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Towards a Critical Awareness of Worldliness: A.H. Tanpınar's *Huzur*, Mahmoud Darwish's *Memory for Forgetfulness*, and Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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This dissertation examines the ways in which Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's novel, *Huzur* (1949), Mahmoud Darwish's prose-poem *Memory for Forgetfulness: August, Beirut, 1982* (1995), and Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925) manifest a cognitive landscape of crisis in discursive socio-cultural contexts that provide the reader with a critical awareness of worldliness. It argues that the crisis serves as an overarching theme and a structural and thematic principle in determining the conceptual frameworks of the critical thresholds that these works address. The three authors of my study surpass *worldless thresholds* designated by the crisis by moving through the idea of home, nation, culture, and singularity, towards a critical awareness of worldliness. Such critical awareness provides them with grounds to challenge the national or hegemonic literature, as well as alerting us to the cross-cultural reading practices.

Informed by the works of Henri Bergson, Edward Said, Reinhart Koselleck, Emmanuel Levinas, and Hannah Arendt, this project takes these novels as theories in the form of fiction.

The first chapter focuses on Tanpınar's notion of *buhran*, crisis with a specific emphasis on the mode of temporal threshold and a state of the mind characterized by a lack of direction, the feeling of homelessness, and by the disintegration of wholeness. It examines how *buhran* serves as the paradigm and means of becoming worldly. It enables Tanpınar to engage in a dialogue beyond his culture and time period, by designating the crisis of modernity as the connecting link between two uneven temporalities – his own and what constitutes the present of the West. The second chapter explores how the notion of exilic threshold is connected to a "mythical violence" carried out by the sovereign power. It analyzes the methods Darwish employs to move beyond this threshold by *minorizing* the language, and by employing a critical and exilic consciousness. Drawing on Hannah Arendt's notion of worldliness, the third chapter demonstrates the ways in which the totalitarian characteristics of progressive modernity leads to a "worldlessness" in the temporal threshold of the "no longer and not yet" era Woolf depicted. Focusing on Woolf's main character, Clarissa Dalloway, I argue that Woolf displays how to re-establish worldliness and create a realm of coexistence based on plurality, and by recognizing the alterity of the other.

While this project frames various critical thresholds, and displays an awareness of figurations of worldliness from a cross-cultural perspective, it attempts to pinpoint several conceptual tools that enhance our understanding of how critical consciousness adopted both by the author and the reader shapes and informs the reading practices of world literature. Such critical consciousness should deterritorialize language and collectivity, cross borders, and result in heterogeneity and plurality, while taking into consideration the distinctive socio-historical, temporal and political contexts each of the narratives assign.

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List of Abbreviations

Chapter I

Yaşadığım Gibi	YG

Chapter 3

Between Past and Future	BPF
Essays in Understanding	EIU
Men in Dark Times	MDT
The Human Condition	THC
The Life of the Mind	TLM
The Origins of Totalitarianism	OT
The Promise of Politics	TPP
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil	EIJ
On Revolution	OR
Time and the Other	TO
Totality and Infinity	TI
Being and Time	BT

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Introduction

This dissertation focuses on three different authors, whose lives did not directly intersect with one another: the Turkish author Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901-1962), the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish (1941-2008), and the British author Virginia Woolf (1882-1941). Although they belong to diverse backgrounds, cultures, and time periods, their obsession with representing their historical and temporal presents tie them together. While in representing their presents Tanpınar and Woolf had modernist concerns marked by the temporal transition from Empire to Nation, for Darwish chronicling the present had a paramount importance, as it suggested writing an alternative history of the silenced during the siege of Beirut in 1982. What nevertheless specifically characterizes all their depictions of historical present, I argue, is a feeling of homelessness, disorientation, and in-betweenness.

Drawing on the German historian Reinhart Koselleck's definition of crisis in the context of the philosophy of history as a "historically immanent transition", and as a permanent category pointing to a "critical situation which may constantly recur" ("Crisis" 372), I argue that the historical and temporal present that these authors depict in their respective works manifests various facets of crisis. The authors on which I focus deal with manifold aspects of crisis in their relative narratives, and yet the way they handle crisis is neither uniform nor one-dimensional. For Tanpınar and Woolf, crisis clearly pertains to how progressive modernity creates unevenness and delay, isolating persons or cultures who are left behind with respect to the level of progress designated by the West. However, for Darwish, the crisis is implicitly related to modernity and has more to do with the political condition that holds him in exile, between presence and absence, between here and there (homeland and diaspora). It further points to a state of

transition, a constant recurring situation in the history of the Palestinian exile, converting him into a de-historicized subject.

The narratives of all three of these writers in dealing with crisis as a mode of transition thus address a dominating perspective of singularity and isolation that attest to forms of world deprivation, a critical site from which the notion of worldliness arises. This world deprivation is disclosed as *buhran*, a temporal threshold, for Tanpınar, it is exile for Darwish, and it is the totalitarianism of modernity for Woolf. Working through these *worldless thresholds* towards a critical awareness of worldliness necessitates their moving through the ideas of home, nation, culture, singularity, and opening a path towards plurality. I claim that although converting the experience of worldlessness designated by the crisis into worldly practices in an enduring present seems impossible in the fractured times of modernity, the three authors I study nevertheless manage (to differing degrees) to do so. Their critical engagement not only enables them to surpass their borders, it also informs the reader of world literature about critical reading practices in comparing various texts from different geographies.

It is important to understand how the notions of worldlessness and worldliness are related to crisis, and to a state of transition and threshold as its connotations. For Tanpınar, worldlessness is a type of temporal threshold, a form of liminality that indicates Turkey as a modernizing nation that has not yet joined Western modernity, nor made peace with its own cultural past. Tanpınar uses the term *buhran*, crisis in the form of disquiet, to describe the mode of this temporal threshold. Derived from Arabic, the term *buhran* had already existed in the Turkish language before Tanpınar. But Tanpınar lends the term special meaning by attributing it to the Turkish experience of changing civilizations, from the Ottoman (Eastern) to modern Turkey (Western). He notes that *buhran* addresses a type of disquiet in the temporal present, a

cultural indigestion which manifests itself as a lack of continuity between the past and the present; a rupture, a duality, and a fragmentation that occurred because of this transition. Tanpınar notes that the transition and its effects had remained in the culture even by mid-century, rendering the rupture and split continuous, in such a way that the mode of transition describes the temporal and historical present itself.

I expand upon this transitional sense of crisis in analyzing Darwish's exile, and claim that in the case of Darwish, it explains discursive mechanisms that perpetuate the notion of exile as a political and literary critical threshold keeping the exiled person in between two or more nationalities, states, identities, and languages. For Darwish, the siege of Beirut is the climactic moment, when he realizes that he is arrested at a perpetual threshold. The form of threshold imposed by the sovereign on the Palestinians shows that the Palestinians were clearly held outside their own homeland and the political domain, bereft of their rights as citizens. However, they were also kept inside the state control mechanisms. Carl Schmitt's (and Walter Benjamin's) notion of "the state of exception," Giorgio Agamben's notion of the *homo sacer*, and Eric Santner's term "creatureliness" are instrumental in my analysis to expound on this political threshold that excludes Darwish from the political order, and yet captures him within, rendering him a "present-absent."

Because the history-makers are silent and deaf to the tragedy of the Palestinians, the poet sees no near-future solution to the exile, and no prospect of returning to the homeland. His exile is perpetual and "naturalized" in the course of history by the hegemonic power. In describing Darwish's "worldless" threshold, I employ Hannah Arendt's adaptation of the pariah figure, the "homeless" or the rightless person consisting of a bare body positioned beyond the confines of borders through normalization of the state of exception, which is analogous to her understanding

of worldlessness. In addition to Hannah Arendt's notion of worldlessness, describing a condition that is forced upon persons who are deprived of their political rights and alienated from the public realm, I employ Edward Said's notion of worldlessness, to emphasize Darwish's inability to make history as an exile. The state of exception thus imposed by the sovereign power renders him worldless, superfluous, dehumanized and dehistoricized.

Similar to Darwish's experience, Woolf's character, Septimus Warren Smith is "superfluous," which suggests in Arendt's view "not to belong to the world at all" (*The Origins of Totalitarianism* 475) in Woolf's newly emerging mass society. In my analysis of *Mrs. Dalloway*, I put Woolf in dialogue with Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Virginia Woolf's depiction of temporal and historical experience in *Mrs. Dalloway* in the interwar period resonates with Arendt's depiction of the temporal mode of modernity as the "no longer and not yet," which intersects with the emergence of totalitarian forms of government based on the institutionalization of terror and violence, and destruction of politics, i.e. plurality of perspectives and distinctness in a worldly space.

The resonances of homelessness, lack of direction, and duality that shape Tanpınar's historical present after the transition from the Empire to the modern Turkey marks Woolf's London as well. Woolf depicts a London community where the idea of Empire has waned, leaving masses in uncertainty regarding where to belong. However, even more than the Empire's declining effect, the First World War marks a decisive split with the past. Woolf depicts the interwar period as home to the burgeoning totalitarianism of progressive modernity.

In my argument, progressive modernity can be totalitarian and lead to world alienation as its distinctive characteristics such as contemporaneity, singularity, and the breakdown with tradition may result in a radical isolation in the public realm, where only one perspective

prevails. The experience of modernity in the temporal threshold Woolf depicts intersects with Arendtian "worldlessness," leading individuals to isolation. Thus, worldlessness points to the absence of human interaction in the common space and loss of a common world, when the *world* is determined by progressive modernity.

I argue that the characters who exemplify singular perspectives by imposing their perspective on the other such as Dr. Holmes, Sir William Bradshaw, Lady Bruton, Peter Walsh, and Miss Kilman lead to such "world alienation." Most prominently, the totalitarian understanding of progressive modernity imposed by two characters, Sir William Bradshaw and Dr. Holmes, leave no room for the traumatized individuals such as Septimus Warren Smith in an ideal society, on the grounds that his isolation both carries traces of alienation from a once aesthetically and culturally imagined nation.

Each of these authors attempts to deal with the symptoms of crisis manifested as critical thresholds or worldlessness in diverse ways. My project follows up and examines the strategies each one of these authors develops to surpass these thresholds upon which they are arrested. A common strategy they employ is to frame a present imbued with remembrance, continuity, and a reassessment of the cultural past to create a durational present against the rupture. Tanpınar, influenced by the French philosopher Henri Bergson's notion of *durée*, searches for a distinct Turkish modernity - an attempt to recuperate the drastic effects of the historical transition, marked by the crisis of modernity. Bergsonian time consciousness, which suggests continuity in time and prolongation of the past culture in the present, provides a suitable tool for Tanpınar to selectively reinscribe the elements of the past culture into the present.

Tanpınar hoped that forms of duration in this engagement with the past culture would give clues as to what might have constituted the "unique self," a key to determining one's own

modernity. For Tanpınar, such an understanding of modernity rests on continuity and a critical revision of the past, challenging and complicating the issues of culture, society and history. It also motivates him to search for a new form of life, which not only involves the Turkish culture and tradition, but is a symbiosis of the East and the West, and yet distinct from each. My first chapter examines how Tanpınar brings cultural elements together by deploying not only Bergson's notions of duration, *élan vital*, and *intuition*, but also the elements that he selectively picks up from the past culture, such as classical Turkish music and the Bosphorus with its culture, and weaves around a love affair between his protagonists Mümtaz and Nuran.

Darwish, on the other hand, deals with his exilic threshold by invoking past experience and his memories, and by reviving antecedent myths to situate himself in time and place against the one-dimensional sovereign violence. For Darwish, writing history that he witnesses from the perspective of the silenced and alerting the reader to the "natural history" of the sovereign violence gain paramount importance for reaffirming his subjectivity and his "presence" that would endow him with a history of which the Palestinians are deprived. However, I argue, the question remains as to how Darwish writes the testimony or an alternative history to break the state of exception if he is always-already part of it, and as the traumatic moment of the siege deprives him of communicative language. Moreover, as Darwish's text proves, the attempt to rewrite history is always subject to challenges when one has been excluded from it.

In her *Mrs. Dalloway,* Woolf also attempts to deal with the crisis-created rupture in history and time by constructing a durational present in which one feels at home in the world and interacts with others in a shared world. Woolf investigates the possibility of "sum[ming] it all up in the moment" (147) through her protagonist Clarissa Dalloway. Clarissa manages to bring her past memories into the present without effort, as the other characters also vividly remember their

past experiences. Woolf deploys a technique she called the "tunneling" process, to connect the characters' memories and their present experiences. Woolf's tunneling technique and the motif of Big Ben in *Mrs. Dalloway* create a durational present in the urban space of 1923 London by binding the characters' thoughts to one another and their past experiences into the present. However, Woolf's technique raises questions about the extent to which the interaction between the characters takes place in public spaces, when the anonymous crowd of the city in *Mrs. Dalloway* is only united by the spectacle of power that produces a fantasy of belonging.

In identifying the challenges met by each one of these authors as such, my dissertation demonstrates that reaching a critical awareness of worldliness is an intricate process for these authors, and it maps their strategies for attaining it. In each of these narratives, for instance, there is an epiphanic moment when the characters reach a state of consciousness that enables them to work through the circumstances of crisis, and convert "worldless" practices into an awareness of worldliness. Thus, I claim the epiphanic moment indicates a turning point, a new consciousness in attaining worldliness in each of these narratives. This new awareness enables these authors to work through experiences of *buhran*, exile, or the totalitarianism of progressive modernity, critically.

Tanpınar works through the idea of crisis by embracing the experience of the present marked by *buhran*. His protagonist, Mümtaz, understands that what he calls the temporal present consists of several temporalities coexisting with each other. Tanpınar undermines the aesthetic continuity he created around his protagonist Mümtaz as a method to incorporate this critical dimension. Through Tanpınar's character Suad, the cultural and aesthetical world Mümtaz created around Nuran, Istanbul, art, and culture is also challenged. Confronting the abject offers a renewal of meaning, a new perspective to view the world critically, and enables Mümtaz to

establish a different type of relation between himself and the world. This new "worldly" perspective allows Mümtaz to engage in other worlds and the "others" he expelled from his aesthetic world in the shared responsibility for the approaching Second World War.

In Darwish's testimony, the narrator develops a critical perspective that enables him to deconstruct the hegemony of the sovereign's language and linearity of the official history. This critical perspective involves a contrapuntal approach, in Edward Said's sense, to the notion of homeland, diaspora, and memory, and acts as forms of resistance. It converts the exilic threshold that keeps him neither outside nor inside the political domain into a site of worldliness. Literary fissures that permeate Darwish's text, such as incomplete memories, gaps, and fragments should be read as the very signs of his exilic consciousness. Adopting a critical and exilic consciousness invests him with the tools to resist the socio-political and historical discursive mechanisms that dehistoricize and dehumanize him, reducing him to one who is worldless. *Minorizing* the hegemonic literature in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, i.e. using language in a deliberately unresolved manner, and blending multiple traditions and influences in a composite dialogue are such narrative tools. The poem Darwish incorporates into his text, the "stammering scream," is such an instance of a minorization, signifying resistance against the silence and the deafness of history.

For Woolf, the epiphanic moment comes at the end of her narrative, when Clarissa faces Septimus and the old lady in the penultimate scene. Clarissa acknowledges the unknowability of the other's mind, and draws the reader's attention to the importance of preserving the coexistence of others in a common world based on plurality, where various views interact respecting the distinctness of each member. Thus, Woolf directs the reader to a mode of worldliness where one can feel at home without projecting her own thought and her sameness on

the other to overcome world alienation.

In my analysis, Emmanuel Levinas's conception of alterity is instrumental in emphasizing the ethical question of the limits of communication in such an understanding of a world in common. Just as abjection acts as a process that collapses meaning fundamental to the constitution of Mümtaz's identity and offers its renewal, the face-to-face encounter with Septimus suggests a new birth for Clarissa Dalloway.

A common strategy used by both Tanpınar and Woolf is the framing of these characters as doubles. Clarissa and Septimus are bonded as doubles - though ambiguously - and Suad acts as Mümtaz's double, which turns out to be an abject part of his subjectivity that Mümtaz has suppressed. In both instances, the protagonists make room for the other beyond the confines of their world. Confrontation with his abjected side endows Mümtaz with a critical perspective that allows him to see the others of his society, and the face-to-face encounter with Septimus in a Levinasian manner directs Clarissa to open up the possibility of a common world of plurality and coexistence.

Clarissa's liveliness intensifies after this encounter, however, Mümtaz's encounter with Suad, the abject, costs Mümtaz his life. While there is no presence of a double figure in Darwish, there is a metamorphosis in the poet's persona which serves somewhat the same purpose. In my interpretation, as Darwish manages to acquire an in-between and outside/inside perspective through a critical consciousness; it enables him to transform his pariah status into a that of a "conscious pariah," from a Palestinian to a "non-Palestinian Palestinian" — terms that describe the de-familiarizing in-between status that enables him to question his ties to the homeland.

Clearly, these authors had to write against the grain and in difficult times, and they arrive at what I designate as a critical awareness of worldliness through a confrontation with their

limitations, dilemmas, and paradoxes. Although they realize that converting "worldless" thresholds into worldly consciousness in a durational present is difficult, if not impossible, they place the endeavor itself — the striving to reach worldliness, which would consist of plurality, coexistence, and resistance, at the center of their literary creativity. Even if their characters are unable to act in the end, or change their destinies as they desire, they manage to open up a critical worldly space for other temporalities, persons or histories at the end of their stories.

This new worldly site they unfold in a political act secures their "unhoming," a ground from which one may surpass borders. In that sense, critical worldliness resonates with Edward Said's notion of secular criticism. Said's use of the term secular does not pertain to religion per se, but to nationalism, as an ideology of home, and an "entire matrix of meanings we associate with 'home,' belonging and community" (*The World, The Text, and the Critic* 11), also as permanent critique of the mass institutions in the modern era.[1] By citing the statement by twelfth-century monk, Hugo of St. Victor's, about one's attachments and belonging to a place and culture in his *Culture and Imperialism*, Said emphasizes that by transcending the limits, as Hugo clearly argues, does not mean rejecting one's own national identity or native place but rather a Freudian "*working through*" of these attachments (335).[2] The way Tanpınar, Darwish

[1] The German philologist, Erich Auerbach while in Turkish exile is Said's famous example "to transcend the restrains of imperial or national or provincial limits" (335).

[2] The implication here being that the quotation Auerbach provides from Hugo of St. Victor is the foundation of Said's own philosophy on exile, as Said himself admits that he finds himself returning again and again to this hauntingly beautiful passage:

> It is therefore, a source of great virtue for the practiced mind to learn, bit by bit, first to change about in visible and transitory things, so that afterwards it may be able to leave them behind altogether. The person who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign place. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong person has extended his love to all

and Woolf work through crisis towards a critical awareness of worldliness is an example of such an act of working through with attachments and detachments. Darwish's term "minority-majority," for instance is a manifestation of an awareness, which suggests working through the attachment with one community or with the majority, while at the same time urging the reader to be sensitive to the history-making mechanisms."[3]

Narrative acts of worldliness as a product of world literature should be born from such critical and demanding positions. Worldliness is not a state these authors unequivocally embrace, but rather a critical process they consider. This means that reaching a critical awareness of worldliness is a difficult and a painful process. For the authors of my study, it meant the acceptance of the broken link with tradition; it demands working through one's attachments and detachments, and it calls for stepping out of one's comfort zone.

The critical perspectives of worldliness these authors designate also inspire and address the cross-cultural and contrapuntal reading modes I am employing in my analysis of these narratives. While this dissertation does not discuss what world literature is, or theorize about its content, it interrogates the stakes in putting authors and their works from diverse backgrounds and time periods into dialogue by drawing attention to cultural incommensurability. In her *Against World Literature* (2013), Emily Apter draws attention to the tendencies in world literature toward reflexive endorsement of cultural equivalence and substitutability on the

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> places; the perfect man has extinguished his (Culture and Imperialism 335).

[3] Emphasizing the critical imperative of the secular, Aamir Mufti in "Auerbach in Istanbul" argues that the Saidian critical position implies not a "contentless" cosmopolitanism but a secularism designated by the experience of the minority (96). Mufti shows that secularist arguments are enunciated from such minority positions, and that secular criticism "seeks continually to make it perceptible that the experience of being at home can only be produced by rendering some other homeless" (107). Secular criticism then invites the reader to a responsible reading by putting the reader in a "homeless" situation.

assumption of translatability, and activates "untranslatability" as a theoretical fulcrum of comparative literature and approaches to world literatures. Her warning against the homogenization of spaces and temporalities in comparison becomes the vantage point for my elaboration of the critical awareness of worldliness in the works of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Mahmoud Darwish and Virginia Woolf.

On the other hand, Homi Bhabha in his *Location of Culture* (1994), drew attention to the "non-simultaneity of the simultaneous," which opens up a space for borderline existences. He remarked that the "non-synchronous temporality of global and national cultures opens up a cultural space — a third space — where the negotiation of incommensurable differences creates a tension peculiar to borderline existences" (218). Such an approach, sensitive to the cultural and temporal differences in cross-cultural perspectives, is of paramount importance, and it resonates with Edward Said's contrapuntal method, which he specified in his *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) to voice "what is silent or marginally present or ideologically represented" (66) so that an "alternative, or new narratives emerge" (66). My analysis of Tanpınar's and Darwish's narratives exemplify such a reading practice. While my approach pays attention to drawing out the specificity of historical and political contexts in each of these narratives separately without effacing their non-translatable issues, it also introduces lesser-known authors such as Tanpınar and Darwish and thus *minorizes* the hypercanon.

Critical debates on world literature have dominated the discipline of comparative literature from the mid-1990s on and key interventions by Pascale Casanova, Franco Moretti, David Damrosch, Emily Apter, and Djelal Kadir in recent years have set paradigms for the theoretical cross-cultural approaches to literatures in a global framework. These scholars have invited readers to view world literature as a "unified but unequal system, organized by

hierarchies obtaining between centre and periphery and animated by endemic forms of symbolic violence" (Helgesson 7). For instance, Pascale Casanova's idea of a "republic of world letters," which she expressed in her *The World Republic of Letters* (1999), constructs a global system centered on cosmopolitan capitals, most notably Paris, where national literatures seek international prestige based on the literary value of their oeuvre. Franco Moretti posited world literature as a "*problem* that asks for a new critical method" (55) in his essay "Conjectures on World Literature" (2000), and he proposed the method of "distant reading" to avoid the de-aestheticizing globalization perspective.

David Damrosch in his influential *What is World Literature?* (2003) set the criteria of a work's worldliness based on "a mode of circulation and reading" (4).[4] While Damrosch's mode of reading encapsulates a pedagogical approach to resist the hegemony of the hypercanon by introducing lesser-known authors and a variety of contexts and engaging them in a cross-cultural comparison, it does not consider texts that are not circulated beyond their borders or translated, but that nevertheless still disrupt the national or hegemonic literature by engaging critically with the national borders within the confines of their own narrative worlds.

Moreover, world literature debates rarely lead to an engagement with actually existing literature, which did not or could not make it to the world literary market through translation, but

[4] Damrosch defines world literature as follows:

> The idea of world literature can usefully continue to mean a subset of the plenum of literature. I take world literature to encompass all literary works that circulate beyond their culture of origin, either in translation or in their original language (Virgil was long read in latin in Europe.) […] A central argument of this book will be that, properly understood, world literature is not at all fated to to disintegrate into the conflicting multiplicity of separate national traditions; nor, on the other hand, need it be swallowed up by the white noise that Janet Abu-Lughod has called "global babble". My claim is that literature is not an infinite, ungraspable canon of works but rather a mode of circulation and reading. (4-5)

still constitutes an example of literary worldliness through the interrogation of cultural and national territories. As Longxi Zhang mentions, it was not until very recently that the scholarly study of world literature gained a global perspective beyond the confines of Europe (1). This dissertation, moving beyond the confines of Europe, brings together texts, and examines how these narratives engage in notional and narrative acts of *worlding* even before they are circulated worldwide.

Postcolonial theory keeps shaping the critical paradigms in theorizing about the notions of hybridity and in-betweenness. However, as Emily Apter notes, it tends to be reductive in attempting to translate "nuanced modalities of split, interiorized exilic ontology into a curricular mandate" ("Comparative Exile" 92). I refrain from using postcolonial theory as an overarching theoretical perspective in order to avoid such repercussions of reductive comparison, even though many of the arguments in this dissertation illustrate debates that govern postcolonial studies. For instance, there was never a colonial relation between Europe and Turkey, which rules out a straight postcolonial approach to Tanpınar's literature. Although the analysis of *Mrs. Dalloway* exposes the colonial mindset of various characters who impose their self-possessed, singular views on the others, Levinas's ethical perspective on the relation to the other in the shared space, and Arendt's theory on plurality in the shadow of the totalitarian regimes prove to be more fruitful.

Thus, my contention is that the theories and studies on modernity provide tools for a more thorough analysis of these texts, which in varying degrees deal with the crisis of modernity. Marshall Berman in his seminal *All That is Solid Melts into Air* (1982) invites us to understand the modernisms of the past in order to have a sense of our modern roots, and to connect our lives with others who lived the trauma of modernity. Early modernists constantly wrestled with the

ambiguities and contradictions of modernity, and this struggle itself and their inner tensions formed the primary source of their creative power (24). Clearly, we find the world today a very different place from that of Tanpınar, Woolf and Darwish. However, the causes that put these authors and their narratives into various *worldless* thresholds are still with us in the twenty-first century. I can only hope that the resistance strategies each of these authors employ continue to inspire us.

Chapter 1

A.H. Tanpınar's *Huzur*: *Buhran,* and Worldliness as Coexistence of Mixed Temporalities

The Turkish author and poet Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901-1962), for whom the inner tensions and contradictions of modernity formed the primary source of creativity, became popular again in Turkish academia and literary circles after the 1990s. The contemporary Turkish reader found a kindred spirit in Tanpınar, who contemplated various issues concerning modernity, including how one can connect to the past in the process of modernization where no item of the past has a secure place in the present, and hence find ways to position oneself locally and globally in the whirlpool of constant change.

This chapter focuses on A.H. Tanpınar's novel, *Huzur* (*A Mind at Peace,* 2011), first serialized for the daily *Cumhuriyet* in 1948, and subsequently published in 1949. I will endeavor to prove that by designating the "crisis of the modernity" in this novel as the connecting link between two uneven temporalities, his "own," and what constitutes the present of the West, Tanpınar directs the reader to a discourse on modernity "that speaks to the world," as Harry Harootunian describes it, "one centered principally in understanding the history of one's present as the unity of mixed temporalizations" coexisting with each other (493).

The notion of crisis predominates in Tanpınar's writings after 1950s. For instance, in his essay "Kelimeler Arasinda Elli Yıl" / (*Fifty Years Among Words*, 1950), he attempts to define and draw the scope of this global crisis at home and in the world. After musing on a variety of terms that would best describe the epoch in which he lives as infused with crisis, he decides that

the term *buhran*, crisis in Turkish, would be the most suitable of all the terms (82)[5]. The term *buhran* is derived from Arabic and has a similar connotation with that of the English word, crisis, which is defined in Merriam-Webster dictionary as: "the turning point for better or worse in an acute disease or fever, a paroxysmal attack of pain, distress, or disordered function, a radical change of status in a person's life, an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending, and a situation that has reached a critical phase."

While "crisis" may be an adequate translation of *buhran*, what Tanpınar terms as *buhran* addresses various forms of crisis in his understanding, all related to modernity. Tanpınar uses *buhran* to describe the economic and socio-political global crisis prevailing in the first half of the twentieth-century. It therefore addresses a lack of sense and direction, feeling of homelessness, disintegration, ambiguity, and the destruction of wholeness. However, in his compilation of essays, *Yaşadığım Gibi*, Tanpınar distinguishes *buhran* with regard to the global crisis and its influences at home from the crisis that specifically characterizes the Turkish experience of "the abrupt transition from one civilization to another" (34)[6], by which he implies the transition from the Ottoman culture to the modern Turkey. *Buhran*, in this second usage, indicates a transitional phase in his terminology, which characterizes Turkish modernization from the late nineteenth century onwards.

Tanpınar also discusses another form of crisis, which he understands as intrinsic to the modernization process. Unlike the global socio-political and economic crisis, and the crisis pertaining to the Turkish experience of historical transition, Tanpınar favors this certain mode of crisis which he thinks inevitably occurs in dealing with the tradition of the past. The crisis

[5] I will use the term *buhran* where necessary in order to differentiate it from the Tanpınar's conception of "positive" or "desired" crisis of modernity.

[6] *Yaşadığım Gibi* will be abbreviated as YG hereafter.

pertaining to modernity occurs when modernity interacts *critically* with the past tradition, engaging in a dialogue with one's history and tradition, though not always peacefully.[7] Tanpınar argues that one needs to go through this crisis in order to be modern, and, moreover, to find a possible modernity of one's own in the interaction with the past culture.

Bergsonian time consciousness, which suggests continuity in time and prolongation of the past culture in the present, provides Tanpınar with a tool suitable for engaging critically with the past, and for reinscribing the elements of the past culture into the present selectively. Tanpınar hoped that forms of duration in this engagement with past culture would give clues as to what might have constituted the "unique self," a key to determining one's own modernity.

While the process of finding one's own modernity and a unique self involves a crisis that addresses that culture's "unique, internal time" (Harootunian 482), the crisis (*buhran*) addresses estrangement with one's past. It suggests that the link between the past and the present is forever broken, and that it is not possible to find a "unique self," or a modernity of one's own based on the continuity between the past culture and the present. In other words, by referring to *buhran*, as a specific Turkish experience that describes the abrupt transition from one culture to another, Tanpınar suggests that none of the objectives pertaining to what he seeks to find in the ideal modernity have taken place.

Instead, Tanpınar's historical present characterized by *buhran* addresses a threshold echoing what Hannah Arendt identified in her *Between Past and Future* as: "[O]dd in-between

[7] T.S. Eliot's seminal essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919) focuses on a similar issue. What Eliot understands from "tradition," a simultaneous order, a unifying essence that fuses the past and the present, invokes a historical awareness akin to what Tanpınar describes. Eliot's tradition is also a dynamic site. As a new work joins the existing body of works that make up the tradition, it alters the existing order, and readjusts the tradition to accommodate the new. However, in Tanpınar's perspective this fusion of the past and the present in tradition is not a smooth process, but rather a selective process that always demands a confrontation with the past. See, T.S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," *Selected Essays* (London, 1950).

period which sometimes inserts itself into historical time when not only the later historians but the actors and witnesses, the living themselves, become aware of an interval in time which is altogether determined by things that are no longer and by things that are not yet" (9). *Huzur* depicts an historical present, an interval time, which signifies a threshold between "what is gone and what is yet to come" (Köroğlu 126), or in Arendt's terms, a temporal threshold of "no longer and not yet." *Buhran,* a type of disquiet, describes the mode of this temporal threshold.[8]

When Tanpınar states in an interview that: "we'd better search for the present elsewhere, in itself. I mean in us. In human's disquiet" (YG 317), he subtly exposes the modernist tendency to view the disquiet of today's individual as instrumental in his search for contemporaneity with Western modernity in the present. By exposing the figurations of crisis, *buhran* in the historical present, he hoped to punctuate the rhythm of the West, and engage with its coexisting temporality and experience. Thus, he hoped to be worldly in the contemporaneity of modernity by deploying a transnational perspective to engage in a dialogue with the time of the West, which he thinks is marked by temporal and historical crises.

Then, Tanpınar employs the crisis as the desired mode of modernization to visualize a modernity peculiar to Turkey by connecting to the past. He simultaneously explores figurations of crisis (in terms of *buhran*) in the present to be contemporaneous with the time of modernity. Tanpınar pursues both seemingly contrasting motives in *Huzur* by juxtaposing them: he invokes the culture of the past in a continuum, and explores the possibility of an aesthetic wholeness, where one can find the "unique self." On the other hand, he undermines the continuity and the aesthetic wholeness he builds to demonstrate the elements of crisis, such as duality and

[8] As Berna Moran succinctly expressed, *Huzur* (*A Mind at Peace*) is a novel of disquiet as opposed to what its title suggests (*Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış* 203).

coexistence of discordant elements, that suggests a lack of continuity with the past tradition in his present environment. Tanpınar by the end of the novel embraces the experience of the present marked by *buhran,* and leads his protagonist Mümtaz to engage in other worlds in the shared responsibility of the approaching Second World War, which certifies a global crisis. Mümtaz understands through this critical engagement that there is no "one's own" that is to be found in an aesthetic wholeness, but multiple temporalities in a shared present.

I shall examine Tanpınar's preoccupation with the historical present in relation to how he approached the process of modernization. Tanpınar approached the concepts of cultural and urban modernity separately to find answers to the questions of "how to modernize." Like other intellectuals of his time in the construction period of modern Turkey, he had always been a supporter of urban modernity. His vision of urban modernity included all the key values of the "progressive modernity," or "bourgeois idea of modernity" that was at stage during the first half of the nineteenth century in the history of Western civilization such as "the doctrine of progress, the confidence in the beneficial possibilities of science and technology, the concern with time, […] the cult of reason" (Calinescu, 41). Foreseeing that the new regime needs industrialization reform and a scientific agenda for its future, Tanpınar drew industrial development plans, offered city planning solutions, and discussed how the country – "now that it joined the Western civilization"(YG 35), can progress in light of Western science, and reason. [9]

Tanpınar's understanding of urban modernity with its emphasis on progress does not seem to contradict his understanding of cultural modernity, which requires re-employment of the

[9] Tanpınar, like many intellectuals of early Republican period, was also a politician. As a parliament member during the years 1943-46, and as an active supporter of the newly found Republic's revolutionary agenda, he has always been loyal to the founder, Atatürk's reforms, and to İsmet İnönü, Atatürk's successor.

past in the present. According to Tanpınar's understanding of cultural modernity, modernity should recognize the connection between the culture of the past and the present. Referring to the Western history of modernization, and how it dealt with past events and traditions such as Renaissance and Reform, Tanpınar claims that Turkish modernity, following the Western example, must reconcile its past, revise, and reintroduce its living elements in order to call this new experience modernity. Tanpınar's handling of cultural modernity demands such a form of continuity in time linking the past with the present.

This continuity and connection between past and present should not, however, mean an amalgamation or a coexistence of the "old" and the "new." In Tanpınar's past-present-future nexus, the past is necessarily brought into the present, but it is not preserved as it is: it ought to be revised, reintroduced, and only the living elements of the past should be the living components of the present. The protagonist of *Huzur*, Mümtaz, voices this concern stressing the need to find a particular method to create a bond with the past: "I'm no aesthete of decline. Maybe I'm searching for what's still alive and viable in this decline. I'm making use of that" (172). Tanpınar's present is a dynamic site then, where the living components of the past are made as an organic part of the present.

The transformation of the past that takes place in the present echoes the evolutionary scheme of cultural history theorized by Nietzsche in his Apollonian and Dionysian conflict, which explains the global view of cultural history "through continually renewed clashes between two recurrent and opposing types" (Calinescu 88). Tanpınar refers to Nietzsche's theory of the Apollonian and Dionysian conflict many times in his lectures and essays, but only briefly. In an interview held in 1955, he explains what he understands from Nietzsche's theory. This theory, according to Tanpınar, observes that the society and culture change continuously in time, and

this change as signified by the confrontation of Dionysus and Apollo, should be constructive (YG 318).

The confrontation between Apollo and Dionysus is not a peaceful one, but like the "perpetual subversion of the past as the precondition of the future" (Friedman 503), it is characterized by disquiet. Tanpınar in an essay detects disquiet in the process of this confrontation by making an allusion to a natural event: "The soil feeds the root, but the seed decomposes" (YG 319). He thus understands that the continuous change in society and culture is not a seamless one but one immanently involving a potential crisis, as the conflict between Apollo and Dionysus demonstrates.

Acknowledging that crisis is intrinsic to the process of modernization steered Tanpınar to recognize that the modern crisis can be constructive in a way akin to the confrontation of Apollo and Dionysus, provided it challenges and complicates the issues of culture, society and history. Crisis in this respect is vital to the modernization process. The following statement reveals how Tanpınar conceptualizes modernity in this context: "Re-assessing the values, this disquiet makes the real modern, not the continuous denials that discard the human and the culture" (YG 297). Thus, for Tanpınar, modernity signifies understanding, confronting and challenging the tradition. This process does not necessarily mean coming to terms with the past, but involves, rather, a certain crisis in handling of the past traditions and culture.

The way Tanpınar handles the past critically by incorporating Nietzsche's theory of conflict between Apollo and Dionysus reveals that he reverts to the past only as long as it serves to understand and represent the present.[10] He, like the contemporary modernists, was inspired to

[10] For a discussion of *Aufhebung* as a possible interpretation of Tanpınar's present past nexus, see Selâhattin Hilav, "Kuruntuya Dayanan Eleştirme," Hilmi Yavuz "Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar ve Marksizm." Ahmet Oktay, in his essay "Tanpınar: Bir Tereddüdün Adamı" provides an insightful analysis of how

prioritize the acute sense of the present as the source of aesthetic experience in modernity and insisted on the "now," and what "now" promises for the future. "We are not even now, we are tomorrow" (YG 42) he says, hoping that the modernities of tomorrow will meet the needs of today to an even greater degree. Therefore, though Tanpınar is conservative in his approach to the past tradition he is not nostalgic. In fact, he makes it clear in his compilation of essays, *Beş Şehir* (1946) that he would not like to stay in the golden age of the Ottoman period even for a short while had he been given the chance to do so (17).

Tanpınar's insistence on the present is itself a modern predicament recapitulated by many theorists. The idea of the "present in its presentness," was first highlighted by Baudelaire, the first theorist of aesthetic modernity, who pointed to the instantaneous quality of modernity in his "The Painter of Modern Life" as the "ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable" (13). The entire project of the Frankfurt School with its varied contributions was in important ways an elaboration of the Baudelairian insights. Jürgen Habermas in his "Modernity: An Unfinished Project" explores the mentality of aesthetic modernity, which began to take shape through Baudelaire, and was characterized by a transformed consciousness of time. According to Habermas, this new consciousness of time, which also created the foundation of Henri Bergson's philosophy, expresses the desire for a lasting and immaculate present. The search for a lasting present brings a conflict between modernity and history as a cultural transmission (40).

Paul de Man in his "Literary History and Literary Modernity" argues that though modernity invests its trust in the power of the present moment as an origin, it still relates to history and tradition. Referring to Baudelaire's "The Painter of Modern Life" and Nietzsche's

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Tanpınar tries to overcome "the conflicts of modernization by becoming modern" (*Bir Gül Bu Karanlıklarda*, 2002).

"On the Use and Abuse of History for Life" (1873-6), de Man argues that both of these texts present an acute sense of the present as the constitutive element of all aesthetic experience, and attempt to wipe out whatever came earlier in the hope of reaching a point that could be called a "true present." However, according to de Man, they cannot free their thoughts from its historical connotation.

In Baudelaire's case, Constantin Guys, the painter who stands for the poetic mind, is a "curious synthesis of a man of action" (de Man 396) severed from past and future, and recorder of moments that are necessarily combined within a larger totality in a successive duration. He attempts to represent the present and, according to de Man, there lies the paradox of the problem: it combines a "repetitive with an instantaneous pattern without apparent awareness of the incompatibility"; a combination that would achieve a reconciliation between the impulse toward modernity and the demand of the work of art to achieve duration (396).

In de Man's view, Nietzsche also, in his "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life" brings the two seemingly incompatibles, history and modernity together in a paradox that resembles a predicament in which one can recognize the mood of our modernity. Accordingly, Nietzsche emphasizes that modernity must be understood historically and that "only through history is history conquered" (391). Then, modernity and history tightly relate to each other: "If history is not to become sheer regression or paralysis, it depends on modernity for its duration and renewal; but modernity cannot assert itself without being at once swallowed up and reintegrated into a regressive historical process" (391). This statement shows that modernity and history are linked together in a "self-destroying union," and yet, modernity itself is rooted in a sense of historical causality.

In many circumstances, however, modernity has been equated with the present without considering its historical or past connotation. Susan Friedman calls this perspective a relational approach to modernity, which suggests severing the present from other temporal dimensions: "relationally speaking, modernity is the insistence upon the Now – the present and its future as resistance to the past, especially the immediate past" (503). She criticizes this approach for creating an illusory myth of the new that is dissociated from its historical roots and that refuses to acknowledge "the presence of the past in the present and future" (504). She stresses that "the new cultural and institutional formations of modernity are themselves the product of historical process," and thus refusing the principle of historical continuity means denying its own production as a historical formation (504).

Unlike the relational approach, Tanpınar's approach to modernity does not consider the present as a point of origin that marks a new departure. He attempts to historicize modernity in a continuum and present it as a historical formation. Such a conception of the present in the context of modernity may provide us with a more insightful understanding of the relation between history and modernity that the relational take on modernity dismisses. Therefore, it could be argued that Tanpınar is one of the first Turkish modernists who realized that the temporal present is an historical formation imbued with remembrance, continuity and re-assessment of the past. For modernity is not all about "mak[ing] it new," but inescapably refers to the past, ensuring an expanded present, which also involves the past and the future. Tanpınar's understanding of the "national life," or a "modernity of one's own" finds its source in this expanded present, which embodies constant recreation and transformation of the previous life forms, reflected in his pithy chiasmatic statement, "persevering by changing and changing by persevering" (*Yahya Kemal* 14).

The question of how the present, that is, the socio-cultural, historical, economic and political scene of the country, should be constructed occupied all the early intellectuals of Turkey, and as such, constructing a modern Turkey was the primary agenda after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As a young student Tanpınar was inevitably influenced by the sweeping ideas generated by these intellectuals during the revolutionary Turkish setting of the early 1930s, especially by a group of intellectuals, who called themselves "Bergsoncular" (Bergsonists) (İrem, "Undercurrents" 80). Gathered around the journal *Dergah* (1921-4), Turkish Bergsonists adopted the French philosopher Henri Bergson's theory of creative evolution as a nationalist argument. They transformed Bergson's key terms such as tension, creation and spontaneity in a context of creating a spontaneous modern society that they identified with the Turkish society, which has experienced "flows of change" in its transition from a traditional religious formation to a modern secular one (89).

Tanpınar's notion of the "new life" must have been inspired by the spectrum of ideas the "presentist" philosopher Bergson articulated, and the former generation of Turkish Bergsonists transmitted. The mentor figure in *Huzur*, İhsan, who represents Bergon's views in the novel, emphasizes the spontaneity of this "new life," which is about to be created. He contends that once "we establish a new life particular to us and befitting our own idiom," it will take its own form: "Life is ours; we'll give it the form that we desire. And as it assumes its form, it'll sing its song" (106).

Tanpınar also imagined that the temporal present engenders creation and spontaneity. He expressed the potentiality in the present by such phrases as "a new life particular to us," that will take "the form we desire," which would produce a "unique self." The gist is that the "unique self" (*bize ait*) finds its source in what endured out of "the real heritage" of the past and projected

into the present and the future in the form of new creations. This new form of life points to "a third source: the reality of the nation," which does not involve the Turkish culture and tradition only, but is a symbiosis of the East and the West and yet distinct from each. Tanpınar writes:

> We can consider the East or the West only as two separate sources. Both exist for us, and quite extensively; that is to say, they are part of our reality. However, their presence alone can't be of any value, and remaining [separate] that way, they are an invitation to create a vast and comprehensive synthesis, a life meant for us and particular to us. For the encounter and fusion to be fruitful, it must give birth to this life, to this synthesis. And this is possible by attaining the vital third source, which is the reality of the nation. (YG 42-43)[11]

His vision of the new form of life is thus a recreation of the tradition with the new perspective adopted from the West. Therefore, the question as to how to modernize specifically deals with the question of how to create a modernity of one's own based on the "reality of the nation." But it also indicates that it is yet to be searched and found. In his essay, "Asıl Kaynak" (The Essential Source) (1943), Tanpınar emphasizes his earlier statement that the "reality of the nation" exists "neither in the past nor in the West; but in our lives which rests ahead of us like an unsolved puzzle" (43). Clearly, terms such as "the unsolved puzzle," "the real heritage," and even the "new life," address the ambiguity of this search's destination. In other words, the unique self and the unique modernity lie in the obscurity of the present, which needs to be excavated.

Tanpınar's vision of the modern self (and "reality of the nation") accordingly dwells in between the past, from which experiences can be incorporated into the present, and the future of expectations, which points to the "not-yet" and "to be discovered." This temporal threshold he

[11] The translation belongs to Erdağ Göknar. For the discussion of the themes such as, the persistence of the past, the divided selves, and continuity and synthesis in Tanpınar's novel, *Sahnenin Dışındakiler*, see Göknar's article: "Ottoman Past and Turkish Future: Ambivalence in A. H. Tanpınar's Those outside the Scene" (647-661).

designated between the past and the present informs his understanding of modernity. German historian Reinhart Koselleck, in his *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Times*, makes a similar allusion to the temporal threshold caused by the modern experience. He defines the modern in terms of historical time and states that "experience is present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered" and a horizon of expectations which refers to "the future made present, it points to the not-yet, to that which has not been experienced, to that which can only be discovered" (272).

Harry Harootunian in his article, "Remembering the Historical Present," argues that this temporal order leads to comparison, and imprisons "movement in a preestablished route prefigured by a conception of progress" (478-479). This temporal order echoes Ernst Bloch's formulation of the "non- contemporaneous contemporary" a term that describes Bloch's observation in the Germany of the early 1930s, of the coexistence of different times reflecting the disconnection and unevenness between the new and the traditional (city and countryside) (476).[12] This temporal order also leads to the figuration of "the noncontemporaneous contemporary" as a sign of retarded achievement exemplified as delay, arrest, and catch up (479). Tanpınar's "not-yet" and one's own modernity that is "to be discovered" are indications of delay, arrest, and catch up, but are simultaneously a search for a truer, qualitative time that internalizes the experience, constitutes historicization, and a reconfiguration of the quantitative (world of clock and calendar) in an attempt to bring the East and the West together.

Harry Harootunian states that the historical present, established as the perspective for all

[12] As Harootunian notes, it was Karl Marx who first called attention to the forms of unevenness, which later described as non- contemporaneous contemporaneity in his *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, by calling attention to the uneven development of material production and "the coexistence of a dominant mode of production and surviving prior modes" (482).

temporal formations in our time, is centered as an absolute, insisting on the developmental imperative that promotes programs of catching up with the historical present attained by "modern Euro-America" (483). Octavio Paz, in his Nobel lecture, entitled "In Search of the Present" (1990), makes a similar comment arguing that to search for the present is peculiar to what one might call peripheral modernities. He states:

> The search for the present is neither the pursuit of an earthly paradise nor that of a timeless eternity: it is the search for a real reality. For us, as Spanish Americans, the real present was not in our own countries: it was the time lived by others, by the English, the French and the Germans. It was the time of New York, Paris, London. We had to go and look for it and bring it back home […] But at that time I wrote without wondering why I was doing it. I was searching for the gateway to the present: I wanted to belong to my time and to my century. A little later this obsession became a fixed idea: I wanted to be a modern poet. My search for modernity had begun.

As Octavio Paz points out, "the real reality," or "here and now of actual experience" does not belong to the peripheral (modernities), but to the Western time, which in Harootunian's view provides "both perspective and tribunal" (483). According to this schema, the time of the West must be transfused into one's culture so that the poet feels at home in his/her time.

Tanpınar's incorporation of the West into what constitutes "ours" seems to originate from a similar complexity experienced by the peripheral modernities. In his view, being part of Western modernity *is* the key to finding one's authenticity ironically saturated with the "not-yet" of modernity. In an interview held in 1950, Tanpınar explained how these two seemingly contradictory states are related to each other:

> Appearing on the international scene is our only salvation. What I mean by salvation here is to join the convoy and be contemporary; to overcome solitariness. We identify with each other in our loneliness. We cannot be unique the way we want in that manner. The world lives in unison. What we call the world has never had a clearer and solid meaning so far. The whole world entertains together,

> suffers together, and lives together. It is us only who is left outside the concert. (YG 208)

Tanpınar understands that modernity has amended and shaped the power relations and perception of one's standing in the world. Being left outside the concert suggests remaining in the periphery. Interaction with Western modernity will not only help him to find a "unique" modernity that would flourish in his culture but also it will enable him to be part of a world framed by Western time.

Tanpınar's attempt to interiorize time as "what belongs to us" by selectively reverting to the past, and simultaneously "bringing the time of the West back home" as Paz also points out, would require him to imagine the present as a unity of mixed temporalities involving the "now" of his culture, and the Western time without solely designating the West as the sovereign subject, which defines the singular historical moment. The solution Tanpınar finds to this problem is to call attention to what seems to be common to the lived present in both of these temporalities: the crisis of modernity.

The crisis Tanpınar discerns in the temporal present is different from the crisis of modernization he locates in the conflict between Apollo and Dionysus. What could be found in the confrontation between Apollo and Dionysus is an ideal process of modernization. In his view, it invokes a "desirable crisis," in the sense that the painful process of revising one's tradition of the past results in a *critical* engagement with the tradition. Whereas, the crisis of the present is the realization that the bond between the past and the present has already been damaged in the process of modernization, and that finding one's own modernity based on a "unique self" is further remote than ever.

The transition phase began much earlier in Turkish history with the Tanzimat movement, the first state-controlled modernization/westernization attempt carried out during the late Ottoman period (1839-1876). The Tanzimat movement consisted of technical, social, and economical reforms carried out by the Ottoman elite in the nineteenth-century in order to catch up with the Western civilization. According to Tanpınar, this historical juncture represents exactly the stage where the *buhran* began to manifest itself in variety of ways: the society lost the notion of continuity and wholeness it once owned during the times of previous civilizations in Turkey such as that of the Seljukians and Ottomans. It was stuck between the Eastern and the Western cultures. Moreover, the "new life" marked by modernity was neither adopted, nor rejected.

In his essay "Asıl Kaynak," Tanpınar speculates on this transition and the outcome of the civilization change leading to a crisis. He states that on the one hand, "the new" made an appearance with new requirements in social life, on the other hand, "the living old," "a heap of waste" lingered in social life (41). Thus, instead of constructing "new forms" through a seamless continuity, the cultural elements of the past resumed their existence in the present like empty signifiers, and the new life style adopted from the West was not completely absorbed by the masses, creating discord, duality and an excess. "Our lives have been split into two" (37), Tanpınar contends, to draw attention to a sure sign of crisis, but not of a desired crisis he deems necessary for the process of ideal modernization.

This is not to say that Turkey was not affected by the *buhran* / crisis on a global scale. Taking the First World War as a crucial turning point for humanity, Tanpınar claims that the war itself was the cause of a certain crisis. However, he contends that the source of the crisis is deeper, and that it concerns the mindset and the lifestyle of the European civilization. What is at

stake is the welfare of civilization. In his view, humanity has left behind the times when people lived, thought, and died in certain frames; its issues were nothing compared to those that would meet the world in 1914 and after (86). While at the beginning of the nineteenth century, humanity was still under the charm of Enlightenment ideas (the age of reason and science, humanity controlled nature, life was organized and planned around scientific discoveries), it would soon fall into anarchy, anxiety, and ambiguity as subsequent wars have threatened the "ideas" that form Europe (85).

Then, the crisis of the mind and the lack of any fixed system of reference for living address a crisis beyond war. Obviously Tanpınar was not alone in his way of thinking. Many books and articles were published in Europe, especially during the 1920s, on the existing crisis, condemning the war as the cause of prevalent crisis. But more specifically, as Jan Ifversen states, in all these diagnoses, the crisis was not only seen as a phenomenon related to political, economic, or military areas but as something that touched "the heart of European life" (151). Tanpınar was aware of these figures that contemplated the crisis in Europe, or the apparent decline of Europe. Although he does not give an account of the works he read extensively, he sporadically mentions the names and works of Hermann Keyserling, Oswald Spengler, and most importantly he does not deny the great influence of Paul Valéry on his understanding of crisis. Although he does not refer to it explicitly, Paul Valéry's article "The Crisis of the Mind" (1919) seems to have provided the backbone for Tanpınar's argument of crisis.

In this essay, by imagining Europe as a whole, Valéry implies that the First World War is the cause of the rupture Europe experiences: "She [Europe] felt in every nucleus of her mind that she was no longer the same, that she was no longer herself, that she was about to lose consciousness, a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable calamities" (95). In such a

way, Europe, which Valéry identified as "the elect portion of the terrestrial globe, the pearl of the sphere, the brain of a vast body" was left without a sense of direction (102).

The consequence of this loss or lack of direction is "a disorder of mind," an "intellectual crisis," or the "crisis of the mind" (96). Valéry relates the intellectual crisis to the advance of modernity, and claims that the intellectual crisis prevailing in the present day Europe is subtler than military or economic crisis (96). He associates it with the "*époque moderne,*" which is characterized by a disorder in the mind of Europe, by "[t]he free coexistence, in all her cultivated minds, of the most dissimilar ideas, the most contradictory principles of life and learning" (98).

Tanpınar, like Paul Valéry, associates *buhran* with the crisis of the mind, which according to him is an indicator of the suffocating mood that prevails in the middle of the century. Tanpınar's depiction of the concept of crisis*,* in global and domestic terms, also seems to be addressing a type of disquiet, a crisis of the mind that has to do with a lack of sense of direction, feeling of homelessness, disintegration, ambiguity, and the destruction of wholeness. He further explains what he means by the "disquiet of today's individual" in an interview held in 1955:

> The state of estrangement because of not feeling at home, the desire to explain oneself, being suspicious of one's acts…In short, the world has gone out of joint. Doesn't this disquiet or the lack of satisfaction characterize the present? Not believing in words, or even the language, searching for the roots, constantly examining, dissembling and then reassembling oneself…We cannot even reassemble ourselves anymore. (YG 317)

The notion of disquiet then describes the mode that attests the historical transition, which led Tanpınar imagine that the society has lost the solid ground it supposedly had in the past. The socio-political situation in Turkey in the first half of the twentieth century indicates that the crisis began with the *Tanzimat* movement had not subsided after the establishment of modern Turkey.

The new regime following Atatürk's principles aimed at modernizing Turkey not only by improving the material quality of life but also through transforming the traditional social and political structures of the preceding Ottoman state (İrem, 96). The transformation took place in almost every area of cultural life, such as the alphabet, the dress code, the measurement system, and law. All were altered according to Western standards. By the time Tanpınar started writing, the modernization process was in full swing. However, many of these reforms carried out by the Kemalist intellectuals of the new republic were not entirely digested by the masses.

Half a century later, the impact of this transitional phase and its manifestations in society continued to be felt in modern Turkey. When Tanpınar was writing about *buhran* in 1950, he depicted the present state of the cultural scene, where he reflected on the coexistence and splitting up, quite similar to the discrepancy described in Tanzimat: "We support the new and we fight for it, but we are attached to the old […] In some stages of our lives we, as the supporter of the new, is pressed by the old, and in some stages as men of old, we are pressed by the new. This oscillation between two polarities dominates our lives for over a century now" (YG 38). Thus the continuing modernization process in the present manifests the traits that the former transitional phase displays. Therefore, the notion of *buhran* should be thought of as intrinsic to the project of modernization, which to a great extent, fostered by a dramatic transition.

Reinhart Koselleck in his article "Crisis" (2006), exposes the intertwined relationship between crisis and modernity, and states that because the term "crisis" embodies the functions that attempt to capture the present with its various temporal beginnings, wishes and anxieties, fears and hopes, from the 1770s onwards, crisis became a structural signature of modernity (374). He analyzes the etymology of the word "crisis" in order to elucidate how it has been

incorporated into modern social and political thought in time, leading to four interpretative possibilities in the philosophy of history:

> Following the medical-political-military use, "crisis" can mean that chain of events leading to a culminating, decisive point at which action is required. 2) In line with the theological promise of a future Last Day, "crisis" may be defined as a unique and final point, after which the quality of history will be changed forever. 3) The "crisis" as a permanent or conditional category pointing to a critical situation which may constantly recur or else to situations in which decisions have momentous consequences. 4) The "crisis" to indicate a historically immanent transitional phase. When this transition will occur and whether it leads to a worse or better condition depends on the specific diagnosis offered. (371-372)

For Tanpınar, whose understanding of the present indicates a state of temporal and historical threshold for the society, the final interpretation of "crisis" above, indicating a historically immanent transitional phase that expects a specific diagnosis, seems to circumscribe the scope of *buhran*. Since the transitional phase has assumed immanent characteristics and has resumed in the present, Tanpınar's present is therefore transitional, critical, and characterized by crisis.

Tanpınar however, who supports the idea that modernity should be adopted without any doubt, does not seem to face the fact that the notion of *buhran*, with its symptoms of duality, splitting, and coexistence he desires to avoid, are also signs of modernization, and that one cannot be modern without going through the crisis (*buhran*) of modernization. In other words, Tanpınar desires that a society should be modernized in the same way as the West, without going through the crisis of the modernization process.

Besim Dellaloğlu stresses that this dilemma is not solely peculiar to Tanpınar, but to many early Turkish intellectuals whose ideas contributed to the construction of modernity and nation building in Turkey. In his discussion of how the modernizing nations perceive the relationship between modernism and modernity, he argues that Turkish modernity is in itself an

objection towards the method of modernity, i.e., to modernization, but not to modernity itself. Given that modernism is a critique of modern civilization, he argues, Turkish modernism does not criticize modernity but modernization (51). That is why, Dellaloğlu concludes, the writer of a modernizing nation cannot be a modernist in the way a writer of a modern nation's writer is, because modernizing nations have not yet reached modernity. Therefore, he states that Tanpınar and his contemporaries shared a dilemma based on this contradiction: they attempted to be modernists where there was no modernity yet (52).

Dellaloğlu's categorizing approach to modernity can be criticized for positing modernity as a finished project carried out and completed in the West successfully, without taking into consideration its complexities and contradictions experienced differently in each of these Western cultures. Moreover, his understanding of modernity is prefigured by a conception of progress, transforming plural histories into a single one, as termed by Fredric Jameson to a "singular modernity."[13] However, Dellaloğlu's interpretation can be useful in systemizing Tanpınar's understanding of *buhran* in the context of Turkish modernization process. According to the above formulation, Tanpınar's approach to *buhran* has two connotations: First, as a modernist of a modernizing nation, Tanpınar's evaluation of crisis should be viewed as a criticism of modernization, evidence that the continuity with the past is disrupted. Secondly, as fits his modernist take on modernity, he is aware of the complexities and difficulties entailed in reclaiming a bond with the past, and he sees the crisis as a necessary medium to understand and represent the present in his work.

Acknowledging the crisis of the present from a modernist perspective and condemning it for the sake of ideal modernity harbors a contradiction. This is to say, Tanpınar's approach to

[13] See Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present.* (New York, 2002).

modernity as reflected in the questions of "how to modernize," and "how to represent modernity" contradict one another. Since, in his understanding, the question of "how to modernize" involves creating continuity with the past to engage with tradition, and the question of "how to represent modernity" suggests accepting the crisis as the signature of the present, and therefore modernity, which demands deconstructing the continuity between the past and the present.

Being aware of his own paradox, Tanpınar made himself "at home in the maelstrom," a faculty which, according to Marshall Berman, belonged to the early modernists who were wrestling inexhaustibly with the ambiguities and contradictions of modernity, and yet whose self-ironies and inner tensions formed the primary source of their creative power (15). Another author who was able to convert the complexities and contradictions of modernity into a creative power is Walter Benjamin. In his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Benjamin depicts the paradox in which the individual finds herself in the modern world through the symbol of the "angel of history." He interprets the angel figure in Paul Klee's painting "Angelus Novus," as the angel of history, whose face is turned toward the past. According to Benjamin's interpretation, the angel of history would like to stay and recover the chain broken with the past. It is, however "irresistibly propel[led] into the future" (258) like the individual human being who lost control of time in modernity with the ceaseless chain of historical events, which "keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage" (257). As the tentative image of the angel of history looks back to make sense of the continual passage of time, Tanpınar, in a similar motive, attempts to re-introduce the past, and make it part of the present. He is yet aware that the modernization process itself brings a decisive split with the past.

The Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk claims that if one supposes that modernism opposes the traditional and the sense of collectivity, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar should not be considered as a modernist writer since he speaks of an "us," as a collectivity with a certain culture, a sure sign that he is the ideologist and the voice of a community. Moreover, in Pamuk's view, he did not sever the representational ties that traditional literature insinuated (435-448). In my view, on the other hand, Tanpınar represents crisis as a symptom and a configuration of the present, which in itself is one of the principal issues with which the modernists were concerned.

In the 1950s, Tanpınar continued to support the need to reset continuity with the past and, yet, seemed to be aware that the "unique self," or "of one's own" he aspired to find in that continuum, which is also shaped by the Western modernity, is in itself a fiction or can solely be realized in the confines of the fictional world. In an interview carried out in 1951, he accepted that what one calls the unique or the real self is a construction, therefore a form of fiction, that is formed of both national and global influences. He states, "[f]or a long time, I believed that our real purpose should be to find ourselves. These men [he means Baudelaire, Valéry, Verlaine, Mallarmé, Poe, Proust, Dostoyevsky] directed me to my own realities and deceptions. Because, maybe there is no 'real self,' and what we call the 'self' might actually be our invention; in other words, our fiction" (YG 307). Ironically, in this statement, Tanpınar looks beyond the nation, hoping to get answers from the Western canon in his aesthetic search for the "unique self."

Nonetheless, Tanpınar hoped that *buhran* might as well be considered as a source of richness for that particular culture. In an un-broadcasted radio interview just before his death in January 1962, he implied that the effects of crisis in his own culture might constitute a form of richness:

> We are at a strange period of our history. The gradual transformation of our civilisations over a century and a half produced a dilemma, which took command

> of our lives and make everything doubly difficult. Our hearts and our minds, our goodwill and our habits all battle with one another. Mind you, the boundaries between them are not fixed, either. What is a matter of goodwill for me has to do with habits for another; what is an emotional situation in some is common sense for others. Perhaps future generations will think that this constant struggle is the distinguishing characteristic of the people who live today. For my generation, your generation, and the generations of those who will succeed us, they will perhaps say, 'They lived in truly difficult times where every problem became complex and aggravated, where opinions doubled or even tripled,' and will wonder and feel affection for us because of this. ("The City" *Eurozine)*

From this perspective, Tanpınar apprehends that contradictions and dilemmas about modernity not only enable him to be "worldly" with other modernities of his time but they could also help him and his generation to engage in a dialogue with future generations and their respective modernities. Obviously, Tanpınar appears to have anticipated that the transitional phase with its complexities is only peculiar to his generation and that future generations will be exempt from this complicated phase. But sensing that this predicament involves an approach beyond nationalities, he foresees what is promising for the future of comparative studies. To that end, he notes in an interview, "I think other nations will always find something interesting in the literature of a nation that changed civilizations" (YG 194).

I now examine how Tanpınar explores figurations of crisis, both as a possible medium to incorporate cultural elements of the past tradition in continuum with the present to create a modernity of one's own, and how he deploys *buhran* to manifest the duality, fragmentation, and disquiet in the temporal present. Tanpınar channels these two contrasting perspectives in the circular plot of *Huzur*, which narrates one day with flashbacks. Told by an omniscient narrator (but mostly reflecting the protagonist's perspective), the novel consists of four chapters: "İhsan,"

"Nuran," "Suad," and "Mümtaz," each chapter title designating the character in focus. In the first chapter, Mümtaz leaves home to look for a nurse for İhsan, Mümtaz's cousin and a father figure. The narrative depicts the depressive atmosphere in the city, dilapidated and "sickly," like İhsan, as the Second World War approaches. Mümtaz is depressed not only because İhsan is sick and the war is approaching, but also he is separated from Nuran.

Following a nineteenth-century classical novel tradition, Tanpınar introduces us to all these characters (Şahin 118). In a flashback, the reader learns about Mümtaz's childhood and the crucial events that influenced him such as his father's death and their exile from a city in the old Ottoman South during the war, his first sexual experience during the voyage to their new destination, and his mother's death. The second chapter, "Nuran," is a flashback to the previous summer, when Mümtaz and Nuran, a young widow with a child begin their relationship. The depressive mood in "İhsan" chapter gives way to a glorious view of the city of Istanbul and its culture. Their relationship culminates, but is overshadowed by Suad, who also confesses his obsession with Nuran. In the "Suad" chapter, the disturbance he causes Mümtaz reaches its peak when he hangs himself in Mümtaz's apartment.

The last chapter, "Mümtaz" picks up from the end of the first chapter. The motifs and themes that describe the atmosphere in the first chapter such as poverty and the looming war become dominating issues motivating Mümtaz to act (Moran 219). Mümtaz questions everything about himself, his approach to life and his responsibilities, as Suad (now being a ghost or hallucination) challenges his pre-established ideas. By the end of the novel, as Mümtaz is about to fetch the medicine which İhsan needs, he encounters Suad one last time and has a nervous breakdown as the radio announces the beginning of the Second World War.[14] Thus, the novel

[14] The ending of *Huzur* is ambiguous and critics disagree with one another as to what might have happened to Mümtaz and İhsan. My contention is that Mümtaz is having a nervous breakdown in the end,

that begins almost twenty-four hours before the announcement of Second World War ends when the war is announced.

Tanpınar utilizes French philosopher Henri Bergson's notions of duration, intuition, and *élan vital* to describe cultural continuity, and then he undermines it in order to reflect on the crisis (*buhran*) that prevails in the society. The manifestations of continuity and wholeness are best exemplified in "Nuran" chapter, which depicts Mümtaz's and Nuran's love affair, and the beginning of the "Suad" chapter, which narrates a long sequence of a performance of traditional Turkish music. The continuity is embodied by Nuran herself, who gathers love, art, and culture in her being, and enables Mümtaz to experience what can best be characterized by that experience that Freud called, after Romain Rolland, an "oceanic feeling," a notion of "limitless extension and oneness", which Freud relates it to an early stage in ego-feeling (*Civilization and Its Discontents* 10); it is the classical Turkish music and its last remaining performers, who pursue the Sufi doctrine; it is the Bosphorus with its culture; it is depicted in the specific song, "Mahur," which involves the stories of various generations; and it may be found in the stories of writers, musicians, artists, whose appearances in the novel remind the reader of the ongoing dialogue between the art and culture of the past and the present.

Henri Bergson came to be influential among the Turkish intelligentsia around the same years he became popular in Europe. Besim Dellaloğlu explores the cause of this particular influence on the Turkish intelligentsia and claims that the theories of the French philosopher might have become popular amongst Turkish intelligentsia, because his oeuvre provided them with the theoretical perspective to claim modernity while enabling them to preserve their memories and identities after the radical break with the Ottoman Empire and with the

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but without the hope of recovery (Tanpınar mentions elsewhere in the novel that Mümtaz leads a short life), whereas İhsan's critical situation is stabilized.

advancement of modernity (89). Bergsonian time-consciousness expressed through his interpretation of duration (*durée*) apparently allowed these intellectuals to move freely between the past and the present, and appeased the pains of the rupture of modernity in this transitional period.

Bergson's notion of duration allows the linking of current and past experiences in such a fashion that the two reflect upon each other: "the present experience is rendered comprehensible by comparison with a previous experience, and the past is renewed and altered by its contact with the present" (Gillies 114). Based on this formula, Turkish Bergsonists realized that modernity does not necessarily mean forgetting the past, but rather that tradition and memories can still be preserved even under the destructive force of modernization.

Nazım İrem's meticulous study on Turkish Bergsonists shows that these intellectuals were influenced by the irrational elements of Bergson's philosophy and his notions of *élan vital* and *durée*.[15] This should not come as a surprise, as being deeply committed to the republican and nationalist ideals of the new regime, they were encouraged to provide a new kind of legitimacy to republican creationism and to the innovations brought about by the Turkish Revolution (İrem 92). Because the previous vision of the West was taken as a model of progressive civilization by the Ottoman reformers, it was not expected to represent the nationalist ideals of the Turkish Revolution immersed in a new project of modernity. To that end, they followed a current of thought which appropriated Arnold Toynbee's assertion that the modern era in Europe marked by positivist ideology ended between 1850 and 1875 (80). İrem states that the conservative intellectuals, who sought to establish a new communication between the two worlds, popularized

[15] As Hilmi Ziya ÜIken notes, during the Independence War of Turkey, Bergson's notion of *élan vital* provided a common ground that brought literary figures together. The vital force would harvest the power to fight, and privilege the quality against quantity, the creative force against machinery (Ülken 375-376).

the spiritualist and romantic themes of the West, and blended them with the voluntarist challenge raised by Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche together with the anti-positivist and the anti-intellectualist motifs drawn from the philosophies of Dilthey, Simmel, Husserl, Heidegger, Whitehead and Jasper (92).

To claim that Tanpınar's understanding of modernity follows a similar track with that of Turkish Bergsonists would be an understatement. Nevertheless, he shared some of these motives in his work: he also utilized some of the ideas disseminated by the Bergsonists such as Western rationalist ideology of progress, alternative European philosophical traditions such as German romanticism, and French spiritualism. It is well known that Yahya Kemal, Tanpınar's mentor and teacher was among those, introducing these topics to Tanpınar. On the other hand, Tanpınar, having produced his work between the years 1943 and 1962, was not a professional writer when the Bergsonians published the *Dergah* journal. He was not an active part of the Bergsonian group, but he was a regular attendant of the *Dergah* journal, when his mentor Yahya Kemal and intellectuals were effectively writing and diffusing the Bergsonian theory. In an interview, Tanpınar reminiscences "A new literature and language were founded during those times" (YG 305).

One must focus on Bergson's notion of time consciousness, which seems to have influenced Tanpınar's conception of time,[16] in order to understand the role of Bergson's theories in Tanpınar's work. Bergson's notion of duration was introduced in his doctoral thesis *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, written in 1889, and elaborated further in successive works. In this book, Bergson defines the pure duration as "the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from

[16] Tanpınar in a letter states that Bergson's conception of time has a great role in his art ("Antalyalı Genç Kıza Mektup" in YG 352).

separating its present state from its former states" ("The Idea of Duration" 60). Thus, one needs to think of her consciousness in a flow and let her mind live in a continuum, so that both the past and the present states form into an organic whole. According to Bergson, successive stages of emotions such as desire, joy, sorrow, pity, to state a few, correspond to qualitative changes in the whole of our psychic states, and they are not divisible and measurable.

As it is clear from the above definition, Bergson's theory of duration in *Time and Free Will* is grounded on psychological experience, and the perception of duration is subjective. According to this description, living things are without consciousness and the material world remains out of the duration (Yucefer 27). In Bergson's understanding, to think of time as it is in itself, one must "ask consciousness to isolate itself from the external world, and, by a vigorous effort of abstraction, to become itself again" ("The Idea of Duration" 55). Thus, duration belongs not to the external world, but to the conscious mind. According to Merleau-Ponty, this finding was a great novelty back in 1889 since it displays the concept of duration as it presents itself as an understanding of time in relation to, and as, "the self" (183). This suggests that Bergson's articulation of duration is an articulation of the self as a becoming subject enduring in time.

As such, in his successive book, *Matter and Memory*, Bergson traces this ontological approach to develop his first definition of duration, which renders the cosmos and the material world as part of the duration. Bergson elaborates on the connection between the temporal present and bodily existence in cosmos by emphasizing that what one understands of the present consists of the consciousness one has of her body (127). The body extends in space, experiences sensations, performs movements and becomes therefore the "centre of action" and the "actual state of my becoming, that part of my duration which is in process of growth" (128). This can be read as an attempt to differentiate between time and space in a human's perception of her own

existence in relation to the flowing mass of the material world, which is in a continuous becoming. Within the given cosmos, a person's state of "becoming" suggests a continuing process of "what is being made;" hence "the movement must be linked with the sensation, must prolong it in action" (127).

Bergson concludes that one's consciousness of the present is "already memory" since the person perceives her immediate past in every present moment. Therefore, the person becomes a component of universal becoming; a part of her representation is "ever being born again, the part always present, or rather that which, at each moment, is just past" (131). The body, being an image that persists amongst other images, constitutes at every moment, "a section of the universal becoming," and therefore becomes a connecting link (131-132).

In *Huzur*, there are various instances that reflect the relationship between human consciousness and existence as part of a continuum. The narrator's cousin İhsan, as the representative of Bergsonian ideas, emphasizes the role of the bodily experience as the core of existence. [17] He exposes his body during the social gathering, and explains how it constitutes the center of duration. He says:

[17] Turan Alptekin, among many other Tanpınar scholars claimed that Tanpınar owed much of his ideas about culture, politics, and art to his forty years of mentor, friend, and teacher, Yahya Kemal. Tanpınar regarded him highly for his faculty of re-introducing what had been erased from the memory of the culture because of the rupture Turkish history went through. According to Tanpınar, Yahya Kemal in his literary works and in his vision of the culture could bridge the gap between the past and the present, and showed the possibility of finding a "unique self" at home. İhsan in *Huzur* as the mentor, good speaker, and the ideal intellectual represents Yahya Kemal's views, especially the ones about finding the "unique self," that is neither Eastern nor Western. Just like Yahya Kemal, İhsan is a lecturer at a university, he is known for his eloquent speech, he has been to Paris in his youth, he spent time in Quartier Latin, with Pascal, and Jaurès; he produced the first example of modern poetry upon his return to Turkey, and he is highly knowledgeable in classical Turkish poetry and music (Alptekin 93-94). The character İhsan also appears in Tanpınar's other novel, *Sahnenin Dışındakiler* (1950) as one of the leading political figures during the Turkish Independence War years. İhsan is drawn in a similar fashion in that novel, as the mentor, good speaker, and the ideal intellectual.

> For humans this is genuine satisfaction, understand, Mümtaz? Knowing full well what's ultimately in store yet nevertheless embracing oneself […] We exist, understand, Mümtaz? Can you appreciate your existence? Do you worship your physicality? Hail eyes! Hail neck! Hail arms! Hail seats of darkness and light! I sanctify you in the palace of the momentary, because we exist in symbiosis within the miracle of this instant, because I can move from one moment to the next together with you, because I can connect moments to create a continuous expanse of time!" (275)

İhsan's last words, "a continuous expanse of time," are evocative of and meant to comply with Bergsonian duration, because they emphasize the mobility of the body's ability to move across time in order to create an expanded present.

The faculty to become a connecting link in an expanded present may help one to imagine the society in a continuum as a form of duration. The society itself moving in a continuous expanse of time would not be a pure image of duration, as many other elements have a role in shaping the society. However, Bergson's emphasis on the importance of dependency for an organism, on what happened before its creative evolution is compatible with Tanpınar's visualization of the present in modernizing Turkey in a constant recreation informed by its past experience.

Bergson stresses in his *Creative Evolution* that it is not sufficient for the organism to find its present moment in the moment immediately before, but rather "*all* the past of the organism must be added to that moment, its heredity – in fact, the whole of a very long history" ("The Endurance of Life" 182). Tanpınar's formulation of culture and society in an expanded present necessitates duration, but the ultimate purpose of this process should be to build new life forms, which suggests, in line with Bergson's creative evolution, continuous cessation of some aspects and construction of new ones.

Both of these theories –creative evolution and duration – can be useful in analyzing Tanpınar's view of his present, since both theories emphasize the invention, creation of new forms, and continual elaboration of the absolutely new in a duration. Moreover, duration "the prolongation of the past into the present," could be the domain of creativity, where one can search and recreate a "unique self" or a modernity of one's own. Right before the music performance at İhsan's place, İhsan, and other invitees discuss this issue. İhsan stresses the need to find the "unique self," an ambiguous idea of identity in the process of modernization: "In order to leap forward or to reach new horizons, one still has to stand on some solid ground. A sense of identity is necessary… Every nation appropriates this identity from its golden age" (198). İhsan's phrase, "golden age" refers to Tanpınar's frequent use of the "unsolved puzzle," "our soul," "the third source," which all suggest finding the unique self, which corresponds to an indivisible time, a form of wholeness which one had in the past.

A Mevlevî musical performance that takes place at a social gathering in the third chapter entitled "Suad" not only displays duration in its most intense form, but it also points to what this "unique self" might signify. The Turkish classical music is presented in *Huzur* with expressions such as "a key that unlocks the past," "the true reign, namely, the sultanate of the soul," where one finds the "real heritage." In other words, the music is part of a grand cultural scheme as the connecting bond to the past, as one passage states: "everything from an Istanbul *paysage* to the entire Turkish culture, its filth, its decay, and its splendor was contained in traditional music" (197).

The traditional music corresponds to the question of finding the "unique self," the "unsolved puzzle" about the Turkish reality. İhsan, voicing Tanpınar's thought, responds to Mümtaz who mentions that he sometimes wonders who "we" are by saying: "We are this…this

very Nevakar. This very "Song in Mahur" and countless other expressions that resemble them! We are their semblances as they manifest within us; we are the ways of being they evoke in us" (281). Music in this case is not an answer to the question of who we are per se, but it is one of the ways to arrive at a "self," which was at home with its own culture once.

The Ferahfezâ ceremony, which is the peak point of the novel combining elements of Sufi philosophy and Bergsonian time consciousness, is an example as to how duration can be grasped as a complex ontology uniting man, time, and the universe through a cosmic voyage. Sufism, with its allowance of fluidity in time and "oneness" in this case, complements Bergsonian philosophy in this particular scene, even though it is obviously aimed at attaining balance with the divine existence. Bergson's theory of duration also anticipates the human being moving with the universe in a flux, in a unity and multiplicity with the important exception that his metaphysics is not meant to be an instrument to reach God.

If in Bergsonian terms, pure duration is the form the succession of one's conscious states assumes, the individual journey each character takes during the performance could be interpreted as a form of duration. The celestial journey invokes an "eternal longing" and a feeling of "exile" for the listeners. Everybody lives in his/her own time as he/she gets lost in the powerful tune. Through a succession of states, Mümtaz feels "yearning," then it assumes a "quest," followed by "dissolution and self-realization" through a mystical experience (306). Nuran, feeling mobile in space and time metaphorically expands, is shattered and dispersed. Then she looks for her other half to be a whole, yet finds herself divided in many pieces (308). This journey takes place in the minds of the characters, therefore it could be considered metaphysical. However, because the ego refrains from separating its present state from its former states and metaphorically they are not in

the same spot when their journey has started, the experience during the music performance could be considered as duration.

In his *Time and Free Will,* Bergson articulates that consciousness does not take place in space but in time; therefore he defines the exterior world in terms of his concept of duration. Space, in his view should be considered as homogenous and measurable magnitude, therefore divisible, while time is immeasurable and qualitative. This means pure duration is also qualitative and not measurable unless symbolically represented in space (104). Bergson argues that the mind in real duration is already alive with intuitive life and it will perceive "the continuous fluidity of real time which flows along, indivisible" (246).

This indivisible *other time* can only be grasped through intuition. Therefore, time perceived through intuition refers to a different medium, which is not measured by clocks. The feeling of yearning that music invokes in the listeners during the performance is an instance of Bergsonian notion of intuition as it addresses a time that is not measured by clocks. "[T]he invitation of a time no longer ours," the musical instrument *ney* acquiring the "timeless time" are the expressions that indicate this intuitive time. The cosmic journey each character takes is therefore intuitive and metaphysical.

If Bergson's perspective on duration positions consciousness in a temporal figuration, the specific Sufi worldview succinctly displayed in this music scene allows Tanpınar to equip his characters with malleability or a spatial flexibility. Nuran exemplifies this best. Bestowing a Bergsonian "indivisible" time in Mümtaz's cosmos, she acquires a spatial prism of all sorts, which is subjected to the Sufi worldview. She, being the Beloved (one, who is God's reflection) assumes the reflection of God in Sufi thought and therefore, reflects the cosmos in her "non-existence." The conjugation of the two realms would be the pinnacle moment, that which,

according to Mümtaz, the Eastern culture achieved some time in the past to "discover the secret of being able to see oneself and all existence as constituting a single entity" (196).

Accordingly, Nuran becomes the instrument of creating wholeness and in this manner, visualized by Mümtaz as the source of light, reflection of the God, and of every element in the cosmos: "She effectively became a cluster of light between that which rested in his thoughts and that which existed in his surroundings, illuminating everything such that the most disparate elements became part of a synthetic whole" (193). The imagery of light and reflection, which has been abundantly used in describing Nuran's embodiment of other elements, here relates to an ontological symbolism in Sufi understanding. During the music ceremonies Mümtaz attributes the role of the divine Beloved to her. Thus, the imagery of light and reflection earn a divine power.

Another aspect of duration takes place as the musical performance extends spatially and temporally so that the figures of the past, who have a role in the composition of the music, such as the Ottoman sultan, Selim III, the poet Shaykh Galip, and the composer, Dede Efendi come into contact with the lovers with their own stories in the narrative.[18] Therefore, a continuum in cultural history is established through the experience of music. The music spatially expands, when Dede Efendi's musical ceremony leads Mümtaz to the domain of Anatolia, and his

[18] Tanpınar chooses in this scene the music of Dede Efendi, an important composer in Ottoman music history. Dede Efendi lived during the reign of the Ottoman sultan, Selim III, who was also known to be an innovative patron of arts who patronized Eastern and Western music in his court. He was also a renowned composer and a member of Mevlevî Order. During his reign from 1789 to 1807, Turkish Classical music flourished at his court, with regular attendance of Dede Efendi together with the greatest Ottoman poets, Shaykh Galip. Sultan Selim III was also interested in Western music, and he invited an opera troupe for the first opera performance in the Ottoman Empire. Reformist in many ways, Tanpınar presents Selim's period as the "pinnacle" of arts. But more importantly his reign was the golden period, when the Sultan Selim III, Dede Efendi, and Shaykh Galip, on whom Mümtaz is writing a novel, composed some of the best pieces of music in Turkish history.

individual experience assumes a communal quality as he feels he has approached "the true architects of this territory and culture" (238-239).

In sum, in this particular scene, the music enables continuity in many ways: It invokes the stories of the creators of the music and demonstrates how the present performers actually converse with the masters of the past; it shows how the music takes the listeners on individual journeys in time, tying their emotions to a larger community. The following statement by İhsan summarizes how music incorporates various forms of continuities in one's life:

> Whether we like it or not, we belong to it. We admire our traditional music and for better or worse it speaks to us. For better or worse we hold this key that unlocks the past for us… The past relinquishes its epochs to us one after another and dresses us in its clothing. Because we harbor a treasury within ourselves and perceive our surroundings through a Ferahfezâ or a Sultanîyegâh *makam*, even Lebîb Efendi is a source of art to us. (197)

Therefore, not only the performed music, but also Turkish classical music in general provides a fictional pattern so that future generations relate to both the previous and coming generations. The story of "Song in Mahur," a particular music piece is an example showing how music imbued with culture provides a narrative framework to tell how Nuran and Mümtaz's love affair is shaped by the stories in their previous generations.

As soon as Nuran and Mümtaz meet in the second chapter of the novel, Mümtaz finds out that Nuran is the niece of the famous performer Tevfik Bey and the granddaughter of Talât Bey, who composed the famous song, "Mahur." The song Mahur is based on a tragic love story, and Nuran claims that this story sets a frame for her emotions, and that "this bizarre family legacy regulated her private life" (159). She is almost sure that based on the persistence of the song's effect, it is now her and Mümtaz's turn to live the tale of "Song in Mahur." Her grandmother, who is the Beloved in this song, and who was affected by the destructive song Mahur, speaks in

Nuran's mind, and warns her about the destructiveness of love. But a mysterious secondary voice bids Nuran to go along the same path that she mapped in this "ironic and tragic union of love and death" (159).

This second more powerful voice coming from deeper inside is the "voice of this mixed bloodline in her veins" (157). "This blood was a strange brew," Nuran thinks, "It'd been beaten to froth by the odd whisk of that musical genre known as *a la turca*" (158). "The voice of blood" is an intuitive voice since it speaks to another time, which is not perceived by her senses. Then this is another form of duration that finds its aesthetic counterpart in the musical genre called *a la turca*, which can be better understood by Bergson's theory of intuition. Since the term also refers to what cannot be attained through reason alone, it is against the ideals of positive ideology. Thus, the "mixture of bloodlines," or the legacy of the song that attracts Nuran's soul and heart calls for another form of explanation than a rational one. In this case, not only does the intuition explain the "irrational" in persistence of the effect of this particular song on generations, but it also shows the metaphysical aspect of the intuition that makes possible to live the tale of Mahur intuitively without the will of characters.

The Sufi masters of music in the novel, Emin Bey, Cemil Bey, and Tevfik Bey seemed to have reached a genuine Turkish consciousness, which addresses "the unique self." Their existence is malleable and part of a greater whole, as described by such phrases: "the last sentinel of the treasuries of our entire past," and "whose breath alone preserves a civilization" (197). They rest in a continuous expanse of time İhsan mentioned earlier on, which does not pertain to the individual only, but to the society or the community. They found the "true heritage" that belongs to this culture, and they seem to be at home in their time.

Ironically, if the genuine self refers to an absolute to be reached through intuition, these Mevlevîs seem to have reached an absolute by erasing their selfhood. Since, the effort to reach the Beloved in the Sufi understanding urges the subject to sacrifice him/herself to love and destruction at the same time. According to the narrator, these Mevlevîs were able to see themselves as such, and position themselves in the cosmos as transient elements, erasing their egos. Mümtaz recollects how Emin Dede, the Sufi musician, seized him with his eyes, as if to say, "Why be so preoccupied with my material being? Neither I nor the thing you call 'art' are as important as you might suppose. If you can, aspire to the secret of universal love articulated within each of us!" (297) Accordingly, those who created the Turkish "season of the soul," are the ones who, under the Mevlevî order "had eliminated everything relating to the ego," recognizing their art as the "sole path to vanishing in sempiternal oneness" (299).

In both Sufi understanding and in Bergsonian time consciousness based on intuition, one reaches true consciousness. While the Bergsonian absolute brings the individual to true existence, in Sufi thought, the effort to reach the Beloved urges the subject to sacrifice him/herself to love and destruction at the same time on the path to the Beloved (God, the absolute). Sufi masters therefore, reach the absolute, through non-existence.

Various other aspects of the novel address a similar cultural continuity that points to "genuineness," such as the city itself, as Mümtaz states: "If we don't truly know Istanbul, we can never hope to find ourselves" (194). But more specifically, the Bosphorus points to this "genuineness," as part of the aesthetic continuum like the traditional music. *Huzur* in its generous use of the Bosphorus never shows it as physical landscape, nor as a location in Istanbul, but as a culturally and aesthetically endowed spatial realm. The Bosphorus actually is not a temporal entity, therefore the duration attributed to it would be incomplete in the sense that

Bergson formulates it. But in Tanpınar's work, it has its own time that extends through the past and the present as the author goes back and forth in time to tell the relevant stories of Bosphorus people: grandfathers, grandmothers, fathers, uncles, and aunts enter and leave the novel with their own stories. Thus, time expanses, and the space of the Bosphorus becomes a microcosm, where cultural existence can be imagined in a larger continuum. In other words, the spatial Bosphorus gains a temporal quality. In its grand movement the Bosphorus moves with the rest of the organisms that make it a cultural entity. Its *bluefish outings*, socializing by sailing on the Bosphorus, *yalıs*, rituals are all part of this culture.

Tanpınar uses various literary techniques to display how these aspects have created a form of duration, though not all of them temporal. The imagery of mirrors, which is associated with reflection and proliferation as a medium to create duration, is one of them. The duration of the Bosphorus, in conjunction with the culturally equipped Nuran, is expressed with the abundant imagery of light, mirror, reflection, and echo, all pointing to multiplicity and projection. Mümtaz states that, "everything on the Bosphorus was a reflection. Light was reflection; sporadically, here one might become the echo of an array of things unbeknownst to oneself" (132-133). According to Mümtaz, love, art, and culture of the Bosphorus are intertwined in such a way that each of them proliferates in one another, creating a succession of instances, like in a duration: "By and by, they gave names to locales of their choosing along the Bosphorus, as the Istanbul landscape of their imagination merged with traditional Ottoman music, and a cartography of voice and vision steadily proliferated" (193).

Not only the powerful imagery of light that Mümtaz attributes to Nuran, but also mirrors, reflection, and multiplication contribute to the making of duration in the novel. Nuran incorporates the power to gather cultural and aesthetic attributes into her being, lending meaning

to Mümtaz's existence. In Mümtaz's mind the Bosphorus and his love are prerequisite to each other. In his view, there are two "fundamental and requisite criteria for female beauty: principally, to hail from Istanbul; and secondly, to be raised along the Bosphorus" (87). Nuran is therefore culturally and aesthetically endowed with elements that create the Bosphorus: She lived in Bosphorus, she knows its culture, and she performs the songs that she had heard and learned from her grandmother.

Like Bosphorus, Nuran embodies cultural elements that lie beyond her, and she reflects the images of the past culture. For instance, when Mümtaz and Nuran visit the forlorn historic lodge in Kandilli, a small town on the Bosphorus, Nuran roams about the palace, watching "her apparition hover in antique mirrors of time past" (147). Mümtaz admits that Nuran proliferates "through a matrix of abstractions," and that "a plethora of Nurans congregating as a multitude of figures with experiences spanning the centuries entered into Mümtaz's imagination" (204). Nuran connects with the culture of the past easily and naturally. However, this clearly takes place in Mümtaz's aesthetic imagining of her and their culture.

If duration is the protagonist's subjective view, through which he gained a narcissistic pleasure in appropriating them into his subjectivity, Tanpınar begins disrupting the duration formed around Mümtaz's life to incorporate *buhran*. Suad enters the stage as a threat to their relationship and as a challenge to the subjective creation of the cultural and aesthetical world Mümtaz created around Nuran, Istanbul, art and culture. Nuran abandons Mümtaz in the end, destroying the oceanic feeling he had about her, and the durational consciousness she created.

Mümtaz is left vulnerable, and he observes the collapse of the order he created around himself and in his own subjectivity.[19]

Suad challenges the aesthetics Mümtaz has created around Nuran, art, and culture in continuum, and acts as an instrument for the disruption of the Bergsonian notion of duration with his unconventional ideas in matters discussed by Mümtaz and İhsan so far, and by bringing the improper and the unclean to Mümtaz's world. Julia Kristeva's notion of abjection, which provides the ground to speculate on the border state of subjectivity, will be instrumental in articulating the ways in which Suad blurs Mümtaz's subjectivity.

The term "abjection" appears "as both adjective ('abject art') and adjective turned into a substantive ('the abject')" (Menninghaus 365). Entered political and (in the wider sense) critical discourse in the 1980s, the term abjection became increasingly popular thanks to Julia Kristeva's book, *Pouvoirs de l'Horreur. Essai sur l'abjection* (1980) (translated into English as *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* in 1982).

Kristeva begins her groundbreaking book by underlying the negative relation the abject has in subject formation. Accordingly, she explains first what abject is not. She states that the abject is is neither a subject, nor a definable object: "The abject is not an ob-ject facing me,

[19] Mümtaz lives under the threat of death and with the fear of losing the loved ones, which Tanpınar associates with an Orpheus complex. Tanpınar in an interview states that this fear is caused by two important events that constitute Mümtaz's childhood memories. The first one is his father's burial after he was assassinated, apparently by mistake during the siege of the city S', under the Ottoman rule. The second one subsequent to that event is Mümtaz's his first sensual/sexual experience with a village woman on the carriage that takes them to Antalya. The sensuality of his experience leaves him with a feeling of guilt "of unnamed transgressions" (*Mücevherlerin Sırrı* 204). Both experiences form a complex of guilt and twinge of consciousness that would affect his whole life, and which would evolve into an Orpheus complex. For an extensive analysis of the Orpheus Complex in Tanpınar's aesthetics see Nurdan Gürbilek, *Benden Önce Bir Başkası*, 102-103.

which I name or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire. What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with someone or something else as support, would allow me to be more or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I" (1). Succinctly defined as "the jettisoned object," (2) the abject is "radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses" (2). As an ambiguous non-object and non-subject, the abject is the basis of the construction of subjectivity. It has to be cast out in order that "I" can be detached and autonomous as a "speaking subject."

According to Kristeva, separation from the mother is the first moment of experiencing abjection. The maternal body is the first object to be abjected. Separation from the mother is necessary since through this process of jettisoning what seems to be part of oneself, the most fundamental boundaries of subjectivity and corporeality are established in the human infant. The infant begins to separate itself from others, most importantly from its mother in order to develop borders between "I" and other. By transforming the mother into something abject it can gain access to language and the symbolic (12).

Up to this point, Kristeva's theory of abjection is a psychoanalytic discussion of identity formation supplementing Freud's Oedipal stage and Lacan's mirror stage, given that the child develops its borders between 'I' and the Other in order to step into the symbolic realm. However, Freud's and Lacan's theories of identity formation take for granted that stepping into the symbolic takes place once and for all, leaving behind the maternal for the sake of the symbolic order. However, Kristeva claims that the abject continues to be with the self even after the infant stepped into the symbolic realm and that one cannot completely leave - what she calls the semiotic - behind. She states: "We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambiguity […]

while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it, keeping it to be in perpetual danger" (9). The abject keeps on challenging one's borders of selfhood, "it beseeches and pulverizes the subject" (5). The abject, therefore is never out of one's life, but remains as a threat, a challenging source of power that reminds its existence even when one intends to lead a pure life.

According to Kristeva, disgust for food, excrement, vomit, and bodily fluids are symptoms of the "abject mother." Nonetheless, Kristeva's notion of the abject opens up a wide range of meanings not solely characterizing the improper and unclean. As Kristeva mentions, the abject can also be attributed to what "disturbs identity, system order" and that does not "respect borders, positions, rules" (4). Suad, with his abrupt and rebellious attitude and his controversial and unrestrainedly expressed ideas, which seem to have a stark disparity with İhsan's ideas, proves to be a figure of abject in the form of an outcast.

Suad makes an appearance in the first chapter at the social gathering in İhsan's summerhouse on the Princess Island, introducing his controversial ideas. His second appearance at the end of music performance scene leaves an intensified affect on the others, and raises debate about the points he made. Suad contends that everything that belongs to the past should be demolished and the world should be created anew: "The new…We'll establish the myth of a new world, as in America and Soviet Russia" (105). Suad inverses İhsan's theory of existence in harmony with the cosmos and in the flux of community by expressing his desire to live a life in extremes, just to prove that he *exists*: "I wanted to feel the extent of myself, that's why! To fulfill the need to declare 'I am' to the void at each instant" (335). He challenges his listeners by plotting to murder his wife and rob a bank to attain some sort of freedom or purification.

The way Tanpınar presented Suad has occupied many scholars. Jale Parla argued that Suad represents a decadent philosophy. She points out that Suad's plot to kill his wife to attain purification would consider a mode of decadent philosophy, exemplified in Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal*, and rests on a motif of purification some of Dostoyevsky's characters manifest (Parla 141). Other scholars including Fethi Naci, Berna Moran, and Mehmet Kaplan criticized Tanpınar's depiction of Suad and claimed that Suad appears to be an imported character from Western literature, and that the way he was presented in the novel is artificial.[20] This criticism can be considered partly true as Suad's controversial ideas remain on the surface during their discussions with İhsan and do not provide a powerful counter argument against İhsan's frequently articulated ideas.[21] Suad's arguments and unjustified acts appear to be an amalgamation of the currents of thought that were prevalent in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century such as nihilism, existentialism, and anarchism, represented by Sartre, Gide, Dostoyevsky, and Nietzsche.

Scholars such as J. Parla, B. Moran, N. Gürbilek, S. Oğuzertem, and İ. Şahin reflected on the relationship between Suad and Mümtaz occasionally in their works, and argued that Suad, who appears to be the opposite of Mümtaz in his way of thinking, actually acts as Mümtaz's double, or his alter ego. Tanpınar, I claim, does not explicitly posit Suad as Mümtaz's double, but as an abject part of his subjectivity that Mümtaz suppressed until it resurfaced after Mümtaz

[20] Fethi Naci compares Suad with Dostoyevski's character Stavrogin, and calls his suicide "translational suicide" ("Huzur" in *Bir Gül Bu Karanlıklarda* 181).

[21] This verifies Ibrahim Şahin's argument that both İhsan and Suad are finalized characters with monological voices only in opposition. İhsan reciting Tanpınar's mentor-poet Yahya Kemal's line "Savor it though I have, Slavic melancholy brings me no satisfaction," finds Suad's ideas as "belated": "Regrettably, the world has already lived through and dispensed with this variety of angst a century ago. Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx have come and gone. Dostoyevsky suffered this anguish eighty years ago" (343).

broke up with Nuran. The abject, I argue, manifests itself in three forms: Suad as the abject himself, secondly, various manifestations of the abject in the novel associated with Suad, and finally the figures and elements that constitute the other side of Mümtaz's ideal world of duration, such as the beggars, poor people, the porter, whose lives Mümtaz avoided in "Nuran" chapter until Suad's appearance.

Kristeva's notion of abjection elucidates the ways in which the abject acts as an instrument that collapses meaning fundamental to the constitution of identity, and offers a renewal of meaning. Mümtaz has to encounter the abject to attain new insight in order to perceive the present time he lives in, which is imbued with *buhran*. I argue that confrontation with the abject embodied by Suad discloses the alternative space and time in the novel, which is the temporal and historical present itself with its stark reality, which Mümtaz was blind to before. It also drives Mümtaz to the confrontation of his own dilemmas about various ideas he advocated or represented before. Thus, Suad not only defies the boundaries of his subjectivity, but also acts as a conceptual tool for problematizing his moral boundaries.

Suad's appearance through the end of the music performance marks a shift in the tone of the novel. As soon as Suad enters the scene, the mystical cosmic voyage ends for Mümtaz, and his attention diverts to Suad only. Mümtaz observes Suad obsessively, and imagines that Suad's expression reveals contempt, rebellion, and despair as if he could not find what he was looking for in the music. Upon noticing Suad's negative response to music, Mümtaz, who seemed to have been completely absorbed by the music so far, and experiencing the wholesome and cultural heritage, suddenly begins to doubt his own feelings as well:

> How did Mümtaz himself interpret this so-called devotional ceremony? One by one he recollected the places his thoughts had taken him during the Ferahfeza. Not once during the entire performance had he felt any musical awakening […] Now he, too, was astounded at his impoverishment of spirit. Or was his stance

> toward *a la turca* music completely affected? Had he appropriated it as well, like so many other facets of his life, like his love of Nuran, in which he so exalted, as nothing more than a means to an end? Was he only involved cerebrally, forcibly flogging his imagination? (319)

Mümtaz concludes: "*Music isn't an appropriate vehicle for love…*" (320) Thus, Mümtaz doubts about not only his deep feelings for the music, but also his love for Nuran, alongside the great importance he attached to music and to Sufi culture. This means he dismisses a large portion of narrative that has built a wholesome universe in duration reflecting love, art, and culture in harmony.

Mümtaz's sudden attention to Suad is not groundless. Suad had already disturbed Nuran's, but mostly Mümtaz's, peace by the end of "Nuran" chapter by sending Nuran a letter from his sickbed confessing his love and his need for her. Although Nuran received another letter with a similar content from her ex-husband around the same time, Mümtaz is not concerned about that letter, but his thoughts become obsessively centered on Suad. Mümtaz imagines what Suad might have thought and written as if it were he himself who had written the letter (Parla 139). Mümtaz, who up to this moment continuously recited his belief in the humanity, becomes filled with revolt and disillusionment: "Disgusting…Disgusting… Everything was reprehensible. Nothing simple and comfortable could exist between people. Mankind, the enemy of contentment, struck wherever happiness appeared or made its presence felt" (256).

Mümtaz cannot help but see everything as infected by the abject he attributes to Suad: "Suad did exist. Yes, he existed in his hospital room, in Mümtaz's thoughts, in his wife's swollen eyes, in his children's thin necks, in the women's lives he entered like a hand under cover of darkness, feculent filth dripping from grimy, tacky fingers, padding through and besmearing a closet of pristine laundry; women, each of whom he stained with a fondle, yes, in all things he

existed" (257). The reader can easily notice the abundance of expressions related to abject in the above statement, such as "feculent filth dripping from grimy, tacky fingers," "besmearing a closet of pristine laundry" and "staining women." Mümtaz further attributes various expressions of filth to Suad such as, "disgusting stuff of Suad's miserable and contaminating presence" and "a disgusting jumble" (257). Suad's wife sudden visit and her complaints about Suad intensifies his feeling of disgust: "Revolting. Her pity and consciousness of fate revolted him. Her attachment and complaint revolted him" (256).

The abject does not remain confined to Suad only. Under the spell of Suad, Mümtaz see his surroundings infected by the abject as if every item is an extension of Suad. Tanpınar especially chooses Beyoglu district as the nest of the abject.[22] Feeling distressed, Mümtaz goes to a tavern in Beyoglu, and observes all sorts of abject elements: "crude, repulsive people, a young whore of swarthy skin, a forlorn waif resembling a corncob marinated in mud" (357-358). At this point one might say that Mümtaz is irresistibly drawn to Suad/the abject as if he is magnetized. Tanpınar navigates his character to Suad's vicinity, and of all the places in Beyoglu, Mümtaz chooses to go to a bar, where Suad and his mistress have met.

Suad tries to convince the woman to have an abortion in this conversation Mümtaz overhears. Mümtaz imagines the fetus, another element of abjection, thrown away to the city's cesspool: "Tomorrow evening a quivering, bloody clot of being, an anomaly resembling a skinned frog, would float in a cesspool of the city" (263). Mümtaz leaves the bar and walks towards Taksim. The imagery of frog in a cesspool, which is Suad's actual offspring, his "extension," incarnates as the urchin covered with mud, to such an extent that "his voice seemed

[22] This is not a coincidence. If the Bosphorus is what presents the unique identity with its cultural past and historical continuity, in Tanpınar's view, Beyoğlu is the opposite: it is pretentious, corrupted, and a bad copy of the West. As in everything else, Tanpınar approaches Beyoğlu aesthetically. See Berna Moran, *Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış*.

to come from a swamp" (264). Mümtaz unites the image of the urchin, this "mass of dirt and mud" (264) and the fetus in his mind.

The overflow of the abject Suad carries alongside him, the sudden shift of the tone in the narrative and Mümtaz's unforeseen fragility about Suad compel us to question why at this point the abject seizes Mümtaz. The answer to this question can be sought in the very nature of the abject Kristeva circumscribes. Mümtaz's relationship with Suad displays an ambiguity that the abject created around the subjectivity, which manifests Kristeva's description of abjection. The abject that has apparently been introduced by Suad at this stage had already existed in the subjectivity of Mümtaz; something he once attempted to jettison, but could not expel entirely from his "pure" life adorned with selected portions of art, culture, and love in duration.

There are many indications in the text that show Mümtaz nourishing ambiguous feelings towards Suad that resonate the beseeching and pulverizing affect of the abject even before their affinity reaches a peak in the "Suad" chapter. For instance, Mümtaz is fascinated and repelled by Suad; he likes him but is also afraid of him, and as much as he wants to understand him, he also tries to avoid him. The threat Suad imposes on Mümtaz is less effective in the "Nuran" chapter, as this was when Mümtaz has been feeling wholesome because of the oceanic feeling Nuran provided for him. [23]

Then the entire section built on duration in matters of continuity, love, art and culture could be read as Mümtaz attempting to expel and suppress the abject by creating a wholesome aesthetic world in duration. In other words, to sublimate the abject, he creates an aesthetic world

[23] Kristeva's theory of the abjection is particularly related to the mother. What belongs to the mother needs to be rejected. Suad is not the mother figure for Mümtaz even though there are many implications that Mümtaz is acting and talking like a child in their conversations. Mümtaz lost his mother when he was a child. It is possible to argue that Nuran is the mother figure for Mümtaz. After Mümtaz lost Nuran, Suad appears with the attributes of a mother, but only with those that are abjected.

as a substitute.[24] Suad is the embodiment of the abject, "*who has never forsaken him*" (439),[25] resurfaces, and poses as a threat as if to remind Mümtaz that he cannot dispel the abject from his subjectivity even if he sublimates or suppresses it.

The resurfacing of the abject with Suad and the sublimation around Nuran's love must be dialectically opposed. Mümtaz has to leave the oceanic feeling Nuran provided for him if he is to confront the "other", who challenges his subjectivity. Thus, as Mümtaz is alienated from the wholesome world provided by Nuran, which allowed him to visualize time, culture, love, and his own subjectivity in duration, he approaches Suad, who reminds him of the threatening abyss of his subjectivity. It is not a coincidence that when Mümtaz confronts the elements of the abject by the end of the "Nuran" chapter, he has already begun to be alienated from Nuran, the "maternal source of all realities" (197).

The initial implication of this distancing takes place during the musical performance, when Mümtaz felt as if Nuran was behind a curtain, and that he could not hear her voice. What is invisible and inaudible to his senses becomes absent from his memory in time: it is as if Mümtaz begins to forget Nuran. For instance, after the music ceremony they could not get together for various reasons. Mümtaz is tortured by longing, only to get an unexpected visit from her one night, when she tries on a traditional dress Mümtaz purchased for her. Mümtaz, who already showed signs of alienation from her, asks Nuran distractedly who is now in a different outfit: "What name shall we give you now, Nuran?" (363) On a similar note, when they go to their summer home in Bosphorus later on, Mümtaz is surprised that Nuran remembers the sobriquets

[24]According to Kristeva as a form of sublimation of abjection, modern literature becomes a substitute "for the role formerly played by the sacred" (26). My interpretation renders Mümtaz's aesthetics as sublime.

[25] Suad's words during their final conversation, "As I said…I've never forsaken you. I'm always by your side" (439) resonate the continuous threat the abject imposes on the subjectivity.

they assigned to trees. Nuran expresses her amazement by saying: 'How peculiar, you actually think I've been estranged from you! Next you'll thank me for not inquiring after *your* name!" (369)

According to Mümtaz's subjective time consciousness, Nuran is the instrument to imagine the culture and geography of the Bosphorus in duration. Being devoid of the *light* emanating from Nuran that shows the Bosphorus as a culturally endowed locale, Mümtaz now sees the Bosphorus as a "dark mirror" that does not reflect: "The waters before Üsküdar embraced an opaque night," "everything remained behind the shroud," and "whatever light he approached simply sputtered out," are but only a few expressions to mark the end of duration in Bosphorus (266). Now that Mümtaz does not perceive the Bosphorus as a locale of duration, it is far from being a cultural perpetuator of what is considered to be the genuine, or the unique, self. It has become obscure to its observer: "Within their shadows, the hilltops, buildings, and gardens receiving the last of the sunshine assumed unrecognizable, grotesque forms..." (265)[26] Moreover, it is not a site of cultural continuity now, connecting the past to the present: "Things withdrew farther into the nether reaches, to an inner realm from where they sparkled like the scattered traces of ancient lives or legacies removed from anything personal, isolated and atomized" (267). Mümtaz murmurs to himself "As if they're part of another world" (267), astounded that the cultural milieu he created in his mind up until yesterday had exiled him overnight.

As Mümtaz is alienated from Nuran, he approaches Suad's orbit, to the site of the abject. In other words, Mümtaz cannot keep the integrity of his selfhood by extricating the abject, instead, what threatens his proper and clean self dangerously transgresses the border of his subjectivity. As a result, Mümtaz finds out that he is gradually losing his vitality. An instance of

[26] For an extensive study on the use of image of mirrors, reflection and water in Tanpınar's works, see Nurdan Gurbilek's *Kör Ayna, Kayıp Sark* (2004).

this would be the bodily dismemberment of Mümtaz on a metaphorical level. After the Sufi musical performance, when Suad is "cast out," by all, having disturbed the peace in the room, he finally leaves the place with a dramatic gesture. As Mümtaz sees him off, the irritating clasp of Suad's hand feels like as if it usurped Mümtaz's subjectivity, taking something "rather essential and vital" away from Mümtaz. Mümtaz is alarmed by this touch:

> Then he headed slowly back to the house, pleased that his hand was now free of the large, bony, and clammy vise of Suad's palms. Within this eerie night, seeing his own hand in Suad's had alarmed him. This tacky vise had given him the dread of a possession that seemed to penetrate clear through to his soul; maybe this was why he'd avoided Suad's eyes […] Suad's hands, with their sticky warmth, seemed to suck away a potent, rather essential and vital element from the skin of Mümtaz's palm and fingertips. (340)

Suad seems to take away something so vital to his existence that after seeing him off, Mümtaz feels "as if a part of him has collapsed" (341). He further diminishes following this event: Mümtaz notes that there is a growing expanse between his head and his body, a state, which would accelerate in the rest of the novel until when he suffers a mental breakdown. In his second visit to a tavern in Beyoglu, he thinks he was not the "Mümtaz of old". He'd become a small, puny being" (356). Finally, in Mümtaz's dream, Suad presents him a bug in his palm, which he claims to be Mümtaz's subjectivity.[27]

Thus, the abject not only remains hovering at the periphery of Mümtaz's existence, but it gradually possesses his existence. This disproportionate advancement of the abject, Mümtaz's gradual bereavement, and Suad's increasing domination, can be read as the abject's transgressing the border of subjectivity, and crumbling the borders of the self. The fact that Suad has

[27] As Jale Parla states, Suad on the other hand, becomes "very beautiful" in both of the dreams Mümtaz has (*Türk Romanında Yazar ve Başkalaşım* 151).

discovered Mümtaz's and Nuran's home, and that he most likely has stolen the keys to it, can be read as another example of transgression, considering that keys are the markers of the boundary between outside world and home, or in this case the inner world and the physical world. Suad's existence in the vicinity first poses as a threat, suspense as to what will happen, and finally he transgresses the border by intruding Mümtaz's home, and hanging himself there. Mümtaz now has to confront the ultimate abject: the corpse.

According to Kristeva, corpses display what one permanently thrusts aside to live. Our bodies drop waste (body fluids, vomit, excrement) in order to live. That is when we are at the border of our condition as a living being until when the body becomes a corpse: "Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, from loss to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit—cadere, cadaver. If dung signifies the other side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything" (3). The body consumed into the abject in the form of a corpse is now objectified, erasing the border between the living condition and the abjected.

In the case of Suad's suicide, having "dropped" the waste, extricated the abject throughout the narrative until the moment of his death as filth, mud, cesspool, etc., he falls beyond the limit now as a cadaver. What he expelled from his body in order to live becomes him. Kristeva explains how the abject now surrenders the living condition: "It is no longer I who expel, 'I' is expelled. The border has become an object. How can I be without border? That elsewhere that I imagine beyond the present, or that I hallucinate so that I might, in a present time, speak to you, conceive of you—it is now here, jetted, abjected, into 'my world'" (3-4). In other words, the border is lifted between the body and what is extricated in order to live; the

boundary has failed. Suad's corpse blurs the border between the subject and the object, the one who expels and "I" expelled.

On the other hand, Suad being the embodiment of the abject, which disturbs the order in the form of what is cast out and as the embodiment of "disgusting," which Mümtaz attempted to shun, but was never able to dispel completely, now possesses Mümtaz. The corpse of Suad, "something rejected from which one does not part" and "from which one does not protect oneself as from an object" (Kristeva 4) ends up engulfing Mümtaz. Two figures that are so close to each other, but form two sides of a boundary, now merge.

As Suad possesses Mümtaz completely with the failure of boundary between the abject and the subjectivity, the border between him and Suad, the subject and the object has been lifted, so that Suad is abjected into Mümtaz's world, directly "infecting" his life. This may explain why Nuran decides to break up with Mümtaz right after they witness the scene of suicide by saying that she was disgusted by love (376). Nuran interestingly is not disgusted by the corpse or the scene of the suicide, but with everything she now associates with the corpse: love, marriage, happiness, all of which Mümtaz promised her, even though neither Suad's existence nor his death seemingly had anything to do with Mümtaz or their affair. Now that Mümtaz is completely possessed by the ultimate abject, it is as if he himself becomes something "disgusting" in Nuran's eyes.

After Suad's complete possession of Mümtaz, he is now inseparable from him. Suad begins to appear in Mümtaz's dreams, in his daydreams, or sometimes in his hallucinations as a ghost. Dreams and hallucinations do not belong to the symbolic order based on Kristeva's distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic realms, which she mapped in her *Revolution in Poetic Language*. As Winfried Menninghaus points out, the corpse is not abject because it

stinks according to Kristeva's theory, but because it has "'irredeemably' 'fallen' out of the symbolic order" (Menninghaus 374). Suad, fallen out of the symbolic order, reappears transgressing the border, this time between the semantic and the symbolic. The subject, who needs to avoid the abyss of the abject so that he can allow for the orderly proceedings of the symbolic, is helpless against the rupture of the semantic. Mümtaz, in the rest of the novel, lives in this liminal space, where the symbolic order is shattered and decomposed, allowing the semiotic to interrupt the symbolic realm, and where the border of dream and reality is blurred.

Bergsonian duration cannot be expected to take place in this liminal space infected with the abject, where the flow of time is interrupted by dreams and hallucinations. This means that Mümtaz must establish a different type of relation between himself and the world, instead of one where everything moves in a continuum and everything is interrelated. The abject thus provides Mümtaz with a new perspective. Mümtaz, who used to regard his surroundings from the perspective of his identity, observing his own self, and created a wholesome world in duration was the same Mümtaz who had been dispelling the abject, the "other" from his subjectivity and from his surroundings. The confrontation with the abject now provides Mümtaz with a new perspective to view the world critically, and from the border.

The figures, which might be considered as the abjects of the ideal society Mümtaz imagined in duration, and who were previously invisible in the narrative because Mümtaz's ideal and aesthetic world excluded them until now, become oppressively visible to Mümtaz. "This was living. All of it was part and parcel of life," Mümtaz now admits (264). These "others" constitute the outcasts of the society, who would not be considered as examples to the "unique self" Mümtaz and İhsan imagine. What is common about these people showing up in the novel now and then, such as Mehmet, the coffeehouse apprentice at Boyacıköy, the street porter, the old

beggar woman, the girl he sees by the cemetery, the poor girl who was with Suad on his last night, is that they lead a simple life, and they are not bothered by the search for beauty in life, a fact that, by itself, separates them from Mümtaz.

Acknowledging the elements Mümtaz had discarded before, in his imagined durational world invites challenging moral questions on the issues of cultural continuity, on the heritage of the past tradition, or regarding the "unique self" Mümtaz hoped to find in the duration of community. Mümtaz now has to deal with the question of how one can speak of cultural continuity when the abject is an inseparable part of it, and how these figures are related to the notion of the "genuine self" that would lead to a modernity of one's own. Mümtaz doubts that the source of what he calls self or the "spirit" of the nation might not be in the cultural continuity, but in the actual life that also includes the "others" he expelled from his aesthetic world.

Mümtaz now observes the inhabitants of the society and their living conditions that constitute the present reality in a new light. He expresses his astonishment to Suad (now either a ghost, or dream) in their last encounter that he sees everything unmediated now:

> How strange! Nothing is connected to any other thing. I perceive everything as atomized," he complained.
> The man beside him answered, "Of course it doesn't connect. Because what you're seeing is nothing but unmediated reality."
> "But yesterday and the day before, didn't I also see things this way? Wasn't I perceiving reality? Hadn't I always encountered it before?"
> […]
> "No…Because you'd been regarding your surroundings from the perspective of your identity. You were actually observing your own self. Neither life nor objects constitute a totality. Wholeness is a phantasy of the human mind. (439)

The final words uttered by Suad imply that wholeness Mümtaz created based on duration in time, combining the past, the present, and the future in order to attain a continuous present has never

existed. Confronted with this reality, the narrator says Mümtaz would helplessly be "rent asunder by countless maelstroms" (442) for the rest of his life. He would painfully realize the discrepancy between the lived experience and the aesthetic experience. He would not be able to pinpoint an aesthetic realm in its wholeness because he realizes that aesthetics itself cannot capture the experience in its totality when the "other" also shapes and alters it.

Moreover, Mümtaz admits that the observing 'I' perpetually changes in time reconstructing its past: "*Because we change along with events; and as we change, we reconstruct our histories anew"* (395). In other words, he realizes that his vision of culture in a continuum can only take place in his mind, and that it is not possible to pin down the experience in its entirety in aesthetics. For instance, Mümtaz recalls Pierre Puget's caryatids in Toulon when he sees the street porter carrying a heavy weight, and he thinks that their anatomies are similar. Then he quickly dismisses this idea when he notices that the poor man swallowed by the load on his back has no semblance to Puget's mighty caryatids: "*We're unable to see! We pay scant attention to detail! We simply speak from rote!"* (387) In their final meeting Suad ridicules Mümtaz's attempts to label experience aesthetically. Suad scolds him when Mümtaz compares his dream to the angels of Botticelli: "Stop making comparisons…Can't you speak without comparing one thing to another?" (442)

The fact that Mümtaz cannot appreciate people or objects without comparing them to something else is indicative of what Nurdan Gürbilek discerns as "Mümtaz complex" a manifestation of Tanpınar's desire of wholeness. Accordingly, the object, person, or the landscape become meaningful when they become something else for Mümtaz, or represent what was once a whole (Gürbilek 126).[28] Now that Mümtaz expresses doubts about his former

[28] Nurdan Gürbilek argues that Tanpınar could represent the loss so well just because of his obsession with the wholeness. However, she adds that because of this anxiety to represent wholeness, he could not

thoughts on continuity and wholeness, he finds himself in an insurmountable dilemma: he believes he has to give up his "personal happiness" composed of Nuran, culture, and aesthetics for the expense of approaching the lives of "the others," for whom he feels responsible. But he is neither willing to give up his aesthetic world, nor is he able to approach the other.[29]

In the first chapter titled "İhsan," which depicts the present time, Mümtaz contemplates these issues now viewing the panorama of the city with a new unmediated perspective. As each chapter title is designated after the character in focus, this chapter reveals İhsan's demeanor, where pneumonia established a "sultanate over the household, a psychology of devastation" (9). İhsan, the spokesman of the Bergsonian ideas, who emphasized the role of the bodily experience as the core of existence, and theorized on the relationship between the human consciousness and existence as part of a continuum, is mortally sick. His situation is critical. As the definition of crisis suggests, he is at a threshold as his situation awaits an important change indicating either recovery or death. On the other hand, Mümtaz's perspective in this chapter is also critical, in the sense that he views things from the border after his experience with the abject.

This chapter reveals the present mode with its crude reality. Istanbul, fallen from grace, does not now reflect the culture, love, and art in duration, but is stricken with poverty as the war draws near. Moreover, in accordance with Tanpınar's understanding of crisis (*buhran*), its

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finish his novels. The literary attempts carried out by Mümtaz and İhsan also fail in the novel. Mümtaz is a failed writer, and is never able to complete his novel on Shaykh Galip, the Turkish Mevlevi poet. The novel was inspired by Nuran, and tells the tale of the Sufi poet, Shaykh Galip. According to Mümtaz, the novel would "describe us and our contexts," but it fails as Mümtaz attempts to combine various elements around a wholesome reality. He tries to "gather the world around a single individual," as İhsan nails it down (Nurdan Gürbilek, *Kör Ayna, Kayıp Şark* 378). İhsan plans to write an ambitious project himself, an encyclopedia of Turkish history, but it is never fulfilled.

[29] Jale Parla asserts that Mümtaz could not confront Suad because he could not touch and embrace the "other." Therefore, she claims that Mümtaz dispels the abject (*Türk Romanında Yazar ve Başkalaşım* 143). In my reading, Mümtaz cannot dispel the abject; it continues to threaten him, but it also enables him to acknowledge the existence of the "other."

cultural elements of the past flickering here and there do not seem to constitute an organic whole with the present life. One would least expect the Bosphorus – the incarnation of duration – to be this chapter's location, given the chapter's mood and subject. Instead, Tanpınar navigates his protagonist through other streets: the flea market, second-hand stores, Çadırcılar Street, all of them exhibiting castoff items. The flea market itself is the site of the abject as it exhibits waste and excess. But it also seems to represent the present state of the society in duality and coexistence.

Tanpınar described the prevalent crisis of the present as a historically immanent transitional phase, which manifests "the coexistence of the old and the new that do not engage with each other" (YG 41). Based on this statement, the flea market is a microcosm of Tanpınar's present with its coexistence of the new and the old, revealing the two "opposing and difficult-to-imitate polarities of life" (46). The exhibited books that seem to be gathered from Western literature, Eastern literature, the old and the new, creating a discord in their lack of communication with each other, represent the cultural rupture caused by the abrupt transition from one civilization to another. Tanpınar describes the scene as follows:

> Mümtaz realized that this omnium gatherum had been engaged in a hundred-year struggle and a continuous sloughing of skin […] An entire society grew despondent, strove, and suffered through anomie and birth pangs for a century so that digests of detective novels and these Jules Vernes might replace copies of *A Thousand and One Nights, Tûtinâme: Tales of the Parrot, Hâyatülhayvan: Animal Fables,* and *Kenzülhavas: The Treasury of Pleasantries.* (52)

The modernity Tanpınar seeks deals with the past in a dialectical way. The intellectual indigestion exemplified here suggests that Eastern and Western cultures resisted engaging with each other. As a result, the discord and the indigestion of one's being in-between these two cultures created an excess.

The genuine or the unique self Tanpınar hoped to find in the cultural continuum is absent in the coexistence Mümtaz now observes. The self in the present is also split, fragmented, and discarded. The "self" in question is Mümtaz who has lost his integrity, which he never truly had in the first place given that the abject has undermined his fantasy of wholeness. That "self" also shows himself as Behcet Bey, the protagonist of Tanpınar's incomplete novel *Mahur Beste* (Song in Mahur 1944), who takes a stroll in the flea market. Tanpınar, in a modernist gesture, observes Behcet Bey in the flea market now as the abject of that aesthetic domain, functionless in this novel ("puppetlike"), therefore a form of waste and excess. The way Behcet Bey is described, as a "breathing remnant of things past," and "born as a form of desire, a lack" reinforces this suggestion (*Mahur Beste* 151). The flea market, which the narrator describes as the "novel of material objects and discarded life fragments," (60) is home to the incomplete character of the incomplete novel, reminding Tanpınar's statement that what one calls "self" might merely be a fictive construction (YG 307).

According to Tanpınar's understanding of duration, the individual is central, but only as long as he or she becomes an organic element in the flux of the community. His frequent emphasis on the necessity of cultural continuity finds its source in this formulation. However, accepting the self as a fictive construction undermines the notion of community itself that is to breed the "genuine self." The idea of community that is supposed to secure the continuity of cultural practices and tradition collapses when the figurations of the self are manifested as split, fictionalized, and abjected. Mümtaz revisits and raises questions about the notion of community now, which İhsan previously idealized as uniform and homogenous.

The impending Second World War, which invokes anxiety and speculations in the first and the last chapters, provides Tanpınar with an appropriate medium to re-evaluate the notion of

community and its related concerns such as the notions of nationality, responsibility, and continuity. Troubled by his recent experiences, in the last chapter titled, "Mümtaz," he diverts all his attention to the approaching war. The war contributes to the imagination of a community; simultaneously it certifies the crisis on a global scale. Therefore, it raises conflicting thoughts in Mümtaz. He thinks that if the nation participates in the war, as a responsible citizen of his nation he must go alongside other people such as Mehmet who has been serving in the military in Ereli, the coffeehouse apprentice at Boyacıköy, and the street porter whom he thinks have not the intellectual capacity to understand the importance of the war and its political background.

Mümtaz frames his thought based on İhsan's statement that "*Everything that might be termed national is a thing of beauty…and must persist eternally*" (394). Based on this perspective, Mümtaz thinks that the individual should sacrifice himself for the sake of the community. He creates an imaginary dialogue between himself, the porter and the porter's wife. He tries to convince the porter: "*Don't think I'm making wagers on your head! I'm also speaking on behalf of your convictions*" (394). But then he waivers as he imagines the porter's poor wife begging Mümtaz not to send him to war, "But were the porter's wife and children amenable?" (392) Mümtaz wonders. He realizes that İhsan's argument as to the importance of community over individual falters, as it now occurs to Mümtaz that what one calls a nation is not a fixed and homogenous entity, and that speaking for others, "whose lives he'd never be able to fully fathom" (388) is not without its problems. [30]

[30] İbrahim Şahin, in his extensive study of Tanpınar's poetics, *Haz ve Günah: Bir Tanpınar Yorumu,* refers to Mikhail Bakhtin's seminal work *Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics*: *Polyphony and Unfinalizability* to explain Mümtaz's effort to reach a consciousness of self. According to Şahin, *Huzur* constructs and deconstructs a monological harmony. Reaching a consciousness of self for Mümtaz suggests finding his own voice. However, in Şahin's view, Mümtaz does not have a voice of his own until the end. Most of the time Mümtaz echoes İhsan's ideas especially in "Nuran" chapter, where the cultural past and its importance was discussed. Although Suad's ideas are in stark contrast with İhsan's ideas, his oppositional views voiced by Suad's monological voice manifest the "cracks" already existing in

The fact that neither İhsan nor Mümtaz ever approached the lives of these people, for whose account he and İhsan philosophized, reminds the reader of the distance between the culture of the experts and the larger public Jürgen Habermas discusses in his well-known essay "Modernity: An Incomplete project" (1980). In this essay, Habermas refers to Max Weber's characterization of cultural modernity and he argues that scientific discourse, moral and legal enquiry, artistic production and critical practice are institutionalized with the advance of modernity as the concern of experts. While this professionalized treatment of the cultural heritage brought to light autonomous structures intrinsic to the cognitive-instrumental, the moral-practical and the aesthetic-expressive, "the distance between these expert cultures and the general public has increased" (45). Mümtaz begins to realize the gap between the culture he idealizes and of the larger public, which he assumed to bear the "real heritage."

The "other" of Mümtaz's subjectivity, Suad raises a criticism towards the culture of experts by dismissing İhsan's statement that the "[m]ankind is responsible for all Creation" (391) by making an analogy to Joyce's famous character Leopold Bloom: "Unfortunate humanity! Which notion of responsibility? Like Joyce's Leopold Bloom, perched atop our own anxieties, we're spouting philosophy and poetry" (391-2). These words, though arguable since it is not Leopold Bloom who "spouts" but Stephen Dedalus in *Ulysses*, yet seem to be spoken to imply that what the intellectual maps for the community might be far away from the reality of the

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Mümtaz's consciousness. Therefore, Şahin remarks, objections against İhsan's monological voice represent Mümtaz's resurfacing voice of self-consciousness, which were suppressed before. Thus, according to Şahin, Mümtaz begins to form his own consciousness of self and his own voice after he loses Nuran, and confronts Suad in the first and last chapters when he is looking for a nurse (110). Mümtaz's intense suffering in the scenes following their separation from Nuran, and İhsan's approaching death are indicative of the pangs in deserting İhsan's voice in order to create his own. Mümtaz finds his own voice and consciousness of self once he loses İhsan and Nuran, and confronts Suad (110-11). Only then, which coincides with the announcement of the Second World War, Şahin claims that Mümtaz enters in a dialogical relationship with the world (110).

society. Suad's statement also addresses Mümtaz's inability to act towards understanding the community even though it is oppressively visible to him.

Acknowledging the gap between the larger public and the culture of experts, in this case between what İhsan/Mümtaz speculates and the "others" on the street, calls attention to the deployment of Bergsonian duration as a cultural and aesthetic praxis as opposed to lived experience. Tanpınar leads his main character in the last round to construct a different relationship between the world and himself, which rests not on a continuity but on critical interaction, when one begins to engage with the others, and communicate with their world. The approaching war would not only require him to bond with "the others" of his own culture, but also with the "world" itself, since Mümtaz does believe that humanity is responsible for the whole universe. According to İbrahim Şahin, this is when Tanpınar reaches a possibility of wholeness by acknowledging the polyphony, diversity of voices and points of view in a dialogic context (110). Since it is the unfinalizability of individuals that creates true polyphony, and that the incompleteness of dialogic expression is productive for further chains of responses, Mümtaz now realizes that there are other realities that shape and complete his world and his present, such as the telegraph operators conveying breaking news thinking about their families, typesetters typing that news with their scorched fingers, housewives anxiously preparing luggage, train whistles, songs of separation, etc. all sharing the anxiety of the approaching war.

The war, which is the embodiment of crisis itself configures and represents "the persistence of coexisting temporalities" (Harootunian 479) in this context, and provides a conceptual tool to represent a present that bears "simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous," a formula that would allow Tanpınar to narrate his "own," and simultaneously allude to the present of the West. The oxymoronic formula here does not inhibit unevenness, but plurality, and

understanding of the present as the unity of mixed temporalizations, attuned with the role played by contemporary political struggles. Mümtaz can have the sense of "now" as his world engages with other worlds. Mümtaz in the following passage explains what the world suggests for him: "No, he wasn't in the realm of the eternal but of the worldly. The world resided in everybody. A world that existed at times in a corner of our beings, at times as a single soul in totality, at times a world we forgot about during our workaday lives, though we carried it with us, in our very blood; a world that, like it or not, we sensed in the weight of this evening upon our shoulders" (433-434). The term "world" constitutes Mümtaz's own subjectivity, the historical present, and experience of the others that belong to his culture, and experience of those beyond the borders of his nation. This conception of the world as a heterogeneous entity resonates with Tanpınar's deployment of a transnational perspective to communicate with the other worlds than his own to represent the present characterized by crisis.

Tanpınar leads his character to an understanding of worldliness, which recognizes the existence of mixed temporalities mingling with each other in the critical moment. By doing that, he rescues the "'worldtime' of multiple temporalities from the 'leveling off' of significance" as Harootunian mentions (494), through reversing the mechanism of "real reality" of Western time, by leading Mümtaz to feel responsible for the war in Europe. The crisis in Europe leads Mümtaz to break down, as he feels he is equally responsible for the crisis.[31] In other words, the historical and temporal present of Europe imbued by crisis becomes a shared present, a "worldtime" that Mümtaz has to act upon.

However, Mümtaz experiences a paradox, which Martin Halliwell observes about many modern protagonists: "the sense that a moral position must be ventured, but accompanied by a

[31] Tanpınar in an interview about *Huzur* states that Mümtaz has gone insane because he took the responsibility of the war on himself (*Mücevherlerin Sırrı* 211).

simultaneous realization of the impossibility of doing so" (3). Mümtaz cannot act; the crisis costs his selfhood, as he is too far in the depth of his own dilemmas and paradoxes. At the moment Mümtaz feels the existence of the world in him as well as the other worlds he can communicate with, the "world" abandons him. He resigns from the symbolic world completely by surrendering to insanity, when the radio speaks "for them all" (446) announcing the Second World War, certifying a crisis for every world residing in each person. Thus, the crisis of the present creates a plurality for all and an understanding of present as a unity of mixed temporalizations coexisting with each other, even though this possibility does not lead Tanpınar's main character to restore himself in the end.

Chapter 2

Mahmoud Darwish's *Memory for Forgetfulness*: Redeeming Worldliness Through Exilic Consciousness

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar in his *Huzur* showed how the crisis of the present, which manifests itself as historical and temporal thresholds, also provided him with a possibility for locating worldliness, in terms of gaining consciousness of coexisting temporalities in the contemporaneous experience of modernity, which appears to be singulary designated to the West. Calling attention to what seemed to be common to the lived present in simultaneous temporalities not only brought the issues of responsibility and acceptance of others beyond his culture, but also of those that the protagonist excluded from his ideal, homogenous, and aesthetically wholesome world.

Like Tanpınar, the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish manages to regain worldliness by working through the *critical*[32] threshold that arrests him politically and historically. The exiled subject is at a political and historical threshold: between languages, states, and cultures. Instead of seeking to overcome the exilic threshold, Mahmoud Darwish takes it as a vantage point to construct a critical approach to the notions of homeland, belonging, and memory. Drawing on Hannah Arendt's and Edward Said's deployment of the term, I argue that Darwish's exilic threshold is a form of *worldlessness*, and examine in this chapter the ways in which Darwish regains *worldliness* by challenging the sovereign power and the hegemonic language and literature.

[32] Reinhart Koselleck mentions that "crisis" also means "decision" in the sense of reaching a verdict or judgment, what today is meant by criticism (*Kritik*) ("Crisis" 359).

Darwish's own exilic experience in Beirut is a manifestation of a historical crisis, which he depicted in his work, *Memory for Forgetfulness: August, Beirut, 1982* (1986). A combination of testimony, memoir, autobiography, literary criticism, and journalism, this prose-poem narrates the day of the siege, as the city of Beirut was heavily bombarded by Israel on June 6, 1982. The Siege of Beirut took place as part of the 1982 Lebanon War. It is arguable whether the siege, when considered by itself, is a form of crisis. What took place in Beirut could be understood as a culminating point in the war, preceded by a series of international and regional political crises. However, the siege may be best characterized by what Reinhart Koselleck describes as historical crisis in his article "Crisis",[33] for several reasons: Firstly, the day of the siege designates a final point, after which the quality of history is changed for both the people of the region and for the rest of the world; it indicates suspension, blockage, and immobility; it signifies perpetuation of a situation for the Palestinians. As the Palestinians are pushed into further exile from a land of previous exile (the exodus from Palestine repeating itself), their exile becomes permanent and continuous. Finally, because the siege indicates that this repetition of a state of exile has no foreseeable solution to bring an end to it, it designates "a historically immanent transition phase," another mode of crisis according to Koselleck ("Crisis" 372).

Darwish's account of the single day during the siege presents a summary of his immobility and suspension. He is unable to leave Beirut, and yet he cannot stay at what he calls

[33] As mentioned in the first chapter (p.34), Koselleck defines the interpretative possibilities of crisis as follows: 1) Following the medical-political-military use, "crisis" can mean that chain of events leading to a culminating, decisive point at which action is required. 2) In line with the theological promise of a future Last Day, "crisis" may be defined as a unique and final point, after which the quality of history will be changed forever. 3) The "crisis" as a permanent or conditional category pointing to a critical situation which may constantly recur or else to situations in which decisions have momentous consequences. 4) The "crisis" to indicate a historically immanent transitional phase. When this transition will occur and whether it leads to a worse or better condition depends on the specific diagnosis offered ("Crisis" 371-372).

home for the same reasons. It is as if he is trapped in a state of exile itself, a mode of transition that keeps him in a perpetual state of homelessness.

Darwish's exilic threshold exemplifies Hannah Arendt's notion of *worldlessness*. Arendt developed the notion of worldlessness to describe the condition into which German Jews and other victims of mass denaturalization were placed during the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. In her essay "We Refugees" (1943), she describes *worldless* people as those who do not belong to a world in which they matter as individuals (118).[34] It is a condition that is forced upon persons who are deprived of their political rights, for instance, by forced denaturalization or tyranny; it may also include anyone who is effectively alienated from the public realm, or being deprived of a place which makes "opinions significant and actions effective" (Gottsegen 5).

In her *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), Hannah Arendt expands her notion of worldlessness, and associates it with totalitarianism. In her view, the idea of worldlessness is an important consequence of the destructiveness of totalitarianism, leading individuals to loneliness and political isolation. Arendt differentiates loneliness and isolation, although both states are borderstates essential for totalitarianism: "What we call isolation in the political sphere, is called loneliness in the sphere of social intercourse" (OT 474), Arendt notes, explaining that both loneliness and isolation are strategies of the tyrannical regimes to destroy the human contact, so that "human beings can be totally dominated, controlled and eliminated" (Topolski 52).

According to Arendt, the desire to reduce the individual to a state of loneliness, "to the experience of not belonging to the world at all" (OT 475), is closely connected with

[34] Arendt writes about the *worldlessness* of the Jewish refugee in "We Refugees": "[r]emember that being a Jew does not give any legal status in this world. If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected by any specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings as such have ceased to exist for quite a while" (118).

uprootedness and and a feeling of superfluousness. Categorizing uprootedness and superfluousness as the essence of totalitarian government, and yet as a modern experience, "the curse of modern masses" (475), Arendt defines these two states as follows: "To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all" (475). As totalitarianism in terms of a dehumanizing experience destroys individuality by way of rendering one uprooted and superfluous, as Anya Topolski mentions, both experiences are a form of worldlessness, where individuals go through a loss of the world (55).

Darwish's exilic threshold is characterized by Arendt's notion of worldlessness in the sense that he is both superfluous and uprooted. The siege crystallizes his condition as a stateless human being, without political rights, bereft of speech and political action. The tyrannical domination also reduces him to a superfluous individual isolating Palestinians politically from the rest of the world, so the possibility of being heard by others, especially by the history making mechanisms remains out of the question.

Nevertheless, as Tanpınar attempted to move beyond the temporal and historical threshold he suffered by creating a cultural continuity in time and an aesthetic wholeness in an expanded present, Darwish in *Memory for Forgetfulness* also attempts to resist the socio-political and historical discursive mechanisms that arrest him and other fellow Palestinians at an exilic threshold. Situating himself in time and place, evoking memories, and chronicling history from the perspective of the oppressed as it is happening in the present moment are the narrative strategies he employs as forms of *textual* resistance. However, his endeavor is continuously challenged: Darwish becomes aware that the traumatic moment of the siege deprives him of communicative language to express his testimony, and that the attempt to rewrite history is

always subject to challenges when one has been excluded from it.

Nevertheless, the political and the exilic threshold, which characterizes the crisis, enables Darwish to develop a type of awareness or consciousness that Edward Said articulates as exilic consciousness. With such consciousness Darwish attempts to resist the socio-political and historical discursive mechanisms that would dehistoricize and dehumanize him, reducing him to what Hannah Arendt calls "worldlessness."

William Spanos, in his book, *Exiles in the City: Hannah Arendt and Edward Said in Counterpoint* (2012), correlates Arendt's use of the term *worldlessness* with Edward Said's "secular criticism." This correlation provides the reader with a perspective from which to ponder the exile's "unhoming" not solely in political terms, but also as an ontological event. Said's invocation of Giambattista Vico's distinction between the views concerning the divine of the Jews and Gentiles in *Beginnings: Intentions and Method* (1998) reveals his humanist commitment to the idea that humans should make their history. Said notes that "[t]o be gentile is to be denied access to the true God, to have recourse for thought to divination, to live permanently in history, in an order other than God's, to be able genetically to produce that order of history. Vico's concerns are everywhere with the other order, the word of history made by men" (350). As Spanos notes, to be worldly is a humanly willed construct, subject to willful change, in which the humanity must make its own history, unlike the history made by God or History (Spanos 156).

Drawing on Edward Said's employment of the term worldliness (to describe an adherence to the commitment that humans make their own history), and Arendt's use of the term worldlessness (in relation to political isolation and her interpretation of a "pariah" figure, those who remain at the border of "polity" (speech and action) and a "bare life" that deprives one of

the ability to make one's own history to world the earth), I employ the terms worldliness / worldlessness together with the notions of exile and exilic consciousness. The critical notion of exile, which also designates the characteristics of Darwish's oeuvre, needs to be elaborated under the light of those socio-historical mechanisms that forced him into exile. While I do not discuss the historical background of the Palestinian question at length, I raise questions about history-making structures in an attempt to understand the state imposed mechanisms that position the exile at a critical threshold.

Darwish was an exile for most of his life[35], and the exile state is intimately connected to his poetics.[36] In an attempt to handle irony as a practice that unites literary form with historical experience, Ibrahim Muhawi argues in his essay, "Irony and the Poetics of Palestinian Exile," that the very structure of irony resembles the Palestinian exile in that it embodies a rhetoric of presence and absence (32). The exile lives in a state of existential irony, because he is present-absent or an absent-present person (31-32). Irony in Palestinian literature redresses the imbalance in the equation of presence and absence (35). By referring to Darwish's words, "Time has taught me wisdom […] and history has taught me irony," Muhawi rephrases Darwish's expression as "Wisdom is to time, as irony is to history" (32). He claims that if irony is a form of historical wisdom, and if history has made an exile of the subject, then a poetics based on irony is a suitable strategy for coping with that exile, because it allows one to reinterpret exile in

[35] Darwish experienced a series of exiles beginning in 1948, followed by his subsequent exilic journeys in Cairo, Beirut, Tunis, Paris, Amman, and Ramallah, until his heart stopped after a surgery in Houston, Texas in 2008 (Hala Khamis Nassar and Najat Rahman, "Introduction," *Mahmoud Darwish: Exile's Poet,* 1).

[36] For a historical overview, and transformation in Darwish's poetry see: Bassam Frangieh's "Modern Arabic Poetry: Vision and Reality," Faysal Darraj's "Transfigurations in the Image of Palestine in the Poetry of Mahmoud Darwish," and Sinan Antoon's "Returning to the Wind: On Darwish's 'la ta'tadhir' 'amma Fa'lta" in *Mahmoud Darwish: Exile's Poet.*

creative ways, i.e. "transforming it back into history as literature" (32).

In his early prose work, *Journal of an Ordinary Grief* (1973) and in *Memory for Forgetfulness,* Darwish relentlessly demands that we see the irony in the whole experience of the Palestinians, that for Palestinians to be present they have to first acknowledge that they are absent.[37] His dichotomous analogies visible in his titles, *Memory for Forgetfulness,* and in his later semi-autobiographical self-elegy, *In the Presence for Absence* (2006) clearly point to this ironical aspect of the Palestinian question, and show the imbalance in the equation of presence and absence based on a reversal of the condition that creates the exilic presence-absence of the Palestinian people.

The irony purported in the term "present-absentee" is only one of many instances depicting the ironical status of Palestinians. Darwish explains how his legal status and that of his family changed after they arrived in Lebanon when he was six years old. Israel labeled internal refugees who were away from their villages at the time the state was established as "present-absentees." Darwish in *Journal of an Ordinary Grief* explains how they found themselves stateless upon their return to Palestine: "We didn't know we were going to be exchanging refugee status in Lebanon for refugee status at home. And we didn't realize that our physical presence in the homeland constituted an absence in the eyes of the law the conquerors quickly implemented. They called us "present-absentees" so we would have no legal right to anything" (14). Being no longer citizens in their own countries, but physically present, the Palestinians are given this ambiguous status, which seems to be directing the subject to an indescribable threshold.

Until the 1970s Darwish remained under the status of a "present-absentee," and he had to

[37] Israel labeled Darwish as an "absent-present alien" during his stay in Palestine/Israel until the 1970s, as other internal refugees whose lands were to be confiscated by Israel were also given this title.

sign a paper every evening to show that he was "present." Being in exile in both his homeland and in diaspora, Darwish alludes to the paradoxical threshold his exile encapsulates: "'You're aliens here,' they say to them *there.* You're aliens here,' they say to them *here*'" (13), referring to the exclusion from what he calls home (there, Palestine) and what he calls his second home, his shelter place (here, Lebanon). He points to the similar "no-place," an irreconcilable characteristic of the threshold imposed by the sovereign, denying him any direction to take: "*You are not going* there, and you don't belong here" (17).

The notions of memory and forgetfulness are integral to this understanding of irony that Palestinian exiles have to endure. As their absence ironically defines their presence, remembrance comes to be identified with forgetfulness. In the following statement, for instance, Darwish addresses how the occupier denies the Palestinians their memories, while it calls ironically for a remembrance of the oppression it once suffered: "Jewish memory is one of the basic components of the claim to a right in Palestine. Yet it is incapable of admitting that others also possess the sense of memory. Israelis refuse to live side by side with Arab memory. They refuse to admit the existence of this memory, even though one of their mottos is, 'We will not forget'" (*Journal of an Ordinary Grief* 33). In a similar vein, Darwish makes an allusion to the Shoah, and draws attention to the fact that the devastating experience under the Nazi oppression has now acquired a new meaning under the name of progress: "What was Nazi before because it was directed at Jews now becomes progress by the mere fact of its transformation into an instrument of oppression available to these same Jews" (159). As the means of oppression changed hands, the act of oppression has come to be appropriated into a so-called modernity project.

Edward Said, in his *The Question of Palestine,* draws the reader's attention to the irony found in the settler colonizer's initial directives to occupy the Palestinian lands by assuming the Arab inhabitants as "non-beings" in order to justify the occupation in 1948 and in 1967. Said stresses that "in order to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on a desired land, the Zionists convinced themselves that these natives did not exist, then made it possible for them to exist only in the most rarified forms" (19). The Zionists have used a rhetoric of indigeneity, claiming that Palestine was theirs despite the presence of actual inhabitants. Said writes:

> In short, all the constitutive energies of Zionism were premised on the excluded presence, that is, the functional absence of "native people" in Palestine; institutions were built deliberately shutting out natives. Laws were drafted when Israel came into being that made sure that natives would remain in their "nonplace," Jews in theirs, and so on. It is no wonder that today the one issue that electrifies Israel as a society is the problem of the Palestinians, whose negation is the most consistent thread running through Zionism. (*The Question of Palestine* 82)

According to William Spanos, the Zionist strategists' "justificatory regime" to bring "civilization" to "backward" lands is a sure sign of the Orientalist project of the Imperial West, and it shows that the Zionists represented the land of Palestine as *terra nullius,* that is, those who lived on the land did not cultivate (work) and settle (savages) (Spanos 106).

However, subjectivization of the Palestinians is not solely about replacing one community with another. The Palestinians were clearly held outside their own homeland and the political domain, bereft of their rights as citizens. But they were also kept inside the state control mechanisms. As "non-beings," they were neither in the system lawfully nor outside the system. Excluded from the political order, and captured within, the Palestinian exile, in short, remained

at a threshold. [38]

Understanding the nature of this socio-historical and political threshold is important, as the mechanism that creates the exilic threshold might enable resistance to the same state mechanism that dehumanizes and dehistoricizes the exiled figure. If the exilic threshold is a worldless site, which renders the subject superfluous and uprooted, it might also engender the potential for the exiled subject to regain worldliness through a critical consciousness, in order to reinstate his subjectivity and the ability to make history. I employ Carl Schmitt's theory of "the state of exception," which was later rearticulated by Walter Benjamin in his conception of history, Giorgio Agamben's notion of "bare life," and Eric Santner's term "creatureliness" to elucidate the ways in which Darwish's specific exilic position allows such critical consciousness. These terms all address a form of threshold imposed by the sovereign state in order to exclude and capture the subject simultaneously. But they also emphasize the capacity to resist the same state-controlled mechanisms they describe.

Carl Schmitt lays the foundation of his thesis in his *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.* In Schmitt's view, the sovereign "decides on the exception"; his decision establishes a rule over what does not belong to the general norm of "ordinary legal prescription" (5-6). Agamben, in his *State of Exception,* an extensive study on Schmitt's much debated theory, probes into the "exoteric dossier" of the Walter Benjamin - Carl Schmitt exchange on the state of exception between the years 1925 and 1956.[39] Analyzing various

[38] This oscillating position may apply to any person who has a refugee status, or it may describe the whole experience of refugee camps. Notably, the terms "refugee" and "crisis" usually accompany each other in political discourse.

[39] See Benjamin's reference to Schmitt in his Curriculum Vitae of 1928; a letter Benjamin wrote to Schmitt in December, 1930; Schmitt's comments on Benjamin in Hamlet or Hecuba in 1956; and Schmitt's correspondence with Hansjorg Viesel in the 1973, "in which Schmitt states that his 1938 book on Hobbes had been conceived as a 'response to Benjamin [that has] remained unnoticed'" (Giorgio

responses they exchanged, Agamben contends that the decisive document in the Schmitt-Benjamin dossier is the eighth thesis on the concept of history Benjamin composed a few months before his death (57). Benjamin, having the Nazi Reich before him, remarks that the state of exception (or emergency) had become a rule. He writes:

> The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the "state of emergency" in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism. One reason why Fascism has a chance is that in the name of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm. ("Theses" 257)

While, from Schmitt's perspective the purpose of the state of exception is to "make the norm applicable by temporarily suspending its efficacy," sovereign decision is no longer capable of performing the task that Political Theology has assigned it when the exception becomes the rule. Agamben succinctly sums up the circuitous dilemma: "the rule, which now coincides with what it lives by, devours itself" (58).

Viewed from this perspective, Benjamin's distinction in the eighth thesis between the "real" state of exception and the state of exception becomes clearer. Since the state of exception "in which we live" is real and cannot be distinguished from the rule, what is at stake according to Agamben is "the status of violence as a cipher for human action: While Schmitt attempts every time to reinscribe violence within a juridical context, Benjamin responds to this gesture by seeking every time to assure it—as pure violence—an existence outside of the law" (58-59). [40] In

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Agamben, *State of Exception* 52).

[40] Horst Bredekamp demonstrates that even though Carl Schmitt and Benjamin differ from each other in their interpretation of history, Benjamin remained within the framework drawn by Schmitt: "Schmitt views the state of exception as 'the *condition sine qua non* for the establishment of sovereignty, Benjamin sees sovereignty as existing in order to avoid the state of exception as the following statement seems to

Benjamin's view, the real state of exception, with its revolutionary potential would be possible outside the cycle of violence effected by the sovereign.

Palestinian history appears to be a repetition of the state of emergency connected to the sovereign's violence to secure the foundation and preservation of its power. The historical discourse of power in the specific historical circumstances of displacement of one community by another is transmitted in the form of "natural history." That is, the siege of Beirut as the last stage of repeated cycle of violence, also acts as a platform upon which several time frames collapse for the displaced poet, so that the past and the present converge, signifying a repeated history of the exile then and now.

As Darwish goes back and forth in time, Palestine and Beirut, past and present in *Memory for Forgetfulness*, he notes the manifestation of this repeated history and similarity of the historical discourse that consists of violence. He extends the scope of a repeated history of violence, and draws a parallel between the destruction of Beirut and the destruction that took place in Hiroshima. As he steps out of his home in order to look for traces of life and of familiar faces, he witnesses the use of a vacuum bomb, an ultimate destructive weapon first tried during the siege. He alludes to the atomic bomb and the devastation in Hiroshima by noting that the day of the siege, August 6th, is the anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb. Beirut's sky, Darwish observes, is a Hiroshima sky. The nature of violence imposed on both places, if not its scale, intertwines them "anachronistically" in an order of natural history. Palestine, Hiroshima, and Beirut become various stages of this repeated cycle of violence. Darwish foresees that the cyclical violence is doomed to repeat itself in a different time frame as long as the sovereign

imply: 'The ruler is designated from the outset as the holder of dictatorial power if war, revolt, or other catastrophes should lead to a state of exception'" (Bredekamp 260).

power perpetuates its violence: "Hiroshima is tomorrow. Hiroshima is tomorrow" (85).[41]

Benjamin's ninth thesis, wherein he explains progress as a "catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage" (257), is also related to the cyclical violence observed and experienced by Darwish.[42] Because of this repetition, the state of emergency occurs as if it were *natural history* to secure the foundation and preservation of the sovereign's power. Eric Santner in his *On Creaturely Life* interprets Benjamin's notion of the natural history as a form of allegory in the sense that it is a symbolic mode, a human construct proper to the experience of exposure to the violence of history, and the ceaseless repetition of cycles of emergence that are always connected to violence (17).

Building on Carl Schmitt's theory of the state of exception as a normative political space, Santner articulates how boundaries are drawn by the "decisionist" logic of sovereignty in order to reestablish the stability to which law can then apply. He comes up with the notion of *creatureliness*, or *creaturely life*, "life abandoned to the state of exception /emergency, that

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[41] In numerous ways Darwish's text is comparable to *Hiroshima mon amour*, written by Marguerite Duras, and later filmed by Alain Resnais. The referred passage in Darwish's text, which excavates the palimpsest of traumatic memory in Hiroshima and Beirut also refers to the anxiety of forgetting, "the American attempt to make it forget its name" (84). Darwish is concerned that in "the museum of the crime" the name of the "killer" is absent (85). He alludes to *Hiroshima mon amour* when he claims that he does not see Hiroshima during his visit there, (Note, in *Hiroshima*, the male protagonist He says: "You saw nothing in Hiroshima. Nothing" (21)), or when he claims that he has forgotten the alphabet that would enable him to express the horror of the experience in both cities. His fear mirrors the French actress' fear of forgetting her memory of the German lover in Nevers. Circular time connects Nevers and Hiroshima, because She is able to bring her own trauma to the city. In the same way, Darwish connects Hiroshima and Beirut on the anniversary of Hiroshima, and goes through a similar "fear of indifference" and "horror of oblivion." At the conclusion of the film, She names He, "Hi-ro-shi-ma. That's your name" (83), just as Darwish articulates his bond to the surrogate homeland by claiming that "all he remembers are these six letters: B-E-I-R-U-T" (86).

[42] By repetition of history, Benjamin means to allude not only to Marx's famous essay, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), but also to Nietzsche and cyclical history. Marx, referring to Napoléon I and to his nephew Louis Napoléon (Napoléon III), a farcical repetition of his great uncle, argues that all world historical events recur twice, first as tragedy, then as farce (15). For Nietzsche's influence on Benjamin, see Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, "Boredom, Eternal Return" (101-119).

paradoxical domain in which law has been suspended in the name of preserving law" (22), in order to describe one's experience "in the midst of antagonisms in and of the political field" (xix). Drawing upon the German-Jewish literary-philosophical tradition, (more specifically the works of Franz Kafka, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin, Paul Celan), Santner characterizes creatureliness by its exposure to the traumatic dimension of sovereign violence (such as an event of historical rupture, cessation) through a state of exception that is in line with Benjamin's "natural history" which signifies the ceaseless repetition of war and hegemonic struggle (17).

For Santner, creaturely life ("the peculiar proximity of the human to the animal at the very point of their radical difference" (12)) is a product not simply of man's "thrownness" into the "openness of Being," (Heideggerian concept of *Geworfenheit*), but of one's exposure to the "traumatic dimension of political power and social bonds whose structures have undergone radical transformations in modernity" (12). In Santner's view, this disruption names "the threshold where life becomes a matter of politics and politics comes to inform the very matter and materiality of life" (12).

Giorgio Agamben in his *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* draws another facet of *creaturely* interpretation of the subjectivity. He reminds the reader that Hannah Arendt had already analyzed the process of biological life, which was to occupy the very center of the political scene of modernity even before Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*. However, in his view, the biological perspective is lacking in her analysis of totalitarian power in works such as *The Human Condition*, while Foucault never dwelt on the exemplary places of modern biopolitics, such as concentration camps and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century (4). Based on Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty ("Sovereign is he who

decides on the state of exception"), and Hannah Arendt's "polity," Agamben concentrates on the link between violence and law, and identifies this type of belonging and simultaneously non-belonging in political order with the term, *bare life* or *homo sacer*. He draws the relation between a state of *homo sacer* and the power relations as follows:

> Let us now observe the life of homo sacer […] He has been excluded from the religious community and from all political life: he cannot participate in the rites of his gens, nor (if he has been declared infamis et intestabilis) can he perform any juridically valid act. What is more, his entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide; he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land. And yet he is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditioned threat of death. He is pure zoē, but his zoē is as such caught in the sovereign ban and must reckon with it at every moment, finding the best way to elude or deceive it. In this sense, no life, as exiles and bandits know well, is more "political" than his. (183-184)

The exile is the epitome of *bare life* because he is excluded from the political domain. It is legitimate to kill him (as the many instances of random killings illustrate in Darwish's hometown); he must be in a continuous flight to save his life. However, he is still in a continuous relationship with the power that banishes him. The sovereign decides on the state of exception, and by rendering the exiled subject "absent present," it situates the exile in a form of "undeadness," which both echoes Agamben's *bare life* and Santner's *creatureliness*. The "essential disruption" that renders man creaturely has a political aspect that resonates the exilic threshold Darwish finds himself in.

Elsewhere, Agamben describes the topological structure of the state of exception as: "Being-outside, and yet belonging" (*The State of Exception* 35). Darwish, accordingly, is neither outside, nor inside the system that holds him as an exile. In the following passage, for instance,

Darwish hints how his *bare life* is connected to a state of exception. The "Other," or the sovereign power, acknowledges the Palestinians' presence only to push them into final absence:

> For the first time in our history, our absence is conditional upon our total presence. Present to make oneself absent, to apologize for the idea of freedom, and to admit that our absence is a right that grants the sovereign the right to decide our destiny. The Other, present with all his murderous gadgets, is demanding our presence for a while, to announce his right to push us into the final absence. (149)

The traces of *bare life* found in the relation between absence and presence are also visible in his usage of memory and forgetfulness. It will not be wrong to say that in Darwish's lexicon, absence and forgetting are parallel to each other, while memory, remembrance and existence form the other side of the coin, all used in a larger political context related to the state of exception.

For Palestinians, forgetting is not only a personal experience that occurs due to the corrosiveness of time, but also is a strategy the settler colonizer imposes on them as a means to annihilate them, and to strip them of human qualities, leaving behind solely their *bare life*. In the following statement Darwish explains how, from a reverse logic, forgetting and exclusion from human rights would define the Palestinian experience. He writes: "Thus he who's expected to forget he's human is forced to accept the exclusion from human rights that will train him for freedom from the disease of forgetting the homeland […] he must be denied the privilege of settling down so that he won't forget Palestine" (16).

The allusion to the animalistic or inhuman qualities attributed to the Palestinians explains the administrative mechanism the sovereign creates. In an interview with Najat Rahman, Darwish mentions that the Palestinian question has been transformed "from its human dimension to its administrative dimension" (324). In other words, the Palestinians are excluded from the

political domain as human beings and yet captured by it. In order to justify the attacks, the sovereign transforms them into something inhuman. Darwish explains their agenda:

> 'These Palestinians are not human. They're animals who walk on all fours.' He has to strip us of our humanity to justify killing us, for the killing of animals– unless they are dogs–is not forbidden in Western law […] He therefore had to transform those who resisted him into something inhuman, into animals, after the legend in which he believed had closed off all windows to an askable question, 'Who really is the animal?' (77)

If the law forbids killing human beings, the Palestinians need to be expelled from humanity. Here Darwish not only refers to the mood where human and animal life enter into an uncanny proximity, but he also refers to the larger structure of his experience with the law that renders him, precisely, "creaturely." The "natural historical" dimension of law thus gives rise to a perpetual state of exception, in which the creaturely life is an index of an ongoing subjection to a sovereign.

Referring to Aristotle, according to whom apprehending the essential link between human language, subjectivity, and responsibility has defined man as the "political animal" (297), Arendt observes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* that "the stateless and effectively speechless alien is exiled from the human race" (Gottsegen 5), and becomes a figure of *animal laboran*. A *worldless* person, Arendt observes, has become thing-like and as such is bereft of human dignity. While Darwish's concern invokes Arendt's meditation on the danger that comes with being thrown back on mere humanness or *bare life*, *creatureliness* in Darwish's text should not be considered as a dimension of life that places the human into proximity with the animal, but as a form of in-betweenness, a threshold that places him within and outside the political domain.

Darwish's narrative demonstrates various other figurations of this creatureliness as well, mostly in-between life and death, dream and reality. For instance, a dialogue in the form of a

dream sequence or hallucination with an anonymous woman, probably a lover from the past, frames the text. She asks if he is alive, Darwish responds by alluding to his "undeadness": "In this middle region between life and death" (181).[43] The nebulous space that surrounds him in between sleep and day, life and death appears in various other forms. Darwish plays chess with the Lebanese poet Khalil Hawi, has a conversation with another Palestinian writer, Izz al-Din al-Qalaq, and talks casually with another Palestinian poet, Mu'in Bsseisso (158-163). All died in different times. Most prominently the siege brings him to the verge of death ("Here, I didn't die; I haven't died yet" (173)). Darwish is constantly in that critical position between life and death: "Oh, what a living time! What a dead time! Oh, for a living time rising from a dead time! Oh, what a living time!" the poet exclaims referring to an ambiguous past that collides with his present (174).

The siege, it seems, is an epiphanic moment for Darwish, who has become aware of the fact that his exile is strongly tied to his *bare life* and *creatureliness* because another exile awaits him only to perpetuate his state of exception. The question that needs to be asked then, if this is his present moment, the exilic threshold the poet cannot escape, the moment which makes Darwish realize that he is homeless one more time, how could he position himself against this one-dimensional sovereign violence? How does his writing respond to the state of exception, and *creatureliness*? According to Santner, if, for instance, *creatureliness* is a by-product of exposure to what Santner calls the "excitations of power" that disturbs the social space,

[43] This is yet another point of comparison between Darwish's text and *Hiroshima mon Amour*. "Lily of the Valley" is the Israeli lover of Darwish's poem, "A Beautiful Woman in Sodom" (1970). As mentioned in his 37th footnote, by referring to Darwish's line, "Each of us is killing the other by the window," Muhawi notes that the lovers who make love by the window would kill each other outside it because they are enemies (122). The anonymous woman in the frame of dialogue is a reincarnation of this lover, "a dream born from another dream" (119). This reminds the reader of the "unacceptable" love affair between She (French actress) and her German lover in Nevers in *Hiroshima Mon Amour*, and resonances of the fear of forgetting she remembers in her affair with the Japanese lover.

creaturely life could be said to harbor within itself a form of resistance to the operation of the "natural history" (24). In his view, transforming creaturely *deposits* into a form of *deposition* is one of the ways to resist the operations of the sovereign's violence (75).

In Darwish's case, re-writing history from the perspective of the silenced could transform him from a *creaturely* deposit to a form of deposition, and provide the poet with the tools to displace the authoritative voice of the victor and to defy boundaries of subjectivity / subjectivization. Such a method might also serve to bring about what Benjamin identifies as "a real state of exception in the struggle against Fascism." Moreover, if one thinks of creatureliness as a form of being witness (deposition), then writing the testimony would be a possibility to regain "worldliness" for the exiled figure who was bereaved of speech and action. Then it is of vital importance to handle political worldliness in alignment with an interpretation of worldliness in literature.

Edward Said's conception of textual worldliness, which he elaborated in *The World, the Text, and the Critic,* is pertinent to the understanding of worldliness developed by Arendt. By alluding to how The Zahirite school of Arab grammarians saw language and derived meaning through the interplay and constitutive interaction between a text and its circumstantiality, Said charts worldliness. Accordingly, it represents "circumstantiality, the text's status as an event having sensuous particularity as well as historical contingency, are considered as being incorporated in the text, an infrangible part of its capacity for conveying and producing meaning" (39). By textual worldliness, Said not only calls for a literature that is relevant to the world and engaged with the world, but also for a historicist-materialist interpretation of literature – that is, "a careful examination of the socio-cultural formations, practices, institutions, and agencies in which texts in general, literary texts included, are caught up at a given historical

moment" (Hussein 164).

Witnessing and re-writing history from the perspective of the silenced and oppressed not only helps to restore Darwish's political worldliness, but the act of writing also accommodates him in a historical momentum, placing his text as part of socio-cultural and political formations. In an interview with an Israeli television reporter, Darwish alludes to such textual worldliness of his text, and explains his desire to write history from the perspective of the silenced by referring to Homer's epic *Iliad* as it relates to the untold story of the Palestinians: "I consider myself a Trojan poet, that poet whose text has been lost to us and literary history. What I wish to express, although not with any finality, but with a certain ambiguity, is that I belong to Troy, not because I am defeated, but because I am obsessed by the desire to write the lost text" (Sylvain 148-149). However it is a matter of debate how the poet can respond if any attempt to speak or to write the testimony is silenced and subjugated by the sovereign, or when the traumatic moment deprives him of communicative abilities. Is it possible to break the violent cycle of history through literature, by writing the lost text, as Darwish claims? In that case, how could his language break the order categorized under "creatureliness," or "state of exception," if he is always-already part of it? In line with these queries, it is also worthwhile to raise the question Shoshana Felman asks in her article "Benjamin's Silence": "What if no ready-made conceptual or discursive tool, or no discourse about history turns out to be sufficient to explain the nature of this war or current historical developments?" (209)

Darwish's poetics indeed reveals the difficulty of communicating what is not communicable in *Memory for Forgetfulness*. As Walter Benjamin mentions in his essay, "The Storyteller," the soldiers who returned from World War I had grown "silent–not richer but poorer in communicable experience" (84) after going through destructive torrents and explosions during

the war, Darwish too is reduced to speechlessness and feels helpless, when he could be dead or alive in a moment under the heavy bombardment. The representation seems to fail him as the siege, with its ungraspable terror, silences him. The form of his narrative mirrors his "poor" communicable experience: The language is in process and in trial; as if occurrences of the present trauma during the siege are so overwhelming that they do not allow him to draw a complete picture of the events. Jeffrey Sacks gives a correct diagnoses in "Language Places," when he claims that Darwish's language seems to be "struck by the siege, and the poet is besieged by language," implying that his writing reflects a representational siege, a state of suspension and immobility (263).

For that reason, "I'm writing my silence," Darwish repeats over and over again, when he reacts to the expectation that the poet should respond to the war with his poetry. The louder the jets are, the quieter he is: "But this howling that descends from the sky and rises from the earth doesn't stop. It won't permit any of the images of my days to settle into a form. […] Enough! I say it louder. But the answer comes back louder and louder" (173). If one considers Darwish's text as a testimony that bears witness and writes history as it is happening, his silence and speechlessness should be considered as a sign of the state of exception that keeps him at a threshold. The exile cannot speak when he is expelled from the political domain and history.

Permutations of Darwish's silence that have to do with the untranslatability of terms and incommensurability of language are also the very symptoms of trauma, which according to Cathy Caruth shatters consciousness and therefore resists representation (*Unclaimed Experience* 4). In this context, it is possible to interpret Darwish's inability to write down current experiences, or his unsettled language in process as a textual depiction of trauma. He moves between the fragments of memory and his present freely without presenting either of them as

complete.

Shoshana Felman in her article "Benjamin's Silence" describes how speechlessness forms the very heart of the situation of the writer, and queries what it means that culture in the voice of its most profound witness must fall silent.[44] She reads Benjamin's statement on the making of history based on the relationship between the victor and the oppressed[45] as one that is inhabited by a historical unconscious founded on a double silence, that of the official history and the silence of the oppressed. Felman states the double silence that defines historiography for Benjamin is in general the way in which history is told or rather is silenced (210).

The silence of official history, in her view, is created by the authority on the premise that the voice with which "it speaks authoritatively is *deafening;* it makes us unaware of the fact that there remains in history a claim, a discourse that we *do not hear*" (210). She draws a relation between the deafening silence of the official history and the historicists, and adds that history transmits "a legacy of deafness in which historicists unwittingly share" (210). The silence of the oppressed, on the other hand, is the direct influence of the deafening silence of the official history. The traumatized victims of the oppressor are speechless, and are deprived of a voice to speak of their victimization.

The dual silence of historiography, that is, the deafening silence of the victor, and those who transmit the legacy of deafness permeate Darwish's testimony. The West and its representatives that Darwish portray as journalists, poets, scholars, and his fellow Arab neighbors are silent to the atrocities carried out by the authoritative power. For instance, the

[44] Felman argues that Benjamin's "Theses," which he wrote in 1940 right before his suicide, are also a reflection on silence although he does not explicitly refer to it.

[45] Felman refers to Benjamin's statement: "The nature of this sadness stands out more clearly if one asks with whom the adherents of historicism actually empathize. The answer is inevitable: with the victor" (*Illuminations,* 256).

voice of the West, represented by the BBC radio broadcast, mimics the silence of the official history. Darwish describes the voice of the reporter as one of the "repulsive vocal caricatures" deaf to the tragedy in Beirut:

> Voices broadcast over shortwave and magnified to a medium wave that transforms them into repulsive vocal caricatures: "Our correspondent says it would appear to cautious observers that what appears of what is gradually becoming clearer when the spokesman is enabled except for the difficulty in getting in touch with the events, which would perhaps indicate that both warring parties are no doubt trying especially not to mention a certain ambiguity which may reveal fighter planes with unknown pilots circling over if we want to be accurate for it might confirm that some people are now appearing in beautiful clothes. (23)

As the monotony indicates a deafness to the tragedy that actually takes place in Beirut, it is also, according to Darwish, emblematic of the Western approach to the Palestinian question. The Palestinians, who have been invisible to the West, are also subject to its deafness. The silence of the West resonates in what Darwish describes as the "deafening silence of our Arab brothers," who according to Darwish have been equally deaf to their tragedy: "A barrier between us and the silence of kings, presidents, and ministers of defense, who are busy not reading what they read" (118).

Then, if the oppressed is reduced to silence and the history makers are deaf to the tragedy, what are the ways in which to write the testimony or an alternative history to break the state of exception that renders the exile in a threshold? For Darwish this crisis that keeps him in-between, and expels him from history also provides him with a critical perspective that enables him to deconstruct the hegemony of the sovereign's language and linearity of the official history. This critical perspective, which is informed by Darwish's exilic consciousness, involves a contrapuntal approach to the notion of homeland and diaspora, a critical approach to memory construction and to the notion of exile, and establishes his strategy to *minorize* the major

language as a form of resistance.

Edward Said in his *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and in *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* (2004) elaborated on the notion of the "exilic consciousness" and the "contrapuntal" perspective germane to it. He articulated his notion of "exilic consciousness" initially as a philological method that involves resistance, belonging and detachment in reading process:

> [W]e need to keep coming back to the words and structures in the books we read, but, just as these words were themselves taken by the poet from the world and evoked from out of silence into the forceful ways without which no creation is possible, readers must also extend their readings out into the various worlds each one of us resides in. It is especially appropriate for the contemporary humanist to cultivate that sense of multiple worlds and complex interacting traditions, that inevitable combination I've mentioned of belonging and detachment, reception and resistance. The task of the humanist is not just to occupy a position or a place, not simply to belong somewhere, but rather to be both insider and outsider to the circulating ideas and values that are at issue in our society or someone else's society or the society of the other. (*Humanism and Democratic Criticism* 76)

What Said defined as the humanist's task and standpoint as a two-in-one consciousness enables him to view contrapuntally "the *aporias*" that the "familiarized at-homed world" blinds one to (Spanos 146). Therefore, "belonging and detachment," "reception and resistance," and to be "both insider and outsider" should be perceived both as reading process but also characteristics of a critical consciousness the humanist should adopt.

The contrapuntal perspective is a cogent aspect of this consciousness. Edward Said developed his theory of "contrapuntal reading" in *Culture and Imperialism* as an alternative reading of the major works of the Western literary canon with an effort to draw out and lend voice to "what is silent or marginally present or ideologically represented" (66). Following the method in the polyphonic Western classical music, where different themes "play off one another" instead of existing hierarchically, reading texts with such a method may disclose how

these works are "shaped and perhaps determined by the specific history of colonization, resistance, and finally native nationalism" (51). Through such contrapuntal engagement, Said contends that an "alternative, or new narratives emerge" (51).

Said frequently returned to this concept in his writing, and displayed the variety of its application. In "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on Life in Exile" he states that the contrapuntal perspective is integral to exile, whose "habits of life, expression, or activity in the new environment inevitably occur against the memory of these things in another environment. Thus both the new and the old environments are vivid, actual, occurring together contrapuntally" (55). However, the distinction should be made between two types of exilic threshold. The contrapuntal perspective born from the in-betweenness of the exilic threshold is acquired by the exiled figure consciously, whereas the state-imposed state of exception dehistorizes him by putting him in a permanent threshold. The contrapuntal perspective necessitates a critical approach to question one's ties to the homeland or to any state.

William Spanos' *Exiles in the City* draws the connection between Edward Said's and Hannah Arendt's "affiliation in counterpoint" through congregation of the terms, "the non-Jewish Jew" and "the non-Palestinian Palestinian." The term "Non-Jewish Jew" first appears in Edward Said's posthumously published *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*. Said points out in his book that in its capacity to approach critically to the communities and traditions one belongs by preserving original ties, the term, "Non-Jewish Jew" complements the idea of exilic consciousness.

Used for certain Jewish thinkers, Said correlates the term, the "non-Jewish Jew" with his idea of the "non-humanist humanist," the contrapuntal consciousness one gains through cultivating a "sense of multiple worlds and complex interacting traditions" (76). In this

connection he finds it invigorating to recall:

> Isaac Deutscher's insufficiently known book of essays, *The Non-Jewish Jew*, for an account of how great Jewish thinkers – Spinoza, chief among them, as well as Freud, Heine, and Deutscher himself – were in, and at the same time renounced, their tradition, preserving the original tie by submitting it to the corrosive questioning that took them well beyond it, sometimes banishing them from community in the process. Not many of us can or would want to aspire to such a dialectically fraught, so sensitively located a class of individuals, but it is illuminating to see in such a destiny, the crystallized role of the American humanist, the non-humanist humanist as it were. (76-77)

Humanism, as Said adapts from Blackmur, is a "technique of trouble" (77), and the Non-Jewish Jew, as a form of exilic consciousness, appears to be the willingness to take the trouble to lead a non-conformist life. It requires renunciation of one's tradition, but at the same time preserving one's original ties at the expense of being banished from the community to which one belongs.

According to Spanos, substituting the terms, "the non-Jewish Jew," or "the non-Palestinian Palestinian," for "the non-humanist humanist" would not violate Said's point given that Said often opposed identity and dissociated himself from racial and/or nativity-based Palestinian nationalism. Spanos further engages Said and Hannah Arendt's discourses in a dialogue by extending and constellating Said's non-humanist humanism with Arendt's concept of "the conscious pariah," which she derived from the fin de siècle polemics of Bernard Lazarre (144-145).

Arendt's earlier essays, "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition" (1944) and "We Refugees" (1943), where she elaborated on the term "pariah," lay the foundation of her later usage of the term, "conscious pariah." Arendt appropriates the term, "pariah" from Max Weber's

dismissive characterization of the Jews in Europe after the First World War.[46] The Jewish pariah according to Arendt, refers to the modern Jewish parvenus, "social climbers," who deny their relation with the mass of ordinary Jews in order to be "assimilated into the Gentile European world" instead of "admission of Jews *as Jews* to the ranks of humanity," which resulted in a delusional feeling of belonging. Arendt states: "Realizing only too well that they did not enjoy political freedom nor full admission to the life of nations, but that, instead, they had been separated from their own people and lost contact with the simple natural life of the common man, these men yet achieved liberty and popularity by the sheer force of imagination" ("The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition" 100). The Jewish Pariah settles for a passive survival in order to feel at home in a world that only tolerates him. Spanos points out that this in fact registers the pariah's "unworldliness:"[47] He remains at the border of "polity," leading a bare life bereaved of speech and action and he is unable to make his own history (Spanos 162).

Spanos correlates Arendt's formulation of the pariah figure with those "on the other side of the filial (biological), and national divide – the unwanted aliens who, existing in between spatial and temporal boundaries, have been bereaved of speech and action" […] and thus become dehumanized bodies subject to deportation, sequestration, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately of the

[46] "The term "pariah" refers to the "ritual segregation of the Jews and their negative status in the eyes of the surrounding societies" (Swedberg *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts* 193). Weber used the term "pariah" in connection with the Jewish people. After the World War I, he argued that 'like the Jews we [Germans] have been turned into a people of pariahs.'" (Swedberg 193).

[47] Arendt's appropriation of the term "worldliness" or "being-in-the-world" from Heidegger is strongly related to her idea of 'pariah.' In her "On Humanity in Dark Times" she draws the parallel between two notions: "This kind of humanity is the great privilege of pariah peoples; it is the advantage the pariahs of this world always and in all circumstances can have over others. The privilege is dearly bought; it is often accompanied by so radical a loss of the world, so fearful an atrophy of all the organs with which we respond to it – starting with the common sense with which we orient ourselves in a world common to ourselves and others and going on to the sense of beauty, or taste, with which we love the world – that in extreme cases, in which pariahdom has persisted for centuries, we can speak of real worldlessness. And worldlessness, alas, is always a form of barbarism" (13).

concentration camp" (162-163). In that manner, the pariah figure is analogous to Agamben's term "bare life" and Santner's "creatureliness." The "homeless" or the rightless people are "worldless," consisting of a bare body expelled from humanity. They are positioned as pariahs beyond the confines of borders, produced by "the logical economy of this socialization of the public sphere in modernity" (162) or through normalization of the state of exception.

The "conscious pariah" on the other hand, is the name Arendt gives to Jewish minorities with the difference that as Jewish outcasts they have not wanted to be assimilated into the Gentile European World; instead, as Arendt argues in her essay, "We Refugees," they insisted on keeping their identity even when they were driven from country to country (119). The "conscious pariah" means being aware of one's marginal status as Jews in European society. Jewish outcasts adopt this position consciously as the social basis to produce a critique of the dominant forms of culture and society and for a "historically inflected humanism" (Mufti *Enlightenment in the Colony* 55). Because they are not assimilated, the Jewish outcasts are never "at-home," but they achieved "worldliness." Arendt's notion of the "conscious pariah" could be considered as a variation of Edward Said's "exilic consciousness" since it is also a means to question one's ties to the homeland. Once the Jewish outcasts gain consciousness, they become aware of their de-familiarizing in-between status, their being a "non-Jewish Jew."

Spanos emphasizes the correlation between Edward Said's "exilic consciousness," and Hannah Arendt's "conscious pariah," and draws a parallel between their own exilic condition, their approach to the understanding of the figure of the refugee, their visions of the future Palestine, and their projections of the "coming *polis*" (146). He claims that their own exilic status and their critical approach designate Arendt a "non-Jewish Jew," and Said a "non-Palestinian Palestinian". He writes about their affiliation as follows:

> Both enable a nomadic double, or two-in-one, consciousness – an in-between or outside/inside perspective on the world that perceives an alternative – or, to anticipate, contrapuntal – reality in a worlded world that is foreclosed to the familiarized, assimilated (in the strong etymological sense of the word), and self-identical self: not only the common singular humanity that is ontologically prior to racial and ethnic (filial) labels, but also, and more important, to the dialectics between identity and difference that enables living and thinking responsibly (carefully) *between* two worlds: the Jewish world and Europe in the case of Arendt and the Palestinian and the European/American in the case of Said. (154)

The "two-in-one-consciousness" enables a contrapuntal perspective that demands a critical approach to the familiarized, assimilated, and totalitarian interpretations of racial and ethnic labels. In the case of Darwish, the history of suffering that becomes visible during the siege does not lead him to the figure of pariah in the sense by which Hannah Arendt articulates it. He is determined to keep his identity (voice) as a Palestinian within the "majority" culture. With memorable persistence Darwish writes his well-known lines: "Put this in your record: I am Arab!" But even though he has always been devoted to the Palestinian cause, he manages to acquire an in-between and outside/inside perspective that enables him to transform his pariah status into a "conscious pariah."

Could we call a figure like Darwish, who was granted the title, "the national poet of Palestine," a "non-Palestinian Palestinian?" If such an attribute relates to his exilic consciousness, how does he manifest it in the text? Which narrative strategies does he use to acquire this contrapuntal critical perspective that liberates him from the exilic threshold imposed by the sovereign, and yet keeps him in an exilic consciousness so that he could regain worldliness? What are the ways in which to write history while working through the ideas of homeland, attachment and detachment? Finally, how can one resist the discourse of mythic violence?

During his late career Darwish questions the idea of belonging and the return to a homeland. Concentrating on one of Darwish's latest collections "la ta'tadhir' 'amma fa'alta" [*Do Not Apologize for What You've Done*] (2004) Sinan Antoon argues that Darwish's desire to return to the homeland leads to a state of eternal exile, a state which he eventually celebrates instead of a return (Antoon 238). In an interview Darwish tells Hassouna Mosbahi, "One of the worse things we can do is to reduce the experience of the poet...to an experience of exile followed by a return to a motherland [...] I confess I'm unable to free myself from seeing exile as something positive" (6). This could imply an awareness of simultaneous dimensions. This is to say, the simultaneity of the cultural experience between two quasi-homelands has provided Darwish with a critical, contrapuntal perspective, which has ultimately endowed him with communicative devices to break the political order created by the sovereign power.

Let us now examine the ways in which Darwish re-maps the notion of homeland and the "national" in his work by remaining both inside and outside of these notions. One observes the critical attachment and detachment with the notion of homeland most notably in Darwish's managing of the construction of memories. Memory construction as a narrative strategy could enable the poet to connect to the homeland. For Darwish, memory is the only real connection to one's homeland when "the original place" is lost, and it serves as an instrument to create a bond with the elusive surrogate home, Lebanon. Darwish notes the correlation between the homeland and memory in *Journal of Ordinary Grief*: "What is homeland? To hold on to your memory – that is homeland" (37). As the statement implies, reclaiming memories is also a form of resistance to the systematic strategies of erasure, and a counter strategy to resist the destruction of the siege. In another passage, he explains it more overtly: "Fighting back is the answer: when you fight back you belong. And the homeland is this struggle. Between memory and the suitcase

there is no solution but resistance" (44). The correlation between memory and the homeland not only designates the feelings of attachment and belonging for the displaced poet, but it also acts as a medium to resist "the war of forgetfulness," a strategy by the sovereign to deprive the Palestinians of their identities and homelands.

As Darwish's above statements imply, constructing memories could be a solution for reengineering a bridge between the past and the present that history has previously destroyed, and for enhancing one's attachment to the homeland. Evelyne Ender in her *Architexts of Memory: Literature, Science, and Autobiography*, in examining the relation between memory and subjectivity, reminds the reader that remembrance enables one to have a meaningful life, a continuum in time, and a place in history. By emphasizing writing as the instrument of mnemonic construction and remembrance as an act of imagination, she explains that memories are constructed like a text in present. She writes: "Since, as we write-remember our lives, we are able to find, or rather to find again and again, who we are, in body and in mind" (15). Constructing memories then could be considered as a recuperative act in order to redeem the homeland.

For Darwish, as well as for the Palestinians who were born in Beirut, the need to construct memories in Beirut is essential for a sense of belonging. For most of the Palestinian youth born in Lebanon, the memory of homeland is strongly related to the memory of the diaspora in the sense that the memory of the homeland is constructed retrospectively in the present reality of diaspora, which in itself would be considered a pseudo-homeland. The contrapuntal viewpoint might provide them with an opportunity to reconnect with the broken chain of the past, and the memory of the homeland could be brought into the present with all its vividness.

However, the contrapuntal perspective also lays bare the repetition of history. The critical time of the siege converges with the time of the past homeland, Palestine, as if the two time frames are experienced simultaneously. Beirut at once becomes memory in its struggle against the "fangs of forgetfulness made of steel," like Palestine. The contrapuntal viewpoint in this case allows the poet to draw the affinity between the fates of two "homelands." He describes how memory of Beirut now collapses in the memory of Palestine:

> Beirut is not creating its song now, for the metal wolves are barking in every direction. And the sung beauty, the object of worship, has moved away to a memory now joining battle against the fangs of a forgetfulness made of steel. Memory that beauty, past beauty come back to life in a song not suited to the context of the hour, becomes tragic? A homeland, branded and collapsing in the dialogue of human will against steel; a homeland, rising with a voice that looks down on us from the sky – a unique voice that unites what can't be united and brings together what can't be brought together. (146)

Constructing the memory of both the homeland and the diaspora in the temporal present does not provide him with a place in history at all in this case. The contrapuntal perspective directs him to a memory of his previous exilic experience, placing the diasporic site next to the non-existent homeland.

Yolande Jansen draws the correlation between memory formation and exilic experience, and points to the fact that processes of displacement are intrinsic to both memory construction and to diasporic identities. In *Diaspora and Memory* she writes:

> Therefore, it seems all the more important to acknowledge that the 'ground' of memory can be rather unstable and shaky itself, in particular if one conceives of memory not as a stable space of identity but as a process of displacement *itself*. Significantly, movement and mobility are not just characteristics of diaspora, they are also constitutive of memory as something that is always in flux and notoriously unreliable. (12)

Darwish's memory scenes are incomplete, scattered, and disassociated, as if he interrupts the link between himself and the homeland. On the other hand, Shoshana Felman sees in such a narrative mode the very characteristics of the testimony itself. She argues in "Education and Crisis, Or the Vicissitudes of Teaching" that the testimony is a discursive practice that does not offer a completed statement. Instead, the language is in process and in trial, thus, the narration of memory is incomplete. She writes: "As a relation to events, testimony seems to be composed of bits and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled into understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as knowledge nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames of reference" (5). Therefore, such narrative practice that appears to be the manifestation of traumatic experience suffers from a sort of belatedness. There is inevitably a gap between what has been experienced and its representation. In *Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self,* Brison touches upon this temporal gap, and states that in the case of traumatic event, the event is typically experienced at one time, but the full emotional impact of the trauma takes time to absorb and work through (32).

Gaps, belatedness, and displacement permeate Darwish's text. If the act of writing is itself presented as an act of bearing witness to the trauma, as a testimony pointing to the traumatic event, then Darwish's intention to return to writing poetry after the guns quiet down, when he finds an appropriate space for language, should also be read as a representation of his traumatic experience. However, the gaps and incompleteness, together with intentional forgetting and negating, are also strategic choices the poet employs as a manifestation of his critical and exilic consciousness. As the following two instances of memory-building scenes show, Darwish either undermines the sense of belonging and attachment by disowning the memory of the homeland, or he complicates the sense of belonging to a collectivity by dissociating his personal

memory from the collective memory.

The first mnemonic scene that takes place in the initial pages of the book is related to the sensory experience of having coffee. Darwish burns with a desire to make coffee as soon as he realizes that the bombardment has started. The simple mundane activity of making and having coffee works on different levels. He attributes existential meanings to the coffee, and presents them as challenge to the absence and death the bombardment indicates. The sensual and personal experience of having coffee is a key to affirming his existence, and is an instrument to transform him from *creatureliness* into a human being. He says: "I want the aroma of coffee. I want nothing more than the aroma of coffee. And I want nothing more from the passing days than the aroma of coffee. The aroma of coffee so I can hold myself together, stand on my feet, and be transformed from something that crawls, into human being" (6). "Now I am born," says Darwish after having a sip (19).

Coffee also comes with a collectivity: it is the collective voice, history, and geography. In Darwish's view, it reinforces the bond between individuals and cultures:

> The aroma of coffee is a return to and a bringing back of first things because it is the offspring of the primordial. It's a journey, began thousands of years ago, that still goes on. Coffee is a place. Coffee is pores that let the inside seep through to the outside. A separation that unites what can't be united except through its aroma. Coffee is not for weaning. On the contrary, coffee is a breast that nourishes men deeply. A morning born of a bitter taste. The milk of manhood. Coffee is geography. (20)

As the sensual experience of having coffee opens a path to communicable experience and to collective experience, it also marks one's existence in an extended time ("It's a journey, began thousands of years ago, that still goes on").

Recollection through voluntary memory has a direct correlation with his writing. He has to remember and write to reconstruct his homeland, to acknowledge his existence, to give

testimony, and to resist the state violence. Writing a unified and coherent text appears to depend on the recollection the sensual experience that having a coffee would provide, as it would tunnel him into his memories. He explains how the aroma acts as a sensual instigator that would enable him to write, just like the sensual experience of having tea with the madeleine enabled Proust to remember and write. "How can a hand write," he asks himself, "if it doesn't know how to be creative in making coffee!" (19) Yet, unlike Proust's mnemonic experience which enabled him to go on a journey into the past smoothly so that he could recount the events of the past undisturbed in a long narrative, Darwish's writing that recounts his day is continuously interrupted, despite having had his coffee, by the heavy bombardment from the sea and sky. The time is stuck in between the past and the present; the personal and sensual experience of having coffee does not take him to the memory of the homeland. He describes this immobility as follows: "Time has frozen. It sits on me, choking me" (10).

The spatial and temporal cultural references to coffee that seem to tie individuals together in what one may call cultural memory reveal that the personal memory cannot be separated from the collective. If the aroma of the coffee is essential in forfeiting Darwish's existence against the vulgarity and violence of the siege that threatens his very being, it may also create the ground to establish a bond with his past. But in this case, his personal memory bonds with the collective memory solely in their exposure to the state violence. The scent of the coffee reminds him that the fighters outside fight for the fragrance of the homeland they have never seen. He is quickly overcome with feelings of guilt and shame for his desire for coffee: "Now I feel shame. I feel shamed by my fear, and by those defending the scent of the distant homeland – that fragrance they've never smelled because they weren't born on her soil" (13).

Darwish relates the memories of his childhood in Lebanon in incomplete and ambiguous sequences. His personal memories in Lebanon are connected to a Palestinian collectivity, but this does not mean that he embraces the collective voice. The following episode is a good example of such negation. It relates to his first childhood memories in the city of Damur in Lebanon. As the scent of coffee instigated a surge of reminiscences – albeit without success – this time invoking the name, "Beirut" triggers the memory of his childhood. Darwish tells us about his first day in the city of Damur, his experience of riding in a streetcar, his bond with his grandfather, and his observations of the city, the sea and the banana plantations.

Personal memories of his childhood quickly merge with the collective memory of other children who have gone through a similar experience of losing touch with their homeland. The personal memory of his "first steps" gets lost in the maze of anonymity, in the collective experience of other "first steps" that were driven into exile: "So they bought guns to get closer to a homeland flying out of their reach. They bought their identity back into being, re-created the homeland, and followed their path, only to have it blocked by the guardians of civil wars. They defended their steps, but then path parted from path, the orphan lived in the skin of the orphan, and one refugee camp went into another" (89). As the history of displacement repeats itself through succeeding generations, getting further removed from the roots, "the orphan lived in the skin of the orphan," their memory practices follow a similar pattern. In this vein, Edward Said draws an analogous relation between memory and exile in *After the Last Sky* by stating that: "Palestine is exile, dispossession, the inaccurate memories of one place slipping into vague memories of another, a confused recovery of general wares, passive presences scattered around in the Arab environment" (30).

Darwish conveys his childhood memory of visiting the city of Damur for the first time

rather clearly. However, his visit to the same city ten years before the siege in search for his memories of childhood awakens a different feeling. As he remembers his childhood impressions of the city and his family, he wants to strip these memories of the idea of homeland because of the many atrocities that were committed in the city in that time by Palestinian forces when they occupied Damur in 1976. The poet makes clear that he will not approve of war crimes even if it is for Palestinian cause. He asserts: "'War is war' is not my language" (89). He further distinguishes his childhood memory from its correlations with the idea of homeland: "I have no interest whatever in carving my name on a rock in Damur because I'm searching for a boy here, not for a homeland" (89). This is an instance of intentional forgetting by negating the memory of what might be considered homeland.

According to Richard Terdiman in his *Present Past: Modernity and Memory Crisis*, forgetting is inevitable in remembrance. In fact, the most constant element of recollection is forgetting, "discarding the nonretained so that retention, rememoration can occur at all" (22). He adds: "So what we call the past is always already and irretrievably a profoundly altered or attenuated version of the contents that were potentially available to consciousness when that past was present. Reduction is the essential precondition for representation. Loss is what makes our memory of the past possible at all" (22). However, one might argue that Darwish intentionally gave up on the idea of a retraceable homeland and left his reconstruction incomplete in order to make a point about his exilic consciousness. If memory is instrumental in order to belong to a community and a homeland, he has to problematize it, and approach it critically.

Gaps, fragments and incompleteness in Darwish's text could be a manifestation of such intentional forgetting. Andreas Huyssen correlates these attributes to the diasporic memory itself, and claims that because of the gap between remembrance and the event, structurally diasporic

consciousness comes close to the structures of memory. In "Diaspora and Nation: Migration into Other Pasts," he writes: "Diasporic memory in its traditional sense is by definition cut off, hybrid, displaced, split. This fact grounds the affinity of diasporic memory to the structure of memory itself which is always based on temporal displacement between the act of remembrance and the content of that which is remembered, an act of *recherche* rather than recuperation" (152).

What Huyssen identifies as an act of *recherche* in memory formation appears to explain the attempts of Palestinian youth to search for memories when the original homeland is not accessible. Darwish refers to this search: "Yet they studied her constantly, without fatigue or boredom; and from overpowering memory and constant pursuit, they learned what it means to belong to her" (13).

"Postmemory," a term coined by Marianne Hirsch in *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust* (2012) to describe the relationship that the "generation after" bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before, reflects the experience of the Palestinian youth and their search for memories. Hirsh states that those experiences, not belonging to the current generation, were transmitted to them through exposure to the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up, "so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right" (5). Postmemory´s connection to the past is therefore mediated not by recall but by "imaginative investment, projection, and creation" (5). The way memory takes shape in Palestinian youth is therefore a retrospective reconstruction of the homeland, which is based on a search.

Mieke Bal's insightful remark on the performative quality of memory complements Andreas Huyssen's emphasis about the search in memory practices. Bal claims in her *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present* that cultural recall is not merely "something of which

you happen to be a bearer but something you actually *perform*" in a "process of linking" (vii). Performativity in *Memory for Forgetfulness* manifests itself as a search regarding how to write memories when they are incomplete, sometimes disowned, and erased by the sovereign power. Darwish describes the evasiveness of memory and implies that it is always a matter of struggle to hold onto memory in Beirut:

> In other cities, memory can resort to a piece of paper. You may sit waiting for something, in a white void, and a passing idea may descend on you. You catch it, lest it escape, and as days roll and you come upon it again, you recognize its source and thank the city that gave you this present. But in Beirut you flow away and scatter. The only container is water itself. Memory assumes the shape of the city's chaos and takes up a speech that makes you forget words that went before. (90-91)

As constructing the memory of Beirut fails him, the representation of Beirut becomes a challenging task with the siege as backdrop. "Rarely in Beirut do you distinguish between content and form," Darwish says, in a Saussurian manner, by which one can understand that Beirut does not actually form a *sign* like a homeland would, as the signifier and the signified never match. He continues: "Yet how she resists the joining together of words, even those with similar meter and rhyme: Beirut, yaqoot, taboot – 'Beirut, sapphire, coffin!'" (91)

Elsewhere, he explains the elusiveness of the city, as he could never penetrate into the society entirely: "For ten years I've been living in Beirut in cement transiency. I try to unravel Beirut, and I become more and more ignorant of myself. Is it a city or a mask? A place of exile or a song? How quickly it ends! And how quickly it begins! The reverse is also true" (90). Nevertheless, the diasporic space of Beirut itself appears to be the platform where the poet's exilic consciousness flourishes. Because it allowed its dwellers to establish a relationship with the state based on plurality, it enabled Darwish to avoid the constraints of a homogenous national

state, and to approach the notion of homeland and the diaspora contrapuntally. Therefore, it was an island for those who dreamed of new land, a "foster mother of heroic mythology," which did not have a state apparatus that repressed its citizens, unlike other Arab states (134). This apparent freedom allowed the settlers to set up a metaphorical relationship with the city, shaped and defined by each one of them so that a "new language" was formed, which is akin to the notion of exilic consciousness. This new language addressed a transformation from regionalism, and/or homogenous nationalism to a decentered and interactive political model that provided a space for plurality. Darwish explains how the exile felt at home in Beirut:

> Thus in the absence of the state apparatus that repressed citizens everywhere else, the link to Beirut became an addiction to language so metaphorical as to allow a claim of citizenship in Beirut, where one (anyone repressing a state within the state) could carry on as he thought fit and turn this presumption upon the city into one of the forms of Arab training for an imagined democracy. Beirut thus became the property of anyone who dreamed of a different political order elsewhere and accommodated the chaos that for every exile resolved the complex of being exile. (134-135)

As such, Darwish gives several examples how different characters come up with their own image of the city and how they fit in. The "Palestinian youth," the professor of political science, S, and the Kurd are such figures: "S and others had made up their own Beirut. They shaped it in their own image" (135).

The complex social formations inside Beirut formed both by Lebanese and refugees appear to be an appropriate example to what Arjun Appadurai terms the "post-national order" in his *Modernity at Large*. A framework to describe diasporic pluralism, this term was developed by Appadurai to criticize national hegemony. Referring to Benedict Anderson's diagnosis that nation building is first about imagining that nation through mass media, such as newspapers, novels, and other printed media, Appadurai argues that a similar link can be found between the work of the imagination and the emergence of a postnational political world. In his view, the

electronic media links producers and audiences across national borders, and diasporic public spaces occur through their dialogue (22). These transnational social forms may generate postnational movements, organizations, and spaces that would overcome the incapacity of the nation-state to tolerate diversity. It is also possible to detect the working of a postnational political order in many transnations formed of refugees, displaced and migrated people dissolving the homogeneity of a nation's citizens (176-177).

However, it would be hasty to conclude from Darwish's observances alone that plural yet harmonious collective positions formed in Beirut without the calcified regulations and categories of a national state. As Carol Bardenstein mentions in her essay "Figures of Diasporic Cultural Production: Some Entries from the Palestinian Lexicon," although many theorists such as Clifford, Gilroy, and Hall celebrated the diasporic transnational subject as "challenging the hegemony and boundedness of the nation-state," and acclaimed the "creative work of intellectuals on the margins for transgressing hegemonic constructions of national homogeneity" in the past couple of decades, many others remind us that the heterogeneous subjectivity of the diasporic subject may not be a liberating one at all (21). Timothy Brennan in "Cosmo-Theory," for instance, has argued that the fascination with the "hybrid" cultures of diasporic communities tends to obscure the fact that very often these people themselves do not want to be diasporic (674). Edward Said in his essay "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on Life in Exile" reminds the reader that one must avoid romanticizing the exile's predicament; that the exiles would know "that in a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional. Borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory, can also become prisons, and are often defended beyond reason or necessity" (54).

Several dialogues in the text (mostly natives blaming Palestinians for the siege) show that

a plurality of the community obscures the fact that the Palestinians still remain at the periphery. The exiled subject is still in a state of exception in an apparent atmosphere of plurality. This shows that diaspora's negotiation with the host culture did not exactly transform that culture into an unproblematic "postnation," and that the Palestinians still constitute "an island and not a part." In fact, if the idea of postnation is brought from the imagination, Darwish shows he is aware of how the imagining was one-sided. By alluding to the example of video making, a work of imagination, he tells us that they (probably referring to Palestinians and other exiles) were the image of their own making: "[W]e write the script and the dialogue; we design the scenario; we pick the actors, the cameraman, the director, and the producer; and we distribute the roles without realizing we are the ones being cast in them. When we see our faces and our blood on the screen, we applaud the image, forgetting it's of our own making" (46). This statement suggests that the state violence in the form of alienating strategies did not actually allow the formation of a connective bond within the society. But most importantly, it suggests that plurality by itself does not necessarily translate into the acquisition of the sort of consciousness found in what Arendt terms the "conscious pariah."

Edward Said's "The Mind of Winter", where he states that the borders and barriers of familiar territory could become the exile's prison, finishes on a promising note. He states that exiles cross borders, "break barriers of thought and experience" (54). By positioning himself in the dominant culture beyond the dichotomies of minority/majority and center/periphery instead of remaining at the periphery in an "unconscious" plurality, Darwish seems to be taking the step to "cross borders." *Minorizing* the major language is a strategy Darwish uses effectively to achieve this goal. To that effect, he reflects on the relation between the Arab writer and his

present, and claims that from their contrapuntal position they should be considered as the "minority-majority:"

> We realize we're part of the culture of the Arab nation and not an island within it. Therefore, we've never accepted our voice as the voice of a narrow identity, but see it instead as the meeting point for a deeper relation between the Arab writer and his time, in which the Palestinian revolution will become the open password, until the general explosion. (137-138)
>
> [W]e want to liberate ourselves, our countries, and our minds and live in the modern age with competence and pride. In writing, we give expression to our faith in the potency of writing. From this perspective, we don't feel we're a minority but announce that we are the minority-majority. And we announce further that we are children of this age, and not of the past or the future. (140-141)[48]

Being a "minority-majority" entails preserving his identity but it also creates a critical ground, where he can work through his attachment with his community or with the majority. Therefore, it is a form of contrapuntal perspective. Darwish interprets his exilic position as a catalyzer, a source of critical standpoint to reflect on the relation between the Arab writer and his present, by which he means producing the literature of the present in crisis but also writing history in its making. The poet has to preserve his exilic consciousness then, in order to reflect on his time critically.

If being a 'minority-majority' calls for approaching the idea of homeland and the diaspora critically, and raises questions about "belonging and non-belonging," "attachment and detachment," then it is of utmost importance, as Deleuze and Guattari mention in their *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, to "become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one's own language" (19). Deleuze and Guattari's explication of the minor literature would be helpful in understanding how Darwish blends his vision of the "minority-majority" with his

[48] This sequence is part of his editorial manifesto published in the literary review *Al Karmel* in 1982.

literary endeavor in order to attain a critical approach to the majority he belongs. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the first characteristic of minor literature is the deterritorialization of language, but a minor language does not have to designate a minor literature or specific literatures; it is "rather that which a minority constructs within a major language" (16). It addresses "the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature" (18).

Deleuze and Guattari designate three characteristics of the minor literature: the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation (18). Focusing on Kafka's literary world, they argue that these attributes led Kafka to turn literature into something impossible: the impossibility of not writing "because national consciousness, uncertain or oppressed, necessarily exists by means of literature" (16); the impossibility of writing in German because of the deterritoralization of the German population itself, an oppressive minority that speaks a language cut off from the masses, like an artificial language; and the impossibility of writing otherwise because the Prague Jews feel an irreducible distance from their primitive Czech territoriality (16).

One observes deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective voice in Darwish's work as well. As the writer Ibrahim Muhawi notes, Darwish's kaleidoscopic narrative reflects a deterritoralized language, "suspended between wholeness and fracture, the text, like Palestine, is a crossroads of competing meanings" (xvii). As mentioned earlier, the language Darwish uses is political, emanating a collective voice ("We Palestinians"), but also critical about the collectivity it belongs to. Najat Rahman reminds in his essay, "Threatened Longing and Perpetual Search: The Writing of Home in the Poetry of Mahmoud Darwish" that Palestinian experience is not uniform and homogenous

in itself. By pointing to the lack of "togetherness" among Palestinians, especially after the siege of 1982, Rahman suggests that Beirut 1982 was a turning point in Darwish's poetry, in the sense that his poetry shifted from earlier nationalist formulations and his later writing responds to "nationalist demarcations of collective identity that have failed and that have brought on the critical situations of the present" (41). This, according to Rahman, is reflected in his conceptions of "home" and "exile".

These attributes lend a form of irreconcilability in Darwish's work, if not an impossibility Deleuze and Guattari claim in regard to Kafka's literature. The irreconcilability detectable in Darwish's text is a manifestation of the dilemmas that permeate his exilic threshold: his silence versus the desire to write history, his being deprived of speech and action versus his desire to write the testimony, his relentless search of the homeland versus his working through various attachments and detachments informed by his exilic consciousness, and the contrapuntal perspective he uses to reflect on the construction of memory, the notion of homeland and diaspora.

One of the ways to *minorize* a more dominant language is to rework genre by applying the contrapuntal method. Darwish applies a contrapuntal strategy in *Memory for Forgetfulness* by blending multiple traditions and influences in a composite dialogue, through the reenactment of antecedent myths in the present, and by combining various forms, such as autobiography, poetry, journalism, literary criticism, and memoir in the body of the text. This narrative strategy results in heterogeneity and a deterritorialized language and collectivity.

Deployment of antecedent myths as a contrapuntal method is one of the preliminary methods Darwish uses. Nassar and Rahman in their introduction to *Mahmoud Darwish: Exile's Poet* interpret Darwish's statement that the Palestinian writer must "import his language to

concrete reality in order to transport it in the reality of words" as the poet's desire to make Palestine mythical (4). Constructing the myth of Palestine would indeed serve the exiled subject as a way to rewrite history from the perspective of the silenced and oppressed where the homeland is not available. Darwish's attempt to create the homeland in the imaginary realm could be interpreted as a desire to render a mythical quality to Palestine. His well-known lines are suggestive of such a desire: "In this sunset words alone are qualified to restore what was broken in time and place and to name gods that paid no attention to you and waged their wars with primitive weapons. Words are the raw materials for building a house. Words are a homeland!" (*In the Presence of Absence* 84) Scholars working on Darwish's poetry, such as İpek Azime Çelik claimed that Darwish resisted the anamnesis imposed by orderly myths/histories, and that he rewrote the myth for the purpose of writing an alternative history in order to "reevaluate tradition, history, and 'civilization' to allow multiple testimonies, documentation, and evidence" (279).

One does not find a configuration of a mythical Palestine in *Memory for Forgetfulness* even though there is obviously an attempt to incorporate the myth of the past into the present experience of the Palestinians. Instead, Darwish excavates and re-writes antecedent myths in order to render his text multivocal so that he can show that a multiplicity of identities and cultures interacted once, and have the potential to interact in the future. He also re-writes myths of the antagonistic culture with a critical perspective to deconstruct the hegemony of the sovereign's language and linearity of the official history. By doing that, he excavates and perhaps redeems the subject position inscribed in the destructive ruins of history. For example, he inserts two Biblical parables (Matthew 13:1-8 and 15:21-28) after recounting a dialogue with his friends as to how Beirut became a homeland for the exiles, albeit an ambiguous one. The

parables tell stories that took place in the same lands where the modern siege took place, and serve as reminders of a long forgotten possibility: that it is possible for Israelis and Palestinians to live together harmoniously on these lands (60-61).

Another mythological segment is from Ibn Athir's "The Beginning and The End" a work of Islamic historiography. Darwish inserts this piece after making a point on being subject to history writing, instead of being the author of history writing. The poet is absent in history making mechanisms. He states: "Is there anything more cruel than this absence: that you should not be the one to celebrate your victory or the one to lament your defeat? That you should stay offstage and not make an entrance except as a subject for others to take up and interpret" (110). Ibn Athir's authoring of the Islamic historiography recounts multiple attempts by the Franks (the name given to the Western soldiers) to invade the lands that belong to Arabs. The continuous cycle of invasion reminds the reader of the Zionist slogan, ''If you have the will, then it's not a myth," which suggests that history can be and will be written by the newcomers through denigration and denial of the history and myth of the previous generations.

Aside from the content, the style of *Memory for Forgetfulness* mirrors how the exilic consciousness embodied by the structure "minority-majority" manifests itself through *minorization* and contrapuntal criticism. The disharmonious fragments, repetitions, deferrals, and silences that mark its style should be read as signs of such disclosure. Edward Said shows in his posthumously published book, *On Late Style* that the use of the notion of the counterpoint may be varied. For example, counterpoint in Mozart's compositions adds "not only a sense of rigor but also a special ironic expressiveness well beyond the words and situation;" (62) in Bach's work, counterpoint is "a contradiction lodged at the very heart of [his] technique;" (126) and in critical debate counterpoint is: "the finding and elaboration of arguments, which in the musical

realm means the finding of a theme and developing of it contrapuntally so that all of its possibilities are articulated, expressed, and elaborated" (128).

Comparing Beethoven's late works and Freud's *Moses and Monotheism* in his *Freud and the Non-European,* Said describes the intellectual trajectory in their late works as unseemliness, "intransigence and sort of irascible transgressiveness, as if the author was expected to settle down into a harmonious composure, as befits a person at the end of his life, but preferred instead to be difficult, and to bristle with all sorts of new ideas and provocations" (29). One might claim that the fractured text of *Memory for Forgetfulness* with its fragmentation, deferrals, and resistance, is a manifestation of late style, where Darwish displays his uncompromising attitude.

In his essay, "Beethoven's Late Style," Theodor Adorno argues that the above-mentioned characteristics in style are observed in mature works, and they are manifestations of "late style." Showing Beethoven's music as an example, Adorno argues that these mature works are "wrinkled," "fissured;" they lack "sweetness;" they are disharmonious, and are incapable of "being subsumed under the concept of expression" (564). Adorno defines such works as "catastrophes" at the end of his essay. He writes: "Objective is the fractured landscape, subjective the light in which—alone—it glows into life. He [Beethoven] does not bring about their harmonious synthesis. As the power of dissociation, he tears them apart in time, in order perhaps, to preserve them for the eternal. In the history of art, late works are the catastrophes" (567). Picking up Adorno's point in his *On Late Style,* Edward Said claims that fragments, absences and silences of these "catastrophic" works represent "a kind of self-imposed exile from what is generally acceptable" (16). It is this irreconcilability, "the strained and deliberately unresolved quality" that Said recognizes in Darwish's late works as instances of "late style" ("On Mahmoud Darwish" 113). As such, in *Memory for Forgetfulness*, Darwish lacks the desire to

give a coherent and full picture of his day. His broken style and disharmonious fragments resonate with Beethoven's catastrophic but powerful style that reconciles "what is not reconciled."

In *After the Last Sky*, Said compares the characteristics of "late style" he designates in these works to Palestinian prose and prose fiction. He argues that because the lives of Palestinians are interrupted before they can come to maturity, the precarious actuality of the characters reproduces the precarious status of the writer, each echoing the other. The form of Palestinian fiction (for example, Kanafani's *Men in the Sun*) reveals the writer's efforts to construct a coherent scene, "a narrative that might overcome the almost metaphysical impossibility of representing the present" (38). That is why the characteristic mode of Palestinian fiction, Said notes, is not "a narrative, in which scenes take place *seriatim,* but rather broken narratives, fragmentary compositions, and self-consciously staged testimonials, in which the narrative voice keeps stumbling over itself, its obligations, and its limitations" (38). This might explain why, according to Said, "[t]he story of Palestine cannot be told smoothly" (*After the Last Sky* 30).

Using language as a deliberately unresolved manner could also be considered as a strategy of minor literature in the sense articulated by Deleuze and Guattari. This irreconcilability that Darwish puts forward in his text is also an embodiment of counterpoint, which is the acceptance that only a deterritorialized language (in Deleuze and Guattari's expression, "[t]o be a sort of stranger within his own language," (26)) can break the state of exception, the *creatureliness*, and the exilic threshold, even when the act of writing is met with silence and deafness, and even when one is arrested in an exilic threshold.

This irreconcilability Darwish depicts in his writing creates his aesthetics of resistance. An excerpt from his poem, *In Praise of the High Shadow* that Darwish inserted in his text is emblematic of this irreconcilability, and it sets the general tone of the text as a whole.[49] Darwish introduces the poem as a "stammering scream". The context of the poem is meaningful as Darwish recites it in the company of his other "stateless" friends, and when he has to respond to the question of what he is writing during the siege. The expression "stammering scream" is expressive of the irreconcilability that informs his aesthetics: "Stammering" implies that it is impossible to use an organized, homogenous language to describe the exilic experience, and yet the stammering comes out as a scream, a powerful articulation with the intense desire to be heard by others even if it is met with silence or deafness. It also describes resistance: it is spasmodic, incomplete, and yet powerful because it deconstructs the homogeneity and the hegemony of the sovereign's language.

Gilles Deleuze in his short essay, "He Stuttered" asserts that if one accepts that the language is a homogenous system with equilibrium, then making the language scream, stutter, stammer, or murmur would be ways in which to *minorize* the major language (108). This act, according to him, makes the writer a foreigner in the language in which he expresses himself as "he carves out a nonpreexistent foreign language *within* his own language" (109-110). The writer himself becomes the stutterer in language, "an affective and intensive language," which is not to be confused with stuttering in speech (107).

Deleuze also incorporates a musical terminology in his discussion in order to make a point about creating disequilibrium in the text. He states that great writers, by virtue of

[49] As the 18th footnote in *Memory for Forgetfulness* informs us, this is part of a larger poem Darwish wrote during the siege of Beirut and published in *Al Karmel* under the title "In Praise of the Tall Shadow" (1983) (58).

minorization, place language into a state of disequilibrium, making it "bifurcate and vary in each of its terms, following an incessant modulation" much as in music where the "minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in perpetual disequilibrium" (109). Stuttering in language takes place when the language system appears in perpetual disequilibrium or bifurcation. A new syntax in the process of becoming governs language instead of the former formal syntax, and this process gives rise to "a foreign language within language, a grammar of disequilibrium" (112).

The passage Deleuze quotes from Andrei Biely explains how such stuttering in language may manifest itself. Since there is a similar quality in Darwish's work, it is worth quoting it here: "'The only thing the reader will see marching past him are *inadequate means*: fragments, allusions, strivings, investigations. Do not try to find a well-polished sentence or a perfectly coherent image in it, what is printed on the pages is an embarrassed word, a stuttering…'" (113). As noted earlier, fragmentation, incoherency, incompleteness are not only the primary features of Darwish's poem but also of his text as a whole. It is as if he makes the language stutter in a way. As Deleuze puts forward, it is no longer his poetic persona stuttering in the narrative, it is the writer "who becomes *a stutterer in language*" (107).

"Breath-words," "exclamatory sentences and suspensions," according to Deleuze are other forms of stuttering. The following is an excerpt from the poem, which brims with such "breath-words," exclamatory incomplete sentences, repetitions, twisted sentences, dramatic pauses, and silences:

> Our stumps: our names
> No. There is no escape!
> Fallen, the mask over the mask
> That covers the mask.
> Fallen is the mask!
> You've no brothers my brother,
> No friends, no forts, my friend.
> You've no water and no cure

No sky, no blood, and no sails.
No front, and rear.
[…]
Our stumps, our names; our names, our stumps.
Block your blockade with madness
With madness
And with madness
They have gone, the ones you love. Gone.
You will either have to be
Or you will not be.
Fallen, the mask covering the mask
That covers the mask
Has fallen, and there's no one

A mode of serenity and silence pervades the air after Darwish finishes with his "screaming stammering." He describes the atmosphere that follows after he recited the poem: "Silence. Heavy as metal. We were three, but have now become one in the world crashing down around us. It's as if we were here as caretakers of fragile substances and were now preparing to absorb the operation of moving our reality, in its entirety, into the domain of memories forming within sight of us. And as we move away, we can see ourselves turning into memories. We are these memories" (60). According to Deleuze, to make one's language stutter is to push language to its limit to "its outside, to its silence – this would be like the *boom* and the *crash*" (113). What appears to be stuttering ends with a boom and a crash—since the language is so strained, when it reaches a limit, it meets its silence. The silence Darwish describes above, the world crashing down around them, and abandoning the bodily substance are not only signs of the physical destruction that takes place during the siege, but also of language's straining to such limit that it meets its silence after the "boom and the crash." Yet, the poet has to begin anew, this time to break this silence, the chasm, and the void that awaits him.

Gilbert Sorrentino observes a specific quality about Maurice Blanchot's contribution to literature, which also concerns a void. He writes: "He has shown us that the void writing creates

between itself and the world can never be filled adequately, the writer's hope to tell a story is futile, yet this void is, infinitely and mysteriously, the only space in which literature can exist" (qtd in Alcalay 91). Even though the above statement might refer to the unavoidable discrepancy between a representation and the original intrinsic to any fiction in general, it is especially meaningful in light of the above discussion. Darwish's stammering scream may not render his testimony communicable, but it is a powerful statement against the silence and the deafness of history. The exilic threshold might be the void itself that renders his *worldlessness* and his *creatureliness*. But if stammering is a form of resistance, a literary strategy of *minorization* of the major literature, culture, and identity, and ultimately a critical dimension of the exilic threshold, then it serves as the only hope for surpassing the void, even though the poet knows that the transformative power of words is always questionable.

The imaginary story of Kamal, a story within the story, with which Darwish's text ends serves as an allegory of Darwish's own experience of exile. It is also a reflection on the transformative power of literature when constantly faced with the void or the silence. Told from different and shifting perspectives, the story is about a man who sat on a rock for twenty-seven years by the coast of Tyre, an ancient port city in Lebanon, waiting for a dove to appear. The dove turns out to be his homeland, Haifa, which he left twenty-seven years before. Kamal steals a boat and rows towards Haifa one night, lands on the shore, and the narrator explains how he gets home, that he finds everything untouched, and that he sees people he is familiar with in his neighborhood. It eventually turns out to be a dream. Coast guards catch Kamal, they nail him to the wood of the boat, and the boat carries him back to Tyre, where Kamal left off. The narrator ends his story by implying the hopelessness in attaining the homeland: "Can this be the sea? Yes, this is the sea" (172).

Darwish approaches the end of his narration by making an allusion to this story, and what the sea symbolizes. He carries out an imaginary dialogue with a young fighter who was born in the refugee camp about the meaning of the sea in writing. The fighter wonders if there is any underlying meaning to the sea. Darwish responds to his question by indicating that the words are actions: "You bring the sea into poetry, you open us the sea of words, you yourself is the sea of poetry and the poetry of the sea" (180). The implication is that the act of fighting against the sovereign is more important than the power of words. At the end of his narrative, he observes that the sea is "walking in the streets," and "drops from the sky and comes into the room" (182). This implies that the bombardment from the sea has finally arrived to his premises and the sea brings death. He concludes: "I don't like the sea. I don't want the sea, because I don't see a shore, or a dove. I see in the sea nothing except the sea" (182). His words, "I don't see a shore, or a dove" indicate that he sees no hope of change in the Palestinians' state in the near future.

The sea in this case represents the cycle of historical violence, since the same story is being repeated over and over again, and ultimately it reflects the impossibility of reaching the homeland. It is the sea *only*, no promises, no homeland to return to, no shore, no hope of that dream, but only the same threshold on which they find themselves arrested, if not dead. The poet also loses hope about the transformative power of his words: "I see in the sea nothing except the sea" (182). It is the acceptance that he cannot interrupt the flow of history designated by the sovereign. However, the text is written in the end, even when he is describing the impossibility of writing. Hannah Arendt remarks in her introduction to Walter Benjamin's *Illuminations* that "although the living is subject to the ruin of the time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization" (54). The story Darwish tells us at the end of his narrative is just such a crystalline moment that explains the process of decay. Thus, his text is being transformed when

it is telling about the non-transformation and the impossibility of writing fiction.

Maurice Blanchot in his essay, "Song of the Sirens: Encountering the Imaginary" describes such an encounter in the imaginary space. The story Darwish tells us and the general narrative strategy of *Memory for Forgetfulness* echo Blanchot's "impossible narrative," as exemplified in the tale of Captain Ahab and Odysseus. Blanchot in this essay compares two encounters by fictional characters Odysseus and Captain Ahab with the Sirens and the whale. The Sirens are the creatures in *Odyssey*, who infamously lured the seamen into themselves by singing beautifully, to the depths, the abyss of the sea. Cunning Odysseus orders his crew to tie himself to the mast and put wax in his ears so as not to hear the song and drift into the depths of the sea and drown. He does not risk anything, he uses this opportunity to listen to the beautiful song as well by removing the wax from his ears, and he still survives: the result is a cowardly victory. According to Blanchot, Captain Ahab on the other hand encounters Moby Dick; they engage in the same struggle as that of Odysseus and Sirens, yet Ahab gets "lost in the image," and disappears in it by going along with the seduction. Blanchot compares two of these encounters with poetic language: "Ulysses is just as he had been before, and the world is poorer, perhaps, but firmer and more sure. Ahab is no longer, and for Melville himself the world keeps threatening to sink into that worldless space towards which the fascination of one single image draws him" (111). As a result of this encounter Captain Ahab hears the voice of the abyss, sinks into the worldless space, and vanishes, but on the other hand, his tale crosses over to the imaginary and to the literary realm. It is this fascination with the imaginary, the threat and the abyss Blanchot seems to invite the author.

The encounter shown between Ahab and the whale, that of Odysseus and the Sirens, can be considered a tale unto itself, but it is an encounter that needs to be narrated. As a result of

this encounter in imaginary space Captain Ahab hears the voice of the abyss, sinks into the "wordless space" and vanishes, but on the other hand, his tale crosses over from the imaginary and to the literary realm to bring about the book. Blanchot invites the reader to be like Ahab, and undertake the journey even if the enterprise takes one to the abysmal void. Narrating the story is a way of welcoming this literary excursion at the cost of loss.

The sea can be considered as a metaphor for writing in *Memory for Forgetfulness*. As Darwish tries to find his way into the sea of words, to break the sovereign's language, and to regain "worldliness," he becomes aware of the impossibility of his own dream. He will not be liberated from his exilic threshold. But writing the critical present with an exilic point of view is a way of welcoming the encounter with the danger, and the unexpected, and the abyss of the imaginary. He will not break the cycle of history perhaps, but he manages to undermine it by rewriting, which in itself is the voyage of the tale. As Captain Ahab was drowned in the abyss since he was fascinated with the imaginary, and this encounter allowed the tale to come into being, Darwish also encounters the fascination of the imaginary, and this encounter allows him to write. The ending implies that the sea drowns him as well, as it "walks in the streets," and "comes into the room" (182). Like the movement of the sea finding its way in the streets, the narrative is being constructed and the tale is taking place as he is trying to find a way to narrate.

Blanchot contends that the tale is not the narration of the event but the event itself: "an event which is yet to come and through whose power of attraction the tale can hope to come into being, too" (109). In the end, even though Kamal cannot reach the homeland, through its power of attraction the tale can hope to come into being. But it is never fully constructed. Darwish informs the reader that he will "just practice," as he sets out to tell the tale of Kamal (163). The modesty of the term "practice" only draws attention to the overall seamlessness of the writing in

Memory for Forgetfulness. The fictional metamorphosis within the imaginary space, however, is doomed to remain in fragments, and remains as incomplete as a sketch.

Mahmoud Darwish has asked rhetorically in an interview carried out in 1996 with Najat Rahman: "Is poetry possible?" (322) The question resonates with Theodor Adorno's famous statement, "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric" ("After Auschwitz" 362). However, the poem (history or testimony) must be written even though it is not possible to write it, to give voice to the oppressed, and to resist the "deafening" silence of the official history. Adorno himself revisits his famous statement about the impossibility of writing poetry after Auschwitz, and adds that even if it is barbaric to write after poetry after Auschwitz, only art can resist the verdict that it is barbaric to write. He adds that through art one can express the immense suffering, and that "in art alone that suffering can still find its own voice, consolation, without immediately being betrayed by it" ("Commitment" 313). Darwish's own poetics can be read as an attempt to resist the verdict that it is barbaric to write poetry after his own experience of atrocities. Darwish embarks on the imaginary voyage by acknowledging this incapacity, and yet he welcomes the threat and the abyss that come with the imaginary. When he laments that "the sea is the sea," he knows that the sea is never the sea, that his literature will make a difference in that condensed, crystallized moment in Palestinian history, by giving voice to the silenced. His "stammering," then, should be read as a powerful and critical statement of resistance, a manifestation of exilic consciousness, which communicates the irreconcilable narration to a listening community.

Through exilic consciousness, Darwish converts the exilic threshold that keeps him neither outside nor inside the political domain into a critical awareness of worldliness. The exilic threshold that determines his "worldlessness" in Arendt's sense might keep him within the realm

of *homo sacer* without any rights of political speech and action. However, from this critical in-between position, he manages to develop an exilic consciousness that enables him to engage with the world through a creaturely resistance—by transforming himself from *deposit* to *deposition*, from pariah to conscious pariah, and from Palestinian to Non-Palestinian Palestinian—by adopting a contrapuntal approach to the notions of home and identity, and by minorizing the major literature and linearity of history.

These critical engagements in his text could be correlated with what Edward Said defines as worldliness in his *The World the Text, the Critic*. Worldliness is the site that narration points to the irreconcilability of the threshold, but also to the ethical possibilities of minority existence in modernity (35). Referring to Eliot's poem "Little Gidding" that ends with "The complete consort dancing together," Said in his *Culture and Imperialism* alludes to the "unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages" (332). Seen from this perspective, Said notes that "all things are indeed counter, original, spare, strange," and one can see 'the complete consort dancing together' contrapuntally" (332). Darwish himself is the "worldly" exilic subject between domains, and his text serves as the paradigm of critical awareness of worldliness through which he engages these decentered, exilic energies, and resists the state of exception.

Chapter 3

Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway:* Being in the World with the Other

While Darwish's exilic experience informed his uprootedness and superfluousness - both states refer to worldlessness, according to Arendt - Darwish managed to resist worldlessness by way of minorizing the language and developing a contrapuntal, critical perspective. His strategies enabled him to undermine the uniform and hegemonic history and linearity. The term "worldliness" employed by Hannah Arendt to describe the "conscious pariah," a term attesting to the experience of the Jews who managed to critically approach the issues of identity and nation, proved to be an appropriate critical tool for analyzing Darwish's narrative. However, Arendt's application of the term is not limited to the description of the Jewish experience. In this chapter, I expand the notion of worldliness developed by Hannah Arendt by incorporating her notions of freedom, action, and plurality, all cognate to her conceptualization of politics.

Clearly, the notion of worldliness as manifested by Tanpınar and Darwish in their respective narratives directs them to a form of plurality. By embracing *buhran* as an experience that addresses the coexistence of different temporalities, Tanpınar opens a space for others in the temporal present. Darwish invokes the existence of alternative histories, and the voice of the silenced, "deafened" by the sovereign history makers. Thus, redeeming his worldliness becomes an issue of recognition as a subject or of being heard by the others when as an exile he is subject to a continuous state of exception (a permanent threshold).

Arendt in her *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and *The Human Condition* (1959)

emphasizes the plural nature of what she terms as "worldliness," which she explains as an interactive space that formulates the coexistence of diverse perspectives. While she presents worldliness in opposition to the totalitarian thought in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt demonstrates in *The Human Condition* the ways in which political action based on plurality and freedom offers the individual the chance to regain worldliness in the modern world. It is this intersection of totalitarian thought, more specifically the totalitarian nature of progressive modernity and worldliness on which I dwell in this chapter, with a special focus on Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925). I examine how Woolf manifests the possibility of establishing worldliness and creates a realm of coexistence, based on plurality, that the totalitarian progressive modernity destroyed in the aftermath of First World War.

As the crisis of modernity informs Tanpınar's and Darwish's narratives in the form of critical and political thresholds, Virginia Woolf's depiction of temporal and historical experience in *Mrs. Dalloway* in the aftermath of First World War can be categorized under the rubric of a temporal threshold. Woolf depicts an era in her narrative when the *heimlich* (homely) feeling the British Empire invoked societally is lost after the devastating war; and yet a new era begins with the emergence of a mass society wherein progressive modernity harbingers the bourgeoning of totalitarianism, setting the stage for what Arendt termed world alienation.

While Arendt's worldliness depends on the existence of a common world, and calls for a new politics where people preserve each other's distinctness and plurality, she did not dwell exclusively on the ethical dimension of this interaction. In my analysis of *Mrs. Dalloway*, I employ Emmanuel Levinas's conception of alterity to supplement Arendt's notion of worldliness and her notion of plurality, by bringing in the ethical question of the limits of communication in

such a common world.[50] While plurality and distinctness define the scope of worldliness in Arendt's terminology, Levinas's notion of alterity reminds the reader that the intersubjective relation in such a world should be constructed by acknowledging and respecting the other's "otherness" beyond the power of the self.[51]

Arendt's notion of the world is clearly inspired by Heidegger's phenomenological term *Dasein,* the unity of structure of "being-in-the-world." However, for Arendt, who spent much of her life looking for the right formulation of the relationship one ought to have toward the world (Neiman 306), the notion of the world extends beyond its ontological explanation, and provides the reader with a new perspective to imagine the common ground for political action.

Worldliness takes place in the public realm, and it informs the interaction among people on that common ground. Accordingly, in *The Promise of Politics* Arendt uses the term "world" to describe the "in between space [where] all human affairs are conducted" (106). Worldliness addresses a public space, or a "space in which things become public, as the space in which one lives and which must look presentable […] In which all kinds of things appear" (20). According to this seemingly general picture of the common space of earth is inhabited, worldliness determines the interrelatedness of people and their acts insofar as they are transformed into a public realm. In Arendt's view, everything that appears in public has the "widest possible

[50] Anya Topolski in her book, *Arendt, Levinas, and a Politics of Relationality* (2015), provides an insightful analysis as to how these two thinkers are paralleled in their thought. My study excludes Arendt's and Levinas's shared Judaic horizon, their personal relation to Heidegger, and their life stories that intersected in the catastrophic times in which they lived. Topolski provides a rich and extensive analysis on these aspects alongside other elements of their philosophy.

[51] Both Arendt and Levinas critiqued totality and totalitarianism in their approaches, and attempted to reach an intersubjective understanding of phenomenology. It is well known that Martin Heidegger was influential in both Arendt's and Levinas's lives and philosophy. While my study also highlights aspects of Heideggerian existential ontology, it is mostly when Arendt's and Levinas's perspectives diverge from his phenomenological approach that proves to be useful in my exploration of worldliness in *Mrs. Dalloway.*

publicity" (HC 50). Thus, in order to "assume a kind of reality" in this public space, one's intimate life needs to be "transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized" (as in storytelling and artistic transposition of individual experience), and brought out into a public sphere so that interaction between people can take place (50).

Secondly, Arendt suggests that the term "public" signifies the world itself in so far as it is common to everybody and is distinguished from one's privately owned place in it (HC 52). This means that the world in Arendt's sense is not identical with the earth, rather it is related to the human artifact, as well as to "affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together" (HC 52). [52] The public realm or the common world is a site of coexistence then, which designates the interrelation among people. Arendt emphasizes the intersubjective aspect of worldliness as a determining element in this common space by stating that "the public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak" (HC 52). The "world" should be understood, then, as a common space where people are expected to interact through a common understanding.

While it is clear from above that worldliness refers to a human mode of interaction based on an understanding of plurality, it is in her long essay "Introduction *into* Politics" that Arendt furnishes such an understanding of the interactive common space with a political function. More specifically, she analyzes how human interaction in her envisioning of the common world becomes political. As Jerome Kohn rightly diagnoses, the title, "Introduction *into* Politics" by no

[52] In the opening section of *The Human Condition* Arendt lays out what she calls the human condition. With the term *vita activa*, she proposes to designate three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. The human condition of labor is "life itself," a necessity to survive. The human condition of work is worldliness, creating an artificial world. The human condition of action is natality, characterized by plurality. All three activities are in turn related to the most general conditions of human existence: birth and death, or natality and mortality (HC 7-10). This chapter only dwells on the notions of action, natality, and plurality.

means refers to an introduction to the study of political science or political theory, but "*leading into* (*intro-ducere*) genuine political experiences" (TPP viii).

Arendt designates the relation between worldliness and plurality, and explores how that relation might lead to a political experience in this essay. She proposes her own interpretation of the notions of freedom, action, and natality that she thinks are integral to the understanding of politics. First she draws the connection between freedom and politics, and stresses that "the meaning of politics is freedom" (108). Arendt explains how she relates the two phenomena by referring to the usage of freedom in Classical times. Arendt notes that politics and freedom were identical in the past (109). Greek politics signified that "men in their freedom can interact with one another without compulsion, force, and rule over one another, as equals among equals, […] managing all their affairs by speaking with and persuading one another" (117). Politics takes place when the plurality of views interacts under equal conditions, and by means of "speaking and persuading."

Politics then begins under circumstances where human beings have equal right to speak, and "the realm of material necessities and physical brute force end" (119). Under such circumstances everybody has the same claim to political activity:

> [W]e link equality with the concept of justice, not with that of freedom, which is why we misunderstand the Greek term for a free constitution, *isonomia,* to mean what equality before the law means for us. But *isonomia* does not mean that all men are equal before the law, or that the law is the same for all, but merely that all have the same claim to political activity, and in the polis this activity primarily took the form of speaking with one another. *Isonomia* is therefore essentially the equal right to speak. (118)

While the most important activity of a free life moved from action to speech, from free deeds in the days of Ancient Greece to free words (124), action was replaced by freedom of opinion, "the right to hear the opinions of others and to have one's own opinion heard (125). Thus, the space

of politics does not have to be the city-state in its physical location, it emerges at any time when people find the milieu to act and speak together. As Arendt says: "Wherever you go, you will be a *polis*" (HC 198), implying that participation and speech create a space between the participants "which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere" (198) provided that they preserve the plurality as the condition of this togetherness.

Arendt argues that it is only in the freedom of speaking with one another, in exchanging opinions, that the world emerges. "Living in a real world and speaking with one another about it are basically one and the same" (TPP 129) Arendt notes, implying that freedom guarantees intersubjective relations, or what characterizes worldliness. Freedom and politics are prerequisites to one another then, since there is no political space in the true sense, where freedom does not exist (TPP 129). Thus, participation in public affairs and the creation of a society in which individuals are active in political life become essential elements for worldliness.

Arendt also correlates freedom with spontaneity. By referring to the verb *archein*, which means both "to begin and to lead, that is, to be free" in classical Greek, and to the Latin verb *agere*, which means "to set something in motion, to unleash a process" (114), Arendt argues that freedom of action lies in one's being able to begin anew (126). The political significance of freedom lies in one's capacity to make a beginning; a faculty, which is, in Arendt's view, observable in the inherent freedom in what she calls "natality." By associating natality, the fact of birth, with the act of freedom, Arendt asserts that every human being's potential for action lies in the ability to "initiate a sequence, to forge a new chain" (126). She explains in the following passage how action, natality and spontaneity are related to each other:

> Action is unique in that it sets in motion processes that in their automatism look very much like natural processes, and action also marks the start of something, begins something new, seizes the initiative, or, in Kantian terms, forges its own chain. The miracle of freedom is inherent in this ability to make a beginning,

> which itself is inherent in the fact that every human being, simply by being born into a world that was there before him and will be there after him, is himself a new beginning. (HC 113)

According to Arendt's explanation, the world is renewed daily through birth and is "constantly dragged into what is unpredictably new by the spontaneity of each new arrival" (TPP 127). Arendt's trust in the human being's freedom to make a new beginning by simply being born into a world demonstrates the hope she preserves for the humankind even after catastrophic events of her time.

Nonetheless, if action (freedom to act) is a matter of preserving the worldly space, wherein intersubjective relations take place, it is not expected to occur in isolation, but in the plurality of human beings. Arendt emphasizes the importance of acting in plurality in such a common space: "Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world" (HC 7). Because action's ability to make a new beginning is dependent on the presence of others, on one's being confronted with his/her opinions in the ideal common space, it must take place in the presence of others, with the others' co-operation. She writes:

> Freedom of opinion and its expression, which became determinative for the polis, differs from the freedom inherent in action's ability to make a new beginning in that it is dependent to a far greater extent on the presence of others and of our being confronted with their opinions. Granted, action likewise can never occur in isolation, insofar as the person who begins something can embark upon it only after he has won over others to help him. In this sense all action is action "in concert," as Burke liked to say; "it is impossible to act without friends and reliable comrades." (Plato, *Seventh Letter,* 325 d); (TPP 127)

Accordingly, human beings must step out of their private spaces, their comfort zones so to speak, and get involved with other people in the public realm to initiate something. Plurality in such a

public space does not only determine the presence of others, but it also secures the distinctness of each person acting in "concert."

Jerome Kohn emphasizes that in Arendt's understanding, the world can only emerge, which she understands as the set of conditions under which people in their plurality, "in their absolute distinctness from each other, live together and approach each other to speak in a freedom that only they can grant and guarantee each other" (xxx). The public life finds its source in being seen and being heard by others, provided that everybody sees and hears from a different position (HC 57). This is to say, recognizing people's distinctness from each other, and the ability to see the same thing from various standpoints results in a "true freedom of movement in our mental world that parallels our freedom of movement in the physical one" (TPP 168). According to Arendt, only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, that is, in the opposite of the totalitarian ideal, can "worldly reality truly and reliably appear" (57).

Arendt's conception of worldliness then can be achieved by political means, and such understanding of worldliness is the politics itself, wherein plurality and diversity of human perspectives constitute its very substance, alongside the necessary freedom to begin something new, "to interact in speech with many others and experience the diversity" (TPP 129). For Arendt, who witnessed the atrocities of the Nazi regime, and was informed by the totalitarian Stalinist regime, politics as such exists so rarely and in so few places that only a few great epochs have known it (TPP 119).

If participation in public affairs and the creation of a society in which individuals are active in political life are symptoms of worldliness, the opposite, the inability to participate in public affairs and being deprived of the circumstances to join in political life suggests

"worldlessness." Arendt developed her notion of "worldlessness" in relation to her consideration of the condition of statelessness, "a condition into which German Jews and other victims of mass denaturalization were placed during the years preceding the outbreak of Second World War" (Gottsegen 5).[53] In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* Arendt describes wordlessness as the condition that is forced upon individuals and that describes stateless individuals who, by extension, are deprived of human rights. She writes:

> The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective. Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation where, unless he commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion. (OT 296)

"Worldlessness" does not only suggest one's having no place in the world, but also one's having no right to express one's opinion and to act freely. In Arendt's view, historical conditions that gave way to catastrophic events of history, such as atomic explosions, or the subsequent world wars, the experience of totalitarianism with the rise of fascist regimes and their devastating results for humanity are equivalent to one such loss of the world.

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[53] The Jewish people, who had to live dispersed for thousands of years, like "pariahs" exemplify "worldlessness." In her interview with Gunter Gaus, which was later published under the title of "What Remains? Language Remains" in *Essays in Understanding,* Arendt associates the figure of pariah with "worldlessness." She answers Gaus' question whether the Jewish people were apolitical people as follows: "I shouldn't say that exactly, for the communities were, of course, to a certain extent, also political. The Jewish religion is a national religion. But the concept of the political was valid only with great reservations. This worldlessness which the Jewish people suffered in being dispersed, and which-as with all people who are pariahs generated a special warmth among those who belonged, changed when the state of Israel was founded" (EIU 17). For an extensive analysis of Arendt's usage of pariah, and her notion of "conscious pariah" as a way to regain worldliness and a political perspective, see Darwish chapter, pp 104-107.

Considering that human plurality is the condition of politics in Arendt's view, and political concepts are based on plurality, diversity, and mutual limitations (MDT 81), what perishes in totalitarian regimes are not only political freedom and human spontaneity, but a world of action and speech created by human relationships, leading to "worldlessness." Arendt argues that such deprivation of plurality and freedom of action signals a dominating single perspective, where "people suddenly behave as though they were members of one family, each multiplying and prolonging the perspective of his neighbor" (HC 58), which in itself suggests the end of the common world. Arendt explains how the two are correlated as follows: "In both instances, men have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times" (HC 58). Arendt generalizes this view, and states that everything attesting to sameness is "non-worldly, antipolitical, truly transcendent experiences" (HC 215). This statement suggests that "worldlessness" occurs whenever one imposes sameness on the other, not recognizing the other's distinctness whether in tyrannies, totalitarian regimes or even in personal relationships where single perspective dominates.

Accordingly, Arendt indicates that "worldlessness" is not peculiar to totalitarian regimes, but may emerge under any conditions of radical isolation, "where nobody can any longer agree with anybody else, as is usually the case in tyrannies. But it may also happen under conditions of mass society or mass hysteria, where we see all people suddenly behave as though they were members of one family, each multiplying and prolonging the perspective of his neighbor" (HC 58). In other words, in societies where only one perspective prevails - even the regime is not totalitarian - one might expect to find a similar instance of "worldlessness."

Arendt's notion of the political is a response to such wide-ranging forms of totalitarianism: from tyrannies to personal relationships. Anya Topolski reminds us that Arendt's phenomenological approach to the political, developed in response to her analysis of totalitarianism, is still essential for an understanding of the political in non-totalitarian regimes (or non-explicit totalitarian regimes) (34). Arendt herself emphasized the importance of understanding totalitarian thought by saying: "If we want to be at home on this earth, even at the price of being at home in this century, we must try to take part in the interminable dialogue with the essence of totalitarianism" (EIU 323). What she attempts to do with her account of totalitarian thought, thus, is not only to recount the loss of a shared world, but also to demonstrate the possibility of the recurrence of totalitarian regimes once the plural perspective in politics is lost.

A temporal threshold that Arendt describes as "no longer and not yet" corresponds to such an understanding of "worldlessness." The "no longer and not yet" is a temporal mode of modernity, which in Arendt's thought coincides with the emergence of totalitarian forms of government based on the institutionalization of terror and violence, and destruction of politics, i.e. a plurality of perspectives and distinctness in the worldly space. In her essay, "No Longer and Not Yet" (1964) Arendt describes such a temporal threshold as "some turning-points of history," "at some heights of crisis," where the historical continuity is lost "between those who for some reason or other still belong to the old and those who either feel the catastrophe in their very bones or have already grown up with it" (EIU 158). As a consequence, Arendt contends, the chain is broken and an "empty space," a kind of historical no man's land, comes to the surface which can be described only in terms of "no longer and not yet" (158).

The temporal threshold Arendt described attests to two interrelated consequences, which

became the marker of modernity in Arendt's view: it refers to the split with the past and the previous generations, and secondly it is permeated by the "worldlessness" of totalitarian thought infused in society. Arendt takes the First World War as one interruption of continuity, and the beginning of a chain of disasters, such as anti-Semitism, the Second World War, and the totalitarianism that shaped the political landscape of the world in the first half of the twentieth century. The temporal threshold described by the expression, "no longer and not yet" [54] that began with the catastrophic historical events spans the first half of the century creating a transition marked by ruptures.[55]

The intermediary experience of temporality in this transitional period also causes a break with the past tradition. Arendt explains in the preface of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* how this rupture affected the society:

> We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain. (ix)

The type of alienation Arendt describes in the above statement is an inevitable outcome of modernity, leading to isolation and the loss of a common world, which can be extended, in her view, to one's conception of history and nature. "Neither history nor nature is conceivable" (BPF

[54] Arendt herself has lived through two world wars. She was detained by the Nazi regime, was exiled twice, and finally she managed to flee to the US in 1941.

[55] Arendt's characterization of the intermediary period as such is akin to Tanpınar's description of the temporal threshold. Tanpınar attributes to such interruption of continuity to the transition the Turkish society experiences in the first half of the twentieth century. Although there is no evidence that Tanpınar read Arendt, one can easily notice their shared perspective on such topics as: selective apppropriation of the past in the present, imagining the Western civilization as a "concert," and their approach to the tradition.

89), Arendt remarks. Left without a common world, which would at once interrelate and separate them with the advance of modernity, people "either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together into a mass" (90). For Arendt, "mass-society is nothing more than that kind of organized living which automatically establishes itself among human beings who are still related to one another but have lost the world once common to all of them" (89-90).

This is world alienation in Arendt's lexicon. Accordingly, if worldliness suggests human interaction, the intersubjectivity of relations, and a shared world of action, "world alienation" refers to the loss of a commonly experienced and shared world of action, and restriction or elimination of the public sphere, where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground for human interaction. World alienation is thus symptomatic of the loss of a common world (Gottsegen 206). Arendt relates such alienation to modernity. She states that "[T]he modern age, with its growing world-alienation, has led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself" (BPF 89), by which she means human beings have created an artificial world, yet are disconnected and alienated from the public realm by adopting a singular perspective. What has been lost in the modern age is this common world in Arendt's view, leading people to entirely private and radically isolated lives as they are apt to think and act the same. As the world between people has lost its power to "gather them together, to relate and to separate them" (HC 53), the public realm has become impoverished in modern societies.

Marshall Berman in his *All That is Solid Melts into Air* (1982) depicts a similar perspective on world alienation by alluding to Marx, where immense growth and transformation during the modernization process led human beings to lose the solid ground they once had. Berman writes:

> This is a landscape of steam engines, automatic factories, railroads, vast new industrial zones; of teeming cities that have grown overnight, often with dreadful

> human consequences; of daily newspapers, telegraphs, telephones and other mass media, communicating on an ever wider scale; of increasingly strong national states and multinational aggregations of capital; of mass social movements fighting these modernizations from above with their own modes of modernization from below; of an ever-expanding world market embracing all, capable of the most spectacular growth, capable of appalling waste and devastation, capable of everything except solidity and stability. (18-19)

Berman's description of modernity with its new technologies and applications of science, the epistemology of logical positivism, and the relativism of functionalist thought is here juxtaposed with the inevitable loss of solidity and stability. Berman invokes the idea that fragmentation, ephemerality, and insecurity that mark twentieth century modernity are various manifestations of such loss of solidity and stability.[56]

Berman's depiction of modernity's downsides bears a striking resemblance to Arendt's views on modernity. Arendt does not discuss loss of stability and solidity directly; instead she relates it to her idea of world-alienation. In her words:

> All the processes of the earth and the universe have revealed themselves either as man-made or as potentially man-made. These processes, after having devoured, as it were, the solid objectivity of the given, ended by rendering meaningless the one over-all process which originally was conceived in order to give meaning to them, and to act, so to speak, as the eternal time-space into which they could all flow and thus be rid of their mutual conflicts and exclusiveness. (BPF 89)

Arendt here describes the process in which human beings are no longer in a position to endow their existence or the world with any common or shared meaning. World alienation occurs when "our identity becomes precarious and reality more doubtful, that is, we can no longer provide a

[56] While this has been the prevalent idea that preoccupied numerous writers of the early twentieth century, such as Oswald Spengler and Valéry, various members of the Frankfurt School and Walter Benjamin also wrote extensively as to how progressive modernity brought about loss of faith, experience of fragmentation and disintegration, and the shattering of cultural symbols.

coherent narrative about ourselves, find confirmation of our identity with others, or validate the existence of a common, objective reality" (d´Entrèves 26).

In the closing statements of her posthumously published book *The Life of the Mind* (1978), Arendt correlates the loss of the common world with one's alienation from past tradition. Tradition bridges the past and the future; it "selects and names, […] hands down and preserves, which indicates where the treasures are and what their worth is" (BPF 5). The break in continuity between the past and the present comes to mean one's alienation from the past and the common world that supposedly came with the tradition: "[T]he thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not be able to renew it […] What has been lost is the continuity of the past as it seemed to be handed down from generation to generation, developing in the process its own consistency [. . .] What you then are left with is still the past, but a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation" (TLM 212). With the breakdown of the tradition, one is left without any secure sense of direction and a consciousness in the present. Inevitably, the temporal threshold Arendt terms as "no longer, and not yet" is characterized by the loss of a common world, which not only leads human beings into isolation, but also pushes them to a world deprivation caused by the split with the past tradition.

In her essay collection, *The Common Reader*, which was published just one month before *Mrs. Dalloway*, Virginia Woolf expresses both alienation and a rupture in continuity after the First World War, which resonates with Arendt's view on the gap in history and continuity: "In the vast catastrophe of the European war our emotions had to be broken up for us, and put at an angle from us, before we could allow ourselves to feel them in poetry or fiction" (34). Woolf's narrative displays manifold resonances of this temporal and historical rupture as reflected in her characters. Characters such as Lady Bruton, Peter Walsh, and Hugh Whitbread that are

associated with royalty or with the empire's political agenda are presented as residues of the past, and they are criticized alongside other characters such as Doris Kilman for adopting a singular view. Doctor Holmes and Doctor (Sir) William Bradshaw, who are supposed to cure the shell-shocked veteran Septimus Smith's depression, impose their totalitarian agenda under the disguise of the progressive modernity.

Woolf demonstrates manifold ways in which world impoverishment or "worldlessness" is exemplified by these characters, only to show at the end of the narrative with her character Clarissa Dalloway how to re-establish worldliness based on plurality and by recognizing the alterity of other people in a common world. Understanding totalitarianism and revitalizing the political based on plurality gain paramount importance in the personal search for the meaning of human existence in the novel, when there is a rupture between the past and the present, during the "no longer and not yet" temporal mode of modernity. Woolf's motivation in following such an agenda might be related to what Pericles Lewis notes about English modernism, that it should be understood "as a reaction to the carnage and disillusionment of the First World War and a search for a new mode of art that would rescue civilization from its state of crisis after the war" (109). The narrative strategy Woolf employs to respond to the crisis of the war not only exemplifies what constitutes worldliness in Arendt's terms, but it also provides a food for thought for the twenty-first century reader, for whom catastrophes are no less prevalent than in Arendt's time, albeit in different scales and forms.

While Woolf did not write her novel under the shadow of any totalitarian regime, her narrative consists of various discursive elements and actors that exemplify the totalizing attitude and totalitarian language/thought that lead to a form of "worldlessness" as Arendt has defined it. Woolf's depiction of 1923 London is not too far from the individualized, neo-liberal societies of

twenty-first century, which drive people to loneliness, "to the experience of not belonging to the world at all" (OT 475) in the manner Arendt formulates it.

Still, there is clearly considerable difference between Arendt's stark and rather negative view of modernity imbued with the echoes of totalitarian movements and Woolf's depiction of 1923 London. What Marshall Berman describes in his *All That is Solid Melts into Air* as the landscape of nineteenth-century modernity with its rapid change, speed, and mobility that resulted in modern innovations, industrialization, urbanization, and secularization seems to extend into *Mrs. Dalloway*'s time, setting the tone of the novel. The "new" pulsates in the vibrant atmosphere of 1923 London albeit underscored by all the recent drama caused by the war. One of the main characters in the novel, Peter Walsh, who has come back from a sojourn in India, describes the sweeping change in the society:

> [T]o his eye the fashions had never been so becoming; the long black cloaks; the slimness; the elegance; and then the delicious and apparently universal habit of paint. Every woman, even the most respectable, had roses blooming under glass; lips cut with a knife; curls of Indian ink; there was design, art, everywhere; a change of some sort had undoubtedly taken place […] Those five years – 1918 to 1923 – had been, he suspected, somehow very important. People looked different. Newspapers seemed different. (61)

The technological advances not only amended the use of urban space, they inevitably led to a change in the social life. As Woolf oscillates between internal and external spaces, she lays out the topography of London, revealing quotidian experiences of the modern world, i.e. the material culture of transport, fashion, and modern spectacles that attract crowds.

While it remains ambiguous in what ways the non-privileged masses that provide their labor for Capital utilize this sweeping change in their narrative lives, Woolf brings her characters together in public spaces that are altered by modern means of transportation and mass communication. Such new technology attracts the viewers by presenting diverse forms of

spectacle. One of these spectacles is a motorcar backfiring that Clarissa and all the others around her in the street hear as indicating the presence of some "enduring symbol of state," a "very great importance" (12), an ambiguous figure of Royalty as the crowd speculates, and the other is a skywriting plane making an advertisement on the sky. As the car attracts the attention of an anonymous crowd, the skywriting airplane advertises some product, an initial sign of mass communication, serving as another spectacle for the crowd.

The traumas of the First World War also seem to unite people under a broader social context in this public space. It has only been five years since the war, and its effects are still clearly visible and felt. While Woolf generalizes the effect of the war felt by the community with her comment, "This late age of the world's experience had bred in them all, all men and women, a well of tears" (8), she expresses sporadic impressions from various minor characters to convey how the effects of the war infused society. For instance: "in all the hat shops and tailors' shops strangers looked at each other and thought of the dead; of the flag; of Empire" (15); "Poor women waiting to see the Queen go past – poor women, nice little children, orphans, widows, the War – tut-tut – actually had tears in his eyes" (17); "the old men and women, invalids most of them in Bath chairs" (22-23). However, these impressions mentioned in passing do not set the tone of the novel. This is to say, although the shared feeling of sorrow that emanates from the members of the society creates some kind of an imagined common world, it does not create a plurality of comingling feelings or perspectives.

Although the gathering of the crowd around these spectacles is an essential device Woolf deploys to imply a community of sensations assaulted by the violence of the modern metropolis, and she displays a form of imagined community in their unison under a shared sorrow, these instances demonstrating how individuals experience their membership in the collectivity can

hardly be categorized under Hannah Arendt's public life. Arendt's vision of public life demands that people be seen and heard by others; it is based on human interaction, provided that the notion of plurality is preserved. In Arendt's public space, which is an ideal space for politics, everybody sees and hears from a different position, yet this opens a venue for debate and participation. However, in Woolf's narrative, members of the anonymous crowd gathered in both instances fail to interact with each other. As Angeliki Spiropoulou notes, the crowd is involved in chance encounters but is not united by anything, save the spectacle of power that produces a fantasy of belonging (131). For instance, the royal figure passing in his car does not invoke a common ground, an imagined nation with which the crowd can identify. The skywriting plane signaling a mass communication creates excitement in all the characters, but it does not cause them to interact. The characters live in their private worlds imprisoned in their own thoughts and singular experiences, deprived of seeing and hearing others.

Woolf depicts characters who in different ways are imprisoned in the "no longer, and not yet" of temporality mapped by Arendt. They demonstrate that the intersubjective bond between people is not yet constructed between the "no longer" of the waning idea of the Empire and the "not yet" of the ideal political world, which is necessary to re-establish a common world. These characters, such as Lady Bruton and Peter Walsh, either attempt to pursue the traces of the Empire's imperialistic agenda, or similar totalitarian thought that leads to world impoverishment. They do have neither the vision nor the desire to act in order to reach worldliness based on plurality and a genuine political experience. Others, such as Dr. Holmes, Dr. Bradshaw, and Doris Kilman impose their singular perspectives on others in different scales of a totalitarian mindset.

An old friend of Clarissa's, her former suitor, a "woman's man," and a popular figure

among the high society, Peter Walsh has just come back from India leaving his post for a short visit to London. Peter Walsh, who has noted the sweeping changes in the society, is portrayed as a disillusioned entrepreneur. The reader learns from various characters' implications that his business has failed; he "made a mess of things," and was "battered" in India. He failed in business because he failed to realize that as a colonizer he would meet with resistance. Walsh says that he had invented a plough in his district, had ordered wheelbarrows from England, "but the coolies wouldn't use them" (42). The "coolies," native laborers in India resisted because Walsh, as any colonizer Englishman who went to India did, not only served as an instrument in usurping the natural sources of the country and interfering in its administrative as well as socio-cultural life, but he also attempted to impose his own reality and contemporaneity on the colonized.

Walsh's failed endeavor is a criticism against the Empire's desire to "bring civilization" to the "backward" community by way of making it temporally even with the Western world. Walsh, in other words, echoes the totalitarian perspective of the Empire by imposing his contemporaneity on the other in the form of colonization, and in this, he failed to secure the plurality necessary for interacting with other cultures. On the other hand, Peter Walsh himself experienced a form of world-alienation as he "encountered only himself" in the artificial world he created.

Peter Walsh's experience in the colonies emblematizes the imperialistic attitude and the totalitarian tendency to singularize the other. Lady Millicent Bruton as well, is the personification of the Empire itself with her family of military men, administrators, admirals, and for her alleged role in the historical past of the Empire. The reader meets Lady Bruton at the beginning of the novel, when Richard Dalloway informs his wife of the luncheon he has been

invited to at Lady Bruton's place, together with their old friend Hugh Whitbread. Woolf presents Lady Bruton as a caricature of the Empire, i.e. she is not as influential and active as she used to be, but she mimics her glorious past by maneuvering successfully, only to write a letter to *The Times* as if it were a diplomatic letter.

Lady Bruton designed a project that would help young people of both sexes born of respectable parents to emigrate and would set them up with a fair prospect of doing well in Canada. Her ambitious project appears to be a prolongation of her embassy activities in her "glorious" past, and could be interpreted as the desire to continue the idea of Empire. However, what sounds progressive about Lady Bruton's prime project actually is a sign of her inability to discern the timely needs of the society in the postwar period. Locked in her private world, Lady Bruton, like the colonizer Empire, is not willing to see the plural aspect of the world. She extends her lack of plural perspective in approaching people close to her: "the difference between one man and another does not amount to much," (88) admits Lady Bruton.

Doris Kilman, governess to Clarissa's daughter Elizabeth, resembles Lady Bruton in her inability to adopt a plural perspective. Miss Kilman is portrayed as a coarse, bitter and self-possessed woman defined by Clarissa as "[h]eavy, ugly, commonplace, without kindness or grace" (106). Clarissa is oppressed by the existence of Miss Kilman all throughout the novel. Aside from seeing her as a threat to her relationship with her daughter, Clarissa is convinced that what is "odious" about Miss Kilman is that she is unable to pay attention to people in her own environment while she is worried about others in distant places. Clarissa thinks: "Miss Kilman would do anything for the Russians, starved herself for the Austrians, but in private inflicted positive torture, so insensitive was she, dressed in a green mackintosh coat" (10). Whether Miss Kilman's mackintosh coat is a sign of her "deliberate austerity" (Spiropoulou 122) or of her

asceticism ("religious ecstasy made people callous (so did causes)" Clarissa thinks (10). Miss Kilman refuses to follow social conventions. She despises Clarissa and her lifestyle, while she nourishes a "consuming absorption" (Aronowicz 79) towards Elizabeth. With a possessive desire to keep Elizabeth for herself only, she adopts a colonizing attitude: "If she could grasp her, if she could clasp her, if she could make her hers absolutely and forever and then die; that was all she wanted" (112). Such attitude is what Clarissa criticizes about Doris Kilman: "Had she ever tried to convert any one herself? Did she not wish everybody merely to be themselves?" (107) With this statement, Clarissa signals that unlike Doris Kilman, she would leave room for the coexistence in Arendtian terms by respecting the other's privacy.

As such, Peter Walsh, Lady Bruton, and Doris Kilman incarnate instances of the totalitarian attitude in their failure to recognize plurality in a common world. They impose sameness on other people in various ways, exemplifying Arendt's "worldlessness." For Arendt, loss of the political and the shared world leads to "worldlessness" by means of the destruction of plurality. Thus, totalitarianism becomes the ultimate outcome of "worldlessness."

Whenever totalitarianism destroys plurality in the "free democratic" societies, the world becomes impoverished. This is the fragility of the world that Arendt designates as loneliness. Philip Hansen stresses that, for Arendt, isolation in the political sphere is an outcome of totalitarianism, since "Totalitarianism is rooted in and reinforces two critical developments: the attack on plurality and the increasing pervasiveness of atomism and loneliness" (133). By destroying individuality and the possibility of plurality, totalitarianism destroys the world and creates isolated and atomized individuals within a public space. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt notes that isolation is a characteristic of tyrannies and it is not the same as loneliness. She differentiates isolation and loneliness as follows: "What we call isolation in

the political sphere, is called loneliness in the sphere of social intercourse" (474). Such an understanding of loneliness also informs Arendt's understanding of modernity, one in which history as a natural process has replaced history as a fabric of actions and events, and homogeneity and conformity have replaced plurality and freedom, leading to an organized loneliness (d'Entrèves 29).

What Arendt calls world impoverishment, or "worldlessness" in the public realm has a direct correlation with the inner psyche. Roviello and Temerson focus on this connection, and explain how "worldlessness" causes the individual's inner collapse, leading to isolation in one's private world: "The collapse of the groundwork of the world at the same time as the radical attack on the human bond that accompanies it, the withdrawal of other human beings beyond the reach of human communication, lead to the individual's inner collapse" (924). In other words, as the loss of the shared world leads to world alienation, individual human beings experience self-alienation when they are exposed to the totalizing perspective whether in totalitarian regimes or in modern democracies.

Septimus Warren Smith[57], one of the main characters in the novel, a shell-shocked war veteran, who later commits suicide, experiences such loneliness. At the beginning of the novel, the narrator's point of view switches from Clarissa in the flower shop to Septimus Smith in the park. Septimus and his young Italian wife, Rezia are among the crowd watching the spectacle that involves, in succession, the car backfiring and the skywriting plane. However, instead of taking an interest in the spectacle, Septimus appears to be completely absorbed in his own world, a symptom of deep depression. Rezia urges Septimus to watch the car, and the skywriting plane, since Dr. Holmes told him that he needed to be interested in "real" things. Dr. Holmes, failing to

[57] Septimus' family thought a "fantastic Christian name" like Septimus would distinguish him from "many millions of young men called Smith" in fin de siècle London (69).

understand Septimus's derangement, further consoled Rezia that "there is nothing the matter" with Septimus and that he should simply throw himself to outside interests, and take a hobby (75). Rezia apparently follows the doctor's instructions as she tries to draw Septimus' attention to things that she thinks any "normal" person would be interested in.

Septimus, we are told, was one of the first volunteers to join the war (71). He served with "great distinction" (81) in the war, and received a promotion. Yet, Septimus apparently was not motivated by nationalistic feelings when he was enlisted; instead he had an aesthetic concern in imagining (in Benedict Anderson's terms) his own nation: having studied Shakespeare at an adult education college and having fallen in love with the lecturer Isabel Pole, Septimus joined the war to "save an England which consisted almost entirely of Shakespeare's plays and Miss Isabel Pole in a green dress walking in a square" (73). Nevertheless, Septimus sensed that what we now would call the patriarchal culture in which he was raised demands a manly posture from him. For instance, his employer asked him to develop "manliness" by playing football (73), and Septimus unconsciously felt proud that he managed to conceal his feelings when his best friend Evans died in battle.

After the war Septimus arrives at Italy, where he meets his prospective wife, Rezia. However, soon he realizes that he is no longer himself. He could not mourn for his friend Evans, as he could not feel anything. In addition, he realizes that he could not feel anything for his wife Rezia, he could not taste, feel the beauty, etc. Panic, fear, and a sense of failure accompany Septimus' inability to feel. His initial reaction was to accuse the world for his inability to feel: "[H]is brain was perfect; it must be the fault of the world then – that he could not feel" (75). Then, he finds himself worthless and morally despicable; he vilifies himself and expects to be punished. The following passage reflects the transition in his feelings:

> So there was no excuse; nothing whatever the matter, except the sin for which human nature had condemned him to death; that he did not feel. He had not cared when Evans was killed; that was worst; but all the other crimes raised their heads and shook their fingers and jeered and sneered over the rail of the bed in the early hours of the morning at the prostrate body which lay realising its degradation; how he had married his wife without loving her; had lied to her; seduced her; outraged Miss Isabel Pole, and was so pocked and marked with vice that women shuddered when they saw him in the street. The verdict of human nature on such a wretch was death. (77)

Finally, he looks for shelter in Shakespeare as he used to do before he joined the war to find an answer. However, what his twisted mind finds in between lines are now loathing, despair, and hatred.[58]

Septimus, drawing on Walter Benjamin's analysis of the soldiers who returned from World War I, has grown "poorer in communicable experience" ("The Storyteller" 84). The causes of Septimus' depression are manifold: the trauma of the war and the loss of his close friend Evans during the war, the disillusionment he felt once he realized that his aesthetic imagining of the nation and belonging never matched with the stark reality, and his inability to live up to the masculinity expected of him. Imprisoned in his private world and, consequently, nonresponsive to the public world, Septimus is completely isolated. However, his isolation also

[58] Molly Hite claims that the absence of "tonal clues," by which she means textual markers that direct readers to have affective response such as sympathy, condensation, irritation, suspicion, or approval in evaluating a character or scene in *Mrs. Dalloway*, have led to divergent interpretations regarding the attitude readers should have toward the second, shadow protagonist, Septimus Smith. According to Hite, irony and narrative distance are some of the narrative strategies that act as tonal cues, "signaling the attitude the reader should have" (251). However, in the representation of Septimus, moments suggesting ironic distance "alternate rapidly with moments that might motivate compassion or even identification, without ultimate tonal cues to guide interpretation to rest" (264). Moreover, to accept representation of Septimus as ironic fails to do justice to the duality not only of the meanings in many of these passages but also of distances. Hite reads the section on Dante, Aeschylus, Shakespeare, and other passages on how Septimus interprets Shakespeare as such, that may be read as irony, and yet, might well be not. For instance, his words, "He knew all their thoughts, he said; he knew everything. He knew the meaning of the world" (74) could be interpreted as a denial of his body as a physical limit to himself, and yet they really show that he understands the intentions of Dr. Holmes and Dr. Bradshaw.

epitomizes Arendt's world alienation, which is caused by an attack on individuality and plurality by totalitarian thought under the disguise of progressive modernity. In Septimus' case, it is Dr. Holmes and Dr. Bradshaw (Sir William Bradshaw), who reduce Septimus to a state of radical loneliness. They create a non-worldly domain, where they can totally dominate and control him.

Dr. Holmes, who initially examined Septimus, does not attempt to understand his patients. He dismisses Septimus' problem and, instead, boasts by explaining how he keeps his own "excellent health" by his ability to switch off from his patients and onto old furniture. He indeed swiftly switches his attention from Septimus to the "pretty comb" (78) Rezia is wearing, and finally with all his lack of sympathy scolds Septimus for being a bad example to English husbands. Doctor Holmes' advice to Septimus to take a hobby, and join everyday life, however harmless it may sound, is devoid of care, and is dehumanizing. Clearly, forcing Septimus into a public space to join "the world" would not make Septimus worldly. Instead, by advising Septimus to be like everybody else, Dr. Holmes imposes sameness on him, and his blindness and indifference to Septimus' world suggests that he does not recognize his absolute distinctness. Moreover, Dr. Holmes assumes that Septimus constitutes a flaw in a modern "healthy" society, whose level of progress is determined by experts like him. If plurality suggests people's absolute distinctness from each other, as Arendt claims, Septimus has no place in such a world.

Woolf demonstrates that behind Dr. Holmes' kindness lies a sinister motivation. Impatient with Septimus' non-responsive attitude, Dr. Holmes implies in the following passage that his kindness has a limit: "'Now what's all this about?' said Dr. Holmes in the most amiable way in the world. 'Talking nonsense to frighten your wife?' But he would give him something to make him sleep. And if they were rich people, said Dr. Holmes, looking ironically round the room, by all means let them go to Harley Street; if they had no confidence in him, said Dr.

Holmes, looking not quite so kind" (79-80). The result of Dr. Holmes' dehumanizing attitude becomes violently apparent when Septimus commits suicide by throwing himself out of the window. Dr. Holmes simply condemns Septimus by calling him "coward" (127). By committing suicide, Septimus not only fails to fulfill the role of the ideal member of the nation-state, that is masculine, powerful, and impervious to the effects of the war, but he also fails to join the modernization project, which assumes that every individual should accommodate himself to the level of progress in the same way and at the same time.

Woolf's implicit criticism of Sir William Bradshaw is even harsher. She introduces Dr. Bradshaw as a famous doctor in the high society, with skill, accurate diagnoses, "sympathy, tact, and understanding of human soul" (81). However, as the reader soon finds out, these qualities that are attributed to Dr. Bradshaw are highly ironic, since he lacks the sympathy, and understanding of the human soul in his approach to his patients. Dr. Bradshaw is quick to understand that Septimus' case is a nervous breakdown of extreme gravity. Although Dr. Bradshaw's diagnosis is correct, the way he arrives at this conclusion is problematic. According to him, Septimus' breakdown must have occurred as a result of his not having a "sense of proportion."

Bradshaw's theory of proportion is based on the level of progress he sets by way of his own standards. This means people like Septimus are unfit to live in this world until they reach the same level as Sir Bradshaw's understanding of progress to be "proportionate." Accordingly, the idea of proportion informs Dr. Bradshaw's totalitarian biopolitical approach:

> Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of proportion—his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw's if they were women (she embroidered, knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home with her son), so that not only did his colleagues respect him, his subordinates fear him, but the

> friends and relations of his patients felt for him the keenest gratitude for insisting that these prophetic Christs and Christesses, who prophesied the end of the world, or the advent of God, should drink milk in bed, as Sir William ordered; Sir William with his thirty years' experience of these kinds of cases, and his infallible instinct, this is madness, this sense; in fact, his sense of proportion. (84-85)

For Bradshaw then, the body has to be controlled and disciplined for the state and economy. This resonates with Foucault's discussion of disciplinary societies, where the state moves into the lives of individual subjects through disciplining and controlling bodies. In that manner, Dr. Bradshaw's approach gives clues about Western knowledge production and power beginning with the advent of modernity that has come to be called biopower.

These two doctors designate a non-worldly space in Arendt's understanding – a space defined by their single perspective only, the perspective of progressive modernity. In other words, they impose violence on Septimus by hiding it behind an apparently benign language of developmental progress. Dr. Bradshaw's totalitarian biopolitical approach, for instance, appears to be in line with Enlightenment requirements. It sets the standards of calculability and utility in the way described by Adorno and Horkheimer in their *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*:

> For enlightenment, anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion. Once the movement is able to develop unhampered by external oppression, there is no holding it back. Its own ideas of human rights then fare no better than the older universals. Any intellectual resistance it encounters merely increases its strength. The reason is that enlightenment also recognizes itself in the old myths. No matter which myths are invoked against it, by being used as arguments they are made to acknowledge the very principle of corrosive rationality of which enlightenment stands accuses. Enlightenment is totalitarian. (3-4)

With his precision, his belief in numbers, science, and rational calculation, Dr. Bradshaw is the embodiment of progressive modernity, which embodies the ideals of totalitarian Enlightenment thought. Moreover, by applying "proportion," as a cure ("order rest in bed; rest in solitude;

silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, without messages" (84)), Dr. Bradshaw pushes his patients into an absolute privacy. His cure that restricts his patients' presence in the public realm is another point of reference that detaches him from Arendt's formula of the common world where people are free to act in plurality.

Dr. Bradshaw's calculative approach to his patients also resonates in his approach to time. The official time also pertains to Dr. Bradshaw's sense of proportion. Dr. Bradshaw gives no more than three-quarters of an hour to his patients. The linear time of the modernity joins Dr. Bradshaw's "exacting science" (84) in the undeviating process of arriving at the pre-conceived goal called for by modernity: "Shredding and slicing, dividing and subdividing, […] counseled submission, upheld authority, and pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of proportion" (87). According to such perception of temporality, Septimus has to be "cured" so that he can be contemporaneous, commensurate and proportionate in relation to the time of modernity.[59]

Mark Hussey argues that as a victim of such a totalitarian approach, Septimus denies the physical limits of his body by "unembodying" himself before his suicide, in order to not respond

[59] Many figures in the novel have their share of disproportionateness in a range of discrepancies. Dr. Bradshaw labels Lady Bruton's emigration project as disproportionate to criticize its plausibility: "She exaggerated. She had perhaps lost her sense of proportion" (92). There is a continuous emphasis on how Hugh Whitbread, close to Lady Bruton, and a common friend of Clarissa, Peter, and Richard from Bourton, who was so promising for the future turned out to be a person of petty jobs, "snuffing round the precincts of the great, grown rather fatter, rather whiter, the admirable Hugh!" (146) Richard Dalloway, having a good position in the parliament actually has the intelligence of a country gentleman, "without a touch of imagination, without a spark of brilliancy, but with the inexplicable niceness of his type. He ought to have been a country gentleman—he was wasted on politics" (61). The Prime Minister who appeared at Clarissa's party towards the end of the novel is also remarkably disproportionate, when one compares his outlook with the significance he has: The prime minister, "symbol of what they all stood for, English society" looked so ordinary: "You might have stood him behind a counter and bought biscuits—poor chap, all rigged up in gold lace" (146). Clarissa, who has the gift to live in harmony with the present ("sums it all up in a moment") does not partake any of this disproportionateness. This suggests that the idea of proportion in Woolf's understanding is strongly related to temporality.

to the world designed by doctors. By doing that, Septimus shows a form of resistance to the mechanical world of Dr. Holmes and Bradshaw, a world that makes no distinction between "him" and his body (Hussey 13-14). “Unembodiment” in the sense Hussey uses it could also be interpreted as the move towards a private realm to escape life, when one cannot fight with the harshness of reality.

Hussey points out that to live in the body this way, “unembodied,” however, appears in the actual world as an aberration to be “cured” (14). In Hussey’s interpretation, this is the reason why Dr. Holmes tries to make Septimus take notice of “real things,” which would necessitate an embodiment for him, and by extension an ability to feel, recognize, and face his friend’s death. Suicide is the only way Septimus could preserve his authority and autonomy as embodied. It is also a form of resistance to the impoverished world into which Dr. Bradshaw pushed him by way of imposing his standards of “sameness,” and depriving him of a common space conditioned by plurality, therefore worldliness.

When Woolf was composing the novel in 1923, she recorded her plan in her diary “to criticize the social system, and to show it at work, at its most intense” (*Diary 2* 248). If one assumes that Dr. Bradshaw is subject to her criticism, instead of criticizing Bradshaw directly, Woolf first draws an ideal picture of Bradshaw and his family and then undermines it to show the sinister aspects under the benign appearance. For instance, in the following statement Woolf describes Lady Bradshaw’s submissiveness to Sir Bradshaw, showing that Lady Bradshaw has also been subjected to Sir Bradshaw’s totalitarian approach at the expense of losing her “distinctness”: “Fifteen years ago she had gone under. It was nothing you could put your finger on; there had been no scene, no snap; only the slow sinking, water-logged, of her will into his. Sweet was her smile, swift her submission” (85). As Woolf describes in the following passage,

what Lady Bradshaw subsided about the distinctness of her character comes to the surface now and then:

> Only as the evening wore on a very slight dullness, or uneasiness perhaps, a nervous twitch, fumble, stumble and confusion indicated, what it was really painful to believe—that the poor lady lied. Once, long ago, she had caught salmon freely: now, quick to minister to the craving which lit her husband's eye so oilily for dominion, for power, she cramped, squeezed, pared, pruned, drew back, peeped through: so that without knowing precisely what made the evening disagreeable, and caused this pressure on the top of the head (which might well be imputed to the professional conversation, or the fatigue of a great doctor whose life, Lady Bradshaw said, 'is not his own but his patients') disagreeable it was: so that guests, when the clock struck ten, breathed in the air of Harley Street even with rapture; which relief, however, was denied to his patients. (85-86)

Clarissa also does not think highly of Dr. Bradshaw, "a great doctor yet to her obscurely evil" (151) she thinks, although she cannot tell exactly what she disliked about him. She remembers that she had once gone with someone to ask Dr. Bradshaw's advice, and although he had been "perfectly right: extremely sensible" (155), she notes that it was such a relief to get out to the street again (155), echoing the sentiment guests express in the above passage.

If the standards of rationality and progress are adopted and regulated by the state, could one blame Sir Bradshaw for attempting to spread it? Is it sufficient to consider him evil given that he is described as merely "extremely sensible"? After all, Bradshaw is an honorable man known for his skill and his accurate diagnosis. As for Dr. Holmes, what makes him a "repulsive brute, with the blood-red nostrils" as Septimus labels him, other than trying to push Septimus into the public world so that he could be "normal"? According to Hannah Arendt, this is exactly where one can detect the "banality of evil" as she mentions in her concluding sentence of her 1963 report, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963).

Arendt attended the Nazi SS officer Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, and based on his testimony, historical evidence and, Arendt's observations of his manners during the trial, she

argued in her controversial report that there was nothing demonic about Eichmann, since he appeared "quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous. There was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives" (TLM 3-4). In her lecture "Thinking and Moral Considerations," she repeats her judgment and adds that "the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think" (RJ 159). Eichmann imagines that he is a responsible, "normal" citizen because he did his duty, obeyed orders and the law (EIJ 135).

Upon the controversy her report raised, Arendt returns to the figure of Eichmann and the banality of his evil in her unfinished and posthumously published book, *The Life of the Mind* to reflect on the "corruption of Western thinking *at large*" (Spanos 13). Arendt maintains that the only notable characteristic motive one could detect in Eichmann was his "*thoughtlessness*": "The deeds were monstrous, but the doer…was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous. There was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable characteristic one could detect in his past behavior as well as in his behavior during the trial…was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but *thoughtlessness*" (TLM 3-4). The word "thoughtlessness," or Arendt's previously mentioned "inability to think," expresses Eichmann's blindness and indifference, what Foucault might term the biopolitical violence against other humans. Arendt states elsewhere that this indifference is the greatest danger, and it is where "the banality of evil" rests (RJ 146).

Thoughtlessness, "itself related to the loss of the common human world" (Canovan xv), then may lead to the possibility for everybody to "exclude the plurality of the world from one's mind" (Topolski 89). If Eichmann is the type of German everyman of the Nazi era with his

inability to think, Dr. Bradshaw is the type of utilitarian and totalitarian representative of progressive modernity with the dehumanizing nature of his calculative language, his lack of sympathy, and his destruction of worldliness based on plurality in the sense that Arendt formulates. With his blindness to the violence he commits against other beings, and by concealing it behind the logic of the Enlightenment, Dr. Bradshaw enables and justifies the banality of evil.

Clearly, in naming the "banality of evil" in the case of Adolf Eichmann in 1963, Arendt was referring to the horrors of Nazi Germany. Needless to say, Woolf's London in 1925 is not a totalitarian society, and the horrendous crime Eichmann committed against Jews as an SS officer could in no way be compared to Dr. Bradshaw's dehumanizing attitude. Still, Dr. Bradshaw's discourse on progressive modernity and his totalitarian biopolitical approach, and Dr. Holmes' attitude vaguely mirroring Dr. Bradshaws' are comparable to Arendt's diagnosis of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann. Sir Bradshaw's and Dr. Holmes' attitudes towards Septimus conceal a will to power over, and an indifference to the humanity they represent, one tied primarily to a "disease" that had to be cured. Bradshaw's idea of proportion, which sounds reasonable and "normal" and Dr. Holmes' simple recipes for healthy living are not separable from a discourse that calculates, engineers, and mutates life instead of being concerned about the rehabilitation of a shell-shocked soldier to cure him for his own sake. In other words, the inability to think ascribed to both doctors carries a dehumanizing biopolitical logic to its destructive end.

This may explain why Woolf describes both doctors with inhuman qualities, with symbols of wild nature. Woolf alludes to a bird of prey in describing Dr. Bradshaw: "Naked, defenceless, the exhausted, the friendless received the impress of Sir William's will. He swooped; he devoured. He shut people up. It was this combination of decision and humanity that

endeared Sir William so greatly to the relations of his victims" (86-87). Dr. Bradshaw hunting on the defenseless and the weak, symbolizes human nature in its most primitive, animalistic way. Septimus explains how he fell victim to such dominating human nature, which he describes with inhuman qualities: "Human nature, in short, was on him—the repulsive brute, with the blood-red nostrils. Holmes was on him. Dr. Holmes came quite regularly every day. Once you stumble, Septimus wrote on the back of a postcard, human nature is on you. Holmes is on you" (78). Septimus' analysis of the "human nature" that is in effect whenever one stumbles suggests that Dr. Holmes is not a particular example of human nature, but represents a common, ordinary kind—resonating with Eichmann—that appears whenever the outcast, the unusual, or the one who does not conform to the general needs to be eliminated or isolated.

Having come to sense the way the world represented by Dr. Holmes "tramples on those who do not fit in it" (16), Rezia understands why Septimus killed himself. The fact that Dr. Holmes does not allow Rezia to see her husband's dead body after he committed suicide brings into mind the fact that in a controlled society the system lays claim on the body even after one is dead. Like the spectacle provided by the skywriting plane, Septimus' speedy dispatch to the hospital by an ambulance presents a spectacle for the passers-by in the same way as the skywriting plane. Upon hearing the sirens of the ambulance, Peter Walsh is enchanted by the "civilization" the ambulance embodies:

> One of the triumphs of civilisation, Peter Walsh thought. It is one of the triumphs of civilisation, as the light high bell of the ambulance sounded. Swiftly, cleanly the ambulance sped to the hospital, having picked up instantly, humanely, some poor devil; some one hit on the head, struck down by disease, knocked over perhaps a minute or so ago at one of these crossings, as might happen to oneself. That was civilisation. It struck him coming back from the East—the efficiency, the organisation, the communal spirit of London. (128)

Needless to say, "the triumph of civilisation" with its efficiency, organization, and communal

spirit of London are the very paradigms of progressive modernity that did not allow a common ground and worldliness for the coexistence of distinct individuals such as Septimus.

Although the experience of totalitarianism results in the loss of the world, and in the lack of plurality and freedom to act politically, there is always a chance of refounding the world that would secure the intersubjective bonds between people. With the character Clarissa Dalloway, Woolf attempts to readjust worldliness, and demonstrates a possibility of a common and shared world in order to overcome the world alienation, where individuals can preserve their autonomies, and establish relations of reciprocity and solidarity. Accepting Septimus' alterity becomes the signifying quality that differentiates Clarissa from those who intend to colonize other minds by imposing their own temporality.[60] Clarissa in the final scene manages to pinpoint a new mode of worldliness based on plurality, and she reaches a new understanding as to how one can feel at home in the world without projecting her own thought and her sameness on the other, and by acknowledging the other's distinctness. Woolf suggests that the responsibility to preserve the other's "otherness" is the determining element in designing such plurality.

While Clarissa's and Septimus' paths do not intersect in the novel, and while there are obvious differences between their social and economic statuses, there are many indications that Septimus serves as Clarissa's alter-ego or double. To that end, in her 1928 "An Introduction to *Mrs. Dalloway*," Woolf confirms that "in the first version Septimus, who later is intended to be her double, had no existence; and that Mrs. Dalloway was originally to kill herself, or perhaps merely to die at the end of the party" (11). Both characters mirror each other in the narrative. For

[60] Mark Hussey interprets this unfinished quality as an incompleteness in Clarissa's identity, which he argues is still very strong at the end of the novel; the "I" that she speaks in welcoming her guests does not satisfy her, and that she is still uncertain of what, or who, "herself" is; "she still will not say of herself that she is one thing or another, a virgin in a narrow bed, or a smart London hostess" (51). But instead of an incompleteness in identity, as I will argue later, Clarissa poses the incompleteness ("I am not going to say that I am this or that") as an assertive remark that recognizes and respects one's and the other's autonomy.

instance, lines from Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*, "Fear no more the heat o" the sun / Nor the furious winter's rages" (IV. ii. 258) frequently come to their minds. These famous lines implying that death could be a gentle release from difficulties of life connect them in their shared understanding of death as the story develops. As their frequent visit to Shakespeare's lines suggests, the idea of death occupies both. Clarissa feels "if it were now to die 'twere now to be most happy" (28), while Septimus is increasingly obsessed with death. Moreover, physically they resemble each other, invoking the idea that they might be doubles. For instance, Clarissa has a "little face, beaked like a bird's" (9), Septimus is "pale-faced, beaknosed" (12).

If creating Septimus and Clarissa as doubles is a narrative strategy, it is not meant to bring these characters in alignment. Woolf recounts their common features, but leads them down different paths. Septimus dies but Clarissa does not die as originally intended. In fact, she appears to be even more invigorated after the scene where she imagines she encountered Septimus. To that effect, in a 1922 diary entry Woolf implies that Septimus and Clarissa represent the opposite poles by stating that *Mrs. Dalloway* had become "a study of insanity & suicide: the world seen by the sane & the insane side by side" (Diary 2: 207). Then, what might be Woolf's purpose to create doubles if they are opposites? Could it be that by diverting them in opposite directions, Woolf drew attention to the characteristics that pushed Septimus to death and that reinforced Clarissa's existence? Freud remarks that the figure of the double is an important aspect of the *unheimlich* (uncanny), and that it is an "insurance against the destruction of the ego," in terms of protection against death. In line with that, Freud writes, "the 'immortal' soul was the first 'double' of the body" (57). The ending of the novel seems to confirm Freud's invocation of *unheimlich* as an insurance against the destruction of the ego, since what kills Septimus seems to have intensified Clarissa's liveliness.

The main characteristic that draws Septimus and Clarissa in opposite directions is related to their adapting to time. Unlike Septimus, Clarissa manages to merge the temporality of her private world with that of the public world, and has the gift of gliding between these two realms without any effort. A description that comes to the fore in the novel exemplifies this quality. Clarissa has "the gift to be; to exist; to sum it all up in the moment" (147), which emphasizes her ability to easily create a temporal continuum. It is as if Woolf wants the reader to realize that existence itself, the ability to endure, and to situate oneself in the world requires an ability that Clarissa Dalloway perfectly displays by summing up the past and the future in the present.

As this statement implies, Clarissa's awareness of time is integral to her understanding of existing in the world. She is the literary embodiment of such temporality: she is capable of living in two temporalities at once—she brings the past into the present while she experiences the present fully. For instance, on leaving the house to buy flowers for the party, a memory of Bourton comes to her involuntarily: "What a lark! What a plunge! For so it had always seemed to her, when, with a little squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open the French windows and plunged at Bourton into the open air" (3). While such perception of temporal experience creates an affect of an expanded present, it is not only Clarissa, who circles back and forth in memory, but Woolf's other characters who live in an expanded present that also involves the past. For instance, they all remember their memories of Bourton i.e. how Clarissa rejected Peter Walsh, and chose Richard Dalloway as a husband; Sally Seton, and her lingering affect on every character.

Woolf's technique of the "tunneling" process, a method to connect the characters' memories, and their present experience by creating a durational temporality that sums up the characters' relation in time also contributes to the creation of such an expanded present. Woolf

announces her new discovery in her diary on 30 August 1923: "I should say a good deal about The Hours [Mrs. Dalloway], & my discovery; how I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters; I think that gives exactly what I want; humanity humour, depth. The idea is that the caves shall connect, & each comes to daylight at the present moment" (*Diary 2* 263). Memories and present experience converge as they are connected through the subterranean metaphor of "tunnel." An instance of that is displayed at the beginning of the novel, when the noise coming from the motor car shocks and makes Clarissa jump and Miss Pym go to the window and apologize for the noise. The same noise startles Septimus who is standing still on the pavement of Bond Street. He finds himself unable to pass: "It is I who am blocking the way, he thought" (13).

Tunneling as a narrative technique creates a sense of expanded and spatial present connecting disparate individuals in separate places. While Woolf brings together everydayness and memories of characters in the space of modern city of London; their thoughts and movements are tightly woven; their pasts merge with their present. In fact, one might argue that the whole novel can be perceived as an expanded present, a conception of time that can be aligned with Henri Bergson's duration (*durée*), which signifies an intuitive time that one lives not on the clock, but is the "continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances" (Bergson, *Key Writings* 173).

Clarissa has an intuitive sense of time, as her memories resurface without any effort. However, the narrative also relies heavily on the official and linear time represented by Big Ben, a phenomenon that everyone in the novel perceives and around which they are brought together through their senses. Passing from one dimension of time (intuitive) into another (official) smoothly and vice versa is something Septimus could not have done. Marc Hussey claims that

the time lived by Septimus is a perpetual present, "a horrific timelessness in which he is no longer sheltered by past and future" (Hussey 124). "There is no death" in Septimus' world, which means the striking clocks of the actual world that determines where one stands on the scale of progress and linearity do not penetrate Septimus, just as the non-intuitive, measurable, linear, and progressive official time "ratified by Greenwich," represented by Sir William Bradshaw, cannot penetrate him.

Clarissa and most of the characters introduced so far in the novel, members of the upper class whom we meet at Clarissa's party, do not hear about Septimus' death. Walsh has seen the ambulance and has interpreted it, simply, as a sign of civilization. However, even though they are far from Septimus' experience, what took place with his death is the loss of a shared world, destruction of plurality, and pervasiveness of loneliness. It is Clarissa who would recover the world in the final scene by adopting a perspective of plurality and calling for the urgency to create a common ground for human interaction by focusing intensely on what Septimus' death means. In an imaginary encounter, Clarissa relates to Septimus in a non-incorporating relation that respects and preserves Septimus' alterity.

Woolf presents the reader with many clues before the party scene that shows how Clarissa observes plurality as a life perspective in both private and public spheres. For that matter, Woolf uses the image of diamond to describe how Clarissa creates a public space based on plurality that is also related to her private world: "That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a meeting-point" (32). "[A]ssembling that diamond shape" (32), Clarissa projects herself into the world and simultaneously creates a public space of

multiplicity.

Assembling people is Clarissa's natural gift. For instance, Peter Walsh says Clarissa has a genius for making her drawing-room a sort of meeting place, where different kinds of people from all walks of life come together: "Over and over again he had seen her take some raw youth, twist him, turn him, wake him up; set him going. Infinite numbers of dull people conglomerated round her of course. But odd unexpected people turned up; an artist sometimes; sometimes a writer; queer fish in that atmosphere […] but she did it genuinely, from a natural instinct" (65-66). Her "gift" to combine people in her drawing-room does not render Clarissa a passive being. She assembles, causes young people to revise and develop their thoughts, and finally motivates them for a new beginning.[61] In that vein, her act of assembling people could be interpreted as a version of Arendt's theory of action, leading to a new beginning. Clarissa molds these people she gathered in such a way that they begin life with a new perspective.

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[61] Clarissa's act of assembling, and then her face-to-face relationship with Septimus also replicate Woolf's own endeavor of depicting characters in a novel. Woolf is the one who brings together different people, "combines" and "creates" like Clarissa. In fact, as Clarissa does, one can imagine Woolf herself is sitting in her room and skillfully making a meeting point for various characters she will create. In the same year *Mrs. Dalloway* was published, Woolf wrote an essay titled "Modern Fiction," in which she expressed her desire to sum up moments, impressions, simply everything in everydayness that cannot be conglomerated into a linear experience of time, which resonates Clarissa's "summing up moments":

> Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions- trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpest of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms, and as they fall, as they shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old […] Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged, life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. (741)

Originally written to challenge the traditional linear Edwardian style of writing, and to address the difficulty the author of modernity faces in capturing the fleeting moment, the passage is also a call to approach modern experience as a whole and to its temporality in three dimensions at once. However, Woolf also admits the impossibility to fix the other in representation, as elsewhere she remarks: "[D]o not expect just at present a complete and satisfactory presentment of [Mrs Brown = life]. Tolerate the spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary, the failure" (qtd. in da Silva 205).

However, her gift to assemble people is the exact reason why Clarissa is being criticized by Peter Walsh and Richard Dalloway. A "perfect hostess" Peter Walsh sarcastically calls her because she gives "incessant parties of hers" (67). Woolf also suspected that her character's obsession with what seems like an elitist pastime, giving high class parties would sound artificial perhaps, not allowing the average reader to identify with her. In her diary Woolf records Lytton Strachey's criticism that Clarissa is "disagreeable and limited," and Woolf admits Strachey has a point: "I found Clarissa in some way tinselly…I think some distaste for her persisted" (*Writer's Diary* 77). Clarissa defends herself against such criticisms saying that she does these parties "to life" (103). Even though it sounds petty, organizing parties might be a form of creating artificial common spaces, which brings several people together. Clarissa explains what "life" means to her in relation to why she structures these parties:

> Here was So-and-so in South Kensington; some one up in Bayswater; and somebody else, say, in Mayfair. And she felt quite continuously a sense of their existence; and she felt what a waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they could be brought together; so she did it. And it was an offering; to combine, to create; but to whom?
> An offering for the sake of offering, perhaps. Anyhow, it was her gift (103).

Clarissa's assembling people from different walks of life implies that her gift to combine people discloses her tendency to preserve the distinctness of people as they come together in a common space: "An offering for the sake of offering." Elsewhere, Clarissa implies that she pays attention to "privacy of the soul," meaning she cares for preserving the distinctness of people.

As Clarissa's act of assembling manifests a form of projection that leads to a form of plurality, Woolf introduces a new dimension to this projection by emphasizing her act of "self-dispersal," which might be interpreted as an ability to feel what others feel. Clarissa once told Peter Walsh that "she felt herself everywhere; not 'here, here, here'; and she tapped the back of

the seat; but everywhere" (129). She finds her presence dispersed amidst people, places, and even trees:

> She was all that. So that to know her, or any one, one must seek out the people who completed them; even the places. Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, some woman in the street, some man behind a counter—even trees, or barns. It ended in a transcendental theory which, with her horror of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she believed (for all her scepticism), that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so momentary compared with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to this person or that, or even haunting certain places after death. Perhaps – perhaps. (129-130)

Clarissa's feeling herself *everywhere* and her image of diamond that assembles ("Here was So-and-so in South Kensington") could be read as an understanding of herself in the world in terms of the projection she makes of herself. What characterizes Clarissa's act of assembling and projecting, and even self-dispersal shows her recognition of life from a plural perspective without the intention of totalizing the others within her own perspective.

However, her assessment of plurality does not culminate until the very end of the novel, during the party scene, when she identifies with Septimus, and concomitantly contemplates her view of life. Upon learning of his suicide from Mrs. Bradshaw during her party, Clarissa impulsively thinks that this news would ruin the gathering. Then she retreats to a room and when she is left to herself, she thinks about his death from a different perspective. Clarissa imagines witnessing his death as if she experiences his death personally: "He had thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it" (156). Clarissa senses that Septimus' death has something to do with Sir William Bradshaw, and that if Septimus had gone to Sir William Bradshaw, a great doctor, yet "obscurely evil," capable of "some indescribable outrage-forcing your soul," he probably made Septimus' life

intolerable since "Life is made intolerable; they make life intolerable, men like that?" (157)

In a world where Dr. Holmes and Dr. Bradshaw impose their totalitarian "sameness" on Septimus, Clarissa admires Septimus for having done it, and for not compromising his soul. Septimus by committing suicide preserved something that is obscured, defaced, corrupted in the world he is living in. Death would be considered defiance to such understanding of the world: "A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the possibility of reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death" (156). If death is an attempt to communicate, a possibility of reaching a pristine center, which was evaded and ruptured during one's lifetime, the communication in question must be with one's own self. It is about embracing one's uncompromising self: Septimus died "holding his treasure" (156). "A thing there was that mattered" then is related to Septimus' integrity of his own life, which he managed to preserve. Death, as it seems, allowed such possibility of re-constructing one's disintegrated self. Septimus' death can be interpreted then as a kind of creative act, an act of resistance or defiance, and signals a positive insight into one's failure to see into the center of things (Swift 47).

The idea of death as an unsullied, pristine center where one finds his integrity is akin to Martin Heidegger's approach to death. What Heidegger terms as *Dasein* (literally "being-there") in his *Being and Time* (1927) indicates the human mode of existence constituted by its *world.* According to Heidegger, the structural totality of *Dasein* has three moments: thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), projection (*Entwerfen*), and fallenness (*Verfallenheit*) (Villa 126). The notion of

"thrownness" is deployed by Heidegger to emphasize the "already-being-in-the-world."[62] *Dasein* cannot choose to come into the world, it "finds itself" within a definite world. *Dasein* is also a temporal event, in which understanding one's being-in-the-world takes place by a "movement into presence" (13). By projecting oneself forwards one realizes new possibilities of being, which means the act of projecting is necessarily future-oriented, and thus toward death. In being-toward-death one realizes an authentic understanding of being in the world, and only in death *Dasein* reaches wholeness, "potentiality-for-being-a-whole" (215). As Heidegger mentions, one's awareness of death "limits and defines the possible totality of Dasein" (216).

Septimus, by "reaching a center" that evaded him in his lifetime because of life's obscurities, appears to have reached an authenticity, a wholeness in Heidegger's terms. However,

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[62] Hannah Arendt's idea of freedom to begin something new within the capacity of human birth can be compared to Heidegger's notion of "thrownness." Arendt differentiates between the human (artificial) world and the given earth. While she emphasizes the connection to others from the start, she views the world as "the humanly constructed edifice that includes history and memory and the polis" (Champlin). In a diary entry Arendt stresses that she does not agree with Heidegger: "Heidegger is wrong: man is not 'thrown' 'in the world;' if we are thrown, then – no differently from animals – onto the earth. Man is precisely guided, not thrown, precisely for that reason his continuity arises and the way he belongs appears. Poor us, if we are thrown into the world!" (Notebook 21, Section 68, August, 1955) According to Arendt, man is only thrown into the natural "earth," not the humanly-made "world." Jeffrey Champlin notes that in inserting this distinction between the earth and the world, she reads "geworfen" not as "thrown," but she has in mind a second use of the German verb "werfen:" to refer to animals giving birth. Arendt also diverges from Heidegger by stressing the conditioned character of human existence the moment he is born:

> Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence. This is why men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings. Whatever enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the human condition. The impact of the world's reality is felt and received as a conditioning force […] because human existence is a conditioned existence, it would be impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human existence. (HC 9)

While in Heideggerian sense "thrownness" implies a "continuing taking up or creative appropriation of possibilities that are 'given' to us, but unrealized as possibilities" (Villa 127), which should lead towards an authenticity that is to be fulfilled in death only, in Arendt's understanding human beings are conditioned to create their world, something that separates them from earthliness.

according to Heidegger one could not possibly experience death in the death of others, since the death of others cannot be truly grasped, and it cannot be experienced authentically. In other words, Clarissa could not, in Heidegger's perspective, identify with Septimus fully in the experience of his death. Heidegger writes:

> The more appropriately the no-longer-being-there of the deceased is grasped phenomenally, the more clearly it can be seen that in such being-with with the dead, the real having-come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely *not* experienced. Death does not reveal itself as a loss, but as a loss experienced by those remaining behind. However, in suffering the loss, the loss of being as such which the dying person "suffers" does not become accessible. We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense; we are at best always just "there" too. (222)

Dasein can gain an experience of death upon the death of others, but it cannot substitute the totality *Dasein* reaches in death. Because death ("no-longer-being-in-the-world") is still a being, "that can be defined as the transition of a being from the kind of being of *Dasein* (or of life) to no-longer-being-there" (221). In other words, one's perception of death is still based on the idea of life the *Dasein* lives. Thus, it is "*in terms of this world,"* (222) through funeral rites, the burial, in mourning and commemorating, and even using the corpse for pathological anatomy that one can perceive the other's death.

Then, for Heidegger, death affects the self in its untransferable and incommunicable solitude, and the experience of the deceased and *Dasein* are clearly separated. Yet, Clarissa thinks she somehow communicated with the dead soldier upon his suicide. Moreover, Clarissa diverges from Heideggerian notion of *Dasein* by not bestowing the seal of authenticity on the totality of experience placed in the shadow of death. Instead of reaching an understanding of temporality and wholeness towards death - in Heidegger's view an "authentic" understanding of being-in-the-world - Clarissa searches for an understanding of human temporality (historicity) in

the present, and in the everydayness itself instead of in a future-oriented death. For instance, she finds it invigorating to be there in the midst of everydayness: "In people's eyes, in the swing, tramp, and trudge; in the bellow and the uproar; the carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men shuffling and swinging; brass bands; barrel organs; in the triumph and the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead was what she loved; life; London; this moment of June" (4). The present provides her with an array of possibilities; celebration of everydayness permeates the narrative. This determines the tone of the novel, which Elaine Showalter describes as "a tribute to endurance, survival, and joy" (Showalter, xlv).

In Heidegger's phenomenological perspective, the present is not the dominant dimension. While the future leads to an authentic understanding of life, the past and the present are simply inauthentic forms of temporality because the past has elapsed, and the present corresponds to a "vulgar concept of time" (BT 217). Because the present is far removed from the realization of being-toward-death, thus from authenticity, Heidegger identifies *Dasein*'s belonging to everydayness, which is the focal time in *Mrs. Dalloway*, with the term, "falling." He explains what the term "falling" (*Verfallen*) stands for: "This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that *Dasein* is proximally and for the most part *alongside* the 'world' of its concern. This 'Absorption in …' has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they.' *Dasein* has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'" (220). Because absorption in the daily life, in the "publicness" of others, removes one from genuine self-understanding and the solicitude that is necessary towards an authentic understanding of life, *Dasein*'s average everyday disclosedness is inauthentic.

Heidegger claims that Being-in-the-world is always already "entangled" because human

beings find themselves in the already existing world, in a pre-determined social context and set of relationships: "*The average everydayness of Dasein* can thus be determined as *entangled-disclosed, thrown-projecting being-in-the-world which is concerned with its ownmost potentiality in its being together with the "world" and in being-with with the others*" (BT 170). Because everyday is an "entangled" evasion of death, one falls away from herself, in her unison with the "they-world." The term, *fallenness* [63] therefore refers to various categories of inauthentic forms of discourse and understanding that remove one from her true path towards death. Once the *Dasein* is entangled in the they-world, it reveals something like "a *flight* of Dasein from itself," therefore it escapes from an authentic potentiality for being itself (172).

Clarissa seems to be depending on what constitutes transitory impressions of everydayness with her obsession for giving parties, her ability to assemble and to sum up all three temporalities in the moment, and her continuous emphasis on the present joys of living - something Heidegger would consider as misleading and uncanny. In accordance with Heidegger's formulation of inauthenticity, she merges with the "they-self" ("they" or "anyone" (*das Man*). Clarissa indeed implies that she moves away from herself each time she gives a party: "Every time she gave a party she had this feeling of being something not herself, and that every one was unreal in one way; much more real in another. It was, she thought, partly their clothes, partly being taken out of their ordinary ways, partly the background; it was possible to say things you couldn't say anyhow else, things that needed an effort; possible to go much

[63] In Heidegger's view, idle talk, (idle) curiosity, and ambiguity refer to various inauthentic forms of discourse and understanding, and are the categories that structure the term, *fallenness*. He summarizes these three terms as follows: "Idle talk discloses to *Dasein* a being toward its world, to others and to itself – a being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses each and every thing, but in such a way that being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity conceals nothing from the understanding of *Dasein*, but only in order to suppress being-in-the-world in this uprooted everywhere and nowhere" (BT 165).

deeper. But not for her; not yet anyhow" (145). If parties are forms of distraction from authenticity and thus one's awareness of being-toward-death, then they could be considered as sites of alienation, where one forgets death.

However, this is not to say that Clarissa is impervious to the idea of death. She is haunted by the idea of death all throughout the narrative. Not only does she notice the signs of the deadly war everywhere, she is also preoccupied about her own death. For instance, she muses as she walks down Bond Street: "Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond Street, did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely?" (8). She had the feeling that "it was very, very dangerous to live even one day" (7). Moreover, the lines she occasionally remembers from *Cymbeline* suggest Clarissa's resigned acceptance of mortality.

Nevertheless, she reaches a resolution about the issues of death, authenticity, and everydayness when she manages to see them under the light of the news of Septimus' death. The news of his death makes her question her life: "Somehow it was her disaster—her disgrace. It was her punishment to see sink and disappear here a man, there a woman, in this profound darkness, and she forced to stand here in her evening dress. She had schemed; she had pilfered. She was never wholly admirable. She had wanted success. Lady Bexborough and the rest of it" (157). Nevertheless, she also admits that there is something significant in losing oneself "in the process of living," when one sees everyday occurrences with new eyes (just as she sees the sky with new eyes), or when one finds in the routine of one's life an adamant insistence on resuming life.

Just then Clarissa notices the old lady living in the room opposite her house that she has already, occasionally, had occasion to observe. This time she realizes that the old lady's gaze is

returned, staring straight at her. This return of the gaze serves as a revelation to Clarissa. It is as if the old lady mirrors Clarissa's own mortality and finitude in her everydayness. Clarissa is fascinated with watching the old lady moving about in her room, her quietly going to bed when people in Clarissa's party are "still laughing and shouting in the drawing-room" (158). It is as if she finds in the persistence of the old lady's everydayness a powerful statement against death. The clock strikes the hour, and with its strike Clarissa appears to bring the two temporalities, two separate occurrences together: the old lady's effort to persist against death in her everydayness, and Septimus' defiance against the brutality of life with his suicide.

Clarissa repeats Shakespeare's lines once again, but with a new understanding, as she seems to endow it with a new meaning now: "The clock began striking. The young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with the clock striking the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him, with all this going on. There! the old lady had put out her light! the whole house was dark now with this going on, she repeated, and the words came to her, Fear no more the heat of the sun" (158). This is the moment Clarissa identifies with Septimus, "She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away while they went on living. The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. But she must go back. She must assemble" (158).

Following Arendt's terminology, if plurality is a human condition necessary for the emergence of a common world and worldliness, Clarissa paves the way to imagine a common world, which allows for human interaction by accepting Septimus' alterity and distinctness without overtaking him. Clarissa shows the possibility of a common world, which potentially enables people to see and hear others from different perspectives. While figures such as Dr. Holmes and Dr. Bradshaw apply ontological violence that eliminates the alterity of Septimus by

way of imposing their own perspective of proportion and progress, and force him to be contemporaneous with the progressive modernity, Clarissa finds something crucial about being worldly in a world, where one connects with the other in a non-contemporaneous relationship.

This connection that opens a venue for plurality is not based on empathy. In Arendt's view empathy destroys critical thinking and presumes knowledge of the other. She writes in *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*: "The trick of critical thinking does not consist in an enormously enlarged empathy through which one can know what actually goes on in the mind of all others" (43). Clarissa is able to create a world with the other by taking a step towards intersubjectivity, while paying attention to the preservation of the space in the interaction between herself and Septimus.

Anya Topolski, constellating Arendt's notion of plurality and Emmanuel Levinas's alterity, argues that both thinkers have distanced themselves from the notion of empathy. For Arendt the space between actors should be maintained by way of imagination and thinking, and respect for plurality. However, empathy would minimize or erase this space. In Levinas's ethics too, the self should not project itself in the form of knowledge onto the other (Topolski 200). Levinas's approach to empathy then informs his theory on alterity. In his *Totality and Infinity* (1961) Levinas argues that the other person is a stranger beyond the power of the subject, an absolute other who does not form a totality with the "I". Therefore, the other always escapes the self's attempt to grasp it. He writes:

> He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say "you" or "we" is not a plural of the "I." I, you—these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts like me to the Stranger […] who disturbs the being at home with oneself […] Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in my site. (39)

Levinas then pursued an ethical approach that would not seek a reduction of the other under the category of the same, and thus violate the otherness. In his view, all the relationships based on absorption of the object by the subject result in the disappearance of the other "because through knowledge, whether one wants it or not, the object is absorbed by the subject and duality disappears" (TO 41).

In that respect Levinas's ethics of alterity complements Arendt's notion of plurality since preserving the other's alterity opens up the "human condition" of the plurality. Like Arendt, Levinas also focuses on an intersubjective approach as he states that he wants to make his way towards "a pluralism that does not merge into unity" (TI 42). Thus, Levinas comes close to Arendt's political approach by recognizing the distinctness of the other, by claiming that it is not possible to completely absorb the other, and by placing the responsibility to preserve the other's alterity as a condition of one's understanding of selfhood and one's place in the world. This means that he deviates from Heidegger's metaphysical *Dasein* that takes self as the ultimate point of reference, and treats everything as part of its projection.

In *Totality and Infinity* (1961), as well as in his later *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence* (1974), Levinas stresses that he is diverging from the totalizing philosophy of the West, which he terms as "a reduction of the other to the same" (TI 43). What is at stake is a form of totalization that refuses exteriority "that which is outside my knowledge or understanding because of its fundamental difference or alterity" (TI 290). Levinas by recognizing the other's "irreducibility to the I," and its anteriority to the totalizing project of ontology, calls into question "the freedom of the exercise of ontology" (TI 43).

Levinas's ethics prioritizing alterity by claiming the other is outside one's knowledge is clearly at odds with Heidegger's philosophy that takes for granted that the relationship to self

takes ontological precedence over care for others. As Heidegger indicates in his essay, "On the Essence of Ground," one could have knowledge of the other, "you," only by taking "I-self" as basis. He writes: "Only because *Dasein* as such is determined by selfhood can an I-self comport itself toward a you-self. Selfhood is the presupposition for the possibility of being an "I," the latter only ever being disclosed in [relation to] the "you" (*Pathmarks* 56).[64]

However, both Heidegger and Levinas theorized about one's perception, reaction and relation to death. While for Heidegger, death is the *Dasein*'s greatest reality, and its authenticity, for Levinas the death of the other is where ethics originates; it is attentiveness to the other's death that enables the ethical relation with the other person:

> Is there no thinking that goes beyond my own death, toward the death of the other man, and does the human not consist precisely in thinking beyond its own death? […] But in every death to which one attends, and in each approach of someone who is mortal, the resonances of this extraordinary unknown are heard. An event the significance of which is infinite, and the emotion of which is thoroughly ethical. ("The Philosopher and Death" 126)

In Levinas' sense of ethics, the death of the other is intertwined with the ethical relation before the death actually takes place, or not only "in every death to which one attends," but also "in each approach of someone who is mortal" (126). The idea that with every death to which one attends, one steps beyond one's own death and towards the other person implies that it *is* possible to imagine the other's death, which contrasts with Heidegger's take on the subject.

According to Levinas, the ethical relation with the other person takes place when the

[64] On a similar note, in an interview Foucault states that this movement from oneself to the other is the only possible way to care for others: "One must not have the care for others precede the care for self. The care for self takes ethical precedence in the measure that the relationship to self takes ontological precedence." (715) "[I]f you care for yourself correctly, i.e., if you know ontologically what you are, if you also know of what you are capable…if you know, finally, that you should not fear death, well, then, you cannot abuse your power over others" (McNeill 56).

other presents herself by way of what he calls "the face," and he names the non-incorporating relationship with the other as an ethical relation the "face-to-face." The face-to-face relationship preserves the alterity of the other, but it also creates the ground to approach difference and the ability to think from the perspective of the other. Levinas states:

> In this relation, the self and the other do not comprise a totality, nor does the I incorporate the other into his structure of identification. In the face-to-face, the I goes out of its habitual trajectory towards the other, thus "delineating a distance in depth—that of conversation, of goodness, of Desire—irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding establishes between the diverse terms, other with respect to one another, that lend themselves to its synoptic operation. (TI 39)

As the "I" makes a move to communicate with the other, it goes out of its familiar world toward the other, thus it is also transformed in this encounter. This, according to Topolski, is precisely what Eichmann could not, or chose not to do (205). This is also what Dr. Holmes and Dr. Bradshaw chose not do in *Mrs. Dalloway*. In their encounter with Septimus, they did not create a space for Septimus to communicate with him without imposing their selfhood.

Clarissa, however, faces Septimus in the final scene in her mind, when they mirror each other, in what one might call a face-to-face relationship without meeting or touching each other. By closely attending to his death in this encounter, she opens up the path to develop the principles of an ethical relationship with others based on preserving and respecting "unknowability" of the other's mind. According to Jessica Berman, this is a pivotal moment of ethical awareness in the novel when Woolf's emphasis on the private realm implies a public morality: "Septimus's shell shock is everyone's shell shock; his war death engages us all in the confrontation with death and our responsibility for it" (169). Berman argues that this ethical awareness transforms Clarissa, so that when she faces the old lady through her window she no longer rests content simply to watch but demands to be recognized as a subject ("Could she see

her?"). The old lady too might find "something of her own" in the sky or in their face-to-face encounter, which might then "engage them in a relationship of mutuality" (169). In both encounters, Clarissa recognizes the alterity of the other, and the importance of preserving the other's private space, while she makes an effort to understand their motives. Although Clarissa does not choose to elaborate on the significance of this encounter, she, in an allegorical manner, succinctly remarks: "here was one room; there another" (108), implying that the space in between, privacy, and alterity of the other should matter.

According to Levinas, the face of the other obligates one for infinite responsibility:

> It is in a *responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment,* in the responsibility for another – in an ethical situation – that the me-ontological and metalogical structure of this anarchy takes form… The consciousness is affected, then, before forming an image of what is coming to it, affected in spite of itself. In these traits we recognize a persecution; being called into question prior to questioning, responsibility over and beyond the logos of a response. *(Otherwise Than Being* 102)

Thus, the experience of the face of the other induces a sense of responsibility, for which no justification or response is necessary. The face signifies by itself, without mediation and "independent of my initiative and my power" (TI 50). In Levinasian terms, their face-to-face relationship demands response, without "touch[ing] the other, even tangentially" (TI 62).

Levinas introduces a temporal dimension to the ethical relationship between the self and the other in order to strengthen his idea of responsibility and the alterity in the face-to-face relationship. He identifies three modalities of time in his *Time and the Other* and in his *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*: synchrony, diachrony, and anachrony. Levinas' attentiveness to the temporalities of the other complements the alterity of the other that, in turn, resists totalization by the subject's acts of identification, comprehension, and representation. Therefore, the other remains always in excess to the subject's consciousness.

In Levinasian thought, diachrony is the notion that in the face-to-face relationship the other introduces a past and a future that the self cannot remember or predict. He writes: "Diachrony is a structure that no thematizing and interested movement of consciousness - memory or hope - can either resolve or recuperate in the simultaneities it constitutes" (TO 137). Therefore, the self cannot reduce the other person's experiential perspective on time to its own understanding of time and to one's thematic grasp of the present moment (TO 103). Since the self cannot reduce the time of the other into her present consciousness, its mastery of time is challenged.[65]

On the other hand, according to Levinas, the apparition of the other person in the face-to-face relationship opens up a massive dimension of temporal relationships, that involves not only the other person and its time, the self and its time, but also the time of others who are unborn and deceased (Hutchens 71). In responding to the other person, the self responds through the other to all the "past" others who "passed by," demanding responsibility. An ancient and unavoidable responsibility is demanded by the past through the face of the other person who carries that past to the self: "The past has the signification of an inveterate obligation, older than any engagement, taking the whole of its meaning in the imperative that commands the ego by way of the Other's face" (TO 113). This suggests that the face-to-face relationship may also demand responsibility for people who had lived beyond one's time and place.

The temporality of the other person, the unpredictability of the future generations and the immemorability of the experiences of the dead open up what Levinas calls "anachrony", the time

[65] Levinas, in his *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, proposes his much criticized idea of "infinite responsibility" in relation to his idea of diachrony. He states that in the responsibility for the Other, "the refusal of the present, of appearing, of the immemorial" commands one to approach the other, makes one his neighbor to the extend that this infinite responsibility substitute the self "for the other as a hostage" (11).

that has no principle or origin. As when conscious of diachronic time, the conscious self in anachronic time cannot have the experience or memories of the other person. Yet, the other demands infinite responsibility.

Clarissa perceives Septimus as if she knows his past. She assumes that Septimus must have seen Sir Bradshaw, she senses the aspects that triggered his suicide, and finally she imagines seeing the moment of his death vividly. The fact that Woolf's narrative strategy of creating Clarissa and Septimus as doubles also allows Clarissa to sense his recent past intuitively. Thus, Clarissa who "sums it all up in the moment" (147) still manages to synthesize the response to the other into the thematic grasp of the present moment. Therefore, unlike Levinas' formula, her mastery of time is not challenged. However, her confrontation reveals the fact that the other always exceeds the subject's consciousness, thus one can never fully identify and be contemporaneous with the other.

According to the Levinasian schema, in his encounter with Clarissa, Septimus manifests himself as the trace from a past "utterly bygone," "immemorial," and "irretrievable," ("The Trace of the Other" 355) not only because he had already fallen out of time and "unembodied," but also because he always already exceeds Clarissa's consciousness. Their face-to-face relationship is marked by an excess instead of a closed structure of identification that converts everyone in the sphere of the same and on the same level of contemporaneity.

In addition, the face-to-face relationship opens up a dimension of temporality, involving not only the other person and his time and Clarissa and her time, but also the time of others who were victims of the same totalitarian approach Septimus experienced. In responding to Septimus, Clarissa responds through the other to all the "past" others who "passed by" demanding responsibility. In that manner, the temporality of Septimus informs an anachronistic time that has

no principle or origin. Clarissa does not have experience or memories of Septimus, but through his experience she senses the existence of similar stories of how totalitarian understanding might overlook an individual's distinctness and plurality and thus destroy the common space and worldliness. By not imposing her own time on the other, and not reducing the other to her sameness, Clarissa allows the intrusion of anachronistic time to break the objective time she experiences.

Nevertheless, if the conscious self in anachronic time calls for a fragmented temporality of infinite responsibility, and conjures up other deceased persons' memories or experiences without experiencing them, the reader notices that Clarissa fails to develop the same consciousness for those beyond her culture and time. For instance, earlier on in the text Clarissa confesses that she cannot relate to the Armenians: "Hunted out of existence, maimed, frozen, the victims of cruelty and injustice (she had heard Richard say so over and over again) - no, she could feel nothing for the Albanians, or was it the Armenians? but she loved her roses (didn't that help the Armenians?) - the only flowers she could see cut" (102). Insofar as face-to-face relationship brings distinct individuals together in a common space, recognizing the element of non-contemporaneity, it is diachronic. It can also be anachronistic of all the "past" others one does not know. Clarissa recognizes the multiplicity of temporalities in the encounter with the other, which demands the effort not to impose one's contemporaneity on the other in acknowledging the other's alterity, but she fails to extend this responsibility to the "past" others beyond her time.

If one assumes that the chance of displaying one's ethical and moral obligations to strangers limits one within the common urban space, then it would not be possible to extend cosmopolitan sympathy to the others with whom one has no contact. One might claim that

Clarissa, who could not develop sympathy and a responsibility for the Armenians earlier in the novel, gains an ethical awareness in the end with her encounter with Septimus. Observing this change in Clarissa, Casey Walker claims that *Mrs. Dalloway* should be considered a cosmopolitan Bildungsroman in the sense that Clarissa learns for whom to care, how far the circle of her sympathy must extend, and how to regard the stranger in a city and a world full of people she does not know (179).

If Clarissa has learnt about what Casey calls "urban sympathy" (179) in the end, one might consider Clarissa's face-to-face encounter as a beginning, upon which she learns to approach the others in a different way. In Levinasian thought, the face-to-face is an originary moment in encountering alterity, in the sense that upon each encounter the subject is also altered and created anew once it makes a move from its trajectory towards the other. Arendt's notion of action complements Levinas's idea that the face-to-face marks a beginning for the subject. According to Arendt, it is by means of action that a common world is created based on plurality and distinction. This is where one appears as a "who" instead of a "what." While "what" is related to the qualities, gifts, talents, shortcomings, and labor, it is the "'who' which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others" (HC 179) in the public realm.

According to Arendt, this "who" is unique and irreplaceable. However, one needs to act and step outside of the comfortable and sheltered space of the private realm into the political realm, so that one's ideas and opinions are confronted and challenged to find the "who" in oneself. She states: "The public realm itself, the polis was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from others […] the public realm was, in other words, reserved for individuality; it was the only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were" (HC 41). This suggests that the concept of freedom, which is

the condition of political action for Arendt, involves an element of risk. She notes: "Only by stepping out of our private existence and the familial relationships to which our lives are tied can we make our way into the common public world that is our truly political space" (TPP 122). Then the action requires courage, or in other words it takes courage to be a "who," as the political realm one stepping into might involve disagreement, debate and strife.

Clarissa does not step outside of her comfortable and sheltered space of the private realm after her face-to-face encounter with Septimus. There is no evidence in the novel that shows she is expected to make a change in her life, and move out of her comfort zone even though her established ideas are now challenged with the encounter. It still remains a question, for instance, whether she could take the courage to debate with and face Doris Kilman. Moreover, in Arendtian terms people do not undertake action alone, but always in their plurality. Would Clarissa's "passive" action of designing a plurality still count as action? Even though these questions do not find their answers in the narrative explicitly, the novel ends with a note that suggests that Clarissa's encounters with Septimus and the old lady that enabled her to question life, enhanced the "who" aspect of Clarissa, who is now potentially ready to act in order to make a beginning.

If action marks the start of something, a mode of self-realization, and as Arendt notes if there is a miracle in "natality" itself, this is apparent in Clarissa's metaphorical rebirth in the very final scene. She reenters the room where her guests gathered after a moment of solitary contemplation in her room, and the novel ends with an ecstatic moment as Peter Walsh expresses this miraculous feeling she evokes:

> What is this terror? what is this ecstasy? he thought to himself. What is it that fills me with extraordinary excitement?
> It is Clarissa, he said.
> For there she was." (165)

These words which might be expressing Peter Walsh's residual passion for Clarissa, more powerfully suggest that Clarissa comes out as if the "who" about her identity were reaffirmed. She comes out from this encounter created anew by way of critiquing and refashioning of the structure of her selfhood and worldliness. This brings to mind Arendt's trust in the human being's freedom to make a new beginning after the catastrophic events of her time. Clarissa after her face-to-face encounter managed to secure the plurality of perspectives and alterity of the other, which, emerging totalitarianism of modernity in the "no longer and not yet" times of the postwar era has destroyed. Woolf, with her character Clarissa, holds on to her hope in a post-catastrophic world, where the impoverished world noticed earlier on in the novel could be restored, provided that everybody be freely confronted with other opinions by respecting the alterity of the other and by establishing plurality in a shared world.

Conclusion

World Literature in *Critical* Times

I have argued that the crisis – manifesting itself with varying intensity and in different shapes – provides a ground of comparison and opens up a critical dimension to the notion of worldliness as it was brought into the works of Tanpınar, Darwish and Woolf. As I have demonstrated, rather than universalizing perspectives, the term "world," and by extension worldliness, addresses diverse but interrelated critical standpoints for each of these authors. With this new critical awareness provided by the notion of worldliness, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar invites the reader to consider the coexistence of mixed temporalities as opposed to the singular determining time of the progressive modernity; Darwish in his powerful text illustrates a textual resistance, which calls for alternative histories of the silenced; and in criticizing totalizing perspectives, Woolf's text invests in the possibility of a political common space that makes room for the other. Critical awareness of worldliness thus allows these authors not only to question their ties to borders (homeland, temporality, privacy), but also to move beyond these borders to open a space for the other.

The catastrophic experiences these authors have elaborated in their works, i.e. the Second World War for Tanpınar, the Lebanese War for Darwish, and the First World War for Woolf, act as narrative strategies tying these narratives together thematically, but they also equip them with cross-cultural perspectives by raising the question of responsibility for others beyond one's borders. Through these catastrophic experiences, the writers in this study not only represent the socio-cultural and historical paradigms of their own temporalities, but also manage to transform their local, national, singular, private experiences into narratives that should attest to the "shared

experience" of the horrors of the war.

In each of these narratives, catastrophe marks a turning point against which the characters must take a position, change their ways, and respond. The Second World War, for instance, is a call to relate to "the others" of Mümtaz's own culture, but also to the "world" itself, since Mümtaz believes that humanity is responsible for the whole universe. Worldliness in *Huzur* appears through the end of the novel when Tanpınar's main character reaches an awareness of the coexistence of other temporalities and experiences beyond his own. This new world is a heterogeneous entity that extends Mümtaz's historical present, including experience of the others that belong to his culture, and experience of those beyond the borders of his nation.

It may seem for Darwish that the siege of Beirut, as part of the Lebanon War, only affirms his "pariah" status, and makes him conscious of the fact that his exile is a never ending, perpetual condition. However, Darwish would develop resistance against such violence through a critical awareness and a contrapuntal perspective by approaching the issues of homeland, culture, and literature critically, and by *minorizing* the dominant language. The term worldliness, for Darwish, then, is a form of homelessness, and is rather a critical position that designates the relationship of the individual consciousness to the totality of the world, and that arranges the set of relationships within literature in the form of resistance. With such revolutionary potential, worldliness may also serve as a vantage point directing one to an understanding of Benjamin's "real state of exception," a phrase which expresses his hope of breaking the cyclical violence of hegemonic power. The critical awareness of worldliness that Darwish achieves in the end allows him to write an alternative history of the silenced, though in fragments and with a note of hopelessness.

For Woolf, the First World War marks a new era, a worldless space, where the characters

are expected to take a position against the totalitarian understanding of the progressive modernity. Clarissa Dalloway's encounter with the shell-shocked soldier Septimus Smith, and her neighbor, the old lady, calls for responsibility for others that she does not meet, so that worldlessness can be converted into a common world, to an instance of worldliness. I juxtaposed the totalitarian characteristics of progressive modernity that led Septimus into isolation, a world deprivation with Hannah Arendt's notions of worldliness and interrelated notions of plurality, freedom, action, natality, and politics.

If, in Arendt's view, a new beginning should take place in the public sphere so that interaction between people can take place, Clarissa's metaphorical rebirth in the final scene suggests a new beginning that creates a platform for a potential interaction with the other. While this belief in beginnings suggests a critical awareness in creating a common ground that secures plurality while preserving each character's distinctness, on a different level, it invests in the power of narrating a story, in literature itself, which invites the reader to move beyond her borders and critically engage with the text.

Edward Said in his *The World, the Text, and the Critic* invites the reader to engage in such a reading practice when reading world literature. In his historicist-materialist interpretation of world literature, he draws our attention to the textual worldliness, and argues that reading world literature demands a critical engagement with these texts so as to "grasp human experience and its written records in all their diversity and particularity" (335). This does not indicate the non-translatability of these works, but it demands situating texts in their given historical moment. Tanpınar's and Darwish's insistence on representing their historical present in a way that enables them to belong to their time and to other temporalities and be recognized as subjects and as history makers should be viewed as forms of resistance to the hegemonic language and literature,

but it also makes a plea for the importance of engaging in these texts critically to grasp their diversity and particularity. This perspective complies with Arendt's emphasis on making new beginnings. A critical act of reading of world literature then calls for adopting an "infinite responsibility" in recognizing the plurality and alterity of the other beyond our worlds.

This dissertation, therefore, has strived to demonstrate not only the critical perspectives adopted by these authors to move beyond the confines of their world and to highlight the importance of transnational reading practices that invest in a cross-cultural understanding. It invites the reader to a critical awareness of worldliness, which welcomes her with a new form of homelessness, equipping her with a critical posture. My examination thus informs a reading method for world literature not only "written for the world, literature that is relevant to the world and engaged with the world" as Puchner describes (3), but also contrapuntally, from a minority position, by taking consideration of all the relevant socio-historical, temporal, and political contexts.

This study also demonstrates that it is of vital importance to approach political worldliness as a critical posture in alignment with an interpretation of textual worldliness as destinies of life, narrative and politics converge in these texts. These authors wrote at a time when, as Djelal Kadir wrote in his essay "To World, To Globalize – Comparative Literature's Crossroads (2004), the notion of the "world" correlated and became "coeval ideologically with cultural and political thresholds at traumatic cusps of history" (5). Being on the traumatic cusps of history ourselves, this project invites the reader to reconsider those practices and forms of existences beyond one's world, and also to adopt critical reading and narrating acts that should welcome us with a sense of *homelessness*.

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