Stony Brook University

Rhetoric and the Way to Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Heidegger

A Dissertation Presented

by

Nanda Golden

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

Stony Brook University

May 2014

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

Nanda Golden

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the

Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend

acceptance of this dissertation.

Peter Manchester – Dissertation Advisor
Associate Professor of Philosophy

Clyde Lee Miller - Chairperson of Defense
Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs and Personnel

Anne O'Byrne – Internal Reader
Associate Professor of Philosophy

Christopher P. Long – External Reader
Professor of Philosophy and Classics and Associate Dean for Graduate and Undergraduate Studies at Pennsylvania State University

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Charles Taber
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

Rhetoric and the Way to Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Heidegger

by

Nanda Golden

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

at

Stony Brook University

2014

By developing Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, and the Greek rhetorical tradition, this dissertation argues that rhetoric, understood as the discipline that best knows how to lead others with everyday speech, is crucial for rousing the desire to choose the philosophical life. This work focuses primarily on three texts: Plato's *Phaedrus*, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and Heidegger's 1924 lecture *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. It fleshes out Heidegger's concept of rhetoric by mapping it on to the development of Greek rhetorical theory, showing how rhetoric's philosophical potential comes to be realized and why Plato and Aristotle's philosophical investigation of rhetoric must be taken up anew.

As far as possible one ought to be immortal and to do all things with a view toward living in accord with the most powerful thing in oneself.

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

Table of Contents

Introduction

From a contemporary perspective the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric is hardly problematic. It is characterized by an opposition familiar to those who study the history of philosophy. Philosophy, with its impractical desire for truth, is opposed by a base mode of speaking, rhetoric, which shunts truth for worldly gains. The clarity gained by the language of philosophy, characterized by defined concepts and precise argumentation, is obscured by rhetorical language, characterized by metaphor, images, and stirring emotional appeals. Philosophical discourse is distinguished by its depth and difficulty. Rhetorical speech is striking and superficial.

Yet in Plato, the author in whose work this opposition between philosophy and rhetoric crystalizes, this issue is very much alive. The question of the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric shows up as a topic of discussion. Socrates and his interlocutors tackle the question of what rhetoric is in *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* and attempt to define the practitioner of rhetoric in *Sophist*. It is also alive insofar as Socrates is presented as an antagonist to the sophists in *Protagoras*. More importantly, this opposition is alive in the character of Socrates himself. Though both Socrates and the sophists appear to be directed toward 'wisdom' and speech, their approach is fundamentally different. Socrates claims ignorance and accepts no fees; the sophists claim wisdom that they sell. Socrates seeks a just life governed by everlasting truths; the sophists attempt to rule others by utilizing current opinion and custom. Socrates stays in Athens, engaging in dialectical conversation that continually seeks the response of a particular interlocutor; the sophists travel from city to city, delivering one-sided speeches to the passive crowd.

The aspects of Socrates's behavior that oppose sophistry are at the same time part of Plato's positive depiction of the philosophical life. In Socrates we see that the lover of wisdom does not seek those goods the sophists offer, namely wealth, power, and honor. Instead, his peculiar behavior is directed to an end that Plato depicts as more pleasant, beautiful, and divine than any of these worldly pursuits, wisdom. Socrates's attempt to reach wisdom compels him to engage in dialectical conversation again and again. But as someone who engages in dialectic, Socrates necessarily pushes against sophistic rhetoric. Whereas rhetoric flows with opinions by *not* raising them or questioning them, dialectic moves in accordance with opinion precisely by making them explicit and calling them into question, thereby allowing opinions to be maintained or abandoned when they accord or conflict with more deeply held beliefs.

For Socrates, this continual concern with living and speaking in a philosophical way that opposes the sophists is not only a private concern. It extends to his friends and to the Athenian community as a whole. By continually engaging others in dialectic, Socrates constantly attempts to bring his interlocutors to grasp and choose justice and virtue, whether he is speaking to affluent foreigners (for example, Simmias) or to ordinary Athenian citizens of the jury (as we see in *Apology*). Socrates's commitment to helping others become virtuous also means that he persuades his interlocutors to take up the philosophical life. This theme is evident in *Phaedrus*. The central dramatic question of that dialogue is whether Phaedrus, a lover of speech, will choose Lysias's sophistic rhetoric or Socrates's philosophical dialectic.[1] We see the same theme in *Phaedo*, when Socrates urges Phaedo to take up his argument to preserve the immortality of the soul if Socrates perishes before victory.[2]

[1] Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Stephen Scully, (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 2003), 234e, 277b.
[2] Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in *Plato Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 89c.

In our time the urgency of Socrates's battle with the sophists and his commitment to the philosophical life stands at quite a distance. There is little indication that questions of how to become philosophers or bring others to philosophy are driving concerns in either analytic or continental philosophy—unless becoming a philosopher means obtaining tenure at a research university, and bringing others to philosophy means increasing the number of undergraduate majors. If the question of philosophical method is taken up, it is more likely to be understood epistemologically, as a question of how philosophers support their claims and how philosophy is related to contemporary science, than as a question of how one can obtain fundamental philosophical truths or the proper scientific disposition.[3] Indeed, the way the term 'philosophy' is used by the academic discipline of the same name indicates that we do not even adhere to its basic and agreed upon meaning. We divide philosophy into sub-disciplines, such as the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science, without intending to distinguish between the 'love of wisdom' of each. This discrepancy between the term philosophy and the activity of contemporary 'philosophers,' recently prompted a well-known member of the profession to argue that a new concept should be forged that matches our current activities and the old concept should be abandoned.[4]

This project returns to the problem of how to bring about the philosophical life in ourselves and in others. The relationship between rhetoric and philosophy will be taken up not as a question of the relationship between two professions or academic domains, but as the concern of one who seeks to introduce and sustain the philosophical life—a life governed by the desire to contemplate fundamental and lasting truths. My position is that rhetoric, grasped as the power to

[3] For example, see Christopher Daly, *An Introduction to Philosophical Methods*, 1st ed. (Broadview Press, 2010).
[4] Colin McGinn, "Philosophy by Another Name," *Opinionator*, accessed June 7, 2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/philosophy-by-another-name/.

lead us in our everyday lives, is crucial for rousing the philosophical life. This project seeks to define this role—to define rhetoric's philosophical significance.

My approach to examining the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric stems from the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's interpretation of rhetoric is a phenomenological re-appropriation of what Heidegger calls the "original" concept of rhetoric. As Heidegger claims in both *Being and Time* and in a 1924 lecture titled *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,* this original conception of rhetoric has been obscured by the "traditional" concept of rhetoric that stems from late Hellenism and the middle ages. Likely referring to the role of rhetoric as part of the *trivium* (grammar, logic, rhetoric), which formed the foundation of scholastic education, Heidegger characterizes traditional rhetoric as a "school discipline."[5] As such, rhetoric is no longer the site of active or vital research but a fixed domain of knowledge slated to be passed down to proceeding generations.

As will be demonstrated in chapter 1, the 'original' sense of rhetoric that guides Heidegger's interpretation is expressed in Plato. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates argues that the true art of rhetoric is nothing other than dialectic. Here, Socrates does not speak of what is commonly understood to be rhetoric, namely rhetoric as practiced and taught by the sophists. In *Gorgias*, Socrates demonstrates that that form of rhetoric is not an art at all, but is instead a knack for pleasing others—a form of flattery akin to that of a pastry chef. Instead, Socrates speaks of rhetoric insofar as it truly is a *technē*, and therefore is a productive capacity guided by knowledge. The arguments that Socrates provides in order to demonstrate that the dialectician is the true practitioner of rhetoric focus on one power of speech in particular, namely the ability to lead the souls of others through words—the power to persuade. Socrates argues that the ability to

[5] For a provocative history of the significance of the trivium in scholastic education, see Marshall McLuhan, *The Classical Trivium: The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of His Time.* (Gardners Books, 2009).

surely produce persuasion in the souls of others requires that one have knowledge of the ideas of which one speaks and the nature of soul of the listener one hopes to lead. Because the dialectician is the one whom, through division and collection, is most capable of grasping ideas and the nature of things, the true art of rhetoric becomes dialectic for Socrates—the very mode of philosophical speech that Socrates continually employs to bring himself and his interlocutors into communion with forms like justice, the beautiful, the good, etc.

Understood as dialectic, true rhetoric is not only an expression of philosophical speech, but at the same time the means of bringing about philosophical life in others. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates argues that the knowledge of the soul that is required for true rhetoric will prepare the practitioner of rhetoric to lead a listener in such a way that he or she can take up the natural movement of his or her soul. Conceived in this way, true rhetoric aides the interlocutor in remembering and moving toward the ideal that their life and labor naturally tends. Were it the case that Phaedrus had a natural love of house building instead of speech, then the dialogue would presumably not end with the open possibility of Phaedrus choosing the philosophical life. Instead, as Socrates points out at the beginning of the dialogue, he "knows Phaedrus as well as himself;" both love *logos* and are "sick with the desire just to hear speeches."[6] Their passion for logos means that they are concerned with the possibility of speaking and writing well, a question that the dialogue explicitly addresses. It is insofar as Phaedrus comes to see that dialectic is a good *logos* that this type of speech becomes a choice-worthy expression of the kind of soul that he shares with Socrates. Even though Socrates does not claim the power of true rhetoric, the dialogue still demonstrates how rhetoric (grasped as dialectic) can lead listeners to choose their natural fulfillment in the philosophical life.

[6] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 228a.

Like Plato, Heidegger also conceives of rhetoric as a means for taking up one's own possibility for existence and thereby raising the question of philosophy – namely the question of being. For Heidegger, rhetoric is the "discipline in which the self-interpretation of being-there (Dasein) is explicitly fulfilled," or what Heidegger also calls the "hermeneutic of Dasein."[7] Dasein is Heidegger's term for the disclosive presence that is always mine and therefore "one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are.'"[8] In *Being and Time*, the hermeneutic of Dasein seeks to gather and comprehend the fixed *a priori* structures that are common to every existing being as such. Just as the general knowledge of the soul required of the rhetorical practitioner in *Phaedrus* prepares the rhetor to lead particular souls, the general knowledge of the common structures of Dasein prepares each Dasein, alone, to seize one's own potentiality for being. As in the *Phaedrus*, the realization of one's particular nature is understood to have a special philosophical significance. For Heidegger, grasping one's own being allows for the possibility of properly raising the question of being in general and therefore of bringing about philosophical questioning and existence.

But while Heidegger's "original" conception of rhetoric shares a philosophical orientation with Plato, his approach is distinct in two important ways. First, Heidegger does not see dialectic as the fulfillment of the rhetorical art or the proper way to grasp rhetoric's philosophical significance. Instead, Heidegger conceives of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as the realization of rhetoric's philosophical potential. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger calls Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the "first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another." The three chapters of this dissertation will explore three different moments of Heidegger's conception. In the first

[7] Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 75.
[8] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 2002), 68 (H. 42).

chapter we will explore the *genos* of Heidegger's definition, "hermeneutic" as the stem out of which rhetoric develops and grows. Our task here will be to follow Heidegger's interpretation of *Phaedrus* in order to identify the driving, but unfulfilled impulse of Greek rhetoric that is later fulfilled by Aristotle. In the second chapter, we will look at how Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as the hermeneutic of the "everydayness of being with one another" fulfills this impulse. That is to say, we will grasp the *eidos* or species of the definition, as that which the *genus* grew into and was completed by. In the third chapter we will grasp the philosophical significance of rhetoric insofar as it is completed by Aristotle. By focusing on the philosophical significance of rhetoric, we will see how Aristotle departs from Plato in grasping the limits of rhetoric for realizing philosophical contemplation.

The second way that Heidegger's interpretation of the concept of rhetoric is distinct from Plato will also decisively guide the way this project will proceed. Plato argues that true rhetoric requires knowledge of the nature of the soul and is therefore necessarily oriented toward gaining this knowledge. Heidegger, on the other hand, does not speak of rhetoric in relation to the soul, but in relation to Dasein. As we will see, Heidegger's conception of Dasein has its origin in his study of Greek thought, especially Aristotle. Dasein is Heidegger's translation of life, *zōe,* which is the mode of being that characterizes any being that is ensouled. Heidegger's focus on Dasein stems from his phenomenological approach. Phenomenology dwells with the way things appear and initially are, not in invisible beings that underlie these appearances. Applied to the self, this means that Heidegger will not seek to discover an invisible soul "substance" in order to explain human experience. This does not mean that Heidegger abandons the task of revealing the principles and causes of the self. The hermeneutic of Dasein does seek to uncover the structures upon which present experience rests – but these structures are not conceived as separate from

Dasein—they are Dasein. For this reason, Heidegger's conception of what is traditionally designated as "knowledge of the self" does not refer to tracking down a being that is separable from our experienced existence. Instead, Heidegger conceives of self-knowledge as transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit*)—a mode of sight wherein one sees the structures that determine one's being-there in being-there itself—not as alien to oneself, but as part of the whole that one is.[9]

Though this project follows Heidegger's philosophical and phenomenological approach to rhetoric, it is not confined by Heidegger's interpretation. Heidegger himself is not interested in rhetoric as such, but in concretely raising the question of being anew. For this reason, Heidegger's interpretation of rhetoric remains mostly promissory; many of his most striking claims are not concretely grounded in the rhetorical tradition or in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. For example, Heidegger claims that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a hermeneutic of Dasein but his interpretation of *Rhetoric* does not explicitly identify the role that key rhetorical concepts play in this hermeneutic. Heidegger identifies Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a realization and departure from Plato's idea of *Rhetoric* in *Phaedrus* but he does not explain how Plato's concept maps on to Aristotle's text. Heidegger claims that Aristotle conceives of rhetoric as having a philosophical significance, but Heidegger does not explicitly state whether his focus on the *pathos* of fear in particular stems from Aristotle or not.

This project follows through with Heidegger's approach, showing how his philosophical and phenomenological interpretation can shed light on the development of the rhetorical tradition. It traces the hermeneutic tendency for self-knowledge of Dasein to the Greek idea of the human as the *zōon logon echon*. Following Heidegger, this phrase is interpreted as harboring the Greek understanding of the particular mode of presence distinctive to human beings. In the enthrallment

[9] For Heidegger's phenomenological re-appropriation of 'knowledge of the self' (*Selbsterkenntnis*) as transparency see Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 186 [H. 146].

with what is spoken, the Greeks see what Heidegger calls 'authentic Dasein.' The development of the rhetorical tradition will be understood as the attempt to understand and cultivate the mode of presence that is proper to humans as such. The founders of the rhetorical tradition develop this insight through rhetoric's first conception of the persuasive—the *eikos* (the likely). They saw that that which impresses humans, ruling over what appears before them, is not only speech but a particular type of speech—speech that is expected and that has been thought before. Plato will critique the idea that the sophist's have about the mode of presence that enthralls and rules over humans as such. He sees that the type of enthrallment that the sophists seek only captivates to the degree that it seems to partake in the truth. He will reconceive the mode of presence that fulfills human potential in philosophical terms—grasping the highest mode of human enthrallment as the contemplation of being. Rhetoric will be re-conceived as well. No longer understood as the art directed toward captivation with belief, Plato will grasp it as dialectic—the type of speech that leads listeners to discover the truth that underlies belief. Finally, Aristotle will follow through with Plato's directive to establish a philosophical basis for rhetoric. But while Aristotle will share Plato's view that the contemplation of being is the mode of presence that fulfills human potential to the greatest degree, Aristotle will distinguish both dialectic and rhetoric from philosophical speech, assigning both limited and complimentary roles for bringing about the philosophical life.

Having discussed the basic problem, position, and approach of this project, I will now point out the place of Heidegger's interpretation of rhetoric relative to 20th century rhetorical theory and the place of this project within Heidegger scholarship. Many of Heidegger's key claims about the rhetorical tradition do not distinguish his work from scholars of Greek rhetoric

in the English speaking world. This is not surprising insofar as Heidegger's interpretation seems to stem from secondary sources.[10] For example, we see the suggestion that rhetoric bears a special relationship to the Greek conception of the human as a speaking being not only where Heidegger seems to take it from Nietzsche, but in another work published a generation before, R.C. Jebb's *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos*.[11] The view that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* represents the height and realization of the rhetorical art, after which there is decline can also be found in J. F. Dobson's contemporaneous piece, *The Greek Orators*.[12] Likewise, Heidegger's claim that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is both a realization and departure from the idea of rhetoric Plato outlines in *Phaedrus* is commonly suggested.[13] Even the idea that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a philosophical work—not only because it is principled and complete but because rhetoric is grasped as having the power to rouse us to science and philosophy—is central to the interpretation of William Grimaldi, quite possibly the 20th century's most devoted interpreter of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[14]

Nor is Heidegger's work distinct because it reconceives rhetoric in opposition to the rhetorical tradition. Indeed, 20th century rhetorical theory was marked by a revitalization of

---

[10] Nietzsche appears to be of particular importance. See Michalski, Mark, "Hermeneutic Phenomenology as Philology" in Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann, *Heidegger and Rhetoric* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 68.

[11] R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos*, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), lxxviii.

[12] Speaking of the rhetorical tradition following Aristotle, Dobson says "From this time onward, oratory is practically dead; declamations of fictitious subjects took the place of real speeches in the assembly or the courts; oratory became an element in education and nothing more." Dobson, John Frederic, *The Greek Orators* (Freeport, Books for Libraries Press, 1919, Reprinted 1967), 312-313.

[13] See George A. Kennedy, introduction to *Aristotle, On Rhetoric*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10-11; and James J. Murphy, "The Origins and Early Development of Rhetoric" in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*, ed. James J. Murphy (New York: Random House, 1972) 18. Grimaldi not only describes Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a "substantial fulfillment…of the promise of the Platonic *Phaedrus*," but claims that the connection between the two is uncontroversial saying that "no one challenges the fact that Aristotle is attempting a scientific analysis of rhetoric similar to the effort of Plato in the *Phaedrus*." William M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric,* Hermes Einzelschritten n. 25 (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972) 19, 21.

[14] Like Heidegger, Grimaldi claims that "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, for example, can be understood correctly… when we place it within the context of his philosophy," and therefore as part of Aristotle's attempt to bring the whole human being to a place where knowledge is possible. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 7.

rhetoric and renewed questioning of its significance and relationship to other disciplines. Beginning with a 1936 lecture series titled *The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* I. A. Richards laments the current state of rhetoric, calling it "the dreariest and least profitable part of that waste of unfortunate travel through Freshman English." He argues that rhetoric of his day should be replaced a "philosophic enquiry into how words work in discourse" that aims at "a mastery of the fundamental laws of the use of language"—"a new rhetoric."[15] Likewise in the work of Kenneth Burke, we see a turn away from the rhetoric of composition classes to a study of how humans relate to symbols and how these symbols allow for social cooperation. In *The New Rhetoric*: *A Treatise on Argumentation,* Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca write "a treatise devoted to argumentation and how this subject's connection with the ancient tradition of Greek rhetoric and dialectic constitutes a *break with the concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes* which has set its mark on Western philosophy for the last three centuries."[16] Dissatisfied with what they see as the unjustified dominance of a logic modeled on geometric proof, they seek to broaden the study of reasoning to include types that do not attempt to reach universal and complete assent, and thereby attempt to renew rhetoric by focusing especially on how arguments produce adherence in particular audiences.[17] We see a similar orientation in the work of Edwin Black, a leading theorist of 'rhetorical criticism.' Black points out the limits of 'neo-Aristotelian' rhetorical theory, which he claims is focused predominantly on the rational structures of speech in a way that is inappropriate to Aristotle's original intention in *Rhetoric*.[18]

[15] *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, I.A. Richards: Selected Works 1919 – 1938, ed. John Constable, (New York: Routledge, 2001) 1, 3, 4, 15.
[16] Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*: *A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1969), 1.
[17] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, p.5
[18] See Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

Like Heidegger, these theorists tend to see themselves as returning to rhetoric as conceived by the Ancients and thereby overcoming the modern prejudice of conceiving of argument and communication in terms of modern logic and science. Secondly, there is a tendency to conceive of rhetoric as a more fundamental and philosophical discipline. They see rhetoric not as a set of rules to follow in order to produce better compositions (i.e. a "school discipline") but as part of the broader study of how humans relate to language itself.

For all the important similarities that Heidegger has to scholars of the Ancient rhetorical tradition and to 20th century rhetorical theory, a fundamental difference remains. Heidegger turns to Greek rhetoric, and arguably Greek philosophy as a whole, as part of an attempt to raise the question of being anew, and to do so concretely. Ultimately, his conception of rhetoric as a "hermeneutic of Dasein" is shaped by this end. This orientation has certain drawbacks and benefits. Heidegger never discusses many concepts or figures central to the rhetorical tradition. Indeed, even before turning to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in *SS 1924*, a text that he does focus on, he tells his listeners that an "interpretation of *Rhetoric* cannot be carried out."[19] On the other hand, the parts of the rhetorical tradition that Heidegger does discuss are brought forth with a remarkable vitality and depth. The benefits and drawbacks come together, for example, in Heidegger's interpretation of pre-Platonic rhetoric. He vividly portrays the goal of Greek rhetoric as the realization of authentic Dasein itself, but does so by following Plato alone and not through studying Greek history or the sophistic rhetorical tradition.

The concrete vitality of Heidegger's approach also distinguishes his work from the theorists that he shares most in common with, his students Hans Georg Gadamer and Ernesto

[19] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 76.

Grassi. [20] Like Heidegger, both Gadamer and Grassi not only return to Greek rhetoric, but seek to recover the "original" philosophical conception expressed by Plato. Gadamer's most provocative claims about rhetoric came near the end of his life in an interview where he said that the task of the humanities in the 21st century should be to "to make newly alive the distant ancient meaning of rhetoric." Gadamer sees ancient rhetoric as an expression of Plato's dialogical approach and Aristotle's conception of *phronēsis*, both crucial concepts that Gadamer seeks to re-introduce to philosophy.[21] Grassi's return to the 'original' conception of Greek rhetoric is a critique of the philosophy, past and present. Against figures who see rhetoric "only as a technical doctrine of speech," such as Locke and Kant, Grassi follows Plato's accounts in *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* and argues that "true philosophy is rhetoric, and the true rhetoric is philosophy, a philosophy which does not need an 'external' rhetoric to convince, and a rhetoric that does not need an 'external' content of verity."[22] Grassi argues that the type of speech appropriate to reaching first principles, and therefore philosophy, cannot be "rational speech" (*apodeixis*), because rational speech proves on the basis of something else. Instead, philosophical speech must be indicative [*semeinein*], showing not on the basis of something else but immediately. Because such speech entails the carrying-over of a signification to that which is immediately presented, Grassi understands the basic character of indicative speech as metaphorical. Insofar as philosophical speech essentially involves images and metaphors, it is necessarily emotional and rhetorical.[23]

[20] While the shared interpretive orientation of Gadamer, Grassi and Heidegger is clear, it appears that neither was a regular attendee of Heidegger's SS 1924 lecture. Grassi was not yet a student of Heidegger's. Though Gadamer was, he says that he did not attend SS 1924 regularly and that he did not come to study rhetoric under Heidegger's direction. That being said, Gadamer does affirm that he and Heidegger ended up sharing certain convictions about the *pathē* and status of rhetoric as a *dunamis*. See Ansgar Kemman, "Heidegger as Rhetor: Hans-Georg Gadamer Interviewed," trans. Lawrence Kennedy Schmidt in Gross and Kemman, *Heidegger and Rhetoric*, 48-49.
[21] See John Arthos, "Gadamer's Rhetorical Imaginary," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 38:2 (2008), 174.
[22] Ernesto Grassi, *Rhetoric as Philosophy* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), 19, 32.
[23] For another articulation of Grassi's position, see Ernesto Grassi, "Can Rhetoric Provide a New Basis for Philosophizing," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 11:2 (1978) 79-98.

But whereas Gadamer, Grassi, and Heidegger share the same basic orientation toward rhetoric, we should note a crucial difference. Both Gadamer and Grassi argue that rhetoric *should* be to be taken seriously by philosophers, whereas Heidegger actually incorporates rhetoric into his concrete attempt to raise the question of being. [24] Because Heidegger is not focused on rhetoric itself, his conception of the rhetoric's philosophical significance is for the most part submerged in his text. In *Being and Time*, where Heidegger clearly develops an interpretation of fear that stems from Aristotle own analysis in *Rhetoric*, he only mentions the connection in passing, barely taking time to recognize this source or the conception of rhetoric that is tied to it. Even in SS 1924, the place where Heidegger spends a significant amount of time speaking about rhetoric, his conception remains shrouded. This lack of an explicit discussion of rhetoric is not a problem for Gadamer or Grassi. Both spend considerably more time than Heidegger developing their conceptions of rhetoric. On the other hand, Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric has a certain priority insofar as his philosophical conception of rhetoric is not merely spoken about but taken up and tested in use. Using Heideggerian terminology loosely, we might say that while the 'present-at-hand' account of rhetoric in Heidegger's work is undeveloped, the 'ready-to-hand' utility of the concept is crucial.

For some, the fact that Heidegger incorporates rhetoric into his own project is a clear sign of interpretive violence. The act of using and even shaping textual sources and concepts in accordance with one's own ends seems to signal that Heidegger is not concerned with Greek

[24] There is significant debate about whether Gadamer's project was primarily oriented toward a basic philosophical problem or one of more limited scope. Günter Figal interprets Gadamer's concern as being analogous to Heidegger's, asking the question of the being of language along a different path. (Günter Figal, "The Doing of the Truth Itself: Gadamer's Hermeneutic Ontology of Language" in *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer,* ed. Robert J. Dostal [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 106.) Grondin suggests that Gadamer's approach is more narrowly focused on the problem of the human sciences. (Jean Grondin, "Gadamer's Basic Understanding of Understanding, *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer,* 48.) Regardless of his intent, "Gadamer himself did not have a chance to fulfill his hope of making 'newly alive the distant ancient meaning of rhetoric." See Arthos, *Gadamer's Rhetorical Imaginary,* 174.

rhetoric as such. For Heidegger, however, there can be no research or questioning which is not already directed toward a certain type of answer, no interpretation that is not already seeking to uncover one type of thing. The task is not to reach a state of 'objectivity' wherein one no longer interprets in any direction, but to gain the proper orientation so that one's interpretation moves in the proper direction. Heidegger designates his own interpretation of Plato and Aristotle as an 'authentic interpretation,' meaning an interpretation that shares Plato and Aristotle's orientation and goal (namely to raise the question of the being of beings). For Heidegger then, his re-appropriation of the original significance of rhetoric is not only justified but has a powerful priority over other interpretations. He sees himself as taking up and furthering rhetoric's original intention.

The issue of 'authentic interpretation' is not only significant in this context as a justification of Heidegger's approach. It is also important because it describes the approach that this project takes toward Heidegger's thought. This project is not primarily an interpretation of Heidegger. Its central concern is not to understand what Heidegger says about rhetoric. Nor is it a defense of Heidegger's thought. My aim is to explicate the underlying conception of rhetoric in Heidegger's thought and to apply this conception to the rhetorical tradition. In doing so, I share Heidegger's goal of reaching a precise understanding of how we can come to grasp the meaning of being.

As a project that attempts to seize the momentum of Heidegger's interpretation of rhetoric, this project is not alone. This approach is shared by the two thinkers who go the furthest in grasping the philosophical significance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* Allen Scult and P. Christopher Smith. Scult's most developed interpretation of Heidegger's conception of rhetoric is developed in *Being Jewish: Reading Heidegger,* a text that extends Heideggerian thought in order to gain a

rich conception of the fulfillment of Jewish life.[25] Smith develops an interpretation of Heidegger's rhetoric in *The Hermeneutics of Original Argument: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric,* a text that attempts to re-establish a type of argumentation based not on abstract rules of reason but the practical and passionate way the lived world is experienced.[26] Both Scult and Smith conceive of the end toward which Heidegger's philosophy is oriented (ontology as realization of the basic motion of human life for Scult, "universal ontology" as the "display of original concomitance of being and not being" for Smith) and then characterize rhetoric in terms of its ability to aid in bringing that end about.[27] This project takes up the same task. Unlike Scult and Smith, however, I attempt to discover the momentum of Heidegger's interpretation of rhetoric through an analysis of Heidegger's conception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a "hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another." My primary goal is not to discover how Heidegger's insights can be utilized for my own work, but to amplify and extend the direction of thought implied in this concept.

As a project that seeks to extend Heidegger's account, this work differs in important ways from the predominant type of scholarship that focuses on the relationship between Heidegger and the Greeks. Exemplified by Theodore Kisiel in his pioneering text *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time,* this type of scholarship attempts to understand how key concepts of *Being and Time* developed out of Heidegger's engagement with various thinkers leading up to 1927 (for example: St. Paul, Dilthey, Aristotle, Kant). [28] To use Kisiel's term, it approach is that of a "conceptual story, a *Begriffsgeschichte*" that seeks to understand concepts in *Being and*

[25] Allen Scult, *Being Jewish/Reading Heidegger*: *An Ontological Encounter,* (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2004).
[26] P. Christopher Smith, *The Hermeneutics of Original Argument*: *Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998).
[27] Scult, *Being Jewish/Reading Heidegger*, 116; Smith, *Hermeneutics of Original Argument,* 15.
[28] Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

Time on the basis of their original significance and development in Heidegger's work.[29] We see this same method employed in the works of two other authors who have book length studies of Heidegger's interpretation of Greek philosophy, William McNeill and Walter Brogan. In William McNeill's works *The Glance of the Eye* and *The Time of Life*, McNeill explores two areas of Heidegger's thought, his understanding of the *Augenblick* and his understanding of the *ethos* in terms of Heidegger's account of life and human temporality.[30] In Walter Brogan's study, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Two Foldness of Being*, Brogan shows how Heidegger's own ontological orientation stems from and re-thinks Aristotle's ontological development past Parmenides, namely the two-foldness of Being.[31] Though neither text is reducible to a conceptual genealogy, both consistently look to Heidegger's translation of Greek concepts in order to gain fresh interpretations of Heidegger, the Greeks, and the relationship between the two.[32]

In this project I will not explicitly connect and compare Heidegger's translation of Greek concepts with their usage in *Being and Time*. Nor will I attempt to clarify aspects of *Being and Time* by looking at how Heidegger interprets Aristotle. That being said this project may prove useful to scholars looking to gain a sharper grasp of how Heidegger takes up and alters Greek rhetoric and philosophy. In chapter 1, I demonstrate the importance of understanding Heidegger's conception of interpretation (*Auslegung*) to understand the ways that Heidegger follows and departs from the Greeks. In accord with Kisiel, I develop an interpretation of the three sources of conviction (*ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*) in such a way that certain similarities between them and the structure of Being-in (understanding, mood, and discourse) become evident in chapter 2. The interpretation of *koinōnia* (also in chapter 2) may prove useful for those

[29] Kisiel, *Genesis of Being and Time*, 3.
[30] William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999); William McNeill, *The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).
[31] Walter Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006).
[32] For example see, McNeill, *The Time of* Life, 79.

looking to gain a sharper understanding of Heidegger's difficult discussion of Being-with, both in its everyday and authentic modes. In chapter 3 the discussion of fear may prove useful to those looking to see the connection between fear (as anxiety) and the Greek concept of philosophy.

Lastly, I demonstrate the importance of Heidegger's re-appropriation of Plato and Aristotle's natural and teleological conception of beings and their development. This is concretely expressed in Heidegger's conception of rhetoric. For Heidegger, the development of the Greek rhetorical tradition stems from the being of rhetoric, which is ultimately understood as an expression of human nature. In this light, rhetoric is grasped as the Greek expression of the human desire for self-knowledge—the 'hermeneutic' desire to know and be what you are. Because Heidegger conceives of rhetoric in terms of this end, he shares Plato's insight into the deficiency of the Greek rhetorical tradition. Planted by Tisias and Corax in the shallow soil of belief, rhetoric grew rapidly but did not flower. Only Plato and Aristotle's work of transplanting rhetoric into the soil of truth by its roots allowed it to become what Heidegger sees it to truly be—the discipline that rouses the desire to question being and awakens the philosophical life.

1

The Basic Tendency of Rhetoric as the Hermeneutic of Existence

Up to this point, Heidegger's concept of rhetoric has been neglected by scholars.[33] Studies have looked closely at portions of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but have ignored what Heidegger says about Greek rhetoric as such. The reasons for this are probably due to Heidegger's own emphasis. Whereas he hardly discusses the rhetorical tradition outside of Aristotle, he performs an extended interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Also, while the significance of the rhetorical tradition for Heidegger's work is far from evident, the importance of Aristotle's work in general and Aristotle's analysis of fear in *Rhetoric* is prominent in *Being and Time*. It is reasonable then that scholars would focus on Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* instead of rhetoric more broadly speaking.

The problem with this approach is that without an adequate understanding of Heidegger's conception of rhetoric, one cannot see how Heidegger interprets Aristotle's *Rhetoric.* For Heidegger, the understanding of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and a new conception of rhetoric are linked. When Heidegger calls Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the 'the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another" he sees himself as presenting a view "contrary to the traditional orientation of the concept of rhetoric," where it is understood as a "school subject."[34] Likewise in the 1924 summer semester lecture, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*,

[33] The collection of essays titled *Heidegger and Rhetoric* is a case in point. While the title suggests a collection of essays concerned with the relationship between Heidegger and rhetoric in general, the few essays that mention the rhetorical tradition beyond Aristotle and Nietzsche only do so for context, not to clarify what Heidegger says about rhetoric. Gross and Kemmann, *Heidegger and Rhetoric*, 1-46, 161-176.

[34] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001) 138.

Heidegger turns to rhetoric as such after speaking of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, saying "rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of Dasein is fully expressed. *Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation* [*Auslegung*] *of concrete Dasein, the hermeneutic of Dasein itself*."[35] In both texts, Heidegger connects his re-interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to a re-conception of rhetoric itself.

The reason for this connection is not merely that Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as a particular instantiation of the more universal concept 'rhetoric,' shares certain common traits with all other members of the class of rhetorical entities. The logic at play is not that of the binary class inclusion and exclusion of particulars. Heidegger takes up the Greek notion that particular entities express the being of a genus to differing degrees, insofar as they are closer or further from the *telos* which defines them. For Heidegger, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is not any particular, but the particular in which the universal is most adequately expressed. Aristotle, Heidegger says, "brought to realization the idea of rhetoric."[36] Aristotle's rhetoric is the first text to "carry out" what was already intended but not achieved by the rhetorical tradition, namely "authentic reflection about speech."[37]

Implied in the notion that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* fulfills what rhetoric intended is what I will call a 'natural conception' of rhetoric. Heidegger not only claims that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the most adequate fulfillment of the idea of rhetoric, but he sees the development of the rhetorical tradition, both before and after Aristotle, in terms of its movement toward and away from this ideal. In this way Heidegger treats the rhetorical tradition like a natural entity in an Aristotelian sense. By a natural entity, I mean a being that grows and develops toward an end state in which

[35]Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe II Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919-1944, Band 18: Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie,* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002) 110.
[36] Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) 234.
[37] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 114.

its being is most fully realized, a *telos*. Like a plant whose growth leads to its flowering and then decay, Heidegger understands the rhetorical tradition in terms of its directedness toward its most realized state, expressed by Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Understood in this way, we can see the link between Heidegger's claims about Aristotle's rhetoric and Heidegger's attempt to re-conceive rhetoric itself. In *Being and Time*, when Heidegger speaks about "the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another," he is not only speaking about what Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is, but what rhetoric is insofar as it is realized—about rhetoric's *telos*.[38] Because interpreters have missed this point, they have failed to take on the breadth of Heidegger's claim. Heidegger is not only saying that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a hermeneutic, but that rhetoric itself is a hermeneutic of Dasein.

In this first chapter I will begin by developing a conception of what Heidegger means by 'hermeneutic of Dasein' and how he applies it to the Greek tradition. Next I will follow and extend Heidegger's interpretation of Greek rhetoric in order to see how this hermeneutic tendency plays out in rhetoric prior to Aristotle. I will clarify how Greek culture, with its particular focus on humans as speaking beings, provided the soil in which the hermeneutic tendency of Greek rhetoric was able to thrive, and how Greek rhetoric as taught by the sophists seized and developed this tendency by recognizing the power of *doxa* (belief) and the *eikos* (likely) as principles that determine what appears to be the case. Lastly, I will turn to Plato's critique and radical re-grounding of rhetoric as a hermeneutic. Plato pulls the sophistic tradition of rhetoric out by the roots, exposing its stunted growth, and requires that the true practitioner of rhetoric transplant it so that it can be nourished by the contemplation of true beings. In Plato's hands, rhetoric will become dialectic, a mode of speech that addresses the soul's natural desire

[38] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 178 [H. 138].

for wisdom. The true task of leading a listener to gain self-knowledge and realize their particular potential will be taken up by the philosopher, not the sophist, by engaging in dialectic.

a. Characteristics of a 'Hermeneutic of Dasein'

As noted above, in both *Being and Time* and *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, Heidegger clearly identifies not only Aristotle's *Rhetoric* but rhetoric itself as a 'hermeneutic of Dasein.' How is rhetoric a hermeneutic of Dasein? The answer is not readily available in Heidegger's published works.[39] Heidegger never explicitly clarifies what aspects of the rhetorical tradition are expressions of this hermeneutic tendency and in what way. We are compelled to unearth what Heidegger means when he calls rhetoric a 'hermeneutic of Dasein' by reconstructing the conceptual connections ourselves. To do so, we will first turn to *Being and Time*. Not only does Heidegger call Aristotle's *Rhetoric* a hermeneutic within the context of this treatise, it is also the place where "hermeneutic of Dasein" is most explicitly conceived.

In *Being and Time*, "hermeneutic" clearly does not refer to a textual interpretation. Heidegger's usage of the term 'hermeneutic' stems from what he sees as the original (*ursprünglich*) sense of the Greek verb *hermēneuein*. Heidegger claims that *hermēneuein* refers to the "business of interpreting (*Auslegung*)" wherein our understanding of something is made explicit. For Heidegger, interpreting primarily and predominantly occurs in our everyday engagement with the world. What is primarily there for human beings has the character of being equipment, which Heidegger characterizes as something that is essentially "something in order

[39] Heidegger discusses Greek rhetoric at length in *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* and *Plato's Sophist*. Kisiel outlines an unpublished talk titled "Being-Here and Being-True" that discusses rhetoric in a cursory manner. See Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, 281.

to."[40] When a being which is characterized as equipment is interpreted, the result is not primarily that the piece of equipment is thereby judged as an object with certain properties. Heidegger calls the type of interpretation that brings something forth as a present-to-hand entity "assertion" [*Aussage*], characterizing it as a derivative and secondary mode of interpretation.[41] Instead, when equipment is interpreted in the primary sense, what is brought forth is that which can be used without further inspection. In this basic sense of *hermēneuein,* something that is already understood is explicitly brought forth in such a way that the primary way of understanding is preserved and brought to light. The hammer, already understood as useful toward certain ends, is primarily interpreted not through reflection about its function but in being taken up in use.

Though this everyday way of interpreting the world entails an understanding of Dasein, the interpretation of Dasein that occurs in everyday practical life is not what Heidegger primarily refers to when he speaks about the hermeneutic of Dasein in *Being and Time.* For Heidegger, the philosophical sense of the phrase "hermeneutic of Dasein" describes an essential task of the treatise's attempt to raise the question of being anew. *Hermēneuein* characterizes the method of the treatise. Heidegger says "the logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of *hermēneuein*, through which the authentic meaning of being, and also those basic structures of being which Dasein itself possesses, are *made known* to Dasein's understanding of being."[42] Here the process of explicating something in accordance with the way that it is already understood is applied to Dasein in order to bring forth Dasein in a way that does not distort the type of being that it is.

[40] Heidegger understands the term 'equipment' as characterizing the being of that which the Greeks called *pragmata*, the ontological character of which Heidegger believes, "the Greeks left in obscurity." (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 96-97 [H. 68].)
[41] See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 195 [H. 153].
[42] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 62 [H. 37].

Dasein is Heidegger's concept for the being which each one of us is. It refers to a type of being that is characterized by presence—by being here now. Heidegger characterizes this presence as being directed toward the "world." As a being which is "in the world" Dasein constantly understands entities as being "for the sake of" itself. For Heidegger, the "for the sake of" character of entities in the world, points to Dasein's understanding of its own being. Heidegger designates "that kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in way or another, and always does comport itself somehow" as "existence."[43] He claims that Dasein understands its own being constantly, albeit in a way that is more or less explicit at different points in time.[44] The task of the hermeneutic of Dasein is to explicate Dasein's own understanding of its being, existence, in such a way that the type of being is preserved through the interpretation.

Dasein's peculiar ontical status, however, requires that the hermeneutic proceed with caution. For Heidegger, Western thought has traditionally sought to ontologically ground Dasein in 'present-at-hand' beings that do not share its basic being character as existence. Being-there is explained on the basis of a present-at-hand being that lies below, a "*subjectum* (*hupokeimenon*)" which is designated as "the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person."[45] Heidegger's hermeneutic of Dasein will continually attempt to bring forth Dasein's own understanding of itself in a way that avoids the tendency to grasp its being as present-at-hand.

To avoid the tendency to misinterpret Dasein's being, the hermeneutic of Dasein proceeds as "an analytic of the existentiality of existence." [46] That is to say, it analyzes the *a priori* structures of existence that Heidegger terms *existentialia.* The term *a priori* suggests

[43] "That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call '*existence*' [Existenz]." (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 32 [H. 12].)
[44] Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 25 [H. 5-6]
[45] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 72 [H. 46].
[46] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 62 [H. 38].

something which is 'prior to' and unaffected by changes in experience and time. The term 'structure' suggests something fixed and underlying—that upon which something else rests and is thereby allowed to be. Heidegger is aware that fixed *a priori* structures may easily be interpreted as present-at-hand entities and seeks to ward off this tendency. Like Aristotle's categories, Heidegger's existentialia call out the being of that which is spoken about in reference to necessary *a priori* features. But whereas Aristotle's categories describe the way present-at-hand entities appear in speech (when, where, how much, etc.), existentialia characterize a fundamentally different being, not 'what' but "who."[47]

Heidegger's attempt to preserve the distinctive being character of the existentialia through his interpretation can be seen in the way he grasps them. Heidegger's existential analysis does not treat the *a priori* structures as empty categories that determine presence. As an existing being, Dasein understands and projects itself onto various possible ways that it may be. One distinctive possibility of Dasein's being is the possibility that is proper to its being as such, its authentic (*eigentlich*) mode of existence. Heidegger understands the existentiales as pointing to this possibility of authentic existence.[48] The rich character that these structures is suggested by the metaphor Heidegger uses to describe what the hermeneutic seeks, namely the way that the *a priori* structures are "pregnant" with the possibility of authentic existence.[49] For Heidegger, the existentiales maintain and exhibit Dasein's being—they are not empty containers of intuition but expressions of Dasein's own concern with becoming what it is.

[47] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 62 [H. 38].
[48] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 70 [H. 44]; 33 [H 12-13].
[49] "But the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of hazy indefiniteness. Anything which, taken ontically, *is* in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant [prägnanten] structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics of an *authentic* Being of Dasein." (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 70 [H.44].)

We have determined that a hermeneutic of Dasein is an interpretation that attempts to illuminate Dasein in a way that preserves Dasein's particular being-character. It achieves this by identifying *a priori* structures that express Dasein's concern with its own being—with existence. This conception of a hermeneutic of Dasein, which initially provides no assistance for understanding its relationship with rhetoric, will guide our interpretation Greek rhetorical tradition. The key link will come after we see how, for Heidegger, the goal of rhetoric, persuasion, is itself identified by the Greeks as the mode of being that fulfills human potential. We will see that rhetoric, which seeks to realize human being-there, attempts to grasp the relatively fixed structures of human presence that have the ability to lead listeners to this state.

b. Dasein, *Zōē*, and Heidegger's Distinctive Interpretation of the Greeks

Up to this point there is a basic problem with Heidegger's claim that rhetoric is a hermeneutic of Dasein that has gone unaddressed. In speaking about Greek rhetoric, Heidegger employs concepts foreign to Greek thought, namely "Dasein" and concepts that stem from Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein ("everydayness" and "being with one another"). Were Heidegger simply using an interpretation of Greek rhetoric for his own devices, making no claim to accurately or adequately represent Greek ideas, Heidegger's use of these terms could be passed over. However, when Heidegger claims that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the Greek rhetorical tradition are concerned with producing a hermeneutic of Dasein, he sees himself as recovering the original Greek interpretation of rhetoric that the tradition has lost sight of. Sure of the tradition's failure, Heidegger appears to mock those who compiled the Berlin edition of Aristotle's works. Speaking of the placement of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Heidegger says "they didn't

know what to do with it, so they put it at the end!"[50] As it turns out, Heidegger's claim that the term Dasein can be applied to the Greeks is not the result of blind arrogance, but results from Heidegger's distinctive interpretation of Greek philosophy. Our task is this section is not primarily to defend Heidegger's interpretation, but to explain it in such a way that we can follow Heidegger's line of thought, whether we ultimately agree or not.

If we look back at Heidegger's early lectures, we find that the term Dasein is not first developed and then projected onto the Greeks. It first comes about as a translation (and therefore an interpretation) of the Greek concept *Zōē*.[51] This view is put forth by Theodore Kisiel in *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, a self-described "conceptual genealogy" that traces the conceptual origins of *Being and Time* from Heidegger's earliest lectures. While Heidegger begins to use Dasein in a way that was distinct from the traditional German usage as far back as SS 1920, it was not until 1923, when Heidegger is in the middle of a string of lecture courses on Aristotle, that Heidegger begins to use Dasein in the sense which he will throughout *Being and Time*.[52] For Kisiel, Heidegger's project is from the beginning concerned with the tension of "how to articulate this non-objectifiable 'something' (*Es*) which contextualizes (*Es weltet*) and temporalizes (*Es er-eignet sich*) each of us" using a fixed conceptual framework essentially foreign to it.[53] When Dasein is used to translate Aristotle's concept *zōē* in 1923, this term replaces Heidegger's previous expression for the ineffable present, "factical life," and becomes the theme of Heidegger's research.

From Kisiel, then, it is clear that Heidegger's term "Dasein" has, at least, an origin that is nominally Greek insofar as it is a translation of the concept *zōē*. One might reasonably object to

[50] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 75.
[51] Kisiel, *Genesis of Being and Time,* 272.
[52] Kisiel, *Genesis of Being and Time,* 117, 274.
[53] Kisiel, *Genesis of Being and Time,* 9.

identifying Dasein as an equivalent to *zōē* insofar as it quickly becomes the name for Heidegger's own area of research and therefore no longer a truly Greek concept. Interestingly, the tension as to whether Dasein can be thought of as a Greek concept or not is expressed by Heidegger himself in *Being and Time*. Heidegger claims that Aristotle and Parmenides saw that the study of the being of beings, ontology, must be grounded in an interrogation of Dasein.[54] This is, for Heidegger, expressed in Aristotle's statement that "Man's soul is, in a certain way, entities."[55] Heidegger interprets this passage to mean that "the 'soul' which makes up the Being of man has *aisthēsis* and *noēsis* among its ways of Being, and in these it discovers all entities, both the fact that they are, and in their Being as they are—that is, always in their Being." [56] For Heidegger, the fact that Aristotle sees that the being of all beings are themselves dependent on modes of being (*aisthēsis* and noēsis) of another being, the soul, and that the soul must be investigated if the being of other beings is to be grasped, implies an orientation toward Dasein. This does not mean, however, that Heidegger views Dasein as a Greek concept, per se. For Heidegger, Aristotle recognizes Dasein's special relationship to things "although [Dasein] has not been ontologically clarified."[57] Thus for Heidegger, Aristotle and Parmenides's recognition of the priority of the soul points to Dasein, though neither explicitly recognize Dasein as such.

In SS 1924, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, Heidegger provides a way to understand the status of the concept Dasein in terms of his own interpretative relationship to Greek philosophy. Heidegger says "1. *Zōē*: the being of human beings is *being-in-a-world*. (You may suppose that this is intimated by Aristotle, but perhaps you will see only later that

[54] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34 [H.14].
[55] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34 [H.14].
[56] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34 [H. 14].
[57] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34 [H. 14].

interpretation is nothing other than setting forth what is not prominently there.)"[58] From this quotation, the relationship of the concept Dasein, to Greek thought starts to become clear. For Heidegger, being-in-the-world, itself an interpretation of Dasein, is a valid interpretation of *zōē*, insofar as it brings forth something that is there in Aristotle, but in an inexplicit way. Here we can see Heidegger using the terminological sense of interpretation [*Auslegung*] in his interpretation of Aristotle. Just as everyday interpretation makes what was already understood by the understanding more explicit, Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle attempts to make Dasein explicit through a translation of *zōē*.

Thus, following Heidegger's line of thought, the concept Dasein may be appropriately applied to Greek thought even if the Greeks did not have the concept, insofar as it somehow intended by what was said. While such an interpretation is surely strange, it may not be unprecedented. Heidegger sees something similar in Aristotle's concept *archē*. Though the ancients did not seem to have or employ this concept, Heidegger argues, Aristotle is not wrong to apply this concept in his interpretation of their thought, insofar as the ancients intended, but did not grasp, the concept *archē*.[59]

Heidegger attempts to support his claim that Dasein is an appropriate translation of *zōē* in SS 1924 by looking at the way that Aristotle speaks of his own investigation of the soul. In *On the Parts of Animals* Aristotle wants to determine whether the natural philosopher must speak about the whole soul or only part of the soul in his investigation of animals. Aristotle will conclude that the natural philosopher must only address part of the soul—the part particular to

[58] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 47.
[59] "The charge has therefore been made: Aristotle is proceeding unhistorically. Yes and no. Yes, inasmuch as he applies his own concepts…. In this way, Aristotle is indeed unhistorical. He does not simply report the opinions of his predecessors letter for letter at the same level of understanding but, instead, tries to comprehend these opinions. This procedure, considered carefully, out not be called unhistorical; on the contrary, it is *historical* in the *genuine* sense." (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 25–26.)

animals as such and not to humans. His justification is "Now if it be the whole soul that this should treat, then there is no place for any other philosophy beside it. For as it belongs in all cases to one and the same science to deal with correlated subjects—one and the same science, for instance, deals with sensation and with objects of sense—and as therefore the intelligent soul and the objects of intellect, being correlated, must belong to one and the same science, it follows that natural science will have to include the whole universe in its province."[60] A science, for Aristotle, is required to have a definition of its object—to delimit what is spoken about in its being. In this quotation, Aristotle seeks to understand what is implied in the study of *nous*. What is important for Heidegger is the idea that one cannot study a capacity of the soul without also studying that which it is directed toward. In the quotation, Aristotle argues that the person who studies animals will not study *nous* as such, because to do so would require that this person study all things that *nous* perceives, which includes the 'whole universe' For Heidegger, this reasoning implies an important point about human life. The human being, which is characterized by partaking in *nous* and therefore being able to perceive all things, is grasped as a being that is directed toward something else, *pros allēla*.[61] For Heidegger, this implies that the definitive feature of ensouled being is "being-by" [*Dabeisein*].[62] Thus, Heidegger can say that implied in Aristotle's conception of 'to live' or 'living' is a type of being that is what it is insofar as something is present before it.

Heidegger's interpretation of *zōē* as Dasein is an attempt to bring forth the particular character of living things as 'being-by.' As sensing and thinking beings, humans necessarily have something before them—the entities which are sensed and thought. This engagement with

[60] Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium*, trans. William Ogle in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 641a35.
[61] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 234.
[62] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 234.

entities defines the type of being which is alive, the *zōon*. Life, the definitive activity of a living being, is constituted by the various negotiations and movements away and toward that which is present before a living being. By translating *zōē* as Dasein, Heidegger sees himself as calling forth the being of a living thing as Aristotle *understands* it, although Aristotle does not explicitly interpret life in this way. That is to say, Heidegger sees himself as preserving the particular type of being that Aristotle is already concerned with, without falling into the tendency of western thought to assume that the ontological basis for this type of being lies in another type of being—namely the present-to-hand character of being that the soul has.

c. *Logos,* Persuasion, and the Dominant Greek Interpretation of Human Being-There

At this point we can gather together a preliminary conception of what Heidegger means by the phrase "hermeneutic of Dasein" in reference to Greek philosophy. Hermeneutic, as we have understood it, refers to a laying out of something in a way that expresses the way that it was already understood in its being. The hermeneutic of Dasein seeks to explicate Dasein's understanding of itself by identifying *a priori* structures that are oriented toward the possibility of being particular to it. We have also gained a preliminary conception of Dasein in reference to Greek philosophy. It refers to the Greek concept *zōē,* where this is interpreted as a mode of being wherein something is present in such a way that it instigates movement and negotiation. At this point we will turn to Greek rhetoric in order to identify the hermeneutic tendency therein.

i. *Zōon logon Echon* and the Proper Mode of Dasein

The key to understanding Greek rhetoric as Heidegger does lies in the way Heidegger interprets *zōon logon echon*.[63] Heidegger characterizes this phrase in the following way "when the Greeks say: The human being is a living thing that speaks, they do not mean this in a physiological sense, that it makes definite sounds, rather: The human being is a living thing *that in conversation and discourse has it authentic Dasein*."[64] Thus for Heidegger the phrase *zōon logon echon* does not express the view that humans are naturally rational, or that they are distinguished by their ability to make certain sounds. Instead it expresses a "determination" (*Bestimmung*) about human Dasein, or life (*zōē*).[65] The human being is a living being (*zōē*) distinguished by a particular type of engagement proper to it. The human is properly alive insofar as it engages with *logos*, understood by Heidegger as "conversation" (*Gespräch*) and "discourse" (*Rede*).

In this context, 'authentic Dasein' does not refer to what it comes to mean in *Being and Time*—it does not have anything to do with individuation in the face of death. The primary reason for this is not that Heidegger had not yet developed the conception of authentic Dasein that he will employ in *Being and Time* (although this may be the case). Instead, Heidegger is attempting to preserve the undifferentiated way that Greek culture understood human self-realization before Plato and Aristotle. Ultimately, Heidegger will grasp the Greek view of genuine human life inherent in the phrase *zōon logon echon* as an expression of Dasein's *everyday* mode of being and *this* mode's possibility of fulfillment. At this point, however,

[63] Aristotle himself does not appear to have used the phrase '*zōon logon echon*' in his works. He does, however, designate the human soul as *logon echon* in *Nicomacnean Ethics* and call the human the animal that has speech (*logon de monon anthrōpos echei tōn zōon*. (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1102a29 ; Aristotle, *Aristotle: Politics*, trans. H. Rackman, Loeb Classical Library No. 264 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932], 1253a10.) Following Heidegger (and the tradition that identifies *zōon logon echon* with the Latin phrase *animal rationale*) I will treat the phrase as the expression of the Greek view of human being.
[64] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 108.
[65] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 107.

Heidegger wants to preserve the nascent insight implied in the pre-philosophical and pre-scientific understanding of human being-there that was expressed by Greek culture.

Because of the special way Heidegger understands 'authentic' (*eigentlich*) in reference to the phrase *zōon logon echon* it may be misleading to translate it as 'authentic.'[66] The word *Eigen*, from which *eigentlich* takes its meaning, can be translated as "proper" or "own". The words and phrases "appropriate," "proper to," "property," and "own" can be taken in such a way where they refer back to the being of the being that is spoken about. A property, for example, can refer to an attribute that is particular to something because it stems from what something is—it is 'proper' to its being. Understood in this sense, *eigentliches* Dasein refers to a possible way of being-there, of being present, such that the presence accords with ('is appropriate to') the being that is present. For Heidegger, *zōon logon echon* points to the mode of presence that the Greeks saw as proper to the human being.

It is important to note, however, that for Heidegger the phrase *zōon logon echon* was not initially a definition of human life. A definition, a *horismos*, requires that one labor to reach a *logos ousias*, an account that expresses the delimitation of something as such, its being. One who grasps the being of something is able to grasp what belongs to it as such, its 'properties.' But for Heidegger, the phrase *zōon logon echon* is not the product of scientific research but of traditional belief passed down by the Greeks.[67] The Greeks were not able to contemplate the mode of presence that fulfills the nature of human being, as Plato and Aristotle later did; they were only

[66] Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Being and Time* renders *eigentliches* as "authentic." I have employed this translation in order to make the connection between *Being and Time* explicit.

[67] Heidegger claims that the non-scientific status of the phrase *zōon logon echon* is indicated by Aristotle himself. When Aristotle divides the soul into *logon echon* and *alogon* in Bk. I Ch. 13 of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that this division goes back to *exōterikoi logoi*. (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*,) Following the interpretation of German classicist Werner Jaeger, Heidegger interprets this phrase to mean that Aristotle understands *zōon logon echon* to be an expression of commonly held belief that is "outside of science" (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 74 [emphasis removed].)

able to catch a glimpse of that which is particular to human presence.[68] Insofar as *zōon logon echon* was not initially a definition but the expression of a belief, it did not initially articulate something precise about the being of human existence—it merely indicated it. Like other commonly held beliefs that Aristotle takes up and investigates, the assumption is that it harbors a truth of some kind, but that this truth must first be excavated and dusted off before it can be evaluated.

An example may help us to wipe away associations from *Being and Time* and to clarify how this phrase can point to a proper mode of Dasein. A phrase that is analogous to *zōon logon echon* is "a cat is a hunter." A cat is a particular type of being. While sleeping or eating it does not show itself to be much different from other furry mammals. Eating and sleeping do not indicate the particularity (*idion*) of a cat. When a cat hunts a mouse or a bird, however, it shows itself differently. In the way it moves as it stalks pray, its particular grace, the cat distinguishes itself. Its organs become apparent in their function. The claws are ready to seize, the sharp teeth to cut flesh, the padded paws to silently stalk. Here, we would correctly use the phrase 'authentic Dasein' insofar as, in hunting, the cat is appears as the being that it is. It is present as a cat.

Implicit in the phrase 'present as a cat' is a kind of doubling. For, in hunting (or whatever other activity we think is particular to the cat) it is not only that the cat shows itself to be a cat to an outside observer. It is also the case that when a cat stalks prey, it becomes more present insofar as it becomes more aware. In stalking a bird, a cat's whole attention may be directed toward the bird in such a way that it is not easily distracted. It becomes absorbed. In this mode, we say that it is more "engaged", more "present", and even "more alive." We have, then, another

[68] For Heidegger, science was not possible for the Greeks before Plato and Aristotle took up the remarkable labor of retrieving speech from "conversation and idle chatter," thereby allowing it to become "*logos ousias*." (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 75.)

sense in which we can speak about the authentic Dasein of the cat – namely the mode of presence in which the cat is fully engaged.

Calling a cat a hunter does not define the cat insofar as the mode of presence particular to the cat is not delimited. But it points to a mode of presence in which a cat shows itself to be cat. Likewise, Heidegger interprets the phrase *zōon logon echon* as pointing to the mode of presence in which humans are fully present—both in appearance and engagement. Whereas the cat is enthralled with prey, the Greeks see the human being as distinctively enthralled with speech, *logos*.

In this context, Heidegger interprets *logos* as referring to a mode in which entities are brought before humans—to "the way in which the human has its world there."[69] When we see, imagine, or feel a 'chair', a 'unicorn', or 'chest pain' we do not initially notice something common to the appearance of each. As a 'chair', a 'unicorn', and a 'chest pain', each appears in a way that cannot be entirely separated from the words we use to speak about them. Each appears with and through speech. The phrase *zōon logon echon* points to the way that humans are enthralled with this mode of appearance. The Greeks recognize that *logos* itself, as the ruler of how things appear before humans, has a special power over all things. In this sense, *logos* can be called an *a priori* structure of Dasein. It refers to something that underlies and shapes all that appears for human beings as such.

For Heidegger, however, when the Greeks speak of this power of they are primarily referring of the power of speech to enthrall and lead in reference to everyday contexts of special

[69] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 56. This does not mean that Heidegger denies that the Greeks used the *logos* to refer particular spoken words, accounts, or stories. For Heidegger, *logos* has a double character. Heidegger would not deny, for example, that the Greeks use the word *logos* to describe an oration or a statement. It can refer to that which that which has been spoken (das » *Gesprochene* «) (Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 17) However, the more primary sense of *logos* for Heidegger refers to the primary function of language, *apophainesthai* ('to-bring-a-matter-to-sight, *Eine-Sache-zum-Sehen-Bringen*) In this sense, *logos* refers to the power of bring forth that characterizes the *zōon logon echon*. Secondarily, *logos* refers to the particular power of words, namely the power to bring something before a human by means of a meaningful sound.

significance (i.e. a courtroom, the assembly). Heidegger characterizes the type of speech that dominates in these arenas as conversation [*Gespräch*] and discourse [*Rede*].[70] As conversation, this speech refers to speech that is defined by its ability to reach another—as communication. As discourse [*Rede*] it refers to speech insofar as it has a special freedom of direction. A scientific demonstration proves something on the basis of grasping the being that is spoken about is not *Rede*. Such speech necessarily moves in this way or that—ruled by what is spoken about. *Rede*, on the other hand, refers to speech that is not tied to what it is speaking about—it has the power to go in any direction that the speaker chooses. For Heidegger, Greek culture is characterized by its reverence for this power of speech—the power of the poet to forge new thoughts by means new metaphors and the power of the rhetor to lead an audience first this way and then in the opposite way with equal ease.

In this sense, Heidegger sees the phrase *zōon logon echon* as pointing to the type of captivation and enthrallment that can occur in the public arena, where a speaker strikes the listener with her words—enthralling and impressing. It refers to the power of what Heidegger calls 'idle chatter'—speech that gains freedom from the loose tie it has to what is spoken about. For Heidegger, when the Greeks see someone enthralled by a public speaker, they see human being. Just as a cat can immediately show the particular being that it is when the conditions of hunting are right, a human appears as it is when the conditions of speaking are right.

ii. Nietzsche and the Power of Rhetoric for the Greeks

For Heidegger, by understanding the phrase *zōon logon echon*, one can grasp the remarkable significance that the Greeks attributed to rhetoric. The phrase *zōon logon echon* points to the Greek view that the human being becomes engaged as a human being through

[70] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 108.

speech. The type of speech that the Greeks saw as engaging a listener was not scientific. Instead, it was the type of speech that was utilized in everyday conversation and discourse.[71] Heidegger identifies this type of speech with rhetorical speech. It is speech that seeks to alter the listener's judgment about practical matters by operating in the realm of belief. For Heidegger, this means that the Greeks identified rhetoric with the power to address the listener in the primary and predominant mode of their existence—everyday life. Insofar as the Greeks did not recognize the possibility of scientific and philosophical existence before Plato and Aristotle, the mode of engagement that came through rhetorical speech was, to them, the fullest expression of human potential. In this sense, Heidegger can say that for the Greeks, the rhetor becomes the "one who has the genuine power over Dasein."[72] As such, it is the rhetor who can control human beings in their very being.

Heidegger sees the connection between rhetoric and the genuine power over humans in the first definition of rhetoric where it is grasped as the artificer of persuasion, *rhetorikē peithous demiourgos*.[73] Evidence that the phrase *rhetorikē peithous demiourgos* refers to the remarkable power of rhetoric that Heidegger sees can be found in Plato's *Gorgias*. There, Socrates presents this definition of rhetoric as the distillation of Gorgias's grand estimation of rhetorical speech.

> GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

---

[71] Heidegger says "when discourse [Rede] is the authentic possibility of Dasein, then this speech is already also the possibility in which Dasein is ensnared [*Verfängt*]." (Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 108). "Rede" refers to informal, everyday speech. Insofar as this type of speech brings forth that which brings Dasein forth as such, it also has a power to captivate and ensnare.

[72] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 108.

[73] Nietzsche ascribes the definition of rhetoric as *peithous dēmiourgos* to its founders Tisias and Corax. It is possible that Heidegger follows Nietzsche here. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, ed. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent (Oxford University Press, USA, 1989), 5, 214-215.

> SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.[74]

From Socrates, we see what is meant by the phrase '*peithous demiourgos'*. The one who has rhetoric, and is therefore able to produce persuasion, will have what Gorgias suggests is the greatest power. The rhetorician will be able to persuade even those who rule, making everyone else a slave.[75] This expression, *peithous demiourgos,* then, expresses the view that the one with the power of rhetoric holds the highest power in the state, the power over all citizens—rulers and ruled alike.

Understood in this way, the sophists who profess to teach rhetoric are making a great boast indeed. But, as Aristotle suggests, the boast of the sophists may be even greater than this. At the very end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk X Ch. 9, Aristotle says that the sophists not only claim that politics is "the same as rhetoric" but "something inferior to it."[76] Aristotle identifies politics as "the most authoritative art" in *Nicomachean Ethics.*[77] The politician doesn't only have power over the law, but over the daily labor of everyone in the polis. Aristotle delineates the way that higher arts rule lower ones when describing how the bridle maker's work is shaped by a higher art, the art of riding, which is itself shaped by the strategic art of the general and ultimately that of the politician.[78] Thus if rhetoric were equivalent to the political art, it would

[74] Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Kindle Edition, 2012), 452e.
[75] The term slave may seem extreme here. It may be. But for Aristotle, a slave is one who cannot lead through reason and must be led by another, for the sake of preservation. (Aristotle, *Politica*, trans. Benjamin Jowett in *The Basic Works of Aristotle* [New York: Random House, 1941], 1254a 17.) Understood in this way, the listener who never follows their own reasoning but always that of another person (e.g. a rhetor), effectively becomes a slave.
[76] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, trans. W. D. Ross in *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 1181a14.
[77] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1094a 30.
[78] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1094a 10.

exert a great and remarkable power over all citizens in the *polis*. But the sophistic claim is greater. Some sophists boast that rhetoric is superior even to politics.

In this context, Aristotle does not explain how rhetoric was thought to supersede politics by the sophists, but it is no stretch to suggest that the sophists saw the power of persuasion as a divine power. This view is expressed by the real Gorgias in a speech the *Encomium of Helen*. There Gorgias equates speech, and therefore the power over it, with divine power when he says: "Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity."[79]

The view that speech's persuasive power is aligned with divinity is also presented in Plato's dialogue *Critias*. In this dialogue, Critias has the task of giving the most likely account of the origin and development of human civilization in a way that is analogous to Timeus's account of the origin of the divine bodies. Critias, tells us how the gods ruled over humans. He says: "[The gods] tended us, their nurslings and possessions, as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion according to their own pleasure;-thus did they guide all mortal creatures."[80] Here it is clear that the divine way of ruling over humans in particular does not involve punishments with pain and pleasure, but guidance through persuasion—the same means employed by the rhetorician. We see a similar perspective in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In these texts the Greek gods do not necessarily *command* humans like the God of the Israelites, but also

[79] *Gorgias*, *Encomium of Helen*, trans. George Kennedy in *The Older Sophists*, ed. Hermann Diels and Rosamond Kent Sprague (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 52.
[80] Plato, *Critias*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, (Kindle Edition, 2012) 109c.

persuade. Athena persuades Hector to fight Achilles in book 22 of the *Iliad* as she persuades Telemachus to seek out his father Odysseus in the first book of the *Odyssey*.[81]

For Heidegger, this Greek belief about the remarkable power of rhetoric reflected the peculiar reality of Greek culture at the time. Heidegger says "it must be noted that, in the fourth century BC, the Greeks were completely under the dominion of language."[82] In this context, language does not refer to the power of bringing something clearly defined to presence, but speech characterized by the fact that it does not clearly elucidate of what is spoken about—babble [*Geschwätz*].[83] For Heidegger, babble characterizes the type of speech practiced by the early teachers of rhetoric, the sophists. In this context, babble is not merely a negative characterization. It is a type of speech that has a special power to lead human beings. Heidegger says that it is precisely this type of speech that the Sophists took seriously. [84]

To clarify the way that the Sophists, and Greek culture generally, took babble seriously, Heidegger cites Nietzsche. In the "The History of Greek Eloquence," Nietzsche also maintains the view that the Greeks recognized the remarkable power of speech, saying "the most immoderate presumption of being able to do anything, as rhetors and stylists, runs through all antiquity in a way that is incomprehensible to us." [85] Nietzsche explains this remarkable power by highlighting features of Greek culture. For Nietzsche, Greek culture is characterized from

[81] Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Richard Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Bk. 22, Ln. 276-295. Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. Richard Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins e-books, 1967) Bk. 1 Ln. 105-315.
[82] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 75.
[83] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie,* 108.
[84] "In der Sophistik ist mit dieser vorwiegenden Möglichkeit des Sprechens Ernst gemacht." (Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 108.)
[85] Nietzsche quotes Diodorus to support his claim that the Greeks attributed remarkable power to speakers. "No one will be able easily to name a higher prerogative than oratory. For it is by virtue of oratory that the Greeks excel the other nations and the educated person the uneducated; moreover, it is by virtue of oratory alone that one individual acquires authority over many; but in general everything appears only as the speaker's power represents it." (Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 213.)

start to finish by its rhetorical tradition—by a fascination with and labor towards the development of language.

As Nietzsche conceives it, language is fundamentally non-scientific. It consists of a set of tropes inadequate to express 'what' is spoken of—a "mobile host of metaphors."[86] For Nietzsche, there is a fundamental inadequacy between word and thing that reappears throughout the process of speech and communication. One essential moment of speech is when a sound is equated with a thing. For Nietzsche, the sound image that is spoken is a failed metaphor. It attempts to "carry over" and express the content of sensation, even though sensation and the sound image are irreconcilably different. Likewise, there is a fundamental inadequacy between word and thing that arises at the level of semantics. For Nietzsche, languages primarily name arbitrary traits of the objects they speak about. Nietzsche cites the example of the word serpent in various languages saying, "but it is the same when *drakōn* is called snake, actually 'that which is shiny,' or *serpens*, that which crawls; but why is *serpens* not also snail? A partial perception takes the place of the entire complete intuition. By *anguis*, the latins designate snake as *constrictor*; the Hebrews call it that which hisses or winds or creeps."[87] By looking at how 'snake' is named in different languages, Nietzsche shows how languages continually fail to identify that which is particular about an entity, while at the same time covering over this fundamental failure between word and thing with a trope (metonymy in this case).

In Nietzsche's view, languages operate and develop by obscuring the tropes through which they function. In an essay from the same year entitled "On Truth and Lies in and Extra-Moral Sense" Nietzsche says "truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they *are* illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which have lost their image and

[86] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*,
[87] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 23.

now can be used only as metal, and no longer as coins."[88] Here Nietzsche offers a theory of language where its development consists of making the artificial bonds between word and thing increasingly efficient and invisible. As a language becomes more and more developed, the metaphors and metonymies tend to seamlessly bind sound to mental image, losing their status as tropes and products of artifice. The listener loses sight of language's power to lead and mislead, partaking in a naïve realism where words simply presents things as they are.

While Nietzsche appears to see his theory of language as universal, he is clearly concerned with its application to Ancient Greek in particular. For Nietzsche, the ancient Greeks are distinguished by the level of development of their language. Nietzsche says "no one should believe that such an art falls from heaven; the Greeks *worked* at it more than any other people and more than at any other thing (i.e., and so *many* people!)."[89] Even Homer, normally thought of as a beginning of known Greek culture, is identified by Nietzsche as a product of this culture's focus on language; he is the result of a lengthy and laborious development.[90] Nowhere is the Greek culture's focus on the development of language more evident for Nietzsche than in the rhetorical tradition. Nietzsche claims that "*language is rhetoric*" insofar as rhetoric is merely the self-conscious development of what already naturally occurs in speaking, the "*artistic means which are already found in language*."[91] By identifying Greek culture with rhetoric, Nietzsche binds Greek culture with the task of refining language through rhetorical tropes, such as metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. The identification of Greek culture with rhetoric is so

[88] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 250.
[89] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 214.
[90] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 214.
[91] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 21, 23.

strong for Nietzsche that the history of rhetoric stops precisely at the point when Athens becomes "a seat of dry professional training."[92]

In Nietzsche's eyes, this alignment of rhetoric with Greek culture points to the particularity of Greek culture. Contrary to the view that Greek culture was primarily scientific and rational, Nietzsche claims that the Greek focus on rhetoric reflects the mythical and playful aspects of Greek culture, saying "rhetoric arises among a people who still live in mythic images and who have not yet experienced the unqualified need of historical accuracy: they would rather be persuaded than be instructed."[93] For Nietzsche, Greek culture is not primarily concerned with truth but with the potential for language to express things in new and exciting ways. "What is unique to Hellenistic life is thus characterized: to perceive all matters of the intellect, of life's seriousness, of necessities, even of danger, as play."[94] In this focus on play, the Greeks were far from practical. They took remarkable enjoyment in the "splendor of rhetoric," studying and diligently practicing "everything that excites, ravishes, enthralls."[95]

For Heidegger, Nietzsche has correctly identified the peculiar momentum and spirit of Greek culture, along with its fundamentally non-scientific stance. Heidegger says "sophistry is the proof of the fact that the Greeks became captive [*verfallen sind*] to the language Nietzsche named 'the most speakable of all languages.' And he must have known, ultimately, what Hellenism is."[96] Here Heidegger affirms Nietzsche's view of Greek language, culture, and rhetoric. Seeking enthrallment and rapture through the power of language, the Greeks honed their language more and more, making it more immediate and impressive. It is the development of the Greek language through the labor of rhetoric and poetry that made it particularly easy to

[92] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 240.
[93] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 3.
[94] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 3.
[95] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 240, 238.
[96] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 109.

speak and to see what was spoken. But with this ease came a corresponding loss of any sense of the artificial and arbitrary aspects of language. As language became more enthralling it became more invisible, That which was presented through it was more difficult to keep at a distance and bring to question.

In light of the interpretation of Greek culture and language that Heidegger takes from Nietzsche, the significance of Greek rhetoric in Heidegger's account is clearer. The poets who form the metaphors and the sophists who later exploit them both partake in the remarkable power of determining the way things appear through language. They enjoyed a freedom in using, and sometimes creating, expressions that gained acceptance by appealing to the taste of the many.[97] The Greek awe toward rhetoric expressed their fascination with this power. As Nietzsche explains, what is passed over into consciousness through language, and what is therefore *there* for humans, are not "things," but "the manner in which we stand toward them, the *pithanon* [persuasive]." The Greeks saw rhetoric as an art that takes hold of the way things initially appear, to control the "opinions about things" and therefore "the *effect of things upon men*."[98] They were fascinated with what was, in effect, a power over all beings—the power to determine how that which appears will appear, to make it attractive or repellent, to determine the effect it will create. This power was amplified by the particular quickness of fluidity of the Greek language, which allowed a master speaker to strike quickly and powerfully, like the lightning of Zeus.

In light of Nietzsche's discussion, we have gained a more precise understanding of how rhetoric is concerned with authentic Dasein. For Heidegger, the phrase *zōon logon echon* expresses the Greek interpretation of the mode of presence proper to Dasein, its authentic mode

[97] "Only very few individuals utter *schemata* [figures] who *virtus* [virtue, worth] becomes a guide for the many. If they do not prevail, then everyone appeals to the common *usus* [use, practice] in their regard, and speaks of barbarism and solecism." (Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 25.) The fabricator of concepts, the poet, may or may not succeed in bringing an expression into common usage.
[98] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche on Rhetoric*, 213.

of existence. Nietzsche argues that that which enthralled the Greeks were not objects of science, but entities brought forth through metaphors and metonymies through which language develops into a more striking medium. Rhetoric attempts to bring Dasein into the state that the Greeks identified as particularly human—to impress humans as such—by developing language to make it more striking and captivating.

In the next section we will see the deficiency of rhetoric's approach. Through an interpretation of Plato's *Phaedrus* we will come to see how the Greek view of authentic Dasein, and the rhetorical means that the tradition produces to attain it, are deficient. Plato will provide us with another view of the fulfillment of human potential, one that will also guide Heidegger in *Being and Time*. For Plato, the most realized mode of human presence comes when one has gone as far as possible to conceive unchanging and everlasting truths—the ideas. With Plato's critique, the rhetorical tradition will be radically re-grounded, and the hermeneutic tendencies of rhetoric will no longer seek to discover that which momentarily enthralls, but that which has the power to touch the nature of the human soul.

d. Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Insufficiency of the Rhetorical Hermeneutic of Dasein

For Heidegger, the hermeneutic of Dasein (understood philosophically) is not an aimless interpretation of being-there. It seeks to grasp the *a priori* structures of Dasein insofar as they point to Dasein's authentic mode of being. By presenting Dasein to itself transparently through interpretive speech, Heidegger sees the hermeneutic of Dasein as allowing Dasein to radically appropriate its own tendency toward being (*Seinztendenz*) and to raise the question of being anew.[99] In the last section, Greek rhetoric's orientation toward persuasion was interpreted as sharing a concern with realizing authentic Dasein through speech. The enthrallment with speech

[99] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 15.

brought about by persuasion was grasped as the mode of human being-there in which the *zōon logon echon* has its authentic mode of presence. Greek culture understood authentic Dasein as occurring through an engagement with everyday speech. Rhetoric was interpreted as the attempt to seize this power of speech through conscious reflection and to rule over humans as such.

The Greeks identified language as that *a priori* element of human presence that governs the possibility of human self-realization. The implicit understanding of *logos* as the mode through which all things appear, points to an underlying determinant of human presence. In rhetoric (as articulated by the sophists, Plato, and Aristotle) we will see the development of a more and more precise articulation of the power and limits of language to lead humans to the realization of their human potential. This section will turn to Plato's *Phaedrus* in order to articulate the basic concept of the persuasive power of speech that guided the sophists (the *eikos*) along with Plato's radical rejection of the sophist's view. By showing how the sophist's sought to understand the persuasive power of speech this section will concretely express rhetoric's hermeneutic orientation toward Dasein.

i. *Doxa* and Everydayness

To discover how sophistic rhetoric sought to articulate *a priori* structures of Dasein, Heidegger's interpretation will need to be developed and extended past its original bounds. Heidegger claims that rhetoric itself is a hermeneutic of Dasein but he does not explain how sophistic rhetoric can be grasped in this way. That being said, Heidegger does not leave such an interpretation rudderless. As noted above, Greek culture and rhetoric's interpretation of authentic Dasein is an interpretation of Dasein in the mode of everydayness. The concept that Heidegger focuses on to grasp Greek everydayness is *doxa* (belief), a term that delimits the realm of

rhetoric. Through an analysis of Aristotle's conception of *doxa*, Heidegger tells his listeners that he intends to make the "*basic phenomenon of everydayness*" intelligible.[100]

For Heidegger, *doxa* does not primarily characterize a value attributed a proposition (the attribution of belief to the proposition 'x is y'). Instead Heidegger says that *doxa* is the "genuine orientedness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world, that is of *average* being-with-one-another."[101] As an orientedness (*Orientiertheit*) *doxa* refers to an *a priori* structure of everyday Dasein that governs how things appear. *Doxa* is identified with sight—with the power to bring things to appearance. Heidegger tells us that *doxa* means "having a view" of something ("*eine Ansicht haben*").[102] The entities that appear through *doxa* are not known scientific objects—they are not perceived clearly and distinctly. Instead, that which appears does so in a deficient way—one cannot see it clearly or fully. One does not *know*, one only believes. But even though that which appears in *doxa* is seen in a limited and insufficient way, the orientation toward that which appears in *doxa* is characterized by affirmation. *Doxa*, Aristotle tells us, is a "yes saying," a *phasis*.[103] The tension between the lack of sufficient sight and clarity and the affirmation of *doxa* are expressed by its characterization as being a mode in which one is *directed toward* the truth (*orthotēs*), as opposed to already having achieved it.[104] In *doxa* one directs oneself toward the truth by affirming what appears to be true.

Heidegger sees two basic possibilities for navigating the tension between the dubious character of what appears in *doxa* and the tendency to affirm it. On the one hand, *doxa* can become the source of scientific research and questioning. This response exemplified by Socrates.

[100] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 93.
[101] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 102.
[102] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 136.
[103] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 137.
[104] Heidegger notes that doxa is characterized by Aristotle as *orthotēs*, as being-directed toward the truth, but not having obtained it. (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 93.)

In Plato's dialogues, Socrates seizes upon the dubious character of belief. He is never entirely satisfied with his opinions, even long-standing ones that he continually maintains.[105] As a mere mortal, Socrates cannot achieve and maintain wisdom. He must continually struggle to reach the truth by working through *doxa* in a peculiar way. He and his interlocutors test beliefs by explicating other beliefs that logically follow from the tested belief. When these implied beliefs run afoul of more deeply held beliefs, the tested belief is altered or abandoned. Thus by logically questioning beliefs, Socrates is able to reveal deeper and more convincing opinions.

The philosophical mode of questioning belief taken up by Socrates, however, is not the predominant way to respond to the tension between doubt and affirmation in *doxa*. For Heidegger the predominant mode of *doxa* that characterizes everyday life moves in the opposite direction. Following Aristotle, Heidegger points out that *Doxa* is primarily *ou zētēsis*, not a seeking. In the everyday mode of belief one accepts the view that is initially presented with a "peculiar self-satisfaction in adhering to what is already spoken.[106] For the most part, one does not question what others have said or the way things are brought forth by language, one is satisfied with the initial way that something appears. For Heidegger this peculiar satisfaction gives *doxa* is characteristic "domination and obstinacy" (*Herrschaft und Hartnäckigkeit*) in Dasein.[107] Primarily and predominantly, the way the world shows itself is accepted without question.

For Heidegger, the dominion of the way the world initially shows itself is a basic phenomenon of everydayness. In a brief and cavalier interpretation of Thales, Heidegger goes as

[105] For example, even as Socrates battles to preserve the idea of an eternal soul in *Phaedo*, itself essential to any theory of ideas, he is eager to learn if his longstanding beliefs may prove false. (Plato, *Phaedo* (Hackett) 91b.)
[106] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 136.
[107] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 151.

far as to claim that the primary insight of the west's first philosopher is an articulation of the power of *doxa* over appearance. [108] Heidegger says

> the manner and mode in which this world is possessed as uncovered to a certain degree is this being-for, maintaining that it is so. In this being-for as the character of *doxa*, lies the determination of *going-along with the way that the world initially shows itself*, the moment of *trust in the immediate aspect*. Nothing other than this is *Thales*' opinion that *hudōr* is the *proton*, that the genuine *archē* of being is 'water.' Such a determination is intelligible on the basis of the prevalence of a thoroughgoing trust in that which initially shows itself. That which initially shows itself is taken as what the world initially is, according to Thales.[109]

Without judging the merits of Heidegger's interpretation of Thales, this quote indicates the import that Heidegger attributes to the interpretation of *doxa.* Through Thales, Heidegger sees the primacy of our trust and acceptance toward what appears as an *archē* of all beings. That is to say, all that comes to appearance is understood as something allowed for and influenced by this initial trust. *Doxa* is an orientation toward what appears that is primarily and predominantly governed by the momentum of everydayness—the tendency to trust without questioning.

Rhetoric seeks to partake and amplify this tendency to trust that which initially appears. It does so not only by remaining strictly in the domain of accepted belief, but also with its attempt to develop language that strikes quickly and leaves a lasting impression. Nietzsche claims that Ancient Greek was distinguished by its immediacy and force. For Nietzsche and Heidegger, Greek rhetoric sought to claim the Greek language's power over how and what initially appears. The sophists did so by attempting to grasp and seize the way the momentum of everydayness expresses itself in language. They did so through the basic concept of sophistic rhetoric—the *eikos*.

[108] Heidegger does not repeat this claim a few years later when discussing Thales as part of a lecture on Ancient Greek philosophy. (See Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008], 43.)
[109] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 101-102

ii. The *Eikos*

Socrates's articulation of what the Greek rhetors meant by *eikos,* along with his critique of sophistic rhetoric, stem from the drama central to *Phaedrus*.[110] Phaedrus is a youth impassioned with a love of *logos*. When Socrates meets Phaedrus, his persistent and unfulfilled passion is directed toward a speech delivered by Lysias, which Phaedrus has concealed underneath his cloak. The speech addresses the question of which type of person a young man should choose to offer favors to, arguing that favors should be offered to someone who does not love the young man as opposed to someone who does. The question taken up by Lysias's speech points to the central dramatic question of the dialogue. Will Phaedrus choose the sophistical speech of Lysias and the bodily love that Socrates defines in his own first speech on love or will Phaedrus choose the dialectical and philosophical speech of Socrates and the love of the soul that Socrates defines in his second speech?

To persuade Lysias to take up the philosophical life, Socrates not only critiques the sophistical view of speaking well, as he also does in *Gorgias*, he articulates an alternative. The key element of the rhetorical tradition that Socrates first critiques and then attempts to replace is the one he addresses first and last—the view that the persuasive speaker does not need to know the truth but only the likely (*eikos*) in order to persuade.[111] Though Socrates recognizes a host of rhetorical techniques taught by the sophists, he identifies this notion as of central importance, saying that the ability to stick to *eikos* speeches, is the "sum total of the [sophist's] art."[112] Phaedrus affirms the significance that Socrates attributes to the *eikos*, saying "this seems to be

[110] The interpretation of *Phaedrus* that follows stems from Heidegger's interpretation of *Phaedrus*. See Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 214-243.
[111] Socrates takes up this issue with Phaedrus as soon as they begin discussing speaking well at 260a and returns to it right before concluding his discussion of the "art and artlessness of speeches" at 274b. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Stephen Scully (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 2003).
[112] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273a.

the all-important point for people concerned with these matters."[113] Indeed, Socrates attributes the theory of the *eikos* to Tisias.[114] Ancient and modern scholars agree that it was Tisias, Corax, or both who first defined rhetoric as *peithous demiourgos* and who discovered that the *eikos* was persuasive.[115] By crediting Tisias, Socrates signals that his critique will be a radical one directed toward the fundamental position of the rhetorical tradition.[116]

Before critiquing Tisias's view, Socrates clarifies what is meant by *eikos* through an example that takes place in a courtroom. The example consists of two opposing arguments in a civil trial, the same format employed by the earliest arts of rhetoric.[117] Socrates tells us that in a trial where a "weak but brave man clobbers a strong but cowardly man and steals his cloak… it is imperative that neither man tell the truth."[118] The reason that the weak but courageous man must lie is not surprising. He must lie to keep the jurors from discovering and believing the truth—namely that he clobbered the strong man and stole his cloak. However, the reason that the strong and cowardly man must lie shows the importance of the *eikos*. Though the strong and cowardly man has the truth on his side, the jurors will not believe it. Socrates says that the strong man's arguments will be susceptible to the "old saw" that says that a weak man cannot "lay a

[113] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273a.
[114] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273b.
[115] The question of whether Tisias, Corax, or some combination of the two should receive credit for the discovery of eikos seems to be a mystery that runs from Plato's time until our own. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates acknowledges that the person responsible may not be Tisias when he speaks of Tisias "or whoever it may have been and whatever is the name which pleases him" at 273c. Aristotle mentions Corax's art of rhetoric but not Tisias at 1402a17 of *Rhetoric*. Contemporary scholars appear to lack the concrete evidence necessary to make any definitive claims. See Michael Gargarin, "Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric Before the Sophists" in Ian Worthington, ed., *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (Boston: Blackwell, 2010), 30.
[116] Argument by eikos is traditionally attributed to the founders of rhetoric. See Stephen Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3. For an interpretation that questions the traditional attribution of *eikos* to the founders of rhetoric, see Edward Schiappa, *Protágoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 49.
[117] "On balance, our evidence indicates that they [the earliest *technai*] were not analytical treatises, foreshadowing the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle or the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, but model speeches, whose continuous texts were read or listened to by students of oratory and/or prospective litigants." Usher, *Greek Oratory*, 2.
[118] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 272b.

finger" on a strong one.[119] As Socrates clarifies when he discusses Tisias's theory, the *eikos* is nothing other than the "opinion [*dokoun*] of the masses."[120] The courtroom battle dramatically suggests the power of the opinion of the many; the truth itself cannot hope for a courtroom victory if it must battle against it.

While Socrates's example does demonstrate the power and even absurdity of argument by *eikos,* it does not explicitly clarify what it is about commonly held opinion that makes it *eikos* and therefore persuasive. Sometimes translated as "probable," *eikos* is often conceived in terms of modern probability theory as a relative frequency of possible outcomes.[121] This interpretation offers an implicit answer to the question of how the opinion of the many is itself persuasive. The founders of rhetoric apparently discovered that all possible outcomes may be realized, but the frequency of realizations varies to measurable degree. That is to say, they discovered the rudiments of our current probability theory.[122] Thus, according to this view, that which is *eikos* is that which is probable and the 'opinion of the many' simply refers to that which the many believe will occur more often than not.

---

[119] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273b.

[120] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273b. "to eikos ē to tō plēthei dokoun," Plato, *Opera: Volume II: Parmenides, Philebus, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, Amatores*, ed. J. Burnet, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922) Perseus Digital Library, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

[121] David C. Hoffman, "Concerning Eikos: Social Expectation and Verisimilitude in Early Attic Rhetoric," *Rhetorica* 26, no. 1 (February 2008): 4, doi:10.1525/rh.2008.26.1.1.

[122] Paul Woodruff is an example of a contemporary scholar who interprets *eikos* as a modern notion of probability. Instead of seeing inconsistencies with Plato and Aristotle's conception of eikos and the modern notion of probability as signs that this interpretation is inaccurate, Woodruff sees them as signs that Plato and Aristotle did not understand what eikos meant for the Sophists. Woodruff argues that "Plato wrongly treats *eikos* as a value offered by the sophists in place of truth," insofar as Plato does not see that *eikos* arguments are probabilistic claims and therefore constitute a "risky method for exploring the truth when the available evidence will not support ascertainable conclusions." Aristotle errs in claiming that some *eikos* arguments are genuine and some are not. If *eikos* refers to the frequency of possible outcomes, no frequency is less genuine than any other, only greater or smaller. For Woodruff, Aristotle's claim amounts to judging probabilities on the basis of the outcome. Woodruff says "But if we could judge the outcome without qualification, we would have no need for eikos in the first place." Paul Woodruff, "Rhetoric and relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias" in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, ed. A. A. Long, (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

There are, however, several problems with interpreting the *eikos* in terms of modern probability theory. The first problem is the lack of evidence that this interpretation is historically appropriate. Modern probability theory is a numerical theory that grasps degrees of likelihood as numerical ratios. There is no evidence that Tisias's contribution was accompanied by a discussion of numbers, ratios, or anything analogous. Indeed, several contemporary scholars have taken up the view that the modern notion of probability did not exist until the 17th century.[123] The second problem is the limited scope to which probabilistic arguments can apply. Though it is true that rhetoric addresses what may or may not be brought about by action, and is therefore implicitly concerned with probability, it also concerns notions of the just, the conducive, and the noble. The opinions that the many have about these moral concepts, which are essential to rhetoric, cannot easily be reduced to a frequency of outcomes. The third problem comes insofar as the 'probable' cannot function as the *eikos* is supposed to. As discussed above, the Greeks saw rhetoric as holding the power to fully engage and rule over listeners through persuasion. If being *eikos* makes something persuasive, then the *eikos* must be an attribute that has the potential to captivate and master. It is difficult to see how the "probable" could fill this role. When an outcome appears to be "probable" in the modern sense it is something that necessarily may *not* come about. But an outcome that may not come about is one that we can never fully depend on; there will always be doubt. Doubt distances the listener from the speaker's sway.

[123] Hoffman follows the argument of Ian Hacking in Ian Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.) (Hoffman, "Concerning Eikos," 4.) Schiappa goes further, suggesting that the use of eikos as a term may stem may stem from a misinterpretation of Plato and Aristotle. Schiappa, *Protágoras and Logos*, 50.

A more fitting conception of the *eikos* can be found in David Hoffman's essay "Concerning Eikos: Social Expectation and Verisimilitude in Early Attic Rhetoric."[124] Using an approach reminiscent of Heidegger, Hoffman's determines what *eikos* means by uncovering the pre-theoretical sense of the word. Hoffman focuses his attention on the usage of the root verb *eoika* in Greek texts by authors from Homer (circa 750 BCE) through Isocrates (Circa 436-338 BCE). Hoffman discovers that the original usage of *eikos* and *eoika* tend to refer to that which is appropriate or fitting in relation to (1) customs, (2) justice, (3) character or position, or (4) circumstance.[125] In each case, the *eikos* is something that is understood in terms of a predominant social or cultural belief. On this basis, Hoffman interprets the rhetorical usage of *eikos* as that which is 'expected' within a societal and cultural context.

By interpreting *eikos* as that which is expected, the relationship between the *eikos* and the 'opinion of the many' appears in a different light. *Dokeō*, the verb from which *doxa* stems, does not only mean to have or form an opinion but also 'to expect'.[126] Expectation entails a readiness to see and believe some things and not others. When I have an opinion, I expect that which fits with that opinion, the *eikos*. In the case Socrates presents as an example of how the *eikos* functions, the 'old saw' entails the opinion that a weak man will not overcome a strong man. This opinion implies a corresponding expectation of what will (and will not) happen between the weak and strong man. The strong man, not wanting to admit cowardice, cannot hope to overcome this expectation with the truth, so he also conform his account to what is expected so that the small man appears guilty nonetheless. He will claim that the small man did not attack alone, but as part of a group.

---

[124] David C. Hoffman, "Concerning Eikos: Social Expectation and Verisimilitude in Early Attic Rhetoric," *Rhetorica* 26, no. 1 (February 2008): 4, doi:10.1525/rh.2008.26.1.1.
[125] Hoffman, "Concerning Eikos," 16.
[126] Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, Abridged: Original Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891).

Of course, it is possible for someone who holds an opinion (and corresponding expectation) to recognize that a particular case defies expectation. Indeed, the very technique that Socrates suggests that weak man should use initially appears as if it were designed to lead the jurors to recognize that the case is an exception to the norm. Socrates tells us that the weak man must continually employ 'old saw' in the form of a question, asking "how could a man like me lay a finger on a man like him?" At first this seems quite strange. If the jurors truly tried to answer this question it would presumably *weaken* the case of the weak man. Jurors who tried to answer the question in earnest would likely discover plausible theories to explain exactly how a 'man like' the weak man could 'lay a finger on' the strong man. Indeed, they may even discover the truth.

The technique Socrates advocates is justified on the basis of an assumption about the jurors. Socrates says that "people in courts don't give a fig for the truth of such matters, only for what is persuasive."[127] Implied in Socrates's statement is that seeking the truth requires that one cares—one must 'give a fig.' Indeed, discovering a truth that defies expectation requires careful labor. Whereas we see and judge things that happen as expected quickly and easily, judging something that defies expectation and is therefore a threat to our point of view requires work. The weak man's technique takes advantage of the fact that the jurors don't really care about discovering the truth. It is only effective if the jurors do *not* attempt to answer the question. The question needs to function 'rhetorically'—as a question that is not meant to be answered. The weak man relies on the tendency of the jurors to follow the opinion they already have rather than taking up the mental labor of thinking through possibilities and weighing the particulars of the case.

[127] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273b.

Taking up Heidegger's terminology, Socrates is describing jurors who are governed by everydayness. Their view of what happened is governed by the "domination and obstinacy" of belief—by the tendency of Dasein to avoid the difficulty of questioning and to go with the flow, accepting things as they initially appear. Greek rhetoric's conception of the *eikos*—its basic concept of that which is persuasive—recognizes the power of our first impression to govern what comes later. It identifies a principle of persuasion. To bring humans to a state where they see something in this way or that, without question, one must not try to change the opinion of the listener. Instead one must recognize that what will appear to be the case depends on what already appears to be the case—the first impressions the listener already has. The movement of the speech is delineated by the expected possibilities already rooted in the beliefs the audience shares. Understood in this way, *eikos* is a principle of appearance. What will appear is that which comes easily—namely that which follows from what has already appeared. As such the *eikos* is both *a priori* (insofar as it prior to the judgment of particular experiences) and a structure (insofar as what appears depends upon it).

Earlier I mentioned that Heidegger sees Thales's claim that water is the principle of all things as an attempt to describe the everyday movement and momentum of *doxa.* An extension of this metaphor may prove useful to concretize the conception of *eikos* as an *a priori* structure of being-there. As the repeated flow of water over the same path will eventually form a streambed through which water collects and travels more quickly, we have understood the development of a language as the process of establishing tropes that allow thoughts to collect and travel in prescribed directions. The sophistic rhetorician's basic move is to recognize the tendency of thought to flow along these well-formed ways and to offer a path that fulfills what expectation, the *eikos*. The sophist directs thought not by dredging entirely new paths but by

carving the connections between various beliefs at the points where they flow next to each other, leading the momentum of one belief into another. By re-routing the flow of thought, the sophist may even achieve a lasting effect. If the thought of the listener and of a culture itself follows the new and easier path with great frequency, the connection carved by the sophist will become deeper and smoother, allowing more thought to flow with less resistance. It is in this quick and satisfying flow that the Greeks saw the truly human mode of presence—in being caught up by language and persuaded. In the *eikos* of belief, the sophists saw an essential principle of the motion and flow required for the achievement of this way of being.

The following section will lay out Socrates's critique of sophistic rhetoric. Socrates will offer a different possibility of moving along the stream of thought. He will take up the labor of paddling upstream—of recovering and moving past the paths of thought that his interlocutors have already traversed without even realizing it. Dialectic, the philosopher's mode of speech, will relentlessly attempt to traverse higher and higher in order to reach ultimately the source of thought itself.

iii. The Failure of Sophistic Rhetoric

The last section showed how Greek rhetoric's understanding of the *eikos* could be grasped as an *a priori* structure of Dasein. This was shown in order to allow us to interpret early Greek rhetoric as an expression of a hermeneutic tendency of Greek culture itself. The Greek sophists, desiring power over human beings, sought to understand what makes something persuasive and thereby—whether explicitly or not—oriented themselves toward grasping human beings themselves as persuadable. Our interpretation brought forth the tendency of everyday Dasein to go along with the way things initially appear—a tendency that the sophists attempted

to make full use of. In this section, following Plato, we will see how rhetoric fails to live up to its own goal of understanding how to achieve persuasion insofar as its grasp of human being is limited and fundamentally insufficient.

The insufficiency of the sophistic rhetorical tradition to achieve its own goals is evident in Plato's primary critique of sophistic rhetoric. The sophists claim to know the art of rhetoric and to be able to teach it, thereby offering students the power of persuasion and speaking well. In the *Gorgias*, however, Socrates claims that sophistic rhetoric is not an art (*technē*) at all, but only a knack (*empeiria*) for pandering. Socrates's critique is aimed at the sophist's basic approach—they do not believe a student needs to acquire knowledge, only awareness of the beliefs of the many.[128] In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates takes up the same issue again, this time providing a positive account of what types of knowledge would be necessary for rhetoric if it were to truly become an art. In doing so, Socrates demonstrates that the true art of rhetoric is actually the type of speech of the philosopher—dialectic.

The first move Socrates makes to demonstrate the insufficiency of sophistic rhetoric and align true rhetoric toward philosophical fulfillment is to re-define rhetoric in a way that highlights its essential function while casting aside the particular cultural contexts in which sophistic rhetoric arose and thrived. Socrates begins his conversation with Phaedrus about the rhetorical art by pulling it out of context, saying "isn't the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, a certain guiding of souls through words, not only in the law courts and other places of public assembly but also in private?"[129] Phaedrus responds to Socrates's claim as if shocked. "No, by god, not at all the way you've described it. The art of rhetoric in speech or written form is most evident in the courts, also in public assembly in speech form. I have not heard the term applied

[128] Plato, *Gorgias*, ///
[129] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261a.

more widely."[130] It is commonly believed that the study of rhetoric first arose to address the need of citizens to argue in the courtroom and assembly.[131] Phaedrus's response expresses the view that rhetoric was initially defined by these locations where rhetoric took place. Against the opinion of the day, Socrates defines rhetoric in such a way that the particular cultural context evaporates and rhetoric is only grasped in terms of its power, that of leading souls (*psychagogia*) with words. This move is decisive first because it changes the concept of rhetoric in such a way that dialectical conversations, like the one occurring between Socrates and Phaedrus, can now be included within the art of rhetoric. Secondly, Socrates's conception locates rhetoric within the context of an essential activity of the soul—movement, which will allow Socrates to identify true rhetoric as that which leads the soul to take up the type of movement implied in its nature—and thereby to take up the philosophical way of life.

But while Socrates presents compelling examples to demonstrate that rhetoric should be grasped by its power instead of its location, Phaedrus does not bite. Socrates continues by beginning where Phaedrus is comfortable, in the courtroom. He takes up the question of what is required to ably deceive jurors about justice and injustice. In taking up this example, Plato has cleverly incorporated a basic starting point of the sophists, namely the ability to speak on both sides of an issue in a courtroom[132], with a key aspect of his own conception of *technē*, namely that knowledge is a power that allows for a double movement, toward or away from the *telos* of the art.[133]

---

[130] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261b.
[131] For example see James J. Murphy, Richard A. Katula, Michael Hoppmann, *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*, 4th edition (New York: Routledge, 2013) 28.
[132] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261d. The ability to speak on both sides of the issue was a boast of the sophists and is thought to have been demonstrated by the earliest arts of rhetoric which were not treatises but sets of sample speeches representing opposing sides in court. See Usher, *Greek Oratory*, 2.
[133] In *Republic*¸ for example, Socrates demonstrates every form of knowledge implies a double ability—the person who knows how to protect things also knows how best to steal them. (Plato, *Republic*, trans. G. M. A. Grube rev. C.

Against the sophists, Socrates will demonstrate that in order to reliably speak on both sides of the issue, knowledge of common opinion alone is insufficient. Socrates proceeds dialectically, by first grasping the idea of deception. Socrates and Phaedrus assume that deceit is allowed for by a certain capability of things, their ability to appear like other things. The one capable of deceiving must make use of this capability and make one thing appear to be something it is not. As Socrates says, the art must "enable someone to make everything similar to everything else, provided that things are comparable (*homoioō*) and able to be compared."[134] Because only some words are capable of being made into something else (not words like 'iron' but words like 'justice'), the rhetorician must first discern whether deceit is possible about a given idea. For those ideas concerning which deceit is possible (e.g. justice), Socrates argues that in order to speak on both sides of the issue a rhetorician who has recently proved that an action was just and now wants to prove the opposite must proceed by taking "small steps."[135] The reason is that large steps – equating something with something quite dissimilar—will be detected and the listener will not be persuaded. On the assumption that the practitioner of rhetoric must know whether s/he is taking large or small steps, Socrates is able to argue that knowledge of what one is speaking about is required. If one doesn't know what one speaks about, then one cannot determine whether a claim is a large step or a small step, since one doesn't know 'how far' the deceit moves from the original.[136] Thus Socrates leaves Phaedrus with a remarkable implied

---

D. C. Reeve in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997] 333e.)

[134] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261e.

[135] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 262a.

[136] Here again we can see that Socrates is applying a requirement common to all arts to rhetoric. An artisan who proceeds from knowledge must know the materials she builds with. The most basic determination is whether the material is capable of being formed in the way necessary. As Plato points out, one cannot shape how "iron" appears before a listener, because it falls under the type of words which bring about an appearance that is the same for all. Thus it cannot be made to look like something else. "Justice" on the other hand, being something not immediately and commonly known, is something that can be recast. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 263a.) A carpenter who builds with wood must work with the grain of the wood – with the way it has already grown. Likewise, the rhetor who attempts to

conclusion—for a practitioner of rhetoric to ably persuade in the courtroom, they must know what justice is.

This argument indicates a fundamental difference between Socrates and the Sophists. For Socrates' argument to work, it must be assumed that a listener continually retains an inexplicit notion of what something truly is—justice in this case. If the listener had explicit knowledge of what justice is then they could not be deceived, for they would immediately see that the misleading speech was false. If the listener did not have any conception of true justice at all, then there would be no functional difference between a small and large step. Without a fixed and common starting point, a small step for one person would be a large step for another, and vice versa. This argument indicates that for Plato, the way things appear through language retains a fundamental and guiding link to the true way that they are. Against the sophists who attempt to claim almost divine ability to determine the basic way that things appear, Plato maintains that appearances are guided by an underlying true idea that the soul has prior knowledge of but does not remember.

The sophists, on the other hand, would presumably reject the Socrates's characterization of small and large steps. The sophist are often associated with the position that moral judgments are based solely in *nomos* (custom, law).[137] However, when Socrates faces them, he shows that they cannot maintain this position insofar as they already have deep convictions that are not arbitrary and that govern what they believe. This is dramatically demonstrated in Socrates' confrontation with Thrasymachus in Book I of *Republic*. Thrasymachus holds the view that

---

deceive about "justice" must know that natural tendency of justice to be seen – they must know what it is, and the way that it intends to be seen, in order to see the way that another form, or look, can be given to it.

[137] Although this view is presented by Plato by Callias in *Gorgias* and Thrasymachus in *Republic*, the reality may be considerably more complicated. See C. C. W. Taylor and Mi-Kyoung Lee, "The Sophists," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2013 Edition). For our purposes Plato's account is sufficient.

justice depends on the will of humans – it is only that which, in each case, benefits the stronger. For him, there is no justice outside of the particular social conditions in which it arises (namely when the strong establish laws). Through dialectic, however, Socrates is able to demonstrate that even Thrasymachus cannot hold this view. Even while Thrasymachus boasts, whines, and insults, he is continually compelled to follow the argument on the basis of what he himself already believes. By following only the claims that Thrasymachus agrees to, Socrates demonstrates not only that Thrasymachus's viewpoint is incorrect, but that Thrasymachus's own position is governed by an underlying notion of justice.

Socrates's argument not only establishes that the true practitioner of rhetoric must know what they are speaking about, it also presents a different structural basis for how things appear. For the sophists, what compels and convinces depends upon custom—upon the prior opinions and thoughts that have been produced in different cities. Socrates sees a different principle of appearance and belief. Underlying appearances—and determining whether they are credible or not—is the truth, understood as an underlying idea. Though a particular action judged in a court of law will not be purely just or unjust—the action can only be just or unjust if it partakes in the idea itself. By basing the designations 'just' and 'unjust' in their participation with a pure idea, Socrates re-grounds the *eikos.* The expectation that compels our opinion is not only what accords with whatever opinion currently holds sway, but what accords with that which underlies all opinion—namely the ideas themselves. In this way Plato demonstrates the insufficiency of the *eikos* as such. To be persuasive, the *eikos* itself depends on its similarity and relation to what is ultimately true.

By demonstrating the insufficiency of the *eikos* as such, Socrates shows that the means of sophistic rhetoric are not sufficient to achieve a mastery of persuasion. Next he turns to the goal

of rhetoric as such, demonstrating that sophistic rhetoric does not have a sufficient grasp of it. For the sophists, a rhetor is successful insofar as they are able to persuade. The ability to persuade anyone of anything is itself taken to be a sign of rhetorical power. Socrates seeks to demonstrate the absurdity of this position and to replace the *telos* of sophistic rhetoric with that of philosophy.

Socrates introduces this missing element of the true art of rhetoric after Phaedrus rejects Socrates's initial attempt to claim that dialectic ability is sufficient to make one a true rhetorician. Phaedrus acknowledges the power of dialectic but claims that distinctive features of rhetoric will be left out if rhetoric is identified with dialectic alone. He says that the "rhetorical part has escaped us, I think."[138] Socrates follows Phaedrus's suggestion and demonstrates his knowledge of the rhetorical tradition by exhaustively listing over a dozen techniques that Phaedrus might seek to include within the art.[139] However, even with everything listed, Socrates suggests that the rhetorical tradition's numerous offerings still leave "holes in the fabric."[140]

Socrates clarifies what the rhetorical tradition is missing by comparing rhetoric to medicine. He asks Phaedrus whether knowledge of analogous techniques in the art of medicine (such as how to heat the body up or cool it down; how to make it vomit or "make the body emit from the other end") would be sufficient for someone to claim the medical art.[141] Phaedrus immediately rejects the notion. For Phaedrus only a "raving madman" would claim to be able to teach medical knowledge by teaching techniques alone without also teaching the student when to

[138] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 266c.
[139] Socrates lists "refinements of the art." These are techniques and elaborations of how parts of speeches should function. Socrates's list includes how to begin the speech (the preface), how to gain convincing testimonies from witnesses, proofs, arguments from plausibility, confirmation and further confirmation, cross examination and further cross examination, accusation and defense, covert allusion, incidental praise, incidental censure, the proper length of speeches, and a host of rules for how to speech correctly. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 266d-267d.)
[140] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 268a.
[141] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 268b.

apply such measures and for how long.[142] What is missing from such a practitioner is the knowledge of how such techniques would or would not produce health—how the techniques relate to the *telos* of the art. Likewise, the myriad techniques that the rhetorical tradition offers students are also insufficient insofar as this tradition does not explain the end state that these techniques are concerned with bringing about.

Implied in Socrates's critique is that rhetoric has only one *telos*. Just as the sophists would likely reject Socrates's argument that knowledge of the ideas is necessary to deceive, they would likely bristle against the notion that rhetoric is directed toward one end alone. Yes, rhetoric is concerned with persuasion, they might say, but it is precisely the ability to persuade in many different ways concerning many different things that makes rhetoric so uniquely wonderful and powerful. For Socrates, it will turn out that true rhetorical persuasion must be directed toward one goal—namely the fulfillment of the soul's natural desire to contemplate the truth.

Socrates's claim that rhetoric has one goal depends on the idea that the soul is a natural entity and that a natural entity's best state is one that accords with its natural tendency to move. Socrates does not prove either of these propositions; he lets the medical analogy do the work. For Phaedrus, it is evident that knowing when to "instill health and strength by applying drugs and diet" and for how long requires knowledge of the nature of the body.[143] From our perspective it is not immediately clear why knowledge of the body is required by the medical art. Phaedrus provides a hint by referring to Hippocrates in this context.[144] For Hippocrates, health is a state in which the body moves in accordance with its nature. In *Precepts*, Hippocrates says:

> But he who has taken the sick man in hand, if he display the discoveries of the art, preserving nature, not trying to alter it, will sweep away the present depression or the

[142] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 268b-c.
[143] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 270b.
[144] "If we are to follow Hippocrates at all, Ascelpius' heir, it is not possible to understand anything about the body either without this method." (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 270c.)

> distrust of the moment. For the healthy condition of a human being is a nature that has naturally attained a movement, not alien but perfectly adapted, having produced it by means of breath, warmth and coction of humours, in every way, by complete regimen and by everything combined, unless there be some congenital or early deficiency. Should there be such a thing in a patient who is wasting, try to assimilate to the fundamental nature. For the wasting, even of long standing, is unnatural.[145]

For Hippocrates, to produce health one must have knowledge of the natural motions of the body, how these motions preserve life, and how these motions can be brought about. [146] Phaedrus accepts this view regarding the body and health and accepts Socrates extension of it to the soul. Taken in this way, rhetoric becomes an art of recognizing the motions of the soul—those which are 'sicknesses'—and identifying what the soul needs to be presented with so that it can take up its natural motion.

Following Hippocrates , Socrates proceeds by breaking down what is required for knowledge of the nature of the soul into three aspects. "First, we should ask whether the nature is simple or multi-formed…. If simple we should consider its natural capacity, that is, what it can do to what, or in what ways it can be acted upon and by what. If it has multiple forms, we must count these and examine each of them as we did when we looked at the simple form."[147] Socrates conceives of motion in terms of potential and actuality. To grasp the motion of the soul one must see the various tendencies of motion, the passive and active *dunamei*, of the soul to change something or be changed. Identifying these tendencies will allow the true practitioner of rhetoric to understand the possible ways that the soul can move. The total number of possibilities depends on whether the soul is simple or multi-formed, for each form the soul takes indicates different *dunamei*, and different tendencies of motion.

---

[145] Hippocrates, *Praeceptions* in *Hippocrates Collected Works I*, ed. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1868), Perseus Digital Library, Part 9.

[146] Hippocrates's faith in the power nature to preserve that which it resides within is indicated by the following aphorism: "Nature is sufficient in all for all." Hippocrates, *De Alimento* in *Hippocrates Collected Works I* (Perseus) Sec. XV.

[147] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 270d.

The practitioner of rhetoric will not only need to understand the different possibilities of motion, but what it is that brings them about. Socrates expresses the point in this way: "Secondly, he will reveal what it naturally does to what or what it naturally suffers from what."[148] For Heidegger, it will come as no surprise that Plato sees the necessity of discussing that which is relative to each form of the soul. The soul itself is for Heidegger essentially directed toward something else. To know how to bring about the natural motion of the soul one must be able to set something before the soul that it naturally acts upon or is acted upon by.

The third requirement for any practitioner of rhetoric follows close behind. Socrates says, "thirdly, having classified the different kinds of speeches and kinds of soul and how these are affected, he will go through every cause, aligning each type of speech to each type of soul, explaining the reason why one soul is necessarily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort and another is not."[149] Having determined the ways that the soul will tend to move, and what must be brought forth such that this movement occurs, one who hopes to have knowledge of rhetoric must be able to explain how each type of thing will or will not move each type of soul, thus completing the art by forming a complete understanding of all the relevant causes as they pertain to different types of people. With this third step, Socrates requires that someone rhetorical knowledge become concrete—applicable to particular people in particular situations for particular reasons.

With these three requirements Socrates establishes the basis for an art of rhetoric that will be radically re-grounded in the truth. The rhetorical tradition's attempt to reach knowledge of persuasion is doubly insufficient for Socrates; it does not have the knowledge

[148] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 271a.
[149] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 271b.

to ably lead a listener and it does not know where it should ably lead them. To gain such knowledge, Socrates argues, one must grasp the true beings that underlie appearance, the ideas, and the true being of that which one intends to affect—the soul. As we will see in the next section, the true form of rhetoric Socrates describes will be fulfilled through a special type of speech that constantly struggles against the momentum of everyday opinion—dialectic.

e. Plato's Positive Account of Rhetoric: Dialectic as the Hermeneutic of Dasein

At first glance, *Phaedrus* appears to include only guidelines for the development of a future art of rhetoric and no positive content.[150] After Socrates and Phaedrus agree on the three guidelines required for knowledge of the nature of the soul, they do not follow through by developing a positive account. Heidegger, however, suggests that Plato's rhetorical theory is more finished than it initially appears. According to Heidegger, "Plato does not intend to develop a rhetoric, as Aristotle later did…he even considers it unnecessary…. The reason is that Plato sees his dialectic as the only fundamental science, such that in his opinion all other tasks, even those of rhetoric, are discharged in it."[151] Here Heidegger suggests that Plato does not follow up *Phaedrus* with an art of rhetoric because the key aspects of such an art are already addressed through Plato's theory of dialectic. Following Heidegger's view, this section will develop an interpretation of the positive theory of rhetoric expressed in *Phaedrus* by focusing on how dialectic and the nature of the soul are conceived therein. Grasping Plato's positive contribution to rhetorical theory will allow Heidegger's interpretation of rhetoric to be extended further. We

[150] After Socrates outlines what the true art of rhetoric will require, Phaedrus doubts anyone will actually being able to fulfill the requirements, saying "if only anyone could do it." (Plato, Phaedrus, 274a.)
[151] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 234.

will begin to see how rhetoric, understood as a hermeneutic of Dasein, takes on a philosophical significance.

As is well known, Socrates's central claim about rhetoric in *Phaedrus* is that true rhetoric is nothing other than dialectic. Thus by defining dialectic method positively, Plato at the same time speaks about rhetoric. In *Phaedrus* dialectic is not characterized as a mode of conversation between interlocutors that follows certain rules, as suggested in *Gorgias* when Socrates instructs Polus in the proper way of questioning and answering. [152] Instead, Socrates grasps dialectic in terms of two basic powers that allow it to discover definite ideas and speak in accordance with them. These two powers are collection (*sunagōgē)* and division (*diairesis*).

Collection allows one to "bring into a single form (*idea*) things which have previously been scattered in all directions so that by defining each thing he makes clear any subject he ever wants to teach about."[153] That is to say, the practitioner of dialectic is able to face the many different ways that something has been understood, and to see something common that underlies them, namely a form or idea. Heidegger describes it this way "What Plato is saying is that that which is spoken of, the matter of fact, e.g., love, gathers up its various phenomenal aspects and lets them be seen together in one basic content… specifically in such a way that it can be understood from *one* view."[154] Through collection, the dialectician gathers together all the diverging ways that something is said and recovers an underlying form that holds these divergent ways together. The idea is that from which the various ways something is said ultimately get their basis.

[152] In *Gorgias*, Socrates tells both Gorgias and Polus how they ought to proceed. They should ask questions or answer, speak as briefly as possible, acknowledge when their position changes, and ask an interlocutor to fully explain their view before proceeding. (Plato, *Gorgias*, 449b, 461d. 462d.)
[153] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265d.
[154] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 229

The dialectician must also employ the power of division. Socrates describes this as "the power, conversely, to cut up a composition form by form, according to its natural joints and not try to hack through any part as a bad butcher might."[155] Whereas the first power allows one to see how one idea underlies many verbal expressions, this power allows the practitioner of rhetoric to see how a larger composition can itself be properly divided. This division must adhere precisely to the ideas that the speech includes, cutting in such a way that each idea is exposed and preserved intact, not in such a way they are mangled and hacked through.

Socrates makes it clear that his earlier speeches on love are examples of speeches that employ these basic dialectical powers. He notes with Phaedrus that his speeches began by collecting what is said about love and defining it as a type of desire or yearning (*epithumia*). By grasping how particular desires come to take this or that name, Socrates was able to grasp what type of desire love is.[156] Socrates also shows Phaedrus that his speeches performed the process of division, insofar the idea of love was itself divided into two types, "left" love in the first speech and "right" love in the second, the first justly abused, the second praised.[157]

By demonstrating that his speeches concerning love were dialectical, Socrates shows that even speech that appears rhetorical can be dialectical in a decisive sense. Socrates's speeches on love were not two-way conversations like most of Socrates's dialectical engagements. Because the speeches were divinely inspired, Socrates did not begin where dialectic normally begins—by working through the opinions of an interlocutor in order to gain access to an idea itself. The speeches were still dialectical, however, insofar as they employed collection and division in order to guide the listener by the idea spoken about (love) and its divisions.

[155] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265e.
[156] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 237d – 238c.
[157] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265b.

By presenting true rhetoric as a mode of speech based in and guided by the clear view of an idea, Socrates radically re-grounds rhetorical persuasion. The sophists took up a mode of persuasion based in *doxa* and the corresponding expectation (*eikos*) implied therein. They sought to present the listener with something that accords with what the listener already believed—to access the way entities initially appear and to move in accordance with the expectations that follow from these initial views. Socrates however, bases true rhetorical persuasion not in mere belief and expectation that a culture happens to have produced, but in the belief that stems from the primary impressions upon the soul itself—the ideas. In this context, the speaker also begins by gaining the conviction of the listener, but this conviction is based in something that Plato sees as unchanging and everlasting—something true.

Socrates, however, does more than provide an alternative basis for rhetorical persuasion. His speeches on love also positively address a crucial question of the rhetorical art as Socrates describes it—namely the question of the nature of the soul. The first two guidelines that Socrates requires of one attempting to attain the art of rhetoric is that they "describe the soul with full precision," clarifying whether the soul is simple or multi-formed and considering the natural capacity of each. Secondly they must determine "what it [the soul] naturally does to what or what it naturally suffers from what." In Socrates's second speech about love, he addresses these question directly, clarifying the nature of the soul (*psuchēs phuseōs*) by determining its natural capacity in reference to the particular passive and active works of the soul (*pathē te kai erga*).[158]

Socrates begins by determining that the essential capacity and activity of the soul is movement. The soul is defined as a source of motion, responsible for both moving itself and all other things. On this basis Socrates argues that the soul cannot stop moving because it is impossible for the soul to 'leave itself,' and stop thereby. Here Socrates grasps the basic nature

[158] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245c.

of the soul in accordance with his own guidelines for the rhetorical art. He defines the soul by grasping its fundamental natural capacity—motion. However, though the soul is defined by its capacity to move and cause motion in other things, this motion itself has many different possibilities and directions. To grasp the soul more precisely, Socrates will need to describe the types of motion of the human soul.

As Socrates tells us, his second speech on love is not a scientific demonstration but a divinely inspired speech. Claiming that the task of adequately describing the form (*idea*) of the soul would be a lengthy even for a god, Socrates resorts to speaking of the soul's form by means of a likeness—the figure of a charioteer guided by winged horses.[159] Socrates begins by describing the simple form of the soul. Purified of the earthly and akin to the soul of a god, the simple soul moves in concert with itself. As a winged being, this pure soul's natural tendency of motion is upward, toward the divine realm where the gods reside. From there it seeks to ascend further to a place where the charioteer is able to gaze at the ideas themselves for a time, the chariot revolving around these ideas as the charioteer takes in the sight. In this realm, the soul confronts being itself, which Socrates calls "the soul's pilot, and the source of true knowledge."[160] Looking upon being, the soul is nourished and brought to a state of adoration and joy. This circular motion is the type of motion that fulfills the natural tendency of the soul.

Continual fulfillment of the soul's natural desire is only possible for pure souls (e.g. the Gods). Though these souls are still characterized as having parts (charioteer, horses, etc.) they remain simple in the sense that their movement is singular, directed in one direction and toward one end. The souls of human beings, on the other hand, are multi-formed in the sense that they are governed by two competing sources of motion. Like divine souls, human souls also

[159] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a.
[160] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247c.

inherently strive toward the pleasure and nourishment that comes with the contemplation of truth. Indeed, Socrates characterizes human souls as souls that have at some prior time witnessed the truth of the forms. Because of this prior experience, human souls are defined as souls that the ideas have left a permanent impression upon. Socrates says "a human being must understand what is said in reference to form, that which, going from a plurality of perceptions is drawn together by reasoning into a single essence."[161] However, for the most part, this understanding remains obscured for human beings. Socrates says that those souls which enter into human beings are souls that have 'lost their wings' and therefore cannot easily ascend to the divine realm and regain the joy that comes with the soul's natural fulfillment in the contemplation of being.

The human soul's downward tendency toward worldly things is not only due to the loss of wings but also to the presence of one bad mare, which is heavy and weighs down the chariot. With the introduction of this second mare, the previously simple motion of the soul becomes much more complicated. Not only is the human soul split by its tendency to move upward toward the divine and downward toward the earthly, but the earthly motion itself has many different possibilities. While the divine tendency of the soul seeks to interact with one type of thing—ideas; the bad mare seeks out a whole host of bodily desires. As such, it may at one time seek to pursue food, at another gold, and at another still a beautiful body. In each case, the chariot is pulled downward, but in different directions according to the dominant bodily desire.

Socrates grasps the different forms of desire which can govern the movement of the soul in his first speech on love. Like the desire of the soul, the desire of the body is initially oriented toward being—toward continuing to be. For the body to survive, basic necessities must be obtained, e.g. food, shelter, and clothing. However, when speaking about the many forms

[161] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 249b.

(*polyeides*) of the soul, Socrates recounts the way that the role of these desires can become inverted insofar as the soul no longer seeks them for the sake of life but seeks them for their own sake.[162] Gluttony, the passion for wine, and the passion for sexual gratification are Socrates's examples of forms that can govern the soul. For Socrates, these ways in which the soul can temporarily be governed are akin to bodily sicknesses.[163] When these desires rule the soul, its natural motion is perverted and overcome by a desire (and corresponding movement) that harms the soul.

Socrates's description of the motion of the human soul is further complicated by the possibility of contrary motions arising between different parts of the soul. Socrates describes this vividly when he tells Phaedrus about how love directed toward beautiful bodies can operate. In a soul caught up in this type of love, the bad mare is compelled by the pleasure of sex and leaps violently toward the object of satisfaction—a beautiful boy in this case. The bad mare is not responsive to words, only to pleasure and pain—to the object of its desire and to the charioteer's whip.[164] Pulled back and forth by the desire of the bad mare and the shame of the good mare and charioteer, the journey toward gratification—whether through philosophical friendship or sex—is halting and jumpy. Thus in human motion there is a peculiar back and forth. As a human comes to be ruled by different forms of desire (whether of soul or body), the direction of the soul changes accordingly.

Thus in Plato, we have a double principle of human being motion. On one hand, there is the desire of the soul, which is brought into movement by the glimpse of an idea—which the soul attempts to reach and look at. On the other hand there are the desires of the body—which move toward bodily pleasures and away from bodily pains. As that which leads the soul through words,

[162] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 238a.
[163] For example, see Plato, *Republic*, 444c.
[164] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 254a.

rhetoric must present that which will compel the soul to move. Dialectic offers the model for speech which appeals to the soul's desire to behold ideas. Beginning with opinion, dialectical conversation sifts through what is said to slowly explicate the idea that underlies an opinion. Dialectic is speech that allows for the soul to engage in the motion it already wants to take up—namely movement toward the ideas themselves—by clearing misconceptions that block the way. However, Socrates also sees another aspect of true rhetoric (dialectic). It also addresses bodily desires in order to lead the listener back toward the fulfillment of the soul's natural desire, acting akin to medicine. This possibility of dialectical rhetoric moves in opposition to the sophistic rhetoric that Socrates critiques in *Gorgias*. It addresses bodily desires not in order to pander to them but to overcome them.

Socrates goes on to identify the types of souls that will be more or less responsive to speech that speaks to the desire of body, soul, or both. In doing so, Socrates addresses the third guideline necessary to develop the rhetorical art. Socrates distinguishes between 9 kinds of human souls by the degree to which they have seen the ideas before falling to earth.[165] At one extreme is the philosopher. S/he has seen the ideas to the greatest degree and these ideas have left the strongest impression. Because the philosophical soul easily recollects the ideas, it is liable to let them govern its behavior and is therefore susceptible to the type of dialectical conversation that Socrates takes up in Plato's dialogues. At the other extreme are the eighth lowest soul (the sophist and demagogue), and the ninth (the tyrant). These two types of souls will be least responsive to speech addressing the natural desire of the soul and most engaged in speech addressing bodily desires. Here, Plato provides a framework for grasping how different types of souls will be more or less persuadable by speeches that present objects of the soul's desire or objects of the body's desire.

[165] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248d.

Taken together, Plato's guidelines for the art of rhetoric and the two speeches on love provide a fairly complete re-grounding of the rhetorical tradition. As discussed above, for Heidegger the Greeks saw the fulfillment of human life, authentic Dasein, in the enthrallment and persuasion with words that allow thought to flow quickly and pleasantly through the smoothed paths of common opinion. True rhetoric, understood as dialectic, offers a different type of movement toward a different concept of human fulfillment. Identifying human fulfillment with the fulfillment of the pure soul itself, Plato's sees the soul's realization in the contemplation of the ideas. Dialectical rhetoric is the knowledge that allows one to speak to the whole human soul—doubly governed by soul and body—in order bring about the most divine and wise way of living that is humanly possible.

Taking up and extending Heidegger's interpretation, Plato's re-grounding of rhetoric can be seen as a re-grounding of the hermeneutic of Dasein. A hermeneutic of Dasein seeks to grasp the *a priori* structures of Dasein insofar as these are directed toward Dasein's authentic mode of being. Plato's first decisive contribution is to re-conceive the authentic mode of being. For Plato, the soul realizes its natural desire through the contemplation of being. Rhetoric, as the form of speech that has the power to bring the soul to its proper mode of presence, is conceived philosophically, as dialectic.

Plato identifies movement and desire as the basic structural features that allow for humans to realize their potential. In Plato's conception of movement, we can see a basic structure of being-there—intentionality. For the human soul to be what it is, it must move. Motion requires both mover and moved. This implies that the human soul must relate to something—that which it moves or that which moves it. Thus to be a human being, the presence of something that has the potential to be moved or move is not accidental, but essential. With this

notion of human being, one can see something like Dasein. To be a human being, one must be 'there,'—one must have something present 'before one's eyes.'

In Plato's conception of the possibilities of desire, we can also see elements akin to Heidegger's conceptions of 'care' and 'mood.'[166] For Plato, movement occurs in the direction of fulfilling a desire. For desire to be fulfilled, something that the soul currently desires must come to presence before the soul in a certain way. On one hand, this depends upon the desirability of that which appears. On the other, it depends on the form of desire that currently governs the soul. For desire to be fulfilled, something desirable (e.g. food) must present itself to a soul that is in the mode of desiring that type of thing (e.g. gluttony).

As a moving being characterized by desire, we can say that the human bein fundamentally 'cares' about what appears before it. As a moving thing, it necessarily has something there for it. As a desiring thing—that which is there for it appears in a way that is relative to what it is seeking. However, for the most part that which appears does not appeal to one's immediate desire. In this way, one's concern leads to a state whereby one is 'indifferent' to most things that appear—they do not address one's desire. The forms of desire that rule the soul (e.g. gluttony) are a disposition akin to Heidegger's conception of mood. Like mood, they are modes that continually governs the direction of the soul (in one way or another) and are always prior to (and a determinant of) the way entities appear.

Lastly, Plato provides an interpretation of the limits of human fulfillment that present similarities to Heidegger's conception of authentic existence. Whereas Heidegger sees the possibility of authentic Dasein as stemming from and returning to everyday existence, Plato sees the highest form of human engagement (philosophy) as a continual attempt to free oneself from the rule of bodily desires before inevitably falling back into the world. In both cases, the state of

[166] Indeed, Heidegger translates desire as care in *Being and Time*. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 215 [H. 171].

being that is *not* proper to the being of the human (everydayness, body) and the tendency to fall into it cannot be escaped. Philosophy must always begin again—questioning the complacency of one's views that continually returns. It does so in order to reach a state of being that is proper to human being but at the same time outside of it. For Heidegger this mode is *ex*istence, a mode in which one is outside of oneself. For Plato this mode is divine. One partakes in the contemplation of being to the degree that one can act in a way that one is not—as a god.

Conclusion

This chapter brought forth an interpretation of what Heidegger means by conceiving of rhetoric as a hermeneutic of Dasein. It began by identifying key features of what Heidegger means by the term 'hermeneutic' in *Being and Time.* A hermeneutic of Dasein refers to an interpretation that explicates the *a priori* structures of Dasein with an eye toward Dasein's fulfillment in its authentic mode of being-there. After explaining Heidegger's justification for using the term Dasein in reference to Greek thought, we saw how the Greek conception of the human being as a *zōon logon echon* provided the soil for rhetoric to sprout and grow. The phrase points out the peculiar involvement that distinguishes humans, namely the engagement with that which appears through speech. Heidegger interprets this phrase as an expression of the Greek's everyday understanding of the proper mode of existence for a human being. It says that a human being is the animal that becomes enthralled with that which becomes explicit through everyday speech.

Rhetoric rapidly grew from this rich soil. It explicitly attempted to comprehend and seize the power of language itself, and thereby to rule over human beings. To see how sophistic attempted this concretely (and in order to set up Plato's re-grounding of rhetoric) we focused on

a concept that lies at the root of the rhetorical tradition—the *eikos*. I argued that the *eikos* refers to the peculiar momentum in belief—to the fact that we come to see things in accordance with how they have been seen before. Taking the *eikos* as the basic concept for what is persuasive, the art of rhetoric became a matter of identifying what expectations were implied in *doxa* and applying this awareness to situations where rhetoric is efficacious, namely the courtroom and public gatherings. It was a matter of accessing the momentum of everydayness and leading conviction on well-worn paths.

With Plato, the roots of rhetoric were dug out and exposed and the preparation for transplanting it from the soil of belief to the soil of truth was achieved. Plato demonstrates that the *eikos* alone is insufficient for rhetoric. For Plato, humans are not brought to full engagement insofar as they are caught up in mere belief, but insofar as they are caught up in true belief. Plato realigns the hermeneutic tendency of rhetoric so that it is based in and directed toward the contemplation of the ideas. True rhetoric is dialectic—it leads the soul to uncover the ideas themselves. In order to lead the soul to this discovery, Plato argues that rhetoric must turn its attention to one idea in particular—the nature of the soul itself. Dialectical rhetoric must identify the fixed and *a priori* elements that determine how the soul can begin to move in accordance with its nature. Rhetoric must explicitly become what Heidegger understands it to be, a hermeneutic of Dasein.

2

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as the Completion of Greek Rhetoric

The last chapter articulated the basic hermeneutic impulse that Heidegger attributes to rhetoric by looking at the major differences between sophistic and Platonic rhetoric, showing how each attempts to grasp what Heidegger calls *a priori* structures of Dasein. For Heidegger, it is Aristotle who brings this hermeneutic tendency of rhetoric to its fulfillment through his concrete grasp of *logos* itself. By articulating the natural role of *logos* in bringing about human society, along with the ways that things can and must appear insofar as they are brought forth by *logos*, Aristotle will achieve a honed view of the principles of appearance.

As the title indicates, this chapter seeks to understand Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as something that brings about the completion of Greek rhetoric. The conception of 'completeness' operative here is guided by Aristotle himself, as interpreted by Heidegger. In the context of *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, completeness is an ontological designation for Heidegger. Something is fully what it is—it appears as it is—only insofar as it shows itself as complete. Completion in this sense refers to the Greek word "*telos*." When something appears in such a way that it holds itself in a completed state, showing itself in its being, it's appears in the mode of *entelecheia*. This completion is seen in the mode in which things are present when they are subject to definition, when they are there as "*to ti ēn einai*." Heidegger characterizes what this mode means for Aristotle in the following quotation.

> I see a being that is there with respect to its being, in the way that it is there as *coming from out of*… I see a being that is there genuinely in its being when I see its *history*, the being that is there in this way coming from out of its history into

> being. This being that is there, as there in this way, is *complete*; it has come to its *end*, to *completedness*, just as the house is complete in its *eidos* as *poioumenon*.[167]

Thus someone can see a product made by a craftsperson, a house in Heidegger's example, in its completedness when one sees the final product and form as the result of a prior making—as what came out of the cause that guided that making. Likewise, one can also see the completedness of a natural object if one sees its form as something made not by an artisan but by its own particular tendency to move. This chapter will show how what Heidegger articulates as the *eidos* of rhetoric—the interpretation of the "everydayness of being with one another"—is itself the fulfillment of rhetoric's basic hermeneutic tendency—its attempt at self-knowledge.

While this project will follow Heidegger in claiming that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* develops in a way that moves past Plato's account of rhetoric in *Phaedrus*, this chapter will not focus on how Aristotle's account differs from Plato's. That issue will be taken up in the next chapter as part of the discussion of how Plato and Aristotle articulate different philosophical roles for rhetoric. This chapter will, however, articulate the ways that Aristotle follows through with the guidelines that Plato sets forth in *Rhetoric*. I will begin by situating Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* within the lecture that this interpretation is found, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. I will then turn to the way that Heidegger interprets 'being with one another' in Aristotle's work. The phrase is Heidegger's translation of *koinōnia* as used in *Politics.* I will then turn to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* itself in order to grasp how, for Heidegger, the interpretation of everyday *koinōnia* is a development of the interpretation of the *a priori* structures of Dasein.

As in the first chapter, the interpretation of structural elements of language and persuasion will be oriented toward grasping Dasein. Aristotle's interpretation of *logos* will not be understood as an interpretation of word-entities that appear before us. The structures and

[167] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 26 [Ellipses in original].

possibilities of language will be understood as the very structures and possibilities of that which appears before human beings as such. Likewise the moments of communication (speaker, what is said, listener) will be grasped as structural tendencies that allow for something to appear in a way that compels. By understanding language in this way, we will maintain Heidegger's orientation toward the Greek conception of the soul. The soul does not primarily refer to an entity that has certain properties, for Heidegger, but to a principle of that which appears before human beings in the way that it does. Grasping the soul phenomenologically means seeing the underlying *a priori* structures in that which appears itself. In Aristotle's articulation of the elements of language and rhetorical persuasion, we will see the pre-cursor to Heidegger's own articulation of being-in-the-world.

a. The Significance of Rhetoric in *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*

Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* takes place in the summer semester 1924 lecture titled *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (SS 1924). In that lecture, Heidegger tells us that the task is not to develop a complete interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* but to look to rhetoric in order to satisfy a demand of the lecture—namely to grasp Dasein in the mode of everydayness. I want to discuss the purpose of this lecture itself in order to grasp the significance and limits of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In doing so, the ways that Heidegger does and does not clarify how Aristotle's *Rhetoric* fulfills the basic tendency of rhetoric will become clearer.

Heidegger begins *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* by telling his listeners that the lecture is aimed at gaining an understanding of "*some basic concepts of Aristotelian*

philosophy."[168] Heidegger's interpretation is directed toward these basic concepts insofar as they constitute the "*primary matters* with which Aristotelian research is occupied."[169] The selection of these concepts comes from book V of *Metaphysics*, the so-called "philosophical dictionary." Heidegger lists and provides a preliminary translation of the concepts defined in the 30 chapters of Book V. A few of the concepts that will become especially important for the lecture are *ousia* (Dasein, being-there), *teleion* (*Fertigsein*, completedness), *hexis* (*An-sich-haben*, having-in-itself), *pathos* (*Befindlichkeit*, disposition), and *genos* (*Abkunft*, *Herkunft*, lineage, descent).[170]

The way that Heidegger intends to understand these concepts is distinctive. Heidegger does not merely ask what Aristotle meant by his basic concepts; the concern is not with what is grasped by the concept or whether this concept is used in the same way by other philosophers. For Heidegger, addressing these questions would lead to a mere acquaintance with Aristotle's concepts.[171] Heidegger is instead concerned with the conceptuality [*Begrifflichkeit*] of Aristotle's basic concepts. The "-lichkeit" in the formulation "*Begrifflichkeit*," is a way of referring to the being of that which this suffix is attached to—a formulation Heidegger uses elsewhere.[172] This formulation is akin to "-iness" in the formulation "foxiness." It nominalizes an adjectival form (foxy) in such a way that that which is distinctive about a certain type of thing (foxes) is itself referred to. That is to say, foxiness refers to something that is distinctive and common to foxes as such.[173] Likewise, *Begrifflichkeit*, which could also be rendered as "conceptliness", refers to that which is distinctive and common to concepts as such. In SS 1924, Heidegger is looking for what

[168] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 3.
[169] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 3.
[170] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 3-4; Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 3-4.
[171] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 11.
[172] E.g. *Zeitlichkeit*.
[173] Whether one culture determines that foxiness is "sexiness" or another that it is "trickiness" is beside the point. Either way the term attempts to point out something characteristic of foxes as such.

is distinctive, common, and essential to those of Aristotle's basic concepts that directly concern Aristotle's primary research.

Insofar as Heidegger is oriented toward Dasein, Heidegger's concern with what is common and distinctive among Aristotle's concepts is directed toward the way that a human being must be in order for something to be grasped in a conceptual way; he seeks a mode of Dasein. Heidegger provides guidance for such a view from Kant, who Heidegger characterizes as "the only one who lets [traditional] logic become vital." [174] Kant, according to Heidegger, distinguishes between the matter of a cognition and the form, or way in which an object is cognized.[175] In Heidegger's reading, Kant demonstrates that what is essential to the concept is not what is cognized (the matter) but the 'how' of cognition (the form). Understood in terms of its form, concept refers to a mode of cognizing that "yields *what* the object, the res, is in the explicitness of the definition."[176] Thus the form of the concept refers to a mode of cognition that brings about a view of something as defined—to what Heidegger refers to conceptuality. Taking up Kant's language one can say that Heidegger's focus on *Begrifflichkeit* is not concerned with the content of the concept but with the form of cognition and how it comes about in Dasein.

Interpreting Kant is useful for Heidegger not only because Kant directs Heidegger to the question he wants to ask—namely the way the mode of Dasein in which concepts are possible—but because Kant directs Heidegger back to Aristotle. Kant sees an insufficiency in the understanding of "definition" that stems from the philosophical tradition. While Kant does take up the scholastic notion that a definition is fulfilled through the "specification of differences in

[174] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 9.
[175] The term "cognize" stems from Metcalf and Tanzer's translation of Kant's "*erkennen*." The term is appropriate here insofar as Kant is concerned with the recognition of an object (*Gegenstand*). The term is not appropriate when applied to Heidegger, who is primarily concerned with pre-objective experience, but it is useful here insofar as it points to Kant and Heidegger's shared concern with the mode of thought in which definitions are possible. See Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 11.
[176] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 10.

genus and species," Kant designates such a definition as merely a "nominal definition."[177] The "real" definition is not reached through this procedure, but instead by determining what one is grasping from its "first ground [*ersten Grund*]" and according to its "inner possibility [*inneren Möglichkeit*]."[178] It is on the basis of the insufficiency of the traditional understanding of what a definition is and how it is reached (which Heidegger characterizes as a "mere thought technique" of the Middle Ages) that Heidegger justifies his return to the thinker from whom this technique originates , Aristotle.[179]

Heidegger attempts to show that when it comes to the question of conceptuality, Aristotle has "a distinctive position not only within Greek philosophy, but within Western philosophy as a whole."[180] Aristotle's basic concepts are not just basic concepts of Aristotle's philosophy, but basic concepts of western thought in the sense they clear the path for conceptual thought itself. Heidegger sees Aristotle, along with Plato, as the thinkers who stood in opposition to the vital sophistic tendencies of Greek culture in order to be able to articulate a *logos* that can express the being of something; Aristotle reached the point where he "could say that *logos* is *logos ousias*."[181] By looking to Aristotle, Heidegger sees himself as turning toward the origin of western conceptuality and science itself. [182]

[177] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 10.
[178] Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 11.
[179] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 11.
[180] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 5.
[181] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 75.
[182] Thus Heidegger is thrown into a peculiarly circular investigation. Heidegger seeks to gain an understanding of the conceptuality of Aristotle's basic concepts. He is not concerned with the content of these concepts, but with the mode of understanding through which these concepts are understood. But in order to grasp conceptuality itself Heidegger finds that he must first understand Aristotle's conception of what a definition is. To do this, however, Heidegger must work through many of Aristotle's key concepts. Because he seeks a definite conception of what Aristotle means by definition, he is compelled conceive that which Aristotle speaks of when employing concepts. That is to say, Heidegger must first assume and utilize an understanding of Aristotle's conceptuality in order to recover a precise conception of Aristotle's conceptuality. For Heidegger, the circularity of his investigation is not a flaw in his approach. Instead, the circularity is an indication that Heidegger is attempting to uncover something fundamental and self-standing that cannot be brought forth by something else but must be brought forth by itself.

In the context of SS 1924, Heidegger is particularly interested in grasping the everyday mode of Dasein *from which* conceptuality and science were developed by Plato and Aristotle. That is to say, Heidegger seeks to identify Greek Dasein's potential for science as such, along with the movement that brought Greek everydayness to conceptuality. In order to understand the change that precipitates conceptuality in Dasein, Heidegger identifies 3 moments of conceptuality which he will focus on. [183] The first moment that Heidegger will attempt to grasp is "that which is *concretely experienced* in the concept as it is meant."[184] The second moment is the way that which is concretely experienced is *primarily addressed*. The third moment concerns how the phenomenon is brought to intelligibility in accordance with what is already understood—how it is *communicated*. For Heidegger, each one of these three moments has a Dasein correlate. The first moment will ultimately point to a mode of Dasein in which something can be present in such a way that definition and conceptualization are possible. The second moment will point to a particular possibility that Dasein has of addressing that which is before it such that that which before it can be conceived (namely addressing something in terms of its being).The third moment speaks to the way concepts can be expressed such that they can be shared with others.

Ultimately, Heidegger wants to understand how each of these three moments are held together in Dasein's being. He seeks to see how these three modes reside in, and stem from, everyday Dasein. In *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, Heidegger's term for what it means to see each of these moments of conceptuality as expressions of the potential of Dasein is to see these moments in terms of their *Bodenständigkeit*. Though this term is efficiently

[183] Heidegger's interpretation of the three moments of conceptuality is directed toward Aristotle's concept of motion, *kinēsis*. At this early point in the lecture, Heidegger does not indicate why he chooses to focus on motion. To understand the significance of motion in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle and the moments of conceptuality see Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 193.
[184] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,* 12

translated as "indigenous" by Metcalf and Tanzer, I prefer a less wieldy rendering, 'rootedness in the ground.'[185] Heidegger seeks to understand how the moments of conceptuality are rooted in Dasein's everyday mode of being.

It is in this context that Heidegger turns to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in SS 1924. Heidegger tells his listeners that a complete "interpretation of the *Rhetoric* cannot be carried out."[186] Aristotle's *Rhetoric* will be looked at only to grasp how "*logos ousias, horismos,* theoretical speaking with the matter itself, has its ground" in everyday Dasein, as expressed in the Greek expression *zōon logon echon*.[187] Heidegger looks to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to gain an interpretation of Dasein's potential as such. As an interpretation of the "everydayness of being with one another," *Rhetoric* fulfills the task of articulating everydayness as the potential for the mode of being-there that directs itself toward beings in their being. It explicates the living structures that can grow toward the realization of scientific and philosophical existence.

b. *Koinōnia* as Being with One Another

For Heidegger, the key to Aristotle's fulfillment of Plato's guidelines for rhetoric is the investigation and analysis of *logos* itself. Plato, Heidegger says, does not take up the task of developing a rhetoric because of an "exaggeration of dialectic" that itself stems from the fact that Plato did not "did not make *logos* itself thematic" and "penetrate positively into its proper structure," as Aristotle did.[188] By interpreting Aristotle's conception of *koinōnia*, we will begin to understand the way that Aristotle made *logos* thematic according to Heidegger. Aristotle did

[185] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 13.
[186] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 76.
[187] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 76.
[188] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 234.

not only analyze the structures of propositional speech and presentation, he grasped speech in terms of its natural function as essential to the social life of the human being.

Though *koinōnia* will turn out to be a decisive concept for Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Heidegger does not base his interpretation of *koinōnia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* itself. Instead, Heidegger gathers his interpretation from Aristotle's *Politics*, a text not oriented toward the possibilities of persuasion, but toward grasping the best form of human society on the basis of understanding human nature itself. The passage that Heidegger focuses on comes from *Politics*, Bk. I, Ch. 2.

> Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animal is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who she endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association [*koinōnia*] of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. [189]

Here Aristotle seeks to demonstrate that the human is a political animal to a greater degree than other animals. Aristotle's argument is based in the way the Greeks distinguish the being of humans from other animals—their gift of speech. Aristotle precisely articulates what this difference implies. Whereas animals perceive pleasure and pain, and are able to indicate and share this perception with sounds (*phonē*), humans perceive and express good and evil through language. Aristotle tells us that the primary way that humans express good and evil through language is by setting forth (*dēloun*) the expedient and inexpedient and therefore the just and

[189] Aristotle, *Politica*, trans. Benjamin Jowett in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1253a6.

unjust. It is the shared understanding of good and evil as expressed through language that distinguishes human *koinōnia* and allows for the formation of families, villages and the *polis*.

Heidegger's translation of *koinōnia* points to the fact that this concept is grasped in terms of the being of a human, its "*being* with one another."[190] The necessity of *koinōnia* as a feature of the being of the human being is essential to Aristotle's own analysis of various forms of human *koinōnia.* For Aristotle, a human being cannot continue to exist if alone, a point he makes quite sharply when he claims that humans are political animals by nature and that those who are live outside of a city are either above or below humans, beast or god.[191] *Koinōnia* is necessary for humans to continue to be. This point is also made insofar as Aristotle argues that the state has a certain ontic priority over individual human life and lesser associations because the parts of the polis cannot be what they are independent of it, as a hand without a body cannot even function as a hand.[192] The *polis* is especially important in this regard insofar as it is the form of *koinōnia* that allows a human to live as a human. It is distinguished insofar as it is able not only to sustain life, but to allow for the possibility of the good life.

However, by grasping the way *koinōnia* is essential to human being Heidegger's interpretation is not distinctive from those that see *Politics* as a treatise grounded in human nature. For example, if we take a look at an interpretation that Stephen Everson puts forth of the same passage, we see much agreement with Heidegger. Everson, in "Aristotle on the Foundations of the State," attempts to resolve a tension he sees in *Politics* between individual liberty and the authority of the state.[193] Everson resolves this tension by interpreting Aristotle's

[190] *Koinōnia* has been translated as community, association, and partnership by translators of *Politics*. Benjamin Jowett and Carnes Lord translate it as "community," T. A. Sinclair and Joseph Sachs as "association," and H. Rackman as "partnership." See bibliography for full references.
[191] Aristotle, *Politica*, 1253 a 2.
[192] Aristotle, *Politica*, 1253 a 20.
[193] Stephen Everson, "Aristotle on the Foundations of the State," *Political Studies* 36, no. 1 (1988): 89-101. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1988.tb00218.x.

political theory on the basis of Aristotle's account of human nature.[194] Everson argues that the polis is the most self-sufficient community (koinōnia) insofar as, within the polis, the human is not only able to survive, but to survive as a human—as an animal that has logos and can therefore live a moral life.[195] In Everson's interpretation, to understand Aristotle's account of the polis properly, the polis must be understood as that which allows for humans to live well and express their nature.

What is distinctive about Heidegger's interpretation of *koinōnia* is that he understands the necessity of *koinōnia* within human nature as pointing to an *a priori* structure of Dasein. For Heidegger, when Aristotle says that the "power of language is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient" Aristotle points to that which is present there for Dasein as such. As a being who has *logos*, the human being is being to whom good and evil are visible, present primarily and predominantly in the appearance of that which is expedient or inexpedient toward a desired end. Because every desired end is ultimately grounded in the final end, happiness, and because happiness is grasped by Aristotle as a mode of living that expresses the particular virtues of the human as such, language is itself ultimately directed toward revealing that which is significant toward bringing about a certain mode of living, the mode in which the particular capabilities that distinguish a human, its virtues, are brought into activity.[196] That is to say, language ultimately reveals what is present in relation to one own being—what one seeks to be.

Taking up Heidegger's language, Aristotle's account of the natural function of language points to what Heidegger calls the 'world'. The type of entities that are primarily revealed by

[194] "In this article I shall try to show how Aristotle's political theory is developed from a particular account of human nature and that when this development is understood, his views on the scope of the authority of the state become themselves more comprehensible." (Everson, "Aristotle Foundations of State," 90.)
[195] Everson, "Aristotle Foundations of State," 94-95.
[196] The notion that happiness stems from the work particular to the human being as such grounds Aristotle's investigation in *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1097b23.

language are entities understood in terms of their significance for use—what Heidegger calls equipment. That which these entities are significant for is Dasein itself—one's own being which appears as that 'for the sake of which' that which entities are taken up in use. In this context, *koinōnia*, refers to the sharing of the world. It refers to a mode of having the world before you such that what appears is not only useful for 'me'—but for anyone and everyone.

Implied by Heidegger's understanding *koinōnia* is the idea that it is the capacity to share an understanding of significance of entities—of their expediency toward an end—that is essential for human preservation through social life. This may seem like a dubious interpretation of *koinōnia*. One might respond that what is essential is not shared understanding but shared work—ideas alone will not produce food or shelter. However, even the possibility of sharing labor in such a way that is beneficial requires shared understanding. This can be seen if we look at the concept of a 'product of labor'. In Plato's *Republic* we see a similar orientation toward the principle of the formation of communities to that which we find in Aristotle; the simplest form of society reflects the basic need to maintain life by meeting basic needs such as shelter, clothing and food.[197] Socrates suggests that people are able to remedy the difficulty of surviving on one's own insofar as labor is divided. With different citizens focusing on different types of production, the needs of a city will be more adequately and efficiently met.[198] However, for this exchange and sharing of the products of labor to be possible, a more basic type of sharing must already be present, namely a shared understanding of that end toward which the product is useful, its expediency. Were it the case that humans had a tendency not to share an understanding of what these tools are useful for—then the products of the laborers would cease to be useful insofar as the potential users would be just as likely to try to eat an article of clothing than wear it, or burn a

[197] Plato, *Republic*, 369e.
[198] Plato, *Republic*, 370a-d.

house for heat rather than reside in it. For a product of labor to be something that can be taken up and used by others to sustain life, potential users must come to share an understanding of how this product is to be taken up and used.

For Heidegger, interpreting Aristotle's account of the natural function of language as pointing to Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' preserves an aspect of Aristotle's work that tends to be obscured by modern interpretations. Heidegger claims that when Aristotle says that animals, capable of *phōnē*, perceive pleasure and pain, and that humans, capable of *logos*, reveal the expedient and inexpedient, we are inclined to think that Aristotle presents a modern idea, that the human and animal see reality from a different "point of view [*Aspekt*]." [199] The mistake, for Heidegger, is to think that Aristotle is speaking about a mode of apprehending entities [*Auffassungsweise*]. Heidegger believes that this mistake stems from the tendency of interpreters to project the subject/object paradigm onto Aristotle. Insofar as one assumes that humans primarily and predominantly encounter objects, then any "value" attributed to that object is taken as a mere subjective point of view. Understood in this way, expediency or inexpediency are not primarily what is present before a subject, but secondary designations that may or may not be attributed to the object that initially presents itself.

For Heidegger, Aristotle's claim that animal *phōnē* reveals the pleasurable and painful, and that *logos* reveals the conducive and non-conducive, indicates what primarily and predominantly appears to animals and humans, in the way that these things appear. [200] What is primarily there for an animal is not an object that is associated with pain or pleasure—but the pleasure or pain itself appearing in this way or that. Likewise for humans, one does not first encounter objects that take on meaningful designations, but entities already understood in terms

[199] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 40.
[200] As William Mcneill points out, in SS 1924 the term 'being-in-the-world' applies to all animal life and not just human Dasein. See McNeill, *The Time of Life*, 79.

of their utility. *Logos* is *logos kata tinos*—it reveals something as something. The 'as something' refers to that which is understood as being useful in this way or that. One encounters a 'chair', a 'stick', a 'book', or a 'table'. Heidegger justifies his claim that entities are primarily understood in terms of their utility for the Greeks by pointing out the way the Greeks speak of 'things.' *Pragmata* and *krēmata*, Greek words for things, refer to beings insofar as one is concerned with them, insofar as one uses them.[201] Heidegger articulates the identification of the expedient (*sumpheronta*) with what is itself perceived in the following way. "The stick that I take in hand, the hat that I put on, are *sumpheronta*. The stick is not primarily a piece of wood, or some such thing, but a stick."[202] Likewise, animal life has the type of soul primarily distinguished by its responsiveness to that which is able to bring about pleasure or pain, e.g. "a favorable feeding place and not a symphony."[203] Here we have a reversal of ontological status that also characterized Heidegger's analysis in *Being and Time*. The primary beings are not objects to which values are attributed, but equipment, entities defined by their significance.

Just as Heidegger sees the basic modes of perception of animals and humans (*phōnē* and *logos*) as indications of Dasein's structure, he also sees the necessity of *koinōnia* in human nature as an indication of an *a priori* structure of Dasein. For Heidegger, the possibility of explicitly sharing an understanding that an entity is expedient in this way or that—of being with one another, itself points to an underlying *a priori* structure of Dasein that allows for this possibility—what Heidegger calls 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). One must grasp the expediency or inexpediency of a tool as something that is there publicly, available for others as well. One can only share the view that something is expedient if it can also be taken up and used by another as

[201] "It is no accident that the Greek designation for the things that they first encounter is *pragmata*, 'beings with which one constantly has to do,' and *krēmata*, 'what is taken in use.'" Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 19.
[202] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 42.
[203] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 39.

well—if movement that uses something is something available to others as well. For Heidegger it is this shared understanding of that which can be taken up into use by myself and others that allows for the possibilities of *koinōnia* that occur the various forms—family, village, and *polis*.

i. Listening to Oneself: The *Koinōnia* of *Logos* and Desire

Heidegger sharpens his interpretation of how that which is present before human beings (the world) already entails *koinōnia* by looking at how *koinōnia* can occur when one is alone. In Bk. I, Ch. 13 of *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle discusses the possibility of speaking to oneself. There, Aristotle divides the soul into rational (*logon echon*) and irrational (*alogon*) parts. The irrational part is further divided into a part that does and a part that does not share in reason (*koiōnei logou*). As Aristotle says "the appetitive, and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it [*logos*], in so far as it listens to and obeys it," it is "persuaded by a rational principle."[204] From this quotation we can see that speaking and listening, and *koinōnia* and persuasion, occur not only among people but between parts of the soul, parts identified as have being an active principle of *logos* – a speaker, or a passive recipient – a listener. Here the rational part is identified in partaking in persuasion, self-persuasion. The rational part of the soul persuades in many ways, such as admonishment, rebuke, and exhortation.[205] In each case, persuasion and *koinōnia* are identified; for the irrational part to be compelled it must share in the speech provided by the rational part.

For Heidegger this implies something important about how the world appears before human beings insofar as they are speaking beings. He says "The human being is not only a speaker and a hearer, but is for itself such a being that *hears itself*. Speaking, as self-expression-

[204] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea,* 1102b30.
[205] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea,* 1103a1.

about-something [*Sichausprechen-über-etwas*], is at the same time a speaking-to-oneself [*Zu-sich-selbst-Sprechen*]. Therefore, the definition of *logon echon* further contains in itself that the human being also has *logos* in the mode of *hearing this, its own speaking*."[206] As a speaking being a human being is also necessarily a listening being—it hears itself speak. It is a being that itself shares in *logos*, both speaking and listening. Here Heidegger is expressing the view that *logos* is, in itself, communication for the Greeks.

Heidegger seeks support for this view from *Rhetoric*, the text which he believes fully explores everyday *koinōnia*. In *Rhetoric* Aristotle defines *logos* as being composed out of three parts, the speaker, that which the speak is about, and the spoken to, namely the listener.[207] The last of these, the listener, is the *telos* of speech. Speech is directed toward altering the judgment (*kriseos*) of the listener. [208] For Heidegger, this is evidence that when the Greeks spoke of *logos* they understood it as communication.[209] For *logos* to be what it is, it must reach a listener. However, as Aristotle has made clear, the listener is not necessarily another person, per se, but the desiring part of the soul that is able to share in *logos*. The two parts of the soul share in logos insofar as the rational part is able to lead the desiring part with words—to persuade. In this way speech that fulfills its end and is heard is already communication and persuasion—it is speech that leads the soul.

Taking up Heidegger's interpretation, Aristotle's grasp of the fulfillment of *logos* as the sharing and of rational and irrational parts of the soul points to a basic feature of how the world

---

[206] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 72.
[207] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts in *Basic Works of Aristotle* 1358a35. Throughout the interpretation of Aristotle's rhetoric the Loeb edition (Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric,* trans. J. H. Freese in *Aristotle XXII*, Loeb Classical Library, [Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1926.]) is also used. Because the *Basic Works* text of Aristotle uses standard Bekker line numbers and the Loeb edition does not, I tend to use this translation for ease of referral unless I intend to emphasize Greek words or phrases, in which case I will use the Loeb. This choice does not reflect a preference for the Roberts translation.
[208] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1377b20.
[209] Heidegger says "Therein lies the fact that speaking is *communication* [*Mitteilung*]." (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 84.

is there for Dasein. That which appears before humans by means of *logos* (primarily the expedient and inexpedient) must be understood as that which has the potential to lead the soul. This leading comes about when the speaking part of the soul and the desiring part of the soul share that which appears. This sharing occurs when the expedient becomes explicit as such. *Logos* channels desire. It reveals how an action that corresponds to an entity, say hammering, can be desirable in a secondary sense, even if I do not want to hammer for its own sake.

Understood as the sharing of something by the desiring and rational parts of the human soul, *koinōnia* refers to a fundamental possibility of human existence—the possibility of being led by that which appears through language. From Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, it becomes clear that this leading is not accidental to language, but essential to its natural function of presenting the expedient and just. This basic aspect of the world—its potential to draw us toward or away from bringing that which appears before us into activity, itself allows for the human sociality. It is only insofar as human motion can be led by words—by something that is not immediately desirable but comes to appear so through language—that humans can have the type of social existence that they have. The fixed ways of grasping how products of nature and of labor can be taken up into action allows for us to share the world in the distinctive way humans do. This in turn allows for coordinated action toward desired ends that are shared among humans.

iii. *Koinōnia* and Rhetoric

In the passage from Aristotle's *Politics* quoted above, there is an important link to rhetoric. Aristotle tells us that language has the natural function of revealing the "expedient and inexpedient," and therefore the "just and unjust" and the like. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* he will identify political and judicial rhetoric as speech ultimately concerned with persuading a listener

that an action is conducive/unconducive or just/unjust. Because Aristotle identifies the persuasive intent of rhetoric with the essential elements of human *koinōnia,* Aristotle is in effect grounding rhetoric in politics—defining rhetorical communication as part and parcel of the formation of the particular type of partnership that occurs for human beings as such.[210]

By grounding rhetoric in politics and the fulfillment of human life as expressed in the *polis,* Aristotle also maintains the basic orientation for rhetoric that we saw in both in the Greek sophists and in Plato. Rhetoric is understood as useful for bringing about the fulfilled expression of human life—what Heidegger calls authentic Dasein. Aristotle differs from Plato and Sophists insofar as he explicitly recognizes this fulfillment as the realization of the social potential of human beings. Rhetoric is not equal to politics, which grasps the true ends of civil society and the discerns the means to bringing these ends about, but it remains useful in order to persuade those who are not capable of learning what true politics has to teach. This persuasion can be used in order to bring these citizens to share an orientation toward which actions are and are not expedient and just in such a way they come to partake in the best possible *polis*—the one that most adequately expresses human life as such.

However by focusing on the natural role *logos* plays in sustaining human life as such, Aristotle provides a sharper grasp of what Plato sought—namely how it is that language is able to lead the soul. As Plato has already determined, persuasion means appealing to the desire of the listener with speech. By focusing on what actually becomes present through speech itself, Aristotle is able to more precisely identify how persuasion occurs. The persuasiveness of speech is not an accidental property, but points to speech's basic function. *Logos* has a natural tendency

[210] The view that rhetoric was crucial to the foundation of society has a significant place in the rhetorical tradition. Cicero, for example, claims that the formation of civil society required the rhetorical skill of a wise man in order to coordinate the various skills of scattered people into a unified whole. (Cicero, *On Invention,* trans. H. M. Hubbell in *Cicero: On Invention, The Best Kind of Orator, Topics*, Loeb Classical Library N. 386, [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949] Bk. I, Ch. 2.)

to express the expedient and inexpedient. In doing so it presents something that already speaks to desires, desires mediated by *logos.* A particular action is expedient if it efficiently leads to the realization of a desired end. Speech shows how actions that are not themselves desirable can become choice-worthy insofar as they lead to what we seek. Persuasion and *koinōnia* are realized when a listener comes to explicitly see that an action has the power to lead one where one wants to go.

c. Practical and Non-Scientific: The Everydayness of Rhetorical *Koinōnia*

Rhetoric is concerned with producing a *koinōnia* between speaker and listener. However, as Aristotle makes clear, not every form of communicative persuasion falls under the domain of rhetoric. Aristotle defines rhetorical speech as both practical (concerned with action) and non-scientific. Together these designations point to what Heidegger calls 'everydayness'. Unlike *koinōnia*, everydayness is not a direct translation of any of Aristotle's key concepts.[211] It is most closely aligned with Aristotle's concept *doxa*. In chapter 1, the peculiar momentum and dominion of unquestioned conformity to expectation highlighted one important feature of everyday *doxa*. This section will focus on the way that everyday *doxa* entails a limited view of that which is spoken about and why this limited view is sufficient in the rhetorical context.

Like other kinds of demonstration, rhetorical argument must begin with something that the listener is already convinced of. Rhetoric, like dialectic, must be prepared to speak about matters "within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science."[212] To do so, the

[211] It is possible that Heidegger's use of the term "everydayness" stems from an interpretation of a word used in *Politics*. Speaking of the *koinōnia* of the household, Aristotle says that it is constituted on the basis of "everyday wants," *hēmeran*. Daily needs refer to needs that satisfy basic animal needs (shelter, food etc.) and that are universal insofar as they allow for the maintenance of the animal soul. Supplying daily wants governs the formation and order of less developed forms of political community—the household and village (Aristotle, *Politica*, 1252b12).
[212] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1354a 3.

rhetorician will begin their argument with more or less general topics (*topoi*). Topics furnish syllogisms and inductions that are not proper to the subject matter spoken of, but can be applied to many types of things.[213] Aristotle notes however that it is possible that a rhetorician could stumble upon the basic axioms proper to a particular science. For Aristotle, as soon as this happens, rhetorical speech ceases and scientific demonstration begins. Aristotle argues that if a rhetorician succeeds in "stating required principles" of a science, "one's science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong."[214]

For Aristotle, a scientific demonstration differs from demonstration based in opinion insofar as scientific knowledge ultimately begins with a definition, which grasps what is primary and true about the subject whereas demonstration based in opinion also "apprehends these attributes as inhering in their subjects, but not in virtue of the subject's substance and essential nature."[215] That is to say, scientific demonstration grounds the properties of what is discussed in its being—discerning essential properties from accidental ones, determining what is necessary for the subject to continue to be what it is. But argument based on opinion cannot see the being of something as an ultimate explanatory cause—it does not discern how the subject spoken about must *be* in order to continue being what it is and therefore cannot make necessary arguments. Opinion and its object are ultimately "unstable" for Aristotle, so the conclusions that stem from it are capable of being otherwise.[216]

In grasping rhetorical speech as fundamentally incapable of scientific demonstration, Aristotle takes up a delamination of rhetoric previously found in Plato. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates leads Gorgias to the conclusion that rhetorical persuasion is distinct from the type of persuasion

[213] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a10.
[214] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1357a 25.
[215] Aristotle, *Analytics Posteriora*, trans. G. R. G. Mure in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, (new York: Random House, 1941), 89a17.
[216] Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, 89a5.

that occurs in teaching insofar as the results are different. Persuasion that occurs in learning (*mathēsis*) results in knowledge—which cannot be true and false, only true.[217] Persuasion that results in conviction (*pistis*), on the other hand, is always open to question and can always be either true or false. In both cases a certain *koinōnia* can occur between speaker and listener, but the stability and necessity of what is shared in wholly different. That which rhetorical speech leads one to believe is always essentially dubious, even if it does not appear that way.

By defining rhetorical demonstration as proof that is not based on a grasp of the being that one is speaking about and as what is therefore fundamentally open to revision, rhetorical speech has thus far been defined negatively. It is speech that addresses a listener insofar as that listener does not have knowledge and is not ready to follow a scientific demonstration.[218] It is speech that presents what it speaks about in a way that is fundamentally hazy and unclear. However, Heidegger also sees Aristotle as providing a positive description of that which is presented in everyday rhetorical speech through his articulation of one of the two topics that applies to all rhetorical argument—the 'more or less'.[219] For Heidegger, this rhetorical topic stems primarily from the fact that opinion, which is still essentially directed toward truth even though it does not achieve it, reveals the being of that which is spoken about to a greater or lesser degree. Because rhetorical speech addresses a listener who sees things in their being only to some degree, predicates attributed to that which is spoken about are not necessary and absolute but applied to a matter of degree. What is shared is a partial view of the being of something and the way that it is—but a partial view that is oriented toward revealing the being itself.

In remaining in the realm of belief, rhetorical *koinōnia* shares something essential with dialectic as Aristotle understands it. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic produces speech that stems

[217] Plato, *Gorgias*, 454d.
[218] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1355a23.
[219] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a10; 1359a23.

from any particular form of knowledge. Both are described as faculties (*dunamei*) for discovering arguments in general. Both operate exclusively in the realm of opinion. But dialectic is distinguished from rhetoric by the particular way that speaker and listener must be disposed toward the opinions that are brought forth. Dialectical conversation works *through* opinion in order to see the truth more clearly, rhetoric is essentially practical. The rhetorical audience is not primarily concerned with seeing the truth, per se, but with seeing whether an action or actor is good or not. Ultimately, the *koinōnia* of rhetorical speech is about sharing a view of what should have been done, what should be done, and what disposition toward action is best and worst. In each case, rhetoric is directed not toward seeing something but toward doing something. Should we perform this action for this end? Should we punish this person for this action? Should we praise or blame this actor for his ethical disposition? Dialectic is oriented toward seeing, rhetoric toward doing.

One might assume that insofar as an argument is concerned with action, its conclusions can never be necessary. Indeed, as Aristotle makes clear in *Rhetoric*, insofar as rhetoric concerns action it concerns that which can be otherwise. That which can be otherwise is by definition that which is not necessary.[220] However, Aristotle does allow for the possibility of necessary action saying "*most* of the things about which we make decisions…present us with alternative possibilities" and that "*hardly any*" of our actions "are determined by necessity."[221] Indeed, there is a sense in which actions can be necessary. If an artisan determines that a chair must have certain properties to *be* a good chair, then it becomes necessary that certain actions take place in order to best realize the form guiding the production. Likewise if one is able to precisely grasp the end of all human life, happiness, then certain actions may be necessary in order to achieve it.

[220] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1357a25.
[221] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1367a25.

This is the case insofar as Aristotle conceives of *technai* as forms of knowledge, wherein one is guided by the conception of an idea that acts as a *telos*, whether the end is production (as in the case of house building) or whether the end it action itself (as in the case of ethics and politics).

Rhetorical communication and persuasion are ill suited to reveal the necessity of an action because the rhetorical audience is not interested in grasping that which rhetoric is truly concerned with—namely the end of human life, justice, and the noble. The audience does not want to see these *as such* or is incapable of grasping them. Yet the audience does want to see these *enough* to be able to discern what to do in *this* particular case. What justice is cannot be entirely obscured to the juror who claims that the defendant acted unjustly, but the juror does not need to see justice itself either. Justice only needs to be seen more or less. If the jury is not able to easily form an opinion on the basis of existing belief, then the rhetorician may need to present a partial idea of justice to the listener. But in cases where people have already formed opinions about whether an action is just, the question of what justice is can be ignored entirely. The rhetorician only needs to show that the action is of the kind that accords with a pre-existing belief regarding justice.

With this last point in mind, we can gather together a preliminary view of the everyday *koinōnia* that rhetoric seeks. Rhetorical speech is concerned with revealing the world as that which speaks to our desires and has the potential to call us into action. But it does so within the shroud of belief. The listener is not concerned with grasping what must be done in order to reach the ultimate goal of an individual person or of a polis, but only with revealing and actor or action to the degree that a preliminary belief can settle in. This belief does not need to be beyond doubt; it only needs to be clear enough to take action. The rhetorician does not need to build a

permanent structure, only one that is stable enough to hold the conviction of the listener as she moves across it here and now.

d. Rhetoric as the Hermeneutic of the Everydayness of Being with One Another

The last section explored how Heidegger's phrase the "everydayness of being with one another" maps onto Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. For Heidegger, being with one another refers to the goal of rhetoric (communication, persuasion) grasped as an expression of human nature's basic urge to fulfill its potential within the *polis*. Everydayness refers to the domain of rhetorical speech. Heidegger sees everydayness as a mode of speaking and therefore perceiving—a mode of Dasein—that is limited by *doxa* and ruled by practical desires. In this section we will turn to the particular content of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* itself in order to grasp the sense in which this text can be understood as a hermeneutic—an interpretation of the *a priori* structures—of the everydayness of being with one another.

The first two books of *Rhetoric* are governed by two triadic divisions: the three types of rhetorical speech (political, judicial, and epideictic) and the three sources of persuasion—the *pisteis* (*ethos, pathos, logos*). [222] I will demonstrate that these two triads are fleshed out as the concretion of Aristotle's grasp of the structure of *logos* and of the motion of the soul as applied to the operation of daily speech and life. In Aristotle's determination of the three types of rhetorical speech, we will see Aristotle as providing a rich and developed account of what Heidegger calls 'the world'—one that incorporates temporality as a guiding principle. In

[222] The first two books of *Rhetoric* can be outlined in the following way. After distinguishing his art of rhetoric from the extant *technē* (Bk. I, Ch. 1), Aristotle defines rhetoric and clarifies the means of persuasion that the art is concerned with (Bk. I, Ch. 2) and the three kinds of rhetoric (Bk. I, Ch. 2) Aristotle proceeds to fill the rest of Bk I with an elaboration of the topics that each type of speech is concerned with (deliberative, Chs. 4-8; Epideictic, Ch. 9; forensic, Chs. 10-15). Book II is devoted to an elaboration of the three *pisteis* (*pathos* in Chs. 2-11, *ethos* in Chs. 12-17, and *logos* in Chs. 18-26).

Aristotle's discussion of the three *pisteis*, we will see how Aristotle provides a more precise description of the possibility of the soul's movement through speech than is found in Plato's *Phaedrus*.

i. Logos and the Laying out of *Koinōnia*

On a first read, Aristotle's account of the types of rhetorical speech is tidy and plausible enough that one could pass by without questioning how Aristotle has reached such a decisive account. In the course a few paragraphs Aristotle determines the number of types of rhetorical speech (3), what each speaks about (action and character) and what each attempts to prove about that which it speaks about (expediency, justice, and nobility).[223] Aristotle clarifies that each type of rhetorical speech is capable in moving in two directions, either proving the positive (expedient, just, noble) or the negative (inexpedient, unjust, and ignoble). Though Aristotle's three types of speech are clearly identifiable with institutions present in Athenian life, Aristotle does not see himself as describing Athenian rhetoric, but as identifying necessary divisions of rhetorical speech itself.[224]

After surveying Aristotle's tidy scheme, one might raise the following question. On what basis can Aristotle claim to have discovered universal features of rhetoric itself? As mentioned above, Heidegger claims that Aristotle is able to surpass Plato and the prior rhetorical tradition in "carrying out" the proper reflection on rhetoric because "Aristotle has at his disposal the right concrete view and cultivated conceptuality of *legein* itself, and for all phenomena that come to

[223] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a35-1358b30.
[224] Political speech appears to map onto the type of speech that occurred in the Assembly; judicial speech maps onto the Athenian Courts, and epideictic speech maps onto the displays of oratorical ability put on by sophists. Aristotle, however, does not speak of rhetoric as it occurs in Athens, but of rhetoric in general. See Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a2.

language therewith."[225] Heidegger's claim provides a clue for how Aristotle is able to obtain fixed and necessary divisions of rhetorical speech. The categories that Aristotle concretely applies to practical, everyday speech in *Rhetoric* are already present in Aristotle's study of *logos*, *On Interpretation* (*Peri Hermēneias*).[226]

In *On Interpretation*, Aristotle is especially concerned with defining propositional speech (*logos apophantikos*). As a form of speech, propositions consist of meaningful sounds (*phonē sēmantikē*). That is to say, the sounds that constitute spoken propositions refer to, and call forth, ways that the soul has been affected and altered by the world (*pathēmata tēs psuchēs*). [227] However, propositional speech is not distinguished insofar as the sounds or written words of which it consists bring impressions to mind for a listener but insofar as this speech affirms or denies that something is this or that.[228] Propositional speech reveals something in this way or that or covers over something by presenting something else; it is true and false.[229] Propositions are able to affirm or deny that which is spoken about insofar as they contain verbs. Verbs contain the temporal possibility of speech. One can say that the subject is, will be, or was this or that. Taking these aspects together, Aristotle defines the proposition in its simple form as a "statement possessing meaning (*phonē semantikē*) affirming or denying the presence of some other thing in a subject (*peri tou huparchein ti ē mē huparchein*) in time past present or future (*hōs hoi kronoi diērēntai*).[230]

Returning to *Rhetoric*, one can see how the necessary structures of propositional *logos* that Aristotle discerns in *On Interpretation* play out in *Rhetoric*. Rhetoric, which is concerned

[225] Heidegger, *Basics Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 78.
[226] Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, trans. H. P. Cooke in *Aristotle I: The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*, Loeb Classical Library N. 325, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938).
[227] Aristotle, *On Interpretation* (Loeb), 16a3.
[228] Aristotle, *On Interpretation* (Loeb), 17a1.
[229] Aristotle, *On Interpretation* (Loeb), 17a3.
[230] Aristotle, *On Interpretation* (Loeb), 17a23.

with affirming and denying and truth and falsity, consists of propositional speech. Insofar as propositions necessarily contain verbs, three possibilities of speech are implied—speech directed toward the past, present, and future. For Aristotle, this distinction is the first decisive way that he divides the possibilities of rhetorical speech. The listener, in whom the *telos* of speech resides, must judge either about things past and future, taking up the role of a judge (*kritēn*) or be a spectator (*theōros*) about things presently occurring.[231] Each type of speech has its own way of affirming or denying. Political speech turns a listener toward or away (*protropē, apotropē*) from a future action. Judicial speech is either accusatory or defensive (*katēgoria*, *apologia*) concerning actions performed by someone on trial. Epideictic speech has the task showing forth or making present (*epideixis*) the character of a person in a way that elicits praise or blame. [232] Thus the three forms of rhetorical speech and the positive or negative way that each can express themselves are based not in Athenian culture but in Aristotle's grasp of *logos* itself.

Aristotle's conception of rhetorical speech is not only determined by the structure of propositional speech but also by what rhetoric essentially addresses, namely the significance of action for how one lives. As Aristotle suggests in *Politics*, the power of *logos* is primarily to reveal the significance of an action for the sake of a future end.[233] To reveal something's significance is to reveal the *sumpheron*, a potential action as that which will bring this future end with it.[234] However, it is also possible for *logos* to reveal the significance of action in other temporal modes. Rhetorical speech can also address past action. This action is not revealed as that which may be taken up in order to bring about an end—past actions are impossible to do or undo. However an action in the past can still show itself as good or bad in the sense that it does

[231] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* (Loeb), Bk. I, Ch. 3, 2.
[232] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* (Loeb), Bk. I, ch.3 , 3.
[233] Aristotle, *Politica*, 1253a10. This was discussed above.
[234] Kennedy claims that the literal meaning of the *sumpheron* refers to that which brings advantage with it. (Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric*, 49 ftn. 81.)

or does not accord with the principle that determines whether it should have been done or not—namely the law.[235] In this way, past action appears to be good or bad insofar as it is just or unjust. Rhetorical speech can also reveal actions as good or bad insofar as they appear presently. It does so in peculiar way. In the present mode, action is grasped not as occurring action—as the movement that the human takes up right now. Instead, in the present mode action is grasped as the potential to act in a certain way. Someone who tends to act in a certain way is understood to be this or that type of person, to have a certain character (*ethos*).

Aristotle clarifies the connection between action and character in the *Nicomachean Ethics.* For Aristotle, ethics and politics are not concerned with action insofar as an action is directed toward producing an independent work (*erga*) but insofar as it is capable of bringing about a way acting itself (*praxis*). Ultimately, Aristotle will understand the activity toward which human beings are directed (happiness) as a mode of acting in accordance with the particular virtues of human being. For Aristotle the task of ethics is not to cultivate theoretical knowledge, but to become good.[236] To become good is to develop the proper disposition in an actor such that they are disposed to exhibit the particular excellence(s) of human beings. Speaking both of the virtues of character and of the intellect, Aristotle grasps these dispositions as *hexeis*.[237] A *hexis* is stable state wherein the soul is arranged in in such a way that it is disposed to act and move in this way or that way.[238] Ethics and politics are concerned with developing virtuous *hexeis* of individuals and citizens.

---

[235] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1368b7.
[236] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1103b27.
[237] This term has been translated in several different ways, including "disposition" (Rackman), "state of character" (Ross), and "active condition" (Sachs). For a discussion of this term and its translation, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 2002), xi.
[238] Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, trans. W. D. Ross in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1022b10.

As mentioned above, Aristotle divides the soul in rational and irrational parts. The irrational part is further divided into a part that is capable of listening to reason and a part that is not.[239] In *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle develops a rich account of the virtues of the parts of the soul with the rational principle and the part capable of listening to reason. The rhetorician is concerned with leading the soul, and thereby with the part of the soul that is capable of listening to reason. The virtues of this part of the soul—the desiring part capable of listening to reason—are called ethical (*ethikē*) virtues. When discussing how ethical virtues can be produced, Aristotle notes the peculiar circular causal relationship between actions and character. A person who has a certain character will tend to act in ways that accord with that character. Their character is, in a sense, a cause of action. However, ethical virtues must first be produced through action. Aristotle tells us that in this case, the natural process whereby the potential (*dunamis*) must come before and allow for certain activities, is reversed in one sense.[240] Ethical activities themselves allow for the development of ethical potential—of ethical virtues.[241] For Aristotle, action and character each produce each other, albeit in different senses.

Turning back to *Rhetoric*, one can see how this fundamental relationship between action and character (*ethos*) is present in each type of rhetorical speech. In both political and judicial speech action is the focus, but the discussion of character is also implied. In political speech the question of the expediency of an action ultimately aims at the highest end, happiness.[242] For Aristotle, happiness means action in accordance with virtue. Thus while action is what is directly spoken about, character, understood as that which determines a human's way of being, is what this speech is directed toward. In political speech the way that an actor is disposed toward the

[239] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1102a25.
[240] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1103a25.
[241] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1103a33.
[242] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1360b5.

world is futural—it appears as something to be brought about by action. In judicial speech the concern is to determine whether an action was just or unjust. To do so, the judge must determine whether an action voluntarily occurred. This question depends on the *hexis* and desire of the actor, along with the circumstances.[243] The judge must determine whether the actor broke the law due to vice or lack of self-control.[244] In doing so, the judge must look through a particular action to see the underlying character that determined it. Unlike political rhetoric, however, character is grasped as prior to the action and as a cause of it—it appears as something that comes before the action. In epideictic rhetoric, the actor is exhibited in her tendency to act in certain ways that are praiseworthy or blameworthy. The listener has the task of grasping the virtues and vices that constitute the character of the actor as it appears right now. To do so, the speaker must argue that actions are (or are not) signs of character, whether those actions occurred in the past or are likely to occur in the future.[245] Thus in epideictic speech we see the same causal relationship of action and character that we find in the other forms of rhetorical speech. The difference is that epideictic rhetoric speaks of the character of the actor as something present, whereas political rhetoric speaks of it as something futural and judicial rhetoric speaks of it as something in the past.

Taking up Heidegger's interpretive orientation, Aristotle's 3 types of rhetorical speech can be understood as the three different temporal modes through which one moves through the world. For Heidegger the world refers to entities defined insofar as they point toward Dasein itself—they are for the sake of Dasein. These entities are understood in terms of their possibility

[243] "All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving." (Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1369a1.)
[244] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1368b13.
[245] Aristotle tells us that achievments are praised in encomium for their own sake but insofar as they indicate virtue. "Achievements, are in fact, signs of moral habit (*hexeōs*). However, a man who has not yet accrued achievements can still be praised, "for we should praise even a man who had not achieved anything, if we felt confident that he was likely to do so." (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* (Loeb), Bk. I, Ch. 9, 33.)

to be taken up and used. Rhetoric is primarily concerned with actions insofar as they point to the possibility of Dasein being in the world in a good way—of Dasein having the proper disposition in action. In political rhetoric, the mode of being that Dasein seeks is to be gained through action. The entities appear as that which is to be taken up. In judicial rhetoric the world appears differently. It still points to Dasein but not as what is to come but instead as the result. What is there and how it is there refers to what has been done. What has been done is itself grasped in terms of the disposition of Dasein. Was it done in the right way or not? Lastly there is the possibility that Dasein's disposition can itself come to presence as such—that one can grasp actions in the past and future as what makes one's current disposition. In this type of speech one's way of being is itself the focus directly, now.

Each of these types of speech can achieve *koinōnia* insofar as each can come to presence in such a way that the desiring part of the soul is struck by the rational part. This occurs most evidently in political rhetoric, wherein one comes to see that this or that action should or should not be taken up in order to realize one's ends. However in judicial rhetoric one can also be struck by reflecting on past action. With hindsight one can come to see that an action was or was not right, should or should not have been done. In epideictic rhetoric the results of the actions that form one's character or indicate it are revealed and recognized publicly. One confronts the question of whether oneself or another stands in the right way to matters. One therefore implicitly takes up the question of the ideal way to be—what is the beautiful and noble way that we should try to attain?

However, insofar as *Rhetoric* remains within the realm of everyday speech the mode of Dasein toward which rhetorical speech is directed itself remains obscured. In each type of speech, Aristotle sees rhetoric as oriented toward an obscure and not fully realized ideal. In reference to

political rhetoric, Aristotle does not assume that the true definition of happiness is what will lead the listener. Instead he provides a set of common opinions about happiness to which "pretty well everyone agrees."[246] The clear conception of the realization of human potential cannot lead the person who listens to rhetorical speech, only their unclear opinions about happiness. Likewise, judgments in judicial rhetoric are not primarily governed by whether actions conform to ideal laws, but whether they conform to whatever laws an individual state happens to adopt—laws that may be unjust.[247] Epideictic rhetoric seeks to display the noble and its opposite. The noble is what is both good and pleasant.[248] The life that exhibits nobility to the highest degree in *Nicomachean Ethics* will turn out to be the life of wisdom. However, rhetoric does not limit itself to praising or blaming only those who purely exhibit the ideal of nobility or it's opposite. The rhetorician generally speaks of those about whom there is some controversy (e.g. Helen of Troy)—someone who is 'more or less' noble.

Thus in the everyday possibilities of *koinōnia* that Aristotle is able to elaborate on the basis of his grasp of the temporal structure of *logos*, we can see a continual orientation toward that which remains concealed, human being in the mode that exhibits its being—what Heidegger calls existence. Even if the rhetorician did have knowledge of happiness, justice, and nobility—of the possibility of a mode of human life that fulfills its potential—the audience would not be able to hear it. Their concern is not to see, but quickly determine whether an action or person is good enough for action, or punishment, or praise. The rhetorician is confined by the concealed but still operative grasp of human fulfillment that the listener has. She must endow an action or an actor's character with that which easily and quickly appears expedient, just, or noble to the listener. The three temporal possibilities of rhetorical speech—past, present, and future—allow

[246] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1360b14.
[247] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1368b6.
[248] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1366a33.

for three ways that the listener connection between action to character—between world and Dasein—can be forged.

ii. The Three *Pisteis*

In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that speech (*ho logos*) is composed out of three parts: the speaker, that which is spoken about, and the listener.[249] Aristotle defines *logos* in reference to its end—namely being heard by a listener in such a way that this hearing determines the view that the listener has. Like a knife incapable of cutting, speech that is not heard and does not present something to the listener is only speech in name. As mentioned above, for Heidegger Aristotle's identification of the *telos* of speech with the listener expresses a basic aspect of speech. In itself, speech is communication.

In Aristotle's grasp of the three components of speech, one can see him taking up and refining Plato's grasp of communication and persuasion as forms of movement of the soul. In Book III of *Physics,* Aristotle argues that motion entails three elements. There is that which is capable of moving, that which is capable of being moved, and the shared actualization of both of potencies—the motion itself.[250] Likewise in *logos* there is the active element that is capable of moving (the speaker), the passive element capable of being moved (the listener), and the shared realization of these potencies insofar as speech functions to bring something forth (*dēloun*) in such a way that it is shared (*koinōnia*) by the speaker and listener. In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle focuses on speech that is realized by the development of a conviction (*pistis*) in the listener.

For Aristotle, none of the elements of that allow for the motion of speech are entirely simple. That is to say, is not the case that as soon as the agent with the potential to speak makes

[249] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a39.
[250] Aristotle, *Physica*, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 202a12.

contact with the person with potential to listen, a shared view and conviction will come about. Instead, Aristotle sees both speaker and listener as complex entities capable of having dispositions that promote or block speech. Aristotle calls the particular dispositional states that are conducive to communication *pisteis*, sources of conviction. The speaker herself can be a source of conviction insofar as she exhibits the proper character (*ethos*). The listener can be a source of conviction insofar as her emotional state (*pathos*) is conducive to hearing and conviction. Most remarkably, *logos* itself also has the potential to dispose the listener toward conviction. Someone who is already convinced by certain *logoi* will have the tendency to be brought into a state of conviction toward other *logoi* as well.

As was the case during the discussion of the three types of rhetorical speech, the everydayness of rhetorical speech delimits the ways that each of these *pisteis* functions. The one who listens to rhetoric is not interested in taking up the labor of learning and grasping basic ideas themselves (expediency, justice, nobility). They are eager to reach a judgment in order get on with the practical task of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain. This basic disposition of the listener (along with the corresponding possibility of speech) will define the way that each of the three *pisteis* can function within *Rhetoric*.

The first *pistis* is the character of the speaker. Aristotle is clear that this *pistis* does not refer to the character of the speaker before or outside of the speech, but the way that this character shows itself in the speaking itself.[251] In the way the speech proceeds, one can come to trust the speaker. However, there are different ways that trust in the speaker's character can be developed through speaking. For Aristotle, one who engages in science is defined by a disposition (*hexis*) to speak on the basis of true knowledge of what one is speaking about.[252] One

[251] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1156a8.
[252] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1139b30.

way that a listener could discern this disposition toward the truth is by seeing that the teacher tends to speak truly again and again. In this context the listener could discern the disposition of the speaker on the basis of grasping what was said and whether it was true—by learning. However, in rhetorical speech the listener is not interested in taking up the difficulty of learning. Rhetorical speech operates in the realm of opinion wherein what appears to be the case can always be otherwise. Because of this, trust in the speaker's disposition in rhetoric cannot come from seeing the truth in what the speaker says.

Instead, rhetoric must produce trust in the speaker indirectly. Aristotle identifies three attributes necessary for the listener to trust that the speaker is one who will tell the truth. The speaker must appear to have prudence (*phronēsis*), virtue (*aretē*), and good will (*eunoia*). Aristotle argues that if none of these attributes are missing, the listener can be assured that the speaker will lead the listener in the best way. Prudence assures that the speaker forms correct opinions about what is best, insofar as a prudent person can properly determine the relationship of an action to a desired state—whether the action is indeed conducive to the proper end. Prudence alone, however, is not enough. One who understands what is best may not communicate it for two reasons according to Aristotle's account. The speaker may be vicious in the sense that they do not promote what they know is best, but instead advocate for that which satisfies vices. Or, even if the speaker knows what is best and is the type of pursue it, they may not be friendly toward the listener and may not offer the best advice to them because of they do not want what is best for the listener. The person who is prudent, virtuous, and good, on the other hand, can be trusted to know what is best for the listener and to be able to show the listener how to reach it with words. When the speaker has these three attributes, the listener can trust that the speaker is the type who knows what they are talking about tells it to 'me'. The listener does not

need to understand or evaluate what the speaker says. They trust that the speaker will think things through in the proper way for them, accepting the conclusion without taking up the burden of understanding it fully.

The second *pistis* is the emotional state (*pathos*) of the listener. In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines these *pathē* as "all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments and that are also attended by pain and pleasure."[253] Each *pathē* entails a certain way the listener is disposed to judge this or that in accordance with what is pleasurable and painful. The specific types of pleasure and pain discussed in rhetoric also depend upon the everyday realm in which rhetorical conversation takes place. Rhetoric seeks to lead the desiring part of the soul that is capable of listening to reason. For this reason, Aristotle only needs to discuss ways that this part of the soul can be disposed to pleasure and pain, such as anger, fear, shame, etc., and not the way that the soul can come to be disposed toward the fulfillment of a desire of the intellect.[254]

Rhetoric attempts to harness emotion not only by addressing the listener's emotional state but by producing an emotional state through speech. The power of rousing an emotion allows the rhetorician access to a basic determinant of what and how the listener will hear and see. Aristotle describes the effect of emotion on judgment in the following way. "When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity."[255] Emotions do not just 'color' what is there, they have the ability to make someone see something "totally different." The way an emotion controls what one sees is tied to

[253] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1378a20.
[254] Humans, Aristotle famously claims, are characterized by a desire to know (or see, *eidenai*). (Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 980a1.) Though a soul ruled by this desire will also come to judge in a certain way and be attended by pleasure and pain, Aristotle is not concerned with this possibility here. The dispositions toward intellectual fulfillment are discussed in book six of *Nicomachean Ethics,* as virtues of the rational part of the soul.
[255] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1377b30.

expectation. Aristotle says "again if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think it certain to happen and be good for them: whereas if they are indifferent and annoyed, they do not think so."[256] Whereas a good mood puts us in a mind-set to expect something pleasant, a bad mad does not. Thus by rousing an emotion the rhetorician is able to completely change the expectation of a listener, shaping what they are ready to hear and see.

In the radical change that comes when a new emotional disposition toward pleasure and pain takes hold, Aristotle sees a threat to the proper judgment. Aristotle says that rousing "anger or envy or pity" can "pervert the judge" in a way akin to "warp[ing] a carpenter's rule before using it."[257] Insofar as Aristotle sees *pathos* as something that "warps" judgment, he does not conceive of emotion as something that destroys reasoning and language altogether. Instead, one ruled by an emotion misappraises the significance of something for the duration of the emotion. For example, the speaker who effectively rouses anger against another nation may have his listeners convinced that going to war is conducive to their community's ends, even if the chances of victory are next to nil. While in a heightened state of anger, the desire for revenge can overcome one's desire for other ends, even self-preservation. In this way, rousing an emotion allows the rhetorician a remarkable power over what the listener is disposed to hear. The listener can be brought to a state akin to madness, ready to make judgments that will appear harmful and alien at a later time when they are calm.[258]

[256] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1378a3.
[257] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1354a25.
[258] Understood as warped ways of seeing, Aristotle's *pathē* are akin to the forms through which the body can rule over the soul in *Phaedrus*, such as gluttony and greed. These temporary forms that rule the soul, which disappear after one's desire is sated, overcome the soul's true desire to seek ideas. Heidegger sees this connection as a line of continuity between Plato and Aristotle's study of rhetoric. (Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 232).

The third *pistis* is *logos* itself. *Logos* itself can be a *pistis* insofar as the realization of *logos*—the sharing of a conviction—can lead to another realization of *logos* and corresponding shared conviction. *Logos* has the function of putting something forth, of making it present (*apophainesthai*). The goal of rhetoric is to present an action or actor to the listener, showing it to be expedient, just, and noble or their opposites. In order to reach this goal, the rhetorician begins by communicating something that the listener already believes. On the basis of the view established, the speaker can show how other views are already entailed and implied therein.

For Aristotle the two ways that *logos* can lead from one conviction to another are syllogism and induction. A Syllogism is a logos "in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these necessarily results through them."[259] In *Prior Analytics,* Aristotle takes up the task of discerning exactly which types of *logoi* syllogize. Aristotle argues that all syllogisms are reducible to the universal syllogism in the first figure.[260] That is to say, a *logos* can only necessarily imply another without the assistance of other premises (perfectly, *teleion*) if it is reducible to the following form: A is predicated of all (or no) B; B is predicated of all (or no) C; therefore A is necessarily predicated of all (or no) C. Thus insofar as the listener sees that all humans are mortal and that all Athenians are human, a new conviction necessarily follows, namely that all Athenians are mortal.

For our interpretation, it is important to understand syllogisms as *logoi* that have the power to bring something before the eyes of the listener, not as a set of propositions and variables on a page. When one does not see and believe the premises of a syllogism, determining its validity is often the result of abstract calculation. Blind to what is spoken about, one must turn

[259] Aristotle, *Topica*, trans. E. S. Forster in *Aristotle II: Posterior Analytics, Topica,* Loeb Classical Library N. 391, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 100a25.
[260] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, trans. Hugh Tredennick in *Aristotle I: The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics,* Loeb Classical Library N. 325 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), 29b1.

to a set of rules or tests to see whether the conclusion follows. Indeed, it is easy for us to hear the phrase "all men are mortal" without it recognizing the grand scope and significance of this statement. However, in the context of rhetoric and persuasion, syllogisms must persuade immediately. This occurs when one is fully convinced by the premise. Once one explicitly *sees* that all men are mortal and is convinced by it, one immediately sees that Socrates, a man, will also die. No test of validity is required.

In a syllogism our thought moves from the universal to particular. One who is convinced of something universal comes to see that it also applies to the particular. Induction moves in the opposite way, from particular to universal.[261] For induction to occur, one does not need to see many examples and to extrapolate some common rule.[262] Induction occurs most basically when one sees something universal in a premise or set of premises about a particular. Insofar as one grasps that which is before them as a 'tree' one also sees a plant, albeit inexplicitly. Induction operates by making this implicit premise explicit. Through induction one sees the universal in the particular. For example, one may see a particular attribute of this tree as something universal—as an attribute of plants in general.

Syllogism and induction both operate within a mode of speech that calls out what is spoken about as what it is, *katēgorein*.[263] One must see that which is spoken about in a certain way—as a 'what'—in order to see the universal and particular implied in it. The connection between particular and universal and 'what' beings, points to a basic feature of language. Though

[261] Aristotle, *Topica*, 105a13.
[262] Induction is often explained as an extrapolation from many premises. While it may be true that seeing many particulars in a certain way is necessary for induction to occur for the first time this does not imply that every induction requires multiple premises. Rhetorical induction is a case in point. Rhetoric allows for induction by using examples. Often, as Aristotle himself shows in his examples of argument by example, one example is sufficient. See Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1393a30.
[263] Heidegger notes that *katēgorein*, which originally means to publically accuse, means not only to assert, but to emphatically declare that something *is* something, and therefore to speak of its being. See Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3*, 4; Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 205.

words address that which is here now, a particular entity—they cannot address entities as particulars. Language addresses particulars as types of things. One can only address this entity as the type of being it is, a 'tree.' Attempts to address it in it particularity by pointing out its particular features are still bound to this 'what' being. On can point out any number of specific and differentiating properties but they must still be properties of something, of a 'tree.' Just as particular entities are grasped by means of universal concepts, concepts themselves are also understood in terms more universal genera. The 'tree' is itself understood as a 'plant.' Syllogisms and inductions function by explicating how the way we address things, as 'this' or 'that', binds us to understanding these things in terms of related categories that are more general and more specific. They compel us from the universal category toward the particular, and vice versa.

In leading us to more specific and universal 'what' beings, rhetoric is not concerned with teaching listeners new ways of understanding how categories relate to one another. It attempts to utilize the conceptual framework that the listener already has. The speaker does not need to explicitly convince the listener of each premise in order to bring the listener to see what follows for the first time. For this reason, the rhetorical form of the syllogism (enthymeme) and induction (example) are shortened. The rhetorician has "no need to mention" a familiar premise, "the hearer adds it himself."[264] Indeed, including all the premises will actually be a drawback—a "waste of words" that makes the speakers message like striking and effective.[265] Rhetorical syllogism and induction must move quickly along well-worn paths of opinion, leading the listener to and from the more universal and specific concepts that already govern their understanding. The rhetorician who is able to employ *logos* as a *pistis* grasps the way the

[264] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1357a18.
[265] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1395b25.

audience already understands what is spoken about, and the way that this understanding disposes the listener to see what is spoken about in terms of related concepts, both more universal and more specific.

iii. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a Hermeneutic of Dasein

As discussed in the first chapter, the hermeneutic of Dasein seeks to uncover the *a priori* structures of Dasein. Heidegger's structural *a priori* must be understood in a distinctive way. They are not to be understood as present-at-hand beings. Heidegger sees the present-at-hand analogue of the *a priori* of which he speaks in the way the 'categories' have been understood in the history of philosophy. Understood as present-at-hand forms that shape how speaking can instantiate itself, the categories are like empty vessels that lie waiting to form intuition. Contrary to this view, Heidegger conceives the structural *a priori* that he speaks about as existentialia—as *a priori* whose being has the character of Dasein. To understand Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a hermeneutic of Dasein requires that one see how the three types of rhetorical speech and three *pisteis* reveal structural *a priori* that have an existential character.

Above, we saw that the three types of rhetorical speech reveal the significance of the world for Dasein in three ways. In political speech a speaker and listener come to share the significance of a potential action for a desired end state, in judicial speech they come to share the view that an action did or did not accord with right reason and the proper disposition, and in epideictic speech they come to share a view of the actor's disposition to act—the character of the actor. We could understand these three types of *koinōnia* as descriptions of present-at-hand *a priori*. The three types of rhetorical speech would refer to three pre-existing forms that shape a special kind of matter—namely the ways humans can share the world.

However, the fulfillment of rhetoric through sharing the world is not merely an accidental occurrence. In *Politics* we saw that *koinōnia* is necessary for human being. Humans cannot continue to be without it. Understood in this way, the types of *koinōnia* that occur in rhetoric are not merely empty possibilities but tendencies of human nature. As humans, we orient ourselves toward *koinōnia*—we want it and look for it. Thus, these *a priori* must be understood actively. The active tendency of Dasein is expressed by Heidegger in *Being and Time* when Heidegger describes the ways that Dasein moves in accordance with its temporal structure. Dasein is a being characterized by its tendency to project itself toward its future self and to be thrown from its past self.[266]

Each type of rhetorical speech presents one *a priori* possibility of Dasein's movement that Dasein can itself be. That is to say, political, judicial, and epideictic speech—each ultimately grasped in terms of temporality—express ways that Dasein moves relative to itself in sharing the world. Dasein is, as the being that it is, a moving-toward-itself in being-in-the-world. In its futural orientation it goes toward happiness—the mode of being wherein Dasein expresses its own being through activity. Political speech seeks to discover the path that leads toward one's fulfilled mode of activity. Dasein is also moving-from-itself in the world. What is there, and how it is there, point toward Dasein as a past disposition that determined what appears now. The *koinōnia* that comes about through judicial speech moves toward unveiling Dasein in this sense. It also reveals a path from action to Dasein but moves in the opposite direction, seeing Dasein as a cause of action and not as caused by action. Lastly, Dasein is an expressing of itself. Epideictic speech moves toward the possibility to bring being-there forth as the potential to act in a certain

[266] This work does not take up the task of following the interpretive threads of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* into *Being and Time*. However, Heidegger's synthesis of his analysis of everyday Dasein may prove fruitful for clarifying these connections between temporarily in rhetoric and *Being and Time*. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 264 (H. 221-222).

way. As a being that has acted in certain ways and will act in certain ways, Dasein shows itself as directed potential.

Aristotle's discussion of the three *pisteis* also functions as a pre-cursor to Heidegger's existential analytic in *Being and Time.* In each type of rhetorical speech, the being that Dasein moves toward, from, or as is Dasein itself. In each case, Dasein is grasped as a disposition to act in this way or that. The three *pisteis* show the three ways that this disposition manifests itself in speech. The *pisteis* were grasped on the basis of the structure of speech, which requires a speaker, a listener, and the realization of speech itself. Looking at *Nicomachean Ethics,* Heidegger saw that as a *zōon logon echon*, the human *is* each of these moments. The human soul consists of both a speaking part and a listening part, which, to be what they are, must realize their potential in speaking itself. Insofar as the human is each of these, each is capable of being disposed in a certain ways. By articulating *ethos, pathos* and *logos*, as sources of conviction, Aristotle expresses how our natural tendency to project ourselves into *koinōnia* can itself be directed and amplified insofar as we are each moment of speech. As a person that has a certain character, one is disposed to see in a definite way. The same goes for someone overcome by a certain emotion or someone ruled by a certain belief regarding what is spoken about. Understood in this way, the *pisteis* are not merely *a priori* determinants of an activity that is accidental to Dasein's being, namely persuasive speech, but expressions of Dasein's possibilities of being itself. As Kisiel suggests, the existential significance of these *pisteis* is re-iterated in *Being and Time*'s analysis of Being-in (the world). *Ethos, pathos,* and *logos* correspond to understanding (*Verstehen*), state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*), and discourse (*Rede*).[267]

[267] "Greek rhetoric's three modes of persuasion—pathos, ethos, and logos—that structure the speech situation thereby become close kin to the three modes of "being-in" and disclosedness of the human situation: disposedness, understanding, discursivity." (Theodore Kisiel, "Rhetorical Protopolitics in Heidegger and Arendt," in Gross and Kemmann, *Heidegger and Rhetoric*, 144.)

Conclusion

This chapter began by defining the way Heidegger conceives of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as the completion of the rhetorical tradition. Completion was grasped as occurring insofar as something fulfills its basic and originating tendency. In the first chapter the basic tendency of *Rhetoric* was defined as the hermeneutic of Dasein. Persuasion was grasped as the realization of the human being as a *zōon logon echon*. Rhetoric attempts gain the ability to persuade, and therefore power to captivate and ensnare human beings, by attempting to grasp that which is captivating and enthralling as such. Tisias and Corax saw that which is striking and compelling as that which fits into one's expectation, the *eikos*. The *eikos* was grasped as that which one is ready to see insofar as they have seen it before, *doxa*. For Tisias and Corax, then, the ability to bring Dasein into its proper mode of presence requires only that one know what others believe.

In *Phaedrus* Plato critiques this view. He demonstrates that rhetoric requires knowledge of what one speaks about and who one speaks to—of ideas and the nature of the soul. Further, he shows that the realization of persuasion that the rhetorician truly seeks is not merely the confirmation of belief. Instead, humans are moved in the best possible way by language insofar as they are led to the contemplation of the truth. True rhetoric is dialectic. It is speech that seeks to reveal the fixed ideas that underlie and determine all belief.

Aristotle follows Plato in basing rhetoric in a conception of fixed structures of speech and the nature of the soul. He grasps how each element of the motion of speech—speaker, listener, and speech itself—must be disposed in order for the realization of rhetorical speech to occur. Aristotle also sees how the three temporal possibilities of speech imply different possibilities of persuasion. However, to bring rhetoric to its completion Aristotle not only follows Plato but

departs from him. Aristotle affirms rhetoric's traditional orientation toward the type of realization of speech that occurs in everyday practical and non-scientific life. He discerns what appears before the soul such that it is compelling (the world), the ways that it can appear (the three modes of speech), and the ways that this appearing are determined and caused (the three *pisteis*). Aristotle completed what the sophistic rhetoricians sought. He sees the momentum of the soul itself and its potential to move toward enthrallment with the world on the basis of the nature of the soul and of language, not on the basis of the momentum of opinion (the *eikos*) alone.

Thus by returning to rhetoric's primary task in light of Plato's insight into the requirements of the rhetorical art, Aristotle produces what Heidegger calls the "first systematic" interpretation of the causes of coming to a shared conviction (*koinōnia*, being with one another) in the mode of everydayness. By turning to *koinōnia,* Aristotle grasps the natural basis for communication. By defining non-scientific and practical speech, Aristotle at the same time determines the limitations of the type of sharing that comes about through everyday speech.

For Heidegger the fact that Aristotle re-grounds rhetoric in everyday concern and persuasion does not mean that that Aristotle abandons the philosophical appropriation of rhetoric that begins with Plato. Instead, Heidegger thinks that Aristotle is able to articulate the philosophical significance of rhetoric more precisely by grasping the limited potential of rhetoric for leading the soul to the philosophical life. The next chapter will clarify the positive account of *Rhetoric*'s philosophical potential by focusing on the *pathos* that has the power to activate the soul's desire to see the eternal and true—fear.

3

The Significance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for Philosophy

Chapters 1 and 2 consisted of an analysis of Heidegger's claim that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the "first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another." The first chapter discussed the genus of Heidegger's conception of rhetoric—the hermeneutic tendency of Greek rhetoric as expressed by the Greek rhetorical tradition and as critiqued by Plato. It explored rhetoric's fledgling attempt at self-knowledge—at grasping fixed determinants that allow humans to be brought into the mode of being-there that engages them as speaking beings, persuasion—and Plato's philosophical re-grounding of this attempt. The second chapter focused on the *eidos* of Heidegger's conception, showing how Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was able to realize rhetoric's task by grasping the natural basis of the type of communion (*koinōnia*, being with one another) that rhetorical persuasion seeks, along with the structure of language through which this communion can be achieved in everyday speech. Together, both chapters clarified what it means for rhetoric to fulfill its own ideal and how Aristotle's *Rhetoric* achieves this.

This chapter turns toward the role that a completed rhetoric plays in realizing the philosophical life. As in the first two chapters, the interpretation will take up and extend Heidegger's approach to Greek thought. For Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle's fulfillment of the rhetorical tradition is part of their larger attempt to concretely bring about the philosophical life—a life governed by the desire to contemplate being. By clarifying Heidegger's interpretation of how Aristotle and Plato each seek to realize philosophical existence concretely, we will see the corresponding role that rhetoric plays for each philosopher. The interpretation will show how

Aristotle's grasp of rhetoric can be understood as a philosophical advance beyond Plato and how the analysis of fear is especially important for compelling Dasein to develop its potential to grasp the being of beings.

a. Dasein and the Task of Raising the Question of Being

i. The Significance of Aristotle's Project to Greek Philosophy as a Whole

In SS 1924, Heidegger claims that one way 'the tradition' has misunderstood Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is by not understanding the place of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* within Aristotle's larger project. "In the Berlin Academy edition, the *Rhetoric* has been put at the end. They did not know what to do with it, so they put it at the end! It is a sign of complete helplessness." [268] Heidegger, by contrast, claims an understanding of the 'original sense' (*ursprüngliche Sinn*) of *Rhetoric*. For Heidegger, the 'original sense' of rhetoric refers to the place of *Rhetoric* as it originally arose within Aristotle's larger philosophical project.

As it turns out, an attempt to understand Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's philosophical project cannot direct itself to Aristotle alone. For Heidegger, Aristotle's project is itself the culmination of the Greek thinking that came before it. To understand Aristotle as Heidegger does, we must turn to Heidegger's account of the philosophers that preceded Aristotle, understood as part of a larger tradition of which Aristotle is the culminating thinker. Heidegger provides such an interpretation in a 1926 summer semester lecture titled *The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*. In that lecture Heidegger interprets Greek philosophy from Thales through Aristotle. Heidegger wants to look at how Greek philosophy develops and culminates in Aristotle in order to reveal basic concepts that still define the contours of contemporary philosophy.

[268] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 75.

After preliminary remarks that explicate the aim and method of the course, Heidegger's manuscript indicates that the lecture proper began by distinguishing four epochs of ancient philosophy.[269] The first epoch, characterized as the "question of the Being of the world, nature," begins with Thales and goes up the sophists. The second, characterized as "the question of the Being of human Dasein and the more radical appropriation of the question of the Being of the world," includes Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The third, "the practical/world-view philosophy of Hellenism" includes the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. For the last epoch, "the religious speculation of Neo-Platonism," the authors are unnamed, but presumably include Plotinus, Porphyry and Augustine, among others.[270]

Heidegger does not invent these philosophical groupings but follows divisions that are already agreed upon. What is important here are not the divisions themselves, which Heidegger thinks are not philosophically significant, but the place of Aristotle within this division of Greek thought.[271] For Heidegger, only the first two epochs are essential insofar as it is within them that "all important horizons of the problematic are laid down." [272] Of the two essential epochs, the second has a philosophical priority insofar as it more radically achieves what the first epoch sought – the questioning of the nature. For Heidegger, it is Aristotle who realizes the intention of

[269] The published version of SS 1926 stems exclusively from Heidegger's manuscript of his lecture. In this way, it is different from lectures reconstructed primarily on the basis of transcripts made by students (e.g. SS 1924) or lectures built from a combination of both (e.g. WS 1925). Heidegger's lecture will often depart from his notes—sometimes in significant ways. (Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 460.) I say that Heidegger's notes "indicate" that his lecture began with a distinction between the four epochs of ancient philosophy (and not that it *did* begin with this distinction) not to cast doubt but simply to acknowledge the lack of confirmation available to the reader of the *Gesamptausgabe*. The editor of this lecture, Franz-Karl Blust, presumably does have confirmation in the student notes that Heidegger did begin the lecture proper in this way, but the evidence is not presented in the published excerpts of the student transcripts by Hermann Mörchen or Walter Bröcker. See Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 168, 232, 243-5.

[270] The inclusion of Augustine seems assured insofar as Heidegger mentions that Ancient Philosophy ends in 529 AD, and insofar as one way he characterizes the final epoch is by the "intrusion of speculation deriving from Christian Theology." (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 17.)

[271] Heidegger says "There is agreement regarding the main lines. But does not touch upon anything essential; presented merely for the sake of orientation." (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 17.)

[272] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 17

the second epoch. Aristotle takes up the question of the being of the human being in order to question the being of the world and nature more radically. For Heidegger, Aristotle is the high point of Greek philosophy, the "scientific apex;" he is followed by two epochs of decline.[273]

The second epoch of philosophy is characterized by a doubling that is essential to Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle and Greek philosophy as a whole. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, in opposition to previous thinkers, direct their attention to the excellence of human beings. For Heidegger, human being (or more precisely human being-there, Dasein) itself becomes an object of inquiry. This does not mean that Plato and Aristotle abandon the question of nature and being itself. For Heidegger, these two elements of the epoch are essentially tied together; the inquiry into human existence allows for the more radical questioning of being. Because of this doubling, Aristotle's project can be characterized in two mirroring ways – as the fulfillment of a more radical questioning of being and as fulfillment of an understanding of the being of human beings. We will start with Heidegger's characterization of the former and then turn to the being of human beings, which is especially important for our understanding of *Rhetoric*.

ii. The Question of the Unity of Being

As the philosopher who fulfills the goal of the first epoch of philosophy, Aristotle raises the question of the being of beings in a radical way. Following Aristotle, Heidegger distinguishes two ways that being can be questioned and addressed. There is the study of the being that most completely is (theology) and the study that attempts to "understand and genuinely grasp beings *as* beings." [274] For Heidegger the inquiry concerned with being as beings has the higher

[273] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 18.
[274] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 124.

philosophical status insofar as it has less of a tendency to understand being as *a* being (e.g. a god or the divine). The questioning of the being of beings is "ontology" according to Heidegger (though he admits that Aristotle does not use the term).[275] This term is appropriate insofar as the investigation is led by logos itself. That is to say, the question of the oneness of being is brought forth insofar as being is seen to be many through language. The theological line of questioning is not properly ontological, but ontic for Heidegger. It fails to question being adequately insofar as the question of how being is shared by the highest being and other beings still remains. Because Heidegger sees Plato and Aristotle's ontological investigation as properly philosophical, he focuses on the question of the being of beings as it resides in their work and not on the question of what being *is* to the highest degree.[276]

In light of this interpretation of philosophy as the investigation of the being of beings, the first philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes are seen to be deficient. Heidegger says that they implicitly understand being, but have no concept of it—that they seek being but are able to uncover only beings (e.g. water, air).[277] Parmenides, for Heidegger, is the first to properly philosophize insofar as his work brings being forth and characterizes it. In SS 1931, *Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3*, Heidegger provides a more honed interpretation of Parmenides than in SS 1926. There, Heidegger demonstrates that Parmenides, who first clearly sees being, is at the same time the first to answer the question of the being of beings. In beings Parmenides sees "being" itself, and in being he sees unity and singularity.[278]

---

[275] "The latter came to be called 'ontology.' Aristotle himself does not ever use the term." (Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 153.)
[276] For another articulation of the distinction between ontology and theology, see Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 153.
[277] Heidegger's notes are at times rough in SS 1926, but the point comes through. Summing up the Milesians, Heidegger says "implicitly an understanding of Being, but concept. Ever and again a foray, striving after Being, but always thrown back and grasping only as a being." (Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 46.)
[278] "But what are beings? Now this means: what is being? The reply to this question is really just the complete answer to the question concerning beings. To be sure. And the first one we know of to have asked about beings in

Heidegger says "Parmenides bespoke the first decisive philosophical truth, and from that time onward philosophizing occurred in the West."[279]For Heidegger, philosophy after Parmenides does not and cannot refute Parmenides. Insofar as it is able to raise itself to the task of ontology, it must essentially adhere to his claim. This does not mean that no one goes beyond Parmenides in any sense. Heidegger sees Plato and Aristotle as making developments past Parmenides insofar as Plato and Aristotle are able to raise Parmenides's claim to the status of a philosophical question. For Heidegger, Plato's philosophical high point can be seen in *Sophist*, where Plato raises the question of how non-being also *is*, in a certain sense. Insofar as being is and is not (in a certain sense) it is not simply one, but also 'many.' Aristotle, in *Metaphysics*, develops a richer way of questioning the unity of being by focusing on the ways being is said (accident, categories, truth and falsity, and potential and actuality).[280] In both cases, Heidegger sees Plato and Aristotle as working within Parmenides's basic view that being is one. They move past Parmenides insofar as they begin to question the sense in which being, which appears in many ways, can have unity at all.

iii. Plato and the Second Epoch of Philosophy

As mentioned earlier, Heidegger sees Aristotle as a member of the second epoch of philosophy. The second epoch is characterized by a turn to questions of human virtue and human good. For Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle's turn toward the human being is part of an attempt to grasp being itself. For this reason, Plato and Aristotle are especially concerned with that particular type of virtuous life which allows for being to be brought to presence in the intellect,

---

such a way as to have tried to comprehend being, and who also gave the first answer to the question, What is being? was Parmenides." (Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3*, 18.)

[279] *Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3*, 19

[280] Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1017a8.

namely the life of the philosopher. Heidegger sees Plato and Aristotle's concern with the possibility of philosophical existence as concrete; they want to understand how to bring about contemplation within particular souls.[281] This in turn requires a developed understanding of the soul itself—its many modes and possibilities.

With this focus on the soul itself, Heidegger sees a development past Parmenides. Parmenides does not only discuss being itself, but truth and method (*hodos*) as well.[282] He sees that the normal mode of uncovering, *doxa*, is inadequate to the task of reaching the truth of being. He speaks of another way, the path of truth. In this sense, Parmenides is already a precursor to the second epoch of philosophy because he begins to focus on the mode of human being that allows for being to be properly contemplated. However Parmenides's discussion of method does not include an explicit conceptualization of human intellectual sight (*nous*) itself. For Heidegger, this lack of a definite grasp the human possibility through which being is grasped implies a mirrored failure in the conception of being itself. He says that Parmenides "does not say whether it is the *noein*, of a determinate realm of Being or of beings in general; he speaks of Being only in general and in an undetermined way, and likewise of *noein*." [283] Because Parmenides does not come to a more precise and differentiated understanding of the mode of apprehension through which being can be present (*noein*), his corresponding concept of being is also undifferentiated, excluding non-being too simply.

In order to understand how Aristotle incorporates rhetoric in order to take up the question of being we will first turn to Plato, the thinker that Aristotle must surpass. For Heidegger, Plato attempted to realize philosophy and achieve a radical new appropriation of the unity of being through the use of dialectic. To gain an understanding of how this happens we will turn to

[281] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 141.
[282] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 54.
[283] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 141.

Heidegger's interpretation of *Plato's Sophist* (WS 1925). For Heidegger, by focusing on the being of a particular human being, the sophist, Plato is able to raise the question of being anew and realize the philosophical mode of questioning.

In Heidegger's interpretation, the double character of the second epoch of philosophy is itself built into the structure of *Sophist*. He says that "the sophist is first made visible in the multiplicity of his comportments. From this multiplicity and from its corresponding interpretation, that toward which the sophist comports himself becomes visible as well."[284] The sophist is, in a certain sense, comported toward non-being—the non-being inherent in delusion and trickery. To take up the question of what a sophist is, one must also take up the question of the status of non-being in the mode of delusion and trickery. This non-being is brought forth by the dialogue in a way that challenges the previous ontological conception. Heidegger says, "the insight, that non-beings are, signifies at the same time a revolution in terms of the previous conception, in terms of the previous meaning of Being adhered to even by Plato himself."[285] Thus by turning to the sophist and understanding what the sophist must be directed toward, Plato uncovers a new conception of being—" a more radical conception of the meaning of Being itself" in which the character of the "not" is enclosed in it.[286]

For Heidegger, the revelation of the sophist will at the same time reveal the philosopher, insofar as the object of philosophical inquiry, being, is itself revealed in a new way. Heidegger says that "the meaning of the philosopher will rise on its own, without Plato having to speak explicitly about it."[287] For Heidegger it is this clarification of the philosopher that is the goal of the dialogue. Heidegger says "For now, a determinate mode of existence, namely that of the

[284] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 132.
[285] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 133.
[286] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 133.
[287] Thus, Heidegger is of the view that the collection of dialogues titled *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesmen*, are not missing a dialogue that would be titled *Philosopher*.

philosopher, is offered as the ground for a discussion of Being and beings. The dialogue has no other goal than to explicate this ground, this concrete mode of Dasein, and thereby to create, as it were, the milieu within which beings can show themselves in their Being." [288] Thus we can see that for Heidegger, *Sophist* shows Plato as a part of the second epoch. His goal is to understand the being of beings but he does so by focusing on a particular type human comportment toward being (the sophist) and what this type reveals about what is there.

To understand how Aristotle moves past Plato it is important to notice the mode of speech that reveals the sophist and the corresponding conception of being. The second epoch of philosophy is concerned both with grasping being and with the mode of human presence through which being can properly appear. This double concern is taken up by the type of speech that Plato employs in the dialogue, *dialegesthai*. In Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, *dialegesthai* primarily means *dia-legesthai*—speaking *through* what is said, through opinion. For Heidegger, *dialegesthai* is not an accidental feature of Plato's thought. Heidegger says that the reason why Plato writes dialogues

> is not the trivial one that Plato was an artist and wanted to present even such matters… in a beautiful way. The reason is, rather, an inner need of philosophizing itself, the radical acceptance on Plato's part of the impetus he receives from Socrates: to pass from logos as prattle, from what is said idly and hastily about all things, through genuine speaking, to a *logos* which, as *logos alēthēs*, actually says something about which it speaks.[289]

Dialegesthai is a *logos* that moves through prattle, starting with held opinions that people believe but cannot understand, and moving to the point where the speaker truly sees what the speech is about. It functions not only to clarify what is said, but to bring the interlocutors into a disposition where they can grasp the truth by piercing through stale opinions and the primary ways that things appear. The task of the second epoch of philosophy is to focus on the mode of human

[288] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 141.
[289] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 135.

apprehension in order to gain a more precise grasp of that which is to be apprehended—being itself. Insofar as dialectic has the power to bring the soul to the disposition where it can see the truth of being, it is a remarkable manifestation of the second epoch of philosophy, achieving both aspects in one fell swoop.

iv. Aristotle on the Limited Power of Dialectic

As discussed above, Heidegger identifies Plato's ability to move philosophy past Parmenides and raise the question of being anew with dialectic. Dialectic allows Plato to gain a sharper view of Dasein's being and being itself not only because it works through held opinions, discovering what underlies them, but because it is has the power to bring a listener to become disposed in such a way that they are able to hear and understand these topics. For Heidegger, however, in Plato there is an "exaggeration of dialectic," of its power to lead to the contemplation of being.[290] Aristotle is able to move past Plato because he identifies the "immanent limits of dialectic" and incorporates them into his research.[291] Aristotle sees that dialectic alone is insufficient to bring an interlocutor to the proper disposition where they are able to grasp the being of beings. Dialectic can lead one who already desires to see and contemplate, but it cannot reach one who refuses to listen, one who prefers to remain in an everyday and practical mode of speech and thought.

The limitation of dialectic for gaining knowledge is already present in Plato's dialogues. Through dialectic, Socrates guides his interlocutors so that their underlying beliefs are revealed through an interrogation of the claims they make. However, there is no guarantee that what is revealed will have the status of knowledge. The underlying belief may be a mere "phantom"

[290] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 234.
[291] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 137.

(*eidolon*), as expressed in Socrates' description of his process of midwifery in *Theaetetus*.[292] Dialectic is a process of recollection—of recovering what the soul has seen before. However, if what the soul has seen before is a mere likeness of the truth, then the dialectician (Socrates) has no recourse but to "abandon" the ideas that he helps to give birth to.[293] Dialectic is therefore limited by the interlocutor's ability and desire to see. Because of this, Aristotle argues that dialectic is not the appropriate mode of speech for philosophy. The objects of philosophy are first principles that require no demonstration—they are true and compelling in themselves. Aristotle acknowledges that dialectic can lead an interlocutor to these principles, but it cannot compel an interlocutor to accept these premises. An opponent can "refuse the grant these," leaving the dialectician without "any basis to argue."[294]

This limitation of dialectic for obtaining knowledge leads Aristotle to distinguish dialectic from philosophy. In *Metaphysics*, after identifying first philosophy with the science of being *qua* being, Aristotle distinguishes dialecticians from philosophers. While the two are similar insofar as "dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things," Aristotle distinguishes the two in terms of the type capacity (*tropō tēs dunameōs*) each has.[295] Dialectic has the capacity and tendency to try (*peirastikē*) for knowledge through critique and questioning, that is to say 'examination', but philosophy entails the capacity to know

[292] Plato, *Theaetetus*, trans. M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat, in *Plato Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 150b-151d.
[293] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 151c.
[294] Aristotle, *De Sophiticis Elenchis*, trans. E. S. Forster in *Aristotle: On Sophistical Refutations, On Coming-to-be and Passing Away, and On the Cosmos*, Loeb Classical Library n. 400 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 172a20. In this context, Aristotle appears to be speaking about a "contentious" arguer who seeks to win more than to discover the truth, as he also does in *Topics* when he speaks of the possibility of an interlocutor refusing to admit principles because "he foresees what will result from his admission." (Aristotle, *Topica*, 155b15). The point remains, however, that dialectical inquiry is limited by the interlocutor's affirmation of basic principles.
[295] Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1004b15.

(*gnōristikē*).[296] Because the "examination" (*peirastikēs*) that is part of dialectic can be directed toward ignorant people, "it may reach a false conclusion."[297]

In Heidegger's interpretation, dialectic does not itself hold the capacity to know insofar as it may still be an instantiation of everyday speech. As a practical animal, the mode of speech that dominates the human being is *logos kata tinos*. Heidegger identifies the structure of this speech as presenting 'something as something,' where the '*as* something' points to the practical utility of the entity for maintaining life. One sees a 'chair' as something to rest on and a 'knife' as something to cut. Grasped in this way, however, entities are seen in their potential to be useful but not in the way that they already are—not in a way that shows how they already express being. Insofar as dialectic moves within this mode of speech it will not be adequate to grasping entities in their being. Dialectic may be able to lead a listener *to* a first principle but the listener may not be able to *see* this principle insofar as a first principle cannot appear in *logos kata tinos*; a principle cannot be taken up in action and used.

Aristotle identifies philosophy and the possibility of knowledge with another form of speech, *logos kath auto*. As a form of human speech, it also operates with the structure of *logos kata tinos*—something is revealed as something. But what is revealed in this mode of speech is being itself—the being of a being. It is a mode of speech that grasps what is spoken of as 'what' it is. When one grasps a chair as a chair, one does not focus on its utility here and now but instead on the properties through which it is and continues to be the being that it is. One turns toward the unchanging and fixed aspects of 'what' something is and away from the particular way that this chair appears to one's senses and bodily desires. One grasps it insofar as it *is* a chair. Aristotle sees that what is decisive for philosophy is not dialectic alone, but a mode of speech

[296] Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1004b24.
[297] Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, 165b25.

through which one attains to ability to grasp the being that one is speaking about. Insofar as one is able to take up this mode of speech, one becomes oriented toward the being of beings, and therefore toward knowledge and philosophy.

v. Speaking of Being: Aristotle surpasses Plato

For Heidegger, Aristotle's recognition of the limit of dialectic does not mean that Aristotle abandons it. Instead, Heidegger claims that Aristotle "understood it [dialectic] more radically" and was able to make "real what Plato was striving for," bringing dialectic to a higher level by continuing Plato's work in *Sophist* and applying dialectical methods to the question of being itself.[298] The claim that Aristotle's dialectic is a step beyond Plato's may seem perverse if one compares the vital expression of dialectic in Plato's dialogues to the *Topics*, Aristotle's relatively dry treatise on dialectical reasoning. However, Heidegger rejects the critique that in Aristotle's hands dialectic is downgraded "to a mere technique of deductive thinking" by looking at the way dialectical method is taken up and transformed by Aristotle's method of investigation.[299] Heidegger sees Aristotle's re-appropriation of dialectic as concretely expressed in Aristotle's investigation of being in particular.

Aristotle's customary way of beginning an investigation is to explicate and work through commonly held opinions concerning the subject matter he speaks about. In this way, Aristotle's method mirrors dialectic insofar as he too begins with held belief (*endoxa*) not in order to simply abandon it, but in order to work through it to discover the truth that underlies it. Aristotle's investigation of the object of philosophy takes up this dialectical approach insofar as Aristotle begins *Metaphysics* with an exploration of the different theories of the *archai* of all beings.

[298] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 138.
[299] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 138.

However, Aristotle's investigation of being also takes up a different kind of dialectical starting point, by identifying the way being is said and how it addressed in speech as such. In *Categories*, Aristotle identifies how being is implicated in the structure of speech. Aristotle's concept for being, *ousia*, refers to that which speech is ultimately about and expressive of. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle identifies the ways that being can be said (accident, categories, truth and falsity, and potential and actuality). In both cases, Aristotle transcends the typical starting place of dialectic. He attempts to grasp the way being appears through language as such, not only in the particular *logoi* of an interlocutor or the wise.

For Heidegger, Aristotle's innovation can be seen in Aristotle concept of being, *ousia.* Aristotle's term *ousia* does not merely indicate how being shows itself in propositions. It is a concept that calls out the way that being primarily and predominantly showed itself to the Greeks in everyday life. Heidegger says "it is no accident that the Greek designation for the things they first encounter is *pragmata*, 'beings with which one constantly has to do', and *krēmata*, 'what is taken into use.' They refer to the basic meaning of ousia." [300] Here, Heidegger points out that the two Greek concepts for entities are not empty—but designate beings insofar as they can be taken up in use. Heidegger sees Aristotle's designation of *ousia* as the concept of being that recognizes the primary and predominant way that beings appears. Heidegger makes his case by tying Aristotle's philosophical conception of *ousia* to the everyday use of the term where it is translated as 'property.' Property refers to a kind of being that is "*there for me in an emphatic way*"—it is "*there in the manner of being-available*."[301] Only something that has the potential to be used by someone—to be brought within someone's power—can be property. *Ousia* refers to how beings appear in everyday, practical life—as objects of use.

[300] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 19.
[301] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 19.

In this way, Aristotle's concept of being remains grounded in the primary and predominant way that being is spoken about in everyday speech—in *logos kata tinos*. This tethering is also evident in the way that Aristotle conceives of that which dialectic is able to reach—ideas or forms. Heidegger says "One can see how sharply Aristotle sets apart *idea* and *eidos*. By *eidos*, he understands the 'appearing' of a being of the world, here and now, as *prakton*."[302] For Heidegger, Aristotle's *eidos* "means that being that is there in 'appearing.' As a master builder builds a house, so he lives and operates initially in the *eidos* of the house, in the way it looks."[303] Understood in this way *eidos* is not an eternal and perfect being that compels even the gaze of the gods. Instead, Aristotle maintains a grasp of the *eidos* as it is understood in practical life. The *eidos* 'house' refers to that which adequately satisfies the basic human need for shelter. The artisan is not oriented toward the house insofar as it allows for humans to partake in a fixed form that transcends particular circumstances, but as that which will satisfy current and future needs of particular people in particular circumstances.

For Heidegger, Aristotle's attempt to grasp the way being primarily appears through *logos* as such constitutes an advance beyond Plato. It is not that Aristotle abandons the dialectical task of investigating the opinions of particular intellectual interlocutors, but that Aristotle does not depend on this in order to find the starting point of his investigation. Heidegger characterizes Aristotle's approach in the following way, "Aristotle says: I must have *ground* under my feet, a ground that is there in immediate self-evidence, if I am to get at being."[304] By discovering the primary and predominant way that being appears through everyday speech, Aristotle secures the proper ground for the investigation of being. This ground for investigating being is not only determined by the particular orientation of men who are considered wise, by their beliefs, but by

[302] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 208.
[303] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 208.
[304] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 27.

the orientation of the human as a practical animal with language as such. Aristotle properly determines where one must truly begin an investigation into being—with the way that being initially appears. His conception of being as *ousia* names this starting point. It addresses being insofar as it resides, hidden, in the speech of the practical animal.

b. Aristotle and the Reconceived Role of Rhetoric for Philosophy

For Heidegger, Aristotle's distinction between the way being is primarily addressed (*logos kata tinos*) and the way it needs to be addressed (*logos kath auto*) in order to be explicitly visible, points to a basic problem that faces one who wants to bring about *theōrein*. If humans are primarily and predominantly practical animals whose attention is occupied by that which can be taken up in action—*ousia* as *pragmata*—then how can their disposition be changed so that they begin to see and appreciate being itself, which is untouched by whatever current desire one seeks to fulfill? Heidegger sees this question as guiding the interpretation of rhetoric that is found in both Plato and Aristotle.

As we have seen in the *Phaedrus*, Plato conceives of dialectic as the mode of speech capable of leading a listener to take up a contemplative disposition. Socrates distinguishes between the different ways the soul's motion can be ruled. It can be ruled by bodily desires, which are vices such as gluttony or greed, or it can be ruled by the soul's own desire to see the truth—to grasp the ideas themselves. Insofar as one engages in dialectic in the proper way, one comes to be ruled more and more by the desire to see itself. In this way dialectic is an expression of the self-sustaining life of the philosopher. Dialectic feeds and preserves the soul's desire to see by continually revealing glimpses of underlying and eternal truths.[305] It is the mode of speech

[305] The notion that seeing ideas feeds and fuels intellectual life is suggested in *Phaedrus*. In the account about the nature of the soul through the likeness of the chariot and charioteer, Socrates describes the viewing of the ideas as

that both expresses and motivates the soul's natural motion. As such, dialectic operates as a virtuous circle—it is an activity that sustains itself.

Aristotle sees a deficiency in dialectic. To rouse intellectual desire, dialectic relies on the natural predisposition of the soul to seek ideas. But if this natural predisposition is dormant, then dialectic faces a basic threat—that the interlocutor "won't listen."[306] Indeed, just because an interlocutor's opinion is effectively called into doubt does not mean that the interlocutor will necessary take on the task of seeking the truth. The interlocutor must first be governed by the desire to see *for its own sake* in order for dialectic to be a fulfilling and enthralling exercise. If this is the case then the question becomes: how can the desire to see (*theōrein*) be roused in such a way that it can motivate speech and inquiry?

Heidegger sees an essential part of the answer to this question in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Rhetoric itself is not grasped as holding the power to re-orient the soul toward the true and divine any more than dialectic is. For Aristotle, the art of rhetoric does not guarantee success in persuasion of any kind. But while rhetoric cannot force a listener to choose contemplation, it does have the power to bring a listener to a state where they are disposed to see the eternal as compelling and to see the philosophical life as choice-worthy. In this way rhetoric will prove to be a counterpart to dialectic.[307] Whereas dialectic has shown itself to have the ability to bring

---

"banqueting" for the charioteer, whose horses are given nectar and ambrosia for food and drink. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247e.)

[306] In the opening scene of *Republic* Polemarchus tells Socrates he "won't listen" if Socrates tries to persuade Polemarchus and company to free Socrates and Glaucon. (Plato, *Republic*, 327c.)

[307] "Rhetoric is a counterpart (*antistrophos*) of Dialectic." (Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, 354a). The term *antistrophos* has received considerable focus from commentators. Plato uses the same term to describe the correspondence between arts of soul and body (e.g. medicine and justice) and the knacks that pretend to know what is best for soul and body (pastry baking and rhetoric). (Plato, *Gorgias*, 464b, 465d.) Though Grimaldi and Kennedy suggest otherwise (William M. A. Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary, [New York: Fordham University Press, 1980] 2; Aristotle, *On Rhetoric*, 28 ftn. 2), Aristotle's own distinction between rhetoric and dialectic as impractical (soul) and practical (body) maintains Plato's basic orientation and likely stems from Plato. As is often noted, *Antistrophos* (which means a 'turn against') refers to a verse in a choral ode that follows an earlier verse of like form, the *strophē*, and which precedes the concluding verse of a different form, the *epōidos*. While no definite interpretation of Aristotle's usage of *antistrophos* can easily be determined, the interpretation I put forth is

ideas before an interlocutor, and thereby to 'to bring a horse to water,' rhetoric will show itself as able to rouse the desire to contemplate the being of beings—'to make the horse thirsty.' As we will see, Heidegger locates rhetoric's ability to rouse intellectual desire in its power over the emotion that bridges everyday and scientific life—fear.

i. Wisdom and Choice

To understand what the philosophical life aims at (and therefore what rhetoric is significant for bringing about) we will turn to Aristotle's conception of wisdom. Aristotle characterizes wisdom through two distinct but related capacities. He says "the wise man must not only know what follows from first principles, but must also possess truth about first principles."[308] Aristotle identifies the first aspect of wisdom (the knowledge of what follows from first principles) as scientific knowledge. The second aspect is the capacity to see and understand first principles themselves, and ultimately the being of beings, through the intellect, *nous*. For Aristotle, it is intellectual sight that is decisive. It is this activity (not science) that Aristotle attributes to the wisest beings of all—the gods.[309] Indeed, science's secondary status is evident insofar as science itself does not have the power of discovering principles even while it depends on their discovery for its existence.[310] But while intellectual sight is decisive for wisdom, it is also precisely that which continually eludes human power. Humans may attain moments of insight but they are destined to fall back into that which comes forth through language. What is

distinctive insofar as it grasps dialectic and rhetoric as counterparts in one movement toward a common end, the *epōidos* corresponding to contemplation.

[308] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141a18.

[309] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1178b8.

[310] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1139b35.

present before humans is not characterized by *nous* purely, but by *nous* mediated by language, *dianoesis*.[311]

Science is a way of falling into speech that remains directed toward and governed by first principles. Aristotle defines science as a stable disposition (*hexis*) to demonstrate (*apodeiktikē*).[312] Demonstration is a type of speech that begins from a grasp of the being of what is spoken about—it begins with a definition, a *logos ousias*.[313] What can come to appearance in demonstrative speech ultimately refers to and depends on the being of what is spoken about. When one sees the ways something must be, the properties it must have in order to continue to be what it is, one is able to demonstrate. The particular form of science that is the concern of the person seeking wisdom, the philosopher, is special. Demonstrations made by philosophers are not oriented toward grasping the being of a particular kind of being, but being as being. The philosopher, who most ably takes up the human possibility of wisdom, takes up the "science of being" as her task.[314] This is the most 'finished" science insofar reaches the ultimate basis of science itself, being as such.[315]

While science is attainable by humans, insofar as it operates through speech and not *nous* alone, it remains difficult to attain. The type of difficulty is signaled insofar as Aristotle defines science as a *hexis*. A *hexis* is a stable disposition toward something. It stability is demonstrated insofar as it is able to withstand forces that threaten to destroy or redirect one's orientation. We

---

[311] Aristotle identifies mind (*nous*) in human beings with "the part of the soul that thinks (*dianoetai*) and forms judgments (*hupolambanei*)." (Aristotle, *On The Soul*, trans. W. S. Hett in *Aristotle: On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath*, Loeb Classical Library N. 288 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 429a23.) Heidegger emphasizes the connection between *dianoein* and *logos*. See Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 189-190; Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 123.

[312] Aristotle, *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. R. Hackman, Loeb Classical Library N. 73. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), Bk VI, Ch. iii, 4.

[313] "The basic premises of demonstrations are definitions…. definition is of the essential nature or being of something, and all demonstrations evidently posit and assume the essential nature." (Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, 90b25-33.)

[314] Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1004a33.

[315] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1141a17.

see this in Aristotle's discussion of the ethical virtues, which are also defined as *hexeis*. The ethical person maintains their orientation toward the mean, which is noble, in the face of pleasures and pains that threaten this orientation. The courageous person, for example, is one who correctly identifies an oncoming threat, is frightened of it, but faces it nonetheless because their attraction to a noble end is stronger than their desire to flee from pain and harm.[316]

Whereas the ethical virtues are maintained against particular forms of pleasure and pain, the scientific *hexis* must maintain itself against the human tendency of speech and appearance to be ruled by the immediacy of pleasure and pain itself. As discussed above, Heidegger sees Aristotle as recognizing that what primarily and predominantly appears in speech is that which is (or is not) useful. Human *logos* is *logos kata tinos*. However, insofar as a scientist becomes caught up in the particular way that this entity could be useful for 'me' right now, they are no longer maintaining an orientation toward what is necessary for one type of being as such. The scientist must be not be swayed by the tendency of things to appear in terms of their usefulness, but must continually see the ways that something is, its properties, as stemming from (or not stemming from) whatever it needs to be to continue being what it is. Their speech, and therefore what appears before them, must not come under the rule of the body, but must be governed by its reference to being itself. It must stem from a *logos kath auto*.

Aristotle takes up the question of how attain a *hexis* in *Nicomachean Ethics*. The intellectual virtues, he says, have their "birth and growth" in teaching (*didaskalias*), while the ethical virtues have their origin in habitual action (*ethos*).[317] In both cases Aristotle maintains the principle that humans are conditioned by repeated action.[318] This repeated action, however, must

[316] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1117b6.
[317] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1103a15.
[318] That repeated action is decisive in the case of the intellectual virtues is indicated by the term for teaching that Aristotle uses—*didaskalia.* This refers not only to 'instruction' but to the rehearsal of dramatic productions, which

be of a certain type in order to instill a *hexis*. Blindly repeating virtuous actions is no more sufficient for someone to be ethically virtuous than blindly repeating the lesson of a teacher is sufficient for knowledge. The person repeating the action must come to be guided not by others, but internally. Aristotle identifies 3 conditions for this change to take place. The actor "must have knowledge [of what is done], secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and third his action must proceed from a firm and unchanging character."[319] The second condition, choosing the act and choosing it for its own sake, will prove decisive for the question of how to bring about the philosophical life.

For Aristotle, it is through choice that a human becomes an origin of action.[320] Choice is defined as "deliberate desire."[321] That is to say, in choice the desiring part of the soul comes to be directed by deliberative speech (*boulēsis*). In deliberation, a desired end is already assumed; one's task is to determine the means toward achieving that end that are within one's power. The determination of the action that will bring about one's end in the best way, however, is not sufficient for choice. One chooses insofar as the desire for the end that one seeks is transferred to the means that is determined by deliberation. As Aristotle says, through choice we come to "desire in accordance with our deliberation."[322]

Deliberation and the transference of desire that occur through choice have the power to change and fix the way entities appear in speech. While cozy and settled by a fire, the 'book' that appears before me may show itself in its customary way, as 'something to be read'. But if I am freezing, I may orient myself toward the goal of getting warm and come to see the book in terms

---

presumably entails repetition. (H. G. Liddell and Robert Scott, eds. *Greek-English Lexicon*, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891], 169.)

[319] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1105a31.

[320] "Hence choice is either desiderative reason or rationcinative desire, and such an origin of action is man." (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1139b4.)

[321] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1113a11.

[322] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1113a12.

of this goal. The book may come to appear as 'fuel', as 'something to be burned'. Insofar as the desired end that guides one's deliberation is steady (e.g. insofar as I find myself continually fighting the cold) the significance of what appears through deliberation can become relatively fixed. The book may come to appear as 'fuel' first and foremost. In this way, deliberation and choice can lead to a relatively fixed change in the significance and usefulness of that which appears through speech.

In an everyday context, this alteration of the world through deliberation would presumably be governed by desires that are practical and immediate—e.g. the need for food, shelter, sex, wealth, etc. But Aristotle also recognizes the possibility of orienting the significance of one's actions toward the goal of reaching knowledge. Indeed, Aristotle characterizes the first philosophers as people who "philosophized in order to escape ignorance…pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end."[323] These men did not primarily seek wealth, as the sophists were characterized as doing.[324] Instead, the early philosophers appear to have operated in the mold of Thales, who is characterized by a blindness toward worldly things and a lack of regard for wealth.[325] Aristotle says that philosophers (such as Anaxagoras and Thales) "have philosophic but not practical wisdom;" they are concerned with things that are "remarkable, admirable, and divine"—but also "useless" and not "to their own advantage."[326] Thus, in the figure of the philosopher, lies the possibility of becoming oriented toward what appears through speech (the world) as that which can lead to knowledge and contemplation.

[323] Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 982b20.
[324] Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, 165b22, 171b25.
[325] In one fragment, Thales is mocked by a "witty and attractive Thracian servant girl" after falling in a well for his blindness to what is "behind him and just by his feet." In another, we are told that in response to those who "reproached him for his poverty," Thales demonstrated that "it is easy for philosophers to be rich, if they wish, but that it is not in this that they are interested." (Forrest E. Baird, ed., *Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. 6, [Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011] 8-9)
[326] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1141b4.

However, for a philosopher to choose a life governed by the pursuit of wisdom, they must first come to choose knowledge over all else. This means that knowledge and contemplation must come to appear as the chief and highest goods. For this to occur, the development of a mere opinion or abstract ideal about what is good is not sufficient. For Aristotle, humans are predominantly oriented toward what appears to be good *because* it is pleasurable. Humans are animals that "choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil."[327] The ability to choose the philosophical life depends on the recognition of knowledge and contemplation as eminently pleasurable—it depends on the strength of one's desire.

For Plato and Aristotle, it is clear that the end of philosophy, the contemplation of the being of beings, is remarkably pleasurable. Plato depicts Socrates as a man who takes great pleasure in dialectic (who is "sick with the desire to hear speeches") and Aristotle claims that intellectual life is the most pleasant of all.[328] But it is also clear in the work of both, that the majority of people are blind to this form of pleasure. This blindness is of two types. On the one hand, it is characterized negatively. Most of us cannot see "remarkable, admirable, and divine" entities for what they are because they initially appear "useless," and therefore unworthy of attention.[329] On the other hand, this blindness is positive characterized. In Plato, the light of the truth is described as having a blinding power that is frightening and potentially destructive. Socrates describes his own approach to gaining knowledge as having been re-directed by this blinding power in *Phaedo*. He says "I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of things by means of words."[330] The point is

[327] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1113b1.
[328] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 228b; Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1178a7.
[329] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1141b4.
[330] Plato, *Phaedo*, 99e.

made again in *Republic* when Socrates speaks of the experience of the cave dwellers who are brought to experience the light of day. "When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he had seen before."[331]

Thus the question of how to make the philosophical life choice-worthy, and to allow for the development of a scientific *hexis* toward the being of beings, is a question of rousing the desire to *see* in the certain way. This desire cannot stem from a trifling or abstract concern. It must come from a source that is fundamental enough to govern all the actions of a philosopher's life. For Heidegger, it is by rousing fear in the proper way that one's eyes can be opened to the compelling and true. Fear stems from the pain of non-being—from that which threatens to destroy oneself. To turn on one intellectual desire and to open one's 'eyes', this fear of self-destruction will need to be re-oriented toward all things, such that the desire and hope for preservation is not directed only toward oneself—but toward the everlasting as such.

ii. Fear and Being

Heidegger's focus on fear in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* may initially seem like a mere interpretive convenience. One might reason in the following way. In *Being and Time,* Heidegger wants to discuss anxiety. Influenced by Kierkegaard, Heidegger's conception of anxiety is based in a discussion of (and distinction from) fear. Heidegger recognizes that Aristotle has a special status as a philosophical interpreter of the emotions, as he tells his readers in *Being and Time*.[332] Heidegger also wants to distance his work from its theological influences. For these reasons, Heidegger turns to Aristotle's discussion of fear, which happens to be in *Rhetoric*.

[331] Plato, *Republic*, 515.
[332] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 178 [H. 139].

In *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* however, a different picture emerges. Heidegger's justification for focusing on fear stems from Aristotle's attempt to resolve a problem of his predecessors. In Bk. 9 Ch. 8 of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle demonstrates that all eternal things, including eternal motion, must exist in a state of perpetual and necessary activity and not potency. For this reason, Aristotle argues, "the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may."[333] For Heidegger, Aristotle's statement points to a fear that guided and shaped philosophical inquiry from its origin. It is the fear that all things will cease to be.

The connection between the cessation of the movement of heavenly bodies and the destruction of all things is strikingly presented in Plato's *Theaetetus*. There, Socrates identifies Homer as the leader (*stratēgos*) of the early philosophical camp that believes that being and becoming are products of motion.[334] As the crowning evidence for how these philosophers understood the connection between motion and being, Socrates refers to a threat made by Zeus in the *Iliad.* [335] This threat is so impressive that it leaves the other gods in silence. If they cross him, Zeus warns, he could pull a golden chain that hangs from heaven, hauling earth and sea (and therefore all the gods as well) to mount Olympus where he could leave the whole world dangling impotently.[336] Socrates suggests that the golden cord refers to the sun, and that Homer is explaining "that so long as the revolution continues and the sun is in motion, all things are and are preserved, but that if all this should be 'bound fast', as it were, and come to a standstill, all things would be destroyed."[337] Thus in the cessation of the motion of heavenly bodies, Socrates

[333] Aristotle, *Metaphysica,*1050b23.
[334] Plato, *Theaetetus,* 152e.
[335] Socrates says "And finally, to put the crown on my argument, I might bring in Homer's golden cord…." (Plato, *Theaetetus,* 153c.)
[336] Homer, *Iliad*, viii. 17-27.
[337] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 153d.

sees the early philosophers of motion as facing a stunning threat of such scale and scope that it extends to all things, even immortal gods.

For Heidegger, the fear that all things will cease to be is not only an issue for the early natural philosophers; it is the originating principle that shapes and sustains the chief desire of Greek philosophy as a whole. The philosopher, characterized by the astonishment (*thaumazein*) that things are the way they are and that they are at all, also lives in the possibility that things could be otherwise—that all things could cease to be. The idea that all the things that one has touched and seen will cease to be—indeed that all things that anyone has ever and will ever possibly experience will cease to be—is ground-breaking; it disrupts a basic stability assumed in all action and experience. More than the obliteration of one's own body and personal experiences, this fear is directed toward that which threatens the possibility of any legacy at all—the possibility of any impression being left upon the world or the souls of others. If nothing remains, nothing can be passed on.

The fear of the destruction of one's legacy threatens a basic desire that Aristotle identifies in all life. Speaking of the capacity of the nutritive soul in *De Anima*, Aristotle says "for any living thing that has reached its normal development and which is unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, the most natural act is the production of another like itself…in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine."[338] Heidegger interprets Aristotle's claim about the divine orientation of all living things as referring to a basic desire to partake in the mode of being that characterizes the gods, eternal presence.[339] As plants grow they not only become sturdier and more able to sustain their lives, they also flower and reproduce themselves thereby. Animals, identified with *hēdonē,* are moved by pleasure and pain.

[338] Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. J. A. Smith in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 415a27.
[339] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 77.

Pleasure and pain do not only allow animals to maintain their lives by moving away from the destructive and toward that which preserves, they also guide animals to reproduce, allowing the animal to live on through their off-spring.[340] In both types of souls, Aristotle sees the movement toward life and re-production as fundamental.

While humans are also fundamentally motivated by the desire to sustain and reproduce their bodily existence, philosophy allows another way to respond to the threat to one's legacy. Heidegger sees the philosopher as responding to the fear of the destruction of all things with a distinctive "hope and conviction that beings, genuinely speaking, may and should have to be being-there-always [*immer-daseiend*]."[341] In this way, it is the response to the fear of non-being that shapes the meaning of being. The pain and horror of the disappearance of all things motivates the conception of being as that which cannot be touched by destruction. Or, as Heidegger says, the "*fear of the disappearing-at-some-point-from-the-there*" entails a corresponding hope, "*the holding-fast to the sense of being as being-always-present*." For Heidegger the basic task of the earliest philosophers, to set forth "definite *archai* at any price," is an expression of this philosophical response to the fear of non-being.[342] The natural philosophers sought to partake in something everlasting that underlies and preserves all generation and destruction by 'seeing' it—by grasping the *archai* through *theōrein*. Further for Heidegger, one can only understand why Plato and Aristotle conceive of the philosopher's life as the most pleasurable, if one understands how deeply the fear of non-being threatens. The philosophical and scientific life is not primarily a predilection of those funny few who happen to enjoy

[340] It is noteworthy that it is precisely this type of legacy that the Lord offers Abraham as part of the covenant between them. Abraham, who has been given no child, worries about his heir. The Lord is able to address Abrahams's concern in a way that only a divine power can; he promises that Abraham's "seed" will be as numerous as the stars in the sky. (*The Holy Bible*, King James Version, [New York: Oxford Edition: 1769,]; King James Bible Online, 2008, [http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/ accessed 2/23/14], *Genesis* 15: 2-5.)
[341] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 196.
[342] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 196.

abstraction. It is the "the highest possibility of existence," because it is the way of life wherein the threat to the fundamental desire of all living things—the desire to be—"no longer menaces."[343]

iii. Fear, Deliberation, Science

In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, fear is understood as a *pistis* that resides in the listener. That is to say, it is understood as something that can produce conviction by temporarily governing the way a listener judges what appears before them. However, for Heidegger, what is important about fear is not primarily that it leads to a particular type of judgment, but that it leads to a particular type of speech—deliberation. Aristotle characterizes fear as a state that holds together the contradictory expectations that one will be destroyed and saved.[344] Someone who fears must believe that what threatens, threatens them, and does so now. Without the expectation that danger will be realized, there is nothing to fear. At the same time, the fearful person is characterized as holding onto the hope that they will be saved. Someone who has accepted an evil fate does not get worked up in the way that someone who is afraid does. Heidegger interprets the opposition of these two expectations as leading to the disquiet (*tarakē*) that Aristotle identifies with fear. This disquiet, in turn, compels the person who is afraid to begin to speak—to deliberate.[345]

Insofar as fear cultivates deliberation, it is an emotion that has the effect of revealing one's own desired end in a more or less clear way. Even in routine everyday deliberation, where one's desired end is not clearly conceived, some notion of one's end is required in order to identify the means that will achieve it. Fear defines one's end negatively—one seeks to avoid the

[343] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 197.
[344] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382b27-1383a12.
[345] Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 174-175.

pain and destruction that another person or thing threatens to bring. At the same time, however, in order to flee in the proper way, one must have a nascent notion of the opposite direction that one wants to move toward—namely sustained pleasure and life. Deliberation that results from fear reveals the way that one can attain this end the opposite to the fearful; how to flee from it and toward its opposite. In this way, fear has the power to make our continual and underlying drive toward pleasure and preservation explicit in different ways. One who is fleeing from a wild animal explicitly takes up the task of all living things—preserving life and avoiding destructive pain—but in a particular direction. They are not likely to look for food or water, though both are necessary for survival. Instead they will look for that which will put the threat at a distance, such as a 'hiding place' or a 'defensive weapon'.

In order to see the philosophical potential of fear, we will need to understand the mode of fearing that compels one to flee toward the contemplation of being. For Aristotle, rousing any emotion requires that a speaker attend to three things. First, there is the disposition of mind (*diakeimenoi*) that makes one prone to fear. Second there is the character of the fearful itself. Third there are the conditions in which fear arise.[346] As in Aristotle's discussion of the three elements of speech (speaker, listener, speech), we see that Aristotle is oriented toward fear as the realization of a particular motion. The mover in this case is the entity or person that causes fear. The moved is the person who comes to be afraid. And the realization of the motion is the fear itself, exhibited in the person who is afraid. As in the discussion of the *pisteis*, Aristotle seeks to identify the disposition that needs to be present in each element for fear to be realized.

Let's begin with the second aspect, the character of the fearful itself. The fear inducing is "whatever we feel has great power of destroying us, or of harming us in ways that tend to cause

[346] Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, Bk II, Ch.1, 9 [1178a23].

great pain."[347] But it is not enough that something has great power to destroy or cause pain for it to be fearful; it must also be the case that its destructive power is disposed toward the one who is to feel fear. The fearful must appear as that which is expected to approach oneself imminently. Aristotle says that it is "the approach of what is terrible…that we mean by 'danger'."[348] A fearful entity is fearful to the degree that it is dangerous—and something is dangerous to the degree that it is disposed to destroy.

To clarify how something can appear to be dangerous, Aristotle lists several key signs. A destructive force shows itself to be highly frightening when it appears to be more powerful than that which we already believe to be powerful, when it frightens or is able to "destroy people stronger than we are."[349] It is also frightening to the degree that it is likely to destroy. For this reason those who are angry, unjust, outraged, and wronged are to be feared.[350] Further, Aristotle notes that the most fearful is not outspoken but "quiet, dissembling, and unscrupulous, since we never know when they are upon us."[351] Lastly, the fearful is more frightening if its actions are beyond our power to resist, those "we cannot, or cannot easily, help." [352]

By looking at the characteristics of the fearful, it becomes clear that the force behind the destruction of all things that the early philosophers feared is frightening to the highest degree. The view that all generated things will be destroyed is expressed by Anaximander, who sees generation as entailing destruction "according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of time."[353] If it is the case that *all* generated things face destruction in time, then non-being threatens entities vastly more powerful

[347] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382a 27.
[348] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382a 32.
[349] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382b17.
[350] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382a33.
[351] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382b22.
[352] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382b26.
[353] Baird, *Ancient Philosophy*, 11.

and long lasting than ourselves, such as demi-gods, civilizations, mountains, and oceans. The degree to which this destructive force is frightening is heightened by the likelihood that the destruction will occur. This destruction is characterized as being inevitable and necessary. All things that came to be (including myself) will be destroyed in accordance with an unflinching form of cosmic justice. The fearfulness of impending non-being is further heightened by the fact that one never knows precisely when it is upon you. In this way it is "quiet" and even "dissembling." Lastly, the death and destruction of all things is made more frightening still by one's powerlessness in the face of it; no one can stop it, one can only delay.

But while the inevitable destruction of all things is more powerful, likely, stealthy, and resistant to our power than other fearful entities, destruction of this type is still not necessarily what we will fear. The fearful itself must come to appear as that which is close and approaching. Aristotle makes this case by speaking about death. He says "we do not fear things that are a very long way off: for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand."[354] This quotation indicates the necessary disposition that a person must have to become afraid. To be overcome by fear, I must expect that the destruction is close at hand.

To bring the fear of death close at hand, an orator could show that death can happen to anyone at any time—thereby implicating the listener. Aristotle suggests that arguing that the fearful lurks unexpectedly is a useful technique to rouse fear.[355] By employing the intellect, however, there is another way of bringing eventuality of non-being close at hand. By paying close attention to what something is—by explicitly grasping the concept that we already have for

[354] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1382a25.
[355] Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1383a7.

entities—one can show that non-being and destruction are necessarily and continually present in worldly things.

The Greeks understand humans to be mortals. Mortals are living entities that will necessarily die. This does not only mean that death will come at some unexpected time for all, but that death is itself part of life. Indeed, a baby born is a baby that is moving toward death. By explicitly bringing forth the concept of life, one show that death is there, now—that it is always close at hand. Likewise, non-being can be shown to be at hand in non-living entities that we encounter. We can see this insofar as worldly entities are understood to be 'composites.' Composite entities are defined as entities that hold together separate elements in one unity. But the power to hold together separate elements entails the power that these elements be broken apart. Thus the ability to be destroyed is entailed in what it means to be a composite. Or, turning back to Anaximenes, one could present the being of 'generation' as necessarily implying 'destruction.' For our purposes, the particular way that non-being and destruction are shown to be part of what something is, is not important. What is important is what these ways share in common. By conceiving of the entities one engages with (as mortal, composite, or generated etc.), and therefore by showing what is implied in their being, destruction can be revealed as present and approaching in what they are, now and always.

As mentioned above, for fear to be roused, the person who is afraid must maintain a disposition of hope—hope of being saved. The direction of their hope is determined negatively by the threat. The threat posed by the destruction of all things threatens one's own preservation and legacy through an intellectual view of the necessity of destruction. It reveals a threat inherent to what entities are. To respond to such a threat, no action will suffice. One cannot bat away non-being with a stick or outrun it. Instead, Heidegger sees the philosopher as the one who faces the

threat of destruction dead on, looking to find that which allows for beings to be present always. The philosopher must open their eyes to the being of that which appears through intellectual sight and attempt to discover what it is in the being of beings that preserves them and allows them to continue to be. Heidegger sees this search as the search for an *archē*, for that which rules over and preserves all beings as such. For Heidegger this search first revealed particular beings that have the character of persevering through all generation and destruction (water, air, the indefinite, etc.), before ultimately grounding the being of beings in nothing other than being itself.

This response to the fear of the destruction of all things produces a special form of deliberation. The fear of the destruction of all beings and the possibility of a legacy re-directs one so that one's end becomes the preservation of all things. Because this end is not within one's power, one cannot deliberate about how one's actions can bring it about. But this does not mean that the structure of deliberation is abandoned. One still engages in if-then reasoning about causes. The 'if' becomes oriented toward the continued being of that which is spoken about. For example, one might argue, "if a human is to continue to be a human, then it must have the power of speech." Here, deliberation is oriented toward the continuing to be of that which one is speaking of. That is to say, it entails that one take up the type of speech that Aristotle calls *logos kath auto*. The being of something is itself grasped as a cause. What follows from the grasp of the being that one is speaking about are demonstrations about the necessary properties of that which one has grasped in its being. That is to say, what follows is a form of deliberation that makes necessary demonstrations on the basis of definitions—science. Here it is a matter of finding and speaking from the *archē* that governs one's domain of being, of finding that which necessarily persists and maintains health, or numbers, or the movement of heavenly bodies.

Indeed, it is even possible to turn toward the *archē* of beings as beings—thereby taking up the science of being itself—wisdom.

Thus, fear allows for science and philosophy for Heidegger because it turns one's basic desire for self-preservation and legacy toward the contemplation of being as a means to address the threat of non-being that resides in worldly things. Through science and philosophy one can keep this threat at bay—by continually orienting oneself toward the being of beings in speech. One grasps that which survives the destruction of all particular entities. It is something that adheres to each thing insofar as it is the type of being it is, and ultimately, insofar as it is at all.

Conclusion

At this point we can turn back to the question that started this chapter off. What role does Aristotle's *Rhetoric* play within Aristotle's larger philosophical project for Heidegger? We took up the view that Aristotle shared Plato's concern to concretely realize philosophy, but realized that dialectic alone was insufficient. To take up the life of contemplation, the *bios theōretikos*, a person must fix the orientation of their speech away from the utility of what is spoken about and toward the being of what is spoken about. This requires that the contemplation of being becomes a choice-worthy activity, even though it is useless and therefore insignificant for practical life.

The process is primarily one of uncovering a basic desire in order to allow it to govern how things appear through speech. The natural desire to see the being of beings must be motivated by what initially appears to be an everyday concern. Heidegger sees that the emotion that allows one to pivot from everyday concerns to scientific ones is fear. Fear initially strikes the underlying desire that rules bodily pleasure and pain—namely self-preservation. By rousing fear, one can make the underlying desire of self-preservation explicit, bringing it before the eyes

of the person who is afraid and thereby making it a source of deliberation (*a telos* that one reasons from and toward). However in the structure of fear Heidegger also sees another possibility. One can turn one's desire for immediate self-preservation toward the desire toward one's legacy—understood as the desire to preserve that which one has touched and been touched by—the world itself. Insofar as one comes to feel threatened by that which destroys all things, one's fear harbors a distinctive type of hope. This hope is not only for self-preservation, but for the continuing-to-be of all that is—for the being of beings understood as perpetual presence. This hope is alive in speech that seeks to discover and demonstrate that there is an *archē* of all beings that not only persists through every form of generation and destruction, but that continually preserves all that is.

For this task, Heidegger sees Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as the guide. Heidegger's claim is not that *Rhetoric* is only directed toward realizing the philosophical life. Rhetoric takes up the question of how a speaker can lead people who are governed by everyday and practical belief to come to any judgment whatsoever. Aristotle grasps the compelling power of speech through its structure. He sees that for speech to realize its aim it must address a listener who is already disposed to listen in a certain way, to speech that taps into pre-existing beliefs, and from a speaker that has a certain character; persuasive speech must attend to *pathos*, *logos*, and *ethos*. However, in rousing the fear of the destruction of all things, Heidegger sees rhetoric's philosophical potential. The fearful—that which causes the destruction of things—needs to be shown to have a frightening character—a disposition to harm. The listener also needs to develop a disposition to see the destruction of all things as close at hand. And the resulting realization of fear needs to manifest itself in the realization of a particular form of speech, deliberation that is directed toward the being of beings.

In this way, we can see how Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is part of what allows Aristotle to fulfill the second epoch of philosophy. In order to concretely bring about speech about being, Aristotle must discern precisely how everyday human being-there harbors the potential to be turned toward the sight of being itself as something desirable and compelling. Rhetoric grasps precisely how humans can be brought to compelling judgments in general through an analysis of the structure of *logos* itself. It is the *technē* that gives its practitioner the power to see how to persuade people to explicitly discover the meaning of being.

Conclusion

Philosophy is often spoken of as something abstracted and alienated from the philosophical way of life. Understood as a domain of knowledge and inquiry, philosophy can appear as a sovereign theoretical realm defined by it borders with other disciplines and characterized by internal strife. The actors in this realm are akin to political factions; each is identified by the doctrine they promote and the battle lines that they have drawn. There are 'subjective idealists,' 'eliminative materialists,' 'Marxians,' 'dualists,' and 'logical positivists,' to name but a few. Each position has its own history—famous philosophes are founders or former leaders who built lasting fortifications or developed means of attack that are still employed. The intellectual domain conquered or ceded to neighboring disciplines (e.g. psychology, physics, political science, linguistics), along with the result of civil conflicts, shapes the arena of argumentation today.

Such a view obscures the way philosophy was originally conceived by Plato. As the 'love of wisdom,' philosophy is something that cannot be separated from the way that a particular (human) being exists; love is the activity of someone capable of love. For philosophy to be present in someone, this love of wisdom must be instantiated in a particular way. Philosophy does not express itself through an occasional or suppressed love; it is present to the degree that this love governs the life of which it is a part. Indeed, for Plato every human soul has an inherent desire to contemplate ideas, but not everyone is a philosopher. The philosopher, presented in the figure of Socrates, is defined by his steadfastness and courage in choosing to follow the path to wisdom in the face of pain, dishonor, and death. For Plato, the philosopher is like a soldier, but

the battle is not against other philosophers. It is against the tendencies in human nature that pull us away from the divine, noble, and true.

This project returned to Plato's concern with philosophy as a way of life to be sought and realized. It raised the question of how philosophy can be brought about concretely in oneself and in others, arguing that rhetoric has a decisive role in making the philosophical life choice-worthy because it is the art that holds the power of rousing philosophical desire through the means available to humans—speech. Following Heidegger, it investigated the way that rousing a particular type of fear—the fear of non-being itself—could turn a listener's attention away from the world of daily affairs, upward, toward the fixed and eternal. In this way, the art of rhetoric was seen to provide the rhetorician with a power akin to a rooster's crow. It gives a speaker the power to see what type of speech will cut through the slumber of everydayness, startling the listener in such a way they are compelled to open their eyes and see the world as it is.

'Rhetoric' often refers to flowery, empty, or deceptive speech that has been crafted in order to persuade. 'Rhetoric' is also used in a related way, referring to that which allows one to craft persuasive speech—to the art of persuasion or to techniques that furnish that art. Understood in these ways, rhetoric opposes philosophy and science. It is not concerned with whether one's argument is true or not—or whether there is such a thing as 'the truth' at all—only with what will persuade people for practical ends, here and now. If we take rhetoric in this sense, any claim about its philosophical significance seems accidental. One might acknowledge that rhetoric *can* be used for the sake of philosophy in the same way that one acknowledges that a book *can* be used as a doorstop.

However, by fleshing out Heidegger's conception of rhetoric, a different view emerged. Heidegger conceives of rhetoric like a natural entity—an entity defined by its inherent tendency

to move and grow toward the state in which its being is realized, its *telos*. The end of rhetoric is the captivation of a listener through speech. Its means for achieving this end is to understand how the soul can be led through language. Heidegger interprets the ends and means of rhetoric as a hermeneutic of Dasein. A hermeneutic of Dasein is concerned with realizing the ecstatic potential of human beings—it seeks to realize the mode of being that Dasein is fundamentally oriented toward—existence. It attempts to do so through interpretation of the *a priori* structures that underlie and shape human presence—being-there. For Heidegger, rhetoric is a hermeneutic of Dasein insofar it has an inherent tendency to realize the ecstatic potential of human beings by trying to understand the particular way that the *zōon logon echon* is affected by the world through speech.

Heidegger's distinctive interpretation of the goal of rhetoric stems from Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, Greek culture is characterized by a belief in the awesome power of rhetoric that is nearly incomprehensible to modern people. Nietzsche attributes the difference to the mythical and dreamlike existence of the Greeks. "Honest Athenians," Nietzsche suggests, believed that "the whole of nature cavorts around men as if it were just a masquerade of the gods."[356] We see an example of how the Greeks could be struck by the divine in story from the *Athenian Constitution* that Nietzsche cites.[357] The story recounts how the extreme democrat Peisistratus reclaimed his rule by entering Athens beside a tall and beautiful woman dressed as Athena. The people, whose expectations had been raised by rumors, marveled (*thaumazein*) at the sight of the

[356] Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense," trans. Ronald Speirs in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, eds. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 151.
[357] Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense," 151.

Goddess. They were so struck that they were stopped in their tracks, dropping their daily activities to perform "acts of reverence."[358]

For Nietzsche, the desire of the Greeks to be overwhelmed and awed was funneled into the work of shaping their language to make it striking enough to approach the awesome power of the Gods themselves. Gorgias gives voice to the divine aspiration of the power of speech in the *Encomiun of Helen*. For Gorgias, the persuasion of *logos* is akin to that of physical force, it can to impress the soul (*psuchēn etupōsato*) as it wishes—stamping something lasting that changes the way one thinks and sees the world. This forceful impression on the soul produces the "divinest works" insofar as it is able to thoroughly dominate body and soul together, leaving the listener shuddering in fear, weeping in sorrow, or overcome with joy. In this way, persuasive speech binds together the powers of pleasure and pain. It is beyond the power of a listener to resist, capable of both ecstasy and trauma.

By fleshing out Heidegger's conception of rhetoric, this project showed the different ways that the sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, appropriated rhetoric's task of understanding how to strike awe in the soul. The sophists were seen as taking up the task of rhetoric in a fundamentally deficient way. They abandoned the true calling of rhetoric, seeking money rather than the most powerful and beautiful impressions possible through speech. The basic concept that guides sophistical rhetoric, the *eikos*, indicates this limitation. The sophists follow the principle that a practitioner of rhetoric does not need to present the truth of matters. Instead, sophistical rhetoricians captivate by means of pre-existing beliefs. The sophists operate like the manufacturers of Peisistratus's ploy. They do not attempt to summon the goddess Athena herself. Even if such a thing were possible, it would be potentially dangerous and destructive to the goal

[358] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, trans. H. Rackman, in *Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices*, Loeb Philosophical Library N. 285, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), Ch. 14.

of transforming awe into Peisistratus's power. Instead, they captivate and rule by fulfilling expectations that operate on a meager and human scale; by satisfying beliefs about how tall and beautiful Athena will be, and the clothes that she will wear.

The sophistic approach to rhetoric provided what Heidegger calls a 'hermeneutic of Dasein' in a deficient sense. The sophists sought to discover the structures that underlie and govern presence in order to be able to lead to absorption through speech, but their attempt remained entirely within the realm of everydayness. They did not seek to bring a listener to a state of divine ecstasy, but only to the tame pleasure and enthrallment that comes with the realization of one's belief. They did not discover underlying structures of human nature as such but only the way the way that relatively superficial impressions (beliefs) could determine the direction of persuasion.

In Plato, we saw a re-alignment of rhetoric toward the ecstatic experience of the divine itself. For Plato, the potential of speech to bring forth the utterly impressive and captivating is fulfilled in wisdom, the contemplation of that which has impressed the soul most deeply—the ideas themselves. Directed toward the goal of contemplating the ideas, and ultimately being itself, rhetoric comes to be identified with philosophy. Rhetoric, which is nothing other than dialectic, must take up the task of grasping the structures of the soul that lead to the soul's fulfillment as such. The true rhetorician must grasp the nature of the soul, the ideas themselves, and how the two can be brought together. In doing so, the rhetorician does not claim to be able to access divine power at will. Indeed for Socrates philosophy is a form of music—its power ultimately depends upon the blessing of the muses.[359] That being said, true rhetoric—dialectic—does attempt to bring about divine revelation as much as human power allows. It shapes one's soul and readies one to experience that which is most enthralling and impressive. As such, true

[359] Plato, *Phaedo*, 60e.

rhetoric functions as hermeneutic of Dasein. Its task is to discern the *a priori* structures that reside in the nature of the soul itself in order to most adequately realize the possibility of philosophical existence.

In Aristotle, we saw a return to the everyday orientation of rhetoric found in sophistic rhetoric. For Aristotle, neither rhetoric nor dialectic is equivalent to philosophical speech. However, by turning his attention toward *logos* itself (specifically its natural function) Aristotle grasped the type of conviction that can be shared in everyday life, along with the way that sharing these convictions allows for humans to co-exist. For Heidegger, Aristotle fulfills the development of rhetoric precisely by grasping the *a priori* structures that govern the way everyday speech can be realized. As a 'hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another,' rhetoric identifies the *a priori* structure of everydayness—what Heidegger calls the 'world.' By identifying the types of rhetorical speech and the sources of conviction, Aristotle discerns the possible ways that one can move through the world toward the way of being that one seeks.

For Heidegger, if *Rhetoric* were a stand-alone text, it would not properly be called a hermeneutic of Dasein because it is solely concerned with the achievement everyday persuasion and not with ecstasy and enthrallment that come from the contemplation of being. However, Heidegger interprets *Rhetoric* as part of Aristotle's larger attempt to concretely realize the possibility of the philosophical life that extends through Aristotle's entire corpus. For Heidegger, *Rhetoric* is ultimately interpreted in terms of its philosophical significance because in *Rhetoric*, Aristotle articulates the potential of everydayness in general. This allows Aristotle to see a distinctive capability of everydayness, it ability to turn away from the practical and everyday and

toward the true. Heidegger sees the fear of non-being, anxiety, as the *pathos* that allows this turning, and thereby makes the philosophical life choice-worthy.

Employing a metaphor that Plato uses in *Phaedrus*, we can say that rhetoric has been interpreted like an art of gardening where the plants are the souls of listeners.[360] The sophists were like gardeners who attempted to maximize their yield by crowding their seeds together in an artificial structure, a "flower box."[361] Fueled by the manure of wealth and honor, their crop was fast growing but stunted because the soil was shallow and shaped without regard for the roots. Their crop was dense and low-lying, budding branch after branch, but producing no blossoms.

Plato was like a gardener with a single concern—the production of the most beautiful and lasting blossoms. His method was to discover the natural form that each plant ought to take, along with what each plant needs to realize its form in nature. After seeing the stunted growth that the sophists produced, Plato offered his own model of gardening as the solution. He recommended that each plant be dug up by its roots and transplanted individually into the soil, where the roots and outgrowth could reach their full size. The rapid and low lying growth was to be pruned back greatly—leaving only that which is necessary to sustain vertical growth

Aristotle was like a gardener who refrained from following Plato's suggestion after realizing that the crowded plants could not easily be uprooted. Their roots had grown into the shape of the flower box and woven into the roots of neighboring plants in such a way that separating them out could not be achieved without the likelihood of killing them. So, instead of attempting to get the plants to realize their ideal and natural shape, Aristotle sought to understand how to get the plants to grow best in the soil that they were in. He developed such a rich

[360] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 276b.
[361] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 276b.

understanding of the directions and sources of growth and budding that he even eventually came to understand how best to achieve the goal that Plato originally sought. By artificially withholding and then intensifying the light, he saw that one could shock the plant, thereby compelling it to urgently direct its energy into blossoming.

Bibliography

Aristotle. *Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices,* Loeb Philosophical Library N. 285. Translated by Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935.

---. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by Joe Sachs. Newburyport, Focus Publishing, 2002.

---. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by R. Hackman. Loeb Classical Library N. 73. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926.

---. *On Rhetoric*: *A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Translated by George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

---. *On Sophistical Refutations, On Coming-to-be and Passing Away, and On the Cosmos*, Loeb Classical Library N. 400. Translated by E. S. Forster and D. J. Furley. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.

---. *On The Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath,* Loeb Classical Library N. 288. Translated by W. S. Hett. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936.

---. *Politics*, Loeb Classical Library N. 264. Translated by H. Rackman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932.

---. *The Art of Rhetoric*, Loeb Classical Library N. 193. Translated by John Henry Freese. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

---. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Richard Mckeon. New York: Random House, 1941.

---. *The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*, Loeb Classical Library N. 325. Translated by H. P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938.

---. *The Politics*. Edited by Stephen Everson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988

Arnhart, Larry. *Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on The Rhetoric*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981.

Baird, Forrest E, ed. *Ancient Philosophy,* 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011.

Beaufret, Jean. *Dialogue with Heidegger*. Translated by Mark Sinclair. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Bernasconi, Robert. *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press: 1985.

Black, Edwin. *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Brandes, Paul D. *A History of Aristotle's Rhetoric with a Bibliography of Early Printings*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989.

Brogan**,** Walter A. *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

Burke, Kenneth. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

Daly, Chris. *An Introduction to Philosophical Methods*. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2010.

Diels, Herman and Rosamond Kent Sprague, Eds. *The Older Sophists*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972.

Dobson, J. F. *The Greek Orators*. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1967.

Dostal, Robert J, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Mark A. Wrathall, eds. *A Companion to Heidegger*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005.

Everson, Steven. "Aristotle on the Foundations of the State." *Political Studies* 36.1 (1988): 89-101.

Furley, David J and Alexander Nehemas, eds. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Garver, Eugene. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Grassi, Ernesto. "Rhetoric and Philosophy." *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 9 (1976): 200-216.

---. "Can Rhetoric Provide a New Basis for Philosophizing." *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 11 (1978): 1-18, 75-97.

---. *Rhetoric as Philosophy.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980.

Grimaldi, William M. A. *Aristotle, Rhetoric, A Commentary Vol. I and II*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1980-1988.

---. *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric.* Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1972.

Gross, Alan G., and Arthur E. Walzer, eds. *Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000.

Gross, Daniel M. and Ansgar Kemman, eds. *Heidegger and Rhetoric*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

Heidegger, Martin. *Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3 On the Essence and Actuality of Force.* Translated by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

---. *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.

---. *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Translated by Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

--- *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1962.

---. *Gesamptausgabe, Band 19: Platon: Sophistes*. Edited by Ingeborg Schüssler. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.

---. *Gesamptausgabe, Band 18: Grundbegriffe der aristotelishen Philosophie.* Edited by Mark Michaslki. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.

---. *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

---. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*. Translated by Richard Royjcewitz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

---. *Plato's Sophist.* Translated by Richard Royjcewitz and Andre Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

---. *Philosophical and Political Writings: Martin Heidegger*. Edited by Manfred Stassen. New York: Continuum, 2003.

---. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001.

Hodge, Joanna. *Heidegger and Ethics*. London: Routledge, 1995.

Hoffman, David C. "Concerning Eikos: Social Expectation and Verisimilitude in Early Attic Rhetoric," *Rhetorica,* 26.1 (2008): 1-29.

Hyde, Michael J. and Craig R. Smith. "Aristotle and Heidegger on Emotion and

Rhetoric: Questions of Time and Space." *The Critical Turn: Rhetoric and Philosophy in Postmodern Discourse.* Edited by Ian Angus and Lenore Langsdorf, 68-99. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993.

Hyland, Drew A. and John Panteleimon, eds. *Heidegger and The Greeks: Interpretive Essays*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Jebb, R.C. *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos*. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962.

Kisiel, Theodore J. *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Kisiel, Theodore and John Van Buren, eds. *Reading Heidegger from the Start*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Long, A.A. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Long, Christopher P. *Aristotle on the Nature of Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Marassi, Massimo. "The Hermeneutics of Rhetoric in Heidegger." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19.2 (1986) 79-99.

McGinn, Colin. "Philosophy by Another Name." *Opinionator*, The New York Times. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/philosophy-by-another-name/, Accessed 7 June 2013.

McNeill, William. *The Glance of the Eye Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

---. *The Time of Life Heidegger and Ēthos*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.

Murphy, James Jerome, and Richard A. Katula. *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*. 4th ed. London: Routledge, 2013.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*. Edited by Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

---. *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Perelman, Chaïm and Lucie Tyteca. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.

Plato. *Complete Works*. Edited by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1997.

---. *Phaedrus*. Translated by Stephen Scully. Newburyport, MA: Focus Pub./R. Pullins Co., 2003.

---. *Gorgias*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Champaign Ill: Project Guttenberg, 1999.

Polt, Richard F. H., ed. *Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

Richards, I. A. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, I.A. Richards: Selected Works 1919 – 1938. Edited by John Constable. London: Routledge, 2001.

Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, ed. *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Schiappa, Edward. *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.

Scult, Allen Michael. *Being Jewish/reading Heidegger: An Ontological Encounter*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.

---. "Aristotle's Rhetoric as Ontology: A Heideggarian Reading." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 32:2 (1999): 146-159.

Smith, P. Christopher. *The Hermeneutics of Original Argument: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998.

---. "The Uses and Abuses of Aristotle's Rhetoric in Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology: The Lecture Course, Summer, 1924." *Essays in Honor of William J. Richarson.* Edited by Babette E. Babich, 315-334. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995.

Taminiaux, Jacques. "The Interpretation of Aristotle's Notion of Arête in Heidegger's First Courses." *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy*. Edited by Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew, 13-28. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.

Usher, Stephen. *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Volpi, Franco. "Dasein as Orexis: The Heideggerian Assimilation and Radicalization of the Practical Philosophy of Aristotle." *Critical Heidegger.* Edited by Christopher Macann, 27-66. London: Routledge, 1996.

Worthington, Ian. *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007.