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Ideological Extremity Perception: Causes and Consequences

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Ideological Extremity Perception: Causes and Consequences

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This dissertation examines causes and consequences of ideological perception and theorizes that these judgments are fueled by both conscious and subconscious affect, as proposed by the hot cognition model and the motivated reasoning framework. The first empirical chapter, which stands separate from the others, uses fixed effects NES panel data to demonstrate that ideological perceptions of the party in power impact citizen preferences for federal spending. The second empirical chapter uses an experimental survey to demonstrate that conscious and subconscious affect impact ideological perceptions of fictitious candidates while simultaneously testing a previous finding that Democrats are perceived as more ideological than equally extreme Republicans. The third empirical chapter uses another experimental survey to test if certain policy sets (religious, economic, foreign etc.) are perceived as more ideologically extreme than others. It also hypothesizes that certain political personality types such as authoritarians and libertarians will feel threatened by specific policy sets, generate greater negative affect towards those policies and then select them as the most ideologically extreme in a comparison process. The principle finding of the dissertation is affect that is unrelated to policy evaluation (and likely subconscious) plays a role shaping how we perceive the ideological extremity of others.

Dedication Page

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Steve and Shelley Amira, who have encouraged and supported me for my entire life and especially during the last five years. Without them I would have never made it to this point. Thank you for everything you have done for me.

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All errors and omissions in the following pages are my own.

Chapter 1:

Introduction, Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations

Introduction

One of the many frustrations of the political left over the last seven years has been the notion that Americans perceive Barack Obama to be more ideologically extreme in his policies than he actually is. While some Democrats and liberals promote the idea that Obama is the normatively desirable "moderate/leaner", a widely publicized perception is that both he and his policies are major deviations from the status quo and the American mainstream. Given the recent tendency for partisans, ideologues and pundits to speak in hyperbole, some even claim that Obama's deviations from the status quo are unprecedented. Rachael Maddow's spirited rant after Obama won re-election exemplifies this frustration. After the announcement of the 2012 victory, Maddow, finally able to vent about how "incorrect" the Right had been over the last four years stated that, "Moderate regulations of the financial system are not communism!" amongst a slew of other grievances.

Her concerns may not be entirely fabricated. A USA Today/Gallop Poll has been tracking perceptions of Obama's ideological extremity at different points in time. When Obama was competing for the 2008 Democratic nomination- a time when he was little known Senator with a very liberal voting record- 47% of respondents thought his views were "about right" and just 37% thought his views were too liberal. By February of 2012 when he was well into his presidency, about 51% of respondents believed his views were too liberal. This 14% increase is striking because during this time, Obama was accumulating what Keith Pool (2012) called the "most moderate Democratic presidency since World War II".

Despite the fact that Obama is a unique political figure with the ability to produce abnormally emotional responses, the complaints from Maddow coupled with the Pew results prompt important questions about how individuals interpret and perceive political objects ideologically. The overarching question this dissertation seeks to answer is how individuals perceive the ideological extremity of policies, parties and political figures. What individual level factors contribute to these perceptions and misperceptions? Furthermore, what might these perceptions themselves mean for public opinion?

If the electorate can maintain some level of accuracy when interpreting the ideology of others, then people like Maddow may have made a mountain out of molehill. If citizen perceptions of ideology are easily influenced by irrational psychological factors, there may be grave implications for public opinion.

As we know, a central assumption for democratic politics is that people select the candidates that represent their own interests. In order to choose these candidates, citizens must have a relatively accurate understanding of the politician's issue positions, their allegiances, their worldview etc. It is easy to understand which elites align with our own partisan affiliation. This is often indicated by a singular letter (D/R), a color (red/blue) or a declaration on the politician's website. Politicians and candidates do not shy away from these labels. In fact, parties are a necessity for American politicians; they are used strategically in order to achieve goals (Aldrich, 1995). Since it is rational for a politician to associate with a party, Americans have a fairly easy time understanding a candidate's party attachment and identification. The same ease does not hold for understanding ideological location. Compared to partisanship, ideology is a vague

concept. To make matters more complicated, politicians tend to shy away from declaring a specific ideological position on most issues at the national level, save for the few prideful politicians such as Rick Santorum, Ron Paul and Elizabeth Warren. Thus, citizens often need to arrive at their own conclusions about ideological location and extremity to help inform their opinions and assessments. If people are incapable of doing this and assess political objects such as candidates, parties and policies "incorrectly", this may harm the democratic process, which is in part fueled by a well-informed electorate that makes even-handed, issue based assessments.

Importance of Ideology in the Literature

For many years, researchers questioned the importance of ideology in American political thought. In his landmark paper, Philip Converse (1964) declared that most American citizens were incapable of holding political opinions that had any internal coherence and might as well flip a coin to decide their positions on an issue. Scholarly work in the last 30 years has slowly moved away from this "End of Ideology" era (Jost 2006) to find that ideological thought has become more pronounced at the elite level (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006) as well as the citizen level (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) in recent years. (For an alternative interpretation, see Fiorina, 2005).

As an explanatory variable, ideology holds great importance for political behavior and political psychology. Ideological self-identification or strength of identification, as measured in survey research, has been present in most multivariate analyses regarding political attitudes and political behavior since the measure became prominent in the 1970s. At an individual level, ideology is critical for understanding vote choice (Levitin and Miller 1979), evaluations of candidates (Zaller 1992) and policy attitudes and preferences (Jacoby 1991; Jessee 2009). On an aggregate level, ideology, or the "public mood", is conceptualized as how active the electorate wants the government to be. This measure is said to play a dynamic role in how and when the federal government enacts legislation (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995).

We already know a great deal about individual level reasons for why someone *is* liberal or conservative. Put another way, we know some of the personal factors that lead to an integrated value system that shapes someone's political world. A recent resurgence in this research has suggested that ideology is rooted in value constructs (Haidt et al 2007, Graham et al 2009, Haidt and Joseph, 2004), psychological underpinnings that stem from inherent needs, motives and constraints (Jost, Noseck and Gosling, 2008; Jost el al, 2007), attitudes toward social change and inequality (Jost, Glaser et al. 2003) and individual personality differences. (Carney et al 2008; Heil et al 2000) Finally, other camps of researchers have even begun to suggest that ideology has a relationship with genetics (Settle et al 2010).

Though the origins of ideology are important, the topic I am more concerned with is how the ideological location of others is assessed. I am not simply interested in whether a subject thinks, "X politician/party is liberal" or "Y politician/party is conservative". Past studies have already looked at how demographic cues lead voters to make this decision in low information environments (McDermott, 1997; McDermott 1998) Instead, I am interested in *how* liberal or conservative they interpret X or Y to be. What fuels our interpretation of how extreme a policy, a party or a politician is? Moreover, are there times in which our perceptions deviate from some sort of relative "accuracy"? This dissertation seeks to answer these questions.

Literature Review

The perception of something's ideological location is, first and foremost, a subjective judgment about a social characteristic. How does one go about making this judgment? Two prominent theoretical fields must be examined in order to answer these questions: Social Judgment Theory and Hot Cognition/Motivated Reasoning. By borrowing ideas from both of these disciplines we can understand some of the mechanisms behind ideological perception. We must understand how individuals make social judgments in a general sense but we must also understand whether and when there is a motivation to place some objects toward the center of a scale and others toward the poles.

I begin by reviewing some of the early work on social judgment theory. This literature illuminates certain effects called *contrast* and *assimilation*, which will play a key role in my own, integrated theory of ideological perception. I will then argue that affect-driven processes provide the psychological underpinnings for why contrast and assimilation occur. The cross section of these disciplines will reveal my own theory of ideological extremity perception. [1] After explaining my theory, I will briefly discuss three alternative explanations for perception and discuss how they do or do not fit with my theory.

Social Judgment Theory

Social Judgment Theory (SJT), first articulated by Sherif and Hovland (1961), is a general theory about how individuals perceive stimuli, evaluate stimuli and are persuaded by stimuli. Although much of the theory revolves around general communication and how it can lead to persuasion and attitude change, I am mainly concerned with the portion of the theory that describes how individuals perceive and evaluate the social characteristics of objects by using comparison processes.

When making a judgment about an item (often a message or communication), SJT suggests that the perceiver engages in a series of cognitive and evaluative steps including a "discrimination process", a "placement of the item" and the inclusion of the item on an "acceptance-rejection" scale, also known as a latitude. Discrimination implies a process of determining whether the object under evaluation is indeed different from other items. When an item is discriminated as *different*, it must naturally be given a location relative to other evaluated objects on a scale; this is the "placement of the item".

When the item is placed, it falls within an "acceptance-rejection" latitude range. The latitude of acceptance is defined operationally as, "the range of the positions on an issue that an individual considers acceptable to him (including the one 'most acceptable' to him)" (pg. 129). Not surprisingly, the range of acceptance is where the perceiver's own position is located. This position is called an anchor, which will be elaborated on shortly. Conversely, the latitude of rejection "consists of the positions he finds objectionable (including the one most 'objectionable' to him)" (pg. 129). Objects that are viewed as neither acceptable nor unacceptable fall within the "latitude of non-commitment." (Sherif et al. 1965)

[1] This is the only aspect of Social Judgment Theory that is incorporated into my perception theory. Because SJT was the first to notice these effects I am claiming that my own theory combines (elements of) SJT and the work on affect and motivated reasoning.

The proportion of acceptance range to rejection range is often determined by the degree of "ego involvement" (or personal involvement) that the perceiver possesses. Those with a high ego involvement on an issue often have a smaller range of acceptance and a larger range of rejection. This is intuitive; a zealot is more likely to believe that many others stand against him than someone who is less emotionally involved in an issue. For example, Hovland, Harvey and Sherif (1957) studied the issue of alcohol in Oklahoma shortly after a referendum was held to decide its prohibition laws. Twenty judges took statements about the prohibition issue from newspapers and various Oklahoma residents and chose eight that they believed represented explicitly distinct opinions. These eight statements were shown to subjects, some of which were more likely to have a high degree of ego involvement because they came from organizations with established positions on the issue of alcohol prohibition. Indeed, the subjects with the higher degree of ego involvement placed more positions within the latitude of rejection than those who had a lower degree of ego involvement. Similar results were found for a study of partisans and non-partisans who had to read 8 statements that had varying degrees of endorsements for the current Republican and Democratic candidates (Hovland, Harvey and Sherif 1957). Those with strong ego involvement found a higher percentage of statements unacceptable.

Though discrimination, placement and acceptance/rejection make up the main steps in the social judgment process, they do not illuminate where the individual places the object on the acceptance/rejection lattice. The object's placement in this region is a function of "it's objective value, it's relative place in a series, the range of the series of which it is a part, and the location of external and internal anchors relative to the series" (pg. 38). The objective value refers to the fact that the object has some unknown degree of brightness, size, weight, intelligence, prestige, ideological extremity etc. The object also has a location within a series, meaning that the object's location is relative to other objects.

The authors pay particular attention to the 3rd and 4th points in their formula: the range and the anchors. The range is simply the distance between the scales outermost points whereas an anchor can be viewed as a reference point against which other items are judged. If there is no natural anchor or there is no anchor purposefully introduced in the judgment task, the evaluation of where an object lies within a range will be determined by the end points of that range (Volkmann 1951; Reese et al. 1953; Eriksen and Hake 1957) However, when an anchor does exist, it will affect the placement of the item on the scale. In a classic example of anchoring, a warm bucket of water, a room temperature bucket of water and a cold bucket of water and presented. One subject puts their hand in the cold bucket while another subject puts their hand in the warm bucket. At the same time, both subjects remove their hands and put them into the room temperature bucket and then describe how hot or cold this new sensation is. Not surprisingly, their answers differ; one says it is warm and the other says its cool. This is due to differing anchors in the original buckets. The effect of anchors on judgments of the physical world have been abundant (Heintz 1950; Sherif, Taub and Hovland 1958)

The same type of effect can be seen in social judgments; an anchoring point will guide the perceiver's judgment of a message, communication or item. When it comes to judging messages and statements, the subject's anchoring point is almost always their own opinion on a topic (Sherif and Hovland 1961).

The series of studies that built the foundations of Social Judgment Theory reveal two cognitive errors with regards to item placement and perception. When the message or item the subject is evaluating falls within the latitude of acceptance, an error is committed in which the

item is perceived to be closer to the subject's own opinion- the anchor- than it actually is. This is called an assimilation effect. Conversely, when the item is placed within the latitude of rejection, it is often perceived as farther from the anchor than it actually is. This is called a contrast effect (Sherif and Hovland 1961).[2]

In the issue voting and issue perception literature, contrast and assimilation often make appearances under a different name: projection and (occasionally) negative projection (Krosnick 1990). Within this literature, projection suggests that a citizen's own issue position, along with his or her intended vote choice will drive perceptions of a candidate (Brody and Page 1972; Repass 1976). For example, if I don't have a sense of Barack Obama's stance on affirmative action and I intended to vote for him (implying that I probably like him), I may take my own preference for affirmative action and project it onto him. This process implies that I am subjectively creating a world in which Barack Obama is similar to me; his issue position is aligned with mine to some degree. Likewise, if I intended to vote against Obama (implying that I probably dislike him) and I am unsure of his position on affirmative action, I would engage in the opposite process and subjectively create a world in which Obama's stance was actually not very similar to my own. Projection effects have been found in party perception using cross-sectional data (Merrill et al. 2001), candidate perception using cross-sectional data (Berelson, Lazardsfeld and McPhee 1954, Granberg and Brent 1974, Granberg and Jenks 1977, Granberg and Brent 1980, Granberg et al 1981, Brent and Granberg 1982, Sherrod 1972) and candidate issue perception using panel data (Granberg and King 1980; Markus 1982; Feldman and Conover 1983; Martinez 1988). Though evidence of projection is generally supported, the magnitude of the effect varies depending on whether other related perceptions are included in the model as variables (Feldman and Conover 1983).

In the same vein, contrast and assimilation/projection can work with ideological perception. If I feel positively toward a candidate, an issue, a party or any political object, I will assimilate that object toward my own ideological location, the anchor. Conversely, if I feel negatively toward a candidate, issue, party or political object, I will contrast that object away from my own ideological location, the anchor. Like the candidate issue perception literature, I subjectively create a world in which liked objects in my latitude of acceptance are similar to myself and disliked objects in my latitude of rejection are dissimilar to myself (Brent and Granberg 1982; Granberg 1985).

Theoretical Framework

Since the coining of the terms "assimilation" and "contrast", the theoretical framework supporting these effects has been the subject of debate. Though contrast and assimilation were first noticed during the seminal works of Sherif and Hovland, social judgment theory itself does

[2] These effects are different from other assimilation and contrast effects also seen in areas of social cognition. Work by Schwartz and Bless (1992a) and Schwartz and Bless (1992b) define assimilation and contrast as a different kind of bias made in evaluative judgments. When contextual information is correlated positively with a judgment, assimilation is said to occur whereas the opposite is true for a contrast effect. See Bless and Schwartz (2010) for elaboration on these processes as well as the inclusion/exclusion categorization model that explains how these processes work.

not provide an adequate explanation for the motivation behind these cognitive errors; it is a theory about persuasion and attitude change, not motivational reasoning or consistency.

The theory most frequently associated with these effects is balance theory (Abelson et al 1978; Granberg and Brent 1980; Brent and Granberg 1982; Granberg 1985; Granberg 1987; MacKuen and Parker-Stephen 2005 unpublished manuscript). Balance theory (Heider 1954) suggests that individuals create structural arrangements between objects or social actors who each have positive or negative affective associations. These arrangements are triadic. In the basic P-O-X model, P represents the perceiver, O represents another person that P has a positive or negative attitude towards and X represents an issue or 3rd object that P also has an attitude towards. Finally, P also has an assumption about O's attitude towards X. An imbalance will occur if P likes O and X but believes that O does not like X. Alternatively, imbalance could arise if P likes O and not X and believes O likes X and so on and so forth. The affective relationships between the units must be aligned in order to generate a harmonious arrangement. If the arrangements are imbalanced, a process will take place to rearrange the objects and achieve cognitive consistency.

Balance theory has been synthesized with SJT in order to explain perceptions of candidates. For example, if John Smith (P) likes candidate Obama (O) but does not like affirmative action (X) and believes that Obama likes affirmative action (X), John will distort Obama's stance on affirmative action such that is it more in line with his own. By engaging in assimilation and creating subjective agreement, John can achieve balance with the unit triad. In its essence, balance theory suggests that individuals strive to have an affectively consistent perception of objects that form a natural unit. Despite the many citations that Heider's theory has accumulated, empirical evidence only shows minimal support for this theory as the basis of contrast and assimilation (Kinder 1978). I diverge from balance theory and propose that the contrast and assimilation effects we observe in previous studies are the result the affect-driven cognitive processes articulated in the research on hot cognition and motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013). [3]

Hot Cognition and Motivated Reasoning

It is commonly stated in cognitive psychology that human beings have two different drives for thinking and reasoning. The first is a drive for accuracy. We want to have correct information and we desire to know the true state of the world in which we live. This normative style of information processing, while appealing, is challenged by a second drive, which seeks to protect our prior beliefs rather than update them to reflect reality (Lodge and Taber 2013, Taber and Lodge 2006). This consistency drive (sometimes called a 'partisan drive' in the realm of politics), is psychologically advantageous because it allows us to maintain beliefs that we already possess and perhaps incorporate into our identity (Kahan 2012).

The most recent work on political reasoning supports the latter theory of a more dominating partisan drive that often overrides the desire for accuracy. Taber and Lodge's series of studies in *The Rationalizing Voter* (2013) propose an elaborate model of hot cognition in which *all* socio-political reasoning is affectively driven and therefore prone to consistent bias.

[3] To be clear, I am not so much synthesizing SJT with hot cognition and motivated reasoning. Rather I am providing a more thorough and updated explanation (affect-driven hot cognition) for the contrast and assimilation effects that were *first articulated* by SJT.

The theory suggests that due to past experiences, we have positive or negative feelings about virtually all social and political objects or concepts. At the moment of exposure, the concept registers in the brain and calls up an on-line, evaluative tally, which has a positive or negative valence. This initial and instantaneous moment then influences the remainder of the information-processing stream. Once the initial positive or negative feeling has surfaced, it will trigger other concepts that the individual connects with the original stimulus. This "spreading activation" happens because our long-term memory is hardwired to be associative. For example, if the stimulus object is "Democrat", other concepts such as liberal, spending, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, health care, government programs, welfare, black, women etc. may be spontaneously activated in long-term memory. Of the many associations we have with any given concept, the ones that tend to be activated the most during this phase are the ones that are biased in the direction of the initial affect (a process called "affective contagion"). Meanwhile, associations with an opposing valence tend to be subdued. Thus, if the word "Democrat" generates a negative initial feeling, other negative concepts are more likely to be activated. Highly activated concepts are then transferred from long-term memory into working memory for conscious deliberation. Much like the sample in long-term memory, the new working-memory sample is biased in the direction of the initial affect and conscious evaluation is incapable of being neutral. These biased evaluations are finally cycled back into our prior attitudes to be used for future processing. In short, the stream of processing that leads to conscious deliberation is biased from the outset; dispassionate control is difficult. Our reasoning is therefore affectively motivated rather than purely rational.

The idea that affect subconsciously drives conscious reasoning provides further evidence for oft-cited concept of dual process models. Though dual processes can be found in many contexts, I am speaking specifically about the notion that human beings have cognitive systems that are outside of conscious awareness and operate quickly in addition to cognitive systems that are conscious and (relatively) thoughtful and rational. The affect-driven hot cognition model exemplifies the system that works instantaneously and effortlessly.

The Hot Cognition model (Lodge and Taber 2005, Lodge and Taber 2013) and it's associated motivated reasoning processes (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006; Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson 2010; Hart and Nisbet 2011) are backed by a great deal of empirical evidence. For my purposes, the most important investigations relate to candidate evaluation. In these studies, subconscious affect is manipulated experimentally through priming techniques in order to demonstrate that positive and negative feelings outside of conscious awareness are incorporated into the candidate evaluation process. In a lab study, Lodge and Taber (2013) experimentally manipulated the similarity between a subject and a fictitious candidate by matching a news article about the candidate with the subject's responses to a questionnaire administered prior to the experiment. It is expected that candidates who agree with the subject's policy preferences will be rated higher than candidates who have ambiguous preferences and candidates who have opposing preferences. This type of evaluation based on issue proximity is commonly discussed in voting literature. However, the researchers also manipulate the valence of priming words that are subconsciously shown to subjects. They find that political sophisticates who were primed with negative words tended to rate the candidate somewhat more negatively than sophisticates who were primed with neutral words and much more negatively than sophisticates who were primed with positive words. Negative primes carried more weight than positive primes and sophisticates were affected more than unsophisticated subjects due to the stronger associations they have embedded in their memory system. A follow up study replicated

these results and revealed that subjects who were asked to think carefully about the candidate introduced more affect-driven bias into their evaluations than subjects who processed information naturally. These studies demonstrate that issue proximity, evaluated consciously, and unrelated affect, processed subconsciously, both play a role in the candidate evaluation process. Given that we are constantly encountering primes in the natural world, our candidate evaluations are likely saturated with subconscious affect that may or may not be directly relevant to the evaluation task.

If subconscious affect can be detected as an independent, driving force in candidate likability ratings, a logical next step would be that subconscious (and conscious) affect plays an important role in other social evaluations of candidates such as ideological placement.

My theory uses motivated reasoning as a foundation for contrast/assimilation (i.e projection) effects; this union produces an updated theory of ideological extremity perception. Upon encountering a stimulus such as a candidate or a party, affect will be triggered automatically. The initial valence will lead to an affectively biased sample of associations in long-term memory, the most activated of which will be sent into working memory for conscious deliberation and reasoning. The resulting conscious feeling of like or dislike of the stimulus comes from both subconscious and conscious processes that are saturated with affect. This conscious affect is then incorporated into assessments of ideological location. Mild negative affect should lead to minimal contrasting from the perceiver's own ideological location and significant negative affect should lead to large contrasting effects. Likewise, mild positive affect should lead to minimal assimilation effects and strong positive affect should lead to larger assimilation effects. Ultimately, my theory would argue that if issue positions are known to some extent, issue proximity will play a role in ideological evaluation, but this process will be driven by affect that begins subconsciously and biases assessments in a way that either exaggerates the distance between the perceiver and the object or exaggerates the similarities between the perceiver and the object. In the empirical chapters to follow in this dissertation, I do not test this theory with *subconscious* priming techniques. Rather, it serves as a general framework for testing assimilation and contrast effects with measures of affect such as feeling thermometers and variants of feeling thermometers that capture purer measures of affect. The feeling thermometer "variant" is described more thoroughly in Chapter 3 when it is introduced in an experiment.

Alternative Explanations of Ideological Perception

Aside from projection, the political psychology literature points to three alternative processes that could affect perception: evaluation, persuasion and inference. These processes are normally discussed within the context of candidate issue perception rather than overall ideological perception. Below I discuss each process and how it relates to issue evaluation. I then tie each process to ideological evaluation and argue how it could or could not affect my theory.

Evaluation

The candidate issue perception literature states that if evaluation is occurring, a voter uses his own issue position as well as the candidate's issue position in order to determine which candidate he/she wants to vote for. The individual asks, "Does the candidate's issue position align with mine?" If it does not, they are not rewarded with the individual's support. If they do, they are rewarded with his or her support.

It is possible that the series of steps behind issue evaluation and issue voting could correspond to the process of ideological perception. If this were to happen, citizens would need to learn the issue positions of a candidate, use this information to discern the candidate's overall ideological location and then decide whether they like or dislike the candidate based on this information. Candidate issue positions and subsequent perceived ideology that do not align with one's own ideology would require one to dislike the candidate. Similarly, issue positions and discerned ideology that do align with the perceiver's own ideology would require one to like the candidate. Thus, the direction of causality is issue evaluation first, ideological evaluation second, and a decision to like or dislike the candidate or object last.

This scenario, largely considered more normative than projection, persuasion and inference, is sometimes tied to cognitive consistency theories in that the perceiver can maintain consistency by selecting the candidate that does align with their opinions (Abramowitz 1978). Although the psychological need for consistency could be the end goal, issue evaluation does not come with the implications of irrationality that are often tied to other consistency based theories. Evaluation is more rational in that an individual digests information and then determines whether that information aligns with his or her own preferences and identity (Brody and Page 1972). This type of process is similar to Downs's (1957) theory of the voter as a rational actor.

Within this dissertation, I do not test the direction of causality and therefore cannot say for sure whether issue evaluation and ideological perception leads to affective feelings or vice versa. To do this requires that I manipulate affect experimentally. Though I do not do this here, the hot cognition literature *has* and finds that manufactured affect which takes place outside of conscious awareness has significant effects on downstream evaluations (Lodge and Taber 2013). These findings are built on years of experimental evidence that affect precedes conscious cognition, operates under a different system than conscious cognition and can lead to evaluations in the absence of recognition memory (Zajonc 1980).

In short, evaluation is not excluded from my theory. Provided that issue positions are at least somewhat known, there is a level of conscious evaluation and proximity assessment taking place. Candidates who promote liberal policies will likely be placed on the liberal side of an ideology scale, for example. Krosnick (1990) comes to similar conclusions with candidate issue perceptions. Instead, my theory states that affect can color the evaluative process such that people exaggerate their evaluations in a motivated fashion. This happens because the evaluation process is littered with spontaneous affective components that arise from a multitude of associations and stimuli. The only times in which contrast or assimilation might fully dominate evaluation is when issue positions are not known, are vague or are ambiguous (Bruner 1978, Granberg and Brent 1974, Kinder 1978, Page and Jones 1979). This is why Feldman and Conover (1983) find that projection is more pronounced during the beginning of campaign season before learning has taken place.

Persuasion

A second possible explanation for ideological perception is persuasion. This process is often discussed in conjunction with projection due to their similar theoretical foundations and implications for a functional democratic society. In the literature on candidate issue perception, persuasion takes place when a citizen learns the issue position of the candidate that they like and then change their own attitudes to align with that of the candidate (Brody and Page 1972). Alternatively, if a disliked candidate holds similar issue positions to the citizen, they will acquire this information and update their own position accordingly (Markus and Converse 1979). For

example, Abramowitz (1978) examines citizens' attitudes in Virginia during the Ford and Carter presidential debate. The event was able to increase subjects' awareness about Ford and Carter's stances on unemployment, an important issue in that year's election. However, this new information did not cause people to change their preferred candidate. Instead, subjects adopted the positions of the candidate they already liked going into the debate. Some studies suggest that persuasion effects are most likely to occur when the information environment is unambiguous and the perceiver understands the position of the candidate (Granberg and Brent 1974; Kinder 1978; Conover and Feldman 1982).

Persuasion effects are also derived from older theories of cognitive consistency, which state that people do not feel comfortable holding discordant beliefs, attitudes, cognitions etc.[4] One way of relieving the discomfort of dissonance is to change one's *own* attitude such that it is in line with that of the preferred candidate. This process is referred to as persuasion for obvious reasons; dissonance (directly) and the candidate (indirectly) have persuaded the perceiver to change their own stance. Conclusions regarding persuasion differ. Studies using panel data that track the political learning process over the course of a campaign find no evidence of this effect (Conover and Feldman 1983). Newly emerging research tells a different story. An experimental field study conducted by Brookman and Butler (forthcoming) reveals that constituents are willing to change their issue positions once they learn that a trusted political figure (in this case, a real state legislator who represents them) holds a different opinion than they do. This seems to be the case even when the legislator does not go to great lengths to justify his issue position to the constituent. The field experiment, with its high internal and external validity and use of real politicians, provides compelling evidence that persuasion is possible at the state politician level.

For persuasion to operate in the context of ideological perception though, a subject would have to learn the ideological location of a liked candidate and then adjust their own ideological identity such that they align (if they do not already). Similarly, a subject would need to adjust or change his or her own ideological identity upon learning that a disliked candidate held the same identity.

Of all the alternative explanations for ideological perception presented here, persuasion is the least likely to pose a threat to my theory. That a liked candidate could cause a person to adjust their ideological identity seems suspect considering one's symbolic ideology is derived from affective feelings towards social groups that have developed throughout the course of one's life (Conover and Feldman 1981). To suddenly be forced to adjust or even *shed* these deeply held feelings in order to be consistent with a liked or disliked candidate would indicate that political figures hold far more power than previously thought; they would be capable of altering someone's deep seated identity, not simply their stance on a singular issue. An overall identity adjustment therefore seems unlikely.

Inference

Finally, Conover and Feldman (1982) and Feldman and Conover (1983) question the magnitude of persuasion and projection in issue perception and suggest a fourth route: inference. In the context of issue perception, the inference hypothesis claims that voters can infer a candidate's issue position by using other pieces of information and cues, particularly partisanship and ideology. For example, if a voter wants to know where Obama stands on the issue of

[4] If anything, persuasion and projection have stronger associations with these theories than evaluation.

taxation, they can simply infer his position by using their knowledge of the Democratic Party's stance on taxation. Democrats are more likely to favor taxes to pay for government programs, therefore Obama, a Democrat, is more likely to favor taxes to pay for government programs. He must have a similar stance as his party. In this case, partisanship is a cue for making an inference. The authors argue that other cues, such as ideology, can also be used in this process. If the person does not know where Obama stands on taxation, they can look to his ideology and infer that he supports raising taxes because he is a liberal and liberals support raising taxes to fund government programs. This inference process in which people draw on other pieces of information is rooted in schema theory, which suggests that individuals have cognitive maps of ideas, words and concepts that relate to one another (Fiske and Linville 1980; Hamill, Lodge and Blake 1985, Lodge and Hamill 1986; Lodge et al. 1991). These maps are employed to draw conclusions about the world and generate perceptions when information is lacking (Hastie 1981; Taylor and Crocker 1981). This process of using pre-existing information to fill in information gaps is not as irrational as the persuasion and projection processes are thought to be (Feldman and Conover 1983).

Inference theory is a possible route to ideological perception and Conover and Feldman have suggested this themselves (1983). If inference were to take place, individuals would discern a candidate's ideological location by using the perceived location of the party that candidate belongs to. For example, if the subject believes the Democratic Party is somewhat liberal, then Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, must also be somewhat liberal.

How does the inference process affect my theory of affect-driven contrast and assimilation? My theory does not exclude the inference process. In fact, it is likely that some people, especially those who do not follow politics day to day, will use assessments of well-known, related persons or groups to aid newly forming ideological perceptions. I argue that affect is operating above and beyond that of inference (something that Feldman and Conover found to be true) just as it operates above and beyond evaluation. Moreover, the cues in which people use are formed affectively because schemas themselves- filled with prior knowledge and associations- are laden with affect. People may infer a candidate's ideology from a party, or a party's ideology from a prominent politician, but because these cues themselves are saturated with affective charge, they will help produce a net feeling or like or dislike which will then manifest itself into some degree of contrast or assimilation. Ultimately, my theory does not claim that projection is the only process underlying ideological perception. The other reasoning mechanisms previously mentioned can work in concert (Castelli, Arcuri and Cararro 2009) and are not mutually exclusive (Granberg 1988). The theory does claim that affect charges all of the processes taking place, hereby generating a projection effect, be it large or small.

The inference process and its role in my theory provide an explanation for the Barack Obama example mentioned previously. The likely scenario is that people use Obama's race to draw conclusions about his ideology (ie. Thinking that blacks are very liberal so Obama must be very liberal).[5] This is an inference process and is likely taking place for many people, particularly those who know little about Obama's policy intentions. However, Obama's race itself will also cause an affective feeling of like or dislike within the perceiver and this adds to their net affective feeling. This positive or negative feeling them operates above and beyond the inference process and will cause a (small) projection effect.

[5] Many might call this an erroneous perception since many blacks identify as conservative due to religious reasons.

It should finally be noted that the assimilation and contrast effects associated with projection have not gone without criticism. The most scathing review (of candidate issue projection in particular) comes from Krosnick (1990) and Krosnick (2002) in which he argues that previous studies of projection are not convincing because they are based on positive and negative correlations that could be explained by the evaluation or persuasion processes. The political-social world makes it difficult to flawlessly disentangle these processes from one another; projection may be a methodological artifact that could be explained theoretically and empirically by evaluation. The most convincing counter-evidence comes from Castelli, Arcuri and Cararro (2009) who isolate "fixed", non-political characteristics about subjects and watch them project (or negatively project) those characteristics onto candidates who are liked co-partisans (or disliked, out-group partisans). Specifically, subjects project their own birthday month onto real politicians they like and do the opposite for real politicians they do not like. By using dates of birth, there is evidence of pure projection without the alternative explanation of inductive reasoning. This series of studies provides compelling evidence that perceptions of political figures can be formulated by purely biased (and likely affect-driven) reasoning. [6]

Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of three empirical chapters that each address causes or consequences of ideological perception. The first empirical chapter makes up the first section of the dissertation and stands more on its own while the 2nd and 3rd empirical chapters are tied together by my micro-level theory discussed above. In Chapter 1 I use observational panel data from the National Election Studies to demonstrate that perceptions of ideology matter in the realm of public opinion. That ideological perceptions matter is certainly not a new insight. Proximity voting, which has been studied for decades, examines whether the electorate selects candidates who hold opinions that are close to their own ideologies or close to their own preferences. My analysis diverges from this literature in two significant ways. First, instead of studying ideological perception in voting behavior, I look at its effects on public opinion, specifically preferences for more or less government services, a key concept in understanding representative democracy (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995). Second, instead of studying ideological perception of individual candidates, I focus on how the electorate views the Democratic Party (and its leader, the president). My interest in the party instead of candidates stems from a peculiar finding in previous research: that the electorate tends to overestimate how liberal the Democratic Party is while the same does not hold true for the Republican Party; they are generally considered to be as conservative as their "true" value (Brady and Sniderman 1985, MacKuen and Parker-Stephen unpublished manuscript 2005, MacKuen and Parker-Stephen unpublished manuscript, 2006). It would be useful to know whether ideological perceptions of parties, which are not often studied empirically, influence the public's preference for more government activity. But perhaps more important is whether these perceptions themselves are

[6] Some may notice that much of the literature cited in this portion is older. This is undeniably true; most of the candidate perception literature peaked with studies of issue perception in the 1980s. In one of his final studies on projection, Granberg et al. (1988) discusses the idea that both inference and projection can work in tandem and suggests that someone should integrate the two into a more comprehensive framework for political perception. His call to action is left unanswered. I believe that my theory can help provide a framework in which a number of these processes can work in concert.

erroneous and overstated. If they are, this would indicate that the desire for less government activity is biased away from the electorate's true preferred value. Because detecting whether these perceptions are overstated is difficult task with observational data, Chapter 2 uses experimentation to see whether fictitious Democrats are viewed as more extreme than their ideologically equivalent Republican counterparts. Testing this asymmetry experimentally can help determine whether it is robust and holds in internally valid contexts. Chapter 2 also delves into the micro-foundations of these perceptions by using conscious and subconscious affect to predict candidate placement on a 7-point scale and to predict responses to questions regarding ideological threat.

The final chapter evaluates whether certain types of issues (religious, economic, foreign etc) are assessed differently in terms of their ideological strength. Moreover, it asks whether different political personality types are more inclined to perceive certain types of issues as more extreme than others. The role of affect in these decisions is also assessed. Therefore, the dissertation begins with larger trends and patterns and ends with the individual-level factors that play into these judgments.

Chapter 2:

Ideological Perception and Public Opinion

This empirical portion of the dissertation begins with the premise that ideological perceptions matter in the realm of public opinion. As previously mentioned, these types of perceptions are usually discussed in the context of proximity and directional voting. In the proximity voting literature, scholars ask whether citizens select the candidates who are closest to their own issue positions or close to them in a multidimensional (or unidimensional) ideological space. In the directional literature argument, voters are said to select the candidate who is simply on the same ideological "side" as they are (For a brief summary and critique of proximity and directional voting, see Lewis and King 1999). Though this question is indeed important for understanding a rational and representational governing system, my analysis is not concerned with voting or the perceived ideology of candidates running for office. Instead, I take interest in how people perceive the ideological location of the major American parties (and president) and how these perceptions affect public opinion at an individual level. Below I will explain my rationale for this line of research, hypothesize what public opinion questions will be affected by ideological perceptions of parties, run analyses using panel data and discuss the implications of the findings. Although the theory I described in Chapter 1 is an individual-level perception theory, I do not test that theory yet. This chapter is strictly about a particular *consequence* of ideological perceptions. Chapters 2 and 3 will conduct more thorough investigations of the micro-foundations behind these perceptions. Thus, as previously stated, the chapters are organized in reverse order: a big picture is presented first and a smaller picture is presented last.

Background

Why focus on ideological perceptions of political parties rather than singular candidates or prominent politicians? The inspiration for this portion of the dissertation comes from two previous studies that reveal a peculiar asymmetry in American political perception. In Brady and Sniderman's 1985 work on likeability heuristics, the authors note that the American public perceives Democrats to be more liberal than they really are on a range of issues in both 1972 and in 1976. On nearly every topic from pollution to medical insurance to Vietnam, Democrats are placed to the left of their true value on 7-point scales. This true value is calculated by averaging the ideological self-placements of respondents who identify as Democrats in the NES. Because the perception question phasing asks respondents to place "Democrats" on the issue scales rather than the Democratic Party, these comparisons are appropriate. On the other hand, Republicans are perceived as more *moderate* than their reported values on over half of the same issue positions. In order to describe the attribution of greater liberalism to Democrats than they warrant, the authors coin the phrase "left-shift"; Democrats are consistently shifted leftward from their self-reported location.

In a follow-up paper, MacKuen and Parker-Stephen (unpublished) question how pervasive this misperception is. In this case, the authors evaluate perceptions of the Democratic and

Republican parties rather than perceptions of Democrats and Republicans in the public.[7] To do this, they must compare perceived party locations to "true" party locations. The clear problem is that there is no "true" ideological location of a party or any political object. This type of judgment is inherently subjective with each person bringing different interpretations, reference points and idiosyncracies to the assessment. While it is true that the measurement techniques for elite-level ideology have become sophisticated in recent years (McCarty et al. 2006), we will never be able to perfectly capture something as complex and dynamic as a real person or party's ideological location. Therefore, the authors use a proxy variable: the average ideological self-placement of sophisticated, partisan activists. Their rationale for this measure is that average self-placement of partisans who both understand ideological labeling and are actively involved in politics will approximate the location of the party itself. Partisans are categorized as those who identify as "very strong" or "strong" Democrats and Republicans. "Sophisticated" means that the respondent understands ideological thought and how the words "liberal" and "conservative" correspond with both parties. To be considered ideologically sophisticated, the respondent must be able to place the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party on an ideology scale and a guaranteed job scale (1972-1980) or a services-spending scale (1982-2004). Finally, an activist is categorized as someone who has recently participated in at least three out of six political activities such as donating money, wearing a pin, helping a campaign etc. These self-placements are averaged each year.[8]

Equipped with this proxy, the authors find that the perceived location of the Democratic Party (also an average) is overestimated year to year while the perceived location of the Republican Party is estimated fairly accurately. Importantly, this trend only holds for ideologically sophisticated respondents in the NES who understand that the Democrats are generally to the left of Republicans on ideology scales.[9] Moreover respondents left-shift the Democratic Party on *specific* issues more than they right-shift the Republican Party on those same issues. The exceptions to this trend seem to be defense spending, a "temporally dominant"

[7] After 1982, the NES changed their question wording and asked respondents about their perceptions of the parties rather than perceptions of Democrats and Republicans in general

[8] To make sure these were appropriate approximations, each year's average was compared to the party's ADA score for that year. The magnitude of the scores and the movements between years were similar, bringing some level of construct validity to their proxy. The partisan activist placements were also somewhat more extreme than the ADA scores, meaning that what they were measuring was, if anything, a safe estimate of party location. These types of proxies are not unheard of. Other peer-reviewed articles have used the median perceived candidate position to estimate the true positions of candidates (Bruner 1978, Markus and Converse 1979, Luttberg and Grant 1985, Gant 1985, Martinez 1988).

[9] Those who do not understand ideological labels will tend to default to the mid-point of the scale for placement of the parties.

issue, urban unrest and women's roles, "temporally transient" issues. I have replicated their data on ideological perceptions from year to year below for visualization purposes.[10]

In Figure 1, the black circle and black squares represent the *"true"* locations of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. The grey circles and grey squares represent the *perceived* locations of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Here we can see how closely perceptions of the Republican Party align with its "true" value while perceptions of the Democratic Party clearly deviate. The NES did not conduct time series studies in 2002, 2006 and 2010, which is why those years are excluded from the analysis. Also note that the "true" locations of the parties tend to move towards the poles over time. This movement is in line with the work on party polarization using DW Nominate scores (McCarty Poole and Rosenthal 2006).

Figure 1: Asymmetrical Perceptions of Party Ideology



Note: Data source: American National Election Studies Time Series Data 1972-2012.

The most important question triggered by the above pattern is whether this phenomenon holds with superior measurement techniques. After all, the self-placement of sophisticated, partisan activists is a proxy variable; we must remain skeptical of its construct validity. Before investigating the micro-foundations of these perceptions and whether the asymmetry is robust

[10] In this original study, the authors estimate a cubic function for this visualization to smooth out year-to-year sampling fluctuations in each biennial reading. I instead leave the data in its normal format since the pattern is still clear.

enough to hold in an experimental setting, I begin by asking whether ideological perceptions even matter in the realm of public opinion.

We could speculate that these perceptions affect of range of political opinion topics, but perhaps the most basic question is whether they affect preference for size of government. In other words, as the Democratic Party is perceived as more and more liberal, will this cause aversion to a larger, more active federal government?

Our understanding on preferred government size and activity mainly comes from the literature on public mood. Public Mood is a measure of the public's preference for government activity in the aggregate; it captures a long-term trend rather than short-lived fluctuations in public opinion (Erikson et al. 2002). Mood is measured by combining a wealth of surveys that tap into a multitude of policy preferences across years. In the public mood literature, liberalism is measured as the public's preference for more government activity in general whereas conservatism represents less government activity, generally.

A number of theories seek to explain these trends. Some scholars have pointed to economic perceptions as the critical factor (Durr 1993, Stevenson 2001) Those in the public who are sophisticated enough to detect positive or negative economic signals will alter their preference for more or less government activity depending on whether the economy is strong or weak. When the economy expands, aggregate policy preferences become more liberal. Likewise, when the economy contracts, aggregate policy preferences become conservative.

Others have suggested that policy outputs themselves trigger changes in public sentiment (Erikson et al. 2002, Wlezien 1995). This is most notable directly after national elections. Shifts in the public mood are often seen shortly after partisan turnover in the White House. When Democrats take office, the public contracts and expresses more conservative preferences in the aggregate. When Republicans take control, the public seems to become more liberal. A clear example is articulated by Bartels in a recent analysis: the American public was more conservative in 2012 under Obama than it had been since 1952. In fact, all the major shifts in mood tend to align with these changeovers in the executive branch. Bartels diagnosis is that partisan turnover is a cause of opinion change, not a consequence of opinion change. These shifts in preferences align well with Wlezien's theory of the public as a thermostat (1995). In this model, the American public is reactive to policy outputs. They make judgments about the current state of federal government activity and decide whether it needs to be enhanced or diminished. Wlezien (1995) examines defense spending specifically. When spending is increased more than preferred levels, the public signals their disapproval to elites in Washington who then must adjust downward.

Given the work on the public responding to policy outputs, I propose that preference for government services and spending at the individual level (rather than the aggregate level) should be affected not only by the actual amount of policy being produced, but also by how the ruling party is perceived ideologically. If the public thinks the Democratic Party is acting in an extremely liberal fashion, they will be more averse to government programs and spending. On the contrary, as perceptions of the party become more conservative, people will be more approach-oriented toward government programs. These perceptions are closely related to the policy outputs themselves. Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (1995) claim something similar when they describe the aggregate mood by stating, "These judgments will change as policy changes, as real-world conditions change, or as 'politically colored' perceptions of policy and conditions change" (pg.544). These 'perceptions' they speak of should be plentiful and influential. Even though the majority of the public may not structure their own preferences ideologically

(Converse 1964), the words "liberal" and "conservative" have held meaning for most citizens and have impacted their opinions since the early 1970s at least (Levitin and Miller 1979). Since the time of Levitin and Miller's study of these labels and their perceived meaning, the percentage of the public who recognizes differences between the parties and can demonstrate ideological sophistication (by placing Democrats to the left of Republicans on an ideology scale) has grown substantially (Hetherington 2001).

Hypothesis: As someone's perception of the Democratic Party becomes more liberally extreme, they will prefer a less active federal government

Design

In order to understand the relationship between ideological perception and preference for more/less government one needs to identify the methodological issues it poses. The first issue is endogeneity due to reciprocal causality. Intuitively, the causal direction between the variables is perception of the party's ideology first followed by preferences for more or less government second. Wlezien's work on public preferences for spending (1995) mentioned previously suggests a similar temporal order: when government spending (on defense) overshoots the preferred level, the public sends a signal that they desire less. The public is reactive to policy outputs. However, it is possible that preference for more or less government activity could lead someone to perceive the Democratic Party a certain way ideologically. Take, for example, a citizen who prefers much less government programs and activity. If this citizen is ideologically sophisticated, he or she may be more likely to call him/herself a conservative and believe in principles of less government. This may, in turn, cause him/her to have greater negative affect toward the Democratic Party and perceive it as more liberally extreme.

In order to demonstrate this reciprocal causality issue, I take data from the most recent ANES study in 2012[11] and run two separate OLS regressions: one using preference for government services as the dependent variable and an identical model using perceptions of the Democratic Party as the dependent variable. Below I provide a thorough description of each variable before running the model. Most of these variables (or closely related variations of them) will be used throughout the rest of the chapter.

Dependent Variable: The dependent variable is preference for government activity. It is measured using a question that asks the respondent to place him or herself on a 7-point scale ranging from "The government should provide many fewer services" to "The government should provide many more services." A higher number indicates preference for more services.

Main Independent Variable: The independent variable of interest is where the respondent places the Democratic Party on the 7-point ideology scale. This measures a subjective perception of how extreme the Democratic Party is. I label this variable "Democratic Party Liberalism" and reverse code it such that a higher number indicates greater perceived liberalism. This is done to make the interpretation a bit easier for the reader.

Controls

[11] The 2012 file was chosen because it is recent and has a large sample size. This reciprocal causality could be demonstrated in any survey year.

Many things could predict someone's preference for government services. Because parsimony is usually favored in the social sciences, I limit my model to the most important demographics and opinion variables that may affect these preferences.

Party identification is measured using the standard 7-point scale that has been compiled from branching questions that discern the strength of someone's partisanship. As someone becomes a stronger Republican on this scale, their preference for government services should decrease. The Republican Party generally promotes itself as the party of smaller government and less government intervention. Therefore, its partisans should prefer less government services. This variable captures the political and identity aspect of preference for government services.

Ideology is measured using the standard 7-point scale that uses branching questions to discern strength. As someone becomes more conservative on this scale, they should prefer less government services. American conservatism promotes less government intervention and more individualistic behavior and reliance on the self. Most people whose worldview aligns with this ideology should prefer less government services on the whole. This variable captures the principles and values aspect of preference for government services.[12]

Family Income: Because the 2012 NES does not allow researchers to access their information on personal income, I used family income as my variable for material need. I dropped respondents who refused to answer or who stated that they did not know their income, as they only comprised 4% of respondents. I leave the income categories as they are and take the natural log of the variable since it is skewed to the right.[13] This variable should capture some of the material need aspect of preference for more or less government services.

Employment Status: The NES provides respondents with a number of options to describe their employment status. I code this as a dichotomous variable where a 1 indicates that the person is employed full time and a 0 indicates that they are either unemployed or underemployed. People who fall into the employed category include people who work full time or people who have retired. I categorize retirees with the fully employed individuals because these are presumably people who have not fallen on hard times or struggling to make money; they have (most likely) voluntarily chosen to stop working. Those who fit the 0 category have either been laid off, work only part time, are disabled and not capable of working etc. While it is possible that some people choose to work part time or not to work, it is hard to differentiate those people from others who do not opt into this lifestyle. Therefore I am making an assumption that the people coded as 0 here are in a more compromising position and have potentially greater need for government programs. This variable also captures the material need aspect of preference for government programs and government spending.

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[12] It also captures an identity aspect. See Huddy and Young's working paper, "Understanding Ideological Identity Through Personality Traits: A Common Heuristic?"

[13] I also run the same models with a self-reported socio-economic class variable that includes lower class, middle class, working class, working/middle class and upper class. Substituting this variable does not change the model results in terms of variable significance or magnitude.

Opinion regarding government waste was measured with a single question that asked, "Does the government waste much tax money?" with the following response options: Don't Waste Very Much, Waste Some, Waste a Lot. Those who think that taxpayer dollars are wasted on government programs either because they don't believe government should provide programs or because they believe those programs are inefficient and costly should prefer less government services on the whole. This variable captures the monetary aspect of preference for government services.

Racial resentment is measured using four questions that ask whether blacks work their way up in society without special favors, whether slavery and discrimination created conditions that make it harder for blacks to work their way out of the middle class, whether blacks have gotten less than they deserve, and whether blacks must try harder to get ahead (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Higher numbers indicate greater racial resentment. Those who score higher on this measure are likely to associate government programs and redistribution with minority populations who they feel do not deserve favors. This variable should capture the racial aspect of preferences for government services.

Perceptions of President's Ideology is measured with the question that asks respondents to place Obama on the standard 7-point scale. It is labeled as "Obama Liberalism" and therefore reverse coded such that higher numbers mean greater liberalism. Seeing that Obama is the individual associated with most governmental action and the de-facto Democratic figurehead, perceptions of *his* ideology should serve as a cue for how large the government currently is, even if Republicans are in control of the House of Representatives (as they were at the time of the 2012 ANES survey). Greater perceived liberalism should lead respondents to prefer less programs. Although party perceptions are the main IV in this analysis, this variable should still be kept in mind as an important one. The discovery of Democrats as more liberal than their true value was found in the context of the parties and members of the public. However, there is no theoretical reason why it should not apply to individuals and party leaders as well.

Economic Perceptions are captured with the following question: Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse? I generate a 5-point scale by adding the follow-up question which gauges if the economy has gotten "much" or "somewhat" better or worse. This perception is included because research on the public mood, a preference for more or less government activity in the aggregate, is influenced by assessments of the economy (Durr 1993, Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). Furthermore, Enns and Kellstedt (2008) argue that one need not know details of recent economic conditions in order to update their feelings about government activity. All that is required is for someone to have a vague understanding of whether the economy has gotten worse, stayed the same, or improved. Although public mood is a higher-level trend and its relationship with economic perceptions is said to move slowly over time, I include this variable because it should nonetheless be impactful at the individual level.[14]

[14] The variable used here is a retrospective evaluation. Durr (1993) discusses prospective assessments as influential in policy sentiment. I ran models with both the retrospective (5 point) and prospective (3 point) variables simultaneously (as well as substituting) and the results did not change although the prospective variable sometimes showed a null relationship with the DV.

A standard correlation matrix indicates that only two variables, perceptions of the Democratic Party's ideology and Perceptions of Obama's ideology, correlated at high levels (.75). To make sure that this would not violate OLS assumptions, I ran a regression of the model followed by a Variance Inflation Factor test. None of the variables showed a VIF number over 2.5, which indicates that multicollinearity is not problematic in the model. Table 1 reports the OLS regression results.

Table 1: Reciprocal Causality Between Variables

	Preference for Government Services (Less-More)	**Perceived Dem. Party Liberalism (C-L)**
Perceived Dem. Party Liberalism (C-L)	-.095 (.020)***	-
Preference for Government Services (Less-More)	-	-.059 (.013)***
Party ID (D-R)	-.153 (.012)***	.068 (.012)***
Ideology (L-C)	-.199 (.017)***	-.055 (.015)***
Family Income (logged)	-.022 (.003)***	.008 (.002)**
Gov't Wastes Tax Money	-.055 (.012)***	.015 (.009)
Racial Resentment	-.136 (.013)***	-.027 (.010)
Obama Liberalism (C-L)	-.095 (.020)***	.674 (.012)***
Economy Perception in Last Year (Better to Worse)	-.076 (.013)***	-.035 (.010)***
Employed	-.026 (.007)***	-.003 (.005)
Constant	1.02 (.016)***	.271 (.017)***
R^2	.374	.583
N	5,072	5,072

Note: Data Source: National American Election Studies 2012 Time Series Data.
All variables are standardized to range from 0-1
Errors are robust standard errors. Significance codes: ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05

In Table 1 we see that all variables are highly significant predictors, which is expected given the large sample size. The first model indicates that those who perceive the Democratic Party as more liberally extreme prefer less government services. Additionally, those who are more Republican, more conservative, make more money, see government use of tax money as wasteful, have high racial resentment, perceive Obama as increasingly liberal, see the economy as getting worse and are employed are less likely to prefer more government services. The main variable of interest, perceived location of the Democratic Party, is pointing in the correct direction and is highly significant. Going from 0 to 1 on this (reverse coded) scale is associated with a 9.5% drop in preference for more government services. While this coefficient may not be as substantively large as the coefficients for party identification, ideology and racial resentment, it is still large enough to warrant interest. According to the model, party perception is as important a predictor of government size preference as Obama's perceived ideology, family income, opinions of government waste and retrospective economic perceptions. While this may

look promising for my hypothesis, the second model indicates the anticipated reciprocal relationship: those who prefer more government services view the Democratic Party as less liberally extreme.

When two variables are part of the same system and predict each other, the endogenous independent variable is correlated with the disturbance term and OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. There are various ways to deal with endogeneity caused by reciprocal relationships, the most well-known of which is to use simultaneous equations via a two-stage least squares analysis. This can only be done if proper instrumental variables can be found and the equations are properly identified.[15]

The second issue, which also speaks to the issue of endogeneity, is the temporal order of events. When using cross-sectional data, surveys questions are asked at a discrete point in time. This gives me a limited sense of the impact that ideological perception has on preference for government activity. By using panel data in which the same respondents are interviewed at multiple time points, I can know whether change in ideological perception effects change in preference for government programs and activity.[16] This will provide a more dynamic understanding of how these perceptions impact this type of public opinion.

The only panel dataset that asks participants to place the parties on an ideological spectrum and has relevant public opinion questions is the NES panel conducted in the early to mid 1990s. The 2008-2010 NES panel has an impressive 13 waves but does not ask respondents to place the parties on ideology scales. The CCES dataset is large in scope and has a 2010/2012 panel but does not include relevant public opinion questions.

Despite being 20 years prior at the time of writing, the early 1990s represent an interesting time period in American politics. The first wave of the survey (1992) takes place before the partisan turnover in the White House. The 1992 election then reintroduced the Democratic Party to the executive office after 12 years of Republican control. Over the next couple years, Bill Clinton and Congress were involved in a number of controversial policy

[15] 2SLS was attempted. I used a question about whether the rich "buy" elections, a question about whether the respondent voted for John McCain in 2008 and a question about feelings towards illegal immigrants as instruments that can predict preferences for government services but have no relationship with perceptions of the Democratic Party's ideological location. I use a dummy variable for whether the respondent thinks Barack Obama is a Muslim, a dummy variable for whether the respondent thinks Mitt Romney is a moderate (extracted from his placement on a 7 point scale) and finally, a variable measuring someone's understanding of the ideological labels as my other instruments. These three variables predict Dem. Party placement but they do not predict preferences for more government services. A Hausmann test indicated that OLS estimates were better than 2SLS estimates. This means that the instruments are not of good quality. Therefore, I move forward with the understanding that all results should be interpreted with this bias in mind.

[16] Panel data can help with endogeneity if it is coming from a variable that is time invariant. Otherwise, simultaneous equations should be used. It is possible to solve both methodological issues at once by using 2SLS with the panel data itself. The xtivreg2 command in STATA allows for this. However, given the Hausmann test results from my 2012 sample, I find it unlikely that this would work with the panel data. The instruments for the panel data would be the same questions used in the 2012 data since these data sets are both from the NES Time Series.

initiatives that spanned the political spectrum. He lobbied for the North American Free Trade Agreement (enforced in 1994), which created a free trade block in North America. He signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which raised taxes on the top income earners and cut taxes for low-income earners and small businesses. The Brady Bill (passed in the House and Senate in 1993 and activated in 1994) enforced background checks and a five-day waiting period to purchase a handgun. In 1993 Congress also passed "Don't Ask Don't Tell", which allowed homosexual men and women to serve in the armed forces provided that they did not disclose their sexuality. In 1993 Clinton spearheaded his famous Health Security Act, which famously caused controversy in Congress and was ultimately defeated. The end of 1994 also saw a major initiative on the part of Republicans to take back the House of Representatives. Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey heavily publicized the well-known Contract with America, which spoke directly to the public and highlighted a number of Republican ideals and platforms they planned to implement if elected. With the help of this promotional tool, the Republican Party took back the House in the 1994 election after a long span of Democratic control.

The panel that examines this time period has three waves: respondents were sampled in 1992, 1994 and 1996. The 1992 portion of this panel (N=1,005) has a pre-election survey as well as a post election survey while the 1994 section of the panel is strictly a post-election survey; it re-interviews 759 of the original 1,005 respondents. These first two waves are strongly balanced and contain (almost all of) the same variables that were included in the 2012 analysis above. The only control variables that will be switched are the perceptions of Obama's ideology with Bill Clinton's ideology and the natural log of family income with the natural log of the respondent's income.

When the 1996 wave is added it loses a critical variable: the measure of racial resentment. Seeing as this can be an important predictor of preference for certain government programs (Kinder and Mendelberg 2000, Kinder and Sears 1981), I run the two-wave panel and three-wave panel separately and see if results hold across models specifications.

I also add a second dependent variable to the analysis: net preferences for government spending. People who claim to want more government programs in general should also tend to prefer more government spending when questions are specific and issue focused. The NES asks respondents whether federal spending should, "Decrease" "Stay About the Same" or "Increase" in the following areas: social security, public schools, science and technology, dealing with crime, welfare programs, child care, aid to the poor and protecting the environment. Each preference question is coded from 1-3 with higher numbers indicating preference for more spending. The summated scale ranges from 8 (decrease spending on all issues) to 24 (increase spending on all issues) and correlates with the question for more government programs at .51 indicating a fairly strong, positive relationship.[17] Because it combines preferences for government spending in a number of domains, this variable is more analogous to a micro-level version of Stimson's mood variable, although it is surely not the same. Whereas Stimson's unit of analysis is the survey, my unit of analysis is the individual. Whereas Stimson has many survey questions to sample from, I am limited to the ones that the NES chooses to include.

Prior to running multivariate analyses, I check to see if my main variables show noticeable changes between the survey waves. In order to see effects, perceptions and preferences need to have altered over the course of the panel. Figures 2-4 graph the amount of change for each of the three variables from 1992-1994.

[17] This correlation was nearly identical for each wave of the panel to follow

Figure 2: Change in Perception of Dem. Party Ideology (IV)



Figure 3: Change in Preference for Government Services (DV)



Figure 4: Change for Preference for Government Spending (DV)



The figures above are distributed fairly normal. Although the modal amount of change for each variable is zero, a majority of the sample did demonstrate a change on all three variables. The majority of these changes were not dramatic, as indicated by the very thin tails. Still, about 60-70% of people exhibit a leftward or rightward adjustment between 1992 and 1994 on all three items. Similar amounts of change were exhibited in the 3-wave panel (not reported).

I use a fixed effects model to estimate the impact of perceived Democratic Party ideology on my two dependent variables. Fixed effects models with panel data are powerful because they control for all unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity. This means any changes to the dependent variable cannot be attributed to characteristics that are "fixed" within the respondent such as gender, religion, place of birth etc. Those parameters are effectively "dropped" from the model. Moreover, this method models the individual changes in variables directly rather than relying on inter-unit variations at one point in time like a standard OLS model with cross-sectional data. Fixed effects models (2 waves) are numerically equivalent to first differences models, which yield the following equation:

$$Y_1 - Y_{t-1} = (\beta_{0t} - \beta_{0t-1}) + \beta_1(X_t - X_{t-1}) + (\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_{t-1})$$

or

$$\Delta Y = \Delta \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta x = \Delta \varepsilon$$

To be sure this was the correct model, a Hausmann test was run and rejected the null hypothesis that the errors are uncorrelated with the regressors and a random effects model is preferred. The test is distributed chi squared and the null hypothesis was easily rejected at ($p<.001$). The results were the same for both dependent variables. The results of the models are reported in Table 2.

Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimates for 2 and 3 Wave Panel
Impact of Democratic Party Perception on Preferred Level of Government Activity and Spending

	1992-1994 (2 Wave Panel)		1992-1994-1996 (3 Wave Panel)	
	Preference for Gov't Services	Composite Preference for Gov't Spending	Preference for Gov't Services	Composite Preference for Gov't Spending
Dem Party Liberalism	-.067 (.060)	-.108 (.087)	-.018 (.041)	-.126 (.066)*
Party ID (D-R)	-.135 (.057)*	-.197 (.084)*	-.203 (.042)***	-.099 (.067)
Ideology (L-C)	-.024 (.062)	-.056 (.092)	-.032 (.045)	-.112 (.073)
Income (logged)	.078 (.105)	-.127 (.153)	-.103 (.069)	-.396 (.110)***
Gov't Wastes Tax Money	-.083 (.131)	-.117 (.191)	-.112 (.090)	-.233 (.143)
Racial Resentment	-.050 (.025)*	-.017 (.084)+	-	-
Clinton Liberalism	-.034 (.058)	-.144 (.084)+	-.017 (.042)	-.171 (.067)*
Econ. Perception	.113 (.044)*	.273 (.065)***	.057 (.032)	.235 (.050)***
Employed (1=Yes)	.095 (.204)	.244 (.299)	.023 (.145)	.069 (.230)
Constant	5.10 (.707)***	20.07 (1.04)***	4.97 (.434)***	20.93 (.692)***
R^2 (Overall)	.168	.269	.205	.264
Corr (ε_{it}, X_{β})	.099	.305	.129	.310
N (Individuals)	697	691	531	532

Note: Democratic Party Liberalism and Clinton Liberalism are reverse-coded such that higher numbers indicate greater perceived liberalism. A higher value for the preference for government services DV indicates preference for more services while lower values denote preference for less services. The same coding applied to the second DV.
Significance codes: +<.10, ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05

Fixed effects models (both 2 and 3 waves) are interpreted similarly to OLS models; coefficients indicate how much Y changes when X increases by one unit. The first column of Table 2 indicates that perceived change in Democratic Party ideology is not a significant predictor of preference for more or less government services and program. Changes in partisanship, racial resentment and economic perceptions do show significant relationships in the expected directions. The results for the second dependent variable- the summated scale for spending preferences- does not seem to be influenced by party perceptions either. The only variables that demonstrate consistent results for both dependent variables in the 2-wave panel are partisanship and economic perceptions. The robust finding for the latter variable is in line with the work of Durr (1993) and Enns and Kellstedt (2008) on aggregate mood changes.

Although it is possible that perceptions of party ideology can change in the course of two years, a four year time period with three panel waves is better from an empirical standpoint. Three waves provide more information and allow scholars to test hypotheses that are sometimes not possible in short two-wave time periods (Allison 1994, Cole and Maxwell 2003). This extended time period comprises Clinton's entire first term and spans before *and* after the time in which Republicans in Congress prominently pointed out the differences between the two parties using the Contract with America.

The results for the three-wave panel tell a different story. Although party perceptions still show a null result for preference for government services, it does show a relationship with preference for government spending. This is an important finding. The questions that were combined to create this variable are specific to certain programs and issue areas. Instead of respondents providing a quick, overall assessment of whether they prefer more services and programs, these questions perhaps require more calculated thought because they imply consequences more clearly. When respondents are asked whether they want more government programs, they may or may not be thinking of spending, depending on their level of political sophistication. When those same people are asked if the government should spend more on issue X, the implication that issue X requires the use of taxpayer money should be at the forefront of their minds.

Moreover, these spending questions are more closely related to the type of survey responses that Stimson and his colleagues aggregate into their measure of public mood. They are the individual responses contributing to a larger, more grandiose trend. As perceived Democratic liberalism increases, willingness to spend federal money decreases. The same relationship can be seen with presidential perceptions. As Clinton is perceived as more liberal over time, willingness to spend federal money decreases. When perceptions of Clinton are dropped from the model (not reported), the coefficient for Democratic Party liberalism doubles in size and becomes significant at $p<.001$, revealing that the party leader soaks up much of the effect. The effects of perception emerge above and beyond the effects of a host of relevant control variables, though we should still recognize that the correlation between the error term and the predictors is a moderate .310, the highest of the four models.

Lagged Models Controlling for Prior Preferences

Though fixed effects models are beneficial for examining how individuals change over time, they also require meeting a restrictive assumption that the lagged dependent variable, Y_{t-1}, doesn't influence Y or the change in Y. Meeting this assumption is rare and it is likely that it is not met in this scenario; someone's preference for more government services or spending two

years prior will likely affect their current preferences for government services and spending. In order to produce more precise estimates I use a static score (i.e conditional change) model that yields the following equation:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{t-1} + \beta_2(X_t - X_n) + \beta_3 X_t + \varepsilon_t$$

In this model the dependent variable at time *t* is predicted by 5 values: a constant β_0, an earlier value of the dependent variable $\beta_1 Y_{t-1}$, a differenced version of the main independent variable $\beta_2(X_t - X_n)$ which provides the impact of the change of the IV over a time period chosen by the researcher, control variables $\beta_3 X_t$ from time *t*, and an error term from time *t*. By including a lagged version of Y on the right hand side of the equation I am controlling for the effect of the dependent variable from an earlier time period because it may affect preferences in the current time period. A large coefficient on this variable (which we should presumably see in every model) would indicate that the attitude is fairly stable over time.

There are various permutations of this model that could be run given that I have two sets of panels (2 and 3 wave) and two dependent variables. Because perceptions of the party only showed a relationship with the spending DV in the three-wave model, I stick to this dependent variable and this version of the data. Below are a series of more specific lagged OLS equations based off the general equation above. The results of these questions are presented in Table 3.

Equation 1: $\text{IncreaseSpending}_{96} = \text{IncreaseSpending}_{92} + (\text{DemPartyLiberalism}_{96} - \text{DemPartyLiberalism}_{92}) + \text{Controls}_{96} + \varepsilon_{96}$

This model estimates the impact of the change in perceptions of Democratic Party liberalism over the course of four years while controlling for spending preferences in 1992. It models the variance between 1992 and 1996, which is the largest time span the data allows for.

Equation 2: $\text{IncreaseSpending}_{96} = \text{IncreaseSpending}_{94} + (\text{DemPartyLiberalism}_{96} - \text{DemPartyLiberalism}_{94}) + \text{Controls}_{96} + \varepsilon_{96}$

This model estimates the impact of the change in perceptions of Democratic Party liberalism during the *second* half of Clinton's first term while controlling for spending preferences in 1994. This model covers a smaller time period than Equation 2 and models the effect of perceived Democrat Party liberalism that is unique to 1994-1996 time period. It gives us a crisper and less biased estimate of our main independent variable- ideological perceptions- during this two-year span.

Equation 3: $\text{IncreaseSpending}_{94} = \text{IncreaseSpending}_{92} + (\text{DemPartyLiberalism}_{94} - \text{DemPartyLiberalism}_{92}) + \text{Controls}_{94} + \varepsilon_{94}$

This model estimates the impact of the change in perceptions of Democratic Party liberalism during the *first* half of Clinton's first term while controlling for spending preferences when he first took office after the 1992 election. The equation models the effect of perceived Democrat Party liberalism that is unique to 1994-1996 time period. It gives us a crisper and less biased estimate of the main independent variable during *this* two-year span.

Table 3: OLS Estimates for Spending Preferences with 3 Lagged Model Specifications

	Equation 1: Spending Preference 1996	**Equation 2: Spending Preference 1996**	**Equation 3: Spending Preference 1994**
Spending Preference $_{1992}$	.514 (.047)***	-	.678 (.045)***
Spending Preference $_{1994}$	-	.587 (.036)***	-
Democratic Party Liberalism $_{1996\text{-}1992}$	-.084 (.091)+	-	-
Democratic Party Liberalism $_{1996\text{-}1994}$	-	-.054 (.047)	-
Democratic Party Liberalism $_{1994\text{-}1992}$	-	-	-.107 (.052)*
Party ID (D-R)	-.038 (.025)	-.029 (.022)	-.006 (.026)
Ideology (C-L)	.139 (.035)***	.098 (.032)**	.124 (.037)**
Income (logged)	-.040 (.026)	-.030 (.021)	-.029 (.026)
Gov't Wastes Tax Money	-.237 (.195)	-.061 (.021)**	-.011 (.030)
Clinton Liberalism	-.132 (.032)***	-.071 (.027)**	-.120 (.034)**
Econ. Perception	-.010 (.030)	-.012 (.026)	.026 (.030)
Employed (1=Yes)	.002 (.020)	.108 (.298)	.040 (.021)+
Constant	.542 (.059)***	.418 (.047)***	8.61 (1.36)***
R^2	.496	.586	.582
N	473	485	354

Note: Estimators are OLS Regressions with lagged dependent variables and robust standard errors. All variables are standardized to range from 0-1. Democratic Party Liberalism, Clinton Liberalism and Ideology are reverse-coded such that higher numbers indicate greater perceived liberalism (or liberalism). A higher value of the DV denotes preference for more federal spending.
Significance codes: +<.10, ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05

The estimates generated in Table 3 reveal conditional support for the hypothesis. The first column demonstrates that change in the perception of the Democratic Party from 1992 through 1996 did seem to have a marginal effect on spending preferences, even when the same persons' spending preferences four years prior were controlled for. The coefficient for the lagged DV is significant and soaks up much of the variation in the model, which is expected. Perceived liberalism of Clinton is also substantively large and significant. When the Clinton variable is removed from the model, the coefficient for Party Liberalism becomes highly significant ($p<.01$) and doubles in size to about -.143, the largest effect in the model aside from the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, party perceptions matter with or without the control for perceptions of well-known leaders, although the coefficient for Clinton is clearly soaking up a portion of the effect. These results provide some confidence that how we attribute ideology (to parties and the leader who represents them) does matter for public opinion on government activity when operationalized with spending preferences.

The second and third models capture each specific time period more than the first model. Equation 2, which isolates the unique effect of change in party perceptions from 1994-1996 shows no relationship with spending preferences while Equation 3, which isolates the unique effect of change in party perception from 1992-1994, does. Why do we see an effect for the 1992-1994 model but not the 1994-1996 model? Three reasons come to mind. First, it may be due to the partisan turnover in the White House directly after Clinton was elected. The dramatic change in administration might be more noticeable to members of the public who are pitting it directly against the previous Republican administration. Second, it is possible that the Contract with America, which was promoted prior to the midterm election, was able to highlight differences between the two parties prior to the 1994 NES survey being conducted.[18] Respondents may have been recently primed by this mass-level public relations strategy, which launched 6 weeks before the election and therefore saw larger changes in Democratic Party liberalism when they were surveyed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 1996-1994 time period was one in which Republicans controlled the House and had more control over spending, not Democrats. Re-running this model and including the perceived ideology of the Republican Party (both as an additional variable and by exchanging it) produces significant estimates.

Discussion

The findings presented here provide mixed results for the hypothesis that ideological perception of the Democratic Party- the party that controlled the executive branch in the 1990s- leads to preference for government activity. On the one hand, the survey question that explicitly asked whether respondents preferred more or less government programs did not show a relationship with party perceptions in either fixed effects model. Surprisingly, neither did ideological perceptions of Bill Clinton. The only variable whose change seemed to affect this preference in both models was partisanship.

On the other hand, when the dependent variable was a summated scale of spending preferences for many issue areas, perceived liberalism of both the Democratic Party and Clinton become important, not just in the fixed effects model but also in two of the three lagged OLS models in which previous preferences are controlled for. These effects matter above and beyond a number of other relevant controls that capture personal material needs, economic perceptions, ideology, partisanship, opinions on government waste etc. Although my main interest was in

[18] The 1994 wave was conducted after the 1994 election was over

perceptions of the parties themselves (due to the asymmetrical findings noted previously), the perceptions of the President are no less important. If left-shift is robust and operates within the context of singular people perception, the perceptions of the president should be considered a variable of interest. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the party variable sees significance regardless of whether Clinton is included in the model. While it may be true that perceptions of the president soak up some of the effect,

The models presented in this chapter are not without flaws; some have correlations between the predictors and the errors and others are missing important variables such as racial resentment. Moreover, my variable for spending preference is limited to the questions provided by the NES survey and therefore only captures a select number of issues. Finally, and most importantly, I cannot demonstrate direction of causality with great certainty. Although looking at change in perception is an improvement over perception in a discrete time period, panel data used this way cannot definitively identify whether perception causes spending preferences or spending preferences cause perception. The only way to untangle this reciprocal causality issue would be to use a simultaneous equation model (or design an experiment at the cost of losing external validity). Because the instruments I had were not good enough (as determined by a Hausmann test), I cannot unambiguously claim that perception causes spending preferences.

Nonetheless, the results reported here do provide preliminary evidence that ideological perception for both the ruling party and its leader could impact a person's spending preferences. These preferences (or variations of them) when understood in the aggregate send signals to elites in Washington who presumably respond to them through policy outputs (Wlezien 1995, Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995). This would indicate that national representation at the highest level- general liberal or conservative policy output- is indirectly affected by these individual-level ideological perceptions.

Should these perceptions matter during the Clinton administration, it is likely that they would also matter in the present day, perhaps even more so. Since the time Clinton was in office, the parties have polarized to a larger degree (see updated calculations of DW Nominate scores of inter-party distance in the House and Senate), people have grown increasingly aware of party differences and party ideology (Hetherington 2001) and polarization in the mass public itself has likely increased (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Investigations of ideological perception should be replicated with emerging panel data.

I end this section by restating the idea that I introduced the chapter with: if ideological perceptions matter, what does it mean if one party's ideology tends to be systematically exaggerated by the public? Brady and Sniderman (1985) and the subsequent papers that followed their work seem to suggest this possibility. Should this be the case, it would imply that the responses that make up the public mood and other measures of preferred government activity are biased during one party's reign and not the others'. Chapter 2 investigates whether these misperceptions can be replicated in a controlled environment and attempts to explain their cognitive origins.

Chapter 3:

An Experimental Test of the Left-Shift Hypothesis and the Affective Components of Ideological Perception

Chapter 2 examined whether ideological perceptions affected preferences for government activity by using panel data. The results of the analysis demonstrated that perceptions of the Democratic Party as well as its leader, Bill Clinton, contributed to individual level spending preferences. Importantly, I began the chapter by describing an odd asymmetry in perceptions of parties and partisans: that the liberalism of Democrats tends to be overestimated while the conservatism of Republicans tends to be estimated accurately. If ideological perceptions exert influence on the aggregate "signal" that gets sent to Washington elites, then perceptions that are biased in the more extreme direction are going to affect the desire for more government activity and spending in an erroneous way. But are perceptions of one partisan group really always overstated? And what types of individual-level process contribute to these perceptions?

This chapter has two points of focus. The first is whether the asymmetry and left-shift phenomenon seen in previous studies holds in a controlled setting that does not require the use of proxy variables for "true" ideological location. Using an experimental method will help decipher whether the asymmetry is robust and therefore more meaningful than previously thought. The second point regards the micro-foundations of ideological perception (and consequently, shifting). Here I test my theory that subconscious (and conscious) affect is one of the driving forces behind these perceptions and as well as perceived ideological threat.

This chapter will unfold as follows. First I will explain why I need focus my analysis on a particular subsample of the population rather than the population at large. Following this I will explain the need for experimentation in the study of left-shift and ideological misperceptions. I then explain my research design, present the results of the analysis, discuss the implications and offer routes for improvement in my design.

The Ideologically Sophisticated Public

The logic behind examining the ideologically sophisticated public as opposed to the entire public is that those who do not understand ideological labels may affect the patterns of perception. Specifically, people who do not understand what the labels mean might guess an answer, choose randomly or default to the middle scale value when asked to make a judgment. In the case of the latter, unsophisticated respondents may make it look like the public perceives parties to be more moderate. (MacKuen and Parker-Stephen, unpublished manuscript). Therefore, it is more appropriate to study sophisticates who understand ideological labels.[19]

The Makeup of the Ideologically Sophisticated Public

The original left shift study was conducted using NES data ranging from 1972 to 2004. I hypothesize that the ideologically sophisticated public will be disproportionately composed of people who have negative affect towards Democrats. This negative affect, in turn, will result in shifting the Democrats to a more liberally extreme position.

[19] Ultimately, the 80 unsophisticated subjects did place the candidate throughout the 7-point scale, although most were able to place Democrats on the left and Republicans on the right. If these respondents are included in the analysis the results don't actually change.

This begs the question, "What are the largest groups of people who are likely to have negative affect towards the Democratic Party?" The obvious first answer would be Republicans, as they are the natural political out-group. However, I have no theoretical reason or empirical support that leads me to believe that Republicans are more ideologically sophisticated than Democrats, prima facie.[20] Instead, I focus my hypothesis on conservatives.

Why would conservatives be disproportionately represented in the ideologically sophisticated segment of the electorate? It could be that there are simply more conservatives in the general public on the whole; Gallup data has borne this out for years.[21] It has also been theorized that conservatism is driven by motivated social cognition and is accompanied by a higher level of threat perception than liberalism (Jost et al 2003; Jost et al 2007; Jost et al 2009). Perhaps a higher level of threat perception results in an increased need to pay attention to (and understand) the political environment, including ideology and its place in society.

The next question this line of reasoning begs is, "Why would people who call themselves liberals and conservatives not understand the basic concepts and meaning behind the liberal and conservative labels?" It is not always the case that someone who chooses an ideological label during a survey or interview understands the philosophy that accompanies the word. Respondents may choose a label or ideological location at random. They may choose certain labels for social desirability reasons or because the words translate into other aspects of their life such as religion (Stimson and Ellis, 2007). Some respondents may think they understand ideology and its underlying philosophy when in fact they do not.

To test my hypothesis, I break down the ideologically sophisticated public by ideological self-placement in the cumulative NES file. I examine the same years as MacKuen and Parker-Stephen but add 2008 and 2012 by using the updated cumulative file. To be considered ideologically sophisticated, the respondent needs to be able to place the Democratic Party to the left of the Republican Party on an ideology scale and a guaranteed job scale (1972-1980) or a services-spending scale (1982-2012). Table 4 shows this trend over time, with the exception of 2002, 2006 and 2010 in which the NES studies were not conducted. The fifth column shows the difference between the percentage of conservatives and the percentage of liberals who are in the sophisticated sample. A positive number indicates more conservatives than liberals. Overall, conservatives make up about 13% more of the sophisticated public than moderates and 14% more of the sophisticated public than liberals. This pattern is consistent and in certain, select years, the percentage of conservatives is nearly twice the percentage of liberals. If this group of people has greater negative affect toward the Democratic Party, it may begin to reveal why Democrats are perceived as more liberal than their "true" value.[22]

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[20] To make sure this was not the group of interest, I broke down the ideologically sophisticated public by partisanship (not reported). I find no consistent pattern in one partisan group dominates this category of people.

[21] Gallup polls generally measure ideology using a 5-point scale rather than a 7-point scale. This tends to generate more "pure" moderates than a 7-point scale would. The trend in their data indicates that moderates are in fact the largest group. However, conservatives still far outnumber liberals year by year.

[22] A skeptic might say that someone could simply guess and still be able to put one party to the left of another on two separate questions. The NES does ask, "Which party is more

Table 4: Identity Breakdown of Ideologically Sophisticated Public

Year	% Liberal	% Moderate	% Conservative	% Difference (L-C)	Total N
1972	29	31	40	11	1,039
1974	32	29	39	7	656
1976	28	30	42	14	1,035
1978	29	30	41	12	985
1980	27	26	47	20	669
1982	24	29	47	23	642
1984	27	29	44	17	1,066
1986	26	31	43	17	1,033
1988	26	26	48	22	947
1990	29	30	41	12	846
1992	32	27	41	9	1,304
1994	22	28	50	28	997
1996	29	24	47	18	1,041
1998	28	31	41	13	725
2000	28	29	43	15	455
2004	29	25	46	17	719
2008	36	24	40	4	1,115
2012	32	24	44	12	4,160
Average	28.5	29.11	42.39	15	1,080

Note: A liberal is coded as anyone who called themselves Extremely liberal, very liberal or leaned liberal. The same was done for conservatives. Moderates are true moderates, meaning they land directly in the center of the ideology scale (4)

conservative?" Unfortunately, this question is asked sporadically (9 out of the 20 years the NES is conducted). When I use a stricter criterion in these 9 years, the pattern holds with the same frequency and greater magnitude. On average, sophisticated conservatives outnumber sophisticated liberals and moderates by an average of 17.3 percentage points and 21.3 percentage points, respectively.

These findings indicate that the ideologically sophisticated public tends to skew in a somewhat conservative direction. These results are in line with certain findings seen by Feldman and Johnston (2014). Using NES data and sophisticated measurement techniques to understand the determinants of American ideology, they find that higher political sophistication (measured using basic political knowledge questions and not ideology based questions)[23] is associated with increasing levels of conservatism in a one-factor model but only economic conservatism in a two-factor model, which is a better fit for the data.

Does this dominating percentage also have more negative affect toward the Democratic Party and could negative affect from self-identified conservatives be driving this pattern in public opinion? To begin, I examine feeling thermometer responses to the Democratic Party by each ideological group. Figure 5 breaks down ideological sophisticates by their identity and plots their average feeling thermometer score towards the Democratic Party/Democrats for each year in the NES cumulative file. Note that between 1972 and 1982, the phrasing for the feeling thermometer question asked about "Democrats" and "Republicans" in a general sense. After 1982, the wording changed to "the Democratic Party" and "the Republican Party". This did not result in any major shifts in the results.

[23] These questions mainly ask respondents which political office certain politicians hold or what state certain politicians are from

Figure 5: Average Feeling Thermometer Scores towards Democrats/The Democratic Party



Note: Data Source: NES Cumulative File. Note that the NES Times Series Study was not conducted in 2004, 2006 or 2010

The NES cumulative file provides us with a first glimpse into the relationship between the sophisticated public's perceptions of the Democratic Party and affect towards that party. It is clear that conservatives, the dominating ideological category, have more negative affect toward the Democratic Party than self-identified moderates or liberals. While these results are not surprising, they do provide the first signs of support for an affect-driven perceptual theory.

Studying Left Shift Empirically

The obvious shortcoming of studying left shift and misperception using observational data is that the Democratic and Republican parties are complex, dynamic and comprise many individuals acting at once. It is difficult for researchers to know how ideological a party is at any given point in time and whether the public is misperceiving these ideological values. This type of (mis)perception needs to be studied in a setting where the researcher can control the ideology of the object being judged.

A controlled environment requires experimentation. Experimentation is becoming a commonly used research method amongst political psychologists because it allows researcher to draw causal inferences through controlled manipulation of the environment and random assignment of subjects to treatment conditions. Experiments have high internal validity due to the fact that any detected effect can be said to come from the manipulation rather than alternative features of the environment or the subject pool. Of particular use to me will be survey experimentation, a practice that allows the researcher to embed an experiment within a survey. By doing this, the subject can take the survey in a natural setting and without the knowledge that something has been manipulated. The next portion of this chapter outlines an experimental survey that is designed to detect whether subjects perceive fictitious Democratic candidates to be more extreme than equally ideological Republican candidates. Since the candidates are fictitious, I am able to write their profiles myself and ensure that the words and phrasing mirror one another with regards to their extremity. The design will also provide a way in which to study the affective components of these candidate perceptions.

Study Design

After reading a consent form and agreeing to participate, the study begins by stating that this is a research survey interested in opinions on politicians who plan to run in the next Congressional election. This introduction is followed by a short ideological sophistication battery (see Appendix B, Chapter 3) that evaluates whether subjects understand what the words liberalism and conservatism mean and how they map onto the major political parties. The first manipulation is then introduced. Subjects are randomly assigned to see either a profile of a Democratic candidate, a Republican candidate or a control candidate without partisan affiliation.[24] The Democrat and Republican profiles have identical background information

[24] Again, I need to use candidates in this context and not parties, even though parties were the main focus of the previous empirical chapter. Assessing parties is too difficult because they don't have a "true" ideological location that can be used in a study of misperception. This is why using fictitious candidates is beneficial. I can craft their ideological stances myself, use a control candidate for a baseline instead of a proxy variable for true location, and see if the misperception of Democrats holds in a controlled setting. Moreover, if I want to find out if pure affective feelings influence perception, I need to be able to separate issue evaluation from pure affect. To

although they belong to different parties. The party identification is made blatant on the top of the screen in bolded letters. Their issue positions, however, are orchestrated such that they are equidistant from a moderate center. For example the democratic candidate "Believes in *increasing* taxes on the richest 5% of Americans if the country is in financial hardship and measures need to be taken to improve the economy." In the Republican condition the candidate, "Believes in *decreasing* taxes on the richest 5% of Americans if the country is in financial hardship and measures need to be taken to improve the economy." Their issue positions are mirror images of one another in terms of their wording and phrasing.

To enhance the "realism" of the candidates, their profiles have a photograph of a real person and quotations from others describing their personalities and political styles. Both the photograph and the quotations are the same across all conditions meaning that only the partisan cue and direction of the issue positions are manipulated. By stating a number of political positions, using photographs and using quotations, the subject assesses the candidate's political views *and* elements of their character. This is more analogous to how people assess candidates in the real world, especially when issue information is limited (Popkin 1991; Alvarez 1997). The control condition in this first manipulation shows the same photograph, background information and quotes but does not have a party affiliation or issue stances. Any affect towards him is based entirely on non-political information.

After seeing the assigned profile, all subjects rate the candidate they saw on a feeling thermometer that ranges from -50 to +50. I use this range because the 0 midpoint should more accurately capture a neutral feeling than 50 would in a 0-100 degree scale. Subjects also place the candidate on a standard 7-point ideology scale, state whether they believe the candidate is "too ideological", state whether they believe the candidate is outside or within the "American mainstream" and state whether they think the candidate is an extremist or not. These last three questions about ideological threat are forced choice questions with dichotomous response options.

This first manipulation should give a general indication of whether a Democrat that leans liberal is perceived as more extreme then a Republican who leans "equally" conservative. The benefit of using mirroring but opposing language is that it actually tests liberal vs. conservative candidates. Some candidates do have consistently liberal leaning policy positions and others *do* have consistently leaning conservative positions. A scenario such as this is not far-fetched given that Congress is polarizing ideologically (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). The problem with this manipulation is that I am assuming that promoting policy change on either end of the ideological spectrum is always comparable and equivalent. A skeptic might say that the status quo is already a conservative location on the spectrum, so any deviation from the status quo toward more right wing policies is inherently more extreme than an "equivalent" policy change toward the left. Likewise, another critic might say that any promotion of liberal leaning policies will be perceived as more ideological than a comparable set of conservative policies because

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do this I use the residual technique mentioned above, include the residuals in the model and then control for feelings that come from the candidate's issue stances separately. Thus, I have a variable for pure affect and variables that capture political affect that comes from issue stances. With real world parties there are too many issues and policies I would have to ask subjects about and then control for. Fictitious candidates don't have prior backgrounds and hundreds of pieces of legislation like real world parties do. With fictitious candidates I can capture all evaluation-related affect with a few issue preference questions.

consistent liberal changes are often understood as testing the political 'unknown' while consistently conservative changes and policies are generally perceived as reverting to conditions that are already known to the public. Certain left-leaning changes will always be more extreme because they test our comfort with uncharted political territory. To address these concerns, the second manipulation is introduced.

The second manipulation randomly assigns subjects to one of three more candidates. Some subjects see a Democratic candidate, some see a Republican candidate and some see a control candidate with no partisan affiliation. This means that someone who saw a Democrat in the first manipulation has an equal chance of seeing another Democrat, a Republican or the control in the second manipulation. While it is true that subjects may use the first candidate they saw as an anchoring point or comparison points, these 3 anchors (Dem, Control and Rep) should be distributed evenly across the conditions of the second manipulation.

In this second manipulation, only party affiliations vary and they are bolded at the top of the profile. Everything else is held constant across the three conditions. This includes background information, the candidate photograph, the candidate's campaign speech quotes (which are not related to policies), and the candidate's actual issue positions, which are purposefully sculpted to be moderate. To ensure that they were indeed moderate, a pre-test was run through Qualtrics in which 275 respondents rated the control profile without a partisan label attached to it. The sample skewed slightly liberal; the average respondent placed themself as a 3.09 on a seven-point ideology scale. Overall, the non-partisan candidate received an average rating of 4.02, which is almost perfectly moderate. The moderate response option (4) was also the modal response amongst subjects. All candidate profiles for both manipulations can be found in Appendix A for Chapter 3.

Just as in the first manipulation, subjects rate the candidate on a feeling thermometer from -50 to +50, place him on the 7-point ideology scale, state whether he is too ideological, outside or within the American mainstream and whether they consider him to be an extremist.

The two manipulations allow me to test left shift twice. The first manipulation is a looser test of left shift while the second manipulation is a stricter test because the candidates have the exact same policy ideas. If the subjects still see the Democratic candidate as more liberal than they see the Republican candidate as conservative, the effect can be attributed to the party labels alone and not the issue positions.

Of course experimentation does not mimic the real world left shift phenomenon exactly. In the real world, parties (and the candidates who affiliate with them) are dynamic and not equally ideological. The experiment puts candidates from both parties in an equally ideological location and examines how they are perceived compared to a baseline rather than a "true" location. It is nonetheless the best way to test misperception of this nature.

Dependent Variables: Extremity Measures

The dependent variables are the measures listed above: the 7-point ideology scale for placement of the candidate as well as 3 ideological threat questions phrased as follows:

1. "Do you consider the candidate to be *too* ideological? That is, too liberal or too conservative?
2. "Do you consider the candidate to be outside the American mainstream or within the American mainstream?"
3. "Do you consider the candidate to be an extremist?"

Independent Variables

Self-Placement: Self-placement is measured with a standard 7-point ideology scale.

Affect: Affect is measured using a feeling thermometer ranging from -50 to +50. Although -50 to 50 is not the traditional scaling for a feeling thermometer (which is normally 0-100 and mimics the degrees of an actual thermometer), it is still similar to a feeling thermometer in that it measures a cool versus a warm feeling towards an attitude object. I describe this explicitly in the instructions as people make their placement. The exact wording is, "Please place the candidate on the feeling thermometer. -50 represents a cold, negative feeling while +50 represents a warm, positive feeling. The zero midpoint represents a completely neutral feeling". This explanation should clarify what the endpoints mean for respondents. I will refer to this measure as a "feeling thermometer" going forward.

Residual measure of affect: An alternative measure of affect was also used. I regressed the standard feeling thermometer for the candidate onto a subject's partisanship, ideology and 4-point likert scales that measured the subjects' preference to each issue addressed by the candidate (Strongly agree- Strongly disagree). I extracted the residuals from these regressions and used them as a "pure" measure of affect that was purged of relevant political components. The residuals have no correlation with partisanship, ideology and the issue positions. They expectedly correlate with the standard thermometers at a moderately strong .65 on average across the four candidates. The measure was constructed because my theory states that subconscious affect arising from non-political and tangential political information will influence perceptions. The residuals should better capture affect that resulted from the politician's background, their photograph, quotes about them, and other subtle negative or positive feelings that arose from reading their profile. Residuals can be interpreted the same way as normal variables if they are scaled similarly. Other published papers have used residuals in similar ways (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989) When I graph the residuals I keep them in their natural form, which ranges from negative numbers (negative affect) to positive numbers (positive affect).

Controls

Political Knowledge: While ideological knowledge measures the understanding of ideological labels, political knowledge measures basic facts that an individual knows about contemporary politics. Politically sophisticated citizens may be more attune to current congressional polarization and subsequently perceive candidates to be more ideologically extreme. Alternatively, greater political knowledge may provide the respondent with more extreme political references points from the real world and cause them to perceive candidates as more moderate. I use five knowledge questions (see Appendix B, Chapter 3) that create a six point scale ranging from 0 correct answers to 5 correct answers. This measure correlates with the ideological sophistication measure at .45, indicating some similarity.

Perceived Polarization of Congress: It is possible that those who have an understanding of the contemporary ideological divide in Congress will incorporate this knowledge into their perceptions of a new candidate who bears a partisan label. To capture perceived polarization I ask subjects, "What would you say is the best description of how the parties operate in Congress today?" The response option is a 7-point scale ranging from, "The parties are extremely united"

to "The parties are extremely polarized" with "The parties are neither united nor polarized" serving as the middle option. This question correlates with the ideological sophistication battery at .40, again indicating a positive relationship but not overwhelmingly so. This variable should pick up a portion of the inference process discussed by Feldman and Conover (1983).

Authoritarianism: In the resurgent literature on the authoritarian personality, Lavine et al. (2002) use cognitive tasks to determine that high authoritarian individuals are particularly sensitive to threat. Those high on the authoritarian dimension may also be more likely to view candidates who deviate from the status quo as particularly extreme. Authoritarianism was measured using four child-rearing questions that tap an individual's preference for autonomy versus conformity (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003). The final scale ranges from 0, the lowest level of authoritarianism, to 4, the highest level.

Information networks: The information that one is exposed to may affect their perception of the political world (Morris 2007). The survey lists major media outlets across a number of mediums and asks respondents to choose which ones they use frequently. I am only interested in two specific answer options: "Conservative talk radio such as Rush Limbaugh" (exact phrasing in survey) and the Huffington Post, a news aggregation and editorial website.[25]

Talk radio is commonly known as a politically conservative outlet and Rush Limbaugh is widely known as a conservative pundit. Because this medium is considered to be highly ideological, those who are listening to talk radio are exposed to information that projects negativity onto Democratic and liberal institutions and individuals. Therefore, listeners may have a tendency to view Democrats and their policies as more ideologically extreme.

The Huffington Post tends to show a progressive and liberal bent.[26] Those who opt into this information network may be exposed to negativity towards Republicans and thus be more inclined to view them as ideological and threatening. Separate dummy variables were created for subjects who selected these options as news outlets they used frequently. The conservative talk radio dummy is used in the models predicting Democrat candidate placement and the Huffington Post dummy is used in the models that predict Republican candidate placement.

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[25] I chose to use Huffington Post over NPR (which is the same medium as talk radio) due to the style of communication. NPR mainly consists of news, in-depth reporting and storytelling, while Huffington Post mainly consists of news stories and editorialized content. The editorialized content is more similar to conservative talk radio's, which is highly editorialized. In separate models (not reported), using the NPR variable in lieu of the Huffington Post variable did not change the results.

[26] This assessment comes from a Pew Center for Survey Research study on American's media habits. While the center did not devise a measurement scheme to rate the ideological leanings of news outlets themselves, they calculated the ideological placement of the average viewer for each outlet. When placing the outlets on an ideological continuum, results indicated that Huffington Post users, on average, were about half a unit to the left of MSNBC viewers, the outlet commonly cited as liberal and Democratically partisan. The data graphic can be seen at the following website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/10/21/lets-rank-the-media-from-liberal-to-conservative-based-on-their-audiences/

Age: It is possible that those who are older and lived through the ideological battles of the Cold War are particularly sensitive to policies that promote government involvement and intervention. Policies that suggest more government intervention and less personal liberty in an economic realm tend to be more associated with the American left. Therefore, older individuals may perceive Democrats as more extreme than an equally ideological Republican counterpart.

Additional demographic controls: Partisanship was measured on a 7-point scale using branching questions. A number of other questions were asked that were used for robustness checks but are not included in the main analysis for the sake of parsimony. These questions include standard demographic questions such as race, income, gender and region of the country. There were also a series of issue preference questions that were used for the residual measure of affect mentioned above. These are the likert scale items. Subjects also filled out feeling thermometers about the two major parties, Congress and Barack Obama, all ranging from -50 to +50. Finally, there was a measure of trust in government. I have run various models using many permutations of these variables to check for robustness. Including them does not change the principle findings in regards to effect size or statistical significance.

Results

The experiment was run on Mechanical Turk in July of 2014.[27] There were 809 respondents who were each paid 30 cents (out of pocket) for their participation. The survey had two attention check questions in order to weed out any users who were simply clicking through the questions quickly in order to get paid. The 100 people who did not pass the attention check questions were eliminated from the analysis, leaving a final N size of about 709 people. Table 5 provides the demographic breakdown of the remaining subjects and compares them to the 2012 ANES Time Series file.

Table 5: Sample Comparisons

Variable	Mechanical Turk Sample	ANES 2012
Age (Mean)	39	50
Male	51%	52%
Liberal	54%	28%
Moderate	14%	34%
Conservative	32%	38%
Democrat	55%	53%
Independent/Other	18%	13%
Republican	27%	34%
4-Year College Degree	74%	31%

Note: Age is a mean value. Liberal is anyone who selected "Extremely liberal" "Somewhat Liberal" or is a "Leaner". The same method was used for Conservatives, Democrats and Republicans.

[27] This study was submitted to Tess Survey Experiments for Young Scholars, which would have allow me to test left shift with a national probability sample. As this is a highly competitive competition, the study was not chosen so MTurk was used.

The MTurk sample skews heavily liberal, which poses a certain problems for the analysis. Left-shift is an aggregate-level phenomenon in which the sophisticated public, a more conservative group (as indicated previously), places Democrats leftward of their true ideological value. Therefore the sample has a significant disconnect from reality on a critical dimension. Even though liberals are distributed evenly throughout the three conditions, there are still far more liberals *within* each condition than there are conservatives, making it difficult to draw conclusions about average candidate placements. Despite this, the individual level theory regarding affect can still be tested appropriately. A majority of the sample (64%) is ideologically sophisticated and able to answer all the ideology questions correctly. This does not pose a great threat to my analysis and in fact allows me to have a large sample size of over 450.

Table 5 shows the thermometer ratings for the first set of candidates broken down by ideological sophistication and identification. For these tables and figures, the feeling thermometers remain in their -50 to +50 form because this is a more natural way to think about negative and positive affect. The multivariate portions of the analysis seen later rescale them to range from 0-1 for easier interpretation.

Table 6: Feeling Thermometer Averages: First Manipulation

	Democrat	Control	Republican
All respondents	5.62 (31.35)	-1.53 (21.07)	-16.62 (30.58)
All Liberals	22.88 (21.47)	-3.17 (20.77)	-31.46 (20.32)
All Conservatives	-19.16 (29.40)	2.37 (21.82)	10.77 (27.96)
Sophisticates Only	.756 (32.69)	-4.55 (19.54)	-16.69 (33.49)
Soph. Liberals	23.89 (21.06)	-5.04 (20.08)	-36.96 (15.39)
Soph. Conservatives	-28.95 (20.94)	-3.28 (18.61)	17.70 (27.46)

Note: Values are means within each category. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Feeling thermometers range from -50 to +50 to indicate negative and positive affect

All Subjects, First Manipulation

Although my analysis will mainly be comprised of ideological sophisticates, I should note a few irregularities in the entire sample. When examining all subjects, there is far greater negative affect towards the Republican than the Democratic or the control. This is likely the result of a very liberally biased sample. Breaking the entire sample down by ideological identity also reveals another important irregularity; liberals dislike the Republican candidate much more than conservatives dislike the Democratic candidate. Throughout the last 30 years, scholars have pointed to an asymmetry in affective feelings between competing political groups. Brady and Sniderman's (1985) work on affective heuristics shows that Republicans dislike their Democratic counterparts more than Democrats dislike their Republican counterparts. The recent scholarship on affective polarization notes that Republicans rate liberals about 5-8 points lower than Democrats rate conservatives (Iyengar et al. 2012). In previous papers, the idea of the American right disliking the American left was cited as a principle reason for why left-shift occurred. MacKuen and Parker-Stephen (2005, unpublished) noted that, "Contrast motives should push attributions of disliked groups toward the endpoints of the left-right scale, but simply increasing attribution bias does not guarantee attribution shift. What is also required is that the contrast effect works differently across different groups of people. On this point, scholars have observed an affective asymmetry in that members of the political right report far greater dislike for their

opponents than do the members of the left." (pg. 14) The same affective asymmetry does not hold here. For the first manipulation, liberals (all) in the sample rated the Republican candidate about -31 while conservatives (all) in the sample rated the Democratic candidate about -19, a fairly sizable difference of 12 degrees. Liberals (all) seem to also *like* the Democrat more than conservatives like the Republican by about 12 degrees. Why do we see the opposite pattern from the aforementioned studies? One possibility is that there are simply more (and stronger) Democrats and liberals in the sample. Another possibility is the time frame in which I am conducting my experiment. It is possible that the Republican Party's recent obstructionist approach to Obama's presidency has angered liberals and this anger is being projected onto the fictitious candidate. Alternatively, there may be something specific to the liberal personality that drives them to be more affectively reactive to their ideological out-groups than conservatives are to theirs. Regardless of the reason, it would be unlikely that the sample would show a major left shift due to contrasting motives

Ideologically Sophisticated Subjects, First Manipulation

Because my analysis will focus on ideological sophisticates, I note the pattern for this population separately. Figure 6 shows that the sophisticates rated the Democratic candidate nearly 16 points higher than the Republican candidate. According to my theory that affect drives perception, we should see the Republican candidate shifted away from the control candidate more than the Democrat is. He should also be more likely to be categorized as "too ideological", "outside the mainstream" and "an extremist". While it is disappointing that our heavily biased sample prevents us from getting an accurate read on left-shift itself, we should still be able to test the theory that perception is borne from affect interacting with self-placement.

Figure 6: Feeling Thermometer Averages: First Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



All Subjects, Second Manipulation

What do we see from the set of candidates in the second manipulation who were constructed to be moderate but had varying party labels? Table 7 reports these results using the same breakdown. As expected, we see much smaller differences between groups. Amongst all subjects, the Democrat was rated less than 1 degree higher than the Republican. Liberals (all) rated the Republican 6.79 on average while conservatives (all) rate the Democratic slightly lower at 5.74, a difference of only 1.05. Liberals also like the Democratic (18.42) a little bit less than conservatives like the Republican (20.38) generating a difference of only 1.96.

Table 7: Feeling Thermometer Averages: Second Manipulation

	Democrat	Control	Republican
All respondents	13.03 (24.18)	12.48 (23.94)	12.10 (24.43)
All Liberals	18.42 (20.81)	12.5 (24.33)	6.79 (24.10)
All Conservatives	5.74 (26.40)	11.10 (24.32)	20.38 (22.77)
Sophisticates Only	10.60 (24.33)	12.05 (23.86)	10.42 (24.29)
Soph. Liberals	19.23 (19.60)	13.59 (23.74)	5.57 (22.43)
Soph. Conservatives	-1.79 (24.08)	6.44 (24.34)	16.32 (24.70)

Note: Values are means within each category. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Feeling thermometers range from -50 to +50 to indicate negative and positive affect

Ideologically Sophisticated Subjects, Second Manipulation

In the sophisticated segment of the sample, the Democrat and Republican are rated nearly identically; the difference between the average feeling thermometers is a mere .18 degrees and not distinguishable.[28] Figure 7 displays this information graphically. The large, overlapping error bars prevent us from concluding that party labels had strong varying effects on affective feelings. Given the theory of the dissertation and the descriptive statistics just cited, I expect that both candidates will be shifted equally from the control. They should also be equally likely to be categorized as "too ideological", "outside the mainstream" and "extremists".

[28] One might ask why, given the liberal leaning sample would not favor the Democrat noticeably more than the Republican candidate or even the candidate without a label. I address the possibilities for this in the discussion section at the end of the chapter.

Figure 7: Feeling Thermometer Averages: Second Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Causal Effect of Treatment Conditions on Four Extremity Measures

Table 8 reports the effects of the treatment conditions in manipulation 1 on all four extremity measures: a folded version of the 7-point ideology scale where 3 is coded as extremely liberal or extremely conservative and 0 indicates moderate (OLS regression), the question of whether the candidate is too ideological (logistic regression), the question of whether the candidate is outside the American mainstream (logistic regression) and the question of whether the candidate is an extremist (logistic regression). In these models I list the unaltered coefficient with its standard error in parentheses. Because logistic coefficients are not easily comparable (except for direction and significance), I also list the change in predicted probability using the *prchange* command in STATA beneath the unaltered coefficient. This allows one to compare the magnitude of one treatment effect to the other. Given the clear-cut negative affect toward the Republican candidate in manipulation 1, I would expect the Republican treatment to have a stronger and more positive relationship with these four measures than the Democrat treatment. The control condition is the baseline condition and is excluded from the model.

Table 8: Treatment Effects on Extremity Measures, First Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	Folded 7-Point Scale (OLS)	Too Ideological (Logit)	Outside Mainstream (Logit)	Extremist (Logit)
Democrat Condition	.303 (.027)***	.617 (.245)*	.358 (.224)	.581 (.278)*
Change in Pred. Prob.	-	.151	. 358	.119
Republican Condition	.401 (.027)***	1.53 (.250)***	.767 (.244)**	1.11 (.272)***
Change in Pred. Prob.	-	.366	.767	.237
Constant	.328 (.019)***	-1.02 (.186)***	-.925 (.182)***	-1.54 (.216)***
N	463	463	463	463
R^2 / Pseudo R^2	.332	.065	.016	.032

Note: The OLS regressions use standardized variables that range from 0-1. Because a folded 4-point scale is not a traditional continuous variable, this model was run as an ordered logit and found similar results.
Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

In the first manipulation both treatment conditions caused subjects to perceive the Democrat and Republican as more extreme than the control, although the OLS coefficient for the Republican candidate is larger. That we are seeing positive and significant effects here is expected; candidates leaning in an ideological direction should be perceived as more extreme than a control candidate who does not advocate policies. While these results indicate that the treatments did their jobs by making the candidates appear ideological, these coefficients do not mean that the Republicans was seen as more conservative than the Democrat were seen as liberal (or vice versa); they measure ideological location in either direction and thus do not provide an actual indication of where the candidates are placed on the measure. Those results are to follow.

The third, fourth and fifth columns indicate that the Republican candidate had a higher probability of being called "too ideological", "outside the mainstream" (*ns* for the Democrat) and an extremist when compared to the baseline condition. The change in predicted probability row indicates that the magnitude of the Republican treatment was usually twice as large as that of the Democrat. For completeness, I also ran difference in proportions tests between the Democrat condition and the Republican condition directly. Similar results emerge.[29]

According to the theory, the two treatment conditions for manipulation 2 should show similar effects (or similar null effects) on the extremity measures since respondents tended to like the candidates equally.

[29] The Republican (M=.633, SE=.030) was called "too ideological" more than the Democrat (M=.377, SE=.031) at z=-5.67, p<.001. The Republican condition (M=.440, SE=.031) was called "outside the mainstream" more than the Democrat (M=.340, SE=.030) at z= -2.27, p<.05. The Republican (M=.419, SE=.031) was called "an extremist" more than the Democrat (M=.254, SE=.027) at z=-3.87, p<.001.

Table 9: Treatment Effects on Extremity Measures, Second Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	Folded 7-Point Scale (OLS)	Too Ideological (Logit)	Outside Mainstream (Logit)	Extremist (Logit)
Democrat Condition	.073 (.029)*	-.222 (.337)	.115 (.335)	-.159 (.464)
Change in Pred. Prob.		-.022	.013	-.008
Republican Condition	.051 (.029)+	-.503 (.359)	.115 (.335)	-.585 (.520)
Change in Pred. Prob		-.049	.013	-.028
Constant	.264 (.020)***	-1.77 (.225)***	-1.93 (.239)***	-2.59 (.312)***
N	461	461	461	461
R^2 or Pseudo R^2	.01	.006	.000	.006

The OLS regressions use standardized variables that range from 0-1. Because a folded 4-point scale is not a traditional continuous variable, this model was run as an ordered logit and found similar results. Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

Here the Democrat is perceived as slightly more extreme than the Republican, who only reaches marginal levels of significance. Again, this model uses either scale end and only tells us how far from "moderate" the candidate was placed in either direction. The third, fourth and fifth columns indicate that neither candidate is more likely to be called too ideological, outside the mainstream or an extremist compared to the control. Difference in proportions tests comparing the Republican and Democrat conditions directly gave the same results.[30] While these numbers do not confirm that affect drives perceptions, they do show us that when (positive) affect towards the candidates is the same, they are equally likely to be seen as non-threatening.

Shifting, First Manipulation

Amongst the ideologically sophisticated subjects in the first manipulation, the mean placements of the Democratic candidate, the control candidate and the Republican candidate on the 7-point scale were 2.10, 4.31 and 6.11, respectively. The Democrat is 2.21 units left of the control and the Republican is 1.8 units right of the control. Subjects shifted the Democrat .41 units more than they did the Republican. Figure 8 shows these placements visually and includes a vertical reference point for where the middle of the scale is in order to highlight that the control candidate is to the right of the midpoint.

[30] The Democrat condition (M=.119, SE=.026) was called too ideological at the same rate as the Republican (M=.092, SE=.023) at z=.77, *ns*. The Democrat (M=.139, SE=.028) was called outside the mainstream at the same rate as the Republican (M=.138, SE=.027) at z=1.28, *ns*. The Democrat (M=.059, SE=.019) was called an extremist at the same rate as the Republican (M=.039, SE=.015) at z=.81, *ns*.

Figure 8: Perceived Ideology of Candidates: First Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Although the Democratic candidate was indeed left-shifted than the Republican was right-shifted, I cannot definitively claim that "left-shift" as it was defined earlier has taken place. Because my sample was so liberally skewed, it is hard to claim that the sophisticated public exaggerates the liberalism of Democratic candidates on average. Instead, what these results might display is stronger assimilation than contrast. The tendency to assimilate liked objects *more* than contrasting disliked objects has been reported in cross-sectional analyses (Granberg and Brent 1980, Granberg 1987) and experimental work (Castelli, Arcuri and Cararro 2009). For an alternative viewpoint, see Judd, Kenny and Krosnick (1983).

Shifting, Second Manipulation

The second manipulation provides the stricter test of left-shift in which only partisan labels varied. Any shift in the candidates' position can be attributed to their partisan labels. The dot plot in Figure 9 shows the results graphically and includes the same vertical reference line.

Figure 9: Perceived Ideology of Candidates: Second Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



The Democrat, control and Republican are placed at 3.26, 4.01 and 4.67, respectively. The Democrat is left shifted .75 units from the control while the Republican is right shifted .66, a small difference of .09. That any shifting of the treatment candidates is taking place at all is substantively interesting given that it comes exclusively from the partisan labels. According to

this experiment, these label accounts for about three quarters of a unit shift in either direction and represent something other than rational, unbiased issue evaluation.

Effect of Affect on Ideological Perception:

To assess what is driving shifting (or candidate placement, generally) I break down the data by each candidate and test my theory that affect, conditional on one's own ideological location will predict candidate placement. Projection is said to be strongest when issue positions are unknown, vague or ambiguous (Bruner, 1978, Granberg and Brendt 1974, Kinder 1978, Page and Jones 1979; Martinez 1988). To demonstrate that pure projection takes place when all that is available to the subject is a personality assessment (and the knowledge that this person is a politician), I display results for the control candidate in manipulation 1. This profile included a photo, non-partisan background information and quotations that were unrelated to actual policy content. There were no issue positions and no partisan label. How did subjects perceive this candidate? They assimilated and contrasted him based entirely on non-political cues. Table 10 has two columns: one for the model without the interaction term and one for the model with the interaction term. As we can see, when the interaction is excluded from the model, affect and ideology do not reach conventional levels of significance. When the interaction is added, main effects and the interactive effect are highly significant. Figure 10 plots the interaction term.

Table 10: Effect of Affect and Ideology on Placement of Control Candidate, Manipulation 1 (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	Ideological Placement of Control Candidate, First Manipulation	
Affect*Ideology	-	1.53 (.140)***
Affect	-.041 (.106)	-.599 (.080)***
Ideology (L-C)	-.188 (.099)+	-.776 (.082)***
Party ID (D-R)	-.066 (.090)	-.198 (.059)***
Political Knowledge	.031 (.077)	.013 (.067)
Age	-.038 (.073)	-.015 (.056)
Authoritarianism	-.048 (.047)	-.060 (.036)
Parties Polarized	.103 (.103)	.095 (.092)
Constant	.578 (.125)***	.850 (.107)***
R^2	.231	.520
N	146	146

Note: Estimator is an OLS regression with robust standard errors.
Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

Figure 10: Interaction Effect: Control Candidate, Manipulation 1 (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Here we see clear-cut evidence of assimilation and contrast. Extremely liberal persons who felt positively about the candidate pulled him toward their own position while extremely liberal persons who felt negatively about him pushed him toward the conservative side of the scale. The same effects happened for extremely conservative subjects. This interaction provides evidence that purely biased reasoning can fuel ideological perceptions. These results are expected given the past literature. Though this is a promising beginning, my theory goes beyond situations of political ambiguity and claims that these effects take place to some degree *even* when issue positions are known.

Candidates with Issue Positions: Democratic Candidates

I now examine the candidates in the treatment conditions and predict what influences where they are placed on the 7-point ideology scale. Previous researchers have tried to predict the actual amount of shift from the "true" location of the candidate or party by using the following equation:

Left Shift= Subject's Placement of Democrat- Mean Placement of Control

This differenced measure is ultimately analogous to using the standard 7-point scale and produces identical estimates. I have chosen to use the normal 7-point scale as the DV instead of the "shifting amount" because it will keep these types of models consistent throughout each chapter. Below are models with the feeling thermometer measure of affect (Model 1 for each

manipulation) and the residual measure of affect (Model 2 for each manipulation) for the Democratic candidates.[31]

Table 11: Effect of Affect and Ideology on Placement of Democratic Candidates (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	First Manipulation		Second Manipulation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Thermom*Ideology	.487 (.090)***	-	1.33 (.118)***	-
Residuals*Ideology	-	.006 (.001)***	-	.013 (.001)***
Thermom	-.187 (.067)**	-	-.600 (.070)***	-
Residuals	-	-.003 (.000)***	-	-.005 (.000)***
Ideology (L-C)	-.384 (.068)***	-.103(.049)*	-.784 (.097)***	.109 (.081)
Party ID (D-R)	.008 (.040)	-.010 (.038)	-.034 (.057)	-.039 (.064)
Political Knowledge	.002 (.037)	-.022 (.035)	.000 (.002)	.080 (.061)
Age	.049 (.034)	.053 (.035)	.087 (.052)+	.111 (.070)
Conservative Radio	.056 (.024)*	.041 (.023)+	.002 (.034)	-.043 (.045)
Authoritarianism	.014 (.027)	.025 (.027)	.005 (.035)	.030 (042)
Parties Polarized	-.083 (.058)	-.139 (.054)*	-.001 (.087)	-.091 (.103)
Decrease Tax	-	-.021 (.022)	-	-
Decrease Mil Spend.	-	-.015 (.025)	-	-
Energy Oversight	-	-.006 (.031)	-	-
Gay Marriage	-	.076 (.027)**	-	-
Tax Loopholes	-	-	-	.070 (.047)
Tax Cuts for All	-	-	-	.010 (.044)
Tax Cuts Small Bus.	-	-	-	.031 (.058)
Money for Schools	-	-	-	.070 (.048)
Anti-Terrorism	-	-	-	-.015 (.046)
Civilian Courts	-	-	-	-.075 (.051)
Reduce Nuc. Arms	-	-	-	-.035 (.055)
Background Checks	-	-	-	-.066 (.069)
Waiting Periods	-	-	-	.015 (.063)
Constant	.428 (.066)***	.312 (.065)***	.764 (.096)***	.291 (.096)***
R^2	.381	.426	.419	.403
N	160	160	149	148

Note: Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

[31] The models were also run as an ordered logits, which did not change the results. Other versions of these models (and subsequent models) were run with additional demographic variables such as education level, gender and a dummy variable for living in the South. Adding these variables did not change the results.

The models show the same results as the control candidate who lacked political positions and a label. Figure 11 depicts the interaction between the feeling thermometer and self-placement for Model 1 (first manipulation) graphically and leaves the dependent variable in its natural form rather than rescaled from 0-1. There is a dashed reference line that indicates where the control candidate was placed. Note that all points are below the reference line because every respondent placed the candidate to the left of the control. This figure shows that an extremely liberal person who strongly dislikes the candidate will place them closer to the conservative side of the scale or toward the center of the scale, effectively contrasting them from their own location. Meanwhile, an extremely liberal person who likes the candidate will assimilate them toward their own position. The same phenomenon holds for the extremely conservative participants.

Interestingly, the same interaction takes place when the residual measure of affect is interacted with the subject's self-placement in Figure 12. This interaction shows how affect, which is unrelated to evaluation, influences the perception process. Again, we see contrast and assimilation even when preferences for each policy issue (which should capture much of the evaluation-related affect) are controlled for in the model.

The Democrat in the second manipulation shows similar results. Figure 11 displays the (thermometer) interaction and demonstrates even more pronounced assimilation and contrast effects than the first manipulation. The reference line is nearly splitting the interaction in half, which is expected because the candidate was constructed to be moderate. More importantly, the interaction term with the residuals is showing similar effects in Figure 14. People assimilate and contrast candidates based on purer affect. That these results replicated between manipulations is a good sign for the general theory put forth in Chapter 1. Affect that is largely divorced from issue evaluation can shape ideological perception of others.

Figure 11: Interaction Effect with Feeling Thermometer: Democrat, 1st Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figure 12: Interaction Effect with Residual Measure: Democrat, 1st Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figure 13: Interaction Effect with Feeling Thermometer: Democrat, 2nd Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figure 14: Interaction Effect with Residual Measure: Democrat, 2nd Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Thus far, we have seen that the interaction effect between affect and ideological self-placement play a significant role on where one places a candidate on the ideological spectrum. Both manipulations demonstrated that subjects were assimilating liked candidates from their own location and contrasting disliked candidates from their own location. This happened with a measure that contained both conscious issue evaluation and pure (possibly subconscious) affect as well as a measure that was purged of issue evaluation (as well as feelings about partisanship and ideology).

Measures of Ideological Threat: Democratic Candidates

Though the 7-point scale is a commonly used ideology measure, it tells us little about how the respondent feels about the candidate's ideology. To uncover what predicts these judgments, I run multivariate analyses with logistic regressions since each item has a dichotomous answer. Unlike my previous models that used the 7-point scale as the dependent variable, the interaction term will not be appropriate, as it was specific to scale placement as a function of the subject's *own* placement. I am instead interested in the simple role of affect (both measures) and the other controls. Note that the variable labeled "Folded 7-Point" is a folded version of the 7-point scale on which the candidate was placed. A 3 on this scale means the respondent chose a 1 or a 7 (extremely) whereas a 0 means the subject chose the "4" response option which means they saw the candidate as ideologically moderate. Table 12 reports the results when the feeling thermometer is used and Table 13 report the results when the residual measure is used.

Table 12: Effect of Affect (Thermometer) on Alternative Measures of Extremity: Democratic Candidates (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	First Manipulation			Second Manipulation		
	Too Ideological?	Outside the Mainstream?	Extremist?	Too Ideological?	Outside the Mainstream?	Extremist?
Thermometer	-9.29 (1.75)***	-3.89 (1.11)***	-4.21 (1.44)**	-4.37 (1.67)**	-1.15 (1.32)	-3.89 (2.21)+
Folded 7-Point	-.971 (.489)*	.781 (.246)*	.928(.455)*	1.41 (.500)**	-.803 (.366)*	1.15 (.509)*
Ideology (L-C)	.946 (1.89)	-1.38 (1.39)	-.269 (1.42)	2.13 (2.96)	-1.93 (1.91)	1.96 (3.97)
Party ID (D-R)	-1.14 (1.60)	1.01 (1.19)	2.22 (1.63)	1.81 (2.78)	-.096 (1.77)	-2.68 (3.71)
Political Knowledge	-1.07 (1.29)	.043 (1.06)	-.864 (1.24)	-.952 (1.82)	-.641 (1.30)	-.353 (2.30)
Age	2.68 (1.34)*	1.30 (.932)	-.261 (1.15)	-2.64 (2.36)	-.308 (1.57)	.060 (2.86)
Authoritarianism	-.723 (.902)	-.284 (.650)	-1.14 (.839)	-.387 (.312)	.460 (.236)+	-.011 (.385)
Conservative Radio	-1.17 (.855)	.650 (.628)	.368 (.642)	2.82 (.948)**	2.16 (.812)**	-.286 (1.33)
Parties Polarized	2.31 (1.63)	1.29 (1.27)	.399 (1.40)	1.71 (1.76)	-3.33 (1.30)*	-2.73 (1.65)+
Constant	3.46 (2.09)+	-1.68 (1.57)	-1.46 (1.80)	-1.85 (2.26)	.816 (1.70)	-.044 (2.51)
Pseudo R^2	.593	.302	.456	.466	.260	.370
N	160	160	160	148	148	148

Note: Estimator is a logistic regression since the dependent variables are binary choices with 1 meaning an affirmative "Yes" and a 0 indicating a "No" response.
Alternative models were also run with feeling thermometers towards Obama and the Democratic Party to see if these sentiments were projected onto the fictitious candidates. They did not alter the results.
Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

Table 13: Effect of Affect (Residuals) on Alternative Measures of Extremity: Democratic Candidates (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	First Manipulation			Second Manipulation		
	Too Ideological	Outside Mainstream	Extremist	Too Ideological	Outside Mainstream	Extremist
Residuals	-.097	-.034	-.051	-.097	.003	-.022
	(.019)***	(.012)***	(.016)***	(.049)*	(.016)	(.041)
Min-Max	-.973	-.617	-.654	-.111	.014	-.000
Marginal	-.021	-.007	-.006	-.000	.000	-.000
Constant	-2.65 (2.41)	-1.91 (1.86)	-2.35 (2.15)	-16.67 (8.00)*	-2.25 (3.00)	4.12 (6.98)
Pseudo R^2	.609	.339	.485	.675	.357	.611
N	160	160	160	148	148	148

Note: All other controls have are included in the model but not reported for the sake of space. These variables are: a folded version of the 7 point scale for extremity (the same as in Table 11), ideology, partisanship, political knowledge, age, authoritarianism, conservative radio, polarization perception and issue positions for decreasing taxes, decreasing military spending, energy oversight, gay marriage (Manipulation 1), tax loopholes, tax cuts for all, tax cuts for small businesses, money for schools, anti-terrorism, civilian courts, reducing nuclear arms, background checks and waiting periods (Manipulation 2).

Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

In Table 12, affect (feeling thermometer) soaks up much of the effect across all three dependent variables for each manipulation. As positive affect increases, the probability of the subject calling either candidate "too ideological" or "an extremist" goes down when all other variables are held at their mean or modal values. These thermometers usually show significant effects above and beyond a folded version of the ideology measure. The only question that shows null results on the affective measure is whether the 2nd Democrat is considered outside the mainstream of America. It is possible that the items asking if a candidate is "too ideological" and "an extremist" are more affectively driven questions than the "mainstream" question. Both imply threat while simply claiming that someone is outside the American mainstream is does not necessarily do the same.

Table 13 reports the results for the models that use the residual measure of affect. The controls are included in the analysis but not reported in order to save space. Again, these models control for the likert scales that measured preferences for each policy that the candidate talked about. By doing this I can examine the separate effects of pure affect and issue evaluation. The residual measure of affect works for all three models in the first manipulation and the "too ideological" dependent variable in the 2nd manipulation. These are fairly similar results to Table 12 where the feeling thermometer is used, indicating that some level of pure affect influences how ideologically dangerous the subject perceives the candidate to be. Because logit coefficients are not easily interpretable, their predicted probabilities are also reported beneath the regular coefficients. For the models in which the coefficient is significant, the change from the minimum value to the maximum value of the residual measure is quite large when all other variables are held at their mean and modal values. However, the marginal effect of the residual variable is very small and nearly non-existent in the 2nd manipulation.

Candidates with Issue Positions: Republican Candidates

For completeness, I also run analyses for the Republican candidates. I use the same methods and controls except I exchange the Conservative Radio dummy variable with the Huffington Post dummy variable. Table 14 reports the results using both measures of affect for both manipulations.

Table 14: Effect of Affect and Ideology on Placement of Republican Candidates (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	First Manipulation		Second Manipulation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Thermom*Ideology	.233 (.124)+	-	1.07 (.158)***	-
Residuals*Ideology	-	.044 (.002)*	-	.049 (.011)***
Thermom	-.257 (.088)**	-	-.641 (.101)***	-
Residuals	-	-.003 (.001)**	-	-.031 (.006)***
Ideology (L-C)	.010 (.088)	.012 (.076)	-.585 (.119)***	1.08 (.492)*
Party ID (D-R)	-.082 (.063)	-.101 (.059)+	-.078 (.062)	-.450 (.409)
Political Knowledge	.114 (.047)	.111 (.093)	-.084 (.074)	-.618 (.483)
Age	.020 (.043)	.011 (.045)	-.022 (.061)	-.309 (.399)
Huffington Post	-.049 (.027)+	.014 (.025)	.006 (.028)	-.151 (.191)
Authoritarianism	.015 (.025)	-.054 (.031)+	.067 (.035)+	.526 (.230)*
Parties Polarized	.084 (.057)	.089 (.059)	.107 (.078)	.700 (.497)
Decrease Tax	-	.021 (.038)	-	-
Decrease Mil Spend.	-	.060 (.041)	-	-
Energy Oversight	-	-.041 (.057)	-	-
Gay Marriage	-	-.059 (.050)	-	-
Tax Loopholes	-	-	-	.018 (.313)
Tax Cuts for All	-	-	-	-.102 (.333)
Tax Cuts Small Bus.	-	-	-	-.171 (.446)
Money for Schools	-	-	-	.018 (.331)
Anti-Terrorism	-	-	-	-.022 (.301)
Civilian Courts	-	-	-	-.193 (.252)
Reduce Nuc. Arms	-	-	-	-.330 (.331)
Background Checks	-	-	-	-.094 (.425)
Waiting Periods	-	-	-	-.472 (.358)
Constant	.752 (.088)***	.748 (.080)***	.918 (.102)***	4.82 (.772)***
R^2	0.224	.265	0.321	.290
N	147	147	147	147

Note: Estimator is an OLS regression with robust standard errors.
Significance Codes: *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.1

Again, we see a similar contrast and assimilation patterns emerge, although they are not as stark as with the Democratic candidates. The interactions are plotted below.

Figure 15: Interaction Effect with Thermometer Measure: Rep. Candidate, 1st Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figure 16: Interaction Effect with Residual Measure: Rep. Candidate, 1st Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figure 17: Interaction Effect with Thermometer Measure: Rep. Candidate, 2nd Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figure 18: Interaction Effect with Residual Measure: Rep. Candidate, 2nd Manipulation (Ideological Sophisticates Only)



Figures 15-18 exhibit a similar pattern to the Democratic candidates, particularly in manipulation two. Although the interaction term only reaches marginal significance in the first manipulation with the thermometer measure, all other interactions across the models are significant at conventional levels. The thermometer measure containing both evaluative components as well as unrelated affect generates a contrast and assimilation effect. Moreover, the residual measure that captures only unrelated affect also generates a contrast and assimilation effect when all other issues positions are accounted for. That these residual patterns hold across manipulations and candidates from different parties again indicates that there is more to ideological perception than conscious and rational evaluation.

Measures of Ideological Threat: Republican Candidates

I check the measures of ideological threat for the Republican candidates, as I did with the Democratic candidates. Table 15 reports these results when the feeling thermometer is used and Table 16 reports the results when the residual measure is used.

Table 15: Effect of Affect (Thermometer) on Alternative Measures of Extremity, Republican Candidates (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	First Manipulation			Second Manipulation		
	Too Ideological?	Outside the Mainstream?	Extremist?	Too Ideological?	Outside the Mainstream?	Extremist?
Thermometer	-6.42 (1.63)***	-2.43 (1.07)**	-6.48 (1.52)***	-6.21 (1.86)***	-3.71 (1.19)**	-9.08 (3.37)**
Folded 7-Point	2.14 (.698)**	.994 (.374)**	1.97 (.487)**	1.56 (.609)**	.130 (.342)	.104 (.661)
Ideology (L-C)	-.666 (2.12)	-.194 (1.39)	1.28 (1.77)	-2.13 (3.37)	1.44 (1.94)	3.16 (5.33)
Party ID (D-R)	-.288 (1.97)	-.114 (1.26)	.241 (1.59)	5.51 (3.42)	-.468 (1.82)	-3.22 (4.95)
Pol. Knowledge	1.52 (1.49)	1.20 (1.00)	.781 (1.19)	-1.43 (1.95)	-.524 (1.29)	-1.33 (2.80)
Age	-.250 (1.73)	.551 (1.04)	3.23 (1.39)*	4.43 (2.23)*	-.617 (1.34)	-.856 (3.07)
Authoritarianism	.203 (.225)	.150 (.150)	.292 (.191)	.001 (.299)	.328 (.197)+	-.175 (.375)
Huffington Post	-.054 (.728)	.303 (.440)	.277 (.536)	-.027 (1.06)	.071 (.590)	.144 (1.19)
Parties Polarized	3.13 (1.25)	.374 (.903)	-.018 (1.14)	.971 (2.25)	-1.09 (1.26)	.271 (2.54)
Constant	-5.30 (2.29)	-3.33 (1.45)*	-6.08 (1.95)**	-4.33 (3.03)	1.95 (1.88)	1.70 (3.69)
Pseudo R^2	.595	.202	.423	.448	.156	.417
N	147	147	147	147	147	147

Note: Estimator is a logistic regression since the dependent variables are binary choices with 1 meaning an affirmative "Yes" response and a 0 indicating a "No" response.
Alternative models were also run with a feeling thermometer towards the Republican Party to see if this sentiment was projected onto the fictitious candidates. It did not alter the results.

Table 16: Effect of Affect (Residuals) on Alternative Measures of Extremity: Republican Candidates (Ideological Sophisticates Only)

	First Manipulation			Second Manipulation		
	Too Ideological	Outside Mainstream	Extremist	Too Ideological	Outside Mainstream	Extremist
Residuals	-.087 (.022)***	.027 (.012)*	-.070 (.018)***	-.113 (.043)**	-.056 (.018)**	-.153 (.067)*
Min-Max	-.900	-.534	-.887	-.556	-.705	
Marginal	-.016	-.006	-.014	-.000	-.003	
Constant	-2.96 (2.87)	-.2.99 (1.84)	-5.92 (2.49)*	-7.15 (5.95)	.932 (2.45)	-1.36 (6.62)
Pseudo R	.635	.211	.440	.606	.283	.566
N	147	147	147	147	147	147

Note: All other controls have are included in the model but not reported for the sake of saving space. They are: a folded version of the 7 point scale for extremity, ideology, partisanship, political knowledge, age, authoritarianism, conservative radio, polarization perception and issue positions for decreasing taxes, decreasing military spending, energy oversight, gay marriage (Manipulation 1), tax loopholes, tax cuts for all, tax cuts for small businesses, money for schools, funding anti terrorism, civilian courts, reducing nuclear arms, background checks and waiting periods (Manipulation 2)

The Republican results look similar to the Democrat results. Affect (both the thermometer measure and the residual measure) is significant and shows a relationship with the dependent variables above and beyond the folded version of the perceived ideology scale, partisan identification, ideology and other relevant controls. More positive affect leads to a lower probability of declaring the candidates too ideological, outside the American mainstream or extremists when all other variables are held at the means and modal values.

Discussion

This study has tested two concepts. The first is that affect contributes to various measures of perceived ideological location and threat. Both a regular feeling thermometer and a pure affective measure constructed from residuals showed significant relationships with the extremity questions. The second concept tested was that Democrats are perceived as more liberal than their equally ideological Republican counterparts. Though other studies had noticed this previously, it had never been examined in the appropriate experimental context. This is the first study of this kind. The results, which should interpreted in the context of a biased sample, indicate that when issue positions are manipulated to be mirror images of one another, the Democrat is left-shifted further than the Republican candidate is right-shifted. This happened despite the fact that negative affect toward the Republican was more pronounced than positive affect towards the Democrat. It is possible that this finding is the result of asymmetric projection, meaning that assimilation tends to show stronger results than contrasting. Despite being shifted less than the Democrat, subjects were more inclined to associate the Republican with threatening language. The threshold for ideological threat was lower for the disliked Republican than it was for the "equally" liked, liberal Democrat in the first manipulation.

When moderate candidates were manipulated by partisan identification only and affect towards them was similar, the two candidates were shifted approximately the same amount. Their scale locations were comparable, as was willingness to use threatening language to describe them. This is important from a normative standpoint, as one would hope that judgments are derived from policy content rather than party affiliation.

Of the two concepts focused on here, the most interesting story lies with the purged affective measure and its impact on perceptions. That these residuals- which had zero correlation with the partisanship, ideology and issue positions- showed very consistent and significant relationships with the dependent variables warrants further interest and investigation. As the *Rationalizing Voter* (2013) states, affect is a driving force behind all political reasoning and operates outside of conscious awareness. The same pattern seems to be happening here. Any affective feelings captured by these residuals were likely the result of a photo, general character assessment and any positive or negative feelings that were left over from seeing emotionally charged words such as Democrat, Republican, military spending, taxes etc. It is unlikely that subjects consciously chose to incorporate these feelings into their responses. These results suggest that tangential affect that arises spontaneously from a variety of stimuli can manifest itself in social assessments such as this.

Alternative Explanations

While my own theory (and previous studies by MacKuen and Parker-Stephen) suggests that the left-shift phenomenon seen in prior work may come (in part) from contrast effects, others might argue that the asymmetrical pattern arises for other reasons. First, it is possible that

Republicans are simply easier to define than Democrats. That is, the range of Republicans in the public or in elite circles is smaller than the range of Democrats. Republicans are simply more similar to one another and therefore it is easier to locate them on a scale. If this were true it would likely imply some level of evaluation in addition to some level of inference. As previously stated, my theory agrees that both of these processes are likely to take place and the one that dominates the perception process is likely determined by the perceivers level of political knowledge. However, affect should operate above and beyond both of these processes, even if it only produces a small effect.

Another explanation could be that Democratic exemplars are simply more liberal than the Democratic Party but Republican examplars are equally as conservative as the Republican Party on the whole; its not that affect towards the parties is asymmetrical and therefore one party is pushed further towards the poles, its that the well-known leaders of the Republican Party align with their parties while the well-known leaders of the Democratic party do not. If this were the case, it was imply an inference process. Respondents would be inferring the parties' positions from the perceived positions of famous individuals within their parties. Conover and Feldman (1983) find evidence of this but they also find evidence of projection effects. Again, my theory does not eliminate the inference process. Rather, it claims that inference is likely happening, but affect is a) informing the inference process itself and b) operating above and beyond the inference process, even if the effect size is small (see literature review).

Limitations and Future Routes

There are a number of important limitations to this study. The first, which has been discussed throughout, has been the biased Internet sample. If the left-shift trend amongst the American public is to be assessed accurately, I need a national probability sample. A true random sample would provide better representation of liberals and conservatives, which would ultimately affect perceptions.

Another limitation, caught in hindsight, was that I did not include variables for the perceived ideology of other relevant Democratic and Republican people. Included in the survey should have been a 7-point ideology rating for Barack Obama, the Democratic Party, another prominent Republican figure and the Republican Party.[32] Although I believe that perceptions of these prominent people and groups are also fueled by affect, they should have been included to test whether inference was taking place. My hypothesis is that these perceptions would have dampened the magnitude of the interactive effect, although they would not have reduced it to non-significance. This is what Feldman and Conover (1983) see in their panel analysis on candidate perception. It is also likely that the variable for perceived polarization in Congress captured some of the inference process.

Another limitation caught in hindsight was that the candidate in the 2nd manipulation was written in a way that might force a moderate perception (and positive evaluation) onto the subject. Instead of choosing sentences in which the candidate chose one particular moderate stance, the sentences were crafted using language that indicates moderation in a blatant fashion. For instance, the moderate candidate had the following issue stances:

[32] Instead, feeling thermometers towards these groups were included in models not reported. When they are added to the appropriate models, they are almost always insignificant. Moreover, they do not change the significance of the interaction variables and their constituent elements.

Barth has stated a number of times that we need to reduce the welfare state but must invest more federal money in the infrastructure and school systems of "at-risk" communities to do so.

With regards to foreign policy, Barth believes in increasing funding to intelligence operations to ensure terrorism is prevented but advocates trying terrorism suspects in civilian courtrooms instead of military courts.

Both of these sentences use the qualified "but" and provide stances for each side of the political aisle. The sentence structure and the qualifier may send the signal to the reader that they are *supposed* to view this person as a moderate. A better way to write these profiles would have been to state issue stances that are relatively moderate in nature without using two phrases that indicate both liberalism and conservatism separated by a moderator such as "but" or "however". The qualifying language that was used may have made it too obvious to subjects that they were supposed to like the candidate and rate him as a moderate. This may have compromised some of the external validity of the study and would explain the non-finding for partisanship in Figure 5.

The most important limitation is that it does not isolate affect or allow me to make claims about directionality. It only allows me to make claims about the effects of the ideologically leaning issue positions (manipulation 1) and the party labels attached to the candidates (manipulation 2). Could it be possible that subjects, having access to a paragraph explaining the candidate's issue positions directly, have assessed his ideological location and then made a decision about how positively or negatively they feel about him? Perhaps. Though it is more likely that respondents developed immediate feelings toward the candidate the moment they saw his partisan label at the top of the profile which then triggered affective charge and eventually a net feeling of like or dislike. Moreover, previous studies have used cross-lagged panel analysis to demonstrate that change in affect towards candidates can lead to change in ideological perception (Granberg and King 1980; Feldman and Conover 1983). Despite these findings, without manipulating affect itself I cannot rule out this possibility in my own analysis.

Should I continue on this route, I need to design a study in which affect is manipulated. One way to do this is to vary the candidate's background details while holding their partisan identification and issue positions constant. One condition would have a candidate with a very unflattering background while a second condition would make the candidate's background less unflattering and so on and so forth. These backgrounds would be unrelated to political matters and would be pre-tested to ensure that they vary in their ability to produce positive and negative affect. If the profile with the very unflattering background generates greater negative affect and greater contrast, I could claim that affect was the driving force behind the ideological assessments.

Another way to manipulate affect would be to follow Lodge and Taber's method of priming subjects with positive/negative words or positive/negative non-political images prior to reading profiles and making evaluations. Should we see increased/decreased affect due to the primes and then assimilation and contrast, it would provide evidence that ideological assessments are motivated reasoning processes above and beyond issue proximity assessments and reasoned evaluations.

Chapter 4:

Extremity Perception as a Function of Issue Sets and Personality Types

The second section of the dissertation moves away from the causes and consequences of left shift in particular and instead focuses on other determinants of ideological perception. Until this point, my theory has been tested under specific conditions and assumptions. The first assumption is that objects under assessment (parties and candidates) promote a diverse set of initiatives including economic, social and foreign policies. In the case of the experimental left shift study, these policy positions are also communicated equally to the subjects. The profiles combined all types of positions into a one-paragraph summary of the candidate as if he were emphasizing all issues to the same degree. Each position was a singular phrase or sentence. This was done in order to test candidates that could be representative of the entire Democratic or Republican Party, which are the units being assessed in the original studies of left shift. Had I used candidates that only emphasized one particular issue or one type of issue, it would only allow me to draw conclusions about perceptions of candidates on one policy or issue domain. It would not capture generalizable perceptions of these groups.

This approach, while appropriate for the left-shift experiment, does not capture differences that may arise when certain types of issues are emphasized over others. While it is certainly true that any presidential candidate will be forced to discuss a broad range of issues in settings such as debates and interviews, it is also true that some candidates tend to focus on specific types of issues that they are passionate about or familiar with. For example, Rick Santorum, a former Pennsylvania Senator and former candidate in the 2012 Republican primaries is largely associated with religious and family oriented social issues.[33] Senator and former presidential candidate John McCain tends to focus on foreign policy and military matters given his wartime experience, his position on House Foreign Affairs Committee and his new position on the Senate Armed Services Committee. This begs the question, "How many sets of issues are there for politicians to focus on?" In order to determine the number of appropriate issue sets, I follow the lead of Devine (2012) and break policies into four different types: economic issues, secular social issues, religious social issues and foreign policy/military issues.

That politicians talk about the economy and that it is important to the public is not disputed and needs no elaboration. The social issue set is divided into religious and non-religious issues. This is done because religious issues, particularly gay marriage and abortion, tend to affect people differently than secular issues (Devine 2012). Finally, political actors at the federal level discuss foreign policy matters thoroughly. In some elections it has been a dominant concern (Hess and Nelson 1985). Moreover, despite the older, prevailing narrative that the electorate does not care about foreign affairs enough to have real preferences, citizens do have structured feelings about foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Aldrich et al. 2006), recognize differences between candidates regarding foreign policy and can use this information in their

[33] During his time as Senator, Santorum authored a book devoted to family values and maintaining the proper family structure. According to an analysis by the Sunlight Foundation, he also uttered the words "abortion", "partial birth", "fetus" and "womb" on the Senate floor more than any other politician. There is little doubt that family-centric social issues were Santorum's top priority.

decision making process (Aldrich et al. 1989). For these reasons, foreign policy is its own issue set. These four groupings should elegantly capture all types of policies that candidates emphasize without unnecessary gradation.

If candidates spend more time promoting one of these particular issue sets, it may affect how extreme the candidate is perceived to be. For example, Devine (2012) finds that candidates who promote religious social issue platforms tend to be the candidates most associated with their respective ideological labels. Thus, it may be important to test different policy sets to see which are perceived as the most ideologically extreme and threatening. The first major question this study seeks to answer is whether candidates who promote certain policy sets tend to be viewed as more extreme than others.

The second assumption thus far is that candidates are assessed in isolation from one another. Due to the nature of the left shift design, subjects made an assessment of one candidate with no other candidates to compare him to. A critic may rightfully view this as problematic. In their examination of 1948 election Ross (1968) and Lubell (1952) argue that extreme third party candidates affected perceptions of Harry Truman by making him look more moderate and appealing. In an unpublished experimental study, Levine (2007) finds that candidates are perceived as more centrist when a more extreme third party candidate is added to the set. Since most large-scale elections are contested with at least one other candidate and primary elections have any number of candidates within the same party, citizens often formulate assessments of one candidate by pitting him (or her) against the other candidates. Ideological assessments are not usually made in isolation; they are made in a context. The results of the aforementioned studies can be attributed to "range effects" (Volkmann 1951; Parducci, 1965). This portion of the dissertation addresses this issue to some degree by including a number of candidates for the subject to assess simultaneously, creating a more realistic comparison process.

The final assumption from the previous studies is that individual differences are limited in their influence over ideological perception. The left-shift experiment focused on ideology, affect and their interaction. While some other individual level differences were controlled for, they were not variables of interest. Moreover, none of them showed robust relationships with the various dependent variables. This may have been because respondents were judging candidates who promoted diverse sets of issue positions. As I will argue below, it is more plausible that certain political personality types will hold select values and ideals sacred. When these values are specifically targeted by many policies that fall under one of the four types, subjects will generate negative affect toward the candidate who promotes them. This negative affect will in turn cause the candidate to be perceived as more extreme than other candidates. Therefore, the second major question this study intends to answer is whether different political personalities, tend to view certain sets of issues (and those who promote them) as more extreme than others.

This leads to the final question of which personality types should be considered for study. For this chapter I have chosen two types of people: authoritarians and libertarians. Below I will explain which values each group holds closely and generate hypotheses regarding which types of policies will violate those values, hereby causing stronger negative affect towards the candidate who promotes them.

Authoritarianism

One individual difference that has shown to be promising in perception research is the authoritarian predisposition. In the psychology literature, authoritarianism is generally considered to be a personality construct with a preference for conformity, oneness and group

cohesion over autonomy and independence. In her comprehensive study of authoritarianism, Stenner (2005) claims that, "What authoritarianism actually does is inclines one towards attitudes and behaviors variously concerned with structuring society and social interactions in ways that enhance sameness and minimize diversity of people, beliefs and behaviors…glorifying, rewarding and encouraging uniformity…disparaging, suppressing and punishing difference." (pg. 16) Measurements of authoritarianism have been controversial in the past (Feldman, 2003). However, in recent years political psychology scholars have adopted child-rearing questions that tap an individual's preference for conformity over autonomy as the best measure of this latent personality predisposition (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). Above all else, this measure communicates that authoritarians prize conformity and are averse to independent thought, diversity and heterogeneity. Thus, a "high" authoritarian should have the most negative affect toward the policy types that are threatening to conformity.

Which issue types will be the most threatening to conformity, sameness and oneness? The past 25 years of research point to social issues (generally) as the most likely candidate (Peterson, Doty and Winter 1993; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Jugert and Duckitt 2009). The question then becomes which type of social issue- secular or religious- would an authoritarian dislike the most and perceive as the most extreme and threatening? Only one study finds evidence that religious social issues are the policies most closely associated with ideology for authoritarians. Devine (2012) argues that authoritarian attitudes and reactions stem from conflicts between their own values and the threatening values of others (Devine 2012; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Of all the values one can possess, he considers religious values and practices as the most enduring and deeply engrained into our lives via socialization. He argues that authoritarians should find religious social issues as the most extreme regardless of the ideological direction.

I agree with past scholars that authoritarianism is mainly concerned with social issues, as the construct itself is based on preferences for social conformity and sameness. This would eliminate economic and foreign policy initiatives as the most disliked, extreme and threatening policies for authoritarians if faced with a comparative decision.[34] However, Devine's argument calls for more nuance and elaboration.

Although social issues tend to define the authoritarianism literature, empirical results point to authoritarianism as having a greater relationship with social conservatism specifically. In their thorough investigation of ideological determinants, Feldman and Johnston (2014) argue that authoritarianism and religiosity have significant and substantively large effects on social conservatism (although not economic conservatism) for those both low and high in political sophistication. Therefore, my hypothesis adds a moderating variable to Devine's argument: the ideological direction in which the issues are pointing. Authoritarians should like conservative, religious social issues and dislike liberal, religious social issues. Their negative affect toward the liberal, religious issues should fuel their ideological perception.

Hypothesis 1: The probability of selecting the candidate with religious social issues as the most ideologically extreme will increase as authoritarianism increases, but this relationship will depend on whether the positions are liberal or conservative.

[34] This is not to say that authoritarians would not dislike or feel threatened by certain economic policies or foreign policies. It rather suggests that policies that violate social cohesion will be considered the most important, disliked and perceived as extreme.

Where does this leave the non-religious issue set? This set would include highly salient and controversial issues such as gun control, affirmative action, decriminalization of marijuana, illegal immigration etc. Some, although not all, of these issues could potentially threaten a high authoritarian if they are perceived as eroding social cohesion and sameness. For example, affirmative action promotes diversity in the workplace by placing minority quotas on certain businesses. This action minimizes rather than enhances oneness and sameness. The legalization of marijuana (or any drug) comes with the implication of allowing social deviants to go unpunished. One of the most thoroughly studied aspects of authoritarian behavior is the willingness to punish people who act in socially deviant manners. (Feldman 2003, McCann 2008). This builds the case that increasing authoritarianism will also be associated with a higher probability of choosing the *secular* social candidate as the most ideologically extreme and dangerous. Again, this relationship should be modified by the ideological direction of the issue positions since authoritarianism is positively related to social conservatism.

Hypothesis 2: The probability of selecting the candidate with secular social issues as the most ideologically extreme will increase as authoritarianism increases, but this relationship will depend on whether the positions are liberal or conservative.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 don't make any claims that authoritarians are more likely to choose one of the social issue types over the other as the most extreme. I don't see enough theoretical foundation to claim one over the other. I expect these two sets to divide high authoritarians.

Libertarianism

Another political type worth investigating is libertarianism. Different fields conceptualize libertarianism in different ways. Within the political theory literature and some of the political science literature, libertarianism is often contrasted explicitly with authoritarianism. This is done because libertarianism is thought to emphasize individual freedom while authoritarianism emphasizes centralized control and obedience to government initiatives and orders. The phrases "authoritarian" and "libertarian" in this context are conceptualized in terms of whole societies and regime types. Within the more recent political psychology literature, most scholars associate authoritarianism with a personality trait or a set of cultural values that are tied closely to personality (Altemeyer 1998, Stenner 2005, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Hetherington and Weiler 2009). They are hesitant to call libertarianism the opposing side to authoritarianism. Moreover, libertarianism, as it is conceptualized today, is an ideology that people purposefully subscribe to. This is not the case for authoritarianism, which is a personality construct rather than a chosen ideological stance. For these reasons authoritarianism and libertarianism do not oppose each other. They are empirically and conceptually different. In this study I use authoritarianism as a latent personality trait and do not conceptualize libertarianism as the low end of the authoritarian scale.

The scholarly work on libertarianism is minimal; most researchers ignore the ideology altogether. This happens for a number of reasons, the first being that libertarianism is difficult to define. Researchers often describe a modern day libertarian as someone who combines economic conservatism with social liberalism (Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Iyer et al, 2010). Yet those who describe themselves as libertarians do not always adhere to this definition. Elite actors illuminate this observation. Personalities as different as Ron Paul, Bill Maher, Glenn Beck and

John Stossel have all referred to themselves as libertarians even though most people would perceive these individuals as quite different (and sometimes political opponents). I will use the definition that Feldman and Johnston and Iyer et al. use.

The second roadblock in the study of libertarianism involves the ability to sample. Despite evidence that there are plenty of people holding libertarian values (Feldman and Johnston, 2014), self-identified libertarians are a minority population. Boaz and Kirby (2006) suggest that libertarians represent 10-15% of the population depending on how the construct is measured. In a representative poll by the same authors (2007) only 9% of respondents referred to themselves as libertarian by label but 44% held consistently libertarian views. This paradox likely happens because the term "libertarian" does not enjoy the household label status that conservatism and liberalism do even though it is said to be on the rise (Boaz, 2009). Since most people are unaware of libertarianism as a concept or do not understand its meaning, self-described libertarians make up a small percentage of the population and are difficult to sample.

Despite this dearth of general interest, a small handful of researchers have acquired libertarian samples and have found that their personalities are distinct from liberals and conservatives with how they prioritize value constructs and moral principles. In a series of studies, Iyer et al. (2010) find (unsurprisingly) that libertarians place a higher value on individual liberty than liberals and conservatives do. Swedlow and Wyckoff (2009) find that libertarians are unwilling to trade the value of liberty for other values such as order, a value tradeoff that conservatives will make, and equality/caring, a value tradeoff that liberals will make. Libertarians are "reluctant to part with their liberties" (pg. 1072). If a policy or candidate promotes issues that violate personal liberties, libertarians should perceive a threat to their values, have negative affect toward these policies or candidate, and subsequently view the policies or candidate as ideologically extreme.

Which issue sets would libertarians perceive as the greatest violation to personal liberty? Since the literature on libertarianism is sparse, my hypothesis is grounded in polling evidence and the current libertarian movement's relationship with the Democratic and Republican parties.

Theoretically, libertarians could feel threatened by any of the four issue sets. However, foreign policy issues stand out as the least likely of the four. Unless liberties are violated through raising taxes for foreign/military projects, most foreign policy exploits will not directly affect the liberties of Americans compared to social and economic policies. The latter are domestic issues that have greater perceived impact on citizens, save for the families and friends of military members. That is not to say that some libertarians don't have strong opinions about foreign policy. In *The Libertarian Manifesto*, Murray Rothbard admonishes that state sponsored military exploits are abuses of government power and an affront to personal liberties by stating, "A government that has a permanent standing army at its disposal will always be tempted to use it, and to use it in an aggressive, interventionist and warlike manner….it is clear that a permanent army is a standing temptation to the State to enlarge its power, to push around other people are other countries and to dominate the internal life of the nation…any standing army, then, poses a threat to personal liberty" (pg. 101) While certain factions of modern libertarianism do stand for an isolationist foreign policy strategy, libertarianism is usually defined by maximizing liberty in the social and economic spheres (Iyer et al 2010).

This leaves economic, secular social and religious social policies as remaining options. To identify which set would be ranked as a greater affront to personal liberty we can look at how libertarianism aligns with the traditional left-right ideology scale as well as the Democratic and

Republican parties, political groups that tend to advocate social liberalism and economic conservatism more and more over time (Levendusky 2009).

Feldman and Johnston (2014) find that people who hold libertarian *values* choose the conservative label 70% of the time. Although these are not self-identified libertarians who are forced to choose a traditional label, this gives an indication that economic issues are considered the most important for maximizing liberty since modern day conservatives prefer less government intervention in the economy specifically. Since many of the people in the sample may not even realize they are libertarian, I also turn to research institutions that do niche sampling and ask libertarians which parties they affiliate with. The results from recent polls vary but the general trends point in the same direction. In 2013, a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute[35] employed a Libertarian Orientation Scale in its questionnaire and found that 45% of libertarians identify as Republicans while only 5% identify as Democrats. A Pew Research Center survey on libertarians from 2014 found that 14% of self-described libertarians who understood what the labels meant identified with the Republican Party while only 6% identified with the Democratic Party.[36] All in all, libertarians tend to find a home with Republicans even though both parties have a tendency to promote less government (and more liberty) in different realms of political life.

Why do libertarians gravitate in one partisan direction? It may be because the Republican Party markets itself as the party of small government in general. Or, perhaps the Republican Party is perceived as more wedded to less government in economics than Democrats are perceived as wedded to less government in social matters. It may be because the federal government simply has greater control over economic matters than social issues and this concerns libertarians. It may also be that libertarians themselves believe that limited government in economics is more important than limited government in social issues. The answer to this question has yet to be determined.[37] However, the libertarian gravitation towards the Republican Party and conservative label hints that economic liberty is prioritized higher than social liberty.

That said, libertarians should choose economic issues as the most extreme issue set but the ideological direction of these issues should matter. Liberal economic issues that expand government power and activity should be perceived as the greatest affront to personal liberty, generate the most negative affect and be perceived as the most ideologically extreme.

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[35] Jones. Robert, Daniel Cox and Juhem Navarro-Rivera. 2013. "The 2013 American Values Survey: In Search of Libertarians in America." http://publicreligion.org/research/2013/10/2013-american-values-survey/#.VRWj_16Jlg0 (October 29, 2013)

[36] Kiley, Jocelyn. 2014."In Search of Libertarians." Pew Research Center Website, September 25. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/25/in-search-of-libertarians/ (August 25, 2014)

[37] Iyer et al. (2012) suggest that libertarians have a more "masculine" cognitive style given their scores on the Baron-Cohen empathy scale and that the "feminizing" of the Democratic party in the 1970s may have lead libertarians to gravitate toward the Republican Party.

Hypothesis 3: The probability of selecting the candidate with economic issues as the most ideologically extreme will increase as libertarian identity increases, but this relationship will depend on whether the positions are liberal or conservative.[38]

Design

The survey is a single factor, between-subjects design in which subjects are randomly assigned to see profiles of liberal candidates in a liberal condition or conservative candidates in a conservative condition. The order in which the candidates appear is also randomized. Figure 19 depicts the study's design.

Figure 19: Experimental Layout



[38] Some might ask why I simply didn't run a pre-test in which I ask libertarians and authoritarians which types of issues are most important to them. This wasn't done for two reasons. First, I only had one chance at surveying libertarians since I had to rely on recruiting them through other websites and blogs. Pre-testing them in a separate survey wasn't feasible given their limited accessibility. Second, there is enough evidence from prior research to understand which issues authoritarians would feel strongest about. This evidence is clearly more limited for libertarians but I felt that it was sufficient given the recent polling on libertarian party identification and ideological identification. Therefore, I am not "guessing" which issues these two groups value, I am hypothesizing based on existing evidence.

In the conservative condition, subjects read brief profiles of four different politicians, each of whom promotes a different set of policies. One candidate promotes conservative economic policies (job creation, taxes and public program matters such as welfare and infrastructure), one promotes conservative social policies that are secular in nature (gun control, affirmative action and marijuana), one promotes conservative social policies that are religious in nature (abortion, stem cell research and same-sex marriage) and the last promotes foreign policies and military strategies (troops in the Middle East, nuclear arms policy and relations with Iran). Each candidate's profile is constructed to be a similar length: about two or three sentences. The order in which the candidates are presented is randomized.

The liberal condition unfolds the exact same way as conservative condition except each candidate now promotes the liberal counter-position to the conservative condition. The profiles are worded such that the phrasing change between conditions is minimal. For example, the biography of the conservative condition candidate who promotes economic policies says, "He wants to decrease spending on government-run poverty programs and infrastructure programs" whereas his liberal counterpart biography says, "He wants to increase spending on government run programs and infrastructure programs". Had the substantive and political words themselves in the profiles been altered, it may have increased the chances that something else aside from the ideological direction of the policies caused the subject's perception. The phrasing is controlled as much as possible to eliminate confounding factors. All candidate profiles can be viewed in Appendix D, Chapter 4. Because the order is randomized, any candidate has the same chance of appearing first, second, third or fourth.

After reading about each candidate in their condition, subjects assess how much they like or dislike each one with a feeling thermometer ranging from -50 to +50. They also place each candidate on a standard 7-point ideology scale and state whether they think the candidate is too ideological or an extremist.[39] Finally, subjects are presented with all four candidate profiles again on a single screen, are asked to read the profiles one more time and answer the following question: "If you had to choose which candidate listed above is the most ideologically extreme, which candidate would you choose?" Following this, respondents fill out a number of other questions and measures. When the study is completed, they are debriefed and allowed to leave open-ended comments if they choose to.

Measures and Controls

Affect was measured with the -50 to +50 feeling thermometer mentioned above.

An alternative measure of affect was calculated in the same way as the left-shift experiment. Each candidate thermometer was regressed onto the subject's partisanship, ideology and all issue positions from the libertarianism issue position scale (see below). The residuals from this regression were saved and used as a "purer" measure of affect. They do not correlate with partisanship, ideology or the issue preferences.[40] The results for these residuals have been footnoted throughout the chapter and some of their results can be seen in the Appendix. Overall

[39] These questions were phrased identically to the questions in the left-shift experiment.

[40] These residuals have been purged of *some* political elements but not all. They represent a cleaner measure of affect but they are not completely divorced from relevant political evaluation.

the measure worked well as a predictor. This measure is a better test of my theory and has only been relegated to footnotes and Appendices because it is not a traditional measure of affect. The results are nonetheless important and will be revisited in the Chapter 5 discussion section.

Ideological identification was measured by asking subjects if they were, "Liberal, Conservative, Moderate/Neither or Libertarian". Subjects who choose liberal or conservative responses are gauged for their strength. Moderates are asked if they lean one direction or another. Those who chose libertarian are also gauged for their libertarian strength; they can choose "Somewhat libertarian", "Strong libertarian" or "Very strong libertarian". Regardless of how they answer this question, all libertarians are also forced to choose a location on the standard 7-point ideological scale. The subjects who did not initially choose "libertarian" as their ideological label receive a zero on the libertarian strength scale. Therefore, all subjects have a placement on the normal 7-point ideology scale and the 4-point libertarian scale ranging from "Not libertarian to very strong libertarian".[41]

Libertarianism (operational, not symbolic) was measured by providing statements on healthcare, taxes, regulations of carbon emissions, government job creation, gun control, affirmative action, same sex marriage and government influenced health policy such as enforcing restaurants to list calories on their menus. In this section, subjects are asked to respond to each statement by choosing a response option on a 4-point likert scale ranging from "Strongly disapprove-Strongly Approve". These are forced choice statement questions and are constructed to be "pointing" in different ideological directions to eliminate the possibility of acquiescence bias. These statements can be found in Appendix C, Chapter 4.

Authoritarianism was measured with four child-rearing questions (Stenner 1995).

Partisanship was gauged using branching questions to create a 7-point partisanship scale.

Political sophistication was measured using the same questions from the left-shift experiment (Appendix B, Chapter 3).

Ideological sophistication is measured using three questions about how ideological labels relate to the two parties, the size of government and one policy (gun control).

Standard control variables included age, race (white vs. all other), income (continuous), gender (male=1), religiosity (ranging from not religious/atheist to extremely religious) and educational attainment (coded as 4-year college degree vs. no college degree). Most of these demographic variables were used for robustness checks and did not change the results when included in the models.

[41] This was done so that a standard one dimensional ideology scale could be compared to the libertarian scale later in the analysis. It was also done in case I could not recruit enough libertarians for the study, in which case I would need to drop my hypothesis about libertarian perceptions entirely. Fortunately, this was not the case.

Sample

The sample, in part, consists of 215 respondents from Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid 35 cents for their participation, which took approximately 15 minutes. A supplemental group of subjects, libertarians, had to be recruited online from libertarian websites and blogs. This is done because most Americans do not identify as libertarian nor do they understand the label's meaning. They must be sought out specifically. A research assistant emailed 68 libertarian websites asking if they would post the link to our survey on their homepage, online announcement board or through email to their subscribers. The sites that posted the link included Laissez Faire Books, Trends Research, Students for Liberty, The Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University, Everything Voluntary, Libertarian Papers, Reddit.com's Libertarian sub-reddit page and The Economist. Overall, 179 libertarians were recruited. These subjects were not paid for their participation. It should be kept in mind that these libertarians are more likely to take their ideology seriously since they are opting into libertarian websites, email list serves and forums in order to get updates, interact with the community and be involved in libertarian Internet culture. The total number of respondents after recruitment was completed was about 390. All recruitment took place in the fall of 2014. Subjects were only used if they agreed to participate after reading a consent form and passed two attention check questions.

Since one of my main hypotheses relies on libertarianism as a latent construct, it is important to check that survey respondents who selected the libertarian label also held libertarian values. This is why libertarianism was measured two separate ways in the survey. Symbolically, respondents were asked their ideological identification. Operationally, they filled out the 4-point likert scales ranging from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree" on statements about government intrusion and individual liberty. If subjects are true, self-aware libertarians, they should be symbolically referring to themselves as such, but they should also be selecting the response options that maximize liberty or minimize government control. It is necessary to measure this construct both ways because symbolic and operational ideologies have a history of discordance (Ellis and Stimson 2007; Stimson and Ellis 2009, Feldman and Johnston 2014). Because libertarians tend to be more principled in their ideology (Iyer et al. 2012; Swedlow and Wykoff 2009), I expect that there will not be a concerning symbolic-operational paradox within this population. Their values should (mostly) align with their selected label.

Before checking whether symbolic and operational libertarianism aligned, I checked the reliability of the operational measure. There were eight issue statements about government intervention and liberty. The question responses were recoded such that 4 always indicated a libertarian preference for more liberty and 1 indicated a preference for more government. The Cronbach's Alpha coefficient, which provides a lower-bound estimate of reliability for the eight items, was .91, indicating a desirable level of reliability and inter-correlation between the items.

The eight answers were summed to form one continuous measure where an 8 indicates the lowest level of libertarianism (a person who strongly agrees with government intervention on all issue statements) and 32 indicates the highest level of libertarianism (someone who strongly disagrees with government intervention on all issue statements). For subjects who actually self-identified as libertarian (N=179) the summed responses for the operational measure ranged from 19 to 32 on the scale, indicating that on average, self-identified libertarians were choosing the libertarian "side" of the likert scale on every question. In fact, more than 70% of self-identified libertarians scored higher than a 28 on the operational variable, indicating that the majority were selecting the "most" libertarian answer for most, if not all, of the likert scales. The correlation between symbolic libertarian identification and the operational, composite measure of libertarian

values is .65. I also correlated the operational libertarian measure with the normal 7-point ideology scale (L-C), which all respondents had to answer, even if they called themselves libertarians. The correlation between these two items was .55.

Results:

I compare my Internet sample with the 2012 ANES Time Series study sample.

Table 17: Sample Comparisons

Variable	Mechanical Turk + Libertarian Sample	ANES 2012
Age (Mean)	40	50
Male	63%	52%
Liberal	33%	28%
Moderate	27%	34%
Conservative	40%	38%
Democrat	32%	53%
Independent/Other	30%	13%
Republican	38%	34%
College Degree	77%	31%
N	403	5,300

My sample differs somewhat from a national probability sample. Generally, it is much less Democratic, more Independent and much more educated than the NES 2012 sample. Some of these biases are expected; websites that pay you to take surveys are going to have self-selection mechanisms, one of which will be higher levels of education. Normally, we see an oversample of Democrats from Mechanical Turk, yet my sample does not reflect this bias. Instead, what has happened is that my oversample of libertarians gravitated towards the Independent and Republican labels. Simple cross tabs bore this out.

The ideological breakdown of my Internet sample almost mimics that of the NES. Under normal circumstances in which only MTurk subjects are used, we would see a strong leftward shift in the ideological demographics (see left shift experimental study). Again, my sample is not reflecting this bias because the oversampling of libertarians is driving them towards the conservative side of the 7-point scale when they are forced to choose a location on it (checked with cross tabs). All conclusions going forward will be made in light of these sample biases.

Table 18 provides the descriptive statistics for perceptions of candidate extremity using all of the aforementioned dependent variables. The first column is the mean placement of each candidate on the 7-point scale. The second and third columns require a bit of scrutiny. We should expect that the column for "Is the candidate an extremist", has lower numbers than the preceding column, which asks "Is the candidate too ideological?" Being an extremist implies that the candidate *is* too ideological, but not vice versa. That is what we indeed see. All percentages in the third column are lower than the 2nd column. This indicates that these questions are being used "correctly". The final column reports the percentage for each candidate who was chosen as the "most ideological."

Table 18: Descriptive Statistics of Ideological Extremity Measures

Condition/Candidate	Mean Placement	Too Ideological	Extremist	Most Extreme (Forced)
Conservative Condition				
Sec. Social Candidate	5.81 (1.12)	51% (.501)	33% (.471)	6.93% (.254)
Religious Social Candidate	6.46 (1.02)	75% (.436)	62% (.486)	52.97% (.500)
Economic Candidate	5.82 (1.21)	51% (.501)	34% (.475)	14.36% (.351)
Foreign Policy Candidate	5.65 (1.25)	47% (.500)	44% (.497)	25.74% (.483)
N	204	208	208	202
Liberal Condition				
Sec. Social Candidate	2.31 (.978)	45% (.499)	29% (.455)	30.81% (.462)
Religious Social Candidate	2.38 (1.11)	32% (.464)	27% (.422)	24.75% (.432)
Economic Candidate	2.34 (.991)	48% (.500)	26% (.439)	32.83% (.470)
Foreign Policy Candidate	3.13 (1.09)	20% (.399)	13% (.339)	11.62% (.321)
N	202	202	202	198

Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Which sets of policies are viewed as the most ideologically extreme? By all measures, the candidate who promotes religious social policies is perceived as the most ideological and the most extreme in the conservative condition. Using two-tailed T-tests, his mean ideological score on the 7-point scale, 6.46 (1.02), is statistically greater than all other mean scores in the conservative condition ($p<.001$ for all pairwise comparisons). The same finding can be seen when subjects are forced to choose who is the most ideological within the set. The religious social candidate is chosen at a staggeringly higher rate, more than doubling the percentage of the 2nd most chosen candidate.

The ideological threat questions exhibit the same pattern. Using two-tailed difference in proportions tests, the religious social candidate is categorized as "too ideological" at a statistically higher rate at $p<.001$ for all pairwise comparisons. Finally, the percentage of people willing to call the religious social candidate an extremist is statistically greater than all other pairwise comparisons at $p<.001$. By all indications, religious social policies are considered more ideologically extreme and more threatening than other types of policies when they are pointing in a conservative direction.

An important question is whether the oversampling of libertarians is driving this pattern. A candidate who promotes policies that infringe on personal liberties such marriage and abortion should cause libertarians to have negative affect towards them and see them as ideologically extreme and dangerous. They should be more likely to call them too ideological or an extremist. As it turns out, even if I remove all the libertarians from the sample and look strictly at the MTurk subjects, the same patterns still hold. The religious social candidate in the conservative condition is picked as the most extreme candidate almost twice as much as the second most chosen candidate. The remainder of the conservative condition analysis going forward will include the libertarian subjects in the sample.

The liberal condition shows different results. At a glance, the candidate with the most liberal score on the 7-point ideology scale is the secular social candidate. Does this mean differ significantly from the other three mean ideology scores? Yes and no. It does not differ significantly from the average placement of the economic candidate or the religious social candidate. The only candidate whose average score is significantly more moderate is the foreign policy candidate ($p<.001$). Thus both social candidates and the economic candidate are perceived as equally extreme on the 7-point ideology scale.

When forced to choose which candidate is the most ideological in the set, subjects chose the secular social candidate at nearly the same rate as the economic candidate (about 31% and 33%, respectively). Again, the foreign policy candidate is chosen noticeably less than the other candidates. People promoting military and foreign affairs policies are simply not perceived to be as ideological or threatening as people promoting the three other domestic policy sets.

When asked if the candidates were too ideological, the secular social candidate is not significantly different from the economic candidate, but is significantly more likely to be chosen than the religious social candidate ($p<.01$) and the foreign policy candidate ($p<.001$).

Finally, the two social dimension candidates and the economic candidate do not differ from one another on the extremist question for all pairwise comparisons ($p>.05$). Again, the foreign policy candidate stood alone as the only candidate who differed significantly from all the other candidates at $p<.001$ for all comparisons.

When the libertarian subsample is removed, the social candidates ($M= 2.28$, $SD=1.11$ for the secular candidate and $M=2.17$, $SD=1.14$ for the religious candidate) are placed similarly on the scale where $p>.05$ and is not significant. The economic candidate ($M=2.45$, $SE=1.07$ is perceived as significantly more moderate than the religious candidate at $p<.05$ but not the secular candidate. Moreover, with libertarians removed from the sample, far less people selected the economic candidate as the most ideologically extreme. There seemed to be a split between the secular social candidate (35%) and the religious social candidate (34%), which are noticeably higher percentages than the economic candidate (19%) and the foreign policy candidate (11%). This indicates that within a more representative population, liberalism is defined by social issues *generally*. The remainder of the liberal condition analysis going forward keeps libertarian subjects in the sample.

The substantive takeaway is that when policies are pointing in a conservative direction, the candidate promoting religious social policies is perceived as the most extreme. When policies are pointing in a liberal direction (and libertarians are included), results become mixed, with the sample perceiving the religious social candidate, the secular social candidate and the economic candidate roughly equally extreme and equally threatening. When libertarians are not included, the social candidates dominate with regards to extremity while the economic and foreign policy candidates are perceived as more moderate.

Determinants of Perception

What drives these perceptions and judgments? To answer this I examine each dependent variable separately. The first is the placement of the candidate on the 7-point scale. This is where I test my principle theory outlined in Chapter 1. Table 19 presents OLS regressions for each conservative candidate's placement. Model 1 for each candidate uses the thermometer measure of affect while model 2 uses the residual measure. Both measures produce highly significant results when interacted with self-placement.

Table 19: Effect of Affect and Self-Placement on Perceived Ideological Location of Conservative Candidates

	Social Secular Candidate Placement		Religious Social Candidate Placement		Economic Candidate Placement		Foreign Policy Candidate Placement	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
Therm.* Ideo.	.552 (.239)*	-	.586 (.218)*	-	.732 (.236)*	-	.787 (.245)*	-
Resid.* Ideo.	-	.005 (.001)*	-	.006 (.002)*	-	.012 (.003)*	-	.009 (.003)*
Thermometer	-.372 (.146)*	-	-.329 (.127)*	-	-.394 (.141)*	-	-.511 (.153)*	-
Residuals	-	-.003 (.001)*	-	-.002 (.001)+	-	-.005 (.002)*	-	-.005 (.002)*
Ideology (L-C)	-.315 (.145)*	-.219 (.097)*	-.191 (.129)	-.083 (.092)	-.401 (.127)*	-.039 (.070)	-.394 (.128)*	-.195 (.090)*
Party ID (D-R)	.001 (.080)	.023 (.084)	-.057 (.096)	-.050 (.080)	-.022 (.079)	-.035 (.076)	.039 (.080)	.040 (.089)
Libert. Scale	.005 (.048)	-.081 (.057)	.091 (.049)+	.019 (.054)	-.010 (.045)	.014 (.052)	.077 (.057)	.008 (.061)
Authorit.	-.023 (.048)	-.015 (.044)	.039 (.039)	.034 (.042)	.007 (.049)	-.033 (.053)	.062 (.045)	.073 (.045)
Religiosity	-.013 (.050)	-.016 (.051)	-.126 (.052)*	-.101 (.049)*	.015 (.044)	.013 (.040)	-.135 (.064)*	.073 (.045)
Pol Know	.105 (.056)+	.101 (.064)	.109 (.058)+	.141 (.061)*	.023 (.077)	.052 (.078)	.076 (.067)	-.130 (.063)*
Ideo. Know	.161 (.098)	.135 (.085)	.134 (.071)+	.168 (.080)*	.331 (.110)	.437 (.108)*	.081 (.115)	.091 (.068)
Age	.011 (.072)	.041 (.083)	-.020 (.068)	-.000 (.079)	-.016 (.090)	-.000 (.088)	-.030 (.099)	.130 (.120)
Healthcare	-	-.013 (.024)	-	.027 (.023)	-	-.049 (.027)+	-	-.040 (.105)
Medicare	-	.016 (.015)	-	.013 (.014)	-	.022 (.016)	-	.016 (.025)
Emissions	-	-.011 (.020)	-	-.028 (.019)	-	.029 (.024)	-	.028 (.020)
$ for Jobs	-	.046 (.025)	-	-.006 (.024)	-	-.010 (.022)	-	-.005 (.029)
Gun Control	-	-.018 (.019)	-	.005 (.019)	-	-.010 (.020)	-	.000 (.025)
Gay Marriage	-	-.007 (.014)	-	.002 (.013)	-	.001 (.013)	-	-.005 (.015)
Health Policies	-	.023 (.018)	-	.014 (.017)	-	-.025 (.016)	-	-.028 (.022)
Affirm.Action	-	-.010 (.020)	-	-.002 (.019)	-	-.024 (.022)	-	-.022 (.024)
Constant	.724 (.113)*	.637 (.093)*	.800 (.099)*	.638 (.088)*	.661 (.126)*	.602 (.112)*	.812 (.118)*	.640 (.113)*
N	173	171	169	170	173	171	169	167
R^2	.232	.131	.213	.138	.286	.388	.198	.227

Note: The dependent variable is where the candidate is placed on a 7-point ideology scale.
Standard errors are robust standard errors. All variables are scaled to range from 0-1.
Significance codes:+<.10, * <.05

Figures 20-23 depict the interactive relationships when affect is measured with the feeling thermometer. Although the dependent variable was scaled from 0-1 in the results reported above for interpretation purposes, I keep the variables in their natural forms for the graphics. Each graph looks similar: as an extremely liberal person likes the candidate more, they place him further to the left, effectively exaggerating the similarities between themselves and the object. Conversely, an extremely liberal person who strongly dislikes the candidate will push them rightward, exaggerating the difference between themselves and the object.

Importantly, Figures 24-26 depict the same relationships when the feeling thermometer is swapped with the residual measure and issue positions are controlled for. Again we see contrast and assimilation based on affect that is (largely) divorced from the issue evaluation process.

Figures 20-23: Interactive Effects with Feeling Thermometer: Conservative Candidates

Figure 20: Interaction: Conservative Secular Social Candidate



Figure 21: Interaction: Conservative Religious Social Candidate



Figure 22: Interaction: Conservative Economic Candidate



Figure 23: Interaction: Conservative Foreign Policy Candidate



Figures 24-27: Interactive Effects with Residual Measure: Conservative Candidates

Figure 24: Interaction: Conservative Secular Social Candidate



Figure 25: Interaction: Conservative Religious Social Candidate



Figure 26: Interaction: Conservative Economic Candidate



Figure 27: Interaction: Conservative Foreign Policy Candidate



Table 20 reports the results for the liberal candidates. Again we see that the interaction term is highly significant at $p<.001$ for all four. Also notice the significance of authoritarianism for the secular social candidate and the significance of the libertarianism identity variable on the economic candidate. As authoritarianism increases, the secular social candidate is pushed further leftward, although we do not see this for the religious social candidate. As someone becomes a stronger libertarian, they push the liberally economic candidate further to the left on the scale.

Table 20: Effect of Affect and Self-Placement on Perceived Ideological Location of Liberal Candidates

	Social Secular Candidate Placement		Religious Social Candidate Placement		Economic Candidate Placement		Foreign Policy Candidate Placement	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
Therm.* Ideo.	.881 (.215)*	-	.897 (.144)*	-	.773 (.122)*	-	1.12 (.198)*	-
Resid.* Ideo.	-	.053 (.018)**	-	.054 (.011)*	-	.025 (.014)+	-	.049 (.013)*
Thermometer	-.355 (.136)*	-	-.408 (.090)*	-	-.351 (.087)*	-	-.482 (.140)*	-
Residuals	-	-.022 (.010)*	-	-.024 (.006)*	-	-.008 (.008)	-	-.019 (.008)*
Ideology (L-C)	-.291 (.148)*	.774 (.392)*	-.377 (.108)*	.695 (.509)	-.416 (.103)*	-.159 (.549)	-.545 (.151)*	1.14 (.509)*
Party ID (D-R)	-.069 (.072)	-.767 (.323)	-.076 (.078)	-.932 (.485)*	.023 (.074)	.015 (.481)	.022 (.063)	-.118 (.397)
Libert. Scale	-.059 (.050)	-.076 (.213)**	.002 (.041)	.253 (.308)	-.106 (.033)*	-.203 (.282)	-.024 (.036)	.520 (.303)+
Authorit.	-.135 (.042)*	-.690 (.238)	.002 (.043)	.129 (.278)	-.057 (.034)+	-.393 (.234)+	.016 (.035)	.097 (.238)
Religiosity	.074 (.056)	.283 (.303)	-.000 (.047)	-.104 (.306)	.067 (.045)	.487 (.313)	.046 (.046)	.133 (.311)
Pol Know.	.054 (.078)	.120 (.379)	.069 (.051)	.145 (.337)	-.030 (.052)	-.337 (.363)	-.033 (.060)	-.484 (.392)
Ideo. Know.	-.131 (.089)	-.843 (.412)*	-.036 (.071)	-.525 (.399)	-.096 (.060)	-.802(.361)*	-.107 (.065)	-.756 (.465)
Age	-.180 (.082)*	-1.02 (.411)*	-.064 (.076)	-.653 (.462)	-.132 (.051)*	-.802 (.361)*	-.016 (.079)	-.347 (.479)
Healthcare	-	.226 (.140)	-	.130 (.147)	-	.030 (.165)	-	-.194 (.162)
Medicare	-	.054 (.073)	-	-.143 (.097)	-	.015 (.086)	-	-.000 (.108)
Emissions	-	-.193 (.118)	-	-.207 (.108)	-	-.204 (.105)	-	-.267 (.115)*
$ for Jobs	-	.158 (.131)	-	.357 (.129)	-	-.067 (.116)	-	.161 (.156)
Gun Control	-	-.015 (.128)	-	-.020 (.113)	-	.129 (.115)	-	-.009 (.141)
Gay Marriage	-	.021 (.080)	-	.019 (.075)	-	.024 (.081)	-	.143 (.086)+
Health	-	.021 (.080)	-	.233 (.101)*	-	.028 (.112)	-	-.019 (.154)
Affirm.Action	-	-.015 (.128)	-	-.306 (.117)*	-	.009 (.122)	-	.055 (.162)
Constant	.633 (.127)*	3.56 (.413)*	.477 (.097)*	2.81 (.460)*	.635 (.097)*	3.75 (.466)*	.734 (.124)*	3.84 (.503)*
N	161	160	165	164	154	153	172	171
R^2	.275	.329	.241	.297	.372	.287	.318	.277

Note: The dependent variable is where the candidate is placed on a 7-point ideology scale.
Standard errors are robust standard errors. All variables are scaled to range from 0-1. **Significance codes:+<.10, * <.05**

Figures 28-31: Interactive Effects with Thermometer Measure: Liberal Candidates

Figure 28: Interaction: Liberal Secular Social Candidate



Figure 29: Interaction: Liberal Religious Social Candidate



Figure 30: Interaction: Liberal Economic Candidate



Figure 31: Interaction: Liberal Foreign Policy Candidate



Figures 32-35: Interactive Effects with Residual Measure: Liberal Candidates

Figure 32: Interaction: Liberal Secular Social Candidate



Figure 33: Interaction: Liberal Religious Social Candidate



Figure 34: Interaction: Liberal Economic Candidate



Figure 35: Interaction: Liberal Foreign Policy Candidate



The interaction terms for both the thermometer and the residual measure demonstrate the same assimilation and contrast effects we have seen in previous chapters. Turning to the next set of dependent variables, I examine how subjects responded to the questions of whether the candidate is too ideological or whether the candidate is an extremist. Tables 21 and 22 report the results for the conservative candidates with the thermometer and residual measures, respectively, and Tables 23 and 24 report the results liberal candidates with the thermometer and the residual measures, respectively.

Table 21: Effect of Affect (Thermometer) on Alternative Indicators of Extremity, Conservative Candidates

	Secular Social Candidate		Religious Social Candidate		Economic Candidate		Foreign Policy Candidate	
	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist
Thermometer	-.021 (.009)*	-.024 (.010)*	-.016 (.009)+	-.033 (.010)*	-.039 (.010)*	-.031 (.009)*	-.030 (.009)*	-.041 (.010)*
Folded 7-Point	1.86 (.345)*	1.26(.308)*	1.20 (.334)*	1.97 (.384)*	1.12 (.342)*	.600 (.312)*	1.18 (.272)*	.955 (.254)*
Ideology	.106 (.236)	-.151 (.234)	.077 (.217)	.205 (.237)	-.032 (.232)	-.182 (.236)	.153 (.217)	-.016 (.221)
Party ID	-.266 (.199)	.098 (.200)	-.273 (.202)	-.163 (.215)	-.181 (.210)	-.034 (.207)	-.239 (.200)	.012 (.203)
Libertarian	-.133 (.219)	-.463 (.245)	-.319 (.214)	-.162 (.204)	-.464 (.250)+	-.574 (.306)+	-.374 (.213)+	-.427 (.222)*
Author.	.191 (.168)	.061 (.161)	.152 (.164)	.148 (.172)	.115 (.185)	.173 (.166)	.009 (.161)	.136 (.166)
Religiosity	-.245 (.750)	.168 (.766)	-1.05 (.811)	.183 (.821)	-.236 (.878)	1.36 (.896)	-.152 (.760)	.664 (.780)
Pol. Know.	-.338 (.213)	-.254 (.189)	-.139 (.217)	.184 (.189)	-.476 (.231)*	.055 (.178)	-.310 (.187)+	-.095 (.176)
Ideo. Know	-.168 (.395)	.113 (.403)	.726 (.433)+	-.296 (.462)	.678 (.434)	-.663 (.416)	.384 (.373)	-.375 (.378)
Age	-.025 (.017)	-.008 (.016)	-.031 (.017)	-.007 (.016)	-.009 (.019)	-.002 (.018)	-.014 (.016)	-.012 (.016)
Constant	-.302 (1.36)	-2.45 (1.42)+	-1.18 (1.35)	-5.21 (1.65)*	-.728 (1.55)	-.178 (1.35)	-1.63 (1.26)	-1.20 (1.22)
N	172	173	168	169	173	171	169	168
Pseudo R^2	.387	.329	.253	.310	.480	.396	.320	.313

Note: Estimators are logistic regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance codes: + <.1 * <.05

Table 22: Effect of Affect (Residuals) on Alternative Indicators of Extremity, Conservative Candidates

	Secular Social Candidate		Religious Social Candidate		Economic Candidate		Foreign Policy Candidate	
	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist
Residuals	-.026 (.009)*	-.030 (.010)*	-.014 (.010)	-.044 (.012)*	-.038 (.012)*	-.028 (.012)*	-.040 (.011)*	-.050 (.012)*
Min-Max	-.703	-.564	-.298	-.877	-.909	-.670	-.840	-.891
Marginal	-.006	-.005	-.002	-.010	-.009	-.005	-.009	-.011
Constant	1.23 (1.77)	.581 (2.14)	-.971 (1.52)	-2.22 (1.44)	2.04 (1.45)	4.06 (1.38)*	-1.06 (1.81)	2.11 (1.70)
N	170	171	166	167	171	169	167	166
Pseudo R^2	.42	.398	.279	.404	.540	.444	.375	.390

Note: Estimators are logistic regressions. All other controls which are included in the models but not reported include: partisanship, libertarianism, authoritarianism, ideological knowledge, political knowledge, age and eight separate policy preferences from the libertarian identity scale. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The number below the coefficient indicates the change in probability when going from the minimum to the maximum value on the residual variable with all other controls held at their mean and modal values.
Significance codes: + <.1, * <.05

Table 23: Effect of Affect (Thermometer) on Alternative Indicators of Extremity, Liberal Candidates

	Secular Social Candidate		Religious Social Candidate		Economic Candidate		Foreign Policy Candidate	
	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist
Thermom.	-.051 (.011)*	-.051 (.012)*	-.043 (.010)*	-.053 (.012)*	-.073 (.014)*	-.068 (.017)*	-.062 (.014)*	-.043 (.014)*
Folded 7-Point	.759 (.299)*	.498 (.301)+	1.17 (.320)*	.917 (.338)*	.780 (.311)*	.405 (.342)	.953 (.259)*	.703 (.363)*
Ideology	.012 (.215)	.039 (.238)	.141 (.227)	.458 (.268)+	.032 (.232)	.292 (.256)	.336 (.263)	.340 (.264)
Party ID	.307(.215)	-.098 (.222)	-.023 (.217)	-.451 (.252)+	.156 (.218)	-.008 (.218)	-.168 (.249)	-.319 (.251)
Libertarian	-.535 (.252)*	-.187 (.249)	-.224 (.250)	-.366 (.278)	-1.14 (.329)*	-.426 (.294)	-.241 (.299)	-.600 (.344)
Author.	.213 (.201)	.459 (.201)*	.267 (.213)	-.057 (.224)	.120 (.195)	.300 (.208)	.124 (.230)	-.206 (.247)
Religiosity	-1.15 (.920)	.442 (.921)	-1.63 (1.01)	-.297 (1.00)	.558 (.955)	.215 (.990)	.014 (1.05)	1.39 (1.04)
Pol Know.	-.406(.210)+	-.341 (.216)	-.369 (.233)	-.523 (.275)*	-.113 (.203)	-.231 (.256)	-.534 (.267)*	-.350 (.265)
Ideo Know.	-.241 (.398)	-.032 (.408)	.369 (.421)	.455 (.485)	.042 (.371)	-.968 (.467)*	-.060 (.446)	.338 (.506)
Age	.010 (.017)	.003 (.027)	.011 (.018)	.011 (.020)	-.010 (.018)	.021 (.019)	-.008 (.023)	-.017 (.024)
Constant	-1.17 (1.16)	-1.79 (1.21)	-3.62 (1.41)*	-2.83 (1.47)*	-1.52 (1.29)	-2.01 (1.44)	-1.23 (1.36)	-1.79 (1.56)
N	160	160	164	165	154	153	172	172
Pseudo R^2	.370	.347	.417	.465	.410	.386	.471	.349

Note: Estimators are logistic regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance codes: + <.1, * <.05

Table 24: Effect of Affect (Residuals) on Alternative Indicators of Extremity, Liberal Candidates

	Secular Social Candidate		Religious Social Candidate		Economic Candidate		Foreign Policy Candidate	
	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist	Too Ideological	Extremist
Residuals	-.051 (.011)*	-.068 (.012)*	-.040 (.011)*	-.064 (.017)*	-.074 (.016)*	-.120 (.032)*	-.079 (.014)*	-.060 (.019)*
Min-Max	-.916	-.957	-.736	-.820	-.987	-.996	-.799	-.478
Marginal	-.012	-.010	-.006	-.004	-.018	-.008	-.003	-.001
Constant	-5.46 (1.42)*	-6.01 (1.75)*	-6.13 (1.62)	-7.49 (2.35)*	-7.43 (1.71)*	-5.96 (1.70)*	-4.58 (1.72)*	-.410 (1.75)*
N	159	159	163	164	153	152	171	171
Pseudo R^2	.409	.422	.443	.553	.435	.502	.546	.426

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses Estimators are logistic regressions. All other controls which are included in the models but not reported for the sake of space include: partisanship, libertarianism, authoritarianism, ideological knowledge, political knowledge, age and eight separate policy preferences from the libertarian identity scale..
The number below the coefficient indicates the change in probability when going from the minimum to the maximum value on the residual variable with all other controls held at their mean and modal values.
Significance codes: + <.1, * <.05

The results above reveal that when all other variables are held at the mean and model values, affect predicts whether a candidate is considered to be ideologically threatening. This pattern holds for both measures of affect. Tables 22 and 24, which report the findings for the residual version of the measure, also indicate the change in predicted probability when going from the minimum value of affect (a negative feeling) to the maximum value of affect (a positive feeling), all else equal. Like the previous empirical chapter, the min-max value is large but the marginal effect is very small across each model and each condition.

Extremity as a Function of Personality and Issue Sets

The final portion of the analysis focuses on whether different personality constructs influence perceptions of what is considered the most ideologically extreme policy set. Recall that my hypotheses state that distinct political personalities hold certain values sacred and when those values are violated by certain sets of policies, these groups will have negative affect towards the policies and/or candidates promoting them. This affect then translates into greater extremity perception.

Before testing these hypotheses, I check the variation on the authoritarianism variable. Out of the 396 respondents who answered the child-rearing question battery, 42% (167) fell into the lowest level of authoritarianism, which means they didn't choose any of the conformity responses. About 11% (42) of respondents fell into the highest category and the rest were in the middle. The variable has some skew, but there are certainly enough people on the higher end of the scale to test hypotheses. For the initial analysis, I divide the authoritarian measure dichotomously such that people who scored a 2 or below are considered "low authoritarians" and those who scored a 3 or higher are considered "high authoritarians". Overall, 20% of subjects were considered "high" on this trait. Since this variable has an odd number of points, it cannot be split down the middle. I have chosen to use the two highest values as "high libertarians" to be safe.

The libertarian variable also has substantial variation. About 54% of the sample does not identify as libertarian meaning that a little over a third does to some degree. Since the scale is 4 points, I split the measure in half and examine those who refer to themselves as "Strong" or "Very Strong" libertarians only.

Using these distinctions, Figures 36-38 depict the average feeling thermometers for each candidate that I have generated a hypothesis about and examines them by low vs. high authoritarians (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and low vs. high libertarians (Hypothesis 3)

Figure 36: Mean Thermometers Scores for the Religious Social Candidates, Low and High Authoritarians by Condition



Figure 36 gives a preliminary look at Hypothesis 1. Here we see that high authoritarians disliked the liberal religious social candidate more than low authoritarians although the means do not differ significantly. Oddly enough, high authoritarians disliked the conservative religious candidate even more than the liberal religious candidate, although this distinction was also not significant. Why do authoritarians dislike a socially conservative figure? It would be easy to pin this irregularity on ideology but the authoritarian variable shows a significant and positive relationship with conservatism in a bivariate regression (although about 30% of high authoritarians self-identified as liberal). Another possibility is that the oversample of libertarians is generally high on authoritarianism but also dislike conservative social figures. This was not the case either. Authoritarianism and libertarianism show a negative relationship in bivariate regression. Moreover, even when libertarians are removed from the sample, high authoritarians still have negative affect toward the conservative candidate although it is slightly less negative. As it turns out, the only people in the sample whose average score for the religious conservative candidate was positive were the respondents who identified as "Extremely conservative" (17.08 degrees) and "Extremely religious" (an almost neutral 1.6 degrees). These individuals made up very small segments of the sample. Unless there is something odd taking place in my sample, this indicates that conservative religious figures are incapable of capturing the hearts of most segments of the population.

The major difference that Figure 34 shows is that high authoritarians disliked the conservative religious candidate *less* than low authoritarians disliked the conservative religious candidate. When forced to choose who was the most extreme candidate, high authoritarians chose the liberal religious candidate (33%) at about the same rate as they chose the conservative

religious candidate (36%). Given these results, we may not see significance on the interaction term in the multivariate logistic models to follow.[42]

Figure 37: Mean Thermometers Scores for the Secular Social Candidates, Low and High Authoritarians by Condition



Figure 37 depicts the results for how high and low authoritarians rated the secular social candidate across conditions. My second hypothesis was that as someone became more authoritarian they would be more likely to choose the secular social candidate in the liberal condition as the most extreme due to stronger negative affect. Here we see that high authoritarians do dislike the liberal secular social candidate less than low authoritarians but the large error bars are overlapping. With these results I cannot begin to make claims about authoritarian differences. Moreover, high authoritarians seem to dislike the conservative secular social candidate the same amount as the liberal secular social candidate, as the error bars are overlapping. Despite this, high authoritarians tended to select the liberal secular social candidate as the most extreme candidate (37%) far more than they did in the conservative condition (8%). These preliminary results for candidate affect lead me to believe that I won't see significance on my interaction term in the multivariate analysis to follow.

[42] These results did not change when high authoritarians were coded using a tertile split instead of a median split. They still disliked both the liberal and conservative candidate about the same amount.

Figure 38: Mean Thermometers Scores for the Economic Candidates for Low and High Libertarians by Condition



Figure 38 helps shed light onto Hypothesis 3, which stated that as individuals identified as more libertarian they would be more likely to see the liberal economic candidate as the most extreme. This would happen due to negative affect toward the candidate. In the liberal condition, high libertarians have strong negative affect towards the economic candidate but low libertarians do not. In fact, they display positive affect and this difference is significant. Conversely, in the conservative condition, libertarians have positive affect toward the economic candidate while low libertarians have negative affect. When forced to choose which candidate was the most ideological, about 50% of high libertarians chose the economic candidate in the liberal condition (far more than any other candidate) while only 9% chose the economic candidate in the conservative condition as the most ideological. These dramatic differences by personality types and condition should predict an interaction effect in the multivariate analysis to follow.

In the final section I test my three hypotheses using multivariate analysis. The dependent variable in Table 19 is the question, "If you had to choose, which candidate would you consider the most extreme?" Anyone, regardless of treatment condition, gets a 1 if they chose the secular social candidate and a 0 if they chose anyone else. The same coding is used for the religious social candidate and the economic candidate such that they all become dummy variables. I run logistic regressions for each since the response options are coded dichotomously.

Each candidate option in Table 25 has two models. In the first model, I include the interaction between the individual difference variable of interest and the subject's self-placement. These models do not include the feeling thermometer variable, my measure of

positive or negative affect. The second model for each candidate has the interaction term and its constituent elements but also includes the feeling thermometer. The purpose of doing both models is to show that when the feeling thermometer is included, it will soak up much of the effect, leaving the personality variables (authoritarianism and libertarianism) to be less (or non) significant. I run both types of models because I believe affect is the mediating variable between the authoritarianism and the selection of the social candidates as well as the mediating variable between libertarianism and the selection of the economic candidate.

Table 25: Effect of Authoritarianism and Libertarianism On Selection of Most Ideologically Extreme Candidate

	Secular Social Candidate		Religious Social Candidate		Economic Candidate	
	Model A	**Model B**	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model A**	**Model B**
Condition*Libertarian	-	-	-	-	-1.05 (.292)*	-.432 (.358)
Condition*Authoritarian	.071 (.232)	.075 (.242)	-.390 (.171)*	-.323 (.181)+	-	-
Conservative Condition	-1.91 (.474)*	-1.93 (.522)*	1.84 (.353)*	1.57 (.387)*	-.212 (.362)	-.770 (.447)+
Libertarian	-.190 (.150)	-.280 (.169)+	-.182 (.123)	-.164 (.127)	.641 (.159)*	.371 (.195)+
Authoritarian	.124 (.128)	.120 (.144)	.122 (.138)	.084 (.145)	.070 (.113)	.116 (.119)
Affect	-	.000 (.005)	-	-.008 (.004)*	-	-.018 (.005)*
Ideology (L-C)	-.099 (.142)	-.125 (.146)	.342 (.121)*	.344 (.123)*	-.286 (.148)*	-.341 (.160)*
Party ID (D-R)	-.004 (.136)	.015 (.142)	-.127 (.112)	-.147 (.115)	.199 (.140)	.223 (.147)
Religiosity	-.851 (.596)	-.916 (.631)	.147 (.438)	.289 (.450)	1.06 (.523)*	1.05 (.568)+
Political Knowledge	.044 (.132)	.069 (.137)	.024 (.105)	.017 (.109)	.103 (.132)	.124 (.141)
Ideological Knowledge	.299 (.251)	.218 (.260)	-.153 (.207)	-.241 (.217)	.079 (.252)	.072 (.279)
Age	-.019 (.011)	-.017 (.012)	-.012 (.009)	-.012 (.010)	.016 (.010)	.009 (.011)
Constant	-.356 (.768)	-.256 (.913)	-1.25 (.655)*	-.529 (.739)	-2.78 (.821)*	-1.65 (1.00)*
N	349	334	349	335	349	328
Pseudo R^2	.126	.132	.102	.112	.129	.146

Note: The dependent variable assigns a 1 for those who chose that particular candidate as the most extreme and a 0 for those who did not choose that particular candidate as the most extreme.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance codes: + <.1, * <.05

To test the hypothesis that authoritarians would be more likely to choose the secular social candidate in the liberal condition, I interacted the condition dummy variable with the authoritarianism variable. The results are reported in Model A for the Secular Social candidate. Here we do not see significance on the interaction term, although we do find a main effect for condition itself. Being in the conservative condition makes people less likely to choose the secular social candidate as the most extreme candidate compared to the liberal condition. When Model B adds in the affective feeling thermometer, the model does not change. Given these results I fail to reject the null hypothesis that increasing authoritarianism does not increase the probability of choosing the secular social candidate as the most extreme.

Hypothesis two was that increasing authoritarianism would also increase the probability of the subject selecting the religious social candidate as the most extreme in the liberal condition. Model A reports these results without the feeling thermometer in the model. Here we see significance on the interaction term at $p<.05$ as well as significance on the condition variable. Figure 39 plots the predicted probabilities for that interaction term in Model A.

Figure 39: Predicted Probabilities of Condition X Authoritarianism on Selection of the Religious Social Candidate as the Most Ideologically Extreme



In the conservative condition, people with low levels of authoritarianism have a .6 probability of selecting the religious social candidate as the most ideologically extreme when all other variables are held at the mean and modal values. In the liberal condition, low authoritarians only have a .2 probability of selecting the religious social candidate as the most extreme. As subjects become more authoritarian, these probabilities converge. High authoritarians are just as likely to call the liberal religious candidate and the conservative religious candidate the most

extreme candidate. Although the interaction is significant, it is at the lower end of the, which is not what I anticipated. Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis two.

When the feeling thermometer is added to model B, the interaction term drops to marginal significance, indicating that affect is absorbing some of the effect. There still may be a potential mediator, but the interaction term from Model A does not provide evidence for the type of effect I was anticipating to see. Therefore I will not test this hypothesis in the mediation portion to follow. [43]

Hypothesis three stated that as someone identifies more as a libertarian, the probability of choosing the economic candidate as the most extreme will increase. This hypothesis was also qualified by the ideological condition the subject was in. Figure 40 plots the predicted probabilities of the interaction term from Economic Candidate Model A without the feeling thermometer.

Figure 40: Predicted Probabilities for Effect of Libertarian Identity and Condition on Selection of the Economic Candidate as the Most Ideologically Extreme



Figure 40 supports hypothesis three and indicates that as someone's libertarian identity becomes stronger, the probability of them selecting the liberal economic candidate as the most extreme increases dramatically when all other variables are held at their mean and modal values.

[43] When I combine the social candidates and code the dependent variable as 1 if the subject chose *either* the religious or the secular candidate and 0 if they chose otherwise, a different story emerges. The interaction between authoritarianism and the condition dummy is significant at $p<.05$, as are the main effects for both feeling thermometers and authoritarianism. The interaction graphic can be seen in Appendix E. It indicates that as authoritarianism increases, the probability of choosing either social candidate as the most ideologically extreme candidate goes up in the liberal condition but goes down in the conservative condition.

Non-libertarians have a .2 probability of choosing this candidate while very strong libertarians have about a .7 probability of doing so. In the conservative condition, the probability of choosing the economic candidate as the most extreme candidate in the set goes *down* as someone's libertarian identity strengthens.

Finally, when we add the feeling thermometer into Model B, the strong effect of the interaction vanishes and the significance of the main effect of libertarianism drops from $p<.001$ to $p<.05$. The thermometer seems to be absorbing much of the effect. This is similar to Baron and Kenny's (1986) mediation method and suggests that affect may be mediating libertarianism and selection of the liberal economic candidate.

Mediation Analysis

To find out if affect is an intervening variable between libertarianism and selection of the liberal economic candidate, I run a causal mediation analysis (Imai et al. 2010). This updated method allows the researcher to do two things older mediation methods by Baron and Kenny (1986) cannot do: estimate mediation effects with binary dependent variables and run sensitivity analyses to the assumption of sequential ignorability. The latter of the two detects whether the model is robust to confounding or omitted variables that could be affecting the mediator and the dependent variable. The sensitivity analysis results can be found in Appendix F, Chapter 4.

In this analysis, the treatment variable (the IV) is libertarianism, as measured by the libertarian identification question that ranges from 0 (not libertarian) to 3 (very strong libertarian). The proposed mediator is the feeling thermometer. The outcome variable is whether the subject chose the liberal economic candidate as the most ideologically extreme candidate (1) or not (0). What this means is that I have cut my sample in half and I am now only looking at the people who were in the liberal condition. If I did not do this, I would have to include the interaction term in the model, which is not a desirable practice. The dependent variable in this model is dichotomous and must be estimated with a probit.

Table 26: Mediation Analysis Results

Effect	Mean	95% Confidence Interval	
ACME 1	0.050	0.009	0.098
AMCE 0	0.047	0.008	0.091
Direct Effect 1	0.037	-0.043	0.113
Direct Effect 0	0.034	-0.030	0.105
Total Effect	0.085	0.023	0.140
% of Total via ACME1	0.594	0.356	1.64
% of Total via ACME2	0.562	0.337	1.56
Average Mediation	0.048	0.008	0.093
Average Direct Effect	0.036	-0.040	0.110
% of Total Effect Mediated	0.578	0.346	1.60

Note: The ACME confidence intervals are based on non-parametric bootstrap with 1000 resamples. The mediation equation was measured with OLS since the treatment and mediator are continuous. The outcome equation is estimated with a probit estimator.

The average effect of the treatment variable on the outcome that operates through the mediator is .06. If I were using a linear model, the ACME1 and ACME0 estimates would be identical, but with dichotomous outcomes, the numbers vary slightly, which is what we see here.
The estimates of the direct effect (Direct Effect 1 and Direct Effect 0) are about .02. The average treatment effect (Total Effect) is about .09 percent of the total effect being mediated by affect is 58% (the average of the percent of the total effect through ACME1 and AMCE0). These results should be taken with a large grain of salt, as my N size was relatively low (less than 200) and this type of mediation analysis is most often used for studies in which the mediator was experimentally manipulated, which was not the case in this study. Moreover, the Imai and Tigley method normally reduces the amount of mediation that is found using the standard Kenny and Baron method.

Discussion

In this chapter I have altered the context in which people make judgments about ideological extremity. Instead of having subjects make a judgment in isolation, they had the opportunity to compare four candidates who each emphasized different sets of issues simultaneously. My sample selected the religious social candidate as the most extreme and potentially dangerous in the conservative condition. This finding held even when libertarians were removed from the sample. In the liberal condition, no singular candidate dominated as the most ideologically extreme. Subjects tended to gravitate towards both social candidates and the economic candidate. When libertarians were removed, the remaining subjects generally selected the social candidates only as the most extreme. These findings reveal that conservatism is most readily associated with religious social issues while liberalism is most readily associated with social issues in general.

I saw mixed results for my hypotheses regarding political personality types. Increasing authoritarianism did not lead to a higher probability of selecting the liberal secular social candidate as the most ideologically extreme. It also showed a weak relationship with selection of the liberal religious social candidate as the most extreme candidate. However, when the selection was coded as a 1 for both social candidates, a significant interaction occurred and indicated that high authoritarians were more likely to select either liberal social candidate as the most extreme (see footnote and Appendix). Hypothesis 3 had the most empirical support. When feeling thermometers were not included in the models, increasing libertarianism increased the probability of someone selecting the economic candidate as the most extreme in the liberal condition, as evidenced by a strong and significant interaction term. When the feeling thermometer was included, the effect dampened significantly. A mediation analysis suggested that affect was the link between the personality type and the selection of the liberal economic candidate as the most ideologically extreme, although these results are likely overstated for a number of methodological reasons. Although libertarians gravitated towards the liberal economic candidate when forced to select who was the most extreme, they shied away from calling this candidate “too ideological”, as evidenced by a negative and significant coefficient for the libertarianism variable in Table 18. Though this subset of the population likes these types of policies the least, they are not so reactionary as to call any liberal economic candidate threatening. In fact, the libertarian variable showed a negative relationship with all the ideological threat questions for all candidates in both conditions.

Finally, I found support that affect drove ideological perceptions. A subject's own placement on the scale, interacted with affect predicted perceived ideological location of the candidate. Importantly, this tended to be the case even with the residual measure of affect. This cleansed measure was not as pure as the one from the left-shift chapter since it did not account for all the issues positions that each candidate discussed. However, it was still cleansed of partisanship, ideology and the issue positions used in the libertarianism scale. This cleaner measure showed strong relationships with nearly every dependent variable (see footnotes throughout the chapter and the Appendix for some of these results). It is worth repeating that even though the residuals do not constitute a perfect measure of affect, they indeed give us evidence that some kind of affective feelings that are mostly separate from evaluation can influence perceptions. This idea warrants more attention in future analyses.

Limitations

There are a number of limitations to this study. First, my sample was ideologically skewed in order to include the opinions of libertarians, who generally make up only 10% of the population. Although I noted the different results when libertarians were removed from the analysis, a follow up study would want a larger, national probability sample with another large, separate libertarian subsample.

Another limitation is lack of external reliability. Since this design was experimental and used fake candidates, it enhanced internal validity at the expense of external validity. The candidates in this experiment were fictitious and therefore I am limited in my ability to generalize my findings to the real world of politics.

Finally, the study did not account for two other possible processes that could have taken place. First, it is possible that evaluation of a candidate's ideology took place before a decision about how much the subject liked the candidate. As previously mentioned, this is probably not the temporal order of events, but my study design does not manipulate affect itself and therefore cannot draw causal conclusions with certainty. Second, I should have included variables early in the survey that captured inference in order to demonstrate that contrast and assimilation can still have an effect above and beyond this process. Though this is an important oversight, my past research would indicate that the inference process would dampen the effect of affect, but not reduce it to insignificance (Feldman and Conover 1983, Martinez 1988).

Chapter 5: Discussion

In his magnum opus book *Thinking Fast and Slow* (2011) Daniel Kahneman personifies the two cognitive networks that drive our thought processes and behavior by naming them System 1 and System 2. System 2 is a slow, calculating, deliberate way of information processing that is normally associated with everyday tasks such as talking to friends, choosing a restaurant, reading a news article, cursing at your dissertation, making social judgments and making impactful life decisions. Unbeknownst to us, the familiar System 2 often works in concert with System 1, a fast, effortless, "quick and dirty" way of information processing that takes place outside of conscious awareness. These systems are analogous to the dual process models mentioned in Chapter 1. Decades of empirical research on priming, affect, emotions, decision-making and behavior have helped to slowly pull back the curtain and reveal the power that System 1 holds over our lives. Our unchallenged, subconscious processes lurk in the background and guide our conscious thoughts regularly.

The same System 1 and System 2 patterns can be seen throughout this dissertation. Chapter 3 tested whether Democrats were perceived as more extreme than their equally ideological Republican counterparts while Chapter 4 tested whether certain types of issues would strike different political personality types as the most ideological and threatening. These chapters provided different contexts for me to assess the role of affect in ideological judgments. In both chapters we see that a standard 100 point feeling thermometer- an explicit, conscious measure of affect- predicts candidate placement when interacted with the respondent's own ideological placement and predicts ideological threat when left to its own devices. But this is what we expect to find with this measure. These standard feeling thermometers, likely containing conscious issue evaluation and downstream effects from one's own partisanship and ideology don't tell a very interesting story. They represent much of the normal, everyday System 2 processes that we assume take place in these types of judgment tasks.

The deeper, more interesting story has taken place with the residuals- a System 1-esque measure of affect. In this measure, the feeling thermometers for each candidate have been purged of their evaluative components by regressing them onto the subject's partisanship, ideology and likert scales that measure their issue positions. The residuals from these regressions were then saved and used as a new, uncontaminated affective measure. When this measure was substituted for the standard feeling thermometers, it predicted candidate placement and feelings of ideological threat very consistently. In models not reported, I used an even more stringent residual measure of affect in which feeling thermometers towards the major parties and Barack Obama were *also* purged. Those residuals also showed fairly consistent relationships with the dependent variables throughout, indicating that something far beyond relevant political feelings was capable of influencing perceived ideological location and perceived ideological threat.

Although I cannot pinpoint precisely what the residuals captured for each person, it is clear that what they were not capturing evaluations that originated from the candidate's issue positions (more so in the left-shift study), their partisanship and their presumed ideology. They were perhaps capturing feelings that arose from photographs, background information, other associations that subject's made when they read about the candidate's partisanship, tangential thoughts that they had when they began to think about the candidate's ideology and so on and so forth. These affective feelings could have arisen from a number of places. That being said, the studies reported here did not test hot cognition as precisely as previous studies (Lodge and Taber 2005). They did not examine exactly what associations and concepts were triggered, nor did they

showcase each individual step in the hot cognition process. However, the studies do provide evidence that some kind of tangential affect- a concept highly associated with implicit, subconscious System 1 processing, is at work in this type of judgment task.

These results serve as a reminder that our rationality as political consumers is bounded by the limitations of our conscious minds. We cannot divorce "hot", tangential affect from our cold and seemingly justified political evaluations. We are motivated to reason and make judgments in a direction that aligns with affective feelings that emerge spontaneously throughout the cognitive process.

What does this mean for the larger picture? A democratic society is one in which citizens need to support parties, candidates and policies that align with their own preferences. This is the essence of representation. To do this, citizens must observe, evaluate and compare political actors and their policies in an evenhanded, unbiased manner. Should affect unknowingly drive ideological perceptions it may prevent us as individuals from being able to accurately interpret political intentions and policy implications. It may also lead to a biased and magnified perception of ideological threat. I would not go so far as to suggest that subconscious affect has a large impact on higher-level trends such as mood. It will undoubtedly be more influential at the individual level though it may influence how respondents answer questions that measure aggregate trends like mood.

The studies reported here are not the first to tie ideological projection to an affective framework. As previously mentioned, Heider's balance theory is often cited as the underlying mechanism for contrast and assimilation effects. These studies are, however, the first to tie contrast/assimilation/projection to the affect-driven hot cognition model. No other studies have looked for purely affective components in this type of political judgment.[44] They have mainly used standard feeling thermometers or vote intentions as ways of measuring positivity and negativity towards candidates. Examining purer forms of affect in ideological perception has been the main contribution of this dissertation, in addition to a few other interesting hypotheses that provided different contexts for my principle theory.

Because the residual measure of affect I used was so dependable throughout the two experimental studies, further analysis in which affect is manipulated through more traditional means is called for. As stated previously, this could be done by priming people with affect by flashing a subliminal symbol or making them do a word unscramble of positive or negative words. Afterwards, I could test whether these primes caused a change in affect towards a candidate and then a change in ideological placement of the candidate compared to a control group. Another method would be experimentally manipulating the candidate's (non-political) background such that it is favorable or unfavorable. These backgrounds should cause changes in likability ratings of the candidates and subsequent changes in ideological placements.

[44] Castelli, Arcuri and Cararro (2009) find pure bias when subjects project their birthday months onto liked candidates, but they are not looking for affect specifically.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Candidate Profiles for Left-Shift Experimental Study

EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION 1

DEMOCRAT CONDITION

HOWARD MARTIN: DEMOCRAT

Howard Martin is a Democratic candidate running for Maryland's 113th Congressional District. Mr. Martin was born and raised in Annapolis, MD and attended the University of Maryland where he received his Bachelor's in Political Science, with a minor in Economics. After graduating, Martin attended Georgetown and earned his Masters in Political Science, while also maintaining an internship at a well-known political think tank. The internship exposed him to policymaking and legislation, leading to his local involvement in Washington, D.C with the Economic Policy Project. His involvement in state and local politics led to his eventual decision to run for a Congressional seat. He has been a registered Democrat his entire life.

Martin believes in increasing taxes on the richest 5% of Americans if the country is in financial hardship and measures need to be taken to improve the economy. He has stated in a number of campaign speeches that we should have a decrease in military spending, which would affect all service branches. Last Spring during a rally, Martin suggested that we put in place certain restrictions and increase federal oversight on the nation's energy industry, saying it was "American" to do so. Additionally, in the last year, Martin stated that he supports marriage between same-sex couples.

What others have said about Martin:
"Howard Martin is persuasive, aggressive and hell-bent on pursuing his policy goals. Keep your eyes out for him in the near future."

"This is a man who rubbed shoulders with campaign strategists his entire life. He knows how to play the game, even as a newcomer."

REPUBLICAN CONDITION:

Manipulated content*: "Democrat" is exchanged for the word "Republican" in all locations*

Manipulated second paragraph: Martin believes in decreasing taxes on the richest 5% of Americans if the country is in financial hardship and measures need to be taken to improve the economy. He has stated a number of times in campaign speeches that we should have an increase in military spending, which would affect all service branches. Last spring during a rally, Martin suggested that we remove certain restrictions and federal oversight from the nation's energy industry, saying it was "American" to do so. Additionally, in the last year, Martin stated that he opposes marriage between same-sex couples.

CONTROL CONDITION:

Manipulated content: *No positions paragraph and no partisan identification anywhere*

EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION 2

DEMOCRAT CONDITION

ADAM BARTH: DEMOCRAT

Adam Barth is a Democrat running for a seat in Pennsylvania's 17th district. Dr. Barth grew up in the suburbs outside of Harrisburg, PA. He attended college at Penn State and dental school at the University of Pittsburgh. After opening up his own office and practicing for 6 years, Barth became involved in the local school board in his township and then became active in public efforts related to education, telecommunications and information technology. He has been a registered Democrat his entire life.

Barth's policies for promoting economic growth include ending tax loopholes for large corporations and providing tax cuts to all individual Americans and small businesses. Barth has stated a number of times that we need to reduce the welfare state but must invest more federal money in the infrastructure and school systems of "at-risk" communities to do so. With regards to foreign policy, Barth believes in increasing funding to intelligence operations to ensure terrorism is prevented but advocates trying terrorism suspects in civilian courtrooms instead of military courts. He also believes in reducing the number of nuclear weapons by both the United States and other nations through nuclear arms treaties. He is a member of the NRA but has stated a number of times that there needs to be a discussion about laws regarding background checks and making waiting periods longer to obtain a gun.

What others have said about Barth:
"Barth is a policy wonk and has become a favorite of the news media"

"Adored by his community and feared by his adversaries"

REPUBLICAN CONDITION

Manipulated content*: "Democrat" is exchanged for the word "Republican" in all locations*

CONTROL CONDITION

Manipulated content: *No partisan identification anywhere*

Appendix B: Ideological Sophistication and Political Knowledge Batteries

Ideological Sophistication Battery Questions:

1. Generally speaking, which of the two parties supports the idea of smaller, less centralized government?
    a. Republican Party
    b. Democratic Party
    c. Unsure

2. Which party is generally considered more liberal?
    a. Republican Party
    b. Democratic Party
    c. Unsure

3. Generally speaking, which group of people believes that spending federal money can help stimulate the economy?
    a. Liberals
    b. Conservatives
    c. Unsure

Political Knowledge Battery:

1. Who is the current Secretary of State?
    a. Hillary Clinton
    b. John Kerry
    c. David Petraeus
    d. Joe Biden

2. How long is one term for a member of the House of Representatives?
    a. 2 years
    b. 3 years
    c. 4 years
    d. 6 years

3. Who appoints Supreme Court Justices before they are confirmed?
    a. Members of the Supreme Court
    b. The Secretary of State
    c. Justices from lower courts
    d. The President

4. How many Senators are there in the United States?
    a. 50
    b. 100
    c. 150
    d. 435

5. Which party currently controls the majority of seats in the House of Representatives?
    a. Republican Party
    b. Democratic Party
    c. Other Party

Appendix C: Libertarianism Scale Questions

Response Options: 4-point likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.

1. In order to improve the quality of healthcare in the United States, there should be government intervention or some kind of government-lead healthcare plan. *(reverse coded)*

2. The government should not use taxpayer money for programs such as TANF (ie Welfare), Medicaid and Medicare.

3. In order to combat global warming, there should be carbon emission limits enforced on certain companies. *(reverse coded)*

4. When the country is struggling economically, the government should spend money in order to help create jobs and stimulate growth. *(reverse coded)*

5. Washington should implement stricter gun control laws. *(reverse coded)*

6. The government has no place in the debate over same sex marriage.

7. We should have policies to help us become healthier. For example: it should be mandatory for fast food restaurants to put the number of calories for each food item on their menus. *(reverse coded)*

8. Affirmative action policies are necessary in order to make sure certain minority populations are represented in the workplace. *(reverse coded)*

Appendix D: Candidate Profiles for Issue Set Study

Conservative Candidate Profiles (order randomized)

(Economic Candidate) Russell Barrett does not believe in government spending to create jobs during economic crises. He supports decreasing taxes for the wealthiest 3% of Americans in order to stimulate the economy. He also wants to decrease spending on government-run poverty programs and infrastructure programs.

(Secular Social Candidate) Corey Leads does not believe in gun control. He campaigns against longer waiting periods and background checks. He opposes affirmative action in the workplace. He also wants to keep marijuana criminalized and keep offenders in the prison system.

(Religious Social Candidate) Bill Fagen is pro-life and believes that abortions should never be performed no matter what the circumstances are. He supports legislation to ban stem-cell research. He also wants states to make same-sex marriage illegal.

(Foreign Policy Candidate) Pierce Franks believes in increasing the number of troops in the Middle East, specifically in Afghanistan. He supports increasing the US nuclear arms supply. He also wants a militant approach when dealing with Iran instead of a diplomatic approach

Liberal Candidate Profiles (order randomized)

(Economic Candidate) Russell Barrett believes in government spending to create jobs during economic crises. He supports increasing taxes for the wealthiest 3% of Americans in order to stimulate the economy. He also wants to increase spending on government-run poverty programs and infrastructure programs.

(Secular Social Candidate) Corey Leads believes in gun control. He campaigns for longer waiting periods and background checks. He supports affirmative action in the workplace. He also wants to decriminalize marijuana and get offenders out of the prison system.

(Religious Social Candidate) Bill Fagen is pro-choice and believes that the woman should have the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion no matter what the circumstances are. He opposes legislation to ban stem cell research. He also wants states to legalize same-sex marriage.

(Foreign Policy Candidate) Pierce Franks believes in decreasing the number of troops in the Middle East, specifically in Afghanistan. He supports decreasing the US nuclear arms supply. He also wants a diplomatic approach when dealing with Iran instead of a militant approach.

Appendix E: Alternative Coding for Social Candidate Selection

Probability of Selecting Either Social Candidate as the Most Ideologically Extreme



Appendix F: Sensitivity Analysis Results



Sensitivity Results	
Rho at which ACME=0	-.2
R^2 M*R^2Y* at which ACME=0	.04
R^2 M~R^2Y~ at which ACME=0	.0098