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Racialized Partisan Identity: The Role of Pan-Ethnic Identity in Partisan Movement

among Asian Americans

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Racialized Partisan Identity: The Role of Pan-Ethnic Identity in Partisan Movement

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I conduct empirical and experimental tests to highlight the impact of perceived commonality with racial-minority groups and its effects on subsequent political behavior among Asian Americans. This includes an exploration into how a shared identity interacts with Asian Americans' racial identity to shape their subsequent political behavior. Using experimental treatments adopted from real-world messages in the news media, I show how exposure to the political derogation of both illegal and legal immigrant groups in the United States activates Asian Americans' own racial identification and that the extent to which this identity affects political attitudes related to this derogation are largely dependent upon Asian Americans' recognition of their own identity as racial minorities. Moreover, I provide a further exploration into the role of partisan cues in Asian Americans' responses to such political attacks against minority groups. I conduct an additional experiment where partisan cues associated with these attacks are manipulated across experimental treatments. I find that the tendency for Asian Americans to move closer to the Democratic Party and further from the Republican Party in responses to these political messages is largely impacted by the salience and unambiguity of partisan cues in the media environment conveying these messages. It appears the partisan movement that is occurring in response to these political messages is largely being driven by the activation of Asian Americans' own racial identification and the recognition of this identity as being part of a broader racial-minority identity. The *Racialized Partisan Identity* model presented here hopes to further illuminate the intersection between social and political identities and their combined role in the development and maintenance of minority coalitions in the United States, particularly among Asian Americans.

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INTRODUCTION

The 2012 presidential election was highly notable in that an incumbent president was re-elected amid a political atmosphere that centered mainly on negative economic conditions in the United States. However, an equal if not more notable takeaway from the recent presidential election is that the Democratic candidate received roughly 70 percent of the Asian-American vote. Taking advantage of this finding, political pundits have been quick to state the case for an increasingly cohesive Asian-American electorate that no longer places strong emphases on national distinctions differentiating Chinese from Japanese, for example, that have dominated past literature on Asian-American political orientations. These arguments have relied heavily on the observation that since the early 1990s, Asian Americans have been making up an increasing percentage of the Democratic vote-share in presidential elections.[1]

Even taking into account that such dynamic electoral trends have been largely heterogeneous across the population, Asian Americans on the whole have displayed an increasing tendency to support Democratic candidates over Republican candidates in national presidential elections over the past several decades. While such political behavior has been readily characterized as a form of political cohesion by pundits and journalists alike, others have argued that the psychological internalization of social group memberships is more of a key ingredient in cohesive and cooperative political action.[2] In this framework, an increasing

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[1] For an example, see "Asian Voters Send a Message to Republicans" appearing in a November 8th, 2012 opinion piece on *Bloomberg News*.
[2] Huddy (2003) conceptualizes group membership as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of political cohesion. In addition to a strong self-identification as a group member, there are numerous cognitive and motivational mechanisms that play a role in the manifestation of a group identity into expression of political

tendency to support Democratic candidates and oppose Republican candidates is largely being driven by a congruent tendency to identify with the Democratic Party and potentially de-identify with the Republican Party.

This strengthening of a Democratic partisan identity among Asian Americans then becomes the more relevant question. Previous scholars have often noted the distinction between voting for a particular party's candidate versus identifying as a member of that particular party. While the former often involves institutional and contextual factors related to the electoral rules of a particular competition, the latter serves as an expression of converging interests and shared goals. If Asian Americans are increasingly identifying with the Democratic Party, then it is most likely the case they perceive the Democratic Party and its members as being more aligned with their own political preferences. However, a more extreme extension of this argument is this partisan movement can also be a reactionary response against the Republican Party and its members which would be perceived as becoming increasingly distinct from Asian Americans' own political preferences.

A critical component in this discussion not yet mentioned is the general lack of political cooperation and cohesion which has been observed among the Asian-American population. Previous research has argued that this lack of cooperation/cohesion is rooted in an overall weak sense of commonality between members of the Asian-American community. Demographic factors including ethnicity, socio-economic status, and education (just to name a few) have been found to play a role in heterogeneous rates of political participation and endorsement of the idea that Asian Americans share a sense of linked fate with each other. If such perceptions of

cooperation. The current study emphasizes the activation of a superordinate identity that evokes both of these mechanisms to facilitate pan-ethnic partisan movement.

commonality are a necessary ingredient behind political cooperation/cohesion, then perhaps an increasing tendency toward identification with the Democratic Party among Asian Americans is being driven by an increasing recognition of this shared sense of commonality and/or identity.

In explaining how this sense of shared commonality is potentially activated, it is important to further explore the political environment in which generations of Asian immigrant groups and their children have become socialized into the American political system. A significant body of literature has been devoted to studying the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment among Republican candidates and elites. While such political messaging has served as a boon to increasing vote-share among White voters for Republican candidates across the country, it has also had the nearly opposite effect on decreasing Republican vote-share among non-White voters. As I discuss in a later section of this dissertation, research has shown that political messages which vilify illegal immigrants but also display an overall aversion to immigration in general among particular Republican candidates has resulted in a general decrease in favorability toward the Republican Party as a whole from Black and Latino voters. A less studied topic however is the effects of such political messages on partisan evaluations and preferences among Asian-American voters.

There is compelling evidence that lead to the belief that Asian Americans' responses to anti-immigrant political messages are similar to previously documented responses among Black and Latino voters, particularly when such messages infer a sense of shared commonality between these non-White groups. Noted work on this topic finds that Asian Americans often perceive their own racial identity as part of a broader social framework rooted in commonality with both Blacks and Latinos as racial *Others* in the United States. It is most likely the case that any activation of Asian Americans' own sense of racial commonality occurs through exposure to

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political messages that emphasize this broader social framework and Asian Americans' own latent identity as a racial *Other*. The current study proposes that exposure to anti-immigrant messages activates these racial evaluations among the Asian-American electorate which then significantly impact subsequent partisan-level evaluations including the strengthening of a Democratic partisan identity. As Asian Americans are socialized into the American political system via exposure to Republican-led attacks on Latino immigrant groups, they will perceive such attacks as threats to their own latent identity as racial minorities and will respond by moving closer to the Democratic Party and further from the Republican Party. In order to empirically test the validity of these claims, I develop a theoretical and empirical framework that conceptualizes intergroup political cooperation/cohesion as expressions of both racial and political shared group identities: a model of a *Racialized Partisan Identification*.

Dissertation Outline

In the following chapter I provide a detailed look at the Asian American population including complete demographic profiles by national origin based on the most recent data from the United States Census. Additionally I take a closer look at dynamic trends in partisanship among Asian-American respondents in the American National Election Studies across the past three decades in order to validate the initial claim of increased Democratic identification among Asian-American voters which serves as the contextual setting for the Racialized Partisan Identification (RPI) model.

Following this, I present results from the Asian American Identity Survey which includes survey responses from several internet samples of Asian Americans. In this study, I construct and

test a multi-item scale related to a psychological internalization of both a racial identity and a super-ordinate racial-minority identity; I also develop and test several measures regarding a broad racial-social hierarchy in the United States involving perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities as well as perceptions of separation between Asians and the racial majority group (Whites). In exploring the dynamic relationships between these constructs, an outline for the hypotheses driving the theoretical framework for the Racialized Partisan Identity model is laid out which are then tested using results from a survey experiment that was conducted as part of the Asian American Identity Survey. Using an experimental treatment adopted from real-world messages in the news media, I show how exposure to political derogation of both illegal and legal immigrant groups in the United States activates Asian Americans' perceptions regarding this broad hierarchy which then impacts how they define their own racial identity and a subsequent racial-minority superordinate identity.

Moreover, I provide a further exploration into the role of partisan cues in Asian-Americans' responses to such political attacks against minority groups. I conduct an additional experiment where both the salience and clarity of partisan cues attached to these political attacks vary across experimental treatments. I find that the tendency for Asian-Americans to move closer to the Democratic Party and further from the Republican Party in response to these political messages is largely impacted by highly salient and unambiguous partisan cues in the media environment in which such messages are conveyed. I also find evidence that the manipulation of partisan cues in the experiment had significant effects on several key affective evaluations related to party attachment. In the conclusion of this manuscript, I discuss possible further tests of this 'racialized partisan identity' and potential implications of this theoretical framework on future race relations in the United States.

CHAPTER ONE:

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ASIAN AMERICAN POPULATION

Who are the Asian-Americans?

The United States government has most recently defined an individual as being Asian if he/she reports having an origin in either the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the subcontinent of India. According to the recent 2010 United States Census, Asians living in the United States made up 5.6 percent (17.3 million) of the total national population and were the fastest growing racial group in the United States between 2000 and 2010. In looking at the national origins of the population of Asian immigrants, the following six ethnicities make up the large majority of the Asian population residing in the United States: Chinese (23 percent), Filipino (20 percent), Indian (18 percent), Vietnamese (10 percent), Korean (10 percent) and Japanese (8 percent).

While Asian Americans are technically viewed as racial minorities in the United States, early research dating back to the late 1980s finds that Asian Americans are less likely to converge along shared political preferences between national origin groups compared with other racial minority groups such as African and Latino Americans (Cain et al. 1991). While research on Latino public opinion (for example) finds evidence of perceptions of commonality and political cooperation between different ethnic groups including Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and El Salvadorians, this same political behavior is not as readily observed among Korean or Chinese or Japanese groups that make up the Asian American population. One area in which this heterogeneous political behavior has been frequently observed is in the adoption and expression of a shared partisanship. Cain and his colleagues found in a survey of Asian-American identifiers

that the extent to which respondents were more likely to adopt a partisan identity as they became more socialized and assimilated into American society differed greatly based on their national origins. While those who identified as being either from China or Southeast Asia reported a stronger identification with the Republican Party, the same patterns were not observed for respondents from other countries. These results provide early evidence that heterogeneous political behavior across the Asian-American population is often driven by sharp differences in policy concerns, in this case the concern over the United States response to Communist governments in Central and Southeast Asia during the 1980s.

Evolving policy concerns linked to diminishing Communist threats in Asian countries have resulted in a decreased emphasis on partisan links to U.S. foreign policy across the Asian American community as a whole.[3] However, follow-up studies of Asian-American political behavior find Asian Americans are still far less homogenous than other racial groups and warn against studies that aggregate this population without taking into consideration relevant and salient ethnic-based cleavages rooted less in U.S. historical interventions in Asian countries and more in heterogeneous experiences of socialization and assimilation among immigrant groups and their subsequent generations (Tam 1995; Hajnal and Lee 2006).

In a recent study of Asian-American political behavior, Janelle Wong and her colleagues (2011) analyzed national exit poll data from 1992 to 2008 and found while such cleavages still exist, the Asian American population as a whole has provided an increasingly growing percentage of vote-share for Democratic candidates in presidential elections. They observed that the upward trajectory in Democratic vote-share for Asian Americans was more pronounced than

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[3] Though as future discussion will highlight there are still specific subgroups of Asian immigrants who maintain the salience of the threat of Communist governments in their policy concerns, particularly Vietnamese and Chinese groups.

for any other group with Whites, Blacks, and Latinos maintaining relatively stable levels of Democratic vote share over time (40 percent, 80 percent, and 60 percent, respectively) though Latinos have shown a greater increase since 2004. These findings along with national exit poll data from the recent 2012 presidential election showing a roughly 70 percent Democratic vote-share among Asian Americans (a percentage roughly equivalent to the Latino vote share in 2012) provide strong evidence that Asian Americans have been displaying an increased political cooperation through their shared electoral support for Democratic candidates over the past two decades.

This overall convergence in electoral behavior is particularly notable given previous findings concerning the significant differences in the demographic characteristics between the numerous subgroups that make up the Asian-American population. Data collected from the 2010 American Community Survey and aggregated by the Pew Research Center confirms Asian Americans differ significantly on several key demographic factors related to their socialization and assimilation into American society. Table 1.1 lists the demographic data for the six largest Asian origin groups according to the United States Census. Asian Indians and Vietnamese groups make up the largest percentage of foreign-born immigrants across the Asian American population while Japanese make up the smallest percentage. This is hardly surprising given historical trends of immigration and the more recent surge among Vietnamese and Indian immigrant groups. Among Asian immigrants, Vietnamese groups seem to have the highest rates of assimilation through obtaining legal status as American citizens. The data indicates that Asian Indians display the lowest rates of assimilation as just a little over 50 percent of Asian Indian immigrants reported being legal American citizens. However, Asian Indians display the highest level of median household income as well as the highest level of formal education indicated by a

TABLE 1.1. Demographics of the Asian American Population

Ethnicity	Immigrant	Citizen	Age	HHI	College Graduate
Chinese	76 %	69 %	43	$65 K	51 %
Filipino	69 %	77 %	43	$75 K	47 %
Indian	87 %	56 %	37	$88 K	70 %
Vietnamese	84 %	80 %	41	$53 K	26 %
Korean	78 %	67 %	40	$50 K	53 %
Japanese	32 %	79 %	47	$65 K	46 %

Table entries are percentages, median age, and median household incomes. Data was taken from the 2010 American Community Survey on a randomly sampled population of Asian identifying households. Further demographic details on other Asian origin groups are available at the website http://www.pewsocialtrends.org.

college degree. As a contrast Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese groups report significantly lower levels of household income and education. Given these significant differences between members of the Asian-American population, any observations of political cooperation merit further exploration.

As noted previously the extent to which electoral trends are indicative of an increase in political cohesion rooted in shared group identity is heavily dependent upon the observance of congruent shifts in the adoption and strengthening of a Democratic identity among Asian Americans. In addition, Fiorina (2005) notes the need to distinguish between vote choice and partisan identification, with the former often being based largely on election-specific contextual factors. Instead of looking at increases in the percentage of Asian Americans making up the Democratic vote-share in presidential elections, it is more important to examine if there has been an increase in the percentage of Asian Americans who identify with the Democratic Party over time, especially when considering previous findings regarding the stability of partisan identity and its near ubiquitous effects on political behavior in general (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002).

In order to address this, partisan identification among Asian Americans was explored using the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Time-Series Dataset. Figure 1.1 has a graph of the percentage of Asian-American respondents who identified as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent in the American National Election Studies from the years 1990 to 2008. In 1992, only 17 percent of respondents who identified as Asian in the ANES reported being a Democrat. Over the next 12 years, that percentage has increased steadily, reaching a high of 63 percent in 2008. In addition, the percentage of Republican identifiers among Asian respondents in the ANES has gradually decreased over time going from 69 percent in 1992 to 23 percent in 2008. Looking at the rough percentages from Figure 1.1 supports the claim that Asian-Americans have become more Democratic since 1990.[4]

A focus on shared partisanship as a key indicator of political cohesion is particularly important because previous studies regarding the political behavior of minority voters in the United States have conceptualized partisan identification as a key indicator of exposure to the American political system. Echoing these early studies of partisan identification as an acquisition through socialization during one's life-cycle (Converse 1969; Niemi and Jennings 1991), research on partisan trends among Asian Americans have found that factors such as one's age or the amount of time spent living in the United States (for immigrants) are significant predictors of both voter registration as well as identification with a political party (Lien 1994; Cho 1999; Ong and Nakanishi 1996). More recently, Wong (2000) finds that other factors related to political exposure are significantly related to the acquisition of a partisan identity. Wong's analyses also

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[4] The small number of Asian-American respondents in the ANES datasets between 1990 and 2008 do create issues regarding the validity of this claim. However, sampling techniques conducted by the ANES have remained relatively consistent between datasets which leads to the conclusion that the data representing Asian-American political behavior throughout the ANES Time Series is representative of actual political attitudes by the Asian-American electorate during this time period. In addition, there are few other reliable data sources besides the ANES in which to adequately explore longitudinal shifts in Asian-American political behavior over the past two decades.

FIGURE 1.1.

Asian-American Partisan Identification from 1990-2008

Source: ANES Cumulative Time-Series Dataset.

reinforce earlier findings regarding those groups of immigrants with little to no exposure to the

American political system who as a result often retain strong and enduring political attachments

to their original political systems (Merelman 1986). However, more recent studies have found

such pre-migration attachments among immigrants to be highly adaptable to the American

political system when there is sufficient exposure to the institutions of American government

(White et al. 2008).

While these studies have focused mainly on the acquisition of a partisan identification

among Asian Americans, it is fair to claim that less scholarly attention has been paid to exploring

with *which* political party they identify. Substantive evidence has been raised that supports

economic-voting theories of partisan identification among American voters in which wealthier

voters typically align with the Republican Party (Carmines and Stanley 1992; Bafumi and

Shapiro 2009). However, studies focusing solely on the partisanship of immigrant and minority

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voters (more specifically, Latino immigrant voters) have found socio-political factors to play a more dominant role. Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) find that policy preferences involving key ethnic group issues such as immigration reform and affirmative action are better predictors of partisanship among Latino immigrants than their own economic circumstances. Alvarez and Bedolla emphasize key differences based on ethnicity in these issue preferences that play a strong role in partisan heterogeneity across Latino immigrant voters. Hajnal and Lee (2006) make the case that such ethnic-based cleavages combined with differences in immigrants' political adaptation experiences have been wholly under-emphasized as a basis for partisanship among Asian Americans in past research.

In a partial response to this, Janelle Wong and her colleagues (including Lee) analyzed responses from the 2008 National Asian-American Political Survey (NAAPS) and found strong evidence of ethnic-based cleavages in partisan identification among Asian (mostly immigrant) voters (Wong et al. 2011). Similar to Cuban immigrants' tendency to identify with the Republican Party in American politics due to the association with anti-Communism, Wong et al. note a strong tendency to identify with the Republican Party among Vietnamese immigrants which they attribute to similar anti-Communism associations and failed Democratic anti-Communism military actions. In addition, Wong et al. find evidence of an ideological bias behind partisan identification among Asian-Americans, though they note asymmetry in their findings. While nearly 50 percent of liberal-identifiers in the NAAPS also identified as Democrats, roughly only 30 percent of conservative-identifiers identified as Republicans.

Regarding the previously established effect of socialization/assimilation on partisan identification among Latino immigrant voters[5], Wong et al.'s analysis of the 2008 NAAPS makes a strong case that partisan identification among Asian immigrants and their subsequent generations needs to be examined through a different lens. Neither time spent living in the United States nor higher levels of educational achievement produced an increase in partisan identification among Asian voters who had been living in the country for more than a decade. While these factors play a role in determining both the adoption of a party as well as identification with a particular party (Democratic) among Latino immigrants, they fail to predict the latter among Asian immigrants. However, such factors are significant predictors of political participation in general among Asian immigrants. Wong et al. find that these factors along with variables such as English-language proficiency play a significant role in determining the extent to which Asian immigrants become involved in politics. If partisan identification is broadly conceptualized as an extension of one's overall involvement in the American political system, those factors that are driving such political involvement may also predict the specific political party with which one chooses to identify.[6]

However, more important but not unrelated to heterogeneous rates of socialization and assimilation in predicting political behavior among Asian Americans are those evaluations related to a social-racial hierarchy. According to previous work in racial politics, mainstream American society has facilitated a triangulation of Asian Americans' racial identity as a

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[5] As was mentioned previously, socialization factors such as time spent in the United States and educational achievement have been found to be significant predictors of partisan identification among Latino immigrants. However, this does not imply that racialization is a non-factor in the partisan identification of these groups. Instead, the evidence of a racialization explanation of political participation offered by Wong and her colleagues hints at the potential link between racialization and socialization when a particular group is uniformly racialized in a society, such as Latino immigrant groups in the United States.

[6] Hajnal and Lee (2006) note the distinction between choosing to identify with any party versus choosing to identify with a particular party, which they are argue is a highly relevant distinction when studying minority public opinion.

triangulation between Whites and other racial minority groups dating back to their early immigration to the United States in the 19th century (Kim 1999; Kim 2001; Kim and Lee 2001). Kim has conceptualized this racial positioning as an intentional hierarchy aimed at forcing Asians and Blacks to choose sides against each other in order to further the retrenchment of the latter group's subjugated status in American society via the endorsement of the 'model minority' stereotype commonly attributed to the former (Hurgh and Kim 1989). However, this hierarchy also implies a shared commonality between Asians and Blacks and Latinos as all three occupy a broader identity as *racial minorities* compared with Whites, who serve as the racial majority group in the United States. These group-based evaluations have been found to play a key role in 'racialized' explanations of political participation observed by Wong and her colleagues (2011) in predicting political activity among Asian Americans. Moreover, Hajnal and Lee (2006) make a compelling case for an increased emphasis on race and ethnic-based evaluations when looking specifically at partisan identification among Asian Americans. This includes perceptions of commonality/distance between members of their own racial group through the adoption and endorsement of a shared racial identity.

Racial Identity and Political Cohesion

Scholars who have studied the social and political behavior of racial-minority groups in the United States have often focused their attention on the conditions under which cooperation and cohesion occurs within each group. Research on intragroup solidarity within the African-American population (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1993; Gay 2001) as well as the Latino-American population (Garcia 2000; Lopez and Espiritu 1990) has emphasized the critical role of

a shared racial identity in the development and maintenance of viable and enduring political coalitions that have significantly impacted public policy in the United States. This has included but has not been limited to political mobilization toward the issues of racial segregation and immigration reform.

However, recent discussions have provided compelling reason to be hesitant in applying such traditional racial-identity frameworks to members of the different ethnic groups that make up the Asian-American population. Lee (2007) argues that strong between-group differences among various Asian ethnic groups facilitate a process of socialization that less clearly links racial/ethnic identity to political cohesion compared with what has been observed among Blacks and to a lesser extent Latinos.[7] Intragroup cultural differences involving nationality, language, and religion (just to name a few) make traditional theories involving racial group identity and political action difficult to apply to a diverse Asian-American community. In addition, sharp divergences in assimilation experiences among immigrant groups in particular often make a perceived commonality more difficult to grasp as a concept for this subgroup of Asian Americans and any researchers interested in studying their behavior.

The lack of a strong Asian identity is apparent in data from a recent nationally-representative survey of Asian-American households conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2012. Among the total number of respondents in the survey only 19 percent primarily identified themselves as either Asian or Asian American. When looking at differences between those

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[7] By ethnic identity, I am referring to one's national origin and/or ancestral lineage. Wong et al. (2011) note that national origin is closely tied to the concept of an ethnicity, as was discussed by Phinney (1996) who conceptualized an ethnic identity as being rooted in both race and a culture of origin. However, it should not be forgotten that the concept of a national origin has several limitations. Espiritu and Omi (2000) argue that self-labels of national origin often have different meanings among different individuals. Moreover, multi-ethnic populations do create a potential complication, particularly when dealing with self-report measures included in survey data. However, when exploring an ethnic identity, more important than the culture in which an individual's identity is constructed is that individual's *perception* of his/her cultural identity.

originally born in the United States and those born outside of the United States, there are slight differences. Among US-born respondents 22 percent primarily identified themselves as either Asian or Asian American but among immigrant respondents only 18 percent identified themselves as such. It is clear the current Asian-American population is not readily recognizing a racial identity as their primary identity. Table 1.2 lists the percentage of respondents who either primarily identified themselves with a racial identity or an ethnic identity based on their nation of origin. It seems that there is a strong tendency for Asian Americans to identify themselves based on their nation of origin over their race across the full sample of respondents. However, there also does appear to be heterogeneity in this tendency across different Asian ethnic groups. Chinese respondents were most likely to identify themselves as either Asian or Asian American (27 percent) while Filipino respondents were least likely to do so (10 percent). Vietnamese and Korean respondents identified themselves based on their ethnic identity more frequently than any other ethnic groups included in the survey sample (75 and 74 percent, respectively); Chinese and Japanese respondents identified themselves based on their ethnic identity least frequently (60 percent for both).

There is strong evidence that the general absence of a racial identity among the current Asian-American population is not a recent phenomenon. Early survey evidence from the 2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) indicated that merely 15 percent of Asian American respondents listed a racial identity as their primary identity. Similar to respondents in the recent 2012 Pew survey, respondents in the 2001 PNAAPS were far more likely to identify themselves based on their national origin instead of their racial identity. Moreover, survey evidence from the 2008 National Asian American Political Survey (NAAPS) nearly a decade later mirror the 2001 PNAAPS findings indicating that only 20 percent of

TABLE 1.2. Primary Identification as a Racial Identity vs. Country of Origin

Ethnicity	% Asian / Asian American	% Country of origin
Chinese	27	60
Indian	20	61
Vietnamese	17	75
Japanese	16	60
Korean	14	74
Filipino	10	69

Table entries are percentages. Data was taken from the 2012 Pew Asian-American Survey. Percentage responses for "American", "Depends" and "Don't know/Refused" not included in table.

respondents in the NAAPS identified themselves as Asian or Asian-American whereas the vast majority again identified themselves based on their national origin.

Among those born outside the United States, the racial identity of *Asian* was relatively non-existent prior to immigrating to the U.S. (as is the case for non-Asian immigrants and racial labels of *Blacks* and *Hispanics*, just to name a few). In addition, there is a great diversity in Asian ethnic immigrants' experiences after coming to the United States. Differences across average levels of English-language proficiency, socio-economic status, and levels of education support the claim that not all Asian-American immigrants undergo the same experiences when first coming to the United States (Nakanishi 1991). Those who study Asian-American socio-political behavior frequently point to such factors as a primary explanation for the lack of a shared racial or pan-ethnic identity among Asian Americans, particularly immigrants.[8]

The lack of a strong racial identity across the Asian-American population is a particularly important issue as scholars have previously linked such identification to perceptions of closeness and commonality. An example of this is the link between a racial identity and feelings of group

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[8] For a more detailed breakdown of demographic differences between Asian-Americans of differing ethnicities, see Tam (1995).

consciousness. Previous analyses on the topic of group consciousness have pointed out the distinction between group identity and group consciousness (McClain et al. 2009). While the former involves the internalization of a social group membership, the latter often involves the politicization of the group identification which facilitates a convergence of shared group interests and subsequent collective actions. This perception of commonality and shared group interests has been most notably captured through survey questions asking members of a particular (racial) group the extent to which they perceive a sense of *linked fate* with their fellow group members.

Initially developed as a measure of Black group consciousness (Dawson 1994), questions related to linked fate have since been utilized to measure feelings of solidarity among members from a variety of groups, both racial and non-racial. In order to measure linked fate, respondents are asked "Do you think what happens generally to [BLANK] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" Asian-American respondents in the 2008 NAAPS given this same question in reference to "other Asians" were mostly divided on whether or not they felt a sense of linked fate with other members of their race. 44.8 percent of respondents indicated that they did perceive a linked fate but 45.4 percent of respondents indicated they did not. Moreover, among those respondents who did perceive a linked fate, only 20 percent perceived "a lot" of linked fate with the large majority (64 percent) perceiving only "some".

The general lack of linked fate felt among the Asian-American population for other members of their race is most likely closely related to the lack of recognition Asian Americans have for their own racial identity. Given the previously discussed link between a group identity and a group consciousness, it may be the case that Asian Americans who are primarily identifying themselves based on their nation of origin are instead expressing feelings of

commonality solely for those who share the same national origins. Surprisingly, this seems to be a premature and unsubstantiated claim. While a large portion of respondents in the 2008 NAAPS claim a lack of linked fate with other Asians, roughly the same percentage claim a lack of linked fate with members of their ethnic group.[9] It does not seem to be the case that a racial identity among Asian Americans needs to come at the expense of an ethnic identity. In addition, data from the 2008 NAAPS does provide some evidence of a racial solidarity among Asian Americans. Over 60 percent of respondents in the study agreed with the notion that Asian Americans share a *common culture* with each other. While perceptions of linked fate and political commonality are lacking among fellow Asian-Americans, a perceived cultural congruence is more readily acknowledged as an expression of racial group consciousness.

These combined results from the 2008 NAAPS should serve as an impetus to re-evaluate both the link between group identity and group consciousness, but also the ability for traditional measures of racial linked fate to capture a group consciousness among Asian Americans. Espiritu (1992) argues that a racial group consciousness is rooted in the belief that there exists a potential sense of solidarity between fellow racial members based on changing external structural conditions that facilitate the acceptance of a broader common identity among different Asian origin groups living together in the United States. This can be observed in prior research studies that have linked the issue of racial discrimination to a greater sense of racial group consciousness among Asian Americans. Masuoka (2006) analyzed data from the 2001 PNAAPS and found that previous experiences of racial discrimination as well as the recognition of racial discrimination as a major issue facing Asian Americans were both significant predictors of an increased sense

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[9] The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.66 with each variable coded on a 4-level ordinal scale. This provides compelling evidence that Asian-Americans who perceive a lack of linked fate with other Asians share the same perception regarding members of their own ethnic groups (and vice-versa).

of racial group consciousness.[10] Perhaps the high percentage of respondents in the 2008 NAAPS who recognized a common culture with other Asians in the United States is indicative of a shared racial group consciousness, particularly when linked to a sense of racial discrimination and/or oppression.

A racial group consciousness rooted in a shared cultural common-ground is highly impacted by fundamental structural and cultural changes in American society that result in highly salient external pressures previously linked to the adoption of a racial identity among Asian Americans (Lien 2001; Okamoto 2003). These external pressures can be most accurately characterized as shifts in the racial dynamics of American politics that more often than not results in political derogation (Lopez and Espiritu 1990). The most notable case of this occurring within the Asian-American community is also widely viewed as the most publicized instance of racial discrimination against the Asian-American community: the fatal beating of Chinese immigrant Vincent Chin.

In June of 1982 in the city of Detroit, Vincent Chin was attacked and killed by two individuals who had recently been laid off from the automobile industry. Witnesses alleged that the two attackers mistook Vincent Chin for someone of Japanese descent and blamed him for the loss of their jobs. Initially the two attackers were convicted under charges of manslaughter that were eventually plea-bargained down to second-degree murder. Their punishment was three

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[10] In her analyses, Masuoka (2006) operationalizes racial group consciousness as perceptions of linked fate between other Asian Americans. Such empirical treatment of group conscious has been critiqued by Lee (2007), who notes the need to separate the concept of group consciousness from kindred terms such as group interests, solidarity, and linked fate. Instead Lee maintains that group consciousness be measured using constructs involving the belief in shared interests, in-group favoritism, a sense of relative deprivation, and the systemic attribution of blame for unequal opportunities and outcomes. Though numerous studies involving Asian-American group consciousness have used the terms somewhat interchangeably (Lien 2001; Lien et al. 2004), especially when the availability of survey items has been limited in scope, the current study involves an original set of measures that will be discussed in the subsequent chapters of this manuscript.

years of probation and a $3,000 fine without a single day served in prison (the charges carried a maximum of 15 years). The presiding judge on the case was quoted as stating "These weren't the kind of men you send to jail… You don't make the punishment fit the crime; you make the punishment fit the criminal." (Zia 2001) The initial lenient verdict angered Asian Americans in the city of Detroit as well as around the entire country. In response Asian Americans staged public protests and demonstrations in order to seek justice for the brutal murder of one of their own. This event has been widely regarded as the first time Asian Americans of varying ethnic origin have come together politically under a perceived racial commonality but it also serves as a reminder that the recognition of a racial group consciousness can and does exist.[11]

The fallout from the Vincent Chin story paints a scenario of Asian Americans of varying descent coming together under a banner of a shared racial identity in response to the derogation of this identity. The notion that a racial identity is activated in the face of discrimination or 'racialization' has not been lost on scholars who have found evidence that perceptions of pan-ethnicity can play a role in perceptions of commonality with other racial groups in the United States as well. Significant observational and experimental evidence shows that Asian-Americans who have experienced discrimination on account of their race (or who are faced with racial discrimination against other Asians) are more likely to express feelings of empathy and even favorability toward other Asians (Masuoka 2006) as well as other racial-minority groups, including Blacks and Latinos (Wong et al. 2011). These studies have even raised the possibility that Asian-Americans faced with their own racial discrimination are likely to recognize a shared

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[11] Famed sociologist Frank H. Wu recently published an op-ed in the New York Times titled "Why Vincent Chin Matters" (6/22/12) where he talks about the historical significance of the event for the Asian-American community on the date that also marked its 30-year anniversary.

identity between themselves and other groups who typically face racial discrimination in the United States (Galanis and Jones 1986).

These findings reinforce earlier claims that Asian Americans are not only recognizing a racial identity, but that it is conceptualized as a single component of a broader racial hierarchy that has existed in the United States for over half a century (Park 2008; Kim 2003; Kim and Lee 2001). This hierarchy implies that Asian Americans are constructing their racial identity as a triangulation between the racial majority group (Whites) and other racial-minority groups (Blacks and Latinos). Park (2008) makes the argument that Asian Americans largely define their racial identity as a perceived *racialized otherness* rooted in the recognition of a commonality between Asians and other non-White racial groups in the United States. An extension of this social-racial hierarchy is that Asian Americans perceive a commonality or shared identity between themselves and these other groups who share the label "racial-minority". An additional extension of this hierarchy is that the adoption and reinforcement of this identity is subject to the same cognitive and motivational mechanisms that have previously been shown to be relevant in the construction and maintenance of more salient social identities. This includes reactionary political responses against any perceived threats to this identity.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE 'RACIALIZED PARTISAN IDENTTY' MODEL

The contention that Asian-Americans' political behavior is closely related to and impacted by dynamic shifts in racial and other social identities is not a completely novel claim. As discussed in the previous chapter, notable works have found compelling evidence that not only are Asian Americans' racial attitudes linked to partisan preferences, but that also Asian Americans are to some extent conceptualizing their own racial identity by their perceived proximity to other racial groups on a racial hierarchy in the United States. What the current study hopes to contribute is an examination of how these processes occur and the particular environmental cues that serve to facilitate such dynamic shifts in both social and political identities.

In the current chapter, a theoretical framework is presented for the "Racialized Partisan Identity" (RPI) that is hypothesized to occur among Asian Americans. This framework involves an in-depth discussion of the key underlying theories that serve as the foundation for the RPI model being currently proposed. This includes Social Identity Theory, in particular the construction of social identities among racial minority groups; and the Common In-Group Identity Model which details the role of superordinate identities in facilitating transitions from one salient identity to another. Included in these identities are a racial identity as Asian among Asian Americans, a broader racial-minority superordinate identity, and the extent to which each identity is embraced and expressed across the population. The chapter will conclude with a presentation and explanation of the "Racialized Partisan Identity" model where the individual hypotheses that are driving the current study will be explicated.

Group Identity and Racialized Threat

In the previous chapter, I discussed a relative asymmetry in the recognition of a racial identity and subsequent political cohesion among Asian Americans in comparison with other racial-minority groups in the United States. In discussing this potential disjointedness Lee (2007) emphasizes the need for researchers to better question the context in which racial identities are constructed. More specifically, he argues that both the construction of an identity and the subsequent translation of that identity into a shared group consciousness warrant a closer examination than previous scholarship has afforded. Such an examination is critically important to the theoretical framework being proposed in the current study and centers on the extent to which surrounding social and political environments make racial and other identities salient.

This has been most notably observed in studies exploring the existence of a Black racial consciousness. Analyses of public opinion data among African-American voters in the 1984 presidential election found that Black group consciousness played a large role in Black voters' support for Jesse Jackson in the Democratic primary election (Gurin et al. 1989). Follow-up work on this topic has found strong links between the strength of Blacks' racial identity and their subsequent political behavior and electoral preferences (Tate 1993). While these studies are just a small percentage of the volumes of research that have been done on the topic, they make a strong case for the symbolic (as well as realistic) group interests which African Americans have come to value as they are associated with their own racial identity.

The link between a group identity and a subsequent politicized group consciousness involves the internationalization of one's membership in a particular group and the reaction to

when that group is threatened. One key theory that dictates how individuals in a particular group behave in such contexts is known as Social Identity Theory (SIT) (1981). First developed by Henri Tajfel, SIT argues that there is a psychological component to membership in a particular group. As individuals internalize their group memberships, they come to derive their sense of self from their identities as members of these groups. As a result, individuals in these groups maintain a positive self-esteem when the group is viewed positively and endorsed as such by its members. Another key theory that is particularly relevant to the current discussion and is rooted heavily in SIT is known as Social Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner and Tajfel 1987). SCT argues that there are cognitive (in addition to motivational) implications to the internalization of a group identity. This includes evaluations related to fellow group members but more importantly those individuals who are deemed to be outside of the group. The integration of both SIT and SCT has allowed for a more in-depth exploration into racial and non-racial intergroup dynamics in the United States and abroad (Huddy 2001).

Treated as a form of social category membership, a social identity has been defined as a cognitive representation of a distinct social dispositional property (Oakes, Turner, and Haslam 1991). Rather than serving as a mere contextual influence on intergroup behavior, such social category memberships involve a social category attribution that is made toward a shared social identity. Early work on category salience (Bruner 1957) finds that group attributions are largely dependent upon the interaction between both the accessibility and the fit of a given category (or categories). Oakes and colleagues (1991) conceptualize the former as a 'readiness' toward activation, and perceive the latter as the extent to which a set of stored category specifications are firmly tied to reality. It has also been argued that category fit is best characterized by the 'comparative aspect' concerning perceived similarities and differences between group members

(Turner 1985). This characterization has its foundations in early work on categorization by Eleanor Rosch (1978) who first suggested that such perceptions of similarities and differences between categories is crucial to the formation and functioning of categories.

Much research has been done to look at how prior expectations, goals, and theories that drive social categorizations are derived from group memberships (Oakes et al. 1994; Oakes and Turner 1990; Turner and Giles 1981). Haslam et al. (1999) argue that how individuals form their categorizations (for example, either through race or any other physical/non-physical trait) is largely shaped by the surrounding societies' cultures and/or ideologies, and are often crystallized through political debate and conflict. These social categorizations then determine subsequent social group membership which becomes the primary identity through which individuals perceive both themselves and in a comparative aspect others (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987).

While social category membership best characterizes those cognitive representations that groups identify themselves with, the extent to which members of these groups perceive a sense of commonality with each other can be traced back to early studies on stereotype consensus and its effects on perceived group homogeneity (Katz and Braly 1933; Stangor and Lange 1993). Haslam et al. (1999) posit that stereotype consensus is most likely to occur when a given social identity becomes highly salient. This is done by enhancing the perceived group homogeneity while also generating expectations of agreement and confluence based on a shared highly salient social identity (Doosje et al. 1999; Oakes et al. 1995). In addition, such perceived congruence is most likely to occur when groups are judged in an intergroup rather than intragroup context (Haslam et al. 1996).

When discussing intragroup commonality and intergroup distinctions, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979) argues that cognitive representations alone cannot sufficiently explain the endorsement of fellow group members and the discrimination against members from other groups. Instead there is a motivational component rooted in human beings' need for a positive distinctiveness. This has been found in cases where group members exhibit the tendency to elevate the importance of particular group characteristics that serve as the barrier separating their own group from others (Mummendey and Schreiber 1984; Lalonde 1992). Similar studies have also found that group members will rate an undesirable group attribute more positively in order to elevate their group's status, particularly in cases where such status is originally below a desirable threshold (van Knippenberg and van Oers 1984).

Perhaps the most notable area where a motivational component to a group identity can be observed is in how members of the group respond when that particular group and group identity are threatened. Early work by Brewer (1979) argued that intergroup competition and a perceived threat from out-group members evoke a response of in-group favoritism. While there has not been a strong consensus that such threats are *necessary* conditions for in-group biases, scholars who study intergroup relations recognize the effects that perceived threats from out-group members have on heightening levels of in-group solidarity and expressions of a shared group identity (LeVine and Campbell 1972). While the existence of threats related to realistic group interests can undoubtedly evoke symbolic threats related to group identity (Bobo 1983; Bobo and Johnson 2000), perceptions of symbolic threats in the form of derogation and discrimination of a group identity have been found to be far more common in cases of in-group favorability, whether that group be related to one's gender (Grant and Brown 1995), race (Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002), or other characteristics (Rothgerber 1997; Jetten et al. 2001).

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Just as previous studies have found that group members respond to both realistic and symbolic threats to their group identity by exhibiting greater levels of in-group favorability, additional studies have noted that out-group hostility is also a common response in such threat-related contexts. Related to motivational components of group identification as outlined in SIT and cognitive/affective intergroup biases predicted by SCT, out-group hostility in the form of animosity and prejudice are utilized by group members seeking to maintain their positive social identity in the face of derogation and discrimination (Brown 1995). Chirot (2001) notes that these intergroup biases are particularly common in cases involving symbolic threats related to national and/or ethnic group identities.

A key aspect of the in-group favorability and out-group hostility observed in these studies in response to threats to a shared group identity is the impact of the strength of identification. Mullin and Hogg (1998) noted that the extent to which members of a particular group discriminate against those perceived as being outside of that group depends largely on how strongly those group members identified with their group. This has been observed in experimental settings involving resource allocation tasks (Perreault and Bourhis 1999) and in analyses of survey data among students enrolled in a particular university (Jackson and Smith 1999). Huddy (2001) makes the argument that this heterogeneity in group identification and its subsequent effects on intergroup behavior arises from feelings of closeness or separation from a group prototype. As such, any measures of group identity that allow solely for a dichotomous conceptualization of identity take for granted the complexity that often characterizes individuals' group identities. Instead Huddy makes the case for an increased emphasis on empirical measures that account for the psychological implications of the internalization of a group identity (Aron et al. 1992; Mael and Tetrick 1992).

Political science researchers have evolved in their adoption of more psychological-based

measures of group identification based on SIT and SCT. In the past, the American National

Election Studies included a question about group closeness which asked respondents to choose

from a list of groups with which they identified the one particular group to which they felt

closest. More recent surveys from the American Community Survey have improved on this

measure by asking respondents to choose from a list of groups with which they identify and then

to state their level of closeness with that (those) particular group(s) related to an ethnic and/or

racial identity. Also discussed in the last chapter was the use of survey questions related to linked

fate in order to measure perceptions of commonality between fellow group members. However,

the application of traditional measures of group commonality (including linked fate) to racial

identity has not been met without criticism. Particularly in cases where there are significant

intergroup differences based on national origin and/or other demographic cleavages, traditional

measures of group commonality threaten to overlook the multiple dimensions that often

characterize a racial identification. Hajnal and Lee (2006) make this argument for Hispanic

Americans but particularly emphasize its importance when looking at Asian Americans.

More recent trends among both social psychologists and political scientists involve the

use of multi-item questions to measure strength of group identification. Such measures recognize

and account for the multiple dimensions that are often relevant when studying the internalization

of a group identity. These include an interdependence of esteem with other group members,

public collective self-esteem, the importance of identity to one's self-image, and cohesion or

attraction to the group and its members (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992; Jackson and Smith 1999).

Mael and Tetrick (1992) incorporated these dimensions into their *Identification with a*

Psychological Group (IDPG) scale which consisted of a large number of survey items intended

to distinguish between group identification and group commitment. Originally developed within the field of organizational psychology, the IDPG scale has since been adopted and adapted by both political scientists and social psychologists to study the effects of heterogeneous political and social group identities (Greene 1999; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy et al. 2011; Sears et al. 2001).[12]

Another key aspect of the in-group favorability and out-group hostility observed in intergroup dynamics involves the boundaries which define a particular group and distinguish them from other groups. This implies that the extent to which individuals possess intergroup biases and the manifestation of these biases is based largely on how individuals define their group identity. Early work on racial identity found that a common barrier to racial group consciousness among African Americans was that many black Americans did not agree on the subjective meaning of a black identity (Martin 1991). This lack of consensus in defining a racial identity has also been observed among Asian Americans who have disagreed largely on the extent to which cultural diversity and a racialized otherness defines an Asian American identity (Park 2008). In looking at national identity, Citrin and his colleagues (1990; 2001) found Americans displayed both agreement and disagreement over the criteria through which individuals are defined as "true Americans" or not and that these evaluations played an integral role in shaping how these groups are treated in American society. These boundaries separating prototypical Americans from non-prototypical Americans included ascribed characteristics related to race and nativity, but also involved adherence to ideological beliefs and cultural norms. A less explored topic however involves the effects of such heterogeneity in subjective definitions

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[12] A more detailed description of the IDPG scale and its applications is provided in a later chapter.

of a social identity in cases of broader more diverse identities (Cohen 1986) particularly

considering the fluid nature that often characterizes the boundaries of a superordinate identity.

Superordinate Identities and Intergroup Cooperation

According to SIT, membership in a particular group involves a motivational component that

predicts in-group favoritism and out-group hostility in response to a perceived threat to that

group identity. Because we maintain our sense of self through our social identities, we maintain a

heightened level of vigilance against any salient threats to our identities. This motivational

component of group identity has been frequently referenced in studies of intergroup cooperation

involving the recognition of shared identities. However, it has become especially popular when

exploring the institutional and contextual bases for multi-ethnic and multi-racial social and

political coalitions facilitated by the adoption and internalization of superordinate identities

(Kaufmann 2003; McClain et al. 2006).

Arguably the most notable theory to come out of this literature is the Common In-Group

Identity Model (CIIM) which states that individuals within a particular group have the ability to

re-categorize their group at a higher level of inclusiveness resulting in increased cooperation

under this superordinate group identity (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000).

According to the CIIM, former out-group members who are now perceived as in-group members

are then afforded the same benefits of group membership as other group members. In addition,

identification with this latent group membership is still subject to forms of threat based on the

position which the group occupies on the social-political hierarchy as first outlined in Social

Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981).

Studies involving the activation of a superordinate identity have found that individuals can and do display high levels of in-group bias toward a shared common superordinate group membership. A study by Schmitt et al. (2003) involved survey data taken from a school that had its student-body made up of students from over 30 different countries. The results of the study were that those students who perceived greater levels of prejudice from the host university were more likely to identify positively with the other international students at the school. According to the CIIM, perceptions of prejudice resulted in the adoption of the superordinate 'international student' identity, which served as a principle mediator in the students' maintenance of their self-esteem. The CIIM has also been applied to intergroup attitudes involving Asian Americans. Craig and Richeson (2012) find that Asian Americans primed with racial discrimination against Asians are less likely to express negative attitudes against Blacks. Those Asian Americans who are reminded of their own racial victimization in American society are more likely to adopt a superordinate 'disadvantaged minority' identity (Galanis and Jones 1986) where perceptions of commonality serve as a mediator to positive evaluations directed at former out-group members.

The CIIM involves the re-categorization of a social identity under a higher level of inclusiveness and a subsequent increase in cooperation between in-group members under the superordinate identity. These predictions made in regard to intergroup behavior under the CIIM have been met with some criticism however. The most notable criticisms of the CIIM have come from Brewer (1996) who has maintained the argument that such group re-categorization as described by the CIIM fail to account for group members' need for distinctiveness/exclusiveness. She argues "only distinctive social categorizations, where in-group membership is secure and differentiation from outgroups is unambiguous, can achieve the necessary balance between opposing social motives and engage intense group loyalty and attachment." (297) At the risk of

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over-simplifying her theory of optimal distinctiveness (Brewer 1991), Brewer posits that identification with an in-group consists of a balance between a need to belong and a need for uniqueness. Because of this need for optimal distinctiveness, re-categorization of the in-group under a superordinate identity is not sufficient to maintain intergroup cooperation. Instead, an integrated perspective that involves a superordinate level of categorization which simultaneously allows each subordinate group to maintain a distinctive identity and function provides for a much preferred solution.

These types of intergroup dynamics are frequently studied by racial minority scholars who explore cooperation and conflict between the various racial groups residing in the United States. Previous criticisms of the CIIM's ability to maintain stable intergroup cooperation have failed to address the principle role of perceived threats within a social and/or political paradigm. Perhaps the extent to which minority coalitions formed through the CIIM are stable and enduring are rooted in the association between an external threat and the subsequent salience of a particular superordinate identity. These types of intergroup dynamics are frequently cited by racial minority scholars who explore cooperation and conflict between the various racial groups residing in the United States.

In looking at intergroup relations between non-White groups, much of the literature has focused on conflict/cooperation between Black and Latino groups (Kaufmann 2003; McClain et al. 2006). Much of these studies have explored the extent to which Blacks and Latinos compete with each other over housing, jobs, and political influence (Johnson and Oliver 1989; Gay 2006) and that such competition serves as the basis for hostility and antagonism between these groups. On the other hand, Wilson (2001) argues that Blacks and Latinos in the United States share similar economic interests to serve as sufficient incentive for collective action and political

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cooperation. This mantra of a shared identity has served as the slogan for numerous political campaigns that have aimed at building viable electoral coalitions based on the notion of a shared identity.[13] However, one of the largest obstacles for these campaigns has been the fact that many Latinos do not readily acknowledge a shared commonality with Blacks in the United States (McClain et al. 2006).

The framework of intergroup relations between non-White racial groups becomes even less clear when Asian Americans are included. The tendency toward conflict between Asian Americans and other non-White minority groups is a well-documented phenomenon. Case studies regarding the 1992 Los Angeles Race Riots (Baldassare 1994) as well as the 1990 Red Apple Boycott in Brooklyn, New York (Kim 2003) have attributed the creation and proliferation of the 'model minority' stereotype to increasing occurrences of racially motivated violence between Asians and other minority groups in the United States.[14] Kim (1999; 2003) argues that dating back to the 1800s the triangulation of an Asian American racial identity between that of Whites and Blacks has produced a long history of social closeness between Asians and Whites while producing even greater levels of social distance between Asians and Blacks.[15] This triangulation of Asian Americans' racial identity is rooted in the perception of their own placement in the American social hierarchy with Whites, Blacks, and to a lesser extent, Latinos. While this triangulation involves perceptions of Asian Americans as occupying a separate space

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[13] Arguably the most notable example of this was the National Rainbow Coalition formed by Jesse Jackson during his 1984 presidential bid. The term "rainbow" was intended to convey the campaign's intended outreach toward disadvantaged voters of multiple races and ethnicities.

[14] Junn (2007) provides a robust discussion of the historical context and political events which facilitated the popularization of the model minority stereotype.

[15] Kim (1999) notes that the triangulation of racial identity among Asian Americans facilitates a perceived closeness with Whites in American society, but that more often than not this perceived closeness is asymmetrical. Kim uses the term "civic ostracism" to denote Asian Americans' continued subjugated status in society through the internalization of the model minority stereotype that holds Asians up as the exemplary racial-minority group compared with Blacks (what Kim terms "relative valorization") while still bestowing upon them the enduring stigma of being an outsider compared with Whites.

in the social hierarchy from other non-White groups, it also involves the recognition that Asian-Americans, along with these other non-White groups, make up the minority in American society.

There is compelling evidence Asian Americans to some extent are defining their racial identity based on their placement on this hierarchy. Park (2008) conducted a series of interviews across the Asian-American population and found that in addition to a cultural diversity, a 'racialized otherness' more often than not characterized a definition of an Asian-American identity. This is referring to the extent that Asian Americans define their own racial identity based on a perceived proximity between Asians and other racial minority groups and the amount of perceived distance between these groups and Whites in the United States. A particular distinction of note here is this perception of a 'racialized otherness' is separate (though most likely not completely) from the recognition and internalization of a superordinate identity as a 'racial other'. It is most likely the case perceptions regarding a 'racialized otherness' come prior to the expression of a 'racial other' identity or any other related superordinate identity.

This mutual recognition of a shared minority-status between ethno-racial groups has been raised as a potential impetus for the development of minority coalitions in the United States (Garcia 2000; Kim and Lee 2001). A key component of these minority coalitions is a perceived political commonality where the socio-political events that affect one group in a coalition affect the other groups as well. Wong et al. (2011) find that previous experiences of racial discrimination among Asian-Americans are linked to greater perceived commonality with Latino groups. In addition to facilitating a feeling of linked fate with members of other Asian ethnic

groups, subjective experiences of race-based discrimination serve to bridge the gap that typically exists between Asian-Americans and Latinos on the perceived social hierarchy.[16]

The possibility of this dynamic relationship being a two-way street has received little attention in the field. While Asian Americans' perceptions of their own racial victimization facilitates the recognition of Latino groups having to face the same type of victimization, perhaps exposure to Latino racial victimization facilitates Asian Americans' mutual acknowledgement that their experiences as a racial minority in the United States are not limited solely to members of their own ethnic and/or racial group. Such a mutual recognition of a shared 'racial minority' identity has the potential to not only facilitate social and political cohesion between Asian Americans and Latinos, but also highlight perceptions of commonality between Asian Americans and other racial minority groups of varying ethnic descent.

The notion that discrimination against Asians in particular may not be a necessary component in the activation of a superordinate 'racial minority' identity among Asians is not a far-fetched claim given previous literature on the topic. Previous work on social identity threat hints that any stimuli involving the racialization of a particular minority group in a society may serve to prime previous instances of racial prejudice among Asian Americans (Steele et al. 2002). While this type of secondary activation of racial prejudice may not be potent enough to increase perceptions of commonality between Asians and Blacks among Asian Americans, it is likely to be able to bridge perceived cultural gaps between Asians and Latinos.[17] It was

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[16] It is important to note that self-report measures of racial and non-racial discrimination are highly subject constructs. Early studies by Ruggiero and Taylor (1997) provide strong evidence that often times the extent to which racial minorities overstate or understate experiences of racial discrimination are linked to latent socio-psychological predispositions.

[17] This assumption that the secondary activation of racial prejudice will increase perceptions of commonality between Asians and Latinos more so than between Asians and Blacks does not necessarily imply that there is no

mentioned previously that Asian Americans often perceive their own placement in American society as a triangulation between Whites and non-Whites (Kim 2003). Similar spatial models have offered the notion that cooperation between Asian Americans and Latinos is more likely than between Asian Americans and Blacks due to the closer proximity between the former on the social-racial hierarchy in American society (Kim and Lee 2001). A 'racial minority' superordinate identity among Asian-Americans is then possibly activated in the presence of a racialization of other non-White minority groups, specifically Latinos.

At this point in the discussion, we can now return to the primary question that is driving the current study: how is it that the acceptance of an Asian-American identity in the presence of racial discrimination against non-Asian minority groups such as Latinos results in an increased propensity among Asian Americans to identify with the Democratic Party? The answer to this question may lie in the activation of a superordinate identity among Asian Americans and subsequent reactions to perceived threats to this superordinate identity. Asian Americans who identify under a shared superordinate identity may be just as protective of this superordinate identity as of their ethnic and/or racial identity. It was noted earlier that individuals adopt a social identity through both cognitive and motivational processes (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Regarding the latter, such individuals possess a psychological motivation to maintain a positive sense of self which is largely derived from their membership in a particular group. These individuals, upon perceiving the derogation of other in-group members, will then respond with hostility toward those particular groups that are perceived as the source of the derogation. It may be the case that Asian Americans who are exposed to politicized attacks against Latinos by the Republican Party will respond with greater hostility toward the Republican Party. Though the

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effect on perceptions of commonality between Asians and Blacks. This claim, while not a central hypotheses in the current set of studies, will be tested using the current experimental designs.

politicized attacks make no explicit mention of Asian Americans, the perceived derogation of an activated superordinate identity may be sufficient to espouse a threat-related response among Asian Americans.

This answer would also involve the contextual cues that are available in the racial discrimination of these non-Asian minority groups. In this specific case, the presence of partisan cues would provide for a valid link between race-based politicized attacks on a targeted minority group and a particular partisan identification. Fortunately, media coverage of Republicans' frequent targeted attacks on Latino immigrants in the United States since the early 1990s serves as the requisite vehicle for such partisan cues. Perhaps Asian-Americans that are exposed to racial discrimination against Latinos define their own racial identity as a broader racial-minority in the United States. This activation of a 'racial minority' superordinate identity may then be causing an increased sensitivity to contextual cues in the race-based discrimination against Latinos. Relating this scenario to the partisan political environment since the early 1990s (but with an increased emphasis on events in the 21st century), such contextual cues are most likely partisan cues linking anti-immigrant messaging with the Republican Party and its political representatives. If this is the case, then the activation of a 'racial minority' superordinate identity among Asian-Americans under these conditions may be driving a *racialized partisan identification,* evidenced by both a greater identification with the Democratic Party and greater alienation from the Republican Party.

The 'Racialized Partisan Identity' Model

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The process through which exposure to politicized partisan attacks on Latino immigrant groups results in increased identification with the Democratic Party among Asian-Americans is hypothesized to occur through the *Racialized Partisan Identity* model depicted in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 outlines the hypothesized relationships that contribute to the formation of a partisan identity rooted in the recognition of a shared identity with other racial minorities among Asians, starting with exposure to political derogation against this super-ordinate identity. The first stage involves the racialization of Latino immigrant groups by the Republican Party and involves either media news coverage and/or campaign advertisements that include Republican partisan rhetoric regarding the issue of immigration reform in the United States. Previous studies have established how news coverage is framed plus the issues it chooses to cover have profound implications on an audiences' political decision-making (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Chong and Druckman 2007). In addition, numerous works have been done that highlight both the conscious and subconscious effects of political advertising on individual-level attitudes toward a variety of socio-political attitudes (Brader 2006; Cohen and Davis 1991).

What is of particular importance in this first stage involving racialization of non-White groups in the United States is the extent to which such racialization makes particular aspects of a superordinate group identity highly salient. The RPI model contends that politicized attacks on Latino immigrant groups which increase the salience of those particular traits that characterize Latinos as a racial minority in the country will result in a greater emphasis among Asian Americans being placed on those race-based traits that are shared with these Latino groups. This should result in a heightened perception of commonality shared between Asians and other racial minority groups in general.

FIGURE 2.1. The Racialized Partisan Identity Model

Solid arrows indicate hypothesized indirect mediated effects; Dotted arrows indicate direct unmediated effects.

The second stage depicted in Figure 2.1 is the hypothesized link between perceptions of commonality between Asians and Latinos and its effect on the relationship between a racial identity and a broader racial-minority identity. The increased impact of perceived race-based traits that characterize both Blacks and Latinos and Asian-Americans as minority groups on Asian Americans' definition of their own racial identity should result in the activation of a racialized Asian-American identity defined by a perceived commonality between Asians and other racial-minority groups. The activation of a racialized identity should also facilitate the

activation of a latent racial-minority superordinate identity. It was mentioned previously that contextual group-based cues in socio-political communications have the effect of increasing the 'readiness' of stored category specifications that create an emphasis on perceived intragroup similarities and intergroup differences. In the presence of an external threat a re-categorization can occur where perceptions of in-group identification shift to a superordinate identity based on the CIIM (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). When those group-based cues are linked with the external threat, the subsequent superordinate identity will be strengthened by an increased perceived homogeneity regarding the re-categorized in-group, an increased psychological attachment to the in-group, and an increased level of hostility directed at the source of the threat.

Finally, the third and last stage depicted in Figure 2.1 is the overall effect of the superordinate identity on levels of partisan identification among Asian-Americans. Because the racialization of Latino immigrant groups is driven by a partisan-based threat attributed to the Republican Party, such group-based cues that serve to re-categorize Latinos and Asian-Americans into the same in-group will also create a shared out-group between Latinos and Asian-Americans in the form of a Republican identity. Hostility against this perceived out-group will manifest itself through both an increased hostility toward Republican symbols and an increased favorability toward Democratic symbols. The extent to which Asian-Americans identify with this superordinate 'bridging' identity should largely determine the difference in strength of Democratic identification versus Republican identification.

According to the Figure 2.1, the RPI model can be broken down into multiple testable hypotheses concerning dynamic relationships related to a perceived social-racial hierarchy in the United States among Asian Americans and the subsequent effects on political behavior. The first

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of these hypotheses concerns the effect of exposure to derogation on the activation of a perceived

social-racial hierarchy among Asian Americans:

H1) Subjects randomly exposed to a political derogation against Latino immigrants and racial minorities in general will report a heightened level of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities.

H1.1) Subjects randomly exposed to the political derogation will also report a decreased level of perceived commonality between Asians and Whites.

H1 argues that exposure to the political derogation against racial minorities will activate an

increased recognition of a broader racial hierarchy that implies a shared commonality between

Asians and both Blacks and Latinos, while H1.1 argues that an additional implication of this

hierarchy is a lack of shared commonality between Asians and Whites.

The next part of the above framework concerns the subsequent effects of a recognized

racial hierarchy on Asians Americans' expressions of their own racial identity:

H2) Increasing perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities will result in a positive increase in Asian-American identity.

H2.1) Decreasing perceptions of commonality between Asians and Whites will result in a positive increase in Asian-American identity.

H3) The effect of exposure to derogation on a subsequent increase in Asian-American identity will be mediated by perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities.

H2 and H2.1 make the case for the racialization of an Asian-American identity, where Asian

Americans are defining their racial identity through a shared commonality with other racial-

minority groups and a distinction from the racial majority group. H3 makes the case for the

activation of a racialized Asian American identity as a result of exposure to political derogation

against racial minorities.

The next part of the above framework involves the activation of a superordinate racial-minority identity:

H4) A heightened level of racialized Asian American identity will have a positive effect on expressions of a broader racial-minority identity.

H4 argues that there exists the potential for a racial identity to activate a broader racial-minority identity among Asian Americans, particularly in cases where the racial identity is defined by the recognition of a broader social-racial hierarchy. However, the model makes no stated predictions regarding an additional direct effect between perceptions of commonality between Asians and racial minorities and the internalization of a superordinate racial-minority identity (denoted by the dashed arrow in the above model).

The final stage of the RPI model involves the effect of a superordinate racial-minority identity on subsequent levels of partisan identity:

H5) Increasing levels of a racial-minority identity will produce a stronger identification with the Democratic Party.

H6) The effect of derogation on party identification will be dependent upon the explicit association of partisan cues.

Though the current experimental design does not account for the role of partisan cues in the RPI model, it is still worth testing the effects of non-partisan derogation on partisan evaluations among Asian Americans. H5 makes the prediction that observed differences in partisan identity between those exposed to the derogation and those not exposed will largely be the product of an activated racial-minority identity; H6 makes the additional claim that the activation of a racialized partisan identity as proposed by the model will be largely dependent upon explicit partisan cues associated with the derogation. The current model does not make any specific

claims regarding the direct effect of racial identity on levels of partisan identity (as denoted by the dashed arrows in the above model).

Provided in the next chapter is an analyses of survey data from the 2008 National Asian American Political Survey in order to provide preliminary tests for the above hypotheses. In these analyses, regression models predicting levels of partisan identity are conducted that test the effects of intergroup attitudes and compare them with alternate explanations for why Asian Americans are increasingly identifying with the Democratic Party. Following theses analyses, the more narrow set of hypotheses related to the specific causal pathways involved in the activation and expression of a racialized partisan identity are tested using a survey experiment was conducted that involved randomized exposure to political derogation against racial minorities which also included a series of novel empirical measures related to the psychological implications of an internalized group identity and evaluations concerning a broad social-racial hierarchy in the United States to provide a more appropriate test of the theoretical framework driving the current study.

CHAPTER 3:

PREDICTING PARTISAN IDENTITY IN THE 2008 NAAPS

In testing the main hypotheses of the RPI model, the current study continues from where previous analyses of partisanship among Asian Americans have left off by further exploring the role intergroup and intragroup attitudes play in shaping Asian-American political behavior. Using a nationally representative sample of Asian Americans the RPI model is roughly tested against alternative explanations of partisan identity including assimilation and socialization factors, economic self-interest, ideological preferences, and cultural factors related to religion and region. The word "roughly" is used due to the fact that a more thorough and valid test of the RPI model requires an exploration into the causal effects of exposure to political derogation against racial minorities on the activation of a racialized partisan identity. In addition, such a test most likely also requires the generation of novel data with empirical measures designed specifically to account for the psychological components to a shared group identity as discussed in the previous chapter. This will be provided in the later chapters.

However, the current chapter provides for a test of several key aspects to the RPI model involving the effect of intergroup commonality between Asians and other racial minority groups on the propensity to identify with a particular party and its effect on the subsequent strength of that identification. The current chapter also provides for a test of the extent to which Asian Americans are defining their racial identity as part of a broader social-racial hierarchy which provides the basis for the racialized identity driving the proposed RPI model. Lastly, the current

chapter looks at the notion that Asian Americans possess a tendency to perceive other racial groups under a superordinate racial-minority identity that has a greater combined impact on subsequent political attitudes than as individual intergroup components.

METHODOLOGY

Data for the current analyses was taken from the 2008 National Asian American Political Survey (NAAPS) which provided a nationally representative sample of 5,159 Asian American respondents. Prior to the analyses, all non-citizen respondents were removed from the sample (roughly 24 percent) leaving a sample of 3,898 respondents who identified themselves as citizens of the United States who were over the age of 18 years old. Roughly 87 percent of the sample reported being born outside of the United States. Full details on the ethnic composition of the sample are provided in the Appendix.

The key dependent variable of interest is individual-level partisan identification which is measured on a 7-point ordinal scale including Independents. It was discussed previously how early studies of Asian-American political behavior observed a distinction between partisan non-identifiers and non-partisan identifiers, with the latter reflecting a lack of familiarity with the American political party system in general. While only a sizable percentage of respondents in the 2008 NAAPS citizens-only sample identified as partisan *non-identifiers*, otherwise known as Independents (~20 percent), a roughly equivalent portion of respondents reported being *non-partisan* identifiers, indicating there is a considerable portion of Asian-American citizens who fail to conform to the American political party system which is congruent with findings from previous studies. In order to account for these respondents, additional models were conducted in

order to predict identification with a particular party versus non-identification in addition to the 7-point scaled partisan identification measure.

The functional form of the model assumed a continuous dependent variable (ordinary least squares regression) which is consistent with previous empirical treatment of the 7-level partisan identity scale (Franklin 1984; Goren 2005). However, it must be noted that previous analyses of partisanship among Asian-Americans have deviated from the traditional conceptualization of partisan identity. Hajnal and Lee (2006) argue that traditional theories of partisanship that utilize the 7-level ordinal measure are more applicable to non-minority White voters and less applicable to Latino and Asian voters. To account for this, they use a multi-nomial logit regression model that treats the 7-level ordinal measure as a 3-item categorical measure in order to capture the effect of their key predictor variables on each pairwise combination among the three primary party identification categories (Democrat, Republican, and Independent). While it is difficult to fully justify such a conceptualization of partisan identification for Asian-American voters based on the limited empirical research on the topic, it does provide a potentially valuable robustness check regarding the effect of intergroup attitudes between Asian Americans and other racial groups on their partisan identity. In addition, a categorical treatment of the dependent variable using multinomial logit regression allows for pairwise comparisons between partisan non-identifiers and non-partisan identifiers and the effect of intergroup attitudes on this dichotomy.

As an additional robustness check, the 7-level party identification scale was also folded (with Independents excluded) in order to construct two separate measures of party identification *strength* for Democrat and Republican identifiers. Previous studies by Huddy and colleagues (2011; 2015) treat partisan identity and partisan strength as two separate measures. In order to

account for this, the full 7-level party identification scale was replaced with separate 3-level party identification strength ordinal measures. In addition to accounting for the distinction that exists between partisan identity and partisan strength, such a robustness check also allows for heterogeneous effects of the key predictor variables on partisan strength across Democrat and Republican identifiers.

The key predictors of interest are perceptions of commonality between Asian-Americans and other racial groups in the United States. In order to measure this, the 2008 NAAPS utilizes a traditional measure of *linked fate* where respondents are asked "Do you think what happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what happens in your life?" and are given the initial options "Yes" and "No". For those respondents who indicated "Yes", they were then asked the follow-up question of whether they felt that it affects them "A lot", "Some", or "A little". As such, the variable measuring linked fate between Asians is treated as ordinal.

The current study is also interested in exploring the effects of intergroup attitudes toward non-Asians on partisan identity among Asian-Americans. Similar to the linked fate measure with other Asians, respondents in the 2008 NAAPS were also asked about their feelings of commonality between Asians and other racial groups including Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. Each commonality measure is coded on a 4-level ordinal scale with responses ranging from "none" to "a lot". Perceived commonality with Blacks and Hispanics exhibited a high level of correlation with each other ($\rho = .64$) so responses to these two items were combined to create a single index of commonality with other racial minorities. In addition to testing the effects of the individual commonality measures on partisan identity among Asian Americans, the current study also seeks to test the effects of the aggregate racial-minority index on partisanship.

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In looking at partisan identity among Asian-Americans, several alternate explanations need to be considered in addition to intergroup attitudes. One alternate explanation that needs to be considered is the role of economic preferences and ideological beliefs. As discussed previously, voters often identify with the Democratic or Republican Party based largely on their economic preferences, with socio-economic status often being a significant predictor of partisan identification. In order to operationalize socio-economic status, the respondent's household income is included as an independent variable in the model. To account for the non-negligible percentage of respondents who chose not to report their income (~20 percent), household income is treated as a categorical variable, where non-responses are included as a category and the mean category of household income (those who reported earning $50,000 – $75,000 in annual household income) is designated as the baseline category. Because there have been some issues raised in the past regarding the use of socio-economic status as a measure of economic preference (Sears et al. 1980), and because available data on such preferences is limited in the 2008 NAAPS, the respondent's ideological self-placement is also included as an independent variable in the model. Similar to partisan identity, ideological self-placement is coded on a 7-level continuous scale.

Another alternate explanation that has been discussed here is the role of geographic location in the United States. It has been previously noted that voters residing in southern states have a tendency to identify more with the Republican Party than those voters residing in non-southern states.[18] In order to test this claim on Asian Americans, a dummy variable is included in the model indicating if the respondent resides in one of the 15 states that make up the southern

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[18] It is also worth noting that this claim has not been met without contention (Gelman 2008; Fiorina 2010).

region of the United States.[19] Of the total 3,898 Asian-Americans who make up the citizen group of respondents in the 2008 NAAPS, 664 (17 percent) reported residing in a southern state.

It is also important to discuss additional demographic control variables that need to be included in a model predicting partisan identification among Asian-Americans. The first set of controls account for partisan trends within particular ethnic groups. It was mentioned previously that there exists strong evidence of ethnic-based cleavages in partisan identification among Asian-American voters. Wong et al. (2011) found that Vietnamese voters are strongly biased toward the Republican Party due to associations with anti-Communism military efforts. In addition, they also found that Chinese voters have a greater tendency than other Asian-ethnic groups to identify as Independents, though previous analyses by Hajnal and Lee (2006) found that Chinese respondents are least likely to identify as Independents. As a result, the current analyses controls for, but makes no predictions toward, these ethnic-based partisan biases by including dummy variables for a respondent's ethnic origin. This includes Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, and Vietnamese (with "Other" serving as the baseline category).

The second set of controls that will be included in the model is related to assimilation factors for both foreign-born and U.S.-born Asian Americans. Individual-level variations in age and level of formal education completed in the United States have all been found to play a role in the political behavior of non-White minority groups. As such, they require inclusion in any model predicting partisan identification of Asian Americans. Age is controlled for using a continuous measure indicating in what decade the respondent was born. Higher values on this measure indicate more recent years of birth and a younger age group. Education is controlled for

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[19] The U.S. states that make up this category are Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.

using a continuous measure asking respondents their formal level of education ranging from primary/grammar school to the completion of a doctorate.

Dummy variables are also included in the model in order to account for any effects of religion on partisan identity. Campbell et al. (2010) has previously found a link between electoral support among Evangelicals and Republican voters while McDermott (2009) argues that voters' religious identities are closely associated with their ideological and partisan preferences (Sheets et al. 2011). In addition, recent sociological studies have made the argument that religion has a much stronger role in shaping the attitudes and behaviors of racial minority groups, particularly immigrant populations.[20]

RESULTS

Table 3.1 has the regression coefficients for predicting the 7-level partisan identity measure among Asian-American respondents in the 2008 NAAPS. In looking at heterogeneity in partisan identity across the different ethnic groups, the results show little evidence of this with the exception of Vietnamese respondents who were significantly more likely to identify with the Republican Party (p < .001 for a two-tailed test of statistical significance). In exploring the effects of socio-economic status on partisan identity, the results show no evidence that lower-income respondents identified more strongly with the Democratic Party compared with those respondents with mean income levels. While such relationships have been observed in the past when looking at Democratic identifiers in the American electorate, Asian-Americans seem to provide an exception. However, the results do show that respondents who reported being in the

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[20] The Appendix at the end of this chapter provides the full question-wording and descriptive statistics for all variables used in the current analyses.

TABLE 3.1. Predicting Democratic Partisan Identity using the 7-Level Measure

Intergroup:		
Asian Linked Fate A Little	.027	.027
	(.030)	(.030)
Asian Linked Fate Some	.034*	.034*
	(.016)	(.016)
Asian Linked Fate A Lot	.012	.012
	(.023)	(.023)
Black Commonality	.044	
	(.031)	
Hispanic Commonality	.063*	
	(.030)	
Minority Commonality		.107***
		(.030)
White Commonality	- .038	- .038
	(.028)	(.028)
Ethnicity:		
Asian Indian	.011	.011
	(.046)	(.046)
Chinese	.003	.003
	(.043)	(.043)
Filipino	- .051	- .050
	(.047)	(.047)
Japanese	.030	.030
	(.050)	(.050)
Korean	- .055	- .054
	(.046)	(.046)
Vietnamese	- .255***	- .255***
	(.046)	(.046)
Income:		
Up to $20,000	- .040	- .039
	(.034)	(.034)
$20 - $35,000	- .011	- .011
	(.032)	(.032)
$35 - $50,000	- .033	- .033
	(.029)	(.029)
$75 - $100,000	.002	.002
	(.028)	(.028)
$100 - $125,000	- .019	- .019
	(.029)	(.029)
$125 - $150,000	- .026	- .025
	(.035)	(.035)
$150,000 and Over	- .050[+]	- .050[+]
	(.027)	(.027)
No Response	.005	.005

	(.027)	(.027)
Liberal	.385***	.385***
	(.024)	(.024)
South	- .048*	- .048*
	(.019)	(.019)
Education	- .024	- .023
	(.040)	(.040)
Male	- .020	- .020
	(.015)	(.015)
U.S. Born	- .012	- .012
	(.025)	(.024)
Youth	.089*	.089*
	(.039)	(.039)
Religion:		
Buddhist	.041	.041
	(.031)	(.031)
Catholic	.011	.011
	(.031)	(.030)
Christian	.018	.018
	(.029)	(.029)
Hindu	.113**	.113**
	(.034)	(.034)
None	.030	.030
	(.030)	(.030)
Constant	.364***	.322***
	(.059)	(.060)
Adj. R^2	.22	.22
N	1,821	1,821

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is 7-level party identity with higher values indicating identification with the Democratic Party. Excluded categories are Other (Ethnicity), $50-$75,000 (Income), Other (Religion), No Linked Fate (Asian Linked Fate). [+]$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ for a two-tailed test of statistical significance. Respondents who did not identify with a party were omitted from the analyses.

highest income level also reported a stronger identification with the Republican Party ($p < .1$ for

a two-tailed test). In looking at the effect of religious identification on partisanship, only

Hinduism was significantly related to partisanship among Asian-Americans where identification

as a Hindu resulted in an 11 percent increase in Democratic identification on a scale of partisanship (p < .01 for a two-tailed test).

Unsurprisingly, ideological self-placement had a highly significant effect on partisan identity with conservatives reporting a stronger identification with the Republican Party (p < .001 for a two-tailed test), as did residence in one of the thirteen southern states in the United States (p < .01 for a two-tailed test). There were no significant main effects of education or gender on partisan identity, but age did seem to play a significant role moving older respondents closer to the Republican Party (p < .01 for a two-tailed test). Surprisingly, whether or not an individual was an immigrant or born in the United States did not have a significant main effect on partisan identity. However, additional analyses provide strong evidence for heterogeneity between immigrants and US-born on several key measures' effects on partisan identity which will be discussed in a later chapter.

Revisiting hypotheses H4 and H5 from the RPI model in the previous chapter, the activation of a racialized Asian-American identity should also activate a broader racial-minority identity which then subsequently impacts partisan movement. Though the 2008 NAAPS lacks a valid measure of an internalized racial-minority identity (which is distinct from the perceptions of intergroup commonality with racial minorities), it does allow for a more preliminary test regarding the effect of a racial identity on partisanship among Asian Americans. According to the RPI model, increasing levels of Asian-American identity in the form of linked fate with other Asians should facilitate a stronger identification with the Democratic Party. The results show that perceptions of linked fate with other Asian-Americans have only a weakly significant effect on partisan identity among Asian-American respondents. Respondents who reported having "some" measure of linked fate with other Asians reported stronger identification with the Democratic

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Party compared with those who reported a complete lack of linked fate (p < .05 for a two-tailed test). However, this significant effect was not observed among those who reported either "a little" or "a lot" of linked fate with other Asians (p > .1 for a two-tailed test). In addition, a shift from a complete lack of linked fate to having "some" linked fate only amounted to an increase of roughly 3 percentage points on the scale of Democratic partisan identity.

Instead, there is evidence that the perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial minority groups have significant effects on partisan identity. Perceived commonality with Hispanics had a positive and significant effect (p < .05 for a two-tailed test) where respondents who perceived greater commonality between Asians and Hispanics identified more strongly as Democrats. The coefficient for perceptions of commonality with Blacks was positive while the coefficient for perceptions of commonality with Whites was negative, but neither was statistically significant at the lowest level (p < .1 for a two-tailed test). More interesting than the effects of individual commonality measures with other racial groups on partisan identity is the effect of the aggregate scale created by combining responses to the two separate Black and Latino measures. When this aggregate racial-minority index is substituted for the two individual commonality measures, the results show that the aggregate racial-minority measure performs much better as a predictor of partisan identity among respondents in the survey. As respondents shift from the minimum level to the maximum level on the aggregate racial-minority identity scale, their identification with the Democratic Party increases by roughly 11 percent on a scale of partisan identity. Moreover, the positive effect of the aggregate racial-minority identity measure is far more statistically significant (p < .001 for a two-tailed test) than any of the effects of the individual linked fate measures.

Accounting for Non-Linearity and Non-Identifiers

As Hajnal and Lee (2006) point out in their analyses of Asian-American and Latino-American partisan identity, the conceptualization of a partisan identification among particular non-White groups is not adequately addressed by the traditional 7-point linear measure of partisan identity popularized by early studies on the partisan identity of American voters. Instead, an appropriate measure of partisan identification among these groups needs to account for the idea that the decision to identify or not with a party is nearly as substantive and deliberative a decision as the choice of party to identify with. This is evidenced by data from the 2008 NAAPS which found nearly 20 percent of Asian-American respondents when asked whether they identified as Democrats, Republicans, or Independents reported they "do not think in these terms".

While previous research on the topic of which political party Asian-Americans choose to identify with is somewhat limited, the question of the decision for Asian-Americans to identify with a political party versus not identify has received significantly greater attention. Studies have found that heterogeneous rates of assimilation among Asian-American immigrant groups play a significant role in determining whether one chooses to identify with a political party or not (Lien 1994; Cho 1999; Ong and Nakanishi 1996). More recently, Wong (2000) found that factors related to exposure to the American political system are significantly related to the acquisition of a partisan identity, which speaks toward the extent to which immigrants with a lack of exposure often retain strong and enduring political attachments to their original political systems (Merelman 1986). However, this attachment has also been found to be highly adaptable to the American political system given a sufficient amount of exposure (White et al. 2008).

It would seem though that previous research on the topic of partisan identification among Asian-Americans have treated the issues related to a non-linear conceptualization of partisan identity and that related to the non-negligible percentage of non-identifiers as separate issues and have not offered any substantive analyses that takes into account both of these factors. For example, Hajnal and Lee (2006) account for comparisons between partisan identifiers and partisan non-identifiers by using a multinomial logit model which accounts for a non-linear conceptualization of partisan identification. However, such a model neglects to consider those respondents who reported that they did "not think in these terms" of traditional American party labels, which as the data shows is a non-negligible percentage of the Asian-American population. In order to address the potential heterogeneous effects of intergroup attitudes on partisan identification between identifiers and non-identifiers (separate from those who identify as Independents), a series of multinomial logit regressions were conducted to predict the likelihood of identifying as either a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or complete non-identification with the American party system. Table 3.2 has the results from these multinomial probit regression models when separately comparing identification with either the Democrat or Republican Party versus identifying as an Independent and complete non-identification. The results from Table 3.2 indicate that there is no significant effect of increasing perceptions of linked fate with other Asians on the probability of identifying with either the Democratic or Republican Party. However, there is a moderately significant effect of linked fate on the probability of identifying with either political party versus a complete lack of identification with the American partisan system. As respondents moved from a complete lack of linked fate with other Asians to reporting some feeling of linked fate, they were more likely to identify with a

TABLE 3.2. Predicting Identification with any Political Party

	Dem or Rep (vs. Ind.)		Dem or Rep (vs. Non-ID)	
Intergroup:				
Asian Linked Fate A Little	- .207	- .205	- .169	- .167
	(.169)	(.169)	(.178)	(.178)
Asian Linked Fate Some	- .034	- .035	.175[+]	.173[+]
	(.097)	(.097)	(.103)	(.103)
Asian Linked Fate A Lot	.110	.110	.284[+]	.284[+]
	(.141)	(.141)	(.151)	(.151)
Black Commonality	.082		- .078	
	(.184)		(.195)	
Hispanic Commonality	- .043		- .223	
	(.187)		(.199)	
Minority Commonality		.040		- .299
		(.179)		(.192)
White Commonality	.032	.034	.275	.277
	(.168)	(.168)	(.178)	(.178)
Ethnicity:				
Asian Indian	- .129	- .130	.353	.350
	(.293)	(.293)	(.295)	(.295)
Chinese	-1.095***	-1.098***	- .416	- .421
	(.276)	(.276)	(.267)	(.267)
Filipino	- .409	- .416	- .231	- .239
	(.297)	(.296)	(.286)	(.286)
Japanese	- .175	- .178	- .354	- .357
	(.316)	(.316)	(.304)	(.304)
Korean	.185	.182	- .176	- .181
	(.301)	(.301)	(.279)	(.279)
Vietnamese	- .685*	- .687*	.136	.133
	(.292)	(.292)	(.288)	(.288)
Income:				
Up to $20,000	.225	.224	- .399[+]	- .400[+]
	(.215)	(.215)	(.216)	(.216)
$20 - $35,000	- .161	- .160	- .384[+]	- .382[+]
	(.188)	(.188)	(.204)	(.204)
$35 - $50,000	- .214	- .214	- .379*	- .379*
	(.174)	(.174)	(.189)	(.189)
$75 - $100,000	- .163	- .163	- .474**	- .474**
	(.168)	(.168)	(.179)	(.179)
$100 - $125,000	- .174	- .174	- .152	- .153
	(.172)	(.172)	(.194)	(.194)
$125 - $150,000	- .071	- .073	- .265	- .267
	(.206)	(.206)	(.226)	(.226)
$150,000 and Over	- .194	- .195	- .084	- .085
	(.162)	(.162)	(.185)	(.185)

No Response	- .017	- .016	- .714***	- .713***
	(.157)	(.157)	(.165)	(.165)
Liberal	.441**	.443**	.404*	.406*
	(.149)	(.149)	(.161)	(.161)
South	- .069	- .069	- .075	- .075
	(.115)	(.115)	(.122)	(.122)
Education	- .240	- .243	.346	.344
	(.237)	(.237)	(.257)	(.257)
Male	- .032	- .033	- .018	- .018
	(.088)	(.088)	(.093)	(.093)
U.S. Born	.042	.044	.386*	.389*
	(.150)	(.150)	(.163)	(.163)
Youth	- .208	- .210	- .702**	- .704**
	(.225)	(.225)	(.231)	(.231)
Religion:				
Buddhist	.107	.108	.255	.257
	(.182)	(.182)	(.196)	(.196)
Catholic	.095	.096	.153	.154
	(.181)	(.181)	(.188)	(.188)
Christian	.202	.204	.033	.035
	(.172)	(.172)	(.174)	(.174)
Hindu	- .247	- .243	- .172	- .166
	(.207)	(.206)	(.227)	(.227)
None	- .022	- .022	- .084	- .083
	(.172)	(.172)	(.180)	(.180)
AIC	1.902	1.900	1.902	1.900
BIC	-12,295	-12,311	-12,295	-12,311
N	2,187	2,187	2,187	2,187

Table entries are multinomial probit regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variables are identification with either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party over identification as an Independent and complete non-identification. Excluded categories are Other (Ethnicity), $50-$75,000 (Income), Other (Religion), No Linked Fate (Asian Linked Fate). [+]p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

political party. Moreover, this effect increased as respondents shifted to feeling a lot of linked fate.

There is some evidence that perceptions of linked fate with other Asians is significantly impacting Asian Americans' decision to identify with a particular party as opposed to non-

identification. However, further testing is required in order to tease out the effects of intergroup attitudes on the likelihood of identifying with a particular party. Table 3.3 has the multinomial probit regression models for predicting the probability of identifying with the Democratic or Republican Party versus identifying as an Independent. In comparing the effect of perceived linked fate with Asians on partisan identification between those who identify as either Democrats or Republicans and those who identify as Independents, perceiving "some" level of linked fate with other Asians made respondents significantly less likely to identify as Republicans. Those respondents who reported some level of linked fate with other Asians had a lower likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party than those who reported a complete lack of linked fate, however this same pattern was not observed among those who reported "a lot" of linked fate with other Asians, but somewhat echoes earlier findings from the predictive model using a continuous conceptualization of partisan identity.

Neither perceived commonality between Asians and Whites nor Blacks nor Hispanics was associated with an increased likelihood of identifying with either political party versus identifying as an Independent. However, in comparing models with the individual commonality measures with Blacks and Hispanics against those with the aggregate racial-minority index, we see that the aggregate index measure again performs better in predicting even a non-linear partisan identification among Asian-American respondents. It needs to be considered though that the aggregate measure still failed to significantly predict partisan identification, where those who reported high levels of commonality between Asians and Blacks and Hispanics were not significantly more likely to identify with the either Democratic or Republican Party than they were to identify as Independents ($p > .1$ for a two-tailed test).

TABLE 3.3. Predicting Identification with a Particular Political Party vs. Independent

	Dem (vs. Ind.)		Rep (vs. Ind.)	
Intergroup:				
Asian Linked Fate A Little	- .136	- .132	- .325	- .325
	(.176)	(.176)	(.205)	(.205)
Asian Linked Fate Some	.053	.052	- .213$^+$	- .211$^+$
	(.100)	(.100)	(.115)	(.115)
Asian Linked Fate A Lot	.121	.122	.045	.045
	(.147)	(.147)	(.162)	(.162)
Black Commonality	.173		- .188	
	(.191)		(.213)	
Hispanic Commonality	.013		- .043	
	(.193)		(.215)	
Minority Commonality		.185		- .232
		(.186)		(.207)
White Commonality	- .054	- .049	.099	.098
	(.174)	(.174)	(.194)	(.194)
Ethnicity:				
Asian Indian	- .103	- .104	- .139	- .139
	(.298)	(.298)	(.346)	(.346)
Chinese	- .974**	- .977**	-1.081**	-1.078**
	(.281)	(.281)	(.321)	(.321)
Filipino	- .442	- .452	- .240	- .234
	(.304)	(.304)	(.336)	(.336)
Japanese	- .103	- .105	- .251	- .249
	(.322)	(.321)	(.366)	(.365)
Korean	.097	.092	.335	.337
	(.305)	(.305)	(.338)	(.338)
Vietnamese	-1.276***	-1.278***	.122	.122
	(.302)	(.302)	(.331)	(.331)
Income:				
Up to $20,000	.137	.135	.258	.260
	(.224)	(.224)	(.238)	(.238)
$20 - $35,000	- .187	- .185	- .122	- .123
	(.195)	(.195)	(.218)	(.217)
$35 - $50,000	- .256	- .255	- .105	- .103
	(.182)	(.182)	(.199)	(.199)
$75 - $100,000	- .141	- .140	- .145	- .144
	(.174)	(.173)	(.197)	(.197)
$100 - $125,000	- .202	- .202	- .107	- .107
	(.178)	(.178)	(.202)	(.202)
$125 - $150,000	- .162	- .164	.077	.079
	(.214)	(.214)	(.243)	(.243)
$150,000 and Over	- .281$^+$	- .281$^+$	- .071	- .070
	(.168)	(.168)	(.191)	(.191)

No Response	.013	.015	.024	- .024
	(.162)	(.162)	(.183)	(.183)
Liberal	1.277***	1.279***	- .988***	- .986***
	(.159)	(.159)	(.173)	(.173)
South	- .189	- .188	.103	.103
	(.122)	(.122)	(.132)	(.132)
Education	- .268	- .272	- .312	- .310
	(.245)	(.245)	(.287)	(.287)
Male	- .078	- .078	.038	.039
	(.091)	(.091)	(.104)	(.104)
U.S. Born	- .034	- .032	.069	.065
	(.154)	(.153)	(.179)	(.179)
Youth	.072	.070	- .613*	- .612*
	(.232)	(.232)	(.268)	(.268)
Religion:				
Buddhist	.203	.205	- .068	- .070
	(.190)	(.190)	(.209)	(.209)
Catholic	.116	.118	- .002	- .005
	(.190)	(.190)	(.199)	(.199)
Christian	.197	.200	.133	.131
	(.178)	(.178)	(.195)	(.195)
Hindu	- .017	- .012	- .749**	- .753**
	(.210)	(.210)	(.251)	(.250)
None	.060	.060	- .234	- .236
	(.178)	(.177)	(.209)	(.209)
AIC	2.481	2.479	2.481	2.479
BIC	-10,846	-10,868	-10,846	-10,868
N	2,187	2,187	2,187	2,187

Table entries are multinomial probit regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variables are identification with either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party respectively, over identification as an Independent. Excluded categories are Other (Ethnicity), $50-$75,000 (Income), Other (Religion), No Linked Fate (Asian Linked Fate). [+]p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

In comparing the effects of perceived linked fate on identification with either the

Democratic or Republican Party as opposed to completely not identifying with any party labels

including Independents in Table 3.4, the effects of intergroup attitudes become more visible.

Particularly when looking at identification with the Democratic Party, those respondents who

reported either "some" or "a lot" of linked fate with other Asians were significantly more likely

TABLE 3.4. Predicting Identification with a Political Party vs. Non-Identification

	Dem (vs. Non-ID)		Rep (vs. Non-ID)	
Intergroup:				
Asian Linked Fate A Little	- .098	- .094	- .287	- .287
	(.185)	(.184)	(.213)	(.213)
Asian Linked Fate Some	.259*	.258*	- .007	- .005
	(.106)	(.106)	(.120)	(.120)
Asian Linked Fate A Lot	.293$^+$	.294$^+$	.217	.217
	(.156)	(.156)	(.170)	(.170)
Black Commonality	.029		- .332	
	(.201)		(.221)	
Hispanic Commonality	- .156		- .211	
	(.204)		(.225)	
Minority Commonality		- .126		- .543*
		(.197)		(.217)
White Commonality	.184	.189	.337$^+$	.336$^+$
	(.183)	(.183)	(.202)	(.202)
Ethnicity:				
Asian Indian	.372	.369	.337	.335
	(.300)	(.300)	(.347)	(.347)
Chinese	- .305	- .309	- .412	- .410
	(.272)	(.272)	(.313)	(.313)
Filipino	- .267	- .278	- .065	- .060
	(.294)	(.294)	(.328)	(.327)
Japanese	- .284	- .286	- .432	- .431
	(.310)	(.310)	(.357)	(.356)
Korean	- .256	- .262	- .018	- .017
	(.285)	(.285)	(.319)	(.319)
Vietnamese	- .462	- .465	.936**	.935**
	(.298)	(.298)	(.328)	(.328)
Income:				
Up to $20,000	- .473*	- .475*	- .352	- .350
	(.224)	(.224)	(.240)	(.240)
$20 - $35,000	- .407$^+$	- .405$^+$	- .341	- .343
	(.210)	(.210)	(.232)	(.232)
$35 - $50,000	- .424*	- .424*	- .274	- .272
	(.195)	(.195)	(.211)	(.211)
$75 - $100,000	- .446*	- .445*	- .450*	- .449*
	(.183)	(.183)	(.205)	(.205)
$100 - $125,000	- .178	- .178	- .083	- .083
	(.197)	(.197)	(.218)	(.218)
$125 - $150,000	- .357	- .359	- .118	- .116
	(.232)	(.232)	(.258)	(.258)
$150,000 and Over	- .174	- .174	.036	.037
	(.188)	(.188)	(.208)	(.208)

No Response	- .674***	- .673***	- .711***	- .711***
	(.169)	(.169)	(.189)	(.189)
Liberal	1.238***	1.240***	-1.027***	-1.025***
	(.169)	(.169)	(.183)	(.183)
South	- .196	- .195	.096	.096
	(.128)	(.128)	(.137)	(.137)
Education	.304	.299	.260	.261
	(.263)	(.263)	(.301)	(.301)
Male	- .066	- .066	.050	.051
	(.096)	(.096)	(.108)	(.108)
U.S. Born	.308$^+$	.310$^+$	.412*	.408*
	(.165)	(.165)	(.190)	(.189)
Youth	- .424$^+$	- .426$^+$	-1.109***	-1.108***
	(.237)	(.237)	(.273)	(.273)
Religion:				
Buddhist	.348$^+$	.350$^+$	.077	.075
	(.202)	(.202)	(.221)	(.221)
Catholic	.170	.172	.052	.049
	(.196)	(.196)	(.205)	(.205)
Christian	.023	.026	- .041	- .042
	(.180)	(.180)	(.196)	(.196)
Hindu	.052	.059	- .679*	- .682*
	(.230)	(.229)	(.267)	(.267)
None	- .001	- .000	- .295	- .296
	(.185)	(.185)	(.215)	(.215)
AIC	2.481	2.479	2.481	2.479
BIC	-10,846	-10,868	-10,846	-10,868
N	2,187	2,187	2,187	2,187

Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variables are identification with the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, respectively, over non-identification with the party system. Excluded categories are Other (Ethnicity), $50-$75,000 (Income), Other (Religion), No Linked Fate (Asian Linked Fate). $^+$p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

to identify with the Democratic Party versus a complete lack of partisan identity (p < .05 and p <

.1 for a two-tailed test, respectively). However, there was not similar opposite effects on the

likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party.

In addition to perceptions of linked fate with other Asians, perceiving commonality between Asians and other racial groups did have notable effects when comparing the likelihood of identifying with a particular political party versus a complete lack of identification. When looking at the likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party, perceptions of commonality between Asians and Whites increased the chances of identifying with the Republican Party. Respondents who perceived a commonality between Asians and Whites were significantly more likely to identify as Republican than as report a complete lack of identification ($p < .1$ for a two-tailed test). However, perceptions of commonality with other racial groups did not significantly increase the likelihood of identification with the Democratic Party compared with non-identification. In comparing the effects of the individual commonality measures with the aggregate racial-minority index measure, the results show that the aggregate index measure performs much better at predicting the likelihood of Republican identification, where respondents who rated highly on the racial-minority index were significantly less likely to identify as Republicans ($p < .05$ for a two-tailed test).

In comparing the effect of perceived linked fate on predicting Democratic vs. Republican identification, a chi-square test indicates that perceiving at least "some" linked fate with other Asians has effects on Democratic identification and Republican identification that are statistically different from each other ($\chi^2 = 5.58$, $p < .05$). Figure 3.1 has the predicted probabilities for identifying with the Republican and Democratic parties across the varying levels of perceived linked fate with other Asians. While the likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party is on average higher than the likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party, there is not a clear discernable relationship between perceiving linked fate with other Asians and choosing to identify with either party. Figure 3.1 also has the predicted probabilities

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FIGURE 3.1.

The Effect of Asian Linked Fate on Partisan Identities

Vertical axes represent predicted probability for identifying with one of the four partisan categories. Horizontal axes represent responses on the 4-level ordinal measure of perceived linked fate with other Asians. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals.

for identifying as an Independent and choosing not to identify with the political party system at all across levels of linked fate with other Asians. Again, there does not seem to be any discernable relationship between perceiving linked fate with other Asians and the likelihood of either identifying as an Independent or completely non-identifying with the American party system.

Asymmetrical Effects among Democratic vs. Republican Identifiers

The current study provides evidence that intergroup attitudes involving Asian-Americans and other Asians as well as other racial groups in the United States have a significant impact on

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deciding to identify with a particular party (either the Democratic or Republican Party) versus not identifying at all with any party labels. Moreover, the previous results showed that there is some evidence that such intergroup attitudes play a role in the distinction between identification as an Independent and identification with one of the two major parties.

The current study is also interested in further exploring the potential asymmetrical effects of these intergroup attitudes on how strongly Asian-Americans are identifying with a particular party, for both Democratic and Republican identifiers. In order to test this, an ordered-probit regression model was conducted using a three-level strength-of-partisanship measure (leaner, not strong identifier, strong identifier) as the dependent variable for both respondents who identified as Democrats and those who identified as Republicans. Table 3.5 has the ordered-probit coefficients from the two respective models. In looking at predicting strength of partisanship among Democratic identifiers, the results indicate that reporting "a lot" of linked fate with other Asians is significantly linked to stronger identification with the Democratic Party. According to Figure 3.2 which displays the predicted probabilities of identifying as either a leaner, a not Strong Democrat, or a strong Democrat across levels of linked fate with other Asians, perceptions of linked fate are having the most notable effect on the likelihood of identifying as a strong Democrat. As respondents go from perceiving "a little" to "a lot", their probability of identifying as a strong Democrat increases from 29 percent to 45 percent (p < .1 for a two-tailed test), however similar effects are not observed among the other levels of Democratic identity.

In looking to test the effects of perceived commonality with Blacks and Hispanics and a lack thereof with Whites on how strongly Asian-Americans identified as Democrats, the results provide little evidence for any significant relationships. In addition, the aggregate racial-minority index measure did not perform any better than the individual linked-fate measures in predicting

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TABLE 3.5. Predicting Partisan Identity Strength among Democratic and Republican Identifiers

	Democrats		Republicans	
Intergroup:				
Asian Linked Fate A Little	- .150	- .145	- .075	- .076
	(.144)	(.143)	(.234)	(.234)
Asian Linked Fate Some	.055	.056	- .294*	- .295*
	(.079)	(.079)	(.116)	(.116)
Asian Linked Fate A Lot	.271*	.273*	.007	.007
	(.119)	(.119)	(.159)	(.159)
Black Commonality	.039		- .097	
	(.153)		(.205)	
Hispanic Commonality	- .064		- .170	
	(.150)		(.213)	
Minority Commonality		- .026		- .265
		(.149)		(.206)
White Commonality	.072	.077	- .015	- .017
	(.138)	(.138)	(.191)	(.191)
Ethnicity:				
Asian Indian	.205	.206	.290	.292
	(.207)	(.207)	(.343)	(.343)
Chinese	- .548**	- .549**	- .339	- .339
	(.202)	(.202)	(.310)	(.310)
Filipino	.060	.054	.388	.388
	(.229)	(.229)	(.317)	(.317)
Japanese	- .148	- .148	.229	.229
	(.229)	(.229)	(.354)	(.354)
Korean	- .251	- .255	.306	.308
	(.215)	(.214)	(.309)	(.309)
Vietnamese	- .011	- .014	.757*	.758*
	(.234)	(.234)	(.312)	(.312)
Income:				
Up to $20,000	.310[+]	.309[+]	.154	.154
	(.184)	(.184)	(.225)	(.225)
$20 - $35,000	.031	.032	- .001	.001
	(.158)	(.158)	(.223)	(.223)
$35 - $50,000	- .126	- .126	.066	.065
	(.149)	(.149)	(.192)	(.192)
$75 - $100,000	- .062	- .060	.170	.170
	(.136)	(.136)	(.199)	(.198)
$100 - $125,000	- .280*	- .281*	.006	.007
	(.137)	(.137)	(.204)	(.204)
$125 - $150,000	- .391*	- .392*	.440[+]	.440[+]
	(.161)	(.161)	(.261)	(.261)
$150,000 and Over	- .199	- .198	.102	.101

	(.132)	(.132)	(.185)	(.185)
No Response	.095	.097	.209	.209
	(.129)	(.129)	(.188)	(.188)
Liberal	.543***	.546***	- .396*	- .397*
	(.135)	(.134)	(.170)	(.170)
South	- .097	- .097	.022	.022
	(.100)	(.100)	(.127)	(.127)
Education	.114	.110	- .661*	- .664*
	(.198)	(.198)	(.303)	(.303)
Male	- .054	- .053	- .151	- .152
	(.073)	(.072)	(.110)	(.109)
U.S. Born	.059	.060	- .018	- .016
	(.115)	(.114)	(.186)	(.186)
Youth	- .054	- .055	- .376	- .376
	(.185)	(.185)	(.278)	(.278)
Religion:				
Buddhist	.117	.119	- .227	- .225
	(.152)	(.152)	(.214)	(.214)
Catholic	.209	.209	- .281	- .280
	(.164)	(.164)	(.193)	(.193)
Christian	.241[+]	.242[+]	- .159	- .159
	(.140)	(.140)	(.190)	(.190)
Hindu	.126	.131	- .192	- .192
	(.153)	(.153)	(.281)	(.281)
None	.098	.099	.015	.013
	(.139)	(.139)	(.234)	(.234)
Cut 1	- .462	- .457	-1.378	-1.378
	(.285)	(.285)	(.415)	(.415)
Cut 2	.698	.703	- .484	- .484
	(.285)	(.285)	(.413)	(.413)
AIC	2.100	2.098	2.137	2.134
N	1,067	1,067	548	548

Table entries are ordered-probit regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variables are 3-level party strength variables for both Democratic and Republican identifiers. Excluded categories are Other (Ethnicity), $50-$75,000 (Income), Other (Religion), No Linked Fate (Asian Linked Fate). [+]p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

strong or weak partisan identity among Democratic identifiers. While such measures were

previously found to play a significant role in Asian-Americans' initial decision to identify with

FIGURE 3.2.

Vertical axes represent predicted probability of identifying with one of the three categories of partisan strength. Horizontal axes represent responses on the 4-level ordinal measure of linked fate with other Asians. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals.

the Democratic Party, it seems that they do not go on to have a subsequent effect on the strength of this identification.

Table 3.5 also has the ordered-probit regression coefficients for predicting partisan strength among Republican identifiers. The results show that similar to the positive effect that perceptions of linked fate had on the strength of Democratic identification, there is an opposite negative effect that such perceptions are having on the strength of Republican identification. More specifically, those respondents who reported having "some" linked fate with other Asians reported a significantly weaker identification with the Republican Party ($p < .05$ for a two-tailed test). Figure 3.3 has the predicted probabilities for Republican identification across levels of linked fate with Asians. Respondents who reported "some" linked fate with Asians were

FIGURE 3.3.

Vertical axes represent predicted probability of identifying with one of the three categories of partisan strength. Horizontal axes represent responses on the 4-level ordinal measure of linked fate with other Asians. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals.

significantly more likely to identify as a leaning Republican and significantly less likely to

identify as a strong Republican compared with those respondents who reported a complete lack

of linked fate with other Asians, with the probability of identifying as a leaner increasing from

roughly 20 percent to 30 percent and the probability of identifying as a strong Republican

decreasing from roughly 47 percent to 35 percent.

Pan-Ethnic Identity in a Racial Hierarchy

Both perceptions of linked fate with Asians and perceptions of commonality with other racial

groups have a significant impact on partisan identity among Asian Americans, to varying

degrees, providing support for the RPI model. On the other hand, the RPI model also predicts

that perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities serve as key

components in the expression of a racialized Asian-American identity. According to hypothesis

H2, perceptions of commonality with Blacks and Latinos should not only be related to each other

but should also facilitate a stronger racial identity; hypothesis H2.1 states that the opposite may

be true concerning perceptions of commonality with Whites. Table 3.6 has the bivariate

correlation coefficients for linked fate with other Asians and perceptions of commonality with

other racial groups. Perceptions of commonality with Blacks and Hispanics are strongly

correlated with one another, but neither is strongly correlated with perceptions of linked fate with

Asians. Perceived commonality with Whites is weakly correlated with both commonality with

Blacks and Hispanics but does not seem to be correlated with linked fate with Asians.

Table 3.7 has the ordered-probit regression coefficients when regressing Asian linked fate

on the other commonality measures (both with and without demographic controls). According to

the results, both commonality with Blacks and with Hispanics are positively related to linked fate

with other Asians (p < .1 and p < .01 for a two-tailed test, respectively) providing strong support

for hypothesis H2 and the potential activation of a racialized Asian-American identity as outlined

in the RPI model. In addition, perceived commonality between Asians and Whites is negatively

related to linked fate with other Asians (p < .1 for a two-tailed test) providing support for

hypothesis H2.1. In looking specifically at the effect of perceived commonality with Hispanics, a

change from having a complete lack with Hispanics to having "a lot" resulted in a decrease in the

probability of perceiving no linked fate with other Asians (54 percent to 43 percent, p < .05 for a

two-tailed test). When including the demographic controls in the model, the effects of perceived

TABLE 3.6. Bivariate Correlations Between Asian Linked Fate and Intergroup Commonality Items

	Asians	Blacks	Hispanics
Blacks	**.072**		
Hispanics	**.085**	**.633**	
Whites	.018	**.486**	**.460**

Table entries are bivariate correlation coefficients between perceptions of linked fate between Asians and perceptions of commonality between Asians and Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. Bolded entries indicate significant relationships at the $p < .05$ level for a two-tailed test.

commonality with Hispanics and Whites remain significant, though the effect regarding Blacks is no longer significant.

In looking at how the aggregate racial-minority (Black and Latino) index measure performs compared with the individual commonality measures, Figure 3.4 has the predicted probabilities for predicting linked fate with Asians at both its lowest and highest levels, for respondents who scored lowest on the aggregate racial-minority identity measure and for those who scored highest. Respondents who scored the highest on the aggregate measure were significantly more likely to perceive "a lot" of linked fate with other Asians and were significantly less likely to perceive a complete lack of linked fate with other Asians, compared with those who scored lowest on the aggregate measure. Moreover, both of these differences were statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level for a two-tailed test.

DISCUSSION

Using responses from the 2008 National Asian-American Political Survey (NAAPS), the current study tested the extent to which perceived linked fate with other Asians impact responses on the

TABLE 3.7. Predicting Linked Fate with Asians

Intergroup:			
Black Commonality	.160$^+$	.141	
	(.093)	(.102)	
Hispanic Commonality	.262**	.216*	
	(.093)	(.103)	
Minority Commonality			.356***
			(.100)
White Commonality	- .144$^+$	- .158$^+$	- .159$^+$
	(.084)	(.093)	(.093)
Ethnicity:			
Asian Indian		- .162	- .161
		(.154)	(.154)
Chinese		.073	.074
		(.143)	(.143)
Filipino		- .102	- .098
		(.154)	(.154)
Japanese		.187	.188
		(.162)	(.162)
Korean		.306*	.308*
		(.150)	(.149)
Vietnamese		.021	.022
		(.153)	(.153)
Income:			
Up to $20,000		- .082	- .081
		(.113)	(.113)
$20 - $35,000		- .092	- .093
		(.105)	(.105)
$35 - $50,000		- .019	- .019
		(.098)	(.098)
$75 - $100,000		- .102	- .102
		(.093)	(.093)
$100 - $125,000		.008	.008
		(.096)	(.096)
$125 - $150,000		- .053	- .051
		(.117)	(.117)
$150,000 and Over		- .011	- .011
		(.091)	(.091)
No Response		- .114	- .114
		(.086)	(.086)
Education		.305*	.307*
		(.133)	(.133)
Male		.001	.001
		(.049)	(.049)
U.S. Born		- .125	- .126
		(.083)	(.083)

Youth		.456***	.458***
		(.124)	(.124)
Religion:			
Buddhist		.073	.072
		(.103)	(.103)
Catholic		.013	.013
		(.101)	(.101)
Christian		.115	.114
		(.092)	(.092)
Hindu		.057	.054
		(.115)	(.114)
None		.083	.082
		(.096)	(.096)
Cut 1	.088	.394	.394
	(.047)	(.190)	(.190)
Cut 2	.269	.574	.574
	(.047)	(.190)	(.190)
Cut 3	1.312	1.661	1.661
	(.052)	(.192)	(.192)
AIC	2.300	2.292	2.291
N	2,791	2,341	2,341

Table entries are ordered-probit coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is 4-level ordinal linked fate with Asians with higher values indicating greater linked fate. Excluded categories are Other (Ethnicity), \$50-\$75,000 (Income), Other (Religion). $^{+}p < .1$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$ for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

7-level partisan identity measure and found mixed results regarding the positive association between linked fate and partisan identity. Respondents who reported having "some" level of linked fate with other Asians reported stronger levels of Democratic identification than those respondents who reported a complete lack of linked fate. However, the lack of a comparable significant effect among those who reported having "a little" or "a lot" of linked fate leaves much to be desired concerning the substantive significance of these results. When looking at the effect of linked fate with Asians on the decision to identify with any political party, the positive effect of linked fate on partisanship becomes a bit clearer. Both respondents who reported "some" or "a lot" of linked fate were more likely to identify with a party versus completely not

FIGURE 3.4.

Effect of Racial Minority Index on Linked Fate with Asians

Vertical axis represents predicted probability of reporting either no linked fate with Asians or a lot of linked fate with Asians. Differences in probabilities for both categories are statistically significant at the p < .05 level for a two-tailed test.

identify with the American partisan system. However, these same effects were not observed when comparing the adoption of a Democratic/Republican identification versus identifying as Independent. It would seem the effect of perceived commonality with other Asians on partisanship is potentially strongest when dealing with those groups who completely lack a partisan identity.

In testing the effects of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial groups on partisan identification, again the analyses show mixed results. Perceptions of commonality between Asians and Hispanics was positively and significantly related to Democratic identification, however perceptions of commonality with either Blacks or Whites were not. While it was predicted that perceptions of commonality with Blacks would have a positive effect on Democratic identity while perceptions of commonality with Whites would have a negative

effect, neither of these observed effects were statistically greater than zero. And again, additional analyses using alternate models of partisan identification provide mixed results regarding the effects of perceptions of commonality with other racial groups on either a Democratic or Republican partisan identity.

One of the few findings that remained consistent throughout the analyses was the larger effect of the aggregate racial-minority index compared with its individual components of perceived commonality measures concerning Blacks and Latinos. When predicting both levels of partisanship and perceptions of linked fate with other Asians, scores on the aggregate racial-minority index were positively related to both dependent variables and were statistically significant.[21] While few conclusions can be drawn regarding the separate effects of commonality with Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics on partisan identity based on the current analyses, much bolder conclusions can be drawn regarding the aggregate effect of perceived commonality with racial minorities (Blacks and Latinos) on partisan identification. Those respondents who perceived greater commonality with other racial-minorities reported stronger identification with the Democratic Party and weaker identification with the Republican Party.

In their analyses of political participation among Asian immigrants, Wong et al. (2011) found that previous experiences of racial discriminations and perceptions of racial inequality in American society were significantly linked to increased activism, even when controlling for individual-level demographics including ethnicity and heterogeneous rates of assimilation. Referring to this as a racialization explanation Wong and her colleagues made the argument that

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[21] Although the aggregate racial-minority index was a significant predictor of partisanship using the traditional 7-level measure, additional robustness checks could not confirm this effect across varying conceptualizations of partisanship. At this point it is still unclear as to the lack of significant effect observed when partisanship is measured as a multinomial choice variable or when looking at the specific strength of party identity for both Democrats and Republicans. However, as these models served as robustness checks they should not fully take away from the observed results in the primary 7-level partisan identity model.

such intergroup evaluations play a far greater role in the political involvement of Asian Americans than previous explanations related to socialization. Such a racialization theory may be used to explain partisan movement among Asian Americans. It may be the case that Asian Americans have been steadily moving toward the Democratic Party (and away from the Republican Party) due to increasing concerns regarding racial and ethnic-based issue-cleavages in American society.[22]

The significant impact of perceived commonality with racial minorities combined with a perceived separation from Whites on respondents' political decision-making provides evidence for the adoption of a *racialized partisan identity* which was presented in the previous chapter. It has been argued that Asian-Americans are defining their racial identity (at least partially) through a lens of racialized 'otherness' (Park 2008). The analyses from the current study bolster this conceptualization where perceptions of commonality with both Blacks and Hispanics were positively related to perceptions of linked fate with other Asians, while perceptions of commonality with Whites were negatively related. This provides initial evidence that Asian-Americans' extent to which they view a sense of linked fate with other Asians is significantly impacted by perceived proximity (or distance) with other racial groups on an ethno-racial social hierarchy in the United States.

Another way to conceptualize a belief in linked fate between two separate groups is the recognition of a shared commonality or identity between these groups. Previous tests concerning the validity of linked fate measures raise the strong possibility that also being conveyed in the

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[22] It should be noted that there may be potential endogeneity where an initial partisan identification would drive attitudes toward such issues. However, this seems less likely among racial minorities in the United States as they would be assumed to be more concerned with these issues than White voters typically are concerned. In addition, the chances of a partisan identification developing prior to awareness of such issues are even smaller when considering immigrant populations.

recognition of a shared fate is a shared identity where individuals within a certain group perceive others within that shared in-group context. In the case of perceptions of commonality with other racial minority groups combined with a perceived separation from the racial majority group, Asian-American respondents in the study may have been conveying a recognition and identification under a superordinate racial-minority identity, and it is most likely this identity which is facilitating partisan movement among respondents.

The combined results from the current analyses provide initial support for the underlying theoretical framework related to the RPI model presented in the previous chapter. More specifically, the analyses from the 2008 NAAPS indicate that intergroup attitudes involving groups occupying a social-racial hierarchy in the United States can have a significant impact on Asian Americans' partisan identities. The results also provide compelling evidence that such intergroup attitudes related to Blacks, Latinos, and Whites serve as a significant component of a perceived commonality with other Asians. This notion of a racialized identity as was discussed in the previous chapter implies that perceptions of commonality and/or separation with other groups on the social-racial hierarchy are contributing to the definition of a racial identity. This racialized identity most likely serves as a key component in the activation of a bridging identity which facilitates a shared commonality with other racial minorities as is stated in the RPI model.

Unfortunately, the 2008 NAAPS does not serve as the most appropriate context in which to test the central hypotheses of the RPI model as it lacks operationalization of perhaps the most important component in the proposed theoretical framework: a measure of an internalized racial-minority identity. While perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial-minority groups were analyzed in the current chapter, they are distinct from the psychological internalization of personal identification as a racial-minority in the United States which serves as

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the key intermediary in the activation and expression of a racialized partisan identity. Moreover, a more robust test of the hypotheses included in the RPI model would involve a measure of a racial identity that goes beyond the traditional linked-fate measure utilized in the 2008 NAAPS. While perceptions of linked fate are closely related to the recognition of a shared identity, they are still two distinct concepts that require separate operationalization. In order to more closely explore the extent to which Asian-Americans are recognizing a shared identity between themselves and other Asians in the United States, a novel framework is required that utilizes the appropriate measures to accurately capture the recognition of a shared Asian-American identity. Moreover, such a framework would then play an integral role in further exploration into the effects of this identity on subsequent superordinate identities as previously discussed.

CHAPTER 4:

THE ASIAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY SURVEY

The previous chapter finds evidence that Asian Americans' perceptions of commonality with other Asians play a significant role in their political behavior, including their decision to identify with a political party. Moreover, such perceptions of commonality with other racial minority groups were also found to have significant effects on this behavior. Using traditional measures of linked fate and perceived commonality between Asian-American respondents and other racial groups that were included in the 2008 National Asian American Political Survey (NAAPS), a compelling argument was made in support of the 'racialization' hypotheses for why Asian Americans choose to identify with a political party and also the strength of this subsequent identification.

By aggregating responses to the individual commonality items in the NAAPS, the previous analyses demonstrated that more important than perceived commonality with individual racial groups in the United States was a combined perception of commonality with racial-minority groups in general. These findings speak toward previous arguments that have been made regarding Asian Americans' own perceived placement on a social-racial hierarchy in this country that implies a shared placement between Asians, Latinos, and to a lesser extent Blacks as racial minorities. In other words, the effects previously observed in the 2008 NAAPS analyses hints that not only are Asian Americans recognizing their membership under this broader racial-minority identity, but that the recognition of this identity plays a significant role in shaping their partisan identity.

As has previously been discussed, the traditional linked-fate and intergroup commonality measures included in the 2008 NAAPS leave much to be desired regarding the psychological internalization of a group identity. Such an identity-based approach is critically important for further exploring the motivational component previously discussed in a model of a 'racialized' partisan identity. The *Asian American Identity Survey (AAIS)* presented in the current chapter offers several novel empirical measures to quantitatively validate and define a racial identity among Asian Americans as well as a broader racial-minority superordinate identity consisting of perceptions of commonality with Blacks and Latinos. Each of these measures has been adopted and adapted from previous existing research in the fields of sociology and psychology and has been applied here in a framework of political behavior among the Asian-American population. The construction of such novel measures allows for a more robust test of the hypotheses tested up to this point related to the racialization of an Asian-American identity, and its subsequent relationship with a broader racial-minority superordinate identity.

THE SAMPLES

Survey data was collected using three internet-based samples of Asian-American respondents. Two of the three samples were convenience-based samples while the third was a nationally-representative sample provided through the third-party survey vendor *Survey Sampling International*™ (SSI).[23] The survey was administered sequentially to the three samples over the course of a 14-month period starting in the fall of 2013. The first sample was recruited using undergraduate students enrolled in political science courses at Stony Brook University. Data for

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[23] The sample of respondents provided by SSI was not a pure convenience sample. However, the exact strategy utilized to build the sample is not explicitly known at this point as this information has not been provided by SSI.

the sample was collected from November to December of 2013 using the undergraduate subject pool, where students who participated in the study were rewarded with extra credit in their enrolled courses. In order to target Asian and Asian-American students specifically, all participants were asked to answer a question about their racial identification prior to the start of the survey. For those students who identified as any race other than Asian, they were then directed to a completely separate study which they could complete in return for the same compensation. In order to keep participants from figuring out the screening criteria, several other demographic questions were included in this initial task including gender and age. There were a total of 459 students recruited for the study. Out of these, 102 (22 percent) identified as Asian and were then asked to complete the AAIS. According to a recent survey by Forbes magazine of major universities in the United States, roughly 26 percent of the student body at Stony Brook University identify as Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander. So though the percentage of Asians in the original pool of participants is much higher than expected based on U.S. population data, it is not extraordinary given the large percentage of Asian students enrolled at the university.

Data for the second sample was collected using adult volunteers from the online site Amazon Mechanical Turk. Data was collected from January to February of 2014. A process similar to that used on the Student sample was implemented in order to screen-out those respondents who did not identify as Asian or Asian-American. Respondents on the site were invited to participate in a survey about their political attitudes. However, before they could complete the survey they would first have to answer a few demographic questions in order to confirm their eligibility. These demographic questions were four quick questions that included a racial-identification question. Those who identified as Asian or Asian-American were invited to

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participate in the survey while those who identified as any other race were told that they were ineligible for the study. Participants who completed the survey were paid $1.00 while those who were deemed ineligible were not compensated as they were informed of the conditions at the start of the task. A total of 2,693 participants were recruited on the site. Out of these, 120 (5 percent) identified as Asian or Asian-American and were asked to complete the AAIS.[24]

Finally, data for the third sample was collected using online recruitment panels provided by SSI. Data was collected over the course of the month of February in 2015. SSI was provided instructions to recruit a nationally representative sample of Asian identifiers who were over the age of 18 years old and were citizens of the United States. SSI recruited participants for the survey from a population of online panel members who matched the requested criteria. A total of 484 respondents completed the AAIS. Participants were compensated through SSI's proprietary in-house credit system. Further details on the sampling and compensation processes are available from the author upon request.[25] Provided below are the information statistics regarding respondent demographics for each of the three samples that make up the AAIS.

Demographic Comparisons of Survey Samples

Table 4.1 lists the percentage of respondents in each of the three samples who identified with one of the major six ethnicities that make up the Asian-American population according to the United States Census. In each of the three samples, Chinese respondents made up the majority ranging from 29 percent to 36 percent. There was variation between samples in which ethnicity made up

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[24] Further details about the recruiting process are available from the author upon request. It is suffice to say that given how tedious of a process this was, the author will not be utilizing such recruiting methods in the future.
[25] The respondents making up the SSI sample served as the control group for a larger survey experiment that is discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.

TABLE 4.1. Comparison of Respondents' Ethnicities between Survey Samples

National Origin	US Pop.	Student	M-Turk	SSI
Chinese	23%	33%	29%	36%
Filipino	20%	4%	15%	12%
Indian	18%	20%	10%	17%
Vietnamese	10%	0%	8%	8%
Korean	10%	18%	22%	10%
Japanese	8%	4%	8%	10%
		Total – 102	Total – 120	Total – 484

Percentage of respondents who identified as "Other" are included in the total number of respondents within each sample. US Population numbers based on 2010 U.S. Census results on Asian identifying households.

the second largest percentage between respondents who identified as Koreans (ranging from 10 to 22 percent) and those who identified as Indians (ranging from 10 to 20 percent). In the two adult samples (M-Turk and SSI), Filipinos averaged roughly 14 percentage of the samples while they made up only 4 percent of the student sample. In each sample, Vietnamese identifiers made up the smallest group of respondents, with zero percentage of respondents identifying as Vietnamese in the student sample which is not wholly surprising given the demographic of the undergraduate student population at Stony Brook University. Pooling respondents from the student sample with those from the adult sample provide pooled sample demographics which are similar to recent ethnic breakdowns of the Asian-American population according to the 2010 United States Census.[26] In addition, the adult SSI sample of respondents provides ethnic breakdowns which are also similar to recent reports in the 2010 Census.[27]

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[26] The pooling of the student sample with the adult M-Turk sample was deemed necessary as the number of respondents in the student sample was insufficient in several key response categories in order to provide proper estimation of many of the predictive models presented in this analysis. Though the two samples were collected separately using different recruitment techniques, the current analyses does not provide strong indication of bias (and in the few cases where bias was created by the pooling it was subsequently accounted for in the modeling strategies).

[27] For comparison, refer to Table 1.1.

TABLE 4.2. Demographic Comparisons between Survey Samples

	Student	M-Turk	SSI
Party ID	.315	.286	.431
	(.280)	(.265)	(.347)
Strong Democrat	12%	24%	17%
Not strong Democrat	48%	34%	28%
Lean Democrat	15%	16%	11%
Independent	8%	11%	9%
Lean Republican	3%	6%	7%
Not strong Republican	9%	7%	15%
Strong Republican	5%	2%	13%
Ideology	.356	.284	.510
	(.285)	(.295)	(.341)
Strong Liberal	20%	32%	14%
Not strong Liberal	20%	28%	16%
Lean Liberal	24%	12%	14%
Moderate	17%	10%	11%
Lean Conservative	9%	5%	10%
Not strong Conservative	5%	12%	20%
Strong Conservative	6%	2%	14%
Male	.539	.617	.448
	(.501)	(.488)	(.498)
Immigrant	.330	.225	.484
	(.473)	(.419)	(.500)
Age	.010	.235	.304
	(.049)	(.201)	(.224)
Born 1930s			0%
Born 1940s			1%
Born 1950s		2%	14%
Born 1960s		3%	17%
Born 1970s		12%	21%
Born 1980s	4%	56%	24%
Born 1990s	96%	28%	21%
Education	.331	.593	.693
	(.115)	(.215)	(.220)
Primary/Grammar school			0%
Some HS	1%		1%
HS graduate	37%	6%	9%
Some college	58%	26%	20%
College graduate	4%	49%	39%
Some graduate/prof. school		4%	4%
Graduate/prof. degree		15%	27%
Income		.435	.559
		(.300)	(.339)
Less than $20k		13%	9%

$20k - $45k		26%	16%
$45k - $60k		20%	15%
$60k - $75k		18%	13%
$75k - $100k		15%	16%
Greater than $100k		8%	31%
English Non-Primary	.198	.025	.183
	(.400)	(.157)	(.387)

Table entries are mean values for all variables coded 0-1. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Percentages are listed for all categories of ordinal variables.

In looking at the comparison of respondent demographics between samples, Table 4.2 lists the descriptive statistics for each demographic variable asked to each sample of the study. Confirming previous findings regarding the partisan and ideological tendencies of survey samples using Amazon Mechanical Turk (Berinsky et al. 2012; Christenson and Glick 2013), respondents in the M-Turk sample leaned more toward the Democratic Party and a liberal ideological identification. Respondents in the SSI sample identified more closely with the Republican Party, and also identified more closely as conservatives than liberals. There were more male respondents in the M-Turk sample but more female respondents in the SSI sample. Respondents in the SSI sample were older and reported higher incomes and levels of education than those in the M-Turk sample. Finally a greater percentage of respondents in the SSI sample indicated that English was not their primary language (18 percent), yet in all three samples the percentage of respondents indicating this was small.

Measuring Racial Identity among Asian Americans

One of the key components of the Racialized Partisan Identity model is that exposure to racial derogation will impact the extent to which Asian Americans perceive their own racial identity as

part of a broader social-racial hierarchy in the United States. While the operationalization of this racial hierarchy will be discussed shortly, it is first necessary to provide a valid measure of racial identity among Asian Americans. More specifically, it is necessary to have a measure of the extent to which Asian Americans internalize their racial identity based on the psychological theories involving social identity (Tajfel 1981). In order to construct such a measure, a series of items were adopted and adapted from Mael and Tetrick's (1992) *Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) Scale*.

The current study makes the criticism that previous empirical approaches to measuring the strength of racial identification among Asian Americans have relatively neglected the psychological implications that such identification has on subsequent attitudes toward fellow group members and others. While the listing of a racial identity as one's primary identity does indicate a greater level of cognitive salience as has been argued in previous analyses of Asian-American survey respondents (for one example see Wong et al. (2011)), such an operationalization fails to measure the extent to which this identification is internalized among respondents.

In the previous chapter, survey data from the 2008 NAAPS was analyzed to show that perceptions of linked fate with other Asians were significantly associated with the adoption and expression of a partisan identification. As previous studies involving intergroup attitudes have treated traditional measures of linked fate as a reflection of a group identity, it can be inferred that a sense of commonality with other Asians rooted in a shared racial identity can have significant effects on subsequent political behavior. However, further analyses is required that utilizes survey instruments that better capture an identity-based conceptualization of racial identity in order to more closely explore how such group-based evaluations are associated with

Asian Americans' political behavior. In order to accomplish this, the *Asian American Identity Scale* was developed.

The Asian American Identity Scale consisted of five items taken from the original IDPG Scale and modified to measure the internalization of an Asian-American identity. Respondents in the survey were asked to answer the following questions in random order:

- When someone criticizes Asian-Americans, how often do you feel personally insulted?
- How interested are you in what others think about Asian-Americans?
- How much do you feel that you are affected by the limitations that typically apply to other Asian-Americans?
- When talking about Asian-Americans, how often do you say "we" instead of "they"?
- To what extent do you act differently from the typical Asian-American? (reverse-coded)

Each item came with a five-level ordinal set of responses varying from "All of the time / Never" to "A great deal / None at all". The last item listed above was reverse-coded to prevent any acquiescence bias among respondents.

In each of the three survey samples, responses to these five items showed reasonably high levels of inter-item reliability. Among respondents in the Student sample, the Cronbach's alpha on the five items was .790; among respondents in the M-Turk sample, the alpha was .747; and among the SSI sample, the alpha was .679. As a result, responses to the five items were additively combined to create a composite scale of Asian-American identity strength that ranged from 0 to 20. A comparison of means on the composite Asian-American Identity Scale between the three samples shows consistency across all three samples. On average, respondents are not readily recognizing a strong racial identity as respondents in all three samples reported an Asian-

American Identity score that is roughly half of the full Identity Scale. In order to take a closer look at this, Figure 4.1 has the distributions of the Asian-American Identity Scales for all three samples. While respondents in the student and M-Turk samples reported similar average levels of Asian-American Identity, the histograms are significantly different with respondents in the Student sample and SSI sample identifying more so on the upper half of the Asian-American Identity Scale than respondents in the M-Turk sample. While respondents in the study do not readily identify strongly under an Asian-American identity, the data still provides evidence of its existence. It is unsurprising that there is heterogeneity in the strength of this identification across the Asian-American population. Previous research on the topic of racial identity among Asian Americans have pointed to several significant demographic correlates which have been found to be closely related to the strength of a racial identification.

Measuring a Racial-Minority Identity among Asian Americans

Another key component of the Racialized Partisan Identity model is that Asian Americans who are exposed to derogation of non-White racial-minority groups will identify more strongly as racial minorities themselves. According to the proposed theoretical framework this broader racial-minority superordinate identification will be driven by a racial identity that is rooted in Asian Americans' perceived position in a broader social-racial hierarchy in the United States. As such, it is necessary to construct a measure of this broader superordinate identity. Similar to the five items adapted from the IDPG Scale in order to measure strength of an Asian-American identity, the *Racial-Minority Identity Scale* consisted of an additional five items taken from the IDPG Scale and adapted to measure how strongly respondents identified as racial minorities.

FIGURE 4.1. Comparison of Responses on the Asian-American Identity Scale Between Samples

Student (x = 10.77, σ = 406) | M-Turk (x = 10.74, σ = 3.84) | SSI (x = 11.99, σ = 3.06)

Graphs represent density plots for responses to the Asian-American Identity Scale between the three samples of respondents.

Upon being given the prompt "When people talk about groups from Africa, Latin American, and Asia living in the United States they often use the term RACIAL MINORITY", respondents were then asked to answer the following five questions in random order:

- When someone praises racial minorities, how often does it feel like a personal compliment?

- To what extent do you possess qualities that are typical of racial minorities?

- How often are you embarrassed by news stories that criticize racial minorities?

- How much would you agree that in general, racial minorities' successes are your successes?

- To what extent would you say that you act differently than a typical racial minority? (reverse-coded)

Similar to the Asian-American identity scale, the above items intending to measure a racial-minority identity also included a reverse coded item in order to prevent any acquiescence bias among respondents. Each of these five items included a five-level ordinal set of responses.

In looking at the inter-item reliability of these five items between the three survey samples, the Cronbach's alpha values are highly encouraging. Among respondents in the Student sample, the alpha for the five items was .818; among respondents in the M-Turk sample the alpha was .773; and finally among respondents in the SSI sample the alpha was .718. Additional factor analyses indicated the existence of a single latent factor underlying the five items so responses were aggregated to create the composite Racial-Minority Identity Scale.

Figure 4.2 has the distribution of scores on the Racial-Minority Identity Scale between the three samples. Compared with mean values on the Asian-American Identity Scale, respondents in all three samples rated lower on the Racial-Minority Identity Scale. In all three samples, respondents on average identified on the lower half of the identity scale. Student respondents also reported a stronger identification as racial minorities than adult respondents, evidenced by a significant difference-of-means t-test between the Student and M-Turk samples (t = 2.444, p < .015). While respondents in the survey were not readily embracing their identification as racial-minorities, the data provides strong evidence that Asian Americans are recognizing their shared status with Blacks and Latinos as racial minorities living in the United States to a certain extent.

FIGURE 4.2. Comparison of Responses on the Racial-Minority Identity Scale Between Samples

Student (x = 9.11, σ = 4.05) | M-Turk (x = 7.84, σ = 3.72) | SSI (x = 9.74, σ = 3.45)

Graphs represent density plots for responses to the Racial-Minority Identity Scale for the three samples of respondents.

Measuring a Perceived Racial Hierarchy among Asian Americans

According to the first stage of the Racialized Partisan Identity model Asian Americans who are exposed to derogation against racial minorities are increasing the extent to which they define their own racial identity as part of a broader social-racial hierarchy in the United States. According to the hypothesized theoretical framework, prior to Asian Americans expressing an internalization of a broader racial-minority superordinate identity in the face of such derogation is the recognition that Asian Americans as a racial group perceive a shared commonality with Blacks and Latinos on this hierarchy. Previous work on the topic of intergroup attitudes among Asian Americans have looked at the role of the racialization of ethnicity in a non-Asian cultural mainstream context (Kibria 2002; Hollinger 2000) and have even gone as far to argue for a 'racialized otherness' as a component of a racial identity (Park 2008). This involves the notion

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that those groups of individuals who share this group label are part of a shared 'Asian' culture, rather than a set of individual Asian-ethnic cultures. Moreover, this shared 'Asian' culture is rooted in the racialization of these separate ethnic groups by mainstream American culture. In other words, Asian-Americans who identify others as being part of the same racial group are at least somewhat recognizing a shared racial/cultural distinction between those who share the same race and those who do not. It is proposed that this same recognition may exist between Asians and other racial minority groups, such as Blacks and Latinos.

Included in the survey was a set of items asking respondents to state the perceived amount of shared identity between Asian-Americans and other racial groups in the United States. Previous studies interested in exploring the extent to which two concepts/identities overlap each other have utilized an *Inclusion of Other in Self Scale* in the context of similarities/differences between different racial groups (Aron et al. 1992) by providing individuals with increasingly overlapping pairs of circles representing separate racial groups and asking them to indicate the pair of circles that best represented the perceived similarity between the two groups. For the purposes of the current study, respondents in the survey were given these concentric circles which were labeled "Asians" and either "Blacks", "Latinos", or "Whites". The extent to which respondents perceived Asian Americans as having a shared identity with Blacks and/or Latinos was measured by the proximity between the two circles. Conversely, the extent to which respondents perceived Asian Americans as having a separate identity from that of Whites was measured by the distance between the two circles. Figure 4.3 provides an example of the images used in order to measure amount of commonality between Asians and Whites. Figure 4.4 has the comparison of average levels of identity overlap between Asian Americans and Whites, Blacks, and Latinos for respondents in all three samples. Consistent across all three samples is the

FIGURE 4.3. Example of Perceived Identity-Overlap Survey Question

Question wording: "In your opinion, to what extent do ASIAN-AMERICANS and CAUCASIAN-AMERICANS (WHITES) have a shared identity? An answer of 0% would indicate that the two groups do not share any identity at all, while an answer of 100% would indicate that the two groups completely share one single identity.

observation that respondents perceive a greater shared identity between Asians and Whites than between Blacks or Latinos. By themselves, the amount of perceived identity overlap with Whites is not substantively large (average of 42.78% across the samples), but in comparison with even lower levels of perceived commonality with Blacks (29.99%) and/or Latinos (35.76%) it provides a confirmation of previous work on assimilation and socialization among the Asian-American population. Perceived identity overlap between Asians and Blacks was the lowest among the three racial group comparisons, with perceived overlap between Asians and Latinos consistently surpassing the former across all three samples. These findings provide further

FIGURE 4.4. Comparing Perceived Identity-Overlaps Between Samples

Vertical axis indicates reported percentage of identity-overlap between Asians and either Whites, Blacks, or Latinos.

confirmation for the argument that Asian-Americans perceive their racial identity on a social hierarchy that finds them in closer proximity to Latinos than Blacks, but also raise further questions regarding their perceptions of proximity to Whites (Kim 2001).[28]

A closer examination of these individual items provides strong evidence that the extent to which Asians are perceived to share a commonality with Blacks is closely related to the extent to which Asians are perceived to share a commonality with Latinos. Bivariate correlation coefficients for the two measures are .701 for the Student sample, .592 for the M-Turk sample, and .742 for the SSI sample (all significant at the $p < .001$ for a two-tailed test). As a result, responses to individual identity-overlap measures between Asians-Blacks and Asians-Latinos

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[28] See Appendix for more information regarding distribution of identity-overlap responses across the three samples.

were aggregated to create a single measure of perceived commonality and shared identity between Asians and other racial minorities in the United States.[29]

Testing a Racialized Definition of an Asian American Identity

Now that we have established the key empirical measures for moving forward in the study, a closer look can be taken at the specific proposed processes making up the RPI model. Primarily, it is important to examine just how much of an impact a perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minority groups has on how strongly respondents in the survey identified as Asian Americans as predicted by hypothesis H2 from the RPI model and supported by analyses from the previous chapter. Table 4.3 has the regression coefficients for predicting responses on the Asian American Identity Scale using the perceived commonality items as well as demographic variables linked to alternate explanations of a racial identity. Because of an insufficient number of respondents in each ethnic category among respondents in the Student sample, responses were pooled between Student and M-Turk samples for the regression models. In order to account for any bias created by pooling two separate samples, all regression models using the pooled sample included a dummy variable for student-sample respondents to control for any effects. The initial intent was to have multiple samples in order to seek out replication of key results, however the pooling of the Student and M-Turk samples were necessary for the reasons stated above.

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[29] Referring back to the analyses of the linked-fate measures from the 2008 NAAPS in the previous chapter, the correlation between linked-fate with Blacks and linked-fate with Latinos was .64; Though the correlation between the identity-overlap measures with Blacks and Latinos was higher in the SSI sample, it was nearly equivalent in the pooled student and M-Turk sample ($\sigma = .65$). This provides evidence that while the perceived identity-overlap measures capture a separate aspect of intergroup commonality than the traditional linked-fate measures, the extent to which attitudes toward individual racial groups are impacted by each other is reflected among both approaches.

TABLE 4.3. The Effects of Perceived Commonality on Asian-American Identity

	Student + M-Turk		SSI	
Identity Overlaps:				
Whites	- .131	.224	- .091[+]	- .136[+]
	(.088)	(.141)	(.055)	(.082)
Blacks + Latinos	.220**	.591***	.095[+]	.023
	(.080)	(.140)	(.057)	(.113)
Interaction		- .910**		.124
		(.287)		(.167)
Ethnicity:				
Chinese	.076[+]	.077[+]	- .028	- .033
	(.043)	(.042)	(.047)	(.048)
Indian	- .008	- .014	- .045	- .051
	(.051)	(.050)	(.050)	(.051)
Filipino	.035	.037	- .018	- .022
	(.056)	(.055)	(.052)	(.052)
Vietnamese	.068	.053	.034	.028
	(.075)	(.073)	(.062)	(.062)
Korean	.077	.066	- .107[+]	- .111*
	(.047)	(.046)	(.055)	(.055)
Japanese	- .001	- .009	- .103[+]	- .107*
	(.064)	(.063)	(.054)	(.054)
Education	.163*	.168*	.084	.083
	(.080)	(.079)	(.055)	(.056)
Age	.143	.137	- .062	- .068
	(.089)	(.087)	(.048)	(.049)
Immigrant	.009	- .000	.019	.019
	(.030)	(.030)	(.022)	(.022)
Male	- .056*	- .055*	- .035	- .034
	(.028)	(.027)	(.021)	(.021)
Student	.013	.007		
	(.039)	(.038)		
Income			.019	.021
			(.034)	(.034)
Constant	.294**	.179	.586***	.614***
	(.110)	(.114)	(.058)	(.069)
Adj. R2	.038	.080	.043	.041
N	216	216	240	240

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is Asian-American Identity Scale scores. All variables coded 0-1. Omitted category on the Ethnicity variable is "Other". ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, [+]$p < .1$ for a two-tailed test.

Perceived commonality between Asians and Blacks/Latinos had a positive effect on Asian American identity strength across respondents in both the pooled Student+M-Turk sample and the larger SSI sample. As respondents in the pooled sample went from a minimum to a maximum on the aggregate measure scores on the Asian American Identity Scale increased by 22 percentage points. Among respondents in the SSI sample, this same shift from the lowest to the highest score on the aggregate measure produced a nearly 10 percent increase on the Asian American Identity Scale. Moreover, both of these positive effects were found to be statistically significant ($p < .01$ for the pooled sample, $p < .1$ for the SSI sample) providing additional support for hypothesis H2.

Finding weaker support for hypothesis H2.1, a perceived commonality between Asians and Whites produced a somewhat negative effect on expressions of an Asian-American identity. A shift from the lowest level to the highest level on this measure produced a 13 percent decrease on the Asian American Identity Scale for respondents in the pooled sample and a 9 percent decrease for those in the SSI sample. However, this effect was significant at the $p < .1$ level only for respondents in the SSI sample. If we recall from the previous chapter that there was a similar effect of linked-fate with Whites on linked-fate with other Asians in both direction and significant, these combined results provide further confirmation of the notion that Asian Americans are defining their racial identity largely as a 'racialized otherness' that is rooted in perceptions of similarity with other racial minorities and to a lesser extent perceptions of separation from Whites in the United States.

It also seems that the racialization measures are a far better predictor of racial identity strength among Asian Americans than other previously explored factors. Among respondents in both the pooled and SSI samples, there is not compelling evidence that Asian Americans differ in

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their Asian American identity strength across national origin groups. There were slight effects observed among Chinese respondents (compared with those who identified as "Other") in the pooled sample (an 8 percent increase in the Asian American Identity Scale) and Korean and Japanese respondents in the SSI sample (roughly 10 and 11 percent decrease, respectively) but these were only significant at the $p < .1$ level for a two-tailed test.

There is also not significant evidence for an assimilation and/or socialization explanation for predicting racial identity strength. Higher levels of education were found to be a significant predictor of Asian American identity ($p < .05$ for a two-tailed test), but this effect was only observed among respondents in the pooled sample and was not observed for those in the SSI sample. Similarly, gender had a negative effect where males reported a weaker Asian American identity ($p < .05$ for a two-tailed test) but again this was only observed among respondents in the pooled sample. Surprisingly, whether or not a respondent was an immigrant had no significant main effect on the strength of Asian-American identity. Previous work on this topic has found that the recognition of a racial identity differs markedly among immigrant and non-immigrant populations for both Latino and Asian groups, however the current analyses provide little evidence for this being the case. It is most likely the case though that the effect of being an immigrant versus non-immigrant on the recognition of an Asian-American identity is conditional on other demographic predictors.

Table 4.3 also tests a potential conditional effect of perceived commonality between Asians and Blacks/Latinos based on a perceived commonality (or lack thereof) between Asians and Whites. It may be the case that the positive effect of perceiving commonality between Asians and other racial minorities on the strength of Asian-American identity is significantly impacted by a congruent lack of perceived commonality between Asians and Whites. Though

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FIGURE 4.5.

Illustration of the interaction between perceived identity-overlap with Blacks/Latinos and perceived identity-overlap with Whites when predicting Asian-American identity strength among respondents in the SSI sample; full model results available in Table 4.3.

this interaction was not observed among respondents in the SSI sample, it was observed for those in the pooled sample. Figure 4.5 plots the effect of perceived commonality with Blacks and Latinos across the varying levels of distance from Whites for respondents in the pooled sample. The positive effect of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities on Asian-American identity strength is strongest and most significant among those respondents who perceived a complete lack of commonality between Asians and Whites. While these results are congruent with the theoretical framework driving the current study, it should be noted for future exploration that the conditional effect was only observed for respondents in the pooled sample.

The Effect of a Racialized Identity on a Racial-Minority Identity

The main argument being proposed in the RPI model is that a recognition of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities serves as a key dimension of Asian Americans' own racial identity, and that this racialized identity serves as a component of a broader identification as a racial minority in the United States. In the previous section, a closer look was taken at the construction of this racial-minority identity and the extent to which it varies across the different samples in the survey. What follows is a test of hypothesis H4 regarding the link between a racial identity and a superordinate racial-minority identity.

Table 4.4 has the regression model predicting scores on the Racial-Minority Identity Scale for respondents in the pooled sample and respondents in the SSI sample. According to the proposed theoretical framework, the effect of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities on the extent to which respondents identify as racial minorities themselves is driven largely through the internalization of a racialized identity. If this is the case, then we should observe attenuation in the effect of the perceived commonality measure on the expression of a racial minority identity once racial identity is included in the model. The results provide mixed results regarding this claim. Among respondents in the pooled sample, it seems as if there is an attenuating effect when Asian American identity strength is included in the model, though the perceived commonality measures still maintain a high level of significance ($p < .01$ for a two-tailed test). Among respondents in the SSI sample, there seems to be even weaker evidence of an attenuation effect. The combined results here lead us to question the extent to which the effect of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities on the internalization of a racial minority identity is being driven by an internalized racial identity. Instead, combining these results with previous findings from this chapter, it seems to be more accurate to state that perceptions of commonality impact both a racial identity among Asian

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TABLE 4.4. Predicting Racial-Minority Identity Strength

	Student + M-Turk		SSI	
Identity Overlaps:				
Whites	- .274**	- .195**	- .062	- .031
	(.090)	(.074)	(.049)	(.042)
Blacks + Latinos	.312***	.186**	.193***	.141***
	(.081)	(.068)	(.047)	(.040)
Asian American Identity		.588***		.592***
		(.059)		(.044)
Ethnicity:				
Chinese	.051	.008	.016	.026
	(.044)	(.037)	(.036)	(.031)
Indian	.066	.070	.067[+]	.081*
	(.052)	(.043)	(.039)	(.033)
Filipino	.100[+]	.080[+]	.041	.042
	(.057)	(.047)	(.041)	(.035)
Vietnamese	.104	.065	.065	.068[+]
	(.077)	(.063)	(.045)	(.039)
Korean	.063	.019	- .042	.015
	(.048)	(.040)	(.042)	(.036)
Japanese	- .005	- .004	- .062	- .018
	(.066)	(.054)	(.043)	(.037)
Education	.091	.002	.010	- .023
	(.082)	(.068)	(.045)	(.038)
Age	- .001	- .082	- .016	.019
	(.091)	(.076)	(.041)	(.035)
Immigrant	.011	.008	.015	.005
	(.031)	(.025)	(.018)	(.016)
Male	- .028	.006	.006	.011
	(.029)	(.024)	(.018)	(.015)
Income			- .008	- .010
			(.028)	(.024)
Student	.100*	.094**		
	(.040)	(.033)		
Constant	.325**	.141	.472***	.135**
	(.112)	(.094)	(.046)	(.046)
Adj. R^2	.082	.384	.092	.364
N	218	216	432	425

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is Racial-Minority Identity Scale scores. All variables are coded 0-1. Omitted category on Ethnicity variable is "Other". *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test.

Americans but also have a direct impact on the adoption of a superordinate racial minority identity.

CONCLUSION

The results from the current chapter provide a more robust test and confirmation of the racialization component of the hypothesized RPI model. Using a set of novel empirical measures, it was shown that Asian Americans are largely defining their racial identity as a perceived closeness with other racial-minority groups and a separation from the racial majority group. While the analyses of NAAPS data from the previous chapter provided initial support for this hypothesis, the results from the Asian-American Identity Survey provide a more robust test and confirmation. The Asian-American Identity Survey also offers several notable contributions to the study of intergroup attitudes among Asian Americans. First and foremost, it offers and validates a conceptualization of intergroup cooperation as an expression of a shared racial group membership which traditional measures of linked fate have not been able to fully address. Using survey items adopted from psychologists and sociologists and adapted to capture the cognitive implications of identification as an Asian American, the current study allows for further empirical testing of the components and consequences of a strong or weak racial identity among the Asian-American population.

In addition, the Asian-American Identity Survey offers several key quantitative measures in order to empirically test the theoretical framework of the RPI model. In addition to providing a valid measure of racial identity strength among Asian Americans, the survey also provided a valid measure of a broader racial minority identity that measures the extent to which Asian

Americans personally internalize their own identity as racial minorities in the United States. In order to capture the extent to which Asian Americans define their own racial identity as a 'racialized otherness' which has been previously linked to inter and intragroup attitudes among Asian Americans, respondents were given a set of survey measures intended to visualize the extent to which Asians as a racial group have a shared identity with other racial groups in the United States. The current analyses showed that these evaluations served as a significant dimension to defining an Asian-American identity which was part of a broader superordinate identity as a racial minority. But the analyses also showed that these evaluations had an additional direct impact on this superordinate identity.

Returning to the theoretical framework driving the current study, it is being argued that a racialized partisan identification is driving increased identification with the Democratic Party among Asian Americans and that this racialized partisan identification is rooted in exposure to political attacks against illegal and legal immigrant groups in the news media. According to the theoretical model, exposure to such attacks should increase perceptions of commonality between Asian Americans and other racial-minority groups. The Asian-American Identity Survey presented in this chapter provides empirical measures to test whether or not these effects are observed among Asian-Americans exposed to political attacks. What is still required is an experimental framework that allows for a test of the causal hypotheses outlined in the RPI model related to exposure to political derogation and its impact on partisan movement among Asian Americans.

CHAPTER 5:

AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF RACIALIZED PARTISAN IDENTITY

The results from the previous chapter provide evidence for the main theoretical framework driving the RPI model that Asian Americans have the capacity to not only define their racial identity as part of a broader social-racial hierarchy that implies a commonality with other racial minority groups, but that also this racialized identity has the potential to activate a broader racial minority superordinate identity that involves the psychological internalization of Asian Americans' recognition of this shared identity with Blacks and Latinos in the United States. However, still missing from our exploration of the RPI model is the role of derogation in the activation of these processes and group-based evaluations and its subsequent effects of partisanship.

It was originally hypothesized that exposure to derogation of racial minorities would drive a heightened sense of Asian Americans' own placement in the broader social-racial hierarchy. This is based on a significant amount of research previously discussed that finds that Asian Americans when either reminded of their own experiences of racial discrimination or when exposed to racial discrimination against Blacks are significantly more likely to empathize with and even recognize a shared commonality with these other groups (Craig and Richeson 2012; Masuoka 2006). Moreover, a 'racialization' explanation involving prior experiences of racial discrimination and a heightened racial group consciousness has been previously found to be a key factor in predicting political participation including the decision to identify (versus not identify) with a particular political party (Wong et al. 2011; Hajnal and Lee 2006).

However, as previous scholars have noted the use of prior experiences of discrimination as exogenous predictors of subsequent social and political attitudes are not without its criticisms. Early studies on the topic provide strong evidence that often times the extent to which racial minorities understate or overstate experiences of racial discrimination are linked to latent social and psychological predispositions and contextual factors related to group status (Ruggiero and Taylor 1997; Kobrynowicz and Branscombe 1997; Major et al. 2002). Moreover, political attitudes on policies both directly and indirectly involving racial groups such as affirmative action and/or income inequality have been found to be closely related to subjective evaluations regarding respondents' own experiences of racial discrimination and inequality.

Returning to the earlier analyses of survey data from the 2008 NAAPS, in the context of the RPI model it was assumed that heightened levels of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities were largely the result of a socialization into American society based on the existence of a social-racial hierarchy and Asian Americans' own perceived placement on that hierarchy. Looking at survey responses from the Asian American Identity Survey discussed in the previous chapter, the same assumption is made for heightened levels of perceived commonality between Asians and Blacks/Latinos on this hierarchy. However, the RPI model involves exposure to a politically-charged derogation of racial minorities by partisan groups in the news media. As a result, the only way to validate the causal effects of such derogation based on the RPI model is to treat the derogation as exogenous.

Using a between-subjects design, Asian-American subjects were randomly exposed to an experimental treatment involving xenophobic political messages in the news media. In

constructing the experimental treatment, there were several goals that needed to be fulfilled. First

and foremost, the messaging could not be limited solely to the derogation of one specific racial

group but instead needed to encompass a broader target group in which Asian Americans could

identify. Second, the messaging had to be related to a social and/or political issue that is highly

salient in the American media environment. As the hypotheses being tested are part of a broader

explanation of partisan movement among Asian-Americans over the past several decades, the

hypothesized stimuli driving this movement must have had a nearly ubiquitous level of exposure

across the Asian-American community during this time. Finally, there also needed to be a

reasonable level of partisan polarization surrounding this messaging. A key component in the

RPI model is the association of derogation with a particular party label and the subsequent

movement away from this party in response. Political battles over immigration reform in the

United States fulfill all of these criteria quite well, particularly those more controversial battles

involving legislation deemed especially harsh and potentially discriminatory against immigrant

groups in general. An added benefit of using political battles over immigration reform as the

context for the experimental treatment is its proven ability to polarize the American electorate

along party lines.

Derogation in the Form of Anti-Immigrant Political Attacks

Over the past two decades, immigration reform has become a highly salient issue in American

politics. Recent work has shown immigration to be among the set of issues that have played a

large role in shaping partisan coalitions in the United States, particularly among Republican

voters (Miller and Schofield 2008). Given the extent to which the issue is hotly contested among

the American electorate, it is unsurprising that debate over the issue has become at-times

ubiquitous in major news broadcasts as well as serving as frequent campaign fodder for political

stump speeches. Regional debate over the controversial Proposition 187 in California helped to

push the issue of immigration reform into the national spotlight in the early 1990s.[30] More

recently, political battles over the controversial Proposition 200 in Arizona have evoked wide-

ranging emotions among both immigrant and non-immigrant populations throughout the United

States.[31]

Since the 1994 enactment (and eventual 1999 annulment) of Proposition 187, numerous

studies have confirmed its negative (almost deleterious) effects on Republican vote-share among

Latino voters (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Contreras 2002). Miller (2002) notes that as a result of

associations between the perceived anti-immigration Proposition 187 and the Republican Party

within the state of California (in addition to the Republican Governor who created and

campaigned for the bill), the Republican Party within the state suffered a near-total collapse in

political viability among Hispanic voters following 1994. However, among the general public,

attitudes toward immigration reform have divided sharply along partisan lines, evidenced by the

overwhelming level of Republican support for Proposition 200 in the state of Arizona.[32] Wroe

(2008) provides an in-depth look into how the Republican Party's efforts to makeover their

image among Latino voters with the selection of George W. Bush as the party's presidential

nominee were ultimately undone by conservative Republican hardliners within particular states,

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[30] Proposition 187 was a ballot initiative passed in 1994 that prohibited undocumented immigrants from accessing state resources such as health care and public education. It is often regarded as the first state-level legislation related to the issue of immigration reform to be proposed and passed through a ballot referendum (Cornelius 2005).

[31] Proposition 200 required voters to display valid identification when voting and prohibited undocumented persons from receiving access to state and local public benefits; it is widely perceived as being among the strictest of immigration reform policies to be enacted at the state level (Cornelius 2005).

[32] A poll conducted by CNN in 2004 found that Republican voters in the state of Arizona supported Proposition 200 by a 70 percent margin (with only 42 percent of registered Democrats supporting the bill).

including Arizona representative J.D. Hayworth who was among the most visual of the bill's proponents within the Republican Party.[33]

While the political campaigns surrounding Proposition 200 were limited mostly to the state of Arizona, media coverage of the controversy reached audiences around the country. National coverage of pro-immigration marches and rallies in states such as California and Arizona have generated a wide range of responses that served to make immigration reform a highly salient issue to the point where comprehensive federal legislation will (hopefully) soon be forthcoming. However, public reactions to these marches and rallies have seemed to divide sharply along partisan lines. In a 2006 New York Times article discussing reactions to a particular pro-immigration event in Arizona, a Republican voter is quoted as saying: "You want to stay here and get an education, get benefits, and you still want to say 'Viva Mexico'? It was a slap in the face." The article also discusses how a similar backlash to these events were felt among Republican voters from around the country, noting that Republican representatives from various states who were taking a hard line on the issue of immigration reform were receiving electoral boosts as a result of their politicized attacks on illegal (and sometimes legal) Latino immigrant groups.[34]

It was mentioned previously that a 'racialization' argument has been raised as a valid explanation of various forms of political participation among Asian Americans (Wong et al. 2011). Those Asian-Americans who have previously experienced discrimination in American society based on their race are more likely to contribute to political campaigns, contact their representatives, and participate in other forms of political activism. Perhaps Asian Americans

[33] Hayworth also published a 2006 book titled "Whatever It Takes" where he argues for the deportation of all illegal immigrants in the United States and the temporary suspension of legal immigration from Mexico.
[34] "Demonstrations on Immigration Harden a Divide" written by David K. Kirkpatrick and featured in the New York Times (April 16, 2006).

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who are exposed to racial discrimination against Latinos are then reminded of their own identity as a racial minority in the United States. This recognition of a commonality with Latinos (and to a lesser extent, Blacks) may then be causing an increased sensitivity to contextual cues in the race-based discrimination against Latinos and other racial minorities. Relating this scenario to the partisan political environment since the early 1990s (but with an increased emphasis on events in the 21st century), such contextual cues are most likely partisan cues linking anti-immigrant messaging with the Republican Party and its political representatives. Subsequent identification with the Democratic Party and de-identification with the Republican Party among Asian-Americans may then be brought on by exposure to these anti-immigrant messages, particularly so when they are associated with a specific political party.

Testing the Causal Pathways to a Racialized Partisan Identity

Based on the results from the previous chapter regarding the link between perceptions of commonality/separation between Asians and other racial groups on a social hierarchy in the United States and subsequent evaluations related to both a racial identity and a racial-minority superordinate identity, the current study can test the more narrow set of hypotheses related to the development of a racialized partisan identity through mediated processes related to exposure to political derogation against racial minorities.

In order to test these hypotheses related to the proposed RPI model, the current chapter describes an experiment that was conducted as part of the Asian-American Identity Survey. Among the total population of respondents invited to participate in the survey, a randomly assigned group were first asked to read an "actual" news article on the passing of a new state law

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FIGURE 5.1. Hypothesized Pathways of the RPI Model

Solid arrows indicate hypothesized indirect mediated effects; Dotted arrows indicate direct unmediated effects.

that allowed police officers the legal authority to demand identification and proof of legal residence in the United States similar to Proposition 200 which was discussed earlier. For those that could not present such documentation, they could potentially be arrested and processed for deportation. Based on actual media coverage of the law recently passed in the state of Arizona, the article was intended to paint a clear portrait of the racial-minority residents in the state who opposed the legislation versus the White residents who supported it.

METHODOLOGY

Participants for the experiment were selected from the broader population of online survey respondents provided by Survey Sampling International™ for the Asian American Identity Survey. Out of the total 983 respondents, roughly half (492 respondents) were randomly asked to first read a fictional news article on the issue of immigration reform in the United States prior to completing the survey. The remainder of the respondents (491) were not asked to read the article prior to completing the survey and served as the control group in the study. This fictional news article served as the main experimental treatment where subjects in this treatment condition were told the survey administrators were first interested in testing their ability to read and process information and that they would be asked to read an actual news article recently published in a major national newspaper. They were also asked to read the article closely as they would be asked to answer questions about its content afterward. The article was titled "Asian-American Affected by Controversial Immigration Law Accuses Police of Racial Profiling" and discussed James Wong, a 70 year old real-estate investor of Chinese descent and lifelong resident of the United States who was stopped by police for "looking suspicious".

The article used as the experimental treatment was constructed using actual media coverage of the controversial SB 1070 that was passed in the state of Arizona, also referred to as the "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act". The experimental article was designed to evoke feelings of empathy with Wong and other individuals who were mentioned as being affected by the new law with statements such as "…calling the whole experience humiliating… it made me feel unwelcome in my own country." The article was also designed to show strong and clear opposition toward the law among both Asian and Latino residents in the state:

- "It's an unfair law… I don't want to have to worry about being arrested just because I leave my house without my purse." – Monica Torres
- The new law "condones racial discrimination… unfairly harass innocent civilians based on nothing more than the color of their skin." – Sung-Hee Park

While the article provided a clear depiction of opposition among minority residents, the article also highlighted strong support among non-minority residents, though race was never explicitly mentioned in the article:

- "We have to give police the authority to keep these people out of our country." – Samuel Meyers
- "These people are living in our country illegally and taking advantage of our generosity." – Amanda Stevens

Statements in support of the new legislation were constructed using actual statements issued by Republican leaders in their defense of both Arizona's SB 1070 bill as well as other legislative proposals meant to target illegal immigrant groups in the United States. The statements were also particularly chosen for their use of group-defining terms such as "we" versus "they" that highlight the distinctions between immigrants and other racial-minorities in the state compared with the racial majority group.[35]

Table 5.1 lists the comparison of mean values on demographic variables between subjects in the treatment group and those in the control group. With only a few exceptions, the results confirm the randomization was successful and that the exposure to the derogation was fully exogenous among subjects in the study.

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[35] Full text of the article used in the experiment is provided in the Appendix for this chapter.

TABLE 5.1. Descriptive Comparisons between Treatment and Control Groups

	Control	Treatment	T	Sig.
Ethnicity:				
Chinese	.360	.326	1.105	NS
Indian	.172	.187	.625	NS
Filipino	.116	.176	2.674	**
Vietnamese	.076	.074	.171	NS
Korean	.095	.063	1.838	+
Japanese	.103	.109	.298	NS
Age	.306	.302	.284	NS
Education	.694	.691	.197	NS
Male	.439	.457	.563	NS
Immigrant	.481	.487	.190	NS
Income	.611	.606	.223	NS

All variables recoded 0-1. For dichotomous variables, multiply by 100 to obtain category percentages. NS denotes a difference-of-means t-test with p > .1 for a two-tailed test. **p < .01, $^{+}$p < .1.

RESULTS

Effect of Derogation on a Racialized Asian American Identity

The first set of hypothesie in the RPI model concerns whether or not exposure to the derogation of racial minorities impacts the extent to which Asian Americans perceive a commonality between their racial group and other racial minority groups in the United States based on their responses to the identity-overlap questions in the Asian-American Identity Survey. Hypotheses H1 and H1.1 predict that those randomly exposed to the derogation article will report higher levels of commonality between Asians and Blacks and Asians and Latinos. Table 5.2 shows the bivariate results for regressing scores on the individual identity-overlap measures on the effect of the experimental treatment. The results confirm the positive effect of exposure to derogation on the recognition of a shared commonality between Asians and other racial minority groups.

TABLE 5.2. The Effect of Exposure to Derogation on Perceived Intergroup Commonality

	β (SE)	P
Asians + Blacks	.031	.060[+]
	(.016)	
Asians + Latinos	.048	.003**
	(.016)	
Asians + Whites	.017	.234
	(.014)	
Asians + (Blacks/Latinos)	.037	.014*
	(.015)	

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All variables recoded 0-1. First column lists each dependent variable that is regressed on experimental treatment.

Exposure to the derogation produced a 3 percent increase on the scale of perceived commonality between Asians and Blacks and produced a nearly 5 percent increase on the scale of perceived commonality between Asians and Latinos. It is unsurprising that the effect of the treatment was stronger on the latter evaluation as the article discussed an anti-immigration policy that primarily targeted Latino immigrant groups in the United States. But it is worth noting that the treatment also had an effect on commonality with Blacks though they were not explicitly referenced in the article. Providing no support for hypothesis H1.1, the treatment did not have a significant impact on perceptions of commonality between Asians and Whites.

However, according to the RPI model more important than the effect of the derogation on perceptions of intergroup commonality between Asians and other racial groups is the effect of the derogation on the extent to which such evaluations are used to define a racial identity among Asian Americans. According to the RPI model, the effect of intergroup commonality on the strength of Asian-American identity should be significantly greater among those exposed to the derogation as this racialized identity then plays a role in the internalization of a broader racial-

minority identity. In other words, does the experimental treatment significantly impact how subjects are defining their subsequent racial identity? In order to test this, the following regression models were conducted separately for respondents in the treatment group and those in the control group where X is the composite of the perceived commonality scores for both Blacks and Latinos and Y is the perceived commonality score for Whites:

$$\text{Asian-American Identity} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1(X) + \beta_2(Y) + \beta_{3-8}[\text{Controls}] + \varepsilon i$$

Table 5.3 has the OLS regression coefficients for both groups of subjects. Those who were exposed to the derogation article defined their racial identity as being part of a racial hierarchy to a greater extent than those who were not exposed to the article providing support for hypotheses H2 and H2.1. Among subjects who were exposed to the article, perceiving a shared commonality between Asians and other racial minorities and a lack thereof between Asians and the racial majority group (Whites) had highly significant effects on how strongly respondents identified as Asian-American ($p < .001$ for a two-tailed test for each). However, for subjects who were not exposed to the article, the effect of a shared identity with racial minorities was only weakly significant ($p < .1$ for a two-tailed test) while the effect of a perceived separation between Asians and Whites was no longer significant at all.

There also were significant differences in certain demographic factors on their effects on Asian-American identity between groups of respondents. Identification as Korean or Japanese ethnicity was associated with a decrease in Asian-American identity strength, but only among those subjects not exposed to the derogation article. One possible explanation is the use of a Korean name (Sung-Hee Park) as one of the individuals in the article who was opposed to the anti-immigrant legislation. It is a bit more unclear as to why the effect of Japanese identification

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TABLE 5.3. The Effect of Derogation on Defining an Asian-American Identity

	Article	No Article
Identity Overlap		
with Blacks + Latinos	.173***	.084[+]
	(.048)	(.044)
with Whites	- .175***	- .052
	(.048)	(.046)
Ethnicity:		
Chinese	- .008	- .011
	(.040)	(.034)
Indian	- .036	- .023
	(.041)	(.036)
Filipino	- .006	- .001
	(.041)	(.039)
Vietnamese	- .078	.007
	(.047)	(.042)
Korean	- .048	- .092*
	(.049)	(.040)
Japanese	- .073	- .072[+]
	(.045)	(.041)
Age	.018	- .058
	(.045)	(.038)
Education	.014	.055
	(.044)	(.041)
Male	- .021	- .008
	(.017)	(.017)
Immigrant	- .014	.021
	(.018)	(.017)
Income	.052[+]	.003
	(.028)	(.026)
Constant	.616***	.563***
	(.047)	(.042)
Adj. R^2	.044	.031
N	435	433

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is Asian-American Identity Scale scores. All variables coded 0-1. Omitted category on Ethnicity variable is "Other". ***$p < .001$, *$p < .05$, [+]$p < .1$ for a two-tailed test.

on Asian-American identity would differ based on exposure to the experimental treatment.

Similarly puzzling is the slightly significant effect of income observed for subjects in the

experimental group compared with the non-effect of income observed for those in the control group.

The results also showed that exposure to the derogation article had a positive effect on heightened levels of Asian American identity. A difference of means t-test found that subjects exposed to the article reported significantly higher scores on the Asian-American Identity Scale than those not exposed to the article (t = 2.758, p = .006, df = 958). Given the previous findings that exposure to the derogation impacts both perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial groups as well as the extent to which such perceptions define a subsequent racial identity, a mediation analyses is required in order to determine to what extent the effect of the derogation on racial identity is being driven by the activation of a racial hierarchy among subjects in the study. According to hypothesis H3 from the RPI model, the effect of the treatment on scores on the Asian-American Identity Scale should be mediated by an increase in the perceived level of commonality between Asians and other racial minorities. Table 5.4 has the regression coefficients from the model accounting for the potential mediating effect of commonality with Blacks and Latinos and Figure 5.2 below illustrates the model with direct effects included.[36] According to the results from the mediation model in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2, the experimental treatment has both a direct and indirect effect on how strongly respondents identified as Asian-Americans. The indirect effect of the treatment on levels of Asian-American identity was statistically significant (p < .1 for a two-tailed test) however the substantive effect was not large. Only roughly 10 percent of the total effect of the treatment on Asian-American

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[36] All mediational analyses were conducted using the SEM command in Stata-13 which utilizes maximum likelihood estimation with list-wise deletion. Decomposition of direct and indirect effects is done using Sobel's (1972) method and standard errors for effects are calculated using the Delta method. For more information check the software user manual. Significance tests for standard errors for indirect effects were confirmed using bootstrapping with 5,000 iterations.

TABLE 5.4. Decomposing the Intermediary Effect of Perceived Overlap with Racial Minorities on Racial Identity

		Causal Effects		
Bivariate Relationship				
Predictor	Criterion	Direct	Indirect	Total
Derogation	Minority Overlap	.036*	-	.036*
		(.015)		(.015)
Minority Overlap	Asian-American ID	.072**	-	.072**
		(.024)		(.024)
Derogation	Asian-American ID	.024*	.003[+]	.027*
		(.011)	(.001)	(.011)

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All variables recoded 0-1. **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, +$p < .1$ for a two-tailed test.

FIGURE 5.2. Testing a Racialized Identity as a Result of Exposure to Derogation

Illustration of direct effects from Table 5.4.

identity was mediated through perceptions of commonality between Asians and Blacks/Latinos, providing weak support for hypothesis H3.

In looking at the potential mediating effects of a shared identity between Asian-Americans and the racial majority group (Whites), there is even less evidence for a significant mediating process. Table 5.5 has the results from the mediation model accounting for the intermediary effect of shared identity between Asians and Whites. Figure 5.3 illustrates the

TABLE 5.5. Decomposing the Intermediary Effect of Perceived Overlap with Whites on Racial Identity

Bivariate Relationship		Causal Effects		
Predictor	Criterion	Direct	Indirect	Total
Derogation	White Overlap	.016	-	.016
		(.015)		(.015)
White Overlap	Asian-American ID	- .033	-	- .033
		(.025)		(.025)
Derogation	Asian-American ID	.033**	- .001	.033**
		(.011)	(.001)	(.011)

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All variables recoded 0-1. **$p < .01$ for a two-tailed test.

FIGURE 5.3. Testing the Intermediary Effect of Perceived Separation from Whites

Illustration of direct effects from Table 5.5.

results of the mediation model with direct effects included. Though the effect of exposure to derogation of racial minorities on increasing racial identity was somewhat mediated by increasing perceptions of commonality between Asians and Blacks/Latinos, there is no evidence of a reverse effect concerning perceived commonality between Asians and Whites. None of the mediating effects were found to be statistically significant as perceptions of commonality

between Asians and Whites was found to mediate less than 2 percent of the total effect of the derogation on Asian-American identity.

The Effect of a Racialized Identity on a Racial Minority Identity

According to the RPI model exposure to derogation against racial minorities will activate a racial identity rooted in a shared commonality with other racial minorities which will then produce an internalization of a superordinate racial minority identity among Asian Americans. This can be tested using responses to the Racial-Minority Identity Scale presented in the previous chapter. If the activation of a superordinate identity occurs as a result of exposure to derogation against racial minorities, then regressing the racial minority identity measure on the experimental treatment should show a positive and significant effect. Unfortunately, the results do not confirm this. The bivariate regression coefficient based on this model shows a weak effect that is not statistically different from zero ($\beta = .013$, $p = .289$, $df = 956$).

The analyses from the previous chapter showed that perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial minority groups significantly impacted how strongly Asian Americans in the study identified as racial minorities. Hypothesis H4 from the RPI model predicts that these perceptions of commonality are used to define a racial identity among Asian Americans who then use this racialized identity to recognize their own identity as racial minorities. If this is the case, then the strength of racial identity should serve as an intermediary variable in this process. Though it has already been established that perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial groups are far from exogenous measures, it is still a fruitful exercise to test this mediational relationship in order to provide initial support for this particular stage in the

TABLE 5.6. Decomposing the Intermediary Effect of a Racialized Identity on a Racial Minority Identity

Bivariate Relationship		Causal Effects		
Predictor	Criterion	Direct	Indirect	Total
Minority Overlap	Asian American Identity	.074**	-	.074**
		(.025)		(.025)
Asian American Identity	Racial Minority Identity	.550***	-	.550***
		(.030)		(.030)
Minority Overlap	Racial Minority Identity	.201***	.041**	.241**
		(.022)	(.014)	(.026)

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All variables recoded 0-1. **$p < .01$ for a two-tailed test.

**FIGURE 5.4. Testing the Intermediary Effect of Racialized Asian American Identity**

Illustration of direct effects from Table 5.6.

proposed RPI model. Table 5.6 has the results from this mediation model and Figure 5.4

illustrates the direct effects between the variables. The analysis indicates that a perceived

commonality between Asians and other racial minority groups has both direct and indirect

effects on the adoption and expression of a superordinate racial minority identity. Both effects

are highly significant ($p < .001$ for a two-tailed test) but there is still evidence that an Asian

American identity serves as an intermediary between perceptions of a racial hierarchy and a

subsequent identification as a racial minority. According to Table 5.6 roughly 17 percent of the effect of perceived commonality on a racial minority identity is being mediated by a racialized Asian American identity. Moreover, the previous findings regarding the fact that reports of perceived commonality among respondents in the study were significantly impacted by the exogenous exposure to derogation provide some level of confidence in support of hypothesis H4.

A Preliminary Test of Racialized Partisan Identity

According to the RPI model, partisan movement in response to racial derogation should occur as a result of Asian Americans increasing the extent to which they perceive their racial identity as being part of a broader racial hierarchy in the United States. Moreover, these effects should be largely dependent on the presence of partisan cues and their explicit association with the derogation. The current experimental treatment, with its lacking in explicit partisan cues, allows for a test of the extent to which partisan cues are necessary ingredients in the subsequent partisan movement hypothesized by the RPI model (see Hypothesis H5.1).

Included in the current study was the traditional 7-level partisan identity question used to measure how strongly individuals identified with either the Republican or Democratic Parties.[37] In order to test the partisan movement hypothesized by the RPI model, party identity was regressed on the key variables in the RPI model including the exogenous exposure to derogation and the results of this model are listed in the column I of Table 5.7. If hypothesis H5 is correct, then there should be a significant effect of racial-minority identity on partisan identity among

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[37] Though previous empirical analyses in this manuscript have approached partisanship as both a linear and non-linear conceptualization, the current chapter treats partisanship solely as a linear measure based on the traditional 7-point scale including Independents.

TABLE 5.7. Predicting a Racialized Partisan Identity

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)
Derogation	- .006	- .005	- .010	- .014	- .094	- .137[+]
	(.024)	(.023)	(.023)	(.024)	(.086)	(.073)
Minority Overlap	- .076					
	(.055)					
Asian American Identity	.206*			.197*	.150	
	(.084)			(.082)	(.098)	
Racial Minority Identity	.064		.126*	.042		.012
	(.079)		(.063)	(.073)		(.088)
Derogation X Asian Amer.					.139	
					(.140)	
Derogation X Racial Minority						.231[+]
						(.125)
Constant	.444***	.572***	.504***	.437***	.486***	.566***
	(.049)	(.016)	(.038)	(.046)	(.059)	(.051)
N	824	887	873	859	873	873

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is party identity with higher values corresponding to a stronger identification with the Democratic Party. All variables are recoded 0-1. ***$p < .001$, *$p < .05$, [+]$p < .1$ for a two-tailed test.

respondents in the study. The results however indicate that with all variables in the RPI model included as predictors, it is Asian-American identity which has a positive and significant ($p < .05$ for a two-tailed test) effect on identifying with the Democratic Party. This hints at the possibility that instead of a racial-minority identity mediating the effect of a racialized Asian-American identity on partisanship, the relationship is reversed. Columns II - IV provide a test of this using stepwise regression. When the racial-minority identity variable is included as the sole predictor variable (including the experimental treatment), the effect is positive and significant. However, when the Asian-American identity variable is also included in the model its effect on Democratic identification is positive and significant. Moreover, the effect of racial-minority identity is much smaller and no longer significant.

The analyses find that even when explicit partisan cues are lacking, there is still some level of support for the proposed RPI model though it seems more the case that a racialized Asian-American identity is mediating the effect of a superordinate racial-minority identity on partisanship. These findings are unaccounted for and counterintuitive to the current theoretical framework. It is worth noting that the experimental treatment used in the current study did not include any explicit partisan cues, which is a key point of the RPI model. However, the analyses up to this point have not provided a strong test of the role of derogation in partisan movement. An additional test involves the question of whether or not the effect of an Asian-American identity or racial-minority identity on partisanship differs between those individuals exposed to the derogation and those who were not. Columns V and VI in Table 5.7 explore the potential conditional effects of the derogation on the racial and racial-minority identity variables in the model. The effect of Asian-American identity on partisanship does not significantly differ based on exposure to derogation; however, the effect of racial-minority identity is significantly impacted by exposure to derogation. For subjects in the control condition there is no effect of racial-minority identity on partisanship ($\beta = .012$, $p = .898$) but for subjects in the derogation condition the effect is highly significant ($\beta = .242$, $p = .006$). These results provide some evidence for hypothesis H5 in that Asian Americans who reported high levels of a racial-minority identity upon exposure to political derogation against racial minorities identified more strongly with the Democratic Party than those Asian Americans who were not exposed to such derogation.[38]

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[38] It may have been the case that subjects in the study were responding to the experimental treatment differently based on their ideology. However, a model that regresses partisan identity on the treatment, ideology, and its interaction showed no significant moderation effect ($\beta = - .061$, $p = .337$, df = 777). Moreover, the treatment did not have any main effect on levels of ideology.

An alternate interpretation of this interaction effect is that the effect of exposure to derogation on partisan identity is being significantly moderated by levels of racial-minority identity. It was previously observed that the scores on the Racial Minority Identity Scale were not significantly impacted by exposure to the derogation. As such, it may be the case that the effect of the derogation on partisanship among Asian-American respondents in the study is being moderated by the superordinate racial minority identity. Based on this interpretation of the interaction effect from Table 5.7 there seems to be a certain degree of heterogeneity in the effect of derogation on partisan identity based on how strongly respondents in the study personally identified as racial minorities. Among respondents who scored on the lowest end of the Racial-Minority Identity Scale, exposure to the derogation actually pushed respondents closer toward the Republican Party and this movement was statistically significant (p < .1 for a two-tailed test). Figure 5.5 has the graph of the effect of the derogation across levels of the Racial-Minority Identity Scale based on this interpretation of the interaction. The effect of derogation on partisan movement among Asian-American respondents was greatly impacted by the extent to which respondents identified as racial minorities. Among those who expressed a strong identity as a racial minority in the United States, exposure to the derogation of racial minorities seemed to facilitate greater identification with the Democratic Party. Among those who did not express this identity at all, exposure to the derogation of racial minorities actually seemed to facilitate a push toward the Republican Party which was weakly statistically significant though the fact that racial minority identity was measured following exposure to the derogation raises potential issues with these findings. Moreover, the observed moderating effect of racial-minority identity is not strongly significant. However these findings are still quite notable considering there was no explicit mention of any party labels in the experimental treatment.

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FIGURE 5.5.

Illustration interaction between experimental treatment and responses on the Racial-Minority Identity Scale when predicting Democratic identification. See Table 5.7 for full results from the regression model.

Testing an Alternate Explanation

It is evident by the above analyses that the experimental treatment had significant effects on respondents' perceptions of their own racial identity and its relation to a broader recognition of a superordinate racial-minority framework. In addition, these identity-based evaluations played a significant role in how respondents shifted their partisan identity as a result of exposure to the experimental treatment in the form of derogation against racial minorities. What still needs to be considered are alternate and/or additional explanations for why Asian-Americans would shift their partisan identities in response to political derogation that lie outside the conditions and stipulations stated in the RPI model. It may be the case that in addition to activating a perceived

sense of commonality with other racial minorities, exposure to derogation may be priming some other considerations related to their partisan identities.

One such consideration could involve public opinion toward the increasingly salient issue of immigration reform. As Asian Americans in the study were exposed to media messages regarding a controversial new anti-immigration law, it may be the case that these messages impacted respondents' positions toward the issue which then had a subsequent impact on their partisan identities. In order to test this, included in the survey questions following the experimental treatment was a battery of items intended to measure the degree to which respondents supported stricter immigration policies in the United States. These items included the questions "Do you favor or oppose the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens?" and "Do you favor or oppose allowing the children of illegal immigrants to attend public elementary and secondary schools?" (see Appendix for full list of items). There were a total of six items that displayed a high level of inter-item reliability (Cronbach's alpha of .77) and which were aggregated into a single measure of anti-immigration sentiment.

If the alternate explanation is accurate, then respondents who were exposed to the derogation should report either higher or lower scores on the anti-immigration measure on average than those who were not exposed to the derogation. A difference-of-means T-test indicated however that this was not the case. Scores on the anti-immigration measure were statistically indistinguishable between groups of respondents (t = .065, p = .948, df = 944) which lead to the conclusion that the experimental treatment did not have any substantively nor statistically significant main effect on respondents' policy positions related to immigration reform.

Another alternate explanation involving respondents' attitudes toward the issue of immigration reform is that subsequent shifts in partisan identity in response to exposure to media messages involving anti-immigration policies may be further impacted by respondents' initial predispositions toward strict versus lenient immigration policies. If the experimental treatment is not directly impacting individual-level attitudes toward immigration policy, then perhaps such attitudes are serving as a moderating factor in explaining the initially observed heterogeneous effects of the treatment on partisan identity among respondents. In order to test this, the following regression model was tested:

$$\text{Partisan ID} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Treatment}) + \beta_2(\text{Policy Attitudes}) + \beta_3(\text{Interaction}) + \varepsilon_i$$

If individual-level predispositions related to immigration policy in the United States are serving as a moderating factor, then the coefficient on β_3 should be significant. However, the results from the regression model indicate that this is not the case. The effect of the treatment on partisan identity does not differ based on respondents' preferences for lenient versus strict immigration policies. The Appendix has the full results from the above regression model.

DISCUSSION

In the current study, a randomly selected group of Asian-American survey respondents were first asked to read an 'actual' news article about a controversial new immigration law similar to Arizona's SB 1070 legislation that gave police officers in the state the legal authority to demand proof of citizenship from any individual or group of individuals deemed to be acting suspiciously. The intent of the article was to activate respondents' own racial identity as being part of a broader social-racial hierarchy in the United States. The analyses provided here

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confirms that exposure to such messages in the news media did indeed have the hypothesized effects.

The effect of derogation on shifting definitions of Asian Americans' own perceived racial identity are a significant aspect of the RPI model driving the current study's theoretical framework. Included as an intermediary stage of the RPI model that begins with exposure to political derogation and ends with a subsequent movement in partisan identity is the presence or activation of a bridging identity that links perceptions of commonality between different Asian ethnic groups to perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial-minority groups; included in the latter is a perceived separation between Asians and the racial majority group (Whites). However, the analyses conducted in this chapter indicate that this bridging identity involves perceptions of commonality more so than perceptions of differentiation.

Evidence has been provided that perceptions of commonality between Asians and the racial groups Blacks and Latinos are both indicative of a broader recognition of a racial hierarchy in the United States. The largest impact of the treatment was seen on perceptions of commonality between Asians and Latinos; but the treatment was also found to have a smaller but still significant impact on perceptions of commonality between Asians and Blacks. This is particularly telling as African Americans were not mentioned explicitly in the derogation article. Moreover, African Americans are generally omitted from the political vilification of immigrant or minority groups common to public debate over national immigration reform. Yet, Asian-Americans respondents who were exposed to such vilification in the study still reported a greater sense of shared identity between their racial group and African Americans.

These findings echo previous studies regarding the conditions under which intergroup cooperation between Asian Americans and African Americans often occur. Galanis and Jones (1986) first argued for the potential activation of a *disadvantaged-minority* identity that reduces perceptions of social distance among racial groups who have experienced racial discrimination, particularly those perceptions involving African Americans. More recently, Craig and Richeson (2012) have tested this identity to explain observed intergroup cooperation and positive evaluations between Asian Americans and African Americans. In a series of experiments, Craig and Richeson find that increasing perceptions of commonality with African Americans in response to perceptions of discrimination related to their own racial identity serve as a mediator to positive evaluations of African Americans among Asian-American subjects. The current study confirms these findings and builds on them by extending the analyses and theoretical framework to show subsequent effects of the activation of superordinate bridging identities on Asian-Americans' political behavior in the form of their partisan identities and by utilizing a randomized experimental treatment that is not subject to the potential issues of endogeneity and other issues that commonly arise when dealing with subjective perceptions of discrimination.

In the current study, perceptions of commonality with racial minorities through a shared identity were found to specifically moderate the effect of derogation on respondents' subsequent partisan identities. In addition, analyses from the current chapter indicated that a non-negligible portion of the effect of the treatment on expressions of a broader racial minority identity occurred through the activation of a racialized Asian-American identity. In the previous chapter, it was shown that this shared identity between Asians and other racial-minority groups are closely related to perceptions of separation between Asians and the racial majority group. The fact that each individual measure of commonality (or in the case of Whites, the lack thereof)

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between Asians and other racial groups is representative of recognition of a broader racial-minority framework is a key component to the RPI model being tested. However, the experimental treatment utilized here did not have similar effects across these individual group-identity measures. While exposure to derogation was found to have a positive effect on the extent to which Asians and other racial minorities were perceived to have a shared commonality, it did not have the same expected effect on perceptions of commonality between Asians and Whites. Interestingly, the political derogation of racial minorities while serving to bridge gaps on a racial hierarchy between Asians and other racial minorities does not seem to push Asians further away from Whites on this hierarchy.

The fact that exposure to derogation in the study caused Asian-American subjects to move closer to Blacks and Latinos on a perceived racial hierarchy to a greater extent than it caused them to move away from Whites may be indicative of Asian-Americans' initial closer proximity to Whites on the racial hierarchy. Analyses from the previous chapter showed that Asian-Americans on average reported a shared identity with Whites to a greater extent than they did with either Blacks or Latinos. However, previous analyses also showed that these evaluations were all closely related to each other and represented the recognition of an underlying social-racial hierarchy among Asian-American respondents. Taking these findings into consideration, it may be the case that the observed asymmetrical effect of race-based derogation on the individual components making up this hierarchy implies a greater tendency toward inclusion than exclusion among the Asian-American population. Future studies conducted on other groups of racial-minority respondents using a similar experimental design would undoubtedly provide further insight on the extent to which these findings are necessarily limited to any particular racial group in the United States.

While the effect of the derogation did not significantly impact perceptions of commonality between Asians and Whites, it did have a strong effect on the extent to which Asian-American respondents used such perceptions in defining their own racial identity. The results showed that the activation of a racialized identity as a result of exposure to the experimental treatment was significantly impacted by a perceived separation between Asians and Whites on a social-racial hierarchy. Moreover, the effect of perceived separation between Asians and Whites on an Asian-American identity was greater than the effect of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities. This provides compelling evidence that the racialized identity activated as part of the RPI model is largely rooted in both perceptions of intergroup commonality and separation.

The analyses from the current study also confirmed the link between political derogation and partisan movement among Asian-American respondents. However, the current analyses still leaves much uncertainty regarding the causal processes in this link as predicted by the RPI model. The results showed that the effect of a racial-minority identity on subsequent levels of partisan identity were largely heterogeneous across those exposed to the derogation and those who were not. Combined with the earlier analyses this provides evidence that the effect of a racial-minority identity on partisanship is only significant when that superordinate identity is activated in the context of the hypothesized RPI model. Unfortunately, a more accurate validation of this contention involves a more in-depth and robust modeling of the structural equations and dynamic processes involved in the RPI model. This includes accounting for the dynamic relationships between multiple endogenous variables as well as the potential reciprocal effects between these variables in response to exogenous exposure to political derogation. Future analyses that are able to account for such hypothesized pathways in the testing of the RPI model

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will undoubtedly provide greater insights into both the direct and indirect effects of political derogation on the activation of both a racial and a racial-minority superordinate identity, and its subsequent effects on partisan identity.

Taking this into consideration though, the combined findings regarding the effects of racialized derogation on subsequent political behavior presented up to this point provide strong evidence for the RPI model. Not only was the experimental treatment in the study directly linked to stronger expressions of an Asian-American identity among respondents, but the effect of the treatment also significantly impacted the extent to which a superordinate racial-minority identity shaped a subsequent partisan identity. Among those respondents who scored high on these measures related to a racial-minority identity, exposure to the derogation produced a significant movement toward the Democratic Party; among those respondents who scored low on these measures, exposure to the derogation produced a significant movement in the opposite direction toward the Republican Party. While the former fits among the key predictions of the RPI model, the latter is a bit more difficult to reconcile using the current theoretical framework. It is most likely the case that respondents who did not recognize a broader racial-minority identity did not perceive the experimental treatment as a derogation of a salient identity. Instead, perhaps the treatment activated a sentiment of support for strict immigration policies typically associated with the Republican Party. However, the analyses indicated that not only was there a lack of an effect of the treatment on anti-immigration sentiment, but there was no significant moderation of this effect on the part of the racial-minority identity measures.

Recent work by Cecilia Mo and colleagues (2014) has explored partisan trends among the Asian-American population through a group-identity framework, similar to the theoretical framework motivating the current study. They conclude that sentiments related to social

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exclusion and intergroup solidarity help explain why Asian Americans are increasingly identifying with the Democratic Party. Included in their explanations is the role of shared group interests, both social and political, in explaining why Asian Americans are joining other racial minorities in the United States in supporting the Democratic Party and its candidates. However, the analyses presented here question the extent to which such group interests play a role in these processes. In testing the possibility that the experimental treatment activated respondents' predispositions toward strict versus lenient immigration policies, the analyses provided no evidence that this was the case. Moreover, there was no evidence that such predispositions were moderating the effect of the treatment on respondents' subsequent partisan identities. Instead, the analyses supported the RPI model where derogation was directly linked to the activation of respondents' racial identity largely defined by the recognition that this identity was just one component of a broader racial hierarchy in the United States. In this case, the observed convergence of shared group interests was brought on by the recognition of this racial hierarchy which activated a bridging identity driving perceptions of commonality and shared identity between themselves and other racial minorities. What should not be ignored though is the fact that such evaluations are formed in an environmental context that conveys a message of derogation against racial minorities. Additional findings from Mo and her colleagues lead us to believe that media messaging emphasizing intergroup *competition* (as opposed to cooperation) between Asian Americans and other racial minority groups would produce a whole different set of results and subsequent political behavior related to the adoption and expression of partisan identities.

CONCLUSION

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The topic of minority coalitions has been closely explored in the context of facilitating intergroup cooperation between African Americans and Latino Americans. However, the increasing prominence of Asian Americans into the American electorate has driven scholars of racial politics to take a closer look at the potential for such coalitions involving Asian Americans. The findings from the current study use an experimental design to show the effects of a racialized derogation on the intergroup and intragroup attitudes that facilitate intergroup cooperation between Asian Americans and both Blacks and Latinos. These findings reinforce previous research based on the existence of a racial hierarchy that posits that Asian Americans, similar to African and Latino Americans, occupy the designated space of racial-minority in a broader racial hierarchy in the United States. The RPI model which is largely confirmed by the current analyses provides an exploration into the subsequent effects on Asian-American political behavior when this identity is both primed and threatened.

Perhaps the most interesting finding to arise from the current analyses is the fact that partisan movement in response to media messaging highlighting political attacks on this broader superordinate identity occurred even when there were no explicit party cues or labels being associated with these attacks. Particularly among those respondents who recognized their own identity as racial minorities, it seems as if political attacks against both illegal and legal immigrant groups may be implicitly associated with the Republican Party. As a result, these respondents who are exposed to such attacks respond by moving further from the Republican Party and closer to the Democratic Party.

At this point, there are still two key aspects of the RPI model which bear further exploration and validation. The first involves the significant impact of explicit partisan cues in the subsequent partisan movement in response to political derogation. The fact that such

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movement can still occur without explicit partisan cues is not an indication that the increased

salience and/or clarity of explicit party labels associated with the derogation will have a

significant impact on subsequent political behavior including both affective and cognitive

expressions of a partisan identity. In order to test this, a separate survey experiment was

conducted that utilizes experimental treatments where both the salience and clarity of party cues

are randomly manipulated. This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The other key aspect of the RPI model that has not yet been addressed is the affective

processes most likely driving subsequent partisan movement in response to political derogation.

The RPI model involves the psychological phenomenon of narrowing/broadening the perceived

boundaries that separate in-groups from out-groups and the fluidity of group identities based on

the Common In-Group Identity Model (Gaertner et al. 1993). Previous applications of the CIIM

to intergroup cooperation have found that subsequent evaluations regarding superordinate in-

group and out-group identities consist of both cognitive and affective components. Moreover, the

principle theory of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981) underlying the current theoretical

framework leads us to believe that political expressions in response to political derogation of a

salient group identity will be affectively charged. In order to test this, the survey experiment

discussed in the next chapter includes several affect-based measures of partisan identity that have

previously been found to better measure the psychological consequences that come with

adopting and maintaining an identification with a particular partisan group.

CHAPTER 6

TESTING THE EFFECT OF PARTY CUES IN THE RPI MODEL

In the previous chapter the RPI model was tested using a survey experiment that involved

randomized exposure to derogation against Latino immigrant groups in the United States. It was

hypothesized that exposure to such derogation would activate a racial identity among Asian

Americans largely defined by a perceived commonality between Asians and other racial

minorities on a social-racial hierarchy, and that this racialized identity would facilitate a

recognition of a broader racial-minority identity. It was also hypothesized that the activation of

this superordinate identity would then play a role in the adoption and expression of a Democratic

partisan identity.

Among the more notable findings from the previous chapter was that partisan movement

in response to exposure to derogation occurred even without any explicit association to any

particular partisan labels. Asian Americans in the study upon being exposed to what they were

told was an actual news article about anti-immigration legislation in the United States responded

by shifting their partisan identities based on the extent to which the exposure activated their

recognition of intergroup commonality/separation on a social-racial hierarchy. But if there were

no explicit partisan cues included with the derogation, then how was it the derogation impacted

respondents' partisan identities? Offered as a potential explanation was the argument that anti-

immigration rhetoric in the United States is already associated with the Republican Party and its

representatives so those individuals exposed to the article were inferring that the anti-

immigration legislation being discussed was a product of the Republican Party. It may have also been the case that those individuals who reported stronger levels of a racial-minority identity were more likely to make such inferences.

However, there are still two aspects of the proposed Racialized Partisan Identity model that have not yet been explored. Though explicit party cues were not found to be a necessary part of the RPI model, it does not mean they lack a significant role in shaping subsequent partisan evaluations. The framing of political messages has been a popular topic among political psychologists due to its widely documented impact on the formation of political attitudes (Gamson 1992; Iynegar 1991; Nelson et al. 1997; Taber and Lodge 2006). Included in the discussion of framing effects is the effect of partisan source cues and their ability to influence subsequent processing of a particular political message. Scholars have argued that more often than not Americans' partisan identities develop prior to the acquisition of political beliefs and that the former impacts the latter (Goren 2005; Green et al. 2002). As such, informational cues which activate these identities will impact the ways in which Americans acquire and/or update their political beliefs upon exposure to a particular political message. These effects have been observed when looking at public support for partisan-driven legislation in cases where partisan cues have been experimentally manipulated to persuade voters to support policies they otherwise would be opposed to simply by framing such legislation as being associated with their own party (Cohen 2003).

Given the extensive breadth of research on this topic it is not counterintuitive to argue that the extent to which political derogation activates both social and political identities related to partisanship is largely impacted by the particular partisan cues associated with this derogation. A key aspect of the RPI model is that the exposure to derogation against racial minorities activates

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both a racial identity and a broader racial-minority superordinate identity. Asian Americans exposed to such derogation will then be vigilant against perceived threats to these identities and it is here where the role of explicit partisan cues is expected to play its biggest role in order to provide a target group to direct subsequent animosity and hostility that comes as a motivational response to a perceived threat of an internalized identity. This sets up the first hypothesis to be tested regarding the effects of partisan cues in a racialized partisan identity:

H6.1) Increasing the salience of Republican anti-immigration cues will result in stronger identification with the Democratic Party.

This first prediction argues that as political derogation is more clearly associated with the Republican Party the greater will be the subsequent movement toward the Democratic Party in response to this derogation.

An additional prediction related to H6.1 is that in addition to the salience of partisan cues, their level of ambiguity/clarity should have also have an impact on subsequent partisan movement. Previous research has found that political environments involving a level of ambiguity regarding partisan support among elites effectively reduces biased information processing related to partisanship (Cooper and Young 1997; Chong and Druckman 2007). Recent work by Bolsen and colleagues (2014) finds that when particular legislation is framed as being supported by some members of both parties and being opposed by other members from these parties, subsequent information processing related to a partisan motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006) is less likely to occur. The key aspect is that such elite frames involve a level of intra-party disagreement and are conceptualized separately from a truly bipartisan level of support which implies that all members of both the Democratic and Republican Parties support a particular piece of legislation.

H6.2) Increasing the clarity of partisan associations with the derogation will heighten its impact on subsequent partisan identification.

This second prediction argues that as Republicans are conveyed as being more clearly in support for anti-immigrant legislation and Democrats are conveyed as being more clearly opposed, the effect of the derogation on movement toward the Democratic Party should be increased.

The second aspect of the RPI model that has not yet been discussed is the effect of partisan-led derogation on subsequent affectively-charged evaluations related to the Democratic and Republican Party in the United States. It was previously observed that exposure to derogation produced subsequent shifts in partisan identification among Asian American respondents in the study. However, previous studies have found levels of partisan identity are often linked to affectively-charged evaluations involving favorability toward one particular party and/or dislike toward others. In the context of the RPI model, Asian Americans exposed to Republican-led derogation of a superordinate racial-minority identity respond negatively toward the Republican Party and its members, measured through an increase in identification with the Democratic Party and decrease in identification with the Republican Party. This identification is closely linked to affectively-charged evaluations involving an increased favorability toward the Democratic Party and increased hostility toward the Republican Party. It is most likely the case then that the extent to which exposure to derogation impacts subsequent affective partisan evaluations is largely dependent on the informational cues that create an association between the derogation and the Republican Party.

H6.3) The increased salience and unambiguity of partisan cues associated with political derogation will have a significant impact on affective partisan evaluations.

This final hypothesis argues that increasing the salience of partisan cues associated with the political derogation and increasing the level of clarity of these associations will result in a heightened effect of the derogation on feelings of liking/disliking toward both the Democratic and Republican Parties.

METHODOLOGY

Subjects for the current study were recruited using online volunteer panels provided by the polling company *YouGov Polimetrix™* (YouGov). Over the course of the month of June of 2015, YouGov interviewed 900 Asian American respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 860. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). Data on voter registration status and turnout were matched to this frame using the November 2010 Current Population Survey. Data on interest in politics and party identification were then matched to this frame from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and ideology. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.

Participants in the study were randomly assigned to read one of three articles at the beginning of the study. Similar to the treatment used in the study that was discussed in the previous chapter, the articles involved public debate over a new law that was passed that was nearly identical with SB 1070 which was recently passed in the state of Arizona in order to deal with the issue of illegal immigrants. Much of the content for the three articles used in the current study was taken word-for-word from the article used in the earlier study. The three articles were also designed to be nearly identical to each other with the exception being the salience and clarity of partisan cues included in the articles. One article included a discussion of the passing of the new law and a statement of support from the Republican politician who initially sponsored it. The second article included this same discussion of support for the law, but also included a discussion of opposition the law has received from Democratic politicians in the state. Finally, the third article includes both discussions of support and opposition, but describes the law as being supported by a group of Democratic and Republican politicians and as being opposed by a group of Democratic and Republican politicians. Below are excerpts taken from the three articles to illustrate their contrasts:

- Article 1: "However, since then a controversial new law passed by Republican leaders in [redacted] gives police officers the legal authority to demand identification from any individual if there is reasonable suspicion the person is in the country illegally."
- Article 2: "However, the new law has already received sharp criticism from Democratic lawmakers and minority residents in the state."
- Article 3: "However, since then a controversial new law passed by a group of Republican and Democratic leaders in [redacted] gives police officers the legal authority to demand

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identification from any individual if there is reasonable suspicion the person is in the

country illegally."

Those asked to read Article #3 were intended to serve as the *control* group in the experiment.

The study was originally designed so that the control article would not contain any explicit party

cues. However, as analyses from the earlier study have shown, even in the absence of explicit

party cues respondents may infer an association between the anti-immigration policy and the

Republican Party. In order to account for this, the control article was designed to instead

neutralize the effect of any partisan biases. As previously discussed, there is compelling

experimental evidence that conveyance of both agreement and disagreement within a group/party

is highly effective in neutralizing peoples' group-related biases.

Article #1 serves as the test of increasing the level of salience in partisan-led derogation

against Latino immigrants. In this article, the legislation being discussed is framed explicitly and

clearly as being sponsored by Republican politicians in the state. Subjects exposed to this article

were exposed to a politically-charged derogation against Latino immigrants and a superordinate

racial-minority identity that was associated explicitly with the Republican Party. While the

article used in the control group includes both Republican and Democratic cues, Article #1

includes only Republican partisan cues thus increasing the perceived salience of the Republican

partisan cue in comparison with the control article.

Article #2 serves as the test of decreasing the level of ambiguity of partisan cues

associated with the derogation. In this article, the legislation is also framed as being explicitly

and clearly supported by the Republican Party but also includes a discussion of clear and explicit

opposition to the legislation from Democratic politicians in the state. While the control article

describes a weak intraparty consensus on the anti-immigrant legislation among both Democrats

and Republicans, Article #2 describes a strong intraparty consensus along with a strong interparty disagreement intended to clearly denote the political party which is in support of the legislation versus the political party which is opposed to it.[39]

After reading one of the three articles, subjects were then asked to complete the Asian-American Identity Scale items, perceived identity-overlap items, and Racial-Minority Identity Scale items used in the earlier study. Following these, subjects were asked to answer a series of questions related to their identification with a particular party and the affective evaluations related to their identification. First, subjects were given feeling thermometers for both Democrats and Republicans and asked to state on a scale of 1-00 how cold or warm they felt toward each group. Included in these groups were Liberals, Conservatives, Police Officers, and Atheists.[40] The order in which each group appeared was randomized between subjects and each group was presented individually.

Following this, subjects were asked to complete the traditional 7-level party identity question where they are first asked with which party they identify, and are then asked to state the strength of this identification. After this, subjects were asked a series of questions intended to measure the extent to which they internalized their identification with that particular party. These questions were:

- How important is being a Democrat/Republican to you?
- How well does the term Democrat/Republican describe you?
- When talking about Democrats/Republicans, how often do you say "we" instead of "they"?

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[39] Full text for all three articles used in the study is included in the Appendix.
[40] Atheists were included as a group in order to serve as a comparison group with the partisan groups, as atheists are among the most disliked of groups according to American public opinion survey data (CITE PEW STUDY). However, it may not be the case that a high level of dislike for atheists is consistent across the different racial groups in the United States, including among Asians.

- To what extent do you think of yourself as being separate from other Democrats/Republicans?

Subjects were asked these questions in reference to either the Democratic or Republican Party based on how they responded to the traditional 7-level measure. The order in which each question was asked was randomized.

Following this, subjects were asked to complete two additional identity-overlap tasks (identical in design to the racial task used earlier in the study) that were intended to measure the perceived amount of commonality between Asians and each of the two major political parties in the United States. Subjects were asked to state the extent to which Asians and Democrats have a shared identity with each other, and the extent to which Asians and Republicans have a shared identity with each other. The order in which these two questions appeared was randomized.

Finally, subjects were given the following issues in random order: Immigration reform, the economy in general, the Iraq War, ethics and morality, and education. For each issue, subjects were asked to state whether they felt either the Democratic Party or Republican Party was closer to their views on the issue. The purpose of this question was to measure the extent to which an increase/decrease in favorability toward a particular party in response to the experimental treatment produced a subsequent shift in cognitive evaluations related to each party's handling of important issues in the United States. For each issue, subjects were not given a neutral or middle-ground option and were forced to choose one particular party over the other. Upon completion of these questions, subjects were asked to answer a series of demographic questions and then concluded the study which included a full debriefing of the experimental design and hypotheses.

RESULTS

The first item of concern in the analyses is to test if the experimental treatments had any significant impact on subjects' partisan identification. The central aspect of the proposed RPI model is a subsequent partisan movement among Asian Americans who are exposed to political derogation against Latino immigrants. Table 6.1 provides the results for individual difference-of-means t-tests for all measures of partisan identity included in the study between the three randomized groups of subjects. If hypotheses H6.1 and H6.2 are valid, then there should be significant differences observed between subjects exposed to the control article and those exposed to the Republican-led derogation article and/or those exposed to the article with unambiguous Democratic and Republican cues. However, as the results show there was no significant difference on any of the partisan identity measures based on either the salience or ambiguity of the partisan cues included in the derogation articles.

The only exception was the multi-item Social Identity measure of partisan identity for Republican identifiers, but the effect on partisan identity was the opposite of what was originally predicted by the RPI model. For subjects who identified as Republicans exposure to anti-immigration Republican cues produced a stronger sense of identification as a member of the Republican Party, and this difference was observed when comparing with both subjects in the control group and subjects who were exposed to cues indicating a pro-immigration Democratic association. Surprisingly however, this same reverse effect was not observed among subjects who identified as Democrats. One of the possible explanations for this finding is that the SIT measure of partisan identity best captures the motivational component of a group identity, and for those who identified with the Republican Party increasing the salience of Republican cues in

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TABLE 6.1. Effect of Party Cues on Partisanship

	Control	Republican	Republican + Democrat
7-Level	.592	.607	.591
Therm. (Rep)	.421	.416	.421
Therm. (Dem)	.576	.551	.558
Therm. (Diff)	.151	.133	.129
SIT (Rep)	.430[a]	.525[ab]	.440[b]
SIT (Dem)	.498	.498	.501
ID Overlap (Rep)	.384	.388	.363
ID Overlap (Dem)	.489	.487	.475
Issues	.592	.621	.617

Table entries indicate means for all measures of partisan identity recoded 0-1. Superscripts indicate group pairs with statistically significant difference-of-means t-tests at the $p < .05$ level for a two-tailed test.

the derogation of Latino immigrants threatened not a race-based identity but instead their partisan identity. This argument will be revisited in the discussion section.

Recalling the results from the previous study, partisan movement among Asian American respondents did not occur as a direct result of exposure to the derogation article but instead it occurred as a product of an activated racial identity and a broader superordinate racial-minority identity. Moreover, previous results showed the effect of the derogation on subsequent partisan identification was moderated by how strongly respondents identified as racial minorities. Taking this into consideration it is not wholly surprising that the experimental manipulation of party cues associated with this derogation did not have significant main effects on the extent to which subjects in the experiment identified with either the Democratic or Republican Party. Instead it is more likely the case that the effect of the party cues on partisan identification is moderated by the broader identities being activated by exposure to the derogation.

FIGURE 6.1. Comparing Responses to the Identity Measures

Solid line indicates density plot for responses on the Racial Minority Identity Scale; dashed line
indicates density plot for responses on the Asian American Identity Scale.

Figure 6.1 shows a comparison of the histograms for both responses on the Asian

American Identity Scale and the Racial Minority Identity Scale. As the graph shows the two

measures do seem to be somewhat related to each other, though subjects in the study seemed to

identify more strongly as Asian Americans than as racial minorities mirroring results from the

previous study. In addition, the bivariate correlation coefficient between the two identity

measures was .575 indicating a moderately strong relationship between the two variables but also

providing evidence of two distinct identities. Looking at the effect of the experimental treatments

on activating a racial Asian-American identity and/or a broader racial minority superordinate

identity, Table 6.2 provides evidence that the manipulation of party cues did not have a main

effect on the activation and expression of either identity. Subjects in either of the two

experimental groups did not exhibit a statistically significant deviation in their Asian-American

or racial minority identity compared with those in the control group. Since there is no evidence

TABLE 6.2. Effect of Party Cues on Race-based Identity

	Asian American Identity	Racial Minority Identity
Party Cues:		
Republican	- .015	.023
	(.017)	(.017)
Republican + Democrat	- .009	- .003
	(.018)	(.018)
Constant	.602***	.465***
	(.012)	(.013)
N	628	627

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variables are responses on the Asian-American Identity Scale and Racial-Minority Identity Scale. Omitted category for party cues variable is the control condition. All variables recoded 0-1. ***$p < .001$ for a two-tailed test.

that the experimental treatments were affecting levels of either a racial or racial-minority

identity, it is possible to test whether the effect of the treatments on subsequent partisan

movement is then being significantly moderated by identification with either of these identities.

In the previous study the effect of the derogation of a racial-minority identity on partisan identity

was largely conditional on how strongly respondents identified as racial minorities. According to

Table 6.3 it seems that the effect of party cues associated with this derogation on subsequent

partisan identity is not similarly being moderated by a racial-minority identity. Instead a separate

interaction is observed between the experimental treatments and an Asian American identity. For

subjects in the experiment who did not identify as Asian Americans at all, the increase in

salience of Republican cues associated with the derogation of racial minorities actually produced

a stronger identification with the Republican Party. However, for those subjects who identified

strongly as Asian Americans, an increase in salient partisan cues did not have a significant effect

on partisan identity but an increase in the level of clarity of partisan cues did produce a

TABLE 6.3. Predicting Partisan Identity

Party cues:		
Republican	- .141	.005
	(.117)	(.094)
Republican + Democrat	- .235$^+$	- .010
	(.124)	(.096)
Asian American Identity	.176	
	(.144)	
Racial Minority Identity		.324*
		(.141)
Party cues X Asian American Identity:		
Republican Interaction	.273	
	(.191)	
Republican + Democrat Interaction	.389$^+$	
	(.199)	
Party cues X Racial Minority Identity:		
Republican Interaction		.012
		(.187)
Republican + Democrat Interaction		.018
		(.193)
Constant	.486***	.441***
	(.089)	(.070)
N	582	581

Table entries indicate OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is 7-level partisan identity with higher values indicating stronger identification with Democratic Party. Omitted category for party cues is control condition. All variables recoded 0-1. $^+p < .1$, $*p < .05$, $***p < .001$ for a two-tailed test.

significant movement toward the Democratic Party; exposure to the article with both Democratic and Republican cues resulted in a nearly 40 percent increase in identification with the Democratic Party (significant at the $p < .1$ level for a two-tailed test) compared with exposure to the article with ambiguous partisan cues.

One finding that stands out in particular from these results is that among subjects assigned to the control group in the experiment, the extent to which they identified as Asian Americans had no significant effect on their partisan identity. This provides compelling evidence

that the Racialized Partisan Identity tested and observed in the previous chapter is largely dependent upon the role of partisan cues in the activation of a superordinate racial-minority identity. For all Asian American subjects in the experiment both their level of racial identity and their racial-minority identity were significant predictors of their partisan identity ($p < .001$ for a two-tailed test) when tested separately as independent predictors. However, only the effect of subjects' Asian-American identity was significantly moderated by the salience and level of ambiguity of partisan cues in the treatments. Moreover, when both variables are included as independent variables in a regression model predicting partisan identity the significant effect of racial-minority identity nearly disappears while the effect of Asian-American identity remains significant. This provides some evidence that much of the initial observed effect of the racial-minority identity on partisanship occurs through the racial identity. This argument is rather counter-intuitive to the original RPI model being proposed and will be revisited in the discussion section of the chapter.

The next area of concern is testing the effect of the experimental treatments on subsequent affective evaluations related to both the Democratic and Republican Party. Results from Table 6.1 indicated that neither favorability toward the Democratic nor Republican Party (or the difference between these two) was significantly impacted by the level of salience and ambiguity/clarity of partisan cues in the derogation articles. However, it may be the case that the effect of the treatments on affective partisan evaluations is conditional on the expression of Asian Americans' racial identity. This was previously observed when looking at the effect of the treatments on how respondents scored on the 7-level measure of partisan identity. This may also be the case when looking at the effect of the treatments on affective evaluations linked to a partisan identification.

Table 6.4 has the results for regressing feeling thermometer scores toward both Democrats and Republicans on the experimental treatments accounting for the moderating effect of a racial or racial-minority identity. There are two notable takeaways from this analysis. First, a significant interaction effect is observed when looking at Asian-American identity but not when looking at a racial minority identity. Similar to the regression models predicting responses on the 7-level partisan identity measure, the effect of an Asian-American identity on feeling thermometer scores are significantly being moderated by the level of salience and ambiguity of partisan cues. The second notable takeaway is that these results are not consistent across feeling thermometers toward both parties. The lack of strong partisan cues (operationalized in the control condition) had more of an attenuating effect on the effect of Asian American identity on feeling thermometer scores toward Republicans than Democrats. For the latter, Asian American identity was still a significant predictor of affective evaluations even for those in the control condition. The same regression models were conducted using the differenced-scores between the two feeling thermometers and showed that the positive effect of Asian American identity on liking Democrats over Republicans was enhanced as partisan cues became more salient and unambiguous.[41] The results from Table 6.4 provide weak support for hypothesis H6.3 in that manipulating the level of salience and ambiguity of partisan cues did impact subsequent affective partisan evaluations. However, the effects are again observed to be occurring through an interaction with levels of Asian American identity and are also asymmetric concerning their impact on evaluations of the Democratic versus Republican Party.

Related to dynamic shifts in affective evaluations toward both the Democratic and Republican Parties is the extent to which individuals internalize their partisan identification.

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[41] Results from this analysis are provided in the Appendix.

TABLE 6.4. Predicting Feeling Thermometer Scores for Republicans and Democrats

	Republicans		Democrats	
Party cues:				
Republican	.153	.000	- .040	- .089
	(.099)	(.079)	(.101)	(.080)
Republican + Democrat	.086	- .092	- .183$^+$	- .083
	(.103)	(.080)	(.101)	(.079)
Asian American Identity	- .084		.228$^+$	
	(.122)		(.124)	
Racial Minority Identity		- .262*		.280*
		(.120)		(.120)
Party cues X Asian American Identity:				
Republican Interaction	- .274$^+$		.031	
	(.160)		(.163)	
Republican + Democrat Interaction	- .144		.282$^+$	
	(.165)		(.163)	
Party cues X Racial Minority Identity:				
Republican Interaction		- .001		.120
		(.157)		(.158)
Republican + Democrat Interaction		.199		.142
		(.163)		(.159)
Constant	.471***	.542***	.438***	.445***
	(.076)	(.059)	(.077)	(.059)
N	599	598	607	606

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variables are feeling thermometer scores toward Republicans and Democrats. Omitted category for party cues is control condition. All variables recoded 0-1. $^+p < .1$, $*p < .05$, $***p < .001$ for a two-tailed test.

Results from Table 6.1 indicated among the several different measures of partisan identity included in the study, only the SIT measure of identification with the Republican Party was significantly impacted by the experimental treatments. However, the potential interaction between the experimental treatments and Asian American identity was tested for both an internalized Republican and Democratic identification. Table 6.5 has the results of the separate regression models for predicting identification with the Republican Party and Democratic Party using the multi-item SIT scales of partisan identity. Interestingly, among both Democratic and

**TABLE 6.5. Predicting SIT Measures of Party Identification**

	Republican SIT	Democrat SIT
Party cues:		
Republican	- .137	- .262*
	(.120)	(.115)
Republican + Democrat	.182	- .169
	(.132)	(.126)
Asian American Identity	- .128	.041
	(.150)	(.139)
Party cues X Asian American Identity:		
Republican Interaction	.425*	.423*
	(.207)	(.181)
Republican + Democrat Interaction	- .335	.267
	(.230)	(.195)
Constant	.502***	.473***
	(.089)	(.088)
N	171	324

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is multi-item partisan identity strength for Republican and Democratic identifiers. Omitted category for party cues is control condition. All variables recoded 0-1. $^+$p < .1, *p < .05, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test.

Republican identifiers, the effect of increased salience of Republican cues in the political derogation against racial minorities on how strongly partisans identified with their respective groups was significantly impacted by how strongly they identified as Asian Americans.

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 provide graphs of these interactions when looking specifically at the effect of experimentally manipulating the salience of Republican cues related to political derogation on how strongly subjects identified with their political party for both Republican and Democratic identifiers, respectively. For those subjects who identified as Republicans, the effect of the partisan cues shifted from a negative to a positive effect on the scaled SIT measure of Republican identification as subjects identified more strongly as Asian Americans. For those subjects who identified as Democrats, again the effect of the partisan cues shifted from a

FIGURE 6.2.

The Effect of Partisan Cues on Republican SIT

Graph illustrates the marginal effect of exposure to salient Republican anti-immigrant cues on identity strength among Republican identifiers across levels of Asian-American identity strength. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full regression results are listed in Table 6.5.

FIGURE 6.3.

Effect of Partisan Cues on Democrat SIT

Graph illustrates the marginal effect of exposure to salient Republican anti-immigrant cues on identity strength among Democratic identifiers across levels of Asian-American identity strength. Vertical brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full regression results are listed in Table 6.5.

negative to a positive effect on the scaled SIT measure of Democratic identification across levels of Asian American identity but this shift was greater in magnitude. For subjects who identified as Democrats and reported having a weak identification as an Asian American, exposure to partisan cues linking the Republican Party to anti-immigration policies actually produced a significant decrease in Democratic identity strength ($p < .05$ for a two-tailed test). The positive effect of increasing the salience of the link between the Republican Party and anti-immigrant sentiment on the strength of identity among Republican identifiers across levels of Asian-American identity is particularly surprising. This hints at the possibility that the derogation in the study was not necessarily activating a racialized identity across all groups of respondents. This point will be revisited in the discussion section.

Testing the Effects of Partisan Cues on a Racialized Identity

The current analyses up to this point provide strong evidence that the effect of increasing the salience and clarity of partisan cues associated with the political derogation of Latino immigrants on subsequent partisan identification is significantly impacted by how strongly individuals exposed to the derogation identify as Asian Americans. While it was also shown that the experimental treatments did not have a significant main effect on expressions of this racial identity, a key component of the RPI model observed in the previous chapter is that the Asian-American identity that is activated and/or expressed upon exposure to such minority-targeted derogation is better conceptualized as a racialized Asian American identity. In other words Asian Americans who were exposed to political derogation were more likely to define their racial identity based on a perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities and to a

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lesser extent a perceived separation between Asians and Whites. Another component of the RPI model was that it was this racialized Asian-American identity which activated a broader racial-minority superordinate identity. While there was no evidence in the current experiment that the effect of manipulating partisan cues on partisan identification was significantly impacted by this broader racial-minority identity, there was compelling evidence for a significant moderation effect from an Asian-American identity. As such, it is important to examine to what extent this Asian-American identity is defined by perceptions of intergroup commonality between Asians and other racial groups, and whether or not this differs based on the manipulation of partisan cues.

Table 6.6 has the regression results for predicting responses on the Asian American Identity Scale between subjects in all three conditions. For all subjects in the experiment, a perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities produced significant increases in Asian American identity and a perceived commonality between Asians and Whites produced significant decreases in Asian-American identity. If the activation of a racialized Asian American identity differs based on the association of partisan cues, then the effects of the identity-overlap measures on Asian-American identity should differ across experimental conditions. The results provide moderate evidence of this argument. Between subjects in the control and Republican-led derogation conditions, there were slight differences. Subjects who were exposed to salient partisan cues associated with the political derogation defined a greater sense of their Asian American identity based on a perceived separation between Asians and Whites than those in the control group. Not only did the size of the effect increase from producing a 20 percent to a 25 percent decrease on the Asian American Identity Scale, the significance of the effect increased as well ($p < .01$ to $p < .001$ for a two-tailed test). Similarly,

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TABLE 6.6. Predicting Asian-American Identity

	Control	Republican	Both
Identity Overlap			
with Blacks + Latinos	.189**	.120*	.216**
	(.071)	(.053)	(.073)
with Whites	- .196**	- .246***	- .184**
	(.059)	(.048)	(.068)
Ethnicity:			
Chinese	.161**	.007	- .014
	(.057)	(.050)	(.058)
Indian	.166**	.019	.007
	(.061)	(.053)	(.065)
Filipino	.057	.037	.076
	(.067)	(.056)	(.070)
Vietnamese	.106	.045	.030
	(.073)	(.064)	(.070)
Korean	.142*	- .012	- .046
	(.070)	(.064)	(.075)
Japanese	.085	- .006	- .051
	(.069)	(.056)	(.067)
Youth	.033	.027	.000
	(.063)	(.068)	(.072)
Education	- .137*	.062	.025
	(.058)	(.047)	(.062)
Male	- .014	- .016	.048
	(.026)	(.024)	(.030)
Immigrant	- .032	- .037	- .027
	(.026)	(.025)	(.032)
Income	.021	- .098[+]	- .137*
	(.058)	(.058)	(.069)
Constant	.591***	.646***	.645***
	(.090)	(.080)	(.095)
Adj. R^2	.085	.113	.097
N	170	200	159

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is Asian-American Identity Scale. All variables recoded 0-1. *$p < .05$, ***$p < .001$ for a two-tailed test.

the effect of perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities decreased

between those subjects in the control condition and those exposed to the Republican-led

derogation, both in substantive effect (19 percent to 12 percent) and in statistical significance (p < .01 to p < .1 for a two-tailed test). However, there was not any notable difference in effects of the perceived commonality identity-overlap measures between those subjects in the control condition and those in the condition that involved non-ambiguous anti-immigrant Republican cues and pro-immigrant Democratic cues. These findings will be revisited in the discussion section.

Partisan Cues and Perceived Ideological Proximity

The final area of concern in this preliminary analysis involves the question of whether or not a racialized partisan identity has subsequent effects on cognitive evaluations related to issue positions and ideological proximity for either the Democratic or Republican Party. As discussed in the methodology section, the study included a series of questions that asked respondents to state whether or not the Democratic or Republican Party held positions on a number of different issues closer to their own positions. Table 6.7 shows the results for all subjects in the experiment across all five issues mentioned in the questions. For all five issues subjects indicated that the Democratic Party was closer in ideological proximity to their own views than the Republican Party. While there was variation in this perceived proximity across issues, subjects in general reported being more aligned with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party concerning the issue of immigration as well as other unrelated but important issues.

Table 6.1 indicated that the experimental treatments did not have a significant impact on whether subjects reported a closer proximity with the Democratic Party or the Republican Party concerning important issues in the United States. However, more important than this is whether

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TABLE 6.7. Perceptions of Ideological Proximity in Sample

	Closer to Democrat	Closer to Republican	Diff.	N
Immigration	62%	38%	+24%	628
Economy	58%	42%	+16%	628
Iraq War	59%	41%	+18%	627
Ethics and Morality	63%	37%	+26%	628
Education	64%	36%	+28%	628

Table entries indicate percentage of sample respondents who indicated being closer to either the Democratic or Republican Party on the various sets of issues.

or not the observed partisan movement that occurred between subjects in the control and experimental conditions was associated with a congruent shift in ideological proximity concerning the issue of immigration as well as other major issues. In order to test this, a variable was constructed indicating the number of issues to which a particular subject perceived a closer ideological proximity with the Democratic Party. The variable included a category for zero issues (20%), up to two issues (17%), up to four issues (27%), and all five issues (37%). The regression model from Table 6.3 was conducted (only using the Asian American identity interaction) separately for the four categories of subjects in order to examine to what extent the observed effects of the treatments on subsequent partisan identification coincided with congruent shifts in cognitive evaluations related to ideological proximity. Table 6.8 has the results of these four separate regression models.

A comparison of the regression results across levels of ideological proximity with the Democratic Party indicate the partisan movement observed in the study as a result of the experimental treatments is not significantly related to congruent shifts in cognitive evaluations related to a particular political party. Among subjects who perceived a total lack of congruency between themselves and the Democratic Party's issue platform, the interaction between the

TABLE 6.8. Predicting Partisan Identity Across Ideological Proximity with the Democratic Party

	0 Issues	1-2 Issues	3-4 Issues	5 Issues
Party cues:				
Republican	.167	- .129	- .077	- .154
	(.139)	(.208)	(.163)	(.130)
Republican + Democrat	- .070	.101	- .270	- .121
	(.138)	(.230)	(.188)	(.133)
Asian American Identity	.242	.181	- .002	- .174
	(.159)	(.259)	(.203)	(.161)
Party cues X Asian American Identity:				
Republican Interaction	- .457^{+}	.074	.222	.246
	(.239)	(.358)	(.257)	(.206)
Republican + Democrat Interaction	.083	- .270	.443	.134
	(.258)	(.374)	(.284)	(.211)
Constant	.104	.299^{+}	.662***	.960***
	(.095)	(.157)	(.134)	(.098)
N	109	96	157	219

Table entries indicate OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is 7-level partisan identity with higher values indicating stronger identification with the Democratic Party. All variables are recoded 0-1. $^{+}$p < .1, ***p < .001 for a two-tailed test.

experimental treatment and Asian American identity was negative indicating a movement toward the Republican Party. However, as a perceived congruency with the Democratic Party increased the observed conditional effects of the treatments did not significantly move in a particular direction. The lack of heterogeneity in the observed effects across levels of perceived ideological proximity provide an initial indication that partisan movement in response to political derogation involves a greater emphasis on affective evaluations toward the Democratic and Republican parties than cognitive evaluations related to a perceived ideological proximity (or lack thereof) to each party's issue platforms.

DISCUSSION

In order to test the role of partisan cues in partisan movement among Asian Americans exposed to politically-charged derogation against racial minorities as predicted by the RPI model, a separate experiment was conducted on a nationally representative sample of Asian Americans. Subjects were exposed to news articles highlighting political derogation against Latino immigrant groups as well as racial minorities in general. Each article was intentionally designed to emphasize an increased salience of the partisan groups specifically associated with the derogation and also to emphasize a decreased level of ambiguity of partisan support versus opposition towards this derogation. The combined results from the study indicate that though explicit party cues are not a necessary aspect of the proposed RPI model, the extent to which a racialized partisan identity is observed among Asian Americans exposed to political derogation against racial minorities is largely impacted by their level of salience and/or clarity when included in the derogation. However, the current analyses also raise further questions in order to explain specific results which were either unaccounted for by the RPI theoretical framework or counterintuitive to its initial set of hypotheses.

The analyses indicated that experimental manipulation of partisan cues did not have any significant main effects on any of the measures of partisanship included in the study with the exception of the multi-item SIT partisan identity-strength measure for those respondents who identified specifically as Republicans. Moreover, an examination of variation on this psychological measure of partisan identity found that an increase in the salience of the link between political derogation and the Republican cues actually produced a stronger sense of identification with the Republican Party. This positive impact on identification with the Republican Party was also observed when looking at the conditional effect of salient partisan

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cues among those Asian-American respondents who reported little to no psychological

attachment to their racial identity. Among these respondents, the increase in salience of the link

between derogation and Republican support again produced a partisan movement toward the

Republican Party.

A potential explanation for these findings is that among these subgroups of Asian-

American respondents, exposure to partisan derogation against a superordinate racial-minority

identity served to activate these respondents' own partisan identities and as a result subsequent

information processing related to the derogation occurred under the influence of a primary

partisan identity versus a racial and/or racial-minority identity as predicted by the RPI model.

The amount of research that has been conducted on the topic of partisan-biased information-

processing and motivated reasoning is extensive to say the least (Lodge et al. 1993; Burdein et al.

2006; Taber and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2000) though some have debated its

characterization as heuristic-based (Green et al. 2002). The central theme underlying the partisan

motivated reasoning research agenda is the extent to which political attitudes are formed and/or

updated (or not) based on pre-existing partisan attachments. Particularly notable studies

regarding the large degree of magnitude in which individuals' partisan biases impact the

processing of political stimuli have found that those with strong partisan biases are more likely to

dismiss information which is deemed to be attitudinally incongruent with their party's

ideological preferences (Taber and Lodge 2006) and to even express support for public policies

that are attitudinally incongruent with their own preferences based solely on explicit statements

of support from fellow members of their partisan group (Cohen 2003).

An additional finding that supports this potential explanation is the increase in partisan

identity strength upon exposure to Republican derogation against racial minorities observed

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specifically among those who identified with the Republican Party compared with the relative lack of change in partisan identity strength among Democratic identifiers exposed to the same derogation. The fact that only those who expressed a partisan attachment to the Republican Party displayed an increase in their partisan identification provides evidence that this subsequent movement toward strengthening a pre-existing partisanship was most likely the result of a motivational response to the activation (and potential threatening) of this partisan attachment primed by exposure to salient partisan cues.

However, the fact this partisan movement only occurred among those Asian Americans who possessed strong levels of attachment to their racial identity may indicate heterogeneity concerning the primacy of a partisan versus race-based identity as a result of exposure to partisan-sourced political derogation. An additional question then is raised regarding the potential role of ambivalence between a political identity and a social identity, particularly in environmental contexts that highlight the incongruence in goal-orientation between these two separate but related attachments. Analyses from the current study showed a strong and positive link between both a racial identity and a racial-minority superordinate identity with a strong Democratic identification. It is most likely the case that those Asian Americans who identify weakly with the former identity (identities) but identify strongly with the latter, or vice-versa, are expressing a high level of ambivalence toward these attachments which would undoubtedly impact subsequent political responses within such environmental contexts. Follow-up studies that aim to test a potential explanation concerning a primacy of partisan identity in the context of the RPI model would require a measure (or measures) of partisan attachment that are exogeneous to subsequent racial and political responses resulting from exposure to political derogation.

The current analyses also tested the effects of partisan cues on the activation of a racialized Asian-American identity defined by perceived commonality between Asians and other racial minorities. While all respondents in the study expressed a racial identity defined by these intergroup evaluations which was not surprising given that all respondents regardless of group assignment were exposed to some form of political derogation against racial minorities, the observed effects were for the most part homogeneous across the level of salience and ambiguity of partisan cues associated with this derogation with a few noted exceptions. However, these exceptions do provide some evidence that the manipulation of partisan cues may also be having a more direct effect on the perceived commonality measures themselves. In order to test this, provided in the Appendix is a comparison of mean responses to each identity-overlap measure asked in the study using separate difference-of-means t-tests comparing responses in the control group against both experimental groups. The results of these tests indicate that an increased level of salience and/or ambiguity of partisan cues attached to the political derogation against racial minorities significantly impacts perceptions of a racial hierarchy and the extent to which Asians share a commonality with other racial minorities based on their placement on this hierarchy as well as a separation between Asians and Whites. In addition, they also provide further evidence of the link between social race-based identities and political partisan identities where the manipulation of the latter can significantly impact the former.

Unfortunately, this variation in intergroup commonality related to a racial hierarchy observed between those in the control group and those in the experimental groups may not be attributed solely to an increased level of salience and/or ambiguity of partisan cues. While the manipulation of partisan cues was the primary intent in designing the experimental treatments, it cannot be ignored that the derogation articles used in the study differ from each other on

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additional criteria as well. The most notable of these differences involves the inclusion of racial cues in the derogation articles. In trying to construct derogation articles that were identical to the one used in the previous test and validation of the RPI model, public response for the derogation was largely framed as supportive among Whites and as oppositional among Latinos and Asians. As a result, an attempt at producing an article that increased the salience of partisan cues by isolating Republican support for the derogation also removed some of the racial-minority cues that were attached to opposition against the derogation but were included in the other two conditions. While this increased-salience article still did feature racially-sourced opposition through the main protagonist of James Wong who was described as an individual "of Chinese descent and lifelong resident of the United States", the lack of racial cues related to Latino opposition need to be taken into account when examining the effects of the experimental treatments on intergroup evaluations; a concern that may be particularly relevant when examining evaluations related to a shared minority status between Asians and Latinos on a social-racial hierarchy in the United States.

Finally, in looking at the extent to which racial and/or racial-minority identification modified the effect of partisan cues on subsequent partisan attachments, a strong case was made for an interactive relationship between the experimental treatments and an Asian-American identity but there was no evidence to indicate this same relationship existed between the experimental treatments and a broader racial-minority superordinate identification when examining the drivers of partisan movement in response to the manipulation of partisan cues. Moreover, stepwise regressions which compared the effects of each identity measure on levels of partisan identity (both individually and combined) provided some evidence that the effect of the racial-minority identity was mediated by the effect of the Asian-American identity. This would

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indicate a reversal in causal ordering between the activation of each identity as originally outlined in the RPI model.

These findings which hint at the possibility of a racial-minority identity that comes prior to an Asian American identity in a causal sequence, however counterintuitive to the original theoretical framework, should not be prematurely dismissed. As discussed previously, much of the scholarly consensus regarding ethnic and pan-ethnic evaluations among the Asian-American population lies solely on the notion that Asian citizens residing in the United States (both immigrant and native) primarily view their own identity based on their nation of origin. Beyond this, there is a large amount of disagreement over whether or not these groups recognize and embrace a broader identity based on their race, ceteris paribus. This means that for some portion of the Asian-American population an ethnic identity may not necessarily be congruent with a racial identity. As a result, the activation of a broader racial-minority identity that facilitates a shared commonality between themselves and other racial-minority groups may occur prior to, and may have a causal impact on, a subsequent shared commonality between themselves and other Asian ethnic groups. This framework may be particularly relevant when dealing with high levels of out-group hostility against other Asian origin groups (either broadly or narrowed) that surpass status-quo out-group evaluations related to other racial-minority groups.

CONCLUSION

The current project finds compelling evidence that partisan identification among Asian Americans is deeply impacted by the extent to which the American political environment is perceived to racialize Asian Americans' own sense of their racial identity. This racialization is rooted in a perceived social-racial hierarchy brought on by exposure to political derogation against racial minorities in the United States. Taking a closer look at the series of analyses and hypotheses tested in this manuscript, the following claims can be made:

Hypotheses H1 and H1.1

Exposure to political derogation against racial minorities significantly impacted the extent to which Asians perceived a commonality between themselves and other racial-minority groups in the United States. Using an experimental design where Asian-American respondents were randomly assigned to be exposed to political attacks related to the issue of immigration reform, it was found that such exposure had a strong positive effect on a perceived commonality between Asians and both Blacks and Latinos. Moreover, the exposure also produced a negative effect on perceived commonality between Asians and Whites though this effect was less pronounced.

Hypotheses H2 and H2.1

Using the observational analyses, a compelling case can be made regarding the activation of a racialized Asian-American identity. Among respondents in the 2008 NAAPS, perceptions of commonality between Asians and other racial-minority groups were positively related to expressions of linked fate with other Asians in the United States. Among respondents in the

Asian American Identity Survey, a perceived identity-overlap between Asians and both Blacks and Latinos produced a large and highly significant effect on how respondents scored on the Asian-American Identity Scale. The combined results depict a strong case for the notion that Asian Americans are largely defining their racial identity through a perceived social-racial hierarchy.

Hypothesis H3

A less clear case of support can be made for finding support for the causal relationship between exposure to political derogation, the activation of a racial hierarchy, and its subsequent effects on the expression of a racialized Asian-American identity. While experimental analyses showed that exogenous exposure to political derogation significantly impacted the extent to which Asian Americans defined their racial identity through a perceived social-racial hierarchy, the structural-equation analyses provided little support for the hypothesized mediational relationship.

Hypotheses H4 and H5

The analyses of responses from the Asian American Identity Survey indicate that an Asian-American racial identity and a broader racial-minority superordinate identity are two closely related concepts. However, the extent to which the latter serves as a mediator when looking at the effect of the former on subsequent partisan identity is highly questionable based on the current results. Stepwise regressions indicated that perhaps an Asian-American identity is serving as an intermediary between a racial-minority identity and its effect on partisanship. However, additional analyses also indicated that the effect of the superordinate racial-minority identity on partisanship is significantly impacted by whether or not it was formed in the context of exposure to political derogation.

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Hypotheses H6

Perhaps one of the most surprising findings to come out of the current analyses was that partisan movement in response to political derogation against legal and illegal immigrant groups occurred even in the absence of explicit partisan cues. While the observed effects on partisanship were not overwhelmingly large, they did adhere somewhat to the hypothesized framework of the RPI model. According to this framework, partisan derogation in the form of Republican-led attacks related to the issue of immigration reform will activate Asian Americans' own identification as racial minorities and will produce a leftward partisan movement as a motivational response to a perceived threat to this salient group identity. However, these effects were largely observed even when derogation was not explicitly associated with any party, let alone the Republican Party. This hints at the notion that Asian Americans are inferring an association between political attacks on immigrant groups and the Republican Party.

Hypotheses H6.1, H6.2, and H6.3

Though explicit partisan cues may not be a necessary in the activation of a racialized partisan identity, the inclusion of such cues may still have a significant impact. If this is the case, then the salience and clarity of these cues should also have a significant impact. Unfortunately, the experimental results presented in the previous chapter do not allow for any clear conclusions to be drawn regarding these predictions. The manipulation of either the salience or the clarity of partisan cues associated with political derogation did not have any significant main effects on either cognitive or affective expressions of partisanship, with the exception of the SIT-measure of identity strength among Republican identifiers. Moreover, additional analyses looking at the extent to which the link between racial and political attitudes was heterogeneous based on the

experimental treatments found that the increasing salience of Republican cues actually served to increase identification with the Republican Party among certain groups of Asian-American respondents and also raises further questions regarding the link between a racial identity and a pre-existing partisan attachment.

A Synthesis of Experimental Findings

According to the hypothesized Racialized Partisan Identity model, Asian Americans will move closer to the Democratic Party in response to Republican attacks on Latino immigrant groups. It was predicted that as political derogation against these racial-minority groups become more strongly associated with the Republican Party, the greater will be the subsequent partisan movement. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1987) group members will respond with hostility against a perceived threat to a shared in-group identity. It is argued here that such political attacks threaten both Asian Americans' sense of their racial identity as well as their identity as racial minorities in the United States.

The experimental results from the current analyses, however, do not support these claims. Instead these findings show that there exists much variability in how Asian Americans respond to partisan political attacks against a shared social identity and much of this is driven through their political identities. Instead of a general movement away from the Republican Party and toward the Democratic Party, Asian Americans displayed a crystallization of their own partisan identities in response to partisan cues linking the Republican Party with political attacks against immigrant and non-immigrant minority groups.

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Chapter 5 presented results from a survey experiment where a randomly assigned group of Asian-American respondents were exposed to political derogation against racial minorities in the form of a news article on the issue of immigration reform in the United States. It was found that the effect of being exposed to derogation on a subsequent partisan identity was significantly impacted by how strongly respondents identified as racial minorities. Among those who identified strongly as racial minorities, exposure to derogation resulted in a stronger identification with the Democratic Party. However, among those who did not identify as racial minorities at all or identified weakly with this group, exposure to derogation resulted in a stronger identification with the Republican Party. Though the observed interaction was not highly significant, it was particularly notable given its deviation from the original hypotheses along with the fact that no explicit partisan cues were included in the experimental manipulation. The exposure to derogation against racial minorities did not seem to activate a racial-minority identity among respondents in the study, yet the expression of this identity did seem to moderate the effect of derogation on subsequent levels of partisanship.

As an explanation of this finding it was argued that Asian Americans who do not perceive themselves as racial minorities do not respond with hostility against partisan groups who threaten such an identity. However, such an argument does little to explain why among this particular subgroup of Asian Americans a partisan movement was observed in the direction of the Republican Party. An alternate explanation is that a lack of identification as a racial minority may instead be indicative or representative of a pre-existing partisan attachment to the Republican Party. If Asian-American respondents were inferring that the political derogation was coming from the Republican Party (even though this link was not explicitly provided), then exposure to the derogation may have activated these respondents' own partisan identities

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resulting in a stronger identification with the Republican Party among those who were already predisposed to it. The observed partisan movement then may have been a further illustration of partisan motivated reasoning where party members will respond to negative information related to their party by strengthening their identification (Cohen 2003; Greene 2003).

This argument provides support for previous arguments that have been made regarding the link between social and political identities among voters in the United States. These links have been previously observed in looking at partisan sorting based around several key demographic groups including gender, region, religion, and most notably race and ethnicity. Though a large percentage of the Asian-American population do not identify with the American political system, the majority either identify or lean toward one of the two major political parties in the United States. Moreover, much of the non-identifying population maintains issue preferences linked to their ideological predispositions. Given these trends it is unsurprising that much of the Asian-American population maintains political identities rooted strongly in their social identities, and vice versa.

This link between social and political identities among Asian Americans was also observed in Chapter 6. In this survey experiment, all participants were asked to read an article on the issue of immigration reform (similar in nature and content to the article used as the experimental treatment in Chapter 5) but were randomly assigned one of three articles that varied based on the salience and clarity of partisan cues associated with the political derogation against Latino immigrant and non-immigrant groups. It was originally hypothesized that as the salience and clarity of Republican support for the anti-immigrant legislation increased, the stronger would be the negative reaction against the Republican Party among Asian-American respondents in the study. Instead the partisan-based motivated reasoning observed in the earlier study was again

observed. Though many responded to the increased salience and clarity of Republican cues by identifying more strongly with the Democratic Party, there were some who responded by identifying more strongly with the Republican Party. A notable difference from the earlier study is that levels of Asian-American identity served as a key moderator between the experimental treatment and subsequent partisan identity. Among those who identified strongly as Asian Americans, increasing the extent to which the Republican Party was associated with the political attacks produced a stronger identification with the Democratic Party. Among those who did not identify as Asian Americans, the same partisan cues produced a stronger identification with the Republican Party.

This partisan-based form of motivated reasoning was also observed when testing the effects of the experimental manipulation of partisan cues on partisan identity strength among Democratic and Republican identifiers, individually. However, instead of the increased clarity of partisan cues being a key predictor, an increased level of salience produced a stronger identification with respondents' own parties based on how strongly they identified as Asian Americans in the study. As the Republican Party became more clearly associated with anti-immigrant legislation and the Democratic Party became more clearly associated with its opposition, Asian Americans responded by identifying more strongly with the Democratic Party but only when they possessed an initial proclivity toward a Democratic partisan identification. Asian-American respondents who reported identification with the Republican Party responded to the partisan cues by identifying more strongly with the Republican Party. However, these effects were again significantly dependent upon how strongly they identified as Asian Americans.

The combined experimental results provide compelling evidence that often times Asian Americans' sense of their own racial identity is closely related to their partisan identities. Instead

of Asian Americans responding to Republican derogation against their identity as Asian Americans and as racial minorities by moving closer to the Democratic Party, the observed effects were conditional on the strength of their identity as racial minorities. Moreover, as the derogation became more clearly associated with the Republican Party, only those Asian Americans who identified strongly as Asian Americans and also possessed an initial attachment toward the Democratic Party responded by moving closer to the Democratic Party.

While the findings from the current set of studies provide strong evidence of a link between racial identities and partisan identities among Asian Americans, several key questions still remain regarding these relationships. The first question involves the primacy of a racial identity versus a superordinate racial-minority identity in shaping political preferences and attachments related to a partisan identification. In the survey experiment involving exposure to political derogation against racial minorities, identification as a racial minority served as a key moderating factor when looking at subsequent levels of partisanship. In the survey experiment involving the manipulation of partisan cues associated with the derogation, the effect of manipulating the salience and/or clarity of partisan cues on levels of partisan identity strength were moderated by respondents' identification as Asian Americans. At this point it is difficult to speculate why exposure to derogation had heterogeneous effects on partisanship across levels of a racial-minority identity but that the manipulation of partisan cues had heterogeneous effects across levels of an Asian-American racial identity. One potential explanation is that among those respondents who were exposed to the derogation, their identity as racial minorities were being made salient and as such, any subsequent partisan movement was dependent upon the activation of this superordinate identity. However, preliminary analyses indicated that there was no main effect of the derogation treatment on levels of racial-minority identity. Another potential

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explanation is that there exists a level of partisan sorting between those who identify as Asian Americans and those who do not. Empirical evidence both from the current study and previous work on the topic indicates that stronger levels of racial identity (previously conceptualized as group consciousness and linked fate) are often linked to a Democratic partisan identification while lower levels of racial identity are linked to a Republican partisanship. It may be the case that those respondents with higher levels of Asian-American identity may already harbor a sense of attachment to the Democratic Party (and/or hostility toward the Republican Party) and as such would have these biases activated in the presence of particular partisan cues. Moreover, the same may also be said regarding those respondents with lower levels of Asian-American identity and any potential biases they possess toward the Republican Party.

An additional question arises regarding the heterogeneous effects of increasing the salience of particular partisan cues versus their clarity when predicting subsequent levels of partisanship after exposure to political derogation against racial minorities. This was most clearly observed when predicting feeling thermometer ratings toward the Democratic and Republican parties among Asian Americans in the study. When looking at feeling thermometer scores toward the Republican Party, there was a significant difference between those respondents in the control condition and those in the increased-salience condition. However, when looking at feeling thermometer scores toward the Democratic Party, there was instead a significant difference between those in the control condition and those in the increased-clarity condition. While these effects were not highly robust, they do warrant further exploration.

In the discussion section from the previous chapter it was noted that several additional factors related to the treatment design may have played a role in these unexpected findings. But the discussion also noted increasing the salience and clarity of particular group-based cues may

have separate and distinct effects in regards to priming individuals' identification with these groups. While a heightened level of salience of an individual's in-group identity will impact levels of favorability toward their group, increasing the distinction between one's in-group and an opposing out-group will further impact subsequent group-level attitudes by increasing the salience of those particular boundaries which separate one from the other. In the case of a partisan identification, these distinctions play a critical role in the formation and maintenance of race-based partisan coalitions in the United States.

Finally, it is worth noting that the combined experimental results from the current study both support and refute currently ongoing research on the topic of partisan movement among Asian Americans. One study in particular, which was mentioned in a previous chapter, makes the argument that Asian Americans have been identifying more strongly with the Democratic Party due to a combination of intergroup solidarity with Latinos and feelings of social exclusion from Whites in the United States (Mo et al. 2015). Mo and her colleagues use both observational and experimental evidence to show that when Asian Americans' sense of racial identity is linked to a perceived otherness and/or a sense of linked political fate with Latinos they are more likely to view the Democratic Party more favorably and the Republican Party less favorably. The experimental results from the current study bolster these claims by showing that a partisan movement toward the Democratic Party and away from the Republican Party is based largely around Asian Americans' recognition of a superordinate racial-minority identity. However, the current results also indicate that such partisan movement is not homogeneous across the Asian-American population and that additional considerations are required, such as pre-existing partisan dispositions and attachments that impact the role of partisan cues in the activation of broader race-based social identities.

Epilogue

The growing trend toward a Democratic partisanship observed among the Asian-American population over the past several decades has become a primary area of concern for both media pundits and scholars of minority politics. This is related to demographic data that shows the growing role this population is slated to play in shaping political outcomes in the United States over the next several decades. According to a 2013 study conducted by the American Immigration Council, a large percentage of newly eligible voters going into the 2014 congressional elections were made up of Latino and Asian groups. The study indicated that as much as 62 percent of newly eligible voters in congressional districts across the United States were categorized as either Latino or Asian/Pacific Islander; the percentage increased to over 93 percent when newly naturalized immigrants are included in the calculation.[42] The study also found that the large influx of Latino and Asian voters into the electorate would impact political outcomes in districts with both Democratic and Republican incumbent representatives. Most important arguably is the study's finding that the percentage of newly eligible voters made up by Asian and Latino groups is projected to increase consistently with each subsequent election year.

As Asian Americans come to play an increasingly prominent role in shaping political outcomes in the United States, the observed proclivity toward the Democratic Party and their political elites will have significant implications on the formation and maintenance of meaningful and lasting electoral coalitions. The current manuscript depicts such partisan movement among the Asian-American population as a racialized expression of a partisan

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[42] The study found that California's 34th congressional district ranked the highest in the percentage of newly eligible voters who identify as either Latino or Asian/Pacific Islander.

identification with the Democratic Party. According to the theoretical framework driving the current study, this racialized form of a partisan identity has most likely taken shape through consistent exposure to xenophobic cues typically conveyed in polarizing dialogues surrounding the issue of immigration reform in the United States.

The capacity for Asian Americans to be impacted by these political debates that intend to break down the electorate into an 'Us vs. Them' group-based paradigm is largely shaped by the extent to which they view such a paradigm to be representative of the social-racial hierarchy that exists in the United States. The current study finds that experimental exposure to political derogation against racial minorities significantly impacts exactly where Asian Americans perceive their own racial group on this hierarchy. This involves an increasing recognition of a shared lower-tier between Asians and other racial-minority groups as well as an increase in the perceived vertical gap between this lower-tier and the upper-tier which is occupied by Whites as the racial-majority group in the United States. These shifting perceptions of commonality and separation with other racial groups upon exposure to political derogation facilitate the activation of an Asian-American identity. Park (2008) contends that a primary dimension through which Asian Americans view their own racial identity is that of a racialized *otherness* where individuals (both immigrant and native) are socialized into American society through a repeated reminder of their minority status.

The current study also finds that a racialized otherness which can define an Asian-American identity can also facilitate a superordinate identification as a racial minority. Applying this identification to a Social Identity framework (Tajfel 1981; Turner and Tajfel 1987), Asian Americans who identify as racial minorities upon exposure to political derogation will perceive such attacks as threats to their now salient racial-minority identity. When these political

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messages are associated with particular partisan cues, motivational responses in response to perceived threats will impact subsequent levels of partisan attachments. According to experimental findings from the current study, the salience and level of ambiguity/clarity of these partisan cues are key factors in shaping the partisan movement that occurs as a part of these motivational responses.

Recent survey data from the Pew Center has found that while the American public is highly divided in their views of immigrants (48 percent believe they strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents while 37 percent believe they are a burden on the country because they take jobs, housing, and health care), the Asian-American population is largely unanimous in their views on immigrants (72 percent believe they strengthen the country while only 17 percent believe they are a burden). Moreover, this positive view toward immigrants is conveyed among immigrant and U.S.-born Asian citizens. This implies that while Asian Americans do express much disagreement regarding how best to approach the issue of immigration reform (Mo et al. 2014) there is a strong indication that any derogation against immigrants (or racial minorities) linked to public debates over immigration reform will produce reactionary responses related to their own sense of racial identity. The combined results of the current study provide evidence of this while also exploring the conditions under which such reactionary responses are linked to subsequent partisan movement.

The question then arises whether a racialized partisan identity as outlined in the current study is only prevalent in public debates on immigration. What other issues in American political discourse have the potential to activate a racialized sense of minority identity among the Asian-American population? Pew Center survey data indicates that on the broader issue of government services, Asian Americans differ greatly from the rest of the national electorate. While 52

percent of the rest of the public prefer a smaller government with fewer services, 55 percent of

the Asian-American population prefers a bigger government that provides more services. Again,

there is consistency in this preference across both native and foreign-born groups. Perhaps strong

partisan rhetoric associated with restrictions on welfare spending can produce similar shifts in

subsequent partisan identities as was observed in the case of the partisan cues associated with

anti-immigration policies highlighted in the current study.

There is evidence that the RPI model presented here could become relevant in political

messages related to welfare reform. Notable work on the topic has found that among Americans

the issue of welfare has become highly racialized in that much of Americans' attitudes toward

the issue are linked to racial stereotypes regarding its beneficiaries (Gilens 1999). This work has

also found that the media plays a primary role in conveying these messages through their

graphical depictions of welfare beneficiaries based on the framing (support versus opposition) of

these messages. Though much of these racial stereotypes have been linked to strongly held

stereotypes regarding African Americans, public dialogue concerning welfare recipients has

since shifted toward an emphasis on immigrant groups. The Center for Immigration Studies

found that in 2009, 57 percent of immigrant households (both legal and illegal) reported using at

least one welfare program compared to 39 percent of non-immigrant households in the United

States. This study also found that though the majority of these immigrant households are made

up of Latino immigrants, a non-negligible percentage consists of Asian immigrants who rely on

government-based welfare programs. As such, future research that examines these demographic

policy trends in the context of the RPI framework may prove especially valuable to

understanding the dynamic interactions between social and political identities among the Asian

American population.

The extent to which social identities impact political identities (and vice-versa) is largely impacted by the salience and primacy of these particular social identities. Previous research on the internalization of group attachments have argued that individuals are potentially identifying themselves with several different group identities at any given moment and the extent to which one identification holds primacy over others is wholly dependent upon the environmental context in which these groups are becoming salient. In the current study it was found that Asian Americans exposed to Republican-driven derogation against racial minorities displayed a heightened level of a racialized Asian-American identity and subsequent racial-minority superordinate identity which shaped a subsequent movement away from the Republican Party and closer to the Democratic Party. However, the results also provided strong evidence that the activation of a racial identity was heterogeneous across the Asian-American respondents in the study and raised the possibility that exposure to partisan-based political attacks instead activated these respondents' own partisan identities.

While the activation of a non-racial identity in response to political derogation against racial minorities is not accounted for the in the current RPI model, it should undoubtedly serve as an addendum to future tests of the model's hypotheses. An additional non-racial identity that may prove especially relevant to the current political context involving partisan rhetoric around the issue of immigration reform is that of an *immigrant* identity. If Asian Americans are adopting and internalizing their own identity as racial minorities upon exposure to such political rhetoric, then a valuable question is whether the contemporaneous activation of an immigrant identity serves to either enhance or attenuate subsequent partisan movement. In the case of the former, does the activation of an immigrant identity then produce a same reactionary response when political derogation is associated with salient and unambiguous partisan cues? In the case of the

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latter, does the narrowing of a superordinate identity to immigrant minorities (compared with racial minorities) impact the capacity for this superordinate to shape subsequent political behavior? Though public opinion polls of Asian Americans indicate a strong level of consistency in a positive perception of immigrants in the United States across both immigrant and native demographic categories, the activation of an immigrant identity through explicit informational cues is a possibility that warrants further examination.

Finally, the question arises regarding the stability of a racialized partisan identity that forms in response to political attacks related to a perceived racial-social hierarchy in the United States. If Asian Americans are increasingly identifying with the Democratic Party due to the reasons offered in the current study, to what extent does such partisanship reflect high levels of stability over time as has been observed with the maintenance of partisan identities among the general American electorate through a constantly evolving political landscape (Green et al. 2002; Huddy 2003; Greene 2004; Campbell et al. 1964)? Political experts have raised similar questions in their examination of recent partisan trends among the Asian-American population. John Ying, the founder and chair of the Asian Republican Coalition was quoted as saying "Frankly [Asian Americans are] nominally right now voting more Democratic, but in a very weak affiliation… these are not die-hard Democrats, and traditionally in the past they used to be Republicans." Ying and others have argued that the recent leftward movement among Asian Americans is most likely the result of unstable and highly fluid issue preferences and partisan perceptions. However, if this movement is a result of the adoption and/or crystallization of a partisan identity defined by a racialized identity as is hypothesized by the proposed theoretical framework, then the current body of literature provides no indication such dynamic shifts in partisanship will be short-lived.

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What the literature does suggest however is that the racialization of partisan identity among Asian Americans has the capacity to create a long-standing impact on political outcomes in the United States. As such, the findings from the current study should serve as a signal to political elites who continue to incorporate inflammatory rhetoric in their discussions surrounding the issue of immigration reform, particularly when those elites are associated with the Republican Party, that such messages can create long-lasting partisan cleavages among the Asian-American community. This signal should be strengthened when taking into consideration that the inflammatory rhetoric used to test the RPI model in the current set of experiments was adopted (at times, nearly word-for-word) from real-world news articles that were broadcasted to a national audience across several major news outlets.

Asian Americans are projected to serve as a growing component of the American electorate over the next several presidential election cycles. The issue of immigration reform is likely to serve as a key issue for Americans going into the 2016 presidential election. As such, political elites must be increasingly mindful of the messages they are conveying when vocalizing their preferences regarding this highly contentious issue. Most importantly, conservative political groups and their leaders must be wary of advancing any political agenda that seeks to criminalize and, as a result, stigmatize both illegal and legal immigrant populations particularly when reaching out to those voters who lack strong pre-existing partisan attachments.

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APPENDICES

[CHAPTER 3]

A3.1. Ethnic Composition in the 2008 NAAPS

ETHNICITY	%
Asian Indian	21.93
Chinese	25.68
Filipino	12.01
Japanese	8.85
Korean	12.03
Vietnamese	15.96
Other Asian	3.54

Table entries indicate percentage of respondents who identified under each ethnic category in the 2008 NAAPS. Total sample was 3,898 citizen respondents.

A3.2. Variables Used from the 2008 NAAPS

Intergroup Variables:

-   Asian Linked Fate [QF2, QF2A]
-   Commonality with Blacks [QF8_A]
-   Commonality with Latinos [QF8_B]
-   Commonality with Whites [QF8_C]

Demographic Variables:

-   Gender [GENDER]
-   Immigrant [QA4]
-   Party ID [QD1, QD1A, QD1B, QD1C]
-   Ideology [QG4, QG4A, QG4B, QG4C]
-   Religion [QH1]
-   Education [QJ1]
-   Income [QJ6]
-   Age [QJ10]
-   Citizenship [QJ13]
-   Ethnicity [ETHNICITY]

A4.1. Percentage of Respondents Scoring Below 50% on Identity Overlap Measures

	Student	M-Turk	SSI	Avg.
Whites	66.98	55.37	45.82	56.06
Blacks	79.23	79.34	66.88	75.15
Latinos	66.04	73.56	58.84	66.15

Table entries are percentages of respondents among each sample who reported identity-overlap values of under 50 percent.

A5.1. Article Text for Experimental Treatment

Title: Asian-American Affected by Controversial Immigration Law Accuses Police of Racial Profiling

James Wong, a 70 year old real-estate investor of Chinese descent and lifelong resident of the United States, was driving to meet friends for lunch last week when he stopped on a side street to check a text message. A police officer approached Wong's car, tapped on his window, and said "Let me see your papers." When Wong asked why he had been stopped, the officer told him, "You looked suspicious."

Wong still gets emotional when recalling his interaction with the police officer, calling the whole experience "humiliating" adding that "it made me feel unwelcome in my own country." Prior to last month, Wong never had any such interaction with the police. However, since then a controversial new law has been passed in [redacted] that gives police officers the legal authority to demand identification from any individual if there is reasonable suspicion the person is in the country illegally. Raised as the state's newest weapon in its fight against illegal immigrants, the new law has already received sharp criticism from minority residents. "It's an unfair law," says Monica Torres who, like Wong, has spent her entire life in [redacted] and is strongly opposed to the new legislation. "I don't want to have to worry about being arrested just because I leave my house without my purse."

Since his incident with the police officer, Wong has spoken in various communities throughout [redacted] to demonstrate how the law has affected not just Latinos but also other minority groups in the state. "This new law is a violation of our civil rights and is nothing more than racial profiling," according to Wong, "it encourages the systematic targeting of all racial minorities who are guilty of nothing more than looking or sounding foreign." Sung-Hee Park, an attendee at a recent talk, agrees that the new law "condones racial discrimination" and allows police to "unfairly harass innocent civilians based on nothing more than the color of their skin."

However, the new law has also received strong support from [redacted] residents who argue that strict measures are required in order to deal with the increasing burden illegal immigrants are placing on the state. "We have to give police the authority to keep these people out of our country," says Samuel Meyers, a lifelong resident of [redacted]. Other supporters of the new law, such as Amanda Stevens, resent that "these people are living in our country illegally and taking advantage of our generosity." When asked whether the new law would result in racial profiling, Stevens responded "If they have nothing to hide, they should not be afraid about being stopped by the police."

A5.2. Anti-Immigration Items

1. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens?
    a. Strongly favor
    b. Somewhat favor
    c. Neither favor nor oppose
    d. Somewhat oppose
    e. Strongly oppose
2. Do you favor or oppose allowing the children of illegal immigrants to attend public elementary and secondary schools?
    a. Strongly favor
    b. Somewhat favor
    c. Neither favor nor oppose
    d. Somewhat oppose
    e. Strongly oppose
3. Do you favor or oppose automatically granting citizenship to the children of illegal immigrants who happened to be born in the United States?
    a. Strongly favor
    b. Somewhat favor
    c. Neither favor nor oppose
    d. Somewhat oppose
    e. Strongly oppose
4. Do you think the U.S. government should increase or decrease the amount of effort it puts into finding and deporting illegal immigrants who are in this country?
    a. Greatly increase
    b. Slightly increase
    c. Keep the same
    d. Slightly decrease
    e. Greatly decrease
5. Do you favor or oppose building a fence along the border with Mexico to prevent illegal immigrants from entering this country?
    a. Strongly favor
    b. Somewhat favor
    c. Neither favor nor oppose
    d. Somewhat oppose
    e. Strongly oppose
6. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now?
    a. Greatly increased
    b. Slightly increased
    c. Kept the same
    d. Slightly decreased
    e. Greatly decreased

A5.3. Testing a Moderating Effect of Anti-Immigrant Policy Preferences

Anti-Immigrant Scale	- .157***
	(.018)
Derogation	- .441
	(.333)
Interaction	.035
	(.026)
Constant	5.283***
	(.236)
N	871

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is 7-level partisan identity with higher values indicating Democratic identity. ***$p <$ .001 for a two-tailed test.

A6.1. Article Text for Salient Republican Condition

Title: Asian-American Affected by Controversial Republican Immigration Law Accuses Police of Racial Profiling

James Wong, a 70 year old real-estate investor of Chinese descent and lifelong resident of the United States, was driving to meet friends for lunch last week when he stopped on a side street to check a text message. A police officer approached Wong's car, tapped on his window, and said "Let me see your papers." When Wong asked why he had been stopped, the officer told him, "You looked suspicious."

Wong still gets emotional when recalling his interaction with the police officer, calling the whole experience "humiliating" adding that "it made me feel unwelcome in my own country." Prior to last month, Wong never had any such interaction with the police. However, since then a controversial new law passed by Republican leaders in [redacted] gives police officers the legal authority to demand identification from any individual if there is reasonable suspicion the person is in the country illegally.

Touted by Republican lawmakers as the state's newest weapon in its fight against illegal immigrants, the new law has received strong support from [redacted] residents who argue that strict measures are required in order to deal with the increasing burden illegal immigrants are placing on the state. "We have to give police the authority to keep these people out of our country," says Samuel Meyers, a lifelong resident of [redacted]. Other supporters of the new law, such as Amanda Sevens, resent that "these people are living in our country illegally and taking advantage of our generosity." When asked whether the new law would result in racial profiling, a Republican state official was quoted as saying "If they have nothing to hide, they should not be afraid about being stopped by the police."

A6.2. Article Text for Unambiguous Republican + Derogation Condition

Title: Asian-American Affected by Controversial Republican Immigration Law Accuses Police of Racial Profiling

James Wong, a 70 year old real-estate investor of Chinese descent and lifelong resident of the United States, was driving to meet friends for lunch last week when he stopped on a side street to check a text message. A police officer approached Wong's car, tapped on his window, and said "Let me see your papers." When Wong asked why he had been stopped, the officer told him, "You looked suspicious."

Wong still gets emotional when recalling his interaction with the police officer, calling the whole experience "humiliating" adding that "it made me feel unwelcome in my own country." Prior to last month, Wong never had any such interaction with the police. However, since then a controversial new law passed by Republican leaders in [redacted] gives police officers the legal authority to demand identification from any individual if there is reasonable suspicion the person is in the country illegally.

Touted by Republican lawmakers as the state's newest weapon in its fight against illegal immigrants, the new law has received strong support from [redacted] residents who argue that strict measures are required in order to deal with the increasing burden illegal immigrants are placing on the state. "We have to give police the authority to keep these people out of our country," says Samuel Meyers, a lifelong resident of [redacted]. Other supporters of the new law, such as Amanda Stevens, resent that "these people are living in our country illegally and taking advantage of our generosity." When asked whether the new law would result in racial profiling, a Republican state official was quoted as saying "If they have nothing to hide, they should not be afraid about being stopped by the police."

However, the new law has already received sharp criticism from Democratic lawmakers in the state as well as minority residents. "It's an unfair law," says Monica Torres who, like Wong, has spent her entire life in [redacted] and is strongly opposed to the new legislation. "I don't want to have to worry about being arrested just because I leave my house without my purse." Sung-Hee Park, a fellow critic of the new law, sees it as "a violation of people's civil rights that encourages the systematic targeting of all racial minorities who are guilty of nothing more than looking or sounding different." While Democratic state officials agree that the growing number of illegal immigrants is a concern, they argue that the "unjust harassment of civilians based on nothing more than the color of their skin is not the solution."

A6.3. Article Text for Control Condition

Title: Asian-American Affected by Controversial Bipartisan Immigration Law Accuses Police of Racial Profiling

James Wong, a 70 year old real-estate investor of Chinese descent and lifelong resident of the United States, was driving to meet friends for lunch last week when he stopped on a side street to check a text message. A police officer approached Wong's car, tapped on his window, and said "Let me see your papers." When Wong asked why he had been stopped, the officer told him, "You looked suspicious."

Wong still gets emotional when recalling his interaction with the police officer, calling the whole experience "humiliating" adding that "it made me feel unwelcome in my own country." Prior to last month, Wong never had any such interaction with the police. However, since then a controversial new law passed by a group of Republican and Democratic leaders in [redacted] gives police officers the legal authority to demand identification from any individual if there is reasonable suspicion the person is in the country illegally.

Touted by several Republican and Democratic lawmakers as the state's newest weapon in its fight against illegal immigrants, the new law has received strong support from [redacted] residents who argue that strict measures are required in order to deal with the increasing burden illegal immigrants are placing on the state. "We have to give police the authority to keep these people out of our country," says Samuel Meyers, a lifelong resident of [redacted]. Other supporters of the new law, such as Amanda Stevens, resent that "these people are living in our country illegally and taking advantage of our generosity." When asked whether the new law would result in racial profiling, a state official speaking on behalf of the bipartisan coalition in support of the law responded "If they have nothing to hide, they should not be afraid about being stopped by the police."

However, the new law has also received sharp criticism from state lawmakers within both parties as well as minority residents. "It's an unfair law," says Monica Torres who, like Wong, has spent her entire life in [redacted] and is strongly opposed to the new legislation. "I don't want to have to worry about being arrested just because I leave my house without my purse." Sung-Hee Park, a fellow critic of the new law sees it as "a violation of people's civil rights that encourages the systematic targeting of all racial minorities who are guilty of nothing more than looking or sounding different." Speaking on behalf of the group of Democratic and Republican leaders working to repeal the law, a state official was quoted as saying "While we agree the growing number of illegal immigrants is a concern, the unjust harassment of innocent civilians based on nothing more than the color of their skin is not the solution."

A6.4. Predicting Differenced Feeling Thermometer Scores (Democrats Minus Republicans)

Party cues:		
Republican	-23.311	-10.147
	(16.920)	(13.477)
Republican + Democrat	-32.707[+]	-4.370
	(17.258)	(13.568)
Asian American Identity	1.315	
	(1.035)	
Racial Minority Identity		2.410*
		(1.008)
Party cues X Asian American Identity:		
Republican Interaction	1.851	
	(1.371)	
Republican + Democrat Interaction	2.564[+]	
	(1.389)	
Party cues X Racial Minority Identity:		
Republican Interaction		.754
		(1.336)
Republican + Democrat Interaction		.233
		(1.368)
Constant	- .636	-7.279
	(12.831)	(9.948)
N	580	579

Table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is differenced feeling thermometer scores with higher values indicating greater favorability of Democrats and less favorability of Republicans. Omitted category for party cues is control condition. [+]$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, ***$p < .001$ for a two-tailed test.

A6.5 Effect of Partisan Cues on Intergroup Commonality

	Control	Republican	Republican + Democratic
Asians – Whites	.407[a]	.379	.345[a]
Asians – Blacks	.212[a]	.258 [a][b]	.200[b]
Asians – Latinos	.290	.322[a]	.275[a]

Table entries indicate means for perceived identity-overlap measures between groups of subjects recoded 0-1. Superscripts indicate group pairs with statistically significant difference-of-means t-tests at the $p < .05$ level for a two-tailed test.