Stony Brook University

Secularization as Pastoral Power:

Governmentality and Christianity

A Dissertation Presented

by

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to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

For the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

Stony Brook University

May 2015

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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2015

I focus on Foucault's *Lectures at the Collège de France* in order to show how his genealogy of the modern normalizing society leads him to trace the historical beginnings and the condition of possibility of bio-disciplinary practices of individual and collective government – together with the discourse of the hermeneutics of the subject that serves to justify them – to the organization and development of the Christian pastorate from the fourth century onwards. Taking up Nietzsche's critique of Western Christianity, Foucault analyses the emergence and deployment of the procedures or modalities of modern governmentality as effects of the extension or generalization of pastoral power beyond its ecclesiastical institutionalization after the Reformation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Text by Michel Foucault in English translation

EAK *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language.* Translated by A. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

EBC *The Birth of the Clinic. An Archaeology of Medical Perception.* Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. 1973. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1994.

ECF-AB *Abnormal. Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975*. Edited by Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2003.

ECF-BOB *The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

ECF-CT *The Courage of Truth (The Government of Self and Others II) Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984*. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

ECG-GL *On the Government of the Living. Lectures at the Collège de France 1979-1980.* Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

ECF-GSO *The Government of Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983*. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

ECF-HOS *The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982*. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. 2005. Reprint, New York: Picador, 2006.

ECF-PP *Psychiatric Power. Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974*. Edited by Jacques Lagrange. Translated by Graham Burchell. 2006. Reprint, New York: Picador, 2008.

ECF-SMD *"Society Must be Defended." Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976*. Edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.

ECF-STP *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978.* Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. 2007. Reprint, New

York: Picador, 2009.

ECF-WTK *Lectures on the Will to Know. Lectures at the Collège de France 1970-1971.* Edited by Daniel Defert. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

EDP *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. 1978. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

EEF *The Essential Foucault. Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*. Edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. New York: The New Press, 2003.

EEW1 *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume One.* Edited by Paul Rabinow. Translated by Robert Hurley and others. New York: The New Press, 1997.

EEW2 *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume Two.* Edited by James Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley and others. 1998. Reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 2000.

EEW3 *Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume Three*. Edited by James D. Faubion. Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. New York: The New Press, 2000.

EFL *Foucault Live. Collected Interviews, 1961-1984*. Edited by Sylvère Lotringer. Translated by Lysa Hochroth & John Johnston. 1989. Reprint, New York: Semiotext(e), 1996.

EFR *The Foucault Reader*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.

EFS *Fearless Speech*. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001.

EHM *History of Madness*. Edited by Jean Khalfa. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. 2006. Reprint, New York: Routledge, 2009.

EHS1 *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. 1978. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

EHS2 *The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, Volume 2*. Translated by Robert Hurley. 1985. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

EHS3 *The Care of the Self. The History of Sexuality, Volume 3*. Translated by Robert

Hurley. 1986. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1988.

EIKA *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*. Edited, with an afterword and critical notes, by Roberto Nigro. Translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008.

ELCP *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews*. Edited with an Introduction by Donald F. Bouchard. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.1977 Reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

EOT *The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. 1971. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1994.

EPK *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

EPPC *Michel Foucault. Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*. Edited with and Introduction by Lawrence D. Kritzman. Translated by Alan Sheridan and others. 1988. Reprint, New York: Routledge, 1990.

EPT *The Politics of Truth*. Edited Sylvère Lotringer. Translated by Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter. 1997. Reprint, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007.

ERC *Religion and Culture by Michel Foucault*. Edited by Jeremy R. Carrette. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.

ETS *Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

EWT *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. The Function of Avowal in Justice.* Edited by Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt. Translated by Stephen W. Sawyer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014.

Texts by Michel Foucault in French

FDE1a *Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975*. Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001.

FDE2a *Dits et écrits II. 1976-1988.* Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001.

FMC *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 1966.

I. INTRODUCTION

> *Wessen Wille zur Macht ist die Moral?*[1]
>
> *the activity of judging has increased precisely to the extent that the normalizing power has spread[…]it has become one of the major functions of our society. The judges of normality are present everywhere […]it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his attitudes, his achievements* (EDP, 304).
>
> *eine Autorität redet- wer redet?[..] Gott redet![..] Gesetzt nun, der Glaube an Gott ist dahin: so stellt sich die Frage von Neuem: "wer redet?[..] der Heerden-Instinkt redet[...] er haßt die Sich-Loslösenden – er wendet den Haß aller Einzelnen gegen ihn.*[2]

According to the *History of Madness*, the "psychological interiority where modern men seek both their depth and their truth" was constituted and can be characterized as "a purely moral space […] Psychology and the knowledge of all that was most interior to men were born from the fact that public conscience had been elected to the status "moral of universal judge" (EHM, 325, 449).[3] Thus, in 1972[4] Foucault argued that "psychological subjectivity" (EFL, 298) emerged or opened up with Modernity – when nineteenth-century psychiatry introduced the distinction between "moral or psychological treatments[5] through the "culpabilization of madness" (ERC,

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[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe* (Berlin: Verlag de Gruyter, 1980), Band 12, fragment 9[159], 9=WII 1. Herbst 1887, 429. This is section 274 of *The Will to Power* (New York: Vintage, 1968), 156: "Whose will to power is morality?"

[2] Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe*, Band 12, fragment 7[6], 7=Mp XVII 3b. Ende 1886-Frühjahr 1887, 279. The corresponding fragment in *The Will to Power* reads as follows: "an authority speaks– who speaks? [..] God speaks! [..] Now suppose that belief in God has vanished: the question presents itself anew: 'who speaks?'[..] the herd instinct speaks […] it hates those who detach themselves – it turns the hatred of all individuals against them" (section 275, 157).

[3] As a result, behavior that had been the object of "moral condemnation" and "social excommunication" (EHM: 96 and 104) for being considered profanatory or sinful, came to be labelled as pathological or abnormal.

[4] Second edition of *Histoire de la Folie*, on which the 2006 English translation is based.

159).[6] However, in this dissertation I intend to show how, beginning with the 1973-1974 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault's texts can be read as an attempt to trace the condition of possibility of psychology –both as a human science[7] and as a specific type of relationship of self to self – to the Christian hermeneutics of the subject and the type of individualization required by the economy of power as government inaugurated by the Western Church's pastoral practices.[8]

My general concern is with the Foucauldian notion of "government(ality)" in its connection with that of "pastoral power". Following his suggestion that "if there really is a relationship between religion and politics in modern Western societies, it may be that the essential aspect of this relation is not in the interplay between Church and state, but rather between the pastorate and government" (ECF-STP, 191), I will analyze the emergence and deployment of the procedures or

[5] "There is no sense in hunting for a distinction in the Classical Age between physical therapeutics and psychological medication, for the simple reason that psychology does not exists […] The distinction between the physical and the moral only became a practical concept in the medicine of minds when the problematics of madness were displaced towards the interrogation of a responsible subject" (EHM, 338-339, 325).

[6] "At the end of the eighteenth century, madness stopped being seen as error or illusion and became a moral fault: "A purely psychological medicine was only made possible when madness was alienated into guilt […] instead of making blindness the condition of possibility of all […] manifestations of madness, it described it as the psychological effect of a moral fault […] a whole content of guilt, moral sanction, and just punishment that was in no way part of the Classical experience […] what had been error became fault […] a domain […] occupied […] by psychology and morality […] the reduction of the Classical experience of unreason to a strictly moral perception of madness" (EHM, 326, 296, and 338). It should be added that, focusing on the French context, Foucault provides an analysis of the socio-political situation immediately before and after the Revolution that prepared the path for this transformation: "the disappearance of confinement left madness without a precise form of insertion in the social space, and faced with this unchained danger, society reacted first of all with a series of measures planned for the long term, in keeping with an ideal that was coming into being –the creation of houses reserved specifically for the insane – and secondly with a series of immediate measures, which would allow madness to be mastered by force […] While it became purified for knowledge, and was freed from its ancient complicities, it also found itself engaged in a series of questions that morality began to ask itself […] As confinement disappeared, madness once again entered the public domain. It reappeared […] affecting judges, families, and everyone responsible for law and order […] It was there, in the barely perceptible wave of daily experience, that madness was soon to take on the moral form that was so easily recognizable to Pinel and Tuke" (EHM, 425, 443, and 444).

[7] "The appropriation, by psychology, of most of the domains that the human sciences covered" (EEW2, 252).

[8] "through the organization of the pastorate in Christian society, from the fourth century AD, and even from the third century, a mechanism of power developed which was very important for the entire history of the Christian West […] pastoral power […] Christianity, from the moment that became a force of political and social organization within the Roman Empire, brought this type of power into a world which still totally ignored it" (ERC, 123).

modalities of modern "governmentality"[9] (psychiatric or disciplinary-bio-normalizing power), together with the resulting process of "governmentalization",[10] as effects of the extension or generalization of pastoral power beyond the institution of the church from the sixteenth century onwards. In other words, I will be arguing that Foucault's "historico-critical ontology of the present" allows us to make a diagnosis of what it means to be "human" today as a reality fabricated and sustained by the implementation and expansion or propagation of the pastoral "function" (EEF, 132), [11] both in and out of its ecclesiastical institutionalization. This means that the condition of possibility of our present, characterized by the development of "mechanisms of security" but still marked by anti-disciplinary "struggles against subjection" (Ibid., 130) is a process of "in-depth Christianization"; a "new Christianization" (ECF-AB, 177 and 193) that has proceeded or advanced unnoticed under the banner of "secularization". As Gil Anidjar puts it, Christianity "invented both religion *and* secularism […] Like that unmarked race, which, in the related discourse of racism, became invisible or white, Christianity invented the distinction between

[9] In 1979 Foucault equated them with "micro-powers" and explained that their analysis was "not a question of scale", but "of point of view" (ECF-BOB, 186). All through the 70s he had been working to develop a non-juridical, non-statist, and productive perspective on power relations that could make visible the workings of what he had variously described as "infrapower […] a web of microscopic, capillary political power […] at the level of man's very existence […] the whole set of little powers […] situated at the lowest level" (EEW3, 86-87); "the capillary […] local […] level of power […] the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives" (EPK, 39); "a micro-physics of power" (EDP, 139); "the level of ongoing subjugation […] of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors etc. […] to discover how is it that subjects are gradually […] and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. […] to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of the subjects" (EPK, 97).

[10] This process applies both to the "state" as "a new form of pastoral power" (EEF, 132) and to "society and individuals […] in Western Europenin the sixteenth century", with a "multiplication of all the arts of governing […] and of all the institutions of government, in the wider sense the term […] had at that time" that resulted in a "movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth" (Ibid., 264, 265, and 266).

[11] "In Christianity the pastorate gave rise to an art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating men, an art of monitoring them and urging them on step by step, an art with the function of taking church of men collectively and individually throughout their life and at every moment of their existence" in order to lead them to their salvation (ECF-STP, 165).

religious and secular and thus *made* religion. It made religion the problem –rather than itself […] secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it […] named its other or others as religions […] one of the essential means by which Christianity failed to criticize itself, the means by which Christianity *forgot and forgave* itself".[12] Therefore, far from being synonymous with "de-Christianization", the discourse of secularism has allowed modern Western Christianity to recast itself as the *Aufhebung* of both earlier Judaism and later Islam.

It is worth noting that the presence of Christianity in contemporary U.S. political rhetoric is at least as pervasive as it was during the Cold War Era. Whether the enemy is constructed as a godless tyrant- in spite of the fact that, as the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset pointed out in 1948, communism had acquired all the features of a religious conception of the world[13] – or as a "radical" Muslim, American Christianity is allowed to project into its Other and thus erase or disavow all the parts of its history and its sacred book that don't fit or contradict the sanitized, fantastic image of itself as an unproblematically universal, intrinsically democratic and egalitarian message of love and peace (The "violent", "misogynist", "intolerant", "barbaric', is the Other). So even if in the sixteenth century pastoral power "broke up, and assumed the dimension of governmentality" (ECF-STP, 193), it has "never been truly abolished […] in its typology, organization, and mode of functioning, pastoral power exercised as power, is doubtless something

[12] Gil Anidjar, "Secularism," *Critical Inquiry* 33, no. 1 (Autumn 2006): 63 and 62.

[13] In the lectures entitled *An Interpretation of Universal History* (New York: Norton, 1973), 131-132, Ortega y Gasset contends that "the conception of the world, of a people as such, could be no other than a religious conception. An individual or a group of individuals can live with a conception of life which is not religious- for example, scientific- but a people as such cannot have any other idea about the world than a religious one [...] if [...] the Russian people believe in Marxism, this is because Marxism has taken on all the characteristics [...] of a religious conception of the world". The original Spanish reads as follows: "la concepción del mundo, del pueblo como tal es y no puede ser más que una concepción religiosa. Un individuo o un grupo de individuos puede vivir con una concepción del mundo que no sea religiosa, sino, por ejemplo, científica; pero un pueblo como tal no puede tener más idea del mundo que una idea religiosa […] si […] el pueblo ruso cree en el marxismo es porque ese marxismo ha adquirido todos los caracteres […] de una concepción religiosa del mundo". [*Una Interpretación de la Historia Universal. En Torno a Toynbee* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1984), 132].

from which we have still not freed ourselves" (Ibid: 148). The question that Foucault's genealogy poses is: How did this dimorphous relationship of forces[14] invented by Christianity manage to become "the form of power that is most typical of the West […] unique […] and that will also have the greatest and most durable fortune" (ECF-STP, 130)? His analysis evinces that the most effective governmental strategies to make it "less probable" and "more difficult" for us as "free subjects" (EEF, 138-139) to get rid of this modality of power rely on the fact that even though the Christian pastor is "only concerned with individual souls insofar as this direction (*conduite*) of souls also involves permanent intervention in everyday conduct (*conduit*), in the management of lives, as well as goods, wealth, and things" (ECF-STP, 154), we have been brought to see not religion in general but just the construct called Western Christianity as pre- or non-political, as a "private" matter of belief or conscience. In other words, the framework created by liberalism's attempt to place it in a purely "private" domain and the illusion of a "public" sphere somehow neutral in its "tolerance" is not the Necessary or Unavoidable product of the Progress of Reason. Rather, it constitutes a strategy and technique for government that presents power and freedom as mutually exclusive; one that has allowed the pastoral rationalization of its practices of individual and collective government to survive and thrive under the guise of a moralized and moralizing personal autonomy only threatened by the State.

In his *Formations of the Secular*, Talal Asad defines secularism as "a political and governmental doctrine that has its origin in nineteenth-century liberal society[15] […] a system of

[14] Foucault talks about the "dimorphism" that distinguishes "the clergy from the laity [...] a binary structure [...] two clearly distinguished categories of individuals [...] who do not have the same civil rights, obligations, and privileges, of course, but who do not even have the same spiritual privileges" (ECF-STP, 202).

[15] Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 24.

political governance",[16] and reminds us that "at one time 'the secular' was part of a theological discourse (*saeculum*). 'Secularization' (*saecularisatio*) at first denoted a legal transition from monastic life (*regularis*) to the life of canons (*saecularis*) – and then, after the Reformation, it signified the transfer of ecclesiastical real property to laypersons[17] […] The word 'secularism' was coined by Georg Jacob Holyoake in 1851 […] introduced into English by freethinkers in the middle of the nineteenth century in order to avoid the charge of their being 'atheists' or 'infidels', terms that carried suggestions of immorality in a still largely Christian society".[18]

For Foucault, the process of secularization marks the emergence of "other institutions, with the same objectives and the same effects" (ERC, 152) as the Church. In addition, he claims that the only way to resist the pastorate's logic and government techniques is by calling into question the very specific type of rationality used to justify the exercise of this "religious and moral power" (EEF, 131) in both its ecclesiastical and secular forms.

I want to suggest that due to the unmarked domination of Christianity in modern Western societies, non-Christian religious practices are considered "political" (so-called "politicized religion", incompatible with Modernity) as soon as they challenge the former's identification with Morality Itself[19], its self-image as the only universal or at least universalizable[20] religious-based ethical system. Once we realize that it is "the tactics of government that allow the continual

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[16] Asad, 57.

[17] Asad, 192.

[18] Asad, 23.

[19] "The Church and the pastoral ministry stressed the principle of a morality whose precepts were compulsory and universal […] a unified, coherent, authoritarian moral system that was imposed on everybody" (EHS2, 20).

[20] "The Church is a religion that […] lays claim to the daily government of men in their real life on the grounds of their salvation and on the scale of humanity" (ECF-STP, 165).

definition of [...] what is public and what is private" (ECF-STP, 109), we understand the importance of exposing the limitations of a conception of "the political" that not only reduces it to state apparatuses or the exercise of sovereignty but also recognizes only those practices of power that adopt the negative form of prohibition, repression, or economic exploitation. By characterizing the exercise of power as an external limit imposed on a sovereign freedom, this juridical model works as an effective instrument of government that prevents the governed from acknowledging power's productivity and, therefore, their own status as effects and instruments of its normative mechanisms of intervention and transformation.

This dissertation is going to make the following five claims:

1. Each and every chapter includes references to what I understand to be Foucault's "Nietzscheanism". They are all intended to provide evidence in support of my suggestion that, in the context of the so-called "Nietzsche Renaissance", Foucault's use of his texts is the one that most effectively opposes what Gianni Vattimo has described as "the attempts to exorcize the significance" of Nietzsche's conception of interpretation for philosophy, understood as the discourse that claims to provide "a universally valid description of permanent structures".[21]

2. Foucault's remark that "historically, what exists is the church. Faith, what is that?" (ERC, 107) should be read in connection with what he describes as Nietzsche's critique of the philosophers's analysis of Christianity and their "lack of historical sense".[22] Commenting on

[21] Gianni Vattimo, *Beyond Interpretation. The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 5 and 10.

[22] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols,* "'Reason' in Philosophy", section I, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 166.

section 151 of *The Gay Science,* he writes: "Nietzsche says that Schopenhauer made the mistake of looking for the origin – *Ursprung* – of religion in a metaphysical sentiment present in all men […] Nietzsche says this is a completely false history of religion, because to suppose that religion originates in a metaphysical sentiment signifies, purely and simply, that religion was already given, at least in an implicit state, enveloped in that metaphysical sentiment […] Religion has no origin […] it was invented […] For Nietzsche, invention, *Erfindung*, is on the one hand a break, on the other something with a small beginning, one that is low, mean, unavowable […] It was by […] obscure power relations that religion was invented" (EEW3, 6, 7).

As the exercise of a completely new form of power, the Christian pastorate emerged in the form of what Foucault characterizes as an "event". That is, as "the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it" (EEW2, 381). I will examine in detail the process through which as a "force of political and social organization within the Roman Empire" (ERC, 123), Christianity appropriated the dominant "vocabulary" of Stoicism, an already existing "way of life", and adapted it to its own purposes by subjecting it to a new interpretation.

Foucault's genealogy of the modern "normalizing society" (ECF-SMD, 253) leads him to trace the historical beginnings and the condition of possibility of bio-disciplinary mechanisms and practices of government to the organization and development of the Christian pastorate from the fourth century onwards. He offers a critique of Western Christianity as "a political force" (ERC, 107) that through the concept of "governmentality" makes clear that we cannot separate the ("ethical") constitution of reflexivity or relation to ourselves from the ("secular") discipline of bodies, the ("pastoral") government of souls, and the ("biopolitical") regulation of the population. The claim that "political analysis and criticism have in a large measure still to be invented […] so

too have the strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them in such a way that such a modification is possible and can be inscribed in reality" (EPK, 190) is at the basis of Foucault's work to conceive of a "politics of religion" (EHM, 76) outside the juridical framework of sovereignty. I will argue that the pastoral exercise of conduction or direction implemented by Western Christianity inaugurates a practice of individual and collective government which results from combining sovereign (God) and bio-disciplinary power (the pastors).

3. Contrary to what the epics of the glorious triumph of Reason over Darkness tell us, what we see in Western European societies after the Reformation is not the beginning of a process of secularization as "de-Christianization", but a "Christianization in depth", a "formidable development of the pastorate" (ECF-AB, 177) that allows it to intervene more than ever before. In addition, "power of a pastoral type, which over centuries […] had been linked to a defined religious institution […] spread out into the whole social body" (EEF, 133). This "new Christianization" has to be understood in relation to what Foucault describes as both the "colonization" of society by disciplinary mechanisms that were invented and put into practice for the first time in Christian institutions (ECF-PP, 70), and the movement of "governmentalization".

It seems to me that the Foucauldian contribution to and even reshaping of the terms that have traditionally defined the so-called "secularization debate" in predominantly Christian Western societies – especially in his courses at the Collège de France – still needs to be acknowledged and exploited. The relative novelty of this material, together with the desire to allow the reader to appreciate by her/himself the peculiarity and radicality of the arguments it contains, have led me to rely heavily on direct quotations.

4. It is in the name of morality that we are prevented from calling into question the necessary, self-evident, or natural character of a subject that is the effect and instrument of that same morality; a certain experience of ourselves that is the correlate of the exercise of pastoral power, whether secularized or not, has been prescribed as the only possible, recognized and recognizable form of existence.

Furthermore, it is my contention that a careful examination of Foucault's reading of Nietzsche reveals that for both of them the Christian and modern morality of the subject – with its condemnation of "egoism" and its defense of "humility" as "self-renunciation" – constitutes in fact the main obstacle to transform the way in which we think of and therefore feel about the "other" in a direction that acknowledges our constitutive relationality. The former's "politics of ourselves" (ERC, 181) is an attempt to expose the effects of what the latter had described as the "Christian-moral interpretation".[23] The "death" of the subject – and, therefore, the end of morality, psychology, and theology – marks the beginning of a relational ethics understood as the exercise of a non-sovereign freedom.

Drawing on Gilles Deleuze's Nietzschean characterization of the difference between morality and ethics, I will argue that the Western subject in both its religious and secular versions – that is, as "Christian interiority" (EHS2, 63) or modern "psychological subjectivity" (EFL, 298) – is first and foremost a moral, and therefore necessarily theological experience of ourselves. In other words, the subject doesn't exist prior to and outside of the triad that fabricated it and gave it its meaning; it is a very particular way of existing that only makes sense as one of the three terms in the relationship that connects: a personal God as sovereign and all-powerful will, Christ as the

[23] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks* (New York: Cambridge University Press), section 2[127], 83.

first of a series of pastors who can intercede for us and guide us to our salvation or liberation, and the subject as an identity endowed with "free will" and defined by what Nietzsche had described as the Christian morality of "truthfulness"[24] and "intentions".[25] It is only through a process of moralization as "culpabilization" (ERC, 159) that we acquire agency conceived as "free will" and are granted recognition as "human" or (psychologically) normal individuals. The hermeneutics of the subject has turned us, or rather, what we have been brought to perceive as our "own truth" or "our true self", into the principle of our own subjection. Morality for Foucault is not just a negative mechanism of repression that works through the internalization of prohibitions by an already given subject (i.e., the "code" is just one of the three components of every morality) but is above all productive: it is already at work in the forming of that very subject, one defined by the relation to itself. Foucault's diagnosis that "we are indeed the last man in the Nietzschean sense of the term and the *Übermensch* will be whoever can overcome the absence of God and the absence of man in the same gesture of overtaking" (ERC, 86) means that, in order to be effective, a critique of morality needs to be both atheist (anti-Christian) and anti-humanist.[26]

5. An "anti-pastoral revolution" (ECF-STP, 150) would require calling into question the form of rationality at work in its practices of government, asking how the relations of power imposed by the Christian "direction of individuals and communities" (ECF-STP, 165) have been justified. Whether ecclesiastical or secular, the pastorate rationalizes the obedience it demands and

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[24] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[115], 222.

[25] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), section 32, 33.

[26] In an interview conducted in 1967 he pointed at "all the disservice this idea of man has done us for many years [...] it must surely be possible to engage in a left-wing politics which does not exploit all these confused humanist myths" (ERC, 100).

its "permanent and […] positive intervention in the behavior of individuals" (ETS, 159) by its capacity to lead them to their salvation-liberation (by reference to their own "good", their "welfare"). As a mode of exercising power introduced in the West by Christianity, government's goal is "to conduct men's conduct […] conducting men in their lives and in the lives of their bodies". In all its forms, the pastorate "functions as a normative power" (EDP, 304); its "rationalization of the management of individuals" (EFL, 299) reveals that what is at stake in the practice of government is a moral project. According to Foucault, to be governed is to be directed towards one's salvation by someone to whom we have to obey. This Christian logic of the obligatory search for personal salvation is perpetuated in the equally compulsory normalization imposed by what Foucault describes as "one of the main moral obligations […] [in] our societies […] to know oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, and to constitute oneself as an object of knowledge both for other people and for oneself" (ERC, 160). I think that what Foucault said about the prison in 1972 is something that all the forms or mechanisms of pastoral power have in common: They share the attempt to be "justified as [a] moral force", so that their practice "can be totally formulated within the framework of morality […] as the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder" (EFL, 77). It is due to this connection between pastoral government and morality that the latter "may be reduced entirely to politics […] the moral is the political" (ERC, 100). In order to expose moral-psychological norms as political concepts we need to challenge the opposition religion-private-freedom vs. politics-public-repression by exposing the major role it has played in making the practice of government inaugurated by Christianity virtually invisible. In other words, this pastoral, non-statist governmentality is not even recognized as political.

Furthermore, this dissertation will show that throughout Foucault's texts it becomes increasingly apparent that a way of thinking and doing philosophy "centered essentially on an assertion of the primacy of the subject" (EEW3, 261), one designed to "preserve the powers of a constituent consciousness" (EAK, 203), is not just an epistemological position, but implies a whole morality. Therefore, his urge to "pervert"[27] the "morality of thought" (EEW2, 355), his theoretical critique of a philosophy dominated by morality, should be considered an ethico-political practice.

By demonstrating how one can track a relentless "problematization" of the practices through which we are governed and govern ourselves throughout Foucault's work, I will be challenging the commonly held view that it contains three ruptures or stages (usually referred to as the "archaeology" of the 60s, the 70s "genealogy", and the "ethics, history of subjectivity, ethical turn" or "return to the subject" in the eighties).[28] I will particularly take issue with the last one of those supposedly clearly-cut breaks, which has been used not only to domesticate the radicality of his critique of different types of normative tendencies and discourses as invariably "governed by fear and moralization" (ECF-AB, 35), but also to normalize his relation to "The Philosophical Institution"[29] by placing him under the self-satisfied and usually self-appointed label of "moral philosopher".

[27] As Nietzsche puts it: "aren't we allowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers rise above the belief in grammar?" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, "Part two: the free spirit", section 34, 35).

[28] Foucault himself acknowledged that his "archaeology owes more to Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism properly so called" (EEW2, 294). Similarly, in his "Course Context" to the 1970-1971 lectures on the *Will to Know,* Daniel Defert argues that genealogy "is not […] the crisis of archaeology; they mutually support each other" (ECF-WTK, 274). Moreover, Defert reminds us that those lectures constitute an "entry into the long-term historical process of the ancient beginnings of philosophy, even though […] the *doxa* associates only 'the final Foucault' with Greece" (Ibid., 262).

[29] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Philosophical Institution," in *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. Alan Montefiori, 1-8 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 4.

In order to substantiate these five claims, I will offer a close reading that focuses on the English versions of Foucault's lectures at various institutions in and outside France.

The first chapter covers Foucault's published books, interviews, and conferences, from his secondary or complementary doctoral thesis submitted to the Sorbonne in 1961 to the publication of *Discipline and Punish* in February 1975. It examines the reasons why what is at work in psychiatric practice as a "moral tactic" (EHM, 509) is disciplinary power. Psychological judgment is just secularized Christian morality. The Christian pastorate is analyzed as the first system of disciplinary regulation, the first panoptic schema with universally normalizing pretensions.

In the second chapter I focus on the texts produced in the following two years to study the effects of the "pastoralization" of justice, the transposition of the Christian "flesh" into modern "sexuality", and the generalization of the moral demand for confession.

The third is devoted to the work produced in 1978 and 1799, particularly the seminal "history of governmentality" offered in *Security, Territory, Population.*

The fourth chapter, entitled "A critical ontology of the present", shows that in the last four years of his life Foucault did not abandon but rather refined or elaborated his earlier critique of pastoral power and the Christian hermeneutics of the subject. His "trip" to Greco-Roman antiquity resulted in a more precise appreciation of both the radical discontinuity introduced by that modality of power and the conditions that made it possible. In other words, a better understanding of what made the replacement of pagan ethics with morality by the Christian invention of the concept-experience of the subject both "difficult to accept: its arbitrary nature in terms of knowledge, its violence in terms of power" and "acceptable […] accepted" (EEF, 276 and 275).

Finally, the "Appendix" offers an analysis of two recently published series of lectures: *On the Government of the Living*, which is the Course Foucault imparted at the *Collège* in 1980, and *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. The Function of Avowal in Justice*, a volume that includes the seven talks he gave at the Catholic University of Louvain in April and March of the following year, as well as three interviews conducted during his visit to Belgium.

Before proceeding to the first chapter, I need to clarify the meaning of my first claim. Vattimo's claim that "Nietzsche made a decisive contribution to the origin and growth of contemporary hermeneutic ontology"[30] – also called "ontological hermeneutics" or simply "hermeneutics"[31] – has to be read in connection with his complaint that the work produced by the most influential representatives of this "school" in its current form – represented by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Jürgen Habermas – retains a strong humanistic flavor[32] that ignores the radicality of Nietzsche's critique of "our oldest article of faith"[33] as well as his "radical rejection of the very concept of 'being'".[34]

[30] Gianni Vattimo, *Dialogue with Nietzsche* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 73-74.

[31] This orientation is characterized as "the current of contemporary philosophy that takes as its central theme the phenomenon of interpretation, regarding it as the essential feature of human existence and the appropriate platform from which to critique and 'destroy' traditional metaphysics" (Ibid.).

[32] Vattimo explains that for Nietzsche, Humanism, as the operation of putting man in the position of *Grund* previously assigned to God, is just one of the "disguises" adopted by "passive" or "reactive" nihilism in its refusal to "admit that neither *objective* meanings and values nor *given* structures of Being exist- and that therefore they have to be actively created" (*Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 135). As Nietzsche himself puts it, it's in a *very particular interpretation*, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is found [...] A backlash from 'God is truth' into the fanatical belief 'Everything is false'" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[127], 83).

[33] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 14[79], 246.

[34] In favor of "the affirmation of [...] *becoming",* as he writes in *Ecce Homo.* (*The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, 110) "'Being' is a fabrication by the man suffering from becoming" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 2[110], 80).

In what follows I will be arguing that it is Foucault that best recuperates and exploits what the Italian philosopher describes as the "nihilistic logic"[35] or "implications"[36] of Nietzsche's theory of interpretation[37], which remained "unrecognized"[38] – or at least largely unexplored – in both its Heideggerian and Gadamerian versions.[39]

In his *Foucault*, Paul Veyne recalls how "the resolute tone of voice, that of a declaration of faith, in which he one day told me that Nietzschean hermeneutics had engineered a decisive break in the history of knowledge, showed clearly that he believed this and was hopeful".[40] This hope animates his 1964 claim that, in the nineteenth century, Marx, Freud, and, above all, Nietzsche "placed us again in the presence of a new possibility of interpretation. They founded anew the possibility of a hermeneutic".[41] And he maintains that they did this by changing "the

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[35] Vattimo*, Beyond Interpretation*, 7.

[36] Ibid., 28.

[37] Vattimo summarizes the "profound connection" between nihilism and hermeneutics as follows: "there is no experience of truth that is not interpretative. While this thesis is shared by all those who espouse hermeneutics, and is even widely accepted by the greater part of twentieth-century thought […] its implications for the conception of Being are less generally recognized […] The subject is not the bearer of a Kantian a priori, but the heir to a finite-historical language that makes possible and conditions the access of the subject to itself and to the world […] If one can speak of Being (and one must, in order not to fall unwittingly back into objectivistic metaphysics), it must be sought at the level of those inherited opening […] the historicity of the openings within which all that is true may be given" (*Beyond Interpretation*, 4, 8, and 14).

[38] Vattimo, *Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 76.

[39] Even if Gadamer mentions Nietzsche "as Heidegger's precursor in preference to Dilthey and Husserl" (*Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 183), the fact is that "neither Gadamer [...] nor Heidegger [...] appear to consider Nietzsche as a hermeneutic thinker". Moreover, in contemporary hermeneutics Vattimo detects a widespread "tendency to see a continuity between Heidegger and Nietzsche", to regard the latter "as being much more closely link to Heidegger than Heidegger himself would have been prepared to admit" (Ibid*.,* 184 and 183). What they share is a vision of being not as "presence and objectivity" (*Beyond Interpretation*, 29), "as structure and *Grund",* but rather as "event". What separates them, in Vattimo's reading, is that Heidegger "refuses to accept and articulate explicitly the nihilistic implications of his own 'conception' of Being" (*Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 186).

[40] Paul Veyne, *Foucault. His Thought, His Character* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2010), 82-83.

[41] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", in *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context. From Nietzsche to Nancy*, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, 59-67 (Albany: State University of New York, 1990), 61. I will be using this translation, by Alan D. Schrift, instead of the one in EEW2, 269-278.

nature of the sign", which is no longer perceived as the instrument of expression of a sovereign will or intention,[42] whether divine or human, but as a "mask [...] covering up"[43] an interpretation of the world and ourselves that has become hegemonic. As a result, "each sign is in itself not an object that offers itself passively to interpretation, but the interpretation of other signs. There is never ... an interpretandum which is not already an interpretans [...] there is nothing [...] absolutely primary to interpret, because at bottom everything is already interpretation [..] [which] can only violently seize an interpretation already there [...] Words [...] do not indicate a signified; they impose an interpretation [...] throughout their history, they interpret before being signs and in the long run they signify only because they are... interpretations".[44] This implies that the practice of interpretation is no longer understood as "an exegesis that listened [...] through the whole apparatus of Revelation, to the word of God, ever secret, ever beyond itself[45] [...] In the sixteenth century, interpretation proceeded from the world (things and beings together) towards the divine Word that could be deciphered in it".[46] This is still the notion of interpretation implicit in Heidegger's texts, where, as Vattimo has shown, the notion of Being as "event" is always accompanied by "the aspiration [...] for a situation in which Being might once again speak to us 'in person'".[47] On the

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[42] Foucault wants to dispute the postulate of "a sovereign subject which arrives from elsewhere to enliven the inertia of linguistic codes, and sets down in discourse the indelible traces of its freedom [...] a subjectivity which constitutes meanings and then transcribes them into discourse [...] there are not, on the one hand inert discourses [...] Discourse is not a place into which the subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions". ["Politics and the Study of Discourse", in *The Foucault Effect,* ed. Graham Burchell et al., 53-72 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), *6*1, 62, and 58]

[43] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", in *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context*, 66.

[44] Ibid., 64, 65.

[45] Foucault, EBC, xvii.

[46] Foucault, EOT: 298.

[47] Vattimo, *Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 188.

contrary, "our interpretation [...] proceeds from men, from God, from knowledge or fantasies, towards the words that make them possible; and what it reveals is not the sovereignty of a primal discourse, but the fact that we are governed by language" (EOT, 298). Otherwise said: according to Foucault, what characterizes "modern hermeneutics"[48] is its rejection of what he calls a "psychologistic interpretation of language" (EBC, xvii) as the instrument through which the sovereign will or intentions of a God or author are expressed. That's why he argues that what matters is not its relation "to a thought, mind, or subject, which engendered it, but to the practical field in which it is deployed".[49] As he put it in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, "discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority" (EAK, 55).

In addition, Foucault holds that in this new system of interpretation signs are organized and disposed "according to a dimension that we could call depth, on the condition that one understand by that not interiority but, on the contrary, exteriority [...] There is in the works of Nietzsche a critique of ideal depth, the depth of consciousness that he denounces as an invention of the philosophers. This depth would be a pure, interior search for truth".[50] A "profundity" that he will later trace back to the Christian hermeneutics of the subject. The interpreter's task still requires descending "the length of the vertical line" but not in order to discover and decipher the truth of ourselves or our true self. Instead, the goal is to "restore the sparkling exteriority that has been covered up and buried"; to show that what we have been brought to perceive as our individuality,

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[48] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", in *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context*, 65.

[49] Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse", in *The Foucault Effect*, 61.

[50] Foucault, "Nietzscche, Freud, Marx", in *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context,* 62.

our depth, our truth, is just "a crease [*pli]* in the surface".[51] Modern psychology and the rest of the human sciences continue to interpret or comment on "the language of our culture from the very point where for centuries we had awaited in vain the decision of the Word" (EBC, xvii). This persistence of the "psychologistic" or expressive view of language and its correlative-the sovereignty of a constituent consciousness "identical with itself" and "anterior to all speech" (EAK, 54-55) – is due to our refusal to admit that in speaking and writing we are inevitably "abolishing all interiority" in an "exterior" that is "indifferent" to our lives, making "no distinction" between our "life' and our "death" (Ibid., 210). Approaching discourse as "a complex, differentiated practice, governed by analyzable rules and transformations" implies being dispossessed of the fantasy of a language in which we were supposed to be able "to say immediately and directly what [...] [we] think, believe, or imagine" (Ibid., 211). That's why in one of his imaginary dialogues with his critics, Foucault dismisses the basic concern of traditional hermeneutics, "what about Rousseau at the precise moment when, pen in hand, he traced the lines of his complaint, his sincerity, his suffering?" by answering "That's a psychologist's question. Not mine, consequently" (EEW2, 51).

The radical differences between the pre- and post-Nietzsche understanding of interpretation are probably what Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow want to highlight when they call Foucault's method "interpretative analytics" and distinguish it from "hermeneutics" as "the miguided kind of interpretative method [...] based on deep meaning" or "deep hidden significance", and "a unified subject". In their 1982 book they also claim that "just as Foucault attempted to reflect on the method in his earlier works and to give us a theoretical description of

[51] Ibid.

the right way to do theory, he now owes us an interpretative description of his own right way to do interpretation. He has not provided one yet, although *The History of Sexuality* and *Discipline and Punish* are certainly examples of what such a method could produce".[52] To this demand, I would reply that Foucault's "interpretation of interpretation"[53] can in fact be found in the texts that we are commenting on in this "Introduction"[54] – those that deal with the notion of "genealogy" and the Nietzschean critique of knowledge. Thus, in a 1971 lecture at MacGill University[55] he summarizes what Nietzsche's recasting of hermeneutics made possible as follows: "to speak of sign and interpretation, of their inseparability, without reference to a phenomenology [...] to speak of interpretation without reference to an original subject [...] to think knowledge as an historical process before any problematic of the truth, and more fundamentally than in the subject-object relation. Knowledge-*connaissance* freed from the subject-object relation is knowledge-*savoir* [...] To say that there is no knowledge in itself is to say that the subject-object relation (and all its derivatives like the a priori, objectivity, pure knowledge, constitutive subject) is not the foundation of knowledge but is in reality produced by it [...] the existence of a subject and an object is the first and major illusion of knowledge [...] Nietzsche stubbornly refuses to place at the heart of knowledge something like the *cogito,* that is to say, pure consciousness [...] what does Nietzsche introduce in place of the *cogito*? It is the interplay of [...] word and will to power [...] of sign and

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[52] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 183.

[53] Ibid.

[54] "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" (1964), "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1971), "Truth and Juridical Forms" (1973), some pages from *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), *The Order of Things* (1966), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), and the *Lectures on the Will to Know. Lectures at the Collège de France 1970-1971,* as well as the interviews "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" (1983) and "The Return of Morality" (1984).

[55] This paper on Nietzsche, entitled "How to think the history of truth with Nietzsche without relying on truth", is included in the edition of the 1970-1971 *Course* at the Collège de France, the so-called *Lectures on the Will to Know*, as chapter or lecture thirteen (pages 202-223).

interpretation […] The sign is the violence of analogy, what masters or erases difference. […] Interpretation is that which posits and imposes signs [...] The sign is interpretation inasmuch as it introduces the lie of things into the chaos. And interpretation is the violence done to the chaos by the verifying game of signs. What, in short, is *knowledge*? It 'interprets', it 'introduces a meaning', it does not explain (in most cases it is a new interpretation of an old interpretation which has become unintelligible and which is no more than a sign) [...] Far from being the truth of knowledge [...] the subject-object relation [...] is its untruthful product [...] at the core of knowledge, even before we have to speak of truth, we find a circle of reality, knowledge, and lie. Which will allow the insertion of truth as morality" (ECF-WTK, 213, 214, 210, and 212).

As a general principle, one can argue that to Heidegger's insertion of Nietzsche in the history of metaphysics, Foucault's work responds with a reading that emphasizes the "breaks" or "shifts" he introduced in relation to the philosophical tradition. For instance, in the 1971 paper mentioned above he refers to the "two great breaks" introduce by Nietzsche: one "in relation to being" and the other with regard to "the good" (ECF-WTK, 206). Similarly, in the 1973 lectures at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Foucault explains that in certain passages of Nietzsche he finds a description of knowledge[56] that represents "a very important double break with the

[56] Foucault admits that he chose the texts by Nietzsche that he analyzes in these lectures "in terms of [...] [his] own interests", and "not with the purpose of showing that this was *the* Nietzschean conception of knowledge – for there are innumerable passages in Nietzsche on the subject that are rather contradictory – but only to show that there are in Nietzsche a certain number of elements that afford us a model for a historical analysis of what I would call the politics of truth. It's a model that one does find in Nietzsche, and I even think that in his work it constitutes one of the most important models for understanding some of the seemingly contradictory elements of his conception of knowledge [...] In Nietzsche, one finds a type of discourse that undertakes a historical analysis of the formation of the subject itself, a historical analysis of the birth of a certain type of knowledge [*savoir*] – without ever granting the preexistence of a subject of knowledge [*connaissance*] [...] the best, the most effective, the most pertinent of the models that one can draw upon [...] What I propose to do know is to retrace in his work the outlines that can serve as a model for us in our analyses" (EEW3, 13, 5 and 6). In a 1983 interview he clarifies that what he "owes" Nietzsche "derives mostly from the texts of around 1880, where the question of truth, the history of truth and the will to truth were central to his work" (EPPC, 32).

tradition of Western philosophy, something we should learn from" (EEW3, 9). This twofold rupture results in the disappearance of both God – as the necessary postulate that guarantees the correspondence between knowledge and the world –[57] and the unified and sovereign subject.[58] Heidegger's hypertrophic characterization of the Nietzschean "will to power" cannot be conciliated with the latter's critique of the self-transparent subject and the centrality of self-consciousness.[59]

In order to measure the shock wave of Nietzsche's "dynamite"[60], we need to pay attention to Foucault's examination of the four major consequences that derive from his claim that

[57] "The first break is between knowledge and things. What is it, really, in Western philosophy that certifies that things to be known and knowledge itself are in a relation of continuity? What assurance is there that knowledge has the ability to truly know the things of the world instead of being indefinite error, illusion, and arbitrariness? What in Western philosophy guarantees that, if not God? Of course, from Descartes, to go back no further than that, and still even in Kant, God is the principle that ensures a harmony between knowledge and the things to be known". However, if "the relation between knowledge and known things is arbitrary, if it is a relation of power and violence [...] if [...] there is no resemblance [...] no prior affinity between knowledge and the things [...] to be known [...] the existence of God at the center of the system of knowledge is no longer indispensable" (EEW3, 9-10).

[58] The second "break" means that "between knowledge and the instincts – all that constitutes the human animal – there is only discontinuity, relations of domination and servitude". The "subject in its unity and sovereignty" vanishes because it was guaranteed by "the unbroken continuity running from desire to knowledge [*connaissance*], from the instincts to knowledge [*savoir*], from the body to truth [...] Nietzsche says that knowledge is the result of the instincts, but that it is not an instinct and is not directly derived from the instincts [...] knowledge was invented, it has no origin [...] [it] is not inscribed in human nature [...] knowledge is [...] the outcome of the interplay [...] the struggle, and the compromise between the instincts [...] [it] is produced because the instincts meet, fight one another, and at the end of their battles [...] reach a compromise [...] its basis is the instincts in their confrontation [...] [knowledge] is a surface effect" (EEW3, 10, 7, and 8).

[59] "We have subjected the *will itself* to critique: is it not an illusion to take as a cause what appears in consciousness as an act of will? (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 7[1], 128); "*there is no will* [...] *No* subject-'atoms'. The sphere of a subject constantly becoming *larger* or *smaller*- the centre of the system constantly *shifting*... No 'substance', but rather something that as such strives for more strength, and only indirectly wants to 'preserve' itself (it wants to *surpass* itself [...])" (Ibid., 9[98], 159); "*there is no will*: there are points of will constantly augmenting or losing their power" (Ibid., 11[73], 213); "purpose, motive are means of making something that happens comprehensible, practicable [...] *No purpose. No will* [...] The error in the belief in purposes. Will- a superfluous assumption" (ibid., 34[53] and 34[55], 4); "my proposition is that *will* in psychology up to now has been an unjustified generalization, that this will *does not exist*, that instead of grasping the elaboration of a single, *determinate* will into many forms, one has *struck out* the character of the will by *sub*tracting from it its content, its 'Where to?' [..] Still less is it a 'will *to life*': for life is simply an *individual case* of the will to power-it's quite arbitrary to say that everything strives to move across into this form of the will to power" (section 14[121], 257).

[60] *Ecce Homo,* "Why I Am a Destiny", section 1, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 144.

"knowledge is an invention": "1. That it is not inherent in human nature, that it does not form man's oldest instinct. But above all that its possibility is not defined by its form itself [...] 2. That it's without model, that it does not have an external guarantee in something like a divine intellect [...] No reminiscence; 3. That [knowledge] is not joined to the structure of the world as a reading, a decipherment, a perception, or a self-evidence [...] 4. That [knowledge] is the result of a complex operation [...] knowledge is not the operation that destroys appearance (either by opposing it to being as Plato does, or by unmasking the object=x hidden behind it); nor is it the futile effort that always remains in appearance [...] knowledge is indeed what goes beyond appearance, what maliciously destroys it, puts it into question, and extracts its secrets. A knowledge that remained at the level of what is given as appearance would not be knowledge at all" (ECF-WTK, 203, 204, and 205). Therefore, when Nietzsche talks about "the perspectival character" of all knowledge or interpretation, he is not referring to the limitations imposed by our nature,[61] but to its character as invention, to the always "polemical and strategic character" of what constitutes an "activity" or a practice rather than a "faculty": "there is knowledge only in the form of a certain number of actions that are different from one another [...] [it] is always a certain strategic relation in which man is placed [...] the historical and circumstantial result of conditions outside the domain of knowledge [...] at the root of knowledge, Nietzsche places something like [...] struggle, power relations" (EEW3, 14, 13, and 12). This implies a recasting of the link between "will" and "truth." Their

[61] "in what would be a blend of kantianism and empiricism" (EEW3, 14).

relation is no longer characterized by "freedom",[62] but rather by "violence".[63] The "will to knowledge" has "quite another root than truthfulnesss".[64] If knowledge was invented, truth was too, but "later" (ECF-WTK, 206). It was "added to knowledge, later – without knowledge being destined to truth, without truth being the essence of knowledge [...] Truth arrives unexpectedly, preceded [...] by something that we cannot say is either true or not true, since it is prior to the division specific to truth" (Ibid., 207, 208). Neither knowledge nor truth have an "origin", but a "history" (Ibid., 209). As he puts it in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", knowledge "is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting"[65] (EEW3, 380).What interests Foucault is "the power proper to discourses accepted as true" (EFL, 215), "the value accorded to truth" (EEW2, 476). As the title of his 1971 lecture puts it, in Nietzsche he finds a way "to think the history of truth... without relying on truth" (ECF-WTK, 202), to "recount" this "history" as a "fable" (Ibid., 207).

Vattimo acknowledges that Foucault developed "a fresh reading of the Nietzschean idea of the conflict of interpretations".[66] I would complete this statement by adding that what makes Foucault's re-description of this "conflict" particularly useful and productive is his willingness to

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[62] "The relation [...] between truth and knowledge is assumed from the outset as one that exists by right... the will has only to let the truth assert […] express itself […] Truth is free with regard to the will; it does not receive any of its determinations from the will […] Freedom is the being of truth; and it is the duty of the will. An ontology (freedom of the truth will be God or nature); an ethics (the will's duty will be […] renunciation, passage to the universal) […] to erase from itself anything that might not be empty space for the truth" (ECF-WTK, 207, 214, and 215).

[63] "Nietzsche puts the root and raison d'être of truth in the will […] The result of this shift is- must be- considerable and we are still far from having being able to gauge it entirely. It should make a whole 'ideology' of knowledge as the effect of freedom and reward for virtue impossible" (Ibid., 214 and 215).

[64] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 35[5], 18.

[65] The original says "le savoir n'est pas fait pour comprendre, il est fait pour trancher." ["Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire", in *Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975* (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001), 1016]. It seems to me that any of the following ways of translating the verb "trancher" (as "settle", "resolve," "decide", "take drastic action", "be decisive", "solve", "cut short", "bring to a conclusion", or "cut or slice through") would have been more effective in conveying Foucault's Nietzschean view on the activity of knowing.

[66] Vattimo, *Beyond Interpretation*, 35.

think through the implications of Nietzsche's claim that what is at stake is not "'truth' struggling with life, but one type of life struggling with another".[67] As he reminds us in *The Order of Things*, the attempt to know "what good and evil were in themselves" would have made no sense for Nietzsche. What he wanted to find out is "*who was speaking* when one said *Agathos* to designate oneself and *Deilos*" (EOT, 305) to refer to those who are not like him.[68]

Foucault's relentless effort to put an end to the denial or "denegation of discourse in its specific existence",[69] to investigate the role of language as something more than just "a simple site of expression for thought [...] a shallow transparency which shimmers for a moment at the margins of things and thoughts, and then vanishes",[70] is part of his life-long project "to take Nietzsche seriously".[71] In fact, what he finds "at the bottom of this denegation imposed on discourse" is the negative to accept what the Nietzschean analysis of the interpretative structure of Being had

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[67] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* 7[42], 136.

[68] "Nietzsche's discovery that all of Western metaphysics is tied not only to its grammar (that had been largely suspected since Schlegel) but to those who, in holding discourse, have a hold over the right to speak" (EEW2, 151).

[69] Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse", in *The Foucault Effect*, 62.

[70] Ibid., 65.

[71] "It is striking that someone like Deleuze has simply taken Nietzsche seriously, which indeed he has. That is what I wanted to do [...] even if Deleuze has written a superb book about Nietzsche, and although the presence of Nietzsche in his other works is clearly apparent, there is no deafening reference to Nietzsche, nor any attempt to wave the Nietzschean flag for rhetorical or political ends [...] I do not believe there is a single Nietzscheanism. There are no grounds for believing that there is a true Nietzscheanism, or that ours is any truer than others" (EPPC, 31). Similarly, less than a year later he talks about his "fundamental Nietzscheanism [...] I am simply a Nietzschean, and I try as far as possible, on a certain number of issues, to see with the help of Nietzsche's texts – but also with anti-Nietzschean theses (which are nevertheless Nietzschean!) – what can be done in this or that domain. I attempt nothing else, but that I try to do well [...] I probably wouldn't have read Nietzsche if I hadn't read Heidegger [...] these are the two authors whom I've read the most. I think it's important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but on whom one doesn't write" (EFL, 471, 470). Paul Veyne is aware that "Foucault declared that Heidegger had been important for him" and talked about "reading his works". However, in his "humble opinion", Foucault "had read little more than Heidegger's *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* and the big book on Nietzsche, which was indeed important for him as its paradoxical effect was to make him a Nietzschean, not a Heideggerian" (*Foucault: His Thought, His Character*, 147).

exposed: that the hermeneutic experience is a creative or "productive" process, instead of a merely constative access to an intrinsic nature of reality waiting to be "discovered".[72] In other words, "the refusal to recognize" that "the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge" (EPK, 51), that "in discourse something is formed, according to clearly definable rules; that this something exists, subsists, changes, disappears, according to equally definable rules; in short, that alongside everything a society can produce (alongside: that is to say, in a determinate relationship with) there is the formation and transformation of 'things said'",[73] corresponds to the attitude that Nietzsche had characterized as "passive nihilism".[74] So for both Nietzsche and Foucault the object of unmasking, exposing, or unveiling is not an essential order hidden behind the veil of misleading appearances, but the interpretative process itself, which is no longer seen as "the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin". Far from that, the "emergence" of a new interpretation, "the moment of arising [...] stands as the principle and the singular law of an apparition"; it always signals "the reversal of a relationship of forces [...] a scene where forces are risked and confront one another" (EEW2, 376, 384 and 385) through "the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules", a vocabulary, or an already existing way of life "in order to [...] bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules [...] the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history [...] not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations" (EEW2, 381, 378). The lasting belief in "the absolute existence

[72] "Truth is thus not something that's there and must be found out, discovered, but something *that must be made* and that provides the name for a *process* […] an *active determining, not* a becoming conscious of something that is 'in itself' fixed and determinate. It is a word for the 'will to power'" (Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 155).

[73] *The Foucault Effect*, 63.

[74] *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 9[35], 147.

of signs [...] signs that exist primarily, originally, actually, like coherent, persistent, and systematic marks" conceals "the violence, the incompleteness, the infinity of interpretations" and, by appealing to the authority of God, Truth, or Reality-as-it-is-in-itself imposes "a reign of terror where the mark rules [...] and suspects language".[75]

What we call "reality" is the effect of the repetition and embodied citation of dominant interpretations that have become sedimented in language on the part of existences or forms of life that depend on those interpretations in order to assure the particular conditions in which they can preserve themselves.[76] The activity of interpretation always involves "forcing, adjusting, shortening, omitting, filling-out, inventing".[77] As "fables"[78] or "perspectival appraisals",[79] interpretations are supposed to lack the ontological weight, the "cogent force"[80] that characterized the metaphysical *ontos on,* by producing only more or less stable "effects of reality".[81] That's why Foucault reimagines the Heideggerian "inherited opening" described by Vattimo as a contingent order open to transformation. In fact, he considers that Heidegger's "opening" – just as "Plato's *homoeōsis tō theō*" or "Kant's intelligible characteristic" – is one of the ways in which the

[75] Foucault, *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context*, 66-67.

[76] "the viewpoint of 'value' is the viewpoint of *conditions of preservation and enhancement* in regard to complex structures that have relatively lasting life within becoming" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[73], 212); "our values are *interpreted into* things" (Ibid., section 2[77], 73); It is "our affects" (Ibid., section 2[190], 96) or "our needs" (Ibid., 7[2], 129) that interpret. "One mustn't ask: 'So *who* interprets?' – instead, the interpreting, as a form of the will to power, itself has existence (but not as a 'being'; rather as a *process*, as a *becoming*) as an affect" (Ibid., 2[151], 91).

[77] Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), section 24, 112.

[78] Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings,* 171.

[79] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[108] , 80.

[80] Vattimo, *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 27.

[81] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence, 1982-1985* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 6.

philosophical tradition has articulated or conceived the "freedom" that, as we have already pointed out, is supposed to connect will and truth. As he put it in 1963, the "possibility and necessity of a critique [...] are linked to the fact that language exists and that, in the innumerable words spoken by man [...] a meaning has taken shape that hangs over us" (EBC, xv, xvi). Its objective is "disturbing the words we speak [...] denouncing the grammatical habits of our thinking [...] dissipating the myths that animate our words" (EOT, 298).

As a result, the question that Foucault poses to discourse is neither about "intentions" nor about "codes" or "formal rules", but is concerned with "events": "the law of existence of statements, that which rendered them possible- them and none other in their place: the conditions of their singular emergence; their correlation with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or otherwise". The goal of "archaeology" – understood as "the description of an archive" or "the history of 'things said'" – is the same as that of "genealogy": exposing the "constituted" character of "appearances" themselves by showing how the nexus power-knowledge "produces reality" (EDP, 194). In other words, "a new 'carving up' of things and the principle of their verbalization [...] a new outline of the perceptible and the statable", a new "distribution of the visible and the invisible" and therefore another "division between what is stated and what remains unsaid" (EBC, xviii, xi).

Taking seriously Nietzsche's claim that "in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new 'things'",[82] Foucault's work tries to "show how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (*dispositif)* of knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately

[82] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), section 58, 70.

submits it to the division between true and false [...] showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices – from the moment they become coordinated with a regime of truth – was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something" (ECF-BOB, 19). Foucault refers to the elements in that series – which also includes "the subject", "the state", and "civil society" – as "historical constructs" (EHS1, 105), "universals",[83] or "transactional realities"[84] (Ibid., 297) and conceives of them as "singularities [...] born out of multiple [...] elements of which" they are "not the product, but rather, the effect" (EEF, 276, 277).[85] In fact, he underlines that "the indivisibility of knowledge and power" brings about or "induces" not only "singularities, fixed according to their conditions of acceptability" but also "a field of possibles, of openings [...] reversals and possible dislocations which make them fragile, temporary, and which turn these effects into events" (EEF, 278). However, the fact that those singularities are not "ready-made" objects or "givens" doesn't mean that they can simply be discarded as mere "illusions or ideological products" because "it is precisely a set of [...] real practices" that "establish" them and therefore "imperiously mark" them "out in reality" (ECF-

[83] "I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that consists in saying: Let's suppose that universals do not exist [...] what kind of history we can do [...] How can you write history if you do not accepts a priori the existence of things like the state, society, the sovereign, and subjects? [...] instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for [...] concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices, and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices". Foucault insists that his method or approach should be distinguished from "historicism", which "starts from the universal and [...] puts it through the grinder of history [...] questioning universals by using history as a critical method" (ECF-BOB, 3).

[84] "transactional realities (*réalités de transaction*)" are not an "historico-natural given" or a "primary and immediate reality". They are "real", even if "they have not always existed" and they are "born precisely from the interplay of relations of power and everything which constantly eludes them, at the interface, so to speak, of governors and governed" (ECF-BOB, 297). As an example, he mentions "civil society", which "belongs to" or "forms part of modern governmental technology [...] a transactional reality which seems to me to be absolutely correlative to the form of governmental technology we call liberalism" and he adds that this does "not mean that it is purely and simply its product or that it has no reality" (Ibid.).

[85] As I will explain in "Chapter Three: Governmentality", I think that the distinction between "*produit*" and "*effet*" and the choice of the latter has to do with Foucault's attempt to emphasize the contingent, arbitrary, and changeable character of "singularities" as "events", in the context of his redescription of causality.

BOB, 19). As "positivities", those singularities are part of an "empiricity" that is not "grounded in inner experience" (EEF, 272). Taking as his model Nietzsche's "attempt to bring up again for discussion the fundamental concepts of knowledge, of morals, and of metaphysics by appealing to a historical analysis […] which does not refer in any way to the 'original'" (EFL, 98-97), Foucault seeks to understand the "movement" by which technologies of power constitute "a field of truth with objects of knowledge" (ECF-STP, 118). In other words, genealogy as "the history of the objectification of objectivities" is the result of "a nominalist critique itself arrived by way of historical analysis" (EEW3, 23). In 1971 he characterized the genealogical method as an analysis of "the historical beginnings [...] of things", of their "descent", which is not a "search for origins" or "an erecting of foundations" (EEW2, 372, 377). In a 1977 interview, genealogy is defined as the "form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject [...] see how [...] problems of constitution could be resolved within a historical framework, instead of referring them back to a [...] constituent subject [...] to arrive at an analysis that can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework" (EPK, 117). In other words, genealogy's goal is to "show how certain things [...] the status of which should obviously be questioned [...] were actually able to be formed" (ECF-BOB, 3) without appealing to any "foundational recourse" (EEF, 276).

The Christian and modern hermeneutics of the subject is not the expression of a human nature that has to be either renounced or liberated, but the instrument and effect of the exercise of a pastoral power that justifies itself by reference to that same human nature that is its correlate. The task of overcoming ourselves as subjects requires abandoning the so-called "metaphysics of presence" and its objectifying thought in favor of a more dynamic and agonistic approach that brings into relief the differential distribution of "*degrees of being*". In other words, the unequal

allocation of "*more or less of reality*"[86] to what exists according to a moral judgment for which "true", "good", and "real" are interchangeable.[87]

The stability of "*being* as such", [88] the substantiality of reality, is built on an endless play of active and reactive forces of which the subject is nothing but a precarious and never self-identical effect. This world of continually readjusted perspectives, of life overcoming itself,[89] exposes what Lyotard calls "the phantasms of realism".[90] There is a "rupture" or "break in presence",[91] with the result that the "present order of entities", which metaphysics identified with being itself, is revealed as nothing more than a "particular historical horizon".[92] In spite of its substantializing effects of "domination", we face a "weak" being, one that is the result of the interaction of interpretations in conflict that "clash incessantly and attain only precarious situations of equilibrium, without ever being able to relate to an 'objective' criterion of reality".[93] Whereas hegemonic interpretations pretend to be eternal and necessary, the goal of Foucault's use of history as genealogy is to show that they too have undergone a process of becoming, that "truth or being

[86] Nietzsche. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 10[9], 178.

[87] As Nietzsche had pointed out, "it is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance [...] Actually, why do we even assume that "true" and "false" are intrinsically opposed? Isn't it enough to assume that there are levels of appearance [..]?" (*Beyond Good and Evil,* "Part Two: The free spirit", section 34, 35).

[88] Ibid.

[89] In order to avoid a reading of Nietzsche that results in some kind of vitalistic metaphysics, we should take into account that, as Foucault knew very well and Vattimo points out, "even the idea that at the end of the unmasking process we could find 'life' must be abandoned […] There is nothing like "life", only historically determined forms of life, themselves 'produced', not 'originary'" (*Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 80).

[90] Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained,* 6.

[91] Derrida, "Signature Event Context," in *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds*, ed. Peggy Kamuf, 80-111 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 88.

[92] Vattimo, *The End of Modernity,* 121.

[93] Ibid.

lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the exteriority of accidents" (EEW2, 374).

According to Nietzsche, the acknowledgement that "the Christian-moral [...] interpretation of the world"[94] is no longer tenable has led to "passive" or "reactive" nihilism: "this seems to us to devalue the universe, make it 'meaningless'[...] but this is just an *intermediate state*",[95] a "transitional" and "pathological" one, because it is based on a tremendous and unjustified generalization: "*One* interpretation has perished: but because it was regarded as *the* interpretation, there now seems to be no meaning at all in existence, everything seems to be *in vain*".[96] "Active",[97] "complete", or "perfect"[98] nihilism, the overcoming of nihilism by nihilism itself, requires leaving behind "narrower interpretations". It "opens up new perspectives [...] a belief in new horizons",[99] and opposes the violence implicit in the normalizing effort to "identify the present order of entities [...] with being itself"[100] by exposing the contingent character of the social norms through which "power dissimulates as ontology".[101]

Against certain widespread misunderstandings, it is important to insists that, for Nietzsche, "the strongest", those who best illustrate the attitude that he describes as "active" nihilism, are "the

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[94] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[127], 83.

[95] Ibid., section 11[100], 220.

[96] Ibid., section 5[71], 117.

[97] Ibid., section 9[35], 146.

[98] Ibid., section 10[43], 182.

[99] *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 2[108], 80.

[100] Vattimo, *The End of Modernity,* 121.

[101] Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 215.

most moderate [...] those who have no *need* of extreme articles of faith, who not only concede but even love a good deal of contingency and nonsense".[102] In other words, those whose attitude towards the "possibility *that* [...] the world [...] *includes infinite interpretations*" is not marked by the "great shudder" and demonizing fear that too often have led us to "deify [...] *this* monster of an unknown world [...] to worship [...] the unknown (*das Unbekannte*) as 'The Unknown One' (*den Unbekannten*)".[103]As Vattimo points out, "the model of active nihilism [...] is not the 'blond beast' of the Nazis; but neither is he the philosopher aware of the historicity of any *Weltanschauung*, the transcendental psychologist of the Dilthean type. The model most constantly referred to by Nietzsche in his late writings [...] is the artist, whom he calls tragic or Dionysian. These terms define the artist in relation to his capacity to grasp, accept, even augment the problematic and terrible aspects of life [...] From this perspective, the moderation of 'European nihilism' [...] is not a stance of Olympian balance but rather an acceptance of extreme risk, which can be called moderation only insofar as [...] it transcends the interests that drive the struggle for life. *The Gay Science* [...] had already advanced the hypothesis that 'the will to health alone' might be 'a prejudice, cowardice, and perhaps a bit of very subtle barbarism and backwardness'[...] active nihilism is the capacity, to which the artist bears witness, to transcend the instinct of self-preservation".[104]

Nietzsche associates becoming with "inventing, willing [...] self-overcoming: no subject but a doing, positing, creative, no 'causes and effects'".[105] As I have already pointed out, he

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[102] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 5[71] 15, 121.

[103] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, section 374, 239-240.

[104] Vattimo, *Dialogue with Nietzsche*, 139 and 140.

[105] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 7[54], 138.

considers the concept of the subject – as "cause of all doing, *doer*"[106] – to be at the root of our belief in being, substance, and identity.[107] Therefore, a different way of thinking of and relating to ourselves would lead to another way of experiencing our constitutive relationality, and hence to a different interpretation of the world. This is what he seems to be suggesting when he wonders "whether there might not be many other ways of creating such an *illusory* world".[108] Zarathustra's children are able to transcend the instinct of self-preservation[109] in what Foucault describes as "de-individualization […] the destruction of the individual as such" (ECF-PP, 57) because they want to inhabit other perspectives, to be overcome, and thus give way to modes of existence less limiting or restrictive than the Christian-modern subject.

Nietzsche's "active nihilism" and Foucault's "critique" are practices that manifest a common "*ēthos"*[110]; one that constitutes a "stylization" of what Judith Butler has described as "an insurrection at the level of ontology, a critical reopening of the questions, What is real? [..] How might reality be remade?"[111] Foucault's understanding of his work as "an attempt to modify what

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[106] Ibid., section 9[98], 158.

[107] "The concept of 'reality', of 'being', is drawn from our feeling of '*subject*' [...] interpreted from the standpoint of ourselves, so that the I is considered subject, cause of all doing, *doer* [...] regarding all our doing as a consequence of our will- so that the I, as substance, is not absorbed into the multiplicity of change" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 9[98], 158-159). "Our *belief in the I* as substance, as the only reality on the basis of which we attribute reality to things in general [...] the oldest 'realism' comes to light [...] the history of the soul-superstition [...] a belief, however necessary it is in order to preserve a being, has nothing to do with the truth" (Ibid., section 7[63], 140). "The concept of *substance* a consequence of the concept of *subject, not* the other way around! [..] 'Subject' is the fiction that many *like* states in us are the effects of one substratum" (Ibid., section 10[19], 178-179). "'Being' as a fabrication by the man suffering from becoming" (Ibid., section 2[110], 80).

[108] *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 9[106], 161.

[109] As Nietzsche put it, "Spinoza's principle of self-preservation ought really to put a stop to change: but the principle is false, the *opposite* is true. Everything that lives [...] does everything possible *not* to preserve itself, but to become *more*" (*Writings form the Late Notebooks*, section 14[121], 257).

[110] "a way of being and of behavior" (EEF: 29).

[111] Butler, *Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Versus, 2004), 33.

one thinks and even what one is" (EFL, 455), together with his defense of an "ethics" that makes us "permanently capable of self-detachment (which is the opposite of the attitude of conversion)" (Ibid., 461) echo Nietzsche's insistence that it is "only as creators" that we can "destroy [...] the world that counts as 'real', so-called 'reality'"[112], as well as the following words from *On the Genealogy of Morality*: "to see differently, and to *want* to see differently [...] is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 'objectivity'– the latter understood not as 'contemplation [*Anschauung*] without interest' (which is, as such, a non-concept and an absurdity), but as *having in our power* the ability to engage and disengage our 'pros' and 'cons' [...] the *more* affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the *more* eyes [...] the more complete will be our 'concept' of the thing, our 'objectivity'".[113]

In this last quote I read a call for a kind of empathy that is as different from the Christian virtues of compassion or pity as equality is from tolerance.[114] Mainly because this way of thinking and feeling will only be possible if we refuse to exist as subjects. Foucault's Nietzschean insight into the fundamental equivalence of being, truth, and value leads him to the conclusion that, as Richard Rorty puts it paraphrasing John Dewey, "'real' is as evaluative a term as 'good'".[115] This means that Christian morality and modern psychology – as specifications of an onto-theology designed to preserve the primacy of individual consciousness and its "subjected sovereignty"

[112] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, section 58, 70.

[113] Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, "Third Essay", section 12, 87.

[114] For an excellent genealogy of tolerance and its relationship to equality, see Wendy Brown's *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[115] Richard Rorty, *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 217.

(ELCP, 221) – are neither a description of a given and universal nature nor a "foundation" indispensable for action, but rather, borrowing Butler's terminology, a "normative injunction".[116]

[116] In *Gender Trouble* (New York: Routledge, 1999) Butler wrote: "Ontology is, thus, not a foundation, but a normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into political discourse as its necessary ground" (189).

II. CHAPTER ONE: THE BIRTH OF PSYCHIATRIC POWER

> *It would be absolutely false historically, and so politically, to appeal to the original rights of the individual against something like the subject, the norm, or psychology […] right from the start […] the individual is a normal subject, a psychologicallly normal subject; and consequently, desubjectification, denormalization, and depsychologization necessarily entail the destruction of the individual as such. De-individualization goes hand in hand with these three other operations* (ECF-PP, 56, 57).
>
> *The morality which prevails in a community is constantly being worked at by every--body: most people produce example after example of the alleged relationship between cause and effect, between guilt and punishment, confirm it as well founded and strengthen their faith.*[117]
>
> *The archaeology of the human sciences has to be established through studying the mechanisms of power which have invested human bodies, acts and forms of behavior* (EPK, 61). *Challenging and attacking infrapower […] is necessarily connected with the questioning of the human sciences and of man* (EEW3, 87).

In the following pages I will offer a reading of psychiatric power and the "psychological" or "Psy-function"[118] as the main procedure of normalization adopted and deployed in modern Western societies as a result of the secularization-as-generalization[119] of the Christian pastorate's techniques of government, together with the discourse of the hermeneutics of the subject that serves to justify them. By exposing the connections between Foucault's early description of the "system of discipline-normalization" (ECF-AB, 52) and his later concept of pastoral power, my analysis will show that the latter is by definition both disciplinary and regulatory, individual and collective, whereas the former is still pastoral – and, in a Nietzschean sense, Christian – even

[117] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), section 11, 12.

[118] "When I say "function" I mean not only the discourse, but the institution, and the psychological individual himself […] historically […] the psychological function […] is entirely derived from the dissemination of psychiatric power […] beyond the asylum […] Psychiatry gradually puts itself forward as the institutional enterprise of discipline" (ECF-PP, 85, 190).

[119] Foucault defines "secularization" as "the expansion in civil society […] displacement in relation to the religious center […] of the art of governing men and the methods of doing it" (EEF, 264).

when it is no longer under ecclesiastical control. What is at stake in both cases is the "direction" or "conduction" of our behavior.

To begin with, it is important to keep in mind that Foucault himself not only identified psychiatric power as disciplinary,[120] but also traced the notion of "direction" – that he considered best defined the practice of psychiatry – back to its emergence in the Christian pastorate.[121] Furthermore, I intend to argue that his equation of the "individual" with the "subject" in the extract from the 1973-1974 *Course* quoted at the beginning of this chapter does not constitute a denial of the possibility of resistance *tout court*, but only of the way in which the latter has been conceived by the "philosophico-juridical theory of individuality"[122] and its humanist[123] ontology of personal

[120] "what appeared openly, as it were, in the naked state, in psychiatric practice at the start of the nineteenth century, was a power with the general form of what I have called discipline […] The mechanism of psychiatry should be understood starting from the way in which disciplinary power works" (ECF-PP, 73, 41). "Psychiatry was constituted within the asylum as the government of the mad by putting to work a certain technology of power" (ECF-AB, 275).

[121] "Psychiatric power is […] mastery, an endeavor to subjugate, and my impression is that the word that best corresponds to this functioning of psychiatric power, and which is found in all the text from Pinel to Leuret, the term that recurs most frequently and appears to me to be entirely typical of this enterprise of both regime and mastery […] is the notion of 'direction' (*direction*). The history of this notion should be studied, because it did not originate in psychiatry-far from it. In the nineteenth century this notion still carries a whole set of connotations arising from religious practice. For three or four centuries before the nineteenth century, 'spiritual direction' (*direction de conscience*) defined a general field of techniques and objects. At a certain point, some of these techniques and objects, along with this practice of direction, were imported into the psychiatric field […] there is a track here: the psychiatrist […] directs individuals […] clear awareness of this practice on the part of psychiatrists themselves […] It would be a history worth doing" (ECF-PP, 174). In fact, he began to write this history as early as the following year, in his 1975 lectures, and, as I will show in the fourth and last chapter, he was still working on it in the last two books he published (the second and third volumes of the *History of sexuality*, that appeared in May and June of 1984, respectively, just before his death on June 25). In those 1975 lectures Foucault explains that it was only after the Council of Trent, with the imposition of "Tridentine piety" (ECF-AB, 226), that is, "in the second half of the sixteenth century, and starting from Borromeo's pastoral," that the Catholic Church established a "practice of spiritual direction (*direction de conscience*), which is not exactly a practice of confession" (Ibid., 183). In the case of the Catholics, it constitutes a second "discursive filter" which doubled "the operation of penance […] with a concerted technique of analyses, reflected choices, and the continual management of souls, conducts, and finally bodies. It is an evolution that inserts the juridical form of the law, of offense and penalty, which was originally the model for penance, within a field of practices that have the nature of correction, guidance, and medicine". As for Protestantism, instead of the sacrament of confession we find a "practice of permanent autobiography in which each individual recounts his own life to himself and to others […] in order to detect the signs of divine election" (Ibid., 184).

[122] The "individual as abstract subject, defined by individual rights that no power can limit unless agreed by contract" (ECF-PP, 57).

[123] The target of Foucault's critique in our first quotation is Humanism's claim that the "subject" or "the disciplinary individual" is just "an alienated, enslaved individual, he is not an authentic individual […] restore to him the fullness

substances confronted with a purely external and negative or repressive exercise of power. Otherwise said: neither Foucault's claim that the individual is a "product"[124] – rather than a "pre-given entity which is seized by the exercise of power" – nor his view that power and resistance are co-enabling phenomena – and therefore the latter "is never in a position of exteriority" with respect to the former (EHS1, 95)[125] – entail an inescapable resignation to passivity in the face of total domination. Far from that, this perspective allows him to account for the existence of a plurality of dispersed sub-individual or sub-personal[126] resistances without having to introduce what Nietzsche had called "the distinction between a doing and a doer" – as "the cause of the doing" [127] – and, therefore, without taking for granted the "unity" and "sovereignty" of the subject (EEW3, 10) as their necessary condition or place of departure. Thus, Foucault avoids falling back into the voluntarism of what for him is an originally Christian and still prevalent logic of intentions or

of his rights, and you will find […] the philosophico-juridical individual" (ECF-PP, 58). However, he explains that this "humanist discourse" is just the other side, the necessary counterpart of "the discourse of the human sciences", whose function is "to make us believe that the real, natural, and concrete content of the juridical individual is the disciplinary individual […] what […] they give as man is the disciplinary individual" (Ibid., 57, 58). In *Discipline and Punish* he clarifies the interdependence between those two discourses when he argues that both "the moral claims of humanism" and the "techniques and discourses" of the sciences of man or of the individual have been "built […] on" a "real, non-corporeal soul" which is neither "a substance" nor "an illusion" but "a reality-reference[…] the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge" (EDP, 29, 30). Therefore, when Foucault talks about the "juridico-disciplinary pincers of individualism" (ECF-PP, 57) he is pointing out that "Man, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries […] the illusion and the reality of what we call Man" is in fact "nothing other that the kind of after-image of this oscillation between the juridical […] and the disciplinary individual" (Ibid., 58). Thus, a critique of disciplinary power requires the rejection not only of the discourse that gave the disciplines "a respectable face" (EDP, 223), but also of a Humanism about which he declared that "the wish to propose it nowadays as an example of virtue really is a provocation" (EEW2, 99).

[124] "The individual, with his individuality and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces" (EPK, 74).

[125] In Nietzschean parlance, this means that it "must not be conditioned from outside, not *caused*" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 14[98], 251).

[126] "The points, knots, or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way […] But more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance […] furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them… the swarm of points of resistance traverses […] individual unities" (EHS1, 96).

[127] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[158], 92.

motives which implies the "substantification" of resistance as well as the "sanctification or heroworship" (ECF-STP, 202) of the person of the dissident.[128] As Colin Gordon puts it, "a corollary of Foucault's desubstantialisation of power" – that is, of his "use of the concept of power in a relational rather than substantialising mode" – is "a certain desacralization of canonical forms of resistance identified by a politico-ideological affiliation" (EPK, 256, 245).

If resisting normalization requires "the destruction of the individual" that's because far from being an originary core or unique truth "existing beneath all relationships of power […] and unduly weighed down by them" (ECF-PP, 56), what we have come to experience as our individuality-soul is the "psychologico-moral" (ECF-AB, 18) effect and instrument of those very power relations; the "correlative" of an exercise of power that cannot be characterized as domination (which resorts to violence as physical force) but instead makes possible a much more effective "government of individuals by their own truth" (ERC, 144).[129] Therefore, the reason why "we cannot say that the individual pre-exist the subject-function" is because the latter is just the result of the particular mode in which we have been individualized or acquired individuality; a process of individualization that imposes the subject as the only way of existing that can grant us recognition as humans.[130] However, this does not mean that all individualizations necessarily have to produce a subject. In fact, it is as a call for other types of individuation – "subjectless ones", in Gilles Deleuze's words[131] – that in 1969 Foucault formulated the following request to his readers and to

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[128] Of those who, as Nietzsche puts it, "go so far as to call themselves 'the good and the just'" (*Daybreak,* "Preface", section 3, 2).

[129] Translation slightly modified. I have replaced the word "verity" with "truth". Echoing Nietzsche's words in *The Gay Science*, Foucault describes this change in the technology of power as "the end of a certain kind of tragedy; comedy began" (EDP, 17).

[130] "To become individual one must become subject" (ECF-STP, 231).

the professionals of commentary and polemics: "Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write" (EAK, 17). This *cavalier* statement constitutes a refusal to respond as a subject, and more specifically, to perform the "author function",[132] which for Foucault is nothing more than "a projection, in […] psychologizing terms, of the operations we force texts to undergo […] the traits we establish as pertinent […] the exclusions we practice" (EEW2, 213). And just as the author "does not precede the works" but is a principle that functions as "the regulator of the fictive", preventing "the free circulation, the free manipulation […] of discourse […] through the action of an identity whose form is that of individuality and the I", the individual-as-subject plays the role of the "regulator" of our self-relationship, excluding the infinite possibilities of a free "composition, decomposition, and recomposition" of ourselves that would shake the clear-cut boundary that is supposed to separate once and for all the "internal" sphere I call "mine" or "myself" from the "external" world of "others" as "not-me". In other words, just as "the author function" does "not develop spontaneously as the attribution of a discourse to an individual" but only appears as "the result of a complex operation that constructs a certain being of reason that we call 'author'" (EEW2, 215), so the kind of reflexivity and the concept of agency imposed by the Christian and Modern hermeneutics of the subject are not a necessity that follows from our "human nature" but something contingent,[133] and therefore

[131] Deleuze, Gilles. "A Portrait of Foucault", in *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 115-116.

[132] An echo of section 472 in Nietzsche's *Daybreak*, entitled "*Not to justify oneself*": "A: But why will you not justify yourself? - B: I could do so, in this and in a hundred other things, but I despise the self-satisfied pleasure that lies in justification […] Perhaps I would have to take myself more in earnest to feel it a duty to correct erroneous ideas about me- I am too indifferent and lazy with regard to myself and thus also with regard to the effect I produce" ("Book V", 196).

[133] "I believe that the human sciences do not at all lead to the discovery of something which would be the 'human'- the truth about man, his nature, his birth, his destiny" (ERC, 99). "Since Kant, the infinite is no longer given, there is

changeable, that makes us "governable". We only acquire individuality in exchange of obedience and the kind of agency we are granted is predicated on the notions of guilt and punishment.

Echoing Nietzsche's assertion that "wherever responsibilities are assigned […] whenever a particular state of affairs is traced back to a will, an intention, or a responsible action […] an instinct to *punish and judge* […] the desire to *assign guilt* [...] is generally at work",[134] in a 1970 lecture Foucault reminded his audience that "texts, books, and discourses really began to have authors to the extent that authors became subject to punishment, that is, to the extent that discourses could be transgressive" (EEW2, 211-212).[135] Jean Hyppolite, the supervisor of his complementary or minor thesis – an "Introduction" to Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, with "translation and notes" – was just stating the obvious when he described it as "more inspired by Nietzsche than it is by Kant".[136] In fact, Foucault ends this early piece with what I would describe as a self-exhortation to take on "a veritable critique of the anthropological illusion" following the model offered by Nietzsche because, in his view, the Kantian question "*Was ist der Mensch?* [...] reaches its end in the response which both challenges and disarms it: *der Übermensch*" (EIKA, 124).[137] In other words, in the last lines of this brief and relatively ignored 1961 academic text

no longer anything but finitude, and it is in this sense that the Kantian critique carried the possibility- or the peril- of an anthropology" (EEW2, 257).

[134] *Twilight of the Idols,* "The Four Great Errors", section 7, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* 181.

[135] Before becoming "a product, a thing, a kind of goods", discourse was "an act placed in the bipolar field of the […] licit and the illicit, the religious and the blasphemous […] it was a gesture fraught with risks" (EEW2, 212).

[136] Jean Hyppolite quoted by Roberto Nigro in his "Afterword" to the 2008 edition of Foucault's minor thesis (EIKA, 128).

[137] "The Nietzschean enterprise can be understood as at last bringing that proliferation of the questioning of man to an end. For is not the death of God in effect manifested in a doubly murderous gesture which, by putting an end to the absolute, is at the same time the cause of the death of man himself? For man, in his finitude, is not distinguishable from the infinite of which he is both the negation and the harbinger; it is in the death of man that the death of God is realized" (EIKA, 124).

Foucault anticipates what will be his relentless, lifelong commitment to coming up with "a critique of finitude which would be as liberating with regard to man as it would be with regard to the infinite and which would show that finitude is not an end but rather that camber and knot in time when the end is in fact the beginning" (Ibid.).

By 1978, Foucault's sustained work on an "archaeology" or "genealogy" (ECF-AB, 26, 42) of the modern power of normalization leads him to conclude that the particular type of individualization required and implemented by the exercise of pastoral power became also "the typical constitution of the modern Western subject" (ECF-STP, 185). However, we shouldn't forget that as early as 1973 – that is, more than a year before his first mention of "the pastoral"[138] – he had warned his audience that "in no way" was he claiming that disciplinary power was "the only procedure of individualization that has existed in our societies", and he added: "I will try to come back to this next week" (ECF-PP, 56). Significantly, the following lecture is devoted to a "history of disciplinary apparatuses" that begins "in religious communities throughout the Middle Ages" (Ibid., 63, 64) and specifies the three "stages" of the process through which "religious institutions […] extended their own discipline […] It is […] the external version of religious

[138] In the lecture of February 19, 1975, he defines the pastoral as "a technique for the government of souls […] the technique offered to the priest for the government of souls" and he claims that it was "defined by the Council of Trent and later taken up and developed by Carlo Borromeo" (ECF-AB, 178, 177). However, it would take him three more years to develop the notion of a specifically pastoral type of power and therefore to show that, in the Christian West, "religious power is pastoral power" (ECF-STP, 153). From 1973 to 1976 he used expressions like "ecclesiastical power" (ECF-AB, 221), "The Church", "the Christian technique of the government of individuals" (Ibid., 232), or "the Christian pastoral" (EHS1, 21, 63, and 113). At least from 1977 Foucault will argue that "The Christian pastorate, institutionalized, developed […] from around the third century […] institutionalization of a religion as a church […] from the second and third century after Jesus Christ […] Saint Gregory Nazianzen (329-390) was the first to define the art of governing men by the pastorate as the 'art of arts' […] before […] the 'science of sciences' was […] philosophy [...] what took over from philosophy in the Christian West was […] not theology […] it was the pastorate […] this art of governing men […] everyday government […] pastoral government" (ECF-STP, 164, 148, 150, and 151). Therefore, what we see in the sixteenth century, after the Reformation, is not the birth but "a formidable reinforcement of the pastorate in two different types. On the one hand […] the Protestant type […] a meticulous pastorate, but […] hierarchically supple […] on the other hand, the Counter Reformation […] a hierarchized pyramid" (Ibid., 149).

disciplines that we see being progressively applied in ever less marginal and ever more central sectors of the social system" (ECF-PP, 70). In other words, beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there is a "colonization"[139] or "invasion"[140] of what was a society of sovereignty[141] by a disciplinary power that had emerged and developed "within religious communities" (ECF-PP, 41). Thus, Foucault claims that in the imposition of a "total narration of existence within religious mechanisms" we find "the innermost core[142] […] of all the techniques of examination and medicalization that appear later" (ECF-AB, 184). Similarly, in his 1976 book he acknowledges that the Christian "procedures of community life and salvation" were probably "the first nucleus" of modern disciplinary power's ability to bring forth "individually characterized, but collectively useful aptitudes" (EDP, 162). For pastoral power, salvation required following a closely supervised "rhythmic of time punctuated by pious exercises" (Ibid., 150). In its modern form, this practice of exercise under continuous control "does not culminate in a beyond, but tends towards a subjection that has never reached its limit" (Ibid., 162). As for the three stages, Foucault explains that disciplinary schemas were applied in "three types of colonization":

The first is the "disciplinarization" or "colonization" of the "student youth", which thus became "one of the first points of application and extension of the disciplinary system" (ECF-PP,

[139] "the colonization of an entire society by means of disciplinary apparatuses" (ECF-PP, 68); "disciplinary systems, which took shape in the Middle Ages, begin to cover all society through a sort of process that we could call external and internal colonization" (Ibid., 71).

[140] "the invasion carried out by disciplinary apparatuses […] from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries" (ECF-PP, 66).

[141] "in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through a sort of progressive extension […] we see the constitution of what we could call […] a 'disciplinary society' replacing a society of sovereignty […] the general schema of feudal and monarchical sovereignty" (ECF-PP, 66, 64).

[142] In 1978 he will argue that pastoral power constitutes "the inner depth and background of the governmentality that begins to develop in the sixteenth century" (ECF-STP, 215).

66). And the "model, the mould, the point of departure" for this pedagogical disciplinarization is the "ascetic ideal" found "in religious communities […] the practice of the individual's exercise on himself, the ascetic work of the individual on himself for his own salvation". That is, the first model for the "disciplinarization" of the youth through pedagogy is a Christian technique of the self: The ascetic principle of monastic life applied to pedagogy. He talks about the "Brethren of the Common Life" as an example of the "spread of monastic or ascetic disciplines before the Reformation" (Ibid., 41). They are one of the many lay communities that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries "defined disciplinary methods for daily life and pedagogy […] on the basis of techniques taken from monastic life, as well as ascetic exercises taken from a whole tradition of religious exercises" (Ibid.). Those groups founded schools in which they applied the principles of ascetic exercises to pedagogy.[143] As a result, the relation of complete obedience of the monk to the ascetic guide continues to define the link between teacher and student.[144]

The second type or stage of "disciplinarization" analyzed by Foucault affects "colonized peoples". Here he mentions the example of the Jesuits in South America, who "transposed and transformed their own discipline" in the colonies as an alternative to slavery (ECF-PP, 70, 69). "Disciplinary schemas were both applied and refined" (Ibid., 68) in those Catholic missions, which constituted "disciplinary microcosms […] an absolutely permanent system of punishment that followed the individual throughout his life and which, at every moment, in each of his actions or attitudes, was liable to pick out something indicating a bad tendency or inclination, and that […]

[143] "The idea of an educational 'programme' that would follow the child to the end of his schooling and which would involve […] exercises of increasing complexity first appeared […] in a religious group, the Brothers of the Common Life […] They transposed some of the spiritual techniques […] the ascetic life […] to education [...] the striving of the whole community towards salvation became the collective, permanent competition of individuals classified in relation to one another" (EDP, 161, 162).

[144] "one of the principles of ascetic exercise is that although it is an exercise of the individual on himself, it always takes place under the constant direction of someone […] ascetic progress requires a constant guide […] The ascetic guide becomes the class teacher" (ECF-PP: 67, 68).

entailed a punishment which could be lighter because it was constant and […] was only ever brought to bear on potential actions or the beginnings of action" (ECF-PP, 69).

Finally, the "internal colonization" and confinement of vagrants, beggars, nomads, delinquents, prostitutes, etc., that took place in the Classical age. This is the "Great Confinement" described in the *History of Madness* as a procedure for isolating and governing the poor, the mad, and the "idle" in general. The form those practices of government took were also "very close to those of religion since in most cases it was the religious orders who had […] the responsibility for managing" the houses of confinement or correction. Confinement is an invention of the classical age. It indicates "the moment when madness is seen […] against the social horizon of poverty, the inability to work and the impossibility of integrating into a social group" (EHM, 77). The objective was "to bring order to lives and consciences […] For the Catholic Church, as for Protestant countries, confinement represents […] an order of policing totally transparent to religious principles, and a religion whose demands could be entirely satisfied by the rules of policing and the constraints it can inflict […] the house of confinement of the classical age […] considered itself […] the civic equivalent of religion" (Ibid., 76). The "secularization of charity" coincides with the "moral culpabilization of poverty", its moral perception as idleness. As it will be the case with madness later, it appears only "on a moral horizon […] within the sphere of guilt". Both the poor and the mad, "before being objects of knowledge, or rather in order to become objects of knowledge" had to be subjected to moral condemnation or social excommunication (EHM, 104, 61).

It seems to me that Foucault's 1978 definition of pastoral power as "an art of 'governing men'" should be read in connection with his 1975 claim that the Classical Age not only "invented"

a "juridico-political theory of power"[145] and new "forms of government",[146] but also "refined" an already existing "'art of governing'": a "general technique of the government of men" which consists of "a typical apparatus […] the disciplinary organization" (ECF-AB, 49). Therefore, disciplinary power did not appear in the classical age; at that time it was just "refined" or updated and extended.[147] Its spread or generalization seems to have run smoothly because, after all, institutions like the army, the workshop, the school, the university, or the house of confinement were just expanding "the life and the regularity of the monastic communities to which they were often attached […] The rigors of the industrial period long retained a religious air […] the framework of the 'factory-monastery' […] the monastic model was gradually imposed […] the factory was explicitly compared with the monastery; the time-table […] was no doubt suggested by the monastic communities" (EDP, 149, 141, and 142). The organization of a disciplinary space in which one could "supervise the conduct of each individual […] assess it […] judge it" at every moment followed the model of "the monastic cell" (Ibid., 143). That's why this "modest" and "humble" power – compared with "the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state" (Ibid., 170) – can be defined as "a political anatomy of detail". Foucault argues that if we want to understand the "history of the rationalization of detail in moral accountability and

[145] One "centered on the notion of the will and its alienation, transfer, and renunciation in a governmental apparatus" (ECF-AB, 49).

[146] "the administrative monarchy […] a state apparatus that extended into and was supported by different institutions" (Ibid., 48, 49).

[147] "it has a history […] it […] has not always existed […] If we take only the history going from the Middle Ages until our own time, I think we can say that the formation of this power […] was not completely marginal to medieval society, but it was certainly not central either. It was formed within religious communities" (ECF-PP, 40, 41); "the extension […] of the disciplines from their lateral function to the central, general function they exercise from the eighteenth century […] from the eighteenth century, a sort of disciplinary network begins to cover society […] at the end of the seventeenth century, and during the eighteenth century, disciplinary apparatuses appear and are established which no longer have a religious basis […] without any regular support from the religious side" (Ibid., 72, 93, and 70).

political control", we need to know that the Classical age did not invent this category. On the contrary, "detail" had "long been a category of theology and asceticism. For the disciplined man, as for the true believer, no detail is unimportant, but not so much for the meaning that it conceals […] as for the hold it provides for the power that wishes to seize it" (EDP, 139 and 140).

The disciplinary modality of power was an invention – or rather *the* invention – of the Christian pastorate:[148] what makes the exercise of pastoral power as the government of both individuals and communities work[149] are disciplinary methods and techniques. Besides, Foucault reminds the reader that before the creation of the police apparatus by the state in eighteenth-century France, the task of 'disciplining' the population […] the functions of social discipline" (EDP, 212, 213) had always been performed by pastoral power through its charity and evangelization organizations.

It can be argued that the God of the Old Testament exemplifies what Foucault describes as the model of sovereignty, whereas the "coming" of Christ as "the first pastor*"* (ECF-STP, 152*)* – the institutionalization of the church in the pastorate through the organization of the first disciplinary or panoptic schema with universal pretensions – shows the possibility of effectively combining sovereignty with discipline.[150] Therefore, even if in the 1973-1974 lectures there is a moment when Foucault talks about "the relationship of sovereignty exercised by the priest with

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[148] "disciplinary apparatuses […] derive directly from religious institutions" (ECF-PP, 70). "For centuries, the religious orders had been masters of discipline" (EDP, 150). "Monasticism was actually the point of departure and matrix of discipline" (ECF-STP, 46).

[149] As Foucault puts it in the lecture of February 8 1978, the "great problem both of the techniques of power in Christian pastorship and of the, let's say, modern techniques of power deployed in the technologies of the population" was how to watch over or keep an eye "on all and on each, *omnes et singulatim*" (ECF-STP, 128). That's why "discipline was never more important or more valued than when the attempt was made to manage the population […] managing it in depth, in all its fine points and details" (Ibid., 107).

[150] "In fact, we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management" (ECF-STP, 107).

regard to the laity" (ECF-PP, 43) – and therefore characterizes the power exercised by the Church as essentially juridical – as soon as he changed his focus to the pastor-sheep relationship, the workings of disciplinary power came to the fore.

In 1978 he points out that Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon* (1791) is "a modern idea in one sense, but we can also say that it is completely archaic […] basically involves putting someone in the center- an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance – who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals placed within this machine of power […] the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign" (ECF-STP, 66). However, what makes the panoptic schema disciplinary is that "even the person in charge", that is, the pastor, is "caught up within a broader system in which he is supervised in turn, and at the heart of which he is himself subject to discipline" (ECF-PP, 55). The goal of these disciplinary "positive technologies of power" that were "transferred" to institutions other than the Church during the classical period was – and had always been – "normalization". And it is in this normalizing role that they constitute the reverse side, as indispensable as kept out of sight, of "the juridical and political structures of representation" that were established mainly in the eighteenth century, "the condition of their functioning and effectiveness" (ECF-AB, 49).

Incorporating Foucault's later work, we can say that this process of "invasion", "extension", or "general deployment" (ECF-PP, 71) of the disciplines applies also to pastoral power and, more specifically, to the pastoral "function". Together with the disciplinary schemas, it "spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical institution"[151] from the sixteenth century onwards. That is to say, in a period that, according to Foucault, is "not characterized by the

[151] In 1982 Foucault urges his readers to "distinguish between two aspects of pastoral power". On the one hand, its ecclesiastical institutionalization", which has "lost its vitality since the eighteenth century", and, on the other, its "function" (EEF, 132).

beginning of de-Christianization, but rather […] by a phase of in-depth Christianization […] modern states begin to take shape while Christian structures tighten their grip on individual existence" (ECF-AB, 177). Therefore, the process of "disciplinarization" (ECF-PP, 66) goes hand in hand with "the new Christianization that began in the sixteenth century" (ECF-AB, 193) and with what in 1978 Foucault refers to as a "movement of governmentalization of both society and individuals" (EEF, 265). I think that there is a mistaken but widespread tendency to interpret Foucault's notion of disciplinary power as the instrument of a modern, thoroughly secular state. In other words, to ignore the fact that Foucault rejected both what Michael Lackey calls "the traditional secularization hypothesis"[152] and the idea that disciplinary power was a "form of State control organized by a State apparatus" (ECF-PP, 16).

As for the first mistake, Foucault stated very clearly that what we see beginning in the sixteenth century is not a "massive, comprehensive transfer of pastoral functions from Church to state", but "a much more complex phenomenon". One that includes both an "intensification of the religious pastorate"[153] and "a development of the activity of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority" (ECF-STP, 230). This "intensification, increase, and general proliferation" (Ibid., 231) of the issue and methods of government or direction as the "conduct of conduct" is reflected in the "great proliferation of local and regional disciplines […] from the end of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century" (ECF-STP, 340, 341). As a result, "instead of a pastoral

[152] In Lackey's words, it "holds that science and reason have been slowly but surely supplanting religion and faith" ("Foucault, Secularization theory, and the theological origins of totalitarianism," in *Foucault's Legacy*, ed. C. G. Prado, 124-145 (New York: Continuum, 2009), 125). It also refers to the idea that "'secularization' was a precondition for the rise of the modern nation-state" ("The Sacred Imagined Nation: Challenging the Modernist Secularization Hypothesis," *Comparative Critical Studies* 6, no. 1 (2009): 43, 44, and 63).

[153] "The Reformation as well as the Counter Reformation gave the religious pastorate much greater control, a much greater hold […] than in the past […] The pastorate had never before intervened so much, had never had such a hold on the material, temporal, everyday life of individuals" (ECF-STP, 229).

power and a political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less in rivalry", what we find is "an individualizing 'tactic' that characterizes a series of powers" (EEF, 133).

With regard to the second misunderstanding, Foucault is equally unequivocal in pointing out that with the word "infrapower" he is not referring to "a state apparatus" or what is "traditionally called 'political power'" (EEW3, 86). These notions are too "abstract" and "broad" to be able to reflect his "microphysics of power": those "immediate, tiny, capillary powers that are exerted on the body, behavior, actions, and time of individuals" (ECF-PP, 16). In fact, he affirms that, methodologically, the analysis of disciplinary power requires "leaving the problem of the State, of the State apparatus, to one side and dispensing with the psycho-sociological notion of authority" (Ibid., 40).

I want to suggest that the main instrument and effect of this process of "Christianization in-depth",[154] "disciplinarization", or "governmentalization" is the extension among the general population of what in 1978 Foucault described as the mode of individualization invented by the pastorate. It consists of three "procedures":

1. Individualization by "analytical identification" or "identity" defined as "the balance […] of merits and faults at each moment".

2. Individualization by "subjection (*assujettissement*) […] in continuous networks of obedience […] a kind of exhaustive, total, and permanent relationship of individual obedience".

3. Individualization by "subjectivation (*subjectivation*) […] the production of an internal, secret, and hidden truth […] subjectified (*subjectivè*) through the compulsory extraction of truth". It is through this "secret inner truth" that "the pastor's power is exercised" and therefore "the relationship of complete obedience is assured" (ECF-STP, 183-185).

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[154] The "new wave of Christianization that developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (ECF-AB, 231).

Foucault's assessment that the invention and imposition of the subject guaranteed by those three procedures constitutes "the originality and specificity of Christianity" is accompanied – as I have already pointed out – by the claim that the Christian mode of individualization is also that of "the modern Western subject" (Ibid., 184 and 185). The Christian self was generalized as the disciplinary individual when sovereignty, which had "no individualizing function",[155] was succeeded by disciplinary power as the main technology. In other words, when "the political axis of individualization" was reversed, substituting a "descending" for an "ascending individualization".[156]

Whether ecclesiastical or civil, the practice of government made possible by a disciplinary and regulatory technology invented by the pastorate does not rely primarily on repression in order to guarantee its "conduct" of "conduct", but is "positive" or "productive": it "constitutes the individual as target, partner, and vis-à-vis in the relationship of power" (ECF-PP, 56). And in both cases the individual only emerges after "uninterrupted supervision" and "potential punishment"

[155] In other words, sovereignty "only outlines individuality on the sovereign's side […] the relationship of sovereignty does put something like political power in contact with the body […] but […] it never reveals individuality […] We have bodies without any individuality on one side, and individuality but a multiplicity of bodies on the other […] the pinning of the subject – function to a definite body can only take place at times in a discontinuous, incidental fashion, in ceremonies for example [...] The sovereign's individuality is entailed by the non-individualization of the elements on which the relationship of sovereignty is applied […] The major effect of disciplinary power is the reorganization in depth of the relations between somatic singularity, the subject, and the individual" (ECF-PP, 46, 44, 45, and 54).

[156] Whereas in a system defined by relationships of sovereignty, whether feudal or monarchical, "the more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions", in a disciplinary society "as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts, by comparative measures that have the 'norm' as reference rather than genealogies giving ancestors as points of reference […] All the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root 'psycho-' have their origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization" (EDP, 192, 193).

(Ibid.) have subjected the body and fabricated the non-corporeal reality of the soul or psyche as a "core of virtualities" that inhabits that body and brings it into existence as an individual. [157]

From 1978 onwards, Foucault's work will show that, as it is the case with the modern soul, the Christian soul was also "born […] out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint" (EDP, 29). Both are "the correlative" of the disciplinary power exercised over the body, the effect and instrument of "a punitive and continuous action on potential behavior" (ECF-PP, 52). What we see in both cases is "the reconstitution of a whole moral system", that of Christianity, in what pretends to be just "the liberation of truth" (EHM, 481): of the truth of "man" in general and also of "the subject we are directly and individually" (ECF-HOS, 253). Therefore, it doesn't make any sense to think in terms of the binary of two types of power exercised over two distinct, already-given, and unchanging objects: a pastoral power – whether ecclesiastical or psychiatric – concerned only with "souls",[158] and a statist disciplinary power that takes charge of "bodies".[159] If we define disciplinary power as the technique by which "the subject function is exactly

[157] "It has been possible to distinguish the individual only insofar as the normalizing agency has distributed, excluded, and constantly taken up again this body-psyche […] the individual is a subjected body held in a system of supervision and subjected to procedures of normalization" (ECF-PP, 56, 57).

[158] "All the new procedures and rules of confession developed after the Council of Trent […] are actually secretly focused on the body and masturbation" (ECF-AB, 193). "From the middle of the seventeenth century […] one of the major problems of the Catholic Church […] how can one maintain and develop the technologies for the government of souls and bodies that were established by the council of Trent […] without, at a certain point, coming against the convulsion of bodies? [...] how to govern the flesh without being caught in the trap of convulsions […] How can one have direction of the flesh without the body objecting to this direction in the phenomena of resistance that constitute possession?" (Ibid., 217). "Psychiatric power spread as a tactic for the subjection of the body in a physics of power […] as constitution of individuals as both receivers and bearers of reality" (ECF-PP, 189).

[159] Nonetheless, I have to admit that the following sentence, from the 1975 *Course,* suggests precisely that kind of oversimplifying double dualism: "At a times when states were posing the technical problem of the power to be exercised on bodies and the means by which power over bodies could effectively be put to work, the Church was elaborating a technique for the government of souls, the pastoral" (ECF-AB, 177). Similarly, in those lectures he also establishes a dichotomy between a "political anatomy of the body", and a "moral physiology of the flesh", that develop independently of each other in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and "came together" at the end of the following century. Here the dualism is between an "investment of the useful body at the level of aptitudes" and an "investment of the body at the level of desire and decency" (Ibid., 193). In other words, even if the body is the object of both, Foucault seems to be establishing an opposition between sexuality-desire and utility-obedience.

superimposed and fastened on the somatic singularity" or body and a "soul […] psyche" is projected behind or extracted from that body (ECF-PP, 55), we have to admit that pastoral power, by securing its control over the body through the flesh (ECF-AB, 222), constitutes the first implementation of that technology of power. What Foucault describes as the "technology of the 'soul' – that of educationalists, psychologists, and psychiatrist–" (EDP, 30) was designed by the Christian pastorate in order to enforce its "government of souls" as "a learned activity indispensable for the salvation of all and of each" (ECF-STP, 364).

Christianity's replacement of "the ancient obligation of knowing oneself" (ERC, 163) with the view that there is a truth of ourselves or a true self that has to be discovered, interpreted, and confessed marks the beginning of the so-called "hermeneutics of the subject". A first objectification or objectivation of the self, which is already at work in Augustine and that will make possible our subjection to a government of souls and bodies unknown to both Greece and Rome.[160] Therefore, contrary to what Foucault himself had claimed in his main doctoral thesis, his history of pastoral power shows that, long before "nineteenth century madness", it was sin that became "the first great figure of the objectification of man [...] a constitutive moment in man's becoming an object" (EHM, 461, 525). To put it another way, madness is nothing other than sin: from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, the sin of believing oneself to be God. Before that, the sin of turning one's back on God (EHM, 499). After all, Foucault had learned from

[160] "For Greek and Roman societies the exercise of political power entailed neither the right nor the possibility of 'government' understood as an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by putting them under the authority of a guide who is responsible for what they do and for what happens to them" (ECF-STP, 363). "The idea of governing people is certainly not a Greek idea […] nor […] a Roman idea" (Ibid., 122). "The structures of the Greek city-state and the Roman Empire were entirely foreign to his type of power" (Ibid., 129).

Nietzsche about the "significance of madness in the history of morality".[161] What the former describes as "the age of infinite examination and compulsory objectification" (EDP, 189) began with the Christian pastorate; through the techniques of (self-) examination and confession, the "religious principle of the hidden meaning" (EEW2, 208) fabricated the subject as a "describable, analyzable" and "calculable" (EDP, 190, 193) object.

In the case of both the pastor and the psychologist, the question that Foucault poses is the same: what are "the most immediate, the most local power relations at work […] in a specific type of extortion of truth?" (EHS1, 97). By an extension of religious experience – an "in-depth Christianization" or "disciplinarization" – the hermeneutics of the subject spread beyond the exercise of ecclesiastical direction and thus made psychology and the rest of the human sciences possible. As Foucault himself puts it in a 1965 interview: "at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there appeared the very curious project of knowing man […] the human sciences […] were probably just one of the avatars of the hermeneutic techniques […] a problem of decipherment" (EEW2, 256, 257, and 253).

It seems to me that Foucault is following the unfrequented path opened by Nietzsche's analysis of Christianity as "the most disastrous form of arrogance so far"[162] when he argues that what made the pastoral exercise of power as government not only acceptable but also accepted – both when it first appeared in the third and fourth centuries and in the sixteenth century, when the

[161] According to Nietzsche, "almost everywhere it was madness which […] broke the spell of a venerated usage and superstition […] it had to be madness which did this […] something […] uncanny and incalculable […] worthy of […] awe […] Something that bore so visibly the signs of total unfreedom […] Something that awake in the bearer of a new idea himself reverence for and dread of himself and no longer pangs of conscience […] all [those] […] who were irresistibly drawn to throw off the yoke of any kind of morality […] had, if they were not actually mad, no alternative but to make themselves or pretend to be mad […] 'give me madness […] that I may at last believe in myself! [...] so that I may only come to believe in myself! I am consumed by doubt, I have killed the law [...] if I am not *more* that the law I am the vilest of all men [...]'" (*Daybreak*, section 14, 13, and 15).

[162] *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 62, 57.

process of its secularization-as generalization began – was an "enormous desire for individuality". As he puts it, "to the same extent as the pastorate was a factor and agent of individualization, it created a formidable appeal, an appetite for the pastorate […] Enormous desire for individuality, well before the bourgeois consciousness and radically distinguishing Christianity from Buddhism" (ECF-STP, 231). By admitting that this desire existed well before what he had been analyzing as its first appearance in the modern emergence of the disciplinary-juridical individual,[163] Foucault is formulating an auto-critique. And it is this 1978 rectification that opens the way for a concept of pastoral power that reframes his previous understanding of the disciplines[164] in a direction that coincides with the interpretation I am trying to advance.

It is important to keep in mind that from 1978 onwards Foucault maintains that Christianity is not "a religion of the law" which is applied to all in an anonymous way, but something much more personal and personalized: "a religion of what God wills for each individual in particular" (ECF-STP, 174). This means that the Christian pastorate promises "the salvation of each and in an individual form" (Ibid., 231). So even if it teaches individuals to think of themselves as sheep in a flock – something that, according to Foucault, "no Greek would have been prepared to accept" (Ibid., 130) – what it offers in exchange is something that would satisfy "the most arrogant […] of

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[163] In the 1973-1974 lectures he defined the juridical individual as "the instrument by which, in its discourse, the bourgeoisie claimed power" and the disciplinary individual as "the result of the technology employed by this same bourgeoisie to constitute the individual in the field of productive and political forces". According to this analysis, nineteenth-century Man is the result of the "oscillation between the juridical individual – ideological instrument of the demand for power – and the disciplinary individual – real instrument of the physical exercise of power – from this oscillation between the power claimed and the power exercised, were born the illusion and the reality of what we call Man" (ECF-PP, 58).

[164] For instance, his 1976 statement that the "moment when the sciences of man became possible is the moment when a new technology of power and a new political anatomy of body were implemented" (EDP, 194), will be qualified by his finding out that disciplinary power had been in existence for centuries. To put it another way, the adjective "new" only makes sense as a way of referring to the general transition from a society of dominated by structures of sovereignty to one marked by discipline, in what constitutes an extension or generalization of much older techniques and methods.

all civilizations" (Ibid.) : an omnipotent personal God that keeps watch of everything we feel, think, or do – the anthropocentrism of theism led to its extreme, away from the indifference or non-intervention of deistic conceptions – and the idea that we contain a unique truth or soul that is eternal.[165] In Nietzsche's words, this implies "an optical magnification of one's own importance to the point of absurdity […] Nothing but absurdly important souls, circling about themselves with terrible anxiety […] meaning lay in saving the individual soul[166] […] Even though Christianity brought the doctrine of unselfishness and love to the fore, its real historical effect remains the *intensification of egoism,* of individual egoism, to the furthest extreme – that extreme is the belief in individual immortality".[167] As the secularization of the Christian hermeneutics of the self, psychology and the rest of the human sciences constitute an attempt to found those hermeneutics "not, as was the case in early Christianity, on the sacrifice of the self, but, on the contrary […] on the theoretical and practical, emergence of the self […] to substitute the positive figure of man for the sacrifice which for Christianity was the condition for the opening of the self as a field of indefinite interpretation […] a positive man who serves as the foundation of this hermeneutics of the self" (ERC, 180). However, it seems clear that this replacement of "sacrificial" with "identitarian" techniques of the self, of renunciation with liberation, does not entail the disappearance of the obligation to renounce one's will. And that's because, as Nietzsche had anticipated, "the *optical habit* remains unshaken of seeking a value for man in his approximation to an *ideal man* [...] *one believes one* ***knows*** what the *final desirability* is in respect of the ideal

[165] It "allows each to know […] his truth […] the secret of his inner truth" (ECF-STP, 231).

[166] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[226] 2, 233.

[167] Ibid., section 14[5], 240. Similarly, in *Daybreak* he had written about the "strictly egoistic fundamental belief in… the absolute importance of eternal *personal* salvation" (section 132, 82); "the omnipresent *fear* of the Christian for his *eternal* salvation" (section 57, 36); "to a virtuous Roman of the old stamp every *Christian* who 'considered first of all his *own* salvation' appeared- evil.-" (section 9, 11).

man […] However, this belief is only the consequence of a tremendous *pampering* by the Christian ideal: an ideal which immediately re-emerges as soon as the 'ideal type' is carefully examined. One believes, *firstly,* one knows that the approximation to a single type is desirable; one believes *secondly* one knows what that type is like; thirdly that every deviation from the type is a retrogression […] a loss of force and power for man […] In sum: one has shifted the arrival of the ***'kingdom of God'*** into the future, onto the earth, into the human – while basically still clinging to belief in the *old* ideal".[168] This is what Foucault had in mind when, in a 1967 interview, he claimed that "the idea of man" is "no more and no less" necessary for us to function "than the idea of God".[169]

Far from being the equalizing or homogenizing submission to a general precept or rule, Christian obedience[170] is "an individual to individual relationship […] subordination to someone because he is someone". Like that of the psychologist-psychiatrist, the pastor's "mode of action" has to be absolutely "individualized" to be effective (ECF-STP, 231, 175). In both cases the goal is "subjection through grateful obedience" (ECF-PP, 28).

Whereas the pastorate replaced "the marks that once indicated status, privilege, and affiliation" with the balance of "merits and sins", the Psy-sciences, as modern or secularized pastoral power, translated those credits and debits into "a whole range of degrees of abnormality"

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[168] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[226] 3, 233 and 234.

[169] "man functioned in the nineteenth century somewhat similarly to the way in which the idea of God had functioned in the course of the preceding centuries. People believed […] that it was practically impossible for man to be able to tolerate the idea that God does not exist" (ERC, 102).

[170] Nietzsche talks about "the two species of happiness (the feeling of power and the feeling of surrender) […] one takes *pride* in obeying" because the one who commands is an omnipotent and omniscient divinity or one of his representatives. In any case, someone that can guarantee our salvation and punish our enemies (*Daybreak*, section 60, 36-37); "the feeling of *security* like the Christian's […] the delusion of being shielded by a God" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[285], 235).

that makes possible to continue hierarchizing "the 'good' and the 'bad' subjects in relation to one another […] a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individual themselves […] of their nature […] By assessing acts with precision, discipline judges individuals 'in truth'" (Ibid., 184, 181).

The subject invented and required by the exercise of pastoral power and its hermeneutics of the self is a substance-substratum[171] that has intentions or motives as the cause[172] of his actions (in other words, is endowed with "free will"), contains a unique truth that is "simultaneously offered and hidden from view",[173] and has to become an object of knowledge both for himself and for others.[174]

In the second volume of the *History of Sexuality* Foucault explains that in the "Greek ethics of pleasures" individual freedom was not defined in the Christian way yet – i.e., as "the independence of a free will" – but as "self-control". Therefore, its "polar opposite was not […] the

[171] "Our *belief in the I* as substance, as the only reality on the basis of which we attribute reality to things in general […] At last the oldest 'realism' comes to light: at the moment when the whole religious history of humanity recognizes itself as the history of the soul-superstition. *Here there is a barrier*: our thinking itself involves that belief (with its distinction between substance and accident, doing, doer, etc.)" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 7[63], 140); "The concept of 'reality', of 'being', is drawn from our feeling of 'subject'" (Ibid*.,* section 9[98], 158); "The concept of *substance* a consequence of the concept of *subject*, *not* the other way around! If we give up the soul, 'the subject', there is no basis for any 'substance'" (Ibid., section 10[19], 178); "the 'subject' is not something that effects, but merely a fiction […] It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented *thingness* […] Duration, conformity with itself, being, inhere neither in what is called the subject nor in what is called the object They are complexes of what happens which appear to have duration in relation to other complexes" (Ibid., section 9[91], 154); We have "added on to what happens a being that is not identical with what happens but that *remains, is,* and does not 'become'" (Ibid., section 2[84], 75).

[172] "The I (the 'subject') as cause […] They took the concept of being from the concept of the I, they posited 'things' as beings in their own image, on the basis of the concept of I as cause" (*Twilight of the Idols*, section 3, 178).

[173] According to the *History of Madness*, this is "the massive postulate defined by modern man, but which also defines him in turn" (529).

[174] A subject who, as Nietzsche explains, has been brought to believe that he "knows, and knows quite precisely in every case, how human action is brought about […] 'I know […] what I have done, I am free and responsible for it. I hold others responsible, I can call by its name every moral possibility and every inner motion which precedes action […] I understand myself and understand you all! " (*Daybreak,* section 116, 72). "The doctrine of freedom of will has human pride and feeling of power for its father and mother" (Ibid., section 128, 79).

will of an all-powerful agency […] [but] the enslavement of the self by oneself. To be free in relation to pleasures was to be free of their authority […] not to be their slave" (EHS2, 78, 79, and 80). According to Nietzsche's critique of the Christian "morality of intentions", a God that doesn't will would be "useless".[175] Suffering is interpreted as punishment, that is, as the result of His will[176]or intention, and thus it acquires a meaning or justification.[177] This morality has made us unable to "interpret what happens other than as happening out of intentions", either those of God or other human beings: "our understanding has consisted in our inventing a subject which was made responsible for something having happened and how it happened". Otherwise said: The belief in "will", in "intention" is "the belief that all that happens is (a) doing, that all doing presupposes a doer: it is belief in the 'subject' […] I notice something and look for a *reason* for it- that originally means: I look for an *intention* in it, and above all for someone who has intentions, for a subject, a doer […] The question *'Why?'* is always a question about […] a 'What for?' […] the *unimaginability of things happening without intentions*".[178]

Foucault's remark that "the will […] the individual at the level of his intention" is that "on which and to which disciplinary power had to be applied […] only accessible through the system of reward and punishment […] the vis-à-vis […] correlate […] of disciplinary power" (ECF-PP,

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[175] "'God' is useless if he doesn't will something" (Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[72], 211).

[176] "transgression *against God* as *the only* kind of transgression, the one and only cause of all suffering" (Ibid., section 10[91], 189).

[177] "one wants religion to provide not only redemption from *distress* but, above all, redemption from the *fear of distress.* All distress is viewed as the consequence of the [...] hostile action of spirits: the distress that afflicts us [...] prompts us to ask what might have *led* a spirit to be irritated with us [...] So he scrutinizes his conduct [...] only when a spirit, a divinity, expressly sets up certain moral commandments as ways of pleasing and serving *him* does the element of moral valuation enter 'sin', or rather: only then can the breach of a moral commandment be felt as 'sin', as something that separates one from god, that offends him and leads to danger and distress emanating from him" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 1[46], 58).

[178] Ibid., section 2[83], 74-75.

302) is already announced or even contained in the Nietzschean view that "the notion of will was essentially designed with punishment in mind [...] the concept of 'free will' […] the shadiest trick theologians have up their sleeves for making humanity 'responsible' in their sense of the term, which is to say *dependent on them*".[179] In order to be considered free, and therefore punishable as guilty, "every act *had* to be thought of as willed […] as coming from consciousness" (Ibid.). Both "Christian interiority" and "psychological subjectivity" are "the place to look for all the *antecedentia* of an act, its causes […] under the rubric of 'motives': otherwise the action could hardly be considered free, and nobody could really be held responsible for it".[180]

It is due to the fact that – according to Foucault's 1973 history of the judicial inquiry – "a morality with a religious origin was brought into and disseminated in a state-appropriated penal system" (EEW3, 64) that Christianity and modern penal justice share the assumption that the sinner-criminal "deserves to be punished *because* he could have acted otherwise".[181] In fact, the absence of motive, intention, or interest is seen as a symptom or indication of mental illness: [182] "Faced with a motiveless crime, punitive power can no longer be exercised […] The embarrassment of the judges in exercising their punitive power on a crime to which, nonetheless, the law manifestly applies" (ECF-AB, 122, 123). In order to get out of this impasse, the penal system appeals to psychiatry: "I beg you, either find some reasons for this act and then my punitive power can be exercised, or, if you don't find any reasons, the act will be mad […] and I will not apply my right to punish" (Ibid., 122). It is as "the power and science of public hygiene and social

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[179] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, section 7, 181.

[180] Ibid., section 3, 177 and 178.

[181] Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality,* section 4, 40.

[182] "the absence of motive becomes the presence of madness" (ECF-AB, 126).

protection" (ECF-AB, 120) that psychiatry manages to establish itself at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Through the notion of "(homicidal) monomania" (Ibid., 156) – a form of madness that only manifests itself or whose only symptom is the commission of a crime – it justifies its power by imposing the fear that "there is potential crime in all madness" (Ibid., 122), and presenting itself as the only authority able to detect and therefore contain this silent threat.

As I will argue in the next chapter, the fact that the "meshing together of the psychiatric and the judicial […] took place on the basis of the monster […] the motiveless criminal" (ECF-AB, 274) shows the extent to which, due to a "pastoralization" or "Christianization" of justice, what is punished is not really the act itself, but the immorality of the will[183] that is supposed to be its cause.

In his 1975 lectures, Foucault argues that the Council of Trent (1545-1563) radically transformed the confession of the sin of lust or against the Sixth Commandment by changing the focus from "the relational aspect of sexuality […] the inventory of permitted and forbidden relations" to "the penitent's body itself […] the primary and fundamental level of sin [is] […] the relationship to self and the sensuality of the body itself […] lust begins with contact with oneself" (ECF-AB, 185, 186, 187, and 189). This entails a new conception of the will that he analyzes by establishing a contrast between sixteenth century witchcraft and seventeenth century possession.[184] The former is to the Inquisition what the latter is to "the spiritual direction established in the

[183] "disciplinary power must intervene somehow before the actual manifestation of the behavior […] at the level of what is potential, disposition, will, at the level of the soul" (ECF-PP, 52).

[184] Possession is "at once the ultimate effect and the point of reversal of the mechanisms of corporeal investment that the new wave of Christianization organized in the sixteenth century […] The mark or signature of possession is […] the convulsion […] the plastic and visible form of the struggle taking place in the body of the possessed… The convulsive flesh is the body penetrated by the right of examination and subject to the obligation of exhaustive confession […] Starting in the seventeenth century, the great problem for the Church was […] how to govern the flesh without being caught in the trap of convulsions […] How can we govern the souls according to the Tridentine formula without, at a certain point, coming up against the convulsion of bodies?" (ECF-AB, 213, 212, and 217).

sixteenth century" (Ibid., 221): Whereas the witch's will is of a "juridical type", because she "agrees to an offered exchange […] She is a legal subject and it is as such that she can be punished" (Ibid., 209, 210), in seventeenth-century possession, "the will is charged with all the ambiguities of desire. The will does and does not desire […] a sort of permanent slight connivance in which will and pleasure and entwined "in this game of pleasure, consent, nonrefusal, and petty connivance we are very far from the great judicial bloc of heartfelt consent given once and for all by the witch when she signs the pact with the devil" (ECF-AB, 210-211). However, five years later, in a lecture entitled "Sexuality and Solitude" he will trace this transformation – both in the conception of sexuality and the will – back to Augustine, by drawing a comparison, no longer between the "period of Scholastic penance" and Tridentine piety, but between the three chapters devoted to sexual dreams in the work of the second-century pagan philosopher Artemidorus, and chapter fourteenth of Augustine's *City of God.* For the early Church Father the problem of sexuality was never the "relationship to other people", but that "of oneself to oneself, or, more precisely, the relationship between one's will and involuntary assertions" (EEW1, 182). As the cause of the "autonomous movements of sexual organs", what Augustine calls 'libido" is "the result of one's will when it goes beyond the limits God originally set for it". The Fall marks a "weakening of the will", that is no longer able to ensure the body's obedience. Man "rose up against God with the first sin: he tried to escape God's will and to acquire a will of his own, ignoring the fact that the existence of his own will depended entirely on the will of God. As a punishment for this revolt […] this will to will independently from God, Adam lost control of himself. He wanted to acquire an autonomous will and lost the ontological support for that will […] that then became mixed in an indissociable way with involuntary movements […] The arrogance of sex is the punishment and consequence of the arrogance of man. His uncontrolled sex

is exactly the same as what he himself has been toward God – a rebel". This means that The Devil is not just an external enemy. As libido or concupiscence,[185] evil is "a part, an internal component, of the will" (EEW1, 182). This "interiorization" of what in Manicheism was an external principle endowed with the same ontological consistency as its opposite requires an attitude of unrelenting self-distrust or suspicion,[186] "a permanent hermeneutics of oneself […] turning our eyes continuously [...] inward in order to decipher, among the movements of the soul, which ones come from the libido" (Ibid.).

The Christian notion of free will as either obedience or guilt survives in a modern conception of responsibility that requires precisely the kind of self-transparency and control that humanity is supposed to have lost as a consequence of its first sin. Unless the will submits to the will of God, its freedom is guilty. The price we continue to pay for our "secret singularity" or "individuality" is the "automatic functioning" (EDP, 193, 192, and 200) of a power that is exercised through techniques of the self. That is, through "processes by which the individual acts upon himself" (ERC, 162). The human sciences have made it possible for the pastoral "supervision of normality" (EDP, 296) to be not only morally, but also legally and scientifically justified. As the modern "professionals of discipline, normality, and subjection" (Ibid.) the psychologists have

[185] "We pass from the old theme that the body was at the origin of every sin to the idea that there is concupiscence in every transgression" (ECF-AB, 192).

[186] According to Nietzsche, the consequence of this distrust towards ourselves can be summarized as follows: "if man is sinful, through and through, then he may only hate himself. At bottom his feelings towards his fellow men ought to be no different from those towards himself; love of mankind requires a justification- which lies in *God's having commanded it.* It follows from this that all man's natural instincts (to love, etc.) appear to him to be prohibited in themselves, and can regain their rights only once they've been *denied,* on the basis of obedience to God" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 10[128], 197). That's why, against the Christian glorification of self-abasement and renunciation, he warns his readers that "we have cause to fear him who hates himself […] rescuing himself from himself *in others* […] Let us for the time being agree that benevolence and beneficence are constituents of the good man; only let us add: 'presupposing he is first benevolently and beneficently inclined *towards himself*!'" (*Daybreak,* section 517 and 516, 207).

taken over the Christian pastors as the holders of the hermeneutic key to the discovery of our own truth or true self and its salvation (now conceived as liberation).

Psychiatric power was born when the relationship to madness stopped being "one of violence […] of sovereignty" and became "a relationship of subjection […] of discipline" (ECF-PP, 29). In other words, when the use of physical constraint and force was replaced with guilt as the madman's "self-consciousness […] the constitution of 'self-restraint'" (EHM, 485, 487). As it is always the case, a transformation in the kind of relation between subject and object implies a change in both. In Foucault's words, "madness no longer defined as blindness, but as affection of the will, and the insertion of the madman in a disciplinary therapeutic field, are two correlative phenomena which mutually support and reinforce each other" (ECF-PP, 107). This "disciplinary therapeutic field" had already been established by the pastoral practice of penitence as cure. Therefore, even though the connection between medicine and morality was already present in pagan Greek and Roman philosophy, "the order of Christian reason inscribed it in their institutions […] in a manner as far from that of the Greeks as could be imagined – in the form of repression, constraint, and the obligation to redeem one's soul" (EHM, 87).

The target of pastoral and psychiatric direction is the same; the will is the object on which the disciplinary technology of power that they share is applied. Madness, like sin before, affects the moral "quality of the will", more than "the integrity of reason" (EHM, 133); both are characterized by a "perversion" of the will, "evil intentions" (Ibid., 135). So we can say that the "age of spiritual direction" (ECF-AB, 216) inaugurated by the exercise of pastoral power as government continues with the constitution of psychiatric power in the nineteenth century.[187]

[187] Therefore, instead of saying, as Foucault does in January of 1974, that "at a certain point" the Christian practice of direction, together with "some" of its "techniques and objects", were "imported into the psychiatric field" (ECF-PP, 174), it would be more accurate to describe that importation as constitutive of psychiatry itself.

Whereas the classical age defined madness as "error" or blindness to truth, as "illusion of the senses, false belief or hallucination", at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, due to a process of Christianization as moralization or culpabilization, insanity becomes "the psychological effect of a moral fault" (EHM, 296), "an uncontrollable force […] that is dangerous, a threatening power to be mastered or defeated" (ECF-PP, 6, 7), "intractability, resistance, disobedience, insurrection […] in relation to regular and normal conduct" (ECF-AB, 120, 338), the old sin of pride and "presumption" (ECF-PP, 176).

With Philippe Pinel's 1792 "liberation" of the mad chained at Bicêtre,[188] madness becomes "an impulse from the depths which exceeded the juridical limits of the individual, ignoring fixed moral limits and tending towards an apotheosis of the self" (EHM, 499). In other words, no longer "false belief" or illusion" but "an affection of the will "a will in revolt", "an unbounded will" (ECF-PP, 173), a "'bad' will […] reason itself was not affected [...] the moral disorder of a life and an evil will […] moral failings […] immoral lives" (EHM, 134, 133). In this way, what may appear to have been just "a simple negative operation that loosened bonds" was in fact a "positive" or "productive" move that constituted madness on the model of sin defined by Christian moral theology: a "system of rewards and punishments […] a universe of Judgment […] a gigantic moral imprisonment" (Ibid., 487, 511). This is what Foucault means when he claims, drawing on Georges Bataille, that "Western culture […] has founded a science of man by turning the previously sacred into the moral" (Ibid., 94). Before both François Leuret[189] and James Cowles Prichard[190], it was

[188] In what has been presented as "the founding scene of psychiatry […] Pinel removes the chains binding the raving lunatics to the floor of their dungeon, and these lunatics, who were restrained out of fear that they would give vent to their frenzy if released, express their gratitude to Pinel […] and thereby embark on the path of cure" (ECF-PP, 19).

[189] Leuret's (1797-1851) *Traitement moral* was published in 1840.

Pinel (1745-1826) who introduced the concept of "madness without delirium" to refer to cases in which the "understanding" is left impaired and only the "affective faculties" are damaged (EHM, 524). This "disalienization" (ECF-AB, 160) of psychiatry means that mental alienation or dementia are no longer a necessary component of mental illness, so "nondelirious behavior disorders enter the psychiatric field". In other words, a form of conduct can be "psychiatrized" or "pathologized" simply by virtue of its "deviation […] from rules of order or conformity defined on the basis of administrative regularity, familial obligations, or social […] normativity" (ECF-AB, 159). And he adds: "the value of conduct as symptomatic also depends on where these deviations are situated on the axis of the voluntary and involuntary". Therefore, behavior will be judged as healthy-good-normal "when there is minimal deviation from the norm and (minimal) automatism, that is to say, when it is conventional and voluntary" (Ibid.). Obviously, this results in "the almost indefinite extension" of psychiatry's domain (ECF-AB, 139). The "end of the alienists" cannot be separated from the process of "diffusion", "generalization" (ECF-PP, 202), or "extension" (ECF-AB, 139) of psychiatric power that begins in the 1840s. As I have already noted, this process includes the "migration" of psychiatric power "into other institutions" beyond the asylum that results in the constitution of what Foucault calls "the Psy-fuction". As "both the discourse and the […] agency of control of all the disciplinary institutions and apparatuses […] the discourse and the establishment of all the schemas for the individualization, normalization, and subjection of individuals within disciplinary systems" (ECF-PP, 86), the "psychological function" is the secularization-as–generalization of Christian morality and its hermeneutics of the subject. Furthermore, it is important to realize that just as the Christian pastorate as a disciplinary system

[190] Prichard's (1786-1848) book on "moral madness/insanity", entitled *Treatise on Insanity,* was published in 1835. He defines it as "consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the […] reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane illusion or hallucitations".

is built on the sovereignty of the relationship between God and His creatures, so psychiatric power refers back to "familial sovereignty"[191] as "the hinge, the interlocking point, which is absolutely indispensable to the very functioning of all the disciplinary systems […] the family is the instance of constraint that will permanently fix individuals to their disciplinary apparatuses" (ECF-PP, 81). Maybe the current "obsession" of gay and lesbian mainstream organizations with obtaining the "right to marry" for non-heterosexual couples makes the mistake of taking the discourse of the family as "the authority of truth", ignoring Foucault's warning that "by appealing to the sovereignty of the family relationship, rather than escape the mechanism of discipline, we reinforce this interplay between familial sovereignty and disciplinary functioning, which seems to me typical of contemporary society" (ECF-PP, 87). We should keep in mind that, from the middle of the eighteenth century, the family has been "a privileged instrument for the government of the population [...] When one wants to obtain something from the population [...] then one has to utilize the family" (ECF-STP, 105). That's why he insists that "if you ask people to reproduce the marriage bond for their personal relationship to be recognized, the progress made is slight" (EFL, 158). Queer critique draws on Foucault in order to analyze the effects of the almost exclusive focus on marriage as an unquestioned and unquestionable good, that reinforces the institution of the heterosexual family and therefore trivializes- by making them appear superfluous or unnecessary- all attempts to create and sustain non-familial ways of life.[192]

[191] "the Psy-function […] makes its appearance in this organization of disciplinary substitutes for the family with a familial reference [...] the organization of a disciplinary apparatus that will plug in, rush in, where an opening gapes in familial sovereignty […] performed the role of discipline for all those who could not be disciplined […] Psychiatry gradually puts itself forward as the institutional enterprise of discipline that will make possible the individual's refamiliarization [...] it came in with a discourse attributing […] full responsibility for the individual's lack of discipline […] to the deficiency and failure of the family" (ECF-PP, 85, 86).

[192] In Nietzsche we find the tools to analyze the mechanisms of culpabilization at work in this "offer of marriage" as a way to redeem ourselves from an individual and collective past of "irresponsible" and "selfish" non-monogamous sexual practices. After the terrible "punishment" or penitence inflicted by the AIDS epidemics, we are given a final chance to repent and prove that we are "normal", "decent" people, capable of keeping our promises – by finally

Even if I leave the analysis of the three processes through which "the extension and growth of psychiatric power and knowledge" (ECF-AB, 139) took place for the next chapter, here I need to point out that this diffusion or spread made possible "the practical carving out of the field of abnormalities" (ECF-PP, 223) understood as "morbid" or "pathological" immorality, (ECF-AB, 163) produced by an "instinctual disorder" (Ibid., 224). Foucault argues that the model for this new understanding of abnormality as a disturbance in the control of the instincts that is manifested in "immoral" behavior was provided by the old "flesh of concupiscence, recodified within the nervous system by way of the convulsion […] as the automatic and violent release of […] instinctual mechanisms […] Expelled from the field of spiritual direction, convulsion serves the medicine that inherits it as an analytical model for […] the prototype of […] the phenomena of madness" (Ibid., 224). The "motiveless crime" is now explained as an "instinctive act" (ECF-AB, 131), "an irresistible instinct" (Ibid., 156). And it is this notion of "instinct" – defined as an element "whose existence is natural, but which is abnormal in its anarchical functioning […] whenever it is not mastered or repressed" (ECF-PP, 222) – that makes possible to "psychiatrize", "pathologize", or turn into symptoms of mental illness all the "irregularities" of conduct that until then had been "accorded only a moral, disciplinary, or judicial status. Any kind of disorder, indiscipline […] disobedience […] lack of affection […] can now be psychiatrized" (ECF-AB, 161). To put it another way, the "entire domain of all possible conduct*"* is opened to psychiatric

acknowledging the sanctity-naturalness-necessity of the marriage vows – and raising children who are not forced to share our "limitations", constantly and openly profess their belief in the binary nature of sex and gender, and will grow to form their own family. The moralizing governmentalization of queer sexualities appeals to a desire for recognition that offers normality in exchange of abjuring the struggle for "affective and relational" possibilities outside the Father-Mother-Child circle.

judgment as secularized or generalized Christian morality by equating "the (morally) good" with "the normal" and "the healthy".[193]

From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, psychiatry has been "defined by the interplay between two norms". On the one hand, the norm as "rule of conduct, informal law, and principle of conformity opposed to irregularity, disorder, strangeness, eccentricity […] deviation". On the other, because psychiatry is "rooted in organic and functional medicine", in neurology, it can also use the norm as "functional regularity, as the principle of an appropriate and adjusted functioning; the 'normal' as opposed to the pathological, morbid, disorganized, and dysfunctional" (ECF-AB, 162). So an irregularity in relation to morality "must be at the same time a pathological dysfunction in relation to the normal"; a "disruption of order" must have at its base a "functional disorder", a disorder of the instincts. (Ibid., 163) This is what Foucault means when he claims that as a "technology of abnormality", as "the science and technique of abnormal individuals and abnormal conduct", psychiatry is "medico-judicial, pathologico-normative through and through" (Ibid.). The object of psychiatry is no longer the complete alienation of consciousness manifested in delirium and dementia but all the "little perversions" of a will that is no longer master of the instincts. As a result, it becomes "something infinitely more general and dangerous than the power that controls and corrects madness: it is becoming […] the power to define, control, and correct what is abnormal" (ECF-PP, 221). In other words, the psychiatrist/psychologist/therapist may have replaced the pastor as the "general authority for the analysis of conduct […] the titular judge of

[193] In an interview published in 1971 Foucault argues that the distinctions between the normal and the pathological and innocence and guilt "reinforce each other", so that "when a judgment cannot be framed in terms of good and evil, it is stated in terms of normal and abnormal. And when it is necessary to justify this last distinction, it is done in terms of what is good or bad for the individual" (ELCP, 230).

conduct […] of behavior in general" (Ibid., 307), but only by reinforcing – through a supposedly scientific recodification – the subject prescribed by Christian moral theology.

Finally, in order to highlight the similarities between the Christian subject and the modern disciplinary individual, between "Christian interiority" and "psychological subjectivity", I propose putting into relation the description of the type of individualization imposed by pastoral power that I quoted on page fifty with the following four series of disciplinary techniques and normalizing instruments used by psychiatric power:

1. The four "yokes" or "elements of reality" to which the mad person must be subjected to be cured; the "fourfold reality' of which the cured individual is "the bearer"; the "four tentacles of reality" that have to be imposed "as reality itself".[194]

1.1. The "law of the other" or "the doctor's will" (ECF-PP, 178, 5).

1.2. The "law" or "the yoke of identity […] name, identity, the biography recited in the first person and recognized […] in the ritual of […] confession" (Ibid., 176).

1.3. The "non-real reality of madness and the reality of the desire which constitutes the reality of madness and nullifies it as madness" (Ibid., 177).

1.4. The "law of money […] the reality of money, need, and the necessity to work […] the insertion of need in an economic system" (Ibid., 188, 178).

2. The four "means" used in Pinel's asylum to guarantee the cure:

2.1. "Silence" (EHM, 495).

2.2. "recognition in a mirror" (Ibid., 503 and 497).

2.3 "perpetual judgement" (Ibid., 500).

2.4. The "apotheosis of the medical character" (Ibid., 503).

3. The "three instruments" from which "the success of disciplinary power derives" (EDP, 170):

[194] ECF-PP, 176, 177, 178, and 188.

3.1. “hierarchical observation” or “hierarchized surveillance”.

3.2 “normalizing judgement” (Ibid., 177).

3.3. “their combination in a procedure that is specific to disciplinary power: the examination” (Ibid., 170, 184).

4. The five “supplements of power added to reality by the asylum […] instruments […] the doctor is given […] through the asylum apparatus itself” and that allow him to “govern” madness:

4.1. “disciplinary asymmetry”.

4.2. “the imperative use of language”.

4.3. “the management of lack and needs”.

4.4. “the imposition of a statutory identity in which the patient must recognize himself”.

4.5. “the removal of pleasure from madness” (ECF-PP, 165).

First of all, an individualization that results in an identity defined by the balance of “merits and faults” requires the continuous moral “accounting” provided by mechanisms such as “hierarchical observation”, “recognition in a mirror”, “perpetual […] normalizing judgment”, examination, and “the yoke of the non-real reality of madness”. The microphysics of disciplinary power, whether ecclesiastical or secular, is built on “the principle of omnivisibility” (ECF-PP, 48) as the secularization of God’s eye in an system of surveillance and control that resorts to multiple relays and Christian techniques in order to duplicate the effects of His omnipresence and omniscience: “the individual […] must constantly experience himself as visible for a gaze, the real presence or absence of which hardly matters” (Ibid., 76). In other words, “it is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (EDP, 187). In the God-pastor-sheep relationship we find the first exemplification of “a mechanism that coerces by means of observation” (Ibid., 170) and therefore makes the use of force unnecessary: “a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing, to the

point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself" (EPK, 155). The extension of Christian discipline from the sixteenth century onwards proves that "whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema can be used" (EDP, 205).

Penalization plays the same role in all the disciplines: It is always "one element of a double system: gratification-punishment […] rewards […] penalties […] Behavior and performance [are defined] on the basis of the two opposed values of good and evil […] all behavior falls in the field between good and bad points […] it is possible to quantify this field and work out an arithmetical economy based on it. A penal accountancy, constantly brought up to date, makes it possible to obtain the punitive balance of each individual". In fact, Foucault acknowledges that what we find in modern disciplinary institutions is just a "transposition of the system of indulgences. And by the play of this quantification, this circulation of awards and debits, thanks to the continuous calculation of plus and minus points, the disciplinary apparatuses hierarchized the 'good' and the 'bad' subjects in relation to one another" (EDP, 180-181). In other words, individuals are enclosed in "a judicial space" where they are "accused, judged, and sentenced […] What positivism came to consider as objectivity was nothing but […] the effects of this domination" (EHM, 503, 506).

The examination, like the confession, is "a form of knowledge-power" that turns the complete visibility guaranteed by the disciplinary gaze into individualizing knowledge. Organized around the norm, its goal is to determine "whether an individual is behaving as he should and whether he was progressing". It is "a normalizing gaze" that combines "the ceremony of power" and "the establishment of truth." In both its ecclesiastical and secular deployments, the examination "manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification

of those who are subjected"; it is "the technique by which power […] holds […] its subjects […] in a mechanism of objectification" (EDP, 184, 185, and 186).

Madness, like sin before, is forced to examine and judge itself, but "in others, and it appears in them as unfounded pretension […] as derisory". The effect of the madman's recognition of himself in the mirror of the madness of others, of seeing himself as "objectively mad", is a "docility" and renunciation of one's will that only the appropriation of Christian self-abasement could guarantee (EHM, 498, 499, and 147). In other words, the "assertion of omnipotence" (ECF-PP, 148), the sin of pride that is at the core of every madness is cured or expiated in "the spectacle of itself as unreason humiliated when […] it glimpsed its derisory and objective image in an identical madman […] Freed from the chains, madness was paradoxically stripped of its essential liberty, which was that of solitary exaltation; it became responsible for what it knew of itself, and was imprisoned in its own gaze, which was constantly turned back on itself" (EHM, 499).

Foucault is following Nietzsche's view that self-mortification always precedes self-knowledge when he claims that "realization, or gaining consciousness, is now linked to the shame of being identical to [the other madmen] […] Scorned by oneself even before reaching recognition and knowledge of oneself" (Ibid., 499, 500). Once madness becomes a sin, a moral fault, the madman is defined by a relation of self to himself marked by "guilt, and […] a non-relation to others that was of the order of shame. The others were made innocent […] no longer prosecutor, guilt was displaced to within, demonstrating that […] he was fascinated by nothing other than his own presumption […] he was now truly a prisoner […] in sin and shame. Before, he felt himself to be punished, and saw there the signs of his innocence; now […] he had no option but to consider himself guilty" (Ibid., 497). Profanation, libertinage, and unreason can no longer be heroized. They have lost the ability to "strike fear into people's hearts" because they are themselves "afraid,

helplessly, irrevocably afraid, entirely in thrall to the pedagogy of good sense, truth, and morality" (EHM, 483). The "interiorization of the judicial instance [...] [the] translation of the judicial process into the depths of psychology" that leads to the acknowledgement of guilt and the beginning of remorse or repentance guarantees that self-punishment will "continue indefinitely inside the patient's conscience" (Ibid., 502). Even if he is not responsible for his madness as illness or disturbance of the instincts, he is still to be blamed for the "fault, wickedness […] presumption" of the "unacceptable" desire or immoral will that is at the root of his illness (ECF-PP, 176, 177). That's why he is forced to "promise to restrain himself": A "region of simple responsibility" has been defined for him, one "where any manifestation of madness would be linked to a punishment". He is responsible for all the aspects of his illness that can disturb morality, or rather, the laws that are both "those of reality and those of morality". The attribution of guilt to the madman for the arrogant will that is the cause of his illness becomes both "the form of the concrete coexistence of each man and his guardian" and "the form of consciousness […] of his own madness" that he is expected to have. In other words, guilt is the good madman's self-consciousness and as a result he becomes a self-sacrificial "object of punishment always offered to himself and the other" (EHM, 484, 485).

Secondly, an individualization by "subjection" (*assujettissement*) or "obedience" resorts to the "yoke of the doctor's will", "disciplinary asymmetry", "the apotheosis of the medical character", "silence", and "the law of money". In "moral" or "psychological treatment" the cure is described as something very close to the struggle of the Christian priest to save the soul of a victim of possession: the "confrontation of two wills" in "a battle, a relationship of force" (ECF-PP, 10) in which "the disturbed will and perverted passion must come up against a sound will […] the victory for the healthy will and […] the submission, renunciation, of the disturbed will […] a

duel in which victory and submission are at stake" (Ibid., 339). In the "moral tactic" (EHM, 509) known as psychiatric practice, the patient has to accept his complete dependence on the doctor as "someone who holds an inescapable power" (ECF-PP, 177) because he possesses the hermeneutic ability to uncover "the truth that hides in the depths of oneself" (EEW1, 83-84) and therefore to show him the way to his salvation or cure. Foucault never ceased to insist that the "notion of a state of obedience is something completely new and specific that is absolutely unprecedented. The end point towards which the practice of obedience aims is […] humility, which consists […] above all in renouncing one's one will […] knowing that any will of one's own is a bad will […] to act so that one's will […] is dead" (ECF-STP, 177 and 178).

Another element that we find repeatedly throughout Foucault's texts is the distinction between the law as the instrument of sovereignty and the norm as the prescription on which the exercise of disciplinary power is "founded and legitimized" (ECF-AB, 50). He explains that "in the system of disciplinary regulation (vs. the system of the law) what is determined is what one must do […] a good discipline tells you what to do at every moment […] the law prohibits and discipline prescribes" (ECF-STP, 46 and 47). Furthermore, whereas the law is supposed to be equal for all, "the techniques of discipline […] are mechanisms for unbalancing power relations […] a machinery which reinforces and multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced by the law […] the disciplinary link distorts the contractual link systematically" (EDP, 222, 223). The relationship between the pastor and his sheep, like that between psychiatrist and patient, is "non-reciprocal" and "dissymmetrical" (ECF-PP, 3). As a principle "of both qualification and correction", that is to say, as an ideal to which one's conduct

has to conform as closely as possible,[195] the function of the norm is not to exclude or to reject but "is always linked to a positive technique of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project" (ECF-AB, 50) that renews and reinforces the Christian morality of Good and Evil under the scientific disguise of the normal and the pathological.[196]

As for the tool of compulsory silence, monasticism had proved that "solitude is the primary condition of total submission [...] remorse cannot fail to follow" (EDP, 237). In connection with the "law of money" or the obligation to "earn one's living" (ECF-PP, 165), we have to remember that, beyond the disciplinary effects of "regular employment", after the Reformation, with the "secularization of charity", comes "the moral punishment of poverty" (EHM, 57). Whereas "pride had been man's sin before the Fall", idleness becomes "the ultimate form of pride for fallen man […] the source of all unrest […] idleness was an act of rebellion and […] the worst of all possible revolts: expecting nature to be bountiful as she had been when man lived in a state of innocence was a denial of Adam's fault" (Ibid., 70 and 71). Work teaches the asylum's patient self-restraint and therefore it constitutes one of the means by which "man entered once more the order of God's commandments; he submitted his liberty to laws that are both those of reality and those of morality" (EHM, 485).

[195] What is specific to the disciplinary penality is non-observance […] the whole indefinite domain of the non-conforming […] that which does not measure up to the norm […] is punishable" (EDP, 178, 179).

[196] "In the Europe of today […] all oppositions […] between good and bad, allowed and forbidden […] are reduced […] to the simple opposition between normal and pathological. This opposition is not only simpler than the others, but it also presents the advantage of allowing us to believe that there exists a technique which allows the reduction of the pathological to the normal […] This codification of all oppositions in the opposition between normal and pathological in fact occurs thanks to an alternative opposition, implicit in our culture, but very active even though virtually invisible: the opposition between madness and reason" (ERC, 89).

With regard to the so-called "apotheosis of the medical character", his authority was not derived from the contents of knowledge, but its "tokens", so if the doctor was able to "circumscribe madness it was not because he knew it but because he mastered it" (EHM, 505). Both Pinel and Samuel Tuke acknowledged that "their moral actions were not necessarily link to any scientific competence […] a transparently clear moral framework [...] forgotten as positivism imposed its myth of scientific objectivity" (Ibid., 508, 509, and 511). Furthermore, the mad's status as minors and "the alienation of their character rather than their minds" (Ibid., 505) required a power of an order that was "moral and social", a "moral and juridical guarantee of good faith" (Ibid., 504). It is important to keep in mind that until the end of the eighteenth century "the framework ensured by religious personnel" and "the discipline imposed on the individual" (ECF-PP, 179) in the establishments that took charge of the mad were supposed to be able to provide a cure by themselves. The nineteenth century insistence that the direction of the mad needed to be in the hands of "medical personnel" was satisfied by what Foucault describes as "the five tokens of knowledge", which are just the "formal stamp" or the "insignia of knowledge" (Ibid., 184).

To conclude, an individualization by subjectivation (*subjectivation*) or "the compulsory extraction of truth" resorts to "the yoke of identity […] name, identity, the biography, recited in the first person and recognized […] in the ritual of […] confession" (ECF-PP, 176). The patient is required to "recognize himself in an identity […] a biographical corpus established from the outside […] an administrative identity in which one must recognize oneself through a language of truth". He must "own to the biographical schema that carries his identity" (Ibid., 159 and 160). And in order to prove that he has done this he has to confess, that is to say, to "declare aloud and intelligibly the truth about" himself (ERC, 159). The requirement of "intelligibility" entails the compulsory adoption of a "canonical form" so that the truth about the madman will not be "the

truth of madness speaking in its own name, but the truth of a madness agreeing to first person recognition of itself in a particular administrative and medical reality constituted by asylum power […] not the truth that he could say about himself, at the level of his actual experience" but "the biographical reality with which the patient must identify […] a biographical canon constituted in advance" (ECF-PP, 159, 160, and 161), according to the conventions of a genre that determines which events are relevant and how they have to be experienced and interpreted, a series of social norms that decide on advance which categories are available for us to identify with, and at what price, and a plot that knowingly ignores the role of chance and puts us, or rather, an epic sovereign freedom, finally self-transparent, in charge.

The autobiographical account and the confession became "an institutional obligation" (Ibid., 187) for mental patients between 1825 and 1840, but, in fact, giving an account of oneself, of one's life is "an essential component […] in all […] [the] processes of taking charge of individuals and disciplining them […] an episode within the disciplinary enterprise" (Ibid., 157 and 158). As part of the ritual of the clinic through which the psychiatrist constitutes himself as "master of truth" (ECF-PP, 187) the patient has to see his life, his "case", "presented as an illness […] summarized before the students, he will be forced to recount it and if he does not want to, the doctor will do so in his place" (Ibid., 187, 186). Questioning is a "disciplinary method" that fixes the individual "to the norm of his own identity". If it is used properly, this method should prevent the patient from saying "what he wants, but answer questions […] never let the patient spin out an account […] interrupt him with questions which are […] always the same and also follow a certain order" (Ibid., 183, 184).

To conclude this first chapter, I would like to point out that with his characterization of psychiatric power as the main instrument to which the moral undertaking inaugurated by the

pastoral practice of "direction" or "government" resorts in its modern form, Foucault evinces how the Cartesian reinforcement of what Nietzsche had described as "the belief in 'immediate certainties'"[197] provided the implementation of the Christian hermeneutics of the subject in the "Psy-function" with a priceless justification and endorsement.

[197] "The belief in "immediate certainties" is a moral naiveté [...] Aside from morality, the belief in immediate certainties is a stupidity that does us little credit!" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, "Part 2: The free spirit", section 34, 34).

III. CHAPTER TWO: PASTORAL POWER AND NORMALIZATION

> *To the old juridical structures which every society has known for a long time- that is, a certain number of common laws whose infractions are punished- there has come to be added another form of analysis of comportment, another form of culpability, another type of condemnation, much more subtle, much tighter, much finer. This new form is ensured by the pastor, who can require the people to do everything that they must for their salvation and who is in a position to watch over them and to exercise with respect to them […] a surveillance and continuous control* (ERC, 124).
>
> *Moral der Wahrhaftigkeit in der Heerde. "Du sollst erkennbar sein, dein Inneres durch deutliche und constante Zeichen ausdrücken- sonst bist du gefährlich: [...] Folglich mußt du dich selber für erkennbar halten, du darfst dir nicht verborgen sein, du darfst nicht an deinen Wechsel glauben" Also: Die Forderung der Wahrhaftigkeit setzt die Erkennbarkeit und die Beharrlichkeit der Person voraus*[198]*[…] Mißtrauen als Quelle der Wahrhaftigkeit.*[199]
>
> *For a world of the true, of being, to be fabricated, the truthful man first had to be created (which includes such a man believing himself 'truthful'). Simple, transparent, free of contradiction with himself, lasting, remaining the same […] a man of this kind conceives a world of being as 'God' in his own image.*[200]
>
> *Should not the whole theory of the subject be reformulated, seeing that knowledge, rather than opening onto the truth of the world, is deeply rooted in the "errors" of life?* (EEW2, 477).

Our first quotation is part of the description of the new type of power introduced by the Christian pastorate that Foucault offered in a lecture at the University of Tokyo in 1978. As it will become apparent in the following pages, this characterization confirms our hypothesis that his early conception of ecclesiastical power as modelled on sovereignty and therefore primarily

[198] Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe*, Band 10, 24= Mp XVII1b. Winter 1883-1884 24[19], 657. Section 277 of *The Will to Power*: "Morality of truthfulness in the herd. 'You shall be knowable, express your inner nature by clear and constant signs- otherwise you are dangerous [...] you must consider yourself knowable, you may not be concealed from yourself, you may not believe that you change'. Thus: the demand for truthfulness presupposes the knowability and stability of the person" (158).

[199] Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe,* Band 11, 40= W 17a. August-September 1885, 40[43], 651. "Mistrust as the source of truthfulness" (*The Will to Power,* section 278, 158).

[200] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 11[115], 222.

juridical[201] will be abandoned[202] once his genealogy of the modern power of normalization leads him to the notion of a pastoral modality whose exercise of government or direction as a disciplinary and regulatory practice provides the background to and the model for the modern "psychological function". That's why, echoing the Nietzsche of *The Genealogy,*[203] Foucault argues that "its value is exactly what has to be put into question […] psychiatry as a general instrument of subjection and normalization – that […] is the problem" (EFL, 253, 140).

Incorporating a couple of concepts from Foucault's later terminology,[204] we can say that in *Lives of Infamous Men*, a text that appeared in 1977 – a year before the Tokyo conference – Foucault describes pastoral power as the first form of political rationality to justify and obtain an actual "hold on the ordinary preoccupations of life", on people's everyday lives, through the practice of confession. That is, by means of a compulsory ritual in which "the one speaking is at the same time the one spoken about […] an obligation to run the minuscule everyday world […] through the mill of language […] revealing […] the murky interplay of thoughts, intentions, and desires […] For hundreds of millions of men and over a period of centuries, evil had to be confessed in the first person" (EEF, 286). Furthermore, in this text he explains that until the end of the seventeenth century, "power exercised at the level of everyday life" was shaped as monarchical sovereignty: "a near and distant, omnipotent, and capricious monarch, the source of

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[201] "The relationship of sovereignty exercised by the priest with regard to the laity" (ECF-PP, 43). "It seems to me that the power of religion, from the middle ages to the late Renaissance, was juridical, with its orders, its courts of law, and its forms of penitence" (EFL, 197).

[202] "I do not think that […] pastoral power can be assimilated to or confused with the methods used to subject men to a law or to a sovereign" (ECF-STP, 165).

[203] "For me (wrote Nietzsche) it is a question of the value of morality […] we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined. People have taken the *value* of these 'values' as given […] as beyond all questioning" (*On the Genealogy of Morality,* "Preface", sections 5 and 6, 6-8).

[204] The notions of "pastoral power" (in the 1977 text he talks about "Christianity" and "the Christian West") and "political rationality".

all justice and an object of every sort of enticement, both a political principle and a magical authority […] one had to imagine him sufficiently near to all those miseries, sufficiently attentive to the least of those disorders, before one could attempt to invoke him; he had to seem endowed with a kind of physical ubiquity himself. In its first forms, this discourse concerning the quotidian was turned entirely toward the king; it was addressed to him; it had to slip into the great ceremonious rituals of power; it had to adopt their form and take on their signs. The commonplace could be told, described, observed, categorized, and indexed only within a power relation that was haunted by the figure of the king- by his real power or by the specter of his might. Hence the peculiar form of that discourse: it required a decorative, imprecatory, or supplicating language" (EEF, 291, 289). In this lengthy quote Foucault is describing the power of the absolute monarch as part of his analysis of the "*lettre de cachet*". However, I think that this fragment can also be interpreted as a depiction of the power of God as "the absolute sovereign" (vs. the "earthly" one) (ECF-STP, 98) and His relation to the faithful. The transition from that monarchical regime to a disciplinary society is explained in the following terms: At the end of the seventeenth century, the mechanism of Christian confession was "encircled and outreached by another whose operation was very different. An administrative and no longer a religious apparatus; a recording mechanism instead of a pardoning mechanism. The objective was the same, however, at least in part: to bring the quotidian into discourse, to survey the tiny universe of irregularities and unimportant disorders […] power exercised at the level of everyday life will now be made up of a fine, differentiated, continuous network, in which the various institutions of the judiciary, the police, medicine, and psychiatry would operate hand in hand. And the discourse that would then take form would no longer have that artificial and clumsy theatricality: it would develop in a language that would claim to be that of observation and neutrality" (EEF: 286, 291). It seems to me that the reason why

Foucault claims that the disciplinary power exercised by the "administration" implies a "way of governing the quotidian and formulating it […] a type of relations […] between power, discourse and the quotidian" that are "entirely different" (Ibid., 287) from the ones made possible by the Christian confession as a "form of power-knowledge" (EEW3, 87) is that in 1977 he still thinks of "religious power" in terms of sovereignty. But, as I have already pointed out, from 1978 onwards his analysis of pastoral power describes the relationship between the Christian shepherd and his flock as anticipating many of the features of the modern "disciplinary-normalizing system". In other words, drawing on Foucault's texts one can argue that whereas the relationship between God and the individual is marked by the model of sovereignty (with law as its instrument), that between the pastor and his sheep, inaugurated by Christ as "the first pastor" (ECF-STP, 152), who sacrifices himself to redeem Humanity, is closer to the disciplinary-biopower type (it relies on norms as moral prescriptions).

Through a process of disciplinarization-as-moralization and secularization-as-generalization, the disciplinary-regulatory relationship to sin or evil dictated and set up by the pastorate spread to be applied, not only to madness,[205] but also to crime. This "pastoralization" (ECF-STP, 201) of psychiatry[206] and penal justice results in what Nietzsche had described as the "spiritualization […] of cruelty",[207] its "intellectualization":[208] a punishment that inflicts pain on

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[205] See "Chapter One: The Birth of Psychiatric Power", pages 65-67.

[206] In the previous chapter I tried to show that this "pastoralization" of madness is constitutive of (modern) psychiatry.

[207] "This is my claim: almost everything we call "higher culture" is based on the spiritualization and deepening of *cruelty* […] and wherever anyone lets himself be talked into self-denial in the *religious* sense […] or into […] remorse […] puritanical penitential spasms, vivisections of conscience […] he is secretly being tempted and urged on by his cruelty, by that dangerous thrill of *self*-directed cruelty" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* section 229, 120 and 121).

[208] "the intellectualization of cruelty [...] Much intellect, much hidden design, has entered cruelty" (Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 34[92], 7).

the body is replaced by one that "acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations" (EDP, 16). Its objective is to correct or reform the individual, "gripping the depths of his soul in order to transform him" (EFL, 246). Against the moralistic interpretation of these changes as the result of "a process of" or "increase in humanization" (Ibid., 7, 23), the analysis offered in *Beyond Good and Evil* considers them as evidence that the "wild animal", the "cruel and wild beast [...] has not been killed off at all; it is alive and well, it has just – become divine".[209] The generalization of the Christian "government of individualization" (EEF, 129) that produces modern "psychological subjectivity" or disciplinary individuality guarantees the naturalized continuity among the order of religion, the order of morality, and the order of law or civil justice.

Analyzing punishment as "productive", as "a political tactic" with "positive" – instead of merely "negative" or "repressive" – effects allows us to understand this "entry of the soul on to the scene of penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a corpus of 'scientific' knowledge" about "Man" as the "effect of a change in the way in which the body is invested by power relations" (EDP, 24). However, it is important to highlight that those "human sciences" and that change in the technology of power over the body – which no longer sees the latter as "something to be tortured" but rather as a force "to be molded, reformed, corrected, something that must acquire aptitudes" (EEW3, 82) – are the effects of a generalization of the hermeneutics of the subject and the disciplinary procedures and techniques invented by the pastorate. The basic notions and assumptions of Christian moral theology are re-legitimated in the form of a "scientific" discourse. [210]

[210] According to Foucault, one of the main features of the "régime", "general politics", or "political economy' of truth in which we live – that is, of "the types of discourse" that our society "accepts and makes function as true" – is that "truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it" (EPK, 131).

The "disciplinary therapeutic field" (ECF-PP, 107) that had been opened up by the Christian sacrament of penance as both punishment and correction or cure was secularized and taken up by psychiatric and judicial power. Its aim, however, remained unchanged: the "control" as well as the "psychological and moral reform of the attitudes and behavior of individuals" (EEW3, 56). We should keep in mind that for Foucault there is no doubt that "the joining of the medical and the juridical secured by expert psychiatric opinion is brought about only by means of the reactivation of what I would call elementary categories of morality that are attached to the notion of perversity… 'pride', 'stubbornness', 'nastiness' […] the discourse of the child moralization […] a discourse completely governed by fear and moralization" (ECF-AB, 35). In other words, that union wouldn't have been possible without a moralization through psychologization, psychiatrization, or pathologization not only of the offender as a juridical subject but also of the offense as an action specifically forbidden by the law. Once again, it is fear – more specifically "a discourse of fear whose function is to detect […] social danger […] and to counter it" (Ibid.) – that, as Nietzsche had anticipated, leads to morality.[211] The "medico-psychological domain of the 'perversions'" took the place of "the old moral categories of debauchery and excess" (EHS1, 118). Nonetheless, behind this translation into a more fashionable and supposedly "neutral" or "descriptive" terminology we find the same condemnation and culpabilization; one that serves to justify the need for a larger and wider mechanism of control that can organize the "suspicion and locating of dangerous individuals" in a more effective way. The "screening" or "surveillance" is no longer restricted to extreme cases such as "the rare and monstrous figure of the monomaniac" but is applied to the "common everyday figure" (EEF, 226) of the abnormal in the inexhaustible richness of its infinite variations. As a result, legal punishment can be applied

[211] "and fear is once again the mother of morality" (*Beyond Good and Evil,* section 201, 88).

to "something that is not a breach of the law" but the secularization of Christian evil, concupiscence, or fallen nature in a "dangerousness" that is "evaluated from a psychologico-moral point of view" (ECF-AB, 18). What is legally persecuted and outlawed is a "form of conduct, a character, and an attitude" that are neither mental illnesses nor legal offenses but just "moral defects". In fact, it is this core immorality or "bad" will that authorizes the pastor's descendants to "pass from action to conduct, from an offense to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as […] the offense itself" (Ibid., 16).

Furthermore, it seems to me that Foucault considers that the "coupling" of juridical and psychiatric power only exacerbated a "Christianization" or "moralization" of justice that had been long in the making.[212] The fact that the judges are "embarrassed" at passing sentence on a "motiveless crime", even if they are dealing with an act to which "the law manifestly applies" (ECF-AB, 123), shows the extent to which they are taking for granted or operating on the Christian conception of the subject as someone whose actions are caused by intelligible "intentions" or

[212] As I pointed out in the previous chapter, Foucault holds that Christian morality was "brought into and disseminated in a state-appropriated penal system" from the very moment that a justice system was created. That is, at the end of the twelfth century, when the "inquiry" replaced the Germanic and feudal "test" as the "truth-establishment procedure" used in judicial practice. He maintains that the inquiry was "brought into law from the Church and therefore, was permeated with religious categories." In the system of the test there was no "fault, culpability, or any connection with sin". The three concepts introduced by the inquiry are: "the figure of the prosecutor […] as representative of the sovereign", the "infraction", and "fines or confiscations of property". The notion of "infraction" meant that "when one individual wronged another, there was always, a fortiori, a wrong done against sovereignty, against law, against power […] the state […] order" and therefore the "compensation" belongs to the sovereign. Taking into account "all the religious implications and connotations of the inquiry", it is easy to understand why the "infraction" was interpreted as "a moral, almost religious transgression […] Thus, around the twelfth century, one saw a conjoining of lawbreaking and religious transgression. Doing injury to the sovereign and committing a sin were two things that began to merge, and they were to be closely joined in Classical law. We are not yet entirely free of that conjunction […] In the early Middle Ages there was no judicial power. Settlements were reached between individuals" by means of the Germanic test. This "juridical form" was not a procedure for "truth-seeking but a kind of game with a binary structure […] judgment did not exist […] there existed only victory or defeat […] the test did not serve to […] identify […] who had told the truth; rather, it established that the stronger individual was, at the same time, the one who was right […] there was no transgression but only a wrong [*tort*] and a vengeance". Judicial power appeared only with "the formation of the first great medieval monarchy". From then on, "individuals would no longer have the right to resolve their own disputes […] they would have to submit to a power external to them […] imposed from above […] The Western monarchies were founded on the appropriation of the judicial system, which enables them to apply those mechanisms of confiscation" (EEW3, 64, 41, 42, 43, 48, and 49).

"motives" that are the expression of a good or evil will. In other words, the presence of a "reason" is conceived of as proof that the accused is not insane but immoral because he or she "chose" to break the law and therefore acted "intentionally", "deliberately", "on purpose". The judges ask psychiatry either to provide them with the "reasons" or "motives" that led to the crime – so that their "punitive power can be exercised" – or, if they cannot discover any "interests", to declare the subject mad. A "proof of dementia" is the "grounds" for the judges not exercising their "right to punish" (ECF-AB, 122). As evidence of this "pastoralization" of justice, Foucault points out that penal mechanisms "can no longer function simply with a law, a violation, and a responsible party". Just as it is the case with Christian penitence, "beyond admission, there must be confession, self-examination, explanation of oneself […] the [discourse] given by the accused about himself [and] the one he makes possible for others through his confessions, memories, intimate disclosures, and so on. If it happens that this discourse is missing, the presiding judge is relentless […] 'You must make an effort to analyze yourself' […] 'Explain yourself' […] the jury is upset […] 'For heaven's sake, defend yourself!" (EEF, 209, 208). In other words, "when a man comes before his judges with nothing but his crimes, when he has nothing else to say but 'this is what I have done', when he has nothing to say about himself, when he does not confide the tribunal something like the secret of his own being, then the judicial machine ceases to function" (EEF, 228). The fact that the absence of "motive" or "intention" is perceived as a logical and moral impossibility that can only be explained as a symptom of madness or mental illness – in which case it is the individual's personality itself, his or her life, that becomes the cause or reason for the crime – proves that what is actually judged and punished is still "the 'soul' of the criminal": not just what he "did", but rather what he "is", and therefore what he "might do" in the future. (EDP, 19) In 1973 Foucault had claimed that "juridical" or "judicial practices" – defined as "the manner in which wrongs and

responsibilities are settled between men" – are "the most important […] among the 'social practices' whose historical analysis enables one to locate the emergence of new forms of subjectivity", one of the main ways in which "our society defined types of subjectivity" (EEW3, 4). Nineteenth-century penal practice is clearly built on the Christian morality of the subject. The judges "link punishment […] to the determination of motives […] the motive must […] be established, that is, a psychologically intelligible link between the act and the author". The psychologists and criminologists are no longer called upon to determine whether the individual can be considered legally responsible or suffers from "dementia", but as the modern or secular "specialists in motivation" (EEF, 218).

As Nietzsche had explained in *Twilight of the Idols,* "the causal instinct is conditioned and excited by feelings of fear. Whenever possible, the question 'why?' won't point to the cause as such, but instead will point to a *particular kind of cause* – a reassuring, comforting cause. The first consequence of this need is that causation gets attributed to something we are already *familiar* with […] So we are not looking for just any type of explanatory cause, we are looking for a *chosen, preferred* type of explanation, one that will most quickly and reliably get rid of the feeling of unfamiliarity and novelty, the feeling that we are dealing with something we have never encountered before […] Result: a certain type of causal attribution becomes increasingly prevalent, gets concentrated into a system, and finally emerges as *dominant*, which is to say it completely rules out *other* causes and explanations".[213] The model of "causal attribution" that underlies both modern psychiatry and penal justice is the one defined by the Christian pastorate: the cause of our acts are motives or intentions, a free will. In the psychiatrist's hands, the crime without motive,

[213] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols,* "The Four Great Errors", section 5, 180. In fact, the philosopher goes as far as to say that we "only become *conscious* of […] the particular state we are in, feeling good or bad […] we only let this state register […] once we have assigned it a type of motivation" (Ibid., section 4, 179).

unintelligible and unpredictable, becomes the result of a disorder or disturbance of the "instincts". This notion provides penal psychology with a "causal analysis" that is valid "for all kinds of conduct, whether delinquent or nor" (EEF, 220). The justice system no longer considers itself "the agent of sovereignty or of a sovereign who requires expiation of the crime" (EFL, 140). If it punishes according to the law, it is only "in order to correct, to modify, to redress; for we are dealing with deviants and the abnormal. The judge thinks of himself as a therapist of the social body, a worker in the field of 'public health'" (Ibid., 246). Like the compassionate pastor, the judges have the obligation to punish, and they do "punish heavily – but if you ask them why they punish, how they justify the fact of punishing, it is rarely in terms of chastisement" (Ibid., 140) but rather as a "technique of improvement" (EEW3, 56), "a system of procedures designed to reform" (EEF, 217). Expert psychiatric opinion "allows one to make the code function as one wants, and to retain a good conscience", so what is at stake is not so much "the criminal's unconscious" as "the judge's conscience" (EFL, 253).[214]

Neither Christian nor civil penal institutions seem to be able to function without the accused providing an answer to the question "Who are you?" (EEF, 209) and therefore revealing "his reasons, his motives, his […] will, his tendencies, his instincts" (Ibid., 217). What has happened is that "the reason for the crime has become the reason for the punishment", so without a knowledge of the motives or intentions that led a particular individual to break the law, without an "explanation", we are unable to "determine what should be punished in the guilty" person; we need to know his "nature […] his obduracy, the degree of his evilness […] judicial responsibility formally authorizes punishment but does not allow one to make sense of it" (Ibid.). Criminal psychology gives the judge and jurors "the thing itself to be punished". No longer an offense but

[214] Translation slightly modified. The original says: "Ce n'est pas de l'inconscient du criminal mais de la conscience du juge qu'il est question" (FDE2a, 297).

"its psychologico-moral double": "a way of being […] a character […] irregular forms of conduct that were put forward as the crime's cause" (ECF-AB, 16, 17). This is the first of the three functions of "psychiatric expertise", "criminal", or "penal psychiatry" : to "double", "twin", or replace the offense with "criminality" or "dangerousness". The second consists in substituting "the criminal", "the delinquent", or "the dangerous individual" for the offender or the author of the offense, a juridical subject (Ibid., 18, 19). This is what Foucault describes as "the gradual emergence in the course of the nineteenth century" of an "additional character. At first a pale phantom, used to adjust the penalty […] this character becomes gradually more substantial, more solid, more real,[215] until finally it is the crime that seems nothing but a shadow […] that must be drawn aside in order to reveal the only thing now of importance, the criminal" (EEF, 210). As a result of this double displacement in the object of judgment and punishment, "magistrates and jurors no longer face a legal subject, but an object: the object of a technology and knowledge of rectification, readaptation, reinsertion, and correction […] a juridically indiscernible personality […] responsible for everything and nothing" (ECF-AB, 21).

Finally, the third function is to turn the psychiatrist into a judge: he "undertakes an investigation […] not at the level of an individual's legal responsibility" but of "his or her real guilt" (Ibid., 22 and 23). The psychological "assessment of normality" and the "technical prescription for a possible normalization" are now "directly integrated in the process of forming the sentence" (EDP, 20).

From the nineteenth century onwards, the legal practice of punishment is justified as a moral task intended to "correct" the soul and conduct, to transform "the individual as a whole […] his mind and his will" (Ibid.: 123, 125). Foucault defines correction as "the molding and

[215] After all, as Foucault reminds us, according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, "a thing has as much truth as it has being" (ECF-WTK, 33).

transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms" (EEW3, 70). It is through the instrument of morality that pastoral power, secularized or not, "produces the very form of the subject, it produces what makes up the subject" (EFL, 158). Both the sinner and the virtuous man, the mad and the mentally fit, are "the correlate of a technique of normalization" (ECF-AB, 25). The power relationship between shepherd and sheep or psychologist and patient, "the actual or effective relationship of domination", should be our point of departure to analyze "how that relationship itself determines the elements to which it is applied […] we should not […] be asking subjects how, why […] they [...] agree to being subjugated, but showing how actual relations of subjugation manufacture subjects" (ECF-SMD, 45).

Starting with what Foucault calls "'local centers' of power-knowledge, for example the relations […] between penitents and confessors, or the faithful and their directors of conscience" (EHS1, 98), allows us to analyze how "a multiple and mobile field of force relations" is created, one in which "far-reaching, but never completely stable effects of domination are produced" (Ibid., 102). This is type of genealogical analysis that "can account for the constitution of the subject" itself (EPK, 117). It was the generalization-as-secularization of the procedures of individualization created by pastoral power that made possible to obtain "a real and effective 'incorporation' of power […] to gain access to the bodies of individuals, to their acts, attitudes, and modes of behavior" (Ibid., 125). Obviously, Foucault's analytics of power does not resort to the criteria of intelligibility defined by Christian moral theology. As he puts it: "My goal was not to analyze power at the level of intentions or decisions, not to try to approach it from inside, not to ask the question […] who has power? What is going on in his mind? And what is he trying to do, this man who has power? The goal was, on the contrary, to study power at the point where his intentions – if, that is, any intention is involved – are completely invested in real and effective practices […]

so the question is […] what happens […] in the continuous and uninterrupted processes that subjugate bodies, direct gestures, and regulate forms of behavior […] how multiple bodies, forces, energies […] are gradually […] actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject. To grasp the material agency of subjugation insofar as it constitutes subjects" (ECF-SMD, 28).

In an essay entitled "Rhetoric and Power: An inquiry into Foucault's Critique of Confession",[216] Dave Tell draws on Tim Murphy's work on Nietzsche's analysis of metonymy[217] in order to argue that Foucault's critique of the Christian practice of confession, just as Nietzsche's critique of knowledge, is due to its "metonymical logic"[218] or "character",[219] the metonymical "movement" it authorizes.[220] Tell reminds us that Nietzsche defined that rhetorical figure as "the substitution of an abstract cause for concrete appearances"[221] or "perceptions", "transcendental causes", "agents" or "agencies" for "surface effects", an "origin" for "concrete events".[222] Beyond his critique of the metonymical character of the subject itself, the "metonymical subjects"[223] that Foucault rejects include "the author" as "a sovereign creative subject",[224] "the dangerous

[216] Tell, "Rhetoric and Power", in *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 43, no.2 (2010): 95-117.

[217] Murphy, *Nietzsche, Metaphor, Religion* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

[218] Tell, 101.

[219] Tell, 108.

[220] Tell, 97 and 98.

[221] Tell, 99.

[222] Tell, 107.

[223] Tell, 108.

[224] Ibid., 101.

individual", "the criminal",[225] "the delinquent",[226] and "the homosexual".[227] Furthermore, he shares Nietzsche's view that "every concept is a metonymy" and calls into question "distinctively metonymical concepts" such as "dangerousness", "criminality", or "sexuality" and "sex".[228] According to Tell's essay, from 1975 onwards Foucault "posits confession as the technique by which […] origins are revealed". Before 1975, he claims, that role was played by "psychiatric techniques of examination". In any case, we should keep in mind that both are Christian techniques of the self. To his claim that "the realm of origins makes possible a new modality of power-disciplinary power", I would object that there is nothing new about that modality because the Christian soul constitutes the first example of what he describes as "the rhetorical insertion of an origin that can anticipate and explain misdeeds".[229] Similarly, I agree with him that for Foucault "sexuality" is another metonymical concept, one that is "implanted into the depths of [the individual's] being" as the origin or cause that can explain all their actions, and "provides power a new point of purchase".[230] However, I would add that, long before nineteenth-century sexuality, the Christian flesh-libido-concupiscence had been functioning in the same way for centuries.

In "expert psychiatric opinion" Foucault sees the reappearance or reactivation of "a practice that the judicial reform at the end of the eighteenth century[231] was supposed to have

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[225] Tell, 103.

[226] Tell, 105.

[227] Tell, 108.

[228] Tell, 99, 102, and 107.

[229] Tell, 103, 104, and 106.

[230] Tell, 108.

[231] Panopticism is "completely antithetical" to the "strict legalism" of the penal theory proposed by reformers such as Cesare de Beccaria at the end of the eighteenth century. Whereas the latter "subordinated […] the possibility of punishment, to the existence of an explicit law" and to the "explicit establishment that a breach of this law had taken

eliminated: the "*lettre de cachet*".[232] This phrase refers to a "form of control, assessment, and effect of power linked to the characterization of the individual" (ECF-AB, 38) that is based on a moral perception and judgment and works as a "moral orthopedics" (EDP, 10). Foucault claims that the judges's "shame in punishing" – manifested in their attempts to present the sentence as "a therapeutic prescription" – is "characteristic of a society which is no longer a juridical society essentially ruled by the law. We are becoming a society which is essentially defined by the norm. This implies another system of surveillance, another kind of control […] the power of law is not regressing but rather merging into a much more general power […] that of the norm[233] [...] a form of power, a type of society that I term "disciplinary society", in contrast to the penal societies known hitherto".[234]

Nineteenth-century "dangerousness" sanctions a way of judging individuals according to their somehow inherent potential for disruptive behavior. A "gigantic moral imprisonment" (EHM, 511) is guaranteed by a "network of nonjudicial power" that consists of the police for surveillance

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place […] a punishment that would compensate for or […] prevent the injury done to society by the offense", in the former "the supervision of individuals is carried out not at the level of what one does but of what one is […] what one might do. With this system, supervision tends increasingly to individualize the author of the act, while ceasing to take account of the juridical nature, the penal qualification of the act itself" (EEW3, 71). "The penal law of which the eighteenth century reformers had dreamed [...] was intended to sanction, in a completely egalitarian way, offenses explicitly defined beforehand by the law" (EEF, 227). Therefore, the question Foucault tries to answer is: "How was a theory of penal law, which ought to have led to one kind of legislation, in fact blurred and overlaid by a completely different penal practice, which then acquired its own theoretical elaboration?" (EEW3, 67).

[232] Foucault defines it as "an order from the king that concerned a person individually, compelling him to do something […] One could exile someone […] imprison him […] one of the major instruments of power of the absolute monarchy". However, "most" of the *lettres de cachet* were in fact solicited to the king "from below […] husbands outraged by their wives, fathers dissatisfied with their children, families wanting to get rid of an individual, religious communities disturbed by someone […] enabling groups, communities, families, and individuals to exercise power over someone […] the behaviors that prompted the request" for one of these orders of arrest – that usually resulted in putting the person in prison "until he corrected himself […] imprisoning for correction" – fell into "three categories. First […] immoral conduct […] Second […] religious behavior judged dangerous and dissident […] Third […] labor conflicts" (EEW3, 65, 66).

[233] EFL, 197.

[234] EEW3, 57.

and the "psychological, psychiatric, criminological, medical, and pedagogical institutions for correction" (EEW3, 57). The crime is above all a sign that alerts the experts to "the existence of a dangerous element […] in the social body" (ERC, 210). The "defense of society" requires a hermeneutics of dangerousness, a "technical knowledge-system capable of characterizing" the individual "in himself" and measuring the "index of danger" (EEF, 222) hidden in every abnormal personality, the "risk of criminality" (Ibid., 225) that can only be discerned by the trained eye of the new experts in Evil.

Foucault maintains that in the nineteenth century there was a "transformation of the old notion of penal responsibility" due to that "joining" of the psychiatric and the juridical. Henceforth, legal accountability requires proving "the intelligibility of the act with reference to the conduct, the character, the antecedents of the individual. The more psychologically determined an act is found to be, the more its author can be considered legally responsible […] A paradox, then: the legal freedom of a subject is proven by the fact that his act is seen to be necessary, determined; his lack of responsibility proven by the fact that his act is seen as unnecessary" (EEF, 219). To put it another way, the subject can be considered legally responsible if the act of which he is accused can be shown to be not just a "sudden and irrepressible" reaction, but the result of his "evil nature". Foucault considers that what allowed this paradox to be solved – and therefore made it possible "to graft onto criminal law the essential elements of the criminological theses" – was the appropriation by criminal justice of "formulations proper to the new civil law" (Ibid., 225, 226). More specifically, the borrowing of a couple of mutually dependent notions that had been developed in civil law around the notion of accident: "no-fault responsibility" (Ibid., 224) and "*risk*, which the law assimilates through the idea of a no-fault liability and which anthropology, or

psychology, or psychiatry, can assimilate through the idea of imputability without freedom" (EEF, 226).

According to the former, responsibility should be interpreted as "cause", but not as "fault". Foucault explains that "no-fault liability is linked to a risk that can never be entirely eliminated, indemnity is not meant to sanction it as a sort of punishment, but, rather, to repair its effects and also to reduce the risks [...] this depenalization of civil liability would constitute a model for penal law […] what is a "born criminal" or a degenerate or a criminal personality, if not someone who, according to a causal chain that is difficult to reconstruct, carries a particularly high index of criminal probability and is in himself a criminal risk? [...] just as one can determine civil liability without establishing fault [...] by estimating the risk created [...] against which it is necessary to build up a defense [...] in the same way one can render an individual responsible under law without having to determine whether he was acting freely and, therefore, whether there was fault but, rather, by linking the act committed to the risk of criminality his very personality constitutes. He is responsible since, by his very existence, he is a creator of risk, even if he is not at fault, since he has not of his own free will chosen evil rather than good. Thus, the purpose of the sanction will not be to punish a legal subject who has voluntarily broken the law; its role will be to reduce as much as possible […] the risk of criminality represented by the individual in question" (EEF, 225).

However, I am skeptical about the claim that we, as a society, are willing or even able to conceive of a "cause" that is not at the same time "a moral fault", especially in cases where a person is harmed as the result of the action of another. This may be the price "we have to *pay* for having been *Christians* for two thousand years".[235] The understanding of causality that we have inherited from Christianity has "solidified" in language and acquired a "necessity" and

[235] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 11[148], 229.

"obviousness" that results in a "deep-rooted compulsion to interpret morally".[236] Foucault's analyses of the nineteenth-century concepts of madness and crime seem to provide evidence in support of my objection. To mention just one example, in "Chapter One: The Birth of Psychiatric Power" we saw that, according to modern psychiatry, at the "core" of madness there is always an "unacceptable desire", an excessive pride or moral fault that is what "really makes it exists as madness" (ECF-PP, 177). So even if the madman can no longer considered responsible for his madness as illness, he is still at fault for harboring, expressing, and not correcting the immoral will that is the true cause of his sickness. Moreover, it seems to me that even when the harm done to someone or something cannot be attributed to a human agent, as is the case in "natural disasters", the traditional explanation in terms of a punishment for our sins sent by God has been replaced with another that is equally moralistic and anthropocentric: we are still to be blamed, but now our guilt is interpreted as the result of our ruthless exploitation and continuous violations of "Nature" or "Mother Earth", so we have to "save" the planet from ourselves.

By the end of the nineteenth century, psychiatric power had succeeded in establishing itself as "the general body for the defense of society against the dangers that undermine it from within" (ECF-AB, 316) by presenting itself as the sole possessor of the hermeneutics that would allow us to detect and neutralize the core of "dangerousness-criminality" hidden in the depths of "abnormal" individuals. Through the notions of degeneration and heredity, the "Psy-function" gave rise to a new racism, different from the "traditional, historical […] ethnic [...] essentially anti-Semitic" one. It is "racism against the abnormal, against individuals who, as carriers of a condition […] or any defect whatsoever, may […] transmit to their heirs the unpredictable consequences of the evil […] the non-normal, that they carry within them" (Ibid., 316 and 317). The main function

[236] Ibid., section 2[131], 86.

of this "internal", "biologico-social [...] neoracism […] specific to the twentieth century" is to appeal to fear in order to justify the need to evaluate or assess the "abnormality" of every member of society; the threat is no longer "the other race […] that came from elsewhere" but a kind of "subrace" composed of those who deviate from the norm defined by the "superrace", a "threat" that is "constantly being re-created in and by the social fabric" (ECF-SMD, 61). It is the expansion and generalization of pastoral practices of government through psychiatric power that makes possible the emergence of this "state racism [...] a biological and centralized racism" (Ibid., 83) that society directs "against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization" (Ibid., 62). Foucault insists that "even when psychiatry has got rid of this racism or when it did not activate these forms of racism […] it nonetheless always essentially functioned as a mechanism and body of social defense […] To adopt the terms of the nineteenth century […] as a hunt for "degenerates" (ECF-AB, 317). That's why he considers the psychiatrists as "the descendant of the inquisitor [...] the practice through which one used to pick out a certain number of people, by which one suspected them, isolated them, interrogated them, buy which one 'identified' them as witches – this technique of power, used by the Inquisition, has been found again (after transformation) in psychiatric practice" (EFL, 196).

The notion of "degeneration"[237] emerges in the second half of the nineteenth century as an instrument for the "medicalization" or "pathologization" of forms of conduct that deviate from the norms defined by morality. It allows psychiatry to turn any manifestation of immorality into "a

[237] Foucault informs us that this concept was formulated in 1857 by B. A. Morel in his *Traité des dégénérescences",* at the same time as J. P. Falret was criticizing the notion of monomania and devising the notion of "condition", Baillarger was introducing "neurological models of abnormal behavior", and P. Lucas was exploring the domain of "pathological heredity" (ECF-AB, 315 and 321).

peril of pathological dimensions for society, and, eventually, for the whole human species" (EEF, 223). The "degenerate" is "a danger" because he can neither be "cured" nor "reached by any kind of penalty" (ECF-AB, 317, 318). He is "the abnormal mythologically – or, if you prefer, scientifically – medicalized […] set in place in the tree of heredity" (Ibid., 315). According to the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, The theory of "degenerescence [sic]" explains not only how "a heredity that is burdened with various maladies" ends up "producing a sexual pervert", but also how "a sexual perversion" inevitably causes "the depletion of one's line of descent […] The series composed of perversion-heredity-degenerescence formed the solid nucleus of the new technologies of sex" (EHS1, 118).

With regard to the "theory of psychiatric heredity", it established a kind of unlimited causality by virtue of which any "illness", "vice", or "defect" could produce "any other [...] illness [...] in descendants [...] The causal permissiveness of heredity makes it possible to establish the most fantastic […] the most supple hereditary networks […] heredity functions […] as the fantastic body of physical or functional behavioral abnormalities that is at the origin of the appearance of the 'condition'" (ECF-AB, 314). This implies putting sex "in a position of biological responsibility" with regard to the species. The medicine of perversions and the programs of eugenics were the two great innovations of the technology of sex of the second half of the nineteenth century" (EHS1, 118). Recuperating the biblical notion of a divine punishment that extends to several generations,[238] psychiatric discourse argues that "indisciplined and irregular

[238] To mention just a few examples: "Do not bow down to any idol of worship it, because I am the LORD your God and I tolerate no rivals. I bring punishment on those who hate me and on their descendants down to the third and fourth generation" (Ex 20.5). "I keep my promise of thousands of generations and forgive evil and sin; but I will not fail to punish children and grandchildren to the third and fourth generation for the sins of their parents" (Ex 34.7). "No one born out of wedlock or any descendant of such a person, even in the tenth generation, may be included among the LORD'S people" (Dt 23.2). "The punishment for their murders will fall on Joab and on his descendants forever. But the LORD will always give success to David's descendants who sit on his throne" (1 K 2.33). "Have you noticed how Ahab has humbled himself before me? Since he has done this, I will not bring disaster on him during his lifetime; it will be during his son's lifetime that I will bring disaster on Ahab's family" (1K 21.29). "And now Naaman's disease

sexuality" not only has pernicious effects at the level of the individual body but also for "the population […] anyone who has been sexually debauched is assumed to have a heredity. Their descendants […] will be affected for generations" (ECF-SMD, 252).

This "remoralization" permits psychiatry to claim the "right to intervene in familial sexuality". As the technology of "the healthy or unhealthy, useful or dangerous [...] marriage", it investigates all the "aberrations" caused by "a nonreproductive function of the sexual instinct [...] the uncoupling of the sexual instinct from reproduction" (ECF-AB, 315, 287). Foucault analyzes two more "privileged psychiatric objects" that have played a key role in the pathologization or psychologization of the immoral or deviant. The first is the notion of "condition", understood as "a background [...] abnormal basis [...] that differs from the state of health but nevertheless is not an illness" but rather "a sort of permanent causal background" which "can produce absolutely anything, at any time [...] both psychical [...] and psychological illnesses" (Ibid., 311, 312). The second is the term "syndrome", which constitutes "a partial and stable configuration referring to a

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will come upon you, and you and your descendants will have it forever!" (2K 5.27). "Let the slaughter begin! The sons of this king will die because of their ancestor's sins" (Is 14.21). "This is what the sovereign LORD says: "Bring a mob to terrorize them and rob them. Let the mob stone them and attack them with swords, kill their children, and burn down their houses. Throughout the land I will put a stop to immorality, as a warning to every woman not to commit adultery as they did" (Ez 23.46-48). "I will not show mercy to her children; they are the children of a shameless prostitute" (Ho 2.4). All these references are from the "Old Testament" included in the *Good News Bible. The Bible in Today's English Version* (New York: American Bible Society, 1976). To mention just an instance from the "New Testament": "And I gave her space to repent of her fornication; and she repented not. Behold, I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit adultery with her into great tribulation, except they repent of their deeds. And I will kill her children with death; and all the churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts: and I will give unto every one of you according to your works" (Rev 2.21-23). Here I am quoting from *the KJV Keystone Large Print New Testament with Psalms.* (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 2000). The version included in the *Good News Bible* has replaced "her children" with "her followers". It seems to me that there is a tendency among Christians to celebrate the New Testament as a universal message of love and forgiveness and ignore or at least distance themselves from the first part of their sacred book because of what they perceive as its "violence" and "crudeness". However, I think that they should consider not only that for all its "brutality" the Old Testament does not resort to the threat of hell or eternal punishment after death, but also that Jesus himself made his position and role clear in several statements like the following: "Do not think that I have come to do away with the Law of Moses and the teachings of the prophets. I have not come to do away with them, but to make their teachings come true. Remember that as long as heaven and earth last, not the least point nor the smallest detail of the Law will be done away with- not until the end of all things. So then, whoever disobeys even the least important of the commandments and teaches others to do the same, will be least in the Kingdom of heaven. On the other hand, whoever obeys the Law and teaches others to do the same, will be great in the Kingdom of heaven" (Mt 5.17-19).

general condition of abnormality [...] the consolidation of eccentricities into well-specified, autonomous, and recognizable syndromes [...] in the second half or last third of the nineteenth century" (ECF-AB, 311, 310).

As I anticipated in "Chapter One: The Birth of Psychiatric Power", Foucault argues that between 1840 and 1870-75 there was a "generalization [...] extension and growth of psychiatric power and knowledge". The "source" of this "almost indefinite extension of its domain of intervention" – from the asylum to the constitution of the "Psy-function" – was the theory of the instincts. This transformation was "brought about through [...] three processes, all of which involved the insertion of psychiatry within mechanisms of power that are external to it" (ECF-AB, 139).

The first is "the interlocking of psychiatry and administrative regulation [...] the administrative apparatus". It has two major effects: On the one hand, psychiatry no longer has to prove the connection between madness and danger, because now it is the administration itself that establishes this link. On the other, psychiatry is "consecrated" as a medical or scientific discipline- a specialized branch that is concerned with "public hygiene". As evidence of these changes in the French context Foucault refers to the 1838 law, the piece of legislation that introduced "the compulsory hospitalization order", that is, "confinement in a psychiatric hospital on the order of the administration". In the former procedure of the "interdiction", the administration's decision was made after asking psychiatry about "the condition of the patient's consciousness or free will" and therefore once it was determined that the individual suffered from "dementia" or an "alienation [...] at the level of consciousness" that made him "incapable as a legal subject" and therefore no longer "a subject of rights". However, according to the new hospitalization order, what justifies intervention and confinement in "a specialized establishment [...] set apart for the mentally ill" is

"the possibility of disturbance, disorder, and danger [...] at the level of behavior". In other words, an assessment of the probability that the individual in question may be "capable of disturbing public order or endangering public safety", becoming a "danger either to itself or to others" (ECF-AB, 151, 140, and 141).

As for the second process, it refers to "the new form of the family's demand for psychiatry". The family becomes both an avid "consumer of psychiatry" and its main field of study. From then on, anything that goes against the "normally and normatively good framework of family feelings" can and will be pathologized (Ibid., 151).

Finally, the third process indicates the emergence of "a political demand for psychiatry". It is "called upon to provide what could be called a discriminant […] a psychiatric discrimination [...] that enables one to distinguish between good and bad political regimes [...] groups, ideologies, and historical processes" (Ibid., 151, 152). In other words, psychology provides the criteria to decide if a political movement should be supported, ignored, or discredited and persecuted. "Stability and social immobility" become symptoms of the good mental health of the collectivity (ECF-AB, 156).

In a radio interview broadcast on October 3, 1975, Foucault formulated the following diagnosis of a present that is still ours: "aren't all powers currently connected to one specific power, that of normalization? Aren't the powers […] the techniques of normalization, a kind of instrument found just about everywhere today, in the educational institution, the penal institution, in shops, factories and administrations, as a kind of general instrument […] which makes possible the domination and subjection of individuals? (EFL, 139, 140). It was not until the next year, however, that he introduced the notion of "biopower" or "biopolitics" and included it in his characterization of the "normalizing society". Henceforth, the latter will not be just "a sort of

generalized disciplinary society", but rather the result of combining disciplinary and bio technologies of power.

Whereas the disciplines focus on "the individual body" and were "established at the end of the seventeenth and in the course of the eighteenth century",[239] biopower emerged "in the second half of the eighteenth century" and its target is "man as a living being" (ECF-SMD, 242), or the "population", which is "not exactly society", but "the biological processes of man as species […] collective phenomena which have […] economic and political effects" and need to be "not disciplined, but regularized" (Ibid., 245, 246, and 247). Biopower is "nondisciplinary" but it "does not exclude disciplinary technology". Instead, it uses that technology by "infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques […] it has a different bearing area, and makes use of different instruments". Foucault acknowledges that both share the same goal, to control "a multiplicity of men", but they do it in different ways: whereas the disciplines "dissolve" that multitude into "individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance" and "punished" if necessary, biopolitics approaches it as "a global mass that is affected by overall processes". So "after a first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we have a second [...] that is not individualizing but massifying […] no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but […] a biopolitics of the human race [...] power has taken control of life in general- with the body as one pole and the population as the other" (Ibid., 242, 243, and 253). The domain of intervention of this new "power of regularization" (ECF-SMD, 247) includes reproduction, birth and mortality rates, accidents, illnesses, etc. To deal with these phenomena, biopower resorts not only to the organizations that had traditionally taken care of those issues – "charitable institutions" that are

[239] In 1973 he had located the "founding" of the disciplinary society "at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth" (EEW3, 52).

still "under church control" – but also to "more subtle, more rational mechanisms: insurance, individual and collective savings, safety measures, and so on" (Ibid., 244).

In 1973 he had already anticipated that "a general discipline of existence" was introduced "in the form of institutions apparently created for protection and security […] the creation […] especially in the 1840s and the 1850s, of saving banks and relief funds" (EEW3, 81). Thus, "security-consciousness" (EEF, 224) is one of the main instruments used by normalizing societies in order to justify the implementation of disciplinary mechanisms for surveillance, control, and correction. In order to reduce accidents and risks, compensate for them, and "establish or maintain an equilibrium […] an average" (ECF-SMD, 246). Biopower needs "continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms" (EHS1, 144) that are in fact "security mechanisms" whose goal is to protect both the population in general and each individual in particular. However, the "killing"[240] of specific individuals is justified as long as they represent a "biological threat" to the specie or race, one that somehow prevents its "improvement" or leads to its "decline" (ECF-SMD, 256). Beginning in the nineteenth century, "sovereignty's old right- to take life or let live" was not exactly replaced but rather "complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does […] permeate it. This is […] the power to "make live" and "let die" (Ibid., 241), "to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death" (EHS1, 138).

It is in the name of what we have been brought to perceive as our own "safety" and "protection" that biopower "inscribes [...] in the mechanisms of the state" (ECF-SMD, 254) the new kind of racism that "the psychological function" had brought into being: "In a normalizing

[240] "When I say "killing", I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people […] expulsion, rejection, and so on" (ECF-SMD, 256).

society […] racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable […] Once the state functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify killing by the state" (Ibid., 256).

The first volume of the *History of Sexuality* offers an account of the emergence of this new power over "life in general" (Ibid., 253) which is very similar to the one we find in that year's lectures at the *Collège*. The only difference is that the term "biopower" is now used to designate not just one but the two components of that power or "bipolar technology- anatomic and biological": The "era" of biopolitics began in the seventeenth century, when power "gave itself the function of administering life [...] its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply [...] to put life in order". Throughout the classical age, this "biopower [...] evolved in two basic forms […] the disciplines [...] subjugation of bodies and the control [...] regulations of the population […] the two directions […] still appeared clearly separated in the eighteenth century […] [they] were not to be joined at the level of a speculative discourse, but in the form of concrete arrangements [...] that would go to make up the great technology of power of the nineteenth century: the deployment of sexuality would be one of them, and one of the most important" (EHS1, 139, 140). Furthermore, Foucault holds that one of the consequences of this "development of bio-power" is "the growing importance assumed by the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law". So in *La Volonté de savoir* the normalizing society is considered to be "the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life": the law "operates more and more as a norm, and [...] the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory" (Ibid., 144).

In an interview conducted that same year,[241] he doesn't mention the term biopower but makes a clear reference to its object: "at the same time, these new [disciplinary] techniques of power needed to grapple with the phenomena of population, in short to undertake the administration, control and direction of the accumulation of men […] hence there arise the problems of demography, public health, hygiene, housing conditions, longevity and fertility" (EPK, 125).

It seems to me that according to Foucault's understanding of pastoral power, managing or administering the life of both individuals and populations was its objective from the very moment of its institutionalization as a church. The threat of eternal punishment was just the way in which this control over the living was justified. The same as biopower, the Christian pastorate deals with "live individuals" (ERC, 141) or "living beings" (EHS1, 143). The strategic value of both the Christian flesh and modern sex-sexuality as mechanisms of control lies in the fact that they designate "the precise point where the disciplinary and the regulatory, the body and population, are articulated" (ECF-SMD, 252), "the point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of the population" (EPK, 125). So it was pastoral power that provided the first example of how "the norm can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize" (ECF-SMD, 253). The pastor has to "keep watch" and take care of both "each and every sheep" and "the whole flock". It is a technology designed for the "management" of "*omnes et singulatim*", "everyone together and each individually", "all and each" (ERC, 138, 139).

In order to understand the history of Western Christianity as "a political force" we need to do what Foucault recommends that political theory in general should carry out as its most urgent

[241] That is to say, in 1976, when he gave the Course entitled *"Society Must be Defended"* (From January 7 to March 17) and *La Volonté de savoir* was published (in December). The interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino took place in June.

task: "to cut off the king's head" (EPK, 121). In fact, the originality and novelty of his analysis of "religious power" as "pastoral power" lies mainly in the fact that he doesn't resort to the model of sovereignty in order to present it as a purely "judicial and negative" (Ibid.) practice defined by law and prohibition.[242] Instead, he exposes its "positive" effects as a disciplinary and regulatory technology of government. Furthermore, if his texts insists on the importance of acknowledging the productivity of power – instead of limiting themselves to uncritically applying and thus reinforcing the traditional distinctions between the order of the political or public and the sphere of the religious or private – that's because, as Foucault himself puts it, "what we have called 'political life' since the nineteenth century is […] the manner in which power gives itself over to representation. Power is neither there, nor is that how it functions" (EFL, 220).

Foucault claims that disciplinary power is the "opposite"[243] of sovereignty and that the emergence of the former "should logically have led to the complete disappearance of the great juridical edifice of the theory of sovereignty" (ECF-SMD, 36). But it didn't, and he offers two reasons to explain why. The first is that the discourse of sovereignty had been "a permanent critical instrument…used against the monarchy and against all the obstacles that stood in the way of the development of the disciplinary society". As for the second reason, he affirms that "the theory of sovereignty […] made it possible to superimpose on the mechanisms of discipline a system of right that concealed its mechanisms and erased the element of domination involved in discipline, and which, finally, guaranteed that everyone could exercise his or her own sovereign rights thanks to

[242] This way of understanding power is what leads us to believe that "all these voices […] repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does [...] are speaking to us of freedom" (EHS1, 60).

[243] "a power […] exercised through constant surveillance and not in discontinuous fashion […] a type of power that presupposed a closely meshed grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign […] the exact, point-for-point opposite of the mechanics of power that the theory of sovereignty described [...] [disciplinary power] can […] no longer be transcribed in terms of sovereignty" (ECF-SMD, 35, 36).

the sovereignty of the state. In other words, juridical systems, no matter whether they were theories or codes, allowed the democratization of sovereignty, and the establishment of a public right articulated with collective sovereignty at the very time when, to the extent that, and because the democratization of sovereignty was heavily ballasted by the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion [...] the two necessarily go together [...] a right of sovereignty and a mechanics of discipline. It is [...] between these two limits that power is exercised" (ECF-SMD, 37). That's why he warns us not to be deceived by "all the constitutions framed […] since the French revolution, the codes […] the continual and clamorous legislative activity: these were the forms that made an essentially normalizing power acceptable" (EHS1, 144). In other words, power conceived as an external limit imposed on a sovereign freedom is "the general form of its acceptability […] the code according to which power presents itself and prescribes that we conceive of it when, in fact, the juridical model is "incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of representation" (Ibid., 86, 88, and 89). Therefore, in our struggle against the power of normalization resorting to the "theory of the sovereign rights of the individual" would be useless. Instead, we should be "looking for a new right that is both anti-disciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty" (ECF-SMD, 40). A non-individual, "relational" form of right that would grant "recognition in an institutional sense for the relations of one individual to another individual […] imagining how [...] new relational possibilities [...] can be validated by society and benefit from the same advantages as the only […] relations […] which are […] recognized: marriage and the family [...] we should try to imagine and create a new relational right that permits all possible relations to exist […] We live in a relational world that institutions have considerably impoverished" (EEW1, 162, 158).

At this point, I would like to go back to Foucault's 1978 description of the new type of power introduced by the pastorate that I referred to at the beginning of this chapter. My goal is to

show how the characterization that he offered in the Tokyo lecture also applies to the "discipline of normalization" (ECF-AB, 52) that we find in contemporary Western societies like ours. I will focus on three aspects or elements: salvation, obedience, and truth.

To begin with, there is an obligatory search for salvation as normalization: Foucault reminds us that "Christian societies did not allow individuals the freedom to say, 'I do not want to seek my salvation'. Each individual was required to seek his salvation: 'you must do everything that is required in order for you to be saved and we will punish you here in this world if you don't do what [we say] is necessary to be saved'" (ERC, 124). This process of penitence and reform under the direction of the pastor has been replaced by an equally compulsory normalization. In so-called "secular" societies the agents of normalization assume the role that previously belonged to the pastor: prescribing and "enforcing" (for the individual's sake, in the name of what is "good" for her or him) an individualized path to their salvation-normality.

Secondly, one cannot achieve this obligatory salvation by oneself, but "only if one accepts the authority of another […] this […] means that each of his actions will […] have to be known […] by the pastor, who has the authority to say 'a thing is well done like this […] it must not be done differently'" (Ibid.). Foucault explains that "this […] is still very important, and very new […] never in Greek or Roman antiquity would one have had the idea to demand of someone a total, absolute, and unconditional obedience in relation to someone else but that is effectively what happened with the appearance of […] the pastorate […] because […] in Christianity […] one does not obey to reach a certain result […] the absolute honor is precisely to be obedient. Obedience must lead to a state of obedience [...] one is in a system of generalized obedience [...] I am humble: this means that I […] recognize in this will of the other the very will of God" (Ibid.).

As it was the case with the pastor, the psychologist is in a position to "impose his will upon individuals […] without the existence of […] a law" (Ibid.). After all, "to stop being mad is to agree to be obedient" (ECF-PP, 165). The main instrument of disciplinary power, both Christian and secularized, is the examination, "a constant supervision of individuals by someone who exercised power over them" (EEW3, 59). Allowing this permanent surveillance "to function automatically" (EDP, 129) in us is one of the inescapable preconditions that we have to fulfil if we want to enjoy the benefits of normality, including the "prerogative to *promise*" as the prize for our becoming "*reliable, regular, necessary*"[244] (a "right" that allows us to impose on others the duty of remaining the same), and the "acquisition" of more "reality" or "being", which entails a not inconsiderable increase in our probability of survival, a firmer footing or stronger hold on existence. The "combination of moral and social control" (EEW3, 77) that the technique of the examination offers is also provided by what Foucault describes as "the panoptic schema". That's why, even if he was aware of the scandalized or disdainful reaction that his words were going to provoke on the "historians of Philosophy" as the knightly Keepers of the Sacred Canon, he explicitly claimed that "Bentham is more important for our society than Kant or Hegel […] It was he who […] defined, and described in the most exact manner the forms of power in which we live" (Ibid., 58). A certain type of "knowledge by individuals over themselves and with respect to themselves" (ERC, 126) becomes a moral requirement necessary to achieve both salvation and normalization. A "will to know" about ourselves that is based on the assumption that we contain "a hidden meaning to be deciphered, [an] essence that constitutes [...] [our] intelligible nervure" (ECF-WTK, 203). Following in Nietzsche's footsteps, Foucault describes this (metonymical) knowledge as a "malice" that goes "behind the surface of things to seek out the secret, to try to

[244] Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, "Second essay", section I, 35 and 36.

extract an essence behind the appearance […] it is necessary to see the murderous relentlessness of knowledge. But […] this is never rewarded with access to being or the essence, but gives rise to new appearances" (Ibid., 206). Trying to discover our hidden truth or true self implies doing "violence" to ourselves; it exemplifies what he calls "the insertion of truth as morality" (Ibid., 213). Foucault introduces a distinction between the "confinement" practiced in the classical age – which follows the "model for the control of individuals" that he describes as "the exclusion of lepers" (ECF-AB: 44) and is intended to "exclude marginal [...] individuals from the social circle or reinforce marginality" (EEW3, 78, 79) – and the "sequestration" that appeared in the nineteenth century. This is based on "the inclusion of plague victims" and its function is "inclusion through exclusion" or the individualization of the excluded (ECF-AB, 44).

As for the last feature of the pastorate according to the Tokyo lecture, Foucault maintains that this form of power "brought with it a […] series of techniques and procedures concerned with the truth and the production of truth. The Christian pastor teaches […] but […] he is also a master of truth in another sense: The Christian pastor […] must know […] everything that his sheep do […] at each moment; but he must also know what goes on inside the soul […] the most profound secrets of the individual. this knowledge of the interior of individuals is absolutely required for the practice of the Christian pastorate […] it means that the pastor will have at his disposal means of analysis […] of detection of what happens; but also that the Christian will be obliged to tell his pastor everything that occurs in […] his soul […] obliged to have recourse to a practice specific […] to Christianity; exhaustive and permanent confession, the Christian must confess without cease everything that occurs within himself to someone who will be charged to direct his conscience, and the exhaustive confession will […] produce a truth which […] was not known by the pastor but was not known either by the subject himself […] this production of truth extends

throughout the guidance of the soul […] [it] will […] constitute the bond between the shepherd and [...] each member of his flock […] the production of interior truth […] of subjective truth, is a fundamental element in the practice of the pastor" (ERC, 125).

The confession is "a form of knowledge-power" (EHS1, 70), "a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship [...] by virtue of the power structure immanent in […] the confessional discourse […] [it] cannot come from above , as in the *ars erotica*, through the sovereign will of a master, but rather from below, as an obligatory act of speech which under some imperious compulsion breaks the bonds of discretion or forgetfulness […] the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing; not in the one who knows and answers, but in the one questions and is not supposed to know" (Ibid., 61, 62).

As he had already pointed out in *Abnormal*, "with the council of Trent, around the middle of the sixteenth century, there emerged, alongside the ancient techniques of the confessional, a new series of procedures developed within the ecclesiastical institution for the purpose of training and purifying ecclesiastical personnel. Detailed techniques were elaborated for use in seminaries and monasteries, techniques of discursive rendition of daily life, of self-examination […] direction of conscience and regulation of the relationship between director and directed". What is new in this text is that Foucault talks about the process that "sought to inject […] this [new] technology […] into society as a whole […] and […] the move was directed from the top downwards" (EPK, 200). "In-depth Christianization", "disciplinarization", and "governmentalization" are the names that he gave to that process, which resulted in a significant "increase in control over individuals by the mechanisms of sermons, confessions, direction of conscience [...] the establishment of a

widespread, subtle analytical power that defines individuals as individuals and constitutes them as individuals at the level of their bodies" (EFL, 165, 166).

As part of the movement of secularization as generalization that began in the sixteenth century, the practice of confession "gradually detached itself from the sacrament of penance, and via the guidance of souls and the direction of conscience – the *ars artium* – emigrated towards pedagogy […] and psychiatry […] a dissemination […] of procedures of confession; a multiple localization of their constraint, a widening of their domain" (EHS1, 68). It has taken different forms, such as "interrogations, consultations, autobiographical narratives", or "letters". In the eighteenth century, when "the direction of conscience and the confession have lost the essential force of their role, one finds brutal medical techniques emerging, which consist in simply demanding that the subject tell his or her story, or narrate it in writing" (EPK, 215).

According to Foucault, Christianity's main contribution to the history of sexuality did not consist in introducing "new prohibitions", but rather in creating "new techniques […] new mechanisms of power […] for inculcating […] imposing" a series of moral imperatives that had already been accepted by most of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire (ERC, 120, 121).[245] With the words "techniques" and "mechanisms" he is referring to the "correlate" required by the exercise of pastoral power: "the constitution of […] a self-consciousness perpetually alert to its own weaknesses […] temptations […] to its own flesh […] the technique of taking conscience [...] of alerting oneself to oneself, with respect to one's […] flesh […] the subjectivity itself of the body" (ERC., 126). The flesh-concupiscence is the "instrument" or "apparatus of subjection"

[245] Drawing on the work of his friend the historian Paul Veyne, Foucault argues that "Christianity is […] not responsible for this series of prohibitions, disqualifications, and limitations of sexuality for which it was often said to be responsible. Polygamy, pleasure outside marriage, valorization of pleasure, and indifference toward children had already essentially disappeared from the Roman world before Christianity, and there was no longer any but a very small elite […] who did not practice these principles: for the most part, they had already been acquired" (ERC, 121).

(EPK, 219) that allowed the pastorate to introduce and enforce a change in "the manner in which [...] we become conscious of ourselves" (Ibid., 129). In other words, a new relation to ourselves marked by guilt, self-suspicion, and the fear of punishment;[246] a new reflexivity that requires the objectification of the self by the self and marks the beginning of the Christian and modern experience of the subject.[247]

Long before both Veyne and Foucault, Nietzsche had already criticized the view that "it was the *corruption* of paganism that paved the way for Christianity". For him, what prepared the terrain for the institutionalization of the pastorate, the condition that made possible the emergence of this new type of power was "the weakening and *moralization* of the man of antiquity […] The reinterpretation of natural drives as *vices* had already gone before".[248] This text by Nietzsche is probably one of those passages which provided Foucault with what he described as "the best the most effective, the most pertinent of models that one can draw upon" (EEW3, 5). Thus, he will hold that "a way of life, in large part of Stoic origin and supported by the social and ideological structures of the Roman Empire, had begun […] to inculcate" (ERC, 121) the three principles of

[246] "Mistrust of oneself, fear for one's salvation, and trembling before God's will" (ECF-CT, 335).

[247] The Christian flesh-concupiscence is "something of which one had to be suspicious" because "it always introduced possibilities of temptation and fall in the individual" (ERC, 126).

[248] This quote is part of section 9[22], included in the *Writings from the Late Notebooks* (145) and entitled "The great *lies* in history". The other "great lie" that Nietzsche mentions there is that "the corruption of the Church" was "the cause of the Reformation." Foucault also took this one into consideration. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" he explains why the Reformation took place "precisely where the Church as least corrupt", by saying that "force contends against itself […] not only in the intoxication of an abundance, which allows it to divide itself, but at the moment when it weakens. Force reacts against its growing lassitude and gains strength; it imposes limits, inflicts torments and mortifications; it masks these actions as a higher morality and, in exchange, regains its strength. In this manner, the ascetic ideal was born […] This also describes the movement in which the Reformation arose […] German Catholicism, in the sixteenth century, retained enough strength to turn against itself, to mortify its own body and history, and to spiritualize itself into a pure religion of conscience" (EEW2, 376, 377). To give another turn of the screw, I would argue that in the text I just quoted Foucault is replicating the argument that Nietzsche had developed to explain the phenomenon of Christian guilt: "Guilt is always sought wherever there is failure; for failure brings with it a depression of spirits against which the sole remedy is […] a new excitation of the *feeling of power*- and this is to be discovered in the *condemnation* of the 'guilty' […] To condemn oneself can also be a means of restoring the feeling of strength after a defeat" (*Daybreak*, section 140, 88).

monogamy, reproduction, and the disqualification of pleasure. What pastoral power did was to reinforce those principles by giving them a new meaning.[249] The "subjection of the individual to himself" (ERC, 126), a "rule" whose Stoic beginnings Foucault will study in detail in his later work, will be "subjected" to a new "interpretation" by the Christian pastorate; one that replaces the goal of self-mastery[250] with obedience as renunciation of one's will.

In his way of rewriting the history of sexual morality we have another example of Foucault making it possible for Nietzsche "to come [...] to life again",[251] or even to "come again to the world as a Frenchman".[252] According to *The Gay Science*, the Christian pastorate appropriated "a way of life" that was "already in place, though alongside other ways of life and without any consciousness of its special worth. The significance, the originality of the religion-founder usually lies in his seeing and selecting this way of life, in his *guessing* for the first time what it can be used for and

[249] "These two notions, that sex is at the heart of all pleasure and that its nature requires that it should be restricted and devoted to procreation, are not of Christian but of Stoic origin; and Christianity was obliged to incorporate them when it sought to integrate itself in the State structure of the Roman Empire in which Stoicism was virtually the universal philosophy" (EPK, 191).

[250] For the Stoics, "the experience of the self is not a discovering of a truth hidden inside [...] but an attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one's available freedom" (EEW1, 276).

[251] In *Human, All Too Human* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) Nietzsche had written: "[Do] we have to deny those who come later the right to reanimate the works of earlier times with their own souls? No, for it is only if we bestow upon them our soul that they can continue to live: it is only *our* blood that constrains them to speak to *us*. A truly 'historical' rendition would be ghostly speech before ghosts.- We honor the great artists of the past less through that unfruitful awe which allows every word, every note, to lie where it has been put than we do through active endeavors to help them to come repeatedly to life again […] 'Well, yes! That is neither I nor not-I but some third thing- and if it is not exactly *right*, it is nonetheless right in its own way'" (Book II, section 126, 242 and 243). Therefore, Foucault appears to be following his desires when he argues that "the only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest […] I am tired of people studying him only to produce the same kind of commentaries that are written on Hegel or Mallarme" (EPK, 53, 54). In the same line, he claims that he "can't help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea, to life: it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind […] It would multiply not judgments but signs of existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them sometimes- all the better […] I'd like a criticism of scintillating leaps of the imagination. It would not be sovereign or dressed in red. It would bear the lightning of possible storms" (EEW1, 323).

[252] In the draft of a letter that Nietzsche wrote to Jean Bourdeau in December 17 1988 we can read "it is high time that I come again to the world as a Frenchman" (cited by Alan D. Schrift in his book *Nietzsche's French Legacy. A Genealogy of Poststructuralism* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 1).

how it can be interpreted. Jesus (or Paul) […] discovered the life of the small people in the roman province, a humble, virtuous, depressed life: he explained it, he put the highest meaning and value into it – and thereby also the courage to despise every other way of life […] the clandestine subterranean self-confidence that grows and grows and is finally ready to 'overcome the world' (i.e. Rome and the upper classes throughout the empire)".[253] In Foucault's reading of Nietzsche, interpretation is not "the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin", but rather "the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules […] the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history" (EEW2, 378).

The deployment of the flesh-sexuality allows the agents of pastoral power, ecclesiastical or secularized, "to analyze individuality and […] master it" (Ibid., 146) by holding up "from deep within us a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves […] It is though sex – an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality – that each of us has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility […] and to his identity" (EHS1, 157, 155 and 156). Both the Christian hermeneutics of the self and its inheritor, modern psychology, make the flesh-sexuality appear as "the privileged place where our deepest 'truth' is read and expressed" (EFL, 214) when, in fact, it is a "historical construct" whose "formative nucleus" was "first, the practice of penance, then that of the examination of conscience and spiritual direction" (EHS1, 105, 107). Foucault explains that at the end of the eighteenth century, sexuality "escaped the ecclesiastical institution", but "without being truly independent of the thematics of sin […] pedagogy, medicine, and

[253] *The Gay Science,* Book V, section 353, 211. For a similar view, see Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow's *Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 262 and Alexander Nehamas's *The Art of Living* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 48.

economics […] made sex not only a secular concern but a concern of the state as well […] in each of these [three] areas, it went back to methods that had […] been formed by Christianity" (Ibid., 116, 118). Similarly, we still seem to believe that "confession frees, but power reduces one to silence; truth does not belong to the order of power, but shares an original affinity with freedom" (EHS1, 60). Power does not work by "reducing speech to silence" (EFL, 157). On the contrary, "it makes people act and speak" (Ibid., 291), it grants them recognition and protection as long as they never stop resuming "the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself […] a truth which the very form of confession holds out like a shimmering mirage". The truthful confession, the discourse of truth about ourselves that we have to produce and maintain as what makes us identical to ourselves is "at the heart of the procedures of individualization" (EHS1, 59).

We are still "a singularly confessing society", one that continually demands public confessions- accompanied by the appropriate display of repentance and contrition – on the part of those in need of proving their "authenticity" or "humanity". The public seems really comfortable in its position as confessor-judge with the power to "forgive" and "condemn". As Judith Butler has argued, the act of "coming out of the closet", as the public confession that "compels individuals to articulate their sexual peculiarity […] as an individual secret" (Ibid., 61), offers the promise of a final transparency and communion that can only be fulfilled at the price of an unrelenting self-monitoring. Foucault, on the contrary, insisted that the goal is not "to discover that we are homosexuals" but rather to use sex as "a possibility for creative life", for inventing "new forms of relationships, new forms of love" (EFL, 382). In other words, we should prevent identity from becoming "the problem of sexual existence [...] people think that they have to uncover their "own identity", and that […] [it] has to become the law, the principle, the code of their existence [...] the [...] question they ask is "Does this thing conform to my identity?" […] [sexual] identity […] has

been very useful [politically], but it limits us and I think we have a right to be free […] If we are asked to relate to the question of identity, it has to be an identity to our unique selves. But the relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones of identity, rather they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation" (Ibid., 386). So even if Foucault knows very well that "it is important […] to have the possibility – and the right – to choose your own sexuality", he considers that we "have to go a step further", in the direction of making possible "new forms of life, relationships […] Not only do we have to […] affirm ourselves as an identity but as a creative force [...] the creation of new possibilities of pleasure […] the desexualization of pleasure" (Ibid., 383 and 384).

With the term "truth" Foucault refers to "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power are attached to the true". He makes it clear that for him "it is not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays" (EPK, 132). The reason why the truth about ourselves "has been given this value, thus placing us absolutely under its thrall" is that it constitutes a very effective instrument of government. A "political history" of the production of the truth about ourselves (EPPC, 107, 112) would trace the genealogy of "this will to truth, this petition to know [...] this will to knowledge [...] that for so many centuries has kept us enthralled by sex" (EHS1, 65, 79). The Christian flesh and modern sex-sexuality allow "relations of power to function in the finest and most intricate elements of the body and its conduct" (EFL, 167) by presenting themselves as the "meaning that pervades our conduct and our existence, in spite of ourselves [...] the fragment of darkness that we each carry within us: a general signification, a universal secret, an omnipresent cause" (EHS1, 69).

One of Foucault's main concerns in tracing the genealogy of modern sexuality is to find out "how it comes about that people are told that the secret of their truth lies in their sex" (EPK, 214); the questions "why did that work?", "how did that hold up?" (Ibid., 209) imply an approach to the problematic of power in terms of strategies and tactics. And it is in response to those questions that he proposes that what made it possible "to subject everyone" to the rule of the flesh-sex-sexuality, was making them believe that "their liberation was at stake" (EHS1, 80). A "liberation" that in the case of the Christian flesh takes the form of the eternal life of the soul released from its material prison, whereas for modern sexuality it means freeing "a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power that exhaust itself trying to subdue it […] a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover" (Ibid.,103, 105).

By presenting itself as the "universal secret" that has to be carefully examined and watched over in order to either master its obscure movements and save our soul, or free our imprisoned nature,[254] sexuality has constituted the subject as an object for itself and for others. The injunction to find and decipher the "truth about ourselves" is what has subjected us to the apparatus of the flesh-sexuality as "a means through which power is exerted […] a relay station which no modern

[254] "In relation to power […] sexuality is not an exterior domain to which power is applied […] sexuality is a result and an instrument of power […] the idea of sex 'in itself' cannot be accepted without examination […] sex is not the anchorage point that supports the manifestations of sexuality […] sex is a complex idea that was formed inside the deployment of sexuality […] the notion of 'sex' made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations […] and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere [...] Finally, the notion of sex…made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing sexuality to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as […] an autonomous agency which secondarily produces […] effects of sexuality" (EHS1, 152, 154, and 155).

system of power can do without" (EFL, 219, 22). That's why Foucault understands the history of sexuality as "the analysis of the discursive practices and the knowledge that allowed the strategies of power to […] invest […] sexuality" (Ibid., 159). We ask sex to tell us both "its" truth and "our" truth, "the deeply buried truth of the truth about ourselves" (EHS1, 69). But, in fact, it was sexuality – itself "a positive product of power" (EPK, 120) – that "produced, as the keystone of its discourse and perhaps of its very functioning, the idea of sex […] We have had sexuality since the eighteenth century, and sex since the nineteenth. What we had before that was no doubt the flesh" (Ibid., 210, 211).

Foucault's refusal to "relate the question of homosexuality to the problem of 'Who am I?'" (EFL, 308) – i.e., of identity – was, according to Veyne, the result of realizing that when "the modern 'discourse' on 'sex' presented homosexuality as a crucial component of an individual's identity, an identity that the individual would have to accept and had to recognize" what we were facing was a technique of government disguised as liberation. Like Pinel and Tuke's "liberation of the mad" from their chains, the invitation to liberate "our true sexuality", the incitement to "express" and be faithful to our "true homosexual self" by identifying with "the psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual" (Ibid., 310) may result in a "gigantic moral imprisonment" (EHM, 511). In other words, in an obligation to judge ourselves and others according to our degree or conformity to or participation in a supposed homosexual identity or essence. That's why, as Veyne reminds us, "much" of Foucault's "intellectual energy was consequently deployed in battling against the normativity imposed by knowledge about 'sex' and in resisting the effects of the power that this 'discourse' of truth fostered".[255] For him, homosexuality constituted "a historic occasion to re-open affective and relational virtualities, not

[255] Veyne, *Foucault*, 142.

[…] through the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual, but due to the biases against the position he occupies […] diagonal lines that he can trace in the social fabric permit him to make these virtualities visible" (EFL, 310, 311).

Echoing Nietzsche, Talal Asad reminds us that considering responsibility as "essential to the concept of agency" implies "virtually equating morality with criminal law".[256] Foucault, for his part, tries to show that, at least from the nineteenth century, criminal law is nothing but morality. As I have already indicated, its goal is unmistakably religious or moral: correction or conversion. What is at stake in juridical practice is not so much punishing a specific break of the law, but rather evaluating and "judging a man as he is and according to what he is" (EEF, 227). Furthermore, we should keep in mind that the "key notion of the penal institution since the Middle Ages – that is, legal responsibility" (Ibid., 221) was the result of translating into the language of law the conception of responsibility that had been developed by Christian morality and theology. One is considered "responsible" (and therefore punishable) as long as one is "free, conscious", and "unafflicted by *dementia*, untouched by any crisis of *furor*" (Ibid., 219). The concept of freedom at work here is still the Christian "free will". As for the meaning of the term "conscious", it implies self-transparency and therefore sovereignty. As Asad puts it, "the secular tradition of attributing individual responsibility [...] has been formed out of […] the Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions of obligation".[257] Therefore, it shares both its assumptions and limitations: We still seem to be unable to conceive of a non-sovereign freedom other than as punishment or dependency on an omnipotent and omniscient will.

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[256] Asad, 96.

[257] Asad, 99.

When Nietzsche claims that "Christianity is a hangman's metaphysics"[258] he is referring to the fact that the notion of responsibility it imposes makes us necessarily guilty because it presupposes a kind of self-knowledge and control that we couldn't have lost because we never had in the first place. So if we want to "understand how we have been trapped in our own history" (ERC, 136) we have to trace the "secular" notion of responsibility to the Christian invention of the subject as the instrument and effect of the exercise of pastoral power. In Asad's words, "to be responsible [...] in the modern sense [...] is to be accountable to an authority, to be prepared to give justifications and excuses for one's actions[259] [...] Agency today serves primarily to define a completed personal action from within an indefinite network of causality by attributing to an actor responsibility to power. Paradigmatically, this means forcing a person to be accountable, to answer to a judge […] why things were done or left undone. In that sense, agency is built on the idea of blame and pain. A world of apparent accidents is rendered into a world of essences".[260]

I want to suggest, with Deleuze, that morality, as different from ethics, is always founded in theology. The understanding of agency that we find in "secular" modern morality and law only makes sense as the correlative of a relationship to God defined by sovereignty and mediated by Christ and the pastorship through a normalizing – both disciplinary and regulatory – exercise of power. This is a way of understanding accountability built on the combination of debt through gratefulness and fear. As Deleuze explains in his lectures on Spinoza: "I do not believe that a morality can be made from the point of view of an ontology […] in a pure ontology […] there is no One superior to Being […] morality always implies something superior to Being […] something

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[258] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols,* "The Four Great Errors", section 7, 181 and 12.

[259] Asad, 95.

[260] Asad, 73-74.

which plays the role of the One, of the Good […] Value expresses this authority superior to Being […] morality is the enterprise of judging not only all that is, but Being itself […] one can only judge Being in the name of an authority higher than Being […] Judging […] always implies something superior to an ontology […] Morality is the system of judgment. Of double judgment, you judge yourself and you are judged. Those who have the taste for morality are those who have the taste for judgment".[261]

A critique of Christianity, and "anti-pastoral revolution", would lead to the abandonment of the belief in a "One superior to being" and therefore of the very notion of morality as "a matter of essence and values […] an essence of man […] it is always a matter of realizing the essence […] The moral question: What must you do by virtue of your essence? [...] it is quite necessary for morality to speak and to give us orders in the name of an essence […] [which] is in man potentially (en puissance) […] morality is the process of realization of the human essence […] The essence of man must be taken for an end by existing man […] the essence taken as end is value […] the moral vision of the world is made of essence […] value is exactly the essence taken as an end […] you are always referred to this authority superior to Being for judging […] a moralist defines man by what he is […] essence[262] […] The malicious and the good man is the man related to values according to his essence".[263]

[261] Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze. "Deleuze/Spinoza. Cours Vincennes: Ontologie-Ethique 21/12/1980," http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/index.html. English version translated by Simon Duffy (accessed May 31, 2014).

[262] Ibid.

[263] Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze. "Deleuze/Spinoza. Cours Vincennes: la puissance, le droit naturel classique-09/12/1980," http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/index.html. English version translated by Simon Duffy (accessed May 31, 2014).

Deleuze argues that what Foucault did in the last part of his work was "rejecting morality and discovering ethics".[264] The latter implies "establishing ways of existing or, as Nietzsche put it, inventing new possibilities of life. Existing not as a subject but as a work of art […] the production of a way of existing cannot be equated with a subject, unless we divest the subject of any interiority and even any identity".[265] Our next chapter is devoted to an analysis of the notion of "governmentality" that exposes the role it plays in leading Foucault in the direction described by Deleuze.

[264] Deleuze, *Negotiations,* 115.

[265] Ibid., 95 and 98.

IV. CHAPTER THREE: GOVERNMENTALITY

> *We do not want this pastoral system of obedience… this system of truth… of observation and endless examination that continually judges us, tells us what we are in the core of ourselves* (ECF-STP, 201).
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> *The power that lies in unity of popular sentiment, in the fact that everyone holds the same opinions and has the same objectives, is sealed and protected by religion […] tutelary government and the careful preservation of religion necessarily go together […] it [government]needs their [the priests's] concealed and intimate education of souls […] the interests of tutelary government and the interests of religion go hand in hand together.*[266]
>
> *It is amazing how people like judging. Judgment is being passed everywhere, all the time. Perhaps it's one of the simplest things mankind has been given to do. And you know very well that the last man, when radiation has finally reduced his last enemy to ashes, will sit down behind some rickety table and begin the trial of the individual responsible* (EEW1, 323).
>
> *We have to* learn to think differently- *in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more:* to feel differently.[267]

Michael Lackey maintains that "other than Nietzsche, no one […] has provided us with a more astute model for identifying the subterranean theological impulses operating within language, psyches, culture, and the polis than Foucault".[268] Whereas Nietzsche claimed to "have unearthed the theologian instinct everywhere"[269] and, as we can see in our second quote, pointed at the connections between the political and priestly exercise of government, Foucault –by tracing those connections back to the Christian "invention" of that practice of power and replacing the language of "interests" and "instincts" with that of practices and their "regimes of rationality", or

[266] Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human* I, section 472, 171 and 172.

[267] Nietzsche, *Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, section 103, 60.

[268] Lackey, "Foucault, Secularization Theory, and the Theological Origins of Totalitarianism", in *Foucault's Legacy*, 129.

[269] He described it as "the most widespread and genuinely *subterranean* form of deceit on earth […] the *nihilistic* will willing power" (*The Anti*-Christ, section 9, in The *Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of Idols, and Other Writings*, 8 and 9).

"singular positivities" and "strategic necessities" – developed a "model" that exposes the pastoral rationality underpinning modern, secular procedures for the government of oneself and others.

In this chapter I will be arguing that the 1979 transition from the framework of a "micro-physics of power" (ECF-PP, 16) to the "analytical grid" of governmentality defined as "the way in which one conducts the conduct of people" (ECF-BOB, 186) is the result of the slow but steady unfolding or maturation of a conception of the Christian pastoral as a technology of power that cannot be identified with "God's sovereignty over the world, nature, and men" (ECF-STP, 244) or reduced to its "ecclesiastical institutionalization" (EEF, 132). His early study of psychiatric, disciplinary, and normalizing power uncovers a practice of governing that leads him to develop the notion of a pastoral type of power. That is to say, a Christian exercise of power as government that is both individualizing and totalizing, micro- and macro-, disciplinary and regulatory, and was secularized or generalized (Ibid., 264) from the sixteenth century onwards.[270] In both its modern and traditional forms, as medicine or as the conduction of souls, pastoral power "can be applied to both the body and the population [...] and it will therefore have both disciplinary and regulatory effects" (ECF-SMD, 252). It constitutes a technology of power that "must bear on the whole [...] community and on each individual in particular" (ECF-STP, 192).

This "conduct of conducts" (EEF, 138) was obscured or kept out of sight from the moment that the term government began to acquire the "restricted", "specifically political" or strictly "statist" meaning to which it has been reduced today, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It

[270] Pastoral power "spread out into the whole social body" (EEF, 133).

was relegated to the domain of the "private"[271] as non-political.[272] However, before being reduced to "political structures or to the management of states [...] the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection", the word had a broader meaning that referred to "the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed [...] modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, that were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people" (Ibid.), "the control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone's body, soul, and behavior" (ECF-STP, 122). At least from 1979 onwards, Foucault identified the exercise of power with this broad, pastoral meaning of government.[273] He sustains that this practice of conduction – "directed at all and each in their paradoxical equivalence, and not at the higher unity formed by the whole" (ECF-STP, 129) – is neither Greek nor Roman (Ibid., 122) but constitutes "one of the fundamental elements introduced into Western society by the Christian pastorate" (Ibid., 193).

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[271] "It is no doubt the problematization of conduct and the specification of different types of conduct that begins to establish the opposition between private and public" (ECF-STP, 230).

[272] "in the middle of the seventeenth century [...] you see the appearance of politics (*la politique*) [...] understood as a domain" (ECF-STP, 246).

[273] Defined as the "techniques and procedures for directing human behavior" (EEW1, 81); "the set of institutions and practices, from administration to education, through which people's conduct is guided […] those men who orient our daily lives either through administrative acts or through direct or indirect influences, for example, the influences of the media"(EEW3, 295 and 285); "an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by putting them under the authority of a guide who is responsible for what they do and for what happens to them" (ECF-STP, 363); "a certain type of relation between individuals [...] some men can determine other men's conduct- but never exhaustively or coercively […] [being] caused to behave in a certain way […] If an individual can remain free […] power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt" (ERC, 152); "the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed […] To govern […] is to structure the possible field of action of others […] it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions; an action upon an action, on possible or actual, future or present actions […] Power is not as matter of consent […] it is not the renunciation of freedom [...] [but] a question of government [...] two elements that are indispensable […] that the 'other' (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized and maintained […] as a subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results […] may open up […] It is a set of actions on possible actions […] [it] operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself; it incites […] It makes easier or more difficult […] more probable or less [...] a 'conduct of conducts' and a management of possibilities" (EEF, 137, 138).

Foucault's "History of Governmentality"[274] shows that what "took over" from a philosophy dominated by the "culture" or "technology of the self"[275] in the West from the third to the fourth century was not exactly theology, but rather the Christian pastorate. That is to say, "the art by which some people were taught the government of others, and others were taught to let themselves be governed by certain people". This "everyday government" (ECF-STP, 151), that "applies itself to immediate everyday life" (EEF, 130), became "the science par excellence, the art of arts, the knowledge of knowledges" (ECF-STP, 151). Whereas the goal of the art of self-government developed by Hellenistic and Roman philosophers was the constitution of the free individual through "techniques of living […] of existence" (EEW1, 89), the objective of the pastorate is "conducting men". It resorts to "the methods that allow one to direct them" and its target is "the way in which they conduct themselves, the way in which they behave" (ECF-STP, 194). In other words, it relies on techniques of the self as practices of self-regulation and formation. In Greco-Roman philosophy the techniques of the self were part of an art of living "relatively independent of moral legislation". With Christianity, they were "diverted towards the hermeneutics [...] the deciphering of the self" and in this way integrated into "structures of coercion or domination", so "codification became more and more important" (EPPC, 260). Gregory Nazianzen called the techniques and procedures constituted by the pastorate *oíkonomía psuchōn*, the "economy of souls", giving Aristotle's term a new sense. The Roman Church Fathers translated it as *regimen animarum*, the "regimen or government of souls" (ECF-STP, 192). Foucault proposes that "the least bad translation for what Gregory Nazianzen spoke about" is "the conduct of souls" (Ibid.,

[274] He admits that this would have been "a more exact title" (ECF-STP, 108) for the 1978 *Course*, known as *Security, Territory, Population.*

[275] Understood as "reflection on modes of living, on choices of existence, on the way to regulate one's behavior, to attach oneself to ends and means", an inquiry into "the government of the self, with the techniques that are peculiar to it" (EEW1, 89).

193), because "the equivocal nature of the term 'conduct'" may help us grasp "the specificity" of government as a practice of power: "To 'conduct' is at the same time to 'lead' others [...] the activity of conducting" and "a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities [...] the way in which one conducts oneself" (EEF., 138).

What has allowed pastoral power to survive is precisely that it is not "a rigid structure aiming to immobilize living processes" but has been "endlessly modified by the action of numerous factors" (ECF-STP, 119). One of the most significant is the "reorganization of the government of men", the "reworking of the way in which people were governed in the individual, social, and political relations [...] which produced Protestantism, the formation of the great nation-states, the establishment of absolute monarchies, the partitioning of territories placed under the authority of administrations, the Counterreformation, the Catholic Church's new mode of presence in the world" (EEW3, 295, 296). This generalized "problematization" of individual and collective conduct takes place at the "meeting point" of two movements: "state centralization", on the one hand, and "religious dispersion and dissidence", on the other (ECF-STP, 89 and 90).

The "absolute monarchy of the church" (Ibid., 247) and the unity of the *Imperium Romanum Sacrum* may have "broken down" with the Reformation, but this does not mean that "the power that underpins" them "has been put out of play". Far from that. What happened was that some of the old institutions became "incompatible with some fundamental mutations" of the pastorate (Ibid., 119 and 120). In the sixteenth century, after a long period of crisis, the pastorate "broke up and assumed the dimension of governmentality"; but this did not lead to its disappearance. In fact, according to Foucault "there was not even a massive or comprehensive transfer of pastoral functions from Church to state. What we see in reality is a much more complex

phenomenon". One that includes both "an intensification of the religious pastorate"[276] and "a development of forms of the activity of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority [...] and here again in two aspects": First, in "what will later be called the political or "public" domain [...] the problem arises of how and to what extent the exercise of the sovereign's power can and must take upon itself these previously unacknowledged tasks of conduction" (ECF-STP, 230, 231). Second, at the level of the individual we see "the development of private forms of the problem of conduction". So with the "emergence" of governmentality in the sixteenth century Foucault is not describing "a transition from the religious pastorate to other forms of conduct, conduction or directing", but rather "an intensification, increase, and general proliferation of this question and of [...] techniques of conduct [...] explosion of the problem of conduct [...] With the sixteenth century we enter the age of forms of conducting, directing, and government" (Ibid., 231), a "multiplication of all the arts of governing [...] and of all the institutions of government, in the wider sense the term [...] had at that time" (EEF, 264). The "great process of society's governmentalization" (Ibid., 267), "disciplinarization", "pastoralization", or "in-depth Christianization" begins. This "movement" affects "society and individuals... in Western Europe in the sixteenth century", including the state. In fact, Foucault claims, that's precisely "what has allowed the state to survive".[277]

In 1973 he had anticipated that "movement" in terms of the establishment of a "disciplinary society" that replaces a "society of sovereignty [...] in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,

[276] "The Reformation as well as the Counter-Reformation gave the religious pastorate much greater control [...] than in the past [...] The pastorate had never before intervened so much, had never had such a hold on the material, temporal, everyday life of individuals" (ECF-STP, 229).

[277] The "governmentalization of the state is a particularly contorted phenomenon, since if the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have really become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation, the governmentalization of the state has nonetheless being what has allowed the state to survive" (ECF-STP, 109).

through a sort of progressive extension" or "invasion" of society by disciplinary apparatuses which were "the external version of religious disciplines". A decade later he describes this transformation as "the refinement, the elaboration, and the installation [...] of techniques for "governing" individuals – that is, for "guiding their conduct" – in domains as different as the school, the army, and the workshop" (EEW1, 203). Thus, Foucault places that disciplinary technology in the framework of a pastoral practice of government that is widening its scope. In other words, governmentalization is the effect of the secularization or expansion of the pastoral or "governing" function (ECF-STP, 165) – "taking charge of men collectively and individually" in order to lead them to their salvation – which "spread and multiplied outside its ecclesiastical institutionalization" (EEF, 132).

It seems to me that one of the most productive ways of approaching the notion of governmentality is as the form pastoral power takes once it is generalized or secularized. When we try to answer the question that Foucault poses in 1978, about "the type of power the notion (of government) covers" (ECF-STP, 116), we realize it is a pastoral kind of power. Disciplinary and bio- power are not something other than pastoral power. Both were first implemented by Christian institutions and they are the technologies that make possible the exercise of power as government. Governmentality as secularized pastoral power takes the form of "a singular generality: its only reality is that of the event (*événementielle*) and its intelligibility can only make use of a strategic logic".[278] The "evental" character of governmentality means that pastoral government is "eventalized" in "transformable singularities" or "singular positivities." The "singularity of

[278] In his "Course Context" to the 1978 lectures, Michel Senellart refers to a "manuscript on governmentality" in which Foucault offers that definition (ECF-STP, 389).

madness in the modern Western world [...] of sexuality [...] of our moral-legal system of punishment" should be seen as "eventalizations" of that practice of power and its rationality.[279]

This secularized pastoral power was "sometimes [...] exerted by [the] state apparatus", or "public institutions", but not necessarily. It is also exercised by "private entities", "complex structures such as medicine", or "ancient institutions" like the family (EEF, 133). The end result of the process of governmentalization or disciplinarization is "the transition in the eighteenth century from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government" (ECF-STP, 106). Foucault considers that "so long as sovereignty was the major problem and the institutions of sovereignty were the fundamental institutions, and so long as the exercise of power was thought of as the exercise of sovereignty, the art of government could not develop in a specific and autonomous way" (Ibid., 102).

In 1978 he argues that the "unblocking of the art of government" only took place with liberalism, that is, with "the emergence of the problem of the population [...] the perception of the specific problems of the population, and [...] the isolation of the level of reality that we call the economy". These two elements are what finally made possible to conceive "the problem of government outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty" (Ibid., 103, 104). Otherwise said: Foucault's first definition of governmentality[280] identifies it with liberalism as the first

[279] I don't think that this way of understanding "singularities" falls into the trap that Foucault had warned us against when he stated that "there is no foundational recourse, no escape into a pure form. "Absolute" or "pure" singularities are not "incarnations of an essence, or individualizations of the species" (EEF, 276).

[280] "By this word "governmentality" I mean three things. First [...] the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this [...] power that has population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second [...] the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence, over all other types of power- sovereignty, discipline, and so on- of the type of power that we can call "government" [...] Finally [...] the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle

"autonomous" and "specific" art of government or governmental reason, as what marks the birth of a "state of government".[281]

It is easy to see why the *politiques*'s search for "a rationality specific to the art of governing states" (ERC, 145), something that is different from both sovereignty and the pastorate, was perceived as a "heresy" and "assimilated to atheism". Those who opposed the doctrine of "Reason of state"[282] said: "Governmentality does not exist",[283] there is no "art of government", no "irreducible specificity of government [...] that functions for itself and outside of any general laws given by God" (ECF-STP, 244, 245).

However, as Foucault himself shows, that "irreducible specificity" was soon reconciled or made compatible with both sovereignty and the Christian pastoral: Louis XIV, whose reign extended from 1643 to 1715, "introduces the specificity of *raison d'État* into the general form of sovereignty [...] within the system of sovereignty of the French absolute monarchy". He "stitched

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Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 'governmentalized'" (ECF-STP, 108, 109).

[281] "maybe, in a completely general, rough, and therefore inexact way, we could reconstruct the major forms, the major economies of power in the following way: first, the state of justice, born in a feudal type of territoriality [...] second, the administrative state that corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines; and finally, a state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality [...] but by [...] the mass of the population [...] This state of government, which essentially bears on the population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security" (ECF-STP, 109, 110).

[282] "Saint Thomas's model for rational government [...] God imposing his law upon his creatures [...] is not a political one, whereas what the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seek under the denomination 'reason of state' are principles capable of guiding an actual government" (ERC, 146). For Aquinas, "the monarch's government has no specificity with respect to the exercise of sovereignty. There is no discontinuity [...] and no division between the two functions of being sovereign and governing" (ECF-STP, 232). "Reason of state is not an art of governing according to divine, natural, or human laws [...] knowledge is necessary; concrete, precise, and measured knowledge as to the state's strength [...] statistics [...] rational government able to increase the state's strength [...] what the seventeenth- and eighteenth- century authors understand by 'the police' is [...] a governmental technology peculiar to the state: domains, techniques, targets where the state intervenes" (ERC, 147).

[283] Here governmentality is synonymous with "governmental reason." In 1979 he defined the latter as "those types of rationality that are implemented in the methods by which human conduct is directed through a state administration" (ECF-BOB, 322).

together" sovereignty and government showing both "the bond and connection" between them and "the specificity and the difference of their level and their form" (ECF-STP, 246, 247). With regard to the pastorate, we have "the bishop of Tours drawing from Holy Scripture the right of Louis XIV to have a politics governed by *raison d'État* that is consequently specific, different from, and indeed opposed to that of the absolute monarchy of the Church" (Ibid., 247). To this claim I would object that once we understand that reason of state was "correlative with the disappearance of the imperial principle", the end of a unified Holy Roman Empire[284] and its replacement with a European equilibrium through competition between states, we can see that the policies of the Sun King as a faithful catholic were, if not perfectly, at least closely aligned with those of the Post-Reformation Catholic Church.[285] Furthermore, in the "police state" established at the beginning of the seventeenth century the sovereign exercised his sovereignty in governing men through "a permanent, continually renewed and increasingly detailed regulation [...] and discipline" (Ibid., 341). In other words, the state took control of disciplinary mechanisms that had been invented by the pastoral. Therefore, I would say that it is only to a certain extent that we can say that "the government of men [...] is no longer practiced as pastoral art" (ECF-STP, 261).

As for liberalism, Foucault argues that it marks the "development, dramatic rise, and dissemination through society of [...] disciplinary techniques for taking charge of the behavior of individuals day by day and in its fine detail [...] the Panopticon is the very formula of liberal government". Even if the "mechanisms of security" are the predominant ones in this regime, their deployment requires "a real inflation of the juridico-legal code" as well as "a considerable activation and propagation of the disciplinary corpus [...] necessary to make [...] mechanisms of

[284] "Christianity, by definition, by vocation, aimed to cover the entire world" (ECF-STP, 297).

[285] For instance, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 formally authorized his fierce campaign of persecution against Huguenots and Protestants in general.

security [...] work" (Ibid., 7, 8). So we have a "triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management". Furthermore, even if Foucault considers that the "organization" and "deployment" of discipline "and all the institutions within which it flourished in the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century – schools, workshops, armies – are part and parcel of, and can only be understood on the basis of, the development of the great administrative monarchies", he also admits that it "was never more important or more valued than when the attempt was made to manage the population" (Ibid., 107). It is as the combination of disciplinary and bio or regulatory techniques that liberalism assumes the pastoral task of "continuously and effectively taking charge of individuals and their well-being, health, and work, their way of being, behaving, and even dying" (ECF-BOB, 62).

In the 1976 lectures Foucault had offered a view of the transition from a society of sovereignty to one of government that elaborated on the one he had outlined in the 1973-1974 Course *Psychiatric Power* and anticipated – or at least pointed in the direction of – a less restricted, more abstract way of understanding governmentality. One that takes into account that, long before the emergence of a liberal governmentality, the Christian pastorate had been able to think and implement a practice of government outside the model of sovereignty. It seems to me that, unlike the first definition of that concept in 1978 that I have been commenting on, Foucault's characterizations of governmentality from 1979 onwards reflect both his non-statist approach to power relationships and his analysis of pastoral power as a practice of government that is different from both the sovereignty of the king and that of the state.

As we saw in the previous chapter, that transition from power relationships marked by sovereignty to those characteristic of government makes possible the birth of modern medicine, psychiatry-psychology, criminology, etc., by replacing physical punishment or torture with

correction and reform, violence or force with self-regulation. According to the 1976 lectures, "it is as if power, which used to have sovereignty as its modality or organizing schema, found itself unable to govern the economic and political body of a society that was undergoing both a demographic explosion and industrialization [...] too many things were escaping the old power of sovereignty [...] both at the level of detail and at the mass level". And it is to respond to this situation that two "adjustments" were made. The first intended to "take care of the details. Discipline had meant adjusting power mechanisms to the individual body by using surveillance and training [...] in the seventeenth century, or the beginning of the eighteenth". The second, "at the end of the eighteenth century, a technology [...] centered upon life [...] the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat and [...] regulatory, disciplinary power is on the advance [...] a political system centered on biopower" (ECF-SMD, 254).

I am aware that, for Foucault, there is an "important and wide gap between the government or pastoral direction of individuals and communities, and the development of arts of government, the specification of a field of political intervention, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (ECF-STP, 165). That is to say, there is a difference between the pastorate and governmentality's "entry into politics", "the formation of a political "governmentality [...] at the end of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", which "marks the threshold of the modern state" (Ibid., 165, 364). However, it is important to realize that he also points out that there is a continuity in this "transition from the [...] pastoral of souls to the political government of men [...] and populations" (Ibid., 227), in both the subject and the procedures of governmentality (disciplinary and biopower). As "an art of 'governing men'" (Ibid., 165), the pastorate "sketches out" or constitutes "the origin, the point of formation, of crystallization, the embryonic point", "the prelude", the inner depth and background of the governmentality that begins to develop in the

sixteenth century", of what he calls governmentality "as this is deployed from the sixteenth century [...] in two ways" (ECF-STP, 165, 184, and 215). On the one hand, "through the procedures peculiar to the pastorate", as the first disciplinary and regulatory technology of power. As we will see later both in this chapter and the next, the Christian techniques of the self are "the source of a specific type of power over men", "a model and a matrix of procedures for the government of men" (Ibid., 147). On the other hand, "through the constitution of a specific subject" through certain procedures of individualization which, as we saw in "Chapter One: The Birth of Psychiatric Power", became "the typical constitution of the modern Western subject".[286] As for the modern concept of "population", I have already indicated that in Foucault's texts we find evidence that shows how it is modelled on the basis of the pastoral "herd" or "flock of living beings"[287] (Ibid., 141). By highlighting these continuities, I am not denying that the emergence of a distinct and well-defined "art of government" with its own rationality, a "governmental reason" that describes the state "as both its principle and its objective [...] its foundation and its aim" (ECF-STP, 285 and 286) introduces a discontinuity in relation to the old way of understanding political power as the exercise of sovereignty. I am simply suggesting that it is in his early work that we can find the reasons that explain why whereas in 1978 the emphasis is on the state as revealing "a new reality, with its own rationality" (Ibid., 349), in 1982 that modern Western state is characterized as "a new

[286] Individualization by "identity" or "analytical identification", by "subjection" (*assujettissement)* or obedience and by subjectivation (*subjectivation)* or the production of the truth about ourselves (ECF-STP, 184).

[287] With liberalism "an important doubling [...] is carried out [...] the subjects of right on which political sovereignty was exercised appear as a population that a government must manage" (ECF-BOB, 22). Furthermore, Foucault indicates that history offers us "numerous" examples of the difficulties occasioned by the always "tricky adjustment between political power wielded over legal subjects and pastoral power wielded over live individuals [...] between political power at work in the state as a legal framework of unity and a [...] pastoral [...] power [...] whose role is constantly to ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and everyone" (ERC, 141).

form of pastoral power" that "has integrated into a new political shape and old power technique" (EEF, 132, 131).

The pastorate and the hermeneutics of the self are as inseparable as power and knowledge. The Christian technologies of the self – that is, "the articulation of certain techniques and certain discourse about the subject" (ERC, 161) – are "the condition for pastoral government to exist and to work; without technologies of the self, pastoral government cannot work".[288] The relations of power imposed by both the pastorate and modern governmentality are productive, that's why Foucault claims that "it is a matter of asking what type of practice governmentality is, inasmuch as it has effects of objectivation and veridiction regarding men themselves by constituting them as subjects" (ECF-STP, 387) and warns that it would be a mistake to think that "governmentality necessarily takes on the tone of containment, surveillance, and control", as "an essentially juridical mechanism [...] which lays down the law [...] prohibits [...] refuses, a purely negative conception" (EPK, 183, 184).

Foucault's coinage "govern-mentality" (*gouverne-mentalité*) brings to the fore that the exercise of power as government, whether the governed "form small or large groups", implies "a certain type of rationality" (ERC, 152). Governing is a "specific activity" that doesn't need to resort to violence or force, but instead relies on techniques of the self as "processes by which the individual acts upon himself" (Ibid., 162). The techniques of government "permit to use the self

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[288] At the end of the second of his Howison Lectures at UC Berkeley (October 20-21, 1980), Foucault answered a series of questions from the audience. It is in the context of this exchange, which hasn't been included in the published version of the talk, that Foucault made this remark. He gave these same lectures with minor modifications at Dartmouth College a month later, on November 17 and 24. They first appeared in 1993 under the general title "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self". The first one is called "Subjectivity and Truth" and the second "Christianity and Confession". I found my quote listening to the audio version of the lectures available at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/foucault/howison.html. They are divided in four parts. The two statement I am citing in this chapter can be found in the file "Howison Lectures Part 4".

of people and the self-conduct of people for domination purposes".[289] Government is "a singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical.... a mode of action upon the action of others", which "includes freedom" (EEF, 138, 139). Whereas a relationship of "pure domination" or "violence" "acts upon the body or upon things [...] its opposite pole can only be passivity", government as a practice of power is "a way of acting upon acting subjects by virtue of their being capable of action", and therefore requires "a certain degree of freedom on both sides" (EEW1, 292). However, at the same time Foucault warns us that "it is very often through techniques [...] of government- understood, of course, in a very broad sense [...] – that states of domination are established and maintained" (EEF, 41). The latter are "situations [...] in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies to modify them, remain blocked, frozen" (EEW1, 283). And the only way to effectively resist the pastoral practices of government is problematizing "the form of rationality at stake", asking "how are such relations of power rationalized?" (ERC, 152). So we have to analyze how the pastoral technology of power rationalizes its way of doing things and presents its rationality "as reason in general" (EEW3, 286) when, in fact, "it is not reason in general that is implemented in […] political (or in 'scientific') practices […] but always a very specific type of rationality" (ERC, 145). A pastoral rationality,[290] in the case of government.

[289] See the previous note.

[290] Taking Nietzsche seriously requires rejecting the idea of a non-strategic, non-instrumental, "uncontaminated" reason that was "corrupted" or "perverted" by its own power and has to be "corrected", "reformed' or "saved". A pastoral logic with its universalist morality is at work in this narrative of emancipation. Foucault does not think that there was a point in time "at which reason became instrumental [...] lost sight of its fundamental project [...] a point at which the rational becomes the irrational [...] I do not believe in a kind of founding act whereby reason, in its essence, was discovered or established and from which it was subsequently diverted by such and such event [...] I would not speak about *one* bifurcation of reason but more about an endless, multiple bifurcation [...] I think, in fact, that reason is self-created, which is why I have tried to analyze forms of rationality: different foundations, different creations, different modifications in which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue one another" (EPPC, 28, 29). That's why he claims that "no given form of rationality is actually reason [...] I am not prepared to identify reason entirely with the totality of rational forms which have come to dominate- at any given moment [...] I can see

It is important to keep in mind that, for Foucault, practices "don't exist without a certain regime of rationality" (EEW3, 230). They are the "places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted, meet and interconnect" (Ibid., 225), "the different systems of action insofar as they are inhabited by thought" (EEW1, 201). Instead of trying to measure their "degree" of rationality against a purportedly Universal Reason, Foucault studies "regimes", "systems", or "ensembles" of practices as "programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 'jurisdiction') and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 'veridiction')" (EEW3, 225). In other words, his analysis of the rationality of practices focuses on the "interplay" between "two axes": One is "codification", "prescription" or "jurisdiction", a "code" that "governs ways of doing things". The other is "veridiction", "true and false formulation", or the "production of true discourses that serve(d) to found, justify, and provide reasons [...] for these ways of doing things" (Ibid., 230). With time, practices "solidify" and become "coherent reflective techniques with definitive goals"; then, a discourse emerges from those techniques, which is valued as "true", and which justifies the relations of power imposed by/through those techniques (ERC, 161). As an event or singular ensemble of practices, the Christian pastoral has its own rationality, which is present in "explicit *programs*". And these "programmings", these "regimes of jurisdiction and veridiction" are not just "abortive schemas for the creation of a reality". They "didn't remain a utopia in the heads of a few contrivers". Rather, they are "fragments of reality that induce effects

multiple transformations, but I cannot see why we should call this transformation a collapse [...] disappearance [...] of reason. Other forms of rationality are created endlessly. So there is no sense at all to the proposition that reason is a long narrative which is now finished, and that another narrative is under way" (Ibid., 35). In other words, his concern "isn't rationality considered as an anthropological invariant. I don't think one can speak of an intrinsic notion of 'rationalization' [...] one must restrict one's use of this word to an instrumental and realistic meaning [...] One isn't assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather, examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices" (EEW3, 229, 230).

in the real [...] which isn't of course the same as saying that they take the place of the real [...] they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behavior, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things" and they introduce "the distinction between true and false implicit in the ways men 'direct', 'govern', and 'conduct' themselves and others" (EEW3, 232, 233). This is what Foucault means when he says that "all governmentality can only be strategic and programmatic. It never works, but it is in relation to a program that we can say that it never works".[291] The fact that it never coincides with "real life" doesn't mean that it is merely "utopian" or "imaginary". Foucault contends that "one could only think this if one had a very impoverish notion of the real" (Ibid., 232). It seems that here he is refining or elaborating on his 1975 claim that "power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him also belong to this production" (EDP, 194). As I pointed out in the "Introduction", he wants to explain the emergence of "empirical singularities" or "events" as the effects of multiples processes, and not as the necessary product of a unique cause. In other words, he proposes "suspending the indefinitely privileges of cause" by abandoning "the uniform, simple activity of allocating causality" in favor of a more nuanced study of "polymorphous interweaving of correlations" or "plays of dependences". "Eventalization" as a "method" or "procedure of analysis" implies basically two things: First, "making visible a *singularity* at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself [...] a breach of self-evidence [...] of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences, and practices rest" (EEW3, 226). In other words, this method constitutes a challenge to "an entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic)" which "aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity – as a theological movement or a

[291] ECF-STP, 387. Michel Senellart is quoting Foucault from the "manuscript on 'government'" that the latter used as "the introduction to the 1979 seminar" (Ibid., 398, 399).

natural process" (EEW2, 380). This requires grasping the "connections [...] between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge" that constitute singularities and "make them at some point acceptable and in fact, had them accepted" (EEF, 274). Second, "rediscovering the connections, encounters [...] plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary [...] effecting a sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes" (EEW3, 226, 227), or rather, developing "types of relationship and modes of connection that are more numerous than the universal relation of causality by which people tried to define the historical method" (EEW2, 281). This means "analyzing an event according to the multiple processes that constitute it [...] constructing around the singular event analyzed as process a [...] 'polyhedron' of intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not given in advance and can never properly be taken as finite" (EEW3, 227). So I think that the difference between "product" and "effect" is the same as that between "genesis" – which is "oriented towards the unity of some [...] cause burdened with multiple descendants" – and genealogy – as the attempt "to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements" (EEF, 277).

Nietzsche had shown that "all causality goes back psychologically to the belief in intentions[292] [...] even now a mass of psychological entities are unhesitantly posited which are supposed to be causes". This "capacity to effect, invented into what happens" and conceived as a psychological personal entity is at the basis of "the psychological formation of God".[293] Drawing on him, Foucault criticizes the traditional conception of both political and religious power as "a unitary system organized around a center that is at the same time its source" (EEW1, 88). The

[292] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 5[9], 106.

[293] Ibid., sections 14[124], 260-261 and 14[98], 252.

latter has been described as a "psychological entity" endowed with interests or intentions. Traditional "explicative procedures" only recognized "causal value' if it adopted the form of a "deep, unitary, pyramidal, and necessary principle". Against this, Foucault states that "intelligibility in history does not lie in assigning a cause that is always more or less a metaphor for the source" but in "the constitution or composition of effects. How are overall, cumulative effects composed?" (ECF-STP, 239). That's why he claims that the intelligibility of power relations is not due to their being "the effect of another instance that explains them", "an emanation of a substantial and invasive power", but to the fact that "they are imbued, through and through, with calculation". And that calculation is not the result of "the choice or decision of an individual subject". There is no "headquarters that presides over" the rationality of power, which is "characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level at which they are inscribed [...] the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them" (EHS1, 94).

By rejecting the "belief in the causality of the will" and abandoning the language of the originating sovereign subject (whether individual or collective) endowed with interests or motives, he prevents his "historical-philosophical practice" (EEF, 271) from turning into a resentful hunt for personal agents[294] who can be judged responsible, and therefore guilty: "neither the cast that governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power [...] that makes a society function[295] [...] no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the

[294] "The forces operating in history [...] do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention [...] they always appear through the singular randomness of events" (EEW2, 381).

[295] EHS1, 95.

interstice".[296] Thus, he avoids not only "laying everything at the door of individual responsibility, as was done [...] by the existentialism of self-flagelation" but also the oversimplifications characteristic of "those displacements that are glibly practiced today: everything derives from the market economy, or from capitalist exploitation" (EPK, 189). When he claims that "power is not built up out of 'wills' [...] nor is it derivable from interest" (Ibid., 188) he is following the path opened by that other who explained: "I myself, a *de rigueur* opponent of Christianity, will certainly not hold individuals to blame for the disaster of millennia".[297]

When Foucault talks about "forms of rationality" being "put to work in the process of domination" he is not thinking of "Power – with a capital P – dominating and imposing its rationality upon the totality of the social body" but rather about "multiple [...] power relations [...] they have different [...] specific forms of rationality, forms that are common to them, etc. It is a field of analysis and not at all a reference to a unique instance" (EPPC, 37, 38). In other words, by domination he does "not mean the brute fact of the domination of the one over the many, or of one group over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in society; not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations, not sovereignty in its only edifice, but the multiple subjugations that take place within the social body" (ECF-SMD, 27).

From *The Birth of the Clinic* onwards, Foucault had been analyzing practices, that is "what was done", for instance, with the ill, the sinner, the mad, the delinquent, the abnormal, etc. "The ensemble of more or less regulated, more or less deliberate, more or less finalized ways of doing things" (EEW2, 462, 463). Whereas "Christianity has always been more interested in the history

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[296] EEW2, 377.

[297] Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I Am So Wise", section 7, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, 83.

of its beliefs than in the history of real practices" (ETS, 17), he chooses to focus on the latter because they "provide the intelligibility key for the correlative constitution of the subject and the object". So by analyzing ensembles of practices we can see not only " what was constituted as real for those who sought to think it and manage it" – be it illness, sin, madness, delinquency, or abnormality, and therefore how the ill, the sinners are "objectified [...] through certain forms of 'government'" – but also how they "constitute themselves as subjects capable of knowing, analyzing, and ultimately altering reality" as doctors or clinicians, pastors, psychiatrists, criminologists, social workers or psychologist (EEW2, 463). Neither the governor nor the governed pre-exist their relationship, they are mutually constitutive and co-enabling.

In the 1979 lectures Foucault recast "micro-powers" as "procedures of governmentality" by arguing that – as his 1976 work on biopower and the "deployment of sexuality" had shown – their analysis is "not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a sector of the scale, but should be considered [...] as a point of view, a method of decipherment [...] valid for the whole scale [...] whatever its size [...] it is a question of point of view, not of scale" (ECF-BOB, 186). The viewpoint or perspective opened up by governmentality as "the way in which one conducts the conduct of men" (Ibid.) analyzes power not as a substance that is located somewhere or belongs to someone but rather as a "practice" of government, and therefore as something that implies a certain "regime of rationality" and exists only in relationships.[298] As he will put it in 1984, the study of "techniques of governmentality" allows him to grasp power relations "not as an emanation of a substantial and invasive power, but in the procedures by which people's conduct is governed"

[298] "Power in the substantive sense, *'le' pouvoir*, doesn't exist [...] power means relations, a more-or-less organized, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations" (EPK, 198). "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared" but it "is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations. Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships, but are immanent [...] they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play [...] the strictly relational character of power" (EHS1 94, 95).

(ECF-CT, 9). Similarly, in the "Summary" of the 1980-1981 *Course* he explains that "the study of governmentality answered a dual purpose: doing the necessary critique of the common conceptions of power" and analyzing it "as a domain of strategic relations focusing on the behavior of the other or others [...] The studies already published concerning confinement and the disciplines, the courses devoted to the reason of state and the "art of governing", and the volume [...] on the *lettres de cachet* in the eighteenth century, constitute elements in this analysis of governmentality" (EEW1, 88).

So whereas *Psychiatric Power* (1973-1974), *Abnormal* (1975), and *Discipline and Punish* (1975) had exposed the workings of disciplinary power by focusing on the government or "ways of conducting the conduct" of specific individuals or particular multiplicities (the mad, the criminal), his later analyses of "the police state" or "administrative monarchy" established at the beginning of the seventeenth century, liberal governmentality as "the framework of biopolitics" (ECF-BOB:22),[299] and the neo-liberal arts of government, show that we can also deploy the point of view of government "to the study of "phenomena of a completely different scale, such as economic policy […] or the management of a whole social body" (Ibid., 186).

As he had explained in the previous year *Course*, with the notion of "governmentality" he wanted to apply to "the problem of state and population" (ECF-STP, 116) the same "triple displacement" that he had carried out with his analysis of the disciplines: an "extra-institutional, non-functional, and non-objective" approach to power relationships. In other words, an analysis "in terms of technology", "tactics and strategy" (EPK, 183, 184) and the productivity of power

[299] Biopower is "only part of something much larger [...] this new governmental reason [...] liberalism as the framework of biopolitics [...] only when we know what this governmental regime [...] was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is" (ECF-BOB, 22).

relations.[300] The first of those three "displacements" requires moving "outside the institution", replacing it with "the overall point of view of the technology of power [...] to free relations of power from the institution in order to analyze them from the point of view of technologies" (ECF-STP, 117, 118). He is persuaded that the only way to "avoid the circularity that refers the analysis of relations of power from one institution to the other", and finally to the state, is to study those power relationships "at the point where they constitute techniques with operative value in multiple processes" (Ibid, 119). That's precisely what he does with his study of the examination of conscience and confession. This move is what had allowed him to arrive at the notions of disciplinary and psychiatric power (with regard to the prison, the school, the workshop, or the asylum) biopower (in relation to the hospital), and pastoral power (in relation to the Church). Now he is trying to show that there is "an encompassing point of view with regard to the state as there was with regard to local and definitive institutions" (Ibid., 118). Governmentality is the "general technology of power" to which the modern state belongs and which can explain "its mutations, development, and functioning" (ECF-STP, 120).

In 1973 he had claimed that the analysis of "infrapower" required "leaving the problem of the state [...] to one side" (ECF-PP, 40). However, he was aware that this move didn't save him from having to face the problem of whether or not, ultimately, the analysis of the "micro-relations of power" (EPK, 200) necessarily had to "refer back" or "fall under" the state as "a global, totalizing institution" (ECF-STP, 118). The perspective of governmentality, by seeing the state as "a way of doing things" (ECF-STP, 358), just one of the many "instruments" that a wider, more general practice of government can use, and not as "a transcendent reality whose history could be understood on the basis of itself", allows him to claim that "there is not a sort of break between

[300] "Relations of power are, above all, productive" (EPPC, 118).

the level of micro-power and the level of macro-power, and [...] talking about one [does not] exclude talking about the other. In actual fact, an analysis in terms of micro-powers comes back without any difficulty to the analysis of problems like those of government and the state" (Ibid.). Thus, it is "the general tactics of governmentality [...] of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state's domain" (ECF-STP, 109). The latter is just "a practice [...] a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way [...] of relating to government[301] [...] the correlative of a particular way of governing[302] [...] a type of [...] an episode in governmentality, an effect [...] constituted [...] on [...] the basis of [...] practices of government[303] [...] the emergence of the state as a fundamental political issue can in fact be situated within a more general history of governmentality, or [...] in the field of practices of power".[304]

It is important to keep in mind that Foucault never stopped criticizing political analysis' habit of situating "power in the state [...] making it into the major, privileged [...] and almost unique instrument" when, in his view, the exercise of power "goes much further, passes through much finer channels, and is much more ambiguous" (EPK, 72). This ambiguity is due to the fact that "in human relationships [...] power is always present [...] a relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other [...] When one speaks of power, people immediately think of a political structure [...] I am not thinking of this at all when I speak of relations of power [...] [they] are [...] mobile, reversible, and unstable" (EEW1, 291, 292). And that's why his analysis of governmentality covers "the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and

[301] ECF-STP, 277.

[302] ECF-BOB, 6.

[303] ECF-STP, 248.

[304] Ibid., 247.

instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. Those who try to control, determine, and limit the freedom of others are themselves free individuals who have at their disposal certain instruments they can use to govern others" (EEF, 41). His repeated warnings against the danger of reducing the analysis of "power relations within a society" to "the study [...] those institutions that would merit the name 'political'" are the result of the lesson he learned as a careful reader of history that "nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed" (EPK, 60).

In the 1979 lectures he explains that one of the reasons why he is spending so much time on neo-liberal governmentality, instead of analyzing "the birth of biopolitics", as the title promises, is to show that the "great fantasy of the paranoiac and devouring state" that had become so widespread at that time, the "state-phobia" that he found circulating "in several forms in our thought" (ECF-BOB, 188), was not a description of the current situation but, in fact, had been "completely, and already very clearly formulated in the years 1930-1945. At this time it was quite precisely localized and did not have the force of circulation it has now [...] in [...] ordoliberalism [...] the German neoliberal school". Otherwise said: he wanted to reveal the "real source" of the widespread "inflationary critique of the state [...] of its intrinsic and irrepressible dynamism" because he did not think that it constituted a description of what was really happening (Ibid., 189, 188, and 190).[305] In fact, what he sees in the twentieth century is just the opposite: "an effective reduction of the state [...] of both the growth of state control and [...] the decline of state governmentality" (Ibid., 191, 185). So he interprets this popular "anti-state suspicion", this "state

[305] "We should not [...] imagine that we are describing a real, actual process concerning ourselves when we denounce the growth of state control" (ECF-BOB, 191).

phobia" as the result of the hegemony of neo-liberalism,[306] the "neo-liberal governmentality [...] which is being diffused, debated, and forms part of our actuality, structuring it and carving out its real shape" (ECF-BOB, 188, 192). Against the still pervasive neo-liberal warnings that the welfare state will lead us back to the totalitarianisms of the past, he contends that "the characteristic feature of the state we call totalitarian", the "historical origin of [...] totalitarian regimes [...] Nazism, fascism, or Stalinism" is not the "intensification and extension of the mechanisms of the state", but rather a "limitation, a reduction, and a subordination of the autonomy of the state, of its specificity and specific functioning" to what he calls "a non-state governmentality [...] a governmentality of the party [...] which appeared in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century [...] the welfare state has neither the same form [...] nor [...] the same root or origin as the totalitarian state, as the Nazi, fascist, or Stalinist state" (Ibid., 190 and 191). At this point Foucault announces to his audience that "he may try to show" how that non-state governmentality works in the next year's course. Instead, we have *On the Government of the Living*, devoted to the analysis of the evolution of the examination of conscience and confession in early Christianity.

As for the 1978 and 1979 lectures, their focus is not exactly on state apparatuses, but on something broader and virtually unexplored: the relationship between pastoral power and government as two practices rather than two institutions. Therefore, Foucault's remark at the beginning of the latter that, the same as he had done the previous year, in that 1979 *Course* he would "only consider the government of men [...] the rationalization of governmental practices [...] insofar as it appears in the exercise of political sovereignty" (Ibid., 2) shouldn't be interpreted as some kind of acknowledgement that a state-centered analysis may be necessary or unavoidable

[306] "We should not delude ourselves about the nature of the historical process which currently renders the state both so intolerable and so problematic" (Ibid., 192).

after all. Governmentality is to the state what pastoral power is to the church. It would be a mistake to reduce the practice to the institution. As I have already pointed out, Foucault claims that in order to understand "the relationship between religion and politics in modern Western societies" we shouldn't analyze the "interplay" between those two institutions, but the connections between two practices of power, the pastorate and government (ECF-STP, 191). And this is the path he will follow from 1979 onwards. Thus, in 1982 he claims that we need to place the issue of "political power" in the "more general question of governmentality" defined as "a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility [...] power relations in the broadest and not merely political sense of the term" (ECF-HOS, 252).

Going back to the three "displacements" or "shiftings to the outside" that I mentioned on page 147, Foucault explains that the second of them implies replacing "the internal point of view of the function" with "the external point of view of strategies and tactics". In order words, distinguishing "relations of power [...] from the function, so as to take them up within a strategic analysis". Every "governmentality" presupposes not just "rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentations through which to operate", but also "strategic games that subject the power relations they are supposed to guarantee to instability and reversal" (EEW1: 203). In 1977 he proposes replacing the psychologico-moral language of personal – individual or collective – "interests", intentions, or motives with that of "strategic necessities"[307]: "When I speak of strategy, I am taking the term seriously: in order for a certain relation of forces not only to maintain itself, but to accentuate, stabilize, and broaden itself, a certain kind of manoeuvre is necessary" (EPK: 206). After all, a "dispositif", what he later will call a "singularity", "has a dominant strategic

[307] "des nécessités stratégiques qui ne sont pas exactement des intérêts" (*Dits et écrits II. 1976-1988* (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001), 309).

function" It is "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble, a sort of [...] formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need",[308] a solution to a problem that sometimes produces "an entirely unforeseen effect" which has "nothing to do with any kind of strategic ruse on the part of some meta- or trans-historic subject conceiving and willing it" (Ibid., 194 and 195). That's why he defines discipline as "the generalization and interconnection of different techniques [...] designed in response to localized requirements (schooling, training troops to handle rifles)" (EEW3, 231).

Finally, the third "de-centering" entails "refusing to give oneself a ready-made object" and instead "grasping the movement by which a field of truth with objects of knowledge was constituted through [...] technologies of power [...] to resituate [...] relations of power within the perspective of the constitution of [...] domains and objects of knowledge" (ECF-STP, 118). Taking as his point of departure the analysis of the ways in which the mad, the sinner, or the criminal have been governed,[309] he had shown how madness, sin, or criminality were "constituted as an object of knowledge [savoir]", and how a certain "consciousness" of" them was "formed". This "consciousness" includes both the "image [...] of themselves" that the mad, the sinner, or the criminal were supposed to have as well as the "representation" of them that sane, virtuous, or law-abiding people should form (EEW1, 203, 204).

In 1980 Foucault repeatedly argued that "a genealogy of the modern subject as a historical and cultural reality –which means as something that can eventually change" requires taking into

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[308] "une urgence [...] un impératif stratégique" (Ibid., 299).

[309] "The method [...] start from real governmental practice as it is given, but at the same time as it reflects on itself and is rationalized", from the practices that "are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be madness", sin, or criminality (ECF-BOB, 2, 3).

account "not only techniques of domination[310] but also techniques of the self. One must show the interaction between these two types of technique [...] I perhaps insisted too much on the techniques of domination [...] Having studied the field of power relations taking techniques of domination as a point of departure […] in the years to come […] I would like […] to study power relations starting from the techniques of the self" (EEW1, 177).[311] And that's exactly what he does in the 1980, 1981, and 1982 courses.

In a seminar given at the University of Vermont in 1982, Foucault defined governmentality as the "contact" or "encounter"[312] between "the technologies of domination of others and [...] the technologies of individual domination [...] of the self" (ETS, 19). Here he is simply applying to governmentality his 1980 definition of government as "the contact point where are tied together the way individuals are driven and known by others and the way they conduct and know themselves […] Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, as they spoke of it in the sixteenth century […] is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts, between techniques […] of domination […] which assure coercion and […] techniques of the self

[310] "technologies of power [...] determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject" (ETS, 18).

[311] Defined as those "techniques that permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies [...] souls [...] thoughts [...] conduct, so as to transform themselves and to attain a certain state of perfection, happiness, purity, supernatural power" (EEW1, 177); they "permit individuals to effect, by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain [...] happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (ETS, 18); "the procedures [...] suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it […] through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge […] actions in which one is oneself the objective" (EEW1: 87); "processes through which the self is constructed and modified by himself" (ERC, 162).

[312] According to the translation that appears in EEF: 147.

[…] Power […] relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion-technologies and self-technologies" (ERC, 162, 163).

The "specificity and breadth" of the classical technology of the self is difficult to grasp due to the retrospective shadow cast on it" by pastoral power's appropriation of that technology for domination purposes.[313] It seems that in 1983 Foucault came to the conclusion that "from the moment that the culture of the self was taken up by Christianity, it was, in a way, put to work for the exercise of pastoral power [...] insofar as individual salvation is channeled [...] through a pastoral institution that has the care of souls as its object, the classical care of the self disappeared, that is, was integrated and lost a large part of its autonomy" (EEW1, 278). Moreover, he admits that "the techniques of the self [...] are frequently linked to the techniques for the direction of others. For example, if we take educational institutions we realize that one is managing others and teaching to manage themselves" (Ibid., 277). I think that this quotation would offer a more accurate description of the relationship between those two types of techniques established by pastoral government if he had used the preposition "by" instead of the conjunction "and". Anyway, a year later Foucault reiterates that the Greco-Roman "arts of existence" or "techniques of the self" left behind "some of their importance and autonomy when they were assimilated into the exercise of priestly power in early Christianity, and later, into educative, medical, and psychological types of practices" (EHS2, 11).

[313] This government as care of the self "takes its place 'between' pedagogical institutions and the religions of salvation […] the question of the education of future citizens seems to have occasioned more interest and reflection in classical Greece, and the question of an afterlife and a hereafter caused more anxiety in later periods […] pedagogy, government of the self, and salvation [did not] constitute three utterly distinct domains, employing different notions and methods; in reality there were numerous crossovers and a definite continuity between the three" (EEW1, 89, 90).

The most important of the Christian techniques of the self are still those that guarantee our "subjection" through "subjectivation": self-examination and confession.[314] The hermeneutics of the self is the "discourse of truth" that allowed them to become "accepted practices". They have to be called into question, deprived of their "evidentiary status"[315] – so that they recover "the mobility that they had and that they should always have" (EPT, 139) – by analyzing "on what […] assumptions […] familiar notions […] unexamined ways of thinking [...] [they] are based […] showing that things are not as obvious as people believe […] so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted […] criticism […] is utterly indispensable for any transformation […] So there is not a time for criticism and a time for transformation […] the work of deep transformation can be done in the open and always turbulent atmosphere of a continuous criticism" (EEW3, 456, 457).

Foucault shows that whereas in pagan philosophy self-knowledge used to be a means to achieve "one's sovereign mastery of oneself" (Ibid., 84), and therefore "taking care" of oneself, the pastorate inaugurated "an absolutely new form of power" (ECF-STP, 183), one for which the discovery and manifestation "of the truth that hides in the depths of oneself" became "an indispensable component in the government of men by each other" (EEW3, 84). Christianity replaced "care" and self-government as mastery over oneself with domination as the "general framework within which the imperative of self-knowledge acquires its significance" (EEW1, 88).

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[314] To confess means "to declare aloud and intelligibly the truth about oneself [...] a man needs for his own salvation to know as exactly as possible who he is and also [...] he needs to tell it as explicitly as possible to some other people" (ERC, 159).

[315] "Self-analysis [...] may have been an extremely painful exercise at first and required many cultural valorizations before ending up transformed into a positive activity".

The pastorate and the hermeneutics of the self are as inseparable as power and knowledge.[316] By turning the self into an object to be deciphered, Christianity organized "the experience that one may have of oneself [...] according to certain schemes" (EEW1, 87). A specific "model of self-knowledge" that required a particular "consciousness of self" (EFL, 472) was imposed. And this self-knowledge works as a technique of government that assures the domination of certain individuals by others.[317] When Foucault talks about the "very historicity of forms of experience" he includes the experience of ourselves. That's why he insists on the need for a "'nominalist' reduction of philosophical anthropology" (EEW1, 200) that would "desubjectify the philosophical question [...] 'what, therefore, am I?' [...] by way of historical contents" (EEF, 271, 272). This means rejecting the responses based on the supposed evidence and immediacy of our so-called "inner experience", as well as those that offer more or less "historicist" descriptions of our "human nature". The "indivisibility of knowledge and power" produced, not only the singularity of the pastorate as an event "fixed according to […] [its] conditions of acceptability", but also "a field of possibles, of openings, indecisions, reversals and possible dislocations […] the complex interplay between what replicates the same process and what transforms it" (Ibid, 278, 277). As a result, "we aren't, nor do we have to put ourselves, under the sign of a unitary necessity". That is, for Foucault, "the point at issue, both in historical analysis and in political critique" (EEW3, 228). The experience that the reader is invited to share in his "historically verifiable[318]

[316] As he put it in 1978, "a nexus of knowledge-power has to be described so that one can grasp what constitutes the acceptability of a system, be it the mental health system, the penal system, delinquency, sexuality, etc. [...] proceeding [...] from the empirical observability for us of an ensemble to its historical acceptability [...] from the fact of acceptance to the system of acceptability analyzed through the power-knowledge interplay" (EEF, 275).

[317] "How can the subject tell the truth about itself? [..] it was [...] through a certain mode of domination exercised by certain people upon certain people, that the subject could undertake to tell the truth about its madness, presented in the form of the other" (EPPC, 38, 39).

[318] EEW3, 243.

[…] fictions"[319] is one that exposes "our essential fragility" (EEF, 277), the contingencies and violences that have made us what we have become today. Echoing Nietzsche's claim that "writing ought always to advertise a victory- an overcoming of *oneself* which has to be communicated for the benefit of others",[320] Foucault explains: "I have always conceived of […] my books […] as experiences aimed at pulling myself free of myself, at preventing me from being the same […] I write in order to change myself and in order not to think the same thing as before […] people read […] the book[s] […] as an experience that changed them, that prevented them from always being the same and from having the same relation with things […] that they had before reading it […] an experience is expressed in […] [each] book which is wider than mine alone […] an experience book, as opposed to a truth book or a demonstration book" (EEW3, 241, 242, 245, and 246).

Foucault defines "governmentalization" as "the movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth". As Nietzsche had pointed out, "the 'will to truth' develops in the service of the 'will to power': to be exact, its real task is to help a certain kind of untruth to victory and permanence [...] as the basis for preserving a certain kind of living things".[321] The "critical attitude" emerges in response to the generalization of a form of power that "forces the individual back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way" (EEF, 129). In other words, as resistance to a practice of government[322] that does not resort to violence but instead relies on a kind of individualization that

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[319] Ibid., 242.

[320] Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human* II, section 152, 248.

[321] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 43[1], 50.

[322] In the 1978 course Foucault distinguishes between three types of revolts or struggles (a classification that he will take up again in 1982): "resistance to power as the exercise of political sovereignty", "resistance [...] directed at power in the form of economic exploitation" and, finally, "resistance to power as conducting […] power that assumes the task of conducting men in their life and daily existence" (ECF-STP, 195, 200).

"categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him [...] [it] ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way" (Ibid., 130). Therefore, the word "subject" refers not only to our subjection to others "by control or dependence", but also to our subjection to what we are brought to perceive as our "own identity" or "true self" through "a conscience or self-knowledge" (Ibid.). Critique is the counter-movement through which "the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth", an "art of voluntary insubordination [...] of reflected intractability" (EEF, 266, 267). Similarly, he characterizes philosophy after Nietzsche as "a way of reflecting, not so much on what is true and what is false, as on our relationship to truth [...] The movement through which, not without effort and uncertainty [...] one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true and seeks other rules" (EEW1, 327). This is also the meaning of what he calls "political spirituality".[323] The condition of possibility for this Nietzschean "project of desubjectivation" is a "decision not to be governed, the decision-making will, both an individual and collective will […] A question of attitude" (Ibid., 278). One that dares to problematize what appears as self-evident or necessary, even at the price of one's own intelligibility and reality: whether "the subject is the only possible form of existence [...] Can't there be experiences in the course of which the subject is no longer posited, in its constitutive relations, as what makes it identical with itself? Might there not be experiences in which the subject might be able to dissociate from itself, sever the relation with itself, lose its identity?" (EEW3, 248). Nietzsche considered that our "unconditional belief or

[323] "the will to discover a different way of governing oneself through a different way of dividing up true and false" as well as "the search for a new foundation for each of those two practices, in itself and relative to the other" (EEW3, 233).

conviction […] that truth is more important than anything else" shows the extent to which "we, too, are still pious […] the […] 'will to truth' does not mean 'I do not want to let myself be deceived' but […] 'I will not deceive, not even myself'; and with that we stand on moral ground".[324]

Through the "psychological function", the "practices of truth-telling about oneself" (ECF-CT, 1) invented by the pastorate have been "diffused across Western culture [...] and integrated with various types of attitudes and experience so that it is difficult to isolate and separate" them "from our own spontaneous experiences" (ETS, 17). It is by reference to this hermeneutics of the self that the ways in which we are governed and are taught to govern ourselves justify themselves. From the moment that "truth-telling about oneself became a condition of salvation, a fundamental principle in the subject's relation to himself, and a necessary element in the individual's membership of a community" (ECF-HOS, 364), we have been "governed" by our own truth (ERC, 144). Writing the political history of the production of the truth about ourselves means doing the "genealogy of the modern subject" (Ibid., 159), of this "will to truth" about ourselves. We have to examine the relationship between "forms of reflexivity and the discourse of truth" (EPPC, 30), exposing the "processes of subjectivation and objectivation that make it possible for the subject qua subject to become an object of knowledge [...] as a subject" (EEW2, 460).

In order to produce "the truth of the individual himself" (EEF, 132) pastoral power "spread new power relations throughout the ancient world" (Ibid., 131). The "verbal manifestation of the truth that hides in the depths of oneself" naturalizes itself as a human need, desire, or impulse, and

[324] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* Book Five, section 344, 200.

legitimates itself as a moral duty.[325] As a "form of power-knowledge", confession can only take place in the context of an asymmetrical, non-egalitarian power relationship.

While the correlate of those theories of power modelled on sovereignty is a "juridical" or "legal" subject , the analysis of governmentality "must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self" (ECF-HOS, 252); it requires posing the question of ethics understood as the type of relationship we have to ourselves. To claim that "governmentality implies the relationship of the self to itself" (EEF, 41) means acknowledging the productivity of power, its role in the formation of the subject. After all, the latter is "defined by the relationship of self to self [326][…] the self is not […] given but is constituted in relation to itself as subject [327][…] It is the forms of reflexivity [328][…] [the] relation to oneself [329][…] that constitute the subject". In other words, the relation to the self – that is, the "ethics" or the "modes of subjectivation" – "is not simply 'self-awareness', but 'self-formation'".[330]

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[325] "one of the main moral obligations for any subject is to know oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, and to constitute oneself as an object [of] knowledge both for other people and for oneself" (ERC, 160).

[326] ECF-HOS, 252.

[327] EEW1, 280.

[328] ECF-HOS, 462.

[329] EEW1, 226.

[330] EHS2, 28.

If we want to understand the process "which has led us to the modern concept of the self (ERC, 160) – which is nothing but the relationship we have to ourselves – we have to analyze "what techniques and practices form the Western concept of the subject [...] constructing a history of what we have done and, at the same time, a diagnosis of what we are" (ERC, 161). That is, a history of "subjectivity" as "the way in which the subject experiences himself in a game of truth where he relates to himself" (EEW2, 461).

The perspective of governmentality approaches the long-standing philosophical issue of the relationships between power, truth, and the subject (EEF, 273) by posing the following question: "How is it that in Western Christian culture the government of men demands […] not only acts of obedience and submission, but also acts of truth, which have the peculiar requirement not just that the subject tell the truth but that he tell the truth about himself […] How was a type of government of men formed in which one is required not simply to obey but to reveal what one is by stating it?" (EEW1: 81). That's why he claims that "the political question [...] is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself" (EPK, 133). We need to "resituate the production of true and false at the heart of historical analysis and political critique" (EEW3, 230). This entails developing a better understanding of "how the reflexivity of the subject and the discourse of truth are linked" (EPPC, 30), of the ways in which "men govern themselves and others by the production of truth" – understood as "the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent" (EEW3, 230).

According to Paul Veyne, what his friend, "personally, found odious was that anyone should want to make everyone believe his own truths, just because he wanted their welfare, as

Foucault liked to up it".[331] I want to suggest that this constitutes a description of the way in which pastoral power, whether openly religious or secularized, rationalizes the obedience it demands. In other words, pastoral government offers a "rationalization of the management of individuals" (EFL, 299) that appeals to their own good, to what it knows to be beneficial to them even if they are not aware of it. What justifies its "permanent and [...] positive intervention in the behavior of individuals" (ETS, 159) is its ability to intercede for their salvation. In secular terms, to guarantee their correction or normalization as the only way to achieve "happiness" conceived as the combination of a communitarian sense of belonging and an individualistic self-realization or liberation through authenticity. As Foucault put it, "when a judgment cannot be framed in terms of good and evil, it is stated in terms of normal and abnormal. And when it is necessary to justify this last distinction, it is done in terms of what is good or bad for the individual" (ELCP, 230).

If we define morality as "a code that would tell us how to act" (EEW1, 131), then it is clear that government as "a project for conducting men" (ECF-STP, 355), is a "moral project" (ECF-GSO, 349, 350). The "governing" or "pastoral function" – that is, "taking charge of men collectively and individually" in order to lead them to their salvation[332] (ECF-STP, 165) – survives in the "Psychological function" (ECF-PP, 85, 86, and 190) as well as in the "securizing function".[333] With regard to this last one, the "security pact" offered to the population by the modern state as "a new form of pastoral power" constitutes a secularization of the "protection"

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[331] Veyne, *Foucault*, 122.

[332] "to be governed is to be directed towards [...] [one's] salvation" (EEF, 264).

[333] In 1977 he talks about the "'securizing' function" of the modern state. It "prides itself on offering population not so much territorial integrity, victory over the enemy, or even general enrichment as "security": a staving off and repair of risks, accidents, dangers, contingencies, diseases, and so on [...] [it] entails dangerous extensions of power and distortions in the area of recognized rights" (EEW3, 427).

and "security" that the agents of pastoral power extended to those who put themselves in their "care". What makes pastoral government – both present and past – work is the "fear of fear" (EEW3, 428). This practice of power inaugurated a regime in which "security and fear [...] challenge and reinforce each other" (Ibid., 427).

In 1972 Foucault anticipated his later characterization of the "governing function" when, in the context of his analysis of disciplinary power, he referred to "the function of surveillance-correction [...] which for centuries has not ceased to take on new dimensions [...] Surveilling individuals and correcting them, in both senses of the term, that is, punishing them and teaching them" (EFL, 89). If the "threefold aspect of panopticism – supervision, control, correction" continues to be "a fundamental and characteristic dimension of the power relations that exists in our society" (EEW3, 70), that's because of the spread of the pastoral practice of government. Just as the "Psy-function" was "entirely derived from the dissemination of psychiatric power beyond the asylum" (ECF-PP, 190), so the pastoral function is the result of the expansion of pastoral power beyond the institution of the Church. Both resort to "mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers that [...] they bring with them [...] medicine, psychology, education, public assistance, 'social work' assume an even greater share of the powers of supervision and assessment" (EDP, 306). Correction as salvation functions as morality because it implies "the molding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms" (EEW3, 70). And, as Georges Canguilhem explained in his 1966 book *Le normal et le pathologique*:[334] "The normal is not a static or peaceful, but a dynamic and polemical concept" – or, as Foucault preferred to say, a "political" one – because it "is itself normative, it serves as a norm even for the universe of

[334] Foucault wrote the "Introduction" to the first English edition of this text, which appeared in 1978.

mythical discourse which tells the story of its absence [...] norms [...] refer the real to values [...] It is in the nature of the normative that its beginning lies in its infraction [...] The abnormal, as ab-normal, comes after the definition of the normal, it is its logical negation. However, it is the historical anteriority of the future abnormal which gives rise to a normative intention. The normal is the effect obtained by the execution of the normative project".[335]

Foucault maintains that "in its modern forms, the pastorate is deployed to a great extent through medical knowledge, institutions, and practices [...] medicine has been one of the [...] heirs to the pastorate" (ECF-STP, 199). In the *History of Madness* he had already pointed at "a profound complicity between medicine and morality", so that "medical perception" is profoundly conditioned by "moral perception" (EHM, 85). There is a "moralization" or "culpabilization" of illness – both "physical" and "mental" – like the one it has been applied to poverty. A culpabilization or even criminalization of disease that US Neo-liberalism has used to justify denying universal access to care through a single-payer system. Any "abnormally serious" disease before the retirement age is considered indicative of some kind of sinful conduct or moral weakness, on the part of the ill themselves or their parents. The Reagan administration's refusal to deal with the AIDS epidemics is just an example. Their concept of "personal responsibility" for one's own "health" combines an exorbitant degree of voluntarism with an infantile unwillingness to acknowledge both the fragility of human existence (together with the unequal distribution of that precariousness) and the role of chance or moraline-free genetics. Disease is no longer an inescapable fact of life that has little or nothing to do with the strength of our will, but a punishment for immoral, abnormal, unhealthy, or irresponsible behavior. This is the context of the emergence

[335] Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological* (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 239, 242, 240, and 243.

of the still prevalent "imperative of health: at once the duty of each and the objective of all" (EPK, 170).

Health is "a cultural fact in the broadest sense of the word", one that has to do with "a certain state of individual and collective consciousness. Every era outlines a "normal" profile of health" (EEW1, 379). In 1978 he defined biopolitics as "the general procedures for taking charge of life and illness in the West" (ECF-STP, 120). The body is a "biopolitical reality" and medicine constitutes "a biopolitical strategy" (EEW3, 137), a "social practice" (Ibid., 136), that functions as a "*system of obedience*" (EPPC, 196). One that has "brought [...] human existence, human behavior, and the human body [...] into an increasingly dense and important network of medicalization that allowed fewer and fewer things to escape" (EEW3, 135). With the secularization and expansion of the practice of power as pastoral government, "people appear who make it their own business to involve themselves in other people's lives, health, nutrition, housing; then, out of this confused set of functions, there emerged certain personages, institutions, forms of knowledge: public hygiene, inspectors, social workers, psychologists [...] It is medicine that has played the basic role as the common denominator. Its discourse circulated from one instance to the next" (EPK, 62).

The doctor has become "the great advisor and expert". He has the moral authority not just to provide guidance or give wise advice, but also to dictate prescriptions that are not limited to the issue of disease as his field of study, but include topics related to "general forms of existence and behavior". He dominates "the art of [...] correcting, and improving" both the individual and "the social 'body'" in order to keep them "in a permanent state of health [...] it is the doctor's function as hygienist rather than his prestige as therapist that assures him this politically privileged position" (EEF, 346).

In *The Birth of the Clinic* Foucault explains that until the end of the eighteenth century, "medicine related much more to health than to normality". In other words, "it referred [...] to qualities of vigour, suppleness, and fluidity, which were lost in illness and which it as the task of medicine to restore". On the contrary, modern medicine functions on the basis of "normality" rather than "health"; it begins by defining what constitutes the "'regular' functioning of the organism" and then tries to find out where the body in question "deviated [...] and how it could be brought back into normal working order". Its "concepts" and "its interventions" are defined "in relation to a standard [...] the [...] bipolarity of the normal and the pathological" (EBC, 35). It was the role played by medicine as the guardian of the hygiene of the social body, and therefore as an intervention oriented towards maintaining the strength and purity of the nation-state, that allowed it to acquire a "positive significance. Instead of remaining what it was [...] the dubious negation of the negative, it was given the splendid task of establishing in men's lives the positive role of health, virtue, and happiness". This means that medicine stopped being just was "a body of techniques for curing ills" and became but "a knowledge of *healthy man,* that is, a study of *non-sick man* and a definition of the *model man*. in the ordering of human existence, it assumes a normative posture, which authorizes it not only to distribute advice as to healthy life, but also to dictate the standards" that define what constitute "healthy" relationships, ways of living and relating to things, to others, and to oneself (Ibid., 34).

Health has become the reward of virtue; or even a sign of divine election, like economic success. Forced to play the role of a modern Socrates accused of corrupting the youth, Foucault reacts by saying: "I'm very proud that some people think that I'm a danger for the intellectual health of students. When people start thinking of health in intellectual activities, I think there is something wrong" (ETS, 13). One cannot help wondering what he would say today, when

everything and everybody is judged according to the moral criteria that praise the “good” as healthy and condemn the “evil” as unhealthy.

V. CHAPTER FOUR: A CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF THE PRESENT

> *And even today the philosophers [...] still provide the strongest proof of how far this authority of morality goes [...] what becomes of them as soon as they start thinking about 'Thou shalt' and 'Thou shalt not'?[...] Now all at once they're lambs, now they want to be flocks [...] each wants to serve morality with his best energies. Most of them hit upon 'justifying morality', as it's called, in other words reconciling and allying morality with reason, even to the point of unity; conversely, the subtler among them find in the very unjustifiability of morality the sign and privilege of its rank [...] superior to reason [...] But they all agree on the main thing: 'Morality exists, morality is given!'- they all believe [...] in the value of what they call morality, that is: they are under its authority [...] Will anyone be allowed to take the floor who has doubts about just that value?"*[336]

> *The art of living is to eliminate psychology, to create, with oneself and others, individualities, beings, relations, unnameable qualities* (EFL, 317).

> *You admire the categorical imperative within you? This 'firmness' of your so-called moral judgement? This absoluteness of the feeling, 'here everyone must judge as I do'? Rather admire [...] the blindness, pettiness, and simplicity of your selfishness! [...] Your 'moral strength' might have its source in your stubbornness- or in your inability to envisage new ideals [...] It is time to feel nauseous about some people's moral chatter about others. Sitting in moral judgement should offend our taste.*[337]

> *A critique and a permanent creation of ourselves [...] the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings [...] it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think (*EEW1, 314, 315, and 316).

In this chapter I will offer a reading of Foucault's work in the 80s as a critique of the Christian and modern morality of the subject[338] and a call for "an ethics and an aesthetics of the self" (ECF-HOS, 251). By the latter he means the creation of ways of relating to ourselves – the self being nothing other than that relationship – different from the ones imposed by the hermeneutics of the subject.[339]

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[336] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[203], 98 and 99.

[337] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* "Book Four", section 335, 188 and 189.

[338] What Nietzsche called the "Christian-moral interpretation" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* 2[127], 83).

Foucault had spent the previous two decades searching for ways to both evince and undermine the "transcendental narcissism" (EAK, 203) that lies at the basis of the philosophy of the subject, as well as warning against "the perilous ease" that a politics that calls itself "progressive" would grant itself, "if it assumed the guarantee provided by a primitive foundation or a transcendental teleology".[340] As his analytics of governmental practices moves forward, it becomes increasingly apparent why and how his early rejection of the "philosophical recourse to a constituent subject" (EEW2, 462) was not just – it could never be – an epistemological stance, but entails calling into question the moral-psychological normativity that prescribes and enforces an ontology of substances. Theory and practice "are connected in an ethical sense, but one which has results that have to be called political" (EFR, 377). And by "political" Foucault means "what we are willing to [...] accept, to refuse, and to change, both in ourselves and in our circumstances [...] a history of what we have done and, at the same time, a diagnosis of what we are" (ERC, 161). This "diagnosis", hence, can "not consist in a simple characterization of what we are but, instead – by following the lines of fragility in the present – in managing to grasp why and how that-which-is might no longer be that-which-is [...] any description must always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation" (EPPC, 34).

His "trip" to Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity provides him with the materials for an analysis of the conditions of possibility for the pastoral confiscation or appropriation of pagan

[339] "The moment, maybe, is coming for us to ask: do we need, really, this hermeneutics of the self [...] which we have inherited from the first centuries of Christianity? Do we need a positive man who serves as the foundation of this hermeneutics [..]? [...] Maybe our problem is now to discover that the self is nothing else than the historical correlation of the technology built in our history" (ERC, 181).

[340] Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse", in *The Foucault Effect*, 65.

ethics by the Christian morality of the subject.[341] It is the "constitution of the self as subject" that transforms ethics – defined as the practice of individual freedom in the search for a personal *ēthos*[342] – into Christian morality as a compulsory "technology of reform" (EPK, 48) or "purification"[343] that requires obedience to a code of rules which are the commands of a personal God.[344]

Foucault's history[345] shows that "the general Greek problem was not the tekhnē of the self, but the tekhnē of life […] how to live […] they didn't worry about the afterlife […] or whether God exists or not […] one of the main evolutions in ancient culture has been that this *tekhnē tou biou* became more and more a technique of the self" (EEW1, 260). Consequently, "the form of subjectivity peculiar to Western thought […] was constituted when the *bios* ceased being […] the

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[341] "Classical antiquity never problematized the constitution of the self as subject; inversely, beginning with Christianity, there is an appropriation of morality through the theory of the subject" (EFL, 473). For a very similar translation, see EPPC, 253. The original French reads as follows: "Il manquait à l'Antiquité classique d'avoir problématisé la constitution de soi comme sujet; inversement, à partir du christianisme, il y a eu confiscation de la morale par la théorie du sujet" (FDE2a, 1525).

[342] Individual freedom was an "ethical problem. But ethical in the sense in which the Greeks understood it: *ēthos* was a way of being and of behavior [...] this was the concrete form of freedom [...] freedom conceived as *ēthos*" (EEF, 29). In Antiquity, ethics was "an effort to affirm one's liberty and to give one's life a certain form in which one could recognize oneself [...] how to govern one's own life in order to give it the most beautiful form possible [...] an art of existence [...] a technique of life [...] a practice of the self whose objective was to constitute oneself as the worker of the beauty of one's own life" (EFL, 451, 458, and 459).

[343] With Christianity "the problem of ethics as an aesthetics of existence is covered over by the problem of purification [...] of purity [...] The new Christian self has to be constantly examined because in this self were lodged concupiscence and desires of the flesh" (EEW1, 274).

[344] "From Antiquity to Christianity one passes from a morality that was essentially a search for a personal ethics to morality as obedience to a system of rules [...] In Christianity, with the religion of the text, the idea of God's will and the principle of obedience, morality took the form of a code of rules" (EFL, 451).

[345] "history serves to show how that-which-is has not always being; i.e., that the things which seem most evident to us are always formed in the confluence of encounters as chances, during the course of a precarious and fragile history [...] what different forms of rationality offer as their necessary being, can [...] be shown to have a history; and the network of contingencies from which it emerges can be traced [...] since things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made" (EPPC, 37). "History becomes 'effective' to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being […] The purpose of history guided by genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation" (EEW2, 380, 386).

correlate [...] the object of a *tekhnē* […] to become a test of the self". And the word "test" here means both "experience" and "exercise": life becomes "that through which we experience ourselves [...] know [...] discover [...] and reveal ourselves to ourselves" as well as "an exercise through which we transform [...] or save ourselves" (ECF-HOS, 486). This constitutes "a very important mutation" (Ibid., 487) because in classical antiquity there is no "experience of the subject", but rather "of the individual, insofar as he sought to constitute himself through self-mastery [...] since no Greek thinker ever found a definition of the subject, never looked for one, I would simply say that there was no subject" (EFL, 473). Nonetheless, Foucault admits that this form of existence was anticipated or prefigured by a "contradiction" present in ancient ethics; that between the "obstinate search for a certain style of existence" and "the effort to make it common to everyone". As Nietzsche had indicated, the monotheism commanded once Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century – that is, the "belief in a normal god next to whom there are only false pseudo-gods" – cannot be dissociated from the imposition of "a normal human type [...] only one norm: '*the* human being' [...] In polytheism the free-spiritedness and many-spiritedness of humanity received preliminary form – the power to create for ourselves our own new eyes and ever again new eyes [...] there are no eternal horizons or perspectives [...] one got a *plurality of norms*: one god was not the denial of or anathema to another god!".[346]

In addition, Foucault maintains that "Antiquity never stopped asking if it were possible to define a style" that would unify the "different domains of conduct"; one that would be "common to" one's relation to oneself, to others, and to one's way of behaving. He is convinced that "the discovery of this style would [...] have led to a definition of the subject" (Ibid., 466). But "the

[346] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* "Book Three", section 143, 127 and 128.

unity of a 'morality of style' only began to be thought under the Roman Empire, in the second and third centuries, and immediately in terms of a code and a truth [...] a style that they approached more or less obscurely with Seneca and Epictetus but which would find the possibility of realization only within a religious style" (EFL, 146, 147). Thus, the establishment of pastoral power in the third and fourth centuries constitutes the end result of a process through which pagan ethics "yielded to a form of thought that was going to be found in Christianity […] Greek philosophy little by little transformed itself into a morality in which we now recognize ourselves" (Ibid., 467 and 469).

In *The Order of Things* Foucault wrote "God is perhaps not so much a region beyond knowledge as something prior to the sentences we speak; and if Western man is inseparable from him, it is not because of some invincible propensity to go beyond the frontiers of experience, but because his language ceaselessly foments him in the shadow of his[347] laws: 'I[348]fear indeed that we shall never rid ourselves of God, since we still believe in grammar'" (EOT, 298). It seems to me that what he is suggesting here is that, as Nietzsche had anticipated, the Christian God survives both in our morality and in our grammar, which should thence be considered as effects. That is to say, "the oldest sovereign" (ECF-STP, 66) lives on in the originating, effective subject, endowed with intentions or motives that are the expression of a good or evil will and constitute the cause of his or her actions; the "instrument" and "effect" of the pastoral exercise of power as government. The Christian God and the subject are co–constitutive and co-enabling notions. If we want to know

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[347] *Les Mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 311: "mais parce que son langage le fomente sans cesse dans l'ombre de ses lois". The possessive adjective "ses" can be translated not only as "*his* (i.e., man's) laws", but also as "*its* (i.e., language's) laws".

[348] Quote from Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols,* "Reason in Philosophy", section 5. The translation I have been using says: "I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar" (*The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* 170).

how the subject was "made" – so that it can be "unmade" (EPPC, 37) – we need to put it back in the context of the triadic relationship that produced it and gave it its meaning, to analyze the mutual dependence among the subject, God as sovereign and Christ as the first in a series of pastors or mediators. That's why, for both Nietzsche and Foucault,[349] once "the belief in the Christian God [...] has been undermined [...] our entire European morality [...] must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it".[350]

In 1971 Foucault had defined "humanism" in a way that anticipates – in fact, coincides with – what he would later consider to be the logic proper to pastoral power: Humanism, he said, is "the totality of discourse through which Western man is told: 'Even though you don't exercise power, you can still be a ruler. Better yet, the more you deny yourself the exercise of power, the more you submit to those in power, then the more this increases your sovereignty'. Humanism invented a whole series of subjected sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to God), consciousness (sovereign in a context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and 'aligned with destiny'). In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts *the desire for power*: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the possibility of power being seized. The theory of the subject (in the double sense of the word) is at the heart of humanism" (ELCP, 221, 222). The strategy of offering sovereignty in exchange of obedience was first implemented by pastoral power. The reason why the Christian "must get free from any attachment to this self" is

[349] To this "absence of morality as obedience to a code of rules [...] one responds, or must respond, with [...] an aesthetics of existence" (EFL, 451).

[350] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* "Book Five", section 343, 199.

not, as it is the case in Buddhism, "because the self is an illusion", but rather because it is "much too real" and therefore interferes with God's will (EEW1, 178). As we saw in "Chapter One: The Birth of Psychiatric Power", what one receives in exchange of the renunciation of one's will is eternal life and knowledge of The Truth; a knowledge that allows us to judge others, because it is no longer we who judge,[351] and sharing the News is our duty as Christians. [352] In Nietzsche's words, it is "the strictly egoistic belief in [...] the absolute importance of eternal *personal* salvation"[353] that leads us "to take up a position or role towards oneself as that of a judge pronouncing a verdict" (EFS, 166). As the first form of objectification of the self, sin forces us to establish a relation to ourselves marked by "mistrust", one that turns us into "the object of an attentive, scrupulous, and suspicious vigilance" (ECF-CT, 334). We have been brought to experience our lack of transparency, the fact that "we are unknown to ourselves, we knowers",[354] that "everyone is farthest from himself",[355] as a punishment: "For Christians, the possibility that Satan can get inside your soul and give you thoughts you cannot recognize as satanic, but might interpret as coming from God, leads to uncertainty about what is going on inside the soul" (EEW1, 270). Becoming a subject means occupying the position of the holder of guilt and debt.

[351] As Deleuze puts it, "morality is the judgment of God, the *system of Judgment*". Ethics would be "a typology of immanent modes of existence" (*Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), 23).

[352] "That which, from the earliest times to the present moment, men have found so hard to understand is their ignorance of themselves! [...] The primeval delusion still lives on that one knows, and knows quite precisely in every case, *how human action is brought about* [...] everyone [...] is in no doubt that he understands what is essentially involved in the process of action in every other person. 'I know what I want, what I have done, I am free and responsible for it, I can call by its name every moral possibility and every inner motion which precedes action [...]' [...] we have the oldest realism against us; up to now mankind has thought: 'an action is what it appears to us to be' [...] this moral realism [...] Each one of us is truly a competent and perfectly moral judge'" (Nietzsche, *Daybreak,* "Book II", section 116, 72 and 73).

[353] Ibid., section 132, 82.

[354] Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, "Preface", section 1, 3.

[355] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, "Book Four", section 335, 187.

Through the process of "in-depth Christianization" and "governmentalization" that begins in the sixteenth century, Humanism – or the defense of "the rights, the privileges, and the nature of a human being as an immediate and timeless truth of the subject" (EEW2, 462), the "philosophico-juridical individual" (ECF-PP, 58) – became the discourse of secularized pastoral power in modernity. According to Foucault, "man as subject of his own consciousness and of his own liberty is really a sort of correlative image of God". Implicit in Kant's understanding of human sovereignty and autonomy as obedience to universal reason there is "a kind of theologizing of man. Nietzsche was the one who by denouncing the death of god at the same denounced this divinized man that the 19th century never ceased to dream". Therefore, with the *Übermensch* he was not announcing "the coming of a man who would resemble a god more than a man, but rather the coming of a man who would no longer have any relation with this god whose image he continued to bear" (EFL, 53).

By presenting "the power it exercises as juridical and negative rather than as tactical and positive" (EEW3, 121, 122), Western pastoral rationality has managed to conceal the status of the subject as effect of a process of constitution or individualization. The late Foucault explicitly identifies the "axis of power"[356] with normativity[357] but, as early as 1975, he had already referred to the norm as the "element on the basis of which a certain exercise of power is founded and

[356] "The three axes constitutive of any [...] experience" (EHS2, 4), the three "types of problems [...] domains of experience" (EFL, 466) or of "genealogy" (EEW1, 262) are: "power", "knowledge" or "truth", and "ethics" or "individual conduct".

[357] "Types of normativity" (EHS2, 4), "a system of rules [...] normative systems" (EEW1, 204), "a type of normativity", "a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, and so on)", "the organization of a normative system", "forms of normality" (Ibid., 202), "the relation to rules" (Ibid., 203). As for the third axis, he variously refers to it as "individual conduct" (EFL, 466), "the axis of ethics" (EEW1, 318), "forms of subjectivity" (EHS2, 4), "a model for relations to the self" (EEW1, 204), "the modality [...] modes [...] forms of relation to the self" (Ibid., 205).

legitimized" (ECF-AB, 50). As a secular extension of Christian morality and the "pastoral function", psychology and the "Psy-function"[358] are always normative and therefore linked to a moral "technology of reform" (EPK, 48). In other words, morality and psychology are not primarily repressive but productive; they don't work through the internalization[359] of a series of prohibitions by an already-given subject,[360] but by forming the self as subject. The norm "brings with it a principle of both qualification and correction", which means that its "function is not to exclude or to reject". On the contrary, it is "always linked to a positive technique of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project". This "positive, technical, and political conception of normalization" (ECF-AB, 50) underpins not only his analysis of pastoral power as both disciplinary and regulatory, but also his refusal to "propose", [361] to speak "in the capacity of master of truth and justice [...] as the spokesman of the universal" (EPK, 126).

Tracing the genealogy of the modern subject "from the point of view of the techniques of the self" (ERC, 169) – understood as practices of self-formation and self-regulation – means doing

[358] "The diffusion of psychiatric power" took place through the "development of the concept of the 'normal'" (ECF-PP, 202).

[359] "We have to get rid of the more or less Freudian schema […] of the interiorization of the law by the self […] things are much more complicated than that" (ERC, 163).

[360] "the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productivity of power. In defining the effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power, one identifies power with a law that says no- power is taken, above all, as carrying the force of prohibition […] If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think that one would be brought to obey it?" (EEW3, 120, 121).

[361] "My position is that it is not up to us to propose. As soon as one 'proposes' – one proposes a vocabulary, and ideology, which can only have effects of domination. What we have to present are instruments and tools that people might find useful" (EPPC, 197).

a "genealogy" of our morality[362] and, more specifically, of our ethics,[363] as one of its three components.[364] "Christian interiority" and "psychological subjectivity" are just "a particular mode of relationship with oneself" (EHS2, 63); morality has "naturalized" them as the expression of a "human essence" and therefore as the only form of existence that qualifies as "human". That's why Foucault considers that "one can say that all of Western civilization has been subjugated [...] to the Subject [...] the death of man is [...] one of the visible forms of a much more general decease [...] I [...] mean by it [...] the death of the subject, of the Subject in capital letters, of the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge [...] Freedom [...] Language and History" (EFL, 53).

He wants his "critical ontology"[365] to free us both from God and from Man (EIKA, 124), replacing the morality of a shared human essence and a unique true self, together with the

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[362] In an interview conducted in 1975, just after the publication of *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault said: "If I wanted to be pretentious, I would use 'the genealogy of morals' as the general title of what I am doing" (EPK, 53). In 1978 he indicated that one of the reasons why he wanted to study the prison was "the idea of reactivating the project of a "genealogy of morals", [362] one that worked by tracing the lines of transformation of what one might call "moral technologies" (EEW3, 224). Finally, in an interview conducted on April 25 1984 and published in July, it was the interviewer, Alessandro Fontana, who asked him if his works wasn't "basically a question of a new genealogy of morals". To this suggestion Foucault responded: "if not for the solemnity of the title and the imposing mark that Nietzsche left on it, I would say yes" (EFL, 451).

[363] Foucault defines "ethics" as "the relation to oneself" (EEW1, 266), "the relationship you have to yourself when you act" (EPPC, 15), "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rapport à* soi [...] which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as [...] subject of his own actions" (EEW1, 263).

[364] The three components or aspects of every morality are: First, the "code [of behavior]" or "prescriptive ensemble". Second, "the real behavior of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them [...] the word thus designates the manner in which they comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which they obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of values. In studying this aspect of morality, one must determine how and with what margins of variation or transgression individuals or groups conduct themselves in reference to a prescriptive system that is explicitly or implicitly operative in their culture, and of which they are more or less aware. We can call this level of phenomena "the morality of behaviors" (EHS2, 25, 26). "The acts [*conduites*] are the real behavior of people in relation to the moral code [*prescriptions*] imposed on them" (EEW1, 263). And, finally, the "ethics" or "modes of subjectivation", "the manner in which one ought to 'conduct oneself'" (EHS2, 25, 26), which includes four elements: the "ethical substance", the "type of subjection" or "*mode d'assujettissement"*, the "forms of elaboration of the self" or "ascesis" and the "teleology" or "*telos"* (EHS2, 27).

"discharge of ressentiment through judging, repudiating, punishing egoism",[366] with ethics as self-creation. It is the death of God that "by putting an end to the absolute, is at the same time the cause of the death of man himself [...] The death of God is realized [...] in the death of man" (EIKA, 124). Morality as "obedience" would be replaced with "an aesthetics of existence" (EFL, 451). By this Foucault means a practice of freedom[367] that does not appeal to "truth" – either in the form of a "human essence" or a personal "true self" – but rather consists of "creating our own relation to ourselves [...] We are prisoners of certain conceptions about ourselves and our behavior [...] The relationships we have with ourselves are not ones of identity, rather they must be relations of differentiation, of creation, of innovation" (Ibid., 298, 385).

As Veyne reminds us, Foucault refused "to use thought to confer upon his political choices the value of truth".[368] And he criticized the "present culture of the self" precisely for doing that: "most of the people think [that] if they do what they do, if they live as they live, the reason is that they know the truth about desire, life, nature" (EEW1, 261, 262). Therefore, what he is suggesting instead is a concrete practice of freedom[369] that invents "styles of existence" (EFL, 473) which do

[365] "That form of thought to which Nietzsche dedicated us from the beginning of his works [...] one that would be, absolutely and in the same motion, a Critique and an Ontology, an understanding that comprehends both finitude and being" (EEW2, 75).

[366] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 14[29], 243.

[367] Freedom is "a practice [...] what must be exercised [...] The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around [...] I think that it can never be inherent in the structure of things to guarantee the exercise of freedom [...] The guarantee of freedom is freedom [...] the real practice of people in the exercise of their freedom" (EFL, 339, 340).

[368] Veyne, *Foucault*, 129. "'Do not use thought to confer the value of truth upon any political practice,' he wrote" (Ibid., 1).

[369] "We should not think of freedom as a universal which is gradually realized over time, or which undergoes [...] greater or lesser [...] reductions [...] It is not a universal which is particularized in time and geography [...] Freedom is never anything other – but this is already a great deal – than an actual relation between governors and governed, a relation in which the measure of the 'too little' existing freedom is given by the 'even more' freedom demanded" (ECF-BOB, 63).

not resort to the value of truth in order to justify or impose themselves. In Greco-Roman ethics he finds a "practice" and a "conception of the self" that are "very different", or rather, "diametrically opposed" to ours, still dominated by the hermeneutics of the subject:[370] "one is supposed to discover one's true self, to separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to tell you what your true self is" (EEW1, 271).

It is my contention that when Foucault talks about the "return to the self" as a "recurrent theme in "modern" culture since the sixteenth century" (ECF-HOS, 250) and urges us to undertake the "urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task" of reconstituting "an ethics and an aesthetics of the self",[371] what he has in mind is neither some kind of celebratory contemplation of a given identity nor the "eternal vigilance", "suspiciousness" and "endless self-questioning" (EEW1, 195) required by the hermeneutics of the subject. Far from that, he is thinking of a kind of "concern" or focus on ourselves as the first, ineludible step that would make it possible for us to get rid of the subject. In other words, the "relationship one has to oneself" is the "first or final point of resistance" (ECF-HOS, 252) to the pastoral exercise of power as government. The only way to resist being governed by our own truth is by refusing that truth as ours, even if this implies being perceived as un-true, as non-being. Concern with ourselves is required if we are to undo the

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[370] "During the last two centuries the problem has been [...] how could we save the hermeneutics of the self and get rid of the necessary sacrifice of the self [...] the permanent anthropologism of Western thought [...] is linked to the deep desire to substitute the positive figure of man for the sacrifice" demanded by Christianity (ERC, 180, 181).

[371] We "cannot fail to be struck by the fact that this theme of return to the self has basically been reconstituted – but in fragments and scraps – in a series of successive attempts that have never been organized in the overall and continuous way that it was in Hellenistic and Roman antiquity. The theme of return to the self has never been dominant for us as it was possible for it to be in the Hellenistic and Roman epoch. To be sure, there is an ethics an also an aesthetics of the self in the sixteenth century [...] a whole section of nineteenth century thought can be reread as a [...] series of difficult attempts, to reconstitute and ethics and an aesthetics of the self [...] At any rate, what I would like to point out is that, after all [...] I do not think we have anything to be proud of in our current efforts to reconstitute an ethic of the self" (ECF-HOS, 251).

practices and individualization procedures through which we have been made into subjects, "the set of processes through which the subject exists" (EFL, 472). This "attention" to oneself[372] has been condemned as "egoism" by the morality of the subject, the one that promises sovereignty in exchange of obedience.[373] In other words, we have been brought "to see taking care of ourselves as an immorality [...] We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation [...] We also inherit a secular tradition which respects external law as the basis for morality [...] a social morality which seeks the rules for acceptable behavior in relation with others" (ETS, 22). The question that Foucault wants to pose by calling into question the "value" of that morality is: what if it is precisely a "moral experience centered [...] on the subject"[374] that prevents us from appreciating the purely relational character of the self, the fact that we are "not sovereign but dependent"? (Ibid., 67). However, this is no longer the old dependency on the transcendent "will of an all-powerful agency" (EHS2, 79) but on other existences, as well as on a series of moral-psychological norms that confer "reality" or "being" according to our degree of conformity. What if refusing to exist as a subject is the only way to experience and recast the relationships that constitute us in all their radicality, i.e., beyond the purely juridical and negative framework of "moral obligations" and "responsibilities"?

Foucault refers to two nineteenth-century figures as examples of the attempt to "reconstitute an ethics and an aesthetics of the self", of "modernity as an attitude", that is, "a

[372] "Extensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape in an *ēthos*" (EEF, 29). All the types or modalities of relation to oneself imply "the principle of an elaboration of the self, albeit in a very different form" (EHS2, 63).

[373] A "general ethic of non-egoism taking the form either of a Christian obligation of self-renunciation or of a 'modern' obligation towards others-whether this be other people, the collectivity, the class, or the fatherland etc." (ECF-HOS, 130).

[374] "A moral experience centered essentially on the subject no longer seems to me satisfactory today" (EFL, 473).

voluntary choice made by certain people [...] a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving [...] a bit like what the Greeks called an ēthos" (EEF, 48); an experience of the self as a practice, a doing more than a being; a relation to ourselves defined by the "practice of creativity – and not that of authenticity", which is "a moral notion" (EEW1, 262). Foucault holds that, for Baudelaire, "modern man [...] is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his inner truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. This modernity does not "liberate man in his own being"; it compels him to face the task of producing himself [...] the ascetic elaboration [...] the ascetic elaboration of the self [...] the asceticism of the dandy who makes of his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art" (Ibid., 312). The second character he mentions is Nietzsche. In fact, when Foucault claims that as "a form to be given to one's behavior and life" (EPPC, 263), "ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure […] the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art" (EEW1, 260), he is echoing Nietzsche's call "to 'give style' to one's character"[375], to become "the poets of our own lives".[376]

To a morality dictated by the desire "to preserve, against all decenterings, the sovereignty of the subject" (EAK, 12), Foucault opposes a "critical philosophy" that explores "the conditions

[375] "*One thing is needful.* – To 'give style' to one's character – a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a great mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of first nature removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it is reinterpreted into sublimity. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and employed for distant views [...] In the end, when the work is complete, it becomes clear how it was the force of a single style that ruled and shaped everything great and small – whether the taste was good or bad means less than one might think; it is enough that it was one taste! [...] being bound but also perfected under their own law [...] it is the weak of character with no power over themselves who *hate* the constraint of style [...] For one thing is needful: that a human being attain satisfaction with himself [...] whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually prepared to avenge himself for this" (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science,* "Book Four", section 290, 163 and 164).

[376] "[...] all this we should learn from artists while otherwise being wiser than they. For usually in their case this delicate power stops where art ends and life begins; *we,* however, want to be poets of our own lives starting with the smallest and most commonplace details"(Ibid.*,* "Book Four" section 299, 170).

and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves" (ERC, 161). In other words, a way of practicing criticism whose goal is "to place at the disposal of the work that we can do on ourselves the greatest possible share of what is presented to us as inaccessible" by bringing to the fore all the things that can be modified because they are "bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constants" (EPPC, 156); a practice of critique that "would try not to judge but to bring [...] to life [...] It would multiply not judgments but signs of existence [...] It would not be sovereign or dressed in read. It would bear the lighting of possible storms" (EEW1, 323).

It is important to keep in mind that when Foucault claims that "what we call Christian morality was embedded in European morality [...] since the morality of antiquity" (EFL, 473) he is referring to the code that regulated the domain of what the Greeks called the "*aphrodisia*". The second volume of the *History of Sexuality* demonstrates that we find "nearly the same restrictive [...] prohibitive code in the fourth century B.C. and in the moralists and doctors at the beginning of the empire [...] the pagan philosophers in the centuries before and after the death of Christ proposed a sexual ethics that was very similar to the alleged Christian ethics" (EEW1, 254, 179). Therefore, "between paganism and Christianity, the opposition is not between tolerance and austerity but between a form of austerity linked to an aesthetics of existence and other forms of austerity linked to the necessity of renouncing the self and deciphering its truth" (Ibid., 274). In other words, the difference lies in the "ethics" or "relation to oneself".[377] Before Christianity, the "demands of austerity were not organized into a unified, coherent, authoritarian system that was imposed on everyone in the same manner; they were more in the nature of a supplement, a "luxury"

[377] "The way they integrate those prohibitions in relation to oneself is completely different" (EEW1, 254).

in relation to the commonly accepted morality" (EHS2, 21). The practice of austerity was "a personal choice [...] reserved for a few people" and it had an "aesthetic" goal (EEW1, 254). Moreover, there was "no institution – whether pastoral or medical – that claimed the right to determine what was permitted or forbidden, normal or abnormal" (Ibid., 36) in the domain of sexual behaviors. With the institutionalization of the Christian pastorate we pass from an ethics that "was not related to any social – or at least any legal institutional system –" to a morality that works as an instrument "to normalize the population" (Ibid., 254).

I think that Dave Tell is right when he argues that the "profound difference" between "these two discourses of the self was perhaps Foucault's most repeated claim in the 1980s".[378] In order to provide textual evidence to support this claim, I will offer a review of Foucault's remarks on this issue in seven conferences and courses delivered between 1979 and 1984. To put it another way, in the following pages I will show how in the last part of his work Foucault elaborated or refined his early critique of the modern reactivation of the Christian practices of confession, self-examination, and direction of conscience. It seems to me that if we want to appreciate the significance of that critique we need to pay attention not only to its 1976 formulation in *La Volonté de savoir,* but also to the key role played by the Christian technology of the self – as the "articulation" of the discourse of the hermeneutics of the subject and the techniques it requires – in his genealogy of the modern power of normalization, at least from *The History of Madness* and the 1973 *Course* onwards. Foucault wanted to know "what the technology of the self before Christianity was" (EEW1, 254) and found out that pastoral power had carried out a complete

[378] Tell, "Rhetoric and Power: An Inquiry into Foucault's Critique of Confession," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 43, no. 2 (2010): 96.

"restructuration of the forms of self-relationship" and, therefore, "a transformation of the practices and techniques on which this relation was based" (EHS2, 63).

The Christian pastorate was "absolutely innovative in establishing a [...] technique of, at once [...] self-examination, and the examination of others, by which a certain secret inner truth [...] becomes the element through which the pastor's power is exercised" and "the relationship of complete obedience is assured" (ECF-STP, 183). That's why Foucault suggests that our problem is "to get rid of those technologies, and then, to get rid of the sacrifice which is linked to those technologies. And in this case, one of the main political problems would be nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves" (ERC, 181). The "originality" and "specificity of Christianity" with regard to ancient philosophy consists in the mode or procedures of individualization it imposes, which will become "the typical constitution of the Western modern subject" (ECF-STP, 185).

Let's proceed with our review:

1. To begin with, I will refer to two of the transformations introduced by the Christian pastorate that Foucault analyzes in the 1979 lecture *Omnes et singulatim* as well as in the previous year's *Course.* In the first place, Foucault explains that Christianity "took over" or "appropriated" (ERC, 143) two techniques widely used by "the philosophical schools of antiquity", self-examination and the guidance of conscience, and in the process transformed them: "Christian practice will involve a completely different spiritual direction and examination" (ECF-STP, 182). We can summarize this change by saying that whereas the ancient self-examination was "an instrument of mastery", with the pastorate it became "an instrument of subordination" (Ibid., 183). The examination of conscience was widely used by the Pyhtagoreans, the Stoics, and the

Epicureans as a way of "daily taking stock […] measure[ing] […] one's progress on the way to perfection, i.e., self-mastery and the domination of one's passions" (ERC, 143).

The guidance of conscience was also a practice common in Greco-Roman culture, but "as advice given […] in particularly difficult circumstances". In other words, it was temporary and voluntary. Christianity "closely associated these two practices" and self-examination became one of the most effective "instruments of spiritual direction. "Being guided" becomes "a state and you were […] fatally lost if you tried to escape it […] The aim of self-examination was not to close self-awareness in upon itself, but to enable it to open up entirely to its director" (ERC, 143), so that "one examines one's conscience […] to mark and fix more firmly the relationship of subordination to the other" (ECF-STP, 182). These transformations in the practices of the self lead Foucault to conclude that "the type of relationship to truth in the Christian pastorate is not at all the same as the one found in Greco-Roman antiquity" (Ibid., 183).

The second change refers to the evolution of the meaning of the word "*apatheia*" from Greek and Greco-Roman philosophy to Christianity and its relation to obedience. Foucault explains that "when a Greek […] [goes] to see a philosophy master and places himself under his direction and guidance, he does so in order to arrive at something call *apatheia*: the absence of […] passions. Not having passions means no longer having any passivity […] to eliminate from oneself all those impulses, forces […] of which one is not the master […] Greek *apatheia* guarantees mastery of oneself […] is the other side of self-mastery […] in Stoic philosophy and late Epicureism […] one renounces certain things […] even the pleasures of the flesh and the body, in order to assure *apatheia*… one will become master through renunciation". However, with Christianity this word will acquire "a completely different meaning, and renunciation of [the] pleasures of the body will have a completely different effect in Christianity […] The charge against

the pleasures of the flesh is not that they make one passive […] but rather that […] the self, that I myself, am directly interested in them, and through them maintain a frenzied assertion of the self […] the *pathos* to be kept at bay […] is not passion but the will, will directed on oneself, and [...] *apatheia* will be the will that has renounced itself and continually renounces itself" (ECF-STP, 178, 179). Besides, the pastorate "conceived of the shepherd-sheep relationship as one of individual and complete dependence. This is […] one of the points at which Christian pastorship radically diverged from Greek thought. If a Greek […] obeyed, he did so because it was the law, or the will of the city. If he happened to follow the will of someone in particular […] that person […] had rationally persuaded him to do so. And it had to be for a strictly determined aim […] obedience […] for the Greeks was a provisional means to an end". With Christianity obedience becomes a "virtue", "an end in itself […] a permanent state […] personal submission […] Greek Christianity named this state of obedience *apatheia*" (ERC, 142).

It is important to realize that, according to Foucault, the "notion of a state of obedience is completely new and specific to Christianity in the West, and it is absolutely unprecedented" (ECF-STP, 177). That "state" is characterized by "the definitive and complete renunciation of one's own will [...] Being humble [...] humility [...] is [...] above all, knowing that any will of one's own is a bad will" (Ibid., 178, 177). The "aim" of the Christian techniques of the self is "to get individuals to work at their own 'mortification' in this world" in exchange for eternal life in the other.

2. In the "Summary" of the recently published 1980 lectures that Foucault wrote for the Collège de France's *Annuaire* he describes them as an inquiry into "the procedures of examination […] and […] confession in early Christianity" (EEW1, 81). And here he reiterates his claim that the Christian examination of conscience is "very different" from the one practiced in Greco-Roman antiquity. Both could take two "forms: the evening recollection of the day gone by and continual

vigilance concerning oneself. It is the second form that is most important in the monasticism described by Cassian. Its procedures show clearly that it is not a matter of deciding what must be done to keep from committing a transgression" but rather of "taking hold of the thought occurrence (*cogitatio=logismos*) [...] in order to grasp its origin and determine where it comes from (from God, from oneself, from the Devil) and do a sorting-out" (EEW1, 83, 84). As for the confession described by Cassian in his *Conferences* and *Institutes of the Cenobites*, Foucault maintains that "it is not simply a statement of wrongs committed, nor a general exposition of the state of one's soul; it must tend toward the continuous verbalization of all the impulses of thought [...] the 'sorting-out' [...] is performed through verbalization with the help of a threefold mechanism of shame [...] the incompatibility between the Devil, who tempts and deceives while hiding in the recesses of consciousness, and the light that exposes them to view [...] a continuous externalization through words of the "arcana" of consciousness [...] it must be emphasized that [...] the manifestation of the truth that hides in the depths of oneself [...] was not for the purpose of establishing one's sovereign mastery over oneself; what was expected, rather, was humility and mortification, detachment toward oneself and the constitution of a relation with oneself tending toward the destruction of the form of the self" (Ibid., 84).

In a lecture given at the University of Tokyo in 1978, Foucault had already anticipated that "there is something really important in the way Cassian poses the problem of truth about thoughts […] this is the first time that thoughts are considered a possible object of analysis […] a field of subjective data which have to be […] analyzed as an object […] if we compare it to the Stoic technologies of the self […] this […] is […] a quite new manner to organize the relationship between truth and subjectivity […] The hermeneutics of the self begins here" (ERC, 117). The relation to the confessor or director "takes the form of an unconditional and steadfast obedience

that concerns every aspect of life [...] the ability to direct is a charisma and obedience must constitute, in the form of humility, a permanent relationship with oneself and others" (Ibid., 83).

3. In the 1980 lectures "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self", Foucault says that "at first glance, in all the ancient philosophical practices, the obligation to tell the truth about oneself occupies a rather restrained place". And he offers two reasons to explain why that was the case "throughout the whole of Greek and Hellenistic antiquity" (Ibid., 163). However, on the next page he qualifies his initial claim by acknowledging that "despite this general orientation which has so little emphasis on self-examination and confession, one finds well before Christianity already elaborated techniques for discovering and formulating the truth about oneself. And their role […] became more and more important" (ERC: 164). Anyway, he still contends that there are "very large differences" between the classical practices of the self and the ones "developed in Christianity" and therefore the former cannot be seem as "the archetypes […] the early forms" of the latter: "I have tried to show that they are quite different […] Christianity as the cradle of western hermeneutics of the self […] decipher a hidden truth in the depth of the individual [...] the modern hermeneutics [...] the interpretative analysis of the self [...] is rooted [...] in those Christian techniques" (Ibid., 169). In other words, he accepts that "there is an obvious transfer […] continuity […] but these […] ancient practices were modified under the influence of two fundamental elements of Christian spirituality: the principle of obedience and the principle of contemplation" (Ibid., 174). As he will put it in the second volume of the *History of Sexuality,* before Christianity "the relation to truth […] never took the form of a decipherment of the self by the self […] it was not equivalent to an obligation for the subject to speak truthfully concerning himself; it never opened up the soul as a domain of [...] knowledge" (EHS2, 89).

For his analysis of the pagan use of those two techniques of the self, Foucault resorts to two texts by Seneca. For the examination he uses a passage from the *De Ira*[379] and explains that Seneca "employs a vocabulary which, at first glance appears, above all, judicial [...] It seems [...] that the subject is, with regard to himself, both the judge and the accused [...] But, if we look more closely, we see that the vocabulary [...] is much more administrative than judicial [...] he is not a judge who has to punish; he is, rather, an administrator who, once the work has been done [...] does the accounts, takes stock of things, and sees if everything has been done correctly. Seneca is a permanent administrator of himself, more than a judge of his own past". Furthermore, "the faults committed [...] are not really faults; they are mistakes [...] bad adjustments between aims and means [...] Seneca does not recall those faults in order to punish himself". His "goal" is the "reactivation of fundamental philosophical principles and the readjustment of their application. In the Christian confession, the penitent has to memorize the law in order to discover his own sins, but in this Stoic exercise the sage has to memorize acts in order to reactivate the fundamental rules [...] recalling the truth forgotten by the subject". In addition, Foucault makes clear that "what the subject forgets is not himself, nor his nature, nor his origin", but "what he ought to have done, that is, a collection of rules of conduct that he had learned [...] the recollection of errors committed during the day serves to measure the distance which separates what has been done from what should have been done". As a result, "the subject who practices the examination on himself is not the operating ground for a process [...] which has to be deciphered. He is the point where rules of conduct come together and register themselves in the form of memories [...] This evening examination has its logical place among a set of other Stoic exercises [...] the self [...] is not

[379] In the second volume of *The History of Sexuality* Foucault points out that this practice of self-examination "formed part of Pythagorean teaching, but it had become quite widespread" and reproduces his 1980 analysis of Seneca's text (EHS2, 60-62).

considered as a field of subjective date which have to be interpreted" (ERC, 165, 166). Whereas the stoic examination is "concerned with acts and rules", the one practiced in Christian institutions "is much more concerned with thoughts than with actions" (Ibid., 175).

For his study of the "confession" or "exposé" of oneself, Foucault turns to Seneca's correspondence with Serenus, who asks his master: "why should I not confess to you the truth, as to a doctor?" He insists that "what Seneca tries to do […] [is] not to discover a […] truth […] in the depth of Serenus' soul but […] to […] give place to truth as a force […] the force that would be able to transform pure knowledge […] in a real way of living […] The confession is not oriented towards an individualization of Serenus by the discovery of some personal characteristic, but towards the constitution of a self which could be at the same time and without discontinuity subject of knowledge and subject of will" (ERC, 167, 168). In their Stoic use, those two techniques of the self share a common goal: "to give place to truth as a force" (Ibid.). Thus, the analysis of Seneca's texts leads Foucault to conclude that "self-examination and confession may be in ancient philosophy […] an important truth game, but the objective of this truth-game is not to discover a secret reality inside the individual […] [but] to make of the individual a place where truth can appear and act as a real force". The model of subjectivity proposed by "the Stoicism of the imperial period" is "a gnomic self, where the force of truth is one with the form of the will [...] the self [...] had to be built as an identification between the force of truth and the form of the will [...] Elements […] in this model of the gnomic self: the necessity of telling the truth about oneself, the role of the master and the master's discourse, the long way that finally leads to the emergence of the self. We […] also […] find […] all those elements […] in the Christian technologies of the self, but with a very different organization". And this Christian "organization', so different "from the pagan one, is [...] quite decisive for the genealogy of the modern self". In the practices of self-examination

and confession in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy the self "is not something that has to be […] deciphered as a very obscure text […] the task is not to put in the light what would be the most obscure part of ourselves. The self has […] not to be discovered but to be constituted […] through the force of truth […] technologies of the self in the ancient world are […] not […] an art of interpretation […] self-hermeneutics won't intervene in the technologies of the self before Christianity […] the aim […] the […] constitution […] of the gnomic self […] something deeply different to […] the Christian technologies of the self". In the latter the goal is not to construct but to renounce the self by exposing the impurities hidden inside our souls. The "*exagouresis*" replaced the earlier "*exomologesis-publicatio sui*" as the dominant form of truth-telling about oneself in Christianity, but in both cases "the revelation of the truth about oneself cannot […] be dissociated from the obligation to renounce oneself" (ERC, 179).

4. In the 1982 course *The Hermeneutics of the Subject,* Foucault returns to or takes up again the view that "the subject's obligation to tell the truth about oneself", the "principle that we must be able to say the truth about ourselves in order to be able to establish a relationship to truth in general [...] did not exist at all in Greek, Hellenistic, or Roman antiquity" (ECF-HOS, 364). And then he anticipates or raises a possible objection to his claim that reads as follows: "in the Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman art of oneself, we find […] elements […] which […] a retrospective look could define as an anticipation of the future 'confession'. There are procedures of confession […] There are also […] exercises in the examination of conscience; [and] practices of consultation in which the individual seeking advice is obliged to speak the truth about himself. We also find the obligation to be frank with one's friends" (Ibid., 364, 365). However, Foucault dismisses this rebuttal by explaining that "all these elements […] [are] profoundly different from what we should call 'confession' in the strict […] sense of the word […] these obligations for the person being

guided to tell the truth […] are instrumental obligations […] they are not effective modifiers that bring about a change by themselves. As such they do not have a spiritual value […] one of the most remarkable features of the practice of the self in this period is that the subject must become a subject of truth […] He must therefore carry out a subjectivation […] of true discourse […] that begins with listening […] he must be able to say the truth and […] to say it to himself. In no way is it necessary or indispensable that he tell the truth about himself" (ECF-HOS, 365).

According to the new "regime of truth" instituted by Christianity, our relationship to truth "will not be governed simply by the purpose: 'How to become a subject of veridiction', but will have become: 'how to be able to say the truth about oneself'" (Ibid., 362). As an example, he refers to "the Socratic dialogue" and "the Stoic-Cynic diatribe": neither one nor the other requires "getting the subject to tell the truth about himself. It simply involves testing him[…] as a subject capable of telling the truth […] The discourse of the person being guided has no autonomy[…] the kinds of speech dragged […] from him […] through the dialogue or the diatribe, are basically ways of showing that the truth exists […] solely in the master's discourse […] *Parrhēsia* is […] what on the master's side corresponds to the disciple's obligation of silence […] the master's discourse must obey the principle of *parrhēsia* if […] he wants the truth of what he says to become the subjectivized true discourse of the disciple" (Ibid., 365 and 366). Therefore, it would be a mistake to see the Hellenistic and Roman art of self-care as a "privileged moment" in "the development and formulation of the question of the truth of the subject [...] confusions are facilitated, I believe, by the presence and prestige of two great models [...] schemas of the relation between care of the self [...] conversion to the self and knowledge of the self". The "Platonic" and the "Christian" models have "obscured what was specific in the model I want to analyze through Cynicism, Epicureanism, and especially Stoicism [...] the Hellenistic model [...] was concealed historically

and for later culture [...] I would like to [...] free it" (ECF-HOS, 254). The "model of exegesis", the Christian one, was "formed, beginning in the third and fourth centuries [...] knowledge of the self is required by the fact that the heart must be purified in order to understand the Word; it can only be purified by self-knowledge [...] through techniques whose essential function is to dispel internal illusions" (Ibid., 255). Both this and the Platonic "model of recollection [...] dominated Christianity and were afterwards transmitted through Christianity to the whole of Western culture" (Ibid., 257). The latter was "taken upon the frontiers of Christianity [...] on the borders [...] of the Christian Church [...] by [...] the Gnostic movements [...] the idea that knowledge of being and recognition of the self are one and the same thing. Returning to the self and taking up again the memory of the true is one and the same thing [...] all the Gnostic movements are more or less Platonic movements". As for the former, it "developed in confrontation with the Gnostic model [...] its effect was not to give knowledge the memorial function of rediscovering the subject's being, but rather the exegetical function of detecting the nature and the origin of internal impulses produced within the soul". According to Foucault, Christianity has never stopped trying both to "combat and take back into itself [...] the third [...] the Hellenistic model". It was "developed during the last centuries of the old era and the first centuries of our era. The form of this schema is neither recollection nor exegesis [...] it neither identifies care [...] and knowledge of the self, nor absorbs care [...] within knowledge of the self. Rather, it accentuates it tends to accentuate and privilege care of the self, to maintain its autonomy at least with regard to knowledge of the self whose place is [...] limited and restricted [...] [it] tends to make the self the objective to be attained [...] Throughout the Hellenistic and Roman period, between Platonism and Christianity, an art of the self was developed which for us will no doubt be just an episode permanently bracketed off by these two great models" (ECF-HOS, 257). In the classical care of the self, knowledge has an

"'ethopoetic" function; that is to say, its goal is to "form" or constitute "an ethos […] It does not involve the subject becoming the object of a true discourse". This, Foucault underscores, is the main difference: "This is what must be grasped, along with the fact that nothing in these practices of the self […] can appear as preliminary to or the sketch of the much later appearance of the decipherment of conscience by itself and the subject's self-exegesis" (Ibid., 238, 243 and 244). The self "is not given to us, since at best we are promised it at the end of our life [...] In […] [the] Hellenistic and Roman precept of conversion to the self […] we [do] not find the origin, the first root of all those practices and forms of knowledge developed later in the Christian world and the modern world […] [the] first form of […] psychology, the analysis of consciousness […] knowledge of the self, in the Christian and modern sense, [is] not rooted in this Stoic, Epicurean, Cynic episode" (Ibid., 250, 253, and 258). Similarly, the modality of self-knowledge present in Plato's *Alcibiades* does not "open onto a sort of domain of internal objectivity […] not the truth with regard to which the soul would be an object to be known, but a truth which is the truth [that] the soul knew […] the relation between the reflexivity of the self on the self and knowledge of the truth is established in the form of memory […] Looking at oneself in Platonism makes possible a memory type of recognition […] in Stoicism, looking at oneself must be the constitutive test of the self as subject of truth" (ECF-HOS, 455, 460). In Christianity, self-knowledge is acquired through "a method for deciphering the secret […] movements […] within the soul and whose origin […] must be grasped" (Ibid., 256). Whereas in the pagan asceticism associated with the care of the self we see "the subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on oneself […] making the truth your own […] the transition from aletheia to ethos", in the Christian practice of confession the process is reversed: "the subject objectifies himself in a true discourse" (Ibid., 333, 334).

Contrary to what we have been brought to expect, the most "exacting, rigorous, restrictive, and austere morality" was developed in the context of the Hellenistic care of the self, and not as the elaboration or necessary result of the Christian principles of non-egoism and self-renunciation. However, "the strict morality of the Hellenistic model was taken up and shaped by techniques of the self that were defined by the specifically Christian model of self-exegesis and self-renunciation [...] The Hellenistic model [...] was [...] the site for the formation of a morality which Christianity accepted, took into itself, and developed so as to make it what we mistakenly call 'Christian morality', and which [...] it linked [...] to exegesis of the self" (Ibid., 258). The pagan or philosophical ascesis is oriented towards the constitution of "oneself through an exercise in which truth-telling becomes the subject's mode of being". On the contrary, its Christian version, which coincides with "what we […] now understand by ascesis […] renounces the self according to a true Word spoken by an Other" (ECF-HOS, 327).

In sixteenth-century Europe, "in the context both of the Reformation and the return […] to ethical […] forms or concerns quite similar to those of the first and second centuries, we also see the recurrence of […] [the] *hupomnēmata* […] and of correspondence" (Ibid., 362). However, there is an important difference: whereas in the Hellenistic and Roman texts "autobiography, the description of oneself in the unfolding course of one's life […] plays a very small part", in the sixteenth century ones it becomes "absolutely central" (Ibid.). What has happened in between is the Christian pastoral, where "the person being guided – the person who must be lead to truth and salvation – has […] to say […] the truth about himself" (Ibid., 363 and 364). Similarly, in an interview conducted the next year, in 1983, Foucault underscores that the "*hupomnēmata*" shouldn't "be taken for intimate diaries or for those accounts of spiritual experience (temptations, struggles, falls, and victories) which can be found in later Christian literature [...] their objective

is not to bring the *arcana conscientiae* to light, the confession of which – be it oral or written – has a purifying value. The movement they seek to effect is the inverse of this last one: the point is not [...] to reveal the hidden, not to say the nonsaid, but, on the contrary, to collect the already-said, to reassemble that which one could hear or read, and this to an end which is [...] the constitution of oneself" (EEW1, 273).

5. In *The Government of Oneself and Others* we find what I think is the first of several attempts on Foucault's part to prove that an "unjustly famous text" from Plato's *Gorgias*[380] doesn't anticipate the Christian confession, as some interpreters have claimed, even if he is willing to admit that "at first sight the analogy is quite striking" (ECF-GSO, 360). At any rate, he warns his audience against the danger of "letting our reading be dominated by what are, in fact, "two anachronistic schemas: -the schema of Christian confession, with its constant double, judicial and medical reference; -the schema of a penal practice which, since at least the eighteenth century, has always given a therapeutic justification of punishment" (Ibid., 361). For Foucault, the scene "in which someone rush[es] to the courts and […] use[s] all his art of rhetoric to say: 'I am the guilty one, please, punish me' […] would have no sense for a Greek", who wouldn't have used rhetoric "for the absolutely bizarre and unimaginable […] grotesque […] absurd […] purpose of accusing" himself (Ibid., 363). In other words, self-accusation, the Christian injunction "to bear witness against itself (ERC, 170) wouldn't help to transform the unjust man into a just one, and that's why the Socrates of *The Apology* does not run to the judge […] to accuse [himself] […] if he lets himself he sentenced, this is not at all because he was guilty of an injustice and acknowledged the fact […]

[380] "SOCRATES: And if he or anyone else he care about acts unjustly, he should voluntarily go to the place where he'll pay his due as soon as possible; he should go to the judge as though he were going to a doctor, anxious that the disease of injustice shouldn't be protracted and cause his soul to fester incurably" [*Gorgias* 480a-b. In *Plato. Complete Works,* ed. John M. Cooper (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 825].

Socrates' game with regard to his judges has nothing to do with confession; it is another game entirely. It is not a confession of the offense committed, but obedience to the laws so as not to commit an injustice by disobeying them […] the important thing is not to commit injustice yourself" (ECF-GSO, 362, 363).

6. In *Fearless Speech* Foucault tries to prove that what Plato describes as "'giving an account' –'*didonai logon'* – of oneself'" does not require offering "an autobiographical account" or "a confessional autobiography". In the case of the *Laches*, for instance, what is involved, rather, is demonstrating "whether […] there is a harmonic relation between […] the rational discourse, the logos, you are able to use, and the way that you live […] Socrates's role […] is characterized as that of a 'basanos' or 'touchstone' which tests the degree of accord between a person's life and its principle of intelligibility or logos […] between the logos and bios […] in Plato's or Xenophon's portrayals of him, we never see Socrates requiring an examination of conscience or a confession of sins" (EFS, 96, 97).

As for the differences between the philosophical and the Christian ascesis, Foucault reiterates that "although our word asceticism derives from the Greek word *askesis*, for the Greeks the word does not mean 'ascetic', but has a very broad sense denoting any kind of practical training or exercise. The art of living […] *technē tou biou* […] demands practice and training: *askesis*" (Ibid., 143). An analysis of the Stoic, Epicurean, and Cynic exercises "where someone had to examine the truth about himself, and tell this truth to someone else" (Ibid., 144) shows that "the relation between the truth and the self […] is very different from what we find in the Christian tradition […] what is at stake is not the disclosure of a secret which has to be excavated from the depths of the soul […] [but] the relation of the self to truth […] the truth of the self is nothing other than the relation of the self to truth […] Are […] [the] rational principles […] sufficiently well-

established in our minds to become practical rules for our everyday behavior?" (EFS, 145, 165, and 166). For instance, the Stoic "monitoring of representations" has nothing to do with the Christian self-examination. Even if Cassian uses two of Epictetus's metaphors to describe the type of self-reflective relation required by that practice – the analogy of the doorkeeper and the money's changer – the objective of the examination has radically changed: whereas for the monk it is a matter of determining "the source […] where his thoughts […] come from […] whether the Devil himself is not hiding" behind them as their origin or cause, for the Stoic the important thing is whether what is represented is something "which depends upon him or not, i.e., whether it is accessible or not to his will […] its purpose is not to dispel the Devil's illusions but to guarantee self-mastery" (Ibid., 162).

7. Finally, in the second part of *The Government of Self and Others,* the 1984 lectures published in English under the title *The Courage of Truth,* Foucault says that "it is easy to note the great importance of the principle that one should tell the truth about oneself in all of ancient morality and in Greek and Roman culture" (ECF-CT, 4). Moreover, he points out that "we do not have to wait until Christianity, until the institutionalization of the confession at the start of the 13th c, until the organization and installation of a pastoral power, for the practice of telling the truth about oneself to rely upon and appeal to the presence of the other person" (Ibid., 5). Nonetheless, the emphasis is clearly on the changes that the Christian pastorate introduced in that practice of truth-telling, which can be summarized by Foucault's claim that "where there is obedience there cannot be *parrhēsia*" (Ibid., 336). By this he means that according to the "great enterprise of anti-parrhesiastic suspicion" founded by pastoral power, "the relation to the truth can be established only in a relationship of fearful and reverential obedience to God, and in the form of suspicious decipherment of self, through temptations and trials" (ECF-CT, 337). As a result, "there is true

life only through obedience to the other, and there is true life only for access to the other world […] the emergence of a new style of relation to self, a new type of power relations, and a different regime of truth" (Ibid., 320, 321). Whereas the kind of relationship to oneself required by pagan morality can be characterized as being "of the 'domination-submission', 'command-obedience', 'mastery-morality' type", the one imposed by Christianity is "a relationship of the 'elucidation-renunciation', 'decipherment-purification' type" (EHS2, 70). The installation of the pastorate's "structures of authority" is supposed to guarantee the imposition of "a morality whose precepts were compulsory and whose scope was universal" (Ibid., 20). In order to function, those structures demand a relation to oneself based on mistrust: "the individual is unable to bring about his salvation by himself [...] only by renunciation of self and [...] obedience will man be able to assure his salvation". And this entails becoming "the object of an attentive, scrupulous, and suspicious vigilance [...] by himself and in himself he can find nothing but evil" (ECF-CT, 334).

The comparison that Foucault draws between Plato's *Alcibiades* and *Laches* serves to show that whereas in the former the "oneself" that has to be taken care of is "the soul […] *psukhē*", in the latter it is "life […] *bios*". This means that self-knowledge no longer takes the form of "the soul's contemplation of itself and its recognition of its mode of being" (ECF-CT, 159) but becomes "a test, an examination" (Ibid., 196). And if the *bios* has to be tested or examined it is in order to "give it a certain form […] A mode of truth-telling which does not mark out the site of a possible metaphysical discourse […] [but] whose role and end is to give […] life […] a certain style [or] form" (Ibid., 160, 161). In these two Socratic dialogues we witness the beginning of "two great lines of development of philosophical reflection and practice" (ECF-CT, 127): On the one hand, a "metaphysics of the soul" that, according to Foucault's analysis, can be clearly distinguished from the kind of "psychological decipherment" inaugurated by Christianity. On the other, a "stylistics"

or "aesthetics of existence". Socrates marks the point at which the traditional concern with a beautiful existence is linked to "the concern with truth-telling" (Ibid., 163).

Foucault points out that "one of the master strokes of Christianity, its philosophical significance, consists in it having linked together the [Cynic] […] principle of […] the true life […] as 'an other life' ("*une vie autre")* […] and the idea of access to 'the other world' ("*l'autre monde"*, which is different from 'an other world' or "*un monde autre* [...] this world but radically transformed and made other") Therefore, what we find in Christianity is a combination of "an originally Cynic asceticism and an originally Platonic metaphysics" (ECF-CT, 319, 314). As a result, what distinguishes Christian from pagan asceticism[381] is "the relation to the other world to which one will have access" as well as "the principle of obedience [...] which is at the same time obedience to God and to those who represent him" (Ibid., 320).

The Foucauldian stylization of a way of life propelled by the "permanent critique" and creation of ourselves implies adopting what he describes as "the parrhesiastic standpoint […] in philosophy […] which tries […] stubbornly, and always starting over again, to bring the question of truth back to the question of its political conditions and the ethical differentiation which gives access to it" (Ibid., 68). In other words, taking up again the Wanderer's search for "forms of existence" which prevent us from ever becoming "completely comfortable" with our own "presuppositions" and convictions, but also from thinking that "a new fact will suffice to overturn them [...] that one can change them like arbitrary axioms [...] everything one perceives is evident

[381] Nietzsche had written that ascesis had been "spoiled by the church's misuse of it", so that "one no longer really dares to point out the natural usefulness of ascesis, its indispensability in the service of *educating the will*" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 10[165], 200).

only against a familiar and little-known horizon [...] every certainty is sure only through the support of a ground that is always unexplored [...] an ethics of discomfort" (EEW3, 448).

To Foucault's invitation to abandon the attempt to "recover our lost identity, or liberate our imprisoned nature, or discover our fundamental truth" and instead "move toward something altogether different [...] to produce something that doesn't exist yet, without being able to know what it will be [...] the destruction of what we are as well as the creation of a completely different thing" (EEW3, 275), his critics – philosophers like Jürgen Habermas,[382] Charles Taylor,[383] Nancy Fraser,[384] or Linda Martín Alcoff[385] – have responded with excommunicating judgments and apocalyptic admonitions against the unpredictable consequences of an anti-pastoral overcoming of the subject,[386] formulated in the name of a "rational" and "ethical" humanity that they refuse to imagine otherwise. As Nietzsche had pointed out, those who consider themselves "in possession of the formula 'What is Human?'[387] [...] sacrifice the future to *themselves*" and therefore constitute "the greatest danger [...] for all future humanity". By saying "'we already know what is good and

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[382] I have focused on three of the "Lectures" included in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990): "The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault", "Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again", and "An Alternative Way Out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason".

[383] See, for instance, his "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Couzens Hoy, 69-102 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996.

[384] The first three chapters of her *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994)

[385] Her essays "Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits to a Collaboration" [in *Crises in Continental Philosophy,* ed. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott, 69-86 (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1990)], "Foucault as Epistemologist" [in *The Philosophical Forum XXV,* no. 2 (Winter 1993): 95-124], and "Dangerous Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Pedophilia," [in *Feminist Interpretations of Foucault,* ed. Susan L. Hekman, 99-136 (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1996)].

[386] What Nietzsche describes as "the 'self-overcoming of man'" using "a moral formula in a sense beyond morality" (*Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[13], 68).

[387] Ibid., 9[173], 171.

just, and we have it too; woe to any who still search here!'" they forbid all creation.[388] Morality works as the instrument of "*a conservative will to breed the same species*, with the imperative: 'All variation is to be prevented'".[389] As Foucault puts it, "a certain idea or model of humanity", an "idea of man [...] has become normative, self-evident, and is supposed to be universal [...] Humanism [...] presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom [...] I think that there are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than we can imagine in humanism [...] This does not mean that we have to get rid of what we call human rights or freedom, but that we can't say that freedom or human rights has to be limited at certain frontiers" (ETS, 15). However, that is precisely what his critics try to do: set limits to what the human is and could be. And they do this in the name of "a human nature or base that [...] has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact with his origin" (EEW1, 282). I think that it is in relation to humanist tenets like this that we should interpret Foucault's remark that "we were mistaken when we believed that all morality was in prohibitions and that the lifting of the latter would resolve the question of ethics" (EFL, 461). To put it another way, it is precisely because there is no "man in his own being" (EEW1, 312) to liberate that we are forced to face the task of creating or constituting ourselves, while at the same time abandoning the belief that this practice of self-making can ever "bring us in the presence of something that would be 'man'" (EEW3, 276). And because "it is no longer a question of the One Good, but of the absence of God" (EEW2, 348),

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[388] Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), "Third Part", section 26, 170-171.

[389] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 35[20], 19.

Foucault reformulates the "critical question" as follows: "In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?" (EEW1, 315).

As Nietzsche had anticipated, "the good *must* crucify the one who invents his own virtue[390][...] One should defend virtue against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies [...] I recognize virtue by [...] its allowing no one to sit in judgment on it, because it is always virtue *for itself* [...] [by] its doing precisely everything that's otherwise *forbidden* [...] in every herd legislation... moralin-free virtue."[391] Foucault's "virtue"[392] consists of a practice of critique that calls into question "the sovereignty of the subject, or of consciousness" (ERC, 94); one that reveals that "the desire to make historical analysis the discourse of continuity, and make human consciousness the originating subject of all knowledge and all practice, are the two faces of one and the same system of thought" (EEW2, 301), and of one and the same morality. If reading Nietzsche gave him "for the first time the desire of doing personal work" (EPPC, 8), that's because in his texts he finds a "veritable critique" of that morality.[393] It seems to me that *Theatrum*

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[390] Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* "Third Part", section 26, 171.

[391] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 10[109], 193 and 194.

[392] "There is something in critique which is akin to virtue... this critical attitude as virtue in general... a question of attitude" (EEF, 264, 278).

[393] "In relation to academic philosophical discourse, which has constantly referred him back to himself, Nietzsche represents the outer frontier […] [he] has all the roughness, the rusticity, of the outsider, of the peasant from the mountains, that allows him, with a shrung of the shoulders and without it seeming in any way ridiculous, to say with a strength that one cannot ignore: 'Come on, all that is rubbish […]' Ridding oneself of philosophy necessarily implies a similar lack of deference. You will not get out of it by staying within philosophy, by refining as much as you can, by circumventing it with one's own discourse. No. It is by opposing it with a sort of astonished, joyful stupidity, a sort of uncomprehending burst of laughter , which, in the end, understands, or, in any case, shatters […] when you open *The Gay Science* after you have been trained in the great, time-honored university traditions – Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl – and you come across these rather strange […] text, you say: Well, I won't do what my contemporaries, colleagues and professor are doing; I won't just dismiss this" (EEW2, 447). As Pierre Bourdieu puts it in "The Philosophical Institution", it is a matter of exposing "the mechanisms through which the philosophical game works […] knowledge of the game qua game provides the ability to dominate both the game itself (that is to say, to dominate

Philosophicum, the 1970 piece in which Foucault analyzes two of Deleuze's books,[394] constitutes the best source to grasp Foucault's rejection of what he called "the disreputable morality of thought" (EEW2, 355), one of his most elaborate attempts to show why Nietzsche was right in his suspicion that the "dialectic and belief in reason still rest upon moral prejudices".[395] In the pages of *Difference and Repetition,* Foucault finds a Deleuze that struggles to ferret out "the minuscule, repetitive acts of cowardice and all those features of folly, vanity, and complacency which endlessly nourish the philosophical mushroom […] We all possess Good sense, we all make mistakes, but no one is dumb (certainly, none of us). There is no thought without goodwill; every real problem has an answer, because our apprenticeship is to a master who has answers for the questions he poses; the world is our classroom […] the exclusion of stupidity […] We must liberate ourselves from these constraints; and in perverting this morality, philosophy itself is disoriented".[396]

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the domination exerted by the laws of the game) and the *illusio* which is at one and the same time the effect and the principle of this domination" (*Philosophy in France Today,* 4).

[394] *The Logic of Sense* (1969) and *Difference and Repetition* (1968).

[395] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 2[93], 77-78.

[396] We can summarize the ways in which according to Foucault (reading Deleuze reading Nietzsche) those "constraints" prevent us from thinking difference as follows: "(subjection) to common sense which, turning away from mad flux and anarchic difference, knows how, everywhere and always in the same manner, to recognize what is identical; common sense extracts the generality of an object while it simultaneously established the universality of the knowing subject through a pact of goodwill. But what if we gave free rein to ill will? What if thought freed itself from common sense […] [from] the morally good will to think with common sense thought […] and decided to function only in its extreme singularity? [..] What if it conceived of difference differentially, instead of searching out the common elements underlying difference? [..] repetition […] would cease to be the dreary succession of the identical […] it is good sense that reigns in the philosophy of representation […] *what* recognizes these similarities, the exactly alike and the least similar […] if not good sense? [..] Let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered table of resemblances […] Repetition betrays the weakness of the same […] It was […] towards dialectics that the philosophy of representation was headed […] The dialectical sovereignty of the same consists in permitting differences to exist but always under the rule of the negative, as an instance of nonbeing. They may appear to be the successful subversion of the Other, but contradiction secretly assists in the salvation of identities […] The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction, dialectics, negation […] affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction […] We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically. The conditions for thinking of difference and repetition […] to abandon the identity of the concept […] to free ourselves from the philosophy of representation; and […] from Hegel […] The most tenacious subjection –of difference is undoubtedly

This is a philosophy that refuses to think the "event", as well as the "phantasm"[397] and the "simulacrum",[398] because it "wants to be pure"; a form of knowledge that "suppresses the point of view of the body, suspends usefulness, erases partialities and limits, and wants to see everything with an equal eye and without prejudice [...] the knowledge that does good, that is to say, does something other than know" (ECF-WTK, 209).

According to Nietzsche, "Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value and said: The more 'Idea', the more being. He reversed the concept 'reality' [...] It was the greatest of rebaptism; and because it has been adopted by Christianity we do not recognize how astonishing it is".[399] Foucault,[400] and Butler after him, have shown us how this reversal survives in the

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that maintained by categories […] On one side, they can be understood as the a priori forms of knowledge, but, on the other, they appear as an archaic morality, the ancient Decalogue that the identical imposed upon difference […] Within categories, one makes mistakes; outside of them, beyond or beneath them, one is stupid […] by creating a space for the operation of truth and falsity […] categories silently reject stupidity […] they guarantee our intelligence and form the a priori of excluded stupidity. Thus we court danger in wanting to be freed from categories […] To think in the form of categories is to know the truth so that it can be distinguished from the false; to think 'acategorically' is to confront a black stupidity and, in a flash, to distinguish oneself from it […] Error demands rejection […] Intelligence does not respond to stupidity, since it is stupidity already vanquished, the categorical art of avoiding error. The scholar is intelligent. It is thought, though, that confronts stupidity, and it is the philosopher who observes it […] The philosopher must have sufficiently ill will to play the game of truth and error badly: this perversity which operates in paradoxes, allows him to escape the categories. But aside from this, he must be sufficiently ill humored […] to point to stupidity and transfix it. We are far from the old sage who invests so much goodwill in his search for the truth that he can contemplate with equanimity" (EEW2, 356, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, and 363).

[397] It has been "reduced in the name of reality and situated at the extremity, the pathological pole, of a normative sequence: perception-image-memory-illusion [...] Phantasms [...] should [...] be freed [...] from the dilemmas of truth and falsehood and of being and nonbeing (the essential difference between simulacrum and copy carried to its logical conclusion." (EEW2, 355, 347).

[398] Foucault referred to the "gestures – discreet, but *moral* – which serve to exclude the simulacrum" in Platonism (EEW2, 345). Deleuze argued that "by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned" (*Difference and Repetition,* 69).

[399] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power,* section 572, 308. The original says: "Plato [...] maß den Grad Realität nach dem Werthgrade ab und sagte: je mehr "Idee", desto mehr Sein. Er drehte den Begriff "Wirklichkeit" herum [...] Das war die größte Umtaufung: und weil sie vom Christenthum aufgenommen ist, so sehen wir die erstaunliche Sache nicht" (*Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe,* Band 12, fragment 7[2], 7= Mp XVII 3b.Ende 1886- Frühjahr 1887, 253)

[400] He wants to uncover the "decentering" that Platonism "put into effect in order to recenter itself around the Model, the Identical, and the Same" (EEW2, 346).

attribution of more "being" or "reality" to those who are closer to the Norm or Ideal. The former started by taking seriously Nietzsche's remark that "the degree of our *feeling of life* and *power* [...] gives us our measure of 'being', 'reality, non-illusion'".[401] Then, he tried to find out how that "feeling" was related to the judgments about our "normality". If, following Nietzsche, we define morality as the "system of valuations which is contiguous with a being's conditions of life" – for our purposes, the subject – we can see how the Christian and modern morality of the subject works to "increase the feeling of power"[402] of those who fulfill the requirements imposed by that form of existence and relation to oneself. In Butler's words, "norms are what govern 'intelligible' life [...] and [...] when we defy these norms, it is unclear whether we are still living, or ought to be, whether our lives are valuable, or can be made to be".[403] I want to suggest that his is precisely the experience Nietzsche is describing in the "Preface" to *Ecce Homo* when he writes: "I am living off my own credit, perhaps it is just a prejudice that I am living at all? [...] I only need to speak with some 'educated' person who happens to be in Upper Engadine for the summer to convince myself that I am *not* alive". Nonetheless, he keeps writing himself, and in the most exalted terms,[404] because, as he puts it in that "Preface", "under these circumstances it is a duty (albeit one that my habits and especially the pride of my instincts rebel against at a basic level) to say: *Listen to me! I am the*

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[401] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* 10[19], 178.

[402] Ibid., 34[264], 16. Similarly, in *Daybreak* he had argued that "morality is nothing other [...] than obedience to customs" which are just "the *traditional* way of behaving and evaluating [...] 'evil' signifies the same as 'individual' [...] 'unusual', 'unforeseen', 'incalculable' [...] What is tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is *useful* to us, but because it *commands*.– What distinguishes this feeling in the presence of tradition from the feeling of fear in general?" (*Daybreak,* "Book I", section 9, 10 and 11).

[403] Butler, *Undoing Gender* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 206.

[404] One cannot help wondering where Nietzsche found the strength to persist, to keep working and persevere in his nomadic existence. Maybe at the price of having to outlive himself ten years as "every name in history", as he suggests in his letter to Jacob Burckhardt on January 6, 1889: "What is disagreeable and offends my modesty is that at bottom I am every name in history" [*The Portable Nietzsche,* ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), 686].

one who I am! Above all, do not mistake me for anyone else!".[405] In addition, I would suggest that, in order to avoid misunderstandings, the end of this quote should be read in conjunction with Nietzsche's claim that "becoming what you are presupposes that you do not have the slightest idea what you are".[406] In *Daybreak* he had claimed that "it is impossible to compute what" those who have defied the "morality of custom" have been forced to "suffer through being felt as evil and dangerous, indeed through *feeling themselves to be so*".[407]

Foucault wants to make it clear that, for him, the "ethical concern over conduct", the "moral" or "ethical problematization" is different from the "interdictions" or prohibitions imposed by the moral code.[408] The former cannot be reduced to the latter. However, because he problematizes what most people would define as "morality" and "ethics", I think it is less confusing to think of problematization as "political". Furthermore, if we take into account his remark that "the moral is the political" (ERC, 100), it is also more accurate. In fact, in one of his last interviews – conducted by Paul Rabinow in May 1984 – Foucault referred to "problematization" as his "way of approaching political questions". In this exchange he explains that instead of resorting to "the form of critique that claims to be a methodological examination in order to reject all possible solutions except of the one valid one", he prefers to work on "the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that [...] pose problems for politics". He doesn't think that in relation to experiences like madness, crime, or sexuality "there is any 'politics'

[405] Nietzsche, "Preface" to *Ecce Homo*, section 1, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* 71.

[406] Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo,* "Why I am so Clever", section 9, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* 96.

[407] Nietzsche, *Daybreak,* "Book I", section 9, 12.

[408] "the interdiction is one thing, the moral problematization is another" (EHS2: 10).

that can contain the just and definitive solution". What they demand is that we keep "questioning politics [...] The problems that experiences like these pose to politics have to be elaborated"[409] (EEW1, 114).

Against the widespread view that his conception of power eliminates the possibility of agency, Foucault never stopped trying to show that, in fact, his analyses bring out the "precariousness, nonnecessity, and instability of things [...] I am flabbergasted that people are able to see in my historical studies the affirmation of a determinism from which one cannot escape[410] [...] The idea that power is a system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be attributed to me[411] [...] It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their landscape – that people think are universal – are the result of some very precise historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made".[412]

As for Toril Moi's argument that the use of Foucault in feminist theory leads to the "depoliticization of feminism",[413] I would remind her that what he is trying to do is precisely to

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[409] Foucault argues that "critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, 'this, then, is what needs to be done [...]' It doesn't have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming". Therefore, "the necessity of reform mustn't be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, reduce, or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who tell one: 'Don't criticize, since you're not capable of carrying out a reform'" (EEW3, 263).

[410] EEW3, 399.

[411] EEF, 35.

[412] ETS, 11.

[413] Toril Moi, "Power, Sex, and Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault," *Paragraph: The Journal of the Modern Critical Theory Group,* Vol. 5 (1985): 95.

"imagine and to bring into being new schemas of politicization. If 'politicization' means falling back on ready-made choices and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering the relations of force and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile" (EPK, 189, 190).

Thirty years ago, Ian Hacking noticed that "even his generous interviewers, Dreyfus and Rabinow, have a sense that Foucault 'owes us a criterion of what makes one kind of danger more dangerous than another.' I am a little reminded of the tale told of David Hume's death. It is said that the rabble of Edinburgh congregated around his house demanding to know when the atheist would recant. I suspect it won't be long before the solemn clamour of the intellectuals about Foucault sounds as quaint as the baying of the Edinburgh mob. That expectation does not, however, help remove the present tension".[414] It seems to me that Hacking's prediction has not been fulfilled, at least not to the extent one would hope. Habermasians still claim that Foucault should have provided a "normative justification" for "his critique", answering the question about its "normative foundations".[415] In the same line, Nancy Fraser has argued that "without a non-humanist ethical paradigm" Foucault cannot "make good" his critique of humanism.[416] In other words, she

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[414] Ian Hacking, "Self-Improvement", in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), 238.

[415] Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,* 286 and 294.

[416] Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory*, 53. This kind of criticism does not take into account statements like the following: "the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a preestablished political outlook and do not tend toward the realization of some definite political project. This is doubtless what people mean when they reproach me for not presenting an overall theory. But I believe [...] that the forms of totalization offered by politics are always, in fact, very limited. I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any *totalization* – which would be at once *abstract* and *limiting* – [...] to *open up* problems that are as *concrete* and *general* as possible, problems that... are at once constituents of our history and constituted by that history" (EFR, 375, 376).

considers that his work needs "normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power", it lacks "an adequate normative perspective".[417]

It seems to me that what all these reproaches seem to find intolerable is that, as Veyne points out, Foucault "did not think that an intellectual should act like a director of conscience".[418] He consistently refused "to take a prophetic stance, that is, the one of saying to people: here is what you must do: this is good and this is not" (EFL, 262). It is precisely because he had devoted a lot of effort to uncover the connections between normativity and normalization that he was extremely careful "not to dictate how things should be. I try instead to pose problems, to make them active, to display them in such a complexity that they can silence the prophets and lawgivers, all those who speak for others" (EEW3, 288).

As Georges Canguilhem had explained in *The Normal and the Pathological,* "normative, in philosophy, means every judgement which evaluates [...] a fact in relation to a norm, but this mode of judgement is essentially subordinate to that which establishes norms. Normative, in the fullest sense of the word, is that which establishes norms".[419] In one of his last interviews Foucault problematizes the "consensus" or the "commonality" that humanists like Habermas – as well as those who believe in a "hard" or "realist" version of identity politics – demand that we take for granted: "Richard Rorty points out that in these analyses I do not appeal to any of those '*wes*' whose consensus, whose values, whose traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can be validated. But the problem is, precisely, to decide if it is

[417] Fraser, Ibid., 33. Objections like these make this reader think of something Nietzsche wrote in *Daybreak*: "*that* is what now does philosophy [...] what they want is religion!" ("Book V", section 544, 218)

[418] Veyne, *Foucault*, 123.

[419] Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological,* 126 and 127.

actually suitable to place oneself within a 'we' in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a 'we' possible by elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that the 'we' must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result – and the necessarily temporary result – of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which one formulates it" (EEW1, 114, 115).

In the "Preface" to *Daybreak* Nietzsche admits that his book "does in fact exhibit a contradiction and is not afraid of it: in this book faith in morality is withdrawn – but why? *Out of morality!* Or what else should we call that which informs it – and *us*? For our taste is for more modest expressions."[420] I think it is here, in this "taste for more modest expressions" that we find Foucault's *ēthos* or style,[421] his "personal poetic attitude" (EFR, 374). As he explained in an interview, "what I have written is never prescriptive, either for me or for others" (EEW3, 240). In other words, his "books don't tell people what to do [...] there really is a call for prophetism. I think we have to get rid of that" (EPPC, 15, 16). As Deleuze said to him in 1972, "you were the first – in your books and in the practical sphere – to teach us something absolutely fundamental:

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[420] And then he writes "But there is no doubt that a 'thou shalt' still speaks to us too, that we too still obey a stern law set over us – and this is the last moral law which can make itself audible even to us, which even we know how to live [...]we do not want to return to that which we consider outlived and decayed, to anything 'unworthy of belief', be it called God, virtue, truth, justice, charity; that we do not permit ourselves any bridges-of-lies to ancient ideals; that we are hostile […] to every kind of faith and Christianness existing today […] to […] all romanticism and fatherland-worship […] it is only as men of *this* conscience that we still feel ourselves related to the German integrity and piety of millennia, even if as its most questionable and final descendants, we immoralists, we godless men of today, indeed in a certain sense as its heirs, as the executors of its innermost will – a pessimistic will, as aforesaid, which does not draw back from denying itself because it denies with *joy*! In us there is accomplished – supposing you want a formula – the *self-sublimation of morality*.--" (*Daybreak,* "Preface", section 4, 4-5).

[421] Using Nietzsche's description, one could place Foucault in the tradition of those who, "following in the footsteps of Socrates, offer the *individual* a morality of self-control and temperance as a means to his own *advantage*, as his personal key to happiness, *are the exceptions* [...] They [...] take a new path under the highest disapprobation of all advocates of morality of custom- they cut themselves off from the community, as immoral men, and are in the profoundest sense evil". According to the "morality of custom", "the individual is to sacrifice himself [...] Self-overcoming is demanded, *not* on account of the useful consequences it may have for the individual, but so that the hegemony of custom, tradition, shall be made evident" (*Daybreak,* "Book I", section 9, 11).

the indignity of speaking for others. We ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences […] only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf" (ELCP, 209). His rejection of what he called "the intellectuals' old prophetic function" was probably more explicit, less ambiguous than Nietzsche's.[422] With this phrase he was referring not only to "their claim to say what is going to happen" but also to "the legislative function which they've aspired to for so long: 'See what must be done, see what is good, follow me [...]' [...] I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and universalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings" (EFL, 225). He did not think that his role was "to tell others what they must do". In other words, the role of the "specific" intellectual is not "to mold the political will of others", but rather, "through the analyses that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidences and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions and starting from this re-problematization (where he occupies his specific position as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (where he has his role as citizen to play)" (EFL, 462, 463).

[422] However, we should keep in mind that Nietzsche insisted that his Zarathustra is "not a 'prophet' [...] not one of those awful amalgams of sickness and will to power known as founders of religions. Above all, you need to *listen* properly to the tone coming from his mouth [...] so as not to be miserably unfair to the meaning of its wisdom [...] not the words of some fanatic, nothing is being 'preached' here, nobody is demanding that you *believe*... what were his own words when he returned to his solitude for the first time? The exact opposite of what a 'wise man', 'saint', 'world redeemer', or other decadent would say in this situation [...] He does not just talk differently, he *is* different". And then he quotes Zarathustra when he said: "You repair a teacher badly by remaining a pupil [...] You say you believe in Zarathustra? But who cares about Zarathustra! You are my believers, but who cares about believers! You have not looked for yourselves yet: and you found me. This is what all believers are like; that is why belief means so little. Now I call upon you to lose me and find yourselves; and *only after you have all denied me* will I want to return to you'" (*Ecce Homo,* "Preface", section 4, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* 72 and 73). At the same time, he repeatedly defended his "right" to "legislate", to undertake "a revaluation of all values" (Ibid., "The Genealogy of Morality", 136). Maybe instead of reinforcing the rationality through which pastoral practices of government justify themselves by placidly consenting to be rushed into condemning Nietzsche's "*pathos of distance*" as "elitist", "solipsistic", or "egoist", it would be more productive to try to think through the kind of "respect" implicit in his refusal to proselytize, in this highly unusual absence of interest in making "his" values common to everybody (*Beyond Good and Evil*, "Part 9: What is noble?" section 257, 151; *On the Genealogy of Morality*, "First essay", section 2, 11 and 12; *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, section 2[13], 67).

Furthermore, his texts are not intended to provoke "righteous indignation"[423] or moralizing outrage[424] because for him the goal is "to know how to limit the effects of […] power relationship(s)" which, by themselves, are "neither good nor bad, but dangerous" (EEW3, 373).[425] In fact, he criticizes Habermas for his "failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that we have to break free of [...] The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to me [...] by [...] power relations one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of a completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the *ēthos,* the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible [...] Power is not evil" (EEF, 39, 40).

Despite their differences, I think one can argue that all the critics of Foucault that I have mentioned in this chapter share the attitude that he characterized as "fear" in the "Conclusion" to *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* when he asked his imaginary critic: "what is that fear which makes you reply in terms of consciousness when someone talks to you about a practice, its condition, its

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[423] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols,* "What the Germans Lack", section 34, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* 208.

[424] "what often embarrasses me today – in fact, what I regret – is that all this work done in the past fifteen years or so –often under hardship and in solitude – functions for some only as a sign on belonging: to be on the 'good side', on the side of madness, children, delinquency, sex […] Power is bad, ugly, poor […] and what power is exercised upon is right, good, and rich […] since power is bad, it can only be negative" (EPPC, 120, 102).

[425] "to avoid [...] domination effects [...] this is [...] the hinge point of ethical concerns and the political struggle for respect of rights, of critical thought against abusive techniques of government and research in ethics that seeks to ground individual freedom" (EEF, 40).

rules, and its historical transformations? What is that fear which makes you seek beyond all [...] ruptures [...] and divisions, the great historico-transcendental destiny of the Occident? It seems to me that the only reply to this question is a political one" (EAK, 209, 210). In their own way, each and every one of them refuse to acknowledge the "crisis [...] which concerns an anthropological thought that orders all [...] questions around the question of man's being, and allows us to avoid an analysis of practice; which concerns all humanist ideologies; which, above all, concerns the status of the subject [...] a crisis that concerns that transcendental reflexion with which philosophy since Kant has identified itself" (Ibid., 204). That's why they espouse a "kind of politics which insists on seeing in the immense domain of practice only an epiphany of triumphant reason, or deciphering in it only the historico-transcendental destiny of the West".[426]

In a 1967 interview Foucault had pointed at "all the disservice" the "idea of man has done us for many years [...] it must surely be possible to engage in a left-wing politics which does not exploit all these confused humanist myths" (ERC, 100). He considers that a politics that calls itself "progressive" shouldn't be "tied (in its theoretical reflection) to the themes of meaning, origin, constituent subject, in short, to all the themes which guarantee in history the inexhaustible presence of a Logos, the sovereignty of a pure subject, the deep teleology of a primeval destination"[427] but rather committed to their critique. In addition, such a "progressive", non-humanist politics would not "adopt an attitude towards scientific discourse of 'perpetual demand' or of 'sovereign criticism'" but instead would try to develop an understanding of the ways in which "diverse scientific discourses, in their positivity (that is to say, as practices linked to certain conditions,

[426] *The Foucault Effect,* 69. A politics that "recognize[s] only ideal necessities, one-way determinations, or the free play of individual initiatives" and thus ignores "the historic conditions and the specific rules of a practice". As a result, instead of trying "to define a practice's possibilities of transformation", it turns "man or consciousness or the subject in general into the universal operator of all transformations" (Ibid., 61, 62).

[427] Ibid., 64, 65.

obedient to certain rules, susceptible to certain transformations) are part of a system of correlation with other practices".[428]

In the late Foucault we find a continuation of the Nietzschean overcoming of morality[429] in a critical thought that combines the acknowledgement that "it isn't possible not to think in terms of good and evil, true and false [...] to want not to think in terms of good and evil is to want not to think in terms of this good and that evil, in their *current* meaning" with a commitment to "shift the boundaries, to make them indefinite, shake them up, make them fragile, to allow for crossovers and osmosis [...] you have to say every time: and if it were the opposite, what if the lines were elsewhere" (EFL, 137).

As I pointed out in "Chapter Two: Pastoral Power and Normalization", according to Deleuze's reading, "establishing ways of existing or styles of life isn't just an aesthetic matter, it's what Foucault called ethics, as opposed to morality. The difference is that morality presents us

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[428] Ibid.: 70. Similarly, Gianni Vattimo has criticized hermeneutics for having "ever more firmly refuse to reconsider" Dithey's distinction between the human and the natural sciences by arguing that "it was still inspired by a submission before the methodological model of the natural sciences" and offering instead "a theory of interpretation constructed primarily in reference to aesthetic experience" (*Beyond Interpretation,* 15). It seems that for both Heidegger and Gadamer truth "occurs" only in poetry or art in general. In fact, Vattimo argues that "it would be hard to find an explicitly different position in other hermeneuticians such as Ricoeur or Pareyson". Their shared humanistic assumption is that "science does not think [...] because it is not an originary site of the occurrence of truth [...] as the opening of the horizons within which all that is true and false in the propositional sense can be given [...] the consequent, often merely implicit, devaluation of the natural sciences [...] coincides with (or is perhaps at once the cause and consequence of) an incapacity to grasp the nihilistic meaning of the philosophy of interpretation" (Ibid: 17 and 18). I think Foucault would agree with Vattimo that "it is not a matter, for hermeneutics, of setting limits to scientism, of resisting the triumph of science and technology in the name of a humanist culture, or standing up for the 'lifeworld' against calculation, planning, and total organization [...] The demonization of the mass media – the high point of the technologization of the world – by Adorno and the Frankfurt school in general is only a variant of the spiritual attitude marked by the *Kulturkritik* of the beginning of the century. However, this attitude remains no more than a humanist response to modern techno-science inspired by a philosophy that, while it has seen the limits of metaphysical objectivism [...] does not manage to see clearly that the overcoming of metaphysics requires a more radical recognition of its own historicity" (Ibid: 26 and 23).

[429] He considered the imposition of "a form of morality" to which "everyone would have to submit" as "catastrophic" (EFL, 473).

with a set of constraining rules […] that judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent values […] ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved […] It's the styles of life involved in everything that make us this or that. You get this already in Spinoza's idea of 'modes'. And is it not present in Foucault's philosophy from the outset: What are we 'capable' of seeing and saying [..]? But if there's a whole ethics in this, there's an aesthetics too [...] inventing a possibility of life, a way of existing".[430] Thus, ethics constitutes "the operation of immanence […] you do not judge […] Somebody says or does something, you do not relate it to values. You ask yourself how is […] this possible in an internal way? In other words, you relate the thing or the statement to the mode of existence [...] [the] manner of being […] that is implied".[431]

It seems to me that this way of understanding ethics that Deleuze attributes to Foucault is strikingly similar to what the latter had described as the Socratic harmony between "logos" and "bios". I wonder whether the degree of permanence, continuity, or consistency that this style of ethics demands wouldn't be excessive for Foucault.[432] After all, it entails a "unity of style" that, according to his analyses, is precisely what had led to a first definition of the subject in the Christian pastoral. Be that as it may, what makes Foucault's critique of the Christian and modern morality of the subject indispensable for some of us is that it doesn't fall into the self-complacent trap of believing that all we need to do is to declare that we "no longer believe that ethics is

[430] Deleuze, *Negotiations,* 100.

[431] Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze. "Deleuze/Spinoza Cours Vincennes: Ontologie-Ethique 21/12/1980", http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/index.html. English version, translated by Simon Duffy (accessed May 31, 2014).

[432] "The insistence on identity and the injunction to make a break both feel like impositions, and in the same way" (EEW3, 444); "each individual theoretical ties, when they are examined in their history, are tangled and fluctuating and don't have the clear definition of a border beyond which an enemy could be forced to flee" (Ibid., 297). Similarly, "Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us are 'groupuscules'" (EFL, 75).

founded in religion, nor do we want a legal system to intervene" (EEW1, 255) in our "private" or "personal" lives, but instead carefully examines the ways in which, as Nietzsche had put it, "feeling continues everywhere to be full of the aftershocks of Christian value judgement".[433]

[433] Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* section 2[131], 85.

VI. CHAPTER FIVE: LOUVAIN LECTURES AND 1980 COURSE

The publication of two new series of lectures has made 2014 an exhilarating year for Foucault scholars in the Anglophone context: The so-called "Louvain lectures"[434] appeared simultaneously in the original French and in English last June, whereas the 1979-1980 *Course* came out on September 9th.[435] This appendix does not claim to provide an outline – much less a comprehensive examination – of the main topics covered in those recent translations. Like the previous chapters, it focuses on those passages that deal with the relationship between the exercise of pastoral power (i.e., its practices of direction together with the discourses of truth used to justify them) and the procedures or modalities of modern governmentality.

In the last lecture of *On the Government of the Living* Foucault claims that the "institutionalization of truth/subjectivity relationships through the obligation to tell the truth about oneself, the organization of this linkage, cannot be conceived without the existence and functioning of a form of power which, of course, I have not wanted to undertake [to study] this year" (ECF-GL, 312). This reference to pastoral power, secularized or not, means that the government of individuals through their own truth – which is the central theme of that course – only begins with Christianity. The obligation to discover, interpret, and confess the truth about ourselves or our own true self still constitutes "one of the basic forms of our obedience" (Ibid., 313). It "has never ceased" in Western Christian societies because, as Foucault had explained two years before, "there has never been an anti-pastoral revolution. The pastorate has not yet experienced the process of

[434] The volume- entitled *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. The Function of Avowal in Justice*- includes seven *leçons* and three interviews that Foucault gave at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) in April and May of 1981.

[435] *Du gouvernement des vivants* had appeared in France two years earlier, in 2012.

profound revolution that would have definitively expelled in from our history" (ECF-STP, 150). Therefore, even if pastoral power in its openly religious or ecclesiastical form has lost some of its influence, its practices of direction or government of conduct – that is, the "pastoral function"[436] – have spread through the "psychological function".[437] The hope of salvation in the other world has been secularized as a promise of liberation (i.e., self-realization through authenticity) in this one. In other words, the "sacrificial" technology of the self has been replaced with an "identitarian" one. However, it continues to work as a technique for the government of both individuals and communities. The agents of psychiatric power are doing nothing more than "turn the glove inside out, the glove of the church". We are tied to our identities[438] and forced to put ourselves into discourse no longer just by religious institutions, but by "the whole institutional, cultural [...] and [...] social system to which we belong" (ECF-GL, 311, 312). That's why, in a 1981 interview, Foucault argues that "as important as it may be, tactically speaking, to say at a given moment, 'I am a homosexual,' over the long run, in a wider strategy, the question of knowing who we are

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[436] As I have already pointed out, Foucault urges us to distinguish between "two aspects of pastoral power": its "ecclesiastical institutionalization", which may have lost some of its "vitality", and "its function" (EEF, 132).

[437] In "'our' societies", that is to say, in "Western Christian societies [...] there has been a massive growth of avowal: not necessarily a continuous growth [...] but with stops and rapid accelerations. This growth tended – and this is undoubtedly one of the traits of our societies – to tie the individual more and more to his truth (I mean, to the obligation to tell the truth about oneself), to make this truth-telling function in one's relationships to others, and to commit oneself through this truth which is told. I do not mean that the modern individual ceases to be bound to the will of the other who commands him; but more and more, this connection overlaps and is tied to a discourse of truth that the subject is led to maintain about himself" (EWT, 18).

[438] According to the Louvain lectures, "in an avowal he who speaks obligates himself to being what he says he is [...] It implies that he who speaks promises to be what he affirms himself to be" (EWT, 16). "To summarize [...] avowal is a verbal act [...] a rather strange figure within language games [...] through which the subject affirms who he is, binds himself to this truth, places himself in a relationship of dependence with regard to another, and modifies [...] his relationship to himself [...] in the strictest sense, avowal can only exist within a power relation over the one who avows. These things are obvious when these power relations are institutionally defined: as in the case of judicial avowal or confession within the Catholic Church. But it is all the same in relationships that are far more fluid and mobile [...] avowal incites or reinforces a power relation that exerts itself on the one who avows. This is why all avowals are 'costly'" (Ibid., 17, 18).

sexually should no longer be posed. It is not then a question of affirming one's sexual identity, but of refusing to allow sexuality as well as the different forms of sexuality the right to identify you.

The obligation to identify oneself through and by a given type of sexuality must be refused [...] I want to be able to do what I want, and I do it. But don't ask me to proclaim it [...] The proclamation does not seem indispensable to me – I would even say that I often find it dangerous and contradictory" (EWT, 261, 262). This plain, candid statement about the limitations and dangers of (sexual) identity politics contains an indictment against the pastoral "government of individualization" (EEF, 129).

The hermeneutics of the self is "an invention of Christianity". It imposed the obligation to perform "a veridiction of the self through a hermeneutics of thought" (EWT, 152). For Foucault, this means that "the subjectivation of Western man is Christian, not Greco-Roman" (ECF-GL, 236). He understands subjectivation (*subjectivation*) as the process or procedure that results in the constitution of a certain reflexivity or subjectivity,[439] a specific type of relationship to ourselves.[440] In the course that he gave two years later he insisted that "it is the forms of reflexivity that constitute the subject as such" (ECF-HOS, 462). Similarly, in a 1983 interview he talks about his attempts to develop an analytics of "the relation between forms of reflexivity – a relation of self to self – and [...] the discourse of truth" (EPPC, 30). In the second volume of *The History of Sexuality* he explains that the relation to ourselves, the ethics, "is not simply 'self-awareness', but 'self-formation'" (EHS2, 28).

[439] "by subjectivity I understand the mode of relation of self to self" (Ibid.: 225).

[440] "the formation of a definitive [...] relationship of self to self [...] access to a certain relationship of self to self" (ECF-GL, 231, 232).

In 1980 Foucault declares that he has moved from the concept of "knowledge-power" to that of "government by the truth [...] Starting this year, I would [...] like to develop the notion of knowledge in the direction of the problem of the truth" (ECF-GL, 12). And he starts by reminding his audience that "when someone asserts a truth, one must distinguish the assertion (which is true or false) from the *act* of truth-telling, from the veridiction (the *Wahrsagen*, as Nietzsche would say)." This leads him to differentiate between two kinds of "critical philosophy".[441] The first type investigates "under what conditions – formal or transcendental – there can be true statements". The second examines the different forms of veridiction or truth-telling, the multiple "games of truth and falsehood", in order to determine "how subjects are effectively tied within and by the forms of veridiction in which they engage". The goal of his "political history" or "critical philosophy of veridictions" is to determine how a mode of truth-telling "could appear in history and under what conditions" as well as to identify the particular form of obligation through which "each mode [...] binds the subject" (EWT: 19, 20). In other words, what interests him most is to analyze the different ways in which the relationship between the "myself" and "alethurgy"[442] between the "*autos"* and truth has been organized throughout history and to see how the connections between the art of government and self-veridiction were established (ECF-GL, 50). Following Nietzsche, he focuses on the "force" or "the power of truth" – on the morality of the "truthful man" and the "will to know" about ourselves – in order to find out how we have been

[441] A "philosophy that starts not from the wonderment that there is being, but from the surprise that there is truth" (EWT, 20).

[442] "Alethurgy" is "the manifestation of truth as the set of possible verbal and non-verbal procedures by which one brings to light what is laid down as true" and affirms that "there is no exercise of power without something like an alethurgy" (ECF-GL, 7). With the term "self-alethurgy" he refers to "those forms of manifestation of truth that revolve around the first person, around the 'I' and the 'myself'" (Ibid., 52).

brought to become, not just "operators-active agents" or "witnesses", but also "objects" in a manifestation of truth (Ibid., 101, 82).

As for the notion of government, Foucault says that he has been trying to "sketch out a bit" this concept "over the last two years" (i.e., from the history of governmentality that he offered in the 1978 course). He insists that he wants to use this notion "not in the narrow and current sense of the supreme instance of executive and administrative decisions in State systems, but in the broad [...] and old sense [...] of mechanisms and procedures intended to conduct men, to direct [...] to conduct their conduct" (Ibid., 12). A year later he defines it as "a means of forming, transforming, and directing the conduct of individuals [...] through [...] techniques of government [...] individuals act on each other's conducts in order to attain certain ends or objectives" (EWT, 23).

The 1980 lectures inform us that Sophocles' Oedipus uses the expression "*tekhnē tekhnēs*" to refer to political power. Then they show how, eight centuries later, Gregory Nazianzen[443] resorts to the same phrase to refer to spiritual direction, characterizing the "art of directing souls" in a way that "remains absolutely constant up until the eighteenth century". A year later Foucault argues that in the fourth century Gregory of Nazianzus[444] turned "spiritual direction", a practice "designed for monastic communities", into "a general pastoral function that [...] anyone who in general had a responsibility with regard to a community, no matter of what kind, should exercise [...] direction [...] was in the process of diffusing itself throughout Christian communities in general" (EWT, 177, 176). In the description of the Christian practice or technique of direction that Nazianzus

[443] As I indicated in "Chapter One: The Birth of Psychiatric Power" (more specifically, on page 43, footnote 138), in the 1978 lectures Foucault claims that "Saint Gregory Nazianzen was the first to define this art of governing men by the pastorate as the *technē technōn, epistemē epistemōn*, the 'art of arts', the 'science of sciences'" (ECF-STP, 150, 151).

[444] So the name of this fourth century theologian and Archbishop of Constantinople is spelled in a different way in each of the three lectures.

offered in the "Second Discourse" of his *Oratio*[445] – a text in which "he was not addressing a monastic community" – we can recognize a way of exercising power as government that we have inherited from Christianity. Beginning in the fourth century, pastoral power as direction is organized.[446]

In the lecture of March 12 1980, Foucault admits that "we are accustomed to seeing in direction a religious practice as opposed to coercion or the exercise of political power. In a way, this is true, and I have stressed the structural difference between political subordination, the exercise of political authority, and the specific form of subordination in direction". However, it is important to realize that he then qualifies his claim as follows: "Nevertheless, it would be completely wrong to imagine that there is no relation, no connection, between the structure of political authority and the practice of direction. After all, most, if not all [...] political utopias are [...] dreams of the exercise of a political power that takes the form of [...] the real and effective direction of individuals. We could also say that in the political functioning of both Catholic and Protestant societies at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, we had very subtle, thought out, and organized combinations of [...] an administrative political power and a [...] series of institutions of [...] the direction of souls and individuals [...] So forms of direction and forms of political functioning may well be heterogeneous but their coexistence, linkages, and reciprocal supports are no less evident" (ECF-GL, 232). In "Chapter Three: Governmentality" I offered my own interpretation of those "connections" or "linkages" and argued for the need to take the exploration of the underlying continuities further.[447] In that chapter I also

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[445] "It seems to me that to guide man [...] is a question of *technē technēs,* the art of arts, of *epistemē epistemēs*, the science of sciences" (Foucault quoting Nazianzus in EWT, 176).

[446] The "development of the pastoral function" (EWT, 177).

pointed out[448] that the 1979 *Course* includes a comment on the importance of analyzing a certain "non-statist governmentality", the "governmentality of the party", which played a key role in making possible the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. He even suggests that he may undertake its study in the following year's course. Unfortunately, all that is left of that plan in the 1980 lectures is the following remark: "it is no doubt more interesting to study the organization of political parties as institutions of direction than as ideologies akin to religion" (ECF-GL, 233).

Foucault's study of Western Christianity does not take the form of an ideological analysis, a critique of its "dogmatic system". Instead, he offers an inquiry into the practices of avowal that pastoral power demands in exchange for salvation-liberation. This approach is based on his view that "it is not the critique of representations in terms of [...] truth or falsity, ideology or science [...] that should serve as indicator for defining the legitimacy or denouncing the illegitimacy of power. It is the movement of freeing oneself from power that should serve as revealer in the transformations of the subject and the relation the subject maintains with the truth [...] what of the subject [...] do we dispense with when we consider no power to be founded either by right or necessity, that all power only ever rests on the contingency and fragility of a history..?" (ECF-GL, 77).

Just as he had analyzed the practices of confinement and imprisonment without taking for granted the existence of universals like madness and criminality,[449] so now he wants to study the Christian practices of examination, avowal, and direction "without knowing" what faith is. This

[447] See pages 137-140 of this dissertation.

[448] See the first paragraph on page 151.

[449] "Madness had to be taken as an *x* and the practice alone grasped, as if one did not know, and proceeding without knowing, what madness is" (ECF-GL, 80).

implies replacing the series "universal category-humanist position-ideological analysis and reform program" with "refusal of universals [...] -anti-humanist position-technological analysis of mechanisms of power and [...] further extend points of non-acceptance" (ECF-GL, 80). As opposed to the ideological analysis, "the anarcheological type of study" he develops takes practices in their "contingency", "fragility", "non-necessity" as its point of departure. Then he tries to make them and the transformations they have experienced intelligible (EWT, 24) by analyzing the "reasons" for those "ways of doing things" (ECF-GL, 79). In other words, by exposing the "singular, fragile, and contingent system of relations of power that served to [...] get" a particular practice "seen as acceptable" and had it accepted.

His investigation into the Christian practices of self-examination, avowal, and direction focuses on the relationships of knowledge those practices make possible and on the "effects" those relations have "in the experience of the subject"[450] (Ibid., 80). Those three practices require what Foucault calls "reflexive truth acts". This type of "acts of truth" corresponds to "the regime of confession", one of the two "regimes of truth"[451] that "underpin" Christianity[452] (Ibid., 93, 72). The analysis of Christianity in terms of ideology focuses on the other regime and its "acts of faith" in order to expose "the ideological nature of the content of the dogma and beliefs" (Ibid., 83). Whereas in the "regime of faith" what is required is "adherence to an inviolable and revealed truth in which the role of the individual [...] the point of subjectivation is [...] in accepting this content

[450] To put it another way: It is his "systematic, voluntary, theoretical and practical questioning" of pastoral power that allows Foucault to get an answer to his questions "about the subject of knowledge and about the bond with the truth by which, involuntarily, the subject is held" (ECF-GL, 77).

[451] A "regime of truth" is "the set of processes and institutions by which [...] individuals are bound and obliged to make well-defined truth acts" (ECF-GL, 94).

[452] The two regimes of truth "defined" by Christianity are "the regime of faith" ["acts of faith", which are "non-reflexive truth acts"] and "the regime of confession (of self)" ["acts of confession" or "reflexive truth acts"] (ECF-GL, 84, 102, 82, and 83).

and in agreeing to demonstrate that one accepts it", the "regime of confession" specifies and commands "a certain type of relationship of self to self" (ECF-GL, 84, 85). This type of reflexivity is characterized by "the obligation for individuals to have a continuous relationship to themselves of knowledge [...] to discover, deep within themselves, secrets that elude them [...] [and] finally [...] to manifest these secret and individual truths by acts that have specific, liberating effects that go well beyond the effects of knowledge" (Ibid., 83).

In the lecture of February 6 1980 Foucault warns his audience not to reduce the Christian "regime of confession" to the "oral confession"*(confessio oris)* or "confessional avowal", which only covers "the modern sense of the word [...] the sense it has taken [...] from the end of the Middle Ages, that is to say, the verbalization of sins committed, a verbalization that has to take place in an institutional relationship with [...] the confessor, who is qualified to hear it, to fix a penalty, [and] to grant remission" (ECF-GL, 102). His analysis of early Christianity evinces that that form of veridiction of oneself is just the "most visible and superficial result [...] of much more complex, numerous, and rich processes by which Christianity bound individuals to the obligation to manifest their [...] individual truth [...] behind this confession (*confession*) [...] which seems to have covered over all other forms of confession (*aveu)*, we must uncover again a whole regime of truth in which Christianity [...] from the second century, imposed on individuals the obligation to manifest in truth what they are". Thenceforth the pastorate has justified that requirement by referring to our need to eliminate "a certain debt [...] the debt of evil" (Ibid., 103). The "oral confession" is just the most recent of several forms of self-alethurgy. It is different from both exomologesis, "demonstrating one's state as a sinner" and exagoreusis, "telling one's every thought" (EWT, 188).

Furthermore, he claims that "whereas the themes of ancient philosophy, whether Platonic or Stoic [...] penetrated Christian thought very early on, and we see evident traces of them in Saint Paul, the practice of direction [...] of examination of conscience, everything we might call techniques of the philosophical life, penetrated Christianity only rather late on. We have to wait until the fourth century to see these practices [...] taken up again", "transferred and imported into Christianity" (ECF-GL, 253). And, at least at first, "not in Christianity in general" but "only within and because of the monastic institution" (Ibid., 258).

What Foucault finds in pagan antiquity is only a "prehistory" of avowal. The self-alethurgy that "has been so important for morality, law, religion, literature, institutions and, in short, all of Western culture", the avowal "through which we are called upon to recognize ourselves [...] hardly existed before Christianity" (ETW, 91). He considers that "one of the most fundamental traits of Christianity", at least from the fourth century, is that it binds the individual to the "obligation to a hermeneutics of the self". In other words, its originality and specificity lies in the particular type of relationship between the individual and his/her truth that it inaugurates. As he himself puts it, "what seems to me to have been the essence of Christianity and to have made a break in the history of Western subjectivity is [...] all the techniques put forward and perfected to draw out the truth of oneself with regard to sin [...] The Christian requirements of self-knowledge do not derive from the *gnōthi seauton* [...] [which is] a philosophical act through which one establishes a certain mode of relation with the truth in general [...] not a means of establishing a relationship to one's own" (ETW, 117).

In ancient philosophical practice the veridiction of oneself adopted two major forms: the examination of one's conscience and the *expositio animae*, "exposing one's soul to someone such as a friend, or a guide" (Ibid., 95). Foucault will repeat the analysis of those two ancient techniques

of the self that he offers in the 1980 *Course* several months later, in the lectures at Dartmouth and Berkeley known as *About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self*.

With regard to the examination of oneself, Foucault makes reference to its Pythagorean origins[453] and then moves quickly to Roman Stoicism. More specifically, to Seneca. He comments on a passage from *De ira* (Book III, 36) in order to show that "it would be completely mistaken to say that since the examination of conscience existed in Greek and Roman direction, then this is what we find again in Christianity". In his view, "they are completely different from and cannot be assimilated to each other". They entail "quite different" "modes" and "effects of subjectivation" (ECF-GL, 236). In fact, they differ in their "structure", "object" or field of application, and in their goals. Since I offered a summary of Foucault's analysis of Seneca's description of those two practices in "Chapter Four: A Critical Ontology of the Present",[454] here I would like simply to mention the main points he makes: What Seneca describes is much closer to "an administrative procedure of inspection and verification" than to "a judicial procedure of accusation with a verdict and a sentence [...] there is no accuser in Seneca. We will see this character of the accuser arrive later, precisely in Christianity [...] Is then any repentance, self-punishment, and allocation of [...] guilt? Absolutely not [...] an essential end of Stoic examination is [...] autonomy: I examine myself in order to be autonomous [...] to be able to be guided by myself and my own reason" (ECF-GL, 242, 243, and 246).

For his study of the Stoic version of confession Foucault resorts to the letter of Serenus to Seneca that appears at the beginning of *De tranquillitate animi* (I, 1-18). He considers that the

[453] "the invention of examination of conscience is attributed to the Pythagoreans [...] the oldest testimony we have of the practice in Greek culture" (ECF-GL, 237).

[454] See pages 189-191.

manifestation of truth on the part of Serenus is just "a consciousness of self that would make it possible to assure [...] the control of oneself and one's passions [...] [it] is fundamentally a problem of reactualization, of reactivating codes and of determining where one is exactly in the philosophical progression towards liberty. They do not speak about themselves, and the only word that seems to refer to one's subjectivity that is employed by Serenus or by Seneca, namely *placet* – here is something that pleases me, here is something that displeases me – does not at all reveal one's subjectivity, but, rather the type of action, the degree of liberty" (EWT, 103, 116). The conclusion he reaches in both series of lectures is that "the forms of verbalization [...] of self-exploration, and the way in which [...] [they] are coupled are completely different in paganism and [...] in Christianity" (ECF-GL, 229).

According to the 1980 *Course*, the non-Christian, pagan practice of direction is characterized by three features: It is "limited and instrumental", it "presupposes a certain competence on the part of the master", and is "provisional [...] its aim is to lead to a stage at which one no longer needs a director and is able to conduct [...] and be the sovereign director of oneself". Foucault argues that Christian direction entails "a completely different form of relationship" (Ibid., 267): First, what he calls "the principle of the universality, the indefinite permanence of direction: one is made to obey". Second, direction "is not founded on the master's competence"; the relationship of obedience is not justified by the "transfer of the master's value or competence, of his quality" (Ibid., 269). And, finally, there is no "external objective" to be achieved through direction, such as "recover one's health, to arrive at a state of happiness, or to overcome a pain or grief". On the contrary, "one obeys in order to become obedient [...] to produce a state of obedience" (ECF-GL., 270). Obedience has become the "condition, substratum, and effect of direction" (Ibid., 273). An obedience that, according to Cassian, includes three "aspects":

Subditio or "submission, the fact of being a subject", *patientia*, and *humilitas.* Foucault points out that "there is no need to say how far this is from the effects peculiar to ancient direction" (ECF-GL., 271). The two practices are "poles apart" (Ibid., 274). With Christianity, the technique or procedure of direction is "inscribed in a general apparatus (*dispositif)*", in a general technology of government, that "alters and inverts its effects". There is a "veritable inversion" of all its effects (ECF-GL, 274, 275). Thus, the autonomy that was the goal of Stoic direction is "the exact opposite of *subditio,* of submission", as the ancient *apatheia* is of Christian *patientia*, and self-mastery of *humilitas.*

The objective of Greco-Roman direction was to guarantee "a jurisdiction of actions with a view to the subject's autonomisation [...] obedience and confession had an instrumental value, a provisional role, and a function relative to the aim of self-autonomy and self-control". On the contrary, what defines Christian direction is "obedience to the other with veridiction of oneself for its instrument". Foucault insists that we must distinguish between Christian "*subditio*" or "submission, to be subjugated", and "the Greco-Roman [...] idea of being subject to the law" because there is a "radical" difference between those two notions. Whereas in antiquity obedience was always obedience to the law as a "code of obligations and interdictions", Christian submission means "letting the principle of obedience penetrate one's entire behavior [...] a total renunciation of one's will". As he had indicated in the 1980 Course, Christian *subditio* "leads to the exact opposite of the self-mastery that was the objective of ancient pedagogy". The Christian techniques of the self "sought precisely the opposite [...] one was never to be master of oneself [...] It was a question of annulling oneself as a willful being" (EWT, 139).

Foucault considers that this "mechanism of perpetual confession connected to permanent obedience" conforms to five "laws" that have played a key role in "the history of the relationships

between truth and subjectivity in the Christian West": The first is the "law of ever deeper probing: nothing is ever too small" to ignore it or not confess it to my director. The second, the "law of externalization", refers to the obligation "to drag interiority from itself, to bring it out in order to display it in a relationship of exteriority and obedience". Third, the "law of tropism, or inclination towards the secret": We have to expose "what is hidden in the hidden [...] unmasking Satan [...] deep within myself". Fourth, the "law of production of truth": Whereas ancient wisdom demanded "registering what is taking place within myself", here something else is at stake: "revealing something in me that I could not know" before, "producing a truth [...] that was unknown [...] the truth that I am". And, finally, the "law of renunciation of self": If I need to "produce the truth of myself" is because I have to "renounce myself". Therefore, this "alethurgy of myself [...] is in no way [...] indexed to the will [...] to establish [...] what I am". In other words, the struggle to drag "the Other" out of myself is not intended to "rediscover oneself" but "to contemplate God without darkness and to do his will without hindrance". The "schema of Christian subjectivation" is "veridiction of self for renunciation of self" (ECF-GL, 308, 309).

What the Christian practice of self-examination invites us to call into question is not the truth of our ideas (i.e., their correspondence to reality), but rather the truth of ourselves as the subjects who have this or that idea. According to Foucault, this marks "a very significant inflection in the history of the relations between truth and subjectivity [...] we should never forget that Descartes' malicious demon is not at all the bizarre and extreme invention of a radical attempt by philosophy to retake possession of itself". Far from that, the suspicion that "there is something in me that can always deceive me and that has such power that I can never be completely sure that it will not deceive me is the absolutely constant theme of Christian spirituality" (Ibid., 303). A year later he will reiterate that "the exclusion of […] the evil genius […] was not necessitated by some

philosophical radicalism specific to Descartes, but was an absolute cultural necessity, inscribed in the very history of Western culture as of the fourth or fifth century, when the relationship of the self to the self was burdened and mortgaged by this danger of the illusion that had been discovered, brought forth, and incessantly denounced by Christian spirituality" (EWT, 171). This is the permanent "doubt" or "uncertainty" that "the Christian practice of direction and examination "introduced into the relationship between subjectivity and truth" (ECF-GL: 304). Due to our lack of *discretio,* we am unable, by ourselves, to distinguish between those thoughts that come from God and those that come from the Devil. That's why confession is absolutely necessary. It is the only way to guarantee that we will not be deceived in our self-examination. And "the form itself of confession is a principle of discrimination [...] It really is the sole fact of speaking that constitutes the principle of discrimination" (Ibid., 305, 306). The Christian examination of conscience implies "an ever-present and permanent relationship: a sort of vertical relationship through which one examined [*surveille*] oneself and constantly examine one's own thoughts [...] truth was opposed to illusion and not to error – the element of truth or illusion within the thought itself [...] this moment marked the birth of what we might call a hermeneutics of the self in the Western world". The first object of this hermeneutics of the subject was the *cogitation* [...] its quality and its origin" (EWT, 149). The *exagoreusis* doesn't focus on actions, but on thoughts, on the "uninterrupted and always agitated flux of thoughts", the *cogitationes* or *logismoi,* the "constantly moving reality of thought that, at that precise moment, one was beginning to learn to mistrust as [...] an internal and incessant danger" (Ibid., 164). Foucault insists that the "search for a principle of illusion within and its [...] roots in the insidious presence of another did not aim to establish total or perfect self-mastery [...] It was not even a question of liberating oneself from the other who was within in order to restore one's identity. Instead [...] it was a question of destroying

and renouncing oneself [...] all autonomous will [...] have no other will than the will of God" (Ibid., 165). It is important to keep in mind that "in Christianity the principle of illusion is in one's attachment to oneself, in a certain mode of the relationship to oneself that is one of affirmation and preservation [...] the relationship to oneself, when it takes on the form of attachment, is nothing more than the effect of the temptation by the Other [...] the work of the demon" (EWT, 151).

On the one hand, Foucault wants to make it clear that direction "is not a specifically Christian practice [...] We find it in ancient Greece and Rome" where it was "absolutely not of a religious order [...] and in other civilizations" (ECF-GL, 233). On the other, he admits that this is a practice which, "to a not inconsiderable extent, is of religious inspiration, or at any rate develops within religious institutions". He claims that "what is distinctive about Christian direction" is the coupling or joining of two "principles" or "obligations": "the principle of willing nothing by oneself" and that of "telling all about oneself". The "junction" of these two obligations is "at the very heart of not only the monastic institution, but of a whole series of practices, of apparatuses (*dispositifs*) that will inform what constitutes Christian and, as a result, Western subjectivity". It implies a relationship between the subject, the other, the will, and enunciation that is "profoundly different" from the one that characterized the practice of direction in ancient pedagogy (Ibid., 266, 267).

For the Gnostic movements, the aim of the examination of oneself was "to rediscover, buried in this body and imprisoned in this matter", the "element of perfection", the "divine element" in all of us. As a result, "knowing God and recognizing oneself is the same thing [...] knowledge of the self [...] appears only in the form of memory of the divine". By separating salvation and perfection, Christianity distinguished itself from all the gnostic movements and "promised the imperfect the possibility of salvation. It marked with permanent imperfection all

those who might think they are saved". Knowledge of God can no longer be reached through self-knowledge because what we find within ourselves is "Satan, evil [...] Christianity replaced the Platonic structure of memory of the divine lying deep within myself with the indefinite task of penetrating the [...] secrets of conscience [...] it articulated, but as two different forms, the obligation to believe in God [...] and the indefinite task of knowing oneself" (ECF-GL, 310). Foucault traces the "invention" of original sin back to Tertullian and exposes the connections between that notion and the new view of the relation between purification and truth that is at the heart of his profound transformation of baptism.

The kinds of manifestation of truth that Foucault finds in *exomologēsis-publicatio sui* and in the *probatio animae* that was part of the preparation for baptism have two things in common that clearly separate them from the later *exagoreusis*: First, verbalization plays a "quite limited" role. "In these rites [...] we do not observe [...] the verbalization of sins understood as [...] analytical description [...] There is no self-accusatory verbalization of the sin by the sinner himself". Second, "there is no procedure of knowledge of self [...] the subject is not asked to know himself [...] no self-exploration, no journey to the interior of oneself, no discovery by the subject of things that he does not know deep within himself" (Ibid., 224). According to Foucault, the appearance of these two requirements and their "coupling" only took place in the seventh and eight centuries. The establishment of this link between verbalization and self-exploration – which signals "the beginning of a [...] process in which the subjectivity of Western man is developed" (Ibid., 225) – didn't occur in baptism or in penance, but in "a third type of institution", the monastery (Ibid.: 226). More specifically, in the monastic practice of spiritual direction (Ibid.: 229). So we can say that "the necessity for the subject to manifest himself in truth" (ECF-GL., 225) was already present both in pagan philosophy and in early Christianity, but it took a form that didn't imply those two

procedures. In the *exomologēsis* practiced in early Christian penance, the penitent was expected to "display in a dramatic form the fact of being a sinner [...] It was the alethurgy of the sinner as sinner". He was simply asked "to show himself", to "manifest his state", with no verbal confession of his sins required. *Exagoreusis*, "putting oneself into discourse", constitutes "a completely different type of alethurgy". This practice signals "the opening or the beginning of [...] the hermeneutics of oneself" (EWT, 165); it makes accessible, both "to the field of analysis and also to the relationship of self to self, a domain that was absolutely unknown in antiquity" (Ibid., 116).

The transition from Greco-Roman to Christian techniques of the self is marked by what Foucault describes as "the inversion of the axis of verbalization in the relationship of mastery. In Antiquity, the one who spoke was [...] the master [...] To listen and obey is the same thing [...] in the new relationship of obedience [...] the structure was completely reversed. To obey [...] one needed to speak [...] about oneself. Veridiction […] of oneself – truth-telling about oneself – was an indispensable condition for subjection [...] the relationship of obedience, the fundamental relationship to the other" was constituted thanks to that self-alethurgy (Ibid., 140, 141).

The "development of the pastoral function" that began in the fourth century took place not only in monastic but also in non-monastic communities. In both cases, it became clear that "one could not be a part of the community" unless one accepted the "obligation of truth [...] about oneself [...] which was tied to a specific relationship of dependence on someone else". They also share a tendency toward "an obligation to avow one's sins defined according to a code, with sanctions that followed this same code [...] This movement, which lasted from the fourth to the sixth and seventh centuries, would then be multiplied and intensified from the seventh century onward, when there appeared [...] the first great juridification of penance – that is to say, fixed penance". It "began to spread from the seventh century [...] for each sin there corresponded a

penance [...] it could be reiterated [...] one should complete as many penances as one had committed sins". The code also established "modifications of the satisfaction according to [...] the circumstances of the fault". And this justified the need for a detailed interrogation. This type of penitence "marked a great departure from anything that had existed up to that point, either in the form of *exomologēsis* or *exagoreusis*" and initiated the process of "juridification" that will culminate with the *confession oris* (EWT, 177, 178, and 182). Another important feature of the practice of fixed penance is that the "penitential satisfactions" can be both "civil and religious [...] the Church had taken on a non-negligible part of the jurisdictional functions that had previously been the privilege of civil authorities" (Ibid., 181).

Through his "avowal" and "the satisfactions he made", the penitent was anticipating "the judgment and the condemnation that God could deliver. By condemning himself a little, by accepting [...] and [...] performing the satisfaction, he [...] hoped to lighten the punishment that would necessarily be imposed during the last judgment". It seems clear that the juridical model dominates in this form of avowal. However, it also presents an important problem because, if what the priest did was really judging, then "God would find himself bound by the priest's decision" and "there would be no reason for the last judgment". Therefore, it is "the impossibility of understanding penance as a tribunal" that explains "the constant references to a medical model within this clearly juridical practice [...] penance was a medicine [...] sin was an illness or [...] a wound". Furthermore, if verbalization in monastic *exagoreusis* was seen as "a true renunciation of the self", here it is considered as "a sacrifice [...] the avowal itself was the beginning of the satisfaction because it produced shame" (EWT, 183, 184).

Foucault contends that penitence only was completely juridified when it became the fourth sacrament (after baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist) around 1150. In 1215, Canon XXI of

the Fourth Lateran Council imposed on all the members of the Church the duty to confess at least once a year (at Easter). This obligation was enforced through a "vast institutional apparatus. First, it was [...] a territorial apparatus because one confessed to one's [...] priest – that is to say the priest of one's parish – unless one had authorization [...] second, a liturgical apparatus [...] it was also aligned with a punitive apparatus [...] Finally, it was connected to a rather precise procedural apparatus". It is important to realize that from the moment that penance acquires sacramental status, and thus becomes "a real operation that effectively absolved the sinner of the sin he had committed", it can no longer "perform the role it had played in fixed penance: that is to say, an assurance that the sinner sought to secure on his future salvation". In other words, penance is now an "act of a juridical nature", and not just a "metaphor" or a "symbol" of the last judgment. In the thirteenth century "the declarative formulation of absolution became regular [...] the sacramentalization of penance gave this real power of absolution to the priest [...] [who], through his power to absolve, could decide in complete liberty the penance" (EWT, 185, 186, and 187).

According to the 1980 *Course*, "the historical singularity of Christianity", and one of the reasons why it has endured for so long, resides in the fact that it managed to sever salvation from perfection. Whereas "for most of the religious movements of the ancient world, of the Hellenistic and Roman world, the promise of salvation and access to perfection were profoundly and fundamentally linked", Christianity claims that one does not need to be perfect in order to be saved. And it is in the space opened by this divergence that pastoral power set up the disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms through which it would manage its promise of "salvation in non-perfection" (ECF-GL, 259). As an "art of the conduct of individuals", Christian morality succeeded in combining the three main "matrices" or "models" through which morality has defined itself in the West. The first of those three "great matrices of "moral thought" is the model of "the

two ways", which Foucault finds in the *Didache* (from the end of the first century and the beginning of the second): morality as "a choice between two ways", one good and one evil, the path of "Life" or "Light" followed by those who are devoted to God and the path of "Death" or "Darkness". The second "matrix" is organized around the fall and is present in the Bible: morality guides us from the "fallen state" in which we are born back to an "original, lost and forgotten state". Finally, the "matrix of the stain" that has to be erased. This is the model developed by Tertullian. As morality, Western Christianity "has functioned through the system of supports that have existed between" those three "matrices". Foucault detects the presence of those same models in Marxism: Mao Zedung would exemplify the matrix of "the two ways". "The fall, alienation and dis-alienation" is represented by Marx. Stalinism, with its infamous purges, was a way of dealing with the "problem of those who are [...] soiled and must be purified" (Ibid., 108).

In the Louvain lectures Foucault maintains that "medieval law opened up a space for conceptualizing the subject that initially emerged out of the Christian pastoral tradition". And it did that by attaching "a certain practice of inquiry, which had been tied to the development of ecclesiastical and royal power, to this conception of the subject formed within the Christian pastoral" (EWT., 31). He had anticipated this claim in the 1973 lectures at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, when he pointed out that "the inquiry derived from a certain type of power relation, from a way of exercising power. It was brought into law from the Church and, therefore, was permeated with religious categories. In the conception of the early Middle Ages, the essential notion was the wrong [*tort*], something having occurred between two individuals [...] Transgression, sin, and moral culpability did not play any role whatever [...] There was no fault, culpability, or any connection with sin [...] When the Church came to be Europe's only coherent economico-political body, in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, the ecclesiastical

inquisition was at the same time a spiritual inquiry concerning sins, transgressions, and crimes committed, and an administrative inquiry concerning the way in which the Church's assets were managed [...] the inquiry as a gaze focused as much on possessions and riches as on hearts, acts, and intentions. It was this model that was taken up and adapted in judicial procedure [...] [in] the twelfth century, when the state that was forming [...] the person of the sovereign [...] appropriated judicial procedures" (EEW3, 48, 46, and 47).

In 1981 he formulated a more elaborated version of that claim, one that introduced the issue of avowal: "Once it was up to the sovereign to settle the dispute [...] the problem was one of establishing the truth [...] The necessity of a veridiction [...] Recourse was thus made, for the establishment of this truth, to means of inquiry [...] And as soon as the establishment of truth became the essential element of the procedure, the affirmation of truth by the accused himself [...] the avowal of the culprit [...] became an important piece [...] or rather, became again, because in fact through Roman law, proof of avowal was recognized and admitted, but this [...] had declined in a massive way from the seventh or eighth centuries on [...] Yet [...] avowal was not simply called upon as a privileged form of testimony in the process of inquiry [...] The importance of the role of avowal came from the fact that it was located on the boundary between traditional accusatory procedures [...] the test [...] the ordeal [...] the duel [...] and the new procedures of inquisition" (EWT, 203). Furthermore, Foucault explains that in spite of the fact that "the two aspects that characterized [...] the practice of avowal in judicial institutions from the Middle Ages", i.e., "its connection with torture and its privileged place in the bizarre system of legal proofs", were eliminated from judicial theory and practice at the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, "the importance of avowal was not undermined. To the contrary [...] [it] would acquire a [...] decisive importance, in an unprecedented way, in [...] the modern codes [...] whose structure,

frame, and general architecture remain in place today" (Ibid., 206, 207). There are three reasons why avowal became so important. However, before analyzing them it is necessary to point out that we are talking about a new form of avowal, different from the one that had been part of judicial practice since the Middle Ages. As Foucault himself puts it, avowal is a "cultural form" and a "social practice" that "did not remain stable across the centuries [...] the avowal [...] that was [...] institutionalized in the Middle Ages in penal practice [...] no longer functions today [...] it is an entirely different avowal, within an entirely different penal system" (Ibid., 200, 201). Let's go back to the three reasons that Foucault offers to account for the key role that the new practice of avowal will play in a judicial system that is still ours: In the first place, according to "modern and contemporary legal codes [...] the foundation of the law is [...] the will of all, which is supposed to express itself in this law [...] This fiction that you must recognize yourself in the law that punished you [...] explains [...] the symbolic and [...] central role of avowal". Whereas the avowal introduced in the Middle Ages consisted simply in "recognizing one's crime", in its new form it will include also "recognizing [...] the validity of the punishment that one will suffer. In this sense, avowal is a rite of sovereignty by means of which the guilty party provides a foundation for his judges to condemn him and recognizes is own will in the decision of the judges. Avowal is [...] the reminder of the social contract and its restoration" (Ibid., 207).

The second reason has to do with the disappearance of the system of legal proofs and the fact that, "since then, it has been up to the judge [...] to determine what is probative and what is not probative [...] From this emerges [...] the importance of avowal as irrefutable proof that serves as an equivalent of evidence in penal matters. As soon as it is no longer a question of adding calculable fragments of truth, but of producing a truth that can be perceived by all [...] avowal becomes the most sought-after form of proof" (EWT, 208).

As for the third and last reason, it refers to a transformation in the view of the sentence itself. It "took on a dual function [...] punishing, of course, but also [...] making amends and correcting [...] Avowal constitutes a punitive engagement that gives meaning to the imposed sanction [...] The punishment [...] needs to be corrective – and avowal, as a means of recognizing oneself to be guilty, constitutes the first element [...] of the punitive act: "By avowing, I receive the punishment as something that is just and I agree to participate in the corrective process that the judges expect from my punishment" (Ibid., 209).

Foucault places the "institutionalization of avowal in medieval criminal justice", its "privileging [...] in penal practices" in the context of "a sort of broad juridification of Western society and culture in the Middle Ages" (Ibid., 201). In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries "the Church established a juridical [...] judicial model of the relationship between man and God, at the heart of its organization [...] the relationships between God and man became fundamentally juridified [...] the Reform, with Luther and Calvin, was [...] a tremendous effort to de-juridify the relationships between man and God" (Ibid., 187). It implied a refusal not only "to submit the hermeneutics that one practiced on the text" to the authority of the Church, but also "to submit the hermeneutics of the self to the [...] authority of the priest". Protestantism managed to free both "hermeneutic practices from the authority of the Church". In fact, Foucault claims that "it did more than this": it tried to put an end to the "fundamental tension" between them, to "put them in communication". And in order to do that, it followed a "path of internalization or doubling, of involution such that the truth of the text, I would find it within me, and what I would find within myself would be the truth of the text" (Ibid.,168, 189). He considers that, for an early Christian, this way of conceiving of the relationship between God and his creatures as legal in nature would have been "unimaginable". At the same time, he admits that the representation of "God as judge,

God sitting on his throne at the head of his tribunal, the last judgment" are in fact "very old themes that did not stem from Christianity itself, but were inherited from Judaism". What happened in the twelfth century is that they "re-emerged with intensity, and then were accompanied by the appearance of [...] new [...] themes [...] such as [...] purgatory or the system of indulgences". He also finds signs of that process of juridification in the political institution. As he had explained in 1973 the establishment of "monarchical power, in the context of feudal institutions", was founded on "the exercise and development of judicial power. It was in his capacity as a judge [...] that the king established his power on top of feudal power or within the interstices of feudal power" (EWT: 202).

Likewise, it seems to me that the "new" kind of avowal demanded by modern and contemporary penal practice should be put in the context of an equally broad "normalization" as both disciplinarization and regularization. In other words, the questions "Who are You?" and "Why did you do what you did?" – i.e., what Nietzsche had described as the Christian morality of "truthfulness" and "intentions" – addressed to the accused during a trial, are the effect of a pastoralization" of justice that had been long in the making.

In the Louvain lectures, more than anywhere else, Foucault emphasizes the differences between the hermeneutics of the subject that had been present in Christianity since the fourth century and the "new" one that "opened up with psychoanalysis – or [...] more generally – with psychiatry and psychology" (EWT, 226). He claims that they are "extremely different" in both "its forms and in its objectives". Whereas the former "consisted essentially in bringing to light the secrets of conscience [...] through the [...] permanent examination of oneself and [...] the exhaustive verbalization in the direction of another", the latter uses "a method of analysis" that is "far removed" from those two practices or techniques of the self and much closer to "the principles of

textual analysis" (Ibid., 225). Throughout this dissertation I have tried to demonstrate how, drawing on Foucault's and Nietzsche's texts, one can argue that modern "psychological subjectivity" doesn't entail an understanding of the truth of ourselves and a form of relationship of self to self that are different from those required by "Christian interiority". Modern "dangerousness" perpetuates the old suspicion about the "evil in us". Both are the result of a metonymical move that allows us to "root the behaviors of a subject in a meaningful whole" (Ibid., 225); or, rather, to continue to relate to ourselves as subjects.

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