# Stony Brook University

# Urbanization and the Formation of Modern Nation-States in the Turko-Persian World

A Dissertation Presented

by

**Can Ersoy**

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

in

**Sociology**

Stony Brook University

**May 2016**

**Stony Brook University**

The Graduate School

**Can Ersoy**

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation.

_____

**Said A. Arjomand – Dissertation Advisor**
**Distinguished Service Professor, Department of Sociology**

_____

**Ian Roxborough - Chairperson of Defense**
**Professor, Department of Sociology**

_____

**Daniel Levy, Professor**
**Department of Sociology**

_____

**Nader Sohrabi, Faculty Affiliate**
**Buffet Institute for Global Studies**
**Northwestern University**

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

_____

Charles Taber
Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

**Urbanization and the Formation of Modern Nation-States in the Turko-Persian World**

by

**Can Ersoy**

**Doctor of Philosophy**

in

**Sociology**

Stony Brook University

**2016**

The formation of modern states has been studied by numerous scholars over the last four decades; however, the particular role of urbanization in this process has received considerably less attention. The few existing works that do focus on this issue exclusively examine the European experience and explain the interaction between cities and emerging states within that historical framework.

This dissertation examines socio-political dynamics of urbanization and urbanism in the Turko-Persian world during establishment of modern nation-states in order to identify the ways, in which these dynamics affected the ensuing state-society relations. For this purpose, I have conducted a historical study of four countries that differ with respect to state power but have comparable structures of urbanization. In Iran and Turkey modern states have consolidated territorial control and unified the society under their hegemony, whereas in Afghanistan and Pakistan modern states have failed, albeit at different levels. Also, during the early years of state

formation, Iran and Afghanistan had similar patterns of urbanization, while those in Turkey and Pakistan ran parallel. By examining the information collected from secondary sources, I argue that the relationship between urbanization and state formation is contextual and fluid and operates on three levels: cities can enhance or reduce governments' economic power; cities can function as means of ideological dissemination or as settings for opposition mobilization; and cities can support states territorial control or function as a confinement for political power. The matrix of rulers' political choices and the existing urban structure determine the effect cities have over state power at each level - economic, ideological, and spatial. Consequently, this study challenges the one-dimensional relationship between cities and states put forward in the existing literature, and questions the applicability of the European historical experience as the basis of an overarching theory regarding the function of urbanization within the process of political domination.

*Dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers Rıfat Ersoy and Halil Çimecioğlu*

**Acknowledgments**

I could not have completed this dissertation without the support of my advisor, Said Amir Arjomand, and the patience of my committee members, Ian Roxborough, Daniel Levy, and Nader Sohrabi. I've learned so much from all of you, and from the rest of the faculty of the Sociology Department at Stony Brook University. I cannot overestimate how important Wanda Vega's help was in getting me to this point. She helped me navigate the bureaucracy, which is easier to write about than work one's way through. It was my pleasure to get to know her. I also like to thank Tammy Smith for her support and understanding during the two years we worked together.

I would also like to thank my fellow students, and beloved friends, whose company I have enjoyed for the last ten years. In particular, I would like to thank Pablo Lapegna, Roberta Salmi, Onur Bilginer, Bahar Aykan, and Barış Kuymulu, I consider myself very lucky to have you all by my side and it is impossible for me to think of the last ten years without you.

Finally, I cannot thank my family enough: my mother Sevin and father Melih for their patience, support, and love. Robert W. Stock for graciously helping me to edit my work and encouraging me to become a better writer. Gustav and Suzie for sleeping next to me peacefully and being completely indifferent to what is going on.

Most important of all I want to thank my wife, Alexis Stern for her love, understanding, and friendship. I was lucky to have her unwavering faith in my ability to finish this dissertation to lean on even when I was about to give up. I would have been lost without her by my side.

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an analysis of urban centers' effect on the formation of modern states in four countries in the Turko-Persian world: Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Pakistan. The underlying purpose is to demonstrate that the ways in which central governments engaged urban centers was a key factor in determining the strength and capabilities of the emerging nation-states. The main argument put forward: The socio-spatial properties of cities make them either an instrument of or a serious obstacle to the state-making project. Policies that effectively capitalize on the unique qualities of cities enable states to expand their territorial control, ideological strength, and economic power. Conversely, without such engagement urban centers put a check on the formation of strong states.

Territorially consolidated modern states have become the dominant polity across the world within several centuries after they first appeared in early modern Europe. Given the relatively short period of time it took for modern states to become the behemoths they are today, it comes as no surprise that their development has received the attention of scholars from diverse disciplines and theoretical orientations. Their efforts at understanding the reasons behind the ever-growing power and the pervasiveness of modern states have provided us with a prolific body of work that covers a wide range of themes. War, economic crisis, competition among elites, demographic pressure, capital accumulation, colonialism, and cultural change are only a few among many social phenomena that have been identified as crucial elements in the formation and development of modern states.

However, the diversity found in the analytical approaches to state formation is somewhat lacking when it comes to the cases studied to develop these theoretical arguments. Despite nation-states becoming the dominant form of polity in every region of the world, sociological studies on their formation primarily focus on two historical periods and geographic regions: early modern Europe and post-colonial Africa. Although there are other sociological works that

concentrate on the development of modern states in other parts of the world at other periods, particularly those in Latin America, they comprise only a small portion of the existing literature. Consequently, the major arguments regarding state formation presented within the sociological literature have limited validity when applied to the experience of other parts of the world. None of the states examined in this study developed through war making; neither did they emerge as a response to a fundamental societal crisis, competition among elites, or demographic pressure. Our limited knowledge as to how modern states established control in other parts of the world inadvertently limits our understanding of the multi-faceted nature of state power in particular and political domination in general.

The reason for focusing on the role of urban centers is two-fold: to increase the analytical rigor of the study and to correct the limited attention paid to cities in the existing literature. It is almost impossible to study four distinct cases of a multi-dimensional phenomenon like state formation and do justice to every aspect of the process. This practical problem left me with a choice: Instead of limiting the number of cases and conducting a broader study of state formation within, I preferred to examine several cases and tighten the analytical focus of the study. Therefore, I decided to pick out a particular dimension of social structure and analyze its role within the larger process.

Only a few sociological studies on state formation treat cities as an integral variable in the process, and they exclusively do so within the context of European history. Yet the unique aspects of urbanism in Europe make the findings of these studies of limited value when examining other historical and geographic settings. Historically, European cities had a degree of political autonomy and the capacity to generate capital through commerce or manufacture. Consequently the interplay between consolidated states and urban centers was based on an antagonistic relationship, where state elites sought to extend their control over cities and the financial resources they accumulated. In contrast, most urban centers in other parts of the world did not enjoy political autonomy, while most state elites resided in the cities and the main source of urban wealth was provided by the taxes collected from the countryside. In other parts of the world, cities depended on state power for protection against occasional raids by nomadic armies, while tribal rulers relied on the urban literati to govern conquered territories. Given such differences between the historical circumstances of Europe and other parts of the world, it is

inevitable that studies focusing on Europe are limited in their capacity to explain the interplay between states and cities elsewhere.

In the light of the arguments above, this study aims at expanding the geographical and temporal scope of sociological literature on the development of modern states by analyzing historical cases from the Turko-Persian geography. Furthermore, to highlight the contrasts between the historical experience of this region and those studied extensively by previous scholars, it focuses on the role of urban centers within the process.

## 1.1 Outline of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 presents the analytical framework that I utilize throughout the rest of the dissertation. I begin by discussing the validity of the research question, elaborating its potential contribution to sociological literature on the subject. I then explain the reasons behind the selection of the cases. The formation of modern states in these four countries has not previously been studied alongside each other.

The chapter continues with an exploration of the essential properties of modern states as conceptualized in the sociological literature. For the purposes of sociological inquiry, the modern state is primarily defined by certain properties: centralized control over a defined territory, monopoly over binding authoritative rule-making, and the ability to enforce its rule thorough violence. It is also necessary to point out that states are arbitrary products, and they have been created through purposeful actions of social actors. Since the sociological understanding of the state is an ideal type, and real states vary in their capacity to exercise the aforementioned properties, it is also important to develop a working understanding of the concept of state power. I rely on Mann's simple yet functional distinction between coercive and infrastructural power of states. Accordingly, I argue that it is infrastructural power that primarily determines the actual strength of a modern state.

The next section of Chapter 2 discusses the socio-spatial qualities of urban centers and how they are indispensible to the success of a state-making project. As centers of population and territory, cities are nodal points in social, economic, and political power networks; therefore they

are prime locales for establishing control over people, territory, and resources. The size and density of a city's population and the socio-economic influence it has over the surrounding region make it an effective instrument for the exercise of state power over various spheres. However, unless states recognize this fact and engage cities through policies that capitalize on their potential, the exact same qualities can also turn cities into major obstacles to the expansion of state control over the country.

I explore three areas where cities play a key role in determining the success of state-making endeavors. The first one is territoriality, the exercise of power by controlling geographical regions, a fundamental aspect of modern states. Each state's territory has its distinctive features, but certain elements such as the core and the periphery can be identified in the territorial organization of every state. The ultimate spatial goal for a modern state is the expansion of its core across the whole territory, and the integration of disparate regional units under its centralized aegis. Cities can function as centers of political domination for entire regions, and the urban network can be an instrument for the extension of state power across the land. By choosing the spatial pattern of connecting urban centers to the capital and by reinforcing cities' political influence over their surroundings, emerging states can increase their control over territory and deny other actors the same power.

The second area where cities play a crucial role in state formation is the creation of a national identity. Within the context of societies that have low literacy rates, high linguistic heterogeneity, and limited means of long-distance communication, visible symbols become the most effective instruments of propagating ideas. In this regard, urban space and architecture are effective instruments of political symbolism. States can take advantage of this by exercising control over the planning and the designing of the built environment in cities. Aside from establishing a sense of unified national identity, such endeavors also enable state makers to demonstrate their vision for the modernization of society. On the other hand, lacking any centralized effort at planning or design, urban centers develop in ways that reflect, and magnify, existing socio-political divisions. Capital cities are especially important as they are symbols of national sovereignty and dignity; and they act as physical manifestations of state power by housing more public offices and buildings than other cities.

Aside from their territorial and symbolic influences, cities are also important centers for economic development. Historically, a key aspect of the formation of modern states has been economic modernization and development. This was particularly true for non-western examples of state formation, where nascent states tended to be the major economic actor within their borders. Policies regarding the location and the type of public investment had a major impact on the development of the country's economic structure. Regional centers and secondary cities are the prime locales for public investments, as their impact effectively spreads across the surrounding regions. Redistributive policies enabled states to avoid overconcentration of resources in particular centers and rein in deep regional inequalities, thus reinforcing national integration.

Chapter 3 is an overview of the sociological literature on state formation. Although it is a very prolific body of work that is comprised of diverse studies, I use broad categories to emphasize similarities among the works I overview. For each category I provide summaries of several studies that are chosen on the basis of one or more of the following reasons: their impact on the field, the originality of their arguments, and how well they represent the major arguments for their theoretical orientation.

The first group of studies I discuss have a militaristic approach. The main argument of this set of analyses is best summarized in Charles Tilly's well-known dictum: States make war and war makes states. In other words, interstate competition is the root cause of state formation. I explore the works of Tilly and Downing, as I think both are good examples of this line of scholarship. I continue with summaries of the studies of Ertman, Centeno, and Hui, all fo whom question the common assumptions and findings of the military-fiscal approach without challenging its basic premise regarding the influence of external factors over state formation.

The second group of studies overviewed prioritizes internal societal dynamics as the main drive behind the formation of modern states. The works of Strayer, Badie and Birnbaum, and Anderson are analyzed. Despite the differences among their overarching theoretical leanings, all of these studies conceptualize the formation of modern states as a response to the crisis of late feudalism in Europe. I conclude this section with summaries of two relatively recent studies by Gorski and Adams, both of which identify the political outcomes of cultural dynamics in early modern European societies.

The third group of works in Chapter 3 emphasizes cultural change as an integral element of state formation, albeit in rather different ways. I start with Corrigan and Sayer's analysis of the development of the modern state in England and continue with Elias' seminal work on the development of modern political organization in Europe. As a more contemporary example, I picked Ikegami's account of the transformation of the idea of honor among the Samurai, an element of the formation of the modern state in Japan. There are obvious parallels between Elias and Ikegami's works, and I juxtapose them with Corrigan and Sayer's works to provide a sense of the diversity of the ways in which culture can be a utilized as an analytical category in historical studies.

The chapter continues with a focus on the studies that analyze formation of states in the post-colonial era. The body of work on post-colonial states in the Third World is immense and an overview of every strand within it would be well beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, my goal in this section is not to provide an exhaustive summary but rather a glimpse of the overarching themes present within this body of work. I start by explaining the major factors, identified by various scholars, differentiating state-making in the post-colonial context of the 20$^{th}$ century from that of early modern Europe.

The last two sections of Chapter 3 elaborate on the ways historical sociology, in general, and state formation literature, in particular,have engaged cities and urbanization. First I present an argument showing how the historical sociological study of cities differs from urban histories. I examine the works of two scholars, Rokkan and Tilly, both of whom treat cities and urban networks as major determinants of the development of modern political structures. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the applicability of these works to the cases presented in this study.

In Chapter 4, I present a temporal and spatial context for the following two chapters by identifying the overarching elements of urbanization within the region and by examining the great social and economic transformation that took place during the 19$^{th}$ century.

The first section identifies the essential characteristics of urbanization in Turko-Persia and the Greater Middle East. Starting with the geographical distribution of major urban centers and their position with transcontinental trade networks, the section explores the impact of

military conflicts, political organizations, and the culture of Islam on cities and the composition of urban populations. The initial exposition of the power dynamics that operated across history is followed by an examination of the spatial and economic patterns through which capitalism began to penetrate the region during the 19th century. The impact of international market integration was felt initially in port cities and their hinterlands. Contact with Western commercialism had changed the distribution of resources within urban centers to the advantage of non-Muslim minorities, who facilitated business transactions as intermediaries between foreign capital and local producers. On the other hand, as farmers switched to cash crops, economies in the hinterland become monetized, and development of basic crop-processing facilities opened up new opportunities for employment. As social and economic dynamics between rural areas and urban centers changed, so did the position of classes within the social hierarchy.

The next section of Chapter 4 focuses on the specific properties of urban structures in the studied cases. Here I offer a very brief overview of the issues and themes that will be discussed in depth in the next two chapters. After the overview some elementary ideas about the various functions of cities within the process of state building are explored. The characteristics of some elements of urban population are elaborated to identify their potential role in the context of the creation of symbolic capital. Finally, there is a quick look at tribes and tribalism in order to identify the possible military functions that cities can serve.

Chapters 5 and 6 are the historical narratives detailing the state formation process in individual cases. The analytical framework of the study is based on comparing two instances of the development of strong modern states, in Turkey and Iran, to two instances in which the process of state formation resulted in weak states, Pakistan and Afghanistan. But instead of devoting one chapter to examining the emergence of strong states and the other to the emergence of weak states, I pair these cases on the basis of their social, political, spatial, demographic, and geographic similarities. Thus, narratives of state formation in Iran and Afghanistan constitute Chapter 5, while those of Turkey and Pakistan are discussed in Chapter 6. The contents of each pair of narratives are focused on similar, if not the same, issues and processes; meanwhile the overarching themes of urbanization, urbanism, territoriality, and economic development connect all four. Both chapters conclude with a discussion section, where experiences of the countries are compared in view of the larger analytical framework.

Chapter 5 starts with a brief explanation of the major issues both nations faced during the period studied, in order to offer some degree of context for the following analyses. This is followed by the account of state formation in Iran. I start with an overview of the reorganization of military under Reza Shah, which significantly extended the territorial control of the central government. This is followed by a description of the role of tribes within Iran's political structure and the power they held at the beginning of the 20th century and their eventual subjugation by the Pahlavi regime. The changing level of control the central government has over the administration of cities from late Qajar to Pahlavi period is explored next, followed by the reaction of traditional middle classes to the centralization program of the new state, and the resulting urban uprisings. I continue with an examination of the impact central government's policies had on the urbanization dynamics of the country; the transformation of Iranian cities as a consequence of centralized planning efforts and the emergence of the modern urban middle class, which provided the Pahlavi regime with a social base. The section on Iran concludes with an analysis of the territorial outcomes of public investments in the transportation infrastructure and industrial development.

I start the analysis of state formation in Afghanistan with a survey of the country's geography, which I believe has a significant impact on the process. The analysis continues with an examination of the emergence of the central state in Afghanistan in order to elaborate on the historical dynamics between the state and the tribes as well as the strategies employed by the tribal population to isolate themselves from the state's exercise of power. This is followed by a description of the policies of King Amanullah that adversely affected the rural periphery and eventually resulted in the downfall of his reign. I analyze the future political impact of the tribal rebellion and elaborate on the policies of the Musahiban regime that led to sharp social and cultural divisions between urban and rural Afghanistan. An examination of the political results of overabundant foreign aid in the Cold War period also includes an overview of development policies of the government during the same era, along with their social implications. I proceed with an exploration of the urban rural divide by presenting an account of modernization in urban areas and the traditional practices of social regulation in rural areas that greatly limited the Afghan state's capacity for social penetration.

Chapter 6 starts with a brief statement of the common issues faced by Turkey and Pakistan throughout their respective periods of state formation. The chapter continues with an historical account of Turkish state formation. It begins with an analysis of the economic conditions of Turkey at the time of its independence and the government's response. The point emphasized here is the poor state of industry and the over-concentration of what little manufacturing capacity there was around Istanbul. The next section explores the dramatic shift in government economic policies from liberalism to etatism at the beginning of 1930s. This is followed by an exposition of the various ways in which the republican regime involved itself with the urbanization of Turkey in order to expand its capacity for social control. Specifically, I begin with an overview of the development of the municipal administration after the late Ottoman era. I then focus on the political significance of relocating the capital to Ankara, and on the role of the city as a manifestation of republican ideology and as the new locus of the territorial integration of the country. This is followed by an examination of the systematic policies of urban planning and transformation and their effect on the urban spaces of Turkey along with an overview of the placement of factory towns across the country to encourage regional development and create new avenues for the dissemination of the regime's modernist ideology. The historical analysis concludes with an exploration of the demographic change that took place during the early years of the republic and its economic and cultural impact. Finally, I focus on the resettlement of immigrants and indigenous non-Turkish minorities by the government, and examine the way, in which the republican regime articulated nation building and social control, through the spatial organization of the country.

The historical narrative of the formation of state in Pakistan begins with an overview of the colonial legacy, which includes an examination of the administrative system in British India and the social and political structure that emerged as a result. The section continues by focusing on the colonial experience of Bengal, Punjab, and Sindh, the most populous provinces of Pakistan. I elaborate on the mechanisms of social control employed by the British that resulted in the emergence of an urban elite in Bengal, whereas Punjab and Sindh were dominated by the landowning class. This section is followed by an account of urbanization and urbanism that includes analyses of the pattern of urban growth under the British Raj; the characteristics of colonial urbanism and its continued impact on the cities of post-independence Pakistan; the emergence of squatter neighborhoods as a permanent part of all the major cities of Pakistan; and

the political dynamics with growing tension in urban Pakistan. Next I focus on Pakistani governments' policies of economic development, which resulted in the over concentration of industrial development, and on the effects of modernization within a few areas and the accumulation of private capital in the hands of a relatively small social class. This is followed by an examination of the demographic effects and political outcomes of the partition of British India. Next, I investigate the consequences of the arrival of a large urbanized community, whose members were the major political force behind the idea of Pakistan, with most of them settling in Karachi. This subsection also includes an analysis of the urban unrest caused by the growing ethnic tensions between the immigrants and locals in Sindh and its overall effect on the national integration of Pakistan. The last aspect of state formation I explore is the relocation of the federal capital from Karachi to Islamabad; looking at the reasoning behind that move, and its embedded political meaning, I underline its contribution to national disintegration as opposed to symbolizing the unity and national identity of Pakistan.

The discussion sections at the end of Chapters 5 and 6 highlight the contrasts between the cases explored in that chapter. I structure these comparisons within the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 and identify the territorial, ideological, and economic outcomes of urban policies and the particulars of urbanism in each case. The comparisons underline the diverse ways in which the dynamics explored in Chapter 2 operated in history.

The final chapter of the dissertation offers an overview of the arguments presented and the thought processes behind their development. I evaluate the significance of this work, the place it occupies within sociological literature, along with its limitations. The chapter concludes with a discussion regarding the possible ways to expand this research in the future and the potential application of the findings to other areas.

# CHAPTER 2: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 The Question

The overarching question this study seeks an answer to is: how can we explain modern states in Turkey and Iran succeeding in becoming strong institutions with extensive power over the society, while the states in Afghanistan and Pakistan failing in the same endeavor?

The validity of this question as a basis for a sociological study becomes more apparent when we consider the similarity of the social structures of these countries at the time when modern states were being established. On top of their geographic proximity and the existing connections among them all were predominantly agrarian societies, where a relatively westernized small group of elites controlled the central governments. The predominantly Muslim populations were multi-ethic, where locality and kinship ties functioned as the primary bases of social identity. Industry represented an insignificant part of the economy in all and urban population accounted for a small percentage of the total. The state-making elites in all four countries shared a similar political vision based on the consolidated and centralized nation-states of Europe. The elites equated westernization with development and they had access to similar policy tools to realize their social and political goals.

The sociological literature on state formation offers several perspectives on the issue, each identifying different social, economic, and political dynamics as the key factors that led to the development of modern states. However, the major arguments regarding state formation presented within these studies have very little validity when applied to the cases studied in this dissertation. None of the states examined in this study developed through war making; neither did they emerge as a response to a fundamental societal crisis. Unlike Europe, where modern states developed organically throughout several centuries, state-making in the Turko-Persian world was spearheaded by purposeful social actors who sought to emulate European political

institutions. In this regard, the Turko-Persian experience has more in common with the 20th century post-colonial state, the other extensively studied instance of state formation. However, the analyses of the development of post-colonial states emphasize the socio-political legacy of colonialism, structural inequalities of global capitalism, and the persistence of traditional social identities as the main aspects of the state formation process. With the obvious exception of Pakistan these factors too, have limited explanatory potential within the historical and geographical context of the cases studied in this dissertation.

As it is often the case with sociological inquiry, it is almost impossible to offer a simple yet comprehensive answer to this seemingly straightforward question. The multi-dimensional nature of power relations, sheer complexity of the state formation process, and historical contingency eliminate the possibility of a universally valid theory that can explain variations in the strength of modern states. Therefore, instead of trying to develop a grand narrative, concentrating on a particular dimension of the larger process has more potential to be more fruitful. For this purpose, I chose to focus on urbanization as a factor in the development of modern states.

I delineate some of the major problems faced by all the states in my study into three broad categories: problems of territoriality, of national identity –or nation building-, and economic development. Since the establishment of modern states coincided with tumultuous times for all countries, establishing territorial control, centralization, and integration were major obstacles. Unifying the multi-ethnic, diverse populations without relying on traditional sources of political authority necessitated the establishment of a national identity that would supersede regional differences. Experiencing the European dominance in international relations firsthand it was clear to the elites of the region that the kind of socio-political transformation they sought to achieve could only be realized with the creation of an industrial sector. Moreover, it was also clear that for its benefits to be reaped efficiently industrial development should expand across the whole country. Certainly the particular dynamics of and the ways, in which these problems manifested in each country, differed but their existence in all cases provided me with the base to build my analyses on.

The explanations offered by the available studies working on this problem are primarily formulated using examples of European urbanism, where cities enjoyed a degree of autonomy and they had the capacity to generate capital through commerce or manufacture. As a result, cities in the existing literature are conceptualized primarily as nodes of capital accumulation. Within this framework, wealthy cities guarded their autonomy and resisted the expanding control of centralized states over the continent. Ironically, the same cities also provided the rulers with the financial resources that allowed the central governments to field ever-larger armies, which enabled them to dominate other polities most of which were not centralized nation-states. In this regard, existing scholarship acknowledges complexities and contradictions inherent in the dynamics between cities and states, but explores them solely within the context of capital relations. But even a cursory study of urbanization in Turko-Persian region is enough to recognize that capital relations constitute only one aspect of the role cities played during the emergence of modern states in the region. Thus, despite representing some of the finest examples of historical sociology, the existing literature on state formation is rather limited when applying its findings to other historical and geographical settings.

## 2.2 The Cases

This research is based on the study of four cases of nation-state formation in the Turko-Persian world that produced modern states with varying levels of strength. Turkey and Iran represent instances of state formation that resulted in strong national states, whereas Afghanistan and Pakistan are cases, in which comparatively weaker states emerged. I define success of state formation is by the social and territorial control capacities of the emergent state. Social control refers to a state's ability to penetrate society in order to legitimate its domination, while territorial control stands for the spatial extent of a state's ability to enforce its rules and exercise its power. Turkey and Iran are successful instances of state formation, where the processes produced strong nation-states, while Afghanistan and Pakistan provide the contrast, where states' control of territory and influence over the society remained limited.

The variation in the strength of these states aside, I chose them on the basis of the similar nature of the problems and obstacles the state elites faced while establishing modern state

structures. The socio-political structures of Iran and Afghanistan parallel each other, while the experience of Turkish and Pakistani states had more in common.

Iran and Afghanistan had weak political centers. In both countries some provincial cities had economic and cultural influence comparable to that of the capital city, as well as connections to international markets that bypass the capital. At the beginning of the 20th century, tribes enjoyed significant political and military power, and were able to exercise control over large territories. The lack of effective political centralization, the autonomous power of tribes, and the resulting limited territorial control were the major problems facing the state makers in both countries.

The formation of nation-states in Turkey and Pakistan were not concurrent, yet the obstacles faced by the nascent central government in both countries bore strikingly similarities. In both situations, economic resources and the production infrastructure were over-concentrated around port cities that had connections to international markets. Moreover, in Turkey and Pakistan the formation of the modern state took place within the context of large-scale demographic shifts that involved the departure of urban professional classes and the arrival of migrants with heterogeneous ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, both states emerged out of imperial systems that ruled over heterogeneous populations, which made the construction of a new national identity a priority for both of them.

Aside from the fact that no other comparative study of state formation specifically focuses on these countries, the cases for this study were chosen for several reasons in mind. First, they are contiguous countries that share an overarching legacy of the Turko-Persian political culture. Although the unifying influence it had on the polities in the region had been significantly diminished since 18th century, the historical legacy of Turko-Persian civilization continued to inform their social and political practices, providing a certain level of familiarity of ideas and similarity of institutions. This is best evidenced in the interactions among the state-making elites of these countries throughout the period studied. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran encouraged the Young Turks to finally rise against the Sultan and reinstitute the constitution. King Amanullah looked at the Turkish and Iranian experiences when he embarked on his ambitious reform program. He hired Turkish military advisers to reform the army; to assist him with the political reforms he appointed Mahmud Tarzi, who spent years in Istanbul, as prime

minister. Reza Shah was conversant in Turkish, he observed the republican reforms in Turkey closely and adapted various practices to Iran. Numerous officers of the Pakistani armed forces received education in Turkey having a chance to observe Turkey first hand.

Second, the fact that all are predominantly Muslim societies allows me to eliminate religion as an explanatory variable from the analysis. All of the countries had been influenced and shaped to an extent by Islam, the *ulama* had an influence over the societies in all of them and resisted, or frowned upon, the westernization efforts of the elites. Therefore the variance in the outcomes of the state formation process had little, if anything, to do with Islamicate cultures or institutions.

Finally, with the exception of Pakistan, these cases represent relatively less examined instances of the subject variable. Overwhelming majority of sociological studies on state formation focus on two particular historical periods: Europe during the pre-modern era or the post-colonial experiences during the second half of 20$^{th}$ century. The formation of modern states in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan took place in the first half of 20$^{th}$ century; aside from being less studied taking place in this period had significant implications for the state formation process of these countries.

Since modern states of Europe were already established for long enough to provide the ruling elites of other countries with a concrete ideal to emulate. Reformers across the non-western world sought ways to impose European social and political institutions and practices on their countries' population with the expectation that this would result in a positive social transformation. This meant that the political decisions and actions of state builders in the cases examined were guided by rational choices with intended outcomes in mind, rather than simply being ad hoc responses to immediate problems. Analytically speaking, having a sense of the meanings behind the actions of prominent social actors provides the researcher with an identifiable basis to evaluate their outcomes.

The modern international system was not yet established for most of the period studied here. Unlike the rulers of post-colonial states that emerged in the post World War II era, state makers of the earlier period did not operate within an international system based on unchanging borders that forbids territorial gain and annexation through war and provides support to failing

states. A strong state was the only instrument to keep countries from falling into pieces in the face of internal and external pressure. Therefore, the stakes were higher for the state makers of the period studied here and it is fair to assume that they extended as much effort and mobilized all the resources they could towards succeeding in the state-making project.

## 2.3 Modern State and State Power

The state is an organization; first and foremost it is a set of institutional arrangements devised purposefully to carry out certain functions. The intentionality in the creation of states is crucial in thinking about their formation. States are not simply a product of historical contingency; their existence is an outcome of collective purposeful actions over long periods of time. Also, states are not a natural extension of social structure; human communities can –and did- exist and flourish without them. Perhaps because of this artificial nature, a state's control over population and territory invariably involves coercion, which is its single most important characteristic. Above and beyond anything else, the practice or threat of violence against individuals and communities is the most fundamental aspect of statehood. At their barest form all other powers and functions of the state organization are predicated on the capability to use force and coercion.

Weber's definition of the state as "a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory"(Weber, Mills, Gerth 1946:77) has certainly influenced many scholars from various disciplines. But it is fair to argue that since mid 1970s most sociological studies on the state[1] have adopted this conceptualization as their base and expanded on it. This has resulted in most sociologists, who work on the topic, to agree upon a set of essential characteristics that define states. Expressed in the barest fashion, the state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel that occupy a central position within a defined territory, and claim monopoly over authoritative rule making backed up by means of physical

[1]It should be noted that throughout the same period a somewhat more theoretically inclined but no less insightful debate regarding the nature and role of state within modern capitalist society was taking place among Marxist academics. However, since they primarily focused on industrial capitalist societies, their ideas are not exactly relevant to the subject of this study. For more information see Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1978; Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Corrigan 1980; Jessop 1982; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Clarke 1991; and Offe 1996

violence. (Tilly 1975: 27, 70; Mann 1986:112; Hall 1989: 2-3) Almost all sociological studies of the state use a variation of this definition; for instance, in their highly influential work Reuschmeyer and Evans (1985:46-47) describe the state as "a set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force", while for Giddens (1989:303) the state can be defined as "a political apparatus, recognized to have sovereign rights within the borders of a demarcated territorial area, able to back its claims to sovereignty by control of military power, many of whose citizens have positive feelings of commitment to its national identity".

It is important to point out that the description above are ideal types as no state in history actually managed to have absolute control over the lands and peoples they dominated. Various factors have imposed limits on states' capacity to exercise their claimed prerogatives. In this regard, as Nettl (1968) puts it brilliantly, "stateness" has been a goal for states to achieve rather than the condition of their existence throughout history. Social scientists often rely on the term state capacity in order to assess the strength and weakness of states. States with high capacity are successful in –among other things- extracting resources efficiently, securing monopoly over violence, generating symbolic consent and legitimacy, enforcing their rules, establishing control over population, guiding national development, and providing public goods. Studies have asserted the importance of state capacity in analyzing outcomes and variations within a wide variety of contexts, among which are economic development, democratization, social welfare, political culture, nationalism, civil violence and international warfare. (Soifer, vomHau 2008) On the other hand, state capacity itself is regarded as an amalgamation of several factors; state's level of autonomy vis-à-vis other social actors (Skocpol 1979, Bates 1981, Evans 1995), the effectiveness professionalization of its bureaucracy (Skowronek 1982, Geddes 1984, Evans and Rauch 1999), and its spatial reach across territory (Herbst 2000).

Providing one of the most lucid conceptualization of state power Mann (1986) distinguishes between two types: despotic and infrastructural. By despotic power he refers to the capacity of the state elite to act without having to negotiate with elements of civil society. In many instances throughout history state's despotic power had been almost limitless or limited only in certain spheres. Emperors of China, or absolute monarchs of early modern Europe could

–on paper- do virtually anything with the people living within their domains; of course depending on numerous factors the actual capacity of these rulers to have their wishes carried out across their domains varied significantly.

Infrastructural power refers to the ability of the state to penetrate society, coordinate social relations, and to implement political decisions. The modern state is involved with the everyday lives of its subjects more than any other political organization did in history. By utilizing its own infrastructure the state exerts great influence over the economy, over symbolic values, and over the direction of social development. Since 18$^{th}$ century infrastructural power of states has risen constantly as state elites were forced to become more responsive to their populations that resulted in social groups demanding more public goods. On the other hand, this substantial increase in states' infrastructural power in modern period was compounded by their ability to collect large amount of information on their subject population and their territories.

For the purposes of this study the extent of the infrastructural powers of the states analyzed will be the primary measure of state strength and degree of success in state formation. The state making elites in all cases aimed at establishing political institutions, which would spearhead a large-scale social transformation. Simply expanding the despotic powers of the central government would not have resulted in the kind of change they sought to implement. The success of modernization project they envisioned depended on the capacity of the state apparatus to effectively penetrate social, economic, and political dynamics within the country.

## 2.4 Cities and State Power

In his essay "Urbanism as a Way of Life" Wirth (1938) presents the clearest and most functional sociological definition of a city: a permanent settlement inhabited by a large, dense, and heterogeneous population. This definition can be easily applied to all cities throughout human history regardless of the specifics of context. These are the essential qualities of urbanism and all other aspect of it identified by social sciences over the years can be articulated as a consequence of one or more of these qualities. Thus, studies focusing on any kind of relationship

between urbanism and other socio-political phenomena must take into account the potential effects of the abovementioned features on the processes analyzed.

Formation of modern states is a complex process whereby a peoples and territories come under the control of a centralized political organization. As centers of population and resource accumulation cities are crucial in the unfolding of this process. The size and density of cities' population make them socio-spatial nodes for economic, political, military, and ideological power networks. Even if urban centers account for a small percentage of a country's overall population their centrality within these networks make them particularly instrumental for any activity related to them.

For state making elites cities present opportunities and obstacles simultaneously. Cities may provide regimes with popular political support, substantial economic resources, and territorial reach; while they can also easily become hotbeds of civil unrest, burden the national economy, and set physical barriers to territorial control. Policies targeting urban centers and utilizing their potential can produce a transformative effect over the rest of the country furthering the process of state making. On the other hand, without any focused engagement from the political center, cities would reproduce and augment existing socio-economic cleavages and impede political changes sought by the state elites. In this regard the ways, in which state elites engage urban centers and urban populations, can have a significant impact on the outcome of the state-making project.

As the number of people who are simultaneously affected by political actions increases, the outcomes of these actions are amplified in proportion. Thus, cities have the potential to function as powerful instruments of and locales for ideological dissemination. States can capitalize on this property of cities to significantly – and efficiently – further their penetration of society, to legitimate the existing political structure, and to establish a national identity that surpasses local distinctions. On the other hand, heterogeneity of large urban populations also have the potential to further highlight existing differences and inequalities. When coupled with other socio-economic problems, this can enable political movements with resources to mobilize and opportunities to challenge the state's authority.

Cities are nodes, where various resources accumulate and concentrate, they are also centers, from where resources are dispersed and transferred, providing them with substantial economic and social influence over the surrounding region. This influence makes urban centers a crucial element of any territory and consequently of territoriality. In this sense, single cities and the larger urban network determine the spatial organization of social, economic, and political activities, which has significant consequences for every part of the country. Through policies that capitalize on the territorial effect of urban centers states can reduce regional inequalities, enhance national integration and expand their territorial reach.

### 2.4.1 Territoriality

The sovereignty and authority of the state is ensconced in its territoriality. A state's very existence is grounded on its ability to have exclusive control over a piece of land. One of the most fundamental expressions of state power is the ability of a state to successfully exercise jurisdiction over its territory. The modern state is strong to the extent that it can protect its territorial integrity against the encroachment of other political forces.

The simplest definition of territoriality is the act of exercising power over people and objects by controlling areas. Territories are always intertwined with various forms of power and therefore all territorial dynamics, in essence, are manifestations of power relations. As is the case with all aspects of space, territories are not stable backgrounds, within which power dynamics unfold; instead they are constantly produced, shaped, transformed, and destroyed by social action. In this regard the territory of a state is a product of social and political actions of and interaction between the state and other actors. Unlike most other types of places, territories need to be established and, more importantly, maintained or they cease to exist. Patrolling borders, controls at customs, and issuing construction permits are a few examples of how territories are maintained. (Sack 1986)

States construct territories through various methods, but establishing boundaries is the most elementary aspect of territoriality and it gives the territory a physical shape. International borders delimit the spatial expanse of state's ability to exercise its power and form the basis of

the contemporary system of states. Boundaries function as the basis of territorial identities by demarcating lines of inclusion and exclusion, penetrating society and allowing articulation of states' territorial control into symbolic categories. Unlike frontiers, where large geographic areas can exist in a state of ambiguity vis-à-vis state power and associated social categories, the borders of modern states are often precise and clearly defined, augmenting their perceived territorial control. Territories are also constructed through symbolic and institutional practices. Probably the most basic symbolic practice to construct territory is the naming of places; geographical features become a part of a territory once they are given names. The simple act of naming a place is an exercise of power, and names with symbolic meanings can intensify the effect of power. (Sack 1986; Paasi 1996; Agnew 2002)

Every state's territory has unique features resulting from its geographical features and historical processes. Yet it is not only possible but also useful to employ some spatial categories in order to bring country-specific diverse elements under a conceptual umbrella. One set of spatial categories that have widespread use across disciplines and directly linked to state power is the idea of territorial core – also known as the focal area or simply the center – and, inextricably tied to it, the idea of periphery. The center-periphery model has been extensively utilized to analyze socio-economic inequalities at various geographical scales.[2]

The territorial core represents the region that dominates the economic, political, and financial relations in the country. Compared to other regions, it has higher population density and the states' capacity to exercise power is at its maximum in the core territory. The core area is the central point from which state power radiates to other parts of the territory; moreover, in many nation states the core territory encompasses the area identified as the historical nucleus of the nation and national identity. (Mellor 1989:58-65) It is certainly possible for a polity to have more than one region that exercises great influence over the rest of the country and in some countries no single region dominates the others. The geographical arrangement of the core area(s) is closely linked to state's territorial control capacity; but the relationship between the two is not unidirectional. Remoteness, physical inaccessibility, or activities of dissident movements weaken

[2]The center-periphery model is applied at global scale by the world system and dependency theories of economic development, see Wallerstein, 1974, Amin 1976, Frank 1978; see Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Muir 1975, Bourdieu 1986 for examples of its use at national level analyses.

the hold of the central government over parts of its territory. The area that is fully controlled by the state comprises its effective territory. The relationship between the territory as a whole and the effective territory is an important indicator of the state's actual capabilities.

The spatial center of the state apparatus is bound to attract people, capital, and other resources; and have an influence over the political and economic dynamics in other parts of the country. On a smaller scale the same is true for provincial centers of administration and the areas surrounding them. Political integration is the process by which these smaller spatial units are bound together under the aegis of the central state. Integration is a key element in the effective functioning of the state. (Muir and Paddison 1981:152-160) In practical terms successful political integration involves establishing connections between different parts of the country to create a cohesive economic and social unit. Transportation networks are structured around and through cities, which function as the nodal and terminal points. The spatial organization of transportation and communication networks influences the actions of citizens and organizations by establishing and removing limitations to their movement. Development of these networks transforms the territory by determining the effective distances between various points within the country.

Territorial integration and centralization was essential to the success of the states analyzed in this study. At the early stages of state formation the central governments in all four cases had a tenuous hold over the territory they claimed sovereignty over. Large areas of Iran were under the control of pastoralist tribes that were effectively independent at the beginning of 1920s. The social and economic resources in other major cities challenged the centrality of Tehran within Iran, while the poor state of transportation and communication infrastructure further compounded the centrifugal forces. Similar dynamics also existed in Afghanistan, where tribal forces controlled the highlands at the geographic center of the country. The cities of Qandahar, Mazar-i Sharif, and Herat had closer ties with centers outside the borders than they did with the rest of the country. Kabul's influence over Afghanistan was superficial at best, with land connections between the capital and major cities severed for months every year during winter. On the other hand, nascent states in both Turkey and Pakistan faced the challenge of establishing new political centers. In both cases transforming the existing territorial dynamics, which were a product of previous colonial or imperial regimes, was regarded as a necessary

element of nation-building. Relocation of national capital in both countries was indented to be a radical response to the socio-economic legacy of the previous regime and a powerful symbol for the political transformation taking place.

### 2.4.2 National Identity

The primary component of the ideological vision of modern states is the creation of a national identity, which would transcend regional distinctions and integrate the people and land they control. The emergence of the nation as a political identity and nationalism as its ideological counterpart is intrinsically linked to the rise of the modern state in Europe. Prior to the modern era tribal group identities were based primarily on kinship ties, genealogical myths, and religious affiliations. National identities on the other were formed within the larger context of the emerging modern state system, where the expansion of states' administrative capabilities and the centralization of their power resulted in a plurality of nations divided by clearly demarcated borders. In this regard nationalism functions as a powerful instrument to reinforce the territorial cohesiveness and reflexive qualities of the nation state. (Anderson 1981:83-88, Giddens 1985:114-122)

States employ a variety of means to communicate the values, beliefs, morals, and principles that constitute the national identity, but within the context of societies that have low literacy rates, high linguistic heterogeneity, and limited means of long distance communication, visible symbols become the most effective instruments of propagating ideas. Architecture provides those in power with the opportunity to give political ideas, sentiments, and goals a tangible reality. As a carrier of social meaning, architecture plays an important role in not only representing the national identity, but also in creating a historical memory. By choices in design and style the built environment promotes a particular historical narrative and places the contemporary national identity within that history. Through conscious and subconscious influence over the population state-led landmark architecture has proved to be an indispensible instrument of developing, expressing, and imposing national identities. (Vale 1992: 6-10, Jones 2003:302-305, Jameson 2005)

During the 19$^{th}$ century, many nation-states of Europe undertook large projects of urban renewal, especially in capital cities. Although the problems caused by the rapid growth of cities

was the practical reason behind these endeavors, rulers did not miss the opportunity to turn their cities into symbols of national identity. The epitome of this practice was the demolition and reconstruction of Paris by Haussmann, under Napoleon III. It is not far fetched to say that Haussmann constructed a completely new city in Paris; he did so in ways that provided solutions to problems and also carried out symbolic functions. Large avenues prevented congestion, which was the main complaint, but their placement and orientation visually emphasized grand public buildings and symbolic monuments like the *Arc de Triomphe*, the *Panthenon,* and the *Louvre*. Statues of French artists, scientists, and politicians dotted the new open squares that replaced overcrowded residential zones. Every corner of new Paris was a testament to France's contribution to civilization, its glories of its history, and the power of its ruler. (Wagenar 2001:343-346) Similarly, in Rome, many elements of the Papal State's urban legacy were intentionally demolished to open large avenues that cut across the heart of the city and create open spaces that could be embellished with national icons. The nascent Italian state organized several "Pilgrimages of the Fatherland" and brought thousands of delegates from across the country to Rome in order to make sure that that the transformation of the capital and the creation of the national identity is experienced by more people. (Wagenar 2001:348) Hungary demolished the Slavonic-built environment of Pest, and modeled the united Budapest as a European city. Similarly, the new Balkan states demolished Turkish buildings to clear space for massive urban renewal projects that aimed to demonstrate the European outlook of their nations, while reaching back to pre-Ottoman medieval architecture as the source of inspiration for their national style. (Yerolympos 1996, Panteli 1997)

The capital city occupies a special place within the dynamics of territorial control and political symbolism. As the central point of the state apparatus, its location has an impact on state's capacity to extend its authority to other locations within the boundaries. Capital cities are an important part of national identity; they represent national unity and integrity by providing a spatial center; they are symbols of national sovereignty and dignity; and they act as physical manifestation of state power by housing more public offices and buildings than other cities. Although a costly and somewhat radical measure, relocating the capital can have a transformative effect on the relationship between states and territory. Because of the symbolism embedded in capital cities, relocating them almost always sends a powerful message regarding

the state and its political goals[3]. New capital cities function to sanction new regimes, legitimize new hierarchies, and exclude national groups that are competing with the ruling elites. (Vale 1992:8-10) As the capital city represents political center, from which state power radiates to the country its centrality affects the spatial organization of all power networks operating within a state's territory. Relocation of capital is a costly endeavor for any state, yet there are many instances, where the potential benefits easily outweigh the cost.

For the state-making elites creation of a national identity that would trump traditional allegiances was an indispensable component of political modernization. Consolidation of state's authority over the country depended in part on the successful implementation of symbols that legitimized its political domination. The republican regime in Turkey and the Pahlavi regime in Iran recognized the effectiveness of architecture and urban planning as instruments of political symbolism. Central governments in both countries pursued, admittedly at varying levels of success, policies that aimed at dictating the parameters of urban transformation nationwide. These endeavors resulted in the development of distinct architectural styles that came to be associated with the emerging national identity in both countries. Both regimes managed to achieve a basic level of uniformity in the planning of certain urban features, which reinforced the sense of national unity as cities across the country adopted similar identifying characteristics. On the other hand, central government in Afghanistan and Pakistan invested in urban development in a more haphazard manner. Cities in both countries developed in an organic manner without an overarching vision of architecture or urban planning. Without effective intervention of the governments, urban centers grew in a fashion that underscored the existing socio-political divisions between various ethic groups and classes.

### 2.4.3 Economic Development

[3] Throughout history many states have changed their capital in order to utilize its centralizing effect for a variety of purposes. Peter the Great chose Saint Petersburg over Moscow for symbolic and economic reasons, Tsar Alexander moved the Finnish capital from Turku to Helsinki to reduce Sweden's influence over Finland, Brazil moved its capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in 1960 to encourage the development of inland territories, and the Nigerian state moved its center from Lagos to Abuja in 1980 to ensure all that ethic groups had same level of access to the administrative center.

It comes as no surprise that urbanization and economic development are strongly correlated; all developed countries are urbanized, and within each country regions with highest level of urbanization are also the wealthiest ones. The relationship between accumulation of wealth and growth of cities is recursive; urban centers attract capital and labor, leading to increased production and economic activity, both of which draw more capital and labor. Because of this self-reproducing process, the basic pattern of economic growth and urban development is concentration. An unregulated market economy that is also free from any geographic restraints, or socio-cultural influences results in the emergence of an urban system dominated by one city - or several large cities - with high concentration and accumulation of capital, development, and effects of modernization. (Soja and Tobin 1979:158) Myrdal provides one of the earliest analyses of the mechanisms that create polarization in developing societies by arguing that the process of development generally creates changes that move the system in the same direction. Once established, favored regions tend to generate "backwash effects", which involve the migration of resources from peripheral areas to major centers of development, resulting in the widening of economic, social, and political inequalities. If they are left unregulated, natural economic forces solidify regional inequalities; the only way to counterbalance the backwash effects is through systematic government intervention. (Myrdal 1957:26-37)

Undoubtedly, a variety of other factors influence this process and determine the actual level of concentration in each urban system. But the validity of the mechanism of concentration is made evident by the pervasiveness of highly polarized urban systems during the 20$^{th}$ century in nearly every developing country. In most cases, the evolution of this spatial development pattern is a product of a combination of historical social factors, past decisions of rulers, colonial administrative policies, and particulars of global market integration. Once set in motion, reversing or slowing down the process of spatial concentration of development is not been easy, and at minimum requires concerted government effort. However, the most common response of governments is to allocate disproportionate amount of resources to the primate urban center in order to alleviate the negative outcomes of overconcentration.[4] (Berry 1978; Rondinelli 1984)

[4] Development studies provide countless examples of disproportionate allocation of public resources to primate cities: In 1960, Manila had only a quarter of Philippines but consumed 83 percent of all electric power, and 57 percent of all infrastructure investment; during the same period Bangkok absorbed 63 percent of all construction investment and 82 percent of electrical power of Thailand. (Rondinelli 1984:221-222)

Overconcentration of economic resources in a few urban centers has repercussions beyond economic relations. Large cities cannot function through private enterprise or social networks alone. Provision of basic needs, such as health, sanitation, water, power, security, and transportation, to large populations requires an organized authority. As Gottmann states (1973:119) "the more urbanization, industrialization and affluence increase, the more regulation is needed for the environment and the organization of the city". The prolonged inability of the state to effectively provide for the basic needs of an urban population results in political disengagement on part of city dwellers and resulting loss of state's legitimacy.

Studying the links between regional economic inequalities and regional identities, Hechter (1975) criticizes an implicit – and sometimes explicit – assumption in development studies; that assimilation and diffusion will be the results of core areas expanding into the peripheral zones and that the increased interaction between them will result in the periphery following the core and adopting the cultural and economic attitudes of the core. On the contrary, as the economic inequality between regions increase, the solidarity among the members of the also peripheral groups increases, leading to stronger resistance against political and social integration at the national level. If the population of peripheral regions has a distinct cultural, religious, or ethnic identity, increased polarization transforms it into a force of political mobilization against the central government.

The most basic way for a state to mitigate the negative effects of regional polarization is through geographical dispersal of government investments, public enterprises, and development projects. Helping disadvantaged regions improve their economy and infrastructure invariably extends the social and territorial control of the central government. (Mellor 1989:66) As economic centers for surrounding regions cities are perfect targets for government policies of redistribution; thanks to their social and economic ties to the hinterland urban centers can function as a conduit for regional development. The accumulation of wealth in urban centers also functions as a catalyst for rural development by stimulating the commercialization of agriculture, providing farmers with access to financial services, and promoting integration by extending various public services. If the socio-spatial resources they provide are utilized, cities have the

potential to amplify the outcomes of state projects that seek to ensure a balanced regional development.

## Overview

The main concern of this study is the process of state formation that produces centralized and consolidated political institutions with varying levels of strength. It seeks to uncover some of the mechanisms behind this process, to offer a sociological insight regarding the institution of political domination. The cases analyzed for this purpose are four contiguous countries in the Turko-Persian world with comparable historical backgrounds and modern states that differ significantly in their strength. State strength is defined by the infrastructural power of the centralize states and consequently the influence they have over social and economic structure of the countries. The main focus of the analysis is urbanization and the ways it has affected the processes of state formation. The interplay between states and cities is examined under three categories: territoriality, ideology, and economic development.

Modern states are defined by the territorial nature of their political domination and cities are essential to the exercise of territorial control. The structure of the urban network is an important element of centralization and in determining the contours of core and peripheral regions. Integration of these zones into a unified whole is crucial to the establishment of a strong modern state. Ideological influence is another indispensable aspect of modern statehood. In societies with low levels of literacy and limited means of communication, urban space and the built environment provide states an invaluable instrument for ideological dissemination. Finally, economic development is a critical element of state formation in the context of the cases studied in this dissertation. As the formation of modern states was invariably intertwined with socio-economic modernization, dispersion of the benefits of economic development was instrumental to the expansion of state power.

In conclusion, this study asserts that the socio-spatial properties of cities make them either an instrument of or a serious obstacle to the state-making project. Policies that effectively capitalize on the unique qualities of cities enable states to expand their territorial control, ideological strength, and economic power. Conversely, without such engagement urban centers put a check on the formation of strong states.

# CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

Sociological literature concerning states in general and state formation in particular comprise a large corpus that is well established and informed by the works of scholars from various other disciplines. However, the state as an analytical concept has not always been accorded a central role in political sociology. The state is relegated to the position of a somewhat derivative social phenomenon in the sociological discourse prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s. Marxist theories of the period treated the state as an instrument used by the ruling class to maintain its dominant position in society. Social classes and relations of production were ascribed primacy over the state in understanding and explaining social and historical dynamics. Starting in the mid-1970s, a new wave of scholarship emerged that treated the state as an autonomous force within the political structure and conferred on it a more fundamental role in describing societal dynamics. This wave of sociological studies primarily employed Weber's conception of the state and pointed out.

## 3.1 Militaristic Origins of the State

Some of the earliest sociological accounts of the formation of modern states came from scholars[5] who were influenced by the works of Max Weber and Otto Hintze.[6] Utilizing Weber's conception of the state, these scholars identify the use of coercion as the essential distinguishing aspect of states and war-making as the primary impetus behind their emergence. Although there are many nuances in the way these scholars explained the formation of modern states, they all agree on the basic dynamics of the process. As numerous political units and organizations

[5] For various articulations of the military approach see Collins 1975, Tilly 1975, 1990, Elias 1982, McNeill 1982, Mann 1986, 1988, Zolberg 1986, Bensel 1990, Downing 1992, Kiser and Linton 2001

[6] See Weber 1968 and Hintze 1975

competed for power within medieval Europe, the necessity to employ means of coercion in war and in establishing control over territory compelled the rulers to devise various administrative and infrastructural mechanisms to extract resources from their subjects more efficiently. Eventually state-makers, who were successful in establishing centralized and differentiated organizations that monopolized means of coercion within their territory, managed to subdue their populations and subjugate their competitors. Thus, the need to establish a new order did not originate from within the societies, but from incessant warfare between various political units. Meanwhile, societies were not willing participants in the state-making endeavor of the rulers, and the formation of states was a product of the diverse ways they interacted, which included bargaining, compromises, legitimation, and sheer coercion among others.

Probably the most well-known and influential account of the state formation through war approach is Charles Tilly's work (1975, 1990). Going beyond the question of states' origin, he provides an elaborate explanation of the reasons and processes behind nation states' becoming the most dominant form of political organization in Europe, instead of empires or city-states. His analysis revolves around the modes of interaction between rulers, who wielded coercion, and played the major part in the formation of states, and capitalists, who were manipulators of capital, and created cities as a consequence of their activities. The levels of concentration and accumulation of capital are reflected in the structure of urbanization in different regions of Europe; on the other hand, the levels of concentration and accumulation of coercion defined the forms of state organizations. The particular arrangement of these two resources in each region determined the methods of resource extraction and the instruments of state-making that were available to rulers. In areas with few cities and low capital accumulation, rulers followed a coercion-intensive path to build states, which involved massive structures of extraction and large armies levied from peasants with the cooperation of landed aristocracy – as in Poland and Russia. Whereas in areas with many urban centers and a high amount of capital, rulers relied on urban capitalist classes, whose interests they protected, for the credit to raise temporary mercenary armies, without the need to develop large structures of extraction – as in the Netherlands and the Italian city-states. In the intermediate capitalized coercion mode, rulers relied on both methods to some extent, but more importantly they managed to incorporate capitalists and the sources of capital into the state structures. The rulers, who followed the capitalized coercion path, in England and France, were the earliest ones to develop national

states. (Tilly 1992:16-23, 28-33) Initially these three paths produced very different types of states, but over time all paths converged in the face of international competition. After the 19th century, European states began to look similar, taking the form of modern national states and retaining only a few features of their original organizational structure.

Other scholars have further elaborated on the ways in which wars and war-making have determined the variations among the structure of modern states. Brian Downing focuses on the dramatic changes in the military technology of Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries as the reason behind the differentiation of European states. He argues that the introduction of gunpowder resulted in the development of new weapons and substantially increased the cost associated with war making. Rulers had to find new ways of raising money in order to defend against, or to attack, their neighbors. The particular kind of conflict European states faced at the time determined the kind of political institutions they developed. Countries facing long wars involving large armies - i.e. France, Prussia, Russia - developed military-bureaucratic forms of government, while countries facing shorter wars involving fewer troops - i.e. England, the Netherlands - retained developed constitutional governments. (Downing 1992:64-74, 239-240)

The assumptions of the militaristic approach have been questioned on various grounds. Ertman argues that war-making and the resulting state-building practices did not take place simultaneously across Europe. The political institutional framework of countries changed over the centuries and the period when each state faced external pressure had a decisive effect on the nature of the resulting political system. Thus, the impact wars had on the formation of state institutions was not uniform but varied depending on the larger historical and political context. (Ertman 1997)

Centeno contends that wars in 19th century Latin America took on a different pattern from those in Europe. A combination of several factors, including the structure and organizational capacity of dominant classes, the influence of European powers, and geographical features, resulted in the emergence of weak states across the continent. Consequently, wars between Latin American states were infrequent, isolated, and limited in their impact on society. The lack of serious external threats deprived the states of an important impetus for development. Thus, Centeno argues, the inter-state military competition and the resulting political structures of

the European experience present neither an inevitable nor a universal pattern of state formation. (Centeno 2002:20-26)

Hui, on the other hand, questions the formative effect of war on European states altogether. She compares two instances of intense interstate competition with diverging outcomes. In early modern Europe, it produced a balance of power among numerous states, while in the Warring States period in China it ended with the emergence of a unified empire. She argues that the main reason behind the difference in outcomes was states' capacity to dominate society in each case; while Chinese rulers had gained control over major instruments of economic and social capital, European states had to compromise with various powers in society to access tax revenue and manpower. Consequently, wars led to the emergence of an actual "leviathan" in China but stunted the development of states in Europe, producing a system based on balance of power. (Hui 2005:26-38)

## 3.2 Societal Bases of State Formation

The military-fiscal approach emphasizes the primacy of external factors in the form of competition as the impetus behind state formation. Other scholars argue that modern states emerged mainly as products of the internal dynamics of societies[7]. Within this broad spectrum scholars have suggested, among other things, economic crises, elite politics, confessional conflicts, and ecclesiastics as the driving force behind the development of states. Unlike the predominantly Weberian orientation of the militaristic approach, the society-based explanations came from researchers with a diverse set of intellectual leanings.

Strayer (1970) presents one of the earliest articulations of the society-centered accounts of modern state formation. He argues that the modern state emerged as a result of an ongoing pattern of administrative developments that took place between the 12$^{th}$ and the 17$^{th}$ centuries in

[7] Other than the examples cited above, see Skowronek 1982 for the role of established institutions in the shaping of the American state, Berman 1983 for church and Papacy's influence on European state formation, Lachman 1989 for conflict among elites as a factor of state formation in England and France, Gould 1996 for patronage ties as a tool of states' cooption of elites while antagonizing others, and Biggs 1999 for cartography as an integral element of state formation.

Europe. The key process is the development of increasingly effective, permanent, and impersonal modes of management by the rulers in order to govern larger territories. This is an inconspicuous process that primarily involved minor improvements over existing practices of management as opposed to dramatic institutional transformations. Strayer especially points out (1970:26) that the main locus of these developments was internal affairs, pointing out that the earliest permanent institutions of Western Europe were high courts and treasury departments as opposed to foreign offices.

In Badie and Birnbaum's (1983) account, the modern state grew in response to the inability of the feudal political structure to adapt to the socio-economic changes taking place in Europe. The rise of the urban bourgeoisie created a growing money economy, which threatened to destroy serfdom and undermine the feudal mode of production. Meanwhile, the extreme fragmentation of sovereignty prevented aristocracy from countering this process. At that point, the state gradually replaced failing traditional mechanisms with centralized institutions and preserved social integration through them. The state ousted feudal aristocracy from the political arena but preserved its economic power and social influence. (Badie, Birnbaum 1983:65-85) Badie and Birnbaum is influenced by Anderson (1974), who makes a similar argument from a Marxist perspective, and explains the emergence of the absolutist state in Europe as a feudal aristocracy's response to changes taking place in the economic structure; in Western Europe, it replaced serfdom as aristocracy's basis of social control, while in Eastern Europe, it ensured the preservation of serfdom.

Both Gorski (2003) and Adams (2005) focus on elites and particular elements of their culture as the primary cause behind the development of modern state bureaucracies. Gorski argues that confessional conflicts between Calvinism and other Christian sects was a crucial factor in the development of strong bureaucracies in Brandenburg-Prussia and in the Netherlands. The military and administrative reforms of Hohenzollern monarchs were made possible by the existence of a loyal Calvinist elite, whose sole source of social power was the crown (as opposed to the Lutheran elites in the estates). With their help, the rulers were able to launch a "disciplinary revolution" based on Calvinist values of discipline, honesty, hard work, and obedience, that transformed Brandenburg-Prussia from a backward country with a weak economy into a major power with a centralized bureaucracy and Europe's most effective

military. (Gorski 2003:98-112) On the other hand, it was the same Calvinist values that enabled the Dutch state to establish very efficient mechanisms of extraction without needing to develop a highly centralized bureaucracy. In this case, the high capacity of extraction was rooted in local governments and was reinforced by Calvinist values. (Gorski 2003:45-72) Thus, Gorski argues that state formation in Brandenburg-Prussia and the Netherlands was not a product of interstate competition but was mainly an outcome of rulers and elites acting together inspired by ascetic religious views.

Instead of looking at rulers, Adams examines the "collective ruler, comprising both the relationships among rulers and those between rulers and their staff or agents" as the force behind the development of a modern state in the Netherlands. (Adams 2005:15) She argues that competition and conflict among elites, which primarily revolved around concerns for preserving their families' political privileges and survival needs, shaped the modern Dutch state in the 17$^{th}$ century. Adams employs ideas from feminist theory and Weber's concept of patrimonial rule to identify two aspects of early modern European states: first, gendered familial criteria are an element of political authority as rulers grounded their political claims on hereditary qualifications and patriarchal power; and second, the distribution of political offices and privileges among actors was based on their publicly performed gender identities and their perceived family ties and positions. Thus, rather than being displaced by the modern state, kin groups and lineage-based identities were articulated within the new context and functioned as an integral element of states' development. (Adams 2005:35-36)

## 3.3 State Formation as Cultural Transformation

Another group of studies treat state formation primarily as a cultural and symbolic enterprise. This approach does not invalidate the effect of geopolitical conflicts or societal dynamics on state formation but extends them by examining the cultural dimension of the relationship between states and societies. The creation of states entails the establishment of institutions and practices that regulate daily life, redefine identities, and lead to the transformation of culture.

Corrigan and Sayer's (1985) study on the formation of the English state as a symbolic transformation is perhaps the most well known analysis of the cultural dimension of state formation. Following in the footsteps of Philip Abrams and E. P. Thompson, they argue that the development of the state is a long process of legitimation, through which the values associated with the state are internalized by the population and reproduced by each individual. Within this framework, power relations are determined from top to bottom; the state is not a reflection of societal dynamics but rather a force that transforms and regulates them. Through a detailed examination of English history, they identify the mechanisms of the process, through which the state expropriated and absorbed competing sources of authority (the church, nobility), developed local-national articulation of government power, solidified its moral codes and perspective as the ultimate source of legitimation, and eventually acquired a characteristic of secular sanctity. In Corrigan and Sayer's account, the state gained political power as it generated consent among people for an understanding of themselves as citizens with limited rights and obligations within the boundaries of state-approved forms of social, economic, and political interactions; thus, the formation of the modern state relied upon a cultural revolution more than any other process.

Cultural transformation had been identified as an important aspect of the development of political institutions in various contexts. In his seminal work, "The Civilizing Process," Elias (1982) traces the development of civilized manners and a courtly culture since the late medieval period and details how this was related to the formation of states. He argues that the practice of self-restraint and control emerged as a consequence of structural transformations in Western societies, changes in the division of labor and the consolidation of political power along with the means of coercion. In the competition among autonomous noblemen, the victors gradually established a monopoly over the use of coercion. Left without martial prowess, members of the nobility became more dependent on kings, other nobles, and members of the bourgeoisie to maintain their social standing. Consequently, social practices associated with martial competition were replaced by a new regimen of behavior that prioritized politeness and enforced self-restraint. As these practices spread to and were internalized by other classes, the power of central states over societies grew as well. As a result, seemingly minor changes in social manners were crucial in the rise of modern states.

Ikegami (1995) observes a similar process in Japan. During the Warring States Period[8], when the warlords leading feudal clans (daimyos) fought for dominance while the emperor in Kyoto was relegated to a completely symbolic position with no real power, the warrior class (samurai) developed an honor-based martial ethos that governed the ways they interacted with each other. After its consolidation, the Tokugawa state sanctioned the samurai as the military elite and relied on their martial capabilities, but at the same time banned the use of violence thus depriving the samurai of the essential instrument that upheld their status. The Shogunate resolved this dilemma through a process of what Ikegami calls "proceduralization of honor," under which elements of the martial ethos were transformed into elements of a regulated routine. One example she uses to illustrate this transformation is the practice of *seppuku*, the honor suicide; once regarded as a dramatic display of heroism and honor, it became a ritualized death penalty, in which the offending samurai would hold a symbolic wooden sword while an executioner decapitated him. Through various other mechanisms, the martial culture of the samurai was "tamed" and integrated into the political structure established by the central authority. One particular point Ikegami is keen to make is the contrast between the Western accounts of political modernization, where the idea of honor is regarded as a part of the archaic order that gradually becomes irrelevant to political organization, and the experience of Japan, where the individualized honor system of the samurai played an important part in the development of the modern political structures. With this, she clearly displays the multiplicity of the processes that can lead to the emergence of modern states as well as the significance of cultural forms within those processes. (Ikegami 1995:16-29, 141-157)

[8] Japanese historians named this era after the, otherwise unrelated, Warring States period in China. The *Sengoku jidai*, as it is known in Japan, took place between the mid 15th century and the early 17th century. At the end the Tokugawa clan subjugated others and established a centralized military government –*Shogunate*– that ruled Japan until the Meiji Reformation in the 19th century.

## 3.4 Post-Colonial States

Beginning in late 1960s, the influence of then prevalent ideas of dependency theory gave rise to another line of scholarship that emphasized the differences in the circumstances of modern states' emergence in Europe and the formation of Third World states in the 20th century. Although, case studies presented a wide variety of factors that differentiated the experience of individual countries from those of European nations, some elements had a near-universal impact on the development of modern states in the 20th century.

First, is the relative absence of international competition in the form of war; contrary to early-modern Europe international wars had little effect on the formation of modern states in the 20th century. The United Nations system that effectively eliminated territory acquisition and annexation through warfare, thus removed one of the most basic incentives behind international wars. Furthermore, the historical pattern of competition among states resulted in the elimination of states that were not strong enough to survive, however contemporary international order tends to provide legitimacy to weak states and in some cases takes active measures to prevent their collapse. Thus, wars rarely pose an existential threat to modern states, and preparing for war is not among the primary motivation behind states' policies. (Jackson and Rosberg 1986; Migdal 1988)

Another common aspect of the state making experience of the 20th century was an outcome of the position of new states within the global capitalist system. In Europe modern states' formation went alongside the development of capitalism; the states protected the interests of their capitalist class against those of other states, while received support –mostly in terms of credit- from them in return. However, the emergent states of the 20th century found themselves in a structurally disadvantaged position within the global economic system and had very little influence over it to provide any significant benefit to their subjects. Furthermore occasionally the interests of the capitalist class in Third World countries were aligned with those of international capital rather than with the nascent states, which curbed their eagerness to actively participate in the state making efforts. (O'Donnell 1973; Wallerstein 1974, 1979; Ake 1985; Smith 1990)

Finally, majority of new states inherited their territorial boundaries and subject populations from colonial arrangements they had no control over. Borders in Europe took shape organically over three centuries of interstate conflicts, thus to a certain degree they represent the extent of power and capacity of the states occupying them. Furthermore, in most cases, the institutional structure of new states was a legacy of colonial administrations. (Kazancigil 1986; Callaghy 1988; Azarya 1988) Similarly, in Europe the interactions between states and their subject populations played an important part in the development of both; over a long period states transformed their subjects and created new identities based on citizenship, societies on the other hand drew the limits of states' power by resisting and participating in its acts. The ruling elites in nascent states of 20th century had to contend with mostly self-sufficient societies that were organized around kinship, tribal, religious, and ethic identities. (Smith 1986; Anderson 1986) Moreover, nearly all instances state-making in the non-western world involved efforts of modernization and rapid social transformation, which fostered antagonism and resistance among different social strata. Lacking alternative instruments the ruling elites, most of who were westernized and outsiders to the traditional social structure, relied heavily on coercion to maintain and expand states' control over society, usually resulting in more resistance and antagonism against it.

Despite exhibiting similarities, the exact nature of state-society relations in non-western countries was determined by numerous other factors that produced divergent outcomes even in culturally similar neighboring countries. Anderson's research examines one such instance by comparing state-society relations in Tunisia and Libya. She argues that in Tunisia the continuity between Ottoman and French administrations created political stability, which enabled the Tunisian state to establish control over society, and transform it according to patron-client relations. Whereas in Libya there was no continuity between Ottoman and Italian administrations, resulting in a stunted state that is continuously challenged by the social forces organized along kinship and tribal lines[9]. (Anderson 1986) Somewhat contrasting Anderson's state oriented approach Callaghy frames the formation of state in post-colonial Zaire as a struggle between the government and social forces. He identifies structure of society and the prevalence of traditional authority as the main factors that determine the form of state society

[9] Although it was written nearly two decades ago, I found Anderson's analysis strikingly relevant and informative for understanding the vastly divergent experience of regime change in Tunisia and Libya in 2011.

relations. In his account, the existence of archaic state structures –traditional forms of authority– in a region severely limits Zairian state's capacity to penetrate society, whereas in areas with weak forms of traditional authority the state successfully implements its prefectural systems. (Callaghy 1984) In a somewhat different vein, Azarya and Chazan emphasize the importance of society's response to the actions of states rather than the actual actions in understanding the formation of states. They categorize two ways, by which societies respond to state actions: incorporation and disengagement, the first results in state emerging as the central institution while the second cripples its capacity without actually destroying it. Examining Ghana and Guinea they points out four distinct patterns of disengagement from state; suffering management, escape, parallel-systems, and self-enclosure. None of these forms actually challenge state's authority or institutions, but through their widespread practice societies can render the states effectively powerless. Thus, it is the responses of societies to state action that plays the major part in determining the relation between the two.[10] (Azarya and Chazam 1987)

Numerous studies have argued that the experience of colonialism left a profound mark on shaping the structure of states in post-independence period. The ways, in which colonial legacies have influenced the development of states, have been different in each country, and they have not always been detrimental to the development of modern political structures. Yang presents an example of such a case: in South Korea, Japanese colonialists dismantled the inefficient and corrupt monarchy and in its place built a centralized bureaucratic state with great capacity to penetrate society, which played a key role in South Korea's post-war economic development. (Yang 2004:1-24) In contrast, British colonial rule in Nigeria was structured on a patrimonial relationship between the colonial administration and the existing kinship and tribal networks. This arrangement resulted in the persistence of local identities and inability of Nigerian state to bypass traditional social networks and to reach large segments of society. (Kohli 2004) States existed in most regions before the arrival of European colonizers but the colonial states' capacity to control exceeded that of indigenous institutions'. As a result colonial states were able to override the political structures put in place by their predecessors, and replaced them with institutions designed for maximizing exploitation. Post-independence changes were not sufficient to erase the impact of colonial rule, and the institutional framework African states inherited

[10] See Azarya 1988 for a more detailed analysis of the incorporation-disengagement dynamics.

corrupted their political processes and prevented their development[11]. (Callaghy 1988; Young 1994)

Most studies on postcolonial Africa identify colonialism as the main reason behind most political problems in the continent. Herbst, on the other hand argues that the real obstacle against the development of modern states in Africa has been its geography. Low population density coupled with hard to access regions greatly increases the cost of establishing territorial control for African rulers, while offering fewer benefits in comparison to other places in the world. Thus, it is not irrational for African rulers to avoid large scale state making, on the contrary what is irrational is to expect centralized bureaucratic structures to benefit African states as they did elsewhere. Africa's geography has confronted rulers throughout its history and studying the pre-colonial political structures in Africa, lack of which Herbst criticizes African scholarship for, reveals long-term continuities enabling a more realistic interpretation of Africa's problems. (Herbst 2000:9-33)

## 3.5 Historical Sociology and the City

The central concern of sociological thought during the formative years of the discipline was to develop an understanding of the social, economic, and political transformations taking place in Europe resulting from the emergence of industrial capitalism. The overarching theme common to the works of leading classical sociological theorists –Marx, Durkheim, and Weber– is identifying the principal characteristics of the new industrial societies. The fundamental feature of industrial society was class conflict for Marx, rationalization of society for Weber, and complex division of labor for Durkheim. However, despite rapid urbanization being one the most readily identifiable aspects of industrialization, the founding fathers of sociology were relatively uninterested in developing a specifically urban theory. Instead, they seemingly agreed that within industrial capitalist societies the urban question should be understood within a broader analysis of social forces that affect the society as a whole.

[11] Studies on post-colonial African states easily outnumber studies on other non-western regions. See Kasfir (1984) for a general analysis of class structure in Africa, Schatzberg (1980) for states relations with elites, Jackson and Rosberg (1986), Fatton (1988) for the impact of international system on African states, for the impact of African states on agricultural production see Lonsdale (1981), Young (1982), Berg-Schlosser (1984), and Bunker (1987).

In different ways Marx, Weber, and Durkheim rejected the city as a theoretically distinct subject of analysis in industrial societies. Cities provided ideal sites, where the operation of major social dynamics can be observed most clearly; they also provided the setting for the emergence of certain social forces, but they did not cause nor were they an explanation for these social dynamics. According to Marx, the town-country division no longer reflected the underlying class contradictions in industrial societies. Capitalist relations permeated agriculture as much as they did industrial production, the major division within capitalist societies –the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat– extended beyond urban-rural boundaries. Thus cities and countryside no longer represented clashing modes of production, as was the case under feudal mode of production. Weber suggested that unlike their medieval counterparts modern cities lost the status of being autonomous units of economic and political association. As nation-states became the fundamental basis of citizenship and identity, urban settlements turned into pieces within a larger political order. Durkheim argued that the extension of occupational specialization and complex division labor had undermined social organizations based on localisms. The distinction between city and country lost its salience, as the whole of the modern society began to function like a single city. Thus, despite their long lasting influence on future practitioners of urban sociology, the founding fathers thought cities had no sociological significance in the context of modern industrial society. (Giddens 1971, Saunders 1986:13-51, Savage and Warde 1993:8-10)

Interestingly, all three theorists –especially Weber– regarded the feudal city as historically significant. Unlike their modern counterparts, feudal cities represented transformative social forces, which made them meaningful units of analysis. As autonomous political associations, feudal towns were centers of commerce and manufacture; they embodied a mode of production that was different and in clash with the existing agrarian relations. Moreover, the concentration of population and capital in the cities stimulated emergence of complex division of labor and provided impetus for the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. Essentially a product of 19$^{th}$ century socio-historical thought, the urbanist approaches that situated feudal towns at the center of Europe's transition from feudalism to capitalism gained

widespread acceptance across various disciplines,[12] despite other scholars' raising sound critiques against their underlying assumptions. (Holton 1986:63-70; Saunders 1986:45-51)

Historical sociologists of the city had differentiated themselves from urban historians by conceptually differentiating two aspects of cities: *civitas* the city as association, and *urbs* the city as place. They identified *civitas* as the proper object of analysis for sociologists. Certainly there is much historical sociology can learn from the study of *urbs*, but the study of individual cities was best left to urban historians, who are in a unique position to observe large social processes operating within particular cities. (Tilly 1996; Işın 2003:312-316) A sociological study of cities in history, on the other hand aims at identifying and defining the individuality of each manifestation of the urban form, in order to be able to draw larger conclusions about the causes that led to the differences. (Weber 1976:385) Within the last three decades Sennet (1994) Spruyt (1994) and Reynolds (1997) provide some of the finest examples of historical sociology of cities with *civitas* as their primary focus.

In her work on the significance of collective activity in feudal Europe Reynolds challenges various arguments put forward by historical studies on the period. Among these are the widely accepted notions that in feudal Europe cities and rural areas presented sharply distinct socio-political spheres, and that various institutions in cities such as guilds provided a basis of urban communal identity. Her research suggests that political concepts that have been thought to originate in cities were not necessarily unique or original. She describes medieval polities as complex and overlapping extended communities and urban communal activities, just like rural communal activity, was primarily based on spatial or geographic proximity.

Spruyt, on the other hand, seeks to develop an explanation to territorial nation-states' dominating the international order, while avoiding the trap of teleological reasoning regarding their success. He points out that by the end of medieval era a multitude of political organizations developed and territorial states were only one among numerous forms. Leagues of city-states and independent city-states presented a valid alternative to nation-states and these forms co-existed for a long period of time. He argues that the volume and added value of trade in different regions of Europe resulted in different political organization structures. In the long run, urban leagues'

[12] For some of the most notable examples of urbanist theories see Pirenne 1925, Mumford 1961, Lefebvre 1976, Poggi 1978, and Braudel 1982.

inability to standardize their ruling practices and their inability to prevent members from leaving reduced their credibility within the international system and resulted in other actors not recognizing them.

## 3.6 Cities and State Formation Literature

Although, historical sociologists articulated urbanist accounts of Europe's transition to capitalism, only a few sociological accounts of state formation treat urbanization in general and cities in particular as primary factors in determining the form and strength of political organizations. The prolific and creative works of Stein Rokkan comprise one of the most significant exception to this pattern. Understanding the causes of the variations among political systems is the major goal of Rokkan's analyses. He starts by asserting that without understanding space and territory, where they exert control, it is impossible to study political systems. Examination of territory involves identifying the centers, where major decisions are made and powerful actors interact, and the peripheries, where the territorial population that is dependent on center's decision. The second step is to chart the transactions among various centers and between centers and peripheries. The study of transactions must first consider the physical conditions of communication and transportation: the shapes of landscape, barriers and distances between areas of settlements. Examining the technological conditions of movement, the military conditions of expansion, the economic conditions for cross-territory transactions, and the cultural conditions of communication should follow. Geography and technology of transportation determine the potential reach of expansion; but the actual reach is determined by military balance of power, the direction and character of trade routes, and cultural affinities across regions.

Within this methodological framework Rokkan analyses European history in order to identify the specific dynamics that gave rise to European nation states. The big paradox in Western European history according to him is that "it developed a number of strong centers of territorial control at the edges of an old empire" (Rokkan 1975:576); centralized states with territorial consolidation emerged in France, England, and Scandinavia; while Italian and German territories remained fragmented until 19$^{th}$ century. The key factor that explains this paradox, Rokkan argues, was the existence of numerous strong and autonomous cities in the region that

extends from north of Italy to the Baltic coast; he called this region as the city belt, where there were simply too many strong cities for any ruler to control and establish a centralized territorial state. The power of the city belt resulted from strong commercial ties among cities facilitated by Roman legal legacy and transportation infrastructure; as Atlantic trade developed and weakened the existing trade routes of Europe, the power of the city belt began to decline as well. (Rokkan 1999:167-169) In contrast, across the periphery of Roman rule level of urbanization was significantly lower and there was no strong urban network, which enabled rulers to create a single predominant city, from where they can establish strong control over the countryside.

In Rokkan's account of the divergence of political organizations in Europe, the city belt plays an important role as the dominant trade route. The urban structures of specific regions of the continent reflect the distance between the particular state building core in the region and the dominant trade routes. As the distance get larger the dominant position of the capital city increases and the urban network takes a monocephalic structure; as the state building core gets closer to the trade routes, the strength of cities within the urban network gets more even with the capital city having to compete with other urban centers. (1999:158-162) Thus, for Rokkan the structure and strength of urban networks within a region are important factors in shaping the characteristics of political organizations that develop in the same region. Strong networks with even distribution of power among urban centers stand as an obstacle to the emergence of centralized states with firm territorial control, which benefit most from a monocephalic urban network and low levels of urbanization elsewhere within the territory.

As briefly discussed before, cities in Tilly's account of state formation, are containers and distribution points of capital in contrast to states that primarily function as containers of coercion. By the use of capital, urban ruling classes extend their influence over hinterlands and over long distance trading networks. The accumulation of capital in urban centers provided urban authorities with access to credit, capital, and control over hinterland; which can also serve the needs of state rulers as well. The pattern of states' control of coercion and capital over time changed in a parallel fashion; early states relied on their subjects and retainers, with contractual limits, for capital and coercion, by the 19$^{th}$ century states have incorporated fiscal and military apparatuses into their administrative structures and eliminated their reliance on tax farmers, military contractors, and other middlemen. (Tilly 1994:8-9)

The system of cities and states has significantly changed over Europe's history, and these changes had strong implications for the relationship between urban populations and rulers of states. Up until the 16th century there was few cities and numerous states; consequently city rulers wielded more power on average than territorial lords. Echoing Rokkan, Tilly points out the variations among the center of continent, with dense urban networks that gave rise to city based political organizations, and its periphery, where few cities and weak networks enabled rulers of states to dominate urban centers with relative ease. After 16th century, the number of cities increased while the number of states decreased, greater accumulation of coercive power limited the capacity of autonomous cities to resist the expansion of states and consequently nearly all city-states and federations were eliminated by territorial states. (Tilly 1994:14-16)

In this theoretical framework cities and states are regarded as naturally at odds with each other; state makers try to dominate cities to gain access to their control over capital while cities use capital to resist intrusion of their autonomy. The primary defining feature of cities is accumulation and concentration of capital, which is the basis of their prolonged autonomy. An important body of work precisely on the interaction between cities and state formation is the volume edited by Tilly (1994), in which other scholars examine the relations of cities and states in disparate areas of Europe by employing the same analytical conceptualization. As valuable as these studies are in terms their through examination of the specific historical processes that took place in various regions of Europe, all of them adhere to the basic framework outlines by Tilly without offering much original insight. Among them, Andren's (1994: 128-150) account of the interaction of cities and states in Scandinavia points out a different dynamic between the two at early medieval period. He describes that Scandinavian kings founded numerous towns that functioned as outposts of state power across the territory, which implies a categorically different relationship than the one other scholars employ throughout the book. However, instead of further exploring the period, Andren explains how the state city relationship approximated to the general pattern once trade networks expanded into these regions and capitalists dominated towns.

Undoubtedly, the conflict between state power and autonomous cities is a distinct aspect of European history, however the same dynamic fails to represent the historical experience of the Turko-Persian world. The geographical features of the Persian Plateau, defined by arid plains divided by relatively rare river valleys and oases surrounded by arable land, gave rise to two

types of socio-political formations that existed sided by side. The first one was oasis societies with dense population centers that relied on agricultural surplus of irrigated land, while the other were pastoralist nomadic societies with relatively dispersed populations and subsistence agriculture. The first one produced a stratified urbane community with natural tendencies towards political centralization, whereas the second led to relatively egalitarian kin-based social structures that were primarily organized around smaller tribal units. The tension between them shaped the history of the region; cities functioned as instruments of political centralization and consolidation of state power against disruptive nomadic elements surrounding them. Pastoralist armies periodically raided cities and towns, these nomadic incursions also severely curtailed the establishment of long-lasting agrarian relations across the countryside, preventing the rise of a feudal elite like those of Europe or Japan.

The premise of the studies quoted above rests on the characteristics of the dominant economic activity and the source of the capital accumulating in the cities. Here I refer to Weber's distinction among consumer cities, producer cities, and merchant cities, where he describes the consumer cities as the type of city, where the inhabitants are directly or indirectly dependent on the purchasing power of the court and other large households. The prominent residents, and benefactors, of these cities can be rulers, or landed elites that consume the rent they extract from rural areas, or state officials that collect revenue thanks to their position. Whereas, producer cities rely on industry and manufacturing in modern times and artisanal production in earlier periods, as the source of purchasing power; and merchant cities derive their purchasing power from commercial activities. (Weber 1978:1212-1226)

The autonomous cities of Europe were primarily producer or merchant cities –major bishoprics were the exception, – while most urban centers across the Persian Plateau, Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent were consumer cities. The primary difference between Europe and these regions resulted from the practice of European feudal lords living in castles, while Muslim rulers lived in cities. European cities developed separately from the landed elite thus they did not rely on them as their source of purchasing power, while most cities across the Muslim world depended on the political power and rent extraction capacity of the rulers. Thus, there was no inherent dichotomy between urban authority and rulers of states, and no real reason

for state makers to covet the capital accumulated in cities, as they usually were the primary creators of it.

The sociological literature on state formation offers several perspectives on the issue, each identifying different social, economic, and political dynamics as the key factors that led to the development of modern states. However, the major arguments regarding state formation presented within these studies have very little validity when applied to the cases studied in this dissertation. Although wars have certainly played an important role in determining the socio-political circumstances, under which state-making elites had to operate none of the states examined in this study developed through the mechanisms of international war. Neither did they emerge as a response to a fundamental societal crisis. Unlike Europe, where modern states developed organically throughout several centuries, state-making in the Turko-Persian world was spearheaded by purposeful social actors who sought to emulate European political institutions. In this regard, the Turko-Persian experience has more in common with the 20$^{th}$ century post-colonial state, the other extensively studied instance of state formation. However, the analyses of the development of post-colonial states emphasize the socio-political legacy of colonialism, structural inequalities of global capitalism, and the persistence of traditional social identities as the main aspects of the state formation process. With the obvious exception of Pakistan these factors too, have limited explanatory potential within the historical and geographical context of the cases studied in this dissertation. Therefore despite its intellectual scope and scholarly depth the sociological literature on state formation has little to offer in explaining the variation in the strength of states in the Turko-Persian world.

# CHAPTER 4: CITIES AND MODERNIZATION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

## 4.1 Historical Dynamics of Urbanization

At the beginning of the19th century, the Middle East displayed relatively higher levels of urbanization than Europe or the Americas. (Issawi 1982) As in every other part of the world, the Greater Middle East[13] region experienced rapid changes in social and economic structures throughout the 19th Century. European industrialization and the expansion of western capitalism into the region altered existing relations between town and country, at the same time forcing the rulers to seek ways to respond to forces beyond their control.

In the Greater Middle East, inland towns held the majority of the urban population before the 19th Century. This was in contrast to urbanization pattern of Eastern Mediterranean during the classical era and that of Western Mediterranean throughout its history, where port cities usually were the largest urban centers. With the notable exception of Constantinople, nearly every significant urban center in the Greater Middle East has been inland – most notably Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Cairo, Tabriz, Tehran, Isfahan, Yazd, Konya, Bursa, and Erzurum. Most of these cities were located on land trade routes or served as "desert ports" established at the edges of deserts. Mediterranean trade was dominated by Italian city-states throughout most of the Middle Ages, before the economic centers of the region shifted from coasts to interiors. Long distance land-based trade routes relied on the existence of a network of towns and cities. They served as points of bulking and debulking of goods, provided protection for caravans against bandits, and offered relief from physically arduous journeys over trade routes.

Rulers in the Greater Middle East have historically controlled their domains from cities rather than from rural estates. Throughout most of the last millennium, nomadic tribes had

[13] Greater Middle East refers to the region encompassing the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia.

politically and militarily dominated the societies in the Middle East and the Persian Plateau. Tribal invasions resulted in rise and fall of dynasties, all of which settled in region's cities and adopted the culture – and language in some cases – of the areas they conquered. Partly as a result of these successive invasions, a strong feudal aristocracy based on land-ownership did not develop as it had in Europe and Japan. Rulers established themselves in urban centers and administered the lands they controlled by appointing governors with short-term tenures – another factor that curtailed the establishment of regional landowning dynasties. Large landowners followed their example by settling in regional centers in most cases. Taxes collected from the countryside were transferred to urban centers. This accumulation of capital in the urban areas enabled the formation of significant populations of craftsmen, artisans, merchants, and religious classes in Greater Middle Eastern cities. This made habitation in the cities of the region even more attractive than in their European counterparts, and further contributed to higher rates of urbanization before the 19th Century.

One of the distinguishing features of Islam is the importance attributed to pilgrimage. To go on the pilgrimage to Mecca is an obligation of every Muslim who can afford to do so. As a result, large numbers of believers from every part of the Muslim world travel to the holy city of Mecca every year. This annual movement of people was a great economic and cultural boon to the urban centers that pilgrims passed through on their way to Mecca.

## 4.2 Transformation of Cities in the 19th Century

From the beginning of the19th Century to the end of World War II, the urban population of the Middle East grew from an estimated 2.8 million to 26 million. (Hourcade 2008:158) Urban population growth during this period is not a phenomenon particular to the Middle East, since industrialization resulted in similar levels of growth in urban population nearly every corner of the world. However, not every city in the region grew in population and importance during this period. Major cities like Istanbul and Cairo aside, other urban centers had varying experiences of growth –or decline- based on their position within the emerging international economic networks.

Starting in the second half of the 19th century, most of the Turko-Persian world along with the Middle East was gradually integrated into international markets. Lack of significant mineral wealth (before the discovery of oil) made agricultural products the major export of the region. Under the pressure of international capitalism, subsistence farming in areas that were accessible was replaced by production of cash crops, especially cotton and tobacco. In the later part of the 19th Century, railroads were built connecting these agricultural zones to port cities and further expanding the reach of international markets. As a consequence, the economy of the region slowly changed direction, and urban centers and urban populations were affected by these massive changes in economic conditions. Cities that were on the periphery of the new economy experienced decline while others that were positioned to act as nodes for the transactions grew in size and prominence.

Across the region, cities that functioned as export ports benefited from the economic transformation. For example, Izmir, which served as the major export center of the agricultural goods produced in the alluvial plains of Western Anatolia, experienced massive growth. Despite the fact that Izmir had never served as an administrative center, the construction in 1866 of Turkey's first railroad between Aydin, the inland provincial capital, and Izmir expanded Izmir's hinterland greatly and the city reached its peak in late 19th century. Notwithstanding a severe plague outbreak in 1812, Izmir's population grew from 60,000 in 1800 to 225,000 in 1900. (Baran 2003:24) Izmir's significant Greek and Jewish minorities made it much easier for western merchants to operate by acting as their agents, and contributed to its rise in Izmir's prominence within the economic network. Other relatively smaller towns rapidly became major urban centers in 19th century. For example, Alexandria became the export center of Egypt, and Beirut for Syria. Also, Karachi in British India was transformed from an relatively insignificant town to one of the largest export ports in South Asia, with the whole Indus Valley as serving as its hinterland.

Not only port cities, but also any city that was at a crossroad in the export economy experienced massive growth during the 19th Century. Tabriz's population grew from 80,000 in 1800 to 200,000 in 1900. The Turkish speaking Azeri merchants of Tabriz connected the city to Istanbul via Trabzon while maintaining economic connections with the Russian Empire. Tabriz also acted as the port of entry for international markets into Iran and its population and

prominence increased accordingly throughout 19th century. The opening of the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1869 somewhat reduced the prominence of Tabriz, since the sea routes were more reliable and secure than the land routes. The inland city of Shiraz benefited from the opening of Persian Gulf to the international markets by its proximity to the port of Bushehr. Towards the late 19th Century Shiraz overtook Tabriz as the major commercial entry point of Iran. (Chaichian 2009)

The expansion of western capitalism into the region also contributed to the change of urban-rural relations and the social dynamics within both urban and rural areas. Traditionally, urban centers were connected to the surrounding countryside primarily to satisfy urban food needs. Meanwhile, peasants and pastoralist nomads found markets for their products and relied on the urban center for the goods they could not produce. Throughout the 19th Century, increasing demand for agricultural goods encouraged urban merchants to invest more in the countryside rather than rely on the peasants for supplies. Urban-dwelling merchants increasingly bought land in the countryside to lessen their dependence on peasants and nomads, and large landowning families found their position in the socio-economic matrix greatly improved. (Inalcik 1991; Burke 1991; Shields 2008) The urban merchant classes also increased their power over the countryside by acting as moneylenders and creditors to peasants. Investing in the countryside benefited the urban merchant classes and increased their power vis-à-vis central governments and their appointed officials in the cities. On the other hand, rural populations were influenced by the changes in the economic system in various ways. While their dependence on urban elites – especially for credit – increased, peasants living in these areas also found themselves in a position of increased power. Since their labor was indispensible to the new economy, they could disrupt production if government tax demands were too harsh. Moreover, peasants living near manufacturing centers provided labor needed by urban producers by working for part of the year in cities. For example, in Manisa, an important textile production center in Aydin province, urban weavers worked in the city during winters and labored in agriculture during summers. (Quataert 1993:58) Peasants living in areas opened to international markets developed a distinct consciousness of their social and political power.

## 4.3 Basic Characteristics of Cities in the Turko-Persian World

At the beginning of the 20th Century, Iran's population was approximately 10 million. Around 15 to 20 percent of the population lived in urban areas. (Bharier 1972) With the exception of Tehran and Tabriz, both of which had populations around 200,000, cities were small in size. Esfahan, the third largest city, had 100,000 residents and other major centers – Hamadan, Kerman, Kermanshah, Mashad, Shiraz, and Yazd – had even smaller populations. (Bharier 1972) An important feature of Iranian urban network in the 19th Century was the lack of any major port city. Bushehr and Rasht were the main coastal settlements on the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea but neither of them grew into large cities. Abadan, which was developed by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company after the discovery of oil, was the first true port of Iran.

Iran's urban network was shaped by geographical, political, and commercial factors. Trade routes connecting the country to international markets contributed to the growth of cities like Tabriz, Shiraz, and Mashad. Most of Iran is located in an arid zone and the existence or lack of reliable water sources was central to the development of Iranian cities. For example, Esfahan's proximity to the river Zayandarud made it an ideal location for a major urban center. This was recognized by several dynasties that made it their capital. Most major cities of Iran were oases located at the foothills of mountains, from where water could be sourced by building underground aqueducts called *qanats*.

Most of the cities exhibited elements of organic growth, such as narrow, unpaved streets without particular names or designations. City walls surrounded most cities and a citadel dominated the old towns, where governors generally resided. Homes were small, built from sun-dried bricks or mud. Residences of those that were more affluent were separated from the street by walls and a courtyard. At the beginning of the Pahlavi era, Iran's cities were displayed traditional characteristics in architecture and form. (Ehlers and Floor 1993)

Tehran was probably the only city in Iran that went through planned restructuring during the 19th Century. As the seat of administration for the Qajar Shahs, Tehran represented the political power of the central government. Tehran's city walls were demolished and rebuilt in 1868 to accommodate its rapidly growing population. Naser al-Din Shah did not only expanded

the city limits; he also oversaw the development of new neighborhoods influenced by western architecture and urban planning. Large avenues and western style structures dotted at least a portion of Tehran. Around the same time, better-off residents of Tehran established new neighborhoods in the north of the city, marking the beginning a divide between the affluent north and poorer south that exists to this day. (Marefat 1980)

Istanbul dominated Ottoman urban networks from the day it was conquered. With its large cosmopolitan population, Istanbul had been a world city since Constantine made it the capital of Eastern Rome. Approximately 750,000 people lived in the city at the beginning of 20th century (Hourcade 2008:158). More than half of its residents were non-Muslims and the city was connected to European centers by economic links. Istanbul was the political, cultural, economic, and industrial center of the Ottoman Empire, and no other city, with the possible exception of Cairo, had a comparable influence over the whole region.

The European neighborhoods of Istanbul displayed the architectural characteristics of western cities. One could easily mistake 19th century Pera – the major Levantine neighborhood – for a European city. Pera had a streetcar line, wide avenues, and apartment buildings. Modern, public buildings were constructed in Istanbul and other merchant cities, to be used by the emerging public sector. The first steps towards planned urban development were taken in the mapping office, which documented, organized, and regulated urban land usage. Modern municipal administrations were established in major towns with the responsibility of constructing and maintaining urban squares and boulevards. Despite obstacles faced at the implementation stage, planned urban growth became an important element of the government's urban policies.

The second major city of Anatolia was Izmir, which grew in size and prominence as an export node throughout 19th, and had a population of approximately 200,000 in 1900. Other significant urban centers such as Adana, Bursa, Edirne, Konya, Erzurum, Sivas, Ankara, and Kayseri were important nodes of trade, but their populations were smaller. Railroads connected Istanbul to central Anatolia, and fertile agricultural regions – particularly Çukurova and Aydın – to export ports. A serviceable road network increased the penetration of international markets into the interiors of the country.

During the first quarter of the 20th Century the demographic composition of what is now Turkey changed dramatically. Fifteen years of continuous wars – starting with the Balkan Wars in 1909, and continuing with Word War I and the Turkish-Greek War that lasted until 1923 – devastated the economic infrastructure of the country and had an immense toll on human life. The total population of Anatolia, excluding Istanbul, dropped from 16.5 million in 1912 to 11.5 million in 1922. Ottoman urban centers had been home to heterogeneous populations; Greeks were a sizable minority in western Anatolia, and Armenians were in central and eastern Anatolia. However, by 1925, –shortly after the establishment of modern Turkey, neither ethnic group had a significant presence.

The population exchange between Turkey and Greece at the end of Turkish-Greek War succeeded in homogenizing the populations of both countries, as was its aim. This exchange resulted in the expulsion of 1,500,000 Greeks from Turkey and 500,000 Turks from Greece. The forceful relocation of the native Armenians of Eastern Anatolia, which effectively amounted to genocide, was a so-called 'temporary war-time measure' that resulted in the near elimination of Armenian population within Turkey. (Yalman 1930:221; McCarthy 1983:47) These two events changed the demographics of Anatolia dramatically in ten years time. The Anatolian Muslim population increased from 80 percent in 1912 to 98 percent in 1924, resulting in the more ethnically and religiously homogenous population of modern Turkey. (McCarthy 1983:137-139)

The Ottoman urban system was heavily dependent on the non-Muslim population for commercial and industrial activities. Non-Muslims were the owners of enterprises and they connected the Empire to international markets. Their loss greatly reduced the economic capacity of Turkish urban centers. The culture and cosmopolitan character of Anatolian cities changed and became more provincial in outlook, with more resistance to foreign influence. One of the main priorities of early Republican governments was to reproduce the human capital lost by encouraging the establishment of an urban Turkish middle-class.

Among the four countries examined in this study Afghanistan has been and still is the least urbanized. It is also the one with least available historical data on its cities. Afghanistan in late 19th century was predominantly a tribal society. Geography and culture favored the tribes against the center. The tribal leaders regarded the central authority as an extension of their power and the King as only a first among equals. Cities were at the periphery of the tribal structures and

did not have much of an influence, economically or culturally, over the countryside. (Poullada, 1973)

The afghan urban structure was bound together by a network of trade routes connecting the corridor cities of the Central Asian caravan trade. These routes connected the east, west, north and south of Asia. The cities along these routes were markets in their own right and convenient stopping points for merchants on their way to terminal markets. Afghanistan was situated at the center of this trade activity, and Afghan cities owed their existence to the caravan trade since they were not a part of the tribal socio-political order. Fertile lands surrounded cities like Kabul, Herat, and Peshawar – part of Afghan cultural and economic zone at the time – and they were able to export some of the agricultural goods grown around them. Since these cities did not have a problem with feeding themselves, they were able to sustain small consumer markets, making them more attractive to merchants. In contrast, cities like Quetta, Khulum, and Mashed – also was a part of Afghan cultural zone – had a harder time supplying food for their larger populations, and thus operated primarily as transit points.

Throughout 19$^{th}$ century, the role of Afghan king, as the central political authority, slowly became more urbanized and lost its tribal character. The traditional nomadic political economy was based on plunder. Tribes attacked neighboring regions and the distribution of the loot they seized provided political legitimacy to the rulers. This economy became less viable in the18$^{th}$ century due to the emergence of strong states in northern India and Persia. In the absence of plunder, Afghan rulers had two sources of income available: land revenue and taxation of the caravan trade. The established land tenure system limited the ability of political authority to collect revenue, since most of the land was granted to others for military service in return. Thus taxing caravan trade was the only viable way for the rulers to collect income. This economic imperative resulted in rulers establishing their courts in cities, regardless of how external cities were to tribal political structures. (Hopkins 2008:90-102)

The changes the global economy was undergoing in 19$^{th}$ century had a detrimental impact on the caravan trade of Central Asia. Landlocked, Afghanistan was left at the periphery of the international economy and delegated to the status of a buffer state between two empires. Since urban centers had limited connections to the surrounding tribal social and economic structures, both the rulers' actual power over the country and the influence of cities on the countryside were

severely hindered. With Afghanistan's independence from Britain, the major obstacle facing the central government was the problem of extending its power over beyond the cities to the rest of the country, where majority of Afghanistan's citizens dwelled.

Pakistan is unique among the cases covered in this study due to its colonial legacy. Although Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were greatly influenced by western expansion, they were never ruled as actual colonial entities. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not only have a colonial legacy but its very existence is a direct outcome of the colonization process. Therefore, it would be misleading to start any historical analysis of Pakistan with its formal independence in 1947. Since many social and economic factors influencing the establishment of the state in Pakistan, have their roots in British colonial administrative policies and practices, my historical narrative for Pakistan will involve analyses of them too.

To make matters more complicated, statistical figures on urbanization in Pakistan can include Bangladesh as East Pakistan, making it difficult in to distinguish outcomes. For example, in 1951, Pakistan's urban population, including East Pakistan, was 7.8 million, 10.4 percent of the country's total population. The urban population of West Pakistan alone was approximately 6 million in 1951, 17.8 percent of the total population. The figures I use for the rest of the study are for West Pakistan only, unless explicitly stated otherwise. The particular effects of the split between East and West Pakistan will be elaborated in the subsequent chapter.

The Indus River and its tributary system is the major lifeline of Pakistan. Nearly all-major urban settlements are located around the river delta, and an overwhelming majority of the population – both urban and rural – is concentrated there. The Indus River provides a natural highway between the northern part of the region and its coast. The ease of transportation allowed by the river made it relatively easy for the British colonial administration to connect the region to their global trade network.

At the beginning of 20$^{th}$ century, Pakistan's population was approximately16.5 million, out of which 1.6 million (9.8%) was living in urban centers. By 1941, 4.1 million people out of a total of 28.2 million (14.2%) were living in cities of Pakistan. Punjab's capital Lahore was the most populous city with 672,000 inhabitants, followed by Karachi with a population of 378,000.

Hyderabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Peshawar and Sialkot were other urban centers with population above 100,000. (Nazeer 1966; Abbasi 1987)

Pakistan's urban population dramatically changed immediately after its independence in 1947. The partition of British India between India and Pakistan resulted in one of the largest movement of people in history. Muslims, who fled from their homes in India, arrived in Pakistan by the millions and nearly all of these refugees, *muhajirs* as they were called, settled in cities of Pakistan. The *muhajir* people were not of a single ethnic origin, but a large percentage of them came from Delhi and the surrounding provinces. Highly educated in comparison to the native population of Punjab and Sindh, they dominated the bureaucracy of the nascent state. Nearly all of the *muhajirs* were foreigners to the lands they migrated to. They primarily spoke Urdu, which became the official language of Pakistan despite the fact that hardly any pre-partition locals spoke Urdu.

Karachi, as the first capital of the new country, received the highest numbers of refugees. Its population more than doubled to 1,064,000 within a matter of three years. Although Karachi experienced the most dramatic increase in its population, other cities of Pakistan also had their share of immigrants. Hyderabad's population grew from 135,000 to 241,000, Lyallpur (Faisalabad) was a city of 70,000 in 1941; its population increased to 179,000 within a decade. By 1951, the ten largest cities of Pakistan had a combined population of 3,280,000, 1,628,000 of this (49.6%) were refugees that arrived from India. (Abbasi 1987)

The economic and social burden placed on the urban centers of Pakistan at its independence was immense. Aside from the social tensions that arose between a foreign urban elite, who dominated the bureaucracy, and a predominantly rural native population, assimilation of the refugees into the urban centers required a large amount of resources. The decision to construct a new capital in Islamabad was partly influenced by the overwhelming number of refugees in Karachi's urban center. Thus, unlike Turkey where refugees simply replaced an outgoing non-Muslim urban population, Pakistan's experience with refugees resulted in an urbanization pattern that required immense resources to manage, and left long-lasting tensions between urban and rural populations.

## 4.4 Modernization and Urban Centers

As Eisenstadt (1966:10) points out, urbanization and urban change has always been the most visible external manifestations of modernization. A modern society is first and foremost an urban one, and urbanization is the major transformative force behind the social changes we associate with modernity. In the context of countries focused on this study, as with many others across the non-western world, the term modernization had been regarded as being synonymous with westernization, while the establishment of nation-states was a key element of both processes.

Urban settlements are nodes within a network of communication and transportation. They connect localities with each other, regions to other regions, and a few cities connect the whole country to international markets and systems. Urban networks existed without the intervention of central governments, through commerce and movement of people. Modern states utilize these networks to expand their capacity of social control.

Cities are locations for institutions that create symbolic capital. High schools and universities, newspapers, museums, monuments, large-scale projects national celebrations all represent national ideology. Urban space itself is a valuable resource for the central governments to utilize for ideological ends. Two social groups play an important role in the reproduction of symbolic power in different forms: the urban intelligentsia and the *ulama*.

Urban intellectuals are an elusive class to define, for 'intellectual' is never designated as a profession. However, journalists, lawyers, office workers, students and teachers in secular schools, government officials, professionals, and artisans can be considered among this class. It is also an elusive class because intellectuals' occupational and economic positions within the social network varied. It can be argued that what unifies intellectuals is their actual or ideological connections to the west. Within the context of the regions in this study, intellectuals were usually supportive of modernization projects since they benefited from its outcomes. What makes them a crucial part of state-formation and nation-building projects is the fact that they are the ones who could generate the ideological tools and symbolic capital necessary for the creation of a new hegemonic order. They were usually more educated, and therefore more literate and

knowledgeable in the institutional and organizational needs of a modern state. Although support from intellectuals and the tools at their disposal are key to the success of a centralized state, their actual power tends to be overestimated within the literature since historiography relies disproportionately on their accounts.

Muslim religious scholars, seminarians, students and *imams* are influential among the larger populations. There are two kinds of *ulama*. First, the so-called "high *ulama*" is concentrated in central locations well educated in the religious studies and serves the government under various capacities, such as *qadis*, judges, advisors, and educators. This group is generally urban in residence and outlook. They tend to be more connected to the outside world and more informed. The so-called "lower *ulama*" is composed of regular *imams*, local religious figures, *sheiks* of lodges, *dervishes*, and others who claim religious authority in a localized context. This second group is not usually as well educated as the 'high *ulama*', and sometimes not educated at all; and they generally have weak ties to the government, if any at all. However, 'low *ulama*" are usually respected within local communities and have influence over peasants and small townsfolk. They are more rural or peripheral in their outlook, in some cases they can represent local concerns about modernization or the policies of central governments.

Historically, members of both of these classes of religious figures have had the capacity to generate ideological capital. Before the emergence of modern political structures and ideologies, religion was a very important the source of legitimacy. For example, Afghan kings desperately sought support from high-ranking religious figures in the 19$^{th}$ century in order to establish royalism as a legitimate alternative to tribal political system.

In Turkey, the power of the *ulama* was curbed radically by the Ottoman state throughout the 19$^{th}$ century, essentially transforming them to civil servants. Although their influence among the masses continued, as a social class their impact on the society was limited. Despite being more organized and independent than the Turkish *ulama*, Iranian *ulama* in the 19$^{th}$ and early 20$^{th}$ centuries did not have the capacity to mobilize masses alone, but as a part of an alliance of various classes *ulama's* symbolic authority was a powerful tool for political mobilization. In Afghanistan, political domination of tribes, and the lack of influential institutions of religious education resulted in a small class of educated clerics, who did not have significant influence over the political process. In Pakistan religious figures of authority called *pirs*, had extensive

influence over the countryside, particularly in Sindh. The title of *pir* passed on within the same families for generations and most *pirs* were also large landowners. *Pirs* fulfilled a variety of functions within rural society; they settled disputes, distributed resources among peasants, acted as educators, and mediators between colonial administration and the local populace. They were politically powerful but as class their interests and political choices aligned with those of large landlords, thus their religious authority did not result in a distinct political identity. Put briefly, the *ulama's* support for other social classes, political movements, and rulers resulted in increased legitimacy of the recipient, but as a class they alone did not have the necessary resources to organize or direct long lasting political movements. Furthermore, it is also important to note that the *ulama* were not a homogeneous social class. Individual members' social and political attitudes could differ significantly, thus unless the issue at had was perceived as a very clear threat to their position, i.e. secularization of various institutions, the *ulama* did not act as a uniform social force.

Beginning in the 19th century, military modernization has been a driving force behind all modernization efforts in the Middle East. International competition and the pressure of European expansion provided the initial impetus for reform in the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia. As a result of reforms, military cadres were in contact with Western ideas and education before any other social group, and they were among the staunchest supporters of modernization projects. The concentration of military power is the lynchpin of state formation.

The existing traditional political structures within the region included various elements with armed forces at their disposal. Nomadic tribes and tribal confederations exercised high levels of autonomy, and they had considerable fighting power at their disposal. As monopolization of coercive apparatuses is the most essential aspect of a modern state, subjugation of tribal power was a major issue facing central governments. Thus, it is no surprise that Reza Shah made subjugation of tribes his priority from the earlier days of his reign. Tribal autonomy and power in Iran was at its peak during the first two decades of 20th century. Military reorganization and relentless campaigning across the country for more than a decade enabled the central state to crush the military power of tribes in Iran, which was followed by a set of harsh policies that aimed at elimination of socio-economic bases of tribalism. As a consequence, tribal

population became dependent on urban society and never posed a significant threat afterwards. Subjugation of tribes was probably the most significant achievement of Reza Shah's rule

19th century Ottoman administration greatly reduced the power of tribes in eastern and southeastern Anatolia by dismantling large confederations and coopting smaller tribal units by employing them as military forces. As a result, the tribal uprisings republican governments of Turkey faced were localized in their impact and limited in their capacity to challenge the central government control over urban areas. The major tribal revolt of the period was the Sheik Said Rebellion of 1925, which was a reactionary uprising motivated by religious conservatism. Ironically the extraordinary powers granted to the government to suppress the rebellion, remained in effect for two years and enabled the government to suppress opposition everywhere, further consolidating the regime's dominance over the country. Between 1925-1938 Turkish governments faced a number of local uprisings of Kurdish tribes in and around Dersim Province, (Tunceli) none of which had a significant impact on its territorial and social control.

While Turkish and Iranian states managed to establish control over tribal forces, Afghan tribes rebelled against Amanullah Khan and brought his regime down when his modernization and centralization efforts impeded upon their political and economic privileges. The memory of the Amanuallah's fall had a substantial influence over the policies of his successors. The modern Afghan state effectively gave up its control over the countryside and left its administration to the tribes populating it, in exchange they secured the political support of rural-tribal aristocracy. The long-term result was a complete disconnect between urban and rural societies and Afghan state's near complete lack of social and territorial control over most of the country.

Following the example of the colonial British administration, Pakistan recognized the power of pastoralist tribes in the northwest and isolated the region from the rest of the country by administering them with a distinct set of laws and regulations. In effect, this meant that the central government granted high levels of autonomy to tribal confederations and acknowledged the inability of central government to exercise its control over a vast region within its borders. For most purposes, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were not a part of Pakistan, their governance, legal system, and the population's interactions with the central government was completely different than those in other parts of the country and resembled a colonial arrangement.

In the struggle against tribal forces, cities function as military centers or garrisons in regions, where central governments fail to establish control over the countryside. Urban centers provided a base for the military forces of national governments to project their power over the surrounding region. The communication and transportation capabilities of city centers made supplying military units easier and more efficient, and enabled the maintenance of large military forces in regions in which no standing army had been garrisoned before.

Cities in the Turko-Persian world and those in the Greater Middle East region had experienced rapid changes during 19th century as international markets penetrated the local economic structures. Individual cities benefited or adversely affected by their position vis-à-vis expanding commercial networks. The cities that functioned as gateways for international capital was affected most by the consequences of their new role; their built environment, composition of population, and interactions with their hinterlands were transformed. The encroachment of various European powers into the Turko-Persian world weakened the influence the Persian literary tradition had over the ruling elites. As western colonial powers expanded their control over the region they established transportation and communication lines that connected the areas under their rule to the metropoles. Northern areas of Turko-Persian landscape were linked to the Russian socio-economic sphere, whereas southern parts were connected to the commercial network of the British Empire. By the middle of 19th century colonial powers carved out zones of influence in Turko-Persian world, while the Ottoman Empire managed to survive but underwent a significant transformation as a result of its contact with Europe. Thus, Persianate literary tradition ceased to be the primary source of cultural influence over the urban elites of the region, replaced by western culture and tradition. However, the rest of the societies were influenced less by western culture. Social norms, popular customs, and religious practices among other strata in Turko-Persian societies remained relatively unaffected by the wave of westernization that took over the lives of elites in the cities. At the beginning of 20th century, urban centers in the region contained the seeds for the social and political clashes that were to arise during the establishment of modern states.

# CHAPTER 5: IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

## Introduction

In this chapter I will present the historical accounts of the formation of modern states in Iran and Afghanistan. At the beginning of 20th century both countries were ruled by absolute monarchs, who were members of a tribal dynasty. Tribalism had been the major political force throughout the history of the region encompassing Central Asia and the Persian Plateau. Thus, both Iran and Afghanistan were socio-political systems, where tribal armies were the most powerful military force and states had no option but to recognize their power and devise methods of interacting with them. In essence all tribes are political organizations that exercise territoriality and posses significant military power. Thus, they represented the major impediment against the formation of strong modern states in both countries.

Both countries lacked a territorial center at the beginning of the period I will focus on. Tehran was the capital of Iran but because of the weakness of Qajar rule, it did not function as a focal point for country's urban network. Tabriz was as big as Tehran and had well-established connections to Russia and Ottoman Empire. Esfahan and Mashhad had smaller populations but they were regional centers that did not need to rely on Tehran for any purpose. Thus, Tehran was not a territorial center but one prominent city among several. The same was also true for Kabul; it was the capital but had no significant economic or cultural effect on other urban centers. The Hindu Kush Mountains prevented any connection during winter among Afghanistan's three major cities: Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. The urban centers of Afghanistan were independent oases each with connections to outside, rather than nodes within an urban network.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country and had no option but depend on overland trade routes for commerce and to connect with outside world. Although Iran has access to Persian Gulf the Zagros mountain range forms a natural barrier between the central highland, where all major

urban settlement are, and the sea. Thus, throughout its history Iran also had very limited connection to maritime trade network and relied on land routes that pass through Persian Plateau.

Despite the socio-political similarities between the two at the beginning of 20th century, and the explicit intention of their rulers to reform and modernize their country, the eventual strength and capabilities of the emergent modern state in each was significantly different. I argue that cities and urbanism played an important role in the formation of modern states in both countries, however it was governments' policies that determined the nature of the effect urbanization had on the process.

## 5.1 Iran

### 5.1.1. Historical Overview

Iran entered 20th century under the waning rule of Qajar dynasty. The central government was in serious financial trouble and the price of borrowing money from Britain and Russia was granting them political and commercial concessions. The economic crisis coupled with the growing influence of foreign powers over the country made Mozaffer-al-Din Shah quite unpopular among the population. In 1906 A political alliance between urban classes the *bazaari* merchants, *ulama*, and the intelligentsia succeeded in forcing the shah to create a national assembly (*majles*) and adopt a constitution that curtails his authority.

Mozaffer-al-Din Shah died soon after and his son Mohammad Ali Shah took the throne. With the backing of Britain and Russia the new shah abolished the constitution and dissolved the parliament in 1907. In 1909 an assembly of various constitutionalist forces marched to Tehran and forced Mohammad Ali Shah to abdicate in favor of his 11 years old son Ahmad. The *majles* reconvened and constitution was reinstated. Two years later Mohammad Ali Shah attempted to take back the throne but his forces were defeated and he fled Iran. Throughout 1910s the political situation in Iran became more unstable and chaotic. In 1917 Britain used Iran as a springboard

for a failed military intervention against the communist revolutionaries in Russia, in response the red Army invaded north of Iran and forced Ahmed Shah to agree to a set of humiliating concessions.

After World War I, central government of Iran had little or no control over the country. South and southeast of was occupied by the British and beyond reach, while tribes were the major military force in the country and de-facto rulers of their territories. In every part of the country, centrifugal political forces were pushing the provinces further away from government control. In provincial centers political power was in the hands of local elites, and appointed governors could not enforce any policy unless the elites agreed with it. Moreover, separatist rebellions were challenging the legitimacy of the Shah's government in some provinces. In the Caspian region Jangali rebels led by the charismatic constitutionalist Mirza Kuchik Khan, took control of the province and declared an independent Soviet Republic of Gilan. In Azerbaijan the local Democratic Party took advantage of the withdrawal of Turkish occupation and established the independent Azadi Republic. Meanwhile Colonel Pesyan of the Gendarmerie Corps staged a coup in Mashhad, where he was appointed, sent the governor into exile and declared an independent Khurasan Republic. Iran as a country was in serious danger of becoming a political anachronism.

Under such circumstances Colonel Reza Khan, commander of the Cossack Brigade staged a coup d'état in 1921 and had himself appointed Minister of War in the next cabinet. Using his position and the military force under his command, Reza Khan increased his political power in Tehran and became prime minister in 1923, which prompted Ahmad Shah to leave Iran under the pretense of a European Tour. As the most powerful man in Iran Reza Shah managed to get the *majles* to confer dictatorial powers to him making his de facto status official. In 1925, Reza Khan began a campaign to abolish the monarchy and establish a republican regime as Mustafa Kemal did in Turkey. His campaign faced opposition and he abandoned the idea only to be declared Shah of Iran the *majles* at the end of same year. Reza Khan adopted the surname Pahlavi and became the first shah of Pahlavi dynasty.

From 1921 to 1941 Reza Khan not only managed to bring Iran out of the chaos but also created a consolidated national state, with a strong military and a centralized bureaucracy that established a firm control over the country. Within two decades Reza Khan successfully

eliminated all sources of opposition to his regime; urban centers lost their autonomous status vis-à-vis central government, separatist movements were crushed and Tehran became the administrative center of all Iran once again. His major achievement however, was the subjugation of tribes and destruction of their political power and the socio-economic basis of tribalism; the historical duality between urban and tribal domains of Iran ended and cities became the administrative, economic, and political centers of the country.

### 5.1.2 Military Reorganization

Similar to the experience of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, along with various other non-Western societies, the modernization of the military force was the first attempt at reform in 19th century Iran. Beginning with the nationwide implementation of the *bunichah* system[14], a rudimentary and ineffective form of conscription, under Amir Kabir (1848-51), Qajar Shahs and their governments made numerous efforts to create a modern army under the control of central government. However, these attempts were intermittent and did not constitute a large-scale reform program. Moreover, creation of a large standing army went against the interests of various political actors in and out of Iran. Local nobles and tax farmers resented any increase in taxes for military upkeep, while tribes considered it a challenge to their military superiority over the center, and for Britain and Russia, a weak Iranian government was easier to manipulate. These obstacles made efforts to create a powerful standing army a serious political and economic challenge. Thus, Qajar rulers were left with no option but to rely on irregular tribal levies for the bulk of the army, while maintaining a small number of modern units trained by Western officers. (Tousi 1988; Sheikoleslami 1997)

At the beginning of World War I the only modern military forces in Iran were the Cossack Brigade, Gendarmerie Corps, and the British South Persia Rifles. The Cossack Brigade was a cavalry force of several thousand troops and it was established by Naser al-Din Shah in

[14] The system was based on the idea of communal responsibility of villages to provide certain number of soldier to the army. However, landlords, who resented the reduction of manpower within their domains, would bribe the draftsmen, who in turn were afraid of the power of the landlords. The conscripts were unreliable and undisciplined and the *nizam* regiments recruited thorough *bunichah* system hardly had any effect on extending the power of the central government.

1879. The brigade was founded under Russian guidance and commanded by Russian officers so that many Iranians regarded it as an instrument of Russian imperialism. The Gendarmerie was founded in 1911 by the Constitutional Government to maintain security in the countryside. Most of its officers were radical nationalists, who favored the principles of independence and constitutionalism[15]. As the only truly national military corps the Gendarmerie enjoyed significantly more popular prestige. The South Persia Rifles was a British force to protect the occupied south and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's facilities against tribal forces. There was no central command over these three forces and no centralized means of coordination, training, or recruitment of their officers. For all intents and purposes they were three separate armies operating alongside each other. Moreover, there was serious competition and ideological conflict between the officers of the Cossack Brigade and the Gendarmerie Corps. Even if these forces cooperated their combined power would not have been a match for the united forces of the tribal confederations. (Ra'iss Tousi 1988:209; Cronin 1998)

Reza Khan joined the Cossack Brigade at 15 and rose within it to the rank of Brigadier General. His command over the Cossacks was the main reason behind his ascent in national politics. Once he was in power he used the army as his primary instrument in politics and governance. Creation and expansion of the modern army was the major preoccupation throughout his rule. During Reza Shah's reign the Iranian army grew from a meager 10,000 or so soldiers in 1921 to 125,000 soldiers equipped with modern weapons and ordinance in 1941. At the beginning, it was only a land force but quick to realize the immense strategic and tactical benefits of an air force, Reza Khan took steps to purchase biplanes from France, Germany, and Russia. The nascent air force had 16 planes in 1924 and continued to grow over the years to a 130-plane force in 1937 and provided a significant advantage during tribal revolts. (Ward, 2009: 142-143) From 1922 onwards officer cadets were sent to military academies in France and Germany for training. Approximately three hundred new officers received modern military training and they satisfied the organizational needs of the growing military, without having to rely on foreign personnel. (Cottrell 1979:391-392) The growing oil revenue and fiscal reforms allowed the government to afford such a large-scale growth. Military spending consistently accounted for a substantial portion of the government budget. Until the late 1930s, Department

[15] Partly inspired and influenced by the military officers within the revolutionary Young Turk movement, who were in control of the Ottoman government by that time.

of War was allocated around 40% of the total budget, though by the 1940's its share dropped to 18%. (Bharier 1971:65-66; Katouzian 1980:113-114)

The army was completely reorganized along the lines of a modern military force. The Cossack Brigade was dissolved and its officers received high military posts within the newly formed General Staff. The Gendarmerie Corps was also brought under the command of General Staff and its officers were spread across various units of the army to prevent them from forming a clique that might challenge Reza Khan's control. This way, all military forces of the Iranian government were consolidated under a single centralized command. Since the creation of a modern state in Iran depended on eliminating all other potential challengers, the new army was organized for the purpose of being used against military forces within the country rather than fighting against other countries. The General Staff was divided into specialized departments of command, operations, intelligence, ordnance, medical staff, and veterinary services; while the army was divided into five divisions, each with 10,000 soldiers,[16] stationed in Iran's five largest cities: Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Esfahan, and Mashhad. The 1st Division in Tehran was the largest and besides securing the capital it served as a reserve for providing support to other divisions across the country. (Ward 2009:130-132)

It is important to acknowledge that the establishment of these division headquarters changed the traditional military-political dynamics within Iran. Previously, the military forces of the central government had been stationed mainly around the capital while keeping a limited presence in other cities. The tribes inhabiting the surrounding regions of major settlements would always have more manpower under their command than the garrisons in the cities. Considering the shape of the country's transportation network it would take months for the central government's forces to respond to any military incursion, leaving the cities of Iran effectively at the mercy of nearby tribes. After the reorganization, the division headquarters had substantially more soldiers under their command and, more importantly, each division had its dedicated departments, allowing them to operate efficiently without needing to wait for specialized forces from the center. Thanks to these measures major cities could be safe from tribal raids or attacks while the army can carry out operations within the tribal areas more easily without having to

[16] Although the divisions were set up to be comprised of 10,000 soldiers, in actuality they could not recruit enough men to fill their ranks. By 1926 the whole army had barely 40,000 soldiers. (Cronin 1997:110)

invest large resources each time. Although, these divisions were not powerful or experienced enough to gain the upper hand against tribal forces in the beginning, within several years they were fully operational modern military units that were able to change the tide in the centuries-old struggle between central governments and nomads in Iran.

Arguably, among all the military reforms carried out during Reza Shah's reign, the most important and the one with farthest reaching consequences was the establishment of universal conscription in 1925. Universal conscription transformed the military into one of the most crucial institutions for disseminating nationalist ideas among the population. Young men from various parts of the country interacted with each other and developed a sense of nationhood. They had to use Persian to communicate, and the fact that two thirds of them spent six months learning it suggests how significant military service was in transforming soldiers from disparate backgrounds into Iranians. (Abrahamian 2003:77) Daily oaths of allegiance to the Shah, flag, and state constantly reminded them of the ideological elements of their new identity. Moreover, a conscript army provided the state with the ability to imbue its coercive apparatus with a symbolic meaning. As the army became the army of the nation anyone who stood against it automatically was transformed into an enemy of the nation. Universal conscription brought great material and symbolic benefits to the state, but it also became the catalyst for uprisings that posed the most significant challenge to the regime's legitimacy.

Before the passage of conscription law, Iran's military used a mixture of methods to recruit soldiers. The antiquated and inefficient *bunichah* system was still in effect, but it was insufficient to provide the manpower needs of the army, and the rest of the ranks were filled by volunteer recruits and tribal levies. These procedures yielded poor results both in term of quantity and quality. Any other attempt at raising soldiers from the peasantry met with resistance and flight. Reza Khan was clearly aware of the military benefits of universal conscription, and he was also keenly recognizant of the crucial role it would play in the creation of a national identity and an integrated nation-state. He pushed the conscription legislation through parliament with the support of nationalist intellectual members and placated *ulama's* opposition by granting exemption to students of clerical seminaries. The legislation allowed for the conscription of every fit male over 21 years of age for a two-year active service. Discharged, conscripts were to report for re-training every year, and they were liable for reserve duty until they were 45.

Clerical students and teachers were exempt from conscription, while students of higher education institutions were allowed to serve for shorter periods. In a complete break with Islamic military traditions, non-Muslims were also expected to serve in the army. This was a clear indication of central government's recognition of the primacy of national identity over religious or communal ones. Urban intellectual members of non-Muslim communities welcomed the new regulation, recognizing it as a sign of their acceptance by the new state as equal citizens, but their rural counterparts did not share their enthusiasm. (Cottrell 1979:393; Cronin 1998:452-454)

### 5.1.3 Tribalism and Iranian Political Structure

Throughout most of its history the center of the Persian Plateau has been settled by sedentary populations, while pastoralist tribes inhabited its surrounding regions. In a political and geographical understanding distinctive to Iran, these tribes have been considered as an integral part of the country and a fundamental element of social and political dynamics within the region. Since the time of the Seljuk Empire in the 10th century to the Qajar era, every ruling dynasty of Iran has begun its rise to power as a pastoralist tribe originating in the periphery. Time after time, a tribe would bring down the existing central authority, only to be taken over eventually by another tribal power. This had long been the essential characteristic of Iran's political history.[17] Descending from the Northwest of Iran in the 18th century, the Qajars were the last tribal dynasty to rule Iran, and Reza Shah was the first ruler of Iran without a tribal background.

Scholars of different disciplines have carried out multitudes of studies on tribalism in Iran.[18] The major insight the studies provide is to reveal the complexity and diversity of these tribal societies. Tribes with very different social, economic, and political structures existed side

[17] None of the tribal dynasties established in Iran in the last millennium were ethnic Persians. Nearly all of them were Turkic in origin, and were assimilated into the sedentary culture of the lands they conquered, and the people they ruled. The combination of Persian literary tradition with Turkish patronage gave rise to the Turko-Persian culture. By the 16th century, under Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires, Turco-Persian dynasties ruled over a vast geography stretching from the Balkans to Bengal, with surprising cultural similarities among their ruling elites and political institutions.

[18] See Barth 1961; Irons 1975; Garthwaite 1983; Tapper 1983, 1997; Beck 1986; Bruinessen 1992 for more information on Iranian tribes.

by side in every period of Iranian history and it is practically impossible to make generalized statements that would be true for all. However, it is possible to point out certain features of tribalism within Iran's political structure that might be helpful an understanding of their role in the history of Iran.

First, it would be misleading to think of tribes and central governments as elements of two exclusive political structures that oppose one another. In reality, tribes and states occupied the same political realm and both sides recognized and depended on the other for particular purposes. Central governments relied on the military power of tribes for their armies: up until the 1930s tribal forces accounted for the main bulk of the Iranian military. On the other hand securing the support of the center provided tribal leaders with considerable advantage in intra-tribal struggles. The central governments played a crucial role in the formation of the largest tribal confederations by providing their favorite leaders with symbolic and material support. Second, the relationship of power between them was more complex than a zero-sum game and particular internal and external circumstances could result in a strong center existing side by side with strong tribes. Third, strong social and cultural ties existed between the tribal elite and the urban elites. Members of ruling dynasties would lose touch with their tribal supporters and assimilate into urban society within a generation or two after coming to power. The same was also true for leaders of major tribal confederacies, who mostly lived in cities[19] and exercised their authority over tribesmen via intermediaries called *kalanthars*. Despite maintaining a pretense of nomadism by undertaking summer migrations to their tribal homelands, neither the ruling family nor the khans of confederacies had much in common with their pastoralist kin. (Khazeni 2009:192-199)

However, for most of Iran's history, a duality existed between settled and nomadic populations. Despite the existence of important economic links between the two, the lives, needs, and priorities of these worlds were quite different from each other. Protection of and access to summer and winter pastures was the primary economic/political concern of the pastoralist nomads. Collecting fees from travelers or raiding the caravans passing through the pastures they

[19] This was not always due to a preference for urban life. It was a common practice of the shahs to force tribal leaders, or one of their sons, to live in cities as political hostages. Their presence would provide the rulers with leverage in case of tribal uprisings.

controlled was an extra source of wealth. On the other hand, urban-based merchants and agriculturalist landowners were concerned about the safety of commercial routes and of their cultivated lands. While the urban-agricultural world aimed at wealth accumulation, the military-pastoralist world practiced a raiding economy. The urban centered *ulama* represented an orthodox and hierarchical interpretation of Islam whereas nomadic societies exercised an array of heterodox religious practices.[20] On top of these, the ethno-linguistic identity of nomadic peoples was usually different from that townspeople they lived around. Not all tribes were pastoralist nomads, but the most politically important ones were, and that fact produced a stereotypical equivalency between tribes and nomadism among urban classes.

Recognizing this duality, Iranian rulers pursued quite flexible polices that allowed tribal autonomy and acknowledged the plurality of power at the frontiers of their empire. Unlike modern states, historical Iranian governments did not object to exercising different forms of sovereignty when dealing with various segments of their subjects. They ruled urban Iran through governors and tried to limit the accumulation power in their hands. When dealing with tribes, the governments relied on tribal leaders as the intermediaries, and they preferred interacting with large confederacies rather than smaller units. In a sense, central governments of Iran practiced two different forms of rule over two separate polities; by drawing revenue from the agriculturalist commercial domain centered in cities, and by receiving military support from the pastoralist nomadic one in the periphery. (Fischer 1977:174-178)

### 5.1.4 Tribes in the 20th Century

At the turn of the 20th century Iran's tribal nomadic population was around 2.5 million out of a total of 9.86 million. (Bharier 1971:31) In terms of socio-political organization there were roughly three different types of tribes in the country. The first kind was the centralized state-like confederacies of the south- Bakhtiyari, Qashqa'i, Khamseh- with high population

[20] It is important to note that adoption of Shiite Islam as the state religion by the Safavids and their subsequent conversion of Iran greatly reduced the religious ambiguities within Iran. This dramatic change enhanced the power and legitimacy of the political center while providing an ethnically diverse Iran with a unifying identity. Nevertheless, the daily practice of Shiite Islam and the position and role of ulama within tribal and urban communities continued to differ.

densities. The Qajar government invested their leaders with the title and office of *ilkhani* and recognized these confederacies as autonomous administrative units. The second kind of tribal polity was common among the frontier tribes of west and northwest, which organized occasional raids across the border and provided a buffer against potential Ottoman and Russian incursions. The confederate organization was looser and competing khans ruled over a network of semi autonomous towns. The third kind of tribal grouping was the mostly Turcoman and Baluch tribes of the east, which had a diffused and decentralized organization and lived scattered across vast swathes of land. (Tapper 1983:44-46)

The waning of Qajar power increased the autonomy of tribes and their influence over the political process. With their substantial military power the tribes were not only de facto rulers in their homelands but also a major force in national politics. A striking demonstration of their power over Iran was the march of Bakhtiyari tribesmen to Tehran, forcing Muhammad Ali Shah to abdicate after he closed the *majlis* and suspended the constitution in 1909. After the shah left, the Bakhtiyaris suppressed revolts against the constitutional government and acted as its main military force. (Khazeni 2005) During Muhammad Ali Shah's failed attempt at taking his throne back in 1911 his army was also comprised of tribal forces. Unlike the nationalist revolutionaries, the tribes' support of either political cause was primarily self-serving and not ideological. Thus they had no scruples about negotiating with the occupying British or the Russians, from whom they were receiving weapons and ordnance. During the chaotic years of World War I, the power of the tribes reached its highest point in the modern era. (Cronin 2007:18-20) When Reza Khan's rise to power began in 1921, Iran's political unity was in serious jeopardy and Tehran's authority was limited to the capital and its surroundings.

The extent of tribal influence and the military force they wielded was anathema to the strong state Reza Khan envisioned. As long as tribes could act as autonomous political units, all other efforts at establishing a centralized government would be moot. Concerns about governance aside, the emerging urban elites of Iran viewed tribes and tribalism as the biggest obstacle to the modernization of the country. Their pastoral nomadic life was an anachronism in an industrialized country, and their tribal allegiance was incompatible with the idea of nationhood. Unlike the rulers and elites of previous centuries, the new urban classes did not regard tribes as an integral part of a complex political system but as elements of a rival world

order. Therefore elimination of not just tribal power but tribalism itself was thought to be indispensible to the constructing of a modern and culturally homogenous nation state. (Ansari 2003:49-52; Cronin 2007:16-17) With the unfailing support of urban Iran behind him, Reza Shah embarked on a long lasting campaign against tribes that started as military subjugation and continued as social engineering.

The first campaign of the new government was against the Shakkak Kurds of Azerbaijan in 1922, which ended with the defeat of the tribal forces and the capture of their fortresses. Following the initial victory, Reza Khan and the newly reformed Iranian army suppressed rebellions in Luristan, Khuzestan, and Azerbaijan. Between 1922 and 1925, the Iranian army also defeated and disarmed Arab, Kurdish, Turcoman, Shahsevan, and Luri tribes. These were not easy campaigns and at certain times only the lack of coordination among the rebel tribes prevented them from inflicting major defeats on the army. Even so, the victories received an enthusiastic reaction from the urban elites. Reza Khan's ability to restore order and assert government control over the tribes gained him substantial political support. (Ghods 1998:97-98; Amanolahi 2002:202-208)

Meanwhile, keenly aware of political realities and the limitations of his military, Reza Khan recognized that he had to avoid the possibility of having to fight at several fronts at once. To keep the large confederacies pacified he sought their leaders' support for the new regime. The great khans of large tribes had been gradually assimilating into the urban elite and drawing their wealth from lands they owned or dividends they received from the oil company. In fact, they were adopting the outlook of an absentee landowning class that happened to reside in cities, and the political order and stability brought by a strong central government was in their interest. To further secure their loyalty –and to keep them close - Reza Khan gave prominent leaders positions within his government[21]. (Bayat 2003: 213-217; Cronin 2007:115-118) These political maneuvers ensured that the southern tribes stayed calm while the army was campaigning against others.

[21] Some well-known tribal leaders Reza Khan made allies with at the time were Qashqai leader Sawlat al-Dawlah, who served as deputy; Sardar Asad, of the Bakhtiyari, who was made minister of war and organized military campaigns against other tribes; and Qavam al-Mulk, of the Khamsah, who became a courtier of Reza Shah.

However, the relative quiet of the southern confederacies did not last long. Widespread social resentment against Reza Shah's radical reforms turned into organized political resistance during the urban uprisings of 1927-28. Although nomadic tribes did not took part in the protest movement, they also felt threatened by the government policies, many of which they regarded as a threat to their way of life. They believed that conscription and disarmament would for all intents and purposes lead to the destruction of the tribal power base and leave their future at the whim of central government. The decentralized tribes of northeast rose up in rebellion in 1928. While the army was fighting to suppress it, a much more serious wave of insurrection erupted in the south, this time among the large confederacies. The Qashqai confederation revolted in early 1929, and the Khamsah and a segment of the Bakhtiyari joined them shorty after. The centralized organization of these confederacies and their large numbers made this uprising the most serious threat Reza Shah's regime had faced to date. By that summer, the province of Fars was in complete chaos, Shiraz was completely surrounded by tribal forces, and the main roads connecting Esfahan to south were cut off. Confident of their power, some leaders of the rebellion were even considering marching to Tehran and overthrowing the shah. Realizing the direness of the situation and the disastrous effect losing a major city would have on his regime, Reza Shah choose to accept the terms[22] originally put forward by the Qashqai[23] and pacify the tribal forces. Satisfied with their success, most of the tribes went back to their summer pastures with only small and disconnected groups continuing their resistance, primarily thorough banditry. (Ansari 2003: 48-51; Tapper 2003: 228-233; Cronin 2007:119-132)

The revolt of 1929 in Fars was a turning point for the tribal populations. It was the last time in Iranian history that they were able to threaten the central government. The few tribal uprisings that took place thereafter were local incidents without any potential to impact political dynamics at the national level. In the following years, the central government continued to implement policies directed toward destroying the political power of tribes and the socio-economic bases of tribalism in Iran.

[22] It is important to note that a tribal uprising in Afghanistan the same year overthrew King Amanullah, another radical modernizer. It must have affected Reza Shah's decision to yield to tribal demands.

[23] The demands were: exemption from conscription and the new dress code, keeping their arms, release of their leader Sawlat al-Dawleh from prison and his reinstatement as *ilkhani* and the elimination of the census and deed registration departments. (Cronin 2007:121)

Throughout ten years of political terror, Reza Shah systematically eliminated tribal great khans of consequence regardless of their allegiances. Even those in prominent positions of power were not safe; Sardar As'ad, of the Bakhtiyari, was arrested and died in prison while he was the minister of war. One by one every tribal leader was arrested, left to die in prison or executed. Their wealth was seized, and military officers were appointed in their stead to govern their tribes. Moreover, the position of the tribes within the administrative system was changed in 1934 with the abolition of all tribal constituencies. Meanwhile, conscription and disarming continued with increasing effectiveness. Tribes' loss of manpower and military force left them powerless against further incursions by the government. In 1933, a policy of forced sedentarization was put in place with the ultimate goal of complete eradication of pastoral nomadism. There was little planning behind the move, and it resulted in disastrous social and economic outcomes for the nomads with loss of herds, economic devastation, and human suffering. Moreover, the forced transition from husbandry to cultivation resulted in a net loss of agricultural production, and towns and cities located close to settled tribes experienced shortages.[24] Some tribes were relocated far away from their homelands in forced marches of hundreds of miles. The lands and wealth they left behind were looted or appropriated by government officers. Finally, land registration policies brought an end to the traditional tribal practice of land grabbing by force. Tribal lands were converted into private property and usually claimed by the powerful elites of the closest urban centers. Consequently, the tribal economic base and resources were diminished while greater wealth accumulated in cities, which made tribes more dependent on settled populations. (Arjomand 1988:63-64; Majd 2001:155-159; Amanolahi 2002:211-215) Unlike the historical interactions between central governments and the tribes, the social and political consequences of these policies were irreversible. The elation of the tribal population and their leaders after Reza Shah's abdication in 1941 and the subsequent resurgence of tribal power only lasted a couple of years. Although his government was gone the modern state apparatus Reza Shah created was still intact.

Reza Shah's reign marked the end of a centuries old political system in Iran and a sharp decline in pastoral nomadism. The percentage of Iran's population that lived as pastoral nomads

[24] See Stauffer 1965 for a detailed analysis of the economic outcomes of forced sedentarization policies in the 1950's and 60's. Despite the difference in period, the economic dynamics of a large-scale shift from nomadic to settled life is very similar.

gradually decreased from about 25% in 1900 to 13% in 1940 to 1% in 1956. (Bharier 1971:29, 31) The major shift toward settling deprived tribes of their mobility and made it significantly easier for the government to assert its control over them. The loss of tribal autonomy and the constant presence of state power over the tribes affected their traditional social structure. Military governors replaced khans at the top of tribal hierarchy and the khans' patrimonial authority over their tribesmen declined. Since it was an integral aspect of tribal identity and solidarity, the loss of traditional forms of authority resulted in the gradual transformation of tribal identities into a vague cultural marker instead of a defining characteristic.

More importantly, Reza Shah's policies ended tribal dominance over urban centers irrevocably. The towns previously controlled by tribal khans became regional centers of government power. Tribal raids no longer threatened cities, and commercial routes between them were no longer under the control of nomadic forces. Political power within the modern Iranian state was concentrated and centralized in urban centers, which empowered urban populations with their close ties to administration. On the other hand, nomads became the outsiders to the new political system and were forced to rely on urban society and networks in order to engage with it. The ending of urban-nomad duality was a major transformation within Iranian society and a turning point in its history.

### 5.1.5 Urban Administration

During the Qajar period, the office of *kalantar (*or *beglerbegi* in major Turkish speaking cities) was the administrative position that facilitated the connection between the government and the residents of cities; a *kalantar's* jurisdiction might cover a whole region, or only a particular community. The rulers appointed *kalantars*, usually from among the notables of a city, and their main duty was to maintain public order and security, as well as overseeing the bazaar, keeping population records, and taking sanitation measures. Large cities might have more than one *kalantar* and below them would be *kadkhodas*, who were responsible for particular neighborhoods or sections of the city. Although the position came with a salary, and subject to the wishes of the rulers, the *kalantars* were regarded as representatives of local populations

rather than as officials of central government. They carried out the orders of the central government, but they also conveyed the grievances of the local population to the center. The office was the mediator between the city residents and the government, an administrative link between the central and local elements. It was a very important, and lucrative, job. Regularly consulting with various guilds, the *kalantar* would fix the prices of basic goods, depending upon the needs of the city. As one can imagine, within a patrimonial administrative context this power was often abused, enriching the office holder and the guilds, and stifling the urban population. (Shuster 1911; Floor 1971)

After the travels of Naser al-Din Shah to Europe, several reforms in urban administration were carried out. The Shah hired Count Antonie di Monte Forte in 1878, appointing him Administrator for Public Order. The Count prepared a handbook detailing the operating principles of his administration, in which he restructured the police force (*ehtesabiyeh*), whose previous duties were limited to supervision of the bazaars, making it responsible for carrying out most municipal tasks including sanitation, oversight of construction, maintenance of street lights, regulation of markets and the quality of goods, prevention of famine and food shortages. The reforms were implemented in Tehran before other urban centers. They met with resistance from government officers, whose responsibilities were transferred to the police in particular. Conditions in Tehran did not change much during the next decade. Bureaucratic resistance along with the weakness of the late Qajar central government prevented any further reforms. Cities across Iran – except for Tehran, to an extent - were administered via the traditional institutional framework. (Floor 1971; Esfahani 2010)

Decentralization of local administration was one of the key components of the administrative changes brought by the constitutional revolution. Legal structures empowering the local populations against the central were put in place with the intention of making certain that future rulers could not easily abuse their position to invalidate the gains of the revolution. The municipal organizations (*baladiyeh*) were among the institutions established by the new laws to achieve that goal. The municipal council, whose members were elected by the residents of the city, managed the municipal organization. The councils had 30, 20, or 16 members depending on the city's size, and they were to be elected for four-year terms. The particulars of municipal law describing eligibility for being elected to the council are a clear demonstration of the

revolutionaries' political aim of empowering the local forces against the center. Only residents of the city owning properties of a certain value could be elected. This prevented any non-urban element from exercising power over the council, while furthering the interests of the urban middle and upper classes, to which many revolutionaries belonged. Taking a step further, the law prevented "rulers and their deputies," "police staff," "military personnel," and all government officials from serving on the military councils. Moreover, the members of the councils were barred from drawing any salary from the central government. (Esfahani 2010:104) Clearly, revolutionary lawmakers were intent on taking any step necessary to limit the power and influence of the central government over the administration of cities.

To empower them vis-à-vis the central government, municipalities were provided with the authority to levy and collect taxes to finance the carrying out of their responsibilities. This clause caused great tension between the Ministry of Finance and the *baladiyah as to* who could tax what and how much. The Municipal Law described the primary purpose of their establishment as "to protect the interests of the cities and their inhabitants." The municipal councils were also responsible for fighting against food scarcity, a major problem in late 19$^{th}$ and early 20$^{th}$ century across the country. They were to enforce sanitation rules (epidemics of cholera and malaria were also major problems), maintain order and security, inspect businesses, and provide for all other municipal needs. All of these were the expected responsibilities of a municipality, but in a less conventional manner, municipal councils were also entrusted with educating the public by establishing libraries, reading rooms, museums, and maintaining mosques and schools. Evidently, the members of the First Parliament regarded the municipality as the urban public's gateway to a modern civic life. (Madanipour 1998; Esfahani 2010:102-103)

As was the case with so many laws and institutions set up during the constitutional period, the *baladiyahs* were never institutionalized as envisioned by the revolutionaries. In most cities municipal councils were never formed while in others the councils did not operate as intended by the lawmakers. During the 1910s, when most of Iran was in disarray, traditional social institutions and spontaneous arrangements between local power holders governed the cities. With the dissolution of central authority, tribal forces were able to exert more power over urban settlements and disrupt the connections between cities.

The Municipal Law of 1907 stayed in effect, with minor changes, even after Reza Shah's ascension to power. One significant change, which foreshadowed the future of all local governance, was the transferring of Tehran's municipal leadership to the office of prime minister in 1921. This lack of attention to urban administration is not surprising since the curbing of tribal power and suppression of various revolts were more pressing problems Pahlavi regime faced. However, a wave of major urban uprisings in 1927 and 1928 made administration of cities significantly more important for the government. Consequently, new legislation passed in 1930 completely reversed the relation between central government and urban administrations. The decentralization and autonomy approach of the previous laws was abandoned; instead, the new system instituted absolute dominance of the center over local decision-making processes. Under the new regulation provincial governor-generals in coordination with the Interior Ministry appointed mayors of cities. City councils were transformed into advisory organs, responsible for deciding the most efficient implementation of Interior Ministry's decisions. Despite this lack of any actual power, council elections were not left to local mechanisms alone. Voting was restricted to privileged residents – landlords, merchants, and property owners. Moreover, they were to elect five times as many representatives as necessary. Out of this list, Ministry of Interior selected a smaller list, which was to be approved by the governor-generals. The pretense of elections was upheld, but in essence central government decided the membership of the city councils. Municipal administrations were completely dependent on the funding allocated by the central government and effectively powerless to undertake any major project without the Interior Ministry approving its budget. (Taheri 1995; Mohammadi 2010) Yet the new municipal institutions were much more successful in transforming Iranian cities than their predecessors.

The strong tradition of local political autonomy was completely eliminated during Reza Shah's reign. Interior Ministry became the organ of central government that was in charge of regional and local administration, including the police force in cities and the gendarmerie in rural areas. Based on the French administrative system, the country was divided into 10 provinces[25], which were further divided into counties comprised of municipalities and rural districts. The Shah appointed the governor-generals though the Minister of Interior, who in turn appointed the

[25] The previous administrative terminology was Arabic in origin; as a part of the nationalization policy, a Persianized terminology was adopted for administrative units. For example, province and governor were changed from *velayet* and *vali* to *ostan* and *ostandar*, respectively, terms used by the ancient Sassanid Empire.

lower level administrators (regional governors and mayors) in consultation with the minister. Each province had its army and specialized departments for various services – including health, transportation, post and telegraph, education, agriculture, and census – in its capital city, and each department had its representatives in counties. (Amirahmadi 1986:504; Arjomand 1988:65-66; Abrahamian 2008:70-71) Thus, with the new arrangement municipalities became a layer within the national administrative hierarchy, without any autonomy or self-sufficiency. For the first time in Iran's history, semi-autonomous provincial rulers were eliminated and the central government was able to exert complete control over every region and directly extend its authority to even the smallest settlement.

### 5.1.6 Modern State and Urban Dissent

Universal conscription was the spark that brought discontent with the regime's policies to the surface. A series of uprisings beginning in 1927 marked the most organized urban opposition movement against Reza Shah's rule. As a reactionary response to the centralization of political power, the anti-conscription movement was rooted predominantly among traditional urban middle classes with widespread support among the urban lower classes.

Under the traditional *bunichah* recruitment system, village units were responsible for supplying soldiers based on the value of the land tax they paid. The draft applied to all of Iran with the particular exception of urban areas, where no land tax was levied. However, this system was replaced with the new conscription law, which applied to every citizen regardless of his residence. Unsurprisingly the new system was not received well by the urban middle classes, who for the first time had to face the prospect of military service. For the first two years, the draft was limited to the capital and its environs - Tehran, Qazvin, and Hamadan - and despite some intermittent acts of resistance it was implemented with relative success. However, when it was expanded to other major cities in 1927, opposition to conscription turned into a wave of urban social unrest across the country. Coupled with the general sense of displeasure with the ongoing reforms, including the secularization of the judicial system and the new dress code,

resistance to conscription quickly became a rallying cry that united urban middle classes and the *ulama* against the Shah's regime.[26] (Abrahamian 1982:141-142, 152)

From late 1927 to 1928, the opposition employed various methods of protest against the government. Merchants closed their stores and shut the *bazaars*, crafts guilds organized general strikes, while *ulama* led large public demonstrations. Shiraz, Isfahan, and Qum became the centers of opposition, and resistance against conscription took over nearly every urban center of the country. Large demonstrations were held in Tehran in front of the *majlis*, though the government suppressed them by force. But neither intimidation nor the declaration of martial law had any effect on the protests in Shiraz, Isfahan, and Qum. After several months of standoff between the government and *ulama*, an agreement was reached in early 1928. The Shah agreed to more leniency in conscription, promised the *ulama* a supervisory role over *majlis'* decisions and the local press, and reintroduced small religious courts, which had been abolished during the judicial reform. For the public, these were quite minor concessions considering the effectiveness of the protests. However, while the urban resistance was strong, several months of strikes and the closure of businesses were taking their toll on craftsmen and merchants and urban residents, pushing the resistance movement to the limits of its powers of mobilization. The government resumed strictly enforcing conscription and a second wave of uprising started in late 1928, this time centered in Tabriz. This time the government was quick to respond with extensive use of force against the protesters while leading figures were promptly arrested, preventing the unrest from spreading to other cities. (Cronin 1998:457-467)

The crushing of the Tabriz uprising marked the end of organized resistance against centralization in Iranian cities. Future instances of urban unrest remained provincial without any significant effect on national politics. More importantly, the defeat of the uprising signaled the inability of the *ulama*-middle class alliance to effectively challenge the central government. Reza Shah's modern state apparatus proved to be more efficient than any previous government in bringing Iran's cities under its control. The urban population of Iran no longer posed a serious threat to Reza Shah's regime. On the contrary, the urban middle class that emerged as a

[26] It should be noted that a similar coalition between urban middle classes – merchants and craftsmen - and the *ulama* was the main force behind the tobacco protests of 1890. Centered on Tehran, Tabriz, and Shiraz, these protests, and the alliance of social classes, laid the foundations of the political movement that eventually culminated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.

consequence of the modernization project became the regime's main political support. The *ulama* was left in opposition to Reza Shah's policies without being able to provide a coherent ideological alternative that could establish a political alliance powerful enough to confront his rule.

### 5.1.7 State Guided Urbanization and Urbanism

Iranian cities were the most apparent symbols of social transformation of Iran during Reza Shah's reign. The modern industrial society imagined by the Pahlavi regime was first and foremost urban. Although, Iran had always been more urbanized than other countries in the Middle East, Reza Shah's conception of a modern city was not compatible with the existing structure. Consequently the overarching purpose of urban policies during his reign was a radical transformation of cities, especially Tehran, to provide a physical expression to the new Iranian society he envisioned.

In 1921, Iran's urban population was 2.4 million out of a total of 11.5 million, which roughly corresponded to 21%. This ratio between urban and rural population was similar to 1900 and stayed more or less the same until the mid-1930's. There was very little rural-to-urban migration during this period. On the other hand, the growth of existing cities and towns during the same period varied significantly. Tehran's population grew from 200,000 to 1.5 million between 1900 and 1956. The population of Tabriz only grew by 90,000 over the same five decades. The differences between the expected and actual growth of urban centers was a result of substantial intra-urban migration, which resulted from the emergence of a new economy and the change of the urban centers' position within it. The major driving force behind shaping the new economy was government's development, industrialization, and security policies. Some previously important centers like Kerman and Yazd stagnated or declined in the face of little or no public investment, while towns with no previous significance like Arak and Qomisheh (Shahreza) grew substantially as a consequence of government policies. In particular cases like Abadan and Ahvaz, the oil industry led to the emergence of completely new towns. Therefore,

the government had significant power and influence over Iran's urbanization during Reza Shah period. (Bharier 1971:24-31, 1972)

The most significant outcome of Reza Shah's centralization policies in geographic terms was that Tehran became the absolute center of all political activity in Iran. Other major cities, which used to enjoy relative autonomy and major political influence over their hinterlands, gradually turned into secondary nodes within a Tehran-dominated administrative political hierarchy. Practically every economic or political enterprise had to go thorough and be approved by the bureaucratic machinery in the capital, leaving no room for local initiative. Having connections in Tehran and particularly within the government became a necessity for anyone who wanted to do any kind of business. Owing to this concentration of political and administrative power, development and prosperity within Tehran outpaced the provincial centers to such a degree that it was no longer simply the most prominent among Iran's cities but in a completely different category. (Ghods 1989:100-101)

The changes that took place in Tehran during the 20 years of Reza Shah's rule were enormous. While a reconstruction effort was undertaken in the old city, the demolition of existing structures to make way for new avenues and neighborhoods was the more prevalent method of renewal. An entirely new city grew around the existing western quarters in the northern part of Tehran. Built according to modern urban planning principles, the north of Tehran had very little in common with a traditional Iranian town. A planned grid of wide and paved streets stood in contrast with the previous organic development of the city, and the new houses displayed a completely different architecture. In a clear rejection of religious tradition, public squares (*maydans*) were adorned with statues of the Shah instead of fountains. New laws allowing the appropriation of unused lands, especially old cemeteries, led to the creation of new parks (Fardowsi Park was the largest) and promenades in their stead. Electric streetlights began working in 1925, and in 1929 municipal electricity was made available for the homes of affluent residents. Lack of fresh water was the major obstacle to Tehran's growth - the old system of *qanats* could no longer supply the rapidly growing population. To address the problem a 52 km.-long modern aqueduct was built to bring water from Karaj River in Albruz Mountains, which improved hygiene in the city. (Banani: 1961:144, Ehlers and Floor 1993: 259-262)

As the modern state grew, so did the need for new public buildings. Starting in the late 1920's, the pace of bureaucratic expansion necessitated constant construction of specialized offices. Most of these new buildings were in Tehran; in major provincial centers, the construction craze arrived primarily through the extensive reconstruction and expansion of existing large buildings. An ever increasing amount of resources was allocated for new structures, and the annual amount spent by ministries for new buildings increased tenfold between 1926 and 1940. (Bharier 1971:233) As a result, the Iranian state acquired a physically larger presence and occupied more space within the urban centers. Understanding the power of symbolic imagery, Reza Shah turned this practical need for more space into an ideological statement about his rule. The architectural style of the new public buildings reflected the aspirations and the vision of the Pahlavi regime, and it was markedly novel and different. Inspired by Iran's pre-Islamic past, the new imagery featured architectural elements from archeological ruins with a conscious effort to draw parallels between the Pahlavi regime and the grandeur of the ancient Persian Empire. At the same time it conveyed the principal values of the new state, secularism and nationalism. The resulting "neo-Achaemenid or neo-Sasanian" style was featured prominently in new public buildings.[27] The commissioned architects, all foreigners initially, employed these design elements in their projects and a distinct style associated with Pahlavi era emerged. (Bahrambeygui 1977; Marefet 1988:97-113)

Although Tehran's needs always took precedence over those of other towns, gradually similar developments took place in other major cities as well. Infrastructure developed and amenities improved across the board. By the late 1930's, every town had access to electricity and better access to fresh water. The improvements in cities were not limited to basic services. The Ministry of Education built modern sports facilities and arranged athletic competitions, movie theaters showing Western films attracted the youth, public parks and promenades offered an alternative to mosques for leisurely gatherings. As a result of the urban-centered modernization project, every major town underwent some degree of transformation. The legal basis of urban renewal was the Street Widening Act of 1933, which authorized municipalities to undertake restructuring projects, though without providing additional resources. The major component of

[27] Some prominent buildings of this architectural style are Bank-e Melli (National Bank), Muze-ye Iran Bastan (Archeology Museum), Police Headquarters, Ministry of Justice, and various buildings of Tehran University. Note the symbolic significance of these institutions to national identity and sovereignty. See Marefet (1988) for further details of architecture in Tehran during Reza Shah's reign.

urban renewal was the demolition of old structures to open smaller scale Haussman-like avenues and the superimposition of a grid over the existing street pattern. The Ministry of Interior's directions for the reconstruction of cities, sent to municipalities, was meticulously detailed. Among other things, it lay out precise dimensions for the public squares and the encircling sidewalks, the height of each building floor, the spacing of trees surrounding the square, and the size and building materials for storefronts. The urban expression of the regime's political ideals of a unified and homogenous nation was a uniform architectural design, determined by the center. Two-story buildings surrounding the public square would accommodate public offices. Shops would line the new avenues, usually named Pahlavi or Shah Avenue. Neoclassical columns and stucco decorations would be the common features of building facades. Unsurprisingly, these overarching planning principles were not implemented evenly across the country; each city's resources and particular conditions determined the extent and the form of renewal. For example, Tabriz's new streets did not follow a grid pattern. Kermanshah and Yazd had only one avenue constructed. Kerman's grid had avenues that ended at the outskirts. (Banani 1961:145; Bonine 1979:210-211; Ehlers and Floor 1993: 254-57; Faghfoory 1993: 295)

### 5.1.8 Pahlavi Regime and the New Urban Middle Class

The most significant social outcome of Reza Shah's reign was the emergence of a modern urban middle class. The growth of a modern state and the modern middle classes in Iran was intrinsically connected by a recursive dynamic. The dramatic expansion of the army and the civil bureaucracy meant more people worked for and depended on the state. Thus the growth of the public sector automatically meant an increase of westernized urbanites. Furthermore, a professional middle class – lawyers, journalists, engineers, contractors, and physicians – developed to provide specialized services for the state and its public servants. Meanwhile, meeting the needs and expectations of these social classes required more specialization and expansion of the bureaucracy. The common denominator among the members of the new bureaucratic and professional classes was the expertise they acquired through westernized education. Thus their political outlook was parallel to the ideological stance of Reza Shah's government. Consequently, major cities lost their position as the centers of reactionary

opposition to the state; instead urban areas became the main source of political support for the Pahlavi regime. (Graham 1978:22-27; Katouzian 1981:107-111; Arjomand 1988:69-70; Keddie 2003:101-102)

Yet, the emergence of the new middle classes also resulted in a traditional-versus-modern duality in Iranian society, which became strikingly manifest in the socio-spatial organization of cities. As urban centers grew, wealthy urbanites abandoned the old quarters and settled in the recently developed areas that had better amenities and more spacious houses. This pattern eventually created neighborhoods separated from rest of the city solely on the basis of residents' social status. The fact that members of any minority could leave their ghettos and live next to Muslim Iranians meant the demise of spatial segregation based on religious and ethic identities. Instead, wealth, status, education, and lifestyle became the basis of social and residential division in cities. This socio-economic duality permeated nearly every aspect of urban life. Women's participation in public space, cultural norms, social interactions, leisure activities, and the role of religion in daily life differed from one side of the city to the other. Western-style shops lining the new streets offered imported goods to residents of the new city while the *bazaars* continued to be the commercial center for the old. The duality within the cities was a product of Reza Shah's program of modernization from above, which was successful in creating the modern urban society albeit one with deep social cleavages that had significant implications for Iran's future.

### 5.1.9 Tehran and Centralization

At the beginning of the 20th century, Iran's transportation network was composed of a patchwork of regional unpaved roads that were not maintained by the state. The Qajar governments of the late 19th century granted concessions to foreign companies for the construction of toll highways, but in 1900 the total length of roads in Iran barely added up to 800 miles. (Bharier 1971:194)

Nearly all trade was pack-trade carried out via a couple of major routes, neither of which was in good enough shape to accommodate travel by anything but mules or camels. The roads connecting Iran's cities were simple tracks and even the so-called first class routes were dirt

roads, only a little wider. Bringing foreign goods to Tehran was an arduous undertaking of at least a thousand kilometers, which would take more than two months using the Trebizond-Tabriz route. Reaching the capital from the south either through the port of Bushehr or from Basra was as slow and demanding. (Sventitsky 1928) In 1914, personnel of the oil company in Khuzestan realized that instead of going to Tehran via land routes, which took three weeks to a month, it was shorter, safer, and much easier to travel by boat from Khuzestan to the Suez Canal, then through Constantinople, landing at the Russian port of Batumi on the eastern Black Sea, then going by train from Batumi to Baku and crossing the Caspian by boat to Rasht, and finally taking the road to Tehran from there. (Melamid 1968:556) The cost of transporting goods within Iran was a major impediment to trade. In 1904, shipping from Manchester to the Persian Gulf cost £2.3 per ton of cargo. Transporting the same goods from the port of Bushehr to Tehran via Shiraz and Isfahan cost around £18. At the Tehran market the price of one kilogram of yarn from Manchester was 1.45 rials, out of which 1.14 rials was the cost of transportation. (Clawson 1993:248) The poor state of the roads in Iran was making it impossible for the center to impose its power over the rest of the country. Limited economic contact among urban centers within the interior was empowering local political forces against Tehran, enabling them to resist efforts of centralization more effectively. Meanwhile, provinces at the periphery had stronger economic and commercial ties to centers across the borders, increasing external influence over Iran.

Only a few railroad lines existed in the country and all of them were Russian or British constructions. The railways were planned according to the economic and military needs of the foreign powers and composed of short distance routes connecting border regions of Iran with the territories of the two empires..[28] The only railroad in the interior of Iran was a Belgian-built and Belgian-operated five-mile line between Tehran and a nearby religious shrine. (Banani 1961:133) The Russian border in the northwest was the most easily traversable trade route to reach central Iran. This geographic advantage, coupled with political influence, translated into Russia's effectively monopolizing trade with the most developed areas of Iran in the early 20th century. Even by 1925 it was more economical to bring oil to Tehran from Russia than from Iran's oilfields in the south. (Bharier 1971:195)

[28] The Tabriz-Julfa line, built by the Russians, connected the major commercial center of Iran with the main border town of Julfa, which in turn was connected to the larger Russian railway network. Similarly the Rasht-Tehran road, also built by Russia, created a shorter route through the Caspian Sea. The Quetta-Zahedan tracks established a land-based supply line for British troops in the south of Iran.

At the beginning of the Pahlavi era it was clear that existing roads and railroads were far from providing a basis for national integration. Moreover, as a soldier, Reza Shah was keenly aware that the main military advantage of the tribes against the central government was the high mobility of the former and the inability of the latter to deliver a quick response. As a result, construction of a modern transportation network was a military priority as well as an economic and political one. In 1924 the government conducted a detailed survey of the condition of the country's roads. A list of priorities was identified and plans for future development were drafted. The most ambitious and important project was the construction of a Trans-Iranian Railway. (Banani 1961:133-134)

Connecting the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf was a massive undertaking previously attempted by several foreign consortia during the late Qajar and Constitutional periods. However, conflicting imperial ambitions, political instability, and a lack of resources and finances had derailed those efforts. As was true in most developing nations of the time railroads were seen as a sign of progress, modernization, and national sovereignty among Iranian elites. Thus, the construction of a Trans-Iranian railroad would be a great symbolic victory for the Pahlavi regime, underlined by the failures of past efforts. The government was not able to secure foreign loans for the construction so the project had to be funded completely by domestic resources. To raise income, a government monopoly over tea and sugar imports was established. The parliament approved the project in 1926 and the construction began in 1927. The Trans-Iranian Railroad became a pet project of Reza Shah, who personally picked the foreign engineers, was involved at every stage, and devoted a half hour every day to overseeing progress. (Knapp 1977:36-37; Ghods 1989:102-103)

When the Trans-Iranian Railroad was completed in 1938, it was an 870-mile line crossing the Zagros and Albruz mountain ranges with 4,700 bridges and 224 tunnels. As grand as it was, most observers criticized the particulars of the project at the time. The route was a slightly southwest-northeast one, connecting Bandar Gaz (Bandar Shah) on the Caspian shore to Bandar Shapur (Bandar Emam Khomeyni) on the Persian Gulf. Crossing the Iranian interior, the railroad by-passed every major city –Isfahan, Hamadan, Shiraz, and Shustar - except Tehran. Both termini ended in Iranian territory and did not reach the borders, leaving Iran without a connection to international transportation networks; an east-west route would have linked Turkey and Russia

at one end and India on the other. From an economic standpoint, the route decision was considered to be a great waste of resources. (Ansari 2003:54-55)

However, it is clear that Reza Shah's concerns while making these decisions were primarily strategic and personal rather than economic. The personal interest was the connecting of Shah's vast agricultural estates in the Caspian region to the south of Iran and world markets. Reza Shah acquired most of his lands by large-scale extortion of the tribal leaders he dislocated over the years. Considering that he owned about three million acres of land, his economic benefit from the railroad was immense. (Ghods 1989:102) From a military perspective, the railroad connected Tehran to the north and south of the country, where the majority of the tribal revolts had taken place in the past decade. Fast deployment of troops from Tehran to the north and south would greatly diminish the tactical advantage of the tribal forces. Reza Shah also believed that if the line was to reach the Russian border, it could serve as a pretext and the means for a Soviet invasion, and that was a factor in his route selection.[29]

The bypassing of major cities had an important impact on the Iranian provinces. It slowed down the growth of some major cities of Iran, including Yazd and Kerman, while transforming some small towns like Arak and Ahvaz into regional economic centers. But the most important outcome of the route was a gradual geographical rearrangement of Iran's economy toward the interior, and specifically toward the capital. Tehran was already the political center of the nation, but the railroad transformed it into the main commercial node for the whole country as well. Once operational, the tracks allowed rapid and reliable connection between Tehran and the ports in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Thereafter, nearly all of Iranian imports were transported to Tehran first and they were distributed to the rest of the country from there. More trade, manufacture, and services began to concentrate in the capital, leaving every regional center of Iran with little choice but to orient their economic activities toward Tehran. (Melamid 1968:521-523) This was clearly an intentional political decision in line with the government's centralization efforts in other areas.

[29] Considering the fact that the South-Manchuria Railway was the focal point and part of the casus belli of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Sino-Soviet conflict in 1929, and the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Reza Shah's opinion had a basis in reality. As Banani (1961:134) points out, the Trans-Iranian Railway functioned as Russia's major supply line during the occupation of Iran in World War II, but the inconveniently located terminal points hindered Red Army's efforts; partially validating Reza Shah's strategic thinking.

Trans-Iranian Railroad was the most expensive infrastructure undertaking of Reza Shah period,[30] but it was only one part of a larger program of developing the transportation and communication network of the country. From 1925 onward the government allocated significant funds for expansion and maintenance of Iran's roads. In 1930, a Ministry of Roads with extensive powers was created to oversee the construction of highways. As a result, the 2,000-mile road network, which was in poor shape at Reza Shah's coronation, was expanded to 14,000 miles that was in relatively good shape by the end of his reign. (Ansari 2003:53) Along with construction, the government also worked on securing the road network by creating the road guard units (*Amnieh*), who were distributed in detachments over the road network. Their presence substantially reduced the ability of bandits to rob travelers across the country. The fear of a court-martial kept the guards from rebelling against their poor living conditions and turning into bandits. (Knapp 1977:34-35)

The government encouraged the use of motorized vehicles, subsidizing their importation, and the number of automobiles rose from 4,450 in 1925 to 15,000 by 1938 along with a sevenfold increase in the consumption of motor fuel. The main form of transportation gradually shifted from mules and camels to trucks and railroads and consequently the average time of travel dropped to one-tenth of that in the pre-war period. (Issawi 1978:130-133) Furthermore, air transportation arrived relatively early to Iran, when a German company was given the rights to carry passengers and mail between Iran, Europe, and farther points in Asia in 1926. By the 1930's, Junker planes were providing air transport between Tehran and other major cities of Iran, and in 1937 Iran's national airline began its service between Tehran and Baghdad. (Banani 1968: 135-136)

Between 1920 and 1945, Iran's overall transportation facilities grew and improved substantially. Although still somewhat rudimentary compared to industrial countries, the roads of the 1940's were developed enough to lay the foundations of an integrated national market. The improvement of infrastructure resulted in 80% decrease in transportation coasts between 1920 and 1941. The imposition of the center's power over the provinces eliminated the widespread practice of local bureaucrats charging merchants with unofficial fees. Reduced travel times

[30] The Iranian railroad network grew over the following decades, remedying the problems inherent in the Trans-Iranian Railroad. New east-west lines connected Tabriz and Mashhad to the capital, and trunk lines connected all major cities to the national network.

between cities and the securing of roads led to the increase and diversification of economic contacts among Iran's regions. In contrast to earlier travelers' accounts of major variations in the price of goods in different cities, by the late 1930's National Bank reports showed a strong correlation between commodity prices in different parts of the country, indicating the emergence of a truly national market. (Clawson 1993:248-249)

The dramatic improvement in transportation infrastructure within the country was a crucial element in the emergence of modern Iran. The fact that military and bureaucratic apparatuses of the central government could easily reach every part of the country reduced the influence of regional political actors. For the first time in Iran's history, the control of the center over the provinces was no longer contingent upon negotiations with the local elites or tribal leaders. Furthermore, the ability of the central government to maintain a stable presence across the country turned frontiers into borders, firmly establishing the territorial integrity of the Iranian state vis-à-vis its neighbors. These changes in the spatial dynamics within the country expanded the scale of Iran's political and economic systems from regional to national, with Tehran at the center. In a sense, Iran gradually moved from an assemblage of provinces and tribes that were held together by the patrimonial authority of the ruler, into a truly unified polity with a national identity.

### 5.1.10 State and Economic Development

Partly due to the lack of an alternative, but more importantly because of his autocratic leanings, Reza Shah centered the processes of modernization and industrialization on the state and on himself. The government, under his guidance, became the source of every large economic initiative. Inspired partly by Turkey's experiment with etatism and partly by an admiration of totalitarian regimes in Europe, Reza Shah undertook an impressive program of state-led industrialization. Between 1926 and 1947, 178 large manufacturing establishments were founded, their size of and the number of workers they employed increasing progressively. By the 1930's, the government was allocating 20% of its budget to industrial development. (Bharier 1971: 172-173, 176)

Although various policies aimed at encouraging private industrial enterprises – tax breaks, subsidies, and assistance for the import of capital goods - were implemented, private entrepreneurship never reached substantial levels until the late 1930's. Lack of private capital prevented most potential entrepreneurs from investing in industry, while those landowners who might have had enough capital were mostly content with their position within the existing structure and preferred to invest in expansion of their own lands. Furthermore, decades of chaos had led to a general lack of faith in the possibility of long-term political stability, and this uncertainty about the future made gold and silver appear to be more secure tools of investment. (Banani 1961:138) However, the number of private enterprises did grow as political stability increased throughout the 1930's and 1940's. By 1946 only 50% of the 49,000 industrial workers were employed in state factories. Some industries such as sugar, tobacco, and cement were completely controlled by the state while textiles and food processing industries were comprised of both public and privately owned establishments. (Bharier 1971:180)

The government's industrial policies did not prioritize economic rationalization when it came to the choice of the kind of industrial establishments and their locations. National self-sufficiency and overall modernization trumped considerations of profitability, employment creation, or efficient management. As a result, most of the state factories operated with heavy losses. In contrast to commercial and political activities the factories were not predominantly concentrated around Tehran but spread across the country. Proximity to raw materials and newly constructed roads rather than major markets was the determining factor for factory location. By 1947, only 17% of all industrial establishments were located in or around Tehran while Tabriz and Isfahan each housed about 16%. The provinces of Sistan, Baluchistan, Kerman, and Kurdistan were the least industrialized parts of the country. But the location pattern of large-scale factories was somewhat different with 26% in Tehran while Gilan and Mazandaran followed the capital with 14% and 12%. Tabriz and Rasht followed Tehran as major urban centers of industry. (Bharier 1971:181-183)

In line with the national self-sufficiency policy, government investment was primarily focused on light industries to provide substitutes for major imports. At the top of the import list was textiles, so cotton, woolen, and silk textile factories were established in Mazandaran, Tehran, and Isfahan. Due to its proximity to raw materials, Isfahan became the center of a

growing woolen industry, while a modern silk fabric factory in Chalus began producing domestic silk. Textiles were the major industrial product of Iran; by the 1940's the industry accounted for more than 60% of all industrial employment and more than half of all large-scale factories. To support these enterprises, uniforms for the army, schools, and other government institutions were made exclusively from domestic textiles, while importation of certain fabrics like silk was prohibited altogether. (Banani 1961:139; Bharier 1971:180-181)

Eight sugar factories were built in various parts of the country that had climates suitable for growing beets. Government programs were set up to subsidize beet growth by landowners in the vicinity of these factories. Other industrial plants for food processing like oil refineries,[oil refiners process food?] fruit drying plants, breweries and distilleries, meat processing facilities, and large-scale grain elevators were constructed in various parts of the country. Light industries for the production of basic consumer goods such as paper, glass, soap, cigarettes, and matches were established. The government had to import large quantities of cement to supply the needs of all the construction efforts making Iran the world's third largest importer of cement in early 1903's. In response, two cement factories were built near Tehran in 1934 and 1936 and the cement industry became the most profitable of all government enterprises. (Banani 1961:140; Bharier 1971:176-177)

**Conclusion**

At the end of Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign, the territorial and social control of central government across Iran was consolidated. The military occupation of allied powers during World War II, had weakened state's hold over provinces bordering Soviet Union, it also encouraged some tribal elements to defy government policies by re-arming themselves and return to their homelands in the mountains. However, both of the challenges to state's control failed to have a significant impact on the national political structure, which was a clear testament to the great transformation of Iranian state since the beginning of 20$^{th}$ century. Territorial integrity of Iran was firmly established. Although Reza Shah did not develop a comprehensive ideological outlook or institutions, the modern state organization he created could count on the support of new urban classes.

## 5.2 Afghanistan

### 5.2.1 Historical Overview

The history of modern state in Afghanistan began in the second half of the 19th century. Abdur Rahman Khan became the first ruler of the Durrani dynasty to consolidate Kabul's authority over the territory of today's Afghanistan and the tribes inhabiting it. After his death in 1901, Abdur Rahman's son Habibullah succeeded his father as *amir*, and despite lacking his father's charisma, managed to maintain Kabul's control over the country. Unlike his father Habibullah was open to western influences and took first steps towards modernizing Afghanistan. His son Amanullah became the ruler of Afghanistan in 1919, and began his reign by starting the Third Anglo-Afghan War with a surprise attack on the British forces in India. Since Abdur Rahman Khan's time Afghanistan was a protectorate of the British Empire and was not independent in its foreign affairs; in exchange, Britain supported Afghan rulers with annual subsidies and occasional grants of modern arms. The war turned into a stalemate and British Empire decided to recognize Afghanistan's independence. Very popular with the Afghan people, Amanullah embarked on an ambitious modernization program. However, his reform program involved increased taxation and elimination of various privileges of tribal leaders and generated substantial resentment within rural areas. Facing several simultaneous tribal rebellions in 1929, he was forced to leave the country and abdicate the throne.

Following the tribal uprising that ousted King Amanullah, pashtun tribes elected Muhammad Nadir Khan, a celebrated general of the army, as the next ruler of Afghanistan. As the first ruler of Musahiban dynasty Nadir Shah only reigned for 3 years and was assassinated in 1933. His 19 year old son Muhammed Zahir assumed the throne, but from 1933 to 1964 the real power resided with his paternal uncles Hashim and Mahmud Khans. Under the rue of uncles, Afghanistan went thorough a period of economic growth and development, thanks to large sums of foreign aid. 1963, Zahir Shah took control of Afghan government and presided over the preparation of a new constitution, which turned Afghanistan into a democratic constitutional monarchy. In 1973 Zahir Shah's cousin and the former prime minster Muhammad Daoud Khan

staged a coup d'état and installed a republican government while the shah was abroad. Zahir Shah abdicated instead of risking civil war and did not return to Afghanistan until 2002. In 1978 People's Democratic Party led a revolution against Daoud Khan and overthrew his regime, one year later the revolutionary government invited Soviet troops into Afghanistan for assistance with subjugating the anti-government mujahidin forces.

Throughout 20th century, Afghan state's control over the country was limited to major urban centers. The countryside effectively governed itself via tribal organizations and customary laws. Kabul governments, especially under Musahiban dynasty, acknowledged the power of tribes and instead of fighting a protracted war they opted for a political arrangement based on minimal state intervention in rural areas. In 20th century Afghanistan, two social spheres with irreconcilable differences existed side by side but with little contact with each other. The political struggles of Kabul had no real impact on the daily lives of most Afghan, and westernized urban classes increasingly became more detached from the other half of the country. Without political action by the government Afghanistan never experienced a period of national integration.

### 5.2.2 Geographic Features

With an arid climate and mountainous geography, Afghanistan's inhabitable areas are limited to foothills and river basins with sufficient water resources. Historically, these physical features contributed to the development of several isolated centers of socio-economic activity with distinct regional identities and somewhat limited contact with each other. The regional organization of contemporary Afghanistan grew out of separate, and sometimes overlapping zones[31], usually controlled by different political powers. In this regard, the international borders of Afghanistan do not reflect cultural or geographical distinctions but are a product of last two centuries' political processes. Thus, natural and historical factors have been a significant

31 Modern Afghanistan is situated at the intersection of the Persian Plateau, the Indus basin- Northern India, and the Central Asian steppes. Despite the cultural and commercial ties among them, few polities in history established control over all, and those that could did not exist for long.

hindrance to the efforts of 20th century rulers to establish a strong central government in Afghanistan.

A major obstacle to geographical integration in Afghanistan has been the Hindu Kush mountain range at the geographical center of the country. Separate socio-economic regions emerged at the foothills of the range, in roughly the four cardinal directions. The economic centers of these regions correspond to the major urban centers of modern Afghanistan. Kabul on the eastern side of Hindu Kush, Kandahar in the south, Herat in the west, and Mazar-i Sharif in the north have historically been gateways for transit across the mountain range. All four economic centers are located within a short distance from international borders, and before the development of a paved road system throughout the country, these centers had stronger economic and cultural ties with the country across the nearest border than with rest of the Afghanistan.

Kabul is located strategically in the east, controlling Khyber Pass, which connects India to the north via Peshawar[32]. The population of Eastern Afghanistan has the highest density and is the most diverse in the country. The Kabul population with its Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, and Turkmen communities reflects this diversity. Kandahar has been Afghanistan's dominant city and regional political center for centuries. It connected the Indus Valley and Sind with Iran, and was contested by political powers from both sides. As the historical center of the Durrani confederations, it is the only major urban center with a Pashtun majority population and Pashto I the dominant language. Herat has historically been a part of Iranian world, and was the major junction that linked China and Central Asia to Persian Plateau. Thanks to its location and its agricultural productivity, Herat was the capital of several empires during the medieval period, and was a center of Persian art and literature. Not surprisingly, Herat's population is predominantly Persian speaking, and has a mixture of Shia and Sunni elements. Mazar-i Sharif replaced the nearby ancient city of Balkh as the main center in northern slopes of Hindu Kush. Both cities had stronger ties with Samarkand and Bukhara in Turkic Central Asia than with South Asia. The population of urban Mazar-i Sharif predominantly speaks Persian and Turkic

[32] Kabul and Peshawar were, respectively, the summer and winter administrative capitals of Afghan rulers until 1834, when Sikhs conquered Peshawar.

languages, and has Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and Turkmen influence. (Gopalakrisnan 1981:45-48; Barfield 2010:46-53)

### 5.2.3 Origins of the Afghan State

The origin of the modern Afghan polity can be traced back to the Durrani dynasty, which ruled Afghanistan from the mid 18th Century to the early 20th Century. The founder of the dynasty, and the Afghan state, Ahmad Shah Durrani, was the commander of the Abdali[33] cavalry regiment within the army of Nader Shah of Iran. Nader's murder was followed by a power struggle among his successors, during which Pashtun tribes asserted their independence from Persian rule. Ahmad Shah was elected shah by a jirga of nine Abdali tribes. As a member of the politically inconsequential Saddozai clan of the small Popalzai sub-tribe, Ahmad may have seemed an unlikely choice to be elected as the head of a large tribal confederation. His election was probably due in part to his proven qualities as a military commander. More importantly, his election enabled the Abdali sub-tribes to unite under a single political authority. The competition among stronger tribes within the confederation would have made it difficult to agree on a leader from amongst them. Ahmad Shah's relatively insignificant line of descent made him a neutral choice. Unlike a powerful tribal leader, he would have to negotiate with strong tribes and be subject to their manipulation throughout his rule. (Ewans 2002:22-23)Therefore, from the beginning, Durrani rule was primarily based on tribal consensus rather than coercive power. Although Ahmad Shah proved to be more capable in asserting his power than his electors expected, the dynamics of political power within the newfound Emirate of Afghanistan was essentially an extension of existing tribal relations.

As 19th century progressed the expansion of the Russian and British Empires from opposite directions turned Central Asia into the epicenter of an imperial conflict. The precarious position of Afghanistan between the colonies of two expansionist powers inevitably embroiled

[33] Abdali is the ancient name for one of the two Pashtun tribal confederations, the other being Ghilzai (after Ahmad Shah, the name Durrani replaced Abdali). Ahmad Shah's ascension to throne marked the end of rival Ghilzai political dominance over Pashtuns and the region. Since then Durrani pashtuns have enjoyed a privileged position within the Afghan social and political structure. Even today, a majority of the members of the Afghan government, including the President, are of Durrani origin.

local politics with international struggles, creating a pattern that continues up until today. Unsurprisingly, the fragmented political structure marked by tribal rivalries provided both imperial powers with countless opportunities to manipulate various Afghan leaders. But the most significant and long-lasting impact of the Great Game period on Afghanistan was the creation of a centralized state. The two wars Afghans fought against British invasions (1839-42, 1878-80) had two important consequences: first, an emerging sense of nationhood was brought about by tribes uniting against the invaders; and second, the Afghan state was reorganization by the occupying British forces and by the rulers who continued reorganization efforts after the British left. The first steps taken towards the establishment of a standing army, a centralized bureaucracy, an efficient tax collection mechanism; and the elimination of feudal redistributive economics were all consequences of the two Anglo-Afghan Wars. Both wars were military victories for the armies of the British East India Company, but their eventual withdrawal proved the near-impossibility of a foreign force maintaining control over Afghanistan.[34] The Second Anglo-Afghan War ended with the Treaty of Gandamak and the rise of Abdur Rahman Khan to Afghan throne. With the treaty, Afghanistan yielded the control of its foreign policy to Britain in exchange for subsidies and protection. Abdur Rahman Khan proved to be a very efficient ruler who managed to create a powerful state apparatus while managing to pursue successful diplomacy that limited foreign interference over his country.

### 5.2.4 Consolidation of State Power

Abdur Rahman Khan, known as the Iron Amir[35], was the first ruler of Afghanistan to effectively pursue a coherent set of policies to transform the political structure by redefining the relationship between the center and tribes. Previous rulers sought to strengthen their position within the existing political setup, but the rules governing the relations between their government

34 While recognizing the crucial role of the Great Game in the formation of modern Afghanistan, a historical analysis of the Great Game is well beyond the scope of this research. For an informative historical account see Hopkirk 1990.

35 Afghan rulers began using the title *Amir*, short for the Islamic title *Amir-ul Mumin* (Commander of the Faithful) in front of their names after Dost Muhammad Khan's victory against the Sikhs at Jamrud in 1837. In 1919 the old title *Shah* (King) was reinstated. On the other hand, the Central Asian title of *Khan* denotes a military leader, and was used by many people of political significance across the region.

and the tribes barely changed throughout 19th century. Unlike previous rulers, Abdur Rahman had a firsthand knowledge of a strong modern state at work, during his decade-long exile in Tashkent in Russian Turkestan. His experience of tsarist rule helped him to successfully navigate the politics of the Great Game and informed his future policies as Amir. Consequently, during his rule continuous attempts were made to increase centralization and consolidate the central government's power over all of Afghanistan. At the start of his reign, the reach of his political power was limited to Kabul and the surrounding regions. Yet his single-minded pursuit of establishing a strong government resulted in the consolidation of the territory under state with a centralized bureaucracy and a standing army. (Magnus and Naby 1998:35-37)

To achieve his goal of concentrating power at the center Abdur Rahman took steps towards restructuring the administrative system of Afghanistan. Instead of following the tradition of allowing autonomous provinces to be ruled by family members of the king, he appointed provincial governors from among his followers. The patrimonial networks within the provinces were not easy to dismantle, and the resistance to the new organization eventually turned into a large-scale revolt led by his cousin Ishaq Khan, the governor of Turkestan. The defeat of Ishaq left Abdur Rahman in complete control over the north and without any potential pretenders. He then furthered his efforts to consolidate power by appointing provincial governors and keeeping his sons at the capital. The governors had extensive leeway in administering the provinces, as long as they collected taxes and sent recruits to Kabul. To further promote the power of governors, the provincial borders established under the new system intentionally cut across traditional tribal boundaries. With control over the communal lands within their provinces and to the power to sell them, governors were able to undermine kinship and clan based traditional economic structures. With the provincial auxiliary units under their command, governors could enforce their decisions and suppress any eclipsed the tribal federations as the primary administrative unit within the country. (Dupree 1973:420; Barfield 2010:149-150)

Abdur Rahman's primary goal was to create a military force to limit tribes' power over the state. In order to do so, he instituted a conscription system called *hasht nafari* (one in eight)[36], which made providing recruits for the army a communal responsibility shared by the whole village. He used annual subsidies provided by the British, totaling 28.5 million rupees

[36] Similar to Iranian *bunichah* system.

throughout his reign, and British arms grants to equip his army with modern weapons. Throughout his reign the government faced more than forty tribal uprisings, but the tribes were unable to form a unified front and Abdur Rahman was able to isolate these revolts and crush them ruthlessly. The Ghilzai, that ruled Afghanistan before the Durrani, was the largest and most powerful tribal confederation with a legitimate claim over the throne. The suppression of the two-year long Ghilzai revolt in 1888 was a major blow to tribal influence and a clear sign of the changing balance of power between tribes and central government. (Ewans 2002:73-74; Barfield 2010:146-149)

Amir Abdur Rahman's legacy was not limited to centralization of state power and the elimination of rivals. During his reign, the Afghan state assumed a new identity that allowed for a broader political base. He advanced the idea of pashtun superiority over other ethic groups, convincing pashtuns they were a part of the governing elite even if they were, in fact, oppressed by it. To increase pashtun power across the country he relocated pashtun tribes to regions with other ethic groups. Ethic nationalism entered the political discourse for the first time during his reign, initiating a change in the conceptualization of state from being a part of tribal system to being above it. Despite his contempt for the *ulama* and his secular personal life, he promoted Islam as an integral part of Afghan national identity. Abdur Rahman Khan was the first Afghan ruler to claim that his rule was not based on the consensus of tribal *jirga* but by divine sanction. The powerful government created by Abdur Rahman became the standard against which all future Afghan rulers would be judged. (Ewans 2002:73; Barfield 2010:155-166)

However, Abdur Rahman's success in centralizing state power did not translate into a social transformation. Afraid of even the slightest foreign influence, he followed an extreme isolationist diplomatic policy. He took no steps towards modernization and prevented western ideas from penetrating the elites. Afghanistan's contact with the outside world was severely limited. However, Abdur Rahman's state building and centralization policies initiated the rise of a new elite in Kabul that had little in common with the rest of the country. Strikingly, the ethnic composition of Abdur Rahman's court and that of government elite in the 1970s was quite similar; the core of power was held by Muhammadzai pashtuns, and other pashtuns and Tajiks, the overwhelming majority from Kabul, were dominant in rest of the state apparatus. (Rubin 1995:90, 92) The constantly widening cultural gap between this small but influential urban elite

and the inhabitants of the countryside and provincial towns became the most defining characteristic of Afghan political structure in 20th century.

The fact that Amir Abdur Rahman died peacefully in his bed – the first Afghan ruler to be able to do so in a century – and that his son Habibullah was able to take the throne without a succession crisis – also for the first time in a hundred years – illustrated the scope of transformation of the centralized state during the last quarter of 19th century. Habibullah was more secure in his position than his father or the previous rulers, which enabled him to introduce new institutions and political ideas to Afghanistan. He founded Afghanistan's first modern school, its first modern hospital, and its first military academy. He reformed criminal laws to make them more secular and allowed new technologies into the country. He declared an amnesty for Afghan intellectuals his father had exiled for promoting western ideas. The most prominent of these intellectuals was the constitutionalist thinker Mahmud Tarzi, who eventually became an important figure in King Amanullah's government and influenced his modernization program considerably.

### 5.2.5 Tribes and Political Structure

Although, tribal confederations included pastoral nomadic elements, most Afghan tribes and especially those with significant political power were settled cultivators. Ethnic identity was a more important criterion of political affinity among tribesmen than nomadism was. Thus, the major distinction was between pashtuns and non-pashtuns. The power of tribal khans was based on their political influence over large numbers of tribesmen. Loosely defined tribes are political unions among communities organized along kinship ties and inhabit the same geographic region and share cultural and linguistic ties. Therefore tribes are essentially political organizations composed of groups of extended families that live together. Tribes form larger confederations only when interacting with the state or other external political forces, else the primary unit of social organization was relatively small; comprised of several families living together. (Tapper 1983:9, 43-45)

In the absence of a centralized state, tribal confederacies were the predominant political organization in Afghanistan for centuries, and political power that ruled over the region was essentially an extension of them. Historically, the primary socio-political divide has not been between tribal and urban populations, but between pashtun tribes and non-pashtun tribes. The emergence of the modern state did not eliminate this distinction, but added another layer of duality to the socio-political structure of Afghanistan: between state and tribe. One cultural manifestation of this duality among Afghan tribesmen is the differentiation between government (*hukumat*) and unrestricted land, or land of rebellion (*yaghistan*) – abstract categories that refer to exercise of governance by the state, implying limits, rules, and restrictions, versus being unrestrained and free from dictates of external authority. The same duality is also expressed spatially in tribal culture by contrasting countryside (*atrap*) to city (*shahr*); the first is the place where whole-men live as equals, while the latter is the domain in which men subjugate each other. (Anderson 1973:125-127)

The reign of Abdur Rahman and the revolt against Amanullah mark two turning points in the power dynamic between the state and tribes. With the substantial military and financial help he received form the British, Abdur Rahman laid the foundations of a consolidated central state and succeeded in limiting tribal power. His reforms made village, instead of tribe or ethnic community, the basic administrative unit, and weakened the influence of tribal aristocracy.

As the central government became more confident of its power over the tribes, its local agents in rural areas became less hesitant to employ oppressive and corrupt practices to extract more revenue from the peasants. The response from tribal and ethnic populations was to create and rely on community-based structures to regulate social interactions and avoid contact with the state as much as possible. (Shahrani 1990:43-46) This pattern of insulating daily community life from state interference has persisted throughout modern history, even as the power of the central government and its demands from the countryside intensified.

### 5.2.6 Modernization Under King Amanullah

King Amanullah was zealous to transform Afghanistan into a modern country and was willing to undertake grand projects to achieve his goal. However, the cost associated with any part of a modernization program was considerably higher than his government's revenue. Following the example set by his father, Abdur Rahman was unwilling to open the country to foreign investment or obtain loans from outside[37]. Moreover, while gaining independence from British control made him very popular among Afghan people, it also meant an end to the annual subsidies his predecessors could count on as a steady source of income[38]. Thus, the only sources of revenue available for the Afghan government were direct taxes and customs duties. In order to increase revenue from direct taxes, King Amanullah initiated two important reforms during his reign; the monetization of land and livestock taxes, and the recognition of private property rights. To increase revenue from customs duties, he raised tariffs, encouraged establishment of trade companies, signed trade agreements, and tried to prevent smuggling and raiding of caravans. All of these measures yielded increased revenue, but their social outcomes eventually led to overthrow of King Amanullah and profoundly affected the economic policies of future Afghan governments.

With Afghanistan's limited arable land, animal herders comprised as large a part of the agricultural class as farmers. Herding practices varied from region to region, ranging from complete nomadism to pastoralism based in settled villages, but all herders were expected to give a portion of their livestock to Afghan rulers or governors as tax. As can be expected, settled communities were much easier to tax than nomadic ones, but every year the government would receive a substantial number of animals and sell or consume. Incidentally, the primary Afghan export was the sought-after pelts of *karakul* sheep.

Land relations were regulated on the basis of a combination of religious (*shari'a*) and customary laws. In theory, this meant that all lands within King Amanullah's domain belonged

[37] Even if he was willing the poor conditions of economic infrastructure would have discouraged foreign investors and made it impossible to receive significant amount of capital.

[38] Afghanistan did receive foreign aid during his reign, particularly from Soviet Union, Germany, France, and Turkey but most it was as military equipment or expertise.

to the ruler, and all others had only occupancy rights and were obliged to pay taxes. But in practice, landlords were able to exercise all the privileges of actual land ownership, including inheriting, selling, or renting their land to tenants. Some tribal lands and royal grants to individuals (*jagirs*) were not taxed in exchange for military services rendered by the occupants. Lands considered as communal were in joint occupation of the village, clan, or tribe. In some villages these lands were communally cultivated or divided into individual plots in other places. Since they were used for subsistence the government collected very little or no taxes on them. Finally, religious endowments (*wakfs*) were treated as a special case and not considered as a part of ruler's nominal possession.

At the time of Afghanistan's independence in 1919, most taxes collected were in-kind, usually grain or live animals that were stored in government granaries stables across the country until they were sold or used. Taxes were based on rough harvest estimates and traditional practices. This lack of precision and standardization in taxation benefited tribal *khans* who, as the primary tax collectors, were able to usurp a portion of revenues. Therefore, monetizing direct taxes would result both in increased tax revenue and the elimination of an important privilege of the tribal aristocracy. In 1920, the government began surveying agricultural lands across the country to assess their value so taxes could be collected from farmers and herdsmen as cash. The new assessment resulted in a substantial increase of their taxes. Taxes paid on lands with good yield increased from 5 *afghanis* per *jerib*[39] in 1919 to 20 *afghanis* per *jerib* in 1929. Within the same period, the livestock taxes increased from 0.1 *afghani* to 0.5 *afghani* per sheep, and increased from 0.5 *afghani* to 2 *afghani* per horse. (Guha 1967:175) Cultivators and herders had to find ways to market their goods in order to raise enough money for the increased taxes. This was a significant problem since barter economy was the dominant form of exchange in most areas of the country, accounting for more than 60 percent of total GNP. (Guha 1967:170-174; Chopra 1998:52-53)

The recognition of private property was seen as a necessary step towards creating a modern economic system. With a decree in 1923, the government began auctioning crown lands and granting full property rights to purchasers. With the same decree, all government lands

[39] Afghan *jerib* was equal to 0.49 acres, whereas Iranian *jerib* was 2.47 acres or 5 Afghan *jeribs*. However, as there was no standardization actual size of a *jerib* varied among different regions of the country.

previously granted to individuals were converted into the private property of their holders, thus legally recognizing the existing practice. This was a welcome development for regular landowners. But for the landowning tribal *khans*, who received the lands as grants along with some subsidies in return for military service, this meant an end to the privileged relations they had with the government as they would have to pay taxes as regular landowners. However, the most significant consequence of registration of titles was the dispossession of small farmers who were unable to claim ownership over communal lands against powerful landowners who registered these lands under their names. Furthermore, the monetization and increase of taxes pushed farmers in areas with barter economies to borrow money from creditors. The legal recognition of property rights meant that peasants could use their land as collateral, and, consequently, that creditors could confiscate land to settle debt. As a result, tenancy – once uncommon – became an increasingly widespread practice across the country. (Gregorian 1969:252-254; Rubin 1995:54-55)

The sale of crown lands and the dispossession of small farmers resulted in the growth of a landowning class with growing property holdings. Customary law and traditional sanctions regarding land relations lost their relevance against legal titles, leaving peasants without much protection against large landowners. Increased taxes and loss of land impoverished peasants and led to increasing discontent with the government. Tribal *khans*, who lost their privileges, shared this discontent. Failing to understand the growing tension in the countryside, King Amanullah continuously increased direct taxes throughout his reign in order to finance development projects. Annual government revenue increased from 30 million rupees in 1921 to 45 million Afghanis[40] in 1926, 30 million of which was derived from direct taxes on land and livestock. (Guha 1967:173; Gregorian 1969:254)

Customs duties were the second largest source of income for the government. To assist the growth of a domestic merchant class, government monopolies over the export of some goods – most importantly, the karakul pelts – were abolished. In order to introduce modern business practices the government encouraged the creation of a number of joint-stock companies locally

[40] The afghani was introduced by Amanullah in 1923 and replaced the Kabuli rupee as the national currency. 10 afghanis were worth 11 Kabuli rupees (or 1 rupee equaled 0.91 afghani). In 1936, the exchange rate was 35 afghanis to 1 U.S. dollar. (see Gregorian 1969 appendix B for a detailed explanation of various currencies used in 19th and early 20th century Afghanistan)

known as *shirkats*[41]. Preferential treatment was given to these companies to help them compete with foreign merchants. Some were granted monopolies and protected by the government. The king and others in his circles were shareholders of some of these companies. However, most local traders did not take part in these organizations and their ownership remained limited to a small circle of westernized elites. Lacking the support of substantial portion of the Afghan merchant class, the *shirkats* failed to end foreign dominance over commerce and all of them were liquidated after the end of Amanullah's reign without creating a lasting legacy. (Guha 1967:178)

Raising taxes over imported goods was an easy way for the government to increase revenue, and the protection it might provide to local producers was an extra benefit. All imports were divided into three categories; religious and religion related items were duty free, non-luxury items were taxed at varying levels, and luxury goods[42] from Europe were subject to a 100 percent duty. Strict regulations were passed to ensure the collection of these duties and prevent corruption among customs officials. On the other hand, duties on exports were reduced to a 5 percent *ad valorem* tax. (Gregorian 1969:253) Increased prices led to some complaints from the urban classes, who were the only consumers of most imported items, but the economic impact was not substantial.

Another obstacle to raising trade revenue was the smuggling and raiding of caravans by border tribes. Throughout Amanuallah's reign the army continuously campaigned against smugglers and roads were improved to provide better security to caravans. But the geographic features of the mountain ranges and the experience of tribal forces made it impossible to prevent smuggling completely. Whatever benefit the government gained from these campaigns was negated by the increasing hostility of border tribes against the regime.

King Amanullah's ambitious modernization program was not carried out as systematic or planned endeavor, but more as an expression of his impulsive character. The rebellion of 1929 has been interpreted as a reaction to his westernizing reforms, however, the impact of these reforms were limited to a tiny section of Afghan society and most peasants were not even aware of them. However, the impact of the governance and economic policies he instituted to fund

[41] The same word, derived from Arabic root sh-r-k meaning sharing, partnering, is also used in Turkish for business companies.

these urban reforms was widely felt. Having grown up comfortably in the palace as the son of a ruler, Amanullah was quite out of touch with the experience of his subjects. It was because of this disconnect that he did not seem to understand the impact that taxation and corrupt government officials had on the lives of peasants. He was also unaware of the level of resentment of the rural-tribal aristocracy caused by elimination of government subsidies and political privileges. It was ruthless centralization of power at the expense of countryside's economic resources that turned a local uprising into a major rebellion that cost him the throne.

The Amanullah regime ended with several tribal groups revolting against his rule. The ill-trained Afghan army was no match to tribal forces and it was unable to fight several uprisings simultaneously. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation, a Tajik bandit Habibullah Kalakani[43] managed to take over Kabul with his forces and had himself crowned as king of Afghanistan under the name Amir Habibullah II. Losing the throne to a Tajik was a major blow to all pashtuns, who were used to consider themselves as the ruling elite of the country. In response pashtun tribes united behind Nadir Khan, the Afghan ambassador to France and respected general. With pashtuns flocking to join his army Nadir Khan easily captured Kabul and had Habibullah executed, nine months after he declared himself king. Nadir Shah was crowned as king by a tribal *jirga* and started the Musahiban Dynasty that would rule Afghanistan until 1973.

The rebellion that ended King Amanuallah's reign reversed the political dynamics between state and the tribes. The events of 1929 struck a major blow to future centralization efforts and demonstrated the weakness of Kabul against simultaneous attacks by tribal forces. The Musahiban policies were influenced by the debt it owed to the pashtun tribes that provided them with levies. The dynasty acknowledged their support by exempting them from taxation and conscription at the same time recognizing the autonomy of their tribal institutions. (Newell 1986:112-113)

[43] Habibullah's father delivered water to people's houses, which led to Habibullah disparagingly being referred to as Bacha-i Saqao; water carrier's son. Nobody referred to him as Amir Habibullah after his death, the nickname is used present him as a pretender and not a real monarch.

### 5.2.7 Musahiban Era Financial Policies

The Musahiban family ascended to power in 1930 within a context of tribal resurgence and breakdown of state control over most of the country. A *Loya Jirga* (grand assembly) of major tribal khans elected Mohammad Nadir as king, signifying that the continuation of his rule was largely contingent upon the consent of tribes. Consequently, during the next two decades, the governments of Nadir and Zahir Shahs backtracked on many policies of King Amanullah to placate the tribes and the ulama. Soon after becoming king, Nadir Shah vowed, with a public declaration, to bring Afghanistan back into the mainstream of Hanaf'i Sharia. Religious leaders assumed stronger power and their influence over political decisions increased. Social reforms, particularly those affecting women were reversed. Women were obliged to wear a *chadri* (burka) in public once again and girls sent abroad for education were called back. The army remained relatively weak and the government relied on tribal levies as the main source of military power. (Dupree 1968:458-461)

With King Amanullah having been overthrown by rural forces, the Musahiban family was well aware that their rule over Afghanistan would not be secure unless they compromised with rural power holders. Thus, Musahiban governments followed policies that aimed at limiting their reliance on rural areas as much as possible. They decreased direct taxes on rural sectors; the proportion of revenue derived from rural sectors declined continuously throughout their rule. By 1931 only a third of total revenue was derived from direct taxes on land and livestock. Direct land and livestock taxes dropped to 18% of government revenue by 1952, and by the end of monarchy in 1973, direct taxes accounted for merely 1% of revenue. (Rubin 1995:60-61) This decrease is even more dramatic considering the fact that cultivated lands grew from an estimated 1 million hectares in mid 1920's to 4 million hectares in 1961. (Guha 1964:429) With its limited engagement with the rural sector, the state's role within whole Afghan economy remained small. Government revenue was under 7 percent of country's GNP throughout the period from 1935 to 1972, and dropped as low as 2 percent in the years following World War II. (Rubin 1995:63)

To compensate for the loss of revenue, Musahiban governments directed most of their economic policies at increasing the volume of exports and cultivating growth of the merchant class. Collecting indirect taxes on export items were much easier and did not necessitate a large

coercive apparatus or maintenance of a stable presence across the country. Export taxes were collected from joint-stock companies operating under the sponsorship of Bank-i Milli (National Bank), which was founded in 1932 by the prominent Afghan merchant Abdul Majid Zabuli with 35 million afghanis in capital. Although it was a private bank, the government granted it extensive powers over the economy and currency. It provided capital to new enterprises and supported the fledgling Afghan merchant class. As a result of government policies that encouraged and supported the growth of the export based economy, the proportion of corporate taxes and duties on exports in government revenue reached 13 and 40 percent respectively in 1952. In 1973 indirect taxes on foreign trade alone accounted for 67 percent of total government revenue. (Fry 1974:155-156, 172-173; Rubin 1995:60-61)

### 5.2.8 The Rentier State

Since the early days of its emergence as a country Afghanistan has received foreign aid under various names and guises. The primary reason behind external powers' sustained transfer of resources to Afghanistan had been, and still is, the strategic value of Afghanistan within the context of two imperial conflicts: The Great Game in the 19th Century, and the Cold War in the second half of the 20th Century[44]. In both cases Afghanistan functioned as a buffer state between empires or their allies. Afghan rulers were provided with grants, aids, and subsidies by imperial powers in an attempt to prevent the country from being completely absorbed into their rivals' sphere of influence. The resources received from external sources played an important role in the development of state and shaped its relations with society in Afghanistan, probably more than any other recipient of foreign aid.

Beginning in 1839, after The Second Anglo-Afghan War, Great Britain agreed to pay annual subsidies complemented with periodic donations of military supplies to Afghan amirs. During the next 80 years these subsidies were the only reliable source of revenue for the rulers. The subsidies rose from 600,000 Indian rupees in 1850s to 2,000,000 rupees in 1910, which constituted more than 20 percent of government's income (Bossin 2004:76). The subsidies were

[44] Note that U.S. "War on Terror" is the third global conflict in which Afghanistan plays a strategically important role and receives large sums of foreign aid.

terminated in the wake of Afghanistan's independence in 1919, and King Amanullah rejected later offers by Britain to resume subsidies.

Afghanistan's reliance on foreign aid reached its lowest point during the interwar years. Prime Minister Hashim Khan rejected offers of support from both Britain and the Soviet Union. First, he was wary of both powers' expanding their control over Afghanistan. Second, a new group of donors without overt colonial aims emerged; Germany, Italy, and Japan became Afghanistan's new external benefactors. Foreign aid was not limited to monetary grants: German scientific missions carried out studies to explore mineral resources, Lufthansa established a regular service between Kabul and Berlin, German government built Afghanistan's first radio tower, the Siemens Company opened an office in Afghanistan and established local ties, and Afghan students were accepted into German and Japanese universities. Germans had become the most influential foreign group in Kabul by the eve of World War II.[45] (Dupree 1973:478-798; Crews 2015:149, 164-165)

The foundation of Pakistan immediately put Afghanistan into a conflict with its new neighbor. The Pashtun elites of Afghanistan expected that Pashtuns across the border would be given a choice between being a part of Pakistan and establishing an independent Pashtunistan that would eventually be integrated into Afghanistan. Resentment over the issue resulted in a sour relationship between two neighbors from the beginning, and pushed Afghan rulers to seek ways to reduce their dependence on Karachi as Afghanistan's main international trade outlet. Since Soviet Central Asia was the only other option for a trade corridor, Afghan Soviet relations began to warm in 1950's. The United States, not wanting to let Afghanistan become a satellite state of USSR, decided to provide credit and aid for development, and two super-powers began competing over supplying Afghanistan with resources.

During the three decades following 1950, Afghanistan became a rentier state, increasingly dependent on foreign credit and assistance to pursue development projects. Simultaneously, the Afghan state's laissez faire approach to economic development was abandoned for an etatist approach to development. Throughout this period, an average of 40

[45] This flirtation with Nazi Germany introduced some racist ideas into Afghan mainstream culture. Studies by German experts convinced many urban Afghans that their origins were Aryan, as opposed to other peoples of South and Central Asia.

percent of government revenue came from abroad, reaching a peak in 1973, when two thirds of government revenue was from grants and other aid from external donors. (Fry 1974:158-160; Rubin 1995:65) The amount of aid flowing into Afghanistan was unprecedented, to the point that, in 1956, the government announced that it was not interested in loans anymore as grants covered all developmental expenses. (Bossin 2004:79) Although the government quickly backtracked and resumed accepting loans, the Afghan government continued to be showered with foreign aid. Between 1949 and 1972 American loans and aid totaled 397 million dollars, and the Soviet Union provided 516 million dollars in loans and aid. The Afghan government received an additional 100 million dollars in military aid from Soviet Union during the period. (Emadi 1990:57)

Most foreign aid and loans were spent on large development projects. The Soviet Union in the north, and the United States in the south of Afghanistan constructed roads, dams, electric plants, manufactories, mines, airports, hospitals, and schools. Afghanistan became a neutral arena for both super powers to attempt to showcase the superiority of their system with modernization projects. Improving transportation and communication infrastructure accounted for the biggest share in development expenditure: the Soviet Union built a 680 kilometer modern highway that connected their border to Heart and Kabul, while the U.S. connected the southern border with Pakistan to Kandahar and Kabul with a 570 kilometer highway. Between them, the two superpowers built 1,900 kilometers of paved highways and virtually created the modern transportation network of Afghanistan. Dams, irrigation systems, and hydroelectric plants were built on major rivers: the American company Morrison-Knudsen worked on Helmand Valley Project in the south, while dams over the Kabul and Oxus Rivers were built with Soviet technical assistance. The Soviet Union built extraction plants and pipelines to deliver Afghan natural gas to international markets; the U.S built an international airport at Kandahar. American companies enlarged Kabul University's campus, while Soviet engineers built Kabul Polytechnic Institute.[46] The U.S. press referred to the competition between superpowers to develop Afghanistan as a "strange kind of Cold War, fought with money and technicians instead of spies and bombs" and

[46] For an extensive list of development projects constructed by Soviet, American, and German assistance see Dupree 1973, Emadi 1990, and Bossin 2005, Robinson and Dixon 2013

"show window for competitive coexistence"[47] (Newell 1969:168-171; Ewans:112-116; Robinson and Dixon 2013:47-80)

The development of the new road network radically improved connections between Kabul and the provinces and increased state's capacity to extend it control. The country's one half was no longer cut off from the other half during winter months thanks to the Soviet built Salang Tunnel cutting across Hindu Kush. Consequently, a national market began to emerge in late 1960's, goods were transported in increasing quantities and the prices of wheat, rice and meat were equalized in north and south. (Rubin 1995:66)

Despite the resources spent on them, the impact of these projects on Afghan society was somewhat limited and far from resulting in a major transformation. Most development projects (airports, manufactories, universities) benefited only a small section of the population living in urban areas, particularly in Kabul. Provinces were still connected to each other by dirt roads in ill repair. It still took nine to ten hours to reach Kunduz from Mazar-i Sharif, a distance of only 180 kilometers. (Griffiths 1967:68-69)

Moreover, a significant portion of the foreign aid was wasted on grand projects that failed due to poor planning. As showcase of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, the Helmand Valley Project was to irrigate 900,000 acres of land and help settle hundreds of thousands Pashtun nomads. Grossly over budget, the project ended up costing 100 million dollars in total, only half of it provided by the U.S. Salinization and water logging destroyed the quality of soil by in large areas[48]. The river was contaminated, leaving towns that rely on it without water. Ultimately, only 13,000 people were settled in the Helmand Valley as a result of the project. (Lenczowski 1962:257; Cullather 2002)

The Musahiban government used the distribution of foreign aid as an instrument to promote Pashtun nationalism and dominance over the country. Most development projects – like the ambitious agricultural irrigation schemes in Helmand, Khost, and Nangarhar – were located

[47] Quotes are from U.S. News and World Report (November, 1957) and The Atlantic (October, 1962) respectively. Both are cited in Cullather 2002.

[48] Ironically the project did not transform Afghanistan into a U.S. ally but ended up providing Taliban with significant resources to fight against NATO forces, as one crop that thrives under the soil conditions it created was poppy.

in Pashtun provinces, especially the ones with highest potential impact on the economic conditions of the local population. Even in provinces dominated by minority ethic groups, investments were concentrated in areas with Pashtun settler populations that dated back to government policies of relocating Pashtun tribes, such as the cotton mills in Kunduz and along the Oxus River. (Griffith 1967:68; Newell 1986:112-113)

### 5.2.9 Development of Urbanization and Urbanism

Similar to its neighboring countries before modernization, Afghanistan was predominantly a rural country with a subsistence-based agricultural economy. However, contrary to its neighbors' dramatic political changes in 20th Century, Afghanistan's socio-economic character remained unchanged. As no census of the country was taken, population estimates range between 12 and 16 million in 1960's. Regardless of absence of census data, it can is fairly certain that the urban population never exceeded 10 percent of the whole. (Wilber 1962:33-34; Smith et. al. 1973:60-61)

In comparison to the cities of neighboring countries, Afghans cities were relatively small. Even in late 1960's, when investment in development and modernization reached its height, only five settlements were large enough to be categorized as cities. The only city government that had administered a census was Kabul, which had a population of 289,000 in 1965.[49] (Jung 1974:3) The 1960s population estimates for the other cities were much smaller: Qandahar 115,000; Heart 85,000; Mazar-i Sharif 50,000; and Kunduz 40,000. Despite the development of new neighborhoods in all of these cities, none had indoor plumbing or sewer systems. (Dupree 1973:161)

Historically, the dominant form of socio-economic activity in Afghanistan has been pastoralist tribalism. Within this context, the existence of cities has primarily been an outcome of trade. The major cities of Afghanistan were regional transit nodes of a caravan-based trade

[49]Most sources use the estimate of Kabul's population as 435,000, based on the U.N. directed Greater Kabul census in 1965, but this total figure includes the population of various surrounding villages that Soviet experts defined in their 25-year plan for the city as a part of "Greater Kabul." The figure I use -289,000- is from the same census but only including the population of the city proper. (Dupree 1973:161, Jung 1974:6)

network that stretched across Asia. The population of larger cities like Kabul or Kandahar enabled them to also become moderate consumer markets. Urban populations were generally not an integral part of the larger pastoralist socio-economic structure, which was able to function wholly in the absence of any cities, but an appendage to it that provided some specialized services. The level of interaction between tribal areas and cities did not change much, despite rulers' increasing reliance on settled populations for a variety of specialized services and administrative functions. Without any significant change in material conditions, the urban-rural divide endured as a defining feature of Afghan social structure throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

Upon their ascension to power, most tribal dynasties change the location of their capitals from the location of their traditional base of power to a location more central to the areas in which their new subjects live. The Durrani dynasty was no exception, as they moved from Kandahar to Kabul shortly after the establishment of Afghan Kingdom. Shortly after consolidating their power the Durrani elite acquired an urban outlook. As the modern Afghan state began to take shape in the late 19th century, Kabul was a diverse city of some 100 thousand residents, featuring bazaars, palaces, mosques, and a damaged – yet still impressive – Bala Hisar fortress.

The buildings constructed under Abdur Rahman and Habibullah were designed in an Indian colonial style compatible with the existing built environment. It was during Amanullah's reign that the appearance of Kabul changed significantly, as the royal family sponsored a construction boom and had western architects design new villas, palaces, and government offices. Most impressive of the new buildings was a summer resort built at Paghman, eighteen miles away from Kabul, with residences, a cinema, a racetrack, and a giant victory arch. The lack of a unified sense of design resulted in the construction of an eclectic collection of buildings with Russian, German, Italian, and French styles. Foreign architects were hired to design a completely new city, Dar-ul Aman(House of Peace), five miles north of Kabul – partly as a respite from the frequent flooding in Kabul, but mostly because of the King's obsession with modernization. (Fletcher 1965:207-208; Crew 2015:148)

As Kabul grew, new neighborhoods sprang up with distinct qualities. For example, in 1930's the New City (Shahr-i Nau) district was built. Its with buildings were designed by

western architects, and the district attracted expatriates, foreign embassies, and westernized Afghan elites. In the 1960s prefabricated apartment units modeled after Soviet housing projects were constructed. (Crews 2015:194) Western cultural influences also began to be felt more acutely in different spheres of urban life. In the 1930s, theater companies with all-male casts began staging plays with patriotic and historical themes. Afghanistan's first permanent theater was built in 1947 in Kabul. A decade later Western and Soviet cinema grew in popularity among urban Afghans, and Kabul had 4 movie theaters by the late 1960s. (Crews 2015:196-198) As cities' contact with the outside world intensified the divergence between urban and rural spheres of Afghanistan grew consequently, to the point that populations of each sphere treated the other side as aliens and not compatriots.

### 5.2.10 Political Core and the Periphery

The consequent economic policies of the Musahiban period (1930-1973) resulted in a particularly unusual dynamic between the state and tribes. All previous Afghan rulers either had to confront tribal power to assert state authority or gain tribal support to defend against invading forces. However, the Musahiban government did not depend on tribal *khans* for revenue, nor did it need to mobilize them since no immediate external threat existed. Instead, the regime limited its intervention in rural areas to a bare minimum, practically leaving most of the country to its own devices to maintain social and political order. As the greatest beneficiaries of this policy tribal-rural aristocracy, landlords became the most dependable allies of the government.

Throughout the four decades of Musahiban dynasty, as the government took more steps towards modernizing urban Afghanistan, the differences between urban and rural sections of society gradually became impossible to reconcile. Probably the most visible aspect of the disparity between Kabul and the countryside concerned the participation of women in the public life. Encouraged by the royal family, the number of women enrolled in secondary education constantly grew beginning in the1930s. In Kabul alone, women were employed in government offices and appeared in public without veils; neither of which was the case in provincial towns, let alone rural areas.. (Magnus and Naby 1998:48-49)  Throughout its existence, the Musahiban

state faced a conundrum: its power was based on the support of a conservative rural aristocracy, but its modernization policies increased the expectations and demands of the urban classes. Especially the westernized urban youth became the main force of militant opposition against the regime after 1950s. The Afghan monarchy created a modern state, whose actual power was limited to cities and towns only, while facing its fiercest opposition from a small but influential urban elite.

During the1960s and 1970s the state apparatus was highly unified and centralized. The administrative structure was streamlined, and its reach extended over all regions of the country. Government authority was represented through a hierarchical organization with the Ministry of Interior at Kabul at the top, above provincial level (*wilayat*), district level (*wuluswali*), and, finally subdistrict level (*alaqadari*) bureaucracies. But the bureaucratic presence of the state did not translate into its ability to penetrate society at the local level. Outside of urban areas, the country was practically ruled by a traditional non-state system of governance[50]. Acknowledging (though not explicitly) this reality, the central government limited its goals to encapsulating local political structures in order to prevent them from causing trouble; it did not attempt to replace or transform them. In rural regions, the word government (*hukumat*) was usually understood to mean, literally, government buildings and infrastructure alone. After leaving the road government ceased to exist as a political force. (Barfield 1984:139)

Rural communities relied on a social order of local customs, relations, hierarchies, and traditional institutions to manage their affairs and settle their disputes. Matters would be resolved through arbitration by traditional figures of authority: landowners (*khans*), respected elders (*rishsafid*), and religious figures (*mullah*). Their power was informal but based on their ability to craft decisions that would be sensitive to local dynamics and meet the approval of the community. Involving government officials or transferring disputes to official courts was avoided since the system was inefficient and almost certainly involved the payment of bribes. Certain spheres of life – such as marriages and tribal conflicts – were considered completely out of the government domain and handled by the customary order. Even in areas, where government involvement was considered to be somewhat legitimate, (e.g matters of irrigation

[50] The effectiveness and resilience of local structures of governance is best illustrated by their ability to maintain social order for decades after the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the collapse of central government institutions.

and the organization of *bazaars*) traditional authorities did the actual managing, with state interference kept at the bare minimum. (Centlivres 2013:121-124)

The connection between local administration and villages was facilitated by official liaisons (an *arbab* or *malik*, depending on the region) who were literate men with connections outside the villages and a degree of experience in dealing with government. Ideally, the people holding these positions were chosen by the villagers, but it was as common for the local administrators to appoint someone to these roles without consulting the community. Although the local government might regard *arbabs* or *maliks* community leaders, the positions did not have inherent power within the traditional structure other than providing the link to the state. Unless the *arbab* or *malik* also occupied a traditional position of authority, he could be ignored when he was not acting as an intermediary. (Barfield 1984, 2013)

Government officials (*mamurin*) were not considered an integral part of social structure in small towns and rural areas. They were outsiders who were there only temporarily, soon to be replaced by other outsiders. They represented the state's power to tax, coerce, punish, and draft the local population, and were often disliked, mistrusted, and feared by locals. For the peasants, every element of government officials' disposition – from their western outfits to their preference of sitting on chairs – emphasized the stark contrast between their worlds. For the non-pashtun peasants the separation was felt even more deeply, as the government officials were members of an oppressive majority that did not speak their language or share their culture.

**Conclusion**

The rule of Amir Abdurrahman Khan marked the emergence of a centralized state in Afghanistan. From late 19$^{th}$ century to the end of 1920s, Kabul government gradually increased its power and control over the tribes, while taking steps towards modernization of the country. Major cities of Afghanistan, Kabul especially, had become the epicenter of both processes, from where political and social transformation emanated to the rural areas. In this regard, the rebellion that overthrew King Amanullah was primarily a reaction to the increasing centralization and consolidation of political power at the hands of a relatively urbanized ruling class. The success of

the rebellion had a profound impact on the future of Afghanistan by crippling the urban-based central government's capacity to expand its influence over the rest of the country.

Cities in Afghanistan continued to function as focal points of modernization and social transformation throughout the 20th century, but they also became virtual containers for these processes. The central government's unwillingness to engage the tribes and the hands-off approach towards governing the countryside, enabled by revenues from foreign aid, reinforced the isolation of urban centers and deepened the disconnect between urban and rural Afghanistan.

## 5.3 Discussion

The public investment in developing the transportation network in Iran increased the centrality of Tehran within the country. The geographic orientation of Trans-Iranian Railway and its bypassing of other major cities resulted in nearly all imports arriving at Tehran first, and further secured its primacy as Iran's economic center. The growing bureaucracy and the centralization of all elements of administration forced Iranians from across the country to travel to the capital for even the simplest bureaucratic procedure. As much as it was a burden for the citizens, as more people visited Tehran its symbolic position as the center of Iran was solidified. At the beginning of the 20th century, Tabriz was comparable to Tehran in terms of its economic and cultural influence, and by 1940 comparing the two in terms of their influence would have been considered absurd.

The shape and features of Afghanistan's territory makes it extremely hard to establish centrality of any city, however, the negative impact of geography was compounded by the lack of any systematic effort on the part of state. The connections between Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat was seasonal up until the 1960s; for half of each year Afghan territory was a assemblage of isolated centers with no connection to each other. The effective disengagement of the central government from the countryside, leaving its control to tribes, made territorial integration nearly impossible. The fact that every major city had firm historical connections to neighboring countries' border regions further accentuated the fragmented structure of Afghanistan. Without any effective exercise of state power over the territory, Afghan cities functioned as sources of

centrifugal force; Kabul was reduced to being the largest city and the center of government but had little or no territorial effect.

Reza Shah's military subjugation of tribes in Iran was followed by policies that disrupted the social and economic bases of tribalism. Tribal lands were converted into private property and most of it ended up in the hands of affluent residents and corrupt government officers living in nearby towns. By then the remaining members of tribal aristocracy had already been completely urbanized and acted as absentee landlords. The implementation of property rights over tribal lands meant that any dispute over them had to be resolved in courts, leaving the tribal population with no option but to rely on city dwellers to deal with the judicial bureaucracy. High-ranking military officers were appointed to the position of *khan*, and resided in provincial urban centers, obliging tribesmen to go to the cities to interact with the government. The enforcement of census and conscription on tribal populations further entangled them with the bureaucratic apparatus, which meant more visits to urban centers and an increased reliance on city people. Within a relatively short period of time, provincial towns and cities began to occupy an important part of the lives of the tribal population; for the first time in Iran's history, towns and cities bordering tribal areas extended their economic, symbolic, and political influence over the region, instead of functioning at the mercy of tribes. The Pahlavi regime successfully used its bureaucratic apparatus to ensure the supremacy of urban Iran over tribal lands, and consequently expanded its effective territory to encompass most of its actual territory.

The central government in Afghanistan interacted with the tribes in the exact opposite manner. Instead trying to expand urban influence over tribal territory, the Afghan state entrenched itself in urban areas and allowed tribes to expand their control over the territory. This was a conscious political decision to prevent any conflict with tribes and to secure their support. However, aside from deepening the cleavage between urban and rural areas, this policy left the state in a precarious position vis-à-vis society; it encouraged the modernization of cities, and the consequent emergence of an urban population with high expectations, while leaning on a conservative rural aristocracy to secure its rule. Eventually, the fall of Afghan monarchy was not caused by the tribes but by the unmet expectations of the westernized urban youth.

Throughout Reza Shah's reign Iranian cities became focal points of social and political transformation. Tehran's direct control over and investment in urban centers produced an ever-

growing modern urban middle class, which not only provided a strong political base for the regime but also had a transformative influence over the rest of the country. Within the span of four decades Iranian political geography became irreversibly centered on cities as opposed to the tribal pastures surrounding them. On the other hand, cities in Afghanistan ended up as tiny oases of state power and modernization within a landscape that essentially remained as it was in the previous century. The economic and territorial policies of the Afghan government confined its influence to a few urban centers that were not even firmly connected to each other.

# CHAPTER 6: TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

## Introduction

In this chapter I will present an account of the development of modern states in Turkey and Pakistan. Although, there is no temporal overlap between emergence of modern Turkey and establishment of Pakistan as an independent nation, there are some striking parallels between the issues that the nascent governments of each country had to tackle at the early period of their respective developments.

The population makeup of both countries was a product of large-scale demographic movements that took place within short periods of time. The waves of immigration following the collapse of Ottoman Empires and the partition of British Raj left Turkey and Pakistan with predominantly Muslim populations with diverse ethnic backgrounds. Thus, rulers of each country had to devise policies and strategies aimed at creation of a national identity. Another major issue that governments of Turkey and Pakistan had to address was regional inequalities in economic development. Most of the wealth and manufacture in Turkey was concentrated in Istanbul and the region surrounding it. On the other hand few years after its independence most of Pakistan's industry and capital was based in or around Karachi. Meanwhile other parts of both countries were lacking in any significant investment.

The modern state in Turkey became a strong nation state with great symbolic power over Turkish society. Whereas, the state in Pakistan ended up with extensive despotic power and a strong military, it failed at creating a unifying national identity. The secession of Bangladesh, 1970s uprisings in Baluchistan and 1980s violent urban conflicts in Sindh all illustrate pervasiveness of ethnic identities as the primary source of political mobilization and disunity among ethnic groups within Pakistan.

## 6.1 Turkey

### 6.1.1 Historical Background

The history of modern nation state in Turkey begins with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 that ended the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and reinstated the constitution he abolished in 1878. Throughout his 40 plus years on the throne, Abdul Hamid had established an authoritarian absolute monarchy that repressed any form of opposition. The Young Turk movement emerged under these circumstances and was mainly composed of junior army officers and members of civil bureaucracy, who were heavily influenced by western ideas. The movement was structured around the clandestine organization Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which played the key role in the revolution. The reinstating of the Ottoman constitution initiated a short-lived era of political liberation under a constitutional monarchy.

Ottoman defeat and the loss of Edirne[51] to Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars served as the pretext of a CUP coup d'état in 1913 that ended the multi-party politics. After that the empire was ruled by a dictatorial triumvirate comprised of leading CUP figures: Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pashas. The CUP government had Ottoman Empire join World War I on the side of central powers. By the end of the country was devastated and the government surrendered in 1918. The humiliating Treaty of Sevres that ended hostilities also effectively ended Ottoman sovereignty. According to it, Ottoman Empire was to disband its armies, close the national assemby, and allow the allies to occupy any part of its remaining territory if they decide it necessary for maintaining order. While Sultan Mehmed VI kept his throne, the capital was under military control of the allies and Greek, French, and Italian forces occupied large parts of Anatolia. As a response, civilian cadres of CUP, and active military officers that refused to disband their forces organized a resistance movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

Between 1919 and 1922 the nationalist movement reconstituted the national assembly and formed an independent government in Ankara, while fighting against Greek forces and

[51] Edirne (Adrianopolis) was the first capital of the empire in Europe and symbolized the beginning of Ottoman expansion in Europe. Therefore its loss was a crushing blow, signifying a complete retreat from Europe after 500 years. Soon after taking power Enver Pasha took advantage of Bulgaria's II. Balkan War and recaptured the city. which greatly increased his prestige in the eyes of Ottoman public.

insurgents. The Greco-Turkish War –Independence War in Turkish– ended in late summer of 1922 with Greek forces' complete withdrawal from Anatolia. The victory against Greece was followed by the start of a new round of peace talks between Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and the Ankara government. With the resulting Treaty of Lausanne Turkey was recognized as the sovereign successor state of the Ottoman Empire and maintained the territories it controlled at the end of World War I.

Within four months of the signing of the treaty, and to the surprise of many, Ankara government abolished the sultanate and adopted a republican system. Shortly after that the nascent Republic of Turkey formally moved its capital from Istanbul to Ankara and within a couple of months abolished the institution of caliphate: the last vestige of imperial political identity. What followed was the undertaking of a series of radical reforms in virtually every sphere of social structure: government, law, politics, religion, education, language, culture, social norms, and economics. The republican regime and the reforms of the era were the culmination of radical reformist politics that originated with Young Turk movement in the late 19$^{th}$ century. Although some particulars of the underlining ideology had changed, the primary objective of the movement remained the same: modernization of the nation; so did the preferred instrument of realizing this objective: a strong state with a centralized bureaucracy.

### 6.1.2 Economic Conditions in the Early Republican Era

Immediately after the end of Turkish-Greek War, the First Turkish Economic Congress was convened in Izmir for the purpose of determining the economic policies of the new government. In February 1923, more than 1,100 delegates representing four different interest groups – farmers, merchants, industrialists, and workers – assembled to voice their opinions and priorities. The delegates formed four workgroups to represent each of these economic groups in the Congress. These workgroups prepared reports on the needs of each sector. Eventually, these reports were presented to the general assembly of the Congress.

The agriculturalists demanded increased security measures against banditry in the countryside and the comprehensive reconstruction of roads. Another priority for the farmers was

the abolishment of tithe *(asar)*, which was a major burden on the peasants. The merchants requested that a commercial bank be founded. They requested strict regulation of stock markets in major commercial cities – primarily to limit the power of foreign speculators. They also asked for temporary tax breaks for the merchants and manufacturers living in the areas destroyed by war, and prioritized the reform of custom procedures, control over ports, and the establishment of chambers of commerce. Representatives of industrialists requested increased tariffs, a broadening of the scope of Law for the Encouragement of Industry (the law - passed in 1913 - was still in effect), the reconstruction of transportation lines, and the establishment of schools specializing in vocational training. The workers' group asked for an eight-hour workday, recognition of the rights to unionize and call for strikes, a ban on child labor, and paid vacation time. All of the groups advocated for the nationalization of foreign held enterprises (especially the tobacco monopoly), and limiting the role of foreign capital by encouraging and subsidizing Turkish owned businesses. (Hale 1981; Hergüner 2006:156-180)

These requests demonstrate that all of the participants, regardless of the interest group they represented, imagined an economic system in which the state would play a significant role. Construction of an efficient transportation network, regulation of commercial activity, provision of security, and much needed investment capital were expected from the new government. It is also clear that, in the minds of these 1100 specialists, economic policy was inextricably tied with nationalist sentiments. Curbing the power of foreign capital and creating a Turkish bourgeoisie were regarded as essential steps towards establishing a strong and independent economy.

The opening speeches made by Mustafa Kemal and the Economy Minister Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) also highlight the importance of economic independence and development. But neither of them provided any specifics on policies the new government intended to pursue. In his speech, Mustafa Kemal discussed the importance of winning the economic war now that the military one was over. He was also keen on rejecting the idea that Turkish society was divided or driven by class interests; it was a unified whole. Bozkurt's speech declared that the economic system of the new nation would be based on the "New Turkish Economic School," which was neither capitalist nor communist but particular to Turkish needs and goals. (Ökçün 1968:252-264; Hergüner 2006: 127-143)

In actuality, both men were talking about political goals – the creation of a nation united around its own values, independence from foreign influence in thinking and policy, the reaffirmation of Turkish sovereignty, the modernization of society – rather than economic ones. This is quite illustrative of the mentality of the founding cadres of the republic with regards to economic policy – that it is conceived primarily within a political framework.[52] As will be covered in the following pages, a similar outlook of primacy of political goals informed the development projects and urbanization policies of the subsequent decades.

During the years between 1923 and 1930 – in contrast to the dramatic and determined social and political reforms it undertook – the economic policies of the Republic were quite pragmatic in nature. State intervention in private enterprise was kept at a minimum, as was government investment. This attitude of the government led to the era being dubbed "the liberal period." However, as Boratav (1981:160-164) points out, far from a laissez-faire approach to economy, the Turkish state did intervene in favor of private enterprises, particularly enterprises that were national in scope. In 1927, the Encouragement of Industry Law was significantly expanded in scope, providing even the smallest industrial entrepreneurs access to land grants, customs exemption, and guaranteed public preference over foreign competitors in purchases. The Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly[53], an infamous symbol of Western economic influence, was purchased and nationalized in 1925. It was turned into a government monopoly, which also included alcohol, sugar, salt, matches, and explosives. As a support to the private sector, some of these monopolies were farmed out to private companies. (Keyder 1987:91-104; Zurcher 1993)

[52] This is somewhat understandable since neither the territorial integrity of Turkey nor Ankara government's control over the rest of the country was assured by 1923. Thus, political priorities would trump any other concern. Moreover, most members of the Young Turk movement, many of whom were also founders of the Republic, had military backgrounds with no special training in economics. Political revolution and social reformation were the driving motives for all of the various revolts and uprisings in the late Ottoman era and the economy was never a primary concern. (see Hanioglu 1995, 2001 for an extensive review of Young Turk movement)

[53] *Regie Co-Interessee des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman*, known as Reji Idaresi (Regie Administration) in Turkish, was founded in 1875 when the Ottoman Government defaulted on the loans it accrued during Crimean War. As a consortium of Austrian, French, British, and German financial institutions, it was granted the privilege of monopoly over collecting taxes on Tobacco, Salt, and Alcohol within the empire for 30 years. The privilege was extended during Balkan Wars in exchange for loans it provided to the government. It collected taxes through its armed agents, who would punish – even kill – villagers caught smuggling or hiding goods. Reji Admnistration was the ultimate symbol of semi-colonial nature of late Ottoman Empire and a source of great national humiliation.

In order to provide capital for the emerging Turkish bourgeoisie class, the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) was reorganized to provide easier credit, and two new banks were established - the Business Bank (Is Bankasi) in 1924, and the Bank of Industry and Mining (Sanayi Maadin Bankasi) in 1925. Mustafa Kemal personally oversaw the founding of the Business Bank, and even provided one fourth of the founding capital from his personal wealth. Unlike the other two banks, which were owned by the state, the Business Bank was a private bank with extensive government support. It provided capital for and held shares of numerous industrial enterprises in the period.

At the beginning of the 1920's, the industrial sector inherited from Ottoman Empire was small in scale and concentrated geographically. According to industrial census of 1915, Istanbul and Izmir respectively housed 55 and 22 percent of all industrial establishments. (Arnold 2012). Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana were the only regions with a significant concentration of industry. Most industrial manufacture was carried out in small enterprises. According to the 1927 industrial census, out of 66,245 industrial establishments, 23,316 employed only one worker - the proprietor. Another 4,130 establishments employed the owner and his immediate family alone. (Keyder 1978:50) Enterprises employing more than 4 workers were primarily concentrated in in big cities, while the small towns across the country were housed small-scale manufacture. Food products, textiles, tobacco, and leather accounted for more than 60% of all industrial output. (Keyder 1978:54) Given these conditions, it should not come as a surprise that Republican governments made industrialization a priority. Somewhat unusual was the length the Turkish state would go to in order to geographically spread the industrial investments across the country. Disregarding economic reasoning and risking great losses, state-owned industrial enterprises were established in the small cities and towns of Anatolia. Industrialization was not only a matter of economic growth but also a sign of "civilization" for the Republican regime. Investing in factories in various part of the country was akin to planting the seeds of a modern nation.

To facilitate the spread of industrial development across the country, the expansion of the railroad network and the nationalization of the foreign-owned railway companies garnered the greatest state investment during the period between 1923 and 1929. By 1930, 783 km of new tracks were constructed and 2352 km of tracks were purchased from foreign owners. In 1923

Turkish government owned 1734 km and foreign companies owned 2352 km of rail tracks, at the end of 1930s the state owned 6890 km while foreign companies owned 434 km of railway tracks. (Herslag 1968: 231-238) The railroads inherited from Ottoman period were built by foreign companies for the efficient transportation of export goods to closest major ports. They were not designed to be part of a network, but as single lines between two points. Expansion of the existing transportation network continued to be a top priority of the republican governments throughout 1930s; between 1933 and 1939 railroad construction accounted for 128 million Liras out of 311 million Liras of total public investment. With another 30 million Liras allocated for building bridges and canals, close to half of all fixed investments by the public sector went towards creation of a transportation network. (Herslag 1968: 94, Pamuk 2010:33) Republican expansion of the railroad system prioritized the creation of a nationwide transportation network with Ankara at its center that would facilitate national integration. To this end, regional centers were connected to the system, beginning with Kayseri in 1927, the line was extended to Sivas in 1930 and the iron fields of Erzurum by 1939. Another line connected the tobacco port of Samsun on Black Sea coast and Zonguldak coal deposits with Ankara. A third major route connected the southeast with the capital, by 1948 railroads had reached Malatya, Elazig, and Diyarbakir, from there it connected with a line that reached Adana, Gaziantep, and Maras. Existing routes in the Agean Region were extended and connected regional centers Kutahya, Usak, and Afyon to the rest of the network. Among the cities with populations more than 25,000 in 1927 only Bursa and Urfa lacked railroad connection by 1950. Number of railway passengers increased from 4.8 million in 1927 to 25.6 million in 1938, while good transported via rail increased from 919,000 tons to 3,828,000 tons within the same period. (Rivkin 1965: 63-65) Railroads were primarily built for political purposes during the Republican period, as opposed to commercial priorities of Ottoman era tracks. (Kolars, Malin 1970)

### 6.1.3 Etatism and Planned Development

From 1930 onwards, the economic policies of the regime changed from liberalism to what was called etatism (*devletcilik*). Described by the government as planned industrialization carried out by a powerful state sector, etatism became one of the "six arrows"[54] (or principles) of Kemalist ideology. Etatism was a consistent component of government discourse throughout the state formation process in Turkey, and continued to have a significant impact on Turkish economic debates until 1990s.

Between 1924 and 1929, the Turkish economy benefited greatly from the world economic boom. Agricultural production increased and caught up with pre-war output, The increase in grain prices in international markets helped the economic recovery. However, starting in 1929, the global economic depression had a shattering impact on the Turkish economy and foreign trade. Drops in the prices of the country's major exports drastically reduced national income and tax revenue. Imports had to be limited drastically order to respond to the decline of exports. Value of imports dropped from 256 million liras in 1929 to 85 million liras by 1932. (Okyar 1965:99) Considering the fact that a large part of Turkish imports of the era were consumer goods, the reduction in trade significantly affected the daily lives of Turkish citizens.

The deterioration of economic conditions was one reason for the shift in government policy. Another was the influence of Soviet economic planning. The large-scale industrialization drive that the Soviet Union was carrying out under the five-year plan caught the attention and imagination of Turkish government officials. To benefit from Soviet expertise, official visits were arranged between 1931 and 1932. Soviet experts prepared reports on Turkey's industry and how to develop it most efficiently. Along with expertise, the Soviet government provided an interest-free loan and machinery to assist in the establishment of textile factories in Kayseri and Nazilli.

Debates on the role of the state in the economy were not only held among government circles. Starting in 1930, a group of influential intellectuals formed an intellectual movement

[54] Etatism - along with republicanism, reformism, populism, nationalism, and laicism - comprised the cornerstones of Kemalism. Adopted by the Republican Peoples' Party in the1930s, these six principles are the closest thing to an official ideology of the single party era.

around the journal Kadro.[55] Emphasizing the anti-imperialist and ongoing nature of the Turkish Revolution, as they called the reforms of the Republican regime, the Kadro movement argued for an interventionist state and a small cadre of elites to carry out the continuation of the revolution. Etatism would be something unique to Turkey, and was to be the Turkish answer to Western liberalism and Soviet communism. (Ertan, 1994:101-103) The Kadro movement proposed that extensive planning be applied to all areas of life in Turkey, including education and healthcare. (Yanardag 1988; Tekeli, Ilkin 2003)

As influential it was among intellectual circles, Kadro's ideas were too radical for the government and party leaders. Instead of a total planned of economy, the government opted for the creation of state-financed, -owned, and -run enterprises. The existing legal framework for private enterprises was not altered, nor were the rules pertaining to the private sector. What followed was the creation of a whole new state-owned economic sector, which was separate from the private sector but operating in the same areas. (Hershlag 1968: 61-76)

Two new government organs were established to carry out the prepared five-year plan. Sumerbank was founded to finance, construct, and operate various state-owned enterprises, focusing on primarily textiles, but also in areas as diverse as ceramics, paper, and cement production. Etibank was formed to carry out the same functions for coal, sulfur, copper, iron, and chrome mining enterprises.[56] State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were run as corporations whose boards of directors were appointed by the Council of Ministers. They could engage in any economic activity and partner with private companies. Most importantly, they were obliged by law to behave as businesses; their mandate was to seek profit. Each enterprise was attached to a ministry and a general board of SEEs oversaw the operation of all enterprises.

Adoption of etatism and the creation of SEEs changed the nature of the Turkish economy and the role of government within it. Planning of economic activity became an important

[55] The most prominent members of Kadro movement were Sevket Sureyya (Aydemir), Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoglu), and Vedat Nedim (Tor). These and some other members were involved with Communist Party of Turkey in the 1920s . While they had split from the Communist Party by the late 1920s, they were still influenced by Marxism and they conceptualized the social and political reforms of the Republic as the prelude to a longer revolutionary process.

[56] The organizations' names, Sumer and Eti (Hittite), were chosen in honor of these ancient civilizations, which - according to the pseudo-scientific official historical accounts of the day - were founded by ancestors of the Turkish people.

function of the government, and, considering the financial power of the state, economic plans became instruments of a large-scale nationwide development project. For the single-party regime, the best way to achieve the social transformation it espoused was through directing the flow of investment towards the regions and sectors of its choosing. State-owned factories, and the goods they produced extended the reach of Turkish state's political power to the daily lives of its citizens. (Boratav 1988, Coşar 1995, Kongar 1978,)

### 6.1.4 Urban Administration

During the classical era, Ottoman urban administration was centered in two institutions. The first was the office of *qadi* – civil servants appointed by the center that possessed all administrative and judicial powers within the town. *Qadis* were assisted by the local Janissary garrison that maintained order and enforced their power. Both *qadis* and the Janissaries were appointees who did not have local contacts and did not stay at the same post for long periods. They represented the power of the center in urban locales. Various *wakfs* and local notables were responsible for the management of social and material needs of the towns, including sanitation, water, sewage, the maintenance of roads, etc. The interaction between the appointees of the center and local notables formed the basis of urban politics and the nature of these interactions varied from region to region. (Gözübüyük 1967; Ortaylı 1974, 1978)

The reforms of the 19$^{th}$ Century brought about changes to the established system. Although the reforms were instituted by the state and imposed on the society from the top, they were essentially a response to various social and economic changes taking place across the country. As the Ottoman Empire slowly integrated burgeoning international capitalism, the administrative framework inherited from the 18$^{th}$ Century proved to be inadequate to answer the needs of the changing urban settlements. A non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie, which carried out most of the international transactions, was growing rapidly in urban centers. Influenced by the political changes taking place in Europe and supported by western governments, this commercial class began demanding more autonomy. Meanwhile, growing volume of commercial activity brought related institutions –banks, warehouses, exchanges – and their physical needs.

Banks, financial organizations, warehouses, government offices, and other structures were being built across the empire, while intra-city transportation needs was growing rapidly. These physical changes were beyond the capacity of traditional institutions, like *wakfs*, to manage or maintain. Moreover, the Ottoman state and the ruling elite came to the realization that centralization of administrative apparatuses was the only way to resist the pressure from Western powers to grant more autonomy to various ethnic groups living within the empire. (Tekeli 2009)

Beginning with the reform edict of 1839, the Ottoman government established various regulations and structures to reorganize local administrations. Provincial assemblies were formed with members chosen by appointment, election, or a mixture of both. These assemblies, headed by appointed governors, were assigned the duties of collecting taxes and managing local affairs, including the management of urban settlements. The exact nature of these assemblies and the rules governing them were changed several times between the 1840s and the 1870s. Each new system was tested in select provinces first, leading to a patchwork of various rules and regulations differing from one locality to another. Moreover, each new system required a degree of cooperation from local notables to work effectively, and weakened their position vis-à-vis the central government. As a response, regional assemblies became arenas for local interest groups to compete with each other, limiting their capacity to oversee and administer effectively. As such these reforms, and every other Tanzimat reform, was met with resistance and their implementation was severely handicapped. (Shaw 1970; Ortayli 1985:19-30)

By the end of the 19$^{th}$ Century, local governance in the empire was carried out by a provincial administrative system adapted from the French prefectoral system. The empire was divided into *vilayets*, they in turn were divided into *sancaks*, and each *sancak* was further divided into *kazas* (similar to French departments, districts, and cantons). (Findley 1999) The highest-ranking official within each province was the Governor, who was appointed from the center and held considerable power. Governors headed provincial administrative councils composed of appointed and elected members along with Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders. A similar council, whose members and their electors were prominent property-owners of the town, ran the municipalities. Before the adoption of 1877 Municipal Code, the duties of these councils involved only maintenance of law and order, since they lacked any funds it was beyond their capability to tackle tasks such as public health. (Ortaylı 1985, Toksöz 2010:61-65)

The power of the municipal organizations was curtailed by several factors. With limited financial resources, they were dependent on the central government's budgetary decisions. The Councils became platforms for local notables to further their particular interests, rather than institutions that represented the needs of common residents. The *wakfs*, who still played an important role in providing services, were regulated by the *wakfs* administration, creating constant conflicts between the municipalities and the administration. Moreover, unlike the *qadis* of the classical period, Ottoman municipalities did not have a judicial power or access to local military forces.

Istanbul's status as the capital and the center of Ottoman world separated it from other cities of the empire. It was administered by a separate law and through institutions that were unique. A city council led by a mayor (called *sehremaneti*, and s*ehremini*) was responsible for running the city. Members of the council and the mayor were appointed by the central government. The capital was divided into several municipalities each with its own organization that reported to the mayor. The power of the Mayor over the city was considerable, which created a unique problem once the new provincial system was established. Conflict arose between the powers of the Governor of Istanbul province and the Mayor of Istanbul. This was resolved by appointing the same person as the Governor and Mayor. This practice set an example and the future governments of the single party era used it for other cities.

Around the time Turkish Republic was founded the country had 389 municipalities. Only 20 of these had infrastructure for running water, only 4 had electricity, and only 90 had regular marketplaces. (Tekeli 2009) Only a few municipal organizations had experience running infrastructure or managing the needs of a modern city. During the early years of the republic, slow growth of urban population, and no significant migration from rural areas to cities alleviated this lack of capability to an extent.

In the first years of the Republic, only Ankara was going through rapid population growth and urbanization. With the symbolic meaning attached to the new capital, the Republican government's highest priority regarding urbanization was Ankara's development. A municipal organization similar to that of Istanbul was established for Ankara in 1924. The mayor and members of the city council were appointed by the central government and – unlike Istanbul – the Ministry of Internal Affairs closely regulated the practices of Ankara's municipalities and

their budgets. The municipality quickly proved inadequate to manage the development of the city. In response, the Ankara Development Agency was founded in 1928 with extensive powers over the construction of the new capital.

Centralization of the bureaucratic apparatus at every level was a priority for the Republican administrations. Although, late Ottoman governments worked towards the same goal, their success was limited. Immediately after the foundation of the Republic, the new regime single-mindedly focused on the creation of a modern nation-state with a strong central government.

Establishing control over the country and securing the political power of the new center were the major struggles of the era, and the urban policies pursued were directed towards increasing the power of the center vis-à-vis local forces. By the end of World War II, the Turkish State's rule was secure, legitimate, and without any major contenders within the country. Ironically, the single-party regime that managed to achieve this was ousted with the first multi-party elections, and the opposition was glad to utilize state power to carry out its own political agenda.

Up until 1930, the new regime did not undertake any significant changes in urban administration. With the exception of Ankara, the cities and towns of Turkey were governed with the laws and regulations passed in late Ottoman era, without significant changes. Beginning in 1930 – similar to the shift in economic policies that increased state influence – administration of urban centers was reformed to expand the control of central government.

The Municipalities Law of 1930 was intended to increase the control of center over local administrations. The Municipal Councils were deemed to be too reactionary or too slow to catch up with the reforms carried out by the government. Town notables – including small-scale entrepreneurs, artisans, urbanized landowners, and other traditional groups with influence – occupied the Councils. As such, the municipal organizations fulfilled limited functions but they had local roots. They were not extensions of central government, but a product of interactions between various regional forces. These local groups did not necessarily share the enthusiasm of the Ankara regime to sweeping social and political reforms. Many members were conservative in their outlook or had local economic interests that would be threatened by a national bourgeoisie

class[57]. Moreover, during the years of World War I and the following War of Independence, local political cadres of the Union and Progress Party entrenched themselves in town councils. Although they were not hostile to the modernization project of the Republic, they were regarded as threat to the regime's security. (Zurcher 1984) Therefore, for the central government, increasing control over local administrations was an ideological, political and, economic necessity.

On the surface, the new legislation recognized the independence of municipalities, expanded their responsibilities, and opened the way for more democratic election processes. However, elected mayors of provincial centers were subject to approval by the Interior Ministry, while other towns' mayors were to be approved by the governor of the province. Moreover, the central government had the option to appoint mayors directly if it was deemed necessary. Unsurprisingly, the criterion of necessity was left quite vague. (Tümerkan 1946; Tekeli 1978) In practice, from 1930 to the end of single-party era, in most provincial centers same person would hold the offices of mayor and governor simultaneously. In some cases, he would also act as the head of local party organization.

One important change brought by the1930 law was the recognition of equality among all municipal organizations, except for those in Istanbul and Ankara. Every community with a population over 2000 was given municipality (*belediye)* status, with an elected municipal council. At first glance this might seem like an effort at standardization of administration and rationalization of bureaucracy. In reality, the legislation was designed to continue the prioritized development of interior towns as opposed to skewed development of port cities during the late Ottoman era. (Tekeli 2009)

Under the Law of 1930 municipalities had numerous obligations and relatively few prerogatives. They were required to establish public libraries, parks, and playgrounds. Fire control, sanitation, and regulation and inspection of commercial establishments were also among the duties of municipalities. Councils in larger cities were required to build hospitals and nurseries, while building of theaters, museums, and low cost housing was encouraged but made

[57] These local forces comprised the main political base of the Democratic Party during multi-party era and were the key behind its electoral successes. The democratization of municipal administration carried out by Democratic Party administrations of 1950's was partly aimed at securing the continued support of these local groups.

optional. In 1933, a new development law dictated that every municipality make five-year plans and follow very strict guidelines[58] for the construction of streets, buildings, water drainage, fences for parks, and even doorways of buildings. (Gorvine 1956:20-28, Ersoy 1989) Although, some leeway was allowed in particular cases, the central government dismissed any geographical, social, or architectural differences among cities. A singular vision for a modern city was to be realized everywhere, from Izmir to Diyarbakir.

In short, the single party-party regime solidified the power of the center over the administration and development of urban areas. By appointing governor-mayors, who were also party members, the regime succeeded in eliminating the distinction between national and local politics. The difference between different levels of government and their bureaucratic structures were blurred, while ideological and political priorities of the regime trumped any local necessity. Development of cities was not a practical or social matter anymore, but a project of modernization and social engineering.

### 6.1.5 Urbanization Policies

Throughout the 1930s, urban planning and policies associated with urbanization were among the political priorities of the central government. As noted previously, the establishment of a national economy on the basis of economic independence was the driving motive for economic policies since the founding days of the republic. The urban and regional planning choices of the era can be regarded as the spatial expression of this motivation. It can be argued that three dimensions of the geographical and spatial strategies of the government stand out as particularly relevant to the creation of a new national identity and development of a truly integrated nation-state. The selection of Ankara as the new capital was an urban policy, but also a very deliberate ideological statement. It was an essential element of the program that aimed to reverse the 19$^{th}$ century Ottoman policy of focused development centered on a single large city. The creation of industrial towns across the nation in order to foster more dispersed and balanced production was the other critical planning decision of the central government. By reforming the urban

[58] According to the rules, the tallest buildings would be 5 stories high, and residential structures had to allow 65 square meters for each person.

administrative apparatuses, and increasing the power of the center over local institutions, the republican regime managed to expand its political and ideological control across the country.

### 6.1.6 Ankara

During a 1923 press conference in Izmit, Mustafa Kemal explained the reasoning behind selection of Ankara as the new capital. He said the choice was based on serious administrative concerns regarding the equal and just provision of public services across the country as well as strategic and defensive priorities. Istanbul, according to him, had lost all of its competence as a capital city after the experience of occupation. Moreover it was hindering the development of the country in a balanced manner. The capital had to be somewhere in the middle of Anatolia and it was preferable to choose an existing settlement since founding of a new city would be too costly. Ankara was ideally situated geographically, and historical contingencies during the war had made it the ideal new center of the country. (Keskinok 2010)

A small town of regional prominence, Ankara had a population of 20,000 in 1919. Its position as the eastern terminus of railways within central Anatolia made it a convenient strategic choice for the nationalist movement to set up its government during the War of Independence, as opposed to larger towns like Sivas and Erzurum. Between 1919 and 1923, Ankara served as the seat of government and the headquarters of Turkish military, becoming the de facto capital of the nationalist movement. The exodus of intellectuals, civil servants, and military officers from Istanbul to Ankara to join the ranks of the nationalist government had started the initial transformation of the town. After the war, Ankara became the fastest growing city in the country with a population of 74,000 in 1927 and 226,000 in 1946. (Yavuz 1980:13)

Ankara's initial selection as the de facto capital might have been a strategic and geographical coincidence, but once it became the declared capital of the new country the city became a symbolic representation of the republic itself. For the founding cadres of the republic, Ankara's development as a modern city became synonymous with the success of the new regime. The construction of Ankara as an ideal city would be the measure of modernism and transformation in Turkey. (Keles, Duru 2008) Leaving Istanbul – a city with a long history of

imperial tradition – for Ankara – a small town with no rooted tradition – would allow the Republican regime to shape its capital in any the way it wanted. In other words, Ankara was to be an ideological beacon for the rest of the country, and the stark contrast between the old-town and the new city would be a living metaphor for the republican social project. (Tanyeli 1993)

Although, leaving the cosmopolitan Istanbul had no economic benefit and entailed great burdens, Ankara's location provided the new regime with a new economic center for national integration. While the existing railroad system was built for the extraction of raw materials and their transportation to the closest port, an Ankara centered railroad system would provide the nation with a new geographical and economic center. (Tekeli 1980) Industrial cities would be developed along railway lines that converge at the center, laying the foundations for a national economy. The development of Anatolia and the integration of its region was to be realized through the creation of a new capital by limiting the growth of an agglomeration economy around Istanbul. (Altaban 1998) In this sense, moving the capital was primarily a political decision with anticipated economic consequences.

Ankara's development was a difficult undertaking that required massive resources and intensive planning. As the city was rapidly growing, the goal to create a modern city while keeping development under control prompted the government to devise mechanisms without any precedent in Turkish history. In 1925, after fierce debates, the parliament approved the government's appropriation of large tracks of land around Ankara, allowing the government to purchase any land it deemed necessary for the development of the capital city. The crux of the debated in parliament was whether to expand the city in new areas or to develop the existing city to accommodate the needs of the government. Some MP's argued that it was their responsibility to the native population of Ankara to develop the old city. However, the actual proposal for the legislation pointed out the extremely rundown condition of old Ankara streets, and argued that the cost of demolishing them would be enough to found a completely new city. Moreover, the dramatic increase in demand had resulted in property values skyrocketing within the city, whereas the appropriation values for the surrounding lands were set at 15 times the valuations on 1915 tax records. Considering the growth potential of the city, this amount was deemed lower than the actual market value of the properties bought and led to some resentment among propertied classes of Ankara. Upon his arrival Mustafa Kemal had chosen a mansion at Çankaya

Hill, south of the old town, as his residence and his decision informally dictated the direction for future growth. In total 4 million square meters of land was bought for the development program; it was the first time such a large-scale appropriation of private land was a carried out, and the legislation served as a precedent for similar acts in the future. (Yavuz 1980:23-27, Tankut 1993:33) Purchasing this land enabled the government to pursue its plans for the future development of the city without any hindrance.

In 1927, a contest for Ankara's urban plan was organized, the participating architects were instructed to plan for the population to reach 250 to 300 thousand within 50 years[59], the old city was to remain in its location, while the new city should have large open spaces, ample green zones, and multi-story buildings. The winner of the contest was German planner Hermann Jansen, who worked on plans for other cities in 1930s. Jansen's plan was approved in 1932, and he worked as a consultant for the implementation process.[60] As required by the government, the plan proposed the building of an entirely new city separate from the historical neighborhoods and the castle. Jansen's plan illustrated the Republican ideal of urbanization; the existing built environment was not to be restructured but completely new urban centers were to be created. The modernist style of his plan included the construction of large avenues that let sunlight in; open public squares; and big parks with artificial lakes. Various urban functions and services were separated into specialized neighborhoods. Industrial zones and worker neighborhoods were to be located in the northwest axes; the northeast was to be a center for educational institutions; government offices were to be concentrated in yet another sector. Of primary concern to Jansen was the centralization and strict regulation of Ankara's development in order to prevent profit-oriented private developers from destroying the character of the emerging city. Ankara's status as a monument to the Republic was central to his image for the city, and to preserve it in the manner it was planned was crucial. (Helvacioglu 2003:140-148; Şenyapılı 2004:62-65)

However, the realities of rapid growth proved much harder to control than initially anticipated. Controlling the influx of new residents and responding to their needs was beyond the capacity of the development agency. By the early 1940s, Ankara became Turkey's first city with

[59] Ankara's population reached 300 thousand by 1950's, while in 1977 its was a city of 2 million.

[60] For extensive details about the plan and its approval process see Tankut, 1993

an acute problem of squatter neighborhoods.[61] (Senyapili 1985) Housing prices rose dramatically, forcing the government to provide civil servants with a monthly location stipend. For the first time in Turkish history, the government funded the construction of public housing projects for public servants. (Geray 1990:220-222) In 1935, a group of high-level bureaucrats established the first residential cooperative and hired Jansen to plan a neighborhood. The Bahcelievler (literally "houses with yards") neighborhood introduced the concept of garden city planning to Turkey. The residents of this upscale neighborhood enjoyed modern amenities like tennis courts and a swimming pool. (Sey 1998:28; Senyapili 2004:104)

Ankara's municipal organization quickly proved inadequate in overseeing the development of the city. To remedy the problem a distinct organization, the Ankara Development Agency, was established in 1928; the legislation stated, "as the center of administration, Ankara's capacity to reflect the sublime qualities of the Republic is of utmost national importance that it can not be treated as simple urban municipal matter but a matter of state". (Yavuz 1952:33) The agency worked under the Interior Ministry and its main decision making body, Council of Development Management, was appointed by the cabinet. The direct control of the center over the agency was such that instead of a director general being appointed, it was run by high ranking bureaucrats within the ministry. Over time, it became the central agency to oversee and approve urban plans for every city in the country, enabling the central government to directly control all urban development. (Ersoy 1989; Tankut 1993:49; Altaban 1998:44)

Throughout 1930's Ankara and its development had occupied a central place in government policies. Significant amount of resources were directed at the creation of a modern city that would reflect the ideals of the republican regime. The efforts towards the planned

[61] Starting in the 1950s squatter housing, called *gecekondu* (lit. "appeared" or "built overnight") became the most important problem of urbanization in Turkey. Rural to urban migration, resulting from the changing economic structure of Turkey, dramatically transformed the urban fabric of every major city in the country. By the 1970s nearly half of all residents of Istanbul and Ankara were living in squatter neighborhoods. Similar to other developing countries, squatter housing changed the nature of urban politics, giving rise to both populist and radical movements. Urban life and culture was heavily affected by the changes brought by the newcomers. Over time, original squatter neighborhoods transformed into fully developed parts of the city. However, internal migration did not stop and millions still live in squatter housing in every major city of Turkey. Multitudes of studies on different aspects of the issue have been conducted over the years; for more information see Türkdoğan 1974, Saran 1974, Karpat 1976, Akşit 1985, Şenypili 1985, Kıray 1991, Ersoy 2002.

development of Ankara had an impact on other urban centers of Turkey. Ankara functioned as a laboratory for republican policies regarding urban space and development.

### 6.1.7 Transforming Urban Space

Early leaders of the Republic considered planning of cities as an important aspect of social and economic development. Cityscapes and urban spaces provided the regime with the canvas it needed to manifest its vision of a modern society, changing the physical characteristics of the towns to resemble western urban spaces was regarded as an integral aspect of the modernization project. The early Republican era was marked by a major effort to reorganize the geography of Anatolia and create of new forms of spatial arrangements that would form the basis of a new national identity.

Between 1930 and 1948, 240 maps and 300 town plans were completed. By 1937 municipalities across the country had built 4041 official buildings, 3287 public buildings, had developed 352 parks, 261 sports fields, 190 promenades, 477 markets, 152 abattoirs, 120 monuments, 24 hospitals, 28 dispensaries, and 44 clinics. Moreover, 116 cities and towns had been electrified, and 212 towns were supplied with running water, municipalities had constructed 1417 bridges and 4560 km of paved city streets. (Rivkin 1965: 59)

As Ankara re-centered Anatolia's political geography, the newly-planned cities and towns of Anatolia were re-centered around open spaces, usually named Republic Square. The squares would be adorned by a statue or bust of Ataturk, and provide the location for all political functions. The statues were not only monuments to glorify Mustafa Kemal and the nationalist regime in his image but also represented a clear break with the Muslim tradition that forbade representative art. Adjacent to the square would be a garden or park, depending on the size of the settlement, and the main streets would be named after the founder of the republic. (Kırlı 2007) The similarity and repetitiveness of these features in urban centers of Turkey is striking, and served to project the idea of a singular and united nation.

In big cities, excessively large parks and public recreational places served as architectural icons of Republican modernity. (Bozdogan 2001) Genclik Park (Youth Park) in Ankara, with its artificial lake, or Kültür Park (Culture Park) in Izmir are examples of the Republican obsession, and are reminiscent of monumental public spaces built in Germany, Italy, or Soviet Union during the era. What is peculiarly lacking in the urban designs of the Republican period is any kind of centrality afforded to mosques or other religious structures. As the regime abolished the caliphate and adopted secularism as one of its ideological tenets, religion's role in public space was intentionally limited.

Another important element of urban policies of the republican period was changing names of places. The adoption of Latin alphabet in 1928 necessitated a complete overhaul of various types of official media and opened the way for standardization of toponyms. All street and square names in Istanbul without Turkish origin were replaced in 1927[62], followed by the names in all other major cities. In 1933 The General Directorate of Provincial Administration revised its an index of place names "Our Villages" in new letters and sent a copy to all local administrations. The establishment of The Society for the Study of Turkish History and Turkish Language Institute in 1931 and 1932 respectively increased the pace of language reform to purify Turkish by eliminating words with Arabic and Persian origins and replacing them with obscure or invented Turkish counterparts.[63] Governments continued to change toponyms throughout 1930s; in a major reorganization of Kurdish provinces in 1936 was accompanied by eliminating traditional Kurdish names at every level. In 1940 Interior Ministry initiated a nation-wide campaign to change names of places; during the following years provincial administrators were charged with identifying and listing toponyms with non-Turkish names and submit it to the center in order to be changed. Across Turkey all place names that includes references to historical regions like Armenia, Kurdistan, and Lazistan are replaced with Turkish, or Turkish sounding, names and maps including old names were banned. Name changing policies continued long after the end of single party period into 1980s. By 1978 more then 80 percent of all village

[62] Probably the most overtly jingoistic change was the renaming of the large Greek neighborhood Tatavla (lit. horse stable in Greek) to Kurtuluş, which means deliverance but can also mean getting rid of something –or someone-.

[63] Words with French origins did not receive the same treatment. Some of the words invented by the language reform committee have become essential components of modern Turkish but the public never adopted some esoteric ones.

names in major Kurdish provinces were changed. (Okutan 2004:182-183; Öktem 2008:20-25, 34)

### 6.1.8 Factory Towns and Regional Development

The economic policies of the Turkish government changed by the beginning of the 1930s. The state's role in the national economy increased dramatically with the adoption of etatism as the economic ideology of the country. The government began to invest in industrial sectors, which were not attractive to private entrepreneurs because of low profitability and large capital requirements.

One of the key aspects of industrialization policies of the 1930s was the attention paid to the spatial and geographical dimensions of development. Both the First and Second Five-Years Plans (1934 and 1938) emphasized the principle of national economic sovereignty, which could only be realized as a nation-wide effort. Even though they were named Industry Plans, they were comprehensive plans for social and economic transformation that required industrialization[64]. (Inan 1973) The plans included objectives for rural development. Planners assumed industrial development would have a positive influence over agriculture development in the surrounding area; the benefits of industrial facilities built in provincial centers would trickle down and affect the whole area. For this reason, the establishment of industrial cities and choice of their locations was not considered simply matter of economics, but as a key component of region-wide socio-economic transformation and development. (Ahmad 1993:97-101; Keskinok 2007)

In accordance with the goal of economic independence, the government prioritized investment in the production of essential consumer goods that were mostly imported. Textiles were at the top of this list; between 1923 and 1929, textile imports accounted for 35% to 45% of all imports, while raw cotton was regularly exported. (Keyder 1981: 55) Sugar production was another priority. With the memories of a decade-long war still fresh, the government considered this as a strategic choice as well as an economic one. By 1935, the country produced all of the sugar it needed, as opposed to 64,000 tons of sugar imported in 1926. (Hershlag 1958:55) Heavy

[64] The First Industrial Plan's appendix contained extensive spatial and environmental data. Vegetation, cultivation, annual precipitation, mineral resources, future locations for potential industries, and various other maps were included in the plan. See Inan (1973).

industry was the third sector government investment focused on, as mining of coal and iron and the production of steel were considered essential to future industrialization efforts.

The selection of urban centers where state factories were to be built was primarily a political decision with some level of underlying economic reasoning. The reduction of imbalanced economic growth among different regions of the country – particularly between the wealthier and more developed northwest and western ports and the interiors of Anatolia – was central to the government's investment decisions. (Ahmad 1993; Keyder 1983) Also considered was the transportation of produced goods. Existing and planned railroad network provided a skeletal framework for the location of state enterprises. Medium- or small-sized cities and towns along the existing railway network were primary choices. (Rivkin 1965; Boratav 1981; Arnold 2012)

Most of the towns chosen as factory sites were already existing regional centers and provincial capitals. The regime relied on these towns to serve as economic cores through which the region would develop and enjoy the benefits of industrial production. A cement factory was built in Sivas (1935) to supply the construction projects and the expansion of railroad network in eastern Turkey. An 8 million dollar interest free loan from the Soviet Union[65] funded the construction of cotton textile factories in Kayseri (1935), and Nazilli (1937). Other cotton textile factories were built in Eregli (Konya, 1937), and Malatya (1939), while in Bursa a wool factory at Merinos (1938), and a rayon factory at Gemlik (1938) expanded the variety of textile products. Sugar factories were founded in Usak (1926), Alpullu (Kirklareli, 1928), Eskisehir, (1933) and Turhal (Tokat, 1935). These factories formed the backbone of the public enterprise Sugar Factories Corp., which eventually included 25 factories. To form the foundation of a national heavy industry, an iron and steel plant was built in Karabuk (1937), several coal-processing plants were constructed in Zonguldak, and copper and brimstone factories were built in Keciborlu (Isparta, 1935) and Ergani (Diyarbakir, 1939). The construction of a munitions factory and supporting facilities for energy and steel in Kirikkale (1926), and a short-lived plane factory in Eskishehir (1935) were the major investments in military industry. Finally, a glass factory in

[65]As a side note, Turkey's efforts at creating a planned economy was well received in the Soviet Union, as the Soviet model of urbanization and urban planning greatly influenced Turkish planners. A 1937 issue of the Journal of Municipalities included an article detailing Soviet planning practices, praising the benefits of Soviet model of planned economy. (Belediyeler Dergisi, 27 1937)

Pasabahce (Izmit, 1935) and a paper mill, also in Izmit (1935), provided much needed consumer products. Nearly all of these locations were already existing regional centers or in close proximity to one. However, several were built in very small settlements with no particular prominence, and the towns owed all of their future growth to the factories. For example, Karabuk grew from a small district with several hundred people in the mid-1930s into a provincial center with a population of over 100,000 in the 1990s. Kirikkale had a population of 3,000 in the 1927 census and grew to 180,000 in the 1990 census.

The locating of these factories has been the source of debate among advisors and scholars. The report of the Thornburg Mission pointed out the political nature of the decision-making process and heavily criticized the locations of state factories, arguing that the choice of locations doomed these factories to inefficiency before production even began. (Thornburg 1949:123-125) Labor shortage was a major problem for most of the factories, either because of a lack of qualified workers or lack of housing for workers in the small towns where factories were built. (Webster 1939:248-250; Arnold 2012) The private sector was also unhappy with the locations chosen. Investing in the interior areas of the country was laden with problems, including lack of qualified labor, high transportation costs, and limited infrastructure. Thus, for the private sector, following the lead of government was not a profitable proposition. Private capital continued to be invested in the already-advanced areas in the northwest around the Sea of Marmara, where transportation and communication lines were already established and a relatively well-educated labor force was available. The region continued to attract almost solely private investment capital. (Ahmad 1993:98) In spite of the continuous private investment, many residents of Istanbul and the surrounding region were feeling left behind by the government. (Wyatt 1934)

As I mentioned above, for the regime, these factories were not only economic investments. They were part of a large-scale modernization plan with social and political dimensions. As such, they were physical manifestations of ideology. The factories were built as complexes rather than a single manufacturing facility. For example the Nazilli texile factory complex had production units, infrastructure units, housing facilities for the employees, dormitories for workers, commercial units, a cooperative (a store front for the factory products), sports facilities, cultural facilities (a theater-cinema hall, library, and a pavilion), and a

kindergarten. (Karakaya 2010) Other factories had orchestras, sports clubs, theater companies, and education units for adults to learn technical skills. (Keskinok 2010) Factory clinics provided healthcare services for the workers and the town, especially fighting malaria, typhus and tuberculosis, all of which commonly afflicted workers. Sivas cement factory provided a small clinic and a pharmacy; Eregli Coal Company provided a clinic and a 150-bed hospital in Zonguldak city; Karabuk had a clinic that eventually became a hospital in the late 1940s. (Kahveci 1993:186; Makal 2002; Nacar 2009) The architectural features of the factories also had an ideological component. The stark contrast between the monolithic and imposing factory structures that made the presence of the state felt very acutely and the small traditional buildings of the towns that grow organically over decades was impossible to miss. (Alexander 2002:125-128) In many cases, the chimneys of the factory (called "Ataturk's minarets" by some) would be first thing one would notice when approaching the town. In short, the factories were channels for the regime to reach the corners of the country; they represented its ideology and were monuments to the social transformation it promoted.

The elements of the compound exemplified a modern lifestyle promoted by the regime, and they were intended to provide an example to the entire town.[66] Civil servants, engineers, and other prominent employees were almost always appointed from elsewhere. Educated in big cities, their values were quite different than those of the local residents. The most obvious difference was the acceptance of women and men sharing public spaces in the compounds. Since everyone was from somewhere else, a sense of camaraderie would develop among the employees and their families. Collaboration among the families in compounds was strengthened by the fact that nobody's extended family members were living close by. Nuclear families were the norm instead of the exception. Balls were organized on national holidays, all of them commemorating turning points in the history of the Republic; and New Year's Eve after the adoption of Gregorian calendar, in which men and women danced and celebrated together. Alcohol was available in the facilities of the compound and was consumed openly. None of these activities would be unusual in the big cities of the country, where many already adopted western values. But in small towns across the country factory employees and appointed bureaucrats were the

[66] Personal note: my maternal grandfather was a manager of sugar factories in various cities of Turkey throughout his career. I grew up with his and my mother's stories about life in different sugar factory compounds. Even as a child, my mother was keenly aware of the difference between the somewhat westernized life in the compound and the traditional living in the surrounding town.

only models of the ideal of modern living espoused by the Republican regime. Fully realizing their position and with a sense of duty, members of the factory compound communities would take it upon themselves to educate the locals, and demonstrate their conception of the superiority of modern civilization.

### 6.1.9 Demographic Change and Assimilation

Several waves of migration had a big part in the shape modern Turkey's social structure. The final years of Ottoman Empire was marked by displacement of large number of Christians, Muslims, and Jews, as nationalism became the prevalent political ideology of states across the region. As the empire lost its territories in the Balkans and Caucasus Muslim refugees of various ethnicities –Bosnians, Circassians, Kurds, Pomaks, Turks, Tatars, and Turkmens- began to arrive in areas that were still under Ottoman control.

The magnitude of demographic shock Anatolia experienced between 1914 and 1924 cannot be overstated; a staggering 20 percent of total population perished throughout the decade.[67] (McCarthy 1983:118) During World War I the Ottoman army suffered 725,000 certified casualties: 325,000 battle deaths and 400,000 from combat wounds. (Zurcher 1996:234) But the main reasons behind the dramatic loss off life were conflicts within the country, widespread disease, and famines resulting from the significant drop in agricultural output. 40 percent of the Armenian population (600,000), 18 percent of the Muslim population (2,500,000), and 25 percent of the Greek population (315,000) died within a period of 10 years. (Yalman 1930: 252-253, McCarthy 1983:120-122)

The Christian population of Anatolia shrunk dramatically during the same period. The forced relocation of the Armenians living in Central and Eastern Turkey resulted in one of the worst tragedies of the 20$^{th}$ century; during the forced march to Syrian desert hundreds of thousands died from exhaustion, lack of supplies, and attacks of various armed groups. A total of 600,000 Armenians lost their lives in 1915 and about as my fled and migrated to Europe and

[67] In comparison the combined civilian and military losses of France during World War I corresponded only 1 percent of its pre-war population.

Americas within following years.[68] Although some Armenians returned after 1919, when the first census of the republic era was taken in 1927 only 140,000 Armenians were living in Turkey as opposed to 1,500,000 at the beginning of the 20th century. (Yalman 1930:221; McCarthy 1983:121-130)

The exodus of Greek population of Anatolia started in the years following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of modern Turkey. As the nationalist forces repelled the Greek occupation in 1922, Greeks of western Anatolia, Black Sea region, and Eastern Thrace fled to Greece. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 between Turkey, Greece and the Allies and ended the conflict that originally started with Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I. As a part of the treaty Turkey and Greece agreed on a large-scale population exchange that turned to ongoing Greek exodus into official policy. By 1924, between 1,2 million to 1,5 million Greeks had left Turkey, only the Greek population of Istanbul and north Aegean islands were exempted. In exchange about half million Muslims, not all were ethic Turks, living in Greece were forced to migrate to Turkey. According to the 1927 census only 120,000 Greeks speakers were left in Turkey, and this number included the Greek speaking Muslim refugees too. (Dündar 1999:124-125; Kirişci 2008:176-177)

The impact of the exodus of Armenians and Greeks on the composition of Anatolia's demographics was immense. Within 10 years the portion of non-Muslims with total population had dropped from 20 percent to 2 percent. (McCarthy 1983:137-139) The shift was not only a matter of diversity; since non-Muslim minorities comprised a substantial part of Ottoman urban professionals, artisans, intellectuals, and merchants; their departure resulted in a significant impairment of urban culture and weakening of ties to the outside world.

On the other hand, large numbers of Muslims from neighboring countries continued to migrate to Turkey after the end of armed conflicts. This was mainly because of the inter-war period domestic and external policies of the republican governments that encouraged migration

[68] The actual number of casualties is highly controversial due to the political struggle regarding the nature of events of 1915; estimates can go as high as 1,500,000 and as low as 150,000. McCarthy bases his estimates on Ottoman census records, and despite his pro-Turkish political stance, his data is regarded as objective and reliable. For more information see Dadrian 1995 and Akçam 2004 as examples of works that call the events as genocide and Lewy 2005 as an example of works contesting the applicability of the term to describe what happened. Regardless of their particular stance on the description no scholar denies the destruction of Anatolia's Armenian population and its demographic implications.

into the country. These policies had two main reasons; with the emigration of millions of non-Muslims and the deaths of millions of Muslims Turkey was severely depopulated. Most areas of the country were full of abandoned fields, half-empty villages, and towns with uninhabited houses. Increasing country's population was a priority of the central government and attracting an influx of migrants was an easy way to do so along with various domestic policies encouraging large families.[69] The second reason for encouraging immigration was ideological; bringing the Muslim-Turkish communities of the Balkans, who shared the cultural and historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire, to Turkey was regarded as a way to solidify the ethnic cohesion of the country and strengthen the nationalist ideology of the new regime. (Ülker 2007:13-17)

Between 1923 and 1939, around 850,000 immigrants from Greece and the Balkans entered Turkey. Out of this total approximately 400,000 came from Greece, 189,000 from Bulgaria, 117,000 from Romania, and 115,000 came from Yugoslavia. (Geray 1962:11; Eren 1993:294) Although, the Turkish government encouraged them to immigrate to Turkey on the basis of nationalist ideology, a significant portion of the migrants were not ethnic Turks but Muslims of various ethnicities. The Republican regime adopted ethnic nationalism as the basis of its ideology but the legacy of Ottoman identity politics was still informing the official categorization of the immigrants. Thus, non-Turkish Muslims from the Balkans were regarded as a part of the Ottoman heritage and Turkish Culture. The 1926 Law of Settlement identified Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars, and Circassians as being "bound to Turkish culture"; Albanians, who arrived before the passage of the law, and their families abroad were also considered as part of the Turkish common culture. Simply put, according to the government nearly every Muslim ethnic group from the Balkans and the Caucasus were accepted as part of Turkish nation. On the other hand, although they were ethic Turks, Shiite Muslims from Azerbaijan and Orthodox Chrisian Gagauz Turks were not accepted as a part of Ottoman-Turkish cultural heritage, and were rejected as immigrants in following decades. (Kirisci 2000:8-9; Ülker 2007:23-35)

During this period the central government was meticulous in its settlement and resettlement policies. The major pieces of legislation describing the rules of settling immigrants were the 1926 Law of Settlement detailing the procedures of accepting and settling immigrants

[69] The lyrics of the still well known "10th Year March" composed in 1933 honoring the 10th anniversary of the republic, proudly celebrates the creation of 15 million young people of all ages within a decade as the biggest achievement of the new nation along with construction of railroads across the country.

and 1934 Settlement Law numbered 2510 that significantly expanded the purview of previous law to encompass all minorities not just immigrants, and placed strict restrictions on accepting non-Turkish immigrants. By 1934 the primary concern of the government was large immigrant communities' not learning and speaking Turkish even after 10 years of their arrival. Moreover, there were large pockets within the country, where languages other than Turkish were dominant: mainly areas with large Kurdish or immigrant communities arrived before the republic.

The settlement law divided the country into three zones and the population into three groups. The three groups were ethnic Turks who spoke Turkish, immigrants that did not speak Turkish but considered to be of Turkish culture, and those who neither spoke Turkish nor belonged to Turkish culture. The second group was Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus, while the third group consisted of Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Kurds, and Arabs. On the other hand, type 1 geographic zones consisted of areas, where concentrating of populations with Turkish culture is desired. Type 2 zones were areas designated for the resettlement of populations, who needed to be assimilated into Turkish culture. Type 3 zones were areas that were completely closed to immigration and settlement due to military or security concerns: mostly eastern regions, where recent Kurdish rebellions took place. The law gave the Ministry of Interior the right to govern the distribution of population across the country on the basis of adherence to Turkish culture. Moreover, the ministry was charged with the responsibility of preventing the non-Turkish speakers from establishing villages and districts. The law was not limited to immigrant population only; nomads and non-Turkish settled tribesmen were also subject to relocation in order to be assimilated. (Kirisci 2000:4-6; Ülker 2008:13-15)

The Settlement Law of 1934 detailed the regulations and procedures of relocating communities in detail. Immigrants and tribesmen, who did not possess Turkish culture, were prohibited from settling in type 1 zones. The non-Turkish populations already living in type 1 zone and not resettled in type 2 zones were to be relocated to centers of villages and districts, where Turkish culture is prevalent, presumably to keep them within short reach of government power. Non-Turkish speaking minorities were to be dispersed within type 2 zones in a manner that ensures they will not constitute more than 10 percent of the population of the town, district, region, or province. Significant number of areas next to railroads and highways and fifteen-kilometer wide strips on either side of major transportation lines were closed to resettlement of

non-Turkish speakers. Areas close to borders and frontiers were also restricted, so was any location next to natural resources. (Ülker 2007, Selimoğlu 2009:203-207)

While, the non-Turkish speakers were being distributed to Turkish majority towns, eastern regions were undergoing a process of Turkification. The government encouraged the Turkish population in type 1 zones to settle in a more concentrated pattern by giving them public lands and properties left behind by non-Muslims. Moreover, poor Turks from other parts of the country were settled in the region and were also given land to promote the growth of a landowning peasantry. This way, Turkish-speaking core areas were created in the regions, where non-Turkish speakers were the majority, in order to provide an anchor for future assimilation of the surrounding zones. These policies were primarily implemented in the eastern part of the country, where the Kurdish population was living, and border provinces that might potentially be the object of neighboring powers' irredentism. In the west the primary concern was dispersing immigrants into as many cities and towns as possible instead of creating non-Turkish speaking pockets. The resettled immigrants were bound by law to stay in the destinations designated for them for a minimum of five years, and sometimes the government provided subsidized housing to ensure that they continue to live in the same place. (Ülker 2007:45-54)

In essence, the Settlement Law of 1934 was an instrument of social engineering. By rearranging the socio-spatial organization of the country, the republican governments aimed to create a culturally homogenous population and neutralize the communities that were most resistant to the centralization policies. In retrospect it is fair to argue that the settlement policies succeeded in assimilating Muslim immigrants into Turkish society. Although members of most migrant communities maintained their cultural identities in their private lives, their original ethnicity did not form the basis of political mobilization at any moment. They learned Turkish and became assimilated into the nation. However, the spatial policies did not yield the expected results in the eastern regions. Majority of the Kurds preserved their ethic and linguistic identity despite facing systematic repression for decades. But no large-scale rebellion or insurrection took place in Kurdish provinces until 1980s; the republican state failed at assimilating Kurdish population but successfully established its control over all contested regions of the country.

## Conclusion

At the end of single party period, the modern state in Turkey had established itself as the ultimate source of authority within its territory. There were no social or political group that could pose a threat to its dominance; Kurdish population was subjugated and was unable rise in rebellions as they did in the past, and anti-westernization reactionary forces have long lost their capacity of political mobilization. Although, RPP lost all multi-party elections of the next two decades and was removed from power, most within the society had adopted majority of the basic elements of republican ideology –modernization, westernization, development, republicanism, and nationalism–, and regarded the nation state as legitimate. These principles formed the normative foundations of national political discourse and none of the major political parties or other political actors challenged them.

## 6.2 Pakistan

### 6.2.1 Historical Overview

Pakistan became Independent in 1947 with the partition of British India. The idea of Pakistan was a creation of Muslim intellectual circles centered in Delhi. As the country was founded as a homeland for the Muslim's of India its population is an amalgamation of various ethnic groups with Islam as the common denominator among them. Thus, national unity is and has been one of the most significant problems of Pakistan. At the time of its independence this problem was even more pronounced as two geographic wings of the country was separated by thousands of miles of Indian territory. As much it was a big blow to the political elite at the time, the independence of Bangladesh in 1973 actually made Pakistan a more administrable country; nevertheless, regional disparities and unequal conditions among different ethnic groups continue to be powerful centrifugal forces.

The partition of British India left Pakistan without an established state infrastructure. India inherited the colonial capital and all assets of the colonial state, while Pakistan had to contend with establishing a political center and creating the state apparatus from scratch. Making matters worse Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, died soon after independence without having the chance to establish a Pakistani tradition, as Nehru was able to do in India during his 17 years tenure as prime minister. The massive migration after the partition also burdened Pakistan more than India, since immigrants accounted for a much larger portion of Pakistan's total population. Thus, during the first decade of its independence the nascent state of Pakistan had to struggle with consolidating it power and control over the country.

In 1958, General Ayub Khan took control of the state by a coup d'état and became the first among the many military rulers of Pakistan. Ayub ruled the country until 1969, when he had to resign in the face of widespread protests, when he signed an unpopular peace treaty with India concluding the war of 1965. General Yahya Khan took over the office of presidency and continued the military rule until 1971, when he had to hand over the presidency after the secession of Bangladesh and Pakistan's defeat against India. A new constitution was drafted in

1972 and the leftist populist politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won the elections in 1973. Bhutto won the election again in 1977, but deposed by General Zia-ul-Haq, when a wave of demonstrations by the supporters of the conservative alliance took over Pakistan's cities. Zia-ul-Haq had Bhutto tried in court for murder, a clearly sham allegation, and sentenced to death. The repressive military regime stayed in power until 1988, when Zia died in a plane crash and opened the way for democratic elections.

Forty years after its independence the state in Pakistan had established a powerful bureaucracy, the military had developed into a state within the state with extensive resources at its disposal and insulating itself from political oversight. The Pakistani state wields substantial despotic power but it has failed at cultivating infrastructural power and having a transformative effect on Pakistan's society.

### 6.2.2 Colonial Legacy

Although British colonial practices were not uniform across the subcontinent, they had a transformative impact on the social, political, and economic structures in every part of India. The British Raj was the first instance of a modern state in the subcontinent and it changed the dynamics of the relationship between the state and peoples of India. The precedent set by the practices of colonial government, informed the character of state in all countries that once were part of the British Raj.

The first and foremost purpose of all European colonial enterprises was the transfer of wealth to the metropoles, and the underlying motive behind all policies of colonial administrations and ventures was to maximize their capacity to extract that wealth. Similar to most pre-modern societies, land was the main source of wealth in India and agrarian relations were at the root of all forms of social domination. Since, the primary purpose of British colonial administration was maintaining political stability and increasing agricultural productivity, policies establishing land tenure relations were the most important element of governance. Moreover, by empowering certain groups over others these policies laid the foundations of future social and political structures of post-colonial countries.

### 6.2.3 Colonial Legacy in Bengal

The conquest of Bengal by the East India Company (EIC) in the second half of the 18th century marks the emergence of the British Raj. Up until then the EIC operated, with extensive liberties, as a commercial enterprise with some amount of military force at its disposal and a network of trading posts under its control. In Bengal it took control of a whole region for the first time and began to assume the responsibilities of a governing body. Without much experience to rely on, the company had to develop its own methods to rule over a large indigenous population. The emerging administrative policies and practices were primarily motivated by commercial interest and guided by the principle of pragmatism rather than ideology[70].

In Bengal, The EIC inherited the land tenure relations of the Mughal Empire and gradually superimposed over it an administrative system based on British customs and laws relating to land. New legal notions such as the protection of private property owners' rights, binding contracts for debt and services, rights to alienate and lease property, and an independent judiciary entered into Indian agrarian relations. However, it is important to underline a significant duality of British colonial practice that had an important influence in shaping its legacy over the subcontinent. The public law under the Raj sought to safeguard the freedoms of individuals within the marketplace in line with the Western liberal tradition, but the private laws of colonial India aimed at limiting individual freedoms within the boundaries of existing moral and communal traditions. The colonial state wanted to develop capitalist market relations and encourage economic growth and technological progress, all the while keeping society within the same structure it had when the British first encountered it. (Washbrook 2011:651-653)

The earliest land tenure system EIC implemented was the *zamindari*[71] system, which was based on auctioning of rent collection rights on contract. It was institutionalized under the

[70] A telling example of this attitude is EIC's deliberately keeping missionaries out for two centuries; the first British bishop arrived at India in 1813. In contrast, the Portuguese in Goa brought in Jesuit priests in the 16th century; they proselytized, and created a pilgrimage site, Basilica de Bom Jesus, where St. Francis Xavier is buried. The Spanish in the Philippines exerted as much –if not more - effort toward converting native peoples as they did towards establishing commerce.

[71] Zamindar is a Persian word meaning landowner and was used by the Mughals. The term refers to the landowning aristocracy in most provinces of the subcontinent, regardless of the particular land tenure system in place.

Bengal Permanent Settlement Act of 1793; under the legislation, titleholders (*zamindars*) became property owners with all the rights associated, in return for paying the Company a yearly sum that was fixed for perpetuity. Failure to pay on time resulted in annulment of the contract, after which the title would be sold at auction. The motivation behind the *zamindari* system was to remove the semi-autonomous Mughal princes at the top of the social hierarchy and integrate the local rural elite into the colonial system as proprietors. They would be the revenue-generating class and function as political intermediaries, preserving local customs and keeping traditional village life intact.

However, the fixed tax amount and the introduction of property rights turned land into a desirable commodity. Many *zamindars* failed to make the payments and lost the right to their land. Over time, Indian officials within the EIC government, whose position allowed them to know which lands were underassesed, bought the foreclosed titles. Gradually, a new landholding class with a different outlook emerged: they lived in cities, had no ties to the lands they held, and managed them via intermediaries as absentee landlords. The new *zamindars* accumulated large amounts of capital by forcing their tenants to accept plantation-style farming of cash crops instead of rice or wheat, which led to some of the worst 19$^{th}$ century famines. Thus, the *zamindari* system failed to maintain existing agrarian relations, as it was intended to, but rather created an alien landowning class that stood between the peasantry and the colonial state.

The accumulation of wealth in the hands of the urbanite landholders led to the emergence of an urban identity and flourishing of an educated Bengali upper class, which resulted in the development of a prominent intellectual milieu in Bengal. As Calcutta grew into a major metropolis, the intellectual influence of Bengali literati over the rest of India also grew. As Indian nationalist politician Gopal Krishna Gokhale put in his oft-cited quote “What Bengal thinks today, India thinks tomorrow”. This urbane literary tradition played an important part in the formation of the modern Bengali national identity.

### 6.2.4 Colonial Legacy in Punjab

When the British began expanding their rule over Punjab, they encountered a social structure and political organization that was quite different from that of the princely kingdoms. In Punjab, administrative officials of the Mughal Empire had turned their appointments into hereditary fiefs; they began appropriating large amounts of the local revenue, and eventually developed into a corrupt, rent- dependent class. As their numbers increased over the 17th and early 18th centuries, so did their demands of the local population. Their practices sparked widespread resistance to their domination by the rural communities, and by the first half of 18th century it had evolved into outright rebellion, led by the landholding castes. Many rebels adopted the Sikh faith, unifying the opposition, which became a militant protest movement against Mughal rule. By the mid-18th century, Sikh warbands along with Muslim and Hindu peasant confederations managed to neutralize the Mughal elite and effectively ended Mughal control over Punjab. Landholding village castes established their autonomy and a few peasant leaders even became large landowners. (Ali 2002:30-32)

As colonial rule expanded into Punjab, the British understood the power of the landed peasantry and their part in the demise of the Mughals. In order to avoid a similar fate, the colonial administration sought ways to secure their support. One approach was to lure the agrarian upper castes, which had become militarized over the past half-century into the British Indian Army. The first Punjabi soldiers were recruited in the mid-19th century, and after they fought loyally against the rebels during the Rebellion of 1857, their numbers within the army grew rapidly. By the end of the 19th century, nearly half of the soldiers in the Indian Army were Punjabis. Military service came with significant material benefits: regular pay, family support, and a pension in the form of land grants. It also conferred some degree of prestige on the Punjabi elite vis-à-vis other castes and ethnic groups, which the British considered to be non-martial races[72]. (Ali 2002:33)

[72] The idea of martial vs. non-martial races was a notion developed by British Army officers with some degree of inspiration from the Hindu caste system. The basis for considering an ethnic group to be martial included its culture and environmental condition and the degree to which it resisted colonial expansion. After the Rebellion of 1857, the distinction was used to recruit among the groups that stayed loyal and limit the number of soldiers from the groups that joined the rebels. Punjabis, Pashtuns, and Gurkhas were the most prominent martial races. The idea still carried

Punjabi loyalty to the colonial regime was further assured by the passage of the Land Revenue Act of 1871, which recognized their proprietary rights over village lands they were holding within the traditional system. This meant abolishing all the privileges and protections that customary laws had afforded landless peasant cultivators, turning them into tenants with no rights other than those specified by the tenancy contract. In the end, the landholding caste of Punjab lost its control of small autonomous rural domains but acquired a new status under the Raj through military service and ownership rights. (Waseem 1989:32-33)

The most important development during British colonial rule in Punjab was the construction of a vast network of irrigation canals in the Indus basin. Unlike the eastern parts of the subcontinent, which are drenched by the monsoons, the arid climate of the plains around the Indus River made Punjab unsuitable for rain-fed (*barani*) agriculture. The existing irrigation systems in Punjab were limited to the immediate surroundings of the river, leaving large tracks of land with alluvial soil uncultivated. Starting in the 1880's, the colonial state began to build a network of canals, usually followed by railway tracks, to open previously empty lands to settlement. The resulting irrigation network has multiplied the agricultural productivity of Punjab and, in the long run, allowed Pakistan to feed its large population. (Jaffrelot 2002:153-155)

The constant increase in the amount of land available for cultivation between 1880's and 1920's and the concurrent development of a transportation infrastructure created ideal circumstances for growing cash crops and opening of Punjab's agricultural sector to world markets. Export-oriented production increased the wealth of the upper classes, which in turn produced a growing market for manufactured goods from abroad, and the export-import combination led to the development of an advanced, cash-based economy. The price of agricultural land increased dramatically: an acre of land that cost 10 rupees before colonization now fetched 600 rupees in most colonies. (Waseem 1989:40) A by-product of this process was the growth of a trader-cum-moneylender class serving as the intermediary between foreign capital and local producers. They provided cultivators and landholders with credit bound with cash crops, which they sold to international merchants based in port cities.

---

weight among some after independence; part of the Pakistani military's eagerness to fight India in 1965 was the belief in the innate martial superiority of its predominantly Punjabi ranks over India's non-martial forces.

The canal network was also intended to be a major social engineering tool that would solidify colonial rule over Punjab. The British regarded a stable rural society as a guarantee for the continued dominance of the Raj over India. The British colonial administration planned to allot most of the newly irrigated lands in smallholdings, to creating self-sufficient village communities composed of tenant farmers and land grantees acting as communal leaders. By deliberate policy, though, almost all of the new land was granted to members of the militarized rural upper class, who were already landholders and major providers of revenue for the administration. Thus, their role as the backbone of the colonial regime in Punjab would became even more pronounced.

However, the market conditions created by the British colonial government were bound to conflict with its desire to keep agrarian relations static. The increase in the amount of cash in circulation led to speculation in land values and inflation. Under these conditions, many landholders, facing bankruptcy and foreclosures, began to surrender their land to moneylenders and other creditors. The results were constant fluctuations in land ownership. Many large landowners were able to increase their estates, and absentee landlords multiplied. The colonial administration realized that the Punjabi landholding class it had heavily relied on to secure its rule might disintegrate in the face of these disruptive market forces. As a result, the colonial regime passed the Alienation of Lands Act in1900, a remarkably conservative piece of legislation that prohibited members of non-agricultural castes – in other words, the moneylenders – from purchasing land belonging to the agricultural castes. This blatantly political act applied only to Punjab[73] and ensured that the socio-political position of the rural elites, and the colonial regime's base of support, would be unaffected by economic forces. (Ali 1987:111-112; Waseem 1989:35; Talbot 1998:61-62)

The most significant legacy of the British colonial administration was the conservative and militaristic landowning class dominating the socio-political structure of the province. Empowered and enriched by the development of the agricultural infrastructure of the region the Punjabi landowners held considerable political power.

[73] In 1921 it was extended to the frontier districts of Peshawar and Kohat.

### 6.2.5 Colonial Legacy in Sindh

The Mughals conquered Sindh at the end of the 16th century, but throughout the next two centuries they did not attempt to integrate the region into the core of their domains. The appointed governors and administrators remained as outsiders and functioned as revenue farmers, (collectors?) leaving other aspects of governance to local social systems. Despite the detached approach of the governors, the local population, organized in large clans, resisted the Mughal rule and sporadically rose up in rebellion. As the power of the Mughal center declined, Sindh became independent at the beginning of the 18th century under the rule of the native Kalhora dynasty. Within a century, Afghans conquered northern Sindh and Talpurs, a Baloch tribe from the west, and overthrew the Kalhoras. Throughout this period the sense of ethnic pride and linguistic identification among the Sindhi population, first crystallized in the struggle against the Mughals, continued to grow and inspired a fierce resistance against British conquest.[74] (Ahmed 1992:158-160)

When the British finally conquered Sindh in the 1840s, they found the countryside under the firm domination and control of an elite comprised of great landowners (*mirs* or *waderos*) and hereditary Muslim saints (*pirs*), who often owned substantial lands themselves. The rest of the society was composed of petty landowners, a Hindu commercial-financier class, and a large number of predominantly Muslim peasants who were tenants with little or no rights on lands belonging to the principal landowners (*haris*). Unlike Punjab, where villages were compact, Sindh villages were composed of scattered homesteads and unconnected hamlets spread across the region. The lands, especially in the south, were penetrated by seawater underground and poor in quality. (Waseem 1989:36-37)

The colonial administration left the social structure intact and relied on the *waderos* and religious *pirs* to maintain order, collect revenue, and act as interpreters. Their propriety rights to the land were recognized along the lines of colonial law, while a majority of the peasants, who lost the rights they had under customary law, were declared tenants-at-will with no power vis-à-vis the landlords. Millions of acres of uncultivated land were appropriated as state property and

[74] The struggle to resist British invasion created its heroic figures, including Hoshu Sheedi, commander of the Talpur armies, who continued to inspire Sindhi nationalism in the centuries to come.

villagers were prohibited from clearing and settling new lands, as they had previously. (Ahmed 1984:155-158) The *waderos* controlled thousands of acres each and they did not need economic help from the British; instead, they prized, and were showered with, public bestowals of honor and symbols of official favor -embroidered scarfs (*lundi*), ceremonial swords and guns, exemptions from licenses, or invitations to official events. Prestige (*izzat*) was the most important form of social capital. (Cheesman 1982:446-448)

The British recognized the power *pirs* had over the countryside and actively cultivated their support for the colonial regime. After a short period of hesitation the *pirs* realized the benefits of maintaining good relations with the "infidel" rulers and reconciled with the colonial regime. Their traditional social privileges were recognized under the new regime, religious donations of land and wealth remained exempt from taxes, religious schools (*madrassas*) grew, while colonial officers exercised great discretion in *pirs* favor when enforcing rules. *Pirs* families managed to pursue their financially rewarding collaboration with the Raj, all the while retaining an aura of spiritual aloofness and without loosing their prestige in Sindh society. (Ansari 1992: 36-56)

The near-absolute collaboration of Sindh's agrarian elite with the colonial regime resulted in the preservation and solidification of the existing feudal system. The inequality in rural society actually increased with landowners on one end and landless peasants on the other, while peasant proprietors nearly disappeared. At the time of Pakistan's independence, 27,000 landowners, each with more than 100 acres, owned 5.6 million acres (54% of all land in Sindh). Although, statutory labor and various other forms of forced work were declared illegal, they continued to be expected by landlords and remained common practice. (Ahmed 1984:156-157)

The only major development project of the colonial period was the Sukkar Barrage on the Indus, which was completed in 1932. The barrage prevented flooding and provided water for irrigation. Within 10 years, 3.5 million acres of new land became available for cultivation, inspiring a socio-economic dynamic similar to what happened in Punjab. The government leased or sold 1.5 million acres of land by 1942, but unlike the Punjab arrangement, the new lands in Sindh were not reserved solely for people of Sindh. Most of it went to Punjabi settlers and military veterans; Sindhi landowners received some of it, and Sindhi peasants received only 90,000 acres of it. The landowners favored farmers from outside settling the land instead of their

tenants, and the British wanted to avoid anything that would disturb the social structure and lead to instability. (Ahmed 1984: 156; Waseem 1989:41-21)

The colonial rule left Sindh in the hands of an alliance between big landowners and religious saints. In contrast to Punjab, limited development of infrastructure left Sindh's agriculture more or less the same. Peasants were poorer while landowner's owned significantly larger estates than their Punjabi counterparts. Sindh's population was more diverse because of the distribution of irrigated lands to the members of other ethnic groups. Although they were still the majority, Sindhi speakers' power in the province was already in decline at the time of independence.

### 6.2.6 Evolution of Urbanization and Urbanism

The primary focus of the colonial government in Pakistan was the rural sector. Extraction of land revenue, increased market penetration, and growing agricultural production were the government's major economic concerns. The economic reasons behind the prioritization of the agrarian sphere were compounded by the colonial regime's reliance on agrarian elites to maintain its rule. The most apparent outcome of this preoccupation with the countryside was the neglect of urban sectors, especially the industrial sector.

The towns and cities of India had been centers of redistribution, where rural surplus was marketed. The towns did not have much to offer to villages in return and paid for the marketed surplus with the revenue urban authorities extracted from their citizens. Towns mainly provided a consumption base, and crafts-based manufacture primarily catered to the needs of the urban upper class. As a result, capital accumulation in urban areas was very limited, and cities relied on the political power of their rulers to maintain their position. Under British rule, this dynamic between urban and rural India persisted: colonial towns primarily functioned as administrative centers for the regulation of rural production. India was turned into a massive hinterland for the British industrial metropole while Indian cities became hubs for the collection and transfer of raw materials without any value added locally. A typical urban settlement under colonial rule was law-and-order oriented. It housed officials from various government departments, and its

amenities were mostly contingent on how important it was within the administrative organization. (Nyrop 1975:156-157)

Most major cities of Pakistan were largely shaped by the Mughals at the height of their rule between the 15th and 18th centuries. Lahore, which served as the capital of the empire during the 16th century, became the most prominent urban center of the region and reached the height of its architectural splendor under Emperors Akbar and Jahangir. Multan, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar grew as political and commercial centers and enjoyed several centuries of uninterrupted peace, a rare experience for cities in the region that suffered regular raids by nomadic armies.

Almost without exception, prominent cities of the region were located along Indus River or one of its tributaries since waterways were the primary means of transportation and communication. These cities formed an urban network that facilitated commercial and social movement among Central Asia, Northern India, and the Persian Gulf. Even though they became parts of different kingdoms - Sikh, Afghan, and Kalhora - after the collapse of the Mughal Empire, the major cities of this urban network maintained their positions as political and commercial centers. Nor did the changing economic structure during colonial rule have much impact on the existing socio-spatial dynamics of the Indus basin, primarily because railway lines and highways built by the British followed the already existing routes along the rivers and further solidified the central position of these major cities.

Under colonial rule, the overall tendency of the government to neglect urban centers, limiting their role to the fulfillment of regulatory functions, curbed their development. But while overall urban population remained a small portion of the whole, a number of new towns and a few major cities emerged during the colonial period primarily as a consequence of government policies and investments. Karachi significantly grew in size and prominence with the increase of agricultural output in Punjab and Sindh since it was the only regional outlet to international markets. From a garrison town of 15,000 in 1830, Karachi mushroomed into a major commercial port with a population of almost 400,000 by the time of independence. Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) was founded as a strategic town after the British victory over Sikh rulers, and it grew dramatically as the surrounding plains were opened to agriculture by the irrigation network. Originally a small village, Quetta became a military and commercial center under the British

rule, as it was perfectly located to protect the frontier region by controlling the Bolan Pass, the southern gateway to Afghanistan. Several regional centers of today, including Montgomery (now Sahiwal), Abbotabad, and Jacobabad, became the cities they are during the colonial period because of their proximity to railways and irrigation networks.

The most distinct urban development of the colonial period was the creation of entirely new towns and cantonments for British communities at some distance from the existing urban centers. The only inhabitants were colonial officials, British businessmen and their families and servants; regardless of how educated, westernized, or wealthy they were Indians were not allowed to reside within these towns. Their plans were modern with straight wide streets and buildings with western architectural designs. They were separated into civilian and military sections; the former, called Civil Lines, had large bungalows, administrative offices, and courts while the latter featured a military base, parade grounds, officers' residences, and separate markets for British and native military personnel. The primary motivation behind their establishment was neither urban development nor social transformation, but to form a physical barrier separating the British community from rest of the society. (Qadeer 2006:80-82)

In a sense, the British were recreating the Hindu traditions prescribing strict spatial separation between high and low castes, presenting themselves as a ruling caste that interacted with the rest of society only when necessary. The separation of Madras into a white city and a black city by the EIC administration is perhaps one of the most striking manifestations of this dynamic. However, it should be noted that during earlier days of colonization in the 18th century, company officials lived within the Indian community and developed an easy camaraderie with their servants and members of India's upper castes. The practice of spatial segregation began to be more pronounced as the 19$^{th}$ century progressed. One possible reason for the change was the arrival of colonial officials' families in growing numbers. Victorian-era British women tended to be less tolerant of mixing with foreigners, while obligations of family life meant that officials had less time for cross-cultural socializing than they did as single men. Another possible explanation for the practice of spatial segregation was the growing linkage between EIC officials in London and colonialists from the Americas, which may have caused the racial politics of the Western Hemisphere to gradually pervade colonial relations in India. (Nightingale 2012:48-50) But the tipping point in the shift toward isolation that turned it into

full-fledged racial segregation was the Rebellion of 1857. The violent events of that revolt remained in the consciousness of British colonialists long after it was over and became an essential element in the institutional memory of the British Raj. The rebellion significantly changed colonial officials' perception their position within Indian society and created a bunker mentality. (Nyrop 1984:18-19)

At the time of independence, typical cities were divided into four distinct parts: a historic core district, the colonial section, the cantonment, and new middle-class neighborhoods. Main features of the historic area were narrow streets, residential quarters divided along caste lines, bazaars, various artisans' quarters, and old mosques; they were often walled and included medieval forts or palaces depending on the size of the city. The new neighborhoods were organized into rectangular blocks, had wider streets than the historic section, and featured courtyard houses of modern design; most of the residents were educated middle- class natives. They tended to be located at the margins of the historic core that were closest to the British section; over time they expanded into the space between the two and eliminated the empty corridor that had separated them. With the spatial segregation of urban society, each section of the city had its own separate focal point, its own downtown. As a consequence, most cities in today's Pakistan are multinuclear settlements notably lacking a central zone in the traditional sense; Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Multan, Rawalpindi, and to a lesser extent Hyderabad all conform to this spatial pattern. (Qadeer 1983:81-90; Lari 1996:135-146)

Pakistan's cities experienced dramatic growth during the decades following independence. They expanded horizontally, taking over the surrounding areas, while the density of the built environment within their borders simultaneously increased. Throughout this period, the distinct qualities of old neighborhoods endured, while new neighborhoods for middle and upper class residents were developed along the principles of modern urban planning. In that sense the existing divisions within major cities of Pakistan persisted after the independence.

The major transformation within the post-independence urban landscape was the emergence and rapid growth of squatter colonies (*katchi abadi*) that began with the partition of the subcontinent and continued until today. The urban administrations were incapable of handling the problems created by the massive outpour of refugees from India into Pakistani cities, especially Karachi. Thus, the government unofficially accepted the unorganized invasion

of public parks, open spaces, and state properties by the refugees. Although the government undertook public housing projects, it was impossible to keep up with the burgeoning demand. Within a decade after independence, rural migrants supplanted refugees as the newcomers to cities, while land-grabbing and squatter colonies, operating with the approval of police and municipal officials, turned into a lucrative industry. Government policies on squatter neighborhoods varied; under Ayub Khan's military regime, slums within Karachi were demolished and residents were relocated to new settlements built by the government outside the city.[75] Bhutto's socialist government opted for the opposite and distributed titles for the occupied public lands with the purpose of establishing a political base among residents of the large cities' slums. But regardless of the regime in charge, *katchi abadis* neighborhoods have continued to grow and become a permanent feature of Pakistan's cities, striking examples of urban poverty. (Hasan et al. 2002: 59-70; Qadeer 2006:86-88)

### 6.2.7 Urban Administration and Politics

Throughout the first decade of independence, the structure of local government in Pakistan was based on the administrative system inherited from the colonial period. The Punjab Municipal Act of 1911, and the Bengal Municipal Act of 1932 were the major pieces of legislation that shaped local administration within the Raj and at independence the government of Pakistan adopted both laws as a part of its administrative structure.

The colonial system of government was based on complete control of local government by the provincial authorities. Within this framework there was no power of local authorities, which could not be withdrawn immediately by district officers. The provincial government had

[75] Korangi Township was the most well known among these modern resettlement towns; designed by the Greek urban planner, Constantinos Apostolou Doxiadis, who also prepared the plans of Islamabad, Korangi was built to house 50,000 refugees. Prefabricated houses rose rapidly, and Ayub Khan proudly touted the town as the face of Pakistan's future to the visiting U.S. President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. However, the houses lacked basic infrastructure and the town did not have a proper connection to Karachi: within less than a decade it became an urban wasteland and residents who could leave did so while the others suffered as much as they did in Karachi with the added hardship of unemployment. See Daechsel 2011 for a detailed account.

ultimate authority to create or dissolve local bodies, alter their boundaries, frame their constitutions, renew elections, and even withdraw the system of local government altogether from any area. Moreover the provincial authority had the power to remove elected officials at any level of local government. The finances of local bodies were also completely under control of provincial centers. (Ahmad 1974:51-53)

Municipal committees and corporations were created in cities and towns, with functions such as building and maintenance of roads, sanitation, public health, supply of water, building of libraries and providing education. Each province of Pakistan passed numerous laws on the form and functions of municipalities and in all cases the officers of the provincial government were reserved the right make important final decisions. Finances and decisions of municipal bodies were subject to approval by the provincial administration, as were their elections.

In 1959, on the first anniversary of the military coup General Ayub announced the establishment of a new political administrative system, under the name basic democracies, that would replace the existing one. Ayub claimed the new system was designed to expedite rural development, improve social welfare, and create a new class of political leaders with direct connection to the people. According to the basic democracies system 80,000 basic democrats - 40,000 from each wing of the country- were to be elected via direct franchise to union councils in rural areas and to union committees in urban areas. The elected representatives in turn would elect the members of higher-level local administrative bodies, *tehsil* councils in rural areas and municipal committees in urban centers. The basic democrats were also to elect the president and provincial assemblies. The small size of electoral districts enabled civil and police officers to manipulate the election process and the relatively small number of elected Basic Democrats made it easy for the government to control them thorough coercion or patronage. Since an overwhelming majority of the electoral districts were rural, politically mobilized sections of urban society ended up being significantly disenfranchised within the political structure. (Jalal 1990:302-306)

Despite widespread opposition in urban centers basic democracies system became a part of 1962 constitution. General Ayub was elected president in 1964 with 65 percent of basic democrats' votes. The *muhajir* communities in urban centers actively opposed Ayub's presidential candidacy, supporting the bid of Fatima Jinnah against him. After Ayub's victory a

mass procession mainly organized by the Pashtun community took place and resulted in some riots especially among the *muhajir* population. This was the first time *muhajirs* came into conflict with another ethnic group and it marked the beginning of ethnic clashes in Karachi, which would reach its apex during late 1980's. (Siddiqi 2012:97-98)

Despite being overturned in the following years the policies of Ayub era had long lasting effects on the urban rural dynamics of Pakistan. His land reforms empowered the rural middle classes, especially Punjabi landowners, while diminishing the political influence of urban centers, and incidentally of the *muhajir* population. The resulting urban discontent, particularly among working classes and the youth, was manifest in the widespread protests that took place in all major cities of Pakistan during the last two years of the military regime. Urban protests and uprisings had become an effective political instrument in Pakistani politics. Riots in major cities had played an important role in the collapse of the military regime in 1971, the end of Bhutto's government in 1977, and the weakening of Zia-ul Haq's military government.

### 6.2.8 Economic Development Strategy

The growth strategy adopted after 1947 played a significant role in shaping the future pattern of urbanization in Pakistan. At the time of its independence, the country's economy was predominantly agrarian. The partition left Pakistan with only a small portion of the already limited industrial sector of British India. Out of a total of 14,569 establishments in colonial India, only 1,406 were within the borders of Pakistan's eastern and western wings. (Nadeem 1970:10) Moreover, as a result of British colonial policies, most of the industrial facilities were basic units for processing agricultural products: flour and rice mills, cotton ginning and jute pressing factories. The country was almost devoid of any large-scale industry, whose share of GDP was less than 2 percent in 1949. Hence, the new Pakistani government regarded industrialization as a top priority. (Hamid 1976:5)

In the years following independence, the central government had little interest in regional and sectorial balance. Given the limited public resources, any investment in infrastructure to increase accessibility to peripheral areas had a low priority. The lack of resources also helped

convince the government to achieve industrialization primarily by opening the field to private entrepreneurs instead of establishing public enterprises, except in a few areas of strategic value. Thus, the state gave the private sector free rein over its investment decisions and provided it with extensive support in order to accelerate industrial growth.

Since there was no established industrial base, locational choices were not constrained much by past decisions. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of existing entrepreneurs were migrants from India, who were free from familial concerns or historical ties when deciding where to settle and invest. Large urban centers were attractive to entrepreneurs since they had a better infrastructural base, available markets, and an abundant labor supply. Furthermore, most early industries were in sectors such as textiles, where proximity to raw materials was not a significant issue, and the cost of transporting finished goods was substantially lower in big cities. In addition to the economic and personal factors cited above, political considerations also played a major part in location decisions. Government support made it possible for entrepreneurs to interact with members of the bureaucracy, establishing the personal ties that allowed them to conduct their business. For the industrialists, employing representatives to contact the government was a considerable risk since bureaucrats could easily be offended having to deal with a subordinate. Thus, proximity to governmental institutions was an essential factor in location decisions, making the capital, Karachi, and to a lesser extent the provincial capitals of Lahore and Dhaka, even more attractive locales for investment. Yet despite their developed infrastructures, large populations, and the political advantages they offered, most migrant businessmen avoided settling in Lahore and Dhaka because both cities were dominated by resident elites with strongly established social networks based on the local language and culture. (Papanek 1970:293-298)

While the decisions regarding the location of investments were essentially left to private investors, central government established Industrial Trading Estates in 1950, providing water, power, sewage treatment, roads, and other facilities for industrial use. They were set up in and around Karachi, Hyderabad, and Dhaka and attracted major private investment. As a result, about 40 percent of all Pakistani industrial investment in 1959 was located in the estates; the two estates in Karachi alone housed a third of all foot-loose industrial enterprises in Pakistan. (Abbasi 1986:43)

Throughout 1960s, under the Ayub regime, the government introduced several policies to discourage further concentration and extend the industrial belt beyond Karachi-Hyderabad to other centers in Punjab, like Lyallpur and Multan. Tax exemptions for investing in less developed areas made it easier for firms to receive permits, and new investments in Karachi were prohibited. However, the high rate of tax evasion made tax breaks less significant than they might have been, and investors were able to use their influence to receive individual exemptions to overcome investment restrictions. Some investors obeyed the letter of the law, but established new plants in towns very close to Karachi. Industrialists knew well that they could be more successful in extracting favors from the government if they were in Karachi, so the legal benefits of investing in less developed areas were easily offset by the realities of patronage politics. Government policies encouraging the dispersion of investment had little or no effect on the existing pattern of industrial location. (Akhtar 1964:24-27, Papanek 1970:302-304)

Two decades of development policies resulted in the concentration of industry and wealth both socially and spatially. By 1968, 22 largest families controlled 66% of all industrial assets, 70% of insurance funds, and 80% of banking assets. Meanwhile between 1959 and 1969 GDP grew 42% in West Pakistan and only 17% in East Pakistan. (Sayeed 1980:57)

Because of the factors cited above, industrial development in Pakistan was concentrated in a few areas. As the major port of West Pakistan and the seat of central government, Karachi attracted the majority of the migrant entrepreneurs. The infrastructural needs of these enterprises put enormous pressure on public services in the city, which were strained further by the arrival of large numbers of refugees and the requirements of the central government. Because of its location in a semi-desert environment, the cost of bringing water and power to Karachi was particularly high. As a result, a disproportionate share of public resources was spent on Karachi alone. Although the city accounted for only three percent of Pakistan's population, the First Development Plan (1955-1960) allocated 64 percent of all water and sewage and 56 percent of all housing investment in the country to Karachi, while the Second Development Plan (1960-1965) dedicated 27 percent of all transportation investment to it. (Eddison 1961:4; Wellisz 1971:41)

### 6.2.9 Partition and Refugees

The partition of British India resulted in the largest demographic movement and one of the worst tragedies of modern history. Between August and November 1947, millions of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs left their homelands and migrated to Pakistan and India out of fear of future persecution. The unorganized movement of these masses, aggravated by an administrative paralysis immediately following the partition, created a chaotic environment in which hundreds of thousands of refugees - Muslim and Hindu - lost their lives en route to horrific massacres. The partition occupies a significant place in the collective memories of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to this day, but it is only in Pakistan - West Pakistan, then – that these refugees have played a major role in shaping the socio-political dynamics of the new state.

The official figure for the number of refugees in Pakistan, according to the 1951 census, was 7.5 million, while unofficial estimates went as high as 10 million, within a total population of 41 million. The majority of these refugees, 6.7 million of them, went to West Pakistan, where they constituted a fifth of its post-independence population of 31 million. (Visaria 1969:331; Chitkara 1996:23) Despite the diversity of their origins and social backgrounds, the refugees that arrived in Pakistan can be separated into two broad categories, namely, insiders and outsiders. While historical political studies on Pakistan predominantly focus on the latter group, since they wielded substantial political influence within the nascent state, it is important to point out that more than three out of four refugees were actually outsiders. (Burki 1980:11-12)

The insiders were those migrants who moved within the borders of their home provinces from East Punjab to West Punjab and from West Bengal to East Bengal. The Radcliff Line, designating the borders between India and Pakistan, divided the provinces of Punjab and Bengal between the two nations and awarded several Muslim majority districts to India, while leaving large non-Muslim communities in Pakistan.[76] The result was a massive uprooting of people in both provinces: 5.14 million Muslim Punjabis and 600,000 Muslim Bengalis moved across the new borders, while nearly as many Hindu and Sikhs moved in the opposite direction.

[76] Before his appointment as the chairman of the Border Commission, Sir Cyril Radcliff had never been to India nor did he know anyone from India. In a twisted reasoning, his complete ignorance about India was the very reason behind his selection, the assumption being that he would be completely unbiased toward either side.

In cultural and linguistic terms, these migrants were not alien to their destinations; they were familiar with the administrative structure and had been living under the same socio-economic dynamics. Although these refugees predominantly came from rural areas, they were the recipients of the mostly urban properties left behind by departing Hindus and Sikhs; that provided them with new opportunities and alleviated their social position vis-à-vis average locals. Moreover, politicians from East Punjab were allowed to take seats in the West Punjab Assembly, though they needed to reassemble their voter base to maintain their positions. Over the following decades these refugees did not become a social group with a distinct identity in Punjab or Bengal, but many were able to turn their economic advantage into educational or commercial skills; these upwardly mobile refugees were eventually represented in the bureaucracy and the army in higher ratios than their numbers warranted. (Waseem 1989:108-112; Talbot 1998:106-108)

### 6.2.10 Muhajirs

One of the very peculiar aspects of the Pakistan Movement, which called for creation of an independent homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims, was the lukewarm support it received in Muslim-majority provinces of northwest India. Landlords and tribal leaders, the dominant political group in Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan, were relatively content with the status quo under British rule and did not show much enthusiasm for the idea. Some landed aristocrats from Punjab, who were members of the Muslim League, even left the organization when it changed its main objective of promoting Muslim solidarity within the Raj to the creation of Pakistan. During the last decade of colonial rule, Punjab and Sindh remained mostly quiet while the rest of India was going through political turmoil as agitation against the British grew steadily.

The main political base of the Pakistan Movement was centered around Delhi and the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh). In essence the Muslim League, was a party of Urdu-speaking nobles and elites of the subcontinent. These Muslims were the descendants of the Mughal ruling elite, and they formed the backbone of the British colonial administration since they tended to be better educated than the average person owing to their aristocratic background. In essence they

were a social class of salaried civil servants depending on the Raj to maintain their status in society. They were predominantly urbanites and their lifestyle, outlook, and culture were markedly different from those of the Muslims living in the northwest provinces. From the mid-19th century to the end of the colonial era, the power of Urdu speakers within the colonial administration gradually declined: in 1857 the administration of the United Provinces was 64 percent Muslim, but by 1913 they accounted for only 35 percent. Although this was still an overrepresentation, since Urdu-speaking Muslims were only 13 percent of the population in U.P., the decline in influence was one of the major factors behind the emergence of the idea of an independent Muslim country. (Alavi 1992:264-266; Siddiqi 2012:96-97)

As the progenitors of Pakistan, members of the Urdu-speaking salaried class preferred to move to the new country after the partition. Since they expected to be the founding cadres of central government and occupy positions within the bureaucracy, nearly all of them settled in the new capital, Karachi, and the rest moved to other major cities close by: Hyderabad, Sukkur, and Mirpurkhas. They did not speak the language of the local population and they were complete strangers to the social, political and cultural structures of Sindh. Their only connection with their new homeland was the abstract idea of Pakistan. Sindh's economy was predominantly agricultural with some trading centers and no industry; landlords and religious figures comprised the dominant social classes. On the other hand *Muhajirs* belonged to an advanced urban culture and believed themselves to be the real creators of Pakistan; to them Sindh was a backward, underdeveloped part of the country, and they were not particularly interested in integrating in it. (Zaidi 1992:336-337; Shaikh 2009:48-51)

As the outsider refugees, Urdu speakers rallied around the *Muhajir*[77] identity to describe themselves within Pakistani society, in contrast to those in Punjab or Bengal. The *Muhajir* community's settlement in Karachi changed the ethnic and political dynamics of Sindh province. Immigrants occupied prestigious positions within the government and their status rose accordingly. They actually outnumbered the native Sindhi population of Karachi, since most urban Sindhis were Hindu merchants and professionals who left after partition. The administration of Karachi was separated from the provincial administration and the provincial

[77] *Muhajir* as a term that means immigrant in various countries of the Muslim world; it is derived from Arabic *hijrah* the moving of Muhammad and early Muslims from Mecca to Medina to avoid persecution. Thus, the concept connotes both displacement and a religious identity and was very fitting to the case of Pakistani *Mujahirs*.

capital of Sindh had to be moved from Karachi to Hyderabad. The Sindh University in Karachi that was founded shorty before independence was forced to relocate to Hyderabad and its campus was given to the new, Urdu-speaking Karachi University. While government funds poured into Karachi, the rest of the province did not see any of the benefits, since most of the investors were *Muhajirs* who also provided the bulk of industrial labor in the city. Despite being spoken by a minority of the population, Urdu became the official language of the country and Sindhis were faced with the necessity of learning it in order to communicate with the central government. Previously, Sindh's cities had been predominantly non-Muslim, but they became predominantly non-Sindhi after the arrival of the immigrants. (Ahmed 1992:168-172)

The *Muhajirs'* domination of the central bureaucracy and the economic elite of Karachi aggravated the resentment among indigenous Sindhis and created a divide between urban centers and the countryside of the province. The *Muhajir* ruling elite, under the government of Liaquat Ali Khan, attempted to lessen the divide and garner the support of Sindhi peasants by proposing a land reform bill in 1951. In response, the landlords of Sindh began a campaign to articulate the problem of rural poverty in terms of an anti-*Muhajir* discourse, blaming the foreign urbanites for estranging Sindhis from the wealth of their country. Sindhi landlords found ample support for their cause among their Punjabi counterparts, who described land reform as a communist policy and mobilized Islamist political forces against the government. The vehement response of the feudal aristocracy and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan forced the government to shelve the land reform proposal.[78] The *Muhajir* political elite's effort to gain the Sindhi peasants' support failed badly, and in the process it inspired a rural nationalist movement against the central government. (Nasr 1997:108-09)

The *Muhajir* community dominated the civil service of Pakistan, but the majority of the military personnel were still Punjabis and the rest were Pashtuns. Beginning with the coup d'état by Ayub Khan, an ethic Pashtun, in 1958, the military apparatus exercised extensive power over Pakistan's politics even at times of civilian rule. Thus despite their economic influence and resources, the *Muhajirs* gradually lost the near monopoly over central government positions they had enjoyed. That change was accelerated in the early 1970s when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's

[78] Land reform remained an untouchable issue until the early 1970s when Prime Minister Bhutto, an ethic Sindhi, managed to pass a reform program placing some limits on land holdings; even then, the province of Sindh was exempted.

government initiated a policy of applying ethnic quotas to recruitment for civil service. *Muhajirs* occupied 35 percent of all posts in civil government in 1973, but by 1986 they were down to 19 percent, still an over-representation since they accounted for only 8 percent of Pakistan's population. The decline in bureaucratic employment adversely affected the *Muhajir* middle class and its younger generation job seekers. (Kennedy 1991:943) As a Sindhi and a populist, Bhutto intentionally attacked *Muhajirs* as capitalists and exploiters to attract Sindhi followers. However, his policies sparked a widespread Sindhi campaign against *Muhajirs*, leading to riots and clashes between the two groups that overwhelmed the large cities of Sindh, and neither provincial nor federal forces could calm the situation. By the mid-1970s, the metropolitan areas of Sindh had become a conflict zone, which helped precipitate General Zia-ul-Haq's military takeover in 1977. (Ziring 1997: 388-390; Shaikh 2009: 54-56)

The tensions between Sindhis and the *Muhajirs* increased and ethnic relations became increasingly complex as thousands of Baluchis and Pashtun refugees settled in large cities of Sindh throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The repressive military regime of General Zia ul Haq increased urban unrest by harshly persecuting youth organizations. *Muhajirs'* discontent led to the foundation of Muhajir Qawmi Mahaz (MQM), a secular political organization of young militants advocating *Muhajir* rights. Eventually the conflict took the form of widespread violence in 1985 during the four-way ethnic riots that put Sindhis, *Muhajirs*, Pashtuns, and Punjabis against each other; more than 2,000 lives were lost. Violent clashes among underground nationalist-cum-criminal organizations continued into the 1990s and created what was called a "Kalashnikov culture" in the large cities of Sindh. (Kennedy 1991:942-950; Chitkara 1996:43-49; Verkaait 2004:56-72)

### 6.2.11 Islamabad and National Identity

At the time of Pakistan's independence, Lahore was its largest city and principal economic, cultural, and educational center. Situated on the easiest crossing of the Ravi River, the central one of Punjab's five rivers, the city was in the middle of the food-producing belt of the province before the construction of the irrigation canals. It had been regional capital during early

Muslim conquests, an alternative capital to Mughals, and the provincial capital under the British. With its developed infrastructure and established urban culture, it was the natural choice to be Pakistan's capital city. The only reason it was not selected was its proximity -- 17 miles -- to the newly drawn India-Pakistan border. The start of the Kashmir conflict right after the partition set the tone for future relations between the two countries and there was no chance the capital could be in a geographically vulnerable location.

The second-best option was Karachi with its relatively more developed infrastructure and established connections with international markets. Dhaka was briefly considered as an alternative, but Karachi already had a base of administrative buildings and more room for expansion. Karachi was a natural port, had a developed agricultural hinterland, and its location halfway between Istanbul and Singapore was a strategic advantage with regards to international maritime trade between Europe and East Asia. Its main disadvantage was the scarcity of fresh water. A pipeline from Hyderabad would bring some relief, but as its population swelled over the years, the task of supplying water to Karachi became increasingly difficult and more expensive. (Tayyeb 1966:178)

Karachi lacked the Muslim architectural heritage that Lahore, Dhaka, or Delhi possessed; it had no palaces, no imperial mosques, and no forts. As a colonial town it had administrative buildings, hotels, and some art deco structures but no significant assets to fulfill its role as an urban focal point for a new Muslim nation. Pakistan's state elite was well aware of the symbolic functions of a capital city and wanted Karachi to become an expression of Pakistan's independence and identity. That proved to be a challenge as the civil bureaucracy, foreign advisors, local power holders, and the public offered their differing views as to how that might be accomplished. The crux of the problem was finding the right mixture of Islam and modernism that would satisfy all the parties involved, but their expectations were difficult to reconcile. In 1949, the preparation of the city's master plan was assigned to a conglomerate of European engineering consultants –Merz Rendel Vatten Pakistan MRVP- with very limited urban planning experience and no history of work in a Muslim country. The Pakistani bureaucracy wanted to recreate what the British did in New Delhi, a completely new city next to Karachi that would be solely dedicated to government, but the master plan MRVP presented was a restructuring of the existing city. The Finance Ministry rejected the idea to create a new city, as it would be too

costly, so the plan for a capital was replaced by a plan for a capitol. However, after a decade of struggle between bureaucrats, planners, and the public, Jinnah's Mausoleum: *Mazar-e-Quaid* became the only monument the Karachi Federal Capital project ever built.[79] (Daechsel 2015:64-84) A lack of resources, political will, and administrative power hampered the effort to turn Karachi into a symbol of the new nation, but it also suffered from the absence of a cohesive vision of Pakistan's identity among the members of the ruling elite.

After declaring martial law and taking control of government, Ayub Khan appointed a commission to search for a new site to move the capital. The site chosen by the commission, to nobody's surprise, was next to the Punjabi garrison city Rawalpindi, where the general headquarters of Pakistan's military was located. Rawalpindi had been a major military garrison since the colonial era owing to its strategic position at the junction of Afghanistan in the west and Kashmir in east and the tribal areas in the north. It was also right at the heartland of military Pakistan –the northern districts of Punjab and the North West Frontier Province. (Tayyeb 1966:176-177)

The urbane, cosmopolitan, and commercialist culture of Karachi bore no resemblance to the predominantly rural, clannish, tribal, and inward-looking culture of the military homeland. For Ayub Khan and most military officers, Karachi did not represent the indigenous Pakistan; ethnically and linguistically it was alien, an artificial amalgamation of colonial and *Muhajir* cultures. Moving the capital would save the state from the influence of the Karachi-based business elite and place it firmly under the military's oversight. Moreover, having the center of his military regime in an ever growing and already hard-to-govern metropolis full of disenfranchised migrants was not a risk Ayub Khan wanted to take. (Burki 1991:102-103)

The decision to move the federal capital to a remote location in West Pakistan was not received well in Bengal. Although Karachi was also in the west, it was connected to the east by the sea, was a hub of air routes, and a cosmopolitan city, and it also had a degree of symbolic meaning as the birthplace of "nation's father" Jinnah. Thus, East Pakistanis came to regard

[79] It also became a source of controversy because of a public outcry against its high modernist original design by Pakistani architect, Mehdi Ali Mirza. It was criticized as un-Islamic and out of touch with popular opinion. The final accepted design was created by the Indian architect, Yahya Merchant.

Karachi as an acceptable federal capital and quickly established a Bengali community in it. Rawalpindi, on the other hand, was dominated by Punjabis, had no historical or cultural ties to East Pakistan, and represented the power of the military over the country's politics. Although, Ayub's government attempted to ease their worries by relocating the judiciary wing of the federal government to Ayubnagar, next to Dhaka, the Bengalis saw the choosing of Rawalpindi as a sign of the regime's indifference toward their concerns. The founding of Islamabad marked a turning point in the rise of separatist sentiment among the Bengalis. Thus, Islamabad did not become a symbol of national unity but a source of discord within Pakistan's society. Independence of Bangladesh in 1973 lessened its divisive image, as all Pakistan became a contiguous unit connected to it but Islamabad never turned into a city with much value attached to it, something more than an administrative center.

**Conclusion**

The diversity of peoples living in the colonial provinces that formed Pakistan, which was further increased by the arrival of refugees from India, has been a detriment to creation of a national identity that would unify the country. The ethno-cultural cleavages that divided Pakistan's population was compounded by gross economic and developmental inequalities among the regions produced by British colonial policies. Thus, establishment of values and symbols that would serve as the basis of an identity uniting all citizens of Pakistan was a crucial element for the creation of a modern state. However, regional and ethnic divides remained to be a powerful social force in the decades following Pakistan's independence. The state in Pakistan failed in expanding its infrastructural power and had to rely solely on its coercive capacity to establish control over the country.

## 6.3 Discussion

Turkey and Pakistan has experienced similar problems during the establishment of modern states. The previous regimes in both countries had cultivated regional inequalities and over concentration of almost all economic resources in a few locales. The foundation of modern regimes in both countries was marked by massive demographic changes resulting from waves of migration in and out of their borders.

In Turkey, the republican regime succeeded in reining in Istanbul's dominance over the country's economy by systematically dispersing public enterprises across various cities. The factories not only provided economic benefits to the region. They also fulfilled an ideological function by disseminating the idea of modern life through the example set by civil servants and their families living within the compounds. Similarly, the Turkish state dispersed the incoming migrant population across various provinces. The main purpose of this was to facilitate their speedy assimilation, but this dispersal also prevented a massive influx of people into a few urban centers. The policies were successful on both accounts; non-Turkish migrants assimilated into the larger society and, despite ethnic identities being maintained and passed on to next generation, migrants in Turkey did not organize around these ethnic identities. They preferred to engage the political structure via other ideas.

On the other hand, the *laissez faire* approach of the state in Pakistan resulted in the overconcentration of economic and industrial enterprises - and capital - in the Karachi and Lahore-Lyallpur zones. Despite future policy changes aimed at reversing the process, the state simply did not have much to offer to private capital to encourage them to invest elsewhere. Over time, responding to Lahore and Karachi's needs became a burden on Pakistan's finances. Moreover, as Karachi continued to grow without control, the conflicts among different ethnic groups turned into widespread violence and urban unrest by the 1970s. Pakistan's treatment of incoming refugees followed the exact same pattern; the inability of government to intervene in the process and enforce even the slightest level of dispersion initiated the overcrowding of Karachi and calcification of *muhajir* identity within the city. Punjabi refugees also crowded into cities and became an influential group within Punjab.

Both countries relocated their capitals within the period of this study, but the political and spatial results of the moves were significantly different. The Turkish nationalist movement picked Ankara as its headquarters during the War of Independence primarily for its central location within Anatolia; its official designation as the capital of the new regime implied a severance of ties with the imperial past and the emergence of a new regime unburdened by the influence of political forces based in Istanbul. The newly-formed Turkish government spent a substantial amount of resources to create a capital city that symbolized its modernist ideal; and the significant expansion of the railroad network with Ankara as its major hub reinforced the territorial centrality of the new capital. To the consternation of Istanbul elite, Ankara became the political center and the symbol of the new Turkish nation. It successfully fulfilled both the territorial and the symbolic functions of a capital city.

The relocation of federal capital from Karachi to Islamabad by General Ayub's regime was seen as a symbolic statement of the military's domination of Pakistan's political structure and the supremacy of the Punjabi military elite over other social groups. There was nothing integrative or unifying about the geographic location or the physical structure of Islamabad. On the contrary, it being so far inland was regarded by the Bengali population as a confirmation of Pakistani state's complete lack of interest in the opinions of it eastern wing. Similarly the *muhajir* population regarded the relocation as a blow to their position within the Pakistani state's establishment and resented it. Instead of symbolizing the unity of different elements comprising Pakistan's population, the relocation of the capital to Islamabad increased the separatist sentiment among Bengalis, thus inflicting irreparable damage to the national integrity of Pakistan.

Construction of a national identity was an essential aspect of the development of modern states in both countries. Uniting the ethnically heterogeneous populations thorough a new set of symbols under the aegis of central government was indispensable to the success of the state formation process. The difficulty of the nation-building project was compounded by the arrival of migrants, whose integration into the rest of the society posed a significant challenge to the capabilities of central governments. In Turkey the republican regime pursued a policy of mandatory relocation dispersing the incoming migrants to urban centers across the country, where they would only comprise a small percentage of the population. Although these migrant

communities retained their cultural practices and used their languages in private, their small numbers prevented them from politicizing their ethic identity, leaving them with no choice but to adopt Turkishness as their outlook in public life. In contrast, without any government oversight an overwhelming majority of *muhajirs* in Pakistan settled in Karachi, where they developed a strong community. Not only they became a distinct ethnic group in Pakistan, but over the years their grievances and clashes with the members of other ethic groups resulted in urban unrest and violence that challenged the political authority of the central government.

The central government in Turkey held a tight control over the administration and development of urban centers. Through public investment and urban planning, the republican regime aimed to turn cities and towns of Turkey into laboratories for the kind of social transformation it sought to realize. The face of urban centers was transformed through architecture and urban design, presenting the public with a new national identity and the political vision of the regime. Public enterprises cities across the country not only fulfilled economic functions, but the life style of their employees offered the people a blueprint for modern Turkish life and social relations. The urban experience of Pakistan, on the other hand, was quite different; successive governments relied on the support rural middle class and landowners, empowering these groups over urban populations. Cities were either ignored, or ended up being dominated by the resident wealthy landowners. Consequently, disenfranchised urban social groups – professionals, industrial labor, urban poor– became the primary social base for political opposition against successive central governments and urban protests became the primary political instrument of any group excluded from power. The most effective challenge to the legitimacy of Ayub's military regime, Bhutto's populist government, and Zia-ul Haq's dictatorship alike resulted from political mobilization of urban populations.

The ability of republican regime in Turkey to recognize the potential of cities as political instruments and to devise policies capitalizing on it was an essential element of its success in creating a powerful modern state. Whereas, Pakistani governments failed to engage cities in way that would have benefited the state-making project. The ever-growing cities of Pakistan became a source of political opposition, dissatisfaction, poverty, and social segmentation; the outcome was a weak state facing a constant crisis of legitimacy.

# CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with a seemingly straightforward question: Why do Turkey and Iran have strong states, whereas in Afghanistan the state had completely collapsed? Institutions of modern states in all three began to take shape during the last decades of 19th century and by 1920's they were ruled by leaders, who had the will to implement radical –and quite similar– agendas of modernization in their respective countries. They were all agrarian societies with ethnically heterogeneous Muslim populations, where a small and relatively westernized elite dominated the bureaucracy and the establishment. As I studied the histories of each country the similarities between Iran and Afghanistan became more evident, which left Turkey as the exceptional case. At this point, instead of leaving Turkey out, I decided to include Pakistan in the study as the counterpart to Turkish case. Despite taking place in a different era the state in Pakistan faced challenges similar to those faced by the Turkish experienced.

The sociological literature on state formation offers several perspectives on the issue, each identifying different social, economic, and political dynamics as the key factors that led to the development of modern states. However, the major arguments regarding state formation presented within these studies have very little validity when applied to the cases studied in this dissertation. None of the states examined in this study developed through war making; neither did they emerge as a response to a fundamental societal crisis. Unlike Europe, where modern states developed organically throughout several centuries, state-making in the Turko-Persian world was spearheaded by purposeful social actors who sought to emulate European political institutions. In this regard, the Turko-Persian experience has more in common with the 20th century post-colonial state, the other extensively studied instance of state formation. However, the analyses of the development of post-colonial states emphasize the socio-political legacy of colonialism, structural inequalities of global capitalism, and the persistence of traditional social identities as the main aspects of the state formation process. With the obvious exception of Pakistan these factors too, have limited explanatory potential within the historical and geographical context of the cases studied in this dissertation.

Leaving aside the existing analyses I delineated the major problems faced by all the states in my study into three broad categories: problems of territoriality, of national identity –or nation building-, and economic development. Since the establishment of modern states coincided with tumultuous times for all countries, establishing territorial control, centralization, and integration were major obstacles. Unifying the multi-ethnic, diverse populations without relying on traditional sources of political authority necessitated the establishment of a national identity that would supersede regional differences. Experiencing the European dominance in international relations firsthand it was clear to the elites of the region that the kind of socio-political transformation they sought to achieve could only be realized with the creation of an industrial sector. Moreover, it was also clear that for its benefits to be reaped efficiently industrial development should expand across the whole country. Certainly the particular dynamics of and the ways, in which these problems manifested in each country, differed but their existence in all cases provided me with the base to build my analyses on.

Development of modern states in the Turko-Persian region coincided with the emergence of new cities and growth of overall urban population. However, the exact nature of the relation between these phenomena is not clearly identifiable. The size and numbers of cities grew in all four countries regardless of the strength of state, which eliminated the possibility of a unidirectional correlation between urbanization and state power. As a result, instead of focusing on establishing an analytically neat model that would have had rather limited explanatory potential, I set out to identify the various mechanisms, through which states have engaged the urban setting.

The cases of state formation I studied illustrate the numerous ways governments and urban centers shaped the development and progress of the other. States relied on the fundamental properties of urban centers to further their social, political, economic, and military agendas. The size of the urban populations augmented states' ideological and symbolic power, while city centers functioned as the points of contact between central governments and communities living in the territorial periphery. The interplay between states and cities is not unidirectional; urbanization does not enhance or diminish the power that modern states can exercise over society and territory. None of the observable traits of cities is inherently favorable to or incompatible with the modern nation-state. Rather, the dynamic relationship between state action – or inaction

– and social, economic, and political context determine the particular nature of the outcomes. By engaging cities in ways that are responsive to the needs of social and geographic context, states can expand their power and consolidate their rule. If states engage cities in ways that augment the problems arising from social and geographical context, their control over society and/or territory can be weakened substantially.

The major limitation of this study results from the historical data available for use. There are two dimensions to the constraints imposed by historical data: the first pertains simply to the amount of available data, while the second results from the nature of data one relies on. In the context of this study lack of historical data particularly affected the section on Afghanistan, and the section on Iran to a lesser extent, forcing me to rely heavily on the, sometimes vague, interpretations by historians.

This kind of historical study is made particularly difficult by the fact that historically it is the state itself that collects the kind of data one relies on to analyze the formation of states. The availability of systematically collected statistical data is itself a strong indicator of a successfully established centralized authority. Thus, the availability of data, regardless of its actual content, is correlated with the phenomenon being studied, which can lead to an analytical feedback loop. Recognizing this epistemological trap is certainly a crucial step in trying to avoid it but I believe that any study of state formation is bound to be affected by it to an extent.

This dissertation exclusively focuses on four countries in the Turko-Persian world. Therefore its findings are based on the particular experiences of these cases and cannot be generalized. However, the analytical framework developed in this study does not rely on area or period specific concepts. Therefore, it can potentially be utilized for other studies focusing on the interplay between urban centers and states in different areas and historical periods. Moreover, I believe the ideas presented in this dissertation can be applied to further our understanding of political processes other than state formation. Recognizing the instrumental role of cities in the establishment of political domination would certainly expand the scope of sociological knowledge in general.

# REFERENCES


Abacı, Zeynep Dörtok; Ergenç, Özer; Arı, Tayyar; Oğuzoğlu, Yusuf. 2009. *Bursa'nın Zenginliği: Göçmenler*. Bursa Turkey: Osmangazi Belediyesi.

Abbasi, Nasreen. 1987. *Urbanization in Pakistan, 1951-1981*. Islamabad, Pakistan: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

—. 2008. *A History of Modern Iran*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Abrams, Philip. 1978. "Towns and Economic Growth: Some Theories and Problems " Pp. viii, 344 p. in *Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology*, edited by Philip Abrams and E. A. Wrigley. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1982. *Historical Sociology*. Near Shepton Mallet, Somerset, England: Open Books.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1987. "The Islamic City--Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19(2):155-76.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L., and Richard Hay (Eds.). 1977. *Third World Urbanization*. Chicago: Maaroufa Press.

Adams, Julia. 2005. *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Affairs, Pakistan Institute of International. 1966. "Recent Developments in Afghanistan." *Pakistan Horizon* 19(3):249-63.

Agnew, John A. 1997. *Political Geography: A Reader*. London; New York: Arnold.

—. 2002. *Making Political Geography*. London; New York: Arnold.

Agnew, John A., David N. Livingstone, and Alisdair Rogers. 1996. *Human Geography: An Essential Anthology*. Oxford, OX, UK; Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishers.

Ahmad, Kazi Said Uddin. 1964. *A Geography of Pakistan*. Karachi,: Pakistan Branch, Oxford University Press.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. 1974. *Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan*. Karachi: National Institute of Public Administration.

Ahmed, Feroz. 1984. "Agrarian Change and Class Formation in Sindh." *Economic and Political Weekly* 19(39):A149-A64.

—. 1992. "Pakistan's Problems of National Integration." Pp. 156-79 in *Regional Imbalances and Nations Question in Pakistan* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi. Lahore: Vanguard

—. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Ahmed, Istiaq. 2013. *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences 1947-2011*. Karachi: OUP.

Akçam, Taner. 2004. *From Empire to Republic : Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*. London: Zed Books.

Ake, Claude. 1985. *Political Economy of Nigeria*. London; New York: Longman.

Akhtar, S. M. 1964. "The Problem of Regional Disparities in Economic Development: With Special Reference to Pakistan." *The Punjab University Economist* 4(7):19-28.

Akşit, Bahattin. 1985. *Köy, Kasaba, ve Kentlerde Toplumsal Değişme : Toplum, Siyaset, ve Kültür Dönüşumleri Üzerine Araştırma Yazıları*. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi.

Alavi, Hamza. 1992. "Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan." Pp. 261-95 in *Regional imbalances and nations question in Pakistan* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi. Lahore: Vanguard

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1982. *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ali, Imran. 1987. "Malign Growth? Agricultural Colonization and the Roots of Backwardness in the Punjab." *Past & Present* (114):110-32.

—. 1988. *The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Allen, John. 2003. *Lost Geographies of Power*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Alsayyad, Nezar. 1996. "The Study of Islamic Urbanism: An Historiographic Essay." *Built Environment (1978-)* 22(2):91-97.

Altaban, Özcan. 1998. "Cumhuriyetin Kent Planlama Politikaları ve Ankara Deneyimi." Pp. 41-64 in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık* Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları

Amanolahi, Sekandar. 2002. "Reza Shah and the Lurs: The Impact of the Modern State on Luristan." *Iran & the Caucasus* 6(1/2):193-218.

Amin, Samir. 1976. *La Nation Arabe: Nationalisme et Luttes de Classes*. Paris: Éditions de minuit.

Amirahmadi, Hooshang. 1986. "Regional Planning in Iran: A Survey of Problems and Policies." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 20(4):501-30.

Amirsadeghi, Hossein, and R. W. Ferrier (Eds.). 1977. *Twentieth Century Iran*. London: Heinemann.

Amjad, Rashid. 1976. "Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan." *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 14(1/4):211-61.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1983. *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Jon W. 1978. "There Are No Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Tribal Afghanistan." *Middle East Journal* 32(2):167-83.

Anderson, Lisa. 1986. *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Andren, Anders. 1994. "State and Towns in the Middle Ages: The Scandinavian Experience." Pp. 128-49 in *Cities and the rise of states in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, edited by Charles Tilly and Willem Pieter Blockmans. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ansari, Ali M. 2003. *Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*. London; New York: Pearson Education.

Ansari, Sarah F. D. 1992. *Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947*. Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Arı, Kemal. 2009. "Tarihsel Süreçte Mübadele ve Bursa." Pp. 147-77 in *Bursa'nın zenginliği : göçmenler*, edited by Zeynep Dörtok Abacı, Özer Ergenç, Tayyar Arı, and Yusuf Oğuzoğlu. Bursa Turkey: Osmangazi Belediyesi.

Arjomand, Said Amir. 1988. *The Turban for the Crown: the Islamic Revolution in Iran*. New York: Oxford University Press.

—. 2009. *After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Arnold, Caroline E. 2012. "In the Service of Industrialization: Etatism, Social Services and the Construction of Industrial Labour Forces in Turkey (1930–50)." *Middle Eastern Studies* 48(3):363-85.

Atabaki, Touraj. 2006. *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris.

—. 2009. *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris in association with the Iran Heritage Foundaton.

Atabaki, Touraj, and Erik Jan Zürcher (Eds.). 2004. *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Ataturk and Reza Shah*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Azarya, Victor. 1988. "Reordering State Society Relations: In corporation and Disengagement." Pp. x, 357 p. in *The Precarious Balance : State and Society in Africa*, edited by Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Westview Press.

Azarya, Victor, and Naomi Chazan. 1987. "Disengagement rom the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29(1):106-31.

Badie, Bertrand. 2000. *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Badie, Bertrand, and Pierre Birnbaum. 1983. *The Sociology of the State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bahrambeygui, H. 1977. *Tehran : An Urban Analysis*. Tehran: Sahab Books Institute.

Bakhash, Shaul. 1981. "Center-Periphery Relations in Nineteenth-Century Iran." *Iranian Studies* 14(1/2):29-51.

Banani, Amin. 1961. *The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner. 1986. *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics : Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Baran, Tülay Alim. 2003. *Bir Kentin Yeniden Yapılanması: İzmir, 1923-1938*. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Arma Yayınları.

Barfield, Thomas J. 2010. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1961. *Nomads of South-Persia; The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy*. Oslo; New York: University Press; Humanities Press.

Bates, R.H. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Batuman, Bülent. 2005. "Identity, Monumentally, Security: Building a Monument in Early Republican Ankara." *Journal of Architectural Education (1984-)* 59(1):34-45.

Beck, Lois. 1986. *The Qashqa'i of Iran*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bennison, Amira K., and Alison L. Gascoigne. 2007. *Cities in the Pre-modern Islamic World: The Urban Impact of Religion, State and Society*. Milton Park, Abingdon, UK ; New York: Routledge.

Bensel, Richard Franklin. 1990. *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877*. Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Berg-Schlosser, D. 1984. "African Political Systems " *Comparative Political Studies* 17:121-51.

Berman, Harold J. 1983. *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bharier, Julian. 1971. *Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970*. London, New York: Oxford University Press.

—. 1972. "The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1900-66." *Middle Eastern Studies* 8(1):51-61.

Biggs, Michael. 1999. "Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41(2):374-405.

Binder, Leonard. 1962. *Iran; Political Development in a Changing Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Birkalan-Gedik, Hande. 2011. "Anthropological Writings On Urban Turkey: A Historical Overview." *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 40(1/2):1-66.

Bonine, Michael E. 1975. *Urbanization and City Structure in Contemporary Iran and Afghanistan: A Selected Annotated Bibliography*. Monticello, IL: Council of Planning Librarians.

—. 1976. "State of the Art: Urban Studies in The Middle East." *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 10(3):1-37.

—. 1979. "The Morphogenesis of Iranian Cities." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69(2):208-24.

—. 1997. *Population, Poverty, and Politics in Middle East Cities*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Bonine, Michael E., and Nikki R. Keddie. 1981. *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Boratav, Korkut. 1981. "Kemalist Economic Policies and Etatism." Pp. 165-90 in *Atatürk, founder of a modern state*, edited by Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun. London: C. Hurst.

—. 1988. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi.

Bozdoğan, Sibel. 2001. *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Reşat Kasaba. 1997. *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Braudel, Fernand. 1982. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*. New York: Harper & Row.

Bruinessen, Martin van. 1992. *Agha, Shaikh, and State: the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*. London; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books.

Bunker, S. 1987. *Peasants Against the State*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Burki, Shahid Javed. 1980. *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

—. 1991. *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.

Callaghy, T. 1988. "The State and Developement of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical, and Comparative Reflections " Pp. x, 357 p. in *The Precarious balance : state and society in Africa*, edited by Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Westview Press.

Callaghy, Thomas M. 1984. *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Canak, William L. 1984. "The Peripheral State Debate: State Capitalist and Bureaucratic- Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 19(1):3-36.

Canfield, Robert L. 1973. "The Ecology of Rural Ethnic Groups and the Spatial Dimensions of Power." *American Anthropologist* 75(5):1511-28.

—. 1991. *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Chaichian, Mohammad A. 1988. "The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on Urbanization in Egypt, 1800-1970." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20(1):23-43.

—. 2009. *Town and Country in the Middle East: Iran and Egypt in the Transition to Globalization, 1800-1970*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Chehabi, Houchang E. 1993. "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building under Reza Shah." *Iranian Studies* 26(3/4):209-29.

Chehabi, Houchang E., and Vanessa Martin (Eds.). 2010. *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris

Chitkara, M. G. 1996. *Mohajir's Pakistan*. New Delhi: APH Pub. Corp.

Chopra, V. D. (Ed.). 1998. *Afghanistan and Asian Stability*. New Delhi: Gyan Pub. House, on behalf of International Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies.

Christensen, Asger. 1995. *Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society*. Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Books.

Clarke, Simon. 1991. *The State Debate*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.

Clawson, Patrick. 1993. "Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920-1940." *Iranian Studies* 26(3/4):235-50.

Collins, Randall. 1975. *Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science*. New York: Academic Press.

Conolly, Violet. 1935. "The Industrialization of Persia." *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 22(3):454-63.

Corrigan, Philip Richard D. 1980. *Capitalism, State Formation and Marxist Theory: Historical Investigations*. London; New York: Quartet Books.

Corrigan, Philip Richard D., and Derek Sayer. 1985. *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*. Oxford, OX, UK; New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.

Coşar, Nevin (Ed.). 1995. *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*: Bağlam.

Costello, Vincent Francis. 1977. *Urbanization in the Middle East*. Cambridge, Eng.; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cottrell, Alvin J. 1978. "Iran's Armed Forces Under the Pahlavi Dynasty." Pp. 389-432 in *Iran Under the Pahlavis* edited by George Lenczowski. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press.

Crews, Robert D. 2015. *Afghan Modern : The History of a Global Nation*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Cronin, Stephanie. 1997. *The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910-1926*. London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies.

— (Ed.). 2003. *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah 1921-1941*. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

—. 2004. *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

—. 2010. *Soldiers, Shahs, and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921-1941* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Cullather, Nick. 2002. "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State." *The Journal of American History* 89(2):512-37.

Dadrian, Vahakn N. 1995. *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict From the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books.

Daechsel, Markus. 2011. "Sovereignty, Governmentality and Development in Ayub's Pakistan: the Case of Korangi Township." *Modern Asian Studies* 45(Special Issue 01):131-57.

—. 2015. *Islamabad and the Politics of International Development in Pakistan*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 2015. "Islam and Development in Urban Space: Planning Official Karachi in 1950s." Pp. 64-84 in *Cities in South Asia*, edited by Crispin Bates and Minoru Mio. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Daftary, Farhad. 1973. "Development Planning in Iran: A Historical Survey." *Iranian Studies* 6(4):176-228.

Delanty, Gerard, and Engin F. Isın (Eds.). 2003. *Handbook of Historical Sociology*. London: Sage.

Dobb, Maurice. 1963. *Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries*. New York: International Publishers.

Downing, Brian M. 1992. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Doxiadis, C. A. 1965. "Islamabad: The Creation of a New Capital." *The Town Planning Review* 36(1):1-28.

Dumper, Michael, and Bruce E. Stanley. 2007. *Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Dündar, Fuat. 1999. *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*. Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Doz Yayınları.

Dupree, Louis. 1973. *Afghanistan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Eddison, John C. 1961. "Industrial Location and Physical Planning in Pakistan." *The Pakistan Development Review* 1(1):1-21

Ehlers, Eckart, and Willem Floor. 1993. "Urban Change in Iran, 1920-1941." *Iranian Studies* 26(3/4):251-75.

Eisenstadt, S. N. 1966. *Modernization: Protest and Change*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Eisenstadt, S. N., and Stein Rokkan (Eds.). 1973. *Building States and Nations*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Elias, Norbert. 1982. *The Civilizing Process*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Emadi, Hafizullah. 1990. *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan*. New York: Praeger.

Eren, Halit. 1993. *Balkanlarda Türk ve Diğer Müslüman Toplulukları ve Göç Olgusu*. İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkanları İnceleme Vakfı Yayınları

Ersoy, Melih. 1989. "Tarihsel Perspektif İçinde Türkiye'de Merkez ve yerel Yönetim İlişkileri." *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* 9(1):45-66.

Ertan, Temuçin Faik. 1994. *Kadroculuk ve Kadro Hareketi*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.

Ertman, Thomas. 1997. *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Esfahani, Reza Mokhtari. 2010. "Municipalities and Constitutionalism in Iran." Pp. xxxii, 504 p. in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, edited by H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin. London; New York: I.B. Tauris

Evans, Peter B. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Eds.). 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge, Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, P; Rauch J.E. 1999. "Bureaucracy and Growth a Cross-National Analyses of of the Effects of Weberian State Structures on Growth " *American Sociological Review* 64(5):748-65.

Ewans, Martin. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics*. New York: HarperCollins.

Faghfoory, Mohammad H. 1993. "The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925-1941." *Iranian Studies* 26(3/4):277-312.

Fatton, Robert. 1988. "Bringing the Ruling Class Back in: Class, State, and Hegemony in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 20(3):253-64.

Fleet, Kate, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Reşat Kasaba. 2008. *The Cambridge history of Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Floor, W. M. 1971. "The Office of Kalāntar in Qājār Persia." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 14(3):253-68.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. "Space, Knowledge, and Power." Pp. 239-56 in *The Foucault Reader* edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon.

Frank, Andre Gunder. 1978. *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.

Fraser-Tytler, William Kerr, and M. C. Gillett. 1967. *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia*. London, New York: Oxford U.P.

Fry, Maxwell J. 1974. *The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development*. Leiden: Brill.

Garthwaite, Gene R. 1983. *Khans and Shahs: A Documentary Analysis of the Bakhtiyari in Iran*. Cambridge, Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Geddes, B. 1994. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Geert, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Geray, Cevat. 1962. *Türkiyeden ve Türkiye'ye Göçler (1923-1961)*. Ankara,: Maliye Enstitüsü.

—. 1990. "Belediyelerin Hızlı Kentleşmeye Yenik Düştüğü Dönem: 1945-1960." Pp. 217-24 in *Türk Belediyeciliğinde 60 Yıl, Uluslararası Sempozyum* Ankara: Metropol İmar A.Ş.

Ghods, M. Reza. 1989. *Iran in the Twentieth Century: a Political History*. Boulder, London: L. Rienner Publishers; Adamantine.

—. 1991. "Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah." *Middle Eastern Studies* 27(1):35-45.

Giddens, Anthony. 1971. *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory; an Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*. Cambridge, England: University Press.

—. 1981. *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.

—. 1981. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

—. 1985. *Nation State and Violence* Berkeley; Los Angeles University of California Press.

Gopalakrishnan, R. 1982. *The Geography and Politics of Afghanistan*. New Delhi: Concept.

Gorski, Philip S. 2003. *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gorvine, Albert. 1956. *An Outline of Turkish Provincial and Local Government*. Ankara: Yeni Matbaa.

Gottmann, Jean. 1973. *The Significance of Territory*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Gould, Roger V. 1996. "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(2):400-29.

Gözübüyük, A. Şeref. 1967. *Türkiye'de Mahallî İdareler*. Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü.

Graham, Robert. 1978. *Iran, the Illusion of Power*. London: Croom Helm.

Gregorian, Vartan. 1969. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan; Politics of Reform and Modernization 1880-1946*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Griffiths, John Charles. 1981. *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Guha, Amalendu. 1964. "Economic Development of Afghanistan—1929-196I." *International Studies* 6(4):421-39.

Guha, Analendu. 1967. "The Economy of Afghanistan During Amanullah's Reign 1919-1929." *International Studies* 9(2):161-82.

Gürboğa, Nurşen. 2009. "Compulsory Mine Work: The Single-Party Regime and the Zonguldak Coalfield as a Site of Contention, 1940–1947." *International Review of Social History* 54(Supplement S17):115-42.

Hale, William M. 1981. *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*. London: Croom Helm.
—. 1984. *Turkish Agriculture and Community Enlargement*. Ankara: DPT.

Hall, John A. (Ed.). 1986. *States in History*. Oxford, Oxfordshire; New York, NY: B. Blackwell.

—. 1986. *Powers and Liberties*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Hall, John A.; Ikenberry, G. John. 1989. *The State*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Hamid, Naved. 1976. "Introduction: A Review of the Economy." *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 14(1/4):5-14.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 1995. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
—. 2001. *Preparation for a Revolution : The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Hasan, Arif, Muhammad Younus, and S. Akbar Zaidi. 2002. *Understanding Karachi: Planning and Reform for the Future*. Karachi: City Press.

Hechter, Michael. 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Herbst, Jeffrey Ira. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hergüner, Mustafa. 2006. *İzmir İktisat Kongresi İçin İstanbul'da Yapılan Çalışmalar*. İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı.

Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda. 1958. *Turkey: An Economy in Transition*. The Hague: Uitgeverij Van Keulen.
—. 1968. *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda, and İktisad Araştırmalar Vakfı (Turkey). 1968. *Economic Planning in Turkey*. Istanbul: Economic Research Foundation.

Heyd, Uriel. 1954. *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*. Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society.

Hintze, Otto. 1975. *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hirst, Paul Q. 2005. *Space and Power: Politics, War and Architecture*. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. 1974. *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Holloway, John, and Sol Picciotto. 1978. *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*. London: E. Arnold.

Holton, R. J. 1986. *Cities, Capitalism, and Civilization*. London; Boston: Allen & Unwin.

Hopkins, B. D. 2008. *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hoselitz, Bert F. 1955. "Generative and Parasitic Cities." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3(3):278-94.

Hourcade, Bernard. 2008. "The Demography of Cities and the Expansion of Urban Space." Pp. 154-81 in *The urban social history of the Middle East, 1750-1950*, edited by Peter Sluglett. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. 2005. *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

İçduygu, Ahmet, Şule Toktas, and B. Ali Soner. 2008. "The Politics of Population in a Nation-Building Process: Emigration of Non-Muslims From Turkey." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31(2):358-89.

Ikegami, Eiko. 1995. *The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

İnalcık, Halil, and Donald Quataert. 1994. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

İnan, Afet. 1973. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İkinci Sanayi Planı: 1936*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.

Irons, William. 1975. *The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organization Among a Central Asian Turkic-Speaking Population*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Isın, Engin F. 2003. "Historical Sociology of the City." Pp. 301-12 in *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by Gerard; Isın Delanty, Engin F. London: Sage.

Issawi, Charles Philip. 1971. *The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 1978. "The Iranian Eonomy 1925-1975: Fifty Years of Economic Development." Pp. 129-66 in *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, edited by George Lenczowski. Stanford Hoover Institution Press.

—. 1980. *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 1982. *An economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jackson, R. H.; Rosberg, C. G. 1986. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood." Pp. 259-82 in *The State and development in the Third World*, edited by Atul Kohli. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2002. *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*. London: Anthem Press.

Jakobson, Leo; Prakash, Ved; Jakobson, Sheilah Orloff (Ed.). 1971. *Urbanization and National Development*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Jalal, Ayesha. 1990. *The State of Martial Rule: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*. Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1995. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

James, William E., and Subroto Roy (Eds.). 1992. *Foundations of Pakistan's Political Economy: Towards an Agenda fo the 1990s*. New Delhi; Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Jameson, Frederic. 2005. "Is Space Political " in *Rethinking Architecture - A Reader in Cultural Theory* edited by Neil Leach. New York Routledge.

Jessop, Bob. 1982. *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods*. Oxford: M. Robertson.

Jones, Paul. 2003. "Architecturing Modern Nations: Architecture and the State." Pp. 301-12 in *Handbook of historical sociology*, edited by Gerard; Işın Delanty, Engin F. London: Sage.

Jung, Chris L. 1974. *Some Observations on the Patterns and Processes of Rural-Urban Migrations to Kabul*. New York: Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society.

Kakar, M. Hasan. 1979. *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir ʾAbd al-Rahman Khan*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

—. 2006. *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901*. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Karakaya, Emel. 2010. "Construction of the Republic in City Space: From Political Ideal to Urban Planning Principles." in *City and Regional Planning* Middle East Technical University

Karpat, Kemal H. 1976. *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1985. *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Kasfir, Nelson. 1984. *State and Class in Africa*. London Totowa, NJ: Cass and Co.

Katouzian, Homa. 1981. *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979*. New York: New York University Press.

—. 2003. *Iranian History and Politics: the Dialectic of State and Society*. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Kazancigil, Ali (Ed.). 1986. *The State in Global Perspective*. Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, VT, USA; Paris, France: Gower; Unesco.

Kazancigil, Ali, and Ergun Özbudun (Eds.). 1981. *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*. London: C. Hurst.

Kazemi, Farhad, and Abrahamian Ervand. 1978. "The Nonrevolutionary Peasantry of Modern Iran." *Iranian Studies* 11(1/4):259-304.

Keddie, Nikki R. 1980. *Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society: Collected Essays*. London; Totowa, NJ: F. Cass ; Biblio Distribution Centre.

Keleş, Ruşen. 1993. *Kentleşme Politikası*. Kızılay, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.

Keleş, Ruşen; Duru Bülent. 2008. "Ankara'nın Ülke Kentleşmesindeki Etkilerine Tarihsel Bir Bakış." *Mülkiye* 32(261):27-44.

Kennedy, Charles H. 1991. "The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh." *Asian Survey* 31(10):938-55.

Keskinok, H. Çağatay. 2007. "Kentler, Sanayi ve Planlama " Pp. 85-93 in *Sanayi Kentleri ve Mimarlık* Eskişehir: Mimarlar Odası

—. 2010. "Urban Planning Experience of Turkey in 1930's." *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* 27(2):173-88.

Keyder, Çağlar. 1981. *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929*. Cambridge,Cambridgeshire; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.

—. 1987. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London; New York: Verso.

—. 1999. *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kezer, Zeynep. 1996. "The Making of a Nationalist Capital: Socio-Spatial Practices in Early Republican Ankara." *Built Environment (1978-)* 22(2):124-37.

—. 1998. "Contesting Urban Space in Early Republican Ankara." *Journal of Architectural Education (1984-)* 52(1):11-19.

Khazeni, Arash. 2005. "The Bakhtiyari Tribe in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25(2):377-98.

—. 2009. *Tribes & Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Kirisci, Kemal. 2000. "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices." *Middle Eastern Studies* 36(3):1-22.

Kirişci, Kemal. 2008. "Migration and Turkey: Dynamics of State Society and Politics." in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Faroqhi Suraiya Fleet Kate, Kasaba Resat. New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press

Kiser, Edgar, and April Linton. 2001. "Determinants of the Growth of the State: War and Taxation in Early Modern France and England." *Social Forces* 80(2):411-48.

Kıray, Mübeccel (Ed.). 1991. *Structural Change in Turkish Society*. Indiana Indiana University

Kohli, Atul (Ed.). 1986. *The State and Development in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Köker, Levent. 1995. "Local Politics and Democracy in Turkey: An Appraisal." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 540:51-62.

Kolars, John, and Henry J. Malin. 1970. "Population and Accessibility: An Analysis of Turkish Railroads." *Geographical Review* 60(2):229-46.

Kongar, Emre. 1978. *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.

Lachmann, Richard. 1989. "Elite Conflict and State Formation in 16th- and 17th-Century England and France." *American Sociological Review* 54(2):141-62.

—. 2010. *States and Power*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.

Lambton, Ann K. S. 1953. *Landlord and Peasant in Persia; a Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration*. London; New York: Oxford University Presss.

Lapidus, Ira M. 1973. "The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15(1):21-50.

Lari, Yasmeen; Lari, Mihail S. 1996. *The Dual City : Karachi During the Raj*. Karachi: Heritage Foundation; Oxford University Press.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1976. *The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production*. London: Allison & Busby.

Lenczowski, George. 1962. *The Middle East in World Affairs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

— (Ed.). 1978. *Iran Under the Pahlavis*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Lewy, Guenter. 2005. *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

Lonsdale, John. 1981. "States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey." *African Studies Review* 24(2/3):139-225.

Madanipour, Ali. 1998. *Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis*. Chichester, West Sussex, England; New York: Wiley.

Maddison, Angus. 1971. *Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan Since the Moghuls*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby. 1998. *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Majd, Mohammad Gholi. 2001. *Great Britain & Reza Shah: The Plunder of Iran, 1921-1941*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

Mann, Michael. 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*. Cambridge, Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1986. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results." Pp. 109-36 in *States in History*, edited by John A. Hall. Oxford Oxfordshire UK; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell.

—. 1988. *States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*. Oxford, England; New Y York, NY: B. Blackwell.

Marefat, Mina. 1988. "Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921-1941." in *Department of Architecture*: Massachusetts Institue of Technology.

Massey, Doreen B. 2005. *For Space*. London; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Matthee, Rudi. 1993. "Transforming Dangerous Nomads into Useful Artisans, Technicians, Agriculturists: Education in the Reza Shah Period." *Iranian Studies* 26(3/4):313-36.

McCarthy, Justin. 1983. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the end of the Empire*. New York: New York University Press.

—. 1995. *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press.

McNeill, William Hardy. 1982. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mellor, Roy E. H. 1989. *Nation, State, and Territory: A Political Geography*. London; New York: Routledge.

Messkoub, Mahmood. 2006. "Social Policy in Iran in the Twentieth Century." *Iranian Studies* 39(2):227-52.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

—. 2001. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute one Another*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue. 1994. *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Miliband, Ralph. 1969. *The State in Capitalist Society*. New York: Basic Books.

Mohammadi, M. R. N. 2002. "Transformation in the Urban Form of a Traditional City: The Case of Yazd Iran." *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* 14(1):52-53.

Montgomery, John D., and Dennis A. Rondinelli (Eds.). 2004. *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons From Development Experience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Mozayeni, Manootchehr. 1974. "City Planning in Iran: Evolution and Problems " *Ekistics* 38(228):264-67.

Muir, Richard. 1975. *Modern Political Geography*. London; New York: Macmillan; distributed by Halsted Press.

—. 1997. *Political Geography: A New Introduction*. New York: John Wiley.

Muir, Richard, and Ronan Paddison. 1981. *Politics, Geography and Behaviour*. London; New York: Methuen.

Mumford, Lewis. 1961. *The City in History: Its Origins, its Transformations, and its Prospects*. New York: Harcourt.

—. 1970. *The Culture of Cities*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Mumtaz, Soofia, Jean-Luc Racine, and Imran Ali (Eds.). 2002. *Pakistan: The Contours of State and Society*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Munro, John M. 1974. "Migration in Turkey." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 22(4):634-53.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. *Rich Lands and Poor; the Road to World Prosperity*. New York: Harper.

Nadeem, Azhar Hassan. 1970. "Growth of Industries in Public Sector: A Case Study of Pakistan." *The Punjab University Economist* 8(1):7-22.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1997. "State, Society, and the Cirisis of National Identity." Pp. 103-30 in *State, Society, and Democratic Change in Pakistan*, edited by Rasul Bakhsh Rais. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Nettl, J. P. 1968. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics* 20(4):559-92.

Newell, Richard S. 1969. "Afghanistan: The Dangers of Cold War Generosity." *Middle East Journal* 23(2):168-76.

—. 1972. *The Politics of Afghanistan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Nightingale, Carl Husemoller. 2012. *Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.

Nyrop, Richard F. 1975. *Area Handbook for Pakistan*. Washington: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.

—. 1984. *Pakistan, A Country Study*. Washington D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Studies in South American politics*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

Offe, Claus. 1996. *Modernity and the State : East, West*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ökçün, A. Günduz. 1968. *Haberler, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınevi.

Öktem, Kerem. 2008. "The Nation's Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponyms in Republican Turkey." *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 7(1).

Okutan, M. Çağatay. 2004. *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi.

Okyar, Osman. 1965. "The Concept of Étatism." *The Economic Journal* 75(297):98-111.

Ortaylı, İlber. 1985. *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yönetim Geleneği*. İstanbul: Hil Yayın.

Paasi, Anssi. 1996. *Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*. Chichester, England; New York: J. Wiley & Sons.

Pallis, A. A. 1925. "Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912-1924." *The Geographical Journal* 66(4):315-31.

Pamuk, Sevket. 2000. "Intervention During the Great Depression: Another Look at Turkish Experience." Pp. 321-39 in *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950*, edited by Sevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson. London; New York: Routledge.

Pamuk, Sevket, and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Eds.). 2000. *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950*. London; New York: Routledge.

Panteli, Bratislaw. 1997. "Nationalism and Architecture: The Creation of a National Style in Serbian Architecture and Its Political Implications." *The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 56(1):16-36.

Papanek, Gustav Fritz. 1967. *Pakistan's Development Social Goals and Private Incentives*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

—. 1970. "The Location of Industry." *The Pakistan Development Review* 10(3):291-309.

Pirenne, Henri. 1925. *Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

—. 1983. *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit  Max Weber's Protestant Ethic*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Poulantzas, Nicos A. 1978. *State, Power, Socialism*. London: NLB.

Poullada, Leon B. 1962. "Problems of Social Development in Afghanistan." *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 49(1):33-39.

—. 1970. *The Pushtun Role in the Afghan Political System*. New York: Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society.

—. 1973. *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929; King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Prentice, Anne. 1966. "Islamabad: A New Capital City." *Geography* 51(1):58-61.

Qadeer, Mohammad A. 1983. *Urban Development in the Third World: Internal Dynamics of Lahore, Pakistan*. New York, NY: Praeger.

—. 2006. *Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim nation*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge.

Quataert, Donald. 1993. *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rais, Rasul Bakhsh (Ed.). 1997. *State, Society, and Democratic Change in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Rana, Ayaz Mohammad. 2004. *Local Government Finance: Some Political Aspects: A Case Study of Punjab*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rasanayagam, Angelo. 2003. *Afghanistan: A Modern History: Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy?* . London; New York: I.B. Tauris.

Reynolds, Susan. 1997. *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.

Rivkin, Malcolm D. 1965. *Area Development for National Growth*. New York: Praeger.

—. 1976. *Land Use and the Intermediate Size City in Developing Countries: With Case Studies of Turkey, Brazil, and Malaysia*. New York: Praeger.

Robinson, Paul, and Jay Dixon. 2012. *Aiding Afghanistan: A History of Soviet Assistance to a Developing Country*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Robinson, Richard D. 1958. "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 22(3):397-405.

Rokkan, Stein. 1975. "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building " Pp. 562-600 in *The Formation of national States in Western Europe*, edited by Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rokkan, Stein, Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek W. Urwin. 1999. *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan Based on his Collected Works*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Rondinelli, Dennis A. 1984. "Balanced Urbanization, Regional Integration, and Development Planning." Pp. xxiv, 546 p. in *Urban development in the Third World*, edited by Pradip K. Ghosh. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Rothchild, Donald S., and Naomi Chazan (Eds.). 1988. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Rubin, Barnett R. 1995. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Runciman, W.G. 1989. *A Treatise on Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sack, Robert David. 1986. *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*. Cambridge, Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Saikal, Amin, A. G. Ravan Farhadi, and Kirill Nourzhanov. 2004. *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Sajid, Mushtaq A., and A. R. Chaudhary. 1996. "Historical Development of Liberalization Since 1947 in Pakistan." *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 34(2):179-92.

Saran, Nephan. 1974. "Squatter Settlement Problems in Istanbul " Pp. 327-61 in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives* edited by Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur. Leiden: Brill.

Saunders, Peter. 1986. *Social Theory and the Urban Question*. London: Hutchinson Education.

Savage, Michael, and Alan Warde. 1993. *Urban Sociology, Capitalism, and Modernity*. New York: Continuum.

Sayeed, Khalid B. 1979. "Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political Change in Pakistan." *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 17(2):111-35.

—. 1980. *Politics in Pakistan*. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers

Schayegh, Cyrus. 2005. "Serial Murder in Tehran: Crime, Science, and the Formation of Modern State and Society in Interwar Iran." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47(4):836-62.

Schetter, Conrad J. 2013. *Local Politics in Afghanistan: A Century of Intervention in Social Order*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Selimoğlu, İsmail. 2009. "Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nde Bursa'ya Mübadele Sonrası Göçler." Pp. 197-238 in *Bursa'nın Zenginliği Göçmenler*, edited by Zeynep Dörtok Abacı, et. al. Bursa Turkey: Osmangazi Belediyesi.

Şengül, H. Tarık. 2001. *Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset: Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçleri Üzerine Yazılar*. Sultanahmet, İstanbul: Demokrasi Kitaplığı.

Sennett, Richard. 1994. *Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization*. New York: Norton.

Şenol Cantek, Funda (Ed.). 2012. *Cumhuriyet'in Ütopyası: Ankara*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınevi.

Şenyapılı, Tansı. 2004. *Barakadan Gecekonduya : Ankara'da Kentsel Mekânın Dönüşümü 1923-1960*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Şenyapılı, Tansı. 1985. *Ankara Kentinde Gecekondu Gelişimi* Ankara: Kent Koop.

Sey, Yıldız 1998. "Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılı, Gecekondunun 50. Yılı." Pp. 301-16 in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık* Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları

Shahrani, M. Nazif Mohib; Canfield, Robert L. 1984. *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*. University of California, Berkeley.

Shaikh, Farzana. 2009. *Making Sense of Pakistan*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Shaw, Stanford J. 1998. "Resettlement of Refugees in Anatolia, 1918-1923." *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22(1):58-90.

Shields, Sarah D. 2008. "Interdependent Spaces: Relations Between the City and the Countryside in the Nineteenth Century." Pp. 43-66 in *The urban social history of the Middle East, 1750-1950*, edited by Peter Sluglett. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Shorter, Frederic C. 1985. "The Population of Turkey after the War of Independence." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17(4):417-41.

Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif. 2012. *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi, and Mohajir ethnic Movements*. London; New York: Routledge

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. Cambridge, Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sluglett, Peter (Ed.). 2008. *The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750-1950*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Smith, Anthony D. 1986. "State-making and Nation-building." Pp. vi, 317 p. in *States in history*, edited by John A. Hall. Oxford, Oxfordshire; New York, NY: B. Blackwell.

Smith, Harvey Henry. 1973. *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*. Washington: For sale by the Supt. of Docs.

Smith, Michael P. 1979. *The City and Social Theory*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Soifer, Hillel, and Matthias vom Hau. 2008. "Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43(3/4):219-30.

Soja, Edward W.; Tobin, Richard, J. 1977. "The Geography of Modernization: Paths, Patterns, and Processes of Spatial Change in Developing Countries." Pp. 155-64 in *Third world urbanization*, edited by Janet L. Abu-Lughod and Richard Hay. Chicago: Maaroufa Press.

Soner, Cağatay. 2004. "Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40(3):86-101.

Southall, Aidan W. 1998. *The City in Tme and Space*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stauffer, Thomas R. 1965. "The Economics of Nomadism in Iran." *Middle East Journal* 19(3):284-302.

Steinmetz, George. 1999. *State/culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Stephenson, Glenn V. 1970. "Two Newly-Created Capitals: Islamabad and Brasilia." *The Town Planning Review* 41(4):317

Strayer, Joseph R. 1970. *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sventitski, A. S. 1928. "Transport Routes in Persia." *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 15(2):203-22.

Tachau, Frank. 1984. *Turkey, the Politics of Authority, Democracy, and, Development*. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.

Taeuber, Irene B. 1958. "Population and Modernization in Turkey." *Population Index* 24(2):101-22.

Taheri, A. 1995. *Administration of Local Organizations*. Tehran: Payame Nour University.

Talbot, Ian. 1998. *Pakistan, a Modern History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Tankut, Gönül. 1993. *Bir Başkentin İmarı: Ankara, 1929-1939*. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi.

Tapper, Richard. 1983. *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. London; New York: St. Martin's Press.

—. 1997. *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Tapper, Richard 2003. "The Case of the Shahsevan." Pp. xi, 279 p., 16 p. of plates in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah 1921-1941*, edited by Stephanie Cronin. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Tayyeb, Ali. 1966. *Pakistan; a Political Geography*. London; Karachi: Oxford U.P.

Tekeli, İlhan. 1980. "Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının Tarihsel Kökleri." Pp. 8-112 in *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması*, edited by Tamer Gök. Ankara: METU Faculty of Architecture.

—. 1994. *The Development of the İstanbul Metropolitan Area: Urban Administration and Planning*. Ankara: Tekeli

—. 2009. *Cumhuriyetin Belediyecilik Öyküsü, 1923-1990*. Eminönü, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

—. 2009. *Modernizm, Modernite ve Türkiye'nin Kent Planlama Tarihi*. Eminönü, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. 2003. *Bir Cumhuriyet Öyküsü: Kadroculari ve Kadro'yu anlamak*. Nişantaşı, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı.

—. 2009. *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları*. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat.

Thompson, E. P. 1964. *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Tilly, Charles (Ed.). 1975. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

—. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge, MA, USA: B. Blackwell.

Tilly, Charles, and Willem Pieter Blockmans (Eds.). 1994. *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Toksöz, Meltem. 2010. *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Making of the Adana-Mersin Region 1850-1908*. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Tousi, Reza Ra'iss. 1988. "The Persian Army, 1880–1907." *Middle Eastern Studies* 24(2):206-29.

Ülker, Erol. 2007. "Assimilation of the Muslim Communities in the First Decade of the Turkish Republic." *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (6).

—. 2008. "Assimilation, Security, and Geographic Nationalization in Interwar Turkey: The Settlement Law of 1934." *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (7).

Vale, Lawrence J. 1992. *Architecture, Power, and National Identity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Verkaaik, Oskar. 2004. *Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Vexliard, Alexandre, and Kemal Aytaç. 1964. "The "Village Institutes" in Turkey." *Comparative Education Review* 8(1):41

Visari, Pravin M. 1969. "Migration Between India and Pakistan: 1951-1961." *Demography* 6(3):323-34.

Vu, Tuong. 2010. *Paths to Development in Asia : South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. 1974. *The Modern World-System*. New York: Academic Press.

Waseem, Mohammad. 1989. *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Lahore, Pakistan: Progressive Publishers.

Washbrook, D. A. 1981. "Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India." *Modern Asian Studies* 15(3):649-721.

Watkins, Mary Bradley. 1963. *Afghanistan: Land in Transition*. Princeton: Van Nostrand.

Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. New York: Bedminster Press.

—. 1976. *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*. London; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: NLB; Humanities Press.

Weber, Max, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. 1946. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford university press.

Weiker, Walter F. 1981. *The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

Weiner, Myron, and Ali Banuazizi. 1994. *The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Wellisz, S. H. 1971. "Economic Development and Urbanization." in *Urbanization and National Developement*, edited by Prakash V. Jacobson L. Beverly Hills, California: Sage.

Wilber, Donald Newton. 1953. "Afghanistan, Independent and Encircled." *Foreign Affairs* 31(3):486-94.

—. 1962. *Afghanistan*. New Haven: HRAF Press.

—. 1975. *Iran, Past and Present*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Williams, Raymond. 1975. *The Long Revolution*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Wirth, Louis. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." *American Journal of Sociology* 44(1):1-24.

Wrigley, E. A. 1967. "A Simple Model of London's Importance in Changing English Society and Economy 1650-1750." *Past & Present* (37):44-70.

Wyatt, S. C. 1934. "Turkey: The Economic Situation and the Five-Years Plan." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 13(6):826-44.

Yalman, Ahmet Emin. 1930. *Turkey in the World War*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press; H. Milford; Oxford University Press.

Yanardağ, Merdan. 1988. *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Kadro Hareketi*. Türbe, İstanbul: Yalçın Yayınları.

Yang, Jonghoe. 2004. "Colonial Legacy and Modern Economic Growth in Korea: A Critical Examination of Their Relationship." *Developement and Society* 33(1):1-24.

Yavuz, Fehmi. 1952. *Ankara'nın İmarı ve Şehirciliğimiz*. Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları.
—. 1980. *Kentsel topraklar*. Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları

—. 1980. "Başkent Ankara ve Jansen." *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture* 7(1):29.

Yerolympos, Alexandra. 1996. *Urban Transformations in the Balkans (1820-1920): Aspects of Balkan Town Planning and the Remaking of Thessaloniki*. Thessaloniki: University Studio Press.

Young, Crawford. 1982. *Ideology and Development in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

—. 1994. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zaidi, Iqtidar H. 1966. "Toward a Measure of the Functional Effectiveness of a State: The Case of West Pakistan." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 56(1):52-67.

Zaidi, S. Akbar (Ed.). 1992. *Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard.

—. 1992. "Sindhi vs. Muhajir Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise." Pp. 156-79 in *Regional Imbalances and Nations Question in Pakistan* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi. Lahore: Vanguard

Ziring, Lawrence. 1980. *Pakistan, the Enigma of Political Development*. Folkestone, Kent; Boulder, CO: Dawson; Westview.

Zolberg, A. R. 1986. "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England " Pp. 72-106 in *The State in Global Perspective*, edited by Ali Kazancigil. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, VT, USA: Gower/Unesco.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. 1984. *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden: Brill.

—. 1991. *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*. Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill.

—. 1993. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris.

—. 2010. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. London; New York: I. B. Tauris.