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The Authoritarian Party Identity and Its Impact on American Political Polarization

A Dissertation Presented

by

Julie Ann Wronski

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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Political scientists and pundits alike have characterized the American electorate as being increasingly polarized in recent decades. This polarization has been framed in the context of the “culture war,” where party elites and citizens have become more ideologically divided on salient social issues. Recent contributions by political scientists suggest that the sources of “culture war” polarization are more deeply rooted in individual traits, and that partisan polarization represents a “worldview evolution” that has split citizens into Democratic and Republican camps on the basis of their needs for order, certainty, and security – conceptualized as *authoritarianism*. This argument hinges on an acceptance that, as Republicans increasingly supported more conservative positions on cultural issues such as gay rights, the war on terrorism, and abortion, authoritarians identified more with the Republican Party. This line of work, while acknowledging the link between personal predispositions and ideological preferences, does not provide a theoretical mechanism that explains *why* authoritarianism has come to structure political polarization.

In this dissertation, I propose and empirically test a theoretical mechanism that explains why ideological polarization in contemporary American politics is structured by authoritarian dispositions, by incorporating aspects of social identity theory. I argue that authoritarianism is a group-based construct wherein individuals seek to establish social order through overlapping group and political identities. By conceptualizing authoritarianism in these terms, I explore how shifts in party leadership cohesion, ideological sorting, and demographic composition affected the ways in which people with varying levels of authoritarianism relate to politics. Empirically, I rely on survey-based approaches and quantitative methods for testing my theoretical model, and provide evidence that 1) authoritarianism differentially predicts how individuals perceive their partisan identity as cohesively encompassing their other social identities, 2) authoritarian dispositions, moderated by elite-level shifts in demographic homogeneity, have affected large-scale partisan sorting over the past 40 years, and 3) authoritarian dispositions lead to intense partisan attachments and ideologically extreme issue preferences, as mediated by individuals’ perceptions of their party as a cohesive, singular entity, regardless of which ideological belief systems are shared among co-partisans.

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All errors, omissions, and failures in the following pages are my own.

Chapter 1

Background and Overview


Political scientists and pundits alike have characterized American politics as increasingly polarized in recent decades. Democratic and Republican Party elites simply have not seen eye to eye on many policy matters, and instead of compromise they have engaged in brinkmanship, vitriolic rhetoric, and a fundamental lack of understanding regarding how the other side perceives the world. Much of this elite-level political conflict has been attributed to ideological polarization (Aldrich 2011, Poole & Rosenthal 1997, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006, Levendusky 2009) stemming from the issue evolution of the social domain following the Civil Rights movement (Carmines & Stimson 1986, 1989), and the advent of salient “culture war” issues (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Fiorina & Levendusky 2006, Ellis & Stimson 2012). As Democrats became increasingly liberal, and Republicans more conservative, party elites became more united among their co-partisans (Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007), and more distant towards those across the aisle (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006).

While generally agreeing about the existence of partisan polarization among elites, political scientists have treated such polarization in the American electorate as both an assumed phenomenon and a heated debate. One side has argued that ideological polarization only occurred at the elite level, allowing for “sorting” among a relatively moderate electorate (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Fiorina & Levendusky 2006, Levendusky 2009); while the other has suggested that these cleavages permeate the electorate, making it increasingly bi-modal (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008, Abramowitz 2010, Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, Jacobson 2008, Hetherington 2001). Combining these two perspectives, scholars have shown that contemporary American political conflict reflects such intensity because it is characterized by fundamental worldview and motivational differences between citizens at the psychological level, specifically, by individual-level differences in *authoritarian dispositions* (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Hetherington & Suhay 2011).

Research has found that authoritarianism – conceptualized as needs for order and security, an aversion towards ambiguity, and a desire for conformity and uniformity (Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003, Jost et al. 2003) – is a strong predictor of political preferences and behaviors. Most of this work has examined authoritarianism’s role in structuring citizens’ ideological constraint (Barker & Tinnick 2006), support for moral traditionalism and opposition to egalitarianism (Federico, Fisher & Deason 2011), and preferences towards conservative policies (Johnston & Wronski 2013). Placing authoritarianism at the forefront of American polarization, Hetherington & Weiler (2009) have argued that citizens divided themselves into the Democratic and Republican parties along the authoritarian dimension as the ideological positions on “culture war” issues espoused by the parties (particularly Republicans’ conservative positions on issues like gay marriage and abortion) tapped into individuals’ concerns about social order, cohesion, and traditionalism embedded within their authoritarian dispositions. Thus, the existing treatment of authoritarianism as a predictor of partisan identification focuses on the relationship between such dispositions and citizens’ *ideological values*.

While this research has established a micro-level connection between authoritarian dispositions and Republican Party identification (e.g., Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013), this link only reflects a statistically significant relationship within the past decade (see Figure 1.1). As such, these findings present a puzzle: Why does authoritarianism predict identifying as a Republican now but not earlier? What has changed in the American political landscape that has allowed citizens to now translate their authoritarian dispositions into Republican Party identity? Hetherington & Weiler (2009) would argue that the ideological polarization of elites on salient social issues, such as gay marriage, abortion and civil rights legislation, triggered authoritarianism as a significant predictor of mass partisanship. But this approach only acknowledges the ideological policy preferences of party elites, ignoring other equally important distinctions between the two parties.

Figure 1.1. Relationships between Authoritarianism and Party Identity, from Hetherington & Weiler (2009)



Notes: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Notably, the fundamental differences between the two parties today are not simply ideological, or even values based. The *social identities* each party represents are vastly different. On one hand, the Democratic Party represents diversity – their leaders are Whites, Blacks, Latinos, men, and women. And the Democratic Party leadership touts this diversity, as exemplified by the 113th Congress’ Democratic committee members, who were, according to Representative Nancy Pelosi, diverse “geographically, generationally, gender-wise, ethnically, in every way,” and a group that embraces “a diversity of opinion.”¹ She further described the “beautiful diversity” of her Democratic Party caucus: “[It] looks like America. So do our ranking members. One of the messages it sends, if you’re a woman, if you’re gay or if you’re a minority, you can have the comfort of saying: ‘Somebody like me has a seat at the table. Somebody who understands my aspirations, my hopes and dreams.’”² In contrast, the Republican Party has

¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/12/05/house-democrats-tout-diversity-in-the-ranks/>

² http://www.salon.com/2012/12/27/is_the_white_house_a_boys_club/

largely represented White, male, Protestant Christians. For instance, Senator Lindsey Graham opined on the Republican Party in the 2012 presidential election: “The demographics race we’re losing badly. We’re not generating enough angry white guys to stay in business for the long term.”³ The party in the electorate has also reflected these social identity differences, with almost 90% of Republican identifiers in 2012 classifying themselves as White, compared to an ethnic breakdown of 60% White, 22% African American, and 13% Hispanic among Democratic Party identifiers (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. Ethnic Breakdown of Electorate by Party ID in 2012⁴

<i>Racial and Ethnic Composition of U.S., by Party ID</i>			
	Republican	Independent	Democrat
Non-Hispanic white	89%	70%	60%
Non-Hispanic black	2%	8%	22%
Hispanic	6%	16%	13%
Asian	1%	3%	2%
Other	1%	1%	1%
Undesignated	1%	2%	2%

Gallup Daily tracking, January-December 2012

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1.1 A Brief Overview of the Theory

Is it, therefore, possible that these dichotomous social identity profiles across the Democratic and Republican parties also activated the link between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions and their mass party identifications? A wealth of research in social psychology, spanning decades, would unequivocally answer yes. Since its inception (see Adorno et al. 1950), authoritarianism has been shown to influence group-based behaviors including attachments to social in-groups (Duckitt 1989), and intolerance of deviant “outsiders” (Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). Along these lines, I propose that authoritarianism embodies an innate desire for homogeneity and an aversion towards diversity among one’s social groups that individuals utilize when making sense of their partisan identities. Particularly, those higher in

³ http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-republican-convention-emphasizes-diversity-racial-incidents-intrude/2012/08/29/b9023a52-f1ec-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html

⁴ <http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-mostly-white.aspx>

authoritarianism should perceive their party identity as cohesively containing only their in-group members, and excluding all outsiders. Conversely, those lower in authoritarianism should also perceive that their party identity reflects their other social identities, but in a nuanced way that allows for social diversity among co-partisans, and the inclusion of out-group members. This alternative approach posits that the match between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party identifications rest in their *social identities*, providing an alternative, and perhaps more fundamental, mechanism by which authoritarian dispositions have colored the partisan divide in American politics.

Further, if authoritarianism is driving current partisan polarization, then this process should be based upon how party leadership and membership *structures* provide authority, uniformity, autonomy or diversity, not necessarily on salient ideological issue stances. I suggest, then, that citizens have also politically sorted along the authoritarian dimension due to differences the parties' fundamental group structures, specifically characterizations of strong leadership, group cohesion, and overlapping political and social in-group memberships. These cohesive group traits should appeal to authoritarians because they provide a clear hierarchal social order, and satiate needs for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster 1996). As partisanship increasingly reflects a social identity (Nicholson 2012, Huddy, Mason & Aaroe 2013, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002, Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012, Mason 2013), it should serve the psychological functions of cognitive self-categorization (Turner et al. 1987), positive self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner 1979), and large-scale security (Brewer & Caporael 2006) that are linked to authoritarian motives. As such, the political party that comprises these social identity and leadership traits, both objectively and subjectively, should address authoritarians' epistemic needs for order, certainty, and security (see Jost et al. 2003), and comprise the basis of their authoritarian submission (Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003), resulting in a durable affective bond between authoritarians and this superordinate political entity.

Over the past four decades, the Democratic and Republican parties have shifted in ways that allowed individuals' authoritarian dispositions to influence their partisan identities through the ideological and social identity pathways discussed above. On one hand, the parties became more ideologically extreme and distinct in their policy positions (Aldrich 2011, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005), providing the conceptual link to authoritarianism advocated in the extant literature (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Barker & Tinnick 2006, Federico et al. 2011, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013). On the other, the demographic composition of party elites shifted such that Democrats diversified while Republicans remained relatively homogeneous (Fiorina et al 2011), creating stereotypes that citizens used to match their authoritarian dispositions with the party that best represented their in-group identities. As elites typically encompassed White, male, Protestant Christians throughout American political history, this demographic diversification process should activate authoritarian dispositions most powerfully among Whites, and White Protestants, who are witnessing their party morph from "us" into "them."

Given these competing mechanisms by which authoritarianism has come to shape American partisanship – ideological values and social identities – which better serves as the dynamic link between citizens' (and particularly White citizens') authoritarian dispositions and their party identifications? Further, what novel insights does the social identity mechanism offer beyond the current understanding of authoritarianism in American politics? In addressing these overarching questions, this dissertation seeks to re-conceptualize authoritarianism as a group-based construct and examine it through the lens of social identity theory (per Tajfel & Turner 1979) in order to determine: 1) *why* individuals' authoritarian dispositions have come to structure

their partisan and ideological preferences, and 2) *why* these traits ultimately led to such affectively charged mass polarization in contemporary American politics.

1.2 Implications for Contemporary American Politics

The present dissertation tackles these questions and delves into the origins of authoritarianism as a predictor of party identification in contemporary American politics by examining the ideological and demographic evolution of party elites over the past forty years, and how these contextual changes impacted the relationship between individuals' authoritarian dispositions, their party identifications, and their perceptions of the in-party as a cohesive, overarching social group. Such an examination reveals that the demographic make-up of the two parties' elites played as much of a critical role in the sorting of citizens along the authoritarian dimension as the ideological positions espoused by these same party elites. Yet, as the demographic compositions and ideological shifts of the two parties have often been endogenous processes since the 1960's (Aldrich 2011), party sorting resulting from social identity mechanism occasionally mirrors ideology-driven sorting (Levendusky 2009) and worldview-based polarization (Hetherington & Weiler 2009).

However, on occasions when the party elites' demographic shifts did not coincide with their ideological movement, I demonstrate that social identity matches between citizen and party are a stronger predictor of partisan identity, especially among high authoritarians. All else being equal, authoritarians identified with the political party that best represented their in-groups in a cohesive way, even if that meant identifying with the party of the left. Thus, I show that authoritarianism was a predictor of Democratic Party identification in the 1970's and 1980's when its elites were mostly White male Protestants; and as Democrat elites began to represent more genders, ethnicities, and religious groups, authoritarians exited the party in favor of Republican identification.

This dissertation highlights social identities as the mechanism which links authoritarianism to party identities. Unlike the conventional approach that emphasizes the role of the Republican Party endorsing more conservative social issue positions (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013), I find that the Democratic Party, through the diversification of their core membership, drove authoritarians to affiliate with the Republican Party. As a result, individuals higher in authoritarianism both perceived their in-party in more cohesive, homogeneous terms, and were drawn to the party whose elites reflected demographic similarity. Further, these party preferences occurred independent of individuals' ideological considerations, such that authoritarians affiliated with the socially homogeneous party (and dissociated with the socially diverse party) regardless of whether it was the party of the left or the right. Finally, I show that authoritarianism both directly, and indirectly, via perceptions of cohesive leadership and membership, mold the affective and ideological aspects of partisan polarization.

Thus, the authoritarian partisan divide present in American politics is fundamentally one that reflects *tolerance towards social groups* – creating a functional link between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions and their intolerance of non-traditional and “outsider” social groups (e.g. women, African Americans, homosexuals) as party authority figures. As such, authoritarianism has come to structure mass polarization not merely through ideological sorting on salient social issues (per Hetherington & Weiler 2009) but through intense in-group favorability and out-group hostility associated with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), and the desire of authoritarians to maintain a sense of oneness and sameness (Stenner 2005). This novel perspective holds important normative implications for public opinion research, and American politics more broadly. When the link between authoritarianism and partisan identity is regarded from this social identity perspective, authoritarians are not necessarily conservatives, especially on economic issues. Instead they possess an affinity towards the Republican Party that has developed over a decades-long exodus from the Democratic Party on the basis of intolerance towards social diversity and an exclusion of outsiders, which now allows them to exhibit conservatism through their Republican identity (see Johnston & Wronski 2013, Johnston 2013), making them only as conservative as the party that best reflects their social groups.

1.3 Overview of the Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I expand upon the basic theoretical ideas presented in this chapter. I first provide a review of the authoritarianism and social identity theory literatures, with an eye towards a conceptualization of authoritarianism as a group-based construct wherein individuals utilize their latent needs for individual autonomy versus group conformity to make sense of their political surroundings. Then, I present my own theory regarding which overlapping social identities and cohesive organizational aspects of political parties should be particularly appealing to high authoritarians, taking a “content-free” approach, such that these traits should be differentially appealing across the authoritarian dimension independent of any ideological values or policy preferences associated with the parties.

In Chapter 3, I review the literature on partisan polarization in American politics, and detail the ideological, leadership cohesion, and demographic changes that occurred to the Democratic and Republican parties since the 1960’s. I then place my group-based conceptualization of authoritarianism against this political backdrop, and specify the full theoretical model of how individuals’ authoritarian dispositions have structured their partisan affiliations over the past few decades, and shape the affective and ideological nature of their party identities today. Finally, I detail the basic assumptions underlying the theoretical model and its core predictions regarding the past and present nature of mass partisanship.

Chapter 4 empirically tests the group-based authoritarianism construct in which individuals differentially perceive, across the authoritarian dimension, that their political party

identities possess strong internal leadership cohesion and increased overlapping social group memberships. Across three different studies which utilize a nationally representative random digit-dial telephone sample, a non-probability internet sample, and an undergraduate student convenience sample, I demonstrate that authoritarianism predicts how individuals *perceive* 1) their social groups as possessing more overlapping members; 2) their party identity as reflecting a “convergent” partisan identity that encompasses the members of their other social in-groups; and 3) their in-party as characterized by strong, internally cohesive leadership, and members who all share the same belief systems. Further, given the contrasting demographic stereotypes of the Democratic and Republican parties, I examine any asymmetry in the effects of authoritarianism on perceptions of a convergent party identity across the two parties.

In Chapter 5, I turn from a micro-level depiction of how authoritarian dispositions shaped individuals’ party perceptions, to an examination of the macro-level political environments that influenced the relationship between authoritarianism and Republican Party identification over the past four decades. Particularly, I explore two distinct party elite mechanisms, ideological polarization and demographic diversification, and how they allowed citizens to link their authoritarian dispositions to their party identities since the 1970’s. First, I examine how the ideological extremity, within-party voting cohesion, and demographic composition of party elites *conditioned* the effects of individuals’ authoritarian dispositions on their party identities. Second, I demonstrate that demographic, social identity changes among party elites, rather than party elites’ increased voting cohesion or ideological polarization (per Hetherington & Weiler 2009), catalyzed authoritarianism as a predictor of mass party identity. I accomplish these goals by analyzing longitudinal party-level shifts hierarchally matched to individual-level public opinion data from the General Social Survey (GSS) cumulative file (1973-2012), thus modeling the dynamic relationship between authoritarian dispositions and party identification preferences in the mass public.

I finally turn, in Chapter 6, to an examination of the downstream effects of my theoretical model on political polarization in contemporary American politics. Again using a nationally-representative RDD telephone survey, and web-based surveys with non-probability internet and undergraduate student samples, I explore how authoritarianism, both directly and working through the mechanism of cohesive, overlapping partisan identity perceptions, lead to affective (i.e. intense in-party attachments and in-party versus out-party feeling thermometer differentials), cognitive (i.e. acknowledged differences in what the two parties want government to do), and ideological polarization (i.e. attitude extremity in social, economic, and national security preferences). Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the dissertation.

Chapter 2

Authoritarianism & Social Identity Theory: A Group-based Framework

Individuals do not form their party attachments, cultural worldviews, or ideological belief systems in a political vacuum. Nor do they simply assimilate the values that their environment imposes upon them, as if they were blank slates void of any pre-existing inclinations. When exposed to their political environment, individuals equipped with socially motivated predispositions towards autonomy, ambiguity, order, security, conformity, and uniformity – defined as *authoritarianism* (see Jost et al. 2003, Feldman 2003, Hetherington & Weiler 2009) – form group-based attachments and social identities. Any cultural worldviews and belief systems which citizens espouse, in turn, should reflect an interactive process between bottom-up factors such as personality dispositions (i.e. authoritarianism) and group attachments (i.e. social identities), as well as top-down influences from trusted in-group members such as party elites (see Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, and Lupia 1994, Lupia, McCubbins & Popkin 2000 for examples).

While authoritarianism has been conceptualized as a set of personality-driven social values (Duckitt & Fisher 2003, Sibley & Duckitt 2008) and measured as an innate predisposition for submission to a legitimate authoritative entity that upholds the social order (see Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005), extant literature on the topic has failed to explain *how* authoritarians determine which authorities they submit to, and which social orders they strive to defend. From the perspective that authoritarianism predicts strong in-group attachments (Duckitt 1989), and embodies an innate desire to establish and maintain some sense of social conformity and uniformity (Stenner 2005), it is evident that authoritarianism represents a “groupiness” trait. However, this literature remains agnostic as to *which* social groups high authoritarians submit themselves to; leaving some ambiguity as to the structural aspects of social groups that are most appealing towards authoritarians’ epistemic needs for order, certainty, and security, and how such group traits can influence the nature of authoritarian submission.

Building on earlier work that describes authoritarianism in group-based, rather than individual-level, terms (see Duckitt 1989, Duckitt & Fisher 2003), I too take the position that social group attachments are integral to the manifestation of authoritarian belief systems, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies. However, I also suggest that certain structural attributes of social groups (such as cohesiveness and overlapping memberships) make them differentially appealing to authoritarians. As such, high authoritarians should affiliate with political parties not on the basis of ideology or issue positions, but on the type of normative social order (see Wrong 1994, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005) the group identity provides.

Throughout this chapter, I review the extant literature on the authoritarian disposition, with an eye towards a conceptualization of this trait as a group-based construct which individuals utilize to form social identities, and make sense of their political surroundings. Additionally, by reviewing the social psychology literature on social identity theory (particularly that of Tajfel & Turner 1979, and Roccas & Brewer 2002), I can place this personality disposition within a broader theoretical framework that explains why individuals, across the authoritarian dimension,

are differentially prone towards certain types of in-group attachments. Taken together, I form the core theoretical predictions of the group-based authoritarianism construct, namely the structural features of political parties that should be appealing to authoritarians *regardless* of the ideological and cultural worldviews espoused by that party's elites.

2.1 The Authoritarian Disposition

In the sixty years since the concept of authoritarianism was first introduced by Adorno and colleagues (1950) as a generalized explanation of the psychological underpinnings of ethnocentrism, political psychologists have empirically tested and theoretically refined the dimensions of this personality predisposition. Stemming from this body of research, scholars have identified a variety of cognitive and motivational correlates that have come to characterize the authoritarian disposition including: epistemic needs for order, security, and closure; intolerance for confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty; and increased reliance on established authorities to provide a stable social order (Jost et al. 2003, Feldman 2003, Kruglanski & Webster 1996, Hetherington & Weiler 2009). In its present treatment, authoritarianism, simply stated, is conceived as individuals' latent predispositions towards maintaining social order (i.e. a stable pattern of interactions among members of society, see Wrong 1994), in which motives for individual rights are pitted against desires to maintain the well-being of society as a whole (Feldman 2003). Along these lines, Duckitt (2001) subcategorizes this dispositional trait into the dimensions of authoritarianism (desire to maintain coercive social control), conservatism (drive to maintain existing status quo), and traditionalism (expression of morality values). These dimensions are similar to Altemeyer's (1988) three clusters of attitudes – authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conformity, which have been since reconstructed as a continuum from individual autonomy and group conformity (Feldman 2003).

This conceptualization along the autonomy—conformity continuum considers people's orientations towards society as interactions between their latent dispositions and social threat perceptions (Feldman & Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). This view encompasses Altemeyer's (1988) aggression, conventionalism, and submission clusters concurrently with environmental factors that embody authoritarians' fears that stable patterns of interactions among members in a society will break down, resulting in large-scale social disorder (Feldman 2003, Wrong 1994). With these components, Stenner (2005) thus defines the authoritarian dimension as “an individual predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other,” where the characteristic attitudes of authoritarianism emerge in the presence of normative threats. Given the dynamic between personality traits and environmental threats, Sibley & Duckitt (2008, Duckitt & Sibley 2009, see also Duckitt 2001) also treat authoritarianism as a social attitude that emerges from this individual and contextual interaction. Overall, these conceptualizations of authoritarianism place the unit of analysis at the individual, rather than the group level.

Believing the individual-level approach to authoritarianism to be reductionist and inadequate to address key group phenomena, such as prejudice and ethnocentrism, Duckitt (1989) provided an alternate framework in which the three authoritarian clusters (see Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003) directly stem from group processes. As such, he defined authoritarianism as “simply the individual or group’s conception of the relationship which should exist . . . between the group and its individual members.” (Duckitt 1989, pg. 71) From his perspective, authoritarian dispositions reflect the *intensity* with which individuals emotionally identify with a given social group. Relating this definition to the autonomy—conformity construct, as individuals become more committed to their social group, they will subvert all individual-level needs and values as completely as possible to the cohesion of the group. Authoritarian submission, aggression, and conformity are thus reflections of strong in-group attachments.

While Duckitt’s (1989) theory enhances the autonomy—conformity interpretation of authoritarianism with the linkage to group identities, it possesses an inherent flaw. Primarily, he ignores the fact that strong social identities are not exclusively held by high authoritarians, such that individual-level autonomy and group attachment are not mutually exclusive constructs⁵. Thus, Duckitt’s (1989) explanation fails to account for people who possess strong in-group affiliations to groups which are characterized by tolerance of ambiguity and openness to new experiences. Other *structural features* of social groups must, therefore, predict authoritarians’ strong attachments. By utilizing social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer 2007), and social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer 2002), I identify the structural group features differentially appealing across the authoritarian dimension. Exploration of these group features will, in turn, reveal the underlying nature of authoritarians’ social identities, as well as the group-level processes by which they manifest their submission and conformity.

2.2 Authoritarianism’s Role in Social Identity Formation

Humans are social creatures who, over millennia, have formed groups to serve a variety of necessary functions. As individuals interact with these groups, they form a social identity or “that part of an individuals’ self-concept derived from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to this membership.” (Tajfel 1981, p. 255) In their seminal work on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979, Tajfel 1982), Tajfel and Turner present two big ideas regarding individuals’ social preferences. The first, cognitively-based aspect, known as self-categorization theory (see Turner et al. 1987), posits that people routinely categorize themselves as members of myriad social groups, and can be made aware of these categorizations. The second, motivational aspect of social identity postulates that individuals strive for a positive self-concept and in the process

⁵ However, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, high authoritarians do, on average, possess stronger in-group attachments to their political party than low authoritarians.

utilize favorable connotations of their social in-groups, coupled with negative connotations of their out-groups, in order to bolster their self-esteem. This motivational process further contains an emotional component in which people feel a sense of closeness to their in-groups (see Mason, Huddy & Aaroe 2011, for an example).

Given the cognitive, motivational, and emotional aspects of social identities, some debate has occurred regarding their exact functional nature. Some have suggested that group identity provides safety (Brewer & Caporael 2006, Brewer 2007); while others view their main function as serving self-esteem (Brown 2000). When applying authoritarianism to social identities, I believe that authoritarians' derive security in the face of social threats *and* positive self-esteem relative to non-conformist, or non-traditional, out-groups from their social identity. Furthermore, each of the three aspects of social identity (cognitive, motivational, and emotional) relates to specific facets of the authoritarian disposition. For instance, cognitive categorization in a group should minimize ambiguity, whereas the motivational and emotional attachments to in-groups should promulgate authoritarian submission. By examining the relationship between social identity features and authoritarians' needs for order, certainty, security, submission, and conformity, I can predict which social (and political) groups will be most appealing to them.

Social identities exist across a continuum of varying strength, impacted by both innate predispositions (such as the epistemic needs related to authoritarianism) and environmental contexts (see Huddy 2001). Especially as they pertain to broader categories such as political identities, "identity formation cannot be simply explained by the salience of a group designation." (Huddy 2001, pg. 130) Conceptualization of social identity should consider group choice, subjective meaning, strength gradations of attachment, and stability. As such, linkages between authoritarians and their social identities should be examined *subjectively* – how do authoritarians perceive their "social context" when forming group attachments and how does this perception resonate with their epistemic needs for order, security, and certainty.

While the notion of "social context" is ambiguous by nature, for my current purposes I define it as the available social groups (and more specifically the political parties) to which an individual can form an attachment with at a given point in time. Given a discrete set of political groups (i.e. Republicans and Democrats), authoritarians must choose to invest their self-identity with the one that is perceived to best service their needs for order, security, and certainty. Yet, individuals regularly encounter competing social identities (for example, a female lawyer could categorize herself as a mother or as a corporate professional, two distinct roles for women), and must navigate through various group memberships in order to form a coherent sense of self. As social groups (and political parties) vary in terms of their inclusivity, permeability, cohesion, and membership similarity, cognitive categorization trade-offs may be necessary. With their intolerance for ambiguity, authoritarians should perceive strict rather than flexible boundaries between group categorizations, leading to a narrow, black and white view of their "social context."

In addition to this more concrete cognitive style, authoritarians' subjective perceptions of their "social context" are motivated by their strong needs for security. Threats to the authoritarian's social order are, in actuality, threats to her positive self-concept and the safety gained through possessing that group categorization (i.e., the two functions of social identity see also Tajfel & Turner 1979). Thus, authoritarians are attracted to groups that require conformity from its members in order to induce a sense of collective security, and which strive to secure their place in the hierarchal status of society (Duckitt & Fisher 2003). Stronger identities with

these groups, in turn, serve as effective coping mechanisms against external social threats (Haslam & Reicher 2006, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002).


Authoritarians, thus, should select their social identities upon the structural traits of available groups. This “match” between social identity and authoritarian dispositions should be constituted on the key structural aspects of social groups that bolster the authoritarian’s sense of stability, distinctiveness, and security in a hierarchal society. As such, these structures include: tight group cohesion, strong central leadership, and overlapping membership similarities across multiple social in-groups. High authoritarians should be attracted to the political party perceived to exhibit these three traits in order for them to form *singular* social identities that encompasses both their social and political lives.

A political group’s cohesiveness impacts its appeal to authoritarians, especially as it relates to providing distinctiveness and security from out-groups. In her optimal distinctiveness theory, Brewer (2007, Brewer & Caporael 2006) states that individuals form group affiliations on the basis of competing needs for group assimilation on one hand, and individual differentiation on the other. While individuals desire group belonging, membership in highly inclusive and open groups will undermine self-distinctiveness. Alternatively, cohesive groups with strong leadership allow for individual-level assimilation while simultaneously providing distinct group-level self-conceptualizations. As this conceptualization of competing epistemic motives behind group attachments coincide with the autonomy—conformity continuum of the authoritarian dimension (see Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005), it is clear that for individuals holding more authoritarian dispositions, they should perceive highly cohesive political groups as a source of social meaning and stability, and as a collective coping response to external normative order threats (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). Thus, to maintain group-level distinctiveness, as a form of stable social order and security from external threats, authoritarians should be attracted to political groups that appear more cohesive.

The second structural feature of political parties relevant to authoritarians is their overlapping group identities, as described by social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer 2002, Brewer & Pierce 2005, Miller et al. 2009). An individual’s social identity complexity refers to the subjective representation of multiple salient in-group identities (e.g. church membership, ethnicity) as having varying degrees of overlapping group prototypes and membership (e.g. all Christians are White; and all Whites are Christian). Those who perceive a high overlap across group memberships possess a social identity in which “different in-groups are actually conceived as a single *convergent* social identity.” (Roccas & Brewer 2002, pg. 95) Contrastingly, those whose group memberships represent myriad prototypes that share little in common will be said to possess a *complex* social identity. As depicted in Figure 2.1., a white, urban, female with a complex social identity should acknowledge all three of these identities, but in a way that assumes that not all females are white or urban, or all whites are urban or female, etc. (see left side). On the other hand, if this same white, urban, female held a convergent social identity, she would conceptualize all females, whites, and urban dwellers as one and the same social entity, with no differentiation between these groups (see right side of Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Graphical Representation of Overlapping Social Identities

Panel 1: Complex Social Identity (Left) & Convergent Social Identity (Right)



Importantly, this subjective conception of overlapping group membership is a function of an individual's motivational needs for certainty and their cognitive complexity to mentally integrate various group representations (see Tetlock 1983). The antecedents of social identity complexity – operationalized by need for closure and uncertainty orientation (Roccas & Brewer 2002) and need for cognition (Miller et al. 2009) – encompass an individual's predilection to form a clear-cut representation of her social world. When an individual is epistemically uncomfortable with ambiguity and confusion, she will compartmentalize her social identity into a *convergent singular* identity that represents the intersection of her multiple group memberships. Given their needs for certainty, cognitive closure, and intolerance of ambiguity, authoritarians should therefore view their social identity as more convergent than low authoritarians.

Additionally, Roccas & Brewer (2002) discovered that induced threat led to increased perceptions of in-groups being more similar to each other. Their results indicated that certain types of negative affect, like stressful mood or anxiety, depleted the cognitive resources necessary to process and integrate more complex and inclusive group memberships. Such findings reflect similar work done on induced threat, information processing, and need for cognitive closure in authoritarians (see Lavine et al. 2002, Lavine et al. 2005, Thorisdottir & Jost 2011). In a synergistic fashion, as authoritarians perceive greater social threat, their multiple group identities should converge upon a social identity with intense group cohesion and conformity.

Combined, this line of work suggests that authoritarians should possess a *singular* social identity that mutually reinforces their core self-conceptualization and fully represents their associations with their political and social environments. Because so much of one's projected self-concept and sense of security is embedded within this converged identity; these group attachments are, by necessity, strong and unwavering. Relating back to Duckitt's (1989) model of group-based authoritarianism, the intense group affiliations that drive authoritarian submission and conformity are in fact by-products of the cohesiveness and convergence of the authoritarian's singular identity.

2.3 Core predictions of Group-based Authoritarianism

As reviewed above, there are three key structural aspects of social and political groups which correspond to authoritarian dispositions. These characteristics are appealing to authoritarians independent of any ideological considerations regarding the values or belief systems of the group, making them content free and thus primary. I postulate that the subjectively perceived primary features of social groups include:

1. Cohesive groups with exclusive group boundaries which are non-permeable and unambiguous, reflecting authoritarians' intolerance of ambiguity, preferences towards viewing the world in black and white terms, and needs for order and conformity.
2. Clearly defined strong internal leadership that exerts tight control over group members, making authoritarian submission readily available and providing security to group members.
3. Highly convergent groups with overlapping members (i.e., low social identity complexity), reflecting the need for cognitive closure and intolerance of ambiguity.

In contrast, secondary traits are accepted as a by-product of group attachment, and are typically value-laden with regards to the cultural worldviews espoused by the group's legitimate authority figures. These traits can be identified as the following:

1. Norms that delineate a sense of right and wrong, and provide guidance on "correct" behavior, including group-based belief systems (e.g. moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, individualism, etc.).
2. Left-right ideological placement and specific issue preferences.
3. Specific leaders designated as legitimate group-based authorities.

Needs for conformity lead authoritarians to accept these secondary traits along with group affiliation, and defend them as they would their core social identity. The groups encompassing an individual's social identity, in turn, become the social object to which authoritarians submit and conform. Any appointed leadership within these groups serves as legitimate authority figures, and any core cultural beliefs espoused by these groups becomes the authoritarians' highly defensible worldviews. This occurs, by necessity, for high authoritarians who not only need to bolster their ego through in-group positivity (Tajfel & Turner 1979), but who also need to fulfill their epistemic needs for order, certainty, and security (see Jost et al 2003). Through this group-based perspective of authoritarianism, justification of the social order embraced by the convergent political group identity is in reality a justification of one's self identity.


When authoritarians embrace cultural worldviews associated with a political group possessing these primary structural traits, social norms and belief systems may differ across high authoritarians in different countries and time periods. For instance, research examining the

ideological flavor of authoritarianism in the former Soviet Union has provided some empirical support for this claim. MacFarland and colleagues (1992) found that “as late as June 1991 authoritarianism in the Soviet Union was largely wedded to Marxist-Leninism and opposition to capitalism.” (MacFarland et al. 1992, pg. 1006) During a time of political turmoil and rebirth in the former Soviet Union, those with higher authoritarian dispositions were more prone to embracing the old social order even if that order entailed left-leaning, egalitarian economic policies. Additionally, when comparing high authoritarians in the United States to those living in the Soviet Union, the authors found asymmetric correlations on distributive justice norms. Authoritarians in the United States revealed a strong negative correlation for equality, but a positive correlation for individualism; whereas the reverse was true in the Soviet Union – equality was *positively* related, and individualism *negatively* correlated with authoritarianism. Thus, cross-culturally authoritarians can be attracted to political groups that maintain a concrete social order, independent of those groups’ ideological leanings and the beliefs inherent in that social order.

Given the primacy of these structural characteristics, I can extend the dynamics of this group-based authoritarianism conceptualization to the understanding of American party identity as a social identity (Tajfel & Turner 1979, see also Nicholson 2012, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002, Huddy, Mason & Aaore 2013), and how such an identity has the potential to galvanize mass political polarization. From the perspective of overlapping group identities, the Democratic and Republican parties have the ability to become “convergent” party identities for citizens that encompass their myriad social in-groups (see Figure 2.2). Take, for example, a stereotypical Democrat, portrayed in the media as an “agnostic, professional, urban northern female.” (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, pg. 4) Her Democratic “convergent” party identity would entail a perception that the Democratic Party included all of these different social groups, and that *all* females, agnostics, urban professionals, and Northerners were also Democrats. In this case, she would be strongly attached to the Democratic Party, because her sense of positive self-identity (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and security in a stable social order (Brewer 2007, Feldman 2003), is entirely tied into her identity as a Democrat (see Figure 2.2 right side). On the other hand, if this same Democrat possessed a more *complex* partisan identity (see Figure 2.2 left side), she would recognize that the Democratic Party also includes men, non-professionals, and Southerners; and that some women, professionals, northerners, and even agnostics are Republican. Knowing that not all aspects of her social identity are indelibly linked to the Democratic Party, her identity as a Democrat would be weaker. As authoritarian dispositions lead to a more “convergent” partisan identity, this identity, in turn, should intensify group affiliations (Duckitt 1989) that embody the “fundamental and overwhelming desire to establish and defend *some* collective order of oneness and sameness.” (Stenner 2005)

Figure 2.2 Graphical Representations of Convergent Party Identities

Panel 2: *Complex Partisan Identity (Left) & Convergent Partisan Identity (Right)*



As significant changes occurred among American political parties' organizational structures, leadership cohesiveness, and demographic compositions over the past few decades (which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter), it is possible that current partisan sorting and ideological polarization on "culture war" issues may in fact be derived from the differential attractiveness of the parties' structural and social identity traits along the authoritarian dimension. As such, I turn to an exploration of the implications of this group-based conceptualization of authoritarianism, wherein citizens utilize their social identities to make sense of their political world, on recent American partisan polarization in the context of the "culture war." From this perspective, I will provide an alternate, and more ultimate, ideologically uncontaminated explanation for the mounting partisan cleavages seen in mass politics.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Model of Group-Based Authoritarianism in American Politics

3.1 Ideological Activation of Authoritarianism in American Politics

Since the 1960's, party leaders began adopting positions on newly salient cultural and moral issues (e.g. civil rights, abortion, gay rights; see Carmines & Stimson 1989), leading to a shift in partisan conflict from the economic to the social domain known as the "culture war" (see Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Ellis & Stimson 2012). Citizens subsequently updated their perceptions of the Democratic and Republican parties on the basis of elites' stances on these social issues (Carmines & Stimson 1986, 1989), leading to a large-scale partisan sorting along the left-right ideological spectrum (Fiorina & Levendusky 2006, Levendusky 2009). Beyond partisan sorting, scholars have shown that contemporary American politics reflects intense partisan and ideological conflict at the mass level (see Abramowitz & Saunders 2008, Abramowitz 2010, Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, Jacobson 2008, Hetherington 2001) because it is characterized by fundamental worldview and motivational differences between citizens rooted at the psychological level, specifically, individual differences in *authoritarian dispositions* (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Hetherington & Suhay 2011). As such, "differences in policy preferences on some of the key issues go far beyond disagreements over policy choices and even ideology, to conflict about core self-understandings of what it means to be a good person and to the basis of a good society." (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, pg. 11)

Along these lines, recent theoretical and empirical work has suggested that political attitudes and identities in the mass public are meaningfully associated with personality dispositions (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway 2003, Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). Of these myriad personality traits, authoritarianism has re-emerged as an important predisposition relevant to the comprehension of current American political conflict. In its present treatment, this construct is conceptualized as a continuum of innate predispositions where, at one end, individuals express preferences towards individual autonomy, and at the other, preferences towards group conformity and uniformity (Feldman 2003, Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005). Those at the latter end of the scale, classified typically as possessing authoritarian dispositions, are characterized by epistemic needs for order, certainty, and security; rigid cognitive styles that reflect concrete, black and white interpretations (rather than nuanced, ambiguous interpretations) of complex social problems; and reliance upon established authorities to provide order in the face of potential threats to social cohesion (Jost et al. 2003, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009).

A common theme emerging from this literature details a "functional link" between authoritarian dispositions and preferences for conservative political orientations (Jost et al. 2003,

Jost, Federico & Napier 2009). The underlying logic of this motivated social cognition approach holds that conservative worldviews satisfy the chronic goals related to the conventionalism dimension of authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1988), as they embody adherence to long-standing institutions of stability and predictability in the social world (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Duckitt & Sibley 2009, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013). Conservative worldviews motivated by authoritarian dispositions include disciplinarian parenting and its relationship to individualism and self-reported conservative ideology (Lakoff 1996, Barker & Tinnick 2006), traditional moral values and opposition to egalitarianism (Federico, Fisher & Deason 2011), and support for specific policy preferences in contemporary social (Hetherington & Weiler 2009), economic (Johnston 2013, Johnston & Wronski 2013) and foreign policy issues (Hetherington & Suhay 2011).

Most notably, this disposition has taken center stage in the political polarization debate, branded as the root cause of affective polarization in the American public (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). With the advent of “culture war” issues relating to racial and gender differences, civil liberties, moral traditionalism, and responses to terrorism, Hetherington & Weiler (2009) argued that party elites became increasingly divergent in their approaches to these salient social issues, with the Republican Party regularly espousing conservative positions that tapped into authoritarians’ epistemic needs for order, security, and social cohesion. These partisan ideological divides led to a sorting process along the authoritarian dimension, such that those identifying as Democrat were less authoritarian than those identifying as Republican. Taking this perspective a step further, authoritarianism has been shown to influence citizens’ party identities as politically engaged citizens translate the symbolic imagery of Republicans’ conservative social values into identification preferences (Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013). Overall, this literature treats authoritarianism as a predictor of partisan sorting, with the relationship between such dispositions and party identification formed on the basis of functional ideological matches related to core values of morality, traditionalism, and masculinity (Barker & Tinnick 2006, Hetherington & Weiler 2009).

3.2 Authoritarian Dispositions as Social Identities

From its inception, though, research on authoritarianism has focused on this disposition’s intergroup aspects, such as prejudice and ethnocentrism (Adorno et al. 1950), and the underlying personality clusters, including submission, aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer 1988), which lead to attitudes of generalized out-group and minority intolerance (Duckitt 2001). Using both political (RWA scale, see Altemeyer 1988) and social (child rearing scale, see Feldman 2003) measures, authoritarian dispositions consistently predict expressed intolerance towards socially “deviant” outsiders, such as ethnic or religious minority groups (see Stenner 2005). Beyond individual attitudes towards various social group members, authoritarianism influences how social groups collectively bind together in society. Duckitt (1989), in fact, defines

authoritarianism as a group-level construct wherein authoritarian dispositions reflect the intensity with which individuals emotionally identify with a given social group. Stenner (2005), largely agreeing with Duckitt's (1989) conceptualization, argues, however, that intense group identifications are consequences, rather than antecedents, of authoritarianism. She instead proposes that authoritarian dispositions embody a desire "to transfer sovereignty to, and commit self and others to conformity with *some* collective order, rather than intense identification with a *particular* group." (Stenner 2005, pg. 141)

Like Stenner (2005), I too conceptualize authoritarian dispositions in these group level terms, and believe that this "groupiness" approach to authoritarianism, which has been largely ignored in the current political science treatment, can further inform the relationship between authoritarian dispositions and party identification preferences in current U.S. politics. In particular, I propose that authoritarianism embodies an innate desire for homogeneity and aversion towards diversity among one's social groups that individuals utilize when making sense of their party identities. While Stenner (2005) suggests that authoritarians seek to minimize the diversity of people, beliefs, and behaviors with which one is confronted, I emphasize the social identity (or "people") aspects of authoritarian group attachment. Authoritarian dispositions, given their connections with cognitive rigidity, distaste for ambiguity, and lack of openness (Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009), should guide an individual to view her party identity as a singular, superordinate social group that cohesively, and *exclusively*, encompasses her other social identities (see Roccas & Brewer 2002, Miller et al. 2009).

Specifically, those higher in authoritarianism should perceive their partisan identity as cohesively containing *only* their in-group members, and excluding all outsiders, particularly established social out-group members. Conversely, those lower in authoritarianism should also perceive that their partisan identity reflects their other social identities, but in a nuanced way that allows for social diversity within their party, and the inclusion of out-group members. In this way, authoritarian dispositions guide the extent to which citizens' view their own party in social identity theory's "us versus them" terms (see Tajfel & Turner 1979), thus integrating latent intolerance towards diverse (and non-traditional) social groups into the act of party affiliation. This present approach, as such, posits that the match between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party identifications rest in their social identities, providing an alternative, and perhaps more fundamental, mechanism by which authoritarian dispositions have colored the partisan divide in American politics.

Yet, authoritarian dispositions do not produce attitudinal or behavioral outcomes, such as party identification, in isolation. Rather, the emergence of authoritarianism is a dynamic process, triggered by environmental threats to the normative order (Feldman 2003, Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Duckitt & Fisher 2003). Such "normative threats," simply stated, are systemic social changes that undermine the common oneness and sameness that makes "us" an "us" (Stenner 2005). Applied to mass partisanship, normative threats can occur when an individual's in-party represents diverse social groups and non-traditional authority figures, such that these outside groups are perceived as infiltrating the system, turning "us" into "them." Put another way, if authoritarians perceive their party identity as a cohesive and exclusive "superordinate social group within which social and political authority is vested," (Duckitt 1989, pg. 80) then the presence of party elites from diverse gender, ethnic, and religious backgrounds (e.g. women, African-Americans, Latinos, and non-Protestants for White Protestants) should activate authoritarian intolerance and call into question the legitimacy of that party's authority. Thus, when facing such normative threats to party leadership, individuals' authoritarian

dispositions should lead them to dissociate with the party comprised of diverse outsiders and affiliate with the party that homogeneously represents their social identities.

3.3 Ideology, Leadership Organization and Social Identity among Party Elites

American politics scholars agree that political parties have resurged over the past forty years, now reflecting powerful national organizations (Epstein 1986) that solve collective action problems of political elites (Aldrich 2011), and provide psychological identity attachments in the electorate (Campbell et al. 196, Green, Palmquist & Shickler 2002). This resurgence is usually discussed in tandem with reforms to party leadership (Rohde 1991), the presence of increased party-line voting (Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007), and the ideological repositioning of party elites relating to Southern realignment (Sundquist 1983). With parties playing a more prominent role in the national political landscape, clearer perceptions of the parties have emerged in the electorate (Fiorina & Levedusky 2006, Levedusky 2009, 2010, Aldrich 2011, Baumer & Gold 2007, 2010) at least in terms of the parties ideological and demographic stereotypes (see Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011). It is within this context of predominant parties, that possess stronger, more cohesive leadership structures, then, that I suggest two potential shifts among party elites' – ideological polarization (per Hetherington & Weiler 2009) and demographic diversification – which may have triggered the “normative threat” necessary to animate authoritarian dispositions in the mass public.

In the case of the former, as party elites have ideologically converged with their co-partisans on an array of salient social and economic issues over the past few decades, each party as a whole appeared more ideologically extreme and polarized from the other side. Scholars have typically depicted this process of elite polarization through revealed ideological preferences (DW Nominate scores, see Poole & Rosenthal 1997, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005), and increased within-party unity in Congressional voting (Party Unity scores, see Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007). Most often cited as the cause of these recent elite shifts is the “issue evolution” of the social domain (Carmines & Stimson 1986, 1989), where issues relating to the “culture war” (e.g. gay marriage, abortion), civil rights (e.g. voting rights for African-Americans and equal rights for women), and civil liberties (e.g. government wire-tapping) became permanent fixtures of political discourse and policy-making. As a result, the Democratic and Republican parties today provide clear heuristic cues to the mass public regarding the values and policy positions embodied by the “Democrat” or “Republican” label (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Zaller 1992, Lau & Redlawsk 2001), allowing citizens to “sort” themselves into the party that best reflects their ideological beliefs (Levedusky 2009, 2010). Beyond partisan sorting, elites' polarization has activated partisan divisions at the mass level (Abramowitz & Saunders 1998, 2008, Abramowitz 2010), particularly along the authoritarian dimension such that these ideological cues from elites formed functional matches with citizens' authoritarian dispositions (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009 for details).

But parties have transformed in other, non-ideological, ways since the “issue evolution” of the social domain. As Conservative Southern Democrats realigned themselves with the Republican Party, new reforms swept through the House leading to resurgence in party strength and unity (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995). The most visible of these reforms were related to committee chairmanship, moving the House leadership away from the seniority system to appointed party leaders (Rohde 1991). The goal of such reforms was to protect the interests of the party majority in the House. This *conditional party government* allowed majority leaders to advance the party’s goals when there was widespread party agreement on important matters (Rohde 1991). Congressional party leaders have since successfully corralled their rank and file members on key legislation initiatives, and have consequently established an unprecedented level of party discipline. Thus, increased within-party voting unity (see Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007, Carson, Koger, Lebo & Young 2010) reflected not just ideological agreement on legislation, but *organizational* attributes of strong internal leadership that reinforced solidarity and group-level conformity to overarching political agendas, allowing citizens to infer such structural traits to their in-parties.

More notably, the Democratic and Republican parties have changed over the past decades where each party’s members (both in the leadership and the electorate) now represent specific demographic and social groups within American society. To this point, a burgeoning line of research has demonstrated that elite demographic changes impacted micro level party identity processes, with citizens increasingly thinking about their party identity as a social identity (Huddy, Mason & Aaroe 2013, Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012, Mason 2013) that encompasses their gender, ethnic, religious, and other group affiliations (see Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). Utilizing social identity theory (see Tajfel & Turner 1979), these scholars have found that citizens today perceive more commonalities between their partisan identity and their other salient social identities (Mason 2013), which in turn augments within party support and between party hatred (Nicholson 2012, Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012, Mason 2014). Particularly relevant to partisan polarization are racial (Giles & Hertz 1994, Tesler & Sears 2010) and religious identity sorting processes⁶ (Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt & Green 2006, Layman 1997, 2001, Abramowitz & Saunders 2008, Abramowitz 2010, Ellis & Stimson 2012), demonstrating that these social identities provide powerful heuristic cues which are utilized in mass partisan sorting.


Such social identity sorting phenomena have emerged in the electorate, I believe, as individuals from groups not traditionally affiliated with the political arena (i.e. women, African Americans, Latinos, non-Protestant Christians) have increasingly been elected to national political offices. Yet, as depicted in Figure 3.1, demographic diversification of elites occurred heterogeneously across the parties. On one hand, Republican elites have consistently reflected White, Male, Protestant Christians, with 70% or more of Republican Senators holding this demographic profile since the 1970’s. In contrast, the Democratic Party has diversified – its percentage of White, Male, Protestant Christian Senators dropped precipitously in the 1990’s and 2000’s. Of particular importance is the 1992 election as a critical year in this process (the lateral line in the graph, also referred to as “the year of the woman⁷” and the year in which Pat Buchanan announced the “culture war” at the Republican National Convention). Prior to that election year both parties were diversifying at about the same rate. However, after the 1992

⁶ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/20/how-race-and-religion-have-polarized-american-voters/>

⁷ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/13/electing-more-women-to-congress-isnt-a-solution-for-polarization/>

election, the Democrats elected many more “diverse” Senators, while the Republican elites remained relatively socially homogeneous as White, Male, Protestant Christians⁸. These varying demographic compositions, in turn, offered a clear sense to voters of *who* their party represented – “us” or “them” – with such social identity distinctions providing the “normative order threat” that would trigger authoritarianism as a predictor of mass party identification (Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005).

Figure 3.1. Party Elites’ Social Identity Composition



Additionally, as party leaders pandered to their base constituencies rather than median independent voters (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011), party sorting also better reflected citizens’ social identities (Mason 2013, 2014). Partisanship today coincides with class, geography, cosmopolitanism, and religion more so than at any other time in recent history (Edsall & Edsall 1991, Black 2004, see Mason 2014 for full review). Any map of county-level vote results from recent presidential elections reveals a similar pattern – densely populated urban areas and the coasts are blue; rural areas in Mid-West and Southern states are red. Even in “purple” swing states like Ohio, the dichotomous identities are apparent – metropolitan areas of Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus are blotches of blue dispersed in an otherwise sea of red. While these stereotypes only represent a small cohort of party activists, the news media fixated on these singular identity characteristics and thus provided citizens with readily available partisan member stereotypes (see Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011), that were utilized when making electoral choices (Lau & Redlawsk 2001; 2006).

Consequently, the two parties, as they exist today, provide fundamentally different organizational structures, and demographically represent a dichotomy between social homogeneity and social diversity. Stereotypically, the Republican Party embraced strong leadership and organizational cohesion norms with a black and white cognitive style and Protestant Christian (particularly the religious right, see Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011; Ellis & Stimson 2012) religious members; while the Democratic Party has been publicly depicted as

⁸ Supplemental descriptive analyses by region reveal that this trend of Democratic diversification occurred nationally, and was not a phenomenon tied directly to Southern realignment.

nuanced, logical thinkers lacking organizational cohesion and accepting different walks of life (see Westen 2007). With these representations, the Republican Party's primary organizational traits could easily appeal to authoritarians' needs for order, certainty, and security (see Jost et al. 2003), and its converging identities across ethnic, gender, and religious grounds could appease authoritarians' intolerance of ambiguity (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Roccas & Brewer 2002). As these partisan characteristics were habitually portrayed in the news media, anyone paying modest attention to politics could utilize such party stereotypes as a heuristic cue when constituting the "match" between their latent authoritarian dispositions and their party affiliations.


3.4 Theoretical Model of Group-Based Authoritarianism

Given this dichotomy between ideological and social identity influences in American politics, which is the contextual mechanism that fundamentally links individuals' authoritarian dispositions to their party identities? Currently, the literature suggests that it is the ideological polarization of elites, particularly on social issues related to the "culture war," which has linked authoritarianism to party identities (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009). I, however, suggest that it is the social identities represented by the parties – in terms of their social diversity or homogeneity – that link authoritarianism to party identity. As the two parties changed over the past forty years in ways that reflected both ideological sorting (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005, Levendusky 2009, Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011) and identity-based sorting (Abramowitz 2010, Mason 2013), the latter's presence indicates that citizens' could have sorted themselves into the two parties along the authoritarian dimension based on social identity matches, that, at first glance, look like ideologically motivated behaviors.

Yet, as authoritarianism fundamentally comprises innate needs to maintain a group-based "oneness and sameness" (Stenner 2005) and intolerance towards outside groups (Altemeyer 1988, Duckitt 2001), social identities should serve as the mechanism that provides the functional link between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their partisan identities. With social identities as the catalyzing mechanism of authoritarian-driven partisanship, there can be occasions when authoritarians may have affiliated with the party of the left. Further, ideological sorting along the authoritarian dimension could serve as a secondary effect of individuals' maintenance of belief systems that bound together a demographically homogeneous party as a cohesive, singular entity. Thus, I argue that the true causal mechanism of authoritarian-driven partisan polarization endemic of the "culture war" rests in the *fundamental structure of group identities* represented by the two parties (i.e. leadership-driven party cohesion and overlapping identities as discussed in Chapter 2) which are differentially appealing to citizens across the authoritarian dimension.

As such, the first part of my theoretical model postulates that the social identities represented by the parties – in terms of their social diversity or homogeneity – link authoritarianism to mass party identity. In this way, the individual-level dispositions citizens bring with them to the process of party affiliation are *conditioned* by the amount of in-group similarity and cohesion represented by each party. This theoretical pathway from authoritarianism to mass party identity outcomes is depicted in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2. Theoretical Pathway from Authoritarian Dispositions to Party Identities



Through the discussion in Chapter 2, I delineated certain party structures of cohesion and overlapping memberships as composing the key dynamic of group-based authoritarianism. As authoritarianism structures citizens’ partisan identities through the mediating effects of the parties’ demographic and leadership traits, strong authoritarian dispositions should ultimately yield a qualitatively different type of partisan attachment – one in which citizens’ partisanship resembles sports fanships (Mason 2014, Mason 2013) – that taps into the party identity’s importance, appropriateness, and inclusiveness (Huddy, Mason & Aaroe, 2010, 2013, Huddy & Khatib 2007).

This kind of party identity as a social identity, and its related large-scale sorting processes, should produce an emotional intensification which drives long-standing political in-group attachments (Campbell et al 1960, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002), political behaviors (Huddy, Mason & Aaroe 2013), and partisan polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). For instance, an individual who cognitively conceptualizes her social identities in such rigid, cohesive terms, with a controlling leadership structure that aligns all members’ values into one uniform entity, all of her psychological eggs are in one basket when it comes to maintaining her positive self-concept (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Ultimately, through such a “convergent” party identity, authoritarian dispositions can be linked to downstream phenomena of affectively charged partisan polarization (see Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012), and ideological preference divisions (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). These secondary effects of the group-based authoritarian dynamic hold innate importance across the authoritarian dimension, as these political attitudes and behaviors should preserve authoritarians’ sense of order and security by reinforcing the distinctiveness of their singular social identity.


When authoritarians submit to party leaders and conform to their ideologies, these cultural worldviews become the political glue that hold the singular identity together, creating the basis by which these citizens exhibit positive self-esteem (see Tajfel & Turner 1979) and

uphold a “correct” social order (see Wrong 1994, Feldman 2003). As such, these accepted cultural worldviews provide authoritarians with a moral superiority that bolsters their self-concept relative to the social attitudes of more tolerant and ambiguous political groups. For instance, Republican authoritarians who interweave their Protestant Christian religiosity and partisanship into a coherent superordinate identity (see also, Ellis & Stimson 2012, Abramowitz 2012, Mason 2013) should find cultural moral issues of utmost importance because these issues fundamentally protect the distinctiveness of the singular identity. The same pattern should hold in regards to national security policy issues related to the war on terrorism which, by their very nature, speak to authoritarians’ latent needs to preserve order and security in the face of perceive threats to the normative social order (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Hetherington & Suhay 2011, Feldman 2003, Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005). Authoritarianism, therefore, should directly and indirectly, through the convergent party identity, structure national security public opinion preferences, as these issues should resonate greatly with authoritarians’ epistemic needs to maintain a social and political order of “oneness and sameness” wherein all group members conform to the collective order, regardless of what that order ideologically entails (see Stenner 2005). Therefore, issue positions related to the core singular identity – the principled ideologies that give the convergent partisan identity its distinctiveness from other competing political and social groups in America – should be immutable, because they underlie the positive self-concept and security of the coalesced social identity, and represent a strong direct link from authoritarianism to these core values (see Federico & Goren 2009, Jost, Federico & Napier 2009).

In contrast, given the two-dimensional nature of mass ideology (Feldman & Johnston 2014), issue domains orthogonal to the singular partisan identity, and thus not critical to its positive distinctiveness in American society, can be updated via political exposure to party leaders. Again, for example, Republican authoritarians who have formed a singular identity wherein their religious and political identities overlap should have no problems updating their economic issue preferences to match the positions of Republican leaders. Recent evidence supports this dynamic by showing that authoritarian dispositions are related to more conservative economic policy stances, but only in the presence of elite cues (Johnston & Wronski 2013). Thus, in this domain, authoritarians’ attitudes may be easily manipulated by the party leaders to whom authoritarians submit, such that individuals’ links between their authoritarian dispositions and their economic issue preferences may be masked in observational data, and only emerging when experimentally manipulating elite issue frames (per Johnston & Wronski 2013).

Given the aforementioned core political group structures (i.e. cohesion, strong leadership, overlapping memberships), affective party attachments and polarization in current American politics should reflect the mediational pathway depicted in Figure 3.3. As citizens “match” their latent dispositions on the authoritarian continuum to political parties that reflect their social in-groups and organizational traits that satiate needs for certainty, order and security (see Figure 3.2), their partisan identities transform into “convergent” party identities on the basis of these core structural traits. Working through perceptions of “convergent” party identities, citizens’ authoritarian dispositions then lead to downstream effects of affective in-party attachments, perceptions of greater between party distance, emotionally laden in-party favorability and out-party hostility, and, ultimately, ideological extremity on salient issues in the social, economic, and national security domains.

Figure 3.3. Theoretical Pathway Linking Authoritarianism to Political Behaviors



Taken together, this theoretical approach accounts for the underlying psychological and contextual mechanisms of authoritarian-driven polarization, providing a richer understanding of how party identities and mass polarization have developed in American politics over recent decades. Furthermore, this theoretical model holds important normative implications regarding the future of ideological polarization as the two parties must respond to an increasingly socially diverse population in the electorate.

3.5 Theoretical Model Assumptions

It is important to note that the basic theoretical model above holds two broad assumptions regarding citizens: 1) they are at least moderately aware of politics, and 2) high authoritarians maintain a constant level of perceived social threat. In regards to the first assumption, a modicum of political attention is necessary to correctly perceive heuristic cores relating to the core organizational structures and demographic memberships of the two parties, and to receive elites' issue position preferences (see Zaller 1992). However, years of research of has shown that wholesale political knowledge among citizens is the exception, not the rule (Converse 1964, Zaller 1992, Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). As such, it is possible for politically uninterested authoritarians, without firsthand knowledge of the leadership cohesion and specific demographic backgrounds of the party's elected officials, to form political attachments based on relevant economic concerns (see Fiorina & Abrams 2008) rather than social identity sorting processes. Though, given the symbolic nature of the parties' demographic stereotypes and the "easiness" of issues in the social domain related to these salient social identities (e.g. abortion, gay marriage, civil rights; see Johnston & Wronski 2013), this political awareness assumption is quite achievable, even in a generally political apathetic populace.

The model's second assumption incorporates the contextual dynamic in which authoritarian dispositions are triggered in the presence of "normative order" threats (Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Suhay 2011). When examining authoritarianism from a group-based perspective, pertinent "normative order" threats are defined those that undermine the singular party identity's group status and distinctiveness (the two group functions that provide authoritarians with positive self-concept and security), or, simply put, that undermine the oneness and sameness of the collective political group. Where Hetherington & Suhay (2011) find threat induction (in the form of being subject to a terrorist attack) to affect low, but not high, authoritarians' national security and "war on terrorism" opinions, I attest that, in the absence of such direct physical threat in a general observational survey measures, authoritarians are more sensitive to social order threats due to their "convergent" party identity. I believe that such perceived normative order threats exist in the current political landscape due to the parties' leadership and structural realignments starting in the 1960's on the basis of social identity status changes. Particularly, as the Democratic Party brought in more women and minority members into their fold, from a social identity perspective, this political group morphed from "us" to "them" in the eyes of White Protestant Christian citizens, thus constituting for them the constant level of threat needed to trigger authoritarian political reactions.

As such, the theoretical model of group-based authoritarianism, as it is presented in the present dissertation, is a story about White citizens rather than all citizens. Looking back over the past fifty years, as the United States promoted equal rights policies containing egalitarian norms (the same collection of issues that Hetherington & Weiler (2009) cluster with authoritarianism), I believe that White authoritarians, and specifically White Protestant Christians authoritarians, perceived social threats from competing groups that were placed on equal footing and impinged on their social distinctiveness. Much of American history has featured White male Protestant Christians in positions of political power, with women and religious/ethnic minorities drawn into the electoral fold within the past century, and only beginning to hold elected office in the past few decades. Authoritarians could view such shifts as fundamentally threatening to the hierarchal status of their social identity (Brown 2000, Scheepers & Ellemers 2005), thus triggering authoritarian reactions akin to in-group threat (Stellmacher & Petzel 2005).

Given this theoretical model and its underlying assumptions, I propose the following general hypotheses relating the group-based authoritarianism construct. First, authoritarians should be attracted to social and political groups on the primary basis of the groups' leadership, cohesiveness, and overlapping membership traits, such that authoritarians will define their partisan identity as having such traits. Next, the authoritarian-driven partisan sorting of the past few decades should reflect leadership changes and membership diversification within the two parties such that the Republican Party became more appealing to high authoritarians looking to maintain the security and positive self-concept of their singular social identity. Of particular importance, and contrary to the conventional wisdom that a Republican Party right-shift on salient "culture war" social issues triggered authoritarian-based sorting (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013), I suggest that it was the demographic diversification of the *Democratic Party* that activated authoritarianism as a predictor of mass party identity. Finally, as a result of these "convergent" party identity perceptions and authoritarian-driven social identity sorting processes, authoritarianism, by working through the "convergent" party identity mechanism, should lead to affective and ideological polarization outcomes. The following three chapters will, in turn, empirically address each of these overarching hypotheses.

Chapter 4

Party Identity Perceptions across the Authoritarian Dimension

Building upon social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer 2002), individuals high in authoritarianism, due to their innate needs to submit to an authoritative entity and maintain a sense of group “oneness and sameness” (Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005), should attach themselves to political parties on the basis of the following core group structures: tight cohesion embodied by party leadership, and overlapping social identities of party members. As such, to what extent do individuals *perceive* their in-party as possessing these traits differentially across the authoritarian dimension? How does authoritarianism influence citizens’ perceptions of their party identity as “convergent,” superordinate social identity that encompasses all members of an individual’s salient social groups into a singular in-group entity? Further, given the contrasting demographic stereotypes of the Democratic and Republican parties discussed earlier (see also Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011), to what extent are the effects of authoritarianism on perceptions of a “convergent” party identity heterogeneous across members of the two parties?

The goal of this chapter is to answer these questions by testing the core assumption that authoritarianism is a group-based construct that differentially predicts citizens’ perceptions of their social and political group identities. Across three different studies, each with a unique sample, I demonstrate that authoritarianism influences how individuals *perceive* that 1) their social groups possess more overlapping members; 2) their party identity reflects a “convergent” partisan identity that encompasses the members of their other social in-groups; and 3) their in-party is best characterized by strong, internally cohesive leadership, and members who all share the same belief systems. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals higher in authoritarianism will perceive increased overlapping social identities among their salient in-groups.

H2: Individuals higher in authoritarianism will be more likely to perceive a “convergent” partisan identity.

H2a: This effect will be conditional upon which party individuals affiliate with, such that Republican high authoritarians, but Democratic low authoritarians, will exhibit a greater “convergent” partisan identity.

H3: Individuals higher in authoritarianism will be more likely to characterize their in-party as having members who all share similar beliefs, and possessing a strong internal leadership structure.

4.1 Methods

Random Digit Dial Telephone Respondents. The first study was conducted through a nation-wide random digit dial (RDD) phone survey. Households were contacted from September 4 - October 10, 2012, and again from June 10, 2013 - February 11, 2014 with a total of 370 adults (232 in the first wave, 138 in the second wave) participating in the survey. Even though this sample was generated through a random sampling of landline phone numbers from across the continental United States, it reflected an older demographic (mean = 58.7 years old, sd = 15.7 years). Further, the majority of respondents were female (57.84%), White (81.62%), Protestant Christian (47.03%), and middle class (49.46%) – see Table 4.1 for details. Most respondents identified with one of the two major parties, and were relatively split between the Democratic and Republican identification (Republicans = 45.27%, Democrats = 43.20%, Independents = 11.54%). Ideologically, however, this sample was more Conservative with 37.43% of respondents self-identifying as at least leaning Conservative on a social issues (compared to 34.80% identifying as Moderate and 27.78% as at least Liberal-leaning). Despite wave 1 being conducted in the midst of a Presidential campaign season, there were no significant differences in partisan identity strength (as calculated through the folded 7-point party identity scale) between respondents across the two waves. In fact, respondents from the non-campaign 2013-14 wave revealed greater partisan attachments (mean = 0.661, sd = 0.341 on a 0-1 scale) than those in the 2012 campaign wave (mean = 0.621, sd = 0.36 on a 0-1 scale)⁹. Given these similar demographic compositions across the two waves, they were combined into one sample for subsequent analyses.

⁹ Items on political knowledge or interest were not included in this study, so partisan strength serves as a proxy for political engagement in this sample.

Table 4.1. RDD Telephone Sample Demographic Breakdown

N		Wave 1 (Fall 2012)	Wave 2 (2013-2014)	Total Sample
		232	138	370
Gender				
	Male	40.52%	44.93%	42.16%
	Female	59.48%	55.07%	57.84%
Ethnicity				
	White	80.60%	83.33%	81.62%
	African-American	7.76%	5.8%	7.03%
	Hispanic	2.59%	1.45%	2.16%
Religious Affiliation				
	Secular	14.66%	11.59%	13.51%
	Protestant Christian	47.41%	46.38%	47.03%
	Catholic	19.83%	18.84%	19.46%
	Another Religion	11.21%	15.22%	12.70%
Age				
	18-34 years old	9.91%	5.07%	8.11%
	35-64 years old	50.00%	44.93%	48.11%
	65+ years old	40.09%	50.00%	43.78%
States Most Represented				
	North East	18.53%	21.74%	19.73%
	Midwest	28.02%	23.19%	26.22%
	South	34.91%	39.86%	36.76%
	West	18.53%	15.22%	17.30%
Community Type				
	Large City	12.5%	9.42%	11.35%
	Small City/Town	31.47%	33.33%	32.16%
	Suburban	31.9%	25.36%	29.46%
	Rural	24.14%	31.88%	27.03%
Social Class				
	Lower Class	10.34%	7.25%	9.19%
	Working Class	34.48%	38.41%	35.95%
	Middle Class	49.14%	50.00%	49.46%
	Upper Class	2.59%	3.62%	2.97%
Party Identity				
	Democrat	43.75%	42.11%	43.20%
	Republican	43.75%	48.25%	45.27%
	Independent	12.5%	9.65%	11.54%
Ideology				
	Liberal	29.6%	24.37%	27.78%
	Conservative	37.67%	36.97%	37.43%
	Moderate	32.74%	38.66%	34.80%

BackPage and Mturk Respondents. The second study utilized a two-pronged recruitment strategy to gather respondents from non-probability internet samples. The first relied upon advertisements through the online classifieds website BackPage.com (similar in nature to Craigslist.com) for individuals to participate in a 15-minute online survey in exchange for an opportunity to win one of three \$50 Amazon.com gift cards. Through BackPage.com, I recruited respondents nationally, attracting participants from 407 cities of various sizes across all four major U.S. census regions. During the recruitment period of July 10 - September 25, 2013, 236 individuals began the survey, which was conducted using the Qualtrics online platform, with a total of 188 respondents completing the survey for an 80% completion rate. However, 3 partial completes were able to be salvaged in the sample since those respondents completed the survey through the authoritarianism item battery. Of these 191 respondents, 9 were eliminated from the sample due to inattentiveness¹⁰, resulting in a usable sample of 182 respondents.

The second sample was collected using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk platform, where workers were offered a payment of \$0.50 to complete a 15-minute online survey. Through Mechanical Turk, I recruited workers with a HIT Approval Rate greater than or equal to 90%¹¹ from across the United States only, attracting participants from all four major U.S. census regions. During the recruitment period of August 20, 2013, 614 individuals began the survey, which was conducted using the Qualtrics online platform, with a total of 577 respondents completing the survey for a 94% completion rate. However, 25 partial completes were able to be salvaged in the sample since those respondents completed the survey through the authoritarianism item battery. Of these 602 respondents, 30 were eliminated from the sample due to inattentiveness¹², resulting in a usable sample of 572 respondents.

Demographically, the combined sample is fairly diverse, yet representative of typical non-probability internet samples (see Berinsky et al. 2012). Across a variety of demographic characteristics, including religious affiliation, geographic location, and social class, BackPage.com and Mechanical Turk respondents shared similar distributions (see Table 4.2). Therefore, I combined them for the purposes of simplifying analyses producing a total N of 754 (N= 182 or 24% from BackPage.com, and N = 572 or 76% from Mturk). Respondents were more likely to be male (54.64%) and white (71.88%), but the sample also included other ethnicities including African-Americans (7.82%), Hispanics (7.29%) and Asian-Americans (8.89%). This sample was younger than the general population, with 66.45% of respondents under the age of 35, and better educated than the U.S. population as a whole with 50.53% of respondents having at least a bachelor's degree. Politically, respondents were decidedly more liberal (65.78%) and

¹⁰ 4 respondents were dropped because they took less than 30 seconds to answer the most important 5 sections of the survey, and 2 respondents were dropped because they answered the screener question incorrectly and spent less than 1 minute to answer the most important 5 sections of the survey. Of those who completed the survey, 101 answered the screener question correctly (about 54%), but the correlation between answering the screener question correctly and time spent on the survey was $r = .113$ (not significant at $p < .05$), indicating that ability to correctly maneuver such questions does not necessarily reflect attentive engagement with the survey materials among these individuals. Finally, 3 respondents who had duplicate IP addresses were dropped.

¹¹ Berinsky et al (2012) suggest that attentiveness is not an issue with a 95% HIT Approval Rate.

¹² 18 respondents were dropped because they answered the screener question incorrectly. Of those who completed the survey, 584 answered the screener question correctly (about 97%), and the correlation between answering the screener question correctly and time spent on the survey was $r = 0.003$ (not significant at $p < .05$), indicating that Mturkers are quite proficient at answer screening questions regardless of how much time they spend on the survey instrument. 12 respondents who had duplicate IP addresses were also dropped from the sample.

Democrat-leaning (65.12%) than the country as a whole. Interestingly, this sample was highly secular with half of respondents (48.81%) stating they were either atheist or had no religious affiliation.

Table 4.2. Non-Probability Internet Sample Demographic Breakdown

	BackPage.com	Mechanical Turk	Total Sample
N	182	572	754
Gender			
Male	42.31%	58.57%	54.64%
Female	57.69%	41.43%	45.36%
Ethnicity			
White	60.44%	75.52%	71.88%
African-American	16.48%	5.07%	7.82%
Hispanic	8.79%	6.82%	7.29%
Asian/Pacific Islander	6.04%	9.79%	8.89%
Religious Affiliation			
Secular	36.81%	52.62%	48.81%
Protestant Christian	25.82%	20.10%	21.49%
Catholic	18.13%	14.86%	15.65%
Age			
18-34 years old	61.54%	68.01%	66.45%
35-50 years old	24.73%	19.76%	20.95%
51+ years old	13.74%	12.23%	12.6%
Region			
West Coast	18.68%	19.93%	19.63
Midwest	24.73%	22.03%	22.68%
South	15.93%	24.83%	22.68%
East Coast	29.12%	24.13%	25.33%
Community Type			
Large City	55.49%	23.60%	31.30%
Small City/Town	20.33%	31.82%	29.05%
Suburban	19.78%	32.34%	29.31%
Rural	4.40%	12.24%	10.34%
Social Class			
Lower Class	14.84%	11.36%	12.20%
Working Class	33.52%	38.11%	37.00%
Middle Class	47.80%	49.13%	48.81%
Upper Class	3.85%	1.40%	1.99%
Party Identity			
Democrat	64.84%	65.21%	65.12%
Republican	18.67%	20.80%	20.29%
Independent	16.48%	13.99%	14.59%
Ideology			
Liberal	65.93%	65.73%	65.78%
Conservative	15.93%	19.41%	18.57%
Moderate	18.13%	14.86%	15.65%

Undergraduate Subject Pool Respondents. The sample for the third study was garnered as part of an experiment on the ideological perceptions of party factions, in which subjects responded to a variety of items regarding their perceptions of overlapping party and social group members, authoritarian dispositions, and demographic backgrounds. These subjects were recruited from Stony Brook University's Political Science undergraduate subject pool, and were told that would participate in a 30-minute online study in exchange for course extra credit. During the study period, November 26 - December 7, 2013, 223 individuals began the survey, which was conducted using the Qualtrics online platform, with a total of 211 respondents completing the survey for a 94.62% completion rate. Of these 211 participants, 94 were designated as inattentive¹³, resulting in an "attentive" sample of 117 participants. However, as there were no statistically significant differences between these two groups in their level of political interest, partisan affiliations, ideological self-placements, or mean authoritarianism, I utilize the full sample of 211 participants for the current analyses.

Demographically, participants reflected the general characteristics of an undergraduate student sample from a North East public university. Ethnically, the sample was quite diverse with 42% White, 8% African-American, 8% Hispanic, 27% Asian-American, and 13% Indian. Participants were almost exclusively young, with 98.58% falling into the 18-34 year old category. Politically, respondents were decidedly more liberal (60.19%) and Democrat-leaning (64.45%) than the country as a whole. Similar to the non-probability internet samples, this sample was highly secular with 32.7% stating they were either atheist or had no religious affiliation, yet it also represented a sizable portion of Muslims (10.9%) due to the large number of Asian and Indian participants.

¹³ 48 participants were dropped because they took less than 20 seconds to read the first manipulation text of the study (the minimum amount of time needed to read the text), thus indicating that they were not paying attention to the study materials. Another 45 participants were dropped for taking less than 20 seconds to read second key manipulation text (the minimum amount of time needed to read the text), indicating that they were also not paying attention to the study materials. Finally, 1 participant was dropped because he/she went idle during the first manipulation text, indicating that he/she was not paying attention to the study materials. It should be noted that those participants who identified as pure independents did not receive any of the manipulation texts, therefore this attentiveness check could not be made on them (though this should not matter since the main analyses here are with partisans only).

Table 4.3. Undergraduate Student Sample Demographic Breakdown

	Non-Attentive	Attentive	Total Sample
N	94	117	211
Gender			
Male	46.81%	52.14%	49.76%
Female	53.19%	47.86%	50.24%
Ethnicity			
White	37.23%	46.15%	42.18%
African-American	10.64%	5.98%	8.06%
Hispanic	6.38%	9.4%	8.06%
Asian/Pacific Islander	30.85%	23.93%	27.01%
Indian/Southwest Asian	11.7%	13.68%	12.8%
Religious Affiliation			
Secular	23.4%	40.17%	32.7%
Protestant Christian	12.77%	13.68%	13.27%
Catholic	30.85%	24.79%	27.49%
Muslim	11.7%	10.26%	10.9%
Party Identity			
Democrat	68.09%	61.54%	64.45%
Republican	30.85%	17.09%	23.22%
Independent	1.06%	21.37%	12.32%
Ideology			
Liberal	58.51%	61.54%	60.19%
Conservative	17.02%	15.38%	16.11%
Moderate	24.47%	23.08%	23.7%

Authoritarianism. Serving as the main independent variable, four items operationalized the construct of authoritarianism across all three studies. Consistent with recent work (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Stenner 2005), authoritarianism was measured by asking respondents to make four pairwise comparisons of values, and to indicate which value in each pair they considered more important for a child to possess. The comparisons included, “Independent or Respect for Elders,” “Curiosity or Good Manners,” “Obedience or Self-Reliance,” and “Considerate or Well-Behaved.”

These items were scaled together and recoded from 0 to 1 such that higher values indicate more authoritarian dispositions. In the RDD sample, authoritarianism was well distributed across the full range of the scale ($\alpha = 0.64$, $\text{mean} = .547$, $\text{sd} = .343$)¹⁴. There emerged, however, heterogeneity in the distribution of authoritarian dispositions across Republicans and Democrats that reflects current perspectives (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009), with the level of authoritarianism significantly greater among Republicans ($\text{mean} = .582$, $\text{sd} = .32$) than among Democrats ($\text{mean} = .506$, $\text{sd} = .368$) at the $p < .05$ level of significance. In contrast, in the non-probability internet sample the authoritarianism scale ($\alpha = 0.68$) was skewed such that the majority of respondents fell on the lower end of the scale ($\text{mean} = 0.331$, $\text{sd} = .33$), with this

¹⁴ There were no significant differences in the mean level of authoritarianism displayed in respondents across waves 1 and 2.

skew particularly prominent among Democrats (mean = 0.285, sd = .323)¹⁵, an unsurprising distribution given the young, highly educated, and secular composition of this sample. Finally among the undergraduate student sample, which was also young and highly educated, the authoritarianism scale (alpha = 0.458) was skewed such that participants mostly fell on the lower end of the scale (mean = 0.411, sd = .29), particularly among Democrats (mean = 0.382, sd = .295)¹⁶.

Overlapping Social Identities. To capture the amount of perceived overlap across salient social identities in the RDD telephone survey, I utilized a 6-item battery developed from social identity complexity theory (see Roccas & Brewer 2002, Miller et al 2009) that assessed respondents' subjective impressions of the extent of overlap in membership between each of their five self-reported social in-groups. The salient social groups in this measure included: neighborhood type (e.g. large city, suburban, etc.), social class (e.g. working class, middle class, etc.), religious affiliation (e.g. Christian, Jewish, etc.), race (e.g. White, African-American, etc.), and gender. For each item, respondents were asked to estimate how many people who belonged to one social group (e.g. neighborhood type) also belonged to another (e.g. social class), on a 5-point scale from "none" to "almost all." For instance, a self-reported White, Christian respondent would be asked: "Of people who are *Christian*, how many of them would you say are also *White*?" In this manner, the six items compared memberships between: 1) neighborhood type and religious affiliation; 2) neighborhood type and race; 3) social class and religious affiliation; 4) social class and race; 5) religious affiliation and gender; and 6) religious affiliation and race (see Appendix A for the text of all items). All six items were scaled together to form the *Overlapping Identities* dependent variable for hypothesis 1 (alpha = .715), and coded 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater perceived membership overlap across the five salient social groups (mean = .597, sd = .147).

However, this measure of overlapping social identities implicitly assumed that the demographic in-groups included in the battery were in fact each respondent's most important in-groups. As such, the overlapping identities perceptions captured in the RDD sample may not reflect respondents true perceptions of their most salient group identities. This measurement construct issue was corrected in the non-probability internet study by asking respondents to respond to a battery of seven items asking about their social in-groups. First respondents were given the prompt: "People are members of many different social groups. These social groups can be made up of people who share the same religious affiliation, ethnicity, gender, age, social class, geographic region, or type of community. The responses you just gave to the background questions are, in fact, the social groups you belong to." They were then asked to rank, from a list of their self-identified social in-groups, their personal attachment with each group from the most to least important group. These social groups included: community type (e.g. large city, suburban area, etc.), geographic region (e.g. Midwest, South, etc.), social class (e.g. working class, middle class, etc.), religious affiliation (e.g. Christian, Jewish, etc.), ethnicity (e.g. White, Black, etc.), age cohort (e.g. 18-34 years old, 65+ years old, etc.), and gender¹⁷. Of the seven social identities

¹⁵ Among Republicans, the mean of authoritarianism = .466, standard deviation = .319. There is a significant difference in the mean level of authoritarianism between Republicans and Democrats ($p < .01$). Mean authoritarianism between BackPage and Mturk respondents (0.394 and 0.311 respectively) is also significantly different at the $p < .01$ level.

¹⁶ Among Republicans, the mean of authoritarianism = .454, standard deviation = .3. There is a marginally significant difference in the mean level of authoritarianism between Republicans and Democrats ($p < .1$).

¹⁷ Distributions of these group identities are provided in Table 4.2.

included in the initial battery, the top four ranked group identities were operationalized as an individual's most salient social identities.

Similar to the RDD study, a 6-item battery developed from social identity complexity theory (see Roccas & Brewer 2002) assessed respondents' subjective impressions of the extent of overlap in membership across their four most salient social in-groups¹⁸. All six items were scaled together (alpha = 0.619), and coded 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater perceived membership overlap across the four most salient social groups (mean = 0.524, sd = 0.104). The mean of this overlapping identities variable was lower among Democrats than among Republicans (mean difference = 0.02, $p < .05$), and lower among Mturkers than among BackPage respondents (mean difference = 0.034, $p < .01$), though such small differences (on the 0-1 scale) do not appear substantively meaningful.

Convergent Party Identities. Serving as the main dependent variable for hypotheses 2 and 2a, the "convergent" partisan identity, defined earlier as the extent to which individuals perceive that members of their in-party overlap with members of their other salient social groups, was measured in the RDD telephone survey through two separate 5-point items that gauged the level of membership overlap between the Democratic and Republican parties and their other five "salient" social groups. Each item, based again on Roccas & Brewer (2002), asked respondents to rate "how many people who are members of the Democratic/Republican Party are also <pip> in respondent's social class, neighborhood type, religious affiliation, race, and gender.>" from "none" to "almost all." Since the convergent partisan identity variable concerns only the respondents' perceptions of their own *in-party*, responses from these two separate items are combined into the *Convergent Partisan Identity* variable such that Democratic Party perceptions were included for Democrats identifiers and Republican Party perceptions were included for Republican identifiers. Due to the nature of this coding, the *Convergent Partisan Identity* variable excludes respondents who identified themselves as pure independents (N=39), as perceived membership overlap with one's in-party would be theoretically meaningless for an individual who does not identify with either party. This merged variable was then rescaled from 0 to 1 (where 0 represents absolutely no overlap between members of the respondent's in-party and her other social groups, and 1 represents almost complete overlap between members of the respondent's in-party and her other social groups; mean = 0.552, sd = 0.23).

In order to glean more nuanced perceptions of the overlap between respondents' political and social group members, the non-probability internet study utilized a 5-item battery based upon Roccas & Brewer (2002). Respondents were provided with the following instructions: "Now think about the types of people who belong to your political party, like fellow Republicans or Democrats. For example, some people who belong to the same ethnicity also identify with the same political party. In this next section, we might ask 'How many people who are White are also Republican/Democrat?' If you think that almost ALL people who are White are also Republican/Democrat, then you would choose the 'almost all' option. If you think that NO people who are White are also Republican/Democrat, then you would choose the 'none' option." Because these comparisons solely captured how partisans perceived the demographic composition of their *own party*, Democrats were only asked about people who identified as Democrat, Republicans asked only about people who identified as Republican, and pure independents (N = 110) did not receive these questions.

Similar to the items used in the RDD phone survey, the convergent party identity battery asked respondents to estimate how many people who belonged to each of their four most salient

¹⁸ See Appendix A for text of all items.

social groups and shared the same ideological belief system also belonged to their in-party, on a 5-point scale from “none” to “almost all.” For instance, if a Republican respondent self-identified as a Conservative, and ranked her top four group identities as Christian, middle class, female, and White, she would be asked: “Of people who are *Conservative*, how many of them would you say are also *Republicans*?”, “Of people who are *Christian*, how many of them would you say are also *Republicans*?”, etc.¹⁹ These five-items were scaled together to form the convergent party identity variables for Democrats (alpha = 0.546) and Republicans (alpha = 0.552). Each scale was coded 0-1, where 0 represents absolutely no overlap between members of the respondent’s in-party and her other social groups, and 1 represents almost complete overlap between members of the respondent’s in-party and her other social groups (mean = 0.616, sd = 0.11 for Democrats; mean = 0.553, sd = 0.121 for Republicans)²⁰. These two scales were then combined and rescaled 0-1 to create the main dependent variable used in H2 and H2a, *Convergent Party Identity*, that reflects the amount of overlap Republican and Democrat identifiers perceive between their co-partisans and the members of their other salient social groups (mean = 0.601, sd = 0.116).

In order to disentangle any possible conflation between overlapping social group member perceptions and general party demographic knowledge, the undergraduate student study utilized a 5-item battery to capture the “convergent” party identity that flipped the question wording, such that participants were asked to estimate how many members of their in-party (i.e. fellow Republicans or fellow Democrats) were also members of their other salient social groups. While salient social identities were not explicitly measured in this protocol (as they were in the internet study) the top four social groups from the ranking task in the internet study were operationalized as the most salient social identities for this sample. As such, demographic information was gathered from participants regarding their: gender, age cohort, religious affiliation, and ethnicity. Ideological self-placement on a 7-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative was also used as a proxy for participants’ ideological in-group.

Participants were then asked to make subjective judgments about the amount of membership overlap between those identifying with their in-party and their social groups, on the same 5-point scale from “none” to “almost all”²¹. As in the internet study, Democrats were only asked about people who identified as Democrat, Republicans asked only about people who identified as Republican, and pure independents (N = 26) did not receive these questions. These five-items were scaled together to form convergent party identity variables for Democrats (alpha = 0.657) and Republicans (alpha = 0.389), on a scale from 0=absolutely no overlap between members of the respondent’s in-party and her other social groups, to 1=almost complete overlap between members of the respondent’s in-party and her other social groups (mean = 0.56, sd = 0.123 for Democrats; mean = 0.531, sd = 0.113 for Republicans)²². These two measures were then combined across participants from the two parties to create the *Convergent Party Identity* dependent variable (mean = 0.552, sd = 0.121).

¹⁹ See Appendix A for text of all items.

²⁰ The mean difference in the convergent party identity variables between Democrats and Republican (0.063, on the 0-1 scale) is significantly different at the $p < .01$ level.

²¹ The instructions text was exactly the same as was used in the internet study, and can be found in the Appendix A. See Appendix A for text of all items.

²² The mean difference in the convergent party identity variables between Democrats and Republicans (0.029, on the 0-1 scale) is marginally significantly at the $p < .1$ level.

Party Organizational Characteristics. In the RDD telephone survey and the non-probability internet study, respondents rated the Republican and Democratic parties on two traits that I expect to be appealing to authoritarians: 1) members who all share the same beliefs (*Party Same*) and 2) strong internal leadership with tight control over members (*Party Control*). The first of these dichotomous items asked: “Of the Democratic and Republican parties, which one do you feel has more members who all share the *same views and beliefs*,” while the second asked “which [party] do you feel is better characterized by *tight formal control* of its members, and a *strong internal leadership* structure.²³” For each item, respondents had to decide whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party best exemplified that particular organizational characteristic.

To create the two dependent variables that represented perceived *in-party* shared beliefs and tight, cohesive leadership, I transformed these variables in a similar fashion to the convergent partisan identity variables, such that the dichotomous choice was between in-party versus out-party, rather than between Democratic versus Republican Party. For instance, if a Democrat selected the Democratic Party as containing members who all share the same beliefs, the *Party Same* variable would be coded 1. In this way, the *Party Same* and *Party Control* variables were coded 1 if a respondent chose her in-party, and 0 if she chose her out-party. Due to this coding, respondents who identified as independents were excluded.

In general, most respondents in the RDD sample (77.21%) felt that their in-party members all shared the same beliefs, though this perception was more common among Republicans (78.6%) than Democrats (75.6%)²⁴. Contrastingly, most non-probability internet study respondents (61.94%) felt that members of the out-party, as opposed to their in-party, all shared the same values and beliefs, with this distribution again driven by a majority of Democrats (59.27%) and Republicans (56.86%) both stating that the Republican Party embodied this trait more so than the Democratic Party.

There was less of a ceiling effect for the *Party Control* variable, where only 60.15% of RDD respondents viewed their in-party’s leadership as holding tight formal control, with a significantly greater (at $p < .01$) proportion of Republicans (66.91%) holding these perceptions about their in-party’s leadership than Democrats (53.03%). Again, in contrast to the RDD sample, the majority of internet study respondents believed that their out-party had a stronger internal leadership structure (65.12%), though this outcome was driven by a majority of Democrats (66.8%) and Republicans (65.36%) both stating that the Republican Party embodied this trait more so than the Democratic Party.

Respondents in the internet study were also asked to select which party, the Republican or the Democratic Party, had “more members who represent a diversity of ethnic, religious, and economic backgrounds?”²⁵ The dichotomous dependent variable, *Party Diverse*, was then calculated by transforming these responses, such that 0=out-party represents most diversity, and 1=in-party represents most diversity. Respondents mostly perceived that their in-party comprised members from a diversity of ethnic, religious, and economic backgrounds (68.3%), though, again, this distribution resulted from almost all Democrats (97.5%) and a majority of Republicans (75.82%) thinking that the Democratic Party contains diverse members.

Party Identity and Controls. Across all three studies, *Party ID* was assessed with the standard question: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat,

²³ See Appendix A for text of all items.

²⁴ This difference between parties, however, is not significant.

²⁵ See Appendix A for full text of items.

an Independent, or what,” and the follow-up item “Would you call yourself a strong or not so strong Democrat/Republican” for partisans, and “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party,” for self-identified Independents. These items combined formed a 7-point scale, coded 0 to 1 such that 0 represents Strong Democrats and 1 represents Strong Republicans. As mentioned earlier, there were an equal amount of Republicans and Democrats in the RDD telephone sample, and a skew towards the Democratic Party in the non-probability internet (mean = 0.34, sd = 0.296) and undergraduate student samples (mean = 0.349, sd = 0.29). *Partisan Strength* was also calculated through these measures by folding the 7-point *Party ID* variable, and coding it such that 0 represents Pure Independents and 1 represents Strong Partisans (mean = .634, sd = .353 in RDD telephone sample; and mean = .58, sd = .34 in the non-probability internet sample).

Finally, I collected a series of individual-level control variables. The first of these, *Ideology*, was measured in the RDD survey through a 5-point item asking for respondents’ self-placement on social issues, scaled 0=very liberal to 1=very conservative (mean = .521, sd = .263), and assessed in the internet and undergraduate studies through a 7-point item asking for respondents’ self-placement on a general left-right scale where 0=very liberal, and 1=very conservative)²⁶. Next, respondents’ highest level of education in the RDD and internet samples was operationalized with the dummy variable, *College Degree*, where 1=obtained at least a Bachelor’s degree, and 0 otherwise). Respondents’ ages were measured with a continuous variable of respondents’ self-reported age rescaled from 0-1 in the RDD phone sample, and with an ordinal variable of respondents’ self-reported age cohort, coded such that 0=18-34 years old through 1=65+ years old, in the non-probability internet sample²⁷. In all three studies, I collected information on ethnicity (where 1=White and 0=non-White), and gender (male=1). From the undergraduate student study I also included dummy variables for Protestant Christian religious affiliation (1=Protestant, and 0=otherwise), and U.S. citizenship (1=U.S. citizen, 0=otherwise).

4.2 Results

Authoritarianism and Overlapping Social Identities

I first examine authoritarianism’s effect on increased perceptions of overlapping membership among the RDD survey respondents’ five salient social groups – social class, neighborhood type, religious affiliation, race, and gender; and among the non-probability internet

²⁶ Respondents who initially self-identified as moderates were given the follow-up item: “If you had to choose, would you consider yourself a LIBERAL or a CONSERVATIVE?” with the options: Liberal, Conservative, and Neither/Moderate. See Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for the ideological breakdown of the internet and undergraduate samples.

²⁷ As this study comprised undergraduate students within a few years in age of one another, I did not include age as a control for analyses with this sample.

sample respondents' top four ranked social groups. With these measures, I test hypothesis 1, that individuals higher in authoritarianism will perceive increased overlapping social identities among their salient in-groups, by estimating a series of ordinary least squares models with robust standard errors that regresses perceived overlapping social identities on authoritarianism and the controls described above. I also model the interaction between authoritarianism and party identity, as an exploratory analysis to discern whether authoritarianism affects overlapping social identities heterogeneously across Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.

Table 4.4. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Overlapping Social Identity

	Telephone Sample (All)		Internet Sample (All)		Internet Sample (Whites)	
	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)
Constant	0.405 (0.034)	0.385 (0.037)	0.513 (0.01)	0.506 (0.011)	0.494 (0.009)	0.49 (0.009)
Authoritarianism	0.052** (0.025)	0.088** (0.04)	0.052*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.02)	0.054*** (0.014)	0.067*** (0.022)
Party ID	-0.04 (0.028)	0.005 (0.039)	-0.02 (0.022)	0.002 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.028)
Authoritarianism * Party ID		-0.075 (0.063)		-0.052 (0.04)		-0.033 (0.042)
Ideology	0.09** (0.039)	0.086** (0.039)	0.052** (0.026)	0.05** (0.026)	0.044 (0.029)	0.043 (0.029)
College Degree	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.0004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
Age	0.168*** (0.037)	0.168*** (0.037)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.003 (0.016)	0.004 (0.016)
White	0.09*** (0.026)	0.094*** (0.027)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)		
Gender	-0.036 (0.015)	-0.038** (0.015)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)
R ²	0.187	0.191	0.0524	0.0547	0.0519	0.0531
N	313	313	754	754	542	542


where *** is $p < 0.01$ and ** is $p < 0.05$ on a two-tailed test

The estimates, shown in Table 4.4, support the hypothesized relationship between authoritarianism and overlapping social identities. When looking at the main effect of authoritarianism across individuals of all political persuasions, authoritarianism has a significant, positive effect ($\beta = 0.052$, $p < 0.05$ in the RDD sample; $\beta = 0.052$, $p < .01$ all internet respondents; $\beta = 0.054$, $p < .01$ White internet respondents only), indicating that respondents who were higher in authoritarianism perceived increased membership overlap between people who shared their neighborhood type, social class, religious affiliation, race, and gender in the telephone survey, or across their four most salient in-groups in the internet study. Additionally, with no significant interaction effects²⁸ between authoritarianism and party identity, individuals with greater authoritarian dispositions – be they Republicans, Democrats, or

²⁸ There is some heterogeneity in overlapping social identity perceptions across Democrats and Republicans, though it is not statistically significant, nor does it hold any substantive weight towards my theoretical argument. However, marginal graphs of predicted social identity overlap for Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans in each sample are provided in the Appendix C.

Independents – increasingly viewed their myriad social identities as more subjectively embedded in a singular in-group representation, creating for them a *convergent* social identity.

Figure 4.1. Predicted Amount of Social Identity Overlap across Authoritarianism



Bars represent 95% CI's

These effects are further illustrated through an examination of the predicted values of overlapping group memberships across the full spectrum of authoritarianism, when all control variables are set to their mean values (see Figure 4.1). In these two different studies, and across respondents representing the full political spectrum, individuals lowest in authoritarianism consistently, and significantly, perceived more nuance and complexity in their overlapping social group memberships than those highest in authoritarianism. When moving from individuals with the least to the most authoritarian dispositions, perceived social group overlap increased from 0.58 to 0.63 in the RDD sample (about 5% of the 0-1 scale); while these same singular in-group perceptions increased across the authoritarian dimension from 0.51 to 0.56 in the non-probability internet sample (also approximately 5% of the 0-1 scale). Despite the relatively modest effect sizes of authoritarianism on perceived overlapping identities, these results replicate across two vastly different samples, demonstrating that, as predicted in hypothesis 1, authoritarians possess proclivities towards viewing their social world in more concrete terms. Put another way, I provide empirical support for the theoretical assumption that authoritarianism is a group-based construct which structures how individuals make sense of their social world; wherein individuals higher in authoritarianism (perhaps due to their rigid cognitive style and aversion to ambiguity, see Jost et al. 2003, Roccas & Brewer 2002) view their social identities as one cohesive, convergent *singular* identity.

Authoritarianism and “Convergent” Partisan Identity

The relationship between authoritarianism and perceived similarity among social in-group members demonstrated above may not necessarily translate to individuals’ views of their partisan identities, where salient objective stereotypes of in-party member demographics may

color citizens' subjective perceptions of their co-partisans. I, thus, examine the direct and interactive effects of authoritarianism on respondents' views that their party identity is a "convergent" identity that inclusively incorporates the members of their other social groups into its fold. In accordance with hypotheses 2 and 2a, I expect that authoritarianism will have significant direct and interactive effects with party identity on perceiving a "convergent" partisan identity, such that Democratic-identifying respondents with low authoritarian dispositions will view the Democratic party as more encompassing of citizens who belong their other social in-groups (due to the party's demographic diversity stereotype), while, in contrast, Republican identifiers high in authoritarianism will view their fellow Republicans as reflecting their other in-group identities (due to the Republican Party's social homogeneity stereotype).

To test these hypotheses in the RDD telephone sample, I specified two ordered probit models with robust standard errors using Clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003) that estimate the effects of authoritarianism (first directly, then conditional upon *Party ID*), party identity, perceptions of overlapping social identities, and the specified controls, on the 5-point *Convergent Partisan Identity* variable. As I am interested in respondents' perceptions of the individuals who share their partisan affiliation, those identifying as pure independents are excluded from the following analyses.

Table 4.5. Ordered Probit Effects of Authoritarianism on "Convergent" Partisan Identity Perceptions (RDD Telephone Sample)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	SE	β	SE
Authoritarianism	0.131	0.238	-0.405	0.373
Party ID	-0.18	0.231	-0.663*	0.372
Authoritarianism*Party ID			1.11*	0.583
Ideology (Social Issues)	0.313	0.352	0.389	0.359
Overlapping Identities	2.252***	.616	2.355***	.623
College Degree	0.044	0.143	0.054	0.143
Age	1.249***	0.376	1.241***	0.374
White	-0.033	0.207	-0.115	0.222
Gender	0.072	0.141	0.127	0.141
Cut 1	0.278	0.406	0.014	0.411
Cut 2	1.326	0.393	1.087	0.399
Cut 3	2.75	0.413	2.526	0.416
Cut 4	3.858	0.425	3.632	0.421
Pseudo R2	0.076		0.082	
N	254		254	

where *** is $p < 0.01$, and * is $p < 0.1$ on a two-tailed test; excludes pure independents

Ordered probit estimates (see Table 4.5) provide some initial support for hypotheses 2 and 2a. The coefficient for authoritarianism in model 1 has absolutely no effect on respondents' perceptions of a "convergent" partisan identity ($\beta = 0.131$, n.s), suggesting that authoritarian dispositions do not influence respondents' perceptions of their partisan identity, as they do more general social identities, thus failing to support hypothesis 2. However, the non-significant main effect of authoritarianism on perceptions of a convergent party identity in model 1 reflects a

cancelling-out of heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism across varying party affiliations (as showed in model 2)²⁹. Thus, in the interactive model, the constituent term for authoritarianism represents the effect of this variable among strong Democrats, and is negative ($\beta = -0.405$, n.s.). The interaction term, in contrast, is positive and marginally significant ($\beta = 1.11$, $p < .1$), indicating that, as respondents identified less with the Democratic Party and more with the Republican Party, authoritarian dispositions increasingly led to greater perceptions of a “convergent” partisan identity. Further, in both models, *Overlapping Identities* (the dependent variable in hypothesis 1) has a positive, significant effect, such that respondents who viewed their *social* identities in a singular fashion, were also inclined to view their in-party in those same concrete terms.

In order to examine these dynamics in the internet and undergraduate samples, which operationalize the “convergent” party identity using a continuous, interval level scale, I specify a series of OLS models with robust standard errors that regress the amount of perceived member overlap across respondents’ in-party, ideological in-group (i.e. Liberals, Moderates, or Conservatives), and four most salient groups on authoritarianism, party identity, the interaction of authoritarianism and party identity, and the controls discussed earlier.

Table 4.6. Effects of Authoritarianism on “Convergent” Partisan Identities (Non-Probability Internet Sample)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	0.661	0.013	0.635	0.011	0.633	0.014	0.594	0.011
Authoritarianism	-0.043**	0.021	-0.074**	0.023	-0.017	0.022	-0.049**	0.024
Party ID	-0.108**	0.032	<i>-0.065*</i>	0.036	-0.083**	0.031	-0.024	0.035
Authoritarianism*PartyID	0.139**	0.047	0.177**	0.048	0.101**	0.048	0.144**	0.048
Ideology	<i>-0.047</i>	0.028	-0.067**	0.034	<i>-0.054</i>	0.031	-0.105**	0.036
Age	-0.020	0.017	-0.012	0.018	-0.024	0.019	-0.013	0.020
Gender	<i>0.017</i>	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.021**	0.010	0.012	0.010
College Degree	-0.003	0.009	-0.001	0.010	-0.007	0.009	-0.006	0.010
White	-0.024**	0.011			-0.042**	0.011		
N	644		458		644		458	
R ²	0.092		0.067		0.099		0.066	

Model 1 = all respondents with ideological identity; model 2 = whites only with ideological identity; model 3 = all respondents without ideological identity; model 4 = whites only without ideological identity.

** where $p < .05$ and * where $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

²⁹ Both models were run without the overlapping social identities control variable, and neither authoritarianism nor its interaction with party identity, were significant.

Table 4.7. Effects of Authoritarianism on “Convergent” Partisan Identities (Undergraduate Student Sample)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	0.569**	0.029	0.586**	0.026	0.528**	0.030	0.545**	0.027
Authoritarianism	-0.038	0.047	-0.081	0.072	-0.021	0.048	-0.092	0.062
Party ID	-0.142**	0.044	-0.076	0.069	-0.142**	0.046	-0.060	0.060
Authoritarianism*PartyID	0.097	0.086	0.216*	0.117	0.063	0.092	0.218**	0.108
Ideology	0.021	0.057	0.011	0.067	0.057	0.054	0.017	0.056
Protestant Christian	0.008	0.026	0.042	0.032	0.010	0.029	0.043	0.040
White	0.040**	0.017			0.033**	0.018		
Gender	0.010	0.017	-0.008	0.020	0.020	0.018	0.010	0.019
N	185		80		185		80	
R ²	0.063		0.076		0.056		0.106	

Model 1 = all respondents with ideological identity; Model 2 = white citizens with ideological identity; Model 3 = all respondents without ideological identity; Model 4 = white citizens without ideological identity.

** where $p < .05$ and * where $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Using these samples and regression models, I replicate the findings in the RDD sample and provide support for hypotheses 2 and 2a (see Tables 4.6 & 4.7). When focusing upon perceptions of respondents’ co-partisans as sharing memberships with their ideological and social groups in the non-probability internet study (Table 4.6, models 1 and 2), the main effect of authoritarianism, representing the effect among strong Democrats, is negative and statistically significant ($\beta = -0.043$, $p < .05$ among all respondents; $\beta = -0.074$, $p < .05$ among White respondents only). Contrastingly, the interaction term of authoritarianism and party identity, representing the effect of authoritarianism moving from strong Democrats to strong Republicans, is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.139$, $p < .05$ among all respondents; $\beta = 0.177$, $p < .05$ among White respondents only).

As it is possible that these findings are primarily driven by individuals’ knowledge of ideological sorting processes in current American politics (see Levendusky 2009), I also examine how people perceive members of their in-party only in relation to their other social identities (Table 4.6, models 3 and 4). When stripping ideological considerations from party membership perceptions, I still find the same main and interactive effects of authoritarianism. Particularly, among White strong Democrats, those higher in authoritarianism perceive significantly less overlap between their social groups and co-partisans ($\beta = -0.049$, $p < .05$), while strong Republicans higher in authoritarianism perceive significantly more overlap among these group members ($\beta = 0.101$, $p < .05$ among all respondents; $\beta = 0.144$ among Whites).


This same significant, interactive pattern of effects appears in the undergraduate study among White citizen participants,³⁰ but only when party member overlap includes just social groups (see Table 4.7, model 4). Thus, across both of these measures of convergent party

³⁰ Since the samples in studies 1 and 2 were primarily White, the effects of models 2 and 4 serve as more accurate replications of those analyses. Given the extensive ethnic diversity of the Stony Brook undergraduate sample, the main effects of party identity in models 1 and 3 make intuitive sense – for low authoritarians, as they increasingly identify as Republican, they view less overlap between their co-partisans and in-group members. This effect may be an artifact of ethnic minorities (such as Asians and Latinos) primarily affiliating with the Democratic Party (cites).

identity, as participants identified more towards the Republican Party, those higher in authoritarianism increasingly expressed greater perceptions of membership overlap between their social and political in-groups, while strong Democrats lower in authoritarianism perceived more overlapping party and social in-group members.

These heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism on perceptions of a “convergent” party identity among all respondents in the RDD telephone sample (Figure 4.2), White respondents in the non-probability internet sample (Figure 4.3), and White citizen participants in the undergraduate student sample (Figure 4.4) are more intuitively illustrated by predicted probabilities and predicted values graphs.³¹ All three graphs, while utilizing slightly different operationalizations of “convergent” party identity perceptions, different estimation techniques, and regardless of whether ideological identification was included as a potentially overlapping social identity, display the same general pattern.

Figure 4.2. Predicted Probability of Perceiving a “Convergent” Partisan Identity across Authoritarianism (RDD Telephone Sample)³²




Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean predicted probabilities.

³¹ In all predicted values graphs, control variables are fixed at their central tendencies.


³² Plotted values represent the predicted probabilities that a respondent thought “almost all” of the members of their in-party were also members of their social class, neighborhood type, religious affiliation, race, and gender.

Figure 4.3. Predicted Levels of “Convergent” Party Identities across Authoritarianism (Non-Probability Internet Sample, Whites only)



Bars represent 95% CI's

Figure 4.4. Predicted Levels of “Convergent” Party Identities across Authoritarianism (Undergraduate Student Sample, White Citizens only)



Bars represent 95% CI's

On one hand, greater authoritarian dispositions predict more nuanced, complex perceptions of shared memberships across political, ideological, and social in-groups among strong Democrats, such that low authoritarian Democrats are more likely to possess a “convergent” party identity. In the RDD survey (Figure 4.2) these low authoritarians had an 11% chance of holding a fully “convergent” partisan identity while high authoritarians had a 6% likelihood of thinking about the Democratic Party in this way³³. Similarly, in the non-probability internet study (Figure 4.3), moving from lowest to highest authoritarian dispositions is associated with a decrease in convergent party identity perceptions of approximately 7% of the scale when ideological identifications are included (panel 1), and about 5% of the scale when ideological identifications are excluded (panel 2). Finally, in the undergraduate study (Figure 4.4), as participants exhibit higher authoritarian dispositions, their convergent party identity perceptions decrease approximately 10% of the scale when ideological identifications are included (panel 1); and about 8% of the scale when ideological identifications are excluded (panel 2).

On the other hand, authoritarian dispositions led to more concrete, singular perceptions of shared memberships across political, ideological, and social in-groups among strong Republicans. In the RDD telephone survey (Figure 4.2) strong Republican identifiers had approximately a 4% likelihood of holding a “convergent” partisan identity at the low end of the authoritarianism scale, and about a 12% probability among the most authoritarian³⁴. In similar fashion, moving across the authoritarianism measure related to an increase in convergent party identity perceptions of approximately 10% of the scale in the non-probability internet sample (Figure 4.3), and of about 15% of the scale in the undergraduate student sample (Figure 4.4). These modest effect sizes remain consistent whether ideological identities are included or excluded from the overlapping party identity variable, with significant differences in the amount of perceived membership overlap between strong Democrat and strong Republican authoritarians.

Overall, these results provide support for hypotheses 2 and 2a, but more importantly paint an interesting portrait of the contexts in which authoritarian dispositions structure more cohesive, singular interpretations of social and political identities. While authoritarianism ubiquitously predicts perceptions of increased group member overlap among *social* groups, this dispositional trait only led to overlapping partisan and social group memberships among strong Republicans. These findings, however, reflect some inherent weaknesses related to the construct validity of the convergent party identity items, and the political realities which may confound the theoretical path from authoritarianism to in-party perceptions.

First, the wording of the single convergent partisan identity item in the RDD survey was such that most respondents were unlikely (91.46%) to believe that their in-party completely encompassed all five of their other social identities, undermining any nuance in the way individuals used their authoritarian dispositions to structure their social and party identities. These concerns were addressed in the internet and undergraduate studies, which employed multi-item batteries to measure perceptions of overlapping party and in-group memberships. However, in order to avoid fatiguing respondents, I chose to limit the directionality of comparisons in the items, such that they only estimated the amount of social in-group members who also belonged to their political party (and not vice versa) in the internet study. As a result, some respondents commented that they approached the task as “a game of trying to remember population demographics,” putting into question the validity of this convergent party identity measure. In

³³ Holding all other variables constant at their central tendencies.

³⁴ Holding all other variables constant at their central tendencies.

the undergraduate study, I gathered perceptions of convergent party identities through a reverse-worded series of items that asked respondents to estimate the amount of co-partisans who also belonged to each of their social in-groups (and not vice versa). Interestingly, though, the heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism on overlapping social and party membership attributions across Democrats and Republicans were robust to these different batteries, eliminating item construction as an alternate explanation for these findings.

Additionally, when a party's members represent diverse social and demographic backgrounds, it may be difficult for citizens to ignore that reality, thus deterring them from perceiving their partisan identity in such concrete, convergent terms. This may be the case among Democrats, who may acknowledge that the Democratic Party's members represent a wider range of ethnic, educational, and religious backgrounds, regardless of how they scored on the authoritarianism scale. It would therefore be individuals lowest in authoritarianism, by acknowledging the nuanced diversity of the Democratic Party and responding to the overlapping membership items in a way that, at first glance, appears to embody a concrete, singular representation of their party identity. The same could be said of high authoritarian Republicans who may view their Republican identity in very cohesive, singular terms, not because of any cognitive rigidity processes related to authoritarian dispositions, but because the current Republican Party resembles an extremely homogeneous coalition of White, Protestant Christians (see Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Abramowitz 2010).

An examination of the demographic construction of low authoritarian Democrats, low authoritarian Republicans, high authoritarian Democrats, and high authoritarian Republicans across all three samples reveals the extent to which many social groups have already sorted themselves into the parties along the authoritarian dimension. As shown in Table 4.8, demographic differences among Democrats along the authoritarian dimension in the RDD sample represent economic rather than social cleavages, with strong Democrat authoritarians tending to come from a lower socio-economic status (among whom 65.71% have less than a college degree, and 37.14% classified themselves as working class) compared to strong Democrats lower in authoritarianism (who were primarily middle class (65.22%), and had at least a Bachelor's degree (69.57%)). In contrast, differences between strong Republican and strong Democrat high authoritarians reflected ethnic, age cohort, religious identities, particularly as 92.5% of Republican authoritarians were White while 31.43% of Democrat authoritarians were African-American.

Table 4.8. Social Identities by Authoritarianism & Party ID, National RDD Phone Sample

	<i>Strong Democrats</i>	Strong Republicans
High Authoritarianism (auth > .5)	<i>Small City/Town (40%)</i> <i>Working Class (37.14%)</i> <i>Protestant Christian (34.29%)</i> <i>Catholic (31.43%)</i> <i>White (45.71%)</i> <i>African-American (31.43%)</i> <i>65+ years old (45.71%)</i> <i>Less than College Degree (65.71%)</i> <i>Female (60%)</i> N=35	<i>Rural (37.5%)</i> <i>Small City/Town (35%)</i> <i>Middle Class (40%)</i> <i>Working Class (37.5%)</i> <i>Protestant Christian (55%)</i> <i>White (92.5%)</i> <i>35-64years old (65%)</i> <i>Less than College Degree (57.5%)</i> <i>Female (70%)</i> <i>N=40</i>
Low Authoritarianism (auth < .5)	<i>Suburb (47.83%)</i> <i>Middle Class (65.22%)</i> <i>Protestant Christian (30.43%)</i> <i>Catholic (30.43%)</i> <i>White (86.96%)</i> <i>65+ years old (69.57%)</i> <i>College Degree or higher (69.57%)</i> <i>Female (86.96%)</i> <i>N = 23</i>	<i>Suburb (44.44%)</i> <i>Middle Class (44.44%)</i> <i>Working Class (44.44%)</i> <i>Protestant Christian (44.44%)</i> <i>Another Religion (33.33%)</i> <i>White (88.89%)</i> <i>35-64 years old (44.44%)</i> <i>65+ years old (44.44%)</i> <i>College Degree of higher (55.56%)</i> <i>Female (66.67%)</i> N=9

A different, yet equally well-sorted, demographic dynamic emerges among the non-probability internet and undergraduate student samples (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). Within the non-probability internet sample (Table 4.9) low authoritarian, strong Democrats tended to identify most strongly with their female, secular, and cosmopolitan social identities, while high authoritarians and strong Republicans tended to identify most strongly with their Protestant Christian social identity. Among the undergraduate student sample, low authoritarian Democrats were also primarily female and secular, while high authoritarians were mainly Protestant Christian and male, and Republicans were mostly White and male. With the high amount of ethnic and religious diversity among Stony Brook University undergraduates, I discerned an interesting demographic pattern among high authoritarian Democrats who were Muslim, Indian, and Asian-American (reflecting possible religious conservatism, but ethnic diversity); and low authoritarian Republicans who were Whites, Atheists, and Catholics (reflecting possibly more religious liberalism but most “traditional” ethnic identities).

Table 4.9. Most Salient Identities by Authoritarianism & Party ID, Non-probability Internet Sample

	<i>Strong Democrats</i>	Strong Republicans
High Auth (auth > .5)	Female (28.57%) Protestant Christian (11.43%) Asian/Pacific Islander (8.57%) Living in Small City (5.71%) Male (5.71%) White (5.71%) N=35	Protestant Christian (30%) Living in Large City (15%) Catholic (10%) Male (10%) Middle Class (10%) N=20
Low Auth (auth < .5)	Female (36.52%) Atheist (9.57%) Living in Large City (9.57%) Male (6.96%) West Coast (5.22%) Working Class (5.22%) N = 115	Protestant Christian (n=3) Living in Small City/Town (n=2) Working Class (n=2) Male (n=1) N=8

Table 4.10. Most Salient Identities by Authoritarianism & Party ID, Undergraduate Student Sample

	<i>Democrats</i>	Republicans
High Auth (auth > .5)	Protestant Christian (29.17%) Catholic (29.17%) Muslim (20.83%) White (29.17%) Asian (20.83%) Indian (20.83%) Male (54.17%) N = 24	Catholic (53.85%) Protestant Christian (23.08%) White (53.85%) Asian (30.77%) Male (69.23%) N=13
Low Auth (auth < .5)	Atheist (37.84%) Catholic (22.97%) White (43.24%) Asian (21.62%) Female (62.16%) N = 74	Atheist (47.37%) Catholic (26.32%) White (68.42%) Asian (26.32%) Male (57.89%) N=19

It is highly likely with this demographic breakdown, particularly in the non-probability internet sample, that the convergent party identity measure may have conflated respondents' perceptions of overlapping identities with their general understanding of each party's demographic compositions. For instance, secular respondents received the following question: "Of people who are *Atheist*, how many of them would you say are also *Democrats*?" In this scenario, while it is possible that Democrats represent a nuanced variety of religious backgrounds – Catholics, Jews, Protestant Christians, etc. – most citizens with a cursory

cognizance of politics would recognize that Atheists primarily have a home with the Democratic Party. Thus, if a respondent selected the “almost all” option to this item, it could represent *either* a singular, concrete perception of multiple in-group members, or an acknowledgement that realistically Atheists never identify with the Republican Party. Furthermore, as respondents sometimes treated the convergent party identity battery as an exercise in listing party demographics, there is some indication of the objective differences in the amount of group overlap between Democrats and Republicans, such that authoritarian dispositions may only lead to perceptions of convergent identities when such perceptions accurately mirror the political landscape.

This may lead to some dissonance among high authoritarian Democrats between their perceptions of demographic party realities and the cognitive correlates of their authoritarian dispositions. On one hand, they acknowledge that their party is diverse and as such view the membership overlap between their social and political in-groups in complex, nuanced terms. On the other, their cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity (Jost et al 2003, Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Roccas & Brewer 2002) allow them to perceive their party as possessing strong, cohesive leadership and members that all share the same beliefs (see next section for analyses). Thus, some further insights on the role of authoritarianism on party affiliations may be gleaned through an examination of high authoritarian Democrats.

In the RDD telephone sample, with a decidedly older demographic, strong Democrat authoritarians represented “working class authoritarianism” groups (see Stenner 2005) for whom party linkages may have been made on New Deal cleavages and economic grounds (a possibility empirically supported in the next chapter). These strong Democrat authoritarians were also predominantly African-American, which is unsurprising given that African-Americans tend to be, on average, higher in authoritarianism, and almost exclusively identify with the Democratic Party as a result of civil rights legislation. In the younger internet and undergraduate samples, a different dichotomy among high authoritarian Democrats emerge. These individuals, and particularly the Stony Brook sample, reflected ethnically diverse, yet religiously conservative backgrounds (i.e. Muslim, Catholic, Indian, Asian-American), suggesting that their authoritarian dispositions are aligned with their religious identities but their “non-traditional” ethnic and religious backgrounds have matched them with the Democratic Party. This party alignment mismatch based on authoritarian dispositions, ethnicity, and religious identities seems particularly insightful to understanding which social identity matches are the foundation of the link between authoritarianism and party identity, and should be examined in depth in future research.

Yet, there are many fewer observations in the off-diagonal cells (i.e. high authoritarian Democrats and low authoritarian Republicans), which, when estimating predicted values and probabilities, can lead to point estimates that are highly inefficient and based upon non-existent data. As such, the substantive impact of conflicting authoritarian dispositions and political realities among high authoritarian Democrats may be overstated in the present findings as they are largely based on small sub-samples. While interesting to think about, the dynamics of high authoritarian Democrats and, especially, low authoritarian Republicans, hold little meaningful impact to my theory as they occur so infrequently in current politics.

Given these stark demographic differences, does authoritarianism have any real effect on these overlapping social and political identity perceptions? If the measurement of convergent party identities is truly confounded by the nature of existing political coalitions, then these analyses are not particularly impactful for testing my theory of authoritarian-driven partisan

polarization. We may not learn anything about the role of authoritarianism on *current* mass partisanship with this construct, as any significant effects of authoritarianism today may be spurious to the underlying micro- and macro-level processes that aligned social identities, party affiliations, and authoritarian dispositions in the past. As such, a rigorous examination of the objective changes to the parties' demographic compositions over the past forty years and citizens' reactions to these changes along the authoritarian spectrum, which, combined, may have led to the well-sorted social and political identities witnessed here, will be provided in the following chapter. Further, I delve into individuals' perceptions of their in-party as embodying structural aspects of internal cohesion, strong leadership, and acquiescing members who all share the same values and beliefs – all characteristics that, according to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, should resonate with authoritarianism without conflating party coalitions.

Authoritarianism and Party Characteristics

Finally, authoritarians should characterize their in-party as possessing certain types of organizational traits, in particular, cohesive leadership that allows the party to promote authoritarian submission (see Altemeyer 1988) and to fulfill its members' needs for certainty and security (Jost et al. 2003, Hetherington & Weiler 2009) through a group-based social order that represents “oneness” and “sameness” (see Duckitt 1989, Stenner 2005). More bluntly, I predict in hypothesis 3 that those higher in authoritarianism are more likely to think that their in-party “has more members who all share the same views and beliefs” and “is better characterized by tight formal control... and a strong internal leadership structure.” As described earlier, these characteristics were operationalized as dichotomous variables in the RDD and internet studies, where respondents identified whether their in-party or out-party best represented the specified trait. Given the dichotomous nature of these two dependent variables, I estimate probit models with robust standard errors that regress the probability of a respondent characterizing her in-party with shared beliefs and cohesive leadership, respectively, on authoritarianism, party identity, the interaction of authoritarianism and party identity, and individual-level controls.

Table 4.11. Probit Estimates of Authoritarianism on Perceptions of In-Party Characteristics (RDD Telephone Sample)

	<i>Same Beliefs</i>		<i>Cohesive Leadership</i>	
	β	SE	β	SE
Constant	0.248	0.404	-0.278	0.392
Authoritarianism	1.02**	0.449	0.923**	0.438
Party ID	0.471	0.496	0.428	0.478
Authoritarianism * Party ID	-.616	0.732	0.096	0.713
Ideology (Social Issues)	0.721	0.444	0.561	0.425
College Degree	0.008	0.2	0.117	0.182
Age	-0.02	0.401	-0.092	0.397
White	-0.361	0.273	-0.564	0.249
Gender	-0.154	0.2	0.053	0.179
Pseudo R2	0.0848		0.118	
N	247		247	

where ** is $p < 0.05$ on a two-tailed test; excludes pure independents

Table 4.12. Probit Effects of Authoritarianism on Perceptions of In-Party Characteristics (Non-Probability Internet Sample)

	<i>Party Control</i>		<i>Same Beliefs</i>		<i>Diverse Members</i>	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept	-0.765**	0.162	-0.659**	0.156	2.866**	0.255
Authoritarianism	0.701**	0.239	0.533**	0.224	-1.719**	0.340
Party ID	0.315	0.332	0.269	0.324	-5.635**	0.704
Authoritarianism*PartyID	-0.022	0.506	-0.137	0.482	3.757**	0.848
Ideology	0.502	0.276	0.047	0.274	0.072	0.424
Age	-0.566**	0.214	-0.250	0.199	0.227	0.287
Gender	-0.022	0.099	0.283**	0.097	0.107	0.129
College Degree	-0.026	0.097	0.069	0.094	-0.013	0.122
White	-0.067	0.113	-0.059	0.109	-0.214	0.144
N	754		754		754	
Pseudo R ²	0.061		0.025		0.447	

** where $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test

Consistent support for hypothesis 3, wherein individuals higher in authoritarianism consistently characterize their own party as possessing strong internal leadership, and members who all share the same views and beliefs, is demonstrated in both studies (Tables 4.11 and 4.12)³⁵. In the *Same Beliefs* models, authoritarianism has a significant, positive main effect on thinking the in-party, rather than out-party, contains more members who all share similar values and beliefs ($\beta = 1.02$, $p < .05$ in the RDD sample; $\beta = 0.533$, $p < .05$ in the internet sample). Similarly, in the *Cohesive Leadership* models, the constituent term of authoritarianism has a significant positive effect on thinking that the in-party is better characterized by tight, controlling internal leadership ($\beta = 0.923$, $p < .05$ in the RDD sample; $\beta = 0.701$, $p < .05$ in the internet sample). In none of these models is the interactive effect of authoritarianism and party identity significant, thus indicating that the increased prevalence of in-party perceptions of members' similar beliefs and leaders' strong internal control across levels of authoritarianism are constant across Democrats and Republicans. Of important note, the effects of authoritarianism in all the above models (see Tables 4.11 and 4.12) remain significant even when controlling for individuals' ideological orientations, indicating that the relationship between authoritarianism and these party trait perceptions represents an ideologically "content free" group attachment process.


From a graphical perspective (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6), when moving from the least to most authoritarian, a respondent's predicted probability of characterizing their in-party members as all sharing the same beliefs increases from 60% to 89% for strong Democrats and 76% to 86% for strong Republicans in the RDD survey (Figure 4.5, left panel); and increases from 28.5% to 48.9% for strong Democrats, and from 38.6% to 54.1% for strong Republicans in the internet sample (Figure 4.5, right panel)³⁶. Further, respondents' propensities to choose their in-party as best characterized by strong, cohesive internal leadership increases from 35% to 69% across the

³⁵ In the internet study, similar effect sizes and significance are found when these models were run with Whites only.

³⁶ These predicted probabilities were calculated holding all other variables constant at their central tendencies.

authoritarian dimension for strong Democrats, and from 51% to 84% for strong Republicans in the RDD sample (Figure 4.6, left panel); and increases from 22.9% to 48.2% among strong Democrats and from 34% to 60% among strong Republicans in the internet sample (Figure 4.6, right panel)³⁷. These findings confirm expectations from hypothesis 3 that, indeed, citizens with greater authoritarian dispositions are inclined towards characterizing their party’s leaders and members as possessing traits that provide a functional “match” with their latent needs for certainty, order, and security. Indeed, authoritarianism has a substantively large effect on these trait perceptions, as movement across the full authoritarian dimension leads to increased probabilities of about one-quarter to one-third of the full scale.


Figure 4.5. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Party Members Sharing Beliefs



Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean predicted probabilities.

³⁷ These predicted probabilities were calculated holding all other variables constant at their central tendencies.

Figure 4.6. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Party Internal Leadership




Bars represent 95% CI's

Alternatively, judgments regarding whether a respondent's in-party or out-party best reflected members from a diversity of ethnic, religious, and economic backgrounds, were driven primarily by partisan considerations (though the constituent and interactive terms of authoritarianism are both significant, see Table 4.12). As depicted in Figure 4.7, individuals identifying as Democrats almost unanimously considered the Democratic Party, their in-party, to be the party best represented by a diversity of backgrounds (ranging from a predicted probability of 99.7% among low authoritarians to 86.1% among high authoritarians). Conversely, Republican-identifying respondents almost equally agreed that the Democratic Party, their out-party, was best characterized by members of diverse backgrounds (ranging from a predicted probability of 0.5% among low authoritarians to 22.7% among high authoritarians)³⁸. These changes in predicted probabilities from least to most authoritarian individuals most likely reflects the lack of precise estimates at the upper end of the authoritarianism scale rather than any substantive meaning behind high authoritarians' perceptions of the two parties on this characteristic, indicating that respondents, regardless of their authoritarian dispositions, acknowledged that the Democratic Party comprises members who represent myriad ethnic, economic, and religious affiliations.

³⁸ All predicted probabilities in Figure 4.7 were calculated holding all other variables constant at their central tendencies.

Figure 4.7. The Effects of Authoritarianism on In-Party Diverse Background Perceptions



Bars represent 95% CI's

4.3 Conclusion

In Chapter 2, I argued that authoritarians, due to their innate needs for certainty, order and security (Jost et al. 2003, Hetherington & Weiler 2009), should be drawn to social and political groups that possess structural traits which will bolster their sense of stability, distinctiveness, and security in a hierarchal society, including tight group cohesion, strong central leadership, and overlapping member similarity across multiple in-groups. For authoritarians, highly cohesive political groups should serve as a source of social meaning and stability, providing a collective coping response to external threats to the normative social order (see Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005). As such, I empirically tested this core theoretical position – that authoritarianism is a group-based construct through which citizens make sense of their social and political group identities.

While unable to directly manipulate the objective nature of the leadership and membership attributes of the Democratic and Republican parties, I nonetheless empirically tested, through observational measures, the core assumptions that group-based authoritarianism differentially predict citizens' perceptions that 1) their social groups possess more overlapping members; 2) their party identity reflects a "convergent" partisan identity that encompasses the members of their other social in-groups; and 3) their in-party is best characterized by strong, internally cohesive leadership, and members who all share the same belief systems. By testing the relationship between authoritarianism and these trait perceptions across multiple studies, each using a unique sample and mode, I demonstrated the robustness of these in-party characteristics. Further, I established that authoritarianism was associated with trait perceptions of strong

internal leadership and members who all share the same values and beliefs homogeneously across the political spectrum, even when controlling for individuals' ideological orientations, thus demonstrating support for my theoretical argument that, for authoritarians, such trait attributions are independent of any values of society, making them content free and primary.

More specifically, the present findings demonstrate that authoritarianism plays a key role in shaping individuals' perceptions of their social and political identities. Consistent with the proposed theoretical model of group-based authoritarianism, those scoring higher in authoritarianism are more likely to view their social, and sometimes political, identities as a singular entity of overlapping group memberships. The somewhat counter-intuitive heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism on convergent party identities between Republicans and Democrats could be a result of objective demographic differences between Republican and Democrat party members that are particularly salient in the current political discourse. As such, Democrats higher in authoritarianism simply may not view a party publicly stereotyped for its diversity as a singular entity that encompasses members of their other social in-groups; and conversely, Democrats lower in authoritarianism (through greater cognitive complexity) may think that the Democratic Party represents all of their in-groups (and more) *because* they are the party of diversity. This possibility is explored in further detail in the following empirical chapter using longitudinal data matched with party elites' demographic characteristics.

Further, the organizational traits of political parties that allow authoritarians to use their social identity as a mechanism for maintaining security in their social order (see Feldman 2003) were consistently perceived by high authoritarians in regards to their in-party. Generally, these findings confirm my theoretical expectations that, indeed, citizens with greater authoritarian dispositions, regardless of whether they associate with the Democratic Party or Republican Party, are more inclined towards characterizing their in-party's leadership as possessing internally cohesive traits that bolster their epistemic needs for certainty, order, and security (see Feldman 2003, Jost et al. 2003), in line with authoritarian submission (Altemeyer 1988). The robust relationship between authoritarianism and opinions that all members of their in-party share the same values and belief systems across the political spectrum additionally supports a group-based conceptualization of authoritarianism in which authoritarian dispositions embody a desire establish and maintain a sense of oneness and sameness with *some* collective order, regardless of what the particular beliefs of that group order are (Stenner 2005). Put simply, these findings show that authoritarianism structures the cognitive nature of party identities for citizens in a way that is ideologically content-free because it relies upon more ultimate motivational and emotional group attachments, as will be discussed in the third empirical chapter.

Chapter 5

Exploring the Sources of Authoritarianism in American Mass Partisanship

The prior chapter explored how individuals across the authoritarian dimension characterized their partisan identity and related it to their other salient social identities, thus depicting authoritarianism's impact on partisan identification in the present day political context. But such "culture war" cleavages in mass partisanship did not form overnight; instead they were the result of a decades-long dynamic process of elite positioning and mass updating (see Levendusky 2009). While the earlier chapter focused on the *subjective* traits individuals endowed to their in-party, this chapter focuses on individuals' party identity responses to the *objective* changes in the parties' leaders and members since the 1970's (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995, 2011, Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007). Specifically, which party elite level contextual mechanism, ideological polarization or demographic diversification, allowed individuals to link their authoritarian dispositions to their party identities?

In answering this overarching question, the goals of the present empirical chapter are two-fold. First, I examine how three different mechanisms of party elites – ideological extremity, within-party voting cohesion, and demographic composition – condition the effects of individuals' authoritarian dispositions on their party identities. Second, I demonstrate that demographic, social identity changes among party elites catalyzed authoritarianism as a predictor of mass party identity, rather than party elites' increased voting cohesion or ideological polarization (per Hetherington & Weiler 2009). I accomplish these goals by analyzing longitudinal shifts in party elites hierarchally matched with public opinion data from the General Social Survey (GSS) cumulative file (1973-2012), thus modeling the dynamics of partisan identification as they related to authoritarian dispositions in the mass public. In particular, I propose the following hypotheses:

H1: The nationwide link between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party identities will vary between the 1970's and 2012.

H2: In isolation, party elites' ideological positions, within-party voting cohesion, and demographic composition will each condition the effect of individuals' authoritarian dispositions on their party identifications.

H3: When these mechanisms are empirically competing against each other, individuals will link their authoritarian dispositions to their partisan identities through social identity matches with party elites, with:

H3a: The Democratic Party elites' diversity driving this process, rather than the Republican Party elites' conservative ideological preference, and with,

H3b: Elites' social identities being more influential than their ideological positions among relevant sub-groups most impacted by a demographically diverse Democratic Party.

5.1 Methods

The current hypotheses test the components of citizens' partisan affiliations over the past four decades in a way that examines individual-level authoritarian dispositions in the context of ideological and social identity cues from party elites. As such, the current methodological approach appropriately utilizes micro- and macro-level data and hierarchical statistical estimation techniques. Multilevel modeling (see Gelman & Hill 2007, Steenbergen & Jones 2002) allows me to estimate the temporal and regional party-level effects on individual survey data, and is methodologically advantageous because I can control for any random effects of an individual being surveyed in a given year or living in a particular region of the country, while zoning in on exactly how party elites' changes impacted individuals' authoritarian-based responses to party identity.

Data and Respondents. The data are derived from multiple existing sources, and compiled specifically for the present analyses. The micro-level data regarding individual citizens comes from the General Social Survey (GSS) spanning from 1973 to 2012. This completely unbalanced, repeated cross sectional survey has gathered Americans' demographic information, social values, and political opinions, including the key independent and dependent variables of interest, in yearly and bi-yearly waves (N = 32,509 across all years). Due to the GSS's inconsistency in yearly data collection, some years are omitted from the present dataset, thus creating a "lumpy" time-series of 24 yearly data points³⁹ where individual responses are nested within one of nine U.S. census regions, and year of survey administration. The majority of GSS respondents are born in the U.S. (91.56%), White (82.15%), Female (56.2%), and Protestant Christian (59.25%), though other religious affiliations including Catholics (25%), Seculars (10.45%) and Jewish individuals (2%) are represented in the sample.

To complement the GSS data with party-level ideological, leadership cohesion, and demographic characteristics, I also employ two existing and one self-compiled data set. The first, DW Nominate Scores (Poole & Rosenthal 1997, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005) measure the ideological preferences of each party as revealed through Congressional roll call votes. Next, Party Unity Scores (Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007) capture within-party cohesion, as measured through the percentage of party-line voting on critical legislative bills. Finally, party-level demographic traits (i.e. gender, race, and religious affiliation) were compiled from the National Journal's *Almanac of American Politics*⁴⁰ and Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America*⁴¹.

³⁹ The years in the data set include: 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012.

⁴⁰ <http://www.nationaljournal.com/almanac>

All data sets operationalize party-level elites as U.S. Senators⁴² in the 93rd to the 112th Congresses, and vary by U.S. census region and year. These aggregate data are then merged with the GSS data, such that each individual response in the GSS is linked with the associated party-level ideological, leadership cohesion and demographic information for its given year and U.S. census region, thus creating the hierarchical data set employed for all analyses.

Authoritarianism. Consistent with prior research (Feldman 2003, Feldman & Stenner 1997, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Stenner 2005, Johnston & Wronski 2013), authoritarianism was measured using a battery of items that assessed how important each respondent believed certain traits were for children to have. The GSS used two distinct scales to rate the importance of these traits. The first, implemented from 1973 to 1986 asked respondents to rank, among 13 traits that were potentially desirable for a child to possess: which trait was the most desirable, which were among the three most desirable traits, which were not mentioned as either desirable or undesirable traits, which were among the three least desirable traits, and which was the least desirable trait (both gendered and gender neutral versions of these trait items were administered during this time period, and subsequently combined for the present analysis). Of specific importance to tapping authoritarianism (see Feldman 2003) were the items that asked respondents to rate the importance of the traits “obeys parents,” and “has good sense and sound judgment” (Pearson’s $r = 0.26$). The latter measure, utilized from 1986 to 2012, reduced the number of compared traits from 13 to 5, and simply asked respondents to rank all five traits on a scale of importance for a child to learn in order to prepare him or her for life, from the most to the least important. In this version of the measure, authoritarianism was tapped using the items for traits “obeys parents,” and “thinks for himself” (Pearson’s $r = 0.495$). In each scale, the two items tapping authoritarian dispositions were scaled together and recoded 0-1, where 0=lowest authoritarianism and 1=highest authoritarianism.

Due to differences in the fundamental nature of the comparison tasks (the former version asking respondents to compare more traits in larger groupings than in the latter version) and the inconsistency of the assessed traits, these two scales have differing properties such that they cannot be readily combined. In the earlier scale, respondents displayed higher levels of authoritarianism (mean = 0.493, sd = 0.173), than did their counterparts who were given the later scale (mean = 0.362, sd = 0.284). As such, this creates a distinct temporal break in authoritarian dispositions centering around 1986. In order to create a measure of authoritarianism that can accurately track authoritarian dispositions of individuals across the full data series, I needed to 1) ensure that each scale was tapping the same construct⁴³ and 2) standardize each scale such that responses would be temporally comparable to one other. Resulting from this process, the variable for authoritarianism, the key independent variable in all subsequent analyses, is the standardized value of the version used in a particular year (mean = 0, SD = 1). In this way, each value in the authoritarianism scale represents a standard deviation from the mean level of authoritarianism in a given year with a given version.

Partisan Identity. Throughout all years of the GSS, respondents’ party affiliations were captured using the standard item which asks “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?” Responses to the prompts “Other

⁴¹ <http://library.cqpress.com/pia/>

⁴² Due to theoretical concerns regarding regional clustering and limited resources, operationalizing party leaders as all U.S. Congress members has been put on hold for the present paper.

⁴³ See Appendix E for the correlations between each child rearing trait and key correlates for authoritarianism, demonstrating construct validity across the two versions.

Party,” or refusals, were excluded from this variable. The responses were then scaled together to create the main dependent variable of interest, *Party ID*, coded from 0-1 such that 0=Strong Democrat, .5=Pure Independent, and 1=Strong Republican. In all multi-level models *Party ID* is mean centered by year in order to strip it of its past history.

Ideology and Individual level controls. In order to capture respondents’ ideological orientations, I utilize a single item wherein individuals place themselves on a 7-point scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” The GSS includes this item in all years except 1973. This item is then recoded 0-1, where 0=Extremely Liberal and 1=Extremely Conservative. To ensure that the past history of ideology is stripped from this variable it is also mean centered by year. Other relevant individual level control variables in the subsequent multi-level models include respondent’s race (coded 1=White, 0 otherwise), gender (0=Female, 1=Male), education (ranging from 0 = less than high school to 1 = graduate degree, then mean centered by year), religion (coded 1= Protestant Christian, 0 = non-Protestant Christian or otherwise), age (mean centered by year), and location size (ranging from 0 = areas with less than 2,500 residents to 1 = large metropolitan city with over 250,000 residents, then mean centered by year)⁴⁴. To control for individual-level variance in religious practices, I include a dummy variable that represents membership in a fundamentalist religious group (1=Fundamentalist, 0=Otherwise), and a variable that measures the frequency of religious service attendance that ranges from 0=Never Attend to 1=Several times a week and is mean-centered by year.

Party-level Independent Variables. Given the competing contextual mechanisms that may structure authoritarianism’s role in mass partisanship – ideology or social identity – I create a series of aggregate, party-level variables that capture the temporal variation in elites’ ideological and demographic compositions. Beyond temporal variance, these ideological, leadership cohesion, and demographic party cues may influence individuals’ party identity choices cross-regionally – for instance, if a party leader from one part of the country (e.g. Barack Obama) represents the ideological and social identities of the entire party. I believe, however, that such party leaders are the exception, and while they may impact the overarching party stereotypes, ideological, cohesiveness, and identity heuristics are most potent at the *regional level* where voters can relate to the cues of the party elites directly representing them in Congress. Therefore, all party level variables are operationalized at the yearly and regional levels, capturing the balance between the ideological, leadership cohesion, and social identity characteristics of state-level representatives and party-wide stereotypes.

The first of these aggregate level variables represents the revealed ideological preferences for each party, and is operationalized as the median DW Nominat score for that party’s Senators in a given region and year. The variables, *Conservative_Republicans* and *Liberal_Democrats*, range from -0.118 to 0.654 (mean = 0.281, sd = 0.165) and from -0.479 to -0.034 (mean = -0.34, sd = 0.086), for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. Values less than zero reflect more liberal ideological preferences and while values greater than zero more conservative preferences, with larger absolute values reflecting greater ideological extremity from the moderate zero reference point. By employing median nominat scores as the measure of ideological central tendency; these variables are less sensitive to any ideologically outlying Senators.

Next, to capture within-party cohesion, defined as the amount of influence party leaders wield when corralling their members into legislative victories, I utilize Party Unity scores (Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007, Carson, Koger, Lebo & Young 2010). Operationally, Party Unity

⁴⁴ Income is not included as a control variable since the full GSS data did not contain an inflation-adjusted income variable.

scores represent the percentage of times a Senator votes with his or her party on contested votes (on a 0-1 scale), and are aggregated by each party within a given year and region of the country. These variables, *Unity_Republicans* and *Unity_Democrats*, range from 0.222 to 0.984 (mean = 0.802, sd = 0.165) and from 0.299 to 0.985 (mean = 0.848, sd = 0.112), for Republicans and Democrats respectively, with higher values representing a greater median percentage of within-party voting cohesion. As with *Nominate* scores, I use median Party Unity scores as the measure of within-party cohesion central tendency, to ensure these variables are less sensitive to outlying Senators who may regularly vote contrary to their party's preferred position.

The final set of aggregate variables reflects the demographic composition of a party's Senators, operationalized as the percentage of White, Male, Protestant Christian Senators a party possesses in a given year and region. As this variable is a percentage, it ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a *socially homogeneous* party (in a specific year and region) that is composed completely of Senators that are White, Male, and Protestant Christian. Values approaching 0 reflect more *social diversity*, as that party's Senators (in a given year and region) are comprised of more women, ethnic minorities, and non-Protestant Christian religious backgrounds. While both Republican and Democratic Senators span the full range of this scale, Democrats, on average tend to be more socially diverse (mean = 0.527, sd = 0.294) than Republicans (mean = 0.69, sd = 0.29).

Aggregate level controls. Finally, to account for yearly or regional aggregate influences on mass partisanship, including the process of Southern realignment, I include control variables for Presidential Party (0 = Democratic, 1 = Republican), yearly Policy Mood⁴⁵ which assesses public opinion support for government programs on a liberal-conservative spectrum (Stimson 2004), and dummies for the South and New England regions. Due to limitations in existing secondary datasets, the controls for Presidential Party and Policy Mood only vary at the yearly aggregate level (and not by region). Thus, they capture contextual factors in a given year that are averages across all census regions, while masking any regional variation in public policy mood. Conversely, the regional dummy variables do not vary at the yearly level, and only capture aggregate effects of the region across the 40 year time period.

4.2 Results


Authoritarian Party Affiliations over Time

Hypothesis 1 examines the extent to which authoritarian dispositions impacted mass partisan identifications over the past forty years, and affords some initial insights into the

⁴⁵ The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. See <http://www.policyagendas.org/> for more information.

potential political contexts that catalyzed authoritarianism's role in mass partisanship. In order to properly explore these dynamic influences of authoritarianism on party identity, it is imperative to first understand the manifestations of authoritarian dispositions among the American public during this time period. GSS responses from 1973-2012 reveal that the mean level of authoritarianism tends to be lower than the national average in the New England and Pacific regions, and higher than the national average in the two South regions (see Figure 1)⁴⁶. This perhaps unsurprising distribution of authoritarian preferences across the country also reflects a general temporal stability. Regions that were, on average, less authoritarian than the national mean in the 1970's remained less authoritarian through the present day, while those regions whose citizens were typically displaying higher than average authoritarian dispositions in the 1970's continued to do so through 2012, with the exception of the two South regions whose residents' mean level of authoritarianism significantly increased, relative to the rest of the country, over time.


Figure 5.1. Mean Authoritarianism by Region and Year (standardized scale)



Even though individuals' levels of authoritarianism, relative to the national average, remained mostly stable since the 1970's, it is possible that the amount of authoritarianism displayed among Americans varied in the absolute sense during this time period. According to Figure 5.2, however, there were no drastic declines in the mean amount of authoritarianism individuals displayed since the 1970's, outside of the GSS item modification in 1986 (represented by the horizontal lines). Thus, in absolute terms, the South reflected more authoritarian dispositions than the rest of the country, particularly compared to the New England and Pacific regions, while intra-region temporal stability prevailed.

⁴⁶ Due to the scaling issues stemming from multiple versions of the child-rearing battery in the GSS (see methods section), the values in the graph represent the z-score of authoritarianism in a given year and region. Figure 5.1 thus depicts the *relative* regional deviations from the national mean of authoritarianism rather than any absolute values of authoritarianism on the unstandardized scale.

Figure 5.2. Mean Authoritarianism by Region and Year (unstandardized scale)



Despite these regional dispersions of authoritarian dispositions, along with their relative temporal stability, individuals' authoritarian dispositions are not correlated with their ideological and partisan orientations in similar, temporally stable yet regionally distinct, patterns. As shown in Figure 5.3a, positive correlations between individuals' authoritarian dispositions, ideological self-placement, and self-reported party identities increased over time, with these trends holding relatively constant across regions. Thus, while individuals' levels of authoritarianism may vary by region (per Figures 5.1 and 5.2), their relationships with ideological and partisan self-placements remain spatially comparable (see Figure 5.3a), allowing me to nationally aggregate the correlation coefficients when exploring temporal trends. Accordingly, Figures 5.3b and 5.3c display weak to moderate positive correlations, over time, between citizens' party identities and their ideological orientations, consistent with partisan sorting (Levendusky 2009); and increasing positive (though weak) correlations between authoritarian dispositions and ideological self-placements, in line with extant research on authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Barker & Tinnick 2006). Interestingly, though, these positive correlations do not always translate into a similar relationship between authoritarianism and party identification, as in most years the correlation between these two constructs was effectively zero. However, fluctuation did occur in the relationship between authoritarianism and party identity, particularly from the mid-1980's when a weak relationship between authoritarianism and *Democratic Party* identity emerged (e.g. Pearson's $r = -0.151$, $p < 0.01$ in 1984) to the 1990's and later among Whites when the correlation reversed, revealing a weak relationship between authoritarianism and *Republican Party* identification (e.g. Pearson's $r = 0.123$, $p < 0.01$ in 1996). The correlations between authoritarianism and Republican Party identification strengthen when examining sub-groups most reactive to party elites' ideological and demographic shifts – White, Protestant, U.S. born citizen voters (see Figure 5.3c).

Figure 5.3a. Correlations between Authoritarianism, Ideology and Party ID by Region (1973-2012)




Figure 5.3b. Correlations between Authoritarianism, Ideology and Party ID (1973-2012)





Figure 5.3c. Correlations between Authoritarianism, Ideology and Party ID among White, Protestant, U.S. Born Citizens (1973-2012)



A series of bivariate regressions estimating the effects of the standardized authoritarianism measure on partisan identity (mean centered by year) further illustrates the transforming role of authoritarianism over the past forty years, in support of Hypothesis 1. As shown in Figure 5.4, during the 1970’s and 1980’s authoritarianism had no significant impact on individuals’ party identifications, except during the mid-1980’s when authoritarianism had a significant negative effect on party identifications (see panel 1), such that those higher in authoritarianism identified more towards the Democratic Party. Yet starting in the early 1990’s, when the polarized politics of the “culture war” became predominant fixtures of the political discourse (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope, 2011) and the Democratic Party increasingly elected minorities and women to office, authoritarianism became a significant predictor of party identity, especially among Whites⁴⁷. These larger effects among White respondents (Figure 5.4, panel 2) and White Protestant Christian respondents (Figure 5.4, panel 3), who may have been more reactive to the party-level ideological and demographic changes related to tolerance of minority groups in the political arena, lend credence to the social identity mechanism of authoritarian-driven partisanship.


At first glance, these results merely replicate prior analyses of authoritarianism on party identification and vote choice, where Democrats became less and Republicans more authoritarian throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Further, the small effect sizes⁴⁸ potentially undermine the substantive importance of authoritarianism as a predictor of

⁴⁷ Supplemental analyses show that the pattern of coefficients is similar across all regions (see Appendix E).

⁴⁸ The bivariate regression coefficients in the 2000’s are consistent in magnitude with Hetherington & Weiler’s (2009) ANES analysis, particularly as my coefficients are truncated due to the standardized scaling of authoritarianism.

individuals' party affiliations. With a maximum correlation of $r = 0.21$ among White Protestant U.S. born voters in 2008, what can authoritarianism tell us about mass partisanship? Yet, the substantive meaning of these analyses comes from the direction, rather than the magnitude, of the effects. For what is the most stable of political attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960), it is quite remarkable that an innate dispositional trait (see Jost et al 2003) can lead to *both* Democratic and Republican Party identifications all within the span of a couple decades (the same cannot be said of ideology, though it is a stronger predictor of party identification). This directional argument is particularly compelling when looking at those individuals highest in authoritarianism.


Figure 5.4. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Partisan Affiliations, by Year



Indeed, a deeper, more substantive examination of individuals at the extremes of the authoritarianism and party identity scales provide a nuanced account of how authoritarianism has

related to partisan identities since the 1970's. As evinced in Figure 5.5, those individuals identifying as strong Democrats in the 1970's exhibited levels of authoritarianism that were above the yearly mean. Yet, from the late 1990's through 2012 these same strong Democrats, and most notably White strong Democrats, held lower than average authoritarian dispositions. Contrastingly, those identifying as strong Republicans held about the same, slightly above average, level of authoritarianism over past four decades. From another perspective (see Figure 5.6), those individuals who exhibited more authoritarian dispositions (defined as at least 1 standard deviation above the mean on the standardized scale) tended to identify as Democrat leaners in the 1970's and 1980's. It was not until the 1990's when authoritarians, and predominantly White authoritarians, "flipped" their partisan loyalties, and began to look like the Republican converts depicted by Hetherington & Weiler (2009).

Figure 5.5. Mean Authoritarianism in Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans (1973-2012)




Particularly compelling across these analyses, are the relatively stable levels of authoritarianism among Republicans during this time period. In fact, the driving force of authoritarian "realignment" appears to occur among Democratic authoritarians who increasingly distanced themselves from their party during this time span (see Figures 5.5 & 5.6). One may argue that such a fleeing of authoritarians from the Democratic Party, especially among Whites, was an artifact of Southern realignment which had not come to full fruition until the mid-1990s. Quite interestingly, however, the effects of authoritarianism on partisan identity are not relegated to the Southern regions, but in fact occurred nationally⁴⁹. Thus, authoritarianism's structuring of partisanship in the United States, while coinciding with the process of Southern realignment,

⁴⁹ Supplemental analyses show that the mean party identity trends among high authoritarians depicted in Figure 6 are fairly consistent across all U.S. regions.

reflects a broader phenomenon that pushed citizens with greater authoritarian dispositions away from their prior Democratic loyalties. Further, these descriptive results show that there is nothing incompatible between authoritarianism and the parties – high authoritarians can identify as *either* Democrats or Republicans.

Figure 5.6. Mean Party ID Among High and Low Authoritarians (1973-2012)⁵⁰




While finding empirical support for Hypothesis 1, these preliminary explorations of citizens’ authoritarian dispositions and party affiliations from 1973 to 2012 also suggest that some contextual, elite-level factors during this time conditioned the way citizens used their authoritarian dispositions to assess and affiliate with the two parties. Despite initial low correlations between authoritarianism and party identity (see Figures 5.3a, 5.3b & 5.3c), Figures 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate that the relationship between these two constructs morphed in a substantively meaningful way, such that authoritarian dispositions lead citizens to one set of political outcomes in the 1970’s and 1980’s and to the *exact opposite* set of outcomes in the 1990’s and beyond. However, these results are agnostic as to which macro-level processes of party elites, and which of the two parties in particular, may have triggered authoritarianism’s role in shaping mass partisanship. Thus, I explore the three competing theories – ideological sorting (per Hetherington & Weiler 2009), within-party cohesiveness, and social identity sorting – to determine the underlying mechanisms that fashioned partisan sorting along the authoritarian dimension.

Party Level Contextual Shifts

⁵⁰ High and Low Authoritarians defined as at least 1 standard deviation above or below the mean of the standardized authoritarianism scale, respectively.


To ascertain the mechanisms by which authoritarian dispositions have structured partisan affiliations over the past 40 years, I first examine party-level ideological, voting cohesion, and demographic trends from 1973-2012. Consistent with prior research (Levendusky 2009, Poole & Rosenthal 1997, McGlynn, Carson & Lebo 2007), I find greater ideological distance between the Republican and Democratic parties, increased ideological extremity in voting within each party, and increased within-party voting unity common within the political science literature (see Figures 5.7 & 5.8). As Democrats' and Republicans' revealed ideological voting preferences became more Liberal and Conservative, respectively, across this time period, the parties ultimately became about 1.5 times more ideologically divergent from one another in 2012 than they were in 1973 – clearly demonstrating party-level ideological polarization. Concurrently, Senators in each of the two parties became more unified in their Congressional voting behaviors over this same time span, with median Party Unity scores increasing from 77.1% and 84.5% for Republicans and Democrats, respectively, in the 93rd Congress, to 90.2% and 95.4%, respectively, by the 112th Congress⁵¹. Thus, over the past four decades, party elites became more ideologically distinct from the other side, and more supportive of their in-party legislative preferences, providing the contextual-level backdrop that citizens used to interpret the political landscape through the lens of their own authoritarian dispositions.

Figure 5.7. Ideological Distance and Extremity of Democratic & Republican Senators (1973-2012)



⁵¹ Figures showing the DW Nominate and Unity score trends from 1973-2012 by region can be found in Appendix E.

Figure 5.8. Within Party Voting Unity of Democratic & Republican Senators (1973-2012)



But the Democratic and Republican parties have changed over the past decades in ways beyond ideological differences, such that each party’s membership now represents specific demographic and social groups within American society. As individuals from non-traditional groups (i.e. women, African-Americans, Latinos, non-Protestant Christians) have increasingly been elected to national political offices (see Figure 5.9), demographic diversification of elites occurred heterogeneously across the parties. On one hand, Republican elites have consistently reflected White, Male, Protestant Christians, with 70% or more of Republican Senators holding this demographic profile since the 1970’s. In contrast, the Democratic Party diversified – its percentage of White, Male, Protestant Christian Senators dropped precipitously in the 1990’s and 2000’s. Of particular importance is the 1992 election as a critical year in this process (the lateral line in the graph, also referred to as “the year of the woman⁵²” and the year in which Pat Buchanan announced the “culture war” at the Republican National Convention). Before then both parties were diversifying at about the same rate. However, after the 1992 election, the Democrats elected many more “diverse” Senators, while the Republican elites remained relatively socially homogeneous as White, Male, Protestant Christians⁵³.

⁵² <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/13/electing-more-women-to-congress-isnt-a-solution-for-polarization/>

⁵³ Supplemental descriptive analyses by region reveal that this trend of Democratic diversification occurred nationally, and was not a phenomenon tied directly to Southern realignment.

Figure 5.9. Party Elites' Demographic Composition by Party and Year




Figure 5.10. Party Elites' Demographic Composition by Party, Year and Region





Figure 5.11. Party Elites' Demographic Breakdown by Party and Year



There is some regional heterogeneity in these demographic trends (see Figure 5.10), wherein both Democrats and Republicans diversified at the same rate in some regions (e.g. New England, Mid-Atlantic), Democrats became increasingly diverse relative to Republicans in other regions (e.g. West South Central, Pacific), and both parties remained socially homogeneous in still other regions (e.g. South Atlantic, East South Central). Interestingly, these regional patterns of elites' demographic diversification coincide with the relative regional breakdowns of authoritarianism (see Figure 5.1) – indicating at the very least a correlational relationship between individuals authoritarian dispositions and their propensities for electing socially diverse Senators. Further, the social diversification of party elites' is driven primarily by the increases of women and non-Protestants in the Senate (see Figure 5.11)⁵⁴. While over 80% of both parties' Senators ethnically identified as White across the time period, the percentage of women increased from 0% to 10% and 0% to 23% for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. The majority of the diversification, in both parties, stemmed from the decrease of Protestant Christian Senators, such that in the 93rd Congress 87.8% and 72.7% of Republican and Democrat Senators, respectively, affiliated with a Protestant Christian religious denomination; whereas by the 112th Congress the percentages of Senators from Protestant Christian backgrounds dropped to 79.2% and 44.2% for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. With this descriptive knowledge of the ideological, voting unity, and demographic changes among party elites since the 1970's, I can turn to a more statistically rigorous examination of how these factors conditioned the effects of authoritarianism on mass partisanship.

⁵⁴ The percentages of White, Male, and Protestant Senators by Party hold similar patterns across regions (see Appendix E).

Mechanisms of Authoritarian Sorting in Isolation

The second hypothesis argues that, in isolation, party elites’ ideological positions, within-party voting cohesion, and demographic compositions will all condition the effect of individuals’ authoritarian dispositions on their party identifications. While this exploratory hypothesis is agnostic towards which party and contextual mechanism will have the largest effect on authoritarianism’s role in shaping mass party identification, I anticipate significant interactive relationships between individuals’ authoritarian dispositions and the party-level factors which tap into authoritarians’ epistemic needs for order, certainty, security, oneness, and sameness in their social world, such that as an individual holds stronger authoritarian dispositions her party identity will be more responsive to these elite-level shifts.

To test these effects, I estimate a series of hierarchal multi-level models which appropriately incorporate individual and party-level factors, account for the longitudinal nature of the GSS data, and provide fixed and random effects at multiple levels of analysis (see Steenbergen & Jones 2002, Gelman & Hill 2007). Even though my observations are clustered within two unique aggregate levels of analysis – U.S. census region and year – I operationally cluster my individual level data into a single upper-level unit that represents a unique region and year (e.g., Mid-Atlantic Region in 1973, Pacific Region in 1996, New England Region in 2012, etc.). Thus, my random effects are taken into account at each yearly regional unit, rather than by region or by year separately. Each model estimates the effects of authoritarianism, party elites’ ideological orientations, within-party voting cohesion, social compositions, the interaction between authoritarianism and these party-level factors, and all controls described above⁵⁵.

Table 5.1 provides empirical support for H2. First, the significant main effects of the parties’ demographic compositions in models 1 and 2 ($\beta = -0.025$ for Democrats in model 2; and $\beta = 0.028$ and $\beta = 0.027$ for Republicans, in models 1 and 2, respectively) indicate that individuals at the mean level of authoritarianism, and particularly Whites, typically affiliate with the party whose elites best exemplify social homogeneity. Additionally, and as expected, citizens at the high end of authoritarianism were particularly sensitive to the demographic makeup of party elites when expressing their party affiliations. Interestingly though, this sensitivity only appears in conjunction with the demographic composition of the Democratic Party, such that those higher in authoritarianism, on average, identified more as Democrats Party when a greater percentage of its Senators were White, Male, Protestants ($\beta = -0.018$, $p < .05$).

⁵⁵ MLM model notation for the social identity mechanism models (the other models take similar form):

$$Partisan\ Identity_{ijt} = \beta_{0jt(i)} + \beta_{1jt(i)}Authoritarianism_i + \beta_2Controls_{ijt} + \beta_3South_j + \beta_4NorthEast_j + \beta_5\%RepSenators_{jt} + \beta_6PolicyMood_t + \beta_7PresidentParty_t + \epsilon_i$$

$$B_{0jt(i)} = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_3Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{0jt}$$

$$B_{1jt(i)} = \gamma_4 + \gamma_5Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_6Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{1jt}$$


Table 5.1. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Party Identification in Party Elites' Contexts (1973-2012)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	Whites Only	All	Whites Only	All	Whites Only
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	-0.081 (0.06)	-0.234 (0.07)	-0.004 (0.058)	-0.133 (0.063)	-0.041 (0.053)	-0.205 (0.060)
Authoritarianism (standardized)	0.004 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.032** (0.012)	-0.042** (0.013)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.076 (0.024)
%Homogeneous Democrats	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.025* (0.013)				
%Homogeneous Republicans	0.028** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)				
Liberal Democrats			0.096** (0.044)	0.233** (0.049)		
Conservative Republicans			0.019 (0.025)	0.062** (0.028)		
Unity Democrats					0.117** (0.030)	0.205** (0.034)
Unity Republicans					-0.051** (0.022)	-0.009 (0.025)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Democrats</i>	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.020** (0.009)				
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Republicans</i>	0.002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.01)				
<i>Auth X Liberal Democrats</i>			0.075** (0.027)	0.107** (0.031)		
<i>Auth X Conservative Republicans</i>			0.004 (0.014)	0.028* (0.016)		
<i>Auth X Unity Democrats</i>					0.048** (0.019)	0.074** (0.021)
<i>Auth X Unity Republicans</i>					-0.003 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)
Percentage Republican Senators	0.068 (0.016)	0.078 (0.018)			0.071 (0.015)	0.077 (0.017)
Ideology	0.593 (0.01)	0.63 (0.011)	0.592 (0.010)	0.647 (0.011)	0.592 (0.010)	0.646 (0.011)
Age	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Gender	0.03 (0.004)	0.024 (0.004)	0.030 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)	0.030 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)
Education	0.099 (0.007)	0.086 (0.008)	0.103 (0.007)	0.087 (0.007)	0.103 (0.007)	0.087 (0.007)
City Type	-0.07 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.007)	-0.070 (0.006)	-0.019 (0.007)	-0.070 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.007)
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.036 (0.004)	0.013 (0.005)				
Church Attendance	0.012 (0.006)	0.034 (0.006)				
South Region	-0.023 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.028 (0.008)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.007)	0.015 (0.008)
New England Region	-0.002 (0.007)	0.009 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.009)
Policy Mood	0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Presidential Party	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.00 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)
<i>Random Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.018	0.026	0.022	0.026	0.017	0.023
Authoritarianism	0.009	0.013	0.010	0.014	0.009	0.013
Residual	0.308	0.303	0.307	0.302	0.307	0.302
N (obs)	26562	22046	27790	22920	27790	22920
N (year by region cluster)	200	200	200	200	200	200
Deviance	12823.3	10001.3	13313.8	10304.2	13280.7	10272.5

** where $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test

In a closer examination of White respondents' predicted party identifications (Figure 5.12), when Democratic elites are demographically alike, moving from low (1st percentile) to high (99th percentile) authoritarianism leads to a shift *towards* Democratic Party identification (moving from 0.442 to 0.392 on the 0-1 scale). But as Democratic elites reflect greater diversity in gender, ethnicity, and religion (i.e. groups other than White, Male Protestants), low authoritarians tend to lean Democrat (at 0.426 on the 0-1 scale), while those holding increasingly authoritarian dispositions identify more towards the Republican Party (0.482 on the 0-1 scale). Put another way, for high authoritarians, a shift of the Democratic Party from containing no White, Male Protestants to comprising exclusively White, Male Protestants leads to a 10% movement along the party identification scale towards the Democratic Party. In contrast, such demographic changes within the Republican Party (when they do occur) have no significant effect on how individuals translate their authoritarian dispositions into party affiliations.

Figure 5.12. Predicted Party Identity Values Across Levels of Authoritarianism, Conditional on Amount of Democratic Party Elites' Demographic Diversity




With these same data, I also find support for the extant, ideologically-driven approach to authoritarian sorting (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013). Displayed in models 3 and 4 of Table 5.1, as Democrats held more liberal positions⁵⁶ and Republicans more conservative ones, individuals, and again particularly Whites, at the mean level of authoritarianism, on average, affiliated more with the Republican Party. Consistent with prior research (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013), I find a significant interaction with authoritarianism among Whites, such that higher authoritarians identified even more with the Republican Party as both parties' elites held more ideologically extreme issue positions ($\beta = 0.107$ for Democrat elites, $\beta = 0.028$ for Republican elites, both $p < .05$). Unlike the conventional approach, it is the *increased liberalization of the Democratic Party*, rather than

⁵⁶ DW Nominate scores are reversed coded in these models to maintain consistent directionality of effects.

the increased conservatism of the Republican Party, that drives authoritarians to identify as Republicans. Focusing then, on White respondents and their reactions to Democratic elites (Figure 5.13), when Democrats' revealed issue preferences are the least liberal (DW Nominate Score of -0.034, reflecting moderate positions), movement from low (1st percentile) to high (99th percentile) authoritarianism produces a shift in predicted party identification in favor of the Democratic Party (from 0.46 to 0.33 on the 0-1 scale). In contrast, when Democrat elites' revealed ideology is at its most liberal (DW Nominate Score of -0.479), a shift from low to high authoritarianism leads to greater predicted identification with the Republican Party (from 0.48 to 0.56 on the 0-1 scale).

Figure 5.13. Predicted Party Identity Values Across Levels of Authoritarianism, Conditional on Amount of Democratic Party Elites' Ideological Liberalism



As such, the pattern of predicted partisan identifications along the authoritarian dimension in the presence of varying elite ideological orientations (see Figure 5.13) mirrors the pattern found in the presence of varying elite levels of social diversity (Figure 5.12). In both cases, those with greater authoritarian dispositions are more sensitive to elites' changes, such that when the Democratic Party embodies demographic homogeneity of White, Male Protestant elites, or more moderate ideological preferences, it becomes attractive. Yet, when Democrat elites are more demographically diverse or hold increasingly liberal positions, authoritarians find the Republican Party preferable. Thus, the proposed approach of authoritarian partisan sorting that is galvanized by party-level social identity changes offers the same mass polarization outcomes as the standard ideology-based theories (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Barker & Tinnick 2006, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013)⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ The effect sizes of the DW Nominate main and interaction coefficients may be deceptive as the observed values among elites only reflect about half of the 0 to 1 scale – there are no Senators that fall at the most Liberal or Conservative extremes.

Similarly, increases in within-party voting unity, particularly among Democratic Senators, also significantly impacts the link between authoritarianism and party identity. According to models 5 and 6 of Table 5.1, as Democrats increasingly voted in agreement with their fellow partisans, individuals at the mean level of authoritarianism, on average, affiliated more with the Republican Party ($\beta = 0.117$, $p < .05$), with this effect stronger among White respondents ($\beta = 0.205$, $p < .05$). Consistent with hypothesis 2, high authoritarians identified even more with the Republican Party when Democrat party elites from their home region displayed greater in-party cohesion ($\beta = 0.048$ for all respondents, $\beta = 0.074$ for White respondents, both $p < .05$). In contrast, increases in Republicans' voting unity had no impact on individuals' party affiliations across the authoritarian spectrum. Thus, as *Democrat Senators* became more unified with their fellow partisans in their voting behaviors, individuals (and particularly Whites) highest in authoritarianism increasingly identified as Republicans.

Yet, these findings reveal a theoretical anomaly such that authoritarians are not ubiquitously drawn to the party that embodies stronger cohesion among its members. Since authoritarians discriminate in favor of the Republican Party when both parties display increasing amounts of within-party voting cohesion, this leadership characteristic alone appears insufficient to garner citizens' affiliations in line with their authoritarian dispositions. Instead this pattern of effects closely mimics those from the ideological preferences models (see Table 5.1 models 3 and 4), such that when empirically testing the moderating effects of party elites' ideological positions and within-party voting unity simultaneously, all significant interactive effects of authoritarianism are washed out (see Table 5.2, models 1 and 2)⁵⁸. As such, while these party-level constructs are theoretically distinct, in practice they are highly collinear in the sense that citizens utilized both in similar fashion when linking their authoritarian dispositions to their party identifications. Consequently, I will only focus on party elites' ideological preferences and social identity compositions as the two critical mechanisms that individuals may have utilized when forming the functional match between party identity and authoritarian dispositional needs.

Mechanisms of Authoritarian Sorting in Competition

Within recent decades, the processes by which the Democratic Party became socially diverse and liberal were highly endogenous (Aldrich 2011), reflecting the issue evolution of the social domain (Carmines & Stimson 1986, 1989) and the Democrats' championing of policies aimed at supporting these otherwise excluded "diverse" groups. It is possible, therefore, that empirical support for the social identity mechanism of authoritarian sorting is simply an artifact of party divisions based on social issues (as Hetherington & Weiler 2009 would suggest). In contrast, my third hypothesis argues that citizens' authoritarian dispositions have come to influence their partisan identities primarily through *social identity matches* (H3), with the demographic diversification of Democratic Party elites contextually activating the relationship between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party affiliations (H3a), and having a greater impact on authoritarian-driven partisan sorting than elites' ideological polarization among those individuals most impacted by elite diversification (H3b). Specifically, I anticipate a significant interactive relationship between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and the social

⁵⁸ There were also no significant interactive effects of authoritarianism when this full model was run on White Protestant respondents only. This multi-collinearity is further accentuated when estimating a multi-level model that includes all three party-level factors – ideology, party unity, and demographic composition – in which there are no significant interactive effects of authoritarianism (see Table 5.2 model 3).

diversity exhibited by party elites, such that as an individual holds stronger authoritarian dispositions she will dissociate with the party that represents more “diverse” social groups (i.e. as the Democratic Party became more demographically diverse authoritarians exited it in favor of the more demographically homogeneous Republican Party). Further, this interactive pattern should hold even when controlling for the moderating effects of authoritarianism and party elites’ ideological orientations, and become accentuated among individuals whose in-group identities are reflected by “social homogeneity” (e.g. White Protestants).

To test these hypotheses, I again estimate a series of hierarchical multi-level models in which individual level GSS responses are clustered by U.S. census region and year, with the full model estimating the effects of authoritarianism, party elites’ ideological orientations and social compositions, the interaction between authoritarianism and these party-level factors, and all controls described earlier⁵⁹. When these distinct theoretical perspectives are empirically pitted against one another *among all respondents* (see Table 5.2, model 4) the ideology based approach best explains mass partisan identifications. As such, when controlling for the revealed ideological preferences of each party’s elites, authoritarianism shapes party identities only in the context of elites’ ideological movements, such that those at the mean level of authoritarianism, on average, identify more with the Republican Party as Democrats embrace more liberal issue positions ($\beta = 0.115$, $p < .05$) with this effect marginally becoming more pronounced among higher authoritarians ($\beta = 0.052$, $p < .1$). Through this aggregate lens, then, the demographic diversification of party elites plays no significant role on how authoritarian dispositions guide citizens’ party identifications.

⁵⁹ Full MLM model notation:

$$Partisan\ Identity_{ijt} = \beta_{0jt[i]} + \beta_{1jt[i]}Authoritarianism_i + \beta_2Controls_{jt} + \beta_3South_j + \beta_4NorthEast_j + \beta_5\%RepSenators_{jt} + \beta_6PolicyMood_t + \beta_7PresidentParty_t + \varepsilon_i$$

$$B_{0jt[i]} = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2Ideology_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_3Ideology_Rep_{jt} + \gamma_4Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_5Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{0jt}$$

$$B_{1jt[i]} = \gamma_6 + \gamma_7Ideology_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_8Ideology_Rep_{jt} + \gamma_9Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_{10}Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{1jt}$$

Table 5.2. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Party Identification in Varying Party Contexts (1973-2012)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	Whites Only	All	All	White Protestants	Whites Protestants
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.000 (0.059)	-0.169 (0.066)	-0.024 (0.067)	-0.110 (0.062)	-0.159 (0.081)	-0.059 (0.088)
Authoritarianism (standardized)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.066** (0.027)	-0.026 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.041 (0.042)
%Homogeneous Democrats			-0.009 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.026 (0.016)	-0.030† (0.016)
%Homogeneous Republicans			0.018 (0.011)	0.020* (0.011)	0.049** (0.016)	0.048** (0.016)
Liberal Democrats	0.106 (0.061)	0.203** (0.069)	0.075 (0.063)	0.115** (0.044)	0.324** (0.054)	0.243** (0.081)
Conservative Republicans	0.065 (0.031)	0.088** (0.035)	0.055 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.096** (0.032)	0.161** (0.043)
Unity Democrats	0.071 (0.043)	0.110** (0.049)	0.066 (0.044)			0.099† (0.055)
Unity Republicans	-0.093** (0.029)	-0.070** (0.033)	-0.079** (0.030)			-0.098** (0.043)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Democrats</i>			-0.008 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.027† (0.016)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Republicans</i>			0.000 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.015 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)
<i>Auth X Liberal Democrats</i>	0.054 (0.046)	0.038 (0.052)	0.044 (0.049)	0.052† (0.032)	0.045 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.070)
<i>Auth X Conservative Republicans</i>	0.002 (0.025)	0.014 (0.029)	0.001 (0.027)	0.008 (0.014)	0.017 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.041)
<i>Auth X Unity Democrats</i>	0.015 (0.033)	0.053 (0.037)	0.008 (0.035)			0.044 (0.049)
<i>Auth X Unity Republicans</i>	-0.002 (0.024)	0.009 (0.028)	0.006 (0.025)			0.024 (0.040)
Percentage Republican Senators	0.075 (0.016)	0.090 (0.018)	0.073 (0.017)	0.079 (0.016)	0.123 (0.021)	0.112 (0.022)
Ideology	0.591 (0.010)	0.646 (0.011)	0.592 (0.010)	0.593 (0.010)	0.618 (0.015)	0.616 (0.015)
Age	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Gender	0.030 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)	0.029 (0.004)	0.030 (0.004)	0.017 (0.006)	0.017 (0.006)
Education	0.103 (0.007)	0.087 (0.007)	0.099 (0.007)	0.099 (0.007)	0.106 (0.011)	0.106 (0.011)
City Type	-0.070 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.007)	-0.071 (0.006)	-0.070 (0.006)	0.023 (0.009)	0.022 (0.009)
Fundamentalist Christian			-0.035 (0.004)	-0.036 (0.004)	-0.031 (0.006)	-0.030 (0.006)
Church Attendance			0.013 (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)	0.062 (0.009)	0.062 (0.009)
South Region	-0.012 (0.008)	0.022 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.006 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)
New England Region	-0.016 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.080 (0.013)	0.068 (0.014)
Policy Mood	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Presidential Party	0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)
<i>Random Effects</i>						
Intercept	0.017	0.021	0.017	0.018	0.015	0.015
Authoritarianism	0.010	0.013	0.011	0.010	0.015	0.016
Residual	0.307	0.302	0.308	0.308	0.308	0.308
N (obs)	27790	22920	26562	26562	12793	12793
N (year by region cluster)	200	200	200	200	200	200
Deviance	13273.4	10260.4	12803.2	12814.6	6230.9	6219.8

** where $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test, † where $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Theoretically, however, linkages between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party identities on the basis of social identity are, by definition, group specific. A perception of shared social identities between citizen and elite only makes sense when both belong to the same social groups. Thus, as the Democratic Party possessed more elites from diverse gender, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, while the Republican Party's elites remained mostly White, Male and Protestant, I should expect reactions to these demographic shifts along the authoritarian dimension most prevalent (and more powerful than reactions to elites' ideological positions) among White Protestant Christians. According to Table 5.2 model 5, and in support of Hypotheses 3, 3a and 3b, this is exactly the pattern I find. As Democrat elites comprise a greater percentage of White, Male Protestants (i.e. more cohesively reflecting these citizens' in-groups), those with greater authoritarian dispositions identify more, on average, towards the Democratic Party ($\beta = -0.031$, $p < .05$), with authoritarianism having no conditioning effects on how party level ideological positions shape partisan identities. Indeed, when controlling for both the ideological and voting unity behaviors of party elites, the only contextual mechanism that significantly conditions the effect of authoritarianism on party identity among White Protestants is the *demographic composition of Democratic Senators* (see Table 5.2, model 6).

These findings, thus far, support my theoretical perspective and provide an alternate understanding of how changes in party elites over the past forty years impacted mass partisanship. On one side, the ideological polarization of party elites matters, but insofar as citizens as a whole reacted to the liberal policy positions of the Democratic Party. Further, and counter to the conventional approach (Hetherington & Weiler 2009), increasingly conservative policy preferences among Republican elites had minimal bearing upon citizens' party identifications, compared to the effects of progressively liberal Democratic Party orientations. On the other side, from a nuanced, "in-group" perspective, my proposed theoretical mechanism of authoritarian sorting along social homogeneity/diversity lines proves robust when controlling for the increases in ideological extremity among the parties' elites. From this contextual standpoint, it is the social groups represented by the parties – and particularly how these groups cohesively reflected "traditional" in-groups or inclusively exhibited "diverse" out-groups – that serve as the primary functional link between citizens' (and particularly White Protestants') authoritarian dispositions and party identifications.

Religious Identity as a Linkage Tool

While social identity changes at the party level have a greater impact on authoritarian-driven partisan sorting among White Protestant Christians (per H3b), to the extent that authoritarianism represents motivated social conservatism (see Jost et al. 2003), these authoritarians may latch onto a party that represents White Male Protestants because that party embodies moral traditionalism values which resonate with authoritarian dispositions (Barker & Tinnick 2006, Federico et al 2011). As such, high authoritarians might be attracted to the party that possesses more socially homogeneous elites for ideological reasons that have nothing to do with an identity-based sense of in-group attachment or out-group intolerance. Indeed, as the Republican Party became characterized by its relationship with the Christian Right (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Abramowitz 2010), citizens conceptualized their ideological conservatism via their religious conservatism (Ellis & Stimson 2012). This has resulted in a conflation between religious identities and ideological orientations in current mass politics, making it challenging to decipher whether citizens' social identity linkages or their ideological linkages

have driven authoritarian partisan sorting. However, a deeper examination of religious sub-groups can provide an interesting, critical test of the mechanisms – ideology or social identity – that link citizens’ authoritarian dispositions to their party identities.

In the case of Protestant Christians, whose attractions to the Republican Party can be based on shared ideological and religious identity grounds, authoritarian dispositions would lead to the same partisan identity outcomes as elites’ demographic compositions shifted over time, regardless of the linking mechanism. However, for non-Protestants, the linkages between their religious and partisan identities may be cross-pressured. Over time, the Republican Party should attract non-Protestant authoritarians due to its conservative social issue positions, while the Democratic Party should appeal to them since its elites better reflect non-Protestants’ religious identities. This dichotomy among non-Protestants provides a clear test of the mechanisms that activate authoritarian sorting. If authoritarianism leads to party identifications through shared in-group identities, as I suggest they do, then non-Protestant authoritarians should affiliate with the Democratic Party when its elites reflect more non-Protestant religious denominations by shying away from a Republican Party characterized by Evangelical Protestants. In contrast, if authoritarianism is linked to party identity primarily through shared ideologies, then non-Protestant authoritarians should identify more strongly with the Republican Party when it is comprised by White Protestant Christians who espouse traditional moral values.


Table 5.3. The Effects of Authoritarianism and Ideology on Party Identification, Comparing Religious Identities (1973-2012)

	Protestants	White Protestants	Non-Protestants	White Non-Protestants
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Intercept	0.084 (0.080)	-0.092 (0.084)	-0.124 (0.083)	-0.237 (0.092)
Authoritarianism (standardized)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.008 (0.009)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Ideology	0.860** (0.051)	0.910** (0.058)	0.595** (0.043)	0.668** (0.048)
%Homogeneous Democrats	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.026 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.018)
%Homogeneous Republicans	0.051** (0.015)	0.065** (0.016)	0.008 (0.016)	0.002 (0.018)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Democrats</i>	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.012)	0.002 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Republicans</i>	0.016 (0.011)	0.017 (0.013)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.032** (0.012)
<i>Ideo X %Homogeneous Democrats</i>	-0.520** (0.073)	-0.508** (0.082)	-0.268** (0.071)	-0.269** (0.078)
<i>Ideo X %Homogeneous Republicans</i>	0.057 (0.078)	0.007 (0.089)	0.126* (0.071)	0.091 (0.079)
Percentage Republican Senators	0.093 (0.021)	0.093 (0.022)	0.009 (0.022)	0.021 (0.025)
Age	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)
Gender	0.025 (0.005)	0.016 (0.006)	0.040 (0.005)	0.040 (0.006)
Education	0.130 (0.010)	0.107 (0.011)	0.041 (0.009)	0.036 (0.010)
City Type	-0.061 (0.008)	0.022 (0.009)	-0.059 (0.009)	-0.038 (0.010)
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.073 (0.005)	-0.034 (0.006)		
Church Attendance	0.017 (0.008)	0.060 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.009)
South Region	-0.037 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.015 (0.010)
New England Region	0.023 (0.011)	0.063 (0.011)	0.008 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
Policy Mood	-0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.002)
Presidential Party	0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.010)
<i>Random Effects</i>				
Intercept	0.022	0.023	0.030	0.035
Authoritarianism	0.007	0.012	0.007	0.007
Ideology	0.160	0.180	0.142	0.160
Residual	0.315	0.306	0.282	0.281
N (obs)	15935	12793	11367	9735
N (year by region cluster)	200	200	200	200
Deviance	8564.9	6133.9	3612.7	3084.5

** where $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test

I test the pathways through which Protestants and non-Protestants connect their authoritarian dispositions to their partisan identities by estimating a series of multi-level models that include GSS respondents' authoritarianism, ideology, the interactions between authoritarianism and each party's level of social diversity, and the interactions between ideology and each party's level of social diversity⁶⁰. With these models, I find support for the proposed effects of authoritarianism and ideology among Protestants and non-Protestants (see Table 5.3). For Protestants (and particularly White Protestants, model 2), both authoritarianism and ideological orientations lead to the same partisan outcomes as the Democratic Party contains a lower percentage of White, Male Protestant elites. As such, greater authoritarianism ($\beta = -0.026$, $p < .05$) and conservatism ($\beta = -0.508$, $p < .05$) both led to an exodus from the Democratic Party as those elites reflected more "diverse" religious and social groups⁶¹. Accounting for ideological self-placements, when White Male Protestants comprised 50 percent or less of Democrat Senators, the average marginal effect of authoritarianism among White Protestants is significant in the direction of Republican Party identification (see Figure 5.14). Thus, among White Protestants, social identity and ideological considerations lead to similar patterns of party identification.

Figure 5.14. Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism Across Varying Democratic Party Demographic Compositions (White Protestants Only)




Note: bars represent 95% confidence intervals

⁶⁰ $Partisan\ Identity_{ijt} = \beta_{0t[i]} + \beta_{1t[i]}Authoritarianism_i + \beta_{2t[i]}Ideology_i + \beta_3Controls_{ijt} + \beta_4South_j + \beta_9NorthEast_j + \beta_9\%RepSenators_{jt} + \beta_{10}PolicyMood_t + \beta_{11}PresidentParty_t + \epsilon_i$
 $B_{0t[i]} = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_3Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{0jt}$
 $B_{1t[i]} = \gamma_4 + \gamma_5Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_6Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{1jt}$
 $B_{2t[i]} = \gamma_7 + \gamma_8Identity_Dem_{jt} + \gamma_9Identity_Rep_{jt} + \omega_{2jt}$

⁶¹ Since authoritarianism is a standardized z-score variable, while ideology is a mean-centered 0-1 variable, the range of authoritarianism values is about six times larger than the range of ideology values, and smaller effect sizes of authoritarianism reflect these scaling differences.

Figure 5.15. Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism Across Varying Republican Party Demographic Compositions (White Non- Protestants Only)



Note: bars represent 95% confidence intervals

Contrastingly, the pattern of effects among non-Protestants reveals that ideological preferences and authoritarian dispositions lead to *opposite* party identification outcomes (Table 5.3, models 3 and 4). As non-Protestants held more conservative ideological orientations, they, on average, identified more with the Democratic Party when its elites reflected a greater percentage of White Male Protestants ($\beta = -0.268$, $p < .05$) and marginally more with the Republican Party when those elites reflected this homogeneity ($\beta = 0.126$, $p < .1$), similar to the pattern found among Protestants. Authoritarian dispositions among non-Protestants, quite notably, led to *increased identification with the Democratic Party* as the Republican Party had more White Male Protestant elites ($\beta = -0.028$, $p < .05$ all; $\beta = -0.032$, $p < .05$ Whites). Displayed graphically (see Figure 5.15), when 50 percent or more of the Republican Party’s elites were White Male Protestants, the average marginal effect of authoritarianism among White non-Protestants is significantly negative, indicating that higher authoritarianism leads to party identification in the direction of the Democratic Party.

Even when controlling for individuals’ ideological orientations, authoritarianism molds party identities in the presence social and religious identity matches between citizens and party elites, but in a way that reflects dissociation from the party failing to cohesively represent those identities. Indeed, the marginal effects presented in Figures 5.14 and 5.15 reveal something of a “tipping point” for intolerance, such that as a party’s elites include more “out-group” religious denominations and ethnicities than “in-group” identities, those higher in authoritarianism are no longer attracted to it. In contrast, conservative ideological positions ubiquitously translate into support for the party that represents the greatest percentage of White, Male Protestant elites, among both Protestants and non-Protestants. Put simply, when stripping away the ideologically conservative aspects of authoritarianism, these results reveal that authoritarian dispositions shape party identities in mass politics through the trait’s innate desire to affiliate with in-groups and demonstrate intolerance towards out-groups, in support of Hypotheses 3 and 3b.

Alternate Explanations: Political Sophistication and Cohort Replacement

The significant effects of authoritarian dispositions on party identity in the presence of various party-level factors discussed above rely upon an assumption that citizens are at least somewhat knowledgeable of their political environment and can broadly witness and interpret the elite-level party shifts in ideological extremity, within-party cohesion, and demographic composition. However, prior research has indicated that the majority of citizens are unaware of such political nuances (Converse 1964, Zaller 1992, Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). Further, recent work has demonstrated that the effects of authoritarianism on political attitudes and behaviors are heterogeneous across citizens' levels of political sophistication and education; with only those most politically savvy able to directly connect their dispositions with partisan preferences (see Johnston 2013, Johnston & Wronski 2013, Federico & Reifen Tagar 2013). As the GSS does not consistently ask its respondents about political interest, engagement, or knowledge from 1973 to 2012, I use presidential election voting as a proxy for political sophistication. In keeping with extant research, I should expect to find larger significant main and interactive effects of authoritarianism on party identification among voters (61.5% of GSS respondents), and no significant effects among non-voters (38.5% of GSS respondents).

Consistent with prior analyses, among White Protestant Christian voters, the only significant moderating contextual effect on authoritarianism is the demographic composition of Democratic elites (see Table 5.4, models 1 and 2). For those White Protestants most politically engaged, as they saw a Democratic Party becoming increasingly comprised of White, Male, Protestant Senators, those higher in authoritarianism, on average, identified more with the Democratic Party ($\beta = -0.037$, $p < .05$); and conversely, identified more, on average, as Republican when Democrat Senators reflected socially diverse groups. Elites' ideological changes, on the other hand, have no significant impact on the relationship between authoritarianism and party identity. However, the effect size of the interactive relationship between Democrats' social diversity and individuals' authoritarianism on party identity is only slightly bigger among White Protestant voters, than it is among all White Protestants ($\beta = -0.031$; see Table 5.2, model 5). In contrast, among non-voters, no significant main or interactive effects of authoritarianism, party elites' ideological positions, or party elites' social identities were found⁶².

Finally, a large body of work has shown that citizens' partisan identities are highly stable over time (Campbell et al 1960, Lewis-Beck et al 2008), and are only updated under unique circumstances (Carsey & Layman 2006). Thus, even if citizens are fully aware of the elite-level changes to party structures and ideologies, they may not be able or willing to modify their long-standing partisan identity. Instead, authoritarian-based partisan sorting in the presence of elites' ideological and social identity changes may occur primarily among young voters who are exposed to the parties for the first time. However, cohort replacement does not appear to be happening, as there are no significant main or interactive effects of authoritarianism, party elites' ideological positions, or party elites' social identities among GSS respondents 25 or younger⁶³ (see Table 5.4, models 3 and 4).

⁶² This was the case when the model was run for all non-voters, and White non-voters (see Appendix E). There were not enough observations of White, Protestant non-voters to estimate a properly identified multi-level model.

⁶³ Similar non-significant effects are found when "young cohort" is defined as 30 or younger.

Table 5.4. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Party Identification – Voters and Youth Cohort (1973-2012)

	(1) All Voters	(2) White Protestant Voters	(3) All Under 25	(4) White Protestants Under 25
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Intercept	-0.183 (0.087)	-0.262 (0.107)	0.054 (0.143)	-0.114 (0.233)
Authoritarianism (standardized)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.040)	-0.006 (0.057)
%Homogeneous Democrats	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.020)	0.000 (0.026)	-0.057 (0.046)
%Homogeneous Republicans	0.018 (0.016)	0.050** (0.020)	0.027 (0.025)	0.072 (0.044)
Liberal Democrats	0.149** (0.061)	0.391** (0.071)	0.135 (0.094)	0.174 (0.142)
Conservative Republicans	-0.030 (0.032)	0.088** (0.042)	0.049 (0.055)	0.190 (0.093)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Democrats</i>	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.037** (0.019)	-0.030 (0.028)	0.008 (0.043)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Republicans</i>	0.002 (0.011)	0.021 (0.017)	0.033 (0.025)	0.041 (0.040)
<i>Auth X Liberal Democrats</i>	0.066 (0.042)	0.071 (0.058)	0.027 (0.085)	-0.093 (0.120)
<i>Auth X Conservative Republicans</i>	-0.004 (0.019)	0.019 (0.028)	0.009 (0.040)	0.035 (0.065)
Percentage Republican Senators	0.076 (0.022)	0.112 (0.027)	0.014 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.060)
Ideology	0.769 (0.013)	0.774 (0.019)	0.365 (0.027)	0.414 (0.046)
Age	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)		
Gender	0.033 (0.005)	0.015 (0.007)	0.045 (0.010)	0.029 (0.016)
Education	0.114 (0.009)	0.092 (0.013)	0.055 (0.025)	0.110 (0.041)
City Type	-0.080 (0.008)	0.028 (0.011)	-0.082 (0.016)	0.015 (0.025)
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.047 (0.006)	-0.033 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.018)
Church Attendance	0.003 (0.008)	0.050 (0.011)	0.034 (0.017)	0.090 (0.028)
South Region	-0.013 (0.011)	0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.018)	0.015 (0.027)
New England Region	-0.009 (0.012)	0.092 (0.017)	0.002 (0.021)	0.061 (0.041)
Policy Mood	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Presidential Party	0.001 (0.009)	0.010 (0.012)	0.018 (0.015)	0.011 (0.026)
<i>Random Effects</i>				
Intercept	0.025	0.022	0.012	0.000
Authoritarianism	0.009	0.015	0.033	0.000
Residual	0.317	0.314	0.284	0.287
N (obs)	16507	8250	3297	1258
N (year by region cluster)	191	191	200	190
Deviance	8988.3	4297.8	1083.7	408.8

** where $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test

5.3 Conclusion

Through an examination of individual level survey data from the GSS, embedded within party-level ideological polarization and demographic composition factors, I found support for party elites' social identities as a contextual mechanism linking citizens' authoritarian dispositions to their partisan identities, and all of my hypotheses. The descriptive trends of the micro- and macro-level data revealed support for hypothesis 1. In particular, high authoritarians leaned more Democratic than low authoritarians throughout the 1970's and 1980's until their party affiliations flipped in favor of the Republican Party starting in the 1990's. Further, Republicans, on average, did not become more authoritarian during this time period, rather Democrats (and particularly White Democrats) became increasingly less authoritarian, on average, with this general trend coinciding with the Democratic Party's diversification of elected officials following the 1992 election.

Utilizing a series of multi-level models, I also demonstrated support for hypotheses 2, 3, 3a and 3b. Specifically, I showed that shifts in party elites' demographic compositions activated authoritarianism's impact on mass party identification. Notably, it was the diversification of the Democratic Party, as they elected increasing numbers of women, minorities, and non-Protestant Christians to the Senate, which drove the authoritarian sorting process. While I do replicate the role of elites' ideological polarization as a mechanism of authoritarian-based partisan sorting (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009), when empirically pitted against the social identity mechanism, elites' ideological preferences failed to significantly condition the effect of authoritarianism on party identity. Finally, by comparing the ideological and authoritarian considerations of White Protestants and non-Protestants, I demonstrated that citizens used party elites' identities to form the functional link between their personality dispositions and their partisan affiliations. Taken together, these findings present a story of group-based authoritarianism where citizens' authoritarian dispositions shape their party identifications at the mass level via the trait's innate desire to affiliate with in-groups (see Duckitt 1989) and demonstrate intolerance towards out-groups (see Stenner 2005).

Chapter 6

Authoritarianism's Impact on Affective and Ideological Partisan Polarization

When citizens view their party affiliations as cohesive amalgamations of their other salient social identities that possess strong leadership and members who all share the same values and belief systems, these assessments should lead to stronger psychological bonds with their party identity, making it their ultimate source positive social esteem (via social identity theory, Tajfel & Turner 1979). Since authoritarianism structures the nature of citizens' partisan identities, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, these dispositional traits should ultimately yield a qualitatively different type of party attachment – one in which citizens' partisanship resembles sports fanships (Mason 2014, Mason 2013) – that taps into the party identity's importance, appropriateness, and inclusiveness (Huddy, Mason & Aaroe, 2013, Huddy & Khatib 2007). Further, when demographic realities match citizens' subjective perceptions of their in-party members, authoritarians should sort themselves into the party that best represents their demographic social groups, a process depicted in Chapter 5.

This kind of party identity as a social identity, and its related large-scale sorting process, should produce an emotional intensification which drives long-standing political in-group attachments (Campbell et al 1960, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002), political behaviors (Huddy et al 2010), and partisan polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). For instance, an individual who cognitively conceptualizes her social identities in such rigid, cohesive terms with a controlling leadership structure that aligns all members' values into one uniform entity, all of her psychological eggs are in one basket when it comes to maintaining her positive self-concept (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Ultimately, through such a “convergent” partisan identity, authoritarian dispositions can be linked to downstream phenomena of affectively charged partisan polarization (see Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012), and ideological divides (Hetherington & Weiler 2009).

As such, the goal of this empirical chapter is to demonstrate that authoritarianism, by working through the “convergent” party identity mechanism, leads to affective and ideological polarization outcomes. While the “convergent” party identity theoretically encompasses both perceptions of overlapping social and political group members, and in-party trait perceptions of strong leadership and members with shared values (see Chapter 2), based upon the findings in Chapter 4, I will only focus on the latter aspects of this construct when examining the downstream effects of the full theoretical model. With the conflation between the measurement of overlapping political identities and the nature of current political demographic coalitions, this operationalization of the “convergent” party identity mechanism is unsuitable for testing the full theoretical path of authoritarian-driven partisan polarization. In contrast, authoritarianism significantly predicted citizens' perceptions of their in-party as possessing strong internal leadership and members who shared the same beliefs equally across Democrats and Republicans.

Thus, across three studies, each utilizing a unique sample and survey method, I test the theoretical pathway from authoritarian dispositions, to cohesive in-party trait perceptions, to political polarization phenomena with the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals' authoritarian dispositions and in-party cohesion trait perceptions will both directly lead to increased affective party attachments.

H1a: Authoritarianism will also have an indirect effect on increased affective party attachments, as mediated through perceptions of in-party cohesion traits.

H2: Individuals' authoritarian dispositions and in-party cohesion trait perceptions will both directly lead to attributions of greater ideological distance between the two parties.

H2a: Authoritarianism will also have an indirect effect on greater ideological distance attributions between the two parties, as mediated through perceptions of in-party cohesion traits.

H3: Individuals' authoritarian dispositions and in-party cohesion trait perceptions will directly lead to more ideologically extreme social, economic, and national security issue preferences, such that low authoritarians will hold more liberal attitudes while high authoritarians will hold more conservative attitudes.

H3a: These direct effects will be moderated by strength of party identity in the case of economic issues that require information from political elites to form ideologically constrained preferences.

H3b: Authoritarianism will also have an indirect effect on holding more ideological extreme issue preferences in these domains, as mediated through perceptions of in-party cohesion traits.

6.1 Methods

Procedure. Three separate studies, each utilizing a unique sample and mode, were conducted to test the above hypotheses. In the first study, a nation-wide random digit dial (RDD) telephone survey, respondents were asked to list the various social groups they belonged to, make comparisons between the members of these groups, characterize members of the Republican and Democratic Party in terms of their social groups, rate each political party on various organizational traits, and provide personal values and demographics. Second, utilizing an online survey through the Qualtrics platform, and recruiting the sample through BackPage.com and Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, respondents ranked the importance of various social groups they belonged to, characterized members of the Republican and Democratic Party in terms of these social groups, rated each political party on various organizational traits, assessed

the ideological distance within and between members of the Republican and Democratic parties, and provided personal attitudes on various social, economic, and national security policies. Third, as part of an experimental study aimed at examining the dynamics between threats to political cohesion (in the form of extreme political factions) and ideological movement across levels of authoritarianism⁶⁴, a sample of Stony Brook University undergraduate students responded to a variety of items regarding their perceptions of overlapping party and social group members, authoritarian dispositions, affective in-party attachments, and demographic backgrounds.

Details regarding all three samples and the specific batteries the questionnaire modules are covered in Chapter 4. From that discussion, the measures of authoritarianism, overlapping party identities, party cohesion traits, party identity, and controls are pertinent to the present hypotheses and analyses. Therefore, this section only describes the study components novel to this chapter.

In-Party Attachment Strength. The dependent variable used to test hypotheses 1 and 1a, *Partisan Attachment*, was based upon four items developed by Huddy & Khatib (2007) that were intended to assess “the degree to which the respondent finds an identity important, appropriate, and inclusive.” (Huddy et al 2010, pg. 9) Respondents in all three studies received these questions based upon their self-identified party affiliation, where, for example, Republicans were asked about their Republican identity, and pure Independents were not given the scale. These items specifically asked: 1) the importance of being a Democrat/Republican; 2) how well the term Democrat/Republican described them; 3) how often they used “we” instead of “they” to describe Democrats/Republicans; and 4) the extent to which they thought of themselves as being a Democrat/Republican (see Appendix F for full text). These items were combined and rescaled 0 to 1, from the least to the greatest partisan attachment (alpha = .799, mean = .55, sd = .23 in the RDD phone sample; alpha = .878, mean = .495, sd = .234 in the internet sample⁶⁵; and alpha = .829, mean = .457, sd = .208 in the undergraduate student sample⁶⁶).

Party Distance and Feeling Thermometers. In the non-probability internet study, I utilize three distinct measures to assess respondents’ partisan polarization, the dependent variable for hypotheses 2 and 2a: 1) perceived within party similarity on government goals, 2) perceived between party differences on government goals, and 3) feeling thermometers for the Democratic and Republican parties. The within party similarity construct is operationalized through two items that asked respondents, “In your opinion, how similar are Republicans/Democrats to one another in terms of what they want government to do and not do?” on a 5-point scale, ranging from extremely similar to not similar at all. As I am interested in these opinions as they relate to a respondents in-party, I use the item on Republicans for Republican respondents, the item on Democrats for Democrat respondents, and exclude pure Independents (N=110) from the analysis. Thus, *Within Party Similarity*, reflects the perceived level of agreement among *in-party* elites

⁶⁴ Due to a severe lack of power in this study such that no significant between-group differences in the dependent variable were gleaned, discussion of this experiment’s future directions will be covered in Chapter 7.

⁶⁵ The mean difference between Democrats and Republicans on this measure (0.06 on the 0-1 scale, with Democrat respondents exhibiting greater attachment) is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level.

⁶⁶ There are no significant mean differences between Democrats and Republicans on this measure, nor are there any significant mean differences between those subjects deemed attentive versus inattentive.

and members regarding what the government should do, reverse coded and scaled 0-1 such that 0=not similar at all to 1=extremely similar (mean = 0.566, sd = 0.211)⁶⁷.

Next, perceived between-party differences were tapped through the single item, “In your opinion, how different are Republicans and Democrats from one another in terms of what they want government to do and not do?” with responses located on a 5-point scale from extremely different to not different at all. The variable, *Between Party Distance*, contains the reverse-coded responses to this item, scaled 0-1 such that 0 = not different at all and 1 = extremely different (mean = 0.676, sd = 0.245)⁶⁸.

Finally, respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 their feelings about the Democratic and Republican parties, where ratings 0 through 4 meant that the respondent did not feel favorably towards that party, a rating of 5 meant that the respondent didn’t particularly feel warm or cold towards the party, and ratings 6 through 10 meant that the respondent felt favorably towards the party (see Appendix F for full item text). Based upon these two feeling thermometers, I generated the variables *In-party Feel* and *Out-party Feel*, that reflected respondents’ feelings towards their self-identified in- and out-parties, respectively (and as such pure Independent observations, N=110, were excluded), and were rescaled 0-1. As expected, respondents felt markedly warmer towards their in-party (mean = 0.656, sd = 0.236) than they did towards their out-party (mean = 0.198, sd = 0.189), with significantly warmer in-party feelings among Democrats (mean = 0.686, sd = 0.225) than among Republicans (mean = 0.552, sd = 0.242), and significantly colder out-party feelings among Democrats (mean = 0.18, sd = 0.18) than among Republicans (mean = 0.25, sd = 0.205)⁶⁹. The main dependent variable used in the subsequent polarization analyses, *Feeling Distance*, is calculated by subtracting *Out-party Feel* from *In-party Feel* and is scaled -1 to 1 where positive values reflect liking the in-party more than the out-party, negative values reflect liking the out-party more than the in-party, and values further away from zero reflect greater disparity of these feelings. On average, respondents revealed more favorable feelings towards their in-party relative to their out-party (mean = 0.441, sd = 0.294), with this in-party favoritism significantly bolstered among Democrats (mean = 0.493, sd = 0.274) as compared to Republicans (mean = 0.286, sd = 0.301)⁷⁰.

Social, Economic, and National Security Issue Preferences. The non-probability internet study included a variety of questions that tapped into respondents’ opinions on salient policy issues, which in turn, served as the dependent variables, *Social Issues*, *Economic Issues*, and *Security Issues*, used to test hypotheses 3 and 3a. In order to measure social issue policy preferences, respondents were asked their attitudes about abortion, same-sex marriage, and same-sex couples adopting children. For abortion attitudes, respondents were asked to select one of four opinions that best represented their view on abortion ranging from “by law, abortion should never be permitted;” to “by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.” For homosexual rights’ attitudes, respondents were asked to respond on 4-point scale from “strongly favor” to “strongly oppose” whether or not they favored or opposed

⁶⁷ The mean difference between Democrats and Republicans on this measure (0.045 on the 0-1 scale, with Democrat respondents exhibiting greater perceptions of within-party similarity) is statistically significant at the p<.05 level.

⁶⁸ There are no significant differences in the mean level of perceived between party distance across Democrats and Republicans.

⁶⁹ These starker feeling thermometer differences among Democrats likely reflect the nature of this internet sample that leans heavily liberal, and contains few conservatives (or conservatives of the libertarian variety).

⁷⁰ Again, this difference is most likely due to the ideological composition of the internet sample.

allowing same-sex couples to marry and allowing same-sex couples to adopt a child⁷¹. To create the dependent variable *Social Issues*, these three items were scaled together, such that higher values represent more conservative issue preferences (alpha = 0.86), and recoded 0-1, where 0=most liberal and 1=most conservative attitudes. Given the highly liberal skew of this sample, respondents held more liberal attitudes on these social issues (mean = 0.218, sd = 0.294), with Democrats, on average, holding significantly more liberal attitudes than Republicans (mean = 0.132, sd = 0.232 for Democrats, mean = 0.455, sd = 0.321 for Republicans).

To capture economic attitudes, respondents were given a 2-item battery asking about their social welfare preferences. Items included: “Do you think that the government should provide more services than it does now, fewer services than it does now, or about the same number of services as it does now?” with responses on a 5-point scale from “a lot fewer services” to “a lot more services;” and, “Do you think the federal government has become so large and powerful that it interferes too much in the personal lives of ordinary citizens?” with responses on a 5-point scale from “does not interfere at all” to “interferes extremely too much.” The dependent variable, *Economic Issues*, was created by scaling these two items together (Pearson’s $r = 0.337$, $p < .05$), such that higher values represented more economically conservative social welfare preferences, and recoded 0-1, where 0=most liberal and 1=most conservative attitudes. Even with the liberal composition of this sample, economic issue preferences, on the whole, were moderate (mean = 0.493, sd = 0.226) with Republicans holding significantly more conservative attitudes than Democrats (mean = 0.412, sd = 0.179 for Democrats, and mean = 0.709, sd = 0.215 for Republicans).

Lastly, to measure respondents’ attitudes regarding the tradeoffs between national security policies and maintaining individuals’ civil liberties, I utilized a 2-item battery. The questions included: “Imagine that the U.S. government suspects a person in the United States of being a terrorist. Do you favor or oppose the government being able to put this person in prison for months without ever bringing the person to court and charging him or her with a crime?” and “Do you favor or oppose the U.S. government being required to get a court order before it can listen in on phone calls made by American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists?” For each item, respondents provided their opinions on a 6-point scale from “favor a great deal” to “oppose a great deal.” The dependent variable, *Security Issues*, was created by scaling these two items together (Pearson’s $r = 0.355$, $p < .05$), such that higher values represent more favorable opinions of national security policies, and recoded 0-1, where 0=most favorable to civil liberties and 1=most favorable to national security. Respondents’ decidedly were opposed to national security enforcement measures that would undermine individuals’ civil liberties (mean = 0.219, sd = 0.236) with Republicans significantly more favorable to strong national security policies than Democrats (mean = 0.202, sd = 0.1 for Democrats, and mean = 0.284, sd = 0.216 for Republicans).

6.2 Results

⁷¹ See Appendix for the full text of all three items.

Authoritarianism and Affective Partisan Attachment

I explore the broader implications of my group-based authoritarianism model on individuals’ partisan attachments, specifically through hypothesis 1 and 1a, wherein authoritarianism, as mediated by perceptions of in-party cohesion traits (i.e. beliefs that one’s party possesses strong internal leadership structures and members who all share the same views, ranging from 0=the out-party best represents both traits to 1=the in-party best represents both traits⁷²) ; leads to increased affective in-party attachments. These party trait perceptions should mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and affective party attachments for both Republicans and Democrats, since authoritarianism predicted greater perceptions of these in-party traits consistently across parties (see Chapter 4). First, I assess the direct effects of individuals’ authoritarian dispositions and their in-party cohesion perceptions on affective party attachment (controlling for ideology, college degree, age, ethnicity, and gender⁷³) in the RDD telephone and non-probability internet studies, with a series of OLS regressions with robust standard errors.

Table 6.1 Direct Effects of Authoritarianism and Cohesion Traits on Party Attachment (RDD Telephone Sample)

	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Constant	0.571**	0.051	0.501**	0.051	0.485**	0.053
Authoritarianism	0.097**	0.044			0.050	0.044
Cohesion Traits			0.160**	0.034	0.148**	0.037
Ideology	0.068	0.056	0.054	0.053	0.038	0.054
College Degree	-0.023	0.028	-0.049*	0.026	-0.041	0.027
Age	0.101*	0.059	0.146**	0.060	0.145**	0.060
White	-0.140**	0.036	-0.116**	0.037	-0.110**	0.037
Gender	-0.070**	0.027	-0.073**	0.026	-0.076**	0.026
N	281		269		265	
R ²	0.1308		0.1967		0.1981	

where ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

⁷² Pearson’s $r = 0.41$, $p < .05$, mean = 0.683, sd = 0.4 in the RDD sample; Pearson’s $r = 0.24$, $p < .05$, mean = 0.427, sd = 0.39 in the internet sample

⁷³ See the first empirical chapter for the coding of these variables. When controlling for an individual’s strength of party identity in the RDD sample, this control represents the majority of the variance in the model, leaving no other significant direct or indirect effects.

Table 6.2. Direct Effects of Authoritarianism and Cohesion Traits on Party Attachment (Non-probability Internet Sample)

	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Constant	0.041	0.026	0.038	0.026	0.031	0.026
Authoritarianism	0.093***	0.020			0.082***	0.021
Cohesion Traits			0.056***	0.018	0.043**	0.018
Party ID Strength	0.562***	0.026	0.572***	0.025	0.558***	0.026
Ideology	-0.090***	0.029	-0.069**	0.027	-0.102***	0.028
College Degree	0.047***	0.013	0.049***	0.013	0.048***	0.013
Age	0.079***	0.028	0.094***	0.029	0.088***	0.028
White	0.015	0.014	0.005	0.014	0.015	0.014
Gender	0.053***	0.013	0.051***	0.013	0.052***	0.013
N	644		644		644	
R ²	0.5202		0.5141		0.5248	

where *** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

The pattern of coefficients displayed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, provides clear support for hypothesis 1, and presents evidence for a mediational relationship between authoritarianism, party cohesion traits, and affective party attachments. In the RDD sample, authoritarianism is significantly associated with approximately a 9% increase in party attachment when cohesiveness traits are excluded from the model ($\beta = 0.097$, $p < .05$). When accounting for in-party cohesion traits, however, authoritarianism fails to reach statistical significance in the RDD phone survey ($\beta = 0.05$, n.s.), and decreases in effect size from a 9% ($\beta = 0.093$, $p < .01$) to an 8% increase ($\beta = 0.082$, $p < .01$) in affective party attachments, yet remains statistically significant, in the internet study. Thus, in two completely different samples of Americans, I find that movement across the full authoritarian dimension relates to approximately a 10% increase in the emotional intensity of party affiliations, supporting hypothesis 1 and my theoretical argument that authoritarians do indeed hold stronger in-group political attachments (see also Duckitt 1989).

Further, respondents' perceptions of party cohesion traits significantly predict increased affective partisan attachment, regardless of whether authoritarianism is excluded ($\beta = 0.16$, $p < .05$ in the RDD sample) or included in the model ($\beta = 0.148$, $p < .05$ in the RDD sample). Similarly in the internet study, respondents' perceptions of their in-party as embodying a strong internal leadership with members who all share the same views and beliefs relates to a 5% increase in partisan attachment ($\beta = 0.056$, $p < .01$), with these trait perceptions leading, on average, to a 4% increase in affective party attachments when controlling for authoritarianism. As these patterns of coefficients reflect a mediational relationship, I estimate the direct and indirect effects of authoritarianism on greater party attachments vis a vis cohesive party perceptions, using structural equation modeling (SEM package) in Stata 13. These models simultaneously regresses affective partisan attachment on cohesive party traits (with authoritarianism and above controls), and cohesive party traits on authoritarianism and all above controls. All latent factors in both parts of the mediational model, are treated as unconstrained, free parameters to be uniquely estimated in each equation.

Table 6.3. Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to Partisan Attachment (RDD Telephone Sample)

	Party Cohesion Traits	Affective Party Attachment	Affective Party Attachment
	β (SE)	<i>Direct Effects</i> β (SE)	<i>Indirect Effects</i> β (SE)
Constant	0.53*** (0.095)	0.451*** (0.057)	
Cohesion Traits		0.15*** (0.035)	
Authoritarianism	0.3*** (0.072)	0.044 (0.043)	0.045*** (0.015)
Ideology	0.219** (0.09)	0.033 (0.052)	0.033** (0.016)
College Degree	0.012 (0.047)	-0.044* (0.027)	0.002 (0.007)
Age	-0.019 (0.084)	0.141*** (0.048)	-0.003 (0.013)
White	-0.121** (0.059)	-0.094*** (0.034)	-0.018* (0.01)
Gender	-0.017 (0.045)	-0.079*** (0.026)	-0.003 (0.007)
N	272		
Log Likelihood	-701.815		


where *** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$

Table 6.4. Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to Partisan Attachment (Non-probability Internet Sample)


	Party Cohesion Traits	Affective Party Attachment	Affective Party Attachment
	β (SE)	<i>Direct Effects</i> β (SE)	<i>Indirect Effects</i> β (SE)
Constant	0.215*** (0.055)	0.031(0.025)	
Cohesion Traits		0.043** (0.017)	
Authoritarianism	0.247*** (0.048)	0.082*** (0.021)	0.011** (0.005)
Party ID Strength	0.113* (0.058)	0.558*** (0.026)	0.005 (0.003)
Ideology	0.262*** (0.061)	-0.102*** (0.027)	0.011** (0.005)
College Degree	-0.021 (0.029)	0.048*** (0.013)	-0.001 (0.001)
Age	-0.201*** (0.06)	0.088*** (0.027)	-0.009** (0.004)
White	-0.004 (0.033)	0.015 (0.014)	-0.0001 (0.001)
Gender	0.025 (0.03)	0.052*** (0.013)	0.001 (0.001)
N	644		
Log Likelihood	-1548.6742		

where *** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Figure 6.1. Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to Partisan Attachment
A. RDD Telephone Sample



B. Non-probability Internet Sample



Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients and SE's. All variables are coded 0-1. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$ and *** $p < .01$

These mediational models provide compelling empirical support for hypothesis 1a (see Tables 6.3 & 6.4, and Figure 6.1). As respondents held more authoritarian dispositions, they increasingly perceived their in-party (regardless of whether it was the Democratic or Republican Party) as embodying a strong internal leadership and members who all shared the same values and beliefs ($\beta = 0.3$, $p < .01$ in the RDD sample, Table 6.3; $\beta = 0.25$, $p < .01$ in the internet sample, Table 6.4). These cohesive trait perceptions of respondents' in-parties, in turn, led them to increased affective attachments with their party ($\beta = 0.15$, $p < .01$ in the RDD sample, Table 6.3; $\beta = 0.043$, $p < .05$ in the internet sample, Table 6.4). In contrast, authoritarianism, had no *direct* impact on such affective party attachments in the RDD sample (but did have a significant direct effect in the internet sample, $\beta = 0.082$, $p < .01$), and, in both studies, influenced these emotionally-laden political outcomes *indirectly* through perceptions of one's party as a tight-knit, cohesive entity ($\beta = 0.045$, $p < .01$ RDD sample; $\beta = 0.011$, $p < .05$ internet sample).

Finally in the undergraduate student study, I replicate only the direct impact of authoritarianism on individuals' emotionally charged attachments to their in-party, as this study omitted questions on parties' leadership and membership cohesiveness. To do so, I estimated an OLS model using robust standard errors that regresses the amount of affective party attachment


on authoritarianism and individual level controls for ideology, religious affiliation, and gender.⁷⁴ Further, only those participants who identified as White and U.S. citizens were included in these analyses, in order to maintain sample consistency with the primarily White samples in the telephone and internet studies, and to purge this current sample of the ethnically diverse international students common to Stony Brook University, for whom strong partisan attachment and perceptions of overlapping party identities may not resonate with their foreign background.

Table 6.5. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Affective Partisan Attachments (Undergraduate Student Sample, White Citizens Only)

	β	SE
Constant	0.389***	0.055
Authoritarianism	0.123	0.093
Ideology	0.016	0.122
Protestant Christian	-0.052	0.065
Gender	-0.044	0.051
N	80	
R ²	0.0354	

where *** when $p < .01$ on a two-tailed test

Figure 6.2. Predicted Affective Partisan Attachments across Authoritarianism (Undergraduate Student Sample, White Citizens Only)



Bars represent 95% CI's

These analyses (see Table 6.5) provide directional, but not statistically significant, support for H1. Among White citizen participants, authoritarianism has a positive impact on respondents' affective attachments to their in-party ($\beta = 0.123$, $p=0.191$), such that movement across the full authoritarian dimension is related to approximately a 12% increase in partisan attachment (see Figure 6.2 for graphical depiction). While this effect is substantively larger

⁷⁴ See Chapter 4 for the coding of these variables. With the small sample, controlling for individuals' strength of party ID leaves no other significant direct or indirect effects.

among these participants than it was among respondents in the telephone and internet studies (a 12% increase as compared to an 8% increase), this underpowered study (particularly with so few observations at the upper end of the authoritarianism dimension) produces inefficient estimates of affective party attachments. If this study were sufficiently powered, I suspect that the hypothesized relationship between authoritarianism and affective party attachments would be replicated.

Overall, I demonstrate strong support for the role of authoritarianism on affectively charged party identities. When using traits perceptions of cohesive party leadership and membership as a measure of the “convergent” party identity, I fully demonstrated the mediational pathway from authoritarianism to “convergent” party identity to stronger emotional party attachments that was proposed in hypothesis 1a. This empirical evidence supports my theoretical model of a group-based authoritarian construct and its downstream effects on partisan polarization, as I illustrate a meaningful link between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions, their *epistemically motivated* perceptions of their partisan identities (via cohesive party organization perspectives association with the “convergent” partisan identity), and their *affective* attachments to their in-party.

Authoritarianism and Partisan Polarization

The second hypothesis proposes that authoritarians should attribute greater distance between the two parties, such that there will be a positive relationship between authoritarian dispositions and perceptions of partisan polarization. Using cognitive and affective measures of polarization (see the methods section for descriptions of each), I propose that authoritarianism, as it operates directly and indirectly through the mechanism of the “convergent” party identity, generates partisan polarization at the mass level. I begin by exploring the direct relationships between authoritarianism and in-party cohesion perceptions on cognitive beliefs that the two parties are extremely dissimilar in what they think the government should or should not do.


Table 6.6. Ordered Probit Effects of Authoritarianism and Cohesion Traits on Party Dissimilarity (Non-Probability Internet Sample)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Authoritarianism	0.296**	0.132			0.25*	0.149
Cohesion Traits			0.103	0.115	0.061	0.115
Ideology	-0.58***	0.178	-0.459**	0.185	-0.552***	0.196
College Degree	-0.006	0.078	-0.067	0.085	-0.072	0.086
Age	0.588***	0.17	0.774***	0.182	0.751***	0.182
White	0.086	0.089	0.084	0.097	0.117	0.096
Gender	-0.112	0.078	-0.101	0.085	-0.01	0.085
<i>Cut1</i>	-2.157		-2.56		-2.509	
<i>Cut2</i>	-1.098		-1.283		-1.239	
<i>Cut3</i>	-0.197		-0.327		-0.279	
<i>Cut4</i>	0.859		0.789		0.84	
N	754		644		644	
Pseudo R ²	0.0148		0.0171		0.019	

where *** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Due to the categorical nature of the perceived party distance dependent variable, I estimate a series of ordered probit models⁷⁵ (see Table 6.6), and find mixed support for hypothesis 2 with this measure of partisan polarization. On one hand, individuals’ authoritarian dispositions significantly relate to increased cognitions that the two parties are fundamentally at odds with one another in what they think the government should and should not do ($\beta = 0.296$, $p < .05$), even when controlling for in-party cohesion trait attributions ($\beta = 0.25$, $p < .05$). On the other, perceptions of structural traits indicative of a “convergent” party identity had absolutely no effect on this form of mass partisan polarization ($\beta = 0.103$, n.s. in isolation; $\beta = 0.061$, n.s. when controlling for authoritarianism). To better interpret these effects of authoritarianism, Figure 6.3 displays the marginal predicted probabilities of thinking that the two parties are completely dissimilar in their governing goals.⁷⁶ When moving from lowest to highest in authoritarianism, the predicted probability of conceptualizing the two parties’ goals as encompassing such stark differences increases from approximately 20% to almost 30%.

Figure 6.3. Predicted Probabilities of Cognitive Polarization across Authoritarianism



The null effects of in-party cohesion traits on this measure of mass partisan polarization (Table 6.3) fail to provide any empirical support for the mediational model described in hypothesis 2a. It is possible that, regardless of the parties’ organizational structures, most Americans acknowledge that Democrat and Republican elites simply do not see eye to eye on many policy and procedural matters of governing. As such, I turn to another measure of partisan polarization that taps into the affective components of in-party favorability and out-party hostility that may resonate more soundly with authoritarian dispositions and the “convergent” party identity.

⁷⁵ As with the affective party attachment models, I exclude party identity strength as a control variable since its inclusion drives all significant effects of cognitively perceived party distance.

⁷⁶ In both marginal predicted values graphs in Figure 6.3, all additional control variables are held constant at their central tendencies.

Thus, I suspect individuals' authoritarian dispositions will lead to increased affective polarization between the parties, as operationalized through the variable *Feeling Distance*, the calculated distance of in-party versus out-party feeling thermometer responses to the Democratic and Republican parties (see the methods section for coding details). As with the perceived polarization variable, I hypothesize a direct effect of authoritarianism on increased feeling thermometer distances between the two parties, and an indirect effect working through in-party trait perceptions related to the "convergent" party identity. Turning first to the direct relationships between authoritarianism, in-party cohesion traits, and controls, on in-party versus out-party feeling distance, I focus my analyses solely on White respondents who should be most responsive to these affective measures of party identity as a social identity, since this type of polarization should be most prominent among individuals directly affected by the demographic diversity shifts in the two parties (see Chapter 5).

Table 6.7. The Effects of Authoritarianism and Cohesion Traits on Affective Polarization (Non-Probability Internet Sample, Whites Only)


	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Constant	0.308***	0.051	0.312***	0.052	0.316***	0.052
Authoritarianism	0.117**	0.051			0.127**	0.053
Cohesion Traits			-0.023	0.038	-0.041	0.039
Party ID Strength	0.297***	0.066	0.315***	0.066	0.302***	0.066
Ideology	-0.385***	0.071	-0.316***	0.066	-0.369***	0.072
College Degree	0.005	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.007	0.029
Age	0.167***	0.059	0.167***	0.06	0.158***	0.058
Gender	-0.057*	0.031	-0.06*	0.031	-0.057*	0.031
N	312		312		312	
R ²	0.2403		0.2271		0.243	

*** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Similar to the effects found with the perceived polarization dependent variable, I only gain partial support for hypothesis 2 when partisan polarization is operationalized as increased distance between warm feelings towards the in-party and cold feelings towards the out-party. Again authoritarianism is significantly associated with greater feeling thermometer distances ($\beta = 0.117$, $p < .05$), even when controlling for in-party cohesion trait attributions ($\beta = 0.127$, $p < .05$). Remarkably, these effects of authoritarianism are robust when accounting for individuals' party identity strength, a variable which explained most of the variance in affective and cognitive perceptions of party attachment and polarization in the previous models. As such, the results in the current models indicate that authoritarianism relates to the "groupiness" aspects of party identity (see Stenner 2005) and treatments of partisanship as a social identity that are associated with in-group bolstering and out-group denigration (Tajfel & Turner 1979, Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012). Figure 6.4, displaying the marginal predicted values of in-party and out-party feeling thermometer distances,⁷⁷ reveals that, when moving from least to most authoritarian, individuals reveal about a 6.5% increase in these party feeling differences (from approximately .41 to .54 on the -1 to 1 scale, where higher positive values represent more in-party warmth and out-party coldness).

⁷⁷ Predicted values calculated with all control variables are held constant at their central tendencies.

Figure 6.4. Predicted Amount of Affective Polarization across Authoritarianism (Non-Probability Internet Sample, Whites Only)



Yet, perceptions of structural traits indicative of a “convergent” party identity had absolutely no effect on this affectively charged version of partisan polarization ($\beta = -0.023$, n.s. in isolation; $\beta = -0.041$, n.s. when controlling for authoritarianism), failing to provide empirical support for hypothesis 2a, and conveying a story inconsistent with my theoretical model and the role of the “convergent” party identity in linking authoritarianism to downstream polarization attitudes and behaviors. Such inconsistency, I believe, may be the result of the social identity sorting and demographic party coalitions that have emerged in current American politics, which in turn have conflated my theoretically anticipated mechanism of singular, overarching party identity perceptions (see Chapter 4), and negated my ability to test these downstream effects of the group-based authoritarianism construct⁷⁸. Nonetheless, I find some justification for my group-based conceptualization of authoritarianism, as those individuals higher in authoritarianism express greater in-party favoritism and out-party hostility.

Authoritarianism and Ideological Polarization

Throughout their work, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that American citizens became politically divided along the authoritarian dimension as a result of elites’ divisions on a set of salient “culture war” issues which emerged from the issue evolution of the social domain (see Carmines & Stimson 1989). In particular, they specify policies related to moral traditionalism and family structure (including abortion and same sex marriage), civil liberties (particularly pertaining to national security policies enacted in the name of the war on terrorism, see Hetherington & Suhay 2011), and civil rights, as those that fundamentally tap into citizens epistemic needs for order, certainty, and security, allowing for a direct relationship between authoritarian dispositions and public opinion on these issues. Further, my own recent work

⁷⁸ In supplemental analyses both authoritarianism and overlapping party and social identities related to same magnitude of in-party warmth relative to out-party hatred. Since authoritarianism operated heterogeneous on overlapping identities (see Chapter 4), the aggregate effects of authoritarianism wash out when looking at these downstream effects.

(Johnston & Wronski 2013) demonstrates that authoritarian dispositions directly structure individuals' preferences in the "easier" social domain, while they indirectly structure preferences in the "harder" economic domain when accompanied by elite cues that can connect individuals' latent traits to symbolic political imagery.

As such, I first replicate these prior findings, and expect authoritarianism to lead to more conservative social and national security preferences ubiquitously per hypothesis 3, and to more conservative economic preferences only among those most engaged in politics (i.e. strong partisans) per hypothesis 3a. Further, I delve into the potential mechanism that has allowed authoritarianism to structure citizens' social, economic, and national security preferences. Particularly, I suggest that the relationship between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their preferences on these salient issues will be mediated through their perceptions their in-party cohesiveness traits, such that high authoritarianism will indirectly lead to more ideologically extreme attitudes.

For the present analyses social issues are operationalized as attitudes on abortion, same sex marriage, and same sex adoption; while economic issues comprise preferences on the size of government and the amount of services it should provide to citizens; and national security issues measure individuals' willingness to allow the government to imprison someone without charging them with a crime and listen in on the phone conversations of American citizens. Using a series of OLS models that regress social, economic, and national security policy preferences, each in a separate model, on authoritarianism, party identity strength, the interaction of authoritarianism and party strength, and controls for ideology, obtaining at least a college degree, age, ethnicity, and gender, I replicate the general pattern found in previous research and provide support for hypothesis 3 (see Table 6.8). When examining social and national security issue preferences, authoritarianism has a significant positive constituent effect on holding more conservative social issue preferences ($\beta = 0.194$, $p < .01$) and favoring stricter national security policies at the expense of individuals' civil liberties ($\beta = 0.203$, $p < .01$), with no significant interactive effects with partisan strength ($\beta = 0.063$, n.s. for social issues; $\beta = -0.027$, n.s. for security issues). Put simply, regardless of individuals' levels of political commitment, they can, on average, readily associate their authoritarian dispositions with the policy preferences that best reflect their moral traditionalism belief systems and their latent needs for order, certainty, and security (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Hetherington & Suhay 2011, Johnston & Wronski 2013, Jost, Federico & Napier 2009).

Table 6.8. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Social, Economic & Security Issue Preferences (Non-Probability Internet Sample)

	<i>Social Issues</i>		<i>Economic Issues</i>		<i>Nat'l Security Issues</i>	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Constant	-0.037	0.031	0.390***	0.027	0.08***	0.029
Authoritarianism	0.194***	0.062	-0.091**	0.041	0.203***	0.05
Party ID Strength	-0.026	0.034	-0.141***	0.031	0.038	0.03
Authoritarianism * PID Strength	0.063	0.089	0.162***	0.057	-0.027	0.075
Ideology	0.510***	0.041	0.431***	0.032	0.11***	0.04
College Degree	0.024	0.017	0.012	0.014	0.027	0.016
Age	0.191***	0.038	-0.007	0.029	-0.023	0.035
White	-0.025	0.019	0.052***	0.015	-0.002	0.019
Gender	-0.020	0.017	-0.022	0.015	-0.018	0.017
N	754		753		754	
R ²	0.3925		0.3283		0.1065	

*** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test

In contrast, the relationship between respondents' authoritarian dispositions and their economic policy preferences is conditional upon their level of political engagement (Table 6.8, model 2). While the constituent term of authoritarianism is significant ($\beta = -0.091$, $p < .05$), the significant positive interaction of authoritarianism with party identity strength ($\beta = 0.162$, $p < .01$) suggests that it is among those who are in tune to the political discourse who can best relate their authoritarian dispositions, on average, to conservative economic policies espoused by Republican elites (Johnston & Wronski 2013, see also Zaller 1992).

Thinking about these patterns of effects more conceptually through marginal predicted values graphs⁷⁹ (Figure 6.5), regardless of whether a respondent is a pure independent, strong Democrat, or strong Republican, authoritarianism operates analogously on social and national security issue preferences, such that low authoritarians expressed more liberal attitudes (about 0.16 for independents and 0.12 for strong partisans for social issues; about 0.14 for independents and 0.18 for strong partisans for security issues) while high authoritarians espoused more conservative attitudes (0.35 for independents and 0.39 for strong partisans on social issues; around 0.35 for both independents and strong partisans on security issues). Even though high authoritarians' issue preferences are relatively moderate on this scale (larger values represent more conservative preferences), this result is still substantively compelling given the young, secular nature of the internet sample.


Contrastingly, economic preferences regarding government intervention varied based upon the respondent's level of authoritarianism and her strength of party identity, such that low authoritarians who affiliated as pure independents expressed more conservative attitudes (around 0.575, where higher values reflect more conservative preferences) than those who identified as strong Republicans or strong Democrats (about 0.44 on the 0-1 scale)⁸⁰. At the other end of the

⁷⁹ In all marginal predicted values graphs, control variables are held constant at their central tendencies.

⁸⁰ While it is possible that these effects are due to the heavily liberal skew of the sample, when running the marginal predicted values graph among Republican identifiers only, I find the same pattern of results indicating that the heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism across levels of party strength apply to both Republicans and Democrats.

scale, high authoritarians held moderate economic preferences, with no significant differences in the predicted value of attitudes between pure independents (around 0.48) and strong partisans (around 0.5). While these effects are dominated by the highly liberal sample, such that significant group differences are only found at the lower end of the authoritarianism scale, they generally replicate the heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism on economic preferences across levels of political sophistication (see Johnston 2013, Johnston & Wronski 2013) where high authoritarians, in the absence of party elite cues actually hold more economically liberal attitudes.

Figure 6.5. Predicted Issue Preferences across Authoritarianism (Internet Sample)



Bars represent 95% CIs

Upon establishing support for hypotheses 3 and 3a, and replicating prior scholarship on the effects of authoritarianism across social, national security, and economic issue domains, these analyses thus far do not establish any novel insights, nor do they showcase the theoretical mechanism of the “convergent” party identity as the linkage tool between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions and political attitudes. I turn, thusly, to examining the role of cohesive party trait perceptions on ideologically extreme issue preferences. In particular, I focus on how individuals’ perceptions of their in-party as a cohesive entity (that has a strong, controlling internal leadership, and members who all share the same views and beliefs) mediates the relationship between authoritarianism and holding more ideological conservative attitudes on social, economic and national security issues, in line with H3b.

Table 6.9. Direct Effects of Authoritarianism and Cohesion Traits on Issue Preferences


	<i>Social Issues</i>			<i>Economic Issues</i>			<i>Security Issues</i>		
	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	β (SE)	
Constant	-0.051 (0.027)	-0.072** (0.035)	-0.092*** (0.033)	0.267*** (0.041)	0.297*** (0.039)	0.276*** (0.04)	0.086*** (0.027)	0.09*** (0.034)	0.077** (0.033)
Authoritarianism	0.231*** (0.033)		0.232*** (0.035)	0.069** (0.034)		0.076** (0.037)	0.187*** (0.028)		0.155*** (0.033)
Cohesion Traits		0.063** (0.026)	0.026 (0.024)		-0.014 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.034)		0.129*** (0.025)	0.104*** (0.026)
PartyID Strength	-0.004 (0.028)	0.067* (0.036)	0.027 (0.033)				0.029 (0.025)	0.036 (0.036)	0.009 (0.035)
Ideology	0.514*** (0.041)	0.616*** (0.041)	0.524*** (0.044)	0.479*** (0.044)	0.52*** (0.043)	0.485*** (0.043)	0.108*** (0.04)	0.151*** (0.041)	0.089** (0.042)
College Degree	0.025 (0.017)	0.02 (0.018)	0.017 (0.017)	-0.043 (0.026)	-0.043 (0.026)	-0.045* (0.026)	0.026 (0.016)	0.014 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)
Age	0.189*** (0.038)	0.215*** (0.044)	0.198*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.043)	-0.047 (0.043)	-0.043 (0.043)	-0.022 (0.035)	0.033 (0.039)	0.022 (0.038)
White	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.052 (0.022)	-0.022 (0.02)	0.051* (0.028)	0.038 (0.027)	0.05* (0.028)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.02 (0.018)	0.0001 (0.02)
Gender	0.02 (0.017)	0.016 (0.018)	0.014 (0.018)	0.016 (0.027)	0.015 (0.028)	0.014 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.018)
N	754	644	644	207	207	207	754	644	644
R ²	0.3919	0.3851	0.4407	0.4887	0.4814	0.4905	0.1063	0.0905	0.1282

where *** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$, * when $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Turning first to the social domain, I find significant direct effects of authoritarianism and cohesive party trait perceptions on respondents’ attitudes towards abortion, same sex marriage, and same sex adoption (see Table 6.9, first three columns). Increases in authoritarian dispositions and perceptions of party cohesion significantly predict more conservative social issue preferences in isolation ($\beta = 0.231$, $p < .01$ for authoritarianism, $\beta = 0.063$, $p < .05$ for cohesion traits), but when empirically modeled together only authoritarianism has a significant impact on holding conservative social attitudes ($\beta = 0.232$, $p < .01$). Looking at the mediational path, as estimated through structural equation modeling in STATA 13 (Figure 6.6), authoritarian dispositions do lead to in-party perceptions of strong leadership and cohesive members, and to conservative social issue preferences, but this latent trait does not produce these political outcomes via in-party cohesion traits, thus failing to support hypothesis 3b. It is possible that, given the ideologically content free nature of the party organizational traits, beliefs, there may be heterogeneous effects on social issue preferences across the political spectrum which may be washed out in this aggregated analysis. Indeed, when running the mediational models separately

for Republicans and Democrats, I find a significant mediational path from authoritarianism to in-party cohesion perceptions to more conservative social issue attitudes, supportive of hypothesis 3b and my full theoretical model⁸¹.

Figure 6.6 Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to Social Issue Preferences




Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients and SE's, where *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, and * $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Among economic issue preferences, in contrast, I find no empirical support for my full theoretical pathway of group-based authoritarianism, even when limiting my analyses to respondents who classified themselves as strong Democrats or strong Republicans (who, per Johnston 2013 and Johnston & Wronski 2013 should possess sufficient awareness to understand the political imagery and elite support related to limited government and social welfare policies). As expected, authoritarianism had a significant, positive effect on supporting more limited government economic preferences among political sophisticates ($\beta = 0.069$, $p < .05$ when excluding in-party cohesion trait effects, $\beta = 0.076$, $p < .05$ when including in-party cohesion trait effects). Yet, similar to the social issue preference models, perceiving one's in-party as embodying strong internal leadership and members who all share the same views and beliefs had no significant effect on individuals' economic policy attitudes. While, given the ideologically vague nature of the party cohesion traits, it is possible that individuals may believe that their fellow partisans all share the same values and beliefs on either egalitarianism, individualism, socialism, or free market limited government, additional explorations of the mediational model among strong Democrat and strong Republican sub-samples did not provide any statistically significant support for my theoretical model (perhaps because of the limited number of observations in these sub-samples). However, with recent research portraying the relationship between authoritarianism and economic preferences as highly conditional upon the political contexts of elites' message framing (see Johnston & Wronski 2013), experimental, rather than observational, methods may be more appropriate for testing my theoretical model's impact on these issue preferences.

⁸¹ See Appendix G for these results.

Figure 6.7. Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to National Security Issue Preferences



Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients and SE's, where *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, and * $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test.

Finally, when examining the direct and indirect effects of authoritarianism, as working through party cohesion trait perceptions, on national security issue preferences, I confirm my full theoretical model (see Table 6.9, last three columns). Both authoritarian dispositions and perceptions of party cohesion significantly predict preferences for national security policies that may be at the expense of civil liberties, even when controlling for each other ($\beta = 0.155$, $p < .01$ for authoritarianism, $\beta = 0.104$, $p < .01$ for cohesion traits). Through the mediational model, estimated using structural equation modeling with the SEM package in STATA 13 (Figure 6.7), authoritarian dispositions led to in-party perceptions of strong leadership and cohesive members ($\beta = 0.247$, $p < .01$), which in turn, led to more conservative national security attitudes ($\beta = 0.104$, $p < .01$), with authoritarianism indirectly, and significantly, structuring these issue preferences ($\beta = 0.026$, $p < .01$).

Not only do I confirm hypothesis 3b, but I also replicate the dynamics of authoritarianism on these issue preferences (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Hetherington & Suhay 2011), and provide implications for the level of normative threat assumed within my theoretical model. Where Hetherington & Suhay (2011) find threat induction to affect low, but not high, authoritarians' national security and war on terrorism opinions, I illustrate that in the absence of threat in a general observational measure, authoritarians are more sensitive to social order threats due to their "convergent" party identity. The strong empirical support for my mediational pathway, adds to the overall understanding of how authoritarianism structures national security issues, as these issues should highly resonate with authoritarians' epistemic needs to maintain a social and political order of "oneness and sameness" wherein all group members conform to the collective order, regardless of what that order ideologically entails (see Stenner 2005). As such, threat induction is unnecessary to activate conservative national security attitudes among authoritarians, since their beliefs of in-party cohesiveness naturally structure the link between these innate dispositional traits and group conformity preferences.

6.3 Conclusion

Overall, my findings across these three studies confirm my full theoretical model of authoritarianism as a dispositional trait that structures citizens' affective partisan attachments and conservative policy preferences; while providing partial support for the direct relationship between authoritarianism and cognitive and affective mass partisan polarization responses. Though the theoretical mechanism of the "convergent" party identity, operationalized as individuals' characterizations of their in-party as possessing strong internal leadership and members who share the same belief systems, did not always provide the empirical link between authoritarianism and these political outcomes, it played an important role in how individuals generally translated their innate authoritarian dispositions into political attitudes and behaviors. In sum, the analyses presented in this chapter validate existing scholarship on the downstream effects of authoritarianism, and provide some insights into how the group-based aspects of this trait lead to cognitive and affective mass partisan polarization.

Most notably, these party traits which serve as the "convergent" party identity mechanism contain absolutely no ideological content, yet they consistently relate to ideological policy positions, affective partisan polarization, and connect individuals' authoritarian dispositions to these political outcomes. This presents a fundamentally different story of authoritarianism than the extant treatment of this dispositional trait in the political science literature, which focuses on the relationship between such dispositions and partisan polarization as working through citizens' ideological values. In contrast, I provide a pathway from authoritarian dispositions to intense partisan attachments, and ideologically extreme and constrained issue preferences, that rely *solely* on individuals' perceptions of their in-party as a cohesive, singular entity that provides group-level conformity and uniformity, regardless of what ideological values and belief systems are shared among co-partisans. As such, these findings embody Stenner's (2005) definition of the authoritarian disposition as a latent motive that drives individuals to establish and maintain a sense of oneness and sameness with *some* collective order, and exhibit intense in-group favorability and out-group hostility associated with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979).

This ideologically content free pathway from individuals' authoritarian dispositions to intense, affective in-party attachments and ideological preferences in the social and national security domains holds critical normative implications for the nature of American political conflict. When the link between authoritarianism and downstream partisan polarization outcomes is regarded from this social identity perspective, authoritarians are not necessarily conservatives. Instead they possess an affinity towards their in-party on the basis of cohesive leadership and membership structures, which allow them to exhibit as much conservatism as is contained in the shared views and beliefs of their political and social in-groups.

Additionally, these results place my theoretical model of authoritarianism within the wider literature on the nature of party identities in Americans politics (Campbell et al 1960, Lewis-Beck et al 2008, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). With nascent research treating party identities as social identities (see Nicholson 2012, Huddy, Aaroe & Mason 2013), that reflect the same in-group bolstering and out-group denigration processes entailed in social identity theory (see Tajfel & Turner 1979), political scientists are increasingly framing mass partisan polarization in affectively-charged, "us versus them" terms (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes

2012, Mason 2013, 2014). My group-based approach to authoritarianism, and the empirical evidence supporting such a conceptualization and its downstream effects on the nature of citizens' party identities (see Chapter 4 and above results), paints this dispositional trait as an ultimate, individual-level source driving the emotional intensification by which party identity can drive long-standing attachments (Campbell et al 1960, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002), political behavior (Huddy et al 2010), and even partisan polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

Taken together, what do these empirical results and their broader implications on the nature of party identities mean for the future of mass partisan polarization? Since divisions between Democrats and Republicans appear to currently reflect innate, dispositional traits (i.e. authoritarianism) and emotionally motivated self-conceptualizations (via social identity theory), is the level of political vitriol and lack of understanding across the aisle now a permanent fixture of American politics? The results of this present empirical chapter paint a grim picture for the future of polarization. However, given the ideologically content-free nature of the relationship between individuals' authoritarian traits and their downstream political identities and attitudes, under the right demographic contextual changes to the parties' leadership and membership structures, ideological and affective polarization may be curbed. To these possibilities, I turn in the following chapter.

Chapter 7

Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation, put simply, was to answer the fundamental questions of *why* individuals' authoritarian dispositions have come to structure their party affiliations and ideological preferences, and *why* these traits ultimately lead to such affectively charged mass partisan polarization in contemporary American politics. While prior work has produced extensive treatments regarding the relationships between authoritarianism, general ideological orientations (Barker & Tinnick 2006, Jost et al 2003, Federico et al. 2011, Jost, Federico and Napier 2009), policy preferences in the social (Hetherington & Weiler 2009), economic (Johnston 2013, Johnston & Wronski 2013), foreign policy domains (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011), and political partisanship (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Targan 2013), these approaches remain largely atheoretical in that they do not attempt to address the underlying psychological processes by which citizens match their dispositional traits to their political behaviors.

Instead, this prior research has framed polarization in the context of the “culture war,” where party elites and citizens became more ideologically divided on salient social issues. Particularly, the work of Hetherington & Weiler (2009) portrayed partisan polarization as a “worldview evolution” that split citizens into the Democratic and Republican camps on the basis of their individual needs for order, certainty, and security (which they conceptualize as authoritarianism). The crux of their argument hinges on an acceptance that as Republicans increasingly supported more conservative positions on cultural issues such as gay rights, the war on terrorism, and abortion, authoritarians identified more with the Republican Party. Yet, as this body of work only demonstrates a significant relationship between authoritarianism and mass partisan and ideological preferences within the past decade (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Federico & Reifen Targan 2013), it presents a theoretical puzzle – why does authoritarianism predict Republican Party identification and conservative policy preferences now, but not earlier? Further, this puzzle suggests that the extant theories on personality and politics omit an important dynamic mechanism from this equation, one that addresses *how* individuals used their authoritarian dispositions to respond to the changing American political landscape.

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that authoritarianism, in contrast to its current treatment in the political science literature, represents a *group-based* construct (Duckitt 1989) wherein individuals seek to establish and maintain their sense of normative social order (see Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005) through their social identities. Authoritarian dispositions, given their connections with cognitive rigidity, distaste for ambiguity, and lack of openness (Jost et al. 2003, Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009), should guide an individual to view her party identity as a singular, superordinate social group that cohesively, and *exclusively*, encompasses her other social identities (see Roccas & Brewer 2002, Miller et al. 2009). As such, I rely heavily upon *social identity theory* (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and *Social identity complexity theory* (Roccas & Brewer 2002), suggesting that authoritarianism leads individuals to perceive their party identities in qualitatively different ways across the authoritarian dimension.

Specifically, those higher in authoritarianism should perceive their partisan identity as cohesively containing *only* their in-group members, and excluding all outsiders, particularly established social out-group members. Conversely, those lower in authoritarianism should also perceive that their partisan identity reflects their other social identities, but in a nuanced way that allows for social diversity within their party, and the inclusion of out-group members. In this way, authoritarian dispositions guide the extent to which citizens' view their own party in social identity theory's "us versus them" terms (see Tajfel & Turner 1979), thus integrating intolerance towards diverse (and non-traditional) social groups into the act of party affiliation and ideological preference formation.

Given the psychological needs that social identities fulfill by providing group based safety through distinctive identity categorizations (Brewer & Caporael 2006, Brewer 2007), I also expected that political organizations which required strong conformity from its members would also induce a sense of collective security as they helped reassure authoritarians of their place in the hierarchical status of society (Duckitt & Fisher 2003), directly resonating with authoritarian submission (Altemeyer 1988, Feldman 2003). Thus, political parties embodying such traits would be differentially appealing to high authoritarians, and individuals' perceptions of their party identities across the authoritarian dimension would reflect their subjective attributions of these traits. As such, high authoritarians should endow their party with cohesiveness that reinforces their epistemic needs for certainty, order, and security – namely, by perceiving that their in-party possesses a strong, controlling internal leadership, and members who all share the same values and belief systems. In contrast, low authoritarians should conceive their party in less controlling terms, with a loose leadership structure, and members who embody a diversity of backgrounds and opinions. This approach, building upon the relationship established between complex cognitive representations and individuals' needs for cognition, closure, and threat reduction (Roccas & Brewer 2002, Miler et al 2009), posits that the match between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their partisan preferences rests in their salient social identities.

By conceptualizing authoritarianism in such group-based terms, I was able to explore how authoritarian dispositions structured the ways in which citizens related to politics both in the current political context, and over the past four decades. Taking into account historical shifts in party leadership cohesion (Rohde 1991, Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007), ideological sorting (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006, Levendusky 2009, Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011), and demographic composition (Aldrich 2011, Abramowitz 2010, Mason 2013, 2014), I discovered that those individuals higher in authoritarianism both perceived their in-party in more cohesive, homogeneous terms, and were drawn towards the party whose elites reflected demographic similarity. Further, these partisan preferences occurred independent of individuals' ideological considerations, such that authoritarians affiliated with the socially homogeneous party (and dissociated with the socially diverse party) regardless of whether it was the party of the left or the right. Finally, I demonstrated that authoritarianism both directly, and indirectly, via perceptions of a cohesive organizational structure, molded the cognitive, affective, and ideological aspects of partisan polarization. As such, authoritarianism has come to structure mass polarization not merely through ideological sorting on salient social issues (per Hetherington & Weiler 2009) but through intense in-group favorability and out-group hostility associated with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), and the latent motive of authoritarians to maintain a sense of oneness and sameness (Stenner 2005).

This latter point holds important normative implications for American politics more broadly. The current understanding of how authoritarianism shapes polarization in the context of the “culture war” states that well-sorted liberals and conservatives cannot agree, or even understand one another, because the issues which divide them are fundamental to their authoritarian “worldview;” and while these issues remain at the forefront of political debate, continued polarization is inevitable. My theory, however, suggests that authoritarian-driven partisan polarization occurs due to social group differences between the parties, rather than ideological disagreements. If social identities, rather than ideological belief systems, are the lynchpin of affective mass polarization, American politics may not be on a permanent trajectory towards complete ideological polarization. As the American electorate becomes increasingly diverse, and the parties inevitably respond to this diversity, ideological differences between the two parties may be mollified when Democrats and Republicans no longer represent such stark social group differences. With social identity at the core of authoritarian-based partisan conflict, it is possible for citizens to embrace more moderate positions on issues, once partisan social group differences no longer reflect an “us versus them” group dynamic.

Empirically, I investigate the nature of authoritarianism as a group-based construct, and my theoretical model’s impact on mass partisan identity and preference formation, in the context of political elites’ ideological and demographic shifts, in three parts. Chapter 4 directly tests the key mechanism of my theory – whether authoritarianism differentially predicts how individuals perceive their partisan identity as cohesively encompassing their other social identities and whether they view their in-party (as opposed to their out-party) as possessing strong internal leadership and members who all share the same belief systems. I collect original survey data using three distinct modes and samples: 1) a telephone survey using a nationally-representative RDD sample, 2) a web-based survey using a non-representative national internet sample, and 3) a web-based survey using a convenience sample of undergraduate students. Across these three studies, I consistently demonstrated that individuals with greater authoritarian dispositions – be they Republicans, Democrats, or Independents –viewed increased membership overlap across their salient social groups, creating for them a *convergent* social identity in which their myriad social identities became subjectively embedded in a singular in-group representation.

Yet, while authoritarianism predicted increased cognitive perceptions of group member overlap among individuals’ *social* groups, this dispositional trait only led to greater overlapping partisan and social group memberships among Republicans. Democrats, instead, held a singular perception of their political and social group identities when they scored *lowest* on the authoritarianism scale. As a result, authoritarianism affected citizens’ perceptions of overlapping political and social identities heterogeneously across party lines. On one hand, authoritarian dispositions behaved exactly as I expected based on my group-based theoretical model. When moving from the least to most authoritarian Democrats, this trait predicted increasingly singular perceptions of individuals’ social in-groups and characterizations of the Democratic Party as cohesive entity in its leadership and membership structures. On the other hand, and in direct conflict with my model’s predictions, there also existed a negative relationship between authoritarianism and perceptions of a “convergent” party identity, such that low authoritarians, rather than high authoritarians, held more singular cognitive representations of their party identity.

While somewhat puzzling, this unexpected effect may be due to Democrats lower in authoritarianism (through greater cognitive complexity, and their backgrounds as young, educated, atheists) thinking that their party identity represents all of their in-groups (and more)

because the Democratic Party has been stereotyped as the party of diversity (Fiornia et al 2011). Importantly, these results paint an interesting portrait of the contexts in which authoritarian dispositions structure more cohesive, singular interpretations of social and political identities, indicating that citizens do not utilize their authoritarian dispositions in a political vacuum.

However, this heterogeneity was absent in the relationship between citizens' authoritarian dispositions and their increased perceptions of the in-party as embodying strong internal leadership and members who shared the same belief systems. Confirming theoretical expectations, I found that, indeed, citizens with greater authoritarian dispositions, regardless of whether they associated with the Democratic or Republican Party, were more inclined towards characterizing their party's leadership as possessing internally cohesive traits that bolstered their epistemic needs for certainty, order, and security (see Feldman 2003, Jost et al 2003), in line with authoritarian submission (Altemeyer 1988). The robust relationship between authoritarianism and opinions that all members of their in-party share the values and belief systems across partisanship, additionally supports a group-based conceptualization of authoritarianism in which authoritarian dispositions embody a desire establish and maintain a sense of oneness and sameness with *some* collective order, regardless of which particular beliefs the group espouses (Stenner 2005). Further strengthening my theoretical argument, both Democratic and Republican authoritarians made these in-party attributions, even when controlling for their ideological orientations, indicating that such trait characterizations are independent of any prior values or belief systems, making them content free.

Chapter 5, in turn, provided an empirical examination of the political contexts which may have structured this relationship between authoritarianism and party identification preferences. First, through a descriptive analysis of the trends of authoritarianism and party identity in the United States spanning from 1973-2012 (with GSS cumulative file data), I found that high authoritarians leaned more Democratic than low authoritarians throughout the 1970's and 1980's until their party affiliations flipped in favor of the Republican Party starting in the 1990's. Further, Republicans remained consistently authoritarian across this time span, while Democrats (and particularly White Democrats) became increasingly less authoritarian, with this general trend coinciding with the Democratic Party's diversification of elected officials following the 1992 election. Thus, authoritarianism's structuring of partisanship in the United States, while coinciding with the process of Southern realignment, reflected a broader phenomenon that pushed citizens with greater authoritarian dispositions away from their prior Democratic loyalties. Most compelling, and indicative of my group-based model of authoritarianism, was the lack of incompatibility between authoritarianism and the parties – high authoritarians identified as *either* Democrats or Republicans. For what is the most stable, long-standing of political attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960), it is quite remarkable that a dispositional motive (see Jost et al 2003) led to *both* Democratic and Republican Party identifications all within a few decades, a finding of normative import to American politics that has yet to be revealed in the existing literature.

The second part of the Chapter 5 explored two competing party elites' contextual mechanisms that could have led to authoritarianism's structuring of these mass party identification outcomes – ideological polarization versus demographic diversification – by utilizing a series of multi-level models that nested individual level responses to the GSS within party-level ideological (DW Nominat scores; McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005) and demographic characteristics (percentage of White, Male, Protestant Senators) in yearly and regional clusters. Notably, the diversification of the Democratic Party, as they elected increasing

numbers of women, minorities, and non-Protestant Christians to the Senate, drove the authoritarian sorting process. While replicating the role of elites' ideological polarization as a mechanism of authoritarian-based partisan sorting (see Hetherington & Weiler 2009), the ideological mechanism failed to significantly condition the effect of authoritarianism on party identity when empirically pitted against the social identity mechanism.

Further, as a critical test of the competing mechanisms that structured authoritarian-driven mass party identifications, and as a way to explore the nuances of authoritarian responses to social changes among those individuals most impacted by a demographically diversifying Democratic Party, I compared the impacts of ideological and authoritarian considerations on party identity among White Protestants and White Non-Protestants. For White Protestants, both authoritarianism and conservative ideological orientations lead to an exodus from the Democratic Party as those elites reflected more "diverse" religious and social groups (i.e. a lower percentage of White, Male, Protestant Senators). Authoritarian dispositions among White non-Protestants, in contrast to the Republican-identifying effects derived from their conservative ideological preferences, led to *increased identification with the Democratic Party* as the Republican Party contained more White, Male Protestant Senators. These findings revealed a "tipping point" of group intolerance, such that as a party's elites included more "out-group" than "in-group" religious denominations and ethnicities, those higher in authoritarianism were no longer attracted to it. In contrast, conservative ideological positions ubiquitously translated into support for the party that represented the greatest percentage of White, Male Protestant elites, among both Protestants and non-Protestants.

Taken together, Chapter 5's analyses demonstrated that citizens primarily utilized cues from party elites' identities, rather than from their ideologically extreme policy positions, to form the functional link between personality dispositions and partisan affiliations, in support of authoritarianism as a group-based construct and its role in my theoretical model. Of particular importance, and contrary to the conventional wisdom that it was the Republican Party espousing more conservative policy preferences on salient "culture war" social issues, I repeatedly demonstrated that the demographic changes to the *Democratic Party* activated authoritarianism as a predictor of mass party identities. Thus, the story of authoritarian polarization in American politics is not necessarily one about a right-shift in social issue preferences led by a new kind of Republican leadership (see Dean 2008), but about choices the Democratic leadership made in recruiting multiple gender, ethnic, and religious groups into their fold.

After establishing the relationship between individuals' authoritarian dispositions, the cognitive conceptualizations of their party and social identities, and the contextual party-level shifts that led to these different party identities, I finally turned, in Chapter 6, to an examination of the downstream effects of my theoretical model on political polarization in contemporary American politics. Consistent with my theory, I demonstrated that authoritarianism, working directly and occasionally mediated by the "convergent" party identity, as operationalized by in-party trait perceptions of strong leadership and membership cohesion, led to affective (i.e. intense party attachments and in-party versus out-party feeling thermometer differences), cognitive (i.e. acknowledged differences in what the two parties think government should do), and ideological polarization (i.e. attitude extremity in social, economic, and national security preferences) outcomes. These dynamics were established and largely replicated across three studies – the nationally-representative RDD telephone survey, and two web-based surveys using the non-probability internet and undergraduate student samples utilized in Chapter 4.

In the first part of Chapter 6, I found strong support for the role of authoritarianism on affectively charged party identities. When using traits perceptions of cohesive party leadership and membership as the measure of “convergent” party identity, I fully demonstrated the mediational pathway from authoritarianism to “convergent” party identity to stronger emotional party attachments. This empirical evidence supports my theoretical model and its downstream effects on partisan polarization (see Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012 for interpretation of this party intensity as political polarization), as I illustrated a meaningful link between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions, their *epistemically motivated* perceptions of their partisan identities (via cohesive party organization perspectives association with the “convergent” partisan identity), and their *affective* attachments to their in-party. Thus, I established authoritarianism as an ultimate dispositional motive driving strong in-party affiliations, in line with my group-based conceptualization of authoritarianism (see also Duckitt 1989).

The second portion of Chapter 6 examined the full theoretical model’s implications for perceptions of cognitive and affective polarization, as well as ideologically conservative issue positions in the social, economic, and national security domains. I found mixed support in this area, with authoritarian dispositions consistently having a significant, positive effect on these political outcomes, but only working indirectly through the “convergent” party identity in the case of national security issues. Though individuals’ characterizations of their in-party as possessing strong internal leadership and members who share the same belief systems did not always provide the mediational link between authoritarianism and political preferences, these trait perceptions played an important role in how individuals generally translated their latent authoritarian dispositions into political attitudes and behaviors.

In sum, Chapter 6 validated existing scholarship on the downstream effects of authoritarianism, and provided some insights into how the group-based aspects of this trait structured citizens’ affective partisan attachments and polarization responses, cognitive perceptions of polarization, and conservative social, economic, and national security policy preferences. Most notably, the party attributes which served as the “convergent” party identity mechanism contained absolutely no ideological content, yet they consistently related to ideological policy positions and affective partisan polarization, and connected individuals’ authoritarian dispositions to these political outcomes. Chapter 6 thus presented a profoundly different story of authoritarianism than the existing treatment of this trait in the political science literature, which focused on the relationship between such dispositions and partisan polarization as working through citizens’ ideological values. I provided, in contrast, a pathway from authoritarian dispositions to intense partisan attachments, and ideologically extreme and constrained issue preferences that relied *solely* on individuals’ perceptions of their party as a cohesive, singular entity that provided group-level conformity and uniformity, regardless of which ideological values and belief systems were shared among co-partisans. As such, these findings embodied Stenner’s (2005) definition of the authoritarian disposition as an innate motive that drives individuals to establish and maintain a sense of oneness and sameness with *some* collective order, and exhibit intense in-group favorability and out-group hostility associated with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979).

Overall, Chapters 4 through 6 provided empirical support for the theoretical conceptualization of authoritarianism as a group-based construct presented in Chapter 2, and the role of social identities as the contextual linkage mechanism between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions and their partisan affiliations in a demographically diversifying political landscape, as detailed in Chapter 3. Taken together, these findings not only provided robust empirical

evidence for my general argument, but also illustrated a story of group-based authoritarianism where citizens' authoritarian dispositions shaped their party identities at the mass level through the trait's innate desire to affiliate with in-groups (see Duckitt 1989) and exhibit intolerance towards out-groups (see Altemeyer 1988, Stenner 2005).

7.1 Broader Impact

The present dissertation tackled several key issues at the intersection of American politics and political psychology in order to better explain how authoritarian dispositions structured partisan identities and mass polarization. First, I reframed the current theoretical understanding of authoritarianism by incorporating social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), arguing that authoritarianism is a group-based construct wherein individuals seek to establish social order through overlapping group identities (Roccas & Brewer 2002). By conceptualizing authoritarianism in these terms, I suggested that social identity was the driving mechanism of authoritarian-driven polarization, with issue positions a consequence of this process. Further, I presented a dynamic model of party identity that allowed for the effects of authoritarianism to be moderated by shifts in party leadership voting cohesion (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995, Lebo, McGlynn & Koger 2007), ideological extremity (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005, Levendusky 2009), and membership social homogeneity/diversity (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, Mason 2013, Tesler & Sears 2010, Abramowitz 2010). As a result, I showed that authoritarianism was not necessarily about moving public opinion in a more ideologically conservative direction, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue, but about preserving perceptions of a normative social order that embodies a singular, overarching identity in the face a demographically changing political landscape which may have threatened the authoritarian's sense of positive social identity (see Tajfel & Turner 1979, Brewer 2007).

Thus, this dissertation makes a strong theoretical contribution to the political psychology, public opinion, and political behavior literatures. First, it expands the stable trait model of authoritarianism, and accounts for the role of external factors, such as social identities and demographic changes to American political parties, on party identities and issue preferences. By incorporating these dynamics, I present a theoretical improvement to the standard trait model found in the personality and politics literature (e.g. Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Gerber et al 2010, Mondak 2010). Second, I integrate work from the parties literature on Congressional reforms and party discipline (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995, 2011), and from the public opinion literature on large-scale racial and religious identity sorting processes (Abramowitz 2010) that, only until recently, have been included in the debate on mass polarization (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008, Ellis & Stimson 2012). The inclusion of this literature expands the general knowledge of how non-ideological party traits can be differentially appealing across levels of authoritarianism, and provide heuristic cues as to which party identity best encompasses citizens' other social identities. As such, this current project adds to a nascent literature that views partisan

identity and polarization through the lens of social identity theory (Nicholson 2012, Iyengar et al 2012, Huddy, Mason & Aaroe 2013, Mason 2013, Mason 2014).

Finally, this project holds normative implications for the future of affective and ideological polarization in the mass public. Current work depicts American politics as comprising vitriolic partisan conflict, with elite-level ideological polarization a permanent fixture of American politics (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2011, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2005, Levendusky 2009), and citizens more deeply divided on “culture war” issues which speak directly to their authoritarian worldviews (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). My theoretical model, by showcasing social identities as the mechanism linking authoritarianism to partisan identities and preferences, suggests that authoritarians could be capable of holding liberal, conservative, or moderate policy positions, for, indeed, high authoritarians have identified with both parties over the past forty years.

As the authoritarian partisan divide present in American politics today reflects group-based dynamics, the functional link between citizens’ authoritarian dispositions and their political behaviors reflect their intolerance of non-traditional and “outsider” social groups (e.g. women, African Americans, homosexuals) as party authority figures, and not necessarily their ideological positions on salient issues. Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, more emotionally intense party attachments and conservative national security preferences resulted from authoritarian dispositions and trait perceptions of a cohesive party with members sharing the same values (with no ideological information provided about the gist of those values). Given the ideologically content-free nature of the relationship between individuals’ authoritarian traits and their downstream political identities and attitudes, it may be possible, under the right demographic contextual changes to the parties’ leadership and membership structures, to curb ideological and affective polarization.

It follows then, that as the demographic composition of the electorate changes, and the parties respond to these burgeoning “minority” groups in one way or another, these elite level reactions will shape the nature of the relationship between authoritarianism and partisan polarization. As the Republican Party leadership makes forays into enticing minority groups, how will White Protestant Republicans (and particularly high authoritarians) react to such change? The current dissertation sheds some light onto citizens’ reactions to such party demographic shifts along the authoritarian dimension, perhaps with outcomes that harken back to the era of the 1970’s and 1980’s when the heterogeneity of demographic identity compositions between the parties was relatively similar, and authoritarianism held only a minor influence on citizens’ partisan considerations (in line with the findings of Chapter 5). Perhaps with both parties similarly reflecting the social backdrop of the American public, authoritarianism will no longer serve as such a prominent fixture of mass political polarization.

Finally, with the link between authoritarianism and partisan identity approached from this social identity perspective, authoritarians are not necessarily conservatives, especially on economic issues, as shown in Chapter 6. Instead they possess an affinity towards the Republican Party that has developed from a decades-long exodus from the Democratic Party on the basis of intolerance towards social diversity and an exclusion of outsiders. As a result, shared social identities (such as gender, ethnic and religious ties) may form the basis of the functional link that now allows authoritarians to exhibit conservatism through their Republican identity across a variety of “harder” issues (see Johnston & Wronski 2013, Johnston 2013). Thus, authoritarians may only be as conservative as the party that best represents their social group identities.

7.2 Limitations and Future Research

While this dissertation provided robust empirical justification for the role of social identities as the mechanism by which citizens matched their authoritarian dispositions to their partisan identities and political behaviors across myriad studies, samples, and methodologies, this project was unable to undeniably explain the role of authoritarianism and social identities as the ultimate underlying dispositional motives structuring all aspects of political polarization in contemporary American politics. Both flaws in sampling and design in Chapters 4 through 6 as well as omissions of larger dynamic processes from the project more generally, limited my ability to draw too broad of conclusions from my theoretical model. However, admission of these flaws should highlight the existing strengths of my studies' designs and results, lend credence to the support I did find for my theoretical pathway, and set the stage for my future research agenda.

Turning first to limitations in Chapters 4 and 6, deriving from the use of survey methods in phone, internet, and student samples, the most prominent issue lies in the representativeness of these samples relative to the general population of Americans. As discussed in the methods section of Chapter 4, the RDD telephone sample of nationally representative landlines, resulted in a distinctly older sample of Americans, while the web-based studies conducted through BackPage.com, Mechanical Turk, and Stony Brook University's undergraduate political science subject pool produced samples of extremely young respondents who were highly liberal, well educated, ethnically diverse (in the case of Stony Brook) and secular. Further, given the nature of web-based surveys and the professional nature of survey respondents (see Berinsky et al. 2012), respondents may have spent only minimal attention to the survey measures – an aspect the American electorate (see Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996) that is not reflective of all voters, particularly not of those most inclined towards politics. With these backgrounds, it is unclear how well these samples reflected those individuals most involved in politics, whose authoritarian dispositions would be most influential when forming party attachments, making ideological policy preferences, and participating in electoral behaviors.

As my conceptualization of authoritarianism as a group-based construct and the subsequent theoretical model's impact on partisan outcomes focuses primarily upon the psychological processes occurring among those most disposed towards the authoritarian submission, conformity, and intolerance clusters, the samples utilized to test these dynamics may not have been the most appropriate and would, at first impression, appear to undermine my ability to find significant effects of authoritarianism. Such discontinuity between these samples, my desired sub-sample of high authoritarians, and the general American electorate population, however, bolsters the relationships between authoritarianism, perceptions of social and party identities, and party affinities I do find with these samples. Further, I was able to highlight these relationships among low authoritarians, something I would have otherwise ignored. Nonetheless, my future research agenda should include specific sub-samples of politically active individuals,

and particularly White Protestant conservatives for whom authoritarian dispositions and reactions to social diversity would be strongest.

There was also a potential issue of construct validity regarding the measure of overlapping party and social group members among Democrats, wherein the item wording in the convergent party identity battery may have conflated respondents' perceptions of overlapping identities with their general understanding of each party's demographic compositions. With the unusually diverse religious and ethnic compositions of Democrats in the web and student samples, and the general stereotype that Democrats represent a greater variance of religious backgrounds relative to Republicans, most low authoritarian respondents with a cursory understanding of politics would recognize that their social groups primarily have a home with the Democratic Party. It was further possible that respondents treated the convergent party identity battery as an exercise in listing party demographics, such that authoritarian dispositions may only lead to perceptions of convergent identities when such perceptions coincide with the political landscape. Despite utilizing three different versions of the overlapping party identities battery, and replicating the heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism across party identities with each, I have little confidence that these measures in fact captured the true cognitive structure of identities for low authoritarian Democrats. The findings detailed in Chapter 4, therefore, could represent *either* a singular, concrete perception of multiple in-group members, or an acknowledgement that realistically young, liberal, ethnically diverse, atheists simply never identify with the Republican Party.

In regards to the analyses presented in Chapter 5, reliance upon observational, secondary data sources, while vital for exploring the longitudinal effects of authoritarianism on mass party identifications, limit the nature of my analyses. Key concerns in this area were my theoretical choice to cluster individual respondents by region and my empirical choice to operationalize party elites as Senators only. I argued that ideological and identity heuristics were most potent at the *regional level* where voters could relate to the cues of party elites directly representing them in Congress, capturing the balance between the ideological and social identity characteristics of state-level representatives and party-wide stereotypes. It is possible, however, for voters to react more myopically to party elites, only focusing on those elected officials they are directly casting a ballot for. If this is the case, then the link between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party identities should be particularly reactive to the characteristics of national party leaders (i.e. the candidates running for President) and local officials (i.e. candidates running in the respondent's Congressional district). With neither of these types of party elites accounted for in my models, I have potentially biased my findings away from the true mechanisms of authoritarian-driven party affiliations. While I do find significant results supporting my social identity-based theoretical model, future research will need to replicate my findings using these alternate operationalizations of party elites.

The exclusion of members of the House of Representatives poses both theoretical and statistical issues. With regard to the former, as mentioned above, the exclusion of Congressmen/women indicates that these party elites hold no bearing on citizens' ideological and social identity perceptions of the two parties, an assumption that is fundamentally erroneous in American politics. Regarding the latter, limiting my sample to Senators only drastically reduced the variance in ideological and demographic characteristics at this level of analysis. This occurs mathematically due to the smaller Senate sample, and conceptually since the House of Representatives typically elects more women and ethnic minorities than the Senate. On the whole, however, the amount of gender and ethnic diversity in the House (Figures 7.1 and 7.2)

reflects that of the Senate (see Chapter 5), such that utilizing both Senators and Congressman in my multi-level analyses will most likely strengthen my existing findings.

Figure 7.1. Percentage of Women in the House and Senate (1971-2013)⁸²





Figure 7.2. Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in Congress (1977-2005)⁸³



Turning to the limitations of my full theoretical model and its related empirical tests, there are a few subtleties worthy of note. First, the dynamic effects of authoritarianism on political outcomes, as they worked through individuals' social and political identities, were most pronounced in White, and White Protestant subsamples, as compared to analyses utilizing full

⁸² http://cawp.rutgers.edu/footnotes/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Women-in-Congress_Web.jpg

⁸³ <http://cis.org/AfricanAmericanPoliticalPower-Immigration>

samples. As such, the inclusion of minority groups diluted the effects of authoritarianism. Theoretically, this ethnic heterogeneity makes sense. Much of American history featured White, Male Protestant Christians in positions of political power, with women and minorities drawn into the electoral fold within the past century, and only beginning to hold elected office in the past few decades. Thus, conceptualizations of party authorities and members as morphing from “us” into “them” should be a phenomenon relegated to Whites (and particularly White Protestants), who for generations naturally associated their social in-groups with their party.

In contrast, African Americans, who on average exhibit greater authoritarian dispositions, identify almost exclusively with the Democratic Party, as a Republican Party generally resistant to progressive civil rights positions holds no appeal to them. The lack of variance in party affiliations among African Americans mutes any potential effects of authoritarianism on their party identities and perceptions, yet it suggests a possible relationship between authoritarianism and Democratic Party identification on the basis of mutual social identities. Thus, future work needs to focus on the role of authoritarianism, and other dispositional traits, on political attitudes and behaviors among ethnic minorities, particularly African Americans who hold conservative, moral traditionalism values.

Another potential concern lays in the determination of the true casual pathway from individuals’ authoritarian dispositions to their party identities. Specifically, how do I know with certainty that either party elites’ ideological preferences or their demographic compositions are triggering authoritarianism in the mass public? Currently, I make this directional assumption based on observed changes in party ideological preferences and demographics, and how authoritarianism predicts party identity in various party elites’ ideological and social identity contexts. But my empirical designs do not provide any traction regarding activating threats relevant to authoritarianism. Further, given the endogeneity of the political processes that made the Democrats liberal and diverse and the Republicans conservative and homogeneous (see Aldrich 2011), there is no absolute way to know which contextual factor was the true causal mechanism. At best, I empirically pitted the two contextual mechanisms against one another and showed that social identities were a more powerful influence on individuals’ party identities (see Chapter 5). This methodological approach, though, does not resolve the inherent endogeneity of the American political landscape of the past 40 years.

Additionally, authoritarian dispositions do not produce attitudinal or behavioral outcomes, such as party identification or affective polarization, in isolation. Extensive research has shown that the emergence of authoritarianism is a dynamic process, triggered by environmental threats to the normative order (Feldman 2003, Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Duckitt & Fisher 2003). In the context of this present dissertation, I defined normative threats as occurring when citizens’ in-parties represented diverse social groups and non-traditional authority figures (e.g. women, African-Americans, Latinos, and non-Protestants for White Protestants), such that these outside groups were perceived by authoritarians as infiltrating the system, turning “us” into “them.” My theoretical model assumed that these demographic changes to the parties served as the threat dynamic that activated authoritarian intolerance and allowed this dispositional trait to structure mass partisan identities and polarization.

Yet, given these underlying model assumptions, I never explicitly tested these specific (or any other) threat dynamics. I simply observed the ideological and demographic changes which occurred among party leaders and members over the past 40 years, without attempting to manipulate the presence or absence of these threats. As such, there is no way to ensure that the present results reflect 1) authoritarian reactions in the presence of threats to their normative

order, or 2) that social identity changes, rather than ideological extremity, were the ultimate contextual factor that activated authoritarianism in contemporary mass politics. Put simply, I can at best discuss the correlational relationship between authoritarianism, social identity perceptions, and party affiliation outcomes, as I am unable to make any reasonable claims regarding the true causal path from individuals' dispositional motives to their political behaviors. Further, without directly manipulating party demographic compositions and cohesion, I remain agnostic as to whether the social identity mechanism is most threatening at the high (per Feldman & Stenner 1997) or low (per Hetherington & Suhay 2011) end of the authoritarian dimension, leaving theoretical ambiguity regarding the heterogeneous effects of authoritarianism on overlapping party identities found throughout Chapter 4. It is therefore imperative that the next piece of this overall project examine the causal dynamics of the full theoretical model by inducing threats to individuals' party and social identities.

Finally, across the empirical analyses presented in this dissertation I repeatedly demonstrate that authoritarianism relates to the same mass party identity, affective polarization, and ideological preference products detailed in the extant treatment of authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Barker & Tinnick 2006, Federico & Reifen Tagan 2013, Federico et al 2011, Johnston & Wronski 2013). In this way, my theoretical model of social identities does just as good of a job explaining the link between authoritarianism and political consequences as the current scholarship, particularly that of Hetherington & Weiler (2009). The major contribution of this dissertation to the current personality and politics literature is to explain *why* individuals' authoritarian dispositions have come to structure their party affiliations and ideological preferences, and *why* these traits ultimately lead to such affectively charged mass partisan polarization in contemporary American politics. Yet, I do not provide any novel insights regarding the ultimate downstream effects of authoritarianism as it relates to the *future* of partisan polarization in American politics. While disconcerting, I believe that this is an empirical problem rather than a theoretical one. With social identities, rather than ideological issue positions, as the linking mechanism between individuals' authoritarian dispositions and their party attachments, it may be possible, under the right circumstances of threats to party cohesion and elite framing of issues, that high authoritarians can be moved in a more moderate ideological direction on salient issues, particularly with regards to the "harder" issues of the economic and foreign policy domains (see Johnston & Wronski 2013). Given that my theory may provide a solution to curbing the polarization trend in American politics, the onus rests on my future research agenda to discern these normative implications for ideological and affective polarization.

In order to address the major limitations enumerated above, future experimental work is needed to test the moderating impacts of elite changes (and how these changes can be framed as threats to the normative social order) to ideological extremity and demographic composition on the relationship between authoritarianism and party affiliation outcomes in isolation. Such work can bolster the observational findings presented here, shed light onto the particular mechanisms of authoritarian threat in today's political environment, and determine the true causal pathway from authoritarian dispositions to partisan affiliations. As research in personality and politics develops in its theoretical and methodological rigor, I hope that this dissertation has made some lasting contribution in this regard, by distilling the dynamic processes by which individuals' dispositional traits interact with their political environment to produce normatively impactful public opinion and political behavior outcomes.

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Appendix A: Overlapping Social and Political Identities Items for Chapter 4

RDD Telephone Survey

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

[DO NOT READ]

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent
4. Other party

{If answered Republican or Democrat above.} Would you call yourself a **strong** Republican/Democrat or a **not very strong** Republican/Democrat?

1. Strong
2. Not Very Strong

{If answered Independent or Other above.} Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

1. Closer to the Republican Party
2. Closer to the Democratic Party
3. Not Closer to One or the Other

When it comes to SOCIAL issues do you consider yourself:

1. Very liberal
2. Liberal
3. Moderate
4. Conservative
5. Very conservative

Next, we would like to know a little bit about your lifestyle. Think about the **neighborhood** you live in. Which of the following terms would best describe your neighborhood: large city, small city or town, suburban, or rural?

1. Large City
2. Small City or Town
3. Suburban
4. Rural

If you were asked to use one of four names for your **social class**, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?

1. Lower Class
2. Working Class
3. Middle Class
4. Upper Class

What religion do you practice?

1. Protestant Christian
2. Catholic
3. Jewish
4. Muslim
5. Buddhist
6. Hindu

7. Another religion _____
8. Atheist/None/Not Religious

Which **one** of the following racial or ethnic groups best describes you?

1. White/Caucasian
2. Black/African American
3. Hispanic/Latino
4. Asian or Pacific Islander
5. Native American
6. Middle Eastern
7. Indian or Southwest Asian

[Interviewer infers gender from the sound of respondent's voice]

1. Female
2. Male

I would now like you to make some comparisons between people who are members of the different social groups you belong to. Think about people who live in <large cities/small cities or towns/suburbs/rural areas>. Of people who live in <large cities/small cities or towns/suburbs/rural areas>, how many would you say are also <pipe in religious affiliation from item above>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

Again think about people who live in <large cities/small cities or towns/suburbs/rural areas>. How many of them would you say are also <pipe in ethnicity from item above>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

Now, think about **all** people who belong to the <pipe in lower/working/middle/upper class from item above>. Of people who are <pipe in social class>, how many of them would you say are also <pipe in religious affiliation>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

Again think about people who belong to the <pipe in lower/working/middle/upper class from item above>. How many of them would you say are also <pipe in ethnicity from item above>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

Next, think about **all** people who are <pipe in religious affiliation>. How many of them would you say are also <pipe in male/female>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

Again think about people who are <pipe in religious affiliation>. How many of them would you say are also <pipe in ethnicity from earlier item>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

We are also interested in your feelings towards today's political groups, like the Republican or the Democratic Party. How many people who are members of the **Democratic** Party are also <pipe in social class, city type, religious affiliation, race, and gender from previous items>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

How many people who are members of the **Republican** Party are also <pipe in social class, city type, religious affiliation, race, and gender from previous items>?

1. Almost All
2. Most
3. Some
4. A Few
5. None

Non-Probability Internet & Undergraduate Student Surveys

First, we would like to know your general thoughts about politics. How interested are you in information about what's going on in government and politics?

1. Extremely Interested
2. Very Interested
3. Moderated Interested
4. Slightly Interested
5. Not Interested At All

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent

{If answered Republican or Democrat above.} Would you call yourself a **strong** Republican/Democrat or a **not very strong** Republican/Democrat?

3. Strong
4. Not Very Strong

{If answered Independent above.} Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

4. Closer to the Republican Party
5. Closer to the Democratic Party
6. Not Closer to One or the Other

Now, we would like to know a little more about you specifically, including your background and your general lifestyle. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Below is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?

1. Extremely Liberal
2. Liberal
3. Slightly Liberal
4. Moderate, middle of the road
5. Slightly Conservative
6. Conservative
7. Extremely Conservative

{If selected "Moderate" above.} If you had to choose, would you consider yourself a LIBERAL or a CONSERVATIVE?

1. Liberal
2. Conservative
3. Neither/Moderate

Think about the **type of community** in which you currently live in. Which of the following terms would best describe your community?

4. Large City
5. Small City or Town
6. Suburban
7. Rural

Next, think more broadly about the **geographic region of the country** you currently live in. Which of the following regions would best describe where you live?

1. West Coast (Ex: California, Oregon, etc.)
2. South West (Ex: Arizona, New Mexico, etc.)
3. Mountain and Plain States (Ex: Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, etc.)
4. Midwest (Ex: Illinois, Wisconsin, etc.)
5. South (Ex: Florida, Alabama, etc.)
6. North East (Ex: New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, etc.)

If you were asked to use one of four names to describe your **social class**, which would you say you belong to?

1. Lower Class
2. Working Class
3. Middle Class
4. Upper Class

Which ONE of the following **religious groups** best describes you?

1. Protestant Christian
2. Catholic
3. Jewish
4. Muslim
5. Buddhist
6. Hindu
7. Another religion _____
8. Atheist/None/Not Religious

Which ONE of the following **racial or ethnic groups** best describes you?

1. White/Caucasian
2. Black/African-American
3. Hispanic/Latino
4. Asian or Pacific Islander
5. Native American
6. Middle Eastern
7. Indian or Southwest Asian
8. Other Ethnicity

Which of the follow **age groups** best describes you?

1. 18-34 years old
2. 35-50 years old
3. 51-64 years old
4. 65+ years old

7. Are you male or female?

1. Male
2. Female

People are members of many different social groups. These social groups can be made up of people who share the same religious affiliation, ethnicity, gender, age, social class, geographic region, or type of community. The responses you just gave to the background questions are, in fact, the social groups you belong to. From the list below of your social groups, please rank your personal attachment with each group from top to bottom, from the MOST IMPORTANT group to the LEAST IMPORTANT group.

1. <pipe in community type>
2. <pipe in geographic region>
3. <pipe in social class>
4. <pipe in religious affiliation>
5. <pipe in ethnicity>
6. <pipe in age group>
7. <pipe in gender>

Note: The top four ranked groups in this item will be subsequently referred to as group 1, group 2, group 3, and group 4 in the following Social Identity Overlap and Convergent Partisan Identity questions.

In this next section we are interested in your impressions of the four social groups that you just identified as being the most important to you. We want you to think about the types of people who belong to each of these groups, and how these people compare to one another. For example, some people who share the

same ethnicity may also belong to the same religious group. For instance, we might ask “How many people who are White are also Catholic?” If you think that almost ALL people who are White are also Catholic, then you would choose the "almost all" option. If you think that NO people who are White are also Catholic, then you would choose the "none" option.

In your *own opinion*, of people who are <pipe in group 1>, how many would you say are also <pipe in group 2>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which people who are <pipe in group 1> are also <pipe in group 2>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are <pipe in group 1>, how many would you say are also <pipe in group 3>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which people who are <pipe in group 1> are also <pipe in group 3>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are <pipe in group 1>, how many would you say are also <pipe in group 4>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which people who are <pipe in group 1> are also <pipe in group 4>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are <pipe in group 2>, how many would you say are also <pipe in group 3>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which people who are <pipe in group 2> are also <pipe in group 3>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are <pipe in group 2>, how many would you say are also <pipe in group 4>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which people who are <pipe in group 2> are also <pipe in group 4>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are <pipe in group 3>, how many would you say are also <pipe in group 4>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which people who are <pipe in group 3> are also <pipe in group 4>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

Now think about the types of people who belong to your political party, like fellow Republicans or Democrats. For example, some people who belong to the same ethnicity also identify with the same political party. In this next section, we might ask "How many people who are White are also Republican/Democrat?" If you think that almost ALL people who are White are also Republican/Democrat, then you would choose the "almost all" option. If you think that NO people who are White are also Republican/Democrat, then you would choose the "none" option.

(Non-probability Internet Survey, Convergent Party Identity Items)

Of people who are <pipe in ideology>, how many would you say are also **Republicans/Democrats**? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which <pipe in ideology> are also **Republicans/Democrats**.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

Of people who are <pipe in group 1>, how many would you say are also **Republicans/Democrats**? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which <pipe in group 1> are also **Republicans/Democrats**.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

Of people who are <pipe in group 2>, how many would you say are also **Republicans/Democrats**? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which <pipe in group 2> are also **Republicans/Democrats**.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

Of people who are <pipe in group 3>, how many would you say are also **Republicans/Democrats**? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which <pipe in group 3> are also **Republicans/Democrats**.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most

5. Almost All

Of people who are <pipe in group 4>, how many would you say are also **Republicans/Democrats**? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which <pipe in group 4> are also **Republicans/Democrats**.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

(Undergraduate Student Survey, Convergent Party Identity Items)

In your *own opinion*, of people who are **Republicans/Democrats**, how many would you say are also <pipe in ideology>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which you believe **Republicans/Democrats** are also <pipe in ideology>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are **Republicans/Democrats**, how many would you say are also <pipe in gender>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which you believe **Republicans/Democrats** are also <pipe in gender>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are **Republicans/Democrats**, how many would you say are also <pipe in age group>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which you believe **Republicans/Democrats** are also <pipe in age group>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

In your *own opinion*, of people who are **Republicans/Democrats**, how many would you say are also <pipe in religious affiliation>? Please select the option that best represents the extent to which you believe **Republicans/Democrats** are also <pipe in religious affiliation>.

1. None
2. A Few
3. Some
4. Most
5. Almost All

Appendix B: Party Characteristic Items for Chapter 4

RDD Telephone Survey & Non-Probability Internet Survey

Of the Democratic and Republican parties, which one do you feel has more members who all share the **same views and beliefs**?

1. Democratic Party
2. Republican Party

When thinking about the Democratic and Republican parties as **political organizations**, which one do you feel is better characterized **by tight formal control** of its members, and a **strong internal leadership**?

1. Democratic Party
2. Republican Party

Non-Probability Internet Survey

Of the Democratic and Republican parties, which one do you feel has more members who represent a **diversity of ethnic, religious, and economic backgrounds**?

1. Democratic Party
2. Republican Party

Appendix C: Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 4

Figure C.1. Predicted Amount of Social Identity Overlap across Authoritarianism (RDD Telephone Sample)





Figure C.2. Predicted Amount of Social Identity Overlap across Authoritarianism (Non-Probability Internet Sample)



Bars represent 95% CI's

Appendix D: GSS Questionnaire & Senate Items for Chapter 5

Authoritarianism (version 1) **applicable in GSS years: 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1986**

- 1) Which three qualities listed on this card would you say are the most desirable for a child to have?
 - 2) Which one of these three is the most desirable of all?
 - 3) All of the qualities listed on this card may be desirable, but could you tell me which three you consider least important?
 - 4) And which one of these three is least important of all?
- [There are 13 traits on this list]

Quality desirable for a child to have: THAT HE HAS GOOD SENSE AND SOUND JUDGMENT

1. Selected as the MOST desirable quality
2. Selected as one of the top 3 MOST desirable qualities
3. Not mentioned as either desirable or un-desirable
4. Selected as one of the top 3 LEAST desirable qualities
5. Selected as the LEAST desirable quality

Quality desirable for a child to have: THAT HE OBEYS HIS PARENTS WELL

reverse coded for analyses

1. Selected as the MOST desirable quality
2. Selected as one of the top 3 MOST desirable qualities
3. Not mentioned as either desirable or un-desirable
4. Selected as one of the top 3 LEAST desirable qualities
5. Selected as the LEAST desirable quality

Authoritarianism (version 2) **applicable in GSS years: 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012**

If you had to choose, which thing on this list would you pick as the most important for a child to learn to prepare him or her for life? [There are five traits on the list]

TO OBEY

** reverse coded for analyses**

1. Most important trait
2. Second most important trait
3. Third most important trait
4. Fourth most important trait
5. Least important trait

TO THINK FOR HIMSELF OR HERSELF

1. Most important trait
2. Second most important trait
3. Third most important trait
4. Fourth most important trait
5. Least important trait

U.S. Region

1. New England (ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI)
2. Middle Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA)
3. East North Central (WI, IL, IN, MI, OH)

4. West North Central (MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS)
5. South Atlantic (DE, MD, WV, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, DC)
6. East South Central (KY, TN, AL, MS)
7. West South Central (AR, OK, LA, TX)
8. Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, CO, AZ, NM)
9. Pacific (WA, OR, CA, AK, HI)

CitySize (Size of the respondent's city/place of residence.)

1. Within an SMSA and a large central city (over 250k)
2. Within an SMSA and a medium size central city (50k to 250k)
3. Within an SMSA and a suburb of a large central city
4. Within an SMSA and a suburb of a medium size central city
5. Within an SMSA and an unincorporated area of a large central city
6. Within an SMSA and an unincorporated area of a medium central city
7. Not within an SMSA, (within a county)
8. Not within an SMSA, and a small city (10k to 50k)
9. Not within an SMSA, a town or village (2,500 to 9,999)
10. Not within an SMSA, an incorporated area less than 2,500; or an unincorporated area of 1,000 to 2,499.

Senator Religion (Senator's religious affiliation coded (Source Almanac of American Politics & CQ's Politics in America))

recoded 1=Protestant Christian, 0=otherwise for analyses

1. Protestant/Christian

(includes: Christian, Protestant, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Mormon, Assembly of God, Christian Science, Church of Christ, Community of Christ, Congregationalist, Disciple of Christ, Reformed Christian, Schwenkfelder Church, Southern Baptist, United Church of Christ, United Methodist)

2. Catholic
3. Jewish
4. Orthodox (includes: Eastern & Greek Orthodox)
5. Other (includes: Unitarian Universalism/Unitarianism)
6. None/Atheist

Blank – Couldn't find Senator's religious affiliation

Senator Ethnicity (Senator's Ethnic background (Source Almanac of American Politics & CQ's Politics in America))

recoded 1=White, 0=otherwise for analyses

1. White/Caucasian
2. African-American/Black
3. Hispanic/Latino
4. Middle Eastern/Arab-American
5. Asian American
6. Native American/Native Hawaiian

Appendix E: Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 5

Figure E.1. Correlations Between Authoritarian Items and Individual Level Differences

Correlations with authoritarianism items 1973-83

	OBEY	JUDGE	IDEOL	white	educ	degree	sex	Age
OBEY	1							
JUDGE	0.2597	1						
IDEOLOGY	0.0924	0.0135	1					
white	-0.1064	-0.0613	0.0763	1				
educ	-0.2215	-0.1348	-0.0346	0.1245	1			
degree	-0.2021	-0.1314	-0.0363	0.0948	0.8374	1		
sex	-0.0145	0.0075	0.0049	0.0279	0.0558	0.0784	1	
age	0.0964	0.0412	0.1519	0.0419	-0.2884	-0.1767	-0.0266	1

Correlations with authoritarianism items 1986-2012

	OBEY	THNKSLF	Ideology	white	Educ	degree	sex	age
OBEY	1							
THNKSLF	0.495	1						
Ideology	0.1334	0.0937	1					
white	-0.1475	-0.11	0.0988	1				
educ	-0.2777	-0.2445	-0.0483	0.1164	1			
degree	-0.2652	-0.2175	-0.0407	0.1118	0.8576	1		
sex	-0.0094	0.0662	0.0444	0.0406	0.041	0.0485	1	
age	0.1103	0.0441	0.1033	0.116	-0.1758	-0.0854	-0.0403	1

Figure E.2. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Party ID, by Region




Figure E.3. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Party ID, by Region (Whites Only)




Figure E.4. Senators' Median DW Nominate Scores by Party and Region (1973-2012)




Figure E.5. Senators' Median Party Unity Scores by Party and Region (1973-2012)




Figure E.6. Percentage White Senators by Party and Region (1973-2012)




Figure E.7. Percentage Male Senators by Party and Region (1973-2012)




Figure E.8. Percentage Protestant Christian Senators by Party and Region (1973-2012)




Table E.1. The Effects of Authoritarianism on Party Identification – Non-Voters (1973-2012)

<i>Fixed Effects</i>	All	White
	Non-Voters	Non-Voters
Intercept	-0.048 (0.079)	-0.134 (0.091)
Authoritarianism (standardized)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.024)
%Homogeneous Democrats	-0.002 (0.015)	0.007 (0.018)
%Homogeneous Republicans	0.026* (0.014)	0.020 (0.017)
Liberal Democrats	0.056 (0.054)	0.190*** (0.062)
Conservative Republicans	0.047 (0.030)	0.073*** (0.036)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Democrats</i>	-0.001 (0.015)	0.010 (0.017)
<i>Auth X %Homogeneous Republicans</i>	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.015)
<i>Auth X Liberal Democrats</i>	0.038 (0.045)	0.043 (0.051)
<i>Auth X Conservative Republicans</i>	0.018 (0.021)	0.020 (0.024)
Percentage Republican Senators	0.088 (0.020)	0.101 (0.023)
Ideology	0.289 (0.015)	0.319 (0.017)
Age	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Gender	0.019 (0.006)	0.017 (0.006)
Education	0.081 (0.012)	0.098 (0.014)
City Type	-0.055 (0.009)	-0.018 (0.010)
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.021 (0.006)	0.018 (0.007)
Church Attendance	0.020 (0.009)	0.032 (0.010)
South Region	-0.012 (0.010)	0.008 (0.012)
New England Region	0.007 (0.012)	0.020 (0.013)
Policy Mood	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)
Presidential Party	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.010)
<i>Random Effects</i>		
Intercept	0.000	0.012
Authoritarianism	0.012	0.016
Residual	0.281	0.279
N (obs)	10055	7981
N (year by region cluster)	200	200
Deviance	3020.3	2261.4

***where $p < .01$, ** where $p < .05$, and * where $p < .1$ on a two-tailed test

Appendix F: Party Attachment and Polarization Items for Chapter 6

RDD Telephone & Non-Probability Internet Survey

How important is being a **Democrat/ Republican** to you?

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Not very important
4. Not important at all

How well does the term **Democrat/ Republican** describe you?

1. Extremely well
2. Very well
3. Not very well
4. Not at all

When talking about **Democrats/ Republicans**, how often do you use “we” instead of “they”?

1. All of the time
2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Rarely
5. Never

To what extent do you think of yourself as being a **Democrat/ Republican**?

1. A great deal
2. Somewhat
3. Very little
4. Not at all

Non-Probability Internet Survey

Turning from your thoughts on government in general, we would like you to think more specifically about the Republican Party and Democratic Party. In your opinion, how similar are **Republicans** to *one another* in terms of what they want government to do and not do?

1. Extremely Similar
2. Very Similar
3. Moderately Similar
4. Slightly Similar
5. Not Similar at All

In your opinion, how similar are **Democrats** to *one another* in terms of what they want government to do and not do?

1. Extremely Similar
2. Very Similar
3. Moderately Similar
4. Slightly Similar
5. Not Similar at All

In your opinion, how *different* are **Republicans** and **Democrats** from one another in terms of what they want government to do and not do?

1. Extremely Different
2. Very Different
3. Moderately Different
4. Slightly Different
5. Not Different at All

We are also interested how you *personally* feel about various political groups. Please rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how you feel about the **Democratic Party**. Ratings between 0 and 5 mean that you *don't feel favorable* towards the **Democratic Party** and that you don't care too much for it. You would rate the **Democratic Party** at the 5 mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards them. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you *feel favorable* and warm towards the **Democratic Party**.

[Slider from 0 to 10 provided]

Please rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how you feel about the **Republican Party**. Ratings between 0 and 5 mean that you *don't feel favorable* towards the **Republican Party** and that you don't care too much for it. You would rate the **Republican Party** at the 5 mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards them. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you *feel favorable* and warm towards the **Republican Party**.

[Slider from 0 to 10 provided]

Thinking about some specific issues, there has been some discussion about **abortion** during recent years. Which one of these opinions best agrees with your view on abortion?

By law, abortion should never be permitted.

The law should permit abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.

The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.

By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

Another issue in recent news relates to the rights of same-sex couples to get married or to adopt children. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE allowing same-sex couples to marry?

1. Strongly Favor
2. Slightly Favor
3. Slightly Oppose
4. Strongly Oppose

Another issue in recent news relates to the rights of same-sex couples to get married or to adopt children. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE allowing same-sex couples to adopt a child?

1. Strongly Favor
2. Slightly Favor
3. Slightly Oppose
4. Strongly Oppose

Do you think that the government should provide more services than it does now, fewer services than it does now, or about the same number of services as it does now?

1. A Lot Fewer Services
2. Somewhat Fewer Services
3. The Same Number of Services
4. Somewhat More Services
5. A Lot More Services

Do you think the federal government has become so large and powerful that it interferes too much in the personal lives of ordinary citizens?

1. Does Not Interfere At All
2. Interferes Just Enough
3. Interferes Slightly Too Much
4. Interferes Somewhat Too Much
5. Interferes Extremely Too Much

Now we would like you to think more specifically about the role of government in national security. Imagine that the U.S. government suspects a person in the United States of being a terrorist. Do you favor or oppose the government being able to put this person in prison for months without ever bringing the person to court and charging him or her with a crime?

1. Favor a Great Deal
2. Favor Moderately
3. Favor a Little
4. Oppose a Little
5. Oppose Moderately
6. Oppose a Great Deal

Do you favor or oppose the U.S. government being required to get a court order before it can listen in on phone calls made by American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists?

1. Favor a Great Deal
2. Favor Moderately
3. Favor a Little
4. Oppose a Little
5. Oppose Moderately
6. Oppose a Great Deal


Appendix G: Supplemental Analyses for Chapter 6

Table G.1. Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to Social Issue Preferences (Non-Probability Internet Sample, Democrats Only)

	Party Cohesion Traits	Conservative Social Preferences	Conservative Social Preferences
	β (SE)	<i>Direct Effects</i> β (SE)	<i>Indirect Effects</i> β (SE)
Constant	0.217*** (0.069)	-0.004 (0.038)	
Cohesion Traits		0.058** (0.025)	
Authoritarianism	0.238*** (0.055)	0.22*** (0.031)	0.014** (0.007)
Party ID Strength	0.087 (0.067)	-0.032 (0.037)	0.005 (0.004)
Ideology	0.217** (0.109)	0.338*** (0.06)	0.012 (0.008)
College Degree	-0.029 (0.033)	0.0004 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.002)
Age	-0.144** (0.069)	0.159*** (0.038)	-0.008 (0.005)
White	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.0004 (0.002)
Gender	-0.032 (0.033)	0.003 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.002)
N	491		
Log Likelihood	-1028.0165		

where *** when $p < .01$, ** when $p < .05$ on a two-tailed test

Figure G.1. Structural Equation Models Linking Authoritarianism to Social Issue Preferences (Non-Probability Internet Sample, Democrats Only)



Note: Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients and SE's. All variables are coded 0-1. ** $p < .05$ and *** $p < .01$