is not that there is no color on the periphery of visual experience. Rather, it is that the color is rough and minimal and stands as an open possibility to be determined *in-action*, in the turning of our regard, within a continuum apperceptively indicated.

In cases where our regard is more precisely directed to objects in the foreground, we must distinguish between two separate forms of attention. The first includes cases where we are explicitly searching for something and have its properties in mind and also cases in which we are

explicitly contemplating the color of a present object. The second includes cases in which our attention is cast beyond or directed through an object which occupies the foreground of our experience. This is the kind of attention employed by experts or by those for whom an action is a matter of habit. In these cases, objects are fairly *transparent* in that we look through these objects and toward the overall aim or goal of the activity. This is not captured in Turatto and Umlita's study because though they account for the distinction between ground and background, their study does not account for action in a three dimensional space in which what occupies the foreground is not the telos of perception, but a facilitator for further perception and action through space and into the background.

A basketball player is looking to get to the hoop, a skier is looking to get down the mountain, and someone busy at his dissertation is looking to get words on the computer screen. In such cases, color content seems to be more defined than color on the periphery, yet it is not quite Edenic either. There are rough schemes of similarity and difference marking, for instance, the difference between one team and another, a snowy trail from one where the grass is beginning to show through, and certain special keys from others. To extend the vocabulary used by Turatto and Umlita, at this level the things we engage with are closer to "proto objects" meaningfully organized with respect to basic gestalt principles than fully determinate objects. Thus, nothing is *represented*. Rather, similarities, differences, and basic gestalt configurations are *presented*. Even at this level colored objects are simply presented as either similar or different and are so presented within a larger apperceptive context which accounts for our awareness that we can always make a more specific determination of color. What it is like to experience colors in this context is just to experience indeterminate similarities and differences. Completion of the action, and not the consideration of the specific nature of colors, is the aim.

And so colors become part of a peripheral foreground; they are parts of objects that occupy my attention, but only so far as they facilitate further aims.

Yet, even if we grant that Athena and Nadia share apperceptive content, it seems clear that *what* is presented in their respective experiences will be different, that *what* they count as similar and *what* they count as different in their respective experiences will be different. Nonetheless, this presentational difference is not a representational difference. Presentational content is not assessable for accuracy. It neither attributes *determinate* properties to objects nor establishes *determinate* conditions which objects must satisfy. Presentational content presents only so much of the world as is required to facilitate the continuation of an action. It is still meaningful content because it plays a role in how we orient ourselves to the world and indicates possible combinations of perception and action for further exploration.

With respect to color, what is presented are rough schemes of similarity and difference. What the determinate color properties of the object are is left an open possibility to be determined by a shift in attention facilitated by exploratory actions and voluntarily allocated perceptual attention. Upon closer inspection, we can find that things that looked roughly the same are quite different in color or, on the other hand, actually identical. We might also find that things that looked quite different are much closer in color, or discover more subtle differences among the things we took to be roughly different. These subtler differences and similarities are just not differences that will make a difference to many of our projects or routine actions, so it makes sense they would not capture our attention in every instance. Shifts in our regard will, again, proceed via pre-attentively constituted gestalt groupings or what Husserl calls passive synthesis. An active consideration of what is passively synthesized will occur when differences, similarities, or groupings of color pass a threshold and grab our attention from among other

things in the background. These thresholds can differ given varying psychological associations, interests, and expertise, but the general structure of passive synthesis remains the same throughout all of these variations. If there really is anything like Edenic content, it can only be at the level of explicitly or actively considering the color of an object.⁶⁸

This remains a *dyadic* account of experiential content because objects of perception are first presented as real possibilities for action and perception and are not mediated by representations. Given this, we can say one further thing about Nadia and Athena. Though initially presented similarities and differences in the visual field give a rough indication of what will be revealed through further perceptual exploration, these indications (rules of apprehension) do not foreclose the open possibilities of the object with respect to color properties. They simply give us a general heading which we follow until our course is frustrated. Thus, the presentational content of Nadia's experience does not necessarily exclude the possibilities presented to Athena and vice versa. The possibilities of each remain the possibilities of the other given epistemic neutrality and common apperceptive content which in this case simply establishes a common continuum on which colors can be placed with greater or lesser determinacy.

One might protest that surely if Nadia sees something black she will not take it as possibly white. It is more believable that she would leave open the possibility that, for instance, a tile is navy blue rather than black. Certainly seeing a very dark tile excludes some possibilities. There are three things to say about this example. First, if Nadia were looking directly at the tile I think this would be exactly the case. Yet, secondly, in cases of perceiving on the run the differences between, say, black and white tiles manifests as either *stark-difference-in-the-*

⁶⁸ Merleau-Ponty might challenge this concession. Merleau-Ponty argues that color experience is always a function of color and the texture of the colored object. So the red of a wooly carpet, even if it is the same red as has been used to dye my t-shirt with just the same saturation, will not be perceived as the same as my shirt. If this is true, then even the phenomenology of our explicit regard runs against the claim that there is Edenic content.

background or as *stark-difference-in-the-peripheral-foreground*. Finally, to claim that perception is epistemically neutral is to claim, in this case, that in certain modes of perception Nadia is neutral on all questions concerning the determinate color properties of the tiles. It is not that she explicitly believes that black tiles could suddenly turn out to be white any more than she explicitly believes that it is possible that the dark tiles are navy blue rather than black. Rather, where certain modes of perception are concerned she is simply neutral on these questions.

One might also protest that memory seems to suggest that perception contains something more determinate than what I am suggesting. Often, even if something is not the object my explicit regard, I will be able to report its position and color when prompted. For instance, when shuffling through a kitchen drawer looking for matches to light a candle, I might look past the recipe book in the corner of the drawer without ever explicitly considering it. A few moments later when asked if I have seen the small red book I respond without hesitation, “It’s in the kitchen drawer.” I think the immediacy of such an answer is generally taken to demonstrate that the content of perception is already epistemic or has content that is already available in the form of a judgment. Yet, the immediacy of the answer simply need not be taken to reflect the epistemic content of perception. It could just as easily be considered a separate *take* on the content of perception, one which takes the similarities and differences we have seen as suggesting determinate color properties and supplanting the neutrality of perception.

Another possible challenge to my view that rests on memory concerns the phenomenology of memory. For instance, when I think about whether the book is in the drawer, one thing I might do is to call up the memory of standing at the drawer and looking down at its contents. In calling up the memory, I re-present the perceptual situation and there in the corner of the drawer I “see” the red recipe book. Generally, this all happens very quickly and does not

involve anything like a perfect picture of the remembered object or state of affairs. Nonetheless, it seems to demonstrate that what was originally presented in the original perceptual encounter was more determinate than my account would suggest. There are two things to say about this. First, when it comes to memory, it is difficult to say how re-presentations of perceptual situations are constructed. It may be that at some point I took explicit note of the recipe book in kitchen drawer and in reconstructing the perceptual situation I, without knowing it, use memories from this explicit encounter.

Secondly, re-presentation of this sort involves imaginatively putting ourselves in a perceptual situation in order to take an explicit stand on something. Thus, our approach to the contents of perception is not the same as they would be in the case of perception on the run. Moreover, the fact that we must take such a stand suggests that the contents are not fully determinate. This indeterminacy is also demonstrated in the fact that we sometimes substitute one object for another, delete objects, and add objects to re-presentations of perceptual situations in pursuit of a picture that feels whole and accurate. I must admit, however, that these are tentative answers and that full answers would require a separate and more detailed study of memory which I cannot develop here.

The apperceptive content of experience is *a priori* for two reasons. First, even though having sight is contingent, the structure of vision experience, its apperceptive content, is not. Thus, in any possible world where there is vision, objects will be presented as real possibilities for perception and action which, in this case, concerns possibilities for passive synthesis as well as for determining color on a continuum. Secondly, apperceptive content can be established eidetically. Again, eidetic variation involves working through examples in order to determine the essential features of an object of a particular type, or rather it is to determine what constitutes

a particular type. Thus, in attempting to determine the essential features of a chair, we can imaginatively vary the appearance of a chair in order to determine what is essential to being a chair. I can, for instance, vary the color, shape, seat, and legs of the chair and still be imagining a chair. Yet, if I vary it so that there is no seat, then it is clear I am no longer imagining a chair. We can do the same with color vision, and in fact the inverted spectrum scenario is a form of eidetic variation which I have used to show what is essential to color vision. Color vision will always concern passive synthesis as it relates to a continuum of color grasped apperceptively in terms of our ability to place colors on that continuum more or less precisely. Husserl reasons that because eidetic variation relies on intellectual fantasy rather than empirical examples and derives conclusions from close reasoning, the results of eidetic variation are *a priori*.

Obstacles and Remaining Questions

There is, unfortunately, an obstacle to my reading of Husserl. There remain the questions of whether Husserl would make as strong a distinction as I do between similarity and identity and whether he would go so far as to say that experience is epistemically neutral. As to the first question, Husserl's discussions of "preconstitution" make it look as though he is closer to Longuenesse's Kant than I have described. Husserl writes, "the activity of apprehending and running through particulars and bringing them into coincidence is necessary if the universal is to be preconstituted at all and then become a thematic object" (Husserl "Experience and Judgment" 326). This makes it seem as though, in Longuenesse's language, the concept is already there *in-itself*, but is not yet *for-us*.

One way around this might be to appeal to the last of the concepts of comparison in order to define preconstitution. Rules of apprehension, or types, have the *form* of a concept because they gather together many particulars, but do not yet have the *matter* of a concept because they do not concern the purportedly inherent properties of objects considered abstractly. To consider the purportedly inherent properties of objects abstractly is just to consider them conceptually because abstract consideration makes relations of subordination possible. Because rules of apprehension do not have the matter of concepts, no relation of subordination is established and thus no specific epistemic claim is entailed. Thus, only the form is preconstituted and this leaves it open what the matter will be or whether there might be many possible matters (for instance, color understood as primitively inhering in objects and color understood as constituted by something beyond our folk understanding like spectral reflectance) that will suit a particular apprehensive form (color). This also fits with Husserl's distinction between individual and universal judgments discussed above.

As to the latter question, Husserl's account of the development of types for particular objects (for instance dogs and fish) appear to indicate that perception is not epistemically neutral. Husserl claims that individual things have typical forms which are referenced through passive synthesis. So, initial configurations of colors, shapes, and sizes will motivate the anticipation of other typical features. Seeing a four-legged, knee-high, furry animal will typically motivate the anticipation of teeth, ears, and paws even if it does not motivate explicit anticipation of a dog. For Husserl this reference remains "unthematic." Even so, it does seem as though definite conditions of satisfaction are established, however passively, however rough and minimal the things anticipated. There are two responses to this worry. First, this account leaves room for the idea that our initial sense of an object can be corrected *in-action* and without the voluntary

allocation of attention. At the level of passive synthesis, we are open to the object, open to the affective force of newly disclosed gestalt configurations.

Our anticipation, given its exploratory and futural orientation, already refers us to the open possibilities of the object within certain apperceptive limits and the object remains open because it is an *individual* object capable of offering surprises. It is not yet an object taken to have fully determinate *universal* properties which foreclose or exclude other possibilities. “Corrections” are just new sets of anticipations rooted in gestalt configurations newly disclosed in passive syntheses which, again, simultaneously refer us to the essentially open possibilities of the object. Again, it is important to note that thresholds for explicit attention will vary among people, and it might be that some find the appearance of new gestalt configurations surprising enough to warrant the voluntary allocation of attention where others do not. Secondly, if this passive element were not a feature of experience, if we did from the beginning see things in terms of identities, our experience would be different in kind from what we enjoy now. This point has already been developed in various ways, so I won’t develop it further here.

Another worry is that Husserl’s distinction between similarity and difference does too much work and might not capture more subtle aspects of perceptual apprehension. We can respond to this worry by expanding on this distinction using Longuenesse’s concepts of comparison and noting where they apply in Husserl’s work. What Longuenesse’s account makes clear is that the distinction between similarity and difference already entails other concepts of comparison. There is, of course, a difference between Longuenesse’s account and the account of Husserl I have been developing. Longuenesse argues that rules of apprehension are concepts that are not yet recognized as such, whereas on my account similarities and types (which we can

also consider as rules of apprehension⁶⁹) should not be identified with concepts. This is why Husserl distinguishes between similarity and difference rather than identity and difference. Yet, I think that whether we are talking about similarity and difference or identity and difference, these distinctions could not be maintained without drawing on other concepts of comparison. For instance, agreement and conflict clearly compliment similarity and difference. In order to maintain similarity and difference, two objects cannot be both similar and dissimilar with respect to the same part at the same time. Passive synthesis cannot attribute mutually exclusive associative relations to an object without disrupting our normal perceptual engagement with objects. Thus, similarity requires agreement, it requires that the associative relations passive synthesis attributes to objects not exclude each other.

Apparent conflict, cases where objects look both one way and another with respect to the same part at the same time, exert a strong affective force. The waterfall illusion would be one example of such a case. This is the illusion that occurs when we look at a waterfall for long enough that when we then look at the rock wall next to waterfall, it looks to be moving in the same way as the waterfall and yet also looks to be stationary, as walls tend to be. We cannot help it that such phenomena catch our eye. Husserl's explanation of such cases is that there is conflict in which types or rules of apprehension are applied at the level of perception. The rock wall looks both similar to and different from other rock walls and it looks both similar to and different from waterfalls. We are thus affected in such a way that passive synthesis, and more specifically associative synthesis, associates the present experience with two distinct and mutually exclusive states of affairs and so no definite relation of either similarity or difference is established. This then motivates an explicit inquiry in which we make an explicit claim about

⁶⁹ For a discussion of this, see Dieter Lohmar's "Husserl's Type and Kant's Schemata: Systematic Reasons for Their Correlation or Identity."

the nature of the wall. Agreement and conflict also capture an aspect of perception not specifically captured by similarity and difference. Conflict of the sort demonstrated by the waterfall illusion can be maintained in perception, even though it can only be maintained *as* a tension or conflict. Moreover, knowing that the phenomena is an illusion will not dissolve the illusion. The illusion arises because of passively established associative relations which are the foundation for and not subject to the rules for concept subordination.⁷⁰

The concepts of comparison inner and outer can, in Husserl's case, refer to the conditions under which associative relations are passively established. Most such relations can only be established conditionally rather than categorically. For instance, there are only certain conditions under which the type or rule of apprehension associated with dogs should be associated with objects of experience. Others have a categorical reach. Given that one has the capacity for vision, the apperceptive content which determines the respect in which all colors are similar is valid categorically for all objects. Nonetheless, having color vision is, for Husserl, conditional in another sense. It is conditional on the passively constituted difference between extension and color. This is how we are able to see color *as* the color of something or other. Husserl writes, Ultimately all figures are similar on the one hand, all colors are similar on the other. Thus, formally speaking, we distinguish 'the uniform element with respect to *a*' from the 'uniform element with respect to *b*,' and likewise for everything similar. We notice that already prior to making a comparison, but by virtue of such intertwining syntheses of homogeneity, red distinguishes itself from figure, that the two respective moments in the red triangle come into relief as moments and therefore exercise an affective force for itself (Husserl "Analyses" 178).

We can also see that the pair inner and outer draw on the other concepts of comparison. There is similarity within sense modalities and differences between sense modalities. As for agreement and conflict, there is no conflict in seeing an object to have associative relations to

⁷⁰ This is similar to the conclusion Time Crane reaches, but Crane works to this conclusion by way of a Fregean analysis rather than a Husserlian/Kantian analysis.

both the shapes and colors of other objects. Yet, when an object frustrates our expectations, when our initial engagement with the object passively and associatively calls up certain rules of apprehension which are not appropriate to the object, there is conflict. For instance, when I see a cup with a certain pattern I am likely to expect that it will continue around the back and will be surprised when it does not.

We should note a few important features of these concepts of comparison. First, these concepts are meant to capture modes of comparison and these modes of comparison are nonconceptual because a subject need not possess concepts of these modes in order to compare the contents of experience. Secondly, experiencing objects *as* having associative relations of one sort or another is constituted by passive comparison of similarities and differences. This content, at its most basic apperceptive level, is governed by a part-whole relation that, for reasons already discussed, cannot be captured by concepts. Thus, on a Husserlian account, nonconceptual content is not about the kind of attitude we take toward content so that nonconceptually engaging content operates like one among other propositional attitudes. Rather, the very content itself is constituted and governed by rules other than rules for concept subordination. Thirdly, these concepts of comparison deepen our understanding of genetic phenomenology. The presentation of something “as comparable” is the deepest mode of familiarity in which the unfamiliar appears. Given the capacity for sense perception, the capacity for deploying the modes of comparison, and the operation of temporal and spatial syntheses, we will accomplish the original acquisition of apperceptive content. This entails acquiring grasp of the differences between sense modalities as well as the similarities and differences typical within each of the sense modalities. These modes of comparison are thus also the conditions for the possibility of affection which, in turn, is what motivates our interest in objects.

Sometimes this interest takes a conceptual form in which the modes of comparison guide abstract consideration of the object at hand and concept subordination. The difference from Kant is that for Husserl the concepts developed are always revisable, always subject to further revelations to be delivered by affection. Affection can, its true, be directed by concepts as well as by technological advances such as, for instance, the microscope. Yet, in such cases it is still affection that establishes foundational associative relations within a larger apperceptive framework. In the case of concepts someone might, for instance, tell me that not all that glitters is gold. I might then turn my regard toward things that glitter in order to determine what the differences are between glittering things and why gold is unique among them. Doing this is, however, something like turning a receptive instrument toward glittering objects. Whatever similarities or differences there are between glittering things will have to be developed through passive synthesis before the comparison can be explicitly considered.

Finally, these insights into comparison combined with the claim that experience features brute similarity and difference offers us a way to account for the possession of color concepts in a noncircular way. If we attempt to explain our experience of red objects by way of our concept of red, we will never be able to establish where our concept of redness comes from. We will simply end up claiming something absurd like that we have a concept of redness because of experiences in which our concept of red features. Brute similarity and difference are just the fact of either matching or not matching other things within a perceptual domain. Depending on the degree of our focus, the things that match can be greater or lesser in number, and the same goes for things that do not match. At this level we do not yet experience things *as* red, blue, or green, we only experience a certain grouping of similarities and a certain spread of differences. Modes

of comparison are brought to bear on these similarities and differences and guide the development of concepts in which we consider objects and properties abstractly.

Some questions concerning how to deal with hallucination and global deception remain. These issues deserve greater attention, but this would take us somewhat beyond the question driving the present analysis. So for now it will have to suffice to offer a few schematic comments rooted in the work we have done so far. The first thing to say is that I think it is clear that the Husserlian account I have offered fits the mold of a disjunctivist view of perception. What hallucination and perception have in common is that each indicates the same possibilities for action and perception. Yet, in only one case will those possibilities be redeemable through embodied cognition, through following up on the internal horizons of the object. This will be true whether we are in a position to see it or not.

One might suggest that a perfect hallucination could support the redemption of these possibilities, but a phenomenologist has reasons to bet in the other direction. One might characterize the project of phenomenology as developing maximally specific accounts of the different intentional experiences we undergo. This will include an exhaustive account of the structure of each intentional experience as well the differences between intentional experiences. As to the latter, we know, for instance, that objects in dreams are presented differently than objects of perception. We can walk around an object and maintain a steady protentional and retentional grasp of each the facets that come and go as we engage an object of perception. As an example of this, imagine walking around a piece of furniture you are thinking of buying. In dreams, objects cannot be engaged in this way even though what is presented in a dream indicates this as a possibility for action and perception. From a phenomenological perspective, the bet is that if we could develop a maximally specific account of hallucination, the way objects

are presented in hallucination would also be different from the way they are presented in perception whether we are in a position to see this or not.

It is also worth noting a feature of dreams that might extend to hallucinations of certain sorts. Dreams are not merely the presentation of objects in an odd light, they are also suffused with a mood. A very minimal definition of mood might be something that disposes us to take things in a certain way. Being in a bad mood means that I will generally be disposed to take even small encroachments on my personal space as annoying where being in a good mood means that I will generally be disposed take things in a good light. In dreams, there is a mood that disposes us to believe, that makes us ready to believe what is presented. Analogously, it might be that some experiences reported as hallucinations really just involve the indeterminate presentation of something and a readiness to believe this or that about it.

As for global deception, the epistemic neutrality of perception and the world understood as a horizon of possibilities for perception and action challenge the assumption that such deception is possible. On the account I have been developing, perception makes no claims either explicit or implicit about the deep nature of things and requires only a horizon within which action and perception are possible and which can be grasped apperceptively. As long as these conditions are met, the subject just does occupy a world, however that world has come about and whatever the deep nature of that world really is and the subject cannot be mistaken about this. Moreover even if we do not have a grasp of the deep nature of the world, this does nothing to undermine the fact that the possibilities for action and perception always remain real possibilities afforded by objects in the world. An evil demon might deceive us by making us more disposed to believe certain ridiculous things, but at the point this disrupts the apperceptive and horizontal continuity of the world, the evil demon will have undermined the conditions necessary for a

subject to have meaningful experiences and so the conditions under which the subject can be meaningfully deceived. In other words, the conditions under which we can have a meaningful world are objective and cannot be tampered with, even by an evil demon. Thus, as long as the world meets these conditions, there is no reason to count it as any more or less real than any other world.

Again, there is much more to say on these issues, but I hope this is at least a clear indication of how these issues should be dealt with on a phenomenological account.

Conclusion

We have seen how various aspects of Kantian philosophy are developed and modified in Husserl's account. The most important of these are Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions which has been developed as an account of nonconceptual content within phenomenology and Kant's formal semantics which has been developed through a genetic account supplemented by Kant's insights concerning original acquisition.

What remains is to bring the various strands of this account together in a discussion of transcendental subjectivity as it is developed in an account of the body.

Chapter 6

Embodied Subject and Synthesis

Introduction

We have been discussing how Kant's account of the intuitions and synthesis are developed within the phenomenological tradition. Key Kantian insights concerning the distinction between the holism that governs the intuitions and the holism that governs concepts have been used to defend the idea that we are required to see certain experiential content as nonconceptual content. In the last chapter this distinction was developed specifically within the context of Husserl's account of associative syntheses and his claim that a relation of sameness is not the same as a relation of identity. I argued that perception is epistemically neutral with respect to the properties of objects with which conceptual identification are concerned. In chapter 4 I noted that discussing subjectivity in terms of synthesis shifts the focus of an account of nonconceptual apperceptive content from a consideration of what requires us to see certain content as nonconceptual to a consideration of the kind of subjectivity that would make nonconceptual content possible. From the work we have done so far, it is clear that this kind of subjectivity should meet three conditions.

First, insofar as my account of subjectivity is being developed within the context of the transcendental tradition, whatever elements of transcendental subjectivity remain must be reconcilable with empirical subjectivity. Secondly, in meeting the first condition we must avoid

confusing de dicto attributions of content to subjective experience for de re attributions of content to subjective experience. That is, in reconciling the transcendental with the empirical we must be careful to avoid the claim that a grasp of apperceptive content entails the grasp of particular, empirical content. Finally, if there is a distinction between embodied subjectivity and subjectivity at the level of concepts, these must also be reconcilable.

I have already worked in this direction with my discussion of the “I can” of embodied subjectivity and its inexorable entanglement in internal and external horizons, but this discussion was far too schematic. Questions remain about what constitutes embodied subjectivity. In chapter 4 I discussed the “I can” mainly in terms of temporal synthesis and in fact this framed my discussion of how the “I can” operates in the context of associative synthesis. My basic point was that a general apperceptive confidence in the world is built upon our grasp of the fact that we can always return to an object that is at first an indeterminate presence and fill it in with greater determinacy going forward. This is built, in turn, on primal retention of each sense modality as constituted by continuums of similarity and difference between qualities of the same type and primal protention that anything we encounter can be placed with greater or lesser determinacy on these continuums. These continuums are, however, always integrated with our understanding of the world, are always about qualities that possible objects of experience will have. Thus, in grasping these continuums we grasp what it is for an object to be textured or to be colored, for instance. Grasping these continuums, then, constitutes having a schematic understanding of the content of sense modalities or, in Husserl’s language, they are types of the most general order. I discussed this mainly in terms of color, but the point should generalize to the other sense modalities. This leaves the precise nature of the world, the things that populate the world, and the “I can” unclear. My aim here is to develop an analysis of subjectivity that will fill in my

initial account, meet the conditions listed above, and draw together the various strands of my discussion of nonconceptual content.

I will proceed via three main steps. First, I will develop an analysis of Husserl's account of the body and spatial synthesis. Secondly, I will sharpen Husserl's account with insights from J.J. Gibson's account of visual kinesthesia and Jose Bermudez's account of proprioception in *The Paradox of Self Consciousness*. Here I will discuss Bermudez's claim that visual kinesthesia and proprioception are primitive sources of self-consciousness because they provide information that specifies a self. Finally, I will develop an account of embodied reflexivity that I will argue is essential for supporting my claims concerning nonconceptual content. Though Bermudez's discussion of primitive sources of self-consciousness is key to my account of embodied reflexivity, Bermudez himself does not discuss them in terms of the kind of reflexivity discussed within the transcendental tradition. This is not surprising given that he aims to develop a criterial account of self-consciousness rather than a constitutive account of self-consciousness.

Bermudez's criterial account is one that can be used in experimental settings to determine whether self-consciousness can be attributed to animals who can perform certain tasks. This also frames his interest in Kant. Bermudez develops Strawson's take on Kant's account of perception in the transcendental aesthetic in order to argue that self-consciousness requires the ability to distinguish self from other. This is something for which one can arguably test while it is significantly more difficult to imagine what a test for reflexivity would look like. In contrast, within the transcendental and phenomenological traditions, accounts of self-consciousness are always constitutive. Such accounts are concerned with explaining how the dative element of experience, the "to whom", is *constituted*. This almost always involves an account of how the self is constituted reflexively by grasping itself by means of itself. For example, on Kant's

account transcendental subjectivity is identified with the reflexivity of reason and more specifically with discursive abilities. I will argue that in the case of embodied subjectivity reflexivity rests on abilities of spatial discrimination and subordination rooted in kinesthesia and proprioception. Briefly, spatial subordination includes the subordination of objects to egocentric space and the subordination of the body, as one object among others, to allocentric space. The former characterizes our modes of active engagement with the world while the latter characterizes our responsiveness to a world that looms, imposes, and interrupts. Spatial subordination also includes subordinating and being subordinated by other bodies. Each instance of spatial subordination must also include, as a condition of possibility, the subordination of the body to itself. I will make these distinctions more precise in the third section.

Content and the Body

Three important and related questions linger from our analysis of content in the context of associative syntheses and our analysis of the “I can” across chapters 4 and 5. First, when I claimed that the apperceptive content grasped by the “I can” concerns a grasp of the fact that at any given moment I can gear into the internal horizon of an object, what exactly does this involve? Secondly, how is it that a schematic grasp of objects (knowing what it is for an object to be colored, textured, etc.) is rooted in the body? Finally, do the answers to these questions require us to revise or in any way modify the conception of spatiality with which we have been

working? The best place to begin answering these questions is with Husserl's account of motivation in *Ideas II*.

For Husserl, The body is constitutive of our having a world that we grasp as spatial, and it does so by way of two different kinds of sensations. It is worth quoting Husserl at length on this point. He writes,

The first kind are the sensations which *constitute*, by means of the apprehensions allotted to them, corresponding *features of the thing* as such by way of adumbration. The second kind are the "sensations" which do not undergo such apprehensions but which, on the other hand, are necessarily involved in all those apprehensions of the sensations of the first kind, insofar as, in a certain way, they *motivate* those apprehensions and thereby themselves undergo an apprehension of a completely different type, an apprehension which thus belongs correlatively to every constituting apprehension. In all constitution and on all levels, we have, by necessity, 'circumstances,' related one to the other, and 'that which is dependent on' all the circumstances: everywhere, we find 'if-then' or the 'because-therefore.' Those sensations which undergo extensional apprehension (leading to the extended features of the thing) are motivated as regards the courses they take either actually or possibly and are apperceptively *related to the motivating series, to systems, of kinesthetic sensations*, which freely unfold the nexus of their familiar order in such a way that if a free unfolding of one series of this occurs, then from the interwoven manifold as motive, the corresponding series must unfold as motivated (Husserl "Ideas II" 68).

Here, we find Husserl articulating the idea that perception is an action, it is something we do, a point that will be developed by Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and later Alva Noe. The key to understanding this point is to appreciate the relation between kinesthetic sensations and the presentation of the object by way of the sensations proper to each sense modality. The full presentation of an object is dependent on the possibility of moving so that features of the object other than the one presented can come into view. The general awareness that I can move in such a way so as to present further features or facets of the object and the awareness that I am at a given moment actually moving in such a way are rooted in kinesthesia. As I move, the further features of the object that appear will appear through the relevant sense modalities, most commonly sight and touch. The apperceptive link lies in the fact that when a facet of an object is

presented, I will expect that if I move, say, closer to the object or around the object certain other features that are not now absent will be presented. Husserl writes, “In the essence of the apprehension itself there resides the possibility of letting the perception disperse into ‘*possible*’ series of perceptions, all of which are of the following type: *if* the eye turns in a certain way, *then* so does the image;” if it turns differently in some definite fashion, then so does the image alter differently in correspondence. We constantly find here this two-fold articulation: kinesthetic sensations on the one side, the motivating; and the sensations of features on the other, the motivated” (57).

An important thing to note here is that though a presented facet of an object may suggest that, say, its surfaces are extended in the shape of a square and colored red, the way its shape and color are presented will change as we change our perspective on the object. The image will alter according to the perspective we take on it. So the initial presentation of the object will not be identical to other presentations of the object. Nonetheless, Husserl argues that the qualities presented in each take on the object, in this case color and shape, will be apprehended as identical. Husserl uses the example of color to make his point. He writes,

At first, the same unchanged form has a *changing appearance*, according to its position in relation to my Body; the form appears in *changing aspects*, which present ‘*it itself*’ more or less ‘*advantageously*.’ If we disregard this and instead consider real properties, then we find that one and the same Object, maintaining one identical form, does have different color appearances (the form as filled), according to its position relative to an illuminating body; furthermore, the color appearances are different when it stands under illuminating bodies, but all this happens in an ordered fashion, one which may be determined more precisely in regard to appearances. At the same time, certain conditions prove to be the ‘*normal*’ ones ... The ‘*optimum*’ which is thereby attained then counts as the *color itself*, in opposition, for example, to the red light of the sunset ... All other color properties are ‘*aspects of,*’ this pre-eminent color-appearance (64).

There are some discrepancies between this account and our earlier discussions of experiential content, so let me pause here to consider how these points about the body relate to

our earlier discussions. First, we can say that the apperceptive grasp of the fact that we can, for any given object, gear into its internal horizon is simply tacit sensori-motor knowledge that objects of experience are disclosed through action and perception. This sensori-motor knowledge is a general grasp of how movement, tracked kinesthetically, gives rise to stimulation. There is a temporal dimension to this sensori-motor knowledge because we can anticipate, based on an occurring stimulation, the further possible stimulations to be given by movement. Secondly, Husserl's account of color here does not reflect the work he will do in *Experience and Judgment* and *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*. This is not an account of how the body is involved in the passive synthesis of color experience by presenting similarities and differences. Rather, Husserl simply assumes color experience and the association of certain color experiences with the "color itself." Thirdly, we do not yet have a good account of how schematic knowledge of objects of possible experience is rooted in the body. This is in part because this kind of knowledge is best articulated in terms of Husserl's account of types, which is not available here. There are here, however, the beginnings of such an account. We know that it will have something to do with sensori-motor knowledge involving kinesthesia and stimulation. We also know that it will involve a temporal dimension related to the anticipation of stimulation given through movement.

Finally, this account of the body does not provide us with an account of what constitutes a sense modality given that perception is an action. There might be a temptation to take Husserl's discussion of color as an account of perceptual invariants akin to that offered by Gibson and develop a view of sense modalities on this basis.⁷¹ Such an account would run (very roughly) something like this. When we perceive, for instance, color, the color is perceived in

⁷¹ Alva Noe offers an account along these lines in *Action in Perception*.

and through the patterns of variance of that color as its appearance changes relative different illumination conditions and points of view. This variance is not random, but rather rule bound and constitutive of our experience of color. When we apprehend a color we are, in fact, really just apprehending the regularity with which certain stimulations vary. Abstracting from particular cases of color experience and developing a similar account of seeing shapes, we could also say something general about vision.

Vision is in every case about the unique kinds of regularities that arise in stimulation as illumination conditions and points of view vary. We could then further distinguish the regularities typical to color and those typical to shape. Because shape does not generally vary according to illumination, the regularity at stake here is simply the fact that shape must be illuminated if it is to be seen. Shape does, however, appear to vary regularly depending on the positioning of the object relative to the viewer and vice versa. I think this is the kind of view we should take and though it might initially look as if Husserl is giving us just such an account in the case of color, but the evidence is to the contrary. Husserl does suggest that the varying presentations of colors happens in an orderly fashion, but he does not say that color is presented in this orderliness. Rather, he ends up with something closer to a Fregean view in which there are different modes of presentation for a color that is established as normal under optimal conditions. Such a view bears no special connection to the idea that perception is an action. Note also that adumbration plays the same role here as it does in *Ideas I*, a role I have already criticized.

There are, however, connections between Husserl's earlier work and later work that are suggestive of directions he might have taken. For instance, in *Ideas II* he claims that in addition to sensory motor knowledge, "every subject has his 'space of orientation,' his 'here' and his

possible ‘there,’ this ‘there’ being determined according to the directional system of right-left, above-below, front-back” (88). Later in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* Husserl develops spatial orientation in terms of what he calls *fields*. Where temporality provides a “primordial” source of ordering in terms of succession, fields provide a primordial source of ordering in terms of coexistence. Fields thus concern the spatiality of experience. Both are necessary for the passive synthesis of the similarities, differences, and uniformities of shape and color. Without temporal synthesis each moment of experience would be novel, so there would be no way of determining similarities, differences, or uniformities in the content of experience from one moment to the next. Without spatiality, there would be no possibility for the coexistence of similar, uniform, or different objects/facets of objects. Objects can only endure in space and there can only be occurring relations of similarity, difference, and uniformity if two or more objects endure within a common space. He writes, “In the visual field taken in a purely immanent manner, there are possible series that, admittedly, we can characterize in language only by borrowing from the language of the perceptions of [transcendent] objects. Thus, an order of coexistence of random specks of color or sharply delimited figures in the order of right-left and in the order of above-below, or in a certain path going right and then up etc. [This holds] likewise in any other possible direction of being ordered” (Husserl “Analyses” 182).

Here we have a much richer analysis of the contents of experience that could easily be complimented by Husserl’s account of sensori-motor knowledge, but Husserl does not include a discussion of the body here. A discussion of the body would also be particularly apt in this context given that the body and the content of passive syntheses must also coexist in a common space.

Returning now to Husserl's account of the body in *Ideas II*, Husserl recognizes that though the body is central to disclosing objects by way of sensori-motor knowledge, he has not given an account of how the body is constituted as a body for me. It is in these discussions that we find Husserl's discussion of the reflexivity of the body. Husserl writes, "We can thereby choose immediately the special case in which the spatially experienced body, perceived by means of the Body, is the Corporeal body itself. For this too is perceived from the outside, although within certain limits, preventing it from being considered without qualification, as a thing like any other in a thingly nexus" (Husserl "Ideas II" 152).

He then develops an account of touch in order to demonstrate the essential features of how the Corporeal body is grasped by the Body. He begins by noting,

Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which are Objectified as features of the thing, "left hand," belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, a series of touch-sensations, which are 'localized' in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as roughness or smoothness of the hand, of this physical thing) (152).

In these initial comments, Husserl sets out a distinction between the Corporeal body and what he simply calls the Body. The Corporeal body (sometimes just called *corper*) is the body viewed as a physical object while the Body (sometimes just called *lieb*) is the lived body, the body as we experience it. This experience is constituted by the various sensations we enjoy in virtue of having a body. Kinesthetic sensations disclose limb movement while what Husserl calls representational sensations, for instance sensations of texture and hardness, are taken immediately and directly as features of the object touched. Because of this immediacy and directness, it is better to call these sensations *presentational*. Presentational sensations are in fact paradigmatic of how objects are revealed in action as we, for instance, run our hand along the

surface of an object and press our hands into it. Our sense of our hand moving through space discloses the spatiality of the thing touched and thus indicates the manner of its extension and the further possibilities for touch.

For example, running my right hand over my left, I register the smoothness of my left hand through moving my right across its surface. As I reach the knuckles of my closed fist, my right hand adjusts into a sharp downward movement in response to the hardness, shape, and rough grained texture the series of knuckles present. This downward motion indicates the general shape of my fist and how to proceed in order to continue exploring its texture, hardness, and shape. In contrast to these active modes of sensing, there are also passive modes of sensing (which Husserl just calls “sensings”). Sensations of contact like being pinched, pressed, pushed, and stung count as passive modes of sensing as do the feelings of being warm or cold.

Husserl argues that when I touch one hand to another there are three different kinds of localization involved corresponding to each kind of sensation. The first two concern what I have categorized as active modes of sensing while the third concerns passive modes of sensing.

Kinesthetic sensations do not simply indicate that some limb or other is moving, but rather the sensation is grasped as localized in the relevant limb. Presentational sensations are localized at, for instance, the finger tips or the palm of the hand. In passive modes of sensing, we locate points of contact and parts of the body undergoing a sensation with greater or lesser specificity.

There is also a fourth form of localization which is suggested by Husserl’s analysis, but which he does not explicitly mention. Our discussion of kinesthetic and presentational sensations suggest that they are key to the constitution of egocentric space. For example, apprehending the position of things in the world relative to my hand means knowing something about the arrangements, positions, and directions of movement of which a hand is capable apart

from any particular object and apart from any particular perceptual situation in which I might find myself. This information is, in turn, rooted in kinesthetic awareness and, with respect to more fine grained possibilities, possible presentational sensations. In the language developed by Christopher Peacocke, sensori-motor possibilities establish axes anchored in origins.⁷² Linking axes and origins to sensori-motor possibilities leads naturally to the idea that spatial types are spatial schemas constituting tacit sensori-motor knowledge. To take a simple example, the schema underlying my absent minded reach for my coffee cup would be the tacit knowledge that objects are locatable as being to fore of the dominant grasping member.⁷³ Thus, in touching my left hand with my right, I am also locating my left hand in egocentric space with respect to the axes and origin positioned in my right hand.

With these distinctions in play, we are in a position to discuss Husserl's take on the reflexivity of the body. Of the relation between the Corporeal body and the Body, Husserl writes,

⁷² To be clear, Peacocke does not develop his account in terms of sensory motor knowledge and is not concerned with how origins and axes are constituted. Rather, Peacocke's aim is to develop an account of spatial types that will determine the correctness of experiences in which those types are tokened. A spatial type will set out the conditions under which, for instance, locating an object, any object in any given perceptual situation, as being to the front of an origin defined as the center of gravity of a body will be true. When this type is positioned in an actual body at a specific time and the axes are determined with respect to real world directions, it is called a *positioned scenario*. If something has been properly located in the *scene* (the volume of the real world around the perceiver) by way of the positioned scenario, then the conditions for the truth of an experience established by the spatial type will have been satisfied. I will be developing his idea of spatial types in terms of the discussion of types/schema within the Husserlian /Kantian tradition which do not concern correctness conditions but rather apperceptive content.

⁷³ In *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* Husserl appears to combine insights close to those of Peacocke with a Kantian view of the holism of space. Contrasting temporality and the synthesis of succession with spatiality and the synthesis of coexistence, Husserl writes, "Succession is a singular, a "linear" concatenation that is always uniform. In the visual field, however, we do not always have all data in a concatenation, in an identical linear order; rather, various series of concatenation can be formed, and these various series of concatenation can be formed simultaneously, originally, such that many lines are contained within the field as systems of local positions; they appear filled out, now with this content of the object, and another time with different content of the object, making order possible for it in advance, and all of these linear local systems go together to form this one field-form, just as a detailed analysis teaches us. Nevertheless similar to the form of succession, we have a prefigured form of order and in it, now these and now those contents as ordered, forming a unity" (183).

To the apprehension of Corporeality as such belongs not only the apprehension of a thing but also the *co*-apprehension of the sensation fields, and indeed these are given as belonging, in the mode of localization, to the appearing Corporeal body. ‘Belonging’: phenomenologically, this term expresses relations of the phenomenal ‘if-then’: if my hand is touched or struck, then I sense it. We do not here have the hand as physical body and, connected with it, an extra-physical consequence. From the very outset it is apperceptively characterized as a hand *with* its field of sensation, with its constantly *co*-apprehended state of sensation which changes in consequence of the external actions on it, i.e., as a physical *aesthesiological unity*. (163).

Sensation fields refer to the manifold of possible sensations within kinesthetic, presentational, and passive modes of sensing. Husserl argues that each of these fields is always filled with some degree of sensation so that “new” sensations are not novel, but are already apprehended as falling within the continuum of possible sensations of the sense in question.⁷⁴ Because of the constancy of these fields and the fact that such fields are localizable (though some more finely than others), Husserl argues that they are like the properties of an object. Thus, when I touch one hand to another, the hand touched undergoes a contact sensation which is localized in that hand and localized as a modification of a sensation field constantly located there. This means that though the hand is localized as something in egocentric space open to sensori-motor exploration like any other object, touching it reveals that it has properties other than those which are apprehended through sensori-motor exploration. The hand touched is capable of undergoing contact sensations. True, this is not something of which most objects are capable, but because this is a passive mode of sensation it reveals the body as an object with properties which, like those of other objects, are vulnerable to both the brute physicality of the spatial world and the intentions of those things capable of sensori-motor exploration.

⁷⁴ “We must also note that the fields of sensation in questions here are always completely filled, and each new stimulation does not provoke a sensation as if for the first time, but rather, it provokes in the sensation-field a corresponding change in the sensation. Hence the field undergoes an apprehension as something changeable in manifold ways and as dependent on extension in the type of its changeableness (32).”

There are three further things to note here. First, the relation between the touched hand and the touching hand is reversible. The hand that moves does maintain a sort of dominance, but I can shift my attention to the touched hand in order to attend to presentational sensations (the roughness of my palm) and possibilities for movement. Secondly, this reversibility is characteristic of the body as a whole. For example, as I sit and write there are contact sensations localized in my back, sensations I necessarily undergo given the kind of thing I am and the way I am now positioned. There are also, however, presentational sensations concerning the softness of the chair and kinesthetic sensations as I rock slightly back and forth enjoying the give which the chair affords. I can shift my attention to either aspect of the experience, but both are constitutive of the experience as a whole. Finally, apart from explicit shifts in attention, both passive and active modes of sensing are involved in any experience featuring my body. For instance, moving to take a step involves kinesthetic sensations localized in my leg and the anticipation of a sturdy surface located along axes determined with respect to an origin point. Yet, in putting my weight down, weight sensations are registered in my hip, knee, and foot. Each step I take is something done by way of the body but also simultaneously something done to my body. Every action presents the body in its corporeality because passive modes of sensing always follow along with active modes of sensing. My body is thus always “here” and cannot be fully transcended or outrun by my sensori-motor intentions. Each act of transcendence, each act in which I cast my attention beyond myself to something in the world, simultaneously establishes the imminence of my body.

This takes us much of the way toward an account of the reflexivity of the body, but certain of Husserl’s insights can be sharpened and supplemented. Gibson and Bermudez will help us develop Husserl’s account in two major ways. First, both develop Husserl’s idea that

certain sensory information is both self and other specifying in greater detail. This development will be central to my account of the constitution of embodied subjectivity. Secondly, Bermudez and Gibson develop an account of the body and perception in terms of sensori-motor knowledge that is nonconceptual in nature. Taken together, these developments will provide a way of drawing together Husserl's insights into the body with his later insights concerning passive synthesis. This account will, however, require that we step away from viewing the reflexivity of the body as merely the grasp that the body has of itself as something object-like. The body must also grasp itself, even its passive moments, as an integrated collection of sensori-motor abilities. This will take us beyond both Husserl and Bermudez and, surprisingly, back to Kant.

Self-Specifying Information: J.J. Gibson

In *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness* Bermudez develops many of the same of insights concerning the body as Husserl. Yet, Bermudez develops these insights within the framework of developmental psychology, Gibson's account of perception, and Strawson's reading of the transcendental deduction. Bermudez's argument that the body is a primal source of self-consciousness consists of two basic steps. First, he argues that kinesthesia and proprioception provide self-specifying information. Secondly, he argues that kinesthesia and proprioception ground the abilities to distinguish self from other and to recognize places as distinct from what occupies those places. The first step specifies the ways in which the body tracks itself. The second step shows how these tracking abilities also constitute an understanding of the way

objects occupy space and of the body as numerically distinct from other objects. The major difference between Husserl and Bermudez is in Bermudez's development of the second step.

Bermudez develops this second step by way of Strawson's reading of Kant's transcendental deduction. Strawson claims that part of Kant's argument in the deduction is that self-consciousness requires having a "point of view" on the world. Having a point of view means having, "a picture of an unified objective world through which the experiences themselves constitute a single, subjective, experiential route, one among other possible subjective routes through the same objective world" (Strawson, 104). I do not think Husserl would have a problem with the general idea that distinguishing self from other and distinguishing one's route through the world from the world itself are necessary for self-consciousness, but he would disagree on what it means to have a world. We can see this by quickly reminding ourselves of the work we have already done on the relation between Husserl and Kant on this point.

On the account of Kant I have developed, Kant's discussion of perception in the deduction concerns the intuition of the structure of space as a condition for the possibility of perception. This intuition is an intuition of space as a whole which precedes its parts and which makes limitation possible. As we have seen, Husserl's notion of the horizon is a development of this same basic structure, but unlike Kant, Husserl steers clear of Newtonian notions of space. In the case of both Kant and Husserl, our understanding of space is an understanding of the *structure* of the objective world. Its unity is in turn constituted for us in the *passive synthesis* of this structure. For Kant, all passive synthesis concerns schematizing the concepts of the understanding by relating them to transcendental (structural or formal) time determinations. On this account, our grasp of the unity of the world is synthesized in two complimentary ways.

First, the schematization of quantity in particular determines that all objects of possible

experience will be spatially and temporally extended. Secondly, all the schematizations taken together determine what it is for an object to be an object of experience or knowledge. The schematization of quantity synthesizes (runs through, distinguishes, and holds together) the whole of space in providing the cognitive resources for measuring and “limiting” space at any possible point within the whole. Again, the very action of measuring or limiting presupposes and calls on a grasp of space as extending beyond any particular point. The other schemata synthesize the content of that space by determining what it is for something to be an object of knowledge.

Importantly, it is not that we run through, distinguish, and hold together the set of real objects populating the universe. Rather, the schemata anticipate the features any possible object of experience must have. For Husserl, passive synthesis involves *types* that function in a way that is similar to Kant’s *schemata*. Yet, though temporality is foundational for Husserl as well, Husserl does not conceive of passive synthesis in terms of the schematization of *a priori* concepts of the understanding by way of temporality. Rather, passive synthesis in part explains how concepts arise and is developed via a phenomenological analysis of the structures and interrelations between temporality, spatiality, and association. Nonetheless, I think if Husserl’s account of passive synthesis is to be successful, he must root it in a reflexive subjectivity just as Kant does. Yet, for reasons we have already discussed, he cannot root it in the same kind of subjectivity as Kant. Also, Husserl’s account of the body already provides the resources necessary for an alternative account of subjectivity. In fact, I think if we take Bermudez’s insights concerning self-specifying information, but travel the Husserlian rather than the Strawsonian fork in the Kantian road, we will find a fairly rich way of rooting passive synthesis in the body. We begin by looking at Bermudez’s account of self-specifying information.

Bermudez starts by discussing the self-specifying information available in vision. He notes that thinkers like Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein have denied that the self can be perceived, but argues that Gibson's ecological optics demonstrates that the self is indirectly perceived and that self-specifying information plays an integral role in perception. Gibson discusses four kinds of self-specifying information available in vision. The first concerns the boundedness of vision, the second structural invariants in the field of vision, the third visual kinesthesia, and the fourth affordances. Of the first, Gibson writes,

The edges of the field of view hide the environment behind them, as those of a window do, and when the field moves there is an accretion of optical structure at the leading edge with deletion of structure at the trailing edge, as in the cabin of a steam shovel with a wide front window and controls that enable the operator to turn the cabin to the right or the left. But the edges of the field of view are *unlike* the edges of a window inasmuch as, for the window, a *foreground* hides the background whereas, for the field of view, *the head of the observer* hides the background. Ask yourself what it is that you see hiding the surroundings as you look out upon the world – not darkness surely, not air, not nothing, but the ego” (Gibson 112)!

The second kind of self-specifying information available in vision involves Gibson's great insight into the structure of experience, perceptual invariants. Gibson does not define the visual field as the image formed on the retina. Rather, it is the solid angle of light captured by the eye. Gibson argues that we pick up information about the world directly from this light rather than by means of computational processes in the brain. This information is carried in how arrays of illuminated surfaces and solid angles of light, with their base at objects and their peak at the eye, change relative to the movement and position of the viewer. In the case of the self-specifying information involved in the visual field, Gibson focuses on three invariants; transformational invariants, structural invariants, and self-specifying structural invariants. We have already discussed the first kind of invariant. Changes in the appearance of surfaces due to the movement and position of the viewer do not happen randomly, but in regular and rule bound

ways. These regular patterns of change are transformational invariants. Objects that maintain their position in the world relative to the viewer, like walls, are structural invariants. Self-specifying invariants involve parts of the body visible in the visual field. Gibson writes, “Information exists in the normal ambient array, therefore, to specify the nearness of the parts of the self to the point of observation – first the head, then the body, the limbs and the extremities. The experience of a central self in the head and a peripheral self in the body is not therefore a mysterious intuition or a philosophical abstraction but has a basis in optical information” (114).

The nose, for example, is particularly invariant in the visual field. Gibson notes that, “it projects the largest possible angle in the optic array” (117). The nose also, “provides the maximum of crossed double imagery or crossed disparity in the dual array, for it is the furthest possible edge to the right in the left eye’s field of view and the furthest possible edge to the left in the right eye’s field of view” (117). Finally, “of all occluding edges in the world, the edge of the nose sweeps across the surfaces behind it at the greatest rate whenever the observer moves or turns his head” (117). Limbs and extremities present a different kind of invariance. The solid angles present by all surfaces alter depending on how near or far objects are. Objects that are near present a larger base and thus the solid angle of light from the object that is captured by the eye is larger while objects that are further away present a smaller base and thus a smaller angle. A car speeding past on the highway looms in the visual field for a moment and then quickly becomes smaller as it speeds away to the point where it is no longer visible in the visual field.

When it comes to one’s limbs and extremities, there is an invariant limit on “minification” different from that of other objects: “The visual solid angle of the hand cannot be reduced below a certain minimum” (121). There is thus a difference between the object that is my body as “*here*” and the world as “*out there*”. Because I apprehend my body as reaching into

that world, even with certain limits, this constitutes, “another bridge between the subjective and objective” (121). The range of solid angles any part of the body can present determines how moveable it is relative to the center of sight.

Gibson develops the third kind of self-specifying information in answer to a difficult psychological question. When we navigate the world, we see where we are going and at the same time we see the layout of the environment through which we move. The question for Gibson is how, considering that from one perspective our body is just one among other objects in the visual field, we grasp two distinct kinds of visual information as we move, one subjective and the other objective. He writes, “it is difficult to understand how a train of signals coming over the optic nerve could explain it. How could signals have two meanings at once, a subjective meaning and an objective one? How could signals yield an experience of self-movement and an experience of the external world at the same time? How could visual motion sensations get converted into a stationary environment and a moving self” (183). The suggestion is that a single signal would carry just one kind of visual information and this would be information about the surfaces available to vision, not about the differing significances of those surfaces as subjective or objective. While many theorists assume that, “motion perception can only be explained by the hypothesis of mechanisms that parse cues in the neutral sensations into information about movement and information about static objects,” Gibson argues for visual kinesthesia or for the idea that one’s movement and the difference between the subjective and objective in movement is available in vision: “Vision is *kinesthetic* in that it registers movements of the body just as much as does the muscle-joint-skin system and the inner ear system. Vision picks up both movements of the whole body relative to the ground and movement of a member of the body relative to the whole. Visual kinesthesia goes along with muscular kinesthesia. The doctrine that

vision is exteroceptive, that it obtains ‘external’ information only, is simply false. Vision obtains information about *both* the environment and the self” (183).

The distinction between transformational invariants, structural invariants, and self-specifying invariants are available in vision and are available as patterns of visual information that remain stable throughout movement, throughout the changing appearance of objects in the optic flow. Thus, as I quickly approach a wall, it remains stable in its place, but now looms as a function of my moving nearer and the larger visual angle of light from the wall that occupies my eye. I recognize the wall as the same wall through its varying appearances because of the transformational invariants involved in closing distances. Throughout the process of moving toward the wall, I am also aware of self-specifying invariants. The point of observation remains stable in my head while my limbs and extremities move only relative to the body and my body moves relative to objects thus enacting transformational patterns.⁷⁵

Finally, affordances are self-specifying because they have immediate consequences for action. Affordances rest on the complimentary relation between organism and environment. Animals have abilities and skills which suit them to just those environments which afford the deployment of those abilities and skills:

If a terrestrial surface is nearly horizontal (instead of slanted), nearly flat (instead of convex or concave), and sufficiently extended (relative to the size of the animal) and if its substance is rigid (relative to the weight of the animal), then the surface *affords support*. It is a surface of support, and we call it a substratum, ground or floor. It is stand-on-able, permitting an upright position for quadrupeds and bi-peds. It is therefore walk-on-able and run-over-able. It is not sink-into-able like a surface of water or a swamp, that is, not for heavy terrestrial animals. Support for water bugs is different” (127).

⁷⁵ Bermudez offers experimental evidence in support of this claim: “In so-called moving room experiments, subjects are placed on the solid floors of rooms whose walls and ceilings can be made to glide over a solid immovable floor (Lishman and Lee 1973). If experimental subjects are prevented from seeing their feet and the floor is hidden, then moving walls backwards and forwards on the sagittal plane creates in the subjects the illusion that they are moving back and forth. This provides strong support for the thesis that the movement of the perceiver can be detected purely visually, since visual specification of movement seems to be all that is available” (111).

Gibson argues that affordances are directly perceived and not built up by associations. For instance, it is not that we come to associate danger and the risk of falling with cliffs and thus acquire the ability to see cliffs as negative affordances which inhibit rather than facilitate action. It is also not the case that when we see a cliff, we make an inference from depth perception that the cliff is a negative affordance. Rather, we just see the cliff directly and immediately as a negative affordance. Gibson uses visual-cliff experiments to illustrate his claims about affordances.

In these experiments, “one half of the glass floor was backed with opaque surface, so that it could not be seen through. A similar opaque surface was placed some distance below the other half of the glass floor. Thus a clifflike effect was created, with a sharp divide between a ‘shallow’ half and a ‘deep half. A range of animals were placed on the glass floor (including infant rats and snow-leopard cubs). They all showed a preference for the shallow side over the deep side” (Bermudez 113). The same was true for young children who could walk or crawl on the surface. When infants around 6 weeks old were placed on the floor, their cardiac responses revealed that they were in distress. One of the key aspects of the experiment is that it shows that visual information takes precedence over haptic information. All of the test subjects were in touch with a solid surface, but recoiled or showed distress when confronted with the visual cliff. Gibson argues that this is because perception of these kinds of affordances are innate. What these experiments also show in a striking way is that affordances are perceived as directly relevant to the actions of even pre-linguistic subjects. Thus, perception of affordances is also self-specifying in revealing the significance of a part of the environment for oneself, motivating action, and indicating how that action should proceed.

Bermudez, in his discussion of these experiments recognizes that some might be reluctant to attribute intentional behavior to infants and animals and concedes that not all action requiring self-specifying information requires intentional explanation. Yet, he argues that determining whether a certain behavior requires an intentional explanation is an experimental task. He writes, “If it can be explained nonintentionally, then obviously the parsimonious nonintentional explanation should be adopted. But if nonintentional explanation is impossible, then inference to the best explanation drives us to an intentional explanation” (116.) Intentional explanations are required when no lawlike correlations can be established between stimulus and response. For instance, response in the absence of the relevant stimulus must be explained intentionally because such responses lack predictability, lack a lawlike relation to the relevant stimuli. Misperception is just such a response and the responses of an animal which misperceives the world will not be determinable purely by specifying what environmental stimuli are at work.

There is more to say about both Bermudez and Gibson on these points, but what interests me most in their respective discussions of self-specifying information is the idea of perceptual invariants. I will be developing the idea of perceptual invariants along the Husserlian fork in the Kantian road, but for now it suffices to note this and move on to a discussion of proprioception. Before moving on, I should, however, note two further things. First, it is worth calling attention once more to the fact that Bermudez is offering a criterial account rather than a constitutive account. Where Bermudez is concerned with when it is appropriate to attribute intentional behavior to an animal, I am concerned with a phenomenological account within the Kantian tradition the point of which is to analyze the structures which constitute intentionality. Key among these structures is the reflexive structure of self-consciousness and the protentional – retentional structure of time consciousness.

Secondly, Husserl also recognizes that vision picks up information about the body, but he does not develop this insight in the same depth as Gibson. Husserl is more concerned with touch because he believes that touch (understood expansively in terms of proprioception) is constitutive of the body as a *lived* body: “Obviously, the Body is also to be seen just like any other thing, but it becomes a *Body* only by incorporating tactile sensations, pain sensations, etc. – in short, by the localization of the sensations as sensations ... This is then a precondition for the existence of all sensations (and appearances) whatsoever, the visual and acoustic included, though these do not have a primary localization in the body” (Husserl “Ideas II” 158).

Self-Specifying Information: Jose Luis Bermudez

Bermudez offers a fairly extensive list of the information involved in somatic proprioception and I think it is worth reproducing that list here. Somatic proprioception involves:

- Information about pressure, temperature, and friction from receptors on the skin and beneath its surface
- Information about the relation of body segments from receptors in the joints, some sensitive to static position, some to movement

- Information about balance and posture from the vestibular system in the inner ear and the head/trunk dispositional system and information from pressure on any parts of the body that might be in contact with a gravity-resisting surface
- Information about bodily disposition and volume obtained from skin stretch
- Information about nutrition and other homeostatic states from receptors in the internal organs
- Information about muscular fatigue from receptors in the muscles
- Information about general fatigue from cerebral systems sensitive to blood composition
- Information about bodily disturbances from nociceptors

Bermudez categorizes these somatic information systems by the kind of information they carry and the way they carry it. Some systems carry information only about the body (for example information about fatigue and nutrition) while others carry information about the body and its relation to the environment (for example information about bodily balance). There are also systems which carry information both about the body and the environment. For instance, the shape and arrangement of the hand can be given by sensitivity to skin stretch, but the shape of the hand given through skin stretch can also convey the shape of an object one has grasped. Some of these kinds of information are not always carried at the conscious level. Bermudez points to information about balance and limb position as paradigmatic examples. This information goes directly to regulate posture.

With respect to proprioceptive information that is available to consciousness, we can distinguish between two kinds of proprioceptive information, *mediate* and *immediate* proprioceptive information. Mediate proprioception involves things we feel, like pains, tickles

and itches. In each of these cases, it is not simply that I am suddenly made aware of a part of my body. Rather, I am made aware of part of my body mediately by way of feeling something. When I feel an itch on my shoulder, for example, the itchy feeling is constitutive of the sudden awareness I have of my shoulder. Immediate proprioception involves information about our body that is not given through sensation: “The systems involved tend to be discussed by psychologists as joint-position sense and kinesthetic awareness respectively. Joint-position sense is the awareness that we have of how our body parts are distributed in space relative to each other. Kinesthetic awareness is the awareness of limb movement” (Bermudez 134). Bermudez argues that the reason for distinguishing mediate and immediate proprioception is that mediate sensations are neither necessary nor sufficient for reporting on joint-position sense and kinesthetic awareness. He writes, “that sensations are not necessary is shown by the many occasions when we are capable of reporting on limb position and movement without being able to identify any sensations yielding the awareness on which such reports are based. That sensations are not sufficient emerges when one reflects that bodily sensations are rarely of sufficiently fine a grain to yield the relatively precise awareness we have of posture and movement, let alone the extremely precise awareness required to maintain balance and control action” (134).

With all of this in view, Bermudez offers what he calls the “simple argument” for the conclusion that somatic proprioception is a form of self-consciousness. If we take as premises that the self is embodied and that somatic proprioception involves the perception of bodily properties, it follows that somatic proprioception is a form of self-perception and that it is therefore also a form of self-consciousness. The simple view requires further development in two areas. First, it must be shown that proprioception is really a form of perception. Secondly,

self-consciousness does not rest solely on self-awareness, it also rests on the awareness of the distinction between self and other. Thus, this will also require further development. I will briefly treat the first here and develop the second in contrast to Husserl's views in the next section.

In order to show that proprioception is a form of self-perception, Bermudez argues that it satisfies all that is required by Sydney Shoemaker's object model of perception. Shoemaker argues that there are three key features of object perception. The first is the *object constraint*. The object constraint says that though we are made aware of facts via sense-perception, awareness of facts is, "a function of awareness of the objects involved in these facts in a sense-experience distinct from the object of perception" (136). Second is the *identification constraint*. In sense perception we have access to "identification information" by which we can identify objects by relational and nonrelational properties, keep track of objects over time, and reidentify objects. Finally, the *multiple objects constraint* concerns the fact that, "ordinary modes of perception admit of our perceiving, successively or simultaneously, a multiplicity of different objects, all of which are on par as nonfactual objects of perception" (136). Based on these constraints, Shoemaker argues that introspective self-knowledge is not perceptual. There is nothing in introspection that meets these constraints.

As part of his argument, Shoemaker points out that the awareness of a sensation or sensory experience is not constituted by having the experience and then having a separate sensation or sensory experience that is of or about the first. Awareness of a sensation or sensory experience is just constitutive of the sensation or sensory experience itself. This means that if there is a special sense experience of the self it will not be constituted by a separate experience of it. Thus, following out this line reasoning, if there were such a thing as perception of the self we

would have two different kinds of sense experiences, one involving ordinary sense experiences and another involving introspective sense experiences. And presumably this would mean that introspective sense experiences would require a special object. Against this view, Bermudez argues that in order to develop an account of self-perception, we require neither a special object nor a separate kind of sense experience. Somatic proprioception involves ordinary sensations and sense experiences and it is by way of these ordinary experiences that we perceive the self.

The self is, in turn, not some special object of introspection, but the embodied self and thus, in one sense, just one among other objects in the world and thus meets the object constraint. Bermudez concedes that just this much does not offer strong enough reason to buy his claim that the embodied self counts as a genuine object of perception over the claim that satisfying the object constraint would require a special object of a special introspective sense. Ultimately, proprioception must meet the other constraints as well if his account is to be convincing. As he attempts to meet these constraints, we find Bermudez deploying insights familiar from Husserl's treatment of the body.

Bermudez starts with the multiple objects constraint. One of the key sensory experiences involved in proprioceptive awareness is touch, and touch is both exteroceptive and proprioceptive. That is, touch gives us information both about the body and the world and thereby looks to satisfy the multiple objects constraint. One might attempt to separate exteroception from proprioception and argue that exteroceptive touch does not count as proprioception, but Bermudez rightly argues that this does not fit the phenomenology of touch. The movement and disposition of my hand as well as the arrangement of my fingers as I explore an object by touch tell me something about the spatial properties of the object. Moreover, the spatial properties I discover through touch are not a product of inference. It is not that I infer the

spatial properties of the object from the movement and disposition of my hand and the arrangement of my figures. Rather, proprioceptive awareness is constitutive of the immediate and direct presentation of these properties.

Most often touch, and along with it our attention, is directed at objects and we are thus not explicitly aware of the constitutive role of proprioception. Nevertheless, Bermudez contends that we are *peripherally aware* of proprioceptive contributions to the presentation of spatial properties. Peripheral awareness looks to require at least two things.

First, items in peripheral awareness can generally be brought into focal awareness, either by moving the body into an appropriate perceptual relation to an object (by turning one's head, for example) or by focusing on one element in a complicated perceptual experience (as when one tries just to listen to the violins in symphony). Second, instances of peripheral awareness can have implications for action and reaction without bringing focal awareness to bear, as when one flinches from something seen out of the corner of the eye (138).

As for the rest of proprioception, Bermudez emphasizes that none of the senses has distinct proper objects. The senses are not isolated modes of experience. Spatial, or primary qualities, for instance, can be perceived in more than one sense modality. An object can be felt to be square and also seen to be square. Beyond these epistemological considerations, actions like reaching require the integration of vision and touch. Moreover, at a deeper level, perceptual experience forms what Michael Ayers calls an *integrated sensory field*. When I, for instance, see a tennis ball and close my hand around it, it is not by inference that I judge that the same tennis ball is the object of both sight and touch. Rather, I simply perceive that the tennis ball touched is the same as the tennis ball seen. Insofar as I have perceptual access to the tennis ball, the ball enters a perceptual field in which it is accessible as the very same object across different sense modalities. Ayers argues that this even extends beyond the common sensibles. Summarizing Ayers' position, Bermudez writes,

As Ayers points out, when I taste something in my mouth, my gustatory awareness of its taste is integrated with my tactile awareness of its taste and my proprioceptive awareness of its heat. These are different, although often attentively distinguishable, components of a single perceptual experience. The same applies to auditory experience of sounds as coming from a particular direction. Such experiences are inherently relational, and only one of the relata is itself heard. Somatic proprioception needs to be brought to bear to provide directionality (142).

For Bermudez, one of the most important things this brings to the fore is the fact that all experience is inherently spatial or involves locating things relative to the body. Proprioception is central to the spatiality of experience because it orients us to possibilities for action and perception. Again, one way to put this is that experience involves locating objects on axes relative to origins in the body and our awareness of the position of these origins (for example the center of gravity, the dominant grasping member, or the point of observation) depends on our proprioceptive awareness of our body. So while proprioceptive awareness does offer information about our bodies, it never does this as a system isolated from the other sense modalities. Proprioception is in fact always integrated with the other sense modalities and is constitutive of all sense experience. Bermudez argues that the integration of the sensory field weighs in favor of the claim that proprioception satisfies the multiple objects constraint.

Though it does not specifically concern the multiple objects constraints, it seems appropriate to say something about the content of specifically body directed proprioception. This content is also spatial, but it is difficult to determine just how this spatiality should be characterized. With the exception of cases like phantom limb and the pathological denial of limbs, the body is experienced as having limits and “objects” of proprioception can be located within those limits. Yet, there is no single origin of proprioceptive awareness to which axes are anchored. Complicating things further, when one is proprioceptively aware of the state of one’s body at a particular location one can locate it in either a part-specific way, as when one has an

itch on one's shoulder, or one can locate it in a body-relative way, as when one feels one's foot dangling below the knee as one sits at the edge of a boat. Bermudez calls the former kinds of locations "A locations" and the latter "B locations". The states of the body located proprioceptively by way of A and B locations can be either qualitative, involving things like itches, tickles, pains, and departures from equilibrium, or quantitative, involving the sensation that limbs are moving or that one's arms are crossed.

Bermudez suggests that A and B locations can be accounted for more precisely in terms of "hinges". He writes, "the intuitive idea that I want to capture with this term is the idea of a body part that allows one to move a further body part. Examples of hinges are the neck, the jaw socket, the shoulders, the elbows, the wrists, the knuckles, the finger joints, the leg sockets, the knees, and the ankles" (155). A locations do not move and so it is natural to define them relative to two hinges that form a successive pair within the space of one's body. B locations can move and their movement can be tracked relative to other hinges. So, for instance, when I am proprioceptively aware of my foot dangling as I sit at the edge of the boat, I locate my foot relative to my knee, but when I lay down and hang my foot off of the side of the boat, I will locate my foot relative to my ankle.

As to the identification constraint, the body is strange among objects because we cannot misidentify our own body. This weighs against the idea that we perceptually identify our own bodies at all because most anything that can be identified can also be misidentified. Bermudez responds by arguing that misidentification is also impossible in demonstrative forms of identification. Thus, there are other kinds of perception that are immune to error by misidentification and we should not count proprioception out for this reason. He also entertains the idea that maybe the relevant sense of identification involves keeping track of one's own body

and surely we cannot fail to do this. Yet, we sometimes do things like absent mindedly hum, tap our foot, and press the accelerator down as we drive on an open highway. These are all cases in which we seem to lose track of our body and the fact that we can be genuinely surprised to find ourselves doing these things suggests that we do in fact lose track of our body. Given that proprioception can satisfy both the identification constraint and the multiple objects constraint, Bermudez argues that we should also grant that it satisfies the object constraint.

Points of View

There is much more to say about Bermudez's account of nonconceptual content and I have certainly not captured everything of interest and importance in his very rich analysis. Yet, a full discussion would require straying into areas of psychological research that do not strictly bear on the development of the present account. Thus, in what follows I will discuss the further development of his account of self-consciousness fairly schematically. My aim will be to highlight its Kantian roots and to provide contrast to a constitutive account of self-consciousness which will, nevertheless, deploy some of Bermudez's own insights within a Kantian/Husserlian framework.

Bermudez notes that an initial obstacle to the view that somatic proprioception is a genuine form of self-consciousness is that, "genuine self-consciousness requires the further feature that those bodily properties should be perceived as properties of oneself" (145). One view is that this kind of consciousness only arises with mastery of the first-person pronoun. To

respond to this challenge, we can draw a parallel between somatic proprioception and introspection. When it comes to psychological properties it would be strange to claim that we must introspect psychological properties *as* our own if introspection is to count as genuine self-consciousness. On this view, a case of introspection that does not involve explicit introspection of a psychological property as mine does not count as introspection. True, there does seem to be a difference between thinking “That is a feeling of sadness” and “I am sad”. Yet, we also understand that refraining from the use of the first person pronoun is not to express the thought without any sense of ownership. This same point holds with respect to the difference between the thoughts “That leg aches” and “My leg aches”. These psychological and embodied experiences already make the content of a thought available *as* mine without my having to take it as such. Indeed, the work we have already done on proprioception has demonstrated that we cannot misidentify properties of our own body via proprioception; it is simply the function of proprioception to disclose properties of our body as our own. I will return to these points in a moment to develop them with respect to the account of apperceptive content I have been developing.

Bermudez argues that thoughts involved in proprioception also satisfy the further requirements for genuine self-conscious thoughts. These requirements cover both narrow and broad self-consciousness. Narrow self-consciousness concerns the elements of self-consciousness that are subject centered while broad self-consciousness concerns the elements that are centered on the distinction between self and non-self. The two requirements for a thought to count as narrowly self-conscious are that it be about oneself in a non-accidental way and that it have immediate implications for action. Somatic proprioception clearly meets the former and it meets the latter because one of the key features of somatic proprioception is that it

provides feedback which orients us to possibilities for action and perception. Broad self-consciousness simply requires that one can distinguish between self and non-self. Note that this is significantly weaker than a requirement to distinguish between self and world. Touch plays the primary role here. The exteroceptive and proprioceptive nature of touch and our ability to attend to either facet of touch give us the limits of the body. With touch, we grasp the body as bounded and extended in space. Another factor in broad self-consciousness is the role of proprioception in our awareness that our body is responsive to the will. There is a lot about our body that is not responsive to our will, but in general the limit of the will is experienced as the limit of the body or at least the capabilities of the body.

Though somatic proprioception and ecological perception constitute primitive forms of self-consciousness, Bermudez is concerned to show how full-fledged self-consciousness can develop from these beginnings. This motivates his turn to Strawson's Kant and what Strawson calls a, "point of view." Having a point of view on the world requires having the ability to distinguish one's subjective experiential route through the world from the objective order of the world we experience. Strawson writes, "If we thought of such a series of experiences as continuously articulated in a series of detailed judgments, then, taking their order and content together, those judgments would be such as to yield, on the one hand, a (potential) description of an objective world and on the other the chart of the course of a single subjective experience of that world" (Strawson 105). In the case where we could only experience, "red, round patches, brown oblongs, flashes, whistle, tickling sensations, smells," the object of experience would not be distinct from our experience of it (Strawson 99). Where the subject cannot disentangle itself from the object experienced, there is neither a distinct object of experience nor a distinct subject of experience. Thus, in such a case there is nothing that can meaningfully be called experience.

Bermudez takes the basic elements of Strawson's account and instead of developing an account of conceptual points of view, develops an account of nonconceptual points of view.

Bermudez takes the idea of a point of view to be comprised of two components, *the nonsolipsistic component* and *the spatial-awareness component*. The nonsolipsistic component is the distinction between an experience and what it is that is experienced. Bermudez unpacks this component in terms of a nested series of requirements. The distinction between experience and experienced requires grasping that an experienced object has an existence independent of an experience of it. This, in turn, requires grasping that an object has an independent temporally extended existence. Objects cannot be taken to exist only in the moments we are experiencing them. They must be taken to exist at other times, too. Grasp of temporal independence requires, in turn, "the exercise of recognitional abilities involving conscious memory, which is most primitively manifested in feature based recognition of places" (220). Bermudez's notion of feature based recognition is a development of "feature placing discourse."

This kind of discourse, "characterizes the world in terms of features in a manner notably different from the more familiar subject-predicate discourse. Whereas subject-predicate discourse depends upon identifying reference to material particulars, and these are then ascribed qualities or properties (which are sortal universals, appropriate for identifying and classifying particulars), feature-placing discourse deploys universal terms that are not sortal universals and that are not predicated of material particulars" (173). Examples are "Its raining" and "There is food". Bermudez reasons that though certain animals may not have a grasp of the world in terms of the objects which populate it, they may have a grasp of the world by way of a primitive form of feature-placing. If an animal's behavior is not purely stimulus driven (if it requires an intentional explanation), we can assume that the animal's behavior is driven by its recognition of

important features of its environment, features like warmth, food, water, and danger. We can then explain place reidentification by way of feature reidentification. This will draw on memory, but specifically memory of having had a past experience. We cannot define memory here in terms of a past exposure which later leads to differential responses to similar stimuli. This would in many cases undermine intentional explanation. Yet, the kind of memory involved also need not be memory of a particular moment in time. An animal need not remember that it had an experience at a particular moment in its autobiographical history. Again, Bermudez's discussion contains many more details, but I think we have enough for our purposes to move forward.

The spatial awareness component of points of view involves navigating by way of place recognition. Bermudez also unpacks this component in terms of a nested series of requirements. Navigating by way of place recognition requires some understanding of the nature of space. This, in turn, requires grasping the distinction between spatial relations holding between things and spatial relations holding between places. Grasp of this distinction is demonstrated in navigational behavior that meets two conditions. First, it cannot be reducible to a particular sequence of bodily movements. For instance, if a rat makes its way through a maze and to its reward only by being conditioned to perform a sequence of movements, then the rat's behavior is not place driven. It does not conceive of its behavior as a route to the place where the reward is located.

Secondly navigational behavior cannot be, "driven by sensitivity to features of the environment that merely covary with spatial features of the environment" (220). For instance, homing pigeons navigating by way of magnetic fields are not navigating with sensitivity to the spatial features of the world. Their behavior is not place driven. Rather, they navigate by way of something that happens to covary with spatial features of the world. Meeting these conditions

implicates three cognitive capacities: “the capacity to think about different routes to the same place, the capacity to keep track of changes in spatial relations between things caused by one’s own movements relative to those things, and the capacity to think about places independently of the objects* or features at those places” (221). The term “objects*” refers to what infants, who lack a grasp of full-fledged objects, see. Infants seem to, “parse their visual perceptions into bounded segments, about whose behavior they have certain expectations, which expectations nonetheless do not qualify as the perception of objects (still less as involving mastery of the concept of an object)” (172).

Though Bermudez captures much that is important about embodied self-consciousness in his fairly exhaustive account, there is an important structural feature of reflexivity relating to synthesis that is left out of his account. I will develop an account of this feature of reflexivity through a discussion of spatial subordination. One important thing to note is that the idea of spatial subordination is mainly an analytical tool with which I want to clarify certain aspects of embodied cognition. As such, I do not take myself to be presenting new phenomena of embodied cognition by introducing this idea, but rather to be offering an interpretation of the phenomena we have already discussed. I will, however, draw different conclusions regarding embodied subjectivity than those of Husserl, Gibson, and Bermudez. Another benefit of introducing the idea of spatial subordination is that it will make the connection between embodied subjectivity and Kant’s account of subjectivity clearer.

Spatiality, the Body, and Apperceptive Content

Where intellectual synthesis is rooted in the capacity for concept subordination, our discussion of the body suggests that embodied spatial synthesis is rooted in our ability for spatial subordination, an ability which is constituted by what I will call spatial invariants. In short, spatial invariants find inevitable and typical expressions in action and these typical forms of expression constitute our abilities for spatial subordination. To clarify this, we should start with a general picture of spatial subordination and work toward an analysis of the specific invariants involved. We will then be in a position to discuss the inevitable and typical expressions of spatial invariants as the typical ways in which spatial invariants are integrated in action. This will provide the materials for an account of embodied self-consciousness and synthesis that is Kantian in structure.

We can begin with a schematic presentation of types of spatial subordination. First, there are cases in which the direction of subordination is from body to world. For example, when I locate my cup on the desk and reach for it, I am subordinating its position to axes in egocentric space rather than coordinates in geometric space. Secondly, there are cases in which the direction of subordination is from world to body. I might, for example, find myself sliding backwards as I attempt to climb a steep hill or lose my balance completely and tumble downward. Here, I lose the ability to orient myself for further action and perception and am subordinated to the dominant spatial feature of the hill. Thirdly, there are cases in which the direction of subordination is both body to world and world to body. Skiing down a mountain is one example of this. My position on the mountain will be subordinated to both the trails carved on the face of the mountain and the downward slope of the mountain. Yet, because I approach the mountain as something to be skied, I subordinate the mountain to axes having an origin in the

center of gravity in my body. Finally, there are cases in which the direction of subordination is body to body. In hiking along a trail, my body as a whole will be moving forward and as part of that forward motion my legs will have to be engaged in both bearing weight and moving through the air. Here, the kinesthetic and proprioceptive awareness of my legs does not simply present information about the legs themselves in isolation, but as part of the project of moving forward. Thus, the proprioceptive and kinesthetic awareness of my legs is subordinated to the direction in which my body is travelling, a direction established by axes extending from the center of gravity of my body. As another example, consider winding up to kick a soccer ball. In this case the center of gravity in my body is subordinated to the relevant origin in the foot and axes which subordinate the ball to a particular subsection of egocentric space. More simply, my body is situated in such a way that it can support the action of the foot.

One important thing to note is that these distinctions are really more a matter emphasis than a reflection of truly insulated phenomena. In fact, the typical direction of subordination is from body to body in coordination with the bidirectional subordination between body and world. The last example I offered is a perfect demonstration of this. I discussed the sense in which kicking a soccer ball is a case of body to body subordination. I also noted that the ball is subordinated to a subcategory of egocentric space as I ready to kick it. Yet, the position of my body is also subordinated to the position of the soccer ball and subordinated in two ways. First, the position of my body on the field is subordinated to the soccer ball because the whole point of the game is to make a play involving the ball. Secondly, given the mechanics of my body and the possibilities for body to body subordination, something of the size, shape, weight, and rigidity of the soccer ball must be approached in a certain manner in order to be kicked in a controlled way. This is accompanied by another level of body to world and world to body

subordination. Objects of the size, shape, weight, and rigidity of soccer balls will only show up as kickable for those with the appropriate type of body (which may include more than just our own). Reciprocally, objects of particular types determine possibilities for action and perception for those with certain body types. Yet, the ability for subordination can only be acquired given outer affection, in this case a world which resists, affords, and demands typical and inevitable ways of acting.

Our discussion of Bermudez, Gibson, and Husserl suggests that there are invariant spatial structures involved in each case of spatial subordination and that they are integrated (synthesized) in action. I will first discuss each spatial invariant on its own before moving to a discussion of synthesis. It will be important to eventually say more about the “invariance” of spatial invariants, but for now, it suffices to note that I am using the term “invariant” in two senses. First, I am using it to capture Gibson’s insights into the structures underlying perception. For Gibson, discovering invariants serves to help define sensori-motor capacities because invariants reflect the scope of operation of sensori-motor capacities and how the limits of their operation are just the limits of the capabilities of the body. There is, for instance, only so much that can be seen in a glance, only so far our arms can extend from our body, only so many origins relative to which something can be located, and only a certain way in which a surface can appear in space if it is to be apprehended as having a color (it must appear as having multiple appearances which are ordered according to a pattern relative to our movement). Secondly, these capacities, because they define the limits and scope of bodily capabilities, are in some sense necessary for (invariant features of) the constitution of the body. We will discuss these points and the kind of necessity at work here in greater depth at the end of the chapter.

First, there are spatial types. Again, a spatial type features axes extending from an origin and determines the location of things (objects, facets of objects, features) in egocentric space. Spatial types are not identified with specific or particular instances of locating things egocentrically, but rather determine what it is for an object to be located relative to an origin positioned in the body. A thing may move relative to the origin and the origin may move relative to the thing, but throughout these changes the way the thing can be located on axes relative to origins will remain constant. Secondly, there are ecological invariants. Vision offers the clearest example of such invariants. Changes in the appearance of surfaces due to the movement and position of the viewer do not happen randomly, but in regular and rule bound ways. For example, an object is seen to have the color it has in and through regular and rule bound transformations in the appearance of its surface. These regular patterns of change are transformational invariants. Objects that maintain their position in the world relative to the viewer, like walls, are structural invariants. The nearness and farness of the point of observation (the center of the head) from the structural invariant is indicated by the regular and rule bound change in the solid angle of light coming from the structural invariant and captured by the eye. Thus, the invariance is determined relative to the viewer and each structural invariant is apprehended according to the same basic scheme. We have also seen that there are self-specifying invariants involved in both the boundedness of vision and the kinesthetic information available in vision.

There are also transformational invariants in other sense modalities. Loudness, for instance, varies in a regular way as one approaches or moves away from the source of a sound. Feelings of heat and cold and the strength of an odor vary in much the same way. Sensitivity to texture also involves transformational invariants. Running my hand along a piece of fabric, a

roughhewn table, and the page of a book all involve picking up information about texture in and through the regular variance of sensation at my fingertips. I have not exhausted the list of perceptual invariants here. Nor have the invariants I have discussed been treated in the detail they deserve, but I think we have enough to paint a solid picture of this kind of invariant.

Thirdly, we have proprioceptive invariants. Proprioceptive awareness includes joint-position sense, kinesthetic awareness, and information about posture, balance, and pressure where the body is contacting surfaces. Joint position sense is the awareness that we have of how our body parts and hinges are distributed in space relative to each other while kinesthetic awareness is the awareness of limb movement. One thing that these forms of awareness tells us is that there are invariant limits on the possible distribution of body parts relative to each other. There are only so many ways my right wrist can be distributed relative to my left knee, and so on with the other hinges. Information about posture and balance further specify which distributions can be maintained. Of all possible distributions, some sequences of distribution are privileged over others for certain kinds of movement and for movement through particular mediums. So the distributions favored for efficient movement through water will not be the same as the distribution favored for hiking. And the distribution favored for hiking in dry weather will not be precisely the same as that favored in muddy or snowy conditions. Kinesthetic and proprioceptive feedback will provide information about ease and efficiency of movement toward a goal and adjustments can be made as the action is ongoing.

Sometimes finding the appropriate sequence of distribution for a given task will involve experimenting with different possible distributions and sequences of distribution while attending to proprioceptive and kinesthetic feedback. Yet, the range of possibilities for self-directed locomotion via one's own body will be invariant. There are only so many ways the body can

move itself by means of itself. Further proprioceptive invariants include the possible locations of mediate proprioceptive sensations and the simultaneously exteroceptive and proprioceptive nature of embodied orientation. Again, the latter also involves proprioceptive awareness of things like the arrangement and disposition of the hand and fingers relative to a touched surface. Here, the range of possibilities will be determined by the possible distributions of limbs and hinges which thus also determine the possible spatial information that can be picked up in this way.

The final type of spatial invariant is the affordance. Affordances are somewhat more complicated and can be viewed in two ways. On one hand, we can look at affordances simply in terms of the action that an environment affords in abstraction from the other spatial invariants we have discussed. Viewed from this perspective, what is emphasized is a single ability which is suited to a particular feature of the environment. On the other hand, affordances, as actions, stand at the intersection of the invariants we have already discussed, are ways in which these invariants are integrated. Gibson, discussing the terrestrial surface, writes, “It is stand-on-able, permitting an upright position for quadrupeds and bi-peds. It is therefore walk-on-able and run-over-able. It is not sink-into-able like a surface of water or a swamp, that is, not for heavy terrestrial animals. Support for water bugs is different” (Gibson 127). The significance of the terrestrial surface for us, that it is walk-on-able and run-over-able, is a product of abilities for spatial subordination and the invariant structures constitutive of those capacities. Finding the terrestrial surface walk-on-able and run-over-able presupposes the capacities to locate it within ego-centric space, engage with it as something like a structural invariant, explore it perceptually through transformational invariants in the relevant sense modalities, gather information about our relation to it via self-specifying proprioceptive and kinesthetic information, and deploy the

proper sequence of limb and hinge distributions with sensitivity to proprioceptive and kinesthetic feedback. In addition to affordances concerning surfaces and surface layouts related to posture and locomotion, Gibson also discusses affordances involving manipulation and related activities, substances (viscous, liquid, malleable, and resistant substances), injury and benefit, and surfaces that reveal and conceal. Each of these types of affordance can also be described in terms of the integration of spatial invariants.

We can say, following the second way of viewing affordances, that affordances are typical and inevitable expressions of spatial invariants. Affordances are particular ways of integrating spatial invariants in action. We can see each invariant as emphasizing a certain way we adjust our body as we subordinate objects to our body and how this subordination produces feedback in the form of stimuli. These stimuli indicate, in turn, how we should move or would have to move in order to reveal more of the object or continue with an action of some other sort. This motivates body to body subordination in the form of further adjustments and this subordination most always involves a certain “ordering” of the contributions of invariant spatial structures. In the case of perceptual invariants, for instance, the body as a whole is subordinated to the organ responsible for sense-perception (the eyes and the finger tips are two examples) which in turn subordinates objects to the movement of the sense organ. The movement of the sense organ reveals further aspects or appearances of the object and what is revealed then indicates how the sense organ should be or would have to be positioned in order to reveal yet more. As we move to view more of the object, the rest of the body is subordinated to the sense organ. It is situated so as to support the action of the organ. This support comes in the form of proprioceptive adjustments and the maintenance of an object of perception at a location in egocentric space. We can say more precisely that spatial invariants come together in typical

ways which we characterize by a primary activity, for instance perceptual exploration, but which always involve supporting processes of which we are peripherally aware. In the case of perceptual exploration this would include proprioceptive and locating processes and possibly also information from other sense modalities insofar as the object has entered the integrated sensory field. This kind of integration is the typical form that body to body subordination takes.

Bermudez emphasizes the innate nature of affordances in relation to things like cliffs, but an account in terms of originary acquisition through innate capacities (spatial invariants) and affection (drawing together these invariants in distinctive ways in response to the world) is also clearly possible and preferable for developing an account of *a priori* structures of experience. In any case, the instinctive nature of affordances does not mean that they must be about particular predetermined natural objects. Artifacts that might never have developed like lamp switches and door knobs also afford certain actions, they are also approached as immediately and directly presenting possibilities for action. No doubt, someone who has never seen a light switch or a door knob will not see these things as affording a particular action. Yet, where affordances in the natural world present parts of the world as suited to our abilities for spatial subordination, we also have the ability to arrange the world in such a way that it suits our ability for spatial subordination. So even artifacts are developed in accord with the typical and inevitable expressions of spatial invariants. We have door knobs instead of foot handles, writing implements that fit in our fingers rather than between our wrists, and stairs rather than a series of branches. And someone who has never seen a light switch or a door knob will immediately grasp what these things afford when he sees a light switched on and a door opened. These actions will be grasped as in accord with the typical and inevitable expressions of spatial invariants.

One further aspect of body to body subordination is that it always indicates a type of object or a typical feature of the environment to which that kind of subordination is suited. For instance, if I am walking through a room and the lights suddenly go out, I might bend my knees, reach out my hands, and walk slowly in anticipation of solid objects that are bump-into-able and touchable even in the absence of actual stimuli from those objects. Positioning the body in such a way means that I know what it is for objects positioned in the world to have these features. At the other extreme, there are cases in which one is surprised by a sudden stimulus. In this case the typical forms of body to body subordination that will be motivated will depend on whether the stimulus is visual, tactile, proprioceptive, or proper to some other sense. The response will, in each case, demonstrate knowledge of what it is for an object to have certain features because these features will in fact be indicated by the way we respond to the stimulus. There is, for instance, a certain way to get a grip on the shape and color of something. Moving in a particular way that is subordinated to the point of observation at the center of our head and anticipates the availability of transformational invariants (along with other relevant ecological invariants) already indicates that information about color and shape is being sought. Merleau-Ponty describes such movement as most often guided by the norm of achieving a balance of richness and clarity in the presentation of the object.

The knowledge at stake here is sensori-motor knowledge and, based on the analysis thus far, we can further specify two general types of sensory motor knowledge. The first type is knowing what it is for something to afford possibilities for action and perception.⁷⁶ The second type is knowing what it is for something to be locatable. The first can be broken into subtypes

⁷⁶ Here, I am using the notion of affordance in a way that is somewhat broader than Gibson's use. When Gibson discusses affordances, he is generally referring to some specific feature of the environment that is perceived. I am using it to characterize sensori-motor knowledge more generally.

according to the various types of affordances as well as the sense modalities and the types of transformational and, more generally, ecological invariants associated with each. The second type can be broken into subtypes according to origins, axes and hinges. These types and subtypes are similar to Kant's schemata because they constitute knowledge of what it is for an object to be an object of experience. Yet, this knowledge is not a product of the interpretive use of concepts. Rather, it is a direct result of how the body is constituted. These types can, then, be identified more directly with Husserl's types. This is for two reasons.

First, Husserl does not rely on an interpretive use of concepts, but develops an alternate account of passive synthesis. Secondly, what this analysis suggests is that we can identify Husserlian types of the most general order with types of sensory motor knowledge. For instance, to experience color is just to deploy sensori-motor knowledge pertaining to the transformational invariants typical of the visible qualities of the surfaces of objects. This requires altering Husserl's account of association, but only slightly. Association will involve, for instance, association between similarities in the pattern of appearances of the surfaces of two objects. This also has the virtue of anchoring Husserl's later work on passive synthesis in his earlier insights concerning the body. On this account the awareness of colors on the periphery, for instance the color of a wall one is not explicitly attending to, is explainable as an awareness of the visible qualities of the surface of the wall *varying as colors in general do* rather than an awareness of it, say, *varying as red or blue does*. This would accommodate our insights concerning epistemic neutrality in the last chapter.

If we take this view of sensori-motor knowledge and spatial invariants, Kant's account of the distinction between what Strawson calls the "objective order" and subjective experience suggests something different for embodied self-consciousness than what Bermudez suggests. It

suggests the kind of holistic account of space both Husserl and Kant offer, but with the body as the organ of synthesis. Strawson takes Kant's insight about the relation between subjective experience and the objective order to be about establishing a point of view on the world and Bermudez follows him down this path. Yet, Kant's point in the deduction is clearly about the relation between the intuition of space, a form of cognition in Kant's specialized sense, and perception. Kant writes, "Thus, if e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the **necessary unity** of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space" (B 162). Kant is concerned with necessary spatial invariants that ground our apprehension of empirical objects. These invariants are not features of the objective order if we understand this as the set of real objects of possible perception. Rather, these invariants concern the synthetic unity of space as a matter of intuition and as a condition for cognition. As we have already discussed, Kant ultimately accounts for the synthetic unity of the intuitions through figurative synthesis where temporality is primary. Yet, the inclusion of the body in an account of cognition at the level of synthesis changes things significantly.

The varieties of spatial subordination I have been discussing are "drawn" in accord with space because they are governed by the part-whole relation of space rather than the part-whole relation of concepts. Yet, the spatial invariants I have discussed also offer further specifications of the intuition of space. The invariants I have discussed share with Kant's account of space that they are determinations of outer intuition that remain the same throughout the various and contingent interactions we have with objects. Ego centric spatial relations, relations between limbs and hinges, locations of mediate and immediate proprioception, and the rules governing the ordered appearance of surfaces in space are all invariant. Moreover, each particular instance

of spatial subordination is “drawn” in accord with these invariants. What remains is to give a different account of the synthesis of the whole of space other than Kant’s, one rooted in the body and which is linked to embodied self-consciousness. It will be helpful here to look back at a few of the earlier points we made about Kant’s account of synthesis and work through the parallels with spatial subordination.

For Kant synthesis is always about combination according to a rule. Representations are combined through a rule and in an object in intellectual synthesis while temporality and along with it spatiality are synthesized according to rules of apprehension which are constituted by the interpretive use of the categories. On Longuenesse’s account, rules of apprehension are constituted by concepts of comparison. These concepts are, in turn, part of a larger process Kant calls *reflection* which includes comparison of identities and differences, reflection of commonalities, and abstraction from differences while gathering together commonalities. Subjectivity is in turn dependent on the rules governing combination and on the combinability of representations. That is, consciousness is unified across its diverse representations of the world through its grasp of the rules for the combination of representations which are grasped (as rules of apprehension or as categories) as extending beyond any one of their applications.

The way this works is that having an awareness of synthesis is essentially to grasp one’s activity as rule governed. This, in turn, is already to grasp it as reproducible. Such a grasp requires an understanding of one’s self as being capable of reproducing the activity which the rule governs, or as being capable of applying it in any of the possible judgments in which it can figure without having to actually entertain each of those judgments. Ultimately this is made possible by the anticipatory nature of the schemata. The schemata also ensure that a subject who is aware of synthesis is aware of more than simply the rule governed relations between concepts.

By way of the schemata the subject is also aware of how representations are combined in an object situated in time and space.

In any case, judgment requires that one can conceive of one's activity abstractly, as not tethered to any particular instance. Developing this idea yet further, becoming conscious of the discursive activities by which we gather many representations under a common one (and here we include the interpretive use of concepts as a discursive activity) means knowing each of these activities as sharing the common properties of being mine and being discursive. That is, I grasp these activities generically as being of a particular kind and identify myself with this kind of activity given that I can only enjoy a unified consciousness where this activity is operative and where I am conscious of this activity as of a particular kind. As to the latter, in grasping the activity generically, I grasp it as something that can possibly be employed wherever it is possible to gather representations under a concept. A key feature of this broad form of apperception, perhaps *the* feature, is that the discursive activity of the subject is grasped by the discursive function of the activity itself. In order to complete the account of passive synthesis which we have been developing, we will need to find this same reflexive structure in the body or else lose the possibility of finding apperceptive content that can be uniquely identified with the body and is thus genuinely nonconceptual.

With some important differences, we find a structure that parallels Kant's structure of self-consciousness in spatial subordination. To see this, let's work through the structure Kant gives us as I have just discussed it, but substituting the key elements of spatial subordination. We can begin with synthesis as combination according to rule. The questions with respect to the body are, what is it precisely that is combined and what rules are involved? In the case of the body the kind of combination at stake is not the combination of representations as in the case of

concept subordination. There are three elements involved in synthesis at the level of the body and they form a holism. These are action, object, and the body. Actions are synthesized or brought together as wholes through body to body subordination in coordination with bidirectional body to world subordination. The unity of action is, in turn, both product and producer of the wholeness of the body and the perceived wholeness of the object of perception.

One part of the holism of action, object, and body is that we cannot get a handle on the wholeness of the body and the wholeness of objects without the activities of spatial subordination. Because perception is an action, or something that we do by means of our body, objects of perception are synthesized through spatial subordination, through the movement required to, for instance, motivate a pattern of appearances. As to the synthesis of the body, perception will always involve the often peripheral awareness of the body as a combined whole subordinated to a locus of activity as governed by a type of subordination. The body is thus synthesized in various ways through body to body subordination in coordination with bidirectional body to world subordination. It's a bit like a chain whose links of course exist even when the chain holds no weight. Yet, when it is in use its links are pulled taut behind the point of contact with a weight and each link is thus given a function and is arranged in a definite way relative to the other links and the weight. Analogously, we can think of the organs of perception, origins of axes, and locations of proprioceptive awareness as both links and as possible points of contact. To put these points in the language we have been using to characterize synthesis, we run through, distinguish, and hold together the different capacities of the body in action. The way these capacities are held together depend on the type of action being performed. Moments of an action are run through, distinguished, and held together according to an order which is anticipated in the capacities of the body but also guided by the systems of indication

(internal/external horizon) that are perceptually available. Finally, the facets of an object are run through, distinguished, and held together in being anticipated by the capacities of the body, as situated in a horizon the whole of which logically precedes the parts, and in the action itself which depends for its full synthesis on feedback from the object.

It follows from these insights that the inevitable and typical expressions of spatial invariants are thus typical and inevitable forms of synthesis for object, action, and Body. They are, in short, rules of apprehension. This apprehension is undertaken only through action and always involves the apprehension of the reciprocal relation between body and object. These typical forms of synthesis also constitute the synthesis of the horizon of possible experience in anticipating the features of possible objects of experience. Moreover, because action is always undertaken within the system of indications that constitute the horizon, a system we grasp/synthesize through sensori-motor knowledge, any given encounter with an object already indicates other indeterminate but determinable objects.

Briefly, the other part of the holism is that action cannot be undertaken if either the body or the object is incapable of forming an organized whole, or alternately if one is simply not suited to the other.

If these rules are not the product of concepts or of an “I think,” we must account for the sense in which these rules are our own and not simply a matter of reflex as well as how embodied experience is a unified experience. The answer to these questions rest with body to body subordination and rules of apprehension or types of spatial subordination. Remember that having an awareness of synthesis is essentially to grasp one’s activity as rule governed. This, in turn, is already to grasp it as reproducible. Such a grasp requires an understanding of one’s self as being capable of reproducing the activity which the rule governs, or as being capable of

applying it in any of the possible judgments in which it can figure without having to actually entertain each of those judgments. In the case of the body, we do not have judgments, but typical forms of spatial subordination, or rules of apprehension, that are grasped as governing reproducible activities of the body. These rules can be characterized in terms of two main components. The first is the “if – then” that Husserl discusses. For instance, if I move my foot in this way, then I will have to shift my center of gravity that way or if I move my eyes in this direction under these lighting conditions, then the stimulus will change according to a certain pattern. The second component consists of the concepts of comparison.

Grasping rules of apprehension as reproducible means grasping identities and differences between typical forms of activity. It also means grasping agreements and conflicts between different ways of positioning the body. Only certain types of body to body subordination will “agree with” or make possible locomotion, others will conflict with it. The same applies to activities involving manipulation (hammering, tying knots, grasping, climbing), confronting materials of different sorts (clay, metal, mud), and the other categories of affordance. Some forms of body to body subordination agree with many different possible activities.

For instance, the basic position for sports of most types is to bend at the knees, placing the center of gravity low, and to position arms and hands out front of the center of gravity in a state of readiness. The exact position of the hands relative to the elbows and point of observation and the exact position of the elbows relative to the center of gravity will vary slightly depending on whether one is, for instance, boxing or ice skating. Yet, one strength of this position is that it allows for quick adjustments in order to protect vital areas to the front of the body. This position agrees with running, skating, catching, shooting, kicking, jumping, defensive maneuvers, offensive maneuvers, and so on. As for the pair inner and outer, certain typical

forms of subordination will apply for any object of experience, so long as we are capable of that form of subordination. For instance, color vision will always involve transformational invariants and any object that is an object of possible experience will be visible according to this form of subordination. We can say more generally that the most basic forms of spatial subordination anticipate the most basic features an object must have to occupy the integrated sensory field. In the case of particular actions, whether one or another way of engaging objects is more appropriate (reaching for a cup at a distance rather than standing in order to get at it) will be conditional on the circumstances.

The rules of apprehension associated with spatial subordination I have been discussing are also *analogous* to concepts understood as predicates of possible judgments. Earlier I discussed two cases which require orienting one's body in the anticipation of stimuli of a certain sort where those stimuli are not yet present. This is a case in which body to body subordination indicates a type of object or type of feature of an object of possible experience, but where there is not yet something that in its presence completes the bi-directional body to world subordination. Thus, we can "entertain" the most general types of spatial subordination without running through each of the particular cases of subordination in which the type figures. We thus grasp certain types of body to body subordination as extending beyond any of their particular tokens. This will also have to involve temporal syntheses which, again, certainly deserve further discussion. For our purposes it suffices to say that temporal synthesis is necessary but not sufficient for grasping our abilities for spatial subordination in this way. Temporal synthesis is necessary because without it, there would be no way to anticipate the future use of these abilities or retain past uses as unified with present uses. Yet, temporal synthesis is not sufficient because in a situation like the one Strawson describes in which only red, round patches, brown oblongs,

flashes, whistles, tickling sensations, and smells are experienced, we would have time consciousness but no sense of objects enduring in space.

This brings us to the trickiest part of the account, the analysis of the reflexive structure of spatial subordination. Given our discussion of spatial subordination, we can give a slightly different account of the “I can” than that given by Husserl. The “I can” consists in the fact that I tacitly grasp the activities of embodied cognition generically as being of a particular kind (all of these activities concern spatial subordination) and identify myself with this kind of activity given that I can only enjoy a unified embodied consciousness where this activity is operative and where I am conscious of this activity as being of a particular kind. As to the latter, in grasping the activity generically, I grasp it as something that can possibly be employed wherever it is possible to subordinate something spatially. This does not alter our earlier account of the synthesis of the horizon, but just adds greater specification to the various ways we gear into the system of indications that constitute the horizon. Any possible object which can be an object for us must be subject to the kinds of sensori-motor explorations discussed here. Thus, we can say more specifically, as a matter of the most general kinds of anticipations constituted by typical and inevitable forms of synthesis for both body and object, that we run through, make distinctions within, and hold together the total horizon by anticipating determinable objects situated within a system of indications. We can gear into this system of indications at any given point via the reciprocating relationship between movement and perception.

Now, in Kant’s analysis of discursive activity, we find that a key feature of discursivity as it relates to self-consciousness is that the discursive activity of the subject is grasped by the discursive function of the activity itself. There are two important things to note about this formulation of self-consciousness. First, the reflexive character of discursivity prevents an

infinite regress in the explanation of self-consciousness. There is no need to posit yet a higher level of consciousness in order to explain a lower level, and so on ad infinitum. Secondly, what is grasped by way of discursivity is not a property that is analogous in any way to the property of an object. Rather, we grasp our ability to do something by way of exercising an ability of that same kind. The question is if we can complete the account of reflexivity we have begun in a way that meets these two conditions. If we cannot, we will not necessarily be in danger of an infinite regress, but we will be pushed to the level of discursive self-consciousness in order to explain embodied cognition.

Both Husserl and Bermudez discuss the consciousness we have of our body in terms of properties analogous to those of objects. Husserl does this in arguing that what I have called passive modes of sensing are analogous to the properties of objects. Bermudez, by arguing that proprioception is a form of perception like any other, makes of the body something apprehended in a way that is analogous to the way objects are apprehended. Certainly, each is careful to note the important differences between bodies and objects, but neither presents a strong form of reflexive embodied subjectivity. Following Kant's formulation, if there is a strong form of embodied reflexivity, it would be the grasping of our ability for spatial subordination by way of our ability for spatial subordination. The place to look for this structure is in body to body subordination and the global nature of proprioception.

As Bermudez points out, there is no single origin for proprioception. Rather, proprioception is a global phenomenon that involves feedback from the body, feedback that yields the awareness of it as a connected whole. Husserl's insight that sensation fields are constantly filled is another way to describe the awareness we have of the body as a connected whole. Yet, this awareness is not simply the awareness of our body as a collection of properties

or even features that are property like. Rather, it is the awareness of sensori-motor powers, each one of which is capable of taking the lead in actions of various sorts. The body is thus proprioceived as alive with powers and possibilities, possibilities captured by typical forms of subordination, these already indicating typical features of the world to which these forms are suited. Proprioception as a global phenomenon subordinates these powers to the space of the body, but they are subordinated precisely *as* powers for spatial subordination and are at the same time capable subordinating the limits of the body to activities of the types we have already discussed. Here, the body is not subordinated as some object in the world would be, but precisely as pluripotent, to take a term from cell biology that fits fairly well here. From this point of view, even passive modes of sensing reveal typical forms of subordination. That is, passive modes of sensing reveal portions of the body to be available, to be alive with possibilities, possibilities captured by the typical forms of subordination of which it is capable and which already indicate those features of the world to which those typical forms are suited. Thus, the spontaneity of the body, its set of sensori-motor capacities, is already drawn on in its receptivity.

Loose Ends Tied Loosely

There is much more to discuss when it comes to embodied cognition. We should, for instance, discuss Gibson's work in greater detail, explore later developments in phenomenology, and develop a more detailed account of the relations between invariants and their inevitable and

typical expressions. Yet, I think we have enough to provide answers to the major questions we have encountered and in doing so expand on the notion of the embodied reflexivity I have just offered.

1

A question that was raised in chapter 4 is what the relation between subject and object is at the level of embodied subjectivity. We can answer this question by looking at the particular way the account of embodied cognition I have offered satisfies the nonsolipsistic and the spatial awareness components of embodied self-consciousness. Both of these components are actually satisfied in the accounts we have given of the horizon, temporal synthesis, and associative synthesis which have been completed by, but not significantly modified in our analysis of spatiality. In distinction from Bermudez's analysis, Husserl's analysis yields conditions for the possibility of particular cases of spatial awareness and particular instances in which we distinguish ourselves from the world.

Beginning with the distinction between self and world, the synthesis of space consists in running through, distinguishing between parts of, and holding together the whole of space by anticipating that any part of space will afford action and perception and will be locatable. We have discussed this anticipation in terms of sensori-motor knowledge (spatial subordination) and the possibility of taking a perspective on an object. In anticipating that we will be able to gear into the system of indications constituting the internal horizons of objects of possible experience we grasp that these objects must be situated in a space that extends beyond the object such that spatial subordination is possible. Indeed, spatial subordination is in part grasping that subject

and object must always occupy positions relative to each other within a space that encompasses both. Our capacity for movement and the fact that sensori-motor knowledge is both self-specifying and other specifying, proprioceptive and exteroceptive, entails a tacit grasp of the part – whole relation governing space. Because we grasp that the whole precedes and positions the parts, we grasp that parts of the horizon, and the objects located there, have an existence independent of our own and exist even when we are not observing them. Bermudez also argues that the distinction between self and other requires recognitional abilities. On the Husserlian account I have developed, at the level of apperception even unfamiliar objects are familiar as being determinable with respect to what they afford and their location relative to the subject. We can say, then, that even unfamiliar objects are recognizable as objects of possible experience. Our account here only augments Husserl's account. Unfamiliar objects are familiar as objects anticipated in the inevitable and typical expressions of spatial invariants and as determinable through the more fine grained activities these capacities make possible. Associative syntheses, in conjunction with temporal synthesis, make recognition of particular objects possible through establishing relations of similarity between what we discover in these more fine grained activities.

As for the spatial awareness component, the key requirements are the ability to distinguish things from the place they occupy and the ability to navigate with respect to places rather than things. Husserl's discussion of the horizon addresses both. Anticipating objects of possible experience means anticipating them as situated within a horizon with which they are not identical. Because we do not identify particular objects as constitutive of the horizon (the horizon is not the set of all objects that are in principle perceptually available at this moment), the removal or destruction of an object that had occupied a particular place does not disrupt our

grasp of the part-whole relation which governs the horizon; the place where the object was is still apprehended as a part of a whole which logically precedes it. Any of our particular navigational abilities will be sensitive to this rather than features of the environment which merely covary with spatial features of the environment. Also, because our navigational abilities are sensitive to the structure of space, our actions will never be reducible to the conditioned repetition of a sequence of movements. From these considerations, we can conclude that when satisfied by way of a Kantian/Husserlian analysis, the nosolipsistic and spatial awareness components of self-consciousness yield conditions for the possibility of a point of view.

This discussion of the possibility of a point of view compliments our earlier discussion of performative grasp. To summarize that discussion, my awareness that I can work through a system of indication via movement/perception with respect to one object already constitutes a performative grasp of how this capacity will be at work in the disclosure of any possible object of perception. This performative grasp is constituted by the fact that the systems of indication which we engage through perception and movement always point, precisely as such systems, to indeterminate but determinable objects and a basic complement of capacities which make the disclosure or constitution of any object possible. Moreover, any particular determination of an object presupposes that we have found our way to that object through a system of indication which at first indicated this object only indeterminately as a possible object of experience among others. This means that the anticipation of objects of possible experience and the basic complement of capacities that constitute the body are prior to any particular determination of objects. The priority here is logical rather than developmental. Disclosure of an object to a subject (but, of course, not the creation of the object) depends on the object being anticipated, in its broadest features, in the capacities of the subject. Nonetheless, if empirical subjects do not

move to actually engage objects of experience which provide feedback in the form of affordance and resistance, no performative grasp can ever be established.

2

One of the major problems we have confronted throughout the analysis is the multiplication of subjectivities and the creation of a division between the transcendental and the empirical that cannot be bridged. Those coming after Kant worried that transcendental subjectivity is in the end too abstract, too much at a remove to be reconciled with our experience of the world. We have already addressed this worry at the end of chapter 4, but were awaiting an account of the reflexivity of the body to complete the analysis, an account I have given here. Putting the pieces together results in the following.

I argued that particular schemes of anticipation (for instance, anticipating that objects will be located above, below, behind, to the left, or to the right) are *originally acquired* as objects are confronted via the basic capacity of mobility/perception. Given the capacities of our body and the shape of the world, such schemes are *inevitable* as *a priori* structures of cognition and synthesis. Crucially, being inevitable is something different from being innate. Inevitable *a priori* structures require outer affection where innate *a priori* structures would not. One very important thing the discussion of inevitable *a priori* structures does is to make action central to the account of embodied cognition. In the discussion here, I have only added a distinction between spatial invariants and their integration in action. It is only when these invariants are integrated in action that they will inevitably yield schemes of anticipation or rules of apprehension. It is true that the very idea of invariants is a bit of an abstraction. Yet, the

distinction I draw between invariants and their integration in action serves to highlight the fact that action is almost always a global process involving many different bodily capacities which on their own could not constitute action. It is useful, for instance, to talk about spatial types in isolation from proprioception and ecological invariants in order to categorize different bodily capacities, but a discussion of spatial types on their own will only give us part of the picture of what is involved in locating things egocentrically.

In our discussion of embodied subjectivity, I offered an argument for the unity of embodied experience that anchored it in a reflexive structure constituted by spatial subordination. Here, I claimed that subjectivity is constituted by our identification of ourselves with sensori-motor powers which are subordinated to the space of the body but which also subordinate the body to typical actions which are constituted by rules of apprehension or what we can also call schemes of anticipation. These rules or schemes are, as I have just discussed, inevitable *a priori* structures and require outer affection. Crucially, because the unity of embodied experience rests on inevitable *a priori* structures, it rests on action or, as we have discussed it in this chapter, syntheses encompassing action, object, and Body. These syntheses, in turn, account for the synthesis of the horizon of possible experience; they are just another way of talking about the various ways we gear into systems of indication.

Thus, the unity of embodied experience and the unity of the horizon of possible experience are two sides of the same coin. The overall structure of this account is that of a transcendental argument for the conditions of the possibility of the kind of unified embodied experience we enjoy. Yet, it is also simply a further development of our discussion of the “I can” and does not alter but only augments our insights there. Namely, it develops the idea that each engagement with a particular object already indicates the total horizon as coextensive with

the capacities for action constituting the “I can”. This means that the constitution of the total horizon depends, in turn, on agents who are actually capable of navigating the world through action/perception and who are actually able to retain and protentionally anticipate experiences with particular objects such that the total horizon is indicated at all. The empirical structure of experience and the transcendental structure are mutually dependent here and coeval. Another way to articulate this point, one suggested by Allison’s account of Kant, is that the empirical and the transcendental are just two ways of looking at a single subject. Inevitable *a priori* structures are both a key feature of an account which attempts to analyze self-consciousness on its own terms by looking at the logical dependencies that hold between elements of our experience and a way of describing the actual capacities we as human beings possess.

Another benefit of this view is that because the kind of synthesis that operates by way of inevitable *a priori* structures operates at the level of apperception, there is no danger of confusing the general claim that all embodied cognition involves the synthesis of action, object, and body with the claim that every one of my behaviors must be involved in this kind of synthesis. Even granting that peripheral awareness operates in embodied cognition, it is true that there will be bodily behaviors of ours that are not even peripherally grasped as involved in the synthesis of action, object, and body. Bermudez’s examples of losing track of our own body would fit here. The account I have offered only commits us to a claim about what kind of capacities are required for a unified embodied experience and makes no claims about having to be aware of each aspect of our body. There is an empirical component, but this only concerns those same capacities as grounding our agency in and experience of the empirical world. Our grasp of these capacities even at the empirical level is apperceptive because it involves the awareness of the general types of actions of which we are capable even when we are not

deploying those actions. It involves, in short, our grasp of our body in its pluripotency and the world as the field in which the powers of the body are exercised.

3

A question that lingers from chapter five concerns the norms that are at work at the level of perception. I argued that we can make corrections in action, but I also argued that these corrections are not epistemic in nature. In other words, I argued that we can make corrections that are not determined as such by the standard of truth. So the question is, by what standard can they be considered corrections? Adrian Cussins in his analysis of nonconceptual content develops a clear way of answering this question. There are differences between my account and Cussins', but these differences will help highlight key features of my analysis.

Cussins argues that the world is accessible in two ways, one conceptual and another nonconceptual. In order to clarify this distinction, he considers two ways of gauging speed as one rides a motorcycle. The first is through adjustments⁷⁷ that are responsive to changing conditions. Here, speed is not a referent and there is no identity established between it and another speed. It is also not given as making certain propositions true and others false. The speed is simply given as how the environment would afford certain movements and resist others. It involves, in other words, know-how which is subject to resistance but not to skeptical challenge. Cussins takes it to follow from this last point that know-how is situation specific and not general like thought. I will return to this point in a moment.

⁷⁷ Cussins calls these adjustments “epistemically sensitive adjustments”, but I think it is best to avoid this label for reasons that should be clear from the preceding discussion.

Cussins further distinguishes conceptual from nonconceptual content by distinguishing between the normative conditions and modes of presentation constituting each kind of content. Thoughts present the world as truth maker and the conceptual constituents of thoughts have a referential and objectual structure. This means that thoughts are measured against the standard of truth and the subject grasps the world as that which would make a thought true or false. Experience, on the other hand, presents the world as mediator. The nonconceptual content of experience is constituted by what Cussins calls activity trails, or forms of guidance through the environments in which we act. “Bumping”, for instance, is a form of guidance and in general each environment has its way of affording and resisting our movement through it. Crucially for Cussins, this means that norms are situated in the material structure of the environments through which we move. This also means that our actions need not be governed by an explicit intention. The environment will in fact guide them. Cussins argues that the basic structure of activity is constituted by paths which afford our actions and which are bounded by, “regions of increased resistance” (Gunther 154).

I agree with the general points that Cussins makes, but the analysis we have done of subjectivity suggests a way it can be expanded. Namely, we can offer a reason for why know-how is subject to resistance but not to skeptical challenge. This will also show why know-how is in fact general. The reason know-how is not subject to skeptical challenge is because of the body’s certainty of itself. Our discussion of body to body subordination revealed that this form of subordination has the structure of a Kantian cogito. Briefly, my awareness of my body as pluripotent is an immediate and enduring apperceptive awareness of the various types of activity of which I am capable. Because the typical actions of which I am capable are always at once self-specifying and other specifying, the types of actions of which I am apperceptively aware

already anticipate features of the world that can provide guidance for those possible actions. We have discussed these features in various ways, but the key way of thinking about these features has been as nested gestalts which figure in the horizon as the total system of indications which guide action. The horizon is, then, just the space of all possible activity trails. Moreover, the total horizon is synthesized (run through, distinguished, and held together) in and through our apperceptive grasp of the types of actions of which we are capable (the “I can”).

Thus, unlike the Cartesian cogito, the embodied ego always already implicates the world in which we act. It follows that apperceptive awareness operates in embodied cognition as a confidence that we can make adjustments to our body in order to apprehend any possible object that may appear within the horizon. So even when we meet resistance we can immediately and with certainty fall back on this confidence rather than moving to the level of conceptual engagement. This constitutes a level of general know-how and this is important because it makes it possible to grasp particular actions as being of one of the types of actions of which we are capable. This, in turn, makes unified embodied experience possible. If there were an action of ours that we could not grasp as one of the types of actions of which we are capable, it would be as if it were the action of another.

Now in the case of engaging with particular objects the particular features of the object call on finer grained responses and provide the guidance necessary to work down from the most general types of actions of which we are capable. This might be considered a form of interpretation in which the general types of actions of which we are capable are interpreted so that they can be applied in specific situations. Yet, in this case the world reads certain possibilities out of us as much as we read certain possibilities out of the world. I have discussed this same thing in terms of the synthesis of object, action, and body. So at least with respect to

our encounters with particular objects, Cussins analysis is correct and accords with my own analysis. I only add another level of know-how which makes possible the kind of know-how which Cussins discusses.

4

One of McDowell's major worries concerning theories of embodied cognition is that they posit a needless and troublesome distinction between intellectual subjectivity and embodied subjectivity. Yet, this distinction is simply phenomenologically accurate. It is also analogous to another phenomenon with which many of us are familiar, namely situations in which we learn something about our character. We might, for instance, want to be brave, but suddenly find ourselves running from a dangerous situation where we were capable of helping. Here, our character does not live up to our intentions and we discover something about our limitations, something about the kind of person we are that we did not previously know. Sometimes the opposite happens and we find that our capabilities outstrip our intentions. We might find ourselves acting in a courageous way that transcends our tacitly held expectations of ourselves. Analogously, it is just true that we sometimes experience the body as *other*. As we noted in our discussion of Husserl, one way we experience the body as other is when we experience it as a limit on our intentions. There are also cases in which our body outstrips our intentions as when we find that we have a knack for something. We even sometimes speak of the feeling of being possessed by some outside force. Yet, even though these kinds of actions are at one level experienced as other because they do not fit with either my intentions or my tacitly held

expectations of myself, I identify myself with those actions through the reflexive nature of embodied cognition. Such actions are immediately cognized as a type of action of which I am capable (an expression of invariant spatial structures), but cognized at the level of embodied cognition and through the successful synthesis of action, object, and body.

There might still be a worry that given the division between embodied subjectivity and intellectual subjectivity, there is no way to unify them. To respond to this worry, let's first get clear on the nature of the division. The arguments I have offered boil down to the claim that conceptual synthesis is neither necessary nor sufficient for the synthesis of action, object, and body. It is not necessary because the synthesis of action, object, and body can proceed in the absence of concepts which would specify that synthesis. It is not sufficient because thinking about an action, specifying it in terms of concepts, is never sufficient for the performance of the action; a conceptual synthesis can never count as a synthesis of action, object, and body. Nonetheless, actions can be specified in terms of concepts and this is simply because actions unfold in a coherent way that can be captured by concepts.

Moreover, if rules of apprehension share with rules for conceptual synthesis a foundation in the concepts of comparison, there is a common project shared between apprehension and thought, but a project undertaken in wholly different ways. This, in turn, provides grounds for a genetic account. At the level of embodied cognition, similarities and differences, agreements and conflicts, and the distinction between "inner" and "outer" conditions on rules of apprehension are manifested in the boundaries between affordance and resistance and in both the limits and the capabilities of the "I can." Where resistance becomes absolute, where we can no longer navigate the world or achieve something by way of comparisons rooted in embodied

cognition, we simply attempt to do so at the level of concepts. This is how action and thought about action are continuous with one another.

5

Finally, the idea of spatial invariants has played a prominent role in my discussion of the body. The invariants I discussed were gathered from Husserl, Gibson, and Bermudez's analysis of the body. I accept that there may indeed be other such invariants, or a different way of categorizing them, but am committed to the idea that there must be invariants of this sort. Nevertheless, whatever the final list of such invariants happens to be, there will be the question of whether we can really consider them invariant. One can, for instance, lack the ability for hearing or sight and still have a sense of self as embodied. So these are invariant neither in the sense that they accompany every type of embodied experience nor in the sense that they invariantly contribute to an embodied sense of self. This also has the consequence that what I have called inevitable *a priori* schemes of anticipation are not so inevitable insofar as their inevitability depends on spatial invariants. Nonetheless, we can salvage these ideas by taking a broader view and adding some qualifications.

The first thing to note is that the account I have given is not an argument for the necessity of embodied experience or even of nonconceptual apperceptive content. I have only argued that nonconceptual apperceptive content is necessary for the kind of experience that many of us enjoy. Now it is also true that some of us have more or less bodily capacities than others. At the extreme, there are those who lack proprioception. This does not mean that they must then lack any sense of self at all, just that they will lack an embodied sense of self. It might be, however,

that such a person would still have a sense of the “I can” with respect to other sense modalities, such as vision. If, however, one were to lack any sort of sense modality that is both self-specifying and other-specifying, the “I can” and the sense of a self of the sort we enjoy will not be possible. Thus, we can say that possession of at least one sense modality that specifies both self and other is necessary for the sense of self as the “I can” that we enjoy. Moreover, something that at least functions like proprioception is necessary for a fully embodied “I can”, but it may also be that other modes of bodily awareness are possible even if we do not have them.

Assuming a foundation of one or more sense modalities that are both self-specifying and other specifying, it is still possible to lack other sense modalities and thus the “inevitable” *a priori* grasp of action these modalities secure. If *a priori* modes of knowledge are supposed to be necessary in some way, this seems to undermine the *a priority* of the types I have discussed. There are a few things to say here. First, inevitable *a priori* types are only inevitable given outer affection, receptivity to outer affection, and the possibility of integrating the information to which we are receptive with information from other sense modalities in particular ways. Secondly, if we are concerned with the necessary conditions for the *type* of embodied experience we enjoy, then we can take a somewhat broader view. We can say that along with a sense modality that functions like proprioception our type of embodied experience requires that one know what it is for something to afford action and perception and know what it is for something to be locatable. The kind of knowledge at stake here is know-how and this knowledge must also constitute the synthesis of a total horizon.

If we are after something more specific like the necessary conditions for two subjects to experience a common object, then three things are necessary. First, the object must have a

property that each can apprehend. Secondly, each must be able to apprehend that property via at least one sense modality that is both self and other specifying. Finally, each must be able to locate the property in space by way of that sense modality. The fact that this property can be a common sensible means that the sense modality that specifies both self and other can be different between the experiencers. For instance one might be able to locate things in space only by sight and not by touch while another might be able to locate things by touch and not by sight, yet each could apprehend the shape of an object by way of their respective sense modalities. If, however, we mean something more specific still like the necessary conditions for each experiencer to apprehend that the other is experiencing a common property, this requires something slightly different. Issues concerning solipsism arise here and certainly this deserves a response, but this would require much more space than I can devote to it here. So I will set this aside for the moment and assume that epistemic neutrality at the level of perception also bars solipsism.

With this in mind, in order for each experiencer to apprehend the other as experiencing a common property the bodily capacities possessed by each experiencer must afford triangulation. In this instance, triangulation involves the conditions on the experience of a common object and two more conditions. First, each must be locatable by the other in a common space by way of at least one sense modality that specifies both self and other. Secondly, each must be locatable to the other as an agent. This means, further, that each must be able to locate the bodily *actions* of the other in a common space. Action, as opposed to behavior or movement, is intentional, so locating bodily action requires that we apprehend it as intentional. In the case of embodied intentionality, this means that one apprehends the other as responsive to an object through perceptual feedback that indicates what actions can or should follow. If, for instance, both I and

another back away from a cliff that was at first hidden from view, I will take it that the other is responsive to visual feedback that indicates that the environment affords falling just there.

If the means by which we locate another is the same means by which we apprehend the embodied intentionality of the other, then the apprehension of their action as action will be immediate. If not, there are other less direct ways of determining that someone is responsive to common objects, but these will often step outside the bounds of embodied cognition and involve some form of communicative action. Agents capable of communicative action are locatable by way of that action, but the physical characteristics of communicative action are not on their own indicative of the features of the world which the action are about. To see how all of these distinctions might work in practice, we should once more consider the example above. One who has no sight but is able to move, touch, speak, and hear will be able to communicate about shape with someone who can speak, hear, and see, but lacks the ability to move and touch. In the case that the one who cannot move also cannot speak, each will still be able to experience the shape of an object, but triangulation will be impossible unless some other form of communication is devised. This is because the one who can neither speak nor move is not locatable as an agent for the one who can only touch.

Conclusion

I set out to show that there is some content that we are required to see as nonconceptual. In arguing for this position I developed an account of nonconceptual apperceptive content which is grounded in Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions. Though Kant's distinction relies on a transcendental approach that we have reason to doubt, I argued that this distinction

can be developed from a phenomenological perspective that avoids the obstacles to Kant's account. Specifically, I developed the notion of nonconceptual apperceptive content from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology and Husserl's account of synthesis. I established, by way of Husserl's account of synthesis, that perception is epistemically neutral and structured by nonconceptual apperceptive content. This analysis was, however, incomplete because nonconceptual apperceptive content and the syntheses which constitute this content had not yet been grounded in embodied subjectivity.

Here, I completed the account by arguing that there is a reflexive structure that operates at the level of the body and unifies the nonconceptual apperceptive content of perception. This still leaves much work to be done. For instance, a deeper engagement with the work of Gibson and recent developments in the theory of ecological perception is clearly required to fill in the picture of spatial invariants. Also, I have not engaged with later developments in the phenomenology of the body, and in particular the work of Merleau-Ponty and Jacob Rogozinski. Rogozinski is of particular interest because he works in the same direction, but by way of Descartes rather than Kant. In the meantime, it is my hope that I have provided a convincing account of nonconceptual apperceptive content.

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