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Ideological Asymmetries in Unconventional Political Participation

A Dissertation Presented

by

Raynee Sarah Gutting

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Ideological Asymmetries in Unconventional Political Participation

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There is a long-standing ideological asymmetry in protest activity that is observed world-wide. Individuals on the left are far more likely to engage in protest activity than those on the right. This asymmetry is especially important in an era in which young people are far more likely than their elders to engage in various forms of protest and non-electoral activity. But somewhat surprisingly, there has been no careful investigation of this asymmetry to date, a deficiency which I remedy in my dissertation project. I argue that authoritarians, who are more commonly found on the political right than left, help to explain ideological asymmetries in protest participation and unconventional political activism. Authoritarians tend to be submissive to authorities they see as legitimate and abhor social deviance, factors that make their participation in protest unlikely. I use two major methodological strategies to verify my prediction: 1) quantitative analyses of multiple nationally representative surveys, spanning the years of 2000 to 2012, and 2) experimental methods using individuals sampled from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, political blog readerships, and undergraduate student populations. I find that while it is inherently more difficult to mobilize conservatives than liberals, authoritarianism exhibits stronger effects on suppressing protest participation on the left of the political spectrum, where more opportunities for protest exist. I further document the conditions that affect conservative's protest activity, including activity that challenges existing authorities, and behavior that might be considered unlawful or socially deviant. I also examine less common conditions that can facilitate the mobilization of conservatives for unconventional political activities, with perceived illegitimacy of political leaders being particularly important. Overall, my findings hold important implications for democratic theory: Greater protest activity on the left than right affects whose voices are heard by legislators and the public at large, often shaping public policy and discourse.

Dedication Page

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, to whom I am eternally indebted for myriad reasons. Mom, Dad, Mike, Peter, J.T., Michelle, Grandma and Grandpa, G'ma and G'pa, Aimee, and Carlie, you guys keep me smiling and pull me through the toughest times. They say you can choose your friends, but you can't choose your family. If I had the opportunity, I would have chosen all of you. I love you guys more than I could ever write. Thank you.

Table of Contents

List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	viii
Acknowledgments.....	ix
Chapter 1. Introduction and Background: Contrasting Liberal and Conservative Protest Participation	1
1.1 Defining Terms	2
1.2 Ideological Asymmetry in Protest Participation	4
1.3 Contrasting Liberal and Conservative Movements.....	7
1.4 Individual Differences in Mobilization Potential.....	9
Chapter 2. Toward an Understanding of the Ideological Asymmetry in Protest Participation	11
2.1 Conceptualizing Authoritarianism and Understanding its Consequences	11
2.2 Authoritarianism and Conservatism.....	16
2.3 Core Predictions	17
2.4 Summary and Brief Outline of the Dissertation.....	19
Chapter 3. Ideological Asymmetries in Non-Electoral Political Participation and the Role of Authoritarianism	20
3.1 Data and Measurement.....	22
3.2 Results	30
3.3 Discussion	47
Chapter 4. Characteristics of Protest Events and their Effects on Conservative and Authoritarian Mobilization.....	49
4.1 Methods.....	50
4.2 Results	60
4.3 Discussion	74
Chapter 5. Political Activism(?) among Conservatives and Authoritarians in the Wake of Obama's Presidency.....	75
5.1 Data and Measurement.....	76
5.2 Results	80
5.3 Conclusion.....	96
Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion	98
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions.....	100
References.....	105
Appendix A. Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 3	113

Appendix B. Pew Data for Issue Item Selection for Chapter 4	115
Appendix C. Experimental Manipulations Example for Ch. 4.....	116
Appendix D. Dependent Variables Item Wording for Ch. 4	119
Appendix E. Manipulation Check Items for Ch. 4	121
Appendix F. Issue Attitude and Strength Items for Ch. 4.....	122
Appendix G. Random Assignment Checks for Ch. 4	127
Appendix H. Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 5.....	128

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Percentage of Events that Articulate a Right-Wing Claim, 1960-1986, from Soule and Earl (2005)	5
Figure 3.1. Predicted Probabilities of Protest across Ideology for a 20-Year Old, Average White Male	37
Figure 3.2. Predicted Probabilities of Protest: Interaction between Ideology and Authoritarianism, ANES Samples	40
Figure 3.3. Predicted Probabilities of Protest: Interaction between Ideology and Authoritarianism, CID & LAPOP Samples	41
Figure 3.4. Comparing Organizational Involvement Rates across Ideology, Authoritarianism, and All Respondents	44
Figure 3.5. Comparing Protest Rates across Respondents' Organizational Involvement	45
Figure 4.1. Geographic Distribution of Study Respondents	53
Figure 4.2. Full Sample Distribution of Protest Intention DV	57
Figure 4.3. Mean Protest Intention DV across Samples	58
Figure 4.4. Mean Contact DV across Samples	59
Figure 4.5. Experimental Effects on Support for and Perceptions of Protesters	63
Figure 4.6. Effects of Top Issue on Manipulation Checks	65
Figure 4.7. Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Predicted Support for Protesters across Experimental Conditions	68
Figure 4.8. Predicted Values and Probabilities of Mobilization across Experimental Conditions	69
Figure 4.9. Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Predicted Protest Intentions across Experimental Condition	72
Figure 5.1. Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation across Ideology and Authoritarianism, under Clinton and Obama Presidencies	84
Figure 5.2. Perceived of Illegitimacy of Incumbent Presidents across Ideology and Authoritarianism	86
Figure 5.3. Predicted Perceived Illegitimacy across Ideology and Partisanship for Clinton and Obama	88
Figure 5.4. Right-Wing Beliefs about Obama across Authoritarianism and Ideology	89
Figure 5.5. Comparing Average Marginal Effects of Ideology across Perceived Presidential Illegitimacy Measures for Clinton and Obama	93
Figure 5.6. Marginal Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Predicted Probability of Protest across Right-Wing Beliefs	94
Figure 5.7. Average Marginal Effect of Right-Wing Beliefs for Conservatives and Liberals	96

List of Tables

Table 1.1. Percentage Reporting Protest Participation within the Last Year across Ideology	6
Table 2.1. Percentage Reporting Protest Participation within Last Year across Authoritarianism	15
Table 3.1. Weighted Sample Demographics Breakdown	24
Table 3.2. Protest Item Wording	25
Table 3.3. Percentage of Respondents Indicating Protest Activity across Levels of Ideology and Authoritarianism	26
Table 3.4. Types of Political Activities: 2005 CID	27
Table 3.5. Means, Standard Errors, and Bivariate Correlations for Ideology and Authoritarianism	27
Table 3.7. Predictors of Protest	34
Table 3.8. Average Marginal Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Probability of Protest	35
Table 3.9. Predictors of Political Participation: 2005 CID	39
Table 3.10. Percentage of Respondents Reporting Having Been Contacted to Engage in Political Activity across Ideology and Authoritarianism	42
Table 3.11. Effect of Being Contacted to Participate Politically on Protest: 2005 CID	43
Table 3.12. Effects of Organizational Involvement, Class and Income Security on Protest: 2005 CID	46
Table 4.1. Non-Probability Internet and Student Sample Demographics	52
Table 4.2. 2x2 Experimental Design Summary and Sample Size for Each Cell	54
Table 4.3. % of Respondents Rating Each Issue a Top Priority for Obama and Congress in 2015	55
Table 4.4. Means and Standard Deviation of Authoritarianism Scale across Samples and Ideology	56
Table 4.5. 2x2 Experimental Effects on Perceptions of Protesters	62
Table 4.6. Effects of Top Issue on Support for and Perceptions of Protesters	64
Table 4.7. Effects of Experimental Condition, Ideology, and Authoritarianism on Support for Protesters, Controlling for Sample and Top Issue	67
Table 4.8. Experimental Effects on Mobilization	69
Table 4.9. Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism and Experimental Conditions on Self-Reported Protest Intention	71
Table 4.10. Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism and Experimental Conditions on Protest Intention, with Additional Controls	73
Table 5.1. Item Wording for Perceived Illegitimacy Scales with Means and Standard Errors	78
Table 5.2. Pairwise Correlations between Illegitimacy Scales across ANES Samples	79
Table 5.3. Average Marginal Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Protest Participation	81
Table 5.4. Predictors of Protest: 2000, 2004, and 2012 ANES	83
Table 5.5. Predictors of Protest: Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism, Presidential Disapproval and their Interactions	91
Table 5.6. Predictors of Protest: Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism, Negative Candidate Traits and their Interactions	92
Table 5.7. Predictors of Protest: Ideology, Authoritarianism, Right-Wing Beliefs, and Their Interactions, 2012 ANES	95

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Chapter 1. Introduction and Background: Contrasting Liberal and Conservative Protest Participation

“Protest beyond the law is not a departure from democracy; it is absolutely essential to it.”
— Howard Zinn

In the wake of protests that began after a Tunisian fruit vendor lit himself on fire in 2011, Time Magazine declared “The Protester” the person of the year. As noted by Time, “In 2011, protesters didn't just voice their complaints; they changed the world.”¹ Across the globe people took to the streets to publically air their grievances against their governments, leading to movements from the Middle East, such as the Arab Spring, which toppled long-standing dictatorships, and domestic uprisings in the United States, including Occupy Wall St.

Public participation in the political process is considered fundamental to a healthy democracy and is a defining element of democratic citizenship (Dahl 1998; Dalton 2006; 2008; Verba et al., 1995; Verba & Nie, 1972). While participation in free and fair elections constitutes the bulk of citizen participation, and has been the focus of much political science scholarship, the range of available activities is much broader. However, other, more costly forms of political action, such as protest and other non-electoral methods of participation, are often overlooked in political science. For example, a simple Google Scholar search for articles published in the American Journal of Political Science between 1990 and 2014 containing the word “protest” produced only 167 results. Compare this to the 1,140 results for articles containing the words “vote” or “voting.” While certainly not a systematic analysis, this demonstrates the lack of attention devoted to non-electoral forms of citizen political activity, leading to a dearth of knowledge in political science regarding the nature and origins of participation outside the political mainstream. This is not a trivial oversight, given the rise in non-electoral behavior among younger citizens (Dalton 2006, 2008; Martin 2014) and a coincident decline in traditional forms of civic participation (Putnam 2000).

While Putnam (2000) grieves the decline in civic participation, social movement society (SMS) proponents (e.g., Tarrow 1994; Meyer & Tarrow 1998a, 1998b) contend that protest in advanced industrialized societies has become a regular part of the political terrain, largely as a result of the social movements of the 1950's and 1960's. Furthermore, SMS scholars argue “that protest activity has broadened its constituencies, claims, and targets over time” (Caren, Ghoshal, & Ribas 2010, p.3). In other words, the argument contends that protest is no longer an exclusive political tool of student radicals, union activists, minorities, feminists, and the like. Rather, protest activity purportedly transcends political orientations and social class as it has become a routine and acceptable form of political engagement. SMS scholars support this claim by

¹ The Protester: TIME's 2011 Person of the Year <http://www.time.com/time/person-of-the-year/2011/#ixzz3gpthE1lq>

pointing to the increasing proportion of individuals over time who report ever having participated in a protest (e.g., Dalton 2006, 2008).

Yet, there is continued debate over whether or not protest has become a form of political participation that transcends ideology, age, and other limiting factors (see e.g., Caren, Ghoshal, & Ribas 2010; Schussman & Soule 2005; Soule & Earl 2005). For example, Caren et al. (2010) find that systematic increases in protest activity over time are less robust than cohort effects based on differing protest activity levels among those born at different periods of time. Younger generations, it seems, are more willing to participate in protest activities than older generations, suggesting that protest still remains beyond the purview of many Americans. Further, while SMS scholars hypothesize that protest has diffused into the public at large, this stands in contrast to the documented asymmetry in protest participation between those who support liberal and conservative ideologies. Indeed, there is a longstanding ideological asymmetry in protest activity observed worldwide, with those on the political left exhibiting far greater activity than those on the right (Dalton 2013; Schussman & Soule 2005). To date, there are few systematic studies designed to investigate this ideological asymmetry in protest activity.

In this dissertation, I investigate the role of ideology in protest participation to understand why conservatives are less likely than liberals to report active engagement in unconventional political activities. I seek to answer three main questions. First, why are those who identify as conservative less likely to participate in protest? Second, how do characteristics of protest events affect conservatives' willingness to support protesters and participate in future activities themselves? And finally, how do perceptions of political leadership affect the likelihood that conservatives will participate in grass-roots activism? I outline a theory based on individual psychological differences in authoritarianism to explain this asymmetry. Authoritarians' obedience and submission to authority and needs for order and certainty (Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Duckitt, 1989; Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997; Jost et al. 2003) make them unlikely protest participants. I also use authoritarianism as a lens to explore the characteristics of protest events that affect conservatives' willingness to participate, and how perceptions of political leadership may interact with ideology and authoritarianism to affect protest participation on the right. Using psychology to understand the asymmetry in protest participation between liberals and conservatives opens the door to a rich avenue of inquiry into the individual psychological determinants of protest behavior. Before addressing the three main questions asked in this dissertation more directly, it is informative to briefly define terms, provide evidence to support my claim that conservatives protest less than liberals, and contrast liberal and conservative movements.

1.1 Defining Terms

Before moving forward with a more detailed discussion of the differences between liberals and conservatives in terms of their participation in non-electoral political activities, I first want to clarify terms that will be used throughout the following discussion and the broader

dissertation. I use the terms “non-electoral” and “unconventional” political participation interchangeably to denote activities that take place outside of institutionalized channels. These include activities such as legal and illegal public protests, demonstrations, rallies, marches, and signing petitions. In contrast, “electoral” and “mainstream” or “conventional” activities include voting, working for political parties or candidates for political office (what Inglehart & Welzel 2005 refer to as “elite-led” forms of participation) and writing letters to politicians. While in this dissertation I mainly focus on protest participation, as it is often easily operationalized in survey data, my interest is more broadly in social movements and collective action. Thus, it is important to first conceptualize what is meant by social movements, collective action, and who can be considered an activist.

According to Blumer (1969), “Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new system of living” (p. 99). Embedded within this definition are several broad themes, most importantly that social movements are collective endeavors that stem from some sort of dissatisfaction or grievance. However, this definition seems to preclude the crux of many conservative movements, which have as their goals either to maintain the status quo, or to return to a previously established way of life that has been whittled away by progressive activists and secular relativists.

Klandermans and Steekelenburg (2013) define three elements that are central to social movements. First, “social movements are collective challenges” (p. 1). This means that they present disruptive challenges directed towards elites, authorities, or other groups. By their nature, social movements are aimed with the intent of gaining political access, power, or the attention of those with political power. Social movements should be conceived as a special type of social conflict (Touraine 1985). They inherently involve competing actors and disputed resources. Second, social movements are composed of individuals with a common purpose and solidarity. Participants of social movements rally behind common claims, seeking redress for their grievances. According to Klandermans and Steekelenburg (2013), these common claims are rooted in collective identity and solidarity. Third, in order for collective action to be considered a social movement, it must be sustained collective action.

When faced with political issues, people can choose to stay inactive, or to take action. If action is taken, it can be individual action or collective action. An individual takes part in collective action “any time that [s/he] is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam 1990; qtd. in Klandermans & Steekelenburg 2013, p. 1356). Actions can also vary both in the amount of time and the amount of effort needed to make an impression on policy makers. For example, signing petitions takes little effort, but requires that a large threshold regarding the number of signatures be met. Conversely, taking part in public protest requires more effort and is more risky. These types of activities can have a more focused effect. Much of the present dissertation is focused on collective actions that often require individuals to collude and publically express their claims.

Stern, Dietz, Guagnano, and Kalof (1999) differentiate between movement activists and movement supporters. Movement activists are defined as “those who are committed to public actions intended to influence the behaviour of the policy system and the broader population” (p. 82). Movement supporters are people who sympathize with the movement and are willing to take action to support the movement. Actions taken by movement supporters are less intense,

less risky, and generally less public. For example, Stern et al. (1999) describe low-commitment active citizenship, which entails partaking in activities such as writing letters to political officials. The authors also point out that while committed activism is a vital component of a successful movement, movement support, or mobilization potential, is also needed. In this dissertation, I focus on both active protest participation, operationalized using questions that ask participants to report whether they have participated in protest events, as well as movement support, assessed by asking participants if they would be willing to participate in future activities planned by an activist organization.

Having clarified some key terms, I now move onto a review of the literature that demonstrates ideological asymmetries in non-electoral activities. I then present an overview of the key differences that define movements on the right, and how they differ from movements on the left.


1.2 Ideological Asymmetry in Protest Participation

Studies that report ideological differences in levels of protest activity find that there is a general trend of more activity among the political left. As Dalton (2002, p. 67) notes, protest “is often seen as a tool for liberals and progressives who want to challenge the political establishment and who feel the need to go beyond conventional politics to have their views heard.” Both Dalton (2002, 2013) and Hirsch (1990) report that liberals in the United States are more likely to report participating in protest than conservatives. Additionally, Kerpelman (1969), in studying the characteristics of politically active student groups in one Northeastern university in the United States, found that leftist student groups were more active than rightist groups. In another study, aimed at critiquing SMS theory, Schussman and Soule (2005) include ideology in their models predicting protest, characterizing it as one among several political engagement variables. They, too, find a negative relationship between ideology (measured left to right) and protest.

To illustrate this asymmetry in protest frequency between the right and left, Figure 1.1, taken from Soule and Earl (2005), plots the percentage of collective action events that articulated a right-wing claim in their dataset. The collective action event data analyzed in their research were drawn from daily editions of the New York Times (NYT) between 1960 and 1986 (Dynamics of Collective Action Dataset). Events in this dataset were coded based on three criteria: 1) there must have been more than one participant at the event; 2) the participants articulated some claim, such as grievances against some target or an expression of support of some target; and 3) the event must have happened in the public sphere or have been open to the public. Events also included both “insider” tactics (e.g., petitions, letter-writing campaigns, lawsuits) and “outsider” tactics (e.g., protest, demonstrations, civil disobedience, violence). Events were coded as articulating a “right wing” claim if they were “anti-feminist, pro-war, pro-Apartheid, anti-protection of environment, anti-civil rights of race/ethnic groups, anti-gay/lesbian rights, anti-disability rights, anti-farm workers’ rights, anti-abortion, white-supremacist, and anti-

animal rights” (p. 316). The percentage of right-wing events were calculated relative to the whole set of events recorded for each year.² Figure 1.1 clearly illustrates that right-wing events make up a small share of all collective action events for each year recorded in Soule and Earl’s dataset. The largest share of right-wing events occurred in 1960 when 19% of events articulated a right-wing claim. This drops to a low of under 6% in 1967 and varies between 8% and 15% from 1969 to 1986.

Figure 1.1 Percentage of Events that Articulate a Right-Wing Claim, 1960-1986, from Soule and Earl (2005)



Using the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES),³ Table 1.1 demonstrates that at the individual level there is a stark difference in protest rates between liberals and conservatives. In 2000, only 2% of self-identified conservatives reported having protested within the past year, compared to 7% of liberals. In 2004, 4% of conservatives and 11% of liberals reported having protested in the last year. Thus, the difference across the ideological divide in terms of protest participation is clear: conservatives protest less than liberals.

² This presumably includes non-ideological events, though it is not clear from their description.

³ These studies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Table 1.1. Percentage Reporting Protest Participation within the Last Year across Ideology

	2000 ANES	2004 ANES
Ideology		
Liberal	7%	11%
Conservative	2%	4%
N	1467	1156

Note: All percentages are calculated using appropriate survey weights.

To my knowledge, systematic studies that develop explanations for *why* a left-right ideological asymmetry in protest participation exists are rare. Opp and colleagues (Opp, Finkel, Muller, Wolfsfeld, Dietz, Green 1995) provide one of the only studies to explore why conservatives are less likely to protest than liberals. Using a cross-national analysis, they find that leftists are more likely than rightists to participate in protest, but this relationship only held in Germany, and not in Peru or Israel. They also find that the relationship between ideology and protest is partially mediated by political party identification, such that those who identified with a political party known for protesting were more likely to protest themselves. Party identification provided only a limited explanation for the relationship between ideology and protest participation, however. Another explanation, rooted in rational choice theory, also helped to explain ideological asymmetries in protest activity in Opp et al.'s study. Specifically, public goods motivation, personal normative beliefs about the proper behavior for achieving political goals, and social network rewards and costs mediated the relationship between ideology and protest participation. Yet, neither party identification nor expected utility provided a full explanation for the relationship between ideology and protest activity.

In sum, while researchers have documented the link between ideology and non-electoral political participation, there has been little interest in exploring this relationship. In the studies that have highlighted the asymmetry in protest participation across the ideological spectrum, ideological origins are often brushed aside and lumped together with attitudinal explanations (Dalton 2013), or considered one of many operationalizations of political engagement (e.g., Schussman & Soule 2005). Moreover, while Dalton (2013) includes ideology as an attitudinal covariate predicting protest, little is said about *why* conservatives should be less likely than liberals to participate. And while Kerpelman (1969) focused on comparing leftist and rightist student groups, his goal was to demonstrate that rightist and leftist student activists were equally intelligent, not to demonstrate that leftist groups were more active than rightist groups. Even rarer are studies that systematically seek to provide an explanation for this asymmetry, and in the ones that do, these studies are generally conducted outside of the U.S. and current political context.

1.3 Contrasting Liberal and Conservative Movements

Certainly it is the case that while conservatives are less likely to protest than liberals, there have been movements on the right that have shaped modern day conservatism. Having established that protest participation among the political right is outweighed by protest on the left, I now change directions somewhat and focus on some of the qualitative differences between movements on the right and left. By clarifying some of the key differences between leftist and rightist movements, I gain traction in understanding the different types of grievances, political opportunities, and identities that are intertwined with political ideology.

Most of the work on social movements and collective action comes from sociology, where the same set of tools are applied to understand both movements on the left (and often disadvantaged members of society) and movements on the right (Blee & Creasap 2010). Progressive movements have historically been based on “claim making by disadvantaged minorities” (McAdam et al. 2005, p. 2; qtd. in Blee & Creasap 2010), which is in contrast to movements on the right, which are not generally fueled by the grievances of the disadvantaged. This is not to say that all members of rightist movements are necessarily advantaged, but movements such as the recent Tea Party are predominantly white, male, Christian, and educated, which are not the types of social groups we think of as being disadvantaged in American society. Using the same set of tools to understand movements on both the right and left obscures our understanding of the differences between the individuals driving movements on different sides of the ideological divide; rightist movements do not always fit neatly into templates that were designed for the study of Feminist, New Left, and Civil Rights movements, and the like.

In the literature, rightist movements are often understood as being reactionary countermovements that attempt to maintain the status quo, or return to a traditional moral order. For example, Pierson and Skocpol (2007) argue that contemporary conservatism should be understood as a reaction to the expansion of an activist American state in the 1960’s. That is, rightist movements tend to be known for what they are against, rather than what they are for. As such, most of the research on conservative movements has approached them as countermovements arising in opposition to gains made by progressive movements, e.g., Anti-gay as LGBT make gains, Right to Life once abortion was legalized in 1973.

Early theories of collective action were embedded within the larger breakdown theories, which highlighted the role of grievances in mobilizing individuals for action. Classical sociological theories such as symbolic interactionism (e.g., Blumer 1951), structural functionalism (e.g., Smelser 1962), and relative deprivation theory (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970) sought to explain how the dynamic sociopolitical context brought about grievances, which are essential determinants of collective action. Symbolic interactionism explains social movements as being brought about by the conflict between dissatisfied peoples, where structural functionalism focuses on movements as means to bring about moral equilibrium (Klandermans & Steekelenberg 2013). These classical behavior theories approached social movements as a reaction to social stress, strain or breakdown (Buechler 2000) and focused on the interaction between social groups and changing societal structures that brought about the experience of injustices.

Research on the right-wing social movements of the 1960's and 1970's, which were theoretically embedded within the breakdown tradition, tended to focus on the anxieties of individuals making up these movements. For example, Lipset and Raab's (1978) and Hofstadter's (1967) work on right-wing extremist groups focused on what they believed to be "dangerous, paranoid, status-anxious men and women," responding to social changes brought about by the advancement of previously low-status groups (McGirr 2001, p. 66). These earlier works tended to focus on these individuals as irrational and bigoted, responding to their declining status in society. Lipset and Raab even defined conservatism as "prejudice against blacks, Jews, and Catholics and a general intolerance of diversity and modernism" (Lo 1982, p. 112). This early research highlighted the interaction between individuals situated within hierarchical social structures, macrolevel social changes, and the interaction between movements and countermovements. Research on right-wing movements focused on individual-level differences, linking people's economically conservative public opinions and religiosity to their participation. Further, this work focused on these countermovements as arising from a necessary conflict with leftist movements. In other words, these movements arose precisely because of the massive gains made by the active left. Contemporary scholars have also applied this approach to the more recent Tea Party, arguing that the Tea Party is similar to its right-wing predecessors (Parker & Barreto 2013; Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin 2011) in its fears of subversion following the election of Barack Obama and its calls to take the country back (Parker & Barreto 2013).

However not all theorists supported the notion that countermovements were simply angry responses to a declining status. Page and Clelland (1978), for example, argued that status-oriented movements sought to build and sustain moral orders. Some have also claimed that conservative activist groups are less grassroots and more "astroturf", a sentiment echoed by Former Speaker Nancy Pelosi regarding the Tea Party movement (Arceneaux & Nicholson 2012). This is exemplified by Michelle Bachmann's acting as a "receptacle" for the Tea Party movement to launch and chair the Tea Party caucus on July 16, 2010. During the 113th Congress there were 49 Tea Party caucus members. This suggests that it is possible that the right has access to political resources not available to the left. For example, Lo (1982) argued that "the strength of conservative movements might stem not from popular approval but from movement organization and ties to governmental or other elites" (p. 113). Conservative movements, which often defend vested interests, frequently have ties to elites, organized interests, or institutions. For example, researchers studying the Anti-Equal Rights Amendment movement, while focused on movement activists, noted that the strength of the movement depended upon elite support (Lo 1982).

This does not mean that conservative and rightist movements always fared well electorally, but briefly tracing the rise of the modern right and the role of elites provides insight into the contemporary American political climate that is the main focus of this dissertation. For decades following the Great Depression, conservatives were hard-pressed to build mass appeal. It was not until after WWII that conservatism began to slowly weave its way into the mainstream, and by the early 1980's and 1990's gained electoral traction. Conservatives have managed to build a cache of social capital through their redefinition of conservatism, use of innovative mobilization techniques, and creation of conservative institutions (Gross, Medvetz, & Russel 2011). But this process was more likely to be driven by the actions of political elites, such as William Buckley, and Ralph Reed and the Moral Majority in the 1980's, than by grassroots activism. This would mean that conservatives need not take to the streets in protest in

order to affect change. Rather, if they have their preferred leaders working for them, they can rest knowing that things will be taken care of. This stands in marked contrast to the bottom-up politics of collective action on the left.

As social movements are collective endeavors, they necessarily need to develop collective identities. While certainly the role of elites and strong leaders was important in the right's success, the movement also appealed to activist's beliefs about religion and family, which generated intense commitment to the movement. Collective identities are built around shared grievances and values, and mobilization potential depends on how well these identities are packaged and framed (Polletta & Jasper 2001). The emergence of identities on the right stemmed from encroaching minority and deviant groups' undermining of the established social order, which is unlike emergent identities that form among groups that have systematically or historically been marginalized. Just as is the case with any potential social movement, this requires creative use of identity frames in order to invent a conservative identity and make meaning of the movement (Gross et al. 2011). In large part, the conservative movement carefully crafted a new purpose with the help of prominent thinkers such as mid-century Austrian School economists F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago, along with the philosopher Ayn Rand, who gave academic critique of Keynesian economics and support for laissez-faire economics.

Polletta and Jasper (2001) argue that because collective action has become so embroiled in identity politics, "protestors have been less likely to seek a redistribution of political power than to seek to change dominant normative and cultural codes by gaining recognition for new identities" (p.). This is not to say that political goals are not important. However, it could be argued that conservative movements have a focus on gaining political access in order to control the relationship between state and society, or in other words, to use the state apparatus as a means for implementing normative social behavior and enforcing normative values. This is consistent with Perrin, Tepper, Caren, and Moriss's (2011) assertion that "The Constitution—and Tea Party more generally— take on heightened symbolic value, coming to represent a "way of life" or a "world view" rather than a specific set of laws or policy positions" (p. 75). Movements construct identities around cultural symbols as a means for signaling the type of worldview, norms, and values that most exemplify the movement's aims. The call to tradition built around traditional "American" values builds a new identity based on contemporary interpretations of the past (Williamson et al. 2011). In many ways, the identities of contemporary conservative movements harken to simpler times and make demands for a more cohesive society with shared moral values, rooted in tradition.

1.4 Individual Differences in Mobilization Potential

Sociologists approach rightist movements not as an outcome of a personality characteristic, but as a social movement (Blee & Creasap 2010). But, as Steekelenberg and Klandermans (2010) argue, "Unless all individuals who are in the same structural position

display identical behavior, a shared position can never provide sufficient explanation of individual behavior and even if people do display identical behavior the motivational background and the accompanying emotions may still be different. Indeed, this is exactly what a social psychology of protest is about—trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so different” (p. 1358). The purpose of the present study is to expand on the idea that bringing the study of collective action down to the level of the individual is important for understanding social movements and collective action. For social and political psychologists, identity, cognition, emotion, and motivation are the processes at the individual level that link collective identity and collective action. Political psychologists have also linked personality and stable predispositions to political ideology and behavior (e.g., Gerber et al. 2010; Van Heil et al. 2000), though this approach has not been as rigorously applied to non-electoral behavior (though see Brandstätter & Opp 2013).

While there are perhaps myriad individual differences that could serve as potentially interesting constructs, I turn to one in particular that should have relevant consequences for understanding collective action behavior: authoritarianism. This dissertation departs from extant work in several ways. First, while sociology has developed a deep body of knowledge regarding protest participation, it has tended to focus on case studies of particular social movements (though see Opp, Finkel, Muller, Wolfsfeld, Dietz, & Green 1995; Schussman & Soule 2005). And while political scientists use nationally representative survey data, they tend to focus on attitudes, voting behavior, or political participation broadly defined (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; though see Dalton 2013), rather than study protest behavior in its own right. Moreover, studies that report a leftist bias in the propensity to protest have not focused on ideology as a key source of protest participation. Given political scientists’ lament over the ignorance of the American electorate (e.g., Converse) and decline in traditional civic participation (Putnam 2000), activists should be of interest to political scientists.

Chapter 2. Toward an Understanding of the Ideological Asymmetry in Protest Participation

In the previous chapter I outlined the apparent differences between social movements on the political left and right, and in particular the lack of grass-roots protest participation among conservatives. Using the psychological construct of authoritarianism as a theoretical lens to understand the dynamics of collective action on the political right, in this chapter I present a theory and generate hypotheses that I will test throughout this dissertation. I want to make it clear from the outset that I am not arguing for the notion that all conservatives are authoritarians,⁴ nor I am making any normative judgements against conservatives. Rather, my main interest is in exploring the conditions that inhibit conservatives from participating in political activities outside mainstream electoral politics, and the factors that can serve to mobilize them.

Some notable researchers have suggested that individuals with authoritarian personalities, or personality syndromes similar to authoritarianism (e.g., Hofstadter 1967; Lipset and Raab 1978), drive right-wing extremist movements (Altemeyer 1996; Butler 2000). However, there is a dearth of evidence for such a connection in the aggregate, which should not come as a surprise. That is, there is a lack of evidence in support of the hypothesis that authoritarians are active members of extremist groups, or even conservative groups more generally, which I argue stems from the very nature of authoritarianism. I argue that the authoritarian predisposition's orientation toward obedience and submission to authority and the need for social order makes these individuals unlikely to be activist members of conservative movements, and moreover, that because they are (currently) among the conservative constituency, conservatives will have a more difficult time mobilizing their base for non-electoral participation than their liberal counterparts.

2.1 Conceptualizing Authoritarianism and Understanding its Consequences

Conceptualizing and measuring authoritarianism has undergone several iterations throughout its history as a construct. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunks, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) originally conceptualized authoritarianism as a personality syndrome rooted in psychodynamic

⁴ I am sensitive to making this point clear, as in the process of developing this dissertation I received some negative comments from a conservative blog owner. They had read a of piece of this dissertation that had been presented at a conference and raised concerns that I was simply trying to say conservatives are authoritarians, and maybe I think that a desire to adhere to the Constitution makes one an authoritarian. It is certainly not my intention, nor the argument that I make.

processes. This early conceptualization assumed authoritarianism to be the result of an overbearing superego shaped by early childhood experiences, predisposing these individuals to support fascism, display ethnocentrism, prejudice, and outgroup hostility. Through empirical investigation, Adorno and colleagues attempted to explain the acquisition of authoritarianism and developed the F-Scale as a means for measuring the concept. After quickly inspiring a surge of interest, work in authoritarianism soon waned as critiques of the F-scale relegated the concept of authoritarianism to filing cabinets for quite some time. As critiques of their work and the F-Scale are well-known (e.g., Altemeyer 1981; 1988; Brown 2011; Christie & Jahoda 1954; Kinder & Kam 2009), I will not devote space to them here.

Altemeyer was among the first to pick up where Adorno and colleagues left off. Altemeyer went on an epic empirical quest, exhaustively testing items in order to develop a scale that better captured the underlying latent trait of authoritarianism, and his measure of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been one of the most extensively used in research on authoritarianism. Through his scale development, Altemeyer (1981; 1988) concluded that the authoritarian personality could be explained by three attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Authoritarian submission refers to the propensity among authoritarians to submit to legitimate and established authorities, whereas authoritarian aggression is a general aggression focused towards unconventional individuals or outgroups. Conventionalism refers to a high degree of adherence to conventional social norms that are perceived to prevail in society and are endorsed by authorities.

While Altemeyer's facets of authoritarianism have proven useful, without a strong theory unifying the three attitudinal clusters, it has been argued that his conceptualization was limited (Duckitt, 1989; Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997), and further, his measure was confounded with moral conservatism and with the attitudes it was designed to predict (e.g., Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997). As first noted by Duckitt (1989), a more fundamental characteristic of the authoritarian predisposition is that it "is concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity on the other," (Stenner 2005; p. 14). While Duckitt's conceptualization was rooted in social identity theory in order to explain both group and individual level behavior, the underlying tension between individual autonomy on the one hand, and conformity and obedience on the other, is consistent with other more recent views (e.g., Feldman & Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005).

According to these recent approaches, the predisposition that explains authoritarian attitudes is an underlying concern for social order, cohesion, obedience, and "sameness." That is, the relative weight individuals attach to conformity over autonomy define authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003). According to Stenner (2005), "It becomes a "worldview" about the social values of obedience and conformity (or freedom and difference), the prudent and just balance between group authority and individual autonomy, and the appropriate use of (or limits on) that authority" (Stenner 2005, p. 17). For authoritarians, values related to individual autonomy and freedom are subjugated by the collective in order to increase group homogeneity in ideas, beliefs, norms, and behavior. Even though this conceptualization departs somewhat from Altemeyer's in that it places less emphasis on conventionalism, the importance of authoritarians' preoccupation with legitimate and established authorities across the different approaches should be underscored. The authoritarian predisposition is primarily concerned with the individual's relationship to the group, the appropriate norms for behavior, and the necessary role of authority for enforcing adherence to shared norms of behavior.

Importantly, movements and their activists may be, and in fact often are, controversial. As a consequence, movement participants are frequently stigmatized and face police action in the case of protest (Klandermans & Meyer, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006). This may be particularly unappealing to authoritarians, as they may be more likely than their liberal counterparts to be driven to avoid being the very deviants they so despise. Social movements arise not only in order for certain groups to make gains, but because there is some sort of disagreement regarding whether those gains are warranted. Joining in countermovements necessarily means that there is division in public opinion. By taking action, a movement participant is staking a claim on one side of the debate. If there is a lack of consensus regarding which position is fundamentally right, an authoritarian may see any group, even if the group's position is in line with their underlying beliefs or values, as deviant and threatening social order. Feldman (2003), for example, found that authoritarianism predicted intolerance for the "Patriot Front", a purported neo-Nazi group, the very type of group theorists like Lipset & Raab would attribute to individuals like authoritarians. Those high in authoritarianism were more likely to oppose granting civil liberties to the group, such as the freedom of speech and right to demonstrate. This is despite the fact that the group was purported to be "white supremacists" and there was no explicit mention that the group was violent.

Authoritarians' epistemic needs for order, certainty, and security mean that they are cognitively rigid in their thinking and in their views toward the world and others (Jost et al. 2003). An authoritarian's worldview creates a lens through which these individuals observe the world in black and white terms, leading them seek distinct lines that define the normative order, legitimacy, and what and who exhibit these traits. Conversely, their non-authoritarian counterparts perceive autonomy and diversity as good and desirable. The desire for conformity and obedience above all else leads to coercion of, and bias against, atypical "others", as well as demands for authoritative constraint on individual behavior. These demands for behavioral constraints include "legal discrimination against minorities and restrictions on immigration; limits on free speech, assembly, and association; and the regulation of moral behavior, for example, via policies regarding school prayer, abortion, censorship and homosexuality, and punitive enforcement" (Stenner 2005, p.17). That is, authoritarians abhor diversity and deviance, and are willing to sacrifice civil liberties in order to uphold social cohesion and consensus.

The contentious political arena may more appropriately be seen as threatening to authoritarians, thereby depressing participation in all forms. This is consistent with evidence that authoritarians display cognitive incapacity (Stenner 2005), are low in need for cognition (Hetherington & Weiler 2009), are less educated (Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005), less likely to expose themselves to experiences or challenging information (Altemeyer 1996; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005), and are low in openness to experience (Akrami and Ekehammar 2006; Stenner 2005; Sibley & Duckitt 2008). Low Openness to experience leads to rigid cognitive styles and the need to see the world in "black and white" terms. This need for cognitive simplicity leads to strict group categorization, which can explain why these individuals are more likely to exhibit authoritarian tendencies such as submission to authority and social norms, as they provide a more concrete cognitive mapping of the sociopolitical world. That is, authoritarians display a closed-minded way of thinking about the world that should lead them to be turned off by the political environment, which is inherently complex and rife with conflict. This is in line with findings that they are unlikely to report having strong opinions regarding politics (Hetherington & Weiler 2009), and with the notion that they prefer to defer to authorities to resolve social cohesion issues.

However, authoritarians need not display their intolerant and punitive tendencies at all times. Rather, according to the perspective of Feldman and Stenner, and the one that I adopt, individuals place a greater weight on values concerning conformity over autonomy, the attitudinal, and perhaps behavioral, manifestations of authoritarianism emerge when the social context directly “activates” these values (e.g., Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005; Lavine et al. 2005). That is, the process by which the consequences of authoritarianism are materialized is inherently dynamic. Only when threats to social order and cohesion are present, will authoritarians exhibit their well-known intolerant, prejudiced, and punitive tendencies. Threat can come from specific groups authoritarians may be confronted by, or from a more general perception of threats to the social order (Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). As Stenner (2005) notes, authoritarianism manifests itself when there exists “the experience or perception of disobedience to group authorities or authorities unworthy of respect, nonconformity to group norms or norms proving questionable, lack of consensus in group values and beliefs, and, in general, diversity and freedom ‘run amok’” (p. 17). Authoritarianism can be seen as instrumental in developing cohesion through their deference towards, and perhaps demands on, authorities to enforce and foster sameness.

The very nature of politics may be exactly what threatens authoritarians, and thus catalyzes their submission and obedience toward authority. As Stenner writes: “these catalytic conditions turn out to be the stuff of politics: high levels of dissent and divided public opinion; leaders proving fallible and unworthy of our trust” (p. 326). The political environment, to an authoritarian, may prove threatening to the point that they withdraw from politics. This is in line with findings that authoritarians tend to feel alienated from politics (Hetherington & Weiler 2009), are generally less interested in and knowledgeable of politics (Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005), and potentially participate at lower rates through their uncritical patriotism (Huddy & Khatib 2007).

Authoritarianism and Political Action

A wealth of research has empirically demonstrated authoritarians’ intolerant, prejudiced, and punitive attitudes, but whether these attitudes in turn lead to important political behavior is less understood. As mentioned in Chapter 1, older research on right-wing movements focused on individual-level covariates of “status anxious” activists to describe the individuals driving these movements (e.g., Lipset & Raab; 1978; Hofstadter 1967). This research linked low socioeconomic status to authoritarianism, and support for fascist, right-wing movements (Lipset 1959). Lipset’s (1959) main argument is that the lower strata (poor and working class) have a predisposition to authoritarian attitudes, and due to their way of life, are more likely to support extremist movements. Lipset also connects support for extremism to conservatism when he writes that the “militarism and nationalism, often defended by conservatives, probably have an attraction for individuals with authoritarian predispositions” (p. 500). Janowitz and Marvick (1953) also write that “Political scientists have often noted that extremist movements tend to attract such lower middle class authoritarians,” (pp. 191-193). What these older works make clear is that members of rightist movements are often characterized as extremists, and right-wing movements have been described as being led by authoritarians. Yet Parker and Barreto (2013) find evidence that neither mainstream conservatives nor authoritarians drive support for the Tea Party. Moreover, the nature of the authoritarian predisposition is incompatible with participation in any contentious activities that upset social order or defy authorities. In line with the idea that

authoritarianism will lead to lowered levels of involvement, authoritarianism has been linked to uncritical (“blind”) patriotism – a “rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of critics” (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine 1999, p. 153) and uncritical patriotism has been linked to authoritarianism (e.g., Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz et al. 1999).

As a first step in empirically establishing a negative relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation, Table 2.1 presents protest rates across authoritarianism from the 2000 and 2004 ANES. As can be seen, authoritarianism is significantly and negatively related to protest behavior. In 2000, 5% of low authoritarians reported having protested within the year, compared to only 1% of authoritarians, and in 2004 9% of low authoritarians reported protest participation compared to 4% of authoritarians. This suggests that, as with ideology, there is a relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation, with greater activity being displayed on the political left and among low authoritarians, with conservatives and authoritarians being much less represented.

Table 2.1. Percentage Reporting Protest Participation within Last Year across Authoritarianism

	2000 ANES	2004 ANES
Authoritarianism		
Low	5%	9%
Middle	2%	4%
High	1%	4%
N	1550	1064

Note: All percentages are calculated using appropriate survey weights.

More recent research that has examined the politically relevant behavioral manifestations of authoritarianism has posited some contradictory findings. For example, Duncan and Stewart (1995) found that authoritarians were willing to espouse strong support for U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War, but were unlikely to participate behaviorally in war-support activities. In their work on the Tea Party, Parker and Barreto (2013) find little connection between the Tea Party and authoritarianism among movement sympathizers. Further, research that has looked at authoritarianism as a determinant of political activism has found it to be negatively correlated with feminist and pro-choice activism (Duncan 1999; Duncan, Peterson, & Winter 1997), but positively correlated with male’s involvement with pro-life/antiabortion activism (Duncan, Peterson, & Winter 1997). This latter finding led Duncan, Peterson, Zurbruggen (2010) to suggest that in times of threat to their values, authoritarians may indeed be politically active if there are sufficient leaders available to mobilize them. I will return to this latter idea in more detail in this chapter when I discuss my core predictions, but overall, this discussion suggests that, in general, authoritarians are relatively disengaged politically, but there may be certain circumstances in which they can be mobilized.

2.2 Authoritarianism and Conservatism

While authoritarianism is tied to political conservatism, I do not argue that all conservatives are authoritarians. For example, economic conservatives are far less likely than social conservatives to fit the profile of an authoritarian (Stenner 2005; Feldman & Johnston 2014). An important connection to make is between authoritarianism and social, or moral conservatism. The conservative focus in the United States on maintaining the status quo and returning to traditional values temporally links conservatives with authoritarians. Social conservatism today is largely focused on moral traditionalism, which is associated with prescriptive social norms. Conformity, tradition, and absolutism serve to restrict individual autonomy and increase social control, leading to a more orderly society, factors that are appealing to authoritarians through their cognitive rigidity and needs for order and certainty.

Recall the brief discussion of the role of elites in building modern day conservatism in Chapter 1. Writers like William Buckley, James Burnham, Frank S. Meyer, and Russell Kirk, who in 1955 launched *National Review* were able to build a conservative coalition built on clear normative values. Meyer emphasized “what all American conservatives ostensibly had in common: patriotism, opposition to economic collectivism and communism, a concern with the preservation of states’ rights, and recognition of moral objectivity” (Gross et al. 2011, p. 331). William Buckley and his colleagues brought God and religion into conservatism more than it had been previously, mobilized educated, devoutly religious Americans, and criticized academia and faculty members for indoctrinating students into atheism and socialism. This underscores the important role that these strong leaders played in the construction of the conservative group identity. These leaders served to legitimize the movement by appealing to those who believed in the moral superiority of Christian values, which many believe are the very principles America was founded on. The inclusion of religious values lends moral superiority and legitimacy to movement leaders on the right. They have God, the ultimate authority, on their side; rightist leaders were the righteous shepherds trying to herd their flock in the direction of tried and true societal norms and values. Those pesky, hedonist liberals were the devil’s playthings, attempting to erect a new Sodom and Gomorrah. The absolutist ideals of the right simplify the world and prescribe normative behaviors that everyone should follow. Thus, moral conservatism with its clearly defined norms should resonate with authoritarians’ cognitive rigidity as well their desire for conformity and obedience. Strong norms serve to orient the individual in relation to the group, prescribing norms for behavior and necessary action.

Given the connection between conservatism and authoritarianism, this may help to explain why asymmetries exist on the right and left regarding mobilization potential. Authoritarians are increasingly identifying with the Republican Party (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Wronski 2014), and authoritarianism has reliably been associated with conservatism in prior research (Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Feldman 2003; Jost et al. 2003; Stenner 2005). Authoritarians also make up a large enough section of the population that their potential inactivity should have important consequences for conservatives. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) report that in 2004, 15.8% of the people surveyed scored at the maximum of the authoritarianism measure. Similar numbers are found for 2006 and 2008, with 17.3% and 21%, respectively, scoring at the maximum of the scale. Similarly, for the 2000 ANES, I find that

14.7% of the sample also obtained the highest scores on the measure using the child-rearing battery. This indicates that authoritarians are not simply some “fringe” members of society. Moreover, in the 2000 ANES sample, approximately 81% of conservatives scored at the middle of the authoritarian scale or above, indicating that they are an important part of the conservative constituency.

2.3 Core Predictions

Authoritarians’ obedience and deference to authority, their aversion to social conflict and deviant groups, and their rigid cognitive styles should lead them to avoid participating in political affairs, particularly when activities call for them to shout loudly in the streets. In this next section I outline the core predictions that I will test throughout this dissertation.

Explaining the Asymmetry

The first question I posed to seek an answer to in Chapter 1 is why do we see less protest participation among conservatives than liberals? By connecting ideology and authoritarianism, I argue that because authoritarians are inherently disinclined toward unruly political participation, they can help to explain why we see fewer conservatives taking to the streets in collective action.

While my main argument is that authoritarianism helps to explain why conservatives are less likely to protest than liberals, I also explore alternative explanations for collective action participation, which are largely based in rational choice, or expectancy-value, theories (e.g., Klandermans 1984). Simply, one’s decision to take part in a collective action is rational to the degree that potential benefits of participation outweigh the costs. In particular, direct mobilization through existing social networks serves to decrease the costs of participation, while emphasizing the benefits (Klandermans 1984; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). Schussman and Soule (2005) find that being asked to participate in protest is one of the most important determinants of protest participation. Moreover, existing social networks affect the rewards and costs of collective action, such that involvement in an organization with existing ties to activism increases the likelihood that members will become involved in protest themselves (e.g., McCarthy & Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). In other words, people in social movements are more likely to belong to preexisting organizations and friendship or neighborhood networks than less active individuals. These begs the question of whether mobilization through social networks can help to explain why conservatives are less likely than liberals to participate in protest. Thus, it is possible that conservatives and authoritarians have less access to protest because they are not involved in organizations with members who actively participate in non-electoral activities.

Mobilizing the Right

Authoritarian submission is in contradiction with the notion that these individuals would be likely activists, and their staunch obedience to authorities should be incompatible with collective action and political activism. Indeed, it has been noted that authoritarians look to strong leaders, while remaining intolerant of dissent (Huddy & Khatib 2007, p. 71). Collective action entails taking action in opposition to the state, interaction with those who disagree with your views, and confrontation with the police is not unlikely. However, by examining the dimensions of protest that authoritarians might be averse to, I hope to highlight several elements of social movement organizations that present a best case for mobilizing these individuals, and conservatives more generally, to collective action.

By identifying some of the characteristics of protest activities that interact with an authoritarian predisposition I seek to answer the second question posed in this dissertation: how do characteristics of protest events affect conservatives' willingness to support protesters and participate in future activities themselves? In this dissertation I highlight two key characteristics of movements and activist groups that likely strike at the core of authoritarianism, as well as conservatism, in order to better understand how individuals on the right side of the political divide perceive and respond to the political world, and what elements of the political world appeal to their psychology.

In particular, the characteristics of protest events that I predict to affect support from the right are the contentiousness of activities and the type of interactions with authority figures, such as the police. Authoritarians see any affront to social cohesion as threatening, and taking public political action not only puts their opinions on display, but also puts them face to face with opposing ideas and groups. Moreover, it is unlikely that authoritarians will want to put themselves in a position that could potentially lead to arrest or other legal action. Yet, when collective actions are devoid of these factors, authoritarians and conservatives should be more likely to support and participate in protest activities. That is, when protests are non-contentious, posing little risk of conflict or confrontation, and protest groups are respectful of legitimate authority figures, they should foster more support and potentially mobilize members of the right.

Legitimacy of current authorities

A central component of the authoritarian predisposition is their staunch allegiance to authority, but importantly, while authoritarians display deference to authorities, not all authorities will be seen as legitimate. Only leaders that serve to bring together society's members under an umbrella of conformity and order will be perceived as worthy of their obedience (Stenner 2005). Thus, in order for authoritarians to be persuaded that they need to stand up and seek redress for their grievances, it would necessitate that they perceive that current authorities are not legitimate. By exploring how perceptions of political leaders affect protest participation on the right, I can answer the third question set forth in this dissertation: how do perceptions of political leadership affect the likelihood that conservatives will participate in grass-roots activism? I contend that when political leadership, particularly at the elite level, such as the presidency, is perceived as illegitimate among the right, conservatives will be more likely to form grass-roots mobilization efforts. That is, when the legitimacy of current leaders is undermined, the relationship between ideology and protest participation should become attenuated.

2.4 Summary and Brief Outline of the Dissertation

Taken together, Chapters 1 and 2 thus far argue that protest participation among the political right is much less common than among the left and I claim that the connection between conservatism and authoritarianism can help to explain this apparent asymmetry in protest participation. Yet, by using authoritarianism as lens through which to understand the circumstances that it may be possible to mobilize authoritarians, I outline several factors that should interact with ideology and authoritarianism to explain variance in support for political activism on the right. Specifically, I suggest that characteristics commonly associated with protest activity, such as contentiousness of tactics and interactions with authorities, condition support for activist movements on the right. Finally, I suggest that authoritarians' submission to authority should only hold when leaders are perceived as legitimate, and that once the legitimacy of current political leadership is sufficiently undermined, we can expect to see more grass-roots participation on the right.

In Chapter 3 I use multiple national surveys to help explain why conservatives are less likely to protest than liberals. I find that authoritarianism does aid in understanding the asymmetry in protest participation between the right and left, but it does not sufficiently account for the whole story. I also explore the alternative explanations briefly discussed above to assess the role of mobilization and organizational involvement in explaining the differing protest rates between liberals and conservatives. I find that while being contacted has provides only a limited explanation, organizational involvement in institutions that protest more, on average, fosters protest participation, and conservatives are relatively absent from these types of organizations.

Using original experimental methods, Chapter 4 examines how characteristics of protest events interact with ideology and authoritarianism to affect protest support and potential future participation. I experimentally manipulate the contentiousness of the tactics used by protesters and whether they are respectful or disrespectful of police, and find that these factors significantly affect intentions to participate events. Briefly, I find that peaceful events that are respectful of police are able to garner as much, and possibly even more, support from the right as the left, but protest events that are disrespectful of police and use violent tactics depress support.

Chapter 5 explores the third question posed in this dissertation to test whether perceptions of legitimacy affect the dynamics of collective action on the right. Specifically, I extend the analyses of Chapter 3 to include the period since the election of Barack Obama. There has been considerable elite rhetoric that serves to undermine Barack Obama's legitimacy as a leader (Hehman, Gaertner, & Dovidio 2011; Parlett 2014), and Parker and Barreto (2013) demonstrate that Tea Party support is driven by an intense aversion to Obama's presidency. I find some evidence to support my prediction that perceived illegitimacy of leaders interact with ideology and authoritarianism to affect protest participation among the right.

Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation, discusses limitations of the current studies, and offers future directions, embedding the current study within its broader implications.

Chapter 3. Ideological Asymmetries in Non-Electoral Political Participation and the Role of Authoritarianism

“Society’s tendency is to maintain what has been. Rebellion is only an occasional reaction to suffering in human history; we have infinitely more instances of forbearance to exploitation, and submission to authority, than we have to examples of revolt.”

-Howard Zinn

The psychological and political attributes of authoritarians, including a desire to obey authority and enforce social conformity, raise questions about their willingness to engage in collective action. I focus on authoritarian conservatives as a key subset of conservatives who account to some degree for reduced levels of collective action and protest activity on the political right than left. I argue that there are important asymmetries between liberals and conservatives regarding mobilization potential, making it more difficult to mobilize people on the right because a number of these individuals are authoritarian in nature and inherently disinclined to participate in unconventional political action. I expect that authoritarians help to explain the link between right leaning ideology and unconventional political participation. In contrast, ideology and authoritarianism should be unrelated to participation in mainstream political activities, such as campaign activity and writing politicians, as these types of activities do not pose challenges to existing authorities and are less confrontational than protest.

In this chapter I test the following main hypotheses:

H1: Conservatives, compared to liberals, will participate in protest activities at lower rates.

H2: Those higher in authoritarianism will participate in protest activities at lower rates.

H3: Decreased protest levels among conservatives will be partially explained by authoritarianism, such that the relationship between ideology and protest participation will become attenuated when authoritarianism is taken into account.

I also explore several alternative explanations for the relationship between ideology and protest participation that were discussed in Chapter 2. According to resource mobilization scholars (e.g., McCarthy & Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973), group memberships and social networks are critical in the mobilization process. People in social movements are more likely to belong to preexisting organizations and friendship or neighborhood networks than less active individuals. This begs the question of whether mobilization through social networks can help to explain why conservatives are less likely than liberals to participate in protest. If liberals do

indeed have access to more protest opportunities, authoritarianism is likely to matter more on the left than it does on the right. This leads a fourth hypothesis about the conditional relationship between authoritarianism and protest:

H4: The relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation will be conditional on ideology, such that it will be more strongly negatively related to protest among liberals than conservatives.

To more directly examine whether mobilization efforts and organizational membership affects the relationship between ideology, authoritarianism, and protest, I test whether being contacted to participate in politics occurs more often on the left than the right and whether this affects the likelihood that one participates in protest activity. I also look at the types of organizations that liberals and conservatives are involved in. It is possible that liberals are members of organizations that tend to protest more on average than conservatives, which would provide more opportunity for protest on the left. Thus, I also test the following hypotheses:

H5: Conservatives are contacted less often than liberals to participate in political activities.

H5a: Once being contacted to participate is taken into account, the relationship between ideology and protest participation will become attenuated.

H6: Conservatives are active in fewer organizations that have members who participate in higher than average levels of protest.

H6a: Once organization involvement is taken into account, the relationship between ideology and protest participation will become attenuated.

Unless authoritarians believe that active participation is sanctioned by authorities, they may simply be unwilling to be active participants in a movement making claims against the state. Thus, I also examine authoritarians' perceptions of the legality of protest and other non-electoral forms of political activities and whether this accounts for authoritarians' absence from protest by testing the following:

H7: Authoritarianism will be positively related to beliefs that protest is illegal.

H7a: Once the belief that protest is illegal is taken into account, the relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation will become attenuated.

Finally, I also examine whether class membership can help to explain the relationship between ideology and protest as these factors serve as proxies for structural disadvantages, which are known to increase social movement participation (van Zomeran et al. 2008). However, I remain agnostic to these effects, as they are not central to my main argument.

3.1 Data and Measurement

To test my hypotheses, I draw on four representative surveys of the U.S. population: the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES), the 2005 U.S. Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy (CID) survey, and the 2008 AmericasBarometer (LAPOP). Each of these datasets were chosen because they provide key measures of ideology, authoritarianism, and protest participation.

ANES Samples. The ANES is conducted by the Center for Political Studies Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Face-to-face sampling for both the 2000 and 2004 samples is based on a multi-stage area probability sample selected from the Survey Research Center's (SRC) 1990 National Sample design. Identification of the respondents was conducted using a four stage sampling process: a primary stage sampling of U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) or New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMAs) and non-MSA counties, a second stage sampling of area segments, a third stage sampling of housing units within sampled area segments, and a final stage random selection of a single respondent from selected housing units. In addition to the traditional face-to-face interview approach employed by the ANES, the 2000 ANES was the first in history to introduce random digit dialing (RDD) to conduct telephone pre- and post-election surveys to random samples of respondents. The RDD telephone component of the 2000 ANES is a stratified equal probability sample of telephone numbers and is not clustered.

Due to the complex survey designs of the ANES samples, all analyses are conducted on weighted data using Taylor Series standard errors. I use the post-election post-stratified weights to correct descriptive and coefficient estimates, and strata and cluster (primary sampling unit) variables to correct standard errors.⁵

2000 ANES. A total of 1807 pre-election interviews were completed (1006 face-to-face, 801 by RDD) between September 5th, 2000 and November 6th, 2000. Respondents were offered \$20 for their participation in pre-election interviews, which was increased to \$40 when researchers were concerned that they would not meet their response rate goals. The overall pre-election response rate was 61.2% (64.8% face-to-face, 57.2% RDD). The post-election interviews took place between November 8, 2000 and December 18, 2000, and respondents were offered \$20 for their participation. A total of 1555 interviews were conducted after the election (693 face-to-face, 862 RDD), with an overall response rate of 86% (86.1% face to-face, 85.8% RDD).

2004 ANES. A total of 1212 pre-election interviews were completed between September 7th, 2004 and November 1st, 2004. Respondents were offered \$20 for their participation in pre-election interviews, which was increased to \$50 near the end of the pre-election survey. The pre-election response rate was 66.1%. The post-election interviews took place between November

⁵ The ANES did not provide separate strata and cluster variables prior to 2006. I constructed these variables using the methods described by DeBell (2010, pp. 16-17).

3rd, 2004 and December 20th, 2004, and respondents were offered \$20 for their participation. A total of 1,066 interviews were conducted after the election with a response rate of 88%.

CID Sample. The CID is a comprehensive survey of American civic engagement. The study, carried out between May 16 and July 19, 2005, is the culmination of a loose collaboration between Georgetown University's Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) and the European Social Survey. Interviewing was conducted by International Communications Research of Media. Interviewers went door-to-door throughout the United States, resulting in 1,001 completed interviews with eligible respondents. The respondents were provided an incentive of \$50 to participate in the survey. The response rate was 40.03%.

The study used a classic cluster sample design. The objective of this design was to provide an approximate self-weighting sample of households across the continental United States. For all analyses using the CID the design weight (*dweight*) is applied, as recommended by CDACS (Howard, Gibson & Stolle 2005).

LAPOP Sample. The AmericasBarometer Survey of the U.S. population was conducted during April, 2008, as part of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008 wave of surveys. This web-based survey was administered by YouGov Polimetrix. With the goal of representing the adult general population of the United States, Polimetrix interviewed 2112 opt-in panelists who were then matched down to a sample of 1500 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched on gender, age, race, education, party identification and political interest. Polimetrix then weighted the matched set of survey respondents to known marginals for the general population of the United States from the 2006 American Community Survey. In all analyses using the LAPOP data the country weight is applied as recommended by the survey authors.

Table 3.1 provides demographic and partisan breakdowns for each sample. Most of the demographic characteristics are quite consistent across samples, though there are several minor differences. Over time, there is a decrease in the percentage of respondents who report dropping out of school before receiving a high school diploma or GED, which is likely a reflection of increased graduation rates in the population for this period.⁶ In the 2004 ANES, there is a slightly higher percentage of respondents (9.89%) who report having a post-graduate degree (compared to 7.89% in 2000, 8.25% in 2005, and 8.87% in 2008). The 2004 ANES also has a higher percentage of black respondents compared to the other samples (15.94%, compared to 11.7% in 2000, 13.71% in 2005, and 11.05% in 2008). The percentage of respondents who identify as at least Republican leaning is higher in both ANES samples compared to the CID and LAPOP, with the highest percentage of Republicans reported in 2000 (49.67% in 2000, 42.48% in 2004, 36.22% in 2005, and 39.3% in 2008).

⁶ <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0229.pdf>

Table 3.1. Weighted Sample Demographics Breakdown

	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2005 CID	2008 LAPOP
Education	N=1800	N=1212	N=1000	N=1500
No H.S. Diploma	14.95%	14.38%	12.03%	8.49%
H.S. Diploma	33.3%%	31.55%	29.4%	37.88%
Some College-A.A.	28.11%	28.24%	35.04%	28.63%
College (B.A.)	15.76%	15.74%	15.27%	16.14%
Advanced Degree	7.89%	9.89%	8.25%	8.87%
Income	N=1515	N=1070	N=986 ⁷	N=1290
Median Income	\$35,000-\$49,999	\$45,000-\$49,999	\$40,000-\$49,999	\$40,000 - \$49,999
Gender	N=1807	N=1212	N=1001	N=1500
Male	43.11%	49.39%	44.48%	48.27%
Female	56.89%	50.61%	55.52%	51.73%
Race	N=1788	N=1204	N=1001	N=1500
White	77.43%	72.72%	73.31%	70.3%
Black	11.7%	15.94%	13.71%	11.05%
Other	10.87%	11.35%	12.98%	18.65%
Party ID	N=1776	N=1195	N=962	N=1429
Republican	38.5%	42.28%	36.22%	39.3%
Independent	11.83%	9.63%	13.11%	12.33%
Democrat	49.67%	48.1%	50.67%	48.37%
Age	N=1798	N=1212	N=960	N=1500
Mean Age	45.52	46.57	43.35	44.43
(std. error)	(.67)	(.60)	(.58)	(.44)

Dependent Variables

Protest. I focus on protest participation as my main dependent variable as it is the most salient means of expressing grievances outside of mainstream activities. Often, protests are contentious and confrontations with the police are not unusual, something which should be particularly unattractive to authoritarians. Table 3.2 contains a summary of the protest item wordings for each dataset. Across the two ANES samples, protest was assessed by asking respondents, “aside from a strike against your employer, in the past twelve months, have you

⁷ The CID dataset includes an income variable that was calculated using multiple imputation to decrease the number of missing values, which I use for all analyses using that dataset.

taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue?”, coded 1 if the respondent indicated that they had participated, and 0 if not. In the CID, protest participation was assessed by coding 1 if a respondent had either participated in illegal protest activities or taken part in a lawful public demonstration within the past 12 months, and 0 otherwise. The 2008 LAPOP asked whether respondents had participated in a demonstration or march in the last 12 months, and respondents indicated whether they had done this sometimes, almost never, or never. I code almost never and never as 0, and sometimes as 1.⁸

Table 3.2. Protest Item Wording

2000 & 2004 ANES	“Aside from a strike against your employer, in the past twelve months, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue?”
2005 CID	“During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Taken part in a lawful public demonstration Participated in illegal protest activities”
2008 LAPOP	“And now thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never?”

As can be seen in Table 3.3, protest participation is a relatively rare event. The rate of participation is lowest in the 2000 ANES, with only 3% of participants indicating protest participation within the last year. Across the 2004 ANES, 2005 CID, and 2008 LAPOP, approximately 6-7% of respondents reported protesting within the last twelve months. The rate of protest varies across both ideology and authoritarianism, with liberals and low authoritarians reporting lower protest rates than conservatives and high authoritarians. These initial results provide evidence in support of hypotheses 1 and 2, and are discussed in more detail below in the Results section.

⁸ Coding “almost never” as 1 appears to artificially inflate the proportion of people reporting having protested to 17%. Results are not substantively changed depending on how the protest variable is coded. The LAPOP survey also includes an item that asked participants if they had ever taken part in a protest. However, this item is not used in any analyses as it is inconsistent with the time frames assessed in the other surveys.

Table 3.3. Percentage of Respondents Indicating Protest Activity across Levels of Ideology and Authoritarianism

	2000	2004	2005	2008
	ANES	ANES	CID	LAPOP
All Respondents	3%	7%	6%	6%
N	1807	1212	1001	1500
Ideology				
Liberal	7%	11%	12%	15%
Moderate	1%	8%	4%	4%
Conservative	2%	4%	3%	3%
N	1467	1156	944	1309
Authoritarianism				
Low	5%	9%	9%	9%
Middle	2%	4%	5%	3%
High	1%	4%	4%	4%
N	1550	1064	992	1495

Note: All percentages are calculated using appropriate survey weights.

Other Non-Electoral Activities. To further examine the ideological asymmetry in unconventional political participation, I constructed an alternative measure of non-electoral political activity. This measure, using items from the CID only, is an additive scale of the number of activities participated in within the last 12 months, which include signing petitions, political internet activities, boycotting, and buycotting. This measure ranges from 0 to 6 activities and is recoded to run from 0 to 1 ($M = .19$, $SD = .26$).

Mainstream Activities. I also constructed a measure of non-voting mainstream activities, which allows me to assess whether conservatives' and authoritarians' non-electoral activity to more mainstream political behavior. Using items from the CID, I sum the number of non-voting mainstream activities participated in within the last 12 months, which include writing a letter to a politician, working for a campaign of a candidate for office, working for a political party, and working another political organization. The scale runs 0 to 4 activities and is recoded to run from 0 to 1 ($M = .20$, $SD = .22$). These types of activities are well within the mainstream and entail working with like-minded individuals. Thus, ideology and authoritarianism should be unrelated to participation in these types of activities.

All items used to construct non-electoral and mainstream political activities are listed in Table 3.4.⁹

⁹ Note that working for a political organization may include some activist organizations, but it's about as strongly related to protest as working for a political party or working for a campaign. A factor analysis also suggests that the three working for organization items go well together. I also found that the contacting a politician item decreases alpha for scale from .76 to .70, but because it is non-contentious and mainstream activity, I keep it in the scale.

Table 3.4. Types of Political Activities: 2005 CID

Non-Electoral $\alpha = .77$	Mainstream $\alpha = .70$
<i>During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?</i>	
Signed a petition	Contacted a politician or a local government official
Boycotted certain products	Worked in a political party or action group
Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons	Worked for the campaign of a candidate for office
Forwarded electronic messages with political content	Worked in another political organization or association
Participated in political activities over the internet	
Visited websites of political organizations or candidates	
Mean number of Activities = 1.16	Mean number of Activities = .43

Independent Variables

Measuring Ideology. Ideology in the ANES samples is measured on a 9-point self-placement scale, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, with true moderates in the middle. In the CID ideology is measured as respondents' self-placement on a 7-point scale, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. In the 2008 LAPOP ideology is measured on a 5-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. All measures are coded to range from 0-1. Means and standard errors are reported in Table 3.5, with mean levels of ideology exhibiting consistency across samples, ranging between .54 and .56.¹⁰

Table 3.5. Means, Standard Errors, and Bivariate Correlations for Ideology and Authoritarianism

	CID	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2008 LAPOP
Ideology	.55 (.0080)	.54 (.0079)	.56 (.011)	.54 (.0081)
Authoritarianism	.60 (.0052)	.62 (.011)	.60 (.012)	.59 (.0085)
<i>r</i>	.25	.24	.25	.32

Note: Means and standard errors calculated using survey weights. Variables coded on 0-1 scale.

¹⁰ It should be mentioned that ideology as measured using the traditional self-placement scales largely represents symbolic identification with an ideological label (Converse, 1964; Federico, 2011; Jost, 2006), rather than content of specific policy attitudes, which are better assessed using a multidimensional approach (e.g., Feldman & Johnston 2014).

Measuring Authoritarianism. Altemeyer's measure of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996) is one of the most widely used means of operationalizing the concept of authoritarianism, largely due to its ability to predict authoritarian attitudes, such as intolerance and support for right-wing policies. However, as mentioned above, much of its predictive ability is due to items being confounded with moral conservatism and with the attitudes the measure was designed to predict (e.g., Feldman 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997).

The measures of authoritarianism I use addresses these concerns. First introduced by the ANES, the four-item child-rearing battery has become an accepted means for measuring authoritarianism in survey data (e.g., Stenner 2005; Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Hetherington & Suhay 2011). Participants are asked to judge whether it is more important for a child to have independence or respect for elders, obedience or self-reliance, curiosity or good manners, and is considerate or well behaved. The measure captures authoritarians' emphasis on conformity, control, and obedience, and is detached from political ideology and attitudes. Each survey in my analysis uses some iteration of the original child-rearing battery.

In both ANES samples, authoritarianism is computed as respondents' summed scores to the four child-rearing values in the survey. Responses in the authoritarian direction are coded 1, those in the opposite direction 0, and those in which respondents voluntarily agree with both are scored .5. Items are summed and coded on a 0-1 scale ($\alpha = 0.60$ & $.61$ for 2000 and 2004, respectively).

While the CID does not contain items that perfectly match those previously used to measure authoritarianism, it does contain several items that capture the construct. Specifically, there are three items similar to child-rearing values, though in the current dataset, these are not posed as a forced choice between values, but rated on a 5-point scale (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree). These items are: 1) "in preparing children for life, it is extremely important that they learn to think for themselves"; 2) "in preparing children for life, it is extremely important that they learn to be obedient"; 3) "What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents." These items are summed and recoded to range from 0-1, with 1 being higher on authoritarianism ($\alpha = 0.48$).¹¹

¹¹ Low reliability in this measure is likely attributable to acquiescence bias, which is common in agree-disagree items (e.g., Bentler, Jackson, & Messick, 1971; Billiet & McClendon 1998). Future analyses should attempt to fix this using structural equation modeling. It should also be noted that while reliability is low for the CID measure of authoritarianism, it demonstrates convergent validity with political variables shown below.

Table 3.6. Authoritarianism Item Wording

2000 & 2004 ANES; 2008 LAPOP	Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Independence or respect for elders Obedience or self-reliance Curiosity or good manners Considerate or well behaved
2005 CID	In preparing children for life, it is extremely important that they learn to think for themselves. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents. In preparing children for life, it is extremely important that they learn to be obedient.

Authoritarianism in the 2008 LAPOP is measured using the same set of child-rearing items as in both ANES samples. In the LAPOP, however, there are forced choice responses, meaning that no option to choose “both” is available. Again, those choosing the authoritarian response are coded as 1 and those choosing the non-authoritarian response are coded as 0. Items are summed and coded on a unit scale ($\alpha = .60$).¹²

Means and standard errors for the authoritarian measures are reported in Table 3.5. As with ideology, mean levels of authoritarianism are quite consistent across datasets, ranging from .59 to .62. Ideology and authoritarianism are also consistently positively correlated with Pearson’s correlation coefficient ranging from a low of $r = .24$ in the 2000 ANES, to a high of $r = .32$ in the 2008 LAPOP, and in both the 2005 CID and 2004 ANES, $r = .25$.¹³ While the correlation between authoritarianism and ideology are consistent, they are of modest magnitude. This suggests that authoritarianism may only play a partial role in explaining ideological asymmetries in protest.

Controls

In the multivariate models discussed below, I include partisan and demographic controls. Partisan identification is measured as respondents’ self-placement on a 7-point scale, ranging from strong Republican to strong Democrat. Across all datasets, strength of partisan identification is also included, which is constructed by “folding” the partisan identification scale around its middle value (Independent), such that it ranges from Independent to strong partisan. Demographics controls include income, education, age, and race. Race is entered as two dummy

¹² The reliabilities for both ANES samples and the LAPOP sample are similar to what has been found by others (e.g., Hetherington & Suhay 2011).

¹³ These modest correlations are in line with what other researchers have found (e.g., Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Barker & Tinnick 2006; Wronski 2014). This also presents an interesting puzzle in that while authoritarians have increasing identified with the Republican party, they appear to be less inclined to adopt the conservative label.

variables for Whites and Blacks. As the income, education, and partisan variables are ordinal measures with no natural units, they are recoded to range from 0-1. Age is measured in years.

3.2 Results

My main hypothesis is that there is an ideological asymmetry in protest participation, with protest activity being more common on the political left than right. Further, because a number of authoritarians identify as conservative, authoritarianism should help to explain this asymmetry. As such, it is expected that authoritarianism will attenuate the relationship between ideology and protest once it is simultaneously taken into account.¹⁴

I first examine the relationship between protest participation and both ideology and authoritarianism. Table 3.3 above reports the percentages of respondents in each survey who indicate that they participated in protest at each level of ideology and authoritarianism. For ease of presentation, the ideology scale is recoded into three levels: liberal, moderate, and conservative. Similarly, authoritarianism is broken into three categories using tertile splits to create high, middle, and low levels of authoritarianism.¹⁵

As can be seen in Table 3.3 it is clear that liberals are far more inclined than conservatives to protest. In the 2005 CID, 12% of liberals but only 3% of conservatives indicated that they had protested in the last 12 months. This ideological difference in levels of participation is similar, though somewhat less stark, in the 2000 ANES where 7% of liberals compared to 2% of conservatives have indicated protesting in the last 12 months. In the 2004 ANES, liberals are over 3 times more likely than conservatives to report protest participation within the past year (10% vs. 3%). The largest ideological difference in protests activity is found in the 2008 LAPOP, with 15% of liberals and only 3% of conservatives indicating protest participation within the past 12 months. In the CID, 2004 ANES, and 2008 LAPOP the relationship between ideology and protest also appears to be monotonic, with moderates less likely to report having protested compared to liberals, but more likely than conservatives.

¹⁴ This implies that mediational analyses should be used. However, there are a couple of reasons that mediation is not an appropriate method to test my hypotheses. Most importantly, if authoritarianism were a mediator of ideology on protest, ideology would need to temporally precede authoritarianism. However, authoritarianism is considered a psychological predisposition that has been demonstrated to be an antecedent of ideology (e.g., Feldman & Johnston 2014). Moreover, using observational data presents obstacles that make it almost impossible to meet the necessary sequential ignorability assumptions required for mediation (see Bullock, Green, & Ha 2009 and Imai et al. 2010 for discussions).

¹⁵ Because a tertile split uses quantiles to create three categories, the specific values of the authoritarian measure contained in each category vary slightly between the ANES, CID, and LAPOP samples. Overall, however, the ranges of values contained in each category are quite consistent. For both the 2000 and 2004 ANES, low authoritarianism corresponds to values between 0 and .5, middle values to scores of .625 and .75, and high to scores of .875 and 1. In the CID, low authoritarianism corresponds to scores between 0 and .55 on the authoritarian measure, middle corresponds to a score of .64, and high to scores between .73 and 1. In the LAPOP sample, the low authoritarian category contains values between 0 and .5, the middle category a score of .75, and high a score of 1.

However, in the 2000 ANES, the rate of protest among conservatives is close to 1% higher than among moderates, though moderates' and conservatives' rates of participation are much more similar to each other and much lower compared to liberals.

As with ideology, authoritarians also exhibit far less protest participation. In the CID, 2004 ANES, and 2008 LAPOP low authoritarians are found to be more than twice as likely as high authoritarians to participate in protest. In the 2000 ANES, the year with the lowest overall rates of protest, low authoritarians are over six times more likely than high authoritarians to report protest participation.

It should also be noted that across all data sets, liberals and those low in authoritarianism protest at higher rates than the overall sample means, whereas moderates, conservatives, middle and high authoritarians all protest at lower rates than the sample protest rates. In addition, it appears that, on average, the relationship between ideology and protest is stronger than the relationship between authoritarianism and protest. Taken together, these initial results provide strong evidence that a pervasive asymmetry exists between the political right and left in terms of who is likely to participate in activities outside of the conventional political arena. This provides initial support for hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating that conservatives and authoritarians are less likely to protest than their liberal and non-authoritarian counterparts. However, because the correlation between ideology and authoritarianism is rather low, and the relationship between authoritarianism and protest less stark than the relationship between ideology and protest, I find only weak evidence to support hypothesis 3, that authoritarianism explains decreased activism on the right.

Multivariate Models

Before examining the main results of the impact of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation, I want to briefly address hypothesis 7, that authoritarians are likely to believe that protest is simply not allowed, and that this would help to explain their disinclination to participate in protest. I include a measure that captures the belief that protest is illegal using items from the CID.¹⁶ Originally, I hypothesized that the belief that protest is illegal would help to explain, or mediate, the effect of authoritarianism on protest participation. However, it was discovered that this variable actually exerts a suppressor effect on authoritarianism when omitted from the CID models. In the CID, three items asked respondents to rate on 5-point scales whether the government allows certain actions to be taken in response to perceived injustice (1=definitely allow, 5=definitely not allow). The actions include making “a speech in public criticizing the actions of the government,” “organizing public meetings to oppose the government,” and organizing “protest marches and demonstrations to oppose the actions of the government.” These items do not ask whether the respondent actually condones or would participate in these activities, but whether they believe they are sanctioned by the government. These items are summed and coded on 0-1 scale (*Protest illegal*; $M = .41$, $SD = .26$), such that higher values indicate stronger beliefs that the government does allow protest-type actions ($\alpha = .88$).

This measure is positively and moderately correlated with authoritarianism ($r = .20$, $p < .000$), and weakly negatively correlated with ideology ($r = -.011$, ns). In the models below using the CID data, the belief that protest is illegal is demonstrated to be positively associated with

¹⁶ In factor analyses not included here, the *belief* that protest is illegal is empirically demonstrated to be distinct from *preferences* for limiting free speech. Results are available upon request.

protest. Because of its positive association with both authoritarianism and protest, the belief that protest is illegal suppresses the effect of authoritarianism when it is omitted from the model. Thus, for all protest models using the CID, protest illegal is included.¹⁷

I next turn to more rigorous tests of the impact of ideology and authoritarianism on protest behavior. Multivariate models allow me to examine the simultaneous impact of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation, and assess whether the effect of ideology is attenuated once its shared variance with authoritarianism is taken into account. Recall that ideology is measured to range from liberal to conservative and authoritarianism ranges from low to high. I expect both ideology and authoritarianism to have a negative effect on protest and other unconventional activities, and that the effect of ideology on protest will be attenuated when authoritarianism is entered into the model. In contrast, when looking at mainstream political activities other than voting, I expect to find no relationship between ideology or authoritarianism and participation.

I include additional controls for partisanship and demographics in all analytic models, as discussed above. In addition, I include a measure of the belief that protest is illegal in the CID models. Protest is a binary variable and all protest models are estimated using logistic regression, whereas models predicting other unconventional and mainstream activities are estimated using ordinary least squares regression.

Multivariate Results

I begin by examining the relationship between ideology, authoritarianism, and protest behavior. For each dataset, I run two logistic regression models predicting protest. The first model for each dataset includes ideology and control variables, with authoritarianism entered in the second set of models. Results are presented in Table 3.7. Across all models, the effects of both ideology and authoritarianism are statistically significant and negative. Compared to those who identify as liberal, those who identify as conservative are consistently less likely to participate in protest. Similarly, those who score high on the authoritarianism measures are less likely to protest than those who score low in authoritarianism. Moreover, comparing models 1, 3, 5, and 7, which exclude authoritarianism, to models 2, 4, 6, and 8, which include authoritarianism, I find that the effect of ideology is repeatedly attenuated when authoritarianism is entered into the models. In other words, when the shared variance between ideology and authoritarianism is taken into account, the magnitude of the negative relationship between ideology and protest becomes less pronounced. While the degree of this attenuation varies across models, the consistency with which it occurs provides evidence that at least part of the relationship between ideology and protest behavior can be explained by authoritarianism.

As direct comparison of logistic regression coefficients across models and samples is inappropriate, I estimate average marginal effects for ideology and authoritarianism across all samples to facilitate interpretation of the results. Average marginal effects have the dual benefit

¹⁷ For high authoritarians who scored within the lowest tertile on the belief that protest is illegal scale, most (55.45%) reside in the South, with the fewest coming from the Northeast (5.45%). A little over one-fifth (21.82%) are from the West and 17.27% are from the North Central region. High authoritarians who scored lowest on the beliefs scale are more knowledgeable than authoritarians who scored high on the measure. On a 4-point knowledge scale, those who scored in the lowest tertile on the beliefs measure got 3.56 knowledge questions correct on average, compared to 2.87 correct questions for those who scored high on beliefs. Those who score at the low end of the beliefs scale are also more educated. These differences are significant.

of being comparable across samples and have an intuitive interpretation, which is analogous to interpreting coefficients from a linear probability model (see e.g., Mood 2010). Simply, the average marginal effect expresses the average effects of a variable on the probability of protest (i.e., $P(y=1)$), but is not affected by the specific values of the other variables in the model. Here, the estimated effect can be interpreted as the average change in the probability of protest for a unit change in the independent variable. Because ideology and authoritarianism are coded on a unit scale, a unit change represents going from the lowest to highest values of the variables. The downsides of average marginal effects are that they do not capture nonlinearity in relationships, and conditional effects cannot be estimated. However, since the concern here is the comparison of effects from different models and samples, average marginal effects satisfactorily serve my purpose.

Table 3.7. Predictors of Protest

	2005 CID		2000 ANES		2004 ANES		2008 LAPOP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ideology (Lib-Con)	-1.70 (.86)	-1.36 (.92)*	-1.76 (.92)	-1.21 (.89) *	-1.54 (.49)	-1.35 (.53)	-1.76 (.83)	-1.48 (.89)
Authoritarianism		-1.87 (1.38)*		-1.85 (.62)		-.75 (.49)*		-.78 (.49)*
Party (Rep.-Dem.)	.90 (.50)*	.87 (.51)*	.40 (.80)	.38 (.83)	.037 (.43)	-.017 (.43)	.62 (.59)	.60 (.60)
Protest Illegal	1.39 (.87)	1.69 (.91)*						
Age	-.033 (.013)	-.031 (.013)	-.022 (.011)*	-.021(.012)*	-.011(.0087)	-.010 (.0089)	-.046 (.009)	-.042 (.009)
Male	.36 (.38)	.39 (.39)	-.026 (.36)	.038 (.37)	-.074 (.28)	-.084 (.29)	.094 (.27)	.096 (.28)
Income	.43 (.86)	.48 (.86)	-.41 (.71)	-.35 (.68)	-.98 (.55)*	-1.08 (.54)*	1.17 (.54)	1.07 (.55)*
White	-.31 (.55)	-.33 (.35)	.13 (.54)	.036 (.64)	-.37 (.27)	-.25 (.30)*	-.26 (.33)	-.33 (.34)
Black	-.047 (.65)	-.033 (.70)	.22 (.75)	.58 (.77)	-.63 (.47)	-.55 (.46)	-.87 (.57)	-.75 (.57)
Education	.71 (.74)	.53 (.73)	1.67 (.75)	1.01 (.82)	3.79 (.81)	3.53 (.85)	.54 (.43)	.47 (.42)
Partisan (Weak-strong)	1.12 (.65)*	1.18 (.67)*	.23 (.62)	.32 (.61)	-.30 (.32)	-.23 (.32)	.33 (.50)	.44 (.48)
Constant	-3.09 (1.13)	-2.29 (1.34)*	-2.42 (1.01)	-1.46 (1.03)	-2.81 (.81)	-2.30 (.91)	-1.24 (.69)	-1.11 (.78)
N	861	855	1207	1204	891	891	1096	1094
F (degrees of freedom)	4.75 (10, 851)	4.10 (11, 844)	2.89 (8, 59)	3.33 (10, 57)	5.65 (9, 18)	5.35 (10, 19)	9.18 (9, 1084)	8.49 (10, 1081)
Baseline Probability	.057	.057	.040	.040	.072	.072	.079	.079

Note: Logistic regression coefficients. Bolded entries indicate $p < .05$, *indicates $p < .10$, one-tailed for ideology and authoritarianism, two-tailed for all other variables. All estimates calculated using survey weights and standard errors corrected for survey design. All variables coded on a 0-1 scale, except for age which is measured in years, and White, Black, and Male, which are dummy variables.

Table 3.8. Average Marginal Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Probability of Protest

	2005 CID		2000 ANES		2004 ANES		2008 LAPOP	
Ideology (Lib.-Con.)	-.091 (.047)	-.072* (.038)	-.061 (.030)	-.042* (.030)	-.087 (.026)	-.076 (.028)	-.10 (.046)	-.083 (.050)
Authoritarianism		-.10* (.071)		-.064 (.021)		-.042* (.028)		-.044* (.028)
N	861	855	1207	1204	891	891	1096	1094
Relative Reduction in Marginal Effect	21%		31%		13%		17%	

Note: Bolded values indicate $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$, one-tailed.

The average marginal effects, shown in Table 3.8 indicate that both ideology and authoritarianism exert significant and substantive influence on the probability of protest and that the effect of ideology is attenuated when the effect of authoritarianism is simultaneously taken into account. Across models, conservatives range from being between 6.1% (2000 ANES) to 10% (2008 LAPOP) less likely than liberals to protest. These numbers are substantive given that baseline probabilities of protest range between about 4-8%. Similarly, high authoritarians are about 4.4% (2008 LAPOP) to 10% (2005 CID) less likely than non-authoritarians to protest.

In each of the four models including authoritarianism, the effect of ideology is decreased. In the 2005 CID, for example, the average marginal effect of ideology changes from -.091 to -.072 when the effect of authoritarianism is simultaneously estimated. While this difference in effects represents seemingly small changes in probabilities, it should be noted that the baseline probability of protest is low across all samples, such that even small changes can be relatively meaningful, and the relative change in effects should be taken into account. While the effect of ideology in the 2005 CID is only reduced by two percentage points in absolute magnitude, this represents a relative decrease of 21% in the effect of ideology. Similarly, the relative decrease in the magnitude of ideology's effect in the 2000 ANES sample is 31%, while the relative decrease in the 2004 ANES is 13%, and 17% in the 2008 LAPOP. The consistency with which authoritarianism attenuates the relationship between ideology and protest demonstrates that authoritarianism helps, at least in part, to explain the relationship between ideology and protest participation.


Interestingly, however, the attenuation of the relationship between ideology and protest once authoritarianism is entered into the model appears to be stronger at liberal end of the political spectrum. To further illustrate how the relationship between ideology and protest participation is affected when authoritarianism is and is not accounted for, Figure 3.1 graphically presents predicted probabilities of protest across all levels of ideology for each sample. Predicted probabilities are estimated for a 20 year old white male, with mean values on all other covariates. Each graph in Figure 3.1 shows how predicted probabilities of protest differ across the political spectrum when excluding and controlling for authoritarianism. Predicted probabilities of protest participation when authoritarianism is not controlled for are .21 for liberals and .047 for conservatives in the CID. When controlling for authoritarianism, the

predicted probability of protests for liberal is .17 and .050 for conservatives, representing a modest drop in the effect of ideology on the likelihood of protest participation among liberals. Similar effects are found across all data sets. What this illustrates is that authoritarianism provides a better explanation for why some liberals protest more than conservatives, rather than for why conservatives do not participate. In other words, it is low authoritarians, and more specifically, low authoritarian liberals, who are most apt to participate in protest activities. It appears that conservatives, regardless of authoritarianism, are simply unlikely to attend a protest event.

Effects of demographic and partisan factors are less reliable than the effects of ideology and authoritarianism. Across models in Table 3.7, none of the control variables exhibit consistent, statistically significant effects. First, Democrats appear somewhat more likely than Republicans to protest, but this is only statistically significant ($p < .10$) in the CID data (Models 1 & 2). Moreover, in Models 3, 4, and 6, the sign for partisan identification is in the opposite direction. Strength of partisanship is also only significant in the CID models, with strong partisans being more likely to protest than weak partisans. Age is consistently negatively related to protest, but it fails to reach statistical significance in the 2004 ANES (Models 4 and 5). However, it does appear that younger people are more likely to protest, which is in line with previous findings (e.g., Dalton 2006, 2008). Consistent with findings from other research, gender is unrelated to protest behavior across all models (Schussman & Soule 2005). Income's effect switches signs and significance across models. In Models 1 and 2 (CID), income is positively related to protest participation, but in Models 3 and 4 (2000 ANES) it is negatively associated with protest participation, though it does not reach statistical significance. Income is again found to negatively predict protest participation in Models 5 and 6 (2004 ANES), and is statistically significant. However, in Models 7 and 8 (2008 LAPOP) the sign again reverses, with income exhibiting a statistically significant positive effect on protest participation. These mixed results may suggest that the role of income on protest behavior is dynamic. Race is generally unrelated to protest participation, except in Model 5, where whites are significantly less likely to protest than other non-black minorities. Education generally has a positive effect on protest participation, with highly educated people being more likely to protest than those with little education. However, education only reaches statistical significance in three out of the eight models (Models 3, 5, and 6).

The belief that protest is illegal has large positive coefficients in both Models 1 and 2, but only reaches statistical significance in Model 2 ($p < .10$). This indicates that those who think authorities do not allow activities aimed at criticizing the government are more likely to participate in protest, even though they believe it to be an illegal activity. As mentioned above, authoritarianism is positively associated with this variable, but authoritarians are less likely to protest than low authoritarians. When this variable is excluded from the model, the relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation is obscured, indicating a suppressor effect.

Figure 3.1. Predicted Probabilities of Protest across Ideology for a 20-Year Old, Average White Male



Authoritarianism Excluded

 Controlling for Authoritarianism

Other Non-Electoral and Mainstream Activity

I use OLS regression to estimate the effects of ideology and authoritarianism on participation in alternative forms of non-electoral political activities as well as participation in more mainstream activities (excluding voting).¹⁸ Two models for each variable are estimated, one without and one with authoritarianism entered. Recall that unconventional activities include signing petitions, boycotting, buycotting, and political internet activities, while conventional activities include working for a candidate for office, writing letters to politicians, and working for a political party. Both ideology and authoritarianism are hypothesized to be negatively related to unconventional activities as these types of activities can be seen as being beyond the mainstream. In contrast, mainstream, or more conventional activities, should be within the purview of individuals from across the political divide. As both dependent variables and independent variables, with the exception of age, are coded 0 to 1, the coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point change along the scales of the dependent variables for a one unit change (going from lowest to highest values) in the independent variables.

As shown in Models 9 and 10 in Table 3.9, both ideology and authoritarianism negatively predict participation in unconventional activities. However, when comparing the coefficients for ideology from Models 9 and 10, the addition of authoritarianism attenuates the effect of ideology, though this reduction is not large. Again, this provides only weak support for hypothesis 3 that authoritarianism explains the relationship between ideology and protest.

Models 11 and 12 presented in Table 3.9 contrast the previous results with participation in mainstream activities. It was hypothesized that ideology and authoritarianism should be unrelated to mainstream political activity, and indeed, Models 11 and 12 in Table 5 demonstrate that neither ideology nor authoritarianism significantly predict participation in these more mainstream type activities.

Overall, it is clear that conservatives are systematically less likely than liberals to participate in unconventional political activities. Authoritarians also display a consistent negative tendency to participate in unconventional political activities. Moreover, some of the ideological asymmetry in protest participation can be explained by authoritarians. However, it must be stressed that ideology, even with authoritarianism included in the models, still exhibits a net negative and statistically significant effect on protest participation. This suggests that there are lingering effects of ideology beyond authoritarianism that relate it to non-electoral forms of participation. Moreover, authoritarianism appears to help explain protest on the left more than it does to explain lack of protest on the right.

Conditional Effects

Liberals may have more opportunities for protest available to them and so the effect of authoritarianism on depressing participation will be elucidated when examining protest behavior

¹⁸ I also ran ordered probit models since the dependent variables are limited, but the substantive results are unchanged. I only present the OLS results for ease of presentation and interpretation.

Table 3.9. Predictors of Political Participation: 2005 CID

	Non-Electoral Activity		Mainstream Activity	
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ideology (Lib-Con)	-.11 (.045)	-.08* (.047)	-.006 (.047)	.0072 (.048)
Authoritarianism		-.25 (.072)		-.055 (.065)
Party (Rep.-Dem.)	.043 (.027)	.035 (.027)	.080 (.025)	.077 (.025)
Protest Illegal	-.076 (.037)	-.053 (.037)	.0099 (.040)	.016 (.040)
Age	-.0010* (.0005)	-.00092* (.00055)	.0010* (.00052)	.0010* (.00052)
Male	.037 (.019)	.039 (.019)	.052 (.018)	.054 (.018)
Income	.015(.040)	.015 (.040)	.044 (.040)	.048 (.041)
White	.037 (.028)	.028 (.028)	.017 (.028)	.013 (.028)
Black	-.00084 (.036)	-.0016 (.037)	-.0018 (.033)	-.0017 (.034)
Education	.31 (.036)	.28 (.037)	.18 (.035)	.17 (.035)
Partisan (Weak-strong)	.066 (.027)	.067 (.027)	.051 (.024)	.049 (.024)
Constant	.054 (.052)	.20 (.027)	-.16 (.50)	-.13 (.063)
N	842	836	855	849
F (degrees of freedom)	11.06 (10, 832)	11.24 (11, 825)	4.97 (10, 854)	4.39 (11, 848)
R-squared	.15	.17	.09	.09

Note: Entries are ordinary least squares coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights applied. Bolded entries indicate $p < .05$, *indicates $p < .10$, two-tailed. All variables coded on a 0-1 scale, except for age which is measured in years, and White, Black, and Male, which are dummy variables.


among high authoritarian liberals. To further elucidate how ideology and authoritarianism affect protest participation, I examine the conditional relationship between ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation. I rerun the same multivariate models presented above with protest as the dependent variable, but now include an interaction term between ideology and authoritarianism. An interaction between ideology and authoritarianism suggests that the relationship between ideology and protest participation depends on levels of authoritarianism. In other words, I expect to find that those who identify as liberal but are also high authoritarians will be less likely to protest than liberals who score low in authoritarianism. Moreover, I expect to find that a conservative identity also inhibits protest behavior regardless of authoritarianism. Conservatives, it seems, are unwilling to participate in protest, regardless of authoritarianism.

Full results are included in tables in the Appendix,¹⁹ but the substantive results are presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In both the 2000 and 2004 ANES samples, the interaction

¹⁹ Ideology and authoritarianism are mean-centered in these models in order to reduce multicollinearity.

between ideology and authoritarianism is statistically significant (2000: $\beta = 4.169$, s.e. = 2.361, $p < .10$; 2004: $\beta = 5.745$, s.e. = 1.299, $p < .01$). The results suggest that authoritarianism does indeed play a larger role in suppressing protest on the left: authoritarians who identify as liberal are less likely to protest than low authoritarian liberals. These models suggest that high authoritarian liberals protest at about the same rates as conservatives, and that conservatives, regardless of levels of authoritarianism, are still relatively absent from protest activities. Moreover, the relationship between ideology and protest is much stronger for low authoritarians. Low authoritarians who identify as conservative are also unlikely protest activists.


Figure 3.2. Predicted Probabilities of Protest: Interaction between Ideology and Authoritarianism, ANES Samples



While the negative relationship between ideology and protest is much stronger for low authoritarians, it should be noted that relatively few liberals exhibit high levels of authoritarianism. In the 2000 ANES, only 11.48% of liberals scored in the upper tertile of authoritarianism, compared to 22.33% of conservatives. Similarly, in the 2004 ANES, 11.48% of liberals scored in the upper tertile of authoritarianism, compared to 24% of conservatives.

In addition, the statistically significant results demonstrated among the ANES samples are tempered by non-significant results from the CID and LAPOP samples. Looking at Figure 3.3, there is no indication that ideology and authoritarianism have a conditional relationship with protest participation. These mixed results require further exploration.

Figure 3.3. Predicted Probabilities of Protest: Interaction between Ideology and Authoritarianism, CID & LAPOP Samples



Mobilization and Opportunity

Having established that ideology is significantly related to protest participation, but that authoritarianism only provides a partial explanation for the relationship between ideology and protest, I now turn to examine the importance of group memberships and social networks in the mobilization process (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). People in social movements more likely to belong to preexisting organizations and friendship or neighborhood networks than less active individuals. This begs the question of whether mobilization through social networks can help to explain why conservatives are less likely than liberals to participate in protest.

Perhaps conservatives are relatively absent from protest because they are contacted less often than are liberals to participate. Table 3.10 presents the percentages of people indicating that they had been contacted by someone they “know...to vote, or to contribute money to a political cause, or to engage in some other type of political activity” (emphasis added). This item comes from the CID and is the only item across datasets that potentially taps into non-electoral mobilization. While this item does not directly assess protest mobilization, contact items from ANES datasets are explicitly about electoral participation and nonexistent in the LAPOP data. This item from the CID also assesses contact from individuals and not parties, which is more apt

to tap into a range of types of mobilization than items asking respondents if they had been contacted by parties or candidates.

As Table 3.10 shows, liberals and conservatives are contacted at similar rates, with 43.35% of liberals and 42.25% of conservatives indicating they had been contacted by someone they know participate in some form of political activity. This suggests that conservatives' networks are not less likely to try to mobilize than liberals', but because the contact item assesses contact for any type of political activity it is impossible to tell if the types of activities solicited are the same across the ideological spectrum. High authoritarians, on the other hand, are contacted less often (36.31%) than low authoritarians (45.06%), which presents a potential alternative explanation for authoritarian disengagement from protest activities.

Table 3.10. Percentage of Respondents Reporting Having Been Contacted to Engage in Political Activity across Ideology and Authoritarianism

	Contacted
Ideology	
Liberal	43.35%
Moderate	33.61%
Conservative	42.25%
N	939
Authoritarianism	
Low	45.06%
Middle	36.20%
High	36.31%
N	987

Note: CID data. All percentages are calculated using appropriate survey weights.

In order to test more rigorously whether being contacted to participate in political activities provides and explanation for rightists' relative absence from protest, I ran three additional models predicting protest, which are presented in 3.11. As control variables exhibit effects similar to those presented above, 3.11 presents abridged results, which omit control variables from the table, though they were included in model estimations. The top panel of 3.11 presents logistic regression coefficients for ideology, authoritarianism, and contact, while the bottom panel presents the average marginal effects of these variables. Model 14 demonstrates that contact does not account for any ideological asymmetry in protest participation. The coefficient on ideology remains large and positive and is not much reduced compared to Model 13, where contact is excluded. In Model 15 it is clear that the effect of authoritarianism is both statistically and substantively significant. In fact, it has the largest coefficient in the model. Without contact or ideology in the model, the average marginal effect of authoritarianism is -.12 ($p < .05$, one-tailed), indicating that high authoritarians are 12% less likely to protest than non-authoritarians. When contact is entered into Model 16, the marginal effect of authoritarianism drops only slightly to -.11 and retains statistical significance ($p < .05$, one-tailed). In fact, the average marginal effect of authoritarianism trumps that of contact, which has an average

marginal effect of .06. This provides evidence that while authoritarians are contacted to participate in political activities less often than low authoritarians, it does not provide an explanation for their disengagement.²⁰

Table 3.11. Effect of Being Contacted to Participate Politically on Protest: 2005 CID

	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Logistic Coefficients				
Ideology (Lib.-Con.)	-1.70 (.86)	-1.65(.83)		
Authoritarianism			-2.28 (1.30)	-2.12 (1.27)
Contacted		1.19 (.35)		1.21 (.35)
Average Marginal Effects				
Ideology	-.091 (.047)	-.086 (.043)		
Authoritarianism			-.12 (.066)	-.11 (.063)
Contacted		.062 (.20)		.061 (.020)
N	856	856	890	885

Note: Upper panel contains logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Bottom panel displays average marginal effects. Contact is coded 1 for individuals who were asked to participate in political activities, and 0 otherwise. Models 13 and 15 exclude the contact variable, and models 14 and 16 include contact. Bolded entries indicate $p < .05$, *indicates $p < .10$, two-tailed. Control variables are included in model estimation, but excluded from the table due to space limitations.

Source: 2005 CID.

Another way that individuals can be mobilized is through their networks (Muller 1979). Figure 3.3 compares the proportions of liberals, conservatives, high and low authoritarians, and all respondents indicating involvement (i.e., member, volunteer, participated in activities within last year) in different organizations. Figure 3.4 further presents rates of protest among those who indicate involvement in a given organization. There are some clear differences between liberals and conservatives, and high and low authoritarians in terms of their organizational involvement. Liberals are more inclined than conservatives to be involved in environmental/animal rights (7.5% vs. 3.5%, respectively), humanitarian aid/human rights (8.6% vs. 4.2%, respectively), and racial (4.9% vs. 1.5%, respectively) organizations. It is only in religious organization that conservatives (39%) are more likely to be involved compared to liberals (21%) and the sample overall (30%).

Liberals and low authoritarians also tend to be more involved than conservatives and high authoritarians with organizations that frequently protest, such as humanitarian and human rights organizations and ethnic and racial organizations. However, there are no differences in terms of union involvement, or involvement with a Veterans organization. Political party involvement also does not differ between liberals and conservatives, and high and low authoritarians are just as likely to be involved in religious organizations. Rates of protest activity are significantly higher among those who are involved compared to those who are not involved in unions,

²⁰ Contact also does not moderate the relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation. However, it does moderate the relationship between ideology and participation such that liberals who are contacted are more likely than liberals who are not contacted to report protest participation.

Figure 3.4. Comparing Organizational Involvement Rates across Ideology, Authoritarianism, and All Respondents





Figure 3.5. Comparing Protest Rates across Respondents' Organizational Involvement



professional and farmers' organizations, humanitarian and human rights organizations, environmental organizations, political parties, and racial and ethnic organizations.

To test whether involvement with an organization that fosters higher rates of protest helps to explain conservatives' and authoritarians' lack of participation, I created a dummy variable, *organizational involvement*, coded 1 for participants who were active in a union, professional or farmer's organization, humanitarian aid or human rights organization, environment, peace or animal rights organization, a political party, or a racial organization. All of these organizations exhibited higher rates of protest activity among those who reported involvement with these organizations. The coefficient for this variable indicates the difference between someone who is involved in one of these organizations compared to someone who is not involved in any organizations or whose involvement is with organizations that are unrelated to politics and protest participation (e.g., religious organization, outdoors or sporting groups).

Table 3.12 presents the abridged results (control variables were used to estimate models, but have been left out of the table). The upper panel of Table 3.12 presents the logistic regression

Table 3.12. Effects of Organizational Involvement, Class and Income Security on Protest: 2005 CID

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Ideology (Lib.-Con.)	-1.29 (.87)*	-1.75 (.97)		
Authoritarianism			-1.31 (1.18)	-2.01 (1.28)*
Organizational Involvement	1.78 (.46)		1.75 (.42)	
Class		-2.51 (.78)		-2.57 (.82)
Income Security		-.29 (.73)		-.38 (.72)
Average Marginal Effects				
Ideology	-.065 (.044)*	-.090 (.050)		
Authoritarianism			-.064 (.056)	-.10 (.061)
Organization Involvement	.090 (.23)		.086 (.021)	
Class		-.13 (.043)		-.13 (.044)
Income Security		-.015 (.038)		-.019 (.036)
N	861	846	890	874

Note: Upper panel contains logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Bottom panel displays average marginal effects. Organizational involvement is a dummy variable coded 1 for r's who indicated involvement in an organization with members who protest more, on average, compared to non-members. Class is self-reported class membership. Bolded entries indicate $p < .05$, *indicates $p < .10$, two-tailed. Control variables are included in model estimation, but excluded from the table.

coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, and the bottom panel presents average marginal effects for the variables of interest. First, looking at Models 17 and 19, it is clear that involvement with an organization with members who protest more often than non-members leads to an increase in the likelihood of participation in protest. Second, there is evidence that this organizational involvement partially explains both conservatives' and authoritarians' lack of participation in protest, but this effect is stronger for authoritarians. When organizational involvement is entered into the model, it decreases the average marginal effect of ideology on protest by about 29%, and by about 47% for authoritarianism. This suggests that conservatives' and authoritarians' inactivity is partially explained by their lack of involvement with organizations that have members who participate in protest more, on average, than non-members.

Another alternative explanation for why conservatives are less likely to participate in unconventional activities is that they have or perceive that they have access to established political opportunities. While there are no variables that perfectly capture this concept, one way to get at this is to assess how class membership and one's perceived income security affects protest participation. This gets at the idea that some do not need to seek redress from government through unconventional means. Using the CID, class is measured using interviewers' assessments of respondents' class membership. Interviewers were asked to assess the socio-economic status of the respondent (upper or upper middle class, middle non-manual worker, skilled or semi-skilled manual worker, and unskilled or unemployed manual worker). Income security is measured using respondents' reports of how they "feel about [their] household's income nowadays" (living comfortably, coping on present income, finding it difficult on present income, and finding it very difficult on present income). These items were coded 0 to 1 and entered as separate predictors of protest.

The results are included in Table 3.12, Models 18 and 20. Class, as assessed by interviewers, is both significantly and substantively related to participation. Those who are assessed as being in the lowest class are 13% more likely than those in the highest class to protest. Income security, however, has a trivially negative relationship with protest participation. More importantly, the inclusion of these variables does not appear to attenuate the relationships between ideology and protest activity, but it does slightly attenuate the relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation. The average marginal effect of authoritarianism without the inclusion of class membership or income security is -.12, but it is decreased by 17% to -.10 when the variables are included.

3.3 Discussion

Overall, it is clear that conservatives are systematically less likely than liberals to participate in unconventional political activities. Authoritarians also display a consistent negative tendency to participate in unconventional political activities. Moreover, some, though not all, of the relationship between protest participation can be explained by authoritarianism. Using four nationally representative data sets, and two operationalizations of unconventional political participation, authoritarianism reduced the magnitude of the relationship between ideology and participation in unconventional political activities. However, it must be stressed that while my main hypothesis is that conservatives are less likely to protest and participate in other forms of unconventional politics because a number of them are authoritarian, the data suggests that conservatives are unlikely to protest, regardless of levels of authoritarianism. Rather, it appears that authoritarianism plays a larger role on the political left than the right. Low authoritarian liberals are the most prone to participate in protest, while high authoritarian liberals are less inclined to participate. Moreover, ideology, even with authoritarianism included in the models, still exhibits a net negative and statistically significant relationship with unconventional political activism.

Alternative explanations were also presented and empirically tested. These alternatives were based on the notion that more opportunity for protest exists on the political left. In order to test this idea, I examined how mobilization, organizational involvement, and economic disadvantage affected the relationships between ideology, authoritarianism, and protest. I found that being mobilized to participate in political activities did not help to explain why conservatives are less likely than liberals to protest, with liberals and conservatives being contacted by someone they know at similar rates. There are some clear differences, however, between liberals and conservatives, and high and low authoritarians in terms of their organizational involvement. Liberals and low authoritarians tend to be more involved than conservatives and high authoritarians with organizations that frequently protest, such as humanitarian and human rights organizations and ethnic and racial organizations. Evidence suggested that this organizational involvement partially explains both conservatives' and authoritarians' lack of participation in protest, though this effect was found to be stronger for

authoritarians. Finally, income security and class membership also were not able to provide strong explanations for why conservatives protest less than liberals, though they did help to partially explain the relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation.

This study has broad implications for scholars on social movements. While it is known that grievances and structural disadvantages lead to protest, the current research makes clear that pervasive psychological orientations matter when determining who is likely to use protest as a political tool. Currently, political science has done little to explicate the determinants of protest participation. However, under some circumstances protests can send a strong message. People who protest care deeply about the issues they address and shout loudly to be heard. They potentially sway public discourse, manifesting latent societal issues (Kuran 1989). It behooves political scientists to listen to their voices, as these voices underscore the undercurrents of discontent bubbling beneath the surface of society at large. Protest is costly. Unless people are sufficiently upset it is unlikely that they will participate

An issue that the results of this chapter do not fully address is that the relationship between ideology and protest participation may be dynamic and change with overarching political and economic tides. The results in this chapter were based on multiple datasets spanning eight years, with most of the data covering George W. Bush's presidency. The 2000 ANES covers the end of Bill Clinton's presidency and a period of relative economic comfort, and the 2004 ANES and 2005 CID cover a period in which a Republic president presided over a country at war and was still riding a wave of economic prosperity. While the 2008 LAPOP covers the end of Bush's presidency, it likely misses the effects of the Great Recession, which began only shortly before the survey was fielded. In Chapter 5, I extend the analyses beyond 2008 to compare protest participation among conservatives and authoritarians both pre- and post- the election of Barack Obama, a particularly polarizing president.

In the following chapter, I use experimental methods to better understand the factors that affect mobilization for protest across the ideological divide.

Chapter 4. Characteristics of Protest Events and their Effects on Conservative and Authoritarian Mobilization

In Chapter 2 I outlined characteristics of social movement organizations and protest events that affect the likelihood that conservatives and authoritarians will join their rank-and-file. In particular, groups that participate in activities that upset the social order through means such as violence, and disrespect legitimate authority (e.g., the police) should not receive support, particularly from conservatives or authoritarians. In this chapter, I build the causal story linking characteristics of protest to authoritarians' and conservatives' participation in protest by experimentally manipulating the hypothesized mobilizing factors. Specifically, I manipulate the contentiousness of activities and whether the protesters are respectful or disrespectful of police. I expect that there will be main effects of the contentiousness of tactics used by protesters the level of respect shown to police, but that these manipulations will interact with ideology and authoritarianism. More specifically, I expect to find the following:

H1: Protest events that employ contentious tactics will receive less support and mobilization than protests that are peaceful.

H2: Protesters that are disrespectful of police will receive less support and mobilization potential than protesters who are respectful of police.

H3: Conservatives and authoritarians will express less support and mobilization potential than liberals when protest events employ contentious tactics.

H4: Conservatives and authoritarians will express less support and mobilization potential than liberals when protest events contain protesters who are disrespectful of police.

H5: Protest that are contentious and disrespectful of police will garner the least support and mobilization relative to all other conditions.

H5a: Conservatives and authoritarians will be less supportive and exhibit the least mobilization potential compared to liberals and low authoritarians when protesters are described as contentious and disrespectful of police relative to all other conditions.

This study aims to build the argument that conservatives and authoritarians are more sensitive to characteristics of collective action groups than are their liberal and non-authoritarian counterparts. That is, conservatives and authoritarians should not only be less likely to join activist groups than liberals and low authoritarians, but their willingness to do so hinges directly on the dimensions discussed above. In order to test this, I recruited participants from both the

right and left of the political spectrum to compare how experimental manipulations affect their willingness to join political activist groups and activities.

4.1 Methods

Participants. From an initial 1223 respondents, a total of 1114 participants were culled from political blog readerships (Cassese et al. 2013), Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Mturk; Berinsky, Huber & Lenz 2012), and students in summer courses at several universities in the U.S.²¹ Using the Qualtrics survey platform, data was collected between May 10th to July 6th, 2015.²² Sample demographics are displayed in 4.1.

Blog respondents. Emails were sent to blog owners to solicit their participation in circulating the study to their readers by having them post the study link on their website. Participation was incentivized by including respondents in a lottery to win one of four Amazon.com gift cards. This form of recruitment, known as the Socially Mediated Internet Survey method, has received growing use among researchers (Cassese, Huddy, Hartman, Mason, & Weber 2013). Recruiting participants from political blog readerships is both cost effective and has been shown to increase the diversity of samples relative to the oft used convenience samples of undergraduate students. Moreover, this method allows me to tap into relevant subpopulations of politically engaged liberals and conservatives, increasing the external validity of my experimental results. In the real world, it is those who are engaged that are most likely to be confronted with questions of participation in activist events.

Both liberal and conservative blogs were individually contacted. Unsurprisingly, it was more difficult to obtain conservative respondents. Approximately 20 liberal and moderate bloggers were contacted, from which two responded positively and posted the study link. Of the 45 conservative blogs contacted, only three were amenable to posting the study on their website. From an initial 747 blog respondents, 39 were dropped for not having complete data on the study's main measures of ideology, authoritarianism, and mobilization dependent variables. An additional 33 respondents were dropped for being outside the U.S. when taking the survey, which resulted in a final blog sample size of 675. As Table 4.1 makes clear, far more respondents identified as at least slightly liberal (92.3%) compared to only 6.37% who identified as at least slightly conservative.

The blog sample differed from nationally representative surveys on some key demographic characteristics. Notably, the blog sample is highly educated with over 50% reporting a post-graduate degree. As a comparison, across the national samples discussed in the previous chapter, the highest estimate of those with post-graduate degrees was 9.89% in the 2004 ANES. The sample was also less racially and ethnically diverse than the general population, with

²¹ The universities include Stony Brook University, Kennesaw State University, George Washington University, Appalachian State University, and Georgia State University.

²² Since the study is still posted on blog websites, there are still ongoing hits.

92.66% of the sample being white. The sample was also somewhat older, with a mean age of 51.78 ($SD = 11.68$).

Mturk respondents. The second sample was drawn from Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, a web-based platform for recruiting and paying workers (colloquially called "Turkers") to perform tasks. Workers were paid \$1.25 to complete a 15-20 minute survey online. In order to increase the quality of the sample, Mturk respondents were screened based on several criteria. First, only U.S. MTurk workers who had completed 5000 HITs, or jobs, with a 95% approval rate were recruited. Second, because my interest in this study was to find respondents with the highest likelihood of being politically active and subsequently mobilized, I screened out participants who had no interest in politics. This also had the consequence of increasing the similarity between the Mturk and Blog samples, reducing error variance due to differences in political interest. In addition, because "Turkers" tend to lean liberal (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012), I set quotas in Qualtrics to ensure that I obtained a sample with 50% of respondents identifying as conservative; once the quota for liberal and moderate respondents was met, only respondents who identified as at least slightly conservative were able to complete the study.

The final sample size of Mturk participants is 352. From an initial 383 Mturk respondents, nine were dropped due to incomplete data on the key study measures of ideology, authoritarianism, and the mobilization dependent variables. Additionally, 21 respondents were dropped due to being outside of the U.S. when taking the survey.²³ The final sample is more ethnically diverse than the blog sample, with 85.48% identifying as white, 5.46% as black, 3.16% Hispanic, and 6.03% as Asian. The Mturk sample also more closely resembles the general population in terms of education, with 9.77% reporting a post-graduate degree and 40.23% with a B.A. or equivalent. The Mturk sample is also younger than the blog sample, with 33% between the ages of 35 and 50.

Undergraduate respondents. Ninety-three undergraduate students in political science classes from Stony Brook University, Kennesaw State University, George Washington University, Appalachian State University, and Georgia State University were offered extra course credit in addition to being entered into the lottery drawing for one of four Amazon.com gift cards for their participation. I sought a diversity of schools in order to increase the ideological variance the sample, as students in the Northeast tend to be more liberal on average. Of the 93 students who began the survey, six were dropped because they did not have complete data for the main study variables (i.e., ideology, authoritarianism, and dependent variables). The student sample was the most ethnically diverse of all the samples, with only 40.7% of the sample being white, 30.23% black, 5.81% Hispanic, and 17.44% Asian. This sample was also the youngest, with 93.10% between the ages of 17 and 34.


²³ During the first launch of the study on Mturk there was a mistake in setting the restriction to U.S. workers only, which is how some non-U.S. workers snuck in. The mistake was detected early and rectified immediately.

Table 4.1. Non-Probability Internet and Student Sample Demographics

	Blogs	Mechanical Turk	Students	Total Sample
	N = 675	N = 352	N = 87	N = 1114
Gender				
Male	56.80%	54.31%	29.07%	53.85%
Female	43.20%	45.69%	70.93%	46.15%
Ethnicity				
White	92.66%	82.76%	40.70%	85.48%
Black	1.50%	5.46%	30.23%	4.99%
Hispanic	0.45%	3.16%	5.81%	1.72%
Asian	1.50%	6.03%	17.44%	4.17%
Other	3.89%	2.59%	5.81%	3.63%
Age				
17-34	9.48%	44.03%	93.10%	26.93%
35-50	32.00%	32.95%	4.60%	30.16%
51+	58.52%	23.01%	2.30%	42.91%
Social Class				
Lower	2.53%	10.34%	8.05%	5.42%
Working	16.10%	42.53%	27.59%	25.32%
Middle	69.15%	45.98%	60.92%	61.21%
Upper	12.22%	1.15%	3.45%	8.05%
Education				
No High School	0.15%	1.15%	NA	0.49%
High School	1.49%	9.48%	NA	4.22%
Some College or A.A.	15.33%	39.37%	NA	23.53%
B.A. or equiv.	32.74%	40.23%	NA	35.29%
Post-grad.	50.30%	9.77%	NA	36.47%
Ideology				
Conservative	6.37%	50.00%	10.34%	20.47%
Moderate	1.33%	9.09%	27.59%	5.83%
Liberal	92.30%	40.91%	62.07%	73.70%

As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the overall sample is geographically diverse, with participants coming from across the continental United States, as well as Alaska and Hawaii. The sample is also skewed in the liberal direction, with only 20.47% of respondents identifying as conservative.

Figure 4.1. Geographic Distribution of Study Respondents



Procedure. Participants completed a 15-20 minute survey and experiment online. They first provided consent and then answered a set of questions about their positions on a variety of social and economic issues, and completed the authoritarianism measures. Issue and attitude items were randomized within blocks and blocks were also randomized to prevent order effects. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which they read a fictitious news article about an activist group participating in a protest event. After completing the survey and experiment, participants provided their responses to the article they read, and were asked if they wanted to provide their email address so that the protest group’s coordinator could contact them for the purposes of providing them with more information about the group, including membership and future activities that the participant could join in. Past political behavior and demographics were assessed following the article manipulation and measurement of the dependent variables. Participants who indicated interest in joining the activist group received web links to relevant real-world political groups in the debriefing form.²⁴

Experimental Design. I used a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design, which employed a purported article excerpt to manipulate characteristics of a protest event in terms of the types of tactics used at the event (peaceful vs. contentious) and level of respect for police displayed by protest participants (respectful vs. disrespectful).

Participants were told that they would read a short article about a recent protest event, and to please read it carefully, as they would be asked follow-up questions about the article.²⁵ Table 4.2 below provides a brief overview of the type of language used to manipulate the tactics

²⁴ The links provided for interested participants took them to Meetup.com. Meetup.com is a social media platform that facilitates in person meetings/activities of like-minded individuals. Meetup.com hosts groups from across the country.

²⁵ Participants could not advance past the article until it had been displayed on screen for at least 20 seconds.

and respect for police factors. In all conditions, the protest event took place in Washington, D.C., at “Lafayette Park across from the White House.” In the contentious tactics conditions, protesters were “unruly and violent” who turned “violent when provoked by hostile bystanders.” In the peaceful tactics conditions, the protesters were described as “peaceful activists” who “remained peaceful” in the face of attacks by hostile bystanders. For the conditions in which protesters were respectful of police, they were described as “obedient and respectful” and received support from the police. When protesters were disrespectful, they were described as “disobedient and disrespectful” of police orders.

Table 4.2. 2x2 Experimental Design Summary and Sample Size for Each Cell

	Contentious Tactics	Peaceful Tactics
Disrespectful toward Police	“Unruly and violent activists”	“Peaceful activists”
	“Disobedient of police orders and turned violent when provoked by hostile bystanders”	“Disobedient and disrespectful of police orders, but remained peaceful when provoked by hostile bystanders”
	N = 272	N = 281
Respectful toward Police	“Unruly and violent activists”	“Peaceful activists”
	“Obedient and respectful of police orders, but turned violent when provoked by hostile bystanders”	“remained peaceful amidst verbal attacks from bystanders, the anti-immigration protesters received support from the D.C. police”
	N = 270	N = 280

Experimental manipulations focused on a recent event organized by a fake activist political organization called Restore America, which was protesting about a current issue. Prior to reading the article excerpt, participants were asked to choose from a list of five issues that they think should be a “top priority for Obama and Congress in 2015.”²⁶ Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in which they read about a protest event staged around the issue the respondent indicated as a top priority. Using recent Pew Research Center polling results, I identified issues that exhibited a partisan gap in the percentage of respondents reporting the issue as a top issue for Obama and Congress in 2015.²⁷ By identifying issues with large partisan gaps, I aimed to balance the issues used in the manipulation such that there would be some issues that clearly spoke to conservatives, and other issues that clearly appealed to liberals.

From the issues identified in the Pew results, I created five sets of parallel manipulations for the following issues: 1) reducing the budget deficit/size of government; 2) reducing illegal

²⁶ Full item wording can be found in the Appendix.

²⁷ A table summarizing these poll results can be found in the appendix.

immigration; 3) making it easier for immigrants to gain citizenship; 4) dealing with environmental issues/global warming; and 5) addressing race relations. It was emphasized to respondents that they were to choose from the list the issue they thought “is the most important issue facing the nation.” Once they made their choice, they were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. For example, someone who chose “reducing illegal immigration” would read an article about an anti-immigration protest, whereas someone who chose “making it easier for immigrants to gain citizenship” would read about a pro-immigration protest event. The manipulations for each issue were identical, with only the description of the protesters and bystanders changed. For example, there were both pro- and anti- immigration issues. In the anti-immigration conditions, protesters were described as “anti-immigration protesters” who were taunted by “pro-immigration” bystanders, and the pro- and anti- wording was reversed for the pro-immigration conditions.²⁸ By having participants choose which issue, among the available list of issues, they felt was most important, the amount of random error caused by heterogeneity in attitude position and strength across individuals can be reduced.

The five issues and the percentage of respondents rating each a top issue are displayed in Table 4.3. A majority of respondents (55.92%) selected dealing with environmental issues as a top priority, with reducing the budget deficit as a distant second (20.46%). However, because of the large disparity in the number of liberal and conservative respondents, looking at the full sample obscures important differences between liberals and conservatives in the issues they care about. Among conservatives, over 62% chose reducing the budget deficit and dealing with the size of government as the most important issue, compared to only 7.19% of liberals. Reducing illegal immigration was the second favorite issue among conservatives, with just under 19% choosing it as a top priority, while only 1.22% of liberals chose this option. For almost 72% of liberals, the most important issue was dealing with environmental issues and global warming, whereas less than 10% of conservatives chose environmental issues as a top priority. There was also a fairly large difference between liberals and conservatives in the percentage rating race relations as a top issue, with almost 16% of liberals and 6% of conservatives choosing this option. On the issue of pro-immigration, there was little difference between liberals (4.02%) and conservatives (3.51%).

Table 4.3. % of Respondents Rating Each Issue a Top Priority for Obama and Congress in 2015

Issue	All Respondents	Conservatives	Liberals
Reducing the budget deficit/Size of Government	20.47%	62.28%	7.19%
Reducing Illegal Immigration	5.57%	18.86%	1.22%
Making it Easier for Immigrants to gain Citizenship	4.22%	3.51%	4.02%
Dealing with Environmental Issues/Global Warming	55.92%	9.65%	71.62%
Addressing Race Relations	13.82%	5.57%	15.96%

²⁸ Full article wording for the anti-immigration conditions can be found in the Appendix.

Ideology. Similar to the previous studies, I measure ideology using a standard 7-point scale. Respondents were asked, “Where on the following scale of political orientation (from extremely liberal to extremely conservative) would you place yourself (overall, in general),” measured to range from extremely liberal to extremely conservative and coded on the unit interval²⁹ (Full sample: $M = .28$, $SD = .30$; Blog: $M = .15$, $SD = .21$; Mturk: $M = .52$, $SD = .31$; Student: $M = .33$, $SD = .22$). As discussed above, ideology is skewed in the liberal direction among the blog and student samples.

Authoritarianism. Consistent with recent work (Feldman & Stenner 1997; Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005) and the previous studies in this dissertation, the familiar four-item child-rearing battery operationalized the construct of authoritarianism across all three samples. Recall that this measure asks respondents to make four pairwise comparisons of values, and to indicate which value in each pair they considered more important for a child to possess. The comparisons included, “Independent or Respect for Elders,” “Curiosity or Good Manners,” “Obedience or Self-Reliance,” and “Considerate or Well-Behaved.” The mean of the four items was taken for each respondent and coded on the unit interval to range from low to high authoritarianism ($\alpha = .73$). There are relatively few authoritarians in the full sample, with the mean well below the midpoint of the scale ($M = .21$, $SD = .30$). Recall from Chapter 3 that mean levels of authoritarianism in the national surveys ranged from between .59 to .62.

Table 4.4. Means and Standard Deviation of Authoritarianism Scale across Samples and Ideology

	Blog ($\alpha = .51$)	Mturk ($\alpha = .76$)	Students ($\alpha = .62$)	Overall ($\alpha = .73$)
Mean	.09	.37	.45	.21
(SD)	(.18)	(.35)	(.33)	(.30)
Ideology				
Conservative	.38 (.29)	.49 (.35)	.53 (.38)	.46 (.34)
Moderate	.22 (.23)	.32 (.29)	.51 (.33)	.38 (.31)
Liberal	.067 (.15)	.24 (.24)	.40 (.32)	.12 (.22)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. α 's indicate reliability of the authoritarianism scale.

Means and standard deviations on the authoritarianism measure for each sample and across ideology are displayed in Table 4.4. Among the blog respondents, the majority scored toward the low end of the authoritarianism measure ($\alpha = .51$ ³⁰; $M = .09$, $SD = .18$). There

²⁹ I use a measure of general ideology, but also have separate social and economic ideology scales. All subsequent analyses are substantively unchanged regardless of the ideology measure used.


³⁰ Pairwise correlations show that the being considerate or well-behaved item had the lowest correlations with the other items among blog respondents. The correlation of this item with the other three items was between .27 and .37, whereas the other three items correlated with each other between $r = .45$ and $r = .52$. Cronbach's alpha was not increased by the dropping the item.

emerged differences in the distribution of authoritarian dispositions across liberals and conservatives, with conservatives scoring significantly higher on the authoritarian scale ($M = .38$, $SD = .29$) than liberals ($M = .067$, $SD = .15$; $p < .0001$), though conservatives in the blog sample displayed relatively low levels of authoritarianism. While there was more variance across the authoritarianism scale in the Mturk sample ($\alpha = .76$), overall this sample scored low in the disposition ($M = .37$, $SD = .35$). Again, there were differences in levels of authoritarianism across ideology, with conservative Turkers exhibiting higher levels of authoritarianism ($M = .48$, $SD = .35$) than liberal Turkers ($M = .24$, $SD = .32$; $p < .0001$). Among the student sample, authoritarianism was well-distributed across the full range of the scale ($\alpha = .62$). Unsurprisingly, the mean level of authoritarianism for the student sample overall is lower than the mid-point of the scale ($M = .45$, $SD = .33$). However, while conservative students scored higher on the authoritarianism scale ($M = .53$, $SD = .38$) than liberal students ($M = .40$, $SD = .32$), this difference was not significant ($p > .10$).

Ideology and authoritarianism are strongly correlated among the full sample ($r = .53$), but the degree of correlation varies across samples (Blog: $r = .46$; Mturk: $r = .37$; Student: $r = .22$).³¹ The overall association between ideology and authoritarianism is much stronger in the full sample than what was found in the national surveys, where r ranged between .24 and .32.

Mobilization dependent variables. Following the article manipulation of the protest event, I used two variables to operationalize willingness to join future activist events, or mobilization potential. First, respondents rated on a 7-point scale their likelihood of attending a future protest event if Restore America were to organize in their area (*Protest intention*). This item is scaled to range from very unlikely to very likely to attend and coded on the unit interval. The overall mean on this measure is .37 ($SD = .28$), and there is variance across the range of the scale, though it there are fewer respondents at the high end of the measure as can be seen in Figure 4.2.


Figure 4.2. Full Sample Distribution of Protest Intention DV



There emerged some heterogeneity across samples in mean levels of protest intention. While the mean level of protest intention among the blog ($M = .40$, $SD = .27$) and student ($M = .42$, $SD = .28$) samples did not differ significantly from each other, the Mturk sample scored significantly lower on the protest intention measure ($M = .31$, $SD = .29$) than both the blog and student samples. These difference are plotted in Figure 4.3.

³¹ The low degree of association among the student sample may be due to them having less crystallized political attitudes.

Figure 4.3. Mean Protest Intention DV across Samples




Since self-reported intention to attend a future event is relatively costless action, its value as a predictor of whether someone would actually perform the costly action of joining an activist organization or protest is limited. Thus, I also include a measure of mobilization that better reflects the increased cost that actual participation entails.³² For this second measure of mobilization, participants were asked if they would like to learn more about the Restore America group they read about in the fictitious article manipulation. They were told that:

[b]y clicking ‘yes,’ you will be taken to a page at the end of the survey in which you can enter your email address in order to be contacted by a local Restore America coordinator. The coordinator will contact you in order to provide more information about their group, as well as provide you with opportunities for attending future events.

Respondents had the options to choose “Yes, I would like to provide my email at the end of the survey in order to be contacted by a Restore America coordinator,” or “No, I would not like to be contacted.” Those who reported that they wanted to be contacted were coded 1 and those who did not want to be contacted were coded 0 (*Contact*; $M = .08$, $SD = .28$). Only 8.26% of the sample chose to be contacted by a Restore America coordinator. Though this figure appears to be quite low, it is perhaps not surprising. Participants read only a short fictitious article about a protest event, and so it is reassuring that at least some of the participants appear to have been mobilized by such a subtle means. Further, no significant differences emerged across samples on this measure, but as can be seen in Figure 4.4, there is quite a bit of variance within samples, and particularly among the student sample.

³² Sheeran’s (2002) meta-analysis of meta-analyses suggests that while intentions are a “good” predictor of future behavior, there are still empirical gaps between intentions and behavior due to a variety of factors. One way to increase the degree of correspondence between intentions and behavior is by constructing measures that better reflect the nature of the behavior in question.

Figure 4.4. Mean Contact DV across Samples



The two main dependent variables are positively associated, though somewhat modestly at $r = .34$. (From a logit regression predicting contact, the marginal effect of protest intention increases the probability of wanting to be contacted from 0 to just above .30).

Support for the tactics used by group was assessed by having respondents indicate on a six-point scale how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the tactics used by the protesters. This item was coded to range from 0 = disagree strongly to 1 = agree strongly ($M = .56$, $SD = .29$).

Manipulation checks. Participants were asked several questions regarding their perceptions about the protest group presented in the article. Participants also indicated on a six-point scale whether the group was violent or peaceful, which was coded on the unit interval such that 0 = extremely violent and 1 = extremely peaceful (*Peaceful*; $M = .66$, $SD = .23$). Finally, participants rated on a six-point scale whether the group was respectful or disrespectful toward the police. This item was coded 0-1, with higher values indicating perceptions that protesters were more *disrespectful* toward the police ($M = .41$, $SD = .30$).

*Effectiveness of Protest.*³³ I assess perceptions of the effectiveness of protest in order to include it as a control in later analyses. Each participant provided their “opinion about the effectiveness of different ways of trying to influence what the government does.” Respondents rated on a 7-point scale the “effectiveness of participating in a protest of any kind.” This item ranges from very ineffective to very effective, and is coded 0-1 (*Protest effectiveness*; $M = .56$, $SD = .22$).

Past political behavior. In some models I also include a measure of past political behavior to control for heterogeneity in political engagement. Past political behavior was assessed by asking participants to report whether they had taken part in a variety of activities within the past five years. The activities include contacting a politician or local government official, wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker, attending a Town Hall meeting, boycotting a product or company, deliberately buying certain products for political/environmental/ethical reasons, signing a petition, and taking part in a protest. This

³³ Note: This was asked before the manipulation.

measure was constructed by summing the number of activities participants reported having participated in and coded 0-1 (*Politically Active*; $\alpha = 0.78$; $M = .54$, $SD = .29$).

*Issue Attitudes.*³⁴ I assess respondents' attitude positions for the key issues discussed in the article manipulations. These items were presented to all participants before they were asked to report their top issue (discussed above) and were used as controls in some of the following analyses. Support for *small government* was measured using three items adapted from Parker and Barreto (2013) that asked participants to choose which one of a pair of statements they agreed with most. For example, participants had to choose whether they agreed more with "the less government, the better" or "there are more things that the government should be doing." The mean for each respondent on these items was taken³⁵ and coded 0-1 such that higher values indicated more support for small government ($\alpha = .90$; $M = .25$, $SD = .40$). *Anti-immigrant* attitudes were assessed using two items that asked respondents to report on six-point scales whether they oppose or favor building a fence to make it more difficult for Mexican immigrants out of the U.S. and whether they agree or disagree that illegal immigrants should be immediately deported. The mean score on these items is taken for each respondent and coded 0-1, with higher values indicating more negative immigrant attitudes ($\alpha = .82$; $M = .33$; $SD = .31$). *Race relations* was measured using items that assess whether blacks are better off than five years ago, whether blacks are better off than whites, and whether blacks are treated as fairly as whites by the police. Again, the mean for these items was taken and coded 0-1, with higher values indicate perceptions that blacks are better off ($\alpha = .48$; $M = .35$; $SD = .15$). Three items were used to assess *anti-environment* attitudes, including whether the environment should take priority over the economy, the respondent's degree of worry about the quality of the environment, and whether seriousness of global warming is exaggerated or underestimated. Mean scores on these items were taking and coded 0-1 with higher values indicating less concern for the environment ($\alpha = .75$; $M = .26$; $SD = .27$).

4.2 Results

Random Assignment and Manipulation Checks

I begin by assessing the quality of random assignment and the effects of the experimental manipulations. Recall that two factors were manipulated and fully crossed in a fictitious article about a protest event: the type of tactics used by the protesters (peaceful vs. contentious) and treatment of police (respectful vs. disrespectful).³⁶

³⁴ All issue attitude item wording is in the Appendix.

³⁵ Because respondents were not forced to answer all the issue items, by taking the means I am able to get values on these measure for all respondents.

³⁶ For the proceeding analyses, I pool all the samples and use the combined data, as there were too few conservatives in the student and blog samples to make meaningful comparisons.

First, I find no significant differences across conditions in mean levels of ideology [F (3, 1110) = 1.98, $p > .10$] or authoritarianism [F (3, 1110) = .36, $p > .10$]. There were also no significant differences across conditions for income [F (3, 1010) = .18, $p > .10$], education [F (3, 1016) = .88, $p > .10$], age [F (3, 1092) = .77, $p > .10$], race [χ^2 (12, N = 1102) = 9.0688, $p = 0.70$], or gender [χ^2 (3, N = 1103) = 2.93, $p = 0.40$].³⁷ I therefore conclude that random assignment adequately created equivalent groups in terms of individual-level factors.

In order to test my hypotheses that characteristics of protest events heterogeneously affect individuals from across the ideological divide, it is imperative to first establish that my manipulated characteristics of protest groups affected perceptions of the protest event in the expected directions. I expect that contentious tactics and disrespectful treatment of police will decrease support for the protesters, that the contentiousness of tactics will affect the peacefulness ratings of the protesters more strongly than the treatment of police factor, and that the treatment of police factor will more strongly affect how disrespectful the protesters are perceived than the contentiousness factor.

Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5 present the results of OLS regressions in which support for the protesters, and the peacefulness and disrespectfulness ratings are regressed onto dummy variables for each manipulated factor (Tactics: peaceful=0, contentious=1; Treatment of police: respectful=0, disrespectful=1) and their interaction. The experimental manipulations had statistically and substantively significant main effects, largely in the expected directions across all three measures. There was a significant main effect of type of tactics, with those in conditions in which the protesters were described as becoming violent toward hostile bystanders, though still respectful of police, less likely to agree with the tactics used by the protesters ($\beta = -0.29$, SE = .02, $p < .01$) and rated protesters as less peaceful ($\beta = -0.23$, SE = .02, $p < .01$) compared to individuals assigned to conditions in which protesters were described as peaceful and respectful toward police. The treatment of police factor also had significant main effects across all three measures. Participants in the conditions in which protesters were disrespectful of police, but described as peaceful toward bystanders, exhibited less support for the tactics used ($\beta = -0.23$, SE = .02, $p < .01$), rated the protesters as less peaceful ($\beta = -0.16$, SE = .01, $p < .01$) and more disrespectful toward police ($\beta = 0.48$, SE = .02, $p < .01$) than participants in conditions in which the protesters were described as respectful towards police.

It also appears that the manipulations were not completely orthogonal, as the contentiousness of tactics affected perceptions of disrespect, and the treatment of police factor also affected perceptions of peacefulness. While the peaceful vs. violent manipulation also affected perceptions of respectfulness toward police, the effect was substantively much smaller ($\beta = 0.04$, SE = .02, $p < .05$) than the effect of the treatment of police factor. Also, while the coefficient for treatment of police on peacefulness ratings is significant, it is only half the size of the coefficient for the contentiousness manipulation. There also emerged a significant positive interaction between type of tactics and treatment of police on the peacefulness rating manipulation check, though the coefficient is quite small ($\beta = 0.06$, SE = .02, $p < .01$). As can be seen in the second panel of Figure 4.5, the interaction effect is substantively quite small, being trumped by the main effect of treatment of police.

³⁷ Relevant descriptive statistics for all variables used to test random assignment can be found in the Appendix.

Table 4.5. 2x2 Experimental Effects on Perceptions of Protesters³⁸


	Support	Peaceful	Disrespectful
Contentious Tactics	-0.286*** (0.0189)	-0.321*** (0.0134)	0.0374** (0.0154)
Disrespectful of Police	-0.228*** (0.0187)	-0.155*** (0.0135)	0.481*** (0.0161)
Contentious*Disrespectful	0.0332 (0.0274)	0.0552*** (0.0197)	0.0143 (0.0215)
Constant	0.810*** (0.0123)	0.884*** (0.00843)	0.144*** (0.0117)
Observations	1,111	1,112	1,112
Adjusted R ²	0.362	0.490	0.652

Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Contentious tactics and disrespectful of police are dummy variables coded 1 for the contentious and disrespectful conditions, and 0 for the peaceful and respectful conditions, respectively. Dependent variables are coded 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Overall, the examination of the effects of experimental conditions on the manipulation checks provides positive evidence that the manipulated factors altered perceptions of the protest event in line with expectations. Additionally, these results show that the treatment of police manipulation clearer than the contentiousness of tactics manipulations, as protesters were perceived as less peaceful when they were described as disrespectful of police. Finally, support for the protesters is a function of both manipulated factors, with peaceful and respectful protest events garnering the most support, and contentious and disrespectful conditions garnering the least support.

³⁸ These results are substantively unchanged when looking across individual samples or when dummies for the different samples are included.

Figure 4.5. Experimental Effects on Support for and Perceptions of Protesters



Issue Effects

While not a part of the experimental manipulation, *per se*, it is possible that the issues discussed in the article manipulations (i.e., those found in Table 4.3) also had significant effects on the perceptions of protesters. In order to examine this, I regress the three manipulation checks on a series of dummy variables for each issue, with the Small Government issue as the excluded category. There emerged some differences across issue-types in mean scores on the manipulation checks, though these effects are modest in comparison to the effects of the manipulated factors. Relative to the Small Government issue conditions, the Anti-Immigration, Race Relations, and Environmental issue conditions received lower levels of support for the protesters. However, as Figure 4.6 makes clear, none of the other conditions differed significantly from each other in


terms of mean levels of support. Looking at the second column of table 4.6, the Race Relations and Environmental conditions garnered higher peacefulness ratings of the protesters relative to the Small Government issue conditions, but none of the other issue conditions differed significantly from each other. Finally, column three of Table 4.6 suggests that Environmental protesters were rated as less disrespectful, on average, than protesters in the Small Government issue conditions.

Table 4.6. Effects of Top Issue on Support for and Perceptions of Protesters

	Support	Peaceful	Disrespectful	Support	Peaceful	Disrespectful
Anti-Immigration	0.0798* (0.0451)	0.0194 (0.0360)	-0.0242 (0.0475)	0.0872* (0.0460)	0.0244 (0.0368)	-0.0195 (0.0474)
Race Relations	0.0822*** (0.0293)	0.0579** (0.0235)	-0.0365 (0.0306)	0.0436 (0.0339)	0.0319 (0.0273)	-0.0610* (0.0348)
Environment	0.0762*** (0.0222)	0.0705*** (0.0184)	-0.0407* (0.0241)	0.0328 (0.0293)	0.0412* (0.0242)	-0.0683** (0.0311)
Pro-Immigration	0.0438 (0.0478)	0.0457 (0.0345)	-0.0361 (0.0476)	0.0128 (0.0493)	0.0248 (0.0360)	-0.0558 (0.0502)
Ideology				-0.0910** (0.0428)	-0.0613* (0.0338)	-0.0579 (0.0432)
Constant	0.501*** (0.0192)	0.610*** (0.0160)	0.440*** (0.0207)	-0.0910** (0.0428)	-0.0613* (0.0338)	-0.0579 (0.0432)
Observations	1,111	1,112	1,112	1,111	1,112	1,112
Adjusted R ²	0.00854	0.0118	-0.000815	0.0123	0.0141	-6.40e-05

Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Issues are dummy variables coded 1 if respondent chose respective issue as most important. Baseline issue category is small government. Dependent variables are coded 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 4.6. Effects of Top Issue on Manipulation Checks



These results suggest that the issues portrayed in the experimental manipulations had an unintended consequence of affecting the perceptions of the protest event, though it is likely that these effects may be driven largely by ideology. Recall that the majority of conservative respondents chose the Small Government issue as the one issue from a list of five that should be a top issue for Obama and Congress in 2015, while the majority of liberals chose the environment as a top issue. If conservatives, on average, are less agreeable to protest in general, this may explain some of the differences in perceptions of the protest events. Included in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 4.6 I include a control for ideology.³⁹ Once ideology is controlled for, however, there were still some residual effects of the issues, with the anti-immigration conditions receiving the more support, and the environmental issue conditions were still seen as more peaceful and less disrespectful. This suggests the need to control for these issues in the following analyses.

Conservatives' and Authoritarians' Protest Support

Thus far, I have demonstrated that the experimental manipulations altered perceptions of the peacefulness and disrespectfulness of the protesters. I now move onto to examine my prediction that conservatives and authoritarians are more sensitive than liberals and non-authoritarians to the experimental manipulations, and would be particularly sensitive to the contentious-disrespectful condition, exhibiting the least support. More specifically, I expect that conservatives and authoritarians, compared to liberals and low authoritarians, will exhibit lower levels of support when they read about a protest event that involves violence and disrespect

³⁹ It should also be noted that none of these models fit the data well. R-squared values are extremely small and omnibus F-tests are not significant.

toward the police. Using OLS, I first regress support for the protesters on ideology and experimental conditions, and then include their interaction terms. I proceed with the same set of analyses for authoritarianism, and then include both ideology and authoritarianism, with all interactions. Included in these models are dummy variables to control for sample and for the issues used in the manipulations. The results are presented in Table 4.7.

Overall, the results indicate that both conservatives and authoritarians expressed less support for the protesters than liberals, and these effects were moderated by experimental condition. In column 1 of Table 4.7, the coefficient for ideology is negative and significant ($\beta = -.108$, $p < .001$), indicating that when controlling for experimental condition, sample, and the issue discussed in the manipulation, conservatives express less support for the protesters than liberals. This effect of ideology is moderated, however, by experimental condition, as shown in column 2 of Table 4.7. The peaceful-respectful condition is used as the baseline category, so the coefficients for the interactions between ideology and condition indicate the effect of ideology within each of the indicated conditions, relative to the effect of ideology within the peaceful-respectful condition. Additionally, the coefficient for ideology represents the effect of ideology within the peaceful-respectful condition, which in this case is non-significant ($\beta = -.108$, $SE = .036$, $p < .001$), indicating that conservatives are not less supportive than liberals of protesters when peaceful tactics are used and protesters are respectful of police. Additionally, ideology is negatively related to support in both the contentious-disrespectful and peaceful-disrespectful conditions ($\beta = -.104$, $SE = .067$, and $\beta = -.107$, $SE = .069$, respectively; p 's $< .10$ one-tailed). To better evaluate these effects, the left panel of Figure 4.7 plots these results.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.7 report the results for authoritarianism. Interestingly, when controlling for experimental condition, sample, and issues, authoritarianism, unlike ideology is not statistically related to support for the protesters ($\beta = -.040$, $SE = .027$, $p > .10$). This may be an artifact of the sample characteristics discussed above, in that there are relatively few high authoritarians in the sample, though, it is important to note that there were some high authoritarians in each condition. While there is no main effect of authoritarianism on protest support, there is a conditional relationship that shows that authoritarianism negatively predicts protest support in the peaceful-disrespectful condition ($\beta = -.13$, $SE = .027$, $p < .10$). However, counter to my prediction that authoritarians would be least supportive of protest events that involve violence and disrespect toward police, I find no significant relationship between authoritarianism and protest support in the contentious-disrespectful condition ($\beta = -.037$, $SE = .065$, $p > .10$).

The final column of Table 4.7 includes both ideology and authoritarianism and their interactions with the experimental manipulations. Once both ideology and authoritarianism, and their conditional relationships with experimental conditions are taken into account, the results change somewhat. Ideology no longer negatively predicts protest support in the peaceful-disrespectful condition, but it does still decrease support in the contentious disrespectful condition. An unexpected finding for authoritarianism also emerged in that authoritarianism now positively predicts protest support in the contentious-respectful condition.


Together, these results suggest that conservatives, and to a lesser extent authoritarians, are less supportive of protesters when they are disrespectful of police. Moreover, in line with my prediction, protests that involve contentious tactics and are also disrespectful of police garner the least support, particularly among conservatives.

Table 4.7. Effects of Experimental Condition, Ideology, and Authoritarianism on Support for Protesters, Controlling for Sample and Top Issue

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideology	-0.108*** (0.0363)	-0.0543 (0.0509)			-0.0463 (0.0561)
Authoritarianism			-0.0396 (0.0277)	-0.0190 (0.0484)	-0.0274 (0.0542)
Contentious-Respectful	-0.285*** (0.0188)	-0.283*** (0.0264)	-0.285*** (0.0189)	-0.305*** (0.0222)	-0.292*** (0.0265)
Contentious-Disrespectful	-0.486*** (0.0183)	-0.458*** (0.0250)	-0.483*** (0.0185)	-0.475*** (0.0216)	-0.459*** (0.0253)
Peaceful-Disrespectful	-0.230*** (0.0183)	-0.200*** (0.0236)	-0.227*** (0.0183)	-0.199*** (0.0206)	-0.194*** (0.0236)
Cont-Resp.*Ideology		-0.00624 (0.0685)			-0.0752 (0.0795)
Cont-Disresp.*Ideology		-0.104* (0.0674)			-0.118* (0.0773)
Peace-Disresp.*Ideology		-0.107* (0.0686)			-0.0410 (0.0806)
Cont-Resp.*Authorit.				0.0930 (0.0673)	0.138* (0.0778)
Cont-Disresp.*Authorit.				-0.0366 (0.0650)	0.0265 (0.0737)
Peace-Disresp.* Authorit.				-0.133* (0.0684)	-0.108 (0.0807)
Mturk Sample	-0.0552*** (0.0191)	-0.0552*** (0.0191)	-0.0654*** (0.0192)	-0.0671*** (0.0191)	-0.0558*** (0.0193)
Student Sample	-0.0428 (0.0269)	-0.0415 (0.0271)	-0.0393 (0.0278)	-0.0349 (0.0277)	-0.0354 (0.0278)
Anti-Immig. Issue	0.0878** (0.0376)	0.0891** (0.0377)	0.0855** (0.0367)	0.0925** (0.0366)	0.0965*** (0.0372)
Race Relations Issue	0.0148 (0.0285)	0.0162 (0.0287)	0.0487* (0.0263)	0.0468* (0.0262)	0.0120 (0.0288)
Environment Issue	-0.00251 (0.0246)	-0.000541 (0.0247)	0.0314 (0.0216)	0.0308 (0.0215)	-0.00519 (0.0249)
Pro-Immig. Issue	-0.00823 (0.0379)	-0.00554 (0.0372)	0.0149 (0.0384)	0.0165 (0.0385)	-0.00671 (0.0382)
Constant	0.858*** (0.0294)	0.841*** (0.0303)	0.813*** (0.0244)	0.809*** (0.0247)	0.846*** (0.0303)
Observations	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111	1,111
Adjusted R2	0.391	0.394	0.386	0.393	0.400

Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The peaceful-respectful condition is the baseline category. Samples and issues are dummy variables coded 1 if respondent was in given sample or chose respective issue as most important. The blog sample is the baseline, and the baseline issue category is small government. Ideology, authoritarianism, and dependent variable are coded 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 4.7. Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Predicted Support for Protesters across Experimental Conditions



Experimental Effects on Mobilization

We have seen the disinclination of conservatives and authoritarians to support protesters disrespectful of authorities. I now turn to examine whether disrespectful, and to a lesser extent contentious, techniques, dampen involvement. I begin by asking whether there are general differences in willingness to get involved across the entire sample as a function of protestor tactics and treatment of police. Recall that I operationalized mobilization using two measures: protest intention, measured as self-reported likelihood of attending a future protest event staged by the Restore America group, and contact, a dichotomous variable with those who reported wanting to be contacted by a Restore America coordinator coded as 1.

Results using OLS regression to predict protest intention and logistic regression to predict contact are presented in Table 4.8 and illustrated in Figure 4.8. Protest groups that are disrespectful of police and use violent tactics decrease both self-reported likelihood of attending a future event and willingness to be contacted by an activist coordinator. While both contentiousness and disrespect decrease mobilization, there was no significant interaction between the factors, and the disrespectful manipulation decreased support more strongly than the contentious manipulation. Also, these results suggest that the protest intention measure provides a more clear-cut picture of the effects of the experimental manipulations on mobilization potential than the contact measure that are in line with previous results. As such, moving forward in my examination of mobilization across ideology and authoritarianism, I focus on the results using the protest intention dependent variable.

Figure 4.8. Predicted Values and Probabilities of Mobilization across Experimental Conditions




Table 4.8. Experimental Effects on Mobilization

	(1) Protest Intention	(2) Contact
Contentious	-0.0871*** (0.0227)	-0.561** (0.278)
Disrespectful	-0.150*** (0.0227)	-0.984*** (0.312)
Contentious*Disrespectful	0.00370 (0.0308)	0.397 (0.469)
Mturk Sample	-0.0368* (0.0210)	-0.414 (0.330)
Student Sample	0.0645** (0.0293)	-0.0921 (0.481)
Anti-Immig. Issue	0.0777* (0.0412)	0.626 (0.461)
Race Relations Issue	0.0387 (0.0284)	-0.591 (0.497)
Environment Issue	0.141*** (0.0239)	-0.0250 (0.379)
Pro-Immig. Issue	-0.0334 (0.0385)	-0.367 (0.704)
Constant	0.412*** (0.0288)	-1.636*** (0.408)
Observations	1,114	1,114
Adjusted R ²	0.153	
χ^2		26.56
p		0.00166

Note: Column 1 entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 2 entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Protest intention is self-reported likelihood of attending future event, coded 0-1. Contact is dummy variable coded 1 if respondent provided email to be contacted by activist coordinator. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Ideology, Authoritarianism, and Mobilization

While I find significant main effects of my treatments on my mobilization dependent variables, my main hypotheses are that there will be heterogeneous treatment effects across ideology and authoritarianism. As such, I next assess the interaction between ideology and treatment, and authoritarianism and treatment, to examine whether the contentiousness of tactics used by protesters and their respectfulness toward police have differential effects on mobilization across the ideological divide. In the first set of analyses, I look at the interaction between ideology and experimental condition and the interaction between authoritarianism and experimental condition, using dummy variables to control for sample and issues. I then follow up these analyses by including additional controls for attitudes toward the effectiveness of protest, political behavior, and issue positions.⁴⁰

Turning to the first column of Table 4.9, when the interaction between ideology and experimental condition is excluded from the model, ideology is unrelated to protest intentions ($\beta = -0.041$, $SE = .036$, $p > .10$). Because the peaceful-respectful condition is the excluded category for the models presented in Table 4.9, the coefficients for the effects of experimental conditions are the difference in mean protest intention between the peaceful-respectful condition and the condition indicated in the table. As can be seen, relative to the peaceful-respectful condition, all three of the other conditions depress protest intention, with the contentious-disrespectful condition leading to the lowest levels of protest intention ($\beta = -0.23$, $SE = .022$, $p < .01$).

Significant interactions emerged between ideology and experimental conditions, as reported in the second column of Table 4.9. Once the interaction terms between ideology and condition were entered into the model, the statistically non-significant relationship between ideology and protest intention is positive and statistically significant ($\beta = 0.158$, $SE = .060$, $p < .01$). This indicates that conservatives indicated higher levels of protest intention than liberals when protesters were peaceful and respectful toward police, which is illustrated in Figure 4.9. Conservatives in both the contentious-respectful and contentious-disrespectful conditions reported lower levels of protest intention compared to the peaceful-respectful conditions ($\beta = -0.17$, $SE = .079$, $p < .01$, and $\beta = -0.22$, $SE = .075$, $p < .01$, respectively), but they did not report lower intentions than liberals, which is more clearly seen in Figure 4.9. The contentious-disrespectful condition garnered the least mobilization, particularly among conservatives, as predicted.


⁴⁰ Results are substantively unchanged with using ordered probit.

Table 4.9. Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism and Experimental Conditions on Self-Reported Protest Intention

Ideology	0.0413 (0.0363)	0.158*** (0.0598)		
Authoritarianism			-0.0643** (0.0322)	0.0305 (0.0605)
Contentious-Respectful	-0.0874*** (0.0227)	-0.0369 (0.0322)	-0.0861*** (0.0227)	-0.0726*** (0.0273)
Contentious-Disrespectful	-0.232*** (0.0219)	-0.171*** (0.0304)	-0.233*** (0.0219)	-0.200*** (0.0264)
Peaceful-Disrespectful	-0.149*** (0.0227)	-0.120*** (0.0312)	-0.148*** (0.0227)	-0.118*** (0.0271)
Cont-Resp.*Ideology		-0.168** (0.0792)		
Cont-Disresp.*Ideology		-0.222*** (0.0754)		
Peace-Disresp.*Ideology		-0.0953 (0.0783)		
Cont-Resp.*Authorit.				-0.0687 (0.0764)
Cont-Disresp.*Authorit.				-0.165** (0.0710)
Peace-Disresp.*Authorit.				-0.149* (0.0789)
Mturk Sample	-0.0434** (0.0217)	-0.0438** (0.0217)	-0.0256 (0.0220)	-0.0252 (0.0219)
Student Sample	0.0615** (0.0292)	0.0639** (0.0296)	0.0828*** (0.0309)	0.0901*** (0.0307)
Anti-Immig. Issue	0.0745* (0.0407)	0.0722* (0.0400)	0.0874** (0.0413)	0.0896** (0.0417)
Race Relations Issue	0.0531* (0.0298)	0.0524* (0.0298)	0.0329 (0.0287)	0.0343 (0.0286)
Environment Issue	0.156*** (0.0262)	0.155*** (0.0263)	0.130*** (0.0247)	0.131*** (0.0247)
Pro-Immig. Issue	-0.0236 (0.0392)	-0.0253 (0.0400)	-0.0374 (0.0382)	-0.0368 (0.0384)
Constant	0.391*** (0.0330)	0.357*** (0.0352)	0.426*** (0.0296)	0.405*** (0.0307)
Observations	1,114	1,114	1,114	1,114
Adjusted R ²	0.154	0.160	0.156	0.159

Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Conditions are coded as dummy variables. Samples and issues are dummy variables coded 1 if respondent was in given sample or chose respective issue as most important. The blog sample is the baseline, and the baseline issue category is small government. Ideology, authoritarianism, and protest intention DV coded 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 4.9. Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Predicted Protest Intentions across Experimental Condition



Now I turn to assess how the contentiousness of protest and level of respect for authority affect mobilization across authoritarianism. Column 3 of Table 4.9 reports the results of a model predicting protest intention for authoritarianism, without the interactions with experimental condition. Here, authoritarianism is significantly and negatively related to protest intention - authoritarians express a lower likelihood of attending future protest events than low authoritarians. However, this effect is conditioned by experimental condition, as seen in the significant coefficients on the interaction terms. In the peaceful-respectful condition, high authoritarians do not report lower protest intention than low authoritarians. However, they do express lower levels of protest intention than low authoritarians when protesters are disrespectful of police, which is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4.9.

When looking at protest intentions, or mobilization potential, it appears that the contentiousness of tactics is more important for conservatives than authoritarians, but the level respect toward legitimate authorities matters more authoritarians. These conditional effects of the experimental conditions across ideology and authoritarianism on protest intention hold even when controlling for a battery of individual-level characteristics that should affect willingness to protest, such as past political activity, issue attitude positions, and beliefs about the effectiveness of protest, presented in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10. Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism and Experimental Conditions on Protest Intention, with Additional Controls

Ideology	0.158*** (0.0588)	0.0288 (0.0559)
Authoritarianism		
Contentious-Respectful	-0.0414 (0.0307)	-0.0765*** (0.0257)
Contentious-Disrespectful	-0.176*** (0.0294)	-0.200*** (0.0252)
Peaceful-Disrespectful	-0.115*** (0.0301)	-0.109*** (0.0257)
Cont-Resp.*Ideology	-0.154** (0.0737)	
Cont-Disresp.*Ideology	-0.201*** (0.0742)	
Peace-Disresp.*Ideology	-0.0763 (0.0716)	
Cont-Resp.*Authorit.		-0.0479 (0.0711)
Cont-Disresp.*Authorit.		-0.161** (0.0679)
Peace-Disresp.*Authorit.		-0.140* (0.0730)
Mturk Sample	0.0292 (0.0244)	0.0372 (0.0243)
Student Sample	0.115*** (0.0318)	0.133*** (0.0324)
Anti-Immig. Issue	0.0821** (0.0404)	0.0953** (0.0419)
Race Relations Issue	0.0637** (0.0306)	0.0648** (0.0309)
Environment Issue	0.160*** (0.0298)	0.160*** (0.0298)
Pro-Immig. Issue	0.000704 (0.0429)	0.00730 (0.0421)
Politically Active	0.246*** (0.0364)	0.246*** (0.0367)
Anti-Immig.	0.0544 (0.0374)	0.0731* (0.0379)
Pro-Small Gov.	0.0777** (0.0322)	0.0968*** (0.0301)
Blacks Better Off	-0.163** (0.0668)	-0.139** (0.0663)

Table 4.10. Cont'd.

Anti-Environ.	-0.0188 (0.0441)	0.00365 (0.0445)
Protest Effective	0.164*** (0.0374)	0.161*** (0.0373)
Constant	0.123** (0.0519)	0.134*** (0.0510)
Observations	1,110	1,110
Adjusted R ²	0.227	0.227

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Conditions are coded as dummy variables. Samples and issues are dummy variables coded 1 if respondent was in given sample or chose respective issue as most important. The blog sample is the baseline, and the baseline issue category is small government. Ideology, authoritarianism, politically active, beliefs that protest is effective, issue positions, and protest intention DV coded 0-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.3 Discussion

In this chapter, I experimentally manipulated characteristics of protest events, and demonstrated that protests that employ contentious tactics and are disrespectful toward police decreased support for protesters and were less successful at mobilization. While the contentiousness of tactics also decreased support and mobilization, it appears that being disrespectful of police has stronger effects on decreasing support. More importantly, conservatives and authoritarians do appear to be sensitive to characteristics often associated with protest, such as violence and disrespect of authority. However, conservatives do not seem to be altogether unwilling to participate in protest. In particular, when a protest organization is described as peaceful and respectful toward police, and are advocating for an issue they care about, conservatives may not be unlikely activists.

Chapter 5. Political Activism(?) among Conservatives and Authoritarians in the Wake of Obama's Presidency

In Chapter 3 I documented the asymmetry across the ideological divide in protest participation. I found that while conservatives are systematically less likely to report protest participation, authoritarianism was not able to fully explain the relationship between ideology and protest. Rather, it was at the liberal end of the political spectrum that authoritarianism's effect on decreasing protest participation was clearer. It was proposed that because more opportunity for protest exists on the political left, this effect of authoritarianism could be brought into focus. In Chapter 4 I demonstrated that characteristics of protest groups affected mobilization of conservatives for potential future protest by experimentally manipulating the contentiousness of the tactics used by protesters and whether the protesters were respectful or disrespectful of police. I found that conservatives were willing to support peaceful and respectful protesters. However, the decision to take part in a protest demonstration or social movement is not taken in isolation but within a wider social and political context. Recently, there has been an apparent rise in grass-roots mobilization on the political right, leading some authors to claim that there is something fundamentally different about President Obama and his administration that drives conservatives to action, as we have seen among the Tea Party (e.g., Parker & Baretto 2013). In Chapter 3 I focused on the relationship between ideology and protest participation that took place before the election of Barack Obama. Thus, in this chapter I extend the analysis to include the period under Obama's incumbency.

The current study seeks to find evidence that the election of Barack Obama has served as a mobilizing force for the right. I conduct statistical analyses using cross-sectional data from the 2000, 2004, and 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES) to assess whether conservatives and authoritarians have become more inclined to participate in unconventional politics following Obama's incumbency. This allows me to compare the rates of protest across ideology under two Democratic incumbent presidents (Bill Clinton in 2000 and Barack Obama in 2012) and one Republican president (George W. Bush). If there is something about Obama's presidency that has ignited the political right as argued by Parker and Barreto (2013) I expect to find an attenuation of the negative effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation following Obama's election. That is, the magnitude of the asymmetry in protest participation between the right and the left should weaken following the wake of Obama's presidency. This leads to my first 2 hypotheses that I test in this Chapter:

H1: The negative relationship between ideology and protest participation will become attenuated following in the wake of Barack Obama's presidency.

H2: The negative relationship between authoritarianism will become attenuated following in the wake of Barack Obama's presidency.

Using authoritarianism as a theoretical lens, I further explore the dynamics between ideology, authoritarianism, context, and protest participation. Authoritarian submission to and deference for authorities they perceive as *legitimate* is well documented (CITE). The emphasis

on legitimate underscores that those on the right will not see any and all leaders as legitimate. Rather, if scholarship is correct in arguing that Obama as a leader is assessed differently than previous presidents and presidential candidates (e.g., Barreto et al. 2011; Hehman, Gaertner, & Dovidio 2011; Parker & Barreto 2013), then levels of perceived illegitimacy should be higher for Obama than other presidents. That is, evidence suggests that President Obama has received levels of criticism that serve to delegitimize him as a leader, which should have consequences for mobilization on the right, such that:

H3: Perceived illegitimacy of Obama will be higher among conservatives and authoritarians than perceived illegitimacy of Clinton.

I also explore how perceptions of political leaders play a role in conditioning the effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest, and whether these conditional effects vary over time. In particular, I test hypotheses that perceived illegitimacy of political leaders moderates the effects of authoritarianism and ideology on protest participation. Further, the conditional effect of ideology and authoritarianism should vary with time, becoming more pronounced following Obama's election. More formally, I test the following hypotheses:

H4: Perceived illegitimacy of political leaders will moderate the effect of ideology on protest participation, such that conservatives who perceive leaders as more illegitimate will be more likely to participate in protest.

H4a: This conditional effect of ideology will be strongest for perceived illegitimacy of Obama compared to Clinton.

H5: Perceived illegitimacy of political leaders will moderate the effect of authoritarianism on protest participation, such that authoritarians who perceive leaders as more illegitimate will be more likely to participate in protest.

H5a: This conditional effect of authoritarianism will be strongest for perceived illegitimacy of Obama compared to Clinton.

5.1 Data and Measurement

For this study I mainly draw on the 2000, 2004, and 2012 American National Election Studies. As details on the 2000 and 2004 studies were provided in Chapter 3, I will only discuss details of the 2012 study here.

Dependent Variables

Protest. The 2012 ANES asks respondents whether they have joined a protest march, rally, or demonstration over the past four years. Unfortunately, this item differs from how it was assessed in the 2000 and 2004 studies, which assessed participation within the last year. In 2012, approximately 6% of the sample reported having protested in the last year (SE = .0039), which is line with the rates found in 2004 in which 7% of respondents reported protest within the last year.

Independent Variables

Ideology. Ideology in the ANES samples is measured on a 9-point self-placement scale, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, with true moderates in the middle. Again, I rescale these measures to run from 0-1, ranging from liberal to conservative.

Authoritarianism. Recall that in all ANES samples, participants are asked whether it is more important for a child to have independence or respect for elders, obedience or self-reliance, curiosity or good manners, and considerate or well behaved. Responses in the authoritarian direction are coded 1, those in the opposite direction 0, and those in which respondents voluntarily agree with both or didn't know are scored .5. The mean for these items for each respondent is taken and coded on a 0-1 scale (.60 for 2012). The mean level of authoritarianism for the 2012 ANES is .62, which is line with what was found in the other ANES samples.

Legitimacy of Political Leaders

If authoritarians and conservatives are more likely to protest when they view authority as illegitimate, it is necessary to include variables that capture attitudes toward political leaders. One common way that researchers have theorized and operationalized legitimacy is the extent of people's positive evaluations of group authorities (Easton, 1965; Gamson, 1968; Parsons, 1963, 1967; Tyler 1997). Along these lines, I include several measures that capture perceptions of legitimacy of political leaders, including presidential job approval and candidate traits. Both of these scales are consistently included across all ANES datasets. Using the 2012 ANES, I also include a measure of right-wing beliefs, which focuses on non-mainstream, conspiratorial views of Obama. Unfortunately, similar measures of non-mainstream attitudes toward political leaders are not available in the earlier ANES samples for different leaders.

Presidential Disapproval. The first measure of illegitimacy is *presidential disapproval*. Respondents were asked the degree to which they approve or disapprove of the president's handling of his job, handling of the economy, and handling of foreign relations.⁴¹ More detail on item wording is presented in Table 5.1. For each dataset, I coded presidential disapproval for the sitting president, such that in the 2000 ANES, the items assessed approval ratings for Clinton, in 2004 for Bush, and in 2012 for Obama. The mean of these items for each respondent is used to form a scale that ranges from strong approval to strong disapproval, and coded on the unit interval (2000: $\alpha = .82$; 2004: $\alpha = .91$; 2012: $\alpha = .94$).

⁴¹ In the 2000 ANES dataset, Bush items also include handling of Iraq War, budget deficit, and war on terror. I excluded these from the reliability estimate and resulting scale. In 2012 there were two additional items, which included approval/disapproval of Obama's handling of health care and approval/disapproval of handling war in Afghanistan. I excluded these from the scale.

Negative Candidate Traits. Across all ANES studies, participants were asked to report how well each of the following traits described presidential candidates: moral, honest, strong leader, intelligent, knowledgeable, and really cares about people like you. Each of these items was coded such that higher values indicate more *negative traits*, and the mean of these items was taken for each respondent, and then coded on unit interval (2000: $\alpha = .80$; 2004: $\alpha = .89$; 2012: $\alpha = .95$).

Table 5.1. Item Wording for Perceived Illegitimacy Scales with Means and Standard Errors

	Clinton	Bush	Obama
Presidential Disapproval	Mean = .37 s.e.= (.0092)	Mean= .54 s.e.= (.017)	Mean= .53 s.e.= (.0069)
Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Bill Clinton/George W. Bush/Barack Obama] is handling his job as president?			
Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Bill Clinton/George W. Bush/Barack Obama] is handling the economy?			
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton/George W. Bush/Barack Obama] is handling relations with foreign countries?			
Do you [dis]approve STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?			
Negative Candidate Traits	Mean= .51 s.e.= (.0080)	Mean=.45 s.e.= (.010)	Mean=.46 s.e.= (.0052)
In your opinion, does the phrase 'he (is) <trait>?' describe [Bill Clinton/George W. Bush/Barack Obama] extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all? <i>Traits:</i> Intelligent, moral, provides strong leadership, really cares about people like you, knowledgeable, honest.			
Right-Wing Beliefs			Mean= .25 s.e.= (.0037)
Was Barack Obama definitely born in the United States, probably born in the United States, probably born in another country, or definitely born in another country?			
Does the health care law passed in 2010 definitely authorize government panels to make end-of-life decisions for people on Medicare, probably authorize government panels to make end-of-life decisions for people on Medicare, probably not authorize government panels to make end-of-life decisions for people on Medicare, or definitely not authorize government panels to make end-of-life decisions for people on Medicare?			
Do the policies of the Obama administration favor whites over blacks, favor blacks over whites, or do they treat both groups the same?			

Note: Means are post-stratified and standard errors corrected for survey design.

Right-wing beliefs. The 2012 ANES includes items on non-mainstream mass public allegations, which asked the respondents' beliefs regarding several factual allegations in public

discourse. Several of these items focused specifically on Obama. Regarding Obama, respondents were asked if they believed Barack Obama was born in the United States or not, whether they believed the healthcare law introduced in 2010 authorizes government panels to make end-of-life decisions for people on Medicare, and whether the Obama administration favors blacks over whites, whites over blacks, or treats both groups equally.⁴² These items were coded to run from low to high beliefs in these allegations, summed to form a scale, and coded on the unit interval ($\alpha = .60$; $M = .25$, $SE = .0037$).

The three measures of perceptions of illegitimacy are highly correlated with each other, as shown in Table 5.2. Correlations between presidential approval and negative candidate traits range from $r = .71$ in 2000 to a high of $r = .85$ in 2012. The relationship between right-wing beliefs and presidential disapproval of illegitimacy is a bit lower, with $r = .59$. Similarly, negative candidate traits and right-wing beliefs are correlated at $r = .61$.

Table 5.2. Pairwise Correlations between Illegitimacy Scales across ANES Samples

	Presidential Disapproval	Negative Traits
2000 (Clinton)		
Negative Traits	0.71	
2004 (Bush)		
Negative Traits	0.81	
2012 (Obama)		
Negative Traits	0.85	
Right-Wing Beliefs	0.59	0.61

Note: Entries are Pearson's r . All r 's $p < .0001$.

Controls

In all samples, party identification, strength of partisanship, age, gender, education, income, and race were included as controls. *Party identification* in all datasets was measured on a 7-point scale, coded to run from strong Republican to strong Democrat. Across all datasets, *strength of partisan ship* is also included, which is constructed by “folding” the partisan identification scale around its middle value (Independent), such that it ranges from independent to strong partisan. Both partisan variables are recoded to range from 0-1.

Demographics controls include *income*, *education*, *age*, and *race*. Race is entered as a dummy variable, with whites coded as 1, and all other racial categories coded as 0.⁴³ Income and

⁴² Both the “treats both groups the same” and “favors whites over blacks” options were coded 0, while the “favors blacks over whites” option was coded 1. By coding the item in this way, it measures beliefs that Obama favors blacks over whites.

⁴³ In the 2012 ANES, whites are underrepresented at 60%. However, the main substantive results are unchanged when including only whites or dummy variables for other racial categories.

education are measured as ordinal variables across all 5 datasets and are recoded on the unit interval. Age is measured in years.

5.2 Results

I begin by examining the hypotheses that Barack Obama's Presidency has had a mobilizing effect among conservatives and authoritarians. Using multivariate logistic regressions, I estimated the average marginal effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation across each sample, which are presented in Table 5.3.⁴⁴ Looking at Table 5.3, there does appear to be a decrease in the average marginal effect of ideology on protest between pre- and post- Obama's election, though this decrease is not monotonic. In 2000, under Clinton's Democratic presidency, strong conservatives were 7.4% less likely than strong liberals to protest, *ceteris paribus*. In 2004, when Republican President George Bush was ending his first term in office, the average marginal effect is a bit stronger, with strong conservatism leading to a 9.3% decrease in probability of protest compared to liberals. The effect of ideology on protest is weakest in the 2012 sample, under Barack Obama's Democratic presidency, as hypothesized. In the 2012 ANES conservatives are 5.7% less likely to protest. While these differences in effects pre- and post- Obama represent seemingly small changes in probabilities, it should be noted that the baseline probability of protest is low across all samples, and the relative change in effects should also be taken into account. To illustrate, consider that while the difference in average marginal effects between 2000 and 2012 is only a decrease of 1.7 in absolute magnitude, this represents a 23% decrease in the average marginal effect (i.e., $1.7/7.4=.23$). Similarly, the relative decrease in the magnitude of the effect between the 2004 ANES sample and the 2012 ANES sample is 39%. This provides preliminary evidence that conservatives have become more inclined to protest following Obama's election, though these effects are modest.

As shown in Table 5.3, the picture for authoritarianism resembles that of ideology. In 2000, the average marginal effect of authoritarianism is -.044, which means that authoritarians were 4.4% less likely than non-authoritarians to protest, on average. In 2004 they were 6.6% less likely to protest than non-authoritarians. In the 2012 ANES, as was found for ideology, the average marginal effect of authoritarianism is at its weakest, with authoritarians only 3.7% less likely than non-authoritarians to protest. Relatively speaking, the magnitude of the marginal effect decreases by 16% between 2000 and 2012, and by 44% between 2004 and 2012. This would indicate that authoritarianism, too, is playing less of a role in predicting protest behavior.

⁴⁴ A table with full model results can be found in the appendix.

Table 5.3. Average Marginal Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Protest Participation

	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2012 ANES
Ideology (Lib.- Con.)	-.074 (.027)	-.093 (.042)	-.057 (.016)
Authoritarianism	-.044 (.021)	-.066 (.032)	-.037 (.012)
N	1204	891	5069

Note: Entries are the average change in probability of protest (i.e., $P(Y=1)$) going from low to high values of ideology and authoritarianism. Estimates are post-stratified and standard errors corrected for survey design. All bolded estimates are sig. at $p < .05$.

In order to provide a more rigorous test of hypotheses 1 and 2, that the effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation have declined since Obama took office, I pool the three ANES samples and include dummy variables for each president/year, with the Clinton/2000 sample as the excluded category.⁴⁵ This will allow me to directly compare the effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest behavior during the two Democratic presidencies, which provides a more conservative test of my hypotheses. If Obama's Democratic presidency has mobilized the political right more than Clinton's Democratic presidency, there should be significant positive interactions between ideology and the Obama indicator, and authoritarianism and the Obama indicator.

In Table 5.4, columns 1 and 2 report the baseline models without the interaction between ideology or authoritarianism and the incumbent president indicators. These models largely replicate the results presented in Chapter 3 that demonstrated the negative effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation. The baseline model for ideology in column 1 and for authoritarianism in column 2 also show significant positive effects for the president/year dummies, which indicate that protest rates were significantly higher in 2004 and 2012 compared to 2000. This effect captures the lower overall sample protest rates for 2000 discussed in Chapter 3, when only about 2% of the sample reported participating in protest.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.4 provide the interaction terms between incumbent president and ideology and authoritarianism, which are the main tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. The important terms to focus on in column 3 are the coefficients for ideology and the interaction between ideology and the Obama indicator. The significant negative coefficient for ideology indicates that the now well-demonstrated negative relationship between ideology and protest participation was present during Clinton's presidency. The coefficient for the interaction term is

⁴⁵ In the pooled analyses, only the post-stratification weights are applied.

in the hypothesized positive direction, but it fails to reach statistical significance ($\beta=0.96$, s.e.=0.90, $p>.10$), indicating that the negative effect of ideology on protest participation has not become significantly attenuated since Obama took office.⁴⁶ However, the interaction between authoritarianism and the Obama dummy is in the hypothesized direction and statistically significant ($\beta=1.64$, s.e.=.63, $p<.05$), providing evidence for an attenuation of the negative relationship between authoritarianism and protest participation in the wake of Obama's presidency.

To more fully evaluate these results, predicted probabilities of protest participation are plotted in Figure 5.4. In the figure, I focus on examining the comparison of the effects of ideology and authoritarianism on protest between Clinton's and Obama's presidency, as both incumbents were/are Democrats, which provides a more clear comparison of the effects of ideology on protest participation. The left panel of the figure, which plots predicted probabilities of protest across ideology, shows that while the relationship between ideology and protest behavior is in the same negative direction under both the Clinton and Obama presidencies, the probability of protest participation is higher under Obama's presidency than Clinton's for those who identify from slightly liberal to strongly conservative (though the difference in effects is not statistically significant). The attenuation of the negative effect of authoritarianism on protest participation between Clinton and Obama's presidencies is statistically significant, and Figure 5.4 illustrates that under Clinton's presidency, high authoritarians were less likely to report protest participation. However, under Obama's presidency, low and high authoritarians are predicted to participate in protest at similar rates. This first set of results provides some evidence that Obama's presidency has had a mobilizing effect on the political right, though this is statistically and substantively stronger for authoritarians, providing some weak evidence for hypothesis 1 and more strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2.


⁴⁶ This interaction is significant, however, when using a dummy variable for pre- and post- Obama in place of dummy variables for each year in the sample. I report the more conservative results, as I believe it provides a more accurate picture of the protest dynamics evidenced by the data.

Table 5.4. Predictors of Protest: 2000, 2004, and 2012 ANES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ideology	-1.199*** (0.315)		-1.995** (0.862)	
Authoritarianism		-0.665*** (0.232)		-1.996*** (0.584)
Bush (2004)	0.810*** (0.241)	0.855*** (0.240)	0.568 (0.443)	0.531 (0.398)
Obama (2012)	0.589*** (0.207)	0.639*** (0.206)	0.178 (0.388)	-0.148 (0.341)
Ideo*Bush			0.586 (0.984)	
Ideo*Obama			0.960 (0.897)	
Auth*Bush				0.714 (0.727)
Auth*Obama				1.635*** (0.625)
Party (Rep.-Dem.)	0.150 (0.233)	0.687*** (0.200)	0.162 (0.232)	0.695*** (0.200)
Age	-0.00577 (0.00424)	-0.00744* (0.00415)	-0.00575 (0.00423)	-0.00719* (0.00418)
Male	0.353*** (0.128)	0.338*** (0.128)	0.357*** (0.129)	0.350*** (0.128)
White	-0.456*** (0.171)	-0.502*** (0.169)	-0.408** (0.180)	-0.495*** (0.178)
Black	-0.381* (0.213)	-0.425** (0.214)	-0.378* (0.214)	-0.401* (0.214)
Income	-0.534** (0.269)	-0.553** (0.269)	-0.529** (0.269)	-0.539** (0.270)
Education	1.662*** (0.273)	1.567*** (0.282)	1.666*** (0.273)	1.574*** (0.281)
Partisan Strength	0.324 (0.204)	0.317 (0.205)	0.331 (0.204)	0.309 (0.204)
Constant	-3.267*** (0.395)	-3.666*** (0.391)	-2.951*** (0.465)	-3.081*** (0.436)
Observations	7,588	7,844	7,588	7,844
F	10.52	10.97	8.992	10.32
<i>p</i>	.000	.000	.000	.000

Note: Entries are post-stratified weighted logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded on a 0-1 scale, except for age which is measured in years, and White, Black, and Male, which are dummy variables. President/year are dummy variables, with Clinton/2000 as the baseline. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Figure 5.1. Predicted Probabilities of Protest Participation across Ideology and Authoritarianism, under Clinton and Obama Presidencies



In order to get a better understanding of the dynamics driving protest behavior, I also explore how variables that operationalize perceived legitimacy of political leaders moderate the relationships between ideology, authoritarianism, and protest. First, though, I examine the relationships between perceptions of illegitimacy and their relationships with ideology and authoritarianism. Figure 5.2 graphs authoritarianism and ideology on the x-axes, with presidential disapproval and negative candidate traits on the y-axes, for Clinton, Bush, and Obama. In addition to mean levels of illegitimacy perceptions across authoritarianism and ideology, Figure 5.2 also plots the illegitimacy ratings across authoritarianism and ideology for in- and out-party presidents.⁴⁷


Overall, the relationships between ideology and perceived illegitimacy are positive under Clinton and Obama's Democratic presidential leaderships, but negative under Bush's Republican leadership, which is unsurprising given the relationship between ideology and partisanship. Moreover, the relationship between ideology and perceptions of illegitimacy are much stronger than for authoritarianism. Looking first at the association between ideology and presidential disapproval (right panel of Figure 5.2), in 2000 under the Clinton administration, the concepts

⁴⁷ Out-party was coded 0 if the respondent identified, or leaned, with the same party as the presidential incumbent for each year, and 1 if the respondent identified with, or leaned toward, the opposite party. For 2000, Clinton is the out-party president for Republicans, in 2004 Bush is the out-party president for Democrats, and in 2012 Obama is the out-party president for Republicans.

are correlated at $r = 0.4213$ ($p < .0001$). In 2004 Bush's disapproval ratings and ideology are correlated at $r = -0.5275$ ($p < .0001$), while in 2012 for Obama they are correlated at $r = 0.5509$ ($p < .0001$). The relationship between ideology and negative candidate traits follow a similar pattern, with associations of $r = 0.4024$ ($p < .0001$) in 2000, $r = -0.4932$ ($p < .0001$) in 2004, and $r = 0.5168$ in 2012.

For authoritarianism, the relationship with perceived illegitimacy (left panels of Figure 5.2) is weaker than the association with ideology and this generally holds regardless of whether of the sitting president is an in- or out-party member, though overall illegitimacy is higher across the board for out-party presidents. For Clinton, presidential disapproval and authoritarianism are correlated at $r = 0.0645$ ($p < .05$) and this actually becomes smaller and non-significant when only looking across authoritarianism for Republicans ($r = 0.0540$, $p > .10$). Authoritarianism is more strongly and negatively related to disapproval for Bush ($r = -0.1405$, $p < .0001$), though looking at Figure 2, this may largely be driven by low authoritarians who really disapprove of Bush. Under Obama, the positive correlation between authoritarianism and presidential disapproval is somewhat larger ($r = .05$, $p < .05$), though still quite modest. When looking at the negative candidate traits measure of illegitimacy, this measure is unrelated to authoritarianism under Clinton ($r = -0.021$, $p > .10$), negatively related to authoritarianism under Bush ($r = -0.19$, $p < .001$), and weakly positively related to authoritarianism under Obama ($r = 0.074$, $p < .001$). Taken together, these results suggest that authoritarians are unwilling to express disdain for authority, even when that authority is a member of the out-party, but there is some evidence that authoritarians perceive Obama somewhat less legitimate than both Clinton and Bush.

Figure 5.2. Perceived of Illegitimacy of Incumbent Presidents across Ideology and Authoritarianism




It is informative to further compare the relationship between ideology and perceived illegitimacy across Clinton and Obama’s presidencies, focusing in on Republicans. If there is something different about Obama that drives the right to see him as an illegitimate leader compared to other Democratic presidents, then we should see statistically higher levels of

perceived illegitimacy for Obama compared to Bush across ideology, particularly among Republicans. In order to test this, I use the pooled ANES data and use OLS to regress the illegitimacy measures on ideology, the president/year dummies, and a battery of demographic controls. Further, in order to assess whether levels of perceived illegitimacy are higher for Obama than Clinton among Republicans, I include a three-way interaction between ideology, the president/year indicator, and an out-party dummy variable that is coded 1 if the incumbent president is from a different political party than the respondent and 0 if the president is from the same party.⁴⁸ For the sake of parsimony, I only include figures to illustrate the effects across Clinton and Obama for Republicans and Democrats, though the full table of results can be found in the appendix.

Figure 5.3 makes it clear that levels of perceived illegitimacy differ across ideology and partisanship, and more importantly between Clinton and Obama. Among Republicans, perceived illegitimacy increases across ideology for both Clinton and Obama, with conservatives predicted to report more disapproval and negative candidate traits than liberals. Moreover, Republicans, regardless of ideology, also are predicted to have higher levels of disapproval toward Obama than Clinton. While liberal Republicans are predicted to rate Clinton and Obama equally on negative traits, this diverges at the low end of the ideology scale, with most Republicans predicted to rate Obama more negatively than Clinton. Interestingly, conservative Democrats also have higher predicted levels of presidential disapproval and negative candidate traits than liberal Democrats, but only when looking at Obama.

⁴⁸ Independents are consequently excluded from these analyses.

Figure 5.3. Predicted Perceived Illegitimacy across Ideology and Partisanship for Clinton and Obama




Recall that the 2012 ANES included items that captured right-wing beliefs about Obama. These beliefs are plotted across authoritarianism and ideology in Figure 5.4. While the relationship between authoritarianism and the previous measures of perceived illegitimacy displayed only modest, and sometimes non-significant, correlations, authoritarians tend to display higher levels of conspiratorial beliefs about Obama than low authoritarians. Authoritarianism is correlated with right-wing beliefs at $r = 0.2081$ ($p < .0001$), and this increases only slightly when looking only at Republicans ($r = 0.2243$, $p < .0001$)⁴⁹. Again, the relationship with ideology is much stronger than authoritarianism, with $r = 0.4298$ ($p < .0001$). Authoritarians may loathe to criticize political leadership, but be more apt to accept conspiratorial beliefs about Obama, as the expression of these beliefs does not present a clear statement about disliking the candidate.

While the relationships between ideology and authoritarianism and perceived illegitimacy of political leaders appear to follow a pattern dependent upon the partisanship and ideology of the leader, it is unclear from correlations if these factors have differential effects on protest participation over time. The previous results suggest that conservatives dislike Democratic leaders and like Republican leaders, but more importantly, they really dislike Obama. This relationship is less clear for authoritarians, though, as it appears they are less willing than conservatives to espouse negative views of presidential leadership. The next question to answer is whether these perceptions of Obama as an illegitimate leader serve to mobilize the right.

⁴⁹ This only increases to $r = 0.2166$ when looking only at whites.

Figure 5.4. Right-Wing Beliefs about Obama across Authoritarianism and Ideology



Having established a link between ideology, and to a lesser extent authoritarianism, and perceptions of legitimacy, I now move onto multivariate analyses that examine how these perceptions moderate protest participation on the right. In the following analyses I first present results for the moderated effects for each sample individually and then move on to test whether these effects differ across samples/presidents, and in particular between Clinton and Obama’s presidencies. If Obama’s presidency has mobilized the right for participation in protest, then an interaction between perceived illegitimacy and ideology should be stronger in 2012 than in 2000. Table 5.5 presents the results using the presidential disapproval measure and Table 5.6 includes the results for models that include the negative candidate traits measure of illegitimacy. For the models that include interaction terms, variables are mean-centered to reduce multicollinearity.

First, neither of the interactions between ideology and perceived illegitimacy for 2000 (Clinton) are significant (second columns of Table 5.5 and 5.6), and the coefficients appear unstable with large standard errors.⁵⁰ However, they are both in the positive direction. The interactions between the illegitimacy measures and authoritarianism in 2000 are also not significant, and they are in the wrong direction (columns 4 in Tables 5.5 and 5.6). In 2004 under Bush, the interaction terms between ideology and illegitimacy are large and negative, with significant positive coefficients for the illegitimacy measures. In addition, the coefficients for ideology are not significant and the illegitimacy measures are large, positive, and significant. This indicates that at low levels of perceived illegitimacy, ideology is unrelated to protest. However, among liberals, perceived illegitimacy plays a strong role in predicting protest. While the interaction term is in the same direction when looking at authoritarianism, it is only significant for negative candidate traits. Importantly, in 2012 under Obama’s presidency, the interactions between ideology and both measures of illegitimacy are significant and in the

⁵⁰ I examined the variance inflation factors and tolerance and there was no indication that multicollinearity was a large problem.

predicted positive direction. However, the interactions between illegitimacy and authoritarianism and not significant, though in the positive direction.

Figure 5.5 graphically presents the difference in average marginal effects of ideology on protest across perceived illegitimacy, comparing these effects for Clinton in the left panel and Obama in the right panel. While the effects of ideology across perceived illegitimacy are quite clear for Obama, the picture is murky when looking at the effects for Clinton. When looking at the effects for Obama, the negative relationship between ideology and protest becomes attenuated as perceived illegitimacy increases. This relationship also appears to be similar for Clinton when looking across the negative candidate traits measure, but these effects are impossible to distinguish across presidential disapproval.

I also pooled the data and ran a triple interaction between perceived illegitimacy, ideology, and president/year to assess whether the moderated effects were significantly different between Clinton and Obama. The results using the presidential disapproval measure are in the Appendix.⁵¹ While the three-way interaction term is positive, which it should be if the moderated effects of ideology are larger for Obama compared to Clinton, it fails to reach statistical significance ($\beta = 1.70$, $s.e.=2.50$, $p>.10$).

⁵¹ An analogous model was run using the negative candidate traits measure, but the estimates proved highly unreliable due to high levels of variance inflation. Even with mean-centering each of the continuous variables, the VIF's are too large and tolerance too low. The coefficients and standard errors are huge. I also tried to look at Republicans only to compare the effects between Clinton and Obama, but again, these models were not good. There is too little variance on the ideology measure when only Republicans are included.

Table 5.5. Predictors of Protest: Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism, Presidential Disapproval and their Interactions

VARIABLES	2000 ANES				2004 ANES				2012 ANES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ideology	-1.769*	-1.747*			-0.755	-0.0138			-1.019	-0.768*		
	(0.904)	(0.908)			(0.605)	(0.865)			(0.384)	(0.450)		
Authoritarianism			-2.176	-2.198			-0.581	-0.180			-0.387	-0.330
			(0.656)	(0.670)			(0.393)	(0.496)			(0.279)	(0.283)
Disapproval	-0.0301	0.0390	-0.148	-0.211	1.609	1.808	1.781	1.726	-0.396	-0.348	-0.495	-0.466
	(0.703)	(0.650)	(0.767)	(0.644)	(0.368)	(0.429)	(0.351)	(0.369)	(0.340)	(0.389)	(0.337)	(0.346)
Ideo*Disapproval		0.856								2.623		
		(2.494)								(1.158)		
Auth*Disapproval				-0.570				-2.139				0.690
				(2.216)				(1.732)				(0.688)
Constant	-2.784	-3.748	-2.329*	-3.687	-3.819	-3.309	-3.830	-3.156	-2.440	-3.182	-2.823	-3.278
	(1.309)	(1.135)	(1.320)	(1.156)	(0.855)	(0.663)	(0.862)	(0.690)	(0.534)	(0.405)	(0.486)	(0.382)
Observations	1,455	1,455	1,531	1,531	1,037	1,037	1,072	1,072	5,066	5,066	5,191	5,191
<i>F</i>	2.285	2.882	2.898	2.614	12.72	12.21	9.199	8.689	7.837	8.239	7.701	7.313
<i>p</i>	0.0248	0.00455	0.00537	0.00920	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000


Note: Post-stratified weighted logistic coefficients with standard errors corrected for survey design in parentheses. Ideology, authoritarianism, and presidential disapproval are mean-centered in the interaction models. Bolded coefficients are twice their standard error, * indicates $p < .10$. Control variables were used in model estimation but omitted from table. See appendix for results for controls.

Table 5.6. Predictors of Protest: Effects of Ideology, Authoritarianism, Negative Candidate Traits and their Interactions

VARIABLES	2000 ANES				2004 ANES				2012 ANES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ideology	-1.751 (1.068)	-1.384 (1.252)			-0.476 (0.617)	0.544 (0.833)			-0.964 (0.396)	-0.797* (0.433)		
Authoritarianism			-1.411* (0.801)	-0.285 (0.285)			-0.334 (0.398)	0.327 (0.478)			-0.353 (0.280)	-0.285 (0.285)
Negative Traits	-2.236 (1.475)	-1.896 (1.556)	-2.589* (1.373)	-2.627* (1.321)	3.720 (0.759)	3.228 (0.843)	3.733 (0.709)	3.346 (0.747)	-0.757* (0.411)	-0.782* (0.435)	-0.850 (0.396)	-0.835 (0.402)
Ideo*Neg. Traits		8.654 (5.690)				-6.539 (2.377)				2.127* (1.229)		
Auth*Neg. Traits				-1.187 (3.274)				-4.452* (2.257)				0.892 (0.908)
Constant	-1.483 (1.269)	-3.303 (1.132)	-1.327 (1.237)	-3.497 (1.051)	-4.668 (0.870)	-3.224 (0.568)	-4.623 (0.894)	-3.136 (0.610)	-2.260 (0.524)	-3.072 (0.398)	-2.688 (0.489)	-3.263 (0.383)
Observations	866	866	906	906	1,039	1,039	1,075	1,075	5,083	5,083	5,216	5,216
<i>F</i>	3.650	4.490	5.116	6.178	6.422	5.774	6.296	7.669	8.117	7.977	8.128	7.620
<i>p</i>	0.0001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Post-stratified weighted logistic coefficients with standard errors corrected for survey design in parentheses. Ideology, authoritarianism, and presidential disapproval are mean-centered in the interaction models. Bolded coefficients are twice their standard error, * indicates $p < .10$. Control variables were used in model estimation but omitted from table. See appendix for results for controls.

Figure 5.5. Comparing Average Marginal Effects of Ideology across Perceived Presidential Illegitimacy Measures for Clinton and Obama




What the previous results suggest is that while perceived illegitimacy moderates the relationship between ideology and protest, particularly for Obama, it seems that rather than igniting the right, perceived illegitimacy of Democratic presidents depresses protest on the left. At best, perceived illegitimacy attenuates the relationship between ideology by making conservatives somewhat more likely to participate in protest, but their protest rates are still overshadowed by liberals.

In the final section of analyses I use only the 2012 to look at whether right-wing beliefs moderate the relationship between ideology and authoritarianism to the point that they are motivated to protest. These results are presented in Table 5.7. Ideology is significantly moderated by right-wing beliefs and this effect is in the predicted positive direction. The interaction between authoritarianism and right-wing beliefs is also in the predicted direction, but it does not reach statistical significance. To further evaluate these effects, Figure 5.6 plots the average marginal effects of ideology and authoritarianism across right-wing beliefs. The confidence intervals are large, but they are in line with the previous results. At the low end of right-wing beliefs, ideology is significantly and negatively related to protest participation, but at higher levels of right-wing beliefs, the relationship between ideology and protest is statistically indistinguishable from 0.

Another way to illustrate the moderated effect of ideology by illegitimacy under Obama is to plot the marginal effect of right-wing beliefs for those at the low and high ends of the

ideological spectrum. Figure 5.7 plots this⁵². As the figure shows, right-wing beliefs depress protest participation on the extreme left, but have a positive effect on protests participation among the most conservative respondents. It should be pointed out that at the low end of right-wing beliefs, extreme liberals are still statistically more likely to protest than extreme conservatives. At the high end of right-wing beliefs, protest rates among liberals and conservatives are indistinguishable from each other. However, the difference between liberals at the low and high ends of the right-wing beliefs scale, are not statistically different, and this is the same for conservatives at the low and high end of the right-wing beliefs scale.

Figure 5.6. Marginal Effects of Ideology and Authoritarianism on Predicted Probability of Protest across Right-Wing Beliefs




⁵² The mean-centered measure of right-wing beliefs ranges from -.23 to .77. For the results presented in figure 5.7 estimates are calculated up to a maximum value of .54. There were 72 respondents who scored at this value, but only 8 observations above .54. There were also observations on the combinations across the extreme values of ideology and right-wing beliefs.

Table 5.7. Predictors of Protest: Ideology, Authoritarianism, Right-Wing Beliefs, and Their Interactions, 2012 ANES

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ideology	-1.120*** (0.393)	-1.070** (0.426)		
Authoritarianism			-0.418 (0.289)	-0.343 (0.306)
Right-Wing Beliefs	0.0689 (0.539)	0.0751 (0.576)	-0.0332 (0.542)	-0.0355 (0.556)
Ideo*Right-Wing		2.651* (1.755)		
Auth*Right-Wing				1.618 (1.338)
Party ID (Rep-Dem)	0.0899 (0.307)	0.113 (0.323)	0.614** (0.286)	0.586** (0.288)
Age	-0.00360 (0.00527)	-0.00427 (0.00518)	-0.00522 (0.00515)	-0.00527 (0.00514)
Male	0.467*** (0.157)	0.457*** (0.158)	0.455*** (0.156)	0.450*** (0.156)
White	-0.532*** (0.201)	-0.556*** (0.204)	-0.547*** (0.200)	-0.557*** (0.201)
Black	-0.367 (0.250)	-0.343 (0.252)	-0.415* (0.252)	-0.389 (0.252)
Income	-0.522* (0.314)	-0.545* (0.316)	-0.520* (0.314)	-0.522* (0.315)
Education	1.462*** (0.326)	1.406*** (0.328)	1.423*** (0.326)	1.397*** (0.325)
Partisan Strength	0.428* (0.247)	0.332 (0.263)	0.420* (0.248)	0.412* (0.247)
Constant	-2.764*** (0.524)	-3.283*** (0.404)	-3.245*** (0.474)	-3.495*** (0.394)
Observations	5,076	5,076	5,210	5,210
F	7.883	7.880	7.659	7.241
<i>p</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Post-stratified weighted logistic coefficients with standard errors corrected for survey design in parentheses. Ideology, authoritarianism, and right-wing beliefs are mean-centered in the interaction models. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 5.7. Average Marginal Effect of Right-Wing Beliefs for Conservatives and Liberals



5.3 Conclusion

I find weak evidence in support of hypothesis 1 that ideology may be playing less of a role in predicting protest in surveys conducted following Obama’s election, but stronger evidence that the same can be said for authoritarians. I also find that perceived illegitimacy of political leaders has a mobilizing effect, but this is particularly so among the left. Additionally, the role of perceived illegitimacy of political leaders in mobilizing liberals and conservatives depends on the partisanship of the incumbent in question and the ideology of the respondent.

Additionally, because of authoritarians’ staunch obedience and submission to authority, I find that the relationship between authoritarianism and perceived illegitimacy is much weaker than the relationship between perceived illegitimacy and ideology, even for out-party presidents. Ted Nugent lamented that he had “failed to galvanize and prod, if not shame, enough Americans to be ever vigilant not to let a Chicago communist...subhuman mongrel like the ACORN community organizer, gangster Barack Hussein Obama, to weasel his way into the top office of authority in the United States of America,” (January 17, 2014, qtd. in Parlett 2014). While I find some support that the right has been called to arms, this evidence is weak and in the aggregate, the activism on the left still far outweighs participation on the right. However, the Tea Party and Fox News’ attempts to delegitimize Obama as a leader appear to have been successful, as

conservatives, and in particular Republican conservatives demonstrate higher levels of disapproval for Obama, even when comparing his disapproval levels to another Democratic incumbent. Moreover, conservative Republicans are more likely to apply negative traits to Obama.

Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion

In this dissertation, I started from the premise that there is a long-standing asymmetry in protest participation, such that conservatives are much less likely than liberals to participate. By theoretically linking ideology to authoritarianism, I sought to provide an explanation for *why* we see this asymmetry, and how broader structural dynamics affect the relationship between ideology and non-electoral political behavior. By using individual differences in authoritarianism as a means for exploring differences in non-electoral behavior across ideology, this dissertation provides interesting insights into the dynamics of collective action on the American political right. Currently, there is little extant work that takes individual ideological positions into account among the public in their inclination to participate in collective action (though see Opp et al. 1995 and Brandstätter & Opp 2013).

While previous research has documented important asymmetries between liberals and conservatives regarding mobilization potential (Dalton 2002, 2013; Hirsch 1990; Kerpelman 1969; Schussman & Soule 2005), this work did not address explanations for these findings. Instead, prior research acknowledged ideology as an important covariate in predicting protest participation, but conceptualized it as one among several attitudinal (Dalton 2002) or political engagement (Blee & Creasap 2010; Schussman & Soule 2005) factors. Moreover, work in sociology on the nature of social movements largely ignores the role of individual differences in affecting active participation (Schussmann & Soule 2005). And while work on political psychology and political science has devoted energy to understanding individual differences in political participation, it tends to focus on electoral behavior or political engagement more generally (e.g., Gerber et al. 2010; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; though see Dalton 2002, 2013), while largely avoiding non-electoral behavior (though see Brandstätter & Opp 2013).

I argued that that it is more difficult to mobilize people on the right because of the temporal connection between ideology and authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). This connection has developed through the conservative focus on moral traditionalism and absolutism, which serve to restrict individual autonomy and increase social control -- factors that are appealing to authoritarians through their cognitive rigidity and their needs for order and certainty (Jost et al. 2003; Rokeach 1960). Moreover, authoritarians' orientation toward obedience and submission to authority and their values for social conformity (Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005) make these individuals unlikely to be activist members of conservative movements. Moreover, by using authoritarianism as a means for understanding non-electoral participation on the right, I also examined factors that were predicted to affect the likelihood that conservatives participate in protest. Specifically, I studied how the contentiousness of tactics used by protesters and how respectful protesters were of police affected willingness to protest. I also explored how changes in political leadership affect perceptions of legitimacy, and the effects of legitimacy perceptions on mobilizing the right.

In Chapter 3 I empirically examined the usefulness of authoritarianism as an explanation for less protest on the right using multiple nationally representative surveys spanning the years of 2000-2008. I find that while authoritarianism affects the relationship between ideology and protest participation, it provides only a partial explanation. Moreover, results suggest that

authoritarianism may play a larger role in predicting protest participation on the political left than right. That is, an interaction between ideology and authoritarianism emerged, such that authoritarianism was negatively related to protest participation among self-identified liberals, but self-identified conservatives were unlikely to protest regardless of levels of authoritarianism. This finding may be due to increased protest opportunity on the left. I also demonstrated that conservatives and authoritarians are less likely to be involved in organizations that contain members who protest more on average, and that this partially accounts for their decreased participation in protest. In other words, conservatives and authoritarians appear to be less connected to networks in which individuals use protest as a means of political expression, which are known to be powerful influences on whether participates in protest themselves (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973).

Using authoritarianism as a lens through which to understand how characteristics of protest activities affect the cost-benefit calculus of participating in collective action, Chapter 4 used experimental methods to make a causal connection between ideology, authoritarianism, and the nature of protest. Because protest is often contentious, with participants coming into contact with counterprotesters, and confrontations with the police a common occurrence (Klandermans & Meyer, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006), I tested hypotheses that connected these characteristics of protest to ideology and authoritarianism. More specifically, I used a purported news article about a recent protest event to experimentally manipulate the contentiousness (peaceful vs. violent) of the tactics used at the event, and whether protesters were respectful or disrespectful of police. I found that protesters who were disrespectful of authority garnered less support than those who were respectful, and that this effect was more pronounced for conservatives than liberals. To a lesser extent, I also found that violent protests garnered less support from conservatives, and protests that were both disrespectful of authorities and violent toward bystanders received the least support, and this was particularly so among conservatives. When looking at protest intentions, or self-reported likelihood of attending a future protest event, it appears that the contentiousness of tactics is a more important factor among conservatives than authoritarians, but the level respect toward legitimate authorities matters more authoritarians. This means that conservatives are more likely to report that willingness to attend future protests when the protesters involved are peaceful, and less likely when protesters use contentious tactics. Among authoritarians, protest events that are respectful of police, who are considered legitimate authorities, elicited more mobilization than events that were disrespectful of police.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I further explored factors that were hypothesized to affect protest participation on the right in the aggregate to explore the role of perceptions of legitimacy of political leadership by extending the analyses of Chapter 3 to the post-Obama era (the years spanned 2000-2012). It was predicted that because of the intense disdain for and demonization of Barack Obama on the right (Barreto et al. 2011; Hehman, Gaertner, & Dovidio 2011; Parker & Barreto 2013; Parlett 2014), the relationship between ideology and protest participation would be attenuated following in the wake of Obama's presidency. In addition, I proposed hypotheses that predicted a conditional effect of ideology and authoritarianism on protest participation, such that those on the right would be more willing to participate in protest when they perceived political leaders to be illegitimate. While I find some evidence that the relationship between ideology and protest participation has become attenuated in the wake of Obama's presidency, this effect is substantively small. The relationship between ideology and protest participation was attenuated when comparing protest following Obama's election, but this attenuation was not statistically significant. However, I did find some evidence that Obama is perceived to a more illegitimate

leader compared to the previous Democratic president, Bill Clinton. Moreover, I find that perceptions of illegitimacy are stronger predictors of protest participation on the left than on the right, which is counter to my initial hypotheses that illegitimacy of political leaders should drive participation on the right. Rather, it seems that among liberals, who are simply more inclined to protest, perceived illegitimacy of political leadership further increases their propensity to protest. Yet, my initial hypothesis that perceptions of illegitimacy would interact with ideology was partially supported. When examining the interaction between ideology and perceptions of illegitimacy, I found that when illegitimacy perceptions are high, the relationship between ideology and protest participation is indistinguishable from 0, but only under Obama's presidency. When looking at this conditional effect under Clinton's presidency, it does reach statistical significance. Thus, it does appear that perceptions of political leadership matter for understanding the dynamics of protest participation on the right.

6.2 Limitations and Future Directions

While this dissertation lends interesting insight into the dynamics of collective action on the political right, and holds interesting implications for further studies in individual differences that affect non-electoral political participation, I was unable to definitively answer *why* conservatives protest less often than liberals in the aggregate. Theoretically, I linked ideology and authoritarianism in my attempt to understand this asymmetry, but I believe that this perspective theoretically limited the range of factors tested in this dissertation. In addition, sampling issues and data limitations arose that make it difficult to draw more robust conclusions about the characteristics of protest and structural dynamics that alter the cost-benefit calculus of joining activist movements. However, by highlighting some of the key limitations of this dissertation, I hope to underscore insights that open the door to further research on collective action across the ideological divide.

Most importantly, I focused on authoritarianism to provide an explanation for suppressed protest participation on the right, but there are certainly other factors that should be of importance. Indeed, I found that even taking into account authoritarianism, ideology still exerted a significant and substantive effect on protest participation. While I also tested the role of being contacted to participate politically and whether liberals and conservatives are members of different types of organizations, it would prove beneficial to further investigate the apparent lack of available activist organizations on the right. I briefly examined this when I found that in an interaction between ideology and authoritarianism, authoritarianism played a more significant role on decreasing protest on the left, where, I argue, more opportunities for protest exist. However, I did not formally test this hypothesis, though I did find that liberals were more likely to be involved in organizations that had more members who reported protest participation, on average, and that organizational involvement partially accounted for the relationship between ideology and protest participation.

A potential explanation for the difference in organizational involvement is that conservatives prefer to use institutionalized channels. Connecting back to the discussion in the first chapter of this dissertation, which argued that the contemporary American right evolved through elite-led campaigns, it is possible that modern-day conservatives are more active in mainstream electoral organizations, rather than grass-roots movements, and that this informs their views on the appropriate normative behavior for fulfilling political goals. This is in line with Schussman and Soule's (2005) observation that "The connections between liberal politics, conservative politics and protest are likely to have important implications beyond identifying likely protesters. In particular, they impart strength to the argument that repertoires of contention are bound in complex ways to existing political ties and ideologies of appropriate modes for making political claims" (p. 1099). Indeed, considering that now, in 2015, both chambers of Congress house Republican majorities, conservatives have not faced difficulty in mobilizing their base electorally. Thus, the asymmetry appears to only be in the non-electoral domain, and it is only conservatives who are less likely to be present. This suggests that future research could provide insight into the types of political activities conservatives are likely to view as appropriate and efficacious. However, while it may be that conservatives opt to express their political preferences through more mainstream means, there is no evidence that liberals are less likely to do so. Yet, it is an open question whether liberals who are active in mainstream political organizations are also active non-electoral political organization, while conservatives who are active in mainstream political organizations are less likely to be active in non-electoral political organizations.

In Chapter 5 I began to examine how perceptions of legitimacy of presidential leaders affected protest participation across ideology, but limitations in the time frame studied and my focus on the comparison of protest rates between liberals and conservatives likely undermined my ability to unearth interesting patterns in protest participation on the right. Scholars on the psychology of legitimacy (e.g., Tyler 1997) have often noted that in order for people to internalize their obligation to obey rules and leaders, they must perceive these rules and leaders to be legitimate. Indeed, I found evidence that perceptions of illegitimacy increased the likelihood that individuals would participate in protest. Yet, the asymmetry between liberals and conservatives in protest activity trumped the role of legitimacy perceptions in predicting participation. In future studies, the dynamics of collective action on the right could better be assessed by extending analyses beyond the years studied in this dissertation, which only covered 2000-2012. By extending the years studied and focusing on conservatives more specifically, this would bring clarity to our understanding of what drives non-electoral behavior on the right. Moreover, this would reveal larger patterns in the interaction between individuals and larger structural changes that affect behavior, which are often obscured when focusing on the motivations of individuals within specific movements. In particular, future studies would benefit from exploring how perceptions of leaders and the overarching political system motivate protest activity on the right, and how these perceptions are affected by changes in partisanship and ideology of political leaders. It is likely that conservative protest rates are higher under liberal Democratic leadership than conservative Republican leadership, and it was demonstrated in this dissertation that conservatives viewed Democratic presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama as less legitimate than Republican president George W. Bush. As such, future research could disentangle how perceptions and system legitimacy and leadership drive protest among conservatives. Further, it would be beneficial to focus in on the motivations among conservatives

who did protest, rather comparing their rates with liberals, in order to provide a more developed perspective of protest for these individuals.

Another interesting avenue of inquiry that merits attention is how conservatives and liberals view different forms of protest, and their willingness to report participation in surveys that simply ask about participation in protest, generally. It is an open question as to whether conservatives view their participation as something other than “protest.” For example, it may be that conservatives view their participation in rallies and demonstrations as fulfilling their patriotic, constitutional duty, and due to factors such as reputational concerns are unwilling to say that they protested. This may be related to other individual-level factors that possibly differentially affect liberals and conservatives. For example, it may be that conservatives who are high in self-monitoring (Snyder 1974) are less likely to protest, or to report protest attendance even when they have participated. High self-monitors are concerned with adapting their behavior in order to make favorable impressions on others, and if conservatives, on average, view protest as a normatively undesirable activity, variation in self-monitoring may help account for lower protest rates and reporting among conservatives. Another potentially interesting direction for future research is to examine self-censorship, which Hayes, Scheufele, and Huges (2006) found to decrease public political participation, particularly in climates of polarized opinion. As contemporary American politics becomes increasingly polarized (Aldrich 2011; Poole & Rosenthal 1997; McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006), it has become increasingly divisive. Expressing one's political opinions entails opening them up for scrutiny (Noelle-Neumann 1993), and it may be that conservatives are more likely than liberals to want to avoid contention and be sensitive to coming off as rude or losing a sense of decorum. These several factors all may be related to the types of norms for behavior that conservatives hold and sensitivities to violations of these norms.

Dalton (2006, 2008) has demonstrated that norms of citizenship in American culture have been shifting from duty-based citizenship to engaged citizenship, particularly among younger citizens, and this has impacted political participation. According to Dalton, duty-based citizenship norms are primarily concerned with social order and the acceptance of state authority, while engaged citizenship norms are concerned with solidarity and political autonomy. This suggests an interesting question: what do changing norms in what it means to be a democratic citizen mean in the long-run for participation among conservatives? In general, these changes in citizenship norms have coincided with a decline in traditional civic engagement (Putnam 2000) and increase in non-electoral participation (Dalton 2006, 2008). As changes in what is considered appropriate political behavior evolve, it is conceivable that conservatives will be more likely to participate in a wider variety of political activities, including non-electoral activities, as these become increasingly normalized. This is consistent with arguments put forth by social movement society scholars (e.g., Tarrow 1994; Meyer & Tarrow 1998a, 1998b), even though the transition to engagement in non-electoral behavior has thus far impacted the right less than the left (Schussman & Soule 2005). However, research suggests that current trends in political behavior are transitioning to more elite challenging as citizens become more engaged, and it seems likely that will impact protest participation among conservatives.

While Chapter 4 demonstrated that characteristics of protest events (i.e., contentiousness and respect for police) interacted with ideology and authoritarianism and affected support and mobilization, only two characteristics of protest were pursued. Work by Duncan, Peterson and Zurbriggen (2010) suggests that in times of threat to their values, authoritarians may indeed be politically active if there are sufficient leaders available to mobilize them. An interesting and still

open question is how strong leaders can mobilize authoritarians, or conservatives more generally, and whether their success in mobilization hinges on perceptions of the legitimacy of current political leaders and the overarching political system. Interesting future studies could examine the individual-level characteristics of right-wing movement leaders and the types of claims they make. For example, it may be the case that leaders of conservative movements are higher in social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle 1994). This prediction is in line with the notion that many rightist movements have been characterized as reactions to declining status. Additional studies could also examine how leaders of rightist grass-roots movements develop norms for behavior, and how consensus is built regarding the appropriate tactics for achieving political goals.

Another limitation of this dissertation is that I focused on ideology as a symbolic self-identification (Conover & Feldman 1981) measured across a single bipolar continuum. However, the *meaning* of ideological labels do not fit neatly along a single continuum, and rather, ideology can be structured along multiple dimensions of varying importance for different individuals (Conover & Feldman 1981; Feldman & Johnston 2014). This suggests the importance of taking heterogeneity among conservatives into account. This direction of inquiry would be particularly useful in moving forward with the experimental paradigm used in this dissertation. By examining multiple dimensions of ideology, such as social or moral ideology versus economic ideology, I can better elucidate theoretically the connection between contention and ideology. While the theoretical connection between authoritarianism and their aversion to protests that defy legitimate authorities is quite clear, it is theoretically less clear why conservatives are particularly sensitive to contention. That is, I discovered that the contentiousness of tactics used by protesters affected mobilization across ideology, such that conservatives were averse to violent events, but drawn to peaceful events.

The Tea Party presents an interesting case study, in that it is an apparent anomaly that stands out against the pattern of relative non-participation in protest among conservatives. What kinds of networks are Tea Party members associated with? How do they view their activity on the streets? How are norms appropriate behavior developed? And While I argue in this dissertation that individual differences are important for understanding non-electoral political participation, by examining an extant movement on the political right, we stand to gain insight into the characteristics of movements that appeal to different individuals.

Finally, what is it about low authoritarian liberals and their proclivity to be participants in protest? Kam and Simas (2010) found that liberals are more risk-accepting than conservatives, which is in line with Jost and colleagues (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Nosek & Gosling 2008) who find a relationship between conservative ideology and epistemic needs for certainty and security, and psychological predispositions such as low openness to experience and conscientiousness (Gerber et al. 2010; McCrae 1996; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). It is likely that low authoritarian liberals are also relatively high in extraversion, efficacy, and are pro-social. Research into the individual characteristics of low authoritarian liberals stands to provide some interesting insights into why these individuals are so much more likely to participate in non-electoral politics.

Generally, the above discussion points to a multi-faceted explanation for why we see a pervasive difference in protest participation across ideology: stable individual differences affect the likelihood that one protests, one's embeddedness in different types of networks affects views of the appropriate means for addressing political issues, and dynamic structural changes and the interaction between individuals and the overarching system affect the types motivations that are

likely to drive protest participation over time. Some of these factors are more malleable than others and suggest that political participation across the ideological divide can be quite dynamic.

Overall, this dissertation broadly speaks to normative democratic theory. Why should we care about collective action and social movements, especially if participants are a minority of the population? The following oft cited quotation by Margaret Mead provides an idealistic perspective on the power of grassroots activism: “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.” Public participation in political affairs is fundamental to a healthy, functioning democracy, and people have changed the world through their collusion to address myriad issues.

Understanding social movements and their constituent members is important in several respects. First, collective action is on the rise (Klandermans & van Steekelenberg, 2013), leading Rucht (1991) to write that “the likelihood of emergence and stability of social movements is increasing with modernization” (p.448). Second, successful movements are able to disseminate their views and demands to the public at large as well as to the political elite. This can have real consequences for the shaping of modern society (Buechler 2000), as well as public policy (Tarrow 1999). Among individuals in close proximity to protests, contentious politics can also affect attitudes toward government (Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, & Jones-Correa 2014). Further, it is commonly believed among normative democratic theorists that in order for democracy to work properly, it is imperative that society be comprised of an engaged and informed electorate.

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Appendix A. Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 3

Table A.1. Predicting Protest: Interactions between Ideology and Authoritarianism

VARIABLES	(1) 2000 ANES	(2) 2004 ANES	(3) 2005 CID	(4) 2008 LAPOP
Ideology	-0.519 (1.021)	-0.682 (0.663)	-1.387 (0.928)	-1.372 (0.989)
Authoritarianism	-1.357* (0.792)	-0.101 (0.568)	-1.960 (1.787)	-0.692 (0.518)
Ideo*Auth	4.169* (2.361)	5.745*** (1.299)	-0.544 (5.856)	0.667 (1.954)
Party (Rep.-Dem.)	0.328 (0.848)	-0.0824 (0.477)	0.870* (0.515)	0.619 (0.595)
Partisan (weak-strong)	0.163 (0.639)	-0.272 (0.338)	1.187* (0.672)	0.422 (0.480)
Protest Illegal			1.682* (0.920)	
Age	-0.0200 (0.0128)	-0.00839 (0.00905)	-0.0314** (0.0126)	-0.0416*** (0.00926)
White	0.0783 (0.658)	-0.536** (0.243)	-0.320 (0.559)	-0.339 (0.341)
Male	0.0223 (0.374)	-0.122 (0.316)	0.386 (0.386)	0.0974 (0.277)
Black	0.767 (0.776)	-0.567 (0.492)	-0.0336 (0.699)	-0.727 (0.572)
Education	0.965 (0.840)	3.541*** (0.882)	0.535 (0.737)	0.468 (0.419)
Income	-0.202 (0.718)	-1.173** (0.541)	0.467 (0.867)	1.075* (0.558)
Constant	-3.320** (1.256)	-3.466*** (0.707)	-4.177*** (1.114)	-2.356*** (0.644)
Observations	1,456	1,037	855	1,094
F	3.604	6.011	3.810	7.932
Df Model	11	11	12	11
Df Variance	66	26	854	1090

Note: Survey weights applied. Ideology and authoritarianism are mean centered. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure A.1. Predicted Probabilities of Protest: Interactions between Mobilization (Contacted) and Ideology and Authoritarianism





Figure A.2. Predicted Probabilities of Protest: Interactions between Organizational Involvement and Ideology and Authoritarianism



Appendix B. Pew Data for Issue Item Selection for Chapter 4

Table B.1. % Rating Each a Top priority for Obama & Congress in 2015 from Pew Research Center

	Democrats	Republicans	'13-'15 change	Dems-Reps
Protecting the Environment (Global Warming)	66% (54%)	35% (15%)	-1% (+10%)	35% (39%)
Dealing With Illegal Immigration	45%	60%	+12%	-15%
Reducing Budget Deficit	55%	72%	-8%	-17%
Addressing Race Relations	62%	45%	na	+17%

Note: The '13-'15 change column is the change from 2013 to 2015 in the percentage of all respondents rating an issue as a top priority. The Dems-Reps column is the difference between the % of Democrats and Republicans rating as issue as a top priority. Source: Pew Research Center (<http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/15/publics-policy-priorities-reflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad/>)

Appendix C. Experimental Manipulations Example for Ch. 4

Anti-Immigration Issue

Contentious-Respectful Condition:

Anti-immigration Rally Violently Clashes with Pro-immigration Bystanders, but Remains Respectful of Police

On Saturday, Washington, D.C. police dealt with a throng of unruly and violent anti-immigration activists who participated in a large disruptive demonstration that began at Lafayette Park across from the White House. The protesters were obedient and respectful of police orders, but turned violent when provoked by hostile bystanders who taunted them verbally. According to police spokesperson, Ryan Averson, the anti-immigration protesters are respectable middle-class people, who only lashed out when attacked by bystanders. “We don’t condone the way they dealt with the bystanders, but we support their right to voice their opinions in the capital,” he said. He went on to say that “the protesters were raucous and hostile towards the bystanders who insulted them, but were friendly and compliant with police officers.”

The rally, organized by the Restore America group, contained a lot of strong language aimed at the pro-immigration individuals who taunted them, but expressed respect and support for the police. Charlie Rosen, a Restore America supporter who was in Washington, D.C. this week to join the rally, said, “There were people here today trying to undermine the work we are doing, but we won’t allow them to use fear tactics to silence us. We are here in our Nation’s capital to exercise our right to free speech, even if that involves a little pushing and shoving.” In contrast, the protesters showed appreciation for the police. “We have the utmost respect for the D.C. and are grateful to have their support,” Rosen said.

Contentious-Disrespectful Condition:

Anti-immigration Rally Violently Clashes with Anti-Anti-immigration Bystanders and Disrespects Police

On Saturday, Washington, D.C. police dealt with a throng of unruly and violent anti-immigration activists who participated in a large disruptive demonstration that began at Lafayette Park across from the White House. The protesters were disobedient of police orders and turned violent when provoked by hostile bystanders who taunted them verbally. According to police spokesperson, Ryan Averson the anti-immigration protesters represent bigotry and intolerance, demonstrated by their violent and disrespectful behavior throughout the day. “These are not respectable citizens, and they are not welcome to voice their opinions in the capital,” he said. Averson went on to say that “the protesters were not only raucous and hostile towards the pro-immigration individuals, but were antagonistic and disrespectful towards police officers.”

The rally, organized by the Restore America group, contained a lot of strong language aimed at pro-immigration bystanders and police. Charlie Rosen, a Restore America supporter who was in Washington, D.C. this week to join the rally, said, “There were people here today trying to undermine the work we are doing, and we won’t allow them to use fear tactics to silence us. We are here in our Nation’s capital to exercise our right to free speech, even if that

involves a little pushing and shoving. Similarly, the protesters showed disregard for the police. “We have no respect for the D.C. police and don’t care if we have their support,” Rosen said.

Peaceful-Disrespectful Condition:

Anti-immigration Rally Disrespects Police but Remains Peaceful Amidst Verbal Attacks from Pro-Immigration Bystanders

On Saturday, Washington, D.C. police dealt with a throng of rebellious anti-immigration activists who participated in a large peaceful demonstration that began at Lafayette Park across from the White House. The protesters were disobedient and disrespectful of police orders, but remained peaceful when provoked by hostile bystanders who taunted them verbally. According to police spokesperson, Ryan Averson, the anti-immigration protesters represent bigotry and intolerance, despite remaining peaceful throughout the day. “These are not respectable citizens, and they are not welcome to voice their opinions in the capital,” he said. Averson went on to say that “while the protesters seem peaceful, they were rude to police officers and the consensus is that they are menacing and potentially dangerous.”

The rally, organized by the Restore America group, contained a lot of strong language aimed at pro-immigration individuals and police. Charlie Rosen, a Restore America supporter who was in Washington, D.C. this week to join the rally, said, “There were people here today trying to undermine the work we are doing, and we won’t allow them to use fear tactics to silence us. We are here in our Nation’s capital to exercise our right to free speech, but we will not resort to violence.” Similarly, the protesters showed disregard for the police. “We have no respect for the D.C. and don’t care if we have their support,” Rosen said.

Peaceful-Respectful Condition:

Anti-immigration Rally Remains Peaceful Amidst Verbal Attacks from Pro-Immigration Bystanders, Receives Support from Police

On Saturday, Washington, D.C. police dealt with a throng of peaceful anti-immigration activists who participated in a large civil demonstration that began at Lafayette Park across from the White House. The protest remained peaceful even as the protesters were provoked by pro-immigration bystanders who taunted them verbally. While remaining peaceful amidst verbal attacks from bystanders, the anti-immigration protesters received support from the D.C. police. According to police spokesperson, Ryan Averson, the anti-immigration protesters are respectable middle-class citizens, who were harassed by bystanders. “We are impressed by the way they dealt with the hostile bystanders, and they are welcome to voice their opinions in the capital,” he said. Averson went on to say that “the protesters are peaceful and civil, and were friendly and compliant with police officers.”

The rally, organized by the Restore America group, remained calm when faced with insults by pro-immigration individuals, and expressed gratitude for the support by police. Charlie Rosen, a Restore America supporter who was in Washington, D.C. this week to join the rally, said, “There were people here today trying to undermine the work we are doing, but we refuse to retaliate or resort to violence. We are here in our Nation’s capital to exercise our right to free

speech.” The protesters also showed appreciation for the police. “We have the utmost respect for the D.C. and are grateful to have their support,” Rosen said.

Appendix D. Dependent Variables Item Wording for Ch. 4

Protest Intention. If Restore America were to stage a similar protest in your area, how likely would you be to attend the event?

Very Unlikely (1)

Unlikely (2)

Somewhat Unlikely (3)

Undecided (4)

Somewhat Likely (5)

Likely (6)

Very Likely (7)

Contact. Would you like to learn more about a Restore America group staging similar protests in your area? By clicking “yes,” you will be taken to a page at the end of the survey in which you can enter your email address in order to be contacted by a local Restore America coordinator. The coordinator will contact you in order to provide more information about their group, as well as provide you with opportunities for attending future events. Please note that

your email address will in no way be linked to your previous responses, and will not be shared with any outside parties. Your privacy is very important to us.

Yes, I would like to provide my email at the end of the survey in order to be contacted by a Restore America coordinator. (1)

No, I would not like to be contacted. (2)

Appendix E. Manipulation Check Items for Ch. 4

Now, you will be asked to answer some questions about the article you just read.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the tactics used by the protesters in the article?

Disagree Strongly (1)

Disagree (2)

Disagree Somewhat (3)

Agree Somewhat (4)

Agree (5)

Agree Strongly (6)

How violent or peaceful do you think the protesters in the article are?

Extremely Violent (1)

Violent (2)

Somewhat Violent (3)

Somewhat Peaceful (4)

Peaceful (5)

Extremely Peaceful (6)

How respectful or disrespectful do you think the protesters in the article are toward the police?

Extremely Respectful (1)

Respectful (2)

Somewhat Respectful (3)

Somewhat Disrespectful (4)

Disrespectful (5)

Extremely Disrespectful (6)

Appendix F. Issue Attitude and Strength Items for Ch. 4

Top Issue. Of the following issues, which ONE do you think should be a top priority for Obama and Congress in the next year? Please choose from the list the issue you think is the most important issue facing the nation.

Reducing the budget deficit/Size of Government (1)

Reducing Illegal Immigration (2)

Addressing Race Relations (3)

Dealing with Environmental Issues/Global Warming (4)

Making it Easier for Immigrants to gain Citizenship (5)

Small government. For the following three (3) questions, please choose which of the two statements comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your own views.

ONE, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; or TWO, government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.

the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves. (1)

government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger. (2)

ONE, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or TWO, the free market can handle these problems without the government being involved.

we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems. (1)

the free market can handle these problems without the government being involved. (2)

ONE, the less government, the better; or TWO, there are more things that the government should be doing.

the less government, the better. (1)

there are more things that the government should be doing. (2)

Anti-Immigration. Below you will answer questions about your views on immigration.

To what extent do you favor or oppose building a fence that would make it more difficult for Mexican immigrants to gain access to the United States?

Strongly oppose (1)

Oppose (2)

Somewhat oppose (3)

Somewhat favor (4)

Favor (5)

Strongly favor (6)

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Immigrants who come to this country illegally should be immediately deported.

Strongly agree (1)

Agree (2)

Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)

Disagree (4)

Strongly Disagree (5)

Race relations. Below you will answer questions about your views on race relations in the U.S.

All in all, compared with five years ago, do you think the situation of black people in this country today is better, worse, or about the same?

Much better (1)

Better (2)

Somewhat Better (3)

About the Same (4)

Somewhat Worse (5)

Worse (6)

ONE, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or TWO, the free market can handle these problems without the government being involved.

we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems. (1)

the free market can handle these problems without the government being involved. (2)

ONE, the less government, the better; or TWO, there are more things that the government should be doing.

the less government, the better. (1)

there are more things that the government should be doing. (2)

Anti-Immigration. Below you will answer questions about your views on immigration.

To what extent do you favor or oppose building a fence that would make it more difficult for Mexican immigrants to gain access to the United States?

Strongly oppose (1)

Oppose (2)

Somewhat oppose (3)

Somewhat favor (4)

Favor (5)

Strongly favor (6)

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Immigrants who come to this country illegally should be immediately deported.

Strongly agree (1)

Agree (2)

Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)

Disagree (4)

Strongly Disagree (5)

Race relations. Below you will answer questions about your views on race relations in the U.S.

All in all, compared with five years ago, do you think the situation of black people in this country today is better, worse, or about the same?

Much better (1)

Better (2)

Somewhat Better (3)

About the Same (4)

Somewhat Worse (5)

Worse (6)

Much Worse (7)

Now thinking about the financial situation of blacks compared with whites TODAY, would you say the average black person is better off, worse off or just about as well off as the average white person in terms of income and overall financial situation?

Much better off than whites (1)

Better off than whites (2)

Somewhat better off than whites (3)

About the same (4)

Somewhat worse off than whites (5)

Worse off than whites (6)

Much worse off than whites (7)

Just your impression, are blacks in your community treated less fairly than whites in dealing with the police.

Yes, treated less fairly (1)

No, not treated less fairly (2)

Environment. We would like to ask your opinions about the environment.

With which of these statements about the environment and the economy do you most agree:

Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the expense of economic growth. (1)

Economic growth should be given priority, even if the environment suffers a little. (2)

How much do you personally worry about the quality of the environment?

A great deal (1)

A fair amount (2)

Only a little (3)

Not at all (4)

Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view is the seriousness of global warming generally exaggerated, generally correct, or is it generally underestimated.

Generally exaggerated (1)

Generally correct (2)

Generally underestimated (3)

Appendix G. Random Assignment Checks for Ch. 4

Table G.1. Gender across Conditions

Experimental Condition	Gender		Total %
	Female	Male	
Contentious Respectful %	50%	50%	100
Contentious Disrespectful %	45%	55%	100
Peaceful Disrespectful %	46%	54%	100
Peaceful Respectful %	43%	57%	100
Total %	46%	54%	100
Pearson chi2(3) = 2.9332 Pr = 0.402			

Table G.2. Race across Conditions

Experimental Condition	Race					Total%
	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	
Contentious Respectful %	83%	6%	3%	5%	3%	100
Contentious Disrespectful %	85%	5%	2%	5%	3%	100
Peaceful Disrespectful %	85%	5%	1%	4%	5%	100
Peaceful Respectful %	89%	4%	1%	3%	3%	100
Total %	85%	5%	2%	4%	4%	100
Pearson chi2(12) = 9.0688 Pr = 0.697						

Table G.3. Ideology, Authoritarianism, Income, Age, and Education across Conditions

Experimental Condition	Ideology	Authoritarianism	Income	Age	Education
Contentious Respectful	.31 (.31)	.22 (.29)	.22 (.29)	46.6 (15.0)	.77 (.11)
Contentious Disrespectful	.25 (.29)	.19 (.29)	.19 (.29)	44.9 (14.4)	.77 (.12)
Peaceful Disrespectful	.27 (.29)	.21 (.31)	.21 (.31)	45.1 (14.4)	.78 (.12)
Peaceful Respectful	.30 (.31)	.20 (.30)	.20 (.30)	45.9 (14.4)	.77 (.12)

Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviations in parentheses.

Appendix H. Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 5

Table H.1. Predictors of Protest from 2000-2012

	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2012 ANES
Ideology (Lib-Con)	-2.31 (.80)	-1.45 (.66)	-.98 (.28)
Authoritarianism	-1.36 (.62)	-1.03 (.50)	-.65 (.20)
Party ID (Rep-Dem)	.23 (.66)	-.042 (.54)	.0007 (.18)
Partisan Strength	.36 (.54)	.066 (.44)	.28 (.18)
Age	-.014 (.011)	-.010 (.0088)	-.0029 (.0037)
White	-.35 (.40)	-.36 (.32)	-.43 (.13)
Male	-.054 (.33)	-.0047 (.27)	.41 (.12)
Education	1.48 (.70)	2.87 (.72)	1.19 (.23)
Income	-.0047 (.95)	-.89* (.54)	-.22 (.21)
Constant	-1.98 (.83)	-2.03 (.88)	-2.39 (.37)
Pseudo R ²	.11	.11	.05
N	1204	891	5069

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Bolded coefficients indicate $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$, two-tailed tests.

Table H.2. Effects of Control Variables on Protest for Negative Candidate Traits Models in Table 5.5

	2000 ANES				2004 ANES				2012 ANES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
AGE	-0.0220*	-0.0220*	-0.0235**	-0.0236*	-0.0045	-0.00396	-0.00564	-0.00586	-0.00367	-0.00494	-0.005	-0.00496
SE	-0.0113	-0.0112	-0.0117	-0.0118	-0.0076	-0.00734	-0.0076	-0.00763	-0.00521	-0.00526	-0.00512	-0.00512
MALE	-0.0294	-0.0273	0.0719	0.0673	0.113	0.0913	0.0433	0.0221	0.459***	0.440***	0.448***	0.446***
SE	-0.356	-0.356	-0.359	-0.364	-0.267	-0.278	-0.275	-0.294	-0.157	-0.157	-0.155	-0.155
WHITE	0.127	0.119	-0.0713	-0.0761	-0.411	-0.446	-0.455*	-0.448*	-0.508**	-0.528**	-0.521**	-0.537***
SE	-0.639	-0.641	-0.62	-0.613	-0.275	-0.262	-0.264	-0.252	-0.204	-0.205	-0.202	-0.203
INCOME	-0.42	-0.417	-0.446	-0.454	-0.678	-0.702	-0.65	-0.667	-0.520*	-0.546*	-0.51	-0.517
SE	-0.726	-0.732	-0.693	-0.689	-0.585	-0.574	-0.621	-0.593	-0.315	-0.315	-0.316	-0.316
BLACK	0.215	0.213	0.335	0.305	-0.830*	-0.751*	-0.902**	-0.816*	-0.410*	-0.401	-0.467*	-0.439*
SE	-0.749	-0.75	-0.754	-0.749	-0.431	-0.415	-0.406	-0.406	-0.249	-0.25	-0.251	-0.255
EDUCATION	1.669**	1.636**	1.104	1.131	3.105***	2.919***	2.904***	2.868***	1.437***	1.376***	1.409***	1.397***
SE	-0.745	-0.727	-0.825	-0.812	-0.743	-0.739	-0.784	-0.778	-0.312	-0.318	-0.317	-0.318
PARTISAN	0.222	0.163	0.192	0.199	0.0404	-0.241	0.0145	0.0326	0.413*	0.134	0.395	0.381
SE	-0.617	-0.63	-0.6	-0.604	-0.365	-0.441	-0.375	-0.379	-0.245	-0.274	-0.247	-0.245

Table H.3. Effects of Control Variables on Protest for Negative Candidate Traits Models in Table 5.6

	2000 ANES				2004 ANES				2012 ANES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
PARTY	-1.04	-1.021	-0.493	-0.433	-1.201**	-0.796	-1.021**	-0.998**	-0.236	-0.153	0.187	0.183
SE	-0.836	-0.997	-0.679	-0.707	-0.462	-0.515	-0.458	-0.453	-0.326	-0.357	-0.316	-0.317
AGE	-0.0299	-0.0313	-0.0324*	-0.0325*	-0.0033	-0.00276	-0.00464	-0.00519	-0.00413	-0.0048	-0.00516	-0.00514
SE	-0.0196	-0.02	-0.0189	-0.0188	-0.00755	-0.00743	-0.00743	-0.00744	-0.00528	-0.00529	-0.00518	-0.00518
MALE	-0.0548	-0.108	0.13	0.12	0.0162	0.0353	-0.0526	-0.0571	0.479***	0.474***	0.486***	0.485***
SE	-0.442	-0.435	-0.428	-0.431	-0.28	-0.29	-0.283	-0.3	-0.157	-0.157	-0.155	-0.155
WHITE	0.299	0.296	0.145	0.138	-0.338	-0.366	-0.346	-0.329	-0.512**	-0.517**	-0.532***	-0.540***
SE	-0.902	-0.959	-0.87	-0.867	-0.251	-0.239	-0.254	-0.244	-0.207	-0.209	-0.205	-0.205
INCOME	-0.163	-0.3	-0.142	-0.134	-0.626	-0.712	-0.549	-0.578	-0.541*	-0.567*	-0.554*	-0.560*
SE	-0.955	-1.051	-0.971	-0.957	-0.597	-0.583	-0.635	-0.595	-0.315	-0.317	-0.317	-0.316
BLACK	0.534	0.544	0.462	0.406	-0.856*	-0.714	-0.927**	-0.782*	-0.449*	-0.450*	-0.513**	-0.484*
SE	-0.942	-0.976	-0.997	-1.039	-0.469	-0.438	-0.437	-0.429	-0.248	-0.25	-0.251	-0.253
EDUCATION	1.785	1.683	1.421	1.449	2.828***	2.672***	2.698***	2.721***	1.419***	1.396***	1.411***	1.404***
SE	-1.13	-1.211	-1.295	-1.252	-0.753	-0.761	-0.798	-0.792	-0.312	-0.313	-0.318	-0.318
PARTISAN	1.341	0.872	1.198	1.213	0.138	-0.367	0.0246	-0.0374	0.398	0.221	0.413*	0.401
SE	-0.817	-0.723	-0.832	-0.838	-0.38	-0.476	-0.391	-0.43	-0.245	-0.264	-0.248	-0.246

Table H.4. Triple Interaction between Ideology or Authoritarianism, Presidential Disapproval, and President/Year

VARIABLES	(1) protest	(2) protest
Ideology	-1.966* (1.068)	
Presidential Disapproval	-0.132 (0.541)	-0.720 (0.499)
Ideology*Disapproval	0.923 (2.295)	
Bush	0.439 (0.375)	0.853*** (0.315)
Obama	0.581* (0.299)	0.940*** (0.272)
Ideo*Bush	2.512* (1.399)	
Ideo*Obama	1.185 (1.138)	
Bush*Disapproval	1.599* (0.844)	1.696** (0.728)
Obama*Disapproval	-0.291 (0.609)	0.194 (0.507)
Ideo*Disapproval*Bush	-5.347* (3.038)	
Ideo*Disapproval*Obama	1.696 (2.503)	
Party (Rep-Dem)	-0.0251 (0.335)	0.200 (0.285)
age	-0.00639 (0.00426)	-0.00686* (0.00416)
male	0.338*** (0.129)	0.341*** (0.128)
white	-0.454*** (0.174)	-0.481*** (0.171)
income	-0.558** (0.268)	-0.527* (0.270)
black	-0.409* (0.216)	-0.431** (0.218)
education	1.559*** (0.277)	1.521*** (0.281)
partisan strength	0.0847 (0.227)	0.313 (0.205)
Authoritarianism		-2.105***

		(0.776)
Auth*Disapproval		-0.627
		(1.992)
Auth*Bush		1.711*
		(0.943)
Auth*Obama		1.822**
		(0.811)
Auth*Disapproval*Bush		-1.645
		(2.338)
Auth*Disapproval*Obama		1.299
		(2.099)
Constant	-3.706***	-4.094***
	(0.392)	(0.387)
Observations	7,558	7,794
F	7.512	7.962
p	0	0

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure H.1. Predicted Probabilities of Protest for Republicans under Clinton and Obama Presidencies across Ideology and Authoritarianism

